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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXVII • No. 1984 • July 4, 1977

X^ de^ yj^ di^tod

PRESIDENT CARTER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JUNE 13
Excei'pts From Trayiscript 1

A GUIDING PHILOSOPHY FOR AMERICAN INFORMATIONAL
AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS ABROAD

Address by John E. Reinhardt
Director, U.S. Information Agency 5

TOWARD INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM:
A STRATEGY FOR THE LONGER PULL

Address by Treasury Secretary Blumenthal 13

PRESIDENT SIGNS AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Remarks by President Carter, Text of Convention 28

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

«i;a;,

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■■J

Vol. LXXVII, No. 1984
July 4, 1977

The Department of State BLLLETIS\
a weekly publication issued by tht
Office of Media Serrices, Bureau ol\
Public Affairs, provides the public ana
interested agencies of the gorernment
with information on developments in
the field of I'.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department ant
the Foreign Service.

The BULLETiy includes selectee
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart'^
ment, and statements, addresses, anc
news conferences of the President ana
the Secretary of State and other offi-:
cers of the Department, as well as spe-\
cial articles on various phases of in-i
ternational affairs and the functions o/
the Department. Information is in-J
eluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
L'nited States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna-^
tional interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United .\ations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

President Carter's News Conference of June 13

Following are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of a news confer-
ence held by President Carter on June 13. ^

Q. Mr. President, are you now considering
unifying the direction of all the intelligence
agencies under a single individual and if so,
irhen might that come about?

The President: Shortly after I was in-
augurated President I asked the National Se-
curity Council to begin a study about the or-
ganizational structure of the intelligence
agencies. I have no predisposition about what
that decision might be. This study has been
going on now for more than four months, and
1 think a recommendation to me is imminent.

There obviously will be differences of opin-
ion. I would hope that these differences could
be ironed out among the State Department,
National Security Adviser, the present Direc-
tor of the CIA — the director of the intelli-
gence community, Stan Turner — and the Sec-
retary of Defense.

But those matters on which they still dis-
agree, when the recommendation comes to
me, I'll resolve them without hesitation. I
think that there is a need to protect the very
important aspect of a diversity of opinion in
making assessments of intelligence, the
proper collation of data to be presented to me
and other consumers. And I think it's impor-
tant that we move very strongly away from a
past procedure and let those who use the in-
telligence data give a direction to the intelli-
gence community about the relative priorities
that are important.

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated June 20, 1977, p.
875.

In the past the intelligence community itself
has set its own priorities. I think in the future
the Defense Department, State Department,
the President, and others ought to set the
priorities. But I don't have any predisposition
yet about the exact organizational structure.

One other comment is that I have met with
the congressional leaders about this subject.
My own hope is that if we can reach reason-
able agreement within the executive branch,
that we can work very closely with the Con-
gress in setting into law the charge to the in-
telligence community and the organizational
structure of the intelligence community.

So far this has been done by Executive or-
der. But I think that progress is good. There
are bound to be differences of opinion, and
strong differences of opinion. If they are not
resolved otherwise, I'll resolve them myself.

Q. Mr. President, you were attacked rather
savagely in the Soviet press last week as
"James Carter, an enemy of detente." From
your vantage point, do you feel there can be
any U.S. -Soviet detente without respect for
observance of human rights on their part?

The President: Well, obviously, the
differences that arise between us and the
Soviet Union are the things that are highly
publicized. I'm grateful to know that we are
beginning this week to work closely with the
Soviet Union on a comprehensive test ban
treaty to prohibit all testing of nuclear de-
vices underground or in the atmosphere.

They have suggested, along with us, that
Great Britain join this negotiation. That's a
step in the right direction.

Paul Warnke [Director, U.S. Arms Control

July 4, 1977

and Disarmament Agency and chairman of the
U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks] will begin to negotiate with the
Soviet Union within the next week on de-
militarization of the Indian Ocean, again, a
very major step forward if completed. There
are continuing discussions between ourselves
and the Soviet Union on details of the overall
SALT agreement. And, as I have announced
earlier, the Secretary of State and the Soviet
Foreign Minister will meet at least twice
more between now and the expiration date for
the present agreement.

So I think that in general we are moving in
the right direction. Our statements concern-
ing human rights, I think, have been well re-
ceived around the world. We have not singled
out the Soviet Union for criticism, and I have
never tried to inject myself into the internal
affairs of the Soviet Union. I have never made
the first comment that personally criticized
General Secretary Brezhnev.

But when we pursue aggressively and with
determination our commitment to the princi-
ple that human beings are to be well treated
by governments, that human freedom is one
of the highest aspirations and commitments of
our country, I think this is the right thing to
do. If it hits ourselves as self-criticism, so be
it. If it touches the Soviet Union and they
interpret it as intrusion, so be it. But we have
tried to make this a broad-based approach.

I think it's hard to assess the results of this
deep commitment, which I think is compatible
with the inclinations of the American people.
But I don't believe that there is a single
leader of a nation on Earth today who doesn't
have within his or her consciousness a concern
about human rights — how do we appear to our
own people, how do we appear to observers
from other nations? And as we approach very
quickly now the preparation for the Belgrade
conference to assess the Helsinki progress —
that will take place next October — I think
there's a general sense in the world we had
better get our own houses in order; we had
better make a good image available to the
outside world. And the scrutiny that's fo-
cused on this issue is constructive.

And I think that the Soviets' reaction

against me personally on the human rights
issue is a misplaced aim. I have no hatred for
the Soviet people, and I believe that the pres-
sure of world opinion might be making itself
felt on them and perhaps I am kind of a
scapegoat for that adverse reaction on their
part.

But I feel very deeply that we ought to pur-
sue aggressively this commitment and I have
no second thoughts or hesitation about it.

Q. Mr. President, U.N. Ambassador An-
drew Young continues to make headlines with
his cominents about racism.

The President: Yes. [Laughter.]

Q. Do you think his words have opened old
wounds at home and damaged our interests
abroad, or do you welcome this discussion on
the nature of raci.^m that he's touched off?

The President: I think the statements
that Andy Young has made are different from
what I would have said. The word "racism"
has different connotations to different
people, as does the phrase "human rights." I
think in almost every instance when Andy has
said something that was criticized, if someone
read the entire text — how he defined
racism — there is no criticism involved. But
when you extract the one word, it implies a
much heavier condemnation than Ambassador
Young meant. I read the transcript of his
comments about former Presidents Nixon and
Ford. He explained that when he used the
word "racism" as it applied to them, that it
was not a condemnation but it was an assess-
ment that they were not familiar with the
special problems of black people or minority
groups who did not have an opportunity to be
vivid in their own consciousness as former
Presidents.

I think that in general what Ambassador
Young is accomplishing for us in deahng with
Third World nations — those who are strug-
gling for recognition, those who are strug-
gling against oppressive hunger and disease
and poverty — is very good. They now look on
the United States as having at least one
representative — I hope more, but at least
one — who understands their problem, who

Department of State Bulletin

speaks their language, who will listen to them
when they put forward their woes and their
hopes for the future.

I think we have a new sense in the minds of
those kinds of people of caring about them and
to a major degree it's because of their trust in
Andy Young.

I'm disturbed that after he spent 17 days in
Africa, sometimes at some considerable
danger to his own self, that a remark about
Sweden was a major headline that derived
from that entire very fruitful visit on his part
to that continent.

Andy is concerned also. He pointed out to
me in a private meeting this past week that he
thought it was time for him to shift his em-
phasis more toward other developing nations
outside of Africa — in Asia, in this hemisphere,
and so forth. I agree with him on that. But in
general I think that Andy Young has been a
superb representative of our country. And I
think that his use of the word "racism" has
clouded the issue and has brought perhaps
undeserved criticism on himself.

Q. Mr. President, on Saturday you spoke
about aggressively, peacefully challenging the
Russians in their own spheres. Could you
please elaborate on those remarks and ex-
plain how this differs, for example, from the
cold war, which in some cases led to hot war,
as in Korea and Vietnam?

The President: Yes. The comment that I
made was — with an emphasis on peaceful
competition — was to win the friendship of na-
tions that in the past have not been close to us
who may have been heavily influenced by or
very closely friendly with the Soviet Union
and who may still be.

I think this is a normal and a proper hope
for our country. We don't want to be in a posi-
tion that once a country is not friefidly to us
and once they are completely within the influ-
ence of the Soviet Union, they should forever
be in that status.

And as I have already indicated and named
several countries — Somalia, Ethiopia, Iraq,
even more controversial nations Hke Vietnam,
Cuba — I want to move as best I can to re-

establish normal, friendly relationships with
those countries.

In some instances the obstacles are quite
severe, as in the case of Cuba and perhaps
Vietnam, but I think this is what our govern-
ment ought to do, and I would like to have a
situation when I go out of office that all the
nations in the world have diplomatic relation-
ships with us.

We now have 14 who don't. I've been pursu-
ing this aggressively — to use the word that
you described — and also I think that I am
completely in harmony with the Secretary of
State and others who work with me on this
pursuit.

Q. Mr. President, to follow up on your re-
marks about human rights, Mrs. Anatoly
Scharansky, the wife of a Soviet dissident who
is under arrest, is visiting in the United
States and yesterday she expressed interest in
seeing you to ask you to iyitervene in this
case. I'd like to ask, do you think that this
sort of thing can be useful, and do you plan to
see her?

The President: I don't have any plans
to meet Mrs. Scharansky, but I have inquired
deeply within the State Department and
within the CIA as to whether or not Mr.
Scharansky has ever had any known relation-
ship in a subversive way or otherwise with
the CIA. The answer is no. We have double-
checked this and I have been hesitant to make
that public announcement, but now I am com-
pletely convinced that contrary to the allega-
tions that have been reported in the press,
that Mr. Scharansky has never had any sort of
relationship to our knowledge with the CIA.

Q. Mr. President, in the context of your
campaign you said a number of times that the
B-1 was an exotic weapon which should not be
built. Now you've given two sets of Con-
gressmen who met with you last ireek the im-
pression that even though this is the most ex-
pensive plane that ever would have been built,
that you are about to go ahead.

Can you comment as to whether you have
made a decision; and whether you have or
not, what leads you to reconsider? What fac-

July 4, 1977

tors make you rethink this compared to ivhat
you said in the campaign?

The President: Well, I have not made
a decision about what I will do concerning the
B-1 bomber. As you know, the Congress late
in 1976, in effect, put the B-1 bomber con-
struction in a dormant stage and permitted
the expenditure of a certain amount of money
per month to build a few B-1 bombers to keep
the program alive.

I'll make a decision before the end of this
month. I have received a great deal of con-
flicting advice from those who work closely
with me and was eager to meet with one
group of Members of Congress who were
against the B-1 bomber to hear their argu-
ments and then later met with a group who
were for the B-1 bomber— I think the other
way around. But both groups presented their
views very strongly and very effectively to
me.

I think now is the time for me to perhaps on
my own and perhaps in a lonely way to make a
final judgment.

There are major factors involved — the
status of our relationship with the Soviet
Union in the SALT talks, the quahty that we
have seen in the latest test of the B-1 bomber,
its radar cross-section and the effectiveness of
present and future electronic counter meas-
ures, the effectiveness of substitutes for
it — the cruise missile being one of those — and
in the overall context of our tactical and
strategic needs I'll make a judgment before
the end of this month.

[After the news conference President Carter an-
swei'ed que.-stions from members of the pi'ess on an in-
foi'mal basis. Following are excerpts from the
transcript.]

Q. Mr. P resident, you seem to have
changed your views sovfiewhat since the cam-
paign about the B-1. Is that accurate?

The President: I don't think that you
could detect what my view might be. I'll make
that decision this month.

Q. You no longer seem to view it as an ex-
otic weapon that shouldn't have been built.
Even though you haven't made your final de-
cision, what you said today seems to be in

somewhat of a different context than the cam-
paign. You seem to think it's a very serious
question one way or the other and that —
there's a different tone to it. Am I wrong?

The President: Well, during the cam-
paign, many of the observers of my effort said
I was so fuzzy on the issue that they couldn't
understand what I was saying. Since I have
become President, people have an almost
exact capability of discerning what I said dur-
ing the campaign. It's hard to correlate the
two.

But one of the things that I was concerned
about during the campaign was that in spite of
the fact that the tests on the B-1 bomber were
not supposed to be completed until last
November, early in the spring, President
Ford came out in favor of a construction pro-
gram. I haven't decided yet what to do. But
when I make a judgment, I think you would
agree with me that I made the best judgment
within my ability.

Q. Could you tell us how you could con-
sider giving Cuba diplomatic recognition —

The President: We have not recognized
Cuba.

Q. — arui how you'd consider this, though, as
a future action until Castro releases some of
these thousands of people that he's holding as
political prisoners and until he withdraws
some of his troops from Africa?

The President: Those are two of the
items that I have said would be of deep con-
cern to me before we could normalize rela-
tionships with Cuba. The consultation with
Cuba, the exchange of ideas with Cuba, the
working out of a fisheries agreement or a
maritime agreement or hopefully an anti-
hijacking agreement — those kind of things I
think are perfectly legitimate. But there is no
immediate prospect for diplomatic recognition
and exchange of Ambassadors with Cuba.

Q. Would you insist that he bring his troops
home from Africa?

The President: That is one of my
expectations.

Department of State Bulletin

A Guiding Philosophy for American Informational
and Cultural Programs Abroad

Address by John E. Reinhardt
Director, U.S. Information Agency ^

Today's commencement is a celebration of
what you have achieved and the possibilities
of your future in America and in the world. I
am not flattering you when I say that this day
at Knoxville College represents the best of
what our country means to me and to many
others.

What our view is of ourselves as Americans
and the meaning of America to the world is
what I should like to address today. I will do
so in Socratic fashion, through questions. I
have three:

— What does America mean to itself and to
the world?

— Why is the world mindful of us?

— And, finally, how do we best communi-
cate what we know of ourselves and our hopes
for the world?

To the first question — what does America
mean to itself and to the world?

At its best — at its very heart — America is
an idea, or a collection of ideas. You may at
times have heard the criticism that our rever-
ence of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
is metaphysically centered on the documents
themselves. That is, I suggest, a misreading
of history and fact.

It is the idea and the ideals of America that
command our loyalties and infuse our image of
ourselves and our practices. The Constitution
and the Bill of Rights, the Federalist Papers,
the amply recorded history of our early days

' Made at the commencement exercises of Knoxville
College at Knoxville, Tenn., on May 28, 1977.

attest to the fact that what had been brought
to this continent was not a new idea of repre-
sentative government. The concept of self-
government had deep roots in much of
Europe, and Britain was the mother of
parliaments.

What was new and central was the procla-
mation of the American Constitution, not on
behalf of a divinity or a divinely appointed
king but rather, and for the first time, in the
name of "We, the People." It is in these words
that the American concept found its unique-
ness. It is these words that are at the core of
an American vision. It is from these words
that flow our legal, social, and political princi-
ples and practices. It is from these words that
we derive our extraordinary cultural vitality,
the lifting force of our ideas, the progressive
yeast of our society.

I would impose on you in an important way
should I suggest that we have never violated
our idea of ourselves. We can point to fixed
times and fixed circumstances in our history
when we faltered. In our most recent past,
there was Watergate and there was Vietnam.

But none of these aberrations, I assert,
could finally stand up to the force of "We, the
People." That force could be warped tem-
porarily; it would not, in the longer run, yield.

We have, in fact, brought ourselves through
these aberrations to today. We are able again
to state that the American historical experi-
ence remains relevant to our lives. Once again
we can attest to the validity of our view that
man is individual, clothed in dignity and at the
very center of the purposes of government.

July 4, 1977

And once again, our institutions were tested
and have proved to be resilient and respon-
sive. We are, many of us, dreaming again.

I iiave commented briefly on the tiines we
have faltered. But I should like to comment,
again briefly, on what I regard as an extraor-
dinarily revealing phenomenon. Perhaps you
have noted it: However shrill the world's ac-
cusations against us, however anguished the
foreign note-taking of our failings, the stand-
ards used by others — in other lands — to judge
us are our own. I know of no other country of
which this is true. That fact, I suggest, af-
firms the power of our view of man.

Opportunities of Communications Technology

To my second question then — why is the
world mindful of us?

Our ties to the world are unique. We are
not, in the traditional sense, one people; we
are many. We are not one culture; we are
several. The mystique of the melting pot does
not define the American experience.

Perhaps you recall what President Carter
said at Notre Dame on May 22:

In ancestry, religion, color, place of origin, and cul-
tural background, we Americans are as diverse'a nation
as the world has ever seen. No common mystique of
blood or soil unites us. What draws us together,
perhaps nioi'e than anything else, is a belief in human
freedom.^

This, it seems to me, explains — at least in
part — why what we have tried to do at home
has had such profound meaning for so many
other nations and people — people to whom our
common past continues to bind us — in Asia, in
Africa, in Europe, in Latin America.

We are they. Many of them would be us.
More of them would hope to hear the rever-
berations of our view of man in their
societies. But something more must be said.

We cannot escape the fact that our great
vitality — political and economic, cultural and
military, intellectual and attitudinal — in and
of itself commands international attention.
Whether we will it or not, it is as much a fact
as the attraction of the American ideal.

We cannot act without being seen; we can-

621.

For the full text, see BULLETIN of June Vo, 1977, p.

not speak without being heard. We are seen;
we are heard. Certainly the palpable interna-
tional response to our view of human
dignity — of human rights — is evidence of both
the power and attraction of our aspirations.

In all of this, I suggest, one discerns the
trails which have led us all to this moment, a
special condition in the world which gives rise
to a unique, perhaps historic, opportunity.

It is in part the fact that we have come
through that recent domestic testing intact,
even revitalized. It is in part the fact that the
world is a quieter place these days. The dec-
ibel count is down. Stridency has subsided.
The general climate — marred, it is true, by
local thunderstorms — has undergone a subtle
change.

There is a disposition to listen — an expect-
ancy, a hope for rational discourse, a recogni-
tion of the international character of many of
our problems.

There is an acknowledgment of the need for
dialogue. There is hope in the fact that the
United States is once again ready to join in
efforts, as President Carter said last week,
"to inspire, to persuade, and to lead."

There is, in short, a new opportunity at
home and abroad. If we harness to that oppor-
tunity the wisest use of what is a communica-
tions revolution, then more of the promise can
be fulfilled. That revolution in communica-
tions technology has, as never before in his-
tory, tied the world together. We interrelate
more rapidly, more comprehensively, than
ever before. And none of us will escape the
consequences of that revolution.

You, for example, will know of events that
affect your lives and your security almost in-
stantaneously. You will have access to knowl-
edge and background to enable you to under-
stand and interpret those events. Each one of
you will be increasingly a citizen of the world
called upon to speak and act just as, in your
role as citizen of community or State, you
must speak and act or there can be no such
thing as democracy, no such heroic figure as a
free man.

There is a requirement to communicate, one
which engages me professionally just as it en-
gages you personally.

Department of State Bulletin

But the technology of communications car-
lies with it a danger and a problem. The
danger is that like all technologies, it is
neutral — awaiting its utilization for better or
worse. The problem, it seems to me, is in-
herent in the extraordinary volume and speed
of communications which can now be gener-
ated.

In a very real sense, we live in a world of
instant images. We are flooded by them. We
see, but too often what we see is out of con-
text. We read about or instantaneously view-
events, but they are often without perspec-
tive. They are instead the "happenings," not
what preceded them nor what is likely to
follow.

In Knoxville, I would assume, you are ac-
customed to seeing Belgians and Japanese and
Nigerians. There will be an occasional foreign
movie; a newspaper headline about the Middle
East; the story on the evening news about
Brazil. There may be a Kabuki play from Ja-
pan; there is certainly access in your libraries
to every foreign culture.

And yet how much time, how much thought
can we give to any single event; how much can
we immerse ourselves individually in any
given international issue? Our schools, our
families, our daily commitments and respon-
sibilities, our jobs, our own personal en-
thusiasms all have claim to the larger part of
our day and the larger part of our lives. We
cannot pretend that most of the images from
around the world are more than images of the
moment, no matter how they may come to-
gether over longer periods of time.

We are not alone. We share this overload of
"instant image" with the entire world. If we
are baffled by what we see or unclear about
the meaning of what we see or simply
staggered by the quantity of what we see, we
are not alone.

You see the paradox. There is this moment
when the world more than ever seeks
dialogue. There is a technology which permits
it on a scale as vast as the technology is
dramatic. And yet we are, for the most part,
drowning in the bits and pieces that are the
instant images.

America's Public Diplomacy

To recall my third question — how then do
we best communicate what we know of our-
selves and our hopes for the world? What can
your society do to organize on your behalf a
rational process of international communica-
tions?

There is a basis in our history and institu-
tions for a process of international communi-
cations. The libertarian theory of the press,
for example, was written into the Bill of
Rights to guarantee a free marketplace of
ideas and information. We have spoken since
1776 of "facts to a candid world" and of "a de-
cent respect for the opinion of mankind."
Clearly, our society today must be in the in-
ternational marketplace with the same vigor
and candor and a decent respect.

Since I turn now to how our society can or-
ganize this effort, I shall speak again of "pub-
lic diplomacy," meaning those efforts through
which your government enters the interna-
tional market of ideas. I should like to put be-
fore you a series of principles and purposes
which I think should govern such efforts.

First, we must undertake these efforts in a
manner consistent with the ethics, ideals, and
principles to which we ourselves aspire. We
cannot be — we must not be — manipulative. To
be so would, as it sometimes has in our past,
prove corrosive of ourselves.

Second, in all that we project to the world
we must reflect the fact that our words and
actions are shaped by our view of ourselves —
that is to say, shaped by the American ideal.
It is the best way to bring clarity and coher-
ence to the many and bewildering images
others have of us. The American ideal forms a
recognizable basis for the context of our
actions.

Third, a decent respect for the opinion of
mankind, today as in 1776, requires that we
present our views and policies and aspirations
forthrightly to the world. Not combatively,
but forthrightly. Our interests require that
others know where we stand. And our great
presence in the world leads others, quite
spontaneously and in their own interests, to
want to know.

July 4, 1977

Fourth, we should do what we can to en-
courage those individuals and institutions,
those coalitions and "networks" — here and
abroad — which are also engaged in the free
flow and exchange of ideas and experiences.
It is not the function of public diplomacy to
compete; rather, to enhance and supplement
existing efforts. They should be allowed the
dignity of independence. But we can clearly
help forge the institutional links — and the ex-
changes between them — that will contribute
not only to the civility and the breadth of our
mutual perceptions but to the common solu-
tions of common problems.

Fifth, we must reach beyond ruling elites
and seek out those who are the future con-
tributors to thought and culture and lead-
ership in their countries. Power is always
transitory; sometimes it is oppressive. In any
event, inherent in the nature of the communi-
cations process I am describing is the future
as well as the present.

Finally, we must insist upon, we must in-
sure, a dialogue. In so doing we strike a bal-
ance between our own most fundamental be-
liefs and needs and recognition of the needs,
perceptions, and circumstances of others. We
have been so greatly enriched by the gather-
ing in of others— of European and Asian,
African and Hispanic, Einstein and Dorati,
apprentice and artist — that we are in fact our-
selves a dialogue. We know it works. We
know the power of listening. We should ex-
tend its realm.

From all of this, it should be eminently
clear that propaganda has no place in our
scheme of things, that there is nothing within
us that enables us to be propagandists.

There is nothing in our history, nothing in
our view of ourselves, no tradition, no value
system that will permit it. To be propagan-
dists, we would necessarily violate that which
we most believe about ourselves.

If, instead, all our efforts are permeated by
absolute fidelity to the American idea, then
we will have joined the power of communica-
tion with the historic possibilities of the world
as it is. We will have undertaken as well as we
can, what must be done — to enter the open

marketplace of ideas with the truth as best we
can perceive it.

As Milton wrote in the Areopagitica: "Who
ever knew Truth put to the worse in a fr^e
and open encounter."

Your experiences here, which culminate in
this moment of commencing, will have
touched you with the power of ideas and re-
confirmed the value of truth. I hope you share
with me an attachment to the idea of America,
a commitment to Libertaiian principles, an af-
fection for our cultural vitality. I hope some of
you will join in the noble effort to communi-
cate to others, at home and abroad, a sense of
what could be, if enough care to make it so.

U.S. Reestablishes Relations
With the Congo

Department Announcement ^

An American delegation, led by the Assist-
ant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
William E. Schaufele, Jr., and a Congolese
delegation, led by Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Cooperation Theophile Obenga, met in
Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany, on June
6, 1977. As a result of this meeting, the Gov-
ernments of the United States of America and
the People's Republic of the Congo have
agreed to end the suspension of their diplomatic
relations as of June 7, 1977, and to reopen
their embassies in Brazzaville and Washing-
ton.

The two governments express their hope
that this step will strengthen relations be-
tween their countries and contribute substan-
tially to bettering their mutual understanding
and cooperation based on the principles of re-
ciprocal respect, sovereign equality, and
noninterference in internal affairs. In this
connection, the two governments reaffirm
their adherence to the principles of interna-
tional law, and, in particular, to the provi-
sions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations.

' Read to news coi-respondents on June 15, 1977, by
John H. Tiattner, Deputy Spokesman.

Department of State Bulletin

President Carter Discusses Cuba
and SALT Negotiations

Following are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of remarks with
reporters by President Carter at the
Brnnswick Airport (Ga.) on May 30. '

Q. Mr. President, what are you going to
tell about the Cuban policy?

The President: I think it's obvious that we
want to have good relations with Cuba. We
haven't had any firm indication yet that
Castro wants to normalize relations with us.
But I think we will have indications in the
next few weeks of strengthened diplomatic
relations with Cuba, far short of recogni-
tion.

Q. Despite their sending military advisers
to Ethiopia? Does that bother you at all?

The President: Well, obviously, it would
be better for the peace of Africa if other na-
tions would not send troops and military
forces into Africa.

Cuba still has almost 15,000 troops in An-
gola. They have recently sent about 50 mili-
tary advisers into Ethiopia. And they have,
in addition to that, people in Mozambique
and 8 or 10 other countries, sometimes just
three or four, sometimes a larger number.

We would like very much for Cuba to re-
frain from this intrusion into African affairs
in a military way. Obviously this is one of
the problems that Cuba creates.

Another major concern of ours is the large
number of political prisoners in Cuba,
between 15,000 and 20,000. We see, though,
that it would be better for our hemisphere if
Cuba did have good relations with the other
nations here. And this is something that we
hope to see in the future.

Q. What do you mean by this "in a few
iveeks"? What's going to happen?

The President: Well, we don't know for
sure, but I think we've demonstrated an

' ¥ov the complete transcript, see Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents dated -June 6,
1977, p. 8.33.

ability to work with Cuba on the fisheries
agreement and also on the maritime agree-
ment. We have some hopes that there will
be other similar kinds of small steps toward
an increased ability to communicate and to
discuss mutual concerns. It would be a mis-
take to be too optimistic about it.

Q. Mr. President, how long will it be, do
you think, before the trade embargo finally
comes to an end?

The President: I don't have any way to
know.

Q. How do you account for the difference
in view between your optimism and
Brezhnev's pessimism on SALT?

The President: Well, I think I've already
discussed this adequately. It's the same dif-
ference that existed between Gromyko and
Vance, both describing the same circum-
stances.

I think compared to what the Soviets indi-
cated in Moscow, it was a great step
forward. We felt, for a change, that they
genuinely wanted to have discussions lead-
ing to an agreement. And they didn't exhibit
this inclination when we sent Cy Vance to
Moscow.

So, in that way it was an improvement.
But it again would be a mistake to underes-
timate the great differences that exist
between us.

The main thing they have that concerns us
is the increasing reliance on very large
missiles with multiple warheads. And the
thing that we have that concerns them ob-
viously is the capability to deploy large
numbers of cruise missiles at an early date.

We hope to — we'll be very persistent
about it without being in a hurry. I don't
feel constrained every time we have a meet-
ing with the Soviets to sign some kind of an
agreement just to be signing something. But
they know very clearly, I think, our own po-
sition now and we know their position much
more clearly than we did before the Geneva
meeting.

My goals have not changed and won't
change. We want to do everything we can to

July 4, 1977

reduce dependence on atomic weapons. We'll
be trying to induce the Soviets to join with
us in this purpose.

Q. Do you still have hopes of meeting
Brezhnev in late September?

The President: Well, we have never put a
date. I think that we certainly would keep
that hope alive when we see how Gromyko
and Vance get along at their next meeting.
So, I think we might make a decision on a
possible meeting with me and Mr. Brezhnev.
But that's not sure yet.

Q. At the next meeting?

The President: It's hard to say.

President Signs Latin America
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

Remarks by President Carter ^

I am very pleased this afternoon to
pai'ticipate in what I believe is a historical
occasion. This is a ratification by the United
States of Protocol I of the Tlatelolco treaty,
the deliberations for which were begun in
November of 1964 following the Cuban mis-
sile crisis, when Brazil and 10 other Latin
American countries, through the U.N. aus-
pices, began to evolve a commitment against
the deployment or use of atomic weapons in
the Latin American part of this hemisphere.

In 1971 our own country ratified Protocol
II with the distinguished representative of
our government, Senator Hubert Hum-
phrey, having signed that on behalf of the
United States.

The ultimate hope of this commitment by
all the nations involved is a complete pro-
hibition against the ownership or deploy-
ment or use of nuclear weapons in the

southern part of this hemisphere and
complete international safeguards for all nu-
clear materials that are owned by all those
countries.

So far only two countries have not signed
[ratified] this treaty. One is Argentina and
the other one is Cuba. France has not yet
signed Protocol I, which we are signing this
afternoon, and the Soviet Union has not
signed Protocol II.

This is a commitment of worldwide signifi-
cance. As I said in my own Inaugural Ad-
dress, our ultimate hope is that we can
eliminate completely from the Earth any de-
pendence upon atomic weapons, and I think
it is significant and typical of our Latin
American neighbors and those countries in
the Caribbean that 10 years before that time
they had already made this worthy commit-
ment which sets an example for the world.

So, at this time I would like to, on behalf
of the American people, sign Protocol I of
the Tlatelolco treaty, which means that we
will not deploy nuclear weapons in the
Caribbean or in the Central or Southern
American Continents.

U.S. and Mexico Complete Transfer
of Territory

Department Announcement *

Secretary Vance and Foreign Secretary
Santiago Roel Garcia approved on May 26 the
report of the International Boundary and
Water Commission, Minute No. 257, of com-
pletion of three relocations of the Rio Grande
under Article I of the U.S. -Mexican boundary
treaty of November 23, 1970.2 gy virtue of
their approval, jurisdiction over some 2,340
acres has been transferred between the two
countries, and for the first time since soon

' Made on May 26 upon signing Protocol I of the
Treaty foi- the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America (last paragraphs omitted); text from the
Weekly Compilation of Pi'esidential Documents dated
May 30, 1977, p. 823.

' Text from press release 232 dated May 26, 1977
^ For the text of the agreement to conclude a treaty
to resolve boundary problems, see BULLETIN of Sept.
14, 1970, p. 296; for text of the Department announce-
ment on the signing of the treaty, .see Bulletin of Dec.
21, 1970, p. 765.

Department of State Bulletin

LOCATION OF MEXICO-U.S. TERRITORIAL TRANSFERS

HIDALGO-REYNOSA AREA

2681 6-77 STATE(RGE)

July 4, 1977

after the U.S. -Mexico boundary .survey of
1853, the Rio Grande marks the undisputed
international boundary at all points on its en-
tire international reach from El Paso, Texas,
to the Gulf of Mexico.

In the boundary treaty of 1970, the two
governments resolved all pending boundary
differences and agreed to restore the Rio
Grande as the international boundary in the
reaches where that character had been lost.
The pending boundary problems included: (1)
The problem created by two tracts under U.S.
sovereignty but located on the Mexican side of
the Rio Grande — the Horcon tract opposite
Mercedes, Texas, and Beaver Island near
Roma, Texas; (2) A major territorial dispute
outstanding since 1907 over a part of the lands
in the Presidio-Ojinaga; and (3) The question
of sovereignty over 319 islands and former is-
lands created and moved by the Rio Grande.

The two governments agreed in the 1970
treaty to relocate the river channel in three
areas so as to place north of the river all terri-
tory to belong to the United States and south
of the river all territory to belong to Mexico.
Transfer of jurisdiction over this territory
was to occur when the two governments had
expressed approval of the Commission's re-
port confirming that it had completed the re-
locations. It is that approval that was given
on May 26.

The Government of Mexico transfers to the
United States 481.68 acres of land about 4.5
miles upstream from Hidalgo, Texas —
Reynosa, Tamaulipas — in exchange for
sovereignty transferred to Mexico over the
Horcon tract and Beaver Island located south of
the Rio Grande and having a combined area of
481.68 acres, thus resolving the problem of Hor-
con tract and of Beaver Island and restoring
the Rio Grande as the international boundary
in that area. The lands thus received by the
United States will be turned over to the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the
Interior, for development as a part of the Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge System.

The Government of the United States
transfers to Mexico 1,606.19 acres upstream
from Presidio-Ojinaga, in settlement of
Mexico's claim to some 2,200 acres in that

area, which had been cut from its territory by
river movements after 1852, when the river
moved from the north side to the south side of
the valley.

The Government of Mexico transfers to the
United States 252 acres of land downstream
from Presidio-Ojinaga in compensation for
Mexico's having received under the treaty a
somewhat greater number and acreage of the
islands and former islands in the Rio Grande.

In accordance with the 1970 boundary
treaty, the cost of the changes in the location
of the channel of the Rio Grande was divided
equally between the two governments.

As a separate project, but concurrently with
the river relocation in the Presidio-Ojinaga
Valley, each government has constructed
levee protection works for the lands on its
side of the valley under an internationally
coordinated project to control future river
floods in the area.

United States and Cuba Agree
To Open Interests Sections

Department Announcetnent ^

The Governments of the Republic of Cuba
and the United States of America exchanged
notes in New York City on May 30 agreeing to
the simultaneous opening of a U.S. Interests
Section in the Embassy of Switzerland in
Havana and a Cuban Interests Section in the
Embassy of Czechoslovakia in Washington.

This agreement will facilitate communica-
tions between the two governments and will
provide a greater range of consular services
for the citizens of the two countries than are
currently available. This step has the ap-
proval of the Governments of Switzerland and
Czechoslovakia.

The notes were exchanged by Dr. Pelegrin
Torras, Vice Minister of External Affairs, for
Cuba and Mr. William H. Luers, Acting As-
sistant Secretary of State, for the United
States.

' Text from press release 256 dated June 3, 1977 (also
announced in Havana).

Department of State Bulletin

Toward International Equilibrium: A Strategy for the Longer Pull

Following is an address by Secretary of
the Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal made
at Tokyo, Japan, on May 25 before the an-
nual meeting of the International Monetary
Conference.

Department oi' the Ti'easury press release dated May 24

As we come to the closing session of this
International Monetary Conference, I can
well understand how your meetings have
become an annual highlight for the world fi-
nancial community. For me it has been a
valuable opportunity to share thoughts on
current international problems with this
informed assembly. I am particularly hon-
ored that you have invited me to offer some
ideas on how I think we should deal with
these issues.

One encounters these days a good many
uncertainties, doubts, even fears about our
international financial prospects, and about
our collective ability to resolve successfully
the formidable difficulties that appear to lie
ahead.

Central to these doubts is an apprehension
over the capacity of our monetary system to
finance, for an extended period, the world's
future oil requirements. Can our system
continue to handle successfully the financial
consequences of massive OPEC [Orga-
nization of Petroleum Exporting Countries]
surpluses, surpluses which cumulated to
about $150 million during 1974 through 1976,
and which may amount to $45 billion this
year and continue to be substantial for a good
many years?

Is the international commercial banking
system becoming dangerously exposed as a
result of the recent sharp expansion in bal-
ance-of-payments lending? Are debt burdens
becoming unbearable? Can we be sure that
official lending resources will be adequate to

the need? Are nations in danger of drifting
into protectionism, losing confidence in their
ability to correct maladjustments promptly
by more acceptable means?

We are right to acknowledge these doubts
and to face them squarely. Nevertheless,
the Administration has full confidence that
the international community, working
together, can and will assure a stable finan-
cial environment and a smoothly functioning
international payments system. I can assure
you that the United States will do its part.

To begin with, we must acknowledge that
large OPEC surpluses are not, as some
thought, a short-term problem. They will
exist for an extended period, and we must
develop a strategy for the longer pull.

Such a strategy must have three facets.
First, we must assure that our national gov-
ernments follow the right policies. Second,
we must assure that our international in-
stitutions have both the resources and the
authority to fulfill their important respon-
sibilities. Third, we must assure that our
private financial markets are in a position to
carry out their essential intermediary role
safely and effectively.

I would like today to examine with you
what must and can be done in terms of each
of these three groups: governments, inter-
national organizations, and private financial
markets.

Responsibilities of Governments

Governments' policies are of key impor-
tance. There are several imperatives. For
one thing, each nation must pursue a sound
energy policy. There can be no permanent
solution to the problem of OPEC financial
surpluses until oil-importing nations adopt
more effective programs for conserving the

July 4, 1977

use of oil and developing alternative
supplies.

The United States has had no comprehen-
sive energy policy. Our fuel import bill has
grown explosively — from $5 billion in 1972
to $37 billion last year. This year, it may
reach $43 billion. Without corrective action,
our oil imports would rise from less than 8
million barrels per day last year to 12-to-16
million barrels per day in 1985. The Presi-
dent has now put forth a national energy
plan designed to reduce those imports to 6
million barrels per day by 1985. This reduc-
tion, supplemented by appropriate policies
in other major nations, will materially assist
in achieving a desirable world energy bal-
ance. OPEC, meanwhile, must recognize
that a healthy world economy is in its own
longrun interest and must display
responsible restraint on its pricing policy.

Sound energy policies will reduce the col-
lective current account deficit of the non-
OPEC states. A second imperative,
however, is that governments collaborate to
assui-e that the deficits which remain are
distributed among countries in a pattern
compatible with their ability to attract
capital on a continuing basis. The present
pattern does not achieve that balance. Sub-
stantial redistribution is required. That re-
quires basic macroeconomic policies and
exchange rates for each nation appropriate
to its own situation.

Countries in a weaker position, with
major deficits, must pursue stabilization
policies which will provide a basis for sus-
tained domestic growth while reducing in-
flationary pressures and expectations. A
number of countries have adopted such
policies. Several others should.

Countries that are in current account
surplus or that can readily attract capital
must follow policies designed to insure
maximum sustainable domestic growth con-
sistent with a gradual reduction of inflation.

These policies, of course, must focus on
domestic market demand rather than on
export-led growth which further adds to
current account surpluses. The United
States is following such a policy. Similarly,
Germany and Japan have adopted

expansionary growth targets for 1977, and
we are all committed to adopt further
policies if needed to achieve stated targets
and to contribute to the adjustment of
payments imbalances.

Flexibility in exchange rates is essential
for both surplus and deficit countries. The
United States, Germany, and Japan have
made clear that they will not resist market
pressures for appreciation. Countries which
need to strengthen their competitive posi-
tions to reduce their deficits must be equally
ready to accept depreciation.

Most importantly, all major countries are
committed to reject protectionism and to
pursue opportunities for expanding trade.
Stronger countries should also increase their
development aid. Finally, each nation, in-
dustrial as well as developing, should adopt
policies to expand domestic investment. If
borrowed funds are used for investment that
expands productive capacity, the ability to
service debt will grow as the debt increases.

The steps that have been taken are, in
general, correct steps. Whether they are
sufficient in all cases remains to be seen.

The current account position of the United
States has already shifted dramatically,
from a surplus of $11 billion in the recession
year 1975 to a deficit this year of perhaps
*$10-to-$12 billion. That shift is making a
major contribution to the stability of the
international monetary system.

We accept that shift. We can sustain it,
although we would not expect the deficit to
continue at this level indefinitely. We
i-eceive substantial inflows of capital from
OPEC and elsewhere and our overall posi-
tion remains satisfyingly strong. The dollar
exchange rate has not declined, despite the
very large current account deficit.

What is now required is a similar shift in
the position of surplus countries such as Ja-
pan, Germany, Switzerland, and the
Netherlands.

*
Contribution of International Institutions

An important part of our strategy de-
pends on the activities of international
institutions — most importantly, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. The United States

Department of State Bulletin

supports the view that the IMF's financing-
capability and its responsibilities for
overseeing the monetary system must be
strengthened. We believe that the Fund's
role in preserving a sound international en-
vironment will be of great importance in the
years ahead.

As a temporary arrangement, the Manag-
ing Director [H. Johannes Witteveen, of the
Netherlands] has proposed that lines of
credit be negotiated. These would be avail-
able as needed to provide additional condi-
tional financing for particular countries
whose needs are very large relative to
quotas. The IMF's Interim Committee re-
cently recognized the need for such a
supplementary credit arrangement, and the
seven nations at the [London] summit have
endorsed that concept. Exploratory talks
are in progress.

For the United States, I have told Mr.
Witteveen that I would strongly favor U.S.
participation, provided a well-designed plan
can be agreed, with an appropriate balance
between credits for OPEC countries and the
industrial world. I am confident that
Congress would also support such a plan.

After work is completed on the establish-
ment of this supplementary credit, we must
turn our full attention to a more permanent
reinforcement of the IMF's conditional lend-
ing resources through another increase in
IMF quotas.

An equally important task for the IMF is
to determine in individual cases the form
and degree of policy conditionality to go
along with the financing. The IMF must
work out specific adjustment programs and
corrective measures to be adopted by par-
ticular borrowing countries. Conditionality
must be applied in an appropriate
manner — neither too harsh nor too soft,
enough to assure adequate adjustment but
no more.

Mr. Witteveen's proposal explicitly recog-
nizes the implications of the present
situation for the pace of adjustment in call-
ing for programs spanning a period longer
than the one year involved in traditional
standby arrangements. The IMF's past
record in negotiating programs of adjust-

ment is an excellent one, and I am confident
that the organization will continue to per-
form this duty with equity, objectivity, and
good sense.

Quite apart from its financing activities,
the IMF will take up, under the amended
IMF articles, a major responsibility for
surveillance of member countries' exchange
rate policies. The Fund is approaching this
task, wisely in my view, in a careful and
cautious way, avoiding grandiose theoretical
concepts. It is not trying to delineate de-
tailed or rigid principles, but rather seeking
to develop, on a case-by-case basis, a body
of common law based on experience. We
must all support and encourage the Fund in
the development of this important tool for
assuring that no nation will manipulate its
exchange rate to prevent payments
adjustment or to gain unfair competitive ad-
vantage over its partners.

Responsibilities of the Private Markets

The role of private capital has been enor-
mously increased by the OPEC surpluses.
Since OPEC's geographic placement of its
surplus funds does not correspond to the
distribution of current account deficits,
intermediation is required. Over the past
three years, about three-quarters of the
deficits have been financed through the
world's money and capital markets.

Concern has been expressed that the pri-
vate market will not be able to continue this
intermediation because of decline in the
creditworthiness of borrowers and, in some
cases, limits imposed by the banks' own cap-
ital. Although some banks are in fact ap-
proaching their legal limits on loans to a few-
governments, it does not appear likely that
this limitation will present a major problem
in the continued growth of aggregate bank
loans either to foreign corporate customers
or to foreign governments.

This issue is frequently posed as an "LDC
[less developed country] debt problem."
This is a misconception. The pressures on
the private markets arise from the
difficulties of a very few countries, many of
which are not normally regarded as LDC's.
For some developing countries, financing

July 4, 1977

continues to be largely a question of the
level of available funds from foreign assist-
ance sources. For the rest of the world —
developing, developed, and middle-income
countries — there is no alternative to a
continued central and predominant role for
the private capital markets.

— Only the private markets have the re-
sources, expertise, and institutions in place
to handle the large-scale, highly complex in-
termediation function smoothly and effi-
ciently.

— Legislatures are not prepared to vote
the massive amounts of official funds, or
guarantees, required for a basic shift from
reliance on private financing to reliance on
official financing.

Clearly it is in the interests of all
concerned — the oil-exporting countries
which are the ultimate creditors, the
money and capital markets which
are intermediaries, and the borrowing
countries — that the flow of private capital
continue. Countries which expect to borrow
must therefore make sure that they retain
their creditworthiness.

Some have asked whether proposals for
increasing IMF lending resources were not
mechanisms for bailing out the commercial
banks or taking over risky loans injudi-
ciously contracted by the banks. But this is
neither the intent nor the likely result.
Uniquely, IMF lending is associated with
policy conditions and adjustment programs
tailored in each case to correct the problems
which caused the need for financing. Thus
IMF lending can, in a very meaningful way,
enhance the creditworthiness of the bor-
rower as viewed by commercial lenders.
Bankers have long recognized this fact in
their operations, sometimes by directly
requiring a nation to enter into an IMF pro-
gram as a prior condition to further bank
credit.

The amount of credit provided through
the IMF is small, relative to private credit,
and will remain so. In the three years since
oil prices increased, the IMF has financed
only about 6 percent of the aggregate
payments deficits, even though Fund lend-

ing has been at historic peaks. While the
balance may shift toward a somewhat higher
ratio of IMF to private financing, there will
be no "takeover" of international lending by
the IMF. The significance of IMF credit,
and the value of expanding the IMF's lend-
ing capacity, is largely that it strengthens
creditworthiness and reinforces the system.

I see no evidence that the system as a
whole is overloaded. The problems — and
there are problems — are found in a few
individual nations which are approaching, or
have reached, the boundaries of prudence.

The concern of private markets about in-
creasing their exposure in particular
countries is a matter of perceived risk — of
the degree to which particular borrowers,
and their particular economies, appear to
have the capacity to service debt. It is on
this risk that private lenders — and the bank
regulators looking over their shoulders — are
quite properly focusing.

Basic to risk evaluation is information,
and borrowers will find they are facing in-
creasing demands for information about the
"vital signs" of their economies. Lenders
should be in a position to weigh, on a
reasonably current basis, a country's rela-
tive performance in such areas as inflation
rates, wage rates and productivity meas-
ures, the shares of investment and
consumption in GDP [gross domestic prod-
uct] trends, public sector deficits, and
trends of monetary aggregates. Chairman
[of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System Arthur F.] Burns has made
the very sensible suggestion that the central
banks agree on the kind of information
which a borrowing country would noi'mally
be expected to supply.

For some borrowers, meeting these re-
quirements will simply mean revealing in-
formation now held confidential. For others,
it will require expansion and upgrading of
their collection and processing effort so as to
obtain more comprehensive, accurate, and
timely data. In some cases, this effort will
require fundamental changes in the way
governments view this aspect of their eco-
nomic management. For the ability and will-

Department of State Bulletin

ingness of countries to provide such data
and analyses will increasingly constitute the
price of admission to private capital
markets — because of the lenders' insistence
in their own prudent self-interest, quite
apart from any suggestions of the regulatory
agencies.

Lenders, by the same token, will need to
develop the capability of extracting the
maximum benefit from this additional infor-
mation. This will require that they refine
their capability for country analyses. There
is in process a change in the type of
borrowers coming to market. Formerly, the
bulk of international lending was to private,
largely corporate, borrowers. In many
cases, such lending was for short-term trade
financing or related to a specific project, and
there was a balance sheet, a management
with a known track record, a product and a
market whose prospects could be analyzed
according to reasonably well-developed
criteria.

Increasingly, however, the prospective
borrowers are governments or quasi-public
entities. Their purpose in entering the mar-
ket is likely to be much less clearly commer-
cial than, for example, when a firm borrows
to expand to service a new market. In some
cases, loans are for general balance-of-pay-
ments support, and it is not immediately
evident whether they will finance consump-
tion or increase productive capacity.

In such situations, we enter the realm of
what used to be called "political economy," a
term that could well bear revival. In asses-
sing the riskiness of a balance-of-payments
loan — or assessing the creditworthiness of a
country — a major question becomes the will-
ingness and the ability of the government of
the prospective borrower to implement the
policies which will permit the service of the
debt. A lender's assessment of the prospects
may require an assessment of the possible
changes in the political climate, as well as in
the underlying economic situation.

It seems to me important, therefore, to
give careful study to the possibilities of de-
veloping a closer interaction, a smoother
transition, between financing through the

private market and official financing through
the IMF. There is a view that the private
markets and the IMF may in some cases be
working at cross-purposes, with private len-
ders increasing their exposure with growing
unease and reluctance, while the IMF
watches from the sidelines with increasing
frustration while the underlying situation
deteriorates. Countries in such cases may
avoid recourse to the IMF — and adoption of
needed adjustment policies — as long as
access to private financing is more or less
readily available. When the situation de-
teriorates to a critical point, it becomes evi-
dent to all, and there is sudden,
discontinuous change. The question is
whether there is legal and practical scope
for earlier involvement by the IMF.

The resolution of this question may be the
next needed step in the evolution of the
framework of international monetary coop-
eration. We do not know, at this stage,
whether there is a need for formal
mechanisms, informal arrangements, or
neither. Certainly we must recognize the
limitations on the IMF's freedom of action.
There would be great reluctance, for
example, to have the IMF enter the field of
credit-rating, not least because such action
could undermine the confidential basis on
which information is given to the Fund.
Nevertheless, there may be ways in which
closer private-official cooperation could be
fashioned without putting the IMF in the
credit-rating business. To invite discussion,
I will list several theoretical possibilities
without endorsing any — and I want to stress
again that I do not feel we are yet in a posi-
tion to make decisions in this area.

Perhaps the least dramatic step could in-
volve IMF willingness to provide staff re-
ports and country assessments to prospec-
tive lenders, on the basis of formal requests
by the countries in question.

The IMF might publish reports based on
its annual consultations with countries,
again subject to the approval of the
countries in question. There is precedent for
this in the OECD's [Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development] publi-

Joly 4, 1977

cation of annual reviews of member
countries' economic situations.

A more overt IMF role might involve IMF
staff participation in the development of pol-
icy conditions to be associated with private
or largely private lending. Thus the Fund
might make available its services to help de-
sign stabilization programs, if requested by
both prospective borrowers and lenders. As
a variant on this approach, the banks might
insist, as part of a negotiated loan package,
that a country establish eligibility for bor-
rowing from the Fund.

Among other suggestions, it has been
proposed that the IMF might participate in
the development of "mixed" financing pack-
ages, featuring a blend of official and
private funds. Depending on the circum-
stances, the initiative might come from pri-
vate lenders, the borrowers, or even the
Fund itself. Arrangements in some cases
might involve a "stretch-out" of debts to
correct excessive "lumpiness" in the earlier
maturities.

All of these proposals raise basic
questions of how the IMF should operate
and how it should relate both to its
sovereign members and to the private sec-
tor. I do not suggest that the international
community will in the end necessarily decide
that it is wise to make such changes. But I
do think that we should be willing to
reexamine old premises, review old
practices, and consider innovations. Only in
that way can we assure that our institutions
grow and adapt to current conditions and
are used with the maximum effectiveness
that the future will require.

To conclude, I am confident that the
strategy I have outlined — a strategy based
on application of sensible government
policies, reinforcement of our international
institutions, and strengthening of private
market mechanisms — will be adequate to the
test for the longer pull. My confidence is
fortified by two facts:

— First, the record of the past 32 years is
on the whole, an excellent one. In the inter-
national monetary sphere, the world

community has, time and again, faced new
problems, new strains. On each occasion, it
has found a cooperative and responsible so-
lution. I am sure we can do so again.

— Second, we have the advantage of a
new, realistic, and flexible monetary system
as a framework for our policies. That system
is itself a product of international
cooperation and will facilitate our progress.

This effort will require the best from all of
us. The skill and determination which you in
the international banking community, as
well as we in national governments, apply in
adapting to the situation we confront will
largely determine our success.

U.S.-Japan End Second Round
of Nuclear Energy Talks

Department Announcement

Piess releai^e 262 datetl June 7

Japanese and U.S. delegations, as a fol-
lowup of the talks between Prime Minister
Fukuda and President Carter, have had a
frank exchange of views on their respective
nuclear energy policies and made utmost ef-
forts to harmonize the development of peace-
ful uses of nuclear energy and the mainte-
nance of nuclear nonproliferation. The second
round of talks [.June 2-6] has seen the further
deepening of mutual understanding of each
others position.

As a result of the talks, it has been agreed
that studies will be undertaken by a Japan-
U.S. joint team of experts to explore
promptly solutions acceptable to both sides
with regard to the operation of the Tokai-Jura
facility.

The team will conduct its studies for about
two weeks, and following its work the team
will submit a joint report on its findings.
Their joint report will be submitted to both
governments, and further consultations will
continue as soon as possible thereafter.

The U.S. team of experts will visit Japan in
the middle of June.

Department of State Bulletin

CONGRESS

Department Testifies on international Commodity Agreements

Statement by Julius L. Katz

Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs '

Mr. Chairman [William S. Moorhead, of
Pennsylvania]: I am pleased to have this op-
portunity to meet with your committee to dis-
cuss international commodity agreements. In
recent years we have seen commodity prices
skyrocket and then collapse, with acute short-
ages followed by glut and, for some com-
modities, followed by shortages again. These
violent fluctuations in price and supply sub-
ject the world economy to severe strain. They
disrupt development planning and intensify
world inflation. The dramatic developments of
recent years have again focused attention on
commodity agreements as a means of remedy-
ing chronic commodity market instability.

I propose in this statement, Mr. Chairman,
to review briefly efforts to negotiate various
commodity agreements. I will attempt in the
course of this statement to assess the poten-
tial and problems of such agreements.

Commodity price instability is not a new
phenomenon. It is a chronic problem. It is due
to variations in supply — primarily because of
changes in weather and plant disease — and
cyclical changes in demand. It is compounded
by the perverse behavior of buyers and sellers
in some markets who buy when the price is
rising, expecting a further rise, and who sell
when the price is falling, expecting a further
fall. The fluctuations are exacerbated in

' Submitted to the Subcommittee on Economic
Stabilization of the House Committee on Banking, Fi-
nance and Ui'ban Affairs on .June 8. The complete tran-
script of the hearings will be published by the commit-
tee and will be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20402.

periods of inflationary psychology and erratic
exchange rate movements by a preference
among some money managers for holding
commodities over currencies. This exagger-
ates shortages in periods of tight supply and
subsequent declines when stocks are liq-
uidated. The stabilization of commodity mar-
kets, if it can be effected successfully, would
substantially impi-ove the functioning of the
world economy.

It may be helpful to review the efforts to
stabilize several specific commodity markets,
with particular emphasis on recent experi-
ence.

Wheat

International agreements to stabilize world
wheat trade began in 1933 with the first In-
ternational Wheat Agreement, under which
producers were to control exports and reduce
acreage while importing countries were to
eliminate protective customs tariffs. Under
pressure of economic depression and abundant
supplies, many participants could not imple-
ment the measures required, and the agree-
ment foundered.

Negotiations resumed during World War
II, culminating in a 1949 agreement that in-
volved reciprocal obligations between expor-
ters and importers in terms of guaranteed
quantities and maximum and minimum prices.
The major problem in those early postwar
years was wheat shortage, and the agreement
was essentially implemented by two dominant
suppliers, the United States and Canada.

By the mid-1950's, the supply situation had

July 4, 1977

changed dramatically, and importing nations
lost interest. A number of subsequent agree-
ments through the mid-1960's did not have
much impact on the market. During that
period of surplus production, the world wheat
market was stabilized largely by production
and e.xport policies in the United States and
Canada.

In 1967, in connection with the Kennedy
Round trade negotiations, a more ambitious
and complex agreement was concluded. While
called the International Grains Agreement,
economic provisions could only be agreed on
wheat. These provisions established price
equivalents and quality differentials for a
large assortment of traded wheats, all based
upon the price of a single reference wheat —
U.S. Hard Red Winter No. 2 (ordinary pro-
tein), f.o.b. Gulf ports. In theory, the 1967 In-
ternational Grains Agreement established a
precise mechanism to keep prices of all
wheats in line within agreed maximum and
minimum prices. In practice, the Interna-
tional Grains Agreement failed. By the time it
came into force in 1968, the world wheat situ-
ation had shifted from one of short supply to
oversupply, and the rigid negotiated price
structure was under heavy pressure. Shipping
patterns and freight rates used in the negotia-
tion proved unrealistic in tight competition, as
did price relationships between different qual-
ities of wheat. The review and adjustment
mechanism set up by the agreement proved
unworkable, and the International Grains
Agreement of 1967 fell apart at its first test.
A subsequent effort in 1971 resulted in an
agreement which provides only for consulta-
tions and information exchange.

We are now embarked on an exploration
into the feasibility of another international
negotiation on grains. I cannot assure that
this effort will be more successful than past
efforts, but I hope we have learned the les-
sons of narrow price bands and overrigidity.
Within the past five years we have moved
from "food crisis" scarcity to income-
depressing excess supply. With growing
world consumption and the uncertainty of
weather, the outlook is for recurring changes
in the global supply of grain. We hope to
achieve an arrangement that can moderate

extreme price swings, while leaving wide
latitude for market forces to operate.

To assure flexibility in changing supply
situations and to improve food security of
poor nations, we believe that a new' agree-
ment should be centered on multilateral obli-
gations for the acquisition and release of re-
serve stocks. We should also seek to comple-
ment a grain agreement with meaningful
liberalization of world grain trade, so that ef-
ficient producers retain adequate incentive to
maintain their output and so that one or two
countries do not have to carry the full burden
of adjustment to changes in global conditions.

Sugar

The first International Sugar Agreement
was negotiated in 1937. Because of the out-
break of World War II, however, it had a hm-
ited life span. In the postwar period, interna-
tional sugar agreements were negotiated in
1953, 1958, and 1968.

The United States was a signatory to the
1953 and 1958 agreements, but did not par-
ticipate in the 1968 agreement. Because of our
domestic sugar legislation, U.S. participation
was not relevant to the international agree-
ments. Indeed, the agreements did not affect
the major part of international sugar trade
which was governed by preferential arrange-
ments such as the U.S. Sugar Act, the Com-
monwealth Sugar Agreement, and the Cuban
arrangement with the Socialist countries. In
effect, the sugar agreements regulated trade
in a residual free market which accounted for
less than 50 percent of the sugar in interna-
tional trade.

The sugar agreements were essentially
market-sharing arrangements based on ex-
port quotas. They attempted, with mixed suc-
cess, to stabilize prices in the residual free
market. The 1968 agreement, which the
United States did not join, contained a feature
of the multilateral contract appi'oach whereby
exporting members undertook to provide a
specified amount of sugar to importing mem-
bers at a fixed "supply commitment price,"
the price ceiling. The 1968 agreement did not
contain a corresponding "purchase commit-
ment price" to defend the floor.

Department of State Bulletin

In 1973, attempts to renegotiate the 1968
agreement failed wlien exporters and import-
ers were unable to agree on a revised supply
commitment price. The 1968 agreement ex-
pired in December 1973, shortly before the
end of the U.S. Sugar Act and the Common-
wealth Sugar Agreement. Since 1975, the free
market for sugar has grown rapidly. The
United States, which imports about 25 per-
cent of the sugar in world trade, now relies
wholly on the free market. Australia and
South Africa, formerly members of the Com-
monwealth agreement, now supply solely the
free market. The free market now accounts
for about 75 percent of world sugar trade.

In 1974, sugar prices reached a peak of 65
cents a pound. Thereafter, they declined sub-
stantially. The production of both sugar and
substitute sweeteners such as high-fructose
corn syrup has increased rapidly. At present,
world sugar prices are between eight and nine
cents a pound, well below cost of production
in the United States and in most, if not all,
exporting countries.

Negotiations for a new international sugar
agreement were held in April and May of this
year in Geneva. The United States partici-
pated actively in these negotiations. We pro-
posed that a new agreement rely on supply
management through a combination of export
quotas and substantial stock buildup during
periods when prices are near the floor. In our
proposal, stocks accumulated at low prices
would be isolated from the market and re-
leased only at the top of the price range to
defend the maximum. We recognize that
stockholding entails certain costs to exporting
members and indicated our willingness to con-
tribute our fair share to international financ-
ing of such stockholding.

Unfortunately, the conference was unable
to reach agreement on a number of key issues,
including the level and financing of stocks, the
division of market shares among exporting
members, and the treatment of preferential
arrangements. Accordingly, negotiations
were suspended in order to provide govern-
ments with further time to consider the vari-
ous proposals and to conduct further examina-
tion of the technical issues involved in stock-
holding and financing. If agreement can be

reached at the technical level, the negotiating
conference will be reconvened in the fall.

Coffee

Coffee is a classic example of a boom or bust
commodity. High prices in 1954 were followed
several years later by a significant production
increase, stock accumulation, and sharply fall-
ing prices. In 1962, the United States and
Brazil undertook a joint initiative which re-
sulted in the International Coffee Agreement
of 1962.

The 1962 agreement was a market-sharing
approach which relied on export quotas to in-
sure the orderly marketing of surplus produc-
tion and accumulated stocks. The agreement
relied on importing countries to enforce ex-
port quotas by prohibiting the entry of non-
quota coffee. The 1962 and the succeeding
1968 coffee agreements were in effect for
nearly a decade, from 1962 to 1972. The
agreements were based on the premise that
coffee was in a permanent surplus. They
sought to encourage coffee exporters to diver-
sify into other agricultural commodities which
would yield a higher return. The agreements
succeeded in maintaining prices at stable, but
relatively low, levels for the better part of
that decade.

In retrospect, it appears that the agree-
ments maintained prices too low, both in abso-
lute terms and in relation to world inflation of
costs of production. The agreements pre-
vented prices from plunging to disaster levels
and permitted the orderly marketing of enor-
mous surplus stocks. However, the prevailing
price levels were so low as to be a disincentive
to new investment. As a result, in the late
1960's consumption began to exceed produc-
tion, and world carryover stocks were drawn
down to moderate levels.

In 1975, the outlook was for production and
consumption of coffee to be roughly in bal-
ance. In July 1975, however, the coffee grow-
ing regions of Brazil were struck by the worst
frost in history. Overnight, the supply outlook
changed from one of comfortable balance to
one of extremely tight supplies for the next
several years. The supply outlook was further
complicated by civil wars and political disturb-

July 4, 1977

cinces in several major African exporting
countries and by poor weather and plant dis-
ease in several Latin American producing
countries.

The price reaction was spectacular. Coffee
pi'ices jumped from about 50 cents a pound to
over $3 a pound earlier this year. World
stocks have been drawn down to near pipeline
levels, but there has been no physical short-
age of coffee. Barring further catastrophe,
production should return to normal in the
next year and, as working stocks are rebuilt,
prices should reflect this improved balance
between supply and demand.

After the 1975 frost, negotiations were
completed on the International Coffee
Agreement which entered into force on Oc-
tober 1, 1976. The United States played a
major role in the negotiation and is a member.
Basically, it is a standby agreement designed
to encourage producers to restore lost produc-
tion by assuring them of consumer-country
cooperation when prices return to normal.

The 1976 coffee agreement is a market-
sharing agreement, but it entered into force
with export quotas in suspense. Market
shares of individual exporting countries will
be largely based on their export performance
during the first two years of the agreement.
Export quotas will come into effect, automati-
cally, when prices fall to a level between 63.5
and 77.5 cents per pound. When quotas are in
effect, a significant portion of them will be
distributed in proportion to a country's share
of world stocks. This feature will provide an
economic incentive for stockholding and will
lead to more rational stock policies than in the
past. If managed wisely, the 1976 coffee
agreement offers the possibility of preventing
a reoccurrence of the excessively high and ex-
cessively low prices we have experienced in
the past 10 years.

Cocoa

Cocoa is another commodity with a long his-
tory of negotiation for an international
agreement. Like coffee, cocoa is a tree crop,
but it differs from coffee in certain significant
respects. First, only five countries account for
almost 80 percent of world cocoa exports.

Second, cocoa cannot be easily stored in the
producing countries, because the quality de-
tei'iorates rapidly in the hot, humid climate in
which it is grown. These distinctive charac-
teristics of cocoa complicate the formulation of
an international agreement.

Negotiations looking to an international
cocoa agreement were held off and on for over
20 years. In 1972, a cocoa conference pro-
duced an agreement which the United States
did not join. The 1972 agreement relied on ex-
port quotas as the principal operating
mechanism, with surplus stocks to be stored
by the cocoa organization in consuming coun-
tries. The United States believed the agree-
ment's price mechanism was too inflexible to
accomplish price stabilization. The 1972
agi"eement was not tested, because cocoa
prices remained well above its price objec-
tives after it came into operation in 1973.

The 1972 agreement was renegotiated in
October 1975. The United States participated
in those negotiations and proposed that the
primary tool to be used for stabilization
should be a buffer stock. Our proposal in-
cluded the following elements:

— The buffer stock would operate to defend
the maximum and minimum price within a
20-cent range.

— The buffer stock would purchase up to
250,000 metric tons through normal commer-
cial channels.

— The Cocoa Council would have the au-
thority to review and adjust the price range
for buffer stock purchases. Prices would not
be fixed for the life of the agreement.

The U.S. proposals were not accepted by
the conference which concluded the Interna-
tional Cocoa Agreement of 1975. The 1975
agreement is generally similar to that of 1972,
relying pi'imarily on export quotas to defend a
rigid price range.

After a thorough review, the United States
decided not to join the 1975 agreement. In our
view it is cumbersome and potentially disrup-
tive of the market. It combines features of
both export quota- and buffer stock-type ar-
rangements. The formula for calculating mar-
ket shares is inflexible and will penalize
dynamic producers. The buffer stock opera-

Department of State Bulletin

tion is unnecessarily rigid and restrictive. The
1975 cocoa agreement entered into force on
October 1, 1976. Like its predecessor, it has
not been tested because world market prices
have remained substantially above the price
range in the agreement. It is unlikely that the
economic provisions of the 1975 cocoa agree-
ment will come into operation in the near fu-
ture. The United States remains willing to
participate in a renegotiation of the agree-
ment, if its members are so inclined.

Tin

International agreements on tin existed as
early as the 1920's, when pr-oducers first com-
bined to form their own arrangements.
Agreements between producers and consum-
ers, however, began only in the mid-1950's
when the first International Tin Agreement
was signed. This agreement had a duration of
five years and was succeeded by later, similar
five-year agreements. The last of these, the
fifth International Tin Agreement, came into
effect in July 1976. The United States, which
declined to join the first four agreements,
agreed to join this last agreement, and its
entry was ratified by the Congress in October
of last year.

The basic goal of the tin agreement is to
balance the supply and demand for tin metal
at stable prices which are remunerative to
producers and fair to consumers. To accom-
plish this goal, the International Tin Council
establishes floor and ceiling prices for tin
metal and attempts to maintain market prices
within the floor and ceiling levels through buf-
fer stock purchases and sales and export con-
trols.

The principal problem with the administra-
tion of the fifth agreement is that the Interna-
tional Tin Council buffer stock is too small to
moderate prices effectively. During periods of
slack demand, therefore, the International
Tin Council has relied on export controls to
protect the fioor price. Export controls have
resulted in decreased tin production which, in
turn, has led to tin shortages and high prices
in subsequent periods of tight demand. Be-
cause the buffer stock has been unable to de-
fend the ceiling price during these periods of

tight demand, the consequent high prices re-
sulted in council action to increase floor and
ceiling prices.

One major step which could be taken to
remedy this operational problem of the
agreement would be to increase the size of the
buffer stock. The new fifth agreement has a
pi'ovision for a larger buffer stock aimed at
solving this problem. At the present time,
however, only producer contributions to the
buffer stock are mandatory, totaling approxi-
mately 16,000 metric tons of tin metal. Con-
sumers may make voluntary contributions,
and six consumers have, in fact, agreed to
contribute funds which in total would equal
the present market value of about 3,400 tons
of tin metal.

Secretary of State Vance announced re-
cently at the CIEC [Conference on Interna-
tional Economic Cooperation] Conference the
intention of the Administration to recommend
to the Congress that the United States con-
tribute an amount of tin to the buffer stock.
This amount would be in proportion to its
share of world tin imports, roughly 4,000 to
5,000 tons. We beheve that this contribution
should result in certain improvements in the
current agreement which would encourage
producers to remove artificial devices, such as
production taxes which now unduly restrict
new investment, and would also encourage
other tin-consuming nations to contribute. A
larger tin buffer stock would contribute sub-
stantially to the improved working of the tin
agreement, since in addition to making more
tin available to the market in times of high
prices, it would also allow greater amounts of
tin to be acquired in periods of low prices,
thus avoiding the imposition of export con-
trols with the restrictive effects on production
I have noted.

Against the background of these several
cases a number of observations can be made.

Commodity agreements are, first of all, dif-
ficult to negotiate, primarily because the ob-
jectives of the participants are frequently dis-
similar and, at times, incompatible.

— While the stated objective is to stabilize
prices, exporters will tend to believe the price
objectives should be set at a higher level than

July 4, 1977

will importers. The determination of the price
that will balance supply and demand on aver-
age over a period of years and encourage
adequate investment for the longer term is
not, after all, an automatic process. Consider-
able judgment is required.

— While buffer stocks are generally re-
garded as a superior mechanism to market
sharing, many countries are unwilling to con-
template undertaking the investment and car-
rying costs of stockpiling.

— Market sharing, however, involves deci-
sions on allocation between old versus new, as
well as efficient versus inefficient, producers.
A number of negotiations have collapsed over
the question of market shares.

Secondly, agreements negotiated may be
difficult to sustain under the pressure of mar-
ket forces.

— Enforcement of export quotas has been a
problem in some agreements because of the
desire of individual producers to realize in-
creased revenues by exceeding their quotas.
Certification procedures have been rea-
sonably effective in surmounting this prob-
lem.

— Inadequate provision for buffer stock
financing has resulted in inability to defend
minimum prices or to protect price ceilings.
This, as I noted earlier, has been the case for
tin, which is the only buffer stock agreement
in operation.

— Poor selection of price objectives has dis-
torted investment decisions, encouraged the
development of substitutes, and on a number
of occasions led to the collapse of agreements.
This was the experience in the 1967 grains ar-
rangement.

It was largely out of frustration with the
history of failed negotiations that the so-called
UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development] Integrated Program
for Commodities was born. Originally pro-
posed in 1975 by the UNCTAD Secretariat,
and subsequently endorsed by the bloc of de-
veloping countries known as the G-77 [Group
of 77], it was adopted in modified form at the
U.N. Conference [fourth ministerial meeting
of UNCTAD] at Nairobi in May 1976.

The integrated program consists of a vari-

ety of proposed measures designed to improve
and stabilize export earnings of commodity
pi'oducers. These measures range from im-
proved information exchange to formal price
stabilization techniques. The heart of the pro-
gram in the UNCTAD proposal is a series of
international agreements for 18 commodities
and buffer stock agreements for at least 10 of
the 18 primary products with a common fund
to finance these stocks.

The Nairobi resolution itself [UNCTAD
Resolution 93 (IV)] establishes a timetable for
discussion of these 18 commodities, which is
to be completed no later than February 1978
and to be followed by negotiating conferences
"as and when required" during the remainder
of 1978. The resolution also specifies that a
negotiating conference on a common fund
should be held by March 1977. This conference
in March failed to advance the consideration
of a common fund. It will be followed by a
second session in November of this year.

Let me now, Mr. Chairman, describe our
current approach to international commodity
agreements. As is clear, the history of com-
modity agreements has been checkered at
best. We recognize both the desirability of
stabilizing the market for commodities impor-
tant in world trade, whose prices are highly
volatile, and the practical difficulties in reach-
ing agreements. We believe that properly
conceived, designed, and operated commodity
agreements can serve useful purposes:

— They can reduce fluctuations in export
earnings of developing countries which dis-
rupt their economies;

— They can assure the adequacy of supply
by improving the climate for investment;

— They can more equitably distribute the
burden of adjustment in production to meet
variations in demand; and importantly,

— They can make a contribution to the criti-
cal battle against inflation. We know from re-
cent U.S. experience that in periods of tight
supply, rising commodity prices transmit in-
flationary impulses throughout the economy.
Through their effect on the cost of living in-
dex, they push up the wage-price spiral. The
rise in costs becomes embedded in the eco-
nomic structure and persists long after the

Department of State Bulletin

commodity markets have turned around. In
periods of low or falling prices, investment is
postponed, and the stage is set for future
shortages.

Having said what commodity agreements
can do, I would have to emphasize that we do
not view commodity agreements as an in-
strument to increase resource transfers to de-
veloping countries by fixing prices above their
equilibrium levels. Such efforts are doomed to
failure because of the inevitable stimulation of
uneconomic production, substitution, or both.
And the distribution of gains to producers, to
the extent there are gains, is unrelated to
need or development performance.

With regard to a common fund, it is our in-
tention to participate actively and positively
in the next negotiating session now scheduled
for November in UNCTAD. We favor the es-
tablishment of a fund that would facilitate the

financing of buffer stocks established under
international agreements between major pro-
ducers and consumers. Such a fund, of course,
would have to be financially viable and ac-
ceptable to the broad range of countries rep-
resented in UNCTAD.

It is the intention of the Administration to
continue to examine commodity problems on a
case-by-case basis, to consider with an open
mind candidates for commodity agreements,
and where we conclude that agreements can
be effective instruments for stabilization, to
join with other producers and consumers to
execute such agreements. At the same time
we will seek to apply other instruments of
commodity policy, such as market develop-
ment, product improvement, diversification,
and compensatory financing, where such
measures would help countries cope with the
problems of commodity trade.

Department Discusses U.S. Efforts in Search for Middle East Peace

Following is a statement by Alfred L.
Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs, before the
Subcommittee on Erirope and the Middle East
of the House Committee on International Re-
lations on June 8. *

It is always a pleasure to appear before the
International Relations Committee and in
particular this subcommittee, with which we
in the Near East and South Asia Bureau of
the State Department have such a close and
continuous and, I personally believe, mutually
useful consultative relationship.

I particularly welcome the opportunity to
discuss with you the U.S. search for peace in
the Middle East. It has long been recognized.

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

and demonstrated most recently in 1973, that
conflict in this region of the world poses a
great potential threat to global stability and
world peace. For this reason, no other part of
the world has received more time and atten-
tion from the President and the Secretary of
State.

In his speech at Notre Dame on May 22,
the President said:

This may be the most propitious time for a genuine
settlement since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict .... To let this opportunity pass could mean dis-
aster, not only for the Middle East, but perhaps for the
international political and economic order as well.^

I cannot overemphasize the seriousness of
our commitment to the search for a perma-
nent peace in the Middle East — a peace that is
just for the people of Israel and the people of
the Arab world; a peace that would alter the

2 For the complete te.xt, see Bulletin of June 1.3,
1977, p. 621.

July 4, 1977

outlook for the future from an expectation of
further war to an expectation of peaceful rela-
tionships between Israel and its Arab
neighbors.

The United States has made clear in its dis-
cussions with the leaders of Israel and the key
Arab states that it has unique responsibilities
with regard to Israel's security. Defining the
special relationship between Israel and the
United States the Secretary of State said in
London on May 11:

We were at the very outset of Israel's birth one of
those that helped to bring it into being. We have been
very close to Israel. We share the same values, we
share the same hopes and aspirations, and we have been
the closest of friends through all of these years and will
be in the future as well.^

This commitment is a constant of American
policy which will continue to sustain the rela-
tionship between Israel and the United States
and which we believe is understood and ac-
cepted by all of the governments in the area.

Along with the underlying U.S. commit-
ment to peace in the Middle East and to Is-
rael's security goes the behef that the basis
for a settlement between Israel and the Arab
states is U.N. Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338.

As this subcommittee is aware, the core is-
sues on which we have focused our diplomatic
efforts have been the nature of the peace to be
established between Israel and the Arab
states; Israeli withdrawal from occupied ter-
ritories and agreement on final borders, to-
gether with the related question of arrange-
ments to make final borders secure; and the
resolution of the Palestinian issue.

In the little more than four months since
this Administration took office, the President
and Secretary Vance have been engaged in in-
tensive consultations with the leaders of the
Middle East countries most directly con-
cerned with the search for peace. I would like
to summarize briefly where our peace efforts
now stand and how we see them unfolding in
the period ahead.

The Secretary's February trip to the Middle

■■' Foi- Secretary Vance's remai'ks with the press follow-
ing a meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Allon, see
Bulletin of .June 6, 1977, p. 607.

East opened the dialogue between this Ad-
ministration and Middle East leaders. It
helped to define more precisely the issues and
the areas of difference on which efforts to
renew the negotiating process, and the
negotiations themselves, must focus. And it
enabled us to announce a consensus among the
governments concerned on three important
points: That all the governments want peace;
that all concerned should work for reconven-
ing the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference
in the latter part of this year; and that the
parties to the conference are prepared to go
to Geneva without preconditions so far as the
substantive issues are concerned. It also iden-
tified the question of Palestinian representa-
tion at Geneva as the principal issue to be re-
solved in order for the conference to meet and
begin its work.

Since February the President has met with
Prime Minister Rabin of Israel and with the
principal Ai-ab leaders beginning with Presi-
dent Sadat of Egypt, whose key role in the
peacemaking efforts of the past few years and
in those which lie ahead has been widely
recognized.

As a result of the detailed discussions the
President has had with Middle East leaders,
we have a clearer idea of the areas in which
difficult compromise will be necessary, and
negotiating tradeoffs will have to be found, if
there is to be progress toward peace. Of equal
importance, we have been able to give each
side a clearer picture of the concerns and per-
ceptions of the other.

Resolution 242 establishes the principle
that a peace settlement must be based on
withdrawal by Israel from territory occupied
in 1967 in return for Arab agreement to end
the state of belligerency, to recognize Israel's
right to exist, and to live in peace with it.
Resolution 338 establishes the principle that
implementation of Resolution 242 — the trans-
lation of the principles it sets forth into the
specifics of a peace settlement — must be ac-
compHshed in negotiations between the par-
ties. Our efforts to serve as a catalyst for this
process are firmly rooted in these two resolu-
tions and in the conviction that a settlement
must include an agreed solution of the Pales-
tinian problem if it is to be just and lasting.

Department of State Bulletin

On this question the President has said he
beheves a peace agreement will have to in-
clude the establishment of a homeland for the
Palestinians. How this would be defined — its
nature and political status — is something the
parties to the Middle East dispute would have
to resolve in their negotiations.

On the question of Israeli withdrawal and
final borders, there remains a wide gap be-
tween the positions of Israel and of the Arab
states. We have made clear our view that ef-
forts to narrow this gap must be guided by
the principles of Resolution 242.

As for the nature of the peace called for in
Resolution 242 between Israel and the Arab
states, I would like to underline a point that
deserves special emphasis. The President has
made a particular effort in his talks with Pres-
ident Sadat, King Hussein, President Asad,
and Crown Prince Fahd to stress the point
that peace is more than simply the absence of
war and should lead to normalization of rela-
tions between the Arab states and Israel, to
be defined as part of a settlement. The Presi-
dent spelled this out in his press statement of
March 9:

I think that wiiat Israel would like to have is what we
would like to have: a termination of belligerence toward
Israel by hei' neighbors, a recognition of Israel's right
to exist ... in peace, the opening up of borders with
free ti'ade, tourist travel, cultural e.xchange between
Israel and her neighbors ....''

We recognize that implementation of these
as well as other aspects of a settlement might
have to be phased over a period of time.

The agenda for our Middle East diplomacy
in the near future calls for a meeting between
the President and the new Israeli Prime
Minister when a new government is estab-
lished. If past experience is a guide, this could
take several weeks more, and the new Prime
Minister may not get to Washington before
July.

After this meeting takes place. Secretary
Vance plans, as you know, to return to the
Middle East for further consultations with the
parties. He will be prepared to discuss with
the parties suggestions of our own if this seems

useful, but I want to emphasize that we will
not be seeking to impose our ideas on the
parties.

As agreed between Foreign Minister
Gromyko and the Secretary in Geneva on May
21, we will be conducting monthly consulta-
tions with the Soviet Union at the ambassa-
dorial level in Moscow and Washington to
compare notes on progress made toward re-
convening the Middle East Peace Conference
this fall. These consultations will be con-
ducted in our respective capacities as
cochairmen of the Geneva conference; they
are exchanges of views and are not envisaged
in any sense as a substitute for the negotia-
tions between the parties which our efforts
are designed to get started.

I think the best summary of our attitude as
we face the next phase of Middle East
peacemaking was made by the President in
Geneva on May 9. He said:

There must be fairness; there must be some flexibil-
ity; there must be a forgetting about past differences
and misunderstandings; there must be determination;
there must be a resolution of the Palestine problem and
a homeland for the Palestinians; there must be some
resolution of border disputes; and there also must be an
assurance of permanent and real peace with guarantees
for the future security of these countries which all can
trust. ^

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

Peace Coi-ps Authorization for Fiscal Year 1978. Report
of the House Committee on International Relations,
together with supplemental and opposing views, to
accompany H.R. 6967. H. Rept. 95-296. May 12,
1977. 14 pp.

Omnibus Multilateral Development Institutions Act of
1977. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Re-
lations to accompany H.R. .5262. S. Rept. 95-159.
May 13, 1977. 83 pp.

International Development Assistance Act of 1977. Re-
port of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to
accompany S. 1520. S. Rept. 95-161. May 13, 1977.
73 pp.

To Amend Further the Peace Corps Act. Report of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accom-
pany S. 1235. S. Rept. 95-168. May 16, 1977. 8 pp.

"* For excerpts relating to foreign policy from Presi-
dent Carter's news conference of Mar. 9. see BULLETIN
of ApriU, 1977, p. 305.

' Made prior to a meeting with President Asad of
Syria. For the complete text of their exchange of re-
marks, see Bulletin of June 6, 1977, p. 593.

July 4, 1977

President Carter Signs American Convention on Human Rights

Following are remarks made by President
Carter upon signing the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights at the Pan Amencan
Union on Jmie 1, together with the text of the
convention.

PRESIDENT CARTER

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Document? dated June 6

This morning, my wife is in Costa Rica, and
yesterday when she arrived at the airport she
reported that today, after waiting for many
years, the United States would ratify this
Convention on Human Rights.

In 1969, when this agreement was reached
in this hemisphere, the other nations came
forward to commit themselves to a legally
binding document which would express the
aspirations that have existed among all our
countries since the first governments were
formed in North and South America.

As far back as the 1920's Simon Bolivar put
forward a concept of human freedom and the
responsibility of government to protect the
rights of individuals.

In 1948, another agreement was reached in
our hemisphere to pursue this noble endeavor
of democratic and free governments. In 1969,
this covenant was signed by the other nations.

This blank place on the page has been here
for a long time, and it's with a great deal of
pleasure that I sign on behalf of the United
States this Convention on Human Rights
which will spell out in clear terms our own
belief in the proper relationship between free
human beings and governments chosen by
them.

I believe that no one nation can shape the
attitudes of the world, and that's why it's so
important for us to join in with our friends
and neighbors in the south to pursue as a uni-
fied group this noble commitment and en-

deavor. And I think that it's accurate to say
that among almost all the leaders of the 150
nations of the world this year, there is a
preoccupation with and a concern about basic
human rights.

Part of it is because of actions like these on
behalf of free people. Another, of course, is
the upcoming conference in Belgrade on the
progress that has been made by the 35 sig-
natories of the Helsinki agreement.

But we are very glad this morning to join in
this commitment and to follow the leadership
of other countries in this hemisphere who
have preceded us in the signing of this
agreement.

I'm very grateful to be honored by the
presence here of these distinguished repre-
sentatives of their governments, and I, there-
fore, sign now for the United States this
agreement.

This is dated the 22d of November 1969.
This is the American Convention on Human
Rights.

TEXT OF CONVENTION ^

American Convention on Human Rights
Preamble

The American states signatory to the present Con-
vention,

Reaffirming their intention to consolidate in this
hemisphere, within the framework of democratic in-
stitutions, a system of personal liberty and social jus-
tice based on respect for the essential rights of man;

Recognizing that the essential rights of man are not
derived from one's being a national of a certain state,
but are based upon attributes of the human personality,
and that they therefore justify international protection

' Signed at the Inter-American Specialized Conference
on Human Rights at San Jose, Costa Rica, on Nov. 22,
1969 (text from OAS doc. 65, rev. 1, corr. 1, dated Jan. 7,
1970, which includes statements and a reservation).

Department of State Bulletin

in the form of a convention reinforcing or complement-
ing the protection provided by the domestic law of the
American states;

Consideriiig that these principles have been set forth
in the Charter of the Oi-ganization of American States,
in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, and in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and that they have been reaffirmed and refined
in other international instruments, worldwide as well as
regional in scope;

Reifetnting that, in accordance with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of fi-ee men en-
joying freedom from fear and want can be achieved only
if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy
his economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as his
civil and political rights; and

Conifidering that the Third Special Inter-American
C^onference (Buenos Aires, 1967) approved the incorpo-
ration into the Charter of the Organization itself of
broader standards with respect to economic, social, and
educational rights and i-esolved that an inter-American
convention on human rights should determine the struc-
ture, competence, and procedure of the organs respon-
sible for these matters,

Have agreed upon the following:

Part I — State Obligations and
Rights Protected

Chapter I — General Obligations

Article 1. Obligation to Respect Rights

1. The States Parties to this Convention undeitake
to respect the rights and freedoms recognized hei'ein
and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction
the free and full exercise of those lights and freedoms,
without any discrimination for reasons of race, color,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, economic status, birth, or any
other social condition.

2. For the purposes of this Convention, "person"
means every human being.

Article 2. Domestic Legal Effects
Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms
refei'red to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legis-
lative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake
to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional proc-
esses and the provisions of this Convention, such legis-
lative or other measures as may be necessary to give
effect to those rights or freedoms.

Chapter II — Civil and Political Rights

Article .!. Right to Juridical Persoiialitij
Every per.son has the right to recognition as a person
before the law.

Article J,. Right to Life

1. Every person has the right to have his life re-
spected. This right shall be protected by law, and. in
general, from the moment of conception. No one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his life.

2. In countries that have not abolished the death
penalty, it may be imposed only for the most serious

crimes and pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a
competent court and in accordance with a law establish-
ing such punishment, enacted prior to the commission
of the crime. The application of such punishment shall
not be extended to ci'imes to which it does not presently
apply.

3. The death penalty shall not be reestablished in
states that have abolished it.

4. In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for
political offenses or related common crimes.

0. Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon per-
sons who, at the time the crime was committed, were
under 18 years of age oi' over 70 years of age; nor shall
it be applied to pregnant women.

6. Every person condemned to death shall have the
right to apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of
sentence, which may be granted in all cases. Capital
punishment shall not be imposed while such a petition is
pending decision by the competent authority.

Article 5. Right to Humane Treatment

1. Every person has the right to have his physical,
mental, and moral integi'ity respected.

2. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All
persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human pei'son.

3. Punishment shall not be extended to any person
other than the criminal.

4. Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circum-
stances, be segregated from convicted persons, and
shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to
their status as unconvicted persons.

5. Minors while subject to criminal proceedings shall
be separated from adults and biought before specialized
tribunals, as speedily as possible, so that they may be
treated in accordance with their status as minors.

6. Punishments consisting of deprivation of liberty
shall have as an essential aim the reform and social
I'eadaptation of the prisoners.

Article 6. Freedom from Slavei-y

1. No one shall be subject to slavei'y or to involun-
tary servitude, which are prohibited in all their forms,
as are the slave trade and ti'affic in women.

2. No one shall be required to perform forced or
compulsory labor. This provision shall not be inter-
preted to mean that, in those countries in which the
penalty established for certain crimes is deprivation of
libei'ty at forced labor, the carrying out of such a sen-
tence imposed by a competent court is prohibited.
Forced labor shall not adversely affect the dignity or
the physical or intellectual capacity of the prisoner.

3. For the purposes of this article the following do
not constitute forced or compulsory labor:

a. work or service normally required of a person im-
prisoned in execution of a sentence oi' formal decision
passed by the competent judicial authoi-ity. Such work
or service shall be carried out under the supervision
and control of public authorities, and any persons per-
forming such work or service shall not be placed at the
disposal of any pi'ivate party, company, or juridical
person;

July 4, 1 977

b. military service and, in countries in which con-
scientious objectors are recognized, national service
that the law may provide for in lieu of military service;

c. service exacted in time of danger or calamity that
threatens the existence or the well-being of the com-
munity; or

d. work or service that forms part of normal civic
obligations.

Article 7. Right to Personal Liberty

1. Every person has the right to personal liberty and
security.

2. No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty ex-
cept for the reasons and under the conditions estab-
lished beforehand by the constitution of the State Party
concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto.

3. No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or
imprisonment.

4. Anyone who is detained shall be informed of the
reasons for his detention and shall be promptly notified
of the charge or charges against him.

.5. Any person detained shall be brought promptly be-
fore a judge or other officer authorized by law to exer-
cise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a
reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to
the continuation of the proceedings. His release may be
subject to guarantees to assure his appearance for trial.

6. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be enti-
tled to recourse to a competent court, in order that the
court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his
arrest or detention and order his release if the arrest or
detention is unlawful. In States Parties whose laws
provide that anyone who believes himself to be
threatened with deprivation of his liberty is entitled to
recourse to a competent court in order that it may de-
cide on the lawfulness of such threat, this remedy may
not be restricted or abolished. The interested party or
another person in his behalf is entitled to seek these
remedies.

7. No one shall be detained for debt. This principle
shall not limit the orders of a competent judicial author-
ity issued foi- nonfulfillment of duties of support.

Article 8. Right to a Fair Trial

1. Every person has the right to a hearing with due
guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a compe-
tent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously
established by law, in the substantiation of any accusa-
tion of a criminal nature made against him or for the
determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, la-
bor, fiscal, or any other nature.

2. Every person accused of a criminal offense has the
right to be presumed innocent so long as his guilt has
not been proven according to law. During the proceed-
ings, every person is entitled, with full equality, to the
following minimum guarantees;

a. the right of the accused to be assisted without
charge by a translator or interpreter, if he does not un-
derstand or does not speak the language of the tribunal
or court;

b. prior notification in detail to the accused of the
charges against him;

c. adequate time and means for the preparation of his
defense;

d. the right of the accused to defend himself person-
ally or to be assisted by legal counsel of his own choos-
ing, and to communicate freely and privately with his
counsel;

e. the inalienable right to be assisted by counsel pro-
vided by the state, paid or not as the domestic law pro-
vides, if the accused does not defend himself pei'sonally
01' engage his own counsel within the time period estab-
lished by law;

f. the right of the defense to examine witnesses pres-
ent in the court and to obtain the appearance, as wit-
nesses, of experts or other persons who may throw
light on the facts;

g. the right not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself or to plead guilty; and

h. the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court.

3. A confession of guilt by the accused shall be valid
only if it is made without coercion of any kind.

4. An accused person acquitted by a nonappealable
judgment shall not be subjected to a new trial foi- the
same cause.

.5. Criminal proceedings shall be public, except in-
sofar as may be necessary to protect the interests of
justice.

Aiiicle 9. Freedo)!) from Ex Post Facto Laws

No one shall be convicted of any act or omission
that did not constitute a criminal offense, under the ap-
plicable law, at the time it was committed. A heavier
])enalty shall not be imposed than the one that was ap-
plicable at the time the criminal offense was committed.
If subsequent to the commission of the offense the law-
provides for the imposition of a lighter punishment, the
guilty person shall benefit therefrom.

Article 10. Right to Compensation

Every person has the right to be compensated in ac-
cordance with the law in the event he has been sen-
tenced by a final judgment thi-ough a miscarriage of
justice.

Article 11. Right to Privacy

1. Everyone has the right to have his honor re-
spected and his dignity recognized.

2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive
interference with his private life, his family, his home,
or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his
honor or reputation.

3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks.

Article 12. Freedom of Conscience and Religion
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience
and of religion. This right includes freedom to maintain
or to change one's religion or beliefs, and freedom to
profess or disseminate one's religion or beliefs either
individually or together with others, in public or in pri-
vate.

Department of State Bulletin

2. No one shall be subject to I'estrictions that might
impair his freedom to maintain or to change his religion
or beliefs.

3. Freedom to manifest one's religion and beliefs may
be subject only to the limitations prescribed by law that
are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or
morals, or the rights or freedoms of others.

4. Parents oi- guardians, as the case may be, have the
right to provide for the religious and moral education of
their children or wards that is in accord with their own
convictions.

Article IS. Freedom ofTliouffht and Expression

1. Evei'yone shall have the right to freedom of
thought and expression. This right shall include free-
dom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas
of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, eithei' orally, in
writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any
other medium of his choice.

2. The e.xercise of the right provided foi- in the
foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior cen-
sorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of
liability, which shall be expressly established by law to
the extent necessary in order to ensure:

a. re.speet for the rights or reputations of others: or

b. the protection of national security, public order,
or public health or morals.

3. The light of expression may not be restricted by
indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of gov-
ernment or private controls over newsprint, radio
broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dis-
semination of information, or by any other means tend-
ing to impede the communication and circulation of
ideas and opinions.

4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2
above, public entertainments may be subject by law to
prioi' censoi'ship for the sole purpose of regulating ac-
cess to them for the moi'al protection of childhood and
adolescence.

5. Any pi-opaganda for war and any advocacy of na-
tional, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incite-
ments to lawless violence or to any other similar illegal
action against any person or group of persons on any
grounds including those of race, color, religion, lan-
guage, or national origin shall be considered as offenses
punishable by law.

Article U. Right of Rephj

1. Anyone injured by inaccurate or offensive state-
ments or ideas disseminated to the public in general by
a legally regulated medium of communication has the
right to reply or make a correction using the same
communications outlet, under such conditions as the
law may establish.

2. The correction or reply shall not in any case remit
other legal liabilities that may have been incurred.

3. For the effective protection of honor and reputa-
tion, every publisher, and every newspaper, motion
picture, radio, and television company, shall have a
person responsible, who is not protected by immunities
or special privileges.

Article 15. Right of Assembly

The right of peaceful assembly, without arms, is
recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exer-
cise of this right other than those imposed in
eonfonnity with the law and necessary in a democratic
society in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public order, or to protect public health or
morals or the rights or freedoms of others.

Article 16. Freedom of Association

1. Everyone has the right to associate freely for
ideological, religious, political, economic, labor, social,
cultural, sports, or other purposes.

2. The exercise of this right shall be subject only to
such restrictions established by law as may be neces-
sary in a democratic society, in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public order, or to protect
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of
others.

3. The provisions of this article do not bar the impo-
sition of legal restrictions, including even deprivation
of the exercise of the right of association, on members
of the armed forces and the police.

Article IT. Rights of the Family

1. The family is the natural and fundamental gi'oup
unit of society and is entitled to protection by society
and the state.

2. The right of men and women of marriageable age
to marry and to raise a family shall be recognized, if
they meet the conditions required by domestic laws,
insofar as such conditions do not affect the principle of
nondiscrimination established in this Convention.

3. No marriage shall be entered into without the
free and full consent of the intending spouses.

4. The States Parties shall take appropriate steps to
ensure the equality of rights and the adequate balanc-
ing of responsibilities of the spouses as to marriage,
during marriage, and in the event of its dissolution. In
case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the
necessary protection of any children solely on the basis
of their own best interests.

5. The law shall recognize equal rights for children
born out of wedlock and those born in wedlock.

Article 18. Right to a Name

Every person has the right to a given name and to
the surnames of his parents or that of one of them.
The law shall regulate the manner in which this right
shall be ensured for all, by the use of assumed names if
necessary.

Article 19. Rights of the Child

Every minor child has the right to the measures of
protection required by his condition as a minor on the
part of his family, society, and the state.

Article 20. Right to Nationality

1. Every person has the right to a nationality.

2. Every person has the right to the nationality of

July 4, 1977

the state in whose territory he was born if he does not
have the right to any other nationality.

3. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nation-
ality or of the right to change it.

Article il. Right to Property

1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment
of his property. The law may subordinate such use and
enjoyment to the interest of society.

2. No one shall be deprived of his property except
upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of pub-
lic utility or social interest, and in the cases and ac-
coi'ding to the forms established by law.

3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man
by man shall be prohibited by law.

Article 22. Freedom of Movement and Residence

1. Every person lawfully in the territory of a State
Party has the right to move about in it and to reside in
it subject to the provisions of the law.

2. Every person has the right to leave any country
freely, including his own.

3. The exercise of the foregoing rights may be
restiicted only pursuant to a law to the extent neces-
sary in a democratic society to prevent crime or to
protect national security, public safety, public order,
public morals, public health, or the rights or freedoms
of others.

4. The exercise of the rights recognized in para-
graph 1 may also be restricted by law in designated
zones for reasons of public interest.

5. No one can be expelled from the territory of the
state of which he is a national or be deprived of the
right to enter it.

6. An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party
to this Convention may be expelled from it only pur-
suant to a decision reached in accordance with law.

7. Every person has the right to seek and be
granted asylum in a foreign territory, in accordance
with the legislation of the state and international con-
ventions, in the event he is being pursued for political
offenses or related common crimes.

8. In no case may an alien be deported or returned
to a country, regardless of whether or not it is his
country of origin, if in that country his right to life or
personal freedom is in danger of being violated be-
cause of his race, nationality, religion, social status, or
political opinions.

9. The collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited.

Article 2S. Right to Participate in Government

1. Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and
opportunities:

a. to take part in the conduct of public affairs, di-
rectly or through freely chosen representatives;

b. to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic
elections, which shall be by universal and equal suf-
frage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free ex-
pression of the will of the voters; and

c. to have access, under general conditions of
equality, to the public service of his country.

2. The law may regulate the exercise of the rights
and opportunities referred to in the preceding para-
graph only on the basis of age, nationality, residence,
language, education, civil and mental capacity, or sen-
tencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings.

Article 21,. Right to Equal Protection

All persons are equal before the law. Consequently,
they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal pro-
tection of the law.

Article 25. Right to Judicial Protection

1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt re-
course, or any other effective recourse, to a competent
court or tribunal for protection against acts that vio-
late his fundamental lights recognized by the constitu-
tion or laws of the state concerned or by this
Convention, even though such violation may have been
committed by persons acting in the course of their offi-
cial duties.

2. The States Parties undertake:

a. to ensure that any person claiming such remedy
shall have his rights determined by the competent au-
thority provided for by the legal system of the state;

b. to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
and

c. to ensure that the competent authorities shall en-
force such remedies when granted.

Chapter III — Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

Article 26. Progressive Development

The States Parties undertake to adopt measures,
both internally and through international cooperation,
especially those of an economic and technical nature,
with a view to achieving progressively, by legislation
or other appropriate means, the full realization of the
rights implicit in the economic, social, educational,
scientific, and cultural standai'ds set forth in the Char-
ter of the Organization of American States as amended
by the Protocol of Buenos Aires.

Chapter IV — Suspension of Guarantees,
Interpretation, and Application

Article 27. Suspension of Guarantees

1. In time of war, public danger, or other emer-
gency that threatens the independence or security of a
State Party, it may take measures derogating from its
obligations under the present Convention to the extent
and for the period of time strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such
measures are not inconsistent with its other obliga-
tions under international law and do not involve dis-
crimination on the ground of race, color, sex, lan-
guage, religion, or social origin.

2. The foregoing provision does not authorize any
suspension of the following articles: Article 3 (Right to
Juridical Personality), Article 4 (Right to Life), Arti-
cle 5 (Right to Humane Treatment), Article 6
(Freedom from Slavery), Article 9 (Freedom from Ex
Post Facto Laws), Article 12 (Freedom of Conscience

Department of State Bulletin

and Religion), Article 17 (Rights of the Family), Arti-
cle 18 (Right to a Name), Article 19 (Rights of the
Child), Article 20 (Right to Nationality), and Article
L':', (Right to Participate in Government), oi- of the ju-
dicial guarantees essential for the pi'otection of such
rights.

3. Any State Party availing itself of the right of
suspension shall immediately inform the other States
Parties, through the Secretary General of the Organi-
zation of American States, of the provisions the
a|i|ilication of which it has suspended, the reasons that
uave I'ise to the suspension, and the date set for the
tei-mination of such suspension.

Article 28. Federal Clause

1. Where a State Party is constituted as a federal
state, the national government of such State Party
shall implement all the provisions of the Convention
over whose subject matter it exercises legislative and
judicial jurisdiction.

2. With respect to the provisions over whose subject
matter the constituent units of the federal state have
jurisdiction, the national government shall
immediately take suitable measures, in accordance
with its constitution and its laws, to the end that the
competent authorities of the constituent units may
adopt appropriate provisions for the fulfillment of this
Convention.

3. Whenever two or more States Parties agree to
form a federation or other type of association they
shall take care that the resulting federal or other
compact contains the provisions necessary for continu-
ing and rendering effective the standards of this Con-
vention in the new state that is organized.

Article 29. Restrictions Regarding Interpretation

No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted
as:

a. peiTnitting any State Party, group, or person to
suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and
freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict
them to a greater extent than is provided for herein;

b. restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right
lii- freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any
State Party or by virtue of another convention to
which one of the said states is a party;

c. precluding other i-ights or guarantees that are in-
herent in the human personality or derived from
representative democracy as a form of government; oi'

d. excluding or limiting the effect that the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other
international acts of the same nature may have.

Article SO. Scope of Restrictions

The restrictions that, pursuant to this Convention,
may be placed on the enjoyment or exercise of the
rights or freedoms I'eeognized herein may not be
applied except in accordance with laws enacted for
reasons of general interest and in accordance with the
purpose for which such restrictions have been estab-
lished.

Article 31. Recognition of Other Rights

Other rights and freedoms recognized in accordance

with the procedures established in Articles 76 and 77
may be included in the system of pi-otection of this
Convention.

Chapter V — Personal Responsibilities

Article J2. Relationship Between Duties and Rights

1. Every person has responsibilities to his family,
his community, and mankind.

2. The rights of each person are limited by the
rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just
demands of the general welfare, in a democratic
society.

Part II— Means of Protection

Chapter VI — Competent Organs

Article 33

The following organs shall have competence with re-
spect to matters relating to the fulfillment of the com-
mitments made by the States Parties to this Conven-
tion:

a. the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, referred to as "The Commission"; and

b. the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, re-
ferred to as "The Court."

Chapter VII — Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights

Section I. Organtzntion

Article 3i

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
shall be composed of seven members, who shall be per-
sons of high moral character and recognized compe-
tence in the field of human rights.

Article 35

The Commission shall represent all the member
countries of the Organization of American States.

Article 36

1. The members of the Commission shall be elected
in a personal capacity by the General Assembly of the
Organization from a list of candidates proposed by the
governments of the member states.

2. Each of those governments may propose up to
three candidates, who may be nationals of the states
proposing them or of any other member state of the
Organization of American States. When a slate of
three is proposed, at least one of the candidates shall
be a national of a state other than the one proposing
the slate.

Article 37

1. The members of the Commission shall be elected
for a term of four years and may be reelected only
once, but the terms of three of the members chosen in

July 4, 1977

the first election shall expire at the end of two years.
Immediately following that election the General As-
sembly shall determine the names of those three mem-
bers by lot.

2. No two nationals of the same state may be
members of the Commission.

Article 38

Vacancies that may occur on the Commission for
reasons other than the normal expiration of a term
shall be filled by the Pei-manent Council of the Organi-
zation in accordance with the provisions of the Statute
of the Commission.

Article 39

The Commission shall prepare its Statute, which it
shall submit to the General Assembly for approval. It
shall establish its own Regulations.

Article W

Secretariat services for the Commission shall be fur-
nished by the appropriate specialized unit of the Gen-
eral Secretariat of the Organization. This unit shall be
provided with the resources required to accomplish the
tasks assigned to it by the Commission.

Section 2. Functions

Article il

The main functions of the Commission shall be to
promote respect for and defense of human rights. In
the exercise of its mandate, it shall have the following
functions and powers:

a. to develop an awareness of human rights among
the peoples of America;

b. to make recommendations to the governments of
the member states, when it considers such action ad-
visable, for the adoption of progressive measures in
favor of human rights within the framework of their
domestic law and constitutional provisions as well as
appropriate measures to further the observance of
those rights;

c. to prepare such studies or reports as it considers
advisable in the performance of its duties;

d. to request the governments of the member states
to supply it with information on the measures adopted
by them in matters of human rights;

e. to respond, through the General Secretariat of
the Organization of American States, to inquiries made
by the member states on matters related to human
rights and, within the limits of its possibilities, to pro-
vide those states with the advisory services they re-
quest;

f. to take action on petitions and other
communications pursuant to its authority, under the
provisions of Articles 44 through 51 of this Convention;
and

g. to submit an annual report to the General
Assembly of the Organization of American States.

Article 42

The States Parties shall transmit to the Commission
a copy of each of the reports and studies that they

submit annually to the Executive Committees of the
Inter-American Economic and Social Council and the
Inter-American Council for Education, Science, and
Culture, in their respective fields, so that the
Commission may watch over the promotion of the
rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, sci-
entific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter
of the Organization of American States as amended by
the Protocol of Buenos Aires.

Article i3

The States Parties undertake to provide the Com-
mission with such information as it may request of
them as to the manner in which their domestic law en-
sures the effective application of any provisions of this
Convention.

Section S. Competence

Article Ith

Any person or group of persons, or any non-
governmental entity legally recognized in one or more
member states of the Organization, may lodge
petitions with the Commission containing denuncia-
tions or complaints of violation of this Convention by a
State Party.

Article 1,5

1. Any State Party may, when it deposits its in-
strument of ratification of or adherence to this Con-
vention, or at any later time, declare that it recognizes
the competence of the Commission to receive and
examine communications in which a State Party alleges
that another State Party has committed a violation of a
human right set forth in this Convention.

2. Communications presented by virtue of this
article may be admitted and examined only if they are
presented by a State Party that has made a declaration
recognizing the aforementioned competence of the
Commission. The Commission shall not admit any
communication against a State Party that has not made
such a declaration.

3. A declaration concerning recognition of compe-
tence may be made to be valid for an indefinite time,
for a specified period, or for a specific case.

4. Declarations shall be deposited with the General
Secretariat of the Organization of American States,
which shall transmit copies thereof to the member
states of that Organization.

Article i6

1. Admission by the Commission of a petition or
communication lodged in accordance with Articles 44
or 45 shall be subject to the following requirements:

a. that the remedies under domestic law have been
pursued and exhausted, in accordance with generally
recognized principles of international law;

b. that the petition or communication is lodged
within a period of six months from the date on which
the party alleging violation of his rights was notified of
the final judgment;

c. that the subject of the petition or communication

Department of State Bulletin

is not pending before another international procedure
for settlement: and

d. that, in the case of Article 44, the petition
contains the name, nationality, profession, domicile,
and signature of the person or persons or of the legal
representative of the entity lodging the petition.

2. The provisions of paragraphs l.a and l.h of this
article shall not be applicable when:

a. the domestic legislation of the state concerned
dues not affoi'd due process of law for the protection of
the right oi' rights that have allegedly been violated;

b. the party alleging violation of his rights has been
denied access to the remedies under domestic law or
has been prevented from exhausting them: oi-

c. there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a
final judgTnent under the aforementioned remedies.

Article i 7

The Commission shall consider inadmissible any pe-
tition oi' communication submitted under Articles 44 or
45 if:

a. any of the requirements indicated in Article 46
has not been met;

b. the petition or communication does not state facts
that tend to establish a violation of the rights guaran-
teed by this Convention:

e. the statements of the petitioner oi- of the state
indicate that the petition or communication is
manifestly groundless or obviously out of order; or

d. the petition or communication is substantially the
same as one previously studied by the Commission oi-
by another international organization.

Section J,. Procedure
Article J,8

1. When the Commission receives a petition or
communication alleging violation of any of the rights
protected by this Convention, it shall proceed as fol-
lows:

a. If it considers the petition or communication ad-
missible, it shall request information from the
government of the state indicated as being responsible
for the alleged violations and shall furnish that gov-
ernment a transcript of the pertinent portions of the
petition or communication. This information shall be
submitted within a reasonable period to be determined
by the Commission in accordance with the circum-
stances of each case.

b. After the information has been received, or aftei'
the period established has elapsed and the information
has not been received, the Commission shall ascertain
whether the grounds for the petition or communication
still exist. If they do not, the Commission shall order
the record to be closed.

c. The Commission shall also declare the petition or
communication inadmissible or out of order on the
basis of information or evidence subsequently

1 received,
d. If the record has not been closed, the Commission
shall, with the knowledge of the parties, examine the

July 4, 1977

matter set forth in the petition or communication in
order to verify the facts. If necessary and advisable,
the Commission shall carry out an investigation, for
the effective conduct of which it shall request, and the
states concerned shall furnish to it, all necessary
facilities.

e. The Commission may request the states con-
cerned to furnish any pertinent infoi-mation, and, if so
requested, shall hear oral statements or receive
written statements from the parties concerned.

f. The Commission shall place itself at the disposal
of the parties concerned with a view to reaching a
friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of
respect foi' the human rights recognized in this Con-
vention.

2. However, in serious and urgent cases, only the
presentation of a petition or communication that fulfills
all the formal requirements of admissibility shall be
necessary in order for the Commission to conduct an
investigation with the prior consent of the state in
whose territory a violation has allegedly been
committed.

Article 1,9

If a friendly settlement has been reached in accord-
ance with paragraph l.f of Article 48, the Commission
shall draw up a report, which shall be transmitted to
the petitioner and to the States Parties to this Con-
vention, and shall then be communicated to the Secre-
tary General of the Organization of American States
for publication. This report shall contain a brief state-
ment of the facts and of the solution reached. If any
party in the ease so requests, the fullest jMJssible in-
formation shall be provided to it.

Article 50

1. If a settlement is not reached, the Commission
shall, within the time limit established by its Statute,
draw up a report setting forth the facts and stating its
conclusions. If the report, in whole or in part, does not
represent the unanimous agi'eement of the members of
the Commission, any member may attach to it a sepa-
rate opinion. The wi'itten and oral statements made by
the parties in accordance with paragi'aph l.e of Aiticle
48 shall also be attached to the report.

2. The report shall be transmitted to the states con-
cerned, which shall not be at liberty to publish it.

3. In transmitting the report, the Committee may
make .such proposals and recommendations as it sees
fit.

Article 51

1. If, within a period of three months from the date
of the transmittal of the report of the Commission to
the states concerned, the matter has not either been
settled or submitted by the Commission or by the state
concerned to the Court and its jurisdiction accepted,
the Commission may, by the vote of an absolute major-
ity of its members, set forth its opinion and conclu-
sions concerning the question submitted for its
consideration.

2, Whei'e appi-opriate, the Commission shall make
pertinent recommendations and shall prescribe a
period within which the state is to take the measures
that are incumbent upon it to remedy the situation
examined.

3. When the prescribed period has expired, the
Commission shall decide by the vote of an absolute
majority of its members whether the state has taken
adequate measures and whether to publish its report.

Chapter VIII — Inter-American Court of Human
Rights

Section 1. 0)ga»ization

Article 52

1. The Court shall consist of seven judges, nationals
of the member states of the Organization, elected in an
individual capacity from among jurists of the highest
moral authority and of recognized competence in the
field of human rights, who possess the qualifications
required for the exercise of the highest judicial func-
tions in conformity with the law of the state of which
they ai-e nationals or of the state that proposes them
as candidates.

2. No two judges may be nationals of the same
state.

Article 5S

1. The judges of the Court shall be elected by secret
ballot by an absolute majority vote of the States Par-
ties to the Convention in the General Assembly of the
Organization, from a panel of candidates proposed by
those states.

2. Each of the States Parties may propose up to
three candidates, nationals of the state that proposes
them or of any other member state of the Organization
of American States. When a slate of three is proposed,
at least one of the candidates shall be a national of a
state other than the one proposing the slate.

Article ok

1. The judges of the Court shall be elected foi' a
terni of six years and may be reelected only once. The
tenn of three of the judges chosen in the first election
shall expire at the end of three years. Immediately
after the election, the names of the three judges shall
be determined by lot in the General Assembly.

2. A judge elected to replace a judge whose term
has not expired shall complete the term of the latter.

3. The judges shall continue in office until the
expiration of their term. However, they shall continue
to serve with regard to cases that they have begun to
hear and that are still pending, for which purposes
they shall not be replaced by the newly elected judges.

Article 55

1. If a judge is a national of any of the States Par-
ties to a case submitted to the Court, he shall retain
his right to hear that case.

2. If one of the judges called upon to hear a case
should be a national of one the States Parties to the
case, any other State Party in the case may appoint a

person of its choice to serve on the Court as an ad hoc
judge.

3. If among the judges called upon to hear a case
none is a national of any of the States Parties to the
case, each of the latter may appoint an ad hoc judge.

4. An ad hoc judge shall possess the qualifications
indicated in Article 52.

5. If several States Parties to the Convention should
have the same interest in a case, they shall be
considered as a single party for purposes of the above
provisions. In case of doubt, the Court shall decide.

Article 56

Five judges shall constitute a quorum for the trans-
action of business by the Court.

Article 57

The Commission shall appear in all cases before the
Court.

Article 58

1. The Court shall have its seat at the place deter-
mined by the States Parties to the Convention in the
General Assembly of the Organization; however, it
may convene in the territoiy of any member state of
the Organization of American States when a majority
of the Court consider it desirable, and with the prior
consent of the state concerned.

The seat of the Court may be changed by the States
Parties to the Convention in the General Assembly, by
a two-thirds vote.

2. The Court shall appoint its own Secretary.

3. The Secretary shall have his office at the place
where the Court has its seat and shall attend the meet-
ings that the Court may hold away from its seat.

Article 59

The Court shall establish its secretariat, which shall
function under the direction of the Secretary of the
Court, in accordance with the administrative standards
of the General Secretariat of the Organization in all
respects not incompatible with the independence of the
Court. The staff of the Court's secretariat shall be ap-
pointed by the Secretary General of the Organization,
in consultation with the Secretary of the Court.

Article 60

The Court shall draw up its statute, which it shall
submit to the General Assembly for approval. It shall
adopt its own Rules of Procedure.

Section 2. Jurisdiction and Fnnctions

Article 61

1. Only the States Parties and the Commission shall
have the right to submit a ease to the Court.

2. In order for the Court to hear a case, it is neces-
sary that the procedures set forth in Articles 48 to 50
shall have been completed.

Article 62

1. A State Party may, upon depositing its instru-
ment of ratification or adherence to this Convention,

Department of State Bulletin

(II at any subsequent time, declare that it recognizes
as binding, ipso facto, and not requiring special
agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court on all matters
relating to the interpretation or application of this
Convention.

2. Such declaration may be made unconditionally, on
the condition of reciprocity, for a specified period, or
for specific cases. It shall be presented to the Secre-
tary General of the Organization, who shall transmit
copies thereof to the other member states of the
Organization and to the Secretary of the Court.

0. The jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all
cases concerning the interpretation and application of
the provisions of this Convention that are submitted to
it, pi'ovided that the States Parties to the case recog-
nize or have recognized such jurisdiction, whether by
special declaration pursuant to the preceding para-
graphs, or by a special agreement.

Article 63

1. If the Court finds that there has been a violation
of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the
Court shall rule that the injured party be insured the
enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It
shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of
the measure or situation that constituted the breach of
such right or freedom be remedied and that fair
compensation be paid to the injured party.

2. In cases of e.xtreme gravity and urgency, and
when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to per-
sons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures
as it deems pertinent in matters it has under consid-
eration. With respect to a case not yet submitted to
the Court, it may act at the request of the Commis-
sion.

Article 6i

1. The member states of the Organization may con-
sult the Court regarding the interpretation of this
Convention or of other treaties concerning the
protection of human rights in the American states.
Within their spheres of competence, the organs listed
in Chapter X of the Charter of the Organization of
American States, as amended by the Protocol of
Buenos Aires, may in like manner consult the Court.

2. The Court, at the request of a member state of
the Organization, may provide that state with opinions
regarding the compatibility of any of its domestic laws
with the aforesaid international instruments.

Article 65

To each regular session of the General Assembly of
the Organization of American States the Court shall
submit, for the Assembly's consideration, a report on
its work during the previous years. It shall specify, in
particular, the cases in which a state has not complied
with its judgments, making any pertinent
recommendations.

Sections. Procedure

Article 66

1. Reasons shall be given for the judgment of the
Court.

2. If the judgment does not represent in whole or in
part the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge
shall be entitled to have his dissenting or separate
opinion attached to the judgment.

Article 67

The judgment of the Court shall be final and not
subject to appeal. In case of disagreement as to the
meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall
interpret it at the request of any of the parties, pro-
vided the request is made within ninety days from the
date of notification of the judgment.

Article 68

1. The States Parties to the Convention undertake
to comply with the judgment of the Court in any case
to which they are parties.

2. That part of a judgment that stipulates compensa-
tory damages may be e.xecuted in the country con-
cerned in accordance with domestic procedure govern-
ing the e.xecution of judgments against the state.

Article 69

The parties to the case shall be notified of the judg-
ment of the Court and it shall be transmitted to the
States Parties to the Convention.

Chapter IX — Common Provisions

Article 70

1. The judges of the Court and the members of the
Commission shall enjoy, from the moment of their
election and throughout their term of office, the im-
munities extended to diplomatic agents in accordance
with international law. During the exercise of their of-
ficial function they shall, in addition, enjoy the
diplomatic privileges necessary for the performance of
their duties.

2. At no time shall the judges of the Court or the
members of the Commission be held liable for any
decisions or opinions issued in the exercise of their
functions.

Article 71

The position of judge of the Court or member of the
Commission is incompatible with any other activity
that might affect the independence or impartiality of
such judge or member, as determined in the respective
statutes.

Article 72

The judges of the Court and the members of the
Commission shall receive emoluments and travel al-
lowances in the form and under the conditions set forth
in their statutes, with due regard for the importance
and independence of their office. Such emoluments and
travel allowances shall be determined in the budget of
the Organization of American States, which shall also
include the expenses of the Court and its secretariat.
To this end, the Court shall draw- up its own budget
and submit it for approval to the General Assembly
through the General Secretariat. The latter may not
introduce any changes in it.

July 4, 1977

Article T-i

The General Assembly may, only at the request of
the Commission or the Court, as the case may be,
determine sanctions to be applied against members of
the Commission or judges of the Court when there are
justifiable grounds for such action as set forth in the
respective statutes. A vote of two-thirds majority of
the member states of the Organization shall be re-
quired for a decision in the case of members of the
Commission and, in the case of judges of the Court, a
two-thirds majoiity vote of the States Parties to the
Convention shall also be required.

Part III— General and Transitory Provisions

Chapter X — Signature, Ratification, Reservations,
Amendments, Protocols, and Denunciation

Article 7J,

1. This Convention shall be open for signature and
ratification by or adhei'ence of any member state of the
Organization of Amei'ican States.

2. Ratification of or adherence to this Convention
shall be made by the deposit of an instrument of ratifi-
cation or adherence with the General Secretariat of the
Organization of American States. As soon as eleven
states have deposited their instruments of ratification
or adhei'ence. the Convention shall enter into force.
With respect to any state that ratifies or adhei'es
thereafter, the Convention shall enter into foi'ce on the
date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or
adherence.

3. The Secretary General shall inform all member
states of the Organization of the entry into force of the
Convention.

Article 73

This Convention shall be subject to reservations only
in conformity with the provisions of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties signed on May 23,
1969.

Article 76

1. Proposals to amend this Convention may be sub-
mitted to the General Assembly for the action it deems
appropriate by any State Party directly, and by the
Commission or the Court through the Secretary Gen-
eral.

2. Amendments shall enter into force for the states
ratifying them on the date when two thirds of the
States Parties to this Convention have deposited their
respective instruments of ratification. With respect to
the other States Parties, amendments shall enter into
force on the dates on which they deposit their respect-
ive instruments of ratification.

Article 77

1. In accordance with Article 31, any State Party
and the Commission may submit proposed protocols to
this Convention for consideration by the States Parties
at the General Assembly with a view to gradually
including other rights and freedoms within its system
of protection.

2. Each Protocol shall determine the manner of its
entry into force and shall be applied only among the
States Parties to it.

Article 78

1. The States Parties may denounce this Convention
at the e.Npiration of a five-year period starting from
the date of its entry into force and by means of notice
given one year in advance. Notice of the denunciation
shall be addressed to the Secretary General of the Or-
ganization, who shall inform the other States Parties.

2. Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of
releasing the State Party concerned from the obliga-
tions contained in this Convention with respect to any
act that may constitute a violation of those obligations
and that has been taken by that state prior to the ef-
fective date of denunciation.

Chapter XI — Transitory Provisions

Section 1. hiter-Aiiicricau Commission on Human
Rights

Article 79

Upon the entry into force of this Convention, the
Secretary General shall, in writing, request each
member state of the Organization to present, within
ninety days, its candidates for membership on the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The
Secretary General shall prepare a list in alphabetical
order of the candidates presented, and transmit it to
the member states of the Organization at least thirty
days prior to the ne.xt session of the General Assem-
bly.

Article 80

The members of the Commission shall be elected by
secret ballot of the General Assembly from the list of
candidates referred to in Article 79. The candidates
who obtain the largest number of votes and an abso-
lute majority of the votes of the representatives of the
member states shall be declared elected. Should it be-
come necessary to have several ballots in order to
elect all the members of the Commission, the candi-
dates who receive the smallest number of votes shall
be eliminated successively, in the manner determined
by the General Assembly.

Section 2. Inter-American Court of Human Rights

Article 81

Upon the entry into force of this Convention, the
Secretary General shall, in writing, request each State
Paity to present, within ninety days, its candidates for
membership on the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. The Secretary General shall prepare a list in
alphabetical order of the candidates presented and
transmit it to the States Parties at least thirty days
prior to the ne.xt session of the General Assembly.

Article 82

The judges of the Court shall be elected from the list
of candidates referred to in Article 81, by secret ballot
of the States Parties to the Convention in the General
Assembly. The candidates who obtain the largest

Department of State Bulletin

mimber of votes and an absolute majority of the votes
of the representatives of the States Parties shall be
declared elected. Should it become necessary to have
several ballots in order to elect all the judges of the
Court the candidates who receive the smallest number
of votes shall be eliminated successively, in the man-
ner determined hv the States Parties.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the
principles and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty of
December 1, 1959 (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Oslo June
20, 197.5, at the eighth consultative meeting. '
Notification of approval: Argentina, June 13, 1977.

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24,
1964; for the United States December 13, 1972. TIAS
7502.
Accession deposited: Libya, June 7, 1977.

Environmental Modification

(■(invention <jn the prohibition of military or any other
hostile use of environmental modification techniques,
with anne.x. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977. '
Signature: Sri Lanka, June 8, 1977.

Finance

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag-
ricultural Development. Done at Rome June 13,
1976. '
Signature: Zaire, May 23, 1977.

Load Lines

Amendments to the international convention on load
lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at Lon-
don October 12, 1971. >
Acceptance deposited: Kuwait, May 25, 1977.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6,
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Acceptance deposited: Angola, June 6, 1977.

Property — Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 en-
tered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States
August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into
force April 26, 1970; for the United States September
5, 1970. TIAS 6923, 7727.

Notification from World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization that accession deposited: Burundi, June
3, 1977.

Property — Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.
Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United
States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Accession deposited: Pakistan, October 6, 1976.

Safety at Sea

International regulations for preventing collisions at
sea. Appi'oved by the International Confei'ence on
Safety of Life at Sea held at London from May 17 to
June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965.
TIAS 5813.
Acceptance deposited: Uruguay, May 17, 1977.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with an-
nexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos
October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975;
for the United States April 7, 1976. TIAS 8572.
Ratifications deposited: Nicaragua, March 25, 1977;
Togo, March 31, 1977.

Tonnage Measurement

International convention on tonnage measurement of
ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23,
1969. '
Accession deposited: India, May 26, 1977.

Trade

Declaration on the provisional accession of Colombia to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Geneva July 23, 1975. Entered into force January 22,
1976; for the United States May 1, 1976. TIAS 8322.
Acceptance deposited: Czechoslovakia, December 23,
1976.

Proces-verbal extending the declaration on the provi-
sional accession of Colombia. Done at Geneva
Novembei- 12, 1976, Entered into force December 17,
1976; for the United States March 28, 1977.
Acceptance deposited: Czechoslovakia, May 23, 1977.

Whaling

International whaling convention with schedule of whal-
ing regulations. Done at Washington December 2,
1946. Entered into force November 10, 1948. TIAS
1849.

Notification of adherence: Netherlands, June 14,
1977.

Protocol to the international whaling convention of De-
cember 2, 1946 (TIAS 1849). Done at Washington
November 19, 1956. Entered into force May 4, 1959.
TIAS 4228.

Notification of adherence: Netherlands, June 14,
1977.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world
cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris
November 23, 1972. Entered into force December 17,
1975. TIAS 8226.
Acceptance deposited: Mali, April 5, 1977.

' Not in force.

July 4, 1977

BILATERAL

Bulgaria

Agreement on exchanges and cooperation in cultural,
scientific, educational, technological and other fields.
Signed at Washington .June 13, 1977. Enters into
force upon completion of an e.xchange of notes by
means of which each party informs the other that the
agreement has been approved by its competent au-
thorities.

Cape Verde

Agreement relating to the transfer of food grain to
Cape Verde. Signed May 21, 1977. Entered into force
May 21, 1977.

Ghana

Agreement relating to the transfer of food to Ghana.
Signed at Accra May 24, 1977. Entered into force
May 24. 1977.

Indonesia

Agi-eement for sales of agricultural commodities, with

agreed minutes. Signed at Jakarta May 17, 1977. En-
tered into force May 17, 1977.

Liberia

Agreement amending and e.xtending the agreement of
January 11. 1951, as amended and extended (TIAS
2171, 3140, 3955, 4660, 4773, 5591, 6689), relating to a
military mission. Effected by exchanges of notes at
Monrovia May 2, 1975, February 2, 4, and 16, and
March 10 and 17, 1977. Entered into force March 17,
1977, effective January 11, 1975.

Mexico

Agreement relating to additional cooperative arrange-
ments to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected
by exchange of letters at Mexico May 27, 1977.
Entered into force May 27, 1977.

Thailand

Economic and technical cooperation agreement,
exchange of notes. Signed at Bangkok June 2,
Entered into force June 2, 1977.

with
1977.

Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: June 13-19

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of
Press Relations, Department of State, Washington,
D.C. 20520.

No.

*271

Date

6/13

*272 6/13

273

6/13

274

6/13

275

6/13

276

6/13

277

6/13

278

6/14

279

6/14

280

6/18

281

6/15

Subject

U.S. and Bulgaria sign first agreement
on cultural, educational, scientific,
technological and other exchanges.

Shipping Coordinating Committee
(SCO, Subcommittee on Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group
on radiocommunications, July 21.

sec, SOLAS, working group on ship
design and equipment, July 13.

Arthur W. Hummel. Jr., sworn in as
Ambassador to Pakistan (biographic
data).

Arthur A. Hartman sworn in as Ambas-
sador to France (biographic data).

Frederick Irving sworn in as Ambas-
sador to Jamaica (biographic data).

Marvin Weissman sworn in as Ambas-
sador to Costa Rica (biographic data).

Harry W. Shlaudeman sworn in as Am-
bassador to Peru (biographic data).

Ocean Affairs Advisory Committee,
Kodiak, Alaska, July 6-7.

Vance; interview by Marino di Medici of
II Tempo.

Herbert Salzman sworn in as U.S. Rep-
resentative to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (biographic data).

No. Date

t282 6/15

*283
*284

*292

t293

6/16
6/16

t285 6/16

286

6/17

287

6/17

288

6/17

289

6/17

290

6/17

*291 6/18

6/18
6/19

Subject

Vance: first intervention before the OAS
General Assembly, St. George's, Gre-
nada, June 14.

John C. West sworn in as Ambassador
to Saudi Arabia (biographic data).

George S. Vest sworn in as Assistant
Secretary for European Affairs (bio-
graphic data).

Vance: statement on U.S. -Panama
negotiations before the OAS General
Assembly, St. George's, Grenada,
June 15.

Vance: news conference, St. George's,
Grenada, June 16.

Patricia Derian sworn in as Coordinator
for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs (biographic data).

Donald C. Bergus sworn in as Ambas-
sador to Sudan (biographic data).

Department transmits 1977 Salmon
Commission regulations.

Program for official visit to Washington
of Prime Minister Fraser of Australia,
June 21-23.

Vance: remarks at a dinner honoring
John F. Kennedy, Robert F. Ken-
nedy, and Martin Luther King, Jr.

Vance: Departure, Port of Spain,
Trinidad and Tobago, June 17.

Vance: interview on ABC's "Issues and
Answers."

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX July i, 1977 Vol. LXXVII, No. 198U

Africa. President Carter Discusses Cuba and
SALT Negotiations (excerpts from remarks) . . 9

American Principles. A Guiding Philosophy for
American Informational and Cultural Pro-
grams Abroad (Reinhardt) 5

Arms Control and Disarmament

President Carter Discusses Cuba and SALT
Negotiations (excerpts from remarks) 9

President Carter's News Conference of .June 13
(excerpts) 1

President Signs Latin America Nuclear Free
Zone Treaty (Carter) 10

Commodities. Department Testifies on Interna-
tional Commodity Agreements (Katz) 19

Congo. U.S. Reestablishes Relations With the
Congo (Department announcement) 8

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 27

Department Discusses U.S. Efforts in Search for
Middle East Peace (Atherton) 2.5

Department Testifies on International Commod-
ity Agreements (Katz) 19

Cuba

President Carter Discusses Cuba and SALT
Negotiations (excerpts from remarks) 9

President Carter's News Conference of June 13
(excerpts) 1

United States and Cuba Agree To Open Inter-
ests Sections (Department announcement) 12

Cultural Affairs. A Guiding Philosophy for
American Informational and Cultural Pro-
grams Abroad (Reinhardt) 5

Department and Foreign Service

United States and Cuba Agree To Open Inter-
ests Sections (Department announcement) 12

U.S. Reestablishes Relations With the Congo
(Department announcement) 8

Developing Countries

President Carter's News Conference of June 13
(excerpts) 1

Toward International Equilibrium: A Strategy
for the Longer Pull (Blumenthal) 13

Economic Affairs

Department Testifies on International Commod-
ity Agreements (Katz) 19

Toward International Equilibrium: A Strategy
for the Longer Pull (Blumenthal) 13

Human Rights

President Carter Signs American Convention on
Human Rights (Carter, text of convention) 28

President Carter's News Conference of June 13
(excerpts) 1

Intelligence Operations. President Carter's
News Conference of June 13 (excerpts) 1

Japan. U.S. -Japan End Second Round of Nuclear
Energy Talks (Department announcement) — 18

Latin America and the Caribbean

President Carter Signs American Convention on
Human Rights (Carter, text of convention) 28

President Signs Latin America Nuclear Free
Zone Treaty (Carter) 10

Mexico. U.S. and Mexico Complete Transfer of
Territory (Department announcement) 10

Middle East. Department Discusses U.S. Ef-
forts in Search for Middle East Peace (Ather-
ton) 25

Nuclear Energy. U.S. -Japan End Second Round
of Nuclear Energy Talks (Department an-
nouncement) 18

Presidential Documents

President Carter Discusses Cuba and SALT

Negotiations (excerpt.s from remarks) 9

President Carter Signs American Convention on

Human Rights 28

President Carter's News Conference of June 13

(excerpts) 1

President Signs Latin America Nuclear Free

Zone Treaty 10

Public Affairs. A Guiding Philosophy for
American Informational and Cultural Pro-
giams Abroad (Reinhardt ) .5

Treaty Information

Current Actions 39

President Carter Signs American Convention on

Human Rights (Carter, text of convention) 28

President Signs Latin America Nuclear Free

Zone Treaty (Carter) 10

U.S. and Mexico Complete Transfer of Territory

(Department announcement) 10

U.S.S.R.

President Carter Discusses Cuba and SALT
Negotiations (excerpts from remarks) 9

President Carter's News Conference of June 13
(excerpts) 1

Naine Inde.v

Atherton, Alfred L., Jr 25

Blumenthal, W. Michael 13

Cartel-, President 1,9, 10, 28

Katz, Julius L 19

Reinhardt, John E 5

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)77,

/??S

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXVII • No. 1985 • July 11, 1977

A FRAMEWORK FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE:
SHAPING A MORE STABLE WORLD
Address by Vice President Moridale J^l

U.S. REITERATES SUPPORT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE

OF NAMIBIA AND ZIMBABWE AT MAPUTO CONFERENCE

Statements by Ambassador Young and Assistant Secretary Maynes,

Text of Final Declaration and Program of Action 55

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,

domestic $42.50. foreign $53.15

Single copy 85 cents

Vol. LXXVII, No. 1985
July 11, 1977

The Department of State BiLLETI?
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested ayencies of the yovernment
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreiyn relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreiyn Service.

The BL'LLETIS includes selected
press releases on foreiyn policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as spe^
cial articles on various phases of inm
ternational affairs and the functions oP
the Department. Information is in-
eluded concerniny treaties and inter-
national ayreements to which the
L'nited States is or may become a party
and on treaties of yeneral interna-
tional interest.

Publications of the Department oi
State, United Nations documents, an
leyislative material in the field of
international relations ate also listed.

A Framework for Middle East Peace: Shaping A More Stable World

Address by Vice President Mondale

In the last several months, I've undertaken
two extended foreign trips on behalf of the
President to Europe and Japan. The more I
travel, and the more nations I visit, the more
1 come to believe that the peoples of the world
are not really so different — that all of us
dream the same dreams for our children and
that the real key to peace and cooperation in
the world lies in better understanding be-
tween people. Diplomats and heads of state
and elected officials must play a role, but we
should never underestimate the power of
ideas and education and greater understand-
ing to break down the barriers of suspicion
and fear that too often separate the nations of
the world.

Your programs in the school system, on
television, the lectures and seminars you
hold, your model U.N. conference for stu-
dents are all an impoilant part of that effort.
And I'm particularly pleased to see that
you're joining together with a number of
groups involved in international relations in a
new World Affairs Center here in San Fran-
cisco, and I wish you every success in that
venture. And so the contributions of an or-
ganization such as yours toward increased un-
derstanding in the world are really crucial,
not only to the foreign policy efforts of this
nation but to the search for peace.

With the words of his Inaugural Address,
President Carter identified at the very outset
of his Administration the guiding spirit of this
nation's foreign policy:

< )ur nation can be strong abroad only if it is strong at
hiime, and we know that the best way to enhance free-
ilom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our
ilcmocratic system is worthy of emulation. To be true to
ourselves, we must be true to others.

And he elaborated on the basic premises of
our relations with other nations in his speech
at Notre Dame this May:

— Our policy must be rooted in our people's
basic commitment to human rights.

— Our policy must be based on close cooper-
ation with the Western industrial democra-
cies. With them we share basic values; with
them also we share a recognition that global
problems cannot be solved without close coop-
eration among us. This was the message the
President had me take to Europe and Japan in
the first week of the Administration, and this
was the spirit which guided the President and
his colleagues at the London summit last
month.

— Our policy must seek to improve relations
with the Soviet Union and China. It must do
so in a balanced and reciprocal way, while we
maintain a strong defense.

— Our policy must recognize that the cleav-
age between North and South is as important
as between East and West. We must reach
out to the world's developing nations, seeking
to narrow the gap between rich and poor.

— Finally, our policy must provide incen-
tives for all nations to rise above ideology or
narrow conceptions of self-interest and work
together to resolve regional conflicts and to
meet global problems that confront all people.

As an Administration, we are only five
months old. However, these months have
been a period of intense activity. We are
committed to shaping effective policies that

' Made before the World Affairs Council of Northern
California at San Francisco on June 17, 1977.

July 11, 1977

truly reflect America's values and objectives,
and we are committed to implementing
policies with other nations so as to shape a
more peaceful and stable world.

One of our first tasks has been to insure
that our foreign policy reflects the commit-
ment to basic human rights that we, as
Americans, share. That commitment to the
inherent dignity of the individual is at the
heart of the American tradition. From it flows
the democratic liberties that we cherish — such
as the right to worship freely; freedom of
speech, of the press, of assembly, and due
process of law. Those are the basic strengths
of our nation.

We have survived as a free nation because
we have remained committed to the defense of
fundamental moral values we cherish as a
people. And unless our foreign policy reflects
those values it will not earn the support of the
American people. Without that support, no
foreign policy — no matter how brilliantly
conceived — can succeed.

I believe we have restored that commit-
ment to human rights. I am proud that the
United States today stands among those who
uphold human rights and human dignity in the
world. I am proud that no foreign leader
today has any doubt that the United States
condemns torture, political imprisonment, and
repression by any government, anywhere in
the world. We believe that basic human rights
transcend ideology. We believe all nations,
regardless of political systems, must respect
those rights.

Just as respect for human rights is central
to our foreign policy values, so progress to-
ward a just and lasting Middle East settle-
ment is essential to the prospect of a more
peaceful world. The President has asked me
to describe what we are trying to do to
achieve peace in the Middle East. We want
the American people to have the fullest possi-
ble understanding of our approach, for your
support is crucial to its success.

President Carter has now met with the
leaders of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi
Arabia. The President met with Prime Minis-
ter Rabin of Israel, and we hope that we will
soon meet with the new Prime Minister.

With the exception of the meeting with

President Asad which was held in Geneva, I
have participated in all of them and havei
sensed these leaders' great desire for peace
and their longing for the benefits that peace
can bring to nations too long mobilized for
war. Yet at the same time, we also found deep
fears and suspicions which must be overcome
if peace is to be achieved in that strategic and
troubled region of the world.

A genuine and lasting peace in the Middle
East is of essential interest to all Americans.
Conflict there carries the threat of a global
confrontation and runs the risk of nuclear
war. As we have seen, war in the Middle East
has profound economic consequences. It can,
and has, damaged the economies of the entire
world. It has been a tragedy for the nations of
the region. Even short of war, continued con-
frontation encourages radicalization and in-
stability.

Genuine peace is needed by all parties to
the conflict. The Arab nations need peace.
Israel, above all, has a profound interest in
peace; there is no question about that.

Israel's Survival

For almost three decades, Israel has borne
the burden of constant war. More than half
its entire budget is dedicated to defense. Its
citizens bear the highest average tax burden
in the world — more than 60 percent of their
income goes for taxes.

And yet, at the same time, this valiant na-
tion has managed to create a miracle in the
desert. With ingenuity, hard work, and skill it
has created a land that could be a model for
economic development and for political liberty
to be emulated throughout the Middle East.
Democracy has thrived in Israel despite the
kind of adversity that has crushed freedom in
other lands.

And yet, what of the future? Is it a future
in which Israel's three million people try, by
force of arms alone, to hold out against the
hostility and growing power of the Arab
world? Or can a process of reconciliation be
started — a process in which peace protects Is-
rael's security, a peace in which the urge for
revenge and recrimination is replaced by
mutual recognition and respect?

Department of State Bulletin

clei

America has a special responsibility and a
;pecial opportunity to help bring about this
dnd of peace. This comes about first of all be-
•ause of our unique and profound relationship
vith the State of Israel since its creation more
han a generation ago. Our sense of shared
.alues and purposes means that, for Ameri-
•ans, the question of Israel's survival is not a
jolitical question but rather stands as a moral
ijmperative of our foreign policy.

(ey Elements for an Agreement

And yet, our special relationship with Israel
™ has not been directed against any other coun-
try. We have been able to enjoy the friendship
af much of the Arab world, where we and our
close allies have important interests.

It is precisely because of our close ties with
both Israel and her Arab neighbors that we
are uniquely placed to promote the search for
St peace, to work for an improved understanding
of each side's legitimate concerns, and to help
them work out what we hope will be a basis
for negotiation leading to a final peace in the
Middle East.

When this Administration entered office on
January 20, we found that the situation in the
Middle East called for a new approach. The
step-by-step diplomacy of our predecessors
had defused the immediate tensions produced
by the war in 1973. But it was also evident
that it would be increasingly difficult to
achieve small diplomatic concessions when the
ultimate shape of a peace agreement remained
obscure. At the same time, it was unlikely
that an agreement on a lasting peace could be
achieved at one stroke.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 242,
which is supported by all the parties, provides
a basis for the negotiations which are required
if there is to be a settlement. But Resolution
242 does not by itself provide all that is re-
quired. We, therefore, decided to work with
the parties concerned to outline the overall
framework for an enduring peace. Our con-
cept was to use this framework as the basis
for a phased negotiation and implementation
of specific steps toward peace.

A major impediment to this approach lay in
the fact that the positions of all sides were
frozen. The words and phrases used by the

)nii
U

parties had become encrusted with the fallout
of countless diplomatic battles.

We have tried to regain momentum in this
process. We have encouraged Arabs and Is-
raelis to begin thinking again seriously about
the elements of peace and not to remain com-
mitted to particular words and formulations.

To this end the President has tried to de-
scribe our understanding of what the key ele-
ments of an overall framework for an agree-
ment might be:

— A commitment to a genuine and lasting
peace demonstrated by concrete acts to nor-
malize relations among the countries of the
area;

— The establishment of borders for Israel
which are recognized by all and which can be
kept secure;

— A fair solution to the problem of the
Palestinians.

The President has set forth these elements
not to dictate a peace or to impose our views
but to stimulate fresh thought.

Relations Among Middle East Countries

President Carter has gone further than any
of his predecessors to stress with Ai-ab lead-
ers the essential point that peace must mean
more than merely an end to hostilities, stating
as he did in Clinton, Massachusetts, last
March:

. . . the first prerequisite of a lasting peace is the
recognition of Israel by her neighbors, Israel's right to
exist, Israel's right to exist permanently, Israel's right
to exist in peace. That means that over a period of
months or years that the borders between Israel and
Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, Israel
and Egypt must be opened up to travel, to tourism, to
cultural exchange, to trade, so that no matter who the
leaders might be in those countries, the people them-
selves will have formed a mutual understanding and
comprehension and a sense of a common purpose to
avoid the repetitious wars and death that have afflicted
that region so long. That's the first prerequisite of
peace.

We have found that the Arab leaders did
not insist that this kind of peace is something
that only future generations could consider.
Some leaders — such as King Hussein [of
Jordan] during his visit to Washington — have
made clear their commitment to a "just, a
lasting peace, one which would enable all the

July n, 1977

people in [the Middle East] to divert their
energies and resources to build and attain a
brighter future. . . ." ^

So we believe that we have made some
progress in getting Arab leaders to recognize
Israel's right to exist and to recognize —
however reluctantly — that this commitment is
essential to a genuine peace; that peace must
be structured in such a way that it can survive
even if some leaders were to nurture aims to
destroy Israel. Still, we have a long way to
go. The Arabs have been insistent that Israel
withdraw from the territories it occupied in
the 1967 war. We have made clear our view
that Israel should not be asked to withdraw
unless it can secure, in return, real peace
from its neighbors.

Borders and Security Arrangements

The question of withdrawal is, in essence,
the question of borders. For peace to be en-
during, borders must be inviolable. Nations
must feel secure behind their borders. Bor-
ders must be recognized by all.

A crucial dilemma has been how to provide
borders that are both secure and acceptable to
all. It is understandable that Israel, having
fought a war in every decade since its birth,
wants borders that can be defended as easily
as possible. But no borders will be secure if
neighboring countries do not accept them.

The problem is that borders that might af-
ford Israel the maximum security in military
terms would not be accepted as legitimate by
Israel's neighbors. Borders that Israel's
neighbors would recognize, Israel has not
been willing to accept as forming an adequate
line of defense.

For this reason, the President has tried to
separate the two issues. On the one hand,
there must be recognized borders. But, in ad-
dition, there could be separate lines of de-
fense or other measures that could enhance
Israel's security. The arrangements in the
Sinai and in the Golan Heights provide models
of how Israel's security might be enhanced
until confidence in a lasting peace can be fully
developed.

^ For the full text of an exchange of toasts between
Pre.sident Carter and King Hussein on Apr. 25, see
Bulletin of May 23, 1977, p. 520.

We would urge all the parties to think
realistically about security arrangements to
reduce the fear of surprise attack, to make
acts of aggression difficult if not impossible,
and to limit the military forces that would
confront one another in sensitive areas.

This approach recognizes the fact that there
is a profound asymmetry in what the two
sides in the Middle East are seeking. On the
one hand, a principal Arab concern is to re-
gain lost territory. On the other, Israel
wishes peace and recognition. Territory is-j
tangible and once ceded difficult to regain
short of war. Peace, on the other hand, can be
ephemeral. Peaceful intentions can change
overnight unless a solid foundation of cooper-
ation and a firm pattern of reinforcing rela-
tionships can be established to insure that all
have a stake in continuing tranquillity.

We believe that separating the imperatives
of security from the requirement of recog-
nized borders is an important advance toward
reconciling the differences between the two
sides. It is in this way that Israel could return
to approximately the borders that existed
prior to the war of 1967, albeit with minor
modifications as negotiated among the par-
ties, and yet retain security lines or other ar-
rangements that would insure Israel's safety
as full confidence developed in a comprehen-
sive peace. Thus, with borders explicitly rec-
ognized and buttressed by security measures
and with the process of peace unfolding, Is-
rael's security would be greater than it is to-
day.

Future of the Palestinians

A further major issue is that of the future oil
the Palestinian people. It has been the source?
of continuing tragedy in the Middle East
There are two prerequisites for a lasting
peace in this regard.

— First, there mu.st be a demonstrated will-!
ingness on the part of the Palestinians to livei
in peace alongside Israel.

— Second, the Palestinians must be given i
stake in peace so that they will turn awaj
from the violence of the past and toward a fu-
ture in which they can express their legiti
mate political aspirations peacefully. ,

Thus, if the Palestinians are willing to exisi

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ill peace and are prepared to demonstrate that
willingness by recognizing Israel's right to
exist in peace, the President has made clear
that, in the context of a peace settlement, we
believe the Palestinians should be given a
chance to shed their status as homeless refu-
gees and to partake fully of the benefits of
peace in the Middle East, including the possi-
bility of some arrangement for a Palestinian
homeland or entity— preferably in association
with Jordan.

How this would be accomplished and the
exact character of such an entity is, of course,
something that would have to be decided by
the parties themselves in the course of
negotiation. However, the President has
suggested that the viability of this concept
and the security of the region might be en-
hanced if this involved an association with
.Jordan. But I emphasize that the specifics are
for the parties themselves to decide.

Necessity of Negotiating

This leads me to a further crucial aspect of
our approach — the necessity of direct negotia-
tions among the parties concerned. We cannot
conceive of genuine peace existing between
countries who will not talk to one another. If
they are prepared for peace, the first proof is
a willingness to negotiate their differences.

This is why we believe it is so important to
proceed with the holding of a Geneva confer-
ence this year. That conference provides the
forum for these nations to begin the working
|out of these problems together directly, face-
to-face. We have a continuing objective to
convene such a conference before the end of
this year.

Underlying this entire effort to promote the
process of negotiation is our determination to
maintain the military security of Israel. There
must be no question in anyone's mind that the
United States will do what is necessary to in-
sure the adequacy of Israel's military posture
and its capacity for self-defense.

We recognize that America has a special re-
sponsibility in this regai'd. In fact, in promul-
gating our overall policy to curb the interna-
tional traffic in arms, the President specif-
I ically directed the gover ment that we will
honor our historic responsibilities to assure

the security of the State of Israel. Let there
be no doubt about this commitment by this
Administration.

We do not intend to use our military aid as
pressure on Israel. If we have differences
over military aid — and we may have some — it
will be on military grounds or economic
grounds but not political grounds. If we have
differences over diplomatic strategy — and
that could happen — we will work this out on a
political level. We will not alter our commit-
ment to Israel's military security.

Let me conclude by saying that we hope the
concepts I have been discussing there
today — concepts which the President has ad-
vanced at talks with Israeli and Arab
leaders — will stimulate them to develop ideas
of their own. We realize that peace cannot be
imposed from the outside, and we do not in-
tend to present the parties with a plan or a
timetable or a map. Peace can only come from
a genuine recognition by all parties that their
interests are served by reconciliation and not
by war, by faith in the future rather than bit-
terness over the past.

America can try to help establish the basis
of trust necessary for peace. We can try to
improve the atmosphere for communication.
We can offer ideas, but we cannot, in the end,
determine whether peace or war is the fate of
the Middle East. That can only be decided by
Israel and her Arab neighbors.

We believe that both sides want peace. As
the President has said [at Notre Dame on
May 22]:

This may be the most propitious time for a genuine
settlement since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict almost 30 years ago. To let this opportunity pass
could mean disaster, not only for the Middle East, but
perhaps for the international political and economic
order as well.

As we go forward in our mediating role, we
will have to expect from time to time to have
differences with both sides. But these will be
differences as to tactics. Our overall objec-
tives will be those that we believe are now
shared by all sides: A permanent and endur-
ing peace in the Middle East.

This is obviously a difficult task and there is
always the possibility of failure. But it is a
historic responsibility that requires the fullest
possible support of the American people.

July 11, 1977

I believe we have this support. And as we
go through the difficult days ahead, this sup-
port will sustain us. It will provide the
strength we need to encourage all parties to
put aside their fears and put trust in their
hopes for a genuine and lasting Middle East
peace.

John Kennedy once described the formula
for peace not only in the Middle East but
throughout the world, and I would like to
close with his words [at the U.N. on Sept.
25, 1961]:

If we all can persevei'e — if we can in every land and
office look beyond our own shores and ambitions — then
surely the age will dawn in which the strong are just
and the weak secure and the peace preseived.

Magazine Publishers Association
Interviews President Carter

Following is an excerpt relating to foreign
policy from President Carter's opening re-
marks and a question and answer from the
transcript of an interview by members of the
Magazine Publishers Association on June
10. 1

In foreign affairs, we've also been quite ag-
gressive, I think, so far. We are trying to
wi'estle with the basic questions of southern
Africa in a deeply involved fashion, working
with the British and others. I have met with
all the leaders in the Middle East. We've
taken an innovative stand on nonproliferation
of nuclear explosive capability.

We've had, I think, so far, a very successful
effort to arouse the consciousness of the world
about basic human rights and human free-
doms. I don't think there is a foreign leader in
the world who doesn't have in the forefront of
his consciousness or her consciousness now,
the basic question of what are we doing in our
country about human rights. And this has
been a very gratifying thing to us so far.

We are dealing with the question of nor-
malizing relationships with countries who

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated June 20, 1977, p.
86.5.

have been our adversaries or even enemies ini
the past. This is one that is fraught with)
grave political consequences if they are noti
handled in a sensitive fashion. My own incli-
nation, though, is to aggressively challenge,
in a peaceful way of course, the Soviet Union;
and others for influence in areas of the world!
that we feel are crucial to us now or poten-
tially crucial 15 or 20 years from now. And
this includes places like Vietnam and places
like Iraq and Somaha and Algeria and places
like the People's Republic of China and even
Cuba. I don't have any hesitancy about these
matters.

The other thing I would like to mention
briefly is that we've, I think, formed a much
tighter alliance of consultation and mutual
purpose with our friends in the Western de-
mocracies. I have the utmost confidence that
their democratic systems can prevail.

I think this is somewhat of a change, maybe
from some of the attitudes of our leaders that,
have preceded me. But I think in the longi
run, we have the advantage on our side be-
cause there is an innate hunger among the
human beings who inhabit this Earth for a-i
right to make their own decisions, not to be
abused by government, to be free to develop
as they choose, to be treated fairly. And I
think in this way, our system of government
can be exemplary to others. I think this is
something that is now being more clearly
seen.

And I feel — like in the competitive world of,
say, among the African nations or in Asia or
in Latin America — that we ought not to be
timid in putting our best foot forward and<
that we ought to be sure that our own system)
here is clean and decent and honest and open
and that there is a general sense among the
world's people that when I speak I don't speako
as an isolated voice; that as best I can, my
Cabinet understands and supports what I say,
that the Congress understands and supports*
what I say, and as best I can, again, that the
American people understand and support
what I say.

We've been criticized to some degree by in-
jecting some of the controversial issues into
the public domain for debate. Obviously, one
of them is concerning the Middle East and

Department of State Bulletin

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another one is nonproliferation, where we
have aroused the displeasure of Germany and
France and Paliistan and Brazil. The other
one is human rights. But I think that if we
stand for something we ought to be forceful
about it. And we might win some and lose
some in relationships with other countries,
but in general, though, I've been pleased.

Q. Mr. President, my name is Harry
Thompson [U.S. vice president of To the
Point International magazine]. I wonder
whether you could articulate for us the U.S.
policy toward Africa, both black and south-
em, and who really speaks out — Vice Presi-
dent Mondale, Secretary Vance, or Ambas-
sador Young?

The President: I will try. In the southern
part of Africa we have three basic simultane-
ous problems. One is to deal with the question
in Rhodesia, or Zimbabwe.

We are working closely with the British,
who just finished a circle of bilateral discus-
sions with the so-called frontline nations — the
leading black nations around Rhodesia — and
with Ian Smith [of Rhodesia] and with Vors-
ter [Prime Minister John Vorster, of South
Africa]. We will now have our negotiators
come back to this country to explain to me and
Secretary Vance, the Vice President, Andrew
Young, what the results of those discussions
were.

One of the hopes is we might evolve,
primarily with the British in the leadership
role, a constitution that would be acceptable
to the black and white future citizens of
Rhodesia who have not been discouraged. I
cannot tell you that we anticipate any easy
resolution.

The second question, of course, is how to
deal with what was formerly known as South
West Africa, now known as Namibia. This is a
nation that is, to a great degree, under the
purview or control of the United Nations as
far as legahties go.

The South Africans have not been willing to
relinquish their tight control over the future
of Namibia. And we have tried to induce Mr.
Vorster to join with us in establishing an
interim government that is broadly represen-
tative, to lead to democratic elections for a

permanent, independent governing structure
for Namibia.

As you know, he had put his eggs in what
you might call a Turnhalle basket. A Turn-
halle is a school gymnasium. That is a kind of
a hand-selected group by Vorster to deal with
the future of Namibia. This has not been ac-
ceptable to the rest of the countries in South
Africa, nor to the U.N. members, including
ourselves.

Under Andy Young's leadership, we've
joined with Canada, England, France, and
Germany and have now concluded two de-
tailed importunities or requests or discussions
with Vorster, asking him to resolve the
Namibian question without delay.

The other question, obviously, is related to
some degree; and that is, the future attitudes
of South Africa itself. We don't feel an inclina-
tion to intrude into their internal policies, but
we ai'e committed as a nation to having equal-
ity of treatment of citizens.

As you know. South Africa is in very bad
repute in many regions of the world. We are
not trying to overthrow their government,
but we do feel that there ought to be some
equality of hiring practices, equality of pay
for the same kind of work done, promotion
opportunities for black citizens — which is not
there — an end to the highly disci'iminatory
past system that exists in Africa.

These are the kind of things that the South
went through 15, 20, 25 years ago, and just
some demonstration of good faith on the part
of the South African officials is what we would
like to see.

We are not in the position to make them do
this. But we've been trying to let South Af-
rica know that we are not abusive, that we
recognize their value as a stabilizing influence
in the southern part of Africa to the extent
that they work with us and resolve these
other questions.

There is actually no disparity of opinion or
responsibility among myself, Cyrus Vance,
the Vice President, or Andy Young. We com-
municate freely. We have open and unre-
stricted debates with one another. When
Andy Young goes to South Africa or to any of
the other many countries that he can now
go — which Kissinger could not go into — and

July 11, 1977

when he speaks for our country, he speaks
with my full authority and my complete sup-
port.

I had a meeting with Andy this past week
to point that out to him. I think that one of
the things that Andy presented to me, which I
did agree, is that there has been too much of a
concentration of attention on his interest in
Africa; that this needs to be spread more
widely to the Caribbean, for instance, to the
developing countries in South and Central
America, to perhaps some of the Asian coun-
tries. And I have approved that change in his
emphasis.

And the other thing is it is very hard on our
country and on Andy, in particular, for him to
spend 17 days on a broad-scale, very success-
ful trip — and I think in some instances very
courageous trip through Africa — and then on
the way back home to make a statement about
the Swedish Government being racist and
having that being the focal point of what he is

about and what he is. It was unfortunate. -
And he recognizes the fact that it did de-
tract from the effectiveness of his past and fu-
ture service. But there is no incompatibility
among us. I would have no reason to mislead
you about that. We are completely compatible
in our hopes.

The other pait of Africa that we are quite
concerned about that you did mention is in the
Horn of Africa with Somalia and Afars and Is-
sas, Ethiopia, Sudan, and to some degree
Ethiopia on the southern part of the Red Sea
and, of course, the Arab countries to the
north. But we are working very closely there
with the Saudi Arabians in particular, trying
to cement relationships with South Yemen,
and trying to improve relationships with
Somalia, trying to understand the conflict
within Ethiopia concerning the Eritreans.
That is where the potential troublespot is in
Africa.

THE CONGRESS

iifaii

Withdrawal of U.S. Ground Forces From South Korea

State7nent by Philip C. Habib

Under Secretary for Political Affairs *

General Brown [Gen. George S. Brown,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] and I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before
the committee to discuss plans for withdraw-
ing U.S. ground forces from Korea.

' Made before the Subcommittees on International
Security and Scientific Affairs and Asian and Pacific
Affairs of the House Committee on International Rela-
tions on June 10, 1977. The complete transciipt of the
hearings will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20402.

As you know, the President has decided to
withdraw U.S. ground forces from the Re-
public of Korea over a 4-5-year period in a
manner which would not endanger the secu-
rity of the Republic of Korea. This decision
reflects our determination after careful
study that, because of a combination of fac-
tors, we should now move to a careful,
phased removal of our ground forces in a
manner which assures continued peace and
stability in northeast Asia.

The world today is a far different one

Department of State Bulletin

from the 1950's, particularly in East Asia.
The pattern of great-power interests in the
area has dramatically changed. The broader
pattern of relationships between the great
powers is such that we believe that it is not
j in the interest of either the People's Repub-
' lie of China or the Soviet Union to encour-
age or support actions which would raise the
risk of war on the Korean Peninsula. Fur-
ther, the Republic of Korea today is
stronger, both economically and militarily,
and is both able and willing to bear increas-
ingly the burdens of its own defense. Given
these considerations we believe that the
time has come to move in a measured fash-
ion to begin the withdrawal of our ground
combat forces over the next 4-5 years.

The ground force withdrawal is a natural,
proper development in our ongoing security
relationship with the Republic of Korea.
Both we and the Republic of Korea have un-
derstood that the presence of U.S. ground
forces in Korea was related directly to our
assessment of the military balance. Republic
of Korea capabilities, and the international
situation. There had been no intention to
keep our ground forces indefinitely in
Korea. As you know the executive branch
and Congress have had the question of
ground force withdrawal under continuing
study over the past yeai's.

At this point, just as we moved to with-
draw a division in 1971 when the Koreans
were able to undertake a greater burden of
their defense, so we believe that in the
period we projected we should move to the
further withdrawal of U.S. ground forces.

In arriving at our determination that the
ground forces should be withdrawn, we have
carefully weighed the military and interna-
tional considerations involved. General
Brown can address in more detail your ques-
tions on the military aspects of this decision.
However, I would note that the basic ele-
ments that have gone into our determination
with regard to the ground forces withdrawal
were:

(a) Our recognition of Korea's impressive
economic growth over the past decade and
the consequent growing capability of the
Republic of Korea to defend itself;

(b) Our firm intention to maintain our
basic security commitment to the Republic
of Korea contained in the Mutual Defense
Treaty, as well as to keep a significant U.S.
force presence in Korea — consisting mainly
of air and key support units — after the
ground force withdrawal is completed. Addi-
tionally, our naval units will remain in the
area. We believe these forces, coupled with
the major U.S. forces remaining in the
western Pacific, provide a clear, visible U.S.
deterrent to any possible North Korean mis-
calculation;

(c) Our readiness, subject to congressional
consultations and approval, to take appro-
priate actions to assure that the ground
force withdrawal does not weaken Republic
of Korea defense capabilities; and

(d) Our assessment of the broader interna-
tional context in which we operate, particu-
larly the pattern of interrelationships be-
tween the great powers in the area.

With regard to the 2nd Infantry Division,
it is our view it could be relocated to the
United States and matched against other un-
fulfilled requirements which will provide
greater and much needed flexibility in meet-
ing U.S. worldwide contingency require-
ments.

In connection with the ground forces
withdrawal decision, the President wished
to consult with the Government of the Re-
public of Korea and the Government of
Japan on the ground force withdrawal in
order to secure their views. The President
accordingly dispatched General Brown and
me to meet with President Park and Prime
Minister Fukuda, as well as senior members
of their governments. Our discussions in
Seoul and Tokyo were comprehensive,
friendly, and constructive.

In our consultations in Seoul, President
Park and other senior Korean officials made
clear that they would have preferred that
our ground force presence remain. At the
same time they have accepted the essentials
of our projected force withdrawal and have
indicated their own confidence in meeting
the North Korean threat; provided, how-
ever, that adequate measures are taken in
parallel to substitute for the military fight-

July 11,1 977

ing power being withdrawn. Further, the
Korean Government made clear its view
that any program to provide equipment to
offset the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces
should be completed before the final phase
of ground force withdrawal is completed.

In Tokyo, the Japanese Government con-
veyed its concern that the ground force
withdrawal be carried out in an appropriate
manner which would not endanger the secu-
rity of the Republic of Korea nor threaten
the security of northeast Asia. The Japanese
Government believes that the key element
in achieving these objectives is the clear
reiteration of the U.S. security commitment
to the Republic of Korea so that there can
be no misunderstanding of our purpose and
determination. It also believes that
adequate measures should be taken to pro-
vide sufficient equipment to the Republic of
Korea to meet any shortfalls caused by the
withdrawal of our ground forces.

In our discussions in Seoul and Tokyo,
General Brown and I were careful to point
out that we were beginning a process of
consultations and that we were authorized
neither to enter into detailed negotiations
nor enter into any commitments. We were
also careful to stress the role of Congress
and our intention to consult fully with Con-
gress before proceeding to any detailed dis-
cussions or negotiations on the ground force
withdrawal. This was fully understood.
There was a clear appreciation on the part
of both the Korean and Japanese Govern-
ments for the President's initiative in pro-
viding this opportunity for initial consulta-
tions on the ground force withdrawal. At the
same time, we were asked to convey the
specific concerns of both governments, par-
ticularly regarding the need for adequate
concrete measures to assure that the secu-
rity of the Republic of Korea is not en-
dangered.

In sum, I would state that our consulta-
tions were successful in explaining to the
Korean and Japanese Governments the Pres-
ident's basic decision and in affording them a
full opportunity to express their views,
which we are now weighing carefully. As a
result of these consultations we believe

there is understanding and acceptance of a
carefully planned, staged withdrawal pro-
gram coupled with provision of needed
equipment to offset the fighting power of
the ground forces withdrawn. Both govern-
ments also understand better our determi-
nation to maintain our Mutual Defense Trea-
ty commitment and to manage the ground
force withdrawal in a manner which neither
endangers the security of the Republic of
Korea nor the basic military balance in
northeast Asia.

For our part we welcome this opportunity
to appear before your committee to discuss
both our recent consultations in Korea and
Japan and the various political and military
aspects of our ground forces withdrawal
program. In addition to these appearances,
we will be in continuing contact with the ap-
propriate congressional committees and con-
gressional leadership to be sure that you are
fully aware of our thinking and planning as
we proceed. As this evolves over the next
months, I can assure you that we will be
fully mindful of the crucial importance of
congressional understanding and support.

Human Rights Situation
in the Republic of China

Following is a statement by Burton Levin,
Director of the Office of Republic of China
Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Organizations of the House Committee
on International Relations on June H. *

I have been asked to appear before you
today to discuss the human rights situation in
the Republic of China. Before doing so, I
would like to make clear that I personally
welcome President Carter's emphasis on
human rights as an essential component of
American foreign policy.

In addition to promoting human rights, our
interests on Taiwan include preserving peace,

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Department of State Bulletin

sustaining a mutually beneficial economic re-
lationship, discouraging nuclear proliferation,
and conducting our relations in ways that are
consistent with our objective of normalizing
relations with the People's Republic of China.
There is a complex and not always supportive
interaction between these interests which
makes it difficult to focus on one of them.
Nevertheless, I shall do my best to describe
in perspective the human rights situation on
Taiwan.

Before getting into specifics, I'd like to take
a few minutes to examine the historical back-
ground.

For 20 centuries, China was guided by the
Confucian concept that it was the individual's
duty to be loyal and obedient to the state.
Repression was a sanctioned means for deal-
ing with opposition to Confucian orthodoxy as
defined by the rulers of the day. Law, to the
extent it played any role in government, fo-
cused on preserving social order rather than
on protecting the individual. Moreover, the
law was meted out by officials who combined
both executive and judicial powers. Western
concepts of government and individual rights
were not introduced into China until the late
19th century and did not flourish in the wars
and internal disunity of the first half of the
20th century.

At the conclusion of World War II, an eco-
nomically prostrate Taiwan was placed under
the control of a China itself wearied by war
and beset by growing civil conflict. The harsh
and arbitrary rule of the island's military gov-
ernment led to the bloodily repressed
Taiwanese uprising of 1947.

Following its defeat on the mainland and re-
treat to Taiwan in 1949, the Republic of China
remained preoccupied with Communist sub-
version. Into the early 1950's, there was an
atmosphere of fear and repression on Taiwan
with many trappings of a police state.

In the intervening quarter century, Taiwan
has evolved toward a more open society. The
police state atmosphere no longer exists, and
the average Chinese goes about his daily life
without fear or repression. Friction between
Taiwanese and Mainlanders has eased dramat-
ically. For the first time in China, elected
local government has been instituted and

taken reasonably firm root. Western legal
forms, based on continental European models,
have been strengthened.

Factors For and Against Change

What brought about this change? Most im-
portantly, uninterrupted peace, stability,
and economic development.

Over the past 20 years, per capita income
has grown from $71 to $809. Income is fairly
well distributed, and the gap between rich
and poor is narrowing. Nearly universal li-
teracy and equal educational opportunities
have exposed the whole population to a com-
mon modernizing influence. In 1952, 140,000
students were in secondary schools; by 1975
this had grown to 1.5 million.

These social and economic advances have
significantly reduced Taiwanese dissatisfac-
tion and given the people a stake in their gov-
ernment. In turn the government feels less
apprehensive about the loyalty of its people.

These domestic trends have been
supplemented by vastly increased contact
with the outside world. For the past decade,
Taiwan's economy has been dominated by the
foreign trade sector. The practices and expo-
sure that accompany this trade have pro-
foundly influenced Taiwan's economic, social,
and political life. At the same time, a signifi-
cant number of Taiwan's elite have been edu-
cated in the West, primarily the United
States. Through them, Western political and
social values have increasingly affected public
attitudes and government policy.

Despite these factors, there are several
reasons why there has not been greater prog-
ress.

First and foremost, despite Western fea-
tures, Taiwan remains a Chinese society. A
2,000-year-old political tradition continues to
bear heavily on the current scene. Taiwan's
political dynamics reflect the highly cen-
tralized and personalized Chinese leadership
pattern. In making its own compromises be-
tween social order and individual rights,
Taiwan predictably continues to give prefer-
ence to the traditional emphasis on social
order and harmony. Not surprisingly, its eco-
nomic and social record is better than its rec-

July 11, 1977

ord on civil and political rights, as we define
them.

Secondly, despite the absence of significant
fighting since the second Taiwan Strait crisis
in 1958, the Republic of China considers itself
in a continuing civil war with the People's Re-
public of China. As an island pitted against a
continent, the Republic of China believes the
situation warrants emergency governmental
measures, which unfortunately result in lim-
itations on human rights.

Finally, some opponents of the present gov-
ernment practice violence. Last fall, a parcel
bomb seriously injured the Governor of
Taiwan. In 1971 there was an assassination
attempt against Premier Chiang Ching-kuo
while he was visiting New York. Last year, a
letter bomb was mailed to the Republic of
China's Ambassador in Washington. These
acts have undoubtedly strengthened the hand
of those unsympathetic to human rights on
Taiwan.

Thus, the Republic of China is a society in
transition. While there are hard-line ele-
ments, there are also many in the government
who appreciate Western concepts of democ-
racy and individual rights.

Specific Issues

In your letter requesting my appearance,
you asked that I address a number of issues
concerning human rights on Taiwan.

Reports of Torture and Harassment

While reports of torture and cruel treat-
ment persist, they have been less frequent in
recent years. Typically, such reports concern
pretrial detention and the extraction of con-
fessions which continue to play a prominent
role in many indictments. It is difficult to ver-
ify them. It is our view that torture is not a
widespread practice in the Republic of China.
Our Embassy has contacts in almost every
segment of society, and we are confident that
were torture widespread, we would be aware
of it. Nevertheless, in light of the continuing
reports, it seems probable that the police and
security services at times have used torture,
harsh treatment, and psychological pressure,
although this is contrary to the declared pol-
icy of the government.

There are also reports of government sur-
veillance and harassment of the families and
associates of those who oppose its basic
policies. This practice derives from the
Chinese tradition of collective, rather than in-
dividual, responsibility. It creates a sense of
apprehension and uncertainty which restricts
free speech and political activity.

Political Prisoners

There are political prisoners in the Republic
of China. How many is uncertain, but we be-
lieve they number in the several hundi-eds.
Amnesty International has the names of about
200. The government stated last December
that there were 254 people in prison at that
time on sedition charges, of whom 95 were
convicted during 1974-76. We would consider
many of these prisoners of conscience; some,
however, were convicted of terrorist acts. In
general the political prisoners fall into two
main groups — those accused of Communist ac-
tivities and associations and those opposed to
basic government policies.

Though crimes of sedition may be punished
by the death penalty, there have been no re-
ports of political executions in recent years. It
is our impression that the average sentence in
recent political trials is about 10 years,
though those convicted of terrorism or Com-
munist activities have often been given life
sentences.

Following President Chiang Kai-shek's
death in 1975, the government promulgated a
Commutation Act, which reduces sentences
for political prisoners, and released about 200
of the approximately 500 persons imprisoned
at the time for political offenses.

Martial Law

In 1948, at the height of the Chinese Civil
War, the government imposed martial law. It
is still in effect. Martial law gives the gov-
ernment broad powers to try a wide variety of
crimes in military courts, to limit political as-
sembly, to prohibit strikes, and to censor the
press. It does not, however, impose military
rule. In fact, over the last two decades, the
role of the military in national affairs has
steadily declined.

Most human rights violations have their
legal basis in the martial law. Its generalized

Department of State Bulletin

references to offenses against the security of
the state and against public order and safety
provide the government ready means to act
against opponents. However, the government
does not utilize all of the discretionary powers
granted by that law; many criminal offenses
which could be tried in military courts are
now tried in civilian courts.

Detention arid Due Process

Though the Republic of China's detailed
habeas corpus law is generally applied in or-
dinary civil and criminal cases, the informa-
tion available to us indicates that people sus-
pected of sedition are detained— often
incommunicado — for weeks and at times
months without being formally charged or
tried. However, in contrast with the early
years of Republic of China rule on Taiwan
when some people simply disappeared, it is
our impression that in recent years detainees
are eventually either charged and tried or re-
leased.

There has been increasing attention to the
forms of due process in military court trials
and appeals involving sedition, but the sub-
stance is largely absent. Attendance is gener-
ally limited to family members and invited
press. Typically such trials last only a matter
of hours. While represented by counsel, the
accused has little real opportunity to defend
himself. The independence of military courts
is not established. Appeals occasionally result
in reduced sentences, but convictions have not
been reversed.

Elections

It is only in the past 25 years that the Re-
pubHc of China has developed a regular pat-
tern of elections. These are at the provincial,
municipal, county, and village levels. While
there have been instances of irregularities,
these elections generally reflect the will of the
electorate. Victories by independent critics
are not rare.

The more important limitations on the elec-
toral process are structural not technical.

First, there have been no general elections
at the national level since 1948, because the
Republic of China maintains it is the govern-
ment of all China and that general national
elections cannot be held until it reestablishes

control over the whole country. Beginning in
1969 supplementary elections have been held
for the national legislative bodies. The num-
bers elected have not been sufficient to alter
the composition of these bodies constituted on
the mainland of China 30 years ago.

Secondly, despite the largely theoretical ex-
istence of two opposition parties, the Republic
of China is effectively a one-party state. Can-
didates who oppose the ruling Nationalist
Party run as independents. They have not,
however, been allowed to organize a meaning-
ful opposition party. Economic and social im-
pi-ovements help explain the party's political
success. Nevertheless, its control rests partly
on restrictions placed on the civil and political
rights of its opponents.

Freedom of the Press

Freedom House classified the press on
Taiwan as "partly free."

While freedom of speech and the press are
guaranteed by the Constitution, martial law
gives the government authority to limit both.
In practice there are well-recognized restric-
tions on questioning basic policies. Views con-
trary to the government's claim to represent
all China — at variance with its adamant anti-
Communist stance — as well as those advocat-
ing Taiwan's independence, are considered
impermissible and punishable under law. With
the exception of these limited but crucial sub-
jects, people are generally free to say and
publish what they wish.

The press on Taiwan practices self-
censorship. The government conducts post-
publication censorship and occasionally recalls
articles or publications. It has suspended,
reorganized, or banned outspoken periodicals.
In recent years the government has allowed
somewhat freer access to information about
overseas developments, including events in
the People's Republic of China, and has be-
come less restrictive in its censorship of
foreign news and periodicals.

U.S. Actions

You asked what representations the De-
partment has made on human rights. Over the
years we have quietly tried to encourage
greater respect for human rights on Taiwan.

July 11, 1977

Our Embassy has frequently discussed
American concerns on human rights with
people in and out of government. I can assure
you that the highest leaders of the Republic of
China are fully aware of our views. The Em-
bassy has maintained contacts with a broad
range of politically active people, including
critics of the government. We have expressed
interest in particular political prisoners in an
effort to indicate our concern for those whose
human rights have been infringed as well as to
help particular individuals. I believe these ef-
forts have encouraged the long-term trend
toward a more open society.

There is eviclence that the Republic of
China is responsive to the President's human
rights emphasis. Administration statements
and the human rights report on the Republic
of China submitted to Congress earlier this
year have prompted public discussion of
human rights issues on Taiwan. Last De-
cember the government, for the first time, re-
leased statistical information on political pris-
oners. This spring the government granted an
exit permit to a prominent opposition
spokesman who previously had not been per-
mitted to travel abroad.

The broad domestic and international fac-
tors that have brought about the Republic of
China's evolution toward a more open society
should continue to operate in the years ahead.
The Government of the Republic of China has
become increasingly conscious of human
rights considerations. There may be tempor-
ary setbacks but the long-term trend prom-
ises to be toward greater respect for indi-
vidual liberties. While broad trends will
largely shape the future, I can assure you that
the Administration, in concert with the Con-
gress, will continue to seek effective means of
encouraging Taiwan's evolution toward a
more open society.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

Food and Agriculture Act of 1977. Report of the Senate
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry,
together with additional views, to accompany S. 275.
S. Kept. 95-180. May 16, 1977. 431 pp.
Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments of
1977. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Re-
lations to accompany H.R. 6179. S. Kept. 95-193.
May 16, 1977. 70 pp.
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978.
Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions to accompany H.R. 6689. S. Rept. 95-194. May
16, 1977. .59 pp.
The International Security Assistance and Arms Ex-
port Control Act of 1977. Report of the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. 1160. S.
Rept. 9.5-195. May 16, 1977. 62 pp.
Authoi'izing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978 for In-
telligence Activities of the U.S. Government, the In-
telligence Community Staff, the CIA Retirement and
Disability System, and for Other Purposes. Report of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to ac-
company S. 1539. S. Rept. 95-214. May 16, 1977.
5 pp.
Agricultural Act of 1977. Report of the House Commit-
tee on Agriculture, together with dissenting, addi-
tional, minority, supplemental, individual, and addi-
tional minoi'itv views, to accompany H.R. 7171. H.
Rept. 9.5-348. "May 16, 1977. 372 pp.
Annual Report to the Senate of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, together with additional
views. S. Rept. 95-217. May 18, 1977. 43 pp.
Export Administration Amendments of 1977. Confer-
ence report of the committee of conference of the
House Committee on International Relations to ac-
company H.R. 5840. H. Rept. 95-354. May 18, 1977.
29 pp. ■
Recent Deaths in Uganda. Report of the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, together with additional
views, to accompany S. Res. 175. S. Rept. 95-222.
May 19, 1977. 8 pp.
Toward Improved United States-Cuba Relations. Re-
port of a special study mission to Cuba, Feb. 10-15,
1977, submitted to the House Committee on Interna-
tional Relations. May 23, 1977. 73 pp.
Technology Transfer and Scientific Cooperation Be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union: A Re-
view. Report to the Subcommittee on International
Secui-ity and Scientific Affairs of the House Commit-
tee on International Relations by the Congressional
Research Service of the Library of Congress. May 26,
1977. 183 pp.

Department of State Bulletin

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

United States Reiterates Support for the Independence
of Namibia and Zimbabwe at Maputo Conference

The United Nations sponsored the Interna-
tional Conference in Support of the Peoples of
Zimbabwe and Namibia in Maputo, Mozam-
bique, May 16-21, 1977, which was attended
by 92 U.N. member states and numerous
nongovernmental organizations and obser-
vers. Following are statements made at that
conference by Andrew Young, U.S. Repre-
sentative to the United Nations, on May 19
and Charles W. Maynes, Assistant Secretary
for International Organization Affairs, at
the closing session on May 21 on behalf of
Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, the United Kingdom, arid the United
States, together with the text of the final dec-
laration and program of action.

AMBASSADOR YOUNG, MAY 19

Text as prepared for delivery

I would like to thank the sponsors of the
conference for enabling me and my colleagues
on the American delegation to join this effort
of the international community to express
deeply held views about Namibia and Zim-
babwe.

I congratulate Secretary General Wald-
heim, as well as Ambassador Salim [Salim
Ahmed Salim, Tanzanian Representative to
the United Nations] and Ambassador Kamana
[Dunstan Weston Kamana, Zambian Repre-
sentative to the United Nations and Chair-
man, U.N. Council for Namibia] and through
them the Committee of 24 and the U.N.
Council for Namibia, for their work in or-
ganizing the conference. I would also like to
thank our host, the Government of Mozam-
bique, for its hospitality here in Maputo.

I have come to Maputo because the United
States wishes to be strongly represented at

this conference in support of the independence
and liberation of Namibia and Zimbabwe. I
have come to Maputo because one of Presi-
dent Carter's first acts was to demand a new
and progressive policy toward Africa. And, I
am here because a personal commitment to
human rights requires that I be here.

I welcome this opportunity today to speak
to all of you gathered here; to speak to you
openly about southern Africa and the policy of
my government toward the problems of
Namibia and Zimbabwe. The Carter Adminis-
tration wants to demonstrate by the Ameri-
can participation in this conference and in
other ways that:

— We want it to develop, prosper, and be
free;

— We very much want to associate our-
selves more closely and work with Africans
on a broad range of matters of mutual in-
terest;

— We firmly believe there must be an end to
the deprivation of human dignity and funda-
mental rights for the majority of the people of
Namibia and Zimbabwe solely because of the
color of their skin; and

— These last vestiges of colonialism must
give way to freedom and independence based
on the will of the people.

We are in a race against time regarding
Namibia and Zimbabwe. The future of those
two countries and the fate of their people is
certain — liberation. We are here to discuss
measures that can hasten the inevitable day of
freedom. We all know that among these
measures will be continuing military efforts
by the liberation forces. They will insist on
continuing their struggle as long as funda-
mental political rights are denied the majority
in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

July 11, 1977

The armed struggle, however, though its
final outcome is inevitable, exacts a cruel
price from the people of Zimbabwe and
Namibia. Africa needs the leadership that
will be lost in a prolonged struggle; it needs
the infrastructure that will be destroyed in
extended military conflict. This is why all
here— whatever their views— must support
efforts to press ahead with any promising ap-
proach to an early negotiated settlement. This
is why one objective of this conference should
be to make it clear that U.N. members, as al-
ways, prefer a negotiated settlement where it
can be found.

The policies of the U.S. Government toward
southern Africa reflect the Carter Adminis-
tration's commitment to human rights. Presi-
dent Carter made it clear from the beginning
that a renewed commitment to our respon-
sibilities in the field of human rights required
justice in southern Africa. But our policy in
southern Africa also grows out of our policy
toward Africa as a whole, a policy based on
support for freedom, independence, territorial
integrity, and economic development and dig-
nity for all African nations. We believe it is in
our national interest to work cooperatively
with African nations on mutual economic and
political concerns.

During the past several months, I have par-
ticipated personally in the U.S. Govern-
ment's review of the situation in southern Af-
rica. Our conclusion is that the time remaining
for peaceful settlement is brief. We therefore
urgently embarked on several initiatives with
the Government of the United Kingdom and
several other Western governments on the
Security Council. We took these initiatives on
Rhodesia and Namibia because of the clear
necessity of resolving these problems while
time remains. Recent mihtary tension involv-
ing the illegal Smith regime and its neighbors
reveals how combustible the situation has be-
come. The United States condemns the
Rhodesian military incursions into Mozam-
bique and Botswana and the Rhodesian threat
against Zambia.

At the heart of tensions in southern Africa
lies the smoldering racial crisis in South Af-
rica itself. There as well, time is the enemy.
Refusal to take daring steps now will make

progress later much more painful, if not im-
possible. The United States will, therefore,
let the South African Government know that
this American Administration strongly be-
lieves that change in South Africa must begin
now.

Toward this end. Vice President Mondale
will be meeting in Vienna today and tomorrow
with Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa.
While we are meeting in Maputo, Vice Presi-
dent Mondale will be conveying to Mr. Vors-
ter all aspects of U.S. policy toward southern
Africa. He will be expressing U.S. support for
British Foreign Secretary Owen's initiative
on Rhodesia and for the effort of the five-
power contact groups to achieve a negotiated
solution for Namibia consistent with Security
Council Resolution 385.' The Vice President
will underscore the need for urgent progress
in Rhodesia and Namibia and for fundamental
positive changes in South Africa itself in the
interests of peace and stability for the entire
region.^

Let me turn to the work of this conference.
It is my strong belief that as we discuss the
questions of Zimbabwe and Namibia here in
Maputo, we should do so in a spirit of coopera-
tion and with a focus on contributing to rapid
solutions to the Zimbabwe and Namibia dis-
putes which will minimize the costs in terms
of human lives. This conference offers us an
opportunity to explore together the ways in
which we can jointly plan workable solutions.
The declaration we adopt at the close of the
conference should state clearly and concisely
our goals and aspirations in approaching this
problem. And it should keep open all roads to
a negotiated settlement.

Over the past several weeks, the five West-
ern members of the Security Council have
been working together on an initiative to help
find a settlement to the Namibian problem.
As most of you know, the approach originated
with an unprecedented joint demarche to
Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa on
April 7. At that meeting, Mr. Vorster was

' For text of the resolution adopted on Jan. 30, 1976,
see Bulletin of Feb. 2.3, 1976, p. 246.

^ For the text of Vice President Mondale's news con-
ference following his meeting with Pi-ime Minister Vor-
ster on May 20, see Bulletin of .June 20, 1977, p. 661.

Department of State Bulletin

told of the necessity for a settlement in
Namibia consistent with U.N. Security Coun-
cil Resolution 385. It was expressed to him
that an absence of progress toward an inter-
nationally acceptable solution would have
serious consequences for South Africa.

From April 27 to 29 officials of the British,
Canadian, French, German, and American
Governments met with South African officials
in Cape Town to discuss in detail the views of
the West on Namibia. The discussions cen-
tered around implementation of Resolution
385 and the importance of holding free elec-
tions in Namibia under U.N. supervision. The
representatives of five countries expressed
their strong view that all parties to the Nami-
bian problem should avoid any steps which
would foreclose the possibility of achieving an
internationally acceptable solution. The
Western delegates informed the South Afri-
cans in particular that the reported plans to
estabhsh an interim government in Namibia
based on the constitution developed by the
Turnhalle conference [South African-
sponsored constitutional conference held in
Windhoek, Namibia, beginning September
1975] would be unacceptable.

Following discussions with the South Afri-
cans, including several sessions with Prime
Minister Vorster, the contact group set out to
discuss the points raised during the talks with
the other parties to the Namibian problem.
We have only just completed informing the
Secretary General, representatives of the
front-line states, other African leaders,
SWAPO [South West Africa People's Or-
ganization], and representatives of various
political groups inside Namibia. We intend to
follow up aggressively on the next stage of
this process, to consolidate the points on
which progress has been made, to clarify new
points that have been raised, and to consult
closely with all parties, particularly in-
terested African states and SWAPO. As our
host, President Samora Machel, stressed in
the opening address, Security Council Resolu-
tion 385 constitutes a platform providing for a
"just solution" to the Namibian conflict. We
are determined to press ahead with this plat-
form precisely because it does provide a just
solution. Our initiatives with the other West-

ern members of the Security Council are
taken in that context. We will point out to
South Africa that Resolution 385 offers it a
final chance for peaceful settlement if it acts
now.

On Zimbabwe Secretary of State Vance re-
cently met with British Foreign Secretary
David Owen to consider the Rhodesian prob-
lem in light of Secretary Owen's trip to Af-
rica. As my colleague, Minister [of State for
Foreign Affairs] Ted Rowlands, has informed
you, the British Government has decided to
establish a consultative group to make contact
with the parties to the Rhodesian conflict
which will visit the area as necessary, includ-
ing Salisbury. The U.S. Government has
agreed to appoint a senior U.S. official to
work with the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office Deputy Under Secretary John Graham,
who will head the consultative group. The
purpose of the group will be to engage in de-
tailed consultations about an independence
constitution for Zimbabwe, as well as the
necessary transitional arrangements. We
offer our assistance in a supportive manner.
We recognize Britain's special role. We rec-
ognize that we can only be helpful if the key
parties involved believe we can be of assist-
ance.

We intend to work closely with all parties
during this phase of intensive consultations to
move forward the process leading toward
majority rule in Zimbabwe. We recognize that
there are serious differences of view, not only
between blacks and whites, between the
Smith regime and the international communi-
ty, but among blacks themselves. Our hope is
that as consultations proceed, these differ-
ences can be bridged and a free Zimbabwe
will be a united Zimbabwe. We are not naive
in thinking that unraveling a problem like the
Rhodesian situation, which has been a long
time in creation, will be easy. But I will
pledge to you today our support and best ef-
forts for a negotiated solution to the problem
so that we may see an independent Zimbabwe
under majority rule in 1978.

It is the view of my government that the
diplomatic efforts on Zimbabwe and Namibia
which have been launched have a chance for
success. For this to happen we must be in-

July 11, 1977

volved at every stage of U.N. discussion of
Zimbabwe and Namibia. Tiiat is one reason
why the United States is attending this con-
ference.

Not all views which have been expressed
here accord with U.S. policy. But let me em-
phasize that the goals of freedom and libera-
tion are fundamental in the Carter Adminis-
tration's approach to the issues of southern
Africa. It is seeking appropriate ways to pro-
mote these goals through the aggressive pur-
suit of negotiated settlements. While we rec-
ognize that not all members of the United
Nations will agree with every detail of the
initiatives we have taken, all member
nations — and this conference in particular —
should be encouraged by these initiatives. We
believe the final conference document should
reflect this fact.

I have stressed today American support for
peaceful, negotiated change in southern Af-
rica. Our reasons involve not only our com-
mitment to nonviolent solutions but also our
realization that Africa needs peace urgently
to begin the process of development as soon as
possible. That is the real challenge in
Africa.

We recognize that continuing armed strug-
gle is being waged, especially in Zimbabwe. It
is our hope that the fighting will be brought to
an early end. We will do all in our power to
end the injustices which have led to violence
and bloodshed and to effect an early transition
to independence in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

As you all know one of President Carter's
first decisions was to press for repeal of the
Byrd amendment. During my last trip to Af-
rica I informed African leaders of my confi-
dence that the President would succeed in re-
pealing this legislation which placed the
United States in violation of Security Council
resolutions regarding Rhodesia.

With the strong support of the President,
the Congress has now repealed the Byrd
amendment. President Carter is determined,
however, to press ahead with additional
measures which can help us make progress in
southern Africa.

On May 17 President Carter announced that
implementation of Security Council Resolu-
tion 385 on Namibia is imperative. Our efforts
to secure its implementation, he noted, in-

volve something stronger than a request. The
United States is prepared to take new meas-
ures in the United Nations if we do not obtain
rapid progress toward the final liberation of
Namibia.^

Let me conclude by stating my desire to
continue meeting with delegates to this con-
ference and having frank and serious discus-
sions of the issues we are considering here.
We all must talk together and understand
each other's views. Our goal must be to en-
courage change in a way that can minimize
violence. In doing this, we serve our overall
goal — manifesting our support for the people
of Namibia and Zimbabwe and working for
majority rule in southern Africa.

MR. MAYNES, MAY 21

The Western members of the Security
Council — Canada, the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and
the United States — came to this conference
for three reasons:

— We wanted to show solidarity with Afri-
can states on these two key issues of Namibia
and Zimbabwe.

— We wanted to seize this unique opportu-
nity to explain our African policies. Since any
African policy must begin with southern Af-
rica, we wanted the opportunity to explain to
the countries and movements most directly
concerned the initiatives we have taken and
the strategy we have followed.

— Finally, we wanted to listen to and un-
derstand African views on these critical sub-
jects. We recognize that our assistance will
not be effective unless the parties most di-
rectly involved understand our purpose and
feel free to convey their reactions.

From all three points of view we assess the
conference as remarkably successful. The con-
ference marks a new stage in the liberation of
Namibia and Zimbabwe. More than 90 coun-
tries came to declare their solidarity with the
people of Zimbabwe and Namibia. This collec-
tive expression of international determination ,

^ For the excerpt referring to South Africa from
President Carter's television question-and-answer
session in Los Angeles on May 17, see BULLETIN of
June 13, 1977, p. 626.

Department of State Bulletin

is a sign that the process of liberation is mov-
ing to a new and culminating phase. We have
found others willing to listen to our point of
view, and we have benefited from theirs. We
see ourselves working for the same goals,
even when we choose different means from
those preferred by others.

As you all know, over the past several
weeks the five Western members of the Secu-
rity Council have together advanced an initia-
tive to resolve the Namibian problem. West-
ern members of the Security Council informed
the South African Government that any set-
tlement in Namibia must be consistent with
U.N. Security Council Resolution 385. We left
no doubt that an absence of progress toward
an internationally acceptable solution would
have serious consequences for South Africa.

In the case of the United States, President
Carter recently confirmed U.S. policy in more
detail. In a statement made in Los Angeles on
May 17, 1977, he stated that unless there was
progress on Namibia, the United States would
be compelled to take strong action in the
United Nations.

The position of the Western members of the
Security Council is clear. In the light of the
initiatives we have taken, we find ourselves
unable to associate ourselves with a number
of the provisions of the declaration and the
program of action. To associate ourselves
would prejudice the results of negotiations
which have brought about the most pi'omising
start to resolve the Namibian pi'oblem. We
take a similar position regarding the negotia-
tion effort of the British in Zimbabwe. The
bulk of the documents, however, represent
our views. They also represent a remarkable
effort to convey to those who have blocked
progress in the past that there is a degree of
commitment and a depth of solidarity on these
issues which are unprecedented.

We recognize that progress must be made
urgently on these problems. We understand
that the issues of Namibia and Zimbabwe are
entering a new and final stage where one path
leads to increased violence and the other to
peaceful settlement.

So while we cannot associate ourselves with
a number of the provisions of the declaration,
we regard it as an important mark in history,
one which helps us understand our own re-

sponsibilities as members of the Security
Council and nations interested in peaceful
change and racial progress in southern Africa.
We commend the authors, and we praise the
organizers of this conference. Both have
helped bring the day of freedom closer than it
has ever been.

TEXT OF FINAL DECLARATION
AND PROGRAM OF ACTION ^

Text of the Maputo Declaration in Support of the
Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia and Programme
of Action for the Liberation of Zimbabwe and
Namibia

l.The International Conference in Support of the
Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, held in Maputo from
16 to 21 May 1977, was attended by 92 Member States
of the United Nations, and numerous observers and
non-governmental organizations representing all re-
gions of the world and diverse political and social sys-
tems. The Conference, which resulted from General As-
sembly Resolution A/31/14.5 of 17 December 1976, was
called to express the solidarity and support of the world
community with the freedom struggle of the oppressed
peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia.

2. The fact that the Conference was held in Maputo,
the capital of the People's Republic of Mozambique,
symbolizes the profound changes which have decisively
tipped the balance of forces in favour of the struggle for
self-determination and independence in the region with
the victories of the Liberation Movements of Mozam-
bique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao
Tome and Principe. The extension of the frontiers of
freedom to the borders of Zimbabwe and Namibia has
given impetus to the liberation struggle in these two
countries and has shaken the foundations of the racist
minority regimes of southern Africa.

3. The Liberation Movements in Zimbabwe and
Namibia have intensified their struggle as a conse-
quence of the intransigence of the colonial racist re-
gimes, which have not only consistently thwarted at-
tempts at arriving at a negotiated settlement, but also
have increased their brutal repression of the peoples of
the two countries. The minority regimes, in their des-
peration, have also carried out acts of agression against
neighbouring African States, thereby seriously threatening
international peace and security.

4. The development of the armed struggle, the isola-
tion of the minority regimes and the international sup-
port for the National Liberation Movements are factors
creating conditions for a negotiated settlement leading
to majority rule and genuine independence in Zimbabwe
and Namibia.

■* Adopted by consensus on May 21, 1977 (U.N. doc.
A/32/109 (Part ID); unofficial text printed here.

July 11, 1977

5. The Conference notes that the minority racist re-
gime of South Africa, in defiance of United Nations
Resolutions, international public opinion and the advis-
ory opinion of the International Court of Justice, gives
comfort and sustenance to the illegal racist minority re-
gime in Southern Rhodesia and is perpetuating its il-
legal occupation and exploitation of Namibia. The
Conference also notes that certain Western Powers
continue to encourage the racist regimes by economic,
military and other forms of collaboration with them and
by their continued refusal to support the Liberation
Movements in their legitimate struggle.

6. The Conference is convinced that the national lib-
eration struggle and the overwhelming international
support for it will overcome these negative factors and
that the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia are on the
threshold of freedom.

7. Against this background, the Conference adopts
the Maputo Declaration in Support of the Peoples of
Zimbabwe and Namibia and the Programme of Action
for the Liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia.

II. Declaration on the Liberation of Zimbabwe

8. The Conference solemnly proclaims its full support
for the people of Zimbabwe in their just struggle for
independence. It reaffirms that there should be no in-
dependence before majority rule and that any settle-
ment relating to the future of the territory must be
worked out with the full participation of the people of
Zimbabwe represented by their National Liberation
Movement, which includes all the progressive forces ac-
tively engaged in the struggle, and in accordance with
their time aspirations. The Conference affirms the prin-
ciple of the rights of individual citizens, regardless of
race or colour, and rejects any notion of special rights
and privileges for, or discrimination against, any ethnic
group.

9. The Conference reaffirms the primary responsibil-
ity of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland as the administering power for Southern
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The international accountability
which the administering power assumed under Chapter
XI of the Charter of the United Nations cannot be com-
promised. It is imperative that the solemn obligation
accepted as a sacred trust by the administering power
cannot be relinquished under any circumstances until
the objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples have been fully im-
plemented.

10. The Conference strongly condemns the illegal ra-
cist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia. It de-
nounces the regime's brutal and repressive measures
against the people of Zimbabwe. The illegal racist
minority regime has forcibly moved thousands of vil-
lagers into concentration camps. Numerous acts of bru-
tality have been committed by the illegal regime against
the people of Zimbabwe and foreign missionaries. There
has been beating, torture and killing of innocent vil-
lagers and the application of criminal and arbitrary
measures of collective punishment. Ruthless repres-

sion has escalated into genocide as shown in the mas-
sacre of hundreds of people in the Nyadzonya refugee
camp. The illegal regime is recruiting mercenaries to
carry out its brutal repression of the people of Zim-
babwe. It is clear that all the actions taken by the illegal
racist minority regime are designed to consolidate its
illegal rule of the teri-itory. Recent manoeuvres such as
the amendment of the Land Tenure Act and the ap-
pointment of puppet chiefs to "ministerial" posts are
futile attempts to perpetuate the status quo. The inter-
national community should act forthwith to put an end to
the illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe).

11. Over the years, efforts have been made to
achieve a negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe. These ef-
forts were particularly intensified in the wake of the
collapse of Portuguese colonialism in Africa and the
consequent extension of the frontiers of freedom in
southern Africa through the emergence of liberated
Mozambique and Angola as well as the development of
the struggle in Zimbabwe and Namibia. These efforts
were undertaken by the Liberation Movements sup-
ported by the frontline States and the Organization of
African Unity (OAU). This support was clearly re-
flected in the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Southern
Africa adopted by the OAU in April 1975.

12. Painstaking attempts were made last year to
reach a negotiated settlement culminating in the
Geneva Conference on Southern Rhodesia (Zim-
babwe). However, so far all reasonable and meaningful
proposals which would have secured a negotiated set-
tlement for an independent Zimbabwe on the basis of
majority rule have been totally rejected by the illegal
racist minority regime. Confronted with the intransi-
gence of the illegal minority regime, the freedom fight-
ers have intensified the armed struggle.

13. Furthermore, the fighting forces have forged
ahead in their drive towards unity. Positive steps were
taken towards the unity of Zimbabweans and the de-
velopment of the liberation struggle. The Conference
stresses the importance of the unity of all the patriotic
forces in their struggle against the illegal racist minor-
ity regime.

14. The development of the armed struggle and the
concerted efforts of the international community are
creating positive conditions for a negotiated settlement
based on majority rule.

1.5. The international community should endeavour to
intensify these efforts so that a speedy end is bi'ought
to the illegal racist minority regime. In this regard, the
Conference takes note of the efforts of the United
Kingdom, the administering power, to achieve a
negotiated settlement with the objective of securing in-
dependence for Zimbabwe under majority rule in 1978.

16. The Conference considers that the strict en-
forcement of existing mandatory sanctions against the
illegal racist minority regime is an important element in
the collective effort of the international community to
promote a settlement of the conflict in Zimbabwe. In
this regard, the actions taken by the Governments of
Mozambique and Zambia in closing their borders with

Department of State Bulletin

Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), imposing total sanc-
tions against the illegal minority regime, constitute a
major contribution in support of the liberation struggle
i]f the people of Zimbabwe and towards the maximum
isolation of the illegal minority regime in accordance
with United Nations objectives.

17. The Conference deplores that some States con-
tinue to violate sanctions with the result that sanctions
have had a limited effect on the economy of Southern
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The principal violator of sanc-
tions is South Africa. In addition, some Western and
other States have not implemented the mandatory sanc-
tions. The need to ensure that the mandatory sanctions
are scrupulously enforced is more urgent than ever.
Any breaches or evasions of obligations under the
Charter of the United Nations must not be tolerated.
At the same time there is an urgent need to widen the
scope of sanctions to include all the measures envisaged
under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations.

18. The Conference strongly condemns South Africa
for its support of the illegal racist minority regime in
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). It is South Africa's
support which sustains the illegal minority regime. The
United Nations should e.xamine all possibilities to en-
sure South Africa's compliance with the Resolutions on
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

19. The Conference strongly condemns the persistent
acts of aggression committed by the illegal racist minor-
ity regime in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) against
Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia. These acts of ag-
gression have resulted in an enormous loss of life and in
destruction of property. The international community
should give the utmost assistance to these States in
order to deter armed attacks by the illegal minority re-
gime in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). Through these
acts the illegal minority regime seeks to achieve a dual
objective on the one hand, to intimidate the frontline
States which are acting as strategic rear bases for the
liberation struggle in Zimbabwe in accordance with
United Nations objectives and, on the other hand, to
internationalize this conflict.

20. The Conference solemnly declares that the natu-
ral resources of Zimbabwe are the birthright of the
people of Zimbabwe. The exploitation of these re-
sources by the illegal racist minority regime in associa-
tion with foreign economic interests is in violation of
the principles of the Charter and of all pertinent Res-
olutions of the United Nations. The exploitation of
these resources by the illegal minority regime brings no
benefit to the people of Zimbabwe and contributes to
maintaining in power the illegal minority regime. The
activities of foreign economic interests engaged in
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) should be the object of
systematic denunciation so that their actions which are
detrimental to the people of Zimbabwe be exposed to
the full scrutiny of and condemnation by the interna-
tional community.

21. The Conference solemnly appeals to all States
J Members of the United Nations, other intergovernmen-
tal and non-governmental organizations to intensify
their assistance to the National Liberation Movement

July 11, 1977

representing the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle
for independence. It commends the international com-
munity for the invaluable moral, political and material
assistance given by it to the National Liberation
Movement of Zimbabwe. It further commends all non-
governmental organizations which have given their sol-
idarity and support to the cause of the liberation strug-
gle in Zimbabwe. The frontline States in Africa which
have taken a finii stand against the illegal racist minor-
ity regime, in accordance with Resolutions of the
United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,
should be given all necessary economic and other as-
sistance by all freedom-loving countries and peoples.
The Conference urges that all Governments, organiza-
tions and peoples join in concerted international action,
in support of the liberation struggle of the people of
Zimbabwe in this crucial and final stage of the total
emancipation of Africa.

III. Declaration on the Liberation of Namibia

22. The Conference solemnly proclaims its full sup-
port for the struggle of the people of Namibia under
the leadership of their sole and authentic Liberation
Movement, the South West Africa People's Organiza-
tion (SWAPO), to achieve self-determination, freedom
and independence in a united Namibia. It recognizes
that the Namibian people have been forced to resort to
anned struggle after many years of arduous attempts to
achieve those objectives by peaceful means. It reaf-
firms the right of the people of Namibia to decide on the
means of their struggle. In the light of the conditions in
the territory, the development of the armed struggle
and continued efforts of the international community
have created positive conditions for a negotiated set-
tlement. It is encouraging and inspiring to see the unity
and solidarity of the Namibian people in their efforts to
fulfill their true aspirations and legitimate interests
under the leadership of their Liberation Movement.
Despite a ferocious oppressor, the determination, com-
petence and heroism of Namibian patriots have gained
for them the respect and admiration of the international
community. It is imperative that all freedom-loving
forces in the international community give maximum
support to SWAPO to ensure the victory of the people
of Namibia in their struggle against the forces of col-
onialism and racism.

23. The Conference strongly condemns the colonial
and illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa which
constitutes an act of aggression against the Namibian
people and against the United Nations, in defiance of
repeated demands for its withdrawal by the Security
Council and the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions. The policies of the illegal South African adminis-
tration are a systematic violation of its obligations
under the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples. The United Nations Council for Namibia as the
legal authority to administer that territory until inde-
pendence has the responsibility to assist the Namibian
people in their struggle against South African aggres-

sion and occupation. It is therefore imperative that ap-
propriate measures be formulated and implemented to
decisively counter South Africa's continued defiance of
the authority of the United Nations.

24. The Conference strongly condemns the policies of
apartheid and homelands which the Pretoria regime has
e.xtended to Namibia. In order to perpetuate its exploi-
tation of the people and natural resources of the terri-
tory, the illegal South African administration in
Namibia follows a policy of brutal institutionalized ter-
rorism against the Namibian people. Many Namibian
patriots have perished under this regime. The illegal
administration in Namibia imprisons and tortures men
and women under its violently repressive racist system.
It carries out massive transfers of population causing
untold suffering to thousands of innocent men, women
and children. In this respect, the Conference invites all
States to implement the Declaration and Programme of
Action adopted at the Dakar Conference on Namibia
and Human Rights. The Conference considers fur-
thermore that all possible pressures should be brought
to bear upon the Pretoria regime to cease its barbaric
repression of the Namibian people in their efforts to
achieve self-determination, freedom and independence
in a united Namibia.

2.5. The Conference recognizes Walvis Bay as an in-
tegral part of Namibia and rejects the attempts of
South Africa to separate it from the rest of Namibia
with which it is inextricably linked by geographical,
historical, economic, cultural and ethnic bonds. All
States should endeavour to dissuade South Africa from
pursuing the separation of Walvis Bay from Namibia.

26. The Conference strongly condemns the increasing
militarization of Namibia by the racist Pretoria regime.
In its increasingly aggressive posture, South Africa has
expanded its military apparatus in Namibia in order to
give itself the capability to attack neighbouring African
countries in a policy of continuous intimidation. It has
enacted the Defence Amendment Act in 1976 in order to
carry out aggression far beyond the borders of South
Africa. Therefore, the sale or supply of any arms or
military material: the transfer of technology; and the
provision of the means to produce weapons, as well as
any nuclear collaboration with South Africa, ultimately
support the acts of aggression by South Africa against
the Namibian people and the United Nations. It is
therefore imperative that all States cease and desist
from any form of direct or indirect military consultation,
co-operation or collaboration with South Africa. In
order to meet the continuous threat of the minority re-
gime to international peace and security in southern
Africa, the Security Council should be called upon to
impose a mandatory arms embargo against South Af-
rica.

27. The Conference strongly denounces the Turnhalle
tribal talks as a South African stratagem to perpetuate
its ruthless colonial and racist policies and practices
under false pretences. South Africa has brought to-
gether in the Turnhalle tribal talks the fanatical racist
promoters of apartheid and tribal puppets to prepare a
so-called Charter with the purpose of misleading the in-
ternational community on its true intentions in

Namibia. The so-called Charter is to be the basis for al
provisional government fabricated by South Africa | piuBt:
which would pretend to be an advance towards a pseudo-
independent Namibia. The international community,
especially all Member States of the United Nations,
should act to frustrate South Africa's tactics of political
deception. No recognition should be accorded to any
group which the illegal South African administration
may install as a consequence of the current fraudulent
constitutional talks or any other manoeuvres in
Namibia. Any independence talks regarding Namibia
must be between the representatives of the South West
Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and South Af-
rica under the auspices of the United Nations for the
sole purpose of discussing the modalities for the trans-
fer of power to the Namibian people.

28. The Conference reaffiiTns that in order that the
people of Namibia shall be enabled freely to determine
their own future, free elections be held urgently under
the supervision and control of the United Nations in the
whole of Namibia as one political entity. However,
prior to such elections, conditions for a negotiated set-
tlement should be created in Namibia in accordance
with all relevant decisions and Resolutions of the
United Nations and, in particular. Security Council
Resolution 38.5 (1976).

29. The Conference solemnly reaffirms the responsi-
bility of the United Nations for Namibia until the terri-
tory attains full independence. The General Assembly
declared Namibia to be a direct responsibility of the
United Nations and entrusted the United Nations
Council for Namibia with the exercise of de jure inter-
na! and external sovereignty over Namibia. Therefore,
the Council has been empowered to protect the rights
and to represent the interests of the Namibian people,
with the full participation of the South West Africa
People's Organization (SWAPO). The Conference rec-
ognizes the United Nations Council for Namibia as the
legal administering authority of Namibia until inde-
pendence, an indispensable role which it is fulfilling. It
is imperative that the international community
strengthen its support for the Council in its efforts to
promote the legitimate aspirations of the Namibian
people for self-detemiination, freedom and independ-
ence in a united Namibia. The Conference calls on all
Member States to im.plement provisions contained in
United Nations Resolutions granting full participation
of the United Nations Council for Namibia in all confer-
ences. United Nations Specialized Agencies and other
organizations of the United Nations system.

30. The Conference solemnly proclaims its support
for the nationhood programme for Namibia. The Coun-
cil for Namibia received from the General Assembly at
its thirty-first Session the mandate to elaborate, in con-
sultation with the South West Africa People's Organi-
zation (SWAPO), the guidelines and policies for such a
programme and to direct and co-ordinate the implemen-
tation of the programme. The nationhood programme
shall cover the present period of struggle for independ-
ence and the initial years of the independence of
Namibia. It is imperative that the international com-
munity ensure the success of the nationhood pro-

Department of State Bulletin

Itiotj

'litid
«aij
fatii

gramme by taking measures to increase the pro-
grammes of concrete assistance to the people of
Namibia through their Liberation Movement, SWAPO.

31. The Conference solemnly declares that the natu-
ral resources of Namibia are the birthright of the
Namibian people. The e.xploitation of these resources
by foreign economic interests under the protection of
the repressive racist colonial administration and in vio-
lation of all principles of the Charter and of the perti-
nent Resolutions of the Security Council and the
General Assembly of the United Nations, is illegal and
contributes to the maintenance of the illegal occupation
regime. The rapid depletion of the natural resources of
the territory due to the reckless plunder in which
foreign economic interests engage in collusion with the
illegal South African administration is a grave threat to
the integrity and prosperity of an independent
Namibia. It is imperative that the activities of foreign
economic interests engaged in Namibia be the object of
systematic denunciation so that their actions, which are
detrimental to the Namibian people, be exposed to the
full scrutiny and condemnation of the international
community.

32. The Conference welcomes the report and recom-
mendations of the Mission of the United Nations Coun-
cil for Namibia to the Specialized Agencies and other
United Nations organizations with headquarters in
Europe. In this regard it urges all Specialized Agencies
and other United Nations organizations to give all the
possible concrete assistance within their spheres of
competence to the Council for Namibia in the discharge
of the mandate entrusted to it, so as to speed up the
implementation of the relevant United Nations Resolu-
tions on Namibia, in particular that on the nationhood
programme foi- Namibia. The Conference calls upon
those Specialized Agencies and other United Nations
organizations in which South Africa still illegally pur-
ports to represent Namibia to terminate such relation-
ships forthwith and to grant full membership to the
United Nations Council for Namibia as the administer-
ing authority of Namibia until independence.

33. The Conference commends the international
community for the invaluable moral, political and mate-
rial assistance it is giving to the South West Africa
People's Organization (SWAPO). It further commends
all non-governmental organizations which are giving
their solidarity and support to the cause of the libera-
tion of Namibia from South African illegal occupation.
The Conference solemnly appeals to all Member States
of the United Nations, other intergovernmental and
non-governmental organizations to intensify their as-
sistance to the South West Africa People's Organization
(SWAPO) in this crucial and final stage in the emanci-
pation of Africa.

IV. General: Zimbabwe and Namibia

34. The Conference notes with appreciation the pro-
grammes of the United Nations, its Specialized Agen-
cies and institutions within the United Nations sys-
tem, which are providing educational, training and
humanitarian assistance to Zimbabweans and Nami-

bians, notably the United Nations Educational and
Training Programme for Southern Africa (UNETPSA),
the United Nations Fund for Namibia, the Institute
for Namibia, the Trust Fund for South Africa, the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and other inter-
governmental and non-governmental organizations. It
appeals to States, organizations and individuals to give
generous assistance to all such programmes designed
to assist Zimbabweans and Namibians.

35. The Conference appeals to the mass media to
join in the campaign in support of the peoples of Zim-
babwe and Namibia. The Conference considers it
necessary for the United Nations to strengthen and in-
tensify the dissemination of information on the strug-
gle for self-determination and independence in Zim-
babwe and Namibia particularly through the network
of the United Nations Information Centres all over the
world. In this regard, the Conference requests the
Genera! Assembly to allocate the necessary resources
to intensify public information action, especially
through the United Nations Infoi-mation Centres.

V. South Africa

36. The Conference recognizes that the South Afri-
can apartheid regime has been the bastion of racism
and colonialism in southern Africa and the main oppo-
nent of the efforts of the United Nations and the in-
ternational community to promote self-determination
and independence in southern Africa.

37. While fully conscious of the need for vigorous
and effective international action to thwart the ma-
noeuvres of the apartheid regime, the Conference de-
cided to concentrate its Programme of Action on spe-
cific measures with respect to Zimbabwe and Namibia,
taking into account that further action against apart-
heid will be considered at the World Conference for
Action Against Apartheid to be held in Lagos, Nigeria,
from 22 to 26 August 1977.

VI. Programme of Action for the Liberation of
Zimbabwe and Namibia

A. Measures in Support of the National Liberation
Movements.

38. The Conference calls upon governments to:

(a) give the greatest possible political and moral
support to the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia and
their National Liberation Movements in their struggle
to attain self-determination;

(b) provide and increase material and financial sup-
port to the people of Zimbabwe and Namibia and their
National Liberation Movements in consultation and
co-operation with the Organization of African Unity
(OAU);

(c) encourage the activities of non-governmental or-
ganizations engaged in providing political and material
assistance to the National Liberation Movements of
Zimbabwe and Namibia;

July 11, 1977

(d) increase their contributions to the United Na-
tions Fund for Namibia in order to ensure the success
of the Institute for Namibia in Lusaka [Zambia] as
well as the formulation and implementation of addi-
tional projects in support of the Namibian people;

(e) extend travel facilities and educational and
employment opportunities to Namibians;

(f) participate in the Week of Solidarity with the
Namibian people which is to be organized each year
during the week following 27 October, the anniversary
of the ending of the mandate of South Africa over
Namibia, particularly by setting up Committees of As-
sistance for Namibia.

39. The Conference urges all Member States, Spe-
cialized Agencies, programmes and other institutions
within the United Nations system, and other inter-
governmental as well as non-governmental organiza-
tions, to extend, as a matter of priority, material and
economic assistance to the frontline States in order to
enable them to implement more effectively the United
Nations Resolutions supporting the liberation sti-uggle
in Zimbabwe and Namibia. The Conference further
urges them to render special assistance to the States
bordering Zimbabwe and Namibia to enable them to
provide for the increasing number of refugees from
these territories.

40. The Conference calls upon the United Nations
to:

(a) further increase its contribution to the United
Nations Fund for Namibia;

(b) increase its support for the United Nations
Council for Namibia in its efforts to achieve self-
determination, freedom and national independence for
the people of Namibia;

(c) consider the possibility of establishing the Uni-
versity of Namibia. With regard to this initiative, the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) should be invited to assist the
United Nations Council for Namibia and the South
West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in the
formulation of its guiding plan.

41. The Conference calls upon the Specialized Agen-
cies and other institutions within the United Nations
system to give high priority to the formulation, with
the active co-operation of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU), of programmes and projects of assist-
ance to the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia and
their National Liberation Movements. In the case of
Namibia, such assistance should be extended in consul-
tation with the United Nations Council for Namibia.

41. The Conference urges other intergovernmental
organizations to extend political and material support
to the National Liberation Movements of Zimbabwe
and Namibia.

43. The Conference appeals to all non-governmental
organizations to:

(a) intensify their campaigns in support of the
peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia and their National
Liberation Movements in their struggle to attain self-
determination and independence;

(b) intensify their campaigns in support of the South
West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) to pre-
vent any action in favour of South Africa's policies in
Namibia and to increase financial contributions to
SWAPO.

44. The Conference appeals to all solidarity organi-
zations and groups to establish effective National
Committees in their respective countries in support of
the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)
and the struggle of the people of Namibia to prevent
any action in favour of South Africa's policies and
practices in the territory in contravention of the
United Nations Resolutions and decisions on Namibia.

4,5. The Conference calls upon all trade unions to in-
tensify their campaign in support of the just struggle
of the people of Namibia by boycotting and othei-wise
refusing to handle vessels, aircraft or any other ve-
hicles carrying Namibian goods, in accordance with
Decree No. 1 on the protection of the natural re-
sources of Namibia enacted by the United Nations
Council for Namibia on 27 September 1974.

B. Measures Against the Illegal Racist Minority
Regime in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

46. The Conference calls upon governments to:

(a) refrain from any co-operation or collaboration
with the illegal racist minority regime in Southern
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe);

(b) observe strictly the aims embargo against the il-
legal racist minority regime;

(c) enact legislation declaring the recruitment, as-
sembly, financing and training of mercenaries in their
territories to be punishable as a criminal act and to do
their utmost to discourage and prohibit their nationals
from serving as mercenaries;

(d) take measures against corporations and trade
interests which operate in or have subsidiaries operat-
ing in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in violation of
sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security
Council;

(e) prevent oil companies registered in their ter-
ritories from supplying oil, directly or indirectly, to
the illegal racist minority regime;

(f) take stringent enforcement measures to ensure
strict compliance by all individuals, associations and
bodies corporate under their jurisdiction with the
sanctions imposed by the Security Council and to pro-
hibit any form of collaboration by them with the illegal
racist minority regime;

(g) take effective steps to prevent or discourage the
emigration to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) of any
individuals or groups of individuals under their juris-
diction;

(h) discontinue any action which might confer a
semblance of legitimacy on the illegal racist minority
regime by forbidding, inter alia, the operation and ac-
tivities of Air Rhodesia, the Rhodesia National Tourist
Board and the Rhodesia Information Office, or any
other activities which contravene the aims and pur-
poses of sanctions;

Department of State Bulletin

(i) invalidate passports and other documents for
travel to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe);

(j) prohibit the use of Southern Rhodesian aircraft
for international passenger or cargo traffic;

(k) deny landing rights in their respective ter-
ritories to flights, the route schedules of which include
stopovers in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), for the
purpose of loading or unloading passengers and/or
goods to and from Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

47. The Conference calls upon the United Nations
to:

(a) reiterate its conviction that the scope of sanc-
tions against the illegal regime must be widened to in-
clude all the measures envisaged under Article 41 of
the Charter of the United Nations and it requests the
Security Council to consider, as a matter of urgency,
taking the necessary measures in that regard;

(b) extend sanctions to marine and air insurance in
order to prevent ships, aircraft carrying passengers or
cargo destined to or coming from Southern Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe) from being insured.

48. The Conference calls upon the Specialized Agen-
cies and other organizations within the United Nations
system to take all necessary measures, in accordance
with the relevant Resolutions of the General Assembly
and the Security Council, to withhold any financial,
economic, technical or other assistance from the illegal
racist minority regime of Southern Rhodesia (Zim-
babwe), to discontinue all support to it and to refrain
from taking any action which might imply recognition
of the legitimacy of the domination of the territory by
that regime.

49. The Conference draws the attention of other in-
tergovernmental organizations to the urgent need to
adopt measures for the complete isolation of the illegal
racist minority regime from the international commu-
nity.

C. Measures Against the Illegal South African Ad-
ministration in Namibia.

50. The Conference calls upon governments to:

(a) categorically reject and denounce all manoeuvres
such as tribal talks by which the South African regime
may seek to impose its will upon the Namibian people;

(b) decisively reject all attempts by South Africa to
dismember the territory of Namibia and specially the
design to annex Walvis Bay;

(c) refrain from according any recognition to or co-
operating with any authority or regime which South
Africa may install in Namibia;

(d) enact the necessary legislation consistent with
Decree No. 1 on the protection of the natural re-

sources of Namibia by the United Nations Council for
Namibia;

(e) fully respect the terms of Security Council Res-
olutions 283 (1970) and 310 (1972) and thereby ensure
an end to foreign economic activities and terminate
any consular representation in or concerning Namibia;

(f) implement the arms embargo against South Af-
rica without any exceptions or reservations.

51. The Conference calls upon the United Nations
Security Council to impose, under Chapter VII of the
Charter, a mandatory amis embargo against South Af-
rica as an important step to ensure South Africa's
compliance with the United Nations Resolutions and
decisions on Namibia.

52. The Conference calls upon the United Nations
General Assembly to convene a Special Session on the
question of Namibia bearing in mind the evolution of
the situation in the territory.

53. The Conference calls upon the Specialized Agen-
cies and other organizations within the United Nations
system, in accordance with relevant Resolutions of the
General Assembly and the Security Council, to take all
necessary measures to withhold any financial, econom-
ic, technical and other assistance from the Government
of South Africa; to discontinue all support to it, as
such support impedes the realization of the inalienable
right of the Namibian people to self-determination and
independence and to refrain from taking any action
which might imply recognition of the legitimacy of the
illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa.

54. The Conference draws the attention of other in-
tergovernmental organizations to the urgent need to
deny any co-operation with the South African Govern-
ment as long as it persists in its illegal occupation of
Namibia and in enforcing in the territory the policies
of apartheid and homelands.

55. The Conference appeals to all non-governmental
organizations to intensify their campaigns against the
illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa and
against the application of its policies of apartheid and
homelands to the territory.

56. The Conference, in accordance with General As-
sembly Resolution A/31/150 of 20 December 1976, calls
upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to
prepare, in consultation with the United Nations
Council for Namibia, a detailed map of Namibia re-
flecting its territorial integrity.

57. The Conference supports the decision of the
General Assembly directing the Secretary-General of
the United Nations to make adequate provision for the
setting up of a United Nations radio transmitter and
recommends to the Secretary-General its early estab-
lishment in accordance with Resolution 3295 (XXIX) of
13 December 1974.

July 11, 1977

U.S. Supports Expansion of Sanctions Against Rhodesia

Following is a statement made in the
U.N. Security Council by Acting U.S. Per-
m.anent Representative James F. Leonard
on May 27, together with the text of a res-
olution adopted by the Council that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR LEONARD

USUN press release 31 dated May 27

For more than 11 years an illegal racist
minority regime in Rhodesia has defied this
Council, stood in open rebellion against the
British Crown, and flouted world opinion.
The result of this rebellion has been wide-
spread suffering on the part of the people of
Zimbabwe, suffering which threatens to ex-
pand if majority rule is not achieved in
Zimbabwe and the minority regime con-
signed to oblivion.

It is with particular satisfaction that my
delegation has joined in drafting, cosponsor-
ing, and adopting this resolution.

The reasons for our satisfaction in this are
numerous. As is well known to the members
of this Council, my delegation was
privileged to play one of the leading roles in
the tightening of sanctions contained in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution. We
believe that the elaboration and adoption of
this resolution comes at an important time
and must be seen in the context of such
other important developments as the ehmi-
nation of the Byrd amendment and the spirit
of harmony and cooperative effort toward a
common goal that characterized the recent
meeting at Maputo [Mozambique]. The deci-
sions taken in this resolution facilitate tight-
ening the sanctions so that the illegal regime
in Southern Rhodesia may no longer take
advantage of loopholes to further its goals.

This resolution, along with the other re-

cent actions to which I have referred, can
leave no doubt in the minds of any of the
leaders in Salisbury, or elsewhere, of the
commitment of the international community
to the attainment of a government in South-
ern Rhodesia based on the consent of the
governed. The unanimous nature of the ac-
tion today underlines the strength of the in-
ternational commitment. The efforts taken
by the members of the Council to achieve
this unanimous result auger well for continu-
ing international cooperation to solve the
many and serious problems of southern Af-
rica.

In agreeing to meet no later than 11
November "to consider the application of
further measures," we are committing our-
selves to continue, in accordance with our
often stated positions of principle, to
explore ways and means of closing loopholes
which may diminish the impact of the eco-
nomic sanctions program.

We are furthermore pleased that the for-
mulation of this resolution has carefully pre-
served the existing functions of the Sanc-
tions Committee. For as matters now stand
the sanctions regime is sufficient to impose a
crushing burden on the economy of Southern
Rhodesia. The need is to examine further
the functioning of the system in order to
prevent its circumvention. After almost nine
years the minority government in Salisbury
is still in power, and economic conditions
have not declined appreciably. There are
reasons for this and those reasons certainly
lie in the fact that some nations allow viola-
tions of the sanctions imposed by this Coun-
cil. The Sanctions Committee's examination
of particular cases, therefore, has become
more important than ever.

We hope, Mr. President [M. Thomas S.

Department of State Bulletin

Boya, of Benin], that before November of
;his year important steps will have been
aken to bring about a government in
Rhodesia based on the free consent of the
governed. We pledge ourselves to continue
,0 work to that end through all available
Tieans.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION i

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12
viovember 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, 221
1966) of 9 April 1966, 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966,
;53 (1968) of 29 May 1968, 277 (1970) of 18 March 1970
ind 388 (1976) of 6 April 1976,

Reaffirming that the measures provided for in those
•esolutions as well as the measures initiated by
Vlember States in pursuance thereof, shall continue in
effect.

Taking into account the recommendations made by
,he Security Council Committee established in pur-
suance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question
)f Southern Rhodesia in its second special report of 31
Oeeember 1976 (S/12296) on the expansion of sanctions
jgainst Southern Rhodesia,

Reaff inning that the present situation in Southern
Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace
and security.

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations,

1. Decides that all States Members of the United
Nations shall prohibit the use or transfer of any funds
in their territories by the illegal regime in Southern
Rhodesia, including any office or agent thereof, or by
other persons or bodies within Southern Rhodesia, for
the purposes of any office or agency of the illegal re-
gime that is established within their territories other
than an office or agency so established exclusively for
pensions purposes;

2. Urges, having regard to the principle stated in
Article 2, paragraph 6 of the Charter of the United
Nations, States not Members of the United Nations to
act in accordance with the provisions of the present
resolution;

3. Decides to meet not later than 11 November 1977
to consider the application of further measures under
Article 41 of the Charter, and meanwhile requests the
Security Council Committee established in pursuance
of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of
Southern Rhodesia to examine, in addition to its other
functions, the application of further measures under
Article 41 and to report to the Security Council
thereon as soon as possible.

' U.N. doc. S/RES/409 (1977); adopted by the Council
by consensus on May 27.

July 11, 1977

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Environmental Modification

Convention on the prohibition of military or any other
hostile use of environmental modification techniques,
with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977.'
Sic/natu)-e: Benin, June 10, 1977.

Health

Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the constitution of
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva
May 17, 1976.'
Acceptance deposited: Finland, June 14, 1977.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490).
Adopted at London October 17, 1974. Enters into
force April 1, 1978.

Acceptances deposited: Angola, June 6, 1977; Jordan,
April 5, 1977.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna
February 21, 1971. Entered into force August 16,
1976.2
Accession deposited: Senegal, June 10, 1977.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by
dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes.
Done at" London, Mexico City, Moscow\ and Washing-
ton December 29, 1972. Entered into force August 30,
1975. TIAS 8165.
Ratification deposited: Monaco, May 16, 1977.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage caused
by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and
Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force Sep-
tember 1, 1972; for the United States October 9,
1973.
Accession deposited: Israel, June 21, 1977.

Tin

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done
at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force provi-
sionally July 1, 1976.

Ratification deposited: Bolivia, June 14, 1977.
Acceptance deposited: Poland, June 14, 1977.
Entered into force definitively: June 14, 1977.

' Not in force.

2 Not in force for the United States.

BILATERAL

Canada

Memorandum of understanding concerning region oper-
ations control centers. Signed at Ottawa and Wash-
ington March 5 and April 11, 1977. Entered into force
April 11, 1977.

European Economic Community

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the
United States. Signed at Washington February 15,
1977.
Entered into force: June 9, 1977.

Iran -<

Agreement on procedures for mutual assistance in con-
nection with mattei's relating to the Lockheed Air-
craft Corporation, Grumman Corporation, and North-
rop Corporation. Signed at Washington June 14,
1977. Entered into force June 14, 1977.

Korea

Memorandum of understanding relating to a program in
science and technology. Signed at Seoul May 24, 1977.
Entered into force May 24, 1977.

Lebanon

Agreement foi" sales of agricultural commodities.
Signed at Beirut April 2.5, 1977.
Entered into force: June 21, 1977.

United Kingdom

Agreed minute I'elating to an air services agreement,
with attachment. Signed at London June 22, 1977.
Entered into force June 22, 1977.

Zaire

Agreement regarding the consolidation and reschedul-
ing of certain debts owed to, guai'anteed, or insured
by the Lhiited States Government and its agencies.
Signed at Washington June 17, 1977. Enters into
force when the United States notifies Zaire in writing
that domestic United States laws and regulations
covering debt rescheduling concerning this agree-
ment have been complied with.

PUBLICATIONS

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low, which include domestic postage, are subject to
change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a
map, a list of principal government officials and U.S.
diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. i.A
complete set of all Background Notes currently in
stock — at least 140 — $21.80; 1-year subscription serv-
ice for approximately 77 updated or new Notes —
$24.00; plastic binder — $1.-50.) Single copies of those
listed below are available at 50? each.

Afghanistan Cat. No. SI. 123:AF3

Pub. 7795 7 pp

Barbados Cat. No. S1.123:B23

Pub. 8242 4 pp

Cambodia Cat. No. SI. 123:C14

Pub. 7747 6 pp

Canada Cat. No. S1.123:C16

Pub. 7769 8 pp

Denmark Cat. No. SI. 123:041

Pub. 8298 4 pp

Honduras Cat. No. SI. 123:H75/2

Pub. 8184 4 pp

Transfer of Technical Data— JT-IOD Jet Engine.

Memorandum of understanding with the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. TIAS
8459. 4 pp. 35C. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8459).

Special Guerrilla Unit Forces and Equipment. Mem-
orandum of understanding with Laos. TIAS 8462. 3 pp.
350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8462).

Malaria Control. Agreement with Ethiopia. TIAS 8463.
.30 pp. 45e. (Cat. No. S9.10:8463).

Triffa High Service Irrigation. Agreement with
Morocco. TIAS 8464. 55 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8464).

Health Cooperation. Agreement with Egypt. TIAS

8465. 11 pp. 3.50. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8465).

Malaria Control. Agreement with Pakistan. TIAS

8466. 55 pp. 750. (Cat. No. S9.10:8466).

Development of Inland Waters Fisheries and
Aquaculture. Agreement with Colombia. TIAS 8467.
48 pp. 700. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8467).

Extradition. Treaty, protocol of signature and e,\-
change of notes with the United Kingdom of Great Bri-
tain and Northern Ireland. TIAS 8468. 15 pp. 3.50.
(Cat. No. 89.10:8468).

Air Transport Services. Agreement with the Polish
People's Republic amending and extending the agree-
ment of July 19, 1972. TIAS 8469. 22 pp. 350. (Cat.
No. 89.10:8469).

Agricultural Development Activities. Agreement
with Kenya. TIAS 8470. 46 pp. 650. (Cat. No.
89.10:8470).

Health Demonstration Project. Agreement with the
Republic of Korea. TIAS 8471. 34 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
89.10:8471).

Dry Milk Products. Memorandum of understanding
with New Zealand. TIAS 8472. 8 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
89.10:8472).

Grains and Perishables Marketing Systems. Agree-
ment with Panama. TIAS 8473. 44 pp. 650. (Cat. No.
89.10:8473).

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX July 11, 1977 Vol. LXXVII, No. 1985

China. Human Rights Situation in the Republic
of China (Levin) 50

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 54

Human Rights Situation in the Republic of China
(Levin) 50

Withdrawal of U.S. Ground Forces From South
Korea (Habib) 48

Human Rights

A Framework for Middle East Peace: Shaping a
More Stable World (Mondale) 41

Human Rights Situation in the Republic of China
(Levin) 50

Magazine Publishers Association Interviews
President Carter (excerpts) 46

Israel. A Framework for Middle East Peace:
Shaping a More Stable World (Mondale) 41

Japan. Withdrawal of U.S. Ground Forces From
South Korea (Habib) 48

Korea. Withdrawal of U.S. Ground Forces From
South Korea (Habib) 48

Middle East

A Framework for Middle East Peace: Shaping a

More Stable World (Mondale) 41

Magazine Publishers Association Interviews

President Carter (excerpts) 46

Military Affairs. Withdrawal of U.S. Ground
Forces From South Korea (Habib) 48

Namibia. United States Reiterates Support for
the Independence of Namibia and Zimbabwe at
Maputo Conference (Young, Maynes, text of
final declaration and program of action) 55

Presidential Documents. Magazine Publishers
Association Interviews President Carter
(excerpts) 46

Publications. GPO Sales Publications 68

South Africa

Magazine Publishers Association Interviews
President Carter (excerpts) 46

United States Reiterates Support for the Inde-
pendence of Namibia and Zimbabwe at Maputo
Conference (Young, Maynes, text of final dec-
laration and program of action) 55

Southern Rhodesia

Magazine Publishers Association Interviews
President Carter (excerpts) 46

United States Reiterates Support for the Inde-
pendence of Namibia and Zimbabwe at Maputo
Conference (Young, Maynes, text of final decla-
ration and program of action) 55

S. Supports Expansion of Sanctions Against
"hodesia (Leonard, text of resolution) 66

aty Information. Current Actions 67

ited Nations

ited States Reiterates Support for the Inde-
lendence of Namibia and Zimbabwe at Maputo
onference (Young, Maynes, text of final dec-
laration and program of action) 55

".S. Supports Expansion of Sanctions Against
Rhodesia (Leonard, text of resolution) 66

Name Index

Carter, President 46

Habib, Philip C 48

Leonard, James F 66

Levin, Burton 50

Maynes, Charles W 55

Mondale, Vice President 41

Young, Andrew 55

No.

Date

*294 6/20

t294
*296

*297
*298

6/21
6/21

Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: June 20-26

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20520.

Subject

Richard K. Fox, Jr., sworn .in as Am-
bassador to Trinidad and Tobago
(biographic data).

Vance: arrival, Andrews Air Force
Base, June 17.

Albert W. Sherer, Jr., sworn in on
June 10 as Ambassador to head the
U.S. delegation to the CSCE pre-
paratory meeting and as head of the
delegation's working group at the
main meeting (biographic data).

21 museum professionals from 19
countries begin five weeks of study,
in the U.S., June 22.

Study group 7 of the U.S. National
Committee for the International
Radio Consultative Committee
(CCIR), Greenbelt, Md., July
21-22.

U.S., U.K. initial new air services
agreement.

15 Latin American visitors begin
2-week seminar on outlook for
world trade, June 20.

Vance: OECD ministerial, Paris.

Third meeting of U.S. -India Subcom-
mission on Science and Technology,
June 16-17.

Program for state visit to U.S. of
President Carlos Andres Perez, of
Venezuela, June 27-July 2.

Study group 1 of the U.S. National
Committee for the International
Radio Consultative Committee
(CCIR), July 21.

Vance: remarks to press following
meeting with President Giscard
d'Estaing, Paris.

Vance, Blumenthal: news conference,
Paris, June 24.

*Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

t299

6/22 1

*300

6/22

t.301
*302

6/23 ■'
6/23 '

*30.3

6/24

*304

6/24

t305

6/24

t306

6/25

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON. DC. 20402

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Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted
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/J.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXVII • No. 1986 • July 18, 1977

SECRETARY VANCE ATTENDS OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT GRENADA
Statements, News Conference, and Text of Resolution 69

SECRETARY VANCE INTERVIEWED ON "ISSUES AND ANSWERS" 78

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES RESULTS OF CIEC MEETING
Statement by Under Secretary Cooper 92

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXVII, No. 1986
July 18, 1977

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington. D.C. 20402

PRICE:

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Single copy 85 cents

The Department of State BLLLETL
a weekly publication issued by th
Office of Media Services, Bureau o\
Public Affairs, provides the public ani
interested agencies of the gocernmen
with information on developments in
the field of L'.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.

The BILLETIS includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
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cial articles on various phases of in^
ternational affairs and the functions on
the Department. Information is in-M
eluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
L'nited States is or may become a parli^
and on treaties of general interna
tional interest.

Publications of the Department o)|
State, United .\ations documents, and
legislative material in the field oi
international relations are also listed.]

ISecretary Vance Attends OAS General Assembly at Grenada

The seventh regular General Assembly of
the Organization of American States niet at
St. George's, Grenada, June 14-2i. Secretary
Vance headed the U.S. delegation June H-16;
he visited Trinidad and Tobago June 16-17
before returning to Washington. Following
are the texts of Secretary Vance's first inter-
vention made before the Assembly on June H,
his statement on U.S. -Panama negotiations
on June 15, the transcript of his news confer-
ence held on June 16, and his arrival remarks
in Washington on June 17, together with the
text of a resolution adopted by the Assemblu
on June 22. ^

FIRST INTERVENTION, JUNE 14

Ptess release 282 dated June 15

I am delighted to join you in this informal
dialogue. We are on our way to a frank, di-
rect, and close working relationship based on
the values and associations we share.

In his remarks before the Permanent Coun-
cil of this organization of April 14, President
Carter said:

... a single U.S. policy toward Latin America and
the Caribbean makes little sense. What we need is a
wider and a more fle.xible approach, worked out in close
consultation with you. Together, we will develop
policies more suited to each nation's variety and poten-
tial. In this process, I will be particularly concerned
that we not seek to divide the nations of Latin America
one from another or to set Latin America apart from
the rest of the world. Our own goal is to address prob-
lems in a way which will lead to productive solutions —
globally, regionally, and bilaterally.

Whatever the forum, we all recognize the
.special core of regional interests that brings

' Another press release related to Secretary Vance's
trip is No. 292 dated June 18.

US together here today. Our nations, for all
their diversity, share historical, institutional,
and personal ties.

These ties are important to us; we cannot
take them for granted. Our cooperation can
shape global decisions to the advantage of all
our countries. In President Carter's words:
"The pi'oblems and the promises of our region
have become as diverse as the world itself."

Through our organization we can usefully
embody that tradition of hemispheric peace, a
tradition already so well advanced in the
Latin American nuclear free zone. This pact
has set an example to all the rest of the world,
and President Carter has just strengthened
my government's adherence.

We are justly proud of our peacekeeping
machinery, our commitment to inter-
American cooperation to settle tei'ritorial dis-
putes. And we are together in our respect for
the human rights of all our peoples.

Today I would like to single out two areas
of regional cooperation that are of special con-
cern to my government. These two areas are
human rights and reform of the OAS. In em-
phasizing these two points, I do not wish to
minimize the other issues before us. The
hemispheric agenda is rich. The OAS can do
much to strengthen our consultations, im-
prove our cultural relations, and maintain a
tradition of peace.

Of all the values which the Americas share,
respect for the individual is surely the most
significant. The basic constitutional docu-
ments of all our nations cite the rights of man.
Nowhere are they more prominent than in the
charter of this organization. In the U.N.
Charter, each of our governments has ac-
cepted the obligation to promote respect for
human rights among all nations.

July 18, 1977

There is no ambiguity about these obliga-
tions. A state's efforts to protect itself and se-
cure its society cannot be exercised by deny-
ing the dignity of its individual citizens or by
suppressing political dissent.

Since the last General Assembly, men who
once sat among us have been victims of vio-
lent assault. We mourn the deaths of Foreign
Minister Borgonovo [of El Salvador] and
former Foreign Minister Letelier [of Chile].
And we share the relief at the narrow escape
of Foreign Minister Guzzetti [of Argentina].

If terrorism and violence in the name of dis-
sent cannot be condoned, neither can violence
that is officially sanctioned. Such action per-
verts the legal system that alone assures the
survival of our traditions.

The surest way to defeat terrorism is to
promote justice in our societies — legal, eco-
nomic, and social justice. Justice that is sum-
mary undermines the future it seeks to pro-
mote. It produces only more violence, more
victims, and more terrorism. Respect for the
rule of law will promote justice and remove
the seeds of subversion. Abandoning such re-
spect, governments descend into the nether-
world of the terrorist and lose their strongest
weapon—their moral authority.

Progress toward higher universal standards
of justice can also be attained by strengthen-
ing the inter-American commitment to human
rights through our common action. On June 1
President Carter signed the American Con-
vention on Human Rights. ^ I believe this
General Assembly should move to strengthen
the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights. The Commission is elected from
among the OAS member states. It serves as
an independent monitor of human rights in the
Americas.

My government will vote to increase the
Commission's budget. The Commission needs
more personnel to handle a growing caseload
of complaints. With more funds, the Commis-
sion could issue more than occasional reports.
It could increase its research efforts, hold
more seminars, and increase the frequency of
visits to every country of the hemisphere.

* For text of the convention, see Bulletin of July 4,
1977, p. 28.

Several Commission reports are on our reg-
ular agenda. They have been prepared with
care and independence, sometimes with full
access to witnesses and records, sometimes
without the cooperation of governments.

If each member state were to grant the
Commission free access to national territory,
this body would be able to carry out onsite in-
vestigations at times and places of its choos-
ing. My country will grant it this facility from
today. We believe that for others to do so as
well would reduce misunderstandings and the
dissemination of false information.

Let us work together to guide this sensitive
issue into the multilateral framework we our-
selves have set up and then let us use that
framework to make progress.

And let there be no doubt that my govern-
ment joins in dedication to international coop-
eration to secure economic and social rights as
well as civil and political rights. We will con-
tinue to contribute to the development of poor
and middle income countries, both bilaterally
and multilaterally. These programs will be
designed to help the poorest of our peoples.

But our cooperation in economic develop-
ment must not be mocked by consistent pat-
terns of gross violation of human rights. My
government believes in the sovereignty and
independence of all states. We do not ask
others to emulate our particular form of de-
mocracy. The principle of political pluralism
lies at the head of this organization.

We do support the right of all people to
freely participate in their government. This
right is based on the conviction that the indi-
vidual citizen is a subject, not an object.
Policies that contradict this tenet are alien to
our shared traditions.

I am pleased to note the attention paid to
the issue of human rights by my esteemed col-
leagues in statements made here today. Uni-
versal recognition of the problem is laudable,
and I believe it would be equally laudable if
we all agreed to do what we can to improve
the situation, individually and collectively.

As we strengthen our collective machinery
for dealing with the problems of human
rights, so should we also be ready to modify
and bring up to date our overall organizational
structure. For almost 30 years, the OAS has

Department of State Bulletin

provided an institutional framework for
inter-American cooperation. In trying to
make this a more dynamic and effective or-
ganization, our representatives have been
working for the last four years to come up
with the draft of a new chapter.

Unfortunately this new draft does not, in
our opinion, reach the goal we set. We need a
charter that all member states can support
without reservations, one that need not be
rewritten every few years. Our charter
should be flexible enough to serve well into
the future.

We believe restructuring should be
analyzed in a broad framework, not in
piecemeal negotiations over clauses in the
draft charter.

Structural reform should provide for:

— A modernized organization, free of un-
necessary bureaucracy, without any hint of
U.S. dominance; and

— Ma.ximum opportunity for all American
states to participate and maximum opportu-
nity for consultations among our govern-
ments.

We need to agree upon a few important
goals. President Carter, in his remarks to the
Permanent Council, April 14, suggested
these:

— Preserving peace and security;

— Promoting respect for human rights;

— Providing for ministerial-level consulta-
tions on major political and economic prob-
lems; and

— Expanding cultural, educational, and
technical assistance.

I am happy to announce on this last point
that the Carter Administration will ask our
Congress to approve a contribution of
$500,000 to the OAS Special Account for Cul-
ture. In addition, we are preparing a request
to Congress for a further $2 million for other
supporting programs.

To embody these goals, we believe, fii'st of
all, that structure and formal bureaucracy
should be kept to a minimum. I do not think
that the Permanent Council should be
abolished — it is important to have an ongoing
body with political authority to decide current

issues. I suggest instead merging the existing
three Councils into one. All three have the
same representatives. Time and money could
be saved by making the merger official. In
addition, the Secretariat should be granted
greater authority to decide routine matters,
thus permitting the new Council to concen-
trate on larger issues.

Second, informal consultations should re-
place much of the standing bureaucracy. Spe-
cial consultations among top officials with op-
erational responsibility should become more
regular. For economic discussions, for in-
stance, governments might send a minister of
finance, trade, or industry to special OAS con-
ferences on development or commerce. Such
consultations should not be institutionalized in
the OAS Charter. The General Assembly
should be free to call for them as needed. Any
committees required should be abolished
when their work is completed.

Finally, realistic participation in our ac-
tivities should reflect the diverse community
of American states. Our membership policy
should be universal with all independent
states of the Americas free to join. My gov-
ernment favors the elimination of article 8 of
the charter. No other international organiza-
tion has a similar bar to admission. ^

Financial obligations of member states
should be realistic. We need to face two ur-
gent tasks:

— Deciding on an appropriate U.S. assess-
ment; and

— Deciding on appropriate contributions
and roles for the smallest states.

It is an anachronism for the United States
to contribute 66 percent to the assessed
budget of the OAS. A balanced and healthy
organization requires that no single member

^ Article 8 of the OAS Charter, as amended by the
protocol of Buenos Aires in 1967, states that:

"The Permanent Council shall not make any recom-
mendation nor shall the General Assembly take any de-
cision with respect to a request for admission on the
part of a political entity whose territory became sub-
ject, in whole or in part, prior to December 18, 1964,
the date set by the First Special Inter-American Con-
ference, to litigation or claim between an extraconti-
nental country and one or more Member States of the
Organization, until the dispute has been ended by some
peaceful procedure."

July 18, 1977

should pay more than 49 percent of the as-
sessed budget.

A new system of OAS financing should be a
part of overall reform. Realignment of quotas
could be phased in over a period of time — as
much as 5-10 years — to minimize hardship for
the membership of the organization itself.

In conclusion, the United States favors a
thoroughly reformed OAS structure — clear in
its purpose, flexible and lean in formal
machinery, vigorous in the use of informal
consultation procedures, and realistically fi-
nanced. We of the OAS have a heritage of
which we can be justly proud. Realization of
its future promise deserves nothing short of
our best combined efforts.

STATEMENT, JUNE 15

Press release 285 dated June 16

Since submitting their second report to this
Assembly last year, the Republic of Panama
and the United States have achieved consid-
erable progress in the negotiation of a new
treaty to replace the 1903 convention.

It is not our intention to review the history
and resurrect old grievances or reopen old
wounds. Instead we approach this question in
the spirit that has characterized this Adminis-
tration's approach to these negotiations. This
statement represents the views of the U.S.
Government on the present state of negotia-
tions. As President Carter emphasized in his
Pan American Day speech in Washington, the
early completion of the new Panama Canal
treaty is a high priority objective of his
foreign policy.

The following events in recent months dem-
onstrate the commitment of both governments
to this objective:

— The meeting between the Secretary of
State and the Panamanian Foreign Minister in
Washington January 31 during which they
reaffirmed the Statement of Principles of
February 1974;

— A round of negotiations in Panama in
mid-February during which the two sides had
an opportunity to explore possible solutions to
important and difficult outstanding issues;

— A meeting in mid-March in Washington
during which the negotiators continued the

process commenced in Panama the month be-
fore; and

— An intensive round of negotiations com-
mencing May 9 in Washington, which is con-
tinuing now.

Discussions between the two sides since
January have focused on the following issues:

— The duration of the treaty;

— The nature and functions of the adminis-
trative organization which will operate the
canal during the life of the treaty;

— The status of the American and Panama-
nian employees of that entity;

— An identification of the lands and waters
which are necessary for the successful opera-
tion of the canal; and

— Provisions to assure that the canal re-
mains permanently secure and open to the
ships of all nations on a nondiscriminatory
basis.

We believe that substantial progress has
been made. The present discussions are fo-
cused on the details of these subjects, each of
which must be linked to the other in any final
agreement that is reached. In addition, our
negotiators will be addressing economic is-
sues, a subject which until this time has not
been under formal discussion.

The objective of our negotiators during the
present round of discussions is to come to
agreement in principle on these issues. Once
these agreements have been reached and the
respective governments have had an opportu-
nity to review the negotiators' work, the
process of treaty drafting will commence.
While one cannot predict with accuracy when
a new treaty will be ready for the initiation of
ratification procedures in both countries, we
hope that an agreement can be reached this
year, perhaps before the end of the summer.

NEWS CONFERENCE, JUNE 16

Press release 286 dated June 17

Secretary Vance: Good morning, ladies and
gentlemen. Why don't we just start in, and I
will take the first question.

Q. Is there any indication that Brezhnev's
new acquisition of greater poiver will change
the nature of U.S. -Soviet relations?

Department of State Bulletin

Secretanj Va?ice: I don't think this is going
to change the relationships between the
Soviet Union and the United States. It was
anticipated that this would be the result, and
I would expect that the relationship between
the Soviet Union and the United States will
continue on the same course and hopefully im-
prove in the period ahead.

Q. Polemics are going in both directions be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union.
It seems we hope for reversing this trend in
trade and in atmospherics most especially.
Do you see hopes for reaching a strategic
arms agreement with the Soviet Union by Oc-
tober 3 when the deadline runs out?

Secretary Vance: It's a lot of questions; let
me try to answer one by one.

Let me start with the latter question first.
Do you see hopes of reaching an arms agree-
ment in the SALT talks with the Soviet Union
before October when the interim agreement
runs out? I simply have no idea if that is pos-
sible but, as I have said on previous occasions,
I don't think we ought to feel ourselves under
any deadline. I think that the most important
thing is that we reach an agreement that is a
sound agreement, that is fair and equitable to
both, and which will be lasting and will not
have ambiguities which would lead to charges
of bad faith in the future. Therefore, I feel we
should proceed with patience and persever-
ence to work out just that kind of an agree-
ment and not to feel ourselves under any
deadline.

Insofar as the issue of trade is concerned, I
did say that I think trade is an important un-
derpinning of the relationship between our
two countries. We have not made the kind of
progress in the field of trade that I would
have hoped. The trade, as anticipated for
next year, will be sub.'^tantially less. Again,
however, I don't think that this means that
we should not continue to persevere to try to
increase the flow of trade between our two
countries, because I think it is of great impor-
tance. One of the factors that affects this, of
course, is the question of most-favored-nation
treatment to the Soviet Union. At the present
time that is precluded by a congressional
amendment, and as I look at the situation now
on Capitol Hill, I think in the climate which

exists that it would be impossible to have that
amendment removed. Therefore, I think it is
not likely in the near future. However, I
would hope that in time this could be done.

Finally, with respect to the general atmos-
phere, I hope very much the general atmos-
phere will improve. I think it's important —
and not only for the bilateral relationship be-
tween our two countries — that that relation-
ship and the atmosphere surrounding it im-
prove. And from our standpoint, we are going
to continue to do what we can to try to im-
prove that relationship, and we hope that
would be reciprocated.

Q. Can you tell us what progress has been
made on human rights?

Secretary Vance: Let me talk about the
human rights question in a broader
framework than this meeting and the bilateral
talks. I think what is of greatest
importance — which is coming out at these
OAS meetings — is the attention which is
being paid to the issue of human rights. There
is no question that that issue is dominating
the discussion in the OAS itself and in the
bilaterals which each of us is having.

There can be no doubt that whatever way
the actual concrete steps eventuate from this
meeting, the sensitivity of all of the parties at
this meeting has been greatly raised, and I
think this is a matter of great importance and
of great significance. Therefore, I feel that
the fact that this has been done indicates a
very important step for this organization and
for the issue of human rights, not only in this
area but throughout the world.

Q. What is your position on the territonal
integrity of Belize?

Secretary Vance: The subject of Belize is
one which is of great importance. It is one
which we have been following with care. We
have discussed with our friends and col-
leagues in this meeting that issue. It has also
been raised in the general discussion.

No conclusions have been reached with re-
spect to how to solve that problem, but there
is a general feeling in spirit that this is an
issue which must be resolved. I get a feeling
that all of the members of the OAS will wish
to do what they can to try to bring about a

July 18, 1977

prompt and satisfactory resolution of the
problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have yon sought or re-
ceived arty assurance from Chile, Uruguay,
or Argentina that they'll release political
prisoners in the near future?

Secretary Vance: In the discussions which I
have had with some of the parties who are
members of the OAS — without specifically re-
ferring to who they are — I have been told that
steps are intended which will improve the
human rights situation in various countries;
that they are sensitive to these problems; and
we shall have to wait and see what happens. I
do not want to go specifically into names of
individual countries.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any chance of
any kind of collective security acts under the
Rio Treaty to resolve the Belize dispute?

Secretary Vance: That has not been dis-
cussed in these meetings. The meetings will
be going on, as you know, for several more
days, and whether that will come up, I just
don't know. At this point, people are talking
in terms of seeing whether some sort of bilat-
eral mediation can help in solving these prob-
lems.

Q. Since President Carter began his cam-
paign on human rights is there any evidence
that the human rights situation has im-
proved?

Secretary Vance: Yes. I think that there is
some evidence that it has improved in certain
countries. There are, as I indicated, state-
ments that further positive steps may be ex-
pected in the future. On the other hand, I
must say that in other countries there does
not appear to have been progress and, indeed,
in one or two cases there may have been re-
gression. If so, I would say the answer is a
mi.x, but I would point out what I have said
many times before — that I think you have to
measure pi'ogress in the human rights area
over a long period of time. You can't measure
it over the short run. And the most important
thing is to have agreement with respect to the
importance of this issue — the fact that this is
a universal issue that affects people through-
out the world, not only in specific countries

but in regions throughout the globe. And I
think this is being done.

So I think what we must do is measure this
over the longer period of time, continue to
work to improve the situation in cases where
problems are raised with different countries,
and then see what happens over the long
period of time.

Q. Do you think you have changed any
minds or won allies on human rights here at
this conference?

Secretary Vance: I found a good deal of
support for many of the proposals which we
have been espousing, but I would not charac-
terize this as only the United States. There
are many other nations which share the views
that we share in human rights, so I don't want
to make this a U.S. thing. There is wide rec-
ognition of the importance of human rights,
the importance of human dignity, and the
need to take steps to preserve and foster
them.

Q. Does the Administration have plans to
stop the flow of pipeline military supplies to
Argentina?

Secretary Vance: The situation for this year
has been determined, and as you know, we
made a cut earlier this year. I understand
there was some legislation proposed yester-
day on the floor of the Senate, and I don't
know what the final disposition of that has
been. That would not affect the total supply,
but I think as it finally came out, it provided
that no action would be taken until the fall of
1978. Whether such action would then be
taken would depend on the progress which
had been made at that time. That is my un-
derstanding of what is in that piece of legisla-
tion. I have not had a chance to see it.

Q. There seems to be a split in the OAS,
with at least half a dozen or more members
taking issue with your position. Were these
the intended results, or how do i/ou explain
it?

Secretary Vance: I think the important
thing is to get the issue out on the table and
have it really discussed. Only through discus-
sion can we hope to make progress. That has

Department of State Bulletin

been the result here, and I think it will con-
tinue long after this meeting.

Q. As you point out, the issue of liuutan
rights has dominated the discussions here and
will do so in Belgrade. Has it made the con-
duct of U .S . foreign policy more complicated?

Secretary Vance: I think emphasis on it has
made it more comphcated, but I think it's im-
portant that be done because it is a compli-
cated business. But it's a fundamental one,
and, therefore, whether it's complicated or
not is not the important issue. The important
issue is: Are we making progress in the right
direction'? Are we beginning to steer a course
which is a proper course? And I think that
this is hopefully the case.

Q. Venezuela and Ecuador feel they have
been adversely affected by GSP [generalized
system of preferences] exclusion. Will there
be any resolution this year?

Secretary Vance: I don't know; we are all
waiting to see what happens in the OPEC
[Organization of Petroleum E.xporting Coun-
tries] meeting. I, myself, don't know at this
point what the result will be. I have heard
rumors to the effect that there may be some
price increases coming out in this next meet-
ing, but that is just a rumor at this point. I
honestly don't know what the result is going
to be.

Q. Does that mean that you no longer re-
gard Venezuela and Ecuador as having spe-
cial status because of their restraints the first
time around when the OPEC prices in-
creased?

Secretary Vance: Well, insofar as the
generalized system of preferences is con-
cerned, they were covered by the' resolution
which was a blocking resolution, whether or
not they took the position that they took [on
oil price increases].

Q. On the Panama Canal, are you optimis-
tic about a Panama Canal treaty by the end
of the summer?

Secretary Vance: On the canal situation, we
have made progress. There are some compli-
cated and difficult issues which still remain to
be resolved. I think it is possible that an
agreement could be reached by the end of the

summer. I don't want to predict that is going
to come about because the questions remain-
ing still are tough ones, but I hope with good
will and hard work on both sides that we can
reach an agi-eement by the end of the summer.

Q. What is your present reading on the
mood of the Seyiate on the treaty?

Secretary Vance: We've got a lot of work in
the Senate. I think if one had to count the
votes as of today, it would be very close, and I
am not sure we would have the votes. I hope
by the time it comes to a vote, we would have
been able to explain clearly to the American
people why it is in the interest of both coun-
tries to have this new agreement, and having
done that we will get the necessary support
for ratification.

Q. When President Carter asked Mr. An-
drew Young to pay more attention to the
Caribbean and Latin America, was he merely
creating a favorable atmosphere for this con,-
ference, or was he really giving expression of
the positive intentions of the United States
toward this region?

Secretary Vance: Clearly the latter. Andy
Young is an extraordinarily able and gifted
man. I think that his work in dealing with
Third World problems has been very positive
and very useful. Certainly in the suggestion
the President was making, he was talking
about the broad sweep, and it had nothing to
do with this conference.

Q. In the Spanish elections today it looks
like the center and center-left parties have a
majority. Do you have any comments at this
stage?

Secretary Vance: My comment is that I
think it is very important what has happened
in Spain. The fact that Spain has been able to
move from an authoritarian rule to the point
where it can have democratic elections is a
most significant political fact.

I think that the greatest tribute is due to
the King for having been able to lead his coun-
try to this point. I think that he has led them
with skill and care along the road toward the
restoration of democracy and that all of us
who believe in democracy throughout the
world can be heartened by this.

July 18, 1977

Q. A number of countries seem to be mak-
ing an issue of linking terrorism and human
rights, a linkage you specifically rejected in
your speech. Do you expect a resolution link-
ing those two will emerge from this confer-
ence, and if so, ivould if deflate what you have
been trying to do here?

Secretary Vance: No, not at all. I think ter-
rorism is a very serious problem. It is a prob-
lem that has to be dealt with. I think it is in-
correct, however, to take a position which
would indicate that one can combat terrorism
by counterterrorism. I think that is wrong
and will produce quite the opposite result.
However, that is not to minimize the problem
of terrorism, which I think must be dealt with
and must be dealt with fii-mly.

Q. Recently you met in Paris with Minister
Azeredo of Brazil, and you have seen him
again here. Can you tell ms about the state of
relations between your government and the
Brazilian Government?

Secretary Vance: Yes, we have had one
meeting with him in Paris and secondly we
have had the visit of Mrs. Carter to Brazil in
which we had very useful and constructive
discussions with President Geisel. I was able
to have some further discussions on a whole
variety of matters. Many of them dealt with
the subject matter of this conference. We
touched upon some other bilateral issues, and
I have agreed to go to Brazil at the end of Oc-
tober for a meeting. As you know, we have a
memorandum of understanding with Brazil
which provides for reciprocal visits between
the Foreign Ministers of the two countries.
Our relationship with Brazil is a very impor-
tant one, and I look forward to going there in
the fall to have discussions on the whole range
of ongoing matters which exist between our
two countries.

ARRIVAL, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, JUNE 17

Press release 295 dated June 21

Q. [Inaudible, but requested the Secretary's
general assessment of the Grenada talks.]

Secretary Vance: I think they were useful.

As I said yesterday, the fact that we got
people to really talk seriously about the issue
of human rights, and focus on the question
and not bury it, is an important step. Obvious-
ly, there is no agreement among the group on
what the answer should be. I think all of us
made our views very clear on the importance
of it. And I think that is an important step.

Q. How did the talks with the leaders of
Trinidad and Tobago go and what did you
talk about?

Secretary Vance: We talked primarily about
economic matters affecting the Caribbean
area. There are a number of situations in the
Caribbean which are really very troublesome.
And the Prime Minister is a very, very
knowledgeable man who has given an awful
lot of thought to the emerging problems of the
area and various ways to try to cope with
them. So I felt it very helpful to have a chance
to get his views on some of those problems.
And we agreed to continue to discuss these
matters with them and with others as well.

But you have a whole series of problems
arising out of those new emerging situations,
as well as some serious problems in countries
like Jamaica and Guyana. There are problems
that have to be faced up to and just can't be
ignored. So I am glad that I had the opportu-
nity to get their views on this and to sharpen
my thoughts on basic ways that one might try
to attack these problems.

Q. Are you concerned about the state of re-
lations with Brazil, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Va?ice: No, no.

Q. Hoiv do you assess them notv?

Secretary Vance: I think our relationships
are good with Brazil. We have our differen-
ces. We understand where those differences
are, but we can discuss them in a friendly
way. And we are going to, as I said yester-
day, continue to operate under the memoran-
dum of understanding. I am looking forward
to having a chance to go there and talk with
them here. I hope that these subgroups in the
meantime will meet and discuss issues in the
area of trade and other matters which have
been provided for under the memorandum of
understanding.

Department of State Bulletin

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ^

Means to promote respect for and protection of
human rights

Whereas:

The nations voluntarily associated in the Organiza-
tion of American States have established the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man as a goal
for the development of their legal culture and a neces-
sary framework for the men of the Americas to reach
their full political expression;

Throughout their history as free nations, they have
struggled to defend the principle of self-determination
and the right of their peoples to choose the system of
government that best suits their interests;

Likewise, the principle of nonintervention of the
states in the internal affairs of other states is respected
and defended by the Organization of American States as
a basis for the juridical equality of the states;

The commitments assumed by the states on protec-
tion of and respect for human rights have not been
delegated by the inter-American community or the in-
ternational community to any particular state, but to
special agencies created by them;

The present legal instruments created to investigate
violations of the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man present deficiencies that make appli-
cation of its standards less effective;

In the initial stages of the processes of economic de-
velopment and capital formation — and in the absence of
effective international financial cooperation —
phenomena, such as reduction in consumption and the

'' Adopted by the Assembly at the fourth plenary ses-
sion on June 22 by a vote of 14 (U.S.) to 0, with 8
abstentions (text from GAS doc. AG/doc. 890/77 rev. 1).

prolonged postponement of the satisfaction of legiti-
mate needs of the peoples present themselves, circum-
stances that create serious social tensions and a politi-
cal climate that is not conducive to the necessary re-
spect for and protection of human rights;

The General Assembly
Resolves:

1. To recommend to the Inter-American Commission
of Human Rights that it prepare a study on the systems
and methods of investigation of violations of those
rights, based on nondiscriminatory principles that rec-
ognize the juridical equality of states and state their ob-
ligation to carry out the commitments assumed in the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
to be submitted to the Permanent Council so that the
latter may examine it and formulate observations with
regard to it.

2. To request the developed countries to expand the
developing countries' participation in international
trade through the abolition of their discriminatory and
protectionist practices; to carry out their commitments
regarding the Generalized System of Preferences; to
reduce their extremely high expenditures for arma-
ments that endanger world peace and the survival of
civilization, and promote the transfer of their flows of
excess capital toward the developing countries within
the framework of their respective national laws, so that
these flows will alleviate the harshness of the processes
of capital formation and create favorable conditions for
the functioning of democratic systems and the full effec-
tiveness of human rights.

3. To expedite establishment of new and effective
inter-American cooperation for the integral develop-
ment of the American countries, and this is a basic
means to promote full legal recognition of human rights
in the juridical as well as economic, social, and cultural
spheres.

July 18, 1977

Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Issues and Answers'

Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Vance on the ABC television
and radio program on June 19. Interviewing
the Secretary ivere Bob Clark and Barrie
Dunsmore of ABC News.

Press release 293 dated June IH

Mr. Clark: The Carter Administration is
coyning under increasing attack these days
from those who think, for a variety of rea-
sons, that the United States is relaxing its
guard against the Communist world. By re-
fusing this week to endorse the President's
plan to 2vithdraw American troops from
South Korea, the Senate seemed to be telling
him to go slow on such a pullout. Will the
Senate's action affect the timetable for with-
drawal?

Secretary Vance: Let me say a word by way
of background and then answer specifically
your question.

Since the very start of the Carter Adminis-
tration we have been striving to work very
closely with the Congress in both the de-
velopment and the implementation of foreign
policy. Both the President and I have said
consistently that we believed that if we were
going to have an effective foreign policy, it
must be developed in coordination and in
cooperation with the Congress. To that end
we have been keeping them fully informed as
we have moved along in the development of
various foreign policy initiatives.

During the last week a number of bills came
to the floor. One of those did relate to the Ko-
rean situation. The action taken by the Con-
gress there did not restrict the President's
rights to proceed with a phased withdrawal of
our troops from Korea. It indicated that they
expected that we would work in cooperation
with the Congress as we proceeded down the

road to a phased withdrawal over a period of
approximately five years.

We intend to do that. That is wholly con-
sistent with the path which we have been fol-
lowing. We welcome that cooperation and that
consultation.

There are obviously some matters which
the President, as Commander-in-Chief, can
only take, because of his responsibilities. But
I look forward, as does the President, to
working with the Congress as we proceed to
the phased withdrawal of our troops from
Korea.

Mr. Clark: But the Senate did appear to be
sending a signal to the President that there
may be trouble ahead if he proceeds according
to the present timetable for ivithdrawal of all
American troops. Is it conceivable to you that
the President might in some way alter that
timetable because of congressional pressure?

Secretary Vance: I did not draw the same
conclusions, Mr. Clark, that you did from
that. What I understood them to be saying
was that they wanted to be kept informed as
we proceeded down this road and not that
they were saying that they did not endorse a
phased withdrawal.

Indeed, I think as the resolution was put in
originally it would have done that, but that
was not the amendment which passed.

Mr. Dunsmore: Mr. Secretary, the one
thing that seems to symbolize the Carter Ad-
miyiistration's foreign policy is, of course,
human rights. The other day in Grenada you
conceded, however, that human rights had
made the co)iduct offoreigti policy somewhat
more difficult or coniplicated, though you
said it was worth it.

I am wondering in view of the fact that rela-
tions with the Soviet Union now appear to be

Department of State Bulletin

i)i considerable difficulty, that there are new
difficulties in Latin America, particularli/
with Brazil, that there are potentially new
difficulties over human rights over places like
China and Korea, if indeed it was really
worth it or if indeed the campaign has been
handled as deftly as it might have been.

Issue of Human Rights

Secretary Vance: I am awfully glad to have
the opportunity to say something about
human rights. Human rights is fundamental to
our foreign policy, and we believe it is a fun-
damental issue that threads through the
foreign policy of all nations of the world. The
issue of human rights is one which is universal
in character, and it is one which for too long
has been swept under the rug and not dealt
with.

I welcomed the opportunity in Grenada to
have a full and frank discussion with our col-
leagues and friends in the OAS on the ques-
tion of human rights. There was not unanim-
ity of view. We didn't expect it. Yet people
were willing to discuss it and to express their
views so that we could know where the other
one stood and try and convince them as to our
view.

This, I think, was a very positive thing.
And my view is that everybody now under-
stands that we are serious, we are deeply
serious, about the importance of human
rights, and we are going to continue to push
this issue because we think its importance is
so great.

I would make another comment, too.

In judging success in the human rights
field, it is a great mistake, in my judgment, to
try and judge it on the short term. This is
something that can only be measured over the
long term. I think what we must be looking
for is how, over the longer period of time, the
sensitizing of the world in general to the im-
portance of human rights is going to work out.

My judgment is that we are going to see, as
we proceed through the years, increased at-
tention to the issue of human rights and that
we are going to see progress in the field of
human rights. I caution against trying to
draw a yardstick and saying as of today we

have made this amount of progress. We must
look to the longer range.

Mr. Dunsmore: Doesn't it mean anything,
however, wheri someone like Roy Medvedev
[Soviet educator and histoyian] says that he
thinks that perhaps because of the campaign
the new Soviet Constitution is even tougher
than it flight have been otherwise, a}id he be-
lieves that so mitch more was accomplished
through quiet diplomacy? Isn't it a question
of tactics, now, more than the actual issue
itself?

Secretary Vance: Well, in the same news-
paper I read this morning an article by Mrs.
Alekseyeva, who has been one of the leaders
in the human rights movement in the Soviet
Union. She drew quite a contrary point of
view with respect to the importance of human
rights and the concern about human rights in
the Soviet Union.

As I repeat again, these are universal prin-
ciples. They are not directed to any particular
country, and I think that is something which
we must bear in mind.

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, the human
rights debate shifted this week to Belgrade
where the United States and other Western
nations will try to lay the groundwork for
strengthening the human rights guarantees
that were agreed to by the Soviets at Helsinki.
Do you think the recent actions of the Rus-
sians and the intensified campaign against
dissideyits and the harassment of newsmen
who try to meet with dissidents bode well for
Belgrade?

Secretary Vance: Let me say that I deeply
regret the incident which took place with re-
spect to Mr. Toth [Robert C. Toth, Los
Angeles Times correspondent, formerly in
Moscow]. We are relieved that Mr. Toth is
now in Great Britain and will be coming back
to the United States after a vacation.

We think that the manner in which this was
handled, the fact that the question of the con-
duct of the press was handled in this fashion,
was wrong. If one followed the policy that
they seemed to be suggesting, the press
would then only be able to deal with people

July 18, 1977

who were officially recognized to deal with
them.

We think that is totally contrary to the
principles of the Helsinki agreements. There-
fore, this is a matter of great concern to us. It
is these kinds of issues which we hope to dis-
cuss, to review, at the Belgrade conference.
We are going to continue to approach this in a
straightforward frank way, without polemics,
and I hope that the others will do the same
thing at that conference.

Eurocommunism

Mr. Clark: Secretary Vance, some of the
President's critics feel that what they regard
as his obsession with human rights is dis-
tracting attention from other ynore important
problems in dealing with the Communist
world.

Your predecessor at the State Department,
Henry Kissinger, thinks the Carter Adminis-
tration should be more worried than it ap-
pears to be about the political successes of
Communist parties in Europe. He said in a
recent speech that he regarded as a very im-
portant speech that it would be disastrous to
the Western alliance if the Communists won a
major role in the governments of France,
Italy, or other NATO countries. Does the
Administration have any strategy to deal
with Communist political successes in
Europe?

Secretary Vance: Indeed it does. We have
said that we are not indifferent to the partici-
pation of Communists in governments of
European countries. We have said that in
dealing with our Western allies on vital issues
we would prefer to be dealing with countries
which have the same fundamental values, the
same democratic concerns, that we have. If
the Communists were to take a dominant role
in these governments, that could present
serious problems insofar as we are concerned.

We have gone on to say that we think the
question, the political question, of whether or
not Communists should or should not play a
part in the government of a particular country
is a political issue to be decided by the people
of that country and one in which we should
not interfere. However, at the same time, I

say again that does not mean that we are in-
different to the fact that they may.

Issue of Strategic Arms

Mr. Dunsmore: On the subject of com-
munism, sir, it brings us to the Soviet Union
and relations generally.

The keystone of detente has always been
strategic arms limitation. You are saying
now almost every day that you don't know if
there will be a new agreement, but you don't
think we should be negotiating under a dead-
line. If there isn't an agreement by October,
what happeyis to U.S. -Soviet relations?

Secretary Vance: I think that if we do not
reach an agreement by October 3rd we will
continue to negotiate. The issue of the
strategic arms talks is too important a one for
either country to put aside. I think we will
both persevere in these discussions even
though the interim agreement may have ex-
pired.

There are two choices that we have at the
point where the interim agreement may ex-
pire. We can either extend the agreement or
we can proceed as if it were, in fact, in effect.
• So I do not think that that will adversely
affect the negotiations themselves, because I
think both of us know that what we want is an
agreement which is a sound agreement, which
provides equal security for both and is fair to
both and is one which we can live with, one
which will not have ambiguities in it which
may raise questions for the future.

That is why I say I think it is important not
to feel we're under a deadline, but to seek a
good agreement, one which we can live with
in the future.

Mr. Dunsmore: Mr. Vance, last month in
Geneva in your talks with Mr. Gromyko you
were able to establish what was called a
"framework" for a new strategic arms limita-
tion agreement. Since then, have you been
able to build at all upon that framework? Are
we making any progress?

Secretary Vance: Yes, I think we're making
some progress. It's slow. We agreed at
Geneva that we would continue our discus-
sions at three different levels.

First, we would allocate some of the issues

Department of State Bulletin

to our two delegations — the Soviet delegation
and our delegation — which are meeting in
Geneva.

Secondly, we agreed that we would discuss
some issues at the ambassadorial level with
the foreign minister in both Moscow and in
the United States.

And thirdly, that Mr. Gromyko and I would
meet again.

The first two are underway at this point.
Insofar as my meetings with Mr. Gromyko are
concerned, we will be having a couple of meet-
ings in September. In the meantime, I hope
we will have made some progress in the dis-
cussion at these other two levels.

Mr. Dunsmore: Your predecessor some-
times used to feel that it was more difficult to
negotiate with the hawks in the Pentagon and
the Capitol than it ivas ivith the Russians. Do
you feel that way?

Secretary Vance: No. We've had really very
good cooperation working with the Pentagon.
I just couldn't be more delighted with the way
that this has worked out. You know, I worked
in the Pentagon for a good many years, and I
must say that I'm simply delighted with the
way that the State Department, the Defense
Department, and all the others involved in the
process of NSC [National Security Council]
discussions are able to get along. There's a
spirit of cooperation which is very heartening.

Mr. Clark: We'd like to turn to the Middle
East, Mr. Secretary. Vice President Mondale
said in a speech on Middle East problems this
week [nt San Francisco on June 11] that the
United States will not use the threat of reduc-
ing our military aid to Israel to get Israel to
give up the occupied territories. With the
adamant position of Menahem Begin, who
will be the new Israeli Prime Minister,
against giving up any of the occupied lands,
isn't the United States going to have to apply
pressure of some sort if it is going to play a
significant role in achieving a Middle East
settlement?

Secretary Vance: I'm going to answer your
question, but let me say something first be-
cause I'd like to sort of set this in a
framework.

When our Administration came into office,
we decided that we were not merely going to
react to situations, but that we were going to
shape an agenda of items which we considered
to be of the highest priority and would pro-
ceed to deal with those issues.

The first of those items was that dealing
with the question of regional peace, which
could affect, in the long run, world peace. And
the Middle East was one of those obvious
areas which involved regional peace. Another
was, of course, Africa, where we're also
working.

Secondly, we agreed that we would work to
achieve progress in the arms control area be-
cause of its importance not only to the big
powers but to the world in general, and there-
fore, we agreed to attack both the problem of
strategic arms and of conventional arms.

Thirdly, we decided that we must work
with our colleagues to try and control the
spread of nuclear weapons throughout the
world, and we have been working to that end.

Fourthly, we decided it was of utmost im-
portance to strengthen the alliances with our
allies, and the most important example of that
is NATO. We have been working in that area,
as you well know.

Fifthly, we decided that it was important to
promote cooperation rather than confronta-
tion with the Third World. Much of what we
have been doing at CIEC [Conference on In-
ternational Economic Cooperation], in the
OAS, in the meeting which I am going to be
attending in the OECD [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development] is
related to this. This is the whole range of so-
called North-South problems that are dealing
with these terribly complicated economic rela-
tionships which arise out of our relationships
with the Third World.

Ne.\t, we believe that we must seek nor-
malization of relations with as many countries
as possible, because without a dialogue — a
diplomatic dialogue — there's no way even to
advance our own interests, let alone hear
what the concerns of the others are.

And the last was, of course, the promotion
of human rights.

Now I just wanted to give you this sort of
agenda of items which we have been using and

July 18, 1977

proceeding along during this first stage.

Now let me return, if I might, to the ques-
tion of the Middle East. I think it's too early
yet to say what the foreign policy of Mr.
Begin is going to be. He is coming to the
United States, hopefully, at the end of the
month of -July. I think we must wait until he
comes and we have a chance to hear firsthand
what his foreign policy is, what he is prepared
to do with respect to the negotiation of a
peace in the Middle East, before we jump to
any conclusions.

I would note that I've read the press in the
last day or so that Mr. Begin's coalition has
apparently endorsed a policy which says that
they are prepared to enter into peace negotia-
tions without any preconditions. We will look
forward to seeing Mr. Begin when he comes
and to finding out specifically what flexibility
there is.

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, the Vice Presi-
dent said flatly that we will not use the threat
of reducing military aid to Israel to get them
to give up occupied territories.

Secretary Vance: That's right.

Mr. Clark: Does that mean that we would
continue to sell arms to Israel, and to Arab
countries to the extent that they buy them
from us, regardless of whether there is any
progress toward peace in the Middle East?

Secretary Vance: We have urged all of the
parties, and I have talked with the parties
myself, about the need for restraint and re-
duction in arms sales in the area — and we will
continue to do so. But let there be no ques-
tion: We have a deep commitment to Israel
that we will provide to Israel the arms which
are necessary for its self-defense, and we will
abide by that without any question. And I
don't want any lack of clarity on that point.

Mr. Dunsmore: Well, let me put the ques-
tion to you this way then, sir: At the end of
the 1973 war, the United States went on an
alert to prevent the Russians from interven-
ing, which in effect was saying we would be
prepared to go to war. If there's another war
in the Middle East, and it comes about, at
least in part, because the Israelis have not
been prepared to make what we consider to be

reasonable concessions, would we go to war to
save them?

Secretary Vance: That is a question which is
an iffy question, which I am not going to
answer.

Let me say that we have told Israel that we
stand behind her, that we will do everything
that's necessary to preserve her security and
integrity, should it be challenged. I think that
sufficiently answers your question.

Mr. Dunsmore: It's a cliche of the Middle
East that it's up to the parties themselves to
settle it, but left to their own devices they've
had four wars. Surely there must be some
kind of friendly persuasion that we are plan-
ning on both sides.

Secretary Vance: We clearly feel that we
have a role to play here as a country which
has good relationships with both sides — with
both Israel and with her Arab neighbors. We
believe that we can work with the parties to
try and help them find common ground. We
are committed to do everything within our
power to bring this about.

Whether it can be accomplished I don't
know, because the ultimate decision is going
to be made, and has to be made, by the par-
ties themselves. You can never have a lasting
peace unless it's one agreed upon by the par-
ties. We will feel free, as I have indicated be-
fore, to make suggestions to the parties as to
what we believe are fair and equitable ap-
proaches to these common core issues which
we have talked about so many times in the
past.

Relations With Cuba

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, we'd like to get
in a few words about Cuba. There is, you
know, considerable opposition in Congress to
the President's move to normalize relations
with Cuba, perhaps because many members
of Congress don't fully understand what he
means. Would we resume full diplo)natic re-
lations with Cuba and niove toward an end to
the trade embargo while Cuban troops remain
in Africa?

Secretary Vance: Let me first say that I
think the dialogue which we have opened up
with Cuba is long ovei'due. It simply has made

Department of State Bulletin

no sense to have a country which is 90 miles
ffom our shore and to refuse to discuss with
them issues — issues where we may have dif-
ferences, but issues which need to be dis-
cussed, issues which affect our bilateral rela-
tionships, and issues which affect the world in
general. Therefore, I think, by starting this
process of discussions we are moving along
the right road.

We have dealt with two issues so far. We've
dealt with the issue of fisheries, where we
have concluded a satisfactory treaty. We have
now agreed that we will have a small repre-
sentation in Havana — a diplomatic represen-
tation— and they will have one here. This I
think is a good second step, because it will
facilitate the dialogue.

One of the issues which we will be discus-
sing with them will be the question of Cuban
troops in Africa.

Mr. Clark: And ive are just about out of
time. I wonder if I could get a yes or no
answer.

Would we normalize diplomatic relations
with Cuba while Cuban troops were still in
Africa?

Secretary Vance: Let me say we are at the
stage now where we have many issues to dis-
cuss beyond that, and we have to discuss all
of these issues before we talk about
normalization.

U.S. and U.K. Initial New
Air Services Agreement

Following is a statement by President Car-
ter issued on June 22, together ivith a De-
partment announcement released that day.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT CARTER

white House press release dated June 22

I am pleased that the delegations of the
United States and the United Kingdom have
come to an agreement on the issues involved
in the negotiations over continuation of com-
mercial air service between our two countries.

The signing of an agreement in principle
means that disruption in air service on the

North Atlantic, Pacific, and Caribbean routes
has been avoided. The agreement insures that
international air service between Britain and
the United States will continue to function in
an atmosphere of healthy competition — an
atmosphere which will benefit consumers and
airlines alike.

I extend my personal appreciation to special
Ambassador Alan Boyd and to the members of
the U.S. delegation.

Our new agreement should demonstrate to
the world that the warm relations our two na-
tions have enjoyed are as strong today as they
have ever been.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 299 dated June 22

The United States and the United Kingdom
announced on June 22 the initialing in London
of a new air services agreement to replace
their existing bilateral agreement, commonly
known as the Bermuda agreement, which ex-
pired at midnight on June 21, 1977. The new
agreement, which will be reviewed by both
sides and signed in Bermuda, possibly as
early as mid-July, will govern air services on
North Atlantic, Pacific, Bermuda, and Carib-
bean routes for airlines of both countries.
Under the new accord those airlines will have
significant new route opportunities and
operating flexibility. Mechanisms have been
established for the review of rates and, in cer-
tain situations, of airline capacity as well, in
order to promote more efficient and econom-
ical service for the public. Moreover, for the
first time, scheduled and charter air services
are linked in a major bilateral agreement.
Pending signature of the new agreement, air
services between the two countries will con-
tinue as under the original Bermuda agree-
ment.

U.S. special Ambassador Alan S. Boyd,
head of the U.S. delegation, stated that "the
agreement will provide significant new oppor-
tunities for the airlines of both nations and
promises real benefits to the traveling public.
Basic decisions concerning the provision of air
services will continue to be made by the air-
lines, subject to governmental approval of
rates and review of capacity that is deemed to

July 18, 1977

be excessive. We expect to see air services
expand and become increasingly efficient."
U.S. officials said that the new agreement
represented an extension of the liberal princi-
ples of the original Bermuda agi-eement and
reflected a new emphasis on low-cost travel.

For the first time in a major air services
bilateral agreement, charter air services are
included together with scheduled services, al-
though certain details remain to be worked
out at a future date. In the interim, both sides
have agreed to incorporate the existing un-
derstanding on charter services in the basic
agreement and apply certain provisions of the
basic agreement to charters. In addition, dur-
ing the last phase of the negotiations Presi-
dent Carter approved an innovative, low-cost,
scheduled service proposed by Laker Air-
ways, a British concern. The Laker plan pro-
vides low-cost, no-frill, no-reservation service
between New York and London. U.S. carriers
are expected to offer competitive proposals
shortly.

Each country will have the right to desig-
nate two flag carriers to conduct services on
two North Atlantic routes. On North Atlantic
routes the United States and United Kingdom
will each be permitted to designate two air-
lines to operate the New York-London and
the Los Angeles-London routes.

Airlines of both countries obtain operating
rights from four new U.S. cities to London. In
the first three years of the agreement, U.S.
airlines will be authorized to serve Atlanta
and Dallas/Ft. Worth nonstop to London; a
British airline will be authorized to serve
Houston. After this three-year period, air-
lines of both nations will be authorized to op-
erate these routes, and the United States will
be free to select a new gateway point for
nonstop air services to London. British com-

petition to the present U.S. flag service from
Seattle to London will be permitted in the
new agreement. In addition, the United
States receives the rights to fly between An-
chorage and London, a route that British
Airways today operates en route to Tokyo.
The present requirement that London-San
Francisco flights by a U.K. airline operate via
New York will be dropped. As a result, it can
be anticipated that British Airways will soon
inaugurate London-San Francisco nonstop
service.

In the Pacific, the United States obtained
new operating rights to Singapore. A U.K.
airline will receive additional rights between
Hong Kong and the U.S. west coast via
Japan.

Obsolete operating restrictions imposed on
U.S. airlines in the old agreement were
dropped. Ambassador Boyd stated, "The new
route structure is expected to result in more
flexible and economic airline operations for
airlines of both countries and better service to
the public."

A special consultative process has been
agreed to prevent unnecessary empty seats on
airplanes on North Atlantic routes. This proc-
ess may be invoked by either country in ex-
ceptional cases if an airline appears to be
operating too many flights. The procedures do
not give either government a veto over indi-
vidual airline flights, but do meet U.K. con-
cerns that increases in flights be reviewed by
them if they appear excessive.

To protect consumers and assure that serv-
ices are economically viable, new procedures
for reviewing the prices charged by airlines of
the two countries have also been agreed. In
addition, a special working group will be set
up to make recommendations on pricing policy
to the two governments.

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Vance Interviewed by II Tempo Correspondent

Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Vance by Marino de Medici,
Washington correspondent for II Tempo,
which was released on June 18.

Press release 280 dated June 18

Q. First of all, I appreciate your attetnpt to
strike a balance. I see that the United States
gets to be accused of many things, as I have
seen for many years. But it is a little bit
ironic that you get accused, on one side, of
intervention in the internal affairs of coun-
tries ayid accused of indifference to the inter-
nal affairs of other countries. It's a
political-moral dilemma — sort of squaring
the circle. My question is, how do you deal
with this dilemma in the U.S. policies?

Secretary Vayice: Well, do you want to take
it, say, in a specific country, or how would
you like to —

Q. Well, obviously the accusation of inter-
vention came from the East, with respect to
huynan rights, whereas some Western coun-
tries which are threatened by ''Eurocom-
munism," by the ascendance to power of the
Communists, would like to have some sort of
American interest in a more tangible way — a
more tangible fashion. How do you view this
dilemma?

Secretary Vance: Let me start and talk
about the question of Eurocommunism and
then move into the question of American pol-
icy with respect to the Eastern bloc and how
we deal with that.

Insofar as Eurocommunism is concerned,
we have tried to make clear from the outset
that we believe it is not for us to tell any
country who they should elect in the way of
their political leaders. That is their responsi-
bility and their right. On the other hand, that
does not mean that we are indifferent to who

is elected and who serves in the government
of any country. As we have said on a number
of occasions, we would obviously prefer those
who have the same kind of views with respect
to fundamental values and precepts; and
therefore we clearly prefer those who have a
democratic backdrop. And we would believe
that this is clearly preferable from our
standpoint.

But again, you have to draw the balance be-
tween this and the right of any country to
elect whom they choose. Now, I think that by
expressing our views in this way — namely,
clearly — that we do have a preference. On the
other hand, we think that the fundamental,
ultimate decision has to be made by the people
of the country. It is a reasonable way of deal-
ing with this very, very difficult problem.

Q. Senator Church said the other day that
he shares the pessimistic view, this scenario
so to speak, of profound consequences in the
relationship between the United States and
Europe should the Communists have a degree
of participation. I think much of the quibbling
now is over whether it should be significant or
decisive — these are two terms used.

Secretary Vance: Yes, we have used those
terms.

Q. Your spokesman on April 6 told us that
the ability of the United States to work to-
gether with European democracies would be
impaired by the coming to power of the Com-
munists in a dominant way. So this was
taken as a change of tone. Is it really a mat-
ter, therefore, of tactics rather than strategy?

Secretary Vance: No, I don't think it's a
question of tactics. I think it's a question of
strategy, basically, because the question of
dominance is a fundamental question, because
it really does affect the basic structure and.

July 18, 1977

therefore, the ultimate policies which will be
developed by a particular country. So I would
not call the issue a tactical issue. I would call
it one of fundamental or strategic importance.

Q. We face the graduality of accession to
power of CommiDiists in some countries to-
day. Take the Italian Commimists. They have
said that they ivill not take over altogether,
even if they had a .51-percent majority. So, it
would have to be a gradual process. Where
does the indifference end when, say, they
move from a subcabinet-level post to a higher
post, to greater participation in the govern-
ment? Hotv would you erect a wall in the
Cabinet, vis-a-vis a Communist member of
the Cabinet?

Secretary Vance: Again, there I think you
are crossing the line. Because for us to
suggest what the wall should be would be in-
appropriate. That would be interfering with
the internal affairs of the given country. That
is for a particular country to decide for itself.
But that does not mean that we should be in-
different to the result.

Q. In other words, there would be conse-
quences. For instance, as to the question of
stationing of American troops: Do you think
that the presence of Communists in some gov-
ernments would erode the moral basis for the
presence of American troops in Western
Europe? Would it have such a consequence?

Secretary Vance: Let me say, I think it
could.

Q. It could. The question also has been
raised as to what the United States could do
in terms of moral support, and President
Carter said that he would go to France to
meet with President Giscard d'Estaing, with a
view to helping him. Do you see this as a
practical way of making your concern felt in
France and elsewhere in Europe?

Secretary Vance: I had forgotten the pre-
cise words that he used in that connection,
but was this in the interview that he had with
the European correspondents?

Q. No, this ivas after London, when it ivas
annouticed that he would go and would pay a
state visit to France. My implication is: Do
we have to assume that he will be there at a

time ivhen his presence as a moral shoiv
would have the maximum benefits for democ-
racy in France and elsewhere?

Secretary Vance: Well, I think we're get-
ting into something there which is not yet de-
finite enough to comment on with respect to
timing and the like. Therefore I would not like
to get into that at this point, because I think
that would give implications.

Q. Some people have found the juxtaposi-
tion between the position of the previous Ad-
ministration and your Administration a bit
relevant. Perhaps, it has been pointed out, it
is simply a change of tone. You have dis-
cussed this before. What would you think in
terms of the contacts that you should have
with European Communists, whereas before
there was a very low-level type of communica-
tion with Communists in Europe? Do you
think that a way could be found to communi-
cate with the Communists without altering or
jeopardizing your basic priyiciples and fun-
damental attitudes?

Secretary Vance: I think we should continue
generally along the lines that we've been
using in the past, and that is the way I would
expect that we would be moving in the future.

Q. You were not quoted, but it was repoHed
that you felt that perhaps the rise in
Eurocommunism implied some advantages
for the democratic nations insofar as it would
create problems in the Eastern bloc and that
perhaps these problems would more than out-
weigh the damage that Eurocommunism
could bring to the NATO structure. Are you
still of this opinion?

Secretary Vance: I would say that I think
that this is a possibility. I think it depends on
how Eurocommunism develops. I think one
has to watch and see what the development of
the process is in the various countries of
Western Europe. And so, therefore, it is too
early to draw any final conclusion with re-
spect to this.

Q. The point, however, has also been made
that ive are not really in the best position to
take advantage of turmoil and problems in the
Eastern world. It took us a long time to find
out about the Chinese-Russian split, and that

Department of State Bulletin

pertained to state relations. Do you think that
we ivould be in a position to better profit out
of the cojitinuing apparent discussion among
Eastern European countries? Would ive
really be able to benefit in terms of a schism
or a series of small schisms within the
Soviet-communist bloc?

Secretary Vance: I think that this could
have a meaningful effect, yes.

Belgrade Review Conference

Q. If I can turn to Belgrade, you said that
the U.S. objective in Belgrade is to avoid
polemics. And yet you also said that the West
would be ready to subject the Eastern coun-
tries to a critique on issues like human rights.
Do you see incompatibility between these?

Secretary Vance: No, not at all.

Q. Could you expand on that?

Secretary Vance: Yes, I'll be delighted to
e.xpand on this. It seems to me that our prin-
cipal task — and when I say "our," I mean all
of the participants to the Belgrade
conference — is to review the implementation
of the Final Act of Helsinki. One of the areas
in which we would be conducting this review
is that of "basket" 3.'

This, of course, raises the question of
human rights. I think what we have to have is
a frank and straightforward review of what
has taken place. We will find, in my judg-
ment, some progress in certain areas, lack of
progress in others, and in others there will be
some retrogression.

And I think it's in the interests of all of us
that we do [the review] in a straightforward
way. Now if one, on the other hand, went into
this process with the objective of ending up in
confrontation, that, I think, could affect the
benefit that could be derived from this review
process. And I think, in the end, all of us
would be the losers if that were the case.

Therefore, I say that we will eschew
polemics but will insist upon a straightfor-
ward and frank review of the facts, whatever
they may show.

Q. What is at issue here is really the prin-
ciple of accountability of nations.

Secretary Vance: That's right.

Q. Where does, however, the moral and jus-
tified concern of one nation end and interfer-
ence begin?

Secretary Vance: Well, this is obviously a
very difficult question. One has to take a look
at the document itself. The Helsinki accords
indicate that human rights is one of the fun-
damental issues for the nations which were
signatories to the Helsinki document. Having
recognized this as a critical and important
area, it is therefore incumbent upon us to de-
termine how well each of us has lived up to
the principles which are set forth there. And
accordingly I think that each one of us should
be willing and prepared to have our own con-
duct scrutinized.

Q. On a general plane, do you think it is
realistic to draw the conclusion that some
kind of linkage exists between political and
strategic questions on one side and moral
questions on the other?

Secretary Vance: Well, I think that basic
moral questions Hke the questions of human
rights are intertwined with the strands of
foreign policy. And this is clear from docu-
ments such as the United Nations Charter,
the Helsinki accords, and other international
documents. And therefore, to that extent, ob-
viously there is a connection between political
and economic and moral.

I think the use of the word "linkage" is
probably not a good choice of words, because
linkage has been used in a different sense. So
I would shy away from using that word.

Q. Should we say connection? Some people
obviously put the choice very squarely, and I
think in unrealistic terms, between a show-
down and a backdown with the Soviet Union.
But they also seem to fear that you are on a
collision course. What is your feeling on this?

Secretary Vance: I don't think it's neces-
sary to have things in such -stark black-and-
white terms. I don't think it has to be either a
showdown or a backdown. I think that both of

' For text of the Final Act of the Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on
Aug. 1, 1975, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1975, p. .32.3; for
"basket" 3, Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other
Fields, see p. 339.

July 18, 1977

us can approach this in a constructive way
which can lead to a result which is useful to
the world community, and therefore I do not
accept these stark contrasting approaches and
think the answer lies more in the middle.

Strategic Arms Talks

Q. On SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks], some people also feel that it is going to
be nearly impossible to reach an agreement by
October. So the question is, what will you do?

I would like to ask you another thing. In
this negotiation, something seems to be mis-
sing. The United States and the Soviet Union
go on improving their land-based missiles.
Have you come to an understanding with the
Soviet Union on the concept of strategic de-
teri'ence'? Do the doctrines mesh on this? At
one point, somebody said, '"What in the name
of God is strategic superiority?" What about
an understanding with the Russians on
strategic deterrence as the buildup of land
missiles continues and becomes a destabiliz-
ing factor?

Secretary Vance: Well, you've asked a very
broad question. Let me try and answer it.
And if I haven't done it completely, why then,
please ask me additional clarifying questions.

I think that both of us recognize that the
concept of a nuclear war is unacceptable to
either of us as a nation. A nuclear war could
result in the destruction of the world as we
know it, and therefore it is something that
both the Soviet Union and we will obviously
do everything within our power to seek to
avoid.

As to whether or not we agree on such re-
finements as strategic deterrence as opposed
to counterforce and the like, those are much
more difficult questions. But I think the broad
important point to make is that both of us rec-
ognize that we must do everything within our
power to avoid nuclear war, and therefore, we
must take the necessary steps to stop the
arms spiral and to begin to move along the
road toward real nuclear disarmament. And
that is the reason that we came forward in our
trip to Moscow with our proposal for a so-
called comprehensive plan. The objective of
this was to try and take a major step forward
in moving toward real disarmament.

Prior to now, agreement has been reached
with respect to certain matters, such as put-
ting a cap upon the total number of strategic
delivery vehicles and such as limiting any bal-
listic missile systems. These were necessary
and important first steps. But it seems to us
that from here on forward we really have got
to take major steps that not only look to re-
ducing the number of strategic weapons that
each has in its arsenal, but also beginning to
get a grip upon the qualitative problem as
well.

It is only when we start moving in this di-
rection that we will really be taking signifi-
cant steps along the road.

Q. How would you assess this movement at
the current stage? Are you optimistic that it
will go on to a successful conclusion before
October?

Secretary Vance: I don't want to put any
guesses as to time on the table, because I
simply don't know the answer to that. I would
say, however, that the most important thing
is not the time at which an agreement is
reached, but whether it's a good agreement.

And therefore, I don't think we should feel
ourselves under any specific time pressure to
complete an agreement by a given date. The
important thing is that we try and reach a
good agreement — an agreement that really
advances us along the road of nuclear deter-
rence and disarmament.

Q. A quick change to China. You are about
to go to China. Do you see any real possibility
for a significant change in. the relationship
between the United States and the People's
Republic of China?

Secretary Vance: As the President has indi-
cated, our conduct with respect to the
People's Republic of China is and will be gov-
erned by the principles of the Shanghai com-
munique.^

Our objective is normalization of relations,
but the questions of pace and the modalities
still have to be worked out. And this would
obviously be a very impoi'tant subject that has
to be discussed with the leaders of the
People's Republic. And that will be one of the

2 For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 20, 1972, p. 435

Department of State Bulletin

main items, obviously, that we will wish to
discuss when we sit down together.

Q. The time frame has not changed sub-
stantially, then?

Secretary Vance: Well, as I said, the ques-
tions of time and modalities are both things
which will have to be discussed between us,
and it is too early before we've sat down
to talk to them about this to make any
predictions.

Negotiations on Cyprus

Q. You have long been involved in Cyprus
negotiations. Do you see a new initiative now
on the horizon as a result of the Turkish polit-
ical elections?

Secretary Vance: Well, let me say I hope
very much that progress can be made in Cyp-
rus. I think it's of great importance that that
long-festering problem can be resolved. I
think we have to wait and see what kind of a
government is formed as a result of the recent
elections. I still believe that it is possible to
make progress in the matter of Cyprus, and I
hope that this can be and will be an item of
importance and high priority on the agenda,
once the new Turkish Government comes to
power.

Q. Is there a possibility that the United
States will take again an initiative in resolv-
ing the dispute?

Secretary Vance: Well, what we've said on
this is something that perhaps I should re-
peat. This problem is a problem that has to be
resolved by the parties. We are willing to do
whatever we can to assist, should they wish
us to do so, within the framework of the over-
all negotiations which are being conducted
under the auspices of the Secretary General.
We are not going to intrude ourselves into
those discussions, but we stand ready and
willing to help the parties should they wish us
to do so.

Q. One question about Andy Young, Am-
bassador Young. Do you think that in some
ways he is hurting the cause of American
diplomacy?

Secretary Vance: I think Andy has made
great contributions to foreign diplomacy. I

think there is a much better understanding of
the United States in the Third World as a re-
sult of Andy's work. I know that this is the
case in Africa, and I believe it is also the case
in other parts of the world as well. So there-
fore, I would say that I think Andy has made
a major contribution and will continue to
make major contributions to our diplomacy.

Q. To conclude, one more question, if I can
go back one second to the hard question of the
American presence. Isn't it true that some-
times when the United States abstains from,
doing something, that is also a form, of inter-
vention? How do you really strike the balance
in moral terms of American presence in the
world — not only in Europe where we do have a
large peril, but all over the world? How would
you see this question of America abstaining
from doing certain things, and therefore prac-
tically intervening in a negative sense in
foreign affairs?

Secretary Vance: Well, I'm not sure I ac-
cept your premise, and I think stated that
broadly, I would not agree with the premise.
But if you have in mind any specific case, I
would be delighted to discuss that specific
case.

Q. The specific case could be, for instance,
a comitry in Europe with a Communist prob-
lem, where a large part of the people who are
democrats, who are concerned, look at the
United States as the source of some encour-
agement, of moral support, in a more con-
crete, tangible way. Obviously, noninterven-
tion is a basic principle that we accept. So,
how would you think that the United States
could go about maintaining credibility, main-
taining the hope and the trust of people who
look at the United States for moral leadership
and for support should things go wrong?

Secretary Vance: Well, I would say that you
do this by the conduct that one demon-
strates—in the way that we handle ourselves
both at home and abroad.

I think we'll be judged by the actions that
we actually carry out. Therefore, I think that
people will be watching what we say and do,
and many times what we say will be of great
importance. But we have to balance that, as
you indicated earlier, by nonintervention.

July 18, 1977

And I would say that in a given situation
that depends upon the particular facts of that
situation, and it, as in so many cases, is a mis-
take to try and overgeneralize and apply
rather complex general principles without
putting them in a factual framework. I'm
afraid if one tries to draw, overly draw
generalizations, sometimes this leads to mis-
takes in this interpretation.

Q. A pragmatic policy and the proof of the
pudding of course would be in real situations.

Secretary Vance: That's right.

Q. I appreciate this.

Finally, I know that when President-elect
Carter introduced you, he said that your
amount of traveling would be fairly minimal,
if I remember correctly. You have been travel-
ing a great deal. Are you now beginning to
sloiv down?

Secretary Vance: It is an interesting and
difficult thing. For a number of reasons, it has
really become almost expected that foreign
ministers will participate in a great variety of
international meetings. In fact, if the foreign
minister does not appear, it is considered to
be a slight on the other participants in the
meeting.

As a result of that, it is being, I think, gen-
erally accepted that foreign ministers are
going to have to travel much more than they
ever did in the past. And I think this comes
about because more and more as the global
problems and the regional problems become
more complex and more difficult, it's neces-
sary to deal with them in regional or in global
forums.

This requires more and more international
meetings, and whether we like it or not, the
foreign minister is going to have to partici-
pate.

Q. I hope we'll have your trip to Italy and
to Europe by the end of the year, perhaps.

Secretary Vance: Well, I hope so too, be-
cause I have a great affection for Italy and its
people. I have been there many times.

Q. You are confident about the political
choices that they will make?

Secretary Vance: I have great confidence in
the Italian people. I really do. I have a great

admiration for them, and I have confidence
that their ultimate judgment will be wise.

Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
It's been a pleasure to talk to you.

U.N. Disengagement Observer Force
in Israel-Syria Sector Extended

Following is a statement made in the U.N.
Security Council by Acting U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations James
F. Leonard on May 26.

USUN press release 29 dated May 26

The United Nations and this Council ac-
cepted an important responsibility in deciding
on May 31, 1974, to establish the United Na-
tions Disengagement Observer Force
[UNDOF]. The calm which has prevailed
during the intervening three years in the
areas under U.N. supervision testifies to the
wisdom of that decision. Nonetheless, as we
accept the additional responsibility of ex-
tending the life of this force for a further six
months, ^ we should review once again briefly
the political and military context in which we
take this action.

Any such review must begin with the ob-
servation that UNDOF to date has been an
unqualified success. The parties have scrupu-
lously observed their obligations under the
terms of the disengagement agreement. There
have been no serious incidents, nor has the
area of disengagement been a source of signif-
icant military tension between the armed
forces of Israel and Syria. Much credit for this
is due to the professionalism and dedication of
the officers and men who have served and are
serving in UNDOF. In addition, however, we
should recognize that the United Nations has
built up over the years an impressive institu-
tional experience and expertise in the area of
peacekeeping operations. We should keep this

' The Seeuritv Council on May 26 adopted a resolu-
tion (S/RES/408 (1977)) renewing "the mandate of the
United Nations Disengagement Obseiver Force for
another period of six months, that is, until 30
November 1977." The vote was 12 (U.S.) to 0: Benin,
the People's Republic of China, and Libya did not pai--
ticipate in the voting.

Department of State Bulletin

\ery much in mind in tlie Middle East and
elsewhere in our efforts to negotiate solutions
to longstanding problems.

The mission of UNDOF and other
peacekeeping forces is, of course, to help
maintain calm in the area so that the search
for peace can go forward — as it must — in an
atmosphere most conducive to success. The
United States in the last few months has em-
barked on a new round of consultations with
the aim of resuming the Middle East Peace
Conference at Geneva. President Carter has
met with the principal leaders on both sides.
He has further indicated a desire to meet with
the new Prime Minister of Israel at the ear-
liest appropriate time. Secretary Vance has
recently discussed with Foreign Minister
Gromyko the shared responsibilities of the
United States and the Soviet Union as
cochairmen of the Geneva conference, and we
have agreed to direct our efforts toward re-
convening the Geneva conference this fall.

In the course of all these discussions, we
have gained considerable insight into the
thinking of the various parties. We have a
keen appreciation of the difficulties which lie
in the way of even the beginning of substan-
tive negotiations, but we have also been im-
pressed by the sincere desire for peace on the
part of both Israel and its Arab neighbors. It
is a desire which grows out of a profound
weariness among all the peoples of the Middle
East with continuing conflict. It is a hope nur-
tured by dreams of a better, more secure, and
more prosperous life for all. With these hopes

in mind, the United States will persist in its
deliberate and determined search for ways to
bring the parties together and to help them
realize the just and durable peace that is the
wish of all. We firmly believe, in the words of
President Carter, that:

This may be the most propitiou.s time for a genuine
settlement since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict. ... To let this opportunity pass could mean disas-
ter, not only for the Middle East, but perhaps for the
international political and economic order as well.^

In closing, I would like to express once
again our admiration and gratitude to Gen.
Hannes Phillip and the forces under his com-
mand for the exemplary manner in which they
continue to discharge their duties on the
Golan Heights. We should also single out for
special recognition those nations — Austria,
Iran, Canada, and Poland — who contribute
forces to UNDOF. At the same time, we must
urge all nations promptly and fully to pay
their assessed amounts in support of these
shared international responsibilities. And fi-
nally, I would like to acknowledge the con-
structive and statesmanlike approach to this
renewal of the governments of Israel and Syria
and to thank both the Secretary General and
the distinguished President of this Council
Thomas S. Boya, of Benin] for their ef-
forts which have made possible our action to-
day.

^ Made at the commencement exercises of Notre
Dame on May 22; for the full text .see BULLETIN of .June
18, 1977, p. (521.

July 18, 1977

THE CONGRESS

Department Discusses Results of CIEC Meeting

Statement by Richard N. Cooper *

The Conference on International Economic
Cooperation [CIEC] concluded on June 3 with
a ministerial communique adopted by consen-
sus of the 27 participants. This 18-month ex-
periment in North-South relations produced
agreement on a significant number of issues in
the fields of energy, raw materials, develop-
ment, and finance. It also brought into much
clearer focus a number of areas and concepts
on which developing and developed countries
have sharply divergent views.

Both sides expressed regret in the com-
munique at the failure to agree on certain
specific issues. Nonetheless, both also cred-
ited CIEC with being useful and contributing
to broader understanding of the international
economic situation.

CIEC was but one stage in the ongoing and
evolutionary process of a North-South
dialogue. The locus of the dialogue will change
after CIEC. For the most part, future
North-South discussions will take place in
existing functional international forums on
specific issues. Over the next several months,
attention will center on negotiations in UN-
CTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development] for a common fund in sup-
port of individual commodity agreements, on
the trade negotiations in the multilateral
trade negotiations (MTN), on discussion of
development assistance issues in the IMF-
IBRD Development Committee, and on
negotiations for a supplementary credit facil-

' Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee on
June 21, 1977. The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will be avail-
able from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
Richard N, Cooper is Under Secretary for Economic
Affairs.

ity in the International Monetary Fund [IMF]
and on negotiations for a general capital in-
crease in the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development [IBRD].

For several years prior to the seventh spe-
cial session of the U.N. General Assembly in
September 1975, the North-South dialogue
had been acrimonious and unproductive. De-
veloping countries were increasingly distres-
sed by the erosion in the real value of re-
source transfers and saw an increasing gap
between their aspirations for more rapid de-
velopment and the level of resources available
to them to undertake development programs.
At the same time, they were motivated by the
success of the OPEC [Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries] cartel into greater
cohesion and the formulation of a far-reaching
set of comprehensive and interrelated de-
mands known as the New International Eco-
nomic Order, which, in essence, calls for a
restructuring of the international economic
system in their favor.

The developed countries during this period
were in a reactive posture. In the wake of the
adverse economic consequences of the oil em-
bargo and the OPEC price increases of 1973-
74, their immediate concern in the North-
South context was to begin discussions with
oil exporters, and they initiated a call for an
international energy conference.

The developing countries which met in
April 197.5 with developed countries to pre-
pare for such a conference did not wish to iso-
late energy from other North-South economic
issues and insisted that all relevant issues be
covered. This meeting failed, but following
months of further negotiations, the same
countries agreed to a single conference with

Department of State Bulletin

substantive discussions on energy, raw mate-
rials, development, and finance to be covered
in four separate commissions.

Since most of these non-energy issues are
handled in other forums, the thrust of CIEC's
work on these issues was to seek to advance
the work on them in these other bodies. A
ministerial-level meeting in December 1975
launched the CIEC as a unique experiment in
North-South relations: a single, relatively
small forum with participants representing
different groups of countries, covering a
broad range of North-South issues. As an ex-
periment, its duration was limited to one
year.

The industrialized country participants
were Australia, Canada, the European Eco-
nomic Community, Japan, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United States [Group of
8]. For the developing countries, the partici-
pants were Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Came-
roon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru,
Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire,
and Zambia [Group of 19]. The participants
were chosen in order to give a wide geo-
graphic representation and one that reflected
a variety of economic situations.

Among the developing countries, the oil-
exporting countries had a heavy representa-
tion because of the origins of the conference.
Among the industrialized countries, the mem-
bers of the European Economic Community
decided to speak with one voice. Venezuela
and Canada furnished the cochairmen for the
conference. The CIEC was not a part of the
U.N. structure, but was an independent con-
ference, with a minimal, temporary sec-
retariat, free-standing and without formal
ties to any existing international body.

The experimental aspects of CIEC resulted
in a different kind of North-South forum. Its
limited size and relative absence from public
view meant that, for the most part, ideologi-
cal rhetoric was eschewed, and a relatively
businesslike atmosphere obtained. Despite
our efforts, however, issues did become linked
across commissions; this situation prevented
us from concentrating on issues on which we
believed the most progress could be made and
relegating others to secondary status. We

were also not able to avoid the bloc-to-bloc
tactics characteristic of other global North-
South forums, as we had hoped.

While industrialized countries had intended
that the conference center on energy, they did
not begin CIEC with the expectation or objec-
tive of securing any agreement on oil prices or
oil embargoes. The industrialized countries
did hope, however, to achieve increased rec-
ognition by oil producers of their role in pro-
viding for a stable, growing global economy
and to further the process of integrating the
economies of oil-exporting countries into the
international economy.

Analysis and Formulation of Proposals

The four commissions met almost monthly
during 1976. The first half of the year was de-
voted to analytical work; the second half to ef-
forts to formulate concrete proposals for sub-
mission to ministers for their consideration
and approval. The process was temporarily
suspended last July, following a meeting of
senior officials, when the four commissions
failed to agree on their work programs for the
second half of the year.

The Group of 19 insisted on agenda lan-
guage that prejudged the outcome of the
"action-oriented" phase, including endorse-
ment of the concepts of generalized debt relief
and indexation of commodity prices. This dis-
pute was subsequently resolved in time for
the commissions to meet as scheduled in Sep-
tember. But the work was arduous and long,
and the participants did not make sufficient
progress to end CIEC as scheduled. The con-
cluding CIEC ministerial meeting, originally
planned for December 1976, was postponed in
November in order that work could be
brought to a better state of readiness for
ministers and also to allow the new U.S. Ad-
ministration to participate in the final stage of
the CIEC.

We believe the North-South dialogue, in
CIEC and other forums, should emphasize
improving, rather than restructuring, the
existing international economic system, thus
enabling the developing countries to partici-
pate fully in this system. Appropriate and ef-
ficient transfer of resources to developing

July 18, 1977

countries through direct mechanisms, such as
foreign assistance, as well as the importance
of trade and investment, are the essential
elements in an improved economic system.
We believe — and seek to convince LDC's [less
developed countries] — that indirect
mechanisms of resource transfer, such as
generalized debt relief and indexation of pri-
mary product prices, would be inefficient,
largely ineffective, and actually contrary to
LDC interests.

CIEC enabled us to demonstrate to de-
veloping countries those areas in which ef-
forts should be concentrated and progress
could be made in the ongoing dialogue. The
developed countries backed their rhetoric
about improving the present interdependent
economic system by undertaking serious ef-
forts to produce concrete results in develop-
ment assistance, commodity issues, and trade.
Moreover, subjecting the demands of develop-
ing countries for automatic, indirect resource
transfer to the intense scrutiny of economic
analysis enabled the developed countries to
explain that a number of these demands can-
not be accepted because they run counter to
LDC interests, as well as being contrary to
the interest of a healthy global economy in
which they have a major stake.

CIEC will not cause developing countries to
abandon their attachment to, or their de-
mands stemming from, the New International
Economic Order. Their political solidarity in
North-South relations is centered around the
concepts embodied in the New International
Economic Order. They cannot abandon any
portion of it without endangering this solidar-
ity. However, the cooperative, workmanlike
atmosphere which obtained in CIEC and the
substantive progress made there may tend to
make future North-South discussions more
productive by encouraging developing coun-
tries to temper their more extreme and un-
realistic demands and concentrate on more
promising areas.

The Final CIEC Package

To demonstrate their commitment to a
more productive and rational ongoing North-
South dialogue, and to try to insure that

CIEC contributed positively to such a
dialogue, the industrialized countries in CIEC
constructed a final package containing signifi-
cant advances in elements designed to benefit
developing countries. These elements include:

— A commitment to increased and more ef-
fective foreign assistance over the next sev-
eral years as well as a Special Action Program
of special assistance to the poorest countries.

— A recommendation supporting a general
capital increase for the IBRD and within this
context greater World Bank priority to lend-
ing for energy and raw materials development
and diversification, without prejudice to its
other priorities.

— A political commitment by CIEC partici-
pants to establish a common fund, which in
the Group of 8 view is to be in conjunction
with individual agreements to stabilize com-
modity prices.

In addition, progress occurred on a number
of secondary issues, including a positive ap-
proach to infrastructure development in Af-
rica, food and agriculture, technology trans-
fer, industrialization, LDC access to capital
markets, and support for cooperation among
developing countries.

There were significant advances in the final
package on several elements of interest to us.
We obtained agreement on general guidelines
for energy supply. There were recommenda-
tions to stimulate increased cooperation in
developing energy resources in oil-importing
developing countries. We obtained LDC rec-
ognition of the importance for both developed
and developing countries of an improved cli-
mate for foreign investment.

A disappointment in the outcome is the fail-
ure to agree on continuing energy consulta-
tion. We believe continuing energy consulta-
tions are in the interests of all countries, yet
energy is distinctive among the issues before
CIEC in that it has no natural place for dis-
cussion in existing bodies.

The Group of 19, however, remained un-
yielding in its opposition to an ongoing energy
dialogue. Some OPEC members of the Group
of 19 believe that such consultation would in-
fringe on their unilateral price and production
decisions. Other OPEC members indicated

Department of State Bulletin

that they were prepared to continue energy
discussions if all CIEC would continue. How-
ever, the continuation of CIEC was not ac-
ceptable to oil-importing members of the
Group of 19, even though some favored an on-
going energy dialogue. In the end the indus-
trialized countries stood alone in their support
of the energy dialogue and decided to drop it
rather than let the issue cause the collapse of
CIEC.

A brief summary of the final decisions in the
four areas of energy, raw materials, develop-
ment, and finance follows.

Energy

We made progress on all of the Group of 8
energy objectives in CIEC, except for obtain-
ing a CIEC recommendation for an ongoing
energy dialogue. The CIEC participants
agreed to a general set of guidelines that:

1. Recognize the essentiality of adequate
and stable energy supplies to global growth
and the responsibilities of all nations, includ-
ing the oil-e.xporting countries, to insure that
such supplies are available;

2. Call for intensified national and interna-
tional cooperative efforts to expand energy
conservation and accelerate the development
of conventional and nonconventional energy
supplies during the energy transition period
and beyond;

3. Affirm that special efforts should be
made to assist oil-importing LDC's alleviate
their energy burdens;

4. Recommend that the IBRD, in the con-
text of a general capital increase, establish as
a new priority lending for LDC energy
development;

5. Call for new international efforts to
facilitate the transfer of energy technology to
LDC's wishing to acquire such technologies;

6. Endorse increased international coopera-
tion in energy research and development,
which will probably lead to participation by
some oil-exporting and other developing coun-
tries in ongoing research and development
work in the International Energy Agency
(lEA); and

7. Recognize the desirability and inevitabil-
ity of the integration of the downstream proc-

essing industries of the oil-exporting coun-
tries into the expanding world industrial
structure as rapidly as practicable.

As a first try in a North-South context, we
consider the energy results to be satisfactory.
While replete with caveats, the agreement on
supply puts OPEC on record as recognizing
that adequate energy supplies are necessary
and that oil exporters have a responsibility of
meeting energy needs during the transition
period that must occur while countries de-
velop alternative sources. The recommenda-
tion that IBRD increase lending to LDC's to
develop energy resources could have a signifi-
cant long-term impact on the development
prospects of oil-importing LDC's by gradually
freeing them of the need for high-cost oil. To
the extent these countries reduce oil imports
over time, the world supply of oil will be
greater.

Many OPEC countries are now concerned
about their energy prospects when their oil
runs out. They have been receptive to the
idea of participation in lEA and other
industrial-country energy research and de-
velopment projects to begin their own conver-
sion to alternative energy sources.

Any final assessment of the CIEC Energy
Commission must include the educational im-
pact its work has had on both the oil-
importing developing countries and the OPEC
countries. The former have become more
keenly aware of the adverse economic impact
on them of OPEC price and production deci-
sions. During the course of the work of the
commission, some of the oil-exporting coun-
tries appeared to become more conscious of
the impact of their decisions on the global
economy.

Raw Materials

U.S. objectives in the Raw Materials Com-
mission consisted essentially of insuring a
pragmatic, objective airing of the various
problems in commodity trade, as well as pos-
sible solutions to these problems. Group of 19
participation in the discussions consisted
largely of laying out the full range of demands
emanating from the Manila declaration of
early 1976 and seeking to gain the greatest

July 18, 1977

possible number of Group of 8 concessions in
response to these demands.

The debates revealed some general areas of
agreement, but even greater areas of dis-
agreement, particularly on such traditional
LDC objectives as "preservation of LDC pur-
chasing power in real terms" and measures to
harmonize the production of synthetics with
that of natural products. On other issues, such
as compensatory financing to cover shortfalls
in LDC earnings from exports of primary
products, a Group of 8 proposed study of the
issue in the IMF-IBRD Development Com-
mittee foundered over Group of 19 insistence
on UNCTAD participation in the study.

In the wake of the decision of participants
in the London economic summit that there
should be a common fund and that CIEC
should seek to give impetus to resumed
negotiations on this issue in November, CIEC
participants reached agreement in principle
on the "establishment of a common fund with
purposes, objectives and other constituent
elements to be further negotiated in UN-
CTAD." As the language implies, the Group
of 8 has not accepted the UNCTAD concep-
tion of a common fund. By the same token,
the Group of 19 has not abandoned this
conception.

Aside from the political decision on the
common fund issue, the discussion of raw ma-
terials issues in CIEC — despite the lack of
agreement on many issues — was probably
salutary in that the industrialized countries
were firm, for the most part, in rejecting
those LDC proposals aimed at market inter-
vention that are impractical and unrealistic.
Although we may expect the LDC's to renew
their demands in other forums, they may do
so with a more sober view of the likely
developed-country response.

Development

CIEC also produced agreement on a
number of useful concepts and programs in
the areas of development finance, transfer of
technology, and trade as well as assistance to
agriculture, infrastructure, and industrializa-
tion. This outcome will serve to advance ac-

tions on these matters in other forums and lay
the groundwork for further programs in the
dialogue.

One of CIEC's most notable achievements
was in the area of development assistance.
The Group of 8 countries made commitments
to increase the volume of aid and agreed to a
variety of concepts to enhance the quality and
distribution of these flows. All traditional
donors agreed — for the first time — to increase
official development assistance "substan-
tially."

U.S. commitment along these lines had an
important positive impact; the Administration
has taken this commitment within the context
of its intention to request increases in eco-
nomic assistance over the next five years,
starting with the current fiscal year. In keep-
ing with this important policy decision, donor
countries further agreed to begin negotiations
on a general capital increase for the World
Bank.

Developed countries in CIEC also agreed to
establish a $1 billion Special Action Program
of aid for the poorest LDC's (i.e., generally
those eligible for concessional assistance from
the International Development Association.
Contributions to this program will take vari-
ous forms as determined by each participant
and in accord with a burden-sharing formula
among donors.

Subject to appropriate congressional action,
the U.S. contribution of $375 million will be
funded by fiscal year 1979 in our regular
bilateral assistance program. The European
Economic Community will contribute $385
million to a special account of IDA for fast
disbursing assistance. Other developed-
country participants will split the remaining
$240 million, generally via bilateral measures.
The Japanese share is $114 million in new as-
sistance. Sweden and Switzerland, and in part
Canada, will participate via debt relief.

The conference also reached important
broad agreements in other development-
related areas. The participants agreed on a
set of general concepts concerning infrastruc-
ture development which represents the first
official text on this subject in a North-South
forum. They recommended that the United

Department of State Bulletin

Nations arrange a conference under Economic
Commission for Africa-African Development
Bank auspices to define and carry forward the
objectives of an African Transport and Com-
munications Decade (1978-87) which would be
aimed at improving both economic and social
infrastructures, with special emphasis on
transportation and communications.

In the area of assistance to industrializa-
tion, agreement covered a wide variety of as-
pects, including better coordination for tech-
nical assistance and support for UNIDO
[U.N. Industrial Development Organ-
ization] sectoral consultations. The confer-
ence, however, was unable to agree on two
particularly extreme demands by developing
countries concerning adjustment assistance
and access to markets. These relate to indus-
trialized countries using adjustment assist-
ance for redeployment of industry from de-
veloped to developing countries and to their
eliminating immediately all trade barriers to
imports from developing countries.

On the subject of technology transfer, par-
ticipants agreed on the importance of three
significant measures:

1. Revision of the Paris convention on in-
dustrial property;

2. Implementation of UNCTAD Resolutions
87 (IV), which deals with strengthening the
technological capacity of developing countries,
and 89(IV), concerning the drafting of an in-
ternational code of conduct on technology
transfer; and

3. The importance of the upcoming U.N.
Conference on Science and Technology.

In the area of food and agriculture, CIEC
agreed on a 500,000-ton emergency grain re-
serve, support for early negotiations on a
grains agreement with stocks, and recom-
mendations for enhanced aid for seed produc-
tion and research.

On trade, the conference agreed on lan-
guage recognizing the importance of making
general progress in the MTN and on special
and differential treatment for LDC's in cer-
tain areas of those negotiations. Language
calling for efforts to improve the generalized
system of preferences and to reach an early

decision on the future of the multifiber ar-
rangement regarding textile trade was also
agreed.

The conference also discussed the question
of developing-country debt and considered the
U.S. -EEC proposal on features to guide acute
debt operations, on the one hand, and on the
other, situations where debt is part of a
longer term structural balance-of-payments
problem. The participants, however, were
unable to reach agreement on this subject,
since the Group of 19 continued to call for a
general moratorium on outstanding debt to
donor governments.

Finance

The work of the Financial Affairs Commis-
sion resulted in four generally agreed papers:
private foreign direct investment, develop-
ing-country access to capital markets, other
financial flows (monetary issues), and cooper-
ation among developing countries.

On private foreign direct investment, par-
ticipants agreed on the importance of a favor-
able investment climate in promoting
investment flows and made considerable
progress in agreeing to the essential elements
that constitute a favorable investment cli-
mate. But those issues generally related to a
legal framework for settlement of compensa-
tion and other investment issues could not be
resolved.

Regarding access to capital markets, the
final results support the work of the IMF-
IBRD Development Committee and urge the
speedy implementation of its recommenda-
tions. These largely involve technical assist-
ance of various sorts.

With respect to monetary issues, the partic-
ipants noted with satisfaction that the work
program laid out for the IMF by its Interim
Committee reflected a large number of con-
cerns expressed during the conference.
Strong support was expressed for the initia-
tive taken to establish a supplementary credit
facility in the IMF. A number of Group of 19
participants advanced specific proposals for
structural changes in the international mone-
tary system and for easier access to interna-

July 18, 1977

tional financial resources. The Group of 8 re-
sisted inclusion of such proposals, as these are
matters for discussion in the IMF and not
within the competence of the CIEC. The
Group of 19, preferring to have monetary is-
sues remain on the table, withdrew their spe-
cific proposals in order to reach an agreed
text, noting, however, that the consensus
reached did not cover all areas of interest to
them.

The paper on cooperation among developing
countries largely reflected the text agreed
earlier in various U.N. forums.

Disagreement on the text for measures
against inflation reflected divergent views on
the sources of inflation. The Group of 19 in-
sisted that the only matter of concern was im-
ported inflation and that measures against
such inflation called for indexation of their
export prices. The Group of 8 maintained that
inflation is largely homegrown and requires
appropriate demand management measures.
However, the Group of 8 noted that those
countries whose actions have worldwide
repercussions — i.e., large industrial countries
and countries with important exports — had a
particular responsibility to combat inflation.
On financial assets of oil-exporting developing
countries, participants agreed that some oil-
exporting developing countries, in order to
accommodate world energy requirements and
thereby contribute to world economic growth
and stability, have been maintaining produc-
tion that, at current prices, yields external
resources in excess of their current require-
ments. However, the Group of 8 countries
could not agree that, as a consequence,
such assets should receive preferential treat-
ment.

As noted above, the results of CIEC are
broadly satisfactory. The participants gained
a much better understanding on a broad range
of issues of mutual concern. The dialogue will
continue in other forums. The specific results
of CIEC as a whole will be put before the
U.N. General Assembly in September for
comment and discussion by both participants
and those countries that did not participate in
the Paris meetings.

Department Testifies on U.S. Policy
Toward Rhodesia

Following is a statonent by William B.
Edmondson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs, before the Subcommittee on
Africa of the House Committee on Intenia-
tional Relations on June 8. '

I am pleased to be here today to discuss
with you the situation in Rhodesia and the
progress of the negotiations which we hope
will lead to a peaceful settlement of the ter-
ritory's constitutional problems and bring a
new Zimbabwe into the community of na-
tions as a majority-ruled independent state.

The first round of meetings in southern
Africa between the United Kingdom Consul-
tative Group on Rhodesia, led by Deputy
Under Secretary John Graham, and the
principal parties to the Rhodesian dispute
has been completed. Stephen Low, our Am-
bassador in Zambia, has been traveling and
working closely with Mr. Graham's party,
participating in practically all of the meet-
ings. The aim of the consultative group is to
establish with the relevant parties — that is
the four nationalist groups and the Smith
regime — the basis for a constitution for an
independent Zimbabwe and the necessary
transitional arrangements to move that
country from minority to majority rule.

We share with Great Britain the belief
that a peaceful transition to independence
can be accomplished within 1978. We also
share with the United Kingdom the under-
standing that any settlement must be predi-
cated upon three fundamental principles:

1. That the new government must be
selected on the basis of a democratic elec-
tion;

2. That there should be universal adult
suffrage in that election; and

3. That the constitution of the new state
should include a bill of rights that is legally

' The complete transcript of the heai'ings will be
published by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Department of State Bulletin

enforceable by an independent judicial sys-
tem.

The initial talks have been reasonably en-
couraging. Much work remains to be done,
however, and it serves no one's interest to
attempt to minimize the hostility, suspicion,
and fundamentally differing approaches to
the problem which separate the Smith re-
gime from the African nationalists.
Nevertheless, it is worthy of note that all
the parties have accepted the consultative
group's method of operation as an acceptable
means of carrying out the negotiations.

As could be e.xpected, most of the parties
have put forth their maximum negotiating
positions in these initial encounters. How-
ever, beyond the initial hardline positions
there are indications of some flexibility. The
possibility exists that a settlement can be
worked out which will meet the legitimate
African demands for rapid and complete
transition to majority rule, while at the
same time, encompassing provisions to in-
still in the white population sufficient confi-
dence in their future well-being to encour-
age them to accept and remain in a nonracial
Zimbabwe.

Mr. Graham has now returned to London
to participate in the Commonwealth Confer-
ence. Over the next month we will consult
closely with the British and maintain contact
with the principal parties to obtain their
further ideas and specific constitutional pro-
posals. We expect that by the end of this
month the consultative group will have for-
mulated the general principles of the con-
stitution and a program of transition for fur-
ther discussion with the principal parties.

While the negotiating effort can and must
continue, the level of fighting is unfortu-
nately also increasing. Recently, the Rhode-
sian regime has taken several steps that

threaten to see the conflict widened rather
than reduced. We have vigorously opposed
such moves and have made our objections
known in no uncertain terms. Specifically,
by means of representations made in Cape
Town, we conveyed to the Smith regime our
strongest warning that .an implementation of
Mr. Smith's threat of "preemptive raids"
into Zambia would clearly damage the pos-
sibilities for a negotiated settlement. Simi-
larly, when Rhodesian forces crossed the
border into Botswana, we made clear that
whatever military advantage the Smith re-
gime sought for itself in the short run would
be lost in the long run by the blow to the
cause of peace brought about by attacking a
country which is nearly defenseless.

We cannot definitively assess the motive
for such actions, but if it is to provoke a
larger conflict with the aim of drawing di-
rect foreign intervention and a Western
compensatory response favorable to the
Rhodesians, it will fail.

Our expressions of concern and indigna-
tion over the recent deep penetration of
Rhodesian troops into Mozambique, the first
of this type in 1977, stressed that such ac-
tion not only threatens the prospects for
peaceful negotia;tion but encourages those
who are prepared to see further escalation
of the violence through the introduction of
extracontinental forces. In each case we
have expressed our view that an expansion
of the war would help no one, and we have
made it clear that Mr. Smith could expect no
help against the escalation resulting from
his actions. We believe that the best chance
for peace in the area will come through a
negotiated end to violence and the resulting
peaceful transition to majority rule and in-
dependence. We shall continue to press
ahead, along with the British, toward this
goal.

July 18, 1977

Department Discusses U.S. Participation
in International Organizations

Statement by Charles W. Maynes

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs *

The interest of the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee in U.S. participation in in-
ternational organizations is encouraging. It is
also timely. Too often we have paid lipservice
to the U.N. system, but not taken it seriously
enough. The issues, as the committee has rec-
ognized, are too important for this to
continue.

President Carter is strongly committed to
developing the full potential of multilateral in-
stitutions. He has indicated the importance he
attaches to the work of the U.N. family of in-
stitutions, and to the opportunities they af-
ford, by a series of actions: by appointment of
Andrew Young as our Ambassador to the
United Nations; by inviting, among his first
visitors, U.N. Secretary General Kurt Wal-
dheim to come to Washington; by delivering
his first major foreign policy address at the
United Nations. With these actions and
others, the President has proclaimed that this
country has an important stake in the effec-
tive functioning of international organizations
and that we intend to be an active and con-
structive presence throughout the U.N.
system.

We are aware of the growing complexities
involved in participation in international or-
ganizations today. There are today three

' Submitted to the Senate Committee on Governmen-
tal Affairs symposium on U.S. participation in the spe-
cialized agencies of the United Nations and other inter-
national organizations on -June 15. The complete tran-
script of the symposium will be published by the com-
mittee and will be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20402.

100

times as many sovereign states in the major
U.N. agencies as signed the U.N. Charter in
San Francisco. They have very diverse needs
and interests, and the claims, usually quite
legitimate, that they make upon the services
of the U.N. system have grown dramatically.

From 194.5 until 1970, the United States
contributed to international organizations .$4.7
billion; since 1970, it has already contributed
an additional $4 billion. It is abundantly clear
that as global problems become more numer-
ous and more acute, the uses of international
organizations multiply, their programs e.x-
pand, their costs increase. Since the energy
crisis, for example, the International Energy
Agency and the OECD [Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development] have
added nearly .300 meetings to our conference
schedule.

We find that whenever an international
problem develops — and this happens with in-
creasing frequency in an interdependent
world — often the only appropriate response
comes through an international organization.
Inevitably, as the capacity of these organiza-
tions is strained by the demands placed upon
them, we become increasingly aware of their
defects. This has happened with national gov-
ernments as they face their burgeoning agen-
das. We should not be surprised when it hap-
pens to international organizations.

This is a challenge which the Carter Ad-
ministration has taken up with alacrity. Rec-
ognizing that our political problems in the
United Nations are caused by the logjams in
southern Africa, in the dialogue concerning a

Department of State Bulletin

new international economic order, and in the
Middle East, the Administration has been dip-
lomatically active on all of these fronts. Al-
though our initiatives on such critical issues
as Namibia, Rhodesia, and apartheid are in-
trinsically important, they also have institu-
tional consequences.

As a result of these initiatives, our credibil-
ity is enhanced and many more states are
prepared to cooperate with us, rather than
confront us in a variety of U.N. forums on a
variety of issues. We believe, for example,
that real progress has been made, as well, in
restoring a sense of fair play and due process
in ILO [International Labor Organization] and
in UNESCO [United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization]; an in-
tense effort on our part has produced en-
couraging results. In effect, we have come
back from that nadir of our morale and pres-
tige which followed the debacle in Vietnam.
Our diplomatic effectiveness — then at a low
ebb — is demonstrating, we believe, new vital-
ity, and we can face the challenge posed by
the U.N. system and its problems with new
confidence.

This is a welcome trend, because it is a
myth to believe that the United States can af-
ford to be indifferent to what happens within
the U.N. system or that we can opt out of
major institutions. Even were this to happen
in a particular organization, we could not fol-
low such a policy generally. We must and can
remain a member and work hard to increase
our influence and to improve these institu-
tions.

In one sense, our participation is obligatory
simply because we are the United States, a
great power with many interests, with a con-
cern in how the international rules are drawn
up, and with much to contribute in the way of
knowledge and experience to global develop-
ment and stability. It is inconceivable that we
could abdicate this responsibility. There or-
ganizations have an impact whether we are
there or not, and we must insist on defending
our interests and helping to shape that im-
pact, whether it be on the development of the
world's educational systems (UNESCO), de-
velopment of airline safety standards
(ICAO — International Civil Aviation Organi-

zation), or any of a myriad of other areas of
impoilance in an interdependent world.

The report of the Senate Governmental Op-
erations Committee addresses the problem of
politicization within U.N. agencies, but it is
equally concerned with the issue of
management — the evidence of inadequate
coordination, wasteful administrative prac-
tices, the failure of international institutions
adequately to evaluate their own programs
and set priorities.^ These are problems of
structure, as opposed to substance. They are
a source of continuing concern to the Adminis-
tration, both because we are the largest single
contributor to the U.N. system and because
the agenda for multilateral action is important
and can ill afford the debilitating effects of
poor administration and management.

We must recognize that these problems of
structure are, in apart, endemic among all
large bureaucratic institutions and that inter-
national organizations are not only not an ex-
ception, but have special problems. In some
ways it is amazing that these problems are not
even more severe. After all, the United
States experiences many of the same difficul-
ties at home, and yet we are a relatively
homogeneous society whose government pos-
sesses authority the U.N. agencies do not
begin to approach.

However, the Administration is working
vigorously on behalf of reforms within the
U.N. system. We are trying to preserve the
primacy of the UNDP [United Nations De-
velopment Program] as coordinating agency
for U.N. development assistance. We have ac-
tively supported the strengthening of the
Joint Inspection Unit as an instrument of ex-
ternal evaluation. We applaud the economies
achieved by several of the specialized agen-
cies in reducing inflated bureaucracies and
curbing meetings and publications. WHO
[World Health Organization] for example, is
reducing its staff in Geneva by 313 positions,
and FAO's [Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization] Director General has accomplished
similar streamlining in Rome. In company

^ The report, entitled "U.S. Participation in Interna-
tional Organizations," was printed as S. Doc. 95-50,
February 1977, 140 pp.

July 18, 1977

101

with the other Geneva group members, we
are trying to institute a pause in real budget
growth or limited growth among the big
four— ILO, WHO, FAO, and UNESCO—
during the 1980-81 biennium. During that
period, we propose that the programs of those
agencies be subjected to a searching evalua-
tion and that realistic priorities be established
and consolidation accomplished.

Economy and good management in intei'iia-
tional organizations should be objectives sup-
ported by all states, the LDC's [less de-
veloped countries] included. We must take
care, however. Our passion for economy is
often perceived by the developing countries as
an indication of our opposition to their use of
the U.N. system to fulfill legitimate develop-
ment goals. We need to enlist the LDC's in a
campaign to make the U.N. system more effi-
cient and effective. We are attempting to do
this by demonstrating a good faith commit-
ment to find mutually agreeable solutions for
substantive issues. We can also do this by
committing ourselves to using the savings
from the more economical management of the
U.N. system for programs of benefit to the
majority of the members.

In spite of these efforts, perhaps the most
important arena for reform, the place where
we must concentrate our energy, is right here
at home. The impact we can make upon the
management of the U.N. system will be
proportionate to the quality of the analysis
and coordination we achieve here in Washing-
ton. At the present time, U.S. policy which
affects international organizations is made in
many different departments and agencies and
committees. Responsibility for U.S. participa-
tion in the U.N. system is fragmented and un-
certain. It is essential that the central
policy-directing role of the Department of
State be reaffirmed and that the President
and the Congress support the exercise of that
responsibility even when the policy prefer-
ences of the other agencies may have to be
subordinated.

The key to reform, we believe, lies in the
development of procedures which impose ob-
ligations on all interested government de-
partments and agencies to cooperate with

102

State in defining our objectives and priorities,
relating them to available resources and pre-
senting them as a coherent program for par-
ticipation in the U.N. system. Moreover, this
must be done far enough in advance of budget
deadlines that we may have a reasonable
prospect of influencing the focus and growth
of the U.N. agencies. We have been working
on such procedures and hope to announce
them shortly. The success of these procedures
will depend, in turn, on the effective function-
ing of interagency committees that are able to
tie together foreign and domestic policy con-
siderations and create common purposes and
priorities for our participation in FAO,
UNESCO, ILO, WHO, ICAO, and the many
other developmental and technical forums to
which we belong.

This Administration has already taken sev-
eral steps to improve the development and
implementation of U.S. policy toward interna-
tional institutions. The size and composition of
U.S. delegations to international meetings
and conferences is the subject of a directive
by the Secretary of State, calling for reduc-
tions by 15-25 percent and placing responsi-
bility at a higher level for recommending
more minority candidates for delegation posi-
tions. It should result in leaner, more repre-
sentative, and better integrated delegations.
We have been able to reduce delegation size
significantly.

In addition, procedures have been insti-
tuted which should appreciably strengthen
U.S. review and appraisal of U.N. develop-
ment assistance. My office has initiated face-
to-face conversations with high-level officials
in the domestic agencies with the objective of
improving coordination and reconciling policy
differences. And in the area of recruitment for
international secretariats, we are embarking
upon a major effort to improve our represen-
tation among field personnel with responsibil-
ity for development projects.

We recognize that the quality of interna-
tional secretariats and the number of U.S. na-
tionals in key posts has troubled the commit-
tee. There is I'oom for improvement. How-
ever, there are some basic points anyone con-
cerned with this area must bear in mind.

Department of State Bulletin

First, the United States is better repre-
sented in the secretariats of U.N. agencies,
including top positions, than any other coun-
try.

Second, when our nationals are grouped
with those of the OECD states, the picture is
even more encouraging.

Third, our principal problems are with in-
stitutions based in foreign countries where
Americans are less willing to live than in their
own country.

Finally, in the years immediately ahead, a
combination of factors will make it very dif-
ficult to increase significantly the American
contingent in international secretariats. Fi-
nancially induced restrictions on recruitment,
intense pressure to provide more positions for
underrepresented developing countries, and
limited career opportunities for American
professionals combine to limit our prospects.
However, we would stress that gains can be
realized if we are prepared to pay the bill for
a national recruitment service or for a system
of shadow promotions which permit some of
our top officers to join international organiza-
tions without sacrificing career benefits at
home.

Whether the objective of an enhanced pres-
ence in U.N. secretariats is worth the addi-
tional investment is a political decision Con-
gress must help us make.

We are approaching a very important
watershed in the history of multilateral dip-
lomacy and the institutions which serve it.
After drifting dangerously into confrontation
between developed and developing countries,
with the United States frequently isolated in
the United Nations and elsewhere, some bal-
ance has been restored. In spite of all of the
seemingly intractable problems of North-South
relations, we have an opportunity now to
make the U.N. system work on behalf of the
entire family of nations. It is an opportunity
that will require thoughtful analysis and con-
siderable patience. It will also require unpre-
cedented cooperation between Congress and
the President and among the Federal de-
partments and agencies to create policies re-
garding U.S. participation in the U.N. system

which reconcile the need for more stringent
management with the need for a more flexible
response on the major development issues.
Whatever the problems, it is an opportunity
which must not be missed. Otherwise, we may
anticipate renewed confrontation and even
more inefficiency and disorder as well.

The report of the Senate Governmental Af-
fairs Committee has thus arrived at a very
crucial time. It raises important questions and
has helped a wider public here and abroad to
understand the nature of the problems we
face. We want to thank the committee for its
contribution to a very important dialogue and
to pledge the continuing support of this Ad-
ministration for the indicated efforts to im-
prove the performance of international or-
ganizations.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes.
Approved by the International Coffee Council De-
cember 3, 1975. Entered into force provisionally
October 1, 1976.
Ratification depv.iited: Ivory Coast, June 22, 1977.

Cotton

Articles of agreement of International Cotton
Institute. Done at Washington January 17, 1966. En-
tered into force February 23, 1966. TIAS 5964.
Accession deposited: Ivory Coast, June 27, 1977.

Customs

Customs Convention on the International Transport of
Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets, with annexes
and protocol of signature. Done at Geneva January
15, 1959. Entered into force January 7, 1960; for the
United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6633.
Accessions deposited: Cyprus, June 3, 1977; Kuwait,
May 26, 1977.

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes
and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972. En-
tered into force December 6, 1975.'
Ratification deposited: Austria, June 17, 1977.

Not in force for the United States.

July 18, 1977

103

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary
Fund. Done at Washington December 27, 1945. En-
tered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.
Signature and acceptance: Seychelles, June 30, 1977.

Agreement establishing the International Fund for
Agricultural Development. Done at Rome June 13,
1976.2

Ratification deposited: Sweden, June 17, 1977.
Accession deposited: Cameroon, June 20, 1977.
Signature: Spain, June 22, 1977.

Law, Private International

Statute of The Hague conference on private interna-
tional law. Drawn up at the 7th session of the con-
ference at The Hague October 9-31, 1951. Entered
into force July 15, 1955; for the United States Oc-
tober 15, 1964".

Notification of denunciation: Brazil, June 13, 1977;
effective June 30, 1978.

Maritime Matters

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the
prevention of pollution of the sea bv oil, 1954, as
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109, 8505). Adopted at
London October 12, 1971. ^

Acceptance deposited: United Kingdom, June 2,
1977.

Postal

Second additional protocol to the constitution of the
Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881,
7150), general regulations with final protocol and
annex, and the universal postal convention with final
protocal and detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne
July 5, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976.
TIAS 8231.
Ratification deposited: Nepal, May 4, 1977.

Money orders and postal travellers' checks agreement,
with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5.
1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. TIAS
8232.
Accession deposited: Kuwait, December 1, 1976.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea,
1974, with anne.x. Done at London November 1,
1974.2

Approval deposited: France (with a declaration),
May 25, 1977.

Terrorism

Convention on the prevention and punishment of
crimes against internationally protected persons, in-

cluding diplomatic agents. Done at New York

December 14, 1973. Entered into force February 20,

1977.

Ratification deposited: Australia, June 20, 1977.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat
trade convention (part of the international wheat
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington
March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976,
with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1976,
with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Austria, June 27, 1977.
Accession deposited: Luxembourg, June 28, 1977.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid
convention (part of the international wheat agree-
ment) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington March
17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with
respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with
respect to other provisions.
Accession deposited: Luxembourg, June 28, 1977.

BILATERAL

Chad

Agreement relating to the transfer of food grain to
Chad. Signed at N'Djamena June 10, 1977. Entered
into force June 10, 1977.

Jamaica

Agreement relating to radio communications between
amateur stations on behalf of third parties. Effected
by exchange of notes at Kingston February 24 and
May 12, 1977. Entered into force June 11, 1977.

Mexico

Agreement relating to additional cooperative arrange-
ments to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics, with
annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico
June 2, 1977. Entered into force June 2, 1977.

Romania

Agreement relating to the transfer of non-fat dry milk
to Romania. Signed at Bucharest May 31, 1977. En-
tered into force May 31, 1977.

Agreement relating to trade in wool and man-made
fiber textiles, with annex. Effected by exchange of
notes at Bucharest June 17, 1977. Entered into force
June 17, 1977.

United Kingdom

Reciprocal fisheries agreement, with agreed minute.
Signed at Washington June 24, 1977. Enters into
force when each party has notified the other by
diplomatic note that the necessary domestic legal
procedures for such entry into force have been
fulfilled.

2 Not in force.

104

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX July 18, 1977 Vol. LXXVII, No. 1986

Arms Control and Disarmament

Secretary Vance Attends OAS General Assembly
at Grenada (statements, news conference, and
text of resolution) 69

Secretary Vance Interviewed by II Tempo
Correspondent 85

Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Issues and
Answers" 78

Aviation. U.S. and U.K. Initial New Air Serv-
ices Agreement (Carter, Department
announcement) 83

Belize. Secretary Vance Attends OAS General
Assembly at Grenada (statements, news con-
ference, and text of resolution) 69

China. Secretary Vance Interviewed by II
Tempo Correspondent 8.5

Congress

Department Discusses Results of CIEC Meeting
(Cooper) 92

Department Discusses U.S. Participation in In-
ternational Organizations (Maynes) 100

Department Testifies on U.S. Policy Toward
Rhodesia (Edmondson) 98

Cuba. Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Issues
and Answers" 78

Cyprus. Secretary Vance Interviewed by II
Tempo Correspondent 85

Economic Affairs. Department Discusses Re-
sults of CIEC Meeting (Cooper) 92

Europe

Secretary Vance Interviewed by II Tempo
Correspondent 85

Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Issues and
Answers" 78

Human Rights

Secretary Vance Attends OAS General Assembly
at Grenada (statements, news conference, and
text of resolution) 69

Secretary Vance Interviewed by II Tempo
Correspondent 85

Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Issues and

Answers" 78

International Organizations and Conferences.

Department Discusses U.S. Participation in In-
ternational Organizations (Maynes) 100

Israel. U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in
Israel-Syria Sector Extended (Leonard) 90

Korea. Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Issues
and Answers" 78

Latin America and the Caribbean. Secretary
Vance Attends OAS General Assembly at Gre-
nada (statements, news conference, and text of
resolution) 69

Middle East. Secretary Vance Interviewed on
"Issues and Answers" 78

Organization of American States. Secretary
Vance Attends OAS General Assembly at Gre-
nada {statements, news conference, and text of
resolution) 69

Panama. Secretary Vance Attends OAS General
Assembly at Grenada (statements, news con-
ference, and text of resolution) 69

Presidential Documents. U.S. and U.K. Initial
New Air Services Agreement (Carter, De-
partment announcement) 83

Southern Rhodesia. Department Testifies on
U.S. Policy Toward Rhodesia (Edmondson) ... 98

Syria. U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in
Israel-Syria Sector Extended (Leonard) 90

Treaty Information. Current Actions 103

United Kingdom. U.S. and U.K. Initial New Air
Services Agreement (Carter, Department
announcement) 83

United Nations. U.N. Disengagement Observer
Force in Israel-Syria Sector Extended
(Leonard) ." 90

Name Index

Carter, President 83

Cooper, Richard N 92

Edmondson, William B 98

Leonard, James F 90

Maynes, Charles W 100

Vance, Secretary 69, 78, 85

t307

6/27

'308

6/27

•309

6/27

t310

6/28

Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: June 27-July 3

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

U.S., U.K. sign new fisheries agree-
ment.

Julia M. Walsh appointed to Board of
Governors of East-West Center
(biographic data); J. William Ful-
bright reappointed, June 24.

Ronald I. Spiers sworn in as Ambas-
sador to Turkey (biographic data).

Vance: question-and-answer session
at the National Foreign Policy Con-
ference for Editors and Broadcas-
ters.

Shipping Coordinating Committee
(S(5C), Subcommittee on Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS), working
group on radiocommunications, re-
scheduled for July 26.

sec, SOLAS, working group on
safety of navigation, July 26.

Vance: The Asia Society, New York,
N.Y.

"Foreign Relations," 1950, vol. I,
"National Security Affairs, Foreign
Economic Policy" released.

Study Group 5 of the U.S. National
Committee of the International
Telegraph and Telephone Consulta-
tive Committee (CCITT), July 26.

Vance: NAACP, St. Louis, Mo.

Vance: question-and-answer session,
St. Louis, July 1.

John A. Linehan, Jr., sworn in as
Ambassador to Sierra Leone (biog-
raphic data).

•311 6/29

•312

6/29

t313

6/29

314

7/1

•315 6/30

t316
t316-

7/1
■A 7/2

•317 7/1

*Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington. dc. 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE STA-SOl

Third Class

6r/

<J:

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXVII • No. 1987 • July 25, 1977

SECRETARY VANCE ATTENDS MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Remarks by Secretaries Vance and Blumenthal
and Texts of Communique and Declaration 105

SECRETARY INTERVIEWED AT FOREIGN POLICY CONFERENCE
FOR EDITORS AND BROADCASTERS 121

THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT IN EXPANDING
AN OPEN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Address by Under Secretary Cooper 127

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXVII, No. 1987
July 25, 1977

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes.

domestic $42.50. foreign $53. 15

Single copy 85 cents

The Secretary of State has determined that the pub-
lication of this periodical is necessary in the transac-
tion of the public business required by law of this
Department. Use of funds for printing this periodi-
ca] has been approved by the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget through January 31,
1981.

The Department of State BL'LLHTIX,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as spe-
cial articles on various phases of in-
ternational affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna-
tional interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United yations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

Secretary Vance Attends Ministerial Conference

of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Secretary Vance headed the U.S. delegation
to the ministerial conference of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), which was held in Paris, June
23-24. Following are Secretary Vance's inter-
vention before the conference on June 23, re-
marks by Secretary of the Treasury W.
Michael Blumenthal on June 2k, the tran-
script of a news conference by Secretaries
Vance and Blumenthal on June 2k, and the
texts of the communique issued on June 2k
and the declaration adopted on June 23.

INTERVENTION BY SECRETARY VANCE
JUNE 23

Press release 301 dated June 23

As we begin our important deliberations to-
day, it is worth keeping in mind how far we
have come over the past 30 years. Many of
our nations three decades ago faced basic
questions:

Could democratic forms of government sur-
vive?

Could we overcome the ravages and divi-
sions of war and build a system of cooperation
to foster prosperity and peace?

Could the industrial nations hope for any
kind of constructive relationship with emerg-
ing new countries?

Did those new nations have, in turn, any
real chance for survival?

If we view our problems today against prob-
lems of that time, and the progress we have
made in resolving them, we can conclude that
the future holds promise for us.

Our hope of 30 years ago and the impulse
that led to the founding of the OEEC [Organi-
zation for European Economic Cooperation]

and this organization was our common dedica-
tion to an ideal of human progress.

I believe that it is that hope and dedication
which hold us together still. I value this meet-
ing as an occasion to confirm the commitment
of the Carter Administration to the OECD.
We consider this organization unique and its
role essential. It is the major forum for eco-
nomic management and coordination among
the industrial democracies.

That, we recognize, is a major undertaking.
The challenge before us is great: not just to
nourish our own well-being, but to make the
world economy work better — with growth,
equity, and justice for all.

We are entering a new political and eco-
nomic era in the world. In that era North-
South confrontation and northern rivalries
must be replaced by new policies based on co-
operation and common action. This will mean:

— Improved economic cooperation among
the industrialized nations;

— A new relationship with the developing
nations; and

— Increased discourse with the state trad-
ing nations.

A new relationship with the South and new
discourse with the East depend, first, on the
state of our own nations. We bear the main
responsibility for assuring the kind of eco-
nomic recovery that translates into a better
life for individuals everywhere.

Economic decisions are only part of that en-
terprise. A fundamental dimension is political.
Can we bring our shared values, traditions,
and aspirations to bear on our economic prob-
lems? I believe that we can and will.

We have taken steps to confirm that re-
solve. Democracy has been tested — and found
working. All our members today enjoy repre-

July 25, 1977

105

sentative government. Portugal, Spain, and
Greece have our support, as they strive to
strengthen their democratic institutions.

Our commitment to economic cooperation
has been tried — and found unshaken. The
Downing Street summit [London, May 7-8]
and other recent meetings of heads of gov-
ernment reflect significant collective en-
deavor. We look forward to maintaining the
momentum attained at those meetings.

Let me sketch a few items, some of which
Secretary Blumenthal will discuss further to-
morrow.

— We must assure sustained economic re-
covery. We should establish national targets
for economic growth and objectives for
stabilization, together with our OECD com-
mitment to more rapid growth this next year.

— We must overcome both unemployment
and inflation which sap our economic strength
and imperil support for our political institu-
tions. Since unemployment hits the young
especially hard, the United States favors the
convening of an OECD-sponsored conference
on jobs for youth.

— We must reject protectionism and expand
trade. We believe this ministerial should
renew the OECD trade pledge and determine
how best to resolve trade problems affecting
our domestic industries before they become
crises. We will press for substantial progi'ess
this year in the multilateral trade negotiations
and advance work to prohibit improper con-
duct and illicit payments in international
commerce.

— We must address key cjuestions of fi-
nance. Both surplus and deficit countries must
take domestic steps to bring about external
adjustment. We are now engaged in efforts to
increase the resources available to finance
balance-of-payments deficits through the In-
ternational Monetary Fund. If, contrary to
our expectations, these efforts are not suc-
cessful, then we should jointly examine pres-
ent and projected financial facilities in the
IMF and consider what should be done about
the OECD Financial Support Fund. Under
these circumstances we would be prepared to
consider all available alternatives, including
the OECD fund.

— Energy, finally, is a particular challenge
to the political purpose and cohesion of the in-
dustrial nations. Overdependence on imported
oil underscores our political and economic
vulnerability. The outlook is not good — unless
we intensify efforts within and among our na-
tions.

President Carter is firm in his determina-
tion to implement our national energy plan.
He knows that we must reduce vulnerability
to embargo and price increases and that we
must begin to adjust now to the postpe-
troleum age.

We must also match our domestic progi'ams
with stronger international efforts, both to
conserve energy and to increase and diversify
sources of supply. We must exchange vital
technology and enter into joint research and
development. The October ministerial of the
International Energy Agency should confirm
our commitment to tai'gets for reduced de-
pendence on imported oil.

Nuclear enei'gy is a field of special interest.
The United States remains committed to the
use of nuclear energy and to the system of in-
ternational safeguards that maintains the crit-
ical distance between civilian and military
uses of nuclear energy. However, if we are to
meet both the security and energy needs of
our peoples, we must find ways to maintain an
effective safeguards system as we approach the
plutonium generation of nuclear technology.

For that reason, we have opposed the pre-
mature entry into a plutonium economy until
we have found ways to reconcile our energy
and security concerns. It is in this spirit that
we have suggested a study of these questions
in the international nuclear fuel cycle evalua-
tion program.

The combined challenge of these issues be-
fore the OECD — the need for sustained eco-
nomic recovery, unemployment and inflation,
trade, finance, and energy — has a global
scope. It also affects directly the great cities
of our countries. Although urban decay and
social malaise preceded these problems, many
have gi'own worse because of them. The city
of the seventies too often has an inhumane
face.

We need to understand better the impact

106

Department of State Bulletin

from the interaction of domestic and interna-
tional economic trends on the place where
most of our citizens live. The United States,
therefore, proposes the establishment of an ad
hoc working group on urban concerns to pre-
pare a draft action program for our considera-
tion next year.

No pursuit of global economic welfare can
be complete without reference to the nations
of the East. The OECD has done a good job in
undertaking factual and analytic studies of
East-West economic relations. I want particu-
larly to congratulate the Secretary General
[Emile van Lennep, of the Netherlands] for
his leadership on the East-West project.

We must engage the COMECON [Council of
Mutual Economic Assistance] nations in our
shared economic challenges and respon-
sibilities. They, like us, can and should help
address issues in the North-South dialogue.
We both have a moral and a practical interest
in increasing the flow of resources and techni-
cal assistance to the developing world.

We should urge the COMECON countries
to join us in seeking genuine, apolitical solu-
tions to problems of global economic develop-
ment. To be more specific:

— They can improve the quality and in-
crease the amount of their development as-
sistance through both bilateral and multilat-
eral programs.

— They can contribute to world food secu-
rity by participating in arrangements sought
under the auspices of the International Wheat
Council.

— They can help establish equitable mul-
tilateral arrangements for commodities.

It is not enough to worry about our own
welfare or seek more cooperation from the
East. That limited perspective overlooks
more than half of the world's population and a
far greater percentage of countries. Solutions
to our problems rest on the realization that
our problems are linked to those of the Third
World and that the aspirations of our citizens
are similar to theirs. Let me be clear on two
points:

First, the goals and values of our so-
cieties— economic, political, and humanitar-

ian— cannot be achieved fully in isolation from
trends in developing nations.

Second, we must understand that in rela-
tions between developing and developed na-
tions, what one side gains is not necessarily
the other side's loss.

Relations between developed and develop-
ing nations need not spawn conflict. We have
concluded an era when the central question
was whether to cooperate. We have begun a
period in which we must develop the means
and institutions for cooperation.

That is the corner we have turned at CIEC
[Conference on International Economic
Cooperation]. The OECD must now take part
in this new start. Together we must maintain
continuing cooperation among ourselves and
with our counterparts in the developing
world.

We, therefore, urge the Secretary General
of this organization to bring about more effec-
tive coordination of OECD efforts in North-
South issues, to propose options for discussion
in the U.N. Third Development Decade, and
to formulate longer term strategy and initia-
tives of mutual benefit to the North and
South.

We also recommend that this conference
endorse the proposed declaration on relations
with developing nations. This declaration ex-
presses our shared political commitment to
the search for more beneficial methods of
cooperation. It, too, could signal a new begin-
ning.

An important part of the declaration stres-
ses increased attention to the basic human
needs of all the peoples of the world. The old
agenda for economic development and many of
the old issues for negotiation are no longer
enough. We need more focus on that part of the
world population that lacks essential food, wa-
ter, shelter, and health care, as well as
employment and education. We must direct our
efforts to meet more effectively the needs of the
poorest peoples in the developing world.

The case for more concerted action is clear.
Almost one billion people live in absolute pov-
erty. The problem is growing. Increases in
GNP for many developing countries have not
meant increased benefits for the poor. For

July 25, 1977

107

many, in fact, life is worse. Development has
too often not "trickled down."

Knowledge about the development process
and the ability to overcome poverty are now
within our grasp. What we miss is the joint
recognition by developed and developing na-
tions that the North-South dialogue is about
humcni beings and that equality of opportu-
nity for a fuller life makes sense for people,
not just states. Let me suggest how we might
begin.

First, we must marshal a sense of our
means and priorities. For that purpose, I pro-
pose that the OECD establish a special work-
ing group mandated to design a program for
basic human needs. That program should
profit from the work in the Development As-
sistance Committee and should be presented
for discussion at the Executive Committee in
special session by the end of this year. The
program should include:

— Projections of domestic and international
resources required to implement a successful
approach to basic human needs;

— Proposals for sharing costs among de-
veloped and developing nations; and

— Agreement on measures needed to use
those resources most effectively.

Second, we must engage the interest and
expertise of the developing nations them-
selves. We need to share perspectives on a
shared problem. No strategy for development
can succeed without requisite political will
within Third World nations. For that purpose,
we should encourage consultations and efforts
to identify the kinds of policy changes re-
quired to address basic human needs and
suggest means for judging progress.

Third, we must move swiftly to expand on
specific proposals for an agenda on basic
human needs. It should include the following
fundamental elements:

— Rural development and food production:
We must give greater priority to the de-
velopment of the Third World's rural areas
where the great majority of the poorest
people live. We must begin with an integrated
strategy which emphasizes increased food
production and better nutrition in these
areas.

— Health: At the same time we must em-
phasize preventive medicine, family planning,
prenatal care, and other forms of medical as-
sistance which, with minimal cost, could mean
the most for the poorest. Again, the relation
to an overall strategy for rural development is
key: increases in productive employment and
ci'op yields can help make better nutrition
possible and bring better health for more
people.

— Education: Education deserves a similar
priority. We should stress primary and sec-
ondary education and promote on-the-job
technical training. The goal is to enhance the
capacity for productive employment and pro-
vide a way out of absolute poverty.

Two areas, related to any human needs
strategy, of import in their own right:

— Women: Although poverty strikes all, in
many countries women suffer more than do
men from poor health, little or no schooling,
and meager diet. Their traditional roles often
keep women out of the paid work force and
lock them into low status. There is a direct
relationship between higher education and
employment opportunities for women and
smaller families. High birth rates both reflect
the specific situation of many women and rein-
force the general cycle of poverty. Release
from rural poverty may well begin with the
real economic and social emancipation of
women.

—Ecological disaster: Finally, a substantial
part of absolute poverty stems from the toll
taken over time by ecological disaster, as in
the Sahel. The poor bear a disproportionate
burden when overpopulation, economic un-
derdevelopment, and ecological overstress in-
teract. Developing nations, with two-thirds of
the world's population, suffer 90 percent of
disaster-related deaths.

The OECD has a unique opportunity to
support emerging efforts in the United Na-
tions and to work with developing nations on
means to provide longer term alleviation of
ecological disaster. Efforts at early warning
and access to food reserves are among meas-
ures which address the core of basic human
needs.

Obviously, attention to basic human needs

108

Department of State Bulletin

is only part of a broader strategy for de-
velopment. It should not supplant other im-
portant efforts at economic advancement
which this organization has supported and
which have contributed to economic develop-
ment in the Third World. To supplant other
ongoing efforts is not our purpose; we wish to
add a vital dimension. If we do not do so, we
run the risk of losing the support of our legis-
lative bodies and peoples.

It is in meeting the challenge of fulfilling
basic human needs that both developed and
developing nations can more firmly establish
their joint commitment to individual human
dignity. We thus look forwaixl to making this
concern more central to the new relationship
and to moving toward more specific programs
for implementation by the time we meet next
year.

At the beginning, I pointed to the progress
we have made together. It has been a long,
hard, but rewarding road we have traveled.
But we have left one destination without
reaching another. We are in transit to a new
era of cooperation and common action.

In practical terms our journey will involve
going beyond new directions for industrial
democracies, new discourse with state trading
nations, and new relationships with develop-
ing countries. It will take us to a firmer focus
on people. It is the individual and collective
hope of people, their rights and their needs,
that deserve the fullest measure of our dedi-
cation.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL
JUNE 24

Department of the Treasury press release dated June 24

Last month the heads of government of
seven of the countries here agreed on several
basic objectives: ^

— To create more jobs while continuing to
reduce inflation;

— To achieve stated growth targets or to
pursue appropriate stabilization policies;

' For text of the declaration issued at the conclusion
of the economic summit meeting at London on May 7-8,
see Bulletin of June 6, 1977, p. .583.

— To support IMF efforts to obtain addi-
tional resources and to link IMF lending to
the adoption of appropriate stabilization
policies;

— To pursue both national and joint efforts
to limit energy demand and to increase and
diversify energy supply;

— To reject protectionism and give a new
impetus to the Tokyo Round of multilateral
trade negotiations; and

— To provide the developing countries with
greater opportunities to share in the growth
of the world economy.

This meeting provides an opportunity for
other nations to join in those commitments. I
urge each one to do so. It provides an oppor-
tunity to establish procedures which will im-
prove our understanding of the implications of
each nation's policies and enable us to monitor
our progress. I propose that we do so. And it
is an occasion of a considering together of our
prospects for sustained economic growth in
the OECD area.

In virtually every country represented here
unemployment is at a totally unacceptable
level. In most of our countries inflation is too
high. Many of our nations are experiencing
external payments deficits which cannot be
long sustained.

We face interrelated problems in an in-
terdependent world. We cannot solve one
problem at the expense of the others. Nor can
any nation expect to be an island of prosperity
in a sea of economic troubles. Our problems
must be solved together and cooperatively.
The survival of our political institutions and
our open trade and financial system depends
on our success.

We can meet this challenge; we can succeed
in achieving sustained noninflationary growth:

— If every member country in a position to
do so pursues the domestic macroeconomic
policies which will induce the maximum rate
of domestic growth consistent with avoiding a
resurgence of inflation;

— If every country which does not yet have
inflationary pressures under control pursues
forceful and effective stabilization policies;

— If we go beyond traditional demand man-
agement measures to attack the underlying

July 25, 1977

109

structural causes of unemployment and infla-
tion; and

— If both sui-plus and deficit countries allow
exchange rates to play their appropriate role
in the adjustment process.

Because some countries have made more
progress than others in controUing inflation
and some are under external financial strains
while others are not, the policies required will
diffei- from country to country.

In the financially strong countries, this
situation calls for economic expansion at the
maximum rate consistent with control and re-
duction of inflationary pressures. In the
United States, we are already well on our way
toward achievement this year of roughly 6
percent growth, year-end to year-end. First
quarter economic activity grew at an annual
rate of 6.9 percent. We expect a similar per-
formance in the current quarter, followed by a
5-5.5 percent growth rate in the second half
of the year. Unemployment has been pushed
below 7 percent for the first time in almost
three years, while employment has risen by
over 2 million in six months.

At the same time, despite temporary set-
backs because of bad weather, the U.S. un-
derlying inflation rate has remained stable al-
though still too high.

We are naturally concerned by the Sec-
retariat's forecasts which suggest that cur-
i-ent policies may not enable eithei- Germany
or Japan to reach its stated growth target and
that too much of the growth of output — in
Japan particularly — is going into exports. But
we have faith in the assurances of Chancellor
Schmidt and Prime Minister Fukuda that they
will take further measures, as needed, to
achieve their growth goals and to reduce their
current account surpluses.

Reduction of the current account surpluses
is essential because some of the weaker coun-
tries are approaching prudent limits to the ac-
cumulation of debt — whether to private lend-
ers or official institutions. In these circum-
stances the availability of ample lendable
funds from persistent surplus countries is not
a complete answer.

Stronger domestic growth and exchange
rate appreciations in the stronger countries

will tend to eliminate their surpluses. But
supplementary steps are also in order. This is
the time for surplus countries to eliminate
practices which favor exports over output for
domestic consumption or impede imports or
interfere with exchange markets. It is a time
for strong countries to dismantle monetary
and capital controls that might depress ex-
change rates and for seeing that foreign ex-
change acquired outside the market, such as
interest accruals on existing reserves, is re-
sold on the market.

Among the responsibilities of the stronger
countries, I count the obligation of the United
States to reduce its excessive imports of oil.
The flow of oil from Alaska will provide an
immediate reduction of our import demand.
But for the longer run, we must achieve a
strong energy program based on conservation
and the substitution of domestic for imported
fuels. President Carter has made that goal his
top priority despite the difficulty of achieving
the economic and social changes it entails.

Countries in weak external financial posi-
tions have an equal responsibility to put their
own houses in order — to stabilize their
economies and improve their international
competitiveness. They have a right to the
cooperation of the stronger countries, but
they cannot expect others to solve their prob-
lems for them. They should not overborrow.
They should permit sufficient depreciation of
their currencies to improve their competitive
positions. And they should back up their de-
clining exchange rates with domestic policies
that retain their competitive gain. The bene-
fits of depreciation may not come quickly, but
if exchange rates are not allowed to respond
to differences in inflation rates, payments im-
balance can only grow worse. It is hard to see
how any country can improve its international
position unless its policies allow its producers
export profit margins that are essential to an
adequate export performance as well as to
improved import competitiveness. Manufac-
turers must have the proper incentives to in-
vest in facilities for both the export and home
markets.

Obviously the domestic economic policies
needed to restore domestic price stability and

110

Department of State Bulletin

external creditworthiness are not easy for
governments. They involve national belt-
tightening. Yet delay will only lead to the
necessity for more severe and more painful
action. At the first sign of difficulty in attract-
ing capital on normal terms, stabilization pro-
grams should be developed, with the coopera-
tion of the IMF if necessary. Such cooperation
will not only bring official financing but will
also help to sustain financing from private
sources.

Many countries have, of course, been fol-
lowing this growth or stabilization strategy
for some time. We are now beginning to see
results. The world payments pattern is shift-
ing significantly in the right direction.

Economic expansion is beginning to exert
its impact, notably in the United States. We
expect a current account deficit of $10-$12 bil-
lion this year compared to a deficit of $600
million in 1976 and a surplus of $11.5 billion in
1975. As the strength of the dollar indicates,
the United States can sustain this deficit for a
time because we attract the capital required
to finance it.

General economic recovery is clearly im-
proving the earnings of many developing
countries. Exports of the non-oil developing
countries were one-third higher in the fourth
quarter of 1976 than a year earlier. And while
some individual developing countries face dif-
ficulties, there is no general "LDC [less de-
veloped countries] debt problem." In fact, re-
serves of non-oil developing countries rose by
$11 billion last year.

Stabilization programs are beginning to
show results. The United Kingdom's balance
of payments appears to be edging into
surplus, while Italy, Mexico, and Brazil have
sharply reduced their deficits.

But despite these signs of progress, we
have a considerable distance to go toward ap-
propriate payments balance.

— We need significant shifts — into deficit —
in the current account positions of such
surplus countries as Japan, Germany, Swit-
zerland, and the Netherlands.

— We need to see stabilization policies
adopted in a number of smaller countries rep-
resented at this table.

— And in the countries which have already
adopted stabilization measures, we need per-
severance until inflation is brought down and
the fears of its resurgence allayed.

I recognize that such changes cannot occur
overnight. They require time and careful,
gradual policies. Countries in a weak external
position will need adequate official financing,
conditioned on the adoption of suitable stabili-
zation policies. I am confident that the cur-
rent efforts to expand the IMF's resources
will insure the adequacy of official financing to
meet this need for the near term, apart from
the unique case of Portugal. For the longer
term, I trust that all OECD members will also
be prepared to support an adequate increase
in the quotas of the IMF.

But while adjustments and structural
changes in our economies take time, the
longer the initiation of this process is delayed,
the greater the danger of domestic turmoil or
of trade restrictions and debt defaults. We
have been preoccupied with concerns about
the sustainability of the financial system. But
the penalty for failure to solve our financial
problems may not be financial collapse. In-
stead, the result may be trade restrictions
and a slide back into the inefficiencies of eco-
nomic nationalism.

Unilateral trade restraints must be rejected
as an unacceptable response to payments defi-
cits or to problems of domestic economic ad-
justment. Such measures clearly risk foster-
ing further unemployment and increasing in-
flation, both at home and abroad.

While we cannot ignore the reality of
trade-related difficulties in certain sectors
which cannot be fully resolved overnight, our
objective should remain meaningful adjust-
ment to structural change within our own
economies without shifting those problems to
our trading partners. Our record has not been
perfect on this score, but overall the OECD
members have resisted the pressures of pro-
tectionism.

Renewal of the trade pledge of 1974 pro-
vides us the opportunity jointly to reaffirm
our determination to avoid trade restrictions
or other restrictive current account measures
and the artificial stimulation of exports. The

July 25, 1977

111

United States strongly supports its renewal
and urges your support as well.

We must also seek to liberalize trade by
granting new impetus to the multilateral
trade negotiations in Geneva by seeking sub-
stantial progress in key areas this year. This
means that we must agree on what the criti-
cal issues are, on what rules we will adopt to
deal with them, and within what time period
each of these steps is to be taken. We ur-
gently need agreement on:

— A formula for tariff reductions and rules
for negotiating the lowering of nontariff bar-
riers;

— A practical and effective means of break-
ing the deadlock on agricultural trade;

— Steps to help the developing countries
benefit from expanding world trade; and

— A new international code on subsidies and
countervailing duties.

We need better mutual understanding of
what constitutes fair and unfair trade, and
host governments may justly respond to un-
fair trade practices to counter a major irritant
in our trading relations.

We need, in short, not rhetoric, but real
progress in addressing the difficult problem of
trade liberalization.

I would like to stress the importance of fur-
ther progress toward an arrangement which
broadens and strengthens the present inter-
national consensus on e.xport credits.

Achieving the domestic and international
adjustments I have outlined will require
skilled and responsible economic management
and a willingness to plan ahead. As the Sec-
retariat points out, our countries must give
more attention to the medium term. In the
United States, President Carter has set a goal
of reducing both the rate of inflation and the
rate of unemployment and balancing the Fed-
eral budget in a high employment economy by
1981. We are viewing economic and budgetary
decisions and developing economic goals in
that context.

Growth targets and stabilization policies
must, of course, remain the ultimate respon-
sibility of sovereign nations. Each country
will be assisted in arriving at its growth goals
and stabilization policies, however, if it has a
clear understanding of the plans of other na-

tions and of the global impHcations of its own
objectives.

I believe it would be useful, therefore, to
strengthen the procedure for multilateral
examination and subsequent monitoring of the
economic policies of member countries. We
need to be reahstic, however. The members
as a whole — although not all member
countries — probably should be aiming at a
somewhat faster rate of expan.sion in 1977.

I support the suggestion that each country
be asked to submit preliminary objectives for
the growth of domestic demand and for
stabilization policies for 1978 to the organiza-
tion early in the fall. We should also expect
countries to indicate the desired direction of
change in prices and current account posi-
tions, although specific targets for these indi-
cators would be impractical. These submis-
sions would form the basis for study and
comment by the Economic Policy Committee.
Because this proposal blends directly into the
ongoing work of the organization, I would not
expect it to require the impetus of a special
meeting of the ministerial council.

Finally, let me say that we must conduct
our economic policies with the recognition
that some of our tools of economic manage-
ment no longer work as they once did. In the
United States and other countries, the trade-
off between economic activity and inflation
has changed. We see that neither high un-
employment nor low utilization of capacity
leads automatically to a rapid drop in infla-
tion. Factors other than excess demand are
increasingly important determinants of infla-
tion.

So we must seek new programs and policies
to supplement demand management in our ef-
forts to reduce unemployment and inflation.
Many of the measures we must adopt should
focus on specific structural problems in our
economies — the need to change employment
patterns and develop new labor skills, the
need for new measures to provide employ-
ment for our youth, the need to foster compe-
tition and to remove regulations that are out-
dated or fail to meet a cost-benefit test.

I support the proposal for a high-level con-
ference to exchange experience and develop
policy directions on measures for alleviating
youth unemployment. This problem is univer-

112

Department of State Bulletin

sal among our countries. Because many of us
are embarked on specific programs to combat
it, we can benefit from sharing our ideas and
our experiences. I also welcome the useful
and timely discussion in the report of the
McCracken Group [of Distinguished
Economists] on techniques for combating in-
flation. As part of President Carter's com-
prehensive anti-inflation program, the United
States is already reviewing government regu-
lations with the intent of reducing unneces-
sary costs imposed on the private sector and
enlarging the scope for the free market. At
the same time, we are working with labor and
management to develop voluntary, coopera-
tive measures to avoid wage-price spirals.

When all is said and done, the success of our
economic policy depends fundamentally on our
ability to engender confidence that we will
achieve sustained growth with lower un-
employment and price stability and that we
will maintain a strong and open monetary and
trading system. In a cost-benefit calculus, the
dangers of pushing ahead too far and too fast
have increased, because it may ignite fears of
inflation that cause consumers and busi-
nessmen to hold back on their spending. Our
policy should be cautious yet committed, pro-
viding a firm basis for rebuilding the confi-
dence that we need to call forth increased in-
vestment in productive capacity. After their
experiences of the recent past, businessmen
in all countries are wary — and understandably
so. But investment is vitally needed to create
jobs, avoid supply problems, and speed up
productivity growth.

Our words alone will not win this confi-
dence. But if we take actions which demon-
strate the determination and ability to adhere
to the approach being proposed here today,
we will gain the confidence that will undam
the vital flow of investment. Unemployment
will be brought down, inflation will be re-
duced, and a sustainable pattern of external
payments will evolve.

JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, JUNE 24

Department press release 306 dated June 25

Secretary Vance: Perhaps I might say a word
or two of introduction and then Mike and I will
be happy to try to answer any questions.

The presence of Secretary Blumenthal and
myself demonstrates the firm commitment of
the United States to close cooperation and
coordination within the OECD. As all of you
know, the OECD is the major forum for eco-
nomic policy coordination among the indus-
trialized democracies. The efforts toward eco-
nomic cooperation have met, in my judgment,
with good success. The recent meetings of the
chiefs of state and government provided an
important stimulus to these efforts.

At this OECD meeting we have had an op-
portunity to meet together with all of our col-
leagues within the 24-member gi'ouping, and
this has proved very helpful and useful to us.
Aside from the details of what we will discuss
here today, I think the very fact that this
meeting here in Paris has taken place is a
demonstration of the solidarity of our coun-
tries in working together to meet the eco-
nomic problems which face our nations and
the world.

A word with respect to the meetings of yes-
terday which had their focus on relationships
with developing countries. I think a very im-
portant aspect of yesterday's discussions was
the fact that there was an endorsement by all
24 of the agreements reached at the CIEC
meeting [Paris, May 30^une 2]. A number of
people who were here at this meeting were
not present at CIEC, but they all endorsed
the commitments which were made by all of
us at the CIEC meeting.

In addition, I think it's important to point
out that yesterday, in the declaration which
was issued, we agreed among the 24 to place
new emphasis on meeting basic human needs
and I think this an important step. We also
agreed on such fundamental issues as the need
to improve the supply and demand balance for
energy through domestic policies, to renew
and strengthen the OECD trade pledge, and a
number of specific economic items which I will
ask Mike to speak to.

I would also call attention to the fact that
we have agreed to pay special attention to the
problem of youth unemployment, which is a
problem that not only is important to the
United States but to practically all of the
countries who are gathered here for this
meeting.

Mike, if you might take up then and speak

July 25, 1977

113

to the economic aspects of it. We can tiien an-
swei- questions.

Secretary Blumenthal: I think there are a
number of matters decided here which are of
considerable significance. The I'enewal of the
trade pledge first agreed to in 1974 under
which countries commit themselves not to
take protectionist measures to deal with in-
ternal economic problems is a very important
step.

In addition, the renewed emphasis which
has been given here to the urgent need to
proceed quickly and substantively with the
multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva fits
in with that general objective of expanding
trade and keeping trade barriers down.

The discussion in reference to the need to
cooperate to bring about more official finan-
cial resources in the world in order to meet
temporary balance-of-payments problems of
individual countries is also of considerable im-
portance and, in particular, with regard to the
general desirable target of a 5 percent growth
for next year.

The procedure has been established under
which individual countries will submit their
plans to the OECD later this year and form an
evaluation. OECD discussion of these indi-
vidual goals will then take place in the Eco-
nomic Policy Committee in order to see to
what extent they are consonant with achiev-
ing the overall desired target of 5 percent.
This represents a good means of following up
on the commitment to work together that we
have all subscribed to.

Secretary Vance: I might just add one more
word. The meetings have also been very use-
ful in that they have provided an opportunity
for both Mike and myself to meet with a
number of foreign and finance ministers and
to discuss with them not only matters that
spring from this conference but to discuss
other matters of mutual concern on both
global and bilateral issues.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Jim Goldsborough of the
Herald Tribune: Relative to your meeting
with French Presideyit Giscard d'Estaing to-
day, I would like to ask whether you share the
concern expressed by the French over the state
of U.S. -Soviet relations? Will you report on it
to President Carter?

Secretary Vance: During my meeting with
President Giscard d'Estaing this morning we
discussed the recent meeting which he had
with General Secretary Brezhnev, and he re-
ported to me the views of the General Secre-
tary on a number of matters, including mat-
ters which are of interest particularly to the
United States, as well as other general mat-
ters. I will certainly convey these messages
back to President Carter. I will be meeting
with President Carter for breakfast tomorrow
morning when I return to the United States
and will profit from the discussion which
I had with President Giscard d'Estaing
today.

Q. Mr. Vance, Mr. Secretary, you called
them messages, is there a message from Mr.
Brezhnev to President Carter?

Secretary Vance: No.

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhy have you and the
British Foreign Secretary decided at this time
to make yet another attempt at negotiating the
Rhodesia)! situation? Have you received in
the last week or 10 days some encouraging in-
formation that a new attempt might prove
more successful?

Secretary Vance: This is an ongoing proc-
ess. We and our British colleagues have been
working at this particular effort for the last
six to eight weeks. We have been in daily
communication with each other and our repre-
sentatives in the field. Mr. Low and Mr.
Graham have been working side-by-side
in discussions with all of the parties in-
volved.^

This was an occasion which brought to-
gether both the Foreign Secretary and myself
and gave us an opportunity to sit down and
review where we stand at this point with our
two representatives on the ground in the
Rhodesian area and permitted us to arrive at
joint instructions to them which they will be
carrying out when they return — I believe it's
either the 5th or 6th of July.

^ Stephen Low, Ambassador to Zambia, is the U.S.
official assigned to the consultative group on Rhodesia,
which is headed by John Graham, Deputy Under
Secretary at the British Foreign and Commonwealth
Office.

114

Department of State Bulletin

Q. Sir, you said that you meant to review
where you stand on the Rhodesia?! situation.
Could you give us an idea of where we stand
now?

Secretary Vance: Where we stand now is
that we are in consultation with all of the par-
ties who would be involved in a settlement of
the Rhodesian problem. We have been discus-
sing with them such questions as what a new
constitution might look like and other matters
which I don't choose to go into at this mo-
ment. But that is the general nature of what
we discussed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Bernard Valery of New
York Daily News: Did, or may I ask you
whether you discussed with President Giscard
d'Estaing the problems of Eurocommunism?

Secretary Vance: We did not discuss that.

Q. Did you discuss the French internal
situation in this regard?

Secretary Vance: No.

Q. Could I ask this question of Secretary
Blumenthal? Could he comment on the pros-
pects of Congress adopting and approving the
special OECD fund to which reference is
made in the communique — all the more im-
portant because of the modest success that Dr.
Witteveen [H. Johannes Witteveen, Managing
Director of the IMF] has had in raising funds
in the IMF special facility?

At the same time if I could ask him, in view
of the trade pledge that the U.S. Administra-
tion, along with others, is now committed to,
are you confident that you can get congres-
sional approval for any changes in U.S. law
that might be made necessary as a result of
current court proceedings which arise from
proposals to impose import levies on certain
industries where there are tax rebates paid to
those exporters?

Secretary Blumenthal: With regard to the
first part of your question, the results of the
efforts which Mr. Witteveen is presently un-
dertaking to put together what has come to be
called the Witteveen facility are not yet clear,
and it is our position that we must wait for
that situation to clarify and that the chances
for his success are quite good. In that case we
feel that there would be enough resources

available, particularly if you take into account
the probability that the International Mone-
tary Fund will also agree — members of the
Fund will also agree on a further increase in
quotas by February of next year, that to-
gether these two resources would be suffi-
cient to take care of any emergencies that
may arise.

Under those circumstances, it does not ap-
pear too likely that the U.S. Congress would
also, at the same time, approve yet another
facility such as the [Financial] Support Fund.
However, we have indicated here that if it
should turn out that contrary to our expecta-
tions the Witteveen facility cannot be put to-
gether, then, of course, the U.S. Administra-
tion would review all of the alternatives avail-
able to us, including the possibility of a sup-
port fund, and discuss that with the Congress.
But, at this point, I really couldn't say that
with the absence or a failure on the Witteveen
facility the chances would be too good to be
successful there.

With regard to the second question that you
raised; the matter to which you refer is pres-
ently before the courts. The U.S. Administra-
tion is making every effort to have the courts
deny the proposition that these internal taxes
are, in fact, not rebatable, and it will take
some time for that matter to be decided. If it
goes to the Supreme Court, I would expect
that it would be next spring before the matter
is decided.

We cannot speculate as to what would hap-
pen if it were decided otherwise, and certainly
we would then have to face a serious situation
and see what could be done. That's somewhat
in the future, and we do think that the court
proceedings will clarify the matter fully and in
a positive way.

Q. Treuthardt (Associated Press): Secre-
tary of the Treasury Blumenthal, you and
many other ministers have urged Japan and
Germany to change their economic policies in
the interest of the rest of the world. In view of
the fact that there seems to be no clear re-
sponse to these appeals, what do you think the
next step is? What is your reaction to the fact
that these views have not yet led to success?

Secretary Blumenthal: Well, I think these
are matters that are constantly in a state of

July 25, 1977

115

evolution and that as time proceeds, we will
have to see how they develop.

It is a fact that in addition to the consider-
able surplus on current account, which some
of the OPEC oil-exporting countries are run-
ning, there are a number of countries — in par-
ticular the Federal Republic, Japan, Switzer-
land, and the Netherlands — who together also
are running at the present moment a surplus
on current account which amounts to as much
as $10-$12 billion. That's an additional prob-
lem in the context of the world economy.

If we look at the situation in the United
States, we see that we are running this year
in all probability a deficit of $10-$12 billion.
Clearly that is a situation that needs to be re-
viewed continually, and I am confident that
with the kind of cooperation and continuous
contact that we're having, changes in policy
will sooner or later be taken so that a greater
and better balance can be brought about.

Q. Secretary Vance, as a result of your
talks with the French President, what are the
trouble spots between the Soviet Union and
the United States?

Secretary Vance: Obviously, one of the
trouble spots between the two of us is the
resolution of the discussion which we are hav-
ing in the field of strategic arms limitation —
the SALT talks. The differences between
the Soviets and ourselves remain substantial.
We made some progress, as we have pre-
viously indicated, at the meeting which we
had in Geneva with Foreign Minister
Gromyko. At that time we developed a gen-
eral framework for an agreement in SALT
Two, but there are very substantial differ-
ences on a number of items and where they
would fit within that framework, which re-
main to be resolved.

There are other differences which we have
with respect to such matters as the question
of human rights, and there remains a clear
difference between us as to how these matters
should be handled. Those are two examples of
differences which exist between us.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will there be a meeting
between President Carter and the Soviet
leader to try to iron out those differences?

Secretary Vance: I don't want to speculate
on that. I think it would be unwise to do so.

Q. In your meeting with President Giscard
d'Estaing, did you talk about the Concorde

issue?

Secretary Vance: No, it didn't come up.
Q. Why?

Secretary Vance: I don't know. [Laughter.]
I guess because it's been before the courts. As
you know, it has been remanded to the Dis-
trict Court. The District Court has now been
asked to examine the question of whether or
not the Port Authority has acted in a dis-
criminatory fashion. There is nothing to be
done until the court reaches a determination
in that matter.

Q. Mr. Vance, do you think that the French
have found a more effective way to deal with
the Soviets than we have?

Secretary Vance: That's a hard question to
answer. Our relationships with the Soviets
are important. We realize the importance of
them. We will work to better those relation-
ships. At this point, there are strains between
ourselves and the Soviet Union in certain
areas.

However, I would also point out that there
are a number of areas in which we are doing
things together which I think are of great im-
portance. For example, this last week we had
discussions in the United States in which we
began to explore the possibility of a com-
prehensive test ban. We had a good first week
of discussions. Those will be continuing in the
near future. We will be joined in the next
meeting of those discussions by the British.
At the present time, discussions are going on
in Moscow between Mr. Warnke [Paul C.
Warnke, Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and chairman of the
U.S. delegation to Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks] and the Soviet negotiators, where we
are beginning to explore the problem of the
Indian Ocean and the possibility of arms lim-
itations measures in that area. We have re-
cently signed an agreement with them in the
field of environment modification. We are
going to begin discussions soon with respect

116

Department of State Bulletin

to the possibility of a treaty wiiich would ban
chemical warfare. Mr. Bluinenthal just re-
cently completed a satisfactory meeting with
the Soviet representatives in Washington in
the field of trade matters between our two na-
tions, and I could go on at great length, so
that the fact that we have differences in cer-
tain areas does not mean that we are not talk-
ing in other areas and making progress.

Q. Secretary Biumenthal, what is the next
step in the review of economic stimuli? How
much farther does that take us from the Lon-
don summit, where we agreed to review the
situation, yet our growth rates are much
lower than targeted?

Secretary Blwmenthal: Well, I don't believe
that it is only a question of growth rates. In
the case of the Japanese, for example, it is
quite possible that the growth rate should ac-
tually achieve, should be close to and not far
off from the figures that were mentioned at
the London summit. It's also a question of
what kind of growth you have and the extent
to which that gi'owth is export-led or the ex-
tent to which it represents a growth in domes-
tic demand.

The significant feature of the agreements at
the Downing Street summit was that the var-
ious heads of states indicated that they would
keep the matter under review and would take
the necessary steps in order to insure, to the
largest extent possible, that the targets that
were discussed would indeed be met. So the
review to which I have now referred is one in
which we hope countries will adjust their pol-
icy, as they see that the figures are coming in
differently, in order to bring about the kinds
of results discussed in London.

Q. [Inaudible — relates to the strength of the
dollar and to paragraph 13 of the OECD
communique.]

Secretary Biumenthal: You have me at a
disadvantage, since I have less information
than you do about that development. Looking
at pai-agraph 13 — and I don't really see any
direct relevance or connection to what is in
paragraph 13 to that kind of development that
has taken place — we believe that the basic

situation of the American economy is really
quite sound. We are meeting the targets we
had previously indicated. The rate of inflation
is decreasing according to the latest figures;
so is the rate of unemployment of the recently
adjusted figures of growth, of real growth of
GNP. The first quarter had been revised up-
ward. The prospects for the second quarter
are equally good. And the likelihood that we
will meet our target of close to 6 percent real
growth — comparing the fourth quarter of this
year to the fourth quarter of last year and an
average growth of something like 5 percent —
is really good. So that when you take those
numbers into account, at the same time you
bear in mind that a good part of our deficit
this year is accounted for by the very high im-
port bill for oil which is due in part to the bad
weather at the beginning of this year, which is
bound to decrease as the Alaskan oil begins to
flow and the President's energy program be-
gins to have effect — we are optimistic about
the trend of the American economy.

Q. David Blake, London Times: Is it your
suggestion that the U.S. current account posi-
tion will improve in coming years? And if
that is the case, what impact will that have on
the world economy?

Secretary Biumenthal: Well, it has cer-
tainly been the expectation at the London
summit and in the various discussions which
have taken place over the last few months
among interested governments that as the
countries with temporarily weaker economies
bring their situation under control, stabilize
their situation, and therefore improve the
situation, so the surplus countries who are
strong economies, who are taking stimulative
steps are also going to adju.st their policies.
Clearly it is not intended the United States
would forever, or for a long period of time,
run a significant deficit of current account or a
very large, ever-increasing trade deficit.
That is unintended and that is not necessary
in our view, as other economies bring their
situation under control and it improves
there. I think the stability of the dollar is
likely to be assured and general stability in
exchange markets will also be reserved.

July 25, 1977

117

OECD press release A/(77)25 dated June 24

COMMUNIQUE, JUNE 24

1. The Council of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development met at Ministerial level on
23rd June, under the Chairmanship of the Honourable
Andrew Peacock, M.P., Australian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, and on 24th June with the Right Hon-
ourable Phillip Lynch, M.P., Australian Treasurer, in
the Chair.

Development Co-operation

2. Ministers reviewed the results of the Conference
on International Economic Co-operation and discussed
longer-term aspects of international development co-
operation. Ministers then adopted the Declaration on
Relations with Developing Countries annexed to this
Communique. They reaffirmed the importance of close
collaboration and strengthened co-ordination within the
OECD to assist Member Governments to prepare for
specific discussions with the developing countries in the
various international fora in working toward the objec-
tives set forth in the Declaration.

Energy

3. Ministers recognised that an imbalance between
world energy supply and demand, which could occur as
early as the 1980s, would have severe economic, social
and political repercussions in OECD countries and
throughout the world. They expressed their determina-
tion to avoid that situation by stronger action to con-
serve energy and develop alternative sources of energy
and by including sound energy policies in their overall
economic policy.

Commodities

4. Ministers noted the importance of continuing dis-
cussions on commodities and endorsed the agreement
reached in the CIEC to establish a Common Fund with
the specific purposes, objectives and other constituent
elements to be further negotiated in UNCTAD [U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development], and the will-
ingness declared at the Conference to make all efforts
for the success of the negotiations being undertaken in
UNCTAD on commodities. They invited the Organisa-
tion to continue its work in the field of commodities in
order to assist Member countries in these efforts, and
to examine other related commodity issues.

Trade

5. Ministers agreed that, while in several respects
the economic situation was different from that which
prevailed at the time of the adoption of the Trade Dec-
laration in 1974, it was still characterised by excep-
tional difficulties and divergencies in Member coun-
tries' situations. They noted with concern that persis-
tent high levels of unemployment and difficulties in cer-
tain sectors have increased protectionist pressures.
Ministers emphasized that recourse to protectionist
policies would foster unemployment, increase inflation
and reduce economic welfare. They agreed that the
present economic situation together with the increasing

interdependence of OECD economies reinforced the
need for a renewed political commitment to avoid re-
strictive unilateral trade and current account measures
and the artificial stimulation of exports; measures of
this kind tended to carry the risk of proliferation with
self-defeating implications. They also agreed that such
a commitment and related disciplines in the field of
general economic policy were an essential element of
the strategy for sustained non-inflationary economic
growth in the OECD area. Indeed such growth should
itself facilitate the avoidance of restrictions.

6. Member Governments ^ therefore decided to re-
new, for a further year, their Trade Declaration of 30th
May, 1974. They agreed that full use should be made of
the existing possibilities for consultation in order to
find and implement multilaterally-acceptable solutions
to trade problems, whether industrial or agricultural,
in a manner which would take into account the interests
of all concerned. In the case of sectoral problems, every
effort should be made to identify such problems before
they assume critical proportions and to proceed to con-
sultations in their regard, taking into consideration,
inter alia, structural changes in the world economy.

7. Ministers welcomed the progress achieved in mul-
tilateral co-operation concerning export credits and un-
derlined the need for further efforts to improve and ex-
tend the consensus on guidelines for the extension of
officially-supported export credits.

8. Ministers reaffirmed that it was essential to main-
tain an open and multilateral trading system as a basic
element in the overall approach to the economic prob-
lems with which their countries were confronted and
stressed the importance of giving impetus to the Mul-
tilateral Trade Negotiations with the objective of mak-
ing substantive progress in key areas in 1977, and
achieving agreement over the range of issues as rapidly
as possible.

9. Ministers welcomed the work being done in the
United Nations Economic and Social Council on corrupt
practices in international commercial transactions, and
expressed the hope that it would take the measures
necessary with a view to reaching agreement as early
as possible on appropriate means, including the negoti-
ation of an international agreement, of combating illicit
payments.

International Investment and Multinational Enter-
prises

10. Recalling the Declaration and the Decisions of
OECD Member Governments of 21st June, 1976, on In-
ternational Investment and Multinational Enterprises,
Ministers also welcomed the work of the United Na-
tions Commission on Transnational Corporations on a
code of conduct.

Progress Under the Strategy for Sustained Economic
Expansion

11. Ministers reaffirmed the strategy for a sustained

^ Spain has reserved temporarily its position. [Foot-
note in original.]

118

Department of State Bulletin

expansion, aiming at a progressive return to full
employment and price stability, which they adopted in
June 1976. The basic premise on which this strategy
rests is that the steady economic growth needed to re-
store full employment and satisfy rising economic and
social aspirations will not prove sustainable unless
Member countries make further progress towards
eradicating inflation. Ministers examined the progress
made in implementing the strategy and reviewed the
prospects for the coming year. While recognising that
serious problems persisted, they welcomed the fact that
some Member Governments had committed themselves
to economic growth targets during 1977 and some
others to stabilization policies which were intended to
provide a basis for sustained non-inflationary growth
world-wide.

12. Ministers agreed that the achievement of the ob-
jectives of the strategy would be promoted by a some-
what faster rate of expansion in the OECD area as a
whole in 1978 than seems likely to be achieved in 1977,
although this does not apply to some countries. An
overall growth rate of OECD GNP of around .5 per cent
in 1978 would at this point seem desirable and consist-
ent with the strategy. They agreed that, where neces-
sary and appropriate, action should be taken to achieve
this. This somewhat faster rate of expansion should:

— enable real progress to be made in reducing un-
employment next year;

— help to stimulate the productive investment needed
to provide jobs for the unemployed; and

— be compatible with a further reduction in the rate
of inflation.

13. Further progress against inflation will not come
about of its own accord. Determined action will be re-
quired to slow down the price/wage spiral. Some coun-
tries will need to pursue — and some to reinforce —
vigorous stabilization policies. To promote better pay-
ments equilibrium. Member countries in a weak exter-
nal position will hold the growth of domestic demand to
a rate compatible with reducing inflation, and also fol-
low policies to improve their competitive position, so as
to attain a sustainable current-account position.
Member countries in a strong external position will
provide for a sustained expansion of domestic demand
compatible with further reduction of inflation; they are
ready to see a weakening in their current-account posi-
tion and an appreciation of their currencies in response
to underlying market forces.

14. Specific objectives and policies for expansion and
stabilization will vary as between Member countries.
But, taken together, they must provide the basis for
sustained non-inflationary growth in the OECD area
and the world economy as a whole. Ministers agreed on
the need to strengthen procedures for monitoring prog-
ress under the strategy. To this end, they decided that
Member countries would communicate their prelimi-
nary objectives for the growth of output and domestic
demand and their stabilization policies for 1978 to the
Organisation so that their mutual consistency and
global implications can be examined, and can then pro-

vide the basis for monitoring progress during the
course of next year.

15. Ministers recognised that a sustained increase in
demand, while necessary, will not on its own solve the
problems of unemployment and lagging investment,
which are due in part to structural causes and the
legacy of events of recent years.

— Lagging investment now can lead to unemployment
later. In countries where real wages have run ahead of
productivity increases in recent years there is a need to
increase the return on investment. In some countries
there may be need for a greater consensus between
government, labour and management on the reduced
scope for increases in public and private consumption.

— In prevailing circumstances further efforts where
appropriate should be made to supplement overall de-
mand management policies by specific measures de-
signed to increase employment, including policies which
help adapt the labour force to the requirements of rapid
structural and technological change.

— In the efforts to reduce unemployment, particular
attention should be paid to the unemployment of young
workers. Special measures have been taken in many
countries and more may be needed. Ministers in-
structed the Organisation to strengthen its exchange of
experience and to organise urgently a high-level con-
ference for this purpose.

16. Ministers reviewed the international payments
situation. They welcomed the progress being made to-
wards a more appropriate payments position by some of
the larger Member countries. While some of the smaller
Member countries are also making progress in the right
direction, many of them are still running unsustainably
large current account deficits. Ministers underlined the
need for continued efforts to arrive at a more sustain-
able pattern of current-account positions in the OECD
area. They agreed on the need to ensure that adequate
official financing facilities are available to back up ap-
propriate stabilization programmes. In this connection
they heard a statement by the Managing Director of the
International Monetary Fund on the progress made in
negotiating additional resources to finance balance of
payments through the IMF. Many Ministers stressed
the importance they attached to implementation of the
OECD Financial Support Fund in addition to the IMF
facility.

17. Ministers noted that present conjunctural dif-
ficulties are exacerbating longer-run structural and de-
velopment problems, as well as the employment and
balance-of-payments difficulties, of some Member coun-
tries. Ministers therefore agreed that the competent
bodies of the Organisation dealing with the various as-
pects of these problems should, in a positive and co-
ordinated way, take into consideration the means to
overcome such difficulties.

18. Ministers noted with interest the recommenda-
tions contained in the report Towards Full Employ-
ment and Price Stability produced by a group of ex-
perts under the chairmanship of Professor McCracken
and instructed the Organisation to examine both the

July 25, 1977

119

analysis and recommendations in the Report. They
agreed that, taking account of the important differences
between countries, the Oi'ganisation and Member Gov-
ernments should study in particular the recommenda-
tion that, over the medium term, a policy of not accom-
modating high rates of inflation should be built around
some or all of the following elements: publicly-
announced norms for the growth of the monetary
aggregates; a fiscal policy geared to guidelines for pub-
lic expenditure and a budget norm designed to avoid
giving an inflationary stimulus; and consultative ar-
rangements designed to clarify the kind of price and
wage behaviour consistent with achieving and maintain-
ing full employment.

19. Ministers also noted with interest the reports by
the OECD Trade Union Advisory Committee on a
strategy for full employment and instructed the Or-
ganisation to study and evaluate the proposals con-
tained in them, as well as in the paper by the OECD
Business and Industry Advisory Committee on non-
inflationary growth.

DECLARATION, JUNE 23

Declaration on Relations With Developing
Countries, Adopted by Governments of OECD
Member Countries on 23rd June, 1977

1. Ministers of Member governments of the OECD
meeting in Paris on 23rd June, 1977, discussed relations
with developing countries and the longei'-term orienta-
tion of international development co-operation.

2. Ministers affirmed that the CIEC had played a
valuable role in building up a climate of dialogue be-
tween the developing and developed countries. It had
provided the opportunity for a thorough global exam-
ination of the major issues involved and agreement was
reached on a number of important points, although it
had not been possible to reach agreement on some other
important topics of mutual interest. All Member gov-
ernments of the OECD, including those who did not
participate in the CIEC, joined together in welcoming
the agreements that were reached there. They also
welcomed the intention of some OECD Member gov-
ernments in addition to those who took part in the Con-
ference, to associate themselves with a Special Action
Programme announced at that Conference.

3. Looking ahead, they agreed that further efforts
were needed on the part of both developed and develop-
ing countries to build a more equitable and stable inter-
national economic system, one which would create a
better life for all people. These efforts will be sup-
ported by a return to full health of the international
economy which is the concern of developed and develop-
ing countries alike. Recalling their Declaration of 28th

May, 1975, Ministers expressed their readiness to pur-
sue actively the on-going dialogue with developing
countries in the United Nations system and in other ap-
propriate fora and to co-operate in solving economic and
social problems of common concern, thereby making it
possible for the developing countries to participate in-
creasingly in the benefits of an improved and expanding
world economy. In this connection they stressed their
willingness to encourage effective international co-
operation and dialogue on energy.

4. Welcoming the progress made in development co-
operation on many fronts. Ministers acknowledged the
necessity to continue working with developing coun-
tries towards improved and more effective development
co-operation policies. They affirmed that while de-
velopment co-operation concerned relations between
governments its objective was the well-being of indi-
viduals; development co-operation should therefore ful-
fil the dual purposes of growth of incomes and meeting
basic needs of individuals in all developing countries.
They stressed that development policies for transfers of
resources and structural changes should be clearly di-
rected to these purposes. This was particularly neces-
sary in order that the objectives and policy concepts of
development co-operation would be better understood
and supported by the peoples of industrialised and de-
veloping countries.

5. Ministers of OECD countries, donors of aid, reaf-
firmed the intention, as expressed by their countries in
different fora, to increase effectively and substantially
their official development assistance and to achieve an
improved balance of their efforts in this regard. They
announced their determination to direct, in co-
operation with developing countries, a progressively
larger share of their efforts to programmes meeting
basic human needs. To realise this new orientation with
respect to all developing countries, they also agreed to
review the scope and direction of development assist-
ance with a view to achieving greater volume and more
efficiency in its use in an enlarged international effort.

Letters of Credence

On June 24, the following newly appointed
Ambassadors presented their credentials to
President Carter: '

Algeria — Abdelaziz Maoui
Colombia — Virgilio Barco
Morocco — Ali Bengelloun

' For texts of the Ambassadors' remarks and the
President's replies, see Department of State press re-
leases dated June 24, 1977.

120

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Interviewed at Foreign Policy Conference
for Editors and Broadcasters

The Department held a National Foreign
Policy Conference for Editors and Broadcast-
ers on June 28-29. Following is the tran-
script of remarks by Secretary Vance in re-
sponse to questions from the group on June
28.

Press release 310 dated June 28

Secretary Vance: First, let me say how
pleased I am to be with you and to welcome
you to the State Department. I'm sure from
looking at the schedule for today that it has
probably been an interesting day, and I'm
sure, now that Sol Linowitz [Co-Negotiator
for the Panama Canal Treaty] has explained
to you all about the Panama Canal, that's one
thing that I won't have to answer any ques-
tions about. [Laughter.]

I think probably, because time is Hmited,
the best thing would be for me to not try and
make any opening statement but simply to an-
swer your questions, because I'm sure you
have a lot of them.

Q. Mr. Secretary. Tomarde Golardo,
WRHC, a Spanish radio in Miami.

On June 16th, sir, in the Congressional
Record, Senator Richard Stone said that there
are from 15,000 to 20,000 Cuban soldiers in
Angola. Yesterday, in that same room, he
said the same thing. I was wondering if you
can comment on the number said by Mr.
Stone and if the Department agrees.

Secretary Vance: I don't have a precise fig-
ure on the number, and I'm not sure that any-
body knows, even in our intelligence services,
the precise number; but I think that's a rea-
sonably accurate figure, and I would not dis-
pute that figure.

Q. Mr. Secretary, several people have told

us today that we are still in the process of de-
veloping a policy on Taiwan. Are we, or are
they protecting your speech tomorrow?
[Laughter. ]

Secretary Vance: I will, of course, comment
on our relationships with the People's Repub-
lic of China and our relationships with Taiwan
in my speech tomorrow. We are still in the
process of formulating our position with re-
spect to normalization of relations with the
People's Republic of China.

Although I will discuss it, the final deci-
sions will not be taken until a period shortly
before I go to China at the end of the month of
August. I will be discussing when I am in
China not only the question of normalization,
but a variety of other subjects, which will be
global in nature and regional, as well as our
bilateral relationships.

Q. Mr. Secretary, although it hadn't been
discussed today and the man who's been the
most specific on it isn't here, in exactly what
time frame and precisely what context —
although that's involved — do yon envision
black majority rule taking place in the Re-
public of South Africa — precisely the time
frame?

Secretary Vance: I cannot give you any pre-
cise answer to that question. When Vice Pres-
ident Mondale had his talks with Prime
Minister Vorster [at Vienna, May 19-20], he
mentioned two things — one, that there should
be an end to discrimination, and secondly,
that there should be full participation of all
South Africans in the affairs of South Africa.
And in that connection he was asked a ques-
tion about one man, one vote; and obviously,
if you're talking about full participation, that
would be included within it.

July 25, 1977

121

He did not specify any time with respect to
the latter. He said that this was obviously a
question that would have to be decided by the
South Africans themselves, and he was not
trying to say what the time schedule should
be.

He did go on to say, however, that what
happened or did not happen in these two areas
could not help but have an effect upon the re-
lationships between South Africa and the
United States.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have we given, or do we
propose to give, some kind of a signal to
North Korea, telling them precisely what will
happen if after our troops are gone they
should begin an invasion? And if so, how will
that signal be given and in what form?

Secretary Vance: We have made it very
clear that we stand behind — and will stand
behind — the mutual security treaty which we
have with the Republic of Korea — namely,
South Korea.

I think this is fully understood by the North
Koreans, and I shall reiterate this again in the
speech which I intend to make tomorrow
evening relating to our Asian policy.

We also have made it clear that the forces
which we will be withdrawing from South
Korea will be done over a period of years on a
phased basis and that by the time that that
withdrawal is completed, in approximately
five years, the forces of South Korea on the
ground should be fully able to take care of
their own defense needs insofar as ground
forces are concerned. We have, in addition,
indicated that we will keep our air forces
there and will continue to supply naval
support.

Therefore, I think that there should be no
question in the minds of the North Koreans
about what our commitments are to the secu-
rity of South Korea, and that this will be not
only clear in terms of what would happen
should any action be taken, but will act as a
deterrent to any adventuristic action.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Don Mulford, Montclair
Times.

Will your speech tomorrow on Asia contain
any of the human relations thrusts — for
human rights, rather — human rights thrusts

that we've heard in regards to Russia, in re-
gards to Africa, in regards to the Middle
East?

Secretary Vance: The answer is, yes.

Q. Mr. President — [Laughter.] —

Secretary Vance: I beg off on that.

Q. — not quite. [Laughter.] Mr. Secretary,
in view of history, was the domino theory very
valid?

Secretary Vance: I'd question it. I do not
think that one can in hindsight say that the
domino theory was right.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been consider-
able consternation in the Midwest — I'm from
WLW [Radio] in Cincinnati, Charlie
Murdoch — about our upcoming possible rec-
ognition of Cuba in light of the Angolan situ-
ation, the amount of troops still there, the
problems that began in the sixties with the
missile crisis. And it seems that the advan-
tages with Castro, if he could begin trade with
us — what possible advantage do we have, rec-
ognizing him, considering the southern
Florida situation where a lot of Cubans still
reside? What is the new light, other than
Members of Congress, to the Cuban situation?

Could you spend a few moments wrapping
this up in a capsule of your feelings about it?

Secretary Vance: Surely, I'd be delighted to
do that.

It has been many years since we had any
dialogue with Cuba. Lots has happened since
the time that that dialogue ceased. In the
meantime, there are many issues which are of
concern to both of our nations. And when this
Administration came into office we deter-
mined that the time had come to open up a
dialogue with the Cubans to begin to discuss
these many, many problems which were of
concern to both of us.

The first and most pressing issue was that
of fishing rights. We had just enacted in the
Congress a new law which set out a fishing
zone which extended beyond Cuba and there-
fore created an obvious problem of potential
conflict.

Because of that, we felt that the first item
we should discuss with the Cubans was the
fishing question. We opened discussions and

122

Department of State Bulletin

were able to reach an agreement in the area of
fishing rights between the two nations.

We next believed that it would be in our in-
terest to have some presence in Havana and
to that end suggested that we put a small
presence in Havana in return for their being
able to do the same here in Washington. So
we have agreed to establish what in diploma-
tic terms are called interests sections. An in-
terests section merely means this — that each
country puts a small group of its diplomats in
a third country's embassy within the capital of
the other country.

We think that this is a natural and positive
step because it gives us a better insight as to
what is going on in Cuba and a chance to dis-
cuss issues which are of concern to us.

There are many other items besides the
ones which I have mentioned which have to be
discussed, and let me mention some of them:

— One, the question of what we consider to
be Cuban interference in the affairs of Puerto
Rico.

— Two, the question of Cuban troops in
Africa.

— Three, the question of political prisoners
in Cuba and the related questions of human
rights.

—Fourth, the questions of claims and assets
that are involved as a result of the expropria-
tion of property when U.S. properties were
taken over.

On their side they, of course, have a
number of issues; the most important of which
they would like to discuss with us is the ques-
tion of the trade embargo.

Now, all of these issues are subjects for dis-
cussion. We are going to approach these dis-
cussions on a careful and measured basis. We
have no time deadline for the completion of
these discussions, but we think these are im-
portant to both of our countries and should be
discussed.

We are not talking about normalizing in the
sense of full diplomatic recognition until all of
these issues have been discussed and we feel
we have satisfactory understandings between
us.

Q. Will Guantanamo play a part in it?

Secretary Vance: I'm sure they probably
will raise the issue.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the light of the Presi-
dent's recent statement about what the huynan
rights issue has apparently cost with rela-
tionship to the Soviet Union, and in regard to
the response you just made about human
rights in China, obviously there must be
something going on that is beyond the public-
ity value of this natioji going forward on. this
issue, if it is as counterproductive as the Pre-
sident seemed to indicate that it was with re-
gards to the Soviet Union. What is it? We all
recognize that human rights are in bad condi-
tion in much of the world, and it really
doesn't yieed this kind of attention on a world
scale, where delicate negotiations are in prog-
ress. What is behind this? What is going on
with it?

Secretary Vance: First, let me say that I
think that you overread what the President
actually said when he commented on this issue
in the statement that he made recently with
respect to its effect in the discussions with the
Soviet Union.

Having said that, let me then move on to
why we believe human rights is an important
matter that should be discussed.

We believe that this is a fundamental part
of our heritage. It is interwoven in the fabric
of the Constitution, and the underlying docu-
ments which support the founding of this na-
tion. We believe it involves universal issues
which affect the lives of individuals through-
out the entire world.

We therefore feel that this is an appropriate
subject to discuss not only in connection with
our foreign policy but in connection with the
foreign policy of other nations as well. In-
deed, we see responsive chords struck in
many countries throughout the world.

For example, I recently attended the OAS
meeting in Grenada, when some of the
strongest proponents of human rights spoke
eloquently about the importance of it and the
need to strengthen the human rights
mechanisms in the inter- American system and
the United Nations as well — Venezuela, Costa
Rica, Colombia, to name but a few.

Our object is to raise this issue and to see

July 25, 1977

123

that it becomes a subject of discussion, be-
cause we believe it is a universal issue of
great importance, and we will continue to
pursue it. We are not going to walk away
from this issue. We think it is important
enough, and indeed vital enough, that we will
continue to press this issue.

We will do it in different ways. Sometimes
it will be by public statement. Sometimes it
will be by quiet persuasion, and it will have to
be done in a measured and careful way. But
we believe it is of great importance, and we
will continue to pursue it.

Now let me say one final thing. I do not
think you can measure progress insofar as
human rights is concerned over the short
term. I think you must look at the long range
and see what happens five, si.x, seven, eight,
ten years down the road. Therefore I think to
try and apply a yai'dstick and say what hap-
pened this month or next month or the month
after that is not the way to try and judge
progi'ess or lack of progress.

We do indeed see in individual cases im-
mediate progress. In other cases we see lack
of progress, or a standing still. But I don't
think that these short-term tests should be
the test. Rather, they should be long term.

Q. Mr. Secretary, exactly to what extent do
you believe the hu?nan rights issue has
clouded or inhibited the SALT talks [Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks], and what is your
prognosis for the talks from this point on?

Secretary Vance: I still believe that the
Soviets will make their decision in the SALT
talks on the basis of what they consider to be
their national interests in military and
strategic terms.

Insofar as when we can expect an agree-
ment, I simply can't predict that.

I would want to say that I think the most
important thing is not how soon we can get it
done, although we would all like to see it done
promptly; but rather, can we get a sound
agreement, an agreement which is beneficial
to both us and the Soviet Union and in our
national interests? And I think that is what
we must strive for, rather than trying to get
an agreement just to have an agreement.

If you try and do that, then you are going to

end up with an agreement which may very
well be a bad agreement, and an agreement
which will have ambiguities in it which will
just lead to confusion and to problems in the
future.

Q. Back to the first part of my question,
exactly to what extent do you believe the
human rights issue has clouded or inhibited
progress of the SALT talks?

Secretary Vance: In my judgment, not
much.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the talks with Viet-
nam, what role, if any, is the question of the
$6 billion of U.S. arms surplus left behind
there playing, and specifically, since the
United States is not prepared to give aid to
Vietnam, is there any question of buying
some of this material and shipping it out of
the area?

Secretary Vance: Well, it is obvious that in-
sofar as the Vietnamese are concerned, the
question of aid is of great importance to them.
We have made it very clear that no aid can be
forthcoming. We are prohibited by the Con-
gress from giving any aid. There is no inten-
tion of giving any aid at this point except for
small amounts of humanitarian aid, which
have been given in the past.

Therefore the position, I think, is very clear
on this. We are prepared to do certain things
such as not oppose the admission of Vietnam
to the United Nations. We have made that
clear. We have made it clear, should we nor-
malize relations and thus have diplomatic re-
lations, that we are prepared to remove the
trade embargo. But as far as aid is concerned,
we have made it clear there is nothing we can
do there.

Q. And the $6 billion of arms surplus left
behind in Vietnatn, is there any question of
purchasing any of that, or is it playing any
role at all in the Vietnam talks?

Secretary Vance: No.

Q. Mr. Secretary, we have heard today that
a Middle East settlement and negotiation is a
foreign policy imperative of the United States
and that an integral paH of this solution or
settlement would be the solution or resolution

124

Department of State Bulletin

of the Palestinian problem. In light of the fact
that we have disqualified the PLO [Palestine
Liberation Organization] as a representative
in such negotiations, how can we realistically
expect to accomplish a solution to the problem
without a representative of the Palestinian
people?

Secretarij Vance: We have said that as long
as the Palestinians refuse to recognize — or the
PLO refuses to recognize — the right of Israel
to exist, or to accept [U.N. Resolutions] 242
and 338 as the basis of discussions, that in-
sofar as we are concerned, we are not going to
enter into discussions with them.

Should that change, we would be faced with
a different situation at that time. In the
meantime, going on to the thrust of your
question, it seems to me that it is key that
there be found a solution to the Palestinian
question. As to exactly how that question can
be resolved, that is up to the parties to come
up with various proposals to deal with it. And
this is certainly one of the subjects we will be
discussing when I return to the Middle East
at the end of next month or in the early part
of August.

The parties all know that this is one of the
three core elements, and it has to be resolved
if you are going to get a solution. And it
seems to me that, therefore, it is incumbent
upon the parties to come up with some con-
crete suggestions as to how this might be ac-
complished. A number have been suggested,
but there is no unanimity of view as to how
this can be done.

Q. Is it implicit in your answer, then, that
the PLO would qualify if they would accept
the tenets of2h2 as the basis of participation?

Secretary Vance: What I have said is that
that would create a different situation, and we
would have to take a look at it fresh then.

Q. Secretary Vance, my name is Jose
Chapa [WSBC Radio]from Chicago. The Pre-
sident of Mexico was here in February. The
President of Venezuela is your guest today.
The First Lady of this country has been in
Latin America just recently, and everything
is, in the protocol, wonderful and beautiful.

But is there any concrete, realistic, positive

plan of President Carter's Administration to
move toward Latin America? We see that the
U.S.A. has been very busy with Europe, ivith
Asia, with Africa, but we demand, we need,
as we say in radio, equal time. [Laughter.]

Secretary Vance: All right, that is a very
good question.

Insofar as the question of the problems of
Latin America are concerned, let me say first
that it is our strong conviction that Latin
America is not just a homogeneous mass. We
have individual countries which should be
dealt with on bilateral matters as individual
countries, as we would anywhere else in the
world.

On multilateral matters, we ought to deal
with them in multilateral fora, as we would
with countries anywhere else in the world.
And I think this is being understood in Latin
America.

Now, specifically with respect to the eco-
nomic problems and the problems which are
involved in the North-South dialogue, we
have spent a great deal of our time recently
working on these problems. These were in-
volved in the so-called CIEC [Conference on
International Economic Cooperation] meet-
ings which have been going on for about two
years and recently concluded in Paris.

As a result of those meetings, certain ac-
tions were taken — not as much as either side
would have wished, but I think certain prog-
ress was made in terms of commodity agree-
ments, in terms of problems of dealing with
debt, in problems of many other complexities
in nature, and therefore I think we now have
created a framework for moving forward in
the United Nations to carry out what has
been arrived at in CIEC.

We have been talking today with the Ven-
ezuelans about how one picks up from where
we left off and continues this dialogue, be-
cause it is really only a beginning that has to
be continued.

We are also talking about problems of how
we can strengthen the economic capacities of
assisting other nations, both in the Carib-
bean, in Central America, and in South
America. And there are many ideas which are
under discussion at this point.

July 25, 1977

125

Let me say that this is a very high-priority
item on our agenda, and we will be discussing
it with the Latin American countries, and I
believe that in the long run we are going to be
able to make progress.

Q. Mr. Secretary, back to Korea just for a
second. We were speaking earlier today of the
so-called tripwire effect. If it is such a good
idea to withdraw the ground troops from the
2d Army, rather the 2d Division, from
Korea, why not apply the same principle to
Western Europe? Or is the thinking of the
Administration now that there is less of a
chance of a ground attack from. North Korea
to South Korea than from the Warsaw Pact
and Russian countries against Western
Europe?

Secretary Vance: What we are talking
about in Korea is withdrawing, over a period
of approximately five years, one division
which remains there and building up the
strength of the Korean Army, so that when
that period has expired, the Korean Army will
be able to take care of the ground problem it-
self.

I think that you have a different situation in
NATO. We have been withdrawing forces
over the years in NATO. I think we are down
to a position right now insofar as NATO is
concerned where to withdraw any other
troops at this time would not be a wise thing
to do.

Q. For what reason, sir?

Secretary Vance: Because I think that in
order to provide a proper balance, they are
required there at this time. If you see what
has happened in the central front and the
buildup that has occurred over the last sev-
eral years in terms of equipment and other-
wise on the Warsaw Pact side, there is at best
a balance at this point.

Q. That doesn't tnean that the Administra-

tion then regards a ground attack from the
East more strongly in Europe than a ground
attack from the North in Korea?

Secretary Vance: No. What we are saying is
we think in both cases that there should be
sufficient deterrent to prevent any ground at-
tack. And we believe that with the strategy
that we have in the two different areas that
they are sufficient to deter an attack.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Roger Allan from WRKO
[Radio] in Boston.

Will you please give an up-to-date report
regarding our European relationships in
connection with the Concorde?

Secretary Vance: On the Concorde, I think
it would be less than candid to say that both
the British and the French are very concerned
about the Concorde situation. [Laughter.] The
matter, however, has been passed on by the
Court of Appeals in New York. It is now back
in the District Court. It went back to the Dis-
trict Court with instructions from the Circuit
Court to expedite the hearing on the remain-
ing question, which is: Did the Port Authority
act in a discriminatory fashion?

I would expect that a decision would be
reached quite promptly under those circum-
stances, which hopefully will resolve the prob-
lem. It remains, however, a matter of great
concern to both Britain and France, and of
course we watch it with great care and con-
cern.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as a member of a na-
tional newspaper association study mission
over several areas of the world in the past
four years, I have come up with several ques-
tions and several observations which I have
been trying to get before your eyes for four
months now and the President's eyes; so, as a
final question, my question is: Could I hand
you a copy of this report and hope you will
read it?

Secretary Vance: I will, indeed.

126

Department of State Bulletin

The Role of Investment in Expanding
an Open International Economic System

Address by Richard N. Cooper

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs ^

Ladies and gentlemen of the Council of the
Americas: It is my pleasure to be here today
to present an overview of the Carter Adminis-
tration's approach to private foreign
investment:

— The contribution of private foreign in-
vestment to Third World development, in
Latin America and elsewhere;

— The impact of outward investment on
American jobs and American exports; and

— The implications of inward investment for
the strength of the American economy.

As you know, the U.S. Government has
traditionally felt that an open international
economic system will maximize the economic
welfare of ourselves and of the rest of the
world. Within this framework, we have gen-
erally encouraged U.S. firms to respond to
market opportunities wherever they could be
found.

But I hardly need remind this audience that
our view of multinational corporations as play-
ing a positive role in the global economic sys-
tem has not gone unchallenged. Some critics
have asserted that foreign investors use inap-
propriate technology in the host countries of
the Third World, destroy jobs, collect excess
profits, and leave poverty and misery in their
wake. More recently, other critics have al-
leged that multinationals take away capital
from their home countries in the developed
world, give away technology, export jobs, and
leave poverty and misery in their wake. A re-

cent book entitled "Global Reach" came to the
remarkable conclusion that multinational cor-
porations syphon off capital, export jobs, and
hurt the balance of payments of home and
host countries simultaneously! ^

I shall argue today that the closer we look
at the evidence the more firmly we remain
convinced that a liberal international eco-
nomic system, permitting broad flows of
foreign investment across national boundaries
according to economic forces, offers the best
hope for stable economic growth — in the Third
World, in other developed countries, and in
our own society.

U.S. Investment in the Third World

Let me turn first to our policy toward pri-
vate direct investment in the Third World.

As you well know, Latin American coun-
tries continue to be the group of developing
countries receiving the largest share of U.S.
investment. Two-thirds of American invest-
ment in the less developed world is located
there, with book value equaling $20 billion
and earnings of approximately $3 billion in
1975. Mexico and Brazil had a combined stock
of more than $8 billion in U.S. investment at
the beginning of this year, making the stake
of American companies in those two countries
greater than in France and almost equal to
that in Germany, though considerably less
than in Britain or Canada.

' Made before the Council of the Americas at Wash-
ington, D.C., on June 27, 1977.

^ "Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Cor-
porations," Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Muller
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975).

July 25, 1977

127

We believe that American companies have a
distinctive contribution to make to Third
World development. They can offer not only
capital, but important managerial, technical,
and marketing skills that cannot be supplied
through aid mechanisms or through foreign
ti'ade. We therefore regard it as a contribu-
tion to development to provide services to
facilitate the flow of U.S. private investment
to those developing countries that want it
through the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) and other U.S. Govern-
ment agencies.

But foreign investment can be effective
only if it is truly acceptable to the host coun-
try. It is not our pohcy to insist that other
countries let American investors in. Nor do
we try to dictate the terms under which
others should receive American companies.
We respect the right of every sovereign gov-
ernment to establish conditions for foreign in-
vestment that will best meet its own de-
velopment needs. But all governments must
realize that private investment is a matter of
choice for the firm as well as for the host
country. Corporations will tend to locate their
activities where they can earn profits and ex-
pect to continue to earn profits.

We do not view the desire of Third World
governments to exercise some degree of con-
trol over foreign investors, however, as a
fundamental threat to continued investment
by American companies. Many countries in
Latin America, Africa, and Asia are indicat-
ing to us that they want more — not less — U.S.
investment. They are realizing that the desire
to maintain their sovereignty does not limit
them to autarchy with respect to foreign in-
vestment any more than it does with respect
to foreign trade. They are becoming increas-
ingly sophisticated in designing policies to
channel multinational corporate resources into
those areas where they are most wanted and
in getting the most out of what multinational
corporations have to offer. They are sharpen-
ing their bargaining skills and more fully
realizing their bai'gaining power.

On investment issues, as elsewhere,
rhetoric is slow in catching up with reality.
But even those leaders who are calling for a
new international economic order are begin-

ning to acknowledge that dependency and
exploitation are peculiarly inappropriate ways
of characterizing how foreign investor-host
country relations are evolving in the modern
world.

One source of increased bargaining strength
on the part of the Third World governments
comes from their sharing of information on
what kinds of policies are more effective, and
what kinds of policies are less effective, in at-
tracting foreign investment and directing it to
serve host-country needs. As an economist, it
is professionally pleasing to me to expect that
in this process they will rediscover some neo-
classical truths.

— One of the surest ways to guard against
what they consider excess profits for
foreigners — or anybody else — for example, is
to lower trade barriers and increase competi-
tion in domestic markets.

— One of the most effective ways to induce
multinational corporations to shift from
capital-intensive to more appropriate labor-
intensive production techniques, as a study
prepared for the U.N. Group of Eminent Per-
sons studying transnational enterprises
pointed out, is to lower trade barriers and in-
crease competition in domestic markets.

— Probably the most forceful method of
keeping foreign investors "under control" is
through the impersonal discipline of the
market.

We think that no mechanism for interna-
tional regulation will be as effective in keep-
ing the power of multinational corporations
manageable as the difficult decision on the
part of host-country governments to increase
competitive pressures domestically.

Our projection that American investment in
the Third World will continue to grow springs
also from our confidence that U.S. corpora-
tions are highly flexible and adaptable. These
virtues have frequently been the key to their
success at home as well as abroad. American
corporations have been, and will have to con-
tinue to be, enterprising in discovering how to
provide their valuable skills and services in
ways consistent with the national aspirations
of the countries where they are located. This
adaptability is particularly important in natu-

128

Department of State Bulletin

ral resource development, where the tradi-
tional method of direct equity ownership
leaves the investor with a large fixed in-
vestment extraordinarily vulnerable.

Making a virtue of necessity, some com-
panies have shifted from direct equity in-
vestment to management contracts, service
contracts, or other forms of nonequity par-
ticipation. These leave them less vulnerable
economically and politically in the Third
World. There are many ways to share risks
and profits between foreign investors and
host countries that do not involve direct
foreign ownership.

Other companies call on the U.S. Govern-
ment to give natural resource investors more
direct support, protection, and guarantees to
bolster their traditional mode of operation.

It seems to us that the more secure course
of action is for multinationals to seek methods
of transferring their valuable skills to the task
of natural resource development, while re-
specting the desires of the host countries to
preserve national patrimony over the re-
sources in question. The feasibility of man-
agement contracts, service contracts, and
other nonequity arrangements has already
been demonstrated in oil and mineral projects
in the Third World. They offer profitable op-
portunities to American companies. And they
are responsive to the desire of many
developing-country governments to maintain
sovereign control over natural resources. The
Overseas Private Investment Corporation has
a particularly useful role to play in helping
U.S. investors and host countries to work out
mutually acceptable arrangements.

No matter how flexible and adaptable
American companies are, however, there will
inevitably be some investment disputes
between foreign investors and host
governments.

On the one hand, we have no desire to take
an interventionist stance in our dealings with
other countries. We assume that private in-
vestors will weigh carefully their vulnerabil-
ity to political risk as part of the economic cal-
culation they make when they are deciding
whether or not to invest in any particular
country, and some will conclude that their ef-
forts are better exerted elsewhere. Moreover,

we anticipate that most investment disputes
that do occur will be settled with the host
country without the need for U.S. Govern-
ment intervention. Indeed many busi-
nessmen, including a number from the
council's own ranks, tell us that official
intervention on our part can be counter-
productive.

On the other hand, the U.S. Government
has an obligation to protect the rights of its
citizens and their property abroad. Thus, we
expect to keep ourselves closely informed
about the course of investment disputes that
do arise and, where necessary, will offer our
assistance in facilitating a mutually acceptable
settlement between the parties, but wherever
possible, we shall seek to limit the direct in-
volvement of the U.S. Government.

Codes of Conduct for Investment

With regard to codes of conduct for multi-
national investment, we seek to strengthen
multilateral discipline and I'estraint over gov-
ernment intervention in investment decisions
when such actions might adversely affect
other countries. Our efforts in the multilateral
arena have been successful in deflecting the
pressures for unilateral action, particularly
among industrialized countries. Within the
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development], we developed last
July guidelines that emphasize a multilateral
commitment to an open international in-
vestment system. This approach has been use-
ful in other international efforts to deal with
foreign investment. In particular, it served as
a model for the International Labor Organiza-
tion's draft tripartite declaration of principles
concerning multinational enterprises and so-
cial policy. In the United Nations Commission
on Transnational Corporations and the related
Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code
of Conduct, we recognize that a large gap still
remains between the developed and the de-
veloping countries over such basic issues as
the limits international law may impose on
"permanent sovereignty," the responsibilities
that governments have in their treatment of
foreign firms, as well as the responsibilities of
the firms as good local citizens, and the bind-

July 25, 1977

129

ing versus the voluntary nature of a code of
conduct.

President Carter has spoken out forcefully
about the need for dealing with irregular
practices and improper conduct. One of the
major reasons for the recent rise in mistrust
of multinational corporations has been the re-
velations of corporate misconduct in connec-
tion with bribes to foreign officials. The
United States is taking firm action to elimi-
nate such practices from international trade
and commerce. In addition to vigorous en-
forcement of existing laws, the Carter Admin-
istration has strongly supported new legisla-
tion which would impose criminal penalties on
U.S. nationals who use U.S. commerce to
bribe foreign officials. However, international
action is essential if we are to deal effectively
with this problem. The United States is thus
proposing an international agreement under
which both home and host governments would
take action against bribery involving their of-
ficials or their nationals in international com-
mercial transactions.

Human Rights and Corporate Responsibility

Finally, I would like to address the question
of human rights and corporate responsibility.
This Administration is seeking to promote
human rights internationally — including civil
rights, political rights, and basic social and
economic rights — because we have a moral ob-
ligation to do so, because we have a legal obli-
gation to do so (under the U.N. Charter), and
because we believe it is in our national in-
terest to do so.

In the short run, it might appear opportune
to support or tolerate a repressive govern-
ment that is willing to give favorable consid-
eration to U.S. political and economic in-
terests. But we believe that over the longer
term a regime that relies upon force for its
authority can be neither popular nor stable.
Only by respecting the law and applying it
equally, and by offering all of its citizens a
share in the fruits of economic growth, can a
government gain the legitimacy upon which
stability and public support are founded.

I am certain that you share our concerns for
human rights. Indeed the Council of the
Americas has played a leading role in publiciz-

ing the efforts of American corporations to
follow the dictates of good corporate citizen-
ship. As corporate citizens, often seen as rep-
resentatives of the United States, you com-
plement our efforts by adhering to high
standards of behavior and demonstrating a
concern for human rights. Local businessmen
may question the sincerity or the motives of
politicians in Washington; they will surely be
impressed at the depth of the U.S. commit-
ment to human rights when they see you re-
flecting the same concerns.

Outward and Inward Investment

When we turn to the impact that outward
investment by U.S. companies has on the
American economy, we find that the con-
troversies of recent years have also been se-
vere. Critics from the ranks of organized
labor have argued that American multination-
als export jobs by producing abroad goods
that could be shipped from the United States
and by speeding the flow of imports from
cheap-labor countries into this country. Ac-
cording to this view, American multinationals
aggravate the unemployment problem in the
United States and deprive disadvantaged —
especially minority — men and women of ac-
cess to the job market at the lower rungs of
the employment ladder.

Supporters from the ranks of international
business make the opposite argument. They
suggest that American multinationals move
abroad as a defensive measure only when it is
no longer possible to export from this coun-
try. And they point to the fact that the
domestic employment and the exports of
American multinationals have risen faster
than the national average to show that they
do not e.xport jobs.

We believe that a close look at the evidence
supports a balanced view. When one dis-
aggregates the data, one can find numerous
instances where outward investment stimu-
lates trade and numerous instances where it
substitutes for trade. But there is no strong
overall statistical correlation between U.S.
foreign investment and trade, positive or
negative.

This finding is not as dramatic as the claims
of either side, but it carries two clear implica-

130

Department of State Bulletin

tions for U.S. policy: first, that we cannot jus-
tify on trade or employment grounds meas-
ures to subsidize outward investment; second,
that we should not adopt restrictive measures
to keep American companies at home. Rather,
our goal should be neutrality in the treatment
of outward investment and domestic invest-
ment; that is, insofar as possible, we should
maintain policies that do not bias the corpo-
rate decisionmaking process between for-
eign and domestic investment one way or
another.

Focusing more broadly on the concerns of
labor, the President is determined, as you
know, to reduce unemployment to a level
below 5 percent by 1981. Restrictive meas-
ures toward outward investment, however,
are not appropriate tools for employment pol-
icy. They would not save jobs in the aggre-
gate. With regard to the incorporation of dis-
advantaged groups into the labor market, we
do not find that import competition during the
past 10 years has been strongest in the low-
skilled, low-wage industries, nor that foreign
investment has increased the pace of import
growth. Hence, multinational corporations
are not the problem; restricting them is not
the solution.

Having said that, however, let me remind
this group that the multinational corporate
community in this country has a great stake in
helping this Administration reheve the pres-
sures for protectionism and restrictionism
that are generated when one sector has to
bear a disproportionate share of the burden of
accommodating our system to a liberal eco-
nomic environment. The trade restrictions
that are often suggested in connection with
investment restrictions would result in sub-
stantial cost to the U.S. economy and upward
pressures on prices. The Carter Administra-
tion will propose that temporary assistance be
provided to affected companies to enable them
to improve their competitive position and that
benefits to trade-affected workers be ex-
panded, coverage widened, certification
speeded up, and the focus redirected from
supplemental unemployment payments to
provisions for retraining and relocating
workers.

The successful launching of this program
will depend to a great e.xtent upon the active

support that we receive from business leaders
like yourselves.

The United States is the second largest host
country for foreign direct investment in the
world — next to Canada — with over $33 billion
at the end of 1976. We seek to make our ap-
proach to inward investment consistent with
our approach to outward investment. Our at-
titude is to welcome foreign investment into
our country. Such foreign investment assumes
considerable importance in terms of its poten-
tial for increasing our welfare, including, al-
though few people realize it, the transfer of
technology to the United States. Our official
poHcy at the Federal level, however, is neu-
trality. We extend to foreign companies no
special privileges and prefer to let them make
their market decisions on the basis of eco-
nomic incentives.

In practice, however, we must recognize
that we, like other countries, maintain certain
restrictions on foreign participation in our
own economy, as in atomic energy, hy-
droelectric power, communications, air trans-
port, and fishing. Thus, we are anxious not to
take a holier-than-thou stance when we view
the efforts of other nations to restrict foreign
corporations in areas where their activities
are not welcome. Yet we hold to the general
norm of having economic considerations de-
termine the location of productive activity
according to international comparative
advantage.

In conclusion, let me reaffirm that interna-
tional financial markets, multilateral lending
agencies, and foreign aid disbursements can-
not, and never will be able to, provide the ta-
lents and the skills that only the international
business community can. We all can benefit
from the activities of foreign investors — Third
World countries, advanced industrial coun-
tries, the United States. We all have a stake
in insuring that international flows of capital,
goods, services, and technology continue to
move competitively according to fundamen-
tally Uberal economic principles.

Particular interests may be served by
adopting more restrictive measures here,
more protective measures there. But the
greater interest of us all is best served by the
continuing struggle to preserve and expand
an open international economic system.

July 25, 1977

131

Prime Minister Fraser of Australia
Visits Washington

Prime Minister J. Malcolm Fraser of Aus-
tralia made an official visit to Washington
June 21-23 during which he met with Presi-
dent Carter and other government officials.
Following is an exchange of remarks between
President Carter and Prime Minister Fraser
at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn
of the White House on June 22.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 27

PRESIDENT CARTER

It's a great honor for me today, on behalf of
the American people, to welcome to the White
House and to our Capital City, the Prime
Minister of Australia, John Fraser. We've had
warm and valued ties with the great nation of
Australia for many years.

We share a common background in history
and our form of life. We also share with them
something of a frontier spirit, a willingness to
venture into new concepts and new ideas, new
lands; at the same time to develop a harmoni-
ous interrelationship among our diverse
people who have come from many other coun-
tries; at the same time preserve the strength
and independence of our own nation and our
own government.

As we have tried to do in our sphere of in-
fluence, Australia has also accomplished a
sense of leadership to set an example of free-
dom, hberty, a commitment to the democratic
processes; at the same time to preserve peace
and to show a genuine concern for neighbors
who are less fortunate than are we.

Australia is a leader in the British Com-
monwealth. It is also a leader in the continent
of Asia and also, of course, in the Western
Pacific.

We have strong treaty ties to Australia and
to New Zealand. And we look with great
sense of gratitude and commitment to the
maintenance of these ties, which are unshak-
able and which have been of long standing
and which, of course, will be permanent in
the future.

When our nations have been endangered
because of war, our people have stood shoul-

der to shoulder. Four times in this century
alone we have shared with the great people of
Australia a common commitment to fight
when necessary to preserve a permanent
peace.

These ties have strengthened our resolve to
communicate with one another, to consult
with one another, and to share the future with
one another.

We now are exploring new ways to pre-
serve the peace. Under the leadership of
Prime Minister Fraser, Australia has laid
down the strictest possible regulations to pro-
tect the world from the further proliferation
of atomic explosives. They are setting an
example for us and other nations to emulate.
And our own nation's commitments to non-
proliferation will certainly be strengthened
and enhanced by the fine example that has
been set by Prime Minister Fraser and his
own government in Australia.

This is a morning which brings honor to our
country, a chance to have this great leader
visit us.

As we leave this platform and go into the
detailed discussions of the future of our two
countries, it's with a sense of assurance that
because of our past friendships and sharing of
challenge and opportunity that the future will
bind us even closer to one another.

Prime Minister Fraser, you are welcome to
the United States.

PRIME MINISTER FRASER

Mr. President, I would like to thank you
very much indeed for your warmth and for
your welcome this morning. It is indeed a
great pleasure to be in Washington again.

Mr. President, you have recognized and
stated clearly the need for the democracies to
consult more closely and work in cooperation,
one with the other, and to show unity and
strength of purpose. I think we all have to
realize the need for increased communication,
increased cooperation between democracies.

Confidence in ourselves and the values we
share and the capacity and strength of free
people is essential if progress is to be made in
resolving problems faced by mankind. These
problems are of urgent and fundamental im-

132

Department of State Bulletin

portance to all of us. We are faced by the
inability of many countries to escape from
poverty, growing world concern over the
availability of energy resources, the denial of
fundamental freedoms to many people in
many countries.

The continued potential for conflict and the
possibility of nuclear proliferation and arms
races are problems to which you have just re-
ferred again. These problems demand greater
attention — for too long words have been a
substitute for effective action. We have to
act, I believe now, with a sense of urgency
and with a sense of determination.

Millions of people throughout the world
want progress in the resolution of these prob-
lems. This was reflected clearly in the Com-
monwealth Heads of Government Conference
which I've just attended in London.

Mr. President, as a near neighbor to many
developing countries, as a significant source
of many important commodities, as a country
with an unswerving faith in democracy, Aus-
tralia is determined to play her part in making
progress toward these ends.

Mr. President, you have shown that you are
determined to use the strength and influence
of the United States to bring about a more se-
cure and equitable world, a world in which
poorer nations' economic development has ac-
celerated, in which deprivation is confronted
and the pernicious doctrine of one race's
superiority over another is banished for all
time.

There are many obstacles on the way to
achieving these objectives. It is always the
case that the more important the goal, the
greater the barrier to achieving it. But the
barriers to achieving a better world might
well be insuperable if the greatest democratic
power were not playing an active and en-
lightened international role in leading toward
a better result.

Mr. President, therefore, I believe your
Presidency has excited men's imagination be-
cause it has appealed to the idealism of free
people, because it has focused attention and
concern on issues which have not previously
attracted the urgent attention that they re-
quire, and because of the stressful need for
consultation and cooperation amongst the

world's democracies. Free men, therefore,
can have renewed faith in realizing the aspira-
tions that we share.

Mr. President, on behalf of my wife and
myself, the Australian party, may I thank you
again for the warmth of your welcome.

U.N. Force in Cyprus Extended
for Six Months

Following is a statement made in the U.N.
Security Council by U.S. Deputy Permanent
Representative to the United Nations James
F. Leonard on June 16, together with the text
of a resolutio7i adopted by the Council 07i
June 15.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR LEONARD

USUN press release 50 dated June 16

This Council's renewal last night of the
mandate of UNFICYP [U.N. Peacekeeping
Force in Cyprus] is an expression of our con-
cern, of our responsibility, and of our confi-
dence that the still unsettled situation in Cyp-
rus can and will be resolved.

We are encouraged that there was a re-
sumption this spring of the intercommunal
negotiations. The Secretary General has
stated in his most recent report that UN-
FICYP fulfills a vital and indispensable mis-
sion in maintaining quiet on the island and
thereby facilitates the search for a peaceful
settlement; my government shares that view.
We do not underestimate the difficulties in
overcoming the deep differences between the
parties on the basic elements of a settlement.
We beheve that the parties must continue to
explore their requirements for a settlement in
a serious and sustained manner. Through this
process steps can be taken toward the perma-
nent settlement for Cyprus which we all seek.

The events of the last six months under-
score the importance of UNFICYP continuing
its essential mission. We are, therefore, con-
cerned by the Secretary General's report of
the growing financial difficulty for the United
Nations in maintaining UNFICYP. It is dis-

July 25, 1977

133

turbing that the UNFICYP deficit has grown
to over $54 million. This means that the
United Nations has been unable to pay the
reimbursement claims of troop-contributing
countries beyond the second half of 1973. We
have consistently expressed our belief that
the financial burden of UNFICYP must be
shared by all member states who profess con-
cern for the realization of an enduring peace
on Cyprus. The permanent members of the
Security Council have a special obligation to
provide financial support to peacekeeping in
Cyprus. We hope the governments to whom
the Secretary General has made a special ap-
peal for their assistance will respond
generously.

My government also wishes to commend the
officers and troop contingents of UNFICYP
for their continuing excellence in carrying out
their important mission. We also wish to ex-
press our deepest appreciation for the efforts
of the Secretary General and his associates.
They deserve especially our praise for their
continuing efforts to help the Cyprus parties
negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement.
Finally, may I express the hope of the U.S.
Government and of the American people that
the months ahead will see steady progress
toward a negotiated settlement on Cyprus.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION i

The Security Council,

Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 7
•June 1977 (S/12342) that in existing circumstances the
presence of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in
Cyprus is essential not only to help maintain quiet in
the island but also to facilitate the continued search for
a peaceful settlement,

Noting from the report the conditions prevailing in
the island.

Noting also from the report that the freedom of
movement of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force
in Cyprus and its civil police is still restricted in the
north of the island, and expressing the hope that ways
will be found to surmount the remaining obstacles,

Noting further that the Secretary-General expressed
the view that the best hope of achieving a just and last-
ing settlement of the Cyprus problem lies in negotia-
tions between the representatives of the two com-

• U.N. doc. S/RES/410(1977); adopted by the Council
on June 15 by a vote of 14-0, with China not participat-
ing in the vote.

munities and that the usefulness of those negotiations
depends upon the willingness of all parties concerned to
show the necessary flexibility, taking into account not
only their own interests but also the legitimate aspira-
tions and requirements of the opposing side,

Noting that due to the efforts of the Secretary-
General, his staff, and of UNFICYP, and with the co-
operation of the parties, there has been a relative im-
provement in the security situation, but that this evolu-
tion has yet to relieve the underlying tensions in the
island.

Noting also the report of the Secretary-General of 30
April 1977 (S/12323) concerning the high-level meeting
under the auspices of the Secretary-General, and em-
phasizing the need to adhere to the agreement reached
at this meeting as well as to the agreements reached at
the previous rounds of the talks.

Noting also the concurrence of the parties concerned
in the recommendation by the Secretary-General that
the Security Council extend the stationing of the
United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a
further period of six months.

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed
that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it
is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15
June 1977,

1. Reaffirms the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of
4 March 1964, as well as subsequent resolutions and de-
cisions on the establishment and maintenance of the
United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus and
other aspects of the situation in Cyprus;

2. Reaffirms once again its resolution 365 (1974) of 13
December 1974, by which it endorsed General Assembly
resolution 3212 (XXIX) adopted unanimously on 1
November 1974, and calls once again for their urgent
and effective implementation and that of its resolution
367 (1975) of 12 March 1975;

3. Urges the parties concerned to act with the utmost
restraint to refrain from any unilateral or other action
likely to affect adversely the prospects of negotiations
for a just and peaceful solution and to continue and ac-
celerate determined co-operative efforts to achieve the
objectives of the Security Council;

4. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of the
United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established under
Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further
period ending 15 December 1977, in the expectation
that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution
will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduc-
tion of the Force;

5. Appeals again to all parties concerned to extend
their fullest co-operation so as to enable the United Na-
tions Peace-keeping Force to perform its duties effec-
tively;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the mis-
sion of good offices entrusted to him by paragraph 6 of
resolution 367 (1975). to keep the Security Council in-
formed of the progress made and to submit a report on
the implementation of this resolution by 30 November
1977.

134

Department of State Bulletin

THE CONGRESS

Department Discusses Proposal
To Extend the Authority of OPIC

Statement by Julius L. Katz

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs '

I appreciate this opportunity to testify on
the Administration's proposal to extend the
authority of the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC). The Department of State
fully supports the draft legislation you have
before you and believes that the changes it
proposes in OPIC's poHcies and programs will
strengthen the agency's effectiveness in sup-
port of U.S. economic development programs
abroad.

OPIC was created in 1971 with the objec-
tive of mobilizing and facilitating the partici-
pation of U.S. private capital and skills to
promote the social and economic development
of less developed, friendly countries. Develop-
ing countries vary in their economic and social
goals, and their receptivity to foreign in-
vestment cannot be taken as a given. How-
ever, for those countries with a strong com-
mitment to economic development, we believe
foreign investment can provide not only capi-
tal, but also employment opportunities, tech-
nology, and management skills vital to the
development process. These inputs are an im-
portant supplement to the flows of official
foreign assistance that cannot alone provide
the external resources developing countries
require.

We see OPIC as playing an important role
in our total development effort abroad. Flows
of private capital are a crucial element of the

' Made before the Subcommittee on International
Economic Policy and Trade of the House Committee on
International Relations on June 23, 1977. The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published by the
committee and will be available from the Superinten-
dent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.

external development resources required by
the developing world; according to some esti-
mates, they provide as much as two-thirds of
total capital flows to these countries. How-
ever, as noted by a recent World Bank report,
the volume of investment flows to the LDC's
[less developed countries] has been slackening
in recent years, especially in the critical min-
erals sector. Through its programs to insure
against political risk, facilitate project financ-
ing, and acquaint investors with opportunities
in the LDC's, OPIC seeks to insure that pri-
vate capital continues to contribute to the de-
velopment process.

The developed countries are able to attract
adequate investment flows as a result of their
efficient administrative systems, pools of
skilled manpower, well-developed capital
markets, and other advantages. In contrast,
the LDC's hold out none of these attractions
for the foreign investor and, moreover, are
often characterized by frequent political
changes that deter long-term investment.
Lack of incentives for foreign investment is
especially critical in the 40 least advanced of
the LDC's whose attractions for the foreign
investor may consist of only unskilled labor
and other natural resources.

We believe OPIC political risk insurance
and other programs contribute significantly to
correcting this inbalance in incentives be-
tween the developing and developed worlds.
There is substantial evidence that the avail-
ability of political risk insurance is a meaning-
ful, if not a vital, factor in many investment
decisions and that such insurance may result
in investments undertaken that would not
have otherwise occurred. Apart from this
question, however, other benefits are realized
from the availability of investment insurance,
since it permits investors to lower contingen-
cies for loss and payback requirements.

OPIC's record has been good with respect
to the number of projects assisted in the least
advanced of the LDC's; the proportion of
projects in countries with per capita income
under $450 (in 1973 dollars) rose from 41 per-
cent in 1974 to 60 percent in 1976.

Thus, there appear to be solid grounds for
some further focusing of OPIC's efforts on the

July 25, 1977

135

poorer of the developing countries. This was
the recommendation of the Administration's
recent interagency study of OPIC's programs,
endorsed by the Cabinet-level Economic Pol-
icy Group.

I would also like to note that an additional
proposal endorsed by the Economic Policy
Group was that OPIC should continue its pro-
gram to develop innovative forms of invest-
ment encouragement in the areas of energy
and raw materials. Given the problems we
may face in the not too distant future with re-
spect to supplies of both fuel and nonfuel min-
erals, we need to support efforts to promote
the availability and access to these materials.
The State Department is prepared to cooper-
ate with OPIC in every possible way to fur-
ther this objective.

To conclude my prepared statement, I
would like to say again that the State De-
partment views OPIC as an important ele-
ment of our foreign economic assistance pro-
grams and that if the Congress enacts the
legislation the Administration has proposed,
OPIC will be greatly aided in carrying out its
unique and useful role.

Balance-of-Payments Assistance
for Portugal

Following is a statement by Paul H.
Boeker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Eco-
nomic and Business Affairs, suhynitted to the
Subcommittee oyi Foreign Operations of the
House Committee on Appropriations on
June 9.^

I am pleased to be here this morning to ex-
plain why the Administration is so strongly
committed to special balance-of-payments as-
sistance for Portugal. We believe that in Por-
tugal the United States has an opportunity to
encourage abroad values and principles that
are fundamental to American policy and, in-
deed, our way of life.

Portugal is making a new democratic begin-
ning. After almost 50 years of dictatorship
and political and economic isolation from

Europe, Portugal has emerged as a new
democratic nation with dynamic leaders cho-
sen in free elections and a new constitution.
President Eanes was elected with 61 percent
of the popular vote last June and Prime Minis-
ter Scares' government was formed as a re-
sult of parliamentary elections in August. The
government is committed to defending the
constitution and protecting the human and
political rights of its citizens.

Portugal is eager to cooperate with and be
considered a full member of the Western
democratic community. The Portuguese are
orienting their scaled-down military toward
effective participation in NATO. They have
recently applied for membership in the Euro-
pean Economic Community. Portugal has
worked with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) to develop a program for economic
recovery.

The key to success in consolidating Portu-
gal's young democracy now consists of con-
fronting the task of rebuilding and stabilizing
an economy severely disrupted by two years
of political and economic turmoil. This is not a
task which the Portuguese can safely meet
alone, given its unique severity. The two-year
period following the 1974 revolution left a
legacy of severe economic problems.

— During this period there was almost no
effective economic leadership.

— Widespread nationalizations and worker
takeovers of businesses and farms disrupted
the private sector.

—Portugal had to absorb and provide
necessities for over 500,000 refugees from the
colonies and most of the 100,000 men Portugal
cut from its armed forces.

— Marked income redistribution led to a
surge in consumption and precipitous decline
in investment.

— Decolonization meant loss of about one-
fifth of Portugal's export markets.

These shocks came at a time when oil-price
increases and global recession already limited

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

136

Department of State Bulletin

opportunities for economic adjustment. As a
result, unemployment is now about 15 percent,
inflation is about 30 percent per year, and the
balance-of-payments deficit was over $900
million in 1976 and about $1.1 billion in 1975.
Solving these problems will require several
years of basic structural adjustments. The
Portuguese people are prepared for real eco-
nomic sacrifices. The populace overwhelm-
ingly supports democratic parties working for
political and economic stability. Portugal is al-
ready implementing elements of a comprehen-
sive recovery program. These include:

— Important measures to restore labor dis-
cipline and productivity while limiting pay in-
creases to 15 percent;

— A wide-ranging package to improve the
balance of payments, including a 15-percent
devaluation of the escudo in February, quotas
on consumer imports, an import deposit re-
quirement, higher tariffs, and incentives for
exports;

— Incentives and guarantees to stimulate
the private sector;

— Increased capital spending and reduced
subsidies plus other steps designed to shift
resources from consumption to investment.

The Portuguese have demonstrated their
commitment to make effective use of their in-
ternational reserves. Their liquid foreign ex-
change reserves, which were $1.6 billion at
the end of 1973, are currently about $200 mil-
lion. Over 40 percent of Portugal's still sub-
stantial gold reserves have already been
pledged as collateral against foreign loans.
Additional mobilization of these assets can
take place only gradually without disrupting
sensitive markets.

Despite these efforts Portugal will have
unmanageable balance-of-payments deficits in
1977 and 1978. To impose immediately the de-
gree of austerity needed to eliminate these
payments deficits would entail severe depres-
sion of economic activity and grave risk for
the process of consolidating Portugal's new
democracy. Prolonged economic adversity
would open fresh avenues for Communist and
extreme right elements which oppose the
government program. Given that Portugal's

balance-of-payments deficits will persist for
several years, Portugal needs assurances that
the sacrifices of its people necessary to carry
through on reforms to contain these deficits
will be complemented by a plan to cover the
remaining deficits and thus provide some
room for economic growth. For the first part
of the coming 2-3 year period, implementation
of this approach will require substantial
foreign assistance.

Recognizing this need for an economic un-
derpinning to Portugal's further progress, the
United States has taken the lead in mobilizing
financial support for Portugal's young democ-
racy. Last year the Portuguese requested
U.S. help to mobilize the large international
financial resources they will need through
1978. We began to consult with other con-
cerned countries to generate support for a
major assistance effort. Vice President Mon-
dale discussed the proposed assistance in
detail with the Portuguese and with allied
leaders during his trips to Europe. President
Carter made personal appeals to other heads
of state and raised this issue during talks at
the Downing Street summit. The leading
edge of this international effort has been the
proposed $300 million loan we are requesting
from Congress as the U.S. participation in a
larger international effort. The Portuguese
have relied on our initiative, and other coun-
tries are looking to the United States to pro-
vide leadership for the assistance effort.

We estimate that Portugal's uncovered
balance-of-payments deficit over the next 18
months will be over $1 billion. The U.S.-
proposed international lending effort would
provide most of the financial support needed
to meet this deficit. This effort would also be
structured so as to bring Portuguese economic
progress and collaboration with the IMF to
the point where the Portuguese balance of
payments could be financed by conventional
sources. After 1978 we anticipate that normal
bilateral and multilateral financial sources, in-
cluding the IMF, would be adequate to cover
Portugal's progressively reduced financing
needs.

In mid-May the United States convened a
meeting of 16 countries interested in assisting

July 25, 1977

137

Portugal. Virtually all participants at that
meeting expressed strong political support for
Portuguese democracy and the importance of
balance-of-payments assistance to the success
of democratic efforts.

The participants generally agreed that Por-
tugal's cumulative balance-of-payments
financing need over the next 18 months would
somewhat exceed $1 billion and that the major
portion of this amount would have to come
from special balance-of-payments loans. The
U.S. proposal of a coordinated set of bilateral
loans was broadly endorsed as the best
framework for proceeding. Participants also
specified that individual loans within this
framework should have certain common
characteristics. Such loans would be:

— Medium term — that is, 5-10 years;

— Repayable at nonconcessional rates of
interest;

— Untied to specific projects or exports;
and

— Without requirements for collateral, rec-
ognizing that Portugal will need to be able to
use its own reserves during the coming
period.

It was also agreed that disbursements of
these loans would be conditioned on continued
Portuguese adherence to an economic pro-
gram on a schedule worked out in cooperation
with the IMF.

During this session the United States
stated it was seeking from Congress authority
for a U.S. balance-of-payments loan of $300
million. We made it clear, however, that we
could participate only if the total effort were
substantial and broadly shared. The Federal
Republic of Germany indicated that under
those circumstances it too would be willing to
make a very substantial loan. Norway also in-
dicated its readiness to participate. Most
other countries represented indicated that
they believed the proposed arrangement
should be supported and that they would rec-
ommend favorable action by their govern-
ments. We have called for a second meeting of
potential participating countries in late June
to hopefully complete arrangements for coor-
dinated balance-of-payments loan effort.

Based on preliminary indicators we believe

that if the Congress approves the U.S. loan of
$300 million, a total lending arrangement of
$700-$900 million can be mobilized. Because of
the bilateral nature of this lending effort
there will be no formal or rigid burden-shar-
ing arrangement. We anticipate, however,
that the U.S. share will fall between 30 and 40
percent of the total effort.

The success of the international assistance
effort depends fundamentally on the United
States. The Portuguese and other nations are
looking to continued U.S. leadership to make
this important effort succeed. We urge the
Congress to support this loan and the signifi-
cant objectives it embodies.

President Carter's Third Report
on Cyprus Submitted to Congress

Message to the Congress ^

To the Congress of the United States:

As required by Public Law 94-104, this re-
port describes what has occurred during the
last sixty days toward settlement of the Cyp-
rus problem and the efforts the Administra-
tion has made toward that goal.

In my last report, I promised to work
closely with the Congress on this problem,
and to devote whatever effort inight be re-
quired to bring about a truly just and lasting
peace in Cyprus. I emphasized as well the im-
portance of continuing to strengthen the ties
of friendship and cooperation between the
United States and Greece and Turkey, our
two major allies in the eastern Mediterra-
nean.

Since my last report on April 15, there have
been only a few significant developments with
regard to Cyprus. This pause is to some ex-
tent a reflection of understandable preoccupa-
tion of the parties with the Turkish national
elections of June 5. Even so, talks between
the two Cyprus communities took place in

' Transmitted on June 22 (text from Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated June 27, 1977);
also printed as H. Doc. 95-173.

138

Department of State Bulletin

Nicosia in late May and early June. These dis-
cussions allowed some clarification of the posi-
tions presented during the earlier meetings in
Vienna which had taken place under the
chairmanship of the United Nations Secretary
General. The United Nations Security Council
authorized a further si.x-month extension of
the mandate of the United Nations
Peacekeeping Force on Cyprus (UNFICYP)
on June 15, and we expect that the negotiat-
ing process will resume at an early date be-
tween the two Cypriot communities.

I would add that while I was in London in
conjunction with the NATO Summit meeting
in May, I met separately with the Greek and
Turkish Prime Ministers. Secretary Vance,
National Security Advisor Brzezinski and the
Special Representative for eastern Mediter-
ranean matters, Clark Clifford, were also
present. I used the opportunity for a brief
discussion of the Cyprus problem as well as a
review of other elements of our relationship
with these two valued NATO allies. Mr. Clif-
ford also had separate discussions with both
Prime Minister Caramanlis and Prime Minis-
ter Demirel. I believe both governments now
appreciate the depth of our interest and de-
termination to assist in achieving a lasting
Cyprus settlement.

We intend to work actively during the
summer months and into the fall toward this
end. I would hope it will soon be possible in
these periodic reports to Congress to record
real progress toward the just and lasting
Cyprus settlement which the United States
seeks.

Jimmy Carter.

The White House, June 22, 1977.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

Import Relief for the U.S. Color Television Industry.
Communication from the President of the United
States transmitting a report on the action he is taking
with respect to color television receivers covered by
the determination of the U.S. International Trade
Commission. H. Doe. 9.5-163. May 23, 1977. 4 pp.

Governing International Fishery Agreement With Ja-

pan. Message from the President of the United States
transmitting the agreement. H. Doc. 95-168. June 2,
1977. 12 pp.

Departments "of State, Justice, and Commerce, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill,
Fiscal Year 1978. Report of the House Committee on
Appropriations to accompanv H.R. 7.5.56. H. Rept.
9.5-382. June 2, 1977. 64 pp.

Further extension of United States-Romanian Trade
Agreement. Message from the President of the
United States. H. Doc. 9.5-169. June 3, 1977. 2 pp.

Foreign Assistance and Related Pi'ograms Appropria-
tion Bill, 1978. Report of the House Committee on
Appropriations, together with dissenting, additional,
and minority views, to acompany H.R. 7797. H. Rept.
95-417. June 15, 1977. 96 pp.

Belgrade Preparatory Conference for Review of the
Helsinki Agreement. Repoi-t of the Senate Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations to accompanv S. Con. Res.
30. S. Rept. 95-275. June 16, 1977. 4 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the
principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty.
Adopted at Oslo June 30, 1975.'
Notification of approval: New Zealand, June 30,
1977.

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of
aircraft. Done at the Hague December 16, 1970. En-
tered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192.
Accession deposited: Zaire, July 6, 1977.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against
the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal Sep-
tember 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973.
TIAS 7570.
Accession deposited: Zaire, July 6, 1977.

Amendments of annexes of the 1956 agreements on
joint financing of certain air navigation services in
Greenland and the Faeroe Islands and in Iceland
(TIAS 4048, 4049). Adopted by the ICAO [Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization] Council at Mon-
treal June 8, 1977. Entered into force June 8, 1977.

Economic Cooperation

Agreement establishing a financial support fund of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-

Not in force.

July 25, 1977

139

velopment. Done at Paris April 9, 1975.'
Ratifications deposited: Italy, July 1, 1977; Nether-
lands, June 27, 1977.

Inter-American Development Bank

Agreement establishing the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, with annexes. Done at Washington April
8, 1959. Entered into force December 30, 1959. TIAS
4397.

Signature and acceptance deposited: Italy, May 26,
1977.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959,
as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332), relating to
maritime mobile service, with annexes and final pro-
tocol. Done at Geneva November 3, 1967. Entered
into force April 1, 1969. TIAS 6.590.
Notification of approval: Norway, April 5, 1977.

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959,
as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590), on space
telecommunications, with annexes. Done at Geneva
July 17, 1971. Entered into force January 1, 1973.
TIAS 7435.
Notification of approiml: Norway, April 5, 1977.

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final pro-
tocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into
force September 1, 1974; for the United States April
21, 1976. TIAS 8586.
Notification of approval: Mexico, April 19, 1977.

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and
final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. En-
tered into force September 1, 1974; for the United
States April 21, 1976. TIAS 8586.
Notification of approval: Mexico, April 19, 1977.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat
trade convention (part of the international wheat
agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17,
1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect
to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect
to other provisions.

Accession deposited: France, June 30, 1977.
Ratification deposited: Portugal, June 30, 1977.

Pi-otocol modifying and further extending the food aid
convention (part of the international wheat agree-
ment) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 1976. En-

Not in force.

tered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain

provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other

provisions.

Accession deposited: France, June 30, 1977.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Agreement renewing and amending the memorandum of
understanding of October 17, 1972 (TIAS 7479), on
the regulation of passenger charter air services. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Brussels June 23 and
27, 1977. Entered into force June 27, 1977; effective
July 1, 1977.

China

Agreement relating to the export of nonrubber foot-
wear from the Republic of China, with annexes,
agreed minutes, and related notes. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Washington June 14, 1977. En-
tered into force June 14, 1977; effective June 28,
1977.

Japan

Agreement relating to export of color television receiv-
ers from Japan, with annexes, agreed minutes, and
related notes. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington May 20, 1977. Entered into force May 20, 1977;
effective July 1, 1977.

Korea

Agreement relating to export of nonrubber footwear
from the Republic of Korea, with annexes, agreed
minutes, and related notes. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington June 21, 1977. Entered into
force June 21, 1977; effective June 28, 1977.

Norway

Extradition treaty. Signed at Oslo June 9, 1977. Enters
into force on the date of exchange of instruments of
ratification.

United Kingdom

Agreement relating to the establishment, operation,
and maintenance of a tracking and telemetry facility
on the island of Mahe, with agreed minute. Effected
by exchange of notes at London December 30, 1966.
Entered into force December 30, 1966. TIAS 6197.
Terminated: June 29, 1976.

140

Department of State Bulletin

IDEX July 25, 1977 Vol. LXXVII, No. 1987

Algeria. Letters of Credence (Maoui) 120

Australia. Prime Minister Eraser of Australia Vis-
its Wasiiington (Carter, Eraser) 132

China. Secretary Interviewed at Foreign Policy Con-
ference for Editors and Broadcasters 121

Colombia. Letters of Credence (Barco) 120

gngress

lalance-of-Payments Assistance for Portugal

l(Boeker) 136

longressional Documents Relating to Foreign

, Policy 139

(department Discusses Proposal to Extend Author-

" ity of OPIC (Katz) 135

I President Carter's Third Report on Cyprus Sub-

; mitted to Congress (message) 138

luba. Secretary Interviewed at Foreign Policy Con-

S ference for Editors and Broadcasters 121

fyprus

president Carter's Third Report on Cyprus Sub-
mitted to Congress (message) 138

I U.N. Force in Cyprus Extended for Six Months

(Leonard, text of resolution) 133

eveloping Countries. Secretary Vance Attends
Ministerial Conference of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (Vance,
Blumenthal, texts of communique and declara-
tion) 105

Sconomic Affairs

Jalance-of-Payments Assistance for Portugal

(Boeker) 136

department Discusses Proposal to Extend Author-

' ity of OPIC (Katz) 135

"he Role of Investment in Expanding an Open In-
ternational Economic System (Cooper) 127

Secretary Vance Attends Ministerial Conference of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (Vance, Blumenthal, texts of com-
munique and declaration) 105

Human Rights

The Role of Investment in Expanding an Open In-
ternational Economic System (Cooper) 127

ecretary Interviewed at Foreign Policy Conference
for Editors and Broadcasters 121

Industrial Democracies. Secretary Vance Attends
Ministerial Conference of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (Vance,
Blumenthal, texts of communique and declara-
tion) 105

International Organizations and Conferences.

Secretary Vance Attends Ministerial Conference
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (Vance, Blumenthal, texts of
communique and declaration) 105

Korea. Secretary Interviewed at Foreign Policy Con-
ference for Editors and Broadcasters 121

Latin America and the Caribbean

The Role of Investment in Expanding an Open In-
ternational Economic System (Cooper) 127

Secretary Interviewed at Foreign Policy Conference
for Editors and Broadcasters 121

Middle East. Secretary Interviewed at Foreign Pol-
icy Conference for Editors and Broadcasters 121

Morocco. Letters of Credence (Bengelloun) 120

Portugal. Balance-of-Payments Assistance for
Portugal (Boeker) 136

Presidential Documents

President Carter's Third Report on Cyprus Sub-
mitted to Congress (message) 138

Prime Minister Eraser of Australia Visits Washing-
ton 132

South Africa. Secretary Interviewed at Foreign Pol-
icy Conference for Editors and Broadcasters 121

Treaty Information. Current Actions 139

United Nations. U.N. Force in Cyprus Extended
for Six Months (Leonard, text of resolution) .... 133

Vietnam. Secretary Interviewed at Foreign PoUcy
Conference for Editors and Broadcasters 121

Name Index

Barco, Virgilio 120

Bengelloun, Ali 120

Blumenthal, W. Michael 105

Boeker, Paul H 136

Carter, President 132, 138

Cooper, Richard N 127

Fraser, J. Malcolm 132

Katz, Julius L 135

Leonard, James F 133

Maoui, Abdelaziz 120

Vance, Secretary 105, 121

Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: July 4-10

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

t318 7/6 "Foreign Relations," 1949, vol. VI,
"The Near East, South Asia, and
Africa" released.

*319 7/6 Richard M. Moose sworn in as Assist-
ant Secretary for African Affairs
(biographic data).

*320 7/6 Patrick J. Lucey sworn in as Ambas-
sador to Mexico (biographic data).

*321 7/7 Program of the visit of Chancellor
Schmidt of the Federal Republic of
Germany, July 13-15.

*322 7/7 U.S., India amend textile agreement,
June 13 and 17.

*323 7/8 U.S., Mexico amend textile agree-
ment. May 24.

1324 7/8 U.S., U.S.S.R. renew Agreement on
Cooperation in Science and Tech-
nology.

*325 7/8 Herman J. Cohen sworn in as Ambas-
sador to Senegal and The Gambia
(biographic data).

*326 7/8 Study Group 8 of the U.S. National
Committee for the International
Radio Consultative Committee
(CCIR), Aug. 4.

*327 7/8 Study Group 1 of the U.S. National
Committee for the CCIR, Aug.
9-10.

*Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington. d.c. 20402

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXVII • No. 1988 • August 1, 1977

AMERICA'S ROLE IN CONSOLIDATING A PEACEFUL BALANCE
AND PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH IN ASIA

Address by Secretary Vance 1^.1

PRESIDENT CARTER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JUNE 30
Excerpts From Transcript H6

CONTROLLING ARMS TRANSFERS: AN INSTRUMENT
OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Address by Under Secretary Benson 155

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

uoston Public Ubmry

t or index see inside back cover, ■ ^ , , .^

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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.

Vol. LXXVII, No. 1988
August 1, 1977

The Department or State BLLLETIS,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of L'.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIS includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as spe-
cial articles on various phases of in-
ternational affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna-
tional interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United \ations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

America's Role in Consolidating a Peaceful Balance
and Promoting Economic Growth in Asia

Address by Secretary Vance ^

It is a great honor to be with you tonight.
For 20 years the Asia Society has been build-
ing bridges of understanding between Asians
and Americans. Much of the credit belongs to
the Society's founder, John D. Rockefeller
III. His interest in the cultures of Asia is en-
during; his concern for Asian-American rela-
tions is profound; the contributions of the So-
ciety which he created are legion.

This evening I want to talk to you about
America's role in Asia — an Asia that is at last
at peace, but an Asia not without its
uncertainties.

I should like to advance the basic proposi-
tion that our prospects for sustaining and de-
veloping effective relationships with the coun-
tries of East Asia are more promising than at
any time since World War II. The fundamen-
tal challenges facing the Administration are to
consolidate the positive developments of the
past few years — the emergence of an even
closer partnership with Japan, a promising
"opening" with China, the growing prospei-ity
of the Pacific Basin economy, the emerging
cohesion of the ASEAN [Association of
Southeast Asian Nations] grouping — and to
prevent or mitigate adverse trends which
could strain the presently favorable regional
environment. High stakes hang on our ability
to meet this challenge, for our interests in
Asia are enduring, and they are substantial.

I hope to leave you with these understand-
ings:

— First, the United States is and will re-
main an Asian and Pacific power.
— Second, the United States will continue

August 1, 1977

its key role in contributing to peace and stabil-
ity in Asia and the Pacific.

— Third, the United States seeks normal
and friendly relations with the countries in
the area on the basis of reciprocity and mutual
respect.

— Fourth, the United States will pursue
mutual expansion of trade and investment
across the Pacific, recognizing the growing
interdependence of the economies of the
United States and the region.

— Fifth, we will use our influence to im-
prove the human condition of the peoples of
Asia.

In all of this, there can be no doubt of the
enduring vitality of our country's relation-
ships with the peoples of Asia and the Paciilc.

To the people of Asia I say tonight without
qualification that our nation has recovered its
self-confidence at home. And we have not
abandoned our interest in Asia.

We are and will remain a Pacific nation, by
virtue of our geography, our history, our
commerce, and our interests. Roughly one-
quarter of all our trade is now with East Asia
and the Pacific; last year we sold $22 billion
worth of our products in the region. For the
last five years more of our trade has been with
that region than with any other, including the
European Community.

To be able to speak of peace and stability in
Asia is a welcome change. But serious prob-
lems persist. Our tasks are to help consolidate^

' Made before the Asia Society at New York, N.Y.,
on June 29, 1977 (te.xt from press release 313).

141

the emerging peaceful balance in Asia and to
promote economic growth that offers promise
to its peoples.

The United States will pursue its relations
with the nations of Asia with an open mind.
We will continue to work closely with allies
and friends. And we hope to normalize rela-
tions on a mutually constructive basis with
those who have been adversaries.

The United States recognizes the impor-
tance of its continuing contribution to Asian
security. We will maintain a strong military
presence in the area.

Japan

Of our allies and old friends, none is more
important than Japan. Our mutual security
treaty is a cornerstone of peace in East Asia.
Japan's democratic institutions are firmly
rooted. No people anywhere enjoy greater
political freedom. Its dedication to peace is
unquestioned. Twenty-five years ago, even
though Japan had recovered from the devasta-
tion of war, its economic advance was just be-
ginning. Today Japan's per capita gross na-
tional product is almost $5,000. In 1953 it was
only about $700 in current value, less than
that in many developing countries today.

Japan's growth has been an indispensable
ingredient in the economic advance of the less
developed countries in the region. Its aid has
been important in contributing to the well-
being of these countries; we welcome its com-
mitment to double its assistance within the
next five years.

Japan's great achievements have brought
with them corresponding responsibilities. Its
actions, like ours, are bound to have an impact
far beyond its own borders. An enlarged
Japanese market for the manufactured prod-
ucts of other countries would make an impor-
tant contribution to a healthier world eco-
nomic equilibrium, as would high rates of ex-
pansion in order to stimulate the economies of
other countries.

The United States and Japan must proceed
in close consultation. Above all, we must set-
tle any issue between us in a spirit of true
friendship and understanding.

People's Republic of China

Turning to China, after 25 years of confron-
tation, we are carrying on a constructive
dialogue with the People's Republic of China.

Vast differences in culture, social systems,
ideology, and foreign policy still separate our
two countries. But the Chinese and American
people no longer face each other with the hos-
tility, misunderstanding, and virtually com-
plete separation that existed for two decades.

We consider friendly relations with China to
be a central part of our foreign policy. China's
role in maintaining world peace is vital. A
constructive relationship with China is impor-
tant, not only regionally, but also for global
equilibrium. Such a relationship will threaten
no one. It will serve only peace.

The involvement of a fourth of mankind in
the search for the solution of global issues is
important.

In structuring our relationship with the
Chinese, we will not enter into any agree-
ments with others that are directed against
the People's Republic of China. We recognize
and respect China's strong commitments to
independence, unity, and self-reliance.

Our policy toward China will continue to be
guided by the principles of the Shanghai com-
munique, and on that basis we shall seek to
move toward full normalization of relations.
We acknowledge the view expressed in the
Shanghai communique that there is but one
China. We also place importance on the peace-
ful settlement of the Taiwan question by the
Chinese themselves.

In seven weeks, I shall be in Peking to talk
with the leaders of China. A broad range of
world issues demands our attention. And we
want to explore ways to normalize further our
bilateral relationship with the People's Repub-
lic of China. Mutual and reciprocal efforts in
this regard are essential.

As we prepare to go to Peking, we recog-
nize that progress may not be easy or im-
mediately evident. But this Administration is
committed to the process, and we are ap-
proaching the talks in Peking with that in
mind.

Across Asia we have close and historic ties

142

Department of State Bulletin

with many other nations, and we intend to
seek new ways to strengthen them.

Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea has made good use of
the opportunities provided by peace on the
peninsula to become increasingly self-reliant
and self-sufficient. The standard of living of
its people has improved significantly over the
past decade; its trade has grown enormously;
its agriculture has been revolutionized.

Our security commitment to the Republic of
Korea and our determination to maintain it
are essential to the preservation of peace in
Northeast Asia.

South Korea's growth and strength are the
basis for President Carter's decision to pro-
ceed with a carefully phased withdrawal of
American ground troops. This will be done in
a way that will not endanger the security of
South Korea. We will also seek, with the con-
currence of the Congress, to strengthen South
Korea's defense capabilities. Furthermore:

— Our ground troops constitute only about 5
percent of the total ground troops committed
to the defense of South Korea.

— The gradual withdrawal of these troops
over four to five years will be offset by the
growing strength and self-confidence of the
South Korean armed forces.

— Our air, naval, and other supporting ele-
ments will remain.

— We are working closely with the Koreans
to help them increase their own defense
capabilities.

The United States and the Republic of
Korea share a strong desire to establish a
durable framework for maintaining peace and
stability on the peninsula.

— We support the entry of North and South
Korea into the United Nations without preju-
dice to ultimate reunification.

— We are prepared to move toward im-
proved relations with North Korea provided
North Korea's allies take steps to improve re-
lations with South Korea.

— We have proposed negotiations to replace

the existing armistice with more permanent
arrangements.

— We have offered to meet for this purpose
with South and North Korea and the People's
Republic of China, as the parties most im-
mediately concerned, and to explore with
them the possibilities for a larger conference
with Korea's other neighbors, including the
Soviet Union. We will enter any negotiations
over the future of the peninsula only with the
participation of the Republic of Korea.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Ten years ago, even while war raged in In-
dochina, five Southeast Asian countries
created a new instrument for peace — the As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations, or
ASEAN. Our ties with one of its members,
the Philippines, are rooted in our shared his-
tory. The strength of these ties is reinforced
by our mutual defense treaty. Each of
ASEAN's other four members — Thailand, In-
donesia, Malaysia, and Singapore — is an old
and valued friend.

Our economic ties with the ASEAN coun-
tries have become increasingly important.
From the ASEAN area we obtain one-tenth of
our crude oil imports and a much higher per-
centage of our rubber, tin, cocoa, bauxite, and
other important raw materials. These five
countries, with a population larger than all of
South America, bought $3.7 billion worth of
American goods in 1976.

We will maintain close bilateral relations
with each ASEAN country. And we welcome
the opportunity to deal with them through
their organization when this is their wish. We
are especially pleased that the first formal
U.S. -ASEAN consultation will be held within
a very few months, in Manila. These talks
will, we hope, form the basis for stronger
American support of Southeast Asian regional
efforts.

Australia and New Zealand

Close relations between the United States,
Australia, and New Zealand long antedate our
formal alliance in ANZUS [security treaty

August 1, 1977

143

among Australia, New Zealand, and the
United States]. Only last week, the President
welcomed Australian Prime Minister Malcolm
Fraser to Washington. In their wide-ranging
talks, particular attention was paid to the
Asian region. The contribution Australia and
New Zealand make to the region is vital, and
we will consult closely with them on all mat-
ters of common interest.

Socialist Republic of Vietnam

While we work with traditional friends, we
have begun the process of normalizing rela-
tions with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
Our old friends in Southeast Asia and the
Pacific have been kept fully informed of our
talks with the Vietnamese. They agree that
the interests of all would be served by the es-
tablishment of normal relations between Viet-
nam and the United States.

The scars of war still exist on both sides.
Both sides retain a residue of bitterness that
must be overcome. But there is some
progress.

— Together with the Vietnamese, we have
devised a system for identifying and returning
the remains of Americans missing in action in
Vietnam. Soon the remains of 20 more Ameri-
can pilots will be returned from the land
where they died — some as long as a decade
ago — to the land they served so honorably and
so well.

— We have lifted restrictions on travel to
Vietnam and taken other positive steps to as-
sist in the process of reconciliation.

— We have offered to lift the trade embargo
as we establish diplomatic relations.

— And we will no longer oppose Vietnam's
membership in the United Nations. I expect
to see its delegation seated there at the next
General Assembly session.

These steps make clear that we seek to
move forward in building a new relationship.
Remembering the lessons of the past, neither
side should be obsessed by them or draw the
wrong conclusions. We cannot accept an in-
terpretation of the past that imposes un-
founded obligations on us.

Meanwhile, a new flow of Indochinese refu-
gees commands the world's urgent humanitar-

ian concern. Their numbers are growing at a
rate of 1,500 a month. A few countries —
including Thailand, France, Canada, Austra-
lia, and most recently Israel — have done much
to help these unfortunate people. Some na-
tions, however, have turned their backs, leav-
ing an increasing number of refugees to perish
by drowning or disease. I urge that shelter
and aid be offered to these refugees, until
more permanent resettlement can be
arranged.

Today, as we look across the vast Pacific,
we see the web of relationships that links us
together. In Korea, we see the obvious in-
teraction of the interests of the Koreans, the
Chinese, the Japanese, the Soviets, and our-
selves. Elsewhere, the web is even more in-
tricate and complex.

Economic Progress and Problems

Peace has freed the United States and Asia
to focus attention on economic growth, which
has been such a striking fact about modern
Asia.

Japan's economic miracle is well known, but
the remarkable economic record of other
countries in Asia has received less attention.
Over the past five years, for example, the
economy of the Republic of Korea expanded
by 11 percent; the economies of Singapore,
Indonesia, and Malaysia by roughly 8 percent;
the economy of the Philippines by almost 7
percent.

Continuation of these gains cannot be taken
for granted. We must adopt policies to insure
that economic progress is not reversed and
that the benefits are more widely spread.

President Carter's pledges at the London
summit [May 7-8] are as relevant to Asia as
they are to other parts of the world.

— We will continue to fight inflation.

— We will continue to seek ways of develop-
ing new energy resources and to insure stable
and equitable fuel prices.

— We will resist protectionist trends and
support a liberal trading system.

— We will support the establishment of
price-stabilizing commodity agreements and
buffer stocks for selected commodities, fi-

144

Department of State Bulletin

nanced by producers and consumers and sup-
ported by a common fund.

In addition, our policies in Asia will be tail-
ored to the economic problems and opportuni-
ties of the region. The role of the Asian De-
velopment Bank is of particular importance.

Human Needs and Rights

In the field of development, the United
States has recently taken the lead in calling
for a concerted international effort to act on
an agenda of basic human needs.

In Asia and elsewhere in the developing
world, our human needs agenda must include
the following essential elements which I out-
lined last week at the OECD [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development]
ministerial meeting in Paris:

— Development of the Third World's rural
areas where the great majority of the poorest
people live;

— An integrated strategy for increased food
production and better nutrition in these areas;

— An emphasis on preventive medicine,
family planning, and prenatal care at minimal
cost;

— Expanded programs of primary and sec-
ondary education and on-the-job technical
training; and

— Renewed efforts to involve women in the
process of development.

To all of these efforts the United States
pledges its strong support. But in many coun-
tries rapid population growth poses a threat
to economic development. While pressures of
population on the land are already threatening
East Asia's natural environment, some East
Asian countries will double their 1970 popula-
tion by the end of the century. I believe the
United States must help countries coping with
these difficult problems.

We must be equally concerned with other
aspects of human rights — the right to live
under a rule of law that protects against cruel,
arbitrary, and degrading treatment; to par-
ticipate in govei-nment and its decisions; to

voice opinions freely; to seek peaceful change.

We understand cultural differences. Our
tradition stresses the individual's rights and
welfare; some Asian traditions stress the
rights and welfare of the group. We applaud
the determination of Asian countries to pre-
serve the ability, won at great cost, to deter-
mine their own policies and establish their
own institutions.

But we believe strongly that there are new
and greater opportunities for improving the
human condition in the Asia I have described
today — a continent at peace, the home of
gifted and capable people secure in their na-
tional independence.

With vigilance and determination, with
friendship and understanding, we encourage
our Asian friends to grasp their opportunities
to promote the human rights of their peoples.

To do so will not weaken any nation. On the
contrary, strength of a deeper sort — the
strength that comes from the full participation
of all the people — will be the long-term result
of dedication to the improvement of the
human condition.

Those countries in Asia which have already
embarked on this course will be the stronger
for it, and we shall be able to work more
closely with them.

I began tonight by speaking of the welcome
promise of peace, and of peaceful change, that
is taking hold across the region. I want to
close by stressing my deep hope for a new
sense of community in Asia and the Pacific.
We seek:

— To build on our relationships of mutual
respect;

^To consolidate the fragile stability al-
ready achieved;

— To bring greater freedom and greater re-
spect for human rights; and

— To erase the divisions that persist.

Toward this I pledge the best efforts of the
Administration; for this I ask the support of
our friends in Asia and of the American
people.

August 1, 1977

145

President Carter's News Conference of June 30

Follotving is the text of the opening state-
ment and excerpts relating to foreign policy
from the transcript of a news conference held
by President CaHer on June SO. ^

OPENING STATEMENT

This has been one of the most difficult deci-
sions that I have made since I've been in of-
fice. During the last few months, I've done my
best to assess all the factors involving produc-
tion of the B-1 bomber. My decision is that we
should not continue with deployment of the
B-1, and I am directing that we discontinue
plans for production of this weapons system.
The Secretary of Defense [Harold Brown]
agrees that this is a preferable decision, and
he will have a news conference tomorrow
morning to discuss this issue in whatever de-
tail you consider necessary.

The existing testing and development pro-
gram now underway on the B-1 should con-
tinue to provide us with the needed technical
base in the unlikely event that more cost-
effective alternative systems should run into
difficulty. Continued efforts at the research
and development stage will give us better an-
swers about the cost and effectiveness of the
bomber and support systems, including elec-
tronic countermeasures techniques.

During the coming months, we will also be
able to assess the progress toward agree-
ments on strategic arms limitations in order to
determine the need for any additional invest-
ments in nuclear weapons delivery systems.
In the meantime, we should begin deployment
of cruise missiles using air-launched plat-
forms, such as our B-52's, modernized as

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated July 4, 1977, p.
951.

necessary. Our "triad" concept of retaining
three basic delivery systems will be continued
with submarine-launched ballistic missiles, in-
tercontinental ballistic missiles, and a bomber
fleet, including cruise missiles as one of its
armaments. We will continue thereby to have
an effective and flexible strategic force whose
capability is fully sufficient for our national
defense.
Thank you.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. Mr. President, the House, at least,
seems bent on providing the money for the
B-1. Does this put you on a collision course
with them on the whole subject?

The President: No, I think not. The Con-
gress took action last year to delay a final de-
cision on the B-1 bomber pending my ability
to analyze its needs.

When I came into office, I tried deliberately
to have an open mind. And I've spent weeks
studying all the aspects of our strategic de-
fense forces. I've met with congressional
leaders. I've spent a great deal of time with
the Secretary of Defense and others in trying
to understand all the ramifications of this very
important decision.

The leaders in the House and Senate this
morning have been informed of my decision,
both by Frank Moore [Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Congressional Liaison] and by the
Secretary of Defense.

My belief is that the Congress will be sup-
portive, knowing that our previous requests
for limited production funds were based on a
previous decision. But my decision is that this
production is not now necessary. And I be-
lieve that the House and the Senate will con-
firm my decision.

146

Department of State Bulletin

Q. Mr. President, in view of the grotving
difficulties between the United States and the
Soviet Union, are there any early prospects in
the corning months for a meeting with
Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, Chairman of
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union],
between yourself and Brezhnev, and is August
in Alaska — does that have any validity?

The President: I don't agree that there are
growing difficulties between ourselves and
the Soviet Union. The technical discussions on
SALT questions, comprehensive test ban,
demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, a reduc-
tion in the sales of conventional weapons to
developing nations of the world have been
proceeding with very good attitudes on the
part of the Soviets and, of course, Os. So I
don't believe that the relations between us are
deteriorating.

I think that my own relationship with Mr.
Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders should be
one of continuing consultations, not just to
ratify final agreements, but to get to know
one another. And I would welcome a chance
this year to meet with President Brezhnev, to
explore the ability of our countries to reach
quicker decisions. But it would not be based
on any deep concern about relations now, nor
any frustration about what's gone on before.

The time or date or place would still have to
be worked out, and it would be inappropriate,
I think, to try to presume what those deci-
sions might be on specifics until we determine
accurately the attitude of the Soviet leaders.

Q. May I say that —

The President: Please do.

Q. — you, yotirself, have expressed surprise
at the reaction of the Soviets to your human
rights drive, and Brezhnev has told Giscard
[Valery Giscard d'Estaing, of France], that
there are difficulties. So I don't think it's
exactly — I mean there is an atmosphere.

The President: There are difficulties, ob-
viously, in reaching final decisions on matters
that are very controversial, very difficult, and
which never have been successfully concluded.
We've never tried as a nation to have a com-

prehensive test ban to eliminate all tests of all
nuclear devices, both peaceful and military.
We've never tried to open up the discussions
of demilitarizing the Indian Ocean, first freez-
ing the present circumstances, then reducing
our military presence there. We've never
tried for a sharp reduction in the deployment
of nuclear weapons.

So these new ideas obviously take more
time to conclude. But I don't have any sense
of fear or frustration or concern about our re-
lationships with the Soviet Union. We have, I
think, a good prospect of continuing our dis-
cussions, and I have every hope that those
discussions will lead to success.

Q. Mr. President, what were the major fac-
tors that led to your decision against the B-1
bomber?

The President: There are a number of fac-
tors. One is obviously the recent evolution of
the cruise missile as an effective weapon it-
self. The tests of this system have been very
successful so far.

Another one, of course, is the continued
ability to use the B-52 bombers, particularly
the G's and H's, up well into the 1980's, and
the belief on my part that our defense capabil-
ity using the submarine-launched missiles and
intercontinental ballistic missiles combined
with the B-52 cruise missile combination is
adequate.

We will also explore the possibility of cruise
missile carriers, perhaps using existing
airplanes or others as a standoff launching
base.

But I think, in toto, the B-1, a very expen-
sive weapons system basically conceived in
the absence of the cruise missile factor, is not
necessary. Those are the major reasons.

Marilyn [Marilyn Berger, NBC News].

Q. Mr. President, the Soviet Union has
shoivn great concern about the cniise missile
capability of the United States.

The President: Yes.

Q. What limits are you ready to accept, if
any, 0)i air-launched cruise missiles so far as
their range, and secondly, are you willing to
accept the proposition that an airplane carry-
ing cruise would be counted as a MIRV [mul-

August 1, 1977

147

tiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle]
under the limits that you would set in a SALT
agreement?

The President: Those questions are being
negotiated now. We have a fairly compatible
position with the Soviets on maximum range
of air-launched cruise missiles carried over
from the Vladivostok discussions. I don't
think there's any particular difference in that.
It's an adequate range in my opinion for the
cruise missiles to be launched as a standoff
weapon without the carrying airplane having
to encroach into Soviet territory. This,
though, is a matter that has not yet been fi-
nally resolved.

Also, the definition of what is a MIRV'ed
weapon is one that is still in dispute. We don't
believe that a bomber equipped with cruise
missiles as a weapon ought to be classified as
a MIRV'ed weapon. But depending upon the
Soviets' attitude in reaching an overall com-
prehensive settlement, those matters are still
open for discussion.

Q. Mr. President, is this decision on your
part not to go ahead with the B-1 intended as
any kind of a signal to the Soviets that you
are willing to — that you want to do something
quickly in the strategic arms talks?

The President: I can't deny that that's a po-
tential factor. But that has not been a reason
for my decision. I think if I had looked upon
the B-1 as simply a bargaining chip for the
Soviets, then my decision would have been to
go ahead with the weapon. But I made my de-
cision on my analysis that, within a given
budgetary limit for the defense of our coun-
try, which I am sure will always be adequate,
that we should have the optimum capability to
defend ourselves.

But this is a matter that's of very great im-
portance, and if at the end of a few years the
relations with the Soviets should deteriorate
drastically, which I don't anticipate, then it
may be necessary for me to change my mind.
But I don't expect that to occur.

Mr. Sperling [Godfrey Sperling, Christian
Science Monitor].

Q. Mr. President, is this emphasis on
human rights now central to your foreign
policy?

The President: Yes. My emphasis on human
rights is central to our foreign policy. As I've
said since my first press conference, I see no
relationship between the human rights deci-
sion, however, and matters affecting our de-
fense or SALT negotiations [Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks]. And I have doubts, based
on analyses in our own country and from those
who know the Soviet system very well in
other countries, that there's any connection
between the two in the minds of the Soviets.

Q. To follow there, has this emphasis helped
or hurt those in the Soviet Union whose lights
were being impaired?

The President: It's hard for me to say. I
think that in the long run our emphasis on
human rights, the high publicity that has ac-
crued to the human rights question because of
the Helsinki agreement and the upcoming
Belgrade conference in October — those two
factors, combined, I think, dramatize every
violation of human rights that is known.

And my guess is that the Soviets, like our-
selves, want to put a good image forward for
the world to observe, and I think in the long
run that this emphasis on human rights will be
beneficial to those who desire free speech and
an enhancement of their own human
freedoms.

Q. Mr. President, Senator Javits says you
are pushing Israel too far. And other Ameri-
cans sympathetic to the Israeli position say
worse, that you are perhaps selling Israel
down the river. My question is, first, do you
think you are, and secondly, how difficult
will it be for you to continue your policy if the
American Jewish community sides with Mr.
Begin instead of Mr. Carter?

The President: I might say, first of all, that
I look forward with great anticipation to the
visit of Prime Minister Begin on the 19th of
July. My determination is that the talks will
be friendly and constructive and also instruc-
tive for both him and me.

148

Department of State Bulletin

He'll be received with the kind of friendship
that's always been a characteristic of the
American people's attitude toward Israel. An
overwhelming consideration for us is the
preservation of Israel as a free and independ-
ent and, hopefully, peaceful nation. That is
preeminent. At the same time, I believe that
it has been good during this year, when I hope
we can reach a major step toward a peaceful
resolution in the Middle East, to have the dis-
cussions much more open, to encourage the
Arab nations and Israel to frankly understand
some of the feelings that each of them has to-
ward the other, and to address the basic ques-
tions of territories, the definition of peace, the
Palestinian question.

I really think it is best for this next roughly
three weeks before Mr. Begin comes that we
refrain from additional comments on specifics,
because I think we've covered the specifics
adequately. And if I or someone in the State
Department or someone on my staff em-
phasizes territory and the definition of peace,
the immediate response is: Why didn't you say
something about the Palestinians, and so
forth. So, I believe that we've discussed it
adequately.

I believe all the issues are fairly clearly de-
fined. It's accurate to say that our own nation
has no plan or solution that we intend to im-
pose on anyone. We'll act to the degree that
the two sides trust us in the role of an inter-
mediary or mediator, and I still have high
hopes that this year might lead toward peace.

But it will never be with any sort of aban-
donment of our deep and permanent commit-
ment to Israel. And I have made this clear in
specific terms to every Arab leader who has
been to our country.

Q. Mr. President, giveyi the numerous ana
obvious violations of the Helsinki accords by
the Soviet Union, which they were pledged to
uphold, could I ask why the Uyiited States
should, on good faith, accept the Soviet word
on a matter far more vital, say, for exam-
ple, the SALT treaty, which you are in the
process of negotiating?

The President: We have never been willing
simply to take the word of the Soviets on
SALT agreements, and neither have they
been willing to take our word alone. We have
methods of confirming or verifying the carry-
ing out of the agreement with various means,
including aerial surveillance from space.

And I think that as we get down to the
more technical agreements, that verification
is becoming more and more a problem. For in-
stance, if we should conclude a comprehensive
test ban treaty with the Soviets of preventing
any sort of nuclear tests, even including
peaceful devices, then we would have to have
some way to confirm that the Soviets indeed
are carrying out their agreement, and vice
versa.

There are sensing devices that might, for
instance, be placed by us on Soviet territory
or perhaps around the periphery of the Soviet
Union. And we might conclude a similar
agreement with them. Or if a factor in the
agreement should be that certain kinds of uses
of atomic weapons — not weapons, but e.xplo-
sives to divert the channel of a river, we
might want to have actual observers there,
and vice versa. My own hope is that we can
conclude an agreement that there would be no
testing. But verification is one of the aspects
not just based on the word of us or the Soviets
but on actual observations on site by sensing
devices or by visual observations or others
that I need not go into now.

Q. What is the status, Mr. President, of the
Panama Canal treaty? Are you likely to sign
such a treaty soon?

The President: I don't know about the time
schedule because it obviously takes two sides
to agree to a treaty. We are putting in a
lot of time on the Panama Canal treaty
negotiations.

And I hope that we'll have a successful con-
clusion this summer. We've been encouraged
so far. The major questions that were iden-
tified at the beginning have fairly well been
concluded.

One of the disagreements at this point is on
the payment of portions of the tolls from the

August 1, 1977

149

Panama Canal to Panama and the exact finan-
cial arrangement.

But I hope still that we'll have one by sum-
mer. I think that General Torrijos feels the
same way, and of course, we have been aided
by the good offices of President Perez from
Venezuela and others who want to have a
peaceful resolution here.

I can't give you an answer because I don't
know yet. We are also trying to keep the
Members of the Senate and others informed
about progress as well as I'm being informed,
so that when we do reach a conclusion, it
would be one that, with a major effort, we
could have confirmed by the Congress.

Q. Mr. President, in view of the apparent
moderation by the OPEC countries [Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries] on
oil prices lately, does that appear to be aimed
at diffusing some of the stronger measures
you'd like Congress to adopt, and what
strategy can you have against that?

The President: When Prince Fahd was over
here, we discussed the prospects for OPEC
prices, and he told me in confidence what he
thought were the prospects. And I think that
is going to come true — that the Saudi Ara-
bians would raise their price to equal that of
other OPEC nations and that the OPEC na-
tions who had already raised their prices 10
percent would forgo their planned additional
increases at least through this year.

I hope, and I believe the Saudis also hope,
that that extension of a price freeze would go
through 1978 at least. I think that our own
strong country can accommodate additional
increases in the price of oil.

I think the prices are too high. But there
are obviously major adverse impacts on world
inflation, and the poor countries that have to
buy large quantities of oil and can't equal it by
exports are very badly damaged.

But we can accommodate the change, but
we are using our good offices when possible to
hold down additional increases in the price of
oil.

Q. Mr. President, is it your intention to
terminate either our defense commitment or
diplomatic relations with Taiwan as a step

toward normalizing relations with the
People's Republic of China?

The President: Our attitude on the Chinese
question has been spelled out by my predeces-
sors and confirmed by me as based on the
Shanghai communique which acknowledges
the concept of one China. We also hope that
Taiwan and the Mainland can work out the dif-
ferences between them. We obviously hope
that these differences can be resolved early,
or perhaps in the future through peaceful
means.

Other nations who have now full relation-
ships with the People's Republic of China on
the Mainland have continued trade, cultural,
social exchanges, sales of major equipment to
Taiwan.

I can't give you a better answer than I've
already described. The Secretary of State is
planning to go to China, to Peking, in August.
This was part of the Shanghai communique
agreement — that we would have consultations
at the highest level, obviously at the Secre-
tary of State level or the national leader level.
But I can answer your question better after
he returns in August.

Did you have one followup?

Q. Could I just follow that in a broader
sense? Is it possible to have relations with the
People's Republic of China and at the same
time maintain a defense commitment to
Taiwan?

The President: This is a difficult question to
answer now. My hope is that we can work out
an agreement with the People's Republic of
China having full diplomatic relations with
them and still make sure that the peaceful
lives of the Taiwanese, the Republic of China,
is maintained. That's our hope, and that's our
goal.

Q. Mr. President, in New York last night
Secretary of State Vance spoke of a construc-
tive dialogue now on the way with Communist
China. And I believe you have referred to this
at least once publicly yourself. However, so
far as I know, there have been only low-level
talks with representatives of the Liaison Of-
fice here about property claims and also,
there have been some other — an occasional
meeting or two. What is involved in this

150

Department of State Bulletin

dialogue? Where and when are these ex-
changes taking place?

The President: As you know, we don't have
ambassadors exchanged. We have special rep-
resentatives with the rank of ambassador.
Ambassador Huang here in Washington meets
with the Secretary of State. He's also been to
the Oval Office to meet with me. We've had a
very frank discussion about some of the rela-
tionships between our country and the
People's Republic of China.

The first meetings at the foreign minister
level or the head of state level will be in Au-
gust in Peking. But the preparations for that
visit will obviously be continuing through
regular diplomatic channels. I think that's the
limit of the discussions to this point.

Q. Mr. President, just one other aspect of
human rights. Although you've e.rpressed
surprise, as Helen [Helen Thomas, United
Press hiternational] pointed out in the begin-
ning, about some of the Soviet response, that
reaction at the very beginning was predicted
almost unthout exception by people ivho had
long experience in dealing with the Soviet
Union. My question is, did you consult any
qualified, experienced people before undertak-
ing your campaign? If you did, who were
they? What did they tell you?

The President: I would guess that the Sec-
retary of State and my national security ad-
viser, my staff, and others would be
adequately qualified. I don't have any regrets
at all about our enthusiastic endorsement of
the principle of human rights, basic human
freedoms, and the respect for individuality of
persons.

I was asked by a group of local newspaper
editors if there were any surprises to me. And
I said that the degree of disturbance by the
Soviets about what I considered to be a
routine and normal commitment to human
rights was a surprise. It has not caused me
any deep concern, and I would certainly not
do it otherwise, in retrospect.

Q. Could I just follow up? Did any of them
suggest that you not under-take this cam-
paign?

The President: No, never.
August 1, 1977

President Perez of Venezuela
Visits the United States

President Carlos Andres Perez of the Re-
public of Venezuela made a state visit to the
United States June 27-July 2. He met with
President Carter and other government offi-
cials at Washington June 28-29. Following is
an exchange of remarks between President
Carter and President Perez on the South
Lawn of the White House on June 28, together
with the texts of a joint communique on their
meetings and a joint communique on human
rights which were issued on July 1.^

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 4

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS

President Carter

This morning we have a great honor paid to
our nation by the visit of President Perez of
Venezuela. In our hemisphere, the nation of
Venezuela has earned the great admiration of
all those who believe in freedom and in the
open, democratic processes of government.

President Perez represents a country which
has set an e.xample for many others in its firm
and unswerving comm.itment to the proposi-
tion that the people of a nation should be the
ones, with universal suffrage and complete
participation in an open and free electoral
process, to choose the leaders of that country.

But his influence has extended far beyond
the borders of his beautiful and great nation.
Because of his dynamism and his great lead-
ership qualities. President Perez has become
an active and effective spokesman for the
Third World nations, and one who can truly
represent the highest aspirations of all the na-
tions in Latin America.

His commitment to the basic principles of
human rights, individual freedom, and liberty
were vividly demonstrated recently at the
Organization of American States conference at

' For an exchange of toasts between President Carter
and President Perez at a dinner at tlie White House and
President Carter's remarks at the entertainment follow-
ing the dinner on June 28 and for President Carter's
remarks on the departure of President Perez on June
29, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
dated July 4, 1977, pp. 937, 942, and 944.

151

Grenada, when he and his people became
leaders in pursuing these hopes for this
hemisphere.

He has also espoused and has pursued his
commitment to a reduction in expenditures for
weapons and in trying to lay the groundwork
for more peaceful relationships among the na-
tions of the world.

He has also taken a strong stand agamst the
proliferation of atomic explosives throughout
the world and has joined with us and others in
espousing the principles of the Tlatelolco
treaty, which prohibits the deployment of any
nuclear explosives in the southern part of this
hemisphere.

Venezuela has been a leader and was re-
cently cochairman of the conference which
tries "to establish better relationships between
the developed nations of the North and the
developing nations of the South.

He leads a country which has been blessed
with great natural resources— oil among
them. And they have been leading suppliers of
that precious fuel to our country for many
years. During the 1973 embargo of our coun-
try by some members of OPEC, Venezuela
maintained their staunch friendship to our
country, and the interruption of oil to our
shores was not part of their policy. And this
past winter, when we faced a particular
shortage because of the severity of our
weather, Venezuela voluntarily increased
their total export of oil and fuel from their
country to meet our needs. At the same time,
he's been strongly committed to the quality of
the environment and to the careful conserva-
tion of his nation's precious oil and other fuel
products.

We all know and admire the early and in-
novative commitment to freedom by the great
liberator Simon Bolivar, and in more recent
times, the great leadership of Don Romulo
Betancourt of Venezuela. And I think I can
say without any doubt that President Perez
continues in this admirable mold of leadership
which has come from the great nation and our
close friend, the country of Venezuela.

Recently my wife, Rosalynn, was welcomed
to your country, Mr. President, in the most
hospitable way by you and your wife, Blanca.

We deeply appreciate the personal friendships
that have already been formed between your
family and my own.

Sefwr Presidente, esta es su casa [Mr. Pres-
ident, this is your house].

President Perez ^

Mr. President Carter, I must begin my
words expressing to you my deep thanks and
that of my wife for this cordial invitation that
allows us to visit the great North American
nation. I am a Latin American voice that,
from Venezuela, comes to express an unre-
served solidarity with your policy of great
ethical substance addressed to affirm the es-
sential values of the human being.

Many years have passed since nations, small
and weak nations, have heard a voice rise
from a great nation to tell the world that over
the human values is the human being, the de-
fense of his dignity, of the human rights.
Those words have reconciliated us with other
attitudes that we have not shared with this
great nation, and they remind us of the voice
of two other gi-eat Presidents, Franklin Del-
ano Roosevelt and John Fitzgerald Kennedy,
who are dear to the affection of all Latin
Americans.

In my country — I mean all of Latin
America, no matter what kind of governments
our countries have, the people are feeling the
warmth and the sincerity of these good words
that constitute themselves in a commitment to
make of America, of the New World, the true
continent of freedom.

I have come, Mr. President, to exchange
ideas with you and your officials with mutual
respect, and as countries that do to each other
the same treatment. Certainly, we will find
points of coincidence very important within
the global politics that are discussed today in
the great forums of the world. Likewise, we
are going to deal with matters that are essen-
tial for us, the relations between the United
States and the Latin American community.

I already had the honor and the very pleas-
ant opportunity to hear from the lips of your
wife, in Caracas, many aspects of the talks

^ President Perez spoke in Spanish.

152

Department of State Bulletin

that we are going to hold. Mrs. Carter
brought the testimony of the friendship and
admiration of the Venezuelan people and of all
of the peoples of Latin America for the people
of the United States and for the Government
of President Carter.

For our hemispheric countries, the best
perspectives are open. I sincerely believe that
this is a historical moment without compari-
son, when the United States is going to as-
sume a leadership role — which we do
appreciate — not that of economic or military
importance, but that of the great values of
mankind.

Mr. President, Mrs. Carter, my wife and I
in this first moment of our meeting give to you
our thanks, and we express to you that be-
yond the formalities of protocol there exists a
sincere friendship that will join in brother-
hood the peoples of Latin America with the
peoples of the United States.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ^

The President of the Republic of Venezuela, Carlos
Andres Perez, and Mrs. Perez made a State Visit to
Washington June 28-29 in response to the invitation ex-
tended by the President of the United States of
America, Jimmy Carter, and Mrs. Carter. Accompany-
ing the President and Mrs. Perez were Minister of
Foreign Relations Ramon Escovar Salon, Minister of
Finance Hector Hurtado, Minister of Energy and Mines
Valentin Hernandez, Minister of Information and
Tourism Diego Arria, Minister of State for Interna-
tional Economic Affairs Manual Perez Guerrero, the
Ambassador of Venezuela and Mrs. Iribarren, Ambas-
sador Simon Alberto Consalvi, and Ambassador Jose
Maria Machin.

Participating in the talks on behalf of the United
States were Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State
Vance, Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs Brzezinski, Assistant to the President
Schlesinger, and leaders of the Congress.

The Presidents of Venezuela and of the United
States, accompanied by their respective parties, re-
ferred in their talks to the strong bonds e.xisting be-
tween their two countries. They analyzed a wide range
of political, economic and cultural affairs of mutual
interest and they made special reference to the fact that
international relations should be based on mutual re-
spect and cooperation.

They confirmed their faith in the future and the im-

^ Issued simultaneously at Washington and Caracas
on July 1.

portance of the ethical and political values of Western
democratic society, and they reiterated their conviction
that man should realize his full potential within a so-
cially, politically, and economically just system which
will foster the advantages of the democratic system and
the importance which it attaches to the individual.

The two Presidents discussed fully the matters of
human rights and agreed to issue a separate com-
munique in this respect. They expressed their convic-
tion that the scientific and technological application of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and for economic
development should be recognized and protected.

They recognized that dissemination of the capability
to produce nuclear weapons has serious implications for
peace and security, and they expressed their determi-
nation to continue their efforts on the international
level to avoid those dangers.

Recognizing the contribution which could be made in
this regard by adequate regional measures, they at-
tached great importance to broad advocacy of the entry
into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco throughout Latin
America. Therefore, States within and without the
Latin American region whose decisions are required in
order to bring the Treaty into effect are urged to take
the necessary measures as soon as possible.

The two Presidents discussed the world energy situa-
tion, especially with respect to petroleum, and agreed
to explore ways of cooperating and encouraging conser-
vation and the development of alternative sources of
energy.

They agreed on the need for intensifying and support-
ing the efforts of mankind to attain general and com-
plete disarmament and on the desirability of perfecting
international standards and instruments of control.

They made known their decision to combine their ef-
forts to achieve a reduction in conventional arms trans-
fers. They also expressed support for regional initia-
tives such as the Declaration of Ayacucho of 1974, the
implementation of which would aid in reducing tensions
and avoiding unnecessary expenditures on arms.

They recognized in terrorism a threat which endan-
gers the lives of innocent persons and jeopardizes
peace. They declared the intent of their governments to
cooperate bilaterally and internationally to combat
terrorism.

The two Presidents examined the work of the
North-South Dialogue or Conference on International
Economic Cooperation, they agreed on the need for con-
tinuing, within the framework of the United Nations,
the constructive dialogue designed to establish an in-
ternational system based on justice, equity, interde-
pendence and cooperation among states.

President Carter and President Perez announced
their intention to carry on direct consultation, as well
as through their respective Ambassadors and other rep-
resentatives, and to dedicate their best efforts to realiz-
ing moral values in terms of the goals and aspirations
shared by the Presidents, Governments, and peoples of
the United States and Venezuela.

President Perez expressed to President Carter his

August 1, 1977

153

deep appreciation for the hiospitality extended to him
and the warm reception given him by the people and the
Government of the United States of America, and his
sincere satisfaction with the results of his talks with
President Carter.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON HUMAN RIGHTS *

The Presidents of the Republic of Venezuela and of
the United States of America,

Recognize that the two countries share the same his-
toric position regarding the protection of human rights
as enshrined in their respective Constitutions;

Recognize that the Charter of the United Nations and
of the Organization of American States obligate mem-
bers to promote universal respect for human rights and
fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language or religion;

Recognize that the Charter of the Organization of
American States provides that member states should
exhibit respect for the sovereignty of other nations, for
peace, the rule of law, individual liberties, and social
justice;

Recognize that the American Convention on Human
Rights represents the reaffirmation of our commitment
to promote the dignity of the individual in the
Hemisphere;

Reaffirm their conviction that the protection and
safeguarding of the rights and liberties of man should
constitute an objective of all nations of the world;

Proclaim their dedication to those objectives and
purposes and agree in their conviction that it is neces-
sary to encourage efforts in support of the dignity of
man and the universal protection of human rights as a
major goal in the evolution of international law;

Affirm their common commitment to join with other
nations in combatting abuses of human rights, including
those caused by political, social, and economic injustice;

Affirm that the struggle for observance of human
rights is an integral part of the political values of demo-
cratic societies;

Express the hope that the American Convention on
Human Rights will be ratified and entered into force as
soon as possible;

Affirm their continuing joint support for the excellent
and effective work performed by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, underlining the indis-
pensable need to provide increasingly efficacious means
to promote effective respect for the rights of man;

Express interest in increasing the autonomy and re-
sources of the Commission;

Express their interest in seeking ways to promote

■* Issued simultaneously at Washington and Caracas
on July 1.

throughout the Hemisphere broadened programs in the
care, protection and resettlement of political refugees;
and

Strongly support the Costa Rican initiative to create
the post of a United Nations High Commissioner on
Human Rights.

United States and United Kingdom
Sign New Fisheries Agreement

Press release 307 dated June 27

On June 24, 1977, representatives of the
United States of America and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land signed a treaty relating to traditional
fishing activities in the Virgin Islands.

The treaty provides for the continuation of
traditional fishing by fishermen from Puerto
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in waters off
the British Virgin Islands and for the con-
tinuation of traditional British Virgin Island
fishing in U.S. Virgin Island waters. The
treaty will come into force after the comple-
tion of internal procedures by both parties.

The signing of this treaty took place in
Washington. Sir Peter Ramsbotham, Ambas-
sador to the United States of the United
Kingdom, signed for the United Kingdom.
Ambassador Robert C. Brewster, Acting As-
sistant Secretary of State for Oceans and In-
ternational Environmental and Scientific Af-
fairs, signed for the United States. Ambas-
sador Brewster was assisted at the signing by
Governor Cyril E. King of U.S. Virgin Is-
lands; Commissioner Virdin Brown, U.S. Vir-
gin Islands Commissioner for Culture and
Conservation; and Mr. Hector Vega, Vice-
Chairman of the Caribbean Fisheries Man-
agement Council.

Ambassador Brewster and Ambassador
Ramsbotham both observed that the treaty
reflects and reinforces the longstanding close
relations between the United States and the
United Kingdom, as well as the close and
warm relations among the people of the Virgin
Islands.

154

Department of State Bulletin

Controlling Arms Transfers: An Instrument
of U.S. Foreign Policy

Address by Lucy Wilson Benson

Under Secretar-y for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology '

It is commonplace to acknowledge that sci-
ence and technology are among the dominant
influences of this mad and magnificent cen-
tury. But far too little has been done to act
upon that recognition and integrate the con-
siderations of technology into either long-
range planning or everyday operations of
foreign policymaking. It is now my job to tiy
to improve that situation.

There are a great many issues involved —
painful, familiar to us all, and global in nature:
Population growth, food supply, air and water
pollution, the arms race, nuclear proliferation,
energy insecurity, health care, competition
for resources, the widening development gap.

Secretary Vance has given my office broad
purview over these matters, with the inten-
tion of providing coordination among the
many responsible bureaus and elevating the
level of attention given to these issues. Gen-
erally speaking, I divide my attention into
three main areas: science and technology as
they relate to foreign policy, the transfer of
conventional arms, and the control of nuclear
technology.

We could talk about any one of these sub-
jects for the whole afternoon, but I would Hke
to concentrate on arms transfers; that is, the
export of conventional, as distinct from nu-
clear, weapons.

I choose it for four reasons: It is controver-
sial, it is complex, it is very important, and
we do have a brand new policy. Let me begin
with a few facts for background:

' Made before the Woman's National Democratic Club
at Washington, D.C., on June 27, 1977.

— About half the international trade in mili-
tary arms and services in the last five years
has been conducted by the U.S. Government.

— Last year we did more than $9 billion
worth of arms business with 68 countries.

— More than 60 percent of this traffic was
with the Middle East, specifically with three
countries — Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.
About a third of the trade was with NATO
and our major Asian allies — Korea and Japan.
About 40 percent of the total was weapons
and ainmunition. The rest was services, spare
parts, and supporting equipment.

For over a quarter of a century arms trans-
fers have been a useful instrument of U.S.
foreign policy. We have used them:

— To strengthen our collective defense ar-
rangements and to encourage allies to assume
a stronger self-defense role, as for example, in
NATO;

— To maintain regional balances, as in the
Middle East;

— To secure base and operating rights for
U.S. forces, as in Spain, Turkey, and the
Philippines;

— To limit Soviet influence or to enhance
our own influence in specific regions or with
particular governments; and

— To offset or compensate for the with-
drawal of U.S. forces, as in Korea.

These are, and will remain, legitimate ob-
jectives of our arms transfer actions.

Over the past few years, however, there
has developed a growing concern that, how-
ever laudable the ends, the huge export of

August 1, 1977

155

arms and our own prominent position as "chief
trafficker" carries with it serious liabilities. In
the last five years our annual sales of military
arms and services has grown fourfold— from
just under $2 billion to well over $9 billion.
This gi'owth has focused public, congressional,
and executive attention on a number of awk-
ward questions.

— Have we been encouraging competition in
arms?

— Have we been heightening local tensions
or involving ourselves in local conflicts in
which we have no legitimate interest?

— Have we been compromising our techno-
logical advantage not only over potential op-
ponents but also over the allies who are our
commercial competitors?

— Have we been distorting the allocations of
scarce resources, particularly in the underde-
veloped world?

— Have we been associating ourselves too
closely, and where our national security intei"-
ests are not really involved, with authoritar-
ian and repressive regimes? Are we perhaps
even reinforcing them?

It would be easy if we could answer yes to
all of those questions. Arms transfer policy
then would be only a question of withdrawing
from the market and either refusing to deal in
arms at all or doing so only with a few close
friends.

However, as you all are seasoned politi-
cians, you know there are no yes-no answers
to these questions. You also will recognize
that there are some important but conflicting
interests involved in our international arms
trade that go to the very heart of our national
security interests. The fact that we are the
largest arms seller in the world is not due
solely to the energy of our salesmen or our
price and credit terms. Indeed other suppliers
of arms; that is, other countries, are often
more competitive in these areas than the
United States.

Our predominance as an exporter of arms
has come about because both our government
and U.S. industry have together a reputation
as a reliable supplier of the best equipment
and service and because there exists between
ourselves and our major customers a basic

congruence of interests and objectives. The
governments which buy our weapons have de-
fense requirements which they view as urgent
and legitimate as our own.

No simple, narrowly focused policy can pos-
sibly reconcile all the contradictions that are
imbedded in this complicated subject. Let me
give you two examples. Severe reductions of
arms sales to unstable areas would seem, log-
ically, to be a practical and desirable policy
guideline. Yet in some areas access to arms
may be necessary to avoid creating a tempting
imbalance in military strength, as in Israel,
Jordan, and Korea.

Arms Transfers and Human Rights

President Carter, Secretary of State Vance,
and the Congress have repeatedly emphasized
the importance of human rights in foreign pol-
icy, and that obviously includes arms transfer
policy. But how do we apply our concern in
this area, since human rights are not just the
right to vote or the right to a fair trial or
freedom from fear of torture? Human rights
also include the right to safety from terrorism
and from external threat. We used to call this
"freedom from fear" 30-odd years ago. What
do we do, therefore, about Korea, which has
an authoritarian government, but which also
has an implacable and well-armed enemy
across the demilitarized zone? How do we ac-
commodate these conflicting objectives, and if
we cannot, how do we decide which rights to
give priority?

There are no easy answers. As is always the
case, facts have to be weighed and judgments
made. Patt Derian [Patricia M. Derian],
former Democratic National Committee-
woman from Mississippi, who, as you know, is
the President's Coordinator for Human Rights
[and Humanitarian Affairs in the Office of the
Deputy Secretary of State], says it is very
discouraging to hear the same arguments and
rationales /o?' not doing things as we used to
hear in the days of civil rights activism. And,
I might add, it is discouraging to hear those
same old arguments ad nauseam in these days
of struggling for equal rights for women. At
the same time, as Ms. Derian said recently,
cutting off military sales or economic assist-

156

Department of State Bulletin

ance to a country is not a very effective way
to show our dissatisfaction with human rights
conditions in a particular country. And so we
are left with the age-old problem in politics
and public policy — trade-offs, often among un-
suitable or at least unattractive alternatives.

All of this is by way of saying that the new
arms transfer policy described by the Presi-
dent in mid-May represents an effort to rec-
ognize and deal with these contradictions.^ It
also sets a challenging goal — to reduce the
worldwide trade in arms and to reduce our
own dependence on this trade as a foreign pol-
icy instrument.

In his May statement the President stated
that arms transfers would henceforth be con-
sidered an e.xceptional policy instrument.
That means it will be used only where it can
be clearly shown that the transfer contributes
to our national security interest. Moreover,
the burden of proof will rest with the propo-
nents of a sale, not with the advocates of
restraint.

The Application of Controls

President Carter specified a number of new
controls — new controls to be applied to all
transfers and to all countries except those
with whom we have longstanding commit-
ments, such as Israel, or with whom we have
major defense treaties (NATO, Japan, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand).

The controls are:

— We will reduce the dollar-volume of new
commitments to sell weapons and weapons-
related items beginning in 1978;

— We will not be the first to introduce into a
region advanced weapons that create new or
higher combat capability;

— We will not sell weapons that are not in
the inventory of our own armed forces;

— We will not develop advanced weapons
solely for export;

— We will sharply curtail the production of
U.S. weapons and components by foreign
governments;

— We will rigorously discourage the reex-
port of U.S. equipment to third countries; and

^ For the text of President Carter's statement of May
19, see Bulletin of June 13, 1977, p. 625.

— We will strengthen the regulations gov-
erning business and government sales ac-
tivities abroad.

The message of these controls is obvious:
discipli)ie and restraint.

It is the objective of this Administration to
sell less and to sell with discrimination. The
test of U.S. national security interest will be
the starting point for considering a sale, a test
that too often has been neglected in the past.

So much for the policy. It is very
straightforward. Now, let me say a few words
about implementation and impact.

Implementation and Impact of Policy

Decisionmaking in the arms transfer busi-
ness is extraordinarily complicated. Most of
the major agencies of our government have
important interests at stake and must be in-
volved in the decision process. The State De-
partment must worry about relations with
foreign governments; Defense about military
capabilities; Labor, Commerce, and Treasury
about jobs, the economy, and the balance of
payments; and the Agency for International
Development about allocation of resources.
Questions of arms control, human rights,
domestic jobs, and compromise of our techno-
logical lead also must be dealt with.

To help me advise the Secretary of State,
we have organized an interagency Arms Ex-
port Control Board to bring together the ex-
perts on these matters. Nine separate agen-
cies are represented, and no meeting takes
place with less than 15 people at the table.
The process is thorough and it guarantees full
exposure and a fair hearing to all the contend-
ing interests.

Nothing, however, can obscure the fact that
the effects of decisions made under this new
policy are going to be widely felt by everyone
from the aircraft and electronics workers in
Dallas and Boston to the Korean soldiers on
the demilitarized zone. We fully recognized
this when we were developing the new policy,
and we designed the controls to insure that
they do not drive policy beyond common
sense. For example, when the President
stated that we will apply the test of our na-
tional security interests, he also made explicit

August 1, 1977

157

one particular test — that we will continue to
fully uphold our treaty obligations and our
historic responsibility "to assure the security
of the State of Israel."

We are fully conscious that for much of the
free world the ability to deter attack, to pre-
vent coercion, and to defend against aggres-
sion rests on a nation's ability to acquire mod-
ern arms. Our policy does not challenge this
fact; on the contrary, it accepts it as a given.

With respect to domestic effects, they have
been meticulously examined. We believe the
impact will be manageable. Some jobs will be
lost, some industries will suffer; but it is our
judgment that the aggregate effect will be
modest.

More worrisome is the likely concentration
of the effects on a few industries — aircraft,
electronics, and ordinance — in a few states.
But even here, there are ameliorating factors.

There is a very large backlog — over $30
billion — of unfilled orders for which signed
contracts e.xist. This Administration considers
these obligations to be good-faith commit-
ments, and it will not interfere with the com-
pletion of existing contracts. The new policy
applies to new orders, not old ones. Thus the
backlog will take some years to work through,
and there will be time for the government and
the defense industries involved to adjust to
the future.

Moreover, it is important to remember
that U.S. defense industries have never, in
the aggregate, depended on foreign sales for
their survival. Their big customers are and
will remain our own military services and our
close friends and allies with whom we will
continue our defense cooperation.

Setting an Example of Self-Restraint

A second big problem with which we have
to deal is to persuade other sellers of arms —
that is, France, Germany, Britain, and the
Soviet Union — not to fill the void we create.

Many people argue that self-restraint is an
open invitation for the competition to move in
and that when the competition does move in,
the United States will lose not only jobs but
also leverage, influence, and control. They

cite the historical example of Latin America,
where we have exercised restraint over the
last 10 or 15 years with the i-esult that the
Europeans now have 70 percent of the Latin
American arms market.

It is a tough argument, and there is some
truth in it. But to accept uncritically the pro-
position "if we don't sell, others will" is to ac-
cept a slogan, not a policy. We propose to deal
with the problem in two ways.

First, we will set an example of restraint by
demonstrating that the United States will not
rush into every possible market. In so doing,
we will try to alter the intensity of the com-
petitive atmosphere surrounding the arms
trade. To some extent, of course, if we don't
sell, buyer's won't buy. We will try to encour-
age that atmosphere.

The other approach will focus on sellers. We
will seek their active cooperation and try to
convince both allies and adversaries that re-
straint is in everyone's interest.

The President, the Vice President, and Sec-
retary Vance have raised the matter in their
trips to Europe, the Middle East, and the
Soviet Union. In addition, the United States
and the Soviet Union have established a joint
working group on conventional arms trans-
fers, and we will hold discussions with our
European allies.

Our hope is that our own restraint will at-
tract the support of buyers and sellers alike
over a period of time. It is very important to
recognize that progress is likely to be slow.
We will aim, with both suppliers and buyers,
for a code of behavior — perhaps by regions,
perhaps globally — that will be adopted be-
cause of mutual interest. Our initial emphasis
might well be on such obvious and trouble-
some problems as:

— Arms sales to unstable regions;

— Sales of sensitive weapons and technol-
ogy, such as long-range surface-to-surface
missiles;

— Sales of equipment particularly attrac-
tive to terrorists, such as hand-carried anti-
aircraft missiles; and

— Sales of highly and indiscriminately lethal
weapons.

158

Department of State Bulletin

We don't underestimate the difficulties.
Still less do we ignore the fact that without
cooperation from both suppliers and buyers a
policy of self-denial will be ineffective. Ob-
viously, however, we must try: Unrestrained
competition is madness.

Decisions To Fill or Refuse Requests

Finally, there is the question of how we as
an exporter decide which requests to fill and
which to refuse. How do we impose our views
of what is necessary and affordable on
sovereign states whose perception of their
own needs may be quite different from our
own?

To this I can only say that the new policy
involves the very essence of diplomacy. In the
last couple of weeks you have seen this Ad-
ministration make two very difficult decisions.
We turned down Pakistan's request to pur-
chase A-7 aircraft on the grounds that the
sale would introduce a significantly greater
military capability into one side of the South
Asian military balance.

We have also refused to authorize at this
time the sale to Iran of the F-18L, a new
lightweight fighter, because it is not now
scheduled to be in the inventory of the U.S.
military services.

Both of these decisions were direct expres-
sions of the new policy. Both involved our re-
lations with friendly foreign governments.
Both involved the prosperity of important
American industrial firms and the job pros-
pects of their highly skilled workers. Both
involved loss of economic benefits to our econ-
omy, to the private sector, and to the Treas-
ury. But both also involved the broadest and
most fundamental national and global inter-
ests.

Either we apply the policy — thoughtfully and
with scrupulous attention to the costs and
benefits — or we don't. But if we take the lat-
ter course and duck the tough decisions, then
we lay ourselves open to charges of political
expediency and diplomatic impotence. It is not
for such behavior that this Administration or
this country intends to be remembered.

Interview With President Carter
by Media Representatives, June 24

Following are excerpts from President Car-
ter's opening remarks and questions and an-
swers relating to foreign policy from the tran-
script of an interview by a group of editors,
publishers, and broadcasters on June 2^.^

OPENING REMARKS

In foreign affairs, we've got an equally am-
bitious program underway. We are working
very closely with some of our allies, Germany,
France, England, Canada, in trying to resolve
the Namibian question in formerly South
West Africa, working with Mr. Vorster in
South Africa. And I think we've made good
progress on that recently. It's still a difficult
thing.

We are working closely with the British on
trying to resolve the Rhodesian question,
leading there toward majority rule. We are in
the process now of bringing the parties to
agree to accept the broad outlines of a con-
stitution under which free elections might be
conducted.

In the Middle East, I've met with all the
leaders there now, except Mr. Begin. I met
with Mr. Rabin when he was Prime Minister.
And Mr. Begin will be coming over here on
the 19th of next month to spend two or three
days in our country, and I'm getting prepared
for his visit. We hope that this year we might
make some progress in the Middle East. It's a
very difficult question. It's one on which I've
spent a great deal of time.

At the same time, we are negotiating with
the Soviets, trying to reach for the first time a
comprehensive test ban on nuclear explosives.
We are prepared to accept the test ban with
adequate safeguards that would apply both to
military and peaceful explosive devices. The
British have asked to join this discussion, and
both the Soviets and we have welcomed them

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated July 4, 1977, p.
919.

August 1, 1977

159

in those talks, and they are being conducted in
Moscow this minute.

We are also talking to them about reducing
the military presence or restraining it in the
future in the Indian Ocean, prior notification
of missile test-firing, a prohibition against the
capability of attacking observation satellites
or others in space, and working as best we can
to bring about a comprehensive, permanent
agreement on SALT.

I feel at this point we've got a good
framework for an agreement, but no specific
agreement on the SALT negotiations
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]. We are in
a strong position on strategic weapons, and I
think that strong position can be maintained
for the foreseeable future, but we don't want
a superiority there.

We'd like to reach an agreement with the
Soviets where we can have a drastic reduction
in total commitments with atomic weapons,
but retaining an equivalent position with them
so that either side will be strong enough to
prevent— to permit a retaliatory attack, but
not be subject to devastation that's over-
whelming in an original attack — at least that
we could still retaliate.

The other thing that we are trying to do
is — and I'll just mention two more before I an-
swer questions — is to prevent the spread of
the capability for atomic e.xplosions. I think
it's accurate to say that eight months ago
there was a general feeling in the world that
there was no way to restrain any more addi-
tional nations joining the nuclear explosive — I
guess you would call it — fraternity. After
India exploded a device, there was a general
sense that with the spread of atomic power to
produce electricity, that the development of
explosives was inevitable.

I think that time has changed. And I believe
there's a general hope now that with strict
control over reprocessing plants and a long
delay in shifting toward a plutonium society,
that we might indeed prevent an expansion of
the nuclear club.

The other thing that's been highly pub-
licized is our commitment to human rights.
We have addressed a subject that is very im-
portant to me and to the American people. It

reestablishes our country, I think, as kind of a :
beacon light for a principle that's right and
decent and compassionate. I don't know if this
would be liberal or conservative, but it
prides — the concept of individuality, of the
freedoms that our country has espoused. And
I don't think there's a national leader in the
world right now who isn't constantly pre-
occupied with how well we measure up on the
subject of human rights. Do our own people
think that we abuse them too much through
government, don't give them an equal oppor-
tunity, or what does the world think of us?

This has been brought about in part by our
own attitude, but I think to a substantial de-
gree because of the Helsinki agreement and
the present Belgrade conference that is pre-
paring to discuss this subject, among others,
in October.

These are some of the things that are im-
portant. Of course, I'll make a decision this
month about whether or not to go ahead with
the production of the B-1 bomber and a few
other incidental questions of that sort.
[Laughter.]

But perhaps it might be better than for me
to go ahead with a dissertation, for me to an-
swer your questions. And I would be glad to
do so.

QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION

Q. Mr. President, Henry Kissinger was in
Denver on Wednesday, and he was defending
his old turf. And the message I got from lis-
tening to him, was it's easy to criticize the
State Department for lack of imagination
when you are on the outside, but once you are
in office many of these rosy-sounding dreams
and ideas for change begin to wilt and the test
for a huge, negative question that he saw is,
what are the consequences of failure of a
foreign policy move?

Do you gamble a little more on those kinds
of questions than President Nixon, President
Ford, and Mr. Kissinger did, do you think?

The President: I don't disagree with what
Kissinger says. We've had a very good series

160

Department of State Bulletin

of conferences with Kissinger, either myself
personally or more frequently the Secretary
of State. And Dr. Brzezinski [Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for Na-
tional Security Affairs] has participated in
some of those as well. Obviously, it's easier to
criticize any government effort from outside
than it is to solve a problem that's longstand-
ing, once you have the responsibility yourself.

I think we've made some basic changes in
the previous policies that might bear fruit,
but we've not made any additional steps for-
ward toward a SALT agreement. We hope we
can. I think we are taking a much more bold
approach to that question, not only seeking
limitations on future construction, which is
what was spelled out at Vladivostok, but ac-
tually asking the Soviets to join with us in a
freeze of present deployment and develop-
ment of nuclear weapons, and then a substan-
tial reduction below what we have now. This
has never been done before.

We are asking the Soviets to join with us in
a comprehensive test ban that would prevent
any nuclear explosives being tested. This has
never been done before. Demilitarization of
the Indian Ocean has never been attempted
before, and so forth.

I don't say that in criticism of the previous
Administration. We have not achieved success
yet in any of these efforts and may not. I can't
guarantee success.

I think that we have also taken a different
approach in the Middle East. And it's a matter
of judgment. Mr. Kissinger's position was to
deal with the Middle Eastern question in a
step-by-step, incremental way. Our hope is
that we can have an overall settlement by the
participants in the Middle East discussion
without delay, hopefully this year, and that
once that settlement is reached, then the
step-by-step implementation of the ultimate
settlement is the best way to go about it. It's
a completely different perspective.

I don't know that I can guarantee success.
Again, we've tried to look on Latin America
as a group of independent nations equal to us
and to deal with them individually, not as a
group or a homogeneous bloc.

We've been much more aggressive, I think,

on the field of human rights. It means that to
some degree our friendships and our al-
legiances in the different parts of the world,
like Latin America, have changed. We've tried
to get away from blind support of totalitarian
governments and tried to enhance and reward
those countries that are shifting toward a
more democratic process. And we've tried to
compliment and encourage countries like Ven-
ezuela, countries like Ecuador that are shift-
ing strongly toward more democratic proc-
esses.

We've taken a very strong stand that has
brought some adverse reaction on the control
of nuclear weapons as far as new countries are
concerned in the sales policies of our own
nuclear-enriched fuels. And in addition to
that, we've departed from Mr. Kissinger's
past attitude, along with obviously the Presi-
dents under whom he's served, in the sale of
conventional weapons. We have some very
strict standards now for the sale of conven-
tional weapons.

And now it's the consumer's or the cus-
tomer's responsibility to convince us that they
need those weapons and that the sale of those
weapons will be to the advantage of the
United States, rather than the other way
around where arms manufacturers freely went
to other countries, sold their products, and we
were in effect quietly encouraging this escala-
tion in nuclear arms — I mean in conventional
arms sales around the world.

So, there are some differences in perspec-
tive, but I have to say that it's too early to
assess tangible results.

Q. Mr. President, it's no more of a gamble
as far as you see it?

The President: I see no more of a gamble,
no. I think our positions are much more
clearly expressed in a public way. I think that
all of you representing the news media and
your readers and viewers and listeners have a
much more accurate assessment of what we
hope to achieve in SALT negotiations, what
we hope to achieve with human rights and
with nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and
what we hope to achieve in the Middle East,
and what we hope to achieve in dealing with

August 1, 1977

161

III!' I'roplc'M Ki'iMililic (ifCliinii ;iii(l ('iili,'i, .iml
lui Idi'lli, very cdiil i'i)Vcr:ii;il riKilliTs, lli.iii
they dill in I li<' punt .

Hill I lhiiil< I he opciiiicHS of il ;iiiil IIk' mi
VdlvcllllMll dl' III)' plllili)' ill III)' il('l):ili':: ;iliil
<liHCUHHiotlH will picvrlll iiUI' lllillUMJ^f Sdllir (if

lilt' iiii;iliikcH I hill wt'iT SI) lirviisliitiii).', lo i>iii'
cmiiitry in I he p;i»l . I ildii'l lliiiik il's iiikic
rlHky ((• llo thin. I linli'l KrlirVf lliiil upcli lie
liiilc ill ilHcir \H II rink, I Ihiiik il pussildy
iiVdidH I 111' risk of ii McriniiH iiiisliikf when ;i
(IcclHidli III in.iilr III nccrcl wilhdiil I he Sdiiiid
Jud^'.iiicnl and I he rxpcricni'i' and I lie (•oniniiiii
HtMiHt' dl' I he Anicricaii proph- and I lie ('mi
Ki'CHH liciiij', invdivi'd in iiiakinj? IhoHc ciiicial
(l(>cinid!is.

President Signs 1977 Amendments
to Export Administration Act

l''till<>win<i in u Hldlrninil hji I'irsiilnil ('(li-
ter issiird ill ciiiiiii'ctioii with the nijiiiiiiii of
thv aiiiviiiliiii'iits 1)11 Jiiiiv £'Ji, imji'tlivi- with n
ftirt shiii irlvamul lit/ tin' W'Inti- lloiisi' Hint
iliijl.'

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT CARTER

WIlKr ll.iiino pii'tin ii'lrrini' <lnli>il .lllllK UV

{•'dr iiKuiy nidiillis 1 liaxc spdkcn sli'diii-Jy of
I 111- nci'd I'df ii'i'islalidii dut law iiii', sfcdiidary
and tciiiaiy boyfdits and disfriniinal ion
HH'iiiiisI Aini'iiian hiisiiu'ssincn on rclinioiis or
nalidiial I'.nninds. I called this "a piofdimd
innral issiic, fi'dm w liicli we shdiild iidt
shrink."

My I'diiccrn alioiil rdit'ii'.ii hdyrolls stem
iiu'd, df coiirst'. tVdiii dur special relalidiiship
willi Israel, as well as tVdin the ecdUdinic,
luililary, and security ne<'ds dl' both diir cdiiii
tries. Kill tiie issue also I'.oes to the very heart
dl" I'ree liadi' he! ween all nalidiis.

I am theret'ore particularly pleased ttulay to
si^Vn intd law tiie li'TT aineiidinents to tile \']\
port .Xdniinist ral idii .Act. wliii-h will keep
I'dreii'.n hdycott practices I'tdin inlrudini; di
I'l'ctly intd Anu'rican cdniiuerce. ■'

Specifii'iilly, this leivislation:

Pidhiliils rl•li^^idlls nr ethnic discriinina
lion liy American companies arising out df a
I'drcij'ii lioycott;

i'rdliihils U.S. firms from joining!; in l.hc
lioycdlt df a friendly coiinli'y like Israel as a
cdiidilidn df ddin^ hUHJiiess in Ihe cdiinlry im
pd.sin^', I he Ixiycdt I ;

I'rohiliils firms in the tlnited States I'rdiii
acliii^j HH ('nforcurs of a I'dreiKH hdycott;

Priihihits U.S. firms friiiii answ■erin^f re-
quests for hdycdit related ini'drmatidii; and

I'rohihitH, after a one year peridd, the use
dl':;d called nej'.ative cerl ificates of di'inin.

'{'he new law dues mil (jueslidii Ihe
sdvereinii rii^iit nf any nation Id reyjulale its
cdmnierc(( witii dther cduntries, nor is it di-
rected toward a particular country. The hill
seeks, instead. Id end the divisive effects on
American life of I'dreij^n hdycdlts aimed at
Jewish niemhers df our sdciety. if we allow
such a precedent to heconie established, wi'
open Ihe doiu' to simil.ir action a^^ainsl any
ethnic, religious, or racial uroiip in America.

This lef^islalion owes much to Ihe hard work
df Senators Stiwt'lison and I'roMnire and ("mi
pressmen Zahldcki, ivoseiithal, iiamilton,
Hiiij;ham, Sdlarz, Whalen, and others. And it
owes just HS much to the patient perseverance
of the Hiisiness ivoundtable, the .Anti-
Defamation l.eanue, the American .lewish
Commillee, and the American .lewisli ("on
i^ress, as vvi'll as other groups.

'I'lie dpenness of t heir disiaissions and of 1 he
delicate legislative process which shaped this
liill has reconfirmed my belief in the value of
open government.

'i'his Cdoperative efl'dit between the busi-
ness cmnmunily, Jewish leaders, ("migress,
and the executive liranch can serve as a model
for what lan be accomplished in even more
difficult areas when ri>asonable pedpli> an'ree
to sit ddwii td.u'etlier in ^oddwill and .nood
faith.

I am I'diifidi'iit tiiat tin- divisive issues in the
Middle Kast which nive rise to current
boycdtts can be resolved eiiually satisfactorily

' Kor till' li'\( nf I'rt'sidcMl Cid'lcr's rciniirUs i>ii si,i;ii
inn II"' I'ill iiil" !•''«. ;*<'<' Wcckl.v I'ompil.'ttinii of I'rcsi
(Iciiliiil l>iu'liiiU'n(N iliiloil June -1. lit??, p. S!»8.

'■' .'V.-i cniu'lcil the 1!I77 iinu'nilnu'nls lo the l',\piirl
.\(lininislinlion Act of l!Mi!t me l*iililio l.jiw !tf)-;VJ.

162

Department of State Bulletin

through ;i similar process of rcasorialilc,
peaceful c()()])<'rali()ii.

My AdfriiniKtratioti will now circctivitly (tri-
forcr' this iriiportaiil l('i.fislal ion.

in).i;H, Hulijcct, to conj^rcHHiotial ovcnifjc liy
cilhcr House of (!orl^M•eHH;

— An increase in the petmltJcH for violatitiiiH
of t lie lv\port Ailinini; 1 1 at ion Act.

WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET

WhII.' llou«<' |iM

'liiirii .iiwK' 'a

Title I — Export Controlt

Title I of the le^fishttjori extend;, the Kxport,
AdtriiniHtration Act. l,o Septemher :'.<), \\)1\S,
and makes numerous chan^^e;, in U.S. export,
control policy and f)rocedures. Included are
provisionH for:

— Specific annual authorizationH of fundH to
carry out, the exiiort. control ftro^jrarri;

A hroade-ninj^ of l,h<; hasis of (;x|>ort. con
trols for national K<;curity purposeH to include
other factors than solely a country'H (/Orn-
rnunist or non-Crtmmunist status;

— A continuinj< review of U.K. policy to
ward individual countries takinp^ into account
their n;lati(inship t,o the; Unit,ed StatoH, its
friendn and allies, their own export control
policies, and other ndevant mat,terH;

— Simplifying and keepinj? U.S. export con
trols and the controls of our allies up to <late
in li^ht of evolvinj( technology, the availahility
of restricted items from other countri<;s, and
other relevant matters;

— A Htudy of technoloj^y tranHferK to other
countries of the world;

— A study of the domestic economic impact
of exports from the United States of certain
industrial technoloj^y;

— StoraK<; in the UniUid States of aj^ricul-
tural commodities purchased for «;xport, free
from future short, supply export limitations,
und<;r certain conditions;

—A crinj<resHional "veto" over emV^argoes
imposed on the export, of aj/ricultural corn
modities for foreij^n p'jlicy and short su|)f>ly
purposes;

— Speerjinj^ the process of export, licensinj^;

— Increasinj^ the effectiveness of industry
representatives in formulatin)^ and irnple-
mentinj^ U.S. export controls;

— A prohibition on the export, of Alaskan
oil, unless the President makes certain find

Title II — Foreign Boycott*

Title II ol'thi' le)M:;lal ion will jirohiliil rnoiit.
forms of compliance with unsanctioned forei),rn
boycotts without unnecessarily jeopardizing
U.S. ftolitical and <;omm(!rcial intitrests in the
Middle Kast. Included ari' provisions to pro-
hil)it U.S. pi'rsons from:

A{.i'S\m\\% 1,0 do business with lilacklisted
firms and b(»ycott<!d fri<;ndly countries;

— niscriminatin^'; a^^ainst U.S. person;', rjn
grounds (>f race, reli^Mon, sex, or national
origin;

l''urnishinj.i; information aliout another-

per'son's r'ace, r•eli^dorl, sex, or national orij/in;

I' lirnishinj,^ information about business

dealinj^s with boycotteil connlrie;'. or'

lilacklisted persons.

i'ixcfjfrtions are provided for- cr-rtain import,,
export, and immigration re(juirem«;nts of
forei^i^n countries enj^aj^ed in boycotts a):jairiHt
others, as well as for complianrH? in cftrtain
circumstances with the for'eij^n buyer's <'hoic(;
of certain j^oods anri servicr^s,

U.S. p«;r'sons receiving boycottndatffd r'e-
<)U(fsts will continue trr be r-erjuircfd to report
such receipt to the Secretary of Commerce,
and such reports will continue to be re(juired
to be made publicly available exc(;pt for cer-
t,ain business confidential information.

'I'he lej<islation also preemjrts foririj^n
boycott laws enacted by State lej^islatunis.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Finartce

t\v,ri-Mu\fny <'>!l,j»bli«hir)K the lril.<!rri;il.iiirial }''iin<l for A^-
ricullural l><!V<floprrM'rit,, Dorm at, I{«rriif Juri« \'A,
VAir,. >

SiynaturnH: CrmKo, Mali, Juru; 'M, |{>77; Orifccft, July
I, 1977; UorxJuran, Kaudi Arabia, July r,, I!r77;
I/Karxla, July «, )«77.

' Not In force.

August 1, 1977

163

Ratification Deposited: Denmark, June 28, 1977.

Organization of American States

Charter of the Organization of American States. Signed
at Bogota April 30, 1948. Entered into force De-
cember 13, 1951. TIAS 2361.
Ratification deposited: Surinam, June 8, 1977.

Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States "Protocol of Buenos Aires."
Signed at Buenos Aires February 27, 1967. Entered
into force February 27, 1970. TIAS 6847.
Ratification deposited: Surinam, June 8, 1977.

Seabed Disarmament

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on
the seabed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow February
11, 1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS
7337.
Ratification deposited: Ethiopia, July 14, 1977.

War

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;

Geneva convention for amelioration of the condition of
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed
forces at sea;

Geneva convention relative to the treatment of prison-
ers of war;

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian per-
sons in time of war.

Done at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force
October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2,
1956. TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, and 3365, respectively.
Accession deposited: Yemen (Aden), May 25, 1977.

BILATERAL

Chile

Agreement amending the agreement of April 5, 1955,
granting duty-free entry, e.xemption from internal
ta.xation, and free transportation within Chile to ul-
timate beneficiary for certain relief supplies and
equipment for U.S. rehabilitation and relief agencies.
Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago June 13,
1977. Enters into force on the date on which both
Governments indicate that they have completed the
internal legal requirements for its approval and
promulgation.

India

Agreement modifying the agreement of August 6, 1974,
as modified (TIAS 7915, 8275), relating to trade in
cotton te.xtiles. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington June 13 and 17, 1977. Entered into force
June 17, 1977.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of May 12, 1975, as

amended (TIAS 8079, 8272), relating to trade in cot-
ton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles. Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington May 24, 1977. En-
tered into force May 24, 1977.

Romania

Agreement relating to trade in wool and man-made
fiber textiles, with annex. Effected by exchange of
notes at Bucharest June 17, 1977. Entered into force
June 17, 1977.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement on cooperation in the fields of science and
technology. Signed at Washington July 8, 1977. En-
tered into force July 8, 1977.

1950 "Foreign Relations" Volume:
National Security, Economic Policy

Press release 314 dated July 1

The Department of State released on July 1 "Foreign
Relations of the United States," 1950, volume I, "Na-
tional Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy." The
"Foreign Relations" series has been published continu-
ously since 1861 as the official record of American
foreign policy.

This volume contains 945 pages of previously unpub-
lished documentation (largely newly declassified) on the
regulation of armaments, atomic energy, national secu-
rity policy, defense of the Western Hemisphere, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, foreign finan-
cial policies of the United States, law of the sea, and
Antarctica. Extensive coverage is given to the prepara-
tion and refinement of report NSC [National Security
Council] 68, "United States Objectives and Programs
for National Security," and to the evolution of U.S. se-
curity policies in light of the emergency conditions
created by the Korean War. The volume also contains
documentation on the continuing examination of U.S.
policy regarding the regulation of armaments and
atomic energy in view of the failure of disarmament
negotiations at the United Nations.

"Foreign Relations," 1950, volume I, was prepared in
the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Department of State. Volume I is the fourth volume for
1950 to be published. The three remaining volumes for
the year are in preparation. Copies of volume I (De-
partment of State publication 8887) may be obtained for
$11.00 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders
should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents
and should be sent to the U.S. Government Book Store,
Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

164

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX August 1, 1977 Vol. LXXVII, No. 1988

Arms Control and Disarmament

Controlling Arms Transfers: An Instrument of
U.S. Foreign Policy (Benson) 155

Interview With President Carter by Media Repre-
sentatives, June 24 (excerpts) 159

President Carter's News Conference of June 30
(excerpts) 146

Asia. America's Role in Consolidating a Peaceful
Balance and Promoting Economic Growth in
Asia (Vance) 141

China. President Carter's News Conference of
June 30 (excerpts) 146

Economic Affairs. President Signs 1977 Amend-
ments to Export Administration Act (Carter,
fact sheet) 162

Human Rights

America's Role in Consolidating a Peaceful Bal-
ance and Promoting Economic Growth in Asia
(Vance) 141

Controlling Arms Transfers: An Instrument of
U.S. Foreign Policy (Benson) 155

President Carter's News Conference of June 30
(excerpts) 146

Middle East

Interview With President Carter by Media Repre-
sentatives, June 24 (excerpts) 159

President Carter's News Conference of June 30
(excerpts) 146

Panama. President Carter's News Conference of
June 30 (excerpts) 146

Presidential Documents

Interview With President Carter by Media Repre-
sentatives, June 24 (excerpts) 159

President Carter's News Conference of June 30
(excerpts) 146

President Perez of Venezuela Visits the United
States (Carter, Perez, texts of communiques) . . 151

President Signs 1977 Amendments to Export Ad-
ministration Act (Carter, fact sheet) 162

Publications. 1950 "Foreign Relations" Volume:
National Security, Economic Policy 164

Treaty Information

Current Treaty Actions 163

United States and United Kingdom Sign New
Fisheries Agreement 154

U.S.S.R.

Interview With President Carter by Media Repre-
sentatives, June 24 (excerpts) 159

President Carter's News Conference of June 30
(excerpts) 146

United Kingdom. United States and United King-
dom Sign New Fisheries Agreement 154

Venezuela. President Perez of Venezuela Visits
the United States (Carter, Perez, texts of com-
muniques) 151

Name Index

Benson, Lucy Wilson 155

Carter, President 146, 151, 159, 162

Perez, Carlos Andres 151

Vance, Secretary 141

Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: July 1 1-17

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

"■328 7/11 William V. Shannon sworn in as Am-
bassador to Ireland (biographic
data).

*329 7/11 Marvin L. Warner sworn in as Am-
bassador to Switzerland (biographic
data).

'*330 7/11 27 international energy experts visit
the U.S.

*331 7/12 Philip M. Kaiser sworn in as Ambas-
sador to Hungary (biographic data).

*332 7/12 U.S., Belgium renew memorandum of
understanding on passenger charter
air services.

*333 7/12 Shipping Coordinating Committee,
Subcommittee on Safety of Life at
Sea, working group on radiocom-
munications, Aug. 15.

*334 7/15 Leonard Woodcock sworn in as Chief,
U.S. Liaison Office, Peking, July 11
(biographic data).

* Not printed.

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

postage and fees paid
Department of State STA-SOI

Third Class

/J:

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXVII • No. 1989 • August 8, 1977

THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA:

BUILDING POSITIVE RELATIONS

Address by Secretary Vance 165

PLANNING A SAFEGUARDABLE NUCLEAR FUTURE
Address by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 183

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXVII, No. 1989
August 8, 1977

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington. D.C. 20402

PRICE-.

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,

domestic $42.50. foreign $53.15

Single copy ^5 cents

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

The United States and Africa: Building Positive Relations

Addi-ess by Secretary Vance ^

This is a special occasion for me to meet
with you and to discuss with you such an im-
portant subject: American relations with
Africa.

Before I turn to our main topic, I would like
to add a personal note about the man who has
led this organization and who has been a voice
for justice and freedom for nearly five dec-
ades. I speak of Roy Wilkins [outgoing execu-
tive director of the NAACP] — a personal
friend, a man I have admired through the
years.

Roy Wilkins has not finished his work.
There remains an important agenda which he
helped fashion — an agenda of human rights
and social justice. I know that President Car-
ter and others in his Administration will con-
tinue to seek his help, be inspired by his
strength, and strive for what he believes to be
just.

While guiding the NAACP, Roy never lost
sight of the importance which Africa has had
for our nation. Africa matters very much to
the United States. This is a fact more and
more Americans are coming to understand.

You in the NAACP have recognized this
fact since the first days of your organization,
almost 70 years ago — in sponsoring the first
Pan African Congress in 1919; in your calls,
during the days of the Marshall plan, for ef-
fective assistance, as well, to Africa, the
Caribbean, and other developing areas.

We in a new Administration hope that we
can show similar vision as we build our
policies toward Africa.

' Made before the annual convention of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) at St. Louis, Mo., on July 1, 1977 (text from
press release 316).

August 8, 1977

We proceed from a basic proposition: that
our policies must recognize the unique iden-
tity of Africa. We can be neither right, nor
effective, if we treat Africa simply as one part
of the Third World, or as a testing ground of
East- West competition.

African reality is incredibly diverse. But
out of this diversity comes a general fact of
great importance: Africa has an enormous
potential — in human talent, in resources to be
developed, in energy to be harnessed.

Let us consider how this is true in terms of
our own national interests; for Africa's poten-
tial is tied to our own.

— The success or failure of the search for
racial justice and peace in southern Africa will
have profound effects among the American
people. And our participation in that search is
based on the values of our own society.

— The role of the African nations at the
United Nations, and in other multilateral
bodies, is pivotal. One-third of the U.N.
member states are African.

— Africa's mineral and agricultural wealth
already provides a substantial portion of our
imports of such commodities as copper, cobalt,
and manganese for our industries, and cocoa
and coffee for our homes. And Africa supplies
38 percent of our crude petroleum imports.

— Our direct investment in sub-Saharan Af-
rica has increased nearly sixfold over the past
15 years; our trade now is almost 12 times
what it was then. And the pattern of our trade
with Africa includes an even larger share for
black Africa. Trade with South Africa in 1960
was 39 percent of our commerce with Africa;
now, our trade with Nigeria alone is double
the value of that with South Africa.

— Beyond these political and economic ties

165

that bind our futures, there are the social and
cultural links from which we have benefited
greatly. Our society and culture are enriched
by the heritage so many Americans find in Af-
rica. We experience this enrichment every
day — in our literature, our art, our music, and
our social values.

During the past few months, as we have
considered the specific policies I will discuss
today, a number of broad points have
emerged. They define the general nature of
our approach.

First, the most effective policies toward Af-
rica are affirmative policies. They should not
be reactive to what other powers do, nor to
crises as they arise. Daily headlines should
not set our agenda for progress. A negative,
reactive American policy that seeks only to
oppose Soviet or Cuban involvement in Africa
would be both dangerous and futile. Our best
course is to help resolve the problems which
create opportunities for external intervention.

Second, our objective must be to foster a
prosperous and strong Africa that is at peace
with itself and at peace with the world. The
long-term success of our African policy will
depend more on our actual assistance to Afri-
can development and our ability to help Afri-
cans resolve their disputes than on maneuvers
for short-term diplomatic advantage.

Third, our policies should recognize and
encourage African natioiialism. Having won
independence, African nations will defend it
against challenges from any source. If we try
to impose American solutions for African
problems, we may sow division among the Af-
ricans and undermine their ability to oppose
efforts at domination by others. We will not
do so.

Fourth, our policies must reflect our na-
tional values. Our deep belief in human
rights — political, economic, and social — leads
us to policies that support their promotion
throughout Africa. This means concern for in-
dividuals whose rights are threatened any-
where on the continent. And it means making
our best effort peacefully to promote racial
justice in southern Africa. In this we join the
many African nations who, having won their
freedom, are determined that all of Africa
shall be free.

Fifth, our ties with Africa are not only>
political, but cultural and econoniic as well.
It is the latter two that are most enduring.

And finally, we will seek openness in our
dealings with African states. We are willing
to discuss any issue, African or global; to
broaden our dialogue with African nations;
and to try to work with them, even when we
may not agree.

Only thus can we promote our views with-
out rancor. Our renewed relations with the
People's Republic of the Congo, our experi-
ence at the recent conference on southern Af-
rica in Maputo [U.N. -sponsored International
Conference in Support of the Peoples of Zim-
babwe and Namibia, May 16-21], and our
work with African delegations at the United
Nations all demonstrate the value of this
approach.

In the end, of course, our Africa policy, will
be judged by results, not intentions.

Assistance for Human Needs

One of Africa's principal concerns is that its
basic human needs be met. Despite its vast
resources, it is still one of the least developed
areas of the world. Eighteen of the twenty-
eight least developed countries in the world
are African.

We are prepared to help.

In addition to our growing trade and in-
vestment relationships with African nations,
we are committed to providing economic as-
sistance that will directly improve the lives of
those most in need. Turning this principle into
practice cannot be accomplished overnight.
But it must be done.

Our economic assistance to Africa is being
increased from $271 million in fiscal year 1976
to a projected $450 million in fiscal year 1978.
We hope that assistance from our European
friends will also increase, and expect to con-
sult with them on how we all can make the
most effective contributions.

To help our aid reach rural villages, we will
emphasize support for the development and
sharing of appropriate technology and tech-
niques. I have in mind such devices as small
farm machinery now being manufactured in
Senegal, Upper Volta, Mali, and elsewhere;
hand-hydraulic palm oil presses in Nigeria;

have sat
;di
port for
Irj-toasi
Luppro]
Weal:
states fi
thi

166

Department of State Bulletin

""'j and basic agricultural extension methods that
"*". lave succeeded in one nation and could be
'8 applied in another. We will also expand sup-
' "'"■ sort for agricultural research in Africa and
''jn? try to assure that our own technical assistance
■'His appropriate to African requirements.
*; We also acknowledge the needs of African
"«'e states for advanced techniques that will en-
able them to develop and process more of
iiith. their own natural resources.

the

^Af.

SOI

ght,

Our Agency for International Development,
headed by Governor [John J.] Gilligan, is de-
termined to cut down on red tape in approving
assistance projects, so it can respond quickly
and effectively. Greater attention will be
given to projects which can be started quickly
and require minimal outside technical assist-
ance or e.xpensive equipment.

Men and women are more important than
machines. Africa's natural resources will be
developed by Africa's people. Human de-
velopment is thus the key to Africa's future.
While we will provide additional opportunities
for Africans to study here, emphasis will be
on programs of training and education in
Africa.

We must also remember the importance of
Africa's infrastructure. It is a vast continent,
and improved transport and communications
are essential to its welfare.

I am aware, as I indicate these directions
for our programs, how tempting, but mista-
ken, it would be to design blueprints for
another continent's development. We can only
work effectively if we work cooperatively with
African governments in behalf of their de-
velopment priorities. Accordingly, we will
seek to increase our contribution to the Afri-
can Development Fund. And we are request-
ing from the Congress $200 million for the
Sahel, to be managed in coordination with the
Club du Sahel.

The long drought in the Sahel devastated
the economies of some of the poorest countries
in the world. Now these countries are working
together to become self-sufficient in food pro-
duction and to develop the ability to withstand
future droughts.

In the Club du Sahel, the African states
plan together for the region. The donor na-
tions participate in the planning and deter-
mine how each can assist most effectively.

August 8, 1977

They then commit the resources necessary to
meet their goals. In this process, we are dis-
covering the great value of encouraging coor-
dination among African states; of planning
with them and with other donors; and of con-
centrating on regional problems rather than
isolated projects. For it will be essential that
sensible and effective programs be planned
and implemented.

America can fully support African develop-
ment only if we meet the kind of commitments
I have outlined. I hope that every citizen with
an interest in Africa will make it clear, to the
Congress and to us in the executive branch,
that he or she wants those commitments met.

Promotion of Human Rights

While we address the reality of human need
in Africa, we must also do what we can in be-
half of human justice there.

We will be firm in our support of individual
human rights. Our concern is not limited to
any one region of the continent.

We must understand the diversity of Afri-
can social and value systems. Gross violations
of individual human dignity are no more ac-
ceptable in African terms than in ours. One of
the most significant events in modern African
history — and in the international effort to
promote human rights — was the recent deci-
sion by Commonwealth countries to condemn
the "massive violation of human rights" in
Uganda. Many African nations took part in
this decision. Their action should be
applauded.

Abuse of human rights is wrong on any
grounds. It is particularly offensive when it is
on the basis of race. In southern Africa, issues
of race, of justice, and of self-determination
have built to a crisis.

—The conflict in Rhodesia is growing.
Rhodesian incursions into neighboring coun-
tries exacerbate an already dangerous situa-
tion and deserve the condemnation they have
received. The choice between negotiated set-
tlement and violent solution must be made
now. The same is true for Namibia. Many
lives — black and white — hang in the balance.

— The risk of increased foreign involvement
is real.

— Violence within South Africa grows.

167

There may be more time there than in
Rhodesia and Namibia for people of goodwill
to achieve a solution. But progress must soon
be made, or goodwill could be lost.

— Crisis within the region has brought pres-
sure for stronger action at the United Na-
tions, and appeals to our responsibilities
under its charter.

This is the reality we face. The dangers, our
interests, and our values, as well as the de-
sires of the Africans themselves, require our
involvement — and our most dedicated and
practical efforts.

We cannot impose solutions in southern Af-
rica. We cannot dictate terms to any of the
parties; our leverage is limited.

But we are among the few governments in
the world that can talk to both white and
black Africans frankly and yet with a measure
of trust. We would lose our ability to be help-
ful if we lost that trust. It is therefore essen-
tial that our policies of encouraging justice for
people of all races in southern Africa be clear
to all.

After careful consideration, this Adminis-
tration has decided to pursue actively solu-
tions to all three southern African
problems — Rhodesia, Namibia, and the situa-
tion within South Africa itself. These prob-
lems must be addressed together, for they are
intertwined.

Some have argued that apartheid in South
Africa should be ignored for the time being, in
order to concentrate on achieving progress on
Rhodesia and Namibia. Such a policy would be
wrong and would not work.

— It would be blind to the reality that the
beginning of progress must be made soon
within South Africa, if there is to be a possi-
bility of peaceful solutions in the longer run;

— It could mislead the South Africans about
our real concerns;

— It would prejudice our relations with our
African friends;

— It would do a disservice to our own be-
liefs; and

— It would discourage those of all races who
are working for peaceful progress within
South Africa.

We believe that we can effectively influence

South Africa on Rhodesia and Namibia while ■
expressing our concerns about apartheid. Im-
plicit in that belief is the judgment that prog-
ress in all three areas is strongly in the inter-
est of the South African Government.

We believe that whites as well as blacks
must have a future in Namibia, Zimbabwe,
and South Africa. We also believe that their
security lies in progress. Intransigence will
only lead to greater insecurity.

We will welcome and recognize positive ac-
tion by South Africa on each of these three
issues. But the need is real for progress on all
of them.

Let me review briefly our approach to each.

Rhodesia

We are actively supporting a British initia-
tive to achieve a negotiated settlement of the
Rhodesian crisis. In coming weeks, we will be
seeking agreement on a constitution that
would allow free elections, open to all parties
and in which all of voting age could participate
equally. These elections would establish the
government of an independent Zimbabwe.
Our goal is that this be accomplished during
1978.

This constitution should include a justiciable
bill of rights and an independent judiciary, so
that the rights of all citizens, of all races, are
protected.

We also hope to lend greater assistance to
the peoples of neighboring nations whose lives
have been disrupted by the crisis in southern
Africa.

Namibia

In Namibia a solution leading to independ-
ence is being sought through the efforts of the
five Western members of the Security Coun-
cil, with South Africa, the United Nations,
and other interested parties, including the
South West Africa People's Organization.
That solution would include free elections in
which the United Nations is involved, free-
dom for political prisoners, repeal of
discriminatory laws and regulations, and the
withdrawal of instruments of South African
authority as the elections are held and inde-
pendence achieved.

168

Department of State Bulletin

On the basis of our discussions thus far, we
are encouraged by the prospects for an inde-
pendent Namibia, one which will take its
rightful place in the African and world com-
munity. We welcome the indications of flexi-
bility on the part of South Africa. We are
gratified by the confidence shown by many
African governments in the efforts of the
United States and Western associates on the
Security Council. Differences remain, how-
ever, and progress will require a willingness
on all sides to be openminded and forthcom-
ing. But we will persevere.

South Africa

While pursuing these efforts for peace and
justice in Namibia and Rhodesia, we have also
expressed to the South African Government
our firm belief in the benefits of a progressive
transformation of South African society. This
would mean an end to racial discrimination
and the establishment of a new course toward
full political participation by all South
Africans.

The specific form of government through
which this participation could be expressed is
a matter for the people of South Africa to de-
cide. There are many ways in which the indi-
vidual rights of all citizens within South Af-
rica could be protected. The key to the future
is that South African citizens of all races now
begin a dialogue on how to achieve this better
future.

The South African Government's policy of
establishing separate homelands for black
South Africans was devised without reference
to the wishes of the blacks themselves. For
this reason, and because we do not believe it
constitutes a fair or viable solution to South
Africa's problems, we oppose this policy. We
did not recognize the Transkei, and we will
not recognize Bophuthatswana if its inde-
pendence is proclaimed in December, as
scheduled.

We deeply hope that the South African
Government will play a progressive role on
the three issues I have discussed. We will
applaud such efforts. If there is no progress,
our relations will inevitably suffer.

We cannot defend a government that is

August 8, 1977

based on a system of racial domination and
remain true to ourselves. For our policy to-
ward South Africa is reinforced by change in
our own society. The activities of the NAACP
are a testament to the inseparability of our
foreign and domestic goals. It is also entirely
fitting that Andy Young [U.S. Ambassador to
the United Nations], who has done so much in
the struggle against our divisions at home,
should now be contributing so well to the
design and effectiveness of our policies a-
broad.

I have heard some suggest that we must
support the white governments in southern
Africa, come what may, since they are anti-
Communist. In fact, the continued denial of
racial justice in southern Africa encourages
the possibilities for outside intervention.

Similarly, when such crises as the recent
invasion of Zaire arise, we see no advantage
in unilateral responses and emphasizing their
East-West implications. We prefer to work
with African nations, and with our European
allies, in positive efforts to resolve such dis-
putes. As President Carter recently said, it is
best to fight fire with water.

The history of the past 15 years suggests
that efforts by outside powers to dominate
African nations will fail. Our challenge is to
find ways of being supportive without becom-
ing interventionist or intrusive.

We see no benefit if we interject ourselves
into regional disputes. We hope that they can
be resolved through the diplomatic efforts of
the parties themselves in an African setting.

We are aware of the African concern that
we have sometimes seemed more interested in
the activities of other outside powers in Africa
than in Africa itself. They know that some
argue we should almost automatically re-
spond in kind to the increase in Soviet arms
and Cuban personnel in Africa.

We cannot ignore this increase — and we op-
pose it. All sides should be aware that when
outside powers pour substantial quantities of
arms and military personnel into Africa, it
greatly enhances the danger that disputes will
be resolved militarily rather than through
mediation by African states or by the OAU
[Organization of African Unity].

This danger is particularly great in the

169

Horn, where there has been an escalation of
arms transfers from the outside. The current
difficulties in Ethiopia, and the tensions
among nations in the area, present complex
diplomatic challenges. We seek friendship
with all the governments of that region. We
have established an embassy in the new nation
of Djibouti. Its peaceful accession to inde-
pendence marks a step toward stability in
what remains a troubled area.

We will consider sympathetically appeals
for assistance from states which are
threatened by a buildup of foreign military
equipment and advisers on their borders, in
the Horn and elsewhere in Africa. But we
hope such local arms races and the consequent
dangers of deepening outside involvement can
be limited.

In accordance with the policy recently an-
nounced by the President, arms transfers to
Africa will be an exceptional tool of our policy
and will be used only after the most careful
consideration.

We hope that all the major powers will join
us in supporting African nationalism, rather
than fragmenting it, and in concentrating on
economic assistance rather than arms.

Our approach is to build positive relations
with the Africans primarily through support
for their political independence and economic
development and through the strengthening
of our economic, cultural, and social ties. Our

new and positive relationships with nations
like Nigeria encourage us in this course. Our
efforts to build such relations may not seize
the headlines. But this quiet strategy will
produce long-term benefits.

Our relations will be closest with those na-
tions whose views and actions are most con-
gruent with ours. We will never forget or take
old friends for granted. Their continuing
friendship is a fundamental concern; they can
rely on our support. When the territorial in-
tegrity of a friendly state is threatened, we
will continue to respond to requests for ap-
propriate assistance.

We do not insist that there is only one road
to economic progress or one way of expressing
the political will of a people. In so diverse a
continent, we must be prepared to work with
peoples and governments of distinctive and
differing beliefs.

American representatives in Africa met last
May to compare notes and discuss new policy
ideas. They agreed that almost everywhere in
the continent there is a new feeling about
America — a sense of hope, a sense that we
have returned to our ideals.

The future of Africa will be built with Afri-
can hands. Our interests and our ideals will be
served as we offer our own support. It will
require the understanding and approval
of this audience, and of Americans every-
where.

Questions and Answers Following Secretary Vance's Address
Before the NAACP, July '

Q. I ivas pleased to hear you, Secretary
Vance, talking about Africa. That's fine about
Africa, but we have a lot of Afncans here in
America. What are you going to do for us that
are living here, staying here, and who intend

' Opening remarks by William H. Oliver of the Board
of Directors of the NAACP are omitted here (te.xt from
press release 316-A dated July 2).

to die here? What about us? I didn't hear you
say anything about what you're going to do
for us, who are being deyiied right here under
your feet. [Applause.]

Secretary Vance: For the rest of you who
might not have been able to hear, the question
was a statement first that I had spoken much
about what we were going to do for Africa and

170

Department of State Bulletin

the people who live in Africa, and a specific
question: What are we going to do for those
here in the United States?

One of the greatest concerns of our Presi-
dent is to deal with the many existing prob-
lems which exist here in our country. These
domestic problems are not within my sphere
of activity, but I can say a few words about
them.

The concerns are many and varied. They re-
late to problems of the poor in our country, as
they do to the poor in other countries such as
Africa to which I have referred during my
remarks. And I can assure you that this Ad-
ministration is devoting intense study to how
to best meet these many, many problems of
the poor in our country.

There are a variety of programs which are
being discussed now, both in the Congress and
in the Administration itself. I do not consider
myself enough of an expert in those fields to
deal with them in the fashion in which they
should be addressed, but I can assure you that
the concern is there. The concern is in the
President, his Cabinet, and I believe that it
exists clearly also on Capitol Hill. And we
realize that we must address these problems
and come up with solutions that meet them.
[Applause.]

Q. One of the national editorials on the
television said that some weeks ago Ambas-
sador [to the United Nations Andrew] Young
was removed from one of the policymaking
committees of decisionmakei's because of the
pressure placed on the Carter Administration
and because of alleged outspoken views of Mr.
Young. Arid you indicated that he is continu-
ally going to be used in policymaking
situations.

I'd like to knoiv which foreign policy com-
mittee was he removed from, and what can we
do to get him back on there?

Secretary Vance: Let me repeat the ques-
tion. The questioner said that he understood
from — I believe it was a program he had seen
either on television or heard on the radio —
that Andy Young had been removed from one
of the policymaking committees which deals
with foreign policy.

That is not correct. Andy has not been re-

moved from any committee. [Applause.] Andy
is playing a full part in all committees.
[Applause.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, in these United States we
have millions of black Americans who are
American citizens here. We are wondering if
the aid that you mentioned to Africa would be
tantamount to the $13.A billion that was ex-
pended after World War II by the Marshall
plan. Will we have a plan in Africa tan-
tamount to the Marshall plan?

Secretary Vance: The question was, will we
in Africa have a plan in terms of economic as-
sistance which is tantamount to that which
was developed in connection with the Marshall
plan after World War II?

The answer is that we do not have the funds
for such a plan at this time. We have, how-
ever, indicated that we intend to substantially
increase the amount of our foreign assistance.
We have made that statement, and we have
begun to discuss that with the appropriate
Members of the Congress. Whatever program
we come up with, it will require the approval
of the Congress, and it is incumbent upon us
and incumbent upon the constituents of the
Congress to persuade them that substantial
increases in foreign aid, and particularly to
countries in continents such as Africa, are of
fundamental importance.

I believe — this Administration believes —
that this is fundamental, not only in terms of
our foreign policy, but in terms of our own
self-interest. And therefore, we are going to
do everything within our power to substan-
tially increase the funds devoted to foreign
assistance. [Applause.]

Q. My question is: In Vienna, during the
conference between Vice President Mondale
and South Africa's Prime Minister Vorster,
what items were discussed; and on these
items, what points did Vice President Mon-
dale and Prime Minister Vorster agree on,
and what items did they disagree on?

Secretary Vance: The question was, in the
conference which took place in Vienna be-
tween the Vice President and Prime Minister
Vorster, what items were discussed and which
items did they reach agreement on and on
which did they fail to agree?

August 8, 1977

171

The items which were discussed were ba-
sically three in nature: Rhodesia, Namibia,
and South Africa. There was a good deal of
agreement reached on the first two issues.
There was a sharp division and a lack of
agreement upon the issue of South Africa.

What I said today essentially reflects the
same kinds of things that Vice President
Mondale said during that conference in
Vienna. [Applause.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, unemployment is ram-
pant throughout the United States, and it af-
fects the minorities the greatest.

In terms of the import of cars coming into
the United States, what control does the State
Department have, or what control can they
engender, over this situation which affects the
employment of Americans when these imports
are corning in and are cutting down on the
production of cars?

We notice, for example, that Volkswagen in
Pennsylvania and other cities in the United
States make cars here, but they discriminate
against minorities. And we think if a foreign
country comes here and makes cars, they
should have an open policy in the hiring of
minorities, and we want to know what the
State Department can do with respect to re-
ducing our unemployment rate here in the
United States.

Secretary Vance: The question was, what
effect, if any, does the State Department have
with respect to importation policies, particu-
larly the importation of foreign cars into the
United States?

Those policies are determined by two basic
sources — one, by treaties which have been
negotiated with foreign countries and in in-
ternational organizations, such as the multina-
tional trade conference which is currently
going on in Geneva. And the other part, of
course, is in domestic legislation, which may
specifically affect specific commodities.

There is really quite little that the State
Department has to do with this. This is ba-
sically a matter which is determined by the
question of the overall government policy, in
which we have an input which deals with the
question of what our trade policies will be. We
have an input, but that is a combined govern-

ment program and policy-formulating
process — and also by what takes place in
terms of actual legislation developed on the
Hill. We have a say, but we are not the ulti-
mate determinant.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there anything ivithin
the power of the Department to have any influ-
ence upon the terrible treatment that has been
accorded to young people, children, in Soweto
and other parts of South Africa, who are pro-
testing the system there? I've never seen such
brutality against young people, children.

Secretary Vance: The question was, what, if
anything, can the State Department do about
the treatment of young people — the inhuman
treatment which has occurred in Soweto?

The answer to that is we have made our
views very clearly known on this issue to the
South African Government and have ex-
pressed our views publicly on those issues.
That is the general nature of how we can
bring our views and our convictions to bear.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your address this
morning you mentioned specifically about a
new direction and a new thrust on educa-
tional programs iyi Africa. You mentioned
that not only would Africans perhaps come to
the United States, as they have in the past,
but there would be an emphasis on having
scholars in America perhaps study in Africa.

Could you expand upon that to suggest the
dimensions of something like the Fulbright
fellowship program that could give great im-
petus to the intercultural expansion and un-
derstanding, plus communications, that we so
vitally yieed? [Applause.]

Secretary Vance: The answer is that we are
in the process of formulating specific sugges-
tions and programs in this area. We have not
completed our work yet. It would include
some of the kinds of things that you are talk-
ing about, and it would also include educa-
tional programs at the primary and secondary
level, as well as at the levels of higher educa-
tion. [Applause.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, will Andy Young be able
to speak as he wants to and not be muzzled
each time he makes a speech to come back to
satisfy the ego of certain ivhite nations? Will

172

Department of State Bulletin

he be able to speak without beivg muzzled
down and then come back a)id make us poor
folk to size and make it soioid a little better?

Secretary Vance: Andy himself — the answer
is, yes.

Mr. Oliver: Could you hear the question?

Voices: No.

Secretary Vance: The question was, will
Andy Young be able to speak his piece on
whatever subject comes up, or will he be
muzzled?

The answer is Andy, of course, won't be
muzzled. Andy will speak his piece as he has
in the past. [Applause.]

Mr. Oliver: This last part of this session is
going to be devoted to questions from the
press.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your speech just
awhile ago you mentioned that our economic
assistance to Africa has been increased $271
million in 1976 to a projected $4^50 million in
1978. Can you give us some specifics of how
this will be spent?

Secretary Vance: Yes. I could give you — the
question made reference to the fact that I re-
ferred in my speech to an increase from some
$270 million to over $400 million in our assist-
ance programs to Africa. And the question
was, could I give some specifics? I gather the
question is, where are the increases?

The principal increases are in two areas.
One is in the contribution to the Sahel fund,
which I referred to. And the other is to a spe-
cial southern Africa fund, which will be used
to deal with the problems of southern Africa,
and particularly those nations which have
been suffering as a result of the fighting and
other difficult problems which are affecting
the lives of the people in southern Africa.

Q. I wonder, Mr. Secretary , if the current
political unrest in Ghana has resulted in a
political upheaval? And if so, is this going to
affect our aid to their country?

Secretary Vance: I'm afraid I didn't hear
your question.

Q. Has the current political unrest in
Ghana resulted in a political upheaval, and if
it has, would this affect our aid to Ghana?

August 8, 1977

Secretary Vance: There has been no change
in our situation with respect to aid to Ghana,
and I really have nothing more to say on that
at this point.

Q. About the political unrest, can you speak
to that?

Secretary Vance: Not at this point, no.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your remarks you
mentioned the conditions in what you call
for — or what the govern ment has called for — a
peaceful resolution to the crisis in Rhodesia,
heading toward majority rule in 1978 and free
elections by that time.

hi essence, is this not the position that Ian
Smith has agreed to, himself? And from what
I understand, the nationalist leaders have
called for a withdrawal of the white Rhode-
sian army before any elections can take place
and a democratization of the country before
that time. Ajid what is the U.S. policy on the
white Rhodesian army, relative to so-called
free elections?

Secretary Vance: The question is a rather
long one. The question is, what is the differ-
ence between what I had said about a pro-
posed peaceful solution of the Rhodesian prob-
lem as compared with what had been
suggested by Mr. Smith?

There are many, many differences between
the two. What we and the British are trying
to do is to develop a settlement which will
provide for, first, the agi'eement on the basic
constitution. That constitution would then
have to go to the British and to the Rhodesian
Parliaments to be approved.

Secondly, there would be a transition period
during which preparations would be made for
an election. During that transition period
there would have to be an interim government
which would be governing Rhodesia. That
government would require a law and order
force to support it.

The suggestions which we and the British
have made are that that force would probably
require outside police forces to make sure that
this was properly carried out.

There are various ways that this might be
done — aid by a U.N. police-type force or by,
say, a Commonwealth force that could act as
the law and order force during that period of

173

time. But this would then all lead to elections
in which all people would have a vote. And the
result of that would determine who the lead-
ers would be.

Q. I would like to know specifically which
types of aid are being giveyi and in which
area. In other words, hoiv much of it is eco-
nomic, how much is nnlitary, and how much
of it is so-called advisory — such as Peace
Corps experts — you know, something along
that line?

Secretary Vance: I cannot give you all the
precise details on that. The four hundred and
fifty plus million that I was talking about is all
economic assistance. I did not talk anything in
terms of military assistance at that time. I do
not have with me the specific figures on mili-
tary assistance, but it is really quite small.
There are only a few countries which are re-
ceiving specific military assistance, and in
most cases the military assistance is through
foreign military sales and not through grant
aid.

Q. And what about this advisory or the
other? Is that included in the economic?

Secretary Vance: Yes, that's included in
economic.

Mr. Oliver: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

President's News Conference
of July 12

Following are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of a news confer-
ence held by President Carter on July 12.^

The President: Good afternoon, everybody.
Do you have any questions? [Laughter.] Ms.
Thomas [Helen Thomas, United Press Inter-
national].

Q. Mr. President, how do you reconcile
your decision to go ahead with the Jieutron
bomb with your inaugural pledge to eliminate

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents dated July 18, 1977, p. 985.

all nuclear weapons? Also, why didn't you
knojv the money was in the bill? And three,
doesn't this escalate the arms race? And I
have afollowup. [Laughter.]

The President: Well, it's a very serious
question. In the first place, I did not know
what was in the bill. The enhanced radiation
of the neutron bomb has been discussed and
also has been under development for 15 or 20
years. It's not a new concept at all, not a new
weapon.

It does not affect our SALT, or strategic
weapons, negotiations at all. It's strictly de-
signed as a tactical weapon. I think that this
would give us some flexibility.

I have not yet decided whether to advocate
deployment of the neutron bomb. I think the
essence of it is that for a given projectile size
or for a given missilehead size, that the de-
struction that would result from the explosion
of a neutron bomb is much less than the de-
struction from an equivalent weapon of other
types.

The essence of the question is that if the
neutron weapon or atomic weapon ever should
have to be used against enemy forces in oc-
cupied territory of our allies or ourselves, the
destruction would be much less.

Before I make a final decision on the neu-
tron bomb's deployment, I would do a com-
plete impact statement analysis on it, submit
this information to the Congi'ess. But I have
not yet decided whether to approve the neu-
tron bomb. I do think it ought to be one of our
options, however.

Q. Mr. President, if you decided to go
ahead, would you renounce the first use of the
bomb? For example, you would not use it un-
less there was an oppressive enemy action?

The President: This is something that I
have not yet decided. Of course we hope that
we can reach an agreement among all nations
in the future to forgo the use of all atomic
weapons and also to eliminate the possession
of all nuclear weapons.

There are two distinct classes of weapons.
One is the tactical weapons which have not
been under the purview of discussions with
the Soviets or others. The other one is the
strategic nuclear weapons.

174

Department of State Bulletin

But the definition of under what circum-
stances we would use such atomic weapons
has not yet been spelled out publicly. I ob-
viously hope that our continuing inclination
toward peace, shared, I'm sure, by the
Soviets and others, will prevent any use of
atomic weapons. They are there as a deter-
rent, however, and the option for their use
has to be maintained as one of the viable op-
tions.

Q. Mr. President, may I go back to the
neutron bomb?

The President: Please.

Q. How much do you think there is to the
argument that if you have a cleaner weapon,
as you define it, it makes war more possible;
that it might be used? And secondly, where do
you stand on that age-old question of nuclear
weapons in Europe, for instance, as to
whether if you start using them it wouldn't
automatically escalate to a full-scale nuclear
war?

The President: I think one of the concepts
that must be avoided is an exact description
ahead of time of what I, as President, would
do under every conceivable circumstance.

The ownership of atomic weapons and their
potential use is such a horrifying prospect —
their use — that it is a deterrent to a major
confrontation between nations who possess
atomic weapons.

I believe that the nation that uses atomic
weapons first would be under heavy condem-
nation from the other peoples of the world,
unless the circumstances were extremely
gross, such as an unwarranted invasion into
another country.

But I'm eager to work with the Soviet
Union, with China, with France, with Eng-
land, on a continuing basis, so that there will
never be a need for the use of those weapons.

To answer the other part of your question,
my guess is — and no one would certainly
know — that the first use of atomic weapons
might very well quickly lead to a rapid and
uncontrolled escalation in the use of even
more powerful weapons with possibly a
worldwide holocaust resulting.

This is a prospect that is sobering to us all.

and that's why the Soviets and we and others
have worked so hard to try to reach an
agreement in the prohibition against atomic
use.

Q. Sir, could I just follow it up with 07te
question? Doesn't that give you a terrible
paradox? Because if we are inferior on the
ground in Europe ivith the Soviet and Warsaw
Pact forces, if we don't use atomic weapons,
can we and our NATO alliance stop a ground
invasion?

The President: My guess is and my belief is
that without the use of atomic weapons, we
have adequate force strength in NATO to stop
an invasion from the Warsaw Pact forces.

There is some advantage in the commitment
and effectiveness of the forces of a defending
nation if they are fighting on their own in-
vaded territory. And I think this would mean
that in a rough balance that the invading na-
tions would have to have an overwhelming
superior force.

We are now putting, as a much greater
priority in our budget request for defense ex-
penditures, moneys for improving our conven-
tional forces in Europe. In years gone by, 15
or 20 years ago, we had an overwhelming
superiority in nuclear weapons. Now I would
say we have a roughly equivalent strength in
atomic weapons. And so, we must insure that
within the bounds of measurement that our
conventional forces are equivalent also. And I
don't acknowledge at all the fact that an inva-
sion of the Warsaw Pact nations would be suc-
cessful without the use of atomic weapons.

Q. Mr. President, Senator Moynihayi of
Neiv York says that the government, both the
Ford Administration and yours, has avoided
telling American citizens that they are the
subject of massive eavesdropping on the part
of the Soviet Union. If the Senator is correct,
ivhy has the government not alerted American
citizens to the situation ?

Second, do you plan to demand that the
Soviets withdraw their rooftop electronic
equipment? And third, if they do not, will
there be diplomatic reprisals?

The President: Senator Moynihan, as you
know, has been a member of the Nixon Ad-
ministration in the past in a very high official

August 8, 1977

175

position, and he is well able to judge the
knowledge that was possessed by that Admin-
istration.

I think it's accurate to say that any detailed
discussion of the electronics capabilities of dif-
ferent nations' intelligence forces is not a
proper subject for complete discussion.

Within the last number of years, because of
the radio transmission of telephone conversa-
tions, the intercept on a passive basis of these
kinds of transmissions has become a common
ability for nations to pursue. It's not an act of
aggression or war; it's completely passive.

I don't know the full circumstances in-
volved. When I became President, I asked to
have a multidepartmental assessment of the
threat to our own security. We have been em-
barked since I've been in office — and I think
before — in an effort to make impervious to
intercept those telephone lines that were in-
volved directly in national security.

For instance, the lines going into and out of
the Defense Department and my own
office — we try to make sure that they are ca-
bles; they are buried underground; they are
not subject to this electronics type of being
overheard.

Some of the major commercial companies in
our nation who want to prevent any eaves-
dropping on their transactions, commercial
transactions, not involving national security,
also make an attempt to prevent intercepts by
those who listen in on the free air waves.

But I would not interpret this use by the
Soviet Union or by other embassies to be an
act of aggression. And although it may be an
intrusion into our security, I think we are tak-
ing adequate steps now to prevent its creating
a threat to our country.

Q. Mr. President, what do you make of all
the unfriendly rhetoric coming out of Moscow
lately? And do your sources suggest that it
may not just be because of your human rights
campaign?

The President: I don't know how to explain
the unfriendly rhetoric. Our proposals have
been fair and reasonable, and almost all of
them have been made public. We have pur-
sued our hopes for increased friendship with
the Soviet Union, a reduction in nuclear

weaponry, an easing of the tensions between
ourselves and the Soviets through quiet dip-
lomatic channels, with myself talking to the
Soviet Ambassador, with Cy Vance, the Sec-
retary of State, going to Moscow, and in con-
tinuing negotiations at Geneva and other
places by Paul Warnke [Director, U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency and chair-
man of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks] and other representa-
tives of me. I believe that the Soviets,
perhaps, have some political reasons for spel-
ling out or exaggerating the disagreements. I
don't know what those reasons are.

Our positions have been carefully contrived
and constantly reassessed. I have no inclina-
tion to change the positions that we have tak-
en; I think they are fair. And I believe that
calm and persistent and fair negotiations with
the Soviet Union will ultimately lead to in-
creased relationships with them.

And the public statements that the Soviets
make, attacking me personally or our own na-
tion's good faith, are both erroneous and ill-
advised. But Vv'hat their reasons for it might
be, I do not know.

Q. Mr. President, with Mr. Begin coming
to visit, I'd like to ask a question about the
Middle East, a two-part question.

When you talk about the necessity for a
Palestinian homeland, are you thinking of
locating that homela)id in territory that at one
time was Palestine, or in your mind, could it
be located anywhere?

The second part of the questioyi is: Do you
still believe, as you said a few iveeks ago, that
Israel eventually must withdraw with only
minor changes to the pre-1967 borders?

The President: I have not changed my opin-
ion since the earlier statements that I made
concerning the general outline of terms to be
sought at a possible Geneva conference.

We have never tried to define geographical
boundaries for a so-called Palestinian entity.
My own preference, which I have expressed
since I've been President and also as a candi-
date, was that the Palestinian entity, what-
ever form it might take and whatever area it
might occupy, should be tied in with Jordan
and not be independent. But I don't have the
authority nor the inclination to try to impose

{

176

Department of State Bulletin

that preference on the parties that will
negotiate.

I think that in his coming over here to our
country next week, on the 19th, that Prime
Minister Begin is trying to bring with him an
open mind and an ability to go to a possible
peace conference with all items being negoti-
able. He said this publicly, and he's also sent
me private messages to that effect.

I've seen an inclination in the Middle East
in recent days toward an alleviation of ten-
sion. I got a private message from President
Sadat, for instance, that he is going to make
every effort again to comply with the Sinai
agreement.

He had a few extra troops in the territory
that had been identified. He's withdrawing
those. He authorized me to announce that he's
returning with full military honors 19 Israeli
bodies that had been left in Egypt. He's ex-
pressed his willingness to go to Geneva with-
out prior commitments. He's had negotiations
or talks lately with the King of Jordan, and
they have agreed that the Palestinian entity
ought to be tied in with Jordan.

So, there's a general inclination on all par-
ties for success, but I don't think it's advisable
now for me to get any more specific than I
have in the past.

And although I haven't changed my posi-
tion, I want to reemphasize that we are not
going to go to the different nations involved
and say, "This is an American plan. You've
got to accept it as a precondition to going to
Geneva. It's what we think would be fair." It's
been deliberately general in nature, and the
ultimate results would have to be agreed to by
the Arab and Israeli nations.

Q. Mr. President, could I get back to rela-
tions with the Soviet Union?

The President: Yes.

Q. Despite the hopes that you expressed for
better relations, there are several things that
suggest that, in fact, relations have grown
worse between the United States and the
Soviet Union since you took office. Do you
think that's the case, and if .so, where are we
headed in this? Are we seeing an end to the
period of detente?

The President: No. I don't think so. I be-
lieve that it's inherent that tough and public
debates will accrue when controversial issues
are addressed. It would be very easy for me
and the Congress to get along completely
harmoniously if I never made a proposal and if
I agreed with everything the Congress did
and we didn't address any of the controversial
issues like welfare reform, tax reform, reor-
ganization, or energy policy.

The same thing applies to the Soviet Union.
We have never before made an attempt with
the Soviet Union drastically to reduce the
level of atomic weaponry. In the past, we've
put limits on increasing production of atomic
weaponry. We've never tried with the Soviet
Union to get a complete prohibition against all
testing of atomic devices. Now we are trying
to work with the Soviet Union to get this very
controversial and very difficult goal realized.

We've never tried before to work with the
Soviet Union to demilitarize the Indian Ocean
or to restrict any further militarization of that
area. This is a controversial matter. It affects
other nations as well — India, Australia, New
Zealand, Iran, Somalia, and so forth.

So, we are now trying to address some
questions that in the past have been avoided
or delayed.

The question of human rights is one that
obviously has caused some tough debate and
difference of opinion, expressed publicly and
privately. We could have sat quiescently and
never raised the issue of human rights. I be-
lieve that our raising of the issue was compat-
ible with the hopes and dreams and inclina-
tions and commitments of the American
people. And there have been varying kinds of
responses to this pursuit.

We do not initiate all these controversies.
As you know, the "basket" 3 aspect of the
Helsinki agreement would have raised the
human rights question to some degree, absent
any commitment on my part.^

But I don't think that this is an indication of
deteriorated relationships between us and the
Soviets, because we are finally addressing in a

^ For the text of the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki
on Aug. 1, 1975, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323;
for "basket" 3, Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other
Fields, see p. 339.

August 8, 1977

177

forceful way, from different perspectives,
some extremely controversial but important
issues.

So although I would like for us to agree on
everything, I think the period of debate, dis-
agreement, probing, and negotiation was in-
evitable. And I have no apologies to offer, and
I have no regrets about the issues that have
been raised that have proven to be controver-
sial.

The press: Thank you, Mr. President.

Federal German Chancellor Schmidt
Visits Washington

Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany, made an official visit
to Washington July 13-15, during which he
met with President Carter and other govern-
ment officials. Folloiving is a statement is-
sued by the White House on July H.^

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 18

President Carter and the Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut
Schmidt, held three lengthy conversations
during the Chancellor's official visit to Wash-
ington, July 13-15. The Chancellor came to
Washington at the President's invitation, and
the President hosted a White House dinner
for the Chancellor and his party on July 13.
The three meetings between the President
and the Chancellor covered a wide range of
economic, political, and security issues in
which the two nations share an interest.
Those discussions followed on the meetings
the President and Chancellor had in May at
the London summit. In addition to the two
scheduled meetings on Wednesday and
Thursday mornings, the President met pri-
vately with the Chancellor for about one hour

• For an exchange of remarks between President
Carter and Chancellor Schmidt at a welcoming cere-
mony on the South Lawn of the White House and their
exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White House on
July 13, and for President Carter's remarks at the en-
tertainment following the dinner, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated July 18, 1977, pp.
995, 998, and 1002.

Wednesday night following the state dinner.

The President and the Chancellor em-
phasized the closeness of the consultation be-
tween their two governments and their basic
agreement on major issues. They expressed
the belief that the small differences between
their governments in recent months have
often become exaggerated in public accounts,
and they committed themselves to be in direct
touch with one another in the future to make
sure that exaggeration does not recur.

In their first meeting, the President and the
Chancellor discussed the spectrum of relations
between East and West, focusing on SALT
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], other arms
control negotiations, and the upcoming fall
meeting in Belgrade of the Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe. They also
exchanged views on the situation in the Mid-
dle East and on how to move forward with in-
ternational efforts to reduce the risk of nu-
clear proliferation, while still assuring all na-
tions access to the nuclear energy they need.
The President and the Chancellor also dis-
cussed the importance of basic human rights
and its role in international affairs.

The second formal meeting between the two
was devoted largely to MBFR [mutual and
balanced force reductions] and economic is-
sues. The Germans presented some thoughts
on MBFR, and the two sides exchanged views
on how to move the negotiations forward.
With regard to economic issues, there was
broad agreement. The Chancellor met on July
13 with Secretary [of the Treasury W.
Michael] Blumenthal, and the President em-
phasized satisfaction, in his second formal
meeting with the Chancellor, at the Federal
Republic's efforts to assure domestic economic
growth and deal with current accounts
surpluses. The two men agreed on the impor-
tance of economic stability to the political
cohesion of the developed countries and to the
prospects for progress in the dialogue be-
tween the North and South. The President
and the Chancellor also agreed on the need to
move forward this year with international
trade negotiations — expressing pleasure at
the results of recent meetings between the
President's Special Trade Representative,
Robert Strauss, and the European

178

Department of State Bulletin

Communities — to assure adequate interna-
tional financing and to implement the com-
mitments their countries and others under-
took at the London summit in May.

The Chancellor, who last visited the United
States in July 1976 to celebrate the American
Bicentennial, was accompanied by Mrs.
Schmidt. His party also included leaders from
German business, labor, and cultural life. At
the conclusion of their last meeting, the Chan-
cellor invited the President to visit Germany,
and the President accepted in principle, indi-
cating that he looked forward to a visit.

Department Discusses CIEC
and Developing-Country Debt

Following is a statement by Robert J.
Ryan, Jr., Director of the Office of Monetary
Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Development of the House Committee
on International Relations on June 29. ^

I am pleased to discuss the issue of
developing-country debt in the Conference on
International Economic Cooperation [CIEC,
Paris, May 30-June 2], as part of your hear-
ings on "Dollars, Diplomacy, and Develop-
ment."

As necessary background, I will first out-
line the current debt situation of developing
countries. The second part of my statement
will encompass an assessment of the demands
of developing countries in the debt area. I will
then outline the handling of the debt question
at CIEC, including particularly a summary of
the proposals which the United States and the
European Community (EC) made there.

As you requested, I will also discuss the
Special Action Program for low-income de-
veloping countries which was agreed at CIEC.
This program, however, is meant to meet the
needs of low-income countries for additional
resource transfers. It was not linked with the
debt issue.

Since 1973 higher oil prices and a substan-
tial downturn in the industrial world have
greatly complicated the balance-of-payments
situation of non-oil-exporting developing

countries. Their aggregate current account
deficit amounted to only $11 bilHon in 1973. It
reached $38 billion in 1975, before declining
somewhat to roughly $28 billion last year.

In order to preserve development momen-
tum, while adjusting to the new situation, de-
veloping countries have been financing these
deficits by external borrowing on an unpre-
cedented scale. The medium- and long-term
indebtedness of non-oil developing nations
rose from about $90 billion in 1974 to an esti-
mated $145 bilhon in 1976. Their debt service
payments reached roughly $21 billion in 1976,
a 75-percent increase over 1973.

Despite increased availabilities of official
bilateral and multilateral financing, the mag-
nitude of financing requirements turned many
developing countries toward the private mar-
ket. In 1975 and 1976 private markets
supplied roughly one-half of the new credit to
these nations. As a result roughly 40 percent
of their outstanding debt is now attributable
to commercial banks.

While the numbers I have cited are unpre-
cedented, we need to keep the debt situation
of developing countries in perspective.

In the first place a rising level of indebted-
ness does not by itself pose the threat of acute
debt servicing difficulties. The nominal in-
creases are, in fact, far less dramatic when
one allows for the favorable effect on debt
service of inflation and the growth of output
and trade. The average ratio of debt service
to merchandise e.xports for non-oil developing
countries, for example, increased modestly
from 17 percent in 1973 to about 20 percent in
1976.

Secondly, aggregate debt statistics are mis-
leading. They do not reflect the wide diversity
in developing-country situations. We can ob-
tain a more meaningful picture by distinguish-
ing three broad groups of countries, realizing
that there is still considerable variation within
groups.

— A dozen rapidly growing countries with
high per capita incomes account for the lion's

' The complete tran.script of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

August 8, 1977

179

share of developing-country debt. In fact two
of them — Brazil and Mexico — account for
one-third. These 12 countries depend largely
on private markets for external capital. Their
productive and diversified economies are cap-
able of generating adequate export earnings
to service debt and maintain international
creditworthiness. They will face, however, a
substantial bunching of debt service over the
next several years. Their ability to attract
adequate levels of new financing will be con-
tingent on domestic measures to keep their
economies efficient and competitive.

— Low-income developing countries are in a
second category. Particularly hard hit by re-
cent economic events, they confront a serious
resource transfer problem. They continue to
benefit, however, from concessional lending.
Very few have a debt problem as such. In
fact, most have very little debt.

— In the third category are a number of
countries with moderate per capita incomes,
which are in transition. They have begun
blending traditional concessional borrowing
with commercial funds. Many have a vulnera-
ble balance-of-payments situation because
their exports are heavily weighted toward a
few commodities with highly variable prices.
Some have failed to make the necessary debt
management improvements associated with an
expanding commercial debt portfolio. Having
seen their newfound creditworthiness rapidly
tarnished, they now confront a serious finan-
cial bind. Only one, however, has thus far had
to ask for a rescheduling of its official and pri-
vate debt. Aside from this country, and one
other small African nation, there are no offi-
cial debt reschedulings currently on the hori-
zon. Given the present tight payments situa-
tion of many developing countries, there may
be others. In our judgment, however, there
will continue to be relatively few reschedul-
ings.

Assessment of Debt Demands

Eligibility for debt relief has traditionally
been based on a case-by-case examination of
individual debt problems as they arise. Since
1956 there have been 37 international agree-

ments negotiating debt relief for 11 countries.
The creditor club has been the most fre-
quently used forum, but the World Bank has
also sponsored debt negotiations through its
aid consortia for Pakistan and India. The cred-
itor club mechanism has confined its activities
to acute debt problem situations where there
is at least imminent default. It also em-
phasizes the link between debt relief and eco-
nomic performance criteria in order to restore
the debtor's ability to pay in an orderly way.
The IMF [International Monetary Fund] has
played a pivotal role in creditor club renegoti-
ations by providing an assessment of the
debtor's balance-of-payments situation and, in
the great majority of cases, supporting a fi-
nancial program adopted by the debtor
country.

The Group of 77 developing countries in
UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development] argues that this case-by-case
approach in situations of debt crisis is no
longer valid. They see their current balance-
of-payments constraints as a common problem
requiring a common solution, namely im-
mediate and generalized debt relief. Their
emphasis is not on the capacity of individual
countries to service debt, but rather on the
impairment of development objectives be-
cause debt payments absorb limited financial
resources. Essentially, they view generalized
debt relief as a means of supplementing what
they consider to be inadequate flows of de-
velopment assistance. From their point of
view, generalized debt relief is an ideal form
of development assistance since it is uncondi-
tional, untied, and fast disbursing.

This viewpoint was first articulated sys-
tematically in the so-called Manila Declara-
tion, which formed the basis for the position of
developing countries at the UNCTAD IV
Conference in Nairobi in May 1976 [May 5-31].
The Manila Declaration called for debt relief
for those developing nations seeking it in the
form of:

— Cancellation of debt owed by the least
developed, landlocked, and island developing
nations;

— A moratorium for some time on debt serv-

180

Department of State Bulletin

ice payments by other "most seriously af-
fected countries," or a very generous re-
scheduling; and

— Consolidation of the commercial debt of
"interested" developing countries, possibly
via an international financial institution, and
the rescheduling of payments over at least 25
years.

Higher income developing countries, while
formally supporting these demands, clearly
disassociated themselves from them. They
realized that their creditworthiness in inter-
national capital markets would be harmed if
they did.

The United States and other major cred-
itors strongly resisted these demands for im-
mediate debt relief at UNCTAD and continue
to do so. There are good reasons for
opposition.

— Generalized debt relief is a very ineffi-
cient form of resource transfer. There is no
reason to think that countries' current needs
for assistance correspond to the amounts of
debt fhey have accumulated.

— In addition, providing aid in this way
could reward bad policies of the past without
any assurance that future ones will bring ef-
fective utilization of the funds provided.

— Low-income developing countries, which
would be the beneficiaries of the pi'oposals,
generally have little debt. Three countries ac-
count for the bulk of the debt of the low-
income group: India currently is in a strong
balance-of-payments situation; Pakistan al-
ready benefits from a generous multilateral
rescheduling; Egypt receives a large volume
of concessional assistance.

— The granting of immediate and
generalized debt relief would disadvantage a
vast number of developing countries by leav-
ing them to compete for a smaller aid pie. This
occurs because for most donors, debt relief
and direct assistance come from the same
overall appropriation.

— Against this background, the costs of
generalized debt relief for all low-income
countries are high. In 1977 a moratorium on
U.S. concessional debt for these nations would
cost $200 million. The comparable figure for

all developed creditors is $800 million.

— Rescheduling of commercial credits would
dry up new loans for countries borrowing in
international capital markets.

Debt Issue at CIEC

Major creditors at the UNCTAD Confer-
ence remained firmly united against
generalized debt relief. As a result, the out-
come of UNCTAD on the debt question was a
procedural resolution. In the convoluted lan-
guage common on such occasions, it invited
"appropriate existing international fora to de-
termine before the end of 1976 what features
might usefully be discerned from past opera-
tions, together with others that might be
identified in the light of the present situation
. . . which could provide guidance in future
operations relating to debt problems as a basis
for deaUng flexibly with individual cases. . . ."

In everyone's mind, the appropriate forum
referred to was the Conference on Interna-
tional Economic Cooperation, or CIEC. Debt
then emerged as one of the major issues with
which CIEC dealt. In the CIEC discussion,
the Group of 19 developing countries again
pressed hard for immediate generalized debt
relief. They also proposed replacing creditor
clubs with a new institutional mechanism
geared to negotiating debt relief solely on the
basis of development need, without reference
to the existence of an imminent default situa-
tion. This was also unacceptable to the United
States and other major creditors.

The United States and the European Com-
munity, with the support of most other de-
veloped nations, made a counterproposal. It
clearly distinguished between debt relief to
deal with emergency situations and the provi-
sion of appropriate assistance to handle longer
term transfer of resources problems. It also
preserved the case-by-case approach to the
problems of developing countries. It had three
parts.

— First, it defined measures by debtors and
creditors to prevent debt crises from arising.

—Second, it laid out guidelines for creditor
club operations, which would insure equitable

August 8, 1977

181

and efficient treatment for countries ex-
periencing severe debt problems.

— Lastly, it suggested procedures to
maximize assistance to low-income developing
countries experiencing structural balance-of-
payments problems, of which debt is an ele-
ment, which unduly impinge on development
prospects.

The developing countries at CIEC showed
some interest in the U.S. -EC approach. They
consistently maintained, however, that they
could not consider it seriously until their de-
mands for immediate generalized debt re-
scheduling were met. It appeared that the
Group of 19 in CIEC had a negotiating man-
date in this regard from the Group of 77 which
gave them very little leeway. In any case, the
outcome of CIEC early in June was that all
proposals made remained on the table, with-
out agreement on any aspects of the debt is-
sue. We continue to regard the U.S. -EC pro-
posal as a constructive, forthcoming approach
which realistically addresses the difficulties of
developing countries.

Special Action Program

The developed countries in CIEC agreed
that special action should be taken to help
meet the immediate needs of individual low-
income countries for additional economic as-
sistance on concessional terms. They
expressed their \)villingness, subject to legisla-
tive approval, to contribute $1 billion to such
a program. The countries for which this addi-
tional effort will be undertaken is the group
eligible for lending by the IDA [International
Development Association].

Contributions to the program will take var-
ious forms as determined by each donor. The
United States would contribute through addi-
tional funding in its regular bilateral de-
velopment assistance program. In this regard,
the Administration will seek congressional
approval for increased aid which by fiscal year
1979 would result in an extra $375 million of
assistance to low-income countries over pres-
ent levels. The Administration does not plan
to request a separate line appropriation for
the purposes of the Special Action Program,
nor does it plan to adjust in any way the legis-

lative focus of our current bilateral assistance
program.

The European Community will contribute
by providing $385 million to a special account
of the IDA. Other members of the Group of 8
will do so through various bilateral measures.
Sweden, Switzerland, and, in part, Canada
will provide assistance in the form of debt re-
lief. This should not be construed as establish-
ing any connection between the Special Action
Program and the demands of developing coun-
tries for generalized debt relief. Rather, it re-
flects the budgetary situation and assistance
instruments available to these three donors.
The Special Action Program is in no way
meant to be an effort to deal with debt
problems.

At the recent ministerial meeting of the
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development], several OECD nations
who were not part of the Group of 8 in CIEC
indicated an interest in contributing to the
Special Action Program. We hope that other
donors outside the OECD will also make a
parallel effort.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

Extension of the Export Administration Act of 1969.
Hearings and markup before the House Committee on
International Relations. Mar. 1-31, 1977. 403 pp.

Emergency Controls on International Economic Trans-
actions. Hearings before Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Economic Policy and Trade of the House Com-
mittee on International Relations on H.R. 1560 and
H.R. 2382, and markup of Trading With the Enemy
Reform Legislation. Mar. 29-June 13, 1977. 281 pp.

Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control,
Oceans, and International Environment of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations on S. Res. 49, ex-
pressing the sense of the Senate that the United
States Government should seek the agreement of
other governments to a proposed treaty requiring the
preparation of an international environmental impact
statement for any major project, action, or continuing
activity which may be reasonably expected to have a
significant adverse effect on the physical environment
or environmental interests of another nation or a
global commons area. Mar. 31, 1977. 58 pp.

The Marshall Plan Resolution. Hearing and markup be-
fore the Subcommittees on International Operations,
International Organizations, and on Europe and the
Middle East of the House Committee on International
Relations on H.J. Res. 436. May 11, 1977. 59 pp.

182

Department of State Bulletin

Planning A Safeguardable Nuclear Future

Address by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. '

According to a recent poll of Americans
with a keen interest in foreign affairs, the
United States should give first priority to
controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.
Similarly, a national Roper poll in February
found that the general public placed nuclear
proliferation at the top of its list of "extremely
serious problems for future generations." And
in fact President Carter has, from the start of
his election campaign, made curbing nuclear
proliferation one of his top priorities out of a
deep conviction of its importance for future
generations.

Why does nuclear proliferation deserve
such a high priority? Because a multiprolifer-
ated world — a world of many nuclear weapons
powers — will be a far less stable world for all
nations to live in. We are well aware of the
possible outbreaks of war in unstable regions,
of overthrown governments and civil wars in
unstable countries, and of the potential for
damage by terrorist groups. If we imagine
easy access to nuclear explosives being added
to the existing sources of instability, the pic-
ture of the world we envisage is not a pleasant
one. Proliferation of nuclear explosive
capabilities to an increasing number of coun-
tries and transnational terrorist groups would
carry with it an inordinate peril to ourselves
and to the world. It would reduce our ability
to control international crises, have a seri-
ously detrimental effect on our alliances, and
expose our nation to grave risks. It would
greatly increase the danger of catastrophic
nuclear war.

' Made before the Houston Rotary Transition Day
luncheon at Houston, Tex., on June 30, 1977. Mr. Nye is
Deputy to the Under Secretary for Security Assistance,
Science, and Technology.

Some of those who oppose the President's
policy have argued that "the horse is out of
the barn, so why don't we stop worrying?"
But the metaphor is misleading. You have to
change from the singular to the plural, be-
cause it matters how many horses are out of
the barn; it matters how many nations have
nuclear weapons capabilities. Many states
that have decided not to make nuclear
weapons despite their ability to do so would
reassess their decision if proliferation pro-
gressed rapidly. It makes a difference how we
manage the process. Rather than throwing up
our hands and saying that "the genie is out of
the bottle" or "the horse is out of the barn,"
our task is to shape a policy that can slow, if
not stop, the spread of nuclear explosives.

Our goal then is to limit the number of na-
tions with nuclear explosive capabilities. How
can we do it? We have to work on two crucial
elements of the problem — a country's motiva-
tion to build a bomb and its technical ability to
do so. Both elements are critically important.

Motivations to Build Bombs

Let's start with motivation. Just because a
state could build a bomb does not mean it will
choose to do so. In fact, less than a third of
the states with commercial nuclear reactors
have chosen to make nuclear explosives. Thus
we have to try as best we can to reduce incen-
tives to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities.
For example, the security assurances that we
provide to Europe and Japan in the context of
the NATO treaty and our bilateral security
agreement with Japan reduce the incentives
of those countries to seek nuclear weapons
even though they have the technical capability

August 8, 1977

183

to acquire them. In fact, lest we overlook the
obvious, I would say that the security guaran-
tees, where we are able to make them credible
in this post- Vietnam era of public attitudes,
are some of the most important instruments of
our nonproliferation policy.

Another important instrument for affecting
motivation is the Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT), which was signed in 1968 and came into
force in 1970. One hundred and two nations
have now signed this treaty in which non-
weapons states agree not to acquire nuclear
explosive devices. The Nonproliferation
Treaty has helped to create an international
regime in which states agree that their secu-
rity interests would be better served by
avoiding the further spread of the bomb. The
treaty provides reassurances that potential
adversaries are confining their nuclear ac-
tivities to peaceful purposes and that, in the
event of diversion to military purposes, the
safeguard system provided for by the treaty
would give timely warning of any such cheat-
ing. Because it is an indispensable framework
for effective nonproliferation efforts, the
United States continues to seek the widest
possible adherence to the treaty.

The Nonproliferation Treaty is a delicate in-
ternational arrangement. Countries without
nuclear weapons have accepted an explicitly
unequal status in the military area, on the
condition that they be treated equally with
regard to civil nuclear cooperation. The es-
sence of the treaty is a compromise in which
discrimination is accepted in the military
sphere — between nuclear and nonnuclear
weapon states — in return for a promise of
nondiscrimination in the energy benefits of
the atom in the civil sphere. Thus we have to
be careful not to adopt discriminatory policies
on the civil side which would destroy the very
fabric of the treaty and, with it, one of the key
nonproliferation institutions.

In sum, therefore, we must be acutely sen-
sitive to the political and security motivations
that lead states to acquire nuclear explosives.
This means insuring the credibility of existing
security guarantees, making progress in
achieving meaningful and verifiable arms con-
trol agreements, limiting or prohibiting nu-
clear testing, and behaving in a way that de-

values the prestige identified with nuclear
weapons. In conformance with those goals the
President has entered into the strategic arms
limitation and comprehensive test ban negoti-
ations with the Soviet Union and has signed
Protocol I of the treaty of Tlatelolco that aims
to establish a Latin American nuclear free
zone.^

Commercial Nuclear Capabilities

The other half of the proliferation problem
is technical capability. That second aspect
presents us with a very different set of chal-
lenges. As commercial nuclear capabilities
spread, particularly the sensitive facilities of
enrichment and reprocessing that can produce
weapons-usable material, the number of
states near the nuclear weapons threshold
increases.

The problem is how to reconcile the spread
of commercial nuclear capabilities with the
possibility of their military misuse. The prob-
lem is not a new one. Over the past 30 years,
our efforts to deal with the problem have gone
through four phases.

Our first approach was to propose U.N. con-
trol of nuclear energy under the Baruch plan
[in an address before the U.N. Atomic Energy
Commission on June 14, 1946]. When this
failed, we tried a second approach of severely
restricting the export of nuclear technology.
But this did not prevent the Soviet Union and
Britain from obtaining a bomb, and in De-
cember 1953, President Eisenhower launched a
third approach with his atoms-for-peace pro-
gram [in his address before the U.N. General
Assembly]. The idea of the atoms-for-peace
approach was to assist countries in their de-
velopment of civilian nuclear energy, in return
for their guarantees that they would use such
assistance only for peaceful purposes.

The atoms-for-peace approach has been
criticized for promoting nuclear energy in
many instances before it was economically
justified, and, in practice, the implementation
of the program was often mindless. Sensitive

2 President Carter signed Protocol I of the Treaty for
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America on
May 26, 1977; for the text of his remarks on that occa-
sion, see Bulletin of July 4, p. 10.

184

Department of State Bulletin

technologies were declassified prematurely;
guarantees of "peaceful use" were sometimes
so loosely written as to seem to permit explo-
sives; and our government often appeared
more as a pusher than a patrolman. Nonethe-
less, despite the faults in implementation, our
approach between 1954 and 1974 had two
major accomplishments: the isolation of the
commercial fuel cycle from nuclear weapons
uses and the establishment of a general cli-
mate of opinion against the spread of nuclear
weapons capabilities.

The International Safeguards System

The basis for those accomplishments was
the system of international safeguards ad-
ministered by the International Atomic
Energy Agency, or IAEA, an independent,
U.N. agency that was established in Vienna in
1957.

Under the IAEA safeguards systems, coun-
tries must file regular detailed reports on
their civilian nuclear activities with the
agency and must allow international inspec-
tors to visit their nuclear facilities to verify
the reports and to insure that there has been
no diversion of materials from civilian to mili-
tary purposes. Underlying the safeguards
system is a basic bargain in which we assist
other countries in their nuclear energy needs
in return for their accepting the intrusion of
safeguards into their sovereignty.

The easiest way to understand the role of
safeguards is to think of them as analogous to
a burglar alarm system. The existence of a
safeguards system deters diversion and warns
us if it occurs. If there were a diversion of ma-
terials from the peaceful nuclear energy do-
main to the military sphere, the alarm would
ring and there would be time for us and other
countries- to step in with diplomacy and make
a strong representation to the country, or
time to find other means of meeting its secu-
rity needs. But an effective burglar alarm has
to ring in time to allow the police or the
homeowner to act. Similarly, an effective in-
ternational safeguards system has to provide
early enough warning of diversion for diplo-
macy to be effective.

Since 1974 we have begun to have doubts

about whether this safeguards policy that had
worked for two decades would continue to
work in the future. This reassessment was
triggered partly by the Indian explosion of
what they termed a peaceful nuclear device
and partly by the substantial rise in oil prices.
These increased oil prices led to a great in-
crease in the projected demand for nuclear
energy and led people to believe that there
would be a shortage of uranium and that,
therefore, we would have to move quickly
from uranium to plutonium. With that chal-
lenge of 1974, more countries began to desire
their own enrichment and reprocessing
facilities and to think in terms of breeder
reactors.

The Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Why is this a problem? In order to explain
the international political problem this poses,
I have to pause to describe a few basic aspects
of the nuclear fuel cycle.

As you know, the kind of nuclear reactors
we now have use uranium fuel. There are two
types of atom in the uranium that comes out of
the ground— U238 and U235. Only U235 sphts
naturally, giving off energy that can be turned
into electricity or be used as an explosive.
Less than 1 percent of the atoms of natural
uranium are U235. In order to sustain a nu-
clear reaction, we have to separate and dis-
card some of the U238 so that the remaining
uranium is enriched in its percentage of U235.
This enrichment process is a highly classified
and expensive process that we carry out in
three large government plants.

If we enrich uranium too far in U235 (20
percent is the figure often quoted), it can be
used to make bombs. Fortunately the kind of
commercial reactors we have now — often
called light water reactors — require fuel that
is only enriched to 3 percent U235 and thus
can't be used for bombs. In other words, we
are fortunate in our current technology: We
can sell nuclear reactors and fuel without any
direct danger of their being easily or quickly
diverted to making nuclear explosives.

Bombs can be made from highly enriched
uranium: They can also be fashioned from
plutonium. Plutonium is a manmade element

August 8, 1977

185

that does not exist in nature. It is created in a
nuclear reactor when some of that apparently
useless U238 captures a neutron set free in
the fission process and becomes transformed
into plutonium 239.

A worrisome fact about plutonium is that it
needs no enrichment. Once it has been sepa-
rated from the spent fuel that is discharged
from a reactor — the separation is called
reprocessing — the plutonium can be readily
shaped into an explosive. In fact it takes only
a dozen pounds or so to make a bomb similar
in effect to the one dropped on Nagasaki at
the end of World War II.

Plutonium can also be used as a fuel for
reactors. Separated plutonium can be recycled
back into hght water reactors. It can also fuel
another type of reactor called a breeder reac-
tor. One of the great attractions of the
breeder reactor is that by transforming U238
into plutonium, it can create more fuel than it
uses and thus increase the energy production
from uranium fifty-fold.

The commercial success of breeder reactors
is still unproven because their projected high
capital costs may make the electricity pro-
duced from the plutonium they create more
expensive than electricity produced from light
water reactors burning uranium. But for
countries concerned about uranium supply,
plutonium and breeder reactors are appealing.

If the world used only the current type of
reactors and the low enriched fuel for them,
never reprocessed the spent fuel to extract
the plutonium, limited the number of enrich-
ment facilities, and never developed breeder
reactors our current international safeguards
system would work very well, and our prob-
lem of keeping commercial and military uses
of nuclear energy isolated from each other
would have a neat solution.

Unfortunately for such a neat solution,
technology does not stand still, and its inter-
national diffusion is difficult to restrict. If
countries are able to buy or develop enrich-
ment plants, they will have facilities which
allow them to enrich uranium beyond the
3-percent level needed for reactors to the
higher levels needed for a bomb. Similarly, if
countries are able to buy or develop reproc-
essing plants, they also will have easy access

to plutonium that can be used for bombs. This
is why President Carter objected to the Ger-
man sale to Brazil of an enrichment and re-
processing plant in addition to reactors. Our
view is that these facilities are not econom-
ically necessary, at least at this time, and that
in the long run the numbers of such facilities
should be restricted, and preferably managed
under multinational arrangements.

Now the trouble with this spread of sensi-
tive facilities, particularly the change of tech-
nological generations — as the world considers
moving from low enriched uranium technology
to a plutonium technology — is that the new
plutonium technology threatens to empty
safeguards of their central political meaning,
which is time for diplomacy to work. In other
words, the key aspect of safeguards, the key
dimension that has made the system workable
for the previous two decades, threatens to be
eroded by the change in generation of tech-
nology. What we will be faced with will be
stockpiles of pure plutonium available to
states, as well as the flow of fuel from which
plutonium is easily chemically separable. Thus
countries would be able to creep closer to the
threshold of nuclear weapons capability. This
evolution would leave less time for diplomacy
to work in cases where intentions are volatile.

Let me point out that we are not assuming
that the commercial fuel cycle is the only path
or even the best path to a nuclear weapon. It
is neither. If a country clearly started qut to
get a bomb, there are technical reasons why it
would be better to build facilities dedicated to
military purposes. What we are assuming,
however, is that in situations of extreme ten-
sion states may turn to second or third best
instruments to get their hands on weapons
they regard as essential to their security. The
point is that with plutonium readily available,
states may turn to it. And those groups within
countries which want to go nuclear can pursue
an ambiguous path of keeping their options
open until the last minute under a commercial
disguise. To avoid this problem, we must find
a way of keeping a distance between the
commercial fuel cycle and the military uses of
nuclear energy in the next generation of nu-
clear technology. We have to know more than
we do now and to plan carefully before we

186

Department of State Bulletin

enter into the commercial competition of a
plutonium economy.

Assumptions About Plutonium Technology

We have begun by reexamining a basic as-
sumption that has been widely held in the nu-
clear industry in this and other countries for
the past quarter century. The industry has
heretofore proceeded on the assumption that
reprocessing would begin when there were
sufficient light water reactors to justify the
large-scale facilities needed for economic op-
eration and that plutonium would be recycled
in light water reactors until fast breeder reac-
tors are introduced. Foreign nations without
our fossil fuel and natural uranium resources
are even more strongly wedded to the belief
that reprocessing would be needed to reduce
long-term risks from nuclear wastes and that
plutonium stockpiles would be needed at an
early date to achieve energy independence
through the use of breeder reactors.

We have come to realize that a second look
is recjMired at these assumptions of the past.
Legitimate questions are now being raised
about the proliferation implications of sepa-
rated plutonium and the possibility that ter-
rorists might steal plutonium for weapons
purposes. Additional concerns are also being
raised about the health hazards of plutonium.

There are substantial grounds for challeng-
ing the previous assumption that recycling
plutonium in light water reactors is econom-
ically advantageous. Current estimates show
that any such economic advantage would be
marginal at most. Such recycle does not pro-
vide independence and there are other poten-
tial ways of stretching uranium resources.

There is also evidence that waste disposal
problems could be exacerbated, rather than
alleviated, by reprocessing. The question is
whether we have come too far down the
plutonium road or whether there is still time
for a second look.

Our conclusion is that we do have time to
examine fuel cycle alternatives that minimize
proliferation and physical protection risks.
This was the basis for the President's April 7
decisions to defer indefinitely the commer-
cialization of reprocessing and to restructure

the U.S. breeder reactor program. I should
emphasize that our intent is not to turn the
clock back or to deprive any nation of required
energy sources but to explore whether we are
able to shape the future of nuclear technology
to serve our broader purposes, while at the
same time deriving the benefits of its energy
potential.

Particular technologies always reflect cer-
tain social assumptions prevalent at the time
of their origin. For example, the objective of
embarking on reprocessing some 30 years ago
was to derive plutonium in as pure a form as
possible in order to make a bomb. Thus we
chose a way of doing reprocessing that was
good for making bombs. But it is not the only
way to do reprocessing, and our times and our
social assumptions have changed. Today our
societies are more concerned about nonprolif-
eration, and we must look again at alternative
technologies that may have been rejected as
suboptimal in the past but which may today be
preferable because of our changed social
assumptions.

Options and alternatives to reprocessing
and recycle that have long been overlooked or
forgotten because they were out of line with
past policies should be closely examined to as-
sure that failure to develop them was based on
technical judgments that are not altered by
changes in social assumptions. While there is
no simple technical fix to the problem of pro-
liferation, different techniques have different
degrees of proliferation resistance. Our
Energy Research and Development Adminis-
tration (ERDA) will be intensively studying a
number of possibilities that have the potential
to extract additional energy from a nuclear
fuel cycle while making it more proliferation-
resistant. There is no guarantee, of course,
that any of them will prove technically and
economically viable, but the dangers of nu-
clear proliferation demand that they be
explored and that we plan for the next nuclear
generation while we still have time.

And we do have time. Estimates of our nu-
clear power growth rate have been consid-
erably reduced since the days when plans
were set for early commercialization of
plutonium. The Energy Research and De-
velopment Administration projects about 350

August 8, 1977

187

nuclear reactors in the United States by the
year 2000, whereas five years ago the figure
was 1,200 nuclear reactors. Even the pessimis-
tic estimates of U.S. uranium supply of 1.8 mil-
lion tons for proven plus probable reserves are
sufficient to provide fuel loads for the 30-year
lifetime of that number of reactors. Downward
revision of estimated demand for uranium by a
factor of three strengthens our view that we
have time to examine alternatives to the
plutonium breeder.

In addition there are good reasons to be-
lieve that there may be considerably more
uranium than these pessimistic estimates.
ERDA uses a figure twice as high; i.e., 3.6
million tons for proven plus potential re-
serves. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
uses an even higher figure. Other countries,
such as Australia, have told us their resources
are many times larger than current official es-
timates indicate. One of our high priorities is
to gather more information and improve our
estimates of U.S. and world uranium
resources.

International Cooperation

If the United States wei'e the only country
with nuclear technology, this problem of man-
aging the change of nuclear generations would
be difficult enough. But there are already
some 20 countries with nuclear reactor pro-
grams and at least five other countries with
advanced breeder reactor programs.

Our strategy cannot rest upon merely set-
ting a good example but will require active
diplomatic efforts. For one thing, other coun-
tries point out that we have the coal and
uranium resources that allow us to afford such
an example while they do not. This means our
example alone is not compelling to them.
Neither can our strategy be based on passing
domestic laws that prevent nuclear exports
from the United States, for other countries
could quickly step in to fill the order books.
Nor do we have the leverage to coerce other
nations to follow our policy.

In short if we are to achieve our goals, we
have no choice but to work closely with other
countries to try to find mutually beneficial so-
lutions to the problems we all share. The Car-

ter Administration does not believe that nu-
clear isolationism is possible in today's world.
Planning for the future of nuclear power must
be an international effort involving all nations
interested in nuclear power, consumers and
suppliers alike.

A Strategy for the Fourth Phase

I said earlier that the U.S. efforts to deal
with the problem of proliferation have gone
through four phases in the last 30 years. Since
1974 we have been struggling to define the
fourth phase — the successor to the atoms-
for-peace era. We are developing a strategy
for dealing with the capabilities part of the
proliferation problem which includes four
major elements.

First, we continue to emphasize controls of
safeguards. We have told other nations that
we are prepared to continue to provide assist-
ance in development of commercial nuclear
reactor programs if they will accept com-
prehensive safeguards on all their civil nu-
clear activities. At the same time, we are try-
ing to improve safeguards techniques and to
strengthen the IAEA.

Second, we continue to embargo the export
of sensitive facilities and technologies, par-
ticularly ennchment and reprocessing, so as
to delay the spread of weapons-usable mate-
rial and the facilities that produce them. The
new aspect here is that we have encouraged
other supplier nations to exercise similar re-
straint. We have achieved considerable
agreement among the 15 supplier countries
that have met periodically in London since
1975. Less than two weeks ago the West
German Government announced that it would
not export reprocessing technology in the fu-
ture, thus joining France, the Soviet Union,
ourselves, and others in this policy of re-
straint. We believe that this second element
of self-restraint is necessary while the inter-
national community develops ways to shape
the future of nuclear energy so as to reduce
proliferation risks and that it is fully consist-
ent with the objectives of an effective
safeguard system under the IAEA.

A third component of our strategy is to pro-

188

Department of State Bulletin

vide incentives for- other natioyis to forgo the
sensitive technologies of enrichment and re-
processing. These incentives would include
our being able to provide assured supply of
nonsensitive nuclear fuels on a timely,
adequate, reliable, and economic basis at the
front end of the fuel cycle and to insure there
is sufficient spent fuel and nuclear waste stor-
age capacity at the back end of the fuel cycle.
Equally important would be assistance to
other nations in the development of nonnu-
clear energy resources.

On the question of assured fuel supply, we
believe a successful program must assure ac-
cess to adequate supplies of natural uranium
and enrichment services at reasonable prices.
In this connection, as the President an-
nounced on April 7, we will increase U.S. pro-
duction capacity for enriched uranium.
Another essential feature of such a program is
that there should be parallel policies among
suppliers so as to avoid placing any reactor
exporter at a commercial disadvantage. And,
finally, we must be able to assure the prompt
and predictable issuance of export licenses to
those nations willing to abide by our export
conditions.

The problems related to the need to insui'e
adequate spent fuel and nuclear waste storage
are equally urgent. We are presently studying
a wide range of solutions which would, as is
the case with fuel assurances, alleviate the
pressure for acquisition of reprocessing
capabilities. Among others these concepts
under study include making storage capacity
available for the interim storage of foreign
spent fuel and developing international spent
fuel storage arrangements, including regional
centers.

A final aspect of the incentives policy for
the longer term future has to do with nonnu-
clear energy technologies. We recognize that
cooperation and assistance in the development
of nonnuclear energy resources, including ap-
propriate technology, form an important ele-
ment in any nonproliferation strategy. We
are, therefore, exploring how such coopera-
tion might best be carried out.

The fourth and final element of our cun-ent
strategy — and perhaps the most important

element in the long term — is to ask other
countries to jointly study how to avoid prema-
ture commitment to new techyiologies until
they can be adequately safeguarded. On April
7 President Carter called for the establish-
ment of an international Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Evaluation in which we would work with
other countries in investigating fuel cycle
alternatives.

At the economic summit in May, President
Carter discussed this evaluation with the
foreign heads of state. We have also had dis-
cussions in various forums with a number of
other countries on the international Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Evaluation and their response has
generally been favorable. We therefore hope
in the near future to move ahead on this
evaluation and are proceeding now to gain in-
ternational consensus on a detailed approach.
We have been in touch with a broad range of
countries, deliberately avoiding any divisions
between consumers and suppliers, rich and
poor. A key part of this evaluation must be
strong U.S. participation in coordinated re-
search programs to explore ways to extend
the current fuel cycle and to develop a com-
bination of technologies and institutions that
will make future fuel cycles more prolifera-
tion-resistant than the currently planned
plutonium breeder fuel cycle concept.

These then are the elements of our strat-
egy for dealing with the capabilities part of
the proliferation problem — safeguards, re-
straint, incentives, and an international
evaluation of current and future nuclear fuel
cycles. This strategy is imbedded in the nu-
clear export legislation which President Car-
ter submitted to the Congress on April 27.
This legislation will tighten the conditions for
nuclear exports from the United States con-
sistent with our emphasis on safeguards but
avoids a moratorium on exports which would
cripple the incentives element of our policy.

This strategy lies at the heart of the Presi-
dent's decisions to continue and extend a
moratorium on reprocessing and recycling of
plutonium in the United States, to defer early
commercialization of the plutonium breeder,
and to restructure our breeder reactor pro-
gram to search for more proliferation-resis-

Aogust 8, 1977

189

tant and safeguardable breeder fuel cycles.
This point has sometimes been
misunderstood.

We have not opposed other countries"
breeder programs nor have we stopped our
own. On the contrary, we will be spending
$483 million on breeder research next year.
What the President has opposed is a race for
early commercialization before we know how
to keep the same critical distance between
peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy
with the next generation of technology that
we have with the current generation.

I believe we have come a long way since
January 20 in developing a comprehensive in-
ternational approach to the problem of pi'olif-
eration. I see ferment in the international
community which bodes well for the success of
the fuel cycle evaluation.

In our conversations with foreign leaders
ideas now come up which would not have come
up six months ago. A high French official told
me that he did not fully agree with our policy
but admitted that France would have to find
better answers to the questions we posed.
Similarly, I recall a private conversation with
a German official a few weeks ago where he
outlined his ideas for an international solution
to the problem of intermediate spent fuel
storage. His approach had much merit but
also needed to be fleshed out. That I beheve is
a good description of where we stand overall
today.

The world community is increasingly seized
with the problem of nuclear proliferation.
Many ideas are being offered, some of which
will prove useful, and some not, when they
are fully explored. We have a long way to go,
but out of this will come a new international
strategy which will be able to deal with a new
generation of nuclear power technology. The
difficulties of the task are enormous. We can-
not expect nations to come to quick agreement
when longstanding assumptions are being
challenged. Nonetheless I think we will all be
able to look back with satisfaction that the
United States took the lead in trying to per-
suade others that now is the time to plan a
new strategy for a safeguardable nuclear
future.

U.S., U.S.S.R. Renew Agreement
on Science and Technology

Press release 324 dated July 8

The United States and the Soviet Union re-
newed on July 8, 1977, for another five-year
period the Agreement on Cooperation in the
Fields of Science and Technology of May 24,
1972, thus expressing satisfaction with past
achievements and affirming faith in the poten-
tial for continued close cooperation in science
and technology.

The new agreement was signed by the
cochairmen of the Joint Commission on Scien-
tific and Technical Cooperation, Dr. Frank
Press, the President's Science Adviser and
Director of the Office of Science and Technol-
ogy Policy [Executive Office of the Pres-
ident], and Academician V.A. Kirillin, Deputy
Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Minis-
ters and Chairman of the State Committee of
the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers for Science
and Technology.

On July 6 Dr. Press, Academician Kirillin,
and a group of distinguished U.S. and Soviet
scientists conducted the fifth meeting of the
Joint Commission, reviewing progress in the
47 individual projects underway and exchang-
ing views on how to make joint activities even
more effective, responsive to national needs,
and reflecting the highest standards of scien-
tiflc research.

The Joint Commission noted with satisfac-
tion the large number of important joint sym-
posia held, research papers published, and the
close professional and personal contacts that
have developed between hundreds of par-
ticipating U.S. and Soviet specialists. The
Joint Commission decided to hold its following
session in Moscow next year.

Dr. Press and Academician Kirillin ex-
pressed their intention to continue a close
dialogue to encourage and facilitate the im-
plementation of the agreement, reflecting the
willingness and ability of the United States
and the U.S.S.R. to work together on the
basis of equality and for the benefit of the
peoples of their two countries and all
mankind.

190

Department of State Bulletin

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for the unification of certain rules relating
to international transportation by air. Done at War-
saw October 12, 1929. Entered into force February
13, 1933; for the United States October 29, 1934. 49
Stat. 3000.

Notification of succession: Botswana, January 31,
1977; Tonga, January 31, 1977.

Montreal protocol No. 4 to amend the convention for the
unification of certain rules relating to international
carriage by air signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929
(49 Stat. 3000), as amended by the protocol done at
The Hague on September 28, 1955. Done at Montreal
September 25, 1975.'
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, March 11, 1977.

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes.
Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force
provisionally October 1, 1976.

Accession deposited: Hungary (with declarations).
May 23, 1977.

Finance

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag-
ricultural Development. Done at Rome June 13,
1976.'

Ratifications deposited: Norway, July 8, 1977;
Guinea, July 12, 1977.

Inter-American Development Bank

Agreement establishing the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, with annexes. Done at Washington April
8, 1959. Entered into force December 30, 1959. TIAS
4397.

Signature and acceptance deposited: Finland, June
30, 1977.

Load Lines

Amendments to the international convention on load
lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at Lon-
don October 12, 1971.'

Extension to territories by United Kingdom: Ber-
muda, Hong Kong, June 8, 1977.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at
Vienna February 21, 1971. Entered into force August
16, 1976.2
Ratification deposited: Monaco, July 6, 1977.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as

amended (TIAS 4900, 6109, 8505). Adopted at London

October 21, 1969. Enters into force January 20, 1978.

TIAS 8505.

Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, June 21, 1977.
Amendments to the international convention for the

prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as

amended (TIAS 4900, 6109, 8505). Adopted at London

October 12, 1971.'

Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, June 21, 1977.
Amendments to the international convention for the

prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as

amended (TIAS 4900, 6109, 8505). Adopted at London

October 15, 1971.'

Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, June 21, 1977.

Reciprocal Assistance — Inter-American

Protocol of amendment to the inter-American treaty of
reciprocal assistance of September 2, 1967 (TIAS
18;B8). Done at San Jose July 26, 1975.'
Senate advice and consent to ratification: July 19,
1977, with reservation.

Safety at Sea

Amendments to the international convention for the

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at

London November 30, 1966.'

Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, June 9, 1977.
Amendments to the international convention for the

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at

London October 25, 1967.'

Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, June 9, 1977.
Amendments to the international convention for the

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at

London November 26, 1968.' ■

Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, June 9, 1977.
Amendments to the international convention for the

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at

London October 21, 1969.'

Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, June 9, 1977.
Amendments to the international convention for the

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS ,5780). Adopted at

London October 12, 1971.'

Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, June 9, 1977.
Convention on the international regulations for pre-
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London Oc-
tober 20, 1972. Entered into force July 15, 1977.

TIAS 8587.

Accessions deposited: Austria, June 8, 1977; Israel,
June 24, 1977; Japan, June 21, 1977.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecommuni-
cations Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with an-
nexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered
into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Accession deposited: Paraguay, July 18, 1977.

Operating agreement relating to the International Tele-
communications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT),
with annex. Done at Washington August 20, 1971.
Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Signature: Administracion Nacional de Tele-
comunicaciones (ANTELCO), for Paraguay, July
18, 1977.

' Not in force.

2 Not in force for the United States.

August 8, 1977

191

Terrorism

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes
against internationally protected persons, including
diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14,
1973. Entered into force February 20, 1977. TIAS
8532.

Accession deposited: Dominican Republic, July 8,
1977.

Tin

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done
at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force June 14,
1977.
Proclaimed by the President: July 15, 1977.

Tonnage Measurement

International convention on tonnage measurement of
ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23,
1969.'
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, June 21, 1977.

Wheat

Instrument of ratification signed by the President:
July 18, 1977.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid
convention (part of the international wheat agree-
ment) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 1976. En-
tered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain
provisions; July 1, 1976, with respect to other provi-
sions.

instrument of ratification signed by the President:
July 18, 1977.

BILATERAL

Bahrain

Agreement relating to the status of personnel of the
Administrative Support Unit in Bahrain. Effected by
exchange of notes at Manama June 28, 1977. Entered
into force June 28, 1977.

Agreement relating to the deployment of the United
States Middle East Force in Bahrain. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Manama December 23, 1971. En-

tered into force December 23, 1971. TIAS 7263.
Terminated : June 30, 1977.

Bangladesh

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag-
ricultural commodities of April 1, 1977, and agreed
minutes of the same date. Effected by exchange of
notes at Dacca June 30, 1977. Entered into force June
.30, 1977.

Canada

Treaty on the execution of penal sanctions. Signed at
Washington March 2, 1977.'

Senate advice and consent to ratification : July 19,
1977.'

Federal Republic of Germany

Agreement on the stationing of training components of
the Federal Minister of Defense in the United States,
with annexes (stationing agreement). Signed at Bonn
and Washington May 24 and July 6, 1977. Entered
into force July 6, 1977.

Agreement on the provision of United States Army
training to the German Air Force in the United
States with annexes (training agreement). Signed at
Bonn and Washington May 24 and July 6, 1977. En-
tered into force July 6, 1977.

Guyana

Agreement relating to acquisition of domestic and
foreign excess property by Guyana. Signed at Wash-
ington and Georgetown June 6 and July 6, 1977. En-
tered into force July 6, 1977.

Hungary

Agreement extending the air transport agreement of
May 30, 1972, as amended (TIAS 7577, 8096). Effected
by exchange of notes at Budapest May 24 and June 22,
1977. Entered into force June 22, 1977.

Yugoslavia

Agreement extending the agreement of May 14, 1976
(TIAS 8305), relating to interim arrangements for
scheduled air services and annex A of the
nonscheduled air service agreement of September 27,
1973, as amended and extended (TIAS 7819, 8305).
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 17
and June 30, 1977. Entered into force June 30, 1977;
effective April 1, 1977.

' Not in force.

^ With declaration.

192

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX August 8, 1977 Vol. LXXVII, No. 1989

rica

estions and Answers Following Secretary
fance's Address Before the NAACP, July 1 . . . 170

United States and Africa: Building Positive
delations (Vance) 165

US Control and Disarmament
bnning A Safeguardable Nuclear Future

■^ye) 183

lesident's News Conference of July 12

excerpts) 174

tigress

iigressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy 182

department Discusses CIEC and Developing-
""jjountry Debt (Ryan) 179

reloping Countries. Department Discusses
[IIEC and Developing-Country Debt (Ryan) ... 179

vnomic Affairs

Bartment Discusses CIEC and Developing-

pountry Debt (Ryan) 179

estions and Answers Following Secretary
J'ance's Address Before the NAACP, July 1 . . . 170

rope. President's News Conference of July 12
'(excerpts) 174

rmany. Federal German Chancellor Schmidt
fisits Washington (statement issued at conclu-

fion of meetings) 178

ana. Questions and Answers Following Secre-
iry Vance's Address Before the NAACP,

|uiy 1 no

nan Rights

ssident's News Conference of July 12

excerpts) 174

United States and Africa: Building Positive

Relations (Vance) 165

ddle East. President's News Conference of

Illy 12 (excerpts) 174

(libia. The United States and Africa: Build-
ng Positive Relations (Vance) 165

iesidential Documents. President's News Con-
erence of July 12 (excerpts) 174

Iclear Policy. Planning A Safeguardable Nu-
llear Future (Nye) 183

llence and Technology. U.S., U.S.S.R. Renew
Agreement on Science and Technology 190

nth Africa

estions and Answers Following Secretary
/■ance's Address Before the NAACP, July 1 . . . 170
|e United States and Africa: Building Positive
delations (Vance) 165

iithern Rhodesia

Sestions and Answers Following Secretary
Vance's Address Before the NAACP, July 1 . .". 170
The United States and Africa: Building Positive
Relations (Vance) 165

Treaty Information

Current Actions 191

U.S., U.S.S.R. Renew Agreement on Science
and Technology 190

U.S.S.R.

President's News Conference of July 12
(excerpts) 174

U.S., U.S.S.R. Renew Agreement on Science
and Technology 190

Name Index

Carter, President 174

Nye, Joseph S. , Jr 183

Ryan, Robert J. , Jr 179

Vance, Secretary 165, 170

Checklist of Department of State

Press Releases: July 18-24

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20.520.

No.
•335

Date

7/18

•336 7/18

•337
•338

7/18
7/20

Subject

Program for official visit of Prime
Minister Begin of Israel to Wash-
ington, July 18-21.

U.S. National Committee for the In-
ternational Radio Consultative
Committee (CCIR), Aug. 17.

Study Group 5 of the U.S. National
Committee for the CCIR, Aug. 18.

Shipping Coordinating Committee,
Subcommittee on Safety of Life at
Sea, working group on international
multimodal transport and contain-
ers, Aug. 31.

Milton A. Wolf sworn in as Ambas-
sador to Austria (biographic data).

Program for official visit of Prime
Minister Andreotti of Italy to Wash-
ington, July 25-28.

U.S., Haiti amend bilateral textile
agreement.

Vance: remarks with U.K. Foreign
Secretary Owen.

W. Howard Wriggins sworn in as
Ambassador to Sri Lanka (bio-
graphic data).

* Not printed.

*Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

•339

7/20

•340

7/22

•341

7/23

t342

7/23

•343

7/22

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U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON. DC. 20402

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/■3:

77/

/??0

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXVII • No. 1990 • August 15, 1977

PRESIDENT CARTER OUTLINES THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP 193

UNITED STATES OUTLINES IMPROVED U.N. PROGRAMS
TO MEET BASIC NEEDS OF WORLD'S POOR

Address by AID Administrator Gilligan 20Jf

THE U.S. BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND THE CARIBBEAN:
PARTNERS IN GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

Address by Assistant Secretary Todman 214.

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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Vol. LXXVII, No. 1990
August 15, 1977

The Department of State BILLETIS\
a weekly publication issued by tht
Office of Media Services, Bureau
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the governmeni^
with information on developments ir
the field of U.S. foreign relations ane
on the work of the Department ant
the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selectee
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Departi
ment, and statements, addresses, ana
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi^
cers of the Department, as well as speA
cial articles on various phases of inA
ternational affairs and the functions ofl
the Department. Information is in-\
eluded concerning treaties and inter^
national agreements to which tht
United States is or may become a partu
and on treaties of general interne
tional interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field
international relations are also listed.

^f President Carter Outlines the U.S.-Soviet Relationship

Remarks by President Carter *

Our Southern States have a proud tradi-
tion of local, independent government, and
now you're the heirs of that tradition. But
we in the South have also felt, perhaps more
directly than many others, some of the rapid
changes that have taken place in this mod-
ern age. More and more our own lives are
shaped by events in other cities, decisions in
other States, tensions in other parts of the
world.

And as Americans we cannot overlook the
way that our fate is bound to that of other
nations. This interdependence stretches
from the health of our economy through war
and peace, to the security of our own energy
supplies. It's a new world in which we can-
not afford to be narrow in our vision, limited
in our foresight, or selfish in our purpose.

When I took office almost exactly six
months ago, our nation was faced with a
series of problems around the world- — in
southern Africa, the Middle East, in our re-
lationships with our NATO allies, and on
such tough questions as nuclear prolifera-
tion, negotiations with our former adver-
saries, a Panama Canal treaty, human
lights, world poverty.

We have openly and publicly addressed
these and other many difficult and contro-
versial issues — some of which had been
either skirted or postponed in the past.

As I pointed out in a recent press confer-
f^nce, a period of debate, disagreement,
probing was inevitable. Our goal has not

' Made before the Southern Legislative Conference
at Charleston, South Carolina, on .July 21, 1977 (open-
ng paragraphs omitted); text from the Weekly Compi-
iation of Presidential Documents dated Aug. 1, 1977,
p. 1063.

been to reach easy or transient agreements
but to find solutions that are meaningful,
balanced, and lasting.

Now, a President has a responsibility to
present to the people of this nation reports
and summations of complex and important
matters. I feel more secure as President
making decisions if I know that either the
most difficult, the most complex questions
that face me have been understood and de-
bated by you and understood and debated by
the Congress.

In the past I think our nation's leaders
have been guilty of making decisions in se-
cret, and even when the decision turns out
to be the right one, it makes the President,
the Secretary of State speak with a weak
voice, when they speak alone.

Today I want to discuss a vitally impor-
tant aspect of our foreign relations, the one
that may most directly shape the chances for
peace for us and for our children. I would
like to spell out my view of what we have
done and where we are going in our rela-
tions with the Soviet Union, and to reaffirm
the basic principles of our national policy.

I don't have any apology for talking about
foreign affairs at a Southern Legislative Con-
ference, because foreign affairs and those
difficult decisions ought never to be made
with a concept that we can abandon common
sense and the sound judgment and the con-
structive influence of the American people.

For decades the central problems of our
foreign policy revolved around antagonism
between two coalitions, one headed by the
United States and the other headed by the
Soviet Union.

Our national security was often defined

August 15, 1977

193

almost exclusively in terms of military com-
petition with the Soviet Union. This compe-
tition is still critical, because it does involve
issues which could lead to war. But however
important this relationship of military bal-
ance, it cannot be our sole preoccupation, to
the exclusion of other world issues which
also concern us both.

Even if we succeed in relaxing tensions
with the U.S.S.R., we could still awake one
day to find that nuclear weapons have been
spread to dozens of other nations who may
not be as responsible as are we. Or we could
struggle to limit the conventional arsenals of
our two nations to reduce the danger of war,
only to undo our efforts by continuing with-
out constraint to export armaments around
the world.

As two industrial giants, we face long-
term, worldwide energy crises. Whatever
our political differences, both of us are com-
pelled to begin conserving world energy and
developing alternatives to oil and gas.

Despite deep and continuing differences in
world outlook, both of us should accept the
new responsibilities imposed on us by the
changing nature of international relations.
Europe and Japan rose from the rubble of
war to become great economic powers.
Communist parties and governments have
become more widespread and more varied,
and I might say more independent from one
another. Newly independent nations
emerged into what has now become known
as the "Third World." Their role in world af-
fairs is becoming increasingly significant.

Both the United States and the Soviet
Union have learned that our countries and
our people, in spite of great resources, are
not all-powerful. We've learned that this
world, no matter how technology has shrunk
distances, is nevertheless too large and too
varied to come under the sway of either one
or two superpowers. And, what is perhaps
more important of all, we have, for our part,
learned, all of us, this fact, these facts in a
spirit not of increasing resignation but of in-
creasing maturity.

I mention these changes with which you
are familiar because I think that to under-
stand today's Soviet or American relation-

ship, we must place it in perspective, both
historically and in terms of the overall global
scene.

The whole history of Soviet-American re-
lations teaches us that we will be misled if'
we base our long-range policies on the mood
of the moment, whether that mood be
euphoric or grim. All of us can remember
times when relations seemed especially
dangerous and other times when they
seemed especially bright.

We've crossed those peaks and valleys be-
fore. And we can see that, on balance, the
trend in the last third of a century has been
positive.

The profound differences in what our two
governments believe about freedom and
power and the inner lives of human
beings — those differences are likely to re-
main, and so are other elements of competi-
tion between the United States and the
Soviet Union. That competition is real and
deeply rooted in the history and the values
of our respective societies. But it's also true
that our two countries share many important
overlapping interests. Our job — my job,
your job — is to explore those shared inter-
ests and use them to enlarge the areas of
cooperation between us on a basis of equal-
ity and mutual respect.

As we negotiate with the Soviet Union,
we will be guided by a vision — of a gentler,
freer, and more bountiful world. But we will
have no illusions about the nature of the
world as it really is. The basis for complete
mutual trust between us does not yet exist.
Therefore, the agreements that we reach
must be anchored on each side in en-
lightened self-interest — what's best for us,
what's best for the Soviet Union. That's why
we search for areas of agreement where our
real interests and those of the Soviets
coincide.

We want to see the Soviets further en-
gaged in the growing pattern of interna-
tional activities designed to deal with human
problems — not only because they can ba of
real help but because we both should be
seeking for a greater stake in the creation of
a constructive and peaceful world order.

When I took office, many Americans were

194

Department of State Bulletin

growing disillusioned with detente —
President Ford had even quit using the
word — and, by extension, people were con-
cerned with the whole course of our rela-
tions with the Soviet Union. Also, and
perhaps more seriously, world respect for
the essential rightness of American foreign
policy had been shaken by the events of a
decade — Vietnam, Cambodia, CIA, Water-
gate. At the same time, we were beginning
to regain our sense of confidence and our
purpose and unity as a nation.

In this situation, I decided that it was
time for honest discussions about interna-
tional issues with the American people. I
felt that it was urgent to restore the moral
bearings of American foreign policy. And I
felt that it was important to put the U.S.
and Soviet relationship, in particular, on a
more reciprocal, realistic, and ultimately
more productive basis for both nations. It is
not a question of a "hard" policy or of a
"soft" policy but of a clear-eyed recognition
of how most effectively to protect our own
security and to create the kind of interna-
tional order that I've just described. This is
our goal.

We've looked at the problems in Soviet-
American relations in a fresh way, and
we've sought to deal with them boldly and
constructively with proposals intended to
produce concrete results. I'd like to point
out just a few of them.

— In the talks on strategic arms limita-
tions— the SALT talks — we advanced a
comprehensive proposal for genuine reduc-
tions, limitations, and a freeze on new tech-
nology which would maintain balanced
strategic strength.

— We have urged a complete end of all nu-
clear tests, and these negotiations are now
underway. Agreement here could be a mile-
stone in U.S. -Soviet relations.

— We're working together toward a ban on
chemical and biological warfare and the
elimination of inventories of these destruc-
tive materials.

— We have proposed to curb the sales and
transfers of conventional weapons to other
countries, and we've asked France, Britain,

August 15, 1977

'Hi
iia!

and other countries to join with us in this
effort.

— We're attempting to halt the threaten-
ing proliferation of nuclear weapons among
the nations of the world which don't yet
have the ability to set off nuclear explosives.

— We've undertaken serious negotiations
on arms limitations in the Indian Ocean.

— We've encouraged the Soviets to sign,
along with us, the treaty of Tlatelolco, which
would ban the introduction of nuclear
weapons into the southern part of the West-
ern Hemisphere.

— We have begun regular consultations
with the Soviet leaders, as cochairmen of
the prospective Geneva conference, to pro-
mote peace in the Middle East.

— We and our allies are negotiating to-
gether with the Soviet Union and their allies
in the Warsaw Pact nations to reduce the
level of military forces in Europe.

—We've renewed the 1972 agreement for,
cooperation in science and technology, and a
similar agreement for cooperation in outer
space.

— We're seeking ways to cooperate in im-
proving world health and in relieving world
hunger.

In the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT) — confirming and then building on
Vladivostok accords — we need to make
steady progress toward our long-term goals
of genuine reductions and strict limitations,
while maintaining the basic strategic bal-
ance. We've outlined proposals incorporating
significant new elements of arms control,
deep reductions in the arsenals of both
sides, freezing the deployment and technol-
ogy, and restraining certain elements in the
strategic posture of both sides that threaten
to destabilize the balance which now exists.

The Vladivostok negotiations of 1974 left
some issues unresolved and subject to hon-
est differences of interpretation. Meanwhile,
new developments in technology have
created new concerns — the cruise missile,
the very large intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles of the Soviets.

The Soviets are worried about our cruise
missiles, and we are concerned about the se-

195

curity of our own deterrent capability. Our
cruise missiles are aimed at compensating
for the growing threat to our deterrent rep-
resented by the buildup of strategic Soviet
offensive weapons forces. If these threats
can be controlled, and I believe they can,
then we are prepared to limit our own
strategic programs.

But if an agreement cannot be reached,
there should be no doubt that the United
States can and will do what it must to pro-
tect our security and to insure the adequacy
of our strategic posture.

Our new proposals go beyond those that
have been made before. In many areas we
are in fact addressing for the first time the
tough, complex core of longstanding prob-
lems. We are trying for the first time to
reach agreements that will not be over-
turned by the next technological break-
through. We are trying, in a word, for
genuine accommodation.

But none of these proposals that I've out-
lined to you involves the sacrifice of secu-
rity. All of them are meant to increase the
security of both sides. Our view is that a
SALT agreement which just reflects the
lowest common denominator that can be
agreed upon easily will only create an illu-
sion of progress and, eventually, a backlash
against the entire arms control process. Our
view is that genuine progress in SALT will
not merely stabilize competition in weapons
but can also provide a basis for improvement
in political relations as well.

When I say that these efforts are intended
to relax tensions, I'm not speaking only of
military security. I mean as well the concern
among our own individual citizens^Soviet
and American — that comes from the knowl-
edge which all of you have that the leaders
of our two countries have the capacity to de-
stroy human society through misunderstand-
ings or mistakes. If we can relax this ten-
sion by reducing the nuclear threat, not only
will we make the world a safer place but
we'll also free ourselves to concentrate on
constructive action to give the world a bet-
ter life.

We've made some progress toward our
goals, but to be frank, we also hear some

negative comments from the Soviet side
about SALT and about our more general re-
lations. If these comments are based on a
misconception about our motives, then we
will redouble our efforts to make our mo-
tives clear; but if the Soviets are merely
making comments designed as propaganda to
put pressure on us, let no one doubt that we
will persevere.

What matters ultimately is whether we
can create a relationship of cooperation that
will be rooted in the national interests of
both sides. We shape our own policies to ac-
commodate a constantly changing world, and
we hope the Soviets will do the same. To-
gether we can give this change a positive di-
rection.

Increased trade between the United
States and the Soviet Union would help us
both. The American-Soviet Joint Commer-
cial Commission has resumed its meetings
after a long interlude. I hope that conditions
can be created that will make possible steps
toward expanded trade.

In southern Africa we have pressed for
Soviet and Cuban restraint. Throughout the
nonaligned world, our goal is not to encour-
age dissension or to redivide the world into
opposing ideological camps but to expand
the realm of independent, economically self-
reliant nations — and to oppose attempts at
new kinds of subjugation.

Part of the Soviet Union leaders' current
attitude may be due to their apparent — and
incorrect — belief that our concern for human
rights is aimed specifically at them or is an
attack on their vital interests.

There are no hidden meanings in our
commitment to human rights. We stand on
what we have said on the subject of human
rights. Our policy is exactly what it appears
to be: the positive and sincere expression of
our deepest beliefs as a people. It's ad-
dressed not to any particular people or area
of the world but to all countries equally; yes,
including our own country. And it's specif-
ically not designed to heat up the arms race
or bring back the cold war.

On the contrary, I believe that an atmos-
phere of peaceful cooperation is far more
conducive to an increased respect for human

196

Department of State Bulletin

rights than an atmosphere of belligerence or
hatred or warlike confrontation. The experi-
ence of our own country this last century
has proved this over and over again.

We have no illusions that the process will
be quick or that change will come easily. But
we are confident that if we do not abandon
the struggle, the cause of personal freedom
and human dignity will be enhanced in all
nations of the world. We're going to do that.

In the past six months we've made clear
our determination — both to give voice to
Americans' fundamental beliefs and to obtain
lasting solutions to East-West differences. If
this chance to emphasize peace and coopera-
tion instead of animosity and division is al-
lowed to pass, it will not have been our
choice.

We must always combine realism with
principle. Our actions must be faithful to the
essential values to which our own society is
dedicated, because our faith in those values
is the source of our confidence that this rela-
tionship will evolve in a more constructive
direction.

I cannot forecast whether all our efforts
will succeed. But there are things which
give me hope, and in conclusion I would like
to mention them very briefly.

This place where I now stand is one of the
oldest cities in the United States. It's a
beautiful town of whose culture and urban
charm all Americans are proud — ^just as the
people of the Soviet Union are justly proud
of such ancient cities as Tbilisi or Novgorod,
which there they lovingly preserve, as you
in Charleston, and into which they infuse a
new life that makes these cities far more
than just dead remnants of a glorious histor-
ical past. Although there are deep differ-
ences in our values and ideas, we Americans
and Russians belong to the same civilization
whose origins stretch back hundreds of
years.

Beyond all the disagreements between
us — and beyond the cool calculations of
mutual self-interest that our two countries
bring to the negotiating table — is the invisi-
ble human reality that must bring us closer
together. I mean the yearning for peace, real
peace, that is in the very bones of us all.

I'm absolutely certain that the people of
the Soviet Union, who have suffered so
grievously in war, feel this yearning for
peace. And in this they are at one with the
people of the United States. It's up to all of
us to help make that unspoken passion into
something more than just a dream— and that
responsibility falls most heavily on those
like you, of course, but particularly like
President Brezhnev and me, who hold in our
hands the terrible power conferred on us by
the modern engines of war.

Mr. Brezhnev said something very in-
teresting recently, and I quote from his
speech: "It is our belief, our firm belief," he
said, "that realism in politics and the will for
detente and progress will ultimately triumph
and mankind will be able to step into the
21st century in conditions of peace stable as
never before." I see no hidden meanings in
that. I credit its sincerity. And I express
the same hope and belief that Mr. Brezhnev
expressed. With all the difficulties, all the
conflicts, I believe that our planet must fi-
nally obey the Biblical injunction to "follow
after the things which make for peace."

President Carter's Remarks
at Yazoo City, Mississippi

Following are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of a question-and-
answer session at the Yazoo City, Miss., High
School on July 21.^

Q. Mr. President, my name is Everett
Beers. I strongly support your position on
human rights as manifested in your foreign
policy statements. I'm very sorry that I
missed your remarks on human rights this af-
ternoon. But I would like to know, aside from
the rhetoric that's been generated, can we
really hope to influence the world community
on human rights issues, and how can you

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated August 1, 1977, p.
1070.

August 15, 1977

197

conscientiously justify excluding our allies
such as Korea a7id Greece from human rights
commitments and also, have you made an af-
firmative action plan to implernent some
long-range goals in this area?

The President: That's a difficult question to
answer, but I'll do the best I can.

Obviously, throughout the world, I think in
every country without exception in the heart
and mind of every person, there's a desire to
be free, to make one's own decision, to speak
without fear, to have a chance to express
one's political beliefs, to seek different kinds
of employment without interference by gov-
ernment, not to be dominated by officials who
have power, not to be imprisoned without
adequate charge, and not to be tortured when
one is arrested, whether or not a conviction
has been carried out or not.

So what we began to speak for six months
ago is nothing new. It doesn't exist just in
democracies or free countries like ours. It
exists in the nations that are most dominated
by totalitarian governments.

I think that my voice and others like mine
all over the world, including, I hope, yours,
when raised for liberty, for human dignity, for
freedom, have a cumulative effect. We don't
have any desire to go into a country with force
and try to change their form of government.
But I think it's accurate to say now that when
an open spokesman for a minority group any-
where in the world is arrested, that it is a
very newsworthy item.

We have seen recently in Argentina 342
political prisoners, who had been there for a
long time, released. In Korea now just this
week political prisoners who had been in
prison for a long time are being released. And
I think it's accurate to say that the trend is
toward an enhancement of human rights.

In Belgrade, Yugoslavia, this October,
there will be a very open and wide debate — I
would say for at least a couple of months —
part of which will be devoted to human rights,
whether or not families can be joined to-
gether, whether people who want to leave a
country can do so without being punished.
And the Soviet Union signed the Helsinki
treaty, and it will be debated. So did Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the United

States, the Western allies of ours. And all off
us, including us, the United States, are trying
to look good in the eyes of the world.

I think the progress is going to be quite
slow. But I believe in the long run our efforts
will be successful. But I am afraid if the
United States does not take a strong position,
that the cause of human rights is going to be
damaged very severely. And I also believe
we've ignored this question too long.

I think it was time this year, following our
own 200th anniversary, to raise again a bea-
con light that will make our people proud and
say we stand for something. We stand for the
same thing that inspired Thomas Jefferson
and George Washington, Benjamin Franklin,
and others to offer their lives, if necessary, to
found a country based on freedom. And I
think this is a good move.

I've been criticized a good bit for being so
outspoken about it because it might make
some leaders of other nations angry. I'm not
trying to make anybody angiy. I'm not trying
to interfere in the internal affairs of
other nations. I'm not trying to bring back the
cold war, but I'll say this: As long as the
American people back me on the subject, we
will never stay quiet on the subject of human
rights. [Applause.]

Q. Hello, Mr. President. I am Jeff Davis
and my question is, with the Republic of
Panama asking for complete control of the
Panama Canal, do you feel it would he a mis-
take to grant their demand, and do you think
that the Panama Canal Zone would be a vital
base in case of a third world ivar, as Cuba is a
threat to our Southern States?

The President: Fine. In 1903 to 1907, our
country worked out with Panama an arrange-
ment to acquire control of the Panama Canal
Zone and, of course, we built the Panama
Canal. The treaty said that Panama retained
sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone; that
we had control over the Panama Canal Zone
as though we had sovereignty. So even in the
time of Theodore Roosevelt the agreement
was that we and the Panamanians both, in ef-
fect, have sovereignty over the Panama Canal
Zone. They have legal sovereignty. We con-

198

Department of State Bulleti

trol it; to operate after the building of the
Panama Canal itself.

My hope is that we can sign a treaty with
Panama to share with them from now until the
year 2000 the operation of the Panama Canal
itself and to continue after the year 2000 an
adequate authority to protect the Panama
Canal, to keep it open for international use,
giving our own warships priority along with
those of Panama in the use of the canal.

My guess is that before many more years go
by we might very well need a new canal, one
at sea level, that can handle very large ships.
This was studied when Lyndon Johnson was
President, and the cost of it was very high —
several billions of dollars. Since then we have
seen a much greater need for the canal.

We are now looking for a way to get Alaskan
oil and gas to the central part and the Eastern
seaboard of the United States. The large ships
that bring the oil down from Panama can't go
through the canal. If they bring oil, they come
down to the Panama area, off-load the oil into
small ships, the small ships go through the
Panama Canal, and bring the oil up in the fu-
ture to the Gulf coast or the Eastern coast.

On natural gas — when it does come — it will
be liquified at a very, very low temperature,
put in large ships, and brought down perhaps
to the Panama Canal itself. There is no way to
change it back into gas, send it across
Panama, and reliquify it. It costs too much.

So in the future I would say that we will
need a sea level Panama Canal that can handle
our large warships and the large tankers and
freighters that are part of international com-
merce now.

So I think we ought to keep good relations
with Panama. We can prevent an attack on
the Panama Canal by a foreign government. It
would be almost impossible to prevent the
disruption or closing of the Panama Canal by
sabotage if the Panamanians were determined
to put it out of commission. So it is important
for us to work with Panama and not against
Panama.

So to summarize, between now and the year
2000, we will retain under the proposed treaty
our control, partial sovereignty with Panama
having sovereignty as well. This is derived
from 1907. After the year 2000, we will give

up the actual operation of the canal to
Panama, but retain the right to defend it with
our armed forces and to keep it open with first
priority given to American warships and
Panamanian warships to use it. I don't know
what the treaty terms might be, but that's the
best report that I can give you right now.

Q. Mr. President, my name is Susan Griss.
I, too, would like to welcome you to Yazoo
City. I have seen on the news this week that
the United States, under the support of your
Ad )ninist ration, has endorsed and supported
the membership of Vietnam into the United
Nations. The first thing that the Vietnamese
asked for was financial aid from the United
States to rebiiild.

How do you feel about this? Do you expect
the United States to, in fact, support the re-
building effort and support the Vietnamese
financially, and do you think the Congress
will support you, too?

The President: I want to answer — this is
the last question I can answer — I want to an-
swer it in a little bit broader sense, but I
won't ignore your question.

We have a basic decision to make in our
country in our foreign policy about how to
deal with nations who in the past have not
been our friends and who in some instances
have been our enemies on the warfield. Should
we write them off permanently as enemies
and force them to be completely under the
control and influence of Communist powers,
or should we start the process of giving them
an option to be both our friends and the
friends of others, hoping that they will come
to a more democratic free society and join
with us in making a better world?

I'm not in favor of writing those countries
off. It's a controversial issue. I might point
out that the Soviet Union, for instance, has a
very strong effort being made to recruit as
friends our own neighbors in Central America
and South America. And I think that this
peaceful competition with the Soviet Union
for friendship of those nonaligned countries is
good for our country, although it is controver-
sial.

I have tried to open up relationships with

August 15, 1977

199

Vietnam. The leader in the Congress in taking
this initiative happens to be our own Con-
gressman Sonny [Gillespie V.] Montgomery.
He went to Vietnam, I think in a very
courageous and effective way to try to get the
Vietnamese to give us back the bodies of
American servicemen lost in action. When I
got to be President, Congressman Montgom-
ery came to the White House to give me a re-
port on what he had done. Later, I sent
another delegation back to them to ask them
to find those bodies and to return them to us.
They've done a great deal to try to find and
return those bodies since that time. When
Congressman Montgomery went to Vietnam,
they brought back 11 American bodies and
since then the Vietnamese have delivered
others.

We have always, for the last 25 years, op-
posed Vietnam's entry into the United Na-
tions. This year we did not oppose it. And now
Vietnam will be a member of the world com-
munity in the United Nations. I don't have
any apology to make about that action. I am
not in favor of the United States paying any
money or reparations to Vietnam, however.
[Applause.]

Editors and News Directors
Interview President Carter

Following are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from President Carter's opening re-
marks ayid a question and answer from the
transcript of an intervieiv by a group of
editors and news directors on July 15.^

We've just finished a superb meeting, I
thought, with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
from Germany. Prior to that, we had a very
good meeting with President Perez fi'om Ven-
ezuela. On Tuesday, Prime Minister Begin
will be here from Israel, and following that,
we'll have Prime Minister Andreotti from
Italy and, following that, President Nyerere
from Tanzania.

This is a series of meetings that we've been

conducting throughout the whole year, and I
think it's given me a good chance to learn
about foreign opinions, to recement our ties
with nations who are naturally our allies and
friends, as are those that I've mentioned to
you this moment.

This year is one when we've addressed
many problems that had been delayed for dec-
ades. I hope we can make progress in some of
the international affairs that we face. We've
got, I think, a very encouraging relationship
with the Soviet Union in spite of the fact that
some of the items are so controversial. But as
I said at my last news conference, we are rais-
ing issues jointly with them which have not
been addressed so substantively in the past.

We are working toward a comprehensive
test ban treaty to prohibit the testing of all
nuclear e.xplosives, both military and peace-
ful. We now have no constraint on peaceful
nuclear devices for underground explosions,
and we have a 150-kiloton limit on military
weapons. So this is quite a liberal restraint.

We've also put forward, as you know, the
hope that we might begin demilitarizing the
Indian Ocean — freezing our present level of
deployment there, which is quite modest on
both sides — and working on prior notification
of missile test launchings, a prohibition
against an attack of observation satellites by
either country.

We've made two basic optional proposals to
the Soviets on SALT talks [Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks]. One is to ratify those items
that were definitely agreed upon between
Kissinger, Ford, and Brezhnev, and a much
more deep series of cuts in nuclear weapon
launchers and MIRV'd [multiple inde-
pendently-targetable reentry vehicle] mis-
siles, with a freeze on further deployment of
the development of more advanced technology
weapons.

We are trying to move, and we are working
with the Soviet leaders. And although we
haven't been successful in these efforts yet,

1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated July 25, 1977, p.
1023.

200

Department of State Bulletin

there are study groups working, and I think
the tone of tiieir own relationship is good
within the study groups themselves. There
liave been some polemical discussions on their
part, particularly about the absence of pro-
gress, but I think this is just a difference of
interpretation.

Q. If you had it to do all over again, would
ifou find a different way to raise the human
rights issue with the Soviet Union?

The President: I can't think of any different
way to do it. I've thought about that a lot, be-
cause it certainly was not done to aggravate
any other government nor to single out any
ciiuntry.

Every time I've ever made a statement
about human rights, I think without exception
I have always included our country in as a
people who are constantly searching for ways
t(i alleviate or to reduce discrimination prac-
tices and to insure that our high standards for
human rights would be realized.

So, I don't think I would do it any differ-
ently. To me, this is an integral part of the
consciousness and commitment of America.
It's another step forward in the realization of
the goals and aspirations that we established
2(10 years ago.

We are not trying to send in troops to make
uther nations conform to us; we are not trying
to punish anyone else. But I think there has to
be some means in a democracy like ours, first
of all, for a President to exemplify or to per-
sonify what the American people believe. And
my opinion is that the American people be-
lieve very deeply in the concept of human
rights.

I think it's important that this commitment
he expressed publicly. We've been through
some sordid and embarrassing years recently
with Vietnam and Cambodia and Watergate
and the CIA revelations, and I felt like it was
time for our country to hold a beacon light of
s(jmething that was pure and decent and right
and proper that would rally our citizens to a
cause. But I've been cautious not to single
anyone out for condemnation.

And I might say that my own attitude on
the human rights question has been fairly

moderate. I'm proud of it. But I think it's ac-
curate to say that some Members of Congress
would go much further than I and even termi-
nate all relationships with other countries who
don't measure up to our standards of human
rights. We can't do that.

So, I think a slow, careful, methodical but
persistent expression of our concern about
human rights violations has already been ef-
fective and will continue to be effective in the
future. I don't believe there is a single leader
of a nation in the world now who doesn't have
at least in his or her consciousness the concept
of human rights and how that country is
measuring up to the expectations of one's own
people or trying to avoid worldwide condem-
nation. So, I think our efforts have had an
impact, and I would not do it otherwise.

Israeli Prime Minister Begin
Visits Washington

Menahem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel,
made an official visit to Washington July
18-21, during which he met with President
Carter and other government officials. Fol-
lowing is a statement issued by the White
House on July 19}

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 25

President Carter and Israeli Prime Minis-
ter Menahem Begin met in the Cabinet Room
for two hours. The meeting was also attended
by the Vice President, Secretary of State
Cyrus Vance, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzez-
inski. Assistant Secretary of State [for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs] Alfred L.
Atherton, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Israel
Samuel Lewis, and William Quandt of the

' For an e.xchange of remarks between President
Carter and Prime Minister Begin at a welcoming cere-
mony on the South Lawn of the White House and their
exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White House on
July 19, and for President Carter's remarks to report-
ers following the Prime Minister's departure on July 20,
see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
dated July 25, 1977, pp. 1035, 1041, and 1049.

August 15, 1977

201

National Security Council staff on the Ameri-
can side; and Israeli Ambassador to the
United States Simcha Dinitz, Advisor to the
Prime Minister Shmuel Katz, Minister of the
Embassy of Israel Hanan Bar-On, Director of
the Prime Minister's Bureau Yechiel
Kadishai, Political Advisor to the Prime
Minister Eli Mizrachi, Military Secretary to
the Prime Minister Brigadier General Eph-
raim Poran, and Advisor to the Prime
Minister Yehuda Avner on the Israeli side.

The President began by repeating his per-
sonal pleasure at welcoming Prime Minister
Begin to the White House so soon after his
taking office last month. The President con-
gratulated Mr. Begin once again on his acces-
sion to national leadership and expressed
confidence that this first visit will inaugurate
the close working relationship natural to the
leaders of two democracies with such
longstanding and deep ties of friendship.
Their talks were conducted in the spirit of
mutual respect common to that warm friend-
ship between our two peoples. The President
and Prime Minister agreed that their meet-
ing and the others to follow here mark a good
starting point for seeking ways toward a just
and durable peace in the Middle East. They
pledged their determination to achieve that
peace, noting that imaginative and responsi-
ble statesmanship is essential to overcoming
the challenges posed.

The meeting this morning was devoted to a
thorough and searching discussion of how to
move toward an overall settlement of the
Arab-Israeli conflict. The President and
Prime Minister each developed their ideas on
the issues involved. They agreed that all the
issues must be settled through negotiations
between the parties based on U.N. Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338 which all the
governments directly concerned have ac-
cepted. They also agreed that this goal would
best be served by moving rapidly toward the
reconvening of the Geneva conference this
year, keeping in mind at the same time the
importance of careful preparation.

In this connection, they focused on the
practical requirements for convening the con-
ference, looking toward Secretary of State
Vance's forthcoming trip to the area for more
talks with all the leaders involved. They ex-

202

pressed a hope that the Prime Minister's visiti *
will help lay the groundwork for rapid' '{*"
movement toward negotiations. '

In the course of the talk this morning on
the diplomacy of peace, the President reaf-
firmed the enduring American commitment
to the security and well-being of Israel. Hi
assured the Prime Minister that any diffei
ences that may occur from time to timj
should not be allowed to obscure America'
and his personal dedication to this historic
American commitment. He asked the Prime
Minister to express to the people of Israel
the determination of the people of the United
States to help them find true peace. Discus-
sions on how to get negotiations started be-
tween the parties will continue this afternoon
in the Prime Minister's meeting with Secre-
tary Vance. No bilateral issues were dis-
cussed at this first meeting. The President
and Prime Minister will meet again tonight sdB!"
the working dinner which the President raP"
giving at the White House, and in the
Cabinet Room again tomorrow morning at *

10.

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ROC and Korea Agree

To Curb Shoe Exports to U.S.

White House Announcement ^

The United States and the Republic oi
China (ROC) on June 14 signed a 4-year Or^iiy
derly Marketing Agreement (OMA), under
which Taiwanese exports of nonrubber foot-
wear to the United States will be limited to
levels well below their record high of 156 mil-
lion pairs in 1976. The agreement, signed by
Ambassador James Shen of the ROC, and
Robert S. Strauss, President Carter's Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations, was
announced by Ambassador Strauss.

Negotiation of a similar agreement betweert
the United States and the Republic of Koreai
is nearly complete and is expected to be

• Made on June 14, 1977 (text from Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated June 20): a sum-
mary of the principal provisions of the footwear agree-
ment was included with the White House press release
of June 14.

Department of State Bulletin

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irei

*«9i

mnounced next week, Ambassador Strauss
I'eported.^

In announcing the OMA with Taipei, Am-
lassador Strauss commended the Govern-
iients of both the Republics of China and
Korea for their "cooperative statemanship" in
leveloping "fair and equitable negotiated so-
utions" to pressing international shoe trade
problems.

"Any agreement such as the one we have
just concluded," Ambassador Strauss noted,
'represents a temporary trade restriction
v\ hich the President has said he is very reluc-
ant to take. These [Orderly Marketing]
Agreements are not the ideal long-term solu-
ions to our trade problems."

"Our agreement with Taipei, however,"
■Strauss said, "is a useful, effective, and ac-
■eptable way of giving one of our basic domes-
tic industries a reasonable temporary period
11 which to adjust to severe, sudden, short-
;erm market disruptions and to become more
•(jmpetitive — which is essential in the long
lun. As such, it comes to grips with an im-
mediate economic problem, which if allowed to
Lontinue to fester, could cause injury to our
workers and industry to reach such propor-
tions as to fuel the fever of protectionism. In
this total context," Strauss observed, "we
have just administered an emergency anti-
protectionist prescription."

Ambassador Strauss also noted that "in ac-
cordance with President Carter's instructions,
the Departments of Commerce and Labor and
my office are working on a newly designed
Federal Trade Adjustment Assistance pro-
gram which will deliver much more effective
help to trade impacted domestic firms and
workers. Details of this proposed new pro-
gram will be announced before the end of this
month."

The OMA with Taipei provides that in the
first year, from June 28, 1977, through June
30, 1978, ROC exports to the United States of
three categories of nonrubber footwear —
leather, plastic, and "other" — will not exceed
122 million pairs. This quota will be increased
by 3 million pairs in each of the succeeding
years, 1978-79, 1979-80, and 1980-81, up to a

■^ The agreement with the Republic of Korea was con-
cluded on June 21, 1977.

limit of 131 million pairs in the final year of
the agreement. Each of the three footwear
categories has a separate sublimit. Exports of
felt footwear liners under the international
Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) are not in-
cluded in these quotas.

The Republic of China has assured the
United States in side letters to the agreement
that it will not permit disruptive shifts in the
type, material, or price range of footwear that
it exports and that it will not circumvent the
agreement by disruptively shifting into lines
of footwear that technically are not covered
by the OMA, but that in fact compete with
lines of shoes that are covered.

The OMA also provides that if other U.S.
footwear export suppliers should move to take
advantage of Taipei's export limitations by
unduly increasing their shipments to the
United States, the United States may take un-
ilateral action to correct the inequities.

This OMA, and a similar draft agreement
with Korea, were approved by President Car-
ter as appropriate import relief, in the na-
tional economic interest under the Trade Act,
to remedy serious injury to domestic footwear
makers and workers, which was found by the
U.S. International Trade Commission
(USITC) to have been substantially caused by
increased imports. The USITC had recom-
mended a system of tariff-rate import quotas
which the President rejected as not being in
the national economic interest.

U.S. imports of nonrubber footwear in-
creased from 265 million pairs in 1974 to 370
million pairs in 1976. Of this 105-minion-pair
increase, Taiwan accounted for 68 million
pairs and Korea 36 million pairs, for a total of
104 million, or 99 percent of the increase over
the 2-y ear-period.

The OMA provides for consultations on any
future-year quota adjustments warranted by
conditions in the domestic footwear industry
and other economic factors; the USITC will
monitor conditions in the domestic footwear
industry as well as any inflationary impact of
the agreements on U.S. consumers and pre-
pare appropriate reports on a quarterly and
yearly basis. Ambassador Strauss noted in
this connection that the agreement should not
have any significant inflationary impact nor
adverse effect upon consumers.

August 15, 1977

203

United States Seeks Improved U.N. Programs
To Meet Basic Needs of World's Poor

Address by John J. Gilligan

Administrator, Agency for International Development ^

I am proud to make my first appearance be-
fore this distinguished body. But my own feel-
ings are not nearly so important as my oppor-
tunity to express once more the support of the
United States for the United Nations and its
development efforts.

I bring you today a statement of policy of
our new Administration. In that policy, which
I shall outline here today, it is the aim of the
United States to make its development con-
tribution effective in three major ways:

— First, we seek strengthened, cooperative
efforts that are devised clearly and specif-
ically to meet the basic needs of the poor
majority of the world's people;

— Second, we seek improved performance
and efficiency in U.N. development efforts;
and

— Third, if the United Nations can make
substantial progress in more efficiently pro-
viding basic services and resources to the
world's poor majority, we are prepared to
consider greater assurance of our support for
such programs over longer periods of time.

As we work together, you will hear the rep-
resentatives of the United States repeat these
aims over and over. What we support, and
what we will work for, are programs to meet
the basic human needs of the poor majority
throughout the world and to strengthen the
effectiveness and efficiency of the apparatus
in which such programs are carried out. That
is the way we intend to bring about our own
significant commitment to longer term
support.

As we all know, our meeting today follows
the economic summit in London [May 7-8] and

the Conference on International Economic
Cooperation in Paris [May 30-June 2]. The ini-
tiatives taken at those sessions — initiatives
toward substantially increased efforts in de-
velopment assistance — must now be trans-
lated into practical actions. Our meeting today
can provide an important step in taking those^
actions.

As Secretary of State Vance declared in-
Paris, the United States is prepared to help
build a new international economic system.
Our view of that system is that it not only
should offer new opportunities for nations to
participate in the world economy, but must
provide the opportunities for all citizens to
participate in the growing economies of their
countries.

As you may recall. President Carter, in his
address at the United Nations on March 17,
said that the United States would be advanc-
ing proposals aimed at meeting the basic
human needs of peoples of the developing
world.

Now let me sketch out in further detail this
Administration's policy of meeting basic
human needs and our expectations of the
United Nations in this area. I will then pre-
sent our position with regard to improving the
administration of programs.

Striving for Fundamental Economic Rights

In our view, international development
means not only closing the gap between rich

' Made before the 24th session of the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) Governing Council at
Geneva, Switzerland, on June 16, 1977.

204

Department of State Bulletin

and poor nations, but also between the rich
and poor within nations. Let me take note of
the excellent background document to our dis-
cussion today, prepared by the Secretariat,
which emphasizes "... the pressing need to
promote greater equity and social justice
within countries, as well as among
them. . . ." ^ We should see the major objec-
tive of development as providing all human
beings with the oppoilunity to develop their
full potential. If such equality of opportunity
is to have any meaning, the basic needs of the
world's poor majority must be met.

Although there is no precise definition of
such basic needs, an emerging international
consensus points to at least certain minimum
levels of food, shelter, health, education, and
employment. Unfortunately, not enough
people realize that at least one billion
people — one quarter of the world's popu-
lation— live in conditions of absolute poverty.
We should know the unpleasant truth: Despite
certain successes in development, the number
of people living in this absolute and degrading
poverty is increasing. The rapid increase in
gross national product in many developing
countries over the past two decades has not
led to an increase in living standards for the
poorer half of their growing populations.

We all know about the "trickle-down
theory." For the world's poorest people, how-
ever, a considerable amount of development
assistance of the past two decades has not
trickled down. The American people, the
American Congress, and the new American
Administration will no longer accept a
"trickle-down" theory in those programs
where its people and money are involved.

A new strategy to meet basic human needs
requires new approaches to rural and indus-
trial development. It means increased agricul-
tural production and greater equity in income
distribution. For many countries, greater
equity must mean significant changes in land
tenure — in other words, land reform. Greater
equity also means improved access to agricul-
tural resources — fertilizer, water, transporta-
tion, and credit.

Increased expenditures must also be made
on rural health and educational facilities.

2 UNDP doc. DP/261 dated May 6, 1977.

And in industrial development, we must
place major emphasis on labor-intensive
production.

As the people in this room know, when we
talk about meeting basic needs, we are not
talking about an international welfare pro-
gram. We are talking about giving the poor a
chance to improve their standard of living by
their own efforts. We are talking about giving
them a chance and the means to rise above
those extreme poverty levels that stunt
human development. We are talking about the
global enhancement of human rights; for the
fundamental needs of the world's people are
also their rights and without these, all other
rights — civil, political, and social — lose
meaning.

Just as President Carter's new Administra-
tion will take a strong stand on issues of civil,
political, and social rights, so too shall we
strive for the achievement of fundamental
economic rights.

We believe that the United Nations De-
velopment Program (UNDP) not only should
offer its assistance to the poor countries of the
world but should insure that it is providing
opportunities for the poor majority within
those countries. We also believe that this de-
velopment effort cannot be allowed to be a
one-way street, with all of the thinking and
planning and working and spending generated
in only one direction. We believe that the
United Nations Development Program should
require recipient nations to commit them-
selves to meeting the minimum needs of their
populations, to distributing the benefits of de-
velopment on an equitable basis, and to pro-
tecting the human rights of their populations
so that development can be self-sustaining.
And we believe that the United Nations has
the means to determine whether nations are
making good on these commitments.

Our government is committed to working
with the United Nations Development Pro-
gram to achieve these objectives.

Improving Performance and Efficiency

Now let us turn to the matter of administra-
tion.

President Carter has directed that all U.S.
Government programs, both domestic and

August 15, 1977

205

foreign, must be made more effective and
efficient.

With regard to our foreign assistance effort,
the President has directed me to undertake a
thorough review of all our development pro-
grams. We have already begun a reorganiza-
tion and strengthening of our Agency for In-
ternational Development. What we expect of
ourselves in this regard, we expect no less of
the international programs in which we
participate.

— We expect development assistance pro-
grams to have clear-cut objectives.

— We expect organizational structures and
staff levels to be lean and muscular.

— We expect to be able to trace easily the
delivery of services and resources to the
people for whom the programs are designed.

These are our expectations. Based on the
results, the United States is prepared, as I
said earlier, we are prepared to consider
longer term funding of the U.N. development
programs to give them added strength.

But let me be clear: We can only engage in
practical consideration of such funding, and
seek acceptance of this concept by the Ameri-
can people and the Congress, if necessary re-
forms are undertaken. We would, of course,
expect other donor nations to make similar
longer term contributions according to appro-
priately shared levels of assistance.

I would now like to offer a number of spe-
cific suggestions for the management of the
United Nations development efforts.

Before I go any further, however, let me
emphasize that we fully support the Adminis-
trator, Bradford Morse, in his conviction that
the United Nations Development Program
should carry out its mission in a way that both
enhances and makes good use of the work of
the [U.N.] specialized agencies and in no way
duplicates their efforts. However, because as
we all realize development by its very nature
requires an integrated approach to be effec-
tive, a central mechanism is required to coor-
dinate efforts to the greatest extent possible.

We believe that the United Nations De-
velopment Program is the mechanism which
can insure better integration of the field tech-

nical assistance programs of the specialized
agencies. The United States strongly supports
the 1970 consensus which clearly establishes a
central funding and coordination role for the
UNDP in the area of U.N. technical assist-
ance. We should strengthen that role and re-
quire greater efficiency in the administration
of scarce resources.

There are certain areas of particular con-
cern to the United States — funding of UNDP
projects, the relationship between the UNDP
and the executing agencies, reserves for
emergencies and special programs, and the
coordinating role of the UNDP. Let me dis-
cuss these areas one by one, including the
recommendations of my government.

In the area of funding, we recommend that
the relatively high income recipients be
"graduated" from grant funding to fully reim-
bursable funding as their ability to pay in-
creases. This could be accomplished gradually
through the introduction of a sliding scale of
cost-sharing and reimbursement. We hope
that by the third programming cycle, grant
funding by the UNDP will be hmited to the
poor countries.

In financial management, we recommend
that UNDP's accumulation of nonconvertible
currencies be reduced. Future contributions
to the UNDP should be in fully usable curren-
cies in accord with the UNDP"s financial rules
and regulations.

Now let me turn to UNDP's relations with
executing agencies. The United States firmly
believes that the growing use of specialized
agency assessed budgets for technical assist-
ance purposes is undesirable. We are con-
cerned that at the very time UNDP is seeking
a substantial funding increase, the prolifera-
tion and duplication of special funds will result
in less, rather than more, resources for the
U.N. technical assistance programs.

We, therefore, urge member states to
strengthen UNDP's coordinating role in de-
velopment activities by assuring UNDP's fi-
nancial viability and by limiting the amount of
technical assistance financed by the assessed
budgets of the specialized agencies. We also
believe the UNDP and the agencies must seek
to secure maximum economies from decen-

206

Department of State Bulletin

tralization of decisionmaking and to expedite
project approval and execution.

My government, therefore, fully endorses
the continuing trend toward further decen-
tralization of UNDP with the ratio of staff
levels between headquarters and the field
changed increasingly in favor of the field. We
also believe that serious consideration might
usefully be given to the concept of an inte-
grated personnel structure within the U.N.
development system.

And now, let me turn to the issue of re-
serves for emergencies and special programs.
As we all know, UNDP's operations have
been adversely affected by grave financial dif-
ficulties beginning in 1975. To provide an
added measure of protection against such
difficulties in the future, we support a
strengthened reserve for emergency
purposes.

We would also support prudent use of this
reserve for special requirements which may
arise from decisions reached within participat-
ing agencies. This would enable the Program
to operate with a greater margin of flexibility;
it would also reduce recurrent demands for
new special purpose funds.

Now as for the coordinating role of the
UNDP. The 1970 consensus, as we all know,
provided a mechanism, under the leadership
of the resident representative, for the coordi-
nation of U.N. development activities at the
field level. We believe, however, that field
level coordination requires still further im-
provement. We also believe that coordination
at the inter-agency level through the Inter-
Agency Consultative Board requires
strengthening. Additionally, we believe that
the Administrator should examine means by
which UNDP resident representatives, to the
extent desired by host governments, can con-
tinue to improve coordination of UNDP and
specialized agency field activities with those
of bilateral aid agencies.

UNDP should also examine the possibility
of expanding its role in joint operations in-
volving both multilateral and bilateral funds,
as in the case of the Sahel program.

Now with regard to the question of how
frequently this council should convene, my
government supports a single, annual meet-

ing. We believe that an annual meeting would
permit more effective use of UNDP's re-
sources and would not weaken the council's
oversight role. In this connection, UNDP
might wish to consider the desirability of es-
tablishing a lower-level intergovernmental
body to insure frequent productive contact be-
tween the UNDP and member governments.

Now, before concluding, Mr. President [Dr.
Johan Kaufmann of the Netherlands] and
fellow representatives, I would also like to
emphasize that my government places high
priority on enhancing the role of women in de-
velopment. We, therefore, strongly support a
role for the United Nations Development Pro-
gram as a clearing house for the exchange of
practical information on the integration of
women in development. Moreover, we rec-
ommend strengthened efforts in the actual
conduct of development programs to insure
that women are fully involved.

I have expressed the position of my gov-
ernment and of my President. I suggest that
Mr. Morse consult with representatives of
other member states concerning the proposals
I have set forth. We also shall do so.

I would hope we could receive a report from
the Administrator at the next Governing
Council session on the progress that has been
made in meeting basic human needs and im-
proving the effectiveness and efficiency of
UNDP activities. We have confidence in the
U.N. development system and in the UNDP's
central role in it. But, if we are to achieve
even greater international commitment to this
development effort, it is imperative that we
can demonstrate that the programs are
effectively reaching the people who need
them.

In making these proposals, I do not want to
give the impression of belittling anything that
has been done in the United Nations De-
velopment Program over the years. Clearly,
however, we must do more and we must do
better. Through UNDP, through our mutual
involvement in the U.N. system of develop-
ment assistance, and through our other pro-
grams of support and cooperation, we can help
achieve a new international economic system
based upon equity, upon growth, and upon
justice.

August 15, 1977

207

Transfer of Sanctions Treaties
With Mexico and Canada

Following is a statement by Barbara M.
Watson, Administrator of the Bureau of Se-
curity and Consular Affairs, made before the
Senate Judiciary Committee on July 13. '

I am pleased to have this opportunity to be
with you today to discuss S.1682, the bill to
implement the Mexican and Canadian prisoner
transfer treaties. The Department of State
strongly supports the treaties and the legisla-
tion both as humanitarian measures to relieve
prisoners' hardships and as steps to improve
relations with our two neighbors. In my
statement I will set forth the background to
the treaties and the need for them. I will then
explain how we came to the conclusion that
they are constitutional. I will not attempt to
explain the details of the implementing
legislation. ^

The bill is the product of painstaking labor
by the Department of Justice which possesses
expertise in criminology and penology which
the State Department does not have. I can,
however, assure you that we have reviewed
the legislation to make certain that it is con-
sistent with the treaties which it implements
and that its operation will not cause foreign
relations difficulties.

The welfare of American prisoners in
foreign jails has greatly concerned the De-
partment of State. Today approximately 2,200
are in foreign jails, nearly 600 of them in
Mexico and 275 in Canada.

The situation in Mexico is well known. Con-
gressional hearings have highlighted the pris-
oners' problems. Prison conditions there are
plainly inadequate by American standards,
with respect to food, medical treatment, secu-
rity against violence, and other matters. In
spite of efforts by the Mexican authorities

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

^ The Senate gave its advice and consent to the treaty
with Canada on July 19, 1977, and to the treaty with
Mexico on July 21, 1977. Ratification of the treaties will
take place after the implementing legislation, now
under consideration by the Congress, has been enacted.

there is still much that we find unsatisfactory.

Even where there is less of a cultural dif-
ference, as in the case of Canada, there are
special hardships involved in being in a prison
abroad. It is difficult or impossible to maintain
contact with one's family. Prisoners cannot be
reintegrated into the civilian environment at
the end of their term. In Mexico, and in
Quebec, language problems make prison life
more difficult. Comparable hardships exist for
foreigners in U.S. prisons even though there
is less pubhcity about them.

The problem of prisoners, and the publicity
they generate, has been a burden on diploma-
tic relations. To improve the situation we
negotiated treaties with Mexico [signed on
November 25, 1976] and Canada [signed on
March 2, 1977] to provide for transfers, with
consent, of prisoners in foreign institutions.
In both cases it was the foreign country that
took the initiative to open negotiations. Our
execution in good faith of the commitments
which we have undertaken is important to our
relations with our neighbors.

The key constitutional question is that of
article VI which provides that all challenges
to the validity of the underlying sentence shall
be addressed to the courts of the country
where the sentence was handed down.

Let me note that the Canadian treaty uses
the words "conviction or sentence" whereas
the Mexican treaty uses only the term "sen-
tence." No difference was intended, but we
were advised that there are no separate Mexi-
can equivalents for the two terms. This clause
was an essential part of the arrangement.
Mexico has a long history of sensitivity to
foreign interference with its legal system, one
it shares with other Latin American coun-
tries. It could not accept review of Mexican
judgments by an American court. We also
concluded that the Senate could not be ex-
pected to give its advice and consent to an ar-
rangement under which Mexican courts
could sit in judgment on the findings of U.S.
courts.

Furthermore, the problems involved in
holding hearings to determine precisely what
happened in a remote foreign police station
would be insurmountable. We know that the
Mexican Constitution provides safeguards not

208

Department of State Bulletin

very dissimilar from those afforded in the
United States and that the Mexican courts af-
ford direct review and collateral review by
way of the writ of amparo. Therefore, that
provision was agreed to.

It is obvious that there will be challenges to
the constitutionality of that provision. The
treaty is, with respect to the United States, a
novel one and the issue is new. We have given
careful study to this question. We would not
have caused the treaty to be signed if we had
not concluded that it was constitutionally de-
fensible. Both the Department of Justice and
distinguished outside scholars have agreed.

Let me state briefly the grounds for that
conclusion. The first ground may be called the
"conflicts of law" ground and the second the
"consent" ground.

Under the first approach we start from the
premise that the prisoner's trial was con-
ducted in a foreign country that lawfully had
jurisdiction over the offender and the offense.
The courts have repeatedly said that the U.S.
Constitution has no applicability to the con-
duct of such a trial. The U.S. action — the ac-
ceptance of custody over the offender — is only
ancillary to the action of the Mexican court.

U.S. authorities have consistently been up-
held in turning over persons to foreign courts
for trials not consistent with our Constitution.
While extradition typically involves foreign
fugitives, surrenders under the status-of-
forces agreements do involve American
citizens — [military] service personnel. It
seems no greater deference to, and no deeper
an involvement in, a foreign criminal process
to receive prisoners when the process is com-
pleted. Indeed, it involves less of an intrusion
than extradition, which will subject them to a
non-American trial.

In receiving foreign prisoners, we do not
deprive them of any rights they have pre-
viously had; indeed, we confer on them the
opportunity to serve their sentences closer to
home. Many prisoners are transferred from
one State to another or from State to Federal
institutions without it being thought that the
receiving State adopted the sentence or made
it its own.

The consent argument proceeds on the basis
of the fact that nobody will be transferred

against his or her will. Extensive precautions
have been written into the implementing
legislation to assure that the consent to trans-
fer will be as free and as fully informed as
possible.

The decisions of the Supreme Court give
wide effect to guilty pleas and other choices
by the accused in the criminal process. This par-
ticular choice stands on even firmer footing.
In this case the offender is offered a genuine
benefit, one to which he had no prior entitle-
ment. In return he is being asked to give up
something to which he was never previously
entitled— an American court review of his
underlying conviction.

It has been suggested that it is analogous to
the case of a conditional pardon, in which it
has been held that i-easonable conditions may
be attached when a benefit is conferred upon a
prisoner. The person accepting the pardon
must take the whole package offered to him.

Similarly, where the President and the
Congress have together obtained a special and
unusual benefit for an offender, he should not
be able to repudiate his assent to the condi-
tions which were necessary to achieve that
benefit. Success in such repudiation would, of
course, destroy this avenue of relief for all
later cases.

For these reasons we believe that the
agreement will be sustained against constitu-
tional challenges.

We have examined successive drafts of the
implementing legislation and are convinced
that it will make possible the successful im-
plementation of the treaties. A good deal of
the necessary spade work to begin implemen-
tation of the treaty relatively promptly after
congressional action is completed has been
done. State Department personnel have ac-
companied representatives of the Justice De-
partment to Mexico to discuss matters with
their Mexican counterparts. While the trans-
fer of prisoners is the responsibility of the
Department of Justice, the State Department
will have the function of helping to make sure
that cooperation between the Mexican and
American penal authorities goes smoothly. I
can assure you that the Department will exert
its best efforts to that end.

One particular function is assigned by the

August 15, 1977

209

legislation to the Department of State. Sec-
tion 4109(b) places upon the Secretary of
State the responsibility of providing council
for indigent prisoners abroad in order that
they may give their consent in a full aware-
ness of the legal consequences of their choice.

It will not be easy to fulfill that responsibil-
ity. For one thing, there are not many
lawyers who know both systems of law well
enough to give good advice. However, we in-
tend to use the resources of both legal defend-
er systems, of the voluntary organizations
that have made offers of assistance, and of
any other source that comes to our attention;
and we hope to be able to provide satisfactory
services.

The Department of State has recommended
without reservation that the Treaties on the
Execution of Penal Sentences with Canada
and Mexico be ratified. We now join the
Department of Justice in urging the enact-
ment of S. 1682 which is necessary for their
implementation.

Department Discusses Human Rights
in Thailand

Following is a statement by Robert B. Oak-
ley, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, made before the
Subcommittee on International Organizations
of the House Committee on International Re-
lations on June 30. '

Several Asian countries figure prominently
in the Administration's and this committee's
commitment to improve human rights
worldwide. I therefore welcome this opportu-
nity to discuss Thailand's human rights record
and to put that record into the context of the
prevailing situation in Southeast Asia.

Given the widespread interest in the events
surrounding the change in the Thai Govern-
ment last October, it seems appropriate to
begin with a description of those events.

The three preceding years of democracy in

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Thailand were an anomaly in Thai political
history, which has had a series of relatively
stable, military-backed governments since
1938. Unfortunately, these three years were
also marked by an unusual amount of social
unrest, as the traditional patterns of political
behavior were challenged by new ones. In this
heady, uncertain atmosphere, right and left
wing elements fought each other in the
streets, Thammasat University was attacked
and burned by students of a rival school, and
even striking pohce took the law into their
own hands when they sacked the Prime Minis-
ter's own home. It was a period of political in-
stability during which four separate Thai gov-
ernments were in power. The Khukrit gov-
ernment, which survived the longest of the
four, consisted of a coalition of no less than 16
separate political parties.

By October 1976, there had been a series of
domestic political crises which began with the
return of former Thai Prime Minister Thanom
from self-imposed exile. There had been
large-scale student demonstrations. The
Prime Minister had unexpectedly resigned
when criticized by the leadership of his own
party, later agreeing to reconstruct his coali-
tion government. A reshuffled Cabinet under
Prime Minister Seni was sworn in by the King
on October 5. The Cabinet was, however, di-
vided into mutually antagonistic factions.
Numerous civilian and military groups and in-
dividuals of all political persuasions were at-
tempting to foment and take advantage of the
increasingly unstable political situation.

The event which finally ignited this incen-
diary situation was a student rally at Tham-
masat University on October 5. Rightwing
groups organized large counterdemonstra-
tions, protesting what they claimed had been
a gross act of student disrespect for the
Crown Prince. On October 6, police units, at
the order of Prime Minister Seni Pramot,
moved to arrest the leaders of those student
demonstrations. The armed confrontation re-
sulting from this police action was further
compounded by fighting between right and
left wing groups in and around the campus.
The violence left 40 dead and approximately
3,000 persons, mostly students, arrested.
Meanwhile, in another part of Bangkok later

210

Department of State Bulletin

that day, a mob of some 50,000 people, drawn
largely from vocational students and rural
groups, demonstrated in front of the Prime
Minister's office, demanding the resignation of
the Cabinet.

Prime Minister Seni appeared to have been
overwhelmed by events and unable to deal
with the situation. Six hours later, in the
wake of this violence, faced with governmen-
tal paralysis and the possibility of further
urban demonstrations and violence on a mas-
sive scale, the senior commanders of the Thai
military took control of the government.

Around the world, television and press
photo coverage of the violence at Thammasat
was reported simultaneously with the news of
the coup d'etat. The resulting erroneous im-
pression in the minds of many was that the
Thai military had brutally seized control of
the government. In fact, the coup was blood-
less. The Thai military did not participate in
the violence at Thammasat, nor were any
members of the previous government injured
or arrested. The commander of the police —
who must bear some responsibility for the
savage violence at Thammasat — was replaced
by the military authorities. However, no dis-
ciplinary action has been taken against the
poHce.

The senior Thai military officers who seized
control of the government stated that it was
not their intention to govern the country di-
rectly. Two days after the coup, the King ap-
pointed Prime Minister Thanin upon the rec-
ommendation of the military. On October 22, a
civilian Cabinet was announced and a new
constitution promulgated.

While the current regime is ultimately de-
pendent upon the backing of the Thai military,
the Prime Minister and his Cabinet have con-
siderable independence. Senior Thai military
commanders have statutory authority to act
as the Prime Minister's Advisory Council, and
it appears that that body sets the essential
guidelines of government policy, particularly
with respect to matters affecting national se-
curity and foreign policy. The Prime Minister
and his civilian Cabinet, however, signifi-
cantly contribute to policy as well as adminis-
tering the day-to-day operations of the Thai
Government.

During the three years of democratic rule,
Thailand had civil and political liberties com-
parable to our own. The military's action to
end the Thai democratic experiment repre-
sented to many Thai a necessary sacrifice if
the country was to stabilize itself and success-
fully face the growing threat from hostile
Communist neighbors.

In his April 30 address on human rights and
foreign policy, Secretary Vance defined our
concern for human rights under the broad
categories of integrity of the person, vital
human needs, and pohtical liberties. I would
like to briefly review Thailand's record as it
relates to that definition.

With respect to integrity of the person,
there is no specific declaration of the people's
rights and liberties in the Thai Constitution.
Thai courts, however, continue to adhere to a
legal code based on Western European mod-
els. In effect, those tried in Thailand are al-
lowed basically the same rights as the accused
in the United States.

There are, however, certain provisions of
martial law in effect in Thailand since October
7 that can be used to supersede Thai law, and
these provisions present a problem of due
process and individual liberty. Under order
22, there are nine categories of violations
which can be cause for arrest and imprison-
ment without recourse to normal Thai legal
procedure. Six categories involve criminal ac-
tivity, while three categories potentially in-
volve pohtical conduct.

Since the October coup, more than 3,000
Thai citizens have been detained under these
nine categories. At present, there are approx-
imately 1,000 persons in detention. The vast
majority of these prisoners are considered
petty criminals and are detained in reform
centers for periods lasting two-to-six months.
The detention of most of these people appears
to be a genuine effort to reform a criminal
element in Thai society. The Thai Government
has, however, identified 64 of the prisoners
currently being held as violators of one of the
three categories of order 22 that has a politi-
cal basis.

We have no way of ascertaining the number
of prisoners, whose arrest may be politically
motivated. However, political or not, all these

August 15, 1977

211

people are held without due process. The
cases of all order 22 prisoners are reviewed
every two months and releases made. The last
was on May 11, when 613 were freed, 43 of
whom Thai authorities identified as "political"
prisoners. We know of no reports that those
detained have suffered torture, cruel, or in-
human treatment.

Of the 3,000 persons, mostly students, ar-
rested at Thammasat University on October 6
before the coup, all but 23 have been released
or are free on bail. Formal charges of criminal
activity against 110 of those persons arrested
before the coup — most of whom have been
freed on bail — are being considered, but the
Department is informed that not all of them
are likely to be brought to trial. In response
to an expression of concern by our Embassy in
Bangkok, the Thai Government has assured
us that normal Thai legal procedures will be
followed for those brought to trial. Summary
justice under article 21 of the Constitution
will not be employed, and the courtroom will
be open to both press and public. We intend to
have an Embassy officer present.

With respect to the second category of
human rights outlined by Secretary Vance,
the Thai Government has demonstrated a
commitment to the provision of essential food,
shelter, health care, and education for the
Thai people. The Thai Government's budget
provides for continuing efforts to expand pri-
mary and secondary schooling. Higher univer-
sity education in Thailand is one of the finest
and largest in Asia, with 32 universities in op-
eration. The Thanin government is promoting
land reform and rural development. There are
special education and development programs
for minority populations, including the King's
hilltribe project. There is a minimum wage
law and a rice price subsidy for the urban
poor.

The Thai Government is appreciative of the
modest U.S. aid program of $14 million in fis-
cal year 1977 and accepts some assistance
from other countries, as well as international
financial institutions. However, most of the
funds and personnel for development projects
in Thailand come from domestic Thai re-
sources.

The third category of human rights deal

with those civil and political liberties which
we hold so fundamental to our own system.
The current Thai Government is nonelective,
and political parties have been disbanded, al-
though there is a formal commitment to a
complicated 12-year formula under which full
democracy may be restored to Thailand.
There are still elected village leaders that
continue to administer government at the
local level. Political interest groups, no longer
able to form political parties, have reverted to
the more traditional Thai network of personal
contacts to influence government policy. Stu-
dent organizations have been similarly barred;
but unions continue to function, although they
are legally constrained from strike action.
This limitation on labor is a serious constraint,
and the Thai Government is considering such
alternatives as a board of binding arbitration.

There is no formal press censorship, but
some newspapers have occasionally had their
licenses revoked. Most papers which have had
their publication suspended have resumed op-
eration within several weeks. Some, curi-
ously, merely changed the name of the paper
slightly and received a new license.

The United States has made President Car-
ter's views on human rights very clearly
known to Thai Government officials, both here
and in Thailand, including our view that a
state of emergency cannot justify the commis-
sion of violations of human rights. It is our
judgment that the Government of Thailand
understands these views and that it is, for its
reasons, becoming more concerned about the
issue of human rights. There has recently
been increased emphasis upon rural develop-
ment, as well as a considerable reduction in
the numbers of prisoners held under order 22.
Also, the few persons still charged because of
their participation in the events of October
1976 will soon be tried, while the rest have
been freed.

Human rights in Thailand cannot be dis-
cussed in a vacuum, given its geographical lo-
cation abutting the Communist states of Cam-
bodia and Laos, its proximity to Vietnam, and
the history of antagonism between the In-
dochina states and Thailand. A justification
given for not returning to the open, politically
effervescent, democratic system which pre-

212

Department of State Bulletin

vailed from 1973 to 1976 is the threat posed by
these states, including support for the Com-
munist insurgencies in Thailand's north,
northeast, and south. Thai feelings of vul-
nerability have been increased by the removal
of the U.S. military from Thailand and the
huge amounts of U.S. arms left in the hands
of the Vietnamese — some of which have been
sent to Laos.

One can draw one's own conclusions as to
the degree to which this situation has contrib-
uted to the nature of the present government.
However, T wish to direct your attention to
another important point — the effect which
massive human rights violations in the In-
dochina countries has upon Thailand.

This committee has already had hearings on
Vietnam and will do so soon on Cambodia.
Thus, there is no need to go into detail on the
human rights problems in Indochina. Suffice it
to say that over the past two years, some
120,000 refugees from Indochina have sought
refuge in Thailand. They see Thailand as
being so far preferable to the situations of
poverty and repressions which exist in their
countries that they take great risks to escape.
Despite the threat of arrest or death from
troops who have orders to fire upon those at-
tempting to flee, over 1,000 refugees a month
continue to pour into Thailand. Despite the
serious economic, social, and political prob-
lems caused by these refugees, the Thai do
not turn them back, although they sometimes
are tempted to do so.

Thus, in addition to the action it is taking to
improve the welfare of its own people, the
Government and people of Thailand are mak-
ing a substantial human rights contribution to
those who are less fortunate than they. In-
deed they are second only to the United
States in providing assistance to Indochina
refugees. They deserve our commendation
and our financial support in this effort, one
which they know must be continued for sev-
eral years to come, given the sharply contrast-
ing human rights situation in Indochina.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

Middle East Problems. Hearings before the Subcommit-
tee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on central in-
fluences and pressures at work in Middle East area.
May 18 and 20, 1977. 79 pp.

Second Protocol to the 1975 Tax Convention With the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land. Message from the President of the United
States transmitting the protocol signed at London on
March .31, 1977. S. E.x. .J. .June 6, 1977. 5 pp.

Ambassador Young's African Trip. Hearing before the
Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations to receive a report from
Ambassador Andrew Young on his recent trip to Af-
rica and United States policy in the area. June 6,
1977. 29 pp.

Survey of Proposals to Reorganize the U.S. Foreign Af-
fairs Agencies, 1951-1975. Part I: Foreign Economic
Policy and Public Diplomacy. Pi-epared for the Sub-
committee on International Operations of the House
Committee on International Relations by the Con-
gressional Research Service of the Library of Con-
gress. June 6, 1977. 70 pp.

Permanent Duty-Free Treatment for Copying Lathes
Used for Making Rough or Finished Shoe Lasts and
for Parts of Such Lathes. Report of the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 3093.
H. Rept. 95-425. June 16, 1977. 5 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Wool Not Finer Than
46S. Report of the House Committee on Ways and
Means to accompany H.R. 3946. H. Rept. 95-428.
June 16, 1977. 5 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Doxorubicin
Hydrochloride Antibiotics. Report of the House
Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R.
4018. H. Rept. 95-429. June 16, 1977. 3 pp.

Temporary Reduction of Duty on Unmounted Underwa-
ter Lenses. Report of the House Committee on Ways
and Means to accompany H.R. 4654. H. Rept. 95-430.
June 16, 1977. 4 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Photographic Color
Couplers and Coupler Intermediates. Report of the
House Committee on Wavs and Means to accompany
H.R. 5052. H. Rept. 95-432. June 16, 1977. 3 pp.

Duty-Free Entry of Competition Bobsleds and Luges.
Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means
to accompany H.R. 5146. H. Rept. 95-433. June 16,
1977. 3 pp.

Reduced Duty on Levulos until July 1, 1980. Report of
the House Committee on Ways and Means to accom-
pany H.R. 5176. H. Rept. 95-434. June 16, 1977. 4
pp.

Suspension of Duty on Certain Bicycle Parts. Report of
the House Committee on Ways and Means to accom-
pany H.R. 5263. H. Rept. 95-435. June 16, 1977. 5
pp.

August 15, 1977

213

The U.S. Business Community and the Caribbean:
Partners in Growth and Development

Address by Terence A. Todman

Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs ^

This is the first time a major conference on
the Caribbean has been directed specifically
toward the American business community,
focusing on the whole range of factors that a
businessperson interested in the Caribbean
must take into account. This conference
brings together representatives of the gov-
ernments of the Caribbean as well as our own
government, representatives of public and
private financial institutions, academic ex-
perts on the Caribbean, and business leaders
in a wide variety of commercial and industrial
activities.

What we all have in common is a personal
interest in the Caribbean and, beyond that, a
recognition that each of us has a very real
stake in its future.

The importance of the Caribbean to the
United States as a nation — economically,
politically, and culturally — is too often under-
estimated. Commercially it offers a vast
potential for enterprise throughout the
hemisphere. In turn investors, exporters, im-
porters, and many others in the U.S. private
sector have much to offer to the economies
and business interests of the Caribbean.

That is why these next two days [of this
conference] will provide an unparalleled op-
portunity for us to build on what we already
know, to open ourselves to new knowledge
and perspectives, and to follow up on a practi-
cal level the mutual opportunities we
discover.

' Made before the Conference on Caribbean Business,
Trade, and Development at Tampa, Florida, on June 23,
1977 (opening paragraphs omitted).

Those of us in government look particularly
to this kind of conference to broaden our own
perspectives and to benefit from the insights
and experiences each of you represent. Those
of you who live and work in the Caribbean —
whether as businessmen, government offi-
cials, or students of the region — bring an es-
sential wisdom and cultural sensitivity to our
discussions here. Your dealings with other
societies and governments are different from
ours in Washington. We earnestly anticipate
your counsel and insights.

As a nation and a people, our ties with the
Caribbean have long been close and are be-
coming increasingly so. We, of course, have a
geographical presence through our links with
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the
territory of the Virgin Islands.

Our commercial relationships have long
been substantial. The United States supplies
25 percent of Caribbean imports and provides
a market for 70 percent of the area's exports.
In dollar terms this amounts to an annual
trade exceeding $6 billion. Volume alone,
however, tells only a small part of the story.
In percentage terms, the Caribbean provides
about 65 percent of the bauxite-alumina and
25 percent of all the sugar imported into the
United States.

U.S. industry has already made a substan-
tial direct investment in the Caribbean re-
gion. For example, U.S. investments in the
Dominican Republic alone amount to more
than $500 million. For the nations of the
English-speaking Caribbean the figure is over
$3 billion.

214

Department of State Bulletin

The interrelationship between the United
States and the peoples of the Caribbean has a
human dimension as well. Americans look to
the Caribbean as their number-one tourist
mecca. An estimated 2.5 million U.S. tourists
visit the Caribbean each year — over a million of
them in the Bahamas alone. The Caribbean at-
tracts more U.S. tourism for its size than the
other nations of the hemisphere combined
and, in fact, is unmatched by any other area of
the world. This great influx of people into a
small, culturally distinctive area has had pro-
found and continuing implications both for the
cultural life of the people they visit and
for the cultural horizons of the tourists
themselves.

Simultaneously, the infusion of tourists into
the Caribbean has been matched by a growing
influx of Caribbean peoples into the U.S.
population.

In many respects, this immigration
pattern — like the great waves of European
immigration of the 19th and early 20th
centuries — is a source of pride and hope for all
concerned. For the United States, it tells us
that our land is still regarded as a place of op-
portunity where a young person would wish to
make his future. At the same time, it has en-
riched the ethnic and cultural makeup of our
own already diverse population.

Yet the migration out of the Caribbean to
the United States continues to trouble both
our government and those of the Caribbean
states themselves.

For us, it raises questions of immigration
policy and competition for jobs in an economy
still grapphng with high unemployment. For
them, while easing the population and un-
employment crunch, it often results in a drain
of professional and management expertise and
educated youth from an area already strug-
gling to care for and educate the staggering 40
percent of the population under 15 years of
age.

Whatever changes and challenges American
and Caribbean citizens have brought to each
other's doorstep, the interweaving of the lives
of our populations has served to link our na-
tions together in a shared history, shared
interests and concerns, and — for better or
worse — a shared future.

Until recently, however, U.S. official in-
volvement with the English-speaking Carib-
bean was extremely limited, while our sub-
stantial involvement in the affairs of the
Spanish-speaking Caribbean was, in the eyes
of many, often aimed in the wrong direction.
In the past, security interests have been the
overriding concern of the U.S. Government in
its dealings with the Caribbean, whereas the
Caribbean nations themselves have been
preoccupied with economic matters.

One State Department official has charac-
terized our past policies as "neglect
punctuated by forceful intervention." How-
ever that may be, what we seek in the Carib-
bean today is not domination, disproportion-
ate influence, or the right to intervene in
other nations' internal affairs. We seek in-
stead a mature, healthy relationship with all
states in the region, founded on respect for
sovereignty, recognition of common interests,
and consultation on matters of mutual
concern.

U.S. View of the Caribbean

For too long the United States has ap-
peared to approach the Caribbean, with its
unique cultures and interests, as simply
another part of "Latin America," giving in-
adequate attention to the Caribbean's own
unique and increasingly serious problems.

The Carter Administration intends to
change that. We see in the Caribbean region a
very special, very important part of the
world. We see in the Caribbean a degree of
cultural diversity truly remarkable for the
area's size. We see economies in widely vary-
ing stages of development and governments
representing a host of differing philosophies
and structures.

We see in the Caribbean a region facing
very serious, and in many respects unique,
economic problems. These problems are not
simply a reflection of broader patterns affect-
ing the rest of Latin America or even the rest
of the developing world; rather they form a
distinctive Caribbean pattern that demands
our direct focus.

Island nations like those of the Caribbean
must depend for their economic existence on
many factors beyond their own borders and

August 15, 1977

215

their own control. They depend on foreign im-
ports for raw materials and consumer goods.
They depend on foreign capital for investment
and foreign markets as outlets for their prod-
ucts. Some of the so-called ministates of the
area are so small that economic viability
would be a severe challenge even under the
most favorable resource circumstances. And
the sizes of even some of the larger of the is-
lands are inadequate compared to their own
growing, and in too many cases jobless,
populations.

All these problems, combined with the
worldwide impact of recession and the energy
crisis, have left some Caribbean states in pre-
carious financial circumstances. In some in-
stances the problems are essentially short-
term ones of stability and debt management
or the still hngering effects of the U.S. reces-
sion on tourism. But in other cases they are
more continuing and complex, such as mount-
ing trade deficits, flight of capital, chronic un-
employment, and the diseconomies of small
scale.

Some observers, after looking at these
problems, have reached overly pessimistic
and, in our view, unwarranted judgments re-
garding the economic and political future of
the Caribbean. The Carter Administration,
for its part, sees in the Caribbean distinctive
and noteworthy elements which far outweigh
the economic crises now commanding
everyone's attention.

In this area we see many good examples of
the open, highly developed political institu-
tions that provide the only long-term guaran-
tee that human rights will enjoy continuing
respect. We can put forward exemplary
Caribbean models of the rule of law, constitu-
tional government, and vigorous political
party competition. We have recently seen in
some countries the peaceful, constitutional
transfer of power between parties after unre-
stricted campaigning.

We see also in the Caribbean an intense
dedication to the other side of the human
rights equation — the equitable meeting of
human needs.

As Secretary Vance discussed in his Law
Day address [at Athens, Ga. on April 30],
freedom from torture and arbitrary arrest is

only the first aspect of human freedom. We
must also deal with loss of dignity — and even
life — through hunger, unmet health needs,
unemployment, and economic despair.

In the Caribbean we see governments and
peoples who are taking those deprivations of \
human rights seriously and are actively trying ;
to do something about them. We see govern-
ments engaged in land reform, rapid indus-
trialization, and major experiments in more
broadly-based ownership and control of
resources.

Indeed, the Caribbean as a whole offers a )
significant test of our commitment to both
democracy and development. Its people face
urgently critical resource needs. Many of its
governments demonstrate full respect for per-
sonal rights, the practice of political democ-
racy, and a firm commitment to social
progress— along with approaches to political
and economic questions that sometimes differ
from ours. Our ability and willingness to re-
spond to their needs under these combined
circumstances will say more about our human
rights policy than all the statements we could
issue.

There is much we don't know about the
Caribbean — about its people and cultures,
about the opportunities in its future, about its
needs and problems and how they might be
met. But there is one thing none of us have to
be told: It is clear beyond all doubt that the
nations of the Caribbean simply cannot meet
the basic needs of their populations without a
major and continuing infusion of capital from
outside the area.

The need is clear. The real question is what
type of response the American people are able
and willing to make. The bottom line is how
important these states are to us — how much it
matters to us what kinds of lives their people
lead. I think it matters a great deal. This Ad-
ministration thinks it matters a great deal.
But I cannot presume to tell you what our
nation's response will be.

When President Carter pledged himself to
bring the American people into the foreign
policymaking process as full partners, it was
because he recognized that in the long run
that is the only way foreign policy in a democ-
racy will work.

216

Department of State Bulletin

This is particularly true of resource trans-
fers. The collective response of our nation will
be determined to a great extent by the at-
titudes and actions of the American public —
particularly interested people like you.

In the public sector, our government al-
ready uses both bilateral and multilateral
programs to transfer aid into the Caribbean.
This year the U.S. Agency for International
Development is conducting a major program
in Haiti — the poorest of the Caribbean
states — with smaller programs operating in
Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and
elsewhere in the Caribbean. Seeking to
strengthen regional economic institutions, the
United States has lent over $40 million to the
Caribbean Development Bank. The volume of
U.S. aid to the Caribbean, in terms of its
population and size relative to other develop-
ing areas, has been substantial.

In terms of Caribbean needs, however, we
are barely scratching the surface. An active
effort is now underway to find ways for our
government to respond more fully to the re-
gion's needs, whether through an expansion of
our own programs or in cooperation with
other concerned countries and institutions.

However, the future of foreign assistance
programs remains an uncertain one. The U.S.
taxpayer is just getting over the effects of the
recession. Like many Caribbean govern-
ments, our own is under severe pressure to
reduce its deficit and achieve a balanced
budget. Additional financial commitments in
the Caribbean may mean cutbacks somewhere
else — in other regions, in other foreign com-
mitments, or in domestic programs. Officials
both in the executive branch and on Capitol
Hill are struggling with those conflicting
pressures.

In making these difficult resource allocation
decisions in the weeks and months ahead, our
government will be looking to you, particu-
larly those with a continuing relationship or
economic stake in the Caribbean, both for
guidance and for support. One thing is clear:
We all have a major stake in the survival of
democracy in the Caribbean.

In a larger sense, however, the response of
our government will only be a small part of
the overall response of the American people.

In the last analysis, the public approach to
foreign policy — particularly in the major
North-South issues — is based on a recognition
that the sum of individual decisions made in
the private sector will probably in the long
run make more difference than the actions of
the government itself.

Opportunities for Private Investment

We have a free enterprise economy. Most of
the technological know-how and, indeed, most
of the capital that the people of developing
countries seek from us is not in the hands of
the U.S. Government but of the U.S. business
community. That is why your role is so impor-
tant. Unless the private sector participates in
a major and constructive way in the develop-
ment drama of our time, the outcome will fall
far short of possibilities and expectations.

No one, of course, expects private invest-
ment or trade decisions to be made on human-
itarian grounds, or even in the service of
American policy goals. They are made mainly
for good business reasons.

I believe there are, in fact, numerous op-
portunities for sound entrepreneurship for the
American businessman or firm interested in
investing in the Caribbean. They exist in in-
dustry, in agriculture, in export and import
sales, and in a wide range of management and
marketing services.

One of the purposes of this conference is to
help to identify those opportunities. We have
to look beyond traditional patterns of financ-
ing, ownership, and relationships between the
different sectors and host governments that
have prevailed in the past. The advent of the
multinational corporation, the growth of in-
ternational financial institutions, the mixed
public-private economies of many developing
nations, and new experiments in joint ven-
tures between nations favored at different
stages of the resource chain all offer chal-
lenging new possibilities; for the enterprising
businessman.

As we look at this area and the challenges
and opportunities before us, we would all do
well to remember that the great industrial
leap of the late 19th century in the United
States — the railroad-building, the mills, the
great western ranches, the urban

August 15, 1977

217

construction — was financed largely by foreign
private investment. French capital assisted
our political revolution, and it was largely
British and other European capital which
financed the early stages of our economic
revolution.

In all cases, wise and farsighted men risked
their fortunes and their reputations on an in-
vestment that made sense not in terms of
what the United States appeared to be at the
time, but what they believed it would come to
be in the future. Their faith proved to be a
self-fulfilling prophecy.

Today America's business community can
play a similar key role in the developing
world. The great drama of development, in
which the major portion of the world is en-
gaged with an intensity and passion which we
can only dimly perceive, will dominate the last
quarter of this century as our own economic
miracle dominated the last.

I cannot tell you that participation offers a
risk-free opportunity for you or your inves-
tors. I can tell you that the development proc-
ess offers a positive alternative to a growing
polarization of rich and poor nations, a break-
down in struggling economies and govern-
ments, and the vast economic and political
disruptions that would follow and affect all of
us.

And it offers, also, a challenge peculiarly
worthy of the genius of American ingenuity.
Even more than the capital itself, the develop-
ing world needs pragmatic, inventive solu-
tions to practical business and management
problems. It needs a sense of optimism and of
historical perspective. It needs to recognize
the possibility of individual rewards for crea-
tive effort. It needs to see how capital in-
vested through sound business planning
works to the benefit of the whole community.
It needs the advanced technology that com-
petitive production requires.

In short, it needs the very things that
American business can best give it. I have no
doubt that each of you who expands into that
horizon will find your decision rewarding in
every sense of the word.

I am equally confident that each of us par-
ticipating in this conference today and
tomorrow — whether from the United States
or the Caribbean, from business or

government — will be rewarded with a greater
understanding of this complex region and of
how each of us personally might contribute to
its future and to the enrichment of our own
lives.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Finance

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag-
ricultural Development. Done at Rome June 13,
1976. '

Signature: Tanzania, July 18, 1977.
Ratification deposited: Saudi Arabia, July 15, 1977.

Fisheries

International convention for the high seas fisheries of
the North Pacific Ocean, with annex and protocol.
Signed at Tokyo May 9, 1952. Entered into force June
12, 19.53. TIAS 2786.

Notice of termination: United States, February 10,
1977; effective February 10, 1978.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea,

1948. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into

force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.

Notification of denunciation: Sweden, June 3, 1977.
Amendments to the international convention for the

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at

London October 25, 1967. '

Acceptance deposited: Tonga, July 12, 1977.
Amendments to the international convention for the

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at

London October 12, 1971. '

Acceptances deposited: Romania, July 11, 1977;
Tonga, July 12. 1977.

Tin

Fifth international tin agreement, with anne,\es. Done
at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force June 14,
1977.
Approval deposited: France, July 15, 1977.

BILATERAL

Canada

Convention for the preservation of the halibut fishery of
the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea. Signed at

Not in force.

218

Department of State Bulletin

Ottawa March 2, 1953. Entered into force October 28,
1953. TIAS 2900.

Notice of termination: United States, April 1, 1977;
effective April 1. 1979.
Memorandum of under.standing on cooperation in the
field of housing and urban affairs. Signed at Ottawa
June 28, 1977. Entered into force June 28, 1977.

Egypt

Project grant agreement for technical and feasibility

studies II. Signed at Cairo June 2, 1977. Entered into

force June 2, 1977.
Agreement amending the project grant agreement of

June 2, 1977 for technical and feasibility studies II.

Signed at Cairo July 10, 1977. Entered into force July

10, 1977.

Haiti

Agreement amending the agreement of March 22 and
23, 1976, as amended (TIAS 8268, 8395), relating to
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber te.xtiles and
te.xtile products. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Julv 19, 1977. Entered into force July 19,
1977.

Kenya

Project agreement relating to a roads gravelling proj-
ect. Signed at Nairobi July 1, 1977. Entered into
force July 1, 1977.

Korea

Agreement amending the agreement of June 26, 1975,
as amended (TIAS 8124, 8267), relating to trade in
cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles. Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington April 29 and June
29, 1977. Entered into force June 29, 1977.

Mexico

Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. Signed at
Mexico November 25, 1976. •

Senate advice and consent to ratification: July 21,
1977. 2

Philippines

Agreement amending the agreement of January 4 and 7,
1977, relating to the transfer of nonfat dry milk to the
Philippines. Signed May 25 and June 6, 1977. Entered
into force June 6, 1977.

Poland

Agreement amending the agreement of November 6,
1975 (TIAS 8180), relating to trade in cotton textiles.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington July 21,
1977. Entered into force July 21, 1977.

Portugal

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag-
ricultural commodities of October 22, 1976 (TIAS
8535). Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon July 7,
1977. Entered into force July 7, 1977.

United Kingdom

Agreement concerning air services, with annexes and
exchange of letters. Signed at Bermuda July 23, 1977.
Entered into force July 23, 1977.

' Not in force.

' With declaration.

August 15, 1977

Upper Voita

Project agreement relating to integrated rural de-
velopment, with annexes. Signed at Ouagadougou
June 30 and July 1, 1977. Entered into force July 1,
1977.

Venezuela

Agreement relating to eligibility for United States mili-
tary assistance and training pursuant to the Interna-
tional Security Assistance and Arms Export Control
Act of 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Caracas
June 16 and 30, 1977. Entered into force June 30,
1977.

PUBLICATIONS

1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume
on Near East, South Asia, Africa

Pres.s release 318 dated July 6 (for release July 13)

The Department of State released on July 13
"Foreign Relations of the United States," 1949, volume
VI, "The Near East, South Asia, and Africa." This vol-
ume is the latest in the "Foreign Relations" series,
which has been published continuously since 1861 as the
official record of American foreign policy.

The volume contains 1,852 pages of previously unpub-
lished documentation on basic U.S. security interests in
the Near East and South Asia; talks with the United
Kingdom concerning the Near East; petroleum policy;
the proposed union of Syria and Iraq; the dispute be-
tween India and Pakistan over Kashmir; a conference of
American consular officials in North Africa; and U.S.
relations with Afghanistan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece,
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and the Union of
South Africa.

The largest single collection of material, comprising
approximately one-half the volume, documents U.S.
interest in the Arab-Israeli controversy over the future
status of Palestine. Coverage is given to the extension
by the U.S. Government of de jure recognition to the
Governments of Israel and Jordan; the armistice
agreements between Israel on the one hand and Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria on the other; the problems
of the Arab refugees, Jerusalem, and territorial bound-
aries; the talks held at Lausanne and other activities of
the Palestine Conciliation Commission; and the failure
to attain a final peace settlement in the area.

"Foreign Relations," 1949, volume VI, was prepared
in the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Department of State. Six other volumes for 1949 have
already been published, and two more are in prepara-
tion. Four volumes for 1950 have also been published,
and three others are in preparation. Copies of volume

219

VI for 1949 (Department of State publication 8885; GPO
Cat. No. Sl.l:949/v. VI), may be purchased for $16.50
(domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should be
made out to the Superintendent of Documents and
should be sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, De-
partment of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock
number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20i02.
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more
copies of any one publication mailed to the same ad-
dress. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown be-
low, which include domestic postage, are subject to
change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a
map, a list of principal government officials and U.S.
diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A
complete set of all Background Notes currently in
stock — at least 140 — $21.80; 1-year subscription service
for appro.ximately 77 updated or new Notes — $24; plas-
tic binder — $1.50.) Single copies of those listed below
are available at 50C each.

CostaRica Cat. No. S1.123:C82

Pub. 7768 4 pp.

El Salvador Cat. No. SI. 123:EL7

Pub. 7794 4 pp.

Equatorial Guinea Cat. No. S1.123:EQ2

Pub. 8025 4 pp.

Finland Cat. No. S1.123:F49

Pub. 8262 7 pp.

Libya Cat. No. S1.123:L61

Pub. 7815 6 pp.

Maldives Cat. No. S1.123;M29/4

Pub. 8026 4 pp.

Swaziland Cat. No. S1.123:SW2

Pub. 8174 6 pp.

Long Range Patrol Aircraft. Agreement with Canada.
TIAS 8388. 4 pp. 35?. (Cat. No. 89.10:8388).

Continued Operation of Long Range Aid to Naviga-
tion (LORAN) Stations. Agreement with the Philip-
pines extending the agreement of November 3 and De-
cember 15, 1975. TIAS 8432. 2 pp. 35«. (Cat. No.
89.10:8432).

Improved Seed Development. Agreement with Thai-
land. TIAS 8474. 40 pp. $1..50. (Cat. No. 89.10:8474).

Rural Education. Agreement with Bolivia. TIAS
8475. 118 pp. $2.75. (Cat. No. 89.10:8475).

Construction of Irrigation Systems. Agreement with
the Republic of Korea. TIAS 8476. 20 pp. $1. (Cat. No.
89.10:8476).

Economic Development. Agreement with Syria. TIAS
8477. 20 pp. $1. (Cat. No. 89.10:8477).

Agricultural Production. Agreement with Syria. TIAS
8478. 34 pp. $1.30. (Cat. No. 89.10:8478).

Atomic Energy — Reactor Safety Experiments.

Agreement with other government.?. TIAS 8479. 66
pp. $1.80. (Cat. No. 89.10:8479).

Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer Space.

Convention with other governments. TIAS 8480. 96
pp. $1.90. (Cat. No. 89.10:8480).

Construction and Equipping of an Abattoir and Ac-
cess Roads. Agreement with Botswana. TIAS 8481. 18
pp. $1. (Cat. No. 89.10:8481).

General Participant Training. Agreement with Syria.
TIAS 8482. 17 pp. $1. (Cat. No. 89.10:8482).

National Metrology Standards Systems. Agreement
with the Republic of Korea. TIAS 8483. 33 pp. $1.30.
(Cat. No. 89.10:8483).

Education in the Basic Sciences. Agreement with the
Republic of Korea. TIAS 8484. 24 pp. $1.20. (Cat. No.
89.10:8484).

Monitoring Food, Beverage and Sanitary Services on

Common Carriers. Memorandum of understanding

with Canada. TIAS 8485. 7 pp. 700. (Cat. No.

89.10:8485).

Double Taxation — Taxes on Income. Convention and

related notes with the Polish People's Republic. TIAS

8486. 68 pp. $1.80. (Cat. No. 89.10:8486).

Food for Work and Distribution. Agreement with
Cape Verde. TIAS 8487. 12 pp. 80(2. (Cat. No.
89.10:8487).

Economic Stability. Agreement with .Jordan. TIAS
8488. 3 pp. 60C. (Cat. No. 89.10:8488).

Agricultural Research. Agreement with the Philip-
pines. TIAS 8489. 85 pp. $1.40. (Cat. No. 89.10:8489).

Technical Cooperation in Statistics and Data Proc-
essing. Agreement with Saudi Arabia. TIAS 8490. 9 pp.
70C. (Cat. No. 89.10:8490).
Improvement of Georgetown Streets and Approaches.

Agreement with Guyana. TIAS 8491. 24 pp. $1.20. (Cat.
No. 89.10:8491).

New Amsterdam Streets and Approaches and Canje
River Bridge Project. Agreement with Guyana. TIAS
8492. 20 pp. $1. (Cat. No. .89.10:8492).

Technical Cooperation in Agriculture and Water.

Agreement with Saudi Arabia. TIAS 8494. 14 pp. 800.
(Cat. No. 89.10:8494).

Technical Cooperation in Acquisition of Electrical
Power Equipment. Agreement with Saudi Arabia.
TIAS 8495. 6 pp. 600. (Cat. No. 89.10:8495).

Housing Loan Guaranty. Agi-eement with Portugal.
TIAS 8496. 3 pp. 60C. (Cat. No. 89.10:8496).

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Luxem-
bourg amending Annex B to the agreement of January
27, 19.50. TIAS 8497. 4 pp. 600. (Cat. No. 89.10:8497).

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Lu.xem-
bourg amending Anne.x B to the agreement of January
27, 1950. TIAS 8498. 4 pp. 600. (Cat. No. S9.10:849si.

220

Department of State Bulletin

IDEX August 15, 1977 Vol. LXXVII, 1990

us Control and Disarmament. Editors and
ilews Directors Interview President Carter (ex-
erpts) 200

iiada. Transfer of Sanctions Treaties With
lexico and Canada (Watson) 208

_IIna. ROC and Korea Agree To Curb Shoe Ex-

' ports to U.S. (White House announcement) 202

ngress

ggressional Documents Relating to Foreign Poi-

fy 213

partment Discusses Human Rights in Thailand

Dakley) 210

tisfer of Sanctions Treaties With Mexico and
panada (Watson) 208

^eloping Countries. United States Seel<s Im-
rove<l U.N. Programs To Meet Basic Needs of
i^orld's Poor (Gilligan) 204

itnomic Affairs. ROC and Korea Agree To Curb
Bhoe Exports to U.S. (White House announce-
■■ment) 202

^eign Aid. United States Seeks Improved U.N.
ograms To Meet Basic Needs of World's Poor
Jilligan) 204

luman Rights

partment Discusses Human Rights in Thailand

■Dakley) 210

ptors and News Directors Interview President

garter (excerpts) 200

resident Carter's Remarks at Yazoo City, Mis-
;_sissippi (excerpts) 197

el. Israeli Prime Minister Begin Visits Wash-
Igton (statement issued at conclusion of first
Beeting) 201

fea. ROC and Korea Agree To Curb Shoe Ex-

Orts to U.S. (White House announcement) .... 202

tin America and the Caribbean. The U.S.
isiness Community and the Caribbean:
tners in Growth and Development (Todman) . . 214

llco. Transfer of Sanctions Treaties With
lexico and Canada (Watson) 208

iiama. President Carter's Remarks at Yazoo

jjty, Mississippi (excerpts) ■. . 197

Bidential Documents

Jtors and News Directors Interview President

Jarter (excerpts) 200

sident Carter Outlines the U.S. -Soviet Rela-

|onship 193

sident Carter's Remarks at Yazoo City, Missis-

ppi (excerpts) 197

Mications

Sales Publications 220

"Foreign Relations" Volume on Near East,
i)Uth Asia, Africa 219

Thailand. Department Discusses Human Rights in
Thailand (Oakley) 210

Treaty Information

Current Actions 218

Transfer of Sanctions Treaties With Mexico and
Canada (Watson) 208

U.S.S.R.

Editors and News Directors Interview President
Carter (excerpts) 200

President Carter Outlines the U.S. -Soviet Rela-
tionship 193

United Nations. United States Seeks Improved
U.N. Progi-ams To Meet Basic Needs of World's
Poor (Gilligan) 204

Vietnam. President Carter's Remarks at Yazoo
City, Mississippi (excerpts) 197

Name Index

Carter, President 193, 197, 200

Gilligan, John J 204

Oakley, Robert B 210

Todman, Terence A 214

Watson, Barbara M 208

Checklist of Department of State

Press Releases: July 25-31

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.
No. Date Subject

*344 7/2.5 Frank V. Ortiz, Jr., sworn in as Am-
bassador to Barbados and Grenada
(biographic data).

*34.5 7/25 Lawrence A. Pezzullo sworn in as
Ambassador to Uruguay (bio-
graphic data).

*346 7/26 U.S., Republic of Korea amend bi-
lateral textile agreement.

*347 7/26 U.S., Poland amend bilateral textile
agreement.

*348 7/29 Advisory Committee to the U.S. Na-
tional Section of the Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Commission, Aug.
30.

t349 7/28 "Foreign Relations," 1949, vol. V,
"Eastern FJurope; The Soviet
Union" (for release Aug. 6).

t350 7/29 Vance: news conference.

* Not printed.

+ Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington, dc. 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

postage and fees paid
Department of State STA-501

Third Class

/J;

77,

79?/

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXVII • No. 1991 • August 22, 1977

PRESIDENT CARTER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JULY 28
Excerpts From Transcript ^21

SECRETARY VANCE'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JULY 29' 227

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES CONSULAR SERVICES
FOR AMERICANS ABROAD
Statements by Miss Watson and Ambassador Stedman 2^8

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index xee inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE B U L L E T I

Vol. LXXVII. No. 1991
August 22, 1977

For sale by the Superintendent of Documenti^

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,

domestic $42.50. foreign $53.15

Single copy 85 cents

lyote' Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re-
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BiLLETI!\
a weekly publication issued hy tkf
Office of Media Serrices, Bureau
Public Affairs, provides the public an\
interested agencies of the gorernmen
with information on developments i\
the field of I'.H. foreign relations an
on the work of the Department an|
the Foreign Service.

The Bl'LLETlS' includes selectel
press releases on foreign policy, issue
by the M'hite House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, ani
news conferences of the President ani
the Secretary of State and other ofH
cers of the Department, as well as sp^
cial articles on various phases of in
ternational affairs and the functions i
the Department. Information is in
eluded concerning treaties and intef
national agreements to which thi
Vnited States is or may become a part\
and on treaties of general interne
tional interest.

Publications of the Department o\
State, L'nited .\ations documents, an^
legislative material in the field
international relations are also listedl

President Carter's News Conference of July 28

Following are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of a news confer-
ence held by President Carter on July 28. ^

I'm very glad to announce that our delega-
tion in Geneva has just completed trilateral
discussions with delegations from the United
Kingdom and from the Soviet Union on the
possible negotiation of a comprehensive ban
against the testing of nuclear weapons or
peaceful nuclear devices. Although there are
still a number of problems that must be re-
solved, the results of these intense consulta-
tions have been sufficiently promising so that
the three countries have decided to begin
formal negotiations in Geneva on October 3.
It's my hope that sufficient basis for agree-
ment can be reached that all other nations of
the world will join us in the ultimate prohibi-
tion against testing of nuclear devices.

Q. Mr. President, in your view, did the Is-
raeli embrace of the three settlements oyi the
West Bank diminish in any way the prospects
for a negotiated settlement in that part of the
icorld?

The President: Yes. I think that any move
toward making permanent the settlements in
the occupied territoi'ies or the establishment
of new settlements obviously increases the
difficulty in ultimate peace.

It's not an insurmountable problem. The
matter of legalizing existing settlements was
a subject that was never discussed by me or
Prime Minister Begin. My own concern was
with the establishment of new settlements.
And I let him know very strongly that this
would be a matter that would cause our own
j government deep concern.

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated August 1, 1977, p.
1120.

This matter of settlements in the occupied
territories has always been characterized by
our government — by me and my pred-
ecessors— as an illegal action. But I think that
the establishment of new territories [settle-
ments] or the recognition of existing ter-
ritories [settlements] to be legal, both provide
obstacles to peace, obstacles which I think we
can overcome, by the way.

Q. Mr. President, since you came into of-
fice, you have stressed so many times that
your policy is to restrain arms sales, we
should not be the arms merchant of the world.
Now you are proposing arms to Egypt, Su-
dan, Somalia, Iran, and there are billions of
dollars worth of arms in the pipeline for
Israel — all areas of potential conflict. Why?

The President: These proposals are compat-
ible with my new arms sales policy, which is
to reduce the level of arms sales in each suc-
ceeding year.

Many of these agreements are the result of
longstanding commitinents by our own gov-
ernment to those nations which are our allies
and friends. We have tried to keep a well-
balanced approach to the whole question.

The most highly divisive issue recently has
been the AWACS [airborne warning and con-
trol system] sale to Iran. They were con-
templating a radar detection system using
ground-based and air-launched mechanisms
that would have been about twice as expensive.

But we are determined to begin a down-
ward trend in the sale of weapons throughout
the world. But at the same time, of course, we
have to have, as a preeminent consideration,
the defense of our own country and an
adequate defense capability for our allies.

And I would comply with my policy that
after this fiscal year, 1977, that in '78 and
subsequent years there would be an overall
reduction in sales.

I am also trying to get our own allies,

August 22, 1977

221

France, England, and others, and also the
Soviet Union, to join us in this effort. And
next year, under the auspices of the United
Nations there will be a world disarmament
conference in which we would not only par-
ticipate but hope to play a leading role. But
the poHcies that I have pursued will be a much
greater constraint on arms sales than has
been the policy in the past.

Q. Then yon are not setting up a competi-
tion with the Soviet Union in Africa on the
question of arms supplies?

The President: No, ma'am, we aren't. I
think it's accurate to say that in the case of
Somalia, which has been almost completely
under the friendly influence of the Soviet
Union and to whom they've been completely
obligated, there has been a change. We are
trying to work not on a unilateral basis but in
conjunction with other nations hke the Saudis,
and France, Italy, and others, to deal with the
Somalia-Ethiopian-Djibouti questions on a
multinational basis to reduce the competition
between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

I might say that in the Libyan-Ethiopian
[Egyptian] conflict that's recently taken place,
and which has now been changed into a peace-
ful relationship for the time being at least,
both ourselves and the Soviets have deliber-
ately shown complete constraint and restraint
in our comments or actions in that area.

We want to confine those conflicts, when
they unfortunately do occur, to as narrowly
geographical an area as possible and prevent
them being identified as a struggle between
ourselves and the Soviet Union.

Oil Imports

Q. Mr. President, in view of the projected
$25 billion budget deficit this year, brought
about largely by foreign oil increases, isn't
this a far greater — imports rather — isn't this
a far greater threat to the American economy
than any energy crunch eight years from
now? Would you consider maki)ig the gov-
ernment the sole importer of foreign oil, and
at the very least, aren't you going to have to
take far more serious energy co)iservation
measures and proposals than ivhat you've al-
ready got?

222

The President: The early estimates thi,
year on our trade deficit were about $25 bil
lion. That's still our best estimate. There ha^
not been a deterioration in that prospect. The
fact is that by leaps and bounds the American'
people are importing and using too much oil.
This has been the primary cause for our con-
cern. We have a positive trade balance,
excluding oil, of about $20 billion. But we are)
importing $45 billion worth of oil this year.

It's a vivid demonstration of the need for
very tight conservation measures on the use
of oil and natural gas. This is a reason for the
long-delayed proposal to establish a strict na-
tional energy policy.

Our hope is to cut down oil imports drasti-
cally by 1985 — 10 million barrels per day less
than the present projected use by that time.
But if the Ameincan people — business, indus-
try, private persons, as well — will join in an ef-
fort to cut down on the waste of oil, then that
would be the major contributing factor toward
balancing our trade with other countries.

I don't know what other actions we will take
at this point. I think that we will continue to
assess additional means by which we can con-
strain oil imports. But whether or not the
government would become the sole importer
is a question that has not yet been considered.

The Middle East

Q. I'd like to go back to the Mideast, if I
may. Some people believe that in your meet-
ings with Mr. Begin, Mr. Begin came away
with sort of the best of it. They think that you
rather embraced him to the extent that our
leverage with Israel has now been reduced.
Would you comment on that, and would you
also tell us what you think now the prospects
for peace versus another war are in the
Mideast?

The President: After I met with President
Sadat and King Hussein and President Asad,
there were major outcries in Israel and among
the American Jewish community that I had
overly embraced the Arab cause. And I think
now that Mr. Begin has visited me, there's a
concern we have overly embraced the Israeli
cause. Obviously, when these leaders come to
see me or when I go to see them, there is an

Department of State Bulletin

t'fort to understand one another, to have a
tase of comprehension and consultation that
■an provide hope for the future.

Our position on the Middle East has been
^•ery carefully spelled out to the degree of
specificity that I choose. We've always made
t clear that, ultimately, the agi-eement had to
ie approved and mutually beneficial to the Is-
aelis and also their Arab neighbors as well.

I think that we have a good chance to go to
Geneva. There are obstacles still to be re-
fill ved. I hope that every leader involved di-
•ectly in the discussions — the four major
■ountries there — will join with us and the
ochairman of the prospective conference —
he Soviet Union — in restraining their state-
nents, not being so adamant on issues, and
lying to cool down the situation until all can
search out common ground, and then hope to
ninimize the differences.

Secretary Vance will leave this weekend to
-'isit the three Arab nations plus Saudi
\rabia, and then come back through Israel as
veil. When he returns to the United States
ifter about a week or so, we'll have a clearer
)icture of the differences that still divide the
■ountries.

I think the major stumbling block at this
3oint is the participation in the negotiations
by the Palestinian representatives. Our posi-
[ion has been that they ought to be repre-
sented and that we will discuss with them
hese elements that involve the Palestinians
iiid other refugees at the time they forego
heir commitment, presently publicly es-
joused, that Israel should be destroyed. But
uitil the Palestinian leaders adopt the propo-
sition that Israel is a nation, that it will be a
lation permanently, that it has a right to live
n peace — until that happens, I see no way
hat we would advocate participation by them
n the peace negotiations.

But these matters are still very fluid. What
jives me hope is that I believe that all na-
ional leaders with whom I've talked
genuinely want to go to Geneva to try to work
)ut permanent peace. That's the primary
:)asis for my optimism. But it's difficult, and
)ast statements by these leaders when they
A ere at war, or in the status of prospective
vvar, have been very rigid and very adamant

and sometimes abusive and filled with hatred
and distrust. We're trying to get them to
change from those positions of distrust to one
of genuine search for peace.

I think it's accurate to say, in closing my
answer, that both sides now have at least a
moderate amount of confidence in us, and I've
tried to take a balanced position to enhance
that trust in us. If I should ever take a biased
position on the part of one of the parties, then
the other parties would simply forego any de-
pendence upon us.

So, I'm very careful in my statements —
privately and publicly — to be consistent and
also to be fair.

Israeli Settlements

Q. Could I follow up on that, Mr. Presi-
dent? I believe you said just a moment ago
that Mr. Begin gave you no advance hint of
this action that he took this week on the set-
tlements. You said that you discussed future
settlements. Cayi you tell us what he said
about that? Is he going to encourage new set-
tlements there, and what did you tell him.
about that?

The President: Mr. Begin did not give me
any promise about his action on the settle-
ment question. I did describe to him our
longstanding position on the settlements,
which I've already outlined, and told him that
this was a major item of potential differences
between Israel and the Arab countries and my
strong hope that nothing would be done by the
Israeli Government in establishing new set-
tlements that might exacerbate an already dif-
ficult position.

He listened to me very carefully. He said
this was a major political issue in Israel, that
in many instances he and his opposition, polit-
ical parties in Israel, felt the same about it,
but that he was certainly aware of our con-
cern. But he did not give me any commit-
ments about what he would do.

And to answer the other part of your ques-
tion, he did not give me any prior notice that
they were going to recognize the legality of
the settlements involved.

Q. Mr. President, isn't there a basic conflict
betiveen all the talk of progress we heard

Xugust 22, 1977

223

around here dunng the Begin visit and at the
titne he left, and the first action that he took
upon returning to Israel and the rejection of
the idea that we could have any influence over
ivhat moves he might make to the West Bank
settlements^

The President: Well, I think it's not fair to
overly criticize Prime Minister Begin. The
fact is that under the previous Mapai
coalition — the labor government — that set-
tlements have been built there, a fairly large
number. The number of people involved is
quite small. And this is not a new thing. I
think it would be a mistake to overemphasize
it or to exaggerate the significance of it. We
feel that any restraint that Prime Minister
Begin might want to exert on this subject
would certainly be contributory toward peace.

I think he's in a position now of great
strength in Israel. I think that his voice would
be honored by the Israeli people. But he, like
myself, has run on campaign commitments,
and I think he's trying to accommodate the
interest of peace as best he can. That doesn't
mean that the settlements are right, but I
think it would not be proper to castigate him
unnecessarily about it because he's continuing
policies that have been extant in Israel for a
long time. And the Israeli Government has
never claimed that these settlements are
permanent. What they have done is to say
that they are legal at the present time.

I think that that's all I know about the sub-
ject, and that's certainly all that I'm going to
say now.

Q. Mr. President, at the risk of going back
over well-plowed ground, Fd like to ask you
why it is that you did not ask Mr. Begin what
his plans were concerning the existing settle-
ments on the West Bank, and more specif-
ically, were you led to believe from your own
studies i)i advance of those talks that he ivas
not going to take this action^

The President: I hate to admit it to you, but
I did not think about raising the subject of
recognizing the legahty of those settlements.
The item that I wanted to discuss with him —
and I did— both in the public meeting with
Cabinet members and also privately upstairs
in the White House, was the establishment of

224

new settlements. And I pointed out to him, as
I've said earlier, that I thought the establish-
ment of new settlements would be a very dif-
ficult thing for public opinion to accept, both
here and in the Arab countries, and that
if — he pointed out to me that new settlers, as
a result of his campaign statements and those
of his opponents, were eager to go into the
area — I don't think it's violating any confi-
dence to tell you what I said, and that was
that I thought it would be easier for us to ac-
cept an increase in the population of existing,
settlements than it would be to accept the es-
tablishment of new settlements. But I did not
think about talking to him concerning the
granting of legal status to those settlements.
It was an oversight which never was
discussed.

Prime Minister Andreotti
of Italy Visits Washington

Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister of Italy,
made an official visit to Washington July
25-28. He met with President Carter and
other government officials July 26-27. Fol-
lowing is a statonent issued by the White
House on July 27. '

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated -August 1

Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti
paid an official visit to Washington July
26-27 at the invitation of President Carter.
He was accompanied by Foreign Minister
Arnaldo Forlani. The President gave a
White House dinner for the Prime Minister
on July 26 and held two lengthy conversa-
tions with the Italian visitors.

The talks between the President and the
Prime Minister covered a wide range of
political, economic, security, and cultural is-
sues in which the two nations share an

' For an exchange of remarks between President
Carter and Prime Minister at a welcoming ceremony
on the South Lawn of the White House and their ex-
change of toasts at a dinner at the White House on
July 26, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments dated Aug. 1, 1977, pp. 1107 and 1112.

Department of State Bulletin

interest. These discussions were a follow-on
to the meeting between the President and
the Prime Minister in May at the London
summit. The President and the Prime Minis-
ter expressed their intention to continue the
process of close consultations between the
two governments and emphasized their basic
agreement on major issues.

During their meetings, the President and
the Prime Minister discussed East-West re-
lations, focusing on SALT [Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks] and other arms control
negotiations; developments in Europe, with
special reference to the European Commu-
nity; the situation in the Mediterranean and
the Middle East; and the upcoming fall meet-
ing in Belgrade of the Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe. The Presi-
dent and the Prime Minister also discussed
human rights and their role in international
affairs, agreeing on the desirability of con-
tinuing to stress implementation of these
universally accepted values as an important
element in the process of detente.

The Prime Minister described the Italian
situation in its various aspects. The Presi-
dent e.xpressed appreciation for Italy's con-
tinued contribution to Western cooperation
and allied solidarity and its commitment to
democratic institutions.

The President and the Prime Minister dis-
cussed the economic difficulties that beset
many of the industrialized democracies and
pledged to work for common solutions. The
two leaders agreed that the Andreotti gov-
ernment's economic program has moved the
Italian economy toward greater stability,
less inflation, and a more favorable balance
of payments. They agreed on the need to
persevere along the lines agreed with the
IMF [International Monetary Fund], as well
as on the necessity of implementing the con-
sensus reached at the London summit to ad-
just payments imbalances in a conte.xt of ex-
panding trade and economic development.

The President and the Prime Minister de-
voted a major part of their talks to world
energy problems. They affirmed their inten-
tion to enhance and reinvigorate cooperation
through the International Energy Agency
and, bilaterally, through the U.S. -Italy
Energy Working Group to coordinate

policies and assist one another in this area of
great significance. In this connection, the
President agreed to explore ways of meeting
Italy's needs for assured supplies of natural
uranium, as well as financing of its nuclear
power program. The two leaders discussed
the special energy requirements and objec-
tives which Italy shares with other major
industralized countries heavily dependent on
imported fossil fuels. They expressed their
hope that the international Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Evaluation would contribute to their
common objectives in the field of nuclear
nonproliferation and to a satisfactory solu-
tion of the participating countries' needs for
assured fuel. They also agreed to expand
cooperation in energy conservation, in safe
and environmentally sound operation of nu-
clear reactors, and in the development of
new sources of energy — solar, bioconversion,
geothermal, and others.

Recognizing the importance of historical
ties of friendship, a common cultural herit-
age, and the contribution of millions of
Americans of Italian descent to the intellec-
tual, spiritual, and economic life of the
United States, the President and the Prime
Minister agreed that every effort should be
made to increase the already significant ex-
changes between the two countries in the
fields of education and culture.

They agreed in particular on the desirabil-
ity of a new effort of reciprocal assistance in
which Italy would assist in the strengthen-
ing of the Italian-language and study pro-
grams in the United States, and the United
States would assist in the strengthening of
English-language teaching and American
studies programs in Italy.

The two leaders also placed high priority
on a two-way expansion of student and scho-
larly exchange and expressed their support
for efforts now underway to finance addi-
tional exchanges through loan funds made
available by the private sector in the two
countries.

The President and the Prime Minister dis-
cussed other areas where future cooperation
between the two countries could lead to im-
mediate results of mutual benefit, including
an agreement on defense. procurement and
follow-up visits by Cabinet-level officials of

August 22, 1977

225

the two governments in the next few
months. These visits will give impetus to
U.S. -Italian cooperation in the areas of de-
fense; economic, financial, and investment
relations; scientific and technological coop-
eration; and exchanges of information on
administrative matters.

During the course of the visit, the two
governments also agreed to announce that
the Chicago Symphony will perform in Milan
in September 1978, in return for the partici-
pation in our Bicentennial celebration of the
La Scala Opera Company. In addition, a
major exhibit called "Pompeii A.D. 79" will
tour the United States soon.

U.S. Supports U.N. Membership
of Djibouti

Following is a statement made in the U.N.
Security Council bij Deputy U.S. Representa-
tive Donald F. McHenry on July 7.

USUN press release 54 dated July 7

The United States is pleased to support the
membership of the Republic of Djibouti in the
United Nations.' As for so many nations be-
fore it, the road to independence and sover-

' The Council on July 7 adopted unanimously a resolu-
tion (S/RES/412 (1977)) recommending "that the Re-
public of Djibouti be admitted to membership in the
United Nations."

eignty for Djibouti has often been difficult.
Djibouti has accomplished its nationhood in
peace and concord and with the support and
friendship of France and of many other coun-
tries, among whom we count ourselves.

Djibouti occupies a location that is signifi-
cant for many other nations. With major port
facilities situated along one of the oldest and
most important trading routes in the world,
Djibouti serves a vast region of the Horn of
Africa. Its people are linked by religion, cul-
ture, and language with many of the people of
surrounding nations, both in Africa and the
Arabian Peninsula. These ties, and the histor-
ical knowledge of the world that a trading na-
tion like Djibouti has, lend its emergence into
an independent role in regional and world af-
fairs an unusual meaning and promise.

The inhabitants of the new republic will now
guide their own destiny. We believe that a
tranquil and independent Djibouti will be an
asset to the international community and most
especially to its immediate neighbors.

The United States has extended recognition
to the Republic of Djibouti and raised its Con-
sulate General to the status of an Embassy.
We support the membership of the new Re-
public of Djibouti in the United Nations with
the confidence that the principles which in-
spired the leaders of the new state to guide
their people successfully to independence will
continue to guide them in our common effort
to establish a world of peace, justice, and
prosperity.

226

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Vance's News Conference of July 29

Press release 350 dated July 29

Secretary Vance: Good morning, ladies and
gentlemen.

Q. Regarding yoiir trip to the Middle East,
Mr. Begin [Prime Minister of Israel], when
he was here [July 18-21 ] , outlined some pro-
cedures that he would like to have followed at
the Geneva peace conference, and I wondered
when you visit the Arab leaders whether you
would endorse or promote those procedures,
have ideas of your own, try to solicit theirs, or
some combination thereof.

Secretary Vance: When I go to the various
capitals [July 31-August 12], I will discuss
with the leaders the proposals made by Mr.
Begin. I will also suggest certain proposals
which we have for the convening of a Geneva
conference, with respect to both questions of
substance and questions of procedure; and of
course I will seek the views of the various
heads of government with whom I will be
meeting. I hope as a result of all this process
we may, by the end of the trip, have a clearer
idea of the ability with which we have been
able to narrow the differences that exist be-
tween the parties and move closer to the
necessary framework for convening a Geneva
conference.

Q. Does that mean you don't yiecessarily
endorse or disapprove, on the other hand, of
the Begin procedural suggestions?

Secretary Vance: As to the proposal as a
whole, we will have some proposals that we
would prefer to put forward than that, but we
will put them forward for discussion.

Q. On that point you said once you would be
putting forth American proposals for, as I
understood it, substantive settleynent in the
Middle East. Will these proposals from the
United States be primarily related to proce-

dure, or will you be putting teryns for a set-
tlement in the area?

Secretary Vance: We will have some
suggestions to make to the parties both on the
questions of substance as well as the questions
of procedure. I think I indicated to most of
you at various times in the past that during
this trip we would be having suggestions to
make to the parties on both these sets of
issues.

Q. One of the ideas that has been raised and
attributed to the United States is that the West
Bank would go under a trusteeship —
apparently a>i Israeli trusteeship — for a
period of several years during which time a
referendum would be held determining the fu-
ture of the West Bank. Is that, in fact, one of
the ideas that you will be bringing?

Secretary Vance: Let me remind you of
what I said before: that if we have sugges-
tions to make during this trip, we would be
making them to the parties rather than mak-
ing them publicly.

We believe, and the parties agree, that if
we are going to play an effective role, the best
way that we can play an effective role is to
make any suggestions which we have directly
to the parties, in confidence, and then receive
their comments on those specific proposals —
which can then be discussed with the other
parties — rather than making them public. And
we are going to adhere to that procedure.

And therefore I think it is inappropriate
and would not be constructive for me to go
into any specifics of what we might be
suggesting to the parties.

Q. President Carter yesterday put posi-
tively, on the issue of the PLO [Palestine Lib-
eration Organization], something that in the
past has been put in essentially negative

August 22, 1977

227

terms — and that is that we would be willing to
deal with the PLO if they accepted Israel's
right to exist as a nation and to exist
permanently.

Are you excluding, on this trip, any possi-
ble meeting with any representative of the
PLO?

Secretary Vance: I do not expect that there
will be any meeting with the PLO during this
trip.

As the President said, there has yet been no
suggestion by the Palestinians that they were
prepared to do the things which President
Carter outlined. In the absence of that, we
feel ourselves constrained by the agreements
we made in Sinai II not to have any discus-
sions with them.

Q. Recognizing that this is a hypothetical
question: If such a statement were to be made
during your trip, would you consider the pos-
sibility of such a meeting?

Secretary Vance: That is a hypothetical
question.

Q. Your Arab-Israeli desk [sic] confirmed
yesterday that the United States never recog-
nized de jure the occupation of the West Bank
by Jordan from 19^8 to 1967, and this desk
has also designated Britain as the last legal
ruler of the West Bank, even though Britain
originally seized the West Bank by military
conquest from the Turks.

And my question is: Do you believe that
until 1922, when the British were granted the
League of Nations mandate, that the British
occupation of the West Bank was legal or
illegal?

Secretary Vance: That is a legal question on
which I have, myself, not devoted the kind of
attention that permits me at this point to give
you the kind of technical answer that is
required.

Q. Since the mandate incorporated Great
Britain's Balfour Declaration of a Jewish na-
tional homeland in Palestine, along with Mr.
Churchill's designation of 80 percent of Pales-
tine as the Emirate of Transjordan — later the
Kingdom of Jordan— do you believe that the
remaining 20 percent of Palestine, in which
Churchill limited Jewish settlements to the

area west of the Jordan, was an excessive ex-
pectation for the Zionists?

Secretary Vance: Again, that is a technical
question on which I do not wish to comment.

Q. Have you received requests for informa-
tion from the Securities and Exchange Coin-
mission about your former law partner, Mr.
Joel Dolkart, a)id the involvement of your
former law firm, Simpson Thacher, with Gulf
Weste7-n in the foreign affairs of the Domini-
can Republic?

Secretary Vance: No.

Q. Do you expect to know definitely by the
end of this trip whether the Geneva peace con-
ference can be reconvened this fall?

Secretary Vance: No, I don't know. It will
all depend on what happens during the trip,
and I think that it is possible that at the end
of the trip we will not know.

If that is the case, then we would plan to
have further meetings, and one of the things
which we have been discussing in the way of
procedures for those further meetings is to
have the further meetings at the time that the
various foreign ministers will be in New York
for the [U.N.] General Assembly.

Q. There has been a certain amount of talk
about the reconvening of the conference in
October.

Isyi't there a danger — what are the risks of
an ill-prepared conference — that there really
is not enough time to prepare the substance to
be negotiated at that conference prior to
October?

Secretary Vance: We have said consistently
that we believe it is important to have a
well-prepared conference and I still believe
that to be the case. And therefore I think we
must do everything within our power to try
and reach as much agreement as is possible on
both substance and procedure before going to
Geneva. And how much we can accomplish
during this trip remains to be seen.

But, as I said, if we cannot get it done on
this trip, then we are prepared to continue the
discussions starting thereafter, probably with
meetings in New York at the time of the Gen-
eral Assembly.

228

Department of State Bulletin

Arms Aid for Africa

Q. The United States is showing consider-
able interest in arms aid for countries in the
Horn of Africa and elsewhere in Africa. Does
this signify an intensified competition with
the Soviet Union for influence, generally?

Secretary Vance: No, I do not think that it
does at all. The President spoke to this issue
yesterday and I would like to reiterate what
he had to say yesterday.

Insofar as the question of arms to countries
located in the Horn of Africa is concerned, let
me just take the case of Somalia. Somalia
asked for both economic and military assist-
ance from the United States. They have asked
for similar assistance from a series of other
countries. They indicated that they wished to
have an alternate source of supply to meet
their defensive needs. We indicated to them
that we would be willing to investigate this
and, to this end, sent an economic assistance
team out to take a look at the situation in
Somalia. We have agreed that we will give
them economic assistance.

Insofar as military assistance is concerned,
we have indicated that, in principle, we would
be prepared to consider the furnishing of some
military assistance for defensive arms — and I
underscore that, for defensive arms^and that
we would do this in conjunction with a number
of other countries who have been approached
in a similar fashion to the approach which was
made to us.

Insofar as the Sudan is concerned, the
Sudan has urged us to give them some addi-
tional help. As you know, we have provided to
them in the past some equipment. They have
had excessive or large pressures from coun-
tries on their borders — they have a very large
country — and therefore we have told them
that we would take under serious considera-
tion additional assistance to them. But this in
no way is to be construed as an attempt to
enter into an arms race with the Soviet Union.

Q. The British decoupling two days ago the
pound from the dollar was at least in part a
reaction, to yoiir recognition of the fact that
the United States was, in essence, attempting
to set off another oil embargo as economic
warfare, so to speak, against the Europeans,

to disrupt the emerging relations between
OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries] and Western Europe around some
formation of a new monetary system.

My question is this: The Arabs, even before
the decoupling move, before the Libya-Egypt
situation, had called an emergency OPEC
yneeting for August 4-th to discuss whether or
not payments should still be made in dollars.
In view of the worsening situation — and it
seems as though our policy in North Africa
has provoked —

Secretary Vance: The worsening situation
between what?

Q. The worsening situation right now in
terms of dollars, internationally; that is to
say, the Arabs have even more incentive now
in trying to go with some alternative to the
dollar, which was ironically provoked by pol-
icy by this Administration that was trying to
set the opposite thing going. But anyway, my
question is are you orientiyig anything in
your trip toward that OPEC meeting, and
what is the estimation of the State Depart-
ment about what might come out of it?

Secretary Vance: The answer is no, I am
not orienting anything in my trip toward that
particular problem which you raise. I am
going to be concerned exclusively with the
subject of trying to resolve with the parties
the necessary procedural and substantive
matters which would be required in order to
move toward Geneva solutions.

Q. You say that U.S. arms to Somalia
should be used for defensive purposes. Does
that mean you would insist that U.S. weapons
not be used in the Ethiopian territory of the
Ogaden, for example?

Secretary Vance: We, I would point out,
have made no decision yet to supply any arms,
and if we were to do so that would, undoubt-
edly, be one of the conditions which would
accompany the furnishing of such arms.

Q. The previous Administration displayed
som,e reluctance to go to Geneva because, ap-
parently, there was the feeling that the Soviet
Union might not be too helpful. That was dur-
ing the full bloom of detente. And I wonder,
now thai some of the blush is off that rose.

August 22, 1977

229

ivhaf makes you believe that the Soviet Union
would be more helpful than before f

Secretary Vance: We have kept closely in
touch with the Soviet Union on the question of
a Middle East conference. We have not only
regular meetings which we agreed to at my
Geneva meeting with Foreign Minister
Gromyko, but I quite frequently discuss the
situation of the Middle East with Ambassador
Dobrynin, bringing him up to date with the
most recent events, and he does the same in-
sofar as we are concerned.

This has been, I think, very useful. We feel
that, as cochairmen, we have a joint responsi-
bility with the Soviet Union to try and bring
the parties to a conference, and we plan to
work together and to cooperate in this
endeavor.

Q. What specifically do you think the Soviet
Utiion is inclined to do to help — not just to
come to Geneva — in the process toward peace?

Secretary Vance: They have indicated they
are willing to use their influence with some of
the parties to urge them to exhibit flexibility,
which will be necessary if we are going to be
able to get to Geneva.

Troop Withdrawals from Korea

Q. You are trying to assure South Korea,
after the troop withdrawal, that the United
States would keep on protecting South Korea.
But in view of the commitment Mr. Nixon
made to President Thieu [of South Vietiiam],
that — I quote — "we will respond with full
force should the settlement be violated by
North Vietnam," plus the fact that the com-
mitment the United States made to
Nationalist China in Taiwan about the de-
fense treaty and so on, is being gradually —
tryi7ig to get out of that, my question is: Why
should South Korea trust the United States to
fulfill its promise, in view of this record?

Secretary Vance: The United States for
many years has been a strong and faithful ally
of Korea, and Korea has been a strong and
faithful ally of the United States. We have re-
peated many times, and Secretary [of Defense
Harold] Brown repeated it recently, that we
stand foursquare behind our treaty with the

230

Republic of South Korea. I think that they
realize that they can depend upon this. The
discussions that we have had with them with
respect to a phased withdrawal over a period
of years of our ground forces, while com-
mitted at the same time to maintain our air
and naval forces in the area, and the close
cooperation which is continuing in the discus-
sion of how this can best be done, I think indi-
cate the importance which we attach to this
and to their security.

I think that they are satisfied that the situ-
ation is one in which they can have confi-
dence that we will stand behind our treaty
commitments.

Q. A few m,onths ago Zaire, which felt it
was being attacked from outside, made a re-
quest for U.S. arms which was not fulfilled.
Why is there, apparently, a difference in ap-
proach for siniilar requests now being made
by Somalia, by Chad, and by Sudan? What is
the main difference, in the American view, be-
tween what happened in Zaire and what is
now happening in the Horn of Africa?

Secretary Vayice: In Zaire, the situation
was different but similar. We continued to
provide nonlethal equipment during the
period of the fighting in Zaire, while at the
same time other allies of ours and allies of
Zaire provided other types of equipment. In
other words, the burden of supplying the
necessary defensive equipment was shared
among a number of countries. We are proceed-
ing with the same kind of procedure in the
case of Somalia and in the case of Chad.

Q. Have you received any kind of signals
from the Palestine Liberation Organization,
short of meeting the American requirement of
recognition of Israel, in which the PLO is
suggesting a way in which they may have a
role in the Geneva conference?

Secretary Vance: We have received nothing
directly from them. Other countries have
passed to us information which they say comes
from the Palestine Liberation Organization
with respect to the Geneva conference and
their desire to participate in a Geneva confer-
ence, but we have nothing in terms of first-
hand information.

Department of State Bulletin

Q. Can you give us some of the shape of
what the PLO signals are like? What are they
prepared to do — even told to you through
intermedianes — to gain a seat at the Geneva
conference?

Secretary Vance: Let me say that it is suffi-
ciently unclear at this point, that I would
hesitate at this point to indicate what they
are, and I want to check firsthand with those
who have communicated this information to
us, namely some of the states which I will be
visiting, to find out exactly what it is that has
been said.

Q. May I just take the liberty of asking you
whether you relayed any messages through
the intermediaries back to the PLO?

Secretary Vance: No.

Q. Following up on the business about the
Russians and the Geneva conference which
you mentioned a moment ago: They are
cochairmen — in view of that and the close re-
lationship, have you outlined to them the
suggestions and proposals that you plan to
take to the Middle East? And, if you have,
can you tell us whether they are in agreement
with it?

Secretary Vance: The answer is, I am going
to. I have not yet; I will before I leave. And,
obviously, the answer is there are no re-
sponses as a result of that.

Q. When you go to Peking next month, do
you have in mind to discuss the Korea
problem — the lessening of tension in the Ko-
rean Peninsula — with the Chinese leaders?

Secretary Vance: When I go to Peking, I
will expect to discuss a whole variety of prob-
lems, including problems of the region— both
the region in the north and in the south — and
I would expect the questions of the Korean
Peninsula to arise in connection with those
discussions.

Panama Canal Treaty

Q. What is the outlook for a new treaty on
the Panama Canal? You just attended a meet-
ing at the White House and Pd like to know.

Secretary Vance: Yes. I attended a meeting

this morning with the President and others
and with two of the negotiators from Panama,
as well as the Panamanian Ambassador. At
that meeting the President indicated his plea-
sure at the progress which has been made to
date on the negotiation of a canal treaty.

There remain some issues between us.
There is a difficult issue of an economic na-
ture, which is probably the most complicated
and difficult of those that remain.

The President expressed hope that these is-
sues could be resolved promptly and that we
could look forward to a completion of the
negotiations in the near future. The Panama-
nians responded that they shared those hopes
and took back with them a letter from the
President to President Torrijos.

Q. In a practical way, there comes a time in
the fall or winter when it's no longer feasible
to try to get a Panama Canal treaty through
the Congress with an election year coming up.
Do you have any notion of what that deadline
might be? In other words, how soon must you
have a treaty in order for its prospects to be
reasonable in the pending political season?

Secretary Vance: I don't think that we can
set, at this point, a date which would be the
date on which we think it would no longer be
feasible to try and push forward in a given
year a canal treaty. I think it remains to be
seen when a canal treaty can be agreed to,
and then we'll have to adopt our legislative
strategy when we see that fact occur.

Q. Returning to the problem of Asia: On the
7th of this month, a Communist pilot defected
to Taiwan and he sent a letter to you asking
for your intervention in getting his wife and
children out of the mainland of China. In the
press briefing a couple of days ago, your of-
fice told us that this particular letter has al-
ready reached you and that this is under
review.

Now, we would like to know what reaction,
or u)hat kind of action you're goiyig to take.
This is one thing. And another question is —

Secretary Vance: Let me answer that. It's
still under review.

Q. Under review.

There is another question. Prime Minister

August 22, 1977

231

[sic] Chiang Ching-kuo of Taiwan just said
yesterday that if the United States is going to
abrogate the treaty of mutual defense with
Nationalist China, then Communist China —
in effect, he said, Communist China is going
to attack Taiwan. Now, with the treaty still in
effect, what kind of action is the United States
going to take?

Secretary Vance: That's a very iffy question
which I'm not going to answer. Let me say,
however, that the question of normalization of
relations and the related issues obviously is an
issue which will come up when I go to Peking
and will have to be discussed at that time.

Q. Two questio}is. First of all, do you
foresee a tinie in the near or distant future
when the United States will or may cut off
)niHfary and economic aid to Israel in order
to pressure for co>icessio)is?

Secretary Vance: I don't see that, no.

U.S. -Cuba Relations

Q. What's the status of U.S. -Cuban talks at
this point?

Secretary Va)tce: On the status of U.S.-
Cuban talks — or U.S. -Cuban relations, let me
broaden it — our so-called interests section,
the establishment of a small number of people
in the Embassy of another country in Havana
and they likewise doing the same thing in the
United States, will take place on the 1st of
September. I am glad that that's going to
happen because I think that will facilitate the
conversations between ourselves and the Cu-
bans, and particularly with such things as the
seizures of vessels which have taken place re-
cently. There have been seizures of about five
ships — six ships, I believe it is — one of which
is still being held by the Cubans.

It is much more difficult to deal with these
kinds of problems through third countries
than dealing directly with them. We have pro-
tested these seizures, and I will feel much
happier about the situation when we have our
own people there who can talk face-to-face on
these kinds of issues.

On other issues, we have not had any fur-
ther discussions since the last time that I had
a press conference.

Q. Mr. Begin is reported to have agreed to
President Carter's suggestion that U.N. obser-
vers he stationed in southern Lebanon or on
the Israeli-Lebanese border.

Is this the sort of suggestion you might be
carrying into your talks with Lebanese, Sy-
rian, and other leaders in the area?

Secretary Vance: That is obviously a ques-
tion which will be discussed. I have discussed
this previously with the Lebanese when I was
last in Beirut. I think it's a constructive
suggestion, one which should be pursued.

It will require agreement among a number
of parties, but I am very pleased that Mr.
Begin has taken a positive attitude with re-
spect to that because I think it is pretty im-
portant to find ways of increasing stability in
southern Lebanon and the preservation of law
and order there.

Q. I am puzzled by what seems to be a dif-
ference in view as to the prospects for success
in Geneva between yourself and the President.
Last week, after his meetings with Mr. Begin,
the President was very optimistic about going
to Geneva. He repeated that optimistic view
yesterday. And, if I understayid you today,
you're not only uncertain about where this
thing is going to shake down on your trip, but
you're talking about further talks after this
trip.

Now, is there a difference in view between
yourself and the President on the prospects
for this conference?

Secretary Vance: The answer is no, and let
me explain why. The President has said that
he is very hopeful that we can go to Geneva at
an early date. I share that view completely.
He indicated that the basis of that view was
that all of the parties have said that they want
to go to Geneva, they want to go to Geneva
promptly, and that they are prepared to go
without preconditions.

Therefore, I think that there is a basis,
based upon what they have said, which indi-
cates a desire on the part of all the parties to
move to Geneva at an early date.

There are, as the President pointed out,
however, some difficult issues that have to be
resolved before that can be done. That's the

232

Department of State Bulletin

purpose of this trip. And what I pointed out
merely was that if we couldn't accomplish it
on this trip, then we'd continue the process to
try and find ways to get over these hurdles.

The Caribbean

Q. A)iibassador [to the U.N. Andrew]
Young is going to be leaving, when you're still
away in the Middle East, for a trip to the
Caribbean and some Central Aniencan coun-
tries; and he's been working closely with the
Depart)nent, of course, in preparing that. I
wonder if you'd tell us from your vantage
point what the purpose of that mission is.

Secretary Vance: Yes. Andy is going to the
Caribbean to do two or three things.

One, he is going to discuss with the various
countries there and some of the countries on
the mainland of South America issues which
will be coming up before the United Nations
in what is going to be, I believe, a very impor-
tant General Assembly in the fall.

In addition to that, he is going to be discuss-
ing a number of important and difficult eco-
nomic problems which exist in the Caribbean.
These are problems which we have been work-
ing on for a number of months but which re-
quire a great deal more work. There are
deep-rooted problems of a very complicated
nature, and I hope that his conversations will
be able to add to and supplement the work
which is already underway in that area.

Thirdly, I think it's important for us to
demonstrate the importance which we attach
to our neighbors in the Caribbean. Andy
knows a number of the leaders in those coun-
tries; and I think it's important that he go
there, meet with them, and demonstrate the
interest and concern that we have with them
and with their individual views, as well as
some of the regional problems which exist.

Q. Could I have another try at the Middle
East? You say there are some difficult issues
yet to be settled. Are they the same ones that
were there in February? Has this process of
consultations that has been going on iyi Wash-
ington actually settled anything?

Secretary Vance: We have narrowed some
of the issues, but a number of the problems

which existed in January — some of the funda-
mental underlying problems — still exist.

Q. And those are essentially representation
of Palestinians, the West Bank, and those are
the same?

Secretary Vance: Those are still the most
difficult problems.

Q. If it is illegal for Israel to establish set-
tlements on the West Bank, who then does
have legal right to the West Bank?

Secretary Vance: There is, I think, an open
question as to who has legal right to the West
Bank.

Q. Well, if the question is open, sir, how
can it be illegal for Israel to move in there?

Secretary Vance: It is possible that with
neither having a right, it is illegal for any
third party to have a right. I think that is
understandable.

Q. The President announced yesterday that
talks will begin on a comprehensive test ban
in Geneva in October. I belieVe it is the same
day that the SALT I agreement is due to ex-
pire. Is there some symbolism there? Is there
going to be some kind of an announcement
that there will be an extension of SALT I?

Secretary Vance: No, there is no sym-
bolism. It is a coincidence that they happen to
take place on the same date.

With respect to SALT, though, let me just
say one thing before we adjouim. Since our
last meeting, we have delegated to our two
delegations in Geneva some of the problems
which remained after the Geneva conference,
and they are now being worked on by our two
delegations in Geneva.

In addition, conversations are continuing
between myself and Mr. Warnke [Paul C.
Warnke, Director, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and chairman of the
U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks], on the one hand, and [Soviet Am-
bassador to the United States] Mr. Dobrynin.
Mr. Dobrynin is now back in the Soviet
Union, but before he left we had some of these
conversations.

A date has now been set for my next meet-
ing with Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Minister of

August 22, 1977

233

Foreign Affairs]. He and I will be meeting in
Vienna on the 7th, 8th, and 9th of September,
and at that time we will be discussing such is-
sues as still remain before us in light of the
work that is now going on.

The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

President Carter Discusses
A New Sea-Level Canal

Following is an excerpt relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of a question-and-
answer session with reporters at the Airport
Hilton Hotel at New Orleans, La., on July

Q. Mr. President, last night you talked
about the possible construction of the >iew
Panama Canal, primarily to transport oil.
But you didn't go very far in telling us what
your thinking — detailed thinking — of that
might be.^

The President: I told you at least as much
as I know. [Laughter]

Q. Let me ask you: Do you have any idea
at this point how much it might cost, when
you would start it, where it would be built,
and just how far along your thinking on this
subject is at this point?

The President: No, I can't. I'll try to an-
swer your questions briefly.

When President Johnson was in office,
there was a very expensive analysis
made — I think it cost about $22 million at
that time — to determine the feasibility of a
canal across the Isthmus of Central
America. The outcome of that report was
that the best location for a sea-level canal
would be a little further north in Panama. I
think the estimated cost at that time was
about $7 billion.

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Aug. 1, 1977, p.
1088.

'■^ For President Carter's response to a question, see
Bulletin of Aug. 15, 1977, p. 197.

234

We did not have the additional problem
then of very serious disputes with Panama
on continued management of the canal under
the 1907 treaty. We also did not have the
additional problem of how to distribute Alas-
kan oil and natural gas to the eastern part of
our country. I think at that time that the
price was considered to be shocking and un-
reasonable.

We have just spent $8 billion on the
pipeline for oil in Alaska. We're now consid-
ering the construction of a natural gas
pipeline that would cost maybe $12 billion.
So, a new sea-level canal would not be un-
reasonable or exorbitant when compared
with other alternative transmission
capabilities.

The other part of the question is about its
need. I have only mentioned the oil and nat-
ural gas transportation, but as you know,
our major warships, large tankers, and
cargo ships cannot presently use the Panama
Canal at all. And I would guess that before
the year 2000 comes and the existing treaty
with Panama and our control of the Panama
Canal might expire, that the need for this
larger, wider, deeper canal without the mul-
tiple locks might be in the interest of our
national security, militarily as well as eco-
nomically.

But all of these are conjectural points.
I've not gone into the question in any depth
and I'm not prepared to answer any further.

Q. Are you planning to make any specific
presentation to Congress or to start further
study for e.rpanding President Johnson's re-
port?

The President: Yes. We've begun to look
now at the report that was prepared when
President Johnson was in office to see its
applicability now under the new circum-
stances that I've described. The two new
factors that I've mentioned are the dispute
with Panama with continued operation of the
canal under the existing treaty, and the
other one is the need to transport Alaskan
oil and natural gas. But those two new fac-
tors will be assessed, and I can't predict the
outcome of it. I've not spent much time on it
myself.

Department of State Bulletin

North-South Dialogue

A Foreign Relations Outline ^

Many poor nations, most of which lie in the
Southern Hemisphere, blame their lack of de-
velopment on an international economic sys-
tem they claim is unjust. For a number of
years now, the United States and other coun-
tries of the industrialized North have engaged
in discussions with the developing nations, in
what has become known as the North-South
dialogue. Designed to establish a more pro-
ductive relationship between developed and
developing nations, the discussions have
taken place in various forums, including the
U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and
the Conference on International Economic
Cooperation (CIEC).

Southern Demands

The less developed countries (LDC's) desire
restructuring of the global economy and redis-
tribution of the world's wealth. They also
want greater economic sovereignty and con-
trol over natural resources. Their plan for a
"new international economic order" entails
sweeping proposals, including:

— Revision of the international trading sys-
tem and commodity marketing arrangements;

— Increased availability of public invest-
ment funds and further exchanges of indus-
trial technology;

— Relief from growing debt repayment bur-
dens; and

— Increases in development assistance flows
and the concessional element of such aid.

U.S. Response

The United States believes that the best
way for the LDC's to attain development ob-
jectives is to work for improvements within
the existing international economic system.
Although differences exist between the
United States and the LDC's on how to en-
hance development and growth, there is a
growing awareness on both sides of the
realities of global economic interdependence.
Progress has been made, in particular since
the U.S. initiatives at the U.N. General As-

sembly Seventh Special Session in September
1975. Most recently, in June 1977, CIEC con-
cluded work on a whole range of North-South
issues, leading to advances in certain areas.

Trade and Commodities

To liberalize trade with the LDC's, the
United States and other industrial countries
have established generalized systems of tariff
preferences covering a broad range of man-
ufactured goods as well as selected primary
products. Specific action to grant further dif-
ferential treatment to the LDC's is being
explored in multilateral trade negotiations in
Geneva.

To deal with commodities, the United
States and the other industrial participants in
CIEC agreed in principle to "establishment of
a Common Fund with purposes, objectives
and other constituent elements to be further
negotiated in UNCTAD." Negotiations on the
Common Fund are scheduled to resume in
November 1977. In addition, preparatory
meetings on individual commodities, also
under UNCTAD auspices, will continue
throughout 1977 and into 1978. Some meetings
may eventually lead to formal commodity
agreements.

Debts and Deficits

To meet the less developed countries' debt
problems, the United States is working to in-
sure that on a case-by-case basis debtor na-
tions undergoing acute crises receive equita-
ble treatment. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF) is the principal source for help in
reducing the balance-of-payments deficits of
the LDC's to acceptable levels. Recently the
IMF greatly expanded its assistance by estab-
lishing a new Trust Fund and by liberalizing
its compensatory financing facility.

Technology

To strengthen the less developed countries'
technological capabilities, the United States

' Based on a Department of State publication in the
GIST series, released in July 1977. This outline is de-
signed to be a quick reference aid on U.S. foreign rela-
tions. It is not intended as a comprehensive U.S. policy
statement.

August 22, 1977

235

proposed in 1976 at UNCTAD IV the creation
of an integrated plan for technological train-
ing, research, and exchange of information.
The plan envisages establishing national and
regional centers for technology transfer and
development. In addition, the United States
has proposed a technology corps, an Intei'na-
tional Institute for Industrialization, and an
International Energy Institute. At the United
Nations, as called for by the Seventh Special
Session, negotiations have begun on a code of
conduct for the transfer of technology.

Development Assistance

To improve development assistance
capabilities of international lending institu-
tions, the United States is participating in
substantial capital replenishments of the
Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian
Development Bank, the Asian Development
Fund, the World Bank, the International
Finance Corporation, the International
Development Association, and the African
Development Fund. The United States also
supports a number of multilateral initiatives,
such as the Sahel fund for Africa, which would
enhance assistance flows to the poorest
countries.

At CIEC the United States committed itself
to work to inci'ease substantially its bilateral
development assistance. We also agreed to
participate in a $1 billion Special Action Pro-
gram to assist poorer developing countries.
Our assistance to the poorest will be mainly in
the form of grants, and we are discussing the
possibility of untying additional amounts of
development assistance. Also, we intend to
focus our aid programs on meeting basic
human needs of the poor in developing
countries.

Food

To deal with urgent food problems of the
poorest countries, an International Fund for
Agricultural Development has been estab-
lished. Initial contributions amount to $1 bil-
lion, including some $420 million from the oil-
producing countries and $200 million from the
United States.

Through Public Law 480 (Food for Peace),
the United States continues to be the world's
largest food donor nation. Recently, we in-
creased our contributions and now transfer
approximately six million tons of food to
needy nations each year through soft-term
loans and grants. These programs not only
feed the hungry but also aim to stimulate ag-
ricultural production and improve food
distribution.

U.S. Nuclear Exports
to South Africa

Following is a statement by Joseph S.
Nye, Jr., Deputy to the Under Secretary for
Security Assistance, Science, and Technol-
ogy, submitted to the Subcommittee on Af-
rica of the House Committee on Interna-
tional Relations on July 12. ^

I am pleased to have this third opportu-
nity to testify before the International Rela-
tions Committee on our nonproliferation and
nuclear export policies. On my appearance
on May 19, 1977, I outlined the general phi-
losophy of the Administration's policy. In
addition I discussed some of the internal pol-
icy decisions that have been taken by the
President as well as some of the details of
the Administration's comprehensive legisla-
tive proposal — H.R. 6910, the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Policy Act of 1977. On my ap-
pearance on May 24, 1977, I testified on the
nonproliferation aspects of the 1978 ERDA
[Energy Research and Development Admin-
istration] authorizations. Since today's hear-
ing is my first appearance before the sub-
committee on Africa, I would like to take
the liberty of summarizing some aspects of
my previous testimony on nonproliferation
so as to provide a framework for a more
specific discussion of the issue of nuclear ex-
ports to the Republic of South Africa.

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

236

Department of State Bulletin

Curbing Nuclear Proliferation

As you know, President Carter has from
the start of his election campaign made curb-
ing nuclear proliferation one of his top
priorities out of a deep conviction of its im-
portance for future generations. The Inter-
national Relations Committee has shown
equal concerns about nonproliferation as in-
dicated by its past actions. The goal of both
the legislative and executive branches is to
limit the number of nations with nuclear ex-
plosive capabilities. Any increase in the
number of nations possessing a nuclear-
weapons capability would have the most
serious ramifications for the stability of the
world. Such a situation would increase the
prospects of nuclear war, adversely affect
our ability to control international events,
have a dissolvent effect on international re-
lationships, and increase the prospect of ter-
rorist nuclear attack. It would also signifi-
cantly impede increased use of the atom for
peaceful purposes, thereby causing greater
reliance on imported oil. Hence, our chal-
lenge is to achieve a prudent balance be-
tween the benefits of nuclear energy and the
risks inherent in it.

As we examine the problem of prolifera-
tion, there appears to be two crucial ele-
ments: the motivation to acquire nuclear ex-
plosive devices and the technical capability
to do so. Neither aspect can be ignored.

First, we must diminish the political and
security motivations that lead states to ac-
quire an explosive capability. Our bilateral
and multilateral security guarantees con-
tribute significantly to reducing the incen-
tives of states to acquire nuclear weapons.
Similarly, the Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) provides an essential framework for
affecting motivation, insofar as it reassures
nations that their neighbors are confining
their nuclear activities to peaceful purposes
and that in the event of diversion to explo-
sive purposes, the treaty's safeguard system
would give timely warning for diplomacy to
work.

In general terms, the NPT represents an
international regime in which states agree
that their security interests would be better

served by avoiding the further spread of nu-
clear weapons capabilities. This also di-
minishes the motivation of NPT parties to
seek the nuclear explosives option. For this
reason and because it is an indispensable
framework for effective nonproliferation ef-
forts, we continue to seek the widest possi-
ble adherence to the NPT.

The NPT is a delicate international ar-
rangement in which states have accepted an
explicitly discriminatory status in the mili-
tary area. But it is imperative that our nu-
clear policies not discriminate among NPT
adherents with regard to civil nuclear coop-
eration. The essence of the treaty is a com-
promise in which discrimination is accepted
in the military sphere — between nuclear-
and non-nuclear-weapon states — in return
for the energy benefits of the atom in the
civil sphere. For nuclear-weapon states to
adopt discriminatory policies on the civil
side would destroy the very fabric of the
NPT and, with it, one of the key nonprolif-
eration institutions.

In sum, therefore, we must be acutely
sensitive to the political and security moti-
vations that lead states to acquire nuclear
explosive devices. In general, this requires
measures such as insuring the credibility of
existing security guarantees, making prog-
ress in achieving meaningful and verifiable
arms control agreements that reduce nuclear
weapon force levels and limit or prohibit nu-
clear testing, strengthening our alliances,
and devaluing the prestige identified with a
nuclear-weapon capability.

The other element of the proliferation
problem — technical capability — presents us
with a very different set of challenges of a
more immediate nature. For if motivations
coincide with a capability to provide nuclear
explosive devices, further proliferation is all
but inevitable. As commercial nuclear
capabilities spread, particularly the sensi-
tive facilities of enrichment and reprocessing
that can produce weapons-usable material,
the number of states near the nuclear
weapons threshold increases.

We must therefore seek to avert the fur-
ther spread under national control of
facilities and materials capable of quick or

August 22, 1977

237

easy conversion to weapons purposes while
meeting our obligations under the NPT. We
need to strengthen the NPT and IAEA [In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency]
safeguards to insure that we have as much
time as possible for diplomacy to work in the
event of deliberate diversion and to help to
deter such diversion. To date, the IAEA
safeguard system has been successful in the
case of the current generation of reactors in
that it provides an alarm that would ring
early enough for diplomacy to work in the
event of deliberate diversion.

Concurrently, our policy recognizes the
concern of other countries for security of
fuel supply. To accommodate this need, we
will be embarking on a wide-ranging pro-
gram to examine ways to provide an assured
supply of nonsensitive nuclear fuel services
on a timely, adequate, reliable, and eco-
nomic basis — hence our decision to expand
U.S. enrichment capacity and to reopen our
order books. In addition, we will examine
ways to go beyond a strictly bilateral ap-
proach. We believe we should explore:

— Multilateral arrangements designed to
substantiate guarantees to consumers as
well as to assure access to fuel supply by
reactor exporters having no indigenous fuel
capabilities and resources; and

— Wider international arrangements such
as an international fuel bank which might
serve as a contingency reserve.

Problems related to the back end of the
fuel cycle — principally the need to insure
adequate spent fuel and nuclear waste
storage — are equally urgent. We are pres-
ently studying a wide range of possible solu-
tions, including expanding domestic U.S.
storage capacity for spent fuel; the idea of
making storage capacity available for the
interim storage of foreign spent fuel; and in-
ternational spent fuel storage arrangements,
including regional centers.

My comments thus far have primarily re-
lated to the current generation of nuclear
reactors. With respect to the next genera-
tion, we have embarked on a major interna-
tional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. We
envision that this evaluation would develop

technical and institutional information on
existing and future nuclear energy systems
which would reduce the maximum potential
risks of proliferation while insuring for each
nation safe and acceptable sources of energy
from an economic as well as environmental
point of view. Among the specific areas the
evaluation would examine are uranium feed
and heavy water availability, uranium en-
richment requirements and capacity long-
term fuel assurances, reprocessing and recy-
cle, fast breeders, spent fuel storage — both
short and long term — methods to increase
once-through uranium utilization, and other
reactor and fuel cycle concepts.

On April 27, 1977, the President sub-
mitted to the Congress H.R. 6910, the Nu-
clear Nonproliferation Policy Act of 1977. ^
This bill would establish the criteria to be
used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NEC) for nuclear exports. In addition the
bill would strengthen the requirements for
new agreements for cooperation by modify-
ing the contents of section 123 of the Atomic
Energy Act. These additional nuclear export
criteria would be required for new agree-
ments for civil nuclear cooperation. A cor-
nerstone among these is our proposal to re-
quire, as a continuing condition of U.S.
supply, that recipients have their nuclear
activities under IAEA safeguards.

The Administration bill is designed to give
the President the ability to deal with the ex-
tremely complex problem of proliferation in
a manner which will best suit the circum-
stances of particular cases. For example, in-
stead of requiring countries that want our
nuclear exports to forswear fuel enrichment
and reprocessing for all time, it allows us to
draft new agreements using incentives to
discourage countries from acquiring such
facilities. Along with the measures of H.R.
6910 the President set forth additional policy
decisions in a fact sheet released by the
White House.

To summarize, the Carter Administration
nonproliferation policy combines two ele-

^ For text of President Carter's letter submitting
the bill on April 27, together with a fact sheet issued
by the White House that dav, see Bulletin of May
16, 1977, p. 477.

238

Department of State Bulletin

merits of continuity with four new elements.
First, the President has reaffirmed our
commitment to the current generation of nu-
clear reactors and our willingness to cooper-
ate in assisting countries within the
safeguards framework established by the
IAEA and the Nonproliferation Treaty. The
second point of continuity was the decision
to continue and extend President Ford's dec-
laration of a moratorium on reprocessing and
recycling of plutonium in the United States.
In addition, President Carter has taken
four new steps:

— First, he has submitted legislation to
Congress that tightens the conditions for
nuclear e.xports from the United States, but
avoids a moratorium on exports that would
have the effect of reducing our influence in
this area;

— Second, he has taken steps to investi-
gate with other countries the possibility of
providing multilateral incentives of enriched
fuel assurances and assistance with short-
term spent fuel storage;

— Third, he has proposed to defer early
commercialization of our breeder reactor
program and to restructure it to search for
more proliferation-resistant and safeguard-
able breeder fuel cycles; and

— Finally, in order to advance a mutual
learning process that can stimulate volun-
tary coordination of policies internationally,
the President has launched the international
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation.

We have been in touch with a broad range
of countries, deliberately avoiding any divi-
sions between consumers and suppliers, rich
and poor, as we try to develop an interna-
tional consensus on how to make the next
generation of nuclear technology safe.

Nuclear Relationship With South Africa

Turning to South Africa, the question of
our future nuclear relationship with that
country is currently under intensive study.
Our nuclear relationship with South Africa
must take into account our global nonprolif-
eration objective. The Administration's pro-
posed legislation is designed to move coun-

tries toward NPT adherence or acceptance
of full-scope safeguards as necessary condi-
tions for the future supply of nuclear
materials.

Under the Administration's nonprolifera-
tion bill, H.R. 6910, in order to continue nu-
clear exports to South Africa, certain im-
mediate criteria would have to be met.
These criteria include: a requirement for
IAEA safeguards, an undertaking not to use
transferred material for any explosive de-
vice, a U.S. retransfer veto, and a U.S. re-
processing veto. Other than some ambiguity
on the acceptance of our view on peaceful
nuclear explosions, the current agreement
for cooperation with South Africa meets all
these conditions.

In addition, the Administration's bill re-
quires that the President institute an im-
mediate program to renegotiate existing
agreements for cooperation. The new terms
that we would seek are set forth in our pro-
posed section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act.
These include a requirement of full-scope
safeguards as a continuing condition of U.S.
supply. We would also incorporate provi-
sions to establish safeguards and other con-
trols on non-U. S. -origin fuel used in U.S.
reactors.

At the same time, our future nuclear rela-
tionship with South Africa must reflect the
spirit of our overall policy toward South Af-
rica. The Administration is very much aware
of the regional conflicts in southern Africa
and the social tensions and violence present
in South Africa.

Moreover, it is the President's policy to
seek a progressive transformation of South
African society. Vice President Mondale
conveyed to Prime Minister Vorster during
their May talks in Vienna the message that
unless South Africa moved away from racial
discrimination and toward full political par-
ticipation for all South Africans, our rela-
tions would deteriorate. Secretary Vance in
a July 1 speech reiterated the basic tenets of
American policy toward South Africa.

We are keenly aware that U.S. nuclear
cooperation with South Africa has in the
past been heavily criticized as constituting
support for the South African Government

August 22, 1977

239

and its policies. This is not our intention.
The pending legislation would tighten our
conditions for nuclear cooperation with
South Africa. A number of specific policy
decisions need to be made. These decisions
must be made in light of the fact that South
Africa has natural uranium and an un-
safeguarded pilot enrichment plant. When
nations have advanced capabilities, we must
be careful not to increase their motivation to
develop nuclear weapons. We believe it es-
sential to bring South African capabilities
and motivations within the international
safeguards system and the regime of the
Nonproliferation Treaty. Whatever policy
choices we make, we must focus on our vital
interests in keeping Africa free of nuclear
weapons.

You have expressed interest in discussing
several other related subjects. Our re-
sponses are as follows:

Legal Basis for Nuclear Cooperation

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, has as one of its purposes provid-
ing for "... a program of international coop-
eration ... to make available to cooperating
nations the benefits of peaceful applications of
atomic energy as widely as expanding tech-
nology and considerations of the common de-
fense and security will permit. ..." Section
123 of the act established procedures and re-
quirements for agreements for cooperation
with other nations. Pursuant to the proce-
dures and requirements of this section, the
United States and South Africa concluded an
Agreement for Cooperation Concerning the
Civil Uses of Atomic Energy which entered
into force in 1957 and which has since been
amended in 1962, 1967, and 1974. U.S. nuclear
cooperation with South Africa is undertaken
pursuant to this agreement for cooperation.

Role of U.S. Government

South Africa became an important
supplier of uranium to the United States be-
ginning in 1953. These shipments continued
until the early 1960's when our requirements

for foreign uranium declined. In the mean-
time, the United States embarked on its
program of peaceful nuclear cooperation be-
ginning in 1955. In pursuance of this pro-
gram, we entered into an agreement for nu-
clear cooperation with South Africa on July
8, 1957. The agreement was similar to those
entered into with approximately 40 other
nations about the same time. It provided for
cooperation in various peaceful uses of nu-
clear energy under safeguards and controls
designed to insure that U.S. assistance
would not be applied to military uses. The
initial type of cooperation was in the area of
research, but eventual cooperation in
nuclear power was envisioned from the
beginning.

With respect to its U.S. -built research
reactor, called Safari-I, the United States
supplied 104 kilograms of fuel between 1965
and 1975. Most of this has been irradiated
and returned to the United States. A South
African request for an additional 26 kilo-
grams of highly enriched uranium fuel for
this reactor is now under consideration
within the Administration. This small reac-
tor (20 megawatts thermal) uses highly en-
riched uranium (93 percent) for engineering
tests, isotope production, and fuel element
development. Our agreement for cooperation
specifies that the amount of HEU [highly
enriched uranium] supplied to South Africa
may not at any one time exceed the quantity
necessary for the loading of the reactor plus
such additional quantities as may be needed
for the efficient and continuous operation of
the reactor. The agreement also provided
that any reprocessing shall be performed in
facilities acceptable to the United States and
that no materials supplied under the agree-
ment may be transferred out of South Africa
unless the United States agrees.

The agreement was amended three
times — in 1962, 1967, and 1974 — in keeping
with our normal practice of extending the
terms and scope of such agreements, as
cooperation proceeded. The 1967 amendment
specifically provided for cooperation in nu-
clear power including the export of power
reactors, but no provision was made in the

240

Department of State Bulletin

amendment foi- the export of nuclear fuel in
power reactor quantities as South Africa had
not as yet firmed up the details of its power
program. By 1974 it reached a decision to
build a two-reactor nuclear power station at
Koeberg, 2U miles north of Cape Town, and
the agreement was amended to permit the
export of the fuel needed for 2,000 MWe
[megawatts electric] of nuclear power capac-
ity.

This amendment, like the original agree-
ment and earlier amendments, was sub-
mitted to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy for a 30-day statutory waiting
period. South Africa subsequently signed
contracts with the Energy Research and
Development Administration for the supply
of, at undetermined future dates, the low-
enriched uranium needed for the Koeberg
power station, currently being built under
an agreement with the French.

The U.S. -South Africa agreement contains
strict safeguards, currently being im-
plemented by the International Atomic
Energy Agency, designed to detect — and
thereby deter — diversion to any military
purpose. In addition, we sent South Africa a
note in 1974 making it clear that any nuclear
explosion, regardless of its stated purpose,
was prohibited by the agreement.

South Africa exports uranium ore concen-
trate to a number of Western European
countries and has also sold uranium to such
other countries as Taiwan and Israel. South
Africa has required application of IAEA
safeguards to all uranium it has exported
and is on record as intending to continue
that policy.

In the next decade. South Africa intends
to establish a commercial uranium enrich-
ment plant and thus to be in a position to
export low enriched uranium for use as fuel in
nuclear power reactors.

South Africa is not engaged in the export
of nuclear technology, and we have no indi-
cation that it has any plans to do so. Rather,
it is our understanding that South Africa
foresees a role as a supplier of "front end"
nuclear fuel services for foreign nuclear
power programs.

Political I))ipiicafio)is

We are, of course, deeply concerned that
South Africa has thus far chosen not to
adhere to the Nonproliferation Treaty or, at
a minimum, place its entire nuclear program
under IAEA safeguards. The Koeberg
power station will be safeguarded pursuant
to a South Africa-France-IAEA trilateral
agreement and if U.S. -origin fuel is utilized
the reactor would be safeguarded pursuant
to the U.S. -South Africa-IAEA trilateral
agreement. In addition South Africa has
stated its willingness to enter into discus-
sions with the IAEA regarding placing its
planned commercial-scale enrichment plant
under IAEA safeguards. To date there has
been no movement on its pilot enrichment
plant.

U.S. policy is to encourage the widest
possible adherence to the NPT and, pending
adherence, the application of full-scope
safeguards. Indeed, as I mentioned earlier,
this will be a requirement in all new or
amended agreements for cooperation. With
regard to existing agreements, such as the
one we have with South Africa, we will be
entering into negotiations with the objective
of securing the same conditions, including
full-scope safeguards, as we will require in
new agreements. In undertaking any such
negotiations with South Africa, we would be
urging in the most emphatic terms that it
adhere to the NPT.

Letters of Credence

On July 29, the following newly appointed
Ambassadors presented their credentials to
President Carter: '

Afghanistan — Abdul Wahid Karim
Canada — Peter Milburn Towe
United Kingdom — Peter Jay
Zambia — Putteho Muketoi Ngonda

' For texts of the Ambassadors' remarks and the
President's replies, see Department of State press re-
leases dated July 29, 1977.

August 22, 1977

241

Department Discusses Program
To Control Narcotic Drugs

Folloiving is a statement by Robert B. Oak-
ley, Deputy Assista)it Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, made before the
House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse
and Control on July 12.^

Four months ago you, Mr. Chairman [Les-
ter L. Wolff of New York], accurately stated
in your address before the East Asian Re-
gional Narcotics Conference in Bangkok
[April 14-16, 1977] that it is "the area of in-
ternational cooperation (which) is the key-
stone in our entire effort" to end the illicit in-
ternational trafficking in narcotics.

In fact, that conference was itself a
watershed in international antinarcotics coop-
eration, a long sought goal of this committee.
At this meeting the Prime Minister of Thai-
land, President Carter's Special Assistant for
Drug Abuse [Dr. Peter Bourne], the Nether-
lands Ambassador to Thailand, the Program
Director of the U.S. Program on Drug Abuse
Control, and you, Mr. Chairman, all identified
an increase in international cooperation as the
principal tool to bring the scourge of drugs
under control. The audience was no less dis-
tinguished consisting of the Ambassadors
from Canada, Federal Republic of Germany,
New Zealand, Belgium, Malaysia, and Great
Britain, all of whom clearly recognized that
the illegal trade in drugs is a threat to the en-
tire international community.

The narcotics conference also gave evidence
of the importance the U.S. Government places
on our antinarcotics program in relation to our
other foreign policy goals. The presence at the
conference of Dr. Peter Bourne, President
Carter's appointment to the newly created of-
fice of Special Assistant to the President, sig-
nificantly emphasized the Administration's
commitment to antinarcotics policies. Dr.
Bourne reports directly to the President, as
well as chairing the new Narcotics Strategy
Council.

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The strategy council, with its mandate to
administer both U.S. domestic and foreign
antinarcotics programs, replaces the old and,
as you well know, less effective Cabinet
Committees on International Narcotics Con-
trol, Drug Law Enforcement, and Drug
Abuse Prevention and Treatment.

Dr. Bourne's office and the Strategy Coun-
cil are indicative of the new approach the U.S.
Government is taking in narcotics policy em-
phasizing closer cooperation with the Con-
gress and better coordination and organiza-
tion of the agencies of the executive branch.
In international narcotics control policy, the
Administration is emphasizing the two themes
of international cooperation and the integra-
tion of U.S. foreign policy with U.S. narcotics
policy.

The problem of drug abuse can no longer be
viewed as a local or even national problem.
For several years American ambassadors
around the world have warned foreign gov-
ernments that drug abuse was not an Ameri-
can problem and that all societies are equally
vulnerable to its destructive forces. There can
be no isolationists in the war against interna-
tional trafficking in dangerous drugs and the
Carter Administration has placed renewed
emphasis on mobilizing foreign governments.

Like the United States, Southeast Asian
nations are themselves "victim countries" un-
dergoing the social and economic problems
brought on by a rising drug addiction rate. We
estimate that between Thailand and Burma
alone there are close to half a million drug ad-
dicts. This number is close to the usual esti-
mates of American addicts but represents a
proportionately greater share of a combined
Thai-Burmese population of less than
80,000,000.

The plight of another country's addict can
no longer be considered that country's prob-
lem. By reducing the number of addicts, de-
mand for drugs and any local support for drug
dealers is reduced. Eventually, this chain of
cause and effect can assist in limiting narcot-
ics production.

In Thailand we are in the final stages of es-
tablishing 15 pilot drug detoxification centers
in Bangkok. At the request of the Burmese
Government we are sending a consultant on

242

Department of State Bulletin

drug treatment to make a study on how we
might similarly reduce the addict population
in that country. U.S. assistance in helping
other countries overcome their drug abuse
problems also produces increased understand-
ing of the narcotics problems we face.

Inci'eased concern about drug addiction is
not relegated to the United States and South-
east Asia. Canada has recognized that it is not
only humane but in Canada's own national
interest to assist Burma in establishing drug
treatment centers and has so indicated to the
Burmese.

Further recognition of the interdependence
of nations in combating drugs can also be
seen in the recent contribution to UNFDAC
[U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control] of the
Scandinavian countries. This contribution of
approximately $6 million was specifically ear-
marked for UNFDAC programs in Thailand
and Burma over the next five years. Also sev-
eral European "victim countries" have re-
cently assigned narcotics officers in Bangkok
to administer their own bilateral antinarcotics
programs, as well as to coordinate interna-
tional efforts. In short the United States is no
longer alone in the fight against drug abuse
and in the cooi'dinated and cooperative efforts
of many nations is the strength to end this
deadly menace.

For our part U.S. antinarcotics programs
obviously need the international support and
strength provided by the overall framework of
American foreign policy and the resources
which support them. This Administration has,
therefore, worked to integrate international
narcotics control objectives more closely into
our overall foreign policy. I speak with assur-
ance when I state that narcotics control is now
a major element of U.S. foreign policy.

The integration of narcotics and foreign pol-
icy is particularly important in Southeast
Asia, where local political, social, and eco-
nomic questions as well as interaction be-
tween states of the region and the interests of
outside parties make narcotics control much
more than a simple law enforcement problem.

An important element in our coordinated
long-term strategy is crop and income sub-
stitution. If alternative crops can be de-
veloped for lands presently given over to

poppy cultivation then opium production itself
can be reduced. UNFDAC, USAID [U.S.
Agency for International Development], and
the Department of Agriculture have been
working cooperatively in Thailand's northwest
not only to identify suitable crops to substi-
tute for opium production but also to design
the infrastructure necessary to make crop
substitution economically viable. Several
crops have been identified as suitable for cul-
tivation in the Golden Triangle area, and ef-
forts are being made by Thailand, with U.S.
help, to begin a pilot production project. The
Thai Government's new Narcotics Control
Board in the Prime Minister's office has the
specific responsibility for crop substitution.

We anticipate an extension program of crop
substitution for sale to be instituted in the
near future. In addition we are assisting in
studies of such infrastructure development
projects as feeder roads, marketing outlets,
food processing plants, and reforestation, all
of which mesh fully with a principal U.S.
foreign policy objective of assisting the eco-
nomic development of a desperately poor area
of the world.

The hill tribe opium growers of Burma,
Laos, and Thailand eke out a bare subsistence
from opium cultivation. Our crop substitution
programs in the Golden Triangle of Southeast
Asia are designed to integrate these tribes-
men into the national market economies of
their country, thereby furthering economic
development, political stabihty, and respect
for the law and our antinarcotics program.

Coincident with crop substitution are pro-
grams designed to meet the basic human need
for health and medical care. The production of
opium in the Golden Triangle is not a modern
phenomenon. Hill tribesmen have for centuries
used opium to deaden the pain of the mul-
titude of serious illnesses which are endemic
to their area. Consequently we are making an
effort that has both humanitarian and antinar-
cotics implications to bring modern medicine
and treatment to the Golden Triangle which
will further reduce one of the major incentives
for the production of opium.

What about the human rights of those
opium farmers in the mountainous regions of
the Golden Triangle? Continued warlord con-

August 22, 1977

243

trol of this region would deny access to the
economic infrastructure of Burma or Thailand
for these hill tribe farmers and would forever
frustrate any hope of economic and social ad-
vancement. Both the Burmese and Thai Gov-
ernments are acutely aware that their anti-
narcotics programs have the potential for
disrupting these hill tribe societies so long de-
pendent on poppy cultivation.

Needless to say, neither Burma nor Thai-
land want to see these farmers join the ranks
of the Communist insurgencies that exist in
both countries. Aside from the crop substitu-
tion and health programs already described,
an example of the care being taken to pre-
serve the viability of the hill tribe societies is
the Burmese decision not to use herbicides
against poppy fields in the Shan states fearing
that such use might damage the food crops in
this area.

Naturally, economic development and inte-
gration into the Thai and Burmese national
economies is not an overnight objective. It
must be accompanied by law enforcement —
national, regional, and international.

The narcotics trade has long fostered a
state of lawlessness over wide areas of Burma
and northern Thailand. The rule of law in
these areas has been replaced by the depreda-
tions of warlord armies and bandits such as
Chang Chi-fu's so-called Shan United Army.
We have, therefore, stressed the need for law
enforcement programs both as a means of ac-
celerating progress toward economic and so-
cial development and to stop, to the degree
possible, the flow of narcotics.

We can take pride in a measure of success in
slowing down narcotics flow. In 1974 narcotics
flowed almost unimpeded from the Golden
Triangle into the international marketplace.
Today the flow continues, but it has been sig-
nificantly reduced and traffickers are finding
the trade increasingly more risky. Since the
narcotics conference in April, there has been a
marked decline in the amount of heroin and
opium coming out of the Golden Triangle. If
current trends continue, and we will do our
best to see that they do, it is conceivable that
the Golden Triangle heroin menace will cease
to threaten the international community
within the next decade.

I would like to point out that most of the
credit for past successes rests with the Thai
and Burmese Governments. While we and
others have provided help, the real enforce-
ment and financial burden has fallen on these
two countries. Their continued cooperation is
absolutely essential if success is to be
achieved.

Both governments have made narcotics con-
trol a major domestic objective. Both coun-
tries have committed substantial resources of
their own to the effort and have pledged to
continue that effort.

A particularly encouraging development has
been recently increased Thai-Burmese coop-
eration against trafficking groups along their
common border. Late last month, forces from
both countries participated in a coordinated
campaign against the Shan United Army and
other warlord groups in the Mae Hong Son
area. This successful effort netted 660 gallons
of semiprocessed opium solution, destroyed
six major refinery sites, and threw the traf-
fickers into further disarray.

Our policies to further the rule of law also
mesh with our overall foreign policy objective
of furthering peace and political stability in
Southeast Asia. A situation of near anarchy in
the sensitive Golden Triangle area is essen-
tially destabilizing. Burmese and Thai efforts
to bring this anarchy under control are fur-
ther complicated by the political affiliations
claimed by these narcotics trafficking organi-
zations and by the regional and political situa-
tion.

In this context we can understand why the
Shan United Army maintains that it is an
anti-Communist movement woi'king for the
self-determination of Burma's Shan state. The
remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's KMT [Kuomin-
tang, or Nationalist Party] in Thailand and
Burma insist that they are essential to protect
Thailand's northern provinces from attack by
Communist forces in Laos and Burma. The il-
lusion that drug dealers and their hired
mercenary armies are legitimate organiza-
tions has complicated past cooperation be-
tween the Govermnents of Burma and Thai-
land. Fear of Burmese Communist insui'gents
(also a major narcotics trafficking organiza-
tion) have tempted some Thai to tolerate

244

Department of State Bulletin

anti-Communist trafficking organizations as a
buffer force along the Thai-Burmese border.
This, in turn, fuels Burmese suspicions that
the Thai are aiding antigovernment forces in
Burma. Even the Communist government in
Laos is troubled by narcotics trafficking or-
ganizations which control some of its border
areas.

A continuation of the tangled situation de-
scribed above makes the prospects for re-
gional peace and stability more precarious. By
helping to dry up the Golden Triangle drug
trade, we will be putting an end to most of the
groups involved in that trade. The demise of
these warlord armies, which live off these
revenues, will reduce tensions in the area and
create a climate more conducive to regional
stability and economic and social progress,
fundamental U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Proposed Sale of AWACS

to Iran

Following is a statement by Secretary
Vance made before the House Committee on
International Relations on July 28, together
with a White House statement issued that
day.^

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY VANCE

I welcome the opportunity to appear be-
fore you today to discuss the proposed sale
of seven AWACS [airborne warning and con-
trol system] aircraft to Iran. The Adminis-
tration favors approval of this sale on two
grounds: It is in our national interest; it
meets a legitimate Iranian defense need.

Let me review briefly with you the rea-
soning behind these conclusions.

Close U.S. -Iranian relations are demon-
strably in our national interest.

— Iran is a strong and friendly regional
power, with which we share many interests.

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the connmittee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

— Iran is a source of stability in a volatile
region; it has no territorial claims against its
neighbors.

— Iran plays a constructive role in the
Middle East and, as you know, did not par-
ticipate in the 1973 oil embargo or terminate
oil shipments to Israel.

— Iran is a major supplier of oil to West-
ern Europe and Japan.

— Iran plays an important role on global
issues of increasing importance to us. For
example, it has been supportive of U.S.
policies on nuclear nonproliferation, both
with regard to its own nuclear programs and
with others internationally.

— Iran works with us in other sensitive
areas that are very important to our na-
tional security interests.

— Iran is strategically situated. It has a
1,200-mile border with the Soviet Union, a
900-mile border with Iraq, and also borders
on the Persian Gulf through which passes 57
percent of the world's oil trade.

Our relations with Iran are thus among
our most important ties abroad. This does
not mean that we must agree on all issues.
But we must be able to discuss any differ-
ences in a context of mutual confidence,
while working together toward many shared
goals. Our relationship with Iran does not
mean we must reward it. Rather our objec-
tive is a strong Iran.

To preserve our mutual confidence Iran
must know that the United States will help
it meet its legitimate defense requirements.
In this regard, Iran should be in a position
to defend itself not only against an actual at-
tack but also against political pressure from
potential adversaries in the form of threats
of force.

This raises the second important element
in our decision — our conclusion that AWACS
meets a legitimate defense need.

In our view, Iran clearly needs a modern
air defense system, particularly an early
warning capability to enable it to scramble
its fighters in time to prevent a successful
preemptive attack. Without this capability,
Iran's air defense is neither effective nor
useful. Some of Iran's most important indus-

August 22, 1977

245

trial installations, such as the Abadan oil re-
finery complex at the head of the gulf, are
vulnerable targets.

Which air defense system is best suited to
Iran's needs? The United States, over a
period of years, has discussed alternative
systems with Iran. The Iranians examined
ground-based as well as airborne systems
such as the E-2C [U.S. Navy airborne warn-
ing and control aircraft] and the AWACS.
They then asked us to carry out a study that
examined ground-based radars and a combi-
nation of ground radars and the AWACS.
The Government of Iran informed us they
were not interested in the E-2C.

Based in part on our study and largely on
their own assessment of the alternatives,
Iran decided that a combination of AWACS
and ground radars was the most cost-
effective system for their needs. Our own
review brought us to the conclusion that this
assessment and the Iranian decision are cor-
rect. On its merits, we are convinced that
this sale makes sense.

Let me discuss next how it relates to the
President's policy on conventional arms
transfers.

The Administration takes seriously its
commitment to restrain the transfer of
arms. Within its overall policy of restraint,
the President's policy provides that arms
transfers will be used "to promote our secu-
rity and the security of our close friends." ^ I
believe that clearly this is the case with the
proposed sale we are discussing today.

This sale would be, in fact, an
exception — specifically, to the policy
guideline that the United States will not be
the first to introduce advanced weapons
sytems into a region. But the exception is
justified in the terms of the policy. The
President's statement contained two grounds
for exceptions, to be made personally by
him: "extraordinary circumstances"; or when
a country "must depend on advanced
weaponry to offset quantitative and other
disadvantages in order to maintain a regional
balance."

■^ For the text of President Carter's statement on
May 19, 1977, see Bulletin of June 13, p. 625.

The President's exception is based on the
second of these grounds. The Soviet Union
and Soviet-supplied Iraq have, in the past,
constituted threats to Iran and could do so
once again. The combined arsenals of these
neighbors are, of course, far larger than that
of Iran. Iraq alone has MIG-23's, supersonic
Blinder bombers, surface-to-surface mis-
siles, and superior air defense. AWACS will
thus help answer specific and identifiable
Iranian security concerns and maintain the
balance against the actual — or, equally
important — the threatened use of force by
its neighbors.

I would like to comment on three concerns
raised by this committee.

The first is the security of the AWACS in
Iran. The Department of Defense has de-
scribed in a letter to you, Mr. Chairman
[Clement J. Zablocki of Wisconsin], and
Congi-essman Hamilton [Lee H. Hamilton of
Indiana] the main elements of the security
plan for the AWACS that we will develop
with the Iranians. In developing this plan,
we will cover .such matters as personnel se-
curity, the security of facilities, and provi-
sions for periodic inspections. There is some
risk; we recognize this. Iran's security rec-
ord, however, is excellent. Iran has strict
security arrangements. We are unaware of
any instance in which U.S. -supplied informa-
tion or equipment has been compromised or
lost. And, as you know, Iran already has
purchased numerous systems containing
sensitive technology.

We are confident that arrangements can
be devised to protect fully the aircraft and
its system. We will continue to consult with
the Congress as we work with the Iranian
Government to safeguard the security of
these aircraft.

Second, with respect to the American
presence in Iran, the AWACS program
would only require about 400 additional con-
tract personnel, plus their families. We are
reviewing the training program with the ob-
jective of increasing the number of Iranians
who will be trained in this country, thereby
reducing the number of Americans who must
be sent to Iran. We shall keep you informed
of our progress in this regard.

246

Department of State Bulletin

Third, on U.S. involvement with Iranian
forces, I want to assure the committee that
no U.S. personnel — whether official or pri-
vate contractor — will participate in AWACS
operational missions. In addition to this fac-
tor, standard contract provisions prohibit
American involvement in any form of hos-
tilities and require that their safety and
well-being be protected. Americans will be
airborne in the AWACS only on missions
that are clearly defined and limited for train-
ing purposes.

In conclusion, the Administration urges
you not to support a resolution of disap-
proval for this sale. We do so because:

— AWACS will be used only for defensive
purposes. It will meet a legitimate defense
need. All our discussions with the Iranian
Government have been based on its use
strictly as an early warning defensive sys-
tem.

— Its security will be protected. Iran al-
ready has an excellent record in protecting
the sensitive systems previously provided.

— AWACS is a cost-effective system. The
combination of AWACS and ground radars
under consideration is best suited to Iran's
needs and rugged terrain and climate. De-
nial of this sale would be a blow to Iran's air
defense planning.

Finally, let me emphasize how strongly
the President and I believe that this sale
serves the interests of the United States. It

will strengthen the security of a friendly na-
tion which looks to us for such support — a
nation which is a source of stability in a crit-
ically important region of the w'orld.

Our relations with Iran have clearly
served the strategic interests of both coun-
tries over the years. This sale will help pre-
serve the mutual confidence so essential to
our ability to work together for progress in
that region and elsewhere in the world.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated August 1

In response to the suggestion of the Senate
leadership and the Senate Foreign Assistance
Subcommittee, the President will withdraw the
notification of the sale for AWACS to Iran and
resubmit it on the day the Congress returns,
September 7, to be part of fiscal year 1977
arms sales.

Congress' time is short because of other
pi'iority legislation. The President is anxious to
give Members of the Senate and House suffi-
cient time, as they have requested, to debate
the complex technical issue of the proposed
sale.

The President is confident that once Con-
gress fully discusses the proposed sale and as-
sesses the assurances we have provided re-
garding the security and management of the
AWACS system in Iran, the sale will receive
favorable congressional review.

August 22, 1977

247

THE CONGRESS

Department Discusses Consular Services
for Americans Abroad

Following are statements by Bai-bara M.
Watson, Administrator of the Bureau of Se-
curity and Consular Affairs, and WilHa)» P.
Sted)na)i, Jr.. Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American AJfairs, made before the Sub-
committee on International Operations of the
House Committee on International Relations
on July H. *

STATEMENT BY MISS WATSON

I am very pleased to have the opportunity
to appear before this committee to give my
assessment of the Special Consular Services
(SCS) aspect of the Bureau of Security and
Consular Affairs, which I have headed since
April of this year.

The Bureau of Security and Consular Af-
fairs, created by the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952, serves as the core, or head-
quarters, for the Department of State's con-
sular operations in the United States and at
250 Foreign Service posts throughout the
world. The constituent offices of the bureau
are keyed to the major consular functions:

— The Visa Office, which manages the is-
suance of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas
to foreign nationals wishing to come to this
country;

— The Passport Office, which issues
passports to Americans who wish to go abroad
and adjudicates the acquisition or loss of U.S.
nationality of Americans abroad; and

— The Office of Special Consular Services,
which directs and coordinates a vai'iety of

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

consular services for Americans traveling or
residing abroad.

In accordance with the committee's wishes,
these SCS services will be the prime topics of
our presentation here today. The following
statistical data will provide the committee an
understanding of the managerial and resource
context in which consular services are pro-
vided. For your convenience, I have prepared
several large charts which will serve to ex-
plain the multilateral environment in which
consular services are provided.

Consular workloads are continually increas-
ing for all three major elements of the
consular function.

As you will note from Chart 1 [page 249],
the number of passports issued overseas has
increased from 594,882 in FY 1972 to 628,679
in 1976, an increase of 5 percent. The increase
in our visa workload has been particularly
heavy, with immigrant visas up 19 percent
from' 353,664 cases in FY 1972 to 421,985
cases in FY 1976, while nonimmigrant visa
cases have increased by a phenomenal 67 per-
cent, from 2,454,632 in FY 1972 to 4,102,148
in FY 1976. Finally, SCS workloads have in-
creased from 949,332 actions in FY 1972 to
1,296,339 in 1976, an increase of 36 percent.

Although the SCS type of caseload is the
prime topic of these hearings, the passport
and visas statistics cannot be ignored, since
the manpower required to handle increased
woi'kloads in these areas often has a direct
and obvious effect on the manpower available
to handle the SCS caseload. Further, many, if
not most, consular services are highly corre-
lated with international travel patterns and
are quite seasonal in nature. We, therefore,
often experience a convergence of demands

248

Department of State Bulletin

for nonimmigrant visa, passport, and special
consular services. We are stretched most se-
verely during the spring and summer months.

We utilized 506 man-years of American con-
sular officer time to handle the FY 1972 work-
load, augmented by 1,436 man-years of
employment by Foreign Service locals. Our
American employment was increased by 23
percent in FY 1976 to 624 man-years, while
local employment increased by 14 percent to
1,638 man-years [see Chart 2," p. 250]. In FY
1976 this included over 28,000 hours of over-
time worked by both American and local em-
ployees to meet unanticipated workload
surges, duty-officer requirements for services
outside normal working hours, and to cover
staff absences.

Consular work is performed at 250 Foreign
Service posts around the world, not including
12 Consular Agencies. The latter are not full-
fledged consular posts and perform only lim-
ited consular functions. Of the 250 Foreign
Service posts, 163 have two or less full-time
consular positions [see Chart 3, p. 251]. All

posts, however, are required to perform the
full range of consular services for Americans
traveling abroad. Most provide nonimmigrant
visa services to foreign nationals, and many
provide immigrant visa services. In sinaller
posts the consular officer, or the officer who
does consular work on a part-time basis, must
truly be a "jack-of-all-trades" in the consular
profession. He or she must be a highly
efficient manager to handle the daily deinand
for consular services.

The American Traveler

Since the primary purpose of our consular
organization is to provide various services to
U.S. nationals traveling or residing abroad,
some commentary regarding these travel-
ers, their numbers, and their profiles is
appropriate:

Although there is no exact correlation be-
tween the numbers of Americans traveling
abroad and those requiring SCS services, a
numerical relationship exists. Clearly, the

GROWTH OF CONSULAR CASELOAD

BY TYPE OF WORK

IMMIGRANT

VISA CASES

NONIMMIGRANT

67%

PASSPORT &
CITIZENSHIP CASES

SPECIAL CONSULAR
SERVICES CASES

2.4M.632 )

19%

36%

FY - 1972 1976

FY - 1972

1976

FY - 1972 1976

FY - 1972

1976

August 22, 1977

249

number of U.S. nationals abroad will continue
to increase for the foreseeable future. At
present at least 14 million Americans hold
valid U.S. passports. Significantly, over 2.8
million new passports were issued to Amei'i-
can travelers last year, and we can expect this
number to increase about 12 percent each
year. Not included in these figures are the
millions of U.S. nationals who travel each
year to Canada, Mexico, and Central and
South America without travel documents or
on tourist cards or similar documents.

Not only are more Americans traveling, but
there are high numbers of travelers from two
age groups who tend to be prime candidates
for SCS services — the very young and the
very old. During calendar year 1976 over
990,000 Americans receiving passports were
under the age of 30; students are second only
to businessmen in the statistics reflecting
passport issuance by occupation.

Similarly, travel by the elderly is on the in-
crease. About 487,300 passport recipients in
calendar year 1976 were over the age of 60,

reflecting an increase of 23 percent from the
previous year's figures. Further, not only are
more elderly Americans traveling but an in-
creasing number are establishing permanent
or semipermanent residences abroad, either
from a desire to live out their days in their
countries of ethnic origin or because they find
that their fixed retirement income still pro-
vides a more comfortable standard of living in
certain places overseas.

The generally higher dependency by these
two age groups on American consular services
is obvious and will be discussed more fully as I
deal with the specific consular functions.

The degree to which the American abroad is
dependent upon the assistance of our consular
officers is a reflection of the traveler's ability
to handle the problems created or magnified
by foreign environments, of the overseas loca-
tion, and of the relative level of local assist-
ance available. We feel there are some impor-
tant trends in both of these areas.

The improved American economy, the rela-
tive standing of the dollar abroad, and the de-

GROWTH OF CONSULAR RESOURCES

IN MAN-YEARS OF EMPLOYMENT

AMERICAN OFFICERS LOCAL EMPLOYEES

1.638

14%

1.436 1

624

506 23%

FY- 1972 1976 FY- 1972 1976 1

250

Department of State Bulletin

creasing cost of overseas travel have all re-
sulted in increased numbers of inexperienced
Americans traveling abroad, many for the
first time. One has only to look at the new
programs such as the "One-Stop Charter," the
"ABC" charters and the new "air train," all
designed to encourage foreign travel by the
inexperienced American. These Americans,
traveling with a minimum of both experience
and funds, will not only be prime candidates
for the many problems and pitfalls facing the
unwary traveler, but will also require a
greater degree of practical assistance, advice,
and reassurance from the American consular
officer.

The number of experienced American
travelers is also on the increase. Their travels
are often marked, however, by a desire to
avoid the normal tourist haunts of Western
nationals and to travel off the beaten paths to
the more exotic, out-of-the-way corners of the
world.

As a result, the experienced traveler who is
capable and resourceful enough to handle
problems encountered in Paris, Rome, or
Japan encounters new and unforeseen difficul-
ties in visiting the mountains of Nepal, the
jungles of the Amazon, or the unstable politi-
cal climes of the Third World. Problems which
might be considered routine or easily resolved
in other areas of the world are intensified by
the lack of communications or the unwilling-
ness or inability of local authorities to assist;
these travelers must rely on the presence and
assistance of the American consular officer.

Concepts of Public Service

Consular service is, by its very nature, a
pubhc service function. In the final analysis
its success or failure cannot be measured only
by its own evaluation of how well it has met
its objectives. Of equal or greater import is an
examination of how satisfactorily the public
which it serves perceives that it has fulfilled

DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS

TOTAL NUMBER
250

NUMBER WITH ONE,

TWO, OR A PART-TIME

CONSULAR OFFICER

48
CONSULATES*

CONSULATES

GENERAL

135
EMBASSIES

163

FY 1976

" PLUS TWELVE CONSULAR AGENTS THAT PROVIDE LIMITED SERVICE

FY 1976

August 22, 1977

251

its service role. In short, the consular service
may not be functioning effectively if the
American public feels that the services of-
fered or performed are insufficient, in-
adequate, or untimely.

In this day of heightened sensitivity to con-
sumer interests, the American public is not
only more aware of the nature of services
available to them, but expects and demands
that these services be performed in an effi-
cient, rapid, and helpful manner.

Although the various categories of consular
services available to the public have been
generally established — and to some extent
limited by law, custom, and political ideal-
ities— the nature of these services and the ex-
tent of consular officer involvement in perform-
ing them must change and expand to meet the
demands of the public, We have seen numer-
ous recent examples of heightened public ex-
pectations expressed in such cases as the

Americans incarcerated in Mexico and other
countries around the world; the Americans
missing in Ecuador; Americans held as
semihostages in Uganda; and the Americans
involved in disasters, such as the earthquake
in Romania and the aircrash in Tenerife.

The Department is well aware that we must
deliver dependable, high quality, responsive
consular services to the American public
abroad and must be wilhng to provide Foreign
Service posts with the manpower and other
resources needed to provide this level of
service.

The significance of the consular function on
the development and exercise of our foreign
policy is becoming increasingly apparent. In
fact, one cannot really separate the protection
and welfare of U.S. nationals — which has al-
ways been a prime tenet of consular serv-
ices— from the more general concern for the
rights of man as an individual everywhere.

EXAMPLES OF SPECIFIC SPECIAL CONSULAR SERVICES
PROVIDED TO AMERICAN CITIZENS ABROAD

ARRESTS

WELFARE & WHEREABOUTS

DEATHS ABROAD

SEAMEN & SHIPPING

ESTATES & PROPERTY CLAIMS

NOTARIALS -

SERVICES FOR OTHER
FEDERAL OR STATE AGENCIES-

1,296,339

70,683

544,356

641.052

7,770

FY 1976

■ VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY, ETC

252

Department of State Bulletin

One has only to consider recent incidents such
as the detention of an American journalist in
Moscow, the incarceration of two American
missionaries in Brazil, the problem of divided
families in Bulgaria, etc., to see the impact
that basic consular problems have on broader
questions of international relations.

The United States has firmly established
the human rights issue as a cornerstone of our
foreign policy. We feel there are few clearer
ways to demonstrate to the world our concern
for the individual than by fielding a strong, ef-
fective consular service that is capable of pro-
viding prompt and obvious assistance and pro-
tection to U.S. nationals throughout the
world.

Specific Consular Functions

Having described some major factors which
impact on performance of consular services
overall, I would like to point out how these
factors specifically affect the individual SCS
services performed by our consular officers
abroad [see Chart 4, p. 252].

Artiest Cases

No other SCS function has attracted more
public, media, and congressional attention and
criticism in the past few years than the serv-
ices performed on behalf of the more than
2,200 U.S. nationals detained or imprisoned
abroad. The relationship between the youthful
American drug offender arrested abroad and
the increasing numbers of younger Americans
traveling is obvious.

Further, with the strong encouragement
and support of U.S. drug interdiction and
suppression programs, many foreign nations
are beginning to see illicit drug use as not just
an "American" problem but an international
one and are increasing their drug enforcement
efforts. Recent examples of this are in Thai-
land, where authorities have publicly stated
their intentions of increasing drug raids and
other enforcement activities in the Chang Mai
Province, and in Colombia where the govern-
ment has recently announced a stepped-up
cocaine interdiction program. These increased
law enforcement efforts, although certainly
necessary, may result in an increase in the

number of Americans arrested abroad on drug
charges.

Consular officials abroad do as much as pos-
sible to assist Americans placed under arrest,
but they must work within the framework of
foreign legal systems with standards of justice
and detention that are often very different
from those that prevail here at home. A citi-
zen ivho travels abroad places himself utuler
the laws and legal systems of the countries he
visits. All the constitutional rights we some-
times take for granted do not go with him.
Hardships endured by American prisoners
abroad and charges of improper actions by
foreign officials — including delays in due proc-
ess and charges of physical abuse — are inves-
tigated promptly by American consular offi-
cials. Frequently, official protests are made to
the foreign governments involved. Where
possible and appropriate, embassies and con-
sulates work with local officials to improve the
conditions for American prisoners.

There is no question that some Americans
incarcerated abroad are subject to penal and
judicial systems that Americans would not to-
lerate at home. The Department is committed
to helping these individuals in every way it
can. However, some prisoners and their
families, in their understandable anxiety,
sometimes exaggerate the degree of leverage
available to the U.S. mission or consulate to
ameliorate penal and legal processes in
foreign countries.

Furthermore, the bottom line in the de-
mands of many prisoners and their families is,
quite understandably, "release." Obviously,
we cannot demand from foreign governments
a degree of immunity or "extraterritoriality"
for American citizens that we are not pre-
pared to grant foreign visitors to the United
States. The watch word is reciprocity. What
we must demand, however — unequivocally
and unceasingly — is that American citizens
not be discriminated against under local law
and procedures and that their treatment meet
what are generally accepted standards of
human rights.

We have extended and expanded arrest
services in an effort to meet the humanitarian
needs of American prisoners. We require.

August 22, 1977

253

with rare exceptions, that every American
imprisoned abroad be visited by a consular of-
ficer at least once a month. We have increased
consular monitoring of trials, pretrial hear-
ings, and other judicial proceedings. We have
requested approval of, and received full sup-
port from, the Congress for a program to pro-
vide emergency medical and dietary assist-
ance to prisoners. All of these services are
necessary although they may place a severe
temporary drain on our consular manpow^er
resources, particularly when the prisons or
courthouses are scattered throughout each
consular district or are often accessible only
by crude or slow means of transportation. To
meet these and future demands will inevitably
require a steady increase in SCS-oriented
consular manpower.

Welfare and Whereabouts Cases

Here again not only the increased numbers
of travelers but increasing numbers at both
ends of the age spectrum tend to compound
the incidence of this type of case. As the
number of younger travelers increases, for
example, we can expect more requests from
concerned parents regarding the whereabouts
of their offspring. With the elderly the re-
verse is often true, with the concerned family
trying to determine the welfare or where-
abouts of the elderly parent or grandparent
who may be ill, injured, missing, or has sim-
ply ceased staying in touch. A third, some-
what unique but growing, category of welfai'e
and whereabouts case is that of the minor
American child who is residing abroad with
one alien parent or some other alien family
member as the result of a divorce or custody
action or dispute and about whom the Ameri-
can citizen parent has become concerned.

These cases require varying degrees of ac-
tion by our consular staff abroad. Although
most of these cases are resolved in a relatively
short period of time, other, more serious,
cases are not — one obvious example being the
three Americans who have been missing in
Ecuador for over a year. Since there is no ab-
solute way of identifying and separating the
potentially serious case from the not-so-
serious, we have little choice but to consider

each case as being potentially serious and to
exert the maximum effort possible to resolve
each case at its outset.

This level of service to as many as 70,000
separate welfare and whereabouts actions
which consular officers can be expected to face
during FY 1979 will require the full expertise
and dedication of all consular officers, as well
as the backing of all of our diplomatic missions
when workloads exceed the capability of our
thinly staffed consular sections.

Financial Assistance Cases

Often consular officers, after determining
an individual American's welfare and/or
whereabouts overseas, find that the American
is encountering difficulties which require fi-
nancial assistance. Again the increase in the
younger and less experienced travelers tends
to create an increased market for these finan-
cial assistance cases since these categories are
most likely to lose their money, miss their
charter flights, or even begin their travels
with insufficient funds, etc.

The increase in travel by the elderly also af-
fects this category of case since it results in
more cases of individuals requiring immediate
medical care for which they have insufficient
funds, failing to receive their scheduled
monthly retirement checks, etc. Consular offi-
cers will be expected to meet these financial
crises by identifying and transmitting private
resources to the indigent individual or, if such
resources are not available, by processing and
administering requests for repatriation loans
to affect the return of the indigent person to
the United States.

Deaths and Estates

Due in large part to the increased numbers
of elderly Americans traveling or residing
abroad, consular officers overseas will handle
an estimated 10,000 cases of American deaths
abroad during fiscal year 1979. Since every
death case is obviously considered a crisis by
the bereaved family and friends, consular offi-
cers must provide a variety of services in con-
nection with each death, ranging from the
identification and shipment of remains, to the
issuance of the consular report of death

254

Department of State Bulletin

abroad, to the temporary conservation of the
decedent's estate. These services are often
compUcated by the strict time Hmits on dispo-
sition of remains in foreign countries and
therefore must be performed rapidly, effec-
tively, and in a concerned, humane manner.

Further, as the number of Americans —
particularly elderly Americans — residing
abroad increases, consular officers find them-
selves faced with not only an increasing
number of death cases but increasingly com-
plex estate matters involved with these
deaths, since the overseas estate may often
include sizable amounts of real as well as per-
sonal property. The handling of death and es-
tate cases by consular officers are legally
mandated, nondeferrable matters, and if there
is insufficient consular staffing at posts abroad
to handle these increased cases other consular
matters must either be delayed or absorbed
by other post officials.

Judicial Services

The various notarial acts and other judicial
services performed by consular officers
abroad are in almost every case mandated by
statute. These include authentication of
foreign documents, commissions from U.S.
courts to take testimony assisting the Justice
Department in the travel of U.S. court wit-
nesses, and related services. These services
are not individually complex as a rule, but the
sheer number of services performed overseas
every year and the fact that most of these
services are mandated by statute require that
adequate staffing be provided to meet these
service needs.

The Federal Benefits Program

Consular officers at 250 Foreign Service
posts, located in 118 countries abroad, are in-
volved daily in the processing of records and
the distribution of over 5 million federal'
retirement, disability, and related checks
annually.

This function is generally routine in nature
and usually does not require complex input on
a case-by-case basis from consular officers.
However, when a problem does occur it
rapidly becomes serious because a large
number of American nationals who live over-

seas are solely dependent on these checks and
have marginal budgets stretching from check
to check. Even minimal delays in receipt of
these checks may create genuine hardships for
these elderly or infirm Americans and require
the quick attention of our consular officers to
resolve whatever problems may have delayed
the checks. A lack in consular manpower as-
signed to the Federal Benefits Program
creates a negative "vicious cycle" effect
wherein the lack of consular manpower to
handle the routine caseload results in errors
or slippage which in turn results in more seri-
ous problems such as missing or delayed
checks, which in turn results in urgent de-
mands for intense consular effort and a higher
manpower usage than would have been re-
quired to maintain the program in routine
fashion to begin with.

This circular syndrome is not unique to just
the Federal benefits portion of consular work
abroad; it appears in all types of consular
work, some of which may tend to be seen as
routine in nature or deferrable.

There are many other services performed
abroad by our consular officers — such as as-
sistance to U.S. vessels and seamen — that I
will not detail here other than to point out
that a number of such services are necessary
and are often mandated by statute. They
perhaps do not have the media impact or take
on the apparent importance of services on be-
half of arrested or missing Americans but
form a definite part of each consular officer's
daily workload and consume a considerable
amount of our consular manpower resources.

Present Day Problems

I feel that the Department is generally
utilizing resources currently available to best
advantage to meet our growing consular
commitment. I would emphasize, for example,
that all consular officers are fully trained and
capable of assisting in SCS cases when
needed. Further, in times of crisis or unpre-
dictably heavy consular workloads, the con-
sular officers can and do draw on the re-
sources of the entire overseas mission, from
the Ambassador on down. For example, as I
am sure Ambassador Stedman can verify [see

August 22, 1977

255

p. 259], the recent events involving Ameri-
cans imprisoned in Bolivia required, and re-
ceived, the involvement of not only consular
officers but of many other officers and local
employees of the Embassy, including the Am-
bassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission.

In fact, one of the Department's announced
management strategies for meeting the cycli-
cal and somewhat unpredictable aspects of
consular work is the temporary transfer of
personnel resources to the consular section
from any or all other post operations. All
Foreign Service Officers are, in fact, given
not only a diplomatic commission but are also
commissioned as consuls, so they may be im-
mediately available for such contingencies.

It is fast becoming obvious, however, that
all of our available resources are unable to
meet the growing demands for consular serv-
ices levied on us by the public we serve. These
shortfalls affect both the consular service and
the individual consular officer and certainly
contribute to what I consider to be the major
problems affecting the consular service today.

Consular "Burnout"

Without wishing to suggest that it has a
bearing on any specific cases we may discuss
today, I would like to call your attention to a
problem affecting our ability to deliver con-
sular services and to which we have recently
been giving attention.

Hour after hour, day after day, consular of-
ficers are intimately involved with troubled
human beings. We are just now beginning to
question what happens to officers who work
intensely with others, learning about their
psychological, social, economical, or physical
problems. Ideally, consular officers retain ob-
jectivity and distance from the situation with-
out losing their concern for the person they
are working with. However, they may not al-
ways be able to cope with this continual emo-
tional stress and so-called burnout may occur.

The term "burnout" did not originate in my
bureau, nor is it a condition unique to the con-
sular service. We have adopted this term from
studies recently done at the University of
California at Berkeley, where the psychology
staff observed professionals at work, con-

ducted personal interviews, and collected ex-
tensive questionnaire data. Their sample in-
cluded poverty lawyers, physicians, prison
personnel, social welfare workers, clinical
psychologists and psychiatrists in a mental
hospital, child care workers, and psychiatric
nurses. We note that the functions of these
professions bear striking similarities to many
of the functions performed by and expected of
our consular officers. We consider it quite
significant that the findings of these studies
showed that all of these professional groups
tended to cope with stress by forms of distanc-
ing that not only hurt the professional but af-
fected service to the client. Our Medical Divi-
sion is just beginning to look at this problem.
We also suspect that "burnout" may be a
key factor in consular officer morale and job
turnover (perhaps the most common response
to consular "burnout" is the desire to transfer
out of the consular specialty). Another reason
for this phenomenon may be a shortage of
consular resources to meet specific consular
problems. As the number of difficult visa,
passport, and protection and welfare cases per
consular officer increases, the result may be
higher and higher emotional overload until,
like a wire that has too much electricity flow-
ing through it, the consular officer "burns
out" and emotionally disconnects. We feel that
there may be an analogy between social
"caseworkers" and our own consular
"caseworkers." We must be more attentive to
the possible linkage between caseload volume
and officer attitudes and effectiveness.

Consular Morale

Closely related to the consular "burnout"
problem is that of the morale within the con-
sular service. It is unfortunate but true that a
number of our consular officers feel that they
are treated as "second-class citizens" by their
counterparts in the Foreign Service and by
top management in the Department.

Abroad they often find themselves in
cramped, unattractive, and ill-suited quar-
ters, sometimes located blocks from the Em-
bassy. When the "country team" meets to
discuss the overall poHcies and goals of the
mission, the senior consular officer may be
conspicuous by his or her absence. It is an un-

256

Department of State Bulletin

fortunate fact that too often consular officers
have not been provided the leadership and
guidance they require from their chiefs of
mission.

Promotional opportunities within the con-
sular cone are not in step with other areas of
the Foreign Service because of a lower rank
structure assigned to consular work. Many of
our better officers find they must transfer to
political, administrative, or other cones to at-
tain senior grades or to qualify for the choice
principal officer assignments. The resultant
loss of experience and talent to the consular
service is obvious.

Post Staffing

As I pointed out earlier, thei'e are a large
number — in fact over half — of Foreign Service
posts that have two or less full-time consular
officers. Staffing patterns heretofore have
tended to be based primarily on workload,
with particular emphasis on passport and visa
caseloads since these are easily quantifiable,
and the amount of time required is about the
same case-by-case. A purely statistical ap-
proach, however, fails to take into account the
demands which even a relatively small
number of SCS cases may make on the con-
sular officer.

Furthermore, passport and visa services, to
a considerable extent, lend themselves to
rationalization through the use of modern
computer and other technology. Protection
and welfare work, on the other hand, is fre-
quently a time-consuming, one-on-one task
which is simply labor intensive.

A consular officer may, for example, have
only a dozen Americans imprisoned within the
consular district, but these prisoners — all of
whom must be visited at least once a
month — ^may be in widely scattered locations,
several hundred miles from the post, requir-
ing hours or even days of travel time. Simi-
larly, a lone consular officer at a small post
might simultaneously encounter a death case,
a plane crash, and a report of a missing
American all at divergent points within the
consular district. All of these require the con-
sular officer's presence, yet the passport,
visa, notarial, and other normal post consular
functions must somehow be carried out as

usual. Although the nature of the consular
service is such that we could never staff every
post to meet every possible contingency, it is
apparent suitable provisions must be made for
the unique resource demands of SCS work-
loads in post staffing decisions.

Post Numbers and Locations

Starting as far back as the 1950's and con-
tinuing through the 1960's, there was a con-
stant trend to "consolidate" Foreign Service
posts by closing smaller posts and transfer-
ring their workload to larger posts in more
centralized areas. This consolidation did pro-
vide for reduced administrative costs and may
have made many consular functions, particu-
larly the issuance of passports and visas, more
cost-effective.

On the negative side, however, it has re-
sulted in the removal of consular officers from
some areas where a relatively large number of
Americans travel or live. As a result, the
American finds that a consular officer is not
immediately available when needed. The con-
sular officer must attempt to assist via long
distance telephone or telegram, an unsatisfac-
tory process at best given the inadequate
commercial communications facilities in many
areas of the world. He soon finds that a great
portion of his time must be devoted to incoun-
try travel.

We obviously cannot open consulates in
every city of the world with an American
population, but perhaps we should weigh more
heavily in our decisions to open or close posts
the numbers of Americans traveling or resid-
ing in certain areas, their need for certain
types of consular services, and the relative
accessibility of the nearest consular post.

Consular Training

Consular work as a whole is both varied and
complex, and a consular officer must have
background and skills in a wide range of sub-
jects from the nationality laws on acquisition
of citizenship by birth abroad to the complex
regulations and procedures involved in the
death of a citizen abroad. The day is long past
when a consular officer can reasonably be ex-
pected to learn the trade through a process of
osmosis; by on-the-job exposure or through a

August 22, 1977

257

lengthy trial and error process. If we are to
field a responsive, efficient, and effective con-
sular service, we must insure that our con-
sular officers are adequately trained, not only
prior to their first assignment as junior offi-
cers but throughout their Foreign Service
careers.

With the recent opening of "Consulate Gen-
eral Rosslyn," a unique and effective model
consular training post located in the Foreign
Service Institute at Rosslyn, Virginia, and
the establishment of annual regional consular
conferences throughout the world, we have
taken some major steps in improving the
amount and level of training available to con-
sular officers.

A continuing effort is needed in the training
field, however, with particular emphasis on
advanced training in the management and
administrative skills for senior consular offi-
cers. One recurring problem within the train-
ing spectrum has been the chronic lack of a
"pipeline" in consular staffing levels and as-
signment timing. The imbalance between the
number of consular officers and the number of
consular positions often prevents our being
able to schedule consular officers for even
short-term, off-site training either during or
between assignments. This chronic "man-in-
motion" problem also sometimes results in
long-term staffing vacancies in consular posi-
tions abroad.

Accomplishments to Date

Although these and related problems are
serious and must be ameliorated if we are to
provide the responsive, high-quality, consular
service today's public expects, I hasten to add
that we have not been passively accepting
these problems. We have made considerable
efforts within the confines of our existing re-
sources to develop solutions and have had
some successes in several areas.

We have established firm guidelines and
policies, including mandatory, regularly
scheduled visits to Americans imprisoned
abroad, and incorporated them in an arrest
"handbook." We have requested and received
from the Congress authorization to fund a new
program to provide emergency medical and
dietary assistance for prisoners. We are cur-

rently updating and expanding our computer '<
capability to monitor, maintain, and correlate
data on all Americans arrested abroad.

As I mentioned earlier, the Department has
a model consulate which permits training of
consular officers in an environment that ap-
proximates Foreign Service post conditions as
closely as possible and incorporates modern
visual and audio training mechanisms. We are
conducting annual regional consular confer-
ences at centralized locations around the
world every year so that the consular officer
in the field has access to the latest develop-
ments, concepts, and policies affecting con-
sular work. In conjunction with the Bureau of
Inter- American Affairs, we have recently in-
augui-ated a pilot project of sending consular
assistance teams to posts in Latin America to
improve the management and operational effi-
ciency of our consular sections. As we gain
experience with this new concept, we hope to
extend it to the other areas of the world.

To the extent possible, we are increasing
the number of consular officer positions, par-
ticularly in the SCS area, through the normal
budget process. At my request, the Director
General of the Foreign Service is presently
conducting a review of the position classifica-
tions of consular and other positions which
hopefully will result in improved promotional
opportunities and improved morale within the
consular service. At the urging of this com-
mittee, the Office of the Inspector General of
the Foreign Service is beginning an unpre-
cedented indepth review of the consular func-
tion in an effort to determine whether our
current legislative mandate can meet the ris-
ing expectations of the general public regard-
ing consular services, and what resources are
needed to successfully comply with existing or
new mandates.

I want to emphasize that we know we are
not perfect, but given our present mandate
and our existing resources the consular serv-
ice is doing a dedicated, creditable job. We
recognize, however, that we are confronted
with a "revolution of rising expectations" with
regard to the consular services the traveling
American public demands and that the re-
sources at our disposal are not sufficient to
meet these new and unprecedented require-
ments.

258

Department of State Bulletin

Therefore, the Department — and particu-
larly those of us in the consular service —
welcome the interest that the Congress has
expressed in the consular function, and par-
ticularly the support and concern which this
committee has demonstrated in its oversight
role. We sincerely hope that we will have your
continuing support in our efforts to do a bet-
ter job in providing for the protection, wel-
fare, and needs of the over 1.3 milhon Ameri-
cans residing abroad, the estimated 7.5
million who will travel abroad this year, and
the millions more who will do so in years to
come.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR STEDMAN

My reason for coming before you today is
to follow up Ms. Barbara Watson's tes-
timony on our consular operations overseas
by discussing certain aspects of our consular
operations and problems in Latin American
countries.

My principal emphasis will be on how best
to assure the protection and welfare of
American citizens who are visiting or resid-
ing in Latin America. I will also deal specif-
ically with three specific protection and
welfare problems of interest to this sub-
committee, and on which this subcommittee
has received testimony from others during
these last three days. These problems are:

— The extended delays involved for a
number of American citizens, imprisoned in
Bolivia for alleged drug-related offenses, in
getting their cases resolved in the Bolivian
judicial process;

— The deaths of two Americans in the im-
mediate aftermath of the Chilean coup of
September 1973, which brought that coun-
try's current government to power; and

— The disappearances of three American
tourists, and the death of a fourth, in
Ecuador in 1975-76.

As Ms. Watson has described — and I will
not go deeply into this subject since she has
already done so — there is a steadily increas-
ing number of Americans traveling overseas.
In Latin America, as elsewhere, this means
more international and more intercultural

contact, which almost certainly will result in
greater mutual understanding of ours and
other nations' problems and opportunities.
Surely this rising tide of visits, and of
Americans living and working abroad, is a
positive development, and we should wel-
come and encourage this trend.

For the great majority of Americans
traveling and residing in Latin America,
dealing with the different cultures and
peoples there provides keen interest and
satisfaction. Of course, there are problems
in living or traveling in any foreign
environment — language barriers, unfamiliar-
ity with local customs, and the rest. But for
the most part, visiting or residing in Latin
American countries means enriching and re-
warding life experiences for our fellow citi-
zens. Certain of the lesser developed coun-
tries offer especially colorful cultural
attractions, but they often have poor trans-
portation and communication and ill-trained,
low paid officials.

But concomitant with this increase in
travel and residence in Latin America is an
increase in the number of Americans who
encounter serious difficulties there. Common
crimes, there as here, take their toll.
Travelers meet with accidents — auto or air
crashes, mountain climbing falls, and the
like — or with serious illness. A few Ameri-
cans, knowingly or unknowingly, get swept
up into the civil disturbances and poHtical dis-
putes of the region, become victims of misun-
derstandings, or are accused of wrongdoing
of which they may be innocent or which
is tolerated or permitted in the United
States.

Drug trafficking, drug abuse, and other il-
legal activities send hundreds of Americans
southward — as "mules" or otherwise — and
many are caught and jailed. This is still going
on.

When Americans find themselves in dif-
ficulties, the State Department's protection
and welfare function comes in. We have an
able corps of devoted, compassionate,
hardworking consular officers and clerks,
but they are not able to satisfy all of the
larger numbers of rising demands of citizens
abroad who experience difficulties. Even the
most routine problems take time to

August 22, 1977

259

handle — for example, one situation may re-
quire contacts with host country police and
other authorities, notifications to the De-
partment and the families involved, process-
ing of replacement passports, and repatria-
tion loans. Much more time is required for
important and complicated protection prob-
lems. Often problems are encountered at a
considerable distance from the consulate in
countries where communications are poor.
Moreover, our manpower ceilings and avail-
able funds are inadequate to the task of
meeting the increasing demands for protec-
tion and welfare services.

Let me draw on my own recent experi-
ence. When I arrived in Bolivia in 1973 as
Ambassador — a post I held until just a
month ago — there was one consular officer
for the entire country. He was charged with
passport and citizenship work, notarials,
visa issuance, as well as welfare and protec-
tion. I foresaw increasing problems for the
consular section to deal with a growing
number of Americans being imprisoned in
that country for alleged drug-related of-
fenses. In November 1975 I asked the De-
partment for a second American consular
position. The position was approved in Feb-
ruary 1976, but the officer to fill that posi-
tion did not arrive until January 1977.

I would like to note that among the many
competing demands on the sole consul were
such problems as the crash in October 1976
of an American cargo plane in Santa Cruz
which took the lives of the American crew
and burned and killed more than 100 Boli-
vians on the ground. Our consul, who then
had a cast on a broken foot, flew to Santa
Cruz whei'e he remained for a week identify-
ing the remains of the Americans, preparing
them for shipment back to the United
States, and arranging assistance to the Boli-
vian victims.

I know my colleagues in the Bureau of Se-
curity and Consular Affairs were sympathet-
ic and supportive, but neither they nor the
Bureau of Personnel, which controls assign-
ments, had a suitable consular officer avail-
able to send me. I shifted officers from other
duties to help part time — which helped
partly to meet the demands for consular

services but at the neglect of their regularly
assigned duties. The point is, if we are to
meet the protection and welfare services in
Latin Amei'ica or anywhere — which the in-
creasing numbers of Americans request —
then we must put more people and funds on
the line.

Let me turn next to the three protection
and welfare cases which this subcommittee
has focused on during its hearings this
week.

American Prisoners In Bolivia

The problem of U.S. prisoners in Bolivia
has its origin prior to 1973 when Bolivia,
along with the United States and other
countries, became increasingly aware of and
concerned about the international narcotics
traffic. Cocaine became more prominent and
began to be exported illegally as a finished
product from Bolivia in significant quan-
tities. This was a drastic departure from the
traditional use of the coca leaf which had
been cultivated and chewed by the Andean
population for centuries. In response to ex-
ternal demand, cocaine production in Bolivia
increased. The country then experienced an
influx of traffickers, carriers, users, and ex-
perimenters with the drug.

When the Government of Bolivia drafted
its first comprehensive narcotics law in
1973, the United States followed develop-
ments with special interest since the new
law could be expected to reduce the flow of
cocaine into the United States. The Boli-
vians had only recently become aware of the
drug problem as a threat to their own
population — and specifically to their
youth — and sought to eradicate the problem
through severe punishment for offenders.
Ten- to twenty-five-year prison sentences
for possession and trafficking were decreed
by the Bolivians.

In early 1976 the Bolivian authorities
found themselves unable to cope satisfactor-
ily with the results of the 1973 narcotics
law. The La Paz judicial district alone — with
a population of 600,000 — had nearly 600 de-
tainees awaiting or in the process of trial
and sentencing. Approximately 50 percent

260

Department of State Bulletin

were held on narcotics charges. Close to 30
were American citizens. Only three judges
presiding over three criminal courts were
attempting to adjudicate all the cases and
administer justice through an archaic judi-
cial system. At that time, most of the U.S.
prisoners and their defense attorneys were
not pressing for prompt trials because of the
severity of penalties under the 1973 law and
because new or amended narcotics legisla-
tion was expected. In the meantime, the
consul was providing assistance, making
monthly calls, and interceding on the prison-
ers' behalf with executive branch and judi-
cial authorities.

A Bolivian Government commission was
established in 1976 to draft a new narcotics
law. Several key members of the commission
firmly wished to retain the very heavy
penalties of the earlier law, but the Ameri-
can Embassy at La Paz successfully used its
influence during commission deliberations
throughout the year to convince them that
more reasonable levels of punishment—
particularly for simple possession — should be
adopted. When promulgated in January of
1977, the new law reduced sentences for
simple possession to 2-8 years; considerably
reduced the length of trials in narcotics
cases by eliminating the first, or summary,
phase; and provided for the parole, under
certain conditions, of prisoners who had
completed two-thirds of their sentences with
a record of good behavior.

In spite of the improvements brought
about by the new law, some difficulties
which impact upon American detainees con-
tinue to exist. These remaining difficulties
have no easy solutions and are a continual
source of frustration to American consular
officers in La Paz, as well as to the detained
American citizens.

Delays are inherent in the Bolivian judi-
cial system itself, which is based on the
Napoleonic Code. Due process is quite dif-
ferent from that prevailing under common
law systems such as that in the United
States. The trial consists of a series of in-
vestigative hearings before a judge and
there is no provision for a jury. The charges
under which the defendant is sentenced are

not known in their final form until sentence
is actually pronounced by the judge. Each
sentence must be reviewed by a Superior
(District) Court and the Supreme Court.

The judiciary is independent under the
Bolivian Constitution and the present gov-
ernment, after it assumed power in 1971,
made a point of stressing that the judiciary
would remain independent. The effect has
been that, although the government is de
facto and dominated by the military, it con-
sciously does not act in a dictatorial, au-
thoritarian manner in judicial matters. It
does not inject itself into legal proceedings
to decide cases by fiat.

Other delays in processing have some-
times resulted from lack of dedication on the
part of the defense attorneys of individual
prisoners. Additionally, some U.S. prisoners
are involved in cases with a number of pris-
oners of other nationalities and with differ-
ent defense attorneys. This also means delay
since all detainees must be heard in the
same court and the decision involving the
U.S. citizen must await that handed down
for all participants in the pertinent case.

Exacerbating problems created by the
slow pace of the judicial system is the fact
that Bolivia is one of the two poorest coun-
tries in the hemisphere. It has a small popu-
lation relative to its geographic size and
most of its resources remain undeveloped. It
has had a turbulent political history marked
by frequent changes of government. Under
these circumstances it is not surprising that
resources for the administration of justice
are minimal, that the number of judges to
hear arguments is small, and that food and
accommodations in detention facilities are
primitive by U.S. standards.

With the preceding difficulties and frus-
trations in mind, allow me to outline the ef-
forts that have been made to improve the
overall situation.

With the enactment of the new law in
January, the Embassy in La Paz im-
mediately reinforced its efforts to accelerate
the proceedings involving American citizen
prisoners. This period coincided with the ar-
rival of a second consular officer whom the
Embassy had requested more than a year

August 22, 1977

261

earlier. The Ambassador and Embassy offi-
cers held talks on the problem of implemen-
tation of the new law with the Bolivian Pres-
ident; the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and
Interior; the Subsecretary of Justice,
judges, and fiscales (public prosecutors);
and other concerned officials and prominent
citizens.

A three-man team organized by the De-
partment of State visited in late January to
obtain information on the legal situation of
each prisoner and on the physical condition
of each one. The Embassy pressed for rapid
hearings, arranged for a consular officer to
attend each hearing in La Paz, and provided
paid interpreters when necessary. Two Boli-
vian legal advisers were retained and they
have been particularly helpful in assisting
defense attorneys, monitoring their ac-
tivities, and making them more attentive to
their clients. A prisoners' committee was
organized under the leadership of the Dep-
uty Chief of Mission to draw on the re-
sources, experience, and advice of all sec-
tions of the Embassy and to recommend
ways in which the trials could be e.xpedited.
The Embassy has suggested to the Govern-
ment of Bolivia that it consider amending
the new law to eliminate the mandatory Su-
preme Court review which now follows
Superior Court review of lower court deci-
sions. This would speed up the trial process.

On the Bolivian side, in addition to the ef-
forts of individual officials to keep the pro-
ceedings moving, a new Subsecretary of Jus-
tice was appointed who has been cooperative
in accelerating procedures and sympathetic
to problems of individual prisoners. The
government has established four new crimi-
nal courts in La Paz, has provided space for
them, and has named presiding judges.
These new courts, which will be in full oper-
ation following the end of the yearly La Paz
judiciary recess in mid-July, will soon affect
the pace of hearings and should reduce de-
lays resulting from crowded court calendars.

As of July 13 there were 41 Americans de-
tained in Bolivia. The detainees in La Paz
are visited regularly — at least once a
week — by a consular officer, and more often
if there are indications that a prisoner is

262

troubled. Prior to February 1977, when
there was only one consular officer assigned
to La Paz, pi-isoners were visited at least*
once each month. In addition to the regular*
visits, a consular officer may be called upon
when a special need or problem arises.
Members of the English-speaking community
have also visited the prisoners on a regular
basis, helping to maintain morale and wel
fare. Prisoners in Santa Cruz are visited
with the same frequency as those in La Paz
by the local consular agent. Because there is
no consular agency in Cochabamba, de
tainees receive weekly visits from U.S. mili-
tary personnel stationed there and a con-
sular officer from La Paz makes periodic
trips to maintain close Embassy contact.
The Embassy attorneys have also visited
Cochabamba and Santa Cruz to consult with
the prisoners and their defense attorneys.

Until very recently U.S. legislation did
not provide financial or other resources
through American Embassies for improving
conditions for American prisoners in foreign
jails. There were no funds for inoculations,
food supplements, vitamins, or medical and
dental care. I am particularly pleased to
note that the Department recently
requested — and the Congress approved —
funds for just these purposes.

In a country like Bolivia, with extremely
limited detention facilities, the absence of
funds has been a daily cause for consterna-
tion among consular officers. To ameliorate
some of the problems, the Embassy in La
Paz has arranged for prisoners to obtain
formal permission required from the judges
to visit dentists at their own expense and to
have medical attention as required. Unfor-
tunately, experience shows that prisoners
sometime fail to notify Embassy officers
promptly of their need for medical or dental
attention.

It seems appropriate at this juncture to
add a word or two about the physical treat-
ment of American citizens detained in
Bolivia. The Embassy's reporting substan-
tiates that, while individuals may have occa-
sionally been mistreated in the past, there
has been no systematic practice of brutality
toward those detained on narcotics charges.

Department of State Bulletin

Mistreatment was stopped as soon as the
Embassy became aware of it and took ac-
tion. It was protested when it was deemed
to be effective on behalf of the prisoners. All
instances of mistreatment, except one, oc-
curred at the time of arrest when detainees
were in the custody of the police and not
after they had been moved to a regular de-
tention facility. While these incidents are
reprehensible, they do not represent a de-
liberate policy or a pattern of violation of
human rights by the Government of Bolivia.

The Department of State and the Embassy
in La Paz are acutely aware that, in the
eyes of the prisoners' families and friends,
the solution to the prisoner issue can only be
the release and return to the United States
of their loved ones. The Department and the
Embassy also want to see a successful res-
olution of this problem, consistent with local
constitutional and legal requirements and
most importantly with justice. But as repre-
sentatives of our government we must re-
main mindful that the procedures to be fol-
lowed on the road to the goal are those of a
sovereign foreign country with its own and
different system of justice.

As I have described to you, these proce-
dures can be painfully slow at times. How-
ever, substantial progress has been achieved
since January in breaking the logjam of pro-
ceedings related to detained American citi-
zens. The Bolivian judiciary has speeded up
procedures and there are indications that
obstacles will be surmounted. This has rein-
forced the view that the solution to the
problem remains in the judicial system.

The accelerated pace has brought about
some tangible movement. Judges have
begun to hand down sentences. One Ameri-
can prisoner has been given a sentence of
absolution. Another has been released.
Eight have been sentenced to incarceration
for periods varying in length from 2 years to
3 years and five months. Six of these were
convicted of possession and two of being ac-
complices after the fact. Another American
has been declared an addict not responsible
for his actions and his case has passed
through the Superior Court and is under re-
view by the Supreme Court. Three others

should be sentenced soon after the judge
holds his next hearing. After one more hear-
ing a case involving two more Americans
should enter the phase of attorneys' final
summation. The public prosecutor has rec-
ommended release for yet two others and
their case is pending sentencing. These ac-
tions are all based on the new Bolivian drug
law.

The prisoner problem will not suddenly
disappear when all of the present detainees
complete due process. So long as Bolivia re-
mains a center of cocaine production and
there is an effective external demand for it,
it is expected that narcotics offenders and
suspects will continue to be apprehended
and that some will be American citizens. The
Department of State and the Embassy in La
Paz will continue their efforts to encourage
improvements in the Bolivian legal system
and will be zealous in protecting those rights
which American citizens are entitled to
under Bolivian and international legal stand-
ards. We are dispatching another team to La
Paz to review the legal situation and to visit
each prisoner once again.

The prisoner problem in Bolivia has arisen
in a comparatively short period of time. It
has called for new initiatives and revised
concepts on the part of Bolivian officials and
U.S. representatives in La Paz. These ini-
tiatives, as you have heard, are being taken.

Deaths of Americans in Chile

Two young Americans, Charles Edward
Horman and Frank Teruggi, died from gun-
shot wounds in Chile sometime in the days
immediately following that country's coup of
September 11, 1973. The circumstances of
these deaths have never been fully ex-
plained, and there are many — often
conflicting — versions of what transpired.

While the Department is willing to pro-
vide further information as we feasibly can
concerning these two tragic deaths, I will
confine my comments this morning to the
findings of the General Accounting Office
which studied this subject in 1974-75. This
is the GAO report which you, Mr. Chairman
[Dante B. Fascell of Florida], asked for in

August 22, 1977

263

your previous capacity as chairman of the
subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
This report, entitled "An Assessment of
Selected U.S. Embassy-Consular Efforts To
Assist and Protect Americans Overseas Dur-
ing Crises and Emergencies," dated De-
cember 4, 1975, made these observations:

— In the immediate aftermath of the Chi-
lean coup, two Americans residing in Chile
died from bullet wounds. A film-maker and
writer, age 31 [Charles Edward HormanJ,
was killed on September 18, 1973; and a stu-
dent, age 24 [Frank Teruggi], was killed on
either September 21 or 22, 1973.

— Available evidence indicates that the
basic statute relating to U.S. assistance to
Americans arrested and detained overseas
(22 U.S. 1732) was not applicable in these
cases. The Americans apparently were dead
when personnel of the U.S. Embassy and
consulate first became aware of their
disappearance.

— The records we reviewed at the consu-
late and the discussions we had with person-
nel show that once the consulate became
aware of the men's disappearance, it tried to
locate them. The consulate also made
numerous oral inquiries and issued diploma-
tic notes of inquiry to the Chilean au-
thorities seeking to learn the circumstances
of the deaths of these Americans. The
families of the deceased, however, were not
completely satisfied with the actions taken
by the Embassy-consulate. The Chilean au-
thorities deny any responsibility for their
deaths. To date no satisfactory explanation
has been advanced regarding the manner in
which the two Americans were killed.

I regret to say that despite further sub-
sequent inquiries the Department has no
reason to reach conclusions about these two
deaths any different from those quoted
above from the GAO report.

Disappearances in Ecuador

The Department of State and our Em-
bassy in Quito, Ecuador, became involved in
the search for three American citizens who

264

disappeared in Ecuador in 1976, in the.
jungle area southeast of Quito.

Jane Ellen Bissel of Northport, New
York, age 35, disappeared in Banos on Oc-
tober 3, 1976. The last person known to
have seen her, a Swedish national, appar-
ently had nothing to do with her disappear-
ance. He breakfasted with her that morning
and states she was planning a long mountain
hike that day. Her disappearance was re-
ported to the Embassy on October 5 by an
Australian woman whom she was to have
met in Banos. A consular officer traveled to
the area to make inquiries and consult with
local authorities, and only when he was con-
vinced she was actually missing did he notify
her family in a cable forwarded October 19.
Both the Department and Western Union
were unable to reach the family by phone,
and Western Union finally delivered the
cable to a neighbor on October 26. The
neighbor was unable to locate the Bissells
until October 29. Ms. Bissell left all her be-
longings in the pension where she was stay-
ing, including her hiking boots. She was
wearing tennis shoes and apparently had her
passport with her. She had not picked up
the money which was waiting for her in
Guayaquil. All inquiries conducted by the
Embassy and the national police have
proved fruitless.

Delilah Rosana Yoder of Bethesda, Mary-
land, age 29, and her traveling companion
James Laverne Herschberger of Philadel-
phia, Pennsylvania, age 29, disappeared at
Macas, Ecuador, in May 1976. In a postcard
mailed from Quito on May 11, 1976, they in-
dicated they planned to visit a jungle farm
belonging to an Ecuadorean, Marcelo Car-
rion. Neither the Ecuadorean authorities,
who conducted an investigation, nor private
investigators hired by the families have been
able to obtain any firm information as to
their whereabouts from that date.

Mr. Carrion has offered conflicting infor-
mation that the couple left him at his farm
to go through the Amazon jungle to Brazil;
that when he left the couple in a restaurant
in Macas they were planning to climb a vol-
cano; that they left him at an unspecified lo-
cation to meet an unnamed Frenchman. Be-

Oepartment of State Bulletin

cause of repeated expressions of interest in
this case by the highest level officers in the
Embassy, the Minister of Government on
March 3 ordered reactivation of the investi-
gation and Carrion was detained for another
50 days for questioning. He was released
unconditionally in June.

Yoder and Herschberger's involvement
with Carrion and their subsequent disap-
pearance raised doubts, but no definite proof
of any foul play e.xists in the death of
another young American, Stephen Lawrence
Bohn of Baker, Oregon, who died at the age
of 22 in a small town in eastern Ecuador on
October 7, 1975, apparently of insulin shock.
He was a diabetic. At the time of his death,
he was accompanied to the hospital by Car-
rion, who stated Bohn had been ill for several
days and was unable to eat or sleep.

In each of these cases the Department of
State, the Embassy at Quito, the Consulate
General at Guayaquil, and Ambassador
Bloomfield personally have attempted
throughout to be helpful and sympathetic to
the families in the United States. The re-
sponsibility for investigating these disap-
pearances rests with the Ecuadorean au-
thorities. Given the circumstances and also
the nature of the terrain where the three
missing persons were last seen, their exact
fate may be very difficult to ascertain.

U.S. Exports of Grain

Following is a statement by Julius L.
Katz, Assistant Secretary for Economic and
Business Affairs, submitted to the Subco)n-
mittee on International Trade of the Senate
Committee on Finance on July IS. '

I am pleased to appear before your sub-
committee to discuss agricultural exports
and particularly exports of grain. The
United States and other grain-trading coun-
tries face major decisions concerning the fu-

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

ture arrangement for world trade in these
basic and essential commodities. U.S.
policies have largely determined the world
market for grains for most of the past gen-
eration, and events in world grain markets
have major implications for our own trade
interests and economic well-being.

Prior to 1972 U.S. agricultural policy had
the effect of assuring fairly stable conditions
for grain trade in terms of both volume and
price as domestic programs generated the
stocks that served as the world reserve.
During the decade prior to the 1972-73 crop
year, the U.S. market share for wheat was
about 36 percent of total world exports, and
for coarse-grains our market share was
about 49 percent. In 1970 U.S. earnings
from agricultural exports were $7.2 billion.

In 1972 world demand for grain shifted
dramatically as serious production shortfalls
in some areas of the world and continued
high levels of consumption set off a trend
that pushed grain prices to record highs and
reduced world stocks to low levels that gen-
erated serious concern over the adequacy of
available world food supplies, particularly
for those countries too poor to readily com-
pete in world markets. All the variables
have changed and by wide margins —
between 1971 and 1973 average wheat prices
tripled, the volume of grain traded increased
by a third, and world grain consumption in-
creased by 10 percent exceeding one billion
tons for the first time ever.

The United States — with a large and effi-
cient production, with ample stocks, and with
unused acreage — was able to supply a large
part of that increased demand. Between
1972 and 1975 our market share for wheat
exports rose to 47 percent and for coarse-
grains to 60 percent. The value of agricul-
tural exports rose to $22 billion.

These trade gains, however, were not
without some costs. Stocks were run down
to low levels, increasing inflationary pres-
sures at home. Our domestic economy had to
absorb the largest part of the burden of ad-
justment to increased foreign demand.

Since 1976 the market, particularly for
wheat, has turned around as generally
favorable weather around the world reduced

August 22, 1977

265

import demand while the investments of re-
cent years in exporting countries resulted in
record production levels. Wheat prices have
dropped to levels below the costs of many
producers and stocks have risen to levels of
the 1960's.

Some exporting countries responded in the
traditional competitive manner as the mar-
ket changed and aggressively pushed sales,
which in turn tended to depress prices fur-
ther. U.S. producers generally decided to
carry their investment over a longer term
and to hold stocks. As a result the U.S.
share of the market declined from the
1972-75 period. Performance of feed grains
was much better and exports during the
1976-77 crop year are at record levels.
Nevertheless, the future picture for all
grains is uncertain and trading countries,
both exporter and importer, must decide
how they are going to respond. Within the
past five years we have moved from "food
crisis" scarcity to income-depressing excess
supply. With growing world consumption
and the uncertainty of weather, the outlook
is for recurring changes in the global supply
of grain.

One possible response could be a competi-
tive race among exporters each seeking to
gain some marginal advantage over the
others. Experience tells us that the risk of
one country setting off a beggar-thy-
neighbor scramble to move excess produc-
tion is indeed real. Experience also tells us
that there are no long-term winners in such
a race for exports.

Cutthroat competition soon results in se-
verely depressed prices with little increase
in volume. There may be some shifting of
sales among suppliers but eventually earn-
ings for all decline. Governments incur
heavy budget expenditures either through
direct subsidies or price support programs,
and domestic consumers end up paying
higher prices than foreign buyers. Not even
importing countries benefit in the long run
from such markets despite windfall savings
from bargain basement purchases. Eventu-
ally depressed markets will oblige producers
to cut back production and once again the
world grain economy will be into the situa-

tion where bad crops in one or two major
countries will provoke another violent swing '
toward short supply, disruptively high
prices, and pressures for restrictions on ex-
ports. Developing countries are especially
vulnerable because depressed world grain
prices can cause a false sense of security and
they are deterred from investments to in-
crease agricultural production to levels
which assure that their minimum food re-
quirements will be met.

In the United States we have recognized
the need for new approaches in order to
keep our free and open grain markets
healthy and to safeguard the interests of our
producers and consumers. To help farmers
face the current market pressures and to as-
sure adequate supplies for the future, the
Administration earlier this year announced
the extended reseal storage program. Sub-
sequently, the Senate ehdorsed that pro-
gram through legislative action. This domes-
tic reserve system will permit the producer
greater freedom to take advantage of mar-
ket opportunities and help him avoid the
need to forfeit his grain to the government.
It also provides an example to other coun-
tries of the U.S. intention to follow agricul-
tural policies aimed at greater stability of
the world grain economy.

Fortunately, there is good reason to be-
lieve that most grain-trading nations have
learned the lessons of the past and are now
prepared to seek a cooperative solution to
the problems of grain market stability. Last
month members of the International Wheat
Council, meeting in London, agreed to ac-
celerate the pace of work of the negotiation
of a new agreement on wheat. In these
negotiations the United States hopes to
achieve an arrangement that will moderate
extreme price swings while leaving wide
latitude for market forces to operate. An
agreement that seeks to reduce extreme
price fluctuations and to improve food secu-
rity of poor nations must provide for flexibil-
ity in changing supply situations.

The United States has proposed that a
new wheat agreement should be centered
about a coordinated system of nationally
held grain reserves that would make possi-

266

Department of State Bulletin

ble, on a shared basis, the shifting of grain
supplies forward from years of excess pro-
duction to years of shortage. Under such an
agreement all major grain-trading nations
would accept meaningful obligations for re-
serve stocks with common guidelines for ac-
cumulation and release. We envisage an ac-
cumulation price consistent with the U.S.
loan rate and a wide price band so that the
system would be compatible with normal
commercial trade. For that same reason we
regard fixed maximum and minimum trading-
prices as both undesirable and unwork-
able.

The United States and other exporting
countries also believe that we should seek to
complement an agreement on wheat with
meaningful liberalization of world grain
trade so that efficient producers retain
adequate incentive to maintain their output
and so that one or two countries do not have
to carry the full burden of adjustment to
changes in global conditions.

We must recognize that agricultural trade
negotiations are not going to result in fun-
damental changes in the domestic agricul-
tural support policies of other grain produc-
ers. Nevertheless, we believe that some
modifications of these policies are possible
which would enable the United States to
compete for an equitable share of the gi"ow-
ing world grain market. We approach these
negotiations pragmatically and are prepared
to be flexible on the ways in which grain
trade issues are handled. If satisfactory
agreements cannot be worked out, however,
the United States obviously will have to
protect its interests. There is no likelihood
that the United States would participate in
an agreement that did not result in an equi-
table sharing of the burden of adjustment to
changes in world demand.

However, if the international community
can achieve agreement to stabilize conditions
in world grain markets — and improve food
security and combine these with a lowering
of barriers to trade in agricultural
products — then we shall have greatly en-
larged prospects for continued growth of
world trade and for greater economic well-
being for all nations.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes.
Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force
provisionally October 1, 1976.
Approval deposited: France, August 1, 1977.

Environmental Modification

Convention on the prohibition of military or any other
.hostile use of environmental modification techniques,
with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977. '
Ratification deposited: Yemen, July 20, 1977.

Finance

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag-
ricultural Development. Done at Rome June 13,
1976. '
Signatures: Algeria, Ethiopia, July 20, 1977; Bolivia,

July 27, 1977; Senegal, July 19, 1977.
Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, July 29, 1977.
Ratification deposited: Ecuador, July 19, 1977;

Kuwait, July 29, 1977.
Accession deposited: Botswana, July 21, 1977.

Health

Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086, 8534). Adopted at
Geneva May 17, 1976. '

Accepta7tce deposited: Romania, July 18, 1977; Malta,
July 20, 1977.

Maritime Matters

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna
February 21, 1971. Entered into force August 16,
1976. 2
Accession deposited: Pakistan, June 9, 1977.

Phonograms

Convention for the protection of producers of phono-
grams against unauthorized duplication of their
phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. En-
tered into force April 18, 1973; for the United States
March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808.
Accession deposited: Zaire, July 25, 1977.

' Not in force.

^ Not in force for the United States.

August 22, 1977

267

Reciprocal Assistance

Protocol of amendment to the inter-American treaty of
reciprocal assistance of September 2, 1947 (TIAS
1838). Done at San Jose July 26, 1975.'
Ratificntion clepo.tited: Brazil, July 14, 1977.

Safety at Sea

Amendments to chapter II of the international conven-
tion for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780).
Adopted by the IMCO Assembly at London
November 30, 1966. '
Acceptance deposited: Tonga, July 12, 1977.

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into
outer space. Done at New York January 14, 1975. En-
tered into force September 15, 1976. TIAS 8480.
Ratification deposited: Czechoslovakia, July 26, 1977.

Terrorism

Treaties

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex.
Done at Vienna May 23, 1969. '
Accession deposited: Zaire, July 25, 1977.

Wills

Convention providing a uniform law on the form of an
international will, with annex. Done at Washington
October 26, 1973. '
Accession deposited: Libya, August 4, 1977.

Haiti

Loan agreement concerning services to small farmers
Signed at Port-au-Prince April 27, 1977. Entered into|
force April 27, 1977.

Hong Kong

Agreement amending and extending the agreement ot
July 25, 1974, as amended (TIAS 7897, 8274), relatinti
to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles
Effected by exchange of notes at Hong Kong July 25.
1977. Entered into force July 25, 1977.

Korea

Project agreement concerning economic assistance to
Korean fishermen, with annexes. Signed at Seoul
January 19, 1977. Entered into force January 19,
1977.

Spain

Agreement on procedures for mutual assistance in con-
nection with the Boeing Corporation matter. Effected
by exchange of letters at Madrid and Washington
June 7 and July 22, 1977. Entered into force Julv 22,
1977.

klin

August 22, 1977 Vol. LXXVII, No. 1991

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement extending the agreement of October 19 and
November 10, 1970, as extended, concerning a co-
operative project to design, develop and test an air-
craft "Augmentor Wing System." Effected by ex-
change of notes at Ottawa May 31 and July 18, 1977.
Entered into force July 18, 1977.

Agreement concerning transit pipelines. Signed at
Washington January 28, 1977.'

Senate advice and consent to ratification: August 3,
1977.

Chad

Grant agreement relating to a Sahel accelerated impact
program to assist the rural population, with annex.
Signed at N'Djamena August 30, 1976. Entered into
force August 30, 1976.

China

Agreement modifying the agreement of May 21, 1975,
as modified (TIAS 8033, 8218), relating to trade in
cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and apparel
products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washing-
ton July 18 and 25, 1977. Entered into force July 25,
1977.

' Not in force.
268

Afghanistan. Letters of Credence (Karim) 241

Africa. Secretary Vance's News Conference of
July 29 ." 227

Arms Control and Disarmament

President Carter's News Conference of July 28
(excerpts) • 221

Proposed Sale of AWACS to Iran (Vance, White

House statement) 245

Secretary Vance's News Conference of July 29 . . . 227

Asia

Department Discusses Program to Control Nar-
cotic Drugs (Oakley) 242

Secretary Vance's News Conference of July 29... 227

Canada. Letters of Credence (Tovve) 241

Commodities. U.S. Exports of Grain (Katz) ... 265

Congress

Department Discusses Consular Services for
Americans Abroad (Watson, Stedman) 248

Department Discusses Program to Control Nar-
cotic Drugs (Oakley) 242

Proposed Sale of AWACS to Iran (Vance, White

House statement) 245

U.S. Exports of Grain (Katz) 265

U.S. Nuclear Exports to South Africa (Nye) 23(i

Consular Affairs. Department Discusses Con-
sular Services for Americans Abroad (Watson,
Stedman) 248

Developing Countries. North-South Dialogue
(foreign relations outline) 235

Department of State Bulletin

Inde

(continued)

^Jbouti. U.S. Supports U.N. Membership of
'""Djibouti (McHenry) 226

lEnergy. President Carter's News Conference of

July 28 (e.\cerpts) 221

Iglig^^Hustrial Democracies. North-South Dialogue
,tilj,^Bforeign relations outline) 23.')

n. Proposed Sale of AWACS to Iran (Vance,
While House statement) 245

lly. Prime Minister Andreotti of Italy Visits
/ashington (statement issued at conclusion of
l^isit) 224

Btin America and the Caribbean

|Department Discusses Consular Services for

Americans Abroad (Watson, Stedman) 248

:retary Vance's News Conference of July 29 . . . 227

Iddle East

esident Carter's News Conference of July 28

Jexcerpts) 221

cretary Vance's News Conference of July 29 . . . 227

Narcotics Control

Department Discusses Consulai' Services for
Americans Abroad (Watson, Stedman) 248

Depai'tnient Discusses Program to Control Nar-
cotic Drugs (Oakley) 242

Nuclear Energy. U.S. Nuclear Exports to South
Africa (Nye) 236

Panama. President Carter Discusses A New
Sea- Level Canal (Carter) 234

Presidential Documents

President (.barter Discusses A New Sea-Level
Canal 234

President Carter's News Conference of July 28
(excerpts) 221

South Africa. U.S. Nuclear Expurl.s to Sciuth Al-
rica (Nye) 236

Treaty Information. Current Actions 267

United Kingdom. Letters of Credence (Jay) ... 241

United Nations. U.S. Supports U.N. Member-
ship of Djibouti (McHenry) 226

Zambia. Letters of Credence (Ngonda) 241

Name Index

Carter, President 221, 234

Jav Peter . . . 241

Kar'im, AbdulWahid . ' 241

Katz, Julius L 26.5

McHenry, Donald F 226

Ngonda, Putteho Muketoi 241

Nve, Joseph S., Jr 236

Oakley, Robert B 242

Stedman, William P., Jr 248

Towe, Peter Milburn 241

Vance, Secretary 227, 24.5

Watson, Barbara M 248

Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: August 1-7

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of
Press Relations, Department of State, Washington,
D.C. 20520.

No. Dale Subject

*351 8/1 Vance: departure, Andrews Air Force

Base, July 31.
+352 8/2 International Joint Commission to
study water quality of the Poplar
River Basin.
Vance: arrival, Alexandria, Egypt.
Program for state visit to U.S. of
President Mwalimu Julius K. Nye-
rere, of Tanzania, Aug. 3-10.
U.S., Romania sign textile agree-
ment, June 17.
U.S., Malaysia set limit for category
of textile agreement by exchange of
letters, July 8 and 29.
8/2 U.S., Republic of China adjust limits
for categories of textile agreement
by exchange of letters, July 18 and
25.
+359 8/3 Vance, Sadat: news conference, Aug.

2.
*360 8/4 U.S. to establish embassy in Cape

Verde.
*36I 8/4 Edward M. Mezvinsky sworn in as
U.S. Representative to the U.N.

*353
*354

8/1
8/2

*355

8/2

*356

8/2

No. Date Subject

Human Rights Commission (bio-
graphic data).

*362 8/4 Shipping Coordinating Committee,
Committee on Ocean Dumping,
Sept. 13.

+363 8/4 Vance: remarks to the press, Beirut,
Aug. 3.

+364 8/4 U.S., Canada working to insure en-
vironmental safety is key factor in
Alaskan oil tanker traffic.

*365 8/4 Ambassador Lucey to keynote U.S.-
Mexican trade conference, San An-
tonio, Sept. 21-22.

*366 8/4 Vance; remarks following talks with
President Assad, Damascus.

*368 8/5 Louis A. Lerner sworn in as Ambas-
sador to Norway (biographic data).

*369 8/5 Vance: departure, Damascus.

*370 8/5 Vance: arrival, Amman.

*371 8/5 Shipping Coordinating Committee,
Subcommittee on Safety of Life at
Sea, working group on ship design
and equipment, Sept. 7-8.

*372 8/5 Study Group 5 of the U.S. National
Committee for the International
Radio Consultative Committee
(CCIR), Sept. 9.

* Not printed.

+ Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington, dc. 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXVII • No. 1992 • August 29, 1977

HUMAN RIGHTS: PRINCIPLE AND REALISM
Address by Deputy Secretary Christopher 269

THE U.S. APPROACH TO THE UNITED NATIONS:
NEW DIRECTIONS

Address by Assistant Secretary Maynes 28^

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
Statement by Mr. Hansell 291

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

\'P

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. lxxvii, No. 1992
August 29, 1977

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

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BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The
Bl^LLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BLLLETL
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of I'.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and,
the Foreign Service.

The BILLETIS includes selecte\
press releases on foreign policy, issue
by the White House and the Depart^
ment, and statements, addresses, an
news conferences of the President ani
the Secretary of State and other offi
cers of the Department, as well as spe
cial articles on various phases of i/i
ternational affairs and the functions i
the Department. Information is in-'
eluded concerning treaties and inter--
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L'nited States is or may become a partg
and on treaties of general interna
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Publications of the Department of"
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■luman Rights: Principle and Realism

Address by Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher^

The American Bar Association has a long
radition of support for the rule of law and
I he protection of human rights. It also has
n illustrious record of helping to insure that
ur principles are put into practice. Indi-
idually and collectively, members of the
Vssociation have played an important role in
iromoting respect for human rights, both
it're and around the world.

Throughout the United States there is a
iL'W awareness of the vitality and value of
lur founding principles. Now, after 200
ears, they continue to bind us together and

0 define our national identity. We have
ome through a difficult period of self-doubt

1 lid self-criticism, but once again we are less
unscious of what divides us and more com-
nitted to the principles and values we hold
11 common.

We believe our underlying principles and
„l|/alues must be reflected in American foreign
xilicy if that policy is to have the support of
lur people and if it is to be effective. Re-
lucting this conviction, the promotion of
iiiman rights has become a fundamental
aMiet of the foreign policy of the Carter
'■(Administration.

a In our efforts to promote human rights we

'■■ must carefully define the principles we seek

■ to apply, for glittering generalities can lead

fto unworkable policies. We must also serve

our principles with an abiding realism, since

iji'igidity in the pursuit of principle, especially

in foreign policy, is likely to lead us astray.

In defining what we mean by human

rights, we believe that we should direct our

efforts to the most fundamental and impor-

' Made before the American Bar Association at
Chicago, 111., on Aug. 9, 1977 (text from press release
374).

tant human rights, all of which are interna-
tionally recognized in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights which the United
Nations approved in 1948. Thus, we em-
phasize three categories of human rights.

— First, the right to be free front gov-
ernmental violation of the integrity of the
person. Such violations include torture;
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment; arbitrary arrest or imprison-
ment; denial of fair public trial; and invasion
of the home. When human beings are forci-
bly abducted from their homes, interrogated
incessantly at the pleasure of their captors,
and prodded with electrodes or held under
water to the point of drowning — when such
things are happening in the world in which
we live — and they are — all who truly value
human rights must speak out.

— Second, the right to the fulfilhiient of
such vital needs as food, shelter, health
care, and education. The stage of a nation's
economic development will obviously affect
the fulfillment of this right. But we must
remember that this right can be violated by
a government's action or inaction — for exam-
ple, when a government diverts vast propor-
tions of its country's limited resources to
corrupt officials or to the creation of
luxuries for an elite while millions endure
hunger and privation.

—Third, the right to enjoy civil and polit-
ical liberties — freedom of thought, of reli-
gion, of assembly, of speech, of the press;
freedom of movement both within and out-
side one's own country; freedom to take part
in government. These liberties that we
Americans enjoy so fully, and too often take
for granted, are under assault in many
places. That authoritarian regimes are prem-

August 29, 1977

269

ised on a denial of these rights is well
known. It is all the more distressing, how-
ever, when regimes in countries with demo-
cratic traditions violate these precious
rights; for example, when they shut down
newspapers and imprison journalists who
have done nothing more than print ideas
which are out of step with official policy.

It is our goal to promote greater observ-
ance by governments of all three groups of
the fundamental human rights I have de-
scribed. It is, after all, these rights that
make life worth living.

Obviously lawyers are deeply concerned
with all these rights. It is of particular rele-
vance to everyone of us and to this Associa-
tion that in some countries our colleagues of
the Bar are being harassed because they
have provided a conscientious defense for
criminal defendants. It is not easy to imag-
ine a lawyer being abducted and held in-
communicado for months for no other reason
than that he defended an alleged subversive.
But such conduct is occurring, and it is es-
sential that the legal profession, both in the
country where it occurs as well as else-
where, unite in opposition to such practices.

I have admired the speech which Presi-
dent Spann [William B. Spann, Jr., Presi-
dent, American Bar Association] made on this
subject to the Inter-American Bar Associa-
tion last May. "I do not call upon any lawyer
for martyrdom," he said, "but I do call upon
every lawyer ... to keep the pressure on,
to lend whatever assistance can be given to
colleagues in other countries wherever the
cry for help is heard." Sharing Bill Spann's
appraisal of the importance of helping our
persecuted colleagues, I want you to know
that the State Department stands ready to do
its part.

Universal Aspirations

Having defined the three categories of
rights that are the subject of our policy, it is
only fair for me to acknowledge that there
are those who suggest that it is unwise for
us to be promoting abroad the human rights
principles that gave this nation its birth.
Such critics argue that we cannot expect

270

non-Western societies to find much rele
vance in what are sometimes disparaging!;
referred to as 18th century, Western ideas."

But there is nothing parochial about tb
principles we seek to promote. They respond'
to universal yearnings of mankind. Thej
have been formally adopted by virtually al
governments, both in their own constitutions!
and through international commitments
What we are urging is that more than lip-
service be accorded to these principles.

Those who say we should not seek to im--
pose our particular form of democracy on the
world have set up a strawman. It is not a
matter of form we are talking about; it is the
substance of human freedom.

Even though people are very poor, they
are still profoundly interested in being free
to go where they want, to say what they
want, to practice the religion of their choice,
and to have a voice in determining the rules
under which they live. Do the critics really
mean to suggest that those struggling to
break the bonds of mass misery are content
permanently to trade in their freedoms for
material advancement? My own view is that
those who make such suggestions have failed
to recognize the deepest aspirations of
human beings.

I see no necessary inconsistency between
economic development on the one hand and
political and civil rights on the other. And I
think people will eventually reject leaders
who unnecessarily impose such a choice. In
the short run, some people may have tem-
pered their desire for freedom, but in
the long run I believe that desire is
irrepressible.

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Limitations of Power and Wisdom

We have no illusions that the process of
encouraging greater respect for human
rights around the world will yield early or
easy successes. We realize that there are
compelling reasons why we must season our
idealism with realism.

There is no blinking the fact that our abil-
ity to change human rights practices in other
societies is limited, even where we use all
the mechanisms and approaches at our dis-

Department of State Bulletin

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josal. We must not proceed as if we had un-
imited power.

Just as our power is limited, so is our
visdom. We must avoid certitude and its
iiiattractive partner, self-righteousness. We
ecognize the variety of human experience,
differing histories and circumstances will
liecessarily mean that there will be a great
iiversity in political systems and economic
•onditions throughout the world.

In addition, we must recognize that our
ctions may provoke retaliation against our
hort-term interests or even sometimes
gainst the victims of repression we seek to
ssist. We will much prefer to find positive
nd creative ways to encourage governments
0 respect human rights rather than to
lenalize poor performance. But where such
lositive measures are not possible, the risks
f imposing sanctions must be faced and
arefully assessed.

It is also realistic to recognize that unless
lur domestic actions reflect a firm commit-
nent to human rights, the message we are
.ending to others will ring hollow. We are
aking important steps to improve our own
mman rights record. We have removed all
■estrictions on the right of our citizens to
ravel abroad. With our support, Congress
las just passed a relaxation of our visa re-
[uirements so that foreigners wishing to
nsit our country will not be excluded be-
•ause of political affiliation except in the
•arest instances.

In addition, we are seeking expansion of
)ur refugee and asylum policies, the most
■urrent example being the plans to admit an
idditional 15,000 Indochinese refugees. The
efforts we are making to prevent a recur-
rence of abuses by the intelligence commu-
lity and to overhaul our outmoded and un-
'air welfare system are also important
■ontributions to the cause of human rights.

Ways To Encourage Improvement

When we find it necessary to address our-
selves to the human rights conditions in other
•ountries, our first approach is to express
)ur views in private to the government in-
volved. There are a variety of ways in which

this can be done. We can, therefore, choose
between a rather wide range of signals. It
can be done, for example, by a State De-
partment desk officer talking to a Minister
in a foreign embassy. It can be done by hav-
ing the Secretary of State call in a foreign
Ambassador. It can be done by our Ambas-
sador in a foreign country going in to see the
Foreign Minister. Or it can be done by a let-
ter from our President to the leader of a
foreign government, and so forth. The point
is that diplomacy is a rich resource that can
be fully mined only by a calibrated, sequen-
tial approach.

We have made scores of diplomatic ap-
proaches with respect to human rights, and
by and large we are achieving good results:
Governments all over the world, even where
they disagree with us, are beginning to un-
derstand our policy better and to gauge ac-
curately the depth of our commitment.

Diplomatic approaches enable other gov-
ernments to respond privately to our con-
cerns. This is appropriate since our objective
is improvement of human rights conditions,
not embarrassment of others or publication of
our successes.

Other governments must be aware, of
course, that when private discussions fail to
convey our message, public comment may at
times be necessary. And we shall never
apologize for expressing our commitment to
our principles.

Our bilateral economic assistance pro-
grams also must reflect our commitment to
human rights. For our part, we are com-
mitted to providing substantial and increas-
ing economic assistance to the Third World.

There are a number of different ways in
which our government gives economic as-
sistance to foreign nations, and we believe
we should bring human rights considerations
to bear with respect to each of them.

This process is greatly complicated by the
fact that most of our bilateral economic aid
now goes to meet the human needs of the
poorest segments of the population. To limit
such aid because of human rights violations
may penalize people who are not responsible
for the violations and cannot prevent them.
On the other hand, we are responsible for

\ugust 29, 1977

271

our actions and must keep trying to assure
that our economic assistance programs do
not run counter to our efforts in behalf of
human rights.

Of course, we are eager to use our eco-
nomic assistance affirmatively to promote
the cause of human rights. For example, we
helped arrange an international loan to Por-
tugal to aid that country in its difficult
transformation into a democratic society.

As for military assistance, our military as-
sistance programs are reviewed in light of
the human rights practices of the recipient
governments. In some cases we may decide
to limit or withdraw security assistance. In
other cases where the human rights per-
formance of the recipient is unsatisfactory,
we may decide to continue to provide aid be-
cause of overriding U.S. national security
interests — but not without expressing our
concern.

We are also taking important initiatives in
multilateral bodies. For example, we are
using our voice and vote in the World Bank
and other international financial institutions
to promote the cause of human rights. We
do this by opposing or seeking reconsidera-
tion of loans to governments that are fla-
grant human rights violators — again with
special consideration being given to loans
that would clearly help meet the needs of
the poor.

At the United Nations, we are working
closely with other governments to give new
strength and validity to that organization's
efforts on behalf of human rights. It is espe-
cially important that the United Nations
take the difficult but crucial step of making
its investigations of human rights violations
evenhanded and comprehensive. We are
therefore enthusiastically supporting an ini-
tiative of Costa Rica to establish a U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights. And
we have urged the General Assembly to es-
tablish a special panel to give new impetus
to the campaign against torture.

In the Organization of American States,
we supported a successful initiative by Ven-
ezuela to increase the resources and effec-
tiveness of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights. We believe that the
Commission can play a critical role in inves-

272

tigating allegations of human rights violg'
tions in this hemisphere and in suggesting
improvements.

Another important multilateral context is
the meeting to be held this fall in Belgrade
where the 35 nations who signed the Hel
sinki Final Act [on Aug. 1, 1975] will review
what has been done — and what has not beerl
done — to implement the human rights anct
other provisions of that historic document
have recently returned from Belgrade where*
the signatories have been making prepara4
tions for the fall meeting, and I can repon
to you that this endeavor augurs well for the
cause of human rights.

The imminence of the Belgrade conference
has itself produced many constructive ac
tions by the governments involved, particu
larly in emigration and divided-family prob
lems. One of the major achievements of the
preparatory conference is to insure thai
there will be further Belgrade-type confer
ences to gauge future progress and again tc
provide an inducement for constructive ac
tion. As for the conference this fall, we are
determined that it should be conducted in ar
honest, frank, and nonpolemical atmosphere
We want to be certain that the cause ol
human rights, as well as the cause of peace
between East and West, will be the ultimate
beneficiaries.

These are some of the tools at our dis
posal. I want to stress that in deciding
whether and how to use them in particular
cases, we will not be distracted by token
improvements that other governments may
make. Rather, our attention will be fixed om
the long-term trend.

I also want to underscore that as we usei
these approaches and mechanisms, it wil
always be our desire to expand our coopera
tion with other governments and peoples
for we know that in the long run we will fai
unless we make the promotion of human
rights an international movement.

Positive Developments

Is our policy working? It is certainly too
early to say. In a sense, it will probably al-
ways be too early to say. The quest to se-
cure human rights is never ending, like the

Department of State Bulletin

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;earch for peace. We may hope and pray for
he day when the world will seem more
•ivilized, when governments will uniformly
reat their citizens with decency and human-
ly, but we will not be discouraged by the
shortcomings we see. Indeed, the failures
ve observe will only cause us to redouble
)ur efforts.
We take encouragement, but do not take
redit, for favorable signs which we observe
round the world on the human rights
ront — signs which indicate that the issue of
luman rights has touched a responsive chord
n a growing number of countries.

— With respect to violations of integrity of
he person, some governments — we hope
vith a real intent to halt repression — have
)egun to release large numbers of political
|»risoners as well as to curtail the indis-
riminate arrest of alleged subversives. And
ome governments have punished those re-
ponsible for torture and ordered that such
ractices cease.

— With respect to economic rights, many
[overnments are showing a renewed deter-
nination to promote the economic rights of
heir citizens. They are turning away from
grandiose schemes and showcase improve-
nents to apply their energies to economic
)rojects that provide the broadest benefits.
The governments of several African coun-
ries, recognizing the vast disparities be-
ween rich and poor, are beginning long-
ange and difficult development programs to
)rovide a better standard of life for their
>eople. In addition, in some Latin American
jountries land reform is again being pursued
IS a way to give people a stake in their own
ountry and provide them an opportunity for
iconomic advancement. I would also note
;hat in Portugal the new democratic gov-
ernment is moving ahead in the areas of
lousing and health care, social security and
«relfare benefits, and new schools. Further,
;he international financial institutions are
gradually redirecting much of their re-
sources toward rural development and ag-
■icultural projects that help the largest
lumber of people.

— With respect to political and civil rights,
ane can perceive a resurgence of democracy.

iri

August 29, 1977

Recent o^v-elopments in India and Spain, as
well as Portugal, are proving that democ-
racy can stage a comeback. In some of the
military regimes in Latin America, there
are hesitant but hopeful signs of reforno — a
return to elected civilian government. In
addition, some East European countries
have permitted the reunification of divided
families and otherwise eased their emigra-
tion rules.

I think all of these positive developments
are clear and convincing evidence of the
power of an idea. When all is said and done,
the idea of human rights has a life and force
of its own which governments can nurture or
oppose but never extinguish. I can see this
so vividly as I review cables from all over
the world. The human rights initiative
echoes in official circles; even more, it has a
resonance in the homes and hearts of people
around the world.

If we have moved human rights to the
front page, it is not because of us but be-
cause of the power of the ideas we are es-
pousing. I see now more clearly than ever
before why it has been said that the cause of
human freedom is the world's only great
revolutionary cause. As Walter Lippmann
once put it:

The deepest issue of our time is whether the
civilized people can maintain and develop a free society
or whether they are to fall back into the ancient order
of things, when the whole of men's existence, their
consciences, their science, their arts, their labor, and
their integrity as individuals were at the disposal of
the State.

Let me conclude by saying that, as in any
new undertaking, our human rights policy
will not be free from mistakes and miscalcu-
lations. But with the understanding and
support of our citizens — as well as of our
leading private organizations, such as the
American Bar Association — and with practi-
cal and persistent effort, I believe that over
time this new policy will achieve historic re-
sults.

The time is propitious. The challenge is
enormous. But our principles are sound and
vital and, when applied with realism, they can
and will provide a harvest of freedom for us
and for people everywhere.

273

Tanzania — A Profile '

Geography

Located on the east coast of Africa and comprised of
Tanganyika (mainland) and the islands of Zanzibar
and Pemba.

Area: Mainland — 363,950 sq. mi. (slightly smaller
than New Mexico and Texas combined).
Zanzibar — 640 sq. mi. Capital: Dar es Salaam (pop.
500,000).

Other Cities: Dodoma (future capital, 35,000), Zan-
zibar Town (80,000), Tanga (60,000), Mwanza
(35,000).

People

Population: 15 million (mainland), 400,000 (Zanzibar)

1975 est.
Annual Growth Rate: 2.7% (1975).
Density: 44 per sq. mi.
Ethnic Groups: Over 130.

Religions: Christian 35%, Moslem 35%, animist 30%.
Languages: Swahili, English.
Literacy: 40-50%.
Life Expectancy: 45 yrs.

Government

Official Name: United Republic of Tanzania.

Type: Republic.

Independence: Tanganyika 1961; Zanzibar 1963; uni-
fied 1964.

Date of Constitution: 1965.

Branches: Executive — President (Chief of State,
Commander in Chief), First Vice President (also
Chairman of Zanzibar's Revolutionary Council),
Second Vice President (Prime Minister).
Legislative — unicameral National Assembly

(parliament).
Judicial — Mainland: High Court, District Courts,
Primary Courts; Zanzibar: People's Courts (no
appeal).

Political Party: Chama Cha Mapinzudi (CCM).

Suffrage: Universal over 18.

Administrative Subdivisions: 25 Regions (20 on
mainland, 5 on Zanzibar).

Economy

GDP: $2.3 billion (1975 est.).

Annual Growth Rate: 4.5% (constant 1966 prices).
Per Capita Income: .$155 annually.
Per Capita Growth Rate: na.

Agriculture: Land — 15%; labor — 90%; products —
sugar, maize, rice, wheat, cotton, coffee, sisal.

' Taken from the Department of State's November
1976 edition of the BACKGROUND Notes on Tan-
zania. Copies of the complete Note may be pur-
chased for 50(2 from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington. D.C. 20402 (a 25% discount is allowed
when ordering 100 or more Notes mailed to the
same address).

cashew nuts, tea, tobacco, pyrethrum, cloves.

Industry: Labor — 15%; products — textiles, agricul-
tural processing, light manufacturing, refined oil,
cement.

Natural Resources: Hydroelectric potential, un-
exploited iron and coal, dwindling gem stone and
gold mines.

Trade: Exports— %381 million (1975 f.o.b.): cotton,
coffee, petroleum products, sisal, diamonds,
cloves, coconuts: partners — East African Commu-
nity (EAC), U.K., India, Zambia, China.
Imports — $797 million (1975 c.i.f.): manufactured
goods, textiles, machinery and transport equip-
ment, foodstuffs, tobacco: partners — EAC, U.K.,
West Germany, China, U.S.

Official Exchange Rate: Tanzanian shillings
8.40 = US$1.00.

U.S. Economic Aid Received: $175 million (since
1970).

Membership in International Organizations

U.N. and several specialized agencies, EAC, OAU,
British Commonwealth of Nations.

Principal Government Officials

Tanzania: President — Julius K. Nyerere, Minister of
Foreign Affairs — Benjamin Mkapa, Ambassador to
the U.S. — Paul Bomani.

United States: Ambassador to Tanzania — James W.
Spain.

U.S. -Tanzania Relations

The United States enjoys friendly bilateral rela-
tions with the United Republic of Tanzania. In addi-
tion to furthering the spirit of respect and coopera-
tion that exists between the two countries, the
United States seeks to assist Tanzania's economic
and social development through bilateral and re-
gional programs administered by the Agency for In-
ternational Development.

U.S. bilateral assistance, which in the past has in-
volved such areas as education, public administra-
tion, and agriculture, is focusing increasingly on the
important area of agricultural production through
new agricultural credit and livestock and seed multi-
plication programs. Total U.S. bilateral aid to Tan-
zania for fiscal year 1976, including loans, grants,
and Public Law 480 funds (Food for Peace),
amounted to $8.8 million.

Under a regional program, the United States has
helped the Tanzanian Government reconstruct and
pave more than 250 miles of the highway that serves
southwestern Tanzania and landlocked Zambia.

The U.S. Information Service maintains a library
at Dar es Salaam. Until its phaseout in 1968-69,
Tanzania was host to one of the earliest Peace Corps
projects in Africa.

An estimated 1,450 U.S. citizens, many of whom
are missionaries and their families, reside in Tan-
zania, and increasing numbers of American tourists
visit Tanzania's game parks.

274

Department of State Bulletin

100 200mlles

2743 8-77 STATE (RGE)

Tanzanian President Nyerere
Visits the U.S.

Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, President of
the United Republic of Tanzania, made an of-
ficial visit to the United States August 3-10;
on August It-5 he met with President Carter
and other government officials. Following is a
statement issued by the White House on
August 5. *

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated August 8

President Julius K. Nyerere of the United
Republic of Tanzania met yesterday and today

' For an exchange of remarks between President
Carter and President Nyerere at a welcoming ceremony
on the South Lawn of the White House and their ex-
change of toasts at a dinner at the White House on Aug.
4, and for President Carter's remarks to reporters fol-
lowing President Nyerere's departure on Aug. 5, see
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated
Aug. 8, 1977, p. 1166, 1177, and 1187.

August 29, 1977

with the President. They reviewed political
and economic developments in Africa and their
relationship to global issues, as well as to sub-
jects directly bearing on United States and
Tanzanian relations.

President Nyerere outlined current political
and development trends in Africa for the
President, focusing in some detail on the prob-
lems of southern Africa. They discussed the
prospects for negotiated settlements in south-
ern Africa.

The President expressed his great pleasure
at welcoming President Nyerere as not only
the first African leader to pay a state visit to
his Administration, but equally as an African
statesman. The President reaffirmed our deep
and continuing interest in obtaining a peaceful
solution to the problems of southern Africa,
our interest in cooperating with Tanzania in
solving its development problems, and dis-
cussed U.S. positions on matters of global
interest to Tanzania. The President also de-
clared his firm desire to make more intimate
the warm and cooperative relations which
exist between our two countries.

President Nyerere thanked the President
for his cordial welcome to the United States.
He reaffirmed Tanzania's commitment to just
and, hopefully, peaceful, negotiated settle-
ments in southern Africa. Further, President
Nyerere expressed his pleasure at meeting
President Carter and his keen desire to con-
tinue the close personal relationship the two
men achieved.

Secretary Vance Meets

With Foreign Secretary Owen

Followiyig are remarks with the press by
Secretary Vance and British Foreign Secre-
tary David A. L. Owen followiyig a meeting
at the Department of State on July 23.

Press release 342 dated July 23

Secretary Vance: Good afternoon gentle-
men. Foreign Secretary Owen and I met
with the President this morning. We con-
tinued our discussions through lunch. We
will be meeting again tomorrow morning;
following that the Foreign Secretary will

275

leave members of his staff to work with us
on specific proposals leading to what we
would hope would be a negotiated settle-
ment, a transfer to majority rule in
Rhodesia.

I will be meeting with the Foreign Secre-
tary to review those proposals immediately
following my trip to the Middle East, and at
that time we will discuss the timing for the
specific presentation of those proposals to all
of the parties.

Foreign Secretary Owen: I have nothing
to add; we have had very full discussions. It
was very important, I think, that the Presi-
dent thought it a matter of sufficient impor-
tance to wish to be involved personally, and
he clearly is extremely knowledgeable about
the problem and also very concerned that we
should make progress toward a negotiated
settlement. The commitment and the sense
of working together on this very difficult
problem is one which is tremendous comfort
to us. No one believes it's going to be easy,
but we are determined to pursue our initia-
tive and, as always, there is a great deal of
common ground and no problems.

Q. Can you say specifically ivhefher you
have disctissed the new situation that has
arisen following the calling of an election in
Rhodesia? Whether that's altered the tactics
at all or ivhether you've got any specific
ideas about having to move the situation
for)vord now?

Foreign Secretary Owen: It cropped up in
the conversation, but I don't think any of us
think it's really all that much changed the
situation or is particularly new. This is an
election taking place, that's been called
without any forwarning or discussion with
any of us, and it involves three percent of
the potential electorate in Rhodesia.

We are concerned with achieving a set-
tlement which is acceptable to all the people
who would live in the future independent
Zimbabwe, both black and white. And of
course we are interested and concerned
about what white Rhodesian opinion thinks.
There is only one aspect — we discussed a
whole range of problems — the views of all

276

the nationalist leaders, the views of the
frontline presidents, the views of Africa as a
whole, and the overall position and the im-
portance of getting a settlement in relatior
to southern Africa. So, this is one aspect,
but it's not the dominant issue.

Quite honestly, I think one would be mak-i
ing a great mistake to build this election up
into being a major new factor. We werei
meeting, and arranged to meet prior to thei
election, because of the difficulty of getting^
agreement on the transitional period and the]
deteriorating security situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in announcing the call for
that election, the Rhodesian Prime Minister
said the proposal that you had presented to
him in the name of the Americayi-British
initiative was completely unacceptable
Where do you gentlemen now intend to go to
fry to revive or modify that proposal?

Foreign Secretary Owen: Well esssen
tially, the proposal we put forward is, we
think, acceptable to a broad majority of the
people who would live under an independent
Zimbabwe; and that is that there should be a
universal suffrage — one man, one vote. Now
that has been supported by all the
nationalist leaders — -by Bishop Muzorewa,
the Reverend Sithole, Mr. Nkomo, and Mr.
Mugabe.^ And it is generally acceptable, I
think, to opinion worldwide.

Now, if Mr. Smith wants to hold out
against that view, then, I think, he is taking
on the whole of international opinion. If you
read his speech very carefully, it's not even
certain that he is wanting to hold out
against that. He wants more reassurances
on certain aspects. We have tried to explain
those, but maybe they need to be clarified in
further discussions, and we're ready to do
so.

Q. Mr. Owen, Mr. Smith — Prime Minister
S)nith — has indicated to a number of people

' Bishop Abel Muzorewa, head of the African Na-
tional Council (ANC); Reverend Ndabanigi Sithole,
head of the African National Council/Sithole; Joshua
Nkomo. President, Zimbabwe African People's Union
(ZAPU); Robert Mugabe, Secretary General, Zim-
babwe African National Union (ZANU).

Department of State Bulletin

that the two things he's concerned about
most are security during the transition
period and that white minority rights i)i a
future government be protected. Did you
specifically discuss the question of a Com-
monwealth peace force a)id the elements of
security during the transition period?

Foreign Secretary Owen: We discussed
the question of law and order and how any
peacekeeping element could contribute to
that and discussed the problems that are as-
sociated with any peacekeeping force, in all
its contexts. And, we discussed the idea that
was current to one stage of the Common-
wealth force, we discussed the whole role of
the United Nations, we discussed all aspects
of this and, indeed, the need for the Rhode-
sian defense forces and the liberation armies
to come to some arrangement. Essentially,
they have got to live together in an inde-
pendent Zimbabwe, and the sooner they
start to live together the better.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the fact that you are com-
iyig up with new specific proposals, does that
mean the current initiative is, in effect,
dead?

Secretary Vayice: No, we are building on
the current initiative and adding new as-
pects to it.

Q. Can you say something about the new
proposals. Dr. Owen?

Foreign Secretary Oweyi: Well, they are
based on the consultations that have been
going on now for the last three months, and
they are evolving. We've never yet brought
them all together — all elements, the con-
stitution, the postindependence situation,
and the transition toward independence. We
have deliberately not brought them to-
gether, not put anything on paper formally.
We've still been listening, and we will go on
listening to the views. But the time is now
coming when we think we will have to put
forward our firm proposals.

Q. How do you propose to handle the differ-
ence between what apparently is the largest
popular support which Muzorewa has and

August 29, 1977

the rather more niilita)it leaders, who have
force on their side? They don't seem to have
the citizenry inside Rhodesia. How do you
then plan to get those two together?

Foreign Secretary Owen: Well, it's always
been a common position of the U.S. Admin-
istration and the U.K. Government that the
decision as to who should be the leaders of
the future Zimbabwe must be made by the
people of Zimbabwe, the people who will ac-
tually live under such a government. It's al-
ways been our view that one of our central
purposes is to so arrange the transition that
a fair election can be held — democratic
election — and that this should be chosen on
the basis of a universal suffrage — one man,
one vote — and that the issue should be put
to the people.

It's to try to arrange that in circum-
stances which are acceptable to the people of
Rhodesia and world opinion that we are try-
ing to get a negotiated settlement. It's
squaring that particular circle that is the
difficulty, but we've always known that the
time would come when we would have to put
our ideas forward, and it clearly is now com-
ing to the time when we will be prepared to
do so. We'll still be prepared to listen to
people.

Q. Secretary Vance, does this mean that the
United States is now preparing to take a
more active participating role in these
negotiations?

Secretary Vance: Well, we have been
working closely with the British all along in
the consultations which have been taking
place over the last several months, and we
are going to continue to work side-by-side
on this.

Q. You cannot consider this in a vacuum.
You've got a war in Eritrea; you've got trou-
ble in Libya; you've got trouble in southern
Africa. This is part of one picture. Where do
you go from Rhodesia or, if you don't see a
solution there, does the rest of it blotv up?
How do you see this Rhodesian thing con-
nected with the other parts of Africa?

Foreign Secretary Owen: Well, I don't

277

think you can totally look at southern Africa
in isolation from Africa as a whole, but I am
certain that you cannot look at Rhodesia in
isolation from the problems of Namibia and
the problem of South Africa itself. We've
ranged widely on the whole interlocking
problems, particularly those three problems
in southern Africa, and I don't think any of
us believe that you can isolate them all. But
as far as Africa as a whole is concerned, of
course we discuss these things with the
frontline presidents, important countries
like Nigeria, and take account of the Organi-
zation of African Unitv and others.

Department Recommends Extending
MFN Treatment for Romania

Following is a statement by Matthew
Ninietz, Counselor of the Department of
State, before the Subcommittee on Trade of
the House Committee on Ways and Means on
July 18. 1

I am pleased to have this opportunity to
testify on behalf of continued extension of
most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment for
Romania. I would like to discuss with you the
foreign policy framework in which our rela-
tions with Romania are set and thereby
suggest the reasons why we believe that
waiver of Section 402 of the Trade Act is
warranted.

The dominant theme of Romania's foreign
policy continues to be a desire to maintain a
high degree of independence in both its politi-
cal and economic relations with other coun-
tries. President Carter took note of this
theme in making his determination that con-
tinuation of the waiver is justified. In his rec-
ommendation to the Congress [dated June 2,
1977], the President said: "I believe that a
further expansion of U.S. -Romanian economic
relations can help to promote a cont-' ation of
such independent policies and that j Trade

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office. Washington, D.C. 20402.

278

Agreement, nondiscriminatory tariff treat-
ment and authority to extend Commodity
Credit Corporation and Export-Import Bank
credits are essential to maintain and expand
our present overall bilateral relationship with
Romania."

Because of the determination with which it
seeks to ma.ximize its independence, Romania
has gone well beyond its fellow members in
the Warsaw Pact and in COMECON [Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance] — the Com-
munist economic group — in expanding its ties
with the West and with the world's developing
countries. Romania was the only COMECON
country to join the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank. It leads the other
COMECON countries in the proportion of
trade that it conducts with the West. It is also
a participant in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Romania is also continuing its efforts to
structure its relations with its Eastern Euro-
pean neighbors along lines that tend to in-
crease its freedom of action on the world
stage. For example, Romania continues to re-
strict its participation in Warsaw Pact mili-
tary exercises and has no Soviet troops
stationed within its borders. In addition,
Romania continues to champion the right of
each Eastern European country to set its own
goals and priorities according to its own
interests.

Romania's independence is also reflected in
its continued ability to maintain good relations
with countries that have widely differing so-
cial and economic systems — with the United
States, the People's Republic of China, Israel,
and the Arab countries. Unlike other Warsaw
Pact countries, Romania did not break diplo-
matic relations with Israel upon the outbreak
of Arab-Israeli hostilities and maintains con-
structive relations with the Israelis. Roma-
nian petroleum products, such as fuel oil, con-
tinued to flow to the United States during the
oil embargo.

As you know, Romania was the only coun-
try to negotiate a trade agreement with the
United States and to receive MFN under the
terms of Section 402 of the Trade Act. In this
respect as well, Romania has demonstrated a
readiness to strike out on its own path.
We believe it is in the interest of the United

Department of State Bulletin

States to encourage this independence by con-
tinuing to grant Romania MFN and access to
U.S. Government credits. We also believe
that good relations with Romania contribute
to our policy of reducing East-West tensions.
Accordingly, the U. S. -Romanian trade
agreement and MFN play an important role in
our foreign policy. Conversely, abrogation of
the trade agreement and withdrawal of MFN
would set back our bilateral relations with
Romania and might discourage other Eastern
European countries from pursuing closer ties
with the United States.

Developments in Bilateral Relations

I would like to review for you briefly some
of the developments in U.S. -Romanian rela-
tions that have taken place since the Ways
and Means Committee last reviewed the ques-
tion of extending MFN to Romania in Sep-
tember 1976.

On November 21, 1976, U.S. Secretary of
Commerce, Elliot L. Richardson, and Roma-
nian Deputy Prime Minister, Ion Patan,
Cochairmen of the U.S. -Romanian Joint Eco-
nomic Commission, signed a 10-year agree-
ment on economic, industrial, and technical
cooperation. The agreement was signed at the
third session of the commission in Bucharest.
It reaffirms the support of both countries for
the expansion of economic relations. This
agreement is intended to supplement, and not
to replace, the U.S. -Romanian trade agree-
ment, concluded with congressional approval
in August 1975. It sets forth general
guidelines for long-term arrangements be-
tween firms and enterprises of the two coun-
tries. It protects investors against expropria-
tion or impairment of their contractual rights
by government action and contains measures
for improving business facilities and the pro-
vision of commercial information. We expect
this agreement to contribute to the steady
growth of trade between the United States
and Romania.

At the same time, we have continued the
wide range of programs in the academic, sci-
entific, commercial, and cultural fields — some
officially sponsored and some private — which
have served to expand our relations with
Romania and to broaden the range of contacts

between the governments and the citizens of
our two countries.

We have also maintained a useful dialogue
with the Romanian leadership on issues that
concern us. We have, for example, made very
clear to the Romanian authorities that this
Administration and this Congress remain
deeply committed to the support of human
rights, both in the United States and abroad.
As in the past, we have found that our rela-
tions with Romania are sufficiently mature to
enable us to discuss usefully even issues on
which we do not share the same perspective.
We also continue to find a willingness on the
Romanian side to resolve, in a humanitarian
way, issues about which we have expressed
our concern. Only in the framework of a firm
relationship, of which MFN forms a part, can
such discussions take place, often with favor-
able results. ,

We have also held frequent discussions with
Romania on the imphcations of the Helsinki
Final Act and the follow-up meetings which
have recently begun in Belgrade. While here
again our perspectives are not always the
same, the exchanges have been useful, and I
might point out that the Romanian leadership
has affirmed its commitment in this context to
help the reunification of divided families.

As this committee is aware, there is concern
on the part of Members of Congress and the
Hungarian-American community with the
Romanian Government's treatment of its
ethnic minority. This concern has focused on
allegations of discrimination in education, cul-
ture, the economy, and the use of the Hunga-
rian language. We have discussed this ques-
tion on several occasions with Romanian
authorities. Like all governments, however,
including our own, the Romanian Government
has preferred to deal with the problems of
minorities as an exclusively domestic ques-
tion: Recently, however, the Romanian and
Hungarian Governments have publicly recog-
nized the existence of a minority question in
their respective countries.

In a joint communique issued on June 17,
President Ceausescu of Romania and General
Secretary Kadar of Hungary declared that the
existence of ethnic minorities in Romania and
Hungary "is a major factor in the develop-
ment of friendly relations between the two

August 29, 1977

279

countries." The two sides agreed to approach
this problem in accordance with the interna-
tional norms adopted by the United Nations
for the protection of the rights of ethnic
minorities.

We are encouraged that the two govern-
ments primarily concerned have openly dis-
cussed the problem, and we hope that this
statement will lead to positive steps by both
governments to improve the conditions of
their minorities. We believe that such a co-
operative approach on the part of the Roma-
nian and Hungarian Governments offers the
best prospect for progress. At the same time
we recognize our obligation to lend whatever
positive encouragement we can.

U.S. -Romanian Trade

I would like now to touch on a few signifi-
cant aspects of U.S. -Romanian trade, which
may be of interest to the committee.

In 1976 U.S. trade with Romania reached
an all-time high of $448 million, which repre-
sents an increase of almost 40 percent over
the 1975 two-way figure. There was a trade
surplus in our favor of over $50 million. This
trend of increasing bilateral trade has con-
tinued into 1977, as has the U.S. positive
trade balance, and at the present rate we
could expect U.S. -Romanian trade to ap-
proach $600 million for 1977. I think it is quite
clear that this growth has occurred in large
measure as a result of our having accorded
Romania MFN and of the positive climate for
American firms which this action has pro-
duced in Romania.

The Romanian Government has stressed its
interest in developing and e.xpanding our
trade relations even further. We believe that
an expansion of our commercial relations can
play a significant role in encouraging
Romania's economic and political independ-
ence.

The recently concluded arrangement be-
tween Romania and the Island Creed Coal
Company of West Virginia is a good example
of Romanian interest and ability to enhance
its independence of action in the commercial
field. Under the terms of this long-term con-
tract, Romania will purchase a minimum of 14
million tons of coal — with an option to buy

considerably more over the next 30-40
years — for an advance payment of $53 million
and subsequent payments which could reach
as much as $2 billion. These purchases will
permit Romania to lessen its dependence for
this vital raw material on the Soviet Union
and other suppliers.

I would like to note that extension of the
Section 402 waiver for Romania will also per-
mit the United States to continue both the
CCC [Commodity Credit Corporation] and
Export-Import Bank credit programs in
Romania, which have supported our agricul-
tural commodity and machinery exports.

Human Rights Issues

Mr. Chairman [Charles A. Vanik of Ohio],
you and other members of your subcommittee
are aware of the efforts of the State Depart
ment, and those of Ambassador [to Romania
Harry G.] Barnes and our Embassy in
Bucharest, to help resolve the many hundreds
of emigration and humanitarian cases that
have come to our attention. Because of the
general waiver authority granted to the Pres-
ident under Section 402 of the Trade Act, and
its application to Romania, it has been possi-
ble to pursue our interests in easing emigra-
tion restrictions in the context of good U.S.
Romanian relations. Consequently, I am
pleased to say that a good proportion of these
cases have been favorably resolved.

We continue to believe that the understand-
ing that we reached with the Romanian Gov
ernment on this matter satisfied the provi
sions of the Trade Act. We believe that the
Romanian performance on emigration during
the past year has contributed to the achieve
ment of the objectives of the act.

As President Carter stated in his request
for extension of his waiver authority, we in
tend to monitor closely Romanian compliance
with the objectives of section 402. Should per
formance not accord with the intent of this
provision, we would recommend reconsidera-
tion of his recommendation. In addition, we
will bring to the attention of the Romanian
Government any actions or emigration trends
which do not seem to conform to the assur-
ances which they have provided in the past to
treat emigration requests in a humanitarian

280

Department of State Bulletin

ses iiill
^nce for
t I'liion

i of the
bo per-
Btli tke

manner. We will continue to keep the Con-
igress informed of the results of this monitor-
ling process.

I should point out that Romania does not
encourage emigration by its citizens. We still
hear complaints, perhaps as the result of arbi-
trary decisions by local authorities. The
bureaucratic procedures remain burdensome
and time-consuming and could well be stream-
lined and speeded up. Further, approval of
•each request to emigrate is not assured, par-
ticularly for persons without relatives in other
countries.

The Romanian Government has demon-
strated, however, an understanding of the
importance we place on emigration and a will-
ingness to discuss our concerns whenever we
raise them. In addition, Romania accepts a
commitment to help carry out the reunifica-
tion of divided families, as provided in the
Helsinki Final Act.

Mr. Chairman, we have provided for you
and your subcommittee statistics which enable
us to assess Romania's emigration perform-
ance. If we look at the totals for the first six
months of this year and last year, we can see
that the rate of emigration to the United
States is now running slightly above last
year's rate. That is, in the period Janu-
ary Wune 30, 1977, 602 persons einigi-ated fi-om
Romania to the United States, as compared to
576 during the same period last year. In addi-
tion to being above last year's rate, this emig-
ration level is considerably above emigration
rates in the pre-MFN years. This year the
Romanian authorities seem to be making a
concerted effort to resolve cases in which con-
gressional interest has been expressed, in-
cluding a number of longstanding marriage
cases. The large volume of approvals — 939 for
permanent departure to the United States so
far this year — indicates that the present
favorable rate of emigration will continue.

In addition to monitoring emigration from
Romania to the United States, we have also
followed closely the progress of Romanian
emigration to Israel. Here the results are not
nearly as encouraging. The six-month total for
1977 is only 567 persons, compared to 1,064 in
1976.

The problem of assessing Romanian emigra-

tion performance with regard to Israel is
complicated by uncertainty regarding the
number of Romanian Jews who actually wish
to depart. As you know, Romania has, in the
postwar period, followed a liberal policy to-
ward Jewish emigration. Well over 300,000
Jews have been permitted to emigrate to Is-
rael. Many of those who remain are quite el-
derly, and may not wish to emigrate. While
we believe that there are Jews in Romania
who wish to emigrate but feel prevented from
doing so, we have no accurate way of deter-
mining how many wish to depart. At times the
debate over the conflicting figures has di-
verted attention from the central humanitar-
ian issue. In this situation, we believe our
best approach is to concentrate our efforts on
securing improved Romanian performance.

In the final analysis, we recognize that an
acceptable level of emigration from Romania
to Israel is the principal concern of the two
countries involved. Only the Israeli au-
thorities can determine which Romanians who
apply to immigrate to Israel are qualified to
do so. It is our impression that Romanian and
Israeli authorities conduct periodic discus-
sions on emigration. At the same time, we in-
tend to keep this matter constantly before the
Romanian Government — but in the context of
good relations, not confrontation.

I would also like to mention that there are
signs of greater Romanian willingness in re-
cent months to permit increased emigration to
other countries. For example, in the case of
the Federal Republic of Germany — the desti-
nation of the largest proportion of Romanian
emigrants — emigration has increased greatly
this year compared to 1976. During the first
four months of this year, some 4,300 Roma-
nians arrived to settle in the Federal Repub-
lic, and Romanian statistics show that over
5,600 persons left Romania for West Germany
up to June 14. This is more than double the
number of Romanians who, according to Ger-
man statistics, settled there in all of 1976. I
must add, however, that the number of
Romanians emigrating to West Germany in
1976 — 2,720 according to German figures —
was relatively low. In 1974, for example,
German figures record 5,400 Romanian
immigrants.

August 29, 1977

281

We believe that the positive effect which
the U.S. -Romanian trade agreement has had
on trade, emigration, and our general bilat-
eral relations with Romania fully justifies con-
tinuation of the agreement. The agreement
has provided an additional stimulus to Roma-
nian independence. In addition, our resulting
improved relations with Romania have ena-
bled us to fui'ther other worthy humanitarian
objectives. We therefore support extension of
the President's waiver authority and its appli-
cation to Romania.

U.S., Canada To Negotiate
Maritime Issues

White House Annowncement ^

The President announced on July 27 the
designation of Lloyd N. Cutler, of Chevy
Chase, Md., as his special representative for
maritime boundary and resource negotiations
with Canada, with the personal rank of Am-
bassador. Ambassador Cutler, who is a Wash-
ington attorney, will conduct negotiations
with Canada over the coming months in an ef-
fort to reach a comprehensive settlement of
U.S. -Canadian maritime boundaries and re-
lated fishery and hydrocarbon issues.

The Government of Canada has named Am-
bassador Marcel Cadieux to conduct its
negotiations. Ambassador Cadieux formerly
served as Under Secretary of the Department
of External Affairs in Ottawa and as Ambas-
sador of Canada to the United States. He is on
temporary assignment from his position as
Canadian Ambassador to the European
Communities.

The two countries attempted to resolve
their maritime boundary and fisheries issues
in talks from late 1975 to early 1977. Failing
agreement, earlier this year they entered into
an interim Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement
for 1977, to enable each country to continue
fishing in the 200-mile zone of the other while
negotiations for more permanent arrange-

' Biographic data on Ambassador Cutler is omitted.
For complete text, see Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents dated Aug. 1, 1977, p. 1116.

282

ments proceed. The new negotiations will re-
sume under the direction of Ambassador
Cutler and Ambassador Cadieux around
August 1.

The two governments have agreed that,
with a view toward reaching a negotiated set-
tlement between them, the special negotiators
will be guided by the following terms of refer-
ence. The negotiators will report to govern-
ments by October 15, 1977, on the principles
of a comprehensive settlement encompassing:

— Maritime boundaries delimitation;

— Complementary fishery and hydrocarbon
resource arrangements, as appropriate; and

— Such other related matters as the two
governments may decide.

The negotiators will develop the substance
of an ad referendum comprehensive settle-
ment for submission to governments by De-
cember 1, 1977. The negotiators will organize
and conduct the negotiations in the manner
and in the places which they judge will best
facilitate a settlement.

Negotiations concerning West Coast salmon
will be resumed separately on a priority basis.
The special negotiators will determine the re-
lationship, if any, between the courses and
outcomes of the two sets of negotiations.

U.S., Canada To Study
River Water Quality

Press release 352 dated August 2

The Governments of the United States and
Canada on August 2 requested the International
Joint Commission [IJC] to conduct a study of
water quality in the Poplar River Basin in Mon-
tana and Saskatchewan and in particular to
focus on the transboundary pollution potential
of the Saskatchewan Power Corporation
thermal generating station — and ancillary
facilities, including coal mining — near Cor-
noach, Saskatchewan. The United States is
concerned that the water quality impacts of
the project and its associated developments
may lead to degradation of water quality in
Montana in violation of Article IV of the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 between the

Department of State Bulletin

two countries. At present, as discussed in the
governments' request to the commission,
there are no firm plans to expand this facility
beyond a capacity of two 300-megawatt units.
The commission has been asked initially to
examine the potential impacts of a 600-
megawatt facihty, but is empowered to con-
duct a study of any future proposed expansion
of the station up to its 1,200-megawatt
potential.

The International Joint Commission will
conduct a binational study under the provi-
sions of article IX of the treaty, consistent
with the terms of reference jointly submitted
by the governments on August 2. The IJC con-
tinues its work under an existing article IX ref-
erence on water apportionment problems posed
by the Saskatchewan power project with
which water quality implications are inti-
mately interrelated. Potential air pollution
impacts from the facility remain under discus-
sion between the two governments. Under the
terms of reference for the IJC study, a report
containing the commission's advisory conclu-
sions and recommendations is due by De-
cember 1, 1978.1

U.S. To Establish Embassy
in Cape Verde

Press release 360 dated August 4

The U.S. Government has informed the
Government of the Republic of Cape Verde
that we intend to establish an Embassy in
Praia, Cape Verde, by January 1, 1978. The
Embassy will be headed by a resident
Charge d' Affaires, ad interim. We will con-
tinue to accredit concurrently the American
Ambassador resident in Bissau, Guinea-
Bissau, as Ambassador to Cape Verde.

The opening of an Embassy in Cape Verde
will enable the United States to represent
U.S. interests more effectively and to pro-
vide consular services to the more than 700

recipients of U.S. Federal benefits checks
and to the approximately 1,000 Cape Ver-
deans who immigrate to the United States
each year.

Cape Verde has established an Embassy
in Washington and a consulate general in
Boston to serve the Cape Verdean-American
community which is estimated at about
300,000 persons, largely concentrated in the
New England States.

Security Council Favors

U.N. Membership for Vietnam

Following is a statement made in the U.N.
Security Council by Deputy U.S. Representa-
tive Donald F . McHeriry on July 19.

USUN press release 56 dated July 19

When the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is
admitted to membership in the United Na-
tions this fall, one more nation will join the
ranks of this organization. > The principle of
universality of representation will be further
advanced. At that time, Vietnam will accept
the purposes and principles of the United
Nations and the obligations of its charter.
As a member of the United Nations, Viet-
nam will join us in our collective responsibil-
ity to maintain international peace and secu-
rity, to develop friendly relations among
nations, to settle disputes peacefully, and to
advance human rights.

My government believes now, as it did
when it helped draft the charter, that last-
ing peace lies in the dedication of all nations
to these high purposes through universal
membership in the United Nations. We look
forward to working with Vietnam, as with
all other members of this body, to bring
about a new era of peace, cooperation, and
friendship, not only in our bilateral relations
but in our work together in the United
Nations.

• Copies of the reference and other IJC materials re-
lating to the proposed project may be obtained at the
offices of the United States section of the commission,
1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

' The Council on July 20 adopted by consensus a res-
olution (S/RES/413 (1977)) recommending "that the
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam be admitted to mem-
bership in the United Nations."

August 29, 1977

283

The U.S. Approach to the United Nations: New Directions

Address by Charles W. Maynes

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ^

I have come today to deliver a different
kind of speech about the United Nations. I
have come not to praise the United Nations,
nor to denounce it. I have come to analyze it.

I've chosen this approach because of con-
cerns which more and more Americans share.
There is — let's face it — a great deal of anxiety
and discouragement in the country. The at-
titudes range from a mounting concern that
international organizations aren't working, to
a growing fear that they are completely out of
control. Some assert that we are being over-
whelmed by new circumstances, that we can't
cope.

I don't think the situation is this desperate.
There are new challenges, but they can be
identified and isolated — and they can be dealt
with.

The situation is serious. The Carter Admin-
istration and a majority of the Congress un-
derstand this. They want to do something
about it. But to make progress they need your
help, which is a good reason for our discussion
today.

At the outset, let's recall some of the as-
pects of international organizations which are
really quite old, and which are here to stay.
We often forget that some of the main ele-
ments of international organization work go
back, not just 20 or 30 years to the founding of
the United Nations, or even back 60 years to
the conception of the League of Nations; they
go back a century or more.

Let me explain by discussing three general
categories: international conferences to de-

' Made before the United Nations Association of
Chicago, 111., on July 13, 1977.

bate great issues and to draw up worldwide
standards; international cooperation to man-
age our interdependence; and regularized
multilateral consultations to preserve peace.

First, global conferences to consider and
debate broad issues and to formulate intema-
tional standards. Because Americans like to
believe they invent things, many of us think
that an American, Woodrow Wilson, invented
the idea of parliamentary diplomacy through
the League of Nations and its successor, the
United Nations. In fact, Wilson was acknowl-
edging a growing historical trend for nations
to handle their affairs multilaterally. The
process extends back well beyond the First
World War.

Throughout the 19th century statesmen in
Europe met together in large multilateral
forums with increasing frequency. By the end
of the century this trend to address security
issues multilaterally had culminated in the
Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, which
focused the world's attention on ways to avoid
conflict through courts, arbitration, and the
like. They were also convened to draw up
global rules to make war less barbarous. This
resulted in the Hague conventions on the laws
of war, some of which are still in force and of
value today.

Let's ask ourselves, isn't this process really
similar to some of the global efforts which
have taken place in recent decades? Through-
out the 19th century there was a growing
trend to address security issues multilater-
ally. Throughout the present century that
trend has even accelerated. But to the earlier
interest in security issues has been added a
totally new tendency to address social and

284

Department of State Bulletin

economic issues multilaterally. And we can no
more resist this trend today than others could
have resisted it a century ago.

The world thus is increasingly conscious
that there must be a new global effort to pre-
serve our environment. So the United Nations
convened a World Conference on the Human
Environment in 1972. Even the Arabs and Is-
raelis agreed to meet together in a recent
U.N. conference concerned with the pollution
of the Mediterranean Sea. The 1972 Stock-
holm conference took a number of steps to-
ward establishing global standards, including
unanimous adoption of a declaration contain-
ing 26 principles for nations to follow and an
action plan containing 109 recommendations
for international action.

Yet one of the most important things this
conference did was to raise global conscious-
ness, both among the international public and
within governments. Because the world
deemed this subject worthy of a special global
conference, dozens of governments actually
established, for the first time, their own de-
partments or agencies to deal with environ-
mental questions. The World Food Conference
in 1974 had the same impact in the food field.
We can expect similar results from the 1979
U.N. Conference on Science and Technology.

So, in reality, we are not dealing with a dip-
lomatic development we can accept or reject.
We are dealing with a very long-term basic
movement in history. We can fight it. We can
move it in unproductive directions. But one
way or another we will have to deal with it.
Wouldn't it be better to recognize that there
is a need in world affairs to debate multilater-
ally the great issues of the day — and in many
cases to develop worldwide standards and
regulations through conventions or declara-
tions or other mechanisms?

The Carter Administration and, I believe,
most of the Congress recognize this need.
That's why we're taking extremely seriously
such efforts as the Law of the Sea negotiations
and the recent worldwide conference spon-
sored by the United Nations in Argentina to
solve world water problems. That's why we
are committed to serious global debate, and
worldwide consciousness raising, regarding
such issues as human rights and improving

worldwide economic cooperation between rich
and poor nations and achieving greater
equity among and within nations.

Except through global debate and the inter-
change of ideas, we can't do these things. And
there is no other place to engage other coun-
tries in this type of debate than in some of the
global U.N. forums, like the U.N. General
Assembly, the assemblies of the large spe-
cialized agencies, and the worldwide con-
ferences convened to tackle broad global
problems.

But let's tiirn to the second broad area of
interest, the management of our interdepend-
ence. It always strikes me as interesting that
sovereign nations felt the need for global in-
stitutions over 100 years ago. The Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union was founded
in 1865; the Universal Postal Union in 1874.
Those two organizations are now specialized
agencies of the present U.N. system. As we
all know, over the years new technologies —
the airplane and nuclear energy are but two
examples — have developed, and we have had
to create new global institutions to manage
these technologies in their international as-
pects. Most of these institutions are now inte-
gral parts of the U.N. system — the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization, the Inter-
governmental Maritime Consultative Organi-
zation, and the International Atomic Energy
Agency.

It's hard to conceive how the modern world
would get along without these organizations.

Without the United Nations International
Civil Aviation Organization, aircraft disasters
wouldn't happen just every now and then, but
with terrible frequency. Could one even en-
visage the present modern system of air
transport without the coordination, training,
and safety regulations made possible by this
organization?

Take the field of health. Epidemics would
occur more often, and world travel would be
greatly restricted, but for the activities of the
World Health Organization.

From the work of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, the Intergovernmental Mari-
time Consultative Organization, and others, a
gi'eat many similar examples could be cited.
Even the more controversial U.N. specialized

August 29, 1977

285

agencies— UNESCO [United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization]
and ILO [International Labor Organi-
zation]— carry out work that affects directly
American interests in important ways. In the
field of multinational corporations, for exam-
ple, the ILO is working on a code of conduct
that is of vital interest to U.S. business and
labor. In the field of international communica-
tions, UNESCO is developing international
guidelines which will affect the work and fu-
ture of the American media.

In other words, although there may come a
time when the United States may be forced on
political grounds to decide that overall its
interests are not served by remaining in a
particular international organization, that de-
cision must be taken with the greatest care.
No one should doubt that we will pay a signifi-
cant price for withdrawal. This is why we are
now examining the issue of our membership in
the ILO with the greatest possible care.

To return to our main theme, then, I think
everyone would agree that interdependence
between nations and peoples has been grow-
ing all the time — and not just in the last few
years, but over the last 100 years. So again,
we are dealing with a very long-term and fun-
damental historical trend, one which will con-
tinue in many fields — trade, investment,
employment, technology, education, the envi-
ronment; the list is almost endless.

In the face of this large-scale force in his-
tory, it's simply not realistic, or rational, to
think for a moment that we won't need global
international organizations — and that we
won't need to make them work. Without qual-
ification, the President and the Secretary of
State recognize this reality and want to make
international organizations work better,
rather than deplore their shortcomings.

The third aspect of international organiza-
tions which I want to mention and which has
very ancient roots relates to collective secu-
rity. Generally, that's what most of us think of
as the most important purpose of the United
Nations. The Security Council is viewed as
the supreme body of the United Nations.
However, there are forerunners even of this
type of activity which go back far beyond even
the League of Nations. I am referring to the

Concert of Europe which was established
around 150 years ago. Through much of the
19th century the major European powers used
this framework to consult, as a group, about
issues of war and peace. In fact, they were
successful to a remarkable degree.

Now, in the last half of the 20th century, we
have a U.N. Security Council. Like other in-
stitutions, it has had its periods of inactivity
and new engagement. It met five times in
1959 and 113 times in 1976. But there can't be
any serious question that an institution like
this is essential. If there were no convenient
way for the strongest countries to consult
regularly about situations threatening the
peace — and to bring other interested coun-
tries, large and small, into these
consultations — there simply would be no ques-
tion that the risk of war, including world war,
would be tremendously greater.

But the central point I want to make is that
this is not a new phenomenon. The arrange-
ments we now have, no matter how imperfect,
respond to realities which forced their way
into the international system 150 years ago.
The prospect now is for greater, not less, use
of the U.N. Security Council. If, for example,
we are to take more comprehensive and last-
ing steps toward Middle East peace, the Secu-
rity Council is almost certainly going to have
to play a significant role in the necessary ar-
rangements. In like measure, it will play an
important role in the unfolding process lead-
ing to independence in Rhodesia and Namibia.
And we can expect it to play a major role in
the other central secui'ity issues of our time.

The New Dimensions

I have talked about some of the aspects of
international organizations which have a very
long history and which I think are quite
enduring — much more so than many people
probably realize.

Let's now turn to what I see as three new
elements of the picture. These include: first,
the fundamentally political character of the is-
sues we have to deal with; second, the new
diffusion of power and its effects on the sys-
tem; and third, the new dimensions of scale
and complexity in the processes of manage-
ment or "government" of the system.

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Department of State Bulletin

First, why single out the political nature of
the issuesl I think any fair observer would
agree that the United Nations in recent years
has been dominated by three large clusters of
political issues: those pertaining to racism and
the completion of the decolonization process in
Africa; those concerning the Middle East; and
those relating to the drive for a new interna-
tional economic order. Different though they
are, they share this characteristic: they are at
heart political issues — even the last, in the
most classical sense of that word — that is,
they have to do with powerful feelings about
human justice. Above all, they evoke the deep
passions of human beings. And that means
that political skills, not just technical skills,
are needed to deal with them.

Some people have characterized the new
and more difficult situation in the United Na-
tions simply as the explosion in the number of
members — roughly a tripling in size from 51 to
nearly 150 members. That, unquestionably, is
a major new element. But it's much more im-
portant to concentrate, not so much on the
number, but on the substantive significance
flowing from the participation of the new
countries. The new members have brought to
the fore issues about which they have de-
veloped great political passion — so much so
that these issues threaten to become perva-
sive throughout the U.N. system.

Some will ask, why is this any different
from the past? Didn't people in the past feel
passion about important issues? That's true.
Still, there are important differences. Let's
discuss a few.

In the past, it was generally possible to
separate and isolate broad areas of endeavor.
The specialists and the technicians were gen-
erally able to work quietly and, at least most
of the time, constructively in their particular
fields of international cooperation. This was
true except when the multilateral system
broke down entirely, as at the beginning of
both world wars. Foreign affairs did seem a
realm apart. Now I ask you, who believes that
today? Who contends we can ignore what the
technicians are doing?

Today the great political issues, at least the
three I have mentioned, are totally enmeshed
in the operations of the international system.

The protagonists are, in effect, using the sys-
tem in every way they can to advance their
aims. This is why I characterized the new
situation not only as involving high political
issues, but also as being pretty nearly domi-
nated by these issues. In honesty, let's ac-
knowledge that this process began in the cold
war as states, including the United States,
began to pursue foreign policy goals in every
area of international activity.

But there is this difference. In the cold war
period only two states — the United States and
the U.S.S.R. — used every feature of the in-
ternational system to pursue their political ob-
jectives. When these two states decided to
desist — to follow a policy of detente — the sys-
tem became reasonably quiet. But today, not
just the United States and the U.S.S.R., but
other states have developed political goals of
such overriding importance to them that they
consider it legitimate to use every feature of
the international system to pursue their
objectives.

The second major new element which we
have to address in international organizations
relates to the way in which we handle these
political issues, and other issues as well. I am
referring to the unprecedented diffusion of
power among nations, and here we must rec-
ognize a new dimension to the problem of
power. Today more traditional forms of
power, like military strength, are less useful
than previously in the pursuit of foreign policy
causes. This has had a radical, almost revolu-
tionary, impact on the international system
and on how we can do business within that
system.

In the past, military and economic strength
could be assessed more or less accurately and
a balance of strength among a fairly limited
number of nations could be sought to maintain
stability and security. Moreover, nations
tended pretty much to accept and operate
within a fairly prescribed set of expectations.
If you had a lot of power — a lot of tanks, a
large standing army, a great economic base —
then you were expected to be a leader, and
others listened to you accordingly. If you had
relatively little power, in conventional terms,
then you probably didn't assert yourself very
much.

August 29, 1977

287

Today the elements of power, strength, and
influence are infinitely more complex. Vast
sums can be expended in acquiring destruc-
tive force, without significantly altering a
nation's ability to achieve many of its most
important goals. Some nations that spend rel-
atively little of their national treasure on
armaments can achieve great weight in the
councils of nations through the strength of
their intellectual and diplomatic
contributions — both positive and negative in
character — in addressing problems of funda-
mental concern, not only to their own citizens,
but to all the world's peoples.

So power today must include the concept of
competence in controlling all the things of im-
portance that can happen to a nation and its
people. Unrivaled military strength, over-
whelming economic power — even if we had
these, and we do not — are no longer enough.

The new international agenda therefore
demands special qualities of leadership and
diplomacy. The United States, if it wants to
play a special role in this new environment,
must demonstrate special qualities. It must
maintain national self-confidence, orchestrate
more effectively all the elements of national
strength, and approach others with a much
more nuanced and accommodating foreign pol-
icy. Yet while we can play a special role — and
many in the outside world want us to play
it — we can never again play an overwhelm-
ingly predominant leadership role. Others
want a voice and are determined to gain one.

It is in international organizations that this
new dimension — a dimension involving both
leadership and power-sharing — is most evi-
dent. It is in international organizations that
we are dealing most directly with issues on
the frontiers of world order — where we are
trying to deal constructively with issues in
which all have a stake, in which a great many
can do much good and great harm — for exam-
ple, in the fields of environment, trade, access
to raw materials, nonprolife ration, and many
others.

Let me describe briefly what I think is the
third major new element of the present situa-
tion. This is the new scope and complexity of
the governmental processes involved in man-
aging world problems. The phenomenon I am

talking about is one not merely present in in-
ternational organizations. We all know that
government within the advanced countries is
also getting to be harder and harder. For
example, very few, if any, of the developed
countries have mastered the problems of infla-
tion, of full employment, and of growth. And
for many countries there is not even a solution
in sight.

Frankly, it would be amazing if any interna-
tional system of cooperation did better, or
even as well, as the systems of government
within large experienced nations. As we all
know, the international system doesn't do bet-
ter. With some 100 intergovernmental organi-
zations, with a thousand or more international
conferences annually, with roughly 150
sovereign participants having widely diver-
gent traditions and purposes, it does worse.

In short, there are great inefficiencies and
frustrating and time-consuming procedures.
And management problems are stretching our
capacities to the utmost. But once again, I
think it will help to recognize what we are
deahng with. Even though we use such words
as management and efficiency, the issues we
are addressing go to the heart of politics —
because they have to do with the pursuit of
basic human aspirations. In seeking solutions,
therefore, we need to apply political skills
even more than managerial competence.

How We Are Responding

What, then, are the new approaches which
should guide us? I think I have already
suggested what I believe is the answer. We
need political approaches to solve political
problems. This isn't as obvious as it may
seem. There really is a difference between
pursuing issues on a technical level, or even a
strictly diplomatic level, and pursuing them as
part of a broad political process.

One of the most important steps the Admin-
istration has taken is to appoint a politician,
ex-Congressman Andrew Young, to be our
representative at the United Nations. I have
had the privilege of working fairly closely
withjAndy the last few months, and I can tell
you he really is an extraordinary politician
and — if one looks at the history and challenges
of the civil rights movement — perhaps one of

288

Department of State Bulletin

the most accomplished in the country today.
What I have seen in just the first months of
Andy's leadership is a remarkable change in
our ability in the United Nations to communi-
cate with other countries, to alter the very
basis on which issues are considered.

More specifically, in the realm of dealing
with African issues, the work of the Security
Council this year has been characterized by
the beginnings of genuine negotiation and the
building of consensus. I don't want to make
any predictions because it's too early for that,
but within the U.N. community I believe it is
generally accepted that the international
community has made the most promising be-
ginning in years, particularly on the Namibian
issue. Incidentally, so that you don't misin-
terpret my main point here as being just par-
tisan, let me say that we are trying to build on
what others began. Previous U.S. Permanent
Representatives at the United Nations suc-
ceeded in convincing the U.S. Government
that we should take the United Nations more
seriously. They began the process of reaching
out to a broader circle of like-minded coun-
tries. This Administration is only continuing
and building on that process.

But I want to discuss more specifically how
we need to handle the great political issues
throughout the U.N. system. The heart of the
matter is that we really do have to come to
grips with them. We can't evade them. I know
that there are many things that we will have
to do, and want to do, because they may do a
little good. For example, we have to urge in
every possible way that others not try to gain
advantage regarding the problems of the Mid-
dle East or of southern Africa in the various
technical and economic bodies of the United
Nations. And we have made some important
progress on this in several forums. But
frankly, even though we may gain ground
through this type of necessary diplomacy, we
are not going to solve our basic problems
permanently in this manner. It's a little like
putting a cold compress on the forehead of
someone who has pneumonia.

Others, rightly or wrongly, will seek advan-
tage, will pursue causes in every way, in
every forum that they are able, with regard to
those great political issues about which they

feel passionately. It is not that I like this de-
velopment; it was wrong in the cold war days,
and it is wrong now. We must try to make
some areas of international life immune to the
political struggle. We can work to this end in
specific policies, and we shall try. But the real
answer, and I think it is probably the only an-
swer, is to deal with the essence of the prob-
lems, using our finest political skills.

That's why we are looking for new ap-
proaches to the vast and central problems of
world economic growth and equity between
North and South. That's one of the reasons
the Carter Administration is giving such high
priority to new approaches to stimulate the
process of peace in the Middle East. And
that's why the United States is now playing a
much more leading and creative role in help-
ing all the interested parties, black and white,
to achieve majority rule and justice in south-
ern Africa.

Let me mention in passing that some of
these new issues present major opportunities
for our country. For example, we need not,
and should not, regard the United Nations
preoccupation with southern African issues,
with the completion of decolonization, as
merely a burden or a harassment. In fact, our
country was one of the original champions of
decolonization — and for basic reasons, con-
sistent with our deepest traditions. Today our
bedrock belief in dignity and opportunity for
the individual human being remains an impor-
tant bridge between us and the peoples and
nations of Africa.

Aside from the question of fundamental
principle involved, which is of course
paramount, it is worth noting that when we
are able to take cooperative and meaningful
steps within international organizations that
are responsive to African concerns, we are
building good will and good relations with
one-third of the United Nations membership.
In political terms, that is a fact of consider-
able practical significance. Andy Young was
not the first to recognize this. One of Gover-
nor Scranton's [William W. Scranton, former
U.S. Representative to the United Nations]
important decisions was to institute a series of
bilateral consultations with African countries.

Turning now to the question of improving

August 29, 1977

289

the efficiency and organization of the entire
U.N. system, I commented that this objective
should also be viewed in a political perspec-
tive. Let me mention one way in which we are
doing this. We have recognized the intercon-
nection between concrete benefits from any
governmental system and the ability to pro-
mote greater efficiency. Greater efficiency, or
more procedural orderliness, or more rational
managerial charts, do not mean anything to
the participants unless there's also a concrete
benefit. That's a political fact of life.

Recently, under the new Administration,
we have attempted significantly to increase
our support for the United Nations Develop-
ment Program (UNDP) one of the most pro-
ductive parts of the U.N. system. We believe
that in doing so, not only will we be making
more resources available for worthwhile proj-
ects, but also we will be strengthening our po-
sition in pressing for management improve-
ments which will permit better use to be made
of our money, as well as other people's money.
For UNDP has a critical overall coordinating
role in the U.N. system. At the same time, at
the recent meeting of UNDP's Governing
Council, we outlined a number of important
reforms which would increase its effective-
ness. We made clear, at the same time, that
managerial reforms of U.N. technical assist-
ance are an urgent necessity if those countries
making the largest financial contributions are
to retain confidence in the system.

Another way management and politics in-
terrelate is found in the way we make ar-
rangements for sharing decisionmaking re-
sponsibility. One of the great political drives
of contemporary times, both within nations
and within the international community, is for
meaningful participation in the decisions
which have direct impact on the well-being
and prosperity of the participants. Whether a
country is large or small today, its economy,
its way of life, its future, all can be affected
enormously by how well or badly the interna-
tional system works.

Obviously, it is not adequate merely to ac-
cede to requests for greater decisionmaking
power. There has to be a balance between
fairness and efficiency. Difficult as this chal-
lenge seems in a U.N. system of nearly 150

nations jealous of their sovereign equality, we
have been engaged in some negotiations which
could set examples for the future. Let me
mention two of these.

We have nearly completed all the arrange-
ments to establish the International Fund for
Agricultural Development, in order to finance
much-needed agricultural development proj-
ects within the poorer countries. The indus-
trial nations are putting up roughly half the
capital, and I am pleased to say that the
OPEC nations [Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries] are contributing almost
all of the other half. Decisionmaking is to be
shared, in effect, among the three main
groups of participants — the industrial coun-
tries, the OPEC countries, and the developing
countries who will be the main recipients.

The second example of important new ex-
perimentation stems from the recently con-
cluded Conference on International Economic
Cooperation in Paris. This was a sustained ef-
fort at serious, responsible dialogue between
a limited number of developing and developed
countries. It did not, of course, accomplish the
impossible — total agreement on all issues —
but there were many significant forward
steps. We have begun an essential process of
more expert exploration of issues. And we in-
tend to draw heavily on what we have learned
from the Paris conference as we work within
the U.N. system to promote sustained and
productive dialogue.

Prospects for the Future

Let me conclude with a few thoughts about
the prospects for the future. I realize that I
have not offered any quick and decisive rem-
edies for our problems. I'd like those just as
much as the next person. But frankly they
don't exist. The problems of the United Na-
tions and other international organizations are
not merely temporary aberrations or quirks in
the international system. Instead, as I've in-
dicated, they reflect fundamental political
forces at work in the world. They reflect the
inherent difficulties in managing human and
social problems that get ever more complex.

But still there are grounds for encourage-
ment: We do have a structure which is here to
stay. As I explained earlier, its main elements

290

Department of State Bulletin

have been developing since the last century.
That doesn't mean it's a perfect structure, or
that we can't improve it, because we should
improve it, and we are trying to do so.

An even more basic reason for encourage-
ment is this: We are beginning to tackle the
problems of the United Nations in the most
realistic way possible. We are beginning to
use our political skills, our political insights,
to deal with issues which will only be suscep-
tible to political management. And we are tak-
ing the political initiatives — regarding Africa,
regarding the North-South dialogue, and later
this year, we hope, regarding the Middle
East — that will permit us to make real prog-
ress.

What this adds up to, in my view, is the
possibility of a new and dynamic situation in
which international organizations can play a

much more important role in our foreign pol-
icy. I know that the President and other high
officials of the Carter Administration attach
great importance to making the fullest possi-
ble, constructive use of the United Nations.
And that's what is important: to utilize this
large structure of international institutions,
imperfect as it may be, to solve problems; to
advance constructive goals that will benefit
both us and other nations.

That's what we want to do. And that's what
we are going to bend every effort to do. Be-
cause the decisions we take and the programs
these organizations undertake will affect your
livelihood and welfare, we hope we can have
your advice.

With your advice we also hope will come
your understanding and, in the end, your
support.

THE CONGRESS

Department Discusses War Powers Resolution

Statement by Herbert J. Hansell
Legal Adviser ^

The War Powers Resolution was born in
the midst of tumultuous political pressures
at home and military conflict abroad. It was
created as a response to a perceived abuse
of authority. As section 2(a) suggests. Con-
gress intended the resolution as a remedial

' Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Re-
lations on July 15, 1977. The complete transcript of the
hearings will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20402.

measure to insure that decisions to commit
U.S. Armed Forces to hostilities should in-
volve ". . . the collective judgment of both
the Congress and the President . . . ."

This Administration is of the view that, as
a matter of constitutional law and of public
policy, this country should not go to war
without that collective judgment. Supreme
Court Justice Joseph Story once stated that
the awesome decisions involving matters of
war and peace deserve "... the utmost de-

August 29, 1977

291

liberation, and the successive review of all
the councils of the nation."

The War Powers Resolution of 1973 also
recognized the needs of a modern nation to
respond to emergency situations. It ac-
knowledges the constitutional responsibility
of the Commander in Chief to act, expedi-
tiously when necessary, to preserve the secu-
rity of our- nation.

We realize that collective judgments can-
not constructively be applied if the Congress
is not well informed in a timely fashion;
neither can they be usefully applied if there
are not effective consultation procedures be-
tween these two branches of government.
By establishing the consultation and report-
ing requirements contained in sections 3 and
4 of the War Powers Resolution, the Con-
gress took a useful and desirable step to-
ward reducing information and communi-
cations obstacles which have impeded
coordination in the past.

For example, as a direct result of section
4 the Departments of State and Defense
have formalized a review process to insure
that reports to the Congress are promptly
submitted whenever they are required by
the law. Under this review process the
Legal Adviser to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff informs the Department of
Defense General Counsel of all troop de-
ployments routed through the Chairman's
office which could raise a question whether a
report to the Congress is required. The
General Counsel of the Defense Department
then has the responsibility to advise the
Secretary of Defense as to whether to rec-
ommend to the President that a war-powers
report be submitted.

In the Department of State, the Legal
Adviser of the Department receives the
same information supplied to the Defense
General Counsel and has the responsibility
of bringing to the attention of the Secretary
of State all cases in which the submission of
a report should be recommended to the
President.

These arrangements, supplemented by
close informal contacts between the De-
partments of State and Defense, provide in
our view a valuable mechanism both for ad-

vising the President and for assuring that
the implications of a proposed use of the
armed foi'ces will be more fully discussed at
an early stage. This Administration is firmly
committed to respect the requirements of
section 4. In addition, we are committed to
insuring that these reports contain meaning-
ful information and that they are submitted
as promptly as possible, and in any case
within the prescribed 48-hour period.

We recognize, of course, that reports
under section 4 relate to actions the Presi-
dent has taken pursuant to his constitutional
or statutory authority. In emergency cases
it is important for the President to obtain
the advice and counsel of the Congress
whenever possible before he acts. By their
very nature some emergencies may preclude
opportunity for legislative debate prior to
involvement of the armed forces in hostile or
potentially hostile situations. However, in
the great majority of cases we believe that
meaningful consultations with an appro-
priate group of congressional representa-
tives should be possible.

Such consultations serve both to keep the
Congress well informed in a timely manner
and to permit the executive branch to bene-
fit from advice from Members of Congress
as it deals with international crises. In order
to facilitate such contacts, the Administra-
tion is prepared to work with the Congress
to develop reliable and efficient consultation
procedures. By improving such procedures,
we may both increase the quality and use-
fulness of consultations and decrease the
number of instances in which the President
is compelled by an emergency situation to
act before such consultations can be or-
ganized.

The first requisite for meaningful consul-
tations is a genuine intention of both the
Congress and the executive branch to make
them work. This Administration has man-
ifested such a commitment on sevei'al occa-
sions, in both word and deed. While we are
all mindful of the necessity to insure the
President's ability to act quickly, this Ad-
ministration is equally convinced of the
necessity to have broad public support for a
national commitment to undertake the po-

292

Department of State Bulletin

tential risks and burdens of involvement in
hostilities.

A second requisite is efficient machinery
for conducting those consultations. In the
past when an international crisis has erupted
executive branch officials have notified the
leadership of each House of Congress and
the chairman and members of appropriate
committees. The initial contacts between the
executive branch and the Congress have
been on an individual basis, which at times
makes it more cumbersome to carry out con-
sultations and to have the benefit of collec-
tive judgments.

In order to help overcome these problems,
Congress may wish to consider establishing
a streamlined structure for carrying out con-
sultations, not only in the war-powers con-
text, but also in other crisis situations. An
improved institutional mechanism would
facilitate a more ready flow of information to
the Congress at an early stage of a situation
and assure the Administration's receipt of
timely congressional advice. We are, of
course, prepared to work with the lead-
ership in whatever manner they deem best.
On our part, we want to assure you that we
will be responsive.

In addition to the consultation and report-
ing provisions, the debates over the War
Powers Resolution have elicited considerable
discussion about several other provisions of
the resolution. In particular I am thinking of
section 5(c), which refers to a concurrent
resolution; and section 5(b), which refers to
a 60-day automatic cutoff period. This Ad-
ministration as a matter of policy intends to
follow the letter and spirit of section 5.

We believe that conscientious observance
of the procedures set forth in the resolution,
including effective consultation and timely
reporting, will assure that both the execu-
tive and legislative branches possess the
means to exercise their full and proper con-
stitutional responsibilities.

The Administration will follow the provi-
sions of the existing resolution. We believe,
however, that the consideration of amend-
ments should be deferred, for two reasons.

— First, the existing law has been in effect
only 4 years. We believe the passage of

more time is necessary to assess the desira-
bility for further legislation — time for the
development of the cooperative working re-
lationship we foresee and the healing of the
deep divisions that were reflected in the de-
bates on the present resolution.

— Second, we believe the existing law,
conscientiously applied, is an effective in-
strument for insuring that the nation will
not be committed to war without adequate
deliberation and participation by both Con-
gress and the executive.

A prolonged debate over elusive constitu-
tional issues — with no assurance as to what
the final form of the amendments would
be — could well produce new uncertainties
within our own government, and in the
minds of our allies and potential adversaries,
and might even detract from the effective-
ness of the existing law.

In conclusion, we intend to work with you
in fullfilling the goals underlying the War
Powers Resolution. Through our joint ef-
forts, we hope to demonstrate once again
the health and vigor of our constitutional
system.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

Temporary Reduction in Duty on Certain Ceramic In-
sulators Used in Spark Plugs. Report of the House
Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R.
1550. H. Kept. 95-419. June 16, 1977. 4 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Wood Excelsior. Re-
port of the House Committee on Ways and Means to
accompany H.R. 2692. H. Rept. 95-421. June 16,
1977. 4 pp.

Suspending Temporarily the Duty on Certain Latex
Sheets. Report of the House Committee on Ways and
Means to accompany H.R. 2850. H. Rept. 95-423.
June 16, 1977. 4 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Synthetic Tan-
talum/Columbium Concentrate. Report of the House
Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R.
2982. H. Rept. 95-424. June 16, 1977. 4 pp.

Extension of Existing Suspension of Duties on Certain
Classifications of Yarns of Silk. Report of the House
Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R.
3373. H. Rept. 95-426. June 16, 1977. 3 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Poppy Straw Con-
centrate Used in Producing Codeine or Morphine.
Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means
to accompany H.R. 3790. H. Rept. 95-427. June 16,
1977. 3 pp.

August 29, 1977

293

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTIUTERAL

Conservation — Endangered Species

Convention on international trade in endangered
species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done
at Washington March 3, 1973. Entered into force July
1, 1975. TIAS 8249.
Accession deposited: Guyana, May 27, 1977.

Health

Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva
May 17, 1976.'
Acceptattce deposited: Barbados, May 17, 1977.

Load Lines

Amendments to the international convention on load
lines, 1966. Adopted at London October 12, 1971.'
Acceptance deposited: Tonga, July 12, 1977.

Narcotic Drugs

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New
York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December
13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS
6298.
Extended by the United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Northern Ireland to: Channel Islands and the

Isle of Man, June 24, 1977.

Peace Treaties — Japan

Treaty of peace with Japan. Signed at San Francisco
September 8, 1951. Entered into force April 28, 1952.
TIAS 2490.
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, August 11, 1977.

Safety at Sea

Amendments to the international convention for the
safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at
London November 26, 1968.'
Acceptance deposited: Tonga, July 12, 1977.

Amendments to the international convention for the
safety of life at sea, 19(50 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at
London October 21, 1969.'
Acceptance deposited: Tonga, July 12, 1977.

Convention on the international regulations for pre-
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London Oc-
tober 20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977.
Extended by the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland to: Bailiwick of Jersey,
Bailiwick of Guernsey, Isle of Man, July 15, 1977.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with an-
ne.xes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos
October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975;
for the United States April 7, 1976. TIAS 8572.

Ratifications deposited: Austria, May 17, 1977;^
Malawi, May 25, 1977.

Terrorism

Tin

Fifth international tin agreement, with anne.xes. Done
at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force June 14,
1977. TIAS 8607.

Notification of intention to ratify deposited: Zaire,
May 17, 1977.

Wills

Convention providing a uniform law on the form of an
international will, with anne.x. Done at Washington
October 26, 1973.

Accession deposited: Yugoslavia, August 9, 1977.
Enters into force: February 9, 1978.

BILATERAL

Canada

Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. Signed at
Washington March 2, 1977.

Instrument of ratification signed by the President:
August 4, i977.

Guyana

Loan agreement for public sector manpower ti-aining,
with annex. Signed at Georgetown July 13, 1977. En-
tered into force July 13, 1977.

Japan

Agreement amending the civil air transport agreement
of August 11, 1952, as amended. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Tokyo Julv 26, 1977. Entered into
force July 26, 1977.

Agreement providing for Japan's financial contribution
for United States administrative and related ex-
penses for Japanese fiscal year 1977 pursuant to the
mutual defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1954
(TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo
July 26, 1977. Entered into force July 26, 1977.

Kenya

Agreement amending loan agreement of September 11,
1974, relating to Kenya livestock development.
Signed at Nairobi Julv 20, 1977. Entered into force
July 20, 1977.

Mexico

Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. Signed at

Mexico November 25, 1976.

Instrument of ratification signed by the President:
August 2, 1977.
Agreement amending the agreement of February 16,

1977, relating to additional cooperative arrangements

to curb the illegal production and traffic in narcotics.

Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico July 28.

1977. Entered into force July 28, 1977.

' Not in force.

With statements.

294

Department of State Bulletin

Morocco

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relat-
ing to the agreement of May 17, 1976. Signed at
Rabat July 26, 1977. Entered into force July 26, 1977.

Convention for the avoidance of double ta.xation and the
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on
income, with related notes. Signed at Rabat August
1, 1977. Enters into force upon the e.xchange of in-
struments of ratification.

Philippines

Agreement amending the agreement of October 15,
1975 (TIAS 8179), relating to trade in cotton, wool,
and manmade fiber textile products. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Manila June 1 and 23, 1977. En-
tered into force June 23, 1977.

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of
October 15, 1975, as amended (TIAS 8179), relating
to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textile
products. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila
July 25 and 28, 1977. Entered into force July 28, 1977.

Tunisia

Agreement amending the agreement of January 21,
1977, for sales of agricultural commodities. Effected
by exchange of notes at Tunis July 27 and 28, 1977.
Entered into force July 28, 1977.

PUBLICATIONS

1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume:
Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union

Pres.s release 349 dated July 28 (for release August 6)

The Department of State released on August 6
"Foreign Relations of the United States," volume
V, "Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union." The "Foreign
Relations" series has been published continuously since
1861 as the official record of U.S. foreign policy. The
volume released August 6 is the eighth of nine volumes
covering the year 1949.

This volume of 987 pages presents the most signifi-
cant and highest level documentation (nearly all of
which is newly declassified for this volume) on the
major problems and policies in the relations of the
United States with the nations of Eastern Europe and
with the Soviet Union during 1949. Of particular sig-
nificance and interest is the documentation on the ef-
forts by the United States to secure fulfillment of the
human rights clauses of the treaties of peace with Bul-
garia, Hungary, and Romania; the attitude of the
United States toward the Yugoslav-Cominform dispute
and U.S. economic assistance to Yugoslavia; the events
leading to the severance of diplomatic relations be-
tween the United States and Bulgaria in 1950; the de-
velopment of control policy on trade with Eastern

Europe and the Soviet Union; and the attitude and re-
sponse of the United States to the Soviet "peace offen-
sive" of 1949-1950. Individuals who figure prominently
in this volume include President Harry S. Truman,
Soviet Generalissimo losif Stalin, Yugoslav Marshal
Josip Tito, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, British
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, and major Depart-
ment of State figures and Soviet experts Dean Rusk,
Llewellyn Thompson, and Foy D. Kohler.

"Foreign Relations," 1949, volume V, was prepared
by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, Department of State. Listed as Department of
State publication 8852, this volume may be obtained
for $11.25. Checks or money orders should be made out
to the Superintendent of Documents and should be sent
to the U.S. Government Book Store, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

GPO Sales Publications

Publicatioyis may be ordered by catalog or stock number
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20i02. A 25-
percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies
of any one publication mailed to the same address. Re-
mittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents,
must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which in-
clude domestic postage, are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which de-
scribe the people, history, government, economy, and
foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a
list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic
and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set
of all Background Notes currently in stock — at least
140 — $21.80; 1-year subscription service for approxi-
mately 77 updated or new Notes — $24.00; plastic
binder — $1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are
available at 50? each.

Israel Cat. No. S1.123:IS7

Pub. 7752 8 pp

Lesotho Cat. No. S1.123:L56

Pub. 8091 4 pp

Nicaragua Cat. No. SI. 123:N51

Pub. 7772 4 pp

Surinam Cat. No. SI. 123:SU7

Pub. 8268 4 pp

Sweden Cat. No. SI. 123:SW3

Pub. 8033 8 pp

Vatican City Cat. No. SI. 123:V45

Pub. 8258 3 pp

Venezuela Cat. No. S1.123:V55

Pub. 7747 6 pp

Taxation — Administration of Income Tax. Agreement
with Canada. TIAS 8499. 4 pp. 600. (Cat. No.
89.10:8499).

Antarctica — Measures of Furtherance of Principles
and Objectives of the Antarctic Treaty. Certain
recommendations adopted at the seventh consultative

August 29, 1977

295

meeting under article IX of tlie Antarctic treaty. TIAS
8500. 10 pp. TOe. (Cat. No. 89.10:8.500).

Euphrates Basin Irrigation Maintenance Project.

Agreement with Syria. TIAS 8501. 25 pp. $1.20. (Cat.
No. 89.10:8501).

Damascus-Dera'a Highway Project. Agreement witli
Syria. TIAS 8502. 25 pp. $1.20. (Cat. No. 89.10:8502).

Economic Stability. Agreement with Jordan. TIAS

8503. 3 pp. 600. (Cat. No. 89.10:8503).

Economic Stability. Agreement with Jordan. TIAS

8504. 3 pp. 60C. (Cat. No. 89.10:8.504).

Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil —
Amendments to the Convention of 1954. Convention
with other governments. TIAS 8505. 28 pp. $1.40. (Cat.
No. 89.10:8505).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Tunisia.
TIAS 8506. 36 pp. $1.40. (Cat. No. 89.10:8506).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Zaire
amending the agreement of March 25, 1976, as
amended. TIAS 8.507. 3 pp. 600. (Cat. No. 89.10:8507).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Repub-
lic of Korea amending the agreement of Febnaai-y 18,
1976, as amended. TIAS 8508. 5 pp. 600. (Cat. No.
89.10:8508).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan.
TIAS 8509. 3 pp. 600. (Cat. No. 89.10:8509).

Agricultural Commodities. Agi-eement with Sri Lanka.
TIAS 8510. 12 pp. 800. (Cat. No. 89.10:8510).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Jordan.
TIAS 8511. 16 pp. $1. (Cat. No. 89.10:8511).

Trade in Textiles — Consultations on Market Disrup-
tion. Agreement with Spain. TIAS 8512. 3 pp. 600.
(Cat. No. 89.10:8512).

Diplomatic and Official Visa Facilitation. Agreement
with the Hungarian People's Republic. TIAS 8513. 3 pp.
600. (Cat. No. 89.10:8513).

Small Farmer Organizations. Agi-eement with Bolivia.

TIAS 8514. 104 pp. .$2.30. (Cat. No. 89.10:8514).

Small Farmer Market Access. Agreement with Colom-
bia. TIAS 8515. 19 pp. $1. (Cat. No. 89.10:8515).

Small Farmer Market Access. Agreement with Colom-
bia relating to the agreement of March 12, 1976. TIAS
8516. 3 pp. 600. (Cat. No. 89.10:8516).

Water Use and Management Project. Agreement with
Egypt. TIAS 8517. 38 pp. $1.40. (Cat. No. 89.10:8517).

Doukkala-Zemamra Sprinkler Irrigation System.

Agreement with Morocco. TIAS 8518. 36 pp. $1.40.
(Cat. No. 89.10:8518).

Small Farmer Development. Agreement with Colom-
bia. TIAS 8519. 47 pp. $1.60. (Cat. No. 89.10:8519).

Small Farmer Development. Agreement with
Guatemala. TIAS 8521. 41 pp. $1.60. (Cat. No.
89.10:8521).

Exchange of Information on Food and Drug Adminis-
tration Regulated Products. Memorandum of under-
standing with Mexico. TIAS 8522. 8 pp. 700. (Cat. No.
89.10:8522).

Fisheries Off the United States Coasts. Agreement
with Spain. TIAS 8523. 50 pp. $1.70. (Cat. No.
89.10:8523).

Fisheries Off the United States Coasts. Agreement
with the Polish People's Republic. TIAS 8524. 69 pp.
$1.80. (Cat. No. 89.10:8524).

Fisheries Off the United States Coasts. Agreement
with the Republic of Korea. TIAS 8526. 40 pp. $1.50.
(Cat. No. 89.10:8526).

Fisheries Off the United States Coasts. Agreement
with the German Democratic Republic. TIAS 8527. 54
pp. $1.70. (Cat. No. 89.10:8527).

Fisheries Off the United States Coasts. Agreement
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS
8528. 55 pp. $1.70. (Cat. No. 89.10:8528).

Fisheries Off the United States Coasts. Agreement
with the Republic of China. TIAS 8529. 44 pp. $1.50.
(Cat. No. 89.10:8529).

Fisheries — Shrimp. Agreement with Brazil extending
the agreement of March 14, 1975. TIAS 8530. 3 pp. 600.
(Cat. No. 89.10:8530).

Physical Facilities for Tribhuvan University Insti-
tute of Agriculture and Animal Sciences. Agreement
with Nepal. TIAS 8531. 24 pp. $1.20. (Cat. No.
89.10:8546

Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Inter-
nationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic
Agents. Convention with other governments adopted
by the General Assembly of the United Nations at New
York December 14, 1973. TIAS 8532. 108 pp. $2.30.
(Cat. No. 89.10:8532).

Criminal Investigations. Agreement with Mexico.
TIAS 8533. 5 pp. 600. (Cat. No. 89.10:8533).

Constitution of the World Health Organization —
Amendments to Articles 34 and 55. Adopted by the
twenty-sixth World Health Assembly at Cleneva May
22, 1973. TIAS 8534. 10 pp. 800. (Cat". No. 89.10:8534).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Portugal.
TIAS 8535. 5 pp. 600. (Cat. No. 89.10:8535).

Agricultural Sector Loan. Agreement with the
Dominican Republic amending annex I to the agreement
of October 16, 1974. TIAS 8537. 41 pp. $1.50. (Cat. No.
89.10:8537).

Improved Seed Development. Agreement with Thai-
land amending the agreement of December 11, 1975.
TIAS 8539. 5 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 89.10:8539).

296

Department of State Bulletin

IDEX August 29, 1977 Vol. LXXII, No. 1992

panada

.S., Canada To Negotiate Maritime Issues

f (White House announcement) 282

J.S. , Canada To Study River Water Quality 282

ape Verde. U.S. To Establish Embassy in Cape
IVerde ." 283

longress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Pol-
icy 293

Department Discusses War Powers Resolution
(Hansen) 291

Department Recommends Extending MFN Treat-
ment for Romania (Nimetz) 278

Consular Affairs. U.S. To Establish Embassy in
Cape Verde 28.3

Economic Affairs. Department Recommends Ex-
tending MFN Treatment for Romania (Nimetz).... 278

Environment. U.S., Canada To Study River
Water Quality 282

Human Rights. Human Rights: Principle and

Realism (Christopher) 269

Maritime Affairs. U.S., Canada To Negotiate
Maritime Issues (White House announcement) . 282

Military Affairs. Department Discusses War
Powers Resolution (Hansell) 291

Publications

GPO Sales Publications 295

1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume: Eastern
Europe; The Soviet Union 295

Romania. Department Recommends Extending
MFN Treatment for Romania (Nimetz) 278

Southern Rhodesia. Secretary Vance Meets With

I [Foreign Secretary Owen (Owen, Vance) 275
iuizania
^nzania — A Profile 274
anzanian President Nyerere Visits the U.S.
'' (statement issued at conclusion of meetings) . . . 275

Treaty Information. Current Actions 294

United Kingdom. Secretary Vance Meets With
Foreign Secretary Owen (Owen, Vance) 275

United Nations

Security Council Favors U.N. Membership for
Vietnam (McHenry) 283

The U.S. Approach to the United Nations: New
Directions (Maynes) 284

Vietnam. Security Council Favors U.N. Member-
ship for Vietnam (McHenry) 283

Maynes, Charles W 284

McHenry, Donald F 283

Nimetz, Matthew 278

Owen, David A. L 275

Vance, Secretary 275

Name Index

Christopher, Warren 269

Hansell, Herbert J 291

Checklist

of Department of State

Press Releases: August 8-14

Press releases may be obtained from the Office

of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash-

ington, D.C

. 20520.

No.

Date

Subject

t373

8/8

Vance: news conference, Amman,
Aug. 6.

374

8/9

Christopher: address before American
Bar Association, Chicago.

+375

8/9

Vance: departure, Taif.

•376

8/9

Vance: arrival, Tel Aviv.

*377

8/10

Vance, Begin: exchange of toasts,
Jerusalem, Aug. 9.

*378

8/9

Andrew I. Killgore sworn in as Am-
bassador to Qatar (biographic data).

•379

8/11

U.S. Advisory Commission on Inter-
national Educational and Cultural
Affairs, Sept. 26.

•380

8/11

U.S., Hong Kong sign textile agree-
ment, July 25.

•380 A 8/11

U.S., Hong Kong sign textile agree-

ment, Aug. 8.

t381

8/11

Vance: news conference, Jerusalem.

•382

8/11

Vance: departure, Damascus.

t383

8/10

Bunker, Linowitz announce concep-
tual agreement on new Panama
Canal Treaty.

•384

8/12

U.S. Advisory Commission on Educa-
tional and Cultural Affairs: annual
report.

•385

8/11

Jean Wilkowski sworn in as U.S.
Coordinator, U.N. Conference on
Science and Technology for De-
velopment.

•386

8/11

Vance, Sadat: remarks following
meeting at Jianaelis Rest House.

•387

8/12

David B. Bolen sworn in as Ambas-
sador to German Democratic Re-
public (biographic data).

t388

8/12

Vance: statement on Panama Canal
Treaty agreement, Aug. 11.

t389

8/13

Vance, Owen: joint news conference,
London, Aug. 12.

;d.

•Not print*

tHeld for a

later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington. dc 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

POSTAGE *ND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE STA-501

Third Class

/J:

/9?3

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXVII • No. 1993 • September 5, 1977

THE FRAMEWORK FOR NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONMAKING
Remarks by Defense Secretary Brown 301

RATIFICATION RECOMMENDED FOR TREATIES WITH U.S.S.R.

RESTRICTING NUCLEAR TESTING

Statements by Mr. Warnke and Under Secretary Habib 3H

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXVII, No. 1993
September 5, 1977

Ki.r j;a)e by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Waishington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,

domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15

Single copy 85 cents

The Department of State BULLETiy^
a weekly publication issued by tht
Office of Media Services, Bureau ok
Public Affairs, provides the public ani
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations ani
on the work of the Department anti
the Foreign Service.

The BLLLETIi\' includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Departi
ment, and statements, addresses, ana
news conferences of the President anti
the Secretary of State and other offiA
cers of the Department, as well as spei
cial articles on various phases of in4
ternational affairs and the functions on
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter^
national agreements to which tht
United States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna'\
tional interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Motions documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

The Framework for National Security Decisionmaking

Following are rei)iarks prepared for deliv-
ery bji Secretary of Defense Harold Brown be-
fore the World Affairs Council of Norther)!
California at San Francisco on July 29, to-
gether -with the transcript of a question-and-
a)isiver sessio)t held after his remarks.

Department of Defense press release 353-77 dated July 29

REMARKS

The headlines always deal with specific is-
sues such as the B-1 or the so-called neutron
bomb. But today I want to talk more about
the framework within which those decisions
are made more than about the decisions them-
selves.

As you well know, the security of the
United States is the first responsibility of any
Administration. The reason is obvious: Unless
the safety of the nation is assured, we can
have no reasonable chance of responding ef-
fectively to more than our most basic domestic
needs.

For the last 6 months, with that priority in
mind, the President has spent more time on
national security than on any other single is-
sue. No doubt, most of you have heard or read
about some of the results — the meetings in
Moscow on SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks], the decision to withdraw U.S. ground
forces from Korea, the drive to halt the prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons, renewed negotia-
tions over the Panama Canal, even discussions
with Cuba and Vietnam.

I have heard two conclusions drawn from
these activities. The first is that ours is a
purely reactive posture that deals with prob-
lems only once they have become acute. The
second is that beneath the velvet glove of our
diplomacy there is another velvet glove. Both
conclusions are wrong. Let me tell you why.

Most Americans now recognize why the
United States, which became heavily involved
in world affairs during and after World War
II, continues to remain involved —
inextricably — despite Vietnam and the other
difficult, if less searing, experiences of the
last decade.

We cannot afford to see the rest of the
world dominated by another power. Our
safety depends in large part on an orderly dif-
fusion of power rather than an attempt to con-
centrate it in our own hands, let alone having
it fall into a single power center elsewhere.
We need independence, territorial integrity,
and freedom from external attack not only for
ourselves but for others as well. We recognize
that need through our treaty and nontreaty
commitments.

We would, in my view, find it virtually im-
possible to preserve our internal liberties if
we were an island of democracy in a sea of to-
talitarianism. We could hardly hope to main-
tain a stable and expanding economy if we
were deprived of external markets. Defense
in this modern age would become an almost
intolerable burden if we did not have allies to
contribute both resources and strategic loca-
tions to the collective security. In a time of
instant communications, we could hardly in-
sist on human rights at home and silently
watch their violation abroad.

Maybe it has become a cliche, but we do in
fact inhabit an interdependent world. Our own
actions have widespread international effects.
Decisions by other nations can have a major
impact on us as well. The oil embargo of 1973
and the subsequent increase in our petroleum
imports — which now make up half our oil
consumption — constitute only the more ob-
vious index of interdependence. We are bound
to care — and care deeply — about what hap-
pens in many parts of the world. Because of

September 5, 1977

297

our power and influence, other nations are
bound to care about us; some of them will al-
ways seek our involvement in their problems.
Isolation today is about as relevant for the
United States as the one-horse shay.

Perhaps we have been too much of an inter-
national busybody in the recent past. But no
one can doubt that there remains much to
busy us in this dynamic world.

The Soviet Challenge

Our principal long-term problem continues
to be the Soviet Union. Whether we like it or
not, the Soviet leadership seems intent on
challenging us to a major military competi-
tion. To quote a friend and colleague —
someone whose professional efforts over the
past 15 years have been focused on arms con-
trol and who during most of that time has con-
sidered that U.S. actions were driving the
competition: The principal factor driving the
arms race now is the Soviet military buildup,
strategic and tactical.

The most evident — and dangerous —
features of this challenge arise from the
steady annual increases, in real terms, in the
Soviet defense budget, the buildup and im-
provement of Soviet strategic nuclear forces,
the modernization of Soviet ground and tacti-
cal air forces in Eastern Europe, and the
growing sophistication of Soviet naval forces,
which include a gradually expanding capabil-
ity to project military power at considerable
distances from Russia itself.

Whatever the motives behind it, the chal-
lenge is serious; we must not underestimate
it. At the same time, we should recognize that
the resulting competition is not an all-out con-
test compared with arms races of the past. It
isn't a purely military competition either.

We are spending a little more than 5 per-
cent of GNP on our defense establishment.
Our best current estimate is that the Soviets
are allocating between 11 and 13 percent of a
much smaller GNP to their military effort,
with the bulk of it designed to give them a ca-
pability against the United States and its im-
mediate allies, although a significant amount
reflects the problem posed by the People's
Republic of China.

Both sides — and especially the United
States — could invest a great deal more in de-
fense. As of now, however, it would be a mis-
take to concentrate all our attention on the
bulk of our resources on the arms race. The
competition reaches into other areas also, and
we have comparative advantages in them,
whereas in the military arena the present bal-
ance and prospective potentials of the two
sides are close. In fact we welcome peaceful
competition because when it comes to indus-
trial, agricultural, and technological strength;
to the efficiency as well as the humaneness of
our system; and to relative political influence,
we have it all over the Soviet Union, and we
can act with the confidence and restraint that
knowledge justifies.

We must take account of the Soviet chal-
lenge at all times. Failure to do so will be
dangerous and could be fatal. But there are
other trends in the world that could have
long-term effects, either helpful or perilous to
our security; we must recognize them as well.

We have every reason to be encouraged by
the revival of freedom in Greece, Portugal,
and Spain. We may possibly find some hope
in the possible rejection by the
Eurocommunists — a posture we must view
with caution — of Moscow as the sole font of
wisdom and authority. It is even conceivable
that some "Socialist" nations, particularly
those that do not live right in the shadow of
the U.S.S.R., are becoming dissatisfied with
having no alternative to dealing with and de-
pending on the hardcore Soviet bloc for their
security and well-being. That is the good
news.

The bad news is that we also face a number
of more dangerous developments. Nuclear
weapons already are an unprecedented threat
to mankind; their continued proliferation —
horizontal as well as vertical — can only make
matters worse. More generally, the violent
settlement of disputes seems to be on the in-
crease. Subversion, terrorism, and organized
national force are on almost constant display.
And their lethality is being heightened by the
expanding trade in nonnuclear weapons and
technologies. We live in a tough neighbor-
hood.

298

Department of State Bulletin

Current Issues and the U.S. Role

It is a neighborhood where, as the result of
earlier and often neglected developments, a
number of current and potentially explosive
issues beg for a solution one way or another.
The differences in the Middle East may have
been narrowed; they have not disappeared.
Racial tensions and clashes in Africa are
mounting. The Sino-Soviet dispute is quies-
cent but by no means extinct. The rising price
of oil continues to send periodic shocks-
through the international economy. We still
lack an agreed international law of the seas.

The list could be made even longer and
more forbidding. But the main point about it
is this: While many of the issues may be spe-
cialized or regional in nature — and may not
even involve the. Soviet Union to begin
with — they can escalate rapidly to the super-
power level unless they are contained, de-
fused, and eventually resolved. We should be
concerned about them for many reasons. We
must, in any event, be concerned about them
on national security grounds.

The analogy of the two scorpions in a bottle
may not precisely capture the current situa-
tion. (It undoubtedly oversimplified the real
situation of the past as well. Now, as then,
there are lots of other bugs, ants, crickets,
butterflies, and also a few vipers in the bot-
tle.) Nonetheless, we should be wary of let-
ting the two scorpions and their bottle be put
on top of a powder magazine built over a
match factory. The scorpions may be cautious,
but someone else could strike a match.

It would be tempting to turn our backs al-
together on this turbulent and dangerous
world. But that choice is no longer open to us.
The United States is bound to have a substan-
tial but finite influence on the rest of the
world. If other nations do not catch colds
when the United States sneezes, they will
certainly feel the draft.

Our highest hopes for a world of peace and
order have not been realized. But our worst
fears have not materialized. Utopia is not just
around the corner, but Armageddon is not in-
evitable either. Despite constraints and mis-
takes, our record of accomplishments has

been, on the whole, a good one. Now is not
the time to turn away from it.

As a nation, we are less inclined than in the
1960's to see a threat in every alien event —
and that is a part of wisdom. But wisdom and
inertia are not the same thing. It is true that
we could adopt a passive strategy, reacting to
events only in the hope of staying out of trou-
ble rather than acting to shape them. But that
is not the President's style. He does not pro-
pose to be an observer or arbitrator; neither
do I. He likes to take initiatives; in my own
area of responsiblity, so do I.

We have learned that we cannot mold the
international environment at all precisely to
our preferences, however altruistic those
preferences may be. But we can still try to
help create a world that accepts and respects
certain fundainental rights of nations — rights
such as national sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity, and freedom from unprovoked attack.
We may not have a grand design — and I cer-
tainly don't want to propose a pentagonal
model — but we can still seek a reasonably
peaceful and stable international environ-
ment.

If that is our goal, as I believe it is, then we
must pay attention to the major issues and
trends I have noted. The peaceful settlement
of disputes is to our interest; it is to
everyone's interest. At the same time, we
must adapt to where necessary, and control if
possible, the trends which could threaten the
nation's security. A strong national defense is
part, but only one part, of that process.
Short-term diplomacy and longer run pro-
grams to create a more benign international
environment must have equal priority. Once
that is understood, the outlines of our
strategy and posture should become evident.

Our actions can be the more restrained,
the greater our strength. The glove may be
velvet, but friends and foes will find that
there is — and will continue to be — a firm
hand inside it.

The Approach to Issues and Trends

As we come to grips with current issues
and provide support to our diplomacy, it is
essential that we in the national security

September 5, 1977

299

community abandon old stereotypes. Lord
Keynes once claimed that: "Practical men,
who believe themselves to be quite exempt
from any intellectual influences, are usually
the slaves of some defunct economist. ..."
Where one issue in particular is concerned,
some of us give the impression of becoming
the slaves, if not to a defunct economist at
least to some strategist from a bygone age.

I refer to the Panama Canal. On this is-
sue, in this day and age, it is surely unrea-
sonable to cling to obsolete asserted rights
and outmoded claimed privileges at the risk
of losing everything — or of preserving our
position only at a terrible cost in blood,
treasure, and long-term hostility. The issue
of the Panama Canal is not the sanctity of
treaties or the maintenance of essential U.S.
security interests; we have successfully in-
sisted on both.

Successful completion of negotiations will
result in the United States and the Republic
of Panama signing a new treaty binding the
two parties until the year 2000. The treaty
will guarantee the neutrality of the canal,
the access of all U.S. ships to it in peace and
war, and U.S. protection of it in collabora-
tion with Panama.

If we do not obtain such a treaty, those
rights will just as surely be in jeopardy. Ac-
cording to the best informed military opin-
ion, we can't defend the canal from a hostile
Panaina. It is too vulnerable to a sack of
dynamite — or to a glove in the gears. Our
relations with Latin America will deterior-
ate. We will be worse off without a reason-
able revision of the existing treaty than with
one.

Accordingly, the real issue before us is
whether we, as a party to the original
treaty, have the imagination, the magnanim-
ity, and the realism to recognize that a
number of fundamental social and ethical
conditions have changed and that it is in our
self-interest to renegotiate the treaty.

I believe we have those qualities and that
on this issue, as on others, we can make
progress in defusing what could otherwise
become an explosive situation into which
troublemakers might be drawn.

Where longer term trends are concerned.

the desirability of controling nuclear prolif-
eration cannot be in question from the
standpoint of national security. The Presi-
dent's determination to conserve energy
supplies and reduce our dependence on
foreign oil makes equally good sense on the
same grounds. So do efforts to review out-
standing issues with old foes and former ad-
versaries.

The Role of Defense

Finally, if we are to achieve a reasonable
settlement of explosive current issues and
have the time to affect longer run trends be-
fore they become explosive, we and our al-
lies have work to do in the realm of defense.
If we are to bring other and more construc-
tive instruments to bear on international
problems, our collective security system
must be effective, reliable, and durable.

Strength breeds the confidence not only to
talk but also to institute constructive
change. I regret, in this connection, that I
cannot review in detail my trip to the Re-
public of Korea and Japan. First, I must re-
port on it to the President. But this much I
can say: The situation on the Korean Penin-
sula and in northeast Asia has changed
greatly since 1950. The Sino-Soviet dispute
is now a fact of life. No one should doubt
that the United States will remain a major
power in the western Pacific and East Asia.
Our capability for the rapid deployment of
U.S. forces has been enhanced and will be
strengthened still further.

Elements of our tactical Air Force will
remain in South Korea, and other units —
ground, naval, and air — will be in the thea-
ter. The Republic of Korea, for its part, now
has twice the population and five times the
GNP of North Korea. Above all, we will
continue to work with our Korean ally to as-
sure that any attack from the North can be
defeated even after the 4-5-year period dur-
ing which the U.S. ground forces will be
withdrawn from the peninsula. Surely those
are powerful conditions of deterrence and
stability.

Make no mistake about it; we are deter-
mined to maintain and modernize our collec-

300

Department of State Bulletin

tive security system. We are equally deter-
mined, to the extent that the arms competi-
tion cannot be brought under control, to
strengthen the competitive position of the
United States.

Where our allies have developed the
necessary strengths, we will adjust the col-
lective burdens to assure that our long-term
security arrangements remain commensu-
rate with the capabilities and stakes of the
partners. Otherwise those arrangements
cannot endure.

Where technology has produced total or
partial substitutes for more traditional
weapons systems, and has done the job effi-
ciently, we will — with all due caution — begin
the substitution. That, in fact, is the main
basis for planning to turn over some of the
functions of the penetrating manned bomber
to long-range cruise missiles and canceling
production of the B-1.

Where inefficiencies exist, as in our use of
scarce personnel and our maintenance of an
excessive base structure — and other
overhead — we will attack them as vigorously
as our other problems. Furthermore, we will
not be deterred from that attack — although
we may on occasion be delayed — by domestic
political obstacles.

Most important of all, where increases in
hostile foreign forces threaten our ability to
maintain the conditions of collective secu-
rity, we will insure the restoration of our
position. Nothing in history suggests that
we can reach our goals from a position of
weakness.

We are not in a position of weakness in
those functions and regions we consider vital
to our security. The strategic nuclear bal-
ance, despite the Soviet buildup, remains in
equilibrium. The balance of tactical power in
Europe is more precarious, but it has not
yet tilted against NATO to the point where
deterrence of the Warsaw Pact is
threatened. If another war begins in the
Middle East, it will not be because of a lack
of Israeli strength. The situation in Korea,
in our judgment, is and can be kept militar-
ily stable, despite increases in North Korean
offensive power. And our naval forces still

control the sea lanes to Europe, the Middle
East, and northeast Asia.

There is where we would prefer to halt
the military competition and begin the proc-
ess of equitable arms reduction. From the
standpoint of the United States, now is the
time to stop the buildup — if others are will-
ing, end the folly of nuclear proliferation,
and cease the wasteful transfer of conven-
tional arms in excess of their real needs to
developing nations.

But we cannot bring about those results
unilaterally. If others will not cooperate, we
will adapt. Certainly we will not shrink from
a world that demands increased strength as
well as greater justice.

I realize that I have outlined a complex
approach to the problems of national secu-
rity. At times the approach may appear in-
ternally inconsistent. It is not. We can move
toward the peaceful resolution of interna-
tional differences only if the conditions of
collective security are maintained. We can
maintain the conditions of collective
security — without excessive cost and risk —
only if we move to resolve current interna-
tional differences and deal constructively
with long-term trends.

To do both we need moral, diplomatic, and
economic — as well as military — strength. We
also need your understanding and support.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. Media reports that your office is very
influeyitial in helping formulate SALT deci-
sions, as it should be. The interim agree-
ment on offensive missiles expires on Oc-
tober 3; do you expect that there is going to
he a netv offensive SALT agreement in the
next 3 or h months? And if not, do you be-
lieve there will be a need to increase spend-
ing on offensive missiles, if there is not an
agreement?

Secretary Brown: There is, as you note,
just a little over 2 months before the 5-year
interim agreement on strategic offensive
forces expires. I think the chances of having
a new agreement by that time are not high.
It's possible but I wouldn't count on it.

September 5, 1977

301

However, that is not a reason either to des-
pair, nor is it a reason to institute im-
mediately substantial increases in the rate of
U.S. expenditures on strategic offensive
forces.

I think that either a tacit agreement to
continue the terms of that interim agree-
ment, or formal extension, are quite possi-
ble. We should be influenced most strongly
in deciding levels of our own strategic offen-
sive forces and, therefore, the funding re-
quired to produce those forces; not by
whether a particular agreement expires or
not, but by what the Soviets are doing and
by what we need to do.

I think we need to watch that balance
very carefully. The Soviets have continued
to build up their forces and they still con-
tinue to do so. At some point I think we will
have to take actions to balance that build-
up. Whether that will be in further subma-
rine ballistic missiles or whether they might
be in additional cruise missile carriers —
aircraft that is — or whether they would be in
new land-based missile systems, I think is
much too early to decide.

But, if we have to, we can and we will.
We have the resources and we have the de-
termination. We'd prefer to avoid further
rounds of arms competition but where we
consider it more dangerous to continue our
exercise of restraint, then we'll move for-
ward.

Q. I'ln going to ask a question that relates
to the withdrawal of American ground forces
from Korea. Most of the Administration
statements today don't make it entirely clear
what we do as the next step, after the with-
drawal of ground forces as indicated over a
5-year period.

I would ask, is the withdrawal of ground
forces viewed as a first step toivard a total
withdrawal of American forces at some day
when the South Koreans have attained air
capability on a level of parity with those of
the North Koreans, or does our conception
of deterrent require that we maintain some
military there as a deterrent? Is it, in fact,
our goal to help the South Koreans develop
air capability that will at some point make
the American air presence superfluous?

Secretary Broivn: Our program calls for
withdrawing over a period of 4 or 5 years all
of the combat ground forces. There will re-
main some supporting forces, other than the
U.S. Air Force units in Korea, after the
1981-82 period, to provide communications,
intelligence, logistic support.

Our present intention — and of course it's
hard to see into the indefinite future — is to
retain our Air Force capability — there's ac-
tually a fighter wing and a composite
wing — beyond that period, partly because
we need to do so to balance the North Ko-
rean advantages in the air and partly to
show that we continue to be a western
Pacific, East Asian power. It would, I sup-
pose, be conceivable to build up, or help
South Koreans build up, a substantial air
force capability. They have considerable, as
it is, but it's inferior in numbers to the
North Koreans, as we will be building up
their ground armament capability with addi-
tional tanks, antitank weapons, artillery,
and so on.

That's not our present intention. Partly
because that would be a very, very expen-
sive additional burden on the Koreans, who
will be assuming the great bulk of the cost
of their own ground force buildup with some
credits from us, but they pay all that money
back; they always have. I think that we
want to maintain a mutual relationship of
defense with the Koreans; we've got, in ad-
dition, interests in other countries in that
region.

The Japanese obviously have great inter-
est in what happens there, and so we don't
want to look at Korea all by itself. For that
reason we don't plan to withdraw our Air
Force in the period after the 1981-82 period;
we plan to leave our Air Force units there
as part of our general posture in the western
Pacific, which includes Japan, Korea, the
Philippines, Guam, and so on.

Q. What about ground troops in Europe?

Secretary Brown: There has been, as you
know, in the past substantial effort in Con-
gress and elsewhere to reduce or even re-
move U.S. ground forces in Europe. That
wave, I believe, has crested and subsided.
We plan to build up the materiel capability

302

Department of State Bulletin

of our ground forces in Europe, though I
would not anticipate any great increase in
their numbers.

As to the implied question, why pull
ground forces over a period of years out of
Korea but not out of Europe; I think that
North Korea is not the Soviet Union, and we
need not be — and the South Koreans need
not be — as concerned over the power of
North Korea as all of us need to be con-
cerned about the military capability of- the
Soviet Union.

Q. [Inaudible].

Moderator. The question related to the in-
telligence community, the value and propri-
ety of the efforts to consolidate the intelli-
gence activities in one organization, and
secondly, whether the intelligence commu-
nity has the capability to keep abreast of
new weapons developments on the part of
other countries.

Secretary Brown: With respect to the in-
telligence organization, there are conflicting
needs and a way has to be found to try to
weigh them, balance them, and resolve
them. There is clearly a need to produce the
maximum possible efficiency by having an
overall view taken on budgetary matters; for
example, of intelligence for economic pur-
poses, for military purposes, for strategic
warning, for use by decisionmakers in Wash-
ington, and for use by division commanders.
That's a tall order because it's a very large
and diverse set of needs with a very large
and diverse set of collection methods. Still,
there does need to be centralization enough
to assure that waste does not run wild and
to assure that there is a coherent picture of
intelligence, of the world, produced for de-
cisionmakers at various levels.

On the other hand, one has the problem
that there are these diverse users in that;
for example, in the particular case of mili-
tary users, they need to have intelligence
people collecting, evaluating, and transmit-
ting tactical intelligence in real time — that
is, very promptly.

If all of their work were subsumed under
some monolithic intelligence organization,
there would be a risk of their needs not
being met, or more likely the world being as

it is, an entirely new set of military intelli-
gence organizations would grow up to fill a
need that the military might conclude was
not being met. Resolving these is not an
easy issue, but then. Administrations always
have lots of difficult issues, and I'm looking
forward to a successful resolution of this one.

With respect to your second question, it is
certainly the case that some of the newer
weapons systems — cruise missiles, for
example — are going to be more difficult to
verify with respect to compliance with arms
limitation agreements than has been the
case with say large ballistic missiles or
bombers.

Verification will never be perfect. The
need is to verify agreements well enough so
that the strategic balance is not importantly
altered by evasion or cheating on an agree-
ment. I think that in that regard we have to
make sure that the agreements we make are
such that the verification capabilities — which
are not perfect but which are very substan-
tial that we have — are sufficient to verify
the agreements well enough so that the
strategic balance cannot be altered by cheat-
ing.

Q. I will be brief. Is Japan prepared to
contribute to the defense of South Korea?

Secretary Brown: I would note first of all
that Japan's defense expenditures altogether
amount to about 1 percent of the Japanese
gross national product; so that Japan, while
an economic superpower and a politically
important power, is not a major military
power. Nevertheless, Korea and the territo-
rial integrity of South Korea, independence
of South Korea, are indeed important to
Japan because of geographical proximity and
economic interaction.

I think that the best way for Japan to con-
tribute to Korean defense — and it's a very
important way — is the economic terms, by
continuing their substantial rate of invest-
ment in Korea and by assuring liberalized
trade relations. By doing that, Japan can
have a very important positive effect on Ko-
rean economic capabilities, and given suffi-
cient economic strength, I'm confident that
Korean efforts in their own defense — to as-
sure their own defense — will be adequate.

September 5, 1977

303

Editors and News Directors
Interview President Carter .

Following are excerpt.^ relating to foreign
polici/ froiii President Carter's opening re-
marks a)td a qnestion-and-answer session
from the transcript of an interview bi/ a
group of editors and news directors o)i July
29.'

I've been meeting frequently with foreign
leaders. I think, so far, we've had 15 heads
of state who have come here on official visits
with me, and I've learned a lot from them.
On my visit to Europe, I had about the same
number with whom I met just a few minutes
or extensively — a couple of hours, and I
have a good relationship there.

This morning I had a meeting with the
Panama Canal negotiating team, both our
two Ambassadors and the two representing
General Torrijos. And early this morning I
met with Cy Vance, who will be leaving
very quickly now to go to the Mideast. He'll
go to Egypt and to Saudi Arabia, to Jordan
and Syria, back through — Israel is the last
stop this time, to try to put together some
sort of framework on which we and the
Soviet Union jointly can call for a Geneva
conference this fall. We still have a lot of
difficulties to overcome. My own belief is
that they can be overcome.

Harold Brown [Secretary of Defense] is on
the way back tonight from California, having
finished a trip to Japan and to South Korea.
Cy Vance is also preparing to go to China,
and we'll spend all tomorrow morning, with
me and him and Dr. Brzezinski [Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs] and the Vice
President and a few others, going over the
component parts of his discussions with the
Chinese Government.

We have, at the same time, tried to re-
store or improve our relationship with the
developing nations of the world, with our
own allies in Europe, with the African coun-
tries, and, particularly, to deal with the

longstanding problems in Rhodesia and
Namibia. And at the same time, we've made
strong and continuous overtures to our
friends in the southern part of this hemi-
sphere to make sure that we have as close as
possible a relationship with them.

The last thing I'll mention, in passing,
which is of crucial importance to us all, is
the progress in our friendly relations with
the Soviet Union. I put a lot of time on a
speech that I made in Charleston last week
to try to encapsulate, as best I could, the
overall thrust of our policies.^

We were successful yesterday in reaching
an agreement with the Soviet Union and
Great Britain to go to the detailed negotia-
tions of an agreement on the comprehensive
test ban. Our own desire is that we prohibit
the testing of nuclear explosives completely,
and we are making some progress in that di-
rection. So far, the Soviets still would like
to reserve the right to conduct some peace-
ful nuclear explosives.

But we've opened up new concepts of ac-
tual reductions in atomic weapons for the
first time since they've been invented, to re-
strain military development in the Indian
Ocean, to work with the Soviets on com-
prehensive SALT discussions, a prohibition
against the destruction of observation satel-
lites, prior notification of firing of test mis-
siles, and so forth.

So we've a lot of things going on with the
Soviet Union, which I think, potentially, are
going to be very constructive. We have
found them in their private attitudes toward
us to be very forthcoming and cooperative.
And these are difficult matters which have
been ignored or postponed for decades, and
we're trying to address them as forthrightly
as possible.

Q. Mr. President, previous Administra-
tions and previous Presidents have made a

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Aug. 8, 1977, p.
1141.

^ For the te.xt of President Carter's remarks on July
21, see Bulletin of Aug. 15, 1977, p. 193.

304

Department of State Bulletin

strong coiinitif iiie)it and p)'oniises to the
Cuban people i)i behalf of their freedom .
Example — President Kennedy at the Orange
Bowl, Miami stadium [on December 29,
1962]: I will return this flag — he was refer-
ring to the 2506 Brigade flag — in a free
Havana. Now, we are approaching Com-
munist Cuba. Are we abandoning our prom-
ise of support to the people of Cuba?

The President: Well, I believe that ob-
viously, the Cuban-Americans here have
complete freedom. We are not committed to
the destruction by military force of the
present Cuban Government; our hope and
aspiration is that maximum freedom for
people who live in Cuba can be achieved.
But I think at the time of the Bay of Pigs,
our country gave up the thought that we
might do it by military attack.

We've proceeded very cautiously in our
dealings with the Castro government. I've
spelled out publicly on many occasions my
own attitude toward this procedure.

We have signed now with the Soviets — I
mean with the Cubans — a fisher's agreement
and a maritime agreement. And we are con-
tinuing in practical application the antihi-
jacking agreement which has not been re-
newed.

We have also opened up the possibility,
which will be realized very quickly, of dip-
lomatic officials to be stationed in Washing-
ton and in Havana in the embassies of other
nations. I don't see any possibility soon of
normalizing relationships with Cuba. Castro's
position has been that a prerequisite to this
must be the removal of the trade embargo be-
fore negotiations can even commence.

As I've said on numerous occasions, my
concerns about Cuba are that they still have
large numbers of political prisoners incar-
cerated that ought to be released. They have
large numbers of large troops in Angola and
other places in Africa which ought to be re-
turned. And they still maintain an attitude of
unwarranted intrusion into the internal affairs
of some of the other nations or places in the
Western Hemisphere.

So, I think all those factors tie together.
But I assume from the tone of your question

you were talking about a military overthrow
of the Castro government. That is not part
of our national purpose.

Q. Mr. President, do tjou have a commif-
>nent from, [Israeli] Prime Minister Begin
before he left here that he would not for-
malize or legalize the three settlements on
the West Bank?

The Presidoit: No, we did not discuss his
legalizing those settlements. We did discuss
my concern about the adverse impact of es-
tablishing new settlements. He did not
promise me anything on the subject, alKl, we
did not even discuss the legalization ques-
tion.

Q. So that i/ou weren't upset bg the fact
that they did legalize these settlements?

The President: Yes, I was upset. As I said
I think it's an obstacle to peace. And I let
Mr. Begin know very clearly that our gov-
ernment policy, before I became President
and now, is that these settlements are illegal
and contravene the Geneva conference
terms.

Mr. Begin disagrees with this. But we've
spelled this out very clearly on several occa-
sions in the United Nations and other places
that these settlements are illegal.

I think that it's accurate to say that the
Israeli Government has never maintained
that they are permanent but, that on a tem-
porary basis, maybe extending quite a while
in the future in their view, that they are
legalized, but not as a permanent settle-
ment.

Israel has never claimed hegemony over
the West Bank territory, as you know. And
I think that it would be a mistake, as I said
in my press conference yesterday, to con-
demn Mr. Begin about this action because
this was a campaign commitment he made. I
think what he did was in consonance with
the desires of the Israeli people.

But I don't want anybody to misun-
derstand our feelings about it. We think it's
wrong to establish these settlements, it's
wrong to insinuate that they are legal, it's
certainly wrong to ever claim that they are

September 5, 1977

305

permanent. And to establish new settle-
ments would be even more unsettling to
their Arab neighbors — as we try to go to
Geneva in a good spirit of compromise and
cooperation — than the allocation of legality
by the government to those already in exist-
ence.

Q. Well, this hasn't passed your optimisni
for a resuinption of a peace conference in
Geneva?

The President: No, I'm still optimistic
about it. But it's an additional obstacle that
we had not anticipated.

Organization and Functions
of Intelligence Community

White House Announcement ^

Following consultations with the Vice Pres-
ident, his principal national security advisers,
and congressional leaders, the President has
completed his review of the NSC [National
Security Council] studies on the organization
and functions of the intelligence community.

The President's decisions provide for
needed changes while retaining the basic
structural continuity of the intelligence com-
munity. The purpose of these changes is to
provide for strong direction by the President
and the National Security Council and to cen-
tralize the most critical national intelligence
management functions under the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) — tasking, re-
sources, and national analytic production.
Left unchanged are operational and support
activities, as they are performed adequately
today.

This organizational arrangement builds on
the experience of the past by strengthening
the role of the NSC system and the DCI. At
the same time, it assures responsiveness to
both the intelligence requirements of major,
national-level consumers of intelligence and

' Issued on Aug. 4 (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents dated Aug. 8, 1977).

the operational needs of the departments and
military services.

— For the first time, the major consumers
of intelligence will be charged with the for-
mal responsibility for formulating their re-
quirements for substantive intelligence.
Thus, the real requirements of the policymak-
ing level, rather than technology or ability to
collect, will drive the entire intelligence
process.

— The DCI will also have the ability to re-
spond to these requirements through his full
control of:

1. A new mechanism for setting specific
tasks for all intelligence collection organiza-
tions, the National Intelligence Tasking Cen-
ter;

2. His mandate to manage the budgets for
all predominantly national intelligence ac-
tivities; and

3. His sole responsibility for the production
of national analytical products.

Placing full responsibility for the most crit-
ical management functions in one authority
should result in more productive and cost-
effective foreign intelligence activities.

— The National Security Council will con-
tinue to play the leading role in overall direc-
tion of the intelligence community. The NSC
Special Coordination Committee will continue
to assume responsibility for review of the
most sensitive intelligence operations and col-
lection activities. The new Policy Review
Committee, when chaired by the DCI, will
provide the direction to both the collection
and analytical production effort that was
missing in the past.

— The recently strengthened Intelligence
Oversight Board will continue to assist the
President in investigating possible illegal or
otherwise improper activities within the in-
telligence community and assuring that ap-
propriate corrective actions are taken.

Here are the specifics of the reorganiza-
tion.

1. The National Security Council should con-
tinue to provide guidance and direction for
the development and formulation of all na-

306

Department of State Bulletin

tional intelligence activities. The NSC Policy
Review Committee (PRO, chaired by the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence, will define and
assign priority for substantive intelligence
requirements and will evaluate the produc-
tion of analytical intelligence reporting. The
PRC will submit semiannual reports to the
NSC on its activities. Its membership will in-
clude the Secretary of State, Secretary of
Defense, Secretary of the Treasury, the As-
sistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, and other attendees as deemed ap-
propriate by the Chairman.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence will
have peacetime responsibility and authority
for translating PRC-validated national intel-
ligence requirements developed by the PRC
into specific intelligence collection objectives
and targets and for assigning these to intelli-
gence collection organizations. For these
purposes a National Intelligence Tasking
Center, jointly manned by civilian and mili-
tary persennel, will be established under the
direction of the DC I to assign tasks to all na-
tional intelligence collection systems. The
Tasking Center will also be responsible for
insuring that the resulting flow of intelli-
gence is routed immediately to relevant com-
ponents and commands. In periods of crisis or
in wartime, the power to assign collection
tasks may be delegated to the Secretary of
Defense upon the e.xpress direction of the
President.

3. The Director of Central Intelligence
should have full and exclusive authority for
approval of the National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP) budget prior to its presen-
tation (through usual procedures) to the Pres-
ident, for its presentation to Congress, for
reprogramming of NFIP funds, and for
monitoring the implementation of programs.
In response to the DCI's guidance, the de-
partments and agencies of the NFIP will
submit their proposed national program
budgets to the DCI and assure that the DCI
has all information necessary to perform his
budgetary responsibilities. The National
Foreign Intelligence Board will advise the
DCI on all of his budgetary responsibilities in
the same manner as it does on national intel-

ligence production and other activities of
common concern. Department heads will re-
tain the right to appeal the DCI's budget de-
cisions to the President. The Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence will be provided with
adequate staff support to insure his full ac-
cess to relevant information and the capabil-
ity to carry out audits and evaluations of in-
telligence programs.

4. The Director of Central Intelligence will
continue to act as the primary adviser to the
National Security Council and the President
on substantive foreign intelligence and to
have full responsibility for production of na-
tional intelligence in appropriate consultation
with departmental analytical centers. He will
retain all other powers provided to him under
relevant statutes and Executive orders.

5. Apart from the foregoing, line authority
will remain with the heads of the relevant
departments and agencies. All other organi-
zational and operational arrangements and
responsibilities assigned under existing stat-
utes and Executive orders shall remain in full
effect. Personnel and administration, man-
agement and support activities, operational
implementation of DCI tasking, and audit-
inspector general functions will remain as
presently assigned under departmental ar-
rangements.

These decisions will be embodied in a new
Executive order for the intelligence commu-
nity as an interim measure until appropriate
charter legislation can be introduced and
enacted by Congress.

U.S., Canada To Insure
Safety of Oil Tanker Traffic

Press release 364 dated August 4

The United States and Canada have been
working closely together to insure that oil
tanker traffic between the Alaskan port of
Valdez and the lower 48 States, especially in
the Puget Sound area, operates with
minimum risk to the environment. Alaskan
oil tanker traffic is expected to increase

September 5, 1977

307

total tanker traffic in the Strait of Juan de
Fuca by about 10 percent — from 31 to 34
tankers per week. Under U.S. law all Alas-
kan oil must be carried in U.S. flag vessels
meeting rigid Coast Guard safety standards
and manned by U.S. crews. In addition,
there are strict requirements for modern
safety, navigational, and collision avoidance
equipment on all tankers, as well as backup
systems. Precise navigation will be facili-
tated by chains of Loran-C transmitters
which are now operational on the coasts of
Alaska and Washington State and similar
Canadian installations which will be opera-
tional shortly.

From Valdez to the entrance of the Strait
of Juan de Fuca, the tankers will follow
routes — established by the Coast Guard —
designed to keep them well off shore and to
separate north- and south-bound traffic. A
similar separation scheme covers all vessels
in the Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound areas.
In addition, the United States and Canada
have implemented a joint plan to combat any
possible marine pollution.

FACT SHEET

Following is a fact sheet issued by the
U.S. Embassy in Ottawa and the Depart-
ment of State in Washington containing spe-
cific details concerning the operation of the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline' System (TAPS) tank-
ers between the port of Valdez and the
lower 48 States.

Tanker Frequency

When Alaskan oil starts to move south-
ward, 2.8 TAPS tankers on the average are
expected to transit the Puget Sound area
per week. This TAPS traffic will increase
only slightly the average of 30.8 tanker
ti-ansits per week in the area during the 6
months ending last April. A portion of the
increased quantity of oil shipped by tanker
will replace oil previously delivered by
pipeline from Canada. This level of tanker
transits is not expected to increase for some
time — unless and until decisions have been
taken to move crude oil through this inland
area rather than via other routes — and the

required facilities are completed. No such
moves are anticipated in the immediate future.

Safety Equipment

All TAPS tankers will be U.S. flag vessels
with experienced U.S. crews. They are re-
quired to have modern equipment including
a rudder-angle indicator, gyro compass,
fathometer, and Loran-C navigation devices,
together with effective backup systems. Ad-
ditionally, these vessels will be required to
comply with new regulations proposed as a
result of recent Presidential initiatives. The
new regulations, when final, will require im-
proved emergency steering standards, inert
gas systems, segregated ballast, and double
bottoms on all new oil tankers of 20,000
DWT [deadweight ton] or more which enter
the navigable waters of the United States to
engage in trade. All vessels of 10,000 gross
tons or more will be required to have a sec-
ond radar system and collision avoidance
equipment. These requirements insure that
TAPS vessels will have fully effective com-
munications, navigation, and collision avoid-
ance capabilities in operation at all times
during transit of these waters.

Traffic Separation

A joint Canada-U.S. marine pollution con-
tingency plan signed in 1974 provides for
close cooperative action to combat possible
spills. The two countries in 197-5 established
a traffic separation scheme under which
one-way traffic lanes separate inbound and
outbound vessels in the area. Since then the
two governments have continued working
together on additional measures to increase
the safety of tanker traffic in the area. Ves-
sels moving to and from Alaska will enter
and exit the area via the traffic separation
scheme and be subject to close monitoring
by U.S. and Canadian authorities at all
•times while in the system.

Navigation AicJs

Loran-C service for the west coast of
Canada and the United States will be fully
operational in the near future. The new U.S.
west coast Loran-C chain was declared op-

308

Department of State Bulletin

erational for navigational use on April 26,
1977, while the new Gulf of Alaska Loran-C
chain became operational on June 28, 1977.
The Canadian west coast Loran-C chain,
which was built using U.S. equipment, is
presently being calibrated and will be de-
clared operational in the next month or so.
These systems will provide the means for
accurate position fixing and navigation of
TAPS trade tankers (and other vessels so
equipped) using the recommended ships'
routing system between Valdez, Alaska, and
west coast ports.

Leaving Valdez harbor, the oil-laden
tankers will proceed to the entrance of Juan
de Fuca using a route recommended by the
U.S. Coast Guard. Their closest point of ap-
proach to Prince Rupert, British Columbia,
is 220 nautical miles. When due west of
Prince Rupert, the tankers will be 310 naut-
ical miles offshore. The course proceeds
southward passing some 160 nautical miles
west of Englefield Bay on the Queen Char-
lotte Islands. The route turns to parallel
Vancouver Island at a point 136 nautical
miles west of Cape Scott and passes 40 nauti-
cal miles off Estevan Point. When the ships
turn due east to enter the strait itself, they
are 30 nautical miles from the island.

Radar Coverage

The fiscal year 1978 Department of Trans-
portation budget contains .$8 million for im-
provement and expansion of the Puget
Sound vessel traffic service. An additional
$3.5 million will be provided in fiscal year
1979 for the same purpose. The present
radar system in Puget Sound will be re-
placed. New radar sites will be added to
provide surveillance coverage for the Strait
of Juan de Fuca and Rosario Strait. In addi-
tion, the vessel traffic center will be ex-
panded and a computer-based, automated-
vessel information system will be installed.

Ballast Treatment

The ballast water treatment facility to be
used by tankers arriving at Port Valdez is

capable of processing all ballast watei' from
the maximum number of vessels expected in
port at any time. All participating companies
have agreed there will be no ballast dis-
charge at sea.

Liability

Should an incident occur, the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act provides
for a fund of .$100 million to pay claims for
damages from possible discharges of oil by
the U.S. tankers on a liability basis without
regard for fault.

The act expressly authorizes such payment
to Canadians.

International Navigational
Rules Act of 1 977

Statement by President Carter ^

I have signed H.R. 186 [Public Law 95-
75], a bill to implement the Convention on
the International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea, 1972. This convention
brings International Rules of the Nautical
Road in line with modern maritime practices
and technology.

The convention, which has. been ratified
by the Senate, became effective for its in-
ternational signatories on July 15, 1977. This
bill would implement the convention fully for
U.S. vessels.

Although I have signed this bill, I want to
make clear that I have serious constitutional
reservations about section 3(d). That section
permits Congress, by concurrent resolution,
to disapprove a proposed amendment to the
convention. The Congress' concurrent res-
olution would not be presented to the Presi-
dent for approval or veto. This may violate
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution.

' Made on July 28, 1977 (te.xt from Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Aug. 1, 1977).

September 5, 1977

309

THE CONGRESS

Ratification Recommended for Treaties With U.S.S.R.
Restricting Nuclear Testing

Following are statements by Paul C.
Warnke, Director, Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency, and Philip C. Habib,
Under Secretary of State for Political Af-
fairs, made before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations on July 28.''-

STATEMENT BY MR. WARNKE

I appreciate the opportunity to appear be-
fore you today to discuss the Treaty on the
Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon
Tests— the TTB [Threshold Test Ban]
Treaty — and its companion treaty, the
Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions
for Peaceful Purposes — the PNE [Peaceful
Nuclear Explosions] Treaty.

These two treaties impose direct restraints
on underground nuclear explosions — weapon
tests as well as nuclear explosions for peace-
ful purposes. Thus they supplement the Lim-
ited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and constitute
a step toward complete elimination of nu-
clear testing.

Because of the problem of distinguishing
between nuclear explosive device technology
applied for weapon-related purposes and
that applied for peaceful purposes, both
treaties have been designed to be part of
one comprehensive regime. The TTB Treaty
places a limit of 150 kilotons on all under-
ground nuclear weapon tests, which is the
identical limit placed on individual under-
ground nuclear explosions for peaceful pur-

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

poses in the PNE Treaty. The two treaties
contain verification provisions not found in
previous arms control agreements which are
essential to this treaty regime and which,
we believe, will have important precedential
value as well.

In his statement. Under Secretary [for
Political Affairs Philip C] Habib describes
the main features of the treaties and discus-
ses their significance in the context of inter-
national efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear
war [see p. 316]. I would like to confine my
remarks to a narrow but vital topic — how
the Administration's request for prompt
Senate action on these two treaties relates
to its goal of achieving a comprehensive ban
on nuclear explosions at an early date.

President Carter has on several occasions
expressed his firm commitment to achieving
an adequately verifiable comprehensive nu-
clear test ban treaty. He believes that such
an agreement could promote U.S. and global
security in a number of ways. By placing
balanced constraints on Soviet and U.S.
nuclear- weapon programs, a comprehensive
test ban would be an important factor in
stabilizing the bilateral strategic relation-
ship and would therefore enhance the secu-
rity of both countries in an equitable man-
ner. An effective comprehensive measure —
one that covers all nuclear explosions,
whether designated to be for weapon testing
or peaceful purposes — would also make a
major contribution to our nonproliferation
objectives.

Diplomatic efforts on behalf of a com-
prehensive agreement have already begun.
Last month, as a result of a decision taken
at the Moscow meetings between Secretary

310

Department of State Bulletin

Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko in
March, 'the United States and Soviet Union
carried out several days of exploratory dis-
cussions in Washington. For the past 2
weeks, beginning on July 13, trilateral
talks — involving the United States, Soviet
Union, and the United Kingdom — were held
in Geneva.

The question may be asked why we wish
to press forward with ratification of the TTB
and PNE Treaties while we are moving vig-
orously to negotiate a comprehensive
agreement that would go beyond their pro-
visions. There are several reasons why we
attach importance to bringing these two
treaties into force.

While the Administration believes that it
is in the national interest to seek an
adequately verifiable prohibition on all nu-
clear explosions — not just a limit at 150
kilotons — it nonetheless recognizes that the
current treaties, by constraining the de-
velopment and testing of new high-yield
warheads and bombs, would have a signifi-
cant moderating effect in their own right.

We would hope that any obstacles to the
conclusion of an effective comprehensive test
ban can be eliminated at an early date.
However, as a hedge against the possibility
that the negotiating process will take longer
than we would hope, we believe that it
would be desirable and prudent to have a
formal regime prohibiting explosions over
150 kilotons already in place while we pro-
ceed with the comprehensive test ban
negotiations. Moreover, a comprehensive
test ban of continuing duration may require
agreement to its terms by all nuclear-
weapon states. The entry into force of these
treaties would thus provide valuable insur-
ance against resumption of higher yield nu-
clear testing.

Another important reason for proceeding
with ratification of the two treaties now is
that it would give us a basis for building
upon some of the treaties' valuable provi-
sions in negotiating a comprehensive test
ban. Many of the provisions of the TTB and
PNE Treaties will not, of course, be directly
applicable to the differing scope and verifi-
cation problems inherent in a comprehensive

ban but other provisions could be carried
over intact. And several precedents will be
important and relevant. The recognition that
each side must furnish data to assist the
other's national technical means of verifica-
tion is significant.

Of even more significance, moreover, is
the recognition that in some cases even na-
tional technical means in combination with
the data furnished should be supplemented
to insure adequate verification. Where this
occurs, the principle will be established by
the PNE Treaty that observers with equip-
ment are authorized to assure compliance
with treaty provisions. On-site verification
is a valid tool that can be helpful in estab-
lishing an adequate verification regime in a
comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests, in-
cluding explosions for peaceful purposes.

With respect to the latter, the negotia-
tions failed to disclose any means for carry-
ing out individual nuclear explosions for
peaceful purposes above 150 kilotons without
making available military benefits otherwise
precluded by the threshold ban on nuclear-
weapon tests. As a result, the threshold for
individual nuclear explosions for peaceful
purposes was set at the same level as the
threshold for nuclear-weapon tests. The log-
ical extension of this provision to a regime
where the threshold for nuclear-weapon
tests would be zero would be a ban on peace-
ful nuclear explosions as well. It should be
added that a number of the features of the
TTB and PNE Treaties that we consider
most valuable — particularly provisions re-
lating to verification — involved concessions
and departures from previous positions by
the Government of the U.S.S.R.

Prompt ratification of the two treaties can
have the additional favorable effect of creat-
ing a more promising climate for the current
comprehensive test ban negotiations to
which you, Mr. Chairman [John Sparkman of
Alabama], and members of this committee
have lent support. The Soviet negotiators
now are the same ones who worked out with
our delegation the treaties now before you.
The Soviet Government has emphasized that
it regards the TTB Treaty regime as an im-
portant product of Soviet-American coopera-

September 5, 1977

311

tion and that it attaches great significance to
its early entry into force. We believe that
our failure to ratify the treaties could raise
doubts in the minds of the Soviets about the
reliability of the United States as a negotiat-
ing partner and could thus diminish pros-
pects for an early and successful conclusion
of a comprehensive treaty.

In conclusion, we believe that the TTB
and PNE Treaties — while certainly less de-
sirable than a comprehensive ban in promot-
ing the objective of curbing the nuclear arms
competition and nuclear proliferation — are
nonetheless useful as immediate, even if
interim, steps. It is our view, moreover,
that the timetable for concluding an effec-
tive comprehensive agreement would be ad-
vanced by prompt favorable Senate action on
these treaties.

STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY HABIB

I am pleased to have this opportunity to
discuss with the committee today the treaty
between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Underground Nuclear
Weapon Tests [Threshold Test Ban (TTB)
Treaty] with its protocol and the treaty be-
tween the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Un-
derground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful
Purposes [Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
(PNE) Treaty] with its protocol and agreed
statement.

The goal of the United States in the area
of constraints on nuclear testing has long
been an adequately verifiable comprehensive
test ban. President Carter strongly supports
such a ban. The two treaties we are addres-
sing today are useful steps in that direction,
and the President and Secretary Vance urge
advice and consent to their ratification.

Background

Since 1945 the United States has recog-
nized the need to prevent the spread of nu-
clear weapons and to stop their further de-

velopment and, indeed, in 1946 proposed the
Baruch plan [in an address before the U.N.
Atomic Energy Commission on June 14,
1946] to control atomic materials. Although
our proposals did not gain international ac-
ceptance, our efforts continued. Since 1958
we have consistently held that an adequately
verifiable cessation of nuclear testing would
be in our national interest.

In pursuit of this goal, in 1963, President
Kennedy presented to the Senate the first
treaty to limit nuclear explosions — the
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in
the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water. This treaty, called the Limited Test
Ban Treaty, reduced the dangers to mankind
by placing restrictions on the parties'
weapons-testing activities but it did not ban
underground explosions. Although the prob-
lem of verification precluded the achieve-
ment of a comprehensive test ban at that
time, the parties pledged themselves to con-
tinue negotiations to the end of: "Seeking to
achieve the discontinuance of all test explo-
sions of nuclear weapons for all time. ..."
The Limited Test Ban Treaty is now in force
for 105 countries.

Another milestone in reaching our goal
was achieved in 1968 when President
Johnson presented to the Senate the Treaty
on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
The purpose of this treaty is to prevent the
spread of nuclear explosive capabilities and
promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
It obligates the parties to pursue negotia-
tions of effective measures to cease the nu-
clear arms race. The Nonproliferation
Treaty is in force for 101 countries and
another 11 have signed but not yet ratified.

Thus our efforts to achieve an effective
cessation of nuclear testing reflect our de-
sires to end competition in nuclear weapons
development, to demonstrate our good faith
to the non-nuclear-weapon states who have
forsworn nuclear weapons, and, thereby, to
contribute to our nonproliferation objec-
tives. These non-nuclear-weapon states are
looking to us, the United Kingdom, and the
Soviet Union to meet the undertaking con-
tained in article VI of the Nonproliferation

312

Department of State Bulletin

Treaty that we shall ". . . pursue negotia-
tions in good faith on effective measures re-
lating to cessation of the nuclear arms race
at an early date. ..."

Further Limitations on Nuclear Testing

With this background in mind, let me turn
to the Threshold Test Ban and PNE
Treaties. These treaties mark the first addi-
tional limitations to be placed on nuclear ex-
plosions since the 1963 Limited Test Ban
Treaty. They demonstrate the continuing
desire of both ourselves and the Soviet
Union to achieve a complete cessation of nu-
clear testing.

While these agreements are complicated,
they reflect the complexity of the problems
which the U.S. and Soviet negotiators faced.
The fact that these problems were overcome
demonstrates once again that with patience
and mutual goodwill even complex problems
touching on national security concerns can
be worked out. Each treaty contains useful
precedents that may contribute to the solu-
tion of analogous problems in a comprehen-
sive test ban.

With regard to the specific provisions of
the two treaties, I would like to discuss
briefly several of the more significant
points.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty requires
each party to prohibit, to prevent, and not
to carry out any underground nuclear-
weapon test having a yield exceeding 150
kilotons and to keep the number of under-
ground tests to a minimum.

Verification is made the responsibility of
each party using its own national technical
means of verification. To assist each party in
its verification efforts, a protocol to the
treaty establishes specific provisions for an
extensive exchange of data — an important
step which goes beyond the Limited Test
Ban Treaty. The protocol requires that data
on geographical boundaries and geological
and geophysical characteristics of the test-
ing areas be exchanged and provides that

testing is limited to specifically designated
test sites. In addition, for the first time,
each party will provide to the other specific
data for two nuclear-weapon tests from
each geophysically distinct testing area for
calibration purposes. This data will include
yield, date, time, depth, and coordinates.
Thereafter, after each future test has taken
place, the geographic coordinates of the test
location are to be given.

Soviet agreement to the U.S. proposal to
exchange these detailed data to assist each
side in calibrating and improving its national
technical means of verification represents a
significant developinent in cooperation be-
tween our two countries.

I should make clear to you that in the
event of Soviet tests at or near 150-kiloton
level, we could not be absolutely certain that
the yield is at or below 150 kilotons. How-
ever, in this regard, taking into account the
uncertainties in our monitoring systems, the
weight of the evidence supports the judg-
ment that the U.S.S.R. has respected the
threshold in the last 15 months.

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty

At the time the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty was concluded, the two sides recog-
nized that they would have to assure that
neither party could gain, through nuclear
explosions for peaceful purposes, benefits
which would otherwise be precluded to the
parties under the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty. This was necessary because there is
no distinction between the technology of a
nuclear explosive device which could be used
as a weapon and one which could be used for
peaceful purposes.

The PNE Treaty, a companion to the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty, was developed
to meet this need. This treaty, together
with its associated protocol and an agreed
statement, covers all underground nuclear
explosions outside of nuclear-weapon test
sites, whether in the territory of the parties
or in third countries. In concluding this
treaty, the United States pursued three
basic objectives.

September 5, 1977

313

— Peaceful nuclear explosions must not
provide weapon-related benefits otherwise
precluded by the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty.

— The fact that nuclear explosions for
peaceful purposes do not contribute such
benefits must be adequately verifiable.

— The treaty must be consistent with
existing international obligations, in par-
ticular the Limited Test Ban Treaty of
1963.

In achieving these objectives, it was
necessary to go beyond the Threshold Test
Ban Treaty. The PNE Treaty provides for
more extensive data exchange and, of par-
ticular significance, the establishment of
procedures for onsite access by obsei'vers
with technical equipment. Specifically, the
treaty requires that extensive amounts of in-
formation be provided about the details of
any project involving nuclear explosions for
peaceful purposes of whatever yield both be-
fore and after the explosion.

The central problem of not allowing
weapon-related benefits otherwise precluded
by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty was
solved by insuring that no individual explo-
sion would have a yield exceeding 150 kilo-
tons. In other words, the thresholds in the
two treaties are identical.

This requirement entails special proce-
dures when the aggregate yield of a group
explosion is larger than 150 kilotons. The
verifying side is granted the right to have
observers and instruments at the site of a
group explosion to determine the yield of
each device in the group. In addition, observ-
ers may be permitted on the basis of con-
sultation between the parties for explosions
with aggregate yields between 100 and 150
kilotons.

In sum, this treaty sets a precedent for
regulating nuclear explosions for peaceful
purposes — the Soviets have agreed that such
explosions must not provide weapon benefits
otherwise precluded by the Threshold Test
Ban Treaty. They have abandoned their
original position that nuclear explosion for
peaceful purposes should not be regulated at
all.

Role of Treaties in National Policy

We have asked for the Senate's advice and
consent to the ratification of these two
treaties because of their usefulness in con-
trolling nuclear-weapon development and in
inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. I
believe the political benefits which can ac-
crue to us by the ratification of these
treaties are as significant as the contribu-
tions which they make to the control of nu-
clear weapons. The limitations which they
impose will not be detrimental to our secu-
rity and their verification features can be
very helpful in other arms control negotia-
tions.

The treaties also provide that large yield
nuclear explosions will no longer be carried
out by the parties. Thus this restriction im-
poses a significant quantitative limit on the
nuclear-weapon development competition.
This is a real and present benefit of these
treaties.

If we were not to ratify these two
treaties, I believe it would be to our disad-
vantage. Other countries are looking to us
and the Soviet Union to end our testing.
While these treaties will not completely end
that testing, they do represent genuine
progress toward that goal. If we were not to
ratify them, it could cause concern as to our
willingness to seek a comprehensive test
ban. Likewise were we not to fulfill this un-
dertaking that we have negotiated, it could
hinder our efforts to press forward with
negotiations on further arms limitations. Fi-
nally, were we not to ratify the treaties, it
is possible that higher yield tests could re-
sume, a result which would be directly con-
trary to the essence of the President's de-
termination to achieve the early and total
cessation of nuclear testing.

On the other hand, ratification of the two
treaties will build confidence and meet the
reasonable expectations of our negotiating
partner that arms control negotiations with
the United States will result in concrete
progress. This in turn will provide a positive
diplomatic climate for negotiations with the
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and
eventually other nations to achieve an effec-
tive comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.

314

Department of State Bulletin

Undocumented Aliens

Following are reinarks by President Carter
made on transmitting a message to the Con-
gress on August ^, together with the text of
that )iiessage.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated August 8

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT CARTER

I have an announcement to make this af-
ternoon, and then following my brief state-
ment, the Attorney General and the Director
of the Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice and the Labor Secretary will answer your
questions. ^

Within this last decade, the problem of un-
documented aliens or illegal aliens or un-
documented workers has become increasingly
severe. It now comprises a total of literally
millions of people who have come into our
country against the law and who are still in
the United States.

Last year alone, 875,000 undocumented
workers were apprehended by the immigra-
tion officials, and the estimates are that only
one out of three coming into our country are
actually caught.

Last month alone, in San Diego County,
35,000 undocumented workers were ap-
prehended, and this is a 25-percent increase
over last year. So, the problem is not only
severe but it's getting worse.

I'm today sending the Congress a message
on this complex problem of undocumented
ahens. As you may know, we've been study-
ing this problem for the last several months,
and the Congress has been working on it for
the last several years.

I'm proposing actions that would meet four
major needs: first of all, to regain greater
control over our own borders; secondly, to
limit employment opportunities of those who
are illegally in our country and who are com-
peting with American workers for scarce
jobs; third, the registration and the regula-

' For the te.xt of the briefing by Griffin B. Bell, At-
torney General; Leonel Castillo, Director, Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service; and Ray F. Marshall,
Secretary of Labor, see White House press release
dated Aug. 4, 1977.

tion of the millions of undocumented workers
who are already here; and fourth, improving
cooperation with countries from which these
undocumented workers are coming into our
own nation.

The proposals that I'm making to Congress
fulfill each of these needs. First of all, border
controls would be improved by adding at
least 2,000 additional enforcement officers at
the borders and by concentrating their
presence where the crossing of our borders is
most likely. Also, we will target our efforts
against smuggling rings which now provide
entry of undocumented aliens into our
country.

Secondly, the employment opportunities
would be limited by prohibiting em-
ployers— with strong civil penalties — from
hiring undocumented aliens. The Justice De-
partment would be responsible for the en-
forcement of the laws against these
employers who habitually hire undocumented
aliens, and if they violated court orders, of
course, they would also be subject to criminal
penalties.

In the process, we must be fair to the
Latin American, Chinese-American, and
other citizens who are here legally, so that an
employer might not discriminate against
them simply because of their racial origin.

We want to get as many of the millions of
undocumented aliens as possible registered.
And the inducement for this and a step that
would give us tangible benefits would be to
give them status which they do not presently
enjoy — legal status.

Those who have been in this country since
before 1970 would be eligible for permanent
resident status and might start their 5-year
process ultimately to become U.S. citizens.
Those who entered between 1970 and 1977
would be eligible for temporary status, per-
mitting them to remain here and to work, but
on a temporary basis only. Those entering
since the beginning of 1977 would be subject
to immediate deportation.

The last point — to increase employment
opportunities in the home countries from
which the undocumented ahens come. We will
work with the Government of Mexico —
already are — and with other nations involved

September 5, 1977

315

to develop economic and technical assistance
programs so it might be more attractive for
undocumented workers who are here to go
back to their home countries and others to
refrain fi'om coming here illegally.

I hope that the Congress will move quickly
on these proposals so that the actions can
take effect very soon. We've worked very
closely with the congressional leaders, and in
the House, Congressman Rodino [Peter W.
Rodino, Jr., of New Jersey] and Con-
gressman Eilberg [Joshua Eilberg of
Pennsylvania] will sponsor this legislation. In
the Senate, Senator Jim Eastland from Mis-
sissippi and Senator Ted Kennedy [Edward
M. Kennedy of Massachusetts] will sponsor
the legislation. They have already told me
that they will do it enthusiastically, and
prompt hearings will begin on this subject.

TEXT OF MESSAGE ^

To fhe Congress of the United States:

1 am proposing to Congress today a set of
actions to help markedly reduce the increas-
ing flow of undocumented aliens in this coun-
try and to regulate the presence of the mil-
lions of undocumented aliens already here.

These proposed actions are based on the
results of a thorough Cabinet-level study and
on the groundwoi'k which has been laid, since
the beginning of the decade, by Congressmen
Rodino and Eilberg and Senators Eastland
and Kennedy. These actions will:

— Make unlawful the hiring of un-
documented aliens, with enforcement by the
Justice Department against those employers
who engage in a "pattern or practice" of such
hiring. Penalties would be civil — injunctions
and fines of $1000 per undocumented alien
hired. Criminal penalties could be imposed by
the courts against employers violating injunc-
tions. Moreover, employers, and others, re-
ceiving compensation for knowingly assisting
an undocumented alien obtain or retain a job
would also be subject to criminal penalties.

— Increase significantly the enforcement of
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Fed-
eral Farm Labor Contractor Registra-

2 Tran.smitled on Aug. 4, 1977; also printed as H.
Doc. 95-202.

tion Act, targeted areas where heavy un-
documented alien hiring occur.

— Adjust the immigration status of un-
documented aliens who have resided in the
U.S. continuously from before January 1,
1970 to the present and who apply with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) for permanent resident alien status;
create a new immigration category of tem-
porary resident alien for undocumented aliens
who have resided in the U.S. continuously
prior to January 1, 1977; make no status
change and enforce the immgration law
against those undocumented aliens entering
the U.S. after January 1, 1977.

— Substantially increase resources avail-
able to control the Southern border, and
other entry points, in order to prevent illegal
immigration.

— Promote continued cooperation with the
governments which are major sources of un-
documented aliens, in an effort to improve
their economies and their controls over alien
smuggling rings.

Each of these actions will play a distinct,
but closely related, role in helping to solve
one of our most complex domestic problems:
In the last several years, millions of un-
documented aliens have illegally immigrated
to the United States. They have breached
our nation's immigration laws, displaced
many American citizens from jobs, and placed
an increased financial burden on many states
and local governments.

The set of actions I am proposing cannot
solve this enormous problem overnight, but
they will signal the beginning of an effective
Federal response. My Administration is
strongly committed to aggressive and com-
prehensive steps toward resolving this prob-
lem, and I am therefore proposing the follow-
ing actions:

Employer Sanctions

The principal attraction of the United
States for undocumented aliens is eco-
nomic— the opportunity to obtain a job pay-
ing considerably more than any available in
their own countries. If that opportunity is
severely restricted, I am convinced that far
fewer aliens will attempt illegal entry.

316

Department of State Bulletin

I am therefore proposing that Congress
make unlawful the hiring by any employer of
any undocumented alien. This employment
bar would be implemented in the following
way:

— Enforcement would be sought against
those employers who engage in a "pattern or
practice" of hiring undocumented aliens, with
the Justice Department setting priorities for
enforcement.

— Penalties for violation of the employment
bar would be both injunctive relief and stiff
civil fines — a maximum of $1,000 for each un-
documented alien hired by an employer. A
violation of a court injunction would subject
an employer to a potential criminal contempt
citation and imprisonment.

— An employer would be entitled to defend
any charge of hiring an undocumented alien
by proving that a prospective employee's
documentation of legal residence, as desig-
nated by the Attorney General in regula-
tions, was seen prior to employment.

— The Social Security card would be desig-
nated as one of the authorized identification
documents; and we will accelerate the steps
already being taken to make certain that such
cards are issued, as the law now mandates,
only to legal residents. Those steps include
requiring personal interviews of card appli-
cants and making the cards more difficult to
forge. But no steps would be taken to make
the Social Security card, or any other card, a
national identification document.

— To further restrict job opportunities,
criminal sanctions would be imposed on those
persons who receive compensation for know-
ingly assisting an undocumented alien obtain
or retain employment, or who knowingly con-
tract with such persons for the employment
of undocumented aliens. These sanctions are
directed at the substantial number of indi-
viduals who broker jobs for undocumented
aliens or act as agents for alien smugglers. It
is not directed at those who inadvertently
refer an undocumented alien to a job, such as
an employment agency or a union hiring hall.

To make certain that all of these new sanc-
tions are uniformly applied, they would pre-
empt any existing state sanctions.

In addition to the creation of these new

sanctions, efforts to increase enforcement of
existing sanctions will be significantly in-
creased. The Fair Labor Standards Act,
which mandates payment of the minimum
wage and provides other employee protec-
tions, would not only be strictly enforced, but
its existing civil and criminal penalties would
be sought much more frequently by the gov-
ernment. To date, the inability of the gov-
ernment to enforce fully this Act, due in part
to a lack of resources, has resulted in the hir-
ing of undocumented aliens at sub-minimum
wages, thereby often displacing American
workers. Two hundred sixty new inspectors
will be hired and targeted to areas of heavy
undocumented alien employment. Similarly,
the Federal Farm Labor Contractor Regis-
tration Act, which prohibits the recruiting
and hiring of undocumented aliens for farm
work, would be tightly enforced. The De-
partments of Justice and Labor will work
closely in exchanging information developed
in their separate enforcement activities.

While I believe that both the new and
existing employer sanctions, and their strict
enforcement, are required to control the
employment of undocumented aliens, the pos-
sibility that these sanctions might lead
employers to discriminate against Mexican-
American citizens and legal residents, as well
as other ethnic Americans, would be intoler-
able. The proposed employer sanctions have
been designed, with their general reliance on
civil penalties and "pattern or practice" en-
forcement, to minimize any cause for dis-
crimination. However, to present any dis-
criminatory hiring, the federal civil rights
agencies will be charged with making much
greater efforts to ensure that existing anti-
discrimination laws are fully enforced.

Border Enforcement

The proposed employer sanctions will not,
by themselves be enough to stop the entry of
undocumented aliens. Measures must also be
taken to significantly increase existing border
enforcement efforts. While our borders can-
not realistically be made impenetrable to il-
legal entry, greater enforcement efforts
clearly are possible, consistent with preserv-
ing both the longest "open" borders in the
world and our humanitarian traditions.

September 5, 1977

317

I am proposing to take the following in-
creased enforcement measures, most of which
will require Congressional approval for the
necessary additional resources:

— Enforcement resources at the border will
be increased substantially and will be reor-
ganized to ensure greater effectiveness. The
exact nature of the reorganization, as well as
the amount of additional enforcement person-
nel, will be determined after the completion
in September of our ongoing border enforce-
ment studies. It is very likely, though, that a
minimum of 2000 additional enforcement per-
sonnel will be placed on the Mexican border.

— INS will shift a significant number of en-
forcement personnel to border areas having
the highest reported rates of undocumented
alien entry.

— An anti-smuggling Task Force will be es-
tablished in order to seek ways to reduce the
number and effectiveness of the smuggling
rings which, by obtaining forged documents
and providing transportation, systematically
smuggle a substantial percentage of the un-
documented aliens entering the country. The
U.S. Attorneys will be instructed to give
high priority to prosecuting individuals in-
volved in alien smuggling.

— The State Department will increase its
visa issuance resources abroad to ensure that
foreign citizens attempting to enter this
country will be doing so within the require-
ments of the immigration laws.

— Passage will be sought of pending legis-
lation to impose criminal sanctions on those
who knowingly use false information to ob-
tain identifiers issued by our Government, or
who knowingly use fraudulent Government
documents to obtain legitimate Government
documents.

— The State Department will consult with
countries which are the sources of significant
numbers of undocumented aliens about co-
operative border enforcement and anti-
smuggling efforts.

Cooperation With Source Countries

The proposed employer sanctions and bor-
der enforcement will clearly discourage a sig-
nificant percentage of those who would
otherwise attempt to enter or remain in the

U.S. illegally. However, as long as jobs are
available here but not easily available in
countries which have been the source of most
undocumented aliens, many citizens of those
countries will ignore whatever barriers to
entry and employment we erect. An effective
policy to conti'ol illegal immigration must in-
clude the development of a strong economy in
each source country.

Unfortunately, this objective may be dif-
ficult to achieve within the near future. The
economies of most of the source countries are
still not sufficiently developed to produce,
even with significant U.S. aid, enough jobs
over the short-term to match their rapidly
gi'owing workforce.

Over the longer-term, however, I believe
that marked improvements in source coun-
tries' economies are achieveable by their own
efforts with support from the United States.
I welcome the economic development efforts
now being made by the dynamic and compe-
tent leaders of Mexico. To further efforts
such as those, the United States is committed
to helping source countries obtain assistance
appropriate to their own economic needs. I
will explore with source countries means of
providing such assistance. In some cases this
will mean bilateral or multilateral economic
assistance. In others, it will involve technical
assistance, encouragement of private financ-
ing and enhanced trade, or population
programs.

Adjustment of Status

The fact that there are millions of un-
documented aliens already residing in this
country presents one of the most difficult
questions surrounding the aliens phenome-
non. These aliens entered the U.S. illegally
and have willfully remained here in violation
of the immigration laws. On the other hand,
many of them have been law-abiding resi-
dents who are looking for a new life and are
productive members of their communities.

I have concluded that an adjustment of
status is necessary to avoid having a perma-
nent "underclass" of millions of persons who
have not been and cannot practicably be de-
ported, and who would continue living here in
perpetual fear of immigration authorities, the

318

Department of State Bulletin

local police, employers and neighbors. Their
entire existence would continue to be predi-
cated on staying outside the reach of
government authorities and the law's
protections.

I therefore recommend the following ad-
justments of status:

First, I propose that permanent resident
alien status be granted to all undocumented
aliens who have resided continuously in the
U.S. from before January 1, 1970 to the
present. These aliens would have to apply for
this status and provide normal documentary
proof of continuous residency. If residency is
maintained, U.S. citizenship could be sought
five years after the granting of permanent
status, as provided in existing immigration
laws.

The permanent resident alien status would
be granted through an update of the registry
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. The registry statute has been updated
three times since 1929, with the last update
in 1965, when permanent resident alien
status was granted to those who had resided
here prior to 1948.

Second, all undocumented aliens, including
those (other than exchange and student vis-
itors) with expired visas, who were residing
in the United States on or before January 1,
1977 will be eligible for a temporary resident
ahen status for five years.

Those eligible would be granted the tem-
porary status only after registering with
INS; registration would be permitted solely
during a one-year period. Aliens granted
temporary status would be entitled to reside
legally in the United States for a five-year
period.

The purpose of granting a temporary
status is to preserve a decision on the final
status of these undocumented aliens, until
much more precise information about their
number, location, family size and economic
situation can be collected and reviewed. That
information would be obtained through the
registration process. A decision on their final
status would be made sometime after the
completion of the registration process and be-
fore the expiration of the five-year period.

Temporary resident aliens would not have
the right to vote, to run for public office or to

serve on juries; nor would they be entitled to
bring members of their families into the U.S.
But they could leave and re-enter this coun-
try, and they could seek employment, under
the same rules as permanent resident aliens.

Unlike permanent resident ahens, tempor-
ary resident aliens would be ineligible to re-
ceive such Federal social services as
Medicaid, Food Stamps, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, and Supplemental Secu-
rity Income. However, the allocation for-
mulas for Revenue Sharing, which are based
on population, would be adjusted to reflect
the presence of temporary resident aliens.
The adjustment would compensate states and
local communities for the fact that some of
these residents — undocumented aliens — are
currently not included in the Census Bureau's
population counts. That undercount deprives
certain states and communities of Revenue
Sharing funds which, if Census figures were
completely accurate, would be received and
used to defray certain expenses caused by
the presence of undocumented aliens. Those
receiving adjustments of status through the
actions I am proposing would be included in
the 1980 Census, so that the allocation
charges would have to be made only through
1980.

Third, for those undocumented ahens who
entered the United States after January 1,
1977, there would be no adjustment of
status. The immigration laws would still be
enforced against these undocumented aliens.
Similarly, those undocumented aliens, who
are eligible for adjustment of status, but do
not apply, would continue to have the immi-
gration laws enforced against them.

In addition, the INS would expedite its
handling of the substantial backlog of ad-
justment of status applications from those
aliens entitled to an adjustment under exist-
ing law.

Finally, those persons who would be eli-
gible for an adjustment of status under these
proposals must not be ineligible under other
provisions of the immigration laws.

Temporary Foreign Workers

As part of these efforts to control the prob-
lem of undocumented aliens, I am asking the

September 5, 1977

319

Secretary of Labor to conduct, in consulta-
tion with the Congress and other interested
parties, a comprehensive review of the cur-
rent temporary foreign worker (H-2) certifi-
cation program. I believe it is possible to
structure this program so that it responds to
the legitimate needs of both employees, by
protecting domestic employment opportuni-
ties, and of employers, by providing a needed
workforce. However, I am not considering
the reintroduction of a bracero-type program
for the importation of temporary workers.

Immigration Policy

Our present immigration statutes are in
need of a compi'ehensive review. I am there-
fore directing the Secretary of State, the At-
torney General, and the Secretary of Labor
to begin a comprehensive interagency study
of our e.xisting immigration laws and policies.

In the interim, I am supporting pending
legislation to increase the annual limitation
on legal Mexican and Canadian immigration
to a total of 50,000, allocated between them
according to demand. This legislation will help
provide an incentive to legal immigration.

I urge the Congress to consider promptly,
and to pass, the legislation I will submit con-
taining the proposals described in this
Message.

Jimmy Carter.

The White House, August 4, 1977.

U.S. Arms Embargo
Against South Africa

Following is a stateiiieiif by Williai)i H.
Lewis, Director of the Office of Inter-
African Affairs, made before the Subconi-
niittee on Africa of the House Co)ninittee on
International Relatio)is o)i July 20. '^

I am happy to have this opportunity to
discuss with you the U.S. arms embargo
against South Africa. This is a particularly
appropriate time to examine such a subject.

since the Administration is in the process of
revising standards and criteria to be applied
in implementing the embargo. As you know,
this Administration has framed a new
American policy for South Africa which
seeks to promote a progressive transforma-
tion of that society away from apartheid and
toward full political participation by all
South Africans in the economy and life of
their country. In establishing new standards
for our arms embargo policy, we intend to
shape them to promote this fundamental
goal.

Before I review the history of our em-
bargo, I would like to state that we have ob-
served this embargo faithfully since we an-
nounced it in 1963. Allegations heard last
week by this subcommittee that the United
States has assisted South Africa in building
a stockpile of sophisticated weapons, includ-
ing aircraft, tanks, and artillery, are utterly
false.

Our arms embargo had its beginning in

1962 when the Kennedy Administration de-
cided not to permit any further sales to
South Africa of arms which might be used to
enforce that country's apartheid policy. In

1963 the embargo was extended to cover all
arms sales. The policy was outlined in a
United Nations speech in August of that
year by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, who
told the Security Council that the United
States expected to bring to an end the sale
of all military equipment to the Government
of South Africa by the end of 1963 ". . .in
order further to contribute to a peaceful so-
lution and to avoid any steps which might at
this point directly contribute to international
friction in the area." ^ Ambassador Steven-
son specified that exceptions would be per-
mitted for the fulfillment of existing con-
tracts and that the United States reserved
the right to interpret this policy in the light

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

2 For the full text, see Bulletin of Aug. 26, 1963,
p. 333.

320

Department of State Bulletin

of requirements for insuring international
peace and security. He added that the
United States was taking this step to show
its deep concern with South Africa's failure
to abandon apartheid.

The guidelines for executing this policy
were established in 1964 and prohibited the
sale of items for use in combat or training by
military, paramilitary, or police forces. The
guidelines prohibited the sale of all military
equipment and items of significant use in
training or combat, as well as equipment and
materials for the production and mainte-
nance of arms and ammunition. They pro-
vided for the contractual and "common de-
fense" exceptions to which Ambassador
Stevenson had referred and also contained a
provision for dealing with so called gray-
area cases. This provision specified that
items for distinct nonmilitary utility, but in
no case any arms, ammunition, or items of a
weapons nature, may be exported to or sold
in South Africa if ordered by and for civilian
nongovernmental users.

In 1968 the gray-area provisions were ex-
tended to cover U.S. manufactured compo-
nents included in items manufactured in
third countries, making it clear that such
items could not be sold to South Africa if the
component or the end product constituted
arms, ammunition, or other items of a
weapons nature.

In 1970 the Administration determined
that nonlethal dual-use items could be
licensed to civilian or military buyers in
South Africa. That decision specified that
items predominantly employed for civilian
use would be licensed for sale to either civil-
ian or military buyers in South Africa. Items
which were preponderantly used by military
forces, but which had no clear and direct ap-
plication to combat or to internal security
operations, would be licensed for civilian use
and might be licensed to military buyers on
a case-by-case basis. Items having a clear
and direct application to combat or to inter-
nal security operations would not be licensed
to military buyers but might be licensed for
civilian use on a case-by-case basis. Under
these guidelines the U.S. Government sub-

sequently approved the sale to the South
African defense forces of limited numbers of
unarmed civilian executive-type aircraft.

I would like now to say a word about the
procedures whereby our arms embargo pol-
icy is executed. Most items affected by the
embargo are included on the munitions list.
The export to any country of any item on
this list is controlled by the Department of
State's Office of Munitions Control. The De-
partment would not, of course, approve the
sale to South Africa of most items on the
munitions list.

There are some items on the list, how-
ever, which not infrequently are exported
for purely civilian use. When a U.S. firm re-
quests approval on such an export to South
Africa, we examine the application carefully,
consulting our Embassy in Pretoria when
necessary. If we are satisfied that the end
use will not be military, we normally ap-
prove the application. Examples of such
items which are included on the munitions
list and whose export we have approved are
power loads for use in power tools — such as
nail drivers — and technical equipment for
use in civilian aircraft conducting geophysi-
cal surveys.

There are also a number of items which
are not included in the munitions list be-
cause they are manufactured for civilian use
but which are affected by our arms embargo
because of the military applications which
they could conceivably have. Requests for
export of such items are made through the
Office of Export Administration at the De-
partment of Commerce, which then seeks a
decision from the Department of State as to
whether the export of such items should be
permitted under the embargo. Examples of
items in this category whose sale to the
South African military we have denied in-
clude 747 aircraft, which are considered
civilian aircraft but which might be suitable
for transporting troops. Items in this cate-
gory whose sale the U.S. Government has
approved in the past include the small
executive aircraft I referred to earlier.

Another aspect of the arms embargo deals
with the sale of weapons which are manufac-

September 5, 1977

321

tui'ed in third countries. In testimony last
week before this subcommittee it was al-
leged that certain European firms were pro-
ducing weapons under license from U.S.
firms for sale to South Africa. In order for
an American firm to export the technology
required for a weapon to be manufactured
abroad, it must first either receive a license
from the Office of Munitions Control of the
Department of State or export such technol-
ogy pursuant to a government-to-
government agreement. The licenses and
agreements contain conditions that the
weapons will not be sold to a third country
without the explicit pei"mission of the U.S.
Government. Permission to sell such weapons
to South Africa is never granted.

Related to this are measures which are
taken to enforce the controls over the trans-
fer of weapons technology. The assertion
was made here last week that a Portuguese
firm, Bravia, had produced V-150 personnel
carriers for sale to South Africa under
license from Cadillac Gage of Detroit. This
statement is false. The facts are that two
former employees of Cadillac Gage stole
technical data and conveyed it to the Por-
tuguese firm. When this was discovered by
the U.S. Government, the two former em-
ployees were prosecuted for illegally trans-
fering the technology and were convicted
and sentenced.

These facts demonstrate the falsity of the
assertion made before this subcommittee
that no attempt has been made to stop such
traffic. As for the ultimate disposition of any
personnel carriers manufactured in Portugal
without a U.S. license, we have been unable
to obtain any confirmation that they were
sold to South Africa. We do not authorize
the export of parts or components to the
company concerned.

Having reviewed the history of the arms
embargo, I would like to comment briefly on
how this policy fits into this Administra-
tion's policy toward South Africa. In our
view, the embargo serves two purposes.
First, we believe it essential to deny the
sale to South Africa of any item which could
be used to enhance or to maintain South Af-

rica's military capabilities or, in the case of
the police, in the enforcement of apartheid.
Second, we want to avoid the possibility
that any of our actions could be interpreted,
particularly by South Africa, as indicating
American acquiescence in its racial policies.
We believe that, allowing for the sale of
items permitted under the guidelines set
forth above, our record on enforcement of
the arms embargo has been excellent.
Moreover, even taking into account those
exceptions, the arms embargo has been,
over the years, an important element in our
policy toward South Africa, as a clear indi-
cation of our feelings about apartheid.

As the committee is aware, we have made
a comprehensive review of our policy toward
South Africa over the past few months. As a
result of that study, we have evolved a new
policy toward South Africa, which has been
well articulated in recent statements by the
Vice President and Secretary of State
Vance. We are now studying particular as-
pects of our relations with South Africa and,
in this regard, paying close attention to the
importance of maintaining an arms embargo
policy which is consistent with this Adminis-
tration's overall approach to South Africa.

It is in this context that we are presently
taking a very close look at the question of
gray-area sales. Even if an item has no clear
and direct application to combat or to inter-
nal security operations, it may not be ap-
propriate to permit sale of that item to the.
South African military. The sale of some
items, although of no use in combat, may
nevertheless strengthen apartheid or en-
courage the belief that we are not serious in
our opposition to apartheid. Where such a
possibility exists, we believe that we ought
to consider very carefully whether the sale
should be permitted. We have already offi-
cially rescinded the 1970 White House de-
termination on gray-area sales. Whether it
is possible to devise guidelines which would
apply in all cases is a question that is under
current review. While establishing basic
ground rules, it may be necessary to deal
with some requests on a case-by-case ba-
sis.

322

Department of State Bulletin

Human Rights Situation
in Cambodia

Following is a statement by Richard C.
Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, made before the
Subcommittee on International Organiza-
tions of the House Committee on Interna-
tional Relations on July 26.^

Since 1975 Cambodia has been almost
completely sealed from the outside world.
Our information on life there comes mainly
from official Cambodian radio broadcasts,
from official public statements, and from
refugee accounts. Unfortunately, impartial
outside observers are not allowed into Cam-
bodia, so the tragic refugee reports cannot
be conclusively documented. Nevertheless,
the reports are too numerous and too de-
tailed to be denied reasonable credibility.

Based on all the evidence available to us,
we have concluded that Cambodian au-
thorities have flagrantly and systematically
violated the most basic human rights. They
have ordered or permitted extensive kill-
ings, forcibly relocated the urban popula-
tion, brutally treated supporters of the pre-
vious government, and suppressed personal
and political freedoms.

In 1976 a new Constitution rechristened
the country "Democratic Kampuchea," using
an ancient name for Cambodia. That docu-
ment provides no guarantees of the rights
we consider basic. It declares that every
Cambodian has the right to work and that
unemployment is nonexistent. This may be
true since the entire population is now or-
ganized into work groups. The Constitution
also speaks of "religious freedom," but pro-
scribes undefined "reactionary" religions.

The ordinary Cambodian has no opportu-
nity to influence the new political system.
Elections for a National Assembly were re-
ported in March 1976, but most refugees say
that they did not really vote. Some report

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

that officials told them they had voted on
behalf of the village or cooperative. In fact,
the Communist Party of Kampuchea, acting
through the "Revolutionary Organization,"
totally controls political life.

The new government seeks a radical re-
structuring of Cambodian personality and
society. Coercion is their instrument to ef-
fect rapid change. Individual political liber-
ties have been eradicated or subordinated to
collective goals.

The most common refugee complaints
about life in their homeland cite pervasive
fear of execution, the absence of personal
freedom, constant hard labor, and in-
adequate food and medical care.

Estimates of the number of deaths result-
ing from the new government's policies vary
widely. Cambodian authorities claim that
only 2,000-3,000 died during the evacuation
of Phnom Penh after the Khmer Communist
takeover and as many again during the first
months in the countryside. Journalists and
scholars, some testifying before this sub-
committee, guess that between half a million
and 1.2 million have died since 1975. While
we have no way to confirm a precise figure,
the number of deaths appears to be in the
tens if not hundreds of thousands.

Reports indicate that many were killed at
once because of their connection with the
former government at even low levels. Polit-
ical executions still take place without trial
or any pretense of due process but in re-
duced scale. Others have been killed because
they were "educated" or privileged or be-
cause they complained of the hard work or
low rations. Many others— particularly the
aged, the infirm, and the very young — have
died because of disease, malnutrition, or the
rigors of life in present-day Cambodia.

The Cambodian authorities do not recog-
nize freedom of speech, assembly, or press.
Internal travel is controlled and emigration
forbidden. Despite constitutional "guaran-
tees," traditional religion apparently has no
role. In some locations Buddhist monks have
been forced to defrock, and pagodas have
become warehouses. A Khmer Muslim stu-
dent group in France recently appealed for

September 5, 1977

323

help to end the suppression of Islam in
Cambodia. Mosques have reportedly been
closed and defiled.

Neither the United States, the United
Nations, nor any Western European nation
has the leverage to affect the human rights
situation in Cambodia. Only Cambodia's
ideological partners have embassies there,
with the exception of one nonaligned state. I
do not believe those countries closest to
Cambodia have the desire, or enough influ-
ence, to move the Khmer authorities.

We have unsuccessfully tried to make con-
tact with Khmer authorities and taken small
steps to ease the plight of the Khmer
people. In March we tried to contact the
Cambodian authorities on MIA's [missing-
in-actionj; they spurned our request. The
United States has made exceptions to the
Export Administration Review Board con-
trols on Cambodia to permit sales of DDT as
a means of easing the outbreak of malaria
there.

We have said that our human rights policy
applies to Cambodia, and I must reem-
phasize that here today. We cannot let it be
said that by our silence we acquiesce in the
tragic events in Cambodia. I wish to say in
the strongest possible terms that we deplore
what has taken place there. I cannot tell
you, however, that anything we can realisti-
cally do would improve the lot of the Khmer
people in the foreseeable future. Although
we have taken the position that the United
States would support a responsible investi-
gation into the situation there, we have no
reason to believe that the Cambodian au-
thorities will permit impartial investigators
to enter the country.

What we can do to affect the human rights
situation in Southeast Asia as a whole is to
continue our assistance to refugees who
have fled Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. We
should continue to aid the U.N. High Com-
missioner for Refugees, who is supporting a
creditable Thai effort to care for Indochinese
refugees. Helping these persons who are in
great need will reinforce our commitment to
the decent treatment of political refugees —
an important area of human rights.

Department Testifies
on East Timor

Following is a statement by George H. Al-
drich, Deputy Legal Adviser, made before the
Subcommittee on International Organizations
of the House Committee on International Re-
lations on July 19. ^

I am appearing before you this morning in
response to the Chairman's [Donald M. Eraser
of Minnesota] request for our testimony on
the legal aspects of the East Timor problem.

Indonesia's military intervention in East
Timor in December 1975, and the subsequent
incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia in
July 1976, raised a number of difficult legal
questions. These questions have related to
permissible uses of force under the U.N.
Charter and uses of U.S. -furnished equipment
under applicable U.S. law and agreements be-
tween the United States and Indonesia, as
well as the right of the people of East Timor
to self-determination.

In an ideal situation, the process of decol-
onization of East Timor would have proceeded
in an orderly fashion with Portugal preparing
for an early transfer of power pursuant to a
plebiscite or other act of self-determination by
the people of East Timor conducted in an at-
mosphere of free political activity. Unfortu-
nately, the situation did not develop that way
and Portugal — preoccupied with political up-
heaval at home and in its African colonies —
abandoned in fact its administration of the
territory in August 1975 and left the struggle
to the warring local factions.

From that period until at least November
1975, Indonesia recognized Portugal as retain-
ing legal authority and responsibility for the
future of East Timor. It also held discussions
with some of the Timorese parties. In late
November 1975, Fretelin — a faction which had
gained control of the former Portuguese arse-
nal and, consequently, military primacy over
much of the territory of East Timor — declared

' The complete transcript of the hearing will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

324

Department of State Bulletin

itself the government of an independent
"Democratic Republic of East Timor." This
declaration was not accepted by members of
the other factions in East Timor and vigorous
fighting continued. Indonesia then intervened
militarily.

The immediate legal question posed to the
United States by Indonesia's intervention in
East Timor was whether any use by Indonesia
in East Timor of U.S. -furnished military
equipment placed Indonesia in substantial vio-
lation of its agreements with the United
States governing the use of such equipment.
These agreements had been entered into in
implementation of the provisions of the
Foreign Assistance Act and Foreign Military
Sales Act governing the purposes for which
such equipment could be furnished by grant or
by sale to Indonesia. Essentially, the appli-
cable agreements limited use of U.S.-
furnished equipment to internal security and
legitimate self-defense, and the statutes pre-
cluded furnishing of new items of assistance
while any substantial violation continued.

This matter was considered within the De-
partment of State in light of all prevailing cir-
cumstances, including the difficulty of deter-
mining the relevant facts as to the extent and
nature of use of any U.S. equipment and the
urgent consideration being given to the ques-
tion in the United Nations. We had in mind
specifically U.N. Security Council Resolution
384 of December 22, 1975, which called upon
all states to respect the right of the people of
East Timor to self-determination and re-
quested the U.N. Secretary General to send
to East Timor a special representative to
make an on-the-spot assessment and to estab-
lish contact with all interested parties in order
to insure implementation of the resolution.

It was decided that it would be appropriate
in these circumstances to defer further sales
under the foreign military sales program and
grants under the military assistance program
with respect to Indonesia, and to defer FMS
[foreign military sales] financing for Indonesia
pending further clarification and develop-
ments. In view of this action, it was not
necessary for us to make any determination
whether there had been any substantial viola-

tion within the meaning of the law.

This situation continued until the end of
June 1976, a period of approximately 6
months. At that time — for a variety of rea-
sons— we decided to resume our military as-
sistance and sales programs to Indonesia. The
legal basis for ending the suspension included
congressional authorization of military assist-
ance for Indonesia (for fiscal years 1976 and
1977) and the defeat of a proposed amendment
urging a cutoff of such assistance on account
of Indonesian actions in Timor.

During the period from December 1975 until
June 1976, it was the policy of the United
States to favor a resolution of the problem of
East Timor by the Timorese and other con-
cerned parties themselves. We supported Se-
curity Council Resolution 384 as well as U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 3485 of De-
cember 12, 1975, also caUing for respect for
the right of self-determination of the people of
East Timor. We remained hopeful that the re-
port of the special representative of the Sec-
retary General would offer a promising
course, but due to a number of factors it was
inconclusive and again called on the parties to
work out a solution.

We abstained on Security Council Resolu-
tion 389 of April 22, 1976, largely because the
Security Council did not accept an amendment
which would have acknowledged steps taken
by Indonesia to begin withdrawal of its forces
from East Timor, but at the same time the
United States representative reaffirmed
"... our support of the right of the people of
East Timor . . . for . . . self-determination."

On July 17, 1976, Indonesia formally incor-
porated East Timor as its 27th province. This
followed unanimous approval by the People's
Council of East Timor on May 31, 1976, of a
petition asking Indonesia to accept integration
of East Tiinor into Indonesia. According to in-
formation we have received from Indonesian
authorities, the People's Council consisted of
28 members — the majority of whom were said
to have been tribal chiefs and other traditional
leaders selected through meetings of local
leaders — with the representatives from Dili,
the capital city, said to have been chosen by
direct elections. We actually know very little

September 5, 1977

325

about the selection process for these dele-
gates, although the process itself took place at
a time of military occupation by Indonesia
during which considerable fighting was still
going on.

The U.S. Government did not question the
incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia at
the time. This did not represent a legal judg-
ment or endorsement of what took place. It
was, simply, the judgment of those responsi-
ble for our policy in the area that the integi'a-
tion was an accomplished fact, that the
realities of the situation would not be changed
by our opposition to what had occurred, and
that such a policy would not serve our best
interests in light of the importance of our re-
lations with Indonesia.

It was for these reasons that the United
States voted against U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 31/53 of December 1, 1976, which
rejected the incorporation of East Timor into
Indonesia and recommended that the Security
Council take immediate steps to implement its
earlier resolutions to secure exercise by the
people of East Timor their right of self-
determination.

I think it is important to state that I do not
view U.S. policy in the case of East Timor as
setting a legal precedent for future cases. The
fact is that decisions whether or not to treat
an entity as part of another entity are most
often taken as political decisions on the basis
of all the circumstances of the particular case
in what is perceived as the national interest.
An important factor to be considered, ob-
viously, is our commitment under articles 55
and 56 of the U.N. Charter to promote re-
spect for human rights, including the right of
self-determination.

However, the question remains what we are
required to do if this right is not observed as
we might wish in a situation in which we be-
lieve that efforts by us to change the situation
would be futile and injurious to other national
interests of the United States. We do not be-
lieve that we are required in such circum-
stances to refrain from acting on the basis of
the prevailing factual situation.

In the case of East Timor, the poHcy judg-
ment has been made by this Administration,
as stated by Deputy Assistant Secretary [for

East Asian and Pacific Affairs Robert B.]
Oakley last March, that our interests would
not be served by seeking to reopen the ques-
tion of Indonesian annexation of East Timor. ^
Instead, we have directed our efforts to urg-
ing Indonesia to institute a humane adminis-
tration in East Timor and to accept an impar-
tial inspection of its administration by the
International Committee of the Red Cross. It
is believed that these measures represent the
most effective way we can promote the human
rights of the inhabitants of East Timor in the
present circumstances.

TREATY INFORMATION

Convention on Migratory Birds
Transmitted to Senate

Message From President Carter ^

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith, for Senate advice and
consent to ratification, the Convention be-
tween the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concern-
ing the Conservation of Migratory Birds and
Their Environment, signed at Moscow on
November 19, 1976.

In the same manner as other Migratory
Bird Conventions which the United States has
with Canada, Japan and Mexico, this Conven-
tion provides for international cooperation in
the protection and preservation of migratory
birds. A fundamental function of this Conven-
tion is the identification of species of birds
which migrate between the United States and
the Soviet Union and species of birds which,
while not actually migratory between the

" For text of Mr. Oakley's statement, see BULLETIN
of April 11, 1977, p. 342.

' Transmitted on July 18 (te.xt from Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated July 25); also
printed as S. Doc. E\. K, which contains the text of the
convention.

326

Department of State Bulletin

United States and the Soviet Union, have
populations in both States and share common
flyways or common breeding, wintering or
feeding areas. With respect to these species of
birds the Parties undertake certain strict
management procedures as well as an ongoing
interchange of information regarding the pro-
tection of these species.

In addition, as I mentioned in my May 23
Message to Congress on the Environment,
this Convention and the legislation which will
be submitted to implement it will establish
new authority to conserve the habitats neces-
sary to the survival of migratory birds. The
Convention contains an undertaking by the
Parties to list in an Appendix to the Conven-
tion, those Migratory Bird Habitats of special
importance within the areas under their juris-
diction and, by mutual agreement, those
which are outside the areas under their
jurisdiction.

There are many species of birds which will
benefit from the provisions of this Conven-
tion, which fills a major gap in the protection
of the species of migratory birds which exists
in the United States. I urge the Senate to act
favorably on this Convention at an early date
by giving its advice and consent to
ratification.

Jimmy Carter.
The White House, July 18, 1977.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes.
Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into
force provisionally October 1, 1976.
Entered into force definitively: August 1, 1977.

Cultural Property

Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing
the illicit import, e.xport, and transfer of ownership
of cultural property: Done at Paris November 14,
1970. Entered into force April 24, 1972.'
Ratifications deposited: Mauritania, April 27, 1977;

Nicaragua, April 19, 1977.
Acceptance deposited: Qatar, April 20, 1977.

Diplomatic Relations

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on diploma-
tic relations concerning the compulsory settlement of
disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered
into force April 24, 1964; for the United States De-
cember 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.
Accession deposited: Bahamas, March 17, 1977.

Environmental Modification

Convention on the prohibition of military or any other
hostile use of environmental modification techniques,
with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977. ^
Signature: Syrian Arab Republic, August 4, 1977.

Human Rights

American convention on human rights. Done at San
Jose November 22, 1969.^
Ratification deposited: Venezuela, August 9, 1977.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or
commercial matters. Done at The Hague March 18,

1970. Entered into force October 7, 1972. TIAS 7444.
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, July 26, 1977.

Patents

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international
patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 24,

1971. Entered into force October 7, 1975. TIAS 8140.

Notification from World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization that accession deposited: Czechoslo-
vakia (with a declaration), August 3, 1977.

Postal

Second additional protocol to the constitution of the
Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964, general
regulations with final protocol and annex, and the
universal postal convention with final protocol and
detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974.
Entered into force January 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.
Ratifications deposited: Burundi, June 2, 1977; Cen-
tral African Empire, June 7, 1977; Oman, June 17,
1977.

Money orders and postal travelers' checks agreement,
with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5,
1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. TIAS
8232.

Ratifications deposited: Burundi, June 2, 1977; Cen-
tral African Empire, June 7, 1977.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecommuni-
cations Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with
annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. En-
tered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Accession deposited: People's Republic of China,
August 16, 1977.

Operating agreement relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTEL-
SAT), with annex. Done at Washington August 20,
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS
7532.
Signature: Peking Administration of Long Distance

' Not in force for the United States.
" Not in force.

September 5, 1977

327

Telecommunications for People's Republic of
China, August 16, 1977.

Terrorism

Convention on the prevention and punishment of
crimes against internationally protected persons, in-
cluding diplomatic agents. Adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly December 14, 1973. Entered into
force February 20, 1977.
Accession deposited: Austria, August 3, 1977.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further e.xtending the wheat
trade convention (part of the international wheat
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington
March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976,
with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1976,
with respect to other provisions.
Ratificatioti deposited: United States, August 17,

1977.
Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid
convention (part of the international wheat agree-
ment) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington March
17. 1976. Entered into force June 19. 1976, with re-
spect to certain provisions and July 1. 1976, with re-
spect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: United States, August 17,

1977.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cul-
tural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November
23, 1972. Entered into force December 17, 197.5.
TIAS 8226.
Ratifications deposited: Ethiopia, July 6, 1977;

Norway (with declaration), May 12, 1977.
Acceptance deposited: Guyana, June 20, 1977.

BILATERAL

Japan

Agreement relating to a program for the production
and acquisition in Japan of the improved Hawk mis-
sile system. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo
July 12, 1977. Enters into force on the date of re-
ceipt by Japan of written notification from the
United States of the completion of domestic proce-
dures for entry into force.

Agreement relating to the production or acquisition of
additional F-4EJ aircraft and related equipment and
materials by Japan. Effected by exchange of notes at
Tokyo July 12, 1977. Enters into force on the. date of
receipt by Japan of written notification from the
United States of the completion of necessary domes-
tic procedures for entry into force.

Agreement relating to the production and acquisition
in Japan of the Sparrow missile for ship-to-air appli-
cation necessary to enhance the defense capability of

Japan. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo July
12, 1977. Enters into force on the date of receipt by
Japan of written notification from the United States
of the completion of necessary domestic procedures
for entry into force.

Switzerland

Understanding relating to the operation of charter air
services. Effected by exchange of letters at Bern
July 14 and 27, 1977. Entered into force July 27,
1977.

Chec

klist

of Department of State

Press

Releases: August 15-21

Press releases may be obtained from the Office

of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash-

ington, D.C

. 20520.

No.

Date

Subject

*390

8/15

Study Group 5 of the U.S. National
Committee of the International
Telegraph and Telephone Consulta-
tive Committee (CCITT), Sept. 15.

*.391

8/15

Shipping Coordinating Committee,
Subcommittee on Safety of Life at

Sea, working group on ship design

and equipment, Sept. 13.

*392

8/15

Advisory Committee on the Law of
the Sea, Sept. 9 (closed session).

*393

8/16

William B. Jones sworn in as Ambas-
sador to Haiti (biographic data).

*394

8/16

U.S., Haiti amend bilateral textile
agreement, Aug. 11.

*395

8/16

Benjamin H. Read sworn in as Dep-
uty Under Secretary for Manage-
ment (biographic data).

*396

8/16

Shipping Coordinating Committee,
Subcommittee on Safety of Life at

Sea, working group on subdivision

and stability, Sept. 13.

*397

8/17

Mauricio Solaun sworn in as Ambas-
sador to Nicaragua (biographic
data).

t398

8/17

Vance: news conference en route
Washington, D.C, Aug. 13.

*399

8/18

Shipping Coordinating Committee,
Subcommittee on Safety of Life at
Sea, working group on radio com-
munications, Sept. 15.

*400

8/18

U.S. delegation to the U.N. Confer-
ence on Desertification.

*401

8/20

Vance: departure, Andrews Air
Force Base.

ted.

*Not prin

+He

Id for

a later issue of the Bulletin.

328

Department of State Bulletin

IDEX September 5, 1977 LXXVII, No. 1993

ms Control and Disarmament

■*rhe Framework for National Security Decision-
making (Brown) 297

atification Recommended for Treaties With
U.S.S.R. Restricting Nuclear Testing

(Warnke, Habib) 310

.S. Arms Embargo Against South Africa
(Lewis) 320

Cambodia. Human Rights Situation in Cambodia -
(Holbrooke) 323

Canada

Undocumented Aliens (statement by President

Carter, message to the Congress) 315

.S., Canada To Insure Safety of Oil Tanker
Traffic 306

ngress

[onvention on Migratory Birds Transmitted to

Senate (message from President Carter) 326

epartment Testifies on East Timor (Aldrich) 324

[uman Rights Situation in Cambodia (Holbrooke) . 323
atification Recommended for Treaties With
U.S.S.R. Restricting Nuclear Testing

(Warnke, Habib) 310

Undocumented Aliens (statement by President

Carter, message to the Congress) 315

.S. Arms Embargo Against South Africa
(Lewis) 320

luba. Editors and News Directors Interview
President Carter (excerpts) 304

last Timor. Department Testifies on East Timor
(Aldrich) 324

invironment

nvention on Migratory Birds Transmitted to

Senate (message from President Carter) 326

.S., Canada To Insure Safety of Oil Tanker
Traffic 306

jurope. The Framework for National Security
Decisionmaking (Brown) 297

!uman Rights. Human Rights Situation in Cam-
bodia (Holbrooke) 323

migration. Undocumented Aliens (statement
by President Carter, message to the
((Congress) 315

idonesia. Department Testifies on East Timor
(Aldrich) 324

itelligence Operations

e Framework for National Security Decision-
making (Brown) 297

Organization and Functions of Intelligence Com-
munity (White House announcement) 306

Israel. Editors and News Directors Interview
President Carter (excerpts) 304

Japan. The Framework for National Security

Decisionmaking (Brown) 297

Korea. The Framework for National Security
Decisionmaking (Brown) 297

Maritime Affairs

International Navigational Rules Act of 1977
(statement by President Carter) 309

U.S., Canada To Insure Safety of Oil Tanker
Traffic 306

Mexico. Undocumented Aliens (statement by
President Carter, message to the Congress) ... 315

Military Affairs. The Framework for National
Security Decisionmaking (Brown) 297

Nuclear Policy. Ratification Recommended for
Treaties With U.S.S.R. Restricting Nuclear
Testing (Warnke, Habib) 310

Panama. The Framework for National Security
Decisionmaking (Brown) 297

Presidential Documents

Convention on Migratory Birds Transmitted to
Senate 326

Editors and News Directors Interview President
Carter (excerpts) 304

International Navigational Rules Act of 1977 . . . 309

Undocumented Aliens 315

South Africa. U.S. Arms Embargo Against
South Africa (Lewis) 320

Treaty Information

Convention on Migratory Birds Transmitted to
Senate (message from President Carter) 326

Current Actions 327

International Navigational Rules Act of 1977
(statement by President Carter) 309

Ratification Recommended for Treaties With
U.S.S.R. Restricting Nuclear Testing
(Warnke, Habib) 310

U.S.S.R.

Convention on Migratory Birds Transmitted to
Senate (message from President Carter) 326

The Framework for National Security Decision-
making (Brown) 297

Ratification Recommended for Treaties With
U.S.S.R. Restricting Nuclear Testing
(Warnke, Habib) 310

Name Index

Aldrich, George H 324

Brown, Harold 297

Carter, President 304, 309, 315

Habib, Philip C 310

Holbrooke, Richard C 323

Lewis, William H 320

Warnke, Paul C 310

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON, DC. 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

postage and fees paid
Department of State STA-501

Third Class

/J;

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXVII • No. 1994 • September 12, 1977

SECRETARY VANCE'S VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND LONDON

JULY 31-AUGUST 13

Remarks and News Conferences 329

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

Boston Public Lilirui v
For index see inside back cover Superintendent of Oocimn-nts

SEP 6 6 1977

DEPOSITORY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXVII, No. 1994
September 12, 1977

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,

dome.stic $42.50, foreign $53.15

Single copy 85 cents

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and ^,
legislative material in the field of 11
international relations are also listed.

Secretary Vance's Visit to the Middle East and London July 31 -August 13

Secretary Vance visited the Middle East
July 31-August 11 arid met with government
leadei's in Egypt (August IS), Lebanon (Au-
gust 3), Syria (August 3-5), Jordan (Augiist
■')-T), Saudi Arabia (August 7-9), Israel (Au-
i/ust 9-11), and returned to Jordan, Syria,
• nid Egypt (August 11); he then visited Lon-
ilon (August 11-13). Following are news con-
ferences and remarks by Secretary Vance and
foreign leaders on various occasio'us during
the tnp, together with a White House state-
ment issued on August i^.'

NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY VANCE AND
PRESIDENT SADAT, ALEXANDRIA, AUGUST 2

Press release 359 dated August 3

Secretary Vance: This has been a very fruit-
ful experience for me. I have had the privilege
i)f meeting with President Sadat on two occa-
sions for intensive discussions over the last
two days and continued those intensive dis-
cussions with the Foreign Minister [Isma'il]
Fahmi] this morning. This has been most use-
ful to me in developing further thoughts on
how the issues can be narrowed as we pursue
the search for a peaceful solution to the
Middle East problem.

I have benefited as I have said, greatly
from these meetings and now look forward to
going on to meet with the leaders of the other
parties in an effort to further narrow the is-
sues and prepare the groundwork for an early
reconvening of the Geneva meeting.

President Amvar al-Sadat: Well, really it
has been a great occasion for me to meet again
with Secretary Vance.

Yesterday and today we have had a thor-
ough survey of the whole problem, and I must
say this; We are really in a crucial moment be-

' Other press releases relating to Secretary Vance's
trip are Nos. 351 and 353 of Aug. 1; ,366 of Aug. 4; 369
and 370 of Aug. 5; 376 of Aug. 9; 377 of Aug. 10; and 382
and 386 of Aug. 11.

cause in my view there has been no opportu-
nity in the last 30 years which was agreeable
like it is now to establish peace in the area.

Yet, in spite of the fact that we may have
differed on certain issues, the fact remains
that both of us are seeking peace built on jus-
tice. I hope we keep in constant contact in the
future, and I have asked also Secretary Vance
to form this working group that I have al-
ready suggested during my visit to the States
last April, so that the preparations for the
Geneva conference could be, I mean, fruitful
and effective in bringing out a peaceful set-
tlement in the area.

I must express my gratitude for President
Carter and the American people to send Sec-
retary Vance to work on this very important
issue on our area, and the caliber of Secretary
Vance himself is the translation of the impor-
tance of this issue for President Carter and
the United States. I hope to see Secretary
Vance again and again. I think we shall be
meeting again in the near future, and I give
him all the best wishes and hope for success in
his mission. Thank you.

Q. I wonder if on the basis of your exchange
of views during these two meetings you will be
able to share with us your estimates of the
probabilities of a Geneva conference being
held later this year?

Secretary Vance: I think it is not wise to try
and pick any precise dates and speculate with
respect to when precisely a Geneva confer-
ence might be held.

Let me say I very much welcome the excel-
lent suggestion 'which President Sadat has
made to call together, in a working group, the
parties to sit down and try and develop the
further work that is required. I will be talking
to the other parties about the implementation
of this suggestion and would hope that it may
be possible to set up such a working group in
the United States around mid-September.

President Sadat: In my idea really it is the

September 12, 1977

329

preparation for Geneva that we should seek
now or work for, because without good prep-
aration, I fear, Geneva could be anything or it
may be useful not to convene at all if there is
no good preparation. For that I have urged
Secretary Vance for this working group under
him to start contacting all the parties
concerned.

Q. [Inaudible] what are the parties con-
cerned to be part of this conference?

Secretary Vance: The parties concerned are
the confrontation states.

Q. Does this mean that the formation of the
working group implies that there will be a
Geneva conference or is the future of Geneva
still in doubt?

Secretary Vance: We would hope very much
that there will be a Geneva conference. As I
indicated earlier, all of the heads of govern-
ment have indicated that they would like to
see a Geneva conference. But, as President
Sadat has said, it's important to continue with
the necessary preparations for that confer-
ence, and that is the purpose of the working
group.

Q. Is it possible — to get the reverse
interpretation — the formation of a working
group suggests that you can't meet your dead-
line for an October Geneva conference? Is it
another way of continuing the process because
you can't get to Geneva when you'd like to?

Secretary Vance: There is no deadline of
October. A Geneva conference will, we hope,
result this fall, but we feel no self-imposed
deadline of October.

Q. Would the working group be Foreign
Ministers at the United Nations?

Secretary Vance: I would hope that it would
be Foreign Ministers at the United Nations or
in Washington immediately prior to the
United Nations and then continuing, if neces-
sary, in New York at the time of the United
Nations.

Q. [Inaudible] the number of U.N. ob-
servers in south Lebanon?

President Sadat: Well, we are of the view
that Lebanon should join us in this peace
process, because Lebanon has borders with

Israel, and we favor stationing any U.N
forces on the borders between Lebanon and||tiiv
Israel.

Q. [Inaudible] your remarks that there are
differences between yourself and Mr. Vance.
Can you enlighten us as to what these differ-
ences are?

President Sadat: Well, I should like that we
try to evade such declarations like this in this
stage, because there is no use at all in starting
any arguments while we are still working on
the main issue of giving momentum to the
peace process.

Q. [Inaudible] communicated to you the Is-
raeli position. Do you still see it as a very
hard-line position, or do you see any en-
couraging aspects?

President Sadat: Well, to be frank, really
there are — I mean there are some positive
elements but also there are negative ele-
ments, and we should work all of us toward
trying to bring the whole thing together.

Q. [Inaudible] that you had some various
alternatives to propose to the Secretary con-
cerning hoiv to get around the roadblock, the
obstacle, of Palestinian participation in
Geneva. Can you tell us what some of those
various proposals are?

President Sadat: Well, really I'm not in a
position to say anything about this except that
I received this afternoon — before Secretary
Vance arrived here — I received a message
from Yasir Arafat [Chairman of the Executive
Committee of the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization (PLO)] and the Palestinian con-
gress urging that their representation should \\
be according to the Rabat conference deci-
sions. I don't think I can say anything now,
because as I told you there are differences of
opinion, there are negative elements and we
should try to be discreet.

Q. [Inaudible] these meetings in Washing-
ton or New York, there will be any kind of
presence?

Secretary Vance: Not at the outset. On the
other hand, we will, of course, be operating as
cochairmen of the Geneva conference and, of
course, the Soviet Union as cochairman will

330

Department of State Bulletin

be kept fully informed as part of this process,
and we will keep the [U.N.] Secretary Gen-
eral informed.

Q. Would you elaborate on the idea of this
working group? You previously said you
would be discussi)ig remaining problems with
the Foreign Ministers in September. But
should we look upon this working group as a
structured kind of preliminary conference
where the various Foreign Ministers would be
in the same place, the same room talking of
problems or is it a case of people calling on
you individually to discuss problems, and
then you — is it a sort of proximity talk, in
other words?

Secretary Vance: We haven't gotten down
to the precise form at this point. They will be
held in the same city. All of the Foreign
Ministers, I hope, will be there. We will be
talking with each of them. Whether or not it
will be possible to have the various Foreign
Ministers meeting with each other, it is too
early to say.

Q. [Inatidible] do you have any objections
to your Foreign Minister sitting in the same
room with the other Foreign Ministers of the
parties concerned?

President Sadat: Well, they will be sitting
in Geneva together; why should they have any
objection? In Geneva they will be sitting
together.

Q. [Inaudible] Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization will accept the framework of the
Geneva conference as it is now constituted?

President Sadat: Well, I think we should, as
I have told you — we should refrain from dis-
cussing this problem now in this stage. But
what I say is this: There is a fact, if we are
going to establish peace in the area here with-
out solving the Palestinian problem, there will
be no peace. This is what I can say only, but
as I told you, let us refrain from discussing
the details at this stage.

Q. [Inaudible] represented in any way at
the working group sessions in New York or
wherever?

President Sadat: Well, I am discussing this,
as I told you, with Secretary Vance. I have

discussed this before with President Carter,
and as I told you, I have nothing more to say
than without the Palestinians, we can have no
peace in the Middle East.

Q. You mentioned Yasir Ai-afat's insistence
on the Rabat resolution. Do you disagree with
the statement that King Hussein [of Jordan]
made to Ar^iaiid de Borchgrave [Chief
Foreign Correspondent, Newsweek magazine]
in an interview that the Rabat resolution tried
to set the clock back and the people had not
been consulted?

President Sadat: Well, if King Hussein said
this, really I don't agree to it at all. We have
decided in Rabat to give full responsibility to
the PLO and the Palestinians, and there is no
place again to discuss this or to comment.

Q. [Inaudible] you said you have no objec-
tion. Does that mean that you have no objec-
tion to the Egyptian Foreign Minister and the
Israeli Foreign Minister negotiating directly
with each other?

President Sadat: There must be a very im-
portant point to be clear. I said that as much
as they will be sitting there in Geneva — the
Foreign Ministers — when Geneva convenes,
they will discuss this together. But what I
have already proposed — this working
group — Secretary Vance has not yet put it in
action either by discussing with all the parties
concerned, because it is not me who will de-
cide this but the other parties must agree to
this. The form that Secretary Vance will start
with, he will notify us, and then we shall de-
cide upon it.

Q. [Inaudible] the Foreign Minister will be
taking his instructions from you as to whether
you wanted him to negotiate directly with Is-
rael and with the other Arab leaders?

President Sadat: I fear you are trying to
plant some misunderstanding, because it may
be taken as there will be bilateral negotiations
between Egypt and Israel; no bilateral, no.
But all of us, we are seeking estabhshment of
peace in the area, so all the parties concerned
should sit together.

Q. I would like a clarification on that. Are
you really saying that you're trusting the
United States to be the broker in arranging

September 12, 1977

331

how it's going to work in the working group?

President Sadat: Right, right.

Q. Will the PLO have ohsei'ver status at this
working group, and secondly, will all the par-
ticipants have the same veto power over the
participants as theij do under Geneva?

Secretary Vaiice: The question of Pales-
tinian representation is one of the issues that
remains to be resolved. This is a subject
which has to be discussed with all of the par-
ties, and there is nothing more that I can say
on that at this moment.

Q. What about the rule of each country, of
each participant , in Geneva having veto power
over other participants? Will they have the
same right as in these working groups? Will
Israel have the right as at Geneva to keep out
the PLO?

Secretary Vance: That kind of detail is
something which I wish to discuss with the
parties before I answer.

Q. Will the Soviet Foreign Minister be in-
vited to participate in this working group?

Secretary Varice: I will have to discuss the
matter with him and see what his pleasure
would be.

Q. [Inaudible] how do you view the pro-
posal that the Soviet —

President Sadat: We have no objection.

Q. In your plan, do you envision this work-
ing group taking up the substantive matters
that you'll have to face in Geneva or is your
idea that it should be limited to procedural
questions to get there?

President Sadat: I think we have reached
the point where we shouldn't sit just to dis-
cuss procedural arrangements or so. To be
practical and not to lose time and to achieve
what we are after — and that's peace — sub-
stance should be discussed.

Q. [Inaudible] it means that for sure you
are coming back, if you have got this kind of
proposal you have to report back ivhat you
have achieved or not?

332

Secretary Vance: If it would be useful to do
so, I certainly don't exclude it.

Q. Secretary Vance said he ivas bringing
specific American proposals for how to get
around the various obstacles still blocking a
conference. Now that you've heard those pro-
posals, are you confident that they will be
able to bridge the gap between the Arab and
Israeli positions and lead to a r-econvening of
a Geneva conference?

President Sadat: Yes, yes, yes.

Q. [Inaudible] the idea of the national
plebiscite on the West Bank, has it been dis-
cussed and do you see any hope of that help-
ing over the West Bank issue?

Secretary Venice: You're going into detail
now, which I am not going to comment on. I
have said many times that if we are to play a
useful role in moving among the parties, I am
not going to discuss specific suggestions pub-
licly. Any such suggestions which may be
made by the parties or which we may suggest
ourselves will be kept among the parties. I
think that this is the only way that we can
play the useful role and the active role which
we hope to play, and I have made that com-
mitment to the parties and intend to adhere to
it.

Q. Can you tell us how long [inaudible] a
couple of meetings, or will this sort of thing
continue for several months?

President Sadat: For me or for the Secre-
tary?

Q. Actually, I asked Mr. Secretary, but I
think it was your idea too.

Secretary Vance: As long as it's useful to do
so.

Q. Is it your idea that this ivorking group
ivith the Foreign Ministers would — dealing
with substatitive issues — would do so much
work that the Geneva conference would simply
ratify what they're going to do?

Secretary Vance: I doubt that it could ac-
complish all that you suggest, but I think it
could lay a very important groundwork for a
Geneva conference.

Department of State Bulletin

Q. [Inaudible].

Secretary Vance: I'm not going to try to go
into that at this point.

Q. [Inaudible] 5 years after a full peace
agreement is signed. A)id yet you seem to be
the only Arab leader who has taken this posi-
tion. Why are you the oJily leader so far, and
if you are willing to do it in 5 years, why not
immediately after a peace agreement is
signed?

President Sadat: I fear there is a misun-
derstanding. I didn't say I'm willing to recog-
nize Israel in 5 years. I said I'm willing to sign
a peace agreement with Israel tomorrow. This
means automatic recognition because, as I
have said before, I am not going to sign this
peace agreement with a ghost there instead of
Israel. It will be Israel that will be signing
with me, so the recognition automatically
after the signature of the peace agreement is
in being, so I don't think I need to —

Q. [Inaudible] full diplomatic relations,
trade relations, and all other sorts of
relations?

President Sadat: Well, we shouldn't mix
this with peace, because this is some misun-
derstanding that is planted. If we are going to
achieve peace, we are ready to achieve
peace — permanent peace — ending the state of
belhgerency, signing a peace agreement, ful-
filHng our obligations in [U.N. Security Coun-
cil] Resolution 242, Israel should do the same
and withdraw from all the land occupied after
'67 and the Palestinian state to be. Well, by
the signature of this agreement, this is com-
plete recognition. Then this opens borders and
economic exchange and all that are put under
the title of the nature of peace. This is impos-
ing conditions again. And this is a matter of
sovereignty.

Q. When we met here 6 months ago — when
the Secretary was over to see you the last
time — you suggested the idea of a link to be
formed between a Palestinian state and Jor-
dan before the convening of the Geneva con-
ference. Could you bring us up to date and
tell us, do you still think iVs a practical idea

and how the other leaders whom you've
spoken to reacted to it?

President Sadat: Well, I still insist on the
fact that a certain link should be agreed upon
between the Palestinians and Jordan, and I
also insist that it should take place before the
convening of a Geneva conference. The parties
concerned — I mean the Palestinians, King
Hussein — know this, and I have discussed it
with them. In principle they have agreed, but
the only difference from the side of the Pales-
tinians is that they prefer to have this link
done and declared after the creation of the
Palestinian state. But I shall be insisting that
it should take place before Geneva convenes,
and in the working group Egypt will be after
this.

Q. [Inaudible] misunderstanding that had
been planted. This appears to me to be a part
of Mr. Carter's vision of peace in the area,
what a full settlement means. Are you reject-
ing President Carter's vision for a peace in
the Middle East?

President Sadat: [Laughs.] I am rejecting
that full peace cannot be achieved without
what we are saying. This is the planting of
misunderstanding. Full peace can be achieved
through the ending of the state of belliger-
ency, fulfilling the obligations of Resolution
242, and not by imposing conditions. If it is
the view of President Carter, okay, but this is
not my view. But it doesn't mean at all that
we are quarreling together upon this.

Q. [Inaudible] conditions such as Presi-
dent Carter envisages whether for 5 years or
for next generations or for how long?

President Sadat: Well, we should be frank.
We shouldn't mix this with the establishment
of peace in the area. We are after establishing
permanent peace in the area, tomorrow,
through the signature of the peace agreement.
If this is known, very well. What you are say-
ing about economic exchange, diplomatic rela-
tions, open borders, and so on shouldn't be
linked that this is a part of the peace. No. It
has never been done in any treaty between
two countries that have been in war together,
but it can be discussed afterward.

September 12, 1977

333

REMARKS, BEIRUT, AUGUST 3

Press release 363 dated August 4

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I'd
like to express my deep thanks to President
Sarkis, the Prime Ministe)- [Salim Ahmad al-
Huss], and to my good friend the Foreign
Minister [Fu'ad Butrus] for their very warm
welcome and gracious hospitality on our
visit — which is too short, unfortunately — to
Beirut and to this lovely country.

The friendship between our own countries is
deep and longstanding, and I appreciated very
much the opportunity to discuss this morning
a number of matters which are of mutual
interest to us. We wholeheartedly support the
work which has been done by President Sarkis
to insure that the sovereignty, territorial in-
tegrity, and unity of Lebanon are
strengthened and preserved. We had the op-
portunity to discuss the efforts that have been
made in connection with rebuilding of the
country and have discussed ways in which the
United States may be helpful in assisting in
some of these efforts.

One of the matters we have discussed was
assistance in connection with the rebuilding of
the army. I have indicated to the President,
the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister
that we have funds in our 1977 budget which
provide for credits in America for some $25
million, which we believe would be useful as a
first step in helping this process go forward.
We hope that other countries will join and as-
sist in this very, very important effort.

I also indicated that we have in the planning
stage additional funds over the next 2 years
which would total an additional $75 million —
for a total sum of $100 million — which would
be devoted for this purpose. Those additional
funds are, of course, subject to congressional
action on our part, but we thought it impor-
tant to give the general dimensions of what
may be possible here so that it may speed up
the process of rebuilding the national army.

We also discussed economic assistance and
the importance of economic assistance from
many countries in order to help in the major
rebuilding process which is required to get
Lebanon back on its feet again. I indicated
that we have in our post-1978 budget some
$20 million of grant assistance and additional

sums in terms of housing guarantees and food
assistance — which would bring the total to
some $43 million, should the Congress ap-
prove the proposals which we will be sending
forward. I think that is a brief summary, all
too brief.

Of course we discussed the subject of the
Middle East and our search for a peace in the
Middle East and benefited greatly from the
discussions with the President, the Prime
Minister, and the Foreign Minister.

Q. Here in Lebanon there have been three
main questions on our minds before your ar-
rival: one is that of stationing of U.N. troops
down in the south, Lebanese participation at
Geneva, and Palestinian representation at
Geneva. Could you tell us a little bit about
those three issues?

Secretary Vance: YeS, I will be delighted
to. With respect to the question of a possible
U.N. force in Lebanon, we discussed that is-
sue. That obviously is a question which is to
be decided by Lebanon itself, and we, of
course, will be guided by the desires of the
Lebanese Government in what they beheve
will be appropriate for the circumstances. It
will be up to the Lebanese Government to let
us know what they desire in this respect, and
we can then act accordingly.

With respect to the second question, which
was Lebanese participation at Geneva, yes,
we have said before — I believe I said it last
time when I was here — that we believe it
would be very useful if Lebanon would par-
ticipate in a reconvened Geneva conference
and be a part of the group which would find a
peaceful solution to the Middle East problem.
And we hope very much that Lebanon will
participate in that process.

Q. Is there any objection to that so far?

Secretary Vance: Not that I know of. Fi-
nally, with respect to the question of Pales-
tinian representation, that is an issue which
has to be discussed with all the parties. I have
just started on my round of visits to the vari-
ous countries involved, and it is too early to
say anything further about that at this point.

Q. About President Sadat's proposal, you
said it is a good suggestion. Why?

Secretary Vance: The suggestion that is

334

Department of State Bulletin

being referred to is the suggestion that it
might be useful to have a working group meet
in Washington or in New York at the time of
the meeting of the General Assembly, namely
in September.

I believe that the better prepared we are in
going to a Geneva conference, the more fruit-
ful and effective a conference can be forthcom-
ing. Therefore I think that it would make very
good sense, if the parties are willing to do
so — and I would stress that it is up to the par-
ties to decide whether they wish to do so or
not — to have such informal working group dis-
cussions in either Washington or New York, if
the parties so choose, and I say it is too early
to say whether all the parties will think that
this is a good idea, but we would welcome it if
they would.

Q. Does the United States have a con-
tingency plan for south Lebanon to spare it
from conflict and from becoming an area of
pressure just in case the preparations for a
Geneva conference are drawn out and even de-
liberations are delayed?

Secretary Vance: The questions of south
Lebanon are questions for Lebanon; it is ap-
propriate for them to comment about that, not
for us.

NEWS CONFERENCE, AMMAN, AUGUST 6

Press release 373 dated August 8

Q. You, a long time ago, defined the "core
issues." The short version of the issues are
Palestinians, withdrawal, and definition of
peace. Having completed almost a week now,
can you give us any idea if the two sides are
any closer together on any or all of those is-
sues?

Secretary Vance: I think I can see some
narrowing of differences on the issue of the
nature of peace.

On the Palestinian question, at this mo-
ment, I do not see any narrowing of differ-
ences between the parties. But I have not yet,
I would caution, been to Israel, so it is too
early to give any definite answer. On the basis
of what we heard in Washington, I would say
there has been no narrowing of the issue.

September 12, 1977

Q. Can you say anything about the third —
territory?

Secretary Vance: On the question of terri-
tory there have been indications by the Is-
raelis that they are prepared to negotiate on
the question of borders, but as to how far they
would be prepared to go into such negotia-
tions, they have said that is a question for the
negotiations and one which they do not wish
to discuss in advance of the negotiations. The
Arab position is clear on this issue and that is
that there should be withdrawal from all oc-
cupied territories.

Q. As it stands now, what is going to hap-
pen in New York during the General Assem-
bly session? Is there going to be some kind of
consultation or a coyitinuation of these talks
you've been having?

Secretary Vance: I would hope very much
that there would be a continuation of the talks
which I have been having with the individual
parties in New York during the General As-
sembly. From the conversations I have had to
date, I believe that there will be such bilateral
talks that I can have with each of the parties
during the General Assembly session.

Q. But nothing that you would have
described the other night as a "working
group"?

Secretary Vance: I don't see anything as
formal as a working group, although I
haven't, again, completed all of my visits. It is
clear from what President Assad [of Syria]
said that he does not support something as
formal as a working group. On the other
hand, he has indicated that he supports
wholeheartedly discussions between his
Foreign Minister and me with respect to the
issues which may remain to be resolved and
the preparations for a Geneva conference and,
indeed, has indicated that he would like to see
those intensified.

Q. In view of the extraordinarily important
American role in negotiating and mediating
the Middle East conflict and in view of the
situation, which you yourself stated many
times, that the Palestinian issue is one of the
core of the factors , isn't it something of a con-
tradiction for the United States not to talk to
the PLO until they recognize the Israelis, in

335

view of the fact that you are trying to get
Geneva without any preconditions? Now isn't
this a precondition?

Secretary Vauce: Insofar as the United
States is concerned, I think our position is
well known and clear on this. At the time of
Sinai II [signed September 4, 1975] the
United States stated that it would not have
discussions with the PLO as long as it refused
to recognize the right of Israel to exist. That
commitment exists, and until that impediment
is removed, we will be bound by that
commitment.

Q. Will you please elaborate on your point
that you think you have narrowed the differ-
ences on the nature of the peace question?
A)?rf also, did you make any progress on the
procedural question of representation at
Geneva ?

Secretary Vaiice: With respect to the first
question — will I be more precise on the nar-
rowing of the differences — I don't want to be
any more precise at this point on that. There
has, in my judgment, been some narrowing of
differences. But that would get me into what
the views of various parties are with respect
to this issue. I have said before that I am not
going to disclose the positions of the various
parties on this issue or any other issue while I
am in the process of trying to act as inter-
mediary. Your second question was what?

Q. It was on the procedural question at
Geneva — who would be seated? Have you
made any progress on that?

Secretary Vance: I would say among the
parties that I have talked to, I find some
progress although there are still differences
among those parties. I still have two other
stops to make, and again it would be prema-
ture to try and draw any conclusion. The dif-
ferences or the narrowing is small at this
point, but there has been some degree of
agreement on how this might be attacked.

Q. You're on this trip in part because it's
necessary for you to talk to chiefs of govern-
ment in order to get the view of what policies
are and ivhat flexibility might exist. How can
the Foreign Ministers' meetings in New York
in any way close the gaps that might exist?

Secretary Vance: I think as a result of these
discussions it has been possible for me to get
down to concrete exploration of substantive
issues, the nature of those issues, and the
possible resolution of those issues. I think it is
now clear in each of the states that I have vis-
ited what it is we feel would be helpful in fur-
ther dealing with those issues. Therefore, I
think it will be possible for the heads of gov-
ernment to give instructions to their Foreign
Ministers or to communicate with us between
now and that time in a fashion which will give
us a clearer and more precise understanding
of the position of each of these countries on
those various issues.

Let me emphasize that during the talks
which I have had, most of the time has been
spent on substantive questions, not on pro-
cedural questions. And I expect that to be the
fact during the balance of my trip.

Q. You talk about the commitment made
duri)ig Sinai II about the United States not
dealing with the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation because of such and such. You refer to
it as something that the Carter Administra-
tion inherited from the Ford Admin-
istration— or was it Nixon's, I'm not
sure on this point. My question is, do you feel
that commitment is correct or do you feel that
this is a commitment you've inherited?

Secretary Vance: It is a commitment. Our
country made it, and we will adhere to it.

Q. What is your appraisal of your talks
with His Majesty in Amman?

Secretary Vance: The talks were very con-
structive. I found His Majesty, as always,
very wise and thoughtful. He had very con-
structive suggestions to make to us as to how
we might grapple with some of these prob-
lems, particularly those respecting a Palestin-
ian entity. Of course, we covered in detail
the other core issues as well. I really was
heartened by the discussions which I had
today and yesterday with His Majesty.

Q. Do you feel now that it is possible to
renew Geneva with formal U.S. participation
now or in October or even by the end of this
year — which was the original objective of the
Administration?

336

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Vance: Let me just say on the Oc-
tober date, I think the October date came
about because one head of government
suggested October, and another one said that
would be fine. October was never accepted by
all the parties as a date on which to begin it.
We have said all along that we thought it
would be possible to convene a Geneva confer-
ence in the fall of 1977. I still would believe
and hope that it may be possible to convene a
Geneva conference in the fall.

But there is a lot to be done between now
and then, and what we have to do is to inten-
sify our effort for discussion among the par-
ties by our talking to each of them. We must
intensify that process so that we can build a
more complete base for going to Geneva. If we
went to Geneva with too shallow a base, there
is always the danger that you might run into
an immediate stalemate. If we can prevent
this by taking a little more time, then we
should do it, and that is a course I think we
should follow.

Q. It has been reported from Paris that you
came with a new American proposal. How
true is that? Is it true in full or in part? What
are your comments on that?

Secretary Vance: I made a number of
suggestions in my discussions at the palace on
a large number of issues, mostly substantive
issues. Those comments and suggestions are
similar to those which I raised with each of
the other heads of government whom I have
visited.

So the answer is, yes, I did come with spe-
cific suggestions which were discussed with
His Majesty.

Q. From ivhat we have heard from the lead-
ers of the various countries, there is a major
problem in that the Israeli Government, at
least up to now, seems to want to go to Geneva
and negotiate an agreement there. Whereas
from what we've heard on this trip, it seems
that, at least in Syria and in Jordan, the
heads of government want an agreement to be
virtually worked out at least in principle be-
fore going to Geneva.

The question is, at one time the United
States, I think, shared that view of having a
preagreement in a sense before Geneva. Where

do you stand now and is this a correct in-
terpretation of the various positions?

Secretary Vance: I think it is correct that
Israel would hke to see the negotiations, ex-
cept on procedural questions, be resolved at
Geneva.

With respect to the Arab states which I
have visited, most of them would like to see as
much of the substantive matters be resolved
as is possible. I, myself, beheve that the more
that can be resolved, the better off we will be
and the less likelihood that we will run into
snags and obstacles which will delay progress
when one gets to Geneva.

Q. The status of the West Bank seems to be
a little bit cojifused. I would like to ask a
two-part question. What is the official U.S.
view on the reestablishment of the West Bank?
Two, when you visit Israel and the occupied
territories in a couple of days' time, will you
talk to some of the mayors of the West Bank
who have expressed an interest in meeting you?

Secretary Vance: Our position on the West
Bank has been stated many, many times and
it remains as it was. On the question of
whether I will meet with any of the mayors on
the West Bank, I am told that the mayors do
not wish to meet with me, but wish to send me
a memorandum expressing their views. I will,
of course, be happy to receive that.

Q. When you say, as you did in the question
before that, you think the more that can be re-
solved in advance the better off, and you say
the Arabs certainly want this, aren't you
undercutting — and I use the word advised-
ly— aren't you undercutting Israel's interest
in direct negotiatioyis? Because with all the
things decided beforehand through you, Israel
isn't deciding these things directly ivith the
Arab confrontation states as they wish to.

Secretary Vance: No, I think that the
Israelis — and they shall have to speak for
themselves on this — would also welcome our
doing what we can to narrow the issues. And
if we can in this process narrow the issues,
they certainly would accept that. There are
many of the issues which we ultimately will
not be able to narrow but must be negotiated

September 12, 1977

337

by the parties themselves. That's been clear
since the outset and remains so.

Q. You spoke earlier of the King helping
you ivith ijour ideas on formation of a Pales-
tinian entity, as well as four other issues.
What were the other four issues?

Secretary Vance: The other issues were the
question of borders and withdrawals and the
question of Palestinian representation. And
indeed, also, his suggestions in connection
with the nature of peace were helpful as well.

Q. After we left Alexandria, Mr. Arafat
came around to talk to President Sadat and a
paragraph was added to President Sadat's
proposal, as we understand it, referring to
right of return or compensation or repatria-
tion. To what extent does that change Presi-
dent Sadat's proposals as far as you're con-
cerned? Does it keep his proposals alive any-
more at all or, for all intents and purposes, is
the working group dead? What is basically
your reaction to the addition of that proposal,
that paragraph?

Secretary Vance: Insofar as the question "is
the working group dead," again this is a ques-
tion that the Arabs are going to have to take
up among themselves. I am going to have to
raise it with the Israelis when I go to Israel.
But I do think — and I want to emphasize this
again — that all of them are saying, whether or
not you have a working group, they all agree
that we have to intensify the discussions in
preparation for a Geneva conference, discus-
sions which will try to come to grips with the
substantive issues as well as the procedural
issues and that they are all willing to cooper-
ate in that kind of preparation. I think the
problem arises in whether or not the working
group creates too formal a structure.

Q. But does the paragraph of additions
change anything as far as you are concerned?

Secretary Vance: I have not read the exact
language of the paragraph, and so I don't
want to comment.

Q. What do you mean ''by the fall" when
you say you hope the Geneva conference will
be convened?

Secretary Vance: Sometime before the end
of the year.

Q. Secondly, if it proves, as a result of your
talks here in the fall, that there is still a wide ':
gap between the parties on the procedure of
getting to Geneva or on some of the substan-
tive matters that ought really to be narrowed
before Geneva starts, would the United States
consider stating its view of what a fair settle-
ment would be, either to the parties in private
or stating it publicly, if you felt that this
could move things along?

Secretary Vance: I think that the United
States would be willing to suggest its views,
as we are doing now, as to what we believe
are fair suggestions with respect to the vari-
ous issues. We are doing it right now, and we
would be prepared to continue that in the
future.

Q. One, are you going to come back to re-
visit all of the Arab capitals after you leave
Israel? Another question, totally unrelated —

Secretary Vance: I thought you already
knew the answer to that. I've read in the
paper that you all said I was going to do that.

Q. I haven't heard you say it though.

Secretary Vance: Yes. I will be going back
on my last day to Amman, to Damascus, and
to Alexandria on my way to London.

Q. The other question, is France trying to
get a new version of Resolution 2U2 in the Se-
curity Council?

Secretary Vance: I haven't heard of it if
they are.

Q. Does the question of compensation and
repatriation enter into the play of negotia-
tions at this stage?

Secretary Vance: That is an issue which has
been raised in my conversations with the
heads of government.

Q. Can we regard that old General Assem-
bly [sic] resolution having validity in this
context?

Secretary Vance: The question has been
raised in even a broader context than that.

Q. Does the old resolution hold some
weight?
Secretary Vance: It holds some weight.
Q. Does the United States support the idea

338

Department of State Bulletin

of return or compensation, and if so, do you
have any ideas on where the compensatio)i
might come from?

Secretary Vance: That is a question that we
have looked into over a number of times dur-
ing the years. As you know, it's been investi-
gated several times. There are positions that
the United States has taken with respect to
that issue in the past. It is an issue, I think,
that will probably have to be dealt with in
connection with any settlement. I don't wish
to go further than that at this point.

Q. I would like to know if a person in your
position sincerely believes in the good inten-
tions of Prime Minister Begin [of Israel^?

Secretary Vance: Yes, I accept the good in-
tentions of all of the chiefs jof state.

Q. One of the elements of Resolutions 2^2
and 338, which is the most controversial
among the Arabs iri the confrontation states
especially , is the fact that it refers to the
Palestinians as a refugee problem. Suppose
the situation were to arise that the entry of the
PLO, or any other Palestinian organization,
into the negotiating process at Geneva would
have to include changing that wording and
putting in its place wording that would treat
the Palestinians as a national issue. What
would the U.S. position be on that?

Secretary Vance: We have always indicated
that we think that the problem is a broader
problem than a refugee problem.

Q. It has been suggested that the Israeli
Government will offer the kibbutzim and the
Israeli settlements as compensation for the
Palestinian refugees iyi case there is any
withdrawal of the West Bank, as part of the
settlement and as part of the compensation.
What are your comments on that?

Secretary Vance: First of all, I don't know
whether that is, in fact, their position and a
position which they will put forward. They
have not yet expressed their position to us
with respect to what they are or are not pre-
pared to do with respect to the West Bank.
And I don't want to jump to conclusions in
taking pieces that are reported to be fact. I
want to wait and get firsthand from Mr. Begin

what he is prepared to say with respect to this
issue.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY VANCE
AND PRINCE SA'UD, TAIF, AUGUST 9

Press release 375 dated August 9

Secretary Vance: I want to thank His
Majesty King Khalid, [Crown] Prince Fahd,
His Royal Highness the Foreign Minister
[Prince Sa'ud bin Faisal] for their generous
hospitality to me and my colleagues during
our stay in Taif. We benefited greatly from
their wise insight into the difficult problem of
a Middle East settlement.

As Prince Sa'ud indicated to you, we have
discussed at length both substantive and pro-
cedural matters relating to a Middle East
settlement. As a result of these discussions I
feel that we have made progress. I conveyed
to His Majesty and their Royal Highnesses
President Carter's undiminished commitment
to search for a just and lasting peace in the
Middle East, and we shall work together in a
cooperative and constructive fashion with our
Saudi Arabian colleagues and the other par-
ties to achieve this end.

I might say that I believe that the nature
of our discussion was both excellent and ex-
tremely constructive, and I am most ap-
preciative of the time that was given to us by
His Majesty and by the Crown Prince, so as
to enable us to devote the necessary effort to
probing deeply these fundamental questions.

Q. Is the United States in contact with the
PLO?

Secretary Vance: We have no direct con-
tact with the PLO. We are informed by the
various Arab parties as to the positions of
the PLO and have been so informed as we
have proceeded through my vi.sit.

Q. Do you have indirect contact? Is the
United States asking, for example, Saudi
Arabia to communicate messages either in
request of substance or clarification directly
to the PLO?

Secretary Vance: We have had indirect
contact.

September 12, 1977

339

Q. Would the United States be willing, in
exchange for Palestinian recognition of Res-
olution 24.2, to guarantee or at least to assure
what is commonly called Palestinian na-
tional rights?

Secretary Vance: It is premature to answer
that question. We'll wait and see what
happens.

Q. [Add7-essed to Prince Sa'ud.] Have you
encouraged the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation to change its covenant or to accept 2U2
and to give up its declared goal of destroying
and dismantling the Jewish state?

Prince Sa'ud: We have not tried to change
any of the positions of the Palestinian libera-
tion movement. What we think is important
at this moment is that there be contacts — and
this is shared by all the Arab countries — that
there be contacts between the United States
and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
We think that these contacts are essential
because the United States is acting as an
honest broker, and since the Palestinian
problem is at the core of the issue that there
must be such contacts. The only people who
can talk for the Palestinians are the Pales-
tinians themselves.

Q. How do you expect to see those U.S.-
PLO contacts coming about?

Prince Sa'ud: By direct contacts.

Q. Yes, but I was referring to the U.S.
commitment not to talk directly to the PLO,
made in the Sinai II agreement.

Prince Sa'7id: As to how these talks can be
initiated or as to the mechanics, that is some-
thing we'll have to see.

Q. Could you amplify on your reply about
the United States having indirect contacts
with the PLO? Of what nature and how
extensive?

Secretary Vance: We have heard views ex-
pressed with respect to the PLO through the
various Arab countries, and we have asked
questions of all the Arab parties as to what is

meant by some of the things which have been
reported.

Q. Could you tell us what your under-
standing is now of what the PLO would be
willing to do in terms of their accepting 242
or asking for a modification?

Secretary Vance: I think the PLO had bet-
ter speak for themselves.

Q. Have you heard anything during your
visit here that might make you optimistic, or
more optimistic, that the PLO might be con-
sidering a change in its position on 242?

Secretary Vance: I have heard some
rumors that they may be considering such a
change, but I have seen nothing concete.

Q. Is the Uyiited States moving aivay from
its commitment not to deal with the PLO
until they recognize 242 and, as you said last
February in Jerusalem, revise the charter
which calls for Israel's destruction; have you
changed your mind about the double
commitment?

Secretary Vance: Well, actually, the double
commitment is contained in 242 itself, be-
cause if one accepts 242, 242 provides for the
fact that each state in the Middle East shall
live in peace and within secure and recog-
nized boundaries.

Q. Well, how can the United States
enter — presuming they [PLO] adopt 242 —
how can the United States enter into negotia-
tion with a party which has sworn to destroy
another country, which the covenant does?

Secretary Vance: If the PLO were to ac-
cept 242, they would be accepting the princi-
ple that they recognize the right of Israel to
exist in a state of peace within secure and
recognized boundaries which, in my judg-
ment, would revoke the covenant.

Q. Has the PLO sent you such an assur-
ance, or is that your interpretation of such
an action?

Secretary Vance: I have not received any
such assurances.

340

Department of State Bulletin

NEWS CONFERENCE, JERUSALEM, AUGUST 10

Press release 381 dated August 11

Secretary Vance: I thought I might make a
brief opening statement and then I will be
happy to answer any questions which you
may have.

We're nearing the end of a trip which we em-
barked upon about 10 days ago which had as
its objective to help the parties move toward
the early reconvening of a Geneva conference
with sufficient preparation on the substantive
issues to improve the chances of success of
such a meeting.

In pursuit of that goal, we have traveled to
si.\ countries in the last 10 days. At each stop
we have explained the positions of the other
parties and have presented proposals which
we believe would narrow the procedural and
the substantive differences. We sought the
reaction of the various parties to these pro-
posals, and we have now, at the end of this
phase, sought to set forth the basis which we
believe should be the framework for a
Geneva conference.

On the positive side, all parties remain
united on the need for a Geneva conference.
All parties have defined in greater detail
than they ever have before their positions on
the key issues. There is a willingness on the
part of all of the parties to examine the views
of the other parties on these key issues and a
willingness, at least in some cases, to reflect
on these other views.

These developments should develop a
firmer foundation for the discussions which I
hope to have with respective Foreign Minis-
ters at the time of the U.N. General Assembly
which will meet in New York in September.

Let me say that fundamental differences
remain.. The parties remain divided on key is-
sues which must be resolved if progress is to
be made toward a settlement. These involve
both procedural and substantive questions.

At this point it is my hope that a Geneva
conference will be convened before the end of
this year. It will take goodwill and a joint

commitment on the part of the parties, as
well as intensive discussions, to bring this
into being. Finally, let me say that it is not
our purpose to impose terms upon the parties
but to assist them in reaching agreement
among themselves.

Q. Did you mean to suggest that there is
any more examination the Israelis are giving
to the idea of the Palestinian home-
land and/or acceptance of the PLO in
negotiations?

Secretary Vance: They are very clear and
firm on their position with respect to a Pales-
tinian entity. They have said that they are
opposed to a Palestinian entity and have
made this very, very clear to me.

Q. Have you succeeded in reaching an
agreement among the Arab states and Israel
to conduct proximity talks in New York next
month, and will this be the achievement of
this trip?

Secretary Vance: I don't want to charac-
terize anything as proximity talks. Let me
say that I believe that each of the leaders of
the countries which I have visited will send
their Foreign Ministers to New York. I will
meet with each of those Foreign Ministers
when they are in New York. I will discuss
with them issues which we have been discus-
sing and which I hope to keep in touch with
them about between now and that time.

Q. Will you be shuttling between the Arab
Foreign Ministers and the Israelis even
though you may not choose to call it prox-
imity talks?

Secretary Vance: I expect to go between
the parties, including between the Israelis
and the Arab parties.

Q. The [Israeli] Foreign Minister, Moshe
Dayan, said last night that Israel must not
permit any foreign rule in the West Bank
territory and the Gaza Strip now occupied by
Israel. He specifically included Jordan as
such a foreign power.

This afternoon a senior advisor to the

September 12, 1977

341

P7-ime Minister, Mr. Katz, said that we are
not in favor of any possible governmental
connections of Jordan rvith the West Bank
territory. We are against it. And he said
there wasn't much difference between saying
that and saying that Israel would not
leave — would not give back any part of the
West Bayik. May we have your reactions to
that? Do you think that is at all acceptable to
the United States or to any Arab power?

Secretary Vance: With respect to the ques-
tion of a Palestinian entity, I have indicated
that the Israelis have made it very clear to
us that they are opposed to a Palestinian en-
tity. With respect to the West Bank, whether
or not the Israelis are prepared to negotiate
on the question of the West Bank is for the
Israelis to speak to, not for me.

Q. This afternoon Mr. Katz also told us
that if the PLO — if the Arabs insist on the
PLO presence at the Geneva conference, there
will be no Geneva conference. How do you
expect to resolve that position with the posi-
tion that you have heard from the Arabs so
far?

Secretary Vance: The question of Pales-
tinian Arab representation at the Geneva
conference remains one of the unresolved is-
sues. This is an issue which will continue to
be discussed with the various parties, and I
cannot predict at this point how that matter
will be resolved.

Q. Would you say that there was no signif-
icant progress during the past 10 days to-
ward the basis and foundation for the Geneva
conference? Do the gaps remain as wide as
ever?

Secretary Vance: There are wide gaps. Let
me be very clear on that. I think we have
made some progress in certain areas. I indi-
cated to you the other day where I thought
those narrowings of the gap were. They re-
main as I indicated the last time that we
spoke.

Q. The President has said the United
States will open discussions with the Palestin-
ians if they recognize Resolution 2Jt2. If the
PLO, in fact, does that, might you conduct

such discussions in New York during the
round of discussions with Foreign Ministers?

Secretary Vance: The President has indi-
cated that if the Palestinians accept clearly
242 — and just to make it clear, that includes
specifically that provision of 242 that relates
to the right of Israel to exist — that we will
talk to the Palestinians.

Q. You said that you had been able to nar-
row the gap on the question of the nature of a
major peace resulting from a peace settle-
ment. Did you yiarrow the gap on any other
core questions while you were here in Israel?

Secretary Vance: Would you repeat the
first part of your question? I'm sorry.

Q. — you had been able to narrow the gap
between the parties on the question of the na-
ture of peace. Were you able to yiarrow the
gap iyi Israel on the other core questions? Or
on any questions?

Secretary Vance: In the discussions here in
Israel we did not narrow the gap any further
than at the time that I left Taif.

Q. Inasmuch as the cochairmen of the
Geneva confereyice will be represented in New
York while you hold those discussions with
the various Foreign Ministers, could you
tell us how you might help the Soviet Uyiion
keep up with the momentum that you have
been fostering in this process?

Secretary Vance: I e.xpect to meet with the
Ambassador from the Soviet Union when I
return to Washington next week; I have
asked him to meet with me. He has indicated
that he [inaudible]. I will give him a general
fill-in with respect to what has happened on
my trip to the Middle East, and we will talk
about how we, as cochairmen, should proceed
from here to continue the process of prepar-
ing ourselves for a Geneva conference.

Q. If the Palestinians will not recognize
Resolutioyi 2k2, will you take the initiative to
change this resolution?

Secretary Vance: No.

Q. At the time of the Likud party election
back in May the question was put to the Ad-

342

Department of State Bulletin

ministration whether they thought it would
he a setback for their plans for peace in the
Middle East. The attitude then was: "Let's
wait and see." Noiv, given the lack of prog-
ress at meetings in the last 2 days, I wonder
if you would agree with that assessment that
some people had made in May that peace
would be more difficult to achieve because of
the election of the Begin government?

Secretary Vance: I don't want to make any
characterizations of the political situation in
any country. Let me say that we, as an in-
termediary, will continue to work between
the parties. We have received cooperation in
our discussions with all of the parties. I do
feel the conversations that we have had have
been useful and will continue to follow out
that process.

Q. Before you set off on this trip, you tvere
asked the question about the sovereignty of
the West Bank area. At that time you said
you did not have an answer to this question.
In the light of your trip, do you now have
an answer?

Secretary Vance: You're going to have to
make your question more clear.

Q. Before you left —

Secretary Vance: Before I left where?

Q. Before you left for this trip, before you
left Washington, you were asked as to who
has sovereignty over the West Bank and at
that time, if I am not misquoting you, you
said that this was a difficult question to
which you did not have an answer.

Secretary Vance: I have nothing further to
add at this time.

Q. You were told that the PLO was out to
make some sort of a change in its public po-
sition. Are you satisfied that they have made
that change because they have announced
several things or do you expect them to say
something further based on what you heard
in Saudi Arabia?

Secretary Vance: I have seen no change so
far that indicates that they accept 242.

Q. Do you expect any further announce-

September 12, 1977

ment from them based on ivhat you heard in
Saudi Arabia?

Secretary Vance: We shall be watching and
waiting.

Q. The American Government seems to be
ready to talk to the PLO if they will accept
2^2. We have heard rather intpassionately
from Mr. Begin, both here and in Washing-
ton, that simply accepting the PLO on the
basis of some words is the equivalent of the
world not taking Mein Kampf seriously in
the 1930's. Does the United States feel that
the PLO is a different body than Mr. Begin
does, or does it simply feel that for the sake
of negotiacions it's worthwhile to deal with
the PLO if it takes the right negotiating step?

Secretary Vance: With respect to Mr.
Begin's characterization of the PLO, I don't
choose to comment on that one way or
another; I don't think it would be appropriate
for me to do so. Let me say that we have, for
a number of years, said that we would not
talk to the PLO until they change their posi-
tion to recognize the right of Israel to exist.
The implication of that was and remains: If
they change that position and recognize the
right of the State of Israel to exist, we would
talk to them.

Q. You spoke about narrowing the gap.
Can you give one concrete detail where the
gap has been narrowed?

Secretary Vance: Yes. I think that in the
question of the nature of peace, the gap has
been narrowed.

Q. You are near the end of your second
trip to the area now and you still report that
wide gaps remain between the positions on
both sides. What is it that you think is going
to happen betweeyi now and your meetings
with the Foreign Ministers in September and
even at those meetings that's going to make a
Geneva peace conference possible this year?

Secretary Vance: As I have proceeded
through these discussions during this last
trip, we have been able to get into more
detail — much more detail — on the substance
of the various issues and the position there-

343

fore of the parties on these issues. In doing
that we have found that in some cases what
appeared to be irreconcilable differences have
disappeared. My hope is that we can continue
to deal more in peace treaties among the par-
ties, that we will find it possible to further
narrow these differences and isolate those
remaining key issues where it is impossible
to close the gap, and then we will have to
decide whether on that basis it is appropriate
then to proceed on to Geneva — but that is up
to the parties.

Q. Where were you able to narrow the gap
on the nature of peace? What were you able
to bring the Israelis from the Arab side which
suggested that —

Secretary Vance: I'm not going to get into
details on this. As I've indicated, I'm going
to stay away from the details on this. Let me
say that I have found more flexibility on the
question of the nature of peace on the Arab
side than I had seen before. That's all I think
I ought to say.

Q. Is that true of all the Arab governynents
that you spoke with or just some of them?

Secretary Vance: Some of them.

Q. Do yon think you've made any progress
in persuading Mr. Begin that basically the
Arabs do want to make peace and not just es-
tablish a better position for a further war?

Secretary Va)ice: I think he was very in-
terested in the conclusion which I expressed
to him that it is my belief that the Arabs
really do want to make peace, and I believe
that Mr. Begin wants to make peace as well.
The problem, however, is accepting the
goodwill on the part of all the parties want-
ing to get to a peaceful solution. How do you
overcome the problems that remain? That's a
tough problem that's going to take time.

Q. Do you think you made progress in per-
suading thon to listen to that goodwill on the
Arab side?

Secretary Vance: I hope so, and I believe
that I may have.

Q. One of the [inaudible] iyi the Middle
East is that it is up to the parties themselves

to resolve this problem left to their own de-
vices. They've had four wars so far. If the
United States clearly has interests in this
area, at what point might the United States
be prepared to act solely in its own interests?

Secretary Vance: I don't want to speculate
with respect to the future. I have said to
you, and I repeat again, that we are now
making suggestions of our own views in re-
spect to each of the parties and soliciting
their reaction to those suggestions which we
are making. Some of those suggestions have
met with favor; others have, as you might ex-
pect, been turned down, and we will continue
to make suggestions of our own. That's as far
as I want to go at this point.

Q. In the Arab world we were told by some
of the leaders there that they feel it is only
worthwhile to go to a Geneva conference if, in
advance, they can have some assurance that
the general principles underlying a
settlement — a comprehensive settlement — are
within the range of possibility at such a con-
ference. Do you agree with that point of
view? Do you think it's one that is valid, and
do you feel that such a statement of general
principles in advance of Geneva is a
possibility?

Secretary Vance: I have been discussing
with the parties — not only including the Arab
parties, but the Israelis as well — general
principles that might govern a Geneva con-
ference and thus operate as a framework. I
find agreement among them on some of these
principles. I find differences of wording on
others, and on one, such as the Palestinian
entity, I find a sharp, almost total division.
But I must say that I do find some agree-
ment and some agreement except for lan-
guage on others.

Q. Let's suggest that you may have drawn
up a U.S. idea of what general principles
may be for their consideration. Have you
done so?

Secretary Vance: 1 have discussed with
them our suggestions as to what the general
principles might be.

Q. Getting back to the proximity talks, are
you satisfied that the Israelis —

344

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Vance: You keep calling them
proximity talks.

Q. Well, because I realize the reason you
chose not to. Are you satisfied that during
these proximity talks the Israelis will con-
tinue their conversations with you even
though the United States at that point may be
in discussion with the PLO?

Secretary Vance: I have considered that.

Q. Have you received assurances from the
Israelis that they will continue talks even
though the United States may at that time be
talking to the PLO?

Secretary Vance: That specific question has
not been raised between the Israelis and our-
selves. They have indicated that their
Foreign Minister will be in New York at that
time. I hope that he would meet with me.

Q. Did you expect to make more progress
on this trip? Do you regret not having made
more progress on this trip?

Secretary Vance: You've asked me that
same question before on other trips.

Q. It's still valid.

Secretary Vance: You want me to answer
it. I'll answer his question.

Q. The Israelis agree that talks in New
York should be about substayitive matters
also, not only about procedural matters.

Secretary Vance: Let me answer that, and
I'll come back to your question. Yes, they
clearly should be about substantive matters.

Q. Do the Israelis agree to that?

Secretary Vance: Yes. Now, your question
was do I feel that I would like to have made
more progress. The answer is yes. I would
like to have made more progress. But, I feel
that these visits to the various countries have
been useful, even though sharp differences
remain between the parties.

Q. You say America is not initiating any
change in 2^2. Woiild America veto any at-
tempt to either change 2^2 or bring in an ad-
dendum to 2U2? Or could a situation arrive

where America would support moves to
change 2U2?

Secretary Vance: Let me say, I hope there
will be no attempt to amend 242, and we will
discourage any attempt to amend 242.

Q. But will you veto any attonpt to change

2h2?

Secretary Vance: When the time comes,
we'll deal with that question. We might.

Q. Excuse me, perhaps I misunderstand,
but I thought you had stated rather flatly not
too long ago — perhaps a day or two ago —
that the United States opposes any change in

2i2.

Secretary Vance: We do.

Q. Well then, why would you simply dis-
courage it? Why wouldn't you simply stop it
from happening?

Secretary Vance: I hope that it will not
come. And I say I hope it'll never even come
to the United Nations.

Q. These fundamental differences — can't
they be bridged? And if you cannot go to a
Geneva conference and really make progress
on the comprehensive settlement which you
and President Carter have spoken about, do
you think the American taxpayers and Con-
gress will continue to subsidize, with very
large sums, the economies of both Israel and
several of the Arab countries and to provide
armaments to both Israel and several of the
Arab countries, knowing the inevitable fact
of a likely war ahead?

Secretary Vance: Our commitment to the
security of Israel is clear and unequivocal,
and we will continue to provide to Israel
what is necessary to preserve its security.

NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY VANCE AND
FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN, LONDON, AUG. 1 2

Press release 389 dated August 13

Foreign Secretary David Owen: Well,
we're sorry to keep you waiting — that's the
first thing — and we realize it's been a day
and I hope you'll understand if we don't say a

September 12, 1977

345

great deal of detail about the discussions.

We've had nearly six and a half hours of
discussions about them. I'd say that they've
been very serious, detailed discussions held
in an open atmosphere; serious discussions of
a group of individuals all of whom I think
have one purpose, which is to try and bring
about peace and stability in southern Africa.
And these are part of the discussions that
have been going on now ever since the
Anglo-U.S. initiative was launched over the
whole problem of Rhodesia and bringing
about an independent Zimbabwe, and they
will culminate fairly soon now in our spring-
ing forward, as we promised we would, our
views on the way we can achieve a
negotiated settlement. And there are still
further discussions with the other parties to
the whole of the problem which need to be
undertaken and the exact timing of these and
the exact way forward; we will make our de-
cisions on these in the light of the further
discussions. Well, I think this has been a
good meeting — very good meeting.

Secretary Vance: You've described it ad-
mirably, and I think we ought to take any
questions they may have.

Q. I hope you ivon'f misunderstand my
question, but what kept you?

Foreign Secretary Owen: This is a big prob-
lem; it's been — it goes back in history, some
would say to 1926, some would say earlier
than that. These are the detailed things, and
the fact that we took a long time over it is a
good sign, not a bad sign. It would have been
very easy to have had a meeting lasting half
an hour. That would not have been a good
sign. This was a meeting going into consider-
able detail in a sensible way of trying to
reach a sensible solution to the problem; so I
think that the length of time was an indica-
tion of the seriousness and the depth of the
discussion.

Secretary Vance: These are very, very
complex issues, and a thorough discussion of
such issues is bound to take time and I quite
agree with David that it is, it was, a good
meeting because there was such a full and
thorough discussion of these issues.

Q. Is the South African Government still
cooperating with the effort to the same extent
it did 6 months ago?

Foreign Secretary Owen: Well, the South
African Government, when I went out there
and discussed it with the Prime Minister
[John Vorster], gave this whole concept of an
Anglo-U.S. initiative in April a fair wind, and
they have done so throughout. They've said
that there are problems and this is the thing,
but they have been ready to discuss the prob-
lem with us.

They pointed out where they think we
should focus the main emphasis of the discus-
sion, but we've kept them — they've been
aware of the various aspects of the discus-
sions and negotiations. Cy would have said
that this is part of a continuum which they
started when we first launched the initiative.
They've never — they've always adopted the
attitude that this is worth doing, and I be-
lieve that it is in their national interests to
have a stable, democratic country on their
borders, and I think that an independent
Zimbabwe is something which they accept
now as being something which is in their best
interests.

Q. What is it that the United States can do
about this in the first place, and secondly,
why is the United States really involved? It
doesn't have any real vital interests in
Rhodesia.

Secretary Vance: Answering your first
question — what can we do about it? — I think
we can constructively work with our British
colleagues in preparing proposals and imple-
menting those proposals for a peaceful res-
olution of the Rhodesian question. I think
that we have made good progress in develop-
ing the proposals which will be made public
in the not too distant future. Let me just
continue, if I may.

You ask why is the United States in-
volved? The issues involved here are the is-
sues of importance, not only to the people of
Rhodesia, or Zimbabwe, themselves, but
they are issues which are important to the
peace of the world as well, and therefore I
think it is entirely appropriate that the

346

Department of State Bulletin

United States should be working shoulder-
to-shoulder with our British allies and
colleagues.

Q. Can you clarify the question of prog-
ress? Have the proposals now been finalized
and do they have a measure of South African
endorsement?

Foreign Secretary Owen: Well, I think that
the proposals will be finalized in the sense
the day they're published, and there are fur-
ther discussions and explanations which we
will need to go through. So to that extent, I
think that one must await the publication of
the proposals.

And as to the question of South Africa's at-
titude to this, this is something for them to
express, and I think they will want to see the
final proposals themselves before they form a
final judgment on it. What you can say is
that they have a much clearer idea of what
we're doing now as a result of the discussions
that have been held today.

Q. When you were in Washington these
were described in the press as one maji, one
vote proposals or a one man, one vote
scheine. Would that description still hold and
really what have you done since Washington?,
How have you advanced this by going into
more detail or have you changed the concept
in any sense — the approach?

Foreigyt Secretary Owen: I think that the
Washington meeting with the President was
a crucial meeting in terms of the approach,
and what one has been doing ever since then
has been — that was part of the continuum of
the discussions going on actually since
April — but that was a time when we came
with the definite decision that the time was
now to lay down proposals. And, since Wash-
ington, there have been a great deal of dis-
cussions between ourselves about aspects of
details, and there have been further meetings
which have been taking place, as you know,
as part of this whole process.

Q. Was there any sensitivity o)i your part
or on the American part in calling this one
man — can both of you gentlemen say one
man, one vote in public?

Foreign Secretary Owen: We've been say-
ing this for some weeks — months — now, that
the franchise should be universal suffrage.

Q. What about the transition problem? If
this is one of the problems that certainly — o.s
far as Mr. Smith [Ian Smith, Prime Minis-
ter of the white regime in Rhodesia] in Salis-
bury objected to some of the proposals that
ivere made, have you advanced in this area?

Foreign Secretary Owen: I really don't
think we should get into too much of the de-
tails of the proposals. The time for that will
be when they are published and that is, you
know, something which is when we'll deal
with it.

Q. Do you have some sort of time frame?
How soon?

Foreign Secretary Owen: I don't think I
want to be drawn. I think you'll discover
when we publish it, when we announce the
publication date. I mean the basic thing
which we've got to do is conduct a few more
discussions. There are a lot of parties that
are interested in this issue; the Rhodesian
elections which are being called by Mr. Smith
without any consultations with anyone and
will involve 3 percent of the electorate in
Rhodesia. They're an element, but there are
other elements and other countries and other
leaders that are involved and other people of
parties in the dispute which need to have this
discussed with them.

Q. Will these sort of discussions involve
you going to Africa again in the 7iear future?

Foreign Secretary Owen: I think they
probably will, yes.

Q. Will you be accompanied by Mr. Young
[U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Andrew Yoting]?

Foreign Secretary Owen: I'm not absolutely
certain of any of this. When, how, who,
where, what we see — none of that has been
finalized yet.

Q. Suppose we speculate it as being before
the end of this month. Would that be?

September 12, 1977

347

Foreign Secretary Owen: Yes, I think
you'd not be too fai* off the mark.

Q. Will you be accompanied by Mr. Young
on this visit?

Foreign Secretary Owen: We've not made
any decisions about the structure, the form,
when we go, or anything at this moment in
time.

Q. On the fundaynevtal issue about one
man, one vote, is the South African Govern-
ment really actively going to try and press
this on the Smith regime?

Foreign Secretary Owen: Well, I think
these questions about the actions of the
South African Government you should ad-
dress to them. I think you should not expect
them to give you specific answers now; they
would want to see the final proposals.

Q. // iVs so vague, one might suggest with
respect, as they say, today's meeting hasn't
actually accomplished anything at all.

Foreign Secretary Owen: Well, the
Anglo-U.S. initiative is being written off now
over the last few months on a number of oc-
casions and I know it's hai'd for everybody to
accept. We would like to try to take you into
our confidence as much as possible and give
you as much information, but we've got to
face it that these are discussions that are
continuing, and the day we go public will be
the day decided to publish them.

Q. Does the demand for the one man, one
vote apply to South Africa as well as to
Rhodesia?

Foreign Secretary Oiven: We're dealing
here with the problem of Rhodesia and,
though all of these issues have some relation-
ship to the whole framework of southern
Africa and go both up and down, the issue
which we're discussing now is the question of
Rhodesia and how we get majority rule gov-
ernment there.

Q. Did Mr. Botha [South African Minister
of Foreign Affairs] support some of the pro-
posals you've worked out, because you've just
indicated that they would not support them
until you see the final one? Does this imply

that you will have to visit South Africa as
well as the other places before the final pub-
lication of the proposals?

Foreign Secretary Owen: We've not
finalized any definite decisions on visits as
yet, and, as to the question of Mr. Botha's
attitude, you must ask him.

Q. Why isn't he here with you and Mr.
Vance?

Foreign Secretary Otven: There's no par-
ticular reason. We decided that we would
talk about our own initiatives and he would
talk to his press and to any other people who
wish to talk to him.

Secretary Vance: David, might I make a
comment here? Insofar as the details of the
proposals which will eventually be put for-
ward, I think it would be quite inappropriate
to discuss them until David has had a chance
to discuss the proposals with each of the par-
ties involved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you consider it a
working group?

Q. Will you be seeing President Nyerere
[of Tanzania] tomorrow?

Foreign Secretary Owen: You seem to be
very keen to get it absolutely specific — of
who e.xactly I am going to see and when. I
am not going to be drawn too much on detail
of who I am going to see and when. Once I
start on that I'll be scheduling a complete
itinerary over the next few weeks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will you be seeing Presi-
dent Nyerere?

Secretary Vance: Yes, I will be seeing
President Nyerere tomorrow. It's either
going to be at ten or ten thirty, sometime in
that neighborhood, at a time which is con-
venient to him.

Q. Where?

Secretary Vance: I believe it's going to be
at the Excelsior Hotel, which I think is at
Heathrow.

Q. Is the clock still running — is the dead-

348

Department of State Bullet

'"l.

line that we've been talking about still the
end of 1978?

Foreign Secretary Owen: That's your dead-
line. The clock is still running; I hope and be-
lieve that it's possible to see it — an independ-
ent Zimbabwe — much earlier than that.
Certainly earlier than the end of 1978.

Q. When the plan is published, will it be
detailed or will other details still have to be
negotiated after the plan has been pjiblished?

Foreign Secretary Owen: It will be
detailed.

Q. Do you still believe that Mr. Smith is
sincere in his commitment to majority rule
within 2 years?

Foreign Secretary Owen: I wish I knew.

Q. Are you still working on that basis?

Foreign Secretary Owen: I have always
said that I can only operate on the basis of
discussions with him that he means what he
says. There is some confusion as to what he
is saying.

Q. Have yozi had any evidence of these
commitments?

Foreign Secretary Oweyi: If I had concrete
evidence, I would answer that I knew what
his intentions were. I hope that he has ac-
cepted the reality of life, which is that there
will have to be a transfer to majority rule
and that is in the interests of the white
Rhodesians and the black Rhodesians and
that that should be based on one man, one
vote; it should be based on free and fair elec-
tions and that it should be the people who
will live under a Zimbabwe government who
should decide who that government should
be.

Q. The Rhodesian problem, obviously has
been going on for some time. What makes
yoii confident that you think there can be an
independent Zimbabwe before the end of
1978?

Foreign Secretary Owen: I said I hope.

Q. Yes, but why do you think that these

proposals will succeed where somebody who
walked that path before, et cetera?

Foreign Secretary Owen: I've never been
exactly an optimist about any of these pro-
posals, but I think as you get closer and as
more and more people see the necessity of
resolving this conflict, then anyone's hopes
are that the sanity of ending this in a
negotiated settlement is the only way that is
going to serve the objectives of almost all the
parties involved. One just hopes that they
will see this — that it is a senseless conflict
going on there where people's lives are being
lost and that in the last analysis we can only
hope.

Q. Is there any indication that the Patriot-
ic Front [a merger of Joshua Nkomo and
Robert Mugabe to present a united front for
the liberation movement] will — is amenable
to a type of negotiated settlement that you
are talking about?

Foreign Secretary Owen: Yes.

Q. They still are interested in not winning
by force?

Foreign Secretary Owen: I believe that
they do accept that there must be elections to
choose future governments of Zimbabwe,
yes.

Q. Can I ask both of you how much pres-
sure are you each willing to put on South Af-
rica to, in turn, put pressure on Rhodesia to
go along?

Secretary Vance: I think the answer to
that should be that we should await South
Africa's response to the complete proposals
and, hopefully, they will respond affirma-
tively to those proposals.

Foreign Secretary Owen: I believe that's
what we want — a considered, constructive
response. But I think that one ought not to
expect first a response until they see the
final proposals, and even then I think they
are going to want to look at this. This will be
a detailed package which, we beheve, when
people look at it — fair-minded people — will
see it as an honest attempt to reach a solu-

September 12, 1977

349

tion to this very great problem. I don't think
we're going to get very much further.

Q. Is it fair to say that your discussion
today was largely devoted to explaining these
complex details rather than receiving from
the South Africans a judgment on them
piece-by-piece?

Secretary Vance: We did discuss at length
the outline and general substance of a
number of the ideas w^hich we have in con-
nection with these proposals, and we did ex-
plain them at length and answered a large
number of questions with respect to what
they involved and how they would operate. I
think that's fair to describe it, don't you?

Foreign Secretary Owen: Absolutely.

Q. Did you get an interim response from
the South Africans today on the proposals
you presented?

Secretary Vance: First, let me say I don't
think we ought to speak for the South Afri-
cans; the South Africans can speak for them-
selves on this. Secondly, I would like to say
that it was inappropriate to ask for an
interim response today because they do not
have all of the matters necessary to ask for
an answer.

Q. But did they give you an intenm re-
sponse in any case?

Secretary Vance: I don't want to say any
more. Ask them.

Q. Did they in any ivay help shape what's
going on? I hate the word input, but was
there a South African input or were they
kind of sitting in the bleachers watchiyig you
work?

Foreign Secretary Owen: In the bleachers,
I am not sure we were in the bleachers, we
were —

Q. No, they, not you.

Foreign Secretary Owen: I don't think they
were. We were, both of us, in the stadium;
we were grappling with the pi'oblem. I think
that's the way I would put it. This was a
serious working meeting dealing with the
complexities and the detail of a package which

we all know will never satisfy every single
element. There is no way, given all the con-
flicting views that are held by the various
different elements in this, that all parts of a
package will be acceptable. There's no way
that that will be. What we have to do is to
put forward proposals that seem to be fair
and honorable and offer a way forward to a
negotiated settlement. That's been our
objective.

Secretary Vance: I would only add that we
sought their views with respect to aspects of
the package as we outlined it to them, and
where they felt it appropriate to respond
they did so.

Q. You mentioned you used the phrase
"sought their views." Does that mean that it
was your feeling and Dr. Owen's to invite the
South Africans to come and participate, in
other words the initiative came from the two
Secretaries of State here?

Secretary Vance: Indeed. All of us have a
common objective, and the common objective,
as David has said, is the objective of the
search for a negotiated peaceful solution to
the Rhodesian problem. And we invited them
to come and discuss with us our thoughts as
they currently stand with respect to these
matters, so that we could have the benefit of
their thinking and could convey our views.

NEWS CONFERENCE ABOARD AIRCRAFT

EN ROUTE LONDON-WASHINGTON, AUGUST 13

Press release 398 dated August 17

Secretary Vance: Let me talk a little bit
about southern Africa and Rhodesia. We've
now completed our work with the British, we
have completed a detailed plan with annexes
which will be a package that we will be taking
around to describe to the parties and sub-
sequent to that we'll be making public. We've
been working on it for a long time now. We
have finally completed all of our work and are
prepared to move forward with it.

The next step will, of course, be to describe
it to the various parties involved, and that
will require a trip to Africa. David will be tak-

350

Department of State Bulletin

ing that trip and Andy will be accompanying
David on the trip. There may be others, such
as Dick Moose [Richard M. Moose, Jr., As-
sistant Secretary for African Affairs], going
along when they take it around to describe it
to the various leaders.

Q. Wheyi are they planning to leave?

Secretary Vance: I can't give you a precise
date on that because the scheduling is now
being worked out with the parties, but it will
be soon.

Q. Will that include South Africa too, since
Botha was present yesterday?

Secretary Vance: It could. I don't know
whether it will or not, but it could.

Q. Did you describe the plan to Nyerere
this morning?

Secretary Vance: I described to him some of
the details of the plan. He is already familiar
with the general outline of the plan from his
discussions with the President when they
were in Washington, and we discussed some
of the specific details of the plan during our
meeting this morning at the Excelsior. We be-
lieve the plan is fair and reasonable. We be-
lieve that it should commend itself to the par-
ties and to international opinion, and we will,
as I said, be putting it forward to them and
then publicly, probably before the end of the
month.

Q. Mr. Owen indicated that these proposals
are not really finalized yet. Is that correct?

Secretary Vance: Today, we have reached
in our discussions final agreement on the plans
and the detail underlying the plans.

Q. As I understand the process, when you
go to South Africa, you are not going to con-
sult with -them; you are going to tell them
what it is. It is not any longer to be modified.

Secretary Vance: We will, of course, if any-
body has any suggestion that they want to
make, we will listen to the suggestion. If it
commends — if it seems to us it's something
that we have left out that should be in there,
we will of course consider that, but basically
we have completed our work on the plans.

Q. Are you going to see Nkomo on Monday
[Joshua Nkomo, President, Zimbabwe Afri-
can People's Union (ZAPU)]?

Secretary Vance: Yes, I will see Nkomo on
Monday. He has asked to see me and I will be
happy to see him as I was Muzorewa this
morning [Bishop Abel Muzorewa, head of the
African National Council (ANC)].

Q. How much have you already put to
Botha?

Secretary Vance: He knows the general out-
line of the plan and some of the details.

Q. But the fact that you're going ahead, I
think, would suggest that he's at least not op-
posed, that he buys —

Secretary Vance: Obviously, Botha's got to
talk to his Prime Minister and get the full de-
tail of the plan.

Q. Is this essentially an evolution of the
plan to have [inaudible]?

Secretary Vance: Yes, that's correct.

Q. Will Yowng and Owen conceivably see
Smith?

Secretary Vance: Conceivably they could. I
don't want to say who they are going to see
because it hasn't been worked out yet.

Q. What happens if either Smith or the Pa-
triotic Front [inaudible]?

Secretary Vance: We have thought out all
the contingencies that we can possibly con-
ceive of. We have made contingency plans for
those various alternatives. I don't want to in-
dicate at this point what those various con-
tingencies are. We'll wait and see what hap-
pens when we get the reactions of the various
parties.

Q. Were these a series of qualified plans?

Secretary Vance: Let me describe them
seriously. It is simply that we have examined
all the various contingencies, and we have de-
cided on the alternatives that we would have
and the choices that we would have to make
under those circumstances.

Q. Will this require that Owen see Smith?

September 12, 1977

351

Secretary Vance: I said I do not know.

Q. Will this require expenditure of money
or other such things that take or require con-
gressional authorization?

Secretary Vance: In a general sense I can
say that included within the plan is provision
for a Zimbabwe development fund.

Q. What is the American attitude now to
making it available to whites and blacks?

Secretary Vance: I'm not going to try and
describe it at this point. Let me just say that,
because I don't want to go into the details as
we indicated yesterday we shouldn't.

Q. Can you give us the amount of the fund?

Secretary Vance: No, I'm not going to go
into that kind of detail.

Q. What is the attitude now on the guerrilla
war? Mr. Nyerere gave reporters the impres-
sion that the United States supports guerrilla
war and you are seeking the same thing he is.
Does the United States back a guerrilla war
as an alternative if nothing else works out?

Secretary Vance: We have a common objec-
tive in that we both want to see the end of the
war. We want to see an election which will de-
cide on a one man, one vote who the govern-
ment of Zimbabwe should be. We want to see
this done in a peaceful manner. And our objec-
tive is to bring the war, which is going on, to
a prompt termination by peaceful means.

Q. Mr. Owen said yesterday that he had
reason to believe that the Patriotic Front
[inaudible] Mugabe [Robert Mugabe, Secre-
tary General, Zimbabwe African National
Union (ZANU)] would indeed be willing to
accept the verdict of an election within Zim-
babwe. Could you expand on what there is
that leads him to believe that?

Secretary Vance: I don't want to expand on
that. That is the view which the Foreign Sec-
retary has after discussions he has had with
various parties. That is his view; I don't have
any reason to disagree with him.

Q. Did you go over this with Muzorewa this
morning?

Secretary Vance: No I did not, because we
had not finalized the plan, and I merely dis-
cussed with him the fact that we were prepar-
ing a plan, that it was almost completed, that
it would be discussed with the parties when it
was completed, and it would be discussed with
them in detail.

Q. When does the plan envisage independ-
ence for Zimbabwe?

Secretary Vance: 1978. No more detail than

that.

Q. As I recall, when Owen was in Washing-
ton for consultations with you, it was said
that the plan would not only be completed but
would be disclosed.

Secretary Vance: Would have disclosed? I
don't think it was; I think you're wrong.

Q. When are you going to see the Presi-
dent?

Secretary Vance: I'm going to see the Pres-
ident tomorrow at 2 p.m.

Q. Does he know all the details yet?

Secretary Vance: Almost all of them.

Q. How and when [inaudible]?

Secretary Vance: We finally reached
agreement.

Q. How big a document is it all together? Is
it 200 pages?

Secretary Vance: No, it's not that long.

Q. Is there a constitution included in with
that?

Secretary Vance: There is included in with
it a constitution, yes.

Q. Is it several hundred pages or —

Secretary Vance: No, I don't want to
characterize the number of pages exactly be-
cause I didn't count them.

Q. When do you think you will be able to
make public the Middle East proposals that
you have been playing off against the parties?

Secretary Vance: I don't know the answer

352

Department of State Bulletin

to that. Yes, obviously some day I will be able
to do that. I can't do it now. I wish I could but
I don't think that it would be useful to do so. I
think that it's necessary that I continue to
keep my discussions with the parties, and our
specific proposals to them, confidential among
the parties for the time being. And when I
think we can do it and do it fairly and prop-
erly, I will do so; but I simply cannot at this
point.

Q. What about the New York meetings? As
you look at it now, is there any difference in
level of participation betiveen Syria, Egypt,
and Jordan? I ask because there was a Reu-
ters' story out of Damascus this morning in
the Guardian that said while Egypt and Jor-
dan would participate in indirect negotia-
tions, Syria would not. Khaddam [Syrian
Minister of Foreign Affairs] would not he
there to participate.

Secretary Vance: What the story said
was — as I read the story — that the Foreign
Minister of Syria would be coming and he
would be meeting with me. And that is right;
he will be.

Q. Well, it sounded like he was going to be
a little less of a participant than Fahmi
[Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs] and
the Jordanian.

Secretary Vance: I'm going to be talking
with each of the Foreign Ministers when they
come, and Khaddam is going to be one of
them. I don't want to add anything to that.

Q. May I put it this way? Syria is involved
in whatever is going on as Egypt and Jordan
are.

Secretary Vance: Syria will continue to talk
to lis about the Middle East and the solutions
to the Middle East problem as they have been
talking to us in the past. We are going to con-
tinue our discussions between now and the
time that Minister Khaddam comes to the
United Nations, as we will continue them
then.

Q. Could you say whether you heard any-
thing further from the PLO intermediaries, or
whatever, aboiit their approach to 2^2?

Secretary Vance: No, I have not.

Q. Do you have a response from all the par-
ties with regard to your proposals, or are you
still waiting for someone to answer your
suggestions?

Secretary Vance: No. I have had the initial
reactions of each of them at this point. All of
them I hope are going to reflect further on
what they had to say, as I did on what they
had to say. Hopefully, out of this continuing
process, we can continue to try to move
forward.

Q. [Inaudible] Nkomo? Will you give him
the details before —

Secretary Vance: Did everyone hear the
question? The question is, will I, when I talk
to Nkomo, go into the details with him? And
the answer is no. I think that should be left
for David Owen and Andy when they go and
see the others. The others will all be getting
the details at about the same time. Therefore,
it would be appropriate for them to get it from
them, rather than me. We will probably be
talking more in general terms rather than —

Q. When we came back from the Middle
East the last time, we asked if you planned to
go back, and you said if necessary you would.
We did, and we're on our way home. Do you
see a third trip in this?

Secretary Vance: At this point I'm looking
forward to seeing my colleagues at the United
Nations, and we'll see what happens when
they come back.

Q. If the Israeli position is as Begin has
consisteyitly said it is with respect to the '67
borders, with respect to the Palestinian en-
tity, or ivhatever word you want to put on it,
what possibility is there for a comprehensive
settlement along the lines that have been set
out by everybody ivho's ever dealt with the
problem?

Secretary Vance: They also say that every-
thing is negotiable.

Q. But isn't that just a ploy to get around
the heat that they would take if they admitted

September 12, 1977

353

that it wasn't, really^ The party platform sets
it out; his speeches set it out.

Secretary Vance: I think we'll have to wait
and see.

Q. He gave no indication that he planned to
back away from that, other thaii that every-
thing is negotiable?

Secretary Vance: Other than that, no.

Q. Can you convince the Arabs that Israel
is sincere in saying that everything is negoti-
able?

Secretary Va)tce: I reported to them what
had been said on that.

Q. [Inaudible]?

Secretary Vance: Yes, I'm going to be focus-
ing almost exclusively on China this week —
getting ready for the China trip. I will be, of
course, working on some other things that I
have to clean up before I go to China.

I want to make sure that we are now get-
ting geared up properly on the Panama situa-
tion. I'm delighted that the canal treaty
negotiations have been completed. I think our
negotiators did a superb job on that. I con-
gratulate them for the way they have been
able to carry this forward. I think the
Panamanians have handled their side very
well, too. I think it has been a very good
negotiation. But we've got a lot of work to do
now.

Q. Are we leaving \for China] on Friday,
Saturday, or Sunday?

Secretary Vance: Saturday we leave.

Q. Has the review of China policy been
completed?

Secretary Vance: I will be having another
meeting with the President before I go. We've
done most all of our work.

Q. Is it possible that the China trip will
take care of the Taiwan problem that would
produce normalization?

Secretary Vance: I don't want to speculate
on that.

Q. Do you expect that you and the Presi-
dent will make some policy statement before
you go to China?

Secretary Vance: No.

Q. No press conference before you leave?

Secretary Vance: No, I don't think so.

Q. Can you sum up the Middle East for us?
What do you feel this trip has accomplished?

Secretary Vaiice: I have been into not only
the general outlines of a settlement but at the
underlying detail of the substantive and pro-
cedural issues now with each of the parties in-
volved. I have presented to them suggestions
that we have for narrowing the differences
between the parties. I have their responses to
this, which in some cases has permitted a nar-
rowing of differences; in some cases where
further narrowing may be possible although it
is not in hand at this point. It has clarified
where the most difficult issues are and what
the position of the parties is on these issues in
the kind of substantive detail that is neces-
sary to an understanding of the position on
those issues, and thus, gives us a better un-
derstanding of how one might hope to attack
the differences between the parties on these
issues.

Let me say that it is clear at the end of this
trip that there are, as I indicated at my press
conference, deep and strong differences on
key issues. I think now we can continue the
process of trying to find ways to bridge these
gaps and discussing this with the various indi-
vidual Foreign Ministers when they come to
the United States.

Q. Have you asked them to do anything
pHor to the time that they go to the United
Nations? Are you going to do it all?

Secretary Vance: No. I have asked them to
do certain things.

Q. You talk about a narrowing of certain
differences. Did the narrowing result from
American suggestions or because both sides
shifted slightly on their own?

Secretary Vance: Both.

354

Department of State Bulletin

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, AUGUST 14

white House press release dated August 14

Secretary Vance reported on August 14 to
the President on his discussions in Egypt,
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and
Israel, which continued the Administration's
sustained search for a just and lasting peace in
the Middle East. He also reported on the talks
held in London concerning southern Africa.

Secretary Vance held in-depth discussions
on all issues, both substantive and procedural
and with each of the leaders he met. He
suggested a number of principles which might
guide the negotiations and discussed with the
parties their proposals on how to narrow the
remaining differences. Progress was made in
some areas, particularly in reaffirming Secu-
rity Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as the
basis for negotiations and in moving closer to
a common concept of the mutual obligations of
peace, although much remains to be accom-
plished in this respect. Major differences be-
tween Arabs and Israelis remain — on how
Palestinian views can best be represented in
negotiations, but also on the definition of se-
cure and recognized borders and the nature of
a Palestinian settlement.

Difficult choices requiring courageous lead-
ership face all parties in the future. President
Carter and the Secretary believe that all of
the leaders desire peace and are aware of the
dangers of stalemate.

The President emphasized the importance
of making progress in the coming months,
building on the foundations already laid. Each
of the parties had been asked to provide more
detailed expressions of their positions in order
to accelerate the reconvening of a well-
prepared Geneva conference. We remain
hopeful that the conference can be reconvened
this fall. In September the Secretary of State
will mee.t in the United States with their
Foreign Ministers for intensive talks to con-
tinue those held during his trip. The President
will also meet with the Foreign Ministers
during their upcoming visits to the United
States.

The President and the Secretary of State
remain determined to do all that is possible to

bring about a just and lasting peace in the
Middle East. With the approval of all con-
cerned, the United States will use its influ-
ence, offer its advice, volunteer its sugges-
tions, and work to bring the parties into fruit-
ful negotiations. The United States will also
stay in close touch with the Soviet union as a
cochairman of the Geneva conference. Secre-
tary Vance will meet later this week with
[Soviet] Ambassador Dobrynin to discuss his
recent Middle East trip and to hear the latest
Soviet views.

Following the completion of his work in the
Middle East, Secretary Vance conferred with
British and African leaders in London con-
cerning southern Africa. While in London, the
Secretary met with Prime Minister Callaghan,
President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania,
Foreign Minister Botha of South Africa,
Foreign Secretary David Owen, and Bishop
Muzorewa of Rhodesia.

Following recent visits to Washington by
President Nyerere of Tanzania and Foreign
Secretary Owen, a comprehensive proposal
for Rhodesia was drawn up by the British
Government. The details of this proposal were
reviewed and completed during Secretary
Vance's conversations in London with Prime
Minister Callaghan and Foreign Secretary
Owen.

The principal objectives of the joint com-
prehensive proposal are free elections based
on universal suffrage leading to a majority
ruled, independent Zimbabwe in 1978.

After reviewing the Secretary's report, the
President directed that the U.S. Government
work with the British in presenting the full
proposal to all the interested parties as soon
as possible.

The President is confident that the proposal
which has been worked out is fair and reason-
able. He believes that it offers a viable alter-
native to an escalating conflict and, as such, it
deserves the support and cooperation of all
the Rhodesian parties as well as the neighbor-
ing states whose own interests are so directly
affected by events in Rhodesia.

The President and the Secretary of State
were joined by Presidential Assistant for Na-
tional Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

September 12, 1977

355

U.S.-Soviet Relations

A Foreign Relations Ontlitie^

Since the Russian revolution of 1917, the
U.S.-Soviet relationship has gone through
several phases, including a period of minimal
contact, a difficult wartime alliance, intense
cold war rivalry, and, during the 1970's, a
situation described somewhat uneasily as de-
tente. What has emerged is a less intense but
more extensive U.S.-Soviet relationship. Of
obvious but crucial importance is the nuclear
weapons aspect of our relationship, as we both
have the capability to destroy mankind.

U.S.-Soviet relations are complex, with
elements of both disagreement and coopera-
tion. The values espoused by our respective
systems are quite different, and political com-
petition takes place in various parts of the
world. Nevertheless, we have reached agree-
ments with the Soviets on limiting strategic
arms and on other arms-related subjects. We
consult on certain regional issues; we engage
in trade; and we have cooperative agreements
in various scientific and cultural fields.

Over the past 5 years, the United States
and the Soviet Union have steadily expanded
their economic relationship, particularly in
the field of trade. Increased trade with the
U.S.S.R. benefits the United States through
higher employment, an improved balance of
trade, and access to valuable raw materials. It
also increases contact between our two
peoples, gives the U.S.S.R. an incentive to
relax its traditional isolation and play a more
normal role in the world community, and adds
an element of stability to our political rela-
tions. In cooperation with other Western na-
tions, we restrict exports of goods and techno-
logical data which would make a significant
contribution to the military potential of the
Soviet Union and prove detrimental to our se-
curity and that of our allies.

Our goal is a stable U.S.-Soviet relationship

'Based on two Department of State publications in
the GIST series, released in July 1977. This outline is
designed to be a quick reference aid on U.S. foreign re-
lations. It is not intended as a comprehensive U.S.
foreign policy statement.

that will permit us to manage competition
successfully and thereby advance U.S. secu-
rity and world peace. To do this, we must re-
main militarily strong, strengthen our al-
liances, and promote regional stability.

SALT

The 1972 SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks] Interim Agreement on the vital ques-
tion of nuclear weapons expires this fall.
Negotiations are underway on followup
agreements. Our ultimate goal is to end the
dangerous and expensive strategic arms race
by eliminating both countries' nuclear arsen-
als. In the interim the United States has pro-
posed mutual reductions and ceilings on the
number of U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons as
well as constraints on the modernization of
some destabilizing strategic weapons. Our
proposals are designed to be fair to both sides,
to be adequately verifiable, and to achieve
mutual security. In pursuing these negotia-
tions, we will continue to consult fully with
our NATO allies.

MBFR

Since 1973 the United States and NATO
have conducted negotiations on mutual and
balanced force reductions (MBFR) with the
Warsaw Pact to limit the threat of conflict in
central Europe. Progress has been slow but
the United States hopes for agreement based
on collective force level parity in central
Europe between NATO and Warsaw Pact
nations.

Other Arms-Related Issues

The United States seeks Soviet cooperation
in other arms-related fields such as:

— Achieving a comprehensive nuclear test
ban;

— Limiting sale of conventional weapons to
third countries;

— Controlling military activities in the In-
dian Ocean;

— Limiting chemical warfare capabilities;
and

356

Department of State Bulletin

— Forgoing development of antisatellite
warfare capabilities.

Berlin

The United States expects that the 1971
Quadripartite Agreement governing Berlin's
status will be strictly honored and that Four
Power rights in the city as a whole will be re-
spected. We are committed to the freedom of
West Berlin and will employ whatever means
necessary to defend the city.

Eastern Europe

The United States does not recognize any
sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and
deals with East European nations as inde-
pendent and sovereign countries. We are
committed to expanding ties with them, in-
cluding trade.

Third World

The United States is making every effort to
keep the Third World free from superpower
competition. We have expressed our deep
concern about Soviet activities in sub-Saharan
Africa and elsewhere in the developing world,
and we strongly oppose the forceful imposition
of one country's social system upon another.

Soviet-supported Cuban intervention in
Angola and other African nations concerns us
because African problems should be resolved
by Africans alone.

At the same time, the United States does
not seek to prevent the Soviets from cooperat-
ing in settlement processes in such trouble-
spots as the Middle East. In addition, we hope
the Soviets will contribute more to interna-
tional development programs in the Third
World.

Human Rights

The United States is firmly committed to
promoting respect for human rights around
the globe because we believe that U.S.
foreign policy must reflect the basic values of
the American people. We view this position as
compatible with detente and have made it

clear to the U.S.S.R. and all nations that we
will speak out on human rights questions
when we believe it necessary. We do not seek
to change the Soviet political system, nor do
we wish to single out the U.S.S.R. for special
criticism.

The United States hopes for steady prog-
ress in implementing the human rights provi-
sions of the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in
August 1975 in Helsinki, Finland. To that end
the United States has publicly expressed con-
cern for the situation of Soviet Jews and
human rights advocates, including those seek-
ing to promote implementation of the Final Act.

Bilateral Exchanges

Improved U.S. -Soviet relations in the early
1970's led to new exchanges in scientific, edu-
cational, and related fields. By 1977 over 200
projects were being implemented, and 1,000
persons were visiting each other's country
annually.

Growth of Trade

U.S. -Soviet trade has expanded consid-
erably from minimal pre-1972 levels. Two-way
trade totaled only $220 million in 1971 but
stood at $2.5 billion in 1976. Last year the
balance of trade was strongly in our favor; ex-
ports were roughly $2.3 billion — about 65 per-
cent in agricultural products — and imports
about $220 million. However, U.S. -Soviet
trade still accounts for a very small percent-
age of total U.S. trade. Our 1976 exports to
the U.S.S.R. constituted only 2 percent of our
total exports.

Our principal nonagricultural exports in
1976 were machinery and transport equipment
($605 million). The main U.S. imports were
platinum-group metals ($55 million), petro-
leum and petroleum products ($54 million),
and chrome ore ($21 million). U.S. firms are
participating in a number of major Soviet
projects. The two most important involve an
exchange of fertilizer and construction of a
truck factory. All trade with the U.S.S.R. is
subject to export controls that preclude trans-
fer of strategic goods.

September 12, 1977

357

Trade and Emigration

In October 1972 the United States signed a
trade agreement with the U.S.S.R. granting
nondiscriminatory (most-favored-nation) tariff
treatment to Soviet goods in return for cer-
tain Soviet commitments: a declaration of in-
tent to place large orders for U.S. agricultural
and industrial goods; provisions for third-
country commercial arbitration; and improved
facilities for U.S. businessmen in Moscow.
Bringing this agreement into force required
authorizing legislation. The necessary author-
ity was included in the 1975 Trade Act but
was linked to Soviet emigration practices by
the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The Soviets
informed us that they could not accept a trad-
ing relationship on this basis.

The 1975 Trade Act also linked Soviet ac-
cess to Export-Import Bank credits and to
Commodity Credit Corporation financing of
U.S. agricultural exports to the question of
freer emigration. The U.S.S.R. is now ineli-
gible for such credits. Other limits on official
credits for the U.S.S.R. were incorporated in
the Export-Import Bank legislation by the
Stevenson amendment.

Trade Agreements and Joint Bodies

Since 1972 the two governments have en-
tered into a number of economic agreements
embracing a wide range of activities.

— A 1972 agreement regarding settlement
of lend-lease provides for Soviet payment of
$722 million over 30 years, and $48 million has
been paid. Payment of the remaining amount
is conditional on our granting most-favored-
nation treatment to Soviet goods.

— A 1972 maritime agreement (renewed in
1975) relaxed U.S. port restrictions on Soviet
ships and assured U.S. -flag vessels a substan-
tial share of U.S. -Soviet trade.

—Under the 1966 Civil Air Transport
Agreement, regular air service was inaugu-
rated in July 1968 between Moscow and New
York. Following the 1973 summit, civil avia-
tion relations expanded. Aeroflot was given
the right to serve Washington, D.C., as well
as New York, from Moscow, and Pan Ameri-
can was granted the right to service Lenin-

358

grad, in addition to Moscow, from New York.

— A 1974 Long Term Agi-eement To Facili-
tate Economic, Industrial, and Technical
Cooperation provides for a continuing
exchange of economic and commercial
information.

—The August 1975 Final Act of the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
signed at Helsinki, calls for intensified coop-
eration in the fields of economics, science, and
the environment. The United States and the
U.S.S.R., along with more than 30 other
European countries, signed this Final Act.

— A 1975 grain agreement provides for an-
nual Soviet purchases through 1980 of at least
six million tons of U.S. wheat and corn.

— A tax treaty to prevent double taxation of
income became effective in January 1976.

— Under a 1976 international fisheries
agreement, Soviet fishing vessels may catch
regulated amounts and types of fish within the
200-mile U.S. conservation zone established
by the Fisheries Conservation and Manage-
ment Act of 1976.

Since 1972 both governments have also ex-
panded the framework for their commercial
relations.

—A Joint U.S. -U.S.S.R. Commercial
Commission meets periodically to review
bilateral economic relations and to explore
new areas of common economic interest. The
Secretary of the Treasury heads the U.S.
delegation at commission meetings, and the
Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade leads the
Soviet side. The most recent commission
meeting took place in Washington in June
1977.

— A Trade Representation has been estab-
lished at the Soviet Embassy in Washington
and a Commercial Office at the American Em-
bassy in Moscow.

Private Companies

U.S. private companies have also under-
taken important initiatives.

—The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic
Council, currently composed of over 200 U.S.
firms and more than 100 Soviet organizations,

Department of State Bulletin

I'oii,

'eial

'ope,

tke

vas formed in 1973. Its offices in New York
ind Moscow assist businessmen to expand
U.S. -Soviet trade.

—Twenty-five U.S. firms have received
sermission to open offices in Moscow.

— At least 55 American firms have entered
nto science and technology cooperation
agreements with the Soviet State Committee
for Science and Technology.

east

ilUlf

les

tlie

Department Discusses MIA's
in Vietnam and Laos

Following is a statement by Richard C.
Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, made before the
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs
of the House Committee on International Re-
lations on July 27.^

I appreciate the opportunity to appear be-
fore this subcommittee to discuss our continu-
ing efforts to obtain an accounting for Ameri-
cans lost in Southeast Asia. This has been a
personal concern of the President and of the
Secretary of State, and it is one that I share.
I am glad to have with me Frank Sie verts,
our Deputy Coordinator for Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs, who has been di-
rectly responsible in the State Department
for our efforts on behalf of our prisoners of
war and missing personnel. Frank accom-
panied the Presidential Commission on
Americans Missing and Unaccounted For in
Southeast Asia on its trip to Vietnam and
Laos [March 16-20, 1977] and was with me in
Paris at our meetings with the Vietnamese in
May and June.

As the subcommittee knows from its meet-
ing with Leonard Woodcock, the Presidential
Commission laid the basis during its visit to
Hanoi for the progress — limited as it has
been — that has been made in resolving this

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

problem. While in Hanoi the Commission re-
ceived Vietnam's formal undertaking to pro-
vide information on our missing men and to
return remains as they are recovered. It also
reached agreement on establishing a perma-
nent mechanism for continuing exchanges on
this subject. This was an advance from Viet-
nam's previous position, in that other
issues — aid and normalization of relations —
were no longer described as preconditions for
progress on MIA's.^

We attach special importance to Vietnam's
readiness to cooperate in setting up a perma-
nent channel to deal with MIA's. Their
agreement on this was put to the test almost
immediately after departure of the Woodcock
commission, when the misidentification of
two of the remains given to the Commission
was discovered by our Central Identification
Laboratory in Hawaii. We informed the
Vietnamese of these errors and received
their assurance that they would undertake
further efforts in these cases without delay.

Further communications were exchanged
after the Woodcock commission returned to
Washington, and we provided additional in-
formation on specific cases on whom it
seemed especially Hkely that the Vietnamese
would have or could find information. Al-
though the immediate results were limited,
these communications provided the back-
ground for the opening of our talks in Paris
May 3-4, at which Deputy Foreign Minister
Phan Hien led the Vietnamese delegation,
and I headed our team.

As the subcommittee knows from my pre-
vious testimony, in that first meeting we
proposed to the Vietnamese that we proceed
to normalization of relations, including the
exchange of ambassadors. We said we were
prepared to end our trade embargo contin-
gent on the opening of an American Embassy
in Hanoi and that we were prepared to agree
to Vietnam's membership in the United Na-
tions. We also made it clear that progress in
our relations was based on the assumption of
continuing effoils on MIA accounting and re-
turn of remains.

^ For the full text of the Commission's report released
Mar. 23, see Bulletin of Apr. 18, 1977, p. 366.

September 12, 1977

359

In connection with these talks, separate
discussions were held between Frank
Sieverts and his Vietnamese counterpart,
Mr. Vu Hoang, a senior Foreign Ministry of-
ficial and Director of the Vietnamese Office
in Charge of Seeking Information about Per-
sonnel Missing in the War. Mr. Hoang came
to Paris from Hanoi for these talks and ap-
peared to speak authoritatively about Viet-
nam's efforts in this area.

A second negotiating round took place June
2-3, also in Paris, this time at the American
Embassy. We covered much the same ground
in these two days as we had in the first ses-
sion, and Frank again had separate talks with
Vu Hoang, who had returned again from
Hanoi.

During this session the Vietnamese pro-
vided a list of 20 cases of Americans whose
remains they said had been located and were
in the process of being recovered. Some of
these cases were in among these about whom
we had provided detailed information, and
some were not. Names were provided in 15 of
the cases, and in five others the identities
were listed as unknown, marking the first
time the Vietnamese had provided such in-
formation without giving specific names.

In Frank's discussions at the May 3-4
meeting and in his written exchanges with
the Vietnamese, we stressed the desirability
of withholding public announcement of iden-
tities until they could be confirmed by our
laboratory in Hawaii. We made this proposal
in view of the anguish caused for the families
of the men whose remains had been misiden-
tified. At the same time we invited the Viet-
namese to send their own representatives to
visit the laboratory and our Joint Casualty
Resolution Center for a first-hand exchange
of information on this subject.

The Vietnamese had informed Frank they
would agree to withhold public announcement
of names until identifications had been con-
firmed, and they followed this policy in the
case of the 20. We told the Vietnamese we
would immediately inform the families of
those named, but for our part also would
delay public announcement until the remains
had been returned and positively identified.

The Vietnamese also told Frank they would
return the remains of another airman whose
name had been provided at the May 3^ ses
sion (and whose family also has been in
formed), as well as those of the U.S. civihan,
Tucker Gougelmann, whose death in Saigon
had been reported to the Woodcock commis
sion. They said they would additionally re
turn other remains if they were recovered by
the time these remains were ready to return

Although communications have continued
since our June session, no date has been set
for further formal meetings between the
United States and Vietnam. Vietnam has not
accepted, thus far, our proposal for normali-
zation of relations, on the ground that it fails
to provide a commitment to provide U.S. re-
construction assistance, which they view as
having been promised by past agreements.
We have been at pains in our talks in Paris,
and in our public statements, to make clear
our view that there is no such obligation, and
that U.S. aid to Vietnam is prohibited by
specific provisions of law enacted by the
Congress. We continue to hope Vietnam will
set aside its demand for such assistance and
instead will join with us in looking toward a
future in which such questions can be dis-
cussed and resolved under conditions of for-
mal relations.

I would like also to discuss our missing-in-
action efforts in Laos. As Mr. Woodcock in-
formed you, the Presidential Commission
made clear to the Lao authorities the impor-
tance we attach to obtaining the fullest pos-
sible accounting for our personnel lost in that
country. The Lao informed the Commission
that they would undertake renewed efforts to
account for the missing, although they called
attention to the difficulty of the search proc-
ess in view of the rugged and unpopulated
territory of their country. As in Vietnam,
Lao officials stated that no Americans are
held prisoners in their country and that all
Americans who had been captured and who
had survived had been returned.

We have followed up since the Commission
visit by providing the Lao authorities with
additional information on our missing men,
and the Lao have told us they are carrying

360

Department of State Bulletin

out searches for information and remains. My
Deputy, Robert Oakley, pursued this subject
in his talks in Laos in May, and our new
Country Director for Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia — Frederick Brown — is in Vientiane
this week to further address this subject in
meetings with Lao officials.

In conclusion let me say that, although
much remains to be done, I believe a start
has finally been made in obtaining an ac-
counting for our men. We have made clear to
the authorities of both Vietnam and Laos the
importance we attach to their continuing ef-
forts in this area. We are continuing our
technical exchanges and expect a return of
remains from Vietnam before long. Whatever
the progress of our negotiations, I can assure
this committee of our continued determina-
tion to seek the fullest possible accounting
for our men. It is our hope that the responsi-
ble authorities in Indochina understand that
the best way to eliminate this humanitarian
problem as an issue of contention is for them
to provide the fullest accounting of which
they are capable at the earliest possible date.

President Carter Signs
Security Assistance Act

Statement by President Carter^

I am signing into law H.R. 6884, the Inter-
national Security Assistance Act of 1977.^
The programs made possible by this law in-
clude military assistance, international mili-
tary education and training, and foreign mili-
tary sales. The bill gives the United States
an, important tool with which to help meet
reasonable and legitimate defense needs of
our friends and allies. Such help contributes
to our own security.

When I requested these authorizations
from Congress in March, I emphasized my
commitment to reducing conventional arms

'Made on Aug. 5, 1977 (text from Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents dated Aug. 8, 1977).

^As enacted H.R. 6884 is Public Law 95-92, approved
Aug. 4, 1977.

transfers throughout the world and to impos-
ing greater discipline on our own arms trans-
fers. Recently I announced a policy of re-
straint which is a major step toward my goal.
And the military programs authorized by
H.R. 6884 will help us make further progress
by fostering the climate of security so impor-
tant to lasting reductions in the world's arms
trade.

I am pleased to note that some two-thirds
of the funds authorized by the bill, as I had
requested, will be for nonmilitary programs.
These will help bring economic and political
stability to troubled regions of the world.
The security supporting assistance programs
in the bill differ somewhat from those which I
proposed to Congress, but I believe that
H.R. 6884 will, nevertheless, permit us to
carry out an effective overall program in fis-
cal year 1978.

I welcome, in particular, this bill's recogni-
tion of the special importance of security
supporting assistance in the Middle East and
in southern Africa.

However, I must note my serious concern
over sections 16 and 20 of the bill. These pro-
visions amend the Arms Export Control Act
in such a way as to let Congress prevent
Presidential action authorized under law
simply by adopting a concurrent resolution of
disapproval. Such provisions raise major con-
stitutional questions, since Article I, Section
7 of the Constitution requires that congres-
sional action having the force and effect of
law be presented to the President for ap-
proval. These provisions also have the poten-
tial of involving Congress in the execution of
the laws, a responsibility reserved for the
President under the Constitution.

I am approving H.R. 6884 because of its
importance to our foreign relations and na-
tional security, but I must express my deep
reservations about these two provisions and
,ny intention to preserve the constitutional
authority of the President.

I intend to carry out the programs au-
thorized by H.R. 6884 — the first security as-
sistance legislation of my Administration — in
such a way as to improve prospects for inter-
national peace and security.

September 12, 1977

361

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

Tariff Treatment of Film, Strips, Sheets, and Plates of
Certain Plastics or Rubber. Report of the House
Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R.
5285. H. Rept. 9.5^36. June 16, 1977. 5 pp.

Duty-Free Treatment for Istle. Report of the House
Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R.
5322. H. Rept. 95-438. June 16, 1977. 4 pp.

Continuation of Existing Suspension of Duty on Syn-
thetic Rutile. Report of the House Committee on
Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 3387. H. Rept.
95-439. June 16, 1977. 3 pp.

International Navigational Rules. Report of the House
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries to ac-
company H.R. 186. H. Rept. 95-447. June 20, 1977.
64 pp.

Extending the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. Report
of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs to accompany H.R. 6415. S. Rept. 95-
279. June 21, 1977. 5 pp.

Departments of State, .Justice, and Commerce, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill,
1978. Report of the Senate Committee on Appropria-
tions to accompany H.R. 7556. S. Rept. 95-285. June
21, 1977. 82 pp.

Trading With the Enemy Act Reform Legislation. Re-
port of the House Committee on International Rela-
tions on H.R. 7738 with respect to the powers of the
President in time of war or national emergency. H.
Rept. 95-459. June 23, 1977. 22 pp.

national Convention Relating to Interven-
tion on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollu-
tion Casualties by providing that, under cer-
tain circumstances, governments may take
action on the high seas to protect the inter-
ests of their coastal areas from marine pollu-
tion caused by substances other than oil. A
list of such substances, compiled by the
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization, accompanies the Protocol.
Under the terms of the Protocol, the list can
be amended to reflect future technological
developments.

The Protocol is evidence of awareness by
the international community that oil is not
the only potential source of marine pollution,
and that steps must be taken to prevent or
reduce damage from other substances as
well. I recommend that the Senate advise
and consent to its ratification.

Jimmy Carter.
The White House, July 25, 1977.

THE CONGRESS

Marine Pollution Protocol
Transmitted to the Senate

Message from President Carter '

To the Senate of the United States:

I herewith transmit for your consideration
the Protocol Relating to Intervention on the
High Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution by
Substances Other than Oil, 1973. I am also
transmitting a report on this Protocol from
the Department of State.
The Protocol complements the 19G9 Inter-

Convention on International
Transport of Goods

Message from President Carter ^

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and
consent of the Senate to ratification, I
transmit herewith the revised Customs Con-
vention on the International Transport of
Goods under cover of Transport Interna-
tional Routier Garnets (TIR Convention),
done at Geneva on November 14, 1975. I
also transmit, for the information of the
Senate, the report of the Department of
State with respect to the Convention.

The revised TIR Convention is based on
the TIR Convention of 1959 to which the
United States is a party. The revised TIR
Convention contains modernized technical

■ Transmitted on July 25, 1977 (text from Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Aug. 1,
1977); also printed as S.Ex.M, which includes the re-
from the Department of State.

' Transmitted on July 26, 1977 (text from Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Aug. 1,
1977): also printed as S.Ex.M, which includes the re-
port from the Department of State.

362

Department of State Bulletin

provisions which will facilitate transporta-
tion of United States goods. The most im-
portant improvements are that the TIR
Garnet is now to be printed in English as
well as French, and United States goods
transported to Europe which arrive late
under the TIR Garnet will be protected
against administrative delays.

I recommend that the Senate give early
and favorable consideration to the Gonven-
tion and give its advice and consent to ratifi-
cation.

Jimmy Garter.
The White House, July 26, 1977.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Signed at
Entered into force Oc-

Agriculture

North American plant protection agreement
Yosemite October 13, 1976.
tober 13, 1976.
Signatures: Canada, Me.xico, the United States.

Environmental Modification

Convention on the prohibition of military or any other
hostile use of environmental modification techniques,
with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977.'
Signatures: Iraq, August 15, 1977; Nicaragua, Au-
gust 11, 1977.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New
York January 31, 1967. Entered into force October 4,
1967; for the United States November 1, 1968. TIAS
6577.
Notification of succession: Djibouti, August 9, 1977.

Weights and Measures

Convention concerning the creation of an international
office of weights and measures, with annexes. Signed
at Paris May 20, 1875. Entered into force January 1,
1876; for the United States August 2, 1878. 20 Stat.
709.

Adherence deposited: People's Republic of China,
May 20, 1977.

Convention amending the convention relating to
weights and measures. Done at Sevres October 6,

'Not in force.

1921. Entered into force June 23, 1922; for the United
States October 24, 1923. 43 Stat. 1686.
Adherence deposited: People's Republic of China,
May 20, 1977.

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag-
ricultural commodities of April 1, 1977. Effected by
exchange of notes at Dacca August 8, 1977. Entered
into force August 8, 1977.

Egypt

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag-
ricultural commodities of October 26, 1976 (TIAS
8406). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo August
4, 1977. Entered into force August 4, 1977.

Hong Kong

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-
made fiber textiles and textile products, with an-
nexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Hong Kong
August 8, 1977. Entered into force August 8, 1977;
effective January 1, 1978.

Jamaica

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities.
Signed at Kingston August 8, 1977. Entered into
force August 8, 1977.

Korea

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities.
Signed at Seoul July 21, 1977. Entered into force July
21, 1977.

Mexico

Minute 256 of the International Boundary and Water
Commission amending and extending Minute 240, as
amended, relating to emergency deliveries of Col-
orado River waters for use in Tijuana. Signed at
Ciudad Juarez February 22, 1977. Entered into force
July 15, 1977.

Agreement relating to cooperation in the field of geo-
thermal energy research and development, with an-
nex. Signed at Mexico July 21, 1977. Entered into
force July 21, 1977.

Agreement extending the agreement of July 31, 1970,
as amended and extended (TIAS 6941, 7927, 8397) for
a cooperative meteorological observation program in
Mexico. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico and
Tlatelolco June 30 and July 25, 1977. Entered into
force July 25, 1977.

Agreement relating to additional cooperative arrange-
ments to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected
by exchange of letters at Mexico July 29, 1977. En-
tered into force July 29, 1977.

Agreement relating to additional cooperative arrange-
ments to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected
by exchange of letters at Mexico August 5, 1977. En-
tered into force August 5, 1977.

Sweden

Agreement concerning a cooperative program on
radioactive waste storage in deep geologic forma-
tions. Signed at Washington and Stockholm June 17
and July 1, 1977. Entered into force July 1, 1977.

September 12, 1977

363

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Repayment of Loan No. 525-L-014. Agreement with
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TIAS 8550. 3 pp. 600. (Cat. No. 89.10:8550).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Jamaica |
amending the agreements of April 16, 1975, as amended,
and September 30, 1976. TIAS 8551. 3 pp. 60C. (Cat.
No. 89.10:8551).

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Syria amend-
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as amended. TIAS 8552. 3 pp. 60?. (Cat. No.
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Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: August 22-28

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.

No. Uate Subject

*402 8/22 Shipping Coordinating Committee,
Subcommittee on Safety of Life at
Sea, Sept. 29.

t403 8/23 Vance, Huang Hua: exchange of
toasts, Peking, Aug. 22.

'404 8/25 U.S., Philippines amend textile
agreement.

*405 8/26 U.S., Colombia amend bilateral tex-
tile agreement, July 29 and Aug.
17.

t406 8/26 Vance, Huang Hua: exchange of
toasts, Peking, Aug. 25.

t407 8/26 Vance: news conference, Peking,
Aug. 25.

t408 8/27 Vance: departure, Tokyo.

*Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

364

Department of State Bulletin

lEX September 12, 1977 Vol. LXXVII, No. 19H

18 Control and Disarmament. President Car-
Signs Security Assistance Act (Carter) 361

la. Secretary Vance's Visit to the Middle
,st and London July 31-August 13 (Owen,
ladat, Sa'ud, Vance) 329

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy 362

convention on International Transport of Goods

(message from President Carter) 362

)epartment Discusses MIA's in Vietnam and

Laos (Holbrooke) 359

ilarine Pollution Protocol Transmitted to the

Senate (message from President Carter) 362

Economic Affairs. Convention on International
Transport of Goods (message from President
Carter) 362

Sgypt. Secretary Vance's Visit to the Middle
East and London July 31-August 13 (Owen,
Sadat, Sa'ud, Vance) 329

Snvironment. Marine Pollution Protocol Trans-
mitted to the Senate (message from President
Carter) 362

srael. Secretary Vance's Visit to the Middle
East and London July 31-August 13 (Owen,
Sadat, Sa'ud, Vance) 329

lordan. Secretary Vance's Visit to the Middle
last and London July 31-August 13 (Owen,

idat, Sa'ud, Vance) 329

Department Discusses MIA's in Vietnam
id Laos (Holbrooke) 359

inon. Secretary Vance's Visit to the Middle
St and London July 31-August 13 (Owen,
idat, Sa'ud, Vance) 329

itime Affairs. Marine Pollution Protocol
•ansmitted to the Senate (message from Pres-
ent Carter) 362

Idle East. Secretary Vance's Visit to the Mid-
le East and London July 31-August 13 (Owen,
idat, Sa'ud, Vance) 329

lama. Secretary Vance's Visit to the Middle
,East and London July 31-August 13 (Owen,

idat, Sa'ud, Vance) 329

Presidential Documents

Convention on International Transport of Goods . . . 362
Marine Pollution Protocol Transmitted to the

Senate 362

President Carter Signs Security Assistance Act . . . 361

Publications

GPO Sales Publications 364

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 362

Saudi Arabia. Secretary Vance's Visit to the
Middle East and London July 31-August 13
(Owen, Sadat, Sa'ud, Vance) 329

South Africa. Secretary Vance's Visit to the
Middle East and London July 31-August 13
(Owen, Sadat, Sa'ud, Vance) 329

Southern Rhodesia. Secretary Vance's Visit to
the Middle East and London July 31-August 13
(Owen, Sadat, Sa'ud, Vance) 329

Syria. Secretary Vance's Visit to the Middle East
and London July 31-August 13 (Owen, Sadat,
Sa'ud, Vance) 329

Treaty Information

Convention on International Transport of Goods

(message from President Carter) 362

Current Actions 363

Marine Pollution Protocol Transmitted to the
Senate (message from President Carter) 362

United Kingdom. Secretary Vance's Visit to the
Middle East and London July 31-August 13
(Owen, Sadat, Sa'ud, Vance) 329

U.S.S.R. U.S. -Soviet Relations (foreign relations
outline) 356

Vietnam. Department Discusses MIA's in Viet-
nam and Laos (Holbrooke) 359

Name Itide.r

Carter, President 361, 362

Holbrooke, Richard C 359

Owen, David A. L 329

Prince Sa'ud bin Faisal 329

Sadat, Anwar al- 329

Vance, Secretary 329

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXVII • No. 1995 • September 19, 1977

SECRETARY VANCE VISITS CHINA AND JAPAN AUGUST 20-27
Exchanges of Toasts, Neivs Conference, Remarks 365

PRESIDENT CARTER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF AUGUST 23
Excerpts From Transcript 376

FRAMEWORK FOR A DYNAMIC NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE

Statement by Ambassador Young 383

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

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Vol. LXXVII, No. 1995
September 19, 1977

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Secretary Vance Visits China and Japan August 20-27

Secretary Va»ce visited China (August
20-26) and Japan (August 26-27). Following
are exchanges of toasts ivith China's Foreign
Minister Huang Hiia and a news conference
and remarks btj Secretary Vance, together
with remarks by President Carter and the
Secretary upon the latter's arrival at Wash-
ington on August 27. ^

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, PEKING, AUGUST 22

Press release 403 dated August 23

Foreign Minister Huang Hua

Mr. Secretary and Mrs. Vance, American
uuests, comrades, and friends, this is not the
first time we get to know Mr. Cyrus Vance,
for he was here 2 years ago as the head of the
delegation of U.S. world affairs organizations.
Now, in the capacity of the U.S. Secretary of
State, Mr. Vance is again here to visit our
country and exchange views with us on ques-
tions of mutual interest. In the name of my
Chinese colleagues present, I wish to express
welcome to Secretary Vance and all members
of his party. We are pleased to have an oppor-
tunity to exchange views with Mr. Secretary
on questions of mutual interest.

Peoples of the world are deeply concerned
about the development of the international
situation — about the issue of war and peace.
In our opinion, with the sharpening of all the
basic contradictions of our time, the interna-
tional situation is drastically turbulent. The
rivalry for world hegemony will lead to war
sooner or later; this is independent of man's
will. Faced with this situation, the people of
all countries must get prepared. By carrying
out aggression and expansion everywhere,

hegemonism sets itself against the people of
all countries and will inevitably bring about
its own defeat. We are historical materialists.
As the Chinese people's great leader and
teacher Chairman Mao pointed out, "The
people, and the people alone, are the mo-
tive force in the making of world history."
Reviewing the past and looking ahead, we
have full confidence in the future of the world.

The Chinese and American peoples are both
great peoples. They have always been friendly
to each other. But owing to reasons known to
all, there was in the past an unpleasant
period, and there are now still problems, in
the relations between our two countries. In
1972 President Richard Nixon visited China
and the Chinese and U.S. sides issued the
well-known Shanghai communique on whose
basis a new page in the annals of our relations
began. ^ This accords with the common desire
of the Chinese and American peoples and is
also well received by the people of all coun-
tries. We have noted that both President Car-
ter and Secretary of State Vance stated they
would adhere to the principles of the Shanghai
communique. China's foreign policy has been
clearly expounded by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng
at the recent Eleventh National Congress of
the Communist Party of China. Chairman
Hua's speech expresses the will of the 800 mil-
lion Chinese people and explains the consist-
ent stand of the Chinese Government.

Like the international situation, the domes-
tic situation in China is excellent and will grow
better and better. After we smashed the an-
tiparty "gang of four" [Chiang Ching, Yao
Wen-yuang, Wuang Hung-wen, and Chang
Chun-chiao], we held a few days ago the success-
ful Eleventh National Congress of the Com-

' Another press release relating to Secretary Vance's
trip is No. 401 dated August 20.

^For text, see Bulletin of March 20, 1972, p. 435.

September 19, 1977

365

munist Party of China, which is a congress of
ti"emendous significance in the history of the
Chinese people's revolution. Rallying closely
round the party Central Committee headed by
Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and holding high the
great banner of Chairman Mao, the Chinese
people are continuing to firmly implement the
line, pi-inciples, and policies formulated by
Chaii-man Mao and courageously advance in
carrying out the strategic decision of grasping
the key link of class struggle and bringing
about great order across the land. Led by our
wise leader Chairman Hua, the Chinese
people have both the determination and confi-
dence to persist in continuing the revolution
under the dictatorship of the proletariat:
modernizing our agriculture, industry, na-
tional defense, and science and technology by
the end of the century; turning China into a
powerful and prosperous Socialist country;
and making a greater contribution to human-
ity.

Now, I propose a toast to the friendship be-
tween the Chinese and American peoples, to
the health of President Jimmy Carter,, to the
health of the Secretary of State and Mrs.
Cyrus Vance, to the health of all American
guests, and to the health of the Chinese com-
rades present here.

Secretary Vance

Mr. Foreign Minister, Chinese and Ameri-
can friends, because of the relations which
have developed between our two countries in
recent years, we do not meet as strangers. Al-
though this is the first visit to Peking by offi-
cials of President Carter's Administration, we
have already enjoyed contact through our
Liaison Offices and through the United
Nations.

I am glad to see old friends whom I met on
my first trip to the People's Republic of China
2 years ago. I have warm memories of that
trip and I am happy to be in Peking again. My
colleagues, my wife, and I appreciate the wel-
come you have accorded us and we look for-
ward to our discussions this week.

We arrive at a significant moment in your
nation's history — the conclusion of the
Eleventh National Party Congress. I con-

366

gratulate you on this event and on the promise'
it holds for your future.

The President has stated that our policy
toward the People's Republic of China will
continue to be guided by the principles of the
Shanghai communique and that normalization
is the goal of that policy. Our foreign policy is
rooted in the beliefs and principles of the
American people. We are strengthening our
relations with our traditional allies. We seek
to improve relations with former adversaries.
We will maintain a strong and ready defense
to guard against any challenge. We are de-
termined to play a creative role in facilitating
the global changes that are necessary for
bringing about a more just and durable inter-
national order.

Our policy toward the People's Republic of
China flows naturally from these consid-
erations. President Carter continues the pol-
icy of viewing the relations between our two
countries as a central element in our foreign
policy. The consultations we are holding this
week were envisioned in the Shanghai com-
munique. They are a valuable feature of our
relationship and provide an important oppor-
tunity for us to exchange views on interna-
tional and bilateral issues of mutual interest.

The Sino-American relationship has become
an important factor contributing to peace in
Asia and elsewhere in the world. We recog-
nize that in part our assessments of the world
differ due to our respective histories, beliefs,
and social systems. But oui' different perspec-
tives do not obscure the many concerns which
our two nations share. This week, and
throughout President Carter's Administra-
tion, we hope to deepen our mutual under-
standing and respect for the role each of us
plays in world affairs.

Since 1972 our bilateral relations have also
improved. A modest level of trade now links
our two countries. Exchanges in a wide vari-
ety of fields have contributed to the growth of
understanding and friendship between our
peoples. Liaison Offices have been established
in each other's capitals. In our talks, we will
want to explore ways in which to continue and
improve the process within the framework of
the Shanghai communique.

It is to our mutual benefit that we join in

Department of State Bulletin

making efforts to move toward our common
objectives. It is in this spirit that I look for-
ward to our forthcoming' talks.

I would like to propose a toast to the health
of Chairman Hua, to the health of Foreign
Minister Huang, to the health of all our
friends here tonight, and to the strengthening
of the friendship between the American and
Chinese peoples.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, PEKING, AUGUST 25

Press release 4(H1 dated August 211

Secretary Vance

Mr. Minister and Madame Huang, Chinese
and American friends, I am pleased to wel-
come Foreign Minister Huang and his col-
leagues tonight.

This dinner is an e.xpression of our appreci-
ation for the hospitality you have accorded us
during the past 4 days. I might mention that
responsible persons fi'om the vai'ious places
we have visited have done much to make our
visit a success. Some of them are here tonight
and we would like to e.xtend to them our
thanks for their help.

I will report to President Carter on my re-
turn home that this has been a good visit. In
my meetings with Chairman Hua, Vice Pre-
mier Teng, and Foreign Minister Huang, we
have had a very serious and candid exchange
of views on many important issues, global and
bilateral. I believe we have enhanced our
mutual understanding and confirmed impor-
tant points of common interest.

In the Administration's first comprehensive
consultations with the Chinese leadership, I
made clear that the starting point of our pol-
icy is that we remain committed to the Shang-
hai communique and to progress toward the
goal of full normalization of relations. I look
forward to further discussions on this and
other issues on the months ahead.

On behalf of my wife and my colleagues, I
wish to thank our hosts and to offer a toast to
the health of Chairman Hua, to the health of
Minister Huang and Mrs. Huang, to continued
and strengthened friendship between the
Chinese and American peoples.

Foreign Minister Huang

Mr. Secretary and Mrs. Vance, American
guests, comrades and friends, U.S. Secretary
of State Mr. Vance, and his party will con-
clude their visit to China tomori-ow. On behalf
of my Chinese colleagues present, I would like
to take this opportunity to express our thanks
to Mr. Vance for giving this banquet to enter-
tain us before his departure.

In these few short days, our two sides held
many talks on issues of mutual interest. Espe-
cially during this period. Chairman and Pre-
mier Hua Kuo-feng and Vice Premier Teng
Hsiao-ping met separately with Mr. Vance
and had earnest and significant conversations
with him. Such direct exchange of views be-
tween Chinese and U.S. leaders to enhance
mutual understanding is of benefit to both
sides.

As we have repeatedly pointed out, China
and the United States have different social
systems, our two sides have different
ideologies, and naturally there are differences
of principle between us; but in the present in-
ternational situation our two countries face
questions of common concern and have quite a
few points in common. We believe that Sino-
U.S. relations will surely move forward stead-
ily as desired by both our peoples so long as
both sides make sincere efforts in conformity
with the principles of the Shanghai com-
munique.

The arrival of Mr. and Mrs. Vance and their
party in Peking coincided with oui- people's
enthusiastic parades to celebrate the great
success of the Eleventh National Congress of
the Communist Party of China. We believe
our American guests will see that the Chinese
people, full of zest, are detei mined to advance
courageously and seize new great victories in
Socialist revolution and Socialist construction
along the correct orientation pointed out by
our great leader and teacher. Chairman Mao,
and under the leadership of the party Central
Committee headed by our wise leader. Chair-
man Hua Kuo-feng. On the eve of Mr. Vance's
departure from our country, allow me once
again to convey the Chinese people's best
wishes for the American people.

Now, I propose a toast to the friendship be-

September 19, 1977

367

tween the Chinese and American peoples, to
the health of President Jimmy Carter, to the
health of the Secretary of State and Mrs.
Vance, to the health of all American guests,
and to the health of the Chinese comrades
present here.

NEWS CONFERENCE, PEKING, AUGUST 25

Press release 407 dated August 26

Secretary Vance: Let me say at the outset
that we are very appreciative of the kind hos-
pitality of our Chinese hosts. You have all
been witnesses to the extraordinarily gracious
arrangements the Government of the People's
Republic of China has provided for myself and
to all of our party. As you know, I met with
Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, Vice Premier Teng
Hsiao-ping, and Foreign Minister Huang Hua
during my 4 days in Peking. We had candid
and serious talks on a wide range of interna-
tional and bilateral matters. I consider the
talks to have been very useful and will report
in detail on them to the President upon my re-
turn.

I don't want to get into details of the talks
but, as a general characterization, let me sim-
ply say the following. I believe that our talks
were very important in establishing important
communications between senior officials of our
two governments which will continue in the
future. Our talks enhanced our mutual under-
standing of our respective positions on a wide
range of issues. As to international issues, our
discussions touched on major political, eco-
nomic, and strategic questions ranging across
the globe. We confirmed that we share impor-
tant common concerns on many subjects. As
for bilateral matters we had a most useful ex-
change of views. Both sides clearly believe
that progress and normalization of our rela-
tions in accord with the principles of the
Shanghai communique is in our mutual inter-
ests. I look forward to continuing our discus-
sions.

Now, I will be happy to take questions.

Q. In your discussions of international is-
sues with the Chinese, were there areas of the
world where they weren't approving of Ameri-

368

can policy, and could you point those areas
out to us?

Secretary Vance: Without going into detail,
I would say there are areas within the world
in which we have some differences of views.
With respect to our particular course of ac-
tion, there may be differences in terms of
nuances but it was very useful because it is in
both of our global interests to clearly discuss
these various issues so that we understand
each other's position and thus we can avoid
misunderstandings in the future.

Q. Where do we go from here? You say these
contacts will continue. Do you foresee discus-
sio)is in Washington? What happens?

Secretary Vance: I don't want to be specific
at this point other than to say that our discus-
sions will continue.

Q. Will Ambassador [sic] Huang Hua be at
the United Nations?

Secretary Vance: My understanding is that
he will be attending the General Assembly at
the United Nations. He himself should speak
specifically to that. I would look forward to
returning the very kind hospitality which he
has extended to us when he comes to the
United States.

Q. On the question of normalization, after
these talks do you feel that the Chinese have a
sense of urgency about the process of nor-
malization or do we have an indefinite
amount of time for them?

Secretary Vance: I think it would be inap-
propriate for me to comment on behalf of the
People's Republic of China. Any such ques-
tions should be addressed to them. We both
have explained to each other our views in
depth on the question of normalization and
this, I think, has been very useful to us and
appropriate.

Q. Let me put it to you. Do you feel a sense
of urgency about the process?

Secretary Vance: I don't think it is helpful
to characterize the situation in terms of
urgency or lack of urgency. I have a report to
make to the President when I get home and I
will report to him in full detail at that time.
Just a minute, please. Let me say that this

Department of State Bulletin

was an exploratory trip as I said at tiie outset
and I thinii, as Chairman Hua Kuo-feng said
this afternoon, that it was important that we
have these exploratory discussions.

Q. President Carter was quoted in aii inter-
view sometime before your departure from
Washington as saying that there ivas no
urgency on the issue of recognition or nor-
malization. Do you agree with that state-
ments

Secretary Vance: What article?

Q. In a Time magazine article.

Secretary Vance: What the President said is
obviously U.S. policy.

Q. Did you discuss with the Chinese the
kinds of U.S. -Taiwan relations they might tol-
erate and still permit full relations with the
United States?

Secretary Vance: As I indicated I am not
going into details. I think it would be inappro-
priate for me to go into details. Let me say
that we discussed the process of normalization
in considerable detail.

Q. After ^ days of talks, do you feel that
generally, since you don't want to go into spe-
cifics, do you feel that you are any closer to
resolving this major obstacle to normalization?

Secretary Vance: Again, I would repeat
that these talks were exploratory. I think that
they were useful talks and I think that, as a
result of that, both of us clearly understand
the views of each other — and that, I think, has
been good and useful.

Q. Well then maybe the question ought to
be, are we further apart than before we came
here? They're useful a)id we're still exploring.
Is there greater distance now between us and
the People's Republic than there was before
you came here?

Secretary Vance: The answer is no.

Q. /h his toast the Foreign Minister said:
"We believe that Sino-U.S. relations will
surely move forward steadily as desired by
both our peoples so long as both sides make
sincere efforts in conformity with the princi-
ples of the Shanghai communique." Do you

feel that the United States is niaking such a
sincere effort?

Secretary Vance: I do.

Q. In your toast and the Foreign Minister's
toast tonight, both of you moitioned points in
common. Could you identify the points in

common?

Secretary Vance: Again, I think it is inap-
propriate at this point for me to go into detail.
I still have to report to the President of the
United States. I think it is significant that
both of us have indicated in our toasts and in
other statements which we have made that we
do find a number of points of common interest
and I think that is the important point.

Q. Could we perhaps elicit a response from
you on how you would characterize Hua
Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-ping as men with
whom to negotiate?

Secretary Vance: I have met Vice Premier
Teng Hsiao-ping before. I had a very high re-
gard for him as a statesman and as a leader
from my previous talks. I appreciated very
much the opportunity to meet with him again.
My talks again this time confirmed by pre-
vious views that he is a statesman and a
leader of stature.

I was privileged today to meet with Hua
Kuo-feng. He is most certainly a statesman
and a distinguished leader of his nation.

Q. My question was as to whether or not
you can appraise them as negotiators.

Secretary Vance: I think that might be pre-
sumptuous of me.

Q. How long do you think it will be before
the remaining 1,000 or so American troops
are pulled out of Taiwan?

Secretary Vance: I do not wish to get into
specifics on any of those kinds of questions.

Q. Did you actually discuss the mechanics
of normalization in all these talks?

Secretary Vance: We discussed normaliza-
tion and the details of normalization.

Q. Could you give us some idea of the na-
ture of your discussions with the Chinese on
the subject of the Soviet Union?

September 19, 1977

369

Secretary Vance: One of the subjects which
we discussed was the Soviet Union; but let me
repeat what I have said many times, namely,
that our relationship with the People's Republic
of China is one of the central elements of our
foreign policy but that in no way jeopardizes
any third country. I have said that repeatedly
and I say it again.

Q. Did you reach agreement or near agree-
ment on any of the lesser issues — bilateral is-
sues like exchanges, trade, assets, or other
such items?

Secretary Vance: We were involved in ex-
ploratory talks and we discussed the kind of
issues which you have mentioned. This was
but the first talk between our two govern-
ments and talks will continue in the future.

Q. Do you thi)ik those other issues, includ-
ing assets and claims, will have to wait set-
tlement until the Taiwan question is settled?

Secretary Vance: I don't know.

Q. The President said a couple of weeks
ago that he thought it was possible that rela-
tions could be normalized with the People's
Republic by the end of next year. Do you
think after i days of talks that is still a pos-
sible and realistic hope?

Secretary Va^ice: I wouldn't want to con-
tradict the President in any way.

Q. One of the toasts tonight by the Chinese
Foreign Minister talked about how our two
countries faced questions of commoii con-
cern and we had quite a few points in com-
mon. Tell me, could you itemize some of
these points?

Secretary Vance: Again I have said re-
peatedly that I do not wish to go into detail.
I think it is inappropriate to go into detail.

Q. Did you find the thrust and style of
Mr. Teng's remarks this time reminiscent of
your conversations ivith him 2 years ago?

Secretary Vance: I found him before and I
found him this time incisive, thoughtful, ar-
ticulate, and I don't know where this view
developed last time that we had an acrimoni-
ous exchange. He and I were talking about

that in our meeting yesterday. Neither of us
recalls any such acrimonious exchange. We
had a difference of viewpoint on one or two
points but they weren't expressed in any ac-
rimonious fashion. They were conducted in a
friendly and cordial atmosphere.

Q. What is the benefit of hearing it from
the Chinese firsthand? Is there anything you
knoiv now that you didn't knotv when you
came from Washington ?

Secretary Va)ice: Yes, indeed. I think it is
always advantageous to sit down firsthand,
particularly with the leaders of a country,
and to have a chance to lay out our views on
issues in which we have a common interest
and issues where there may be differences of
view and to have the opportunity to probe
their views so that we fully understand the
details and nuances of those positions and
for them to be able to do the same with us. I
think that anybody who has been involved in
discussions and negotiations in the past
knows full well that this is essential if one is
going to proceed to develop understanding.

Q. In terms of detail or nuance, have you
seen any alteration in the Chinese position
between the time you left Washington and

now?

Secretary Vance: Again, I do not wish to
comment on behalf of the Chinese.

Q. Have the Chinese given you the condi-
tions of normalizing relations?

Secretary Vance: The Chinese position on
a number of the matters relating to Taiwan
has been expressed publicly and I think that
it would be best if I left it that way.

Q. Were there specific proposals made for
solving some of the lesser issues — such as
assets, cultural exchange?

Secretary Vance: There was a full discus-
sion of these issues. There have been pre-
vious discussions on a number of these is-
sues before and what we were doing in those
particular areas— such as cultural ex-
changes, trade, and those kind of mat-
ters— was to back up and carry on from a
specific situation.

370

Department of State Bulletin

Q. Could I fullow up with two points^
One, did i/ou bring up the subject of the
Chinese jauniiiug the Voice of America:'

Secret aril Vance: No, that specific issue
did not arise.

Q. // not, why not:' Is it not something
that would improve relations from the U.S.
point of vieu)?

Secretarg Va)ice: We will be having fur-
ther discussion in the future. We have only
so much time.

Q. Second point, did t/ou, a)id at what
level, bring up the subject of human rights^

Secretary Vance: Yes I did. In discussing
our foreign policy, obviously I discussed
human rights because it is one of the essen-
tial elements in our foreign policy. I laid out
our view on this and, I hope, clarified it.

Q. Did the Chinese respo)id to your views
0)1 human rights i'

Secretary Vance: I have discussed it with
them ovei' and above my own statement.

Q. At what level was that? Was it just at
Foreign Minister level or —

Seorto)-// Vance: I don't want to get into
individuals; it was at a high level.

Q. Was huma)( rights discussed i)i rela-
tio)i to China?

Sec)'eta)-y Vance: I don't want to get into
any further detail on that than I have
already.

Q. In your toast tonight you said, "I be-
lieve we have enha>tced our mutual u)ider-
standing. . ." and you went o)i. I'm going to
ask you, ca)i you share with us how there
was an enhancement of mutual under-
standi}ig — for example, o)i the co)iflicting
views of Taiiva)!?

Secretary Va)ice: Surely. There was an
opportunity in the face-to-face discussion
which I had with the three leaders — with
whom I spent many hours of conversation —
to discuss the details and positions of both
parties. In the process of such a discussion,

lack of knowledge or misunderstandings or
differences of views are often clarified and
this was the case.

Q. Did you have a feeling that the Chinese
understood some of the complexities from
the American point of view in meeting the
Chi)iese requirements on Taiwan?

Secretary Vance: I don't want to express a
view on behalf of them. They are extremely
intelligent and I think they understood
exactly what I was saying.

Q. Did you say a)n/thing to them about the
role or attitude of the U.S. Congress on
)iormalizatio)i?

Secretary Vance: I discussed at some
length the domestic situation in the United
States in general terms, our relationships
with the Congress, the changes which have
occurred over the last year and a half or so.
I think this was a useful discussion from
their standpoint to hear firsthand what the
views of the people of the United States are
and of those who represent the people of the
United States in the Congress.

Q. When you say the changes of the last
year and a half, ivhat do you niean by that?

Secretary Vance: Let me give you a couple
of examples. I think that in the United
States there is general and broad support
for the President and the President's policy.
I think, secondly, that the trend which ap-
peared to be developing in earlier years to-
ward a withdrawing and therefore an unwill-
ingness to play a role in the international
sphere — a constructive role — has changed
and the American people are prepared to
support a constructive role by the United
States in international trends.

Q. Would you say in the most general
terins that you are going away from here
more confidoit of being able to normalize
relations or nierely better infornied on the
difficulties?

Secretary Vance: I would say that I go
away from here better informed. Certainly
there is no question about that. I think as I
leave here that the leaders of the People's

September 19, 1977

371

Republic probably now have a better under-
standing of the views of our government and
the people of the United States on these is-
sues, and I hope and believe that as a part
of that process we are both more under-
standing and thus are in a position where we
have a better grasp of the problems of nor-
malization. We both have stated that we be-
lieve it is in the interests of our two countries
to proceed toward normalization. That has
been the stated goal of our country. It has
been stated by the President and by me and it
remains our position.

Q. When i/oii came to this series of meet-
ings you had in ijoiir mind some question
about how the People's Republic might react
to certain American iyiitiatives in the nor-
malizatio)! process. Without intruding on
the substance of whatever answers you have
received, do you leave Peking with the no-
tion that you now do u)idersfand the posi-
tion of this government on this question?

Secretary Va}ice: I believe I do.

Q. A technical question. Why is there no
communique at the end of this meeting?

Secretary Va)ice: The reason is a very
simple one. We talked it over. We decided
that, inasmuch as this was an exploratory
meeting, there was no need for a com-
munique at this time. There had been pre-
vious meetings here during the last Admin-
istration where there were no communiques.
It seemed to me that, there being no reason
for it, there was no need to try and draft a
communique. Our hosts agreed and we de-
cided to proceed in that fashion. It was as
simple as that.

Q. Did you specifically discuss congres-
sional opinion of Taiwan and the Taiwan
question ?

Secretary Vance: In describing the domes-
tic situation in the United States that was
one of the subjects that I discussed.

Q. Did you get any more indications of
flexibility in your private talks on the ques-

tion of Taiwan than we seem to be hearing
in public?

Secretary Vance: I don't want to talk in
terms of fle.xibility or lack of flexibility.
Again you are trying to get into detail I
don't want to get into.

Q. Without going into substance, are you
able to say that you made, i)i this series
of m eetings , any progress toward
normalization?

Secretary Vance: Let me say simply that I
think this was a very useful meeting. As I
have said before, it was a good meeting, a
constructive meeting. I will leave it at that.

Q. Did the Chinese ask questio)is or ex-
press concern about weakening of American
military presence in Asia?

Secretary Va)!ce: In Asia?

Q. Yes.

Secretary Vance: No.

Q. Or elsewhere?

Secretary Vance: We had a discussion
about all of the various regions of the world,
and as a result of that I think they have a
much clearer understanding of our position
and of the new initiatives which we have tak-
en, and I think they reacted favorably to a
number of these initiatives.

Q. You will be going to Japan to report on
these talks. Will you also be soiding a)tyone
to South Korea or the Philippines?

Secretary Va)ice: I will indeed, yes.

Q. Will you be sending anyo)ie to Taiwan?

Secretary Vance: I will be sending the As-
sistant Secretary, Mr. Holbrooke [Richard
C. Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs], to South Korea.
It has been traditional in the past that after
a meeting in Peking the Assistant Secretary
should go and have talks in Seoul and it is
also traditional for the Assistant Secretary
to go to Taipei and have talks there. That
will continue here as it did in the past.

372

Department of State Bulletin

DEPARTURE, TOKYO, AUGUST 27

Press release 408 dated August 27

Secrefarif Vance: I am glad to have had
the oppoi'tunity to visit Japan. Of all of our
allies and old friends, none is more impor-
tant to us than Japan. I came to continue
the consultations which have marked our re-
lationship. I particularly appreciated the op-
portunity of meeting with Prime Minister
Fukuda; and today, again with Foreign
Minister Hatoyama and members of his
staff. We discussed not only my trip to
China but a large number of other matters
of interest and importance to our two na-
tions. Our consultations under this adminis-
tration really started when the Prime Minis-
ter came to visit President Carter and we
were so happy to welcome him in the United
States. As you know. Vice President Mon-
dale was here at a very early stage during
our taking over office. There have been
many, many others and there will be many
more to follow me.

These close consultations are a vital part
of the relationship between our two nations.
As the Prime Minister said when he was in
the United States, "Never have the rela-
tions between Japan and the U.S. been more
friendly and cordial, but we cannot take
them for granted. We must work to per-
fect." We agree. And that is what we will
do. Again, I want to express my deep ap-
preciation for the many, many courtesies
and warm hospitality. I look forward to com-
ing back — I hope soon in the future.

Q. If we may ask ijou a question? One of
the areas ijou undoubtedly discussed is the
Middle East and the PLO [Palestine Libera-
tion Organization] Executive Council, or at
least one of their Governing Council, de-
cided to not accept [U.N. Resolution] 2^2
and thereby inrplicitly accept Israel. Any
comment?

Secretary Vance: I have not had a chance
to read the statement itself. Somebody men-
tioned to me as I was leaving the hotel that
this had taken place. I want to take a look at

what was actually said at the time, and I'll
have something to say about that after I've
read it. Thanks a lot.

ARRIVAL, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE,
AUGUST 27

Press release 410 dated August 30

President Carter

It is with a great deal of both pleasure
and pride that I welcome Cy Vance back to
our country. He has had a very important
mission to one of the most important nations
on Earth, the People's Republic of China.
This is a country of central importance and
also influence in the world and we attach
very high significance to this trip. Although
our objectives were deliberately limited —
and as has been mentioned in the press the
discussions were exploratory in nature —
they were highly successful.

Premier Hua has sent word back to me,
along with Vice Premier Teng, that the dis-
cussions were very fruitful from their point
of view. I believe that this is a major step
forward in our ultimate goal of normalizing re-
lationships with the People's Republic of
China. Discussions will be continued, and
they could not have been in better hands nor
will they be in the future in better hands
than those of our Secretary of State, Cy
Vance.

Cy, we are proud to have you back. You
are a great representative of our country
and, as always, our people have full faith in
you.

Secretary Vance

Thank you very much, Mr. President. I
appreciate very much your coming out to
welcome us home.

Let me say it is very good to be home. We
had a good and useful trip to China. I had
the privilege of meeting not only with the
Foreign Minister but also with Chairman
Hua and with Vice Premier Teng. The con-
versations were described by them as ear-

September 19, 1977

373

nest and significant. I felt them to be very
useful. As the President has said, this was
an exploratory trip and I think it was very
important that we have this exchange of
views for the first time with this powerful
and great nation. We will be continuing our
discussions in the future.

And let me close by saying again, it is
very good to be back home.

Western Summation of 12th Round
of MBFR Talks

The 12th round of negotiations on mutual
and balanced force reductions in central Europe
was held at Vienna May 12-Jultj 22. Following
is a statement made on behalf of the Westeyii al-
lies bij Baron W. J. de Vos van Steenwyk,
Netherlands Represeiitative, at a news confer-
ence at Vioina on July 21.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency press release 77-15

In my statement today, I would like to
summarize briefly where, in the Western
view, these negotiations stand at the end of
this round.'

Western and Eastern representatives are
continuing the data discussions which were
begun during the last round with the purpose
of clarifying the discrepancy between East-
ern and Western figures on Eastern military
manpower in the area. The fact that these
discussions are being conducted in a busi-
nesslike way is a positive element. Both sides
recognize the necessity of reaching agree-
ment on the total number of active-duty mili-
tary personnel which each side has in the
area as a prerequisite for any reduction
agi'eement.

However, the discussions have not yet
brought to light the reasons for this discrep-
ancy. Western figures show that Eastern
active-duty military personnel in the area
greatly outnumber those of the West. We do
not accept the Eastern contention that there

' For summation of 11th round, see Bulletin of
May 16, 1977, p. 482.

is approximate equality in the military man-
power of the two sides in the area. Accord-
ingly, the reasons for the discrepancy must
be clarified. In a situation where there is dis-
agreement on these data, there can be, of
course, no agreed basis for calculating the
size of reductions or the level of resulting
limitations.

In order to facilitate our mutual efforts to
clarify the sources of the discrepancy, the
Western participants have recently proposed
ways for moving the data discussion foi'ward.
Given the confidentiality of these talks, I can-
not give details.

Turning to other areas of these negotia-
tions, the principal Western objective re-
mains the achievement of appi'oximate parity
in ground forces, to be reached by reductions
to a common collective ceiling in ground force
manpower and by substantial reduction of the
large Eastern superiority in main battle
tanks.

In December 1975 the West put forward
additional proposals of major military signifi-
cance. To the reductions and limitations it
had previously offered to undertake, the
West added U.S. nuclear reductions which
amount to a substantial portion of NATO's
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] nuclear
capability in the area. At the same time, the
West also proposed to include air force man-
power under a combined common collective
ceiling.

The West's December 1975 move was un-
questionably the most important one made by
either side since East and West put down
their original proposals in November 1973.

However, since December 1975 there has
been no commensurate move from the East.
The Eastern proposal of February 1976 of-
fered no change in the Eastern approach to
reductions. Therefore, it cannot be regarded
as an answer to the December 1975 Western
proposal — in short, the West is still waiting
for the East to give a positive and serious re-
sponse to these Western proposals.

The West proposed an outcome of genuine
parity in military manpower. Eastern repre-
sentatives claim that approximate parity in
military manpower already exists and that

374

Department of State Bulletin

therefore equal percentage reductions would,
on the basis of their figures, result in a rela-
tionship of appi'oximate equality in military
personnel. However, Western figures show
that the East has a large numei'ical superior-
ity in military manpower. Consequently, this
Eastern approach would result in an outcome
which would merely mask the continued ex-
istence of Eastern superiority in military
manpower.

On the issue of armaments reductions, the
East continues to insist on an approach of re-
ducing and limiting all armaments on an
equal percentage basis. This approach would
contractualize the East's very large numeri-
cal advantages in most types of major arma-
ments in the area. The West for its part has
proposed the concept of a selective approach
to armaments reductions which would avoid
the contractualization of disparities. We con-
sider that this concept represents a practical
and equitable way of dealing with this issue.

As regards the limitations on military
manpower that would result from an agree-
ment. Eastern participants still refuse to ac-
knowledge that the realistic and equitable so-
lution to this complex problem is the one the
West has pi'oposed — namely, that there
should be a collective ceiling on the man-
power of each side along with the limitation
on the manpower which the two world mili-
tary powers, the United States and the
U.S.S.R., can maintain in the area.

This solution is essential to preserve
NATO's collective defense system and is re-
quired to avoid prejudice to the future or-
ganization of Western European defense. It
also reflects the unique military capabilities
and world status of the United States and
U.S.S.R. It takes into account the fact that
anv limitation will fall more heavilv on those

participants who have substantially all of
their forces inside the area than it will on
those who have most of their forces outside
the area and who will be limited only as to
the manpower they may maintain in the area.

In this respect as in others. Eastern partic-
ipants still have not taken into account the
facts of geography and the advantages which
geography confers on the East through the
fact that the Soviet Union, with its large
forces, is contiguous to the reduction area.

In their February 19 proposal, the Eastern
participants claim to have modified their orig-
inal position as regards the sequence of the
implementation of reductions and as regards
provision for two separate agreements. How-
ever, the East is still asking us to accept
from the outset all the main elements of its
original inequitable and unrealistic reduction
approach. It cannot logically claim to have
moved significantly to meet the Western po-
sition on phasing when, in the first phase
agreement, all direct participants — and not
only the United States and U.S.S.R. — would
have to undertake binding commitments to
carry out reductions of the type proposed in
the Eastern November 1973 proposal.

The basic reason for the unsatisfactory
overall situation in the Western view is the
East's unwillingness to change its inequitable
and unrealistic reduction approach.

Despite these negative aspects of the past
round, the Western participants continue
strongly interested in advancing an agree-
ment. We remain convinced that progress can
be made if participants can use the continu-
ing data discussion to reach agreement on
the basic facts with regard to the strength of
military manpower in central Europe. This
issue remains at the heart of these
negotiations.

September 19, 1977

375

President Carter's News Conference of August 23

Following are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of a news confer-
ence held by President Carter on August 23.^

The President: I have three or four brief
announcements to make before I answer
your questions.

First of all, in response to our own direct
inquiry and that of other nations, South Africa
has informed us that they do not have and do
not intend to develop nuclear explosive de-
vices for any purpose, either peaceful or as a
weapon; that the Kalahari test site, which has
been in question, is not designed for use to
test nuclear explosives; and that no nuclear
explosive test will be taken in South Africa
now or in the future.

We appreciate this commitment from
South Africa and this information. We will,
of course, continue to monitor the situation
there very closely. We"ll also renew our ef-
forts to encourage South Africa to place all
their nuclear power production capabilities
under international safeguards and inspec-
tions and encourage them, along with other
nations, to sign the Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty.

Another item is that, as relates to the
Panama Canal treaty, we have become in-
terested, after the original discussions were
concluded, in assuring that some definite
commitment be made about a possible future
development of a sea-level canal. As you
know, the existing canal facilities cannot be
used for large warships or cargo ships. And if
it becomes necessary in the future for a sea-
level canal to be constructed, we want to be

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Aug. 29, 1977, p.
1240.

sure that we have an opportunity to be in-
volved directly in this construction and not
have some possible hostile nation supplant us
with our influence in the canal area.

We have asked Panama for this assurance,
and this will be part of the treaties that we
will sign — that if any sea-level canal or mod-
ification of the present canal is concluded,
that we will be part of it if we choose and
also, in return, that any sea-level canal to be
built during the terms of the treaty will be
built in Panama.

A third item that I have to report to you
is that in our effort to bring about a peaceful
solution to the Rhodesian, or Zimbabwe,
crisis, we have been trying to evolve, along
with the British, a fair proposal that would
be acceptable to the frontline nations, to the
nationalist forces in Rhodesia, to the present
Government of Rhodesia, to the South Afri-
cans, and others. And there will be a meet-
ing of the frontline presidents in Lusaka,
which is Zambia, beginning Friday.

And Ambassador Young [Andrew Young,
U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.J, representing
us, and Foreign Minister David Owen, rep-
resenting the British, will be meeting with
the frontline presidents in Lusaka on Satur-
day, the 27th of August. There they will go
over our proposals on the Rhodesian ques-
tion. And I believe this is a possible step
toward a peaceful resolution of that ques-
tion. We still have a lot of issues to resolve,
but it is an encouraging thing.

The other I'd like to report is that Secre-
tary Vance is continuing his discussions in
China, primarily with Foreign Minister
Huang Hua, and this evening he has been
having a banquet sponsored by and hosted
by Teng Hsiao-ping, who is the Vice Chair-
man of the Communist Party in China and

376

Department of State Bulletin

who is also the Deputy Prime Minister.

We don't know what the results of these
in-depth discussions might be yet. I won't be
prepared to give you any detailed informa-
tion until I hear from Secretary Vance at
the conclusion of these talks.

Q. Yuii have said that your foreign policy
decisions should be )nade hi. consultation
with the American people and that these de-
cisions should reflect their thinking.

The Presideiit: Yes.

Q. Yet there have been, so far, strong ex-
pressions of public disagreement with the
Panama Canal treaty as we now see it.

How do you reconcile these differences,
and what steps will be taken to convince the
American people that you are right, that
they are wro)ig, and that the canal treaty is
in the best long-term interest of the United
States?

The President: We expect to conclude the
drafting of the detailed language in the
Panama Canal treaties within the next few
days, but they have to be compared to be
sure that the Spanish text and the English
text are compatible and that all the elements
have been expressed in legal and proper
language.

As soon as that is done, the text of the
treaty will be released to the Members of
the Congress and also to the American
people and the news media. At this time we
are going on a fairly detailed expression of
principles which will be the basis for the
treaty itself. And that set of principles in
some minute detail has already been
released.

I think there's been a great deal of mis-
conception about what is being concluded in
Panama, which may be one of the reasons
that there is not popular support for the
Panama Canal treaty at this point.

The negotiations were begun 13 years ago
when President Johnson was President, as a
result of an altercation, bloodshed, loss of
life by both Panama and American troops
there. And in my opinion, the terms of the
canal protect American interests very well.
We will retain control of the Panama Canal

throughout the century. We will have an as-
surance in perpetuity following the year
2000 that the Panama Canal will be neutral,
that oui- ships will have unlimited access to
the canal, along with the ships of other na-
tions. We have no constraints on the action
that we can take as a nation to guarantee
that neutrality. Our own ships and those of
Panama will have priority for expeditious
passage through the canal in a case — in a
time of emergency.

And I think that this is an agreement that
is very conducive to continued peace, to bet-
ter relationships with nations and people in
the Latin American ai-ea, and I think most of
the objections that were raised earlier about a
giveaway, a highly exorbitant payment to
Panama, loss of control, takeover by some
other government, a prohibition against the
free use of the canal — all those concerns,
which were legitimate in the past, have now
been answered successfully for our nation
within the present negotiations.

But it will be a major responsibility of my
own, through my own statements and
through those of others who support the
Panama Canal treaty, to give the. American
people the facts. I think that to a substantial
degree, those who do have the facts and
have studied this situation closely concur
that these two treaties are advantageous for
us. This is a bipartisan support. It does in-
volve, of course, myself and the members of
my Administration. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff, with absolutely no pressure, encour-
agement from me, unanimously believe that
this treaty is in the best interests of our
own nation's security. President Ford sup-
ports the treaty strongly. Secretary Kis-
singer supports it strongly, and so do many
others.

But my belief is that as the American
people become acquainted with the very
good terms of the treaty, they will shift
their support to the treaty itself.

Q. Would you say, then, that those who
are criticizing it are not fully informed on it
yet?

The President: Obviously there are some

September 19, 1977

377

who are fully informed who just don't want
to make any change in the present terms
concerning the operation of the treaty. I
wouldn't want to say that anyone who dis-
agrees with me is ignorant, but I believe
that the way to arouse public support for the
treaty is to let the American people know
the advantages to our country of its terms.

I'm convinced that it's advantageous. I
was not convinced of this fact, say, a year
ago. But I think that the terms that we hope
to achieve in our negotiations for the benefit
of our country have all been achieved.

Q. Twice in recent weeks the United States
has said that Israel is in violation of inter-
national law in terms of the West Bank set-
tlements, which some vieiv as an annexation
plan. My question is: What does the United
States plan to do to protect the rights of the
people in the occupied lands?

The President: Well, it's been the position
of our own government, long before I was
elected President, that the West Bank terri-
tory, the Gaza Strip, areas of the Golan
Heights, Sinai region — the occupied ter-
ritories, in other words — were not a part of
Israel. Our government has expressed on
several occasions— the President, our Am-
bassadors to the United Nations, and
otherwise — that the settlement of Israeli
citizens in some of these areas was in viola-
tion of the Geneva convention and that,
therefore, the settlements were illegal.

We have private assurances and there
have been public statements made by [Is-
raeli Prime Minister] Mr. Begin that these
settlements were not intended to show that
Israel was to occupy these territories per-
manently, that the final boundaries to be es-
tablished through mutual agreement be-
tween Israel and the Arab countries was to
be decided without prior commitment, and
negotiations would include these areas.

So, at this time, our pointing out to Israel
that these three settlements that were just
established are illegal because they were
made on occupied territory, is the extent of
our intention.

I concur with the statement that was
made by Secretary Vance — the State De-

partment— that this kind of action on the
part of Israel, when we are trying to put to-
gether a Middle Eastern conference leading
to a permanent peace, creates an unneces-
sary obstacle to peace. I believe that our
opinion is shared by the overwhelming
number of nations in the world, but we don't
intend to go further than our caution to Is-
rael, our open expression of our own con-
cern, and the identification of these settle-
ments as being illegal.

Q. But you don't feel that you have any
leverage at all to move in any direction in
terms of military aid to Israel to keep her
front violating —

The President: Obviously, we could exert
pressure on Israel in other ways, but I have
no intention to do so.

Q. Going bock to the Pa)iaina Canal, do
you favor a widening of the ca)ial to make it
usable for the largest modern warships and
perhaps an American investment in a sea-
level canal, as you mentioned earlier?

The President: It's obvious to me that
over a period of time the Panama Canal in
its original conformation has become in-
adequate. I think in the last 12 months, only
four or five Navy warships have been
through the canal at all. Any large ship — an
aircraft carrier, for instance— would have to
go around the southern area of South
America.

Standard oil tankers that would bring oil,
say, from Alaska to the gulf coast area or
the Atlantic area, could not possibly go
through the Panama Canal. That oil, if
transported through the canal, would have
to be offloaded into small, lighter small ships
and taken to the canal and then up to, say,
New Orleans or some other gulf coast port.

Over a period of time, I think that the
canal needs to be expanded. I think it's
premature now, though, for me to decide
whether or not a sea-level canal would be
advocated or whether an expansion of the
present canal facilities would be best. There
has been a very elaborate study made of

378

Department of State Bulletin

this, I think concluding only a year or two
ago, and, I think, initiated when President
Johnson was in office, that showed that if a
sea-level canal was needed, that it ought to
be placed in Panama. That was before we
had the additional opportunity to haul Alas-
kan oil and natural gas through the canal.
So, that's an option for the future. I just
want to be sure that we don't foreclose the
option, if a sea-level canal is built, of our
nation playing a role in it, in harmony with
and in partnership with Panama.

But whether we need it at this time, I
doubt; in the future I think we will —

Q. When i/ou Diet with Secretarii Kissinger
last week, i/ou told him in the presence of
reporters that i/on had told President Ford
that morning that i/oii had what i/ou called
an absolute continuum of what you —
referri)ig to Secretari/ Kissi)iger — and Pres-
ident Ford had started on southern Africa,
the Middle East. Panama, and Chile.

The President: No, I didn't mention those
things, but go ahead with your question.

Q. This is according to a report that was
written bg reporters who were present.

At ang rate, if gou used the wo)xls "abso-
lute continuum ," what did you mean by
that, and were you saying that the voters
had no choice on those issues between gou
and Presidoit Fords'

The President: I didn't mention any spe-
cific areas of the world where there was an
absolute continuum. What Secretary Kis-
singer came to talk to me about was the
Panama Canal.

In some ai'eas of foreign policy, there is a
complete continuum as Presidents change. I
have a different emphasis that I have placed
on foreign affairs questions than did Presi-
dent Ford or President Nixon or their
predecessors.

I think in the case of the Panama Canal
negotiations, there was a complete con-
tinuum. We did appoint Sol Linowitz to help
Ellsworth Bunker, and we added to the dis-
cussions a concept of guaranteed neutrality
of the canal after the year 2000. That was an
innovation. But the negotiations with the

Panamanian officials continued without
interruption.

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who was
the lead negotiator when President Ford
was in office, continued as my lead
negotiator. We added on Sol Linowitz. But I
never mentioned anything about Chile or
any specific nation in that comment.

President Carter Comments
on Middle East

Followi)ig is an excerpt from a brief ex-
change President Carter had with reporters
at Plai)is, Ga., o)/ August 8.^

Q. There's encouraging news out of the
Middle East this morning. Any coniment on
the reports of the PLO [Palestine Liberation
Orgatiization]?

The Presidoif: No. We don't know yet
what's going to happen until I get a complete
report from Cy Vance — I get a message from
him every night and then a briefing every
morning. If the Palestinians will recognize
the applicability of the U.N. Resolution 242,
then it would open up a new opportunity for
us to start discussions with them and also
open up an avenue that they might participate
in the Geneva conference. But whether they'll
do that, we don't know yet.

Q. If indeed they do recognize 2Jt2,
woukhi't that more or less assure that the
Geneva conferoice will indeed begin?

The P)'esident: I can't answer that question
because there might be other obstacles to it.
But I think I can be able to answer that
question when Secretary Vance gets back.
He's now decided, I think, to talk with some
of the leaders in the Middle East. So, this
might be an encouraging sign.

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Aug. 1.5, 1977, p.
1213.

September 19, 1977

379

Q. He woidd go back to the other Arab
countries again?

The President: Either go back or have ad-
ditional conversations with them before he
leaves the Middle East. And he's going to
stay over in London an extra day to talk to
President Nyerere [of Tanzania] about
Rhodesia and Namibia. So, I think things
look better than they did. I hope we can
work something out on the Palestinians. That
is the biggest obstacle right now.

Q. What about prospects for a Geneva con-
feroice i)i October? Still good?

The President: Well, I'd say they are about
the same as they were. The biggest obstacle
that we've detected, of course, is whether or
not the Palestinians would participate in the
discussions. And our position has been that
until the Palestinians and their leaders rec-
ognize Israel's right to exist that we would
not have conversations with them ourselves.

So, if the Palestinians do adopt as a basis
for the discussions the U.N. Resolutions 242
and 338, then that would certainly make it
easier for them to go —

Q. Have we had any contact with the
Palesti)iia)is formally — informally to indi-
cate their position?

The President: I think a better word would
be indirectly. We've not had any direct con-
versations with them. But, of course, they
are sending us messages though the Syrians
and the Saudi Arabians, the Jordanians and
the Egyptians.

So, we have a means to contact them and
to exchange ideas with them indirectly. But
we are not going to meet with the Palestinian
leaders as long as they are committed to the
destruction of Israel.

Q. What were they saying, indirectly?

The President: That they may adopt U.N.
Resolution 242, which does recognize Israel's
right to exist permanently and in peace with
secure borders.

The thing that has made the Palestinians
reluctant to do this is, at the time 242 was

passed, it only referred to Palestinians as
refugees. And if the Palestinians should say,
"We recognize U.N. Resolution 242 in its en-
tirety, but we think the Palestinians have
additional status other than just refugees,"
that would suit us okay.

International Cooperation
To Control Dangerous Drugs

Following is a)i excerpt of remarks made
by Presidoit Carter on transmitting a mes-
sage to the Congress on August 2, together
with the portion of that message relating to
foreign policy.^

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT CARTER

We must also have international coopera-
tion to control the production and transport
of dangerous drugs into our country. We are
making some progress on this already, in
part because of the very good cooperation
among the governments of foreign countries.

The influx of heroin from Mexico has been
drastically reduced within this last 6-month
period. In the Thailand-Burma area, co-
operating with us, they have now mounted a
very successful antidrug campaign. I think
last week, we had the largest confiscation of
heroin on record — about 400 pounds of her-
oin. And recently, we formed a very good
working relationship with the Government
of Colombia.

Heroin sold in our streets is now in such
short supply that it's only 4.9-percent pure,
the lowest quality detected since records
have been kept.

We will make further efforts to deal with
the problem on an international level by
cooperating with law enforcement officials
abroad, by sharing treatment knowledge, by

' For the complete texts, see Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents dated Aug. 8, 1977. p. 1153
and p. 1154.

380

Department of State Bulletin

backing drug efforts of the United Nations,
by helping to find alternate crops for drug-
producing countries — particularly in the
mountainous areas where heroin poppies are
grown — and by supporting the ratification of
the Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS

Tu the Congress of the United States:

For certain drugs originally derived from
plant sources outside the United States,
especially heroin and cocaine, diplomatic
agreements against cultivation and traffick-
ing are indispensable. Turkey — once virtu-
ally the sole source of heroin supply in this
country — is now gone from the illicit market
as the result of such an agreement. The
enormous profits generated by the illicit
drug traffic distort the economies of many
smaller countries, aggravating inflation and
draining tax revenues; they also engender
corruption and corrode political stability.
We must work closely with other govern-
ments to assist them in their efforts to
eradicate the cultivation of drugs, and to
develop legitimate alternative sources of in-
come for the impoverished farmers who have
for generations raised and sold crops such as
opium.

We have made significant progress in the
last few months. In February, I discussed
with President Lopez-Portillo of Mexico my
deep concern about the illegal cultivation of
opium in his country. Under his strong lead-
ership, the eradication program has been in-
tensified and is producing dramatic results,
significantly reducing the availability of
heroin in many American cities. In addition,
President Ne Win of Burma and Prime
Minister Thanin of Thailand have shown a
resolute determination to control drug culti-
vation and trafficking in their countries.
Most recently I have received strong assur-
ances from President Lopez-Michelsen of
Colombia that he plans to give the problem
of drug trafficking his highest priority. We
are establishing a commission made up of

government officials from our two countries
to coordinate a stepped up effort to deal
with the major international trafficking of
cocaine and marihuana between our two
countries, and the devastating economic im-
pact of that traffic.

As a result of these efforts and those of
the Drug Enforcement Administration, the
purity of heroin in our country has dropped
in the last six months to 4.9%, the lowest
level in 4 years.

There is, however, more that we can do:

(1) I am directing the Secretary of State
to give greater emphasis to the international
narcotics control program and to reiterate to
foreign governments our strong desire to
curtail production of, and traffic in, illicit
drugs.

(2) To this end, I am directing the Ad-
ministrator of the Agency for International
Development to include such measures as
crop and income substitution in its develop-
ment programs for those countries where
drugs are grown illicitly. I expect the Secre-
tary of State to continue to call on other
agencies and departments, such as the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Cus-
toms Service, the U.S. Department of Ag-
riculture, and the National Institute on
Drug Abuse, to assist in the international
narcotics control program according to the
special expertise of each.

(3) I am directing the intelligence commu-
nity to emphasize the collection and analysis
of information relating to international drug
trafficking.

(4) I strongly support the work of the
United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Con-
trol (UNFDAC), the United Nations Com-
mission on Narcotic Drugs, the International
Narcotics Control Board, the World Health
Organization, and other organizations work-
ing within the framework of the United Na-
tions in their efforts to help drug-producing
countries find alternate crops, improve drug
control measures, and make treatment re-
sources available.

(5) I am instructing the United States
representatives to the loan committees of the
Regional Development Banks and other in-

September 19, 1977

381

ternational financial institutions to use their
votes and influence to encourage well de-
signed rural development and income sub-
stitution projects in countries which now
produce dangerous drugs, and to ensure that
assistance is not used to foster the growth of
crops like opium and coca.

(6) Because of the need to improve inter-
national controls over dangerous drugs
which have legitimate medical uses, like
barbiturates and amphetamines, I urge the
Congress to adopt legislation implementing
the Convention on Psychotropic Substances,
and I urge the Senate to ratify this treaty
promptly.

(7) In my communications with foreign
leaders, I will emphasize international coop-
eration among drug law enforcement agen-
cies, so that intelligence and technical ex-
pertise can be shared. I will encourage them
to send law enforcement officials to work
with us to stop the flow of drugs through
other countries. This kind of cooperation has
already begun in Bangkok among French,
German, British, Dutch, American, and Thai
officials.

I will, in addition, promote the interna-
tional sharing of knowledge and e.xpertise in
the treatment of drug abuse. We will make a
special effort to share our experience, espe-
cially with those nations which have serious
drug problems and which are working with
us in the effort to control drug sources and
prevent drug abuse. Our program will en-
compass training, research and technical as-
sistance projects, including providing
American experts as consultants.

U.S., Republic of the Comoros
Establish Diplomatic Relations

Depcniiiieiif Atntouiiceiuent^

The Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic of
the Comoros, guided by the desires of their
peoples to estabhsh and develop relations of
friendship and cooperation, based on the princi-
ples of the United Nations Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, have
agi-eed to establish diplomatic relations as of
August 15.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

United States-Canadian Recipi-ocal Fisheries Agree-
ment. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations to aceompanv H.R. 5638. S. Rept. 9.5-317.
June 29, 1977. 23 pp.

Making Appropriations for the Departments of State,
Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies for Fiscal Year 1978. Report" of the commit-
tee of conference to accompany H.R. 755fi. H. Rept.
95-476. June 30, 1977. 17 pp.

International Development and Food Assistance Act of
1977. Report of the committee of conference to ac-
company H.R. 6714. H. Rept. 9.5-.501. July 14, 1977.
45 pp.

Protocol of Amendment to the Inter-American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). Report of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to acompany
Ex. J., 94-1. S. Ex. Rept. 9.5-8. July 15, 1977. 36 pp.'

Agreement with Canada Concerning Transit Pipelines.
Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions to accompany E.\. F., 9.5-1. S. E.x. Rept. 9.5-9.
July 15, 1977. 98 pp.

Jimmy Carter.
The White House, August 2, 1977.

' Read to news correspondents on Aug. 15, 1977, by
Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

382

Department of State Bulletin

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Framework for a Dynamic North-South Dialogue

Stateii/e)/t hi] Andrew Yomig

U.S. Rcprei^ciifative to the United AV;//o)rs' '

At this session of the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) our major emphasis will be
on economic development and the review of
U.N. programs touching every aspect of the
economic life of nations — from industrial de-
velopment to agriculture — and how they are
best coordinated. But, whether we are discuss-
ing the restructuring of the economic and so-
cial sectors of the United Nations, follow-up
to the Habitat Conference [U.N. Conference
on Human Settlements, May 31-June 11,
1976], the problems of promoting industrial
development in developing countries, or the
need to suppress illicit payments in commer-
cial transactions, our object is the same: to
best marshal our resources as nations and as
an organization so that they may bring the
greatest lasting benefit to the greatest
number of people.

So, the "economics" and "organization" we
are treating here cannot be handled by
economists or administrators alone or by
other "experts." They require the attention of
dedicated persons of every persuasion. They
also require the will of governments and, ul-
timately, the commitment of the people they
represent.

Never has this common political and pubhc
will been more important for today we stand
at the threshold of a new era. The nations of
the developed and developing world have
crossed a difficult period. We know now that

'Made before the United Nations Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) at Geneva, Switzerland, on July 8,
1977 (text from USUN press release 58 dated Aug. 3).

we can and must cooperate and that our aspi-
rations do not differ as much — in North and
South, East and West — as we thought.
Rather, we have begun a period when we
must find the best methods and structures for
collaboration in meeting the common aspira-
tions of all men.

This search is an evolving process which, in
our view, must be open to the ideas of all con-
cerned. No single blueprint can possibly set in
concrete the final answers to the problems we
all seek to solve. In a sense, we are involved
in a rolling, never-ending process toward ob-
jectives which must constantly be
readjusted— a process that involves persever-
ance in pursuing valid concepts but at the
same time permits the incorporation of new
ideas and the abandonment or revision of
those that prove unworkable or unattainable.
The only unchangeable element in this process
is its fundamental purpose: the achievement of
economic justice for nations and for people.

The aspirations of the developing
countries — the Third World — for achieving
economic justice have come to be symbolized
in the phrase "new international economic or-
der." We support this concept, whatever par-
ticular phrase is used to express it. President
Carter in his first major foreign policy ad-
dress, made in the hall of the General Assem-
bly [on March 17, 1977], stated our country's
readiness to ". . . promote a new system of in-
ternational economic progress and coopera-
tion. . . ."2 Secretarv of State Vance at the

•■'For text, see Bulletin of April 11, 1977, p. 329.

September 19, 1977

383

Paris Conference on International Economic
Cooperation [May 30^une 2, 1977] called for
"a new international economic system" in
which there must be equity, growth, and
above all, justice. ^

Our problems with the particular phrase
"new international economic order" arose
from its association with the two resolutions
[3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI)] adopted by the
Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly
in 1974 on which we had — and continue to
have — some serious reservations; but the na-
ture of these reservations should be under-
stood. They have never meant that we object
to the totality of those documents, as there is
much in them with which we can agree. Nor
do they mean in any way that we object to the
broad concept of achieving a new and more
equitable international economic order; quite
the contrary.

We plan to make this distinction clearer
than we have heretofore when we are asked to
join in reiterating the goal of achieving a new
international economic order. Whenever the
context permits we will interpret this to mean
the broad, evolving concept I have been dis-
cussing and on that basis we will indeed join
in supporting it. On the other hand, we will
not be able to join when we are asked to en-
dorse or implement the provisions of the Sixth
Special Session resolutions as a whole or to
criticize ourselves for not doing so. We take
our reservations seriously.

Our preference is to explore with you every
compatible and workable means of achieving
the more just system that the new order im-
plies. We will contribute our own ideas and
ask that you examine them just as we examine
yours. We further ask that you understand
our positions but also our sincere intention to
work for changes in international economic
relationships — changes that will accelerate
the progress of the developing countries and
that will at the same time represent a true
consensus of interest and of resolve. The in-
ternational order is, after all, a system of re-
lationships among all nations. The process of
change, therefoi'e, must be through an evolv-
ing consensus that takes into account the eco-

^For text, see Bulletin of June 20, 1977, p. 645.

nomic systems, the interests, and the ideas of
all countries. Thus we are talking about a
process or a broad framework for dialogue and
progress, as much as an order. It will involve
negotiation, agreement, but also dis-
agreement. It must be dynamic, not static or
stagnant.

Laying the Basis for Discussion

The time seems ripe for this manner of ex-
change. New ideas — ideas that grow out of a
common quest and out of new experience — are
usually generated in an atmosphere of com-
mon search more than from one of mutual mis-
trust. It is that lesson that the nations of
North and South are learning again today.
Perhaps you will allow me to think out loud on
these issues — not offering a negotiating posi-
tion, but mainly raising questions.

We have just concluded a successful exper-
iment in discussing international economic
problems in a small but still representative
forum, the Conference on International Eco-
nomic Cooperation in Paris. We have reached
agreements on a number of key areas: the
need for substantial and effective increases in
flows in development assistance; the need for
special efforts for the poorest nations, as
exemplified by the Special Action Program;
programs to accelerate the development of
both new and conventional energy sources in
developing countries; the establishment of a
common fund; and on increased efforts to aid
infrastructure development in Africa. In other
areas, we have not yet agreed. But the most
important gain of all was in understanding we
have come not only to appreciate each other's
views and positions but the reasons for them,
derived from national conditions, tradition,
and philosophy.

Now these questions have come back to the
United Nations where we have held open the
31st Session of the General Assembly to re-
view the results of the Paris conference. So,
too, do all questions touching on the evolution
of the world economy return for discussion to
the United Nations. We welcome this fact not
only because we have supported the United
Nations since its foundation but precisely be-
cause it is in the United Nations where all

384

Department of State Bulletin

considerations pertaining to the welfare of
men and women as individuals can be taken
into account. When the U.N. system deals
with economic questions, it is clearly the Gen-
eral Assembly which is the forum of highest
resort. In the Assembly, where all member
nations are represented, each delegation has a
chance to express its national vision for the
future and each has a chance to give the opin-
ion of its government on problems and pro-
posals for economic cooperation.

But, what of ECOSOC? What are the ad-
vantages to be drawn from the special nature
of this body, with its smaller, but equitably
derived, membership and its closer link to
specific problems and U.N. mechanisms? One
of these advantages, potentially, would be to
use ECOSOC for a more open dialogue, for a
kind of consensus building. My government is
open to all other ideas as well. We want the
United Nations — and all of its organs, includ-
ing ECOSOC — each in its own way to be as
effective as possible as a means of making
continuous economic and social progress.
Hence, we must bring to bear a maximum of
cooperation, of openness to new ideas, and of
willingness to accept change in our work on
the restructuring of the economic and social
sectors of the U.N. system.

As a former U.S. Congressman, long con-
cerned with the role of the United Nations, I
have also been familiar with criticisms of its
deficiencies as an organization, particularly in
the vital economic and social sectors. These
criticisms have not been peculiar to the
United States; indeed, they found expression
in Consensus Resolution 3362 of the Seventh
Special Session which called into being the Ad
Hoc Committee on [the] Restructuring [of the
Economic and Social Sectors of the United
Nations System].

We will not be spending much of our formal
time on the committee's work, but I know that
Ambassador Dadzie [Kenneth K. S. Dadzie of
Ghana, chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Restructuring] and his friends have been
working hard to prepare a text which we can
examine at our resumed session and pass to
the 32d General Assembly. This group is a
particularly inventive one; my delegation is
pleased to be taking an active role in it and is

confident that the results will justify the 2
years of effort that Ambassador Dadzie and
the members of the committee, from North
and South, East and West, have been putting
into it.

One of the organs of the United Nations
which has most reflected the aspiration for
change is UNCTAD [United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development]. I do not
want to make my first address in Geneva
without mentioning this organization. My
government has been participating fully in the
work of UNCTAD on commodities within the
framework of the integrated program. We
look forward to the conclusion of a number of
commodity agreements; we support the crea-
tion of a common fund to help finance these
agreements, a common fund which will be a
key component in assuring that the producers
of these commodities can expect more stable
proceeds as an input to their planned de-
velopment. I am confident that UNCTAD will
find other challenges to meet as well. I have
already met with the distinguished Secretary
General of UNCTAD, Mr. Gamani Corea [of
Sri Lanka], to explore ways in which we can
strengthen our cooperation i-n areas of
UNCTAD's responsibility, in meeting our
common goals of development.

My government is also anxious to
strengthen the work of the United Nations
regional commissions. The United States finds
most encouraging the very frank and con-
structive attention the ECLA [Economic
Commission for Latin America] Secretariat
and the Commission's 17th session have given
to the urgent need to mold together the con-
cepts of social justice and economic develop-
ment so that the poorest people of the region
may share in the fruits of Latin America's im-
pressive economic growth.

ECLA and other regional economic commis-
sions are limited geographically while some
other bodies of the United Nations can be said
to be limited in duration — I refer to U.N. con-
ferences. I believe 1977 can be said to mark a
particularly important year in this regard. At
Mar del Plata in Argentina [U.N. Water Con-
ference, March 14-25, 1977], we achieved con-
sensus on a plan of action for concrete steps in
the domain of water resources. Soon, we will

September 19, 1977

385

be holding the U.N. Conference on Desertifi-
cation in Nairobi, Kenya [August 29-
September 9. 1977], to deal with a tragic prob-
lem affecting many lands, but most acutely a
number of the poorest.

This year also saw the first meeting of the
ECOSOC Committee on Science and Technol-
ogy in its capacity as preparatory committee
for the 1979 Conference on Science and Tech-
nology for Development. I would not hide my
delegation's disappointment at the excessive
emphasis on personnel questions which seems
to have marked the preparatory work since
the conclusion of that meeting. It had been my
country's hope that the resolution passed by
consensus at the 61st ECOSOC provided a
sufficient basis for dealing with this problem.

My government remains willing to assure
the fullest possible contribution to the
Conference — by American business, American
universities, and the entire American scien-
tific community. We remain willing to serve
as host for the Conference. But the United
States alone cannot assure its success.
ECOSOC has a special responsibility in this
regard and it must exercise it. I have not
dwelt on this Conference for its own sake, but
because it touches on a theme essential to
economic development and to the extension of
every man's capacity for self-realization — the
application of science and technology to
development.

The greatest contribution that industrializa-
tion and the transfer of technology can make
is to the realization of human potential.
Hence, when we visualize the transfer of
technology, we do not conceive of a package
tied with a ribbon — the basis for any such
transfer is education so that modernization
may truly take root in a country. Hence, we
see training; we see educational exchanges.
We see research with the needs of the de-
veloping countries in mind — in which my
country is the leader among the industrialized
nations. We see governments collaborating in
an effort to insure that technologies applied
are truly applicable to the needs of the coun-
try where they will be used. And, of course,
we see important contributions of the business
world .

I think we can agree that private companies

and state-owned enterprises, firms in market
economy countries and in industrial Socialist
countries, industries in the developed and de-
veloping world alike can and must contribute
to the expansion of industrial capacity
throughout the world. I need hardly repeat
the fact that investments have provided for
transfers of real resources well in excess of
those arising from official development
assistance.

What is perhaps more often forgotten is
how international investment can contribute
to the advancement of human capacities as
well, through the development of industrial
skills. In the business world, perhaps more
than any other, men and women are advanced
on the basis of their capacities; this is particu-
larly true when business is implanted in a de-
veloping country. The year of the expatriate
technician and manager has faded; new gener-
ations of both can be trained in developing
countries as the need for them arises.

This is the role investment can fulfill. De-
veloping countries themselves must decide
whether they want this and under what condi-
tions. What is important is that these condi-
tions be mutually understood. Already today,
and fully consistent with the goal of attaining
a new international economic order, develop-
ing countries on every continent and with
every economic philosophy have learned that
they can reach agreements with multinational
corporations that fully take into account their
interests, their developmental priorities, and
their national sovereignty.

Under our system the U.S. Government
cannot dictate to American companies where
they should transfer technology or where they
should participate in the creation or rede-
ployment of industries. Investment implies
freely negotiated contracts and respect for the
rights of the investor; it implies mutual bene-
fits. The decisions of American firms to trans-
fer capital or technology rest with them but
depend in large measure on the conditions set
by host countries.

We believe the United Nations can help in
clarifying the conditions under which mutually
acceptable arrangements are possible.
Through the Centre for Transnational Corpo-
rations, through studies of UNITAR [United

386

Department of State Bulletin

Nations Institute for Training and ResearciiK
through work in UNCTAD, and in the Com-
mission on Transnational Corporations we can
learn to deal in constructive and positive ways
with the real issues that affect commercial re-
lations between countries— in particular the
relations between multinational corporations
and the countries in which they operate.

In the second session of the Commission on
Transnational Corporations held in Lima in
1976, we agreed to give highest priority to the
development of a code of conduct relating to
transnational corporations. We have partici-
pated fully and actively in the working group
established to develop such a code. We are
aware that there remain areas of serious diffi-
culty but nevertheless hope that there will be
significant progress in the near future in the
development of a code that is mutually satis-
factory to all of us.

In this same spirit, we should also proceed
with the development of a realistic and bal-
anced code of conduct, or guidelines, for the
transfer of technology. In this context, let me
also refer to the work of the Ad Hoc Inter-
governmental Working Group on the Problem
of Corrupt Practices which was established by
the 61st Session of this Council. The working
group will present to us at this session a re-
port which fulfills that part of its mandate
calling for it "to elaborate in detail the scope
and contents" of an international agreement
dealing with illicit payments. My government
attaches the highest priority to this effort.

I am impressed that in this area — the prob-
lem of illicit payments including bribery — we
are operating on the basis of fundamental
agreement. We all agree that bribery of public
officials corrupts national institutions, that it
distorts economic decisionmaking and thereby
impedes the development process, that it
raises the costs of goods and services to the
consumer, and affects the national balance of
payments. The national laws of almost all of
the members of this Council e.xplicitly prohibit
bribery of their public officials. And in Res-
olution 3514 of the 30th Session of the General
Assembly, we agreed on the need for interna-
tional cooperation to prevent and eliminate
such practices. Accordingly, we would sin-
cerely hope that, in considering the report of

the working group, the Council will make the
necessary arrangements to complete the
negotiation of an international agreement.

Work on such an agreement should not de-
tract from our continuing efforts to formulate
a general code of conduct on transnational
corporations. I see the two efforts as being
complementary. In fact, if we can prove to
ourselves that it is possible to take effective
action in this limited area where there is fun-
damental agreement, it should help us in our
efforts to reach general agreement on some of
the wider issues.

Meeting Basic Human Needs

I have touched upon but a few questions
arising from our agenda. I did not come to
make a catalogue of our work or of my own
government's actions or intentions. Rather,
my main purpose here is a very simple one. It
is to share with you my own conviction that,
in all of our deliberations in the evaluation we
give to the documents and reports we
examine, we must never lose track of the
basic needs of human beings. We have ample
facts and statistics before us and we should
examine them. We have progress reports on
governments' implementation of U.N. resolu-
tions and we will consider them. But, in each
case, let us ask how our efforts contribute to
social change and especially how we affect
poor nations and poor people in every nation.

We recognize that there cannot be social
justice unless the fruits of the expansion of
the world economy are equitably shared and
serve to meet goals of economic development.
But there cannot be lasting economic de-
velopment without social justice. Develop-
ment must be linked with liberation — from
poverty, dependence, and degradation. Im-
pressive growth rates, the fulfillment of
targets are not enough. Indeed, fixation on
such numerical goals, if carried to excess, can
even be self-defeating, as they may divert at-
tention from overcoming poverty and gross
imbalance between I'ich and poor. I would re-
call that Dr. Raul Prebisch, the father of
UNCTAD, said recently at the Guatemala
City meeting of ECLA that the new interna-
tional economic order means nothing if it does

September 19, 1977

387

not deal with poverty and injustice. This
means that creating a new international eco-
nomic order does not mean only equality of
opportunity for all states to share in the fruits
of the continued expansion of the global econ-
omy but equality of opportunity also for all
people within those states.

During the period 1971-75, the growth rate
of those developing countries that had at-
tained a per capita gross domestic product of
more than $200 in 1970 exceeded the 6 percent
growth target set in the international de-
velopment strategy for developing countries
as a whole. Countries below the .$200 figure
averaged only 3.5 percent. The per capita
growth of the latter countries was only 0.9
percent per year, as compared to the IDS [In-
ternational Development Service] goal of 3.5
percent per capita growth for developing
countries as a whole. How these developments
actually affected the people in these countries
we dare hardly speculate. Nor do these fig-
ures tell us anything about the problem of the
least advantaged people in all countries. But
we do know that for these people to join in
building the society we are seeking for all,
they will need adequate food; they will need
shelter and health care; they will need educa-
tion and a chance to participate meaningfully
in the nation's economic life.

All of us — in developed and developing
countries. Socialist and market-economy
countries — must make a compact to meet
these basic human needs. No group of coun-
tries can disclaim responsibility for participat-
ing in this universal endeavor. We must sit
down and decide on what resources are
needed, how they can be provided, and how-
costs can be shared. We look on this greater
emphasis on meeting basic human needs as a
new and vital dimension to a broader strategy
for development. It would not be designed to
supplant pi'ograms to develop the infrastruc-
ture and productivity of developing countries,
which are essential if these countries are in-
creasingly to assume the burden of meeting
the basic human needs of their own people. I
would propose for youi* consideration that this
process of analysis commence at various levels
in central and specialized bodies of the United
Nations and in the regional economic commis-

sions. All U.N. members should have the op-
portunity of discussing the needs of the
poorest, as they see them; they should pool
their ideas and reflections on how this organi-
zation can best contribute to the common ef-
fort at meeting basic human needs.

An encouraging example is the action taken
at the World Food Council session held in
Manila last month. The Council, in its bal-
anced recommendations, recognized the need
for additional assistance from traditional and
new donors while also calling attention to the
need for self-help measures and proper
priorities within the developing countries — all
in the interest of meeting the needs of poor
people.

U.S. Role in World Economy

The United States of America pledged itself
at the Paris conference to substantially raise
the levels of economic assistance. We will
provide both bilaterally and through interna-
tional institutions. But it would be disingenu-
ous to ignore the fact that our capacities will
depend substantially on the state of our own
economy. I will conclude, therefore, with a
few remarks about what we are planning to
achieve within the United States in the years
immediately ahead.

The U.S. economy, like most others, has
been struck by a series of shocks which culmi-
nated in the worst inflation and the worst re-
cession that we had in a decade. These in-
cluded the jump in food prices in 1972-73,
combined with a rise in raw materials prices
due to heavy demand, and a quadrupling of oil
prices. While my country has been more suc-
cessful than some others in recovering from
these immediate shocks, some severe prob-
lems remain. Unemployment is at far higher
levels than those we are accustomed to; while
inflation rates have declined somewhat, they
remain unsatisfactory.

Therefore, we have set goals of further re-
ducing the rate of inflation through coopera-
tion with business and labor and, most impor-
tant, of bringing our rate of unemployment
down to 4.75 percent by 1981 — a i-ate which is
close to normal in our highly mobile labor
force. In order to reach these objectives, our

388

Department of State Bulletin

economy will need to grow between now and
1981 at an average real rate of about 5 percent
per year. Nearly 10 million new jobs will have
to be created; these goals, in turn, mean that
consumer confidence must remain high. Most
important, business fixed investment will
have to rise by about 9-10 percent a year be-
tween now and 1981 in order to insure full
employment while guarding against inflation-
causing bottlenecks.

These goals will be realizable only if an im-
portant change takes place in the United
States. The present dark cloud of uncertainty
in the minds of business investors and in fi-
nancial markets must be lifted. Therefore, the
government has given priority to restoring
confidence that stable and sustained economic
growth is attainable in the future.

Words alone cannot promote this change.
The Federal Government must show its own
capacity to contribute to such a stable envi-
ronment through the economic level most di-
rectly under control — the budget. The danger
resulting from an imbalanced budget is not
the deficit itself but the risk that the deficit
will revive inflationary forces and eventually
undermine our entire program. We therefore
have set a goal of attaining a balanced budget
by 1981 and sustaining it thereafter. Since de-
cisions taken now will affect budgets years
hence, we must take them with this goal in
mind.

These will continue to be important consid-
erations for us in conducting our national and
also international economic policy in the com-
ing years.

But we will not conduct this policy in isola-
tion. We must all remember that we live in an
interdependent international economic sys-
tem. Hence, when industrialized countries
contribute to the development process in the
Third World, we lay the basis for a greater
general level of prosperity and economic activ-
ity which in the end will benefit all nations,
including ourselves. By the same token,
healthy economies in the industrialized coun-
tries enhance their capacity to provide assist-
ance, markets, and investments benefiting
developing countries.

Interdependence also means that failure to
consider the impact of our decisions on other

countries could do great harm. We pledge
ourselves to take that responsibility most
seriously. Any new international economic
order must fully respect the sovereign I'ights
of nations to maintain their own economic sys-
tems. But it also requires that decisions made
within each system must fully take into ac-
count the needs of others. While my country
cannot fulfill every hope and expectation to-
day, we will not forget our responsibilities as
a member of this interdependent world
community.

Law of the Sea Conference:
Problems and Progress

Following is a statement made to the press
bii Ambassador at Large Elliot L.
Richardson, Special Representative of the
President for the Law of the Sea Conference,
i)i Neiv York o)t July 20.

USUN Press Release 57 dated July 20

The Informal Composite Negotiating Text
resulting from this session of the U.N. Law of
the Sea Conference evidences real progress on
vital issues relating to international security
and freedom of navigation. * At the same time
it substantially sets back prospects for
agreement on an international regime for the
conduct of seabed mining. Both the substance
of the text on this issue and the lack of fair
and open processes in its final preparation re-
quire me to recommend that the United
States undertake a most serious and searching
review of both the substance and procedures
of the conference.

It is with a sense of considerable frustration
that I make this accounting; for true progress
was made during the past session.

— New provisions were negotiated to clarify
the legal status of the new 200-mile economic
zone. They seek to safeguard traditional high
seas freedoms within this zone except for spe-
cific resource-related rights accorded coastal

'Printed as U.N. document A/CONF. 62/WP.lO dated
July 15. 1977.

September 19, 1977

389

states by the convention. These provisions are
a marked improvement over previous texts
and may help prevent erosion of high seas
freedoms by coastal state attempts to extend
their sovereignty over ocean space.

— We successfully retained the generally
satisfactory previous texts on passage of
straits which a determined minority sought to
change. At the same time we found a way to
accommodate the real need for environmental
protection in straits, particularly in areas such
as the Straits of Malacca.

— Th'e provisions of the text dealing with
scientific research were improved. An effort
by some delegations to increase the degree of
coastal state control of scientific research in
the economic zone was defeated. In the new
text, the conditions for conducting scientific
research are set out clearly and are likely to
be copied into national laws, thus regularizing
what has until now been a capricious situa-
tion. Also, we successfully eliminated a clause
that could have obliged the United States to
restrict publication of scientific data after the
fact and without the consent of scientists,
which was highly offensive to our concepts of
free science and free speech. Now the coastal
state, in granting consent, must indicate in
advance if it wishes to impose such a restric-
tion and, if so, the scientist can decide
whether he wishes to proceed with the project
under such circumstances.

— We were successful in eliminating texts
that could have prevented us from imposing-
rules in our territorial sea to prevent pollution
from foreign ships. At the same time, we re-
tained our right to fix strict environmental
conditions — including construction, manning,
equipment, and design regulations — for entry
into U.S. ports. These changes bring the text
into full harmony with the Administration's
antipollution program.

—Continued progress was made in the de-
sign of a comprehensive system for peaceful
settlement of disputes relating to ocean uses.

— Under the fair and judicious leadership of
Minister Jens Evensen of Norway [a Vice
Chairman of the Law of the Sea Conference],
a responsible and effective discussion of sea-

bed issues took place. This discussion and the
texts formulated by Minister Evensen offered
real prospect that the impasse on seabed min-
ing issues could be resolved on terms accept-
able to both the developed and developing
nations.

Regrettably, however, the new "composite"
text concerning the system of exploitation and
governance of the deep seabed area (Part XI)
is now fundamentally unacceptable. It de-
viates markedly from the proposed com-
promise text which had been prepared on the
basis of full, fair, and open discussion under
Minister Evensen's leadership.

The Evensen text, although not without
problems, was generally viewed as a useful
basis for further negotiation. The newer
text — produced in private, never discussed
with a representative group of concerned na-
tions, and released only after this session of
the conference terminated — cannot be viewed
as a responsible substantive contribution to
further negotiation. Indeed, the manner of its
production — treating weeks of serious debate
and responsible negotiation as essentially
irrelevant — raises an equally serious pro-
cedural problem: whether the Law of the Sea
Conference can be organized to treat deep
seabed issues with the seriousness they, and
the conference which depends upon their
satisfactory resolution, demand.

Among the serious points of substantive dif-
ficulty in the latest deep seabeds te.xt, and the
system it would define, are the following:

— It would not give the reasonable assur-
ance of access that is necessary if we and
others could be expected to help finance the
enterprise and to accept a "parallel system" as
a basis of compromise;

— It could be read to make technology
transfer by contractors a condition of access
to the deep seabed — subject, at least in part,
to negotiation in the pursuit of a contract;

— It could be read to give the Seabed Au-
thority [International Seabed Resource Au-
thority] the power effectively to mandate
joint ventures with the Authority as a condi-
tion for access;

— It fails to set clear and reasonable limits

390

Department of State Bulletin

on the financial burdens to be borne by con-
tractors; indeed, it simply combines a wide
range of alternative financial bui-dens, as if
such a combination could be a compromise —
when, in fact, it is likely to prove a com-
pound burden sufficient to stifle seabed
development;

— It would set an artificial limit on seabed
production of minerals from nodules — which is
not only objectionable in principle, it is also
far more stringent than would be necessary to
protect specific developing country producers
from possible adverse effects and is incompat-
ible with the basic economic interests of a de-
veloping world generally;

— It would give the Seabed Authority ex-
tremely broad new, open-ended power to reg-
ulate all other mineral production from the
seabed "as appropriate;"

— It would appear, arguably, to give the
Authority unacceptable new power to regu-
late scientific research in the area;

— It would fail adequately to protect minor-
ity interests in its system of governance and
would, accordingly, threaten to allow the
abuse of power by an anomalous "majority;"

— It would allow the distribution of benefits
from seabed exploitation to peoples and coun-
tries not party to the convention;

— It would seriously prejudice the likely
long-term character of the international re-
gime, by requiring that — if agreement to the
contrary is not reached within 25 years — the
regime shall automatically be converted into a
"unitary" system, ruling out direct access by
contractors except to the extent that the Au-
thority might seek their participation in joint
ventures with it.

With this unfortunate, last-minute devia-
tion from what had seemed to be an emerging
direction of promise in the deep seabed
negotiations, I am led now to recommend to
the President of the United States that our
government must review not only the balance
among our substantive interest but also
whether an agreement acceptable to all gov-
ernments can best be achieved through the
kind of negotiations which have thus far taken
place.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done
at London Decembers, 1975. Entered into force provi-
sionally October 1, 197(j, definitively August 1, 1977.
RalificatioHs deposited: Gabon, August 8, 1977; Por-
tugal, August 2.5, 1977.
Accession deposited: Congo, August 19, 1977.

Energy

Agreement on an international energy program. Done at
Paris November 18, 1974. Entered into force January
19, 1976. HAS 8278.
Definitive accession deposited: Greece, July 15, 1977.

Finance

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag-
ricultural Development. Done at Rome June 13, 1976.'
Signature: Mexico, August 2, 1977.
Ratification deposited: Tunisia, August 23, 1977.

Maritime Matters

Amendment of article VII of the convention on facilita-
tion of international maritime traffic, 1965 (TIAS
6251). Adopted at London November 19, 1973.'
Acceptance deposited: Chile, August 2, 1977.

Oil Pollution

International convention on civil liability for oil pollution
damage. Done at Brussels November29, 1969. Entered
into force June 19. 1975.'^
Accession deposited: Chile, August 2, 1977.

International convention for the prevention of pollution
of the sea by oil, as amended. Done at London May 12,
1954. Entered into force Julv 26, 1958; for the United
States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900, 6109.
Acceptance deposited: Chile (with a reservation). Au-
gust 2, 1977.

Patents

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at
Washington June 19, 1970.'
Accession deposited: Congo, August 8, 1977.

Property — Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial prop-
erty of March 20. 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm
July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entei'ed into force
May 19, 1970: for the United States August 25, 1973.
Articles 13 through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970;

' Not in force.

September 19, 1977

391

for the United States September 5. 1970. TIAS 6923.

7727.

Notice from World Intellecfual Property Organization

of territorial e.rte>isio>i: United Kingdom to Hong

Kong. August 16, 1977.
Trademark registration treaty, with regulations. Done at
Vienna June 12, 1973.'
Accessioti deposited: Congo, August 8, 1977.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all forms of
racial discrimination. Done at New York December 21,
1965. Entered into force .January 4, 1969.=
Accession deposited: Chad, August 17, 1977.

Satellite Communications System (INMARSAT)

Convention on the international maritime satellite or-
ganization (INMARSAT). Done at London September
3, 1976.'
Signature: New Zealand, August 17, 1977.

Operating agreement on the international maritime satel-
lite organization (INMARSAT). Done at London Sep-
tember 3, 1976.'

Signature: Postmaster-General for Paraguay, August
17, 1977.

Slavery

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery,
the slave trade, and institutions and practices similar to
slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 1956. Entered
into force April 30, 1957; for the United States De-
cember 6, 1967. TIAS 6418.
Accession deposited: Congo, August 25, 1977.

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer
space. Opened for signature at New York January 14,
1975. Entered into force September 15, 1976. TIAS
8480.
Accession deposited: Uruguay, August 18, 1977.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with an-
ne.xes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos Oc-
tober 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975; for
the United States April 7, 1976. TIAS 8572.
Ratifications deposited: Iraq (with a statement), June
14, 1977; Nepal, July 4, 1977.

Treaties

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with anne.x.
Done at Vienna May 23, 1969.'
Ratification deposited: Finland, August 19, 1977.

BILATERAL

Canada

Reciprocal fisheries agreement. Signed at Washington
February 24, 1977.
Entered into force: July 26, 1977.

Czechoslovakia

Agreement amending and e.xtending the air transport
agreement of February 28, 1969, as amended and ex-
tended (TIAS 6644, 7316, 7356, 7881, 8132). Effected
by exchange of notes at Prague August 12, 1977. En-
tered into force August 12, 1977.

Haiti

Agreement amending the agreement of March 22 and 23,

1976, as amended (TIAS 8268, 8395), relating to trade
in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile
products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
August 11, 1977. Entered into force August 11, 1977.

Iran

Memorandum of agreement relating to the provision of
technical assistance to the Iranian Civil Aviation Or-
ganization, with annex. Signed May 12 and June 9,

1977. Entered into force June 9, 1977.

Mexico

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the
United States. Signed at Washington August 26, 1977.
Enters into force on a date to be mutually agreed by
exchange of notes.

Tanzania

Agreement relating to the transfer of food grain to Tan-
zania. Signed at Dar es Salaam August 15, 1977. En-
tered into force August 15, 1977.

' Not in force.

^ Not in force for the United States.

392

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX September 19, 1977 Vol. LXXVII, No. 1995

Arms Control and Disarmament

President Carter's News Conference of August 23
(excerpts)

Western Summation of 12th Round of MBFR Talks
(news conference statement by Netherlands
Representative)

Asia. International Cooperation To Control

Dangerous Drugs (Carter, message to the Con-

_ gress)

Khina

president Carter's News Conference of August 23

(excerpts)

Secretary Vance's Visit to China and Japan Au-
gust 20-27 (Carter, Huang Hua, Vance)

Comoros. U.S., Republic of the Comoros Estab-
lish Diplomatic Relations (Department an-
nouncement)

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Pol-
icy

International Cooperation To Control Dangerous
Drugs (Carter, message to the Congress)

Consular Affairs. U.S., Republic of the Comoros
Establish Diplomatic Relations (Department an-
nouncement)

Developing Countries. Framework for a Dynamic
North-South Dialogue (Young)

Economic Affairs. Framework for a Dynamic
North-South Dialogue (Young)

Europe. Western Summation of 12th Round of
MBFR Talks (news conference statement by
Netherlands Representative)

Human Rights. Secretary Vance's Visit to China
and Japan August 20-27 (Carter, Huang Hua,
Vance)

International Organizations and Conferences.

Framework for a Dynamic North-South Dialogue
(Young)

Israel. President Carter's News Conference of
August 23 (excerpts)

Japan. Secretary Vance's Visit to China and Japan
August 20-27 (Carter, Huang Hua, Vance)

Korea. Secretary Vance's Visit to China and Japan
August 20-27 (Carter, Huang Hua, Vance)

Latin America and the Caribbean. International
Cooperation To Control Dangerous Drugs (Car-
ter, message to the Congress)

Law of the Sea. Law of the Sea Conference; Prob-
lems and Progress (Richardson)

Middle East

President Carter Comments on Middle East (Cai-
ter)

Secretary Vance's Visit to China and Japan Au-
gust 20-27 (Carter, Huang Hua, Vance)

Narcotics Control. International Cooperation To
Control Dangerous Drugs (Carter, message to
the Congress)

376
374

380

37(i
365

382

382
380

382
383
383

374

365

383
37(5
365
365

380
389

379

365

380

Panama. President Carter's News Conference of
August 23 (excerpts) 376

Presidential Documents

International Cooperation To Control Dangerous
Drugs 380

President Carter Comments on Middle East 379

President Carter's News Conference of August 23
(excerpts) 376

Secretary Vance's Visit to China and Japan Au-
gust 20-27 365

South Africa. President Carter's News Confer-
ence of August 23 (excerpts) 376

Southern Rhodesia. President Carter's News
Conference of August 23 (excerpts) 376

Treaty Information. Current Actions 391

Turkey. International Cooperation To Control
Dangerous Drugs (Carter, message to the Con-
gress) 380

U.S.S.R. Secretary Vance's Visit to China and
Japan August 20-27 (Carter, Huang Hua,
Vance) 365

United Nations

Framework for a Dynamic North-South Dialogue
(Young) 383

International Cooperation To Control Dangerous
Drugs (Carter, message to the Congress) 380

Law of the Sea Conference: Problems and Prog-
ress (Richardson) 389

Name Index

Carter, President 365, 376, 379, .380

Huang Hua 365

Richardson, Elliot L 389

Vance, Secretary 365

Young, Andrew 383

Checklist of Department of State

Press Releases: August 29-September 4

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of
Press Relations, Department of State, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20520.

No.

t409
410

Date
8/29

Subiect

U.S., Mexico sign new fisheries
agreement, Aug. 26.
8/30 Carter, Vance: remarks, Andrews
Air Force Base, Aug. 27.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington. d.c. 204o2

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE STA-50I

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7??i^

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXVII • No. 1996 • September 26, 1977

TRADE AND BUSINESS IN INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS
Address by Assistant Secretary Todman 393

HELPING AMERICANS UNDERSTAND WORLD AFFAIRS

Address by Charles W. Bray III i02

Deputy Director, U.S. Information Agency

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

A Foreign Relations Outline UOU

U.S. AMBASSADORS AS OF SEPTEMBER 14, 1977 hl3

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

.;s---

or:^

<^\^V

otpo^

ATOR^

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXVII, No. 1996
September 26, 1977

i ,

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C 20402

PRICE;

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,

domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15

Single copy 85 cents

The Secretary of Slate has determined that the pub-
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tion of the public business required by law of this
Department. Use of funds for printing this periodi-
cal has been approved by the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget through January 31,
1981.

The Department of State BLLLETIS,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Sen ices. Bureau of
Public Affairs, procides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The Bl'LLETlS includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as spe-
cial articles on various phases of in-
ternational affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna-
tional interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Salions documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

Trade and Business in Inter-American Relations

Address by Terence A. Tod»ia>i

Assistant Secretary for hiter-Anierican Affairs '

It is a pleasure for me to appear before this
group. Your experience represents in a very
real sense our past and our future, our con-
cerns and our hopes, and two continents
whose interests are increasingly intertwined.
As American businessmen and women living
and working in Latin America, you. are in a
better position than most of our fellow citizens
to appreciate the importance of this vast re-
gion to our own nation and its economy.

You are in a better position than most to
appreciate the changes that have taken place
in Latin America in the last 10 years: The new
economic realities we have to face and the
record of phenomenal economic growth in an
area many Americans still envision —
wrongly— as hopelessly underdeveloped.

You are in a better position than most to
appreciate the close relationship between the
way our private citizens and those of Latin
American nations relate to one another in
their individual business or personal lives and
the type of attitudes and policies our nation is
able to project. And you know — certainly bet-
ter than anyone — the tremendous stake this
country has in Latin America as a trading
partner and just how beneficial this growing
relationship has been to us.

I mention "Latin America," but I should
make clear that I'm going to use that term to
include the whole region your organization
embraces. As a native of the Caribbean, I am
fully aware of the drawbacks of that approach,
but as we all continue to search for a more
comprehensive yet concise term, I can take

' Made before the Association of Chambers of Com-
merce in Latin America (ACCLA) at Washington, D.C.,
on May 3, 1977.

comfort from noting that your organization
has taken the same liberty in its title.

By any term, Latin America accounts for a
huge volume of U.S. trade. Our exports and
imports from the region have more than tri-
pled in the last 10 years — from under $5 bil-
lion each in 1966 to nearly $17 billion each in
1976. This makes Latin America our second
largest trading partner next to Western
Europe and Canada. Every other area is far
behind.

Also important is the fact that the United
States enjoys an export surplus in our trade
with over half of our Latin trading partners.
We have a $3.5 billion surplus with the non-
oil-exporting nations of the region, enough to
balance our deficit with those that do sell us
oil. Two-thirds of this surplus is in our trade
with Mexico and Brazil alone.

With U.S. business now doing over $33 bil-
lion worth of trade with Latin America annu-
ally, I think we can have no doubt about its
impact — and its impact in a beneficial way — on
our domestic economy.

I think it is also important for all of us to
realize that trade means even more to Latin
America than it does to us. Foreign trade as a
percentage of our own gross domestic product
has doubled in just 3 years, to 13 percent. But
in Brazil it accounts for 20 percent, in Peru for
37 percent, in Venezuela for 57 percent, and
in Jamaica for 66 percent. Try to imagine for a
moment a U.S. economy in which two-thirds
of our total productivity was tied to foreign
trade — it is hard to even picture.

Trade, however, has been the key to Latin
America's rapid development in the last dec-
ade. Latin America has recorded the highest

September 26, 1977

393

rate of growth of any underdeveloped region.
As a whole, Latin America can be said to
stand today at about the same point where the
economy of the European Economic Commu-
nity stood in 1950.

This growth has come largely because of
rapid industrialization. Manufacturers are in-
creasingly important to Latin American coun-
tries. And they look increasingly toward their
trading partners — of which we are far in the
lead by volume — to make available new mar-
kets for these new manufactured goods as well
as for their more traditional primary exports.
In the new Latin America of the 1970's, trade
has replaced aid as the major source of the re-
sources needed to implement development
goals.

Almost all Latin nations have outgrown the
classification of extreme poverty toward
which most direct assistance programs —
whether bilateral or multilateral — are today
directed. And yet these nations are more sen-
sitive than ever to the gap between them and
the "rich" nations and to the unequal distribu-
tion of world income and technology that
underlies the so-called North-South debate.
They have not forgotten our moral commit-
ments to try to bridge that gap.

They look now to increased export sales,
not so much to turn their trade deficits
around — development economies tend, after
all, to be net importers by nature — but rather
to find new markets for their expanding in-
dustries and in turn finance even greater im-
ports, particularly of capital goods.

Increased trade is thus a two-way street,
with vast stakes on both sides. That is why so
much of the relationship we hope to build with
our Latin American neighbors^a relationship
of respect and cooperation and friendship —
depends on how we are able to relate to them
as trading partners.

There are some positive steps that our gov-
ernment can take, and this Administration in-
tends to take them.

We are committed to minimizing trade re-
strictions and are actively pursuing a wide
range of trade liberalization proposals in the
multilateral trade negotiations taking place in
Geneva.

We are trying to see both sides when
legitimate conflicts arise between vulnerable

sections of our own U.S. economy and the
needs of our Latin American trading partners
for American markets. We know, for instance,
that restrictions on shoes, or on sugar, would
do major harm to the economies of several
Latin American countries, and yet there are
considerable problems within this country
that push us in that direction.

One program that has been used to advan-
tage by Latin America is the generalized sys-
tem of preferences under which about 2,800
items are eligible to enter the United States
duty free. This is an effort by the indus-
trialized countries to meet the recognized
need of developing countries for special trade
treatment.

We are also preparing to take positive steps
to cope with one of the most serious problems
that has plagued many Latin American
economies, particularly those dependent on
one or two primary products. That is the wild
fluctuations in commodity prices.

These fluctuations, such as skyrocketing
coffee prices or plummeting sugar prices,
create problems for both producers and
consumers.

President Carter has said the United States
will take a positive and open attitude toward
the negotiation of agreements to stabilize
commodity prices, including the establishment
of a common funding arrangement for financ-
ing buffer stocks where they are a part of in-
dividual and negotiated agreements. And we
intend to consult closely with all our Latin
trading partners in seeking solutions to the
global problems — energy, food resources,
inflation — that set artificial limits to whatever
we might hope to agree on or accomplish
within the Western Hemisphere.

But there is much that government cannot
do — and many things that private busi-
nessmen can and must do to help build the in-
ternational economy and peaceful society of
the future. It is up to you to keep the business
community aware of the link between our will-
ingness to import and our ability to export.

You can also play a key role in making sure
that consumers, retailers, and those who de-
pend on raw materials realize that the imports
they depend on, depend in turn on the con-
tinued growth and viability of the Latin
economies themselves and the well-being of

394

Department of State Bulletin

the industries and workers that comprise
them.

But beyond that our government looks to
you to pai'ticipate personally in many of the
decisions and consultations which we owe to
our commercial allies — but which, since we
are, after all, a free enterprise system, can
ultimately come only from the private sector.

We look to you to take the lead in the great
dilemmas of technology transfer — as was the
case at the March meeting of the technology
e.xperts' working group which explored ways
to transfer technology to Latin American
countries.

We look to you, as President Carter has
said, for a new flexibility and adaptability in
resolving disputes between American busi-
nesses abroad and their host governments and
for the development of new patterns of
cooperation that will prevent future
misunderstandings.

We look to you to help move us beyond for-
mal intergovernmental consultations to direct
planning and problem-solving efforts with
your Latin American counterparts and their
governments. The pragmatic genius of our
own private sector can join the fight against
the problems hindering business development
in our neighbor nations — as in the case of the
quadripartite commission, in which American
and Mexican businessmen are joining their
two governments in searching for new an-
swers to Mexico's development problems.

We look to you to help us convey unmis-
takably the message of the commitment of
our whole nation to the cause of human rights.
You can do this in many ways our government
cannot. Human rights must concern all of us,
not just "someone in Washington." I hope you
will show a commitment to human rights in
the social and professional relationships you
form, in the example you set in your conduct
toward your own employees, and in the con-
cern you show for people in the communities
where you live.

American business in Latin America today
faces a different type of world than it has
known in the past. But the new world — even
with its unfamiliar rules and complex relation-
ships— is a tremendously challenging, econom-
ically promising, and ultimately a very excit-
ing one.

I am particularly pleased to note that the
recent objectives adopted by ACCLA include
not only the fostering of trade and investment
but also "promoting understanding by its
membership of social responsibility as good
corporate citizens toward the communities in
which they operate."

You who are working in Latin America
today are part of the economic miracle of this
generation — the model the whole world looks
to to see if development dreams in mixed
economies, with both private enterprise and
government planners harnessed to the
effort, can work.

We believe it can and that American busi-
ness can carve out for itself a constructive
role, which this government and our children
in later generations will be able to look back
on and be very proud. Your government will
provide all the support we can, and I want you
to know we are counting on you in this great
effort.

President Carter Interviewed
By ABC News Correspondents

Following is an excerpt from an interview
President Carter held with ABC News Corre-
spondents Harry Reasoner and Sam
Do)ialdson at Plains, Ga., on August 10^

Mr. Reasoner. In foreign affairs, the
suggestion has heeyi made that both in the
SALT talks [Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks] and in the Mideast that you have
tended to perhaps be too ope>i, that you have
come out with what might seem to be an in-
flexible American program and just — it's sit-
ting up there for everyone else to shoot at.
Have you changed your attitude on how to do
this kind of thing since you've taken office?

The President: No. I think it's best for the
American people to know the reason why we
have not had a Middle Eastern settlement in
30 years, or maybe 2,000 years, and to un-

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Aug. 22, 1977, p
1221.

Septiember 26, 1977

395

derstand not only our own nation's positions
in seeking a compromise or an agreement
that might lead to permanent peace but also
to understand, as best we can, the difference
of opinion that exists between Israel and
Egypt and Jordan and Syria and some of the
other nations in the Mideast. I think the
American people ought to understand and
know the facts.

To the extent that there is an open debate
in the Congi-ess, in the news media, among
the people themselves, I'll feel much more
secure, when we take a strong position, that
I have the backing of the Congress and the
American people — that we ought not to
evolve a complicated position in a sensitive
area like the Middle East in secret and then
spring it on people or negotiate privately.

No one can expect miracles. As I say, this
is something that's been sought after for
generations — this peace in the Middle East.
We may or may not be successful, but we're
going to continue to try in a very determined
and tenacious way. And I'm going to continue
to go public with the American position.

In the SALT talks, we've developed a
comprehensive proposal to present to the
Soviets. We are doing it both privately and,
to some degree, publicly. We want a com-
plete end of testing of nuclear explosives,
both military and peaceful explosives.

We have put into effect a new policy on
nonproliferation to try to prevent nations
that don't presently have atomic explosives
from developing them. This has upset some
of our allies in Europe who want to sell fac-
tories and machines that can make explosive
material. But I think we ought to be tenacious
about it.

And I think it's good to let the American
people know the facts behind the controver-
sies and the debates. Obviously, when these
kinds of debates are made public, it creates
an image of confusion and a lack of a com-
prehensive policy, and it shows that our na-
tion is not a dictator for other countries.

We have to put forward ideas, and maybe
over a period of time we'll have some prog-
ress. I think we will. But I've never had any
doubt that the American people ought to be
as thoroughly informed as possible and also
involved in the decisionmaking process.

Mr. Reasoner. Keeping on the Middle East
for just one minute, a number of Israeli
leaders in private say that ijou have made
drastic changes in America's attitude toward
Israel and that they regard you with consid-
erable trepidation. Are you aware of that feel-
ing, and do you think there is justification for
it?

The President: Yes, I'm aware of that feel-
ing and also many other feelings. There's no
single attitude among all Jews in the world or
all Israeli citizens. To the extent that Israeh
leaders genuinely want a peace settlement, I
think that they have to agree that there will
be an acceptance of genuine peace on the part
of the Arabs, an adjustment of boundaries in
the Middle East which are secure for the Is-
raelis and also satisfy the minimum require-
ments of the Ai-ab neighbors and the U.N.
resolutions, and some solution to the question
of the enormous numbers of Palestinian refu-
gees who have been forced out of their homes
and who want to have some fair treatment.

These three basic elements are there. And
we are trying not only to put forward our
own ideas but to search among the different
disputing nations for some common basis on
which they can reach agreement. We can
only act as an intermediary to the extent that
the different countries trust us.

So, we've tried to be fair. We've tried to
be open when possible. We've kept confi-
dences when they have been given to us in
confidence. And I don't know that we can
reach a final solution. We are hopeful that we
can, and I think world opinion is very power-
ful on disputing nations when there is a con-
sensus about what ought to be done.

So, we'll continue to labor at it, taking
slings and arrows from all directions, criti-
cisms, publicly in nations when privately the
leaders say we are willing to do this when we
come out publicly for the same position.
Quite often for domestic political consumption
there's an adamant, very disputive, and an-
tagonistic attitude taken on the part of some
leaders. But we are willing to accept this
consequence. I don't know how to guarantee
an ultimate success, but I am willing to ac-
cept the criticism that comes from all parties
as we struggle for success.

396

Department of State Bulletin

Editors and News Directors
Interview President Carter

Followiiig are excerpts relati>ig to foreig)i
policy from President Carter's opening re-
marks and a question-and-answer session
from the transcript of an interview by a group
of editors and news directors on August 26.^

In the field of foreign policy we have very
carefully delineated a set of goals that will
take us through a 4-year period, obviously
recognizing that unforeseen challenges and
opportunities can present themselves at any
moment.

But some of those major goals that are ob-
vious to all of you are the SALT [Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks] talks. They will be re-
commenced next week when Cy Vance, after a
short rest period, will go on over to Vienna.
We are negotiating with the Soviets every day
on that item. The comprehensive test ban, for
which we have good hopes at this moment,
has been joined in by Great Britain. This may
or may not materialize as we envision it.

We've been quite active in the Middle East-
ern negotiations, and I think that it's com-
pletely accurate and a very cautious thing to
say that Cy Vance's last trip to the Middle
East was very successful, certainly compared
to the news reports from it.

We've found a much more compatible rela-
tionship among the Arab leaders, a much
more flexible attitude on their part. And I
think we still have a chance for progress
there. Obviously, the chances are directly de-
termined by the attitudes of the parties in-
volved, although we have a very major inter-
est in the Middle East. We're not just idle
bystanders. We don't play a narrowly defined
negotiating or intermedial^ role. But we are
not trying to impose an American or U.S. set-
tlement upon the other nations involved. We
will be aggressive. But I have to say that
there's going to be a great deal of disillu-
sionment on our part in the Middle East and
around the world if some progress is not dem-
onstrated within this year.

' For complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents dated Sept. 5, 1977, p. 1263.

I doubt that our government could continue
to spend as much time and effort on my part,
the State Department's, and all the other
agencies involved, on a continuing basis, un-
less it's obvious to us that all the parties in-
volved genuinely want a comprehensive peace
settlement.

In southern Africa we have three major and
simultaneous and interrelated goals. Again,
we can't order people around. We can't impose
a settlement on others. One is concerning
Namibia, where we have taken the initiative
and have recruited Germany, England,
France, and Canada to join in with us to en-
courage South Africa to comply with the U.N.
demands and international law concerning
what was formerly Southwest Africa, now
known as Namibia.

We have had encouragement from the South
Africans. I think they want a settlement.
We're now working with the so-called
SWAPO [South West Africa People's Or-
ganization] group to get them to accept free
and democratic elections. This is still conjec-
tural, but we are encouraged now compared to
what we were 3 months ago.

In Rhodesia, or Zimbabwe, we have the
same problem. We and the British are work-
ing jointly on this project. The British have a
tangible and a legal and historical responsibil-
ity in Rhodesia. Andy Young [U.S. Ambas-
sador to the United Nations Andrew Young]
and David Owen, who is the Foreign Minister
of Great Britain, will be meeting tomorrow
with the five frontline presidents [Agostinho
Neto of Angola, Seretse M. Khama of Bot-
swana, Samora Moises Machel of Mozam-
bique, Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania, and
Kenneth David Kaunda of Zambia]. We've
evolved what I think is a rational and fair ap-
proach, which, if adopted, would be very
beneficial.

And of course, the other problem is the con-
tinuing one with South Africa — their apar-
theid policy. We would like to encourage them
to, at the most rapid possible rate, eliminate
the grossly discriminatory practices that have
been extant there for a number of years.
We're not trying to cause a revolution or to
destroy their government. But this is a sensi-
tive issue. There again, we have a limited role
that we can play.

September 26, 1977

397

As you know, we've begun negotiations
again with tiie People's Republic of China. Cy
Vance will be retui-ning now. He's just left
Japan. He will be coming back home, and I'll
be meeting with him Sunday afternoon to get
a more detailed report from him.

This visit was e.xploratory in nature. No one
in our government had met Premier Hua
[Kuo-feng] before, certainly not since he's
been in an ascendant position. [Vice Premier]
Teng Hsiao-ping had been known by more of
our people. But Cy had extensive talks with
both those men, along with Huang Hua, who
is their Foreign Minister. I think they under-
stand our position better; we understand
theirs.

I won't go into any detail on the Panama
situation, except to point out that this treaty
is one that I consider to be vital to our coun-
try. It's been negotiated now for 13 years.

I had serious concerns about it a couple of
years ago, and I think that my concerns — to a
very minor degree — but the concerns ex-
pressed by many Members of the Senate then
have been taken into account. I think that the
present set of principles which are being
drafted into treaty terms or language this
week are completely compatible with our own
nation's best intei'ests and our security needs.

We retain complete control over the opera-
tion of the Panama Canal for the rest of this
century, with the right to defend it. There
will be a nine-person board of directors, five
of whom will always be from the United
States. We will appoint all nine. Until 1990,
the executive director — who does not set pol-
icy, but carries out policy — will be an Ameri-
can citizen. Following 1990 that person will be
a Panamanian citizen. Following the year
2000, the Panamanians will take operating
control of the canal. We will retain the right,
unilaterally, to decide what is necessary on
our part to guarantee the neutrality of the
canal, that it's open to all international ship-
ping. In case of an emergency, we and the
Panamanians have so-called rights of ex-
peditious passage, which means that we get
priority use of the canal for our warships and
for strategic cargo to be passed through the
canal.

I think in balance the treaty is fair to both
sides, and for that purpose alone, I would
favor it. But the additional major advantage is
that it would enhance tremendously our own
relationships with other countries in the
Southern Hemisphere.

I think Mexico all the way down to the
southern part of South America, our
neighbors would know that we were trying to
deal in good faith, that we were no longer at-
tempting to act as a colonial power. And for
that reason, again, there will be, I think, a
great benefit to our business community, to
our nation's stature in the world, and I think
in balance, the Panama Canal is much more
likely now to be open, free, uninterrupted in
its service to all nations of the world than it
would be if we continued the constant alterca-
tions with Panama about the means by which
it should be operated.

Q. To get hack to Patiaiua for a Dioment,
would you hazard your assessment of what
would be the immediate impact and the future
impact of the rejection of the treaty, if it is
rejected — the impact in Panama and Latin
America generally?

The President: I think if the treaty was re-
jected that our nation would have the military
capability to defend it in spite of a threat of
sabotage or other similar threats. I believe
that the cooperative arrangement that has
been spelled out in the treaty between our-
selves and Panama would greatly lessen the
chance of violence and the need to defend the
Panama Canal with force.

We have made an agreement with Panama
that we would have access to the lands and
waters, the military defense establishments in
the Canal Zone as necessary to guarantee its
safety and defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
have been a pai'ty to the negotiations since
I've been in office. They unanimously think
that this is in the best interest of our country.
And on their own initiative, without any or-
ders or encouragement from me, they have
said this publicly, even to the VFW [Veterans
of Foreign Wars] and the American Legion.

We will have a signing ceremony in Wash-

398

Department of State Bulletin

ington the 7th of September. We have invited
each of the Latin American countries who are
supportive to send a high government official
to represent their country. In some instances,
the Presidents or the Prime Ministers them-
selves will come. In others, they might send
the Foreign Minister, or some might choose
not to support the treaty. In all my travels in
Latin America — and I've met with represen-
tatives, I think, of almost all the Latin Ameri-
can countries since I've been in office — I be-
lieve they're unanimously supportive of the
treaty itself.

Had we never started the negotiations 13
years ago, the consequences of not having a
treaty would be much more manageable. Now
the e.xpectation of Latin American people that
we are going to have a resolution of this ques-
tion has built up hopes of new friendship, new
trade opportunities, and a new sense of com-
monality and equality of stature between their
governments and our government that never
existed before. I think if those hopes were
dashed, if we signed the treaty — which we
will do, if the other nations of Latin America
signed the neutrality treaty which will take
effect after the year 2000. and then our Sen-
ate rejects the treaty, I think that the conse-
quences would be very severe. I hope to avoid
that consequence.

I might add that several of the Senators
who are strongly opposed to the treaty recog-
nize this threat and this danger and this
very difficult position in which we find our-
selves.

I have received a report from the Joint
Chiefs to corroborate the first statement I
made that we can defend the treaty. Senator
Gold water [Barry Gold water of Arizona] has
taken a very interesting position with which I
do not agree — that if the American people are
committed to fight in Panama against the
Panamanians some time in the future, then,
he says, he would favor our retention of pres-
ent rights and the exclusion of Panama. If we
are not willing to go to war with the Pana-
manians to retain the open canal, then the
treaty is advisable. And this is basically the
position that others have taken. Very conserv-
ative news columnists like Bill Buckley, to

some degree James Kilpatrick, agree with
that position.

I don't want to have to go to war with
Panama about the treaty, about the canal op-
eration. The ownership of the canal is not
nearly so important to me as the openness of
the canal and its free access to all countries,
as has been the case in the past with our hav-
ing the right to defend it under any circum-
stances, to operate it to the end of this cen-
tury, and to have our own warships, in case of
an emergency, have priority.

Q. Governor Busbee [George Bushee of
Georgia] made the statement that he did not
believe you were receiving enough input from
the American people o)i foreign policij. Before
I left town, I asked the viewers of our news-
cast to call in on the questions of Panama a)id
Cuba. And on the Paiiama treaty, i)i an
hour's time, 822 said no to the treaty and 128
yes. Normalization of relations with Cuba:
589 said no and 3.57 said yes. So there's some
input. But I'd like to k)ioiv what you feel
about Governor Busbee's statement.

The President: I wish you'd ask Jody [Jody
Powell, Press Secretary to the President] this
if you see him again, but I think Governor
Busbee called Jody to say that the text of the
speech to which you refer, that was issued,
was not the speech that he delivered, and I
don't think he made those comments when he
delivered the speech. But that was in the pre-
liminary text that was prepared.

There are times in the life of any public offi-
cial and in any news official when a position
must be taken that's not completely compat-
ible with the public view. There's been a great
deal of legitimate concern about the Panama
Canal expressed in the past, based on propos-
als that were put forward 5, 10, 13 years ago,
that in the present treaty draft have been al-
leviated. The concerns are no longer there be-
cause the treaty terms are better than we had
anticipated.

I have talked to 50 or 60 Members of the
Senate myself since the treaty was completed,
the terms of it. Many of the Senators who
signed the so-called Thurmond resolution a
year or so ago — I think there were 40 of them.

September 26, 1977

399

urging that no treaty be signed— have now
changed their minds, and they will vote for
the treaty because they have been pleasantly
surprised at the terms.

I have a responsibility to be sure that not
only the Members of the Senate but the
American people know the facts about the
current terms of the treaty. My belief is that
when those facts are known, the opinion of the
American people will change.

I think it will have a beneficial effect when 8
or 10 or more leaders of foreign countries
come here in September to ratify the treaty
and express their support for it. I intend to go
to the nation with a fireside chat presentation
some time in the not too distant future to ex-
plain the exact terms of the treaty.

We are also, at the request of individual
Senators, inviting key opinion shapers from
individual States to come here for a briefing
by myself, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
negotiators in the State Department. We've
already had two States, Kentucky and Missis-
sippi. And I think it's accurate to say that the
people in Mississippi who came here were
pleasantly surprised at the terms of the
treaty.

So, I think a current assessment of the feel-
ing of the American people about the Panama
Canal, that can't yet be based on the actual
terms, is not of overwhelming concern to me.
It obviously is of some concern. But that's my
responsibility, and if I can't sell the American
people on the fact that the terms of the treaty
are beneficial, then I'll have a very difficult
time seUing it to the Senate. But I'd predict
that the treaty will be ratified.

Q. You said there'll be great disillusion-
iiieut if progress toward the Middle East peace
settlement is)i't achieved bij the e)id of the
year. What will the United States do )ie.vt —

The Presided: Do next or —

Q. — if there isn't progress and if talks be-
tween Vance and the Middle East Foreign
Ministers next month do not accomplish
anything?

The President: Let me say that our deter-
mination to bring about progress in the Mid-
dle East is as fervent as it has ever been.
We're not going to slacken our effort. I'm
convinced that the Congress and the Ameri-
can people can have their commitment to a
peaceful settlement aroused even more than
has been the case in the past.

We have found a growing impatience among
the other nations of the world, in the Euro-
pean Community for instance, with a lack of
progress. So, I think that any nation in the
Middle East that proved to be intransigent or
an obstacle to progress would suffer at least
to some degree the condemnation of the rest
of the world. That's a persuasive thing in
itself

The three basic problems have been obvious
for decades. They are being addressed in de-
tail now in a much more constructive way than
7 or 8 months ago when I came into office —
territorial boundaries, defensible borders
combined, the Palestinian refugee question,
and a recognition by the Arab countries that
Israel is there, that it has a right to exist, to
exist in peace, and to be accepted as an equal.

I think we've made progress on all three of
those basic areas. My hope is that we can
bring the parties to Geneva for discussions
under the aegis of ourselves and the Soviet
Union and then let the world and the par-
ticipating negotiators themselves realize that
it's going to be a long, tedious process.

There is no instant solution. Disagreements
that have existed in some cases 2,000 years
can't be resolved overnight. But I think as
long as each country proves that they are act-
ing in good faith — which will require some
flexibility, a moving away from adamant
stands that have been expressed in the
past — I think with that sort of demonstration
on their part, then our commitment will con-
tinue to be very dedicated and very constant.

Q. YoK characterized the Vance talks [in
China] as exploratory.

The Presidoit: Yes.

Q. Precisely what was being explored? Did

400

Department of State Bulletin

ive talk, for example, about the use of )iuclear
weapons, did we talk about Taiwan? What
ivere the areas that you were explori)ig?

The President: There was a long agenda
prepared before Mr. Vance went to China that
was of great interest to me for months. He
covei'ed a wide range of interests, different
areas of the world — the Mideast, Africa, ob-
viously, the Western Pacific, peace in Korea,
the SALT talks, comprehensive test ban, the
relationship between ourselves and the
People's Republic of China if recognition is
not initiated, the terms under which we could
normalize relationships with the People's Re-
public of China on the mainland and also honor
our longstanding commitment that the people
on Taiwan could live in freedom — these kinds
of questions were all explored at great length.

I had myself met with the Ambassador from
the People's Republic of China — he's actually
a trade representative, since we don't have an
embassy here — and gone into these questions
to some degree. We've got at least 850 million
people in China whose government we don't
recognize diplomatically. We're one of the few
governments who don't.

It's our hope that we can find some basis on
which to have diplomatic exchange, an en-
hancement of trade, constructive coopera-
tion— not against the Soviet Union or against
anyone else, but for our mutual advantage to
stabilize peaceful relationships in the far
Pacific and also in the rest of the world — with
Hua, Teng, and others, and at the same time
honor our longstanding commitment to
Taiwan — to continue trade with them, to
make sure that any resolution of the China
question is done peaceably.

I think that Secretary Vance spent an ex-
tended period of time talking to Premier Hua.
He spent several hours talking to the Vice
Premier and the Vice Chairman of the Party,
Teng Hsiao-ping. And he spent a couple of
days talking to Huang Hua, his equal as
Foreign Minister or Secretary of State.

The only thing that I know about the dis-
cussion so far is what I received from dis-
patches that come in over the teletype. But I
will meet with Cy Vance this weekend for an

extended briefing. I don't feel under any con-
straint in this instance to act precipitously
just to get an agreement. Nor do I feel any
constraint to act hastily to get a SALT
agreement with the Soviets, or a comprehen-
sive test ban with the Soviets, or to jump into
something in Cuba or southern Africa that
might get massive approval for me and my
success in foreign policy that might in the
long run not be in the best interest of our
country.

I feel like I've got time. I feel at this mo-
ment, at least, that I've got overwhelming
support and ti'ust from the American people,
and I believe that we ought to act from a posi-
tion of strength and soundness. But it is very
important for us to understand the attitude of
the Chinese leaders. It's very important for
them to understand us. And because of the
new leadership that has come there since
either Nixon or Kissinger were there, I
thought it was valuable to us to get ac-
quainted with them, not just on a social basis
but discussing the issues that are vital to
world peace.

So, the agenda was very extensive and very
long. But we try to be very frank with the
Chinese and with others that we talk to or
negotiate with. We don't violate confidences.
We never tell one national leader one thing
about a subject and tell a different country's
leader a different thing about the same sub-
ject. Sometimes it takes longer to negotiate a
settlement using that technique. But I think
in the long run the trust in our negotiators,
certainly Cy Vance, is enhanced.

Although I can't give you an accurate as-
sessment of the progress made, Cy Vance's
reports to me were very encouraging.

Q. They are eyicouraging, sir?

The President: Yes, the reports are very
encouraging. But we don't intend to act hast-
ily. When we do make a decision about China
which, if we make one of recognition, it's un-
doubtedly going to be well into the future and
it'll be based on what I consider to be in the
best interests of our country and one which I
think the American people will support.

September 26, 1977

401

Helping Americans Understand World Affairs

Address by Charles W. Bray III

Depnty Director, U.S. Inforniafio)i Agency ^

The subject of this meeting — Americans and
Worid Affairs — is important, very important.
When Bob Pickus [Consultant to the National
Council on Philanthropy] asked me to address
"The Challenge and the Problems," I accepted
without hesitation. The challenge and the
problem have preoccupied me for many of my
years in the State Department; they continue
to do so in my new responsibilities with the
U.S. Information Agency.

The number of Americans who are deeply
interested in international affairs, either pro-
fessionally or by avocation, is not large — and
it shows. Indeed, the most effective presenta-
tion would require not more than two minutes
of statistics and one minute of silence. I won't
leave it at that, but I will begin with a few
statistics.

A Gallup Poll taken this spring showed that
50 percent of the American people did not
know the United States must import petro-
leum to meet its energy needs. Less than 10
percent knew that we had to import almost
half our petroleum requirements. In another
survey, Gallup found that only 33 percent of
Americans could name any of the member
agencies or institutions of the United Nations.
Sixty-six percent of the American public
admit to little or no knowledge about the
Panama Canal negotiations. The Washington
Post reported a recent poll of high school
seniors in which 40 percent thought Israel was
an Arab nation; a significant percentage

' Made before the National Council on Philanthropy at
Cleveland. Ohio, on June 27, 1977.

thought Golda Meir had been President of
Egypt.

Those are straight facts. Some other facts:
One out of every six manufacturing jobs pro-
duces for export. One out of every three acres
of American farmland produces for export.
Nearly $1 of every $3 of American corporate
profits derives from international activities,
exports, and foreign investments. In short,
business is increasingly a foreign affair.

Yet, a recent study by the Conference
Board found that only 0.9 percent of corporate
contributions from 796 major U.S. businesses
went to foreign affairs-oriented organizations
in 1975. This figure compares with 1.7 percent
in 1970 and more than 4 percent in 1968.

I suggest that there is a connection between
these two sets of statistics — one having to do
with civic illiteracy and the other with corpo-
rate disinterest. It seems as clear to me as the
connection between the extraordinary vitality
of American art and culture and the fact that
in 1975 business contributed $150 million to
support the arts in this country. It also seems
to me that, taken together, these statistics
are a fair statement of both the challenge and
the problem to which I was asked to address
my remarks.

Having been given the floor, however, I
would like to offer a few additional thoughts
for your consideration.

First is that there is demonstrably renewed
interest among Americans in the rest of the
world and this country's role in the world. The
oil embargo, the end of the war, the change in
Administrations may have been precipitating

402

Department of State Bulletin

factors. Whatever the cause, all of the infor-
mal statistics — requests for speakers and pub-
lications, audience size, correspondence —
reflect serious and constructive concern on
the part of growing numbers of Americans.
There is a disposition to listen, a hope for ra-
tional discourse, a recognition of the interna-
tional character of many of our problems.
There is, in short, a new opportunity.

There are also — and this is my second
thought — new audiences. The farmer in Iowa
and the commodities expert in Chicago are
profoundly e.xpert in some areas of our foreign
affairs. Coffee prices have sensitized the con-
sumer to the world beyond. But as nearly as I
can tell — and this is my greatest criticism of
both philanthropy and existing grant recipi-
ents— there has been no serious effort to take
advantage of interest in world affairs among
groups organized primarily around othei-
community concerns: ethnic, professional,
women's groups, Hispanics, and blacks, for
example.

The General Federation of Women's Clubs,
with millions of members, is exemplary on
three counts. First, it had never taken a seri-
ous interest in world affairs. Second, it took
the initiative a year ago to approach the De-
partment of State directly to explore areas of
common interest. Third, it innovated; rather
than establishing a speakers program or
pumping its membership full of reading mate-
rial, it developed brief statements of opposing
views on a few serious pohcy issues and then
asked its members for their views. Two
hundred thousand women returned completed
questionnaires to the General Federation. An
analysis of the membership's views was con-
veyed directly to the Department.

What is important, I think, is not only that
the General Federation uncovered such wide-
spread interest but that it created a process
which gave individuals a sense that they can
now communicate with decisionmakers. I am
told by the President of the Federation that
the membership — and the organization — were
so turned on by the experience that they in-
tend to remain involved in foreign policy.

In general, however, there is depressingly
little innovation among grant recipients. And

there is depressingly little disposition among
grant-givers to encourage — much less
sustain — innovation.

So the interest in world affairs is there, but
the increasingly small circle of elites don't ap-
pear to acknowledge the fact or accommodate
to it.

My third thought is really a question: What
is the proper balance between school-centered
education and research, on the one hand, and
the requirements of adult literacy and con-
tinuing education programs, on the other? I
don't pretend to have an answer. But clearly
both are important. Clearly both have been
neglected.

A fourth thought refers to the role of gov-
ernment. It is not fair for me, as a govern-
ment official, to criticize the disinterest in the
private sector when government itself is also
remiss. Title VI of the National Defense Edu-
cation Act, which promised to lift some of the
burdens from private foundations, has never
been funded. In constant dollars, the Ful-
bright and other educational and cultural ex-
change programs are operating at a level
one-third below that of a decade ago. Federal
funds for foreign policy related research, not
to say language and area studies, are now at
trivial levels. The American Council on Edu-
cation and others have produced useful
documentation on these and related problems.
They are, I beheve, on the verge of having a
beneficial effect on government's thinking.
Clearly, you and others like you could help to
draw the government's attention to these
questions and problems. But I doubt you are
organized to do so.

A final thought: Grant-givers, in particular,
need to give very careful thought to the qual-
ity of the processes which bring citizens and
world affairs together. Luncheon and dinner
speakers have their place; but while I find au-
diences attentive, I also find them restive if
all they get is a speech. Americans are looking
for new ways to involve themselves in matters
of civic concern. Foreign policy and the diplo-
mat have always been remote. Yet people in-
creasingly see foreign policy as proximate, as
impinging on their daily lives. They want a
role — or at least a voice — in major decisions.

September 26, 1977

403

How can foundations, how can world affairs
councils, how can educational institutions
cooperate to create healthy civic processes
which respond to the public's obvious interest.

I have not been a consistent fan of Senator
Fulbright. But as a former Fulbright Fellow
in France, I agree wholeheartedly with at
least one of his statements. He has said:

International education can turn nations into people
and contribute as no other form of communication can to
the humanizing of international relations. Man's capac-
ity for decent behavior seems to vary proportionately
with his perception of others as individuals with mo-
tives and feelings, whereas his capacity for barbarism
seems related to his perception of an adversary in
abstract terms as the embodiment of some evil design
or ideology.

Finally, let me end now where I should
have stopped earlier — with statistics. Fifty
percent of us don't know that we must import
petroleum. Two-thirds of us can't name any of

the agencies of the United Nations. Forty
percent of high school seniors think Israel is
an Arab nation. One-third of corporate profits
derive from foreign activities. Corporate con-
tributions to civic education in world affairs
are now less than 1 percent of corporate giv-
ing and only a quarter of what they were 10
years ago. But the arts are flourishing,
largely because business has invested in them.
I submit that the precondition to cultural
vitality is national survival. If we have
learned anything in the past decade, it is that,
wealthy as we are, we do not have the re-
sources to overwhelm our foreign problems.
Increasingly — and like most other
societies — we must live by our wits. The pre-
condition to wit is education. The precondi-
tions to education are money and creative
thought. These are the challenges and these
are the problems.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

A Foreign Relations Outline ^

The U.S.S.R. and its Warsaw Pact allies
first proposed a European conference on secu-
rity and cooperation in 1954. The West was
initially cool to the idea. But as East-West
tensions relaxed during the 1960's, the United
States and its Atlantic allies used the Soviet
desire for a conference to encourage progress
on matters of interest to us. The Warsaw Pact
met our conditions when it:

— Agreed in 1970 to U.S. and Canadian par-
ticipation in the conference;

' Based on five Department of State publications in
the Gist series, released in March and April 1977, This
outline is designed to be a quick reference aid on U.S.
foreign relations. It is not intended as a comprehensive
U.S. policy statement.

— Liberalized access between East and
West Berlin through the Four-Power protocol
on Berlin which took effect in June 1972; and

— Announced its readiness to begin pre-
paratory mutual and balanced force reduction
(MBFR) discussions which commenced in
January 1973.

Multilateral preparatory talks on the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE), which began in November
1972, established enough common ground
among the participants to warrant e.xpecta-
tions that a conference on security and coop-
eration in Europe would produce satisfactory
results. In July 1973 the CSCE opened for-
mally at the Foreign Minister level. The par-
ticipants adopted an agenda and agreed that

404

Department of State Bulletin

decisions would be taken by consensus. The
working phase of the CSCE began at Geneva
in September 1973 and concluded on July 19,
1975, with the announcement that a final
document, the CSCE Final Act, would be
signed by national leaders of the United
States, Canada, and 33 European states on
August 1 at Helsinki, Finland. ^

Final Act

The Final Act is a political statement of in-
tent; it is neither a treaty nor a legally bind-
ing agreement. It does, however, carry con-
siderable moral and political weight since it
was signed at the highest level. There are
four main sections grouped into three "bas-
kets" (a term devised at the conference).

Basket 1

1. A declaration o>i principles: indicates
how states should conduct their relations with
one another.

2. Confidence-buildi)ig measures, security,
and disarniamevt: concerns ways to
strengthen military confidence and reduce
tension, thus reducing the danger of armed
conflict among the signatory states.

Basket 2

3. Economic, scientific, technical, and en-
vironmental cooperation: contains language
on enhancing commercial e.xchanges, indus-
trial cooperation, and cooperation in several
other economic fields, such as promotion of
tourism.

Basket 3

4. Cooperation in humanitarian and other
fields: includes statements advocating the
freer movement of people, ideas, and informa-
tion, with texts on family reunification and
visits; binational marriages; travel; access to
printed, broadcast, and filmed information;
improved working conditions for journalists;
and increased cultural and educational
exchanges.

"For the full text of the CSCE Final Act, see
Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323.

Follow-up action to the Conference includes
a 1977 meeting in Belgrade, which will begin
in October, to review results and decide on
further activities. In addition there is a sepa-
rate text on the relationship of the CSCE to
certain non-European Mediterranean states.

Basket 1 — Declaration on Principles

The declaration consists of 10 principles de-
signed to guide the conduct of states in their
relations with one another. In many respects
they are similar to the principles in the U.N.
Charter; they reflect the essence of the char-
ter as contained in the U.N. Friendly Rela-
tions Declaration. The 10 CSCE principles
cover:

— Sovereign equality and respect for the
rights inherent in sovereignty;

— Refrainment from the threat or use of
force;

— The inviolability of frontiers;

— Territorial integrity of states;

— Peaceful settlement of disputes;

— Nonintervention in the internal affairs of
states;

— Respect for human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms, including the freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion or belief;

— Equal rights and self-determination of
peoples;

— Cooperation among states; and

— Fulfillment in good faith of obligations
under international law.

Human Rights

The Western states successfully incorpo-
rated a detailed statement on human rights
into the Principles Declaration. The statement
recognizes human rights as both a legitimate
concern in relations between states and a
proper subject for discussion among them.
Any claim that the human rights principle is
less important than the other principles is
counter to the intent of the Principles
Declaration. All the principles are equally
important.

The human rights principle states that
countries will act in conformity with the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, and this

September 26, 1977

405

includes the unqualified right of persons to
leave and return to their own countries.

No)ii)iterve)itio)i

The Communist states claim the noninter-
vention in internal affairs principle limits the
extent to which states may pursue subjects
related to the human rights principle. They
maintain that activity involving human rights
constitutes interference in a state's internal
affairs. The United States does not accept this
position.

European Frontiers

The Soviet Union sought to obtain in the
Declaration on Principles recognition of the
territorial status quo in Eastern Europe. Al-
though the CSCE states did agree to a princi-
ple on the inviolability of frontiers, its lan-
guage reflects a longstanding rule recognized
by international law — the duty to refrain from
assaulting frontiers or seizing or usurping
another's territory. The declaration also
specifies that frontiers may be changed peace-
fully and by agreement, a clause that would,
for example, allow for the eventual reunifica-
tion of Germany. The CSCE Final Act has no
effect on longstanding U.S. positions on
European frontiers.

Baltic States

The United States had made it clear that
the CSCE has not altered our policy of not
recognizing the forcible incorporation of the
Baltic states into the U.S.S.R. In fact, the
principle on territorial integrity excludes the
acquisition of territory by force or threat of
force. It states that no acquisition contrary to
international law may be regarded as legal.
The language in this principle reflects and
supports the longstanding U.S. position on
the Baltic states. Our policy was reiterated by
the President on the eve of the Helsinki sum-
mit in July 1975 and again in a letter to
Estonian-Americans on February 19, 1976.
The executive branch of the government has
also welcomed House and Senate resolutions
expressing no change in the U.S. position of
nonrecognition.

"Brezhnev Doctrine"

Following the 1968 invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia, the Soviet Union claimed the right to
protect Communist regimes even if it meant
the use of force. The CSCE principles on
sovereign equality of states and equal rights
and self-determination of peoples, however,
reflect the concept that all states should be
able to choose and carry out their own politi-
cal lives free from domination by any other
states. These elements, coupled with the prin-
ciple of nonintervention in internal affairs,
constitute a de facto rejection of what is popu-
larly known as the "Brezhnev doctrine."

Four-Power Rights

The Declaration on Principles contains
terms protecting the rights and respon-
sibilities of the four powers in Berlin and
Germany. There is also a stipulation that the
benefits of the CSCE apply throughout
Europe, which of course includes Berlin.

Basket 1 — Confidence-Building Measures,
Security, and Disarmament

To contribute to increasing stability and se-
curity in Europe, the CSCE participating
states adopted several military confidence-
building measures. Called "CBM's," they call
for:

— Prior notification of major military ma-
neuvers (exercises) involving more than
25,000 troops;

— Voluntary exchanges of observers to at-
tend military maneuvers;

— Voluntary notification of major military
movements (transfers of troops); and

— Recognition that other means exist to
promote confidence-building, such as military
exchange visits.

Implementation of CBM's has generally
been satisfactory. The NATO allies, several
neutral and nonaligned states, the U.S.S.R.,
and some other Warsaw Pact countries have
given advance notice of both major and
smaller-scale military maneuvers.

These countries also have invited observers
to view their maneuvers, although the invita-

406

Department of State Bulletin

tions from the Warsaw Pact countries have
been more limited. Observers from NATO
countries have attended Warsaw Pact maneu-
vers, but the Soviet Union and East European
countries have not yet accepted invitations to
view NATO maneuvers.

So far none of the states has notified the
others of movements involving the transfer of
troops. On the other hand several military ex-
change visits between Eastern and Western
states have taken place, continuing a pattern
of activity that began before the CSCE.

Before agreeing to the convening of the
CSCE, the United States and its NATO allies
insisted on the opening of exploratory talks to
deal with MBFR in central Europe. As a re-
sult MBFR discussions began at Vienna in
January 1973. Although there is no institu-
tional linkage between the MBFR and the
CSCE, a provision in the Helsinki Final Act
encourages MBFR participants to keep non-
participants apprised of developments in the
MBFR negotiations. The Final Act also urges
the MBFR negotiators to consider the views
of the nonparticipants.

General language in the Final Act recog-
nizes the interrelationship of security in
Europe to security in the world and the neces-
sity of general disarmament under effective
international controls. The United States and
its NATO allies have emphasized the need to
make further progress on disarmament and
arms control in bilateral and multilateral fora
such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT) and MBFR.

Basket 2 — Economics, Science,
Technology, and Environment

CoiiiDiercial Exchanges

Provisions in this area stress the impor-
tance of developing East-West trade. To this
end, specific emphasis is given to improving
business contacts and facilities, marketing
procedures, and the dissemination of economic
and commercial information.

Even before Helsinki, conditions had been
improving gradually for Western firms doing
business in the East, but language in the

Final Act has made the commercial climate
more favorable. Since August 1975, for exam-
ple, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia have
enacted laws permitting Western firms to
open offices, and a few companies have done
so. It is still difficult, however, to obtain
adequate office space, trained local staffs, and
living accommodations. Moreover, the East-
ern bloc has done little to upgrade the quality
and quantity of commercial information avail-
able to Western firms or to ease business ac-
cess to potential customers. The United
States is encouraging Eastern countries on a
bilateral basis to provide more useful eco-
nomic and trade data.

Industrial Cooperation

Cooperation between Eastern and Western
firms in the industrial sphere existed before
negotiation of the Final Act. Since Helsinki
cooperative endeavors have continued to de-
velop. Joint economic-commercial commis-
sions, for example, have facilitated industrial
cooperation by promoting business contacts
and the exchange of information.

Trade

The recommendations in this area concern
efforts to eliminate vai'ious obstacles to trade.
Suggested remedies include standardizing
technical regulations, the use of arbitration to
settle disputes, and the negotiation of bilat-
eral agreements. While it is impossible to cor-
relate trade levels with the Final Act's com-
mercial provisions, figures for 1976 show
continuing growth in East-West trade. For
example, American exports to the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, excluding Yugo-
slavia, totaled almost $3.5 billion in 1976,
compared with $2.8 billion in 1975. Even
excluding the sizable Soviet purchases of U.S.
grain in 1976, the increase was substantial.
U.S. imports from Eastern Europe and the
U.S.S.R. in 1976 also registered some
growth.

The U.S.S.R. and East European govern-
ments argue that by withholding most-
favored-nation tariff status the United States
is acting contrary to the Final Act. These

September 26, 1977

407

complaints, however, are without foundation
since the Final Act only notes the ". . . bene-
ficial effects which can result for the develop-
ment of trade from the application of most-fa-
vored-nation treatment. ..." The United
States supports and is working toward reduc-
tion of trade barriers with Eastern countries
on a mutual basis.

Science o»f/ Technology

This portion emphasizes the possibilities of
cooperation in scientific and technological
fields. Specific areas for joint efforts include
research projects in the fields of agriculture,
energy, transportation, physics, chemistry,
medicine, meteorology and hydrology,
oceanography, seismology, space, and the en-
vironment. Among the methods envisaged to
broaden cooperation are the exchange of sci-
entists, technicians, and periodicals, as well as
the development of joint programs.

Environ i)ie>tf

This section calls for greater cooperation in
environmental affairs, involving such issues as
the control of air and water pollution, protec-
tion of the marine environment, preservation
of natural ecological systems, and land utiliza-
tion problems.

Cooperation in Other Areas

Proposals in this area call for cooperation in
transport, tourism, migrant labor, and per-
sonnel training. With respect to tourism, the
United States hopes to persuade more private
Soviet citizens to visit our country through a
"Visit the USA" committee established in
Moscow.

U.N. Eco)io)uic Co)n mission for Europe

Specific Basket 2 projects are assigned to
the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe
(ECE), where significant multilateral activity
relating to commercial and industrial coopera-
tion has already taken place. At an April 1976
ECE meeting, the participants agreed to a
Western proposal that the Commission con-
centrate on matters referred to it by the Final
Act and focus attention on several technical
projects. The members also agreed to study a

Soviet proposal for pan-European conferences
on energy, transport, and the environment.

Council for Economic Mutual Assistance

In February 1976 the CEMA— the Common
Market's Eastern counterpart — proposed that
the two organizations cooperate in various
fields, a move hnked to the provisions of the
Final Act. After study the Common Market
replied that on trade questions it planned to
deal bilaterally with CEMA countries, al-
though agreement on such matters as
exchange of technical information might be
possible.

Basket 3 — Humanitarian and Other Fields

Human Contacts

Since Helsinki the United States has inten-
sified efforts to encourage Eastern countries
to relax their restrictions on family reunifica-
tions and visits, binational marriages between
Americans and local citizens, and travel for
personal or professional reasons. So far the
Warsaw Pact nations have taken only limited
steps to fulfill these CSCE commitments. For
its part the United States is undertaking a
general review of its visa requirements.

The Soviet Union, even though it has strict-
er controls on human contacts than the East
European countries, has made several
changes in emigration procedures in accord-
ance with CSCE provisions. For example,
more Soviet citizens — mainly Armenians —
have been allowed to emigrate to the United
States, although the total remains relatively
small. The number of such emigrants rose
from 1,162 in 1975 to 2,574 in 1976. Similarly,
the number of ethnic Germans permitted to
leave for West Germany has increased mark-
edly. Soviet Jewish emigration, on the other
hand, was up only slightly over 1975.
Moreover, there has been no improvement in
the resolution rate of longstanding U.S.-
Soviet family reunification and marriage
cases.

Some of the East European countries have
resolved various family reunification cases,
while others have done little or nothing. In
the area of binational marriages there has

408

Department of State Bulletin

been little change, although practice varies
widely. Interestingly, a substantial increase
in Romanian emigration to the United States
occurred after Romania was granted most-
favored-nation tariff status in August 1975.

The Eastern states have done little to ease
restrictions on private and professional travel.
One exception is a slight increase in Soviet
"private visitors" allowed to visit relatives in
the United States— from 1,184 in 1975 to 1,654
in 1976. In addition, several zones in Eastern
Europe, previously closed to American diplo-
mats, have been opened, and some travel re-
strictions on American journalists have been
lifted.

Information

Here again the United States has urged
Eastern governments to implement CSCE
provisions. Travel conditions were improved
somewhat for Western correspondents
employed in the U.S.S.R. following Soviet
agreement to issue multiple entry and exit
visas. The Soviets also announced that jour-
nalists might request interviews directly with
government officials rather than through the
Soviet Foreign Ministry. A few East Euro-
pean countries continue to deny visas to
Western journalists; working conditions in the
region vary but are generally difficult.

Most East European states, as well as the
U.S.S.R., have attacked broadcasts from
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty as
being contrary to CSCE principles. The offi-
cial American response is that the broadcasts
are fully consistent with CSCE provisions.
The United States also states that elimination
of radio jamming by Communist countries
would satisfy their CSCE commitments on
radio broadcasting. (The Soviet Union ceased
jamming the Voice of America, the official
U.S. radio station, at the outset of the CSCE
negotiations in 1973, and East European
countries no longer jam it either. The
U.S.S.R. does jam Radio Liberty, while Bul-
garia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland sporadi-
cally jam Radio Free Europe.)

Western newspapers and magazines ai'e still
difficult to find in the East. However, the
U.S.S.R. and East European countries claim

that a greater volume of Western books and
films are available in the East than Eastern
books and films in the West. The Communists
believe that governments should control the
distribution of books and films available to the
public. The United States rejects this view,
which is not supported in the Final Act. A
basic purpose of the CSCE is to lower barriers
to the exchange of information and to permit
people, not governments, to decide what they
wish to see and read.

Cultural and Educational Cooperation
and Exchanges

While CSCE provisions on human contact
and information break new ground, the provi-
sions on culture and education largely pro-
mote and support East-West bilateral ex-
changes and international organizations that
existed prior to the CSCE.

Although there has been no dramatic ex-
pansion of cultural and educational activities
involving the United States and East Euro-
pean countries since the signing of the Final
Act, progress continues to be made. A signifi-
cant development since Helsinki has been the
conclusion of bilateral exchange agreements
with Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia
in the cultural, educational, and scientific
areas. Discussions had taken place before the
Conference, but the summit contributed to
the success of these negotiations.

Significance and Implementation

The Western and neutral participants' em-
phasis at the CSCE was on improving, not
freezing, the status quo in Europe. And the
United States approached the Conference on
this premise. Significantly, the Conference
produced agreements on detailed provisions
emphasizing cooperation and not confronta-
tion. But the CSCE is only one step in the im-
provement in East- West relations. It is not an
end in itself. Its success will be judged by im-
plementation of its provisions — particularly
those on freer movement of people, ideas, and
information.

The U.S.S.R., while seeking to enlarge
mutually beneficial areas of cooperation and

September 26, 1977

409

the reasonable discussion of East- West differ-
ences, has also made it clear that it intends to
continue the ideological struggle. Thus, even
though the CSCE has made a valuable contri-
bution by adding human rights and the freer
movement of people and ideas to the East-
West dialogue, basic East-West differences
remain.

Since Helsinki the United States has
pressed the U.S.S.R. and East European na-
tions for progress on the implementation of
the Final Act's provisions. We have also sup-
ported the CSCE related activities in mul-
tilateral organizations. The United States
carefully monitors implementation and, to-
gether with our NATO allies, exchanges and
gathers information. In addition, the United
States consults with other Western states
that signed the Final Act. Our implementation
is good; indeed, much of what is called for in
the Final Act has long been commonly ac-
cepted in the United States and the West.

The Soviet Union and East European coun-
tries have taken some implementation steps.
Little change, however, has taken place on
human rights, although the CSCE has served
to draw more attention to this area. The
United States is encouraging the East to take
further steps as we approach the CSCE
follow-up meeting in Belgrade.

President Carter States Policy
on Northern Ireland

Statement by President Carter ^

Throughout our history, Americans have
rightly recalled the contributions men and
women from many countries have made to
the development of the United States.
Among the greatest contributions have been
those of the British and Irish people, Prot-
estant and Catholic alike. We have close ties
of friendship with both parts of Ireland and
with Great Britain.

It is natural that Americans are deeply

■ Made on Aug. 30, 1977 (te.xt from Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 5, 1977).

concerned about the continuing conflict and
violence in Northern Ireland. We know the
overwhelming majority of the people there
reject the bomb and the bullet. The United
States wholeheartedly supports peaceful
means for finding a just solution that involves
both parts of the community of Northern Ire-
land and protects human rights and guaran-
tees freedom from discrimination — a solution
that the people in Northern Ireland, as well
as the Governments of Great Britain and Ire-
land, can support. Violence cannot resolve
Northern Ireland's problems; it only in-
creases them and solves nothing.

We hope that all those engaged in violence
will renounce this course and commit them-
selves to peaceful pursuit of legitimate goals.
The path of reconciliation, cooperation, and
peace is the only course that can end the
human suffering and lead to a better future
for all the people of Northern Ireland. I ask
all Americans to refrain from supporting with
financial or other aid organizations whose in-
volvement, direct or indirect, in this violence
delays the day when the people of Northern
Ireland can live and work together in har-
mony, free from fear. Federal law enforce-
ment agencies will continue to apprehend and
prosecute any who violate U.S. laws in this
regard.

U.S. Government policy on the Northern
Ireland issue has long been one of impartial-
ity, and that is how it will remain. We sup-
port the establishment of a form of govern-
ment in Northern Ireland which will
command widespread acceptance throughout
both parts of the community. However, we
have no intention of telling the parties how
this might be achieved. The only permanent
solution will come from the people who live
there. There are no solutions that outsiders
can impose.

At the same time, the people of Northern
Ireland should know that they have- our com-
plete support in their quest for a peaceful
and just society. It is a tribute to Northern
Ireland's hard-working people that the area
has continued to attract investment, despite
the violence committed by a small minority.
This is to be welcomed, since investment and
other programs to create jobs will assist in in-

410

Department of State Bulletin

suring a healthy economy and combating un-
employment.

It is still true that a peaceful settlement
would contribute immeasurably to stability in
Northern Ireland and so enhance the pros-
pects for increased investment. In the event
of such a settlement, the U.S. Government
would be prepared to join with others to see
how additional job-creating investment could
be encouraged, to the benefit of all the
people of Northern Ireland.

I admire the many true friends of Northern
Ireland in this country who speak out for
peace. Emotions run high on this subject, and
the easiest course is not to stand up for con-
ciliation. I place myself firmly on the side of
those who seek peace and i-eject violence in
Northern Ireland.

Recommendation To Parole
Indochinese Refugees

Following is a statement by Richard C.
Holbrooke, Assistayit Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, made before the
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship,
and International Law of the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary on August i.^

I appreciate the opportunity to appear be-
fore the committee today to support the De-
partment's recommendation for the parole
into the United States of an additional 15,000
Indochinese refugees. The motivation is
simple — the deep humanitarian concern which
has for so long been a distinctive part of our
national character. This has led us in the past
to open our doors to victims of oppression
from Nazi Germany, Hungary, Cuba, and
Vietnam. It leads the Secretary of State
today to propose that the United States act
urgently, in concert with other nations, to
deal with a refugee problem which has sud-
denly become acute.

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Eighteen months ago when the decision
was made to accept 11,000 refugees, there
was no appreciation that the human condition
in the three Indochina states would deterior-
ate to such an extent that thousands upon
thousands of persons each month would risk
their lives to the dangers from armed troops
and the high seas in a desperate effort to es-
cape oppression and misery, knowing that
even if escape were successful and they
reached another country, the next step could
well be indefinite detention in a camp or even
aboard the small boat on which they fled. But
this is what has occurred and continues to oc-
cur, even as the number of Indochina refu-
gees being accepted for permanent resettle-
ment has fallen off.

The result has been that free countries
around the periphery of the South China
Sea — with the notable exceptions of the
Philippines and Thailand — began to turn
boats away. Ships at sea began to pass by
the survivors in their unseaworthy craft. Re-
ports have reached us in increasing number
of long and harrowing odysseys at sea, many
with tragic endings.

The State Department sought a broadened
response from the international community
and, as the U.S. contribution to the easing of
this problem, it assigned some 500 spaces
under the expanded parole program to boat-
case refugees. Starting in March 1977, we
developed a system of using up to 100 condi-
tional entry numbers per month for boat-case
refugees. We also hoped to use nonpreference
numbers for their accompanying dependents.
In this way slightly over 950 boat-case refu-
gees entered the United States between
March and the end of July under the condi-
tional entry arrangements.

Unfortunately, the total response proved
inadequate. Refugees have been arriving on
Asian shores by boat at the rate of 500 per
month, with an additional 1,200 per month
arriving by land. Over 7,000 boat cases are
now stranded in various countries in Asia,
and some of these countries are once again
forcing refugees back to sea. Except for
France and Australia, other countries —
including the United States — have provided
fewer and fewer resettlement opportunities.

September 26, 1977

411

It is this situation which creates the need
for urgent action by the United States to as-
sert once again its leadership in the
worldwide campaign for the preservation of
human life, the promotion of human rights. It
is our judgment that only by paroling addi-
tional refugees into the United States can we
end this tragic loss of innocerit lives. Israel
recently demonstrated its concern by break-
ing all precedent and taking in 66 Vietnamese
survivors from a small boat.

The second group of refugees for which we
are seeking parole consists of 8,000 to be
chosen from among the larger group of 81,000
now in inland camps in Thailand. While re-
finement of the following figures must await
intensive screening of the refugees in the
camps, our best current estimates of the
8,000 include 1,900 close relatives of In-
dochinese now in the United States, :^,100
former employees of the U.S. Government in
Indochina, and 4,000 persons previously so
deeply associated with U.S. programs and
policies in their homeland that their con-
tinued presence there was untenable. These
refugees left Indochina since the close of eli-
gibility for the expanded parole program in
June 1976. Over 7,000— including about 3,000
Hmong — came from Laos. The rest came
from Cambodia. We will carefully follow
criteria used under previous programs in
screening this group of refugees. INS [Im-
migration and Naturalization Service] officers
will make the final clearance and determina-
tion of eligibility.

We share with you the concern that this
parole action is a palliative. The present flow
is about 500 refugees monthly by boat and
about 1,200 by land. Based on what has been
occurring, the only prudent planning assump-
tion is that this situation will continue. We also
share with you the desire to see a more pre-
dictable and regularized response to this prob-
lem. As the Attorney General has noted, the
President has directed the establishment of an
Interagency Task Force [on Indochinese Refu-
gees] to develop long-term solutions. I believe
I can assure you that this administration will
pursue vigorously the search for these
solutions. We look forward to working
with the committee in developing informa-
tion and recommendations -needed to deal

with this problem over the long term.

We also hold to your belief that the inter-
national community should and can be
brought to do more in sharing this burden.
We are planning extensive bilateral diploma-
tic approaches on this question. These ap-
proaches will stress the need for these coun-
tries to provide opportunities for permanent
resettlement as well as to increase their con-
tributions to the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees. Our example of taking an addi-
tional 15,000 will provide a powerful argu-
ment to use with others and we will use it
forcefully.

It is also our hope that multilateral efforts
within the international community may pro-
vide a useful forum within which progress
can be made in meeting the long-term prob-
lem. The initiative for an international con-
ference should proceed from the international
community rather than solely from the
United States. We have noted with great
interest your proposal that such a conference
be held and welcome your offer of support in
such an endeavor.

Concerning the immediate problem, it
would be our intention to work with other
countries of potential resettlement to see
that the present backlog of boat cases is
cleared away over the next months. We ex-
pect that a number of these refugees will go
to other countries, but we shall need to take
a substantial number — all of whom would
naturally have to pass Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service requirements. Addition-
ally, we will continue the conditional entry
program. The authorization to bring in 7,000
boat-case refugees should, therefore, provide
adequate numbers for the United States to
do our full share in meeting the problem of
escapees by boat over the next few months
as we seek longer term solutions.

As previously, the voluntary agencies will
work with us in the field to gather informa-
tion to assist in the resettlement process and
will provide sponsors for these refugees. The
American Council of Voluntary Agencies [for
Foreign Service], responding once again to
this urgent need, has assured us unequivo-
cally that it can provide appropriate sponsors
for these 15,000 refugees in a timely manner:
The refugees would not proceed to the

412

Department of State Bulletin

United States until they were cleared in all
respects and sponsors are ready to receive
them. Thus, there will be no requirement for
camps in the United States.

Department of State expenses for this pro-
gram will come from refugee emergency
funds. They will cover the costs of transpor-
tation that the Intergovernmental Committee
for European Migration will arrange, volun-
tary agency support of this program both in
the United States and abroad, and grants of
$300 per capita to the voluntary agencies for
resettlement services. We estimate the total
cost to the Department of State at approxi-
mately $13.5 million. While money for early
expenditures for the parole is available in
current refugee emergency funds, a supple-
mental appropriation in FY 1978 will be re-
quired to replenish these funds.

In closing, let me stress once again our
dual concern: To act quickly to deal with this
tragic situation and at the same time to
structure an effective and orderly response to
the long-term problem. We must provide
both for an adequate U.S. contribution to the
solution and encourage a more satisfactory
international response. I am confident that
you share these goals, and we look forward
to working with the committee in seeking to
achieve them in the future.

ing verification, including the degree to
which each element of any significant arms
control proposal made to or by the United
States can be verified by existing national
technical means. The report of the Confer-
ence Committee points out that this provision
is not intended to interfere with the Presi-
dent's ability to conduct arms control negoti-
ations but is intended to emphasize the
responsibility of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency to keep Congress informed
on these matters.^

As Congress recognizes by the adoption of
the Conference Report, the conduct of
negotiations with other nations is the respon-
sibility of the President under our Constitu-
tion. But I share Congress' belief in the im-
portance of consultation and close cooperation
on these matters, and I am confident that we
shall continue to work together in a manner
that is consistent with our respective con-
stitutional responsibilities in the conduct of
the nation's foreign policy. It is in this spirit
that I am signing this legislation.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Amendments to Arms Control
and Disarmament Act

Statement by President Carter ^

I am signing H.R. 6179, the Arms Control
and Disarmament Act Amendments of 1977.'^
H.R. 6179 authorizes fiscal year 1978 appro-
priations of $16,600,000 for the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency.

The bill also adds a new section 37 to the
Arms Control and Disarmament Act, declar-
ing the sense of the Congress that adequate
verification of compliance should be an indis-
pensable part of any international arms con-
trol agreement.

The section provides for the Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to
furnish to the Congress information regard-

U.S. Ambassadors

as of September 14, 1977'

Location of Embassy

Afghanistan

(Kabul)
Algeria (Algiers)

Argentina (Buenos

Aires)
Australia

(Canberra)
Austria (Vienna)
Bahamas (Nassau)

Name Category '

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. FSO-CM

Ulric St. Clair Haynes, NC

Jr.

Raul H. Castro^ NC

Philip Henry Alston, NC

Jr., (see also Nauru)

Milton A. Wolf NC

William B. Schwartz = NC

' Made Aug. 18, 1977 (te.xt from Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents dated Aug. 22).

2 As enacted, H.R. 6179 is Public Law 95-108, ap-
proved Aug. 17.

^ For the text of the report submitted by the Com-
mittee of Conference, see H. Rept. 95-563, dated Aug.
3, 1977.

* Footnotes begin on p. 415.

September 26, 1977

413

Bahrain (Manama)
Bangladesh (Dacca)
Barbados

(Bridgetown)
Belgium (Bi-ussels)
Benin (Cotonou)
Bolivia (La Paz)
Botswana (Gaborone)

Brazil (Brasilia)
Bulgaria (Sofia)
Burma (Rangoon)
Burundi (Bujumbura)
Cameroon (Yaounde)
Canada (Ottawa)
Cape Verde (Praia)"

Central African
Empire (Bangui)
Chad (N'Djamena)
Chile (Santiago)
China (Taipei)
Colombia (Bogota)
Comoros (Moroni) "
Congo

Costa Rica (San Jose)
Cyprus (Nicosia)

Czechoslovakia

(Prague)
Denmark

(Copenhagen)
Djibouti (Djibouti)
Dominican Republic

(Santo Domingo)
Ecuador (Quito)
Egypt (Cairo)
El Salvador

(San Salvador)
Ethiopia

(Addis Ababa)
Fiji (Suva)

Finland (Helsinki)
France (Paris)
Gabon (Libreville)
Gambia (Banjul)
German Democratic

Republic (Berlin)
Germany (Bonn)
Ghana (Accra)
Greece (Athens)

Grenada

(St. George's)"
Guatemala

(Guatemala)
Guinea (Conakry)

Wat T. Cluverius IV
Edward E. Masters
Frank V. Ortiz, Jr."

(see also Grenada)
Anne Cox Chambers
(Vacant)

Paul H. Boeker =
Donald R. Norland

(see also Lesotho

and Swaziland)
John Hugh Crimmins
Raymond L. Garthoff
Maurice DaiTow Bean ^
David E. Mark
Mabel Murphy Smythe
Thomas 0. Enders
Edward Marks'

(see also Guinea-
Bissau)
Anthony C.E.

Quainton
William G. Bradford
George W. Landau *
Leonard Unger
(Vacant)
(Vacant)
(Vacant)
Marvin Weissman
William R. Crawford,

Jr.
Thomas R. Byrne

John Gunther Dean

(Vacant)

Robert A. Huruitch

FSO-^i
FSO-1
FSO-1

FSO-1
FSO-1

FSO-CM

FSO-1

FSO-3

FSO-1

FSO-1
FSO-1
FSO-CM

NC
FSO-1

FSO-1

FSO-CM

Richard J. Bloomfiekl FSO-1
Hennann F. Eilts FSO-CM

(Vacant)

AiTnistead L Seldin, NC

Jr.'" (see also New

Zealand, Tonga, and

Western Samoa)
Rozanne L. Ridgway FSO-2
Arthur A. Hartman FSO-CM
(Vacant)

Herman J. Cohen" '^ PSO-I
David B. Bolen FSO-1

WalterJ. Stoessel,Jr. FSO-CM

Robert P. Smith FSO-1

William E. Schaufele, FSO-CM

Jr.

Frank V. Ortiz, Jr.'' FSO-1

(see also Barbados)

Davis Eugene Boster FSO-1

(Vacant)

Guinea-Bissau

(Bissau)
Guyana (Georgetown)
Haiti (Port-au-Prince)
Honduras

(Tegucigalpa)
Hungary (Budapest)
Iceland (Reykjavik)
India (New Delhi)
Indonesia (Jakarta)
Iran (Tehran)
Ireland (Dublin)
Israel (Tel Aviv)
Italy (Rome)
Ivory Coast

(Abidjan)
Jamaica (Kingston)
Japan (Tokyo)
Jordan (Amman)
Kenya (Nairobi)

Korea (Seoul)
Kuwait (Kuwait)
Laos (Vientiane)
Lebanon (Beirut)
Lesotho (Masei-u)

Liberia (Monrovia)
Libya (Tripoli)
Luxembourg

(Luxembourg)
Madagascar

(Antananarivo)
Malawi (Lilongwe)
Malaysia

(Kuala Lumpur)
Maldives (Male)"^

Mali (Bamako)
Malta (Valletta)
Mauritania

(Nouakchott)
Mauritius

(Port Louis)
Mexico (Mexico)
Morocco (Rabat)
Mozambique

(Maputo)
Nauru (Yaren)"

Nepal (Kathmandu)
Netherlands (The

Hague)
New Zealand

(Wellington)

Nicaragua

(Managua)
Niger (Niamey)

Edward Marks'
(see also Cape Verde)
John Richard Burke'"
William Bo wdoin Jones
Marci-Luci Jaramillo ^

Philip Mayer Kaiser
James J. Blake
Robert F. Goheen
David D. Newsom
William H. Sullivan
William V. Shannon
Samuel W. Lewis
Richard N. Gardner
Monteagle Stearns

Frederick Irving
Michael J. Mansfield
Thomas R. Pickering
Wilbert John Le Melle

(see also Seychelles)
Richard L. Sneider
Frank E. Maestrone
(Vacant)

Richard B. Parker
Donald R. Norland'^

(see also Botswana

and Swaziland)
W. Beverly Carter, Jr.
(Vacant)
James Gordon

Lowenstein
(Vacant)

Robert A. Stevenson
Robert H. Miller

FSO-3

FSO-1
FSO-1
NC

FSO-1

FSO-CM

FSO-1

FSO-1
NC

FSO-CM
NC

FSO-CM
FSO-1

FSIO-1
FSO-1

FSO-1
FSO-1

W. Howard Wriggins"
(see also Sri Lanka)
Patricia M. Bjmie FSO-1

Lowell Brace Laingen FSO-1
Holsey G. Handyside FSO-1

Robert V. Keeley FSO-1

Patrick J. Lucey NC

Robert Anderson FSO-1

Willard A. De Free FSO-1

Philip Henry Alston, NC

Jr." (see also

Australia
L. Douglas Heck FSO-1

Robert J. McCloskey FSO-CM

AiTnistead I. Selden, NC
Jr. (see also Fiji,

Tonga, and Western

Samoa)
Mauricio Solaun NC

Charles A. James NC

414

Department of State Bulletin

Nigeria (Lagos)
Norway (Oslo)
Oman (Muscat)
Pakistan (Islamabad)

Panama (Panama)
Papua New Guinea

(Port Moresby)
Paraguay (Asuncion)
Peru (Lima)

Philippines (Manila)
Poland (Warsaw)
Portugal (Lisbon)
Qatar (Doha)
Romania (Bucharest)
Rwanda (Kigali)
Sao Tome and

Principe

(Sao Tome)'»
Saudi Arabia (Jidda)
Senegal (Dakar)

Seychelles

(Victoria)
Sierra Leone

(Freetown)
Singapore

(Singapore)
Somali (Mogadiscio)
South Africa

(Pretoria)^"
Spain (Madrid)
Sri Lanka (Colombo)

Sudan (Khartoum)

Surinam
(Paramaribo)

Swaziland (Mbabane)

Sweden (Stockholm)

Switzerland (Bern)
Syria (Damascus)
Tanzania

(Dar es Salaam)
Thailand (Bangkok)

Togo (Lome)
Tonga (Nuku'alofa)^'

Trinidad and
Tobago

(Port-of-Spain)
Tunisia (Tunis)
Turkey (Ankara)
Uganda (Kampala)
U.S.S.R. (Moscow)

Donald B. Easum FSO-1

Louis A. Lerner NC

William D. Wolle FSO-2

Arthur W. Hummel, FSO-CM

Jr.

William J. Jorden NC

Mary S. Olmsted FSO-1

George W. Landau FSO-1

Henry W. FSO-CM

Shlaudeman
(Vacant)

Richard T. Davies FSO-CM

Frank C. Carlucci FSO-CM

Andrew Ivy Killgore FSO-2

Harry G. Barnes, Jr. FSO-CxM

T. Frank Crigler FSO-3
(Vacant)

John C. West NC

Herman J. Cohen" FSO-1

(see also Gambia)

Wilbert John Le Melle'" NC

(see also Kenya)

John Andrew Linehan FSO-2

John H. Holdridge FSO-1

John L. Loughran FSO-1

William G. Bowdler FSO-CM

Wells Stabler FSO-CM

W. Howard Wriggins" NC

(see also Maldives)
Donald Clayton

Bergus FSO-1

J. Owen Zurhellen, FSO-1

Jr.
Donald R. Norland'^ FSO-1

(see also Botswana

and Lesotho)
Rodney O'Gliasain NC •

Kennedy-Minott
Marvin L. Warner NC

Richard W. Murphy FSO-1
James W. Spain FSO-1

Charles S. FSO-CM

Whitehouse
Ronald D. Palmer FSO-2

Ai-mistead I. Selden, NC

Jr. (see also Fiji,

New Zealand, and

Western Samoa)
Richard K. Fo.\, Jr. FSO-1

Edward W. Mulcahy FSO-1

Ronald I. Spiers FSO-CM

Malcolm Toon FSO-CM

United Arab

Emirates

(Abu Dhabi)
U.K. (London)
Upper Volta

(Ouagadougou)
Uruguay

(Montevideo)
Venezuela (Caracas)
Western Samoa

(Apia)23

Yemen (Sana)
Yugoslavia
(Belgrade)
Zaire (Kinshasa)
Zambia (Lusaka)

Francois M. Dickman FSO-1

Kingman Brewster, Jr. NC
Pierre R. Graham FSO-1

Lawrence A. PezzuUo FSO-1

Viron P. Vaky
Ai-mistead I. Selden,

Jr. (see also Fiji,

New Zealand, and

Tonga)
Thomas J. Scotes
Lawrence S.

Eagleburger
Walter L. Cutler
Stephen Low

FSO-CM
NC

FSO-2
FSO-1

FSO-1
FSO-1

Ambassadors at Large

Chief Co-Negotiator
for the Panama
Canal Treaty
Negotiations

Special Representative
of the President for
the Law of the Sea
Conference and
Chief of Delegation

U.S. Special Represen-
tative for Nonprolif-
eration Matters

Ellsworth Bunker

Elliot L. Richardson

Gerard C. Smith

Chiefs, Permanent U.S. Missions
to International Organizations

U.S. Mission to the
U.N. (USUN),
New York

Organization of Amer-
ican States (OAS),
Washington

International Atomic
Energy Agency
(IAEA), Vienna

North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
(NATO), Brussels

Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation
and Development
(OECD), Paris

European Office of the
U.N., Geneva

European Communi-
ties (EC), Brussels

Andrew J. Young

Gale McGee

Gerard C. Smith

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. FSO-CM

Herbert Salzman

William J,

Heuvel

Deane R.

vanden

Hinton

FSO-CM

' Category abbreviations: FSO — Foreign Service Offi-
cer (career); FSO-CM— Career Minister; FSIO—
Foreign Service Information Officer (career); NC —
noncareer.

September 26, 1977

415

2 Nominated Aug. 22, 1977.

^ Nominated Aug. 15, 1977.

' Processing has not been completed on Ambassador
Ortiz' designation as U.S. Special Representative to
Antigua, Dominica, St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, St.
Lucia, and St. Vincent.

^ Nominated Aug. 26, 1977.

" No mission e.xists at Praia; the Ambassador is resi-
dent at Bissau, Guinea-Bissau.

' Nominated Aug. 2, 1977.

"* Nominated Sept. 14, 1977.

" No mission e.xists at Moroni: the Ambassador is
resident at Antananarivo, Madagascar.

'" Resident at Wellington, New Zealand.

" Pending Senate confirmation.

'^ Resident at Dakar, Senegal.

'^ No mission exists at St. George's; the Ambassador is
resident at Bridgetown, Barbados.

'•* Nominated July 8, 1977.

'^ Resident at Gaborone. Botswana.

'^ No mission e.xists at Male; the Ambassador is resi-
dent at Colombo, Sri Lanka.

'^ No mission exists at Yaren; the Ambassador is resi-
dent at Canberra, Australia.

'* No mission exists at Sao Tome; the Ambassador is
resident at Libreville, Gabon.

'^ Resident at Nairobi, Kenya.

'■'" The Embassy is located at Cape Town during par-
liamentary sessions.

^' No mission exists at Nuku'alofa; the Ambassador is
resident at Wellington, New Zealand.

^^ All U.S. Government personnel in LIganda with-
drawn. Embassy closed Nov. 10, 1973.

^^ No mission exists at Apia; the Ambassador is resi-
dent at Wellington, New Zealand.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

Kingdom, .July 1, 1977; effective October 1, 1977.'

Human Rights

American convention on human rights ("Pact of San
Jose, Costa Rica"). Done at San Jose November 22,
1969.2

Sig}iafui-es: Peru, July 27, 1977; Dominican Repub-
lic, September 7, 1977.
Ratification deposited: Honduras, September 7,
1977.

BILATERAL

India

Agreement on procedures for mutual assistance in con-
nection with matters relating to the Boeing Com-
pany. Signed at Washington August 19, 1977.
Entered into force August 19, 1977.

Jordan

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag-
ricultural commodities of November 29, 1976 (TIAS
8511). Effected by exchange of notes at Amman Au-
gust 10, 1977. Entered into force August 10, 1977.

Panama

Panama Canal treaty, with annex, agreed minute, re-
lated agreements, notes, and letters. Signed at Wash-
ington September 7, 1977. Enters into force, simul-
taneously with the treaty concerning the permanent
neutrality and operation of the Panama Canal, si.x
calendar months from the date of the exchange of in-
struments of ratification.

Treaty concerning the permanent neutrality and opera-
tion of the Panama Canal, with annexes and related
protocol. Signed at Washington September 7, 1977.
Enters into force, simultaneously with the Panama
Canal treaty, six calendar months from the date of
the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Sierra Leone

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities.
Signed at Freetown August 18, 1977. Entered into
force August 18, 1977.

MULTILATERAL

Customs

Customs convention regarding E.C.S. carnets for
commercial samples, with annex and protocol of sig-
nature. Done at Brussels March 1, 1956. Entered
into force October 3, 1957; for the United States
March 3, 1969. TIAS 6632.
Notification of denuvciatioti deposited: United

Zaire

Agreement regarding the consolidation and reschedul-
ing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed, or insured
by the United States Government and its agencies.
Signed at Washington June 17, 1977.
Entry into force: August 30, 1977.

' Denunciation applicable also to Hong Kong,
Man, Jersey, and Bailiwick of Guernsey.
2 Not in force.

Isle of

416

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX September £6, 1977 Vol. LXXVII, No. 1996

Africa. Editors and News Directors Interview
President Carter (excerpts) 397

Arms Control and Disarmament

Amendments to Arms Control and Disarmament
Act (Carter) 413

Editors and News Directors Interview President
Carter (excerpts) 397

President Carter Interviewed by ABC News
Correspondents (excerpt) 395

Asia. Recommendation To Parole Indochinese
Refugees (Holbrooke) 411

China. Editors and News Directors Interview
President Carter (excerpts) 397

Congress

Amendments to Arms Control and Disarmament
Act (Carter) 413

Recommendation To Parole Indochinese Refugees
(Holbrooke) 411

Department and Foreign Service. U.S. Ambas-
sadors as of September 14, 1977 413

Economic Affairs

Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (foreign relations outline) 404

Trade and Business in Inter-American Relations
(Todman) 393

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Helping
Americans Understand World Affairs (Bray) . . 402

Europe. Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (foreign relations outline) 404

Human Rights. Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (foreign relations out-
line) 404

Latin America and the Caribbean. Trade and
Business in Inter-American Relations (Todman) 393

Middle East

Editors and News Directors Interview President
Carter (excerpts) 397

President Carter Interviewed by ABC News
Correspondents (excerpt) 395

Military Affairs. Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (foreign relations out-
line) 404

Panama. Editors and News Directors Interview
President Carter (excerpts) 397

Presidential Documents

Amendments to Arms Control and Disarmament
Act 413

Editors and News Directors Interview President
Carter (excerpts) 397

President Carter Interviewed by ABC News
Correspondents (excerpt) 395

President Carter States Policy on Northern

Ireland 410

Public Affairs. Helping Americans Understand
World Affairs (Bray) 402

Refugees. Recommendation To Parole In-
dochinese Refugees (Holbrooke) 411

Treaty Information. Current Actions 416

U.S.S.R. Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (foreign relations outline) 404

United Kingdom. President Carter States Policy
on Northern Ireland (Carter) 410

Name Index

Bray, Charles W. Ill 402

Carter, President 395, 397, 410, 413

Holbrooke, Richard C 411

Todman, Terence A 393

Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: September 5-1 1

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

*411 9/6 Texts of Panama Canal treaties
released.

*412 9/6 Joint U.S. -Japan subcabinet-level
talks, Toyko, Sept. 12-13.

t413 9/7 "Foreign Relations," 1950, vol. Ill,
"Western Europe" (for release
Sept. 12).

t414 9/7 Vance, Torrijos: remarks, Andrews
Air Force Base, Sept. 5.

•415 9/8 U.S., ASEAN economic consulta-
tions, Manila, Sept. 8-10.

•416 9/8 Secretary's Advisory Committee on
Private International Law, study
group on hotelkeepers' liability,
Oct. 11.

•417 9/8 Advisory Panel on Music, Oct. 4-5.

•418 9/9 Rodney 0. Kennedy-Minott sworn in
as Ambassador to Sweden (bio-
graphic data).

•419 9/9 Forum oh foreign policy, St. Louis,
Sept. 29.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

postage and fees paid
Department of State STA-501

Third Class

BOSTON PUBLIC UBRABY

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