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BOSTOM 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 




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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXVII • No. 1984 • July 4, 1977 

X^ de^ yj^ di^tod 

PRESIDENT CARTER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JUNE 13 
Excei'pts From Trayiscript 1 

A GUIDING PHILOSOPHY FOR AMERICAN INFORMATIONAL 
AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS ABROAD 

Address by John E. Reinhardt 
Director, U.S. Information Agency 5 

TOWARD INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM: 
A STRATEGY FOR THE LONGER PULL 

Address by Treasury Secretary Blumenthal 13 

PRESIDENT SIGNS AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
Remarks by President Carter, Text of Convention 28 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 







«i;a;, 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE B U L L E T I Nj 






For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

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Single copy 85 cents 

The Secretary of State has determined that the pub- 
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cal has been approved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through January 31. 
1981. 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re- 
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The 
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 



■■J 



Vol. LXXVII, No. 1984 
July 4, 1977 



The Department of State BLLLETIS\ 
a weekly publication issued by tht 
Office of Media Serrices, Bureau ol\ 
Public Affairs, provides the public ana 
interested agencies of the gorernment 
with information on developments in 
the field of I'.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department ant 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETiy includes selectee 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart'^ 
ment, and statements, addresses, anc 
news conferences of the President ana 
the Secretary of State and other offi-: 
cers of the Department, as well as spe-\ 
cial articles on various phases of in-i 
ternational affairs and the functions o/ 
the Department. Information is in-J 
eluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
L'nited States is or may become a party 
and on treaties of general interna-^ 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United .\ations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



President Carter's News Conference of June 13 



Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a news confer- 
ence held by President Carter on June 13. ^ 



Q. Mr. President, are you now considering 
unifying the direction of all the intelligence 
agencies under a single individual and if so, 
irhen might that come about? 

The President: Shortly after I was in- 
augurated President I asked the National Se- 
curity Council to begin a study about the or- 
ganizational structure of the intelligence 
agencies. I have no predisposition about what 
that decision might be. This study has been 
going on now for more than four months, and 
1 think a recommendation to me is imminent. 

There obviously will be differences of opin- 
ion. I would hope that these differences could 
be ironed out among the State Department, 
National Security Adviser, the present Direc- 
tor of the CIA — the director of the intelli- 
gence community, Stan Turner — and the Sec- 
retary of Defense. 

But those matters on which they still dis- 
agree, when the recommendation comes to 
me, I'll resolve them without hesitation. I 
think that there is a need to protect the very 
important aspect of a diversity of opinion in 
making assessments of intelligence, the 
proper collation of data to be presented to me 
and other consumers. And I think it's impor- 
tant that we move very strongly away from a 
past procedure and let those who use the in- 
telligence data give a direction to the intelli- 
gence community about the relative priorities 
that are important. 



' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated June 20, 1977, p. 
875. 



In the past the intelligence community itself 
has set its own priorities. I think in the future 
the Defense Department, State Department, 
the President, and others ought to set the 
priorities. But I don't have any predisposition 
yet about the exact organizational structure. 

One other comment is that I have met with 
the congressional leaders about this subject. 
My own hope is that if we can reach reason- 
able agreement within the executive branch, 
that we can work very closely with the Con- 
gress in setting into law the charge to the in- 
telligence community and the organizational 
structure of the intelligence community. 

So far this has been done by Executive or- 
der. But I think that progress is good. There 
are bound to be differences of opinion, and 
strong differences of opinion. If they are not 
resolved otherwise, I'll resolve them myself. 



Q. Mr. President, you were attacked rather 
savagely in the Soviet press last week as 
"James Carter, an enemy of detente." From 
your vantage point, do you feel there can be 
any U.S. -Soviet detente without respect for 
observance of human rights on their part? 

The President: Well, obviously, the 
differences that arise between us and the 
Soviet Union are the things that are highly 
publicized. I'm grateful to know that we are 
beginning this week to work closely with the 
Soviet Union on a comprehensive test ban 
treaty to prohibit all testing of nuclear de- 
vices underground or in the atmosphere. 

They have suggested, along with us, that 
Great Britain join this negotiation. That's a 
step in the right direction. 

Paul Warnke [Director, U.S. Arms Control 



July 4, 1977 



and Disarmament Agency and chairman of the 
U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limita- 
tion Talks] will begin to negotiate with the 
Soviet Union within the next week on de- 
militarization of the Indian Ocean, again, a 
very major step forward if completed. There 
are continuing discussions between ourselves 
and the Soviet Union on details of the overall 
SALT agreement. And, as I have announced 
earlier, the Secretary of State and the Soviet 
Foreign Minister will meet at least twice 
more between now and the expiration date for 
the present agreement. 

So I think that in general we are moving in 
the right direction. Our statements concern- 
ing human rights, I think, have been well re- 
ceived around the world. We have not singled 
out the Soviet Union for criticism, and I have 
never tried to inject myself into the internal 
affairs of the Soviet Union. I have never made 
the first comment that personally criticized 
General Secretary Brezhnev. 

But when we pursue aggressively and with 
determination our commitment to the princi- 
ple that human beings are to be well treated 
by governments, that human freedom is one 
of the highest aspirations and commitments of 
our country, I think this is the right thing to 
do. If it hits ourselves as self-criticism, so be 
it. If it touches the Soviet Union and they 
interpret it as intrusion, so be it. But we have 
tried to make this a broad-based approach. 

I think it's hard to assess the results of this 
deep commitment, which I think is compatible 
with the inclinations of the American people. 
But I don't believe that there is a single 
leader of a nation on Earth today who doesn't 
have within his or her consciousness a concern 
about human rights — how do we appear to our 
own people, how do we appear to observers 
from other nations? And as we approach very 
quickly now the preparation for the Belgrade 
conference to assess the Helsinki progress — 
that will take place next October — I think 
there's a general sense in the world we had 
better get our own houses in order; we had 
better make a good image available to the 
outside world. And the scrutiny that's fo- 
cused on this issue is constructive. 

And I think that the Soviets' reaction 



against me personally on the human rights 
issue is a misplaced aim. I have no hatred for 
the Soviet people, and I believe that the pres- 
sure of world opinion might be making itself 
felt on them and perhaps I am kind of a 
scapegoat for that adverse reaction on their 
part. 

But I feel very deeply that we ought to pur- 
sue aggressively this commitment and I have 
no second thoughts or hesitation about it. 

Q. Mr. President, U.N. Ambassador An- 
drew Young continues to make headlines with 
his cominents about racism. 

The President: Yes. [Laughter.] 

Q. Do you think his words have opened old 
wounds at home and damaged our interests 
abroad, or do you welcome this discussion on 
the nature of raci.^m that he's touched off? 

The President: I think the statements 
that Andy Young has made are different from 
what I would have said. The word "racism" 
has different connotations to different 
people, as does the phrase "human rights." I 
think in almost every instance when Andy has 
said something that was criticized, if someone 
read the entire text — how he defined 
racism — there is no criticism involved. But 
when you extract the one word, it implies a 
much heavier condemnation than Ambassador 
Young meant. I read the transcript of his 
comments about former Presidents Nixon and 
Ford. He explained that when he used the 
word "racism" as it applied to them, that it 
was not a condemnation but it was an assess- 
ment that they were not familiar with the 
special problems of black people or minority 
groups who did not have an opportunity to be 
vivid in their own consciousness as former 
Presidents. 

I think that in general what Ambassador 
Young is accomplishing for us in deahng with 
Third World nations — those who are strug- 
gling for recognition, those who are strug- 
gling against oppressive hunger and disease 
and poverty — is very good. They now look on 
the United States as having at least one 
representative — I hope more, but at least 
one — who understands their problem, who 






Department of State Bulletin 



speaks their language, who will listen to them 
when they put forward their woes and their 
hopes for the future. 

I think we have a new sense in the minds of 
those kinds of people of caring about them and 
to a major degree it's because of their trust in 
Andy Young. 

I'm disturbed that after he spent 17 days in 
Africa, sometimes at some considerable 
danger to his own self, that a remark about 
Sweden was a major headline that derived 
from that entire very fruitful visit on his part 
to that continent. 

Andy is concerned also. He pointed out to 
me in a private meeting this past week that he 
thought it was time for him to shift his em- 
phasis more toward other developing nations 
outside of Africa — in Asia, in this hemisphere, 
and so forth. I agree with him on that. But in 
general I think that Andy Young has been a 
superb representative of our country. And I 
think that his use of the word "racism" has 
clouded the issue and has brought perhaps 
undeserved criticism on himself. 



Q. Mr. President, on Saturday you spoke 
about aggressively, peacefully challenging the 
Russians in their own spheres. Could you 
please elaborate on those remarks and ex- 
plain how this differs, for example, from the 
cold war, which in some cases led to hot war, 
as in Korea and Vietnam? 

The President: Yes. The comment that I 
made was — with an emphasis on peaceful 
competition — was to win the friendship of na- 
tions that in the past have not been close to us 
who may have been heavily influenced by or 
very closely friendly with the Soviet Union 
and who may still be. 

I think this is a normal and a proper hope 
for our country. We don't want to be in a posi- 
tion that once a country is not friefidly to us 
and once they are completely within the influ- 
ence of the Soviet Union, they should forever 
be in that status. 

And as I have already indicated and named 
several countries — Somalia, Ethiopia, Iraq, 
even more controversial nations Hke Vietnam, 
Cuba — I want to move as best I can to re- 



establish normal, friendly relationships with 
those countries. 

In some instances the obstacles are quite 
severe, as in the case of Cuba and perhaps 
Vietnam, but I think this is what our govern- 
ment ought to do, and I would like to have a 
situation when I go out of office that all the 
nations in the world have diplomatic relation- 
ships with us. 

We now have 14 who don't. I've been pursu- 
ing this aggressively — to use the word that 
you described — and also I think that I am 
completely in harmony with the Secretary of 
State and others who work with me on this 
pursuit. 

Q. Mr. President, to follow up on your re- 
marks about human rights, Mrs. Anatoly 
Scharansky, the wife of a Soviet dissident who 
is under arrest, is visiting in the United 
States and yesterday she expressed interest in 
seeing you to ask you to iyitervene in this 
case. I'd like to ask, do you think that this 
sort of thing can be useful, and do you plan to 
see her? 

The President: I don't have any plans 
to meet Mrs. Scharansky, but I have inquired 
deeply within the State Department and 
within the CIA as to whether or not Mr. 
Scharansky has ever had any known relation- 
ship in a subversive way or otherwise with 
the CIA. The answer is no. We have double- 
checked this and I have been hesitant to make 
that public announcement, but now I am com- 
pletely convinced that contrary to the allega- 
tions that have been reported in the press, 
that Mr. Scharansky has never had any sort of 
relationship to our knowledge with the CIA. 

Q. Mr. President, in the context of your 
campaign you said a number of times that the 
B-1 was an exotic weapon which should not be 
built. Now you've given two sets of Con- 
gressmen who met with you last ireek the im- 
pression that even though this is the most ex- 
pensive plane that ever would have been built, 
that you are about to go ahead. 

Can you comment as to whether you have 
made a decision; and whether you have or 
not, what leads you to reconsider? What fac- 



July 4, 1977 



tors make you rethink this compared to ivhat 
you said in the campaign? 

The President: Well, I have not made 
a decision about what I will do concerning the 
B-1 bomber. As you know, the Congress late 
in 1976, in effect, put the B-1 bomber con- 
struction in a dormant stage and permitted 
the expenditure of a certain amount of money 
per month to build a few B-1 bombers to keep 
the program alive. 

I'll make a decision before the end of this 
month. I have received a great deal of con- 
flicting advice from those who work closely 
with me and was eager to meet with one 
group of Members of Congress who were 
against the B-1 bomber to hear their argu- 
ments and then later met with a group who 
were for the B-1 bomber— I think the other 
way around. But both groups presented their 
views very strongly and very effectively to 
me. 

I think now is the time for me to perhaps on 
my own and perhaps in a lonely way to make a 
final judgment. 

There are major factors involved — the 
status of our relationship with the Soviet 
Union in the SALT talks, the quahty that we 
have seen in the latest test of the B-1 bomber, 
its radar cross-section and the effectiveness of 
present and future electronic counter meas- 
ures, the effectiveness of substitutes for 
it — the cruise missile being one of those — and 
in the overall context of our tactical and 
strategic needs I'll make a judgment before 
the end of this month. 

[After the news conference President Carter an- 
swei'ed que.-stions from members of the pi'ess on an in- 
foi'mal basis. Following are excerpts from the 
transcript.] 

Q. Mr. P resident, you seem to have 
changed your views sovfiewhat since the cam- 
paign about the B-1. Is that accurate? 

The President: I don't think that you 
could detect what my view might be. I'll make 
that decision this month. 

Q. You no longer seem to view it as an ex- 
otic weapon that shouldn't have been built. 
Even though you haven't made your final de- 
cision, what you said today seems to be in 



somewhat of a different context than the cam- 
paign. You seem to think it's a very serious 
question one way or the other and that — 
there's a different tone to it. Am I wrong? 

The President: Well, during the cam- 
paign, many of the observers of my effort said 
I was so fuzzy on the issue that they couldn't 
understand what I was saying. Since I have 
become President, people have an almost 
exact capability of discerning what I said dur- 
ing the campaign. It's hard to correlate the 
two. 

But one of the things that I was concerned 
about during the campaign was that in spite of 
the fact that the tests on the B-1 bomber were 
not supposed to be completed until last 
November, early in the spring, President 
Ford came out in favor of a construction pro- 
gram. I haven't decided yet what to do. But 
when I make a judgment, I think you would 
agree with me that I made the best judgment 
within my ability. 



Q. Could you tell us how you could con- 
sider giving Cuba diplomatic recognition — 

The President: We have not recognized 
Cuba. 

Q. — arui how you'd consider this, though, as 
a future action until Castro releases some of 
these thousands of people that he's holding as 
political prisoners and until he withdraws 
some of his troops from Africa? 

The President: Those are two of the 
items that I have said would be of deep con- 
cern to me before we could normalize rela- 
tionships with Cuba. The consultation with 
Cuba, the exchange of ideas with Cuba, the 
working out of a fisheries agreement or a 
maritime agreement or hopefully an anti- 
hijacking agreement — those kind of things I 
think are perfectly legitimate. But there is no 
immediate prospect for diplomatic recognition 
and exchange of Ambassadors with Cuba. 

Q. Would you insist that he bring his troops 
home from Africa? 

The President: That is one of my 
expectations. 



I! 



Department of State Bulletin 



A Guiding Philosophy for American Informational 
and Cultural Programs Abroad 



Address by John E. Reinhardt 
Director, U.S. Information Agency ^ 



Today's commencement is a celebration of 
what you have achieved and the possibilities 
of your future in America and in the world. I 
am not flattering you when I say that this day 
at Knoxville College represents the best of 
what our country means to me and to many 
others. 

What our view is of ourselves as Americans 
and the meaning of America to the world is 
what I should like to address today. I will do 
so in Socratic fashion, through questions. I 
have three: 

— What does America mean to itself and to 
the world? 

— Why is the world mindful of us? 

— And, finally, how do we best communi- 
cate what we know of ourselves and our hopes 
for the world? 

To the first question — what does America 
mean to itself and to the world? 

At its best — at its very heart — America is 
an idea, or a collection of ideas. You may at 
times have heard the criticism that our rever- 
ence of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights 
is metaphysically centered on the documents 
themselves. That is, I suggest, a misreading 
of history and fact. 

It is the idea and the ideals of America that 
command our loyalties and infuse our image of 
ourselves and our practices. The Constitution 
and the Bill of Rights, the Federalist Papers, 
the amply recorded history of our early days 



' Made at the commencement exercises of Knoxville 
College at Knoxville, Tenn., on May 28, 1977. 



attest to the fact that what had been brought 
to this continent was not a new idea of repre- 
sentative government. The concept of self- 
government had deep roots in much of 
Europe, and Britain was the mother of 
parliaments. 

What was new and central was the procla- 
mation of the American Constitution, not on 
behalf of a divinity or a divinely appointed 
king but rather, and for the first time, in the 
name of "We, the People." It is in these words 
that the American concept found its unique- 
ness. It is these words that are at the core of 
an American vision. It is from these words 
that flow our legal, social, and political princi- 
ples and practices. It is from these words that 
we derive our extraordinary cultural vitality, 
the lifting force of our ideas, the progressive 
yeast of our society. 

I would impose on you in an important way 
should I suggest that we have never violated 
our idea of ourselves. We can point to fixed 
times and fixed circumstances in our history 
when we faltered. In our most recent past, 
there was Watergate and there was Vietnam. 

But none of these aberrations, I assert, 
could finally stand up to the force of "We, the 
People." That force could be warped tem- 
porarily; it would not, in the longer run, yield. 

We have, in fact, brought ourselves through 
these aberrations to today. We are able again 
to state that the American historical experi- 
ence remains relevant to our lives. Once again 
we can attest to the validity of our view that 
man is individual, clothed in dignity and at the 
very center of the purposes of government. 



July 4, 1977 



And once again, our institutions were tested 
and have proved to be resilient and respon- 
sive. We are, many of us, dreaming again. 

I iiave commented briefly on the tiines we 
have faltered. But I should like to comment, 
again briefly, on what I regard as an extraor- 
dinarily revealing phenomenon. Perhaps you 
have noted it: However shrill the world's ac- 
cusations against us, however anguished the 
foreign note-taking of our failings, the stand- 
ards used by others — in other lands — to judge 
us are our own. I know of no other country of 
which this is true. That fact, I suggest, af- 
firms the power of our view of man. 

Opportunities of Communications Technology 

To my second question then — why is the 
world mindful of us? 

Our ties to the world are unique. We are 
not, in the traditional sense, one people; we 
are many. We are not one culture; we are 
several. The mystique of the melting pot does 
not define the American experience. 

Perhaps you recall what President Carter 
said at Notre Dame on May 22: 

In ancestry, religion, color, place of origin, and cul- 
tural background, we Americans are as diverse'a nation 
as the world has ever seen. No common mystique of 
blood or soil unites us. What draws us together, 
perhaps nioi'e than anything else, is a belief in human 
freedom.^ 

This, it seems to me, explains — at least in 
part — why what we have tried to do at home 
has had such profound meaning for so many 
other nations and people — people to whom our 
common past continues to bind us — in Asia, in 
Africa, in Europe, in Latin America. 

We are they. Many of them would be us. 
More of them would hope to hear the rever- 
berations of our view of man in their 
societies. But something more must be said. 

We cannot escape the fact that our great 
vitality — political and economic, cultural and 
military, intellectual and attitudinal — in and 
of itself commands international attention. 
Whether we will it or not, it is as much a fact 
as the attraction of the American ideal. 

We cannot act without being seen; we can- 



621. 



For the full text, see BULLETIN of June Vo, 1977, p. 



not speak without being heard. We are seen; 
we are heard. Certainly the palpable interna- 
tional response to our view of human 
dignity — of human rights — is evidence of both 
the power and attraction of our aspirations. 

In all of this, I suggest, one discerns the 
trails which have led us all to this moment, a 
special condition in the world which gives rise 
to a unique, perhaps historic, opportunity. 

It is in part the fact that we have come 
through that recent domestic testing intact, 
even revitalized. It is in part the fact that the 
world is a quieter place these days. The dec- 
ibel count is down. Stridency has subsided. 
The general climate — marred, it is true, by 
local thunderstorms — has undergone a subtle 
change. 

There is a disposition to listen — an expect- 
ancy, a hope for rational discourse, a recogni- 
tion of the international character of many of 
our problems. 

There is an acknowledgment of the need for 
dialogue. There is hope in the fact that the 
United States is once again ready to join in 
efforts, as President Carter said last week, 
"to inspire, to persuade, and to lead." 

There is, in short, a new opportunity at 
home and abroad. If we harness to that oppor- 
tunity the wisest use of what is a communica- 
tions revolution, then more of the promise can 
be fulfilled. That revolution in communica- 
tions technology has, as never before in his- 
tory, tied the world together. We interrelate 
more rapidly, more comprehensively, than 
ever before. And none of us will escape the 
consequences of that revolution. 

You, for example, will know of events that 
affect your lives and your security almost in- 
stantaneously. You will have access to knowl- 
edge and background to enable you to under- 
stand and interpret those events. Each one of 
you will be increasingly a citizen of the world 
called upon to speak and act just as, in your 
role as citizen of community or State, you 
must speak and act or there can be no such 
thing as democracy, no such heroic figure as a 
free man. 

There is a requirement to communicate, one 
which engages me professionally just as it en- 
gages you personally. 



Department of State Bulletin 



But the technology of communications car- 
lies with it a danger and a problem. The 
danger is that like all technologies, it is 
neutral — awaiting its utilization for better or 
worse. The problem, it seems to me, is in- 
herent in the extraordinary volume and speed 
of communications which can now be gener- 
ated. 

In a very real sense, we live in a world of 
instant images. We are flooded by them. We 
see, but too often what we see is out of con- 
text. We read about or instantaneously view- 
events, but they are often without perspec- 
tive. They are instead the "happenings," not 
what preceded them nor what is likely to 
follow. 

In Knoxville, I would assume, you are ac- 
customed to seeing Belgians and Japanese and 
Nigerians. There will be an occasional foreign 
movie; a newspaper headline about the Middle 
East; the story on the evening news about 
Brazil. There may be a Kabuki play from Ja- 
pan; there is certainly access in your libraries 
to every foreign culture. 

And yet how much time, how much thought 
can we give to any single event; how much can 
we immerse ourselves individually in any 
given international issue? Our schools, our 
families, our daily commitments and respon- 
sibilities, our jobs, our own personal en- 
thusiasms all have claim to the larger part of 
our day and the larger part of our lives. We 
cannot pretend that most of the images from 
around the world are more than images of the 
moment, no matter how they may come to- 
gether over longer periods of time. 

We are not alone. We share this overload of 
"instant image" with the entire world. If we 
are baffled by what we see or unclear about 
the meaning of what we see or simply 
staggered by the quantity of what we see, we 
are not alone. 

You see the paradox. There is this moment 
when the world more than ever seeks 
dialogue. There is a technology which permits 
it on a scale as vast as the technology is 
dramatic. And yet we are, for the most part, 
drowning in the bits and pieces that are the 
instant images. 



America's Public Diplomacy 

To recall my third question — how then do 
we best communicate what we know of our- 
selves and our hopes for the world? What can 
your society do to organize on your behalf a 
rational process of international communica- 
tions? 

There is a basis in our history and institu- 
tions for a process of international communi- 
cations. The libertarian theory of the press, 
for example, was written into the Bill of 
Rights to guarantee a free marketplace of 
ideas and information. We have spoken since 
1776 of "facts to a candid world" and of "a de- 
cent respect for the opinion of mankind." 
Clearly, our society today must be in the in- 
ternational marketplace with the same vigor 
and candor and a decent respect. 

Since I turn now to how our society can or- 
ganize this effort, I shall speak again of "pub- 
lic diplomacy," meaning those efforts through 
which your government enters the interna- 
tional market of ideas. I should like to put be- 
fore you a series of principles and purposes 
which I think should govern such efforts. 

First, we must undertake these efforts in a 
manner consistent with the ethics, ideals, and 
principles to which we ourselves aspire. We 
cannot be — we must not be — manipulative. To 
be so would, as it sometimes has in our past, 
prove corrosive of ourselves. 

Second, in all that we project to the world 
we must reflect the fact that our words and 
actions are shaped by our view of ourselves — 
that is to say, shaped by the American ideal. 
It is the best way to bring clarity and coher- 
ence to the many and bewildering images 
others have of us. The American ideal forms a 
recognizable basis for the context of our 
actions. 

Third, a decent respect for the opinion of 
mankind, today as in 1776, requires that we 
present our views and policies and aspirations 
forthrightly to the world. Not combatively, 
but forthrightly. Our interests require that 
others know where we stand. And our great 
presence in the world leads others, quite 
spontaneously and in their own interests, to 
want to know. 



July 4, 1977 



Fourth, we should do what we can to en- 
courage those individuals and institutions, 
those coalitions and "networks" — here and 
abroad — which are also engaged in the free 
flow and exchange of ideas and experiences. 
It is not the function of public diplomacy to 
compete; rather, to enhance and supplement 
existing efforts. They should be allowed the 
dignity of independence. But we can clearly 
help forge the institutional links — and the ex- 
changes between them — that will contribute 
not only to the civility and the breadth of our 
mutual perceptions but to the common solu- 
tions of common problems. 

Fifth, we must reach beyond ruling elites 
and seek out those who are the future con- 
tributors to thought and culture and lead- 
ership in their countries. Power is always 
transitory; sometimes it is oppressive. In any 
event, inherent in the nature of the communi- 
cations process I am describing is the future 
as well as the present. 

Finally, we must insist upon, we must in- 
sure, a dialogue. In so doing we strike a bal- 
ance between our own most fundamental be- 
liefs and needs and recognition of the needs, 
perceptions, and circumstances of others. We 
have been so greatly enriched by the gather- 
ing in of others— of European and Asian, 
African and Hispanic, Einstein and Dorati, 
apprentice and artist — that we are in fact our- 
selves a dialogue. We know it works. We 
know the power of listening. We should ex- 
tend its realm. 

From all of this, it should be eminently 
clear that propaganda has no place in our 
scheme of things, that there is nothing within 
us that enables us to be propagandists. 

There is nothing in our history, nothing in 
our view of ourselves, no tradition, no value 
system that will permit it. To be propagan- 
dists, we would necessarily violate that which 
we most believe about ourselves. 

If, instead, all our efforts are permeated by 
absolute fidelity to the American idea, then 
we will have joined the power of communica- 
tion with the historic possibilities of the world 
as it is. We will have undertaken as well as we 
can, what must be done — to enter the open 



marketplace of ideas with the truth as best we 
can perceive it. 

As Milton wrote in the Areopagitica: "Who 
ever knew Truth put to the worse in a fr^e 
and open encounter." 

Your experiences here, which culminate in 
this moment of commencing, will have 
touched you with the power of ideas and re- 
confirmed the value of truth. I hope you share 
with me an attachment to the idea of America, 
a commitment to Libertaiian principles, an af- 
fection for our cultural vitality. I hope some of 
you will join in the noble effort to communi- 
cate to others, at home and abroad, a sense of 
what could be, if enough care to make it so. 



U.S. Reestablishes Relations 
With the Congo 

Department Announcement ^ 

An American delegation, led by the Assist- 
ant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 
William E. Schaufele, Jr., and a Congolese 
delegation, led by Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and Cooperation Theophile Obenga, met in 
Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany, on June 
6, 1977. As a result of this meeting, the Gov- 
ernments of the United States of America and 
the People's Republic of the Congo have 
agreed to end the suspension of their diplomatic 
relations as of June 7, 1977, and to reopen 
their embassies in Brazzaville and Washing- 
ton. 

The two governments express their hope 
that this step will strengthen relations be- 
tween their countries and contribute substan- 
tially to bettering their mutual understanding 
and cooperation based on the principles of re- 
ciprocal respect, sovereign equality, and 
noninterference in internal affairs. In this 
connection, the two governments reaffirm 
their adherence to the principles of interna- 
tional law, and, in particular, to the provi- 
sions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations. 



' Read to news coi-respondents on June 15, 1977, by 
John H. Tiattner, Deputy Spokesman. 



Department of State Bulletin 



President Carter Discusses Cuba 
and SALT Negotiations 

Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of remarks with 
reporters by President Carter at the 
Brnnswick Airport (Ga.) on May 30. ' 

Q. Mr. President, what are you going to 
tell about the Cuban policy? 

The President: I think it's obvious that we 
want to have good relations with Cuba. We 
haven't had any firm indication yet that 
Castro wants to normalize relations with us. 
But I think we will have indications in the 
next few weeks of strengthened diplomatic 
relations with Cuba, far short of recogni- 
tion. 

Q. Despite their sending military advisers 
to Ethiopia? Does that bother you at all? 

The President: Well, obviously, it would 
be better for the peace of Africa if other na- 
tions would not send troops and military 
forces into Africa. 

Cuba still has almost 15,000 troops in An- 
gola. They have recently sent about 50 mili- 
tary advisers into Ethiopia. And they have, 
in addition to that, people in Mozambique 
and 8 or 10 other countries, sometimes just 
three or four, sometimes a larger number. 

We would like very much for Cuba to re- 
frain from this intrusion into African affairs 
in a military way. Obviously this is one of 
the problems that Cuba creates. 

Another major concern of ours is the large 
number of political prisoners in Cuba, 
between 15,000 and 20,000. We see, though, 
that it would be better for our hemisphere if 
Cuba did have good relations with the other 
nations here. And this is something that we 
hope to see in the future. 

Q. What do you mean by this "in a few 
iveeks"? What's going to happen? 

The President: Well, we don't know for 
sure, but I think we've demonstrated an 



' ¥ov the complete transcript, see Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents dated -June 6, 
1977, p. 8.33. 



ability to work with Cuba on the fisheries 
agreement and also on the maritime agree- 
ment. We have some hopes that there will 
be other similar kinds of small steps toward 
an increased ability to communicate and to 
discuss mutual concerns. It would be a mis- 
take to be too optimistic about it. 

Q. Mr. President, how long will it be, do 
you think, before the trade embargo finally 
comes to an end? 

The President: I don't have any way to 
know. 

Q. How do you account for the difference 
in view between your optimism and 
Brezhnev's pessimism on SALT? 

The President: Well, I think I've already 
discussed this adequately. It's the same dif- 
ference that existed between Gromyko and 
Vance, both describing the same circum- 
stances. 

I think compared to what the Soviets indi- 
cated in Moscow, it was a great step 
forward. We felt, for a change, that they 
genuinely wanted to have discussions lead- 
ing to an agreement. And they didn't exhibit 
this inclination when we sent Cy Vance to 
Moscow. 

So, in that way it was an improvement. 
But it again would be a mistake to underes- 
timate the great differences that exist 
between us. 

The main thing they have that concerns us 
is the increasing reliance on very large 
missiles with multiple warheads. And the 
thing that we have that concerns them ob- 
viously is the capability to deploy large 
numbers of cruise missiles at an early date. 

We hope to — we'll be very persistent 
about it without being in a hurry. I don't 
feel constrained every time we have a meet- 
ing with the Soviets to sign some kind of an 
agreement just to be signing something. But 
they know very clearly, I think, our own po- 
sition now and we know their position much 
more clearly than we did before the Geneva 
meeting. 

My goals have not changed and won't 
change. We want to do everything we can to 



July 4, 1977 



reduce dependence on atomic weapons. We'll 
be trying to induce the Soviets to join with 
us in this purpose. 

Q. Do you still have hopes of meeting 
Brezhnev in late September? 

The President: Well, we have never put a 
date. I think that we certainly would keep 
that hope alive when we see how Gromyko 
and Vance get along at their next meeting. 
So, I think we might make a decision on a 
possible meeting with me and Mr. Brezhnev. 
But that's not sure yet. 

Q. At the next meeting? 

The President: It's hard to say. 



President Signs Latin America 
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty 

Remarks by President Carter ^ 

I am very pleased this afternoon to 
pai'ticipate in what I believe is a historical 
occasion. This is a ratification by the United 
States of Protocol I of the Tlatelolco treaty, 
the deliberations for which were begun in 
November of 1964 following the Cuban mis- 
sile crisis, when Brazil and 10 other Latin 
American countries, through the U.N. aus- 
pices, began to evolve a commitment against 
the deployment or use of atomic weapons in 
the Latin American part of this hemisphere. 

In 1971 our own country ratified Protocol 
II with the distinguished representative of 
our government, Senator Hubert Hum- 
phrey, having signed that on behalf of the 
United States. 

The ultimate hope of this commitment by 
all the nations involved is a complete pro- 
hibition against the ownership or deploy- 
ment or use of nuclear weapons in the 



southern part of this hemisphere and 
complete international safeguards for all nu- 
clear materials that are owned by all those 
countries. 

So far only two countries have not signed 
[ratified] this treaty. One is Argentina and 
the other one is Cuba. France has not yet 
signed Protocol I, which we are signing this 
afternoon, and the Soviet Union has not 
signed Protocol II. 

This is a commitment of worldwide signifi- 
cance. As I said in my own Inaugural Ad- 
dress, our ultimate hope is that we can 
eliminate completely from the Earth any de- 
pendence upon atomic weapons, and I think 
it is significant and typical of our Latin 
American neighbors and those countries in 
the Caribbean that 10 years before that time 
they had already made this worthy commit- 
ment which sets an example for the world. 

So, at this time I would like to, on behalf 
of the American people, sign Protocol I of 
the Tlatelolco treaty, which means that we 
will not deploy nuclear weapons in the 
Caribbean or in the Central or Southern 
American Continents. 



U.S. and Mexico Complete Transfer 
of Territory 

Department Announcement * 

Secretary Vance and Foreign Secretary 
Santiago Roel Garcia approved on May 26 the 
report of the International Boundary and 
Water Commission, Minute No. 257, of com- 
pletion of three relocations of the Rio Grande 
under Article I of the U.S. -Mexican boundary 
treaty of November 23, 1970.2 gy virtue of 
their approval, jurisdiction over some 2,340 
acres has been transferred between the two 
countries, and for the first time since soon 



' Made on May 26 upon signing Protocol I of the 
Treaty foi- the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 
Latin America (last paragraphs omitted); text from the 
Weekly Compilation of Pi'esidential Documents dated 
May 30, 1977, p. 823. 



' Text from press release 232 dated May 26, 1977 
^ For the text of the agreement to conclude a treaty 
to resolve boundary problems, see BULLETIN of Sept. 
14, 1970, p. 296; for text of the Department announce- 
ment on the signing of the treaty, .see Bulletin of Dec. 
21, 1970, p. 765. 



10 



Department of State Bulletin 



LOCATION OF MEXICO-U.S. TERRITORIAL TRANSFERS 




HIDALGO-REYNOSA AREA 




2681 6-77 STATE(RGE) 



July 4, 1977 



11 



after the U.S. -Mexico boundary .survey of 
1853, the Rio Grande marks the undisputed 
international boundary at all points on its en- 
tire international reach from El Paso, Texas, 
to the Gulf of Mexico. 

In the boundary treaty of 1970, the two 
governments resolved all pending boundary 
differences and agreed to restore the Rio 
Grande as the international boundary in the 
reaches where that character had been lost. 
The pending boundary problems included: (1) 
The problem created by two tracts under U.S. 
sovereignty but located on the Mexican side of 
the Rio Grande — the Horcon tract opposite 
Mercedes, Texas, and Beaver Island near 
Roma, Texas; (2) A major territorial dispute 
outstanding since 1907 over a part of the lands 
in the Presidio-Ojinaga; and (3) The question 
of sovereignty over 319 islands and former is- 
lands created and moved by the Rio Grande. 

The two governments agreed in the 1970 
treaty to relocate the river channel in three 
areas so as to place north of the river all terri- 
tory to belong to the United States and south 
of the river all territory to belong to Mexico. 
Transfer of jurisdiction over this territory 
was to occur when the two governments had 
expressed approval of the Commission's re- 
port confirming that it had completed the re- 
locations. It is that approval that was given 
on May 26. 

The Government of Mexico transfers to the 
United States 481.68 acres of land about 4.5 
miles upstream from Hidalgo, Texas — 
Reynosa, Tamaulipas — in exchange for 
sovereignty transferred to Mexico over the 
Horcon tract and Beaver Island located south of 
the Rio Grande and having a combined area of 
481.68 acres, thus resolving the problem of Hor- 
con tract and of Beaver Island and restoring 
the Rio Grande as the international boundary 
in that area. The lands thus received by the 
United States will be turned over to the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the 
Interior, for development as a part of the Na- 
tional Wildlife Refuge System. 

The Government of the United States 
transfers to Mexico 1,606.19 acres upstream 
from Presidio-Ojinaga, in settlement of 
Mexico's claim to some 2,200 acres in that 



area, which had been cut from its territory by 
river movements after 1852, when the river 
moved from the north side to the south side of 
the valley. 

The Government of Mexico transfers to the 
United States 252 acres of land downstream 
from Presidio-Ojinaga in compensation for 
Mexico's having received under the treaty a 
somewhat greater number and acreage of the 
islands and former islands in the Rio Grande. 

In accordance with the 1970 boundary 
treaty, the cost of the changes in the location 
of the channel of the Rio Grande was divided 
equally between the two governments. 

As a separate project, but concurrently with 
the river relocation in the Presidio-Ojinaga 
Valley, each government has constructed 
levee protection works for the lands on its 
side of the valley under an internationally 
coordinated project to control future river 
floods in the area. 



United States and Cuba Agree 
To Open Interests Sections 

Department Announcetnent ^ 

The Governments of the Republic of Cuba 
and the United States of America exchanged 
notes in New York City on May 30 agreeing to 
the simultaneous opening of a U.S. Interests 
Section in the Embassy of Switzerland in 
Havana and a Cuban Interests Section in the 
Embassy of Czechoslovakia in Washington. 

This agreement will facilitate communica- 
tions between the two governments and will 
provide a greater range of consular services 
for the citizens of the two countries than are 
currently available. This step has the ap- 
proval of the Governments of Switzerland and 
Czechoslovakia. 

The notes were exchanged by Dr. Pelegrin 
Torras, Vice Minister of External Affairs, for 
Cuba and Mr. William H. Luers, Acting As- 
sistant Secretary of State, for the United 
States. 



' Text from press release 256 dated June 3, 1977 (also 
announced in Havana). 



12 



Department of State Bulletin 



Toward International Equilibrium: A Strategy for the Longer Pull 



Following is an address by Secretary of 
the Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal made 
at Tokyo, Japan, on May 25 before the an- 
nual meeting of the International Monetary 
Conference. 

Department oi' the Ti'easury press release dated May 24 

As we come to the closing session of this 
International Monetary Conference, I can 
well understand how your meetings have 
become an annual highlight for the world fi- 
nancial community. For me it has been a 
valuable opportunity to share thoughts on 
current international problems with this 
informed assembly. I am particularly hon- 
ored that you have invited me to offer some 
ideas on how I think we should deal with 
these issues. 

One encounters these days a good many 
uncertainties, doubts, even fears about our 
international financial prospects, and about 
our collective ability to resolve successfully 
the formidable difficulties that appear to lie 
ahead. 

Central to these doubts is an apprehension 
over the capacity of our monetary system to 
finance, for an extended period, the world's 
future oil requirements. Can our system 
continue to handle successfully the financial 
consequences of massive OPEC [Orga- 
nization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] 
surpluses, surpluses which cumulated to 
about $150 million during 1974 through 1976, 
and which may amount to $45 billion this 
year and continue to be substantial for a good 
many years? 

Is the international commercial banking 
system becoming dangerously exposed as a 
result of the recent sharp expansion in bal- 
ance-of-payments lending? Are debt burdens 
becoming unbearable? Can we be sure that 
official lending resources will be adequate to 



the need? Are nations in danger of drifting 
into protectionism, losing confidence in their 
ability to correct maladjustments promptly 
by more acceptable means? 

We are right to acknowledge these doubts 
and to face them squarely. Nevertheless, 
the Administration has full confidence that 
the international community, working 
together, can and will assure a stable finan- 
cial environment and a smoothly functioning 
international payments system. I can assure 
you that the United States will do its part. 

To begin with, we must acknowledge that 
large OPEC surpluses are not, as some 
thought, a short-term problem. They will 
exist for an extended period, and we must 
develop a strategy for the longer pull. 

Such a strategy must have three facets. 
First, we must assure that our national gov- 
ernments follow the right policies. Second, 
we must assure that our international in- 
stitutions have both the resources and the 
authority to fulfill their important respon- 
sibilities. Third, we must assure that our 
private financial markets are in a position to 
carry out their essential intermediary role 
safely and effectively. 

I would like today to examine with you 
what must and can be done in terms of each 
of these three groups: governments, inter- 
national organizations, and private financial 
markets. 

Responsibilities of Governments 

Governments' policies are of key impor- 
tance. There are several imperatives. For 
one thing, each nation must pursue a sound 
energy policy. There can be no permanent 
solution to the problem of OPEC financial 
surpluses until oil-importing nations adopt 
more effective programs for conserving the 



July 4, 1977 



13 



use of oil and developing alternative 
supplies. 

The United States has had no comprehen- 
sive energy policy. Our fuel import bill has 
grown explosively — from $5 billion in 1972 
to $37 billion last year. This year, it may 
reach $43 billion. Without corrective action, 
our oil imports would rise from less than 8 
million barrels per day last year to 12-to-16 
million barrels per day in 1985. The Presi- 
dent has now put forth a national energy 
plan designed to reduce those imports to 6 
million barrels per day by 1985. This reduc- 
tion, supplemented by appropriate policies 
in other major nations, will materially assist 
in achieving a desirable world energy bal- 
ance. OPEC, meanwhile, must recognize 
that a healthy world economy is in its own 
longrun interest and must display 
responsible restraint on its pricing policy. 

Sound energy policies will reduce the col- 
lective current account deficit of the non- 
OPEC states. A second imperative, 
however, is that governments collaborate to 
assui-e that the deficits which remain are 
distributed among countries in a pattern 
compatible with their ability to attract 
capital on a continuing basis. The present 
pattern does not achieve that balance. Sub- 
stantial redistribution is required. That re- 
quires basic macroeconomic policies and 
exchange rates for each nation appropriate 
to its own situation. 

Countries in a weaker position, with 
major deficits, must pursue stabilization 
policies which will provide a basis for sus- 
tained domestic growth while reducing in- 
flationary pressures and expectations. A 
number of countries have adopted such 
policies. Several others should. 

Countries that are in current account 
surplus or that can readily attract capital 
must follow policies designed to insure 
maximum sustainable domestic growth con- 
sistent with a gradual reduction of inflation. 

These policies, of course, must focus on 
domestic market demand rather than on 
export-led growth which further adds to 
current account surpluses. The United 
States is following such a policy. Similarly, 
Germany and Japan have adopted 



expansionary growth targets for 1977, and 
we are all committed to adopt further 
policies if needed to achieve stated targets 
and to contribute to the adjustment of 
payments imbalances. 

Flexibility in exchange rates is essential 
for both surplus and deficit countries. The 
United States, Germany, and Japan have 
made clear that they will not resist market 
pressures for appreciation. Countries which 
need to strengthen their competitive posi- 
tions to reduce their deficits must be equally 
ready to accept depreciation. 

Most importantly, all major countries are 
committed to reject protectionism and to 
pursue opportunities for expanding trade. 
Stronger countries should also increase their 
development aid. Finally, each nation, in- 
dustrial as well as developing, should adopt 
policies to expand domestic investment. If 
borrowed funds are used for investment that 
expands productive capacity, the ability to 
service debt will grow as the debt increases. 

The steps that have been taken are, in 
general, correct steps. Whether they are 
sufficient in all cases remains to be seen. 

The current account position of the United 
States has already shifted dramatically, 
from a surplus of $11 billion in the recession 
year 1975 to a deficit this year of perhaps 
*$10-to-$12 billion. That shift is making a 
major contribution to the stability of the 
international monetary system. 

We accept that shift. We can sustain it, 
although we would not expect the deficit to 
continue at this level indefinitely. We 
i-eceive substantial inflows of capital from 
OPEC and elsewhere and our overall posi- 
tion remains satisfyingly strong. The dollar 
exchange rate has not declined, despite the 
very large current account deficit. 

What is now required is a similar shift in 
the position of surplus countries such as Ja- 
pan, Germany, Switzerland, and the 
Netherlands. 

* 
Contribution of International Institutions 

An important part of our strategy de- 
pends on the activities of international 
institutions — most importantly, the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund. The United States 



14 



Department of State Bulletin 



supports the view that the IMF's financing- 
capability and its responsibilities for 
overseeing the monetary system must be 
strengthened. We believe that the Fund's 
role in preserving a sound international en- 
vironment will be of great importance in the 
years ahead. 

As a temporary arrangement, the Manag- 
ing Director [H. Johannes Witteveen, of the 
Netherlands] has proposed that lines of 
credit be negotiated. These would be avail- 
able as needed to provide additional condi- 
tional financing for particular countries 
whose needs are very large relative to 
quotas. The IMF's Interim Committee re- 
cently recognized the need for such a 
supplementary credit arrangement, and the 
seven nations at the [London] summit have 
endorsed that concept. Exploratory talks 
are in progress. 

For the United States, I have told Mr. 
Witteveen that I would strongly favor U.S. 
participation, provided a well-designed plan 
can be agreed, with an appropriate balance 
between credits for OPEC countries and the 
industrial world. I am confident that 
Congress would also support such a plan. 

After work is completed on the establish- 
ment of this supplementary credit, we must 
turn our full attention to a more permanent 
reinforcement of the IMF's conditional lend- 
ing resources through another increase in 
IMF quotas. 

An equally important task for the IMF is 
to determine in individual cases the form 
and degree of policy conditionality to go 
along with the financing. The IMF must 
work out specific adjustment programs and 
corrective measures to be adopted by par- 
ticular borrowing countries. Conditionality 
must be applied in an appropriate 
manner — neither too harsh nor too soft, 
enough to assure adequate adjustment but 
no more. 

Mr. Witteveen's proposal explicitly recog- 
nizes the implications of the present 
situation for the pace of adjustment in call- 
ing for programs spanning a period longer 
than the one year involved in traditional 
standby arrangements. The IMF's past 
record in negotiating programs of adjust- 



ment is an excellent one, and I am confident 
that the organization will continue to per- 
form this duty with equity, objectivity, and 
good sense. 

Quite apart from its financing activities, 
the IMF will take up, under the amended 
IMF articles, a major responsibility for 
surveillance of member countries' exchange 
rate policies. The Fund is approaching this 
task, wisely in my view, in a careful and 
cautious way, avoiding grandiose theoretical 
concepts. It is not trying to delineate de- 
tailed or rigid principles, but rather seeking 
to develop, on a case-by-case basis, a body 
of common law based on experience. We 
must all support and encourage the Fund in 
the development of this important tool for 
assuring that no nation will manipulate its 
exchange rate to prevent payments 
adjustment or to gain unfair competitive ad- 
vantage over its partners. 

Responsibilities of the Private Markets 

The role of private capital has been enor- 
mously increased by the OPEC surpluses. 
Since OPEC's geographic placement of its 
surplus funds does not correspond to the 
distribution of current account deficits, 
intermediation is required. Over the past 
three years, about three-quarters of the 
deficits have been financed through the 
world's money and capital markets. 

Concern has been expressed that the pri- 
vate market will not be able to continue this 
intermediation because of decline in the 
creditworthiness of borrowers and, in some 
cases, limits imposed by the banks' own cap- 
ital. Although some banks are in fact ap- 
proaching their legal limits on loans to a few- 
governments, it does not appear likely that 
this limitation will present a major problem 
in the continued growth of aggregate bank 
loans either to foreign corporate customers 
or to foreign governments. 

This issue is frequently posed as an "LDC 
[less developed country] debt problem." 
This is a misconception. The pressures on 
the private markets arise from the 
difficulties of a very few countries, many of 
which are not normally regarded as LDC's. 
For some developing countries, financing 



July 4, 1977 



15 



continues to be largely a question of the 
level of available funds from foreign assist- 
ance sources. For the rest of the world — 
developing, developed, and middle-income 
countries — there is no alternative to a 
continued central and predominant role for 
the private capital markets. 

— Only the private markets have the re- 
sources, expertise, and institutions in place 
to handle the large-scale, highly complex in- 
termediation function smoothly and effi- 
ciently. 

— Legislatures are not prepared to vote 
the massive amounts of official funds, or 
guarantees, required for a basic shift from 
reliance on private financing to reliance on 
official financing. 

Clearly it is in the interests of all 
concerned — the oil-exporting countries 
which are the ultimate creditors, the 
money and capital markets which 
are intermediaries, and the borrowing 
countries — that the flow of private capital 
continue. Countries which expect to borrow 
must therefore make sure that they retain 
their creditworthiness. 

Some have asked whether proposals for 
increasing IMF lending resources were not 
mechanisms for bailing out the commercial 
banks or taking over risky loans injudi- 
ciously contracted by the banks. But this is 
neither the intent nor the likely result. 
Uniquely, IMF lending is associated with 
policy conditions and adjustment programs 
tailored in each case to correct the problems 
which caused the need for financing. Thus 
IMF lending can, in a very meaningful way, 
enhance the creditworthiness of the bor- 
rower as viewed by commercial lenders. 
Bankers have long recognized this fact in 
their operations, sometimes by directly 
requiring a nation to enter into an IMF pro- 
gram as a prior condition to further bank 
credit. 

The amount of credit provided through 
the IMF is small, relative to private credit, 
and will remain so. In the three years since 
oil prices increased, the IMF has financed 
only about 6 percent of the aggregate 
payments deficits, even though Fund lend- 



ing has been at historic peaks. While the 
balance may shift toward a somewhat higher 
ratio of IMF to private financing, there will 
be no "takeover" of international lending by 
the IMF. The significance of IMF credit, 
and the value of expanding the IMF's lend- 
ing capacity, is largely that it strengthens 
creditworthiness and reinforces the system. 

I see no evidence that the system as a 
whole is overloaded. The problems — and 
there are problems — are found in a few 
individual nations which are approaching, or 
have reached, the boundaries of prudence. 

The concern of private markets about in- 
creasing their exposure in particular 
countries is a matter of perceived risk — of 
the degree to which particular borrowers, 
and their particular economies, appear to 
have the capacity to service debt. It is on 
this risk that private lenders — and the bank 
regulators looking over their shoulders — are 
quite properly focusing. 

Basic to risk evaluation is information, 
and borrowers will find they are facing in- 
creasing demands for information about the 
"vital signs" of their economies. Lenders 
should be in a position to weigh, on a 
reasonably current basis, a country's rela- 
tive performance in such areas as inflation 
rates, wage rates and productivity meas- 
ures, the shares of investment and 
consumption in GDP [gross domestic prod- 
uct] trends, public sector deficits, and 
trends of monetary aggregates. Chairman 
[of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System Arthur F.] Burns has made 
the very sensible suggestion that the central 
banks agree on the kind of information 
which a borrowing country would noi'mally 
be expected to supply. 

For some borrowers, meeting these re- 
quirements will simply mean revealing in- 
formation now held confidential. For others, 
it will require expansion and upgrading of 
their collection and processing effort so as to 
obtain more comprehensive, accurate, and 
timely data. In some cases, this effort will 
require fundamental changes in the way 
governments view this aspect of their eco- 
nomic management. For the ability and will- 



16 



Department of State Bulletin 



ingness of countries to provide such data 
and analyses will increasingly constitute the 
price of admission to private capital 
markets — because of the lenders' insistence 
in their own prudent self-interest, quite 
apart from any suggestions of the regulatory 
agencies. 

Lenders, by the same token, will need to 
develop the capability of extracting the 
maximum benefit from this additional infor- 
mation. This will require that they refine 
their capability for country analyses. There 
is in process a change in the type of 
borrowers coming to market. Formerly, the 
bulk of international lending was to private, 
largely corporate, borrowers. In many 
cases, such lending was for short-term trade 
financing or related to a specific project, and 
there was a balance sheet, a management 
with a known track record, a product and a 
market whose prospects could be analyzed 
according to reasonably well-developed 
criteria. 

Increasingly, however, the prospective 
borrowers are governments or quasi-public 
entities. Their purpose in entering the mar- 
ket is likely to be much less clearly commer- 
cial than, for example, when a firm borrows 
to expand to service a new market. In some 
cases, loans are for general balance-of-pay- 
ments support, and it is not immediately 
evident whether they will finance consump- 
tion or increase productive capacity. 

In such situations, we enter the realm of 
what used to be called "political economy," a 
term that could well bear revival. In asses- 
sing the riskiness of a balance-of-payments 
loan — or assessing the creditworthiness of a 
country — a major question becomes the will- 
ingness and the ability of the government of 
the prospective borrower to implement the 
policies which will permit the service of the 
debt. A lender's assessment of the prospects 
may require an assessment of the possible 
changes in the political climate, as well as in 
the underlying economic situation. 

It seems to me important, therefore, to 
give careful study to the possibilities of de- 
veloping a closer interaction, a smoother 
transition, between financing through the 



private market and official financing through 
the IMF. There is a view that the private 
markets and the IMF may in some cases be 
working at cross-purposes, with private len- 
ders increasing their exposure with growing 
unease and reluctance, while the IMF 
watches from the sidelines with increasing 
frustration while the underlying situation 
deteriorates. Countries in such cases may 
avoid recourse to the IMF — and adoption of 
needed adjustment policies — as long as 
access to private financing is more or less 
readily available. When the situation de- 
teriorates to a critical point, it becomes evi- 
dent to all, and there is sudden, 
discontinuous change. The question is 
whether there is legal and practical scope 
for earlier involvement by the IMF. 

The resolution of this question may be the 
next needed step in the evolution of the 
framework of international monetary coop- 
eration. We do not know, at this stage, 
whether there is a need for formal 
mechanisms, informal arrangements, or 
neither. Certainly we must recognize the 
limitations on the IMF's freedom of action. 
There would be great reluctance, for 
example, to have the IMF enter the field of 
credit-rating, not least because such action 
could undermine the confidential basis on 
which information is given to the Fund. 
Nevertheless, there may be ways in which 
closer private-official cooperation could be 
fashioned without putting the IMF in the 
credit-rating business. To invite discussion, 
I will list several theoretical possibilities 
without endorsing any — and I want to stress 
again that I do not feel we are yet in a posi- 
tion to make decisions in this area. 

Perhaps the least dramatic step could in- 
volve IMF willingness to provide staff re- 
ports and country assessments to prospec- 
tive lenders, on the basis of formal requests 
by the countries in question. 

The IMF might publish reports based on 
its annual consultations with countries, 
again subject to the approval of the 
countries in question. There is precedent for 
this in the OECD's [Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development] publi- 



Joly 4, 1977 



17 



cation of annual reviews of member 
countries' economic situations. 

A more overt IMF role might involve IMF 
staff participation in the development of pol- 
icy conditions to be associated with private 
or largely private lending. Thus the Fund 
might make available its services to help de- 
sign stabilization programs, if requested by 
both prospective borrowers and lenders. As 
a variant on this approach, the banks might 
insist, as part of a negotiated loan package, 
that a country establish eligibility for bor- 
rowing from the Fund. 

Among other suggestions, it has been 
proposed that the IMF might participate in 
the development of "mixed" financing pack- 
ages, featuring a blend of official and 
private funds. Depending on the circum- 
stances, the initiative might come from pri- 
vate lenders, the borrowers, or even the 
Fund itself. Arrangements in some cases 
might involve a "stretch-out" of debts to 
correct excessive "lumpiness" in the earlier 
maturities. 

All of these proposals raise basic 
questions of how the IMF should operate 
and how it should relate both to its 
sovereign members and to the private sec- 
tor. I do not suggest that the international 
community will in the end necessarily decide 
that it is wise to make such changes. But I 
do think that we should be willing to 
reexamine old premises, review old 
practices, and consider innovations. Only in 
that way can we assure that our institutions 
grow and adapt to current conditions and 
are used with the maximum effectiveness 
that the future will require. 

To conclude, I am confident that the 
strategy I have outlined — a strategy based 
on application of sensible government 
policies, reinforcement of our international 
institutions, and strengthening of private 
market mechanisms — will be adequate to the 
test for the longer pull. My confidence is 
fortified by two facts: 

— First, the record of the past 32 years is 
on the whole, an excellent one. In the inter- 
national monetary sphere, the world 



community has, time and again, faced new 
problems, new strains. On each occasion, it 
has found a cooperative and responsible so- 
lution. I am sure we can do so again. 

— Second, we have the advantage of a 
new, realistic, and flexible monetary system 
as a framework for our policies. That system 
is itself a product of international 
cooperation and will facilitate our progress. 

This effort will require the best from all of 
us. The skill and determination which you in 
the international banking community, as 
well as we in national governments, apply in 
adapting to the situation we confront will 
largely determine our success. 



U.S.-Japan End Second Round 
of Nuclear Energy Talks 

Department Announcement 

Piess releai^e 262 datetl June 7 

Japanese and U.S. delegations, as a fol- 
lowup of the talks between Prime Minister 
Fukuda and President Carter, have had a 
frank exchange of views on their respective 
nuclear energy policies and made utmost ef- 
forts to harmonize the development of peace- 
ful uses of nuclear energy and the mainte- 
nance of nuclear nonproliferation. The second 
round of talks [.June 2-6] has seen the further 
deepening of mutual understanding of each 
others position. 

As a result of the talks, it has been agreed 
that studies will be undertaken by a Japan- 
U.S. joint team of experts to explore 
promptly solutions acceptable to both sides 
with regard to the operation of the Tokai-Jura 
facility. 

The team will conduct its studies for about 
two weeks, and following its work the team 
will submit a joint report on its findings. 
Their joint report will be submitted to both 
governments, and further consultations will 
continue as soon as possible thereafter. 

The U.S. team of experts will visit Japan in 
the middle of June. 



18 



Department of State Bulletin 



CONGRESS 



Department Testifies on international Commodity Agreements 



Statement by Julius L. Katz 

Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs ' 



Mr. Chairman [William S. Moorhead, of 
Pennsylvania]: I am pleased to have this op- 
portunity to meet with your committee to dis- 
cuss international commodity agreements. In 
recent years we have seen commodity prices 
skyrocket and then collapse, with acute short- 
ages followed by glut and, for some com- 
modities, followed by shortages again. These 
violent fluctuations in price and supply sub- 
ject the world economy to severe strain. They 
disrupt development planning and intensify 
world inflation. The dramatic developments of 
recent years have again focused attention on 
commodity agreements as a means of remedy- 
ing chronic commodity market instability. 

I propose in this statement, Mr. Chairman, 
to review briefly efforts to negotiate various 
commodity agreements. I will attempt in the 
course of this statement to assess the poten- 
tial and problems of such agreements. 

Commodity price instability is not a new 
phenomenon. It is a chronic problem. It is due 
to variations in supply — primarily because of 
changes in weather and plant disease — and 
cyclical changes in demand. It is compounded 
by the perverse behavior of buyers and sellers 
in some markets who buy when the price is 
rising, expecting a further rise, and who sell 
when the price is falling, expecting a further 
fall. The fluctuations are exacerbated in 



' Submitted to the Subcommittee on Economic 
Stabilization of the House Committee on Banking, Fi- 
nance and Ui'ban Affairs on .June 8. The complete tran- 
script of the hearings will be published by the commit- 
tee and will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402. 



periods of inflationary psychology and erratic 
exchange rate movements by a preference 
among some money managers for holding 
commodities over currencies. This exagger- 
ates shortages in periods of tight supply and 
subsequent declines when stocks are liq- 
uidated. The stabilization of commodity mar- 
kets, if it can be effected successfully, would 
substantially impi-ove the functioning of the 
world economy. 

It may be helpful to review the efforts to 
stabilize several specific commodity markets, 
with particular emphasis on recent experi- 
ence. 

Wheat 

International agreements to stabilize world 
wheat trade began in 1933 with the first In- 
ternational Wheat Agreement, under which 
producers were to control exports and reduce 
acreage while importing countries were to 
eliminate protective customs tariffs. Under 
pressure of economic depression and abundant 
supplies, many participants could not imple- 
ment the measures required, and the agree- 
ment foundered. 

Negotiations resumed during World War 
II, culminating in a 1949 agreement that in- 
volved reciprocal obligations between expor- 
ters and importers in terms of guaranteed 
quantities and maximum and minimum prices. 
The major problem in those early postwar 
years was wheat shortage, and the agreement 
was essentially implemented by two dominant 
suppliers, the United States and Canada. 

By the mid-1950's, the supply situation had 



July 4, 1977 



19 



changed dramatically, and importing nations 
lost interest. A number of subsequent agree- 
ments through the mid-1960's did not have 
much impact on the market. During that 
period of surplus production, the world wheat 
market was stabilized largely by production 
and e.xport policies in the United States and 
Canada. 

In 1967, in connection with the Kennedy 
Round trade negotiations, a more ambitious 
and complex agreement was concluded. While 
called the International Grains Agreement, 
economic provisions could only be agreed on 
wheat. These provisions established price 
equivalents and quality differentials for a 
large assortment of traded wheats, all based 
upon the price of a single reference wheat — 
U.S. Hard Red Winter No. 2 (ordinary pro- 
tein), f.o.b. Gulf ports. In theory, the 1967 In- 
ternational Grains Agreement established a 
precise mechanism to keep prices of all 
wheats in line within agreed maximum and 
minimum prices. In practice, the Interna- 
tional Grains Agreement failed. By the time it 
came into force in 1968, the world wheat situ- 
ation had shifted from one of short supply to 
oversupply, and the rigid negotiated price 
structure was under heavy pressure. Shipping 
patterns and freight rates used in the negotia- 
tion proved unrealistic in tight competition, as 
did price relationships between different qual- 
ities of wheat. The review and adjustment 
mechanism set up by the agreement proved 
unworkable, and the International Grains 
Agreement of 1967 fell apart at its first test. 
A subsequent effort in 1971 resulted in an 
agreement which provides only for consulta- 
tions and information exchange. 

We are now embarked on an exploration 
into the feasibility of another international 
negotiation on grains. I cannot assure that 
this effort will be more successful than past 
efforts, but I hope we have learned the les- 
sons of narrow price bands and overrigidity. 
Within the past five years we have moved 
from "food crisis" scarcity to income- 
depressing excess supply. With growing 
world consumption and the uncertainty of 
weather, the outlook is for recurring changes 
in the global supply of grain. We hope to 
achieve an arrangement that can moderate 



extreme price swings, while leaving wide 
latitude for market forces to operate. 

To assure flexibility in changing supply 
situations and to improve food security of 
poor nations, we believe that a new' agree- 
ment should be centered on multilateral obli- 
gations for the acquisition and release of re- 
serve stocks. We should also seek to comple- 
ment a grain agreement with meaningful 
liberalization of world grain trade, so that ef- 
ficient producers retain adequate incentive to 
maintain their output and so that one or two 
countries do not have to carry the full burden 
of adjustment to changes in global conditions. 

Sugar 

The first International Sugar Agreement 
was negotiated in 1937. Because of the out- 
break of World War II, however, it had a hm- 
ited life span. In the postwar period, interna- 
tional sugar agreements were negotiated in 
1953, 1958, and 1968. 

The United States was a signatory to the 
1953 and 1958 agreements, but did not par- 
ticipate in the 1968 agreement. Because of our 
domestic sugar legislation, U.S. participation 
was not relevant to the international agree- 
ments. Indeed, the agreements did not affect 
the major part of international sugar trade 
which was governed by preferential arrange- 
ments such as the U.S. Sugar Act, the Com- 
monwealth Sugar Agreement, and the Cuban 
arrangement with the Socialist countries. In 
effect, the sugar agreements regulated trade 
in a residual free market which accounted for 
less than 50 percent of the sugar in interna- 
tional trade. 

The sugar agreements were essentially 
market-sharing arrangements based on ex- 
port quotas. They attempted, with mixed suc- 
cess, to stabilize prices in the residual free 
market. The 1968 agreement, which the 
United States did not join, contained a feature 
of the multilateral contract appi'oach whereby 
exporting members undertook to provide a 
specified amount of sugar to importing mem- 
bers at a fixed "supply commitment price," 
the price ceiling. The 1968 agreement did not 
contain a corresponding "purchase commit- 
ment price" to defend the floor. 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



In 1973, attempts to renegotiate the 1968 
agreement failed wlien exporters and import- 
ers were unable to agree on a revised supply 
commitment price. The 1968 agreement ex- 
pired in December 1973, shortly before the 
end of the U.S. Sugar Act and the Common- 
wealth Sugar Agreement. Since 1975, the free 
market for sugar has grown rapidly. The 
United States, which imports about 25 per- 
cent of the sugar in world trade, now relies 
wholly on the free market. Australia and 
South Africa, formerly members of the Com- 
monwealth agreement, now supply solely the 
free market. The free market now accounts 
for about 75 percent of world sugar trade. 

In 1974, sugar prices reached a peak of 65 
cents a pound. Thereafter, they declined sub- 
stantially. The production of both sugar and 
substitute sweeteners such as high-fructose 
corn syrup has increased rapidly. At present, 
world sugar prices are between eight and nine 
cents a pound, well below cost of production 
in the United States and in most, if not all, 
exporting countries. 

Negotiations for a new international sugar 
agreement were held in April and May of this 
year in Geneva. The United States partici- 
pated actively in these negotiations. We pro- 
posed that a new agreement rely on supply 
management through a combination of export 
quotas and substantial stock buildup during 
periods when prices are near the floor. In our 
proposal, stocks accumulated at low prices 
would be isolated from the market and re- 
leased only at the top of the price range to 
defend the maximum. We recognize that 
stockholding entails certain costs to exporting 
members and indicated our willingness to con- 
tribute our fair share to international financ- 
ing of such stockholding. 

Unfortunately, the conference was unable 
to reach agreement on a number of key issues, 
including the level and financing of stocks, the 
division of market shares among exporting 
members, and the treatment of preferential 
arrangements. Accordingly, negotiations 
were suspended in order to provide govern- 
ments with further time to consider the vari- 
ous proposals and to conduct further examina- 
tion of the technical issues involved in stock- 
holding and financing. If agreement can be 



reached at the technical level, the negotiating 
conference will be reconvened in the fall. 



Coffee 

Coffee is a classic example of a boom or bust 
commodity. High prices in 1954 were followed 
several years later by a significant production 
increase, stock accumulation, and sharply fall- 
ing prices. In 1962, the United States and 
Brazil undertook a joint initiative which re- 
sulted in the International Coffee Agreement 
of 1962. 

The 1962 agreement was a market-sharing 
approach which relied on export quotas to in- 
sure the orderly marketing of surplus produc- 
tion and accumulated stocks. The agreement 
relied on importing countries to enforce ex- 
port quotas by prohibiting the entry of non- 
quota coffee. The 1962 and the succeeding 
1968 coffee agreements were in effect for 
nearly a decade, from 1962 to 1972. The 
agreements were based on the premise that 
coffee was in a permanent surplus. They 
sought to encourage coffee exporters to diver- 
sify into other agricultural commodities which 
would yield a higher return. The agreements 
succeeded in maintaining prices at stable, but 
relatively low, levels for the better part of 
that decade. 

In retrospect, it appears that the agree- 
ments maintained prices too low, both in abso- 
lute terms and in relation to world inflation of 
costs of production. The agreements pre- 
vented prices from plunging to disaster levels 
and permitted the orderly marketing of enor- 
mous surplus stocks. However, the prevailing 
price levels were so low as to be a disincentive 
to new investment. As a result, in the late 
1960's consumption began to exceed produc- 
tion, and world carryover stocks were drawn 
down to moderate levels. 

In 1975, the outlook was for production and 
consumption of coffee to be roughly in bal- 
ance. In July 1975, however, the coffee grow- 
ing regions of Brazil were struck by the worst 
frost in history. Overnight, the supply outlook 
changed from one of comfortable balance to 
one of extremely tight supplies for the next 
several years. The supply outlook was further 
complicated by civil wars and political disturb- 



July 4, 1977 



21 



cinces in several major African exporting 
countries and by poor weather and plant dis- 
ease in several Latin American producing 
countries. 

The price reaction was spectacular. Coffee 
pi'ices jumped from about 50 cents a pound to 
over $3 a pound earlier this year. World 
stocks have been drawn down to near pipeline 
levels, but there has been no physical short- 
age of coffee. Barring further catastrophe, 
production should return to normal in the 
next year and, as working stocks are rebuilt, 
prices should reflect this improved balance 
between supply and demand. 

After the 1975 frost, negotiations were 
completed on the International Coffee 
Agreement which entered into force on Oc- 
tober 1, 1976. The United States played a 
major role in the negotiation and is a member. 
Basically, it is a standby agreement designed 
to encourage producers to restore lost produc- 
tion by assuring them of consumer-country 
cooperation when prices return to normal. 

The 1976 coffee agreement is a market- 
sharing agreement, but it entered into force 
with export quotas in suspense. Market 
shares of individual exporting countries will 
be largely based on their export performance 
during the first two years of the agreement. 
Export quotas will come into effect, automati- 
cally, when prices fall to a level between 63.5 
and 77.5 cents per pound. When quotas are in 
effect, a significant portion of them will be 
distributed in proportion to a country's share 
of world stocks. This feature will provide an 
economic incentive for stockholding and will 
lead to more rational stock policies than in the 
past. If managed wisely, the 1976 coffee 
agreement offers the possibility of preventing 
a reoccurrence of the excessively high and ex- 
cessively low prices we have experienced in 
the past 10 years. 

Cocoa 

Cocoa is another commodity with a long his- 
tory of negotiation for an international 
agreement. Like coffee, cocoa is a tree crop, 
but it differs from coffee in certain significant 
respects. First, only five countries account for 
almost 80 percent of world cocoa exports. 



Second, cocoa cannot be easily stored in the 
producing countries, because the quality de- 
tei'iorates rapidly in the hot, humid climate in 
which it is grown. These distinctive charac- 
teristics of cocoa complicate the formulation of 
an international agreement. 

Negotiations looking to an international 
cocoa agreement were held off and on for over 
20 years. In 1972, a cocoa conference pro- 
duced an agreement which the United States 
did not join. The 1972 agreement relied on ex- 
port quotas as the principal operating 
mechanism, with surplus stocks to be stored 
by the cocoa organization in consuming coun- 
tries. The United States believed the agree- 
ment's price mechanism was too inflexible to 
accomplish price stabilization. The 1972 
agi"eement was not tested, because cocoa 
prices remained well above its price objec- 
tives after it came into operation in 1973. 

The 1972 agreement was renegotiated in 
October 1975. The United States participated 
in those negotiations and proposed that the 
primary tool to be used for stabilization 
should be a buffer stock. Our proposal in- 
cluded the following elements: 

— The buffer stock would operate to defend 
the maximum and minimum price within a 
20-cent range. 

— The buffer stock would purchase up to 
250,000 metric tons through normal commer- 
cial channels. 

— The Cocoa Council would have the au- 
thority to review and adjust the price range 
for buffer stock purchases. Prices would not 
be fixed for the life of the agreement. 

The U.S. proposals were not accepted by 
the conference which concluded the Interna- 
tional Cocoa Agreement of 1975. The 1975 
agreement is generally similar to that of 1972, 
relying pi'imarily on export quotas to defend a 
rigid price range. 

After a thorough review, the United States 
decided not to join the 1975 agreement. In our 
view it is cumbersome and potentially disrup- 
tive of the market. It combines features of 
both export quota- and buffer stock-type ar- 
rangements. The formula for calculating mar- 
ket shares is inflexible and will penalize 
dynamic producers. The buffer stock opera- 



22 



Department of State Bulletin 



tion is unnecessarily rigid and restrictive. The 
1975 cocoa agreement entered into force on 
October 1, 1976. Like its predecessor, it has 
not been tested because world market prices 
have remained substantially above the price 
range in the agreement. It is unlikely that the 
economic provisions of the 1975 cocoa agree- 
ment will come into operation in the near fu- 
ture. The United States remains willing to 
participate in a renegotiation of the agree- 
ment, if its members are so inclined. 



Tin 



International agreements on tin existed as 
early as the 1920's, when pr-oducers first com- 
bined to form their own arrangements. 
Agreements between producers and consum- 
ers, however, began only in the mid-1950's 
when the first International Tin Agreement 
was signed. This agreement had a duration of 
five years and was succeeded by later, similar 
five-year agreements. The last of these, the 
fifth International Tin Agreement, came into 
effect in July 1976. The United States, which 
declined to join the first four agreements, 
agreed to join this last agreement, and its 
entry was ratified by the Congress in October 
of last year. 

The basic goal of the tin agreement is to 
balance the supply and demand for tin metal 
at stable prices which are remunerative to 
producers and fair to consumers. To accom- 
plish this goal, the International Tin Council 
establishes floor and ceiling prices for tin 
metal and attempts to maintain market prices 
within the floor and ceiling levels through buf- 
fer stock purchases and sales and export con- 
trols. 

The principal problem with the administra- 
tion of the fifth agreement is that the Interna- 
tional Tin Council buffer stock is too small to 
moderate prices effectively. During periods of 
slack demand, therefore, the International 
Tin Council has relied on export controls to 
protect the fioor price. Export controls have 
resulted in decreased tin production which, in 
turn, has led to tin shortages and high prices 
in subsequent periods of tight demand. Be- 
cause the buffer stock has been unable to de- 
fend the ceiling price during these periods of 



tight demand, the consequent high prices re- 
sulted in council action to increase floor and 
ceiling prices. 

One major step which could be taken to 
remedy this operational problem of the 
agreement would be to increase the size of the 
buffer stock. The new fifth agreement has a 
pi'ovision for a larger buffer stock aimed at 
solving this problem. At the present time, 
however, only producer contributions to the 
buffer stock are mandatory, totaling approxi- 
mately 16,000 metric tons of tin metal. Con- 
sumers may make voluntary contributions, 
and six consumers have, in fact, agreed to 
contribute funds which in total would equal 
the present market value of about 3,400 tons 
of tin metal. 

Secretary of State Vance announced re- 
cently at the CIEC [Conference on Interna- 
tional Economic Cooperation] Conference the 
intention of the Administration to recommend 
to the Congress that the United States con- 
tribute an amount of tin to the buffer stock. 
This amount would be in proportion to its 
share of world tin imports, roughly 4,000 to 
5,000 tons. We beheve that this contribution 
should result in certain improvements in the 
current agreement which would encourage 
producers to remove artificial devices, such as 
production taxes which now unduly restrict 
new investment, and would also encourage 
other tin-consuming nations to contribute. A 
larger tin buffer stock would contribute sub- 
stantially to the improved working of the tin 
agreement, since in addition to making more 
tin available to the market in times of high 
prices, it would also allow greater amounts of 
tin to be acquired in periods of low prices, 
thus avoiding the imposition of export con- 
trols with the restrictive effects on production 
I have noted. 

Against the background of these several 
cases a number of observations can be made. 

Commodity agreements are, first of all, dif- 
ficult to negotiate, primarily because the ob- 
jectives of the participants are frequently dis- 
similar and, at times, incompatible. 

— While the stated objective is to stabilize 
prices, exporters will tend to believe the price 
objectives should be set at a higher level than 



July 4, 1977 



23 



will importers. The determination of the price 
that will balance supply and demand on aver- 
age over a period of years and encourage 
adequate investment for the longer term is 
not, after all, an automatic process. Consider- 
able judgment is required. 

— While buffer stocks are generally re- 
garded as a superior mechanism to market 
sharing, many countries are unwilling to con- 
template undertaking the investment and car- 
rying costs of stockpiling. 

— Market sharing, however, involves deci- 
sions on allocation between old versus new, as 
well as efficient versus inefficient, producers. 
A number of negotiations have collapsed over 
the question of market shares. 

Secondly, agreements negotiated may be 
difficult to sustain under the pressure of mar- 
ket forces. 

— Enforcement of export quotas has been a 
problem in some agreements because of the 
desire of individual producers to realize in- 
creased revenues by exceeding their quotas. 
Certification procedures have been rea- 
sonably effective in surmounting this prob- 
lem. 

— Inadequate provision for buffer stock 
financing has resulted in inability to defend 
minimum prices or to protect price ceilings. 
This, as I noted earlier, has been the case for 
tin, which is the only buffer stock agreement 
in operation. 

— Poor selection of price objectives has dis- 
torted investment decisions, encouraged the 
development of substitutes, and on a number 
of occasions led to the collapse of agreements. 
This was the experience in the 1967 grains ar- 
rangement. 

It was largely out of frustration with the 
history of failed negotiations that the so-called 
UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development] Integrated Program 
for Commodities was born. Originally pro- 
posed in 1975 by the UNCTAD Secretariat, 
and subsequently endorsed by the bloc of de- 
veloping countries known as the G-77 [Group 
of 77], it was adopted in modified form at the 
U.N. Conference [fourth ministerial meeting 
of UNCTAD] at Nairobi in May 1976. 

The integrated program consists of a vari- 



ety of proposed measures designed to improve 
and stabilize export earnings of commodity 
pi'oducers. These measures range from im- 
proved information exchange to formal price 
stabilization techniques. The heart of the pro- 
gram in the UNCTAD proposal is a series of 
international agreements for 18 commodities 
and buffer stock agreements for at least 10 of 
the 18 primary products with a common fund 
to finance these stocks. 

The Nairobi resolution itself [UNCTAD 
Resolution 93 (IV)] establishes a timetable for 
discussion of these 18 commodities, which is 
to be completed no later than February 1978 
and to be followed by negotiating conferences 
"as and when required" during the remainder 
of 1978. The resolution also specifies that a 
negotiating conference on a common fund 
should be held by March 1977. This conference 
in March failed to advance the consideration 
of a common fund. It will be followed by a 
second session in November of this year. 

Let me now, Mr. Chairman, describe our 
current approach to international commodity 
agreements. As is clear, the history of com- 
modity agreements has been checkered at 
best. We recognize both the desirability of 
stabilizing the market for commodities impor- 
tant in world trade, whose prices are highly 
volatile, and the practical difficulties in reach- 
ing agreements. We believe that properly 
conceived, designed, and operated commodity 
agreements can serve useful purposes: 

— They can reduce fluctuations in export 
earnings of developing countries which dis- 
rupt their economies; 

— They can assure the adequacy of supply 
by improving the climate for investment; 

— They can more equitably distribute the 
burden of adjustment in production to meet 
variations in demand; and importantly, 

— They can make a contribution to the criti- 
cal battle against inflation. We know from re- 
cent U.S. experience that in periods of tight 
supply, rising commodity prices transmit in- 
flationary impulses throughout the economy. 
Through their effect on the cost of living in- 
dex, they push up the wage-price spiral. The 
rise in costs becomes embedded in the eco- 
nomic structure and persists long after the 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 



commodity markets have turned around. In 
periods of low or falling prices, investment is 
postponed, and the stage is set for future 
shortages. 

Having said what commodity agreements 
can do, I would have to emphasize that we do 
not view commodity agreements as an in- 
strument to increase resource transfers to de- 
veloping countries by fixing prices above their 
equilibrium levels. Such efforts are doomed to 
failure because of the inevitable stimulation of 
uneconomic production, substitution, or both. 
And the distribution of gains to producers, to 
the extent there are gains, is unrelated to 
need or development performance. 

With regard to a common fund, it is our in- 
tention to participate actively and positively 
in the next negotiating session now scheduled 
for November in UNCTAD. We favor the es- 
tablishment of a fund that would facilitate the 



financing of buffer stocks established under 
international agreements between major pro- 
ducers and consumers. Such a fund, of course, 
would have to be financially viable and ac- 
ceptable to the broad range of countries rep- 
resented in UNCTAD. 

It is the intention of the Administration to 
continue to examine commodity problems on a 
case-by-case basis, to consider with an open 
mind candidates for commodity agreements, 
and where we conclude that agreements can 
be effective instruments for stabilization, to 
join with other producers and consumers to 
execute such agreements. At the same time 
we will seek to apply other instruments of 
commodity policy, such as market develop- 
ment, product improvement, diversification, 
and compensatory financing, where such 
measures would help countries cope with the 
problems of commodity trade. 



Department Discusses U.S. Efforts in Search for Middle East Peace 



Following is a statement by Alfred L. 
Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs, before the 
Subcommittee on Erirope and the Middle East 
of the House Committee on International Re- 
lations on June 8. * 

It is always a pleasure to appear before the 
International Relations Committee and in 
particular this subcommittee, with which we 
in the Near East and South Asia Bureau of 
the State Department have such a close and 
continuous and, I personally believe, mutually 
useful consultative relationship. 

I particularly welcome the opportunity to 
discuss with you the U.S. search for peace in 
the Middle East. It has long been recognized. 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



and demonstrated most recently in 1973, that 
conflict in this region of the world poses a 
great potential threat to global stability and 
world peace. For this reason, no other part of 
the world has received more time and atten- 
tion from the President and the Secretary of 
State. 

In his speech at Notre Dame on May 22, 
the President said: 

This may be the most propitious time for a genuine 
settlement since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli con- 
flict .... To let this opportunity pass could mean dis- 
aster, not only for the Middle East, but perhaps for the 
international political and economic order as well.^ 

I cannot overemphasize the seriousness of 
our commitment to the search for a perma- 
nent peace in the Middle East — a peace that is 
just for the people of Israel and the people of 
the Arab world; a peace that would alter the 



2 For the complete te.xt, see Bulletin of June 1.3, 
1977, p. 621. 



July 4, 1977 



25 



outlook for the future from an expectation of 
further war to an expectation of peaceful rela- 
tionships between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors. 

The United States has made clear in its dis- 
cussions with the leaders of Israel and the key 
Arab states that it has unique responsibilities 
with regard to Israel's security. Defining the 
special relationship between Israel and the 
United States the Secretary of State said in 
London on May 11: 

We were at the very outset of Israel's birth one of 
those that helped to bring it into being. We have been 
very close to Israel. We share the same values, we 
share the same hopes and aspirations, and we have been 
the closest of friends through all of these years and will 
be in the future as well.^ 

This commitment is a constant of American 
policy which will continue to sustain the rela- 
tionship between Israel and the United States 
and which we believe is understood and ac- 
cepted by all of the governments in the area. 

Along with the underlying U.S. commit- 
ment to peace in the Middle East and to Is- 
rael's security goes the behef that the basis 
for a settlement between Israel and the Arab 
states is U.N. Security Council Resolutions 
242 and 338. 

As this subcommittee is aware, the core is- 
sues on which we have focused our diplomatic 
efforts have been the nature of the peace to be 
established between Israel and the Arab 
states; Israeli withdrawal from occupied ter- 
ritories and agreement on final borders, to- 
gether with the related question of arrange- 
ments to make final borders secure; and the 
resolution of the Palestinian issue. 

In the little more than four months since 
this Administration took office, the President 
and Secretary Vance have been engaged in in- 
tensive consultations with the leaders of the 
Middle East countries most directly con- 
cerned with the search for peace. I would like 
to summarize briefly where our peace efforts 
now stand and how we see them unfolding in 
the period ahead. 

The Secretary's February trip to the Middle 



■■' Foi- Secretary Vance's remai'ks with the press follow- 
ing a meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Allon, see 
Bulletin of .June 6, 1977, p. 607. 



East opened the dialogue between this Ad- 
ministration and Middle East leaders. It 
helped to define more precisely the issues and 
the areas of difference on which efforts to 
renew the negotiating process, and the 
negotiations themselves, must focus. And it 
enabled us to announce a consensus among the 
governments concerned on three important 
points: That all the governments want peace; 
that all concerned should work for reconven- 
ing the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference 
in the latter part of this year; and that the 
parties to the conference are prepared to go 
to Geneva without preconditions so far as the 
substantive issues are concerned. It also iden- 
tified the question of Palestinian representa- 
tion at Geneva as the principal issue to be re- 
solved in order for the conference to meet and 
begin its work. 

Since February the President has met with 
Prime Minister Rabin of Israel and with the 
principal Ai-ab leaders beginning with Presi- 
dent Sadat of Egypt, whose key role in the 
peacemaking efforts of the past few years and 
in those which lie ahead has been widely 
recognized. 

As a result of the detailed discussions the 
President has had with Middle East leaders, 
we have a clearer idea of the areas in which 
difficult compromise will be necessary, and 
negotiating tradeoffs will have to be found, if 
there is to be progress toward peace. Of equal 
importance, we have been able to give each 
side a clearer picture of the concerns and per- 
ceptions of the other. 

Resolution 242 establishes the principle 
that a peace settlement must be based on 
withdrawal by Israel from territory occupied 
in 1967 in return for Arab agreement to end 
the state of belligerency, to recognize Israel's 
right to exist, and to live in peace with it. 
Resolution 338 establishes the principle that 
implementation of Resolution 242 — the trans- 
lation of the principles it sets forth into the 
specifics of a peace settlement — must be ac- 
compHshed in negotiations between the par- 
ties. Our efforts to serve as a catalyst for this 
process are firmly rooted in these two resolu- 
tions and in the conviction that a settlement 
must include an agreed solution of the Pales- 
tinian problem if it is to be just and lasting. 



i| 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 



On this question the President has said he 
beheves a peace agreement will have to in- 
clude the establishment of a homeland for the 
Palestinians. How this would be defined — its 
nature and political status — is something the 
parties to the Middle East dispute would have 
to resolve in their negotiations. 

On the question of Israeli withdrawal and 
final borders, there remains a wide gap be- 
tween the positions of Israel and of the Arab 
states. We have made clear our view that ef- 
forts to narrow this gap must be guided by 
the principles of Resolution 242. 

As for the nature of the peace called for in 
Resolution 242 between Israel and the Arab 
states, I would like to underline a point that 
deserves special emphasis. The President has 
made a particular effort in his talks with Pres- 
ident Sadat, King Hussein, President Asad, 
and Crown Prince Fahd to stress the point 
that peace is more than simply the absence of 
war and should lead to normalization of rela- 
tions between the Arab states and Israel, to 
be defined as part of a settlement. The Presi- 
dent spelled this out in his press statement of 
March 9: 

I think that wiiat Israel would like to have is what we 
would like to have: a termination of belligerence toward 
Israel by hei' neighbors, a recognition of Israel's right 
to exist ... in peace, the opening up of borders with 
free ti'ade, tourist travel, cultural e.xchange between 
Israel and her neighbors ....'' 

We recognize that implementation of these 
as well as other aspects of a settlement might 
have to be phased over a period of time. 

The agenda for our Middle East diplomacy 
in the near future calls for a meeting between 
the President and the new Israeli Prime 
Minister when a new government is estab- 
lished. If past experience is a guide, this could 
take several weeks more, and the new Prime 
Minister may not get to Washington before 
July. 

After this meeting takes place. Secretary 
Vance plans, as you know, to return to the 
Middle East for further consultations with the 
parties. He will be prepared to discuss with 
the parties suggestions of our own if this seems 



useful, but I want to emphasize that we will 
not be seeking to impose our ideas on the 
parties. 

As agreed between Foreign Minister 
Gromyko and the Secretary in Geneva on May 
21, we will be conducting monthly consulta- 
tions with the Soviet Union at the ambassa- 
dorial level in Moscow and Washington to 
compare notes on progress made toward re- 
convening the Middle East Peace Conference 
this fall. These consultations will be con- 
ducted in our respective capacities as 
cochairmen of the Geneva conference; they 
are exchanges of views and are not envisaged 
in any sense as a substitute for the negotia- 
tions between the parties which our efforts 
are designed to get started. 

I think the best summary of our attitude as 
we face the next phase of Middle East 
peacemaking was made by the President in 
Geneva on May 9. He said: 

There must be fairness; there must be some flexibil- 
ity; there must be a forgetting about past differences 
and misunderstandings; there must be determination; 
there must be a resolution of the Palestine problem and 
a homeland for the Palestinians; there must be some 
resolution of border disputes; and there also must be an 
assurance of permanent and real peace with guarantees 
for the future security of these countries which all can 
trust. ^ 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

Peace Coi-ps Authorization for Fiscal Year 1978. Report 
of the House Committee on International Relations, 
together with supplemental and opposing views, to 
accompany H.R. 6967. H. Rept. 95-296. May 12, 
1977. 14 pp. 

Omnibus Multilateral Development Institutions Act of 
1977. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Re- 
lations to accompany H.R. .5262. S. Rept. 95-159. 
May 13, 1977. 83 pp. 

International Development Assistance Act of 1977. Re- 
port of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to 
accompany S. 1520. S. Rept. 95-161. May 13, 1977. 
73 pp. 

To Amend Further the Peace Corps Act. Report of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accom- 
pany S. 1235. S. Rept. 95-168. May 16, 1977. 8 pp. 



"* For excerpts relating to foreign policy from Presi- 
dent Carter's news conference of Mar. 9. see BULLETIN 
of ApriU, 1977, p. 305. 



' Made prior to a meeting with President Asad of 
Syria. For the complete text of their exchange of re- 
marks, see Bulletin of June 6, 1977, p. 593. 



July 4, 1977 



27 



President Carter Signs American Convention on Human Rights 



Following are remarks made by President 
Carter upon signing the American Conven- 
tion on Human Rights at the Pan Amencan 
Union on Jmie 1, together with the text of the 
convention. 

PRESIDENT CARTER 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Document? dated June 6 

This morning, my wife is in Costa Rica, and 
yesterday when she arrived at the airport she 
reported that today, after waiting for many 
years, the United States would ratify this 
Convention on Human Rights. 

In 1969, when this agreement was reached 
in this hemisphere, the other nations came 
forward to commit themselves to a legally 
binding document which would express the 
aspirations that have existed among all our 
countries since the first governments were 
formed in North and South America. 

As far back as the 1920's Simon Bolivar put 
forward a concept of human freedom and the 
responsibility of government to protect the 
rights of individuals. 

In 1948, another agreement was reached in 
our hemisphere to pursue this noble endeavor 
of democratic and free governments. In 1969, 
this covenant was signed by the other nations. 

This blank place on the page has been here 
for a long time, and it's with a great deal of 
pleasure that I sign on behalf of the United 
States this Convention on Human Rights 
which will spell out in clear terms our own 
belief in the proper relationship between free 
human beings and governments chosen by 
them. 

I believe that no one nation can shape the 
attitudes of the world, and that's why it's so 
important for us to join in with our friends 
and neighbors in the south to pursue as a uni- 
fied group this noble commitment and en- 



deavor. And I think that it's accurate to say 
that among almost all the leaders of the 150 
nations of the world this year, there is a 
preoccupation with and a concern about basic 
human rights. 

Part of it is because of actions like these on 
behalf of free people. Another, of course, is 
the upcoming conference in Belgrade on the 
progress that has been made by the 35 sig- 
natories of the Helsinki agreement. 

But we are very glad this morning to join in 
this commitment and to follow the leadership 
of other countries in this hemisphere who 
have preceded us in the signing of this 
agreement. 

I'm very grateful to be honored by the 
presence here of these distinguished repre- 
sentatives of their governments, and I, there- 
fore, sign now for the United States this 
agreement. 

This is dated the 22d of November 1969. 
This is the American Convention on Human 
Rights. 

TEXT OF CONVENTION ^ 

American Convention on Human Rights 
Preamble 

The American states signatory to the present Con- 
vention, 

Reaffirming their intention to consolidate in this 
hemisphere, within the framework of democratic in- 
stitutions, a system of personal liberty and social jus- 
tice based on respect for the essential rights of man; 

Recognizing that the essential rights of man are not 
derived from one's being a national of a certain state, 
but are based upon attributes of the human personality, 
and that they therefore justify international protection 



' Signed at the Inter-American Specialized Conference 
on Human Rights at San Jose, Costa Rica, on Nov. 22, 
1969 (text from OAS doc. 65, rev. 1, corr. 1, dated Jan. 7, 
1970, which includes statements and a reservation). 



28 



Department of State Bulletin 



in the form of a convention reinforcing or complement- 
ing the protection provided by the domestic law of the 
American states; 

Consideriiig that these principles have been set forth 
in the Charter of the Oi-ganization of American States, 
in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man, and in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and that they have been reaffirmed and refined 
in other international instruments, worldwide as well as 
regional in scope; 

Reifetnting that, in accordance with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of fi-ee men en- 
joying freedom from fear and want can be achieved only 
if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy 
his economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as his 
civil and political rights; and 

Conifidering that the Third Special Inter-American 
C^onference (Buenos Aires, 1967) approved the incorpo- 
ration into the Charter of the Organization itself of 
broader standards with respect to economic, social, and 
educational rights and i-esolved that an inter-American 
convention on human rights should determine the struc- 
ture, competence, and procedure of the organs respon- 
sible for these matters, 

Have agreed upon the following: 

Part I — State Obligations and 
Rights Protected 

Chapter I — General Obligations 

Article 1. Obligation to Respect Rights 

1. The States Parties to this Convention undeitake 
to respect the rights and freedoms recognized hei'ein 
and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction 
the free and full exercise of those lights and freedoms, 
without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, na- 
tional or social origin, economic status, birth, or any 
other social condition. 

2. For the purposes of this Convention, "person" 
means every human being. 

Article 2. Domestic Legal Effects 
Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms 
refei'red to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legis- 
lative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake 
to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional proc- 
esses and the provisions of this Convention, such legis- 
lative or other measures as may be necessary to give 
effect to those rights or freedoms. 

Chapter II — Civil and Political Rights 

Article .!. Right to Juridical Persoiialitij 
Every per.son has the right to recognition as a person 
before the law. 

Article J,. Right to Life 

1. Every person has the right to have his life re- 
spected. This right shall be protected by law, and. in 
general, from the moment of conception. No one shall 
be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 

2. In countries that have not abolished the death 
penalty, it may be imposed only for the most serious 



crimes and pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a 
competent court and in accordance with a law establish- 
ing such punishment, enacted prior to the commission 
of the crime. The application of such punishment shall 
not be extended to ci'imes to which it does not presently 
apply. 

3. The death penalty shall not be reestablished in 
states that have abolished it. 

4. In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for 
political offenses or related common crimes. 

0. Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon per- 
sons who, at the time the crime was committed, were 
under 18 years of age oi' over 70 years of age; nor shall 
it be applied to pregnant women. 

6. Every person condemned to death shall have the 
right to apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of 
sentence, which may be granted in all cases. Capital 
punishment shall not be imposed while such a petition is 
pending decision by the competent authority. 

Article 5. Right to Humane Treatment 

1. Every person has the right to have his physical, 
mental, and moral integi'ity respected. 

2. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All 
persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with 
respect for the inherent dignity of the human pei'son. 

3. Punishment shall not be extended to any person 
other than the criminal. 

4. Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circum- 
stances, be segregated from convicted persons, and 
shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to 
their status as unconvicted persons. 

5. Minors while subject to criminal proceedings shall 
be separated from adults and biought before specialized 
tribunals, as speedily as possible, so that they may be 
treated in accordance with their status as minors. 

6. Punishments consisting of deprivation of liberty 
shall have as an essential aim the reform and social 
I'eadaptation of the prisoners. 

Article 6. Freedom from Slavei-y 

1. No one shall be subject to slavei'y or to involun- 
tary servitude, which are prohibited in all their forms, 
as are the slave trade and ti'affic in women. 

2. No one shall be required to perform forced or 
compulsory labor. This provision shall not be inter- 
preted to mean that, in those countries in which the 
penalty established for certain crimes is deprivation of 
libei'ty at forced labor, the carrying out of such a sen- 
tence imposed by a competent court is prohibited. 
Forced labor shall not adversely affect the dignity or 
the physical or intellectual capacity of the prisoner. 

3. For the purposes of this article the following do 
not constitute forced or compulsory labor: 

a. work or service normally required of a person im- 
prisoned in execution of a sentence oi' formal decision 
passed by the competent judicial authoi-ity. Such work 
or service shall be carried out under the supervision 
and control of public authorities, and any persons per- 
forming such work or service shall not be placed at the 
disposal of any pi'ivate party, company, or juridical 
person; 



July 4, 1 977 



29 



b. military service and, in countries in which con- 
scientious objectors are recognized, national service 
that the law may provide for in lieu of military service; 

c. service exacted in time of danger or calamity that 
threatens the existence or the well-being of the com- 
munity; or 

d. work or service that forms part of normal civic 
obligations. 

Article 7. Right to Personal Liberty 

1. Every person has the right to personal liberty and 
security. 

2. No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty ex- 
cept for the reasons and under the conditions estab- 
lished beforehand by the constitution of the State Party 
concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto. 

3. No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or 
imprisonment. 

4. Anyone who is detained shall be informed of the 
reasons for his detention and shall be promptly notified 
of the charge or charges against him. 

.5. Any person detained shall be brought promptly be- 
fore a judge or other officer authorized by law to exer- 
cise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a 
reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to 
the continuation of the proceedings. His release may be 
subject to guarantees to assure his appearance for trial. 

6. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be enti- 
tled to recourse to a competent court, in order that the 
court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his 
arrest or detention and order his release if the arrest or 
detention is unlawful. In States Parties whose laws 
provide that anyone who believes himself to be 
threatened with deprivation of his liberty is entitled to 
recourse to a competent court in order that it may de- 
cide on the lawfulness of such threat, this remedy may 
not be restricted or abolished. The interested party or 
another person in his behalf is entitled to seek these 
remedies. 

7. No one shall be detained for debt. This principle 
shall not limit the orders of a competent judicial author- 
ity issued foi- nonfulfillment of duties of support. 

Article 8. Right to a Fair Trial 

1. Every person has the right to a hearing with due 
guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a compe- 
tent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously 
established by law, in the substantiation of any accusa- 
tion of a criminal nature made against him or for the 
determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, la- 
bor, fiscal, or any other nature. 

2. Every person accused of a criminal offense has the 
right to be presumed innocent so long as his guilt has 
not been proven according to law. During the proceed- 
ings, every person is entitled, with full equality, to the 
following minimum guarantees; 

a. the right of the accused to be assisted without 
charge by a translator or interpreter, if he does not un- 
derstand or does not speak the language of the tribunal 
or court; 



b. prior notification in detail to the accused of the 
charges against him; 

c. adequate time and means for the preparation of his 
defense; 

d. the right of the accused to defend himself person- 
ally or to be assisted by legal counsel of his own choos- 
ing, and to communicate freely and privately with his 
counsel; 

e. the inalienable right to be assisted by counsel pro- 
vided by the state, paid or not as the domestic law pro- 
vides, if the accused does not defend himself pei'sonally 
01' engage his own counsel within the time period estab- 
lished by law; 

f. the right of the defense to examine witnesses pres- 
ent in the court and to obtain the appearance, as wit- 
nesses, of experts or other persons who may throw 
light on the facts; 

g. the right not to be compelled to be a witness 
against himself or to plead guilty; and 

h. the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court. 

3. A confession of guilt by the accused shall be valid 
only if it is made without coercion of any kind. 

4. An accused person acquitted by a nonappealable 
judgment shall not be subjected to a new trial foi- the 
same cause. 

.5. Criminal proceedings shall be public, except in- 
sofar as may be necessary to protect the interests of 
justice. 

Aiiicle 9. Freedo)!) from Ex Post Facto Laws 

No one shall be convicted of any act or omission 
that did not constitute a criminal offense, under the ap- 
plicable law, at the time it was committed. A heavier 
])enalty shall not be imposed than the one that was ap- 
plicable at the time the criminal offense was committed. 
If subsequent to the commission of the offense the law- 
provides for the imposition of a lighter punishment, the 
guilty person shall benefit therefrom. 

Article 10. Right to Compensation 

Every person has the right to be compensated in ac- 
cordance with the law in the event he has been sen- 
tenced by a final judgment thi-ough a miscarriage of 
justice. 

Article 11. Right to Privacy 

1. Everyone has the right to have his honor re- 
spected and his dignity recognized. 

2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive 
interference with his private life, his family, his home, 
or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his 
honor or reputation. 

3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks. 

Article 12. Freedom of Conscience and Religion 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience 
and of religion. This right includes freedom to maintain 
or to change one's religion or beliefs, and freedom to 
profess or disseminate one's religion or beliefs either 
individually or together with others, in public or in pri- 
vate. 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 



2. No one shall be subject to I'estrictions that might 
impair his freedom to maintain or to change his religion 
or beliefs. 

3. Freedom to manifest one's religion and beliefs may 
be subject only to the limitations prescribed by law that 
are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals, or the rights or freedoms of others. 

4. Parents oi- guardians, as the case may be, have the 
right to provide for the religious and moral education of 
their children or wards that is in accord with their own 
convictions. 

Article IS. Freedom ofTliouffht and Expression 

1. Evei'yone shall have the right to freedom of 
thought and expression. This right shall include free- 
dom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas 
of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, eithei' orally, in 
writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any 
other medium of his choice. 

2. The e.xercise of the right provided foi- in the 
foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior cen- 
sorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of 
liability, which shall be expressly established by law to 
the extent necessary in order to ensure: 

a. re.speet for the rights or reputations of others: or 

b. the protection of national security, public order, 
or public health or morals. 

3. The light of expression may not be restricted by 
indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of gov- 
ernment or private controls over newsprint, radio 
broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dis- 
semination of information, or by any other means tend- 
ing to impede the communication and circulation of 
ideas and opinions. 

4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 
above, public entertainments may be subject by law to 
prioi' censoi'ship for the sole purpose of regulating ac- 
cess to them for the moi'al protection of childhood and 
adolescence. 

5. Any pi-opaganda for war and any advocacy of na- 
tional, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incite- 
ments to lawless violence or to any other similar illegal 
action against any person or group of persons on any 
grounds including those of race, color, religion, lan- 
guage, or national origin shall be considered as offenses 
punishable by law. 

Article U. Right of Rephj 

1. Anyone injured by inaccurate or offensive state- 
ments or ideas disseminated to the public in general by 
a legally regulated medium of communication has the 
right to reply or make a correction using the same 
communications outlet, under such conditions as the 
law may establish. 

2. The correction or reply shall not in any case remit 
other legal liabilities that may have been incurred. 

3. For the effective protection of honor and reputa- 
tion, every publisher, and every newspaper, motion 
picture, radio, and television company, shall have a 
person responsible, who is not protected by immunities 
or special privileges. 



Article 15. Right of Assembly 

The right of peaceful assembly, without arms, is 
recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exer- 
cise of this right other than those imposed in 
eonfonnity with the law and necessary in a democratic 
society in the interest of national security, public 
safety, or public order, or to protect public health or 
morals or the rights or freedoms of others. 

Article 16. Freedom of Association 

1. Everyone has the right to associate freely for 
ideological, religious, political, economic, labor, social, 
cultural, sports, or other purposes. 

2. The exercise of this right shall be subject only to 
such restrictions established by law as may be neces- 
sary in a democratic society, in the interest of national 
security, public safety, or public order, or to protect 
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of 
others. 

3. The provisions of this article do not bar the impo- 
sition of legal restrictions, including even deprivation 
of the exercise of the right of association, on members 
of the armed forces and the police. 

Article IT. Rights of the Family 

1. The family is the natural and fundamental gi'oup 
unit of society and is entitled to protection by society 
and the state. 

2. The right of men and women of marriageable age 
to marry and to raise a family shall be recognized, if 
they meet the conditions required by domestic laws, 
insofar as such conditions do not affect the principle of 
nondiscrimination established in this Convention. 

3. No marriage shall be entered into without the 
free and full consent of the intending spouses. 

4. The States Parties shall take appropriate steps to 
ensure the equality of rights and the adequate balanc- 
ing of responsibilities of the spouses as to marriage, 
during marriage, and in the event of its dissolution. In 
case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the 
necessary protection of any children solely on the basis 
of their own best interests. 

5. The law shall recognize equal rights for children 
born out of wedlock and those born in wedlock. 

Article 18. Right to a Name 

Every person has the right to a given name and to 
the surnames of his parents or that of one of them. 
The law shall regulate the manner in which this right 
shall be ensured for all, by the use of assumed names if 
necessary. 

Article 19. Rights of the Child 

Every minor child has the right to the measures of 
protection required by his condition as a minor on the 
part of his family, society, and the state. 

Article 20. Right to Nationality 

1. Every person has the right to a nationality. 

2. Every person has the right to the nationality of 



July 4, 1977 



31 



the state in whose territory he was born if he does not 
have the right to any other nationality. 

3. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nation- 
ality or of the right to change it. 

Article il. Right to Property 

1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment 
of his property. The law may subordinate such use and 
enjoyment to the interest of society. 

2. No one shall be deprived of his property except 
upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of pub- 
lic utility or social interest, and in the cases and ac- 
coi'ding to the forms established by law. 

3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man 
by man shall be prohibited by law. 

Article 22. Freedom of Movement and Residence 

1. Every person lawfully in the territory of a State 
Party has the right to move about in it and to reside in 
it subject to the provisions of the law. 

2. Every person has the right to leave any country 
freely, including his own. 

3. The exercise of the foregoing rights may be 
restiicted only pursuant to a law to the extent neces- 
sary in a democratic society to prevent crime or to 
protect national security, public safety, public order, 
public morals, public health, or the rights or freedoms 
of others. 

4. The exercise of the rights recognized in para- 
graph 1 may also be restricted by law in designated 
zones for reasons of public interest. 

5. No one can be expelled from the territory of the 
state of which he is a national or be deprived of the 
right to enter it. 

6. An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party 
to this Convention may be expelled from it only pur- 
suant to a decision reached in accordance with law. 

7. Every person has the right to seek and be 
granted asylum in a foreign territory, in accordance 
with the legislation of the state and international con- 
ventions, in the event he is being pursued for political 
offenses or related common crimes. 

8. In no case may an alien be deported or returned 
to a country, regardless of whether or not it is his 
country of origin, if in that country his right to life or 
personal freedom is in danger of being violated be- 
cause of his race, nationality, religion, social status, or 
political opinions. 

9. The collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited. 

Article 2S. Right to Participate in Government 

1. Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and 
opportunities: 

a. to take part in the conduct of public affairs, di- 
rectly or through freely chosen representatives; 

b. to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic 
elections, which shall be by universal and equal suf- 
frage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free ex- 
pression of the will of the voters; and 

c. to have access, under general conditions of 
equality, to the public service of his country. 



2. The law may regulate the exercise of the rights 
and opportunities referred to in the preceding para- 
graph only on the basis of age, nationality, residence, 
language, education, civil and mental capacity, or sen- 
tencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings. 

Article 21,. Right to Equal Protection 

All persons are equal before the law. Consequently, 
they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal pro- 
tection of the law. 

Article 25. Right to Judicial Protection 

1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt re- 
course, or any other effective recourse, to a competent 
court or tribunal for protection against acts that vio- 
late his fundamental lights recognized by the constitu- 
tion or laws of the state concerned or by this 
Convention, even though such violation may have been 
committed by persons acting in the course of their offi- 
cial duties. 

2. The States Parties undertake: 

a. to ensure that any person claiming such remedy 
shall have his rights determined by the competent au- 
thority provided for by the legal system of the state; 

b. to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; 
and 

c. to ensure that the competent authorities shall en- 
force such remedies when granted. 

Chapter III — Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 

Article 26. Progressive Development 

The States Parties undertake to adopt measures, 
both internally and through international cooperation, 
especially those of an economic and technical nature, 
with a view to achieving progressively, by legislation 
or other appropriate means, the full realization of the 
rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, 
scientific, and cultural standai'ds set forth in the Char- 
ter of the Organization of American States as amended 
by the Protocol of Buenos Aires. 

Chapter IV — Suspension of Guarantees, 
Interpretation, and Application 

Article 27. Suspension of Guarantees 

1. In time of war, public danger, or other emer- 
gency that threatens the independence or security of a 
State Party, it may take measures derogating from its 
obligations under the present Convention to the extent 
and for the period of time strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation, provided that such 
measures are not inconsistent with its other obliga- 
tions under international law and do not involve dis- 
crimination on the ground of race, color, sex, lan- 
guage, religion, or social origin. 

2. The foregoing provision does not authorize any 
suspension of the following articles: Article 3 (Right to 
Juridical Personality), Article 4 (Right to Life), Arti- 
cle 5 (Right to Humane Treatment), Article 6 
(Freedom from Slavery), Article 9 (Freedom from Ex 
Post Facto Laws), Article 12 (Freedom of Conscience 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



and Religion), Article 17 (Rights of the Family), Arti- 
cle 18 (Right to a Name), Article 19 (Rights of the 
Child), Article 20 (Right to Nationality), and Article 
L':', (Right to Participate in Government), oi- of the ju- 
dicial guarantees essential for the pi'otection of such 
rights. 

3. Any State Party availing itself of the right of 
suspension shall immediately inform the other States 
Parties, through the Secretary General of the Organi- 
zation of American States, of the provisions the 
a|i|ilication of which it has suspended, the reasons that 
uave I'ise to the suspension, and the date set for the 
tei-mination of such suspension. 

Article 28. Federal Clause 

1. Where a State Party is constituted as a federal 
state, the national government of such State Party 
shall implement all the provisions of the Convention 
over whose subject matter it exercises legislative and 
judicial jurisdiction. 

2. With respect to the provisions over whose subject 
matter the constituent units of the federal state have 
jurisdiction, the national government shall 
immediately take suitable measures, in accordance 
with its constitution and its laws, to the end that the 
competent authorities of the constituent units may 
adopt appropriate provisions for the fulfillment of this 
Convention. 

3. Whenever two or more States Parties agree to 
form a federation or other type of association they 
shall take care that the resulting federal or other 
compact contains the provisions necessary for continu- 
ing and rendering effective the standards of this Con- 
vention in the new state that is organized. 

Article 29. Restrictions Regarding Interpretation 

No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted 
as: 

a. peiTnitting any State Party, group, or person to 
suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and 
freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict 
them to a greater extent than is provided for herein; 

b. restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right 
lii- freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any 
State Party or by virtue of another convention to 
which one of the said states is a party; 

c. precluding other i-ights or guarantees that are in- 
herent in the human personality or derived from 
representative democracy as a form of government; oi' 

d. excluding or limiting the effect that the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other 
international acts of the same nature may have. 

Article SO. Scope of Restrictions 

The restrictions that, pursuant to this Convention, 
may be placed on the enjoyment or exercise of the 
rights or freedoms I'eeognized herein may not be 
applied except in accordance with laws enacted for 
reasons of general interest and in accordance with the 
purpose for which such restrictions have been estab- 
lished. 



Article 31. Recognition of Other Rights 

Other rights and freedoms recognized in accordance 

with the procedures established in Articles 76 and 77 
may be included in the system of pi-otection of this 
Convention. 

Chapter V — Personal Responsibilities 

Article J2. Relationship Between Duties and Rights 

1. Every person has responsibilities to his family, 
his community, and mankind. 

2. The rights of each person are limited by the 
rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just 
demands of the general welfare, in a democratic 
society. 

Part II— Means of Protection 

Chapter VI — Competent Organs 

Article 33 

The following organs shall have competence with re- 
spect to matters relating to the fulfillment of the com- 
mitments made by the States Parties to this Conven- 
tion: 

a. the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, referred to as "The Commission"; and 

b. the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, re- 
ferred to as "The Court." 

Chapter VII — Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights 

Section I. Organtzntion 

Article 3i 

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
shall be composed of seven members, who shall be per- 
sons of high moral character and recognized compe- 
tence in the field of human rights. 

Article 35 

The Commission shall represent all the member 
countries of the Organization of American States. 

Article 36 

1. The members of the Commission shall be elected 
in a personal capacity by the General Assembly of the 
Organization from a list of candidates proposed by the 
governments of the member states. 

2. Each of those governments may propose up to 
three candidates, who may be nationals of the states 
proposing them or of any other member state of the 
Organization of American States. When a slate of 
three is proposed, at least one of the candidates shall 
be a national of a state other than the one proposing 
the slate. 

Article 37 

1. The members of the Commission shall be elected 
for a term of four years and may be reelected only 
once, but the terms of three of the members chosen in 



July 4, 1977 



33 



the first election shall expire at the end of two years. 
Immediately following that election the General As- 
sembly shall determine the names of those three mem- 
bers by lot. 

2. No two nationals of the same state may be 
members of the Commission. 

Article 38 

Vacancies that may occur on the Commission for 
reasons other than the normal expiration of a term 
shall be filled by the Pei-manent Council of the Organi- 
zation in accordance with the provisions of the Statute 
of the Commission. 

Article 39 

The Commission shall prepare its Statute, which it 
shall submit to the General Assembly for approval. It 
shall establish its own Regulations. 

Article W 

Secretariat services for the Commission shall be fur- 
nished by the appropriate specialized unit of the Gen- 
eral Secretariat of the Organization. This unit shall be 
provided with the resources required to accomplish the 
tasks assigned to it by the Commission. 

Section 2. Functions 

Article il 

The main functions of the Commission shall be to 
promote respect for and defense of human rights. In 
the exercise of its mandate, it shall have the following 
functions and powers: 

a. to develop an awareness of human rights among 
the peoples of America; 

b. to make recommendations to the governments of 
the member states, when it considers such action ad- 
visable, for the adoption of progressive measures in 
favor of human rights within the framework of their 
domestic law and constitutional provisions as well as 
appropriate measures to further the observance of 
those rights; 

c. to prepare such studies or reports as it considers 
advisable in the performance of its duties; 

d. to request the governments of the member states 
to supply it with information on the measures adopted 
by them in matters of human rights; 

e. to respond, through the General Secretariat of 
the Organization of American States, to inquiries made 
by the member states on matters related to human 
rights and, within the limits of its possibilities, to pro- 
vide those states with the advisory services they re- 
quest; 

f. to take action on petitions and other 
communications pursuant to its authority, under the 
provisions of Articles 44 through 51 of this Convention; 
and 

g. to submit an annual report to the General 
Assembly of the Organization of American States. 

Article 42 

The States Parties shall transmit to the Commission 
a copy of each of the reports and studies that they 



submit annually to the Executive Committees of the 
Inter-American Economic and Social Council and the 
Inter-American Council for Education, Science, and 
Culture, in their respective fields, so that the 
Commission may watch over the promotion of the 
rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, sci- 
entific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter 
of the Organization of American States as amended by 
the Protocol of Buenos Aires. 

Article i3 

The States Parties undertake to provide the Com- 
mission with such information as it may request of 
them as to the manner in which their domestic law en- 
sures the effective application of any provisions of this 
Convention. 

Section S. Competence 

Article Ith 

Any person or group of persons, or any non- 
governmental entity legally recognized in one or more 
member states of the Organization, may lodge 
petitions with the Commission containing denuncia- 
tions or complaints of violation of this Convention by a 
State Party. 

Article 1,5 

1. Any State Party may, when it deposits its in- 
strument of ratification of or adherence to this Con- 
vention, or at any later time, declare that it recognizes 
the competence of the Commission to receive and 
examine communications in which a State Party alleges 
that another State Party has committed a violation of a 
human right set forth in this Convention. 

2. Communications presented by virtue of this 
article may be admitted and examined only if they are 
presented by a State Party that has made a declaration 
recognizing the aforementioned competence of the 
Commission. The Commission shall not admit any 
communication against a State Party that has not made 
such a declaration. 

3. A declaration concerning recognition of compe- 
tence may be made to be valid for an indefinite time, 
for a specified period, or for a specific case. 

4. Declarations shall be deposited with the General 
Secretariat of the Organization of American States, 
which shall transmit copies thereof to the member 
states of that Organization. 

Article i6 

1. Admission by the Commission of a petition or 
communication lodged in accordance with Articles 44 
or 45 shall be subject to the following requirements: 

a. that the remedies under domestic law have been 
pursued and exhausted, in accordance with generally 
recognized principles of international law; 

b. that the petition or communication is lodged 
within a period of six months from the date on which 
the party alleging violation of his rights was notified of 
the final judgment; 

c. that the subject of the petition or communication 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



is not pending before another international procedure 
for settlement: and 

d. that, in the case of Article 44, the petition 
contains the name, nationality, profession, domicile, 
and signature of the person or persons or of the legal 
representative of the entity lodging the petition. 

2. The provisions of paragraphs l.a and l.h of this 
article shall not be applicable when: 

a. the domestic legislation of the state concerned 
dues not affoi'd due process of law for the protection of 
the right oi' rights that have allegedly been violated; 

b. the party alleging violation of his rights has been 
denied access to the remedies under domestic law or 
has been prevented from exhausting them: oi- 

c. there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a 
final judgTnent under the aforementioned remedies. 

Article i 7 

The Commission shall consider inadmissible any pe- 
tition oi' communication submitted under Articles 44 or 
45 if: 

a. any of the requirements indicated in Article 46 
has not been met; 

b. the petition or communication does not state facts 
that tend to establish a violation of the rights guaran- 
teed by this Convention: 

e. the statements of the petitioner oi- of the state 
indicate that the petition or communication is 
manifestly groundless or obviously out of order; or 

d. the petition or communication is substantially the 
same as one previously studied by the Commission oi- 
by another international organization. 

Section J,. Procedure 
Article J,8 

1. When the Commission receives a petition or 
communication alleging violation of any of the rights 
protected by this Convention, it shall proceed as fol- 
lows: 

a. If it considers the petition or communication ad- 
missible, it shall request information from the 
government of the state indicated as being responsible 
for the alleged violations and shall furnish that gov- 
ernment a transcript of the pertinent portions of the 
petition or communication. This information shall be 
submitted within a reasonable period to be determined 
by the Commission in accordance with the circum- 
stances of each case. 

b. After the information has been received, or aftei' 
the period established has elapsed and the information 
has not been received, the Commission shall ascertain 
whether the grounds for the petition or communication 
still exist. If they do not, the Commission shall order 
the record to be closed. 

c. The Commission shall also declare the petition or 
communication inadmissible or out of order on the 
basis of information or evidence subsequently 

1 received, 
d. If the record has not been closed, the Commission 
shall, with the knowledge of the parties, examine the 



July 4, 1977 



matter set forth in the petition or communication in 
order to verify the facts. If necessary and advisable, 
the Commission shall carry out an investigation, for 
the effective conduct of which it shall request, and the 
states concerned shall furnish to it, all necessary 
facilities. 

e. The Commission may request the states con- 
cerned to furnish any pertinent infoi-mation, and, if so 
requested, shall hear oral statements or receive 
written statements from the parties concerned. 

f. The Commission shall place itself at the disposal 
of the parties concerned with a view to reaching a 
friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of 
respect foi' the human rights recognized in this Con- 
vention. 

2. However, in serious and urgent cases, only the 
presentation of a petition or communication that fulfills 
all the formal requirements of admissibility shall be 
necessary in order for the Commission to conduct an 
investigation with the prior consent of the state in 
whose territory a violation has allegedly been 
committed. 

Article 1,9 

If a friendly settlement has been reached in accord- 
ance with paragraph l.f of Article 48, the Commission 
shall draw up a report, which shall be transmitted to 
the petitioner and to the States Parties to this Con- 
vention, and shall then be communicated to the Secre- 
tary General of the Organization of American States 
for publication. This report shall contain a brief state- 
ment of the facts and of the solution reached. If any 
party in the ease so requests, the fullest jMJssible in- 
formation shall be provided to it. 

Article 50 

1. If a settlement is not reached, the Commission 
shall, within the time limit established by its Statute, 
draw up a report setting forth the facts and stating its 
conclusions. If the report, in whole or in part, does not 
represent the unanimous agi'eement of the members of 
the Commission, any member may attach to it a sepa- 
rate opinion. The wi'itten and oral statements made by 
the parties in accordance with paragi'aph l.e of Aiticle 
48 shall also be attached to the report. 

2. The report shall be transmitted to the states con- 
cerned, which shall not be at liberty to publish it. 

3. In transmitting the report, the Committee may 
make .such proposals and recommendations as it sees 
fit. 

Article 51 

1. If, within a period of three months from the date 
of the transmittal of the report of the Commission to 
the states concerned, the matter has not either been 
settled or submitted by the Commission or by the state 
concerned to the Court and its jurisdiction accepted, 
the Commission may, by the vote of an absolute major- 
ity of its members, set forth its opinion and conclu- 
sions concerning the question submitted for its 
consideration. 



35 



2, Whei'e appi-opriate, the Commission shall make 
pertinent recommendations and shall prescribe a 
period within which the state is to take the measures 
that are incumbent upon it to remedy the situation 
examined. 

3. When the prescribed period has expired, the 
Commission shall decide by the vote of an absolute 
majority of its members whether the state has taken 
adequate measures and whether to publish its report. 

Chapter VIII — Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights 

Section 1. 0)ga»ization 

Article 52 

1. The Court shall consist of seven judges, nationals 
of the member states of the Organization, elected in an 
individual capacity from among jurists of the highest 
moral authority and of recognized competence in the 
field of human rights, who possess the qualifications 
required for the exercise of the highest judicial func- 
tions in conformity with the law of the state of which 
they ai-e nationals or of the state that proposes them 
as candidates. 

2. No two judges may be nationals of the same 
state. 

Article 5S 

1. The judges of the Court shall be elected by secret 
ballot by an absolute majority vote of the States Par- 
ties to the Convention in the General Assembly of the 
Organization, from a panel of candidates proposed by 
those states. 

2. Each of the States Parties may propose up to 
three candidates, nationals of the state that proposes 
them or of any other member state of the Organization 
of American States. When a slate of three is proposed, 
at least one of the candidates shall be a national of a 
state other than the one proposing the slate. 

Article ok 

1. The judges of the Court shall be elected foi' a 
terni of six years and may be reelected only once. The 
tenn of three of the judges chosen in the first election 
shall expire at the end of three years. Immediately 
after the election, the names of the three judges shall 
be determined by lot in the General Assembly. 

2. A judge elected to replace a judge whose term 
has not expired shall complete the term of the latter. 

3. The judges shall continue in office until the 
expiration of their term. However, they shall continue 
to serve with regard to cases that they have begun to 
hear and that are still pending, for which purposes 
they shall not be replaced by the newly elected judges. 

Article 55 

1. If a judge is a national of any of the States Par- 
ties to a case submitted to the Court, he shall retain 
his right to hear that case. 

2. If one of the judges called upon to hear a case 
should be a national of one the States Parties to the 
case, any other State Party in the case may appoint a 



person of its choice to serve on the Court as an ad hoc 
judge. 

3. If among the judges called upon to hear a case 
none is a national of any of the States Parties to the 
case, each of the latter may appoint an ad hoc judge. 

4. An ad hoc judge shall possess the qualifications 
indicated in Article 52. 

5. If several States Parties to the Convention should 
have the same interest in a case, they shall be 
considered as a single party for purposes of the above 
provisions. In case of doubt, the Court shall decide. 

Article 56 

Five judges shall constitute a quorum for the trans- 
action of business by the Court. 

Article 57 

The Commission shall appear in all cases before the 
Court. 

Article 58 

1. The Court shall have its seat at the place deter- 
mined by the States Parties to the Convention in the 
General Assembly of the Organization; however, it 
may convene in the territoiy of any member state of 
the Organization of American States when a majority 
of the Court consider it desirable, and with the prior 
consent of the state concerned. 

The seat of the Court may be changed by the States 
Parties to the Convention in the General Assembly, by 
a two-thirds vote. 

2. The Court shall appoint its own Secretary. 

3. The Secretary shall have his office at the place 
where the Court has its seat and shall attend the meet- 
ings that the Court may hold away from its seat. 

Article 59 

The Court shall establish its secretariat, which shall 
function under the direction of the Secretary of the 
Court, in accordance with the administrative standards 
of the General Secretariat of the Organization in all 
respects not incompatible with the independence of the 
Court. The staff of the Court's secretariat shall be ap- 
pointed by the Secretary General of the Organization, 
in consultation with the Secretary of the Court. 

Article 60 

The Court shall draw up its statute, which it shall 
submit to the General Assembly for approval. It shall 
adopt its own Rules of Procedure. 

Section 2. Jurisdiction and Fnnctions 

Article 61 

1. Only the States Parties and the Commission shall 
have the right to submit a ease to the Court. 

2. In order for the Court to hear a case, it is neces- 
sary that the procedures set forth in Articles 48 to 50 
shall have been completed. 

Article 62 

1. A State Party may, upon depositing its instru- 
ment of ratification or adherence to this Convention, 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



(II at any subsequent time, declare that it recognizes 
as binding, ipso facto, and not requiring special 
agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court on all matters 
relating to the interpretation or application of this 
Convention. 

2. Such declaration may be made unconditionally, on 
the condition of reciprocity, for a specified period, or 
for specific cases. It shall be presented to the Secre- 
tary General of the Organization, who shall transmit 
copies thereof to the other member states of the 
Organization and to the Secretary of the Court. 

0. The jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all 
cases concerning the interpretation and application of 
the provisions of this Convention that are submitted to 
it, pi'ovided that the States Parties to the case recog- 
nize or have recognized such jurisdiction, whether by 
special declaration pursuant to the preceding para- 
graphs, or by a special agreement. 

Article 63 

1. If the Court finds that there has been a violation 
of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the 
Court shall rule that the injured party be insured the 
enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It 
shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of 
the measure or situation that constituted the breach of 
such right or freedom be remedied and that fair 
compensation be paid to the injured party. 

2. In cases of e.xtreme gravity and urgency, and 
when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to per- 
sons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures 
as it deems pertinent in matters it has under consid- 
eration. With respect to a case not yet submitted to 
the Court, it may act at the request of the Commis- 
sion. 

Article 6i 

1. The member states of the Organization may con- 
sult the Court regarding the interpretation of this 
Convention or of other treaties concerning the 
protection of human rights in the American states. 
Within their spheres of competence, the organs listed 
in Chapter X of the Charter of the Organization of 
American States, as amended by the Protocol of 
Buenos Aires, may in like manner consult the Court. 

2. The Court, at the request of a member state of 
the Organization, may provide that state with opinions 
regarding the compatibility of any of its domestic laws 
with the aforesaid international instruments. 

Article 65 

To each regular session of the General Assembly of 
the Organization of American States the Court shall 
submit, for the Assembly's consideration, a report on 
its work during the previous years. It shall specify, in 
particular, the cases in which a state has not complied 
with its judgments, making any pertinent 
recommendations. 

Sections. Procedure 

Article 66 

1. Reasons shall be given for the judgment of the 
Court. 



2. If the judgment does not represent in whole or in 
part the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge 
shall be entitled to have his dissenting or separate 
opinion attached to the judgment. 

Article 67 

The judgment of the Court shall be final and not 
subject to appeal. In case of disagreement as to the 
meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall 
interpret it at the request of any of the parties, pro- 
vided the request is made within ninety days from the 
date of notification of the judgment. 

Article 68 

1. The States Parties to the Convention undertake 
to comply with the judgment of the Court in any case 
to which they are parties. 

2. That part of a judgment that stipulates compensa- 
tory damages may be e.xecuted in the country con- 
cerned in accordance with domestic procedure govern- 
ing the e.xecution of judgments against the state. 

Article 69 

The parties to the case shall be notified of the judg- 
ment of the Court and it shall be transmitted to the 
States Parties to the Convention. 

Chapter IX — Common Provisions 

Article 70 

1. The judges of the Court and the members of the 
Commission shall enjoy, from the moment of their 
election and throughout their term of office, the im- 
munities extended to diplomatic agents in accordance 
with international law. During the exercise of their of- 
ficial function they shall, in addition, enjoy the 
diplomatic privileges necessary for the performance of 
their duties. 

2. At no time shall the judges of the Court or the 
members of the Commission be held liable for any 
decisions or opinions issued in the exercise of their 
functions. 

Article 71 

The position of judge of the Court or member of the 
Commission is incompatible with any other activity 
that might affect the independence or impartiality of 
such judge or member, as determined in the respective 
statutes. 

Article 72 

The judges of the Court and the members of the 
Commission shall receive emoluments and travel al- 
lowances in the form and under the conditions set forth 
in their statutes, with due regard for the importance 
and independence of their office. Such emoluments and 
travel allowances shall be determined in the budget of 
the Organization of American States, which shall also 
include the expenses of the Court and its secretariat. 
To this end, the Court shall draw- up its own budget 
and submit it for approval to the General Assembly 
through the General Secretariat. The latter may not 
introduce any changes in it. 



July 4, 1977 



37 



Article T-i 

The General Assembly may, only at the request of 
the Commission or the Court, as the case may be, 
determine sanctions to be applied against members of 
the Commission or judges of the Court when there are 
justifiable grounds for such action as set forth in the 
respective statutes. A vote of two-thirds majority of 
the member states of the Organization shall be re- 
quired for a decision in the case of members of the 
Commission and, in the case of judges of the Court, a 
two-thirds majoiity vote of the States Parties to the 
Convention shall also be required. 



Part III— General and Transitory Provisions 

Chapter X — Signature, Ratification, Reservations, 
Amendments, Protocols, and Denunciation 

Article 7J, 

1. This Convention shall be open for signature and 
ratification by or adhei'ence of any member state of the 
Organization of Amei'ican States. 

2. Ratification of or adherence to this Convention 
shall be made by the deposit of an instrument of ratifi- 
cation or adherence with the General Secretariat of the 
Organization of American States. As soon as eleven 
states have deposited their instruments of ratification 
or adhei'ence. the Convention shall enter into force. 
With respect to any state that ratifies or adhei'es 
thereafter, the Convention shall enter into foi'ce on the 
date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or 
adherence. 

3. The Secretary General shall inform all member 
states of the Organization of the entry into force of the 
Convention. 

Article 73 

This Convention shall be subject to reservations only 
in conformity with the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties signed on May 23, 
1969. 

Article 76 

1. Proposals to amend this Convention may be sub- 
mitted to the General Assembly for the action it deems 
appropriate by any State Party directly, and by the 
Commission or the Court through the Secretary Gen- 
eral. 

2. Amendments shall enter into force for the states 
ratifying them on the date when two thirds of the 
States Parties to this Convention have deposited their 
respective instruments of ratification. With respect to 
the other States Parties, amendments shall enter into 
force on the dates on which they deposit their respect- 
ive instruments of ratification. 

Article 77 

1. In accordance with Article 31, any State Party 
and the Commission may submit proposed protocols to 
this Convention for consideration by the States Parties 
at the General Assembly with a view to gradually 
including other rights and freedoms within its system 
of protection. 



2. Each Protocol shall determine the manner of its 
entry into force and shall be applied only among the 
States Parties to it. 

Article 78 

1. The States Parties may denounce this Convention 
at the e.Npiration of a five-year period starting from 
the date of its entry into force and by means of notice 
given one year in advance. Notice of the denunciation 
shall be addressed to the Secretary General of the Or- 
ganization, who shall inform the other States Parties. 

2. Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of 
releasing the State Party concerned from the obliga- 
tions contained in this Convention with respect to any 
act that may constitute a violation of those obligations 
and that has been taken by that state prior to the ef- 
fective date of denunciation. 

Chapter XI — Transitory Provisions 

Section 1. hiter-Aiiicricau Commission on Human 
Rights 

Article 79 

Upon the entry into force of this Convention, the 
Secretary General shall, in writing, request each 
member state of the Organization to present, within 
ninety days, its candidates for membership on the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The 
Secretary General shall prepare a list in alphabetical 
order of the candidates presented, and transmit it to 
the member states of the Organization at least thirty 
days prior to the ne.xt session of the General Assem- 
bly. 

Article 80 

The members of the Commission shall be elected by 
secret ballot of the General Assembly from the list of 
candidates referred to in Article 79. The candidates 
who obtain the largest number of votes and an abso- 
lute majority of the votes of the representatives of the 
member states shall be declared elected. Should it be- 
come necessary to have several ballots in order to 
elect all the members of the Commission, the candi- 
dates who receive the smallest number of votes shall 
be eliminated successively, in the manner determined 
by the General Assembly. 

Section 2. Inter-American Court of Human Rights 

Article 81 

Upon the entry into force of this Convention, the 
Secretary General shall, in writing, request each State 
Paity to present, within ninety days, its candidates for 
membership on the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights. The Secretary General shall prepare a list in 
alphabetical order of the candidates presented and 
transmit it to the States Parties at least thirty days 
prior to the ne.xt session of the General Assembly. 

Article 82 

The judges of the Court shall be elected from the list 
of candidates referred to in Article 81, by secret ballot 
of the States Parties to the Convention in the General 
Assembly. The candidates who obtain the largest 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



mimber of votes and an absolute majority of the votes 
of the representatives of the States Parties shall be 
declared elected. Should it become necessary to have 
several ballots in order to elect all the judges of the 
Court the candidates who receive the smallest number 
of votes shall be eliminated successively, in the man- 
ner determined hv the States Parties. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the 
principles and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty of 
December 1, 1959 (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Oslo June 
20, 197.5, at the eighth consultative meeting. ' 
Notification of approval: Argentina, June 13, 1977. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at 
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 
1964; for the United States December 13, 1972. TIAS 
7502. 
Accession deposited: Libya, June 7, 1977. 

Environmental Modification 

(■(invention <jn the prohibition of military or any other 
hostile use of environmental modification techniques, 
with anne.x. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977. ' 
Signature: Sri Lanka, June 8, 1977. 

Finance 

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag- 
ricultural Development. Done at Rome June 13, 
1976. ' 
Signature: Zaire, May 23, 1977. 

Load Lines 

Amendments to the international convention on load 
lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at Lon- 
don October 12, 1971. > 
Acceptance deposited: Kuwait, May 25, 1977. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044. 
Acceptance deposited: Angola, June 6, 1977. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial 
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at 
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 en- 
tered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States 
August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into 
force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 
5, 1970. TIAS 6923, 7727. 

Notification from World Intellectual Property Or- 
ganization that accession deposited: Burundi, June 
3, 1977. 



Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. 
Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United 
States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932. 
Accession deposited: Pakistan, October 6, 1976. 

Safety at Sea 

International regulations for preventing collisions at 
sea. Appi'oved by the International Confei'ence on 
Safety of Life at Sea held at London from May 17 to 
June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. 
TIAS 5813. 
Acceptance deposited: Uruguay, May 17, 1977. 

Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention with an- 
nexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos 
October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975; 
for the United States April 7, 1976. TIAS 8572. 
Ratifications deposited: Nicaragua, March 25, 1977; 
Togo, March 31, 1977. 

Tonnage Measurement 

International convention on tonnage measurement of 
ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23, 
1969. ' 
Accession deposited: India, May 26, 1977. 

Trade 

Declaration on the provisional accession of Colombia to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at 
Geneva July 23, 1975. Entered into force January 22, 
1976; for the United States May 1, 1976. TIAS 8322. 
Acceptance deposited: Czechoslovakia, December 23, 
1976. 

Proces-verbal extending the declaration on the provi- 
sional accession of Colombia. Done at Geneva 
Novembei- 12, 1976, Entered into force December 17, 
1976; for the United States March 28, 1977. 
Acceptance deposited: Czechoslovakia, May 23, 1977. 

Whaling 

International whaling convention with schedule of whal- 
ing regulations. Done at Washington December 2, 
1946. Entered into force November 10, 1948. TIAS 
1849. 

Notification of adherence: Netherlands, June 14, 
1977. 

Protocol to the international whaling convention of De- 
cember 2, 1946 (TIAS 1849). Done at Washington 
November 19, 1956. Entered into force May 4, 1959. 
TIAS 4228. 

Notification of adherence: Netherlands, June 14, 
1977. 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the world 
cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris 
November 23, 1972. Entered into force December 17, 
1975. TIAS 8226. 
Acceptance deposited: Mali, April 5, 1977. 



' Not in force. 



July 4, 1977 



39 



BILATERAL 

Bulgaria 

Agreement on exchanges and cooperation in cultural, 
scientific, educational, technological and other fields. 
Signed at Washington .June 13, 1977. Enters into 
force upon completion of an e.xchange of notes by 
means of which each party informs the other that the 
agreement has been approved by its competent au- 
thorities. 

Cape Verde 

Agreement relating to the transfer of food grain to 
Cape Verde. Signed May 21, 1977. Entered into force 
May 21, 1977. 

Ghana 

Agreement relating to the transfer of food to Ghana. 
Signed at Accra May 24, 1977. Entered into force 
May 24. 1977. 

Indonesia 

Agi-eement for sales of agricultural commodities, with 



agreed minutes. Signed at Jakarta May 17, 1977. En- 
tered into force May 17, 1977. 

Liberia 

Agreement amending and e.xtending the agreement of 
January 11. 1951, as amended and extended (TIAS 
2171, 3140, 3955, 4660, 4773, 5591, 6689), relating to a 
military mission. Effected by exchanges of notes at 
Monrovia May 2, 1975, February 2, 4, and 16, and 
March 10 and 17, 1977. Entered into force March 17, 
1977, effective January 11, 1975. 

Mexico 

Agreement relating to additional cooperative arrange- 
ments to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected 
by exchange of letters at Mexico May 27, 1977. 
Entered into force May 27, 1977. 



Thailand 

Economic and technical cooperation agreement, 
exchange of notes. Signed at Bangkok June 2, 
Entered into force June 2, 1977. 



with 
1977. 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 13-19 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of 
Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, 
D.C. 20520. 



No. 

*271 



Date 

6/13 



*272 6/13 



273 


6/13 


274 


6/13 


275 


6/13 


276 


6/13 


277 


6/13 


278 


6/14 


279 


6/14 


280 


6/18 


281 


6/15 



Subject 

U.S. and Bulgaria sign first agreement 
on cultural, educational, scientific, 
technological and other exchanges. 

Shipping Coordinating Committee 
(SCO, Subcommittee on Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group 
on radiocommunications, July 21. 

sec, SOLAS, working group on ship 
design and equipment, July 13. 

Arthur W. Hummel. Jr., sworn in as 
Ambassador to Pakistan (biographic 
data). 

Arthur A. Hartman sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to France (biographic data). 

Frederick Irving sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Jamaica (biographic data). 

Marvin Weissman sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Costa Rica (biographic data). 

Harry W. Shlaudeman sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Peru (biographic data). 

Ocean Affairs Advisory Committee, 
Kodiak, Alaska, July 6-7. 

Vance; interview by Marino di Medici of 
II Tempo. 

Herbert Salzman sworn in as U.S. Rep- 
resentative to the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment (biographic data). 



No. Date 



t282 6/15 



*283 
*284 



*292 

t293 



6/16 
6/16 



t285 6/16 



286 


6/17 


287 


6/17 


288 


6/17 


289 


6/17 


290 


6/17 



*291 6/18 



6/18 
6/19 



Subject 

Vance: first intervention before the OAS 
General Assembly, St. George's, Gre- 
nada, June 14. 

John C. West sworn in as Ambassador 
to Saudi Arabia (biographic data). 

George S. Vest sworn in as Assistant 
Secretary for European Affairs (bio- 
graphic data). 

Vance: statement on U.S. -Panama 
negotiations before the OAS General 
Assembly, St. George's, Grenada, 
June 15. 

Vance: news conference, St. George's, 
Grenada, June 16. 

Patricia Derian sworn in as Coordinator 
for Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs (biographic data). 

Donald C. Bergus sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Sudan (biographic data). 

Department transmits 1977 Salmon 
Commission regulations. 

Program for official visit to Washington 
of Prime Minister Fraser of Australia, 
June 21-23. 

Vance: remarks at a dinner honoring 
John F. Kennedy, Robert F. Ken- 
nedy, and Martin Luther King, Jr. 

Vance: Departure, Port of Spain, 
Trinidad and Tobago, June 17. 

Vance: interview on ABC's "Issues and 
Answers." 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX July i, 1977 Vol. LXXVII, No. 198U 



Africa. President Carter Discusses Cuba and 
SALT Negotiations (excerpts from remarks) . . 9 

American Principles. A Guiding Philosophy for 
American Informational and Cultural Pro- 
grams Abroad (Reinhardt) 5 

Arms Control and Disarmament 

President Carter Discusses Cuba and SALT 
Negotiations (excerpts from remarks) 9 

President Carter's News Conference of .June 13 
(excerpts) 1 

President Signs Latin America Nuclear Free 
Zone Treaty (Carter) 10 

Commodities. Department Testifies on Interna- 
tional Commodity Agreements (Katz) 19 

Congo. U.S. Reestablishes Relations With the 
Congo (Department announcement) 8 

Congress 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 27 

Department Discusses U.S. Efforts in Search for 
Middle East Peace (Atherton) 2.5 

Department Testifies on International Commod- 
ity Agreements (Katz) 19 

Cuba 

President Carter Discusses Cuba and SALT 
Negotiations (excerpts from remarks) 9 

President Carter's News Conference of June 13 
(excerpts) 1 

United States and Cuba Agree To Open Inter- 
ests Sections (Department announcement) 12 

Cultural Affairs. A Guiding Philosophy for 
American Informational and Cultural Pro- 
grams Abroad (Reinhardt) 5 

Department and Foreign Service 

United States and Cuba Agree To Open Inter- 
ests Sections (Department announcement) 12 

U.S. Reestablishes Relations With the Congo 
(Department announcement) 8 

Developing Countries 

President Carter's News Conference of June 13 
(excerpts) 1 

Toward International Equilibrium: A Strategy 
for the Longer Pull (Blumenthal) 13 

Economic Affairs 

Department Testifies on International Commod- 
ity Agreements (Katz) 19 

Toward International Equilibrium: A Strategy 
for the Longer Pull (Blumenthal) 13 

Human Rights 

President Carter Signs American Convention on 
Human Rights (Carter, text of convention) 28 



President Carter's News Conference of June 13 
(excerpts) 1 

Intelligence Operations. President Carter's 
News Conference of June 13 (excerpts) 1 

Japan. U.S. -Japan End Second Round of Nuclear 
Energy Talks (Department announcement) — 18 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

President Carter Signs American Convention on 
Human Rights (Carter, text of convention) 28 

President Signs Latin America Nuclear Free 
Zone Treaty (Carter) 10 

Mexico. U.S. and Mexico Complete Transfer of 
Territory (Department announcement) 10 

Middle East. Department Discusses U.S. Ef- 
forts in Search for Middle East Peace (Ather- 
ton) 25 

Nuclear Energy. U.S. -Japan End Second Round 
of Nuclear Energy Talks (Department an- 
nouncement) 18 

Presidential Documents 

President Carter Discusses Cuba and SALT 

Negotiations (excerpt.s from remarks) 9 

President Carter Signs American Convention on 

Human Rights 28 

President Carter's News Conference of June 13 

(excerpts) 1 

President Signs Latin America Nuclear Free 

Zone Treaty 10 

Public Affairs. A Guiding Philosophy for 
American Informational and Cultural Pro- 
giams Abroad (Reinhardt ) .5 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 39 

President Carter Signs American Convention on 

Human Rights (Carter, text of convention) 28 

President Signs Latin America Nuclear Free 

Zone Treaty (Carter) 10 

U.S. and Mexico Complete Transfer of Territory 

(Department announcement) 10 

U.S.S.R. 

President Carter Discusses Cuba and SALT 
Negotiations (excerpts from remarks) 9 

President Carter's News Conference of June 13 
(excerpts) 1 

Naine Inde.v 

Atherton, Alfred L., Jr 25 

Blumenthal, W. Michael 13 

Cartel-, President 1,9, 10, 28 

Katz, Julius L 19 

Reinhardt, John E 5 



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)77, 



/??S 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXVII • No. 1985 • July 11, 1977 



A FRAMEWORK FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE: 
SHAPING A MORE STABLE WORLD 
Address by Vice President Moridale J^l 

U.S. REITERATES SUPPORT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE 

OF NAMIBIA AND ZIMBABWE AT MAPUTO CONFERENCE 

Statements by Ambassador Young and Assistant Secretary Maynes, 

Text of Final Declaration and Program of Action 55 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $42.50. foreign $53.15 

Single copy 85 cents 

The Secretary of State has determined that the pub- 
lication of this periodical is necessary in the transac- 
tion of the public business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this periodi- 
cal has been approved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through January 31. 
1981. 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re- 
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The 
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 




Vol. LXXVII, No. 1985 
July 11, 1977 



The Department of State BiLLETI? 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested ayencies of the yovernment 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreiyn relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreiyn Service. 

The BL'LLETIS includes selected 
press releases on foreiyn policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, and 
news conferences of the President and 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as spe^ 
cial articles on various phases of inm 
ternational affairs and the functions oP 
the Department. Information is in- 
eluded concerniny treaties and inter- 
national ayreements to which the 
L'nited States is or may become a party 
and on treaties of yeneral interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department oi 
State, United Nations documents, an 
leyislative material in the field of 
international relations ate also listed. 



A Framework for Middle East Peace: Shaping A More Stable World 



Address by Vice President Mondale 



In the last several months, I've undertaken 
two extended foreign trips on behalf of the 
President to Europe and Japan. The more I 
travel, and the more nations I visit, the more 
1 come to believe that the peoples of the world 
are not really so different — that all of us 
dream the same dreams for our children and 
that the real key to peace and cooperation in 
the world lies in better understanding be- 
tween people. Diplomats and heads of state 
and elected officials must play a role, but we 
should never underestimate the power of 
ideas and education and greater understand- 
ing to break down the barriers of suspicion 
and fear that too often separate the nations of 
the world. 

Your programs in the school system, on 
television, the lectures and seminars you 
hold, your model U.N. conference for stu- 
dents are all an impoilant part of that effort. 
And I'm particularly pleased to see that 
you're joining together with a number of 
groups involved in international relations in a 
new World Affairs Center here in San Fran- 
cisco, and I wish you every success in that 
venture. And so the contributions of an or- 
ganization such as yours toward increased un- 
derstanding in the world are really crucial, 
not only to the foreign policy efforts of this 
nation but to the search for peace. 

With the words of his Inaugural Address, 
President Carter identified at the very outset 
of his Administration the guiding spirit of this 
nation's foreign policy: 

< )ur nation can be strong abroad only if it is strong at 
hiime, and we know that the best way to enhance free- 
ilom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our 
ilcmocratic system is worthy of emulation. To be true to 
ourselves, we must be true to others. 



And he elaborated on the basic premises of 
our relations with other nations in his speech 
at Notre Dame this May: 

— Our policy must be rooted in our people's 
basic commitment to human rights. 

— Our policy must be based on close cooper- 
ation with the Western industrial democra- 
cies. With them we share basic values; with 
them also we share a recognition that global 
problems cannot be solved without close coop- 
eration among us. This was the message the 
President had me take to Europe and Japan in 
the first week of the Administration, and this 
was the spirit which guided the President and 
his colleagues at the London summit last 
month. 

— Our policy must seek to improve relations 
with the Soviet Union and China. It must do 
so in a balanced and reciprocal way, while we 
maintain a strong defense. 

— Our policy must recognize that the cleav- 
age between North and South is as important 
as between East and West. We must reach 
out to the world's developing nations, seeking 
to narrow the gap between rich and poor. 

— Finally, our policy must provide incen- 
tives for all nations to rise above ideology or 
narrow conceptions of self-interest and work 
together to resolve regional conflicts and to 
meet global problems that confront all people. 

As an Administration, we are only five 
months old. However, these months have 
been a period of intense activity. We are 
committed to shaping effective policies that 



' Made before the World Affairs Council of Northern 
California at San Francisco on June 17, 1977. 



July 11, 1977 



41 



truly reflect America's values and objectives, 
and we are committed to implementing 
policies with other nations so as to shape a 
more peaceful and stable world. 

One of our first tasks has been to insure 
that our foreign policy reflects the commit- 
ment to basic human rights that we, as 
Americans, share. That commitment to the 
inherent dignity of the individual is at the 
heart of the American tradition. From it flows 
the democratic liberties that we cherish — such 
as the right to worship freely; freedom of 
speech, of the press, of assembly, and due 
process of law. Those are the basic strengths 
of our nation. 

We have survived as a free nation because 
we have remained committed to the defense of 
fundamental moral values we cherish as a 
people. And unless our foreign policy reflects 
those values it will not earn the support of the 
American people. Without that support, no 
foreign policy — no matter how brilliantly 
conceived — can succeed. 

I believe we have restored that commit- 
ment to human rights. I am proud that the 
United States today stands among those who 
uphold human rights and human dignity in the 
world. I am proud that no foreign leader 
today has any doubt that the United States 
condemns torture, political imprisonment, and 
repression by any government, anywhere in 
the world. We believe that basic human rights 
transcend ideology. We believe all nations, 
regardless of political systems, must respect 
those rights. 

Just as respect for human rights is central 
to our foreign policy values, so progress to- 
ward a just and lasting Middle East settle- 
ment is essential to the prospect of a more 
peaceful world. The President has asked me 
to describe what we are trying to do to 
achieve peace in the Middle East. We want 
the American people to have the fullest possi- 
ble understanding of our approach, for your 
support is crucial to its success. 

President Carter has now met with the 
leaders of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi 
Arabia. The President met with Prime Minis- 
ter Rabin of Israel, and we hope that we will 
soon meet with the new Prime Minister. 

With the exception of the meeting with 



^ 



President Asad which was held in Geneva, I 
have participated in all of them and havei 
sensed these leaders' great desire for peace 
and their longing for the benefits that peace 
can bring to nations too long mobilized for 
war. Yet at the same time, we also found deep 
fears and suspicions which must be overcome 
if peace is to be achieved in that strategic and 
troubled region of the world. 

A genuine and lasting peace in the Middle 
East is of essential interest to all Americans. 
Conflict there carries the threat of a global 
confrontation and runs the risk of nuclear 
war. As we have seen, war in the Middle East 
has profound economic consequences. It can, 
and has, damaged the economies of the entire 
world. It has been a tragedy for the nations of 
the region. Even short of war, continued con- 
frontation encourages radicalization and in- 
stability. 

Genuine peace is needed by all parties to 
the conflict. The Arab nations need peace. 
Israel, above all, has a profound interest in 
peace; there is no question about that. 

Israel's Survival 

For almost three decades, Israel has borne 
the burden of constant war. More than half 
its entire budget is dedicated to defense. Its 
citizens bear the highest average tax burden 
in the world — more than 60 percent of their 
income goes for taxes. 

And yet, at the same time, this valiant na- 
tion has managed to create a miracle in the 
desert. With ingenuity, hard work, and skill it 
has created a land that could be a model for 
economic development and for political liberty 
to be emulated throughout the Middle East. 
Democracy has thrived in Israel despite the 
kind of adversity that has crushed freedom in 
other lands. 

And yet, what of the future? Is it a future 
in which Israel's three million people try, by 
force of arms alone, to hold out against the 
hostility and growing power of the Arab 
world? Or can a process of reconciliation be 
started — a process in which peace protects Is- 
rael's security, a peace in which the urge for 
revenge and recrimination is replaced by 
mutual recognition and respect? 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



clei 



America has a special responsibility and a 
;pecial opportunity to help bring about this 
dnd of peace. This comes about first of all be- 
•ause of our unique and profound relationship 
vith the State of Israel since its creation more 
han a generation ago. Our sense of shared 
.alues and purposes means that, for Ameri- 
•ans, the question of Israel's survival is not a 
jolitical question but rather stands as a moral 
ijmperative of our foreign policy. 

(ey Elements for an Agreement 

And yet, our special relationship with Israel 
™ has not been directed against any other coun- 
try. We have been able to enjoy the friendship 
af much of the Arab world, where we and our 
close allies have important interests. 

It is precisely because of our close ties with 
both Israel and her Arab neighbors that we 
are uniquely placed to promote the search for 
St peace, to work for an improved understanding 
of each side's legitimate concerns, and to help 
them work out what we hope will be a basis 
for negotiation leading to a final peace in the 
Middle East. 

When this Administration entered office on 
January 20, we found that the situation in the 
Middle East called for a new approach. The 
step-by-step diplomacy of our predecessors 
had defused the immediate tensions produced 
by the war in 1973. But it was also evident 
that it would be increasingly difficult to 
achieve small diplomatic concessions when the 
ultimate shape of a peace agreement remained 
obscure. At the same time, it was unlikely 
that an agreement on a lasting peace could be 
achieved at one stroke. 

U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, 
which is supported by all the parties, provides 
a basis for the negotiations which are required 
if there is to be a settlement. But Resolution 
242 does not by itself provide all that is re- 
quired. We, therefore, decided to work with 
the parties concerned to outline the overall 
framework for an enduring peace. Our con- 
cept was to use this framework as the basis 
for a phased negotiation and implementation 
of specific steps toward peace. 

A major impediment to this approach lay in 
the fact that the positions of all sides were 
frozen. The words and phrases used by the 



)nii 
U 



parties had become encrusted with the fallout 
of countless diplomatic battles. 

We have tried to regain momentum in this 
process. We have encouraged Arabs and Is- 
raelis to begin thinking again seriously about 
the elements of peace and not to remain com- 
mitted to particular words and formulations. 

To this end the President has tried to de- 
scribe our understanding of what the key ele- 
ments of an overall framework for an agree- 
ment might be: 

— A commitment to a genuine and lasting 
peace demonstrated by concrete acts to nor- 
malize relations among the countries of the 
area; 

— The establishment of borders for Israel 
which are recognized by all and which can be 
kept secure; 

— A fair solution to the problem of the 
Palestinians. 

The President has set forth these elements 
not to dictate a peace or to impose our views 
but to stimulate fresh thought. 

Relations Among Middle East Countries 

President Carter has gone further than any 
of his predecessors to stress with Ai-ab lead- 
ers the essential point that peace must mean 
more than merely an end to hostilities, stating 
as he did in Clinton, Massachusetts, last 
March: 

. . . the first prerequisite of a lasting peace is the 
recognition of Israel by her neighbors, Israel's right to 
exist, Israel's right to exist permanently, Israel's right 
to exist in peace. That means that over a period of 
months or years that the borders between Israel and 
Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, Israel 
and Egypt must be opened up to travel, to tourism, to 
cultural exchange, to trade, so that no matter who the 
leaders might be in those countries, the people them- 
selves will have formed a mutual understanding and 
comprehension and a sense of a common purpose to 
avoid the repetitious wars and death that have afflicted 
that region so long. That's the first prerequisite of 
peace. 

We have found that the Arab leaders did 
not insist that this kind of peace is something 
that only future generations could consider. 
Some leaders — such as King Hussein [of 
Jordan] during his visit to Washington — have 
made clear their commitment to a "just, a 
lasting peace, one which would enable all the 



July n, 1977 



43 



people in [the Middle East] to divert their 
energies and resources to build and attain a 
brighter future. . . ." ^ 

So we believe that we have made some 
progress in getting Arab leaders to recognize 
Israel's right to exist and to recognize — 
however reluctantly — that this commitment is 
essential to a genuine peace; that peace must 
be structured in such a way that it can survive 
even if some leaders were to nurture aims to 
destroy Israel. Still, we have a long way to 
go. The Arabs have been insistent that Israel 
withdraw from the territories it occupied in 
the 1967 war. We have made clear our view 
that Israel should not be asked to withdraw 
unless it can secure, in return, real peace 
from its neighbors. 

Borders and Security Arrangements 

The question of withdrawal is, in essence, 
the question of borders. For peace to be en- 
during, borders must be inviolable. Nations 
must feel secure behind their borders. Bor- 
ders must be recognized by all. 

A crucial dilemma has been how to provide 
borders that are both secure and acceptable to 
all. It is understandable that Israel, having 
fought a war in every decade since its birth, 
wants borders that can be defended as easily 
as possible. But no borders will be secure if 
neighboring countries do not accept them. 

The problem is that borders that might af- 
ford Israel the maximum security in military 
terms would not be accepted as legitimate by 
Israel's neighbors. Borders that Israel's 
neighbors would recognize, Israel has not 
been willing to accept as forming an adequate 
line of defense. 

For this reason, the President has tried to 
separate the two issues. On the one hand, 
there must be recognized borders. But, in ad- 
dition, there could be separate lines of de- 
fense or other measures that could enhance 
Israel's security. The arrangements in the 
Sinai and in the Golan Heights provide models 
of how Israel's security might be enhanced 
until confidence in a lasting peace can be fully 
developed. 



^ For the full text of an exchange of toasts between 
Pre.sident Carter and King Hussein on Apr. 25, see 
Bulletin of May 23, 1977, p. 520. 



44 



We would urge all the parties to think 
realistically about security arrangements to 
reduce the fear of surprise attack, to make 
acts of aggression difficult if not impossible, 
and to limit the military forces that would 
confront one another in sensitive areas. 

This approach recognizes the fact that there 
is a profound asymmetry in what the two 
sides in the Middle East are seeking. On the 
one hand, a principal Arab concern is to re- 
gain lost territory. On the other, Israel 
wishes peace and recognition. Territory is-j 
tangible and once ceded difficult to regain 
short of war. Peace, on the other hand, can be 
ephemeral. Peaceful intentions can change 
overnight unless a solid foundation of cooper- 
ation and a firm pattern of reinforcing rela- 
tionships can be established to insure that all 
have a stake in continuing tranquillity. 

We believe that separating the imperatives 
of security from the requirement of recog- 
nized borders is an important advance toward 
reconciling the differences between the two 
sides. It is in this way that Israel could return 
to approximately the borders that existed 
prior to the war of 1967, albeit with minor 
modifications as negotiated among the par- 
ties, and yet retain security lines or other ar- 
rangements that would insure Israel's safety 
as full confidence developed in a comprehen- 
sive peace. Thus, with borders explicitly rec- 
ognized and buttressed by security measures 
and with the process of peace unfolding, Is- 
rael's security would be greater than it is to- 
day. 

Future of the Palestinians 

A further major issue is that of the future oil 
the Palestinian people. It has been the source? 
of continuing tragedy in the Middle East 
There are two prerequisites for a lasting 
peace in this regard. 

— First, there mu.st be a demonstrated will-! 
ingness on the part of the Palestinians to livei 
in peace alongside Israel. 

— Second, the Palestinians must be given i 
stake in peace so that they will turn awaj 
from the violence of the past and toward a fu- 
ture in which they can express their legiti 
mate political aspirations peacefully. , 

Thus, if the Palestinians are willing to exisi 



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ill peace and are prepared to demonstrate that 
willingness by recognizing Israel's right to 
exist in peace, the President has made clear 
that, in the context of a peace settlement, we 
believe the Palestinians should be given a 
chance to shed their status as homeless refu- 
gees and to partake fully of the benefits of 
peace in the Middle East, including the possi- 
bility of some arrangement for a Palestinian 
homeland or entity— preferably in association 
with Jordan. 

How this would be accomplished and the 
exact character of such an entity is, of course, 
something that would have to be decided by 
the parties themselves in the course of 
negotiation. However, the President has 
suggested that the viability of this concept 
and the security of the region might be en- 
hanced if this involved an association with 
.Jordan. But I emphasize that the specifics are 
for the parties themselves to decide. 

Necessity of Negotiating 

This leads me to a further crucial aspect of 
our approach — the necessity of direct negotia- 
tions among the parties concerned. We cannot 
conceive of genuine peace existing between 
countries who will not talk to one another. If 
they are prepared for peace, the first proof is 
a willingness to negotiate their differences. 

This is why we believe it is so important to 
proceed with the holding of a Geneva confer- 
ence this year. That conference provides the 
forum for these nations to begin the working 
|out of these problems together directly, face- 
to-face. We have a continuing objective to 
convene such a conference before the end of 
this year. 

Underlying this entire effort to promote the 
process of negotiation is our determination to 
maintain the military security of Israel. There 
must be no question in anyone's mind that the 
United States will do what is necessary to in- 
sure the adequacy of Israel's military posture 
and its capacity for self-defense. 

We recognize that America has a special re- 
sponsibility in this regai'd. In fact, in promul- 
gating our overall policy to curb the interna- 
tional traffic in arms, the President specif- 
I ically directed the gover ment that we will 
honor our historic responsibilities to assure 



the security of the State of Israel. Let there 
be no doubt about this commitment by this 
Administration. 

We do not intend to use our military aid as 
pressure on Israel. If we have differences 
over military aid — and we may have some — it 
will be on military grounds or economic 
grounds but not political grounds. If we have 
differences over diplomatic strategy — and 
that could happen — we will work this out on a 
political level. We will not alter our commit- 
ment to Israel's military security. 

Let me conclude by saying that we hope the 
concepts I have been discussing there 
today — concepts which the President has ad- 
vanced at talks with Israeli and Arab 
leaders — will stimulate them to develop ideas 
of their own. We realize that peace cannot be 
imposed from the outside, and we do not in- 
tend to present the parties with a plan or a 
timetable or a map. Peace can only come from 
a genuine recognition by all parties that their 
interests are served by reconciliation and not 
by war, by faith in the future rather than bit- 
terness over the past. 

America can try to help establish the basis 
of trust necessary for peace. We can try to 
improve the atmosphere for communication. 
We can offer ideas, but we cannot, in the end, 
determine whether peace or war is the fate of 
the Middle East. That can only be decided by 
Israel and her Arab neighbors. 

We believe that both sides want peace. As 
the President has said [at Notre Dame on 
May 22]: 

This may be the most propitious time for a genuine 
settlement since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli con- 
flict almost 30 years ago. To let this opportunity pass 
could mean disaster, not only for the Middle East, but 
perhaps for the international political and economic 
order as well. 

As we go forward in our mediating role, we 
will have to expect from time to time to have 
differences with both sides. But these will be 
differences as to tactics. Our overall objec- 
tives will be those that we believe are now 
shared by all sides: A permanent and endur- 
ing peace in the Middle East. 

This is obviously a difficult task and there is 
always the possibility of failure. But it is a 
historic responsibility that requires the fullest 
possible support of the American people. 



July 11, 1977 



45 



I believe we have this support. And as we 
go through the difficult days ahead, this sup- 
port will sustain us. It will provide the 
strength we need to encourage all parties to 
put aside their fears and put trust in their 
hopes for a genuine and lasting Middle East 
peace. 

John Kennedy once described the formula 
for peace not only in the Middle East but 
throughout the world, and I would like to 
close with his words [at the U.N. on Sept. 
25, 1961]: 

If we all can persevei'e — if we can in every land and 
office look beyond our own shores and ambitions — then 
surely the age will dawn in which the strong are just 
and the weak secure and the peace preseived. 



Magazine Publishers Association 
Interviews President Carter 

Following is an excerpt relating to foreign 
policy from President Carter's opening re- 
marks and a question and answer from the 
transcript of an interview by members of the 
Magazine Publishers Association on June 
10. 1 



In foreign affairs, we've also been quite ag- 
gressive, I think, so far. We are trying to 
wi'estle with the basic questions of southern 
Africa in a deeply involved fashion, working 
with the British and others. I have met with 
all the leaders in the Middle East. We've 
taken an innovative stand on nonproliferation 
of nuclear explosive capability. 

We've had, I think, so far, a very successful 
effort to arouse the consciousness of the world 
about basic human rights and human free- 
doms. I don't think there is a foreign leader in 
the world who doesn't have in the forefront of 
his consciousness or her consciousness now, 
the basic question of what are we doing in our 
country about human rights. And this has 
been a very gratifying thing to us so far. 

We are dealing with the question of nor- 
malizing relationships with countries who 



' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated June 20, 1977, p. 
86.5. 



46 



have been our adversaries or even enemies ini 
the past. This is one that is fraught with) 
grave political consequences if they are noti 
handled in a sensitive fashion. My own incli- 
nation, though, is to aggressively challenge, 
in a peaceful way of course, the Soviet Union; 
and others for influence in areas of the world! 
that we feel are crucial to us now or poten- 
tially crucial 15 or 20 years from now. And 
this includes places like Vietnam and places 
like Iraq and Somaha and Algeria and places 
like the People's Republic of China and even 
Cuba. I don't have any hesitancy about these 
matters. 

The other thing I would like to mention 
briefly is that we've, I think, formed a much 
tighter alliance of consultation and mutual 
purpose with our friends in the Western de- 
mocracies. I have the utmost confidence that 
their democratic systems can prevail. 

I think this is somewhat of a change, maybe 
from some of the attitudes of our leaders that, 
have preceded me. But I think in the longi 
run, we have the advantage on our side be- 
cause there is an innate hunger among the 
human beings who inhabit this Earth for a-i 
right to make their own decisions, not to be 
abused by government, to be free to develop 
as they choose, to be treated fairly. And I 
think in this way, our system of government 
can be exemplary to others. I think this is 
something that is now being more clearly 
seen. 

And I feel — like in the competitive world of, 
say, among the African nations or in Asia or 
in Latin America — that we ought not to be 
timid in putting our best foot forward and< 
that we ought to be sure that our own system) 
here is clean and decent and honest and open 
and that there is a general sense among the 
world's people that when I speak I don't speako 
as an isolated voice; that as best I can, my 
Cabinet understands and supports what I say, 
that the Congress understands and supports* 
what I say, and as best I can, again, that the 
American people understand and support 
what I say. 

We've been criticized to some degree by in- 
jecting some of the controversial issues into 
the public domain for debate. Obviously, one 
of them is concerning the Middle East and 

Department of State Bulletin 



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another one is nonproliferation, where we 
have aroused the displeasure of Germany and 
France and Paliistan and Brazil. The other 
one is human rights. But I think that if we 
stand for something we ought to be forceful 
about it. And we might win some and lose 
some in relationships with other countries, 
but in general, though, I've been pleased. 

Q. Mr. President, my name is Harry 
Thompson [U.S. vice president of To the 
Point International magazine]. I wonder 
whether you could articulate for us the U.S. 
policy toward Africa, both black and south- 
em, and who really speaks out — Vice Presi- 
dent Mondale, Secretary Vance, or Ambas- 
sador Young? 

The President: I will try. In the southern 
part of Africa we have three basic simultane- 
ous problems. One is to deal with the question 
in Rhodesia, or Zimbabwe. 

We are working closely with the British, 
who just finished a circle of bilateral discus- 
sions with the so-called frontline nations — the 
leading black nations around Rhodesia — and 
with Ian Smith [of Rhodesia] and with Vors- 
ter [Prime Minister John Vorster, of South 
Africa]. We will now have our negotiators 
come back to this country to explain to me and 
Secretary Vance, the Vice President, Andrew 
Young, what the results of those discussions 
were. 

One of the hopes is we might evolve, 
primarily with the British in the leadership 
role, a constitution that would be acceptable 
to the black and white future citizens of 
Rhodesia who have not been discouraged. I 
cannot tell you that we anticipate any easy 
resolution. 

The second question, of course, is how to 
deal with what was formerly known as South 
West Africa, now known as Namibia. This is a 
nation that is, to a great degree, under the 
purview or control of the United Nations as 
far as legahties go. 

The South Africans have not been willing to 
relinquish their tight control over the future 
of Namibia. And we have tried to induce Mr. 
Vorster to join with us in establishing an 
interim government that is broadly represen- 
tative, to lead to democratic elections for a 



permanent, independent governing structure 
for Namibia. 

As you know, he had put his eggs in what 
you might call a Turnhalle basket. A Turn- 
halle is a school gymnasium. That is a kind of 
a hand-selected group by Vorster to deal with 
the future of Namibia. This has not been ac- 
ceptable to the rest of the countries in South 
Africa, nor to the U.N. members, including 
ourselves. 

Under Andy Young's leadership, we've 
joined with Canada, England, France, and 
Germany and have now concluded two de- 
tailed importunities or requests or discussions 
with Vorster, asking him to resolve the 
Namibian question without delay. 

The other question, obviously, is related to 
some degree; and that is, the future attitudes 
of South Africa itself. We don't feel an inclina- 
tion to intrude into their internal policies, but 
we ai'e committed as a nation to having equal- 
ity of treatment of citizens. 

As you know. South Africa is in very bad 
repute in many regions of the world. We are 
not trying to overthrow their government, 
but we do feel that there ought to be some 
equality of hiring practices, equality of pay 
for the same kind of work done, promotion 
opportunities for black citizens — which is not 
there — an end to the highly disci'iminatory 
past system that exists in Africa. 

These are the kind of things that the South 
went through 15, 20, 25 years ago, and just 
some demonstration of good faith on the part 
of the South African officials is what we would 
like to see. 

We are not in the position to make them do 
this. But we've been trying to let South Af- 
rica know that we are not abusive, that we 
recognize their value as a stabilizing influence 
in the southern part of Africa to the extent 
that they work with us and resolve these 
other questions. 

There is actually no disparity of opinion or 
responsibility among myself, Cyrus Vance, 
the Vice President, or Andy Young. We com- 
municate freely. We have open and unre- 
stricted debates with one another. When 
Andy Young goes to South Africa or to any of 
the other many countries that he can now 
go — which Kissinger could not go into — and 



July 11, 1977 



47 



when he speaks for our country, he speaks 
with my full authority and my complete sup- 
port. 

I had a meeting with Andy this past week 
to point that out to him. I think that one of 
the things that Andy presented to me, which I 
did agree, is that there has been too much of a 
concentration of attention on his interest in 
Africa; that this needs to be spread more 
widely to the Caribbean, for instance, to the 
developing countries in South and Central 
America, to perhaps some of the Asian coun- 
tries. And I have approved that change in his 
emphasis. 

And the other thing is it is very hard on our 
country and on Andy, in particular, for him to 
spend 17 days on a broad-scale, very success- 
ful trip — and I think in some instances very 
courageous trip through Africa — and then on 
the way back home to make a statement about 
the Swedish Government being racist and 
having that being the focal point of what he is 



about and what he is. It was unfortunate. - 
And he recognizes the fact that it did de- 
tract from the effectiveness of his past and fu- 
ture service. But there is no incompatibility 
among us. I would have no reason to mislead 
you about that. We are completely compatible 
in our hopes. 

The other pait of Africa that we are quite 
concerned about that you did mention is in the 
Horn of Africa with Somalia and Afars and Is- 
sas, Ethiopia, Sudan, and to some degree 
Ethiopia on the southern part of the Red Sea 
and, of course, the Arab countries to the 
north. But we are working very closely there 
with the Saudi Arabians in particular, trying 
to cement relationships with South Yemen, 
and trying to improve relationships with 
Somalia, trying to understand the conflict 
within Ethiopia concerning the Eritreans. 
That is where the potential troublespot is in 
Africa. 



THE CONGRESS 



iifaii 



Withdrawal of U.S. Ground Forces From South Korea 



State7nent by Philip C. Habib 

Under Secretary for Political Affairs * 



General Brown [Gen. George S. Brown, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] and I 
appreciate the opportunity to appear before 
the committee to discuss plans for withdraw- 
ing U.S. ground forces from Korea. 



' Made before the Subcommittees on International 
Security and Scientific Affairs and Asian and Pacific 
Affairs of the House Committee on International Rela- 
tions on June 10, 1977. The complete transciipt of the 
hearings will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402. 



As you know, the President has decided to 
withdraw U.S. ground forces from the Re- 
public of Korea over a 4-5-year period in a 
manner which would not endanger the secu- 
rity of the Republic of Korea. This decision 
reflects our determination after careful 
study that, because of a combination of fac- 
tors, we should now move to a careful, 
phased removal of our ground forces in a 
manner which assures continued peace and 
stability in northeast Asia. 

The world today is a far different one 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



from the 1950's, particularly in East Asia. 
The pattern of great-power interests in the 
area has dramatically changed. The broader 
pattern of relationships between the great 
powers is such that we believe that it is not 
j in the interest of either the People's Repub- 
' lie of China or the Soviet Union to encour- 
age or support actions which would raise the 
risk of war on the Korean Peninsula. Fur- 
ther, the Republic of Korea today is 
stronger, both economically and militarily, 
and is both able and willing to bear increas- 
ingly the burdens of its own defense. Given 
these considerations we believe that the 
time has come to move in a measured fash- 
ion to begin the withdrawal of our ground 
combat forces over the next 4-5 years. 

The ground force withdrawal is a natural, 
proper development in our ongoing security 
relationship with the Republic of Korea. 
Both we and the Republic of Korea have un- 
derstood that the presence of U.S. ground 
forces in Korea was related directly to our 
assessment of the military balance. Republic 
of Korea capabilities, and the international 
situation. There had been no intention to 
keep our ground forces indefinitely in 
Korea. As you know the executive branch 
and Congress have had the question of 
ground force withdrawal under continuing 
study over the past yeai's. 

At this point, just as we moved to with- 
draw a division in 1971 when the Koreans 
were able to undertake a greater burden of 
their defense, so we believe that in the 
period we projected we should move to the 
further withdrawal of U.S. ground forces. 

In arriving at our determination that the 
ground forces should be withdrawn, we have 
carefully weighed the military and interna- 
tional considerations involved. General 
Brown can address in more detail your ques- 
tions on the military aspects of this decision. 
However, I would note that the basic ele- 
ments that have gone into our determination 
with regard to the ground forces withdrawal 
were: 

(a) Our recognition of Korea's impressive 
economic growth over the past decade and 
the consequent growing capability of the 
Republic of Korea to defend itself; 



(b) Our firm intention to maintain our 
basic security commitment to the Republic 
of Korea contained in the Mutual Defense 
Treaty, as well as to keep a significant U.S. 
force presence in Korea — consisting mainly 
of air and key support units — after the 
ground force withdrawal is completed. Addi- 
tionally, our naval units will remain in the 
area. We believe these forces, coupled with 
the major U.S. forces remaining in the 
western Pacific, provide a clear, visible U.S. 
deterrent to any possible North Korean mis- 
calculation; 

(c) Our readiness, subject to congressional 
consultations and approval, to take appro- 
priate actions to assure that the ground 
force withdrawal does not weaken Republic 
of Korea defense capabilities; and 

(d) Our assessment of the broader interna- 
tional context in which we operate, particu- 
larly the pattern of interrelationships be- 
tween the great powers in the area. 

With regard to the 2nd Infantry Division, 
it is our view it could be relocated to the 
United States and matched against other un- 
fulfilled requirements which will provide 
greater and much needed flexibility in meet- 
ing U.S. worldwide contingency require- 
ments. 

In connection with the ground forces 
withdrawal decision, the President wished 
to consult with the Government of the Re- 
public of Korea and the Government of 
Japan on the ground force withdrawal in 
order to secure their views. The President 
accordingly dispatched General Brown and 
me to meet with President Park and Prime 
Minister Fukuda, as well as senior members 
of their governments. Our discussions in 
Seoul and Tokyo were comprehensive, 
friendly, and constructive. 

In our consultations in Seoul, President 
Park and other senior Korean officials made 
clear that they would have preferred that 
our ground force presence remain. At the 
same time they have accepted the essentials 
of our projected force withdrawal and have 
indicated their own confidence in meeting 
the North Korean threat; provided, how- 
ever, that adequate measures are taken in 
parallel to substitute for the military fight- 



July 11,1 977 



49 



ing power being withdrawn. Further, the 
Korean Government made clear its view 
that any program to provide equipment to 
offset the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces 
should be completed before the final phase 
of ground force withdrawal is completed. 

In Tokyo, the Japanese Government con- 
veyed its concern that the ground force 
withdrawal be carried out in an appropriate 
manner which would not endanger the secu- 
rity of the Republic of Korea nor threaten 
the security of northeast Asia. The Japanese 
Government believes that the key element 
in achieving these objectives is the clear 
reiteration of the U.S. security commitment 
to the Republic of Korea so that there can 
be no misunderstanding of our purpose and 
determination. It also believes that 
adequate measures should be taken to pro- 
vide sufficient equipment to the Republic of 
Korea to meet any shortfalls caused by the 
withdrawal of our ground forces. 

In our discussions in Seoul and Tokyo, 
General Brown and I were careful to point 
out that we were beginning a process of 
consultations and that we were authorized 
neither to enter into detailed negotiations 
nor enter into any commitments. We were 
also careful to stress the role of Congress 
and our intention to consult fully with Con- 
gress before proceeding to any detailed dis- 
cussions or negotiations on the ground force 
withdrawal. This was fully understood. 
There was a clear appreciation on the part 
of both the Korean and Japanese Govern- 
ments for the President's initiative in pro- 
viding this opportunity for initial consulta- 
tions on the ground force withdrawal. At the 
same time, we were asked to convey the 
specific concerns of both governments, par- 
ticularly regarding the need for adequate 
concrete measures to assure that the secu- 
rity of the Republic of Korea is not en- 
dangered. 

In sum, I would state that our consulta- 
tions were successful in explaining to the 
Korean and Japanese Governments the Pres- 
ident's basic decision and in affording them a 
full opportunity to express their views, 
which we are now weighing carefully. As a 
result of these consultations we believe 



there is understanding and acceptance of a 
carefully planned, staged withdrawal pro- 
gram coupled with provision of needed 
equipment to offset the fighting power of 
the ground forces withdrawn. Both govern- 
ments also understand better our determi- 
nation to maintain our Mutual Defense Trea- 
ty commitment and to manage the ground 
force withdrawal in a manner which neither 
endangers the security of the Republic of 
Korea nor the basic military balance in 
northeast Asia. 

For our part we welcome this opportunity 
to appear before your committee to discuss 
both our recent consultations in Korea and 
Japan and the various political and military 
aspects of our ground forces withdrawal 
program. In addition to these appearances, 
we will be in continuing contact with the ap- 
propriate congressional committees and con- 
gressional leadership to be sure that you are 
fully aware of our thinking and planning as 
we proceed. As this evolves over the next 
months, I can assure you that we will be 
fully mindful of the crucial importance of 
congressional understanding and support. 



Human Rights Situation 
in the Republic of China 

Following is a statement by Burton Levin, 
Director of the Office of Republic of China 
Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Interna- 
tional Organizations of the House Committee 
on International Relations on June H. * 

I have been asked to appear before you 
today to discuss the human rights situation in 
the Republic of China. Before doing so, I 
would like to make clear that I personally 
welcome President Carter's emphasis on 
human rights as an essential component of 
American foreign policy. 

In addition to promoting human rights, our 
interests on Taiwan include preserving peace, 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



sustaining a mutually beneficial economic re- 
lationship, discouraging nuclear proliferation, 
and conducting our relations in ways that are 
consistent with our objective of normalizing 
relations with the People's Republic of China. 
There is a complex and not always supportive 
interaction between these interests which 
makes it difficult to focus on one of them. 
Nevertheless, I shall do my best to describe 
in perspective the human rights situation on 
Taiwan. 

Before getting into specifics, I'd like to take 
a few minutes to examine the historical back- 
ground. 

For 20 centuries, China was guided by the 
Confucian concept that it was the individual's 
duty to be loyal and obedient to the state. 
Repression was a sanctioned means for deal- 
ing with opposition to Confucian orthodoxy as 
defined by the rulers of the day. Law, to the 
extent it played any role in government, fo- 
cused on preserving social order rather than 
on protecting the individual. Moreover, the 
law was meted out by officials who combined 
both executive and judicial powers. Western 
concepts of government and individual rights 
were not introduced into China until the late 
19th century and did not flourish in the wars 
and internal disunity of the first half of the 
20th century. 

At the conclusion of World War II, an eco- 
nomically prostrate Taiwan was placed under 
the control of a China itself wearied by war 
and beset by growing civil conflict. The harsh 
and arbitrary rule of the island's military gov- 
ernment led to the bloodily repressed 
Taiwanese uprising of 1947. 

Following its defeat on the mainland and re- 
treat to Taiwan in 1949, the Republic of China 
remained preoccupied with Communist sub- 
version. Into the early 1950's, there was an 
atmosphere of fear and repression on Taiwan 
with many trappings of a police state. 

In the intervening quarter century, Taiwan 
has evolved toward a more open society. The 
police state atmosphere no longer exists, and 
the average Chinese goes about his daily life 
without fear or repression. Friction between 
Taiwanese and Mainlanders has eased dramat- 
ically. For the first time in China, elected 
local government has been instituted and 



taken reasonably firm root. Western legal 
forms, based on continental European models, 
have been strengthened. 

Factors For and Against Change 

What brought about this change? Most im- 
portantly, uninterrupted peace, stability, 
and economic development. 

Over the past 20 years, per capita income 
has grown from $71 to $809. Income is fairly 
well distributed, and the gap between rich 
and poor is narrowing. Nearly universal li- 
teracy and equal educational opportunities 
have exposed the whole population to a com- 
mon modernizing influence. In 1952, 140,000 
students were in secondary schools; by 1975 
this had grown to 1.5 million. 

These social and economic advances have 
significantly reduced Taiwanese dissatisfac- 
tion and given the people a stake in their gov- 
ernment. In turn the government feels less 
apprehensive about the loyalty of its people. 

These domestic trends have been 
supplemented by vastly increased contact 
with the outside world. For the past decade, 
Taiwan's economy has been dominated by the 
foreign trade sector. The practices and expo- 
sure that accompany this trade have pro- 
foundly influenced Taiwan's economic, social, 
and political life. At the same time, a signifi- 
cant number of Taiwan's elite have been edu- 
cated in the West, primarily the United 
States. Through them, Western political and 
social values have increasingly affected public 
attitudes and government policy. 

Despite these factors, there are several 
reasons why there has not been greater prog- 
ress. 

First and foremost, despite Western fea- 
tures, Taiwan remains a Chinese society. A 
2,000-year-old political tradition continues to 
bear heavily on the current scene. Taiwan's 
political dynamics reflect the highly cen- 
tralized and personalized Chinese leadership 
pattern. In making its own compromises be- 
tween social order and individual rights, 
Taiwan predictably continues to give prefer- 
ence to the traditional emphasis on social 
order and harmony. Not surprisingly, its eco- 
nomic and social record is better than its rec- 



July 11, 1977 



51 



ord on civil and political rights, as we define 
them. 

Secondly, despite the absence of significant 
fighting since the second Taiwan Strait crisis 
in 1958, the Republic of China considers itself 
in a continuing civil war with the People's Re- 
public of China. As an island pitted against a 
continent, the Republic of China believes the 
situation warrants emergency governmental 
measures, which unfortunately result in lim- 
itations on human rights. 

Finally, some opponents of the present gov- 
ernment practice violence. Last fall, a parcel 
bomb seriously injured the Governor of 
Taiwan. In 1971 there was an assassination 
attempt against Premier Chiang Ching-kuo 
while he was visiting New York. Last year, a 
letter bomb was mailed to the Republic of 
China's Ambassador in Washington. These 
acts have undoubtedly strengthened the hand 
of those unsympathetic to human rights on 
Taiwan. 

Thus, the Republic of China is a society in 
transition. While there are hard-line ele- 
ments, there are also many in the government 
who appreciate Western concepts of democ- 
racy and individual rights. 

Specific Issues 

In your letter requesting my appearance, 
you asked that I address a number of issues 
concerning human rights on Taiwan. 

Reports of Torture and Harassment 

While reports of torture and cruel treat- 
ment persist, they have been less frequent in 
recent years. Typically, such reports concern 
pretrial detention and the extraction of con- 
fessions which continue to play a prominent 
role in many indictments. It is difficult to ver- 
ify them. It is our view that torture is not a 
widespread practice in the Republic of China. 
Our Embassy has contacts in almost every 
segment of society, and we are confident that 
were torture widespread, we would be aware 
of it. Nevertheless, in light of the continuing 
reports, it seems probable that the police and 
security services at times have used torture, 
harsh treatment, and psychological pressure, 
although this is contrary to the declared pol- 
icy of the government. 



There are also reports of government sur- 
veillance and harassment of the families and 
associates of those who oppose its basic 
policies. This practice derives from the 
Chinese tradition of collective, rather than in- 
dividual, responsibility. It creates a sense of 
apprehension and uncertainty which restricts 
free speech and political activity. 

Political Prisoners 

There are political prisoners in the Republic 
of China. How many is uncertain, but we be- 
lieve they number in the several hundi-eds. 
Amnesty International has the names of about 
200. The government stated last December 
that there were 254 people in prison at that 
time on sedition charges, of whom 95 were 
convicted during 1974-76. We would consider 
many of these prisoners of conscience; some, 
however, were convicted of terrorist acts. In 
general the political prisoners fall into two 
main groups — those accused of Communist ac- 
tivities and associations and those opposed to 
basic government policies. 

Though crimes of sedition may be punished 
by the death penalty, there have been no re- 
ports of political executions in recent years. It 
is our impression that the average sentence in 
recent political trials is about 10 years, 
though those convicted of terrorism or Com- 
munist activities have often been given life 
sentences. 

Following President Chiang Kai-shek's 
death in 1975, the government promulgated a 
Commutation Act, which reduces sentences 
for political prisoners, and released about 200 
of the approximately 500 persons imprisoned 
at the time for political offenses. 

Martial Law 

In 1948, at the height of the Chinese Civil 
War, the government imposed martial law. It 
is still in effect. Martial law gives the gov- 
ernment broad powers to try a wide variety of 
crimes in military courts, to limit political as- 
sembly, to prohibit strikes, and to censor the 
press. It does not, however, impose military 
rule. In fact, over the last two decades, the 
role of the military in national affairs has 
steadily declined. 

Most human rights violations have their 
legal basis in the martial law. Its generalized 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



references to offenses against the security of 
the state and against public order and safety 
provide the government ready means to act 
against opponents. However, the government 
does not utilize all of the discretionary powers 
granted by that law; many criminal offenses 
which could be tried in military courts are 
now tried in civilian courts. 

Detention arid Due Process 

Though the Republic of China's detailed 
habeas corpus law is generally applied in or- 
dinary civil and criminal cases, the informa- 
tion available to us indicates that people sus- 
pected of sedition are detained— often 
incommunicado — for weeks and at times 
months without being formally charged or 
tried. However, in contrast with the early 
years of Republic of China rule on Taiwan 
when some people simply disappeared, it is 
our impression that in recent years detainees 
are eventually either charged and tried or re- 
leased. 

There has been increasing attention to the 
forms of due process in military court trials 
and appeals involving sedition, but the sub- 
stance is largely absent. Attendance is gener- 
ally limited to family members and invited 
press. Typically such trials last only a matter 
of hours. While represented by counsel, the 
accused has little real opportunity to defend 
himself. The independence of military courts 
is not established. Appeals occasionally result 
in reduced sentences, but convictions have not 
been reversed. 

Elections 

It is only in the past 25 years that the Re- 
pubHc of China has developed a regular pat- 
tern of elections. These are at the provincial, 
municipal, county, and village levels. While 
there have been instances of irregularities, 
these elections generally reflect the will of the 
electorate. Victories by independent critics 
are not rare. 

The more important limitations on the elec- 
toral process are structural not technical. 

First, there have been no general elections 
at the national level since 1948, because the 
Republic of China maintains it is the govern- 
ment of all China and that general national 
elections cannot be held until it reestablishes 



control over the whole country. Beginning in 
1969 supplementary elections have been held 
for the national legislative bodies. The num- 
bers elected have not been sufficient to alter 
the composition of these bodies constituted on 
the mainland of China 30 years ago. 

Secondly, despite the largely theoretical ex- 
istence of two opposition parties, the Republic 
of China is effectively a one-party state. Can- 
didates who oppose the ruling Nationalist 
Party run as independents. They have not, 
however, been allowed to organize a meaning- 
ful opposition party. Economic and social im- 
pi-ovements help explain the party's political 
success. Nevertheless, its control rests partly 
on restrictions placed on the civil and political 
rights of its opponents. 

Freedom of the Press 

Freedom House classified the press on 
Taiwan as "partly free." 

While freedom of speech and the press are 
guaranteed by the Constitution, martial law 
gives the government authority to limit both. 
In practice there are well-recognized restric- 
tions on questioning basic policies. Views con- 
trary to the government's claim to represent 
all China — at variance with its adamant anti- 
Communist stance — as well as those advocat- 
ing Taiwan's independence, are considered 
impermissible and punishable under law. With 
the exception of these limited but crucial sub- 
jects, people are generally free to say and 
publish what they wish. 

The press on Taiwan practices self- 
censorship. The government conducts post- 
publication censorship and occasionally recalls 
articles or publications. It has suspended, 
reorganized, or banned outspoken periodicals. 
In recent years the government has allowed 
somewhat freer access to information about 
overseas developments, including events in 
the People's Republic of China, and has be- 
come less restrictive in its censorship of 
foreign news and periodicals. 

U.S. Actions 

You asked what representations the De- 
partment has made on human rights. Over the 
years we have quietly tried to encourage 
greater respect for human rights on Taiwan. 



July 11, 1977 



53 



Our Embassy has frequently discussed 
American concerns on human rights with 
people in and out of government. I can assure 
you that the highest leaders of the Republic of 
China are fully aware of our views. The Em- 
bassy has maintained contacts with a broad 
range of politically active people, including 
critics of the government. We have expressed 
interest in particular political prisoners in an 
effort to indicate our concern for those whose 
human rights have been infringed as well as to 
help particular individuals. I believe these ef- 
forts have encouraged the long-term trend 
toward a more open society. 

There is eviclence that the Republic of 
China is responsive to the President's human 
rights emphasis. Administration statements 
and the human rights report on the Republic 
of China submitted to Congress earlier this 
year have prompted public discussion of 
human rights issues on Taiwan. Last De- 
cember the government, for the first time, re- 
leased statistical information on political pris- 
oners. This spring the government granted an 
exit permit to a prominent opposition 
spokesman who previously had not been per- 
mitted to travel abroad. 

The broad domestic and international fac- 
tors that have brought about the Republic of 
China's evolution toward a more open society 
should continue to operate in the years ahead. 
The Government of the Republic of China has 
become increasingly conscious of human 
rights considerations. There may be tempor- 
ary setbacks but the long-term trend prom- 
ises to be toward greater respect for indi- 
vidual liberties. While broad trends will 
largely shape the future, I can assure you that 
the Administration, in concert with the Con- 
gress, will continue to seek effective means of 
encouraging Taiwan's evolution toward a 
more open society. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



J 



Food and Agriculture Act of 1977. Report of the Senate 
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 
together with additional views, to accompany S. 275. 
S. Kept. 95-180. May 16, 1977. 431 pp. 
Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments of 
1977. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Re- 
lations to accompany H.R. 6179. S. Kept. 95-193. 
May 16, 1977. 70 pp. 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978. 
Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions to accompany H.R. 6689. S. Rept. 95-194. May 
16, 1977. .59 pp. 
The International Security Assistance and Arms Ex- 
port Control Act of 1977. Report of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. 1160. S. 
Rept. 9.5-195. May 16, 1977. 62 pp. 
Authoi'izing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978 for In- 
telligence Activities of the U.S. Government, the In- 
telligence Community Staff, the CIA Retirement and 
Disability System, and for Other Purposes. Report of 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to ac- 
company S. 1539. S. Rept. 95-214. May 16, 1977. 
5 pp. 
Agricultural Act of 1977. Report of the House Commit- 
tee on Agriculture, together with dissenting, addi- 
tional, minority, supplemental, individual, and addi- 
tional minoi'itv views, to accompany H.R. 7171. H. 
Rept. 9.5-348. "May 16, 1977. 372 pp. 
Annual Report to the Senate of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, together with additional 
views. S. Rept. 95-217. May 18, 1977. 43 pp. 
Export Administration Amendments of 1977. Confer- 
ence report of the committee of conference of the 
House Committee on International Relations to ac- 
company H.R. 5840. H. Rept. 95-354. May 18, 1977. 
29 pp. ■ 
Recent Deaths in Uganda. Report of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations, together with additional 
views, to accompany S. Res. 175. S. Rept. 95-222. 
May 19, 1977. 8 pp. 
Toward Improved United States-Cuba Relations. Re- 
port of a special study mission to Cuba, Feb. 10-15, 
1977, submitted to the House Committee on Interna- 
tional Relations. May 23, 1977. 73 pp. 
Technology Transfer and Scientific Cooperation Be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet Union: A Re- 
view. Report to the Subcommittee on International 
Secui-ity and Scientific Affairs of the House Commit- 
tee on International Relations by the Congressional 
Research Service of the Library of Congress. May 26, 
1977. 183 pp. 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



United States Reiterates Support for the Independence 
of Namibia and Zimbabwe at Maputo Conference 



The United Nations sponsored the Interna- 
tional Conference in Support of the Peoples of 
Zimbabwe and Namibia in Maputo, Mozam- 
bique, May 16-21, 1977, which was attended 
by 92 U.N. member states and numerous 
nongovernmental organizations and obser- 
vers. Following are statements made at that 
conference by Andrew Young, U.S. Repre- 
sentative to the United Nations, on May 19 
and Charles W. Maynes, Assistant Secretary 
for International Organization Affairs, at 
the closing session on May 21 on behalf of 
Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom, arid the United 
States, together with the text of the final dec- 
laration and program of action. 



AMBASSADOR YOUNG, MAY 19 

Text as prepared for delivery 

I would like to thank the sponsors of the 
conference for enabling me and my colleagues 
on the American delegation to join this effort 
of the international community to express 
deeply held views about Namibia and Zim- 
babwe. 

I congratulate Secretary General Wald- 
heim, as well as Ambassador Salim [Salim 
Ahmed Salim, Tanzanian Representative to 
the United Nations] and Ambassador Kamana 
[Dunstan Weston Kamana, Zambian Repre- 
sentative to the United Nations and Chair- 
man, U.N. Council for Namibia] and through 
them the Committee of 24 and the U.N. 
Council for Namibia, for their work in or- 
ganizing the conference. I would also like to 
thank our host, the Government of Mozam- 
bique, for its hospitality here in Maputo. 

I have come to Maputo because the United 
States wishes to be strongly represented at 



this conference in support of the independence 
and liberation of Namibia and Zimbabwe. I 
have come to Maputo because one of Presi- 
dent Carter's first acts was to demand a new 
and progressive policy toward Africa. And, I 
am here because a personal commitment to 
human rights requires that I be here. 

I welcome this opportunity today to speak 
to all of you gathered here; to speak to you 
openly about southern Africa and the policy of 
my government toward the problems of 
Namibia and Zimbabwe. The Carter Adminis- 
tration wants to demonstrate by the Ameri- 
can participation in this conference and in 
other ways that: 

— We want it to develop, prosper, and be 
free; 

— We very much want to associate our- 
selves more closely and work with Africans 
on a broad range of matters of mutual in- 
terest; 

— We firmly believe there must be an end to 
the deprivation of human dignity and funda- 
mental rights for the majority of the people of 
Namibia and Zimbabwe solely because of the 
color of their skin; and 

— These last vestiges of colonialism must 
give way to freedom and independence based 
on the will of the people. 

We are in a race against time regarding 
Namibia and Zimbabwe. The future of those 
two countries and the fate of their people is 
certain — liberation. We are here to discuss 
measures that can hasten the inevitable day of 
freedom. We all know that among these 
measures will be continuing military efforts 
by the liberation forces. They will insist on 
continuing their struggle as long as funda- 
mental political rights are denied the majority 
in Zimbabwe and Namibia. 



July 11, 1977 



55 



The armed struggle, however, though its 
final outcome is inevitable, exacts a cruel 
price from the people of Zimbabwe and 
Namibia. Africa needs the leadership that 
will be lost in a prolonged struggle; it needs 
the infrastructure that will be destroyed in 
extended military conflict. This is why all 
here— whatever their views— must support 
efforts to press ahead with any promising ap- 
proach to an early negotiated settlement. This 
is why one objective of this conference should 
be to make it clear that U.N. members, as al- 
ways, prefer a negotiated settlement where it 
can be found. 

The policies of the U.S. Government toward 
southern Africa reflect the Carter Adminis- 
tration's commitment to human rights. Presi- 
dent Carter made it clear from the beginning 
that a renewed commitment to our respon- 
sibilities in the field of human rights required 
justice in southern Africa. But our policy in 
southern Africa also grows out of our policy 
toward Africa as a whole, a policy based on 
support for freedom, independence, territorial 
integrity, and economic development and dig- 
nity for all African nations. We believe it is in 
our national interest to work cooperatively 
with African nations on mutual economic and 
political concerns. 

During the past several months, I have par- 
ticipated personally in the U.S. Govern- 
ment's review of the situation in southern Af- 
rica. Our conclusion is that the time remaining 
for peaceful settlement is brief. We therefore 
urgently embarked on several initiatives with 
the Government of the United Kingdom and 
several other Western governments on the 
Security Council. We took these initiatives on 
Rhodesia and Namibia because of the clear 
necessity of resolving these problems while 
time remains. Recent mihtary tension involv- 
ing the illegal Smith regime and its neighbors 
reveals how combustible the situation has be- 
come. The United States condemns the 
Rhodesian military incursions into Mozam- 
bique and Botswana and the Rhodesian threat 
against Zambia. 

At the heart of tensions in southern Africa 
lies the smoldering racial crisis in South Af- 
rica itself. There as well, time is the enemy. 
Refusal to take daring steps now will make 



progress later much more painful, if not im- 
possible. The United States will, therefore, 
let the South African Government know that 
this American Administration strongly be- 
lieves that change in South Africa must begin 
now. 

Toward this end. Vice President Mondale 
will be meeting in Vienna today and tomorrow 
with Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa. 
While we are meeting in Maputo, Vice Presi- 
dent Mondale will be conveying to Mr. Vors- 
ter all aspects of U.S. policy toward southern 
Africa. He will be expressing U.S. support for 
British Foreign Secretary Owen's initiative 
on Rhodesia and for the effort of the five- 
power contact groups to achieve a negotiated 
solution for Namibia consistent with Security 
Council Resolution 385.' The Vice President 
will underscore the need for urgent progress 
in Rhodesia and Namibia and for fundamental 
positive changes in South Africa itself in the 
interests of peace and stability for the entire 
region.^ 

Let me turn to the work of this conference. 
It is my strong belief that as we discuss the 
questions of Zimbabwe and Namibia here in 
Maputo, we should do so in a spirit of coopera- 
tion and with a focus on contributing to rapid 
solutions to the Zimbabwe and Namibia dis- 
putes which will minimize the costs in terms 
of human lives. This conference offers us an 
opportunity to explore together the ways in 
which we can jointly plan workable solutions. 
The declaration we adopt at the close of the 
conference should state clearly and concisely 
our goals and aspirations in approaching this 
problem. And it should keep open all roads to 
a negotiated settlement. 

Over the past several weeks, the five West- 
ern members of the Security Council have 
been working together on an initiative to help 
find a settlement to the Namibian problem. 
As most of you know, the approach originated 
with an unprecedented joint demarche to 
Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa on 
April 7. At that meeting, Mr. Vorster was 



' For text of the resolution adopted on Jan. 30, 1976, 
see Bulletin of Feb. 2.3, 1976, p. 246. 

^ For the text of Vice President Mondale's news con- 
ference following his meeting with Pi-ime Minister Vor- 
ster on May 20, see Bulletin of .June 20, 1977, p. 661. 



56 



Department of State Bulletin 



told of the necessity for a settlement in 
Namibia consistent with U.N. Security Coun- 
cil Resolution 385. It was expressed to him 
that an absence of progress toward an inter- 
nationally acceptable solution would have 
serious consequences for South Africa. 

From April 27 to 29 officials of the British, 
Canadian, French, German, and American 
Governments met with South African officials 
in Cape Town to discuss in detail the views of 
the West on Namibia. The discussions cen- 
tered around implementation of Resolution 
385 and the importance of holding free elec- 
tions in Namibia under U.N. supervision. The 
representatives of five countries expressed 
their strong view that all parties to the Nami- 
bian problem should avoid any steps which 
would foreclose the possibility of achieving an 
internationally acceptable solution. The 
Western delegates informed the South Afri- 
cans in particular that the reported plans to 
estabhsh an interim government in Namibia 
based on the constitution developed by the 
Turnhalle conference [South African- 
sponsored constitutional conference held in 
Windhoek, Namibia, beginning September 
1975] would be unacceptable. 

Following discussions with the South Afri- 
cans, including several sessions with Prime 
Minister Vorster, the contact group set out to 
discuss the points raised during the talks with 
the other parties to the Namibian problem. 
We have only just completed informing the 
Secretary General, representatives of the 
front-line states, other African leaders, 
SWAPO [South West Africa People's Or- 
ganization], and representatives of various 
political groups inside Namibia. We intend to 
follow up aggressively on the next stage of 
this process, to consolidate the points on 
which progress has been made, to clarify new 
points that have been raised, and to consult 
closely with all parties, particularly in- 
terested African states and SWAPO. As our 
host, President Samora Machel, stressed in 
the opening address, Security Council Resolu- 
tion 385 constitutes a platform providing for a 
"just solution" to the Namibian conflict. We 
are determined to press ahead with this plat- 
form precisely because it does provide a just 
solution. Our initiatives with the other West- 



ern members of the Security Council are 
taken in that context. We will point out to 
South Africa that Resolution 385 offers it a 
final chance for peaceful settlement if it acts 
now. 

On Zimbabwe Secretary of State Vance re- 
cently met with British Foreign Secretary 
David Owen to consider the Rhodesian prob- 
lem in light of Secretary Owen's trip to Af- 
rica. As my colleague, Minister [of State for 
Foreign Affairs] Ted Rowlands, has informed 
you, the British Government has decided to 
establish a consultative group to make contact 
with the parties to the Rhodesian conflict 
which will visit the area as necessary, includ- 
ing Salisbury. The U.S. Government has 
agreed to appoint a senior U.S. official to 
work with the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office Deputy Under Secretary John Graham, 
who will head the consultative group. The 
purpose of the group will be to engage in de- 
tailed consultations about an independence 
constitution for Zimbabwe, as well as the 
necessary transitional arrangements. We 
offer our assistance in a supportive manner. 
We recognize Britain's special role. We rec- 
ognize that we can only be helpful if the key 
parties involved believe we can be of assist- 
ance. 

We intend to work closely with all parties 
during this phase of intensive consultations to 
move forward the process leading toward 
majority rule in Zimbabwe. We recognize that 
there are serious differences of view, not only 
between blacks and whites, between the 
Smith regime and the international communi- 
ty, but among blacks themselves. Our hope is 
that as consultations proceed, these differ- 
ences can be bridged and a free Zimbabwe 
will be a united Zimbabwe. We are not naive 
in thinking that unraveling a problem like the 
Rhodesian situation, which has been a long 
time in creation, will be easy. But I will 
pledge to you today our support and best ef- 
forts for a negotiated solution to the problem 
so that we may see an independent Zimbabwe 
under majority rule in 1978. 

It is the view of my government that the 
diplomatic efforts on Zimbabwe and Namibia 
which have been launched have a chance for 
success. For this to happen we must be in- 



July 11, 1977 



57 



volved at every stage of U.N. discussion of 
Zimbabwe and Namibia. Tiiat is one reason 
why the United States is attending this con- 
ference. 

Not all views which have been expressed 
here accord with U.S. policy. But let me em- 
phasize that the goals of freedom and libera- 
tion are fundamental in the Carter Adminis- 
tration's approach to the issues of southern 
Africa. It is seeking appropriate ways to pro- 
mote these goals through the aggressive pur- 
suit of negotiated settlements. While we rec- 
ognize that not all members of the United 
Nations will agree with every detail of the 
initiatives we have taken, all member 
nations — and this conference in particular — 
should be encouraged by these initiatives. We 
believe the final conference document should 
reflect this fact. 

I have stressed today American support for 
peaceful, negotiated change in southern Af- 
rica. Our reasons involve not only our com- 
mitment to nonviolent solutions but also our 
realization that Africa needs peace urgently 
to begin the process of development as soon as 
possible. That is the real challenge in 
Africa. 

We recognize that continuing armed strug- 
gle is being waged, especially in Zimbabwe. It 
is our hope that the fighting will be brought to 
an early end. We will do all in our power to 
end the injustices which have led to violence 
and bloodshed and to effect an early transition 
to independence in Zimbabwe and Namibia. 

As you all know one of President Carter's 
first decisions was to press for repeal of the 
Byrd amendment. During my last trip to Af- 
rica I informed African leaders of my confi- 
dence that the President would succeed in re- 
pealing this legislation which placed the 
United States in violation of Security Council 
resolutions regarding Rhodesia. 

With the strong support of the President, 
the Congress has now repealed the Byrd 
amendment. President Carter is determined, 
however, to press ahead with additional 
measures which can help us make progress in 
southern Africa. 

On May 17 President Carter announced that 
implementation of Security Council Resolu- 
tion 385 on Namibia is imperative. Our efforts 
to secure its implementation, he noted, in- 



volve something stronger than a request. The 
United States is prepared to take new meas- 
ures in the United Nations if we do not obtain 
rapid progress toward the final liberation of 
Namibia.^ 

Let me conclude by stating my desire to 
continue meeting with delegates to this con- 
ference and having frank and serious discus- 
sions of the issues we are considering here. 
We all must talk together and understand 
each other's views. Our goal must be to en- 
courage change in a way that can minimize 
violence. In doing this, we serve our overall 
goal — manifesting our support for the people 
of Namibia and Zimbabwe and working for 
majority rule in southern Africa. 

MR. MAYNES, MAY 21 

The Western members of the Security 
Council — Canada, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States — came to this conference 
for three reasons: 

— We wanted to show solidarity with Afri- 
can states on these two key issues of Namibia 
and Zimbabwe. 

— We wanted to seize this unique opportu- 
nity to explain our African policies. Since any 
African policy must begin with southern Af- 
rica, we wanted the opportunity to explain to 
the countries and movements most directly 
concerned the initiatives we have taken and 
the strategy we have followed. 

— Finally, we wanted to listen to and un- 
derstand African views on these critical sub- 
jects. We recognize that our assistance will 
not be effective unless the parties most di- 
rectly involved understand our purpose and 
feel free to convey their reactions. 

From all three points of view we assess the 
conference as remarkably successful. The con- 
ference marks a new stage in the liberation of 
Namibia and Zimbabwe. More than 90 coun- 
tries came to declare their solidarity with the 
people of Zimbabwe and Namibia. This collec- 
tive expression of international determination , 



^ For the excerpt referring to South Africa from 
President Carter's television question-and-answer 
session in Los Angeles on May 17, see BULLETIN of 
June 13, 1977, p. 626. 



58 



Department of State Bulletin 



is a sign that the process of liberation is mov- 
ing to a new and culminating phase. We have 
found others willing to listen to our point of 
view, and we have benefited from theirs. We 
see ourselves working for the same goals, 
even when we choose different means from 
those preferred by others. 

As you all know, over the past several 
weeks the five Western members of the Secu- 
rity Council have together advanced an initia- 
tive to resolve the Namibian problem. West- 
ern members of the Security Council informed 
the South African Government that any set- 
tlement in Namibia must be consistent with 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 385. We left 
no doubt that an absence of progress toward 
an internationally acceptable solution would 
have serious consequences for South Africa. 

In the case of the United States, President 
Carter recently confirmed U.S. policy in more 
detail. In a statement made in Los Angeles on 
May 17, 1977, he stated that unless there was 
progress on Namibia, the United States would 
be compelled to take strong action in the 
United Nations. 

The position of the Western members of the 
Security Council is clear. In the light of the 
initiatives we have taken, we find ourselves 
unable to associate ourselves with a number 
of the provisions of the declaration and the 
program of action. To associate ourselves 
would prejudice the results of negotiations 
which have brought about the most pi'omising 
start to resolve the Namibian pi'oblem. We 
take a similar position regarding the negotia- 
tion effort of the British in Zimbabwe. The 
bulk of the documents, however, represent 
our views. They also represent a remarkable 
effort to convey to those who have blocked 
progress in the past that there is a degree of 
commitment and a depth of solidarity on these 
issues which are unprecedented. 

We recognize that progress must be made 
urgently on these problems. We understand 
that the issues of Namibia and Zimbabwe are 
entering a new and final stage where one path 
leads to increased violence and the other to 
peaceful settlement. 

So while we cannot associate ourselves with 
a number of the provisions of the declaration, 
we regard it as an important mark in history, 
one which helps us understand our own re- 



sponsibilities as members of the Security 
Council and nations interested in peaceful 
change and racial progress in southern Africa. 
We commend the authors, and we praise the 
organizers of this conference. Both have 
helped bring the day of freedom closer than it 
has ever been. 



TEXT OF FINAL DECLARATION 
AND PROGRAM OF ACTION ^ 



Text of the Maputo Declaration in Support of the 
Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia and Programme 
of Action for the Liberation of Zimbabwe and 
Namibia 

l.The International Conference in Support of the 
Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, held in Maputo from 
16 to 21 May 1977, was attended by 92 Member States 
of the United Nations, and numerous observers and 
non-governmental organizations representing all re- 
gions of the world and diverse political and social sys- 
tems. The Conference, which resulted from General As- 
sembly Resolution A/31/14.5 of 17 December 1976, was 
called to express the solidarity and support of the world 
community with the freedom struggle of the oppressed 
peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia. 

2. The fact that the Conference was held in Maputo, 
the capital of the People's Republic of Mozambique, 
symbolizes the profound changes which have decisively 
tipped the balance of forces in favour of the struggle for 
self-determination and independence in the region with 
the victories of the Liberation Movements of Mozam- 
bique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao 
Tome and Principe. The extension of the frontiers of 
freedom to the borders of Zimbabwe and Namibia has 
given impetus to the liberation struggle in these two 
countries and has shaken the foundations of the racist 
minority regimes of southern Africa. 

3. The Liberation Movements in Zimbabwe and 
Namibia have intensified their struggle as a conse- 
quence of the intransigence of the colonial racist re- 
gimes, which have not only consistently thwarted at- 
tempts at arriving at a negotiated settlement, but also 
have increased their brutal repression of the peoples of 
the two countries. The minority regimes, in their des- 
peration, have also carried out acts of agression against 
neighbouring African States, thereby seriously threatening 
international peace and security. 

4. The development of the armed struggle, the isola- 
tion of the minority regimes and the international sup- 
port for the National Liberation Movements are factors 
creating conditions for a negotiated settlement leading 
to majority rule and genuine independence in Zimbabwe 
and Namibia. 



■* Adopted by consensus on May 21, 1977 (U.N. doc. 
A/32/109 (Part ID); unofficial text printed here. 



July 11, 1977 



59 



5. The Conference notes that the minority racist re- 
gime of South Africa, in defiance of United Nations 
Resolutions, international public opinion and the advis- 
ory opinion of the International Court of Justice, gives 
comfort and sustenance to the illegal racist minority re- 
gime in Southern Rhodesia and is perpetuating its il- 
legal occupation and exploitation of Namibia. The 
Conference also notes that certain Western Powers 
continue to encourage the racist regimes by economic, 
military and other forms of collaboration with them and 
by their continued refusal to support the Liberation 
Movements in their legitimate struggle. 

6. The Conference is convinced that the national lib- 
eration struggle and the overwhelming international 
support for it will overcome these negative factors and 
that the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia are on the 
threshold of freedom. 

7. Against this background, the Conference adopts 
the Maputo Declaration in Support of the Peoples of 
Zimbabwe and Namibia and the Programme of Action 
for the Liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia. 

II. Declaration on the Liberation of Zimbabwe 

8. The Conference solemnly proclaims its full support 
for the people of Zimbabwe in their just struggle for 
independence. It reaffirms that there should be no in- 
dependence before majority rule and that any settle- 
ment relating to the future of the territory must be 
worked out with the full participation of the people of 
Zimbabwe represented by their National Liberation 
Movement, which includes all the progressive forces ac- 
tively engaged in the struggle, and in accordance with 
their time aspirations. The Conference affirms the prin- 
ciple of the rights of individual citizens, regardless of 
race or colour, and rejects any notion of special rights 
and privileges for, or discrimination against, any ethnic 
group. 

9. The Conference reaffirms the primary responsibil- 
ity of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North- 
ern Ireland as the administering power for Southern 
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The international accountability 
which the administering power assumed under Chapter 
XI of the Charter of the United Nations cannot be com- 
promised. It is imperative that the solemn obligation 
accepted as a sacred trust by the administering power 
cannot be relinquished under any circumstances until 
the objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and 
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples have been fully im- 
plemented. 

10. The Conference strongly condemns the illegal ra- 
cist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia. It de- 
nounces the regime's brutal and repressive measures 
against the people of Zimbabwe. The illegal racist 
minority regime has forcibly moved thousands of vil- 
lagers into concentration camps. Numerous acts of bru- 
tality have been committed by the illegal regime against 
the people of Zimbabwe and foreign missionaries. There 
has been beating, torture and killing of innocent vil- 
lagers and the application of criminal and arbitrary 
measures of collective punishment. Ruthless repres- 



sion has escalated into genocide as shown in the mas- 
sacre of hundreds of people in the Nyadzonya refugee 
camp. The illegal regime is recruiting mercenaries to 
carry out its brutal repression of the people of Zim- 
babwe. It is clear that all the actions taken by the illegal 
racist minority regime are designed to consolidate its 
illegal rule of the teri-itory. Recent manoeuvres such as 
the amendment of the Land Tenure Act and the ap- 
pointment of puppet chiefs to "ministerial" posts are 
futile attempts to perpetuate the status quo. The inter- 
national community should act forthwith to put an end to 
the illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe). 

11. Over the years, efforts have been made to 
achieve a negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe. These ef- 
forts were particularly intensified in the wake of the 
collapse of Portuguese colonialism in Africa and the 
consequent extension of the frontiers of freedom in 
southern Africa through the emergence of liberated 
Mozambique and Angola as well as the development of 
the struggle in Zimbabwe and Namibia. These efforts 
were undertaken by the Liberation Movements sup- 
ported by the frontline States and the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU). This support was clearly re- 
flected in the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Southern 
Africa adopted by the OAU in April 1975. 

12. Painstaking attempts were made last year to 
reach a negotiated settlement culminating in the 
Geneva Conference on Southern Rhodesia (Zim- 
babwe). However, so far all reasonable and meaningful 
proposals which would have secured a negotiated set- 
tlement for an independent Zimbabwe on the basis of 
majority rule have been totally rejected by the illegal 
racist minority regime. Confronted with the intransi- 
gence of the illegal minority regime, the freedom fight- 
ers have intensified the armed struggle. 

13. Furthermore, the fighting forces have forged 
ahead in their drive towards unity. Positive steps were 
taken towards the unity of Zimbabweans and the de- 
velopment of the liberation struggle. The Conference 
stresses the importance of the unity of all the patriotic 
forces in their struggle against the illegal racist minor- 
ity regime. 

14. The development of the armed struggle and the 
concerted efforts of the international community are 
creating positive conditions for a negotiated settlement 
based on majority rule. 

1.5. The international community should endeavour to 
intensify these efforts so that a speedy end is bi'ought 
to the illegal racist minority regime. In this regard, the 
Conference takes note of the efforts of the United 
Kingdom, the administering power, to achieve a 
negotiated settlement with the objective of securing in- 
dependence for Zimbabwe under majority rule in 1978. 

16. The Conference considers that the strict en- 
forcement of existing mandatory sanctions against the 
illegal racist minority regime is an important element in 
the collective effort of the international community to 
promote a settlement of the conflict in Zimbabwe. In 
this regard, the actions taken by the Governments of 
Mozambique and Zambia in closing their borders with 



60 



Department of State Bulletin 



Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), imposing total sanc- 
tions against the illegal minority regime, constitute a 
major contribution in support of the liberation struggle 
i]f the people of Zimbabwe and towards the maximum 
isolation of the illegal minority regime in accordance 
with United Nations objectives. 

17. The Conference deplores that some States con- 
tinue to violate sanctions with the result that sanctions 
have had a limited effect on the economy of Southern 
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The principal violator of sanc- 
tions is South Africa. In addition, some Western and 
other States have not implemented the mandatory sanc- 
tions. The need to ensure that the mandatory sanctions 
are scrupulously enforced is more urgent than ever. 
Any breaches or evasions of obligations under the 
Charter of the United Nations must not be tolerated. 
At the same time there is an urgent need to widen the 
scope of sanctions to include all the measures envisaged 
under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations. 

18. The Conference strongly condemns South Africa 
for its support of the illegal racist minority regime in 
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). It is South Africa's 
support which sustains the illegal minority regime. The 
United Nations should e.xamine all possibilities to en- 
sure South Africa's compliance with the Resolutions on 
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). 

19. The Conference strongly condemns the persistent 
acts of aggression committed by the illegal racist minor- 
ity regime in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) against 
Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia. These acts of ag- 
gression have resulted in an enormous loss of life and in 
destruction of property. The international community 
should give the utmost assistance to these States in 
order to deter armed attacks by the illegal minority re- 
gime in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). Through these 
acts the illegal minority regime seeks to achieve a dual 
objective on the one hand, to intimidate the frontline 
States which are acting as strategic rear bases for the 
liberation struggle in Zimbabwe in accordance with 
United Nations objectives and, on the other hand, to 
internationalize this conflict. 

20. The Conference solemnly declares that the natu- 
ral resources of Zimbabwe are the birthright of the 
people of Zimbabwe. The exploitation of these re- 
sources by the illegal racist minority regime in associa- 
tion with foreign economic interests is in violation of 
the principles of the Charter and of all pertinent Res- 
olutions of the United Nations. The exploitation of 
these resources by the illegal minority regime brings no 
benefit to the people of Zimbabwe and contributes to 
maintaining in power the illegal minority regime. The 
activities of foreign economic interests engaged in 
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) should be the object of 
systematic denunciation so that their actions which are 
detrimental to the people of Zimbabwe be exposed to 
the full scrutiny of and condemnation by the interna- 
tional community. 

21. The Conference solemnly appeals to all States 
J Members of the United Nations, other intergovernmen- 
tal and non-governmental organizations to intensify 
their assistance to the National Liberation Movement 



July 11, 1977 



representing the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle 
for independence. It commends the international com- 
munity for the invaluable moral, political and material 
assistance given by it to the National Liberation 
Movement of Zimbabwe. It further commends all non- 
governmental organizations which have given their sol- 
idarity and support to the cause of the liberation strug- 
gle in Zimbabwe. The frontline States in Africa which 
have taken a finii stand against the illegal racist minor- 
ity regime, in accordance with Resolutions of the 
United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, 
should be given all necessary economic and other as- 
sistance by all freedom-loving countries and peoples. 
The Conference urges that all Governments, organiza- 
tions and peoples join in concerted international action, 
in support of the liberation struggle of the people of 
Zimbabwe in this crucial and final stage of the total 
emancipation of Africa. 

III. Declaration on the Liberation of Namibia 

22. The Conference solemnly proclaims its full sup- 
port for the struggle of the people of Namibia under 
the leadership of their sole and authentic Liberation 
Movement, the South West Africa People's Organiza- 
tion (SWAPO), to achieve self-determination, freedom 
and independence in a united Namibia. It recognizes 
that the Namibian people have been forced to resort to 
anned struggle after many years of arduous attempts to 
achieve those objectives by peaceful means. It reaf- 
firms the right of the people of Namibia to decide on the 
means of their struggle. In the light of the conditions in 
the territory, the development of the armed struggle 
and continued efforts of the international community 
have created positive conditions for a negotiated set- 
tlement. It is encouraging and inspiring to see the unity 
and solidarity of the Namibian people in their efforts to 
fulfill their true aspirations and legitimate interests 
under the leadership of their Liberation Movement. 
Despite a ferocious oppressor, the determination, com- 
petence and heroism of Namibian patriots have gained 
for them the respect and admiration of the international 
community. It is imperative that all freedom-loving 
forces in the international community give maximum 
support to SWAPO to ensure the victory of the people 
of Namibia in their struggle against the forces of col- 
onialism and racism. 

23. The Conference strongly condemns the colonial 
and illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa which 
constitutes an act of aggression against the Namibian 
people and against the United Nations, in defiance of 
repeated demands for its withdrawal by the Security 
Council and the General Assembly of the United Na- 
tions. The policies of the illegal South African adminis- 
tration are a systematic violation of its obligations 
under the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples. The United Nations Council for Namibia as the 
legal authority to administer that territory until inde- 
pendence has the responsibility to assist the Namibian 
people in their struggle against South African aggres- 



61 



sion and occupation. It is therefore imperative that ap- 
propriate measures be formulated and implemented to 
decisively counter South Africa's continued defiance of 
the authority of the United Nations. 

24. The Conference strongly condemns the policies of 
apartheid and homelands which the Pretoria regime has 
e.xtended to Namibia. In order to perpetuate its exploi- 
tation of the people and natural resources of the terri- 
tory, the illegal South African administration in 
Namibia follows a policy of brutal institutionalized ter- 
rorism against the Namibian people. Many Namibian 
patriots have perished under this regime. The illegal 
administration in Namibia imprisons and tortures men 
and women under its violently repressive racist system. 
It carries out massive transfers of population causing 
untold suffering to thousands of innocent men, women 
and children. In this respect, the Conference invites all 
States to implement the Declaration and Programme of 
Action adopted at the Dakar Conference on Namibia 
and Human Rights. The Conference considers fur- 
thermore that all possible pressures should be brought 
to bear upon the Pretoria regime to cease its barbaric 
repression of the Namibian people in their efforts to 
achieve self-determination, freedom and independence 
in a united Namibia. 

2.5. The Conference recognizes Walvis Bay as an in- 
tegral part of Namibia and rejects the attempts of 
South Africa to separate it from the rest of Namibia 
with which it is inextricably linked by geographical, 
historical, economic, cultural and ethnic bonds. All 
States should endeavour to dissuade South Africa from 
pursuing the separation of Walvis Bay from Namibia. 

26. The Conference strongly condemns the increasing 
militarization of Namibia by the racist Pretoria regime. 
In its increasingly aggressive posture, South Africa has 
expanded its military apparatus in Namibia in order to 
give itself the capability to attack neighbouring African 
countries in a policy of continuous intimidation. It has 
enacted the Defence Amendment Act in 1976 in order to 
carry out aggression far beyond the borders of South 
Africa. Therefore, the sale or supply of any arms or 
military material: the transfer of technology; and the 
provision of the means to produce weapons, as well as 
any nuclear collaboration with South Africa, ultimately 
support the acts of aggression by South Africa against 
the Namibian people and the United Nations. It is 
therefore imperative that all States cease and desist 
from any form of direct or indirect military consultation, 
co-operation or collaboration with South Africa. In 
order to meet the continuous threat of the minority re- 
gime to international peace and security in southern 
Africa, the Security Council should be called upon to 
impose a mandatory arms embargo against South Af- 
rica. 

27. The Conference strongly denounces the Turnhalle 
tribal talks as a South African stratagem to perpetuate 
its ruthless colonial and racist policies and practices 
under false pretences. South Africa has brought to- 
gether in the Turnhalle tribal talks the fanatical racist 
promoters of apartheid and tribal puppets to prepare a 
so-called Charter with the purpose of misleading the in- 
ternational community on its true intentions in 



62 



Namibia. The so-called Charter is to be the basis for al 
provisional government fabricated by South Africa | piuBt: 
which would pretend to be an advance towards a pseudo- 
independent Namibia. The international community, 
especially all Member States of the United Nations, 
should act to frustrate South Africa's tactics of political 
deception. No recognition should be accorded to any 
group which the illegal South African administration 
may install as a consequence of the current fraudulent 
constitutional talks or any other manoeuvres in 
Namibia. Any independence talks regarding Namibia 
must be between the representatives of the South West 
Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and South Af- 
rica under the auspices of the United Nations for the 
sole purpose of discussing the modalities for the trans- 
fer of power to the Namibian people. 

28. The Conference reaffiiTns that in order that the 
people of Namibia shall be enabled freely to determine 
their own future, free elections be held urgently under 
the supervision and control of the United Nations in the 
whole of Namibia as one political entity. However, 
prior to such elections, conditions for a negotiated set- 
tlement should be created in Namibia in accordance 
with all relevant decisions and Resolutions of the 
United Nations and, in particular. Security Council 
Resolution 38.5 (1976). 

29. The Conference solemnly reaffirms the responsi- 
bility of the United Nations for Namibia until the terri- 
tory attains full independence. The General Assembly 
declared Namibia to be a direct responsibility of the 
United Nations and entrusted the United Nations 
Council for Namibia with the exercise of de jure inter- 
na! and external sovereignty over Namibia. Therefore, 
the Council has been empowered to protect the rights 
and to represent the interests of the Namibian people, 
with the full participation of the South West Africa 
People's Organization (SWAPO). The Conference rec- 
ognizes the United Nations Council for Namibia as the 
legal administering authority of Namibia until inde- 
pendence, an indispensable role which it is fulfilling. It 
is imperative that the international community 
strengthen its support for the Council in its efforts to 
promote the legitimate aspirations of the Namibian 
people for self-detemiination, freedom and independ- 
ence in a united Namibia. The Conference calls on all 
Member States to im.plement provisions contained in 
United Nations Resolutions granting full participation 
of the United Nations Council for Namibia in all confer- 
ences. United Nations Specialized Agencies and other 
organizations of the United Nations system. 

30. The Conference solemnly proclaims its support 
for the nationhood programme for Namibia. The Coun- 
cil for Namibia received from the General Assembly at 
its thirty-first Session the mandate to elaborate, in con- 
sultation with the South West Africa People's Organi- 
zation (SWAPO), the guidelines and policies for such a 
programme and to direct and co-ordinate the implemen- 
tation of the programme. The nationhood programme 
shall cover the present period of struggle for independ- 
ence and the initial years of the independence of 
Namibia. It is imperative that the international com- 
munity ensure the success of the nationhood pro- 



Department of State Bulletin 



Itiotj 

'litid 
«aij 
fatii 



gramme by taking measures to increase the pro- 
grammes of concrete assistance to the people of 
Namibia through their Liberation Movement, SWAPO. 

31. The Conference solemnly declares that the natu- 
ral resources of Namibia are the birthright of the 
Namibian people. The e.xploitation of these resources 
by foreign economic interests under the protection of 
the repressive racist colonial administration and in vio- 
lation of all principles of the Charter and of the perti- 
nent Resolutions of the Security Council and the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, is illegal and 
contributes to the maintenance of the illegal occupation 
regime. The rapid depletion of the natural resources of 
the territory due to the reckless plunder in which 
foreign economic interests engage in collusion with the 
illegal South African administration is a grave threat to 
the integrity and prosperity of an independent 
Namibia. It is imperative that the activities of foreign 
economic interests engaged in Namibia be the object of 
systematic denunciation so that their actions, which are 
detrimental to the Namibian people, be exposed to the 
full scrutiny and condemnation of the international 
community. 

32. The Conference welcomes the report and recom- 
mendations of the Mission of the United Nations Coun- 
cil for Namibia to the Specialized Agencies and other 
United Nations organizations with headquarters in 
Europe. In this regard it urges all Specialized Agencies 
and other United Nations organizations to give all the 
possible concrete assistance within their spheres of 
competence to the Council for Namibia in the discharge 
of the mandate entrusted to it, so as to speed up the 
implementation of the relevant United Nations Resolu- 
tions on Namibia, in particular that on the nationhood 
programme foi- Namibia. The Conference calls upon 
those Specialized Agencies and other United Nations 
organizations in which South Africa still illegally pur- 
ports to represent Namibia to terminate such relation- 
ships forthwith and to grant full membership to the 
United Nations Council for Namibia as the administer- 
ing authority of Namibia until independence. 

33. The Conference commends the international 
community for the invaluable moral, political and mate- 
rial assistance it is giving to the South West Africa 
People's Organization (SWAPO). It further commends 
all non-governmental organizations which are giving 
their solidarity and support to the cause of the libera- 
tion of Namibia from South African illegal occupation. 
The Conference solemnly appeals to all Member States 
of the United Nations, other intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organizations to intensify their as- 
sistance to the South West Africa People's Organization 
(SWAPO) in this crucial and final stage in the emanci- 
pation of Africa. 

IV. General: Zimbabwe and Namibia 

34. The Conference notes with appreciation the pro- 
grammes of the United Nations, its Specialized Agen- 
cies and institutions within the United Nations sys- 
tem, which are providing educational, training and 
humanitarian assistance to Zimbabweans and Nami- 



bians, notably the United Nations Educational and 
Training Programme for Southern Africa (UNETPSA), 
the United Nations Fund for Namibia, the Institute 
for Namibia, the Trust Fund for South Africa, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and other inter- 
governmental and non-governmental organizations. It 
appeals to States, organizations and individuals to give 
generous assistance to all such programmes designed 
to assist Zimbabweans and Namibians. 

35. The Conference appeals to the mass media to 
join in the campaign in support of the peoples of Zim- 
babwe and Namibia. The Conference considers it 
necessary for the United Nations to strengthen and in- 
tensify the dissemination of information on the strug- 
gle for self-determination and independence in Zim- 
babwe and Namibia particularly through the network 
of the United Nations Information Centres all over the 
world. In this regard, the Conference requests the 
Genera! Assembly to allocate the necessary resources 
to intensify public information action, especially 
through the United Nations Infoi-mation Centres. 

V. South Africa 

36. The Conference recognizes that the South Afri- 
can apartheid regime has been the bastion of racism 
and colonialism in southern Africa and the main oppo- 
nent of the efforts of the United Nations and the in- 
ternational community to promote self-determination 
and independence in southern Africa. 

37. While fully conscious of the need for vigorous 
and effective international action to thwart the ma- 
noeuvres of the apartheid regime, the Conference de- 
cided to concentrate its Programme of Action on spe- 
cific measures with respect to Zimbabwe and Namibia, 
taking into account that further action against apart- 
heid will be considered at the World Conference for 
Action Against Apartheid to be held in Lagos, Nigeria, 
from 22 to 26 August 1977. 

VI. Programme of Action for the Liberation of 
Zimbabwe and Namibia 

A. Measures in Support of the National Liberation 
Movements. 

38. The Conference calls upon governments to: 

(a) give the greatest possible political and moral 
support to the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia and 
their National Liberation Movements in their struggle 
to attain self-determination; 

(b) provide and increase material and financial sup- 
port to the people of Zimbabwe and Namibia and their 
National Liberation Movements in consultation and 
co-operation with the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU); 

(c) encourage the activities of non-governmental or- 
ganizations engaged in providing political and material 
assistance to the National Liberation Movements of 
Zimbabwe and Namibia; 



July 11, 1977 



63 



(d) increase their contributions to the United Na- 
tions Fund for Namibia in order to ensure the success 
of the Institute for Namibia in Lusaka [Zambia] as 
well as the formulation and implementation of addi- 
tional projects in support of the Namibian people; 

(e) extend travel facilities and educational and 
employment opportunities to Namibians; 

(f) participate in the Week of Solidarity with the 
Namibian people which is to be organized each year 
during the week following 27 October, the anniversary 
of the ending of the mandate of South Africa over 
Namibia, particularly by setting up Committees of As- 
sistance for Namibia. 

39. The Conference urges all Member States, Spe- 
cialized Agencies, programmes and other institutions 
within the United Nations system, and other inter- 
governmental as well as non-governmental organiza- 
tions, to extend, as a matter of priority, material and 
economic assistance to the frontline States in order to 
enable them to implement more effectively the United 
Nations Resolutions supporting the liberation sti-uggle 
in Zimbabwe and Namibia. The Conference further 
urges them to render special assistance to the States 
bordering Zimbabwe and Namibia to enable them to 
provide for the increasing number of refugees from 
these territories. 

40. The Conference calls upon the United Nations 
to: 

(a) further increase its contribution to the United 
Nations Fund for Namibia; 

(b) increase its support for the United Nations 
Council for Namibia in its efforts to achieve self- 
determination, freedom and national independence for 
the people of Namibia; 

(c) consider the possibility of establishing the Uni- 
versity of Namibia. With regard to this initiative, the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) should be invited to assist the 
United Nations Council for Namibia and the South 
West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in the 
formulation of its guiding plan. 

41. The Conference calls upon the Specialized Agen- 
cies and other institutions within the United Nations 
system to give high priority to the formulation, with 
the active co-operation of the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU), of programmes and projects of assist- 
ance to the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia and 
their National Liberation Movements. In the case of 
Namibia, such assistance should be extended in consul- 
tation with the United Nations Council for Namibia. 

41. The Conference urges other intergovernmental 
organizations to extend political and material support 
to the National Liberation Movements of Zimbabwe 
and Namibia. 

43. The Conference appeals to all non-governmental 
organizations to: 

(a) intensify their campaigns in support of the 
peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia and their National 
Liberation Movements in their struggle to attain self- 
determination and independence; 



(b) intensify their campaigns in support of the South 
West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) to pre- 
vent any action in favour of South Africa's policies in 
Namibia and to increase financial contributions to 
SWAPO. 

44. The Conference appeals to all solidarity organi- 
zations and groups to establish effective National 
Committees in their respective countries in support of 
the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) 
and the struggle of the people of Namibia to prevent 
any action in favour of South Africa's policies and 
practices in the territory in contravention of the 
United Nations Resolutions and decisions on Namibia. 

4,5. The Conference calls upon all trade unions to in- 
tensify their campaign in support of the just struggle 
of the people of Namibia by boycotting and othei-wise 
refusing to handle vessels, aircraft or any other ve- 
hicles carrying Namibian goods, in accordance with 
Decree No. 1 on the protection of the natural re- 
sources of Namibia enacted by the United Nations 
Council for Namibia on 27 September 1974. 

B. Measures Against the Illegal Racist Minority 
Regime in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). 

46. The Conference calls upon governments to: 

(a) refrain from any co-operation or collaboration 
with the illegal racist minority regime in Southern 
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe); 

(b) observe strictly the aims embargo against the il- 
legal racist minority regime; 

(c) enact legislation declaring the recruitment, as- 
sembly, financing and training of mercenaries in their 
territories to be punishable as a criminal act and to do 
their utmost to discourage and prohibit their nationals 
from serving as mercenaries; 

(d) take measures against corporations and trade 
interests which operate in or have subsidiaries operat- 
ing in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in violation of 
sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security 
Council; 

(e) prevent oil companies registered in their ter- 
ritories from supplying oil, directly or indirectly, to 
the illegal racist minority regime; 

(f) take stringent enforcement measures to ensure 
strict compliance by all individuals, associations and 
bodies corporate under their jurisdiction with the 
sanctions imposed by the Security Council and to pro- 
hibit any form of collaboration by them with the illegal 
racist minority regime; 

(g) take effective steps to prevent or discourage the 
emigration to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) of any 
individuals or groups of individuals under their juris- 
diction; 

(h) discontinue any action which might confer a 
semblance of legitimacy on the illegal racist minority 
regime by forbidding, inter alia, the operation and ac- 
tivities of Air Rhodesia, the Rhodesia National Tourist 
Board and the Rhodesia Information Office, or any 
other activities which contravene the aims and pur- 
poses of sanctions; 



64 



Department of State Bulletin 



(i) invalidate passports and other documents for 
travel to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe); 

(j) prohibit the use of Southern Rhodesian aircraft 
for international passenger or cargo traffic; 

(k) deny landing rights in their respective ter- 
ritories to flights, the route schedules of which include 
stopovers in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), for the 
purpose of loading or unloading passengers and/or 
goods to and from Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). 

47. The Conference calls upon the United Nations 
to: 

(a) reiterate its conviction that the scope of sanc- 
tions against the illegal regime must be widened to in- 
clude all the measures envisaged under Article 41 of 
the Charter of the United Nations and it requests the 
Security Council to consider, as a matter of urgency, 
taking the necessary measures in that regard; 

(b) extend sanctions to marine and air insurance in 
order to prevent ships, aircraft carrying passengers or 
cargo destined to or coming from Southern Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe) from being insured. 

48. The Conference calls upon the Specialized Agen- 
cies and other organizations within the United Nations 
system to take all necessary measures, in accordance 
with the relevant Resolutions of the General Assembly 
and the Security Council, to withhold any financial, 
economic, technical or other assistance from the illegal 
racist minority regime of Southern Rhodesia (Zim- 
babwe), to discontinue all support to it and to refrain 
from taking any action which might imply recognition 
of the legitimacy of the domination of the territory by 
that regime. 

49. The Conference draws the attention of other in- 
tergovernmental organizations to the urgent need to 
adopt measures for the complete isolation of the illegal 
racist minority regime from the international commu- 
nity. 

C. Measures Against the Illegal South African Ad- 
ministration in Namibia. 

50. The Conference calls upon governments to: 

(a) categorically reject and denounce all manoeuvres 
such as tribal talks by which the South African regime 
may seek to impose its will upon the Namibian people; 

(b) decisively reject all attempts by South Africa to 
dismember the territory of Namibia and specially the 
design to annex Walvis Bay; 

(c) refrain from according any recognition to or co- 
operating with any authority or regime which South 
Africa may install in Namibia; 

(d) enact the necessary legislation consistent with 
Decree No. 1 on the protection of the natural re- 



sources of Namibia by the United Nations Council for 
Namibia; 

(e) fully respect the terms of Security Council Res- 
olutions 283 (1970) and 310 (1972) and thereby ensure 
an end to foreign economic activities and terminate 
any consular representation in or concerning Namibia; 

(f) implement the arms embargo against South Af- 
rica without any exceptions or reservations. 

51. The Conference calls upon the United Nations 
Security Council to impose, under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, a mandatory amis embargo against South Af- 
rica as an important step to ensure South Africa's 
compliance with the United Nations Resolutions and 
decisions on Namibia. 

52. The Conference calls upon the United Nations 
General Assembly to convene a Special Session on the 
question of Namibia bearing in mind the evolution of 
the situation in the territory. 

53. The Conference calls upon the Specialized Agen- 
cies and other organizations within the United Nations 
system, in accordance with relevant Resolutions of the 
General Assembly and the Security Council, to take all 
necessary measures to withhold any financial, econom- 
ic, technical and other assistance from the Government 
of South Africa; to discontinue all support to it, as 
such support impedes the realization of the inalienable 
right of the Namibian people to self-determination and 
independence and to refrain from taking any action 
which might imply recognition of the legitimacy of the 
illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa. 

54. The Conference draws the attention of other in- 
tergovernmental organizations to the urgent need to 
deny any co-operation with the South African Govern- 
ment as long as it persists in its illegal occupation of 
Namibia and in enforcing in the territory the policies 
of apartheid and homelands. 

55. The Conference appeals to all non-governmental 
organizations to intensify their campaigns against the 
illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa and 
against the application of its policies of apartheid and 
homelands to the territory. 

56. The Conference, in accordance with General As- 
sembly Resolution A/31/150 of 20 December 1976, calls 
upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to 
prepare, in consultation with the United Nations 
Council for Namibia, a detailed map of Namibia re- 
flecting its territorial integrity. 

57. The Conference supports the decision of the 
General Assembly directing the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations to make adequate provision for the 
setting up of a United Nations radio transmitter and 
recommends to the Secretary-General its early estab- 
lishment in accordance with Resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 
13 December 1974. 



July 11, 1977 



65 



U.S. Supports Expansion of Sanctions Against Rhodesia 



Following is a statement made in the 
U.N. Security Council by Acting U.S. Per- 
m.anent Representative James F. Leonard 
on May 27, together with the text of a res- 
olution adopted by the Council that day. 

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR LEONARD 

USUN press release 31 dated May 27 

For more than 11 years an illegal racist 
minority regime in Rhodesia has defied this 
Council, stood in open rebellion against the 
British Crown, and flouted world opinion. 
The result of this rebellion has been wide- 
spread suffering on the part of the people of 
Zimbabwe, suffering which threatens to ex- 
pand if majority rule is not achieved in 
Zimbabwe and the minority regime con- 
signed to oblivion. 

It is with particular satisfaction that my 
delegation has joined in drafting, cosponsor- 
ing, and adopting this resolution. 

The reasons for our satisfaction in this are 
numerous. As is well known to the members 
of this Council, my delegation was 
privileged to play one of the leading roles in 
the tightening of sanctions contained in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution. We 
believe that the elaboration and adoption of 
this resolution comes at an important time 
and must be seen in the context of such 
other important developments as the ehmi- 
nation of the Byrd amendment and the spirit 
of harmony and cooperative effort toward a 
common goal that characterized the recent 
meeting at Maputo [Mozambique]. The deci- 
sions taken in this resolution facilitate tight- 
ening the sanctions so that the illegal regime 
in Southern Rhodesia may no longer take 
advantage of loopholes to further its goals. 

This resolution, along with the other re- 



66 



cent actions to which I have referred, can 
leave no doubt in the minds of any of the 
leaders in Salisbury, or elsewhere, of the 
commitment of the international community 
to the attainment of a government in South- 
ern Rhodesia based on the consent of the 
governed. The unanimous nature of the ac- 
tion today underlines the strength of the in- 
ternational commitment. The efforts taken 
by the members of the Council to achieve 
this unanimous result auger well for continu- 
ing international cooperation to solve the 
many and serious problems of southern Af- 
rica. 

In agreeing to meet no later than 11 
November "to consider the application of 
further measures," we are committing our- 
selves to continue, in accordance with our 
often stated positions of principle, to 
explore ways and means of closing loopholes 
which may diminish the impact of the eco- 
nomic sanctions program. 

We are furthermore pleased that the for- 
mulation of this resolution has carefully pre- 
served the existing functions of the Sanc- 
tions Committee. For as matters now stand 
the sanctions regime is sufficient to impose a 
crushing burden on the economy of Southern 
Rhodesia. The need is to examine further 
the functioning of the system in order to 
prevent its circumvention. After almost nine 
years the minority government in Salisbury 
is still in power, and economic conditions 
have not declined appreciably. There are 
reasons for this and those reasons certainly 
lie in the fact that some nations allow viola- 
tions of the sanctions imposed by this Coun- 
cil. The Sanctions Committee's examination 
of particular cases, therefore, has become 
more important than ever. 

We hope, Mr. President [M. Thomas S. 



Department of State Bulletin 



Boya, of Benin], that before November of 
;his year important steps will have been 
aken to bring about a government in 
Rhodesia based on the free consent of the 
governed. We pledge ourselves to continue 
,0 work to that end through all available 
Tieans. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION i 

The Security Council, 

Reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 
viovember 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, 221 
1966) of 9 April 1966, 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966, 
;53 (1968) of 29 May 1968, 277 (1970) of 18 March 1970 
ind 388 (1976) of 6 April 1976, 

Reaffirming that the measures provided for in those 
•esolutions as well as the measures initiated by 
Vlember States in pursuance thereof, shall continue in 
effect. 

Taking into account the recommendations made by 
,he Security Council Committee established in pur- 
suance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question 
)f Southern Rhodesia in its second special report of 31 
Oeeember 1976 (S/12296) on the expansion of sanctions 
jgainst Southern Rhodesia, 

Reaff inning that the present situation in Southern 
Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace 
and security. 

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, 

1. Decides that all States Members of the United 
Nations shall prohibit the use or transfer of any funds 
in their territories by the illegal regime in Southern 
Rhodesia, including any office or agent thereof, or by 
other persons or bodies within Southern Rhodesia, for 
the purposes of any office or agency of the illegal re- 
gime that is established within their territories other 
than an office or agency so established exclusively for 
pensions purposes; 

2. Urges, having regard to the principle stated in 
Article 2, paragraph 6 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, States not Members of the United Nations to 
act in accordance with the provisions of the present 
resolution; 

3. Decides to meet not later than 11 November 1977 
to consider the application of further measures under 
Article 41 of the Charter, and meanwhile requests the 
Security Council Committee established in pursuance 
of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of 
Southern Rhodesia to examine, in addition to its other 
functions, the application of further measures under 
Article 41 and to report to the Security Council 
thereon as soon as possible. 



' U.N. doc. S/RES/409 (1977); adopted by the Council 
by consensus on May 27. 



July 11, 1977 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Environmental Modification 

Convention on the prohibition of military or any other 
hostile use of environmental modification techniques, 
with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977.' 
Sic/natu)-e: Benin, June 10, 1977. 

Health 

Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the constitution of 
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as 
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva 
May 17, 1976.' 
Acceptance deposited: Finland, June 14, 1977. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974. Enters into 
force April 1, 1978. 

Acceptances deposited: Angola, June 6, 1977; Jordan, 
April 5, 1977. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna 
February 21, 1971. Entered into force August 16, 
1976.2 
Accession deposited: Senegal, June 10, 1977. 

Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by 
dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. 
Done at" London, Mexico City, Moscow\ and Washing- 
ton December 29, 1972. Entered into force August 30, 
1975. TIAS 8165. 
Ratification deposited: Monaco, May 16, 1977. 

Space 

Convention on international liability for damage caused 
by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 
1973. 
Accession deposited: Israel, June 21, 1977. 

Tin 

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done 
at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force provi- 
sionally July 1, 1976. 

Ratification deposited: Bolivia, June 14, 1977. 
Acceptance deposited: Poland, June 14, 1977. 
Entered into force definitively: June 14, 1977. 



' Not in force. 

2 Not in force for the United States. 



67 



BILATERAL 

Canada 

Memorandum of understanding concerning region oper- 
ations control centers. Signed at Ottawa and Wash- 
ington March 5 and April 11, 1977. Entered into force 
April 11, 1977. 

European Economic Community 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the 
United States. Signed at Washington February 15, 
1977. 
Entered into force: June 9, 1977. 

Iran -< 

Agreement on procedures for mutual assistance in con- 
nection with mattei's relating to the Lockheed Air- 
craft Corporation, Grumman Corporation, and North- 
rop Corporation. Signed at Washington June 14, 
1977. Entered into force June 14, 1977. 

Korea 

Memorandum of understanding relating to a program in 
science and technology. Signed at Seoul May 24, 1977. 
Entered into force May 24, 1977. 

Lebanon 

Agreement foi" sales of agricultural commodities. 
Signed at Beirut April 2.5, 1977. 
Entered into force: June 21, 1977. 

United Kingdom 

Agreed minute I'elating to an air services agreement, 
with attachment. Signed at London June 22, 1977. 
Entered into force June 22, 1977. 

Zaire 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and reschedul- 
ing of certain debts owed to, guai'anteed, or insured 
by the Lhiited States Government and its agencies. 
Signed at Washington June 17, 1977. Enters into 
force when the United States notifies Zaire in writing 
that domestic United States laws and regulations 
covering debt rescheduling concerning this agree- 
ment have been complied with. 



PUBLICATIONS 



GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20i02. A 25- 
percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more 
copies of any one publication mailed to the same ad- 
dress. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of 
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown be- 
low, which include domestic postage, are subject to 
change. 



Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a 
map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. 
diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. i.A 
complete set of all Background Notes currently in 
stock — at least 140 — $21.80; 1-year subscription serv- 
ice for approximately 77 updated or new Notes — 
$24.00; plastic binder — $1.-50.) Single copies of those 
listed below are available at 50? each. 

Afghanistan Cat. No. SI. 123:AF3 

Pub. 7795 7 pp 

Barbados Cat. No. S1.123:B23 

Pub. 8242 4 pp 

Cambodia Cat. No. SI. 123:C14 

Pub. 7747 6 pp 

Canada Cat. No. S1.123:C16 

Pub. 7769 8 pp 

Denmark Cat. No. SI. 123:041 

Pub. 8298 4 pp 

Honduras Cat. No. SI. 123:H75/2 

Pub. 8184 4 pp 

Transfer of Technical Data— JT-IOD Jet Engine. 

Memorandum of understanding with the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. TIAS 
8459. 4 pp. 35C. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8459). 

Special Guerrilla Unit Forces and Equipment. Mem- 
orandum of understanding with Laos. TIAS 8462. 3 pp. 
350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8462). 

Malaria Control. Agreement with Ethiopia. TIAS 8463. 
.30 pp. 45e. (Cat. No. S9.10:8463). 

Triffa High Service Irrigation. Agreement with 
Morocco. TIAS 8464. 55 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:8464). 

Health Cooperation. Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 

8465. 11 pp. 3.50. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8465). 

Malaria Control. Agreement with Pakistan. TIAS 

8466. 55 pp. 750. (Cat. No. S9.10:8466). 

Development of Inland Waters Fisheries and 
Aquaculture. Agreement with Colombia. TIAS 8467. 
48 pp. 700. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8467). 

Extradition. Treaty, protocol of signature and e,\- 
change of notes with the United Kingdom of Great Bri- 
tain and Northern Ireland. TIAS 8468. 15 pp. 3.50. 
(Cat. No. 89.10:8468). 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with the Polish 
People's Republic amending and extending the agree- 
ment of July 19, 1972. TIAS 8469. 22 pp. 350. (Cat. 
No. 89.10:8469). 

Agricultural Development Activities. Agreement 
with Kenya. TIAS 8470. 46 pp. 650. (Cat. No. 
89.10:8470). 

Health Demonstration Project. Agreement with the 
Republic of Korea. TIAS 8471. 34 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 
89.10:8471). 

Dry Milk Products. Memorandum of understanding 
with New Zealand. TIAS 8472. 8 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 
89.10:8472). 

Grains and Perishables Marketing Systems. Agree- 
ment with Panama. TIAS 8473. 44 pp. 650. (Cat. No. 
89.10:8473). 



68 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX July 11, 1977 Vol. LXXVII, No. 1985 



China. Human Rights Situation in the Republic 
of China (Levin) 50 

Congress 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 54 

Human Rights Situation in the Republic of China 
(Levin) 50 

Withdrawal of U.S. Ground Forces From South 
Korea (Habib) 48 

Human Rights 

A Framework for Middle East Peace: Shaping a 
More Stable World (Mondale) 41 

Human Rights Situation in the Republic of China 
(Levin) 50 

Magazine Publishers Association Interviews 
President Carter (excerpts) 46 

Israel. A Framework for Middle East Peace: 
Shaping a More Stable World (Mondale) 41 

Japan. Withdrawal of U.S. Ground Forces From 
South Korea (Habib) 48 

Korea. Withdrawal of U.S. Ground Forces From 
South Korea (Habib) 48 

Middle East 

A Framework for Middle East Peace: Shaping a 

More Stable World (Mondale) 41 

Magazine Publishers Association Interviews 

President Carter (excerpts) 46 

Military Affairs. Withdrawal of U.S. Ground 
Forces From South Korea (Habib) 48 

Namibia. United States Reiterates Support for 
the Independence of Namibia and Zimbabwe at 
Maputo Conference (Young, Maynes, text of 
final declaration and program of action) 55 

Presidential Documents. Magazine Publishers 
Association Interviews President Carter 
(excerpts) 46 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications 68 

South Africa 

Magazine Publishers Association Interviews 
President Carter (excerpts) 46 

United States Reiterates Support for the Inde- 
pendence of Namibia and Zimbabwe at Maputo 
Conference (Young, Maynes, text of final dec- 
laration and program of action) 55 

Southern Rhodesia 

Magazine Publishers Association Interviews 
President Carter (excerpts) 46 

United States Reiterates Support for the Inde- 
pendence of Namibia and Zimbabwe at Maputo 
Conference (Young, Maynes, text of final decla- 
ration and program of action) 55 

S. Supports Expansion of Sanctions Against 
"hodesia (Leonard, text of resolution) 66 

aty Information. Current Actions 67 

ited Nations 

ited States Reiterates Support for the Inde- 
lendence of Namibia and Zimbabwe at Maputo 
onference (Young, Maynes, text of final dec- 
laration and program of action) 55 

".S. Supports Expansion of Sanctions Against 
Rhodesia (Leonard, text of resolution) 66 



Name Index 

Carter, President 46 

Habib, Philip C 48 

Leonard, James F 66 

Levin, Burton 50 

Maynes, Charles W 55 

Mondale, Vice President 41 

Young, Andrew 55 



No. 



Date 



*294 6/20 



t294 
*296 



*297 
*298 



6/21 
6/21 



6/21 
6/21 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 20-26 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Washing- 
ton, D.C. 20520. 

Subject 

Richard K. Fox, Jr., sworn .in as Am- 
bassador to Trinidad and Tobago 
(biographic data). 

Vance: arrival, Andrews Air Force 
Base, June 17. 

Albert W. Sherer, Jr., sworn in on 
June 10 as Ambassador to head the 
U.S. delegation to the CSCE pre- 
paratory meeting and as head of the 
delegation's working group at the 
main meeting (biographic data). 

21 museum professionals from 19 
countries begin five weeks of study, 
in the U.S., June 22. 

Study group 7 of the U.S. National 
Committee for the International 
Radio Consultative Committee 
(CCIR), Greenbelt, Md., July 
21-22. 

U.S., U.K. initial new air services 
agreement. 

15 Latin American visitors begin 
2-week seminar on outlook for 
world trade, June 20. 

Vance: OECD ministerial, Paris. 

Third meeting of U.S. -India Subcom- 
mission on Science and Technology, 
June 16-17. 

Program for state visit to U.S. of 
President Carlos Andres Perez, of 
Venezuela, June 27-July 2. 

Study group 1 of the U.S. National 
Committee for the International 
Radio Consultative Committee 
(CCIR), July 21. 

Vance: remarks to press following 
meeting with President Giscard 
d'Estaing, Paris. 

Vance, Blumenthal: news conference, 
Paris, June 24. 



*Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



t299 


6/22 1 


*300 


6/22 


t.301 
*302 


6/23 ■' 
6/23 ' 


*30.3 


6/24 


*304 


6/24 


t305 


6/24 


t306 


6/25 



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXVII • No. 1986 • July 18, 1977 



SECRETARY VANCE ATTENDS OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT GRENADA 
Statements, News Conference, and Text of Resolution 69 

SECRETARY VANCE INTERVIEWED ON "ISSUES AND ANSWERS" 78 

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES RESULTS OF CIEC MEETING 
Statement by Under Secretary Cooper 92 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Ik 



Vol. LXXVII, No. 1986 
July 18, 1977 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington. D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $J2.50, foreign $53.15 

Single copy 85 cents 

The Secretary of State has determined that the pub- 
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Department. Use of funds for printing this periodi- 
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of Management and Budget through January 31, 
1981. 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re- 
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BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The 
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BLLLETL 
a weekly publication issued by th 
Office of Media Services, Bureau o\ 
Public Affairs, provides the public ani 
interested agencies of the gocernmen 
with information on developments in 
the field of L'.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 

The BILLETIS includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, and 
news conferences of the President and 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as spe- 
cial articles on various phases of in^ 
ternational affairs and the functions on 
the Department. Information is in-M 
eluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
L'nited States is or may become a parli^ 
and on treaties of general interna 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department o)| 
State, United .\ations documents, and 
legislative material in the field oi 
international relations are also listed.] 



ISecretary Vance Attends OAS General Assembly at Grenada 



The seventh regular General Assembly of 
the Organization of American States niet at 
St. George's, Grenada, June 14-2i. Secretary 
Vance headed the U.S. delegation June H-16; 
he visited Trinidad and Tobago June 16-17 
before returning to Washington. Following 
are the texts of Secretary Vance's first inter- 
vention made before the Assembly on June H, 
his statement on U.S. -Panama negotiations 
on June 15, the transcript of his news confer- 
ence held on June 16, and his arrival remarks 
in Washington on June 17, together with the 
text of a resolution adopted by the Assemblu 
on June 22. ^ 



FIRST INTERVENTION, JUNE 14 

Ptess release 282 dated June 15 

I am delighted to join you in this informal 
dialogue. We are on our way to a frank, di- 
rect, and close working relationship based on 
the values and associations we share. 

In his remarks before the Permanent Coun- 
cil of this organization of April 14, President 
Carter said: 

... a single U.S. policy toward Latin America and 
the Caribbean makes little sense. What we need is a 
wider and a more fle.xible approach, worked out in close 
consultation with you. Together, we will develop 
policies more suited to each nation's variety and poten- 
tial. In this process, I will be particularly concerned 
that we not seek to divide the nations of Latin America 
one from another or to set Latin America apart from 
the rest of the world. Our own goal is to address prob- 
lems in a way which will lead to productive solutions — 
globally, regionally, and bilaterally. 

Whatever the forum, we all recognize the 
.special core of regional interests that brings 



' Another press release related to Secretary Vance's 
trip is No. 292 dated June 18. 



US together here today. Our nations, for all 
their diversity, share historical, institutional, 
and personal ties. 

These ties are important to us; we cannot 
take them for granted. Our cooperation can 
shape global decisions to the advantage of all 
our countries. In President Carter's words: 
"The pi'oblems and the promises of our region 
have become as diverse as the world itself." 

Through our organization we can usefully 
embody that tradition of hemispheric peace, a 
tradition already so well advanced in the 
Latin American nuclear free zone. This pact 
has set an example to all the rest of the world, 
and President Carter has just strengthened 
my government's adherence. 

We are justly proud of our peacekeeping 
machinery, our commitment to inter- 
American cooperation to settle tei'ritorial dis- 
putes. And we are together in our respect for 
the human rights of all our peoples. 

Today I would like to single out two areas 
of regional cooperation that are of special con- 
cern to my government. These two areas are 
human rights and reform of the OAS. In em- 
phasizing these two points, I do not wish to 
minimize the other issues before us. The 
hemispheric agenda is rich. The OAS can do 
much to strengthen our consultations, im- 
prove our cultural relations, and maintain a 
tradition of peace. 

Of all the values which the Americas share, 
respect for the individual is surely the most 
significant. The basic constitutional docu- 
ments of all our nations cite the rights of man. 
Nowhere are they more prominent than in the 
charter of this organization. In the U.N. 
Charter, each of our governments has ac- 
cepted the obligation to promote respect for 
human rights among all nations. 



July 18, 1977 



69 



There is no ambiguity about these obliga- 
tions. A state's efforts to protect itself and se- 
cure its society cannot be exercised by deny- 
ing the dignity of its individual citizens or by 
suppressing political dissent. 

Since the last General Assembly, men who 
once sat among us have been victims of vio- 
lent assault. We mourn the deaths of Foreign 
Minister Borgonovo [of El Salvador] and 
former Foreign Minister Letelier [of Chile]. 
And we share the relief at the narrow escape 
of Foreign Minister Guzzetti [of Argentina]. 

If terrorism and violence in the name of dis- 
sent cannot be condoned, neither can violence 
that is officially sanctioned. Such action per- 
verts the legal system that alone assures the 
survival of our traditions. 

The surest way to defeat terrorism is to 
promote justice in our societies — legal, eco- 
nomic, and social justice. Justice that is sum- 
mary undermines the future it seeks to pro- 
mote. It produces only more violence, more 
victims, and more terrorism. Respect for the 
rule of law will promote justice and remove 
the seeds of subversion. Abandoning such re- 
spect, governments descend into the nether- 
world of the terrorist and lose their strongest 
weapon—their moral authority. 

Progress toward higher universal standards 
of justice can also be attained by strengthen- 
ing the inter-American commitment to human 
rights through our common action. On June 1 
President Carter signed the American Con- 
vention on Human Rights. ^ I believe this 
General Assembly should move to strengthen 
the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights. The Commission is elected from 
among the OAS member states. It serves as 
an independent monitor of human rights in the 
Americas. 

My government will vote to increase the 
Commission's budget. The Commission needs 
more personnel to handle a growing caseload 
of complaints. With more funds, the Commis- 
sion could issue more than occasional reports. 
It could increase its research efforts, hold 
more seminars, and increase the frequency of 
visits to every country of the hemisphere. 



* For text of the convention, see Bulletin of July 4, 
1977, p. 28. 



Several Commission reports are on our reg- 
ular agenda. They have been prepared with 
care and independence, sometimes with full 
access to witnesses and records, sometimes 
without the cooperation of governments. 

If each member state were to grant the 
Commission free access to national territory, 
this body would be able to carry out onsite in- 
vestigations at times and places of its choos- 
ing. My country will grant it this facility from 
today. We believe that for others to do so as 
well would reduce misunderstandings and the 
dissemination of false information. 

Let us work together to guide this sensitive 
issue into the multilateral framework we our- 
selves have set up and then let us use that 
framework to make progress. 

And let there be no doubt that my govern- 
ment joins in dedication to international coop- 
eration to secure economic and social rights as 
well as civil and political rights. We will con- 
tinue to contribute to the development of poor 
and middle income countries, both bilaterally 
and multilaterally. These programs will be 
designed to help the poorest of our peoples. 

But our cooperation in economic develop- 
ment must not be mocked by consistent pat- 
terns of gross violation of human rights. My 
government believes in the sovereignty and 
independence of all states. We do not ask 
others to emulate our particular form of de- 
mocracy. The principle of political pluralism 
lies at the head of this organization. 

We do support the right of all people to 
freely participate in their government. This 
right is based on the conviction that the indi- 
vidual citizen is a subject, not an object. 
Policies that contradict this tenet are alien to 
our shared traditions. 

I am pleased to note the attention paid to 
the issue of human rights by my esteemed col- 
leagues in statements made here today. Uni- 
versal recognition of the problem is laudable, 
and I believe it would be equally laudable if 
we all agreed to do what we can to improve 
the situation, individually and collectively. 

As we strengthen our collective machinery 
for dealing with the problems of human 
rights, so should we also be ready to modify 
and bring up to date our overall organizational 
structure. For almost 30 years, the OAS has 



70 



Department of State Bulletin 



provided an institutional framework for 
inter-American cooperation. In trying to 
make this a more dynamic and effective or- 
ganization, our representatives have been 
working for the last four years to come up 
with the draft of a new chapter. 

Unfortunately this new draft does not, in 
our opinion, reach the goal we set. We need a 
charter that all member states can support 
without reservations, one that need not be 
rewritten every few years. Our charter 
should be flexible enough to serve well into 
the future. 

We believe restructuring should be 
analyzed in a broad framework, not in 
piecemeal negotiations over clauses in the 
draft charter. 

Structural reform should provide for: 

— A modernized organization, free of un- 
necessary bureaucracy, without any hint of 
U.S. dominance; and 

— Ma.ximum opportunity for all American 
states to participate and maximum opportu- 
nity for consultations among our govern- 
ments. 

We need to agree upon a few important 
goals. President Carter, in his remarks to the 
Permanent Council, April 14, suggested 
these: 

— Preserving peace and security; 

— Promoting respect for human rights; 

— Providing for ministerial-level consulta- 
tions on major political and economic prob- 
lems; and 

— Expanding cultural, educational, and 
technical assistance. 

I am happy to announce on this last point 
that the Carter Administration will ask our 
Congress to approve a contribution of 
$500,000 to the OAS Special Account for Cul- 
ture. In addition, we are preparing a request 
to Congress for a further $2 million for other 
supporting programs. 

To embody these goals, we believe, fii'st of 
all, that structure and formal bureaucracy 
should be kept to a minimum. I do not think 
that the Permanent Council should be 
abolished — it is important to have an ongoing 
body with political authority to decide current 



issues. I suggest instead merging the existing 
three Councils into one. All three have the 
same representatives. Time and money could 
be saved by making the merger official. In 
addition, the Secretariat should be granted 
greater authority to decide routine matters, 
thus permitting the new Council to concen- 
trate on larger issues. 

Second, informal consultations should re- 
place much of the standing bureaucracy. Spe- 
cial consultations among top officials with op- 
erational responsibility should become more 
regular. For economic discussions, for in- 
stance, governments might send a minister of 
finance, trade, or industry to special OAS con- 
ferences on development or commerce. Such 
consultations should not be institutionalized in 
the OAS Charter. The General Assembly 
should be free to call for them as needed. Any 
committees required should be abolished 
when their work is completed. 

Finally, realistic participation in our ac- 
tivities should reflect the diverse community 
of American states. Our membership policy 
should be universal with all independent 
states of the Americas free to join. My gov- 
ernment favors the elimination of article 8 of 
the charter. No other international organiza- 
tion has a similar bar to admission. ^ 

Financial obligations of member states 
should be realistic. We need to face two ur- 
gent tasks: 

— Deciding on an appropriate U.S. assess- 
ment; and 

— Deciding on appropriate contributions 
and roles for the smallest states. 

It is an anachronism for the United States 
to contribute 66 percent to the assessed 
budget of the OAS. A balanced and healthy 
organization requires that no single member 



^ Article 8 of the OAS Charter, as amended by the 
protocol of Buenos Aires in 1967, states that: 

"The Permanent Council shall not make any recom- 
mendation nor shall the General Assembly take any de- 
cision with respect to a request for admission on the 
part of a political entity whose territory became sub- 
ject, in whole or in part, prior to December 18, 1964, 
the date set by the First Special Inter-American Con- 
ference, to litigation or claim between an extraconti- 
nental country and one or more Member States of the 
Organization, until the dispute has been ended by some 
peaceful procedure." 



July 18, 1977 



71 



should pay more than 49 percent of the as- 
sessed budget. 

A new system of OAS financing should be a 
part of overall reform. Realignment of quotas 
could be phased in over a period of time — as 
much as 5-10 years — to minimize hardship for 
the membership of the organization itself. 

In conclusion, the United States favors a 
thoroughly reformed OAS structure — clear in 
its purpose, flexible and lean in formal 
machinery, vigorous in the use of informal 
consultation procedures, and realistically fi- 
nanced. We of the OAS have a heritage of 
which we can be justly proud. Realization of 
its future promise deserves nothing short of 
our best combined efforts. 



STATEMENT, JUNE 15 

Press release 285 dated June 16 

Since submitting their second report to this 
Assembly last year, the Republic of Panama 
and the United States have achieved consid- 
erable progress in the negotiation of a new 
treaty to replace the 1903 convention. 

It is not our intention to review the history 
and resurrect old grievances or reopen old 
wounds. Instead we approach this question in 
the spirit that has characterized this Adminis- 
tration's approach to these negotiations. This 
statement represents the views of the U.S. 
Government on the present state of negotia- 
tions. As President Carter emphasized in his 
Pan American Day speech in Washington, the 
early completion of the new Panama Canal 
treaty is a high priority objective of his 
foreign policy. 

The following events in recent months dem- 
onstrate the commitment of both governments 
to this objective: 

— The meeting between the Secretary of 
State and the Panamanian Foreign Minister in 
Washington January 31 during which they 
reaffirmed the Statement of Principles of 
February 1974; 

— A round of negotiations in Panama in 
mid-February during which the two sides had 
an opportunity to explore possible solutions to 
important and difficult outstanding issues; 

— A meeting in mid-March in Washington 
during which the negotiators continued the 



process commenced in Panama the month be- 
fore; and 

— An intensive round of negotiations com- 
mencing May 9 in Washington, which is con- 
tinuing now. 

Discussions between the two sides since 
January have focused on the following issues: 

— The duration of the treaty; 

— The nature and functions of the adminis- 
trative organization which will operate the 
canal during the life of the treaty; 

— The status of the American and Panama- 
nian employees of that entity; 

— An identification of the lands and waters 
which are necessary for the successful opera- 
tion of the canal; and 

— Provisions to assure that the canal re- 
mains permanently secure and open to the 
ships of all nations on a nondiscriminatory 
basis. 

We believe that substantial progress has 
been made. The present discussions are fo- 
cused on the details of these subjects, each of 
which must be linked to the other in any final 
agreement that is reached. In addition, our 
negotiators will be addressing economic is- 
sues, a subject which until this time has not 
been under formal discussion. 

The objective of our negotiators during the 
present round of discussions is to come to 
agreement in principle on these issues. Once 
these agreements have been reached and the 
respective governments have had an opportu- 
nity to review the negotiators' work, the 
process of treaty drafting will commence. 
While one cannot predict with accuracy when 
a new treaty will be ready for the initiation of 
ratification procedures in both countries, we 
hope that an agreement can be reached this 
year, perhaps before the end of the summer. 

NEWS CONFERENCE, JUNE 16 

Press release 286 dated June 17 

Secretary Vance: Good morning, ladies and 
gentlemen. Why don't we just start in, and I 
will take the first question. 

Q. Is there any indication that Brezhnev's 
new acquisition of greater poiver will change 
the nature of U.S. -Soviet relations? 



72 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretanj Va?ice: I don't think this is going 
to change the relationships between the 
Soviet Union and the United States. It was 
anticipated that this would be the result, and 
I would expect that the relationship between 
the Soviet Union and the United States will 
continue on the same course and hopefully im- 
prove in the period ahead. 

Q. Polemics are going in both directions be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet Union. 
It seems we hope for reversing this trend in 
trade and in atmospherics most especially. 
Do you see hopes for reaching a strategic 
arms agreement with the Soviet Union by Oc- 
tober 3 when the deadline runs out? 

Secretary Vance: It's a lot of questions; let 
me try to answer one by one. 

Let me start with the latter question first. 
Do you see hopes of reaching an arms agree- 
ment in the SALT talks with the Soviet Union 
before October when the interim agreement 
runs out? I simply have no idea if that is pos- 
sible but, as I have said on previous occasions, 
I don't think we ought to feel ourselves under 
any deadline. I think that the most important 
thing is that we reach an agreement that is a 
sound agreement, that is fair and equitable to 
both, and which will be lasting and will not 
have ambiguities which would lead to charges 
of bad faith in the future. Therefore, I feel we 
should proceed with patience and persever- 
ence to work out just that kind of an agree- 
ment and not to feel ourselves under any 
deadline. 

Insofar as the issue of trade is concerned, I 
did say that I think trade is an important un- 
derpinning of the relationship between our 
two countries. We have not made the kind of 
progress in the field of trade that I would 
have hoped. The trade, as anticipated for 
next year, will be sub.'^tantially less. Again, 
however, I don't think that this means that 
we should not continue to persevere to try to 
increase the flow of trade between our two 
countries, because I think it is of great impor- 
tance. One of the factors that affects this, of 
course, is the question of most-favored-nation 
treatment to the Soviet Union. At the present 
time that is precluded by a congressional 
amendment, and as I look at the situation now 
on Capitol Hill, I think in the climate which 



exists that it would be impossible to have that 
amendment removed. Therefore, I think it is 
not likely in the near future. However, I 
would hope that in time this could be done. 

Finally, with respect to the general atmos- 
phere, I hope very much the general atmos- 
phere will improve. I think it's important — 
and not only for the bilateral relationship be- 
tween our two countries — that that relation- 
ship and the atmosphere surrounding it im- 
prove. And from our standpoint, we are going 
to continue to do what we can to try to im- 
prove that relationship, and we hope that 
would be reciprocated. 

Q. Can you tell us what progress has been 
made on human rights? 

Secretary Vance: Let me talk about the 
human rights question in a broader 
framework than this meeting and the bilateral 
talks. I think what is of greatest 
importance — which is coming out at these 
OAS meetings — is the attention which is 
being paid to the issue of human rights. There 
is no question that that issue is dominating 
the discussion in the OAS itself and in the 
bilaterals which each of us is having. 

There can be no doubt that whatever way 
the actual concrete steps eventuate from this 
meeting, the sensitivity of all of the parties at 
this meeting has been greatly raised, and I 
think this is a matter of great importance and 
of great significance. Therefore, I feel that 
the fact that this has been done indicates a 
very important step for this organization and 
for the issue of human rights, not only in this 
area but throughout the world. 

Q. What is your position on the territonal 
integrity of Belize? 

Secretary Vance: The subject of Belize is 
one which is of great importance. It is one 
which we have been following with care. We 
have discussed with our friends and col- 
leagues in this meeting that issue. It has also 
been raised in the general discussion. 

No conclusions have been reached with re- 
spect to how to solve that problem, but there 
is a general feeling in spirit that this is an 
issue which must be resolved. I get a feeling 
that all of the members of the OAS will wish 
to do what they can to try to bring about a 



July 18, 1977 



73 



prompt and satisfactory resolution of the 
problem. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, have yon sought or re- 
ceived arty assurance from Chile, Uruguay, 
or Argentina that they'll release political 
prisoners in the near future? 

Secretary Vance: In the discussions which I 
have had with some of the parties who are 
members of the OAS — without specifically re- 
ferring to who they are — I have been told that 
steps are intended which will improve the 
human rights situation in various countries; 
that they are sensitive to these problems; and 
we shall have to wait and see what happens. I 
do not want to go specifically into names of 
individual countries. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any chance of 
any kind of collective security acts under the 
Rio Treaty to resolve the Belize dispute? 

Secretary Vance: That has not been dis- 
cussed in these meetings. The meetings will 
be going on, as you know, for several more 
days, and whether that will come up, I just 
don't know. At this point, people are talking 
in terms of seeing whether some sort of bilat- 
eral mediation can help in solving these prob- 
lems. 

Q. Since President Carter began his cam- 
paign on human rights is there any evidence 
that the human rights situation has im- 
proved? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. I think that there is 
some evidence that it has improved in certain 
countries. There are, as I indicated, state- 
ments that further positive steps may be ex- 
pected in the future. On the other hand, I 
must say that in other countries there does 
not appear to have been progress and, indeed, 
in one or two cases there may have been re- 
gression. If so, I would say the answer is a 
mi.x, but I would point out what I have said 
many times before — that I think you have to 
measure pi'ogress in the human rights area 
over a long period of time. You can't measure 
it over the short run. And the most important 
thing is to have agreement with respect to the 
importance of this issue — the fact that this is 
a universal issue that affects people through- 
out the world, not only in specific countries 



but in regions throughout the globe. And I 
think this is being done. 

So I think what we must do is measure this 
over the longer period of time, continue to 
work to improve the situation in cases where 
problems are raised with different countries, 
and then see what happens over the long 
period of time. 

Q. Do you think you have changed any 
minds or won allies on human rights here at 
this conference? 

Secretary Vance: I found a good deal of 
support for many of the proposals which we 
have been espousing, but I would not charac- 
terize this as only the United States. There 
are many other nations which share the views 
that we share in human rights, so I don't want 
to make this a U.S. thing. There is wide rec- 
ognition of the importance of human rights, 
the importance of human dignity, and the 
need to take steps to preserve and foster 
them. 

Q. Does the Administration have plans to 
stop the flow of pipeline military supplies to 
Argentina? 

Secretary Vance: The situation for this year 
has been determined, and as you know, we 
made a cut earlier this year. I understand 
there was some legislation proposed yester- 
day on the floor of the Senate, and I don't 
know what the final disposition of that has 
been. That would not affect the total supply, 
but I think as it finally came out, it provided 
that no action would be taken until the fall of 
1978. Whether such action would then be 
taken would depend on the progress which 
had been made at that time. That is my un- 
derstanding of what is in that piece of legisla- 
tion. I have not had a chance to see it. 

Q. There seems to be a split in the OAS, 
with at least half a dozen or more members 
taking issue with your position. Were these 
the intended results, or how do i/ou explain 
it? 

Secretary Vance: I think the important 
thing is to get the issue out on the table and 
have it really discussed. Only through discus- 
sion can we hope to make progress. That has 



74 



Department of State Bulletin 



been the result here, and I think it will con- 
tinue long after this meeting. 

Q. As you point out, the issue of liuutan 
rights has dominated the discussions here and 
will do so in Belgrade. Has it made the con- 
duct of U .S . foreign policy more complicated? 

Secretary Vance: I think emphasis on it has 
made it more comphcated, but I think it's im- 
portant that be done because it is a compli- 
cated business. But it's a fundamental one, 
and, therefore, whether it's complicated or 
not is not the important issue. The important 
issue is: Are we making progress in the right 
direction'? Are we beginning to steer a course 
which is a proper course? And I think that 
this is hopefully the case. 

Q. Venezuela and Ecuador feel they have 
been adversely affected by GSP [generalized 
system of preferences] exclusion. Will there 
be any resolution this year? 

Secretary Vance: I don't know; we are all 
waiting to see what happens in the OPEC 
[Organization of Petroleum E.xporting Coun- 
tries] meeting. I, myself, don't know at this 
point what the result will be. I have heard 
rumors to the effect that there may be some 
price increases coming out in this next meet- 
ing, but that is just a rumor at this point. I 
honestly don't know what the result is going 
to be. 

Q. Does that mean that you no longer re- 
gard Venezuela and Ecuador as having spe- 
cial status because of their restraints the first 
time around when the OPEC prices in- 
creased? 

Secretary Vance: Well, insofar as the 
generalized system of preferences is con- 
cerned, they were covered by the' resolution 
which was a blocking resolution, whether or 
not they took the position that they took [on 
oil price increases]. 

Q. On the Panama Canal, are you optimis- 
tic about a Panama Canal treaty by the end 
of the summer? 

Secretary Vance: On the canal situation, we 
have made progress. There are some compli- 
cated and difficult issues which still remain to 
be resolved. I think it is possible that an 
agreement could be reached by the end of the 



summer. I don't want to predict that is going 
to come about because the questions remain- 
ing still are tough ones, but I hope with good 
will and hard work on both sides that we can 
reach an agi-eement by the end of the summer. 

Q. What is your present reading on the 
mood of the Seyiate on the treaty? 

Secretary Vance: We've got a lot of work in 
the Senate. I think if one had to count the 
votes as of today, it would be very close, and I 
am not sure we would have the votes. I hope 
by the time it comes to a vote, we would have 
been able to explain clearly to the American 
people why it is in the interest of both coun- 
tries to have this new agreement, and having 
done that we will get the necessary support 
for ratification. 

Q. When President Carter asked Mr. An- 
drew Young to pay more attention to the 
Caribbean and Latin America, was he merely 
creating a favorable atmosphere for this con,- 
ference, or was he really giving expression of 
the positive intentions of the United States 
toward this region? 

Secretary Vance: Clearly the latter. Andy 
Young is an extraordinarily able and gifted 
man. I think that his work in dealing with 
Third World problems has been very positive 
and very useful. Certainly in the suggestion 
the President was making, he was talking 
about the broad sweep, and it had nothing to 
do with this conference. 

Q. In the Spanish elections today it looks 
like the center and center-left parties have a 
majority. Do you have any comments at this 
stage? 

Secretary Vance: My comment is that I 
think it is very important what has happened 
in Spain. The fact that Spain has been able to 
move from an authoritarian rule to the point 
where it can have democratic elections is a 
most significant political fact. 

I think that the greatest tribute is due to 
the King for having been able to lead his coun- 
try to this point. I think that he has led them 
with skill and care along the road toward the 
restoration of democracy and that all of us 
who believe in democracy throughout the 
world can be heartened by this. 



July 18, 1977 



75 



Q. A number of countries seem to be mak- 
ing an issue of linking terrorism and human 
rights, a linkage you specifically rejected in 
your speech. Do you expect a resolution link- 
ing those two will emerge from this confer- 
ence, and if so, ivould if deflate what you have 
been trying to do here? 

Secretary Vance: No, not at all. I think ter- 
rorism is a very serious problem. It is a prob- 
lem that has to be dealt with. I think it is in- 
correct, however, to take a position which 
would indicate that one can combat terrorism 
by counterterrorism. I think that is wrong 
and will produce quite the opposite result. 
However, that is not to minimize the problem 
of terrorism, which I think must be dealt with 
and must be dealt with fii-mly. 

Q. Recently you met in Paris with Minister 
Azeredo of Brazil, and you have seen him 
again here. Can you tell ms about the state of 
relations between your government and the 
Brazilian Government? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, we have had one 
meeting with him in Paris and secondly we 
have had the visit of Mrs. Carter to Brazil in 
which we had very useful and constructive 
discussions with President Geisel. I was able 
to have some further discussions on a whole 
variety of matters. Many of them dealt with 
the subject matter of this conference. We 
touched upon some other bilateral issues, and 
I have agreed to go to Brazil at the end of Oc- 
tober for a meeting. As you know, we have a 
memorandum of understanding with Brazil 
which provides for reciprocal visits between 
the Foreign Ministers of the two countries. 
Our relationship with Brazil is a very impor- 
tant one, and I look forward to going there in 
the fall to have discussions on the whole range 
of ongoing matters which exist between our 
two countries. 

ARRIVAL, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, JUNE 17 

Press release 295 dated June 21 

Q. [Inaudible, but requested the Secretary's 
general assessment of the Grenada talks.] 

Secretary Vance: I think they were useful. 



As I said yesterday, the fact that we got 
people to really talk seriously about the issue 
of human rights, and focus on the question 
and not bury it, is an important step. Obvious- 
ly, there is no agreement among the group on 
what the answer should be. I think all of us 
made our views very clear on the importance 
of it. And I think that is an important step. 

Q. How did the talks with the leaders of 
Trinidad and Tobago go and what did you 
talk about? 

Secretary Vance: We talked primarily about 
economic matters affecting the Caribbean 
area. There are a number of situations in the 
Caribbean which are really very troublesome. 
And the Prime Minister is a very, very 
knowledgeable man who has given an awful 
lot of thought to the emerging problems of the 
area and various ways to try to cope with 
them. So I felt it very helpful to have a chance 
to get his views on some of those problems. 
And we agreed to continue to discuss these 
matters with them and with others as well. 

But you have a whole series of problems 
arising out of those new emerging situations, 
as well as some serious problems in countries 
like Jamaica and Guyana. There are problems 
that have to be faced up to and just can't be 
ignored. So I am glad that I had the opportu- 
nity to get their views on this and to sharpen 
my thoughts on basic ways that one might try 
to attack these problems. 

Q. Are you concerned about the state of re- 
lations with Brazil, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary Va?ice: No, no. 

Q. Hoiv do you assess them notv? 

Secretary Vance: I think our relationships 
are good with Brazil. We have our differen- 
ces. We understand where those differences 
are, but we can discuss them in a friendly 
way. And we are going to, as I said yester- 
day, continue to operate under the memoran- 
dum of understanding. I am looking forward 
to having a chance to go there and talk with 
them here. I hope that these subgroups in the 
meantime will meet and discuss issues in the 
area of trade and other matters which have 
been provided for under the memorandum of 
understanding. 



76 



Department of State Bulletin 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION ^ 

Means to promote respect for and protection of 
human rights 

Whereas: 

The nations voluntarily associated in the Organiza- 
tion of American States have established the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man as a goal 
for the development of their legal culture and a neces- 
sary framework for the men of the Americas to reach 
their full political expression; 

Throughout their history as free nations, they have 
struggled to defend the principle of self-determination 
and the right of their peoples to choose the system of 
government that best suits their interests; 

Likewise, the principle of nonintervention of the 
states in the internal affairs of other states is respected 
and defended by the Organization of American States as 
a basis for the juridical equality of the states; 

The commitments assumed by the states on protec- 
tion of and respect for human rights have not been 
delegated by the inter-American community or the in- 
ternational community to any particular state, but to 
special agencies created by them; 

The present legal instruments created to investigate 
violations of the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man present deficiencies that make appli- 
cation of its standards less effective; 

In the initial stages of the processes of economic de- 
velopment and capital formation — and in the absence of 
effective international financial cooperation — 
phenomena, such as reduction in consumption and the 



'' Adopted by the Assembly at the fourth plenary ses- 
sion on June 22 by a vote of 14 (U.S.) to 0, with 8 
abstentions (text from GAS doc. AG/doc. 890/77 rev. 1). 



prolonged postponement of the satisfaction of legiti- 
mate needs of the peoples present themselves, circum- 
stances that create serious social tensions and a politi- 
cal climate that is not conducive to the necessary re- 
spect for and protection of human rights; 

The General Assembly 
Resolves: 

1. To recommend to the Inter-American Commission 
of Human Rights that it prepare a study on the systems 
and methods of investigation of violations of those 
rights, based on nondiscriminatory principles that rec- 
ognize the juridical equality of states and state their ob- 
ligation to carry out the commitments assumed in the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 
to be submitted to the Permanent Council so that the 
latter may examine it and formulate observations with 
regard to it. 

2. To request the developed countries to expand the 
developing countries' participation in international 
trade through the abolition of their discriminatory and 
protectionist practices; to carry out their commitments 
regarding the Generalized System of Preferences; to 
reduce their extremely high expenditures for arma- 
ments that endanger world peace and the survival of 
civilization, and promote the transfer of their flows of 
excess capital toward the developing countries within 
the framework of their respective national laws, so that 
these flows will alleviate the harshness of the processes 
of capital formation and create favorable conditions for 
the functioning of democratic systems and the full effec- 
tiveness of human rights. 

3. To expedite establishment of new and effective 
inter-American cooperation for the integral develop- 
ment of the American countries, and this is a basic 
means to promote full legal recognition of human rights 
in the juridical as well as economic, social, and cultural 
spheres. 



July 18, 1977 



77 



Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Issues and Answers' 



Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Vance on the ABC television 
and radio program on June 19. Interviewing 
the Secretary ivere Bob Clark and Barrie 
Dunsmore of ABC News. 

Press release 293 dated June IH 

Mr. Clark: The Carter Administration is 
coyning under increasing attack these days 
from those who think, for a variety of rea- 
sons, that the United States is relaxing its 
guard against the Communist world. By re- 
fusing this week to endorse the President's 
plan to 2vithdraw American troops from 
South Korea, the Senate seemed to be telling 
him to go slow on such a pullout. Will the 
Senate's action affect the timetable for with- 
drawal? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say a word by way 
of background and then answer specifically 
your question. 

Since the very start of the Carter Adminis- 
tration we have been striving to work very 
closely with the Congress in both the de- 
velopment and the implementation of foreign 
policy. Both the President and I have said 
consistently that we believed that if we were 
going to have an effective foreign policy, it 
must be developed in coordination and in 
cooperation with the Congress. To that end 
we have been keeping them fully informed as 
we have moved along in the development of 
various foreign policy initiatives. 

During the last week a number of bills came 
to the floor. One of those did relate to the Ko- 
rean situation. The action taken by the Con- 
gress there did not restrict the President's 
rights to proceed with a phased withdrawal of 
our troops from Korea. It indicated that they 
expected that we would work in cooperation 
with the Congress as we proceeded down the 



road to a phased withdrawal over a period of 
approximately five years. 

We intend to do that. That is wholly con- 
sistent with the path which we have been fol- 
lowing. We welcome that cooperation and that 
consultation. 

There are obviously some matters which 
the President, as Commander-in-Chief, can 
only take, because of his responsibilities. But 
I look forward, as does the President, to 
working with the Congress as we proceed to 
the phased withdrawal of our troops from 
Korea. 

Mr. Clark: But the Senate did appear to be 
sending a signal to the President that there 
may be trouble ahead if he proceeds according 
to the present timetable for ivithdrawal of all 
American troops. Is it conceivable to you that 
the President might in some way alter that 
timetable because of congressional pressure? 

Secretary Vance: I did not draw the same 
conclusions, Mr. Clark, that you did from 
that. What I understood them to be saying 
was that they wanted to be kept informed as 
we proceeded down this road and not that 
they were saying that they did not endorse a 
phased withdrawal. 

Indeed, I think as the resolution was put in 
originally it would have done that, but that 
was not the amendment which passed. 

Mr. Dunsmore: Mr. Secretary, the one 
thing that seems to symbolize the Carter Ad- 
miyiistration's foreign policy is, of course, 
human rights. The other day in Grenada you 
conceded, however, that human rights had 
made the co)iduct offoreigti policy somewhat 
more difficult or coniplicated, though you 
said it was worth it. 

I am wondering in view of the fact that rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union now appear to be 



78 



Department of State Bulletin 



i)i considerable difficulty, that there are new 
difficulties in Latin America, particularli/ 
with Brazil, that there are potentially new 
difficulties over human rights over places like 
China and Korea, if indeed it was really 
worth it or if indeed the campaign has been 
handled as deftly as it might have been. 

Issue of Human Rights 

Secretary Vance: I am awfully glad to have 
the opportunity to say something about 
human rights. Human rights is fundamental to 
our foreign policy, and we believe it is a fun- 
damental issue that threads through the 
foreign policy of all nations of the world. The 
issue of human rights is one which is universal 
in character, and it is one which for too long 
has been swept under the rug and not dealt 
with. 

I welcomed the opportunity in Grenada to 
have a full and frank discussion with our col- 
leagues and friends in the OAS on the ques- 
tion of human rights. There was not unanim- 
ity of view. We didn't expect it. Yet people 
were willing to discuss it and to express their 
views so that we could know where the other 
one stood and try and convince them as to our 
view. 

This, I think, was a very positive thing. 
And my view is that everybody now under- 
stands that we are serious, we are deeply 
serious, about the importance of human 
rights, and we are going to continue to push 
this issue because we think its importance is 
so great. 

I would make another comment, too. 

In judging success in the human rights 
field, it is a great mistake, in my judgment, to 
try and judge it on the short term. This is 
something that can only be measured over the 
long term. I think what we must be looking 
for is how, over the longer period of time, the 
sensitizing of the world in general to the im- 
portance of human rights is going to work out. 

My judgment is that we are going to see, as 
we proceed through the years, increased at- 
tention to the issue of human rights and that 
we are going to see progress in the field of 
human rights. I caution against trying to 
draw a yardstick and saying as of today we 



have made this amount of progress. We must 
look to the longer range. 

Mr. Dunsmore: Doesn't it mean anything, 
however, wheri someone like Roy Medvedev 
[Soviet educator and histoyian] says that he 
thinks that perhaps because of the campaign 
the new Soviet Constitution is even tougher 
than it flight have been otherwise, a}id he be- 
lieves that so mitch more was accomplished 
through quiet diplomacy? Isn't it a question 
of tactics, now, more than the actual issue 
itself? 

Secretary Vance: Well, in the same news- 
paper I read this morning an article by Mrs. 
Alekseyeva, who has been one of the leaders 
in the human rights movement in the Soviet 
Union. She drew quite a contrary point of 
view with respect to the importance of human 
rights and the concern about human rights in 
the Soviet Union. 

As I repeat again, these are universal prin- 
ciples. They are not directed to any particular 
country, and I think that is something which 
we must bear in mind. 

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, the human 
rights debate shifted this week to Belgrade 
where the United States and other Western 
nations will try to lay the groundwork for 
strengthening the human rights guarantees 
that were agreed to by the Soviets at Helsinki. 
Do you think the recent actions of the Rus- 
sians and the intensified campaign against 
dissideyits and the harassment of newsmen 
who try to meet with dissidents bode well for 
Belgrade? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say that I deeply 
regret the incident which took place with re- 
spect to Mr. Toth [Robert C. Toth, Los 
Angeles Times correspondent, formerly in 
Moscow]. We are relieved that Mr. Toth is 
now in Great Britain and will be coming back 
to the United States after a vacation. 

We think that the manner in which this was 
handled, the fact that the question of the con- 
duct of the press was handled in this fashion, 
was wrong. If one followed the policy that 
they seemed to be suggesting, the press 
would then only be able to deal with people 



July 18, 1977 



79 



who were officially recognized to deal with 
them. 

We think that is totally contrary to the 
principles of the Helsinki agreements. There- 
fore, this is a matter of great concern to us. It 
is these kinds of issues which we hope to dis- 
cuss, to review, at the Belgrade conference. 
We are going to continue to approach this in a 
straightforward frank way, without polemics, 
and I hope that the others will do the same 
thing at that conference. 

Eurocommunism 

Mr. Clark: Secretary Vance, some of the 
President's critics feel that what they regard 
as his obsession with human rights is dis- 
tracting attention from other ynore important 
problems in dealing with the Communist 
world. 

Your predecessor at the State Department, 
Henry Kissinger, thinks the Carter Adminis- 
tration should be more worried than it ap- 
pears to be about the political successes of 
Communist parties in Europe. He said in a 
recent speech that he regarded as a very im- 
portant speech that it would be disastrous to 
the Western alliance if the Communists won a 
major role in the governments of France, 
Italy, or other NATO countries. Does the 
Administration have any strategy to deal 
with Communist political successes in 
Europe? 

Secretary Vance: Indeed it does. We have 
said that we are not indifferent to the partici- 
pation of Communists in governments of 
European countries. We have said that in 
dealing with our Western allies on vital issues 
we would prefer to be dealing with countries 
which have the same fundamental values, the 
same democratic concerns, that we have. If 
the Communists were to take a dominant role 
in these governments, that could present 
serious problems insofar as we are concerned. 

We have gone on to say that we think the 
question, the political question, of whether or 
not Communists should or should not play a 
part in the government of a particular country 
is a political issue to be decided by the people 
of that country and one in which we should 
not interfere. However, at the same time, I 



say again that does not mean that we are in- 
different to the fact that they may. 

Issue of Strategic Arms 

Mr. Dunsmore: On the subject of com- 
munism, sir, it brings us to the Soviet Union 
and relations generally. 

The keystone of detente has always been 
strategic arms limitation. You are saying 
now almost every day that you don't know if 
there will be a new agreement, but you don't 
think we should be negotiating under a dead- 
line. If there isn't an agreement by October, 
what happeyis to U.S. -Soviet relations? 

Secretary Vance: I think that if we do not 
reach an agreement by October 3rd we will 
continue to negotiate. The issue of the 
strategic arms talks is too important a one for 
either country to put aside. I think we will 
both persevere in these discussions even 
though the interim agreement may have ex- 
pired. 

There are two choices that we have at the 
point where the interim agreement may ex- 
pire. We can either extend the agreement or 
we can proceed as if it were, in fact, in effect. 
• So I do not think that that will adversely 
affect the negotiations themselves, because I 
think both of us know that what we want is an 
agreement which is a sound agreement, which 
provides equal security for both and is fair to 
both and is one which we can live with, one 
which will not have ambiguities in it which 
may raise questions for the future. 

That is why I say I think it is important not 
to feel we're under a deadline, but to seek a 
good agreement, one which we can live with 
in the future. 

Mr. Dunsmore: Mr. Vance, last month in 
Geneva in your talks with Mr. Gromyko you 
were able to establish what was called a 
"framework" for a new strategic arms limita- 
tion agreement. Since then, have you been 
able to build at all upon that framework? Are 
we making any progress? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, I think we're making 
some progress. It's slow. We agreed at 
Geneva that we would continue our discus- 
sions at three different levels. 

First, we would allocate some of the issues 



80 



Department of State Bulletin 



to our two delegations — the Soviet delegation 
and our delegation — which are meeting in 
Geneva. 

Secondly, we agreed that we would discuss 
some issues at the ambassadorial level with 
the foreign minister in both Moscow and in 
the United States. 

And thirdly, that Mr. Gromyko and I would 
meet again. 

The first two are underway at this point. 
Insofar as my meetings with Mr. Gromyko are 
concerned, we will be having a couple of meet- 
ings in September. In the meantime, I hope 
we will have made some progress in the dis- 
cussion at these other two levels. 

Mr. Dunsmore: Your predecessor some- 
times used to feel that it was more difficult to 
negotiate with the hawks in the Pentagon and 
the Capitol than it ivas ivith the Russians. Do 
you feel that way? 

Secretary Vance: No. We've had really very 
good cooperation working with the Pentagon. 
I just couldn't be more delighted with the way 
that this has worked out. You know, I worked 
in the Pentagon for a good many years, and I 
must say that I'm simply delighted with the 
way that the State Department, the Defense 
Department, and all the others involved in the 
process of NSC [National Security Council] 
discussions are able to get along. There's a 
spirit of cooperation which is very heartening. 

Mr. Clark: We'd like to turn to the Middle 
East, Mr. Secretary. Vice President Mondale 
said in a speech on Middle East problems this 
week [nt San Francisco on June 11] that the 
United States will not use the threat of reduc- 
ing our military aid to Israel to get Israel to 
give up the occupied territories. With the 
adamant position of Menahem Begin, who 
will be the new Israeli Prime Minister, 
against giving up any of the occupied lands, 
isn't the United States going to have to apply 
pressure of some sort if it is going to play a 
significant role in achieving a Middle East 
settlement? 

Secretary Vance: I'm going to answer your 
question, but let me say something first be- 
cause I'd like to sort of set this in a 
framework. 



When our Administration came into office, 
we decided that we were not merely going to 
react to situations, but that we were going to 
shape an agenda of items which we considered 
to be of the highest priority and would pro- 
ceed to deal with those issues. 

The first of those items was that dealing 
with the question of regional peace, which 
could affect, in the long run, world peace. And 
the Middle East was one of those obvious 
areas which involved regional peace. Another 
was, of course, Africa, where we're also 
working. 

Secondly, we agreed that we would work to 
achieve progress in the arms control area be- 
cause of its importance not only to the big 
powers but to the world in general, and there- 
fore, we agreed to attack both the problem of 
strategic arms and of conventional arms. 

Thirdly, we decided that we must work 
with our colleagues to try and control the 
spread of nuclear weapons throughout the 
world, and we have been working to that end. 

Fourthly, we decided it was of utmost im- 
portance to strengthen the alliances with our 
allies, and the most important example of that 
is NATO. We have been working in that area, 
as you well know. 

Fifthly, we decided that it was important to 
promote cooperation rather than confronta- 
tion with the Third World. Much of what we 
have been doing at CIEC [Conference on In- 
ternational Economic Cooperation], in the 
OAS, in the meeting which I am going to be 
attending in the OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development] is 
related to this. This is the whole range of so- 
called North-South problems that are dealing 
with these terribly complicated economic rela- 
tionships which arise out of our relationships 
with the Third World. 

Ne.\t, we believe that we must seek nor- 
malization of relations with as many countries 
as possible, because without a dialogue — a 
diplomatic dialogue — there's no way even to 
advance our own interests, let alone hear 
what the concerns of the others are. 

And the last was, of course, the promotion 
of human rights. 

Now I just wanted to give you this sort of 
agenda of items which we have been using and 



July 18, 1977 



81 



proceeding along during this first stage. 

Now let me return, if I might, to the ques- 
tion of the Middle East. I think it's too early 
yet to say what the foreign policy of Mr. 
Begin is going to be. He is coming to the 
United States, hopefully, at the end of the 
month of -July. I think we must wait until he 
comes and we have a chance to hear firsthand 
what his foreign policy is, what he is prepared 
to do with respect to the negotiation of a 
peace in the Middle East, before we jump to 
any conclusions. 

I would note that I've read the press in the 
last day or so that Mr. Begin's coalition has 
apparently endorsed a policy which says that 
they are prepared to enter into peace negotia- 
tions without any preconditions. We will look 
forward to seeing Mr. Begin when he comes 
and to finding out specifically what flexibility 
there is. 

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, the Vice Presi- 
dent said flatly that we will not use the threat 
of reducing military aid to Israel to get them 
to give up occupied territories. 

Secretary Vance: That's right. 

Mr. Clark: Does that mean that we would 
continue to sell arms to Israel, and to Arab 
countries to the extent that they buy them 
from us, regardless of whether there is any 
progress toward peace in the Middle East? 

Secretary Vance: We have urged all of the 
parties, and I have talked with the parties 
myself, about the need for restraint and re- 
duction in arms sales in the area — and we will 
continue to do so. But let there be no ques- 
tion: We have a deep commitment to Israel 
that we will provide to Israel the arms which 
are necessary for its self-defense, and we will 
abide by that without any question. And I 
don't want any lack of clarity on that point. 

Mr. Dunsmore: Well, let me put the ques- 
tion to you this way then, sir: At the end of 
the 1973 war, the United States went on an 
alert to prevent the Russians from interven- 
ing, which in effect was saying we would be 
prepared to go to war. If there's another war 
in the Middle East, and it comes about, at 
least in part, because the Israelis have not 
been prepared to make what we consider to be 



82 



reasonable concessions, would we go to war to 
save them? 

Secretary Vance: That is a question which is 
an iffy question, which I am not going to 
answer. 

Let me say that we have told Israel that we 
stand behind her, that we will do everything 
that's necessary to preserve her security and 
integrity, should it be challenged. I think that 
sufficiently answers your question. 

Mr. Dunsmore: It's a cliche of the Middle 
East that it's up to the parties themselves to 
settle it, but left to their own devices they've 
had four wars. Surely there must be some 
kind of friendly persuasion that we are plan- 
ning on both sides. 

Secretary Vance: We clearly feel that we 
have a role to play here as a country which 
has good relationships with both sides — with 
both Israel and with her Arab neighbors. We 
believe that we can work with the parties to 
try and help them find common ground. We 
are committed to do everything within our 
power to bring this about. 

Whether it can be accomplished I don't 
know, because the ultimate decision is going 
to be made, and has to be made, by the par- 
ties themselves. You can never have a lasting 
peace unless it's one agreed upon by the par- 
ties. We will feel free, as I have indicated be- 
fore, to make suggestions to the parties as to 
what we believe are fair and equitable ap- 
proaches to these common core issues which 
we have talked about so many times in the 
past. 

Relations With Cuba 

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, we'd like to get 
in a few words about Cuba. There is, you 
know, considerable opposition in Congress to 
the President's move to normalize relations 
with Cuba, perhaps because many members 
of Congress don't fully understand what he 
means. Would we resume full diplo)natic re- 
lations with Cuba and niove toward an end to 
the trade embargo while Cuban troops remain 
in Africa? 

Secretary Vance: Let me first say that I 
think the dialogue which we have opened up 
with Cuba is long ovei'due. It simply has made 

Department of State Bulletin 



no sense to have a country which is 90 miles 
ffom our shore and to refuse to discuss with 
them issues — issues where we may have dif- 
ferences, but issues which need to be dis- 
cussed, issues which affect our bilateral rela- 
tionships, and issues which affect the world in 
general. Therefore, I think, by starting this 
process of discussions we are moving along 
the right road. 

We have dealt with two issues so far. We've 
dealt with the issue of fisheries, where we 
have concluded a satisfactory treaty. We have 
now agreed that we will have a small repre- 
sentation in Havana — a diplomatic represen- 
tation — and they will have one here. This I 
think is a good second step, because it will 
facilitate the dialogue. 

One of the issues which we will be discus- 
sing with them will be the question of Cuban 
troops in Africa. 

Mr. Clark: And ive are just about out of 
time. I wonder if I could get a yes or no 
answer. 

Would we normalize diplomatic relations 
with Cuba while Cuban troops were still in 
Africa? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say we are at the 
stage now where we have many issues to dis- 
cuss beyond that, and we have to discuss all 
of these issues before we talk about 
normalization. 



U.S. and U.K. Initial New 
Air Services Agreement 

Following is a statement by President Car- 
ter issued on June 22, together ivith a De- 
partment announcement released that day. 



STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT CARTER 

white House press release dated June 22 

I am pleased that the delegations of the 
United States and the United Kingdom have 
come to an agreement on the issues involved 
in the negotiations over continuation of com- 
mercial air service between our two countries. 

The signing of an agreement in principle 
means that disruption in air service on the 



North Atlantic, Pacific, and Caribbean routes 
has been avoided. The agreement insures that 
international air service between Britain and 
the United States will continue to function in 
an atmosphere of healthy competition — an 
atmosphere which will benefit consumers and 
airlines alike. 

I extend my personal appreciation to special 
Ambassador Alan Boyd and to the members of 
the U.S. delegation. 

Our new agreement should demonstrate to 
the world that the warm relations our two na- 
tions have enjoyed are as strong today as they 
have ever been. 



DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT 

Press release 299 dated June 22 

The United States and the United Kingdom 
announced on June 22 the initialing in London 
of a new air services agreement to replace 
their existing bilateral agreement, commonly 
known as the Bermuda agreement, which ex- 
pired at midnight on June 21, 1977. The new 
agreement, which will be reviewed by both 
sides and signed in Bermuda, possibly as 
early as mid-July, will govern air services on 
North Atlantic, Pacific, Bermuda, and Carib- 
bean routes for airlines of both countries. 
Under the new accord those airlines will have 
significant new route opportunities and 
operating flexibility. Mechanisms have been 
established for the review of rates and, in cer- 
tain situations, of airline capacity as well, in 
order to promote more efficient and econom- 
ical service for the public. Moreover, for the 
first time, scheduled and charter air services 
are linked in a major bilateral agreement. 
Pending signature of the new agreement, air 
services between the two countries will con- 
tinue as under the original Bermuda agree- 
ment. 

U.S. special Ambassador Alan S. Boyd, 
head of the U.S. delegation, stated that "the 
agreement will provide significant new oppor- 
tunities for the airlines of both nations and 
promises real benefits to the traveling public. 
Basic decisions concerning the provision of air 
services will continue to be made by the air- 
lines, subject to governmental approval of 
rates and review of capacity that is deemed to 



July 18, 1977 



83 



be excessive. We expect to see air services 
expand and become increasingly efficient." 
U.S. officials said that the new agreement 
represented an extension of the liberal princi- 
ples of the original Bermuda agi-eement and 
reflected a new emphasis on low-cost travel. 

For the first time in a major air services 
bilateral agreement, charter air services are 
included together with scheduled services, al- 
though certain details remain to be worked 
out at a future date. In the interim, both sides 
have agreed to incorporate the existing un- 
derstanding on charter services in the basic 
agreement and apply certain provisions of the 
basic agreement to charters. In addition, dur- 
ing the last phase of the negotiations Presi- 
dent Carter approved an innovative, low-cost, 
scheduled service proposed by Laker Air- 
ways, a British concern. The Laker plan pro- 
vides low-cost, no-frill, no-reservation service 
between New York and London. U.S. carriers 
are expected to offer competitive proposals 
shortly. 

Each country will have the right to desig- 
nate two flag carriers to conduct services on 
two North Atlantic routes. On North Atlantic 
routes the United States and United Kingdom 
will each be permitted to designate two air- 
lines to operate the New York-London and 
the Los Angeles-London routes. 

Airlines of both countries obtain operating 
rights from four new U.S. cities to London. In 
the first three years of the agreement, U.S. 
airlines will be authorized to serve Atlanta 
and Dallas/Ft. Worth nonstop to London; a 
British airline will be authorized to serve 
Houston. After this three-year period, air- 
lines of both nations will be authorized to op- 
erate these routes, and the United States will 
be free to select a new gateway point for 
nonstop air services to London. British com- 



petition to the present U.S. flag service from 
Seattle to London will be permitted in the 
new agreement. In addition, the United 
States receives the rights to fly between An- 
chorage and London, a route that British 
Airways today operates en route to Tokyo. 
The present requirement that London-San 
Francisco flights by a U.K. airline operate via 
New York will be dropped. As a result, it can 
be anticipated that British Airways will soon 
inaugurate London-San Francisco nonstop 
service. 

In the Pacific, the United States obtained 
new operating rights to Singapore. A U.K. 
airline will receive additional rights between 
Hong Kong and the U.S. west coast via 
Japan. 

Obsolete operating restrictions imposed on 
U.S. airlines in the old agreement were 
dropped. Ambassador Boyd stated, "The new 
route structure is expected to result in more 
flexible and economic airline operations for 
airlines of both countries and better service to 
the public." 

A special consultative process has been 
agreed to prevent unnecessary empty seats on 
airplanes on North Atlantic routes. This proc- 
ess may be invoked by either country in ex- 
ceptional cases if an airline appears to be 
operating too many flights. The procedures do 
not give either government a veto over indi- 
vidual airline flights, but do meet U.K. con- 
cerns that increases in flights be reviewed by 
them if they appear excessive. 

To protect consumers and assure that serv- 
ices are economically viable, new procedures 
for reviewing the prices charged by airlines of 
the two countries have also been agreed. In 
addition, a special working group will be set 
up to make recommendations on pricing policy 
to the two governments. 



84 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Vance Interviewed by II Tempo Correspondent 



Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Vance by Marino de Medici, 
Washington correspondent for II Tempo, 
which was released on June 18. 

Press release 280 dated June 18 

Q. First of all, I appreciate your attetnpt to 
strike a balance. I see that the United States 
gets to be accused of many things, as I have 
seen for many years. But it is a little bit 
ironic that you get accused, on one side, of 
intervention in the internal affairs of coun- 
tries ayid accused of indifference to the inter- 
nal affairs of other countries. It's a 
political-moral dilemma — sort of squaring 
the circle. My question is, how do you deal 
with this dilemma in the U.S. policies? 

Secretary Vayice: Well, do you want to take 
it, say, in a specific country, or how would 
you like to — 

Q. Well, obviously the accusation of inter- 
vention came from the East, with respect to 
huynan rights, whereas some Western coun- 
tries which are threatened by ''Eurocom- 
munism," by the ascendance to power of the 
Communists, would like to have some sort of 
American interest in a more tangible way — a 
more tangible fashion. How do you view this 
dilemma? 

Secretary Vance: Let me start and talk 
about the question of Eurocommunism and 
then move into the question of American pol- 
icy with respect to the Eastern bloc and how 
we deal with that. 

Insofar as Eurocommunism is concerned, 
we have tried to make clear from the outset 
that we believe it is not for us to tell any 
country who they should elect in the way of 
their political leaders. That is their responsi- 
bility and their right. On the other hand, that 
does not mean that we are indifferent to who 



is elected and who serves in the government 
of any country. As we have said on a number 
of occasions, we would obviously prefer those 
who have the same kind of views with respect 
to fundamental values and precepts; and 
therefore we clearly prefer those who have a 
democratic backdrop. And we would believe 
that this is clearly preferable from our 
standpoint. 

But again, you have to draw the balance be- 
tween this and the right of any country to 
elect whom they choose. Now, I think that by 
expressing our views in this way — namely, 
clearly — that we do have a preference. On the 
other hand, we think that the fundamental, 
ultimate decision has to be made by the people 
of the country. It is a reasonable way of deal- 
ing with this very, very difficult problem. 

Q. Senator Church said the other day that 
he shares the pessimistic view, this scenario 
so to speak, of profound consequences in the 
relationship between the United States and 
Europe should the Communists have a degree 
of participation. I think much of the quibbling 
now is over whether it should be significant or 
decisive — these are two terms used. 

Secretary Vance: Yes, we have used those 
terms. 

Q. Your spokesman on April 6 told us that 
the ability of the United States to work to- 
gether with European democracies would be 
impaired by the coming to power of the Com- 
munists in a dominant way. So this was 
taken as a change of tone. Is it really a mat- 
ter, therefore, of tactics rather than strategy? 

Secretary Vance: No, I don't think it's a 
question of tactics. I think it's a question of 
strategy, basically, because the question of 
dominance is a fundamental question, because 
it really does affect the basic structure and. 



July 18, 1977 



85 



therefore, the ultimate policies which will be 
developed by a particular country. So I would 
not call the issue a tactical issue. I would call 
it one of fundamental or strategic importance. 

Q. We face the graduality of accession to 
power of CommiDiists in some countries to- 
day. Take the Italian Commimists. They have 
said that they ivill not take over altogether, 
even if they had a .51-percent majority. So, it 
would have to be a gradual process. Where 
does the indifference end when, say, they 
move from a subcabinet-level post to a higher 
post, to greater participation in the govern- 
ment? Hotv would you erect a wall in the 
Cabinet, vis-a-vis a Communist member of 
the Cabinet? 

Secretary Vance: Again, there I think you 
are crossing the line. Because for us to 
suggest what the wall should be would be in- 
appropriate. That would be interfering with 
the internal affairs of the given country. That 
is for a particular country to decide for itself. 
But that does not mean that we should be in- 
different to the result. 

Q. In other words, there would be conse- 
quences. For instance, as to the question of 
stationing of American troops: Do you think 
that the presence of Communists in some gov- 
ernments would erode the moral basis for the 
presence of American troops in Western 
Europe? Would it have such a consequence? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say, I think it 
could. 

Q. It could. The question also has been 
raised as to what the United States could do 
in terms of moral support, and President 
Carter said that he would go to France to 
meet with President Giscard d'Estaing, with a 
view to helping him. Do you see this as a 
practical way of making your concern felt in 
France and elsewhere in Europe? 

Secretary Vance: I had forgotten the pre- 
cise words that he used in that connection, 
but was this in the interview that he had with 
the European correspondents? 

Q. No, this ivas after London, when it ivas 
annouticed that he would go and would pay a 
state visit to France. My implication is: Do 
we have to assume that he will be there at a 



time ivhen his presence as a moral shoiv 
would have the maximum benefits for democ- 
racy in France and elsewhere? 

Secretary Vance: Well, I think we're get- 
ting into something there which is not yet de- 
finite enough to comment on with respect to 
timing and the like. Therefore I would not like 
to get into that at this point, because I think 
that would give implications. 

Q. Some people have found the juxtaposi- 
tion between the position of the previous Ad- 
ministration and your Administration a bit 
relevant. Perhaps, it has been pointed out, it 
is simply a change of tone. You have dis- 
cussed this before. What would you think in 
terms of the contacts that you should have 
with European Communists, whereas before 
there was a very low-level type of communica- 
tion with Communists in Europe? Do you 
think that a way could be found to communi- 
cate with the Communists without altering or 
jeopardizing your basic priyiciples and fun- 
damental attitudes? 

Secretary Vance: I think we should continue 
generally along the lines that we've been 
using in the past, and that is the way I would 
expect that we would be moving in the future. 

Q. You were not quoted, but it was repoHed 
that you felt that perhaps the rise in 
Eurocommunism implied some advantages 
for the democratic nations insofar as it would 
create problems in the Eastern bloc and that 
perhaps these problems would more than out- 
weigh the damage that Eurocommunism 
could bring to the NATO structure. Are you 
still of this opinion? 

Secretary Vance: I would say that I think 
that this is a possibility. I think it depends on 
how Eurocommunism develops. I think one 
has to watch and see what the development of 
the process is in the various countries of 
Western Europe. And so, therefore, it is too 
early to draw any final conclusion with re- 
spect to this. 

Q. The point, however, has also been made 
that ive are not really in the best position to 
take advantage of turmoil and problems in the 
Eastern world. It took us a long time to find 
out about the Chinese-Russian split, and that 



86 



Department of State Bulletin 



pertained to state relations. Do you think that 
we ivould be in a position to better profit out 
of the cojitinuing apparent discussion among 
Eastern European countries? Would ive 
really be able to benefit in terms of a schism 
or a series of small schisms within the 
Soviet-communist bloc? 

Secretary Vance: I think that this could 
have a meaningful effect, yes. 

Belgrade Review Conference 

Q. If I can turn to Belgrade, you said that 
the U.S. objective in Belgrade is to avoid 
polemics. And yet you also said that the West 
would be ready to subject the Eastern coun- 
tries to a critique on issues like human rights. 
Do you see incompatibility between these? 

Secretary Vance: No, not at all. 

Q. Could you expand on that? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, I'll be delighted to 
e.xpand on this. It seems to me that our prin- 
cipal task — and when I say "our," I mean all 
of the participants to the Belgrade 
conference — is to review the implementation 
of the Final Act of Helsinki. One of the areas 
in which we would be conducting this review 
is that of "basket" 3.' 

This, of course, raises the question of 
human rights. I think what we have to have is 
a frank and straightforward review of what 
has taken place. We will find, in my judg- 
ment, some progress in certain areas, lack of 
progress in others, and in others there will be 
some retrogression. 

And I think it's in the interests of all of us 
that we do [the review] in a straightforward 
way. Now if one, on the other hand, went into 
this process with the objective of ending up in 
confrontation, that, I think, could affect the 
benefit that could be derived from this review 
process. And I think, in the end, all of us 
would be the losers if that were the case. 

Therefore, I say that we will eschew 
polemics but will insist upon a straightfor- 
ward and frank review of the facts, whatever 
they may show. 

Q. What is at issue here is really the prin- 
ciple of accountability of nations. 

Secretary Vance: That's right. 



Q. Where does, however, the moral and jus- 
tified concern of one nation end and interfer- 
ence begin? 

Secretary Vance: Well, this is obviously a 
very difficult question. One has to take a look 
at the document itself. The Helsinki accords 
indicate that human rights is one of the fun- 
damental issues for the nations which were 
signatories to the Helsinki document. Having 
recognized this as a critical and important 
area, it is therefore incumbent upon us to de- 
termine how well each of us has lived up to 
the principles which are set forth there. And 
accordingly I think that each one of us should 
be willing and prepared to have our own con- 
duct scrutinized. 

Q. On a general plane, do you think it is 
realistic to draw the conclusion that some 
kind of linkage exists between political and 
strategic questions on one side and moral 
questions on the other? 

Secretary Vance: Well, I think that basic 
moral questions Hke the questions of human 
rights are intertwined with the strands of 
foreign policy. And this is clear from docu- 
ments such as the United Nations Charter, 
the Helsinki accords, and other international 
documents. And therefore, to that extent, ob- 
viously there is a connection between political 
and economic and moral. 

I think the use of the word "linkage" is 
probably not a good choice of words, because 
linkage has been used in a different sense. So 
I would shy away from using that word. 

Q. Should we say connection? Some people 
obviously put the choice very squarely, and I 
think in unrealistic terms, between a show- 
down and a backdown with the Soviet Union. 
But they also seem to fear that you are on a 
collision course. What is your feeling on this? 

Secretary Vance: I don't think it's neces- 
sary to have things in such -stark black-and- 
white terms. I don't think it has to be either a 
showdown or a backdown. I think that both of 



' For text of the Final Act of the Conference on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on 
Aug. 1, 1975, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1975, p. .32.3; for 
"basket" 3, Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other 
Fields, see p. 339. 



July 18, 1977 



87 



us can approach this in a constructive way 
which can lead to a result which is useful to 
the world community, and therefore I do not 
accept these stark contrasting approaches and 
think the answer lies more in the middle. 

Strategic Arms Talks 

Q. On SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks], some people also feel that it is going to 
be nearly impossible to reach an agreement by 
October. So the question is, what will you do? 

I would like to ask you another thing. In 
this negotiation, something seems to be mis- 
sing. The United States and the Soviet Union 
go on improving their land-based missiles. 
Have you come to an understanding with the 
Soviet Union on the concept of strategic de- 
teri'ence'? Do the doctrines mesh on this? At 
one point, somebody said, '"What in the name 
of God is strategic superiority?" What about 
an understanding with the Russians on 
strategic deterrence as the buildup of land 
missiles continues and becomes a destabiliz- 
ing factor? 

Secretary Vance: Well, you've asked a very 
broad question. Let me try and answer it. 
And if I haven't done it completely, why then, 
please ask me additional clarifying questions. 

I think that both of us recognize that the 
concept of a nuclear war is unacceptable to 
either of us as a nation. A nuclear war could 
result in the destruction of the world as we 
know it, and therefore it is something that 
both the Soviet Union and we will obviously 
do everything within our power to seek to 
avoid. 

As to whether or not we agree on such re- 
finements as strategic deterrence as opposed 
to counterforce and the like, those are much 
more difficult questions. But I think the broad 
important point to make is that both of us rec- 
ognize that we must do everything within our 
power to avoid nuclear war, and therefore, we 
must take the necessary steps to stop the 
arms spiral and to begin to move along the 
road toward real nuclear disarmament. And 
that is the reason that we came forward in our 
trip to Moscow with our proposal for a so- 
called comprehensive plan. The objective of 
this was to try and take a major step forward 
in moving toward real disarmament. 



Prior to now, agreement has been reached 
with respect to certain matters, such as put- 
ting a cap upon the total number of strategic 
delivery vehicles and such as limiting any bal- 
listic missile systems. These were necessary 
and important first steps. But it seems to us 
that from here on forward we really have got 
to take major steps that not only look to re- 
ducing the number of strategic weapons that 
each has in its arsenal, but also beginning to 
get a grip upon the qualitative problem as 
well. 

It is only when we start moving in this di- 
rection that we will really be taking signifi- 
cant steps along the road. 

Q. How would you assess this movement at 
the current stage? Are you optimistic that it 
will go on to a successful conclusion before 
October? 

Secretary Vance: I don't want to put any 
guesses as to time on the table, because I 
simply don't know the answer to that. I would 
say, however, that the most important thing 
is not the time at which an agreement is 
reached, but whether it's a good agreement. 

And therefore, I don't think we should feel 
ourselves under any specific time pressure to 
complete an agreement by a given date. The 
important thing is that we try and reach a 
good agreement — an agreement that really 
advances us along the road of nuclear deter- 
rence and disarmament. 

Q. A quick change to China. You are about 
to go to China. Do you see any real possibility 
for a significant change in. the relationship 
between the United States and the People's 
Republic of China? 

Secretary Vance: As the President has indi- 
cated, our conduct with respect to the 
People's Republic of China is and will be gov- 
erned by the principles of the Shanghai com- 
munique.^ 

Our objective is normalization of relations, 
but the questions of pace and the modalities 
still have to be worked out. And this would 
obviously be a very impoi'tant subject that has 
to be discussed with the leaders of the 
People's Republic. And that will be one of the 



2 For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 20, 1972, p. 435 



88 



Department of State Bulletin 



main items, obviously, that we will wish to 
discuss when we sit down together. 

Q. The time frame has not changed sub- 
stantially, then? 

Secretary Vance: Well, as I said, the ques- 
tions of time and modalities are both things 
which will have to be discussed between us, 
and it is too early before we've sat down 
to talk to them about this to make any 
predictions. 

Negotiations on Cyprus 

Q. You have long been involved in Cyprus 
negotiations. Do you see a new initiative now 
on the horizon as a result of the Turkish polit- 
ical elections? 

Secretary Vance: Well, let me say I hope 
very much that progress can be made in Cyp- 
rus. I think it's of great importance that that 
long-festering problem can be resolved. I 
think we have to wait and see what kind of a 
government is formed as a result of the recent 
elections. I still believe that it is possible to 
make progress in the matter of Cyprus, and I 
hope that this can be and will be an item of 
importance and high priority on the agenda, 
once the new Turkish Government comes to 
power. 

Q. Is there a possibility that the United 
States will take again an initiative in resolv- 
ing the dispute? 

Secretary Vance: Well, what we've said on 
this is something that perhaps I should re- 
peat. This problem is a problem that has to be 
resolved by the parties. We are willing to do 
whatever we can to assist, should they wish 
us to do so, within the framework of the over- 
all negotiations which are being conducted 
under the auspices of the Secretary General. 
We are not going to intrude ourselves into 
those discussions, but we stand ready and 
willing to help the parties should they wish us 
to do so. 

Q. One question about Andy Young, Am- 
bassador Young. Do you think that in some 
ways he is hurting the cause of American 
diplomacy? 

Secretary Vance: I think Andy has made 
great contributions to foreign diplomacy. I 



think there is a much better understanding of 
the United States in the Third World as a re- 
sult of Andy's work. I know that this is the 
case in Africa, and I believe it is also the case 
in other parts of the world as well. So there- 
fore, I would say that I think Andy has made 
a major contribution and will continue to 
make major contributions to our diplomacy. 

Q. To conclude, one more question, if I can 
go back one second to the hard question of the 
American presence. Isn't it true that some- 
times when the United States abstains from, 
doing something, that is also a form, of inter- 
vention? How do you really strike the balance 
in moral terms of American presence in the 
world — not only in Europe where we do have a 
large peril, but all over the world? How would 
you see this question of America abstaining 
from doing certain things, and therefore prac- 
tically intervening in a negative sense in 
foreign affairs? 

Secretary Vance: Well, I'm not sure I ac- 
cept your premise, and I think stated that 
broadly, I would not agree with the premise. 
But if you have in mind any specific case, I 
would be delighted to discuss that specific 
case. 

Q. The specific case could be, for instance, 
a comitry in Europe with a Communist prob- 
lem, where a large part of the people who are 
democrats, who are concerned, look at the 
United States as the source of some encour- 
agement, of moral support, in a more con- 
crete, tangible way. Obviously, noninterven- 
tion is a basic principle that we accept. So, 
how would you think that the United States 
could go about maintaining credibility, main- 
taining the hope and the trust of people who 
look at the United States for moral leadership 
and for support should things go wrong? 

Secretary Vance: Well, I would say that you 
do this by the conduct that one demon- 
strates—in the way that we handle ourselves 
both at home and abroad. 

I think we'll be judged by the actions that 
we actually carry out. Therefore, I think that 
people will be watching what we say and do, 
and many times what we say will be of great 
importance. But we have to balance that, as 
you indicated earlier, by nonintervention. 



July 18, 1977 



89 



And I would say that in a given situation 
that depends upon the particular facts of that 
situation, and it, as in so many cases, is a mis- 
take to try and overgeneralize and apply 
rather complex general principles without 
putting them in a factual framework. I'm 
afraid if one tries to draw, overly draw 
generalizations, sometimes this leads to mis- 
takes in this interpretation. 

Q. A pragmatic policy and the proof of the 
pudding of course would be in real situations. 

Secretary Vance: That's right. 

Q. I appreciate this. 

Finally, I know that when President-elect 
Carter introduced you, he said that your 
amount of traveling would be fairly minimal, 
if I remember correctly. You have been travel- 
ing a great deal. Are you now beginning to 
sloiv down? 

Secretary Vance: It is an interesting and 
difficult thing. For a number of reasons, it has 
really become almost expected that foreign 
ministers will participate in a great variety of 
international meetings. In fact, if the foreign 
minister does not appear, it is considered to 
be a slight on the other participants in the 
meeting. 

As a result of that, it is being, I think, gen- 
erally accepted that foreign ministers are 
going to have to travel much more than they 
ever did in the past. And I think this comes 
about because more and more as the global 
problems and the regional problems become 
more complex and more difficult, it's neces- 
sary to deal with them in regional or in global 
forums. 

This requires more and more international 
meetings, and whether we like it or not, the 
foreign minister is going to have to partici- 
pate. 

Q. I hope we'll have your trip to Italy and 
to Europe by the end of the year, perhaps. 

Secretary Vance: Well, I hope so too, be- 
cause I have a great affection for Italy and its 
people. I have been there many times. 

Q. You are confident about the political 
choices that they will make? 

Secretary Vance: I have great confidence in 
the Italian people. I really do. I have a great 



admiration for them, and I have confidence 
that their ultimate judgment will be wise. 

Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 
It's been a pleasure to talk to you. 



U.N. Disengagement Observer Force 
in Israel-Syria Sector Extended 

Following is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council by Acting U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations James 
F. Leonard on May 26. 

USUN press release 29 dated May 26 

The United Nations and this Council ac- 
cepted an important responsibility in deciding 
on May 31, 1974, to establish the United Na- 
tions Disengagement Observer Force 
[UNDOF]. The calm which has prevailed 
during the intervening three years in the 
areas under U.N. supervision testifies to the 
wisdom of that decision. Nonetheless, as we 
accept the additional responsibility of ex- 
tending the life of this force for a further six 
months, ^ we should review once again briefly 
the political and military context in which we 
take this action. 

Any such review must begin with the ob- 
servation that UNDOF to date has been an 
unqualified success. The parties have scrupu- 
lously observed their obligations under the 
terms of the disengagement agreement. There 
have been no serious incidents, nor has the 
area of disengagement been a source of signif- 
icant military tension between the armed 
forces of Israel and Syria. Much credit for this 
is due to the professionalism and dedication of 
the officers and men who have served and are 
serving in UNDOF. In addition, however, we 
should recognize that the United Nations has 
built up over the years an impressive institu- 
tional experience and expertise in the area of 
peacekeeping operations. We should keep this 



' The Seeuritv Council on May 26 adopted a resolu- 
tion (S/RES/408 (1977)) renewing "the mandate of the 
United Nations Disengagement Obseiver Force for 
another period of six months, that is, until 30 
November 1977." The vote was 12 (U.S.) to 0: Benin, 
the People's Republic of China, and Libya did not pai-- 
ticipate in the voting. 



90 



Department of State Bulletin 



\ery much in mind in tlie Middle East and 
elsewhere in our efforts to negotiate solutions 
to longstanding problems. 

The mission of UNDOF and other 
peacekeeping forces is, of course, to help 
maintain calm in the area so that the search 
for peace can go forward — as it must — in an 
atmosphere most conducive to success. The 
United States in the last few months has em- 
barked on a new round of consultations with 
the aim of resuming the Middle East Peace 
Conference at Geneva. President Carter has 
met with the principal leaders on both sides. 
He has further indicated a desire to meet with 
the new Prime Minister of Israel at the ear- 
liest appropriate time. Secretary Vance has 
recently discussed with Foreign Minister 
Gromyko the shared responsibilities of the 
United States and the Soviet Union as 
cochairmen of the Geneva conference, and we 
have agreed to direct our efforts toward re- 
convening the Geneva conference this fall. 

In the course of all these discussions, we 
have gained considerable insight into the 
thinking of the various parties. We have a 
keen appreciation of the difficulties which lie 
in the way of even the beginning of substan- 
tive negotiations, but we have also been im- 
pressed by the sincere desire for peace on the 
part of both Israel and its Arab neighbors. It 
is a desire which grows out of a profound 
weariness among all the peoples of the Middle 
East with continuing conflict. It is a hope nur- 
tured by dreams of a better, more secure, and 
more prosperous life for all. With these hopes 



in mind, the United States will persist in its 
deliberate and determined search for ways to 
bring the parties together and to help them 
realize the just and durable peace that is the 
wish of all. We firmly believe, in the words of 
President Carter, that: 

This may be the most propitiou.s time for a genuine 
settlement since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli con- 
flict. ... To let this opportunity pass could mean disas- 
ter, not only for the Middle East, but perhaps for the 
international political and economic order as well.^ 

In closing, I would like to express once 
again our admiration and gratitude to Gen. 
Hannes Phillip and the forces under his com- 
mand for the exemplary manner in which they 
continue to discharge their duties on the 
Golan Heights. We should also single out for 
special recognition those nations — Austria, 
Iran, Canada, and Poland — who contribute 
forces to UNDOF. At the same time, we must 
urge all nations promptly and fully to pay 
their assessed amounts in support of these 
shared international responsibilities. And fi- 
nally, I would like to acknowledge the con- 
structive and statesmanlike approach to this 
renewal of the governments of Israel and Syria 
and to thank both the Secretary General and 
the distinguished President of this Council 
Thomas S. Boya, of Benin] for their ef- 
forts which have made possible our action to- 
day. 



^ Made at the commencement exercises of Notre 
Dame on May 22; for the full text .see BULLETIN of .June 
18, 1977, p. (521. 



July 18, 1977 



91 



THE CONGRESS 



Department Discusses Results of CIEC Meeting 



Statement by Richard N. Cooper * 



The Conference on International Economic 
Cooperation [CIEC] concluded on June 3 with 
a ministerial communique adopted by consen- 
sus of the 27 participants. This 18-month ex- 
periment in North-South relations produced 
agreement on a significant number of issues in 
the fields of energy, raw materials, develop- 
ment, and finance. It also brought into much 
clearer focus a number of areas and concepts 
on which developing and developed countries 
have sharply divergent views. 

Both sides expressed regret in the com- 
munique at the failure to agree on certain 
specific issues. Nonetheless, both also cred- 
ited CIEC with being useful and contributing 
to broader understanding of the international 
economic situation. 

CIEC was but one stage in the ongoing and 
evolutionary process of a North-South 
dialogue. The locus of the dialogue will change 
after CIEC. For the most part, future 
North-South discussions will take place in 
existing functional international forums on 
specific issues. Over the next several months, 
attention will center on negotiations in UN- 
CTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development] for a common fund in sup- 
port of individual commodity agreements, on 
the trade negotiations in the multilateral 
trade negotiations (MTN), on discussion of 
development assistance issues in the IMF- 
IBRD Development Committee, and on 
negotiations for a supplementary credit facil- 



' Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee on 
June 21, 1977. The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 
Richard N, Cooper is Under Secretary for Economic 
Affairs. 



ity in the International Monetary Fund [IMF] 
and on negotiations for a general capital in- 
crease in the International Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development [IBRD]. 

For several years prior to the seventh spe- 
cial session of the U.N. General Assembly in 
September 1975, the North-South dialogue 
had been acrimonious and unproductive. De- 
veloping countries were increasingly distres- 
sed by the erosion in the real value of re- 
source transfers and saw an increasing gap 
between their aspirations for more rapid de- 
velopment and the level of resources available 
to them to undertake development programs. 
At the same time, they were motivated by the 
success of the OPEC [Organization of Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries] cartel into greater 
cohesion and the formulation of a far-reaching 
set of comprehensive and interrelated de- 
mands known as the New International Eco- 
nomic Order, which, in essence, calls for a 
restructuring of the international economic 
system in their favor. 

The developed countries during this period 
were in a reactive posture. In the wake of the 
adverse economic consequences of the oil em- 
bargo and the OPEC price increases of 1973- 
74, their immediate concern in the North- 
South context was to begin discussions with 
oil exporters, and they initiated a call for an 
international energy conference. 

The developing countries which met in 
April 197.5 with developed countries to pre- 
pare for such a conference did not wish to iso- 
late energy from other North-South economic 
issues and insisted that all relevant issues be 
covered. This meeting failed, but following 
months of further negotiations, the same 
countries agreed to a single conference with 



92 



Department of State Bulletin 



. 



substantive discussions on energy, raw mate- 
rials, development, and finance to be covered 
in four separate commissions. 

Since most of these non-energy issues are 
handled in other forums, the thrust of CIEC's 
work on these issues was to seek to advance 
the work on them in these other bodies. A 
ministerial-level meeting in December 1975 
launched the CIEC as a unique experiment in 
North-South relations: a single, relatively 
small forum with participants representing 
different groups of countries, covering a 
broad range of North-South issues. As an ex- 
periment, its duration was limited to one 
year. 

The industrialized country participants 
were Australia, Canada, the European Eco- 
nomic Community, Japan, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United States [Group of 
8]. For the developing countries, the partici- 
pants were Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Came- 
roon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, 
Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, 
and Zambia [Group of 19]. The participants 
were chosen in order to give a wide geo- 
graphic representation and one that reflected 
a variety of economic situations. 

Among the developing countries, the oil- 
exporting countries had a heavy representa- 
tion because of the origins of the conference. 
Among the industrialized countries, the mem- 
bers of the European Economic Community 
decided to speak with one voice. Venezuela 
and Canada furnished the cochairmen for the 
conference. The CIEC was not a part of the 
U.N. structure, but was an independent con- 
ference, with a minimal, temporary sec- 
retariat, free-standing and without formal 
ties to any existing international body. 

The experimental aspects of CIEC resulted 
in a different kind of North-South forum. Its 
limited size and relative absence from public 
view meant that, for the most part, ideologi- 
cal rhetoric was eschewed, and a relatively 
businesslike atmosphere obtained. Despite 
our efforts, however, issues did become linked 
across commissions; this situation prevented 
us from concentrating on issues on which we 
believed the most progress could be made and 
relegating others to secondary status. We 



were also not able to avoid the bloc-to-bloc 
tactics characteristic of other global North- 
South forums, as we had hoped. 

While industrialized countries had intended 
that the conference center on energy, they did 
not begin CIEC with the expectation or objec- 
tive of securing any agreement on oil prices or 
oil embargoes. The industrialized countries 
did hope, however, to achieve increased rec- 
ognition by oil producers of their role in pro- 
viding for a stable, growing global economy 
and to further the process of integrating the 
economies of oil-exporting countries into the 
international economy. 

Analysis and Formulation of Proposals 

The four commissions met almost monthly 
during 1976. The first half of the year was de- 
voted to analytical work; the second half to ef- 
forts to formulate concrete proposals for sub- 
mission to ministers for their consideration 
and approval. The process was temporarily 
suspended last July, following a meeting of 
senior officials, when the four commissions 
failed to agree on their work programs for the 
second half of the year. 

The Group of 19 insisted on agenda lan- 
guage that prejudged the outcome of the 
"action-oriented" phase, including endorse- 
ment of the concepts of generalized debt relief 
and indexation of commodity prices. This dis- 
pute was subsequently resolved in time for 
the commissions to meet as scheduled in Sep- 
tember. But the work was arduous and long, 
and the participants did not make sufficient 
progress to end CIEC as scheduled. The con- 
cluding CIEC ministerial meeting, originally 
planned for December 1976, was postponed in 
November in order that work could be 
brought to a better state of readiness for 
ministers and also to allow the new U.S. Ad- 
ministration to participate in the final stage of 
the CIEC. 

We believe the North-South dialogue, in 
CIEC and other forums, should emphasize 
improving, rather than restructuring, the 
existing international economic system, thus 
enabling the developing countries to partici- 
pate fully in this system. Appropriate and ef- 
ficient transfer of resources to developing 



July 18, 1977 



93 



countries through direct mechanisms, such as 
foreign assistance, as well as the importance 
of trade and investment, are the essential 
elements in an improved economic system. 
We believe — and seek to convince LDC's [less 
developed countries] — that indirect 
mechanisms of resource transfer, such as 
generalized debt relief and indexation of pri- 
mary product prices, would be inefficient, 
largely ineffective, and actually contrary to 
LDC interests. 

CIEC enabled us to demonstrate to de- 
veloping countries those areas in which ef- 
forts should be concentrated and progress 
could be made in the ongoing dialogue. The 
developed countries backed their rhetoric 
about improving the present interdependent 
economic system by undertaking serious ef- 
forts to produce concrete results in develop- 
ment assistance, commodity issues, and trade. 
Moreover, subjecting the demands of develop- 
ing countries for automatic, indirect resource 
transfer to the intense scrutiny of economic 
analysis enabled the developed countries to 
explain that a number of these demands can- 
not be accepted because they run counter to 
LDC interests, as well as being contrary to 
the interest of a healthy global economy in 
which they have a major stake. 

CIEC will not cause developing countries to 
abandon their attachment to, or their de- 
mands stemming from, the New International 
Economic Order. Their political solidarity in 
North-South relations is centered around the 
concepts embodied in the New International 
Economic Order. They cannot abandon any 
portion of it without endangering this solidar- 
ity. However, the cooperative, workmanlike 
atmosphere which obtained in CIEC and the 
substantive progress made there may tend to 
make future North-South discussions more 
productive by encouraging developing coun- 
tries to temper their more extreme and un- 
realistic demands and concentrate on more 
promising areas. 

The Final CIEC Package 

To demonstrate their commitment to a 
more productive and rational ongoing North- 
South dialogue, and to try to insure that 



CIEC contributed positively to such a 
dialogue, the industrialized countries in CIEC 
constructed a final package containing signifi- 
cant advances in elements designed to benefit 
developing countries. These elements include: 

— A commitment to increased and more ef- 
fective foreign assistance over the next sev- 
eral years as well as a Special Action Program 
of special assistance to the poorest countries. 

— A recommendation supporting a general 
capital increase for the IBRD and within this 
context greater World Bank priority to lend- 
ing for energy and raw materials development 
and diversification, without prejudice to its 
other priorities. 

— A political commitment by CIEC partici- 
pants to establish a common fund, which in 
the Group of 8 view is to be in conjunction 
with individual agreements to stabilize com- 
modity prices. 

In addition, progress occurred on a number 
of secondary issues, including a positive ap- 
proach to infrastructure development in Af- 
rica, food and agriculture, technology trans- 
fer, industrialization, LDC access to capital 
markets, and support for cooperation among 
developing countries. 

There were significant advances in the final 
package on several elements of interest to us. 
We obtained agreement on general guidelines 
for energy supply. There were recommenda- 
tions to stimulate increased cooperation in 
developing energy resources in oil-importing 
developing countries. We obtained LDC rec- 
ognition of the importance for both developed 
and developing countries of an improved cli- 
mate for foreign investment. 

A disappointment in the outcome is the fail- 
ure to agree on continuing energy consulta- 
tion. We believe continuing energy consulta- 
tions are in the interests of all countries, yet 
energy is distinctive among the issues before 
CIEC in that it has no natural place for dis- 
cussion in existing bodies. 

The Group of 19, however, remained un- 
yielding in its opposition to an ongoing energy 
dialogue. Some OPEC members of the Group 
of 19 believe that such consultation would in- 
fringe on their unilateral price and production 
decisions. Other OPEC members indicated 



94 



Department of State Bulletin 



that they were prepared to continue energy 
discussions if all CIEC would continue. How- 
ever, the continuation of CIEC was not ac- 
ceptable to oil-importing members of the 
Group of 19, even though some favored an on- 
going energy dialogue. In the end the indus- 
trialized countries stood alone in their support 
of the energy dialogue and decided to drop it 
rather than let the issue cause the collapse of 
CIEC. 

A brief summary of the final decisions in the 
four areas of energy, raw materials, develop- 
ment, and finance follows. 

Energy 

We made progress on all of the Group of 8 
energy objectives in CIEC, except for obtain- 
ing a CIEC recommendation for an ongoing 
energy dialogue. The CIEC participants 
agreed to a general set of guidelines that: 

1. Recognize the essentiality of adequate 
and stable energy supplies to global growth 
and the responsibilities of all nations, includ- 
ing the oil-e.xporting countries, to insure that 
such supplies are available; 

2. Call for intensified national and interna- 
tional cooperative efforts to expand energy 
conservation and accelerate the development 
of conventional and nonconventional energy 
supplies during the energy transition period 
and beyond; 

3. Affirm that special efforts should be 
made to assist oil-importing LDC's alleviate 
their energy burdens; 

4. Recommend that the IBRD, in the con- 
text of a general capital increase, establish as 
a new priority lending for LDC energy 
development; 

5. Call for new international efforts to 
facilitate the transfer of energy technology to 
LDC's wishing to acquire such technologies; 

6. Endorse increased international coopera- 
tion in energy research and development, 
which will probably lead to participation by 
some oil-exporting and other developing coun- 
tries in ongoing research and development 
work in the International Energy Agency 
(lEA); and 

7. Recognize the desirability and inevitabil- 
ity of the integration of the downstream proc- 



essing industries of the oil-exporting coun- 
tries into the expanding world industrial 
structure as rapidly as practicable. 

As a first try in a North-South context, we 
consider the energy results to be satisfactory. 
While replete with caveats, the agreement on 
supply puts OPEC on record as recognizing 
that adequate energy supplies are necessary 
and that oil exporters have a responsibility of 
meeting energy needs during the transition 
period that must occur while countries de- 
velop alternative sources. The recommenda- 
tion that IBRD increase lending to LDC's to 
develop energy resources could have a signifi- 
cant long-term impact on the development 
prospects of oil-importing LDC's by gradually 
freeing them of the need for high-cost oil. To 
the extent these countries reduce oil imports 
over time, the world supply of oil will be 
greater. 

Many OPEC countries are now concerned 
about their energy prospects when their oil 
runs out. They have been receptive to the 
idea of participation in lEA and other 
industrial-country energy research and de- 
velopment projects to begin their own conver- 
sion to alternative energy sources. 

Any final assessment of the CIEC Energy 
Commission must include the educational im- 
pact its work has had on both the oil- 
importing developing countries and the OPEC 
countries. The former have become more 
keenly aware of the adverse economic impact 
on them of OPEC price and production deci- 
sions. During the course of the work of the 
commission, some of the oil-exporting coun- 
tries appeared to become more conscious of 
the impact of their decisions on the global 
economy. 

Raw Materials 

U.S. objectives in the Raw Materials Com- 
mission consisted essentially of insuring a 
pragmatic, objective airing of the various 
problems in commodity trade, as well as pos- 
sible solutions to these problems. Group of 19 
participation in the discussions consisted 
largely of laying out the full range of demands 
emanating from the Manila declaration of 
early 1976 and seeking to gain the greatest 



July 18, 1977 



95 



possible number of Group of 8 concessions in 
response to these demands. 

The debates revealed some general areas of 
agreement, but even greater areas of dis- 
agreement, particularly on such traditional 
LDC objectives as "preservation of LDC pur- 
chasing power in real terms" and measures to 
harmonize the production of synthetics with 
that of natural products. On other issues, such 
as compensatory financing to cover shortfalls 
in LDC earnings from exports of primary 
products, a Group of 8 proposed study of the 
issue in the IMF-IBRD Development Com- 
mittee foundered over Group of 19 insistence 
on UNCTAD participation in the study. 

In the wake of the decision of participants 
in the London economic summit that there 
should be a common fund and that CIEC 
should seek to give impetus to resumed 
negotiations on this issue in November, CIEC 
participants reached agreement in principle 
on the "establishment of a common fund with 
purposes, objectives and other constituent 
elements to be further negotiated in UN- 
CTAD." As the language implies, the Group 
of 8 has not accepted the UNCTAD concep- 
tion of a common fund. By the same token, 
the Group of 19 has not abandoned this 
conception. 

Aside from the political decision on the 
common fund issue, the discussion of raw ma- 
terials issues in CIEC — despite the lack of 
agreement on many issues — was probably 
salutary in that the industrialized countries 
were firm, for the most part, in rejecting 
those LDC proposals aimed at market inter- 
vention that are impractical and unrealistic. 
Although we may expect the LDC's to renew 
their demands in other forums, they may do 
so with a more sober view of the likely 
developed-country response. 

Development 

CIEC also produced agreement on a 
number of useful concepts and programs in 
the areas of development finance, transfer of 
technology, and trade as well as assistance to 
agriculture, infrastructure, and industrializa- 
tion. This outcome will serve to advance ac- 



tions on these matters in other forums and lay 
the groundwork for further programs in the 
dialogue. 

One of CIEC's most notable achievements 
was in the area of development assistance. 
The Group of 8 countries made commitments 
to increase the volume of aid and agreed to a 
variety of concepts to enhance the quality and 
distribution of these flows. All traditional 
donors agreed — for the first time — to increase 
official development assistance "substan- 
tially." 

U.S. commitment along these lines had an 
important positive impact; the Administration 
has taken this commitment within the context 
of its intention to request increases in eco- 
nomic assistance over the next five years, 
starting with the current fiscal year. In keep- 
ing with this important policy decision, donor 
countries further agreed to begin negotiations 
on a general capital increase for the World 
Bank. 

Developed countries in CIEC also agreed to 
establish a $1 billion Special Action Program 
of aid for the poorest LDC's (i.e., generally 
those eligible for concessional assistance from 
the International Development Association. 
Contributions to this program will take vari- 
ous forms as determined by each participant 
and in accord with a burden-sharing formula 
among donors. 

Subject to appropriate congressional action, 
the U.S. contribution of $375 million will be 
funded by fiscal year 1979 in our regular 
bilateral assistance program. The European 
Economic Community will contribute $385 
million to a special account of IDA for fast 
disbursing assistance. Other developed- 
country participants will split the remaining 
$240 million, generally via bilateral measures. 
The Japanese share is $114 million in new as- 
sistance. Sweden and Switzerland, and in part 
Canada, will participate via debt relief. 

The conference also reached important 
broad agreements in other development- 
related areas. The participants agreed on a 
set of general concepts concerning infrastruc- 
ture development which represents the first 
official text on this subject in a North-South 
forum. They recommended that the United 






96 



Department of State Bulletin 



Nations arrange a conference under Economic 
Commission for Africa-African Development 
Bank auspices to define and carry forward the 
objectives of an African Transport and Com- 
munications Decade (1978-87) which would be 
aimed at improving both economic and social 
infrastructures, with special emphasis on 
transportation and communications. 

In the area of assistance to industrializa- 
tion, agreement covered a wide variety of as- 
pects, including better coordination for tech- 
nical assistance and support for UNIDO 
[U.N. Industrial Development Organ- 
ization] sectoral consultations. The confer- 
ence, however, was unable to agree on two 
particularly extreme demands by developing 
countries concerning adjustment assistance 
and access to markets. These relate to indus- 
trialized countries using adjustment assist- 
ance for redeployment of industry from de- 
veloped to developing countries and to their 
eliminating immediately all trade barriers to 
imports from developing countries. 

On the subject of technology transfer, par- 
ticipants agreed on the importance of three 
significant measures: 

1. Revision of the Paris convention on in- 
dustrial property; 

2. Implementation of UNCTAD Resolutions 
87 (IV), which deals with strengthening the 
technological capacity of developing countries, 
and 89(IV), concerning the drafting of an in- 
ternational code of conduct on technology 
transfer; and 

3. The importance of the upcoming U.N. 
Conference on Science and Technology. 

In the area of food and agriculture, CIEC 
agreed on a 500,000-ton emergency grain re- 
serve, support for early negotiations on a 
grains agreement with stocks, and recom- 
mendations for enhanced aid for seed produc- 
tion and research. 

On trade, the conference agreed on lan- 
guage recognizing the importance of making 
general progress in the MTN and on special 
and differential treatment for LDC's in cer- 
tain areas of those negotiations. Language 
calling for efforts to improve the generalized 
system of preferences and to reach an early 



decision on the future of the multifiber ar- 
rangement regarding textile trade was also 
agreed. 

The conference also discussed the question 
of developing-country debt and considered the 
U.S. -EEC proposal on features to guide acute 
debt operations, on the one hand, and on the 
other, situations where debt is part of a 
longer term structural balance-of-payments 
problem. The participants, however, were 
unable to reach agreement on this subject, 
since the Group of 19 continued to call for a 
general moratorium on outstanding debt to 
donor governments. 

Finance 

The work of the Financial Affairs Commis- 
sion resulted in four generally agreed papers: 
private foreign direct investment, develop- 
ing-country access to capital markets, other 
financial flows (monetary issues), and cooper- 
ation among developing countries. 

On private foreign direct investment, par- 
ticipants agreed on the importance of a favor- 
able investment climate in promoting 
investment flows and made considerable 
progress in agreeing to the essential elements 
that constitute a favorable investment cli- 
mate. But those issues generally related to a 
legal framework for settlement of compensa- 
tion and other investment issues could not be 
resolved. 

Regarding access to capital markets, the 
final results support the work of the IMF- 
IBRD Development Committee and urge the 
speedy implementation of its recommenda- 
tions. These largely involve technical assist- 
ance of various sorts. 

With respect to monetary issues, the partic- 
ipants noted with satisfaction that the work 
program laid out for the IMF by its Interim 
Committee reflected a large number of con- 
cerns expressed during the conference. 
Strong support was expressed for the initia- 
tive taken to establish a supplementary credit 
facility in the IMF. A number of Group of 19 
participants advanced specific proposals for 
structural changes in the international mone- 
tary system and for easier access to interna- 



July 18, 1977 



97 



tional financial resources. The Group of 8 re- 
sisted inclusion of such proposals, as these are 
matters for discussion in the IMF and not 
within the competence of the CIEC. The 
Group of 19, preferring to have monetary is- 
sues remain on the table, withdrew their spe- 
cific proposals in order to reach an agreed 
text, noting, however, that the consensus 
reached did not cover all areas of interest to 
them. 

The paper on cooperation among developing 
countries largely reflected the text agreed 
earlier in various U.N. forums. 

Disagreement on the text for measures 
against inflation reflected divergent views on 
the sources of inflation. The Group of 19 in- 
sisted that the only matter of concern was im- 
ported inflation and that measures against 
such inflation called for indexation of their 
export prices. The Group of 8 maintained that 
inflation is largely homegrown and requires 
appropriate demand management measures. 
However, the Group of 8 noted that those 
countries whose actions have worldwide 
repercussions — i.e., large industrial countries 
and countries with important exports — had a 
particular responsibility to combat inflation. 
On financial assets of oil-exporting developing 
countries, participants agreed that some oil- 
exporting developing countries, in order to 
accommodate world energy requirements and 
thereby contribute to world economic growth 
and stability, have been maintaining produc- 
tion that, at current prices, yields external 
resources in excess of their current require- 
ments. However, the Group of 8 countries 
could not agree that, as a consequence, 
such assets should receive preferential treat- 
ment. 

As noted above, the results of CIEC are 
broadly satisfactory. The participants gained 
a much better understanding on a broad range 
of issues of mutual concern. The dialogue will 
continue in other forums. The specific results 
of CIEC as a whole will be put before the 
U.N. General Assembly in September for 
comment and discussion by both participants 
and those countries that did not participate in 
the Paris meetings. 



98 



Department Testifies on U.S. Policy 
Toward Rhodesia 

Following is a statonent by William B. 
Edmondson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
African Affairs, before the Subcommittee on 
Africa of the House Committee on Intenia- 
tional Relations on June 8. ' 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss 
with you the situation in Rhodesia and the 
progress of the negotiations which we hope 
will lead to a peaceful settlement of the ter- 
ritory's constitutional problems and bring a 
new Zimbabwe into the community of na- 
tions as a majority-ruled independent state. 

The first round of meetings in southern 
Africa between the United Kingdom Consul- 
tative Group on Rhodesia, led by Deputy 
Under Secretary John Graham, and the 
principal parties to the Rhodesian dispute 
has been completed. Stephen Low, our Am- 
bassador in Zambia, has been traveling and 
working closely with Mr. Graham's party, 
participating in practically all of the meet- 
ings. The aim of the consultative group is to 
establish with the relevant parties — that is 
the four nationalist groups and the Smith 
regime — the basis for a constitution for an 
independent Zimbabwe and the necessary 
transitional arrangements to move that 
country from minority to majority rule. 

We share with Great Britain the belief 
that a peaceful transition to independence 
can be accomplished within 1978. We also 
share with the United Kingdom the under- 
standing that any settlement must be predi- 
cated upon three fundamental principles: 

1. That the new government must be 
selected on the basis of a democratic elec- 
tion; 

2. That there should be universal adult 
suffrage in that election; and 

3. That the constitution of the new state 
should include a bill of rights that is legally 



' The complete transcript of the heai'ings will be 
published by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



Department of State Bulletin 



enforceable by an independent judicial sys- 
tem. 

The initial talks have been reasonably en- 
couraging. Much work remains to be done, 
however, and it serves no one's interest to 
attempt to minimize the hostility, suspicion, 
and fundamentally differing approaches to 
the problem which separate the Smith re- 
gime from the African nationalists. 
Nevertheless, it is worthy of note that all 
the parties have accepted the consultative 
group's method of operation as an acceptable 
means of carrying out the negotiations. 

As could be e.xpected, most of the parties 
have put forth their maximum negotiating 
positions in these initial encounters. How- 
ever, beyond the initial hardline positions 
there are indications of some flexibility. The 
possibility exists that a settlement can be 
worked out which will meet the legitimate 
African demands for rapid and complete 
transition to majority rule, while at the 
same time, encompassing provisions to in- 
still in the white population sufficient confi- 
dence in their future well-being to encour- 
age them to accept and remain in a nonracial 
Zimbabwe. 

Mr. Graham has now returned to London 
to participate in the Commonwealth Confer- 
ence. Over the next month we will consult 
closely with the British and maintain contact 
with the principal parties to obtain their 
further ideas and specific constitutional pro- 
posals. We expect that by the end of this 
month the consultative group will have for- 
mulated the general principles of the con- 
stitution and a program of transition for fur- 
ther discussion with the principal parties. 

While the negotiating effort can and must 
continue, the level of fighting is unfortu- 
nately also increasing. Recently, the Rhode- 
sian regime has taken several steps that 



threaten to see the conflict widened rather 
than reduced. We have vigorously opposed 
such moves and have made our objections 
known in no uncertain terms. Specifically, 
by means of representations made in Cape 
Town, we conveyed to the Smith regime our 
strongest warning that .an implementation of 
Mr. Smith's threat of "preemptive raids" 
into Zambia would clearly damage the pos- 
sibilities for a negotiated settlement. Simi- 
larly, when Rhodesian forces crossed the 
border into Botswana, we made clear that 
whatever military advantage the Smith re- 
gime sought for itself in the short run would 
be lost in the long run by the blow to the 
cause of peace brought about by attacking a 
country which is nearly defenseless. 

We cannot definitively assess the motive 
for such actions, but if it is to provoke a 
larger conflict with the aim of drawing di- 
rect foreign intervention and a Western 
compensatory response favorable to the 
Rhodesians, it will fail. 

Our expressions of concern and indigna- 
tion over the recent deep penetration of 
Rhodesian troops into Mozambique, the first 
of this type in 1977, stressed that such ac- 
tion not only threatens the prospects for 
peaceful negotia;tion but encourages those 
who are prepared to see further escalation 
of the violence through the introduction of 
extracontinental forces. In each case we 
have expressed our view that an expansion 
of the war would help no one, and we have 
made it clear that Mr. Smith could expect no 
help against the escalation resulting from 
his actions. We believe that the best chance 
for peace in the area will come through a 
negotiated end to violence and the resulting 
peaceful transition to majority rule and in- 
dependence. We shall continue to press 
ahead, along with the British, toward this 
goal. 



July 18, 1977 



99 



Department Discusses U.S. Participation 
in International Organizations 



Statement by Charles W. Maynes 

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs * 



The interest of the Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee in U.S. participation in in- 
ternational organizations is encouraging. It is 
also timely. Too often we have paid lipservice 
to the U.N. system, but not taken it seriously 
enough. The issues, as the committee has rec- 
ognized, are too important for this to 
continue. 

President Carter is strongly committed to 
developing the full potential of multilateral in- 
stitutions. He has indicated the importance he 
attaches to the work of the U.N. family of in- 
stitutions, and to the opportunities they af- 
ford, by a series of actions: by appointment of 
Andrew Young as our Ambassador to the 
United Nations; by inviting, among his first 
visitors, U.N. Secretary General Kurt Wal- 
dheim to come to Washington; by delivering 
his first major foreign policy address at the 
United Nations. With these actions and 
others, the President has proclaimed that this 
country has an important stake in the effec- 
tive functioning of international organizations 
and that we intend to be an active and con- 
structive presence throughout the U.N. 
system. 

We are aware of the growing complexities 
involved in participation in international or- 
ganizations today. There are today three 



' Submitted to the Senate Committee on Governmen- 
tal Affairs symposium on U.S. participation in the spe- 
cialized agencies of the United Nations and other inter- 
national organizations on -June 15. The complete tran- 
script of the symposium will be published by the com- 
mittee and will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402. 



100 



times as many sovereign states in the major 
U.N. agencies as signed the U.N. Charter in 
San Francisco. They have very diverse needs 
and interests, and the claims, usually quite 
legitimate, that they make upon the services 
of the U.N. system have grown dramatically. 

From 194.5 until 1970, the United States 
contributed to international organizations .$4.7 
billion; since 1970, it has already contributed 
an additional $4 billion. It is abundantly clear 
that as global problems become more numer- 
ous and more acute, the uses of international 
organizations multiply, their programs e.x- 
pand, their costs increase. Since the energy 
crisis, for example, the International Energy 
Agency and the OECD [Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development] have 
added nearly .300 meetings to our conference 
schedule. 

We find that whenever an international 
problem develops — and this happens with in- 
creasing frequency in an interdependent 
world — often the only appropriate response 
comes through an international organization. 
Inevitably, as the capacity of these organiza- 
tions is strained by the demands placed upon 
them, we become increasingly aware of their 
defects. This has happened with national gov- 
ernments as they face their burgeoning agen- 
das. We should not be surprised when it hap- 
pens to international organizations. 

This is a challenge which the Carter Ad- 
ministration has taken up with alacrity. Rec- 
ognizing that our political problems in the 
United Nations are caused by the logjams in 
southern Africa, in the dialogue concerning a 



Department of State Bulletin 



new international economic order, and in the 
Middle East, the Administration has been dip- 
lomatically active on all of these fronts. Al- 
though our initiatives on such critical issues 
as Namibia, Rhodesia, and apartheid are in- 
trinsically important, they also have institu- 
tional consequences. 

As a result of these initiatives, our credibil- 
ity is enhanced and many more states are 
prepared to cooperate with us, rather than 
confront us in a variety of U.N. forums on a 
variety of issues. We believe, for example, 
that real progress has been made, as well, in 
restoring a sense of fair play and due process 
in ILO [International Labor Organization] and 
in UNESCO [United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization]; an in- 
tense effort on our part has produced en- 
couraging results. In effect, we have come 
back from that nadir of our morale and pres- 
tige which followed the debacle in Vietnam. 
Our diplomatic effectiveness — then at a low 
ebb — is demonstrating, we believe, new vital- 
ity, and we can face the challenge posed by 
the U.N. system and its problems with new 
confidence. 

This is a welcome trend, because it is a 
myth to believe that the United States can af- 
ford to be indifferent to what happens within 
the U.N. system or that we can opt out of 
major institutions. Even were this to happen 
in a particular organization, we could not fol- 
low such a policy generally. We must and can 
remain a member and work hard to increase 
our influence and to improve these institu- 
tions. 

In one sense, our participation is obligatory 
simply because we are the United States, a 
great power with many interests, with a con- 
cern in how the international rules are drawn 
up, and with much to contribute in the way of 
knowledge and experience to global develop- 
ment and stability. It is inconceivable that we 
could abdicate this responsibility. There or- 
ganizations have an impact whether we are 
there or not, and we must insist on defending 
our interests and helping to shape that im- 
pact, whether it be on the development of the 
world's educational systems (UNESCO), de- 
velopment of airline safety standards 
(ICAO — International Civil Aviation Organi- 



zation), or any of a myriad of other areas of 
impoilance in an interdependent world. 

The report of the Senate Governmental Op- 
erations Committee addresses the problem of 
politicization within U.N. agencies, but it is 
equally concerned with the issue of 
management — the evidence of inadequate 
coordination, wasteful administrative prac- 
tices, the failure of international institutions 
adequately to evaluate their own programs 
and set priorities.^ These are problems of 
structure, as opposed to substance. They are 
a source of continuing concern to the Adminis- 
tration, both because we are the largest single 
contributor to the U.N. system and because 
the agenda for multilateral action is important 
and can ill afford the debilitating effects of 
poor administration and management. 

We must recognize that these problems of 
structure are, in apart, endemic among all 
large bureaucratic institutions and that inter- 
national organizations are not only not an ex- 
ception, but have special problems. In some 
ways it is amazing that these problems are not 
even more severe. After all, the United 
States experiences many of the same difficul- 
ties at home, and yet we are a relatively 
homogeneous society whose government pos- 
sesses authority the U.N. agencies do not 
begin to approach. 

However, the Administration is working 
vigorously on behalf of reforms within the 
U.N. system. We are trying to preserve the 
primacy of the UNDP [United Nations De- 
velopment Program] as coordinating agency 
for U.N. development assistance. We have ac- 
tively supported the strengthening of the 
Joint Inspection Unit as an instrument of ex- 
ternal evaluation. We applaud the economies 
achieved by several of the specialized agen- 
cies in reducing inflated bureaucracies and 
curbing meetings and publications. WHO 
[World Health Organization] for example, is 
reducing its staff in Geneva by 313 positions, 
and FAO's [Food and Agriculture Or- 
ganization] Director General has accomplished 
similar streamlining in Rome. In company 



^ The report, entitled "U.S. Participation in Interna- 
tional Organizations," was printed as S. Doc. 95-50, 
February 1977, 140 pp. 



July 18, 1977 



101 



with the other Geneva group members, we 
are trying to institute a pause in real budget 
growth or limited growth among the big 
four— ILO, WHO, FAO, and UNESCO— 
during the 1980-81 biennium. During that 
period, we propose that the programs of those 
agencies be subjected to a searching evalua- 
tion and that realistic priorities be established 
and consolidation accomplished. 

Economy and good management in intei'iia- 
tional organizations should be objectives sup- 
ported by all states, the LDC's [less de- 
veloped countries] included. We must take 
care, however. Our passion for economy is 
often perceived by the developing countries as 
an indication of our opposition to their use of 
the U.N. system to fulfill legitimate develop- 
ment goals. We need to enlist the LDC's in a 
campaign to make the U.N. system more effi- 
cient and effective. We are attempting to do 
this by demonstrating a good faith commit- 
ment to find mutually agreeable solutions for 
substantive issues. We can also do this by 
committing ourselves to using the savings 
from the more economical management of the 
U.N. system for programs of benefit to the 
majority of the members. 

In spite of these efforts, perhaps the most 
important arena for reform, the place where 
we must concentrate our energy, is right here 
at home. The impact we can make upon the 
management of the U.N. system will be 
proportionate to the quality of the analysis 
and coordination we achieve here in Washing- 
ton. At the present time, U.S. policy which 
affects international organizations is made in 
many different departments and agencies and 
committees. Responsibility for U.S. participa- 
tion in the U.N. system is fragmented and un- 
certain. It is essential that the central 
policy-directing role of the Department of 
State be reaffirmed and that the President 
and the Congress support the exercise of that 
responsibility even when the policy prefer- 
ences of the other agencies may have to be 
subordinated. 

The key to reform, we believe, lies in the 
development of procedures which impose ob- 
ligations on all interested government de- 
partments and agencies to cooperate with 



102 



State in defining our objectives and priorities, 
relating them to available resources and pre- 
senting them as a coherent program for par- 
ticipation in the U.N. system. Moreover, this 
must be done far enough in advance of budget 
deadlines that we may have a reasonable 
prospect of influencing the focus and growth 
of the U.N. agencies. We have been working 
on such procedures and hope to announce 
them shortly. The success of these procedures 
will depend, in turn, on the effective function- 
ing of interagency committees that are able to 
tie together foreign and domestic policy con- 
siderations and create common purposes and 
priorities for our participation in FAO, 
UNESCO, ILO, WHO, ICAO, and the many 
other developmental and technical forums to 
which we belong. 

This Administration has already taken sev- 
eral steps to improve the development and 
implementation of U.S. policy toward interna- 
tional institutions. The size and composition of 
U.S. delegations to international meetings 
and conferences is the subject of a directive 
by the Secretary of State, calling for reduc- 
tions by 15-25 percent and placing responsi- 
bility at a higher level for recommending 
more minority candidates for delegation posi- 
tions. It should result in leaner, more repre- 
sentative, and better integrated delegations. 
We have been able to reduce delegation size 
significantly. 

In addition, procedures have been insti- 
tuted which should appreciably strengthen 
U.S. review and appraisal of U.N. develop- 
ment assistance. My office has initiated face- 
to-face conversations with high-level officials 
in the domestic agencies with the objective of 
improving coordination and reconciling policy 
differences. And in the area of recruitment for 
international secretariats, we are embarking 
upon a major effort to improve our represen- 
tation among field personnel with responsibil- 
ity for development projects. 

We recognize that the quality of interna- 
tional secretariats and the number of U.S. na- 
tionals in key posts has troubled the commit- 
tee. There is I'oom for improvement. How- 
ever, there are some basic points anyone con- 
cerned with this area must bear in mind. 



Department of State Bulletin 



First, the United States is better repre- 
sented in the secretariats of U.N. agencies, 
including top positions, than any other coun- 
try. 

Second, when our nationals are grouped 
with those of the OECD states, the picture is 
even more encouraging. 

Third, our principal problems are with in- 
stitutions based in foreign countries where 
Americans are less willing to live than in their 
own country. 

Finally, in the years immediately ahead, a 
combination of factors will make it very dif- 
ficult to increase significantly the American 
contingent in international secretariats. Fi- 
nancially induced restrictions on recruitment, 
intense pressure to provide more positions for 
underrepresented developing countries, and 
limited career opportunities for American 
professionals combine to limit our prospects. 
However, we would stress that gains can be 
realized if we are prepared to pay the bill for 
a national recruitment service or for a system 
of shadow promotions which permit some of 
our top officers to join international organiza- 
tions without sacrificing career benefits at 
home. 

Whether the objective of an enhanced pres- 
ence in U.N. secretariats is worth the addi- 
tional investment is a political decision Con- 
gress must help us make. 

We are approaching a very important 
watershed in the history of multilateral dip- 
lomacy and the institutions which serve it. 
After drifting dangerously into confrontation 
between developed and developing countries, 
with the United States frequently isolated in 
the United Nations and elsewhere, some bal- 
ance has been restored. In spite of all of the 
seemingly intractable problems of North-South 
relations, we have an opportunity now to 
make the U.N. system work on behalf of the 
entire family of nations. It is an opportunity 
that will require thoughtful analysis and con- 
siderable patience. It will also require unpre- 
cedented cooperation between Congress and 
the President and among the Federal de- 
partments and agencies to create policies re- 
garding U.S. participation in the U.N. system 



which reconcile the need for more stringent 
management with the need for a more flexible 
response on the major development issues. 
Whatever the problems, it is an opportunity 
which must not be missed. Otherwise, we may 
anticipate renewed confrontation and even 
more inefficiency and disorder as well. 

The report of the Senate Governmental Af- 
fairs Committee has thus arrived at a very 
crucial time. It raises important questions and 
has helped a wider public here and abroad to 
understand the nature of the problems we 
face. We want to thank the committee for its 
contribution to a very important dialogue and 
to pledge the continuing support of this Ad- 
ministration for the indicated efforts to im- 
prove the performance of international or- 
ganizations. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. 
Approved by the International Coffee Council De- 
cember 3, 1975. Entered into force provisionally 
October 1, 1976. 
Ratification depv.iited: Ivory Coast, June 22, 1977. 

Cotton 

Articles of agreement of International Cotton 
Institute. Done at Washington January 17, 1966. En- 
tered into force February 23, 1966. TIAS 5964. 
Accession deposited: Ivory Coast, June 27, 1977. 

Customs 

Customs Convention on the International Transport of 
Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets, with annexes 
and protocol of signature. Done at Geneva January 
15, 1959. Entered into force January 7, 1960; for the 
United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6633. 
Accessions deposited: Cyprus, June 3, 1977; Kuwait, 
May 26, 1977. 

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes 
and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972. En- 
tered into force December 6, 1975.' 
Ratification deposited: Austria, June 17, 1977. 



Not in force for the United States. 



July 18, 1977 



103 



Finance 

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund. Done at Washington December 27, 1945. En- 
tered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501. 
Signature and acceptance: Seychelles, June 30, 1977. 

Agreement establishing the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development. Done at Rome June 13, 
1976.2 

Ratification deposited: Sweden, June 17, 1977. 
Accession deposited: Cameroon, June 20, 1977. 
Signature: Spain, June 22, 1977. 

Law, Private International 

Statute of The Hague conference on private interna- 
tional law. Drawn up at the 7th session of the con- 
ference at The Hague October 9-31, 1951. Entered 
into force July 15, 1955; for the United States Oc- 
tober 15, 1964". 

Notification of denunciation: Brazil, June 13, 1977; 
effective June 30, 1978. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974. Enters into 
force April 1, 1978. 
Acceptance deposited: Qatar, May 19, 1977. 

Oil Pollution 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea bv oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109, 8505). Adopted at 
London October 12, 1971. ^ 

Acceptance deposited: United Kingdom, June 2, 
1977. 

Postal 

Second additional protocol to the constitution of the 
Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881, 
7150), general regulations with final protocol and 
annex, and the universal postal convention with final 
protocal and detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne 
July 5, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. 
TIAS 8231. 
Ratification deposited: Nepal, May 4, 1977. 

Money orders and postal travellers' checks agreement, 
with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5. 
1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. TIAS 
8232. 
Accession deposited: Kuwait, December 1, 1976. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 
1974, with anne.x. Done at London November 1, 
1974.2 

Approval deposited: France (with a declaration), 
May 25, 1977. 

Terrorism 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against internationally protected persons, in- 



cluding diplomatic agents. Done at New York 

December 14, 1973. Entered into force February 20, 

1977. 

Ratification deposited: Australia, June 20, 1977. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington 
March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, 
with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1976, 
with respect to other provisions. 
Ratification deposited: Austria, June 27, 1977. 
Accession deposited: Luxembourg, June 28, 1977. 

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid 
convention (part of the international wheat agree- 
ment) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington March 
17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with 
respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with 
respect to other provisions. 
Accession deposited: Luxembourg, June 28, 1977. 



BILATERAL 

Chad 

Agreement relating to the transfer of food grain to 
Chad. Signed at N'Djamena June 10, 1977. Entered 
into force June 10, 1977. 

Jamaica 

Agreement relating to radio communications between 
amateur stations on behalf of third parties. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Kingston February 24 and 
May 12, 1977. Entered into force June 11, 1977. 

Mexico 

Agreement relating to additional cooperative arrange- 
ments to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics, with 
annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico 
June 2, 1977. Entered into force June 2, 1977. 

Romania 

Agreement relating to the transfer of non-fat dry milk 
to Romania. Signed at Bucharest May 31, 1977. En- 
tered into force May 31, 1977. 

Agreement relating to trade in wool and man-made 
fiber textiles, with annex. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Bucharest June 17, 1977. Entered into force 
June 17, 1977. 

United Kingdom 

Reciprocal fisheries agreement, with agreed minute. 
Signed at Washington June 24, 1977. Enters into 
force when each party has notified the other by 
diplomatic note that the necessary domestic legal 
procedures for such entry into force have been 
fulfilled. 



2 Not in force. 



104 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX July 18, 1977 Vol. LXXVII, No. 1986 



Arms Control and Disarmament 

Secretary Vance Attends OAS General Assembly 
at Grenada (statements, news conference, and 
text of resolution) 69 

Secretary Vance Interviewed by II Tempo 
Correspondent 85 

Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Issues and 
Answers" 78 

Aviation. U.S. and U.K. Initial New Air Serv- 
ices Agreement (Carter, Department 
announcement) 83 

Belize. Secretary Vance Attends OAS General 
Assembly at Grenada (statements, news con- 
ference, and text of resolution) 69 

China. Secretary Vance Interviewed by II 
Tempo Correspondent 8.5 

Congress 

Department Discusses Results of CIEC Meeting 
(Cooper) 92 

Department Discusses U.S. Participation in In- 
ternational Organizations (Maynes) 100 

Department Testifies on U.S. Policy Toward 
Rhodesia (Edmondson) 98 

Cuba. Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Issues 
and Answers" 78 

Cyprus. Secretary Vance Interviewed by II 
Tempo Correspondent 85 

Economic Affairs. Department Discusses Re- 
sults of CIEC Meeting (Cooper) 92 

Europe 

Secretary Vance Interviewed by II Tempo 
Correspondent 85 

Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Issues and 
Answers" 78 

Human Rights 

Secretary Vance Attends OAS General Assembly 
at Grenada (statements, news conference, and 
text of resolution) 69 

Secretary Vance Interviewed by II Tempo 
Correspondent 85 

Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Issues and 

Answers" 78 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

Department Discusses U.S. Participation in In- 
ternational Organizations (Maynes) 100 

Israel. U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in 
Israel-Syria Sector Extended (Leonard) 90 

Korea. Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Issues 
and Answers" 78 

Latin America and the Caribbean. Secretary 
Vance Attends OAS General Assembly at Gre- 
nada (statements, news conference, and text of 
resolution) 69 

Middle East. Secretary Vance Interviewed on 
"Issues and Answers" 78 

Organization of American States. Secretary 
Vance Attends OAS General Assembly at Gre- 
nada {statements, news conference, and text of 
resolution) 69 

Panama. Secretary Vance Attends OAS General 
Assembly at Grenada (statements, news con- 
ference, and text of resolution) 69 

Presidential Documents. U.S. and U.K. Initial 
New Air Services Agreement (Carter, De- 
partment announcement) 83 



Southern Rhodesia. Department Testifies on 
U.S. Policy Toward Rhodesia (Edmondson) ... 98 

Syria. U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in 
Israel-Syria Sector Extended (Leonard) 90 

Treaty Information. Current Actions 103 

United Kingdom. U.S. and U.K. Initial New Air 
Services Agreement (Carter, Department 
announcement) 83 

United Nations. U.N. Disengagement Observer 
Force in Israel-Syria Sector Extended 
(Leonard) ." 90 

Name Index 

Carter, President 83 

Cooper, Richard N 92 

Edmondson, William B 98 

Leonard, James F 90 

Maynes, Charles W 100 

Vance, Secretary 69, 78, 85 



t307 


6/27 


'308 


6/27 


•309 


6/27 


t310 


6/28 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 27-July 3 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

U.S., U.K. sign new fisheries agree- 
ment. 

Julia M. Walsh appointed to Board of 
Governors of East-West Center 
(biographic data); J. William Ful- 
bright reappointed, June 24. 

Ronald I. Spiers sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Turkey (biographic data). 

Vance: question-and-answer session 
at the National Foreign Policy Con- 
ference for Editors and Broadcas- 
ters. 

Shipping Coordinating Committee 
(S(5C), Subcommittee on Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS), working 
group on radiocommunications, re- 
scheduled for July 26. 

sec, SOLAS, working group on 
safety of navigation, July 26. 

Vance: The Asia Society, New York, 
N.Y. 

"Foreign Relations," 1950, vol. I, 
"National Security Affairs, Foreign 
Economic Policy" released. 

Study Group 5 of the U.S. National 
Committee of the International 
Telegraph and Telephone Consulta- 
tive Committee (CCITT), July 26. 

Vance: NAACP, St. Louis, Mo. 

Vance: question-and-answer session, 
St. Louis, July 1. 

John A. Linehan, Jr., sworn in as 
Ambassador to Sierra Leone (biog- 
raphic data). 



•311 6/29 



•312 


6/29 


t313 


6/29 


314 


7/1 



•315 6/30 



t316 
t316- 



7/1 
■A 7/2 



•317 7/1 



*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. dc. 20402 



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXVII • No. 1987 • July 25, 1977 



SECRETARY VANCE ATTENDS MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 

Remarks by Secretaries Vance and Blumenthal 
and Texts of Communique and Declaration 105 

SECRETARY INTERVIEWED AT FOREIGN POLICY CONFERENCE 
FOR EDITORS AND BROADCASTERS 121 

THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT IN EXPANDING 
AN OPEN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM 

Address by Under Secretary Cooper 127 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXXVII, No. 1987 
July 25, 1977 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

52 issues plus semiannual indexes. 

domestic $42.50. foreign $53. 15 

Single copy 85 cents 

The Secretary of State has determined that the pub- 
lication of this periodical is necessary in the transac- 
tion of the public business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this periodi- 
ca] has been approved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through January 31, 
1981. 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re- 
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The 
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BL'LLHTIX, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, and 
news conferences of the President and 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as spe- 
cial articles on various phases of in- 
ternational affairs and the functions of 
the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and on treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United yations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Secretary Vance Attends Ministerial Conference 

of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 



Secretary Vance headed the U.S. delegation 
to the ministerial conference of the Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment (OECD), which was held in Paris, June 
23-24. Following are Secretary Vance's inter- 
vention before the conference on June 23, re- 
marks by Secretary of the Treasury W. 
Michael Blumenthal on June 2k, the tran- 
script of a news conference by Secretaries 
Vance and Blumenthal on June 2k, and the 
texts of the communique issued on June 2k 
and the declaration adopted on June 23. 



INTERVENTION BY SECRETARY VANCE 
JUNE 23 

Press release 301 dated June 23 

As we begin our important deliberations to- 
day, it is worth keeping in mind how far we 
have come over the past 30 years. Many of 
our nations three decades ago faced basic 
questions: 

Could democratic forms of government sur- 
vive? 

Could we overcome the ravages and divi- 
sions of war and build a system of cooperation 
to foster prosperity and peace? 

Could the industrial nations hope for any 
kind of constructive relationship with emerg- 
ing new countries? 

Did those new nations have, in turn, any 
real chance for survival? 

If we view our problems today against prob- 
lems of that time, and the progress we have 
made in resolving them, we can conclude that 
the future holds promise for us. 

Our hope of 30 years ago and the impulse 
that led to the founding of the OEEC [Organi- 
zation for European Economic Cooperation] 



and this organization was our common dedica- 
tion to an ideal of human progress. 

I believe that it is that hope and dedication 
which hold us together still. I value this meet- 
ing as an occasion to confirm the commitment 
of the Carter Administration to the OECD. 
We consider this organization unique and its 
role essential. It is the major forum for eco- 
nomic management and coordination among 
the industrial democracies. 

That, we recognize, is a major undertaking. 
The challenge before us is great: not just to 
nourish our own well-being, but to make the 
world economy work better — with growth, 
equity, and justice for all. 

We are entering a new political and eco- 
nomic era in the world. In that era North- 
South confrontation and northern rivalries 
must be replaced by new policies based on co- 
operation and common action. This will mean: 

— Improved economic cooperation among 
the industrialized nations; 

— A new relationship with the developing 
nations; and 

— Increased discourse with the state trad- 
ing nations. 

A new relationship with the South and new 
discourse with the East depend, first, on the 
state of our own nations. We bear the main 
responsibility for assuring the kind of eco- 
nomic recovery that translates into a better 
life for individuals everywhere. 

Economic decisions are only part of that en- 
terprise. A fundamental dimension is political. 
Can we bring our shared values, traditions, 
and aspirations to bear on our economic prob- 
lems? I believe that we can and will. 

We have taken steps to confirm that re- 
solve. Democracy has been tested — and found 
working. All our members today enjoy repre- 



July 25, 1977 



105 



sentative government. Portugal, Spain, and 
Greece have our support, as they strive to 
strengthen their democratic institutions. 

Our commitment to economic cooperation 
has been tried — and found unshaken. The 
Downing Street summit [London, May 7-8] 
and other recent meetings of heads of gov- 
ernment reflect significant collective en- 
deavor. We look forward to maintaining the 
momentum attained at those meetings. 

Let me sketch a few items, some of which 
Secretary Blumenthal will discuss further to- 
morrow. 

— We must assure sustained economic re- 
covery. We should establish national targets 
for economic growth and objectives for 
stabilization, together with our OECD com- 
mitment to more rapid growth this next year. 

— We must overcome both unemployment 
and inflation which sap our economic strength 
and imperil support for our political institu- 
tions. Since unemployment hits the young 
especially hard, the United States favors the 
convening of an OECD-sponsored conference 
on jobs for youth. 

— We must reject protectionism and expand 
trade. We believe this ministerial should 
renew the OECD trade pledge and determine 
how best to resolve trade problems affecting 
our domestic industries before they become 
crises. We will press for substantial progi'ess 
this year in the multilateral trade negotiations 
and advance work to prohibit improper con- 
duct and illicit payments in international 
commerce. 

— We must address key cjuestions of fi- 
nance. Both surplus and deficit countries must 
take domestic steps to bring about external 
adjustment. We are now engaged in efforts to 
increase the resources available to finance 
balance-of-payments deficits through the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund. If, contrary to 
our expectations, these efforts are not suc- 
cessful, then we should jointly examine pres- 
ent and projected financial facilities in the 
IMF and consider what should be done about 
the OECD Financial Support Fund. Under 
these circumstances we would be prepared to 
consider all available alternatives, including 
the OECD fund. 



— Energy, finally, is a particular challenge 
to the political purpose and cohesion of the in- 
dustrial nations. Overdependence on imported 
oil underscores our political and economic 
vulnerability. The outlook is not good — unless 
we intensify efforts within and among our na- 
tions. 

President Carter is firm in his determina- 
tion to implement our national energy plan. 
He knows that we must reduce vulnerability 
to embargo and price increases and that we 
must begin to adjust now to the postpe- 
troleum age. 

We must also match our domestic progi'ams 
with stronger international efforts, both to 
conserve energy and to increase and diversify 
sources of supply. We must exchange vital 
technology and enter into joint research and 
development. The October ministerial of the 
International Energy Agency should confirm 
our commitment to tai'gets for reduced de- 
pendence on imported oil. 

Nuclear enei'gy is a field of special interest. 
The United States remains committed to the 
use of nuclear energy and to the system of in- 
ternational safeguards that maintains the crit- 
ical distance between civilian and military 
uses of nuclear energy. However, if we are to 
meet both the security and energy needs of 
our peoples, we must find ways to maintain an 
effective safeguards system as we approach the 
plutonium generation of nuclear technology. 

For that reason, we have opposed the pre- 
mature entry into a plutonium economy until 
we have found ways to reconcile our energy 
and security concerns. It is in this spirit that 
we have suggested a study of these questions 
in the international nuclear fuel cycle evalua- 
tion program. 

The combined challenge of these issues be- 
fore the OECD — the need for sustained eco- 
nomic recovery, unemployment and inflation, 
trade, finance, and energy — has a global 
scope. It also affects directly the great cities 
of our countries. Although urban decay and 
social malaise preceded these problems, many 
have gi'own worse because of them. The city 
of the seventies too often has an inhumane 
face. 

We need to understand better the impact 



106 



Department of State Bulletin 



from the interaction of domestic and interna- 
tional economic trends on the place where 
most of our citizens live. The United States, 
therefore, proposes the establishment of an ad 
hoc working group on urban concerns to pre- 
pare a draft action program for our considera- 
tion next year. 

No pursuit of global economic welfare can 
be complete without reference to the nations 
of the East. The OECD has done a good job in 
undertaking factual and analytic studies of 
East-West economic relations. I want particu- 
larly to congratulate the Secretary General 
[Emile van Lennep, of the Netherlands] for 
his leadership on the East-West project. 

We must engage the COMECON [Council of 
Mutual Economic Assistance] nations in our 
shared economic challenges and respon- 
sibilities. They, like us, can and should help 
address issues in the North-South dialogue. 
We both have a moral and a practical interest 
in increasing the flow of resources and techni- 
cal assistance to the developing world. 

We should urge the COMECON countries 
to join us in seeking genuine, apolitical solu- 
tions to problems of global economic develop- 
ment. To be more specific: 

— They can improve the quality and in- 
crease the amount of their development as- 
sistance through both bilateral and multilat- 
eral programs. 

— They can contribute to world food secu- 
rity by participating in arrangements sought 
under the auspices of the International Wheat 
Council. 

— They can help establish equitable mul- 
tilateral arrangements for commodities. 

It is not enough to worry about our own 
welfare or seek more cooperation from the 
East. That limited perspective overlooks 
more than half of the world's population and a 
far greater percentage of countries. Solutions 
to our problems rest on the realization that 
our problems are linked to those of the Third 
World and that the aspirations of our citizens 
are similar to theirs. Let me be clear on two 
points: 

First, the goals and values of our so- 
cieties — economic, political, and humanitar- 



ian — cannot be achieved fully in isolation from 
trends in developing nations. 

Second, we must understand that in rela- 
tions between developing and developed na- 
tions, what one side gains is not necessarily 
the other side's loss. 

Relations between developed and develop- 
ing nations need not spawn conflict. We have 
concluded an era when the central question 
was whether to cooperate. We have begun a 
period in which we must develop the means 
and institutions for cooperation. 

That is the corner we have turned at CIEC 
[Conference on International Economic 
Cooperation]. The OECD must now take part 
in this new start. Together we must maintain 
continuing cooperation among ourselves and 
with our counterparts in the developing 
world. 

We, therefore, urge the Secretary General 
of this organization to bring about more effec- 
tive coordination of OECD efforts in North- 
South issues, to propose options for discussion 
in the U.N. Third Development Decade, and 
to formulate longer term strategy and initia- 
tives of mutual benefit to the North and 
South. 

We also recommend that this conference 
endorse the proposed declaration on relations 
with developing nations. This declaration ex- 
presses our shared political commitment to 
the search for more beneficial methods of 
cooperation. It, too, could signal a new begin- 
ning. 

An important part of the declaration stres- 
ses increased attention to the basic human 
needs of all the peoples of the world. The old 
agenda for economic development and many of 
the old issues for negotiation are no longer 
enough. We need more focus on that part of the 
world population that lacks essential food, wa- 
ter, shelter, and health care, as well as 
employment and education. We must direct our 
efforts to meet more effectively the needs of the 
poorest peoples in the developing world. 

The case for more concerted action is clear. 
Almost one billion people live in absolute pov- 
erty. The problem is growing. Increases in 
GNP for many developing countries have not 
meant increased benefits for the poor. For 



July 25, 1977 



107 



many, in fact, life is worse. Development has 
too often not "trickled down." 

Knowledge about the development process 
and the ability to overcome poverty are now 
within our grasp. What we miss is the joint 
recognition by developed and developing na- 
tions that the North-South dialogue is about 
humcni beings and that equality of opportu- 
nity for a fuller life makes sense for people, 
not just states. Let me suggest how we might 
begin. 

First, we must marshal a sense of our 
means and priorities. For that purpose, I pro- 
pose that the OECD establish a special work- 
ing group mandated to design a program for 
basic human needs. That program should 
profit from the work in the Development As- 
sistance Committee and should be presented 
for discussion at the Executive Committee in 
special session by the end of this year. The 
program should include: 

— Projections of domestic and international 
resources required to implement a successful 
approach to basic human needs; 

— Proposals for sharing costs among de- 
veloped and developing nations; and 

— Agreement on measures needed to use 
those resources most effectively. 

Second, we must engage the interest and 
expertise of the developing nations them- 
selves. We need to share perspectives on a 
shared problem. No strategy for development 
can succeed without requisite political will 
within Third World nations. For that purpose, 
we should encourage consultations and efforts 
to identify the kinds of policy changes re- 
quired to address basic human needs and 
suggest means for judging progress. 

Third, we must move swiftly to expand on 
specific proposals for an agenda on basic 
human needs. It should include the following 
fundamental elements: 

— Rural development and food production: 
We must give greater priority to the de- 
velopment of the Third World's rural areas 
where the great majority of the poorest 
people live. We must begin with an integrated 
strategy which emphasizes increased food 
production and better nutrition in these 
areas. 



— Health: At the same time we must em- 
phasize preventive medicine, family planning, 
prenatal care, and other forms of medical as- 
sistance which, with minimal cost, could mean 
the most for the poorest. Again, the relation 
to an overall strategy for rural development is 
key: increases in productive employment and 
ci'op yields can help make better nutrition 
possible and bring better health for more 
people. 

— Education: Education deserves a similar 
priority. We should stress primary and sec- 
ondary education and promote on-the-job 
technical training. The goal is to enhance the 
capacity for productive employment and pro- 
vide a way out of absolute poverty. 

Two areas, related to any human needs 
strategy, of import in their own right: 

— Women: Although poverty strikes all, in 
many countries women suffer more than do 
men from poor health, little or no schooling, 
and meager diet. Their traditional roles often 
keep women out of the paid work force and 
lock them into low status. There is a direct 
relationship between higher education and 
employment opportunities for women and 
smaller families. High birth rates both reflect 
the specific situation of many women and rein- 
force the general cycle of poverty. Release 
from rural poverty may well begin with the 
real economic and social emancipation of 
women. 

—Ecological disaster: Finally, a substantial 
part of absolute poverty stems from the toll 
taken over time by ecological disaster, as in 
the Sahel. The poor bear a disproportionate 
burden when overpopulation, economic un- 
derdevelopment, and ecological overstress in- 
teract. Developing nations, with two-thirds of 
the world's population, suffer 90 percent of 
disaster-related deaths. 

The OECD has a unique opportunity to 
support emerging efforts in the United Na- 
tions and to work with developing nations on 
means to provide longer term alleviation of 
ecological disaster. Efforts at early warning 
and access to food reserves are among meas- 
ures which address the core of basic human 
needs. 

Obviously, attention to basic human needs 



108 



Department of State Bulletin 



is only part of a broader strategy for de- 
velopment. It should not supplant other im- 
portant efforts at economic advancement 
which this organization has supported and 
which have contributed to economic develop- 
ment in the Third World. To supplant other 
ongoing efforts is not our purpose; we wish to 
add a vital dimension. If we do not do so, we 
run the risk of losing the support of our legis- 
lative bodies and peoples. 

It is in meeting the challenge of fulfilling 
basic human needs that both developed and 
developing nations can more firmly establish 
their joint commitment to individual human 
dignity. We thus look forwaixl to making this 
concern more central to the new relationship 
and to moving toward more specific programs 
for implementation by the time we meet next 
year. 

At the beginning, I pointed to the progress 
we have made together. It has been a long, 
hard, but rewarding road we have traveled. 
But we have left one destination without 
reaching another. We are in transit to a new 
era of cooperation and common action. 

In practical terms our journey will involve 
going beyond new directions for industrial 
democracies, new discourse with state trading 
nations, and new relationships with develop- 
ing countries. It will take us to a firmer focus 
on people. It is the individual and collective 
hope of people, their rights and their needs, 
that deserve the fullest measure of our dedi- 
cation. 



REMARKS BY SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL 
JUNE 24 

Department of the Treasury press release dated June 24 

Last month the heads of government of 
seven of the countries here agreed on several 
basic objectives: ^ 

— To create more jobs while continuing to 
reduce inflation; 

— To achieve stated growth targets or to 
pursue appropriate stabilization policies; 



' For text of the declaration issued at the conclusion 
of the economic summit meeting at London on May 7-8, 
see Bulletin of June 6, 1977, p. .583. 



— To support IMF efforts to obtain addi- 
tional resources and to link IMF lending to 
the adoption of appropriate stabilization 
policies; 

— To pursue both national and joint efforts 
to limit energy demand and to increase and 
diversify energy supply; 

— To reject protectionism and give a new 
impetus to the Tokyo Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations; and 

— To provide the developing countries with 
greater opportunities to share in the growth 
of the world economy. 

This meeting provides an opportunity for 
other nations to join in those commitments. I 
urge each one to do so. It provides an oppor- 
tunity to establish procedures which will im- 
prove our understanding of the implications of 
each nation's policies and enable us to monitor 
our progress. I propose that we do so. And it 
is an occasion of a considering together of our 
prospects for sustained economic growth in 
the OECD area. 

In virtually every country represented here 
unemployment is at a totally unacceptable 
level. In most of our countries inflation is too 
high. Many of our nations are experiencing 
external payments deficits which cannot be 
long sustained. 

We face interrelated problems in an in- 
terdependent world. We cannot solve one 
problem at the expense of the others. Nor can 
any nation expect to be an island of prosperity 
in a sea of economic troubles. Our problems 
must be solved together and cooperatively. 
The survival of our political institutions and 
our open trade and financial system depends 
on our success. 

We can meet this challenge; we can succeed 
in achieving sustained noninflationary growth: 

— If every member country in a position to 
do so pursues the domestic macroeconomic 
policies which will induce the maximum rate 
of domestic growth consistent with avoiding a 
resurgence of inflation; 

— If every country which does not yet have 
inflationary pressures under control pursues 
forceful and effective stabilization policies; 

— If we go beyond traditional demand man- 
agement measures to attack the underlying 



July 25, 1977 



109 



structural causes of unemployment and infla- 
tion; and 

— If both sui-plus and deficit countries allow 
exchange rates to play their appropriate role 
in the adjustment process. 

Because some countries have made more 
progress than others in controUing inflation 
and some are under external financial strains 
while others are not, the policies required will 
diffei- from country to country. 

In the financially strong countries, this 
situation calls for economic expansion at the 
maximum rate consistent with control and re- 
duction of inflationary pressures. In the 
United States, we are already well on our way 
toward achievement this year of roughly 6 
percent growth, year-end to year-end. First 
quarter economic activity grew at an annual 
rate of 6.9 percent. We expect a similar per- 
formance in the current quarter, followed by a 
5-5.5 percent growth rate in the second half 
of the year. Unemployment has been pushed 
below 7 percent for the first time in almost 
three years, while employment has risen by 
over 2 million in six months. 

At the same time, despite temporary set- 
backs because of bad weather, the U.S. un- 
derlying inflation rate has remained stable al- 
though still too high. 

We are naturally concerned by the Sec- 
retariat's forecasts which suggest that cur- 
i-ent policies may not enable eithei- Germany 
or Japan to reach its stated growth target and 
that too much of the growth of output — in 
Japan particularly — is going into exports. But 
we have faith in the assurances of Chancellor 
Schmidt and Prime Minister Fukuda that they 
will take further measures, as needed, to 
achieve their growth goals and to reduce their 
current account surpluses. 

Reduction of the current account surpluses 
is essential because some of the weaker coun- 
tries are approaching prudent limits to the ac- 
cumulation of debt — whether to private lend- 
ers or official institutions. In these circum- 
stances the availability of ample lendable 
funds from persistent surplus countries is not 
a complete answer. 

Stronger domestic growth and exchange 
rate appreciations in the stronger countries 



will tend to eliminate their surpluses. But 
supplementary steps are also in order. This is 
the time for surplus countries to eliminate 
practices which favor exports over output for 
domestic consumption or impede imports or 
interfere with exchange markets. It is a time 
for strong countries to dismantle monetary 
and capital controls that might depress ex- 
change rates and for seeing that foreign ex- 
change acquired outside the market, such as 
interest accruals on existing reserves, is re- 
sold on the market. 

Among the responsibilities of the stronger 
countries, I count the obligation of the United 
States to reduce its excessive imports of oil. 
The flow of oil from Alaska will provide an 
immediate reduction of our import demand. 
But for the longer run, we must achieve a 
strong energy program based on conservation 
and the substitution of domestic for imported 
fuels. President Carter has made that goal his 
top priority despite the difficulty of achieving 
the economic and social changes it entails. 

Countries in weak external financial posi- 
tions have an equal responsibility to put their 
own houses in order — to stabilize their 
economies and improve their international 
competitiveness. They have a right to the 
cooperation of the stronger countries, but 
they cannot expect others to solve their prob- 
lems for them. They should not overborrow. 
They should permit sufficient depreciation of 
their currencies to improve their competitive 
positions. And they should back up their de- 
clining exchange rates with domestic policies 
that retain their competitive gain. The bene- 
fits of depreciation may not come quickly, but 
if exchange rates are not allowed to respond 
to differences in inflation rates, payments im- 
balance can only grow worse. It is hard to see 
how any country can improve its international 
position unless its policies allow its producers 
export profit margins that are essential to an 
adequate export performance as well as to 
improved import competitiveness. Manufac- 
turers must have the proper incentives to in- 
vest in facilities for both the export and home 
markets. 

Obviously the domestic economic policies 
needed to restore domestic price stability and 



110 



Department of State Bulletin 



external creditworthiness are not easy for 
governments. They involve national belt- 
tightening. Yet delay will only lead to the 
necessity for more severe and more painful 
action. At the first sign of difficulty in attract- 
ing capital on normal terms, stabilization pro- 
grams should be developed, with the coopera- 
tion of the IMF if necessary. Such cooperation 
will not only bring official financing but will 
also help to sustain financing from private 
sources. 

Many countries have, of course, been fol- 
lowing this growth or stabilization strategy 
for some time. We are now beginning to see 
results. The world payments pattern is shift- 
ing significantly in the right direction. 

Economic expansion is beginning to exert 
its impact, notably in the United States. We 
expect a current account deficit of $10-$12 bil- 
lion this year compared to a deficit of $600 
million in 1976 and a surplus of $11.5 billion in 
1975. As the strength of the dollar indicates, 
the United States can sustain this deficit for a 
time because we attract the capital required 
to finance it. 

General economic recovery is clearly im- 
proving the earnings of many developing 
countries. Exports of the non-oil developing 
countries were one-third higher in the fourth 
quarter of 1976 than a year earlier. And while 
some individual developing countries face dif- 
ficulties, there is no general "LDC [less de- 
veloped countries] debt problem." In fact, re- 
serves of non-oil developing countries rose by 
$11 billion last year. 

Stabilization programs are beginning to 
show results. The United Kingdom's balance 
of payments appears to be edging into 
surplus, while Italy, Mexico, and Brazil have 
sharply reduced their deficits. 

But despite these signs of progress, we 
have a considerable distance to go toward ap- 
propriate payments balance. 

— We need significant shifts — into deficit — 
in the current account positions of such 
surplus countries as Japan, Germany, Swit- 
zerland, and the Netherlands. 

— We need to see stabilization policies 
adopted in a number of smaller countries rep- 
resented at this table. 



— And in the countries which have already 
adopted stabilization measures, we need per- 
severance until inflation is brought down and 
the fears of its resurgence allayed. 

I recognize that such changes cannot occur 
overnight. They require time and careful, 
gradual policies. Countries in a weak external 
position will need adequate official financing, 
conditioned on the adoption of suitable stabili- 
zation policies. I am confident that the cur- 
rent efforts to expand the IMF's resources 
will insure the adequacy of official financing to 
meet this need for the near term, apart from 
the unique case of Portugal. For the longer 
term, I trust that all OECD members will also 
be prepared to support an adequate increase 
in the quotas of the IMF. 

But while adjustments and structural 
changes in our economies take time, the 
longer the initiation of this process is delayed, 
the greater the danger of domestic turmoil or 
of trade restrictions and debt defaults. We 
have been preoccupied with concerns about 
the sustainability of the financial system. But 
the penalty for failure to solve our financial 
problems may not be financial collapse. In- 
stead, the result may be trade restrictions 
and a slide back into the inefficiencies of eco- 
nomic nationalism. 

Unilateral trade restraints must be rejected 
as an unacceptable response to payments defi- 
cits or to problems of domestic economic ad- 
justment. Such measures clearly risk foster- 
ing further unemployment and increasing in- 
flation, both at home and abroad. 

While we cannot ignore the reality of 
trade-related difficulties in certain sectors 
which cannot be fully resolved overnight, our 
objective should remain meaningful adjust- 
ment to structural change within our own 
economies without shifting those problems to 
our trading partners. Our record has not been 
perfect on this score, but overall the OECD 
members have resisted the pressures of pro- 
tectionism. 

Renewal of the trade pledge of 1974 pro- 
vides us the opportunity jointly to reaffirm 
our determination to avoid trade restrictions 
or other restrictive current account measures 
and the artificial stimulation of exports. The 



July 25, 1977 



111 



United States strongly supports its renewal 
and urges your support as well. 

We must also seek to liberalize trade by 
granting new impetus to the multilateral 
trade negotiations in Geneva by seeking sub- 
stantial progress in key areas this year. This 
means that we must agree on what the criti- 
cal issues are, on what rules we will adopt to 
deal with them, and within what time period 
each of these steps is to be taken. We ur- 
gently need agreement on: 

— A formula for tariff reductions and rules 
for negotiating the lowering of nontariff bar- 
riers; 

— A practical and effective means of break- 
ing the deadlock on agricultural trade; 

— Steps to help the developing countries 
benefit from expanding world trade; and 

— A new international code on subsidies and 
countervailing duties. 

We need better mutual understanding of 
what constitutes fair and unfair trade, and 
host governments may justly respond to un- 
fair trade practices to counter a major irritant 
in our trading relations. 

We need, in short, not rhetoric, but real 
progress in addressing the difficult problem of 
trade liberalization. 

I would like to stress the importance of fur- 
ther progress toward an arrangement which 
broadens and strengthens the present inter- 
national consensus on e.xport credits. 

Achieving the domestic and international 
adjustments I have outlined will require 
skilled and responsible economic management 
and a willingness to plan ahead. As the Sec- 
retariat points out, our countries must give 
more attention to the medium term. In the 
United States, President Carter has set a goal 
of reducing both the rate of inflation and the 
rate of unemployment and balancing the Fed- 
eral budget in a high employment economy by 
1981. We are viewing economic and budgetary 
decisions and developing economic goals in 
that context. 

Growth targets and stabilization policies 
must, of course, remain the ultimate respon- 
sibility of sovereign nations. Each country 
will be assisted in arriving at its growth goals 
and stabilization policies, however, if it has a 
clear understanding of the plans of other na- 



tions and of the global impHcations of its own 
objectives. 

I believe it would be useful, therefore, to 
strengthen the procedure for multilateral 
examination and subsequent monitoring of the 
economic policies of member countries. We 
need to be reahstic, however. The members 
as a whole — although not all member 
countries — probably should be aiming at a 
somewhat faster rate of expan.sion in 1977. 

I support the suggestion that each country 
be asked to submit preliminary objectives for 
the growth of domestic demand and for 
stabilization policies for 1978 to the organiza- 
tion early in the fall. We should also expect 
countries to indicate the desired direction of 
change in prices and current account posi- 
tions, although specific targets for these indi- 
cators would be impractical. These submis- 
sions would form the basis for study and 
comment by the Economic Policy Committee. 
Because this proposal blends directly into the 
ongoing work of the organization, I would not 
expect it to require the impetus of a special 
meeting of the ministerial council. 

Finally, let me say that we must conduct 
our economic policies with the recognition 
that some of our tools of economic manage- 
ment no longer work as they once did. In the 
United States and other countries, the trade- 
off between economic activity and inflation 
has changed. We see that neither high un- 
employment nor low utilization of capacity 
leads automatically to a rapid drop in infla- 
tion. Factors other than excess demand are 
increasingly important determinants of infla- 
tion. 

So we must seek new programs and policies 
to supplement demand management in our ef- 
forts to reduce unemployment and inflation. 
Many of the measures we must adopt should 
focus on specific structural problems in our 
economies — the need to change employment 
patterns and develop new labor skills, the 
need for new measures to provide employ- 
ment for our youth, the need to foster compe- 
tition and to remove regulations that are out- 
dated or fail to meet a cost-benefit test. 

I support the proposal for a high-level con- 
ference to exchange experience and develop 
policy directions on measures for alleviating 
youth unemployment. This problem is univer- 



112 



Department of State Bulletin 



sal among our countries. Because many of us 
are embarked on specific programs to combat 
it, we can benefit from sharing our ideas and 
our experiences. I also welcome the useful 
and timely discussion in the report of the 
McCracken Group [of Distinguished 
Economists] on techniques for combating in- 
flation. As part of President Carter's com- 
prehensive anti-inflation program, the United 
States is already reviewing government regu- 
lations with the intent of reducing unneces- 
sary costs imposed on the private sector and 
enlarging the scope for the free market. At 
the same time, we are working with labor and 
management to develop voluntary, coopera- 
tive measures to avoid wage-price spirals. 

When all is said and done, the success of our 
economic policy depends fundamentally on our 
ability to engender confidence that we will 
achieve sustained growth with lower un- 
employment and price stability and that we 
will maintain a strong and open monetary and 
trading system. In a cost-benefit calculus, the 
dangers of pushing ahead too far and too fast 
have increased, because it may ignite fears of 
inflation that cause consumers and busi- 
nessmen to hold back on their spending. Our 
policy should be cautious yet committed, pro- 
viding a firm basis for rebuilding the confi- 
dence that we need to call forth increased in- 
vestment in productive capacity. After their 
experiences of the recent past, businessmen 
in all countries are wary — and understandably 
so. But investment is vitally needed to create 
jobs, avoid supply problems, and speed up 
productivity growth. 

Our words alone will not win this confi- 
dence. But if we take actions which demon- 
strate the determination and ability to adhere 
to the approach being proposed here today, 
we will gain the confidence that will undam 
the vital flow of investment. Unemployment 
will be brought down, inflation will be re- 
duced, and a sustainable pattern of external 
payments will evolve. 

JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, JUNE 24 

Department press release 306 dated June 25 

Secretary Vance: Perhaps I might say a word 
or two of introduction and then Mike and I will 
be happy to try to answer any questions. 



The presence of Secretary Blumenthal and 
myself demonstrates the firm commitment of 
the United States to close cooperation and 
coordination within the OECD. As all of you 
know, the OECD is the major forum for eco- 
nomic policy coordination among the indus- 
trialized democracies. The efforts toward eco- 
nomic cooperation have met, in my judgment, 
with good success. The recent meetings of the 
chiefs of state and government provided an 
important stimulus to these efforts. 

At this OECD meeting we have had an op- 
portunity to meet together with all of our col- 
leagues within the 24-member gi'ouping, and 
this has proved very helpful and useful to us. 
Aside from the details of what we will discuss 
here today, I think the very fact that this 
meeting here in Paris has taken place is a 
demonstration of the solidarity of our coun- 
tries in working together to meet the eco- 
nomic problems which face our nations and 
the world. 

A word with respect to the meetings of yes- 
terday which had their focus on relationships 
with developing countries. I think a very im- 
portant aspect of yesterday's discussions was 
the fact that there was an endorsement by all 
24 of the agreements reached at the CIEC 
meeting [Paris, May 30^une 2]. A number of 
people who were here at this meeting were 
not present at CIEC, but they all endorsed 
the commitments which were made by all of 
us at the CIEC meeting. 

In addition, I think it's important to point 
out that yesterday, in the declaration which 
was issued, we agreed among the 24 to place 
new emphasis on meeting basic human needs 
and I think this an important step. We also 
agreed on such fundamental issues as the need 
to improve the supply and demand balance for 
energy through domestic policies, to renew 
and strengthen the OECD trade pledge, and a 
number of specific economic items which I will 
ask Mike to speak to. 

I would also call attention to the fact that 
we have agreed to pay special attention to the 
problem of youth unemployment, which is a 
problem that not only is important to the 
United States but to practically all of the 
countries who are gathered here for this 
meeting. 

Mike, if you might take up then and speak 



July 25, 1977 



113 



to the economic aspects of it. We can tiien an- 
swei- questions. 

Secretary Blumenthal: I think there are a 
number of matters decided here which are of 
considerable significance. The I'enewal of the 
trade pledge first agreed to in 1974 under 
which countries commit themselves not to 
take protectionist measures to deal with in- 
ternal economic problems is a very important 
step. 

In addition, the renewed emphasis which 
has been given here to the urgent need to 
proceed quickly and substantively with the 
multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva fits 
in with that general objective of expanding 
trade and keeping trade barriers down. 

The discussion in reference to the need to 
cooperate to bring about more official finan- 
cial resources in the world in order to meet 
temporary balance-of-payments problems of 
individual countries is also of considerable im- 
portance and, in particular, with regard to the 
general desirable target of a 5 percent growth 
for next year. 

The procedure has been established under 
which individual countries will submit their 
plans to the OECD later this year and form an 
evaluation. OECD discussion of these indi- 
vidual goals will then take place in the Eco- 
nomic Policy Committee in order to see to 
what extent they are consonant with achiev- 
ing the overall desired target of 5 percent. 
This represents a good means of following up 
on the commitment to work together that we 
have all subscribed to. 

Secretary Vance: I might just add one more 
word. The meetings have also been very use- 
ful in that they have provided an opportunity 
for both Mike and myself to meet with a 
number of foreign and finance ministers and 
to discuss with them not only matters that 
spring from this conference but to discuss 
other matters of mutual concern on both 
global and bilateral issues. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Jim Goldsborough of the 
Herald Tribune: Relative to your meeting 
with French Presideyit Giscard d'Estaing to- 
day, I would like to ask whether you share the 
concern expressed by the French over the state 
of U.S. -Soviet relations? Will you report on it 
to President Carter? 



Secretary Vance: During my meeting with 
President Giscard d'Estaing this morning we 
discussed the recent meeting which he had 
with General Secretary Brezhnev, and he re- 
ported to me the views of the General Secre- 
tary on a number of matters, including mat- 
ters which are of interest particularly to the 
United States, as well as other general mat- 
ters. I will certainly convey these messages 
back to President Carter. I will be meeting 
with President Carter for breakfast tomorrow 
morning when I return to the United States 
and will profit from the discussion which 
I had with President Giscard d'Estaing 
today. 

Q. Mr. Vance, Mr. Secretary, you called 
them messages, is there a message from Mr. 
Brezhnev to President Carter? 

Secretary Vance: No. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhy have you and the 
British Foreign Secretary decided at this time 
to make yet another attempt at negotiating the 
Rhodesia)! situation? Have you received in 
the last week or 10 days some encouraging in- 
formation that a new attempt might prove 
more successful? 

Secretary Vance: This is an ongoing proc- 
ess. We and our British colleagues have been 
working at this particular effort for the last 
six to eight weeks. We have been in daily 
communication with each other and our repre- 
sentatives in the field. Mr. Low and Mr. 
Graham have been working side-by-side 
in discussions with all of the parties in- 
volved.^ 

This was an occasion which brought to- 
gether both the Foreign Secretary and myself 
and gave us an opportunity to sit down and 
review where we stand at this point with our 
two representatives on the ground in the 
Rhodesian area and permitted us to arrive at 
joint instructions to them which they will be 
carrying out when they return — I believe it's 
either the 5th or 6th of July. 



^ Stephen Low, Ambassador to Zambia, is the U.S. 
official assigned to the consultative group on Rhodesia, 
which is headed by John Graham, Deputy Under 
Secretary at the British Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office. 



114 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. Sir, you said that you meant to review 
where you stand on the Rhodesia?! situation. 
Could you give us an idea of where we stand 
now? 

Secretary Vance: Where we stand now is 
that we are in consultation with all of the par- 
ties who would be involved in a settlement of 
the Rhodesian problem. We have been discus- 
sing with them such questions as what a new 
constitution might look like and other matters 
which I don't choose to go into at this mo- 
ment. But that is the general nature of what 
we discussed. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Bernard Valery of New 
York Daily News: Did, or may I ask you 
whether you discussed with President Giscard 
d'Estaing the problems of Eurocommunism? 

Secretary Vance: We did not discuss that. 

Q. Did you discuss the French internal 
situation in this regard? 

Secretary Vance: No. 

Q. Could I ask this question of Secretary 
Blumenthal? Could he comment on the pros- 
pects of Congress adopting and approving the 
special OECD fund to which reference is 
made in the communique — all the more im- 
portant because of the modest success that Dr. 
Witteveen [H. Johannes Witteveen, Managing 
Director of the IMF] has had in raising funds 
in the IMF special facility? 

At the same time if I could ask him, in view 
of the trade pledge that the U.S. Administra- 
tion, along with others, is now committed to, 
are you confident that you can get congres- 
sional approval for any changes in U.S. law 
that might be made necessary as a result of 
current court proceedings which arise from 
proposals to impose import levies on certain 
industries where there are tax rebates paid to 
those exporters? 

Secretary Blumenthal: With regard to the 
first part of your question, the results of the 
efforts which Mr. Witteveen is presently un- 
dertaking to put together what has come to be 
called the Witteveen facility are not yet clear, 
and it is our position that we must wait for 
that situation to clarify and that the chances 
for his success are quite good. In that case we 
feel that there would be enough resources 



available, particularly if you take into account 
the probability that the International Mone- 
tary Fund will also agree — members of the 
Fund will also agree on a further increase in 
quotas by February of next year, that to- 
gether these two resources would be suffi- 
cient to take care of any emergencies that 
may arise. 

Under those circumstances, it does not ap- 
pear too likely that the U.S. Congress would 
also, at the same time, approve yet another 
facility such as the [Financial] Support Fund. 
However, we have indicated here that if it 
should turn out that contrary to our expecta- 
tions the Witteveen facility cannot be put to- 
gether, then, of course, the U.S. Administra- 
tion would review all of the alternatives avail- 
able to us, including the possibility of a sup- 
port fund, and discuss that with the Congress. 
But, at this point, I really couldn't say that 
with the absence or a failure on the Witteveen 
facility the chances would be too good to be 
successful there. 

With regard to the second question that you 
raised; the matter to which you refer is pres- 
ently before the courts. The U.S. Administra- 
tion is making every effort to have the courts 
deny the proposition that these internal taxes 
are, in fact, not rebatable, and it will take 
some time for that matter to be decided. If it 
goes to the Supreme Court, I would expect 
that it would be next spring before the matter 
is decided. 

We cannot speculate as to what would hap- 
pen if it were decided otherwise, and certainly 
we would then have to face a serious situation 
and see what could be done. That's somewhat 
in the future, and we do think that the court 
proceedings will clarify the matter fully and in 
a positive way. 

Q. Treuthardt (Associated Press): Secre- 
tary of the Treasury Blumenthal, you and 
many other ministers have urged Japan and 
Germany to change their economic policies in 
the interest of the rest of the world. In view of 
the fact that there seems to be no clear re- 
sponse to these appeals, what do you think the 
next step is? What is your reaction to the fact 
that these views have not yet led to success? 

Secretary Blumenthal: Well, I think these 
are matters that are constantly in a state of 



July 25, 1977 



115 



evolution and that as time proceeds, we will 
have to see how they develop. 

It is a fact that in addition to the consider- 
able surplus on current account, which some 
of the OPEC oil-exporting countries are run- 
ning, there are a number of countries — in par- 
ticular the Federal Republic, Japan, Switzer- 
land, and the Netherlands — who together also 
are running at the present moment a surplus 
on current account which amounts to as much 
as $10-$12 billion. That's an additional prob- 
lem in the context of the world economy. 

If we look at the situation in the United 
States, we see that we are running this year 
in all probability a deficit of $10-$12 billion. 
Clearly that is a situation that needs to be re- 
viewed continually, and I am confident that 
with the kind of cooperation and continuous 
contact that we're having, changes in policy 
will sooner or later be taken so that a greater 
and better balance can be brought about. 

Q. Secretary Vance, as a result of your 
talks with the French President, what are the 
trouble spots between the Soviet Union and 
the United States? 

Secretary Vance: Obviously, one of the 
trouble spots between the two of us is the 
resolution of the discussion which we are hav- 
ing in the field of strategic arms limitation — 
the SALT talks. The differences between 
the Soviets and ourselves remain substantial. 
We made some progress, as we have pre- 
viously indicated, at the meeting which we 
had in Geneva with Foreign Minister 
Gromyko. At that time we developed a gen- 
eral framework for an agreement in SALT 
Two, but there are very substantial differ- 
ences on a number of items and where they 
would fit within that framework, which re- 
main to be resolved. 

There are other differences which we have 
with respect to such matters as the question 
of human rights, and there remains a clear 
difference between us as to how these matters 
should be handled. Those are two examples of 
differences which exist between us. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will there be a meeting 
between President Carter and the Soviet 
leader to try to iron out those differences? 



Secretary Vance: I don't want to speculate 
on that. I think it would be unwise to do so. 

Q. In your meeting with President Giscard 
d'Estaing, did you talk about the Concorde 

issue? 

Secretary Vance: No, it didn't come up. 
Q. Why? 

Secretary Vance: I don't know. [Laughter.] 
I guess because it's been before the courts. As 
you know, it has been remanded to the Dis- 
trict Court. The District Court has now been 
asked to examine the question of whether or 
not the Port Authority has acted in a dis- 
criminatory fashion. There is nothing to be 
done until the court reaches a determination 
in that matter. 

Q. Mr. Vance, do you think that the French 
have found a more effective way to deal with 
the Soviets than we have? 

Secretary Vance: That's a hard question to 
answer. Our relationships with the Soviets 
are important. We realize the importance of 
them. We will work to better those relation- 
ships. At this point, there are strains between 
ourselves and the Soviet Union in certain 
areas. 

However, I would also point out that there 
are a number of areas in which we are doing 
things together which I think are of great im- 
portance. For example, this last week we had 
discussions in the United States in which we 
began to explore the possibility of a com- 
prehensive test ban. We had a good first week 
of discussions. Those will be continuing in the 
near future. We will be joined in the next 
meeting of those discussions by the British. 
At the present time, discussions are going on 
in Moscow between Mr. Warnke [Paul C. 
Warnke, Director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency and chairman of the 
U.S. delegation to Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks] and the Soviet negotiators, where we 
are beginning to explore the problem of the 
Indian Ocean and the possibility of arms lim- 
itations measures in that area. We have re- 
cently signed an agreement with them in the 
field of environment modification. We are 
going to begin discussions soon with respect 



116 



Department of State Bulletin 



to the possibility of a treaty wiiich would ban 
chemical warfare. Mr. Bluinenthal just re- 
cently completed a satisfactory meeting with 
the Soviet representatives in Washington in 
the field of trade matters between our two na- 
tions, and I could go on at great length, so 
that the fact that we have differences in cer- 
tain areas does not mean that we are not talk- 
ing in other areas and making progress. 

Q. Secretary Biumenthal, what is the next 
step in the review of economic stimuli? How 
much farther does that take us from the Lon- 
don summit, where we agreed to review the 
situation, yet our growth rates are much 
lower than targeted? 

Secretary Blwmenthal: Well, I don't believe 
that it is only a question of growth rates. In 
the case of the Japanese, for example, it is 
quite possible that the growth rate should ac- 
tually achieve, should be close to and not far 
off from the figures that were mentioned at 
the London summit. It's also a question of 
what kind of growth you have and the extent 
to which that gi'owth is export-led or the ex- 
tent to which it represents a growth in domes- 
tic demand. 

The significant feature of the agreements at 
the Downing Street summit was that the var- 
ious heads of states indicated that they would 
keep the matter under review and would take 
the necessary steps in order to insure, to the 
largest extent possible, that the targets that 
were discussed would indeed be met. So the 
review to which I have now referred is one in 
which we hope countries will adjust their pol- 
icy, as they see that the figures are coming in 
differently, in order to bring about the kinds 
of results discussed in London. 

Q. [Inaudible — relates to the strength of the 
dollar and to paragraph 13 of the OECD 
communique.] 

Secretary Biumenthal: You have me at a 
disadvantage, since I have less information 
than you do about that development. Looking 
at pai-agraph 13 — and I don't really see any 
direct relevance or connection to what is in 
paragraph 13 to that kind of development that 
has taken place — we believe that the basic 



situation of the American economy is really 
quite sound. We are meeting the targets we 
had previously indicated. The rate of inflation 
is decreasing according to the latest figures; 
so is the rate of unemployment of the recently 
adjusted figures of growth, of real growth of 
GNP. The first quarter had been revised up- 
ward. The prospects for the second quarter 
are equally good. And the likelihood that we 
will meet our target of close to 6 percent real 
growth — comparing the fourth quarter of this 
year to the fourth quarter of last year and an 
average growth of something like 5 percent — 
is really good. So that when you take those 
numbers into account, at the same time you 
bear in mind that a good part of our deficit 
this year is accounted for by the very high im- 
port bill for oil which is due in part to the bad 
weather at the beginning of this year, which is 
bound to decrease as the Alaskan oil begins to 
flow and the President's energy program be- 
gins to have effect — we are optimistic about 
the trend of the American economy. 

Q. David Blake, London Times: Is it your 
suggestion that the U.S. current account posi- 
tion will improve in coming years? And if 
that is the case, what impact will that have on 
the world economy? 

Secretary Biumenthal: Well, it has cer- 
tainly been the expectation at the London 
summit and in the various discussions which 
have taken place over the last few months 
among interested governments that as the 
countries with temporarily weaker economies 
bring their situation under control, stabilize 
their situation, and therefore improve the 
situation, so the surplus countries who are 
strong economies, who are taking stimulative 
steps are also going to adju.st their policies. 
Clearly it is not intended the United States 
would forever, or for a long period of time, 
run a significant deficit of current account or a 
very large, ever-increasing trade deficit. 
That is unintended and that is not necessary 
in our view, as other economies bring their 
situation under control and it improves 
there. I think the stability of the dollar is 
likely to be assured and general stability in 
exchange markets will also be reserved. 



July 25, 1977 



117 



OECD press release A/(77)25 dated June 24 

COMMUNIQUE, JUNE 24 

1. The Council of the Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development met at Ministerial level on 
23rd June, under the Chairmanship of the Honourable 
Andrew Peacock, M.P., Australian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, and on 24th June with the Right Hon- 
ourable Phillip Lynch, M.P., Australian Treasurer, in 
the Chair. 

Development Co-operation 

2. Ministers reviewed the results of the Conference 
on International Economic Co-operation and discussed 
longer-term aspects of international development co- 
operation. Ministers then adopted the Declaration on 
Relations with Developing Countries annexed to this 
Communique. They reaffirmed the importance of close 
collaboration and strengthened co-ordination within the 
OECD to assist Member Governments to prepare for 
specific discussions with the developing countries in the 
various international fora in working toward the objec- 
tives set forth in the Declaration. 

Energy 

3. Ministers recognised that an imbalance between 
world energy supply and demand, which could occur as 
early as the 1980s, would have severe economic, social 
and political repercussions in OECD countries and 
throughout the world. They expressed their determina- 
tion to avoid that situation by stronger action to con- 
serve energy and develop alternative sources of energy 
and by including sound energy policies in their overall 
economic policy. 

Commodities 

4. Ministers noted the importance of continuing dis- 
cussions on commodities and endorsed the agreement 
reached in the CIEC to establish a Common Fund with 
the specific purposes, objectives and other constituent 
elements to be further negotiated in UNCTAD [U.N. 
Conference on Trade and Development], and the will- 
ingness declared at the Conference to make all efforts 
for the success of the negotiations being undertaken in 
UNCTAD on commodities. They invited the Organisa- 
tion to continue its work in the field of commodities in 
order to assist Member countries in these efforts, and 
to examine other related commodity issues. 

Trade 

5. Ministers agreed that, while in several respects 
the economic situation was different from that which 
prevailed at the time of the adoption of the Trade Dec- 
laration in 1974, it was still characterised by excep- 
tional difficulties and divergencies in Member coun- 
tries' situations. They noted with concern that persis- 
tent high levels of unemployment and difficulties in cer- 
tain sectors have increased protectionist pressures. 
Ministers emphasized that recourse to protectionist 
policies would foster unemployment, increase inflation 
and reduce economic welfare. They agreed that the 
present economic situation together with the increasing 



interdependence of OECD economies reinforced the 
need for a renewed political commitment to avoid re- 
strictive unilateral trade and current account measures 
and the artificial stimulation of exports; measures of 
this kind tended to carry the risk of proliferation with 
self-defeating implications. They also agreed that such 
a commitment and related disciplines in the field of 
general economic policy were an essential element of 
the strategy for sustained non-inflationary economic 
growth in the OECD area. Indeed such growth should 
itself facilitate the avoidance of restrictions. 

6. Member Governments ^ therefore decided to re- 
new, for a further year, their Trade Declaration of 30th 
May, 1974. They agreed that full use should be made of 
the existing possibilities for consultation in order to 
find and implement multilaterally-acceptable solutions 
to trade problems, whether industrial or agricultural, 
in a manner which would take into account the interests 
of all concerned. In the case of sectoral problems, every 
effort should be made to identify such problems before 
they assume critical proportions and to proceed to con- 
sultations in their regard, taking into consideration, 
inter alia, structural changes in the world economy. 

7. Ministers welcomed the progress achieved in mul- 
tilateral co-operation concerning export credits and un- 
derlined the need for further efforts to improve and ex- 
tend the consensus on guidelines for the extension of 
officially-supported export credits. 

8. Ministers reaffirmed that it was essential to main- 
tain an open and multilateral trading system as a basic 
element in the overall approach to the economic prob- 
lems with which their countries were confronted and 
stressed the importance of giving impetus to the Mul- 
tilateral Trade Negotiations with the objective of mak- 
ing substantive progress in key areas in 1977, and 
achieving agreement over the range of issues as rapidly 
as possible. 

9. Ministers welcomed the work being done in the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council on corrupt 
practices in international commercial transactions, and 
expressed the hope that it would take the measures 
necessary with a view to reaching agreement as early 
as possible on appropriate means, including the negoti- 
ation of an international agreement, of combating illicit 
payments. 

International Investment and Multinational Enter- 
prises 

10. Recalling the Declaration and the Decisions of 
OECD Member Governments of 21st June, 1976, on In- 
ternational Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 
Ministers also welcomed the work of the United Na- 
tions Commission on Transnational Corporations on a 
code of conduct. 

Progress Under the Strategy for Sustained Economic 
Expansion 

11. Ministers reaffirmed the strategy for a sustained 



^ Spain has reserved temporarily its position. [Foot- 
note in original.] 



118 



Department of State Bulletin 



expansion, aiming at a progressive return to full 
employment and price stability, which they adopted in 
June 1976. The basic premise on which this strategy 
rests is that the steady economic growth needed to re- 
store full employment and satisfy rising economic and 
social aspirations will not prove sustainable unless 
Member countries make further progress towards 
eradicating inflation. Ministers examined the progress 
made in implementing the strategy and reviewed the 
prospects for the coming year. While recognising that 
serious problems persisted, they welcomed the fact that 
some Member Governments had committed themselves 
to economic growth targets during 1977 and some 
others to stabilization policies which were intended to 
provide a basis for sustained non-inflationary growth 
world-wide. 

12. Ministers agreed that the achievement of the ob- 
jectives of the strategy would be promoted by a some- 
what faster rate of expansion in the OECD area as a 
whole in 1978 than seems likely to be achieved in 1977, 
although this does not apply to some countries. An 
overall growth rate of OECD GNP of around .5 per cent 
in 1978 would at this point seem desirable and consist- 
ent with the strategy. They agreed that, where neces- 
sary and appropriate, action should be taken to achieve 
this. This somewhat faster rate of expansion should: 

— enable real progress to be made in reducing un- 
employment next year; 

— help to stimulate the productive investment needed 
to provide jobs for the unemployed; and 

— be compatible with a further reduction in the rate 
of inflation. 

13. Further progress against inflation will not come 
about of its own accord. Determined action will be re- 
quired to slow down the price/wage spiral. Some coun- 
tries will need to pursue — and some to reinforce — 
vigorous stabilization policies. To promote better pay- 
ments equilibrium. Member countries in a weak exter- 
nal position will hold the growth of domestic demand to 
a rate compatible with reducing inflation, and also fol- 
low policies to improve their competitive position, so as 
to attain a sustainable current-account position. 
Member countries in a strong external position will 
provide for a sustained expansion of domestic demand 
compatible with further reduction of inflation; they are 
ready to see a weakening in their current-account posi- 
tion and an appreciation of their currencies in response 
to underlying market forces. 

14. Specific objectives and policies for expansion and 
stabilization will vary as between Member countries. 
But, taken together, they must provide the basis for 
sustained non-inflationary growth in the OECD area 
and the world economy as a whole. Ministers agreed on 
the need to strengthen procedures for monitoring prog- 
ress under the strategy. To this end, they decided that 
Member countries would communicate their prelimi- 
nary objectives for the growth of output and domestic 
demand and their stabilization policies for 1978 to the 
Organisation so that their mutual consistency and 
global implications can be examined, and can then pro- 



vide the basis for monitoring progress during the 
course of next year. 

15. Ministers recognised that a sustained increase in 
demand, while necessary, will not on its own solve the 
problems of unemployment and lagging investment, 
which are due in part to structural causes and the 
legacy of events of recent years. 

— Lagging investment now can lead to unemployment 
later. In countries where real wages have run ahead of 
productivity increases in recent years there is a need to 
increase the return on investment. In some countries 
there may be need for a greater consensus between 
government, labour and management on the reduced 
scope for increases in public and private consumption. 

— In prevailing circumstances further efforts where 
appropriate should be made to supplement overall de- 
mand management policies by specific measures de- 
signed to increase employment, including policies which 
help adapt the labour force to the requirements of rapid 
structural and technological change. 

— In the efforts to reduce unemployment, particular 
attention should be paid to the unemployment of young 
workers. Special measures have been taken in many 
countries and more may be needed. Ministers in- 
structed the Organisation to strengthen its exchange of 
experience and to organise urgently a high-level con- 
ference for this purpose. 

16. Ministers reviewed the international payments 
situation. They welcomed the progress being made to- 
wards a more appropriate payments position by some of 
the larger Member countries. While some of the smaller 
Member countries are also making progress in the right 
direction, many of them are still running unsustainably 
large current account deficits. Ministers underlined the 
need for continued efforts to arrive at a more sustain- 
able pattern of current-account positions in the OECD 
area. They agreed on the need to ensure that adequate 
official financing facilities are available to back up ap- 
propriate stabilization programmes. In this connection 
they heard a statement by the Managing Director of the 
International Monetary Fund on the progress made in 
negotiating additional resources to finance balance of 
payments through the IMF. Many Ministers stressed 
the importance they attached to implementation of the 
OECD Financial Support Fund in addition to the IMF 
facility. 

17. Ministers noted that present conjunctural dif- 
ficulties are exacerbating longer-run structural and de- 
velopment problems, as well as the employment and 
balance-of-payments difficulties, of some Member coun- 
tries. Ministers therefore agreed that the competent 
bodies of the Organisation dealing with the various as- 
pects of these problems should, in a positive and co- 
ordinated way, take into consideration the means to 
overcome such difficulties. 

18. Ministers noted with interest the recommenda- 
tions contained in the report Towards Full Employ- 
ment and Price Stability produced by a group of ex- 
perts under the chairmanship of Professor McCracken 
and instructed the Organisation to examine both the 



July 25, 1977 



119 



analysis and recommendations in the Report. They 
agreed that, taking account of the important differences 
between countries, the Oi'ganisation and Member Gov- 
ernments should study in particular the recommenda- 
tion that, over the medium term, a policy of not accom- 
modating high rates of inflation should be built around 
some or all of the following elements: publicly- 
announced norms for the growth of the monetary 
aggregates; a fiscal policy geared to guidelines for pub- 
lic expenditure and a budget norm designed to avoid 
giving an inflationary stimulus; and consultative ar- 
rangements designed to clarify the kind of price and 
wage behaviour consistent with achieving and maintain- 
ing full employment. 

19. Ministers also noted with interest the reports by 
the OECD Trade Union Advisory Committee on a 
strategy for full employment and instructed the Or- 
ganisation to study and evaluate the proposals con- 
tained in them, as well as in the paper by the OECD 
Business and Industry Advisory Committee on non- 
inflationary growth. 



DECLARATION, JUNE 23 

Declaration on Relations With Developing 
Countries, Adopted by Governments of OECD 
Member Countries on 23rd June, 1977 

1. Ministers of Member governments of the OECD 
meeting in Paris on 23rd June, 1977, discussed relations 
with developing countries and the longei'-term orienta- 
tion of international development co-operation. 

2. Ministers affirmed that the CIEC had played a 
valuable role in building up a climate of dialogue be- 
tween the developing and developed countries. It had 
provided the opportunity for a thorough global exam- 
ination of the major issues involved and agreement was 
reached on a number of important points, although it 
had not been possible to reach agreement on some other 
important topics of mutual interest. All Member gov- 
ernments of the OECD, including those who did not 
participate in the CIEC, joined together in welcoming 
the agreements that were reached there. They also 
welcomed the intention of some OECD Member gov- 
ernments in addition to those who took part in the Con- 
ference, to associate themselves with a Special Action 
Programme announced at that Conference. 

3. Looking ahead, they agreed that further efforts 
were needed on the part of both developed and develop- 
ing countries to build a more equitable and stable inter- 
national economic system, one which would create a 
better life for all people. These efforts will be sup- 
ported by a return to full health of the international 
economy which is the concern of developed and develop- 
ing countries alike. Recalling their Declaration of 28th 



May, 1975, Ministers expressed their readiness to pur- 
sue actively the on-going dialogue with developing 
countries in the United Nations system and in other ap- 
propriate fora and to co-operate in solving economic and 
social problems of common concern, thereby making it 
possible for the developing countries to participate in- 
creasingly in the benefits of an improved and expanding 
world economy. In this connection they stressed their 
willingness to encourage effective international co- 
operation and dialogue on energy. 

4. Welcoming the progress made in development co- 
operation on many fronts. Ministers acknowledged the 
necessity to continue working with developing coun- 
tries towards improved and more effective development 
co-operation policies. They affirmed that while de- 
velopment co-operation concerned relations between 
governments its objective was the well-being of indi- 
viduals; development co-operation should therefore ful- 
fil the dual purposes of growth of incomes and meeting 
basic needs of individuals in all developing countries. 
They stressed that development policies for transfers of 
resources and structural changes should be clearly di- 
rected to these purposes. This was particularly neces- 
sary in order that the objectives and policy concepts of 
development co-operation would be better understood 
and supported by the peoples of industrialised and de- 
veloping countries. 

5. Ministers of OECD countries, donors of aid, reaf- 
firmed the intention, as expressed by their countries in 
different fora, to increase effectively and substantially 
their official development assistance and to achieve an 
improved balance of their efforts in this regard. They 
announced their determination to direct, in co- 
operation with developing countries, a progressively 
larger share of their efforts to programmes meeting 
basic human needs. To realise this new orientation with 
respect to all developing countries, they also agreed to 
review the scope and direction of development assist- 
ance with a view to achieving greater volume and more 
efficiency in its use in an enlarged international effort. 



Letters of Credence 

On June 24, the following newly appointed 
Ambassadors presented their credentials to 
President Carter: ' 



Algeria — Abdelaziz Maoui 
Colombia — Virgilio Barco 
Morocco — Ali Bengelloun 



' For texts of the Ambassadors' remarks and the 
President's replies, see Department of State press re- 
leases dated June 24, 1977. 



120 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Interviewed at Foreign Policy Conference 
for Editors and Broadcasters 



The Department held a National Foreign 
Policy Conference for Editors and Broadcast- 
ers on June 28-29. Following is the tran- 
script of remarks by Secretary Vance in re- 
sponse to questions from the group on June 
28. 

Press release 310 dated June 28 

Secretary Vance: First, let me say how 
pleased I am to be with you and to welcome 
you to the State Department. I'm sure from 
looking at the schedule for today that it has 
probably been an interesting day, and I'm 
sure, now that Sol Linowitz [Co-Negotiator 
for the Panama Canal Treaty] has explained 
to you all about the Panama Canal, that's one 
thing that I won't have to answer any ques- 
tions about. [Laughter.] 

I think probably, because time is Hmited, 
the best thing would be for me to not try and 
make any opening statement but simply to an- 
swer your questions, because I'm sure you 
have a lot of them. 

Q. Mr. Secretary. Tomarde Golardo, 
WRHC, a Spanish radio in Miami. 

On June 16th, sir, in the Congressional 
Record, Senator Richard Stone said that there 
are from 15,000 to 20,000 Cuban soldiers in 
Angola. Yesterday, in that same room, he 
said the same thing. I was wondering if you 
can comment on the number said by Mr. 
Stone and if the Department agrees. 

Secretary Vance: I don't have a precise fig- 
ure on the number, and I'm not sure that any- 
body knows, even in our intelligence services, 
the precise number; but I think that's a rea- 
sonably accurate figure, and I would not dis- 
pute that figure. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, several people have told 



us today that we are still in the process of de- 
veloping a policy on Taiwan. Are we, or are 
they protecting your speech tomorrow? 
[Laughter. ] 

Secretary Vance: I will, of course, comment 
on our relationships with the People's Repub- 
lic of China and our relationships with Taiwan 
in my speech tomorrow. We are still in the 
process of formulating our position with re- 
spect to normalization of relations with the 
People's Republic of China. 

Although I will discuss it, the final deci- 
sions will not be taken until a period shortly 
before I go to China at the end of the month of 
August. I will be discussing when I am in 
China not only the question of normalization, 
but a variety of other subjects, which will be 
global in nature and regional, as well as our 
bilateral relationships. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, although it hadn't been 
discussed today and the man who's been the 
most specific on it isn't here, in exactly what 
time frame and precisely what context — 
although that's involved — do yon envision 
black majority rule taking place in the Re- 
public of South Africa — precisely the time 
frame? 

Secretary Vance: I cannot give you any pre- 
cise answer to that question. When Vice Pres- 
ident Mondale had his talks with Prime 
Minister Vorster [at Vienna, May 19-20], he 
mentioned two things — one, that there should 
be an end to discrimination, and secondly, 
that there should be full participation of all 
South Africans in the affairs of South Africa. 
And in that connection he was asked a ques- 
tion about one man, one vote; and obviously, 
if you're talking about full participation, that 
would be included within it. 



July 25, 1977 



121 



He did not specify any time with respect to 
the latter. He said that this was obviously a 
question that would have to be decided by the 
South Africans themselves, and he was not 
trying to say what the time schedule should 
be. 

He did go on to say, however, that what 
happened or did not happen in these two areas 
could not help but have an effect upon the re- 
lationships between South Africa and the 
United States. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, have we given, or do we 
propose to give, some kind of a signal to 
North Korea, telling them precisely what will 
happen if after our troops are gone they 
should begin an invasion? And if so, how will 
that signal be given and in what form? 

Secretary Vance: We have made it very 
clear that we stand behind — and will stand 
behind — the mutual security treaty which we 
have with the Republic of Korea — namely, 
South Korea. 

I think this is fully understood by the North 
Koreans, and I shall reiterate this again in the 
speech which I intend to make tomorrow 
evening relating to our Asian policy. 

We also have made it clear that the forces 
which we will be withdrawing from South 
Korea will be done over a period of years on a 
phased basis and that by the time that that 
withdrawal is completed, in approximately 
five years, the forces of South Korea on the 
ground should be fully able to take care of 
their own defense needs insofar as ground 
forces are concerned. We have, in addition, 
indicated that we will keep our air forces 
there and will continue to supply naval 
support. 

Therefore, I think that there should be no 
question in the minds of the North Koreans 
about what our commitments are to the secu- 
rity of South Korea, and that this will be not 
only clear in terms of what would happen 
should any action be taken, but will act as a 
deterrent to any adventuristic action. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Don Mulford, Montclair 
Times. 

Will your speech tomorrow on Asia contain 
any of the human relations thrusts — for 
human rights, rather — human rights thrusts 



that we've heard in regards to Russia, in re- 
gards to Africa, in regards to the Middle 
East? 

Secretary Vance: The answer is, yes. 

Q. Mr. President — [Laughter.] — 

Secretary Vance: I beg off on that. 

Q. — not quite. [Laughter.] Mr. Secretary, 
in view of history, was the domino theory very 
valid? 

Secretary Vance: I'd question it. I do not 
think that one can in hindsight say that the 
domino theory was right. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been consider- 
able consternation in the Midwest — I'm from 
WLW [Radio] in Cincinnati, Charlie 
Murdoch — about our upcoming possible rec- 
ognition of Cuba in light of the Angolan situ- 
ation, the amount of troops still there, the 
problems that began in the sixties with the 
missile crisis. And it seems that the advan- 
tages with Castro, if he could begin trade with 
us — what possible advantage do we have, rec- 
ognizing him, considering the southern 
Florida situation where a lot of Cubans still 
reside? What is the new light, other than 
Members of Congress, to the Cuban situation? 

Could you spend a few moments wrapping 
this up in a capsule of your feelings about it? 

Secretary Vance: Surely, I'd be delighted to 
do that. 

It has been many years since we had any 
dialogue with Cuba. Lots has happened since 
the time that that dialogue ceased. In the 
meantime, there are many issues which are of 
concern to both of our nations. And when this 
Administration came into office we deter- 
mined that the time had come to open up a 
dialogue with the Cubans to begin to discuss 
these many, many problems which were of 
concern to both of us. 

The first and most pressing issue was that 
of fishing rights. We had just enacted in the 
Congress a new law which set out a fishing 
zone which extended beyond Cuba and there- 
fore created an obvious problem of potential 
conflict. 

Because of that, we felt that the first item 
we should discuss with the Cubans was the 
fishing question. We opened discussions and 



122 



Department of State Bulletin 



were able to reach an agreement in the area of 
fishing rights between the two nations. 

We next believed that it would be in our in- 
terest to have some presence in Havana and 
to that end suggested that we put a small 
presence in Havana in return for their being 
able to do the same here in Washington. So 
we have agreed to establish what in diploma- 
tic terms are called interests sections. An in- 
terests section merely means this — that each 
country puts a small group of its diplomats in 
a third country's embassy within the capital of 
the other country. 

We think that this is a natural and positive 
step because it gives us a better insight as to 
what is going on in Cuba and a chance to dis- 
cuss issues which are of concern to us. 

There are many other items besides the 
ones which I have mentioned which have to be 
discussed, and let me mention some of them: 

— One, the question of what we consider to 
be Cuban interference in the affairs of Puerto 
Rico. 

— Two, the question of Cuban troops in 
Africa. 

— Three, the question of political prisoners 
in Cuba and the related questions of human 
rights. 

—Fourth, the questions of claims and assets 
that are involved as a result of the expropria- 
tion of property when U.S. properties were 
taken over. 

On their side they, of course, have a 
number of issues; the most important of which 
they would like to discuss with us is the ques- 
tion of the trade embargo. 

Now, all of these issues are subjects for dis- 
cussion. We are going to approach these dis- 
cussions on a careful and measured basis. We 
have no time deadline for the completion of 
these discussions, but we think these are im- 
portant to both of our countries and should be 
discussed. 

We are not talking about normalizing in the 
sense of full diplomatic recognition until all of 
these issues have been discussed and we feel 
we have satisfactory understandings between 
us. 

Q. Will Guantanamo play a part in it? 



Secretary Vance: I'm sure they probably 
will raise the issue. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the light of the Presi- 
dent's recent statement about what the huynan 
rights issue has apparently cost with rela- 
tionship to the Soviet Union, and in regard to 
the response you just made about human 
rights in China, obviously there must be 
something going on that is beyond the public- 
ity value of this natioji going forward on. this 
issue, if it is as counterproductive as the Pre- 
sident seemed to indicate that it was with re- 
gards to the Soviet Union. What is it? We all 
recognize that human rights are in bad condi- 
tion in much of the world, and it really 
doesn't yieed this kind of attention on a world 
scale, where delicate negotiations are in prog- 
ress. What is behind this? What is going on 
with it? 

Secretary Vance: First, let me say that I 
think that you overread what the President 
actually said when he commented on this issue 
in the statement that he made recently with 
respect to its effect in the discussions with the 
Soviet Union. 

Having said that, let me then move on to 
why we believe human rights is an important 
matter that should be discussed. 

We believe that this is a fundamental part 
of our heritage. It is interwoven in the fabric 
of the Constitution, and the underlying docu- 
ments which support the founding of this na- 
tion. We believe it involves universal issues 
which affect the lives of individuals through- 
out the entire world. 

We therefore feel that this is an appropriate 
subject to discuss not only in connection with 
our foreign policy but in connection with the 
foreign policy of other nations as well. In- 
deed, we see responsive chords struck in 
many countries throughout the world. 

For example, I recently attended the OAS 
meeting in Grenada, when some of the 
strongest proponents of human rights spoke 
eloquently about the importance of it and the 
need to strengthen the human rights 
mechanisms in the inter- American system and 
the United Nations as well — Venezuela, Costa 
Rica, Colombia, to name but a few. 

Our object is to raise this issue and to see 



July 25, 1977 



123 



that it becomes a subject of discussion, be- 
cause we believe it is a universal issue of 
great importance, and we will continue to 
pursue it. We are not going to walk away 
from this issue. We think it is important 
enough, and indeed vital enough, that we will 
continue to press this issue. 

We will do it in different ways. Sometimes 
it will be by public statement. Sometimes it 
will be by quiet persuasion, and it will have to 
be done in a measured and careful way. But 
we believe it is of great importance, and we 
will continue to pursue it. 

Now let me say one final thing. I do not 
think you can measure progress insofar as 
human rights is concerned over the short 
term. I think you must look at the long range 
and see what happens five, si.x, seven, eight, 
ten years down the road. Therefore I think to 
try and apply a yai'dstick and say what hap- 
pened this month or next month or the month 
after that is not the way to try and judge 
progi'ess or lack of progress. 

We do indeed see in individual cases im- 
mediate progress. In other cases we see lack 
of progress, or a standing still. But I don't 
think that these short-term tests should be 
the test. Rather, they should be long term. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, exactly to what extent do 
you believe the hu?nan rights issue has 
clouded or inhibited the SALT talks [Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks], and what is your 
prognosis for the talks from this point on? 

Secretary Vance: I still believe that the 
Soviets will make their decision in the SALT 
talks on the basis of what they consider to be 
their national interests in military and 
strategic terms. 

Insofar as when we can expect an agree- 
ment, I simply can't predict that. 

I would want to say that I think the most 
important thing is not how soon we can get it 
done, although we would all like to see it done 
promptly; but rather, can we get a sound 
agreement, an agreement which is beneficial 
to both us and the Soviet Union and in our 
national interests? And I think that is what 
we must strive for, rather than trying to get 
an agreement just to have an agreement. 

If you try and do that, then you are going to 



end up with an agreement which may very 
well be a bad agreement, and an agreement 
which will have ambiguities in it which will 
just lead to confusion and to problems in the 
future. 

Q. Back to the first part of my question, 
exactly to what extent do you believe the 
human rights issue has clouded or inhibited 
progress of the SALT talks? 

Secretary Vance: In my judgment, not 
much. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the talks with Viet- 
nam, what role, if any, is the question of the 
$6 billion of U.S. arms surplus left behind 
there playing, and specifically, since the 
United States is not prepared to give aid to 
Vietnam, is there any question of buying 
some of this material and shipping it out of 
the area? 

Secretary Vance: Well, it is obvious that in- 
sofar as the Vietnamese are concerned, the 
question of aid is of great importance to them. 
We have made it very clear that no aid can be 
forthcoming. We are prohibited by the Con- 
gress from giving any aid. There is no inten- 
tion of giving any aid at this point except for 
small amounts of humanitarian aid, which 
have been given in the past. 

Therefore the position, I think, is very clear 
on this. We are prepared to do certain things 
such as not oppose the admission of Vietnam 
to the United Nations. We have made that 
clear. We have made it clear, should we nor- 
malize relations and thus have diplomatic re- 
lations, that we are prepared to remove the 
trade embargo. But as far as aid is concerned, 
we have made it clear there is nothing we can 
do there. 

Q. And the $6 billion of arms surplus left 
behind in Vietnatn, is there any question of 
purchasing any of that, or is it playing any 
role at all in the Vietnam talks? 

Secretary Vance: No. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, we have heard today that 
a Middle East settlement and negotiation is a 
foreign policy imperative of the United States 
and that an integral paH of this solution or 
settlement would be the solution or resolution 



124 



Department of State Bulletin 



of the Palestinian problem. In light of the fact 
that we have disqualified the PLO [Palestine 
Liberation Organization] as a representative 
in such negotiations, how can we realistically 
expect to accomplish a solution to the problem 
without a representative of the Palestinian 
people? 

Secretarij Vance: We have said that as long 
as the Palestinians refuse to recognize — or the 
PLO refuses to recognize — the right of Israel 
to exist, or to accept [U.N. Resolutions] 242 
and 338 as the basis of discussions, that in- 
sofar as we are concerned, we are not going to 
enter into discussions with them. 

Should that change, we would be faced with 
a different situation at that time. In the 
meantime, going on to the thrust of your 
question, it seems to me that it is key that 
there be found a solution to the Palestinian 
question. As to exactly how that question can 
be resolved, that is up to the parties to come 
up with various proposals to deal with it. And 
this is certainly one of the subjects we will be 
discussing when I return to the Middle East 
at the end of next month or in the early part 
of August. 

The parties all know that this is one of the 
three core elements, and it has to be resolved 
if you are going to get a solution. And it 
seems to me that, therefore, it is incumbent 
upon the parties to come up with some con- 
crete suggestions as to how this might be ac- 
complished. A number have been suggested, 
but there is no unanimity of view as to how 
this can be done. 

Q. Is it implicit in your answer, then, that 
the PLO would qualify if they would accept 
the tenets of2h2 as the basis of participation? 

Secretary Vance: What I have said is that 
that would create a different situation, and we 
would have to take a look at it fresh then. 

Q. Secretary Vance, my name is Jose 
Chapa [WSBC Radio]from Chicago. The Pre- 
sident of Mexico was here in February. The 
President of Venezuela is your guest today. 
The First Lady of this country has been in 
Latin America just recently, and everything 
is, in the protocol, wonderful and beautiful. 

But is there any concrete, realistic, positive 



plan of President Carter's Administration to 
move toward Latin America? We see that the 
U.S.A. has been very busy with Europe, ivith 
Asia, with Africa, but we demand, we need, 
as we say in radio, equal time. [Laughter.] 

Secretary Vance: All right, that is a very 
good question. 

Insofar as the question of the problems of 
Latin America are concerned, let me say first 
that it is our strong conviction that Latin 
America is not just a homogeneous mass. We 
have individual countries which should be 
dealt with on bilateral matters as individual 
countries, as we would anywhere else in the 
world. 

On multilateral matters, we ought to deal 
with them in multilateral fora, as we would 
with countries anywhere else in the world. 
And I think this is being understood in Latin 
America. 

Now, specifically with respect to the eco- 
nomic problems and the problems which are 
involved in the North-South dialogue, we 
have spent a great deal of our time recently 
working on these problems. These were in- 
volved in the so-called CIEC [Conference on 
International Economic Cooperation] meet- 
ings which have been going on for about two 
years and recently concluded in Paris. 

As a result of those meetings, certain ac- 
tions were taken — not as much as either side 
would have wished, but I think certain prog- 
ress was made in terms of commodity agree- 
ments, in terms of problems of dealing with 
debt, in problems of many other complexities 
in nature, and therefore I think we now have 
created a framework for moving forward in 
the United Nations to carry out what has 
been arrived at in CIEC. 

We have been talking today with the Ven- 
ezuelans about how one picks up from where 
we left off and continues this dialogue, be- 
cause it is really only a beginning that has to 
be continued. 

We are also talking about problems of how 
we can strengthen the economic capacities of 
assisting other nations, both in the Carib- 
bean, in Central America, and in South 
America. And there are many ideas which are 
under discussion at this point. 



July 25, 1977 



125 



Let me say that this is a very high-priority 
item on our agenda, and we will be discussing 
it with the Latin American countries, and I 
believe that in the long run we are going to be 
able to make progress. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, back to Korea just for a 
second. We were speaking earlier today of the 
so-called tripwire effect. If it is such a good 
idea to withdraw the ground troops from the 
2d Army, rather the 2d Division, from 
Korea, why not apply the same principle to 
Western Europe? Or is the thinking of the 
Administration now that there is less of a 
chance of a ground attack from. North Korea 
to South Korea than from the Warsaw Pact 
and Russian countries against Western 
Europe? 

Secretary Vance: What we are talking 
about in Korea is withdrawing, over a period 
of approximately five years, one division 
which remains there and building up the 
strength of the Korean Army, so that when 
that period has expired, the Korean Army will 
be able to take care of the ground problem it- 
self. 

I think that you have a different situation in 
NATO. We have been withdrawing forces 
over the years in NATO. I think we are down 
to a position right now insofar as NATO is 
concerned where to withdraw any other 
troops at this time would not be a wise thing 
to do. 

Q. For what reason, sir? 

Secretary Vance: Because I think that in 
order to provide a proper balance, they are 
required there at this time. If you see what 
has happened in the central front and the 
buildup that has occurred over the last sev- 
eral years in terms of equipment and other- 
wise on the Warsaw Pact side, there is at best 
a balance at this point. 

Q. That doesn't tnean that the Administra- 



tion then regards a ground attack from the 
East more strongly in Europe than a ground 
attack from the North in Korea? 

Secretary Vance: No. What we are saying is 
we think in both cases that there should be 
sufficient deterrent to prevent any ground at- 
tack. And we believe that with the strategy 
that we have in the two different areas that 
they are sufficient to deter an attack. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Roger Allan from WRKO 
[Radio] in Boston. 

Will you please give an up-to-date report 
regarding our European relationships in 
connection with the Concorde? 

Secretary Vance: On the Concorde, I think 
it would be less than candid to say that both 
the British and the French are very concerned 
about the Concorde situation. [Laughter.] The 
matter, however, has been passed on by the 
Court of Appeals in New York. It is now back 
in the District Court. It went back to the Dis- 
trict Court with instructions from the Circuit 
Court to expedite the hearing on the remain- 
ing question, which is: Did the Port Authority 
act in a discriminatory fashion? 

I would expect that a decision would be 
reached quite promptly under those circum- 
stances, which hopefully will resolve the prob- 
lem. It remains, however, a matter of great 
concern to both Britain and France, and of 
course we watch it with great care and con- 
cern. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, as a member of a na- 
tional newspaper association study mission 
over several areas of the world in the past 
four years, I have come up with several ques- 
tions and several observations which I have 
been trying to get before your eyes for four 
months now and the President's eyes; so, as a 
final question, my question is: Could I hand 
you a copy of this report and hope you will 
read it? 

Secretary Vance: I will, indeed. 



126 



Department of State Bulletin 



The Role of Investment in Expanding 
an Open International Economic System 



Address by Richard N. Cooper 

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs ^ 



Ladies and gentlemen of the Council of the 
Americas: It is my pleasure to be here today 
to present an overview of the Carter Adminis- 
tration's approach to private foreign 
investment: 

— The contribution of private foreign in- 
vestment to Third World development, in 
Latin America and elsewhere; 

— The impact of outward investment on 
American jobs and American exports; and 

— The implications of inward investment for 
the strength of the American economy. 

As you know, the U.S. Government has 
traditionally felt that an open international 
economic system will maximize the economic 
welfare of ourselves and of the rest of the 
world. Within this framework, we have gen- 
erally encouraged U.S. firms to respond to 
market opportunities wherever they could be 
found. 

But I hardly need remind this audience that 
our view of multinational corporations as play- 
ing a positive role in the global economic sys- 
tem has not gone unchallenged. Some critics 
have asserted that foreign investors use inap- 
propriate technology in the host countries of 
the Third World, destroy jobs, collect excess 
profits, and leave poverty and misery in their 
wake. More recently, other critics have al- 
leged that multinationals take away capital 
from their home countries in the developed 
world, give away technology, export jobs, and 
leave poverty and misery in their wake. A re- 



cent book entitled "Global Reach" came to the 
remarkable conclusion that multinational cor- 
porations syphon off capital, export jobs, and 
hurt the balance of payments of home and 
host countries simultaneously! ^ 

I shall argue today that the closer we look 
at the evidence the more firmly we remain 
convinced that a liberal international eco- 
nomic system, permitting broad flows of 
foreign investment across national boundaries 
according to economic forces, offers the best 
hope for stable economic growth — in the Third 
World, in other developed countries, and in 
our own society. 

U.S. Investment in the Third World 

Let me turn first to our policy toward pri- 
vate direct investment in the Third World. 

As you well know, Latin American coun- 
tries continue to be the group of developing 
countries receiving the largest share of U.S. 
investment. Two-thirds of American invest- 
ment in the less developed world is located 
there, with book value equaling $20 billion 
and earnings of approximately $3 billion in 
1975. Mexico and Brazil had a combined stock 
of more than $8 billion in U.S. investment at 
the beginning of this year, making the stake 
of American companies in those two countries 
greater than in France and almost equal to 
that in Germany, though considerably less 
than in Britain or Canada. 



' Made before the Council of the Americas at Wash- 
ington, D.C., on June 27, 1977. 



^ "Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Cor- 
porations," Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Muller 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975). 



July 25, 1977 



127 



We believe that American companies have a 
distinctive contribution to make to Third 
World development. They can offer not only 
capital, but important managerial, technical, 
and marketing skills that cannot be supplied 
through aid mechanisms or through foreign 
ti'ade. We therefore regard it as a contribu- 
tion to development to provide services to 
facilitate the flow of U.S. private investment 
to those developing countries that want it 
through the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) and other U.S. Govern- 
ment agencies. 

But foreign investment can be effective 
only if it is truly acceptable to the host coun- 
try. It is not our pohcy to insist that other 
countries let American investors in. Nor do 
we try to dictate the terms under which 
others should receive American companies. 
We respect the right of every sovereign gov- 
ernment to establish conditions for foreign in- 
vestment that will best meet its own de- 
velopment needs. But all governments must 
realize that private investment is a matter of 
choice for the firm as well as for the host 
country. Corporations will tend to locate their 
activities where they can earn profits and ex- 
pect to continue to earn profits. 

We do not view the desire of Third World 
governments to exercise some degree of con- 
trol over foreign investors, however, as a 
fundamental threat to continued investment 
by American companies. Many countries in 
Latin America, Africa, and Asia are indicat- 
ing to us that they want more — not less — U.S. 
investment. They are realizing that the desire 
to maintain their sovereignty does not limit 
them to autarchy with respect to foreign in- 
vestment any more than it does with respect 
to foreign trade. They are becoming increas- 
ingly sophisticated in designing policies to 
channel multinational corporate resources into 
those areas where they are most wanted and 
in getting the most out of what multinational 
corporations have to offer. They are sharpen- 
ing their bargaining skills and more fully 
realizing their bai'gaining power. 

On investment issues, as elsewhere, 
rhetoric is slow in catching up with reality. 
But even those leaders who are calling for a 
new international economic order are begin- 



ning to acknowledge that dependency and 
exploitation are peculiarly inappropriate ways 
of characterizing how foreign investor-host 
country relations are evolving in the modern 
world. 

One source of increased bargaining strength 
on the part of the Third World governments 
comes from their sharing of information on 
what kinds of policies are more effective, and 
what kinds of policies are less effective, in at- 
tracting foreign investment and directing it to 
serve host-country needs. As an economist, it 
is professionally pleasing to me to expect that 
in this process they will rediscover some neo- 
classical truths. 

— One of the surest ways to guard against 
what they consider excess profits for 
foreigners — or anybody else — for example, is 
to lower trade barriers and increase competi- 
tion in domestic markets. 

— One of the most effective ways to induce 
multinational corporations to shift from 
capital-intensive to more appropriate labor- 
intensive production techniques, as a study 
prepared for the U.N. Group of Eminent Per- 
sons studying transnational enterprises 
pointed out, is to lower trade barriers and in- 
crease competition in domestic markets. 

— Probably the most forceful method of 
keeping foreign investors "under control" is 
through the impersonal discipline of the 
market. 

We think that no mechanism for interna- 
tional regulation will be as effective in keep- 
ing the power of multinational corporations 
manageable as the difficult decision on the 
part of host-country governments to increase 
competitive pressures domestically. 

Our projection that American investment in 
the Third World will continue to grow springs 
also from our confidence that U.S. corpora- 
tions are highly flexible and adaptable. These 
virtues have frequently been the key to their 
success at home as well as abroad. American 
corporations have been, and will have to con- 
tinue to be, enterprising in discovering how to 
provide their valuable skills and services in 
ways consistent with the national aspirations 
of the countries where they are located. This 
adaptability is particularly important in natu- 



128 



Department of State Bulletin 



ral resource development, where the tradi- 
tional method of direct equity ownership 
leaves the investor with a large fixed in- 
vestment extraordinarily vulnerable. 

Making a virtue of necessity, some com- 
panies have shifted from direct equity in- 
vestment to management contracts, service 
contracts, or other forms of nonequity par- 
ticipation. These leave them less vulnerable 
economically and politically in the Third 
World. There are many ways to share risks 
and profits between foreign investors and 
host countries that do not involve direct 
foreign ownership. 

Other companies call on the U.S. Govern- 
ment to give natural resource investors more 
direct support, protection, and guarantees to 
bolster their traditional mode of operation. 

It seems to us that the more secure course 
of action is for multinationals to seek methods 
of transferring their valuable skills to the task 
of natural resource development, while re- 
specting the desires of the host countries to 
preserve national patrimony over the re- 
sources in question. The feasibility of man- 
agement contracts, service contracts, and 
other nonequity arrangements has already 
been demonstrated in oil and mineral projects 
in the Third World. They offer profitable op- 
portunities to American companies. And they 
are responsive to the desire of many 
developing-country governments to maintain 
sovereign control over natural resources. The 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation has 
a particularly useful role to play in helping 
U.S. investors and host countries to work out 
mutually acceptable arrangements. 

No matter how flexible and adaptable 
American companies are, however, there will 
inevitably be some investment disputes 
between foreign investors and host 
governments. 

On the one hand, we have no desire to take 
an interventionist stance in our dealings with 
other countries. We assume that private in- 
vestors will weigh carefully their vulnerabil- 
ity to political risk as part of the economic cal- 
culation they make when they are deciding 
whether or not to invest in any particular 
country, and some will conclude that their ef- 
forts are better exerted elsewhere. Moreover, 



we anticipate that most investment disputes 
that do occur will be settled with the host 
country without the need for U.S. Govern- 
ment intervention. Indeed many busi- 
nessmen, including a number from the 
council's own ranks, tell us that official 
intervention on our part can be counter- 
productive. 

On the other hand, the U.S. Government 
has an obligation to protect the rights of its 
citizens and their property abroad. Thus, we 
expect to keep ourselves closely informed 
about the course of investment disputes that 
do arise and, where necessary, will offer our 
assistance in facilitating a mutually acceptable 
settlement between the parties, but wherever 
possible, we shall seek to limit the direct in- 
volvement of the U.S. Government. 

Codes of Conduct for Investment 

With regard to codes of conduct for multi- 
national investment, we seek to strengthen 
multilateral discipline and I'estraint over gov- 
ernment intervention in investment decisions 
when such actions might adversely affect 
other countries. Our efforts in the multilateral 
arena have been successful in deflecting the 
pressures for unilateral action, particularly 
among industrialized countries. Within the 
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development], we developed last 
July guidelines that emphasize a multilateral 
commitment to an open international in- 
vestment system. This approach has been use- 
ful in other international efforts to deal with 
foreign investment. In particular, it served as 
a model for the International Labor Organiza- 
tion's draft tripartite declaration of principles 
concerning multinational enterprises and so- 
cial policy. In the United Nations Commission 
on Transnational Corporations and the related 
Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code 
of Conduct, we recognize that a large gap still 
remains between the developed and the de- 
veloping countries over such basic issues as 
the limits international law may impose on 
"permanent sovereignty," the responsibilities 
that governments have in their treatment of 
foreign firms, as well as the responsibilities of 
the firms as good local citizens, and the bind- 



July 25, 1977 



129 



ing versus the voluntary nature of a code of 
conduct. 

President Carter has spoken out forcefully 
about the need for dealing with irregular 
practices and improper conduct. One of the 
major reasons for the recent rise in mistrust 
of multinational corporations has been the re- 
velations of corporate misconduct in connec- 
tion with bribes to foreign officials. The 
United States is taking firm action to elimi- 
nate such practices from international trade 
and commerce. In addition to vigorous en- 
forcement of existing laws, the Carter Admin- 
istration has strongly supported new legisla- 
tion which would impose criminal penalties on 
U.S. nationals who use U.S. commerce to 
bribe foreign officials. However, international 
action is essential if we are to deal effectively 
with this problem. The United States is thus 
proposing an international agreement under 
which both home and host governments would 
take action against bribery involving their of- 
ficials or their nationals in international com- 
mercial transactions. 



Human Rights and Corporate Responsibility 

Finally, I would like to address the question 
of human rights and corporate responsibility. 
This Administration is seeking to promote 
human rights internationally — including civil 
rights, political rights, and basic social and 
economic rights — because we have a moral ob- 
ligation to do so, because we have a legal obli- 
gation to do so (under the U.N. Charter), and 
because we believe it is in our national in- 
terest to do so. 

In the short run, it might appear opportune 
to support or tolerate a repressive govern- 
ment that is willing to give favorable consid- 
eration to U.S. political and economic in- 
terests. But we believe that over the longer 
term a regime that relies upon force for its 
authority can be neither popular nor stable. 
Only by respecting the law and applying it 
equally, and by offering all of its citizens a 
share in the fruits of economic growth, can a 
government gain the legitimacy upon which 
stability and public support are founded. 

I am certain that you share our concerns for 
human rights. Indeed the Council of the 
Americas has played a leading role in publiciz- 



ing the efforts of American corporations to 
follow the dictates of good corporate citizen- 
ship. As corporate citizens, often seen as rep- 
resentatives of the United States, you com- 
plement our efforts by adhering to high 
standards of behavior and demonstrating a 
concern for human rights. Local businessmen 
may question the sincerity or the motives of 
politicians in Washington; they will surely be 
impressed at the depth of the U.S. commit- 
ment to human rights when they see you re- 
flecting the same concerns. 



Outward and Inward Investment 

When we turn to the impact that outward 
investment by U.S. companies has on the 
American economy, we find that the con- 
troversies of recent years have also been se- 
vere. Critics from the ranks of organized 
labor have argued that American multination- 
als export jobs by producing abroad goods 
that could be shipped from the United States 
and by speeding the flow of imports from 
cheap-labor countries into this country. Ac- 
cording to this view, American multinationals 
aggravate the unemployment problem in the 
United States and deprive disadvantaged — 
especially minority — men and women of ac- 
cess to the job market at the lower rungs of 
the employment ladder. 

Supporters from the ranks of international 
business make the opposite argument. They 
suggest that American multinationals move 
abroad as a defensive measure only when it is 
no longer possible to export from this coun- 
try. And they point to the fact that the 
domestic employment and the exports of 
American multinationals have risen faster 
than the national average to show that they 
do not e.xport jobs. 

We believe that a close look at the evidence 
supports a balanced view. When one dis- 
aggregates the data, one can find numerous 
instances where outward investment stimu- 
lates trade and numerous instances where it 
substitutes for trade. But there is no strong 
overall statistical correlation between U.S. 
foreign investment and trade, positive or 
negative. 

This finding is not as dramatic as the claims 
of either side, but it carries two clear implica- 



130 



Department of State Bulletin 



tions for U.S. policy: first, that we cannot jus- 
tify on trade or employment grounds meas- 
ures to subsidize outward investment; second, 
that we should not adopt restrictive measures 
to keep American companies at home. Rather, 
our goal should be neutrality in the treatment 
of outward investment and domestic invest- 
ment; that is, insofar as possible, we should 
maintain policies that do not bias the corpo- 
rate decisionmaking process between for- 
eign and domestic investment one way or 
another. 

Focusing more broadly on the concerns of 
labor, the President is determined, as you 
know, to reduce unemployment to a level 
below 5 percent by 1981. Restrictive meas- 
ures toward outward investment, however, 
are not appropriate tools for employment pol- 
icy. They would not save jobs in the aggre- 
gate. With regard to the incorporation of dis- 
advantaged groups into the labor market, we 
do not find that import competition during the 
past 10 years has been strongest in the low- 
skilled, low-wage industries, nor that foreign 
investment has increased the pace of import 
growth. Hence, multinational corporations 
are not the problem; restricting them is not 
the solution. 

Having said that, however, let me remind 
this group that the multinational corporate 
community in this country has a great stake in 
helping this Administration reheve the pres- 
sures for protectionism and restrictionism 
that are generated when one sector has to 
bear a disproportionate share of the burden of 
accommodating our system to a liberal eco- 
nomic environment. The trade restrictions 
that are often suggested in connection with 
investment restrictions would result in sub- 
stantial cost to the U.S. economy and upward 
pressures on prices. The Carter Administra- 
tion will propose that temporary assistance be 
provided to affected companies to enable them 
to improve their competitive position and that 
benefits to trade-affected workers be ex- 
panded, coverage widened, certification 
speeded up, and the focus redirected from 
supplemental unemployment payments to 
provisions for retraining and relocating 
workers. 

The successful launching of this program 
will depend to a great e.xtent upon the active 



support that we receive from business leaders 
like yourselves. 

The United States is the second largest host 
country for foreign direct investment in the 
world — next to Canada — with over $33 billion 
at the end of 1976. We seek to make our ap- 
proach to inward investment consistent with 
our approach to outward investment. Our at- 
titude is to welcome foreign investment into 
our country. Such foreign investment assumes 
considerable importance in terms of its poten- 
tial for increasing our welfare, including, al- 
though few people realize it, the transfer of 
technology to the United States. Our official 
poHcy at the Federal level, however, is neu- 
trality. We extend to foreign companies no 
special privileges and prefer to let them make 
their market decisions on the basis of eco- 
nomic incentives. 

In practice, however, we must recognize 
that we, like other countries, maintain certain 
restrictions on foreign participation in our 
own economy, as in atomic energy, hy- 
droelectric power, communications, air trans- 
port, and fishing. Thus, we are anxious not to 
take a holier-than-thou stance when we view 
the efforts of other nations to restrict foreign 
corporations in areas where their activities 
are not welcome. Yet we hold to the general 
norm of having economic considerations de- 
termine the location of productive activity 
according to international comparative 
advantage. 

In conclusion, let me reaffirm that interna- 
tional financial markets, multilateral lending 
agencies, and foreign aid disbursements can- 
not, and never will be able to, provide the ta- 
lents and the skills that only the international 
business community can. We all can benefit 
from the activities of foreign investors — Third 
World countries, advanced industrial coun- 
tries, the United States. We all have a stake 
in insuring that international flows of capital, 
goods, services, and technology continue to 
move competitively according to fundamen- 
tally Uberal economic principles. 

Particular interests may be served by 
adopting more restrictive measures here, 
more protective measures there. But the 
greater interest of us all is best served by the 
continuing struggle to preserve and expand 
an open international economic system. 



July 25, 1977 



131 



Prime Minister Fraser of Australia 
Visits Washington 

Prime Minister J. Malcolm Fraser of Aus- 
tralia made an official visit to Washington 
June 21-23 during which he met with Presi- 
dent Carter and other government officials. 
Following is an exchange of remarks between 
President Carter and Prime Minister Fraser 
at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn 
of the White House on June 22. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 27 

PRESIDENT CARTER 

It's a great honor for me today, on behalf of 
the American people, to welcome to the White 
House and to our Capital City, the Prime 
Minister of Australia, John Fraser. We've had 
warm and valued ties with the great nation of 
Australia for many years. 

We share a common background in history 
and our form of life. We also share with them 
something of a frontier spirit, a willingness to 
venture into new concepts and new ideas, new 
lands; at the same time to develop a harmoni- 
ous interrelationship among our diverse 
people who have come from many other coun- 
tries; at the same time preserve the strength 
and independence of our own nation and our 
own government. 

As we have tried to do in our sphere of in- 
fluence, Australia has also accomplished a 
sense of leadership to set an example of free- 
dom, hberty, a commitment to the democratic 
processes; at the same time to preserve peace 
and to show a genuine concern for neighbors 
who are less fortunate than are we. 

Australia is a leader in the British Com- 
monwealth. It is also a leader in the continent 
of Asia and also, of course, in the Western 
Pacific. 

We have strong treaty ties to Australia and 
to New Zealand. And we look with great 
sense of gratitude and commitment to the 
maintenance of these ties, which are unshak- 
able and which have been of long standing 
and which, of course, will be permanent in 
the future. 

When our nations have been endangered 
because of war, our people have stood shoul- 



der to shoulder. Four times in this century 
alone we have shared with the great people of 
Australia a common commitment to fight 
when necessary to preserve a permanent 
peace. 

These ties have strengthened our resolve to 
communicate with one another, to consult 
with one another, and to share the future with 
one another. 

We now are exploring new ways to pre- 
serve the peace. Under the leadership of 
Prime Minister Fraser, Australia has laid 
down the strictest possible regulations to pro- 
tect the world from the further proliferation 
of atomic explosives. They are setting an 
example for us and other nations to emulate. 
And our own nation's commitments to non- 
proliferation will certainly be strengthened 
and enhanced by the fine example that has 
been set by Prime Minister Fraser and his 
own government in Australia. 

This is a morning which brings honor to our 
country, a chance to have this great leader 
visit us. 

As we leave this platform and go into the 
detailed discussions of the future of our two 
countries, it's with a sense of assurance that 
because of our past friendships and sharing of 
challenge and opportunity that the future will 
bind us even closer to one another. 

Prime Minister Fraser, you are welcome to 
the United States. 



PRIME MINISTER FRASER 

Mr. President, I would like to thank you 
very much indeed for your warmth and for 
your welcome this morning. It is indeed a 
great pleasure to be in Washington again. 

Mr. President, you have recognized and 
stated clearly the need for the democracies to 
consult more closely and work in cooperation, 
one with the other, and to show unity and 
strength of purpose. I think we all have to 
realize the need for increased communication, 
increased cooperation between democracies. 

Confidence in ourselves and the values we 
share and the capacity and strength of free 
people is essential if progress is to be made in 
resolving problems faced by mankind. These 
problems are of urgent and fundamental im- 



132 



Department of State Bulletin 



portance to all of us. We are faced by the 
inability of many countries to escape from 
poverty, growing world concern over the 
availability of energy resources, the denial of 
fundamental freedoms to many people in 
many countries. 

The continued potential for conflict and the 
possibility of nuclear proliferation and arms 
races are problems to which you have just re- 
ferred again. These problems demand greater 
attention — for too long words have been a 
substitute for effective action. We have to 
act, I believe now, with a sense of urgency 
and with a sense of determination. 

Millions of people throughout the world 
want progress in the resolution of these prob- 
lems. This was reflected clearly in the Com- 
monwealth Heads of Government Conference 
which I've just attended in London. 

Mr. President, as a near neighbor to many 
developing countries, as a significant source 
of many important commodities, as a country 
with an unswerving faith in democracy, Aus- 
tralia is determined to play her part in making 
progress toward these ends. 

Mr. President, you have shown that you are 
determined to use the strength and influence 
of the United States to bring about a more se- 
cure and equitable world, a world in which 
poorer nations' economic development has ac- 
celerated, in which deprivation is confronted 
and the pernicious doctrine of one race's 
superiority over another is banished for all 
time. 

There are many obstacles on the way to 
achieving these objectives. It is always the 
case that the more important the goal, the 
greater the barrier to achieving it. But the 
barriers to achieving a better world might 
well be insuperable if the greatest democratic 
power were not playing an active and en- 
lightened international role in leading toward 
a better result. 

Mr. President, therefore, I believe your 
Presidency has excited men's imagination be- 
cause it has appealed to the idealism of free 
people, because it has focused attention and 
concern on issues which have not previously 
attracted the urgent attention that they re- 
quire, and because of the stressful need for 
consultation and cooperation amongst the 



world's democracies. Free men, therefore, 
can have renewed faith in realizing the aspira- 
tions that we share. 

Mr. President, on behalf of my wife and 
myself, the Australian party, may I thank you 
again for the warmth of your welcome. 



U.N. Force in Cyprus Extended 
for Six Months 

Following is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council by U.S. Deputy Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations James 
F. Leonard on June 16, together with the text 
of a resolutio7i adopted by the Council 07i 
June 15. 



STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR LEONARD 

USUN press release 50 dated June 16 

This Council's renewal last night of the 
mandate of UNFICYP [U.N. Peacekeeping 
Force in Cyprus] is an expression of our con- 
cern, of our responsibility, and of our confi- 
dence that the still unsettled situation in Cyp- 
rus can and will be resolved. 

We are encouraged that there was a re- 
sumption this spring of the intercommunal 
negotiations. The Secretary General has 
stated in his most recent report that UN- 
FICYP fulfills a vital and indispensable mis- 
sion in maintaining quiet on the island and 
thereby facilitates the search for a peaceful 
settlement; my government shares that view. 
We do not underestimate the difficulties in 
overcoming the deep differences between the 
parties on the basic elements of a settlement. 
We beheve that the parties must continue to 
explore their requirements for a settlement in 
a serious and sustained manner. Through this 
process steps can be taken toward the perma- 
nent settlement for Cyprus which we all seek. 

The events of the last six months under- 
score the importance of UNFICYP continuing 
its essential mission. We are, therefore, con- 
cerned by the Secretary General's report of 
the growing financial difficulty for the United 
Nations in maintaining UNFICYP. It is dis- 



July 25, 1977 



133 



turbing that the UNFICYP deficit has grown 
to over $54 million. This means that the 
United Nations has been unable to pay the 
reimbursement claims of troop-contributing 
countries beyond the second half of 1973. We 
have consistently expressed our belief that 
the financial burden of UNFICYP must be 
shared by all member states who profess con- 
cern for the realization of an enduring peace 
on Cyprus. The permanent members of the 
Security Council have a special obligation to 
provide financial support to peacekeeping in 
Cyprus. We hope the governments to whom 
the Secretary General has made a special ap- 
peal for their assistance will respond 
generously. 

My government also wishes to commend the 
officers and troop contingents of UNFICYP 
for their continuing excellence in carrying out 
their important mission. We also wish to ex- 
press our deepest appreciation for the efforts 
of the Secretary General and his associates. 
They deserve especially our praise for their 
continuing efforts to help the Cyprus parties 
negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement. 
Finally, may I express the hope of the U.S. 
Government and of the American people that 
the months ahead will see steady progress 
toward a negotiated settlement on Cyprus. 

TEXT OF RESOLUTION i 

The Security Council, 

Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 7 
•June 1977 (S/12342) that in existing circumstances the 
presence of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in 
Cyprus is essential not only to help maintain quiet in 
the island but also to facilitate the continued search for 
a peaceful settlement, 

Noting from the report the conditions prevailing in 
the island. 

Noting also from the report that the freedom of 
movement of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force 
in Cyprus and its civil police is still restricted in the 
north of the island, and expressing the hope that ways 
will be found to surmount the remaining obstacles, 

Noting further that the Secretary-General expressed 
the view that the best hope of achieving a just and last- 
ing settlement of the Cyprus problem lies in negotia- 
tions between the representatives of the two com- 



• U.N. doc. S/RES/410(1977); adopted by the Council 
on June 15 by a vote of 14-0, with China not participat- 
ing in the vote. 



munities and that the usefulness of those negotiations 
depends upon the willingness of all parties concerned to 
show the necessary flexibility, taking into account not 
only their own interests but also the legitimate aspira- 
tions and requirements of the opposing side, 

Noting that due to the efforts of the Secretary- 
General, his staff, and of UNFICYP, and with the co- 
operation of the parties, there has been a relative im- 
provement in the security situation, but that this evolu- 
tion has yet to relieve the underlying tensions in the 
island. 

Noting also the report of the Secretary-General of 30 
April 1977 (S/12323) concerning the high-level meeting 
under the auspices of the Secretary-General, and em- 
phasizing the need to adhere to the agreement reached 
at this meeting as well as to the agreements reached at 
the previous rounds of the talks. 

Noting also the concurrence of the parties concerned 
in the recommendation by the Secretary-General that 
the Security Council extend the stationing of the 
United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a 
further period of six months. 

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed 
that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it 
is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 
June 1977, 

1. Reaffirms the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 
4 March 1964, as well as subsequent resolutions and de- 
cisions on the establishment and maintenance of the 
United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus and 
other aspects of the situation in Cyprus; 

2. Reaffirms once again its resolution 365 (1974) of 13 
December 1974, by which it endorsed General Assembly 
resolution 3212 (XXIX) adopted unanimously on 1 
November 1974, and calls once again for their urgent 
and effective implementation and that of its resolution 
367 (1975) of 12 March 1975; 

3. Urges the parties concerned to act with the utmost 
restraint to refrain from any unilateral or other action 
likely to affect adversely the prospects of negotiations 
for a just and peaceful solution and to continue and ac- 
celerate determined co-operative efforts to achieve the 
objectives of the Security Council; 

4. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of the 
United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established under 
Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further 
period ending 15 December 1977, in the expectation 
that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution 
will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduc- 
tion of the Force; 

5. Appeals again to all parties concerned to extend 
their fullest co-operation so as to enable the United Na- 
tions Peace-keeping Force to perform its duties effec- 
tively; 

6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the mis- 
sion of good offices entrusted to him by paragraph 6 of 
resolution 367 (1975). to keep the Security Council in- 
formed of the progress made and to submit a report on 
the implementation of this resolution by 30 November 
1977. 



134 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE CONGRESS 



Department Discusses Proposal 
To Extend the Authority of OPIC 

Statement by Julius L. Katz 

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ' 

I appreciate this opportunity to testify on 
the Administration's proposal to extend the 
authority of the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC). The Department of State 
fully supports the draft legislation you have 
before you and believes that the changes it 
proposes in OPIC's poHcies and programs will 
strengthen the agency's effectiveness in sup- 
port of U.S. economic development programs 
abroad. 

OPIC was created in 1971 with the objec- 
tive of mobilizing and facilitating the partici- 
pation of U.S. private capital and skills to 
promote the social and economic development 
of less developed, friendly countries. Develop- 
ing countries vary in their economic and social 
goals, and their receptivity to foreign in- 
vestment cannot be taken as a given. How- 
ever, for those countries with a strong com- 
mitment to economic development, we believe 
foreign investment can provide not only capi- 
tal, but also employment opportunities, tech- 
nology, and management skills vital to the 
development process. These inputs are an im- 
portant supplement to the flows of official 
foreign assistance that cannot alone provide 
the external resources developing countries 
require. 

We see OPIC as playing an important role 
in our total development effort abroad. Flows 
of private capital are a crucial element of the 



' Made before the Subcommittee on International 
Economic Policy and Trade of the House Committee on 
International Relations on June 23, 1977. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published by the 
committee and will be available from the Superinten- 
dent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



external development resources required by 
the developing world; according to some esti- 
mates, they provide as much as two-thirds of 
total capital flows to these countries. How- 
ever, as noted by a recent World Bank report, 
the volume of investment flows to the LDC's 
[less developed countries] has been slackening 
in recent years, especially in the critical min- 
erals sector. Through its programs to insure 
against political risk, facilitate project financ- 
ing, and acquaint investors with opportunities 
in the LDC's, OPIC seeks to insure that pri- 
vate capital continues to contribute to the de- 
velopment process. 

The developed countries are able to attract 
adequate investment flows as a result of their 
efficient administrative systems, pools of 
skilled manpower, well-developed capital 
markets, and other advantages. In contrast, 
the LDC's hold out none of these attractions 
for the foreign investor and, moreover, are 
often characterized by frequent political 
changes that deter long-term investment. 
Lack of incentives for foreign investment is 
especially critical in the 40 least advanced of 
the LDC's whose attractions for the foreign 
investor may consist of only unskilled labor 
and other natural resources. 

We believe OPIC political risk insurance 
and other programs contribute significantly to 
correcting this inbalance in incentives be- 
tween the developing and developed worlds. 
There is substantial evidence that the avail- 
ability of political risk insurance is a meaning- 
ful, if not a vital, factor in many investment 
decisions and that such insurance may result 
in investments undertaken that would not 
have otherwise occurred. Apart from this 
question, however, other benefits are realized 
from the availability of investment insurance, 
since it permits investors to lower contingen- 
cies for loss and payback requirements. 

OPIC's record has been good with respect 
to the number of projects assisted in the least 
advanced of the LDC's; the proportion of 
projects in countries with per capita income 
under $450 (in 1973 dollars) rose from 41 per- 
cent in 1974 to 60 percent in 1976. 

Thus, there appear to be solid grounds for 
some further focusing of OPIC's efforts on the 



July 25, 1977 



135 



poorer of the developing countries. This was 
the recommendation of the Administration's 
recent interagency study of OPIC's programs, 
endorsed by the Cabinet-level Economic Pol- 
icy Group. 

I would also like to note that an additional 
proposal endorsed by the Economic Policy 
Group was that OPIC should continue its pro- 
gram to develop innovative forms of invest- 
ment encouragement in the areas of energy 
and raw materials. Given the problems we 
may face in the not too distant future with re- 
spect to supplies of both fuel and nonfuel min- 
erals, we need to support efforts to promote 
the availability and access to these materials. 
The State Department is prepared to cooper- 
ate with OPIC in every possible way to fur- 
ther this objective. 

To conclude my prepared statement, I 
would like to say again that the State De- 
partment views OPIC as an important ele- 
ment of our foreign economic assistance pro- 
grams and that if the Congress enacts the 
legislation the Administration has proposed, 
OPIC will be greatly aided in carrying out its 
unique and useful role. 



Balance-of-Payments Assistance 
for Portugal 

Following is a statement by Paul H. 
Boeker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Eco- 
nomic and Business Affairs, suhynitted to the 
Subcommittee oyi Foreign Operations of the 
House Committee on Appropriations on 
June 9.^ 

I am pleased to be here this morning to ex- 
plain why the Administration is so strongly 
committed to special balance-of-payments as- 
sistance for Portugal. We believe that in Por- 
tugal the United States has an opportunity to 
encourage abroad values and principles that 
are fundamental to American policy and, in- 
deed, our way of life. 

Portugal is making a new democratic begin- 
ning. After almost 50 years of dictatorship 
and political and economic isolation from 



Europe, Portugal has emerged as a new 
democratic nation with dynamic leaders cho- 
sen in free elections and a new constitution. 
President Eanes was elected with 61 percent 
of the popular vote last June and Prime Minis- 
ter Scares' government was formed as a re- 
sult of parliamentary elections in August. The 
government is committed to defending the 
constitution and protecting the human and 
political rights of its citizens. 

Portugal is eager to cooperate with and be 
considered a full member of the Western 
democratic community. The Portuguese are 
orienting their scaled-down military toward 
effective participation in NATO. They have 
recently applied for membership in the Euro- 
pean Economic Community. Portugal has 
worked with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) to develop a program for economic 
recovery. 

The key to success in consolidating Portu- 
gal's young democracy now consists of con- 
fronting the task of rebuilding and stabilizing 
an economy severely disrupted by two years 
of political and economic turmoil. This is not a 
task which the Portuguese can safely meet 
alone, given its unique severity. The two-year 
period following the 1974 revolution left a 
legacy of severe economic problems. 

— During this period there was almost no 
effective economic leadership. 

— Widespread nationalizations and worker 
takeovers of businesses and farms disrupted 
the private sector. 

—Portugal had to absorb and provide 
necessities for over 500,000 refugees from the 
colonies and most of the 100,000 men Portugal 
cut from its armed forces. 

— Marked income redistribution led to a 
surge in consumption and precipitous decline 
in investment. 

— Decolonization meant loss of about one- 
fifth of Portugal's export markets. 

These shocks came at a time when oil-price 
increases and global recession already limited 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



136 



Department of State Bulletin 



opportunities for economic adjustment. As a 
result, unemployment is now about 15 percent, 
inflation is about 30 percent per year, and the 
balance-of-payments deficit was over $900 
million in 1976 and about $1.1 billion in 1975. 
Solving these problems will require several 
years of basic structural adjustments. The 
Portuguese people are prepared for real eco- 
nomic sacrifices. The populace overwhelm- 
ingly supports democratic parties working for 
political and economic stability. Portugal is al- 
ready implementing elements of a comprehen- 
sive recovery program. These include: 

— Important measures to restore labor dis- 
cipline and productivity while limiting pay in- 
creases to 15 percent; 

— A wide-ranging package to improve the 
balance of payments, including a 15-percent 
devaluation of the escudo in February, quotas 
on consumer imports, an import deposit re- 
quirement, higher tariffs, and incentives for 
exports; 

— Incentives and guarantees to stimulate 
the private sector; 

— Increased capital spending and reduced 
subsidies plus other steps designed to shift 
resources from consumption to investment. 

The Portuguese have demonstrated their 
commitment to make effective use of their in- 
ternational reserves. Their liquid foreign ex- 
change reserves, which were $1.6 billion at 
the end of 1973, are currently about $200 mil- 
lion. Over 40 percent of Portugal's still sub- 
stantial gold reserves have already been 
pledged as collateral against foreign loans. 
Additional mobilization of these assets can 
take place only gradually without disrupting 
sensitive markets. 

Despite these efforts Portugal will have 
unmanageable balance-of-payments deficits in 
1977 and 1978. To impose immediately the de- 
gree of austerity needed to eliminate these 
payments deficits would entail severe depres- 
sion of economic activity and grave risk for 
the process of consolidating Portugal's new 
democracy. Prolonged economic adversity 
would open fresh avenues for Communist and 
extreme right elements which oppose the 
government program. Given that Portugal's 



balance-of-payments deficits will persist for 
several years, Portugal needs assurances that 
the sacrifices of its people necessary to carry 
through on reforms to contain these deficits 
will be complemented by a plan to cover the 
remaining deficits and thus provide some 
room for economic growth. For the first part 
of the coming 2-3 year period, implementation 
of this approach will require substantial 
foreign assistance. 

Recognizing this need for an economic un- 
derpinning to Portugal's further progress, the 
United States has taken the lead in mobilizing 
financial support for Portugal's young democ- 
racy. Last year the Portuguese requested 
U.S. help to mobilize the large international 
financial resources they will need through 
1978. We began to consult with other con- 
cerned countries to generate support for a 
major assistance effort. Vice President Mon- 
dale discussed the proposed assistance in 
detail with the Portuguese and with allied 
leaders during his trips to Europe. President 
Carter made personal appeals to other heads 
of state and raised this issue during talks at 
the Downing Street summit. The leading 
edge of this international effort has been the 
proposed $300 million loan we are requesting 
from Congress as the U.S. participation in a 
larger international effort. The Portuguese 
have relied on our initiative, and other coun- 
tries are looking to the United States to pro- 
vide leadership for the assistance effort. 

We estimate that Portugal's uncovered 
balance-of-payments deficit over the next 18 
months will be over $1 billion. The U.S.- 
proposed international lending effort would 
provide most of the financial support needed 
to meet this deficit. This effort would also be 
structured so as to bring Portuguese economic 
progress and collaboration with the IMF to 
the point where the Portuguese balance of 
payments could be financed by conventional 
sources. After 1978 we anticipate that normal 
bilateral and multilateral financial sources, in- 
cluding the IMF, would be adequate to cover 
Portugal's progressively reduced financing 
needs. 

In mid-May the United States convened a 
meeting of 16 countries interested in assisting 



July 25, 1977 



137 



Portugal. Virtually all participants at that 
meeting expressed strong political support for 
Portuguese democracy and the importance of 
balance-of-payments assistance to the success 
of democratic efforts. 

The participants generally agreed that Por- 
tugal's cumulative balance-of-payments 
financing need over the next 18 months would 
somewhat exceed $1 billion and that the major 
portion of this amount would have to come 
from special balance-of-payments loans. The 
U.S. proposal of a coordinated set of bilateral 
loans was broadly endorsed as the best 
framework for proceeding. Participants also 
specified that individual loans within this 
framework should have certain common 
characteristics. Such loans would be: 

— Medium term — that is, 5-10 years; 

— Repayable at nonconcessional rates of 
interest; 

— Untied to specific projects or exports; 
and 

— Without requirements for collateral, rec- 
ognizing that Portugal will need to be able to 
use its own reserves during the coming 
period. 

It was also agreed that disbursements of 
these loans would be conditioned on continued 
Portuguese adherence to an economic pro- 
gram on a schedule worked out in cooperation 
with the IMF. 

During this session the United States 
stated it was seeking from Congress authority 
for a U.S. balance-of-payments loan of $300 
million. We made it clear, however, that we 
could participate only if the total effort were 
substantial and broadly shared. The Federal 
Republic of Germany indicated that under 
those circumstances it too would be willing to 
make a very substantial loan. Norway also in- 
dicated its readiness to participate. Most 
other countries represented indicated that 
they believed the proposed arrangement 
should be supported and that they would rec- 
ommend favorable action by their govern- 
ments. We have called for a second meeting of 
potential participating countries in late June 
to hopefully complete arrangements for coor- 
dinated balance-of-payments loan effort. 

Based on preliminary indicators we believe 



that if the Congress approves the U.S. loan of 
$300 million, a total lending arrangement of 
$700-$900 million can be mobilized. Because of 
the bilateral nature of this lending effort 
there will be no formal or rigid burden-shar- 
ing arrangement. We anticipate, however, 
that the U.S. share will fall between 30 and 40 
percent of the total effort. 

The success of the international assistance 
effort depends fundamentally on the United 
States. The Portuguese and other nations are 
looking to continued U.S. leadership to make 
this important effort succeed. We urge the 
Congress to support this loan and the signifi- 
cant objectives it embodies. 



President Carter's Third Report 
on Cyprus Submitted to Congress 

Message to the Congress ^ 

To the Congress of the United States: 

As required by Public Law 94-104, this re- 
port describes what has occurred during the 
last sixty days toward settlement of the Cyp- 
rus problem and the efforts the Administra- 
tion has made toward that goal. 

In my last report, I promised to work 
closely with the Congress on this problem, 
and to devote whatever effort inight be re- 
quired to bring about a truly just and lasting 
peace in Cyprus. I emphasized as well the im- 
portance of continuing to strengthen the ties 
of friendship and cooperation between the 
United States and Greece and Turkey, our 
two major allies in the eastern Mediterra- 
nean. 

Since my last report on April 15, there have 
been only a few significant developments with 
regard to Cyprus. This pause is to some ex- 
tent a reflection of understandable preoccupa- 
tion of the parties with the Turkish national 
elections of June 5. Even so, talks between 
the two Cyprus communities took place in 



' Transmitted on June 22 (text from Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated June 27, 1977); 
also printed as H. Doc. 95-173. 



138 



Department of State Bulletin 



Nicosia in late May and early June. These dis- 
cussions allowed some clarification of the posi- 
tions presented during the earlier meetings in 
Vienna which had taken place under the 
chairmanship of the United Nations Secretary 
General. The United Nations Security Council 
authorized a further si.x-month extension of 
the mandate of the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Force on Cyprus (UNFICYP) 
on June 15, and we expect that the negotiat- 
ing process will resume at an early date be- 
tween the two Cypriot communities. 

I would add that while I was in London in 
conjunction with the NATO Summit meeting 
in May, I met separately with the Greek and 
Turkish Prime Ministers. Secretary Vance, 
National Security Advisor Brzezinski and the 
Special Representative for eastern Mediter- 
ranean matters, Clark Clifford, were also 
present. I used the opportunity for a brief 
discussion of the Cyprus problem as well as a 
review of other elements of our relationship 
with these two valued NATO allies. Mr. Clif- 
ford also had separate discussions with both 
Prime Minister Caramanlis and Prime Minis- 
ter Demirel. I believe both governments now 
appreciate the depth of our interest and de- 
termination to assist in achieving a lasting 
Cyprus settlement. 

We intend to work actively during the 
summer months and into the fall toward this 
end. I would hope it will soon be possible in 
these periodic reports to Congress to record 
real progress toward the just and lasting 
Cyprus settlement which the United States 
seeks. 

Jimmy Carter. 

The White House, June 22, 1977. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

Import Relief for the U.S. Color Television Industry. 
Communication from the President of the United 
States transmitting a report on the action he is taking 
with respect to color television receivers covered by 
the determination of the U.S. International Trade 
Commission. H. Doe. 9.5-163. May 23, 1977. 4 pp. 

Governing International Fishery Agreement With Ja- 



pan. Message from the President of the United States 
transmitting the agreement. H. Doc. 95-168. June 2, 
1977. 12 pp. 

Departments "of State, Justice, and Commerce, the 
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 
Fiscal Year 1978. Report of the House Committee on 
Appropriations to accompanv H.R. 7.5.56. H. Rept. 
9.5-382. June 2, 1977. 64 pp. 

Further extension of United States-Romanian Trade 
Agreement. Message from the President of the 
United States. H. Doc. 9.5-169. June 3, 1977. 2 pp. 

Foreign Assistance and Related Pi'ograms Appropria- 
tion Bill, 1978. Report of the House Committee on 
Appropriations, together with dissenting, additional, 
and minority views, to acompany H.R. 7797. H. Rept. 
95-417. June 15, 1977. 96 pp. 

Belgrade Preparatory Conference for Review of the 
Helsinki Agreement. Repoi-t of the Senate Commit- 
tee on Foreign Relations to accompanv S. Con. Res. 
30. S. Rept. 95-275. June 16, 1977. 4 pp. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Antarctica 

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the 
principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty. 
Adopted at Oslo June 30, 1975.' 
Notification of approval: New Zealand, June 30, 
1977. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft. Done at the Hague December 16, 1970. En- 
tered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192. 
Accession deposited: Zaire, July 6, 1977. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against 
the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal Sep- 
tember 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973. 
TIAS 7570. 
Accession deposited: Zaire, July 6, 1977. 

Amendments of annexes of the 1956 agreements on 
joint financing of certain air navigation services in 
Greenland and the Faeroe Islands and in Iceland 
(TIAS 4048, 4049). Adopted by the ICAO [Interna- 
tional Civil Aviation Organization] Council at Mon- 
treal June 8, 1977. Entered into force June 8, 1977. 

Economic Cooperation 

Agreement establishing a financial support fund of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and De- 



Not in force. 



July 25, 1977 



139 



velopment. Done at Paris April 9, 1975.' 
Ratifications deposited: Italy, July 1, 1977; Nether- 
lands, June 27, 1977. 

Inter-American Development Bank 

Agreement establishing the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank, with annexes. Done at Washington April 
8, 1959. Entered into force December 30, 1959. TIAS 
4397. 

Signature and acceptance deposited: Italy, May 26, 
1977. 

Telecommunications 

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, 
as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332), relating to 
maritime mobile service, with annexes and final pro- 
tocol. Done at Geneva November 3, 1967. Entered 
into force April 1, 1969. TIAS 6.590. 
Notification of approval: Norway, April 5, 1977. 

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, 
as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590), on space 
telecommunications, with annexes. Done at Geneva 
July 17, 1971. Entered into force January 1, 1973. 
TIAS 7435. 
Notification of approiml: Norway, April 5, 1977. 

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final pro- 
tocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into 
force September 1, 1974; for the United States April 
21, 1976. TIAS 8586. 
Notification of approval: Mexico, April 19, 1977. 

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and 
final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. En- 
tered into force September 1, 1974; for the United 
States April 21, 1976. TIAS 8586. 
Notification of approval: Mexico, April 19, 1977. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 
1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect 
to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect 
to other provisions. 

Accession deposited: France, June 30, 1977. 
Ratification deposited: Portugal, June 30, 1977. 

Pi-otocol modifying and further extending the food aid 
convention (part of the international wheat agree- 
ment) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 1976. En- 



Not in force. 



tered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain 

provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other 

provisions. 

Accession deposited: France, June 30, 1977. 



BILATERAL 

Belgium 

Agreement renewing and amending the memorandum of 
understanding of October 17, 1972 (TIAS 7479), on 
the regulation of passenger charter air services. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Brussels June 23 and 
27, 1977. Entered into force June 27, 1977; effective 
July 1, 1977. 

China 

Agreement relating to the export of nonrubber foot- 
wear from the Republic of China, with annexes, 
agreed minutes, and related notes. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington June 14, 1977. En- 
tered into force June 14, 1977; effective June 28, 
1977. 

Japan 

Agreement relating to export of color television receiv- 
ers from Japan, with annexes, agreed minutes, and 
related notes. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington May 20, 1977. Entered into force May 20, 1977; 
effective July 1, 1977. 

Korea 

Agreement relating to export of nonrubber footwear 
from the Republic of Korea, with annexes, agreed 
minutes, and related notes. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington June 21, 1977. Entered into 
force June 21, 1977; effective June 28, 1977. 

Norway 

Extradition treaty. Signed at Oslo June 9, 1977. Enters 
into force on the date of exchange of instruments of 
ratification. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement relating to the establishment, operation, 
and maintenance of a tracking and telemetry facility 
on the island of Mahe, with agreed minute. Effected 
by exchange of notes at London December 30, 1966. 
Entered into force December 30, 1966. TIAS 6197. 
Terminated: June 29, 1976. 



140 



Department of State Bulletin 



IDEX July 25, 1977 Vol. LXXVII, No. 1987 



Algeria. Letters of Credence (Maoui) 120 

Australia. Prime Minister Eraser of Australia Vis- 
its Wasiiington (Carter, Eraser) 132 

China. Secretary Interviewed at Foreign Policy Con- 
ference for Editors and Broadcasters 121 

Colombia. Letters of Credence (Barco) 120 

gngress 

lalance-of-Payments Assistance for Portugal 

l(Boeker) 136 

longressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

, Policy 139 

(department Discusses Proposal to Extend Author- 

" ity of OPIC (Katz) 135 

I President Carter's Third Report on Cyprus Sub- 

; mitted to Congress (message) 138 

luba. Secretary Interviewed at Foreign Policy Con- 

S ference for Editors and Broadcasters 121 

fyprus 

president Carter's Third Report on Cyprus Sub- 
mitted to Congress (message) 138 

I U.N. Force in Cyprus Extended for Six Months 

(Leonard, text of resolution) 133 

eveloping Countries. Secretary Vance Attends 
Ministerial Conference of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (Vance, 
Blumenthal, texts of communique and declara- 
tion) 105 

Sconomic Affairs 

Jalance-of-Payments Assistance for Portugal 

(Boeker) 136 

department Discusses Proposal to Extend Author- 

' ity of OPIC (Katz) 135 

"he Role of Investment in Expanding an Open In- 
ternational Economic System (Cooper) 127 

Secretary Vance Attends Ministerial Conference of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (Vance, Blumenthal, texts of com- 
munique and declaration) 105 

Human Rights 

The Role of Investment in Expanding an Open In- 
ternational Economic System (Cooper) 127 

ecretary Interviewed at Foreign Policy Conference 
for Editors and Broadcasters 121 

Industrial Democracies. Secretary Vance Attends 
Ministerial Conference of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (Vance, 
Blumenthal, texts of communique and declara- 
tion) 105 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

Secretary Vance Attends Ministerial Conference 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (Vance, Blumenthal, texts of 
communique and declaration) 105 

Korea. Secretary Interviewed at Foreign Policy Con- 
ference for Editors and Broadcasters 121 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

The Role of Investment in Expanding an Open In- 
ternational Economic System (Cooper) 127 

Secretary Interviewed at Foreign Policy Conference 
for Editors and Broadcasters 121 

Middle East. Secretary Interviewed at Foreign Pol- 
icy Conference for Editors and Broadcasters 121 

Morocco. Letters of Credence (Bengelloun) 120 

Portugal. Balance-of-Payments Assistance for 
Portugal (Boeker) 136 



Presidential Documents 

President Carter's Third Report on Cyprus Sub- 
mitted to Congress (message) 138 

Prime Minister Eraser of Australia Visits Washing- 
ton 132 

South Africa. Secretary Interviewed at Foreign Pol- 
icy Conference for Editors and Broadcasters 121 

Treaty Information. Current Actions 139 

United Nations. U.N. Force in Cyprus Extended 
for Six Months (Leonard, text of resolution) .... 133 

Vietnam. Secretary Interviewed at Foreign PoUcy 
Conference for Editors and Broadcasters 121 

Name Index 

Barco, Virgilio 120 

Bengelloun, Ali 120 

Blumenthal, W. Michael 105 

Boeker, Paul H 136 

Carter, President 132, 138 

Cooper, Richard N 127 

Fraser, J. Malcolm 132 

Katz, Julius L 135 

Leonard, James F 133 

Maoui, Abdelaziz 120 

Vance, Secretary 105, 121 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 4-10 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

t318 7/6 "Foreign Relations," 1949, vol. VI, 
"The Near East, South Asia, and 
Africa" released. 

*319 7/6 Richard M. Moose sworn in as Assist- 
ant Secretary for African Affairs 
(biographic data). 

*320 7/6 Patrick J. Lucey sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Mexico (biographic data). 

*321 7/7 Program of the visit of Chancellor 
Schmidt of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, July 13-15. 

*322 7/7 U.S., India amend textile agreement, 
June 13 and 17. 

*323 7/8 U.S., Mexico amend textile agree- 
ment. May 24. 

1324 7/8 U.S., U.S.S.R. renew Agreement on 
Cooperation in Science and Tech- 
nology. 

*325 7/8 Herman J. Cohen sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Senegal and The Gambia 
(biographic data). 

*326 7/8 Study Group 8 of the U.S. National 
Committee for the International 
Radio Consultative Committee 
(CCIR), Aug. 4. 

*327 7/8 Study Group 1 of the U.S. National 
Committee for the CCIR, Aug. 
9-10. 



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXVII • No. 1988 • August 1, 1977 



AMERICA'S ROLE IN CONSOLIDATING A PEACEFUL BALANCE 
AND PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH IN ASIA 

Address by Secretary Vance 1^.1 

PRESIDENT CARTER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JUNE 30 
Excerpts From Transcript H6 

CONTROLLING ARMS TRANSFERS: AN INSTRUMENT 
OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 

Address by Under Secretary Benson 155 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

uoston Public Ubmry 

t or index see inside back cover, ■ ^ , , .^ 

Superintendent of Document.' 



AUG i 6 1377 



U»t.i-Woi H^'KK 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The 
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 



Vol. LXXVII, No. 1988 
August 1, 1977 

The Department or State BLLLETIS, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of L'.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIS includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, and 
news conferences of the President and 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as spe- 
cial articles on various phases of in- 
ternational affairs and the functions of 
the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and on treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United \ations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



America's Role in Consolidating a Peaceful Balance 
and Promoting Economic Growth in Asia 

Address by Secretary Vance ^ 



It is a great honor to be with you tonight. 
For 20 years the Asia Society has been build- 
ing bridges of understanding between Asians 
and Americans. Much of the credit belongs to 
the Society's founder, John D. Rockefeller 
III. His interest in the cultures of Asia is en- 
during; his concern for Asian-American rela- 
tions is profound; the contributions of the So- 
ciety which he created are legion. 

This evening I want to talk to you about 
America's role in Asia — an Asia that is at last 
at peace, but an Asia not without its 
uncertainties. 

I should like to advance the basic proposi- 
tion that our prospects for sustaining and de- 
veloping effective relationships with the coun- 
tries of East Asia are more promising than at 
any time since World War II. The fundamen- 
tal challenges facing the Administration are to 
consolidate the positive developments of the 
past few years — the emergence of an even 
closer partnership with Japan, a promising 
"opening" with China, the growing prospei-ity 
of the Pacific Basin economy, the emerging 
cohesion of the ASEAN [Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations] grouping — and to 
prevent or mitigate adverse trends which 
could strain the presently favorable regional 
environment. High stakes hang on our ability 
to meet this challenge, for our interests in 
Asia are enduring, and they are substantial. 

I hope to leave you with these understand- 
ings: 

— First, the United States is and will re- 
main an Asian and Pacific power. 
— Second, the United States will continue 



August 1, 1977 



its key role in contributing to peace and stabil- 
ity in Asia and the Pacific. 

— Third, the United States seeks normal 
and friendly relations with the countries in 
the area on the basis of reciprocity and mutual 
respect. 

— Fourth, the United States will pursue 
mutual expansion of trade and investment 
across the Pacific, recognizing the growing 
interdependence of the economies of the 
United States and the region. 

— Fifth, we will use our influence to im- 
prove the human condition of the peoples of 
Asia. 

In all of this, there can be no doubt of the 
enduring vitality of our country's relation- 
ships with the peoples of Asia and the Paciilc. 

To the people of Asia I say tonight without 
qualification that our nation has recovered its 
self-confidence at home. And we have not 
abandoned our interest in Asia. 

We are and will remain a Pacific nation, by 
virtue of our geography, our history, our 
commerce, and our interests. Roughly one- 
quarter of all our trade is now with East Asia 
and the Pacific; last year we sold $22 billion 
worth of our products in the region. For the 
last five years more of our trade has been with 
that region than with any other, including the 
European Community. 

To be able to speak of peace and stability in 
Asia is a welcome change. But serious prob- 
lems persist. Our tasks are to help consolidate^ 



' Made before the Asia Society at New York, N.Y., 
on June 29, 1977 (te.xt from press release 313). 



141 



the emerging peaceful balance in Asia and to 
promote economic growth that offers promise 
to its peoples. 

The United States will pursue its relations 
with the nations of Asia with an open mind. 
We will continue to work closely with allies 
and friends. And we hope to normalize rela- 
tions on a mutually constructive basis with 
those who have been adversaries. 

The United States recognizes the impor- 
tance of its continuing contribution to Asian 
security. We will maintain a strong military 
presence in the area. 

Japan 

Of our allies and old friends, none is more 
important than Japan. Our mutual security 
treaty is a cornerstone of peace in East Asia. 
Japan's democratic institutions are firmly 
rooted. No people anywhere enjoy greater 
political freedom. Its dedication to peace is 
unquestioned. Twenty-five years ago, even 
though Japan had recovered from the devasta- 
tion of war, its economic advance was just be- 
ginning. Today Japan's per capita gross na- 
tional product is almost $5,000. In 1953 it was 
only about $700 in current value, less than 
that in many developing countries today. 

Japan's growth has been an indispensable 
ingredient in the economic advance of the less 
developed countries in the region. Its aid has 
been important in contributing to the well- 
being of these countries; we welcome its com- 
mitment to double its assistance within the 
next five years. 

Japan's great achievements have brought 
with them corresponding responsibilities. Its 
actions, like ours, are bound to have an impact 
far beyond its own borders. An enlarged 
Japanese market for the manufactured prod- 
ucts of other countries would make an impor- 
tant contribution to a healthier world eco- 
nomic equilibrium, as would high rates of ex- 
pansion in order to stimulate the economies of 
other countries. 

The United States and Japan must proceed 
in close consultation. Above all, we must set- 
tle any issue between us in a spirit of true 
friendship and understanding. 



People's Republic of China 

Turning to China, after 25 years of confron- 
tation, we are carrying on a constructive 
dialogue with the People's Republic of China. 

Vast differences in culture, social systems, 
ideology, and foreign policy still separate our 
two countries. But the Chinese and American 
people no longer face each other with the hos- 
tility, misunderstanding, and virtually com- 
plete separation that existed for two decades. 

We consider friendly relations with China to 
be a central part of our foreign policy. China's 
role in maintaining world peace is vital. A 
constructive relationship with China is impor- 
tant, not only regionally, but also for global 
equilibrium. Such a relationship will threaten 
no one. It will serve only peace. 

The involvement of a fourth of mankind in 
the search for the solution of global issues is 
important. 

In structuring our relationship with the 
Chinese, we will not enter into any agree- 
ments with others that are directed against 
the People's Republic of China. We recognize 
and respect China's strong commitments to 
independence, unity, and self-reliance. 

Our policy toward China will continue to be 
guided by the principles of the Shanghai com- 
munique, and on that basis we shall seek to 
move toward full normalization of relations. 
We acknowledge the view expressed in the 
Shanghai communique that there is but one 
China. We also place importance on the peace- 
ful settlement of the Taiwan question by the 
Chinese themselves. 

In seven weeks, I shall be in Peking to talk 
with the leaders of China. A broad range of 
world issues demands our attention. And we 
want to explore ways to normalize further our 
bilateral relationship with the People's Repub- 
lic of China. Mutual and reciprocal efforts in 
this regard are essential. 

As we prepare to go to Peking, we recog- 
nize that progress may not be easy or im- 
mediately evident. But this Administration is 
committed to the process, and we are ap- 
proaching the talks in Peking with that in 
mind. 

Across Asia we have close and historic ties 



142 



Department of State Bulletin 



with many other nations, and we intend to 
seek new ways to strengthen them. 

Republic of Korea 

The Republic of Korea has made good use of 
the opportunities provided by peace on the 
peninsula to become increasingly self-reliant 
and self-sufficient. The standard of living of 
its people has improved significantly over the 
past decade; its trade has grown enormously; 
its agriculture has been revolutionized. 

Our security commitment to the Republic of 
Korea and our determination to maintain it 
are essential to the preservation of peace in 
Northeast Asia. 

South Korea's growth and strength are the 
basis for President Carter's decision to pro- 
ceed with a carefully phased withdrawal of 
American ground troops. This will be done in 
a way that will not endanger the security of 
South Korea. We will also seek, with the con- 
currence of the Congress, to strengthen South 
Korea's defense capabilities. Furthermore: 

— Our ground troops constitute only about 5 
percent of the total ground troops committed 
to the defense of South Korea. 

— The gradual withdrawal of these troops 
over four to five years will be offset by the 
growing strength and self-confidence of the 
South Korean armed forces. 

— Our air, naval, and other supporting ele- 
ments will remain. 

— We are working closely with the Koreans 
to help them increase their own defense 
capabilities. 

The United States and the Republic of 
Korea share a strong desire to establish a 
durable framework for maintaining peace and 
stability on the peninsula. 

— We support the entry of North and South 
Korea into the United Nations without preju- 
dice to ultimate reunification. 

— We are prepared to move toward im- 
proved relations with North Korea provided 
North Korea's allies take steps to improve re- 
lations with South Korea. 

— We have proposed negotiations to replace 



the existing armistice with more permanent 
arrangements. 

— We have offered to meet for this purpose 
with South and North Korea and the People's 
Republic of China, as the parties most im- 
mediately concerned, and to explore with 
them the possibilities for a larger conference 
with Korea's other neighbors, including the 
Soviet Union. We will enter any negotiations 
over the future of the peninsula only with the 
participation of the Republic of Korea. 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

Ten years ago, even while war raged in In- 
dochina, five Southeast Asian countries 
created a new instrument for peace — the As- 
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations, or 
ASEAN. Our ties with one of its members, 
the Philippines, are rooted in our shared his- 
tory. The strength of these ties is reinforced 
by our mutual defense treaty. Each of 
ASEAN's other four members — Thailand, In- 
donesia, Malaysia, and Singapore — is an old 
and valued friend. 

Our economic ties with the ASEAN coun- 
tries have become increasingly important. 
From the ASEAN area we obtain one-tenth of 
our crude oil imports and a much higher per- 
centage of our rubber, tin, cocoa, bauxite, and 
other important raw materials. These five 
countries, with a population larger than all of 
South America, bought $3.7 billion worth of 
American goods in 1976. 

We will maintain close bilateral relations 
with each ASEAN country. And we welcome 
the opportunity to deal with them through 
their organization when this is their wish. We 
are especially pleased that the first formal 
U.S. -ASEAN consultation will be held within 
a very few months, in Manila. These talks 
will, we hope, form the basis for stronger 
American support of Southeast Asian regional 
efforts. 

Australia and New Zealand 

Close relations between the United States, 
Australia, and New Zealand long antedate our 
formal alliance in ANZUS [security treaty 



August 1, 1977 



143 



among Australia, New Zealand, and the 
United States]. Only last week, the President 
welcomed Australian Prime Minister Malcolm 
Fraser to Washington. In their wide-ranging 
talks, particular attention was paid to the 
Asian region. The contribution Australia and 
New Zealand make to the region is vital, and 
we will consult closely with them on all mat- 
ters of common interest. 

Socialist Republic of Vietnam 

While we work with traditional friends, we 
have begun the process of normalizing rela- 
tions with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
Our old friends in Southeast Asia and the 
Pacific have been kept fully informed of our 
talks with the Vietnamese. They agree that 
the interests of all would be served by the es- 
tablishment of normal relations between Viet- 
nam and the United States. 

The scars of war still exist on both sides. 
Both sides retain a residue of bitterness that 
must be overcome. But there is some 
progress. 

— Together with the Vietnamese, we have 
devised a system for identifying and returning 
the remains of Americans missing in action in 
Vietnam. Soon the remains of 20 more Ameri- 
can pilots will be returned from the land 
where they died — some as long as a decade 
ago — to the land they served so honorably and 
so well. 

— We have lifted restrictions on travel to 
Vietnam and taken other positive steps to as- 
sist in the process of reconciliation. 

— We have offered to lift the trade embargo 
as we establish diplomatic relations. 

— And we will no longer oppose Vietnam's 
membership in the United Nations. I expect 
to see its delegation seated there at the next 
General Assembly session. 

These steps make clear that we seek to 
move forward in building a new relationship. 
Remembering the lessons of the past, neither 
side should be obsessed by them or draw the 
wrong conclusions. We cannot accept an in- 
terpretation of the past that imposes un- 
founded obligations on us. 

Meanwhile, a new flow of Indochinese refu- 
gees commands the world's urgent humanitar- 



ian concern. Their numbers are growing at a 
rate of 1,500 a month. A few countries — 
including Thailand, France, Canada, Austra- 
lia, and most recently Israel — have done much 
to help these unfortunate people. Some na- 
tions, however, have turned their backs, leav- 
ing an increasing number of refugees to perish 
by drowning or disease. I urge that shelter 
and aid be offered to these refugees, until 
more permanent resettlement can be 
arranged. 

Today, as we look across the vast Pacific, 
we see the web of relationships that links us 
together. In Korea, we see the obvious in- 
teraction of the interests of the Koreans, the 
Chinese, the Japanese, the Soviets, and our- 
selves. Elsewhere, the web is even more in- 
tricate and complex. 

Economic Progress and Problems 

Peace has freed the United States and Asia 
to focus attention on economic growth, which 
has been such a striking fact about modern 
Asia. 

Japan's economic miracle is well known, but 
the remarkable economic record of other 
countries in Asia has received less attention. 
Over the past five years, for example, the 
economy of the Republic of Korea expanded 
by 11 percent; the economies of Singapore, 
Indonesia, and Malaysia by roughly 8 percent; 
the economy of the Philippines by almost 7 
percent. 

Continuation of these gains cannot be taken 
for granted. We must adopt policies to insure 
that economic progress is not reversed and 
that the benefits are more widely spread. 

President Carter's pledges at the London 
summit [May 7-8] are as relevant to Asia as 
they are to other parts of the world. 

— We will continue to fight inflation. 

— We will continue to seek ways of develop- 
ing new energy resources and to insure stable 
and equitable fuel prices. 

— We will resist protectionist trends and 
support a liberal trading system. 

— We will support the establishment of 
price-stabilizing commodity agreements and 
buffer stocks for selected commodities, fi- 



144 



Department of State Bulletin 



nanced by producers and consumers and sup- 
ported by a common fund. 

In addition, our policies in Asia will be tail- 
ored to the economic problems and opportuni- 
ties of the region. The role of the Asian De- 
velopment Bank is of particular importance. 

Human Needs and Rights 

In the field of development, the United 
States has recently taken the lead in calling 
for a concerted international effort to act on 
an agenda of basic human needs. 

In Asia and elsewhere in the developing 
world, our human needs agenda must include 
the following essential elements which I out- 
lined last week at the OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development] 
ministerial meeting in Paris: 

— Development of the Third World's rural 
areas where the great majority of the poorest 
people live; 

— An integrated strategy for increased food 
production and better nutrition in these areas; 

— An emphasis on preventive medicine, 
family planning, and prenatal care at minimal 
cost; 

— Expanded programs of primary and sec- 
ondary education and on-the-job technical 
training; and 

— Renewed efforts to involve women in the 
process of development. 

To all of these efforts the United States 
pledges its strong support. But in many coun- 
tries rapid population growth poses a threat 
to economic development. While pressures of 
population on the land are already threatening 
East Asia's natural environment, some East 
Asian countries will double their 1970 popula- 
tion by the end of the century. I believe the 
United States must help countries coping with 
these difficult problems. 

We must be equally concerned with other 
aspects of human rights — the right to live 
under a rule of law that protects against cruel, 
arbitrary, and degrading treatment; to par- 
ticipate in govei-nment and its decisions; to 



voice opinions freely; to seek peaceful change. 

We understand cultural differences. Our 
tradition stresses the individual's rights and 
welfare; some Asian traditions stress the 
rights and welfare of the group. We applaud 
the determination of Asian countries to pre- 
serve the ability, won at great cost, to deter- 
mine their own policies and establish their 
own institutions. 

But we believe strongly that there are new 
and greater opportunities for improving the 
human condition in the Asia I have described 
today — a continent at peace, the home of 
gifted and capable people secure in their na- 
tional independence. 

With vigilance and determination, with 
friendship and understanding, we encourage 
our Asian friends to grasp their opportunities 
to promote the human rights of their peoples. 

To do so will not weaken any nation. On the 
contrary, strength of a deeper sort — the 
strength that comes from the full participation 
of all the people — will be the long-term result 
of dedication to the improvement of the 
human condition. 

Those countries in Asia which have already 
embarked on this course will be the stronger 
for it, and we shall be able to work more 
closely with them. 

I began tonight by speaking of the welcome 
promise of peace, and of peaceful change, that 
is taking hold across the region. I want to 
close by stressing my deep hope for a new 
sense of community in Asia and the Pacific. 
We seek: 

— To build on our relationships of mutual 
respect; 

^To consolidate the fragile stability al- 
ready achieved; 

— To bring greater freedom and greater re- 
spect for human rights; and 

— To erase the divisions that persist. 

Toward this I pledge the best efforts of the 
Administration; for this I ask the support of 
our friends in Asia and of the American 
people. 



August 1, 1977 



145 



President Carter's News Conference of June 30 



Follotving is the text of the opening state- 
ment and excerpts relating to foreign policy 
from the transcript of a news conference held 
by President CaHer on June SO. ^ 



OPENING STATEMENT 

This has been one of the most difficult deci- 
sions that I have made since I've been in of- 
fice. During the last few months, I've done my 
best to assess all the factors involving produc- 
tion of the B-1 bomber. My decision is that we 
should not continue with deployment of the 
B-1, and I am directing that we discontinue 
plans for production of this weapons system. 
The Secretary of Defense [Harold Brown] 
agrees that this is a preferable decision, and 
he will have a news conference tomorrow 
morning to discuss this issue in whatever de- 
tail you consider necessary. 

The existing testing and development pro- 
gram now underway on the B-1 should con- 
tinue to provide us with the needed technical 
base in the unlikely event that more cost- 
effective alternative systems should run into 
difficulty. Continued efforts at the research 
and development stage will give us better an- 
swers about the cost and effectiveness of the 
bomber and support systems, including elec- 
tronic countermeasures techniques. 

During the coming months, we will also be 
able to assess the progress toward agree- 
ments on strategic arms limitations in order to 
determine the need for any additional invest- 
ments in nuclear weapons delivery systems. 
In the meantime, we should begin deployment 
of cruise missiles using air-launched plat- 
forms, such as our B-52's, modernized as 



' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated July 4, 1977, p. 
951. 



necessary. Our "triad" concept of retaining 
three basic delivery systems will be continued 
with submarine-launched ballistic missiles, in- 
tercontinental ballistic missiles, and a bomber 
fleet, including cruise missiles as one of its 
armaments. We will continue thereby to have 
an effective and flexible strategic force whose 
capability is fully sufficient for our national 
defense. 
Thank you. 



QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Q. Mr. President, the House, at least, 
seems bent on providing the money for the 
B-1. Does this put you on a collision course 
with them on the whole subject? 

The President: No, I think not. The Con- 
gress took action last year to delay a final de- 
cision on the B-1 bomber pending my ability 
to analyze its needs. 

When I came into office, I tried deliberately 
to have an open mind. And I've spent weeks 
studying all the aspects of our strategic de- 
fense forces. I've met with congressional 
leaders. I've spent a great deal of time with 
the Secretary of Defense and others in trying 
to understand all the ramifications of this very 
important decision. 

The leaders in the House and Senate this 
morning have been informed of my decision, 
both by Frank Moore [Assistant to the Presi- 
dent for Congressional Liaison] and by the 
Secretary of Defense. 

My belief is that the Congress will be sup- 
portive, knowing that our previous requests 
for limited production funds were based on a 
previous decision. But my decision is that this 
production is not now necessary. And I be- 
lieve that the House and the Senate will con- 
firm my decision. 



146 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. Mr. President, in view of the grotving 
difficulties between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, are there any early prospects in 
the corning months for a meeting with 
Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, Chairman of 
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and 
General Secretary of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], 
between yourself and Brezhnev, and is August 
in Alaska — does that have any validity? 

The President: I don't agree that there are 
growing difficulties between ourselves and 
the Soviet Union. The technical discussions on 
SALT questions, comprehensive test ban, 
demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, a reduc- 
tion in the sales of conventional weapons to 
developing nations of the world have been 
proceeding with very good attitudes on the 
part of the Soviets and, of course, Os. So I 
don't believe that the relations between us are 
deteriorating. 

I think that my own relationship with Mr. 
Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders should be 
one of continuing consultations, not just to 
ratify final agreements, but to get to know 
one another. And I would welcome a chance 
this year to meet with President Brezhnev, to 
explore the ability of our countries to reach 
quicker decisions. But it would not be based 
on any deep concern about relations now, nor 
any frustration about what's gone on before. 

The time or date or place would still have to 
be worked out, and it would be inappropriate, 
I think, to try to presume what those deci- 
sions might be on specifics until we determine 
accurately the attitude of the Soviet leaders. 

Q. May I say that — 

The President: Please do. 

Q. — you, yotirself, have expressed surprise 
at the reaction of the Soviets to your human 
rights drive, and Brezhnev has told Giscard 
[Valery Giscard d'Estaing, of France], that 
there are difficulties. So I don't think it's 
exactly — I mean there is an atmosphere. 

The President: There are difficulties, ob- 
viously, in reaching final decisions on matters 
that are very controversial, very difficult, and 
which never have been successfully concluded. 
We've never tried as a nation to have a com- 



prehensive test ban to eliminate all tests of all 
nuclear devices, both peaceful and military. 
We've never tried to open up the discussions 
of demilitarizing the Indian Ocean, first freez- 
ing the present circumstances, then reducing 
our military presence there. We've never 
tried for a sharp reduction in the deployment 
of nuclear weapons. 

So these new ideas obviously take more 
time to conclude. But I don't have any sense 
of fear or frustration or concern about our re- 
lationships with the Soviet Union. We have, I 
think, a good prospect of continuing our dis- 
cussions, and I have every hope that those 
discussions will lead to success. 

Q. Mr. President, what were the major fac- 
tors that led to your decision against the B-1 
bomber? 

The President: There are a number of fac- 
tors. One is obviously the recent evolution of 
the cruise missile as an effective weapon it- 
self. The tests of this system have been very 
successful so far. 

Another one, of course, is the continued 
ability to use the B-52 bombers, particularly 
the G's and H's, up well into the 1980's, and 
the belief on my part that our defense capabil- 
ity using the submarine-launched missiles and 
intercontinental ballistic missiles combined 
with the B-52 cruise missile combination is 
adequate. 

We will also explore the possibility of cruise 
missile carriers, perhaps using existing 
airplanes or others as a standoff launching 
base. 

But I think, in toto, the B-1, a very expen- 
sive weapons system basically conceived in 
the absence of the cruise missile factor, is not 
necessary. Those are the major reasons. 

Marilyn [Marilyn Berger, NBC News]. 

Q. Mr. President, the Soviet Union has 
shoivn great concern about the cniise missile 
capability of the United States. 

The President: Yes. 

Q. What limits are you ready to accept, if 
any, 0)i air-launched cruise missiles so far as 
their range, and secondly, are you willing to 
accept the proposition that an airplane carry- 
ing cruise would be counted as a MIRV [mul- 



August 1, 1977 



147 



tiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle] 
under the limits that you would set in a SALT 
agreement? 

The President: Those questions are being 
negotiated now. We have a fairly compatible 
position with the Soviets on maximum range 
of air-launched cruise missiles carried over 
from the Vladivostok discussions. I don't 
think there's any particular difference in that. 
It's an adequate range in my opinion for the 
cruise missiles to be launched as a standoff 
weapon without the carrying airplane having 
to encroach into Soviet territory. This, 
though, is a matter that has not yet been fi- 
nally resolved. 

Also, the definition of what is a MIRV'ed 
weapon is one that is still in dispute. We don't 
believe that a bomber equipped with cruise 
missiles as a weapon ought to be classified as 
a MIRV'ed weapon. But depending upon the 
Soviets' attitude in reaching an overall com- 
prehensive settlement, those matters are still 
open for discussion. 

Q. Mr. President, is this decision on your 
part not to go ahead with the B-1 intended as 
any kind of a signal to the Soviets that you 
are willing to — that you want to do something 
quickly in the strategic arms talks? 

The President: I can't deny that that's a po- 
tential factor. But that has not been a reason 
for my decision. I think if I had looked upon 
the B-1 as simply a bargaining chip for the 
Soviets, then my decision would have been to 
go ahead with the weapon. But I made my de- 
cision on my analysis that, within a given 
budgetary limit for the defense of our coun- 
try, which I am sure will always be adequate, 
that we should have the optimum capability to 
defend ourselves. 

But this is a matter that's of very great im- 
portance, and if at the end of a few years the 
relations with the Soviets should deteriorate 
drastically, which I don't anticipate, then it 
may be necessary for me to change my mind. 
But I don't expect that to occur. 

Mr. Sperling [Godfrey Sperling, Christian 
Science Monitor]. 



Q. Mr. President, is this emphasis on 
human rights now central to your foreign 
policy? 

The President: Yes. My emphasis on human 
rights is central to our foreign policy. As I've 
said since my first press conference, I see no 
relationship between the human rights deci- 
sion, however, and matters affecting our de- 
fense or SALT negotiations [Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks]. And I have doubts, based 
on analyses in our own country and from those 
who know the Soviet system very well in 
other countries, that there's any connection 
between the two in the minds of the Soviets. 

Q. To follow there, has this emphasis helped 
or hurt those in the Soviet Union whose lights 
were being impaired? 

The President: It's hard for me to say. I 
think that in the long run our emphasis on 
human rights, the high publicity that has ac- 
crued to the human rights question because of 
the Helsinki agreement and the upcoming 
Belgrade conference in October — those two 
factors, combined, I think, dramatize every 
violation of human rights that is known. 

And my guess is that the Soviets, like our- 
selves, want to put a good image forward for 
the world to observe, and I think in the long 
run that this emphasis on human rights will be 
beneficial to those who desire free speech and 
an enhancement of their own human 
freedoms. 

Q. Mr. President, Senator Javits says you 
are pushing Israel too far. And other Ameri- 
cans sympathetic to the Israeli position say 
worse, that you are perhaps selling Israel 
down the river. My question is, first, do you 
think you are, and secondly, how difficult 
will it be for you to continue your policy if the 
American Jewish community sides with Mr. 
Begin instead of Mr. Carter? 

The President: I might say, first of all, that 
I look forward with great anticipation to the 
visit of Prime Minister Begin on the 19th of 
July. My determination is that the talks will 
be friendly and constructive and also instruc- 
tive for both him and me. 



148 



Department of State Bulletin 



He'll be received with the kind of friendship 
that's always been a characteristic of the 
American people's attitude toward Israel. An 
overwhelming consideration for us is the 
preservation of Israel as a free and independ- 
ent and, hopefully, peaceful nation. That is 
preeminent. At the same time, I believe that 
it has been good during this year, when I hope 
we can reach a major step toward a peaceful 
resolution in the Middle East, to have the dis- 
cussions much more open, to encourage the 
Arab nations and Israel to frankly understand 
some of the feelings that each of them has to- 
ward the other, and to address the basic ques- 
tions of territories, the definition of peace, the 
Palestinian question. 

I really think it is best for this next roughly 
three weeks before Mr. Begin comes that we 
refrain from additional comments on specifics, 
because I think we've covered the specifics 
adequately. And if I or someone in the State 
Department or someone on my staff em- 
phasizes territory and the definition of peace, 
the immediate response is: Why didn't you say 
something about the Palestinians, and so 
forth. So, I believe that we've discussed it 
adequately. 

I believe all the issues are fairly clearly de- 
fined. It's accurate to say that our own nation 
has no plan or solution that we intend to im- 
pose on anyone. We'll act to the degree that 
the two sides trust us in the role of an inter- 
mediary or mediator, and I still have high 
hopes that this year might lead toward peace. 

But it will never be with any sort of aban- 
donment of our deep and permanent commit- 
ment to Israel. And I have made this clear in 
specific terms to every Arab leader who has 
been to our country. 



Q. Mr. President, giveyi the numerous ana 
obvious violations of the Helsinki accords by 
the Soviet Union, which they were pledged to 
uphold, could I ask why the Uyiited States 
should, on good faith, accept the Soviet word 
on a matter far more vital, say, for exam- 
ple, the SALT treaty, which you are in the 
process of negotiating? 



The President: We have never been willing 
simply to take the word of the Soviets on 
SALT agreements, and neither have they 
been willing to take our word alone. We have 
methods of confirming or verifying the carry- 
ing out of the agreement with various means, 
including aerial surveillance from space. 

And I think that as we get down to the 
more technical agreements, that verification 
is becoming more and more a problem. For in- 
stance, if we should conclude a comprehensive 
test ban treaty with the Soviets of preventing 
any sort of nuclear tests, even including 
peaceful devices, then we would have to have 
some way to confirm that the Soviets indeed 
are carrying out their agreement, and vice 
versa. 

There are sensing devices that might, for 
instance, be placed by us on Soviet territory 
or perhaps around the periphery of the Soviet 
Union. And we might conclude a similar 
agreement with them. Or if a factor in the 
agreement should be that certain kinds of uses 
of atomic weapons — not weapons, but e.xplo- 
sives to divert the channel of a river, we 
might want to have actual observers there, 
and vice versa. My own hope is that we can 
conclude an agreement that there would be no 
testing. But verification is one of the aspects 
not just based on the word of us or the Soviets 
but on actual observations on site by sensing 
devices or by visual observations or others 
that I need not go into now. 

Q. What is the status, Mr. President, of the 
Panama Canal treaty? Are you likely to sign 
such a treaty soon? 

The President: I don't know about the time 
schedule because it obviously takes two sides 
to agree to a treaty. We are putting in a 
lot of time on the Panama Canal treaty 
negotiations. 

And I hope that we'll have a successful con- 
clusion this summer. We've been encouraged 
so far. The major questions that were iden- 
tified at the beginning have fairly well been 
concluded. 

One of the disagreements at this point is on 
the payment of portions of the tolls from the 



August 1, 1977 



149 



Panama Canal to Panama and the exact finan- 
cial arrangement. 

But I hope still that we'll have one by sum- 
mer. I think that General Torrijos feels the 
same way, and of course, we have been aided 
by the good offices of President Perez from 
Venezuela and others who want to have a 
peaceful resolution here. 

I can't give you an answer because I don't 
know yet. We are also trying to keep the 
Members of the Senate and others informed 
about progress as well as I'm being informed, 
so that when we do reach a conclusion, it 
would be one that, with a major effort, we 
could have confirmed by the Congress. 

Q. Mr. President, in view of the apparent 
moderation by the OPEC countries [Organi- 
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries] on 
oil prices lately, does that appear to be aimed 
at diffusing some of the stronger measures 
you'd like Congress to adopt, and what 
strategy can you have against that? 

The President: When Prince Fahd was over 
here, we discussed the prospects for OPEC 
prices, and he told me in confidence what he 
thought were the prospects. And I think that 
is going to come true — that the Saudi Ara- 
bians would raise their price to equal that of 
other OPEC nations and that the OPEC na- 
tions who had already raised their prices 10 
percent would forgo their planned additional 
increases at least through this year. 

I hope, and I believe the Saudis also hope, 
that that extension of a price freeze would go 
through 1978 at least. I think that our own 
strong country can accommodate additional 
increases in the price of oil. 

I think the prices are too high. But there 
are obviously major adverse impacts on world 
inflation, and the poor countries that have to 
buy large quantities of oil and can't equal it by 
exports are very badly damaged. 

But we can accommodate the change, but 
we are using our good offices when possible to 
hold down additional increases in the price of 
oil. 

Q. Mr. President, is it your intention to 
terminate either our defense commitment or 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan as a step 



toward normalizing relations with the 
People's Republic of China? 

The President: Our attitude on the Chinese 
question has been spelled out by my predeces- 
sors and confirmed by me as based on the 
Shanghai communique which acknowledges 
the concept of one China. We also hope that 
Taiwan and the Mainland can work out the dif- 
ferences between them. We obviously hope 
that these differences can be resolved early, 
or perhaps in the future through peaceful 
means. 

Other nations who have now full relation- 
ships with the People's Republic of China on 
the Mainland have continued trade, cultural, 
social exchanges, sales of major equipment to 
Taiwan. 

I can't give you a better answer than I've 
already described. The Secretary of State is 
planning to go to China, to Peking, in August. 
This was part of the Shanghai communique 
agreement — that we would have consultations 
at the highest level, obviously at the Secre- 
tary of State level or the national leader level. 
But I can answer your question better after 
he returns in August. 

Did you have one followup? 

Q. Could I just follow that in a broader 
sense? Is it possible to have relations with the 
People's Republic of China and at the same 
time maintain a defense commitment to 
Taiwan? 

The President: This is a difficult question to 
answer now. My hope is that we can work out 
an agreement with the People's Republic of 
China having full diplomatic relations with 
them and still make sure that the peaceful 
lives of the Taiwanese, the Republic of China, 
is maintained. That's our hope, and that's our 
goal. 

Q. Mr. President, in New York last night 
Secretary of State Vance spoke of a construc- 
tive dialogue now on the way with Communist 
China. And I believe you have referred to this 
at least once publicly yourself. However, so 
far as I know, there have been only low-level 
talks with representatives of the Liaison Of- 
fice here about property claims and also, 
there have been some other — an occasional 
meeting or two. What is involved in this 



150 



Department of State Bulletin 



dialogue? Where and when are these ex- 
changes taking place? 

The President: As you know, we don't have 
ambassadors exchanged. We have special rep- 
resentatives with the rank of ambassador. 
Ambassador Huang here in Washington meets 
with the Secretary of State. He's also been to 
the Oval Office to meet with me. We've had a 
very frank discussion about some of the rela- 
tionships between our country and the 
People's Republic of China. 

The first meetings at the foreign minister 
level or the head of state level will be in Au- 
gust in Peking. But the preparations for that 
visit will obviously be continuing through 
regular diplomatic channels. I think that's the 
limit of the discussions to this point. 

Q. Mr. President, just one other aspect of 
human rights. Although you've e.rpressed 
surprise, as Helen [Helen Thomas, United 
Press hiternational] pointed out in the begin- 
ning, about some of the Soviet response, that 
reaction at the very beginning was predicted 
almost unthout exception by people ivho had 
long experience in dealing with the Soviet 
Union. My question is, did you consult any 
qualified, experienced people before undertak- 
ing your campaign? If you did, who were 
they? What did they tell you? 

The President: I would guess that the Sec- 
retary of State and my national security ad- 
viser, my staff, and others would be 
adequately qualified. I don't have any regrets 
at all about our enthusiastic endorsement of 
the principle of human rights, basic human 
freedoms, and the respect for individuality of 
persons. 

I was asked by a group of local newspaper 
editors if there were any surprises to me. And 
I said that the degree of disturbance by the 
Soviets about what I considered to be a 
routine and normal commitment to human 
rights was a surprise. It has not caused me 
any deep concern, and I would certainly not 
do it otherwise, in retrospect. 

Q. Could I just follow up? Did any of them 
suggest that you not under-take this cam- 
paign? 

The President: No, never. 
August 1, 1977 



President Perez of Venezuela 
Visits the United States 

President Carlos Andres Perez of the Re- 
public of Venezuela made a state visit to the 
United States June 27-July 2. He met with 
President Carter and other government offi- 
cials at Washington June 28-29. Following is 
an exchange of remarks between President 
Carter and President Perez on the South 
Lawn of the White House on June 28, together 
with the texts of a joint communique on their 
meetings and a joint communique on human 
rights which were issued on July 1.^ 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 4 

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS 

President Carter 

This morning we have a great honor paid to 
our nation by the visit of President Perez of 
Venezuela. In our hemisphere, the nation of 
Venezuela has earned the great admiration of 
all those who believe in freedom and in the 
open, democratic processes of government. 

President Perez represents a country which 
has set an e.xample for many others in its firm 
and unswerving comm.itment to the proposi- 
tion that the people of a nation should be the 
ones, with universal suffrage and complete 
participation in an open and free electoral 
process, to choose the leaders of that country. 

But his influence has extended far beyond 
the borders of his beautiful and great nation. 
Because of his dynamism and his great lead- 
ership qualities. President Perez has become 
an active and effective spokesman for the 
Third World nations, and one who can truly 
represent the highest aspirations of all the na- 
tions in Latin America. 

His commitment to the basic principles of 
human rights, individual freedom, and liberty 
were vividly demonstrated recently at the 
Organization of American States conference at 



' For an exchange of toasts between President Carter 
and President Perez at a dinner at tlie White House and 
President Carter's remarks at the entertainment follow- 
ing the dinner on June 28 and for President Carter's 
remarks on the departure of President Perez on June 
29, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
dated July 4, 1977, pp. 937, 942, and 944. 



151 



Grenada, when he and his people became 
leaders in pursuing these hopes for this 
hemisphere. 

He has also espoused and has pursued his 
commitment to a reduction in expenditures for 
weapons and in trying to lay the groundwork 
for more peaceful relationships among the na- 
tions of the world. 

He has also taken a strong stand agamst the 
proliferation of atomic explosives throughout 
the world and has joined with us and others in 
espousing the principles of the Tlatelolco 
treaty, which prohibits the deployment of any 
nuclear explosives in the southern part of this 
hemisphere. 

Venezuela has been a leader and was re- 
cently cochairman of the conference which 
tries "to establish better relationships between 
the developed nations of the North and the 
developing nations of the South. 

He leads a country which has been blessed 
with great natural resources— oil among 
them. And they have been leading suppliers of 
that precious fuel to our country for many 
years. During the 1973 embargo of our coun- 
try by some members of OPEC, Venezuela 
maintained their staunch friendship to our 
country, and the interruption of oil to our 
shores was not part of their policy. And this 
past winter, when we faced a particular 
shortage because of the severity of our 
weather, Venezuela voluntarily increased 
their total export of oil and fuel from their 
country to meet our needs. At the same time, 
he's been strongly committed to the quality of 
the environment and to the careful conserva- 
tion of his nation's precious oil and other fuel 
products. 

We all know and admire the early and in- 
novative commitment to freedom by the great 
liberator Simon Bolivar, and in more recent 
times, the great leadership of Don Romulo 
Betancourt of Venezuela. And I think I can 
say without any doubt that President Perez 
continues in this admirable mold of leadership 
which has come from the great nation and our 
close friend, the country of Venezuela. 

Recently my wife, Rosalynn, was welcomed 
to your country, Mr. President, in the most 
hospitable way by you and your wife, Blanca. 



We deeply appreciate the personal friendships 
that have already been formed between your 
family and my own. 

Sefwr Presidente, esta es su casa [Mr. Pres- 
ident, this is your house]. 

President Perez ^ 

Mr. President Carter, I must begin my 
words expressing to you my deep thanks and 
that of my wife for this cordial invitation that 
allows us to visit the great North American 
nation. I am a Latin American voice that, 
from Venezuela, comes to express an unre- 
served solidarity with your policy of great 
ethical substance addressed to affirm the es- 
sential values of the human being. 

Many years have passed since nations, small 
and weak nations, have heard a voice rise 
from a great nation to tell the world that over 
the human values is the human being, the de- 
fense of his dignity, of the human rights. 
Those words have reconciliated us with other 
attitudes that we have not shared with this 
great nation, and they remind us of the voice 
of two other gi-eat Presidents, Franklin Del- 
ano Roosevelt and John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 
who are dear to the affection of all Latin 
Americans. 

In my country — I mean all of Latin 
America, no matter what kind of governments 
our countries have, the people are feeling the 
warmth and the sincerity of these good words 
that constitute themselves in a commitment to 
make of America, of the New World, the true 
continent of freedom. 

I have come, Mr. President, to exchange 
ideas with you and your officials with mutual 
respect, and as countries that do to each other 
the same treatment. Certainly, we will find 
points of coincidence very important within 
the global politics that are discussed today in 
the great forums of the world. Likewise, we 
are going to deal with matters that are essen- 
tial for us, the relations between the United 
States and the Latin American community. 

I already had the honor and the very pleas- 
ant opportunity to hear from the lips of your 
wife, in Caracas, many aspects of the talks 



^ President Perez spoke in Spanish. 



152 



Department of State Bulletin 



that we are going to hold. Mrs. Carter 
brought the testimony of the friendship and 
admiration of the Venezuelan people and of all 
of the peoples of Latin America for the people 
of the United States and for the Government 
of President Carter. 

For our hemispheric countries, the best 
perspectives are open. I sincerely believe that 
this is a historical moment without compari- 
son, when the United States is going to as- 
sume a leadership role — which we do 
appreciate — not that of economic or military 
importance, but that of the great values of 
mankind. 

Mr. President, Mrs. Carter, my wife and I 
in this first moment of our meeting give to you 
our thanks, and we express to you that be- 
yond the formalities of protocol there exists a 
sincere friendship that will join in brother- 
hood the peoples of Latin America with the 
peoples of the United States. 



JOINT COMMUNIQUE ^ 

The President of the Republic of Venezuela, Carlos 
Andres Perez, and Mrs. Perez made a State Visit to 
Washington June 28-29 in response to the invitation ex- 
tended by the President of the United States of 
America, Jimmy Carter, and Mrs. Carter. Accompany- 
ing the President and Mrs. Perez were Minister of 
Foreign Relations Ramon Escovar Salon, Minister of 
Finance Hector Hurtado, Minister of Energy and Mines 
Valentin Hernandez, Minister of Information and 
Tourism Diego Arria, Minister of State for Interna- 
tional Economic Affairs Manual Perez Guerrero, the 
Ambassador of Venezuela and Mrs. Iribarren, Ambas- 
sador Simon Alberto Consalvi, and Ambassador Jose 
Maria Machin. 

Participating in the talks on behalf of the United 
States were Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State 
Vance, Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs Brzezinski, Assistant to the President 
Schlesinger, and leaders of the Congress. 

The Presidents of Venezuela and of the United 
States, accompanied by their respective parties, re- 
ferred in their talks to the strong bonds e.xisting be- 
tween their two countries. They analyzed a wide range 
of political, economic and cultural affairs of mutual 
interest and they made special reference to the fact that 
international relations should be based on mutual re- 
spect and cooperation. 

They confirmed their faith in the future and the im- 



^ Issued simultaneously at Washington and Caracas 
on July 1. 



portance of the ethical and political values of Western 
democratic society, and they reiterated their conviction 
that man should realize his full potential within a so- 
cially, politically, and economically just system which 
will foster the advantages of the democratic system and 
the importance which it attaches to the individual. 

The two Presidents discussed fully the matters of 
human rights and agreed to issue a separate com- 
munique in this respect. They expressed their convic- 
tion that the scientific and technological application of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and for economic 
development should be recognized and protected. 

They recognized that dissemination of the capability 
to produce nuclear weapons has serious implications for 
peace and security, and they expressed their determi- 
nation to continue their efforts on the international 
level to avoid those dangers. 

Recognizing the contribution which could be made in 
this regard by adequate regional measures, they at- 
tached great importance to broad advocacy of the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco throughout Latin 
America. Therefore, States within and without the 
Latin American region whose decisions are required in 
order to bring the Treaty into effect are urged to take 
the necessary measures as soon as possible. 

The two Presidents discussed the world energy situa- 
tion, especially with respect to petroleum, and agreed 
to explore ways of cooperating and encouraging conser- 
vation and the development of alternative sources of 
energy. 

They agreed on the need for intensifying and support- 
ing the efforts of mankind to attain general and com- 
plete disarmament and on the desirability of perfecting 
international standards and instruments of control. 

They made known their decision to combine their ef- 
forts to achieve a reduction in conventional arms trans- 
fers. They also expressed support for regional initia- 
tives such as the Declaration of Ayacucho of 1974, the 
implementation of which would aid in reducing tensions 
and avoiding unnecessary expenditures on arms. 

They recognized in terrorism a threat which endan- 
gers the lives of innocent persons and jeopardizes 
peace. They declared the intent of their governments to 
cooperate bilaterally and internationally to combat 
terrorism. 

The two Presidents examined the work of the 
North-South Dialogue or Conference on International 
Economic Cooperation, they agreed on the need for con- 
tinuing, within the framework of the United Nations, 
the constructive dialogue designed to establish an in- 
ternational system based on justice, equity, interde- 
pendence and cooperation among states. 

President Carter and President Perez announced 
their intention to carry on direct consultation, as well 
as through their respective Ambassadors and other rep- 
resentatives, and to dedicate their best efforts to realiz- 
ing moral values in terms of the goals and aspirations 
shared by the Presidents, Governments, and peoples of 
the United States and Venezuela. 

President Perez expressed to President Carter his 



August 1, 1977 



153 



deep appreciation for the hiospitality extended to him 
and the warm reception given him by the people and the 
Government of the United States of America, and his 
sincere satisfaction with the results of his talks with 
President Carter. 



JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON HUMAN RIGHTS * 

The Presidents of the Republic of Venezuela and of 
the United States of America, 

Recognize that the two countries share the same his- 
toric position regarding the protection of human rights 
as enshrined in their respective Constitutions; 

Recognize that the Charter of the United Nations and 
of the Organization of American States obligate mem- 
bers to promote universal respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language or religion; 

Recognize that the Charter of the Organization of 
American States provides that member states should 
exhibit respect for the sovereignty of other nations, for 
peace, the rule of law, individual liberties, and social 
justice; 

Recognize that the American Convention on Human 
Rights represents the reaffirmation of our commitment 
to promote the dignity of the individual in the 
Hemisphere; 

Reaffirm their conviction that the protection and 
safeguarding of the rights and liberties of man should 
constitute an objective of all nations of the world; 

Proclaim their dedication to those objectives and 
purposes and agree in their conviction that it is neces- 
sary to encourage efforts in support of the dignity of 
man and the universal protection of human rights as a 
major goal in the evolution of international law; 

Affirm their common commitment to join with other 
nations in combatting abuses of human rights, including 
those caused by political, social, and economic injustice; 

Affirm that the struggle for observance of human 
rights is an integral part of the political values of demo- 
cratic societies; 

Express the hope that the American Convention on 
Human Rights will be ratified and entered into force as 
soon as possible; 

Affirm their continuing joint support for the excellent 
and effective work performed by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, underlining the indis- 
pensable need to provide increasingly efficacious means 
to promote effective respect for the rights of man; 

Express interest in increasing the autonomy and re- 
sources of the Commission; 

Express their interest in seeking ways to promote 



■* Issued simultaneously at Washington and Caracas 
on July 1. 



throughout the Hemisphere broadened programs in the 
care, protection and resettlement of political refugees; 
and 

Strongly support the Costa Rican initiative to create 
the post of a United Nations High Commissioner on 
Human Rights. 



United States and United Kingdom 
Sign New Fisheries Agreement 

Press release 307 dated June 27 

On June 24, 1977, representatives of the 
United States of America and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire- 
land signed a treaty relating to traditional 
fishing activities in the Virgin Islands. 

The treaty provides for the continuation of 
traditional fishing by fishermen from Puerto 
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in waters off 
the British Virgin Islands and for the con- 
tinuation of traditional British Virgin Island 
fishing in U.S. Virgin Island waters. The 
treaty will come into force after the comple- 
tion of internal procedures by both parties. 

The signing of this treaty took place in 
Washington. Sir Peter Ramsbotham, Ambas- 
sador to the United States of the United 
Kingdom, signed for the United Kingdom. 
Ambassador Robert C. Brewster, Acting As- 
sistant Secretary of State for Oceans and In- 
ternational Environmental and Scientific Af- 
fairs, signed for the United States. Ambas- 
sador Brewster was assisted at the signing by 
Governor Cyril E. King of U.S. Virgin Is- 
lands; Commissioner Virdin Brown, U.S. Vir- 
gin Islands Commissioner for Culture and 
Conservation; and Mr. Hector Vega, Vice- 
Chairman of the Caribbean Fisheries Man- 
agement Council. 

Ambassador Brewster and Ambassador 
Ramsbotham both observed that the treaty 
reflects and reinforces the longstanding close 
relations between the United States and the 
United Kingdom, as well as the close and 
warm relations among the people of the Virgin 
Islands. 



154 



Department of State Bulletin 



Controlling Arms Transfers: An Instrument 
of U.S. Foreign Policy 



Address by Lucy Wilson Benson 

Under Secretar-y for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology ' 



It is commonplace to acknowledge that sci- 
ence and technology are among the dominant 
influences of this mad and magnificent cen- 
tury. But far too little has been done to act 
upon that recognition and integrate the con- 
siderations of technology into either long- 
range planning or everyday operations of 
foreign policymaking. It is now my job to tiy 
to improve that situation. 

There are a great many issues involved — 
painful, familiar to us all, and global in nature: 
Population growth, food supply, air and water 
pollution, the arms race, nuclear proliferation, 
energy insecurity, health care, competition 
for resources, the widening development gap. 

Secretary Vance has given my office broad 
purview over these matters, with the inten- 
tion of providing coordination among the 
many responsible bureaus and elevating the 
level of attention given to these issues. Gen- 
erally speaking, I divide my attention into 
three main areas: science and technology as 
they relate to foreign policy, the transfer of 
conventional arms, and the control of nuclear 
technology. 

We could talk about any one of these sub- 
jects for the whole afternoon, but I would Hke 
to concentrate on arms transfers; that is, the 
export of conventional, as distinct from nu- 
clear, weapons. 

I choose it for four reasons: It is controver- 
sial, it is complex, it is very important, and 
we do have a brand new policy. Let me begin 
with a few facts for background: 



' Made before the Woman's National Democratic Club 
at Washington, D.C., on June 27, 1977. 



— About half the international trade in mili- 
tary arms and services in the last five years 
has been conducted by the U.S. Government. 

— Last year we did more than $9 billion 
worth of arms business with 68 countries. 

— More than 60 percent of this traffic was 
with the Middle East, specifically with three 
countries — Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. 
About a third of the trade was with NATO 
and our major Asian allies — Korea and Japan. 
About 40 percent of the total was weapons 
and ainmunition. The rest was services, spare 
parts, and supporting equipment. 

For over a quarter of a century arms trans- 
fers have been a useful instrument of U.S. 
foreign policy. We have used them: 

— To strengthen our collective defense ar- 
rangements and to encourage allies to assume 
a stronger self-defense role, as for example, in 
NATO; 

— To maintain regional balances, as in the 
Middle East; 

— To secure base and operating rights for 
U.S. forces, as in Spain, Turkey, and the 
Philippines; 

— To limit Soviet influence or to enhance 
our own influence in specific regions or with 
particular governments; and 

— To offset or compensate for the with- 
drawal of U.S. forces, as in Korea. 

These are, and will remain, legitimate ob- 
jectives of our arms transfer actions. 

Over the past few years, however, there 
has developed a growing concern that, how- 
ever laudable the ends, the huge export of 



August 1, 1977 



155 



arms and our own prominent position as "chief 
trafficker" carries with it serious liabilities. In 
the last five years our annual sales of military 
arms and services has grown fourfold— from 
just under $2 billion to well over $9 billion. 
This gi'owth has focused public, congressional, 
and executive attention on a number of awk- 
ward questions. 

— Have we been encouraging competition in 
arms? 

— Have we been heightening local tensions 
or involving ourselves in local conflicts in 
which we have no legitimate interest? 

— Have we been compromising our techno- 
logical advantage not only over potential op- 
ponents but also over the allies who are our 
commercial competitors? 

— Have we been distorting the allocations of 
scarce resources, particularly in the underde- 
veloped world? 

— Have we been associating ourselves too 
closely, and where our national security intei"- 
ests are not really involved, with authoritar- 
ian and repressive regimes? Are we perhaps 
even reinforcing them? 

It would be easy if we could answer yes to 
all of those questions. Arms transfer policy 
then would be only a question of withdrawing 
from the market and either refusing to deal in 
arms at all or doing so only with a few close 
friends. 

However, as you all are seasoned politi- 
cians, you know there are no yes-no answers 
to these questions. You also will recognize 
that there are some important but conflicting 
interests involved in our international arms 
trade that go to the very heart of our national 
security interests. The fact that we are the 
largest arms seller in the world is not due 
solely to the energy of our salesmen or our 
price and credit terms. Indeed other suppliers 
of arms; that is, other countries, are often 
more competitive in these areas than the 
United States. 

Our predominance as an exporter of arms 
has come about because both our government 
and U.S. industry have together a reputation 
as a reliable supplier of the best equipment 
and service and because there exists between 
ourselves and our major customers a basic 



congruence of interests and objectives. The 
governments which buy our weapons have de- 
fense requirements which they view as urgent 
and legitimate as our own. 

No simple, narrowly focused policy can pos- 
sibly reconcile all the contradictions that are 
imbedded in this complicated subject. Let me 
give you two examples. Severe reductions of 
arms sales to unstable areas would seem, log- 
ically, to be a practical and desirable policy 
guideline. Yet in some areas access to arms 
may be necessary to avoid creating a tempting 
imbalance in military strength, as in Israel, 
Jordan, and Korea. 

Arms Transfers and Human Rights 

President Carter, Secretary of State Vance, 
and the Congress have repeatedly emphasized 
the importance of human rights in foreign pol- 
icy, and that obviously includes arms transfer 
policy. But how do we apply our concern in 
this area, since human rights are not just the 
right to vote or the right to a fair trial or 
freedom from fear of torture? Human rights 
also include the right to safety from terrorism 
and from external threat. We used to call this 
"freedom from fear" 30-odd years ago. What 
do we do, therefore, about Korea, which has 
an authoritarian government, but which also 
has an implacable and well-armed enemy 
across the demilitarized zone? How do we ac- 
commodate these conflicting objectives, and if 
we cannot, how do we decide which rights to 
give priority? 

There are no easy answers. As is always the 
case, facts have to be weighed and judgments 
made. Patt Derian [Patricia M. Derian], 
former Democratic National Committee- 
woman from Mississippi, who, as you know, is 
the President's Coordinator for Human Rights 
[and Humanitarian Affairs in the Office of the 
Deputy Secretary of State], says it is very 
discouraging to hear the same arguments and 
rationales /o?' not doing things as we used to 
hear in the days of civil rights activism. And, 
I might add, it is discouraging to hear those 
same old arguments ad nauseam in these days 
of struggling for equal rights for women. At 
the same time, as Ms. Derian said recently, 
cutting off military sales or economic assist- 



156 



Department of State Bulletin 



ance to a country is not a very effective way 
to show our dissatisfaction with human rights 
conditions in a particular country. And so we 
are left with the age-old problem in politics 
and public policy — trade-offs, often among un- 
suitable or at least unattractive alternatives. 

All of this is by way of saying that the new 
arms transfer policy described by the Presi- 
dent in mid-May represents an effort to rec- 
ognize and deal with these contradictions.^ It 
also sets a challenging goal — to reduce the 
worldwide trade in arms and to reduce our 
own dependence on this trade as a foreign pol- 
icy instrument. 

In his May statement the President stated 
that arms transfers would henceforth be con- 
sidered an e.xceptional policy instrument. 
That means it will be used only where it can 
be clearly shown that the transfer contributes 
to our national security interest. Moreover, 
the burden of proof will rest with the propo- 
nents of a sale, not with the advocates of 
restraint. 

The Application of Controls 

President Carter specified a number of new 
controls — new controls to be applied to all 
transfers and to all countries except those 
with whom we have longstanding commit- 
ments, such as Israel, or with whom we have 
major defense treaties (NATO, Japan, Aus- 
tralia, and New Zealand). 

The controls are: 

— We will reduce the dollar-volume of new 
commitments to sell weapons and weapons- 
related items beginning in 1978; 

— We will not be the first to introduce into a 
region advanced weapons that create new or 
higher combat capability; 

— We will not sell weapons that are not in 
the inventory of our own armed forces; 

— We will not develop advanced weapons 
solely for export; 

— We will sharply curtail the production of 
U.S. weapons and components by foreign 
governments; 

— We will rigorously discourage the reex- 
port of U.S. equipment to third countries; and 



^ For the text of President Carter's statement of May 
19, see Bulletin of June 13, 1977, p. 625. 



— We will strengthen the regulations gov- 
erning business and government sales ac- 
tivities abroad. 

The message of these controls is obvious: 
discipli)ie and restraint. 

It is the objective of this Administration to 
sell less and to sell with discrimination. The 
test of U.S. national security interest will be 
the starting point for considering a sale, a test 
that too often has been neglected in the past. 

So much for the policy. It is very 
straightforward. Now, let me say a few words 
about implementation and impact. 

Implementation and Impact of Policy 

Decisionmaking in the arms transfer busi- 
ness is extraordinarily complicated. Most of 
the major agencies of our government have 
important interests at stake and must be in- 
volved in the decision process. The State De- 
partment must worry about relations with 
foreign governments; Defense about military 
capabilities; Labor, Commerce, and Treasury 
about jobs, the economy, and the balance of 
payments; and the Agency for International 
Development about allocation of resources. 
Questions of arms control, human rights, 
domestic jobs, and compromise of our techno- 
logical lead also must be dealt with. 

To help me advise the Secretary of State, 
we have organized an interagency Arms Ex- 
port Control Board to bring together the ex- 
perts on these matters. Nine separate agen- 
cies are represented, and no meeting takes 
place with less than 15 people at the table. 
The process is thorough and it guarantees full 
exposure and a fair hearing to all the contend- 
ing interests. 

Nothing, however, can obscure the fact that 
the effects of decisions made under this new 
policy are going to be widely felt by everyone 
from the aircraft and electronics workers in 
Dallas and Boston to the Korean soldiers on 
the demilitarized zone. We fully recognized 
this when we were developing the new policy, 
and we designed the controls to insure that 
they do not drive policy beyond common 
sense. For example, when the President 
stated that we will apply the test of our na- 
tional security interests, he also made explicit 



August 1, 1977 



157 



one particular test — that we will continue to 
fully uphold our treaty obligations and our 
historic responsibility "to assure the security 
of the State of Israel." 

We are fully conscious that for much of the 
free world the ability to deter attack, to pre- 
vent coercion, and to defend against aggres- 
sion rests on a nation's ability to acquire mod- 
ern arms. Our policy does not challenge this 
fact; on the contrary, it accepts it as a given. 

With respect to domestic effects, they have 
been meticulously examined. We believe the 
impact will be manageable. Some jobs will be 
lost, some industries will suffer; but it is our 
judgment that the aggregate effect will be 
modest. 

More worrisome is the likely concentration 
of the effects on a few industries — aircraft, 
electronics, and ordinance — in a few states. 
But even here, there are ameliorating factors. 

There is a very large backlog — over $30 
billion — of unfilled orders for which signed 
contracts e.xist. This Administration considers 
these obligations to be good-faith commit- 
ments, and it will not interfere with the com- 
pletion of existing contracts. The new policy 
applies to new orders, not old ones. Thus the 
backlog will take some years to work through, 
and there will be time for the government and 
the defense industries involved to adjust to 
the future. 

Moreover, it is important to remember 
that U.S. defense industries have never, in 
the aggregate, depended on foreign sales for 
their survival. Their big customers are and 
will remain our own military services and our 
close friends and allies with whom we will 
continue our defense cooperation. 

Setting an Example of Self-Restraint 

A second big problem with which we have 
to deal is to persuade other sellers of arms — 
that is, France, Germany, Britain, and the 
Soviet Union — not to fill the void we create. 

Many people argue that self-restraint is an 
open invitation for the competition to move in 
and that when the competition does move in, 
the United States will lose not only jobs but 
also leverage, influence, and control. They 



cite the historical example of Latin America, 
where we have exercised restraint over the 
last 10 or 15 years with the i-esult that the 
Europeans now have 70 percent of the Latin 
American arms market. 

It is a tough argument, and there is some 
truth in it. But to accept uncritically the pro- 
position "if we don't sell, others will" is to ac- 
cept a slogan, not a policy. We propose to deal 
with the problem in two ways. 

First, we will set an example of restraint by 
demonstrating that the United States will not 
rush into every possible market. In so doing, 
we will try to alter the intensity of the com- 
petitive atmosphere surrounding the arms 
trade. To some extent, of course, if we don't 
sell, buyer's won't buy. We will try to encour- 
age that atmosphere. 

The other approach will focus on sellers. We 
will seek their active cooperation and try to 
convince both allies and adversaries that re- 
straint is in everyone's interest. 

The President, the Vice President, and Sec- 
retary Vance have raised the matter in their 
trips to Europe, the Middle East, and the 
Soviet Union. In addition, the United States 
and the Soviet Union have established a joint 
working group on conventional arms trans- 
fers, and we will hold discussions with our 
European allies. 

Our hope is that our own restraint will at- 
tract the support of buyers and sellers alike 
over a period of time. It is very important to 
recognize that progress is likely to be slow. 
We will aim, with both suppliers and buyers, 
for a code of behavior — perhaps by regions, 
perhaps globally — that will be adopted be- 
cause of mutual interest. Our initial emphasis 
might well be on such obvious and trouble- 
some problems as: 

— Arms sales to unstable regions; 

— Sales of sensitive weapons and technol- 
ogy, such as long-range surface-to-surface 
missiles; 

— Sales of equipment particularly attrac- 
tive to terrorists, such as hand-carried anti- 
aircraft missiles; and 

— Sales of highly and indiscriminately lethal 
weapons. 



158 



Department of State Bulletin 



We don't underestimate the difficulties. 
Still less do we ignore the fact that without 
cooperation from both suppliers and buyers a 
policy of self-denial will be ineffective. Ob- 
viously, however, we must try: Unrestrained 
competition is madness. 

Decisions To Fill or Refuse Requests 

Finally, there is the question of how we as 
an exporter decide which requests to fill and 
which to refuse. How do we impose our views 
of what is necessary and affordable on 
sovereign states whose perception of their 
own needs may be quite different from our 
own? 

To this I can only say that the new policy 
involves the very essence of diplomacy. In the 
last couple of weeks you have seen this Ad- 
ministration make two very difficult decisions. 
We turned down Pakistan's request to pur- 
chase A-7 aircraft on the grounds that the 
sale would introduce a significantly greater 
military capability into one side of the South 
Asian military balance. 

We have also refused to authorize at this 
time the sale to Iran of the F-18L, a new 
lightweight fighter, because it is not now 
scheduled to be in the inventory of the U.S. 
military services. 

Both of these decisions were direct expres- 
sions of the new policy. Both involved our re- 
lations with friendly foreign governments. 
Both involved the prosperity of important 
American industrial firms and the job pros- 
pects of their highly skilled workers. Both 
involved loss of economic benefits to our econ- 
omy, to the private sector, and to the Treas- 
ury. But both also involved the broadest and 
most fundamental national and global inter- 
ests. 

Either we apply the policy — thoughtfully and 
with scrupulous attention to the costs and 
benefits — or we don't. But if we take the lat- 
ter course and duck the tough decisions, then 
we lay ourselves open to charges of political 
expediency and diplomatic impotence. It is not 
for such behavior that this Administration or 
this country intends to be remembered. 



Interview With President Carter 
by Media Representatives, June 24 

Following are excerpts from President Car- 
ter's opening remarks and questions and an- 
swers relating to foreign policy from the tran- 
script of an interview by a group of editors, 
publishers, and broadcasters on June 2^.^ 

OPENING REMARKS 



In foreign affairs, we've got an equally am- 
bitious program underway. We are working 
very closely with some of our allies, Germany, 
France, England, Canada, in trying to resolve 
the Namibian question in formerly South 
West Africa, working with Mr. Vorster in 
South Africa. And I think we've made good 
progress on that recently. It's still a difficult 
thing. 

We are working closely with the British on 
trying to resolve the Rhodesian question, 
leading there toward majority rule. We are in 
the process now of bringing the parties to 
agree to accept the broad outlines of a con- 
stitution under which free elections might be 
conducted. 

In the Middle East, I've met with all the 
leaders there now, except Mr. Begin. I met 
with Mr. Rabin when he was Prime Minister. 
And Mr. Begin will be coming over here on 
the 19th of next month to spend two or three 
days in our country, and I'm getting prepared 
for his visit. We hope that this year we might 
make some progress in the Middle East. It's a 
very difficult question. It's one on which I've 
spent a great deal of time. 

At the same time, we are negotiating with 
the Soviets, trying to reach for the first time a 
comprehensive test ban on nuclear explosives. 
We are prepared to accept the test ban with 
adequate safeguards that would apply both to 
military and peaceful explosive devices. The 
British have asked to join this discussion, and 
both the Soviets and we have welcomed them 



' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated July 4, 1977, p. 
919. 



August 1, 1977 



159 



in those talks, and they are being conducted in 
Moscow this minute. 

We are also talking to them about reducing 
the military presence or restraining it in the 
future in the Indian Ocean, prior notification 
of missile test-firing, a prohibition against the 
capability of attacking observation satellites 
or others in space, and working as best we can 
to bring about a comprehensive, permanent 
agreement on SALT. 

I feel at this point we've got a good 
framework for an agreement, but no specific 
agreement on the SALT negotiations 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]. We are in 
a strong position on strategic weapons, and I 
think that strong position can be maintained 
for the foreseeable future, but we don't want 
a superiority there. 

We'd like to reach an agreement with the 
Soviets where we can have a drastic reduction 
in total commitments with atomic weapons, 
but retaining an equivalent position with them 
so that either side will be strong enough to 
prevent— to permit a retaliatory attack, but 
not be subject to devastation that's over- 
whelming in an original attack — at least that 
we could still retaliate. 

The other thing that we are trying to do 
is — and I'll just mention two more before I an- 
swer questions — is to prevent the spread of 
the capability for atomic e.xplosions. I think 
it's accurate to say that eight months ago 
there was a general feeling in the world that 
there was no way to restrain any more addi- 
tional nations joining the nuclear explosive — I 
guess you would call it — fraternity. After 
India exploded a device, there was a general 
sense that with the spread of atomic power to 
produce electricity, that the development of 
explosives was inevitable. 

I think that time has changed. And I believe 
there's a general hope now that with strict 
control over reprocessing plants and a long 
delay in shifting toward a plutonium society, 
that we might indeed prevent an expansion of 
the nuclear club. 

The other thing that's been highly pub- 
licized is our commitment to human rights. 
We have addressed a subject that is very im- 
portant to me and to the American people. It 



reestablishes our country, I think, as kind of a : 
beacon light for a principle that's right and 
decent and compassionate. I don't know if this 
would be liberal or conservative, but it 
prides — the concept of individuality, of the 
freedoms that our country has espoused. And 
I don't think there's a national leader in the 
world right now who isn't constantly pre- 
occupied with how well we measure up on the 
subject of human rights. Do our own people 
think that we abuse them too much through 
government, don't give them an equal oppor- 
tunity, or what does the world think of us? 

This has been brought about in part by our 
own attitude, but I think to a substantial de- 
gree because of the Helsinki agreement and 
the present Belgrade conference that is pre- 
paring to discuss this subject, among others, 
in October. 

These are some of the things that are im- 
portant. Of course, I'll make a decision this 
month about whether or not to go ahead with 
the production of the B-1 bomber and a few 
other incidental questions of that sort. 
[Laughter.] 

But perhaps it might be better than for me 
to go ahead with a dissertation, for me to an- 
swer your questions. And I would be glad to 
do so. 

QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION 

Q. Mr. President, Henry Kissinger was in 
Denver on Wednesday, and he was defending 
his old turf. And the message I got from lis- 
tening to him, was it's easy to criticize the 
State Department for lack of imagination 
when you are on the outside, but once you are 
in office many of these rosy-sounding dreams 
and ideas for change begin to wilt and the test 
for a huge, negative question that he saw is, 
what are the consequences of failure of a 
foreign policy move? 

Do you gamble a little more on those kinds 
of questions than President Nixon, President 
Ford, and Mr. Kissinger did, do you think? 

The President: I don't disagree with what 
Kissinger says. We've had a very good series 



160 



Department of State Bulletin 



of conferences with Kissinger, either myself 
personally or more frequently the Secretary 
of State. And Dr. Brzezinski [Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for Na- 
tional Security Affairs] has participated in 
some of those as well. Obviously, it's easier to 
criticize any government effort from outside 
than it is to solve a problem that's longstand- 
ing, once you have the responsibility yourself. 

I think we've made some basic changes in 
the previous policies that might bear fruit, 
but we've not made any additional steps for- 
ward toward a SALT agreement. We hope we 
can. I think we are taking a much more bold 
approach to that question, not only seeking 
limitations on future construction, which is 
what was spelled out at Vladivostok, but ac- 
tually asking the Soviets to join with us in a 
freeze of present deployment and develop- 
ment of nuclear weapons, and then a substan- 
tial reduction below what we have now. This 
has never been done before. 

We are asking the Soviets to join with us in 
a comprehensive test ban that would prevent 
any nuclear explosives being tested. This has 
never been done before. Demilitarization of 
the Indian Ocean has never been attempted 
before, and so forth. 

I don't say that in criticism of the previous 
Administration. We have not achieved success 
yet in any of these efforts and may not. I can't 
guarantee success. 

I think that we have also taken a different 
approach in the Middle East. And it's a matter 
of judgment. Mr. Kissinger's position was to 
deal with the Middle Eastern question in a 
step-by-step, incremental way. Our hope is 
that we can have an overall settlement by the 
participants in the Middle East discussion 
without delay, hopefully this year, and that 
once that settlement is reached, then the 
step-by-step implementation of the ultimate 
settlement is the best way to go about it. It's 
a completely different perspective. 

I don't know that I can guarantee success. 
Again, we've tried to look on Latin America 
as a group of independent nations equal to us 
and to deal with them individually, not as a 
group or a homogeneous bloc. 

We've been much more aggressive, I think, 



on the field of human rights. It means that to 
some degree our friendships and our al- 
legiances in the different parts of the world, 
like Latin America, have changed. We've tried 
to get away from blind support of totalitarian 
governments and tried to enhance and reward 
those countries that are shifting toward a 
more democratic process. And we've tried to 
compliment and encourage countries like Ven- 
ezuela, countries like Ecuador that are shift- 
ing strongly toward more democratic proc- 
esses. 

We've taken a very strong stand that has 
brought some adverse reaction on the control 
of nuclear weapons as far as new countries are 
concerned in the sales policies of our own 
nuclear-enriched fuels. And in addition to 
that, we've departed from Mr. Kissinger's 
past attitude, along with obviously the Presi- 
dents under whom he's served, in the sale of 
conventional weapons. We have some very 
strict standards now for the sale of conven- 
tional weapons. 

And now it's the consumer's or the cus- 
tomer's responsibility to convince us that they 
need those weapons and that the sale of those 
weapons will be to the advantage of the 
United States, rather than the other way 
around where arms manufacturers freely went 
to other countries, sold their products, and we 
were in effect quietly encouraging this escala- 
tion in nuclear arms — I mean in conventional 
arms sales around the world. 

So, there are some differences in perspec- 
tive, but I have to say that it's too early to 
assess tangible results. 

Q. Mr. President, it's no more of a gamble 
as far as you see it? 

The President: I see no more of a gamble, 
no. I think our positions are much more 
clearly expressed in a public way. I think that 
all of you representing the news media and 
your readers and viewers and listeners have a 
much more accurate assessment of what we 
hope to achieve in SALT negotiations, what 
we hope to achieve with human rights and 
with nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and 
what we hope to achieve in the Middle East, 
and what we hope to achieve in dealing with 



August 1, 1977 



161 



III!' I'roplc'M Ki'iMililic (ifCliinii ;iii(l ('iili,'i, .iml 
lui Idi'lli, very cdiil i'i)Vcr:ii;il riKilliTs, lli.iii 
they dill in I li<' punt . 

Hill I lhiiil< I he opciiiicHS of il ;iiiil IIk' mi 
VdlvcllllMll dl' III)' plllili)' ill III)' il('l):ili':: ;iliil 
<liHCUHHiotlH will picvrlll iiUI' lllillUMJ^f Sdllir (if 

lilt' iiii;iliikcH I hill wt'iT SI) lirviisliitiii).', lo i>iii' 
cmiiitry in I he p;i»l . I ildii'l lliiiik il's iiikic 
rlHky ((• llo thin. I linli'l KrlirVf lliiil upcli lie 
liiilc ill ilHcir \H II rink, I Ihiiik il pussildy 
iiVdidH I 111' risk of ii McriniiH iiiisliikf when ;i 
(IcclHidli III in.iilr III nccrcl wilhdiil I he Sdiiiid 
Jud^'.iiicnl and I he rxpcricni'i' and I lie (•oniniiiii 
HtMiHt' dl' I he Anicricaii proph- and I lie ('mi 
Ki'CHH liciiij', invdivi'd in iiiakinj? IhoHc ciiicial 
(l(>cinid!is. 



President Signs 1977 Amendments 
to Export Administration Act 

l''till<>win<i in u Hldlrninil hji I'irsiilnil ('(li- 
ter issiird ill ciiiiiii'ctioii with the nijiiiiiiii of 
thv aiiiviiiliiii'iits 1)11 Jiiiiv £'Ji, imji'tlivi- with n 
ftirt shiii irlvamul lit/ tin' W'Inti- lloiisi' Hint 
iliijl.' 

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT CARTER 

WIlKr ll.iiino pii'tin ii'lrrini' <lnli>il .lllllK UV 

{•'dr iiKuiy nidiillis 1 liaxc spdkcn sli'diii-Jy of 
I 111- nci'd I'df ii'i'islalidii dut law iiii', sfcdiidary 
and tciiiaiy boyfdits and disfriniinal ion 
HH'iiiiisI Aini'iiian hiisiiu'ssincn on rclinioiis or 
nalidiial I'.nninds. I called this "a piofdimd 
innral issiic, fi'dm w liicli we shdiild iidt 
shrink." 

My I'diiccrn alioiil rdit'ii'.ii hdyrolls stem 
iiu'd, df coiirst'. tVdiii dur special relalidiiship 
willi Israel, as well as tVdin the ecdUdinic, 
luililary, and security ne<'ds dl' both diir cdiiii 
tries. Kill tiie issue also I'.oes to the very heart 
dl" I'ree liadi' he! ween all nalidiis. 

I am theret'ore particularly pleased ttulay to 
si^Vn intd law tiie li'TT aineiidinents to tile \']\ 
port .Xdniinist ral idii .Act. wliii-h will keep 
I'dreii'.n hdycott practices I'tdin inlrudini; di 
I'l'ctly intd Anu'rican cdniiuerce. ■' 

Specifii'iilly, this leivislation: 



Pidhiliils rl•li^^idlls nr ethnic discriinina 
lion liy American companies arising out df a 
I'drcij'ii lioycott; 

i'rdliihils U.S. firms from joining!; in l.hc 
lioycdlt df a friendly coiinli'y like Israel as a 
cdiidilidn df ddin^ hUHJiiess in Ihe cdiinlry im 
pd.sin^', I he Ixiycdt I ; 

I'rohiliils firms in the tlnited States I'rdiii 
acliii^j HH ('nforcurs of a I'dreiKH hdycott; 

Priihihits U.S. firms friiiii answ■erin^f re- 
quests for hdycdit related ini'drmatidii; and 

I'rohihitH, after a one year peridd, the use 
dl':;d called nej'.ative cerl ificates of di'inin. 

'{'he new law dues mil (jueslidii Ihe 
sdvereinii rii^iit nf any nation Id reyjulale its 
cdmnierc(( witii dther cduntries, nor is it di- 
rected toward a particular country. The hill 
seeks, instead. Id end the divisive effects on 
American life of I'dreij^n hdycdlts aimed at 
Jewish niemhers df our sdciety. if we allow 
such a precedent to heconie established, wi' 
open Ihe doiu' to simil.ir action a^^ainsl any 
ethnic, religious, or racial uroiip in America. 

This lef^islalion owes much to Ihe hard work 
df Senators Stiwt'lison and I'roMnire and ("mi 
pressmen Zahldcki, ivoseiithal, iiamilton, 
Hiiij;ham, Sdlarz, Whalen, and others. And it 
owes just HS much to the patient perseverance 
of the Hiisiness ivoundtable, the .Anti- 
Defamation l.eanue, the American .lewish 
Commillee, and the American .lewisli ("on 
i^ress, as vvi'll as other groups. 

'I'lie dpenness of t heir disiaissions and of 1 he 
delicate legislative process which shaped this 
liill has reconfirmed my belief in the value of 
open government. 

'i'his Cdoperative efl'dit between the busi- 
ness cmnmunily, Jewish leaders, ("migress, 
and the executive liranch can serve as a model 
for what lan be accomplished in even more 
difficult areas when ri>asonable pedpli> an'ree 
to sit ddwii td.u'etlier in ^oddwill and .nood 
faith. 

I am I'diifidi'iit tiiat tin- divisive issues in the 
Middle Kast which nive rise to current 
boycdtts can be resolved eiiually satisfactorily 

' Kor till' li'\( nf I'rt'sidcMl Cid'lcr's rciniirUs i>ii si,i;ii 
inn II"' I'ill iiil" !•''«. ;*<'<' Wcckl.v I'ompil.'ttinii of I'rcsi 
(Iciiliiil l>iu'liiiU'n(N iliiloil June -1. lit??, p. S!»8. 

'■' .'V.-i cniu'lcil the 1!I77 iinu'nilnu'nls lo the l',\piirl 
.\(lininislinlion Act of l!Mi!t me l*iililio l.jiw !tf)-;VJ. 



162 



Department of State Bulletin 



through ;i similar process of rcasorialilc, 
peaceful c()()])<'rali()ii. 

My AdfriiniKtratioti will now circctivitly (tri- 
forcr' this iriiportaiil l('i.fislal ion. 



in).i;H, Hulijcct, to conj^rcHHiotial ovcnifjc liy 
cilhcr House of (!orl^M•eHH; 

— An increase in the petmltJcH for violatitiiiH 
of t lie lv\port Ailinini; 1 1 at ion Act. 



WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET 



WhII.' llou«<' |iM 



'liiirii .iiwK' 'a 



Title I — Export Controlt 

Title I of the le^fishttjori extend;, the Kxport, 
AdtriiniHtration Act. l,o Septemher :'.<), \\)1\S, 
and makes numerous chan^^e;, in U.S. export, 
control policy and f)rocedures. Included are 
provisionH for: 

— Specific annual authorizationH of fundH to 
carry out, the exiiort. control ftro^jrarri; 

A hroade-ninj^ of l,h<; hasis of (;x|>ort. con 
trols for national K<;curity purposeH to include 
other factors than solely a country'H (/Orn- 
rnunist or non-Crtmmunist status; 

— A continuinj< review of U.K. policy to 
ward individual countries takinp^ into account 
their n;lati(inship t,o the; Unit,ed StatoH, its 
friendn and allies, their own export control 
policies, and other ndevant mat,terH; 

— Simplifying and keepinj? U.S. export con 
trols and the controls of our allies up to <late 
in li^ht of evolvinj( technology, the availahility 
of restricted items from other countri<;s, and 
other relevant matters; 

— A Htudy of technoloj^y tranHferK to other 
countries of the world; 

— A study of the domestic economic impact 
of exports from the United States of certain 
industrial technoloj^y; 

— StoraK<; in the UniUid States of aj^ricul- 
tural commodities purchased for «;xport, free 
from future short, supply export limitations, 
und<;r certain conditions; 

—A crinj<resHional "veto" over emV^argoes 
imposed on the export, of aj/ricultural corn 
modities for foreij^n p'jlicy and short su|)f>ly 
purposes; 

— Speerjinj^ the process of export, licensinj^; 

— Increasinj^ the effectiveness of industry 
representatives in formulatin)^ and irnple- 
mentinj^ U.S. export controls; 

— A prohibition on the export, of Alaskan 
oil, unless the President makes certain find 



Title II — Foreign Boycott* 

Title II ol'thi' le)M:;lal ion will jirohiliil rnoiit. 
forms of compliance with unsanctioned forei),rn 
boycotts without unnecessarily jeopardizing 
U.S. ftolitical and <;omm(!rcial intitrests in the 
Middle Kast. Included ari' provisions to pro- 
hil)it U.S. pi'rsons from: 

A{.i'S\m\\% 1,0 do business with lilacklisted 
firms and b(»ycott<!d fri<;ndly countries; 

— niscriminatin^'; a^^ainst U.S. person;', rjn 
grounds (>f race, reli^Mon, sex, or national 
origin; 

l''urnishinj.i; information aliout another- 

per'son's r'ace, r•eli^dorl, sex, or national orij/in; 

I' lirnishinj,^ information about business 

dealinj^s with boycotteil connlrie;'. or' 

lilacklisted persons. 

i'ixcfjfrtions are provided for- cr-rtain import,, 
export, and immigration re(juirem«;nts of 
forei^i^n countries enj^aj^ed in boycotts a):jairiHt 
others, as well as for complianrH? in cftrtain 
circumstances with the for'eij^n buyer's <'hoic(; 
of certain j^oods anri servicr^s, 

U.S. p«;r'sons receiving boycottndatffd r'e- 
<)U(fsts will continue trr be r-erjuircfd to report 
such receipt to the Secretary of Commerce, 
and such reports will continue to be re(juired 
to be made publicly available exc(;pt for cer- 
t,ain business confidential information. 

'I'he lej<islation also preemjrts foririj^n 
boycott laws enacted by State lej^islatunis. 



Current Treaty Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Finartce 

t\v,ri-Mu\fny <'>!l,j»bli«hir)K the lril.<!rri;il.iiirial }''iin<l for A^- 
ricullural l><!V<floprrM'rit,, Dorm at, I{«rriif Juri« \'A, 
VAir,. > 

SiynaturnH: CrmKo, Mali, Juru; 'M, |{>77; Orifccft, July 
I, 1977; UorxJuran, Kaudi Arabia, July r,, I!r77; 
I/Karxla, July «, )«77. 



' Not In force. 



August 1, 1977 



163 



Ratification Deposited: Denmark, June 28, 1977. 

Organization of American States 

Charter of the Organization of American States. Signed 
at Bogota April 30, 1948. Entered into force De- 
cember 13, 1951. TIAS 2361. 
Ratification deposited: Surinam, June 8, 1977. 

Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organiza- 
tion of American States "Protocol of Buenos Aires." 
Signed at Buenos Aires February 27, 1967. Entered 
into force February 27, 1970. TIAS 6847. 
Ratification deposited: Surinam, June 8, 1977. 

Seabed Disarmament 

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear 
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on 
the seabed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. 
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow February 
11, 1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 
7337. 
Ratification deposited: Ethiopia, July 14, 1977. 

War 

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 
wounded and sick in armed forces in the field; 

Geneva convention for amelioration of the condition of 
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed 
forces at sea; 

Geneva convention relative to the treatment of prison- 
ers of war; 

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian per- 
sons in time of war. 

Done at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force 
October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 
1956. TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, and 3365, respectively. 
Accession deposited: Yemen (Aden), May 25, 1977. 



BILATERAL 

Chile 

Agreement amending the agreement of April 5, 1955, 
granting duty-free entry, e.xemption from internal 
ta.xation, and free transportation within Chile to ul- 
timate beneficiary for certain relief supplies and 
equipment for U.S. rehabilitation and relief agencies. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago June 13, 
1977. Enters into force on the date on which both 
Governments indicate that they have completed the 
internal legal requirements for its approval and 
promulgation. 

India 

Agreement modifying the agreement of August 6, 1974, 
as modified (TIAS 7915, 8275), relating to trade in 
cotton te.xtiles. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington June 13 and 17, 1977. Entered into force 
June 17, 1977. 

Mexico 

Agreement amending the agreement of May 12, 1975, as 



amended (TIAS 8079, 8272), relating to trade in cot- 
ton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington May 24, 1977. En- 
tered into force May 24, 1977. 

Romania 

Agreement relating to trade in wool and man-made 
fiber textiles, with annex. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Bucharest June 17, 1977. Entered into force 
June 17, 1977. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Agreement on cooperation in the fields of science and 
technology. Signed at Washington July 8, 1977. En- 
tered into force July 8, 1977. 



1950 "Foreign Relations" Volume: 
National Security, Economic Policy 

Press release 314 dated July 1 

The Department of State released on July 1 "Foreign 
Relations of the United States," 1950, volume I, "Na- 
tional Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy." The 
"Foreign Relations" series has been published continu- 
ously since 1861 as the official record of American 
foreign policy. 

This volume contains 945 pages of previously unpub- 
lished documentation (largely newly declassified) on the 
regulation of armaments, atomic energy, national secu- 
rity policy, defense of the Western Hemisphere, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, foreign finan- 
cial policies of the United States, law of the sea, and 
Antarctica. Extensive coverage is given to the prepara- 
tion and refinement of report NSC [National Security 
Council] 68, "United States Objectives and Programs 
for National Security," and to the evolution of U.S. se- 
curity policies in light of the emergency conditions 
created by the Korean War. The volume also contains 
documentation on the continuing examination of U.S. 
policy regarding the regulation of armaments and 
atomic energy in view of the failure of disarmament 
negotiations at the United Nations. 

"Foreign Relations," 1950, volume I, was prepared in 
the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Department of State. Volume I is the fourth volume for 
1950 to be published. The three remaining volumes for 
the year are in preparation. Copies of volume I (De- 
partment of State publication 8887) may be obtained for 
$11.00 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders 
should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents 
and should be sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, 
Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



164 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX August 1, 1977 Vol. LXXVII, No. 1988 



Arms Control and Disarmament 

Controlling Arms Transfers: An Instrument of 
U.S. Foreign Policy (Benson) 155 

Interview With President Carter by Media Repre- 
sentatives, June 24 (excerpts) 159 

President Carter's News Conference of June 30 
(excerpts) 146 

Asia. America's Role in Consolidating a Peaceful 
Balance and Promoting Economic Growth in 
Asia (Vance) 141 

China. President Carter's News Conference of 
June 30 (excerpts) 146 

Economic Affairs. President Signs 1977 Amend- 
ments to Export Administration Act (Carter, 
fact sheet) 162 

Human Rights 

America's Role in Consolidating a Peaceful Bal- 
ance and Promoting Economic Growth in Asia 
(Vance) 141 

Controlling Arms Transfers: An Instrument of 
U.S. Foreign Policy (Benson) 155 

President Carter's News Conference of June 30 
(excerpts) 146 

Middle East 

Interview With President Carter by Media Repre- 
sentatives, June 24 (excerpts) 159 

President Carter's News Conference of June 30 
(excerpts) 146 

Panama. President Carter's News Conference of 
June 30 (excerpts) 146 

Presidential Documents 

Interview With President Carter by Media Repre- 
sentatives, June 24 (excerpts) 159 

President Carter's News Conference of June 30 
(excerpts) 146 

President Perez of Venezuela Visits the United 
States (Carter, Perez, texts of communiques) . . 151 

President Signs 1977 Amendments to Export Ad- 
ministration Act (Carter, fact sheet) 162 

Publications. 1950 "Foreign Relations" Volume: 
National Security, Economic Policy 164 

Treaty Information 

Current Treaty Actions 163 

United States and United Kingdom Sign New 
Fisheries Agreement 154 



U.S.S.R. 

Interview With President Carter by Media Repre- 
sentatives, June 24 (excerpts) 159 

President Carter's News Conference of June 30 
(excerpts) 146 

United Kingdom. United States and United King- 
dom Sign New Fisheries Agreement 154 

Venezuela. President Perez of Venezuela Visits 
the United States (Carter, Perez, texts of com- 
muniques) 151 

Name Index 

Benson, Lucy Wilson 155 

Carter, President 146, 151, 159, 162 

Perez, Carlos Andres 151 

Vance, Secretary 141 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 1 1-17 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

"■328 7/11 William V. Shannon sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Ireland (biographic 
data). 

*329 7/11 Marvin L. Warner sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Switzerland (biographic 
data). 

'*330 7/11 27 international energy experts visit 
the U.S. 

*331 7/12 Philip M. Kaiser sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Hungary (biographic data). 

*332 7/12 U.S., Belgium renew memorandum of 
understanding on passenger charter 
air services. 

*333 7/12 Shipping Coordinating Committee, 
Subcommittee on Safety of Life at 
Sea, working group on radiocom- 
munications, Aug. 15. 

*334 7/15 Leonard Woodcock sworn in as Chief, 
U.S. Liaison Office, Peking, July 11 
(biographic data). 

* Not printed. 



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXVII • No. 1989 • August 8, 1977 



THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA: 

BUILDING POSITIVE RELATIONS 

Address by Secretary Vance 165 

PLANNING A SAFEGUARDABLE NUCLEAR FUTURE 
Address by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 183 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



7> 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXXVII, No. 1989 
August 8, 1977 



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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
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ment, and statements, addresses, and 
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United States is or may become a party 
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Publications of the Department of 
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international relations are also listed. 



The United States and Africa: Building Positive Relations 



Addi-ess by Secretary Vance ^ 



This is a special occasion for me to meet 
with you and to discuss with you such an im- 
portant subject: American relations with 
Africa. 

Before I turn to our main topic, I would like 
to add a personal note about the man who has 
led this organization and who has been a voice 
for justice and freedom for nearly five dec- 
ades. I speak of Roy Wilkins [outgoing execu- 
tive director of the NAACP] — a personal 
friend, a man I have admired through the 
years. 

Roy Wilkins has not finished his work. 
There remains an important agenda which he 
helped fashion — an agenda of human rights 
and social justice. I know that President Car- 
ter and others in his Administration will con- 
tinue to seek his help, be inspired by his 
strength, and strive for what he believes to be 
just. 

While guiding the NAACP, Roy never lost 
sight of the importance which Africa has had 
for our nation. Africa matters very much to 
the United States. This is a fact more and 
more Americans are coming to understand. 

You in the NAACP have recognized this 
fact since the first days of your organization, 
almost 70 years ago — in sponsoring the first 
Pan African Congress in 1919; in your calls, 
during the days of the Marshall plan, for ef- 
fective assistance, as well, to Africa, the 
Caribbean, and other developing areas. 

We in a new Administration hope that we 
can show similar vision as we build our 
policies toward Africa. 

' Made before the annual convention of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) at St. Louis, Mo., on July 1, 1977 (text from 
press release 316). 



August 8, 1977 



We proceed from a basic proposition: that 
our policies must recognize the unique iden- 
tity of Africa. We can be neither right, nor 
effective, if we treat Africa simply as one part 
of the Third World, or as a testing ground of 
East- West competition. 

African reality is incredibly diverse. But 
out of this diversity comes a general fact of 
great importance: Africa has an enormous 
potential — in human talent, in resources to be 
developed, in energy to be harnessed. 

Let us consider how this is true in terms of 
our own national interests; for Africa's poten- 
tial is tied to our own. 

— The success or failure of the search for 
racial justice and peace in southern Africa will 
have profound effects among the American 
people. And our participation in that search is 
based on the values of our own society. 

— The role of the African nations at the 
United Nations, and in other multilateral 
bodies, is pivotal. One-third of the U.N. 
member states are African. 

— Africa's mineral and agricultural wealth 
already provides a substantial portion of our 
imports of such commodities as copper, cobalt, 
and manganese for our industries, and cocoa 
and coffee for our homes. And Africa supplies 
38 percent of our crude petroleum imports. 

— Our direct investment in sub-Saharan Af- 
rica has increased nearly sixfold over the past 
15 years; our trade now is almost 12 times 
what it was then. And the pattern of our trade 
with Africa includes an even larger share for 
black Africa. Trade with South Africa in 1960 
was 39 percent of our commerce with Africa; 
now, our trade with Nigeria alone is double 
the value of that with South Africa. 

— Beyond these political and economic ties 



165 



that bind our futures, there are the social and 
cultural links from which we have benefited 
greatly. Our society and culture are enriched 
by the heritage so many Americans find in Af- 
rica. We experience this enrichment every 
day — in our literature, our art, our music, and 
our social values. 

During the past few months, as we have 
considered the specific policies I will discuss 
today, a number of broad points have 
emerged. They define the general nature of 
our approach. 

First, the most effective policies toward Af- 
rica are affirmative policies. They should not 
be reactive to what other powers do, nor to 
crises as they arise. Daily headlines should 
not set our agenda for progress. A negative, 
reactive American policy that seeks only to 
oppose Soviet or Cuban involvement in Africa 
would be both dangerous and futile. Our best 
course is to help resolve the problems which 
create opportunities for external intervention. 

Second, our objective must be to foster a 
prosperous and strong Africa that is at peace 
with itself and at peace with the world. The 
long-term success of our African policy will 
depend more on our actual assistance to Afri- 
can development and our ability to help Afri- 
cans resolve their disputes than on maneuvers 
for short-term diplomatic advantage. 

Third, our policies should recognize and 
encourage African natioiialism. Having won 
independence, African nations will defend it 
against challenges from any source. If we try 
to impose American solutions for African 
problems, we may sow division among the Af- 
ricans and undermine their ability to oppose 
efforts at domination by others. We will not 
do so. 

Fourth, our policies must reflect our na- 
tional values. Our deep belief in human 
rights — political, economic, and social — leads 
us to policies that support their promotion 
throughout Africa. This means concern for in- 
dividuals whose rights are threatened any- 
where on the continent. And it means making 
our best effort peacefully to promote racial 
justice in southern Africa. In this we join the 
many African nations who, having won their 
freedom, are determined that all of Africa 
shall be free. 



Fifth, our ties with Africa are not only> 
political, but cultural and econoniic as well. 
It is the latter two that are most enduring. 

And finally, we will seek openness in our 
dealings with African states. We are willing 
to discuss any issue, African or global; to 
broaden our dialogue with African nations; 
and to try to work with them, even when we 
may not agree. 

Only thus can we promote our views with- 
out rancor. Our renewed relations with the 
People's Republic of the Congo, our experi- 
ence at the recent conference on southern Af- 
rica in Maputo [U.N. -sponsored International 
Conference in Support of the Peoples of Zim- 
babwe and Namibia, May 16-21], and our 
work with African delegations at the United 
Nations all demonstrate the value of this 
approach. 

In the end, of course, our Africa policy, will 
be judged by results, not intentions. 

Assistance for Human Needs 

One of Africa's principal concerns is that its 
basic human needs be met. Despite its vast 
resources, it is still one of the least developed 
areas of the world. Eighteen of the twenty- 
eight least developed countries in the world 
are African. 

We are prepared to help. 

In addition to our growing trade and in- 
vestment relationships with African nations, 
we are committed to providing economic as- 
sistance that will directly improve the lives of 
those most in need. Turning this principle into 
practice cannot be accomplished overnight. 
But it must be done. 

Our economic assistance to Africa is being 
increased from $271 million in fiscal year 1976 
to a projected $450 million in fiscal year 1978. 
We hope that assistance from our European 
friends will also increase, and expect to con- 
sult with them on how we all can make the 
most effective contributions. 

To help our aid reach rural villages, we will 
emphasize support for the development and 
sharing of appropriate technology and tech- 
niques. I have in mind such devices as small 
farm machinery now being manufactured in 
Senegal, Upper Volta, Mali, and elsewhere; 
hand-hydraulic palm oil presses in Nigeria; 



have sat 
;di 
port for 
Irj-toasi 
Luppro] 
Weal: 
states fi 
thi 



166 



Department of State Bulletin 



""'j and basic agricultural extension methods that 
"*". lave succeeded in one nation and could be 
'8 applied in another. We will also expand sup- 
' "'"■ sort for agricultural research in Africa and 
''jn? try to assure that our own technical assistance 
■'His appropriate to African requirements. 
*; We also acknowledge the needs of African 
"«'e states for advanced techniques that will en- 
able them to develop and process more of 
iiith. their own natural resources. 



the 



^Af. 



SOI 



ght, 



Our Agency for International Development, 
headed by Governor [John J.] Gilligan, is de- 
termined to cut down on red tape in approving 
assistance projects, so it can respond quickly 
and effectively. Greater attention will be 
given to projects which can be started quickly 
and require minimal outside technical assist- 
ance or e.xpensive equipment. 

Men and women are more important than 
machines. Africa's natural resources will be 
developed by Africa's people. Human de- 
velopment is thus the key to Africa's future. 
While we will provide additional opportunities 
for Africans to study here, emphasis will be 
on programs of training and education in 
Africa. 

We must also remember the importance of 
Africa's infrastructure. It is a vast continent, 
and improved transport and communications 
are essential to its welfare. 

I am aware, as I indicate these directions 
for our programs, how tempting, but mista- 
ken, it would be to design blueprints for 
another continent's development. We can only 
work effectively if we work cooperatively with 
African governments in behalf of their de- 
velopment priorities. Accordingly, we will 
seek to increase our contribution to the Afri- 
can Development Fund. And we are request- 
ing from the Congress $200 million for the 
Sahel, to be managed in coordination with the 
Club du Sahel. 

The long drought in the Sahel devastated 
the economies of some of the poorest countries 
in the world. Now these countries are working 
together to become self-sufficient in food pro- 
duction and to develop the ability to withstand 
future droughts. 

In the Club du Sahel, the African states 
plan together for the region. The donor na- 
tions participate in the planning and deter- 
mine how each can assist most effectively. 

August 8, 1977 



They then commit the resources necessary to 
meet their goals. In this process, we are dis- 
covering the great value of encouraging coor- 
dination among African states; of planning 
with them and with other donors; and of con- 
centrating on regional problems rather than 
isolated projects. For it will be essential that 
sensible and effective programs be planned 
and implemented. 

America can fully support African develop- 
ment only if we meet the kind of commitments 
I have outlined. I hope that every citizen with 
an interest in Africa will make it clear, to the 
Congress and to us in the executive branch, 
that he or she wants those commitments met. 

Promotion of Human Rights 

While we address the reality of human need 
in Africa, we must also do what we can in be- 
half of human justice there. 

We will be firm in our support of individual 
human rights. Our concern is not limited to 
any one region of the continent. 

We must understand the diversity of Afri- 
can social and value systems. Gross violations 
of individual human dignity are no more ac- 
ceptable in African terms than in ours. One of 
the most significant events in modern African 
history — and in the international effort to 
promote human rights — was the recent deci- 
sion by Commonwealth countries to condemn 
the "massive violation of human rights" in 
Uganda. Many African nations took part in 
this decision. Their action should be 
applauded. 

Abuse of human rights is wrong on any 
grounds. It is particularly offensive when it is 
on the basis of race. In southern Africa, issues 
of race, of justice, and of self-determination 
have built to a crisis. 

—The conflict in Rhodesia is growing. 
Rhodesian incursions into neighboring coun- 
tries exacerbate an already dangerous situa- 
tion and deserve the condemnation they have 
received. The choice between negotiated set- 
tlement and violent solution must be made 
now. The same is true for Namibia. Many 
lives — black and white — hang in the balance. 

— The risk of increased foreign involvement 
is real. 

— Violence within South Africa grows. 

167 



There may be more time there than in 
Rhodesia and Namibia for people of goodwill 
to achieve a solution. But progress must soon 
be made, or goodwill could be lost. 

— Crisis within the region has brought pres- 
sure for stronger action at the United Na- 
tions, and appeals to our responsibilities 
under its charter. 

This is the reality we face. The dangers, our 
interests, and our values, as well as the de- 
sires of the Africans themselves, require our 
involvement — and our most dedicated and 
practical efforts. 

We cannot impose solutions in southern Af- 
rica. We cannot dictate terms to any of the 
parties; our leverage is limited. 

But we are among the few governments in 
the world that can talk to both white and 
black Africans frankly and yet with a measure 
of trust. We would lose our ability to be help- 
ful if we lost that trust. It is therefore essen- 
tial that our policies of encouraging justice for 
people of all races in southern Africa be clear 
to all. 

After careful consideration, this Adminis- 
tration has decided to pursue actively solu- 
tions to all three southern African 
problems — Rhodesia, Namibia, and the situa- 
tion within South Africa itself. These prob- 
lems must be addressed together, for they are 
intertwined. 

Some have argued that apartheid in South 
Africa should be ignored for the time being, in 
order to concentrate on achieving progress on 
Rhodesia and Namibia. Such a policy would be 
wrong and would not work. 

— It would be blind to the reality that the 
beginning of progress must be made soon 
within South Africa, if there is to be a possi- 
bility of peaceful solutions in the longer run; 

— It could mislead the South Africans about 
our real concerns; 

— It would prejudice our relations with our 
African friends; 

— It would do a disservice to our own be- 
liefs; and 

— It would discourage those of all races who 
are working for peaceful progress within 
South Africa. 

We believe that we can effectively influence 



South Africa on Rhodesia and Namibia while ■ 
expressing our concerns about apartheid. Im- 
plicit in that belief is the judgment that prog- 
ress in all three areas is strongly in the inter- 
est of the South African Government. 

We believe that whites as well as blacks 
must have a future in Namibia, Zimbabwe, 
and South Africa. We also believe that their 
security lies in progress. Intransigence will 
only lead to greater insecurity. 

We will welcome and recognize positive ac- 
tion by South Africa on each of these three 
issues. But the need is real for progress on all 
of them. 

Let me review briefly our approach to each. 

Rhodesia 

We are actively supporting a British initia- 
tive to achieve a negotiated settlement of the 
Rhodesian crisis. In coming weeks, we will be 
seeking agreement on a constitution that 
would allow free elections, open to all parties 
and in which all of voting age could participate 
equally. These elections would establish the 
government of an independent Zimbabwe. 
Our goal is that this be accomplished during 
1978. 

This constitution should include a justiciable 
bill of rights and an independent judiciary, so 
that the rights of all citizens, of all races, are 
protected. 

We also hope to lend greater assistance to 
the peoples of neighboring nations whose lives 
have been disrupted by the crisis in southern 
Africa. 

Namibia 

In Namibia a solution leading to independ- 
ence is being sought through the efforts of the 
five Western members of the Security Coun- 
cil, with South Africa, the United Nations, 
and other interested parties, including the 
South West Africa People's Organization. 
That solution would include free elections in 
which the United Nations is involved, free- 
dom for political prisoners, repeal of 
discriminatory laws and regulations, and the 
withdrawal of instruments of South African 
authority as the elections are held and inde- 
pendence achieved. 



168 



Department of State Bulletin 



On the basis of our discussions thus far, we 
are encouraged by the prospects for an inde- 
pendent Namibia, one which will take its 
rightful place in the African and world com- 
munity. We welcome the indications of flexi- 
bility on the part of South Africa. We are 
gratified by the confidence shown by many 
African governments in the efforts of the 
United States and Western associates on the 
Security Council. Differences remain, how- 
ever, and progress will require a willingness 
on all sides to be openminded and forthcom- 
ing. But we will persevere. 

South Africa 

While pursuing these efforts for peace and 
justice in Namibia and Rhodesia, we have also 
expressed to the South African Government 
our firm belief in the benefits of a progressive 
transformation of South African society. This 
would mean an end to racial discrimination 
and the establishment of a new course toward 
full political participation by all South 
Africans. 

The specific form of government through 
which this participation could be expressed is 
a matter for the people of South Africa to de- 
cide. There are many ways in which the indi- 
vidual rights of all citizens within South Af- 
rica could be protected. The key to the future 
is that South African citizens of all races now 
begin a dialogue on how to achieve this better 
future. 

The South African Government's policy of 
establishing separate homelands for black 
South Africans was devised without reference 
to the wishes of the blacks themselves. For 
this reason, and because we do not believe it 
constitutes a fair or viable solution to South 
Africa's problems, we oppose this policy. We 
did not recognize the Transkei, and we will 
not recognize Bophuthatswana if its inde- 
pendence is proclaimed in December, as 
scheduled. 

We deeply hope that the South African 
Government will play a progressive role on 
the three issues I have discussed. We will 
applaud such efforts. If there is no progress, 
our relations will inevitably suffer. 

We cannot defend a government that is 



August 8, 1977 



based on a system of racial domination and 
remain true to ourselves. For our policy to- 
ward South Africa is reinforced by change in 
our own society. The activities of the NAACP 
are a testament to the inseparability of our 
foreign and domestic goals. It is also entirely 
fitting that Andy Young [U.S. Ambassador to 
the United Nations], who has done so much in 
the struggle against our divisions at home, 
should now be contributing so well to the 
design and effectiveness of our policies a- 
broad. 

I have heard some suggest that we must 
support the white governments in southern 
Africa, come what may, since they are anti- 
Communist. In fact, the continued denial of 
racial justice in southern Africa encourages 
the possibilities for outside intervention. 

Similarly, when such crises as the recent 
invasion of Zaire arise, we see no advantage 
in unilateral responses and emphasizing their 
East-West implications. We prefer to work 
with African nations, and with our European 
allies, in positive efforts to resolve such dis- 
putes. As President Carter recently said, it is 
best to fight fire with water. 

The history of the past 15 years suggests 
that efforts by outside powers to dominate 
African nations will fail. Our challenge is to 
find ways of being supportive without becom- 
ing interventionist or intrusive. 

We see no benefit if we interject ourselves 
into regional disputes. We hope that they can 
be resolved through the diplomatic efforts of 
the parties themselves in an African setting. 

We are aware of the African concern that 
we have sometimes seemed more interested in 
the activities of other outside powers in Africa 
than in Africa itself. They know that some 
argue we should almost automatically re- 
spond in kind to the increase in Soviet arms 
and Cuban personnel in Africa. 

We cannot ignore this increase — and we op- 
pose it. All sides should be aware that when 
outside powers pour substantial quantities of 
arms and military personnel into Africa, it 
greatly enhances the danger that disputes will 
be resolved militarily rather than through 
mediation by African states or by the OAU 
[Organization of African Unity]. 

This danger is particularly great in the 



169 



Horn, where there has been an escalation of 
arms transfers from the outside. The current 
difficulties in Ethiopia, and the tensions 
among nations in the area, present complex 
diplomatic challenges. We seek friendship 
with all the governments of that region. We 
have established an embassy in the new nation 
of Djibouti. Its peaceful accession to inde- 
pendence marks a step toward stability in 
what remains a troubled area. 

We will consider sympathetically appeals 
for assistance from states which are 
threatened by a buildup of foreign military 
equipment and advisers on their borders, in 
the Horn and elsewhere in Africa. But we 
hope such local arms races and the consequent 
dangers of deepening outside involvement can 
be limited. 

In accordance with the policy recently an- 
nounced by the President, arms transfers to 
Africa will be an exceptional tool of our policy 
and will be used only after the most careful 
consideration. 

We hope that all the major powers will join 
us in supporting African nationalism, rather 
than fragmenting it, and in concentrating on 
economic assistance rather than arms. 

Our approach is to build positive relations 
with the Africans primarily through support 
for their political independence and economic 
development and through the strengthening 
of our economic, cultural, and social ties. Our 



new and positive relationships with nations 
like Nigeria encourage us in this course. Our 
efforts to build such relations may not seize 
the headlines. But this quiet strategy will 
produce long-term benefits. 

Our relations will be closest with those na- 
tions whose views and actions are most con- 
gruent with ours. We will never forget or take 
old friends for granted. Their continuing 
friendship is a fundamental concern; they can 
rely on our support. When the territorial in- 
tegrity of a friendly state is threatened, we 
will continue to respond to requests for ap- 
propriate assistance. 

We do not insist that there is only one road 
to economic progress or one way of expressing 
the political will of a people. In so diverse a 
continent, we must be prepared to work with 
peoples and governments of distinctive and 
differing beliefs. 

American representatives in Africa met last 
May to compare notes and discuss new policy 
ideas. They agreed that almost everywhere in 
the continent there is a new feeling about 
America — a sense of hope, a sense that we 
have returned to our ideals. 

The future of Africa will be built with Afri- 
can hands. Our interests and our ideals will be 
served as we offer our own support. It will 
require the understanding and approval 
of this audience, and of Americans every- 
where. 



Questions and Answers Following Secretary Vance's Address 
Before the NAACP, July ' 



Q. I ivas pleased to hear you, Secretary 
Vance, talking about Africa. That's fine about 
Africa, but we have a lot of Afncans here in 
America. What are you going to do for us that 
are living here, staying here, and who intend 



' Opening remarks by William H. Oliver of the Board 
of Directors of the NAACP are omitted here (te.xt from 
press release 316-A dated July 2). 



to die here? What about us? I didn't hear you 
say anything about what you're going to do 
for us, who are being deyiied right here under 
your feet. [Applause.] 

Secretary Vance: For the rest of you who 
might not have been able to hear, the question 
was a statement first that I had spoken much 
about what we were going to do for Africa and 



170 



Department of State Bulletin 



the people who live in Africa, and a specific 
question: What are we going to do for those 
here in the United States? 

One of the greatest concerns of our Presi- 
dent is to deal with the many existing prob- 
lems which exist here in our country. These 
domestic problems are not within my sphere 
of activity, but I can say a few words about 
them. 

The concerns are many and varied. They re- 
late to problems of the poor in our country, as 
they do to the poor in other countries such as 
Africa to which I have referred during my 
remarks. And I can assure you that this Ad- 
ministration is devoting intense study to how 
to best meet these many, many problems of 
the poor in our country. 

There are a variety of programs which are 
being discussed now, both in the Congress and 
in the Administration itself. I do not consider 
myself enough of an expert in those fields to 
deal with them in the fashion in which they 
should be addressed, but I can assure you that 
the concern is there. The concern is in the 
President, his Cabinet, and I believe that it 
exists clearly also on Capitol Hill. And we 
realize that we must address these problems 
and come up with solutions that meet them. 
[Applause.] 

Q. One of the national editorials on the 
television said that some weeks ago Ambas- 
sador [to the United Nations Andrew] Young 
was removed from one of the policymaking 
committees of decisionmakei's because of the 
pressure placed on the Carter Administration 
and because of alleged outspoken views of Mr. 
Young. Arid you indicated that he is continu- 
ally going to be used in policymaking 
situations. 

I'd like to knoiv which foreign policy com- 
mittee was he removed from, and what can we 
do to get him back on there? 

Secretary Vance: Let me repeat the ques- 
tion. The questioner said that he understood 
from — I believe it was a program he had seen 
either on television or heard on the radio — 
that Andy Young had been removed from one 
of the policymaking committees which deals 
with foreign policy. 

That is not correct. Andy has not been re- 



moved from any committee. [Applause.] Andy 
is playing a full part in all committees. 
[Applause.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in these United States we 
have millions of black Americans who are 
American citizens here. We are wondering if 
the aid that you mentioned to Africa would be 
tantamount to the $13.A billion that was ex- 
pended after World War II by the Marshall 
plan. Will we have a plan in Africa tan- 
tamount to the Marshall plan? 

Secretary Vance: The question was, will we 
in Africa have a plan in terms of economic as- 
sistance which is tantamount to that which 
was developed in connection with the Marshall 
plan after World War II? 

The answer is that we do not have the funds 
for such a plan at this time. We have, how- 
ever, indicated that we intend to substantially 
increase the amount of our foreign assistance. 
We have made that statement, and we have 
begun to discuss that with the appropriate 
Members of the Congress. Whatever program 
we come up with, it will require the approval 
of the Congress, and it is incumbent upon us 
and incumbent upon the constituents of the 
Congress to persuade them that substantial 
increases in foreign aid, and particularly to 
countries in continents such as Africa, are of 
fundamental importance. 

I believe — this Administration believes — 
that this is fundamental, not only in terms of 
our foreign policy, but in terms of our own 
self-interest. And therefore, we are going to 
do everything within our power to substan- 
tially increase the funds devoted to foreign 
assistance. [Applause.] 

Q. My question is: In Vienna, during the 
conference between Vice President Mondale 
and South Africa's Prime Minister Vorster, 
what items were discussed; and on these 
items, what points did Vice President Mon- 
dale and Prime Minister Vorster agree on, 
and what items did they disagree on? 

Secretary Vance: The question was, in the 
conference which took place in Vienna be- 
tween the Vice President and Prime Minister 
Vorster, what items were discussed and which 
items did they reach agreement on and on 
which did they fail to agree? 



August 8, 1977 



171 



The items which were discussed were ba- 
sically three in nature: Rhodesia, Namibia, 
and South Africa. There was a good deal of 
agreement reached on the first two issues. 
There was a sharp division and a lack of 
agreement upon the issue of South Africa. 

What I said today essentially reflects the 
same kinds of things that Vice President 
Mondale said during that conference in 
Vienna. [Applause.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, unemployment is ram- 
pant throughout the United States, and it af- 
fects the minorities the greatest. 

In terms of the import of cars coming into 
the United States, what control does the State 
Department have, or what control can they 
engender, over this situation which affects the 
employment of Americans when these imports 
are corning in and are cutting down on the 
production of cars? 

We notice, for example, that Volkswagen in 
Pennsylvania and other cities in the United 
States make cars here, but they discriminate 
against minorities. And we think if a foreign 
country comes here and makes cars, they 
should have an open policy in the hiring of 
minorities, and we want to know what the 
State Department can do with respect to re- 
ducing our unemployment rate here in the 
United States. 

Secretary Vance: The question was, what 
effect, if any, does the State Department have 
with respect to importation policies, particu- 
larly the importation of foreign cars into the 
United States? 

Those policies are determined by two basic 
sources — one, by treaties which have been 
negotiated with foreign countries and in in- 
ternational organizations, such as the multina- 
tional trade conference which is currently 
going on in Geneva. And the other part, of 
course, is in domestic legislation, which may 
specifically affect specific commodities. 

There is really quite little that the State 
Department has to do with this. This is ba- 
sically a matter which is determined by the 
question of the overall government policy, in 
which we have an input which deals with the 
question of what our trade policies will be. We 
have an input, but that is a combined govern- 



ment program and policy-formulating 
process — and also by what takes place in 
terms of actual legislation developed on the 
Hill. We have a say, but we are not the ulti- 
mate determinant. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there anything ivithin 
the power of the Department to have any influ- 
ence upon the terrible treatment that has been 
accorded to young people, children, in Soweto 
and other parts of South Africa, who are pro- 
testing the system there? I've never seen such 
brutality against young people, children. 

Secretary Vance: The question was, what, if 
anything, can the State Department do about 
the treatment of young people — the inhuman 
treatment which has occurred in Soweto? 

The answer to that is we have made our 
views very clearly known on this issue to the 
South African Government and have ex- 
pressed our views publicly on those issues. 
That is the general nature of how we can 
bring our views and our convictions to bear. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your address this 
morning you mentioned specifically about a 
new direction and a new thrust on educa- 
tional programs iyi Africa. You mentioned 
that not only would Africans perhaps come to 
the United States, as they have in the past, 
but there would be an emphasis on having 
scholars in America perhaps study in Africa. 

Could you expand upon that to suggest the 
dimensions of something like the Fulbright 
fellowship program that could give great im- 
petus to the intercultural expansion and un- 
derstanding, plus communications, that we so 
vitally yieed? [Applause.] 

Secretary Vance: The answer is that we are 
in the process of formulating specific sugges- 
tions and programs in this area. We have not 
completed our work yet. It would include 
some of the kinds of things that you are talk- 
ing about, and it would also include educa- 
tional programs at the primary and secondary 
level, as well as at the levels of higher educa- 
tion. [Applause.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will Andy Young be able 
to speak as he wants to and not be muzzled 
each time he makes a speech to come back to 
satisfy the ego of certain ivhite nations? Will 



172 



Department of State Bulletin 



he be able to speak without beivg muzzled 
down and then come back a)id make us poor 
folk to size and make it soioid a little better? 

Secretary Vance: Andy himself — the answer 
is, yes. 

Mr. Oliver: Could you hear the question? 

Voices: No. 

Secretary Vance: The question was, will 
Andy Young be able to speak his piece on 
whatever subject comes up, or will he be 
muzzled? 

The answer is Andy, of course, won't be 
muzzled. Andy will speak his piece as he has 
in the past. [Applause.] 

Mr. Oliver: This last part of this session is 
going to be devoted to questions from the 
press. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your speech just 
awhile ago you mentioned that our economic 
assistance to Africa has been increased $271 
million in 1976 to a projected $4^50 million in 
1978. Can you give us some specifics of how 
this will be spent? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. I could give you — the 
question made reference to the fact that I re- 
ferred in my speech to an increase from some 
$270 million to over $400 million in our assist- 
ance programs to Africa. And the question 
was, could I give some specifics? I gather the 
question is, where are the increases? 

The principal increases are in two areas. 
One is in the contribution to the Sahel fund, 
which I referred to. And the other is to a spe- 
cial southern Africa fund, which will be used 
to deal with the problems of southern Africa, 
and particularly those nations which have 
been suffering as a result of the fighting and 
other difficult problems which are affecting 
the lives of the people in southern Africa. 

Q. I wonder, Mr. Secretary , if the current 
political unrest in Ghana has resulted in a 
political upheaval? And if so, is this going to 
affect our aid to their country? 

Secretary Vance: I'm afraid I didn't hear 
your question. 

Q. Has the current political unrest in 
Ghana resulted in a political upheaval, and if 
it has, would this affect our aid to Ghana? 

August 8, 1977 



Secretary Vance: There has been no change 
in our situation with respect to aid to Ghana, 
and I really have nothing more to say on that 
at this point. 

Q. About the political unrest, can you speak 
to that? 

Secretary Vance: Not at this point, no. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your remarks you 
mentioned the conditions in what you call 
for — or what the govern ment has called for — a 
peaceful resolution to the crisis in Rhodesia, 
heading toward majority rule in 1978 and free 
elections by that time. 

hi essence, is this not the position that Ian 
Smith has agreed to, himself? And from what 
I understand, the nationalist leaders have 
called for a withdrawal of the white Rhode- 
sian army before any elections can take place 
and a democratization of the country before 
that time. Ajid what is the U.S. policy on the 
white Rhodesian army, relative to so-called 
free elections? 

Secretary Vance: The question is a rather 
long one. The question is, what is the differ- 
ence between what I had said about a pro- 
posed peaceful solution of the Rhodesian prob- 
lem as compared with what had been 
suggested by Mr. Smith? 

There are many, many differences between 
the two. What we and the British are trying 
to do is to develop a settlement which will 
provide for, first, the agi'eement on the basic 
constitution. That constitution would then 
have to go to the British and to the Rhodesian 
Parliaments to be approved. 

Secondly, there would be a transition period 
during which preparations would be made for 
an election. During that transition period 
there would have to be an interim government 
which would be governing Rhodesia. That 
government would require a law and order 
force to support it. 

The suggestions which we and the British 
have made are that that force would probably 
require outside police forces to make sure that 
this was properly carried out. 

There are various ways that this might be 
done — aid by a U.N. police-type force or by, 
say, a Commonwealth force that could act as 
the law and order force during that period of 



173 



time. But this would then all lead to elections 
in which all people would have a vote. And the 
result of that would determine who the lead- 
ers would be. 

Q. I would like to know specifically which 
types of aid are being giveyi and in which 
area. In other words, hoiv much of it is eco- 
nomic, how much is nnlitary, and how much 
of it is so-called advisory — such as Peace 
Corps experts — you know, something along 
that line? 

Secretary Vance: I cannot give you all the 
precise details on that. The four hundred and 
fifty plus million that I was talking about is all 
economic assistance. I did not talk anything in 
terms of military assistance at that time. I do 
not have with me the specific figures on mili- 
tary assistance, but it is really quite small. 
There are only a few countries which are re- 
ceiving specific military assistance, and in 
most cases the military assistance is through 
foreign military sales and not through grant 
aid. 

Q. And what about this advisory or the 
other? Is that included in the economic? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, that's included in 
economic. 

Mr. Oliver: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 



President's News Conference 
of July 12 

Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a news confer- 
ence held by President Carter on July 12.^ 

The President: Good afternoon, everybody. 
Do you have any questions? [Laughter.] Ms. 
Thomas [Helen Thomas, United Press Inter- 
national]. 

Q. Mr. President, how do you reconcile 
your decision to go ahead with the Jieutron 
bomb with your inaugural pledge to eliminate 



' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents dated July 18, 1977, p. 985. 



all nuclear weapons? Also, why didn't you 
knojv the money was in the bill? And three, 
doesn't this escalate the arms race? And I 
have afollowup. [Laughter.] 

The President: Well, it's a very serious 
question. In the first place, I did not know 
what was in the bill. The enhanced radiation 
of the neutron bomb has been discussed and 
also has been under development for 15 or 20 
years. It's not a new concept at all, not a new 
weapon. 

It does not affect our SALT, or strategic 
weapons, negotiations at all. It's strictly de- 
signed as a tactical weapon. I think that this 
would give us some flexibility. 

I have not yet decided whether to advocate 
deployment of the neutron bomb. I think the 
essence of it is that for a given projectile size 
or for a given missilehead size, that the de- 
struction that would result from the explosion 
of a neutron bomb is much less than the de- 
struction from an equivalent weapon of other 
types. 

The essence of the question is that if the 
neutron weapon or atomic weapon ever should 
have to be used against enemy forces in oc- 
cupied territory of our allies or ourselves, the 
destruction would be much less. 

Before I make a final decision on the neu- 
tron bomb's deployment, I would do a com- 
plete impact statement analysis on it, submit 
this information to the Congi'ess. But I have 
not yet decided whether to approve the neu- 
tron bomb. I do think it ought to be one of our 
options, however. 

Q. Mr. President, if you decided to go 
ahead, would you renounce the first use of the 
bomb? For example, you would not use it un- 
less there was an oppressive enemy action? 

The President: This is something that I 
have not yet decided. Of course we hope that 
we can reach an agreement among all nations 
in the future to forgo the use of all atomic 
weapons and also to eliminate the possession 
of all nuclear weapons. 

There are two distinct classes of weapons. 
One is the tactical weapons which have not 
been under the purview of discussions with 
the Soviets or others. The other one is the 
strategic nuclear weapons. 



i 



174 



Department of State Bulletin 



But the definition of under what circum- 
stances we would use such atomic weapons 
has not yet been spelled out publicly. I ob- 
viously hope that our continuing inclination 
toward peace, shared, I'm sure, by the 
Soviets and others, will prevent any use of 
atomic weapons. They are there as a deter- 
rent, however, and the option for their use 
has to be maintained as one of the viable op- 
tions. 

Q. Mr. President, may I go back to the 
neutron bomb? 

The President: Please. 

Q. How much do you think there is to the 
argument that if you have a cleaner weapon, 
as you define it, it makes war more possible; 
that it might be used? And secondly, where do 
you stand on that age-old question of nuclear 
weapons in Europe, for instance, as to 
whether if you start using them it wouldn't 
automatically escalate to a full-scale nuclear 
war? 

The President: I think one of the concepts 
that must be avoided is an exact description 
ahead of time of what I, as President, would 
do under every conceivable circumstance. 

The ownership of atomic weapons and their 
potential use is such a horrifying prospect — 
their use — that it is a deterrent to a major 
confrontation between nations who possess 
atomic weapons. 

I believe that the nation that uses atomic 
weapons first would be under heavy condem- 
nation from the other peoples of the world, 
unless the circumstances were extremely 
gross, such as an unwarranted invasion into 
another country. 

But I'm eager to work with the Soviet 
Union, with China, with France, with Eng- 
land, on a continuing basis, so that there will 
never be a need for the use of those weapons. 

To answer the other part of your question, 
my guess is — and no one would certainly 
know — that the first use of atomic weapons 
might very well quickly lead to a rapid and 
uncontrolled escalation in the use of even 
more powerful weapons with possibly a 
worldwide holocaust resulting. 

This is a prospect that is sobering to us all. 



and that's why the Soviets and we and others 
have worked so hard to try to reach an 
agreement in the prohibition against atomic 
use. 

Q. Sir, could I just follow it up with 07te 
question? Doesn't that give you a terrible 
paradox? Because if we are inferior on the 
ground in Europe ivith the Soviet and Warsaw 
Pact forces, if we don't use atomic weapons, 
can we and our NATO alliance stop a ground 
invasion? 

The President: My guess is and my belief is 
that without the use of atomic weapons, we 
have adequate force strength in NATO to stop 
an invasion from the Warsaw Pact forces. 

There is some advantage in the commitment 
and effectiveness of the forces of a defending 
nation if they are fighting on their own in- 
vaded territory. And I think this would mean 
that in a rough balance that the invading na- 
tions would have to have an overwhelming 
superior force. 

We are now putting, as a much greater 
priority in our budget request for defense ex- 
penditures, moneys for improving our conven- 
tional forces in Europe. In years gone by, 15 
or 20 years ago, we had an overwhelming 
superiority in nuclear weapons. Now I would 
say we have a roughly equivalent strength in 
atomic weapons. And so, we must insure that 
within the bounds of measurement that our 
conventional forces are equivalent also. And I 
don't acknowledge at all the fact that an inva- 
sion of the Warsaw Pact nations would be suc- 
cessful without the use of atomic weapons. 

Q. Mr. President, Senator Moynihayi of 
Neiv York says that the government, both the 
Ford Administration and yours, has avoided 
telling American citizens that they are the 
subject of massive eavesdropping on the part 
of the Soviet Union. If the Senator is correct, 
ivhy has the government not alerted American 
citizens to the situation ? 

Second, do you plan to demand that the 
Soviets withdraw their rooftop electronic 
equipment? And third, if they do not, will 
there be diplomatic reprisals? 

The President: Senator Moynihan, as you 
know, has been a member of the Nixon Ad- 
ministration in the past in a very high official 



August 8, 1977 



175 



position, and he is well able to judge the 
knowledge that was possessed by that Admin- 
istration. 

I think it's accurate to say that any detailed 
discussion of the electronics capabilities of dif- 
ferent nations' intelligence forces is not a 
proper subject for complete discussion. 

Within the last number of years, because of 
the radio transmission of telephone conversa- 
tions, the intercept on a passive basis of these 
kinds of transmissions has become a common 
ability for nations to pursue. It's not an act of 
aggression or war; it's completely passive. 

I don't know the full circumstances in- 
volved. When I became President, I asked to 
have a multidepartmental assessment of the 
threat to our own security. We have been em- 
barked since I've been in office — and I think 
before — in an effort to make impervious to 
intercept those telephone lines that were in- 
volved directly in national security. 

For instance, the lines going into and out of 
the Defense Department and my own 
office — we try to make sure that they are ca- 
bles; they are buried underground; they are 
not subject to this electronics type of being 
overheard. 

Some of the major commercial companies in 
our nation who want to prevent any eaves- 
dropping on their transactions, commercial 
transactions, not involving national security, 
also make an attempt to prevent intercepts by 
those who listen in on the free air waves. 

But I would not interpret this use by the 
Soviet Union or by other embassies to be an 
act of aggression. And although it may be an 
intrusion into our security, I think we are tak- 
ing adequate steps now to prevent its creating 
a threat to our country. 

Q. Mr. President, what do you make of all 
the unfriendly rhetoric coming out of Moscow 
lately? And do your sources suggest that it 
may not just be because of your human rights 
campaign? 

The President: I don't know how to explain 
the unfriendly rhetoric. Our proposals have 
been fair and reasonable, and almost all of 
them have been made public. We have pur- 
sued our hopes for increased friendship with 
the Soviet Union, a reduction in nuclear 



weaponry, an easing of the tensions between 
ourselves and the Soviets through quiet dip- 
lomatic channels, with myself talking to the 
Soviet Ambassador, with Cy Vance, the Sec- 
retary of State, going to Moscow, and in con- 
tinuing negotiations at Geneva and other 
places by Paul Warnke [Director, U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency and chair- 
man of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks] and other representa- 
tives of me. I believe that the Soviets, 
perhaps, have some political reasons for spel- 
ling out or exaggerating the disagreements. I 
don't know what those reasons are. 

Our positions have been carefully contrived 
and constantly reassessed. I have no inclina- 
tion to change the positions that we have tak- 
en; I think they are fair. And I believe that 
calm and persistent and fair negotiations with 
the Soviet Union will ultimately lead to in- 
creased relationships with them. 

And the public statements that the Soviets 
make, attacking me personally or our own na- 
tion's good faith, are both erroneous and ill- 
advised. But Vv'hat their reasons for it might 
be, I do not know. 

Q. Mr. President, with Mr. Begin coming 
to visit, I'd like to ask a question about the 
Middle East, a two-part question. 

When you talk about the necessity for a 
Palestinian homeland, are you thinking of 
locating that homela)id in territory that at one 
time was Palestine, or in your mind, could it 
be located anywhere? 

The second part of the questioyi is: Do you 
still believe, as you said a few iveeks ago, that 
Israel eventually must withdraw with only 
minor changes to the pre-1967 borders? 

The President: I have not changed my opin- 
ion since the earlier statements that I made 
concerning the general outline of terms to be 
sought at a possible Geneva conference. 

We have never tried to define geographical 
boundaries for a so-called Palestinian entity. 
My own preference, which I have expressed 
since I've been President and also as a candi- 
date, was that the Palestinian entity, what- 
ever form it might take and whatever area it 
might occupy, should be tied in with Jordan 
and not be independent. But I don't have the 
authority nor the inclination to try to impose 



1 



\ 



{ 



176 



Department of State Bulletin 



that preference on the parties that will 
negotiate. 

I think that in his coming over here to our 
country next week, on the 19th, that Prime 
Minister Begin is trying to bring with him an 
open mind and an ability to go to a possible 
peace conference with all items being negoti- 
able. He said this publicly, and he's also sent 
me private messages to that effect. 

I've seen an inclination in the Middle East 
in recent days toward an alleviation of ten- 
sion. I got a private message from President 
Sadat, for instance, that he is going to make 
every effort again to comply with the Sinai 
agreement. 

He had a few extra troops in the territory 
that had been identified. He's withdrawing 
those. He authorized me to announce that he's 
returning with full military honors 19 Israeli 
bodies that had been left in Egypt. He's ex- 
pressed his willingness to go to Geneva with- 
out prior commitments. He's had negotiations 
or talks lately with the King of Jordan, and 
they have agreed that the Palestinian entity 
ought to be tied in with Jordan. 

So, there's a general inclination on all par- 
ties for success, but I don't think it's advisable 
now for me to get any more specific than I 
have in the past. 

And although I haven't changed my posi- 
tion, I want to reemphasize that we are not 
going to go to the different nations involved 
and say, "This is an American plan. You've 
got to accept it as a precondition to going to 
Geneva. It's what we think would be fair." It's 
been deliberately general in nature, and the 
ultimate results would have to be agreed to by 
the Arab and Israeli nations. 



Q. Mr. President, could I get back to rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union? 

The President: Yes. 

Q. Despite the hopes that you expressed for 
better relations, there are several things that 
suggest that, in fact, relations have grown 
worse between the United States and the 
Soviet Union since you took office. Do you 
think that's the case, and if .so, where are we 
headed in this? Are we seeing an end to the 
period of detente? 



The President: No. I don't think so. I be- 
lieve that it's inherent that tough and public 
debates will accrue when controversial issues 
are addressed. It would be very easy for me 
and the Congress to get along completely 
harmoniously if I never made a proposal and if 
I agreed with everything the Congress did 
and we didn't address any of the controversial 
issues like welfare reform, tax reform, reor- 
ganization, or energy policy. 

The same thing applies to the Soviet Union. 
We have never before made an attempt with 
the Soviet Union drastically to reduce the 
level of atomic weaponry. In the past, we've 
put limits on increasing production of atomic 
weaponry. We've never tried with the Soviet 
Union to get a complete prohibition against all 
testing of atomic devices. Now we are trying 
to work with the Soviet Union to get this very 
controversial and very difficult goal realized. 

We've never tried before to work with the 
Soviet Union to demilitarize the Indian Ocean 
or to restrict any further militarization of that 
area. This is a controversial matter. It affects 
other nations as well — India, Australia, New 
Zealand, Iran, Somalia, and so forth. 

So, we are now trying to address some 
questions that in the past have been avoided 
or delayed. 

The question of human rights is one that 
obviously has caused some tough debate and 
difference of opinion, expressed publicly and 
privately. We could have sat quiescently and 
never raised the issue of human rights. I be- 
lieve that our raising of the issue was compat- 
ible with the hopes and dreams and inclina- 
tions and commitments of the American 
people. And there have been varying kinds of 
responses to this pursuit. 

We do not initiate all these controversies. 
As you know, the "basket" 3 aspect of the 
Helsinki agreement would have raised the 
human rights question to some degree, absent 
any commitment on my part.^ 

But I don't think that this is an indication of 
deteriorated relationships between us and the 
Soviets, because we are finally addressing in a 



^ For the text of the Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki 
on Aug. 1, 1975, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323; 
for "basket" 3, Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other 
Fields, see p. 339. 



August 8, 1977 



177 



forceful way, from different perspectives, 
some extremely controversial but important 
issues. 

So although I would like for us to agree on 
everything, I think the period of debate, dis- 
agreement, probing, and negotiation was in- 
evitable. And I have no apologies to offer, and 
I have no regrets about the issues that have 
been raised that have proven to be controver- 
sial. 

The press: Thank you, Mr. President. 



Federal German Chancellor Schmidt 
Visits Washington 

Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, made an official visit 
to Washington July 13-15, during which he 
met with President Carter and other govern- 
ment officials. Folloiving is a statement is- 
sued by the White House on July H.^ 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 18 

President Carter and the Chancellor of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut 
Schmidt, held three lengthy conversations 
during the Chancellor's official visit to Wash- 
ington, July 13-15. The Chancellor came to 
Washington at the President's invitation, and 
the President hosted a White House dinner 
for the Chancellor and his party on July 13. 
The three meetings between the President 
and the Chancellor covered a wide range of 
economic, political, and security issues in 
which the two nations share an interest. 
Those discussions followed on the meetings 
the President and Chancellor had in May at 
the London summit. In addition to the two 
scheduled meetings on Wednesday and 
Thursday mornings, the President met pri- 
vately with the Chancellor for about one hour 



• For an exchange of remarks between President 
Carter and Chancellor Schmidt at a welcoming cere- 
mony on the South Lawn of the White House and their 
exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White House on 
July 13, and for President Carter's remarks at the en- 
tertainment following the dinner, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated July 18, 1977, pp. 
995, 998, and 1002. 



Wednesday night following the state dinner. 

The President and the Chancellor em- 
phasized the closeness of the consultation be- 
tween their two governments and their basic 
agreement on major issues. They expressed 
the belief that the small differences between 
their governments in recent months have 
often become exaggerated in public accounts, 
and they committed themselves to be in direct 
touch with one another in the future to make 
sure that exaggeration does not recur. 

In their first meeting, the President and the 
Chancellor discussed the spectrum of relations 
between East and West, focusing on SALT 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], other arms 
control negotiations, and the upcoming fall 
meeting in Belgrade of the Conference on Se- 
curity and Cooperation in Europe. They also 
exchanged views on the situation in the Mid- 
dle East and on how to move forward with in- 
ternational efforts to reduce the risk of nu- 
clear proliferation, while still assuring all na- 
tions access to the nuclear energy they need. 
The President and the Chancellor also dis- 
cussed the importance of basic human rights 
and its role in international affairs. 

The second formal meeting between the two 
was devoted largely to MBFR [mutual and 
balanced force reductions] and economic is- 
sues. The Germans presented some thoughts 
on MBFR, and the two sides exchanged views 
on how to move the negotiations forward. 
With regard to economic issues, there was 
broad agreement. The Chancellor met on July 
13 with Secretary [of the Treasury W. 
Michael] Blumenthal, and the President em- 
phasized satisfaction, in his second formal 
meeting with the Chancellor, at the Federal 
Republic's efforts to assure domestic economic 
growth and deal with current accounts 
surpluses. The two men agreed on the impor- 
tance of economic stability to the political 
cohesion of the developed countries and to the 
prospects for progress in the dialogue be- 
tween the North and South. The President 
and the Chancellor also agreed on the need to 
move forward this year with international 
trade negotiations — expressing pleasure at 
the results of recent meetings between the 
President's Special Trade Representative, 
Robert Strauss, and the European 



178 



Department of State Bulletin 



Communities — to assure adequate interna- 
tional financing and to implement the com- 
mitments their countries and others under- 
took at the London summit in May. 

The Chancellor, who last visited the United 
States in July 1976 to celebrate the American 
Bicentennial, was accompanied by Mrs. 
Schmidt. His party also included leaders from 
German business, labor, and cultural life. At 
the conclusion of their last meeting, the Chan- 
cellor invited the President to visit Germany, 
and the President accepted in principle, indi- 
cating that he looked forward to a visit. 



Department Discusses CIEC 
and Developing-Country Debt 

Following is a statement by Robert J. 
Ryan, Jr., Director of the Office of Monetary 
Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Interna- 
tional Development of the House Committee 
on International Relations on June 29. ^ 

I am pleased to discuss the issue of 
developing-country debt in the Conference on 
International Economic Cooperation [CIEC, 
Paris, May 30-June 2], as part of your hear- 
ings on "Dollars, Diplomacy, and Develop- 
ment." 

As necessary background, I will first out- 
line the current debt situation of developing 
countries. The second part of my statement 
will encompass an assessment of the demands 
of developing countries in the debt area. I will 
then outline the handling of the debt question 
at CIEC, including particularly a summary of 
the proposals which the United States and the 
European Community (EC) made there. 

As you requested, I will also discuss the 
Special Action Program for low-income de- 
veloping countries which was agreed at CIEC. 
This program, however, is meant to meet the 
needs of low-income countries for additional 
resource transfers. It was not linked with the 
debt issue. 

Since 1973 higher oil prices and a substan- 
tial downturn in the industrial world have 
greatly complicated the balance-of-payments 
situation of non-oil-exporting developing 



countries. Their aggregate current account 
deficit amounted to only $11 bilHon in 1973. It 
reached $38 billion in 1975, before declining 
somewhat to roughly $28 billion last year. 

In order to preserve development momen- 
tum, while adjusting to the new situation, de- 
veloping countries have been financing these 
deficits by external borrowing on an unpre- 
cedented scale. The medium- and long-term 
indebtedness of non-oil developing nations 
rose from about $90 billion in 1974 to an esti- 
mated $145 bilhon in 1976. Their debt service 
payments reached roughly $21 billion in 1976, 
a 75-percent increase over 1973. 

Despite increased availabilities of official 
bilateral and multilateral financing, the mag- 
nitude of financing requirements turned many 
developing countries toward the private mar- 
ket. In 1975 and 1976 private markets 
supplied roughly one-half of the new credit to 
these nations. As a result roughly 40 percent 
of their outstanding debt is now attributable 
to commercial banks. 

While the numbers I have cited are unpre- 
cedented, we need to keep the debt situation 
of developing countries in perspective. 

In the first place a rising level of indebted- 
ness does not by itself pose the threat of acute 
debt servicing difficulties. The nominal in- 
creases are, in fact, far less dramatic when 
one allows for the favorable effect on debt 
service of inflation and the growth of output 
and trade. The average ratio of debt service 
to merchandise e.xports for non-oil developing 
countries, for example, increased modestly 
from 17 percent in 1973 to about 20 percent in 
1976. 

Secondly, aggregate debt statistics are mis- 
leading. They do not reflect the wide diversity 
in developing-country situations. We can ob- 
tain a more meaningful picture by distinguish- 
ing three broad groups of countries, realizing 
that there is still considerable variation within 
groups. 

— A dozen rapidly growing countries with 
high per capita incomes account for the lion's 



' The complete tran.script of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



August 8, 1977 



179 



share of developing-country debt. In fact two 
of them — Brazil and Mexico — account for 
one-third. These 12 countries depend largely 
on private markets for external capital. Their 
productive and diversified economies are cap- 
able of generating adequate export earnings 
to service debt and maintain international 
creditworthiness. They will face, however, a 
substantial bunching of debt service over the 
next several years. Their ability to attract 
adequate levels of new financing will be con- 
tingent on domestic measures to keep their 
economies efficient and competitive. 

— Low-income developing countries are in a 
second category. Particularly hard hit by re- 
cent economic events, they confront a serious 
resource transfer problem. They continue to 
benefit, however, from concessional lending. 
Very few have a debt problem as such. In 
fact, most have very little debt. 

— In the third category are a number of 
countries with moderate per capita incomes, 
which are in transition. They have begun 
blending traditional concessional borrowing 
with commercial funds. Many have a vulnera- 
ble balance-of-payments situation because 
their exports are heavily weighted toward a 
few commodities with highly variable prices. 
Some have failed to make the necessary debt 
management improvements associated with an 
expanding commercial debt portfolio. Having 
seen their newfound creditworthiness rapidly 
tarnished, they now confront a serious finan- 
cial bind. Only one, however, has thus far had 
to ask for a rescheduling of its official and pri- 
vate debt. Aside from this country, and one 
other small African nation, there are no offi- 
cial debt reschedulings currently on the hori- 
zon. Given the present tight payments situa- 
tion of many developing countries, there may 
be others. In our judgment, however, there 
will continue to be relatively few reschedul- 
ings. 

Assessment of Debt Demands 

Eligibility for debt relief has traditionally 
been based on a case-by-case examination of 
individual debt problems as they arise. Since 
1956 there have been 37 international agree- 



ments negotiating debt relief for 11 countries. 
The creditor club has been the most fre- 
quently used forum, but the World Bank has 
also sponsored debt negotiations through its 
aid consortia for Pakistan and India. The cred- 
itor club mechanism has confined its activities 
to acute debt problem situations where there 
is at least imminent default. It also em- 
phasizes the link between debt relief and eco- 
nomic performance criteria in order to restore 
the debtor's ability to pay in an orderly way. 
The IMF [International Monetary Fund] has 
played a pivotal role in creditor club renegoti- 
ations by providing an assessment of the 
debtor's balance-of-payments situation and, in 
the great majority of cases, supporting a fi- 
nancial program adopted by the debtor 
country. 

The Group of 77 developing countries in 
UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development] argues that this case-by-case 
approach in situations of debt crisis is no 
longer valid. They see their current balance- 
of-payments constraints as a common problem 
requiring a common solution, namely im- 
mediate and generalized debt relief. Their 
emphasis is not on the capacity of individual 
countries to service debt, but rather on the 
impairment of development objectives be- 
cause debt payments absorb limited financial 
resources. Essentially, they view generalized 
debt relief as a means of supplementing what 
they consider to be inadequate flows of de- 
velopment assistance. From their point of 
view, generalized debt relief is an ideal form 
of development assistance since it is uncondi- 
tional, untied, and fast disbursing. 

This viewpoint was first articulated sys- 
tematically in the so-called Manila Declara- 
tion, which formed the basis for the position of 
developing countries at the UNCTAD IV 
Conference in Nairobi in May 1976 [May 5-31]. 
The Manila Declaration called for debt relief 
for those developing nations seeking it in the 
form of: 

— Cancellation of debt owed by the least 
developed, landlocked, and island developing 
nations; 

— A moratorium for some time on debt serv- 



180 



Department of State Bulletin 



ice payments by other "most seriously af- 
fected countries," or a very generous re- 
scheduling; and 

— Consolidation of the commercial debt of 
"interested" developing countries, possibly 
via an international financial institution, and 
the rescheduling of payments over at least 25 
years. 

Higher income developing countries, while 
formally supporting these demands, clearly 
disassociated themselves from them. They 
realized that their creditworthiness in inter- 
national capital markets would be harmed if 
they did. 

The United States and other major cred- 
itors strongly resisted these demands for im- 
mediate debt relief at UNCTAD and continue 
to do so. There are good reasons for 
opposition. 

— Generalized debt relief is a very ineffi- 
cient form of resource transfer. There is no 
reason to think that countries' current needs 
for assistance correspond to the amounts of 
debt fhey have accumulated. 

— In addition, providing aid in this way 
could reward bad policies of the past without 
any assurance that future ones will bring ef- 
fective utilization of the funds provided. 

— Low-income developing countries, which 
would be the beneficiaries of the pi'oposals, 
generally have little debt. Three countries ac- 
count for the bulk of the debt of the low- 
income group: India currently is in a strong 
balance-of-payments situation; Pakistan al- 
ready benefits from a generous multilateral 
rescheduling; Egypt receives a large volume 
of concessional assistance. 

— The granting of immediate and 
generalized debt relief would disadvantage a 
vast number of developing countries by leav- 
ing them to compete for a smaller aid pie. This 
occurs because for most donors, debt relief 
and direct assistance come from the same 
overall appropriation. 

— Against this background, the costs of 
generalized debt relief for all low-income 
countries are high. In 1977 a moratorium on 
U.S. concessional debt for these nations would 
cost $200 million. The comparable figure for 



all developed creditors is $800 million. 

— Rescheduling of commercial credits would 
dry up new loans for countries borrowing in 
international capital markets. 

Debt Issue at CIEC 

Major creditors at the UNCTAD Confer- 
ence remained firmly united against 
generalized debt relief. As a result, the out- 
come of UNCTAD on the debt question was a 
procedural resolution. In the convoluted lan- 
guage common on such occasions, it invited 
"appropriate existing international fora to de- 
termine before the end of 1976 what features 
might usefully be discerned from past opera- 
tions, together with others that might be 
identified in the light of the present situation 
. . . which could provide guidance in future 
operations relating to debt problems as a basis 
for deaUng flexibly with individual cases. . . ." 

In everyone's mind, the appropriate forum 
referred to was the Conference on Interna- 
tional Economic Cooperation, or CIEC. Debt 
then emerged as one of the major issues with 
which CIEC dealt. In the CIEC discussion, 
the Group of 19 developing countries again 
pressed hard for immediate generalized debt 
relief. They also proposed replacing creditor 
clubs with a new institutional mechanism 
geared to negotiating debt relief solely on the 
basis of development need, without reference 
to the existence of an imminent default situa- 
tion. This was also unacceptable to the United 
States and other major creditors. 

The United States and the European Com- 
munity, with the support of most other de- 
veloped nations, made a counterproposal. It 
clearly distinguished between debt relief to 
deal with emergency situations and the provi- 
sion of appropriate assistance to handle longer 
term transfer of resources problems. It also 
preserved the case-by-case approach to the 
problems of developing countries. It had three 
parts. 

— First, it defined measures by debtors and 
creditors to prevent debt crises from arising. 

—Second, it laid out guidelines for creditor 
club operations, which would insure equitable 



August 8, 1977 



181 



and efficient treatment for countries ex- 
periencing severe debt problems. 

— Lastly, it suggested procedures to 
maximize assistance to low-income developing 
countries experiencing structural balance-of- 
payments problems, of which debt is an ele- 
ment, which unduly impinge on development 
prospects. 

The developing countries at CIEC showed 
some interest in the U.S. -EC approach. They 
consistently maintained, however, that they 
could not consider it seriously until their de- 
mands for immediate generalized debt re- 
scheduling were met. It appeared that the 
Group of 19 in CIEC had a negotiating man- 
date in this regard from the Group of 77 which 
gave them very little leeway. In any case, the 
outcome of CIEC early in June was that all 
proposals made remained on the table, with- 
out agreement on any aspects of the debt is- 
sue. We continue to regard the U.S. -EC pro- 
posal as a constructive, forthcoming approach 
which realistically addresses the difficulties of 
developing countries. 

Special Action Program 

The developed countries in CIEC agreed 
that special action should be taken to help 
meet the immediate needs of individual low- 
income countries for additional economic as- 
sistance on concessional terms. They 
expressed their \)villingness, subject to legisla- 
tive approval, to contribute $1 billion to such 
a program. The countries for which this addi- 
tional effort will be undertaken is the group 
eligible for lending by the IDA [International 
Development Association]. 

Contributions to the program will take var- 
ious forms as determined by each donor. The 
United States would contribute through addi- 
tional funding in its regular bilateral de- 
velopment assistance program. In this regard, 
the Administration will seek congressional 
approval for increased aid which by fiscal year 
1979 would result in an extra $375 million of 
assistance to low-income countries over pres- 
ent levels. The Administration does not plan 
to request a separate line appropriation for 
the purposes of the Special Action Program, 
nor does it plan to adjust in any way the legis- 



lative focus of our current bilateral assistance 
program. 

The European Community will contribute 
by providing $385 million to a special account 
of the IDA. Other members of the Group of 8 
will do so through various bilateral measures. 
Sweden, Switzerland, and, in part, Canada 
will provide assistance in the form of debt re- 
lief. This should not be construed as establish- 
ing any connection between the Special Action 
Program and the demands of developing coun- 
tries for generalized debt relief. Rather, it re- 
flects the budgetary situation and assistance 
instruments available to these three donors. 
The Special Action Program is in no way 
meant to be an effort to deal with debt 
problems. 

At the recent ministerial meeting of the 
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development], several OECD nations 
who were not part of the Group of 8 in CIEC 
indicated an interest in contributing to the 
Special Action Program. We hope that other 
donors outside the OECD will also make a 
parallel effort. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

Extension of the Export Administration Act of 1969. 
Hearings and markup before the House Committee on 
International Relations. Mar. 1-31, 1977. 403 pp. 

Emergency Controls on International Economic Trans- 
actions. Hearings before Subcommittee on Interna- 
tional Economic Policy and Trade of the House Com- 
mittee on International Relations on H.R. 1560 and 
H.R. 2382, and markup of Trading With the Enemy 
Reform Legislation. Mar. 29-June 13, 1977. 281 pp. 

Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, 
Oceans, and International Environment of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations on S. Res. 49, ex- 
pressing the sense of the Senate that the United 
States Government should seek the agreement of 
other governments to a proposed treaty requiring the 
preparation of an international environmental impact 
statement for any major project, action, or continuing 
activity which may be reasonably expected to have a 
significant adverse effect on the physical environment 
or environmental interests of another nation or a 
global commons area. Mar. 31, 1977. 58 pp. 

The Marshall Plan Resolution. Hearing and markup be- 
fore the Subcommittees on International Operations, 
International Organizations, and on Europe and the 
Middle East of the House Committee on International 
Relations on H.J. Res. 436. May 11, 1977. 59 pp. 






182 



Department of State Bulletin 



Planning A Safeguardable Nuclear Future 



Address by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. ' 



According to a recent poll of Americans 
with a keen interest in foreign affairs, the 
United States should give first priority to 
controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. 
Similarly, a national Roper poll in February 
found that the general public placed nuclear 
proliferation at the top of its list of "extremely 
serious problems for future generations." And 
in fact President Carter has, from the start of 
his election campaign, made curbing nuclear 
proliferation one of his top priorities out of a 
deep conviction of its importance for future 
generations. 

Why does nuclear proliferation deserve 
such a high priority? Because a multiprolifer- 
ated world — a world of many nuclear weapons 
powers — will be a far less stable world for all 
nations to live in. We are well aware of the 
possible outbreaks of war in unstable regions, 
of overthrown governments and civil wars in 
unstable countries, and of the potential for 
damage by terrorist groups. If we imagine 
easy access to nuclear explosives being added 
to the existing sources of instability, the pic- 
ture of the world we envisage is not a pleasant 
one. Proliferation of nuclear explosive 
capabilities to an increasing number of coun- 
tries and transnational terrorist groups would 
carry with it an inordinate peril to ourselves 
and to the world. It would reduce our ability 
to control international crises, have a seri- 
ously detrimental effect on our alliances, and 
expose our nation to grave risks. It would 
greatly increase the danger of catastrophic 
nuclear war. 



' Made before the Houston Rotary Transition Day 
luncheon at Houston, Tex., on June 30, 1977. Mr. Nye is 
Deputy to the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, 
Science, and Technology. 



Some of those who oppose the President's 
policy have argued that "the horse is out of 
the barn, so why don't we stop worrying?" 
But the metaphor is misleading. You have to 
change from the singular to the plural, be- 
cause it matters how many horses are out of 
the barn; it matters how many nations have 
nuclear weapons capabilities. Many states 
that have decided not to make nuclear 
weapons despite their ability to do so would 
reassess their decision if proliferation pro- 
gressed rapidly. It makes a difference how we 
manage the process. Rather than throwing up 
our hands and saying that "the genie is out of 
the bottle" or "the horse is out of the barn," 
our task is to shape a policy that can slow, if 
not stop, the spread of nuclear explosives. 

Our goal then is to limit the number of na- 
tions with nuclear explosive capabilities. How 
can we do it? We have to work on two crucial 
elements of the problem — a country's motiva- 
tion to build a bomb and its technical ability to 
do so. Both elements are critically important. 

Motivations to Build Bombs 

Let's start with motivation. Just because a 
state could build a bomb does not mean it will 
choose to do so. In fact, less than a third of 
the states with commercial nuclear reactors 
have chosen to make nuclear explosives. Thus 
we have to try as best we can to reduce incen- 
tives to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities. 
For example, the security assurances that we 
provide to Europe and Japan in the context of 
the NATO treaty and our bilateral security 
agreement with Japan reduce the incentives 
of those countries to seek nuclear weapons 
even though they have the technical capability 



August 8, 1977 



183 



to acquire them. In fact, lest we overlook the 
obvious, I would say that the security guaran- 
tees, where we are able to make them credible 
in this post- Vietnam era of public attitudes, 
are some of the most important instruments of 
our nonproliferation policy. 

Another important instrument for affecting 
motivation is the Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT), which was signed in 1968 and came into 
force in 1970. One hundred and two nations 
have now signed this treaty in which non- 
weapons states agree not to acquire nuclear 
explosive devices. The Nonproliferation 
Treaty has helped to create an international 
regime in which states agree that their secu- 
rity interests would be better served by 
avoiding the further spread of the bomb. The 
treaty provides reassurances that potential 
adversaries are confining their nuclear ac- 
tivities to peaceful purposes and that, in the 
event of diversion to military purposes, the 
safeguard system provided for by the treaty 
would give timely warning of any such cheat- 
ing. Because it is an indispensable framework 
for effective nonproliferation efforts, the 
United States continues to seek the widest 
possible adherence to the treaty. 

The Nonproliferation Treaty is a delicate in- 
ternational arrangement. Countries without 
nuclear weapons have accepted an explicitly 
unequal status in the military area, on the 
condition that they be treated equally with 
regard to civil nuclear cooperation. The es- 
sence of the treaty is a compromise in which 
discrimination is accepted in the military 
sphere — between nuclear and nonnuclear 
weapon states — in return for a promise of 
nondiscrimination in the energy benefits of 
the atom in the civil sphere. Thus we have to 
be careful not to adopt discriminatory policies 
on the civil side which would destroy the very 
fabric of the treaty and, with it, one of the key 
nonproliferation institutions. 

In sum, therefore, we must be acutely sen- 
sitive to the political and security motivations 
that lead states to acquire nuclear explosives. 
This means insuring the credibility of existing 
security guarantees, making progress in 
achieving meaningful and verifiable arms con- 
trol agreements, limiting or prohibiting nu- 
clear testing, and behaving in a way that de- 



values the prestige identified with nuclear 
weapons. In conformance with those goals the 
President has entered into the strategic arms 
limitation and comprehensive test ban negoti- 
ations with the Soviet Union and has signed 
Protocol I of the treaty of Tlatelolco that aims 
to establish a Latin American nuclear free 
zone.^ 

Commercial Nuclear Capabilities 

The other half of the proliferation problem 
is technical capability. That second aspect 
presents us with a very different set of chal- 
lenges. As commercial nuclear capabilities 
spread, particularly the sensitive facilities of 
enrichment and reprocessing that can produce 
weapons-usable material, the number of 
states near the nuclear weapons threshold 
increases. 

The problem is how to reconcile the spread 
of commercial nuclear capabilities with the 
possibility of their military misuse. The prob- 
lem is not a new one. Over the past 30 years, 
our efforts to deal with the problem have gone 
through four phases. 

Our first approach was to propose U.N. con- 
trol of nuclear energy under the Baruch plan 
[in an address before the U.N. Atomic Energy 
Commission on June 14, 1946]. When this 
failed, we tried a second approach of severely 
restricting the export of nuclear technology. 
But this did not prevent the Soviet Union and 
Britain from obtaining a bomb, and in De- 
cember 1953, President Eisenhower launched a 
third approach with his atoms-for-peace pro- 
gram [in his address before the U.N. General 
Assembly]. The idea of the atoms-for-peace 
approach was to assist countries in their de- 
velopment of civilian nuclear energy, in return 
for their guarantees that they would use such 
assistance only for peaceful purposes. 

The atoms-for-peace approach has been 
criticized for promoting nuclear energy in 
many instances before it was economically 
justified, and, in practice, the implementation 
of the program was often mindless. Sensitive 



2 President Carter signed Protocol I of the Treaty for 
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America on 
May 26, 1977; for the text of his remarks on that occa- 
sion, see Bulletin of July 4, p. 10. 



184 



Department of State Bulletin 



technologies were declassified prematurely; 
guarantees of "peaceful use" were sometimes 
so loosely written as to seem to permit explo- 
sives; and our government often appeared 
more as a pusher than a patrolman. Nonethe- 
less, despite the faults in implementation, our 
approach between 1954 and 1974 had two 
major accomplishments: the isolation of the 
commercial fuel cycle from nuclear weapons 
uses and the establishment of a general cli- 
mate of opinion against the spread of nuclear 
weapons capabilities. 



The International Safeguards System 

The basis for those accomplishments was 
the system of international safeguards ad- 
ministered by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, or IAEA, an independent, 
U.N. agency that was established in Vienna in 
1957. 

Under the IAEA safeguards systems, coun- 
tries must file regular detailed reports on 
their civilian nuclear activities with the 
agency and must allow international inspec- 
tors to visit their nuclear facilities to verify 
the reports and to insure that there has been 
no diversion of materials from civilian to mili- 
tary purposes. Underlying the safeguards 
system is a basic bargain in which we assist 
other countries in their nuclear energy needs 
in return for their accepting the intrusion of 
safeguards into their sovereignty. 

The easiest way to understand the role of 
safeguards is to think of them as analogous to 
a burglar alarm system. The existence of a 
safeguards system deters diversion and warns 
us if it occurs. If there were a diversion of ma- 
terials from the peaceful nuclear energy do- 
main to the military sphere, the alarm would 
ring and there would be time for us and other 
countries- to step in with diplomacy and make 
a strong representation to the country, or 
time to find other means of meeting its secu- 
rity needs. But an effective burglar alarm has 
to ring in time to allow the police or the 
homeowner to act. Similarly, an effective in- 
ternational safeguards system has to provide 
early enough warning of diversion for diplo- 
macy to be effective. 

Since 1974 we have begun to have doubts 



about whether this safeguards policy that had 
worked for two decades would continue to 
work in the future. This reassessment was 
triggered partly by the Indian explosion of 
what they termed a peaceful nuclear device 
and partly by the substantial rise in oil prices. 
These increased oil prices led to a great in- 
crease in the projected demand for nuclear 
energy and led people to believe that there 
would be a shortage of uranium and that, 
therefore, we would have to move quickly 
from uranium to plutonium. With that chal- 
lenge of 1974, more countries began to desire 
their own enrichment and reprocessing 
facilities and to think in terms of breeder 
reactors. 



The Nuclear Fuel Cycle 

Why is this a problem? In order to explain 
the international political problem this poses, 
I have to pause to describe a few basic aspects 
of the nuclear fuel cycle. 

As you know, the kind of nuclear reactors 
we now have use uranium fuel. There are two 
types of atom in the uranium that comes out of 
the ground— U238 and U235. Only U235 sphts 
naturally, giving off energy that can be turned 
into electricity or be used as an explosive. 
Less than 1 percent of the atoms of natural 
uranium are U235. In order to sustain a nu- 
clear reaction, we have to separate and dis- 
card some of the U238 so that the remaining 
uranium is enriched in its percentage of U235. 
This enrichment process is a highly classified 
and expensive process that we carry out in 
three large government plants. 

If we enrich uranium too far in U235 (20 
percent is the figure often quoted), it can be 
used to make bombs. Fortunately the kind of 
commercial reactors we have now — often 
called light water reactors — require fuel that 
is only enriched to 3 percent U235 and thus 
can't be used for bombs. In other words, we 
are fortunate in our current technology: We 
can sell nuclear reactors and fuel without any 
direct danger of their being easily or quickly 
diverted to making nuclear explosives. 

Bombs can be made from highly enriched 
uranium: They can also be fashioned from 
plutonium. Plutonium is a manmade element 



August 8, 1977 



185 



that does not exist in nature. It is created in a 
nuclear reactor when some of that apparently 
useless U238 captures a neutron set free in 
the fission process and becomes transformed 
into plutonium 239. 

A worrisome fact about plutonium is that it 
needs no enrichment. Once it has been sepa- 
rated from the spent fuel that is discharged 
from a reactor — the separation is called 
reprocessing — the plutonium can be readily 
shaped into an explosive. In fact it takes only 
a dozen pounds or so to make a bomb similar 
in effect to the one dropped on Nagasaki at 
the end of World War II. 

Plutonium can also be used as a fuel for 
reactors. Separated plutonium can be recycled 
back into hght water reactors. It can also fuel 
another type of reactor called a breeder reac- 
tor. One of the great attractions of the 
breeder reactor is that by transforming U238 
into plutonium, it can create more fuel than it 
uses and thus increase the energy production 
from uranium fifty-fold. 

The commercial success of breeder reactors 
is still unproven because their projected high 
capital costs may make the electricity pro- 
duced from the plutonium they create more 
expensive than electricity produced from light 
water reactors burning uranium. But for 
countries concerned about uranium supply, 
plutonium and breeder reactors are appealing. 

If the world used only the current type of 
reactors and the low enriched fuel for them, 
never reprocessed the spent fuel to extract 
the plutonium, limited the number of enrich- 
ment facilities, and never developed breeder 
reactors our current international safeguards 
system would work very well, and our prob- 
lem of keeping commercial and military uses 
of nuclear energy isolated from each other 
would have a neat solution. 

Unfortunately for such a neat solution, 
technology does not stand still, and its inter- 
national diffusion is difficult to restrict. If 
countries are able to buy or develop enrich- 
ment plants, they will have facilities which 
allow them to enrich uranium beyond the 
3-percent level needed for reactors to the 
higher levels needed for a bomb. Similarly, if 
countries are able to buy or develop reproc- 
essing plants, they also will have easy access 



to plutonium that can be used for bombs. This 
is why President Carter objected to the Ger- 
man sale to Brazil of an enrichment and re- 
processing plant in addition to reactors. Our 
view is that these facilities are not econom- 
ically necessary, at least at this time, and that 
in the long run the numbers of such facilities 
should be restricted, and preferably managed 
under multinational arrangements. 

Now the trouble with this spread of sensi- 
tive facilities, particularly the change of tech- 
nological generations — as the world considers 
moving from low enriched uranium technology 
to a plutonium technology — is that the new 
plutonium technology threatens to empty 
safeguards of their central political meaning, 
which is time for diplomacy to work. In other 
words, the key aspect of safeguards, the key 
dimension that has made the system workable 
for the previous two decades, threatens to be 
eroded by the change in generation of tech- 
nology. What we will be faced with will be 
stockpiles of pure plutonium available to 
states, as well as the flow of fuel from which 
plutonium is easily chemically separable. Thus 
countries would be able to creep closer to the 
threshold of nuclear weapons capability. This 
evolution would leave less time for diplomacy 
to work in cases where intentions are volatile. 

Let me point out that we are not assuming 
that the commercial fuel cycle is the only path 
or even the best path to a nuclear weapon. It 
is neither. If a country clearly started qut to 
get a bomb, there are technical reasons why it 
would be better to build facilities dedicated to 
military purposes. What we are assuming, 
however, is that in situations of extreme ten- 
sion states may turn to second or third best 
instruments to get their hands on weapons 
they regard as essential to their security. The 
point is that with plutonium readily available, 
states may turn to it. And those groups within 
countries which want to go nuclear can pursue 
an ambiguous path of keeping their options 
open until the last minute under a commercial 
disguise. To avoid this problem, we must find 
a way of keeping a distance between the 
commercial fuel cycle and the military uses of 
nuclear energy in the next generation of nu- 
clear technology. We have to know more than 
we do now and to plan carefully before we 



1i 



186 



Department of State Bulletin 



enter into the commercial competition of a 
plutonium economy. 

Assumptions About Plutonium Technology 

We have begun by reexamining a basic as- 
sumption that has been widely held in the nu- 
clear industry in this and other countries for 
the past quarter century. The industry has 
heretofore proceeded on the assumption that 
reprocessing would begin when there were 
sufficient light water reactors to justify the 
large-scale facilities needed for economic op- 
eration and that plutonium would be recycled 
in light water reactors until fast breeder reac- 
tors are introduced. Foreign nations without 
our fossil fuel and natural uranium resources 
are even more strongly wedded to the belief 
that reprocessing would be needed to reduce 
long-term risks from nuclear wastes and that 
plutonium stockpiles would be needed at an 
early date to achieve energy independence 
through the use of breeder reactors. 

We have come to realize that a second look 
is recjMired at these assumptions of the past. 
Legitimate questions are now being raised 
about the proliferation implications of sepa- 
rated plutonium and the possibility that ter- 
rorists might steal plutonium for weapons 
purposes. Additional concerns are also being 
raised about the health hazards of plutonium. 

There are substantial grounds for challeng- 
ing the previous assumption that recycling 
plutonium in light water reactors is econom- 
ically advantageous. Current estimates show 
that any such economic advantage would be 
marginal at most. Such recycle does not pro- 
vide independence and there are other poten- 
tial ways of stretching uranium resources. 

There is also evidence that waste disposal 
problems could be exacerbated, rather than 
alleviated, by reprocessing. The question is 
whether we have come too far down the 
plutonium road or whether there is still time 
for a second look. 

Our conclusion is that we do have time to 
examine fuel cycle alternatives that minimize 
proliferation and physical protection risks. 
This was the basis for the President's April 7 
decisions to defer indefinitely the commer- 
cialization of reprocessing and to restructure 



the U.S. breeder reactor program. I should 
emphasize that our intent is not to turn the 
clock back or to deprive any nation of required 
energy sources but to explore whether we are 
able to shape the future of nuclear technology 
to serve our broader purposes, while at the 
same time deriving the benefits of its energy 
potential. 

Particular technologies always reflect cer- 
tain social assumptions prevalent at the time 
of their origin. For example, the objective of 
embarking on reprocessing some 30 years ago 
was to derive plutonium in as pure a form as 
possible in order to make a bomb. Thus we 
chose a way of doing reprocessing that was 
good for making bombs. But it is not the only 
way to do reprocessing, and our times and our 
social assumptions have changed. Today our 
societies are more concerned about nonprolif- 
eration, and we must look again at alternative 
technologies that may have been rejected as 
suboptimal in the past but which may today be 
preferable because of our changed social 
assumptions. 

Options and alternatives to reprocessing 
and recycle that have long been overlooked or 
forgotten because they were out of line with 
past policies should be closely examined to as- 
sure that failure to develop them was based on 
technical judgments that are not altered by 
changes in social assumptions. While there is 
no simple technical fix to the problem of pro- 
liferation, different techniques have different 
degrees of proliferation resistance. Our 
Energy Research and Development Adminis- 
tration (ERDA) will be intensively studying a 
number of possibilities that have the potential 
to extract additional energy from a nuclear 
fuel cycle while making it more proliferation- 
resistant. There is no guarantee, of course, 
that any of them will prove technically and 
economically viable, but the dangers of nu- 
clear proliferation demand that they be 
explored and that we plan for the next nuclear 
generation while we still have time. 

And we do have time. Estimates of our nu- 
clear power growth rate have been consid- 
erably reduced since the days when plans 
were set for early commercialization of 
plutonium. The Energy Research and De- 
velopment Administration projects about 350 



August 8, 1977 



187 



nuclear reactors in the United States by the 
year 2000, whereas five years ago the figure 
was 1,200 nuclear reactors. Even the pessimis- 
tic estimates of U.S. uranium supply of 1.8 mil- 
lion tons for proven plus probable reserves are 
sufficient to provide fuel loads for the 30-year 
lifetime of that number of reactors. Downward 
revision of estimated demand for uranium by a 
factor of three strengthens our view that we 
have time to examine alternatives to the 
plutonium breeder. 

In addition there are good reasons to be- 
lieve that there may be considerably more 
uranium than these pessimistic estimates. 
ERDA uses a figure twice as high; i.e., 3.6 
million tons for proven plus potential re- 
serves. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
uses an even higher figure. Other countries, 
such as Australia, have told us their resources 
are many times larger than current official es- 
timates indicate. One of our high priorities is 
to gather more information and improve our 
estimates of U.S. and world uranium 
resources. 

International Cooperation 

If the United States wei'e the only country 
with nuclear technology, this problem of man- 
aging the change of nuclear generations would 
be difficult enough. But there are already 
some 20 countries with nuclear reactor pro- 
grams and at least five other countries with 
advanced breeder reactor programs. 

Our strategy cannot rest upon merely set- 
ting a good example but will require active 
diplomatic efforts. For one thing, other coun- 
tries point out that we have the coal and 
uranium resources that allow us to afford such 
an example while they do not. This means our 
example alone is not compelling to them. 
Neither can our strategy be based on passing 
domestic laws that prevent nuclear exports 
from the United States, for other countries 
could quickly step in to fill the order books. 
Nor do we have the leverage to coerce other 
nations to follow our policy. 

In short if we are to achieve our goals, we 
have no choice but to work closely with other 
countries to try to find mutually beneficial so- 
lutions to the problems we all share. The Car- 



ter Administration does not believe that nu- 
clear isolationism is possible in today's world. 
Planning for the future of nuclear power must 
be an international effort involving all nations 
interested in nuclear power, consumers and 
suppliers alike. 

A Strategy for the Fourth Phase 

I said earlier that the U.S. efforts to deal 
with the problem of proliferation have gone 
through four phases in the last 30 years. Since 
1974 we have been struggling to define the 
fourth phase — the successor to the atoms- 
for-peace era. We are developing a strategy 
for dealing with the capabilities part of the 
proliferation problem which includes four 
major elements. 

First, we continue to emphasize controls of 
safeguards. We have told other nations that 
we are prepared to continue to provide assist- 
ance in development of commercial nuclear 
reactor programs if they will accept com- 
prehensive safeguards on all their civil nu- 
clear activities. At the same time, we are try- 
ing to improve safeguards techniques and to 
strengthen the IAEA. 

Second, we continue to embargo the export 
of sensitive facilities and technologies, par- 
ticularly ennchment and reprocessing, so as 
to delay the spread of weapons-usable mate- 
rial and the facilities that produce them. The 
new aspect here is that we have encouraged 
other supplier nations to exercise similar re- 
straint. We have achieved considerable 
agreement among the 15 supplier countries 
that have met periodically in London since 
1975. Less than two weeks ago the West 
German Government announced that it would 
not export reprocessing technology in the fu- 
ture, thus joining France, the Soviet Union, 
ourselves, and others in this policy of re- 
straint. We believe that this second element 
of self-restraint is necessary while the inter- 
national community develops ways to shape 
the future of nuclear energy so as to reduce 
proliferation risks and that it is fully consist- 
ent with the objectives of an effective 
safeguard system under the IAEA. 

A third component of our strategy is to pro- 



188 



Department of State Bulletin 



vide incentives for- other natioyis to forgo the 
sensitive technologies of enrichment and re- 
processing. These incentives would include 
our being able to provide assured supply of 
nonsensitive nuclear fuels on a timely, 
adequate, reliable, and economic basis at the 
front end of the fuel cycle and to insure there 
is sufficient spent fuel and nuclear waste stor- 
age capacity at the back end of the fuel cycle. 
Equally important would be assistance to 
other nations in the development of nonnu- 
clear energy resources. 

On the question of assured fuel supply, we 
believe a successful program must assure ac- 
cess to adequate supplies of natural uranium 
and enrichment services at reasonable prices. 
In this connection, as the President an- 
nounced on April 7, we will increase U.S. pro- 
duction capacity for enriched uranium. 
Another essential feature of such a program is 
that there should be parallel policies among 
suppliers so as to avoid placing any reactor 
exporter at a commercial disadvantage. And, 
finally, we must be able to assure the prompt 
and predictable issuance of export licenses to 
those nations willing to abide by our export 
conditions. 

The problems related to the need to insui'e 
adequate spent fuel and nuclear waste storage 
are equally urgent. We are presently studying 
a wide range of solutions which would, as is 
the case with fuel assurances, alleviate the 
pressure for acquisition of reprocessing 
capabilities. Among others these concepts 
under study include making storage capacity 
available for the interim storage of foreign 
spent fuel and developing international spent 
fuel storage arrangements, including regional 
centers. 

A final aspect of the incentives policy for 
the longer term future has to do with nonnu- 
clear energy technologies. We recognize that 
cooperation and assistance in the development 
of nonnuclear energy resources, including ap- 
propriate technology, form an important ele- 
ment in any nonproliferation strategy. We 
are, therefore, exploring how such coopera- 
tion might best be carried out. 

The fourth and final element of our cun-ent 
strategy — and perhaps the most important 



element in the long term — is to ask other 
countries to jointly study how to avoid prema- 
ture commitment to new techyiologies until 
they can be adequately safeguarded. On April 
7 President Carter called for the establish- 
ment of an international Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Evaluation in which we would work with 
other countries in investigating fuel cycle 
alternatives. 

At the economic summit in May, President 
Carter discussed this evaluation with the 
foreign heads of state. We have also had dis- 
cussions in various forums with a number of 
other countries on the international Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle Evaluation and their response has 
generally been favorable. We therefore hope 
in the near future to move ahead on this 
evaluation and are proceeding now to gain in- 
ternational consensus on a detailed approach. 
We have been in touch with a broad range of 
countries, deliberately avoiding any divisions 
between consumers and suppliers, rich and 
poor. A key part of this evaluation must be 
strong U.S. participation in coordinated re- 
search programs to explore ways to extend 
the current fuel cycle and to develop a com- 
bination of technologies and institutions that 
will make future fuel cycles more prolifera- 
tion-resistant than the currently planned 
plutonium breeder fuel cycle concept. 

These then are the elements of our strat- 
egy for dealing with the capabilities part of 
the proliferation problem — safeguards, re- 
straint, incentives, and an international 
evaluation of current and future nuclear fuel 
cycles. This strategy is imbedded in the nu- 
clear export legislation which President Car- 
ter submitted to the Congress on April 27. 
This legislation will tighten the conditions for 
nuclear exports from the United States con- 
sistent with our emphasis on safeguards but 
avoids a moratorium on exports which would 
cripple the incentives element of our policy. 

This strategy lies at the heart of the Presi- 
dent's decisions to continue and extend a 
moratorium on reprocessing and recycling of 
plutonium in the United States, to defer early 
commercialization of the plutonium breeder, 
and to restructure our breeder reactor pro- 
gram to search for more proliferation-resis- 



Aogust 8, 1977 



189 



tant and safeguardable breeder fuel cycles. 
This point has sometimes been 
misunderstood. 

We have not opposed other countries" 
breeder programs nor have we stopped our 
own. On the contrary, we will be spending 
$483 million on breeder research next year. 
What the President has opposed is a race for 
early commercialization before we know how 
to keep the same critical distance between 
peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy 
with the next generation of technology that 
we have with the current generation. 

I believe we have come a long way since 
January 20 in developing a comprehensive in- 
ternational approach to the problem of pi'olif- 
eration. I see ferment in the international 
community which bodes well for the success of 
the fuel cycle evaluation. 

In our conversations with foreign leaders 
ideas now come up which would not have come 
up six months ago. A high French official told 
me that he did not fully agree with our policy 
but admitted that France would have to find 
better answers to the questions we posed. 
Similarly, I recall a private conversation with 
a German official a few weeks ago where he 
outlined his ideas for an international solution 
to the problem of intermediate spent fuel 
storage. His approach had much merit but 
also needed to be fleshed out. That I beheve is 
a good description of where we stand overall 
today. 

The world community is increasingly seized 
with the problem of nuclear proliferation. 
Many ideas are being offered, some of which 
will prove useful, and some not, when they 
are fully explored. We have a long way to go, 
but out of this will come a new international 
strategy which will be able to deal with a new 
generation of nuclear power technology. The 
difficulties of the task are enormous. We can- 
not expect nations to come to quick agreement 
when longstanding assumptions are being 
challenged. Nonetheless I think we will all be 
able to look back with satisfaction that the 
United States took the lead in trying to per- 
suade others that now is the time to plan a 
new strategy for a safeguardable nuclear 
future. 



U.S., U.S.S.R. Renew Agreement 
on Science and Technology 

Press release 324 dated July 8 

The United States and the Soviet Union re- 
newed on July 8, 1977, for another five-year 
period the Agreement on Cooperation in the 
Fields of Science and Technology of May 24, 
1972, thus expressing satisfaction with past 
achievements and affirming faith in the poten- 
tial for continued close cooperation in science 
and technology. 

The new agreement was signed by the 
cochairmen of the Joint Commission on Scien- 
tific and Technical Cooperation, Dr. Frank 
Press, the President's Science Adviser and 
Director of the Office of Science and Technol- 
ogy Policy [Executive Office of the Pres- 
ident], and Academician V.A. Kirillin, Deputy 
Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Minis- 
ters and Chairman of the State Committee of 
the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers for Science 
and Technology. 

On July 6 Dr. Press, Academician Kirillin, 
and a group of distinguished U.S. and Soviet 
scientists conducted the fifth meeting of the 
Joint Commission, reviewing progress in the 
47 individual projects underway and exchang- 
ing views on how to make joint activities even 
more effective, responsive to national needs, 
and reflecting the highest standards of scien- 
tiflc research. 

The Joint Commission noted with satisfac- 
tion the large number of important joint sym- 
posia held, research papers published, and the 
close professional and personal contacts that 
have developed between hundreds of par- 
ticipating U.S. and Soviet specialists. The 
Joint Commission decided to hold its following 
session in Moscow next year. 

Dr. Press and Academician Kirillin ex- 
pressed their intention to continue a close 
dialogue to encourage and facilitate the im- 
plementation of the agreement, reflecting the 
willingness and ability of the United States 
and the U.S.S.R. to work together on the 
basis of equality and for the benefit of the 
peoples of their two countries and all 
mankind. 



190 



Department of State Bulletin 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention for the unification of certain rules relating 
to international transportation by air. Done at War- 
saw October 12, 1929. Entered into force February 
13, 1933; for the United States October 29, 1934. 49 
Stat. 3000. 

Notification of succession: Botswana, January 31, 
1977; Tonga, January 31, 1977. 

Montreal protocol No. 4 to amend the convention for the 
unification of certain rules relating to international 
carriage by air signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929 
(49 Stat. 3000), as amended by the protocol done at 
The Hague on September 28, 1955. Done at Montreal 
September 25, 1975.' 
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, March 11, 1977. 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. 
Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force 
provisionally October 1, 1976. 

Accession deposited: Hungary (with declarations). 
May 23, 1977. 

Finance 

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag- 
ricultural Development. Done at Rome June 13, 
1976.' 

Ratifications deposited: Norway, July 8, 1977; 
Guinea, July 12, 1977. 

Inter-American Development Bank 

Agreement establishing the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank, with annexes. Done at Washington April 
8, 1959. Entered into force December 30, 1959. TIAS 
4397. 

Signature and acceptance deposited: Finland, June 
30, 1977. 

Load Lines 

Amendments to the international convention on load 
lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at Lon- 
don October 12, 1971.' 

Extension to territories by United Kingdom: Ber- 
muda, Hong Kong, June 8, 1977. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at 
Vienna February 21, 1971. Entered into force August 
16, 1976.2 
Ratification deposited: Monaco, July 6, 1977. 

Oil Pollution 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 



amended (TIAS 4900, 6109, 8505). Adopted at London 

October 21, 1969. Enters into force January 20, 1978. 

TIAS 8505. 

Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, June 21, 1977. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 

amended (TIAS 4900, 6109, 8505). Adopted at London 

October 12, 1971.' 

Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, June 21, 1977. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 

amended (TIAS 4900, 6109, 8505). Adopted at London 

October 15, 1971.' 

Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, June 21, 1977. 

Reciprocal Assistance — Inter-American 

Protocol of amendment to the inter-American treaty of 
reciprocal assistance of September 2, 1967 (TIAS 
18;B8). Done at San Jose July 26, 1975.' 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: July 19, 
1977, with reservation. 

Safety at Sea 

Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at 

London November 30, 1966.' 

Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, June 9, 1977. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at 

London October 25, 1967.' 

Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, June 9, 1977. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at 

London November 26, 1968.' ■ 

Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, June 9, 1977. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at 

London October 21, 1969.' 

Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, June 9, 1977. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS ,5780). Adopted at 

London October 12, 1971.' 

Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, June 9, 1977. 
Convention on the international regulations for pre- 
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London Oc- 
tober 20, 1972. Entered into force July 15, 1977. 

TIAS 8587. 

Accessions deposited: Austria, June 8, 1977; Israel, 
June 24, 1977; Japan, June 21, 1977. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with an- 
nexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered 
into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. 
Accession deposited: Paraguay, July 18, 1977. 

Operating agreement relating to the International Tele- 
communications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), 
with annex. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. 
Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. 
Signature: Administracion Nacional de Tele- 
comunicaciones (ANTELCO), for Paraguay, July 
18, 1977. 



' Not in force. 

2 Not in force for the United States. 



August 8, 1977 



191 



Terrorism 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes 
against internationally protected persons, including 
diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 
1973. Entered into force February 20, 1977. TIAS 
8532. 

Accession deposited: Dominican Republic, July 8, 
1977. 

Tin 

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done 
at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force June 14, 
1977. 
Proclaimed by the President: July 15, 1977. 

Tonnage Measurement 

International convention on tonnage measurement of 
ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23, 
1969.' 
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, June 21, 1977. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 
1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect 
to certain provisions; July 1, 1976, with respect to 
other provisions. 

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: 
July 18, 1977. 

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid 
convention (part of the international wheat agree- 
ment) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 1976. En- 
tered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain 
provisions; July 1, 1976, with respect to other provi- 
sions. 

instrument of ratification signed by the President: 
July 18, 1977. 



BILATERAL 

Bahrain 

Agreement relating to the status of personnel of the 
Administrative Support Unit in Bahrain. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Manama June 28, 1977. Entered 
into force June 28, 1977. 

Agreement relating to the deployment of the United 
States Middle East Force in Bahrain. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Manama December 23, 1971. En- 



tered into force December 23, 1971. TIAS 7263. 
Terminated : June 30, 1977. 

Bangladesh 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag- 
ricultural commodities of April 1, 1977, and agreed 
minutes of the same date. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Dacca June 30, 1977. Entered into force June 
.30, 1977. 

Canada 

Treaty on the execution of penal sanctions. Signed at 
Washington March 2, 1977.' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification : July 19, 
1977.' 

Federal Republic of Germany 

Agreement on the stationing of training components of 
the Federal Minister of Defense in the United States, 
with annexes (stationing agreement). Signed at Bonn 
and Washington May 24 and July 6, 1977. Entered 
into force July 6, 1977. 

Agreement on the provision of United States Army 
training to the German Air Force in the United 
States with annexes (training agreement). Signed at 
Bonn and Washington May 24 and July 6, 1977. En- 
tered into force July 6, 1977. 

Guyana 

Agreement relating to acquisition of domestic and 
foreign excess property by Guyana. Signed at Wash- 
ington and Georgetown June 6 and July 6, 1977. En- 
tered into force July 6, 1977. 

Hungary 

Agreement extending the air transport agreement of 
May 30, 1972, as amended (TIAS 7577, 8096). Effected 
by exchange of notes at Budapest May 24 and June 22, 
1977. Entered into force June 22, 1977. 

Yugoslavia 

Agreement extending the agreement of May 14, 1976 
(TIAS 8305), relating to interim arrangements for 
scheduled air services and annex A of the 
nonscheduled air service agreement of September 27, 
1973, as amended and extended (TIAS 7819, 8305). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 17 
and June 30, 1977. Entered into force June 30, 1977; 
effective April 1, 1977. 



' Not in force. 

^ With declaration. 



192 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX August 8, 1977 Vol. LXXVII, No. 1989 



rica 

estions and Answers Following Secretary 
fance's Address Before the NAACP, July 1 . . . 170 

United States and Africa: Building Positive 
delations (Vance) 165 

US Control and Disarmament 
bnning A Safeguardable Nuclear Future 

■^ye) 183 

lesident's News Conference of July 12 

excerpts) 174 

tigress 

iigressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 182 

department Discusses CIEC and Developing- 
""jjountry Debt (Ryan) 179 

reloping Countries. Department Discusses 
[IIEC and Developing-Country Debt (Ryan) ... 179 

vnomic Affairs 

Bartment Discusses CIEC and Developing- 

pountry Debt (Ryan) 179 

estions and Answers Following Secretary 
J'ance's Address Before the NAACP, July 1 . . . 170 

rope. President's News Conference of July 12 
'(excerpts) 174 

rmany. Federal German Chancellor Schmidt 
fisits Washington (statement issued at conclu- 

fion of meetings) 178 

ana. Questions and Answers Following Secre- 
iry Vance's Address Before the NAACP, 

|uiy 1 no 

nan Rights 

ssident's News Conference of July 12 

excerpts) 174 

United States and Africa: Building Positive 

Relations (Vance) 165 

ddle East. President's News Conference of 

Illy 12 (excerpts) 174 

(libia. The United States and Africa: Build- 
ng Positive Relations (Vance) 165 

iesidential Documents. President's News Con- 
erence of July 12 (excerpts) 174 

Iclear Policy. Planning A Safeguardable Nu- 
llear Future (Nye) 183 

llence and Technology. U.S., U.S.S.R. Renew 
Agreement on Science and Technology 190 

nth Africa 

estions and Answers Following Secretary 
/■ance's Address Before the NAACP, July 1 . . . 170 
|e United States and Africa: Building Positive 
delations (Vance) 165 

iithern Rhodesia 

Sestions and Answers Following Secretary 
Vance's Address Before the NAACP, July 1 . .". 170 
The United States and Africa: Building Positive 
Relations (Vance) 165 



Treaty Information 

Current Actions 191 

U.S., U.S.S.R. Renew Agreement on Science 
and Technology 190 

U.S.S.R. 

President's News Conference of July 12 
(excerpts) 174 

U.S., U.S.S.R. Renew Agreement on Science 
and Technology 190 

Name Index 

Carter, President 174 

Nye, Joseph S. , Jr 183 

Ryan, Robert J. , Jr 179 

Vance, Secretary 165, 170 



Checklist of Department of State 

Press Releases: July 18-24 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20.520. 



No. 
•335 



Date 

7/18 



•336 7/18 



•337 
•338 



7/18 
7/20 



Subject 

Program for official visit of Prime 
Minister Begin of Israel to Wash- 
ington, July 18-21. 

U.S. National Committee for the In- 
ternational Radio Consultative 
Committee (CCIR), Aug. 17. 

Study Group 5 of the U.S. National 
Committee for the CCIR, Aug. 18. 

Shipping Coordinating Committee, 
Subcommittee on Safety of Life at 
Sea, working group on international 
multimodal transport and contain- 
ers, Aug. 31. 

Milton A. Wolf sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Austria (biographic data). 

Program for official visit of Prime 
Minister Andreotti of Italy to Wash- 
ington, July 25-28. 

U.S., Haiti amend bilateral textile 
agreement. 

Vance: remarks with U.K. Foreign 
Secretary Owen. 

W. Howard Wriggins sworn in as 
Ambassador to Sri Lanka (bio- 
graphic data). 



* Not printed. 

*Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



•339 


7/20 


•340 


7/22 


•341 


7/23 


t342 


7/23 


•343 


7/22 



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^ 

/■3: 



77/ 



/??0 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXVII • No. 1990 • August 15, 1977 



PRESIDENT CARTER OUTLINES THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP 193 

UNITED STATES OUTLINES IMPROVED U.N. PROGRAMS 
TO MEET BASIC NEEDS OF WORLD'S POOR 

Address by AID Administrator Gilligan 20Jf 

THE U.S. BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND THE CARIBBEAN: 
PARTNERS IN GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 

Address by Assistant Secretary Todman 214. 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



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Vol. LXXVII, No. 1990 
August 15, 1977 

The Department of State BILLETIS\ 
a weekly publication issued by tht 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the governmeni^ 
with information on developments ir 
the field of U.S. foreign relations ane 
on the work of the Department ant 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selectee 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Departi 
ment, and statements, addresses, ana 
news conferences of the President and 
the Secretary of State and other offi^ 
cers of the Department, as well as speA 
cial articles on various phases of inA 
ternational affairs and the functions ofl 
the Department. Information is in-\ 
eluded concerning treaties and inter^ 
national agreements to which tht 
United States is or may become a partu 
and on treaties of general interne 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field 
international relations are also listed. 



^f President Carter Outlines the U.S.-Soviet Relationship 



Remarks by President Carter * 



Our Southern States have a proud tradi- 
tion of local, independent government, and 
now you're the heirs of that tradition. But 
we in the South have also felt, perhaps more 
directly than many others, some of the rapid 
changes that have taken place in this mod- 
ern age. More and more our own lives are 
shaped by events in other cities, decisions in 
other States, tensions in other parts of the 
world. 

And as Americans we cannot overlook the 
way that our fate is bound to that of other 
nations. This interdependence stretches 
from the health of our economy through war 
and peace, to the security of our own energy 
supplies. It's a new world in which we can- 
not afford to be narrow in our vision, limited 
in our foresight, or selfish in our purpose. 

When I took office almost exactly six 
months ago, our nation was faced with a 
series of problems around the world- — in 
southern Africa, the Middle East, in our re- 
lationships with our NATO allies, and on 
such tough questions as nuclear prolifera- 
tion, negotiations with our former adver- 
saries, a Panama Canal treaty, human 
lights, world poverty. 

We have openly and publicly addressed 
these and other many difficult and contro- 
versial issues — some of which had been 
either skirted or postponed in the past. 

As I pointed out in a recent press confer- 
f^nce, a period of debate, disagreement, 
probing was inevitable. Our goal has not 



' Made before the Southern Legislative Conference 
at Charleston, South Carolina, on .July 21, 1977 (open- 
ng paragraphs omitted); text from the Weekly Compi- 
iation of Presidential Documents dated Aug. 1, 1977, 
p. 1063. 



been to reach easy or transient agreements 
but to find solutions that are meaningful, 
balanced, and lasting. 

Now, a President has a responsibility to 
present to the people of this nation reports 
and summations of complex and important 
matters. I feel more secure as President 
making decisions if I know that either the 
most difficult, the most complex questions 
that face me have been understood and de- 
bated by you and understood and debated by 
the Congress. 

In the past I think our nation's leaders 
have been guilty of making decisions in se- 
cret, and even when the decision turns out 
to be the right one, it makes the President, 
the Secretary of State speak with a weak 
voice, when they speak alone. 

Today I want to discuss a vitally impor- 
tant aspect of our foreign relations, the one 
that may most directly shape the chances for 
peace for us and for our children. I would 
like to spell out my view of what we have 
done and where we are going in our rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union, and to reaffirm 
the basic principles of our national policy. 

I don't have any apology for talking about 
foreign affairs at a Southern Legislative Con- 
ference, because foreign affairs and those 
difficult decisions ought never to be made 
with a concept that we can abandon common 
sense and the sound judgment and the con- 
structive influence of the American people. 

For decades the central problems of our 
foreign policy revolved around antagonism 
between two coalitions, one headed by the 
United States and the other headed by the 
Soviet Union. 

Our national security was often defined 



August 15, 1977 



193 



almost exclusively in terms of military com- 
petition with the Soviet Union. This compe- 
tition is still critical, because it does involve 
issues which could lead to war. But however 
important this relationship of military bal- 
ance, it cannot be our sole preoccupation, to 
the exclusion of other world issues which 
also concern us both. 

Even if we succeed in relaxing tensions 
with the U.S.S.R., we could still awake one 
day to find that nuclear weapons have been 
spread to dozens of other nations who may 
not be as responsible as are we. Or we could 
struggle to limit the conventional arsenals of 
our two nations to reduce the danger of war, 
only to undo our efforts by continuing with- 
out constraint to export armaments around 
the world. 

As two industrial giants, we face long- 
term, worldwide energy crises. Whatever 
our political differences, both of us are com- 
pelled to begin conserving world energy and 
developing alternatives to oil and gas. 

Despite deep and continuing differences in 
world outlook, both of us should accept the 
new responsibilities imposed on us by the 
changing nature of international relations. 
Europe and Japan rose from the rubble of 
war to become great economic powers. 
Communist parties and governments have 
become more widespread and more varied, 
and I might say more independent from one 
another. Newly independent nations 
emerged into what has now become known 
as the "Third World." Their role in world af- 
fairs is becoming increasingly significant. 

Both the United States and the Soviet 
Union have learned that our countries and 
our people, in spite of great resources, are 
not all-powerful. We've learned that this 
world, no matter how technology has shrunk 
distances, is nevertheless too large and too 
varied to come under the sway of either one 
or two superpowers. And, what is perhaps 
more important of all, we have, for our part, 
learned, all of us, this fact, these facts in a 
spirit not of increasing resignation but of in- 
creasing maturity. 

I mention these changes with which you 
are familiar because I think that to under- 
stand today's Soviet or American relation- 



ship, we must place it in perspective, both 
historically and in terms of the overall global 
scene. 

The whole history of Soviet-American re- 
lations teaches us that we will be misled if' 
we base our long-range policies on the mood 
of the moment, whether that mood be 
euphoric or grim. All of us can remember 
times when relations seemed especially 
dangerous and other times when they 
seemed especially bright. 

We've crossed those peaks and valleys be- 
fore. And we can see that, on balance, the 
trend in the last third of a century has been 
positive. 

The profound differences in what our two 
governments believe about freedom and 
power and the inner lives of human 
beings — those differences are likely to re- 
main, and so are other elements of competi- 
tion between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. That competition is real and 
deeply rooted in the history and the values 
of our respective societies. But it's also true 
that our two countries share many important 
overlapping interests. Our job — my job, 
your job — is to explore those shared inter- 
ests and use them to enlarge the areas of 
cooperation between us on a basis of equal- 
ity and mutual respect. 

As we negotiate with the Soviet Union, 
we will be guided by a vision — of a gentler, 
freer, and more bountiful world. But we will 
have no illusions about the nature of the 
world as it really is. The basis for complete 
mutual trust between us does not yet exist. 
Therefore, the agreements that we reach 
must be anchored on each side in en- 
lightened self-interest — what's best for us, 
what's best for the Soviet Union. That's why 
we search for areas of agreement where our 
real interests and those of the Soviets 
coincide. 

We want to see the Soviets further en- 
gaged in the growing pattern of interna- 
tional activities designed to deal with human 
problems — not only because they can ba of 
real help but because we both should be 
seeking for a greater stake in the creation of 
a constructive and peaceful world order. 

When I took office, many Americans were 



# 



194 



Department of State Bulletin 



growing disillusioned with detente — 
President Ford had even quit using the 
word — and, by extension, people were con- 
cerned with the whole course of our rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union. Also, and 
perhaps more seriously, world respect for 
the essential rightness of American foreign 
policy had been shaken by the events of a 
decade — Vietnam, Cambodia, CIA, Water- 
gate. At the same time, we were beginning 
to regain our sense of confidence and our 
purpose and unity as a nation. 

In this situation, I decided that it was 
time for honest discussions about interna- 
tional issues with the American people. I 
felt that it was urgent to restore the moral 
bearings of American foreign policy. And I 
felt that it was important to put the U.S. 
and Soviet relationship, in particular, on a 
more reciprocal, realistic, and ultimately 
more productive basis for both nations. It is 
not a question of a "hard" policy or of a 
"soft" policy but of a clear-eyed recognition 
of how most effectively to protect our own 
security and to create the kind of interna- 
tional order that I've just described. This is 
our goal. 

We've looked at the problems in Soviet- 
American relations in a fresh way, and 
we've sought to deal with them boldly and 
constructively with proposals intended to 
produce concrete results. I'd like to point 
out just a few of them. 

— In the talks on strategic arms limita- 
tions — the SALT talks — we advanced a 
comprehensive proposal for genuine reduc- 
tions, limitations, and a freeze on new tech- 
nology which would maintain balanced 
strategic strength. 

— We have urged a complete end of all nu- 
clear tests, and these negotiations are now 
underway. Agreement here could be a mile- 
stone in U.S. -Soviet relations. 

— We're working together toward a ban on 
chemical and biological warfare and the 
elimination of inventories of these destruc- 
tive materials. 

— We have proposed to curb the sales and 
transfers of conventional weapons to other 
countries, and we've asked France, Britain, 



August 15, 1977 



'Hi 
iia! 



and other countries to join with us in this 
effort. 

— We're attempting to halt the threaten- 
ing proliferation of nuclear weapons among 
the nations of the world which don't yet 
have the ability to set off nuclear explosives. 

— We've undertaken serious negotiations 
on arms limitations in the Indian Ocean. 

— We've encouraged the Soviets to sign, 
along with us, the treaty of Tlatelolco, which 
would ban the introduction of nuclear 
weapons into the southern part of the West- 
ern Hemisphere. 

— We have begun regular consultations 
with the Soviet leaders, as cochairmen of 
the prospective Geneva conference, to pro- 
mote peace in the Middle East. 

— We and our allies are negotiating to- 
gether with the Soviet Union and their allies 
in the Warsaw Pact nations to reduce the 
level of military forces in Europe. 

—We've renewed the 1972 agreement for, 
cooperation in science and technology, and a 
similar agreement for cooperation in outer 
space. 

— We're seeking ways to cooperate in im- 
proving world health and in relieving world 
hunger. 

In the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT) — confirming and then building on 
Vladivostok accords — we need to make 
steady progress toward our long-term goals 
of genuine reductions and strict limitations, 
while maintaining the basic strategic bal- 
ance. We've outlined proposals incorporating 
significant new elements of arms control, 
deep reductions in the arsenals of both 
sides, freezing the deployment and technol- 
ogy, and restraining certain elements in the 
strategic posture of both sides that threaten 
to destabilize the balance which now exists. 

The Vladivostok negotiations of 1974 left 
some issues unresolved and subject to hon- 
est differences of interpretation. Meanwhile, 
new developments in technology have 
created new concerns — the cruise missile, 
the very large intercontinental ballistic mis- 
siles of the Soviets. 

The Soviets are worried about our cruise 
missiles, and we are concerned about the se- 



195 



curity of our own deterrent capability. Our 
cruise missiles are aimed at compensating 
for the growing threat to our deterrent rep- 
resented by the buildup of strategic Soviet 
offensive weapons forces. If these threats 
can be controlled, and I believe they can, 
then we are prepared to limit our own 
strategic programs. 

But if an agreement cannot be reached, 
there should be no doubt that the United 
States can and will do what it must to pro- 
tect our security and to insure the adequacy 
of our strategic posture. 

Our new proposals go beyond those that 
have been made before. In many areas we 
are in fact addressing for the first time the 
tough, complex core of longstanding prob- 
lems. We are trying for the first time to 
reach agreements that will not be over- 
turned by the next technological break- 
through. We are trying, in a word, for 
genuine accommodation. 

But none of these proposals that I've out- 
lined to you involves the sacrifice of secu- 
rity. All of them are meant to increase the 
security of both sides. Our view is that a 
SALT agreement which just reflects the 
lowest common denominator that can be 
agreed upon easily will only create an illu- 
sion of progress and, eventually, a backlash 
against the entire arms control process. Our 
view is that genuine progress in SALT will 
not merely stabilize competition in weapons 
but can also provide a basis for improvement 
in political relations as well. 

When I say that these efforts are intended 
to relax tensions, I'm not speaking only of 
military security. I mean as well the concern 
among our own individual citizens^Soviet 
and American — that comes from the knowl- 
edge which all of you have that the leaders 
of our two countries have the capacity to de- 
stroy human society through misunderstand- 
ings or mistakes. If we can relax this ten- 
sion by reducing the nuclear threat, not only 
will we make the world a safer place but 
we'll also free ourselves to concentrate on 
constructive action to give the world a bet- 
ter life. 

We've made some progress toward our 
goals, but to be frank, we also hear some 



negative comments from the Soviet side 
about SALT and about our more general re- 
lations. If these comments are based on a 
misconception about our motives, then we 
will redouble our efforts to make our mo- 
tives clear; but if the Soviets are merely 
making comments designed as propaganda to 
put pressure on us, let no one doubt that we 
will persevere. 

What matters ultimately is whether we 
can create a relationship of cooperation that 
will be rooted in the national interests of 
both sides. We shape our own policies to ac- 
commodate a constantly changing world, and 
we hope the Soviets will do the same. To- 
gether we can give this change a positive di- 
rection. 

Increased trade between the United 
States and the Soviet Union would help us 
both. The American-Soviet Joint Commer- 
cial Commission has resumed its meetings 
after a long interlude. I hope that conditions 
can be created that will make possible steps 
toward expanded trade. 

In southern Africa we have pressed for 
Soviet and Cuban restraint. Throughout the 
nonaligned world, our goal is not to encour- 
age dissension or to redivide the world into 
opposing ideological camps but to expand 
the realm of independent, economically self- 
reliant nations — and to oppose attempts at 
new kinds of subjugation. 

Part of the Soviet Union leaders' current 
attitude may be due to their apparent — and 
incorrect — belief that our concern for human 
rights is aimed specifically at them or is an 
attack on their vital interests. 

There are no hidden meanings in our 
commitment to human rights. We stand on 
what we have said on the subject of human 
rights. Our policy is exactly what it appears 
to be: the positive and sincere expression of 
our deepest beliefs as a people. It's ad- 
dressed not to any particular people or area 
of the world but to all countries equally; yes, 
including our own country. And it's specif- 
ically not designed to heat up the arms race 
or bring back the cold war. 

On the contrary, I believe that an atmos- 
phere of peaceful cooperation is far more 
conducive to an increased respect for human 



196 



Department of State Bulletin 












rights than an atmosphere of belligerence or 
hatred or warlike confrontation. The experi- 
ence of our own country this last century 
has proved this over and over again. 

We have no illusions that the process will 
be quick or that change will come easily. But 
we are confident that if we do not abandon 
the struggle, the cause of personal freedom 
and human dignity will be enhanced in all 
nations of the world. We're going to do that. 

In the past six months we've made clear 
our determination — both to give voice to 
Americans' fundamental beliefs and to obtain 
lasting solutions to East-West differences. If 
this chance to emphasize peace and coopera- 
tion instead of animosity and division is al- 
lowed to pass, it will not have been our 
choice. 

We must always combine realism with 
principle. Our actions must be faithful to the 
essential values to which our own society is 
dedicated, because our faith in those values 
is the source of our confidence that this rela- 
tionship will evolve in a more constructive 
direction. 

I cannot forecast whether all our efforts 
will succeed. But there are things which 
give me hope, and in conclusion I would like 
to mention them very briefly. 

This place where I now stand is one of the 
oldest cities in the United States. It's a 
beautiful town of whose culture and urban 
charm all Americans are proud — ^just as the 
people of the Soviet Union are justly proud 
of such ancient cities as Tbilisi or Novgorod, 
which there they lovingly preserve, as you 
in Charleston, and into which they infuse a 
new life that makes these cities far more 
than just dead remnants of a glorious histor- 
ical past. Although there are deep differ- 
ences in our values and ideas, we Americans 
and Russians belong to the same civilization 
whose origins stretch back hundreds of 
years. 

Beyond all the disagreements between 
us — and beyond the cool calculations of 
mutual self-interest that our two countries 
bring to the negotiating table — is the invisi- 
ble human reality that must bring us closer 
together. I mean the yearning for peace, real 
peace, that is in the very bones of us all. 



I'm absolutely certain that the people of 
the Soviet Union, who have suffered so 
grievously in war, feel this yearning for 
peace. And in this they are at one with the 
people of the United States. It's up to all of 
us to help make that unspoken passion into 
something more than just a dream— and that 
responsibility falls most heavily on those 
like you, of course, but particularly like 
President Brezhnev and me, who hold in our 
hands the terrible power conferred on us by 
the modern engines of war. 

Mr. Brezhnev said something very in- 
teresting recently, and I quote from his 
speech: "It is our belief, our firm belief," he 
said, "that realism in politics and the will for 
detente and progress will ultimately triumph 
and mankind will be able to step into the 
21st century in conditions of peace stable as 
never before." I see no hidden meanings in 
that. I credit its sincerity. And I express 
the same hope and belief that Mr. Brezhnev 
expressed. With all the difficulties, all the 
conflicts, I believe that our planet must fi- 
nally obey the Biblical injunction to "follow 
after the things which make for peace." 



President Carter's Remarks 
at Yazoo City, Mississippi 

Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a question-and- 
answer session at the Yazoo City, Miss., High 
School on July 21.^ 



Q. Mr. President, my name is Everett 
Beers. I strongly support your position on 
human rights as manifested in your foreign 
policy statements. I'm very sorry that I 
missed your remarks on human rights this af- 
ternoon. But I would like to know, aside from 
the rhetoric that's been generated, can we 
really hope to influence the world community 
on human rights issues, and how can you 



' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated August 1, 1977, p. 
1070. 



August 15, 1977 



197 



conscientiously justify excluding our allies 
such as Korea a7id Greece from human rights 
commitments and also, have you made an af- 
firmative action plan to implernent some 
long-range goals in this area? 

The President: That's a difficult question to 
answer, but I'll do the best I can. 

Obviously, throughout the world, I think in 
every country without exception in the heart 
and mind of every person, there's a desire to 
be free, to make one's own decision, to speak 
without fear, to have a chance to express 
one's political beliefs, to seek different kinds 
of employment without interference by gov- 
ernment, not to be dominated by officials who 
have power, not to be imprisoned without 
adequate charge, and not to be tortured when 
one is arrested, whether or not a conviction 
has been carried out or not. 

So what we began to speak for six months 
ago is nothing new. It doesn't exist just in 
democracies or free countries like ours. It 
exists in the nations that are most dominated 
by totalitarian governments. 

I think that my voice and others like mine 
all over the world, including, I hope, yours, 
when raised for liberty, for human dignity, for 
freedom, have a cumulative effect. We don't 
have any desire to go into a country with force 
and try to change their form of government. 
But I think it's accurate to say now that when 
an open spokesman for a minority group any- 
where in the world is arrested, that it is a 
very newsworthy item. 

We have seen recently in Argentina 342 
political prisoners, who had been there for a 
long time, released. In Korea now just this 
week political prisoners who had been in 
prison for a long time are being released. And 
I think it's accurate to say that the trend is 
toward an enhancement of human rights. 

In Belgrade, Yugoslavia, this October, 
there will be a very open and wide debate — I 
would say for at least a couple of months — 
part of which will be devoted to human rights, 
whether or not families can be joined to- 
gether, whether people who want to leave a 
country can do so without being punished. 
And the Soviet Union signed the Helsinki 
treaty, and it will be debated. So did Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the United 



States, the Western allies of ours. And all off 
us, including us, the United States, are trying 
to look good in the eyes of the world. 

I think the progress is going to be quite 
slow. But I believe in the long run our efforts 
will be successful. But I am afraid if the 
United States does not take a strong position, 
that the cause of human rights is going to be 
damaged very severely. And I also believe 
we've ignored this question too long. 

I think it was time this year, following our 
own 200th anniversary, to raise again a bea- 
con light that will make our people proud and 
say we stand for something. We stand for the 
same thing that inspired Thomas Jefferson 
and George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, 
and others to offer their lives, if necessary, to 
found a country based on freedom. And I 
think this is a good move. 

I've been criticized a good bit for being so 
outspoken about it because it might make 
some leaders of other nations angry. I'm not 
trying to make anybody angiy. I'm not trying 
to interfere in the internal affairs of 
other nations. I'm not trying to bring back the 
cold war, but I'll say this: As long as the 
American people back me on the subject, we 
will never stay quiet on the subject of human 
rights. [Applause.] 



Q. Hello, Mr. President. I am Jeff Davis 
and my question is, with the Republic of 
Panama asking for complete control of the 
Panama Canal, do you feel it would he a mis- 
take to grant their demand, and do you think 
that the Panama Canal Zone would be a vital 
base in case of a third world ivar, as Cuba is a 
threat to our Southern States? 

The President: Fine. In 1903 to 1907, our 
country worked out with Panama an arrange- 
ment to acquire control of the Panama Canal 
Zone and, of course, we built the Panama 
Canal. The treaty said that Panama retained 
sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone; that 
we had control over the Panama Canal Zone 
as though we had sovereignty. So even in the 
time of Theodore Roosevelt the agreement 
was that we and the Panamanians both, in ef- 
fect, have sovereignty over the Panama Canal 
Zone. They have legal sovereignty. We con- 



198 



Department of State Bulleti 



trol it; to operate after the building of the 
Panama Canal itself. 

My hope is that we can sign a treaty with 
Panama to share with them from now until the 
year 2000 the operation of the Panama Canal 
itself and to continue after the year 2000 an 
adequate authority to protect the Panama 
Canal, to keep it open for international use, 
giving our own warships priority along with 
those of Panama in the use of the canal. 

My guess is that before many more years go 
by we might very well need a new canal, one 
at sea level, that can handle very large ships. 
This was studied when Lyndon Johnson was 
President, and the cost of it was very high — 
several billions of dollars. Since then we have 
seen a much greater need for the canal. 

We are now looking for a way to get Alaskan 
oil and gas to the central part and the Eastern 
seaboard of the United States. The large ships 
that bring the oil down from Panama can't go 
through the canal. If they bring oil, they come 
down to the Panama area, off-load the oil into 
small ships, the small ships go through the 
Panama Canal, and bring the oil up in the fu- 
ture to the Gulf coast or the Eastern coast. 

On natural gas — when it does come — it will 
be liquified at a very, very low temperature, 
put in large ships, and brought down perhaps 
to the Panama Canal itself. There is no way to 
change it back into gas, send it across 
Panama, and reliquify it. It costs too much. 

So in the future I would say that we will 
need a sea level Panama Canal that can handle 
our large warships and the large tankers and 
freighters that are part of international com- 
merce now. 

So I think we ought to keep good relations 
with Panama. We can prevent an attack on 
the Panama Canal by a foreign government. It 
would be almost impossible to prevent the 
disruption or closing of the Panama Canal by 
sabotage if the Panamanians were determined 
to put it out of commission. So it is important 
for us to work with Panama and not against 
Panama. 

So to summarize, between now and the year 
2000, we will retain under the proposed treaty 
our control, partial sovereignty with Panama 
having sovereignty as well. This is derived 
from 1907. After the year 2000, we will give 



up the actual operation of the canal to 
Panama, but retain the right to defend it with 
our armed forces and to keep it open with first 
priority given to American warships and 
Panamanian warships to use it. I don't know 
what the treaty terms might be, but that's the 
best report that I can give you right now. 



Q. Mr. President, my name is Susan Griss. 
I, too, would like to welcome you to Yazoo 
City. I have seen on the news this week that 
the United States, under the support of your 
Ad )ninist ration, has endorsed and supported 
the membership of Vietnam into the United 
Nations. The first thing that the Vietnamese 
asked for was financial aid from the United 
States to rebiiild. 

How do you feel about this? Do you expect 
the United States to, in fact, support the re- 
building effort and support the Vietnamese 
financially, and do you think the Congress 
will support you, too? 

The President: I want to answer — this is 
the last question I can answer — I want to an- 
swer it in a little bit broader sense, but I 
won't ignore your question. 

We have a basic decision to make in our 
country in our foreign policy about how to 
deal with nations who in the past have not 
been our friends and who in some instances 
have been our enemies on the warfield. Should 
we write them off permanently as enemies 
and force them to be completely under the 
control and influence of Communist powers, 
or should we start the process of giving them 
an option to be both our friends and the 
friends of others, hoping that they will come 
to a more democratic free society and join 
with us in making a better world? 

I'm not in favor of writing those countries 
off. It's a controversial issue. I might point 
out that the Soviet Union, for instance, has a 
very strong effort being made to recruit as 
friends our own neighbors in Central America 
and South America. And I think that this 
peaceful competition with the Soviet Union 
for friendship of those nonaligned countries is 
good for our country, although it is controver- 
sial. 

I have tried to open up relationships with 



August 15, 1977 



199 



Vietnam. The leader in the Congress in taking 
this initiative happens to be our own Con- 
gressman Sonny [Gillespie V.] Montgomery. 
He went to Vietnam, I think in a very 
courageous and effective way to try to get the 
Vietnamese to give us back the bodies of 
American servicemen lost in action. When I 
got to be President, Congressman Montgom- 
ery came to the White House to give me a re- 
port on what he had done. Later, I sent 
another delegation back to them to ask them 
to find those bodies and to return them to us. 
They've done a great deal to try to find and 
return those bodies since that time. When 
Congressman Montgomery went to Vietnam, 
they brought back 11 American bodies and 
since then the Vietnamese have delivered 
others. 

We have always, for the last 25 years, op- 
posed Vietnam's entry into the United Na- 
tions. This year we did not oppose it. And now 
Vietnam will be a member of the world com- 
munity in the United Nations. I don't have 
any apology to make about that action. I am 
not in favor of the United States paying any 
money or reparations to Vietnam, however. 
[Applause.] 



Editors and News Directors 
Interview President Carter 

Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from President Carter's opening re- 
marks ayid a question and answer from the 
transcript of an intervieiv by a group of 
editors and news directors on July 15.^ 

We've just finished a superb meeting, I 
thought, with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
from Germany. Prior to that, we had a very 
good meeting with President Perez fi'om Ven- 
ezuela. On Tuesday, Prime Minister Begin 
will be here from Israel, and following that, 
we'll have Prime Minister Andreotti from 
Italy and, following that, President Nyerere 
from Tanzania. 

This is a series of meetings that we've been 



conducting throughout the whole year, and I 
think it's given me a good chance to learn 
about foreign opinions, to recement our ties 
with nations who are naturally our allies and 
friends, as are those that I've mentioned to 
you this moment. 



This year is one when we've addressed 
many problems that had been delayed for dec- 
ades. I hope we can make progress in some of 
the international affairs that we face. We've 
got, I think, a very encouraging relationship 
with the Soviet Union in spite of the fact that 
some of the items are so controversial. But as 
I said at my last news conference, we are rais- 
ing issues jointly with them which have not 
been addressed so substantively in the past. 

We are working toward a comprehensive 
test ban treaty to prohibit the testing of all 
nuclear e.xplosives, both military and peace- 
ful. We now have no constraint on peaceful 
nuclear devices for underground explosions, 
and we have a 150-kiloton limit on military 
weapons. So this is quite a liberal restraint. 

We've also put forward, as you know, the 
hope that we might begin demilitarizing the 
Indian Ocean — freezing our present level of 
deployment there, which is quite modest on 
both sides — and working on prior notification 
of missile test launchings, a prohibition 
against an attack of observation satellites by 
either country. 

We've made two basic optional proposals to 
the Soviets on SALT talks [Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks]. One is to ratify those items 
that were definitely agreed upon between 
Kissinger, Ford, and Brezhnev, and a much 
more deep series of cuts in nuclear weapon 
launchers and MIRV'd [multiple inde- 
pendently-targetable reentry vehicle] mis- 
siles, with a freeze on further deployment of 
the development of more advanced technology 
weapons. 

We are trying to move, and we are working 
with the Soviet leaders. And although we 
haven't been successful in these efforts yet, 



1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated July 25, 1977, p. 
1023. 



200 



Department of State Bulletin 



there are study groups working, and I think 
the tone of tiieir own relationship is good 
within the study groups themselves. There 
liave been some polemical discussions on their 
part, particularly about the absence of pro- 
gress, but I think this is just a difference of 
interpretation. 

Q. If you had it to do all over again, would 
ifou find a different way to raise the human 
rights issue with the Soviet Union? 

The President: I can't think of any different 
way to do it. I've thought about that a lot, be- 
cause it certainly was not done to aggravate 
any other government nor to single out any 
ciiuntry. 

Every time I've ever made a statement 
about human rights, I think without exception 
I have always included our country in as a 
people who are constantly searching for ways 
t(i alleviate or to reduce discrimination prac- 
tices and to insure that our high standards for 
human rights would be realized. 

So, I don't think I would do it any differ- 
ently. To me, this is an integral part of the 
consciousness and commitment of America. 
It's another step forward in the realization of 
the goals and aspirations that we established 
2(10 years ago. 

We are not trying to send in troops to make 
uther nations conform to us; we are not trying 
to punish anyone else. But I think there has to 
be some means in a democracy like ours, first 
of all, for a President to exemplify or to per- 
sonify what the American people believe. And 
my opinion is that the American people be- 
lieve very deeply in the concept of human 
rights. 

I think it's important that this commitment 
he expressed publicly. We've been through 
some sordid and embarrassing years recently 
with Vietnam and Cambodia and Watergate 
and the CIA revelations, and I felt like it was 
time for our country to hold a beacon light of 
s(jmething that was pure and decent and right 
and proper that would rally our citizens to a 
cause. But I've been cautious not to single 
anyone out for condemnation. 

And I might say that my own attitude on 
the human rights question has been fairly 



moderate. I'm proud of it. But I think it's ac- 
curate to say that some Members of Congress 
would go much further than I and even termi- 
nate all relationships with other countries who 
don't measure up to our standards of human 
rights. We can't do that. 

So, I think a slow, careful, methodical but 
persistent expression of our concern about 
human rights violations has already been ef- 
fective and will continue to be effective in the 
future. I don't believe there is a single leader 
of a nation in the world now who doesn't have 
at least in his or her consciousness the concept 
of human rights and how that country is 
measuring up to the expectations of one's own 
people or trying to avoid worldwide condem- 
nation. So, I think our efforts have had an 
impact, and I would not do it otherwise. 



Israeli Prime Minister Begin 
Visits Washington 

Menahem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, 
made an official visit to Washington July 
18-21, during which he met with President 
Carter and other government officials. Fol- 
lowing is a statement issued by the White 
House on July 19} 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 25 

President Carter and Israeli Prime Minis- 
ter Menahem Begin met in the Cabinet Room 
for two hours. The meeting was also attended 
by the Vice President, Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance, Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzez- 
inski. Assistant Secretary of State [for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs] Alfred L. 
Atherton, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Israel 
Samuel Lewis, and William Quandt of the 



' For an e.xchange of remarks between President 
Carter and Prime Minister Begin at a welcoming cere- 
mony on the South Lawn of the White House and their 
exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White House on 
July 19, and for President Carter's remarks to report- 
ers following the Prime Minister's departure on July 20, 
see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
dated July 25, 1977, pp. 1035, 1041, and 1049. 



August 15, 1977 



201 



National Security Council staff on the Ameri- 
can side; and Israeli Ambassador to the 
United States Simcha Dinitz, Advisor to the 
Prime Minister Shmuel Katz, Minister of the 
Embassy of Israel Hanan Bar-On, Director of 
the Prime Minister's Bureau Yechiel 
Kadishai, Political Advisor to the Prime 
Minister Eli Mizrachi, Military Secretary to 
the Prime Minister Brigadier General Eph- 
raim Poran, and Advisor to the Prime 
Minister Yehuda Avner on the Israeli side. 

The President began by repeating his per- 
sonal pleasure at welcoming Prime Minister 
Begin to the White House so soon after his 
taking office last month. The President con- 
gratulated Mr. Begin once again on his acces- 
sion to national leadership and expressed 
confidence that this first visit will inaugurate 
the close working relationship natural to the 
leaders of two democracies with such 
longstanding and deep ties of friendship. 
Their talks were conducted in the spirit of 
mutual respect common to that warm friend- 
ship between our two peoples. The President 
and Prime Minister agreed that their meet- 
ing and the others to follow here mark a good 
starting point for seeking ways toward a just 
and durable peace in the Middle East. They 
pledged their determination to achieve that 
peace, noting that imaginative and responsi- 
ble statesmanship is essential to overcoming 
the challenges posed. 

The meeting this morning was devoted to a 
thorough and searching discussion of how to 
move toward an overall settlement of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The President and 
Prime Minister each developed their ideas on 
the issues involved. They agreed that all the 
issues must be settled through negotiations 
between the parties based on U.N. Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338 which all the 
governments directly concerned have ac- 
cepted. They also agreed that this goal would 
best be served by moving rapidly toward the 
reconvening of the Geneva conference this 
year, keeping in mind at the same time the 
importance of careful preparation. 

In this connection, they focused on the 
practical requirements for convening the con- 
ference, looking toward Secretary of State 
Vance's forthcoming trip to the area for more 
talks with all the leaders involved. They ex- 

202 



pressed a hope that the Prime Minister's visiti * 
will help lay the groundwork for rapid' '{*" 
movement toward negotiations. ' 

In the course of the talk this morning on 
the diplomacy of peace, the President reaf- 
firmed the enduring American commitment 
to the security and well-being of Israel. Hi 
assured the Prime Minister that any diffei 
ences that may occur from time to timj 
should not be allowed to obscure America' 
and his personal dedication to this historic 
American commitment. He asked the Prime 
Minister to express to the people of Israel 
the determination of the people of the United 
States to help them find true peace. Discus- 
sions on how to get negotiations started be- 
tween the parties will continue this afternoon 
in the Prime Minister's meeting with Secre- 
tary Vance. No bilateral issues were dis- 
cussed at this first meeting. The President 
and Prime Minister will meet again tonight sdB!" 
the working dinner which the President raP" 
giving at the White House, and in the 
Cabinet Room again tomorrow morning at * 

10. 

»;■ 



:iDt 



M 
Up 
iin 

HKJ 



ROC and Korea Agree 

To Curb Shoe Exports to U.S. 

White House Announcement ^ 



The United States and the Republic oi 
China (ROC) on June 14 signed a 4-year Or^iiy 
derly Marketing Agreement (OMA), under 
which Taiwanese exports of nonrubber foot- 
wear to the United States will be limited to 
levels well below their record high of 156 mil- 
lion pairs in 1976. The agreement, signed by 
Ambassador James Shen of the ROC, and 
Robert S. Strauss, President Carter's Special 
Representative for Trade Negotiations, was 
announced by Ambassador Strauss. 

Negotiation of a similar agreement betweert 
the United States and the Republic of Koreai 
is nearly complete and is expected to be 



• Made on June 14, 1977 (text from Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated June 20): a sum- 
mary of the principal provisions of the footwear agree- 
ment was included with the White House press release 
of June 14. 



Department of State Bulletin 



ave 



k 



'kl 



m 

ielp 



k 

Rl! 
irei 



*«9i 



mnounced next week, Ambassador Strauss 
I'eported.^ 

In announcing the OMA with Taipei, Am- 
lassador Strauss commended the Govern- 
iients of both the Republics of China and 
Korea for their "cooperative statemanship" in 
leveloping "fair and equitable negotiated so- 
utions" to pressing international shoe trade 
problems. 

"Any agreement such as the one we have 
just concluded," Ambassador Strauss noted, 
'represents a temporary trade restriction 
v\ hich the President has said he is very reluc- 
ant to take. These [Orderly Marketing] 
Agreements are not the ideal long-term solu- 
ions to our trade problems." 

"Our agreement with Taipei, however," 
■Strauss said, "is a useful, effective, and ac- 
■eptable way of giving one of our basic domes- 
tic industries a reasonable temporary period 
11 which to adjust to severe, sudden, short- 
;erm market disruptions and to become more 
•(jmpetitive — which is essential in the long 
lun. As such, it comes to grips with an im- 
mediate economic problem, which if allowed to 
Lontinue to fester, could cause injury to our 
workers and industry to reach such propor- 
tions as to fuel the fever of protectionism. In 
this total context," Strauss observed, "we 
have just administered an emergency anti- 
protectionist prescription." 

Ambassador Strauss also noted that "in ac- 
cordance with President Carter's instructions, 
the Departments of Commerce and Labor and 
my office are working on a newly designed 
Federal Trade Adjustment Assistance pro- 
gram which will deliver much more effective 
help to trade impacted domestic firms and 
workers. Details of this proposed new pro- 
gram will be announced before the end of this 
month." 

The OMA with Taipei provides that in the 
first year, from June 28, 1977, through June 
30, 1978, ROC exports to the United States of 
three categories of nonrubber footwear — 
leather, plastic, and "other" — will not exceed 
122 million pairs. This quota will be increased 
by 3 million pairs in each of the succeeding 
years, 1978-79, 1979-80, and 1980-81, up to a 



■^ The agreement with the Republic of Korea was con- 
cluded on June 21, 1977. 



limit of 131 million pairs in the final year of 
the agreement. Each of the three footwear 
categories has a separate sublimit. Exports of 
felt footwear liners under the international 
Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) are not in- 
cluded in these quotas. 

The Republic of China has assured the 
United States in side letters to the agreement 
that it will not permit disruptive shifts in the 
type, material, or price range of footwear that 
it exports and that it will not circumvent the 
agreement by disruptively shifting into lines 
of footwear that technically are not covered 
by the OMA, but that in fact compete with 
lines of shoes that are covered. 

The OMA also provides that if other U.S. 
footwear export suppliers should move to take 
advantage of Taipei's export limitations by 
unduly increasing their shipments to the 
United States, the United States may take un- 
ilateral action to correct the inequities. 

This OMA, and a similar draft agreement 
with Korea, were approved by President Car- 
ter as appropriate import relief, in the na- 
tional economic interest under the Trade Act, 
to remedy serious injury to domestic footwear 
makers and workers, which was found by the 
U.S. International Trade Commission 
(USITC) to have been substantially caused by 
increased imports. The USITC had recom- 
mended a system of tariff-rate import quotas 
which the President rejected as not being in 
the national economic interest. 

U.S. imports of nonrubber footwear in- 
creased from 265 million pairs in 1974 to 370 
million pairs in 1976. Of this 105-minion-pair 
increase, Taiwan accounted for 68 million 
pairs and Korea 36 million pairs, for a total of 
104 million, or 99 percent of the increase over 
the 2-y ear-period. 

The OMA provides for consultations on any 
future-year quota adjustments warranted by 
conditions in the domestic footwear industry 
and other economic factors; the USITC will 
monitor conditions in the domestic footwear 
industry as well as any inflationary impact of 
the agreements on U.S. consumers and pre- 
pare appropriate reports on a quarterly and 
yearly basis. Ambassador Strauss noted in 
this connection that the agreement should not 
have any significant inflationary impact nor 
adverse effect upon consumers. 



I 



August 15, 1977 



203 



United States Seeks Improved U.N. Programs 
To Meet Basic Needs of World's Poor 



Address by John J. Gilligan 

Administrator, Agency for International Development ^ 



I am proud to make my first appearance be- 
fore this distinguished body. But my own feel- 
ings are not nearly so important as my oppor- 
tunity to express once more the support of the 
United States for the United Nations and its 
development efforts. 

I bring you today a statement of policy of 
our new Administration. In that policy, which 
I shall outline here today, it is the aim of the 
United States to make its development con- 
tribution effective in three major ways: 

— First, we seek strengthened, cooperative 
efforts that are devised clearly and specif- 
ically to meet the basic needs of the poor 
majority of the world's people; 

— Second, we seek improved performance 
and efficiency in U.N. development efforts; 
and 

— Third, if the United Nations can make 
substantial progress in more efficiently pro- 
viding basic services and resources to the 
world's poor majority, we are prepared to 
consider greater assurance of our support for 
such programs over longer periods of time. 

As we work together, you will hear the rep- 
resentatives of the United States repeat these 
aims over and over. What we support, and 
what we will work for, are programs to meet 
the basic human needs of the poor majority 
throughout the world and to strengthen the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the apparatus 
in which such programs are carried out. That 
is the way we intend to bring about our own 
significant commitment to longer term 
support. 

As we all know, our meeting today follows 
the economic summit in London [May 7-8] and 



the Conference on International Economic 
Cooperation in Paris [May 30-June 2]. The ini- 
tiatives taken at those sessions — initiatives 
toward substantially increased efforts in de- 
velopment assistance — must now be trans- 
lated into practical actions. Our meeting today 
can provide an important step in taking those^ 
actions. 

As Secretary of State Vance declared in- 
Paris, the United States is prepared to help 
build a new international economic system. 
Our view of that system is that it not only 
should offer new opportunities for nations to 
participate in the world economy, but must 
provide the opportunities for all citizens to 
participate in the growing economies of their 
countries. 

As you may recall. President Carter, in his 
address at the United Nations on March 17, 
said that the United States would be advanc- 
ing proposals aimed at meeting the basic 
human needs of peoples of the developing 
world. 

Now let me sketch out in further detail this 
Administration's policy of meeting basic 
human needs and our expectations of the 
United Nations in this area. I will then pre- 
sent our position with regard to improving the 
administration of programs. 

Striving for Fundamental Economic Rights 

In our view, international development 
means not only closing the gap between rich 






' Made before the 24th session of the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) Governing Council at 
Geneva, Switzerland, on June 16, 1977. 



204 



Department of State Bulletin 



and poor nations, but also between the rich 
and poor within nations. Let me take note of 
the excellent background document to our dis- 
cussion today, prepared by the Secretariat, 
which emphasizes "... the pressing need to 
promote greater equity and social justice 
within countries, as well as among 
them. . . ." ^ We should see the major objec- 
tive of development as providing all human 
beings with the oppoilunity to develop their 
full potential. If such equality of opportunity 
is to have any meaning, the basic needs of the 
world's poor majority must be met. 

Although there is no precise definition of 
such basic needs, an emerging international 
consensus points to at least certain minimum 
levels of food, shelter, health, education, and 
employment. Unfortunately, not enough 
people realize that at least one billion 
people — one quarter of the world's popu- 
lation — live in conditions of absolute poverty. 
We should know the unpleasant truth: Despite 
certain successes in development, the number 
of people living in this absolute and degrading 
poverty is increasing. The rapid increase in 
gross national product in many developing 
countries over the past two decades has not 
led to an increase in living standards for the 
poorer half of their growing populations. 

We all know about the "trickle-down 
theory." For the world's poorest people, how- 
ever, a considerable amount of development 
assistance of the past two decades has not 
trickled down. The American people, the 
American Congress, and the new American 
Administration will no longer accept a 
"trickle-down" theory in those programs 
where its people and money are involved. 

A new strategy to meet basic human needs 
requires new approaches to rural and indus- 
trial development. It means increased agricul- 
tural production and greater equity in income 
distribution. For many countries, greater 
equity must mean significant changes in land 
tenure — in other words, land reform. Greater 
equity also means improved access to agricul- 
tural resources — fertilizer, water, transporta- 
tion, and credit. 

Increased expenditures must also be made 
on rural health and educational facilities. 



2 UNDP doc. DP/261 dated May 6, 1977. 



And in industrial development, we must 
place major emphasis on labor-intensive 
production. 

As the people in this room know, when we 
talk about meeting basic needs, we are not 
talking about an international welfare pro- 
gram. We are talking about giving the poor a 
chance to improve their standard of living by 
their own efforts. We are talking about giving 
them a chance and the means to rise above 
those extreme poverty levels that stunt 
human development. We are talking about the 
global enhancement of human rights; for the 
fundamental needs of the world's people are 
also their rights and without these, all other 
rights — civil, political, and social — lose 
meaning. 

Just as President Carter's new Administra- 
tion will take a strong stand on issues of civil, 
political, and social rights, so too shall we 
strive for the achievement of fundamental 
economic rights. 

We believe that the United Nations De- 
velopment Program (UNDP) not only should 
offer its assistance to the poor countries of the 
world but should insure that it is providing 
opportunities for the poor majority within 
those countries. We also believe that this de- 
velopment effort cannot be allowed to be a 
one-way street, with all of the thinking and 
planning and working and spending generated 
in only one direction. We believe that the 
United Nations Development Program should 
require recipient nations to commit them- 
selves to meeting the minimum needs of their 
populations, to distributing the benefits of de- 
velopment on an equitable basis, and to pro- 
tecting the human rights of their populations 
so that development can be self-sustaining. 
And we believe that the United Nations has 
the means to determine whether nations are 
making good on these commitments. 

Our government is committed to working 
with the United Nations Development Pro- 
gram to achieve these objectives. 

Improving Performance and Efficiency 

Now let us turn to the matter of administra- 
tion. 

President Carter has directed that all U.S. 
Government programs, both domestic and 



August 15, 1977 



205 



foreign, must be made more effective and 
efficient. 

With regard to our foreign assistance effort, 
the President has directed me to undertake a 
thorough review of all our development pro- 
grams. We have already begun a reorganiza- 
tion and strengthening of our Agency for In- 
ternational Development. What we expect of 
ourselves in this regard, we expect no less of 
the international programs in which we 
participate. 

— We expect development assistance pro- 
grams to have clear-cut objectives. 

— We expect organizational structures and 
staff levels to be lean and muscular. 

— We expect to be able to trace easily the 
delivery of services and resources to the 
people for whom the programs are designed. 

These are our expectations. Based on the 
results, the United States is prepared, as I 
said earlier, we are prepared to consider 
longer term funding of the U.N. development 
programs to give them added strength. 

But let me be clear: We can only engage in 
practical consideration of such funding, and 
seek acceptance of this concept by the Ameri- 
can people and the Congress, if necessary re- 
forms are undertaken. We would, of course, 
expect other donor nations to make similar 
longer term contributions according to appro- 
priately shared levels of assistance. 

I would now like to offer a number of spe- 
cific suggestions for the management of the 
United Nations development efforts. 

Before I go any further, however, let me 
emphasize that we fully support the Adminis- 
trator, Bradford Morse, in his conviction that 
the United Nations Development Program 
should carry out its mission in a way that both 
enhances and makes good use of the work of 
the [U.N.] specialized agencies and in no way 
duplicates their efforts. However, because as 
we all realize development by its very nature 
requires an integrated approach to be effec- 
tive, a central mechanism is required to coor- 
dinate efforts to the greatest extent possible. 

We believe that the United Nations De- 
velopment Program is the mechanism which 
can insure better integration of the field tech- 



nical assistance programs of the specialized 
agencies. The United States strongly supports 
the 1970 consensus which clearly establishes a 
central funding and coordination role for the 
UNDP in the area of U.N. technical assist- 
ance. We should strengthen that role and re- 
quire greater efficiency in the administration 
of scarce resources. 

There are certain areas of particular con- 
cern to the United States — funding of UNDP 
projects, the relationship between the UNDP 
and the executing agencies, reserves for 
emergencies and special programs, and the 
coordinating role of the UNDP. Let me dis- 
cuss these areas one by one, including the 
recommendations of my government. 

In the area of funding, we recommend that 
the relatively high income recipients be 
"graduated" from grant funding to fully reim- 
bursable funding as their ability to pay in- 
creases. This could be accomplished gradually 
through the introduction of a sliding scale of 
cost-sharing and reimbursement. We hope 
that by the third programming cycle, grant 
funding by the UNDP will be hmited to the 
poor countries. 

In financial management, we recommend 
that UNDP's accumulation of nonconvertible 
currencies be reduced. Future contributions 
to the UNDP should be in fully usable curren- 
cies in accord with the UNDP"s financial rules 
and regulations. 

Now let me turn to UNDP's relations with 
executing agencies. The United States firmly 
believes that the growing use of specialized 
agency assessed budgets for technical assist- 
ance purposes is undesirable. We are con- 
cerned that at the very time UNDP is seeking 
a substantial funding increase, the prolifera- 
tion and duplication of special funds will result 
in less, rather than more, resources for the 
U.N. technical assistance programs. 

We, therefore, urge member states to 
strengthen UNDP's coordinating role in de- 
velopment activities by assuring UNDP's fi- 
nancial viability and by limiting the amount of 
technical assistance financed by the assessed 
budgets of the specialized agencies. We also 
believe the UNDP and the agencies must seek 
to secure maximum economies from decen- 



206 



Department of State Bulletin 



tralization of decisionmaking and to expedite 
project approval and execution. 

My government, therefore, fully endorses 
the continuing trend toward further decen- 
tralization of UNDP with the ratio of staff 
levels between headquarters and the field 
changed increasingly in favor of the field. We 
also believe that serious consideration might 
usefully be given to the concept of an inte- 
grated personnel structure within the U.N. 
development system. 

And now, let me turn to the issue of re- 
serves for emergencies and special programs. 
As we all know, UNDP's operations have 
been adversely affected by grave financial dif- 
ficulties beginning in 1975. To provide an 
added measure of protection against such 
difficulties in the future, we support a 
strengthened reserve for emergency 
purposes. 

We would also support prudent use of this 
reserve for special requirements which may 
arise from decisions reached within participat- 
ing agencies. This would enable the Program 
to operate with a greater margin of flexibility; 
it would also reduce recurrent demands for 
new special purpose funds. 

Now as for the coordinating role of the 
UNDP. The 1970 consensus, as we all know, 
provided a mechanism, under the leadership 
of the resident representative, for the coordi- 
nation of U.N. development activities at the 
field level. We believe, however, that field 
level coordination requires still further im- 
provement. We also believe that coordination 
at the inter-agency level through the Inter- 
Agency Consultative Board requires 
strengthening. Additionally, we believe that 
the Administrator should examine means by 
which UNDP resident representatives, to the 
extent desired by host governments, can con- 
tinue to improve coordination of UNDP and 
specialized agency field activities with those 
of bilateral aid agencies. 

UNDP should also examine the possibility 
of expanding its role in joint operations in- 
volving both multilateral and bilateral funds, 
as in the case of the Sahel program. 

Now with regard to the question of how 
frequently this council should convene, my 
government supports a single, annual meet- 



ing. We believe that an annual meeting would 
permit more effective use of UNDP's re- 
sources and would not weaken the council's 
oversight role. In this connection, UNDP 
might wish to consider the desirability of es- 
tablishing a lower-level intergovernmental 
body to insure frequent productive contact be- 
tween the UNDP and member governments. 

Now, before concluding, Mr. President [Dr. 
Johan Kaufmann of the Netherlands] and 
fellow representatives, I would also like to 
emphasize that my government places high 
priority on enhancing the role of women in de- 
velopment. We, therefore, strongly support a 
role for the United Nations Development Pro- 
gram as a clearing house for the exchange of 
practical information on the integration of 
women in development. Moreover, we rec- 
ommend strengthened efforts in the actual 
conduct of development programs to insure 
that women are fully involved. 

I have expressed the position of my gov- 
ernment and of my President. I suggest that 
Mr. Morse consult with representatives of 
other member states concerning the proposals 
I have set forth. We also shall do so. 

I would hope we could receive a report from 
the Administrator at the next Governing 
Council session on the progress that has been 
made in meeting basic human needs and im- 
proving the effectiveness and efficiency of 
UNDP activities. We have confidence in the 
U.N. development system and in the UNDP's 
central role in it. But, if we are to achieve 
even greater international commitment to this 
development effort, it is imperative that we 
can demonstrate that the programs are 
effectively reaching the people who need 
them. 

In making these proposals, I do not want to 
give the impression of belittling anything that 
has been done in the United Nations De- 
velopment Program over the years. Clearly, 
however, we must do more and we must do 
better. Through UNDP, through our mutual 
involvement in the U.N. system of develop- 
ment assistance, and through our other pro- 
grams of support and cooperation, we can help 
achieve a new international economic system 
based upon equity, upon growth, and upon 
justice. 



August 15, 1977 



207 



Transfer of Sanctions Treaties 
With Mexico and Canada 

Following is a statement by Barbara M. 
Watson, Administrator of the Bureau of Se- 
curity and Consular Affairs, made before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee on July 13. ' 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to be 
with you today to discuss S.1682, the bill to 
implement the Mexican and Canadian prisoner 
transfer treaties. The Department of State 
strongly supports the treaties and the legisla- 
tion both as humanitarian measures to relieve 
prisoners' hardships and as steps to improve 
relations with our two neighbors. In my 
statement I will set forth the background to 
the treaties and the need for them. I will then 
explain how we came to the conclusion that 
they are constitutional. I will not attempt to 
explain the details of the implementing 
legislation. ^ 

The bill is the product of painstaking labor 
by the Department of Justice which possesses 
expertise in criminology and penology which 
the State Department does not have. I can, 
however, assure you that we have reviewed 
the legislation to make certain that it is con- 
sistent with the treaties which it implements 
and that its operation will not cause foreign 
relations difficulties. 

The welfare of American prisoners in 
foreign jails has greatly concerned the De- 
partment of State. Today approximately 2,200 
are in foreign jails, nearly 600 of them in 
Mexico and 275 in Canada. 

The situation in Mexico is well known. Con- 
gressional hearings have highlighted the pris- 
oners' problems. Prison conditions there are 
plainly inadequate by American standards, 
with respect to food, medical treatment, secu- 
rity against violence, and other matters. In 
spite of efforts by the Mexican authorities 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

^ The Senate gave its advice and consent to the treaty 
with Canada on July 19, 1977, and to the treaty with 
Mexico on July 21, 1977. Ratification of the treaties will 
take place after the implementing legislation, now 
under consideration by the Congress, has been enacted. 



there is still much that we find unsatisfactory. 

Even where there is less of a cultural dif- 
ference, as in the case of Canada, there are 
special hardships involved in being in a prison 
abroad. It is difficult or impossible to maintain 
contact with one's family. Prisoners cannot be 
reintegrated into the civilian environment at 
the end of their term. In Mexico, and in 
Quebec, language problems make prison life 
more difficult. Comparable hardships exist for 
foreigners in U.S. prisons even though there 
is less pubhcity about them. 

The problem of prisoners, and the publicity 
they generate, has been a burden on diploma- 
tic relations. To improve the situation we 
negotiated treaties with Mexico [signed on 
November 25, 1976] and Canada [signed on 
March 2, 1977] to provide for transfers, with 
consent, of prisoners in foreign institutions. 
In both cases it was the foreign country that 
took the initiative to open negotiations. Our 
execution in good faith of the commitments 
which we have undertaken is important to our 
relations with our neighbors. 

The key constitutional question is that of 
article VI which provides that all challenges 
to the validity of the underlying sentence shall 
be addressed to the courts of the country 
where the sentence was handed down. 

Let me note that the Canadian treaty uses 
the words "conviction or sentence" whereas 
the Mexican treaty uses only the term "sen- 
tence." No difference was intended, but we 
were advised that there are no separate Mexi- 
can equivalents for the two terms. This clause 
was an essential part of the arrangement. 
Mexico has a long history of sensitivity to 
foreign interference with its legal system, one 
it shares with other Latin American coun- 
tries. It could not accept review of Mexican 
judgments by an American court. We also 
concluded that the Senate could not be ex- 
pected to give its advice and consent to an ar- 
rangement under which Mexican courts 
could sit in judgment on the findings of U.S. 
courts. 

Furthermore, the problems involved in 
holding hearings to determine precisely what 
happened in a remote foreign police station 
would be insurmountable. We know that the 
Mexican Constitution provides safeguards not 



208 



Department of State Bulletin 



very dissimilar from those afforded in the 
United States and that the Mexican courts af- 
ford direct review and collateral review by 
way of the writ of amparo. Therefore, that 
provision was agreed to. 

It is obvious that there will be challenges to 
the constitutionality of that provision. The 
treaty is, with respect to the United States, a 
novel one and the issue is new. We have given 
careful study to this question. We would not 
have caused the treaty to be signed if we had 
not concluded that it was constitutionally de- 
fensible. Both the Department of Justice and 
distinguished outside scholars have agreed. 

Let me state briefly the grounds for that 
conclusion. The first ground may be called the 
"conflicts of law" ground and the second the 
"consent" ground. 

Under the first approach we start from the 
premise that the prisoner's trial was con- 
ducted in a foreign country that lawfully had 
jurisdiction over the offender and the offense. 
The courts have repeatedly said that the U.S. 
Constitution has no applicability to the con- 
duct of such a trial. The U.S. action — the ac- 
ceptance of custody over the offender — is only 
ancillary to the action of the Mexican court. 

U.S. authorities have consistently been up- 
held in turning over persons to foreign courts 
for trials not consistent with our Constitution. 
While extradition typically involves foreign 
fugitives, surrenders under the status-of- 
forces agreements do involve American 
citizens — [military] service personnel. It 
seems no greater deference to, and no deeper 
an involvement in, a foreign criminal process 
to receive prisoners when the process is com- 
pleted. Indeed, it involves less of an intrusion 
than extradition, which will subject them to a 
non-American trial. 

In receiving foreign prisoners, we do not 
deprive them of any rights they have pre- 
viously had; indeed, we confer on them the 
opportunity to serve their sentences closer to 
home. Many prisoners are transferred from 
one State to another or from State to Federal 
institutions without it being thought that the 
receiving State adopted the sentence or made 
it its own. 

The consent argument proceeds on the basis 
of the fact that nobody will be transferred 



against his or her will. Extensive precautions 
have been written into the implementing 
legislation to assure that the consent to trans- 
fer will be as free and as fully informed as 
possible. 

The decisions of the Supreme Court give 
wide effect to guilty pleas and other choices 
by the accused in the criminal process. This par- 
ticular choice stands on even firmer footing. 
In this case the offender is offered a genuine 
benefit, one to which he had no prior entitle- 
ment. In return he is being asked to give up 
something to which he was never previously 
entitled— an American court review of his 
underlying conviction. 

It has been suggested that it is analogous to 
the case of a conditional pardon, in which it 
has been held that i-easonable conditions may 
be attached when a benefit is conferred upon a 
prisoner. The person accepting the pardon 
must take the whole package offered to him. 

Similarly, where the President and the 
Congress have together obtained a special and 
unusual benefit for an offender, he should not 
be able to repudiate his assent to the condi- 
tions which were necessary to achieve that 
benefit. Success in such repudiation would, of 
course, destroy this avenue of relief for all 
later cases. 

For these reasons we believe that the 
agreement will be sustained against constitu- 
tional challenges. 

We have examined successive drafts of the 
implementing legislation and are convinced 
that it will make possible the successful im- 
plementation of the treaties. A good deal of 
the necessary spade work to begin implemen- 
tation of the treaty relatively promptly after 
congressional action is completed has been 
done. State Department personnel have ac- 
companied representatives of the Justice De- 
partment to Mexico to discuss matters with 
their Mexican counterparts. While the trans- 
fer of prisoners is the responsibility of the 
Department of Justice, the State Department 
will have the function of helping to make sure 
that cooperation between the Mexican and 
American penal authorities goes smoothly. I 
can assure you that the Department will exert 
its best efforts to that end. 

One particular function is assigned by the 



August 15, 1977 



209 



legislation to the Department of State. Sec- 
tion 4109(b) places upon the Secretary of 
State the responsibility of providing council 
for indigent prisoners abroad in order that 
they may give their consent in a full aware- 
ness of the legal consequences of their choice. 

It will not be easy to fulfill that responsibil- 
ity. For one thing, there are not many 
lawyers who know both systems of law well 
enough to give good advice. However, we in- 
tend to use the resources of both legal defend- 
er systems, of the voluntary organizations 
that have made offers of assistance, and of 
any other source that comes to our attention; 
and we hope to be able to provide satisfactory 
services. 

The Department of State has recommended 
without reservation that the Treaties on the 
Execution of Penal Sentences with Canada 
and Mexico be ratified. We now join the 
Department of Justice in urging the enact- 
ment of S. 1682 which is necessary for their 
implementation. 



Department Discusses Human Rights 
in Thailand 

Following is a statement by Robert B. Oak- 
ley, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, made before the 
Subcommittee on International Organizations 
of the House Committee on International Re- 
lations on June 30. ' 

Several Asian countries figure prominently 
in the Administration's and this committee's 
commitment to improve human rights 
worldwide. I therefore welcome this opportu- 
nity to discuss Thailand's human rights record 
and to put that record into the context of the 
prevailing situation in Southeast Asia. 

Given the widespread interest in the events 
surrounding the change in the Thai Govern- 
ment last October, it seems appropriate to 
begin with a description of those events. 

The three preceding years of democracy in 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



Thailand were an anomaly in Thai political 
history, which has had a series of relatively 
stable, military-backed governments since 
1938. Unfortunately, these three years were 
also marked by an unusual amount of social 
unrest, as the traditional patterns of political 
behavior were challenged by new ones. In this 
heady, uncertain atmosphere, right and left 
wing elements fought each other in the 
streets, Thammasat University was attacked 
and burned by students of a rival school, and 
even striking pohce took the law into their 
own hands when they sacked the Prime Minis- 
ter's own home. It was a period of political in- 
stability during which four separate Thai gov- 
ernments were in power. The Khukrit gov- 
ernment, which survived the longest of the 
four, consisted of a coalition of no less than 16 
separate political parties. 

By October 1976, there had been a series of 
domestic political crises which began with the 
return of former Thai Prime Minister Thanom 
from self-imposed exile. There had been 
large-scale student demonstrations. The 
Prime Minister had unexpectedly resigned 
when criticized by the leadership of his own 
party, later agreeing to reconstruct his coali- 
tion government. A reshuffled Cabinet under 
Prime Minister Seni was sworn in by the King 
on October 5. The Cabinet was, however, di- 
vided into mutually antagonistic factions. 
Numerous civilian and military groups and in- 
dividuals of all political persuasions were at- 
tempting to foment and take advantage of the 
increasingly unstable political situation. 

The event which finally ignited this incen- 
diary situation was a student rally at Tham- 
masat University on October 5. Rightwing 
groups organized large counterdemonstra- 
tions, protesting what they claimed had been 
a gross act of student disrespect for the 
Crown Prince. On October 6, police units, at 
the order of Prime Minister Seni Pramot, 
moved to arrest the leaders of those student 
demonstrations. The armed confrontation re- 
sulting from this police action was further 
compounded by fighting between right and 
left wing groups in and around the campus. 
The violence left 40 dead and approximately 
3,000 persons, mostly students, arrested. 
Meanwhile, in another part of Bangkok later 



210 



Department of State Bulletin 



that day, a mob of some 50,000 people, drawn 
largely from vocational students and rural 
groups, demonstrated in front of the Prime 
Minister's office, demanding the resignation of 
the Cabinet. 

Prime Minister Seni appeared to have been 
overwhelmed by events and unable to deal 
with the situation. Six hours later, in the 
wake of this violence, faced with governmen- 
tal paralysis and the possibility of further 
urban demonstrations and violence on a mas- 
sive scale, the senior commanders of the Thai 
military took control of the government. 

Around the world, television and press 
photo coverage of the violence at Thammasat 
was reported simultaneously with the news of 
the coup d'etat. The resulting erroneous im- 
pression in the minds of many was that the 
Thai military had brutally seized control of 
the government. In fact, the coup was blood- 
less. The Thai military did not participate in 
the violence at Thammasat, nor were any 
members of the previous government injured 
or arrested. The commander of the police — 
who must bear some responsibility for the 
savage violence at Thammasat — was replaced 
by the military authorities. However, no dis- 
ciplinary action has been taken against the 
poHce. 

The senior Thai military officers who seized 
control of the government stated that it was 
not their intention to govern the country di- 
rectly. Two days after the coup, the King ap- 
pointed Prime Minister Thanin upon the rec- 
ommendation of the military. On October 22, a 
civilian Cabinet was announced and a new 
constitution promulgated. 

While the current regime is ultimately de- 
pendent upon the backing of the Thai military, 
the Prime Minister and his Cabinet have con- 
siderable independence. Senior Thai military 
commanders have statutory authority to act 
as the Prime Minister's Advisory Council, and 
it appears that that body sets the essential 
guidelines of government policy, particularly 
with respect to matters affecting national se- 
curity and foreign policy. The Prime Minister 
and his civilian Cabinet, however, signifi- 
cantly contribute to policy as well as adminis- 
tering the day-to-day operations of the Thai 
Government. 



During the three years of democratic rule, 
Thailand had civil and political liberties com- 
parable to our own. The military's action to 
end the Thai democratic experiment repre- 
sented to many Thai a necessary sacrifice if 
the country was to stabilize itself and success- 
fully face the growing threat from hostile 
Communist neighbors. 

In his April 30 address on human rights and 
foreign policy, Secretary Vance defined our 
concern for human rights under the broad 
categories of integrity of the person, vital 
human needs, and pohtical liberties. I would 
like to briefly review Thailand's record as it 
relates to that definition. 

With respect to integrity of the person, 
there is no specific declaration of the people's 
rights and liberties in the Thai Constitution. 
Thai courts, however, continue to adhere to a 
legal code based on Western European mod- 
els. In effect, those tried in Thailand are al- 
lowed basically the same rights as the accused 
in the United States. 

There are, however, certain provisions of 
martial law in effect in Thailand since October 
7 that can be used to supersede Thai law, and 
these provisions present a problem of due 
process and individual liberty. Under order 
22, there are nine categories of violations 
which can be cause for arrest and imprison- 
ment without recourse to normal Thai legal 
procedure. Six categories involve criminal ac- 
tivity, while three categories potentially in- 
volve pohtical conduct. 

Since the October coup, more than 3,000 
Thai citizens have been detained under these 
nine categories. At present, there are approx- 
imately 1,000 persons in detention. The vast 
majority of these prisoners are considered 
petty criminals and are detained in reform 
centers for periods lasting two-to-six months. 
The detention of most of these people appears 
to be a genuine effort to reform a criminal 
element in Thai society. The Thai Government 
has, however, identified 64 of the prisoners 
currently being held as violators of one of the 
three categories of order 22 that has a politi- 
cal basis. 

We have no way of ascertaining the number 
of prisoners, whose arrest may be politically 
motivated. However, political or not, all these 



August 15, 1977 



211 



people are held without due process. The 
cases of all order 22 prisoners are reviewed 
every two months and releases made. The last 
was on May 11, when 613 were freed, 43 of 
whom Thai authorities identified as "political" 
prisoners. We know of no reports that those 
detained have suffered torture, cruel, or in- 
human treatment. 

Of the 3,000 persons, mostly students, ar- 
rested at Thammasat University on October 6 
before the coup, all but 23 have been released 
or are free on bail. Formal charges of criminal 
activity against 110 of those persons arrested 
before the coup — most of whom have been 
freed on bail — are being considered, but the 
Department is informed that not all of them 
are likely to be brought to trial. In response 
to an expression of concern by our Embassy in 
Bangkok, the Thai Government has assured 
us that normal Thai legal procedures will be 
followed for those brought to trial. Summary 
justice under article 21 of the Constitution 
will not be employed, and the courtroom will 
be open to both press and public. We intend to 
have an Embassy officer present. 

With respect to the second category of 
human rights outlined by Secretary Vance, 
the Thai Government has demonstrated a 
commitment to the provision of essential food, 
shelter, health care, and education for the 
Thai people. The Thai Government's budget 
provides for continuing efforts to expand pri- 
mary and secondary schooling. Higher univer- 
sity education in Thailand is one of the finest 
and largest in Asia, with 32 universities in op- 
eration. The Thanin government is promoting 
land reform and rural development. There are 
special education and development programs 
for minority populations, including the King's 
hilltribe project. There is a minimum wage 
law and a rice price subsidy for the urban 
poor. 

The Thai Government is appreciative of the 
modest U.S. aid program of $14 million in fis- 
cal year 1977 and accepts some assistance 
from other countries, as well as international 
financial institutions. However, most of the 
funds and personnel for development projects 
in Thailand come from domestic Thai re- 
sources. 

The third category of human rights deal 



with those civil and political liberties which 
we hold so fundamental to our own system. 
The current Thai Government is nonelective, 
and political parties have been disbanded, al- 
though there is a formal commitment to a 
complicated 12-year formula under which full 
democracy may be restored to Thailand. 
There are still elected village leaders that 
continue to administer government at the 
local level. Political interest groups, no longer 
able to form political parties, have reverted to 
the more traditional Thai network of personal 
contacts to influence government policy. Stu- 
dent organizations have been similarly barred; 
but unions continue to function, although they 
are legally constrained from strike action. 
This limitation on labor is a serious constraint, 
and the Thai Government is considering such 
alternatives as a board of binding arbitration. 

There is no formal press censorship, but 
some newspapers have occasionally had their 
licenses revoked. Most papers which have had 
their publication suspended have resumed op- 
eration within several weeks. Some, curi- 
ously, merely changed the name of the paper 
slightly and received a new license. 

The United States has made President Car- 
ter's views on human rights very clearly 
known to Thai Government officials, both here 
and in Thailand, including our view that a 
state of emergency cannot justify the commis- 
sion of violations of human rights. It is our 
judgment that the Government of Thailand 
understands these views and that it is, for its 
reasons, becoming more concerned about the 
issue of human rights. There has recently 
been increased emphasis upon rural develop- 
ment, as well as a considerable reduction in 
the numbers of prisoners held under order 22. 
Also, the few persons still charged because of 
their participation in the events of October 
1976 will soon be tried, while the rest have 
been freed. 

Human rights in Thailand cannot be dis- 
cussed in a vacuum, given its geographical lo- 
cation abutting the Communist states of Cam- 
bodia and Laos, its proximity to Vietnam, and 
the history of antagonism between the In- 
dochina states and Thailand. A justification 
given for not returning to the open, politically 
effervescent, democratic system which pre- 



212 



Department of State Bulletin 



vailed from 1973 to 1976 is the threat posed by 
these states, including support for the Com- 
munist insurgencies in Thailand's north, 
northeast, and south. Thai feelings of vul- 
nerability have been increased by the removal 
of the U.S. military from Thailand and the 
huge amounts of U.S. arms left in the hands 
of the Vietnamese — some of which have been 
sent to Laos. 

One can draw one's own conclusions as to 
the degree to which this situation has contrib- 
uted to the nature of the present government. 
However, T wish to direct your attention to 
another important point — the effect which 
massive human rights violations in the In- 
dochina countries has upon Thailand. 

This committee has already had hearings on 
Vietnam and will do so soon on Cambodia. 
Thus, there is no need to go into detail on the 
human rights problems in Indochina. Suffice it 
to say that over the past two years, some 
120,000 refugees from Indochina have sought 
refuge in Thailand. They see Thailand as 
being so far preferable to the situations of 
poverty and repressions which exist in their 
countries that they take great risks to escape. 
Despite the threat of arrest or death from 
troops who have orders to fire upon those at- 
tempting to flee, over 1,000 refugees a month 
continue to pour into Thailand. Despite the 
serious economic, social, and political prob- 
lems caused by these refugees, the Thai do 
not turn them back, although they sometimes 
are tempted to do so. 

Thus, in addition to the action it is taking to 
improve the welfare of its own people, the 
Government and people of Thailand are mak- 
ing a substantial human rights contribution to 
those who are less fortunate than they. In- 
deed they are second only to the United 
States in providing assistance to Indochina 
refugees. They deserve our commendation 
and our financial support in this effort, one 
which they know must be continued for sev- 
eral years to come, given the sharply contrast- 
ing human rights situation in Indochina. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



Middle East Problems. Hearings before the Subcommit- 
tee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on central in- 
fluences and pressures at work in Middle East area. 
May 18 and 20, 1977. 79 pp. 

Second Protocol to the 1975 Tax Convention With the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire- 
land. Message from the President of the United 
States transmitting the protocol signed at London on 
March .31, 1977. S. E.x. .J. .June 6, 1977. 5 pp. 

Ambassador Young's African Trip. Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations to receive a report from 
Ambassador Andrew Young on his recent trip to Af- 
rica and United States policy in the area. June 6, 
1977. 29 pp. 

Survey of Proposals to Reorganize the U.S. Foreign Af- 
fairs Agencies, 1951-1975. Part I: Foreign Economic 
Policy and Public Diplomacy. Pi-epared for the Sub- 
committee on International Operations of the House 
Committee on International Relations by the Con- 
gressional Research Service of the Library of Con- 
gress. June 6, 1977. 70 pp. 

Permanent Duty-Free Treatment for Copying Lathes 
Used for Making Rough or Finished Shoe Lasts and 
for Parts of Such Lathes. Report of the House Com- 
mittee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 3093. 
H. Rept. 95-425. June 16, 1977. 5 pp. 

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Wool Not Finer Than 
46S. Report of the House Committee on Ways and 
Means to accompany H.R. 3946. H. Rept. 95-428. 
June 16, 1977. 5 pp. 

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Doxorubicin 
Hydrochloride Antibiotics. Report of the House 
Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 
4018. H. Rept. 95-429. June 16, 1977. 3 pp. 

Temporary Reduction of Duty on Unmounted Underwa- 
ter Lenses. Report of the House Committee on Ways 
and Means to accompany H.R. 4654. H. Rept. 95-430. 
June 16, 1977. 4 pp. 

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Photographic Color 
Couplers and Coupler Intermediates. Report of the 
House Committee on Wavs and Means to accompany 
H.R. 5052. H. Rept. 95-432. June 16, 1977. 3 pp. 

Duty-Free Entry of Competition Bobsleds and Luges. 
Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means 
to accompany H.R. 5146. H. Rept. 95-433. June 16, 
1977. 3 pp. 

Reduced Duty on Levulos until July 1, 1980. Report of 
the House Committee on Ways and Means to accom- 
pany H.R. 5176. H. Rept. 95-434. June 16, 1977. 4 
pp. 

Suspension of Duty on Certain Bicycle Parts. Report of 
the House Committee on Ways and Means to accom- 
pany H.R. 5263. H. Rept. 95-435. June 16, 1977. 5 
pp. 



August 15, 1977 



213 



The U.S. Business Community and the Caribbean: 
Partners in Growth and Development 



Address by Terence A. Todman 

Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs ^ 



This is the first time a major conference on 
the Caribbean has been directed specifically 
toward the American business community, 
focusing on the whole range of factors that a 
businessperson interested in the Caribbean 
must take into account. This conference 
brings together representatives of the gov- 
ernments of the Caribbean as well as our own 
government, representatives of public and 
private financial institutions, academic ex- 
perts on the Caribbean, and business leaders 
in a wide variety of commercial and industrial 
activities. 

What we all have in common is a personal 
interest in the Caribbean and, beyond that, a 
recognition that each of us has a very real 
stake in its future. 

The importance of the Caribbean to the 
United States as a nation — economically, 
politically, and culturally — is too often under- 
estimated. Commercially it offers a vast 
potential for enterprise throughout the 
hemisphere. In turn investors, exporters, im- 
porters, and many others in the U.S. private 
sector have much to offer to the economies 
and business interests of the Caribbean. 

That is why these next two days [of this 
conference] will provide an unparalleled op- 
portunity for us to build on what we already 
know, to open ourselves to new knowledge 
and perspectives, and to follow up on a practi- 
cal level the mutual opportunities we 
discover. 



' Made before the Conference on Caribbean Business, 
Trade, and Development at Tampa, Florida, on June 23, 
1977 (opening paragraphs omitted). 



Those of us in government look particularly 
to this kind of conference to broaden our own 
perspectives and to benefit from the insights 
and experiences each of you represent. Those 
of you who live and work in the Caribbean — 
whether as businessmen, government offi- 
cials, or students of the region — bring an es- 
sential wisdom and cultural sensitivity to our 
discussions here. Your dealings with other 
societies and governments are different from 
ours in Washington. We earnestly anticipate 
your counsel and insights. 

As a nation and a people, our ties with the 
Caribbean have long been close and are be- 
coming increasingly so. We, of course, have a 
geographical presence through our links with 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the 
territory of the Virgin Islands. 

Our commercial relationships have long 
been substantial. The United States supplies 
25 percent of Caribbean imports and provides 
a market for 70 percent of the area's exports. 
In dollar terms this amounts to an annual 
trade exceeding $6 billion. Volume alone, 
however, tells only a small part of the story. 
In percentage terms, the Caribbean provides 
about 65 percent of the bauxite-alumina and 
25 percent of all the sugar imported into the 
United States. 

U.S. industry has already made a substan- 
tial direct investment in the Caribbean re- 
gion. For example, U.S. investments in the 
Dominican Republic alone amount to more 
than $500 million. For the nations of the 
English-speaking Caribbean the figure is over 
$3 billion. 



214 



Department of State Bulletin 



The interrelationship between the United 
States and the peoples of the Caribbean has a 
human dimension as well. Americans look to 
the Caribbean as their number-one tourist 
mecca. An estimated 2.5 million U.S. tourists 
visit the Caribbean each year — over a million of 
them in the Bahamas alone. The Caribbean at- 
tracts more U.S. tourism for its size than the 
other nations of the hemisphere combined 
and, in fact, is unmatched by any other area of 
the world. This great influx of people into a 
small, culturally distinctive area has had pro- 
found and continuing implications both for the 
cultural life of the people they visit and 
for the cultural horizons of the tourists 
themselves. 

Simultaneously, the infusion of tourists into 
the Caribbean has been matched by a growing 
influx of Caribbean peoples into the U.S. 
population. 

In many respects, this immigration 
pattern — like the great waves of European 
immigration of the 19th and early 20th 
centuries — is a source of pride and hope for all 
concerned. For the United States, it tells us 
that our land is still regarded as a place of op- 
portunity where a young person would wish to 
make his future. At the same time, it has en- 
riched the ethnic and cultural makeup of our 
own already diverse population. 

Yet the migration out of the Caribbean to 
the United States continues to trouble both 
our government and those of the Caribbean 
states themselves. 

For us, it raises questions of immigration 
policy and competition for jobs in an economy 
still grapphng with high unemployment. For 
them, while easing the population and un- 
employment crunch, it often results in a drain 
of professional and management expertise and 
educated youth from an area already strug- 
gling to care for and educate the staggering 40 
percent of the population under 15 years of 
age. 

Whatever changes and challenges American 
and Caribbean citizens have brought to each 
other's doorstep, the interweaving of the lives 
of our populations has served to link our na- 
tions together in a shared history, shared 
interests and concerns, and — for better or 
worse — a shared future. 



Until recently, however, U.S. official in- 
volvement with the English-speaking Carib- 
bean was extremely limited, while our sub- 
stantial involvement in the affairs of the 
Spanish-speaking Caribbean was, in the eyes 
of many, often aimed in the wrong direction. 
In the past, security interests have been the 
overriding concern of the U.S. Government in 
its dealings with the Caribbean, whereas the 
Caribbean nations themselves have been 
preoccupied with economic matters. 

One State Department official has charac- 
terized our past policies as "neglect 
punctuated by forceful intervention." How- 
ever that may be, what we seek in the Carib- 
bean today is not domination, disproportion- 
ate influence, or the right to intervene in 
other nations' internal affairs. We seek in- 
stead a mature, healthy relationship with all 
states in the region, founded on respect for 
sovereignty, recognition of common interests, 
and consultation on matters of mutual 
concern. 

U.S. View of the Caribbean 

For too long the United States has ap- 
peared to approach the Caribbean, with its 
unique cultures and interests, as simply 
another part of "Latin America," giving in- 
adequate attention to the Caribbean's own 
unique and increasingly serious problems. 

The Carter Administration intends to 
change that. We see in the Caribbean region a 
very special, very important part of the 
world. We see in the Caribbean a degree of 
cultural diversity truly remarkable for the 
area's size. We see economies in widely vary- 
ing stages of development and governments 
representing a host of differing philosophies 
and structures. 

We see in the Caribbean a region facing 
very serious, and in many respects unique, 
economic problems. These problems are not 
simply a reflection of broader patterns affect- 
ing the rest of Latin America or even the rest 
of the developing world; rather they form a 
distinctive Caribbean pattern that demands 
our direct focus. 

Island nations like those of the Caribbean 
must depend for their economic existence on 
many factors beyond their own borders and 



August 15, 1977 



215 



their own control. They depend on foreign im- 
ports for raw materials and consumer goods. 
They depend on foreign capital for investment 
and foreign markets as outlets for their prod- 
ucts. Some of the so-called ministates of the 
area are so small that economic viability 
would be a severe challenge even under the 
most favorable resource circumstances. And 
the sizes of even some of the larger of the is- 
lands are inadequate compared to their own 
growing, and in too many cases jobless, 
populations. 

All these problems, combined with the 
worldwide impact of recession and the energy 
crisis, have left some Caribbean states in pre- 
carious financial circumstances. In some in- 
stances the problems are essentially short- 
term ones of stability and debt management 
or the still hngering effects of the U.S. reces- 
sion on tourism. But in other cases they are 
more continuing and complex, such as mount- 
ing trade deficits, flight of capital, chronic un- 
employment, and the diseconomies of small 
scale. 

Some observers, after looking at these 
problems, have reached overly pessimistic 
and, in our view, unwarranted judgments re- 
garding the economic and political future of 
the Caribbean. The Carter Administration, 
for its part, sees in the Caribbean distinctive 
and noteworthy elements which far outweigh 
the economic crises now commanding 
everyone's attention. 

In this area we see many good examples of 
the open, highly developed political institu- 
tions that provide the only long-term guaran- 
tee that human rights will enjoy continuing 
respect. We can put forward exemplary 
Caribbean models of the rule of law, constitu- 
tional government, and vigorous political 
party competition. We have recently seen in 
some countries the peaceful, constitutional 
transfer of power between parties after unre- 
stricted campaigning. 

We see also in the Caribbean an intense 
dedication to the other side of the human 
rights equation — the equitable meeting of 
human needs. 

As Secretary Vance discussed in his Law 
Day address [at Athens, Ga. on April 30], 
freedom from torture and arbitrary arrest is 



only the first aspect of human freedom. We 
must also deal with loss of dignity — and even 
life — through hunger, unmet health needs, 
unemployment, and economic despair. 

In the Caribbean we see governments and 
peoples who are taking those deprivations of \ 
human rights seriously and are actively trying ; 
to do something about them. We see govern- 
ments engaged in land reform, rapid indus- 
trialization, and major experiments in more 
broadly-based ownership and control of 
resources. 

Indeed, the Caribbean as a whole offers a ) 
significant test of our commitment to both 
democracy and development. Its people face 
urgently critical resource needs. Many of its 
governments demonstrate full respect for per- 
sonal rights, the practice of political democ- 
racy, and a firm commitment to social 
progress— along with approaches to political 
and economic questions that sometimes differ 
from ours. Our ability and willingness to re- 
spond to their needs under these combined 
circumstances will say more about our human 
rights policy than all the statements we could 
issue. 

There is much we don't know about the 
Caribbean — about its people and cultures, 
about the opportunities in its future, about its 
needs and problems and how they might be 
met. But there is one thing none of us have to 
be told: It is clear beyond all doubt that the 
nations of the Caribbean simply cannot meet 
the basic needs of their populations without a 
major and continuing infusion of capital from 
outside the area. 

The need is clear. The real question is what 
type of response the American people are able 
and willing to make. The bottom line is how 
important these states are to us — how much it 
matters to us what kinds of lives their people 
lead. I think it matters a great deal. This Ad- 
ministration thinks it matters a great deal. 
But I cannot presume to tell you what our 
nation's response will be. 

When President Carter pledged himself to 
bring the American people into the foreign 
policymaking process as full partners, it was 
because he recognized that in the long run 
that is the only way foreign policy in a democ- 
racy will work. 



216 



Department of State Bulletin 



This is particularly true of resource trans- 
fers. The collective response of our nation will 
be determined to a great extent by the at- 
titudes and actions of the American public — 
particularly interested people like you. 

In the public sector, our government al- 
ready uses both bilateral and multilateral 
programs to transfer aid into the Caribbean. 
This year the U.S. Agency for International 
Development is conducting a major program 
in Haiti — the poorest of the Caribbean 
states — with smaller programs operating in 
Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and 
elsewhere in the Caribbean. Seeking to 
strengthen regional economic institutions, the 
United States has lent over $40 million to the 
Caribbean Development Bank. The volume of 
U.S. aid to the Caribbean, in terms of its 
population and size relative to other develop- 
ing areas, has been substantial. 

In terms of Caribbean needs, however, we 
are barely scratching the surface. An active 
effort is now underway to find ways for our 
government to respond more fully to the re- 
gion's needs, whether through an expansion of 
our own programs or in cooperation with 
other concerned countries and institutions. 

However, the future of foreign assistance 
programs remains an uncertain one. The U.S. 
taxpayer is just getting over the effects of the 
recession. Like many Caribbean govern- 
ments, our own is under severe pressure to 
reduce its deficit and achieve a balanced 
budget. Additional financial commitments in 
the Caribbean may mean cutbacks somewhere 
else — in other regions, in other foreign com- 
mitments, or in domestic programs. Officials 
both in the executive branch and on Capitol 
Hill are struggling with those conflicting 
pressures. 

In making these difficult resource allocation 
decisions in the weeks and months ahead, our 
government will be looking to you, particu- 
larly those with a continuing relationship or 
economic stake in the Caribbean, both for 
guidance and for support. One thing is clear: 
We all have a major stake in the survival of 
democracy in the Caribbean. 

In a larger sense, however, the response of 
our government will only be a small part of 
the overall response of the American people. 



In the last analysis, the public approach to 
foreign policy — particularly in the major 
North-South issues — is based on a recognition 
that the sum of individual decisions made in 
the private sector will probably in the long 
run make more difference than the actions of 
the government itself. 

Opportunities for Private Investment 

We have a free enterprise economy. Most of 
the technological know-how and, indeed, most 
of the capital that the people of developing 
countries seek from us is not in the hands of 
the U.S. Government but of the U.S. business 
community. That is why your role is so impor- 
tant. Unless the private sector participates in 
a major and constructive way in the develop- 
ment drama of our time, the outcome will fall 
far short of possibilities and expectations. 

No one, of course, expects private invest- 
ment or trade decisions to be made on human- 
itarian grounds, or even in the service of 
American policy goals. They are made mainly 
for good business reasons. 

I believe there are, in fact, numerous op- 
portunities for sound entrepreneurship for the 
American businessman or firm interested in 
investing in the Caribbean. They exist in in- 
dustry, in agriculture, in export and import 
sales, and in a wide range of management and 
marketing services. 

One of the purposes of this conference is to 
help to identify those opportunities. We have 
to look beyond traditional patterns of financ- 
ing, ownership, and relationships between the 
different sectors and host governments that 
have prevailed in the past. The advent of the 
multinational corporation, the growth of in- 
ternational financial institutions, the mixed 
public-private economies of many developing 
nations, and new experiments in joint ven- 
tures between nations favored at different 
stages of the resource chain all offer chal- 
lenging new possibilities; for the enterprising 
businessman. 

As we look at this area and the challenges 
and opportunities before us, we would all do 
well to remember that the great industrial 
leap of the late 19th century in the United 
States — the railroad-building, the mills, the 
great western ranches, the urban 



August 15, 1977 



217 



construction — was financed largely by foreign 
private investment. French capital assisted 
our political revolution, and it was largely 
British and other European capital which 
financed the early stages of our economic 
revolution. 

In all cases, wise and farsighted men risked 
their fortunes and their reputations on an in- 
vestment that made sense not in terms of 
what the United States appeared to be at the 
time, but what they believed it would come to 
be in the future. Their faith proved to be a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. 

Today America's business community can 
play a similar key role in the developing 
world. The great drama of development, in 
which the major portion of the world is en- 
gaged with an intensity and passion which we 
can only dimly perceive, will dominate the last 
quarter of this century as our own economic 
miracle dominated the last. 

I cannot tell you that participation offers a 
risk-free opportunity for you or your inves- 
tors. I can tell you that the development proc- 
ess offers a positive alternative to a growing 
polarization of rich and poor nations, a break- 
down in struggling economies and govern- 
ments, and the vast economic and political 
disruptions that would follow and affect all of 
us. 

And it offers, also, a challenge peculiarly 
worthy of the genius of American ingenuity. 
Even more than the capital itself, the develop- 
ing world needs pragmatic, inventive solu- 
tions to practical business and management 
problems. It needs a sense of optimism and of 
historical perspective. It needs to recognize 
the possibility of individual rewards for crea- 
tive effort. It needs to see how capital in- 
vested through sound business planning 
works to the benefit of the whole community. 
It needs the advanced technology that com- 
petitive production requires. 

In short, it needs the very things that 
American business can best give it. I have no 
doubt that each of you who expands into that 
horizon will find your decision rewarding in 
every sense of the word. 

I am equally confident that each of us par- 
ticipating in this conference today and 
tomorrow — whether from the United States 
or the Caribbean, from business or 



government — will be rewarded with a greater 
understanding of this complex region and of 
how each of us personally might contribute to 
its future and to the enrichment of our own 
lives. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Finance 

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag- 
ricultural Development. Done at Rome June 13, 
1976. ' 

Signature: Tanzania, July 18, 1977. 
Ratification deposited: Saudi Arabia, July 15, 1977. 

Fisheries 

International convention for the high seas fisheries of 
the North Pacific Ocean, with annex and protocol. 
Signed at Tokyo May 9, 1952. Entered into force June 
12, 19.53. TIAS 2786. 

Notice of termination: United States, February 10, 
1977; effective February 10, 1978. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 

1948. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into 

force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495. 

Notification of denunciation: Sweden, June 3, 1977. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at 

London October 25, 1967. ' 

Acceptance deposited: Tonga, July 12, 1977. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at 

London October 12, 1971. ' 

Acceptances deposited: Romania, July 11, 1977; 
Tonga, July 12. 1977. 

Tin 

Fifth international tin agreement, with anne,\es. Done 
at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force June 14, 
1977. 
Approval deposited: France, July 15, 1977. 



BILATERAL 

Canada 

Convention for the preservation of the halibut fishery of 
the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea. Signed at 



Not in force. 



218 



Department of State Bulletin 



Ottawa March 2, 1953. Entered into force October 28, 
1953. TIAS 2900. 

Notice of termination: United States, April 1, 1977; 
effective April 1. 1979. 
Memorandum of under.standing on cooperation in the 
field of housing and urban affairs. Signed at Ottawa 
June 28, 1977. Entered into force June 28, 1977. 

Egypt 

Project grant agreement for technical and feasibility 

studies II. Signed at Cairo June 2, 1977. Entered into 

force June 2, 1977. 
Agreement amending the project grant agreement of 

June 2, 1977 for technical and feasibility studies II. 

Signed at Cairo July 10, 1977. Entered into force July 

10, 1977. 

Haiti 

Agreement amending the agreement of March 22 and 
23, 1976, as amended (TIAS 8268, 8395), relating to 
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber te.xtiles and 
te.xtile products. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Julv 19, 1977. Entered into force July 19, 
1977. 

Kenya 

Project agreement relating to a roads gravelling proj- 
ect. Signed at Nairobi July 1, 1977. Entered into 
force July 1, 1977. 

Korea 

Agreement amending the agreement of June 26, 1975, 
as amended (TIAS 8124, 8267), relating to trade in 
cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington April 29 and June 
29, 1977. Entered into force June 29, 1977. 

Mexico 

Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. Signed at 
Mexico November 25, 1976. • 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: July 21, 
1977. 2 

Philippines 

Agreement amending the agreement of January 4 and 7, 
1977, relating to the transfer of nonfat dry milk to the 
Philippines. Signed May 25 and June 6, 1977. Entered 
into force June 6, 1977. 

Poland 

Agreement amending the agreement of November 6, 
1975 (TIAS 8180), relating to trade in cotton textiles. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington July 21, 
1977. Entered into force July 21, 1977. 

Portugal 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag- 
ricultural commodities of October 22, 1976 (TIAS 
8535). Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon July 7, 
1977. Entered into force July 7, 1977. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement concerning air services, with annexes and 
exchange of letters. Signed at Bermuda July 23, 1977. 
Entered into force July 23, 1977. 



' Not in force. 

' With declaration. 

August 15, 1977 



Upper Voita 

Project agreement relating to integrated rural de- 
velopment, with annexes. Signed at Ouagadougou 
June 30 and July 1, 1977. Entered into force July 1, 
1977. 

Venezuela 

Agreement relating to eligibility for United States mili- 
tary assistance and training pursuant to the Interna- 
tional Security Assistance and Arms Export Control 
Act of 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Caracas 
June 16 and 30, 1977. Entered into force June 30, 
1977. 



PUBLICATIONS 



1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume 
on Near East, South Asia, Africa 

Pres.s release 318 dated July 6 (for release July 13) 

The Department of State released on July 13 
"Foreign Relations of the United States," 1949, volume 
VI, "The Near East, South Asia, and Africa." This vol- 
ume is the latest in the "Foreign Relations" series, 
which has been published continuously since 1861 as the 
official record of American foreign policy. 

The volume contains 1,852 pages of previously unpub- 
lished documentation on basic U.S. security interests in 
the Near East and South Asia; talks with the United 
Kingdom concerning the Near East; petroleum policy; 
the proposed union of Syria and Iraq; the dispute be- 
tween India and Pakistan over Kashmir; a conference of 
American consular officials in North Africa; and U.S. 
relations with Afghanistan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, 
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and the Union of 
South Africa. 

The largest single collection of material, comprising 
approximately one-half the volume, documents U.S. 
interest in the Arab-Israeli controversy over the future 
status of Palestine. Coverage is given to the extension 
by the U.S. Government of de jure recognition to the 
Governments of Israel and Jordan; the armistice 
agreements between Israel on the one hand and Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria on the other; the problems 
of the Arab refugees, Jerusalem, and territorial bound- 
aries; the talks held at Lausanne and other activities of 
the Palestine Conciliation Commission; and the failure 
to attain a final peace settlement in the area. 

"Foreign Relations," 1949, volume VI, was prepared 
in the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Department of State. Six other volumes for 1949 have 
already been published, and two more are in prepara- 
tion. Four volumes for 1950 have also been published, 
and three others are in preparation. Copies of volume 

219 



VI for 1949 (Department of State publication 8885; GPO 
Cat. No. Sl.l:949/v. VI), may be purchased for $16.50 
(domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should be 
made out to the Superintendent of Documents and 
should be sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, De- 
partment of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20i02. 
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more 
copies of any one publication mailed to the same ad- 
dress. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of 
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown be- 
low, which include domestic postage, are subject to 
change. 

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a 
map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. 
diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A 
complete set of all Background Notes currently in 
stock — at least 140 — $21.80; 1-year subscription service 
for appro.ximately 77 updated or new Notes — $24; plas- 
tic binder — $1.50.) Single copies of those listed below 
are available at 50C each. 

CostaRica Cat. No. S1.123:C82 

Pub. 7768 4 pp. 

El Salvador Cat. No. SI. 123:EL7 

Pub. 7794 4 pp. 

Equatorial Guinea Cat. No. S1.123:EQ2 

Pub. 8025 4 pp. 

Finland Cat. No. S1.123:F49 

Pub. 8262 7 pp. 

Libya Cat. No. S1.123:L61 

Pub. 7815 6 pp. 

Maldives Cat. No. S1.123;M29/4 

Pub. 8026 4 pp. 

Swaziland Cat. No. S1.123:SW2 

Pub. 8174 6 pp. 

Long Range Patrol Aircraft. Agreement with Canada. 
TIAS 8388. 4 pp. 35?. (Cat. No. 89.10:8388). 

Continued Operation of Long Range Aid to Naviga- 
tion (LORAN) Stations. Agreement with the Philip- 
pines extending the agreement of November 3 and De- 
cember 15, 1975. TIAS 8432. 2 pp. 35«. (Cat. No. 
89.10:8432). 

Improved Seed Development. Agreement with Thai- 
land. TIAS 8474. 40 pp. $1..50. (Cat. No. 89.10:8474). 

Rural Education. Agreement with Bolivia. TIAS 
8475. 118 pp. $2.75. (Cat. No. 89.10:8475). 

Construction of Irrigation Systems. Agreement with 
the Republic of Korea. TIAS 8476. 20 pp. $1. (Cat. No. 
89.10:8476). 

Economic Development. Agreement with Syria. TIAS 
8477. 20 pp. $1. (Cat. No. 89.10:8477). 



Agricultural Production. Agreement with Syria. TIAS 
8478. 34 pp. $1.30. (Cat. No. 89.10:8478). 

Atomic Energy — Reactor Safety Experiments. 

Agreement with other government.?. TIAS 8479. 66 
pp. $1.80. (Cat. No. 89.10:8479). 

Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer Space. 

Convention with other governments. TIAS 8480. 96 
pp. $1.90. (Cat. No. 89.10:8480). 

Construction and Equipping of an Abattoir and Ac- 
cess Roads. Agreement with Botswana. TIAS 8481. 18 
pp. $1. (Cat. No. 89.10:8481). 

General Participant Training. Agreement with Syria. 
TIAS 8482. 17 pp. $1. (Cat. No. 89.10:8482). 

National Metrology Standards Systems. Agreement 
with the Republic of Korea. TIAS 8483. 33 pp. $1.30. 
(Cat. No. 89.10:8483). 

Education in the Basic Sciences. Agreement with the 
Republic of Korea. TIAS 8484. 24 pp. $1.20. (Cat. No. 
89.10:8484). 

Monitoring Food, Beverage and Sanitary Services on 

Common Carriers. Memorandum of understanding 

with Canada. TIAS 8485. 7 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 

89.10:8485). 

Double Taxation — Taxes on Income. Convention and 

related notes with the Polish People's Republic. TIAS 

8486. 68 pp. $1.80. (Cat. No. 89.10:8486). 

Food for Work and Distribution. Agreement with 
Cape Verde. TIAS 8487. 12 pp. 80(2. (Cat. No. 
89.10:8487). 

Economic Stability. Agreement with .Jordan. TIAS 
8488. 3 pp. 60C. (Cat. No. 89.10:8488). 

Agricultural Research. Agreement with the Philip- 
pines. TIAS 8489. 85 pp. $1.40. (Cat. No. 89.10:8489). 

Technical Cooperation in Statistics and Data Proc- 
essing. Agreement with Saudi Arabia. TIAS 8490. 9 pp. 
70C. (Cat. No. 89.10:8490). 
Improvement of Georgetown Streets and Approaches. 

Agreement with Guyana. TIAS 8491. 24 pp. $1.20. (Cat. 
No. 89.10:8491). 

New Amsterdam Streets and Approaches and Canje 
River Bridge Project. Agreement with Guyana. TIAS 
8492. 20 pp. $1. (Cat. No. .89.10:8492). 

Technical Cooperation in Agriculture and Water. 

Agreement with Saudi Arabia. TIAS 8494. 14 pp. 800. 
(Cat. No. 89.10:8494). 

Technical Cooperation in Acquisition of Electrical 
Power Equipment. Agreement with Saudi Arabia. 
TIAS 8495. 6 pp. 600. (Cat. No. 89.10:8495). 

Housing Loan Guaranty. Agi-eement with Portugal. 
TIAS 8496. 3 pp. 60C. (Cat. No. 89.10:8496). 

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Luxem- 
bourg amending Annex B to the agreement of January 
27, 19.50. TIAS 8497. 4 pp. 600. (Cat. No. 89.10:8497). 

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Lu.xem- 
bourg amending Anne.x B to the agreement of January 
27, 1950. TIAS 8498. 4 pp. 600. (Cat. No. S9.10:849si. 



220 



Department of State Bulletin 



IDEX August 15, 1977 Vol. LXXVII, 1990 



us Control and Disarmament. Editors and 
ilews Directors Interview President Carter (ex- 
erpts) 200 

iiada. Transfer of Sanctions Treaties With 
lexico and Canada (Watson) 208 

_IIna. ROC and Korea Agree To Curb Shoe Ex- 

' ports to U.S. (White House announcement) 202 

ngress 

ggressional Documents Relating to Foreign Poi- 

fy 213 

partment Discusses Human Rights in Thailand 

Dakley) 210 

tisfer of Sanctions Treaties With Mexico and 
panada (Watson) 208 

^eloping Countries. United States Seel<s Im- 
rove<l U.N. Programs To Meet Basic Needs of 
i^orld's Poor (Gilligan) 204 

itnomic Affairs. ROC and Korea Agree To Curb 
Bhoe Exports to U.S. (White House announce- 
■■ment) 202 

^eign Aid. United States Seeks Improved U.N. 
ograms To Meet Basic Needs of World's Poor 
Jilligan) 204 

luman Rights 

partment Discusses Human Rights in Thailand 

■Dakley) 210 

ptors and News Directors Interview President 

garter (excerpts) 200 

resident Carter's Remarks at Yazoo City, Mis- 
;_sissippi (excerpts) 197 

el. Israeli Prime Minister Begin Visits Wash- 
Igton (statement issued at conclusion of first 
Beeting) 201 

fea. ROC and Korea Agree To Curb Shoe Ex- 

Orts to U.S. (White House announcement) .... 202 

tin America and the Caribbean. The U.S. 
isiness Community and the Caribbean: 
tners in Growth and Development (Todman) . . 214 

llco. Transfer of Sanctions Treaties With 
lexico and Canada (Watson) 208 

iiama. President Carter's Remarks at Yazoo 

jjty, Mississippi (excerpts) ■. . 197 

Bidential Documents 

Jtors and News Directors Interview President 

Jarter (excerpts) 200 

sident Carter Outlines the U.S. -Soviet Rela- 

|onship 193 

sident Carter's Remarks at Yazoo City, Missis- 

ppi (excerpts) 197 

Mications 

Sales Publications 220 

"Foreign Relations" Volume on Near East, 
i)Uth Asia, Africa 219 



Thailand. Department Discusses Human Rights in 
Thailand (Oakley) 210 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 218 

Transfer of Sanctions Treaties With Mexico and 
Canada (Watson) 208 

U.S.S.R. 

Editors and News Directors Interview President 
Carter (excerpts) 200 

President Carter Outlines the U.S. -Soviet Rela- 
tionship 193 

United Nations. United States Seeks Improved 
U.N. Progi-ams To Meet Basic Needs of World's 
Poor (Gilligan) 204 

Vietnam. President Carter's Remarks at Yazoo 
City, Mississippi (excerpts) 197 

Name Index 

Carter, President 193, 197, 200 

Gilligan, John J 204 

Oakley, Robert B 210 

Todman, Terence A 214 

Watson, Barbara M 208 



Checklist of Department of State 

Press Releases: July 25-31 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 
No. Date Subject 

*344 7/2.5 Frank V. Ortiz, Jr., sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Barbados and Grenada 
(biographic data). 

*34.5 7/25 Lawrence A. Pezzullo sworn in as 
Ambassador to Uruguay (bio- 
graphic data). 

*346 7/26 U.S., Republic of Korea amend bi- 
lateral textile agreement. 

*347 7/26 U.S., Poland amend bilateral textile 
agreement. 

*348 7/29 Advisory Committee to the U.S. Na- 
tional Section of the Inter-American 
Tropical Tuna Commission, Aug. 
30. 

t349 7/28 "Foreign Relations," 1949, vol. V, 
"Eastern FJurope; The Soviet 
Union" (for release Aug. 6). 

t350 7/29 Vance: news conference. 



* Not printed. 

+ Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN. 



Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, dc. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 



postage and fees paid 
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Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
service, please renew your subscription promptly 
when you receive the expiration notice from the 
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re- 
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months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



/J; 



77, 



79?/ 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXVII • No. 1991 • August 22, 1977 



PRESIDENT CARTER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JULY 28 
Excerpts From Transcript ^21 

SECRETARY VANCE'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JULY 29' 227 

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES CONSULAR SERVICES 
FOR AMERICANS ABROAD 
Statements by Miss Watson and Ambassador Stedman 2^8 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index xee inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE B U L L E T I 



Vol. LXXVII. No. 1991 
August 22, 1977 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documenti^ 

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The Department of State BiLLETI!\ 
a weekly publication issued hy tkf 
Office of Media Serrices, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides the public an\ 
interested agencies of the gorernmen 
with information on developments i\ 
the field of I'.H. foreign relations an 
on the work of the Department an| 
the Foreign Service. 

The Bl'LLETlS' includes selectel 
press releases on foreign policy, issue 
by the M'hite House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, ani 
news conferences of the President ani 
the Secretary of State and other ofH 
cers of the Department, as well as sp^ 
cial articles on various phases of in 
ternational affairs and the functions i 
the Department. Information is in 
eluded concerning treaties and intef 
national agreements to which thi 
Vnited States is or may become a part\ 
and on treaties of general interne 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department o\ 
State, L'nited .\ations documents, an^ 
legislative material in the field 
international relations are also listedl 



President Carter's News Conference of July 28 



Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a news confer- 
ence held by President Carter on July 28. ^ 



I'm very glad to announce that our delega- 
tion in Geneva has just completed trilateral 
discussions with delegations from the United 
Kingdom and from the Soviet Union on the 
possible negotiation of a comprehensive ban 
against the testing of nuclear weapons or 
peaceful nuclear devices. Although there are 
still a number of problems that must be re- 
solved, the results of these intense consulta- 
tions have been sufficiently promising so that 
the three countries have decided to begin 
formal negotiations in Geneva on October 3. 
It's my hope that sufficient basis for agree- 
ment can be reached that all other nations of 
the world will join us in the ultimate prohibi- 
tion against testing of nuclear devices. 

Q. Mr. President, in your view, did the Is- 
raeli embrace of the three settlements oyi the 
West Bank diminish in any way the prospects 
for a negotiated settlement in that part of the 
icorld? 

The President: Yes. I think that any move 
toward making permanent the settlements in 
the occupied territoi'ies or the establishment 
of new settlements obviously increases the 
difficulty in ultimate peace. 

It's not an insurmountable problem. The 
matter of legalizing existing settlements was 
a subject that was never discussed by me or 
Prime Minister Begin. My own concern was 
with the establishment of new settlements. 
And I let him know very strongly that this 
would be a matter that would cause our own 
j government deep concern. 



' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated August 1, 1977, p. 
1120. 



This matter of settlements in the occupied 
territories has always been characterized by 
our government — by me and my pred- 
ecessors — as an illegal action. But I think that 
the establishment of new territories [settle- 
ments] or the recognition of existing ter- 
ritories [settlements] to be legal, both provide 
obstacles to peace, obstacles which I think we 
can overcome, by the way. 

Q. Mr. President, since you came into of- 
fice, you have stressed so many times that 
your policy is to restrain arms sales, we 
should not be the arms merchant of the world. 
Now you are proposing arms to Egypt, Su- 
dan, Somalia, Iran, and there are billions of 
dollars worth of arms in the pipeline for 
Israel — all areas of potential conflict. Why? 

The President: These proposals are compat- 
ible with my new arms sales policy, which is 
to reduce the level of arms sales in each suc- 
ceeding year. 

Many of these agreements are the result of 
longstanding commitinents by our own gov- 
ernment to those nations which are our allies 
and friends. We have tried to keep a well- 
balanced approach to the whole question. 

The most highly divisive issue recently has 
been the AWACS [airborne warning and con- 
trol system] sale to Iran. They were con- 
templating a radar detection system using 
ground-based and air-launched mechanisms 
that would have been about twice as expensive. 

But we are determined to begin a down- 
ward trend in the sale of weapons throughout 
the world. But at the same time, of course, we 
have to have, as a preeminent consideration, 
the defense of our own country and an 
adequate defense capability for our allies. 

And I would comply with my policy that 
after this fiscal year, 1977, that in '78 and 
subsequent years there would be an overall 
reduction in sales. 

I am also trying to get our own allies, 



August 22, 1977 



221 



France, England, and others, and also the 
Soviet Union, to join us in this effort. And 
next year, under the auspices of the United 
Nations there will be a world disarmament 
conference in which we would not only par- 
ticipate but hope to play a leading role. But 
the poHcies that I have pursued will be a much 
greater constraint on arms sales than has 
been the policy in the past. 

Q. Then yon are not setting up a competi- 
tion with the Soviet Union in Africa on the 
question of arms supplies? 

The President: No, ma'am, we aren't. I 
think it's accurate to say that in the case of 
Somalia, which has been almost completely 
under the friendly influence of the Soviet 
Union and to whom they've been completely 
obligated, there has been a change. We are 
trying to work not on a unilateral basis but in 
conjunction with other nations hke the Saudis, 
and France, Italy, and others, to deal with the 
Somalia-Ethiopian-Djibouti questions on a 
multinational basis to reduce the competition 
between ourselves and the Soviet Union. 

I might say that in the Libyan-Ethiopian 
[Egyptian] conflict that's recently taken place, 
and which has now been changed into a peace- 
ful relationship for the time being at least, 
both ourselves and the Soviets have deliber- 
ately shown complete constraint and restraint 
in our comments or actions in that area. 

We want to confine those conflicts, when 
they unfortunately do occur, to as narrowly 
geographical an area as possible and prevent 
them being identified as a struggle between 
ourselves and the Soviet Union. 

Oil Imports 

Q. Mr. President, in view of the projected 
$25 billion budget deficit this year, brought 
about largely by foreign oil increases, isn't 
this a far greater — imports rather — isn't this 
a far greater threat to the American economy 
than any energy crunch eight years from 
now? Would you consider maki)ig the gov- 
ernment the sole importer of foreign oil, and 
at the very least, aren't you going to have to 
take far more serious energy co)iservation 
measures and proposals than ivhat you've al- 
ready got? 



222 



The President: The early estimates thi, 
year on our trade deficit were about $25 bil 
lion. That's still our best estimate. There ha^ 
not been a deterioration in that prospect. The 
fact is that by leaps and bounds the American' 
people are importing and using too much oil. 
This has been the primary cause for our con- 
cern. We have a positive trade balance, 
excluding oil, of about $20 billion. But we are) 
importing $45 billion worth of oil this year. 

It's a vivid demonstration of the need for 
very tight conservation measures on the use 
of oil and natural gas. This is a reason for the 
long-delayed proposal to establish a strict na- 
tional energy policy. 

Our hope is to cut down oil imports drasti- 
cally by 1985 — 10 million barrels per day less 
than the present projected use by that time. 
But if the Ameincan people — business, indus- 
try, private persons, as well — will join in an ef- 
fort to cut down on the waste of oil, then that 
would be the major contributing factor toward 
balancing our trade with other countries. 

I don't know what other actions we will take 
at this point. I think that we will continue to 
assess additional means by which we can con- 
strain oil imports. But whether or not the 
government would become the sole importer 
is a question that has not yet been considered. 

The Middle East 

Q. I'd like to go back to the Mideast, if I 
may. Some people believe that in your meet- 
ings with Mr. Begin, Mr. Begin came away 
with sort of the best of it. They think that you 
rather embraced him to the extent that our 
leverage with Israel has now been reduced. 
Would you comment on that, and would you 
also tell us what you think now the prospects 
for peace versus another war are in the 
Mideast? 

The President: After I met with President 
Sadat and King Hussein and President Asad, 
there were major outcries in Israel and among 
the American Jewish community that I had 
overly embraced the Arab cause. And I think 
now that Mr. Begin has visited me, there's a 
concern we have overly embraced the Israeli 
cause. Obviously, when these leaders come to 
see me or when I go to see them, there is an 



Department of State Bulletin 



t'fort to understand one another, to have a 
tase of comprehension and consultation that 
■an provide hope for the future. 

Our position on the Middle East has been 
^•ery carefully spelled out to the degree of 
specificity that I choose. We've always made 
t clear that, ultimately, the agi-eement had to 
ie approved and mutually beneficial to the Is- 
aelis and also their Arab neighbors as well. 

I think that we have a good chance to go to 
Geneva. There are obstacles still to be re- 
fill ved. I hope that every leader involved di- 
•ectly in the discussions — the four major 
■ountries there — will join with us and the 
ochairman of the prospective conference — 
he Soviet Union — in restraining their state- 
nents, not being so adamant on issues, and 
lying to cool down the situation until all can 
search out common ground, and then hope to 
ninimize the differences. 

Secretary Vance will leave this weekend to 
-'isit the three Arab nations plus Saudi 
\rabia, and then come back through Israel as 
veil. When he returns to the United States 
ifter about a week or so, we'll have a clearer 
)icture of the differences that still divide the 
■ountries. 

I think the major stumbling block at this 
3oint is the participation in the negotiations 
by the Palestinian representatives. Our posi- 
[ion has been that they ought to be repre- 
sented and that we will discuss with them 
hese elements that involve the Palestinians 
iiid other refugees at the time they forego 
heir commitment, presently publicly es- 
joused, that Israel should be destroyed. But 
uitil the Palestinian leaders adopt the propo- 
sition that Israel is a nation, that it will be a 
lation permanently, that it has a right to live 
n peace — until that happens, I see no way 
hat we would advocate participation by them 
n the peace negotiations. 

But these matters are still very fluid. What 
jives me hope is that I believe that all na- 
ional leaders with whom I've talked 
genuinely want to go to Geneva to try to work 
)ut permanent peace. That's the primary 
:)asis for my optimism. But it's difficult, and 
)ast statements by these leaders when they 
A ere at war, or in the status of prospective 
vvar, have been very rigid and very adamant 



and sometimes abusive and filled with hatred 
and distrust. We're trying to get them to 
change from those positions of distrust to one 
of genuine search for peace. 

I think it's accurate to say, in closing my 
answer, that both sides now have at least a 
moderate amount of confidence in us, and I've 
tried to take a balanced position to enhance 
that trust in us. If I should ever take a biased 
position on the part of one of the parties, then 
the other parties would simply forego any de- 
pendence upon us. 

So, I'm very careful in my statements — 
privately and publicly — to be consistent and 
also to be fair. 

Israeli Settlements 

Q. Could I follow up on that, Mr. Presi- 
dent? I believe you said just a moment ago 
that Mr. Begin gave you no advance hint of 
this action that he took this week on the set- 
tlements. You said that you discussed future 
settlements. Cayi you tell us what he said 
about that? Is he going to encourage new set- 
tlements there, and what did you tell him. 
about that? 

The President: Mr. Begin did not give me 
any promise about his action on the settle- 
ment question. I did describe to him our 
longstanding position on the settlements, 
which I've already outlined, and told him that 
this was a major item of potential differences 
between Israel and the Arab countries and my 
strong hope that nothing would be done by the 
Israeli Government in establishing new set- 
tlements that might exacerbate an already dif- 
ficult position. 

He listened to me very carefully. He said 
this was a major political issue in Israel, that 
in many instances he and his opposition, polit- 
ical parties in Israel, felt the same about it, 
but that he was certainly aware of our con- 
cern. But he did not give me any commit- 
ments about what he would do. 

And to answer the other part of your ques- 
tion, he did not give me any prior notice that 
they were going to recognize the legality of 
the settlements involved. 

Q. Mr. President, isn't there a basic conflict 
betiveen all the talk of progress we heard 



Xugust 22, 1977 



223 



around here dunng the Begin visit and at the 
titne he left, and the first action that he took 
upon returning to Israel and the rejection of 
the idea that we could have any influence over 
ivhat moves he might make to the West Bank 
settlements^ 

The President: Well, I think it's not fair to 
overly criticize Prime Minister Begin. The 
fact is that under the previous Mapai 
coalition — the labor government — that set- 
tlements have been built there, a fairly large 
number. The number of people involved is 
quite small. And this is not a new thing. I 
think it would be a mistake to overemphasize 
it or to exaggerate the significance of it. We 
feel that any restraint that Prime Minister 
Begin might want to exert on this subject 
would certainly be contributory toward peace. 

I think he's in a position now of great 
strength in Israel. I think that his voice would 
be honored by the Israeli people. But he, like 
myself, has run on campaign commitments, 
and I think he's trying to accommodate the 
interest of peace as best he can. That doesn't 
mean that the settlements are right, but I 
think it would not be proper to castigate him 
unnecessarily about it because he's continuing 
policies that have been extant in Israel for a 
long time. And the Israeli Government has 
never claimed that these settlements are 
permanent. What they have done is to say 
that they are legal at the present time. 

I think that that's all I know about the sub- 
ject, and that's certainly all that I'm going to 
say now. 

Q. Mr. President, at the risk of going back 
over well-plowed ground, Fd like to ask you 
why it is that you did not ask Mr. Begin what 
his plans were concerning the existing settle- 
ments on the West Bank, and more specif- 
ically, were you led to believe from your own 
studies i)i advance of those talks that he ivas 
not going to take this action^ 

The President: I hate to admit it to you, but 
I did not think about raising the subject of 
recognizing the legahty of those settlements. 
The item that I wanted to discuss with him — 
and I did— both in the public meeting with 
Cabinet members and also privately upstairs 
in the White House, was the establishment of 

224 



new settlements. And I pointed out to him, as 
I've said earlier, that I thought the establish- 
ment of new settlements would be a very dif- 
ficult thing for public opinion to accept, both 
here and in the Arab countries, and that 
if — he pointed out to me that new settlers, as 
a result of his campaign statements and those 
of his opponents, were eager to go into the 
area — I don't think it's violating any confi- 
dence to tell you what I said, and that was 
that I thought it would be easier for us to ac- 
cept an increase in the population of existing, 
settlements than it would be to accept the es- 
tablishment of new settlements. But I did not 
think about talking to him concerning the 
granting of legal status to those settlements. 
It was an oversight which never was 
discussed. 



Prime Minister Andreotti 
of Italy Visits Washington 

Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister of Italy, 
made an official visit to Washington July 
25-28. He met with President Carter and 
other government officials July 26-27. Fol- 
lowing is a statonent issued by the White 
House on July 27. ' 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated -August 1 

Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti 
paid an official visit to Washington July 
26-27 at the invitation of President Carter. 
He was accompanied by Foreign Minister 
Arnaldo Forlani. The President gave a 
White House dinner for the Prime Minister 
on July 26 and held two lengthy conversa- 
tions with the Italian visitors. 

The talks between the President and the 
Prime Minister covered a wide range of 
political, economic, security, and cultural is- 
sues in which the two nations share an 



' For an exchange of remarks between President 
Carter and Prime Minister at a welcoming ceremony 
on the South Lawn of the White House and their ex- 
change of toasts at a dinner at the White House on 
July 26, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments dated Aug. 1, 1977, pp. 1107 and 1112. 

Department of State Bulletin 






interest. These discussions were a follow-on 
to the meeting between the President and 
the Prime Minister in May at the London 
summit. The President and the Prime Minis- 
ter expressed their intention to continue the 
process of close consultations between the 
two governments and emphasized their basic 
agreement on major issues. 

During their meetings, the President and 
the Prime Minister discussed East-West re- 
lations, focusing on SALT [Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks] and other arms control 
negotiations; developments in Europe, with 
special reference to the European Commu- 
nity; the situation in the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East; and the upcoming fall meet- 
ing in Belgrade of the Conference on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe. The Presi- 
dent and the Prime Minister also discussed 
human rights and their role in international 
affairs, agreeing on the desirability of con- 
tinuing to stress implementation of these 
universally accepted values as an important 
element in the process of detente. 

The Prime Minister described the Italian 
situation in its various aspects. The Presi- 
dent e.xpressed appreciation for Italy's con- 
tinued contribution to Western cooperation 
and allied solidarity and its commitment to 
democratic institutions. 

The President and the Prime Minister dis- 
cussed the economic difficulties that beset 
many of the industrialized democracies and 
pledged to work for common solutions. The 
two leaders agreed that the Andreotti gov- 
ernment's economic program has moved the 
Italian economy toward greater stability, 
less inflation, and a more favorable balance 
of payments. They agreed on the need to 
persevere along the lines agreed with the 
IMF [International Monetary Fund], as well 
as on the necessity of implementing the con- 
sensus reached at the London summit to ad- 
just payments imbalances in a conte.xt of ex- 
panding trade and economic development. 

The President and the Prime Minister de- 
voted a major part of their talks to world 
energy problems. They affirmed their inten- 
tion to enhance and reinvigorate cooperation 
through the International Energy Agency 
and, bilaterally, through the U.S. -Italy 
Energy Working Group to coordinate 



policies and assist one another in this area of 
great significance. In this connection, the 
President agreed to explore ways of meeting 
Italy's needs for assured supplies of natural 
uranium, as well as financing of its nuclear 
power program. The two leaders discussed 
the special energy requirements and objec- 
tives which Italy shares with other major 
industralized countries heavily dependent on 
imported fossil fuels. They expressed their 
hope that the international Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Evaluation would contribute to their 
common objectives in the field of nuclear 
nonproliferation and to a satisfactory solu- 
tion of the participating countries' needs for 
assured fuel. They also agreed to expand 
cooperation in energy conservation, in safe 
and environmentally sound operation of nu- 
clear reactors, and in the development of 
new sources of energy — solar, bioconversion, 
geothermal, and others. 

Recognizing the importance of historical 
ties of friendship, a common cultural herit- 
age, and the contribution of millions of 
Americans of Italian descent to the intellec- 
tual, spiritual, and economic life of the 
United States, the President and the Prime 
Minister agreed that every effort should be 
made to increase the already significant ex- 
changes between the two countries in the 
fields of education and culture. 

They agreed in particular on the desirabil- 
ity of a new effort of reciprocal assistance in 
which Italy would assist in the strengthen- 
ing of the Italian-language and study pro- 
grams in the United States, and the United 
States would assist in the strengthening of 
English-language teaching and American 
studies programs in Italy. 

The two leaders also placed high priority 
on a two-way expansion of student and scho- 
larly exchange and expressed their support 
for efforts now underway to finance addi- 
tional exchanges through loan funds made 
available by the private sector in the two 
countries. 

The President and the Prime Minister dis- 
cussed other areas where future cooperation 
between the two countries could lead to im- 
mediate results of mutual benefit, including 
an agreement on defense. procurement and 
follow-up visits by Cabinet-level officials of 



August 22, 1977 



225 



the two governments in the next few 
months. These visits will give impetus to 
U.S. -Italian cooperation in the areas of de- 
fense; economic, financial, and investment 
relations; scientific and technological coop- 
eration; and exchanges of information on 
administrative matters. 

During the course of the visit, the two 
governments also agreed to announce that 
the Chicago Symphony will perform in Milan 
in September 1978, in return for the partici- 
pation in our Bicentennial celebration of the 
La Scala Opera Company. In addition, a 
major exhibit called "Pompeii A.D. 79" will 
tour the United States soon. 



U.S. Supports U.N. Membership 
of Djibouti 

Following is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council bij Deputy U.S. Representa- 
tive Donald F. McHenry on July 7. 

USUN press release 54 dated July 7 

The United States is pleased to support the 
membership of the Republic of Djibouti in the 
United Nations.' As for so many nations be- 
fore it, the road to independence and sover- 



' The Council on July 7 adopted unanimously a resolu- 
tion (S/RES/412 (1977)) recommending "that the Re- 
public of Djibouti be admitted to membership in the 
United Nations." 



eignty for Djibouti has often been difficult. 
Djibouti has accomplished its nationhood in 
peace and concord and with the support and 
friendship of France and of many other coun- 
tries, among whom we count ourselves. 

Djibouti occupies a location that is signifi- 
cant for many other nations. With major port 
facilities situated along one of the oldest and 
most important trading routes in the world, 
Djibouti serves a vast region of the Horn of 
Africa. Its people are linked by religion, cul- 
ture, and language with many of the people of 
surrounding nations, both in Africa and the 
Arabian Peninsula. These ties, and the histor- 
ical knowledge of the world that a trading na- 
tion like Djibouti has, lend its emergence into 
an independent role in regional and world af- 
fairs an unusual meaning and promise. 

The inhabitants of the new republic will now 
guide their own destiny. We believe that a 
tranquil and independent Djibouti will be an 
asset to the international community and most 
especially to its immediate neighbors. 

The United States has extended recognition 
to the Republic of Djibouti and raised its Con- 
sulate General to the status of an Embassy. 
We support the membership of the new Re- 
public of Djibouti in the United Nations with 
the confidence that the principles which in- 
spired the leaders of the new state to guide 
their people successfully to independence will 
continue to guide them in our common effort 
to establish a world of peace, justice, and 
prosperity. 



226 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Vance's News Conference of July 29 



Press release 350 dated July 29 

Secretary Vance: Good morning, ladies and 
gentlemen. 

Q. Regarding yoiir trip to the Middle East, 
Mr. Begin [Prime Minister of Israel], when 
he was here [July 18-21 ] , outlined some pro- 
cedures that he would like to have followed at 
the Geneva peace conference, and I wondered 
when you visit the Arab leaders whether you 
would endorse or promote those procedures, 
have ideas of your own, try to solicit theirs, or 
some combination thereof. 

Secretary Vance: When I go to the various 
capitals [July 31-August 12], I will discuss 
with the leaders the proposals made by Mr. 
Begin. I will also suggest certain proposals 
which we have for the convening of a Geneva 
conference, with respect to both questions of 
substance and questions of procedure; and of 
course I will seek the views of the various 
heads of government with whom I will be 
meeting. I hope as a result of all this process 
we may, by the end of the trip, have a clearer 
idea of the ability with which we have been 
able to narrow the differences that exist be- 
tween the parties and move closer to the 
necessary framework for convening a Geneva 
conference. 

Q. Does that mean you don't yiecessarily 
endorse or disapprove, on the other hand, of 
the Begin procedural suggestions? 

Secretary Vance: As to the proposal as a 
whole, we will have some proposals that we 
would prefer to put forward than that, but we 
will put them forward for discussion. 

Q. On that point you said once you would be 
putting forth American proposals for, as I 
understood it, substantive settleynent in the 
Middle East. Will these proposals from the 
United States be primarily related to proce- 



dure, or will you be putting teryns for a set- 
tlement in the area? 

Secretary Vance: We will have some 
suggestions to make to the parties both on the 
questions of substance as well as the questions 
of procedure. I think I indicated to most of 
you at various times in the past that during 
this trip we would be having suggestions to 
make to the parties on both these sets of 
issues. 

Q. One of the ideas that has been raised and 
attributed to the United States is that the West 
Bank would go under a trusteeship — 
apparently a>i Israeli trusteeship — for a 
period of several years during which time a 
referendum would be held determining the fu- 
ture of the West Bank. Is that, in fact, one of 
the ideas that you will be bringing? 

Secretary Vance: Let me remind you of 
what I said before: that if we have sugges- 
tions to make during this trip, we would be 
making them to the parties rather than mak- 
ing them publicly. 

We believe, and the parties agree, that if 
we are going to play an effective role, the best 
way that we can play an effective role is to 
make any suggestions which we have directly 
to the parties, in confidence, and then receive 
their comments on those specific proposals — 
which can then be discussed with the other 
parties — rather than making them public. And 
we are going to adhere to that procedure. 

And therefore I think it is inappropriate 
and would not be constructive for me to go 
into any specifics of what we might be 
suggesting to the parties. 

Q. President Carter yesterday put posi- 
tively, on the issue of the PLO [Palestine Lib- 
eration Organization], something that in the 
past has been put in essentially negative 



August 22, 1977 



227 



terms — and that is that we would be willing to 
deal with the PLO if they accepted Israel's 
right to exist as a nation and to exist 
permanently. 

Are you excluding, on this trip, any possi- 
ble meeting with any representative of the 
PLO? 

Secretary Vance: I do not expect that there 
will be any meeting with the PLO during this 
trip. 

As the President said, there has yet been no 
suggestion by the Palestinians that they were 
prepared to do the things which President 
Carter outlined. In the absence of that, we 
feel ourselves constrained by the agreements 
we made in Sinai II not to have any discus- 
sions with them. 

Q. Recognizing that this is a hypothetical 
question: If such a statement were to be made 
during your trip, would you consider the pos- 
sibility of such a meeting? 

Secretary Vance: That is a hypothetical 
question. 

Q. Your Arab-Israeli desk [sic] confirmed 
yesterday that the United States never recog- 
nized de jure the occupation of the West Bank 
by Jordan from 19^8 to 1967, and this desk 
has also designated Britain as the last legal 
ruler of the West Bank, even though Britain 
originally seized the West Bank by military 
conquest from the Turks. 

And my question is: Do you believe that 
until 1922, when the British were granted the 
League of Nations mandate, that the British 
occupation of the West Bank was legal or 
illegal? 

Secretary Vance: That is a legal question on 
which I have, myself, not devoted the kind of 
attention that permits me at this point to give 
you the kind of technical answer that is 
required. 

Q. Since the mandate incorporated Great 
Britain's Balfour Declaration of a Jewish na- 
tional homeland in Palestine, along with Mr. 
Churchill's designation of 80 percent of Pales- 
tine as the Emirate of Transjordan — later the 
Kingdom of Jordan— do you believe that the 
remaining 20 percent of Palestine, in which 
Churchill limited Jewish settlements to the 



area west of the Jordan, was an excessive ex- 
pectation for the Zionists? 

Secretary Vance: Again, that is a technical 
question on which I do not wish to comment. 

Q. Have you received requests for informa- 
tion from the Securities and Exchange Coin- 
mission about your former law partner, Mr. 
Joel Dolkart, a)id the involvement of your 
former law firm, Simpson Thacher, with Gulf 
Weste7-n in the foreign affairs of the Domini- 
can Republic? 

Secretary Vance: No. 

Q. Do you expect to know definitely by the 
end of this trip whether the Geneva peace con- 
ference can be reconvened this fall? 

Secretary Vance: No, I don't know. It will 
all depend on what happens during the trip, 
and I think that it is possible that at the end 
of the trip we will not know. 

If that is the case, then we would plan to 
have further meetings, and one of the things 
which we have been discussing in the way of 
procedures for those further meetings is to 
have the further meetings at the time that the 
various foreign ministers will be in New York 
for the [U.N.] General Assembly. 

Q. There has been a certain amount of talk 
about the reconvening of the conference in 
October. 

Isyi't there a danger — what are the risks of 
an ill-prepared conference — that there really 
is not enough time to prepare the substance to 
be negotiated at that conference prior to 
October? 

Secretary Vance: We have said consistently 
that we believe it is important to have a 
well-prepared conference and I still believe 
that to be the case. And therefore I think we 
must do everything within our power to try 
and reach as much agreement as is possible on 
both substance and procedure before going to 
Geneva. And how much we can accomplish 
during this trip remains to be seen. 

But, as I said, if we cannot get it done on 
this trip, then we are prepared to continue the 
discussions starting thereafter, probably with 
meetings in New York at the time of the Gen- 
eral Assembly. 



228 



Department of State Bulletin 



Arms Aid for Africa 

Q. The United States is showing consider- 
able interest in arms aid for countries in the 
Horn of Africa and elsewhere in Africa. Does 
this signify an intensified competition with 
the Soviet Union for influence, generally? 

Secretary Vance: No, I do not think that it 
does at all. The President spoke to this issue 
yesterday and I would like to reiterate what 
he had to say yesterday. 

Insofar as the question of arms to countries 
located in the Horn of Africa is concerned, let 
me just take the case of Somalia. Somalia 
asked for both economic and military assist- 
ance from the United States. They have asked 
for similar assistance from a series of other 
countries. They indicated that they wished to 
have an alternate source of supply to meet 
their defensive needs. We indicated to them 
that we would be willing to investigate this 
and, to this end, sent an economic assistance 
team out to take a look at the situation in 
Somalia. We have agreed that we will give 
them economic assistance. 

Insofar as military assistance is concerned, 
we have indicated that, in principle, we would 
be prepared to consider the furnishing of some 
military assistance for defensive arms — and I 
underscore that, for defensive arms^and that 
we would do this in conjunction with a number 
of other countries who have been approached 
in a similar fashion to the approach which was 
made to us. 

Insofar as the Sudan is concerned, the 
Sudan has urged us to give them some addi- 
tional help. As you know, we have provided to 
them in the past some equipment. They have 
had excessive or large pressures from coun- 
tries on their borders — they have a very large 
country — and therefore we have told them 
that we would take under serious considera- 
tion additional assistance to them. But this in 
no way is to be construed as an attempt to 
enter into an arms race with the Soviet Union. 

Q. The British decoupling two days ago the 
pound from the dollar was at least in part a 
reaction, to yoiir recognition of the fact that 
the United States was, in essence, attempting 
to set off another oil embargo as economic 
warfare, so to speak, against the Europeans, 



to disrupt the emerging relations between 
OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries] and Western Europe around some 
formation of a new monetary system. 

My question is this: The Arabs, even before 
the decoupling move, before the Libya-Egypt 
situation, had called an emergency OPEC 
yneeting for August 4-th to discuss whether or 
not payments should still be made in dollars. 
In view of the worsening situation — and it 
seems as though our policy in North Africa 
has provoked — 

Secretary Vance: The worsening situation 
between what? 

Q. The worsening situation right now in 
terms of dollars, internationally; that is to 
say, the Arabs have even more incentive now 
in trying to go with some alternative to the 
dollar, which was ironically provoked by pol- 
icy by this Administration that was trying to 
set the opposite thing going. But anyway, my 
question is are you orientiyig anything in 
your trip toward that OPEC meeting, and 
what is the estimation of the State Depart- 
ment about what might come out of it? 

Secretary Vance: The answer is no, I am 
not orienting anything in my trip toward that 
particular problem which you raise. I am 
going to be concerned exclusively with the 
subject of trying to resolve with the parties 
the necessary procedural and substantive 
matters which would be required in order to 
move toward Geneva solutions. 

Q. You say that U.S. arms to Somalia 
should be used for defensive purposes. Does 
that mean you would insist that U.S. weapons 
not be used in the Ethiopian territory of the 
Ogaden, for example? 

Secretary Vance: We, I would point out, 
have made no decision yet to supply any arms, 
and if we were to do so that would, undoubt- 
edly, be one of the conditions which would 
accompany the furnishing of such arms. 

Q. The previous Administration displayed 
som,e reluctance to go to Geneva because, ap- 
parently, there was the feeling that the Soviet 
Union might not be too helpful. That was dur- 
ing the full bloom of detente. And I wonder, 
now thai some of the blush is off that rose. 



August 22, 1977 



229 



ivhaf makes you believe that the Soviet Union 
would be more helpful than before f 

Secretary Vance: We have kept closely in 
touch with the Soviet Union on the question of 
a Middle East conference. We have not only 
regular meetings which we agreed to at my 
Geneva meeting with Foreign Minister 
Gromyko, but I quite frequently discuss the 
situation of the Middle East with Ambassador 
Dobrynin, bringing him up to date with the 
most recent events, and he does the same in- 
sofar as we are concerned. 

This has been, I think, very useful. We feel 
that, as cochairmen, we have a joint responsi- 
bility with the Soviet Union to try and bring 
the parties to a conference, and we plan to 
work together and to cooperate in this 
endeavor. 

Q. What specifically do you think the Soviet 
Utiion is inclined to do to help — not just to 
come to Geneva — in the process toward peace? 

Secretary Vance: They have indicated they 
are willing to use their influence with some of 
the parties to urge them to exhibit flexibility, 
which will be necessary if we are going to be 
able to get to Geneva. 

Troop Withdrawals from Korea 

Q. You are trying to assure South Korea, 
after the troop withdrawal, that the United 
States would keep on protecting South Korea. 
But in view of the commitment Mr. Nixon 
made to President Thieu [of South Vietiiam], 
that — I quote — "we will respond with full 
force should the settlement be violated by 
North Vietnam," plus the fact that the com- 
mitment the United States made to 
Nationalist China in Taiwan about the de- 
fense treaty and so on, is being gradually — 
tryi7ig to get out of that, my question is: Why 
should South Korea trust the United States to 
fulfill its promise, in view of this record? 

Secretary Vance: The United States for 
many years has been a strong and faithful ally 
of Korea, and Korea has been a strong and 
faithful ally of the United States. We have re- 
peated many times, and Secretary [of Defense 
Harold] Brown repeated it recently, that we 
stand foursquare behind our treaty with the 



230 



Republic of South Korea. I think that they 
realize that they can depend upon this. The 
discussions that we have had with them with 
respect to a phased withdrawal over a period 
of years of our ground forces, while com- 
mitted at the same time to maintain our air 
and naval forces in the area, and the close 
cooperation which is continuing in the discus- 
sion of how this can best be done, I think indi- 
cate the importance which we attach to this 
and to their security. 

I think that they are satisfied that the situ- 
ation is one in which they can have confi- 
dence that we will stand behind our treaty 
commitments. 

Q. A few m,onths ago Zaire, which felt it 
was being attacked from outside, made a re- 
quest for U.S. arms which was not fulfilled. 
Why is there, apparently, a difference in ap- 
proach for siniilar requests now being made 
by Somalia, by Chad, and by Sudan? What is 
the main difference, in the American view, be- 
tween what happened in Zaire and what is 
now happening in the Horn of Africa? 

Secretary Vayice: In Zaire, the situation 
was different but similar. We continued to 
provide nonlethal equipment during the 
period of the fighting in Zaire, while at the 
same time other allies of ours and allies of 
Zaire provided other types of equipment. In 
other words, the burden of supplying the 
necessary defensive equipment was shared 
among a number of countries. We are proceed- 
ing with the same kind of procedure in the 
case of Somalia and in the case of Chad. 

Q. Have you received any kind of signals 
from the Palestine Liberation Organization, 
short of meeting the American requirement of 
recognition of Israel, in which the PLO is 
suggesting a way in which they may have a 
role in the Geneva conference? 

Secretary Vance: We have received nothing 
directly from them. Other countries have 
passed to us information which they say comes 
from the Palestine Liberation Organization 
with respect to the Geneva conference and 
their desire to participate in a Geneva confer- 
ence, but we have nothing in terms of first- 
hand information. 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. Can you give us some of the shape of 
what the PLO signals are like? What are they 
prepared to do — even told to you through 
intermedianes — to gain a seat at the Geneva 
conference? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say that it is suffi- 
ciently unclear at this point, that I would 
hesitate at this point to indicate what they 
are, and I want to check firsthand with those 
who have communicated this information to 
us, namely some of the states which I will be 
visiting, to find out exactly what it is that has 
been said. 

Q. May I just take the liberty of asking you 
whether you relayed any messages through 
the intermediaries back to the PLO? 

Secretary Vance: No. 

Q. Following up on the business about the 
Russians and the Geneva conference which 
you mentioned a moment ago: They are 
cochairmen — in view of that and the close re- 
lationship, have you outlined to them the 
suggestions and proposals that you plan to 
take to the Middle East? And, if you have, 
can you tell us whether they are in agreement 
with it? 

Secretary Vance: The answer is, I am going 
to. I have not yet; I will before I leave. And, 
obviously, the answer is there are no re- 
sponses as a result of that. 

Q. When you go to Peking next month, do 
you have in mind to discuss the Korea 
problem — the lessening of tension in the Ko- 
rean Peninsula — with the Chinese leaders? 

Secretary Vance: When I go to Peking, I 
will expect to discuss a whole variety of prob- 
lems, including problems of the region— both 
the region in the north and in the south — and 
I would expect the questions of the Korean 
Peninsula to arise in connection with those 
discussions. 

Panama Canal Treaty 

Q. What is the outlook for a new treaty on 
the Panama Canal? You just attended a meet- 
ing at the White House and Pd like to know. 

Secretary Vance: Yes. I attended a meeting 



this morning with the President and others 
and with two of the negotiators from Panama, 
as well as the Panamanian Ambassador. At 
that meeting the President indicated his plea- 
sure at the progress which has been made to 
date on the negotiation of a canal treaty. 

There remain some issues between us. 
There is a difficult issue of an economic na- 
ture, which is probably the most complicated 
and difficult of those that remain. 

The President expressed hope that these is- 
sues could be resolved promptly and that we 
could look forward to a completion of the 
negotiations in the near future. The Panama- 
nians responded that they shared those hopes 
and took back with them a letter from the 
President to President Torrijos. 

Q. In a practical way, there comes a time in 
the fall or winter when it's no longer feasible 
to try to get a Panama Canal treaty through 
the Congress with an election year coming up. 
Do you have any notion of what that deadline 
might be? In other words, how soon must you 
have a treaty in order for its prospects to be 
reasonable in the pending political season? 

Secretary Vance: I don't think that we can 
set, at this point, a date which would be the 
date on which we think it would no longer be 
feasible to try and push forward in a given 
year a canal treaty. I think it remains to be 
seen when a canal treaty can be agreed to, 
and then we'll have to adopt our legislative 
strategy when we see that fact occur. 

Q. Returning to the problem of Asia: On the 
7th of this month, a Communist pilot defected 
to Taiwan and he sent a letter to you asking 
for your intervention in getting his wife and 
children out of the mainland of China. In the 
press briefing a couple of days ago, your of- 
fice told us that this particular letter has al- 
ready reached you and that this is under 
review. 

Now, we would like to know what reaction, 
or u)hat kind of action you're goiyig to take. 
This is one thing. And another question is — 

Secretary Vance: Let me answer that. It's 
still under review. 

Q. Under review. 

There is another question. Prime Minister 



August 22, 1977 



231 



[sic] Chiang Ching-kuo of Taiwan just said 
yesterday that if the United States is going to 
abrogate the treaty of mutual defense with 
Nationalist China, then Communist China — 
in effect, he said, Communist China is going 
to attack Taiwan. Now, with the treaty still in 
effect, what kind of action is the United States 
going to take? 

Secretary Vance: That's a very iffy question 
which I'm not going to answer. Let me say, 
however, that the question of normalization of 
relations and the related issues obviously is an 
issue which will come up when I go to Peking 
and will have to b