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BOSTOl^ 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 


of  State 


m  of  state -m-m  j  ^ 

buUetBn 


JaiBuary  197S 


e  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  78  /  Number  2010 


tl.S.S.R.  /  1 


TV  Interview  /  9 


-SI 


^ 


#1 


Middle  East  /  40 


Departmf*nt  of  State 

bulletin 

Volume  78  /  Number  2010  /  January  1978 


Cover  Photos: 

Marshall  D.  Shulman 
President  Carter 
Anthony  Lake 
Andrew  Young 
Secretary  Vance 


The  Department  of  State  Bul- 
letin, published  by  the  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of 
U.S.  foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to 
provide  the  public,  the  Congress,  and 
government  agencies  with  information 
on  developments  in  U.S.  foreign  rela- 
tions and  the  work  of  the  Department 
of  State  and  the  Foreign  Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include 
major  addresses  and  news  conferences 
of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
State;  statements  made  before  congres- 
sional committees  by  the  Secretary 
and  other  senior  State  Department  of- 
ficials; special  features  and  articles  on 
international  affairs;  selected  press  re- 
leases issued  by  the  White  House,  the 
Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
other  agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party. 

The  Secretary  of  State  has  deter- 
mined that  the  publication  of  this  peri- 
odical is  necessary  in  the  transaction  of 
the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  Use  of  funds  for 
printing  this  periodical  has  been  ap- 
proved by  the  Director  of  the  Office 
of  Management  and  Budget  through 
January  31,  1981. 

NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication 
are  not  copyrighted  and  items  con- 
tained herein  may  be  reprinted.  Cita- 
tion of  the  Department  of  State 
Bulletin  as  the  source  will  be  appre- 
ciated. The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Litera- 
ture. 

For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402 

Price: 

12  issues  plus  annual  index  — 

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Single  copy— 

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CYRUS  R.  VANCE 

Secretary  of  State 

HODDING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Af 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 

Consulting  Editor 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 
Editor 

COLLEEN  SUSSMAN 
Assistant  Editor 


CO]\TEl\TS 


U.S.S.R. 

1  An  Overview  of  U.S. -Soviet  Relations  (Marshall  D.  Shulman) 

3  U.S.S.R.— A  Profile 

5  U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  U.S.S.R.  (Biographic  Data) 

8  Summit  Meetings 


THE  PRESIDENT 

9  Television  Interview.  December  28 

12  News  Conference,  December  15 

15  Carter  Administration's  First-Year  Accomplishments,  (White  House  Summary) 


THE  SECRETARY 

17         News  Conference,  December  6 

ARMS  CONTROL 

20  SALT  and  the  Test  Ban — Cause  for  Optimism  (Paul  C.  Warnke) 


ECONOMICS 

24  The  United  States  and  the  Third  World  (Anthony  Lake) 

27         Corrupt  Practices,  Investment  Disclosure  (Statement  by  President  Carter) 

27         U.S.  Balance  of  Trade  and  Payments  (Statement  by  President  Carter) 


EUROPE 

28  Secretary  Vance  Attends  NATO  Ministerial  Meeting  in  Brussels 

30  Letters  of  Credence  (Finland.  France) 

31  Crown  of  St.  Stephen  (Matthew  Nimetz.  Joint  Communique} 

32  U.S.,  Bulgaria  Lift  Travel  Restrictions  on  Diplomats  (Department  Statement) 


FOOD 

33  Fulfilling  A  Basic  Human  Right  (Andrew  Young) 

36  Food  Aid  (Foreign  Relations  Outline) 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 

37  U.S.  Observes  Human  Rights  Day  at  Belgrade  (Arthur  J.  Goldberg) 

38  Bill  of  Rights  Day,  Human  Rights  Day  and  Week  (Proclamation) 

39  Release  of  Political  Prisoners 

Boston  P 
MIDDLE  EAST  Supermtsnd 

40  Visit  of  Secretary  Vance  l-*^?  ^  1    '[T"^') 

46  Assistant  Secretary  Atherton  Interviewed  on  the  "Today"  Show 

47  Cairo  Preparatory  Meeting  Opens  (Alfred  L.  Atherton,  Jr.) 

48  Prime  Minister  Begin  Visits  United  States,  December  14—19  nFDOSiTORY 

49  Middle  East  Peace  Efforts  (Department  Statement) 
49  Chronology  of  Recent  Events 


UNITED  NATIONS 

50  New  U.S.  Approaches  and  Initiatives  (Charles  William  Maynes) 

53  International  Civil  Aviation  Safety  (John  Clifford  Kennedy.  Lester  L.  Wolff) 

55  Operational  Activities  (Charles  W.  Whalen) 

56  Outer  Space  Programs  (Marjorie  Crai^  Benton) 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

58  Jamaican  Prime  Minister  Visits  United  States 

TREATIES 

59  U.S.,  U.K.  Aviation  Agreement  (Julius  L.  Katz) 

60  Current  Actions 

62     PRESS  RELEASES 
INDEX 


luary  1978 


U.S.S.R.:  An  Overvietc  of  U^^Sovi^t  Relations 


tyMarshall  D.  Shulman' 

'ublic  opinion  in  the  United  States 
1,  tended  to  fluctuate  widely  in  its 
iKids  about  the  Soviet  Union,  based 
i;it  has  been  upon  simplified  and 
jiarized  stereotypes  about  the  nature 
III  purposes  of  the  Soviet  system. 
Fs  Administration  has  both  the  op- 
xtunity  and  the  obligation  to  build  a 
under  and  steadier  base  in  public 
)inion  for  a  realistic  and  consistent 
Moach  to  our  relations  with  the 
Id  Union,  without  any  illusions 
at  the  seriousness  of  the  problems 
il\ed  in  this  relationship  and  with- 
)i  undue  expectations  about  the  time 
ii  effort  that  will  be  required  to  move 
i1)-by-step  toward  a  less  dangerous 
II  more  constructive  relationship.  To 
1- elop  this  kind  of  public  support,  we 
lid  a  more  widespread  understanding 
)ioth  the  changes  and  the  continuities 
rSoviet  political  life,  as  well  as  a 
;|jr  perception  of  our  own  interests  in 
1  way  we  would  like  to  see  our  rela- 
iiship  with  the  Soviet  Union  develop 
)  r  the  coming  years. 

iather  than  attempting  to  clarify  the 
miguities  of  the  word  "detente,""  it 
*jld  be  more  productive  to  make  it 
•.IT  that  we  start  from  a  frank  recogni- 
ii  that  the  Soviet-American  relation- 
ilp  at  this  period  in  history  is  a  com- 
)itive  one,  based  upon  quite  different 
/  ws  of  the  world  and  conflicting 
(g-term  aims;  at  the  same  time,  it  is 
10  true  that  these  two  countries,  as 
labitants  of  the  same  planet,  have 
tny  overlapping  interests. 
Zommon  sense  dictates  that  we 
>)uld,  while  advancing  our  own  inter- 
;s  and  purposes  energetically,  seek  to 
■i;ulate  the  competitive  aspects  of  the 
lationship  to  reduce  the  danger  of  war 
ji  at  the  same  time  to  enlarge  the  area 
"  cooperation  where  our  interests  are 
in  conflict.  Over  the  coming  dec- 
's, to  the  extent  that  future  genera- 
ns  of  Soviet  leaders  may  see  their 
'  f-interest  in  a  more  constructive  rela- 
t  nship,  we  should  make  it  clear  that 
H  would  be  receptive  and  responsive 
t  a  movement  in  this  direction. 
Although  Soviet-American  relations 
1.;  but  one  element  of  our  foreign  pol- 


icy, there  is  scarcely  an  aspect  of  inter- 
national life  that  is  not  affected  by  this 
relationship  and  that  would  not  be 
made  more  difficult  and  more  danger- 
ous by  a  high  level  of  Soviet-American 
tension  and  unregulated  competition. 

While  these  considerations  suggest 
that  we  should  welcome  and  seek  to 
strengthen  the  prospect  of  an  improve- 
ment in  Soviet-American  relations, 
they  also  suggest  that  substantial  prog- 
ress over  the  long  run  will  be  better 
served  by  specific  actions  on  concrete 
problems  based  upon  mutual  self- 
interest  than  by  symbolic  gestures  or 
abstract  declarations  about  detente. 
Further,  they  suggest  that,  although  the 
balance  between  competitive  and  co- 
operative interest  may — and  we  hope 
will — shift  increasingly  in  favor  of  the 
latter,  both  elements  are  an  integral 
part  of  the  relationship,  and  there  is 
nothing   inconsistent   in   dealing  with 


both  competitive  and  cooperative  aspects 
of  the  relationship  at  the  same  time. 

Although  it  lacks  the  headline  appeal 
of  simplistic  slogans,  this  measured, 
balanced,  and  realistic  approach  can 
help  to  avoid  the  swings  of  public  sen- 
timent between  too  high  expectations 
and  disillusioned  hostility.  With  public 
support  and  understanding  of  this  ap- 
proach, we  can  sustain  a  steadier  and 
more  consistent  policy  toward  the 
Soviet  Union  through  the  inevitable  ups 
and  downs  caused  by  changes  in  the 
Soviet  Union,  in  the  United  States,  and 
in  the  international  scene. 

Current  Issues 

Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 

(SALT).  The  most  urgent  foreign  pol- 
icy issue  arising  out  of  the  Soviet- 
American  relationship  stems  from  the 
fact  that,  as  a  result  of  modern  military 


Marshall  D.  Shulman  was  born  April  8, 
1916,  in  Jersey  City,  New  Jersey.  He 
graduated  from  the  University  of  Michigan 
in  1937.  After  pursuing  graduate  studies  at 
the  University  of  Chicago  and  Harvard,  he 
received  an  M.A.  degree  in  1948  from  Col- 
umbia University  and  a  Ph.D.  degree  in 
1959.  also  from  Columbia. 

In  January  1977  Mr.  Shulman  was  ap- 
pointed Special  Consultant  to  the  Secretary 
on  Soviet  Affairs;  the  following  September 
he  was  sworn  in  as  Special  Adviser  to  the 
Secretary  of  State  on  Soviet  Affairs  with  the 
rank  of  Ambassador.  He  is  also  chairman  of 
the  Interagency  Coordinating  Committee  for 
U.S. -Soviet  Affairs.  Mr.  Shulman  is  on 
leave  from  his  position  as  Adlai  E.  Steven- 
son Professor  of  International  Relations  al 
Columbia  University  where  he  was  also  Di- 
rector of  the  Russian  Institute.  He  is  the  au- 
thor of  a  number  of  books  and  articles  on 
international  politics,  Soviet  foreign  policy, 
and  the  limitation  of  armaments. 

Among  his  other  activities,  Mr.  Shulman 
has  served  as  Special  Assistant  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  (1950-53).  consultant  to  the 
U.S.  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament 
Agency,  and  was  on  the  Advisory  Commit- 
tee on  East-West  Trade  of  the  Department 


of  Commerce.  He  has  been  on  the  faculties 
of  Harvard  (1954-62)  and  the  Fletcher 
School  of  Law  and  Diplomacy  at  Tufts  Uni- 
versity (1961-68).  Mr.  Shulman  also  has 
been  a  director  of  the  Council  on  Foreign 
Relations  and  a  member  of  the  Council  of 
the  International  Institute  of  Strategic 
Studies  (London).  □ 


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larv  1978 


inology,  each  country  has  the  abil- 
;  o  destroy  the  other  as  a  functioning 
ct\ .   How  we  should  react  to  this 
MMiie  fact  has  been  the  subject  of  a 
imuing  debate  in  this  country  and  is 
\ct  clearly  resolved  in  the  public 
■r,d. 
lur  fundamental  premise  is  that  we 
t  provide  adequately  for  the  secu- 
iif  our  country  and  of  our  allies  and 
othe  preservation  of  the  values  of  our 
■iety.  Some  argue  that  we  can  best 
cct  the  security  of  our  country  by 
ing  for  as  much  military  superior- 
is  possible  over  the  Soviet  Union 
other  possible  adversaries.   The 
^cquence  of  this  course,   however, 
1  encourage  the  other  side  to  do  the 
i  c.  with  the  net  effect  of  a  continu- 
n  movement   toward  larger,   more 
ciplex,  and  less  stable  weapons  sys- 


tems on  both  sides;  a  steady  decrease  in 
our  security;  and  a  mounting  strain 
upon  our  society. 

Between  this  approach  and  the  other 
extreme  of  inadequate  concern  for  the 
importance  of  a  military  equilibrium, 
there  is  a  third  course  which  has  been 
the  declared  policy  of  this  government 
in  recent  years  and  whose  purpose  has 
been  to  seek  to  stabilize  the  strategic 
military  competition  at  moderate  levels 
by  negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Union 
in  the  Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks. 

We  are  committed  to  the  proposition 
that  this  country  must  be  strong  so  that 
no  adversary  could  ever  be  in  a  posi- 
tion to  believe  that  it  could  attack 
either  this  country  or  our  allies  without 
disastrous  consequences  for  itself.  Al- 
though the  United  States  can,  if  neces- 
sary, keep  pace  with  whatever  level  of 


.  PROFILE  * 


Geography 

rea:   8,649,490  sq.    mi.    (about   I'A   times 

the  size  of  U.S.). 
apital:  Moscow  (pop.  7.8  million), 
ilher  Cities:  Leningrad  (4.4  million),  Kiev 

(2.1  million),  Taslikent  (1.7  million). 


'eople 

opulation:  258.9  million  (July  1977). 

,nnual  Growth  Rate:  Less  than  1%  (1975). 

lensity:  84  per  sq.  mi.  (European  part),  4 
per  sq.  mi.  (Eastern  Siberia  and  Soviet 
Far  East). 

thnic  Groups:  53%  Russian.  17%  Ukrain- 
ian, 4%  Uzbek,  4%  Byelorussian  (1970). 

.eligions:  70%  atheist;  18%  Russian  Or- 
thodox; 9%  Moslem;  3%  Jewish,  Protes- 
tant. Georgian  Orthodox,  Roman 
Catholic,  Armenian  Gregorian. 

.anguages:  Russian  (official).  76%  Slavic. 
11%  Altaic.  8%  other  Indo-European. 
3%  Uralian.  2%  Caucasian. 

iteracy:  98.57o  (between  9-49  yrs.  of  age). 

-ife  Expectancy;  70  yrs.  ( 1974). 


government 

)fficial   Name:   Union   of  Soviet  Socialist 
Republics. 

Type:  Federal  Union  (est.  Dec.  30,  1922). 

5ate  of  Constitution:  1977. 

branches:  E.xecurive — USSR.  Council  of 
Ministers.  Legislative — bicameral 
USSR.  Supreme  Soviet  (767-member 
Council  of  the  Union,  750-member 
Council  of  Nationalities).  Judicial — 
Supreme  Court  of  USSR. 
[Political  Party;  Communist  Party  of  the 
Soviet  Union  (CPSU). 

luffrage:  Universal  over  18;  direct,  equal. 


Administrative  Subdivisions:  15  Union  Re- 
publics, 20  autonomous  republics,  6 
krays,  120  oblasts.  8  autonomous  ob- 
lasts. 

Economy 

GNP:  $937  billion  (1976  est). 

Annual  Growth  Rate:  3.7%  (average 
1971-75). 

Per  Capita  Income:  $3,591  (1976  est.). 

Per  Capita  Growth  Rate:  2.8%  (1976). 

Agriculture:  Land — 27%;  labor — 23%; 
products — wheat,  rye,  corn,  oats, 
potatoes,  sugar  beets,  linseed,  sunflower 
seed,  cotton  and  flax,  cattle,  pigs,  sheep. 

Industry:  Labor— 38%  (1976);  products- 
mining,  ferrous  and  nonferrous  metal- 
lurgy, fuels  and  power,  building  mate- 
rials, chemicals,  machine  building. 

Natural  Resources;  Fossil  fuels,  water- 
power,  limber,  manganese,  lead,  zinc, 
nickel,  mercury,  potash,  phosphate. 

Trade:  ExportsSil .2  billion  (1976);  fossil 
fuels,  raw  materials,  machinery  and 
equipment,  semifinished  products. 
Imports — $38,1  billion  (1976):  machin- 
ery and  equipment,  foodstuffs,  raw  mate- 
rials. Partners — G.D.R  ,  Poland, 
Czechoslovakia,  Bulgaria,  Hungary, 
F.R.G.,  Cuba,  U.S.,  Japan,  Finland, 
Yugoslavia.  Italy,  France,  Romania. 

Official  Exchange  Rate:  1  ruble  = 
US  $1.38026  (August  1977). 


*Taken  from  the  Department  of  State's 
January  1978  edition  of  the  Background 
Notes  on  the  USSR.  Copies  of  the  com- 
plete Note  may  be  purchased  for  50c  from 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402  (a  25%  discount  is  allowed 
when  ordering  100  or  more  Notes  mailed  to 
the  same  address). 


military  competition  is  required,  it 
clearly  is  in  our  security  interest  that 
the  military  competition  be  as  stable 
and  reduced  to  as  low  a  level  as  can  be 
achieved  through  negotiations.  This  is 
what  we  have  been  trying  to  do  in 
SALT  since  it  began  in  November 
1969. 

The  Treaty  on  Limiting  Anti- 
Ballistic  Missile  Systems  and  the 
Interim  Agreement  on  the  Limitation  of 
Strategic  Offensive  Arms  of  May  1972 
have  clearly  been  useful,  but  both  sides 
have,  nevertheless,  continued  to  build 
up  their  strategic  weapons  arsenals — 
qualitatively  and  quantitatively — in 
ways  that  were  not  limited  by  the  treaty 
or  the  Interim  Agreement. -' 

One  reason  why  SALT  has  not  been 
more  effective  so  far  is  that  the  differ- 
ences in  the  weapons  systems  and  the 
geographical  situations  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  have  made 
it  difficult  to  measure  with  any  preci- 
sion what  strategic  equality  means. 
Each  side  is  stronger  in  some  aspects  of 
the  military  competition,  and  each  side 
has  been  driven  by  concern  that  the  ad- 
vantages of  the  other  might  be,  or 
might  appear  to  be,  more  effective  than 
its  own.  We  have  also  been  experienc- 
ing a  period  of  extraordinary  techno- 
logical innovation  in  weapons  which 
has  made  the  calculations  involved 
in  SALT  negotiations  incredibly  com- 
plex. 

And  yet,  despite  the  complexity  of 
the  technical  aspects  of  SALT,  the 
basic  policy  questions  involved  come 
down  to  a  matter  of  common  sense  and 
judgment  on  which  the  President,  the 
Congress,  and  an  informed  public  can 
base  their  decisions. 

In  the  present  negotiations  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  an  effort  is  being  made 
to  stabilize  the  military  competition,  to 
begin  a  downward  turn  to  more  sensi- 
ble levels,  and  to  slow  down  the  intro- 
duction of  new  and  less  stable  military 
technologies.  If  these  negotiations  suc- 
ceed, both  countries  will  be  more  se- 
cure, and  the  world  will  be  safer. 

During  the  visit  of  Soviet  Foreign 
Minister  Gromyko  to  Washington  in 
September,  considerable  progress  was 
made  in  breaking  through  issues  that 
had  been  deadlocked  for  a  long  time. 

Although  the  Interim  Agreement 
formally  expired  on  October  3,  each 
side  has  stated  that  it  "will  not  take  any 
actions  which  would  be  inconsistent 
with  that  agreement  while  the  present 
negotiations  are  proceeding.'  In  these 
negotiations,  the  basic  agreed  elements 
would  be  incorporated  in  a  new  treaty 
which  would  run  until  1985.  Other 
elements  which  are  of  concern  to  one 
side  or  the  other  but  on  which  full 
agreement  has  not  yet  been  reached 


would  be  held  in  place  by  a  protocol  to 
the  treaty,  whose  function  would  be  to 
give  us  3  years  in  which  to  continue  ef- 
,  forts  to  find  mutually  satisfactory  solu- 
tions to  these  problems.  At  the  same 
time,  it  is  anticipated  that  agreement 
will  be  reached  on  the  principles  to 
govern  the  next  round  of  negotiations, 
the  main  thrust  of  which  will  be  to 
work  for  more  substantial  reductions 
than  are  immediately  possible  while 
preserving  the  strategic  equilibrium  be- 
tween the  two  countries. 

Progress  in  SALT  would  represent 
not  only  a  significant  improvement  in 
the  most  important  single  aspect  of 
Soviet-American  relations  but  an  ad- 
vance in  the  most  fundamental  issue  af- 
fecting international  peace  and  secu- 
rity. Although  SALT  must  stand  on  its 
own,  based  upon  the  enlightened  self- 
interest  of  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union,  it  can  enhance  the  pros- 
pects for  other  arms  control  problems 
and  for  an  improvement  in  other  as- 
pects of  Soviet-American  relations. 

Other  Arms  Limitation  Aspects.  A 

brief  summary  of  the  present  status  of  a 
number  of  other  arms  limitation  negoti- 
ations in  process  is  in  order,  since  they 
are  more  extensive  than  may  be  gener- 
ally appreciated. 

•  Indian  Ocean — the  second  round 
of  bilateral  U.S. -Soviet  talks  on  this 
subject,  held  in  Washington  in  late 
September,  was  encouraging.  We  are 
seeking  Soviet  agreement  to  stabilize 
the  military  situation  in  that  region  as  a 
first  step  and  to  prevent  an  arms  com- 
petition from  developing  between  the 
two  countries. The  third  round  con- 
vened in  December  in  Bern. 

•  Comprehensive  test  ban — in  these 
negotiations,  which  also  include  the 
United  Kingdom,  there  has  been  some 
progress  in  moving  from  the  present 
partial  test  ban  toward  one  that  would 
include  all  underground  nuclear  explo- 
sions. Although  an  agreement  seems  to 
be  emerging  that  a  ban  on  nuclear 
weapons  tests  would  be  desirable 
now — whether  or  not  other  nuclear  na- 
tions are  prepared  to  join  in  the 
agreement— differences  remain  on  sev- 
eral questions,  including  whether 
peaceful  nuclear  explosions  should  also 
be  banned.  We  feel  that  such  a  total 
ban  is  necessary  and  are  continuing  to 
negotiate  on  this  question  at  Geneva. 

•  Mutual  and  balanced  force  reduc- 
tions (MBFR)  in  central  Europe — at 
Vienna  arduous  negotiations  involving 
the  United  States,  the  Soviet  Union, 
and  some  of  their  respective  allies  have 
been  seeking  an  equitable  solution  to 
this  source  of  danger  and  tension. 
There  has  not  yet  emerged  any  com- 
mon ground  between  the  Western  in- 


sistence that  reductions  should  move 
toward  equal  levels  and  the  Soviet  in- 
sistence that  the  present  balance  of 
forces  should  be  preserved  by  equal 
percentage  reductions.  We  are  continu- 
ing these  negotiations  in  the  conviction 
that  a  solution  to  this  problem  could 
contribute  substantially  to  European 
security  and  a  climate  of  justified  con- 
fidence. 

•  Chemical  weapons — these  negotia- 
tions are  moving  forward  reasonably 
well.  The  Soviet  and  American  delega- 
tions are  working  on  technical  details 
and  problems  of  definition  in  the  hope 
that  it  may  be  possible  by  spring  to 
make  a  joint  submission  of  guidelines 
to  the  Committee  of  the  Conference  on 
Disarmament  in  Geneva. 

•  Antisatellite  arms  control — since 
both  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  rely  heavily  upon  satellite  re- 
connaissance to  monitor  compliance 
with  SALT  and  other  agreements,  as 
well  as  for  early-warning  systems,  it  is 
obviously  a  matter  of  concern  that 
agreement  should  be  reached  to  prevent 
either  side  from  developing  the  capabil- 
ity of  destroying  satellites.  There  have 
been  reports  that  the  Soviet  Union  has 
been  experimenting  with  such 
capabilities,  and,  if  these  were  to  con- 
tinue, the  United  States  would  clearly 
draw  on  its  strong  technological  base  to 
develop  capabilities  at  least  as  strong 
as  those  of  the  Soviet  Union.  We  are 
continuing  our  own  research  and  de- 
velopment work  in  this  area  should  it 
be  necessary  swiftly  to  develop  such 
capabilities;  at  the  same  time,  we  are 
preparing  proposals  which  we  hope 
will  head  off  this  potentially  destabiliz- 
ing development. 

•  Radiological  weapons — negotia- 
tions are  proceeding  on  this  subject  at 
Geneva  with  some  prospect  of  reaching 
agreement  in  a  few  months. 

•  Advance  notification  of  missile 
launches — this  subject  has  been  in- 
cluded in  the  strategic  arms  limitation 
negotiations  and  is  now  under  negotia- 
tion at  Geneva.  The  Soviet  position  has 
been  that  necessary  safeguards  are  al- 
ready provided  in  two  previous 
agreements — one  on  the  Prevention  of 
Incidents  on  and  Over  the  High  Seas  of 
May  1972  and  the  other  on  Measures 
To  Reduce  the  Risk  of  Outbreak  of  Nu- 
clear War  of  September  1971 — which 
oblige  either  side  to  notify  the  other  if 
a  test  or  accidental  launch  might  be 
subject  to  misinterpretation.^  We  be- 
lieve that  a  more  far-reaching  obliga- 
tion on  both  parties  is  required  if  a 
genuine  contribution  to  mutual  confi- 
dence is  to  be  achieved. 

•  Limitations  on  conventional  arms 
transfers — only  a  beginning  has  been 
made  in  dealing  with  this  dangerous 


Department  of  State  Bullei 

problem,  which  is  made  more  diffici 
because  it  involves  conflicting  politic 
interests  in  specific  areas  and  touch 
on  important  interests  of  our  allie 
Since  the  United  States  is  the  princip 
source  of  conventional  arms  sales  aii 
transfers,  it  has  felt  the  obligation 
initiate  proposals  on  this  subject,  b 
substantial  negotiations  have  not  y 
resulted. 

•  Nonproliferation      of      nucle. 
weapons — this  is  a  subject  on   whi< 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Unii 
should  have,  and  do  have,  strong  pan!] 
lei  interests  and  on  which  a  fair  degr 
of  cooperation  has  been  achieved. 
June  the  two  sides  agreed  to  subsur  . 
their  joint  efforts  on   nonproliferati'  j 
under    the    aegis    of    the     Londi  i 
Suppliers  Group  since  the  cooperati   ' 
of  other  nuclear  suppliers  is  obviouj  I 
essential. 

The  key  to  any  effort  to  halt  prolift 
ation  is  to  increase  our  knowledge 
the  relationship  between  the  fuel  eye 
in  peaceful  applications  and  the  pi 
duction   of  nuclear   materials    frc 
which  weapons  can  be  produced.  \  l 
must  not  only  know  this  subject  we  1 
we  must  insure  that  other  nations  i'A 
also  aware  of  these  risks  and  benef " 
of  nuclear  energy.   The  Internatioi 
Atomic  Energy  Agency,  in  which  i 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Uni 
have  generally  worked,  well  togeth' 
has  played  a  valuable  role  in  this 
fort.  Constructive  participation  by  i 
Soviet  Union  in  the  International  ^ 
clear  Fuel  Cycle  Evaluation  Organizi 
Conference,   held  October   19-21 
Washington,  has  been  a  further  indii 
tion  of  the  high  level  of  cooperation  I 
tween     our    two     governments 
nonproliferation. 

•  Theater  nuclear  weapons — Sov 
weapons  which  are  targeted  on  Euro 
are  at  present  largely  unconstrained 
any  international  agreement.  Sov 
development  of  increasingly  modt 
systems,  such  as  the  SS-20^a  nn>bi 
intermediate  range  ballistic  miss 
with  multiple  independently  targctal 
warheads — and  the  Backfire  bombi 
are  causing  our  allies  increasing  cc 
cern.  We  are  at  this  point  uiim 
whether  negotiations  on  these  systcii 
which  fall  into  the  "gray  areas"  1 
tween  SALT  and  MBFR,  are  feasib 
The  problem  is  an  increasingly  imp( 
tant  one,  however,  and  one  to  wfii 
we  will  be  giving  much  thought. 

A  summary  judgment  of  these  vari 
arms  limitation  efforts  would  suggi 
that  a  wide  number  of  significant  pre 
lems  are  being  addressed,  some  w 
reasonable  prospects  of  effective  i; 
suits,  some  less  so.  In  our  judgmeiH 
these  efforts  are  more  likely  to  be  u;, 


! 


irv  1978 


1  the  extent  that  they  seek  specific 
oncrete  steps  rather  than  general 
rations.  In  our  view,  propagandis- 
\  larations  of  intent,  although  they 
li  i\e  a  specious  public  appeal,  do 
oiitribute  substantially  to  the  solu- 
if  concrete  problems  in  reducing 
langer  of  either  conventional  or 
ar  war. 
eas  of  Political   Competition. 

the  Quadripartite  Agreement  of 
on  Berlin,  the  most  crucial  area 
itential  confrontation  between  the 
d  States  and  the  Soviet  Union — 
;/  Europe — has  been  relatively 
c  By  comparison  with  earlier 
Js.  it  is  an  important  step  forward 
;urope  is  now  in  the  category  of 
aphical  areas  where  the  risk  of 
ontation  has  been  substantially  re- 
.1  Although  Europe — East  and 
—continues  to  be  a  vital  area  of 
:al  competition  because  of  its  sig- 
iit  industrial  resources,  the  con- 
of  that  competition  can  be  made 
dangerous  to  the  peace  of  the 
I  if  more  substantial  progress  is 
ved  in  the  negotiations  at  Vienna 
e  reduction  of  military  forces  in 
ea. 
contrast  the    Middle  East  still 

I  substantial  risk  of  hostilities 
1  could  involve  the  Soviet  Union 
he  United  States.  For  30  years, 
gh  four  Arab-Israeli  conflicts, 
t  and  American  interests  have  in- 
;ted  in  the  Middle  East.  While 
t  intluence  in  the  area  has  had  its 
nd  downs,  it  is  obvious  that  the 
is  of  considerable  importance  to 


the  Soviet  Union  and  that  a  construc- 
tive rather  than  an  obstructive  role  by 
the  Soviet  Union  would  be  an  impor- 
tant element  in  any  effort  to  reduce  the 
danger  of  another  Middle  Eastern  war. 

In  the  current  situation,  we  have 
been  able  to  work  both  with  Israel  and 
the  Arab  parties  in  starting  the  process 
toward  a  settlement,  but  to  achieve  a 
comprehensive  and  durable  solution 
requires  direct  negotiations  between 
the  parties.  This  can  best  be  achieved, 
we  believe,  under  the  auspices  of  a 
Geneva  conference,  with  the  coopera- 
tion and  support  of  its  two  co- 
chairmen — the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union. 

It  should  be  made  clear  beyond  any 
doubt  that  it  was  this  objective  that  was 
the  sole  motivation  in  our  joining  with 
the  Soviets  in  issuing  a  statement  on 
the  Middle  East  on  October  1  during 
the  presence  of  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko  in  New  York.'*  It  would  be  an 
error  to  believe  that  the  statement  was 
inspired  by  any  desire  to  use  the  Mid- 
dle East  as  a  vehicle  for  improving 
U.S. -Soviet  relations. 

In  Africa  it  must  be  said  that  Soviet 
actions  over  the  past  2  years  have 
shown  a  lack  of  restraint.  In  Angola 
and  also  in  the  war  between  Ethiopia 
and  Somalia,  we  feel  that  Soviet 
policies — especially  arms  supply — 
contributed  to  local  conflicts  in  a  way 
that  seriously  destabilized  the  region. 

In  other  African  areas  of  potential 
conflict — Rhodesia  and  Namibia — 
there  have  been  set  in  motion  initia- 
tives which  could  lead  to  a  settlement 


enjoying  wide  African  support.  It  has 
been  our  purpose  to  encourage  the 
Soviet  Union  to  adopt  a  constructive  at- 
titude toward  these  initiatives  and  to 
avoid  any  further  East-West  polariza- 
tion of  Africa.  We  hope  and  expect  that 
the  Soviet  Union  will  support  the  es- 
sential role  of  the  United  Nations  in 
working  toward  settlement  in  these 
areas. 

In  a  summary  assessment  of  this 
brief  review  of  the  global  aspect  of 
Soviet-American  relations,  it  can  be 
said  that  although  realism  compels  us 
to  accept  the  political  competition  be- 
tween the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United 
States  in  various  areas  of  the  world  as  a 
fact  of  international  life,  there  has  been 
some  modest  progress  in  moving  to- 
ward a  codification  of  the  restraint  that 
can  be  expected  in  greater  or  lesser  de- 
gree in  the  different  areas.  This  is 
motivated  not  by  altruism  but  by  self- 
interest  on  both  sides,  since  it  is  pain- 
fully evident  that  an  unregulated  com- 
petition can  dangerously  exacerbate  the 
many  local  sources  of  conflict  which 
have  arisen  and  will  arise,  and  the  pos- 
sibility of  local  conflicts  spiraling  out 
of  control  is  always  present. 

Economic  Relations.  The  develop- 
ment of  economic  relations  is  clearly 
an  important  component  of  the  total  re- 
lationship between  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union.  In  recent  years, 
the  Soviet  Union  has  indicated  an  ac- 
tive interest  in  expanding  its  importa- 
tion of  agricultural  products,  consumer 
goods,  manufactured  goods,  and  ad- 
vanced technology.  It  would  also  like 


I S.  AMBASSADOR 
DTHE  U.S.S.R. 

'lalcolm  Toon,  a  career  Foreign  Service 

(  iccr,  was  born  in  Troy,  New  York,  on 

i  V  4,  1916.  He  holds  an  A.B.  degree  from 

1  Is  College  ( 1937)  and  an  M.A.  from  the 

F  Icher  School  of  Law  and  Diplomacy 

I  -18)    Upon  graduating  from  the  Fletcher 

Jiool,  he  became  a  research  assistant  for 

t   National  Planning  Board.  He  served  in 

I    U.S.   Navy  (1942-46)  as  a  PT-boat 

cnmander,   principally   in  the   South 

f.ific,  attaining  the  rank  of  Lt.   Com- 

rnder    He  was  awarded  the  Bronze  Star. 

\mbassador  Toon  joined   the   Foreign 

vice  in  1946  and  was  assigned  to  War- 

.   where  he  served  as  an  administrative 

leer  (1946-49);  he  then  served  as  Politi- 

i   Officer  in  Budapest  (1949-50).  During 

'    academic  year   1950-51,  he  attended 

ddlcbury  College  and  Harvard  University 

ere  he  took  Russian  area  and  language 

ining.  He  was  then  assigned  to  Moscow 

ere  he  served  as  a  consular  and  political 


officer  (1951-52).  After  spending  a  year  in 
Rome,  he  became  Political  Officer  and 
Chief  of  Consular  Affairs  in  Berlin. 

In   1956  he  was  assigned  to  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  and  during  that  tour  was  a 


delegate  to  various  international  confer- 
ences, including  the  U.S. -U.S.S.R.  cultural 
exchange  negotiations,  the  1958  nuclear  test 
ban  conference  in  Geneva,  the  1959  Geneva 
foreign  ministers'  conference  on  Berlin,  and 
the  10-nation  Committee  on  Disarmament  in 
1959.  He  served  in  the  Department  as  Dep- 
uty Director  of  the  East-West  Exchanges 
Staff  (1956-60)  and  then  as  First  Secretary 
at  the  Embassy  in  London  until  1963.  He 
was  then  assigned  to  Moscow  where  he  was 
Counselor  for  Political  Affairs. 

From  1965  to  1968  Ambassador  Toon 
was  Director  of  the  Office  of  Soviet  Affairs 
in  the  Department  and  in  1968-69  was  Act- 
ing Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  Euro- 
pean Affairs. 

He  was  appointed  Ambassador  to 
Czechoslovakia  in  1969,  Ambassador  to 
Yugoslavia  in  1971,  and  Ambassador  to  Is- 
rael in  1975;  he  was  sworn  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  the  U.S.S.R.  in  December  1976. 

Ambassador  Toon  received  the  Depart- 
ment's Superior  Honor  Award  in  1965  and 
was  appointed  a  Career  Minister  in  1973. D 


to  expand  its  export  of  manufactured 
goods  as  well  as  raw  materials  to  West- 
ern markets.  The  development  of  this 
trade  with  the  United  States  and  other 
advanced  industrial  nations  can  be  a 
stabilizing  factor  in  Soviet  policy  to- 
ward the  world. 

There  are  also  areas  in  which  Soviet 
and  U.S.  economic  policies  are  af- 
fected by  and  have  a  critical  impact  on 
the  rest  of  the  world.  Foremost  among 
these  are  international  grain  trade  and 
energy  problems.  The  cooperation  of 
the  Soviet  Union  in  the  orderly  alloca- 
tion and  handling  of  food  reserves,  as 
well  as  the  supply  and  availability  of 
oil,  will  be  increasingly  important. 

Questions  have  been  raised  about  the 
balance  of  political  risks  and  benefits 
to  the  United  States  that  need  to  be 
weighed  in  determining  a  national  pol- 
icy on  the  expansion  of  economic  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union.  Clearly  a 
period  of  national  discussion  and  con- 
sultations with  the  Congress  lie  before 
us  as  we  seek  to  clarify  such  issues  as 
the  extension  of  most-favored-nation 
status  to  the  Soviet  Union,  what 
criteria  should  govern  the  extension  of 
credits  through  the  Export-Import 
Bank,  what  criteria  should  govern  the 
transfer  of  technology,  to  what  extent 
we  should  participate  in  energy  and 
other  resource  development  projects, 
etc.  We  shall  also  have  to  address  the 
question  of  how  the  necessary  degree 
of  coordination  can  be  achieved  be- 
tween the  government  and  the  private 
sector  and  between  the  United  States 
and  its  allies. 

It  has  been  the  declared  policy  of 
this  government  that  it  looks  toward  an 
improvement  in  economic  relations  be- 
tween the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United 
States  as  conditions  make  this  possible, 
and  it  would  be  desirable  to  move  in 
this  direction  by  prompt  and  measured 
steps.  The  concrete  measures  by  which 
this  policy  can  be  implemented  will  be 
determined  on  the  basis  of  consulta- 
tions with  the  Congress. 

Scientific,  Academic,  and  Cultural 
Exchanges.  Between  1972  and  1974, 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
signed  a  series  of  1 1  bilateral  agree- 
ments to  foster  cooperation  in  a  variety 
of  technical  fields:  health,  enviroamen- 
tal  protection,  artificial  heart  research, 
energy,  atomic  energy,  agriculture, 
housing,  transportation,  oceanography, 
space,  and  science  and  technology. 
Prior  to  1972,  our  cooperative  relations 
with  the  Soviet  Union  in  these  fields 
had  been  largely  restricted  to  one-time 
exchanges.  The  bilateral  agreements 
added  an  element  of  continuity  to  our 
cooperative  ventures  and  have  stressed 
joint  research  efforts. 

We  have  pursued  a  variety  of  objec- 


tives in  implementing  the  agreements: 
achieving  scientific  or  technical  ben- 
efit, promoting  commercial  relations, 
broadening  and  deepening  our  overall 
relations  with  the  Soviet  Union,  and 
expanding  our  access  to  their  closed 
.society.  Participating  U.S.  agencies  re- 
port satisfactory  or  better  progress  to- 
ward these  goals.  As  evidence  of  our 
determination  that  continued  participa- 
tion remains  in  our  interest,  during 
1977  we  agreed  to  the  extension  of  five 


Department  of  State  Bull. 

agreements — artificial  heart  resear 
health,  environmental  protectic 
space,  and  science  and  technology — 
a  further  5  years.  Under  tht 
agreements,  876  Soviet  participa 
traveled  to  the  United  States  and  ! 
U.S.  participants  traveled  to  the  SoM' 
Union  in  1976. 

Other  programs,  notably  that  of  1 
National  Academy  of  Sciences,  bri 
Soviet  and   American   scientists 
gether,  in  some  cases  for  collaborai 


U.S.  TRADE  WITH  THE  U.S.S.R. 

IN  MILLIONS  OF  DOLLARS 


2,305.9 


EXPORTS  TO 
U.S.S.R. 

GRAIN  AND 
FEEDSTUFFS 

IMPORTS  FROM 
U.S.S.R. 


1972  1973  1974  1975 


SOURCE:  COMPILED  FROM  DEPARTMENT  OF  COMMERCE  FIGURES 


1976  1977 

JAN.  SEPT. 


lary  1978 


carch  of  up  to  a  year's  duration. 
•owledge  and  understanding  of  one 

itlicr  has  grown  as  a  result  of  a  20- 

ir  old  official  exchanges  agreement. 

Ici  which  approximately  350  schol- 

.  students,  and  lecturers  now  travel 
asiually  between  the  two  countries. 

Jnder  the   same  agreement,   six 

ici  performing  arts  groups  visited 
t  United  Slates  in  1977  and  two 
^lerican  groups  have  gone  to  the 
i.'iet  Union.  Soviet  and  American 
e;iibitions  are  to  tour  nine  cities  in 
jih  country  in  the  next  3  years.  In 
|''6  a  Soviet  exhibit  on  science  toured 
tl-  United  States,  and  a  U.S.  exhibit 
o  photography  completed  a  Soviet 

r  in  1977.  In  addition,  we  had  a 
•  entennial  exhibition  in  Moscow  and 
th  Soviets  in  turn  held  a  60th  anniver- 
Siy  exhibition  in  Los  Angeles  in 
Nvember  1977. 

n  addition  to  the  scientific  and 
Molarly  advances  that  flow  from  these 
e;hange  arrangements,  we  attach  im- 
pitance  to  the  opportunities  for  per- 
st  al  contacts  and  increased  insight 
it)  each  other's  society.  While  there 
a  asymmetries  between  the  two 
siieties  that  complicate  the  problem 
0  managing  these  exchanges  so  that 
tlir  benefits  are  equally  distributed, 
e' ry  effort  is  being  made  to  insure 
t\  this  is  the  case,  and  significant  im- 
p  vements  have  been  registered  since 
tl  exchanges  began. 

luman  Rights.  Although  the  human 
riits  issue  has  been  a  source  of  con- 
tetion  in  U.S. -Soviet  relations,  it  is 
0  hope  that  over  the  longer  run,  it 
u  I  be  seen  to  have  had  constructive 
ei!cts. 

vt  the  philosophical  level,  we  be- 
li  e  that  there  can  be  a  useful  dialogue 
bween  societies  that  start  from  the 
n  ds  of  the  society  and  emphasize  the 
ft'illment  of  material  needs  and  those 
w.ch  start  from  the  dignity  and  worth 

0  he  individual  and  emphasize  the  ful- 
fiment  of  political  rights. 

t  is  obvious,  however,  that  the 
hnan  rights  issue  also  raises  political 
al  bureaucratic  problems — that  it 
tiches  on  fundamental  questions  of 
pitical  control  and,  therefore,  often 
STiulates  neuralgic  responses.  We 
h/e  sought  to  make  it  clear  in  our 
hateral  discussion  on  human  rights  is- 
'  s  and  at  the  Belgrade  Review  Con- 

L-nce  on  the  Helsinki  Final  Act,  that 
commitment  of  this  Administration 

the  advancement  of  human  rights  is 
a  integral  element  of  our  foreign  pol- 

1  generally  and  is  not  directed  against 

Soviet  Union  in  particular.   There 

■  not  been  and  there  will  not  be  any 

s  ckening  in  this  commitment.   We 

'  ^e  sought  the  most  effective  means 

I  which  to  realize  our  purpose,  which 


U.S.  TRADE  WITH  THE  U.S.S.R. 

JANUARY  SEPTEMBER  1977 


EXPORTS 

S1,278.8  MILLION 

RICE      X 

1.5%/           OTHER 
\V              18.0% 

WHEAT 
26.0% 

1    SOYBEANS  ^^=^ 
1        12.0%        ^^-'^ 



\                CORN 
\              19.0% 

MACHINERY  & 
TRANSPORT 
EQUIPMENT 
23,5%         . 

IMPORTS 

$187.1  MILLION 


ALUMINUM 

WASTE  &  SCRAP 

9.0% 


SOURCE:  COMPILED  FROM  DEPARTMENT  OF  COMMERCE  FIGURES 


is  to  seek  constructive  results  in  im- 
proving the  lot  of  individuals  con- 
cerned and  to  encourage  long-term 
trends  in  the  world  toward  a  wider  re- 
spect for  the  dignity  and  worth  of 
human  beings. 

We  do  not  see  this  objective  as  in- 
consistent with  the  desire  to  work  to- 
ward reduced  international  tension  and 
improved  Soviet-American  relations; 
on  the  contrary,  we  believe  that  in  the 
long  run  the  reduction  of  international 
tension  can  contribute  to  an  easing  of 
the  internal  pressures  which  restrict  the 
fullest  realization  of  the  creative  poten- 
tial of  men  and  women  everywhere. 

Internal  Developments 

Our  thinking  about  the  relations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  clearly  rests  upon  the  assump- 
tions we  make  about  domestic  trends 
within  each,  although  in  practice  these 
assumptions  often  remain  unagreed  to 
or  unarticulated  in  our  discussions  of 
the  subject. 

Some  students  of  the  Soviet  Union 
tend  to  emphasize  the  historical  con- 
tinuities in  the  Russian  experience; 
others,  the  changes  in  the  complex  re- 
sponses of  Soviet  society  to  advancing 
industrialization.  There  are  obviously 
important  truths  in  both  perspectives, 
and  both  have  to  be  taken  into  account 
in  our  thinking.  The  Soviet  system  re- 
flects the  centuries  of  centralization, 
autocracy,  bureaucratism,  and  isolation 
from  the  Western  traditions  which  has 
marked  the  Russian  experience  and 
been  carried  over  into  the  Soviet 
period.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  also  true 
that  the  Soviet  Union  is  constantly  in  a 
process  of  change  in  significant  re- 


spects, reflecting  the  tugs  and  hauls  of 
competing  pressures  and  interests 
characteristic  of  developing  societies 
elsewhere. 

Notwithstanding  the  extreme  cen- 
tralization which  marks  Soviet  institu- 
tions, the  central  drama  of  Soviet  polit- 
ical life  is  between  tendencies  toward 
orthodoxy  and  toward  modernization, 
contending  in  every  aspect  of  domestic 
and  foreign  policy,  sometimes  perhaps 
within  the  minds  of  individual  Soviet 
leaders. 

Although  in  the  limited  public  im- 
pressions we  have  of  the  Soviet  Union 
through  Western  press  accounts  the 
main  divisions  appear  to  be  between 
the  dissidents  and  the  Soviet  "Estab- 
lishment," the  fact  is  that  even  within 
these  groups  there  are  significant  dif- 
ferences, and  there  are  many  other  gra- 
dations of  opinion  that  need  to  be  taken 
into  account  in  Soviet  society  and 
Soviet  political  life.  Although  the 
population  as  a  whole  appears  to  be  ex- 
tremely resistant  to  change  and  largely 
apolitical,  there  can  be  observed  at 
both  ends  of  the  political  spectrum — 
among  the  dissidents  as  well  as  among 
the  party  elite — the  modem  equivalent 
of  the  dual  strains  in  Russian  history  of 
the  Slavophils  and  the  Westerners. 

Nationalism  is  reflected  in  the  Soviet 
Union  not  only  among  the  various 
minority  nationality  groups  but  also 
among  the  Great  Russians;  similarly, 
the  impulse  toward  modernizing  the 
country  along  Western  lines  also  cuts 
across  other  divisions  in  the  political 
spectrum.  These  divisions  have  their 
effects  on  two  of  the  most  interesting 
questions  affecting  the  present  and  fu- 
ture development  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  first  of  these  stems  from  the  fact 


8 


Department  of  State  Bulletj 


that  the  Soviet  Union  is  on  the 
threshold  of  a  wholesale  generational 
turnover  at  the  upper  levels  of  its 
power  structure.  Not  necessarily  in  the 
next  succession  but  within  the  foresee- 
able future,  it  is  clear  that  an  ascendant 
generation  will  be  holding  the  levers  of 
power,  and  one  of  the  most  intriguing 
questions  before  us  concerns  the 
character  of  that  generation — men  now 
in  their  forties  and  early  fifties.  We 
know  that  by  and  large  they  tend  to  be 
better  educated  than  the  present  ruling 
group  and  more  familiar  with  the  out- 
side world,  but  beyond  that,  they  do 
not  appear  to  be  a  homogenous  group. 
Whether  they  will  tend  to  move  toward 
nationalism  and  orthodoxy  or  toward 
Western-style  modernization,  we  can- 
not now  predict.  All  that  we  can  say, 
perhaps,  is  that  to  the  extent  they  see 
their  interest  in  a  responsible  involve- 
ment of  their  country  in  the  world 
economy  and  the  world  community, 
they  should  not  feel  from  what  we  do 
or  say  that  this  option  is  closed  to 
them. 

This  is  related  to  the  second  ques- 
tion: how  the  Soviet  leadership  will 
deal  with  some  fundamental  structural 
problems  in  the  Soviet  economy.  Be- 
hind the  problems  of  low  productivity 
and  lags  in  the  advanced  technological 
sector  are  organizational  problems  that 
inevitably  involve  anomalies  in  the 
highly  centralized  political  control  sys- 
tem. Conflicting  approaches  to  the  so- 
lution of  these  problems  reflect  the  di- 
visions between  the  impulses  toward 
orthodoxy  versus  modernization  men- 
tioned earlier  and  also  appear  to  have 
some  correlation  with  the  differences 
between  the  generations.  While  we 
should  not  underestimate  the  capaility 
of  the  Soviet  system  to  manage  its 
problems  on  a  day-to-day  basis  without 
any  clear-cut  solutions  to  these 
choices,  it  may  have  some  relevance 
for  our  own  policy  choices  that  the  de- 
velopment of  economic  relations  with 
the  advanced  industrial  societies  of  the 
West  is  bound  to  have  some  influence 
on  the  directions  that  will  emerge. 

External  Factors 

At  least  brief  mention  should  be 
made  of  a  few  of  the  most  important  of 
the  factors  external  to  the  Soviet  Union 
likely  to  influence  the  course  of 
Soviet- American  relations. 

The  Sino-Soviet  relationship  ob- 
viously deeply  influences  the  Soviet 
outlook,  involving  both  rational  calcu- 
lations and  visceral  fears.  Some  of  the 
effects  of  this  Soviet  preoccupation 
may  be  salutory,  and  some  may  be  dis- 
advantageous to  our  interests.  As  a 
general  principle,  our  efforts  to  move 


toward  normalization  of  our  relations 
with  the  People's  Republic  of  China 
rest  upon  the  desirability  for  our  own 
interests  and  those  of  the  international 
community  of  that  outcome.  It  should 
not  be  interpreted  as  an  effort  to  ma- 
nipulate the  geopolitical  triangle  in 
order  to  achieve  short-term  benefits. 
The  stabilization  of  the  strategic  mili- 
tary competition  cannot  be  fully 
realized  without  the  participation  of  the 
People's  Republic  of  China,  and  until 
that  is  possible,  there  will  remain  sig- 
nificant limits  on  how  far  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  United  States  can  go  on 
a  purely  bilateral  basis. 

Among  other  external  factors, 
perhaps  the  most  important  for  its  in- 
fluence on  the  Soviet-American  rela- 
tionship is  the  capability  of  the  interna- 
tional community  to  absorb  the  thrust 
of  the  Soviet  Union  toward  expanding 
its  political  influence  and  establishing 
itself  as  a  global  power.  It  is  a  charac- 
teristic mark  of  this  period  in  history 
that  the  rise  of  the  Soviet  Union  as  a 
world  power  coincides  with  many  other 
profound  transformations  in  the  inter- 
national order.  The  Soviet  Union  seems 
not  to  have  fully  perceived  how  much 
the  revolutionary  transformations  of 
this  age  have  moved  from  the  patterns 
of  traditional  Marxist-Leninist  thought, 
and  it  is  not  clear  how  Soviet  aspira- 
tions will  adjust  to  the  new  patterns. 

In  this  connection,  a  significant  prac- 
tical aspect  of  the  question  is  the  capa- 
bility of  the  international  community  to 
deal  with  the  tensions  and  potential 
conflicts  between  the  developing  na- 
tions and  the  industrialized  nations. 
The  intersection  of  the  East-West  and 
the  North-South  divisions  in  interna- 
tional politics  requires  a  broadening  of 
our  perspectives  over  those  to  which 


we  have  been  accustomed  in  the  pa 
Here  the  balance  between  competiti 
and  cooperative  elements  in  t 
Soviet-American  relationship  has  to 
tested  and  assessed  freshly  in  each  pi 
ticular  circumstance.  And  here  the  b; 
ance  between  our  national  rivalry  a: 
our  common  stake  in  the  solution 
such  global  problems  as  resource 
food,  energy,  and  the  environment  r 
quire  a  constant  interplay  betwei 
short-term  advantages  and  longer  tei 
imperatives. 

We  can  only  claim  to  have  a 
proached  the  threshold  of  this  problei. 
but  events  move  with  such  rapidity  th 
we  may  not  be  granted  the  luxury  oi 
leisurely  adjustment  in  our  habitu 
modes  of  thought.  To  the  codificati 
of  the  restraints  we  seek  in  t 
Soviet-American  competition  as 
bears  on  local  conflict  situations,  ' 
seek  to  add  the  more  positive  dima 
sion  of  active  cooperation  between  t 
Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States 
supporting  international  institutio 
that  are  emerging  to  deal  with  the 
global  problems. 


'Based  on  a  statement  before  the  Subcomr 
tee  on  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  of  the  Ho 
Committee  on  International  Relations  on  i 
tober  26,  1977  The  complete  transcript  of 
hearings  will  be  published  by  the  committee 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Off 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

''For  texts  of  the  treaty  and  the  Inte 
Agreement,  see  Bulletin  of  June  26,  15 
p.  918  and  920,  respectively. 

'For  Secretary   Vance's  statement,  see  B» 
LETiN  of  Nov.  7,  1977.  p.  642. 

*For  texts,  see  Bulletins  of  June  26,  19 
p.  926,  and  Oct    18,  1971,  p.  400,  respective 

^For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  7,  19- 
p.  639. 


SUMMIT  MEETINGS 

Tehran 

Nov.  28-Dec.  1,  1943 

Roosevelt-Stalin 
(Churchill) 

Yalta 

Feb.  4-11,  1945 

Roosevelt-Stalin 
(Churchill) 

Potsdam 

July  17-Aug.  2,  1945 

Truman-Stalin 
(Churchill-Atlee) 

Geneva 

July  18-23,  1955 

Eisenhower- Khrushchev 
(Eden-Faure) 

Washington 

Sept.  15,  1959 

Eisenhower-Khrushchev 

Camp  David 

Sept.  25-27,  1959 

Eisenhower- Khrushchev 

Vienna 

June  3-4,  1961 

Kennedy-Khrushchev 

Glassboro 

June  23.  25,  1967 

Johnson-Kosygin 

Moscow 

May  22-30,  1972 

Nixon-Brezhnev 

Washington 

June  18-26,  1973 

Nixon-Brezhnev 

Moscow 

June  27-July  3,  1974 

Nixon-Brezhnev 

Valdivostok 

Nov.  23-24,  1974 

Ford-Brezhnev 

Source:  Office  of  Ihe  H 

slonan.  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs. 

iry  1978 


THE  PRESIDEIVT:  Television  Interview 


h'sident  Carter  was  interviewed  on  television  by  news  correspondents  of  the 
imijor  television  networks — Tom  Brokaw  (NBC),  Robert  MacNeil  (PBS). 
S,hleffer  (CBS),  and  Barbara  Walters  (ABC)— on  December  28.  1977.  Fol- 
;;■  iire  excerpts  relating  to  foreign  policy. ' 


(,  There  are  a  number  of  sub- 
«  that  we  want  to  cover  tonight, 
Kiding  some  news  developments 
\s  are  going  on  even  as  we  spealt. 
imt  to  begin,  however,  with  a 
oiition  about  the  trip  that  you 
•ae  on  tomorrow.  It  was  origi- 
al'  postponed  because  you  did  not 
eltiave  the  energy  bill  passed.  It 
ilhas  not  been  passed. 
ly  question  is  this:  Aren't  you 
sing  into  the  twin  themes  of  your 

ics  who  complain  that  your 
ni  gy  bill  has  not  been  passed; 
It  you  have  failed  on  the  major 
«iestic  priority  of  your  Adminis- 
■aon;  and  that  your  foreign  pol- 
yias  no  real  definition  because 
li  trip  seems  to  have  no  urgent 
Mie  to  it? 

The  only  major  legislation  that 
,  u)i  pass  the  Congress  this  year 
ai  which  1  was  expecting  to  pass, 
a  energy.  Speaker  of  the  House  Tip 

■ill  [Thomas  P.  O'Neill,  Jr.,  of 
[jiachusetts]  said  that  it  was  the 

0  productive  session  since  the  first 
r  of  Franklin  Roosevelt.  I'll  let 
n  3e  the  judge  of  that. 

'  e  energy  legislation,  I  think,  will 
;  le  first  item  on  the  agenda  when 
lelongress  reconvenes  in  January, 
n  there's  no  doubt  that  wherever  I 
n  this  trip — to  Eastern  Europe,  to 

1  ern  Europe,  to  the  Mideast,  to 
Ki — what  our  nation  does  about 
U|y  will  be  a  prime  question. 

'e  are  the  leader  of  the  world.  We 
t  me  of  the  major  oil  producers. 
I  are  the  greatest  consumer,  and 
II  Congress  does  take  action  on  the 
Kgy  proposal  that  I  put  forward 
s  April,  and  which  the  House  of 
e-esentatives  passed  in  August, 
a  cloud  will  hang  over  the  determi- 
II  in  and  leadership  qualities  of  our 
)i  try.   So  I  am  disappointed  about 

■  far  as  the  trip  is  concerned,  it's 
ully  planned.  We  began  working 
his  trip  last  March,  and  the  na- 
.:'.  that  we  will  visit  are  important 
s  both  domestically  and  in  our 
gn  relations. 

•  land  in  Eastern  Europe — a  Com- 
ist  government  with  close  ties  to 


the  Soviet  Union  but  also  friendships 
with  us,  heavy  trade  with  the  Western 
nations — is  relatively  willing  to  give 
people  their  religious  freedom  and 
other  freedoms.  We  will  have  a  good 
meeting,  I  think,  in  Poland. 

We  go  from  there  to  Iran,  very 
close  military  ally  of  ours,  a  strong 
trade  partner  of  ours  with  whom  we 
share  many  political  responsibilities. 
And  then  we  go  to  India,  the  biggest 
democracy  in  the  world,  one  that  in 
recent  years  has  turned  perhaps  ex- 
cessively toward  the  Soviet  Union, 
but  under  the  new  leadership  of  Prime 
Minister  Desai  is  moving  back  toward 
us  and  assuming  a  good  role  of,  I 
would  say,  neutrality.  And  we  have  a 
strong  friendship  with  India.  It's  a 
strong  country.  They  are  almost  self- 
sufficient  now.  They  have  food 
surpluses. 

We  come  back  from  there  to  Saudi 
Arabia,  our  major  supplier  of  im- 
ported oil,  a  nation  that's  worked 
closely  with  us  in  foreign  affairs  in 
many  parts  of  the  world;  from  there 
back  to  France,  our  historic  ally, 
keystone  in  Europe.  I'll  have  long 
discussions  with  President  Giscard 
there,  and  then  go  back  to  Brussels  to 
strengthen  our  relationships  with  the 
European  Community  and  with 
NATO. 

So  every  stop  will  be  productive 
for  us.  I'll  be  taking  the  word  and  the 
good  will  and  the  sense  of  importance 
of  the  American  people  toward  them 
in  learning  about  those  countries  in 
the  process. 

But  energy  will  be  the  tie  that  will 
bind  us  together  on  this  trip,  and  I 
hope  that  this  will  demonstrate  to  the 
American  people  and  to  the  Congress 
the  necessity  for  rapid  action  on  one 
of  the  most  controversial  and  divisive 
issues  that  the  Congress  has  ever 
faced,  and  that  is  to  give  our  country 
for  the  first  time  a  comprehensive 
energy  policy. 

Q.  I  know  we'll  all  want  to  get 
back  to  just  how  you  plan  to  go 
about  getting  that  energy  policy. 
But  while  we  are  on  foreign  policy, 
I'd  like  to  ask  you  about  the  Middle 
East.  President  Sadat,  I  think 
everyone  agrees,  made  a  spectacu- 


lar gesture  that  opened  up  a  whole 
new  era  here.  Do  you  feel  that  the 
Israelis  have  as  yet  made  a  com- 
parable gesture?  Have  they  been  flex- 
ible enough  in  your  view? 

A.  Both  President  Sadat  and  Prime 
Minister  Begin  have  been  bold  and 
courageous.  We've  been  dealing  with 
the  Mideast  question  as  a  nation  for 
decades — in  a  leadership  role  at  least 
within  the  last  two  Administrations. 
And  we  see  the  complexity  of  the 
questions  and  the  obstacles  to  prog- 
ress. When  I  first  became  President, 
we  spelled  out  the  basic  issues — 
withdrawal  from  occupied  territories, 
secure  borders,  the  establishment  of 
real  peace,  the  recognition  of  Israel's 
right  to  be  there,  and  dealing  with  the 
Palestinian  question. 

We  are  now  in  a  role  of  supporter. 
We  encourage  them  to  continue  with 
their  fruitful  negotiations.  We  try  to 
resolve  difficulties,  to  give  advice 
and  counsel  when  we  are  requested  to 
do  it.  This  is  a  better  role  for  us.  In 
the  past,  we've  been  in  the  unenvi- 
able position  and  sometimes  unpleas- 
ant position,  sometimes  nonproduc- 
tive position  as  mediator  among  par- 
ties who  wouldn't  even  speak  to  each 
other.  So  I  think  that  the  progress  that 
has  been  made  in  the  last  month  and  a 
half  has  been  remarkable  and  has 
been  much  greater  than  I  had  antici- 
pated. And  I  know  Sadat  and  Begin 
well  and  personally  and  favorably. 

If  any  two  leaders  on  Earth  have 
the  strength  and  the  determination  and 
the  courage  to  make  progress  toward 
peace  in  the  most  difficult  region  that 
I've  ever  known,  it  is  Prime  Minister 
Begin  and  President  Sadat.  There  is 
no  reason  for  us  to  be  discouraged 
about  it.  We  will  help  in  every  way 
we  can  to  let  their  progress  be  fruit- 
ful. 1  think  that  President  Sadat  and 
Prime  Minister  Begin  could  have 
reached  a  fairly  quick  solution  of  just 
the  Egyptian-Israeli  problem  in  the 
Sinai  region.  But  this  is  not  what  they 
want. 

They  both  want  to  try  to  resolve  the 
other  questions — what  is  real  peace; 
will  Israel  be  recognized  as  a  perma- 
nent neighbor  to  the  countries  that 
surround  them;  can  the  Palestinian 
question,  the  West  Bank,  the  Gaza 
Strip  be  addressed  successfully?  And 
knowing  how  difficult  these  questions 
are,  I  have  nothing  but  admiration, 
further  nothing  but  congratulations  for 


10 


them  on  what  they  have  achieved  so 
far. 

Q.  You  are  going  to  see  King 
Hussein  of  Jordan  in  Tehran.  Pres- 
ident Sadat  said  in  an  interview 
that  was  broadcast  on  public  televi- 
sion last  night  that  King  Hussein 
had  told  him  that  he  was  fully  be- 
hind his  efforts  in  public;  until 
now,  King  Hussein's  opinion  has 
been  relatively  mysterious.  Do  you 
have  any  information  that  would 
make  you  agree  with  Mr.  Sadat  and 
are  you  going  to  discuss  that  with 
King  Hussein  and  urge  him  to  sup- 
port the  Sadat  initiative  when  you 
see  him? 

A.  I  don't  intend  to  put  any  pres- 
sure on  King  Hussein — I  couldn't  if  I 
wanted  to — to  immediately  begin  to 
negotiate  with  Israel  and  Egypt  as  a 
partner.  If  he  wants  to  do  it,  we 
would  certainly  welcome  that.  What  I 
will  try  to  learn,  however,  is  what 
role  Jordan  is  willing  to  play  in  the 
resolution  of  the  Palestinian-West 
Bank  problem,  at  what  point  he 
thinks  it  would  be  advisable  for  him 
to  enter  the  negotiations  personally  as 
a  government  leader,  and  what  we 
can  do  to  get  him  to  give  his  open 
support  and  encouragement  to  both 
Begin  and  Sadat  as  they  struggle  to 
resolve  the  differences  between  them. 

I  think  King  Hussein  has — indeed 
in  his  private  discussions  with  Secre- 
tary Vance  and  his  personal  com- 
munications to  me — shown  a  very 
positive  attitude.  And  in  his  travels 
around  the  Middle  East  to  visit  with 
other  leaders — some  who  don't  en- 
courage the  talks  like  [Syrian]  Presi- 
dent Asad,  those  who  are  very  hope- 
ful for  progress,  like  those  in  Saudi 
Arabia — I  think  he's  shown  a  con- 
structive attitude  already.  But  it  helps 
me  to  understand  on  a  current  basis 
the  remaining  problems  and  in  what 
way  they  can  be  brought  in  to  achieve 
a  comprehensive  peace. 

I  think  they  all  trust  our  country; 
our  motives  are  good.  We've  never 
misled  them.  We've  been  honest  and 
as  a  person,  as  a  country  that  carried 
messages  from  one  to  another,  and  I 
think  that  this  puts  us  in  a  position  to 
exert  legitimate  influence.  But  what 
we've  always  hoped  for  is  direct 
negotiations  or  discussions  — 
communications  among  the  leaders 
involved  with  our  offering  good  of- 
fices when  we  are  requested  to  do  it. 

Q.  The  chief  stumbling  block 
right  now  does  seem  to  be  what  we 
might  call  the  right  of  return  of  the 
Palestinians  to  the  West  Bank  and 
the  Gaza.  You  have  in  the  past 
come  out  against  an  independent 
nation  per  se  on  the  West  Bank,  but 


Department  of  State  Bu* 


you  have  also  talked  of  the  legiti- 
mate rights  of  the  Palestinians  and 
you  have  been  in  favor  of  some  kind 
of  an  entity — although  people  are 
still  a  little  obscure  about  what  that 
means — an  entity  perhaps  linked  to 
Jordan. 

Would  you,  in  the  light  of  the  de- 
velopments, now  clarify  your  views 
for  us  today;  tell  us  if  they  have 
changed;  and  if  they  have  not,  is  it 
because  the  United  States  has  de- 
cided to  be  neutral  on  this  subject? 

A.  You've  described  my  position 
very  well.  We  do  favor  a  homeland  or 
an  entity  wherein  the  Palestinians  can 
live  in  peace.  I  think  Prime  Minister 
Begin  has  taken  a  long  step  forward 
in  offering  to  President  Sadat,  and  in- 
directly to  the  Palestinians,  self-rule. 

President  Sadat  so  far  is  insisting 
that  the  so-called  Palestinian  entity  be 
an  independent  nation.  My  own  pref- 
erence is  that  they  not  be  an  inde- 
pendent nation  but  be  tied  in  some 
way  with  the  surrounding  countries, 
making  a  choice,  for  instance,  be- 
tween Israel  and  Jordan. 

President  Sadat  has  not  yet  agreed 
to  that  position  of  ours.  Prime  Minis- 
ter Begin  has  offered  that  the  citizens 
who  live  in  the  West  Bank  area  or  the 
Gaza  Strip  be  given  an  option  to  be 
either  Israeli  citizens  or  Jordanian 
citizens,  to  actually  run  for  the  Knes- 
set as  candidates,  and  to  vote  in 
elections — both  national  Israeli  and 
Jordanian  or  local  elections  in  the  oc- 
cupied territories  once  they  are  re- 
leased. 

But  we  don't  have  any  real  choice. 
I've  expressed  an  opinion,  but  if  Is- 
rael should  negotiate  with  the  sur- 
rounding countries  a  different  solu- 
tion, we  would  certainly  support  it. 
But  my  own  personal  opinion  is  that 
permanent  peace  can  best  be  main- 
tained if  there's  not  a  fairly  radical, 
new  independent  nation  in  the  heart 
of  the  Middle  Eastern  area. 

Q.  In  view  of  the  deadlock  now, 
however,  have  you  tried  to  convince 
either  side  of  your  opinion?  You've 
had  conversations  with  both. 

A.  I've  expressed  this  opinion  to 
President  Asad,  to  King  Hussein,  to 
President  Sadat,  to  Crown  Prince 
Fahd  [of  Saudi  Arabia],  and  also  to 
Prime  Minister  Begin,  and 
privately — and  of  course  they  have 
heard  my  statements  publicly.  Our 
preference  is  not  to  have  an  inde- 
pendent nation  there,  but  we  are  per- 
fectly willing  to  accept  any  reason- 
able solution  that  the  parties  them- 
selves might  evolve. 

Q.  If  I  could  just  get  back  to  the 
question  I  asked  you,  do  I  take  it 
that  you  would  not  pass  judgment 


li 


il 


in  public,  at  least  at  this  point, 
whether  the  Israelis  have  been  f 
ibie  enough  in  the  negotiating 
far.  Do  you  think  that  the  posil 
that  they  put  forward — Mr.  Be 
said  today  that  there  would  alw 
be  Israeli  troops  on  the  West  B 
and  that  all  who  wanted  peace 
have  to  know  that.  Is  that  a  rei 
tic  negotiating  position? 

A.   Yes,   it's  certainly  a  reali 
negotiating  position. 

Q.  But  would  Mr.  Sadat  ever 
cept  that? 

A.  I  don't  know.  There  is  a  g 
deal  of  flexibility  there:  the  nun 
of  military  outposts;  the  length 
time  when  this  interim  solution  mi 
be  in  effect — I  think  Prime  Mini 
Begin  said  it  would  be  reassessen 
the  end  of  5  years — the  degree  of 
ticipation  of  the  governments  of  Is 
and  Jordan  in  a  possible  adminij— 
live  arrangement.  All  these  quest* 
could  add  a  tone  of  progress  or  a  | 
sibility  for  resolution  of  what  sea 
to  be  insurmountable  obstacles. 

So  I  think  that  Prime  Mini 
Begin  already  has  shown  a  great 
of  flexibility.  Obviously  Presic 
Sadat  and  King  Hussein  and  ot; 
would  have  to  accept  (or  rej' 
whatever  proposal   is  put  forw 

But  the  length  of  time  when 
interim  agreement  would  be  in  el 
would  be  negotiable  and  the  exac 
lationship  between  the  new  self- 
government  as  far  as  its  autonom- 
concerned — its  dependence  upow 
subservience  to  the  Jordanians  on 
Israelis — all  of  these  things  are  sti 
be  negotiated.  So  I  think  ther 
enough  flexibility  at  this  point. 

Q.  Has  either  Egypt  or  Israel 
both,  asked  the  United  States 
mally  yet  to  provide  guarantees 
any  agreement  that  is  made? 

A.  In  my  private  conversati 
with  some  of  them,  they  have 
pressed  to  me  that  if  a  guarantet 
rangement  between  ourselves  ant 
rael  should  be  worked  out,  th, 
would  be  acceptable  to  the  Arab  ! 
ers.  But  we've  never  discussed 
between  ourselves  and  Israel  in 
definitive  form. 

My  preference  would  be  that 
involvement  would  be  minim 
after  an  agreement  has  been  reac 
But  if  it  became  a  matter  of  ha 
the  negotiations  break  down  c 
pletely,  our  having  some  limited 
as  mutually  accepted  among  t) 
parties  involved,  then  we  would 
sider  that  very,  very  favorably. 

Q.  There  now  seems  to  be  s 
signals  coming  out  of  Geneva — 'f 
even      from      friends      of 
Administration — that  we  will 


I 


i 


^ 


I 


1978 


M  a  SALT  [Strategic  Arms  Limita- 
I  Talks]  agreement  in  1978,  or  at 
.  t  one  will  not  get  before  the 
^te.  That's  the  word  from  Sena- 
-rA'an  Cranston  [of  California], 
Ml  is  known  as  a  very  good  vote 
oter  in  the  Senate.  Is  that  your 
iking  as  well,  that  we  are  not 
1 1>  to  have  a  SALT  agreement 
t  the  Russians  during  this  next 

,o 

u  • 

'   I  would  be  disappointed  if  we 

It  have  a  SALT  agreement  this 

.1    We've  made  good  progress  on 

r    We  started  out  with  SALT  I, 

/Soviets   having   a   very   heavy 

l\ntage — about  a  three  to  two  ratio 

,  leir  favor.    President   Ford  and 

ec.'tary  Kissinger  made  great  prog- 

■    I  think,  at   Vladivostok  and   in 

_    subsequent  negotiations  to  pro- 

d  the   first  indication  of  equality. 

n  we  will  maintain  that  posture  of 

u  al  advantage  between  ourselves 

ic  he  Soviets. 

V'  have  added  a  new  dimension — 
ve  tight  constraints  on  future  de- 
xjnent  of  weapons,  both  quantita-. 
•  y  and  also  the  quality  of  the 
ons,  and  to  reduce  actually  the 
iuer  of  destructive  weapons  per- 
il d.  We  still  have  some  negotiat- 
0  do.  But  we  have  made  good 
ross  on  SALT.  We  have  also 
Bi  pleased  with  the  results  of 
:}tiations  with  the  Soviet  Union  on 
le  omprehensive  test  ban  to  prohibit 
1]  esting  of  nuclear  weapons  at  all. 
yid  we  have  made  progress,  also, 
,  /ing  to  stop  a  military  buildup  in 
le  ndian  Ocean.  My  guess  is  that 
re  dent  Brezhnev  would  be  likely  to 
a  to  come  here  to  visit  after  those 
if  negotiations  have  made  some 
il  antial  progress  and  when  there  is 
f)spect  of  immediate  resolution  of 
eemaining  differences. 
Iwould  never  approve  a  SALT 

I  ement  nor  present  one  to  the 
ogress  that  didn't  have  an  adequate 
;]ee  of  verification  of  compliance 

II  which  didn't  protect  the  right  of 
liown  country  to  defend  itself  and 
I  irry  out  our  domestic  and  foreign 
3:y.  Whatever  I  put  forward  to  the 
ogress  will  be  good  for  our  nation. 

e've  had  a  ma.ximum  degree  of 
i^lvement  by  the  Congress.  We've 
^1  had  Senators  in  Europe  at  the 
BJtiating  table.   And  we've  kept 

an  informed  as  the  progress  is 
e.  So  my  guess  is  that  1978  will 
i  us  successful,  and  my  guess  is 
li  when  we  present  it  to  the  Con- 
g's, the  SALT  agreement  will  be 
o\ed. 


.  It  is  reported  that  Vice  Presi- 
l|t  Mondale  with  you,  of  course. 


is  working  on  a  list  of  your  top 
priorities  for  next  year  with  the 
feeling  perhaps  that  you  had  too 
many  top  priorities  this  year  to  give 
to  Congress.  Can  you  tell  us  what 
the  top  two  or  three  priorities 
would  be  and  can  you  tell  us  if  it 
would  include  a  national  health  in- 
surance program  which  organized 
labor  feels  you  promised  to  intro- 
duce this  year? 

A.  Yes,  I  intend  to  introduce  a  na- 
tional health  program  to  the  Congress 
this  year,  late  in  this  session.  They 
can't  pass  it  this  year,  but  it  will  be 
introduced.  Dealing  with  the 
economy  —  which  we've  just 
discussed — would  be  a  top  priority. 
Completing  work  on  the  energy  pack- 
age would  be  the  first  specific  thing' 
that  we'll  do.  One  of  the  most  impor- 
tant is  to  resolve  the  Panama  Canal 
treaty  question.' 

About  75  years  ago  in  the  middle 
of  the  night  the  American  Secretary 
of  State  signed  the  Panama  Canal 
treaty  that  presently  is  in  existence. 
No  Panamanian  has  ever  signed  it;  no 
Panamanian  ever  saw  it  before  it  was 
signed.  It  was  signed  by  a  Frenchman 
who  be'nefited  financially  from  the 
terms  of  the  treaty  on  behalf  of  the 
Panamanians.  That  treaty  gave  us  a 
chance  to  do  a  tremendous  job  in  build- 
ing the  Panama  Canal,  keeping  it  open 
for  international  shipping.  It's  helped 
our  country  a  lot.  It's  something  of 
which  we  can  be  proud. 

Presidents  Eisenhower  and  Ken- 
nedy recognized  that  the  present 
treaty  was  inadequate.  President 
Johnson  started  negotiations  to 
change  it.  Presidents  Nixon  and  Ford 
continued,  and  we  concluded  it  this 
year. 

It's  one  of  the  most  difficult  politi- 
cal questions  that  we'll  have  to  deal 
with.  It's  going  to  take  a  lot  of  time 
in  the  Congress  to  pass  it.  What  we 
wanted  was  one  that  treated  us  and 
Panama  fairly,  and  we  got  it.  We 
wanted  a  treaty  that  did  not  put  a  fi- 
nancial burden  on  the  American  tax- 
payer, and  we  got  it.  We  wanted 
treaties  that  would  guarantee  proper 
operation  of  the  Panama  Canal 
itself — for  us  and  for  foreign 
shipping — and  we  got  it.  We  wanted 
treaties  that  would  also  guarantee  us 
permanently  the  right  to  take  what  ac- 
tion we  think  necessary  to  keep  the 
canal  safe,  to  defend  it,  and  to  keep  it 
open  for  us  to  use,  and  we  got  it. 

We  wanted  a  treaty — two  treaties 
there  are  [Panama  Canal  Treaty  and 
Treaty  Concerning  the  Permanent 
Neutrality  and  Operation  of  the 
Panama  Canal] — that  would  give  us 
the  right  for  expeditious  passage  in 


11 

time  of  need  or  emergency,  for  our 
ships  to  go  to  the  head  of  the  line  and 
go  through  the  canal  without  delay, 
and  we  got  it.  We  wanted  treaties 
also  that  would  be  acceptable  in  the 
eyes  of  the  international  community, 
particularly  in  Latin  America,  and  we 
got  them. 

So  this  is  what  we  have  tried  to  do 
under  four  Presidents,  and  we  have 
finally  succeeded.  And  I  would  say 
that  would  be  one  of  the  most  dif- 
ficult challenges  that  we  have  politi- 
cally this  year.  It  is  absolutely 
crucial  that  the  Senate  ratify  these 
treaties,  and  I  think  the  terms  are 
very  favorable  to  us  and  to  Panama. 

Q.  You've  got  all  that  in  the 
treaty.  Do  you  have  the  votes  in  the 
Senate? 

A.  I  think  we  will  get  the  votes  in 
the  Senate. 

Q.  Do  you  not  now  have  them? 

A.  I  can't  say  for  sure  that  we  do 
because  many  Senators  still  haven't 
expressed  their  commitment  to  me  or 
their  opinion.  But  I  was  talking  to 
President  Ford  this  past  week  who's 
strongly  supportive  of  the  treaties, 
along  with  Secretary  Kissinger  and 
others,  and  he  said  that  in  his 
speeches  to  college  groups  and  others 
around  the  nation  that  he  is  getting  an 
increasingly  favorable  response  from 
the  audience.  I  think  public  opinion  is 
building  up  for  the  treaties  as  they 
know  the  terms  of  them. 

Q.  Could  we  interpret  this  as  the 
beginning  of  a  new  campaign  on 
your  part  to  get  out  and  sell  the 
treaty?  You've  been  criticized  for 
having  left  the  ground  to  the  oppo- 
sition somewhat.  Are  you  going  to 
make  a  major  effort  personally  to 
try  and  sell  it? 

A.  Yes,  I  consider  it  one  of  my 
most  important  responsibilities. 

Q.  And  can  you  meet  the  dead- 
line? President  [Chief  of  Govern- 
ment General  Omar]  Torrijos  has 
set  April — which  he  says  is 
urgent — and  that  Panama's  pa- 
tience could  be  exhausted. 

A.  No,  I  don't  feel  any  constraint 
to  operate  under  a  deadline,  but  both 
Senator  Byrd  [Robert  C.  Byrd  of 
West  Virginia]  and  I  and  the  leaders 
of  the  Senate  all  hope  that  we  can  re- 
solve that  issue  early  in  the  year, 
certainly  I  think  by  April. 

Q.  On  that — since,  by  the  way, 
just  to  get  back  to  my  original 
questions — it  seems  that  your 
priorities  next  year  are  very  similar 
to  your  priorities  this  year,  energy 
and  the  economy.  But  in  October, 
you  and  President  Torrijos  issued  a 
joint  statement  to  remove  the 
doubts  about  the  rights  of  the 


12 


United  States  to  defend  the  neu- 
trality of  the  canal  and  also  the 
right  of  ships  to  pass  promptly 
through  it.'  A  number  of  Senators 
have  felt  that  they  might  be  more 
comfortable  with  this  if  it  were  ac- 
tually written  into  the  treaty. 
Would  you  be  willing  to  see  the 
treaty  amended  so  that  it  would  re- 
flect this  understanding,  this  state- 
ment between  you  and  General 
Torrijos? 

A.  No,  I  think  it  would  be  good  to 
have  a  signed  agreement  between  me 
and  President  Torrijos,  and  he  has  in- 
dicated he  would  be  glad  to  sign  that 
statement  that  was  made  and,  of 
course,  I  would  too.  I  think  the  Sen- 
ate could  express  an  understanding 
that  the  treaty  was  being  approved  by 
them  with  the  understanding  that  this 
was  a  proper  interpretation.  But  to  ac- 
tually amend  the  treaty  would  require 
Panama  to  have  another  referendum 
on  the  subject  and  they've  already 
had  one. 

Many  people  in  Panama  think  that 
the  treaties  are  too  favorable  to  the 
United  States.  And  I  don't  think  it 
would  be  fair  to  them  after  they 
negotiated  in  good  faith  to  cause  them 
to  have  a  completely  new  referendum. 
I  would  certainly  hate  to  have  two 
ratification  votes  in  the  Senate,  sepa- 
rated by  several  months.  So  I  think 
that  the  Senate  can  very  well  express 
its  understanding  of  what  the  treaties 
mean.  We  can  exchange  documents 
with  the  Panamanian  leader.  To 
amend  the  treaties,  though,  I  think, 
would  be  inadvisable. 

Q.  Abraham  Lincoln  said  just 
toward  the  end  of  his  Presidency — 
he  said,  I  must  confess  that  events 
have  controlled  me  rather  than  the 
other  way  around.  I  wonder,  look- 
ing back  over  your  first  year,  how 
do  you  feel  about  this  first  year? 

A.  I  feel  good  about  it.  It's  been 
exciting  and  stimulating  and  challeng- 
ing and  sometimes  frustrating  experi- 
ence for  me. 

Q.  Were  you  controlled  by 
events? 

A.  I  think — yes,  I  think  so.  I've 
tried  to  represent  what  the  American 
people  want  me  to  be  and  what  they 
are.  I  noticed  one  of  the  news  com- 
mentators the  other  night  said  that 
when  I  said  during  the  campaign  that 
I  wanted  a  government  as  good  as  the 
American  people  are,  that  it  was  dem- 
agoguery.  I  don't  think  that's  accu- 
rate. You  know  the  American  people 
are  good  and  decent  and  idealistic. 
And  I  think  they  want  their  govern- 
ment to  be  good  and  decent  and 
idealistic. 


One  of  the  most  popular  things  that 
I've  tried  to  do  is  to  express  to  the 
world  our  own  peoples'  commitment 
to  basic  human  rights — to  freedom 
and  independence  and  autonomy,  the 
worth  of  a  human  being — whether 
they  live  here  or  in  Russia  or  in  South 
America  or  in  Uganda  or  China.  And 
1  doubt  that  there's  a  national  leader 
in  the  world  now  who  doesn't  think 
about  human  rights  every  day  and 
how  his  or  her  actions  are  measured 
against  a  standard  that  the  world  is 
beginning  to  demand. 

So  I  think  what  I've  tried  to  do  is 
to  see  what  is  good  in  our  nation,  in 
our  people,  in  our  past,  and  try  to 
preserve  it  and  to  deal  with  changing 
events  to  the  best  of  my  ability.  I've 
got  a  good  Cabinet.  I've  had  good 
cooperation  and  support  from  the 
Congress  who  recognized  my  newness 
in  Washington.  And  overall,  although 
I  see  great  problems  ahead  of  us,  I 
feel  confident. 

I  got  my  staff — the  National  Secu- 
rity Council — today  to  give  me  an 
analysis  of  the  world  situation  as  it 
was  a  year  ago  and  the  comparison 
doesn't  look  bad.  I  think  we  are 
trusted  now  where  we  weren't 
before — say  in  Africa,  primarily 
because  of  the  influence  of  [U.S. 
Ambassador  to  the  United  Nations] 
Andrew  Young.  I  believe  that  our  in- 
tentions are  recognized  as  being  good. 
So  in  all  I  think  it's  been  a  good  year 
for  us. 


Q.  Can  you  tell  us  what  you 
think  has  been  your  greatest  single 
achievement  this  past  year  and 
also — even  though  we  hear  that  you 
don't  have  sleepless  nights, 
everyone  makes  mistakes — what  do 
you  think  your  biggest  mistake  has 
been? 

A.  I  think  my  biggest  mistake  has 
been  in  inadvertently  building  up  ex- 
pectations too  high.  I  underestimated 
the  difficulty  and  the  time  required 


Department  of  State  BuW 

for  Congress  to  take  action  on  c 
troversial  measures.  It's  much  ea 
for  me  to  study  and  evolve  and  p 
ent  legislation  to  the  Congress  tha 
is  for  them  to  pass  it  in  its  final  fo 
And  I've  dashed  some  hopes  and 
appointed  people  that  thought 
might  act  quicker. 

I  think  that  the  achievements 
not  measured  in  how  many  bills  v 
passed   and  how   many  bills  I 
signed  or  even  my  harmony  with 
Congress.   If  I  have  achieved  a< 
thing,  it's  been  to  restore  a  tons 
our  nation's  life  and  attitude  i 
most  accurately  exemplifies  what 
stand  for.   I  use  the  human  ri| 
issue  as  one  example.  It  gratifies 
to  know  that  the  nations  in  Af  t 
now  look  to  us  with  friendship 
with  trust  whereas,  just  a  short  t: 
ago,  they  wouldn't  permit  our  Se 
tary  of  State  to  come  in  their  coun 

It  gratifies  me  to  see  a  burgeoi 
friendship  with   Latin   American 
tions  and  to  see  our  NATO  allies  i 
recommitting  themselves  to  str 
military  commitments,  and  it  g rati  is 
me  to  see  some  progress  being  n" 
in  relieving  tensions  between  c 
selves  and  the  Soviet  Union.  We 
making  slow,  steady  progress.  We 
attempting   many   things   simultt 
ously.  Sometimes  they  get  confu 
because  they  are  so  voluminous 
so  many  of  them. 

But  I  think  having  our  nation 
its  government  represent  more  a< 
rately  the  hopes  and  dreams  of 
American  people  is  a  general  ace 
plishment  of  which  I  am  most  prou 


'  For  complete  text,  see  Weekly  Com 
tion  of  Presidential  Documents  of  Jar 
1978,  p.  1941. 

'  For  texts  of  treaties  and  related  matei 
see  Bulletins  of  Oct  17.  1977,  p.  481 
Nov.  7,  1977.  p.  615. 

'  For  text  of  statement  of  understandin 
Oct.  14,  1977,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov 
p.  631. 


IMetvs  Conference 
o§  December  15  (Excerptsy 


I  have  a  statement  to  make  first 
about  a  subject  of  great  importance  to 
us.  This  is  Human  Rights  Week 
around  the  world.  I  have  worked  day 
and  night  to  make  sure  that  a  concern 
for  human  rights  is  woven  through 
everything  our  government  does,  both 
at  home  and  abroad. 

This  policy  has  produced  some  con- 


troversy but  is  very  much  in  keep  If 
with  the  character  and  the  historj' 
our  own  country.  We  became  an  i 
dependent  nation  in  a  struggle  'f 
human  rights.  There  have  been  m) 
such  struggles  since  then — for  e 
abolition  of  slavery,  for  universal  :f- 
frage,  for  racial  equality,  for  el 
rights  of  workers,  for  women's  rig 


feuary  1978 


13 


viot  all  of  these  struggles  have  yet 
n  won.  But  the  freedom  and  the 
or  of  our  own  national  public  life 
\idence  of  the  rights  and  the  liber- 
-  that  we  have  achieved.  I  believe 
I  public  life  everywhere,  in  all  na- 
is,  should  have  that  same  freedom 
I  vigor. 

Ve  have  no  wish  to  tell  other  na- 
ns what  political  or  social  systems 
ty  should  have,  but  we  want  our 
1  n   worldwide   influence  to  reduce 
iian  suffering  and  not  to  increase 
This  is  equally  true   whether  the 
se  of  suffering  be  hunger  on  the 
hand  or  tyranny  on  the  other.  We 
.  therefore,  working  to  advance  a 
L    range  of  human  rights — economic 
J   social   as   well   as  civil   and 
pritical. 
The  Universal   Declaration  and 
oier  international  human  rights  cov- 
eiints  mean   that  one  nation  may 
ciiicize  another's  treatment  of  its 
/ens  without  regarding  each  other 
enemies.   We  will  continue  to  do 
..  just  as  we  welcome  the  scrutiny 
criticism  of  ourselves  as  part  of 
[b  normal  dealings  between  nations. 
■^    have  strengthened  our  foreign 
icy  on  human  rights,  and  we  are 
ing  it  be  known  clearly  that  the 
ted  States  stands  for  the  victims  of 
ruession.  We  stand  with  the  tortured 
ai   the  unjustly  imprisoned  and  with 
ifse  who  have  been  silenced. 

)ther  governments  and  the  dissi- 
Ji  ts  in  Eastern  Europe  and  the  polit- 
itl  prisoners  in  Latin  America  and 
A  a  know  where  we  stand.  We  have 
S|.ken  out  against  the  gross  viola- 
dis  of  human  rights  in  countries  like 
Cmbodia  and  South  Africa  and 
Landa.  We  have  received  exiles 
fim  many  other  countries — exiles 
«o  represent  those  who  are  unable 
t<>peak  freely  in  their  own  lands. 

Ve  have  encouraged  several  coun- 
ti;s  to  permit  inspection  of  human 
nhts  situations  by  the  International 
Cmmittee  of  the  Red  Cross.  We 
h/e  reduced  military  relationships 
wich  in  some  countries  in  the  past 
ii^e  seemed  to  support  repressive 
n;imes. 

Dur  foreign  assistance  programs 
wll  now  reflect  more  clearly  our 
cicern  about  human  rights.  We  will 
cntinue  to   lead  the  fight  in  the 

1  ited  Nations  sponsored  by  Costa 
t:a  to  establish  an  Office  of  the 
figh  Commissioner  on  Human 
tjghts.  We  support  the  private  and 
t|:  independent  human  rights  organi- 

2  ions  which  gather  information  and 
sjport  activities  in  the  human  rights 
fid. 

In  the  past  year,  human  rights  has 
•  come  an  issue  that  no  government 


on  Earth  can  now  afford  to  ignore. 
There  have  been  numerous  instances 
of  improvement.  Some  represent 
genuine  change,  some  are  only 
cosmetic  in  nature.  But  we  welcome 
them  all  because  they  reflect  a  relief 
of  suffering  people  and  persecuted 
people. 

The  results  of  our  human  rights 
policy  will  seldom  be  dramatic.  There 
will  be  tensions  along  the  way,  and 
we  will  often  be  perceived  as  either 
being  too  rash  or  too  timid.  But  this 
is  a  small  risk  compared  to  the  risk 
assumed  by  brave  men  and  women 
who  live  where  repression  has  not  yet 
yielded  to  liberty. 

My  personal  commitment  to  human 
rights  is  very  strong.  The  American 
people  feel  as  I  do.  Our  government 
will  continue  to  express  that  commit- 
ment and  not  ever  hide  it.  And  we 
will  always  encourage  other  nations 
to  join  us. 

Q.  There  are  reports  that  Prime 
Minister  Begin  is  bringing  along 
some  of  his  peace  proposals  to  dis- 
cuss with  you.  My  question  is,  if  the 
United  States  underwrites  peace, 
will  we  have  a  say  in  terms  of  what 
real  peace  is;  if  it  gives  economic 
aid,  psychological  aid,  security,  and 
so  forth? 

A.  Our  hope  and  our  goal  has  been 
that  the  nations  directly  involved  in 
the  Middle  Eastern  crisis — the  Middle 
Eastern  disputes — would  meet  directly 
with  one  another  and  reach  agree- 
ments that  would  encompass  three 
basic  questions.  One  is  the  definition 
of  real  peace,  genuine  peace,  predict- 
able peace,  relationships  among 
human  beings  that  might  transcend 
the  incumbency  of  any  particular 
leader.  1  think  President  Sadat  has 
made  a  major  stride  already  in  the 
achievement  of  what  is  real  peace. 

The  second  one  is  the  withdrawal 
of  the  Israelis  from  territory  and,  at 
the  same  time,  the  assurance  that  they 
would  have  secure  borders. 

And  the  third  one,  of  course,  is  to 
resolve  the  Palestinian  question.  As  I 
have  said  before,  the  direct  negotia- 
tions between  Egypt  and  Israel  is  a 
major  step  forward. 

We  are  attending  the  Cairo  confer- 
ence and  will  offer  our  good  services 
when  it  is  needed.  But  the  basic  re- 
sponsibility will  be  on  the  shoulders 
of  the  two  nations  directly  involved. 

As  you  know,  U.N.  observers  are 
also  there.  Other  countries  were  in- 
vited by  President  Sadat  to  attend — 
Lebanon,  Syria,  Jordan,  and  the 
Soviet  Union.  They  have  not  yet  ac- 
cepted that  invitation.  We  are  not  try- 
ing to  define  the  terms  of  peace.  Any- 
thing that  is  acceptable  to  Israel  and 


her  neighbors  will  certainly  be  ac- 
ceptable to  us. 

But  we  are  always  available,  I 
hope,  as  a  trusted  intermediary  on  oc- 
casion to  break  a  deadlock  or  add  a 
supportive  word  or  in  a  way  to  intro- 
duce one  of  those  leaders  to  another 
and  convince  the  opposite  party  that 
each  leader  is  acting  in  good  faith. 

I  have  no  idea  what  proposals,  if 
any.  Prime  Minister  Begin  will  bring 
to  me  tomorrow  morning.  But  he  and 
I  will  meet  privately — ^just  the  two  of 
us — for  a  while  at  his  request,  and  I 
will  listen  to  what  his  report  might 
be,  and  we  will  be  as  constructive  as 
we  have  been  in  the  past. 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  idea  of  what 
the  outcome  of  the  Cairo  conference 
will  be  in  terms  of  goals? 

A.  I  have  hopes,  but  obviously  I 
can't  predict  what  will  occur.  We 
have  always  hoped  that  even  when 
some  of  the  nations  choose  not  to  par- 
ticipate that  the  nations  who  do 
negotiate  could  move  a  major  step 
forward  toward  an  ultimate  com- 
prehensive peace  settlement. 

Both  Prime  Minister  Begin  and 
President  Sadat  have  stated  publicly 
and  repeatedly  that  they  are  not  seek- 
ing strictly  a  bilateral  or  two-nation 
agreement.  They  recognize  that  an 
agreement  in  the  Sinai  without  involv- 
ing the  West  Bank,  the  Gaza  Strip, 
the  Golan  Heights,  could  not  be  a  per- 
manent resolution  of  territorial  differ- 
ences. And  if  they  ignore  the  Palestin- 
ian question  this  would  still  not  result 
in  permanent  peace,  and  if  the  Palestin- 
ian question  is  not  addressed,  again,  it 
would  not  be  an  adequate  step  toward 
permanent  peace. 

So  I  think,  obviously,  this  is  a 
good  first  step.  I  would  hope  that  in 
Cairo  itself,  even  if  the  other  nations 
don't  choose  to  attend,  that  Egypt  and 
Israel  can  make  a  major  stride  toward 
a  comprehensive  peace  that  would  at 
least  address  in  definitive  terms  the 
questions  that  also  involve  Palestin- 
ians, Jordanians,  Syrians,  and 
Lebanese. 

Q.  I  take  it  from  your  description 
of  the  U.S.  role  in  the  Mideast  that 
it  is  not  your  intention  to  endorse 
specific  proposals;  that  is  to  say,  if 
Mr.  Begin  or  anyone  else  presents 
to  you  what  they  hope  to  do,  that 
they  would  not  be  able  to  go  back 
to  a  peace  conference  and  say, 
"Jimmy  Carter  says  that  this  is 
what  he  likes." 

A.  That  is  a  fairly  good  assess- 
ment. I  stay  in  close  touch  with  most 
of  the  Middle  Eastern  leaders,  cer- 
tainly President  Sadat.  We  exchange 
communications   several   times  a 


14 

week.  Cy  Vance  is  returning  from  the 
Middle  East  tonight,  and  he  will  give 
me  a  very  definitive  analysis  of  the 
attitude  of  all  the  Middle  Eastern 
leaders  involved,  plus  Saudi  Arabia, 
one  step  removed  geographically. 

I  think  I  know  at  least  in  general 
terms  what  would  be  acceptable  to 
President  Sadat,  maybe  not  as  a  final 
conclusive  agreement  but  as  an 
interim  step  or  major  step,  toward  a 
final  agreement.  And  if  Prime  Minis- 
ter Begin's  proposal,  in  my  own  per- 
sonal judgment,  is  conducive  to  a 
step  in  the  right  direction  and  would 
be  acceptable  to  President  Sadat,  then 
I  would  certainly  privately  tell  him, 
"This  is  a  very  good  step."" 

If  it  should  be  far  short  of  what  I 
think  President  Sadat  could  accept 
without  very  serious  political  conse- 
quences and  serious  disappointment  in 
Egypt  and  the  rest  of  the  world,  I 
would  have  no  reticence  about  telling 
Prime  Minister  Begin  privately,  "I 
just  don't  think  this  goes  far 
enough.""  But  1  would  not  be  the  ul- 
timate judge  of  whether  it  would  be 
acceptable  to  the  Egyptians  or  not. 
That  would  be  up  to  President  Sadat. 

Q.  Do  you  feel  that  the  Soviet 
Union  in  recent  months  has  been  in 
any  way  helpful  in  trying  to  bring 
peace  to  the  Middle  East,  and  how 
do  you  regard  U.S. -Soviet  relations 
as  we  come  to  the  end  of  this  year? 

A.  I  think  our  relations  with  them 
are  much  better  than  they  were 
shortly  after  I  became  President.  1 
think  they  have  gotten  to  know  me 
and  my  attitudes;  I  think  I  have  got- 
ten to  know  them  and  their  attitudes 
much  better  than  before,  on  the 
Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks,  a 
comprehensive  test  ban,  the  Indian 
Ocean,  and  many  other  items.  We 
have  had  a  very  constructive  relation- 
ship with  the  Soviet  Union  which  I 
think  is  constantly  improving.  I  think 
the  Soviets  have  been  much  more 
constructive  in  the  Middle  East  than 
they  formerly  had. 

Obviously,  they  have  not  been  as 
constructive  as  1  would  like  to  have 
seen.  The  Soviets,  for  instance,  were 
invited  to  attend  the  Cairo  confer- 
ence, along  with  other  nations.  They 
were  invited  by  President  Sadat.  They 
chose  to  decline  the  invitation.  I 
wished  that  they  had  accepted.  The 
Syrians  have  chosen  to  decline.  I 
have  no  evidence  that  the  Soviets 
have  had  to  use  their  influence  on  the 
Syrians  to  prevent  their  attendance.  I 
think  this  was  a  decision  made  by 
President  Asad  in  Syria. 

So  I  would  say  the  Soviets  have  not 
been  very  constructive  yet.  They  have 


not  been  nearly  as  much  of  an  obsta- 
cle as  they  apparently  were  in  the 
past. 

Our  general  relationships  with  the 
Soviets  are  very  good,  and  my  hope 
is  that  they  will  continue  to  cooperate 
in  the  future  when  we  go  past  Cairo 
toward  an  ultimate  Geneva  confer- 
ence. 1  was  well  pleased  with  the 
joint  Soviet  and  American  statement." 
Although  it  is  not  a  definitive  solu- 
tion, obviously,  it  has  no  obstacles  in 
it  which  would  prevent  an  ultimate 
resolution  of  the  Middle  East  differ- 
ences. 

So  I  would  say  it  is  a  mixed  as- 
sessment. In  general,  though,  they 
could  have  been  much  worse. 

Q.  Your  preference  for  a  general 
or  comprehensive  settlement  in  the 
Middle  East  is  quite  understanda- 
ble, one  that  could  be  endorsed  by 
all  the  interested  parties.  But  I 
wonder  if  you  think,  in  light  of 
what  has  happened  since  President 
Sadat's  visit,  since  many  people  feel 
that  Israel  has  no  real  worries 
about  a  one-time  war,  that  if  an 
agreement — formal  or  informal — 
even  a  real  warming  takes  place  be- 
tween Israel  and  Egypt,  that  you 
could  have  de  facto  peace  in  the 
Middle  East,  perhaps  not  as  neat 
and  wrapped  up  as  a  treaty,  that 
would  be  a  major  accomplishment 
in  itself?  And  do  you  think  that  it 
may  have  to  come  to  that  as  a  result 
of  President  Asad's  opposition  to 
the  talks  and  the  Palestine  Libera- 
tion Organization  (PLO)? 

A.  Our  immediate  hope  and  goal  is 
that  any  peace  move  made  by  Israel 
and  Egypt  would  be  acceptable  to  the 
moderate  Arab  leaders  in  the  Middle 
East,  certainly  King  Hussein  in  Jor- 
dan, certainly  the  Saudi  Arabians.  We 
have  had  good  indications  in  my  per- 
sonal visits  with  President  Asad  that 
he  wants  to  resolve  the  differences. 
Lebanon  is  heavily  influenced,  as  you 
know,  by  Syrian  presence  there.  The 
PLO  have  been  completely  negative. 
They  have  not  been  cooperative  at 
all. 

In  spite  of  my  own  indirect  invita- 
tion to  them  and  the  direct  invitations 
by  Sadat  and  by  Asad,  by  King  Hus- 
sein, by  King  Khalid  in  Saudi  Arabia, 
the  PLO  have  refused  to  make  any 
move  toward  a  peaceful  attitude. 
They  have  completely  rejected  U.N. 
Resolutions  242  and  338.  They  have 
refused  to  make  a  public  acknowl- 
edgement that  Israel  has  a  right  to 
exist,  to  exist  in  peace.  So  I  think 
they  have,  themselves,  removed  the 
PLO  from  any  immediate  prospect  of 
participation  in  a  peace  discussion. 

But  I  certainly  would  not  ascribe 


Department  of  State  Bulletj 

that  sort  of  intransigence  or  negati 
attitude  toward  any  of  the  other  pa 
ties  who  have  been  mentioned  as  pa 
sible  participants.  We  want  to  be  sui 
that  at  least  moderate  Palestinians  a 
included  in  the  discussions.  And  th 
is  an  attitude  that  is  mirrored  not  om 
by  myself  but  also  by  Prime  Minist 
Begin,  President  Sadat,  and  other 
So  I  think  they  are  all  major  steps,  a 
ready  having  been  taken,  to  delinea 
those  who  are  immediately  eager 
conclude  a  step  toward  peace — thoi 
like  President  Asad  who  will  wi 
awhile  to  see  what  does  occur,  see 
the  Golan  Heights  question  can  be  r 
solved  and  so  forth,  and  those  wl 
have,  in  effect,  removed  themselv. 
from  serious  consideration  like  tl 
PLO. 


Q.  Your  foreign  trip  is  takii 
you  to  a  disparate  range  of  cou| 
tries,  and  the  schedule  offers  fain 
limited  time  for  exchange  wii 
other  heads  of  state.'  Can  you  U 
us  what  overall  objective  you  hai 
in  mind  for  this  trip  and  if  there 
any  foreign  policy  theme  that  y 
want  to  accomplish?  I  would  like 
add  to  that,  do  you  intend  to  pr<< 
this  issue  of  human  rights  that  y' 
mentioned  earlier  in  your  stops 
Poland  and  Iran? 

A.  Yes,  1  do  intend  to  press  t 
subject  of  human  rights.  My  time 
aside  for  negotiations  with  forei 
leaders  where  I  will  visit  is  equivah 
to  the  time  that  I  set  aside  for  disci 
sions  with  foreign  leaders  who  coi 
here  and  visit  me.  There  are  litera* 
weeks  of  preparation  that  go  into  i 
visit  to  any  country,  days  of  prepai 
tion  on  my  own  part. 

1  will  spend  a  lot  of  my  time  o> 
the  Christmas  holidays  reading  thi 
notebooks  on  the  nations  to  be  v 
ited.  Each  nation  is  different.  I  w 
start  off  my  trip  with  Poland.  I  thi 
it  is  very  important  that  an  Americ 
President  indicate  our  interest 
Eastern  European  countries.  Poland 
one  that  has  very  close  ties  to  us.  > 
have  strong  trade  relationships  w 
Poland. 

And  my  presence  there  is  just 
important  as  is  the  presence  of  Pre 
dent  Brezhnev  when  he  visits  a  nati 
like  France  or  Germany.  We  will 
discussing  a  broad  range  of  questic 
with  Poland.  We  are  just  making 
brief  stop  in  Saudi  Arabia  and  Iran 
and  from  India.  But  we  will  ha 
time  for  several  hours  of  intensi 
discussions  with  the  leaders  in  the 
two  Middle  Eastern  countries. 

They  are  major  suppliers  of  oil 
ourselves  and  to  the  rest  of  the  wor 
They  have  a  major  political  and  mi 


J 


'  uary  1978 

A  influence  in  the  Middle  East.  It 
\ery  important  that  I  let  their 
iplc  and  those  leaders  know  that  I 
c  about  our  friendship  with  them 
I  Nice  versa.  India,  as  you  know,  is 
world's  largest  democracy,  with 
I'ldreds  of  millions  of  people. 

n  the  past  under  Mrs.  Ghandi, 
lir  primary  orientation  shifted  to- 
.vrd  friendship  with  the  Soviet 
Uion.  I  would  like  very  much  for  the 
jople  of  India,  for  Prime  Minister 
Dial,  with  whom  I  have  a  continuing 
;(respondence,  to  know  how  much 
w  value  a  restoration  of  those  strong 
•  ■  of  friendship,  trade,  commerce, 
.\h  India.  I  think  this  is  a  very  im- 
Bitant  consideration  for  me. 

have  already  visited  England. 
Ely  next  summer  or  late   spring,  I 
.4 1  be  visiting  West  Germany  and  I 
'  iicularly  wanted  to  visit  France,  as 
I     When   I  was  in  London  last 
\ .   President  Giscard  particularly 
ed  me  if  I  could  come  to  France 
..  r  this  year — late  this  year.   I  re- 
p)  d  that  I  would  if  I  could  schedule 
t  So.  I  am  very  eager  to  negotiate 
i)r  problems  with  France.   They 
a.  e  a  much  greater  historical  pres- 
et e.  for  instance,  in  Africa,  than  do 
1  think  many  of  the  African  na- 
is,  particularly  those  who  speak 
F  nch,   look   toward   France   as   a 
i<  rce  of  advice  and  counsel,  eco- 


nomic aid  to  them.  It  will  help  me  to 
have  a  better  avenue  or  understanding 
of  Africa  to  meet  with  Giscard. 

France  is  not  a  member  of  NATO.^ 
But  they  are  very  supportive  of  the 
European  defense  effort.  They  retain 
very  rigidly  their  autonomy  and  inde- 
pendence from  the  influence  of  other 
countries,  which  is  good.  But  I  want 
to  discuss  with  Giscard  our  negotia- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union,  our  in- 
fluence in  the  Middle  East,  our  grow- 
ing influence  in  Africa. 

Of  course,  to  visit  NATO  headquar- 
ters is  important,  as  well,  because  we 
are  trying  to  increase  our  contribution 
and  our  influence  in  NATO. 

Those  trips  are  not  tied  harmoni- 
ously or  homogenously  together  be- 
cause each  country  is  unique,  each 
visit  will  be  unique,  and  I  will  pre- 
pare each  one  to  get  maximum  benefit 
from  it. 

.    D 


'  For  the  full  text,  see  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  Dec.  19.  1977. 
p.  1867. 

^  For  text  of  the  statement  issued  on  Oct.  1. 
1977,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  7,  p.  639. 

'  President  Carter  visited  Poland,  Iran,  In- 
dia, Saudi  Arabia,  Egypt,  France,  and  Bel- 
gium Dec.  29,  1977-Jan.  6.  1978. 

'  France  does  not  participate  in  the  military 
activities  of  NATO  but  it  is  a  member  of  that 
Organization. 


Carter  Administraiion^s 
I      Ftrst^\ear  AccompUshments 


W  ite  House  Summary ' 

n  his  commencement  address  at  the 
U  versity  of  Notre  Dame  on  May  22, 
ti  President  outlined  the  objectives  of 
1    foreign  policy  and  described 

.  .  the  strands  that  connect  our  ac- 
tins  overseas  with  our  essential 
ci.racter  as  a  nation." 

it  declared  his  belief  that 
'we  can  have  a  foreign  policy  that 

democratic ,  that  is  based  on  funda- 
nntal  values,  and  that  uses  power  and 
iiluence  ...  for  humane  purposes. 
V-  can  also  have  a  foreign  policy  that 
t  American  people  both  support  .  .  . 
I  i  understand.  ..." 
Our  policy  must  be  open;  it  must 

candid;  it  must  be  one  of  construc- 

-   global   involvement,  resting  on 

J  cardinal  principles." 
First,  we  have  reaffirmed  Ameri- 

s  commitment  to  human  rights  as  a 

idamental  tenet  of  our  foreign  pol- 


" Second,  we  have  moved  deliber- 
ately to  reinforce  the  bonds  among 
.  .  .  democracies." 

"Third,  we  have  moved  to  engage 
the  Soviet  Union  in  a  joint  effort  to 
halt  the  strategic  arms  race." 

"Fourth,  we  are  taking  deliberate 
steps  to  improve  the  chances  of  last- 
ing peace  in  the  Middle  East." 

"Fifth,  we  are  attempting  ...  to 
reduce  the  danger  of  nuclear  prolifer- 
ation and  the  worldwide  spread  of 
conventional  weapons."* 

The  Administration,  by  its  work  in 
international  affairs  this  year,  has 
sought  to  carry  out  the  objectives 
which  the  President  set  forth  at  Notre 
Dame.  Among  the  principal  accom- 
plishments in  the  realm  of  foreign 
policy  and  national  security  are  these. 

Human  Rights 

The  President  has  strengthened  our 
human  rights  policy,  and  we  are  let- 


15 


ting  it  be  known  clearly  that  the 
United  States  stands  with  the  victims 
of  repression.  We  are  also  working  to 
advance  the  full  range  of  human 
rights — economic  and  social  as  well 
as  civil  and  political.  He  has  signed 
the  American  Convention  on  Human 
Rights  [June  11,  the  International  Cov- 
enant on  Economic,  Social  and  Cul- 
tural Rights  [October  5].  Our  foreign 
assistance  programs  will  reflect  more 
clearly  our  human  rights  concerns. 

We  have  encouraged  several  coun- 
tries to  permit  inspection  visits  from 
the  International  Committee  of  the 
Red  Cross.  We  are  strongly  support- 
ing international  organizations  con- 
cerned with  human  rights,  particularly 
the  Inter-American  Commission  on 
Human  Rights,  whose  budget  was  tri- 
pled this  year. 

Nuclear  Proliferation 

The  Administration  has  developed  a 
comprehensive  policy  covering 
domestic  and  export  activities  and  has 
initiated  an  international,  technical 
evaluation  of  the  entire  nuclear  fuel 
cycle.  The  President  signed  [on  May 
26]  Protocol  I  of  the  treaty  of 
Tlatelolco,  which  creates  a  nuclear 
weapons-free  zone  in  Latin  America. 

Arms  Transfers 

For  the  first  time,  the  United  States 
has  adopted  a  policy  of  restraining 
both  the  number  and  the  kinds  of 
American  arms  sold  abroad.  We  have 
also  begun  to  discuss  restraint  with 
other  major  arms  suppliers. 

Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 

At  the  end  of  the  last  Administra- 
tion, the  SALT  negotiations  were  at  a 
stalemate.  The  efforts  of  this  Admin- 
istration, beginning  with  the  March 
proposal  set  forth  by  Secretary  Vance 
in  Moscow,  have  resulted  in  major 
progress  in  the  SALT  negotiations. 
We  are  now  working  on  a  comprehen- 
sive settlement  consisting  of  a  treaty 
to  last  through  1985,  a  3-year  pro- 
tocol, and  a  statement  of  principles  to 
guide  the  SALT  III  negotiations.  Al- 
most all  the  major  issues  are  now  re- 
solved, and  we  anticipate  completion 
of  a  SALT  II  treaty  in  the  early  part 
of  next  year. 

Panama  Canal  Treaties 

After  14  years  of  negotiations 
under  four  U.S.  Presidents,  the 
United  States  and  Panama  adjusted 
their  relationship  as  it  applies  to  the 
Panama  Canal.  President  Carter  and 
Gen.  Omar  Torrijos  signed  two  canal 
treaties  on  September  7,  1977,  which 


16 

would  gradually  transfer  responsibil- 
ity for  the  operation  and  defense  of  a 
neutral  canal  to  Panama.  The  treaties 
give  the  United  States  the  permanent 
right  to  defend  the  canal's  neutrality. 

Comprehensive  Test  Ban 

Negotiations  are  underway  on  a 
treaty  banning  all  nuclear  explosions. 

North-South  Relations 

The  U.S.  image  in  the  less  de- 
veloped world  and  the  United  Nations 
has  changed  dramatically  from  that  of 
an  adversary  to  that  of  a  potential 
partner.  In  the  Security  Council  de- 
bate on  Africa,  we  played  a  mediating 
role.  Our  arms  control  policies  have 
made  a  favorable  impression  on  the 
U.N.'s  annual  review  of  disarmament 
issues.  We  played  a  constructive  role 
in  the  Maputo  and  Lagos  conferences. 
And  we  participated,  for  the  first 
time,  in  an  Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations  ministerial  meeting. 
The  appointment  of  Ambassador  An- 
drew Young  [as  U.S.  Permanent  Rep- 
resentative to  the  United  Nations] 
highlighted  our  concern  for  the  Third 
World. 

Western  Europe 

The  Administration  has:  partici- 
pated in  a  successful  Belgrade  Con- 
ference on  Security  and  Cooperation 
in  Europe,  including  a  review  of 
human  rights;  prepared  another 
mutual  and  balanced  force  reductions 
proposal  to  advance  talks;  inaugurated 
four  NATO  efforts  (the  long-term  de- 
fense program,  the  short-term  im- 
provements, the  "two-way  street"  in 
defense  purchases,  the  East-West 
study);  agreed  to  provide  a  $300  mil- 
lion loan  and  forged  a  multinational 
consortium  to  help  democracy  in  Por- 
tugal; and  secured  a  major  Interna- 
tional Monetary  Fund  loan  for  Italy. 

Soviet  Union-Eastern  Europe 

The  Administration  has  put  the 
U.S. -Soviet  relationship  on  a  more 
reciprocal,  realistic,  and  what  we 
hope  will  be  an  ultimately  more  pro- 
ductive basis  for  both  nations.  The 
Administration  has  improved  relations 
with  various  Eastern  European  coun- 
tries, including  Yugoslavia,  as  a  re- 
sult of  the  Vice  President's  visit,  and 
Poland,  as  a  result  of  Secretary  [of 
Commerce]  Kreps'  visit  and  the  Pres- 
ident's scheduled  state  visit. 

Arab-Israeli  Conflict 

The  Administration  stressed  the 
need  for  a  comprehensive  settlement 


which  has  three  core  elements:  defini- 
tion of  the  nature  of  the  peace,  estab- 
lishment of  recognized  borders  and 
security,  and  resolution  of  the  Pales- 
tinian question.  We  have  urged,  with 
considerable  success,  the  Arabs  and 
the  Israelis  to  be  forthcoming  on 
peace  commitments,  direct  negotia- 
tions, and  peace  treaties.  We  have 
supported  the  Sadat-Begin  dialogue. 

People's  Republic  of  China 

The  Administration  has  followed 
the  Shanghai  communique  in  efforts 
toward  normalization  of  relations, 
while  emphasizing  the  mutuality  of 
efforts  necessary  to  complete  the 
process.  Recognizing  their  strategic 
importance,  we  have  also  continued 
to  develop  a  consultative  relationship 
with  the  Chinese  on  global  affairs. 

Korea 

The  details  of  the  Korean  ground 
troop  withdrawal  plan  have  been  de- 
signed to  alleviate  major  Asian  ap- 
prehensions that  the  United  States  is 
in  the  process  of  disengaging  from 
the  region. 

Vietnam 

The  Administration  has  started  the 
process  of  normalizing  relations 
through  talks  in  Paris  and  has  estab- 
lished a  mechanism  to  continue  to  try 
to  account  for  our  servicemen  still 
missing  in  action. 

Africa 

Vice  President  Mondale  informed 
Prime  Minister  Vorster  in  Vienna  that 
U.S. -South  Africa  relations  depended 


President 
Carter^s  Trip 


As  the  Bulletin  goes  to  press.  Pres- 
ident Carter  is  completing  his  trip  to 
seven  countries  in  Europe,  the  Middle 
East,  and  South  Asia: 


Dec.  29 

Poland 

Dec.  31 

Iran 

Jan.  1 

India 

Jan.  3 

Saudi  Arabia 

Jan.  4 

Egypt,  France 

Jan.  6 

Belgium 

Department  of  State  Bullc 

upon  South  Africa  moving  away  fr, 
apartheid.  With  the  British,  we  t 
fered  a  plan  for  Rhodesian  indeper 
ence.  We  initiated  a  five  power  gro 
to  negotiate  toward  an  independe 
Namibia.  We  have  restored  good  re 
tions,  based  on  mutual  respect,  w 
black  African  states  of  all  politicil 
leanings. 

I  till 

Latin  America 

The  Administration  has  developec 
new  global  approach  to  Latin  Ameri  i 
and  the  Caribbean,  one  which  recoh 
nizes  the  diversity  of  the  region  rati  | 
than  one  which  pretends  a  single  pi 
icy  identified  by  a  simple  sloga 
(This  approach  has  been  well-receiv, ,. 
in  the  region.)  The   President  sign'l- 
the   Panama  Canal  treaties.   Throu  j 
direct   negotiations   with   Cuba,  •  I 
have  concluded  a  fisheries  agreemi 
and  established  an  interest  section 
each  country.  We  have  ratified  an  ( 
change  of  prisoners  treaty  wi 
Mexico  and   negotiated  one  wi 
Bolivia.   We  have  adopted  a  co 
prehensive  policy  for  the  Caribbe   , 
and  have  been  joined  by  28  natic 
and  16  international  institutions  to  ^   I 
tablish  a  Caribbean  Group  for  Co(" 
eration  in  Economic  Developme 
We  have  dramatically  improved  < 
relations  with  a  number  of  countri 
including   Venezuela,  Jamaica,   Pe 
and  Mexico. 

London  Summit 

With  the  leaders  of  major  industi 
democracies,  the  President  read 
agreement  at  the  London  summit  oi 
common  program  for  internatioi 
economic  cooperation. 


Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations 

The  Administration  has  reach 
agreement  with  the  European  E( 
nomic  Community  on  a  timetable 
negotiations,   breaking  a  long  sta 
mate. 


I 


The  February  issue  will  carry  com- 
plete documentation  on  this  trip,  in- 
cluding the  President's  news  confer- 
ence in  Warsaw  and  addresses  in  New 
Delhi  and  Paris.  D 


Defense  and  Security 

The  Administration  has  formula 
a  comprehensive,  national  defeij 
strategy  which  includes  an  over' 
American  posture  toward  the  Sov 
Union.  The  President  reached  a  de 
sion  not  to  produce  the  B-1  bomi 
but  to  proceed  with  cruise  missiles. 

Intelligence 

The  Administration  has  reorganiz| 
the  intelligence  agencies  and  h> 
taken  comprehensive  steps  to  protit 
telecommunications. 


luary  1978 


17 


ternational  Communications 

The  Administration  has  established 
Kvs  International  Communication 
cncy  to  replace  the  U.S.  Informa- 
n  Kgency  and  the  Bureau  of  Educa- 
n.il  and  Cultural  Affairs  in  the  De- 
inient  of  State. 

Dfense  Budget  Reduction 

The   President  met  his  campaign 
p  dge  to  cut  military  spending  by 


$5-7  billion.  The  Ford  budget  for  fis- 
cal year  1978  was  $123  billion.  The 
Carter  budget  is  $117  billion,  as  ap- 
proved by  Congress.  D 


'  Issued  as  a  press  release  by  the  White 
House  on  Dec.  17,  1977,  which  also  included 
domestic  accomplishments  (text  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of 
Dec.  26). 

■  For  the  full  text,  see  Bulletin  of  June 
13.  1977,  p.  621. 


I  THE  SECRETARY: 

^ews  Conference  of  December  0 


Before  I  take  your  questions,  I'd  like 
timake  a  few  opening  remarks  about 
tl  important  developments  that  have 
bn  occurring  in  the  Middle  East. 

The  President  has  already  stated  the 
aniration  and  respect  of  our  govern- 
nnt  for  the  leadership  of  President 
Slat  and  Prime  Minister  Begin.  They 
he  broken  through  psychological  bar- 
r  s  which  have  impeded  progress  to- 

V  rd  peace  in  the  Middle  East  for  three 
d  ades.  As  a  result,  an  irreversible 
p  cess  has  begun.  The  leader  of  the 
li'est  Arab  state  has  been  received  in 

I  ael  before  the  eyes  of  the  whole 

VI  rid.  This  single  act  has  done  more 
ti  n  any  number  of  words  could  to 
s  :ep  away  doubts  about  the  sincerity 
oboth  governments  in  seeking  an  end 
toloodshed  and  strife. 

Tom  the  first  days  of  this  Adminis- 

0  ion,  we — like  our  predecessors — 
h  e  sought  to  get  the  parties  talking 
dectly  with  each  other  in  serious 
n;otiations.  Now  these  two  strong 
l<ders  have  done  just  that,  leaping 
0;r  inhibitions  of  the  past  and  pro- 
c  lural  quarrels  of  the  present. 

rhanges  so  fundamental  inevitably 
s  nulate  a  variety  of  reactions.  There 
early  are  now  crosscurrents  at 
wrk — some  bringing  the  parties  closer 
t(  ether,  some  moving  them  apart.  We 
b  ieve  our  proper  role  at  this  point  is 
t<  support  and  reinforce  the  former 
wile  using  our  relationships  across  the 
Sctrum  to  moderate  the  latter.  I  will 
b  seeking  to  do  both  on  my  trip  to  the 
a  a  [December  9-15]. 

The  President  wants  to  be  sure  that 
3  the  Middle  East  leaders  fully  under- 
s  nd  that  the  present  Egyptian-Israeli 
i|tiatives  have  our  full   support  and 

I I  they  know  our  support  is  fully  con- 
stent  with  our  continuing  dedication 
t  the  objective  of  a  comprehensive 

1  ddle  East  peace  settlement.  We  be- 
IVe  that  all  the  parties  to  the  Geneva 


conference  remain  committed  to  that 
goal. 

President  Sadat  and  Prime  Minister 
Begin  have  made  a  breakthrough,  and 
we  intend  to  help  them  wherever  possi- 
ble to  enlarge  that  opening.  They  and 
the  other  leaders  concerned  in  peace  ef- 
forts have  told  us  they  want  us  to  con- 
tinue our  role.  In  the  past,  when  there 
was  no  movement,  our  proper  role  was 
to  take  the  initiative  in  stimulating  new 
ways  of  acting  and  thinking.  Today, 
when  leaders  in  the  area  are  boldly 
moving  forward,  our  proper  role  is  to 
support  their  progress  and  help  broaden 
it  to  all  fronts  in  the  continuing  search 
for  a  final  settlement.  All  the  leaders 
have  welcomed  my  visit,  and  I  look 
forward  to  receiving  their  counsel  and 
their  views. 

Q.  When  you  say  in  your  state- 
ment that  all  the  parties  remain 
committed,  do  you  include  the  Soviet 
Union?  And  Mr.  Habib's  trip  to 
Moscow;  is  that  designed,  at  least  in 
part,  to  tell  the  Soviets  they  haven't 
been  as  constructive  as  we  would  like 
them  to  have  been  with  the  Syrians 
and  the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation 
Organization]?- 

A.  Insofar  as  the  Soviet  Union  is 
concerned,  they  consider  to  have  their 
responsibilities  as  one  of  the  two 
cochairmen  of  the  Geneva  conference. 
Some  of  the  statements  which  they 
have  made  in  recent  days  have  not  been 
helpful;  they  raise  questions. 

I  look  forward  to  meeting  with  Mr. 
Habib  when  I  get  to  Brussels 
[December  7-9],  where  he  will  report 
to  me  on  his  discussions  with  the 
Soviets  during  the  last  2  days. 

Q.  The  enthusiasm  that  you  show 
for  the  Sadat-Begin  talks  seems  to  be 
somewhat  tardy.  There  was  a  long 
pause  in  this  capital  when  they 
started.  Has  this,  in  fact,  represented 
a  reassessment  of  American  policy? 


A.  Let  me  first  address  your  question 
of  being  tardy.  As  soon  as  the  state- 
ment of  the  Cairo  conference  was  made 
[by  President  Sadat  on  November  26], 
we  indicated  that  we  believed  that  it 
could  play  a  helpful  role  but  that  we 
wished  to  consult  with  all  of  the  par- 
ties. We  did  that  consultation  over  the 
weekend  and  made  a  statement — which 
I  think  was  clearly  a  very  positive 
statement — on  Monday  following  our 
consultations. 

We  do,  as  I  have  indicated,  support 
very  strongly  this  initiative.  We  believe 
that  it  can  be  a  steppingstone  toward 
peace,  and  we  shall  do  all  that  we  can 
within  our  power  to  help  support  that 
effort  as  it  moves  forward. 

Q.  Is  it  now  conceivable,  in  the 
light  of  American  policy,  that  there 
could  be  a  settlement  without  a 
Geneva  conference? 

A.  It  is  possible,  but  all  of  the  par- 
ties have  said  that  it  is  their  intention  to 
move  toward  a  Geneva  conference. 
That  has  been  stated  by  Prime  Minister 
Begin,  by  President  Sadat,  and  the 
others  have  indicated  also  their  desire 
to  go  to  a  Geneva  conference.  So  that 
as  of  the  moment  all  of  the  parties  ap- 
pear to  wish  ultimately  to  go  to  a 
Geneva  conference. 

However,  we  have  first  the  Cairo 
conference  [December  14],  and  we 
have  to  see  how  much  can  be  accom- 
plished during  the  Cairo  conference.  I 
hope  that  much  can  be  accomplished 
during  the  Cairo  conference. 

Q.  When  you  say  "all  the  leaders 
have  welcomed  my  visit,"  are  you 
saying  that  Syria  has  accepted  receiv- 
ing you? 

A.  Yes,  they  have,  and  they  have 
said  they  welcome  the  visit. 

Q.  Is  there  any  reason  to  think 
that  Syria  would  see  the  Cairo  con- 
ference as  a  step  on  the  way  to  a 
Geneva  conference?  Any  communi- 
cations or  any  actions  by  Syria  that 
would — 

A.  No.  I  have  nothing  at  this  point 
that  would  indicate  that.  Indeed,  the 
indications  as  a  result  of  the  statement 
which  was  made  at  Tripoli  yesterday 
would  indicate  the  contrary.  However, 
the  Syrians  have  indicated  they  wel- 
comed my  visit  to  discuss  the  issues. 
They  have  never  said  that  they  close 
the  door  to  a  Geneva  conference  and  an 
ultimate  settlement,  and  I  look  forward 
to  my  discussions  with  President  Asad 
to  find  his  views  as  to  how  he  believes 
one  should  proceed  from  here. 

Q.  Breaking  the  psychological  bar- 
rier would  be  a  guarantee  to  bring 
peace  to  the  Middle  East? 

A.  I  think  the  breaking  of  the 
psychological  barrier  is  an  historic 
event.  I  think,  as  I  said  I  believe  at  my 


18 


last  press  conference,  that  the  principal 
obstacle  to  peace  was  the  psychological 
barrier  that  existed  as  the  parties 
moved  forward  and  came  closer  and 
closer  to  serious  face-to-face  negotia- 
tions; and  I  think  by  the  steps  which 
were  taken  in  President  Sadat's  trip  to 
Jerusalem  [November  19-21]  and  by 
his  reception  there  by  Prime  Minister 
Begin  and  the  Israeli  people  that  a  bar- 
rier really  was  broken  and  that  a  sea 
change  was  effected  that  will  have 
events  following  upon  them  in  a  fash- 
ion which  is  irreversible. 

Q.  Have  the  recent  developments 
in  the  Middle  East  shaken,  chal- 
lenged, or  changed  any  of  the  basic 
assumptions  and  directions  of  Ad- 
ministration policy? 

A.  We  have  always,  as  1 
indicated — as  did  our  predecessors — 
strived  for  the  objective  of  bringing  the 
parties  face-to-face  in  negotiations.  We 
have  said — as  did  our  predecessors — 
that  the  only  way  there  could  be  a  solu- 
tion was  for  the  parties  to  negotiate  that 
solution  themselves.  Therefore,  1  be- 
lieve that  the  steps  which  we  are  seeing 
now  in  terms  of  face-to-face  negotia- 
tions are  of  fundamental  importance, 
and  1  hope  that  that  circle  of  face-to- 
face  negotiations  will  be  widened  and 
that  others  will  join. 

Q.  Does  that  not  change  the  origi- 
nal nature  of  the  Geneva  conference 
as  a  meeting  place  to  stimulate  face- 
to-face  negotiations  where,  in  fact, 
you  have  them  started  now;  and  does 
that  not  change  the  process  in  terms 
of  the  necessity  for  the  immediacy  of 
a  Geneva  conference  to  be  a  launch- 
ing pad  for  talks,  whereas  you  have 
the  talks  going  on  now?  Can  you  ex- 
pound on  that? 

A.  I'll  be  glad  to  expound  on  that. 
The  process  of  serious  discussions 
could  have  started  at  Geneva  had  the 
parties  been  willing  to  do  so.  It  can 
also  start  in  the  Cairo  discussions  in  the 
circumstances  that  now  exist. 

1  think  that  we  should  seize  any  op- 
portunity, and  we  should  not  concern 
ourselves  about  the  forum  in  which  the 
peace  process  starts  to  enter  upon  seri- 
ous discussions  and  that,  therefore, 
with  this  new  initiative  having  been  ta- 
ken, we  should  support  it;  and  we 
would  hope  that  others  would  join  in 
the  process,  as  I've  indicated,  as  it 
moves  forward. 

Q.  Does  this  raise  a  possibility  of  a 
sequence  of  conferences  like  Cairo, 
or  extensions  of  Cairo,  which  could 
take  place  before  there  would  be  a 
Geneva  conference  for  the  purposes 
of  formalizing  an  agreement? 

A.  I  think  it  is  too  early  to  say 
exactly  what  the  length  and  form  of  the 
Cairo  conference  will  be.  That  will  be 


Department  of  State  BuUedl 


up  to  the  parties  once  the  discussions 
get  under  way.  They  have  put  no  time 
limits  on  that  particular  conference,  but 
they  have  stated  that  this  was  prepara- 
tory toward  a  Geneva  conference. 

Q.  One,  with  the  principle  of  di- 
rect talks  now  established  between 
Israel  and  an  Arab  country,  what  do 
you  see  as  the  future  role  for  the 
United  States,  if  any?  And  secondly, 
in  that  connection,  on  this  trip,  why 
do  you  feel  that  you  have  to  go  out 
personally?  I  mean,  do  you  doubt 
that  the  Middle  East  leaders  fully 
understand  that  you  strongly  support 
the  present  Egyptian-Israeli  initia- 
tives and  that  they  know  your  sup- 
port is  fully  consistent  with  continu- 
ing dedication  to — 

A.  Your  first  question  is  which? 

Q.  With  the  principle  of  direct 
talks  now  established,  what  do  you 
see  as  the  future  role  for  the  United 
States? 

A.  The  role  for  the  United  States  at 
this  point,  as  I  indicated  in  my  opening 
statement,  I  believe  is  to  be  supportive 
and  facilitate  the  direct  talks  which  are 
getting  under  way  in  the  Cairo  confer- 
ence and  to  work  with  the  parties  to 
help  them  move  forward  in  their  direct 
talks. 

As  we  go  along,  they  may  wish  us  to 
play  a  greater  role,  and  if  they  do,  we 
are  prepared,  of  course,  to  help  in  any 
way  to  move  the  peace  process  for- 
ward. 

In  respect  to  the  second  half  of  your 
question,  why  do  I  feel  it  necessary  to 
go  out  to  the  Middle  East  at  this  time, 
both  the  President  and  I  feel  that  there 
is  no  substitute  for  face-to-face  conver- 
sations, direct  talks  with  the  leaders  of 
the  various  nations  involved;  and  we 
think  this  is  particularly  important  at 
this  time  when  there  is  a  blockage  of 
communications  between  the  various 
leaders  and  that  perhaps  we  can  play  a 
facilitating  role  by  keeping  all  of  those 
channels  of  communication  open. 

Q.  On  your  last  trip — in  fact,  I 
think  on  your  two  previous  trips — 
you  asked  for  and  received  drafts,  in 
effect,  of  peace  treaties,  at  least  from 
the  Israelis  and  to  a  lesser  extent  in 
outline  form  from  the  Egyptians.  Do 
you  feel  that  that  process  contributed 
to  the  breakthrough,  and  will  you  on 
this  trip  be  asking  the  Jordanians, 
Syrians,  or  any  of  the  other  parties 
to  put  together  in  any  kind  of  draft 
form  what  they  feel  an  ultimate 
peace  treaty  should  look  like. 

A.  During  my  last  trip,  I  asked  all  of 
the  parties  to  provide  us  with  drafts  of 
peace  treaties  or  with  memoranda  re- 
flecting the  essential  elements  of  a 
peace  treaty  as  they  saw  it.  We  did  re- 
ceive from  each  of  the  countries  either 


a  draft  peace  treaty  or  their  views  wf4 
respect  to  the  essential  elements  of  j 
peace  treaty  or  treaties.    1  think  tW 
they  have  been  helpful,  and  at  th 
point  I  don't  think  that  there  is  aiHl''' 
need  for  us  to  ask  for  further  work  ( 
their  part,  but  we  will  undoubtedly  1 
discussing  their  current  views  with  r 
spect  to  the  elements  of  peace  treatie 

Q.   Is  it  your  intention  when  yc 
meet  with  President  Asad  to  try  i 
convince  him  or  one  of  his  represe' 
tatives  to  participate  in  the  Caiiip 
conference,  and  if  not,  what  form 'I' 
do  you  see  the  Syrians  becoming  i 
volved  in  in  the  future? 

A.  We  have  made  clear  to  all  of  tif 
parties  that  we  would  hope  that  th(  ' 
might  find  it  possible  to  participate 
the  Cairo  conference.  As  you  know, 
number  of  the  countries  have  declini 
to  do  that.  We  hope  that  they  will  ke  i 
an  open  mind.  1  think  it  will  be  helpl 
to  discuss  with  each  of  the  leaders  th( 
views  with  respect  to  how  one  shoi 
proceed  in  light  of  the  current  siti 
tion.  and  I  would  hope,  in  my  conv( 
sation  with  President  Asad,  to  recei 
his  views  as  to  how  he  thinks  one  c 
best  proceed  to  keep  the  process 
peace  moving  forward. 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  notion  of  yo 
own,  any  particular  framework 
your  own,  that  you  would  like 
suggest  if,  in  fact,  he  is  adama    i 
about  not  going  to  Cairo? 

A.  First.  I  think  we  ought  to  s 
what  the  parties  themselves  can  ( 
velop  on  this.  If  they  run  i 
roadblocks  on  this,  then,  as  I've  si 
and  the  President  has  said,  new  inil 
tives  might  be  helpful;  then  we  woi 
be  willing,  should  the  parties  desire 
to  come  up  with  some  suggestions  (Mi 
our  own. 

Q.  Have  recent  developments 
South  Africa,  particularly  the  Bi 
verdict,  had  any  effect  on  our  c( 
tinuing  review  of  policy  towa 
South  Africa,  any  change  in  our  re 
tions  expected  now?  ' 

A.  You're  talking  about  South  Atr    I 
itself?  I 

Q.  South  Africa,  the  country,  y« 

A.  Insofar  as  South  Africa  itscit 
concerned,  during  the  election  cai 
paign   which   was  recently   finishfr 
there  were  statements  by  the  gove 
ment  that  they  intended  to  take  cert: 
actions  in  the  postelection  period  wh: 
dealt  with  the  problem  of  aparthe 
We  shall  be  watching  to  see  what  hi 
pens  under  these  circumstances,  and 
course,  it's  too  early  to  say  yet  what 
anything,  may  come  out  of  this  pri'' 
ess.  But  I  think  it  would  be  premati; 
for  me  at  this  point  to  speculate  w 
may  eventuate  from  the  South  Afric 
Government. 


I 


uary  1978 

}.  Can  you  tell  us  the  current 
Ditus  of  our  thinking  on  economic 
^lations  with  South  Africa? 

I.  Our  current  thinking  is  that  this 
•  iier  is  under  review  in  the  U.S. 

veinment,  as  I  believe  I  indicated  to 

I  earlier,  and  there  have  been  no 
:il  conclusions  reached. 

}.  Just  to  follow  up  your  earlier 
iltement  about  the  Soviet  state- 
iints,  you  said  that  their  recent 
(nments  have  raised  questions.  Is  it 
B-  to  surmise  that  their  comments 
ve  raised  questions  about  their  liv- 
B  up,  if  not  to  the  letter,  to  the 
ijrit  of  the  Soviet-American  state- 
rnt  of  October  1st?  ' 

i.  They  have  raised  questions  about 
Wit  their  ultimate  objectives  are.  We 
it  believe  their  ultimate  objective  is 
:c^ee  a  comprehensive  settlement  of 
ii  Middle  East  problem  and  to  work 
iKochairman  to  that  end.  That  is  one 
jihe  reasons  that,  as  I  say,  I  will  be 
ccing  forward  to  the  reports  of  Mr. 
H)ib"s  discussions  in  Moscow  to  get 
[h  latest  thinking  which  he  will  have 
relived  as  a  result  of  those  talks. 

\.  Could  you  please  give  us  your 
ij^ssment  of  the  Saudi  role  right 
wv  and  their  attitude  toward  the 
C  ro  conference  as  you  understand 
It 

V.  It  would  be  inappropriate  for  me 
icipeak  specifically  for  the  Saudis. 
r  t  is  clearly  up  to  them  to  do.  In  the 
pc,  they  have  played  a  very  construc- 
ti  role  in  connection  with  the  Middle 
E  t  problem  and  in  seeking  to  facili- 
ta  a  solution  to  this  problem,  and  I 
wild  hope  that  in  the  future,  they 
wild  continue  to  play  such  a  role. 

>.  Do  you  believe  that  the  appro- 
pition  for  the  State  Department  is 
s(  imple  that  you  can  overlook  Mrs. 
A  tug's  commission's  [Bella  S.  Ab- 
zi ,  Chairperson,  National  Commis- 
si i  on  the  Observance  of  Interna- 
tiial  Women's  Year]  defiance  of  a 
S  te  Department  directive  that  they 
sip  using  your  franking  privilege 
f(  thousands  of  dollars  a  month? 
i.  With  respect  to  that,  Mr.  Read 

1  njamin  H.  Read,  Deputy  Under 
■i  retary  for  Management]  talked  to 
Commission  and  indicated  to  them 
-f  they  should  use  their  own  franking 
puilege.  It  is  taking  a  while  for  them 
"  lo  that.  They  will  do  it — I  have  no 
stion  about  it.  It  simply  has  not 
.■t;;hed  the  point  where  they  can  do  it. 
^.  About  a  month  ago,  it  was  an- 
otinced  the  United  States  would  re- 
t'n  the  Crown  of  St.  Stephen  to 
tingary.  Since  then  there  has  been 
s;ae  opposition  to  that  and  appar- 
eHy  some  delay.  Even  one  Con- 
|>sswoman  said  that  she  had  been 
t  d  at  the  White  House  that  certain 


conditions  would  be  put  on  this,  and 
I  wanted  to  know  if  it  is  definitely 
going  to  be  returned,  and  if  there  are 
any  conditions,  what  they  are. 

A.  The  decision  to  return  the  crown 
is  a  firm  decision.  We  have  been  hold- 
mg  the  crown  in  safekeeping.  We  be- 
lieve that  the  time  has  come  when  the 
crown  should  be  returned.  There  have 
been  a  number  of  improvements  in  the 
relationships  between  our  country  and 
Hungary.  They  are  seen  in  the  area  of 
the  reunification  problems;  they  are 
seen  in  the  complete  repayment  of  the 
debts  which  arose  out  of  World  War  I; 
they  have  been  seen  in  cultural,  scien- 
tific, and  technical  agreements  which 
have  been  negotiated  with  them;  and 
we  believe  that  it  is  appropriate  under 
the  circumstances  to  return  it. 

Q.  Is  there  any  chance  that  we  will 
negotiate  a  trade  agreement  with 
Hungary  if  it  should  be  returned? 

A.  That  is  a  question  which  is  not 
yet  ripe  for  discussion. 

Q.  The  new  American  enthusiasm 
for  direct  talks  between  Israel  and 
the  Arab  states  put  the  United  States 
in  diametric  opposition  to  Syria, 
which  has  stated  that  it  wants  talks 
only  in  the  context  of  Geneva  and 
does  not  want  direct  talks. 

A.  First,  let  me  take  issue  with  your 
statement  "the  new  enthusiasm."  We 
have  been  urging  direct  talks  from  the 
outset,  and  there  should  be  no  question 
about  that.  That  is  not  a  new  policy 
with  us;  that  has  been  a  consistent  pol- 
icy of  the  United  States. 

You  ask,  has  that  put  the  United 
States  and  the  other  parties  in  conflict 
with  Syria?  Syria  has  not  indicated 
whether  or  not  they  would  enter  into 
direct  conversations.  What  they  have 
been  raising  questions  about  up  to  this 
point  is  the  question  of  the  forum  in 
which  any  such  talks  would  take  place. 
Q.  Are  you  hopeful  the  Congress 
would  approve  an  increase  in  mili- 
tary aid,  including  compensation  aid 
to  South  Korea,  in  light  of  the  Park 
regime's  lack  of  cooperation  with  the 
United  States  in  the  congressional 
bribery  scandal  and  repeated  human 
rights  violations  in  South  Korea? 

A.  When  the  question  of  assistance 
goes  to  the  Congress,  I  hope  that  it  will 
be  acted  upon  affirmatively.  I  would 
have  to  be  very  clear,  however,  in  say- 
ing that  such  things  as  the  Tongsun 
Park  affair  and  some  of  the  recent  ac- 
tions in  the  civil  rights  area — the 
human  rights  area — cannot  help  but 
have  an  eroding  or  negative  effect  upon 
the  attitudes  within  the  Congress  and,  I 
think,  generally  within  the  United 
States. 

Q.  You  are  going  to  be  talking  to 


19 


[British]  Foreign  Secretary  Owen  the 
day  after  tomorrow — 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  — on  the  Rhodesian  situation? 
From  all  appearances  the  Anglo- 
American  plan  is  as  dead  as  a  door- 
nail, and  the  play  has  been  taken  in 
Rhodesia  by  Ian  Smith  in  his  propos- 
als for  an  internal  settlement.  I  won- 
der if  you  could  share  with  us  some 
of  your  thoughts  about  where  we  go 
next. 

A.  Yes.  I  would  be  glad  to.  I  will  be 
meeting  with  Secretary  Owen  at  the 
Brussels  meetings  on  Thursday  and 
Friday,  and  we  will  be  discussing  the 
question  of  southern  Africa,  including 
the  Rhodesian  situation.  Mr.  Moose, 
the  Assistant  Secretary  for  African  Af- 
fairs, will  be  with  me  during  those 
discussions. 

I  think  in  talking  about  this  problem 
it  is  important  in  dealing  with  such  a 
complex  situation  to  keep  some  basic 
points  in  mind. 

The  only  way,  we  believe,  to  resolve 
the  problem  peacefully  and  rapidly  is 
through  agreement  on  free  elections 
open  to  all  of  the  parties;  secondly,  by 
the  transfer  of  power  to  a  government 
freely  chosen  by  the  people  of  Zim- 
babwe; and  third,  a  constitution  that 
protects  the  rights  of  all  of  the  people 
of  that  country,  whether  they  be  black 
or  white.  This  will  require  that  the 
transition  agreements  be  fair  and  that 
they  not  favor  any  one  group. 

These  are  the  goals  that  lie  at  the 
heart  of  the  Anglo-American  plan,  and 
that  plan  we  are  continuing  to  pursue. 

Coming  to  Mr.  Smith's  initiative, 
the  Smith  plan  may  be  a  step  in  the 
right  direction,  but  it  doesn't  appar- 
ently provide  for  the  kind  of  open  elec- 
tions that  all  parties  will  find  fair.  It  is 
not  yet  clear  whether  it  really  provides 
for  universal  suffrage  for  all  adults 
within  the  country.  So  that  there  are  a 
number  of  questions  that  one  has  to 
find  the  answer  to  in  order  to  determine 
how  this  fits  into  these  essential  areas 
which  are  so  important. 

A  number  of  the  nationalist  leaders 
have  already  indicated  that  they  are 
taking  a  look  at  the  Smith  proposals  in 
the  light  of  and  in  the  framework  of  the 
Anglo-American  proposal.  That  re- 
mains on  the  table  and  remains  active 
and  supported  by  both  ourselves  and 
the  British. 

Q.  How  great  a  setback  has  been 
dealt  to  the  prospects  in  the  longer 
term  of  an  overall  settlement  and  a 
broader  peace  conference  by  the  fact 
that  Egypt  has  broken  relations  with 
Syria — another  one  of  the  major 
parties — and  may  be  on  the  verge  of 
breaking  relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union? 


20 


A.  I  think  it  was  too  bad  that  Presi- 
dent Sadat  was  forced  to  break  rela- 
tions with  the  five  Arab  nations.'^  It  is 
our  hope  that  in  time  those  differences 
may  be  healed,  particularly  insofar  as 
Syria  is  concerned,  and  we  would  hope 
that  all  of  the  parties  in  the  Middle  East 
conference — or  the  Middle  East  situa- 
tion in  terms  of  the  confrontation 
states — would  keep  an  open  mind  and 
that  the  channels  of  communications 
may  again  be  open  so  that  there  can  be 
movement  by  all  toward  a  final 
settlement. 

Q.  The  time  has  come  for  Israel  to 
make  some  move  on  the  substance 
and  for  someone  to  say  what  will  be 
supported? 

A.  Yes.  I  think  that  the  time  has 
come,  and  I  think  that  the  parties  agree 
that  the  time  has  come,  to  really  begin 
to  come  to  grips  with  the  question  of 
substance  and  not  merely  with  the 
question  of  procedures  alone. 

1  think  everybody  knows  what  the 
questions  of  substance  are  that  have  to 
be  dealt  with.  They  are  the  nature  of 
peace;  they  are  the  question  of  with- 
drawals from  occupied  lands;  and  they 
are,  of  course,  the  Palestinian  question. 
These  issues  are  going  to  have  to  be 
dealt  with  in  connection  with  any  dis- 
cussions which  could  lead  to  a  com- 
prehensive peace,  and  I  think  the  par- 
ties are  saying — both  Israel  and 
Egypt — that  they  recognize  that  these 
issues  have  to  be  dealt  with. 

Q.  There  have  been  political 
executions  in  China.  I  wonder  if  the 
United  States  is  still  concerned  about 
the  situation  —  human  rights 
situation — in  mainland  China. 

A.  Yes,  the  United  States  is  con- 
cerned about  the  human  rights  situation 
in  any  part  of  the  world  where  there  are 
executions.  The  information  which  we 
have  with  respect  to  that  particular 
situation  is  limited,  and  that  is  all  I  can 
say  at  this  point  on  it. 

Q.  If  the  PLO  were  also  invited  to 
the  Cairo  meeting,  are  you  intending 
to  meet  with  them  and,  if  not,  how 
are  you  going  to  get  them  to  the 
Cairo  meeting? 

A.  No,  I  am  not  intending  to  meet 
with  the  PLO.  As  I  have  said  to  you 
many  many  times,  as  a  result  of  the 
commitments  which  we  made  in  the 
Sinai  II  agreement  [September  1975], 
we  cannot  speak  with  the  PLO  unless 
certain  conditions  are  met.  Those  con- 
ditions have  not  been  met.  There  is  no 
indication  that  there  is  any  intention  to 
meet  those  conditions.  So,  I  do  not  ex- 
pect to  meet  with  the  PLO. 

Q.  Can  you  now  give  us  any  kind 
of  a  framework  for  when  you  expect 
to  get  a  Geneva  conference  going?  I 
take  it  the  first  of  the  year  is  out. 


A.  No,  1  can't  give  you  any  specula- 
tion or  guess  on  that,  and  I  don't  think 
it  is  that  important.  1  think  the  impor- 
tant thing  now  is  to  see  how  much 
progress  we  can  make  at  the  Cairo  con- 
ference. That  is  what  is  on  the  table 
now.  Let's  see  what  we  can  do  and  see 
how  we  can  move  ahead  there. 

Q.  Would  you  say  that  the  events 
of  the  past  days,  what  with  the  sharp 
disagreements  amongst  the  Arabs, 
have  led  us  closer  or  further  away 
from  Geneva? 

A.  I  think  for  the  moment  they  have 
probably  led  us  further  away.  On  the 
other  hand,  I  would  hope  that  as  time 
passes  that  changes  will  be  effected  and 
that  the  circle  of  those  discussing  the 
peace  process  will  be  enlarged  again. 

Q.  I  think  it  is  safe  to  say  now  that 
there  won't  be  a  Geneva  conference 
before  the  end  of  the  year,  and  I 
think  we  would  appreciate  your  re- 
flecting backward  and  telling  us  what 
in  your  mind  prevented  a  Geneva 
conference.  As  you  look  back,  what 
one  thing  or  several  things. 

A.  As  I  indicated,  I  think  that  one  of 
the  main  stumbling  blocks  was  the 
psychological  stumbling  block,  and 
that,  I  think,  has  been  removed. 

Secondly,  there  were  still  two  pro- 
cedural problems  that  were  holding  up 
a  Geneva  conference,  and  it  was  not 
possible  up  to  the  present  time  to  work 
out  those  different  views  with  respect 
to  those  procedural  points,  and  those 
were  the  basic  factors  that  made  it  im- 
possible at  this  time  to  go  to  a  Geneva 
conference. 

Q.  Has  the  political  importance  of 
the  PLO  been  reduced  by  President 
Sadat's  various  actions? 

A.  It  seems  to  me,  insofar  as  the 
PLO  is  concerned,  that  the  actions 
which  they  have  taken  recently  indicate 
less  of  a  willingness  to  consider,  in  a 


Department  of  State  Bulletril  i~ 

way  which  might  make  it  possible  fo 
some  sort  of  participation,  for  that  t< 
happen,  and  so  I  don't  think  it  seem; 
likely  now  that  that  is  a — 

Q.  Can  the  Palestinian  issue  be  set 
tied  without  the  PLO's  involvement? 

A.  1  think  that  the  Palestinian  issut 
must  be  solved.  As  to  exactly  how  tha  I 
will  be  solved,  I  think  we  would  wan  ' 
to  look  and  see  what  the  parties  them 
selves  suggest  on  this.  I  don't  want  t( 
prejudge  what  is  going  to  be  put  for 
ward  by  any  of  the  parties  with  respec 
to  this  issue. 

Q.  You  said  progress  should  b 
made,  you  should  work  toward  prog 
ress  at  the  Cairo  conference.  Sine 
the  only  parties  there  other  than  th 
U.N.  observer  are  Israel,  Egypt,  am 
the  United  States,  what  is  the  natur 
of  progress  that  you  would  like  t  | 
see?  , 

A.  I  would  hope  that  out  of  the  Cair  i 
conference  it  might  be  possible  to  com  i 
up  with  a  framework  of  the  substantiv  i 
matters  that  have  to  be  dealt  with  itj 
order  to  achieve  a  comprehensive  set' 
tlement;  and  in  addition  to  that,  the  nil 
maining  procedural  questions  migl' 
be  cleared  away.  I  think  if  that  wei  | 
accomplished,  then  there  would  ha\  , 
been  real  progress.  1 '' 


'  Text  from  press  release  544  of  Dec.  6.  197 

-  Under  Secretary  for  Political  Affairs  Phil 
C.  Habib  met  with  U.S.S  R  officials  in  Mosct 
Dec.  5-6.  1977. 

'  Mr.  Biko  was  a  black  South  African  critic 
the  apartheid  policies  of  the  South  African  Go 
ernment  who  died  in  Sept.  1977  in  detention. 
Dec.  1977  a  Pretoria  magistrate,  presiding  at 
inquest,  found  no  one  criminally  responsible  f 
Mr.  Biko's  death. 

'  For  text  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  7,  1977, 
639. 

■■  President  Sadat  broke  diplomatic  relatio 
with  Algeria.  Iraq.  Libya.  South  Yemen,  a 
Syria  on  Dec    5.  1977. 


ARMS  COI^TROL:  SALT  and  thi 
Test  Ban — Cause  for  Optintism 


by  Paul  C.  Warnke' 

1  have  been  assigned  today  a  topic 
which  I  think  speaks  eloquently  of  the 
emphasis  that  the  Carter  Administra- 
tion has  put  on  the  subject  of  arms  con- 
trol. As  you  know,  since  January,  the 
Carter  Administration  has  undertaken 
at  least  10  separate  initiatives  in  this 
particular  area. 

They  involve  perhaps  most  promi- 
nently the  negotiations  with  the  Soviet 
Union  on  strategic  arms  limitations.  In 


addition  to  that,  we  have  the  cor 
prehensive  test  ban  negotiations,  whici 
have  been  going  on  in  Geneva  in  addl 
tion  to  the  Strategic  Arms   Limitaticl 
Talks  (SALT).  Also  in  Geneva  we  ha^j 
been  discussing  the  questions  of  bai 
ning  chemical  weapons  and  radiolog 
cal  weapons.  We  have,  in  addition,  til 
Indian  Ocean  arms  limitation  talks, 
which  we  are  engaged  with  the  Sovi 
Union. 

Pending  on  the  horizon  are  su( 
things  as  discussions  with  respect  to  n 


uary  1978 

ctions  on  conventional  arms  trans- 
and  the  elimination  of  antisatellite 

ipons  in  space  that  could,  of  course, 

ously  jeopardize  U.S. -Soviet  rela- 

iships  and  arms  control  objectives. 

Ve  are  also  involved  in  preparations 
the  Special   Session  on   Disarma- 

it  of  the  United  Nations,  which  will 
place  next  spring. 

imbassador  Gerard  Smith  and  Mr. 
•Hip  Farley  are  engaged  on  a  continu- 
n  basis  with  the  overarching  problem 
rfivoiding  the  proliferation  of  nuclear 
vi:pons.^ 

•n  November  5  I  returned  from  5 
viks  in  Geneva,  where  I  participated 
n:he  discussions  with  delegations 
rn  the  Soviet  Union  on  strategic 
irs  limitations  and  a  comprehensive 
e  ban  treaty. 

think  that  most  Americans  and  the 
nrnational  community  generally 
a)r  these  initiatives.  They  recognize 
h  this  is  the  most  effective  way  of 
ii  inishing  the  chances  of  a  confronta- 
u  between  the  Soviet  Union  and  the 
J  ted  States  leading  to  a  war  that 
:cld  devastate  human  society.  I  would 
u;  to  say,  however,  that  the  initia- 

's  are  not  free  from  criticism.  From 

■  10  time,  even  in  Geneva,  I  get  a 
a  t  echo  of  the  fact  that  there  are 
h  e  who  are  less  than  totally  satisfied 
M  I  our  efforts. 

uriously,  there  are  two  basic  com- 
)lnts  and,  it  seems  to  me,  they  repre- 
ie  a  striking  contrast.  One  of  them  is: 
*i  /  is  it  that  we  keep  caving  in  to  the 
li  sians  and  how  can  you  trust  them 
iiivay?  And  the  other  one  is:  Why 
1(  i  it  take  you  so  long  and  why  do 
K  get  so  little  done? 

may  come  as  no  surprise  to  you  to 
ii  that  1  don't  think  that  either  one  of 
he  criticisms  has  any  validity.  I'd 
il  to  deal  with  them,  however,  or  at- 
e:pt  to  deal  with  them. 

N  ;otiating  Process 

irst,  with  respect  to  the  criticism 

we  are  giving  in  to  the  Russians, 

I    we  are  making  too  many  conces- 

iiis,  and  how  can  we  trust  them:   I 

:hik  that  particular  school   of  criti- 

:i  1  suffers  from  the  fact  that  its  ad- 

lEints  haven't  really  stopped  to  con- 

*  r  what  is  the  nature  of  arms  control 

ifiDtiations. 

y  their  very  nature  they  are  differ- 

than  other  types  of  negotiations, 

11  in  the  international  field.   Arms 

trol  is  not  the  kind  of  a  zero-sum 

le  that  sometimes  it's  portrayed  to 

It  has  few  of  the  attributes  of  a 

imercial  negotiation.  What  it  has  to 

with,  in  terms  of  substance,  is  the 

ic  security  of  the  nations  that  are 

aged  in  the  conversations.  And  that 


basic  security  is  going  to  be  protected. 
What  that  means  is  that  either  side,  in 
the  long  run  can  be  out-traded.  Ob- 
viously, each  side  would  like  to  end  up 
with  an  agreement  in  which  it  had  all 
the  advantages  and  in  which  the  other 
side  was  restricted  where  it  was  not. 
But  that  can't  happen  because,  even  if 
one  side  should  be  out-traded,  you 
would  not  have  a  viable,  durable  arms 
control  agreement.  There  is  no  way  in 
which  either  side  could  get  specific  en- 
forcement. There  is  no  court  of  law  to 
which  you  could  take  your  contract  and 
say  I  won  this  particular  trade  and  I  am 
entitled  to  the  fruits  of  my  victory.  In- 
stead, you  would  find  that  the  side  that 
had  been  out-traded  would  promptly 
repudiate  the  deal  in  the  exercise  of  its 
sovereign  rights. 

So  you  start  with  the  fact  that  you 
have  to  end  up  with  an  arms  control 
agreement  which  is  fair,  which  is  bal- 
anced, which  has  equal  restrictions  on 
both  sides,  and  provides  for  equal  secu- 
rity. Now  that  necessarily  means  a 
process  of  hard  bargaining,  hard  trad- 
ing, but  also  a  process  of  analysis  in 
which  you  have  to  consider  what  the 
basic  interests  are  of  the  other  side.  It 
makes  for.  obviously,  a  prolonged  and 
complex  sort  of  process. 

With  regard  to  the  entire  question  of 
arms  control,  moreover,  there  is  no 
way  of  avoiding  dealing  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  There  are  only  two  mili- 
tary superpowers,  so  that  we  have  to 
proceed  on  the  basis  that  we  can  work 
out.  in  the  final  analysis,  some  sort  of 
useful  agreements  with  the  Soviet 
Union  that  will  stabilize  the  competi- 
tion that  will  unquestionably  continue 
to  exist  between  us.  I  don't  think  we 
can  proceed  on  the  basis  that  arms  con- 
trol limitations  are  going  to  eliminate 
this  spirit  of  competition  and  the  exist- 
ence of  friction  between  the  two  coun- 
tries. But  we  don't  have  to  be  friends 
in  order  to  reach  agreements  which  are 
in  the  interests  of  both  sides. 

I  feel  very  strongly  that  arms  control 
is  in  the  interests  of  both  sides.  I  think 
that  is  the  case  because,  even  if  you  as- 
sume a  continuing  competition  for 
world  influence,  that  competition  can 
express  itself  in  one  of  two  ways. 
Either  the  military  competition  will 
proceed  without  restraint,  or  we  will 
find  some  way  in  which  a  measure  of 
greater  sanity  and  greater  safety  can  be 
introduced  into  the  relationship.  That, 
as  I  say,  is  in  the  common  interest.  It  is 
in  the  interests  of  both  sides. 

At  the  present  point,  despite  some 
comments  that  you  read  in  the  press, 
there  is  a  military  balance  between  the 
two  countries.  There  is  no  military 
superiority  on  the  part  of  the  Soviet 
Union.  I  don't  know  of  any  reasonable 


21 


person,  in  or  out  of  the  government, 
who  feels  otherwise.  In  most  respects, 
we  maintain  a  qualitative  edge,  but  it  is 
not  a  qualitative  edge  that  gives  us  the 
type  of  political  domination  that  we 
would  like  to  have  but  which,  ba- 
sically, is  unattainable  given  the  re- 
sources that  exist  on  the  side  of  the 
Soviet  Union. 

So  that  we  have  the  choice:  We  can 
either  continue  with  the  military  com- 
petition without  restraints  or  we  can 
find  some  way  of  bringing  that  compe- 
tition under  control  by  effective  arms 
control  measures. 

I  don't  think  that  any  one  of  us 
would  be  prepared  to  see  the  Soviet 
Union  achieve  a  degree  of  military 
superiority.  That  might  not  end  up  with 
a  war,  but  it  would  certainly  end  up 
with  the  kind  of  world  in  which  our 
interests  would  be  subordinated. 

So,  essentially.  I  see  arms  control 
negotiations  as  being  a  measure  by 
which  we  can  best  advance  the  security 
of  the  United  States.  And  I  think  that 
we  can  deal  with  the  Soviet  Union  be- 
cause their  perception  has  to  be  the 
same.  You  don't  have  to  trust  the  mo- 
tives of  the  Soviet  Union  to  feel  that 
they  would  negotiate  in  good  faith  on 
arms  control  issues.  You  can  trust  any- 
body to  protect  his  own  interests.  And 
you  can  trust  any  nation  to  take  those 
steps  that  will  protect  its  national 
security. 

Strategic  Balance 

We  are  in  a  position  at  the  present 
time  in  which,  as  Defense  Secretary 
Harold  Brown  said  on  "Issues  and  An- 
swers" on  November  6,  we  have  a  sta- 
ble strategic  balance.  Now  by  that  we 
mean  that  neither  side  at  the  present 
point — no  matter  what  the  circum- 
stances of  international  friction,  no 
matter  what  the  tensions,  no  matter 
what  the  provocations — would  have 
any  incentive  to  initiate  a  first  strike. 
Neither  side  could  adopt  the  option  of 
going  to  nuclear  war. 

At  the  present  point,  we  have  some- 
thing in  excess — well  in  excess — of 
9,000  individual  nuclear  warheads 
targeted  at  the  Soviet  Union.  They 
don't  have  anywhere  near  that  number. 
They  have  only  something  around 
4,500.  In  each  instance,  it's  more  than 
there  are  lucrative  targets  available  to 
strike.  In  each  instance,  it  means  that 
the  side  that  was  attacked  would  be  in  a 
position  to  respond  with  a  devastating 
retaliatory  strike  and  eliminate  the 
other  country  as  an  industrialized 
society. 

That's  a  grim  sort  of  picture,  but  it  is 
the  best  we  can  hope  for  in  the  way  of 
stability  in  the  nuclear  weapon  age. 


22 


And  the  anomaly  is  that  both  countries 
continue,  without  restraint,  to  accumu- 
late more  and  more  in  the  way  of  nu- 
clear arms,  to  spend  tens  of  hundreds 
of  billions  of  dollars.  While  this  con- 
tinues, the  very  best  that  we  can  hope 
for  is  that  the  situation  won't  become 
worse,  that  there  won't  be  some  sort  of 
development  which  would  make  the 
strategic  balance  less  stable. 

That's  a  very  powerful  incentive  for 
the  United  States  to  negotiate.  It's  a 
very  powerful  incentive  for  the  Soviet 
Union  to  negotiate.  There  are  other 
reasons  that,  as  far  as  I'm  concerned, 
tend  toward  good-faith  negotiations  in 
the  arms  control  field.  For  the  Soviet 
Union  there  are  political  reasons  as 
well.  It  obviously  is  to  them  of  impor- 
tance to  be  seen  dealing  responsibly 
with  the  United  States  on  measures  that 
have  to  do  with  the  safety  of  the  world. 
There  are,  finally,  I  think,  real  military 
reasons  why  the  Soviet  Union  would  be 
prepared  to  negotiate  in  good  faith  on 
arms  control.  They  recognize  that  in  no 
event  would  we  be  willing  to  concede 
them  military  superiority.  So  the  alter- 
native is  that  they  would  be  faced  by 
actions  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 
in  response  to  their  military  buildup. 
Moreover,  they  have  to  recognize  that 
we  do  have  a  technological  lead.  And 
then  also,  from  the  military  standpoint, 
there  is  the  entire  question  of  prolifera- 
tion. And  the  Soviet  Union,  just  as  we, 
has  to  be  responsive  to  the  danger  that 
nuclear  weapons  will  fall  into  the  hands 
of  more  and  more  countries  or  subna- 
tional  terrorist  groups.  And  I  have  no 
doubt  that  the  fact  that  if  nuclear 
weapons  do  become  that  widely  dis- 
tributed, this  would  exponentially  in- 
crease the  risk  that  a  nuclear  weapon 
will  someday  be  used  in  anger. 

At  the  present  point,  our  relationship 
with  the  Soviet  Union  and  our  common 
possession  of  nuclear  weapons  have 
reached  the  stage  of  maturity  in  which 
only  insanity  would  motivate  their  use. 
We  can't  count  on  less  stable  govern- 
ments with  less  experience  in  the  field. 
And  we  can't  certainly  count  on  ter- 
rorist groups  to  exercise  a  comparable 
degree  of  sane  restraint. 

Comprehensive  Test  Ban 

In  that  regard,  I  think  that  the  com- 
prehensive test  ban  negotiations  that 
have  been  conducted  in  Geneva  for  the 
past  5  weeks  can  have  very  important 
consequences  for  the  proliferation 
problem.  As  I'm  sure  you  know,  these 
negotiations  are  on  a  trilateral  basis. 
The  United  Kingdom  is  working  with 
the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States 
to  try  to  put  an  end  to  nuclear  tests.  We 


have  had  some  quite  severe  obstacles 
that  explain  the  fact  that,  for  the  past 
20  years,  we  have  been  striving  for  a 
comprehensive  test  ban  but  haven't 
achieved  it;  that  explains  the  fact  that  it 
has  been  14  years  since  we  achieved 
the  limited  test  ban  which  put  an  end  to 
atmospheric  testing.  One  of  the  major 
problems  has  been  the  dispute  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
as  to  the  coverage  of  a  comprehensive 
test  ban  treaty.  It's  been  our  view  that 
to  be  truly  comprehensive,  to  be  effec- 
tive, and  to  have  the  maximum  inhibit- 
ing effect  on  proliferation,  the  treaty 
should  ban  all  nuclear  explosions,  not 
just  the  weapons  tests. 

The  Soviet  Union  has  appeared  to 
place  a  great  premium  on  the  conduct 
of  so-called  peaceful  nuclear  explo- 
sions (PNE) — the  use  of  nuclear  explo- 
sive devices  for  a  variety  of  purposes, 
such  as  the  enhancement  of  yields  from 
gas  and  oil  wells,  mining  operations, 
river  diversions. 

We,  on  the  other  hand,  have  at  least 
for  the  past  several  years  contended 
that,  whatever  the  possible  economic 
benefits  might  be,  they  are  far  more 
than  offset  by  the  advantages  to  both 
countries  and  to  mankind  of  putting  an 
end  to  nuclear  explosions  completely. 
Now  we  can't  really  blame  the  Soviet 
Union  exclusively  for  adopting  this  po- 
sition. It's  not  so  many  years  back  that 
in  the  United  States  we  harbored  really 
quite  ambitious  objectives  for  the  use 
of  PNE.  At  one  point,  for  example,  we 
considered  that  this  might  be  a  means 
of  creating  a  new  Panama  Canal.  How- 
ever, the  prospect  began  to  seem  more 
and  more  illusory.  It  was  predicted  by 
some  that  the  resulting  landslides  might 
not  only  blot  out  the  new  canal  but 
might  put  an  end  to  the  old  one  too.  In 
any  event,  we  have  moved  on  from  that 
view  of  PNE  utility.  But  the  Soviets 
have  continued  to  maintain  that  any 
comprehensive  test  ban  had  to  have  an 
exclusion  for  peaceful  nuclear  explo- 
sions. Our  position  has  been  that  not 
only  would  this  leave  the  possibility  of 
the  accrual  of  military  benefits,  but  it 
also  would  not  have  the  desired  effect 
of  preventing  other  countries  from  de- 
veloping their  own  nuclear  explosive 
devices.  You  will  recall  that,  back  a 
few  years  ago,  the  Indian  Government 
exploded  a  nuclear  device  which  they 
promptly  labeled  as  a  peaceful  nuclear 
explosive.  The  results,  of  course,  are 
almost  indistinguishable  from  those  of 
a  nuclear  bomb  because,  in  fact,  it  is  a 
nuclear  bomb. 

We  believe,  that,  from  the  prolifera- 
tion standpoint,  if  the  United  Kingdom, 
the  Soviet  Union,  and  the  United  States 
all  totally  gave  up  any  nuclear  explo- 


Department  of  State  Bullett' 

sions,  it  would  be  very,  very  difficu, 
for  any  other  country  to  face  the  conse 
quences,  in  terms  of  international  con 
demnation,  if  it  were  to  become  a  ne\ 
member  of  the  nuclear  club. 

I  am  delighted  to  report  that  th. 
speech  that  President  Brezhnev  mad 
last  week  did,  in  fact,  represent  a  ver 
major  move  on  the  part  of  the  Sovie 
Union.  The  Soviet  negotiators  i 
Geneva  promptly  confirmed  the  fac 
that  he  meant  what  he  had  said  and  the 
they  were  prepared  to  have 
moratorium  on  peaceful  nuclear  explc 
sions  which  would  accompany  a  ban  o 
nuclear  weapons  tests.  There  remain  t 
be  worked  out  a  number  of  very  sever 
problems,  but  I  am  much,  much  mor 
optimistic  than  I  was  10  days  ago. 
think  that  it  is  a  very  constructive  mov 
on  their  part.  I  believe  that  it  will  everji 
tually  solve  this  major  problem.  J 

'As  I  indicated,  there  are  problem  I 
that  remain,  particularly  the  question  c 
whether  other  nuclear  weapons  state 
will  join  in  a  comprehensive  test  bar   , 
We  obviously  would  like  to  see  thi  1 
happen,  but  our  feeling  is  that  the  mo:,| 
important  prospect  for  ending  nuclei' I 
weapons  tests  and  nuclear  explosior  i 
generally  is  for  the  countries  that  ai  ' 
the  major  nuclear  powers,  that  condu^ 
the  great  bulk  of  the  tests,  to  enter  ini 
an  agreement  which  would  put  an  eri< 
to  them.  And,  of  course,  the  participa 
tion  of  the  United  Kingdom  in  this  n 
gard  is  of  immense  importance  in  tern' 
both  of  international  support  and  al; 
of  showing  that  this  is  not  just  a  des 
between  the  two  superpowers. 

So  with  regard  to  this  issue  of  noi 
proliferation,  this  is  certainly  one  ( 
which  we  and  the  Soviet  leadership  a 
find  common  ground.  We  have  there  i 
identity  of  interests  which  leads  to 
distinct  stimulation  for  our  arms  coi 
trol  initiatives. 


SALT  Negotiations 

With  respect  to  the  SALT  tall 
themselves,  this  is  where  the  complai 
is  most  often  voiced  that  we  are  cavii 
in  to  the  Russians,  that  we  are  makii 
concessions,  that  it's  all  one-sided,  th 
we  are  being  out-traded.  The  defense 
those  charges  is  that  they  are  incorrec 
We  are  not  being  out-traded.  We  ha 
to  recognize  that  any  agreement  w 
involve  matching  restrictions  on  bo 
sides.  There  has  been  movement.  The 
is  no  question  about  that.  The  mov 
ment  has  not  been  one-sided. 

I'd  like  to  take  you  back  to  the  ear 
days  of  the  Carter  Administration  ai 
our  first  efforts  with  regard  to  initi 
lives  in  the  field  of  strategic  arms  co 
trol.  You  will  remember  that  Secreta 


Iiary  1978 
ce  led  a  delegation  to  Moscow  last 
ch,  and  we  brought  with  us  alterna- 
;'i  proposals. 

ine  of  them  was  a  so-called  com- 
riiensive  package  that  would  have 
:  nt  a  very  dramatic  step  forward  in 

cdve  strategic  nuclear  arms  control. 

;i(.i  a  number  of  provisions  which 

Id  have  meant  that  the  qualitative 
would  have  been  slowed  down,  in- 

d  of  merely  putting  new  limits 
uierically  on  the  numbers  of  strategic 
ijiear  weapons  that  each  side  could 

:  The  agreement  would  have  in- 
i.ed  significant  reductions  in  the 
vail  total  of  so-called  strategic  nu- 
kr  delivery  vehicles.  It  would  have 
imt  a  reduction  in  the  number  of 
rti.e  vehicles  which  have  MIRVs, 
vich  is  an  acronym  for  multiple 
n  ;pendently-targetable  reentry 
eicles — the  capability  of  a  single 
iiiiile  to  launch  a  number  of  warheads 
.n  launch  them  accurately  at  a  number 
if  irgets.  It  would  have  meant  also  a 

ction  in  the  introduction  of  new 

s  (if  nuclear  missiles. 

le  Soviet  Union  leadership,  as  far 
iS 'e  could  tell,  felt  that  this  went  too 
Aind  too  fast.  They  appeared  to  feel 
il:  that  it  went  beyond  what  had  been 
ig  ed  upon  in  Vladivostok  between 
'i  ident  Ford  and  General  Secretary 
ii'.hnev  in  1974.  Recognizing  that 
h  was  a  possibility,  we  had  an  alter- 
iZ'/e  proposal  to  present  in  Moscow 
n  larch.  And  that  was  the  so-called 
le  rral  package.  What  it  would  have 
ri'  nt  is  the  acceptance  in  a  treaty  of 
h'  Vladivostok  ceilings,  which  were 
1, 10  in  total  numbers  of  strategic  nu- 
ll r  delivery  vehicles,  of  which  1,320 
:c  d  be  launchers  of  MIRVed  mis- 
ili.  Other  issues  would  have  been 
leerred  for  a  subsequent  SALT 
leitiation.  Now  the  Soviet  Union  also 
e  :ted  that  as  not  going  far  enough. 

D  where  are  we  today  and  how  have 
VI  gotten  there? 

radually  in  the  months  since 
Axh.  we  have  begun  to  evolve  a 
i/.T  II  treaty  which  I  would  say  is  in 
)«veen  the  two  proposals  that  we  pre- 
«  ed  in  March.  It  does  not  in  one  step 

l^  far  as  our  March  comprehensive 

kuge.  It  is,  however,  from  the 
■tidpoint  of  arms  control,  from  the 
it  dpoint  of  protecting  the  invulnera- 
»i  ty  of  our  deterrent,  from  the 
Midpoint  of  our  national  security,  a 
iiiiificant  step  forward  and  much  bet- 
"han  our  deferral  package  of  March, 
rather  than  there  having  been  a 
'  dy  retreat  since  Moscow,  I  would 
'  there  has  been  a  steady  advance, 
ii  we  now  can  see  in  the  making  a 
5  LT  II  agreement  which  will  move  us 

^urd  toward  effective  arms  control. 


What  it  will  mean  is  a  significant  re- 
duction in  both  the  overall  aggregate  of 
nuclear  delivery  vehicles  and  in  the 
number  of  those  vehicles  that  have 
multiple  independently-targetable  reen- 
try vehicles.  From  that  standpoint,  it 
diminishes  the  threat  to  our  own  land- 
based  intercontinental  ballistic  missiles 
(ICBM).  It  diminishes  the  counterforce 
potential.  It  will  mean  a  reduction  in 
the  number  of  the  intercontinental  bal- 
listic missiles  that  the  Soviet  Union  has 
with  multiple  warheads.  And  we  hope 
it  will  mean  at  least  the  beginning  of 
stopping  the  qualitative  improvements 
of  nuclear  weapons  which  are  poten- 
tially destabilizing.  I  think  that  there  is 
no  question  that  the  agreement  is  a  sub- 
stantial improvement  over  the  deferral 
package  of  last  March.  I  believe  also 
that  it  points  the  way  toward  an  even 
more  effective  arms  control  agreement. 

Essentially,  what  we  are  working  out 
is  a  three-piece  framework.  The  first 
piece  would  be  a  basic  treaty  lasting 
through  1985,  which  would  set  these  nu- 
merical limits,  which  would  constrain 
some  of  the  weapons  programs  that 
threaten  to  be  destabilizing.  There 
would  be  a  3-year  protocol  which 
would  handle,  on  a  temporary  basis, 
some  of  the  weapons  systems  which  are 
being  considered  and  as  to  which  our 
thinking  has  not  progressed  to  the  point 
at  which  we  know  where  our  best  inter- 
ests would  lie  in  a  long-range  solution. 
The  protocol  would  leave  us  in  a  posi- 
tion to  continue  with  all  of  the  de- 
velopments that  we  feel  are  essential  to 
protect  our  security  in  the  event  that 
arms  control  turns  out  to  be  a  failure. 

One  of  the  problems  that  exists  at  the 
present  time  is  that  we  are  endeavoring 
to  defend  against  criticism  a  treaty 
which  remains  to  be  completely 
negotiated.  And  we  are  trying  to  de- 
fend it  against  an  ideal  that  doesn't 
exist.  The  issue  at  the  present  point  ap- 
pears to  be  whether  this  treaty  is  as 
good  as  some  other  hypothetical, 
theoretical  treaty,  and  the  answer  is,  of 
course,  that  it  is  not.  I  can  dream  up  a 
treaty  which  would  be  better.  But  I 
don't  think  I  can  negotiate  that  dream 
treaty  and  I  don't  think  anybody  else 
can,  at  this  point.  The  real  issue  has  to 
be  whether  the  treaty,  as  it  is  finally 
developed,  advances  or  diminishes  the 
security  of  the  United  States.  And  I  can 
say  to  you  without  the  least  doubt  that 
the  treaty  which  is  being  negotiated 
will  represent  a  very  significant  im- 
provement in  the  security  of  the  United 
States. 

Now,  essentially,  that's  where  we 
are  at  the  present  point.  My  account 
leads,  of  course,  to  brief  discussion  of 
the  second  basic  complaint  that  I  men- 


23 

tioned  at  the  beginning  of  my  remarks, 
which  is:  Why  does  arms  control  take 
us  so  long? 

Differences  in  Military  Situations 

I  think  the  answer  is  really  pretty 
clear.  It  takes  so  long  because  it's  very 
complicated,  because  it  deals  with  the 
essence  of  the  security  of  the  countries 
involved  in  arms  control  negotiations. 
We're  also  dealing  with  a  situation  in 
which  there  is  a  considerable  asym- 
metry between  the  situations  of  the  two 
major  military  powers.  There  are  dif- 
ferences in  the  way  in  which  their 
forces  have  developed  and  the  stresses 
that  they  have  placed  on  particular 
weapons  systems  as  against  others, 
differences  certainly  as  far  as  their  rela- 
tions with  other  countries  are  con- 
cerned, and  obvious  geographic  differ- 
ences. These  are  asymmetries  which 
require  consideration  and  resolution  in 
the  course  of  arms  control  negotiations. 
I  will  discuss  a  couple  of  these  asym- 
metries briefly. 

We  have  placed  our  primary  em- 
phasis on  the  maintenance  of  the  so- 
called  strategic  nuclear  triad.  We  have 
our  strategic  nuclear  forces  divided  in 
three  parts.  We  have  the  intercontinen- 
tal ballistic  missiles.  We  have  the  sub- 
marine launched  ballistic  missiles.  We 
have  our  strategic  bombers.  It's  a  rela- 
tively even  division  among  those  three 
components. 

The  Soviet  Union,  on  the  other  hand, 
has  placed  its  primary  emphasis  on  the 
land-based  intercontinental  ballistic 
missiles.  So,  therefore,  constraints  that 
affect  primarily  the  ICBM's  bear  more 
heavily  on  the  Soviet  Union  than  they 
do  on  us. 

Other  asymmetries  that  exist  are,  for- 
tunately, very  much  in  our  favor.  We 
have  only  one  military  threat  of  signifi- 
cance and  that's  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
Soviet  Union,  on  the  other  hand,  has  to 
face  a  long  and  troubled  Eastern  border 
with  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
They  have  on  the  West  the  Eastern 
Europeans,  who  frequently  become  sul- 
len if  not  rebellious.  We,  fortunately, 
don't  have  that  sort  of  a  troubled  bor- 
der situation.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Soviet  Union  is  closer  than  we  are  to 
Western  Europe  and,  therefore,  the 
rapid  deployment  of  forces  is  more 
readily  available  to  them  than  it  is  to 
us. 

With  respect  to  the  future,  it  is  cer- 
tainly my  hope  that  we  will  be  able, 
within  a  relatively  short  period  of  time, 
to  bring  to  a  completion  a  SALT  II 
treaty.  It  will  be,  I  think,  along  the 
general  lines  that  I  have  discussed.  It 
will,  as  I  have  said,  mean  a  significant 


24 


forward  step.  I  hope,  also,  that  with  the 
new  position  of  the  Soviet  Union  with 
regard  to  peaceful  nuclear  explosions 
that  we  will  be  able  to  achieve  a  com- 
prehensive test  ban.  The  two  very  much 
complement  one  another.  If,  for  exam- 
ple, we  succeed  in  a  SALT  agreement 
in  getting  a  ban  on  new  types  of  nu- 
clear weapons,  then  the  existence  of  a 
comprehensive  test  ban  will  give  us  a 
further  degree  of  assurance  that  there  is 
compliance  with  that  provision,  be- 
cause it  would  make  the  development  of 
new  types  of  warheads  considerably 
more  difficult. 

As  far  as  the  other  arms  control 
measures  are  concerned — the  other 
negotiations  on  chemical  weapons, 
radiological  weapons,  conventional 
arms  transfers,  eliminating  the  threat  of 
antisatellite  systems — they,  I  think, 
will  profit  from  the  success  of  these 
two  major  negotiations.  The  time  re- 
quired is  certainly  something  that  I 


Department  of  State  Bulletji 


can't  predict.  They  should  not  be  very 
prolonged  negotiations  now  that  we 
have  succeeded  in  bridging  the  major 
gaps.  We  can  only  hope  that  the  Soviet 
Union  will  continue  to  feel  as  we  feel 
that  the  completion  of  these  agreements 
is  basic  to  the  security  of  both  coun- 
tries, is  essential  to  world  peace,  and 
will  create  the  kind  of  climate  in 
which,  hopefully,  we  can  resolve  many 
of  the  other  differences  that  exist  be- 
tween us  and  that  add  to  the  troubles  of 
the  world.  D 


'  Address  before  the  Woman's  National 
Democratic  Club  in  Washington,  D.C..  on 
Nov.  10.  1977;  Ambassador  Warnke  is  Director  of 
the  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Agency 
(ACDA)  and  chairman  of  the  U.S.  delegation  to 
the  Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks. 

^  Ambassador  Smith  is  U.S.  Special  Repre- 
sentative for  Nonproliferation  Matters  and  U.S. 
Representative  to  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency;  Mr  Farley  is  Deputy  U.S.  Spe- 
cial Representative  for  Nonproliferation  Matters. 


ECOIVOHIICS:  The  United  States 
and  the  Third  World 


by  Anthony  Lake^ 

I  will  speak  for  a  while  first  on  the 
approach  of  a  new  Administration  to 
the  crucial  economic  issues  we  are  ad- 
dressing with  the  developing  nations. 
The  phrase  "new  Administration"  may 
no  longer  be  accurate  after  10  months. 
But  I  think  we  do  have  an  approach  to 
these  issues  that  is  new  in  some  of  its 
directions  and  priorities.  Before  getting 
to  the  specific  issues  themselves,  let 
me  say  a  few  words  about  context. 

For  many  years  during  the  period 
after  World  War  II,  American  relations 
with  Latin  America,  Africa,  and  Asia 
were  looked  at  primarily  through  the 
prism  of  the  cold  war.  And  especially 
with  regard  to  Africa  and  Asia,  our 
concerns  for  close  relations  with  our 
traditional  allies  cut  across  our  inclina- 
tion to  support  the  movement  toward 
independence  by  Europe's  colonies. 

In  recent  years,  we  have  come  to 
look  at  the  problems  of  the  Third 
World  more  in  their  own  right,  in  terms 
of  realities  of  the  Third  World  itself. 
We  can  do  so  because  we  have  come  to 
appreciate  better  the  limits  to  the  influ- 
ence of  both  the  Soviet  Union  and  the 
United  States  in  the  Third  World.  We 
must  do  so  because  of  the  growing  im- 
portance of  the  Third  World  to  us, 
politically  as  well  as  economically,  and 
because  only  bad  policy  ensues  when 
we  allow  either  our  global  fears  or  our 


global  hopes  to  skew  our  vision  of  the 
facts. 

This  is  not  to  say  we  should  be  indif- 
ferent to  the  influence  of  the  Soviet 
Union  in  the  Third  World  or  elsewhere. 
We  and  the  Soviets  have  different 
views  of  history  and  of  the  future;  our 
relationship  continues  to  have  competi- 
tive, as  well  as  cooperative,  elements. 

But  in  terms  of  our  own  self-interest, 
we  must  begin  to  deal  with  the  develop- 
ing nations  on  a  basis  which  takes  full 
account  of  their  growing  importance  to 
us.  And  we  should  understand  that  the 
determination  of  Third  World  nations 
to  decide  their  own  policies,  their  wish 
to  determine  their  own  fates,  is  a  basic 
protection  for  the  world  of  diversity  we 
want  to  see  preserved. 

So  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  say  that 
East-West  relations  or  ties  among  the 
industrial  democracies  are  more  impor- 
tant to  us  than  North-South  policies. 
For  different  reasons,  they  are  all  vital 
to  U.S.  interests  and  to  the  kind  of 
world  we  want  for  our  children.  Ad- 
vancement of  our  objectives  in  one  area 
cannot  be  divorced  from  progress  in 
another.  Worldwide  energy  security, 
for  example,  affects  the  economic  wel- 
fare of  the  industrial  democracies,  the 
developing  world,  and  the  eastern 
Communist  states.  Economic  coopera- 
tion among  the  United  States,  Europe, 
and  Japan  affects  growth  in  the  Third 
World;  by  the  same  token,  their  eco- 


nomic health  is  important  to  our  own 
Another  way  of  looking  at  the  impal 
tance  of  the  U.S. -Third  World  relation 
ship  is  to  enumerate  some  of  thosj 
problems  which  cannot  be  solved  will 
out  their  cooperation. 

•  Controlling  the  proliferation  of  m 
clear  weapons  requires  the  assistanc 
of  India,  Iran,  Brazil,  and  Argentin; 
among  others. 

•  Restraining  the  dangerous  growl 
of  conventional  arms  races  must  be  a( 
dressed  on  every  continent. 

•  Human  rights,  including  the  eci 
nomic  dimension  of  those  rights,  are 
concern  to  us  wherever  they  are  i 
jeopardy. 

•  Managing  an  economically  inte 
dependent  world  to  assure  glob; 
growth  and  promote  economic  equii 
requires  close  cooperation  between  tf 
governments  of  the  industrial  democr; 
cies  and  those  of  the  developin 
nations. 

Managing  the  Relationship 

For  many  of  these  first  months  in  o 
fice,  the  Administration  has  bet 
reviewing — and  arguing  about — ho 
this  complex,  interconnected  relatio: 
ship  with  the  developing  nations  can  I 
managed.  Let  me  summarize  son 
general  conclusions  we  have  come  i 
with  in  six  points. 

First,  we  must  adopt  a  positive  ai 
constructive  attitude  in  addressing  i 
temational  problems  encompassing  t 
developing  countries.  We  will  se( 
common  ground  with  these  countrie 
for  progress  will  only  be  possible  whi 
solutions  are  mutually  beneficial  to  ; 
parties. 

Second,  we  will  recognize  in  our  a 
tions  that  interdependence  is  more  thi 
a  slogan.  It  requires  us,  as  we  fashit 
our  domestic  economic  policies,  to  tal 
into  account  their  impact  on  the  rest 
the  world,  including  the  Third  Worl 
Traditionally,  the  economies  of  the  d  i 
veloping  countries  have  relied  upon  tl  ' 
economic  dynamism  of  the  major  i  I 
dustrial  economies.  We  must  contini  ' 
to  be  reliable  on  that  score.  But  it 
increasingly  true  that  we  have  a  maji 
stake  in  the  health  and  vitality  of  tl  j 
Third  World,  as  well.   No  less  th; 
35%  of  our  exports  went  to  developii 
countries,  while  almost  half  of  our  ir  i 
ports  came  from  them.  ' 

Third,  the  structure  of  the  intern 
tional  system  is  changing,  gradual 
evolving  from  a  "North"  and 
"South"  into  a  global  community 
which  all  countries  have  respoi 
sibilities  as  well  as  rights.  Much  of  tl 
North-South  rhetoric  has,  unforti 
nately,  implied  that  only  the  industri 
nations  have  obligations.  This  cann< 


\» 


¥ 


i 


nuary  1978 


25 


true.  If  fully  accepted,  it  fosters 
th  paternalism  and  resentment.  Even 
e  phrase  "North-South,""  and  the 
chotomy  it  sets  up,  obscures  the  gra- 
tions  that  exist  among  nations.  This 
alysis  does  not  mean  we  can — or 
ould  try  to — split  the  Group  of  77.- 
it  as  the  economies  of  developing 
untries  advance  from  one  level  to 
other,  it  is  important  that  they  show 
:reasing  concern  for  the  global  wel- 
re.  They  will  have  a  growing  stake  in 
:  common  good. 

Key  oil-producing  nations,  for 
ample,  now  ponder  the  damaging  ef- 
;t  of  rising  oil  prices  on  the  health  of 
i  global  economic  system  and,  there- 
re,  on  their  own  long-term  economic 
velopment.  Even  small  oil  price  rises 
n  easily  wipe  out  the  gains  which  the 
lird  World  could  reap  from  aid,  in- 
stment,  and  loans  from  the  industrial 
tions.  Treasury  Secretary  Blumenthal 
Iculated  the  other  day  that  each  per- 
ntage  point  of  increase  in  oil  prices 
ds  $400  million  to  the  U.S.  energy 
St;  it  has  an  even  more  devastating 
pact  on  other  countries. 
Each  nation  must  also  face  its  re- 
Dnsibilities  to  its  own  citizens,  who 
;  most  in  need — and  our  own  country 
no  exception.  However  well- 
ictioning  the  international  economic 
item,  development  is  fundamentally 
challenge  for  each  government  and 
;iety  to  address  in  its  own  terms. 
Fourth,  while  our  policies  must  be 
)bal  in  their  concept,  their  implemen- 
ion  must  be  specific  to  each  situa- 
n.  Policies  must  be  tailored  to  take 
o  account  the  great  diversities  that 
ist  among  the  developing  countries. 
For  the  economically  stronger  coun- 
es,  the  most  appropriate  areas  of 
operation  are  trade  and  access  to  pri- 
te  capital  and  technology.  Most  of 
tin  America  is  now  in  this  position, 
hile  aid  still  plays  an  important  role 

the  region,  its  prosperity  depends 
imarily  upon  the  continuing  evolu- 
in  of  an  open  international  financial 
d  trading  system  in  which  developing 
untries  can  participate  ever  more 
lly. 

For  the  poorer  nations,  including 
ost  African  countries,  official  de- 
lopment  assistance — foreign  aid — 
mains  the  vital  source  of  external 
pital.  Africa  will  benefit  from  the  in- 
ntion  of  the  World  Bank — and  of  our 
vn  Agency  for  International 
svelopment — to  focus  concessional 
sistance  on  the  nations  most  in  need. 
Fifth,  we  accept  the  diverse  models 

economic  and  political  development 
at  the  less  developed  countries 
-DCs)  have  chosen  to  benefit  their 
:oples.  But  we  also  believe  that  cer- 
in  human  rights  have  universal  appli- 


cation. Human  rights  include  not  just 
the  basic  rights  of  due  process,  to- 
gether with  political  freedoms,  but  also 
the  right  of  each  human  being  to  a  just 
share  of  the  fruits  of  one"s  country's 
production. 

Sixth,  we  recognize  that  the  eco- 
nomic and  social  issues  we  all  face — 
such  as  protecting  the  environment  and 
the  oceans — are  global  problems  from 
which  Communist  countries  are  not 
immune  and  to  which  they  can  and 
should  make  a  positive  contribution. 
Consequently,  it  will  be  our  policy  to 
encourage  a  constructive  role  by  the 
centrally  planned  economies — to  in- 
crease their  development  assistance 
generally  and  to  join  us  and  developing 
countries  in  a  global  development  ef- 
fort. 

Basic  North-South  Issues 

These  six  principles  only  have  mean- 
ing, of  course,  in  terms  of  the  specific 
issues  we  face:  liberalizing  trade,  insur- 
ing adequate  balance-of-payments 
financing,  improving  our  foreign  as- 
sistance performance  and  reorienting 
its  focus  in  the  direction  of  poor 
people,  stabilizing  commodity  price 
fluctuations,  and  facilitating  the  flow 
of  investment  and  technology  on  terms 
fair  to  companies  and  governments. 
Underlying  many  of  these  issues,  how- 
ever, are  at  least  three  basic  tensions. 

1.  We  frequently  face  difficult 
choices  between  our  short-term  and  our 
longer  term  interests. 

2.  We  sometimes  confront  a  tension 
between  what  we  consider  to  be  sound 
economic  policy  and,  at  the  same  time, 
our  desire  to  maintain  a  positive 
momentum  in  our  political  relation- 
ships with  the  developing  nations. 

3.  On  almost  every  issue,  we  must 
find  ways  to  enhance  the  participation 
of  LDC"s  in  international  decisionmak- 
ing in  a  way  that  is  acceptable  to  them 
and  to  us. 

Let  me  say  a  word  about  each. 

First,  trade-ojfs  between  short-term 
and  longer  term  interests. 

We  are,  as  you  know,  in  a  period  of 
economic  difficulties,  both  in  the 
United  States  and  abroad.  Governments 
everywhere  are  under  pressure  to  re- 
spond to  the  immediate  plight  of  their 
citizens,  particularly  the  need  to  protect 
jobs.  This  results  in  at  least  two  policy 
dilemmas  for  the  United  States. 

•  It  is  axiomatic  that  a  liberal  trade 
regime  is  in  the  interest  of  both  the  de- 
veloped and  the  developing  nations. 
Freer  trade  can  promote  the  long-term 
development  of  the  resources  the  world 
needs,  provide  lower  prices  and  greater 


choice  for  consumers,  and  increase  op- 
portunities for  producers  in  all  coun- 
tries. Trade  can  be  an  engine  for  eco- 
nomic development  and  a  means  for 
developing  nations  to  participate  in  the 
international  economic  system.  All  this 
is  accepted  in  principle,  as  the  stated 
goal  of  all  countries  participating  in  the 
current  multilateral  trade  negotiations 
in  Geneva.  But  the  harsh  political  real- 
ity is  that  these  longer  term  benefits  are 
threatened  by  short-term  protectionism. 

The  United  States  has  been  in  the 
forefront  in  encouraging  the  negotia- 
tions to  move  forward.  We  must  con- 
tinue to  do  so,  while  seeking  to  cushion 
the  impact  of  immediate  dislocations. 
In  the  months  ahead  the  United  States 
will  be  vigorously  pushing  for  trade 
liberalizing  measures  in  the  current 
trade  negotiations  in  Geneva.  We  will 
be  giving  special  attention  to  products 
of  interest  to  LDC"s.  And  we  will  do 
our  best  to  work  with  other  countries  to 
devise  trading  rules  which  promote 
trade  between  the  developed  and  de- 
veloping world. 

•Another  example  of  the  need — and 
the  difficulty — in  protecting  the  future 
against  shorter  term  pressures  is  the 
issue  of  foreign  assistance.  Our  foreign 
aid  program  has  undergone  many 
changes  over  the  past  decade,  from  the 
large,  capital-intensive  programs  of  the 
I960's  to  the  small  programs  we  now 
increasingly  support — much  of  which 
is  focused  on  rural  development. 

This  Administration  intends  to  give 
more  priority  to  development  assist- 
ance than  it  received  throughout  the 
1970"s.  We  see  these  development  pro- 
grams as  an  integral  part  of  our  overall 
strategy  of  promoting  flows  of  de- 
velopment finance,  as  the  most  effi- 
cient and  direct  method  of  transferring 
resources  to  countries  which  do  not 
have  full  access  to  private  capital  mar- 
kets, and  as  the  most  direct  way  to  at- 
tack poverty. 

We  believe  that  larger  and  more  ef- 
fective foreign  assistance  programs — 
bilateral  and  multilateral — are  in  the 
U.S.  national  interest  and  in  the  inter- 
est of  global  development.  So  year  by 
year,  it  is  increasingly  important  to 
convince  the  Congress  and  the  public 
that  devoting  resources  to  the  fight 
against  poverty  abroad  is  tied  to  the  ul- 
timate health  of  our  economy  here  at 
home. 

The  Administration  consequently 
faces  the  challenge  of  demonstrating  to 
American  citizens  that  foreign  assist- 
ance works — that  it  can,  together  with 
other  policies,  make  a  difference  in  the 
global  food,  energy,  or  population  bal- 
ance and  that  it  can,  by  mobilizing  the 
assistance  of  other  donors  and  en- 
couraging sound  domestic  policies  on 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulletii; 


the  part  of  recipients,  stimulate  growth 
and  equity. 

Let  me  say  another  word  about  our 
approach  to  foreign  assistance.  Our 
focus  on  meeting  basic  human  needs, 
which  is  an  integral  part  of  our  overall 
human  rights  policy,  is  not  as  simple  as 
it  may  appear.  We  face  at  least  two 
basic  challenges  here. 

•In  some  cases,  we  face  a  dilemma 
when  we  consider  foreign  assistance 
for  countries  where  political  and  eco- 
nomic human  rights  are  denied.  Our  as- 
sistance is  targeted  on  improving  the 
economic  conditions  of  poor  people. 
Since  aid  is  generally  govemment-to- 
govemment,  the  regime  concerned  in- 
evitably derives  some  political  boost 
from  our  assistance.  But  we  do  not 
want  to  deprive  poor  people  because  of 
the  nature  of  their  government.  In  such 
cases,  our  decisions  must  be  made  on  a 
pragmatic,  case-by-case  basis  and  very 
human  terms. 

•In  addition,  meeting  basic  human 
needs  is  not,  in  our  view,  a  welfare 
program  but  a  way  for  a  country  and  a 
society  to  develop.  Accordingly,  we 
will  encourage  host  governments  to 
make  an  increasing  commitment  of 
their  own  to  the  needs  of  their  poor,  at 
the  same  time  as  we  increase  our  aid  to 
them.  Many  developing  countries  faced 
with  balance-of-payments  problems, 
high  energy  prices,  and  the  need  for 
massive  domestic  investment,  may  re- 
sist placing  a  priority  emphasis  on  the 
well-being  of  their  poor.  Because  the 
poor  are  often  excluded  from  the  politi- 
cal process,  their  concerns  are  given 
less  weight  by  governing  elites.  If  we 
place  conditions  on  our  aid,  these  elites 
could  charge  us  with  attempting  to 
intervene  in  their  internal  affairs.  Our 
challenge  is  to  be  sensitive  to  their 
concerns,  while  promoting  our  views 
and  our  commitment  to  the  poor. 

A  second  dilemma  which  underlies 
our  North-South  efforts  is  the  need 
both  to  maintain  a  cooperative  mul- 
tilateral political  environment  for  dis- 
cussing economic  issues  while  expres- 
sing our  differences  over  what  are  the 
soundest  and  most  effective  economic 
policies  that  can  serve  our  common 
long-term  interests. 

I  can  think  of  two  cases  where  this 
issue  has  arisen.  In  the  area  of  com- 
modity policy,  the  developing  nations 
have  proposed  the  negotiation  of  an  in- 
tegrated commodity  program  for  18 
different  raw  materials.  The  idea  is  to 
relate  international  efforts  to  address 
the  problem  of  each  commodity  market 
through  a  common  financing 
mechanism — a  common  fund.  This 
proposal  has  assumed  a  strong  political 


significance  in   the   North-South 
dialogue. 

The  United  States  and  other  indus- 
trial nations  agree  with  Third  World 
leaders  that  commodity  issues  are  of 
central  importance  to  the  world  econ- 
omy and  to  the  economic  development 
of  many  countries.  But  we  are  con- 
vinced that  effective  measures  can  be 
devised  only  if  each  market  is  ad- 
dressed as  an  individual  case  and  that 
these  individual  arrangements  form  the 
best  basis  for  a  common  commodity 
policy  and  funding  arrangement. 
Negotiations  on  this  question  begin 
November  7.  We  will  enter  them  in  the 
hope  that  we  can  advance  a  positive 
and  realistic  position.  We  face  the 
challenge  of  supporting  what  we  con- 
sider sound  economic  policies,  while 
working  to  maintain  a  constructive 
negotiating  atmosphere. 

Another  such  area  is  debt.  Develop- 
ing countries  have  been  seeking 
generalized  forgiveness  of  past  official 
debt,  which  many  of  them  see  as  a 
structural  impediment  to  future 
development. 

We  seek  to  respond  to  such  financial 
needs  by  arranging  additional  resource 
transfers,  through  bilateral  and  mul- 
tilateral foreign  assistance.  But  our 
analysis  shows  that  every  debtor  is  in  a 
different  situation.  Some  have  little 
problem  managing  their  debts.  Others 
face  only  a  temporary  difficulty  in  serv- 
icing their  loans.  Still  others  may  face 
long-term  structural  problems  charac- 
terized by  an  inadequate  net  flow  of  fi- 
nancial resources. 

In  cases  of  extreme  and  urgent  need, 
obviously  we  stand  prepared  to  discuss 
debt  rescheduling.  But  in  the  divergent 
circumstances  we  face,  we  believe  any 
generalized  debt  forgiveness  would  be 
inadvisable.  First,  the  benefits  to 
debtors  would  bear  little  relationship  to 
their  development  needs,  since  some 
nations  with  the  largest  debts  are  grow- 
ing fast  and  can  more  easily  service 
them.  Second,  by  treating  all  countries 
alike,  we  would,  in  effect,  be  dis- 
criminating against  those  countries 
which  have  struggled  to  pursue  policies 
to  reduce  their  indebtedness  over  time. 
And  third,  a  general  debt  moratorium 
would  be  seized  upon  by  those  who 
have  traditionally  cried  "giveaway"  at 
any  effort  to  transfer  resources  to  the 
Third  World. 

A  third  basic  issue  underlying 
North-South  economic  relations  is  the 
need  to  expand  LDC  participation  in 
the  management  of  the  world  economy. 

One  of  the  major  drives  behind  the 
new  international  economic  order  is 
Third  World  desire  for  greater  political 
participation  in  the  global  economy. 


The  developing  nations  want  not  only  i 
larger  slice  of  the  global  pie,  they  wan 
to  be  at  the  table  when  the  pie  is  slicec 
and  have  a  voice  in  its  apportionment. 
We  are  convinced  that  it  is  essentia 
to  widen  the  circle  of  international  de 
cisionmaking.  We  believe  that  the  eco 
nomic  system  must  be  fair,  and  equall\ 
important,  it  must  be  seen  as  fair.  Bu 
going  from  principle  to  practice  pre 
sents  us  with  difficult  issues. 

•First,  there  is  the  question  of  hov 
broadbased  global  economic  manage 
ment  can  be.  While  we  live  in  a  work 
of  sovereign  nations,  it  is  also  a  worh  ' 
of  states  which  are  unequal  in  thai 
ability  to  influence  the  system,  fo 
good  or  bad.  Thus  it  is  exceedingly  dif 
ficult  for  the  international  community 
including  developing  countries  them, 
selves,  to  select  which  developinM 
countries  should  play  the  largest  role. 

•There  is  also  the  practical  questioi 
of  which  management  arrangement 
and  institutions  should  be  expanded 
Should  the  most  advanced  developin; 
countries  be  invited  to  join  the  Organi 
zation  for  Economic  Cooperation  ati' 
Development?  Would  they  want  to 
Should  their  voice  and  vote  be  enlarge 
in  international  financial  institutions 
and  if  so,  are  they  willing  to  undertak 
commensurate  obligations?  Should  w 
make  a  special  effort  to  incorporal 
LDCs  into  institutions  which  have  y( 
to  be  created — such  as  for  energy  c 
the  oceans?  These  are  some  of  the  it ' 
sues  we  are  addressing  now.  ( 

To  summarize,  I  think  it  is  fair  to  sa  I 
that  despite  the  increasing  complexitie  y 
of  North-South  relations  and  the  cor  I- 
ceptual  as  well  as  practical  problen" 
we  face,  the  Administration  has  mad 
considerable  progress  in  formulating 
set  of  positive  development  policies. 

•We  are  intent  on  making  substantii 
increases  in  our  foreign  assistance 
while  emphasizing  the  focus  on  meet 
ing  basic  human  needs. 

•On  commodities,  we  reversed  th 
policy  of  previous  years  and  have  at 
cepted  the  principle  of  a  common  fun 
to  facilitate  buffer  stocks. 

•We  have  agreed  to  an  expansion  c 
World  Bank  activities,  also  a  revers. 
of  previous  policy. 

•The  Administration  has  agreed  I 
the  expansion  of  International  Mone 
tary  Fund  lending  and  is  now  seekin 
congressional  agreement. 

•In  the  trade  negotiations,  we  ar 
willing  to  reduce  trade  barriers  o 
products  of  special  interest  to  LDCs. 

•We  will  vigorously  negotiate  for 
system  of  internationally  coordinate 
national  food  reserves. 


L 


I 


.nuary  1978 

•And  for  once,  we  are  taking  the 
nited  Nations  very  seriously  on  eco- 
jmic  and  social  issues. 

The  general  principles  I  have 
ggested  tonight  are  only  a  shorthand 
r  reality.  This  is  especially  true  when 
le  speaks  in  the  abstractions  of  eco- 
)mics.  Our  statistics  and  our  analyses 
(incem  the  lives  of  billions  of  people 
i  the  coming  generation — people  here 
i  America  and  people  abroad.  If  we 
irn  inward,  toward  protectionism  and 
idifference,  the  human  cost  would  be 
itolerably  high.  That  is  the  essential 
joblem  we  will  be  addressing  on  al- 
lost  every  foreign  policy  issue  we  now 
■ce. 

Contributions  of  scholars  such  as 
mrselves  can  be  threefold. 

•Your  objective  analyses  of  events 
Latin  America  and  Africa  are  valu- 
ile  as  scholarship.  They  are  also  valu- 
ile  for  policymakers  trying  to  under- 
and  the  facts  with  which  we  must 
al. 

•  Equally  valuable  would  be  your 
oughts  on  some  of  the  policy  dilem- 
as  I  have  discussed.  I  am  quite  sin- 
re  in  hoping  each  of  you  will  con- 
ier  writing  me  with  your  views  and 
ggestions.  Asking  you  to  do  so  is  one 
the  reasons  I  came  here. 
•And  finally,  whatever  your  views, 
t  me  urge  you  to  press  them  on  de- 


cisionmakers in  both  the  executive 
branch  and  the  Congress  and  to  con- 
tribute to  the  public  debate  on  these 
issues. 

Such  involvement  may  seem,  to 
many  of  you,  inconsistent  with  the  ob- 
jectivity of  a  scholar.  I  have  no  quarrel 
with  such  an  individual  conclusion.  But 
before  reaching  it,  I  hope  you  will  con- 
sider one  point. 

We  are  emerging  now  from  the  most 
contentious  period  in  the  last  100  years 
of  our  nation's  history.  The  war  in 
Vietnam  so  engaged  the  passions  of  us 
all — as  it  should  have  done — that  we 
began  to  think  too  easily  about  all  pol- 
icy issues  in  terms  of  simple 
categories:  right  or  wrong,  interven- 
tionism  or  noninterventionism,  real 
politik  or  idealism. 

As  I  have  tried  to  suggest  tonight, 
the  time  has  passed  when  we  can  think 
in  the  simple  terms  of  any  doctrine, 
whether  derived  from  Munich  or  Viet- 
nam. The  complexities  of  our  chal- 
lenges, the  necessary  breadth  of  our 
priorities,  and  the  depth  of  our  dilem- 
mas elude  such  simple  formulas. 

If  we  are  to  have  a  decent  public  de- 
bate on  our  policies — which  we 
want — and  if  we  are  to  show  how  pro- 
gressive policies  abroad  are  in  our 
long-term  national  interest — as  we 
must — then  there  can  be  no  substitute 
for  the  participation  in  those  debates  of 


27 


scholars  such  as  yourselves.  For  one 
essence  of  scholarship  is  to  help  us 
comprehend  more  clearly  the  com- 
plexities we  must  address,  without  re- 
treat to  a  world  of  comforting 
simplicity.  □ 


Corrupt  Practwes^ 
Investment  IHsclosure 


atement  by  President  Carter  ' 


I  am  pleased  to  sign  into  law  S.  305, 
e  Foreign  Corrupt  Practices  Act  of 
'77  and  the  Domestic  and  Foreign  In- 
;stment  Improved  Disclosure  Act  of 
>77. 

During  my  campaign  for  the  Presi- 
;ncy,  I  repeatedly  stressed  the  need 
r  tough  legislation  to  prohibit  corpo- 

te  bribery.  S.  305  provides  that 
jcessary  sanction. 

I  share  Congress'  belief  that  bribery 
ethically  repugnant  and  competi- 
vely  unnecessary.  Corrupt  practices 
Jtween  corporations  and  public  offi- 
als  overseas  undermine  the  integrity 
id  stability  of  governments  and  harm 
ir  relations  with  other  countries.  Re- 
jnt  revelations  of  widespread  overseas 
ribery  have  eroded  public  confidence 
I  our  basic  institutions. 

This  law  makes  corrupt  payments  to 
)reign  officials  illegal  under  U.S.  law. 


It  requires  publicly  held  corporations  to 
keep  accurate  books  and  records  and 
establish  accounting  controls  to  prevent 
the  use  of  "off-the-books"  devices, 
which  have  been  used  to  disguise  cor- 
porate bribes  in  the  past.  The  law  also 
requires  more  extensive  disclosure  of 
ownership  of  stocks  registered  with  the 
Securities  and  Exchange  Commission. 

These  efforts,  however,  can  only  be 
fully  successful  in  combating  bribery 
and  extortion  if  other  countries  and 
business  itself  take  comparable  action. 
Therefore,  I  hope  progress  will  con- 
tinue in  the  United  Nations  toward  the 
negotiation  of  a  treaty  on  illicit  pay- 
ments. I  am  also  encouraged  by  the  In- 
ternational Chamber  of  Commerce's 
new  Code  of  Ethical  Business 
Practices.  D 


'  Made  on  signing  S.305  into  law  on  Dec.  20. 
1977  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Dec.  26).  As  enacted 
S.305  is  Public  Law  95-213,  approved  Dec.  19. 


'  Address  before  the  annual  meeting  of  the 
African  Studies  Association  and  Latin  American 
Studies  Association  in  Houston  on  Nov.  5.  1977 
(introductory  paragraph  omitted);  Mr.  Lake  is 
Director  of  the  Policy  Planning  Staff. 

^  The  Group  of  77  is  a  caucus  of  developing 
countries  formed  in  1964  at  the  first  U.N.  Con- 
ference on  Trade  and  Development  to  present  a 
unified  bargaining  position  in  their  negotiations 
with  industrialized  countries.  It  is  now  com- 
posed of  1 15  developing  countries. 


I7J§».  Balance 

of  Trade 
and  Payments 

Statement  by  President  Carter  ' 

The  U.S.  balance  of  trade  and  pay- 
ments has  shifted  this  year  to  a  large 
deficit  position.  The  two  main  causes 
appear  to  be  large  oil  imports  by  the 
United  States  and  relatively  slow  eco- 
nomic growth  in  Japan,  Germany,  and 
other  nations. 

These  deficits  have  contributed  to 
some  disorder  in  the  exchange  markets 
and  rapid  movements  in  exchange 
rates.  Heightened  uncertainty  and  in- 
creased exchange  market  pressure  in 
recent  weeks  have  coincided  with  the 
delay  in  congressional  action  on  our 
energy  legislation.  A  mistaken  belief 
that  the  United  States  is  not  prepared  to 
adopt  an  effective  energy  program  has 
been  partly  responsible  for  recent  un- 
settled conditions  in  the  exchange  mar- 
kets. We  have  a  responsibility  to  pro- 
tect the  integrity  of  the  dollar.  Prompt 
action  is  needed  in  energy  and  other 
fields  to  reduce  our  deficits. 

Last  April,  I  submitted  to  the  Con- 
gress a  comprehensive  conservation 
and  conversion  program  to  reduce  our 
dependence  on  foreign  oil.  I  am  confi- 
dent that  the  Congress  will  not  allow 
this  situation  to  continue  to  deteriorate 
through  inaction.  I  am  equally  confi- 
dent that  the  American  people  will 
fully  support  this  critically  important 
program.  When  enacted,  the  measures 
now  under  consideration  will  have  in- 
creasingly beneficial  effect  in  coming 
years  and  exert  their  main  impact  by 
1985. 

The  United  States  is  currently  im- 


28 


porting  petroleum  at  a  cost  of  about 
$45  billion  a  year.  In  1978,  taking  ac- 
count of  planned  production  of  Alaskan 
oil,  our  oil  imports  will  be  stable,  de- 
spite substantial  purchases  for  our 
strategic  petroleum  reserve.  Neverthe- 
less, it  is  essential  that  we  take  further 
steps  to  curtail  these  imports  in  order  to 
reduce  both  our  excessive  dependence 
on  imported  oil  and  the  burden  on  our 
balance  of  payments.  The  energy 
measures  I  am  now  proposing  are  de- 
signed to  serve  these  ends. 

I  have  instructed  the  Department  of 
Energy  to  pursue  efforts  to: 

•  Expand  production  of  oil  at  the  Elk 
Hills  Naval  Petroleum  Reserve; 

•  Encourage  an  expansion  of  produc- 
tion at  Prudhoe  Bay  above  the  1.2  mil- 
lion barrels  a  day  planned  for  early 
1978; 

•  Maintain  production  of  California 
crude  at  a  high  level;  and 

•  Work  with  appropriate  governmen- 
tal and  private  interests  in  expediting 
provision  of  adequate  pipeline  capacity 
for  transport  of  Alaskan  and  Califor- 
nian  oil  east  of  the  Rocky  Mountains. 

Combined  with  conservation  meas- 
ures, these  efforts  offer  good  promise. 

The  new  measures  will  take  effect  in 
the  period  immediately  ahead  and  serve 
as  a  bridge  until  the  implementation  of 
the  more  comprehensive  legislative 
program  begins  to  exert  fundamental 
changes  in  our  energy  balance  in  the 
years  ahead. 

I  have  also  instituted  measures  to 
expand  U.S.  exports. 


•  We  have  doubled  Commodity 
Credit  Corporation  credits  to  support 
agricultural  exports. 

•  In  1978,  we  will  increase  sharply 
lending  activity  by  the  Export-Import 
Bank,  to  support  exports  generally. 

We  will  not  engage  in  unfair  compe- 
tition for  export  markets;  we  will  fully 
respect  our  understandings  with  other 
governments  regarding  export  credit 
terms.  But  within  these  understand- 
ings, there  is  room  for  a  more  active 
effort  to  expand  our  exports.  Through 
such  an  effort,  I  believe  we  can  achieve 
substantial  increases  in  exports  in 
1978,  as  well  as  in  subsequent  years. 

With  these  measures,  the  prospects 
for  an  improvement  in  our  trade  posi- 
tion will  be  good.  Some  of  these  meas- 
ures will  begin  to  take  effect  in  1978. 
When  fully  implemented,  these  meas- 
ures, energy  and  nonenergy,  should 
produce  an  annual  improvement  in  our 
trade  position  of  several  billion  dollars 
and  will  improve  the  U.S.  balance  of 
payments. 

There  has  been  a  great  deal  of  public 
discussion  in  recent  weeks  about  the 
large  U.S.  trade  and  payments  deficits 
and  the  movement  of  rates  in  the  ex- 
change markets,  mainly  between  the 
dollar  and  the  German  mark  and 
Japanese  yen.  The  American  economy 
and  the  dollar  are  fundamentally  sound; 
U.S.  products  on  the  whole  are  com- 
petitive. While  some  exchange  rate  ad- 
justment has  been  understandable  in 
light  of  economic  developments  in 
Germany,   Japan,  and   the  United 


Department  of  State  Bulleticijii 

States,  recent  exchange  market  disor- 
ders are  not  justified.  \|  ^ 

The  new  energy  measures  strike  di-^lit 
rectly  at  a  key  part  of  the  balance-of- 
trade  problem.  The  export  measures 
will  enable  us  to  respond  effectively  to 
expanding  export  opportunities.  To- 
gether, the  energy  and  export  measures 
represent  action  to  strengthen  our  bal- 
ance of  payments  and  deal   with  our 
trade  deficit  in  a  substantive  way  byil>'' 
improving   the  underlying  conditions  I*'' 
upon  which  the  value  of  the  dollar  fun- ' 
damentally  depends. 

Furthermore,  next  month  I  shall  be 
presenting  to  the  Congress  a  com- 
prehensive economic  program  designed 
to  insure  a  healthy  and  growing  econ- 
omy, to  increase  business  capital  in- 
vestment, to  expand  industrial  capacity 
and  productivity,  and  to  maintain  pru- 
dent budgetary  policies  while  coun- 
teracting inflationary  pressures.  These 
and  related  measures  will  promote  eco- 
nomic progress  and  underscore  our 
commitment  to  a  strong  and  sound 
U.S.  economy. 

In  the  discharge  of  our  respon- 
sibilities, we  will,  in  close  consultation 
with  our  friends  abroad,  intervene  to 
the  extent  necessary  to  counter  disor- 
derly conditions  in  the  exchange  mar- 
kets. The  measures  I  have  enumerated 
will  deal  with  the  root  causes  of  these 
market  disturbances  in  a  more  direci 
and  fundamental  way.  C 


'  Made  on  Dec.  21,  1977  (text  from  Week!; 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  o 
Dec.  26). 


EUROPE:  Secretary  Vawwe 
Attends  ]%ATO  Ministerial  Meeting  in  Brussels 


Ik-: 


Secretary  Vance  headed  the  U.S. 
delegation  to  the  regular  ministerial 
meeting  of  the  North  Atlantic  Council 
in  Brussels  on  December  8-9. ' 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
DEC.  9' 

The  ministerial  meeting  which  we 
have  just  finished  has  left  me  with  re- 
newed confidence  in  the  alliance  as 
the  keystone  of  our  relations  with 
Europe  and  of  U.S.  foreign  policy. 
This  meeting,  although  it  produced  no 
dramatic  events,  in  my  judgment  was 
productive  and  very  useful.  We  had  a 
detailed  review  of  the  state  of  East- 
West  relations  and  ongoing  negotia- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union  in  the 


Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks  and 
in  the  mutual  and  balanced  force  re- 
ductions talks  which  are  going  on  in 
Vienna.  In  addition,  we  have  re- 
viewed the  not  yet  completed  discus- 
sions which  are  taking  place  in 
Belgrade. 

We  also  reviewed  the  progress 
which  has  been  made  to  date  in  fulfil- 
ling the  work  program  which  we  had 
set  out  for  ourselves  at  the  summit 
meeting  which  was  held  last  May, 
and  I  think  all  of  us  concluded  that 
the  progress  which  is  being  made  on 
the  various  studies  which  are  under 
way  is  encouraging.  While  the  issues 
which  we  face  are  complex,  and  not 
susceptible  to  easy  solution,  our  dis- 
cussions were  marked  by  harmony 
among  the  15  sovereign  nations. 


It  is  clear  that  the  determination  o| 
the  allies  to  do  what  is  necessary  ti| 
maintain  NATO's  effectiveness  ii 
shared  by  all.  And  1  will  leave  BrusI 
sels  with  the  conviction  that  the  all 
liance  has  the  will,  the  determination! 
and  resourcefulness  to  meet  any  chali 
lenge  to  its  purpose,  its  strength,  or  it 
cohesion.  i, 

Q.  [Inaudible]  Israeli  hard-line i| 
what  will  be  the  position  of  youiti 
country  if  an  armed  conflict  fol>l 
lows?  A  declaration  from  you  nov 
may  help. 

A.  I  don't  want  to  talk  about  such  ; 
hypothetical  question.  I  don't  want  ti 
talk  about  failure.  We  have  before  u:  l 
the  Cairo  conference  which  is  cominj 
up  on  the  14th  of  December.  We  ari 
going  to  do  all  that  we  can  to  heliyjid 


I||kl 


aary  1978 

;e  progress  in  this  conference.  One 
he  purposes  of  my  trip  to  the  Mid- 
East  is  to  do  all  that  I  can  in  help- 
to  assure  that  this  is  a  step  forward 
he  peace  process,  which  I  believe 
be,  and  to  see  that  the  channels 
»minunication  are  kept  open  with 
of  the  parties  to  the  Middle  East 
lict. 

K  Do  you  feel  that  the  Western 
les  have  done  all  that  they  can  to 
e  that  there's  progress  at  the 
l;ro  conference? 

..  This  is  a  matter  which  has  been 
iiussed  with  the  Western  allies,  and 
ai  of  them  will  be  making  their  in- 
iidual  decisions  with  respect  to 
/ht  they  believe  they  can  do  and 
hild  do  with  respect  to  the  Cairo 
o"erence. 

'.  Did  you  get  any  feeling 
H'ther  the  alliance  would  like  the 
Jited  States  to  go  ahead  with  de- 
opment  and  deployment  of  the 
Ktron  bomb? 

.  In  our  ministerial  meetings  the 
eiced  blast  bomb,  the  so-called 
etron  bomb,  was  only  mentioned 
1/ e  and  very  briefly.  [Secretary  of 
){:nse]  Harold  Brown  covered  this  at 
nt  length  in  his  press  conference, 
n  I  endorse  what  Harold  had  to  say 
n  le  discussion  that  he  had  with  all 
f  )U  just  2  days  ago.  I  would  merely 
o  that  no  decision  has  yet  been 
eihed  by  the  President  of  the  United 
ti  ;s  with  respect  to  either  production 
r  ;ployment. 

le  President  has  made  it  clear  that 
'e  /ish  to  have  the  views  of  all  of  our 
II  s  with  respect  to  both  the  question 
f  oduction  and  deployment;  we  have 
o  /et  received  the  views  of  all  of  our 
l;s;  and  we  are  awaiting  their 
i(  ghts  and  suggestions  with  respect 
D  is  matter. 

.  In  Washington  at  your  last 

•rts  conference  you  said  Soviet 

tiements  on  the  Middle  East  had 

a  ed  questions,  but  before  you 

old  make  a  judgment  you  wanted 

o;et  a  report  from  Mr.   Habib 

Uder  Secretary  for  Political  Af- 

aij  Philip  C.  Habib].  You've  got- 

ei  this  report.  What's  your  judg- 

n.it? 

..  My  judgment  is  that  the  Soviet 

rm  wishes  to  see  a  comprehensive 

"•ement  reached  in  the  Middle  East, 

their  objective  remains  a  Geneva 

erence.   Those  objectives  are 

ed,  I  believe,  by  all  the  parties. 

is  what  the  leaders  of  all  of  the 

'  itries  involved  have  stated. 

le  Soviet  Union  and  ourselves  do 

|f>-'agree  with  respect  to  the  question 

Cairo  conference.  Our  position  is 

well  known  with  respect  to  that. 

believe  this  is  an  important  step 


forward,  and  we  are  going  to  do  all  we 
can  to  help  make  progress  through  the 
Cairo  conference. 

Q.  What  is  your  reaction  to  the 
public  Soviet  statement  that  our 
actions — American  actions — now 
are  in  direct  contradiction  to  the 
U.S. -Soviet  joint  declaration  which 
was  issued?^ 

A.  ril  refer  you  back  to  what  I  just 
said  a  couple  of  days  ago  in  a  press 
conference  which  I  held  just  before  I 
left  the  United  States.  I  stated  at  that 
time  that  our  objective  was  a  com- 
prehensive settlement  ultimately  to  be 
consummated  at  a  Geneva  conference. 
That  remains  our  ultimate  objective. 
The  Soviets  state  that  that  is  their  ob- 
jective as  well.  I  see  nothing  in  con- 
flict between  what  we  said  in  the  joint 
U.S. -Soviet  statement,  which  was  ba- 
sically that.  We  did  refer  to  the  de- 
sirability of  convening  a  Geneva  con- 
ference by  the  end  of  the  year  in  the 
joint  statement. 

New  circumstances  have  occurred 
since  that  time.  I  think  that  we  ought 
to  take  advantage  of  those  new  circum- 
stances and  proceed  with  the  Cairo 
conference.  That  does  not  rule  out  an 
ultimate  Geneva  conference,  and, 
therefore,  1  do  not  see  the  inconsis- 
tency which  seems  to  have  been 
suggested  in  the  Tass  article  to  which 
you're  referring. 

Q.  Dr.  Luns,  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral of  NATO,  has  told  the  Greek 
press  that  he  expects  a  new  Ameri- 
can initiative  to  help  with  the 
Greek-Turkish  differences.  Could 
you  comment  on  that? 

A.  No,  all  I  would  say  on  the 
Greek-Turkish  problem  is  that  the 
Foreign  Ministers  of  Greece  and  Tur- 
key, as  I  understand  it,  will  be  meet- 
ing this  afternoon  under  the  auspices 
of  the  Secretary  General.  He  will  not 
be  present  but  the  two  will  be  having  a 
bilateral  discussion.  I  think  all  of  us 
welcome  such  a  discussion.  No  one 
knows  what  will  come  out  of  that  dis- 
cussion. We  hope  that  progress  may 
result  from  it,  but  we'll  have  to  wait 
and  see  what  transpires  at  that 
meeting. 

Insofar  as  the  United  States  is  con- 
cerned, we  have  always  said  that  the 
matter  of  Cyprus,  which  is  one  of  the 
issues  between  them,  is  a  matter 
which  is  being  handled  under  the  aus- 
pices of  the  Secretary  General  of  the 
United  Nations.  We  have,  from  the 
very  first,  said  that  we  welcome  that 
and  that  we  would  do  whatever  we 
could  to  support  that  effort,  and  that 
remains  our  position.  If  at  any  time 
Greece  and  Turkey  ask  our  help  with 
respect  to  their  problems  and  the  res- 
olution of  their  problems,  as  with  any 


29 


other  allies,  we  would  of  course  be 
happy  to  do  what  we  could  to  help. 

Q.  Would  you  give — taking  into 
account  the  Arab  world  reactions, 
would  you  give  any  blessing  to  the 
idea  of  a  separate  peace  between 
Israel  and  Egypt? 

A.  Both  the  President  of  Egypt  and 
the  Prime  Minister  of  Israel  have  said 
that  they  are  seeking  a  comprehensive 
settlement,  not  a  bilateral  settlement, 
and  I  believe  and  accept  what  they 
have  stated. 

Q.  We  have  heard  a  good  deal 
about  the  allies  wanting  more  par- 
ticipation in  the  SALT  discussions 
[Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks] 
in  view  of  SALT  III,  and  the  fact 
that  the  guidelines  for  SALT  III 
are  to  be  part  of  SALT  II.  I  won- 
der if  you  would  comment  on  that 
desire,  and  what  you  think  the  U.S. 
Government  can  do  about  it? 

A.  Yes,  this  is  a  subject  which  I 
addressed  at  some  length  during  my 
remarks  to  the  ministerial  meeting  yes- 
terday. I  gave  assurance  to  our  col- 
leagues with  respect  to  two  or  three 
matters  on  which  concerns  had  been 
expressed.  I  believe  all  of  them  accept 
the  reassurances  which  I  have  given  to 
them.  We  believe  very  strongly  that 
there  should  be  full  and  complete  con- 
sultation in  SALT  II  and,  when  we  get 
to  SALT  III,  in  SALT  III  with  our 
NATO  allies. 

This  is  of  great  importance,  and  we 
have  been  consulting  with  our  NATO 
allies  as  we  have  moved  along  in  SALT 
II.  I  think  if  you  will  talk  to  the  minis- 
ters of  the  various  countries  they  will 
tell  you  that  they  believe  that  these 
consultations  have  been  full  and  have 
been  helpful  to  them. 

I  think  it  is  important,  as  we  move 
on  into  SALT  III  in  the  future,  that 
we  even  intensify  these  consultations 
because  we,  ever  increasingly,  move 
into  more  and  more  complex  matters. 
And,  therefore,  it  is  important  to  have 
even  greater  consultation  than  was  the 
case  in  earlier  times  when  there  were 
not  so  many  complex  issues  to  be 
dealt  with. 

Q.  Would  the  United  States  dis- 
courage the  separate  agreement  in 
principle  between  Egypt  and  Is- 
rael, as  distinct  from  a  separate 
peace  agreement? 

A.  At  this  stage  the  parties  say  they 
want  to  reach  a  comprehensive  agree- 
ment. I  take  what  they  say  at  face 
value;  and  we  are  going  to  do  every- 
thing to  support  what  they  say  they  be- 
lieve is  in  their  interest  and  in  the 
interest  of  regional  peace. 

Q.  I  understand  that,  but  on  the 
way  toward  that  comprehensive 
agreement,  evidently  there's  con- 


30 


Department  of  State  BuUe 


sideration  of  an  agreement  in  prin- 
ciple; not  a  separate  peace  treaty 
but  a  separate  agreement  in  prin- 
ciple. 

A.  But  an  agreement  in  principle 
covering  a  compreiiensive  settlement. 

Q.  I  take  it  from  what  you  said 
about  the  Russians  that  we  do  not 
now  expect  them  to  cooperate  with 
the  United  States  in  Middle  East 
diplomacy  until  you  start  redirect- 
ing your  efforts  toward  reconven- 
ing a  Geneva  conference. 

A.  No.  I  did  not  say  that.  What  I 
said  was  that  I  did  not  believe  that 
they  would  support,  in  any  way,  the 
Cairo  conference  and  that  we  have 
differing  views  with  respect  to  that 
matter. 

Q.  We've  been  told  by  several 
countries  that  there's  now  a  pros- 
pect of  some  movement  forward  in 
the  mutual  and  balanced  force  re- 
ductions in  Vienna.  Is  that  the 
American  impression  also?  And  if 
so  how  would  that  progress,  what 
form  would  it  take? 

A.  We  discussed  at  some  length  the 
mutual  and  balanced  force  reduction 
discussions  and  various  possible  steps 
which  need  to  be  taken  if  progress  is 
going  to  be  made  in  those  talks.  I 
think  it  was  the  unanimous  opinion  of 
all  of  the  ministers  that  it  would  be  in 
the  interest  of  both  sides  if  progress 
could  be  made.  The  first  issue  which 
has  to  be  cleared  away  is  the  issue  of 
data  exchange,  which  is  fundamental 
to  all  other  steps,  and  this  is  the  area 
in  which  I  would  hope  and  expect  that 
we  might  see  the  first  real  steps  of 
progress. 

Q.  The  hopes  were  expressed 
that  the  Cairo  conference  might  be 
open-ended.  In  such  a  case,  would 
you  expect  Jordan  to  join  at  a 
later  stage,  and  at  what  stage? 

A.  I  have  no  idea  what  the  parties 
who  have  declined  to  attend  the  Cairo 
conference  will  or  will  not  do.  That  is 
a  sovereign  decision  that  each  one  of 
them  will  have  to  make  in  the  future, 
and  we're  all  going  to  have  to  watch 
and  see  what  happens  as  the  Cairo 
conference  moves  forward. 

Q.  You  referred  twice  in  an  ear- 
lier statement  to  the  ultimate  need 
for  a  Geneva  conference.  Is  it  the 
American  view  that  there  should  be 
as  much  direct  negotiation  as  pos- 
sible following  the  Cairo  confer- 
ence, not  only  between  Israel  and 
Egypt  but  between  Israel  and  each 
of  the  other  parties? 

A.  We  have  said  for  years  that  we 
believe  that  the  only  way  you  are  going 
to  get  a  settlement  is  through  direct 
discussion  among  the  parties,  and  we 
have  encouraged  direct  discussions 


among  the  parties.  Any  steps  which 
lead  to  that  are  positive  steps  in  our 
judgment,  and,  as  in  the  past,  we  will 
continue  to  encourage  direct  discus- 
sions among  all  the  parties. 


FINAL  COMMUNIQUE^ 

The  North  Atlantic  Council  met  in  Ministe- 
rial session  in  Brussels  on  the  8th  and  9th  of 
December,  1977. 

Ministers  examined  developments  since  the 
Council's  meeting  in  London  last  May.  They 
reaffirmed  their  resolve  to  fulfill  the  common 
purposes  and  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  the 
Alliance  and  agreed  that  the  work  in  this  direc- 
tion was  proceeding  satisfactorily. 

Ministers  emphasized  that  the  strength,  vital- 
ity and  cohesion  of  the  Alliance  are  drawn  not 
only  from  its  defense  preparedness  but  also 
from  the  shared  commitment  of  its  peoples  to 
the  principles  of  democracy,  respect  for  human 
rights,  the  rule  of  law  and  social  progress  and 
from  their  common  desire  to  safeguard  their 
freedom  and  independence.  Ministers  reaf- 
firmed their  commitment  to  the  pursuit  of  de- 
tente and  to  the  achievement  of  a  better  under- 
standing with  the  countries  of  Eastern  Europe 
In  these  efforts  they  are  guided  by  their  dedica- 
tion to  peace  and  their  concern  for  the  worth  of 
the  individual.  Ministers  stressed  that,  to  be 
significant,  efforts  to  remove  barriers  within 
Europe  should  benefit  the  lives  of  individual 
citizens  as  well  as  relations  between  states. 
Ministers  noted  that  although  recent  progress  in 
East-West  relations  had  been  uneven,  there  had 
been  some  favorable  trends.  They  resolved  to 
develop  these  and  to  seek  a  broader  pattern  of 
cooperation  with  the  countries  of  the  Warsaw 
Pact  across  a  wide  range  of  international  is- 
sues. For  these  efforts  to  succeed,  reciprocity 
and  restraint  are  required  on  the  part  of  all 
governments  concerned.  A  policy  of  detente 
cannot  be  pursued  selectively. 

Ministers  considered  the  meeting  now  being 
held  in  Belgrade  as  a  follow-up  to  the  Helsinki 
Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in 
Europe.  They  noted  that  a  thorough  presenta- 
tion of  views  was  taking  place  on  the  degree  of 


Letters 
of  Credence 


On  November  22,  1977,  the  follow- 
ing newly  appointed  Ambassadors  pre- 
sented their  credentials  to  President 
Carter:  ' 


Finland — Jaakko  Olavi  Iloniemi 
France — Francois  de  Laboulaye 


n 


'  For  texts  of  the  Ambassadors'  remarks  and 
the  President's  replies,  see  Department  of  Stale 
press  releases  dated  Nov.  22,  1977. 


progress  made  in  implementing  the  Final  A 
but  regretted  that  a  number  of  specific  cr' 
cisms  of  inadequacies  in  implementation  h 
not  yet  received  satisfactory  answers.  The  i 
change  of  views  in  Belgrade  so  far  has  ci 
firmed  that  while  some  progress  has  be 
achieved  in  certain  fields,  much  remains  to 
done  in  improving  relations  between  states  a 
in  ensuring  the  rights  and  well-being  of  in 
viduals.  Ministers,  recalling  the  importance 
the  commitment  of  all  signatory  governments 
respect  fundamental  freedoms  and  hum 
rights,  including  that  of  the  individual  to  kn 
and  act  upon  his  rights  and  duties  in  this  fie 
affirmed  their  determination  to  pursue 
dialogue  on  these  matters  In  addition  to  me 
ures  to  improve  implementation  in  other  fiel 
Ministers  considered  that  the  scope 
confidence-building  measures  should 
broadened  in  accordance  with  the  provisions 
the  Final  Act.  Recognising  the  long-term  nal 
of  the  CSCE  process,  the  allies  will  contir 
their  efforts  both  during  the  Belgrade  meet 
and  afterwards  to  ensure  that  a  stronger  impe 
is  given  to  full  implementation  of  all  provisi 
of  the  Final  Act  by  all  participating  states. 

Ministers  expressed  satisfaction  at  the  s 
stantial  amount  of  work  already  done  by 
Council  in  permanent  session  on  the  fresh  sti 
of  long-term  trends  in  East-West  relations 
their  implications  for  the  Alliance  requested 
allied  leaders  at  their  meeting  in  London 
May. 

Ministers  noted  with  concern  that  the  ste 
growth  in  the  military  strength  of  the  War- 
Pact  inevitably  casts  a  shadow  over  the  E 
West  relationship.   Emphasizing  the  defeni 
character  of  the  Alliance,  Ministers  recogni 
that  the  foundation  of  its  security  was 
maintenance  by  the  Alliance  of  forces  suffic 
in  quantity  and  quality  to  d-.ter  aggressi 
withstand  pressure  or,  if  necessary,  defend 
territorial  integrity  of  the  member  states.  T 
asserted  their  determination  to  take  the  ne*i 
sary  steps  to  achieve  this  objective.  In  this  c 
text.  Ministers  reaffirmed  their  view  that 
early  coming  into  operation  of  the  defense 
operation  agreements  between  allied  count 
will  strengthen  the  defences  of  the  entire 
liance  in  particular  in  the  Mediterranean. 

The  Ministers  of  countries  participating!  j 
the  integrated  defense  structure  of  the  Allia  !  I 
welcomed  the  progress  being  made  by  those  \ 
lies  concerned  in  developing  the  long-term  |-  ' 
gram  in  selected  areas  to  enable  NATO  foi  i 
to  meet  the  changing  defense  needs  of  ■ 
1980s  and  the  successes  achieved  in  the  |  •  I 
gram  of  short-term  measures  designed  to  ■  , 
prove  the  capabilities  of  NATO  forces  by 
end  of  1978. 

Ministers  took  note  with  appreciation  of 
ports  on  efforts  to  make  more  effective  usd 
available  resources  for  defense  through  - 
creased  standardization  and  interoperabil 
They  welcomed  initiatives  to  encourage 
trans-Atlantic  dialogue  on  equipment  matti 
to  remove  obstacles  to  the  establishment  of 
operative  projects  and  to  create  a  more  I 
anced  relationship  among  European  and  Ncli 


I 


! 


lanuary  1978 


31 


American  members  of  the  Alliance  in  connec- 
tion with  the  procurement  of  defense  equip- 
ment. 

Ministers  reaffirmed  their  determination  to 
strive  for  genuine  measures  of  disarmament  and 
arms  control.  They  noted  the  increased  activity 
in  this  field  in  recent  months  and  the  prospects 
for  progress  on  important  matters.  They  af- 
firmed their  intention  to  play  a  constructive 
role  in  the  forthcoming  United  Nations  special 
session  on  disarmament.  They  expressed  the 
hope  that  1978  would  see  more  rapid  progress 
in  achieving  concrete  measures  in  this  area. 

Ministers  of  the  participating  countries  re- 
viewed the  state  of  negotiations  in  Vienna  on 
Tiutual  and  balanced  force  reductions  (MBFR). 
They  expressed  once  more  their  conviction  that 
these  negotiations  would  achieve  their  agreed 
aim  of  contributing  to  a  more  stable  relation- 
ship and  to  the  strengthening  of  peace  and  se- 
:urity  in  Europe  only  if  they  were  to  result  in 
eliminating  the  existing  ground  force  manpower 
disparity  in  Central  Europe  and  ensuring  undi- 
ITiinished  security  for  all  allies.  These  Ministers 
reaffirmed  their  position  that  these  objectives 
*ould  be  achieved  by  their  proposal  to  estab- 
ish,  in  the  area  of  reductions,  approximate  par- 
ity in  ground  forces  in  the  form  of  a  common 
;ollective  ceiling  for  ground  force  manpower  on 
;ach  side  and  to  reduce  the  disparity  in  main 
5attle  tanks.  They  called  for  a  positive  response 
10  the  additional  offer  they  made  to  the  Warsaw 
Pact  countries  in  December  1975.  They  indi- 
cated the  importance  they  attach  to  the  inclu- 
sion of  associated  measures  in  an  MBFR 
agreement.  These  Ministers  stressed  the  need 
for  a  genuine  data  discussion  as  a  basis  for  fur- 
ther progress  in  these  negotiations. 

Ministers  discussed  the  recent  developments 
in  the  US-USSR  Strategic  Arms  Limitation 
Talks  and  noted  with  satisfaction  the  progress 
made.  They  expressed  support  for  the  efforts  for 
the  United  States  to  conclude  a  SALT  agree- 
ment which  maintains  and  enhances  strategic 
stability  and  is  responsive  to  the  security  inter- 
ests and  concerns  of  the  Alliance. 

Ministers  reviewed  the  developments  con- 
cerning Berlin  and  Germany  as  a  whole  since 
their  last  meeting  in  May    1977.  They  noted 


with  satisfaction  the  positive  effects  which  the 
Quadripartite  Agreement  of  September  3,  1971 
continues  to  have  in  and  around  Berlin.  The 
Ministers  emphasized  the  importance  of  strict 
observation  and  full  implementation  of  all  the 
provisions  of  the  Quadripartite  Agreement,  in- 
cluding those  regarding  the  lies  between  the 
western  sectors  of  Berlin  and  the  Federal  Re- 
public of  Germany  and  those  regarding  the  rep- 
resentation abroad  of  the  interests  of  the  west- 
ern sector  of  Berlin.  Ministers  underlined  the 
essential  connection  between  the  situation  re- 
lating to  Berlin  and  detente,  security  and  coop- 
eration throughout  Europe. 

Ministers  expressed  the  hope  that  recent  de- 
velopments in  the  Middle  East,  which  they  wel- 
come, will  lead  to  a  just  and  lasting  peace  in 
the  region  endorsed  by  all  directly  interested 
parties.  Ministers  took  note  of  the  report  on  the 
situation  in  the  Mediterranean  prepared  on 
their  instructions.  They  once  more  emphasized 
the  importance  they  attach  to  maintaining  the 
balance  of  forces  throughout  the  Mediterranean 
area.  They  requested  the  Council  to  continue  its 
consultations  on  this  subject  and  to  report  to 
them  at  their  next  meeting. 

Ministers  noted  with  appreciation  the  work  of 
the  Committee  on  the  Challenges  of  Modern  So- 
ciety (CCMS)  and  the  actions  taken  by  nations 
to  implement  the  CCMS  recommendations  and 
resolutions  on  air,  inland  water  and  marine  pol- 
lution. Ministers  noted  that  the  Alliance  mem- 
bers had  resolved  to  deal  effectively  with 
hazardous  wastes  to  minimize  environmental 
damage. 

The  next  Ministerial  session  on  the  North  At- 
lantic Council  will  be  held  with  the  participa- 
tion of  heads  of  states  and  governments  in 
Washington  on  30th  and  31st  May,  1978.         D 


'  Another  press  release  relating  to  Secretary 
Vance's  trip  to  Brussels  is  No.  550  of  Dec.  8, 
1977. 

^  Text  from  press  release  551  of  Dec  10, 
1977. 

'  For  text  of  the  joint  statement  issued  on 
Oct.  1,  1977,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  7, 
p.  639. 

*  Text  from  press  release  552  of  Dec.  10, 
1977. 


Crotnt  of  St.  Stephen 


STATEMENT  BY  MR.  NIMEIZ' 

It  is  a  great  pleasure  for  me  to  testify 
this  morning  before  this  subcommittee 
about  a  most  important  milestone  in  our 
relationship  with  the  people  of  Hun- 
gary. As  you  know,  President  Carter 
has  decided  that,  in  light  of  substantial 
improvement  in  U.S. -Hungarian  rela- 
tions, we  will  return  to  the  Hungarian 
people  the  crown  of  St.  Stephen  which 


has  been  in  our  custody  since  the  close 
of  World  War  11. 

There  has  never  been  any  doubt  that 
the  crown  of  St.  Stephen  belongs  to  the 
Hungarian  people.  This  has  been  our 
stated  policy  since  we  received  the 
crown  in  1945.  We  have  recognized  al- 
ways that  our  role  was  merely  one  of 
safekeeping  this  unique  historic  relic 
and  we  have  fulfilled  our  responsibility 
with  propriety  and  dignity.  The  time 


has  come  to  return  the  crown  to  Hun- 
gary where  it  has  served  as  a  symbol  of 
Hungarian  nationhood  for  nearly  1,000 
years.  We  believe  the  decision  to  re- 
turn the  crown  of  St.  Stephen  to  the 
Hungarian  people  at  the  present  time  is 
both  the  right  action  to  take  and  an  ac- 
tion that  is  in  our  national  interest. 

The  President  made  his  decision  in 
light  of  the  history  of  the  crown  and  its 
unique  place  in  the  Hungarian  national 
existence.  Tradition  holds  that  Pope 
Sylvester  II  gave  the  crown  of  St. 
Stephen  to  Hungary's  first  Christian 
king  in  the  year  1000.  It  came  to  sym- 
bolize the  essence  of  the  Hungarian 
people  and  as  such  played  a  central 
role  in  the  course  of  Hungarian  history. 
At  the  end  of  World  War  II,  the  custo- 
dial guard  gave  over  the  treasure  with- 
out condition  to  elements  of  the  U.S. 
Army.  I  am  submitting  to  the  subcom- 
mittee a  narrative  of  this  event  based 
on  the  archives  of  the  executive 
branch. 

Throughout  the  postwar  period,  the 
U.S.  Government  at  many  times  con- 
sidered the  possibility  of  the  return  of 
the  crown.  However,  a  series  of  histori- 
cal events,  as  well  as  difficulties  in 
U.S. -Hungarian  relations,  led  to  post- 
ponement of  a  positive  decision  until 
our  most  recent  review  which  was  un- 
dertaken from  late  spring  through  early 
fall. 

The  return  of  the  crown  to  the  people 
of  Hungary  is  correct  and  needs  no  fur- 
ther justification.  A  historical  treasure 
that  played  a  major  role  in  a  nation's 
history  for  nearly  1,000  years  should  be 
in  that  country  for  its  people,  and  for 
people  everywhere,  to  view  and 
cherish — rather  than  in  a  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment vault. 

Aside  from  the  essential  rightness  of 
the  decision  to  return  the  crown,  we  be- 
lieve this  decision  will  advance  U.S.- 
Hungarian relations.  The  return  of  the 
symbol  of  Hungary's  nationhood  will  re- 
spond to  the  national  aspirations  of  the 
Hungarian  people  and  will  encourage 
understanding  and  better  relations  be- 
tween our  peoples  and  our  two  govern- 
ments. It  will  foster  the  spirit  of  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act^  to  which  we  as  a 
people  and,  we  believe,  the  Hungarian 
people  are  dedicated. 

Relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Hungary  have  improved  signifi- 
cantly in  recent  years. 

•  Hungary  has  been  exemplary 
within  the  Warsaw  Pact  in  its  im- 
plementation of  the  provisions  of  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act. 

•  Our  two  nations  have  signed  a  con- 
sular convention  that  affords  protection 
to  U.S.  citizens  in  Hungary. 

•  We  have  settled  the  outstanding 


32 


nationalization  claims  of  U.S.  citizens 
and  resolved  all  U.S.  Government  fi- 
nancial claims,  including  payment  in 
full  of  the  arrearages  on  a  World  War  I 
era  debt. 

•  We  have  signed  our  first  inter- 
governmental agreement  on  exchanges 
and  cooperation  in  culture,  education, 
science,  and  technology. 

The  decision  to  return  the  crown  in 
no  way  alters  our  view  that  Hungary,  as 
a  Communist  state,  lacks  many  of  the 
essential  elements  of  a  democracy. 

In  considering  the  return  of  the 
crown,  the  Administration  was  con- 
scious of  the  specific  concerns  of 
Hungarian-American  organizations  and 
individuals.  President  Carter,  as  a  can- 
didate, told  the  Coordinating  Commit- 
tee of  Hungarian  Organizations  in  North 
America  in  the  fall  of  1976  that  he 
would  take  their  points  of  view  into 
consideration  because,  as  he  put  it, 
"the  involvement  of  ethnic  and  reli- 
gious groups  in  our  political  system 
should  be  viewed  as  a  national 
strength."  During  the  past  year.  State 
Department  officers  have  met  or  spoken 
with   nearly    100  representatives  of 


Hungarian-American  organizations.  The 
views  of  these  organizations,  as  well  as 
those  of  concerned  Members  of  Con- 
gress and  other  interested  individuals, 
were  fully  taken  into  consideration  in 
making  this  decision. 

We  will  return  the  crown  to  the  Hun- 
garian nation  and  people  in  a  manner 
most  fitting  to  its  significant  national, 
cultural,  and  religious  character.  A 
personal  representative  of  the  President 
will  return  the  crown  in  Budapest  on 
behalf  of  the  American  people  to  a  per- 
sonal representative  of  the  Hungarian 
President  and  a  delegation  of  govern- 
ment officials;  parliamentarians;  lead- 
ers of  a  wide  range  of  popular  organiza- 
tions; and  prominent  religious  leaders 
of  the  Catholic,  Protestant,  and  Jewish 
faiths.  The  Hungarian  Government  has 
assured  us  that  the  crown  will  be 
promptly  and  permanently  displayed  in 
Budapest  in  a  manner  appropriate  to 
the  crown's  historic  and  national  sig- 
nificance. Everyone — Hungarians, 
Americans  of  Hungarian  and  other 
ethnic  backgrounds,  and  ail  others — 
will  be  welcome  to  view  it. 

To  conclude,  I  would  like  to  reiterate 
that  President  Carter  in  making  this 


(/.  ;§>•  9  Bulgaria  Lift  Travel 
RestrnctuMns  on  tHpUnnats 


Department  Statement' 

The  Government  of  the  United  States 
of  America  and  of  the  People's  Repub- 
lic of  Bulgaria  on  November  9  recipro- 
cally lifted  travel  restrictions  on  the 
movement  of  each  others'  accredited 
diplomats  and  their  staffs  within  their 
respective  countries  by  an  exchange  of 
diplomatic  notes  at  the  Bulgarian 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  Sofia. 
The  notes  were  exchanged  by  U.S. 
Ambassador  to  Bulgaria  Raymond  L. 
Garthoff  and  Bulgarian  Director  of  State 
Protocol  Dr.  Boris  Dzhibroz. 

The  Government  of  Bulgaria  declared 
certain  border  zones  off  limits  to  dip- 
lomatic personnel  from  all  foreign  coun- 
tries in  1964.  These  restrictions  still 
apply.  The  Government  of  Bulgaria  im- 
posed additional  restrictions  applicable 
only  to  accredited  U.S.  diplomats  in 
1968  in  response  to  restrictions  placed 
on  accredited  Bulgarian  diplomats  by 
the  U.S.  Government  in  1967.  It  is 
these  bilateral  restrictions  which  the 
exchange  of  notes  yesterday  lifted. 
Henceforth,  the  only  travel  restrictions 
applicable  to  U.S.  diplomats  in  Bul- 
garia are  those  which  apply  to  all  other 


diplomats,  including  those  of  other 
Communist  countries. 

By  virtue  of  this  exchange  of  notes, 
diplomats  of  all  Eastern  European  coun- 
tries with  which  the  United  States  has 
diplomatic  relations  are  free  of  travel 
restrictions  within  the  United  States  ex- 
cept for  visits  to  installations  of  national 
security  significance.  Reciprocal  travel 
restrictions  on  the  movement  of  Soviet 
diplomats  remain  in  effect. 

The  Department  of  State  views  this 
reciprocal  elimination  of  travel  restric- 
tions as  a  positive  step  by  the  Govern- 
ments of  the  People's  Republic  of 
Bulgaria  and  the  United  States  to  im- 
plement the  provisions  of  the  Final  Act 
of  the  Conference  on  Security  and 
Cooperation  in  Europe,  especially  those 
of  basket  III,  to  "  .  .  .  ease  the  regula- 
tions concerning  movement  of  citizens 
from  the  other  participating  States  in 
their  territory,  with  due  regard  to  secu- 
rity requirements."^  □ 


Department  of  State  Bulleti. 

decision  has  fully  taken  into  accoun 
the  particular  history  and  status  of  tht 
crown,  the  expressed  concerns  O' 
Hungarian-Americans,  the  impact  o 
the  crown's  return  on  the  developmen 
of  U.S. -Hungarian  relations,  and  th( 
expected  benefits  to  the  foreign  polic; 
interests  of  the  United  States.  We  be 
lieve  that  the  American  people  wil 
take  pride  in  the  fact  that  we  acceptec 
the  responsibility  of  safeguarding  tht 
crown  during  the  dark  days  of  1945 
that  we  fulfilled  our  custodianship  witl 
dignity,  and  that  we  are  now  returning 
this  single  most  treasured  symbol  of  thi 
Hungarian  people  to  its  proper  anc 
rightful  home. 


JOINT  COMMUNIQUE' 

The  President  of  the  United  States  o^' 
America  has  determined  that  it  is  api 
propriate  and  fitting  that  the  Crown  o*' 
St.  Stephen  and  other  Hungarian  core 
nation  regalia,  which  had  bee: 
safeguarded  in  the  United  States  sinci 
the  close  of  World  War  II,  be  returnei 
to  the  people  of  Hungary. 

The  return  of  the  Crown  will  taki 
place  in  Budapest  on  January  6  and 
in  ceremonies  in  which  delegations  rep 
resenting  the  American  and  Hungariai 
peoples  will  participate. 

The  Government  of  the  Hungariai 
People's  Republic  will  place  the  Crowi 
and  the  coronation  regalia  on  perma 
nent  public  display  in  an  appropriate 
historical  location  in  Budapest  for  th«(i 
population  of  the  country,  Hungariani 
living  abroad  and  foreigners  alike  t« 
see. 


EXCHANGE  OF  LETTERS, 
DEC.  13^ 

United  States 

His  Excellency 

Frigyes  Puja 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 

Hungarian  People's  Republic 


Your  Excellency: 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting 
Department  spokesman  John  Trattner  on 
Nov.  10,  1977. 

'For  complete  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Sept.  1, 
1975,  p.  323. 


As  you  know.  President  Carter  has  deter 
mined  that  it  is  appropriate  and  fitting  that  the 
Crown  of  St  Stephen  and  other  Hungariar 
coronation  regalia,  which  have  been  in  the 
safekeeping  of  the  United  States  since  the  close 
of  World  War  II.  be  returned  to  the  people  ol 
Hungary.  We  are  now  prepared  to  return  the 
Crown  and  other  coronation  regalia  in  a  cere- 
mony in  Budapest. 

As  a  result  of  my  discussions  with  you  and 
with  other  senior  officials  of  the  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs  concerning  the  return  of  the 
Crown,  it  is  my  understanding,  and  that  of  my 


nuary 


1978 


33 


vernment,  that  the  following  arrangements 
ve    been    decided     upon    by     our     two 
"vemments: 

•  The  Crown  and  other  coronation  regalia 

II  be  returned  to  the  Hungarian  nation  and 

I  ipie  in-a  solemn  public  ceremony  at  a  venue 

i  Budapest  which  will  underscore  the  histori- 

cultural,   religious,   and  national   tradition 

ihcse  objects  as  well  as  the  '"people-to- 
piple"  nature  of  their  return. 

>  President  Carter,  as  Chief  of  State,  will 
a'oint  a  senior  United  States  Government  of- 
fial.  or  other  prominent  American,  as  his  per- 
sial  representative  to  lead  the  American  dele- 
gion  which  will  return  the  Crown  and  other 
rialia.  The  American  delegation  will  include 
kmbers  of  the  United  States  Congress  and 
oer  representatives  of  the  American  people.  It 
i:jur  intention  that  the  American  delegation 
«1  include  Americans  of  Hungarian  descent 
c  sen  to  exemplify  the  contributions  of  Hun- 
g  y  to  the  development  of  the  American  nation . 
I  ill  inform  you  as  soon  as  possible  of  the  pre- 
c  ■  composition  of  the  American  delegation. 

•  The  Crown  and  other  regalia,  as  property 
(the  Hungarian  nation  and  people,  will  be  re- 
(  ved  by  the  head  or  designated  representative 
( ihe  Hungarian  state.  We  understand  that  rep- 
tentatives  of  the  Hungarian  National  Assem- 
\  .  Presidential  Council  and  Government, 
I  ders  of  the  Hungarian  Churches — including 
1  Hungarian  Cardinal-Primate  and  leaders  of 
I  ngarian  Protestant  denominations  and  of  the 
I  ;ional  Representation  of  Hungarian  Jews — as 
\  1  as  representatives  of  Hungarian  public  or- 
I  lizations  and  outstanding  personalities  of 
!  !ntific  and  cultural  life  will  be  among  those 
i  ited  to  participate  in  the  ceremony. 
'  Remarks  at  the  ceremony  will  be  confined 

I  statements  which  will  emphasize  traditional 
I  ited  States-Hungarian  ties,   friendship  be- 


tween our  two  peoples,  and  our  mutual  desire 
to  continue  the  development  of  better  bilateral 
relations. 

•  In  keeping  with  the  fact  that  the  ceremony 
of  return  of  the  Crown  will  be  an  event  of  inter- 
national interest,  representatives  of  American, 
Hungarian,  and  international  media,  including 
press,  radio,  and  television,  will  be  permitted 
to  film,  record,  and  report  the  ceremony.  Such 
media  coverage  will  also  be  possible  for  the  ar- 
rival in  Budapest  of  the  American  delegation 
and  for  other  similar  events  in  connection  with 
the  return  of  the  Crown. 

•  The  Hungarian  and  United  States  Govern- 
ments will,  upon  transfer  of  the  Crown  and 
other  regalia,  exchange  notes  or  letters 
acknowledging  the  safe  receipt  of  these  objects 
and  waiving  any  claims  by  each  Government 
against  the  other  Government  arising  from  the 

United  States  Government  safekeeping  of 
them. 

•  A  Joint  Communique  officially  announcing 
that  the  Crown  and  other  coronation  regalia  will 
be  returned  is  to  be  made  simultaneously  in  the 
near  future  by  appropriate  United  States  and 
Hungarian  authorities. 

•  The  Crown  and  other  coronation  regalia 
will  be  placed  on  permanent  public  display  in 
an  appropriate  historical  location  in  Budapest 
for  the  population  of  the  country,  Hungarians 
living  abroad,  and  foreigners  alike  to  see. 

Your  Excellency.  I  would  appreciate  receiv- 
ing confirmation  that  you  and  your  Government 
share  the  same  understanding  of  the  arrange- 


ments, as  specified  above,  pertaining  to  the  re- 
turn of  the  Crown  of  St.  Stephen  and  other 
coronation  regalia. 

Sincerely  yours. 

Philip  M.  Kaiser 
American  Ambassador 

Hungary 

His  Excellency 
Philip  M.  Kaiser 
American  Ambassador 
Budapest.  Hungary 

Dear  Mr.  Ambassador: 

I  wish  to  thank  you  for  your  letter  of  De- 
cember 13,  1977,  in  which  you  have  reaffirmed 
the  decision  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States  to  return  the  Crown  of  St.  Stephen  and 
other  Hungarian  coronation  regalia  to  the  Hun- 
garian people  and  have  described  your  under- 
standing of  the  arrangements  pertaining  to  the 
return  of  the  Crown. 

I  am  pleased  to  inform  you  that  the  points 
outlined  in  your  letter  of  December  13,  1977. 
clearly  reflect  my  understanding,  and  that  of 
my  Government,  of  the  arrangements  which 
have  been  decided  upon  by  our  two  govern- 
ments concerning  the  return  of  the  Crown. 

Sincerely  yours, 

Frigyes  Puja 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 

Hungarian  People's  Republic  D 


'Made  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Europe  and 
the  Middle  East  of  the  House  Committee  on  In- 
ternational Relations  on  Nov.  9,  1977.  The  com- 
plete transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  published 
by  the  committee  and  will  be  available  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 


Printing  Office,  Washington,  DC.  20402. 
Matthew  Nimetz  is  Counselor  of  the  Department. 

^For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Sept.  1,  1975, 
p.  323. 

'Press  release  570  of  Dec.  15,  1977. 


FOOD:  FuimUng  A  Bcmc  Human  Right 


I  Andrew  Young^ 

It  is  an  honor  for  me  to  be  invited  to 
^  e  this  10th  lecture  commemorating 
hnk  L.  McDougall  of  Australia  who 
d  so  much  to  create  this  wonderful  ag- 
r  ultural  arm  of  the  U.N.  system, 
'lile  I  was  not  privileged  to  know  him, 
lim  told  that  inspiration,  imagination, 

d  determination  best  characterize 
hnk  McDougall. 

We  are  often  told  that  this  planet  is 
\  efuUy  short  of  persons  of  the 
I;Dougall  mold,  but  this  view  is  not 
•  :eptable  to  me.  Many  others,  in  all 
irts  of  the  world,  have  the  visions  and 
■  mirations  of  this  noble  Australian,  and 

lope  and  pray  they  also  have  his  de- 


termination. You  Ministers,  the  Sec- 
retariat, representatives  of  other  agen- 
cies, can  best  remember  Frank 
McDougall  by  stimulating  thought 
on  new  approaches  among  your 
colleagues. 

By  refusing  to  accept  anything  but 
the  very  best  and  by  assuring  that 
whatever  we  do  or  propose  in  this  criti- 
cal field  of  agriculture  has,  as  its  very 
base,  the  fullest  consideration  of  the 
dignity  of  man  and  the  rights  given  him 
by  our  Creator. 

America  has  its  roots  deep  in  agricul- 
ture. Our  greatness,  our  failures,  our 
joys,  and  our  agonies  derive  in  large 
part  from  these  roots.  Thomas  Jefferson 
was  a  democrat,  a  humanist,  and  a 


farmer.  His  role  in  the  birth  of  our  coun- 
try and  in  the  declaration  of  human 
rights  derives  from  his  agrarian  back- 
ground and  philosophy. 

American  farmers  played  a  vital  role 
in  expanding  our  frontiers  westward. 
Their  detemiination,  their  courage,  and 
their  individualism  rose  from  their 
closeness  to  and  love  for  the  land. 
America's  commitment  to  human  rights 
and  individual  liberty  owes  much  to 
these  agricultural  pioneers.  Our  eco- 
nomic development  in  the  past  and  our 
prosperity  today  are  based  in  large  part 
on  our  agricultural  abundance.  While 
only  a  tiny  fraction  of  our  labor  force 
remains  in  agriculture,  much  of  our  in- 
dustrial production  capability  and  our 


34 


export  potential  would  not  exist  without 
agriculture. 

President  Carter  is  a  farmer.  His  farm 
was  not  run  by  a  corporation;  it  was  fam- 
ily run.  His  hands  and  his  feet  know 
well  the  red  dirt  of  Georgia.  Bob  Berg- 
land,  our  Secretary  of  Agriculture,  is 
also  a  farmer — not  an  agronomist  or  a 
bureaucrat  or  an  agricultural  business 
executive,  but  a  farmer — elected  by 
other  farmers  to  Congress  and  then  ap- 
pointed by  the  President. 

Our  background  and  our  philosophy, 
our  leaders  and  our  people  make  the 
United  States  a  strong  supporter  of  ag- 
ricultural development.  We  believe  that 
international  cooperation  is  necessary  if 
the  world's  problems  in  food,  nutrition, 
and  agriculture  are  ever  to  be  resolved. 
But  we  know  full  well  also  that  great 
mistakes  can  be  made  in  agriculture. 
Coming  from  the  southern  part  of  the 
United  States,  I  am  painfully  aware  that 
the  organization  of  agriculture  can  be  an 
instrument  of  repression  and  human 
bondage.  The  colonial  system  of  agricul- 
ture in  our  South  was  based  on  cheap 
slave  labor.  Even  after  the  Civil  War 
many  elements  of  this  system  remained. 
Hatred  of  land  contributes  to  continued 
enslavement. 

Industrialization  transformed  the 
South — its  labor,  its  economic  struc- 
ture, and  its  social  organization.  Indus- 
trialization attracted  the  poor 
farmers — black  and  white — off  the  land 
where  they  could  barely  scratch  a  liv- 
ing. Industrialization  generated  a  de- 
mand for  skilled  and  educated  labor. 
The  blacks  of  our  South  could  no  longer 
be  held  down  to  fuel  the  profits  of  ab- 
sentee landlords.  They  had  to  become 
educated,  trained,  and  proud  in  order  to 
participate  in  the  industrialization  proc- 
ess. 

The  experience  of  the  southern 
United  States  has  taught  us  a  lesson. 
Agricultural  development  can  only  suc- 
ceed in  the  long  run  if  the  rights  to  land 
and  the  social  organization  that  support 
agriculture  production  and  distribution 
are  fair  and  just. 

We  must  reorient  our  thinking  to- 
ward the  land  and  to  the  needs  of  those 
who  labor  on  the  land.  Farmers  need 
motivation  to  do  their  job.  The  work 
must  pay.  The  life  must  be  bearable.  If 
people  are  to  find  living  in  the  rural 
areas  attractive,  then  leaders  need  to 
adopt  policies  that  make  those  areas  in- 
viting and  see  to  it  that  the  total  rural 
environment  satisfies.  The  public  can 
push  for  this.  Many  Americans  believe 
now  that  they  can  best  influence  na- 
tional policy  by  controlling  their 
neighborhood  community.  Others  are 
returning  to  the  land  in  search  of  a  bet- 
ter way  to  live. 

Our  experience  has  taught  us  also 


that  many  of  our  urban  problems  have 
rural  origins;  for  example,  where  ag- 
riculture is  neglected  by  public  officials 
to  the  point  that  people  abandon  the 
land  and  go  to  the  cities  to  seek  a  better 
life.  Yet  in  the  cities,  life  is  not  neces- 
sarily better. 

Food  is  and  always  has  been  top-level 
politics  in  my  country  and,  I  suspect,  it 
has  been  and  is  in  yours.  How  many 
times  political  leaders  would  have  done 
better  to  choose  a  full  granary  than  a 
full  arsenal  to  prevent  violence  and  dis- 
ruption. 

Food  and  hunger  are  now  very  much  a 
part  of  the  international  debate  between 
what  we  call  the  North  and  the  South.  In 
the  past,  monarchs,  presidents,  prime 
ministers  and  generals  have  risen  or  fal- 
len with  the  fluctuations  of  staple  food 
prices.  Hunger  knows  no  homeland;  it 
violates  borders,  impels  migrations, 
alienates  otherwise  loyal  citizens. 
Hunger  is  said  to  be  a  problem  of  the 
poor,  but  the  hungry  poor,  in  their  anger 
and  frustration,  can  pull  down  the  rich 
and  powerful.  Food  is  a  right. 

Food  is  a  political  right.  Our  own  po- 
sitions as  leaders  depend  on  guaran- 
teeing this  right.  Many  of  us  began  our 
careers  with  slim  waistlines  and  good  in- 
tentions. Now  we  are  part  of  a  privileged 
group,  circling  the  groaning  tables  of  in- 
ternational diplomacy.  It  is,  therefore, 
incumbent  on  us  to  stay  aware:  There  is 
hunger  and  malnutrition,  in  my  own 
country  and  in  other  lands;  it  can  come 
upon  us  swiftly. 

I  grew  up  in  the  tradition  of  civil 
rights  struggles  to  affirm  popular  rights. 
In  the  U.S.  civil  rights  movement,  we 
used  to  ask,  "What  good  is  it  to  have  the 
right  to  eat  at  an  integrated  lunch 
counter  if  you  can't  pay  the  bill?"  We 
knew  we  had  to  desegregate  public  ac- 
commodations; we  also  knew  we  had  to 
confront  the  economic  barriers  to  uni- 
versal human  rights. 

What  more  basic  right  could  there  be 
than  the  right  to  food?  It  underpins  all 
other  human  rights,  for  without  food 
there  is  no  humanity,  either  of  body  or 
spirit.  Hunger  not  only  saps  vitality,  it 
violates  human  dignity.  Though  many  of 
us  live  with  abundance,  we  are  all  aware 
how  pervasive  hunger  is. 

In  the  African  Sahel  even  now  rainfall 
and  crops  are  uncertain,  and  the  situa- 
tion grows  more  ominous  daily.  In  the 
United  States  too,  there  have  been  seri- 
ous droughts  in  the  West  and  South. 
Elsewhere,  in  the  midst  of  natural  or 
political  upheavals,  farmers  do  not 
plant.  Although  most  of  the  world's 
granaries  are  overflowing  today,  they 
may  not  be  tomorrow.  Even  in  the  midst 
of  plenty,  drought  and  famine  are  still 
with  us.  Experts  tell  us  that  a  reason- 
able estimate  of  the  number  who  are  un- 


Department  of  State  BulK 

dernourished  in  our  world  is  500  ir 
lion.  We  know  that  many  govemmc 
are  hard-pressed  to  raise  the  money 
pay  for  badly  needed  food  imports. 

Today,  in  a  period  of  relative  plen 
it  is  essential  to  work  toward  guarantc 
of  the  right  to  food  for  the  world's  po[ 
lation.  It  is  time  to  take  stock  and  pi 
against  future  famines. 

Billions  have  gone  into  food  relief 
recent  years.  But  relief  ends  only 
day's  hunger;  it  does  nothing  for  I 
long  term.  The  ultimate  goal  is  to 
food  security.  We  have  the  obligati 
now  to  plan  preventive  measures  in  b«' 
marketing  and  production  that  may  ( 
viate  the  emergency  sacks  of  grain  a 
help  people  devise  ways  to  feed  the 
selves. 

Hunger  and  Poverty 

Hunger  is  primarily  a  problem  of  i 
poor  and  the  powerless.  The  rich  son 
how  manage  to  get  enough  to  eat.  Fc 
is  not  the  only  problem  of  the  nomads 
the  Sahel,  the  miseries  of  those  sleep) 
in  the  overcrowded  streets  of  Calcut 
or  the  hungry  in  Haiti.  Poverty  is 
complex  of  deprivations,  only  one 
which  is  hunger.  But  of  all  the  misf 
tunes  that  afflict  this  planet,  surely 
lief  of  hunger  is  the  most  essential. 

Our   ancestors  were  far  more 
the    mercy    of    natural    threats 
food  production — drought,  pestilen 
floods,  and  disease — than  we  need 
We  possess  many  techniques  for  solv 
the  problems  of  world  hunger  and  m 
nutrition.  Today  hunger  need  not  be 
evitable.  The  world  can  produce  enoi 
food  for  all — within  our  lifetime 
thanks  to  the  advances  throughout 
ages,  including  the  plow.  Productic 
however,  is  only  one  side  of  the  co 
The  other  is  distribution.  Who  will  p 
duce  more  and  for  whose  benefit?  W 
is  food  distributed  so  unevenly? 

In  attacking  problems  of  hunger  a 
poverty,  we  need  pay  special  attent: 
to  the  rural  poor.  One  way  to  help  i 
rural  poor  is  to  increase  their  se 
sufficiency.  There  are  many  rural  p« 
who  canot  pay  for  imported  food  a 
who  live  on  marginal  lands  in  fragile  t 
vironments.  For  a  variety  of  reasc 
they  are  unable  to  grow  enough  foe 
draw  enough  water,  and  plant  enou 
ground  cover  to  subsist.  My  Chint 
friends  say,  "It  is  good  to  give  a  fish  t< 
hungry  man.  It  is  better  still  to  help  h 
fish  for  himself." 

Self-reliance,  however,  is  only  a  p 
of  the  answer.  In  food,  the  world 
interdependent.  Our  common  task- 
organize  this  interdependence  fairly— 
unJFinished.  Many  people  feel  helpl«[ 
and  angry  before  the  fluctuations 
world  food  prices,  the  insufficiencies! 


luary 


1978 


;  present  grain  reserve  pattern,  the 

raries  of  marketing,  the  difficulties  in 

ablishing  grain  reserves,  the  scarcity 

Icapital  for  investment.  Even  minimal 

bal  emergency  food  reserves  fall 

rt  of  what  many  consider  sufficient. 

le  poor  nations  expect  a  genuine  rein- 

ced  effort  from  the  richer  nations. 

e  must  renew  domestic  efforts  to  im- 

ement  the  agrarian  reforms  necessary  to 
d  the  poor.  Hard  political  choices  have 
t(be  made.  Let  us  terminate: 

»  Land  tenure  policies  which  result 

iiunfair  distribution  of  the  fruits  of  the 

l?d  and  inefficient  production; 

»  Credit  facilities  that  benefit  the 

h  farmers  and  ignore  the  small-  and 

ndium-sized  entrepreneurs; 

•  Pricing  policies  which  deny  low- 
i:ome  fanners  a  fair  return  on  their 
piduction  or  place  a  disproportionate 
t;  burden  on  them; 

»  Distribution  policies  which  impede 
t  free  flow  of  vital  foodstuffs  from 
a  as  of  abundance  to  areas  of  need, 
e'n  in  the  midst  of  famine;  and 
:  »  Population  policies  that  fail  to  in- 
$e  couples  the  right  to  determine  the 
Dnber  and  spacing  of  births. 

Dbviously  each  nation  should  insure 
t  it  it  is  conscientiously  following 
p  icies  designed  to  help  the  poor  to 
a  lieve  their  right  to  food.  However,  the 
cnmunity  of  nations  collectively  has  a 
r  ponsibility  to  cooperate  to  improve 
t  international  climate  for  efficient 
fiduction  and  distribution  and  elimina- 
1 1  of  hunger  and  poverty: 

»  By  a  substantial  and  effective  in- 
case in  resources  transfer  devoted  to  the 
f  blems  of  hunger  and  malnutrition; 

*  By  an  accelerated  transfer  of  tech- 
r  ogy  and  know-how  with  careful  adap- 
t  on  to  local  circumstances;  and 

»  By  an  improvement  in  the  interna- 
t  nal  market  for  food,  reducing  the 
c;le  of  scarcity  and  plenty,  of  high 
p  ces  that  take  food  from  hungry 
nuths,  and  low  prices  that  ruin  farms 
fancially  and  destroy  their  access  to 
edit. 

Die  richer  nations  have  done  far  less 

tin  they  might  to  help  their  poorer 

righbors  through  resource  transfers 

ad  technological  assistance.  Govem- 

n  nts  are  supported  by  constituencies 

Tthin  their  own  borders  who  often 

I  ither  know  of  nor  care  about  problems 

i' other  countries.  Taxes  are  always  too 

:h,  and  there  is  little  sentiment  for 

ng  them  on  projects  whose  benefits 

:;  at  best  far  away  and  indirect.  Con- 

"vation  is  fine  for  others  but  not  if  it 

•  mands  a  change  in  one's  own  style 

d  patterns  of  life. 

Protectionism,  subsidization  of  ineffi- 
.'nt  production,  and  unfair  commercial 


practices  still  abound.  And  yet  if  pov- 
erty in  general  and  the  maldistribution 
of  the  world's  wealth  is  to  be  corrected, 
we  need  the  courage  and  wisdom  to  ac- 
cept changes,  not  because  they  are  easy 
to  accomplish  but  because  we  recognize 
their  innate  justice.  The  food  producing 
and  exporting  countries  have  a  special 
obligation — to  help  organize  a  more  ef- 
fective and  stable  market  for  food,  to 
use  their  food  abundance  wisely  for  the 
international  good,  to  contribute  to  an 
effective  international  system  of  food  re- 
serves, and  to  disseminate  their  produc- 
tion knowledge  to  enhance  food  security 
for  all. 

Rural  Development 

But  in  spite  of  all  that  is  done  by  the 
agricultural  exporting  nations,  there  will 
be  no  true  independence  and  freedom 
without  a  well-developed  program  of 
rural  development.  Our  task  is  not  just 
to  feed  hungry  people  but  to  involve 
them  in  productive  capabilities. 

The  problems  of  urban  migration,  un- 
employment, and  income  distribution 
that  plague  all  of  the  nations  of  the 
world  in  some  form  are  only  exaggerated 
by  food  dependence.  Rural  development 
can  be  a  key  to  both  food  production  and 
the  stabilization  of  our  nations  in  new 
development  patterns. 

In  this  decade,  the  development  plans 
of  many  countries  received  a  rude  set- 
back from  rising  oil  prices.  Many  na- 
tions experienced  hunger.  We  have 
given  much  thought  to  oil  and  not 
enough  to  agriculture.  Treated  well,  the 
land  is  an  inexhaustible  resource,  not  a 
depletable  one  like  oil.  Renewing  itself 
every  growing  season,  the  land  can  pro- 
tect us  from  the  worst  terrors  of  want.  It 
is  up  to  us — the  international  commu- 
nity of  nations — to  behave  responsibly, 
using  our  resources  well  and  effectively 
for  the  good  of  all.  Rome  is  called  the 
Eternal  City.  It  is  also  the  city  of  our 
sustenance. 

The  Food  and  Agriculture  Organiza- 
tion (FAO)  here  in  Rome  has  been  a 
vital  force  for  international  cooperation 
in  agriculture  since  1945.  It  is  deserv- 
ing of  our  support  and  close  attention.  It 
is  our  organization,  and  we  have  the  re- 
sponsibility to  make  it  an  increasingly 
effective  force  in  world  agriculture. 

The  FAO's  World  Food  Program  is  an 
increasingly  important  channel  for  food 
aid.  The  concept  of  food  for  work, 
pioneered  by  the  program,  can  be  ex- 
panded into  one  increasingly  develop- 
mental tool. 

But  if  food,  production  is  to  be  a  de- 
velopment machine,  contributing  to  an 
agriculture-based  rural  development 
strategy,  the  entire  community  of  inter- 
national development  agencies  must  be 


35 


involved.  The  patterns  of  roads  and 
infrastructure  in  most  of  the  developing 
world  are  part  of  the  colonial  pattern  of 
exploitation.  They  were  not  designed  to 
help  the  nationals  develop.  They  are 
still  contributing  to  the  enslavement  of 
the  people. 

If  this  pattern  is  to  be  reversed,  then 
freedom  roads  developed  by  the  U.N. 
Development  Program;  credit  availabil- 
ity structured  through  the  International 
Fund  for  Agricultural  Development  and 
the  World  Bank;  fertilizer,  irrigation, 
and  rural  industrial  development  must 
somehow  be  done  in  concert. 

But  bureaucratic  coordination  can 
also  be  the  death  of  development.  We 
can  get  so  concerned  about  protecting 
our  bureaucratic-vested  interests  that  we 
never  get  to  the  people  with  the  re- 
sources they  so  desperately  need. 

There  is  a  delicate  balance  between 
coordination  and  creative  competition 
that  must  be  found.  Every  country  in  the 
world  is  fighting  and  losing  the  battle  of 
bureaucracy.'  Whether  East,  West, 
North,  or  South,  we  find  that  we  are  our 
own  worst  enemies. 

Food  Corps 

One  of  the  mechanisms  which  has 
emerged  as  a  creative  challenge  to  the 
problems  of  bureaucracy  is  the  utiliza- 
tion of  the  volunteer.  As  a  concept  to 
help  the  agriculturally  less  developed 
nations  of  the  world,  I  like  the  idea  of 
national,  regional,  and  perhaps  even  in- 
ternational volunteers  for  food  produc- 
tion. The  idea  would  be  to  integrate  the 
best  of  the  volunteer  service  concept 
with  the  best  ideas  for  promoting  effi- 
cient, low-cost  agricultural  productivity 
and  technical  cooperation  among  de- 
veloping countries.  Technical  efficiency 
is  as  important  as  voluntary  service  and 
might  best  be  built  in  by  emphasis  on 
both  human  and  technical  progress. 

Volunteers  have  many  strengths. 
They  are  dedicated;  they  are  not  a  new 
bureaucracy  for  they  are  temporary.  But 
to  be  effective,  they  must  be  well- 
trained. 

For  technical  services,  we  have 
within  the  U.N.  system  itself  consider- 
able available  backup.  Moreover,  since 
self-reliance,  not  exports,  is  the  goal, 
village  improvement  needs  to  be  kept 
low-cost. 

Such  a  corps  of  volunteers  could 
serve  where  the  mechanized  techniques 
of  expensive  famis  are  ruled  out.  Even  if 
funds  were  available,  mechanized  tech- 
niques have  their  limits,  particularly  in 
the  fragile  environments  where  many  of 
the  people  most  vulnerable  to  famine 
live.  There,  even  small  shifts  in  weather 
or  land  use  can  bring  disaster.  Massive 
mechanized  intervention  can  even  result 


36 


in  great  waste,  like  the  infamous  peanut 
(groundnut)  scheme  in  Tanzania  before 
independence. 

Such  a  national,  regional,  and  inter- 
national food  corps  would  promote  small 
improvements  that  reduce  problems  of 
excessive  or  wasteful  land  use,  poor 
crops  or  stock  varieties,  erosion,  grass 
burning,  inadequate  water  supply,  and 
deforestation.  One  part  might  specialize 
in  the  needs  of  rural  women,  who  ac- 
count for  at  least  half  of  the  subsistence 
food  production  of  the  developing  world. 
Volunteers  must  have  knowledge  not 
only  of  different  agricultural  processes 
but  also  of  different  societies.  Village 
agricultural  development  requires  great 
sensitivity  to  local  social  relations. 

Farming  takes  time  and  persistence. 
As  outside  volunteers  withdraw,  and  the 
nationals  take  over,  it  is  important  to 
maintain  technical  backup  services  for 
some  years.  Too  many  village  develop- 
ments have  faded  away  for  lack  of  tech- 
nical support  during  a  reasonable  transi- 
tion period.  Food  volunteers  would  take 
on  tasks  in  the  context  of  national  plans, 
through  a  process  which  might  include 
dialogue  with  capital  donors.  At  the  out- 
set if  the  international,  regional,  and  na- 
tional volunteers  train  together,  this 
could  reinforce  the  national  agricul- 
tural, educational,  research,  and  exten- 
sion services.  As  many  of  the  outside 
volunteers  as  possible  should  come  from 
the  developing  countries. 

Volunteers  would  be  expected  to  put 
their  hand  to  the  plow,  the  pump,  the 
wheel.  However,  their  main  charge 
would  be  to  stimulate  villagers  to  greater 
production  and  self-sufficiency  to  be 
part  of  a  self-perpetuating  chain  of  prac- 
tical agricultural  education. 

This  idea  of  food  volunteers  is  con- 
ceived as  a  complement  to  the  existing 
international  development  structures. 
Since  any  organizational  planning  must 
be  done  collectively,  I  suggest  the  con- 
cept only  in  broad  outline;  it  must,  of 
course,  fit  into  the  existing  international 
system  and  benefit  from  existing  na- 
tional services. 

In  our  struggle  against  hunger  and 
malnutrition,  a  food  corps  concept  is 
only  a  step.  Who  would  not  volunteer  in 
such  a  cause?  Of  course,  this  cannot  an- 
swer all  our  problems;  there  is  no  simple 
single  answer.  Working  to  develop  this 
concept  can  refresh  our  dialogue,  give 
us  strength  to  solve  conflicts  among  our- 
selves, and  renew  our  dedication  to  al- 
leviating global  hunger. 

This  year  I  had  the  good  fortune  to 
travel  to  several  African  and  Caribbean 
countries.  In  Jamaica,  I  met  people  who 
said,  "Why  should  a  poor  country,  with 
good  land,  import  foodT'  In  Guyana  I 
was  impressed  by  the  cooperative  vil- 
lages I  visited  and  by  the  towns  where 


authorities  gave  people  land  and  en- 
couraged fanning. 

But  perhaps  the  most  impressive  les- 
sons were  those  from  Costa  Rica  and 
Ivory  Coast.  Both  are  countries  with  ex- 
tremely limited  mineral  resources;  their 
development  of  the  land  has  been  the 
key  to  all  of  their  industrial  develop- 
ment and  social  progress. 

There  are  still  many  problems,  but 
the  food  self-sufficiency  by  these  coun- 
tries is  the  basis  not  only  for  an  export 
potential  and  earnings  of  foreign  ex- 
change but  the  basis  of  a  new  social  de- 
velopment and  political  freedom.  Thus, 
even  in  bad  times,  townsmen  who  have 
no  jobs  can  still  subsist  from  their  own 
harvests. 

The  poor  nations  are  right  to  expect  a 
genuine  reinforced  effort  from  the  richer 
nations,  but  they  must  work  toward  their 
own  balanced  agricultural  development. 
No  country  has  developed  a  powerful 
economy  without  strong  agriculture. 
This  does  not  mean  each  country  is 
self-sufficient,  but  it  has  to  develop  its 
agrarian  economy  to  insure  a  firm  foun- 
dation for  its  development. 

Our  backgrounds  differ  in  many  ways 
and  we  have  many  different  viewpoints. 
As  Julius  Nyerere  [President  of  Tan- 
zania] has  said,  "The  nations  must  have 
the  courage  to  talk  about  their  differ- 
ence and  must  hold  fast  to  the  principles 
of  our  common  humanity." 

The  basic  human  need  is  for  a  filled 
breadbasket;  a  bowl  of  rice  or  millet; 
and  for  the  balancing  nutrients  of 
greens,  protein,  fruit,  and  milk.  Our 
larger  objective  is  to  create  a  global  food 
system  integrated  enough  to  meet 
everyone's  needs  for  adequate  nutrition, 
flexible  enough  to  respond  to  the  rapidly 
changing  conditions  in  agriculture,  and 
yet  producing  an  absolute  increase  in 
the  total  amount  of  food  so  that  there  is 
enough  to  go  around. 

Never  before  in  history  have  these 
goals  been  so  attainable  and  so  neces- 
sary for  the  survival  of  us  all.  Food  se- 
curity is  not  just  bread  for  the  hungry;  it 
is  some  guarantee  of  peace  for  the 
world. 

The  patterns  of  agricultural  and  eco- 
nomic cooperation  which  can  produce  a 
sugar  agreement  or  evolve  a  common 
fund  can  also  contribute  to  an  interde- 
pendence and  mutual  understanding 
which  limits  the  potential  for  starvation, 
military  destruction,  and  civil  strife. 

There  is  no  task  which  requires  more 
urgency  than  "the  beating  of  swords  into 
plowshares  and  spears  into  pruning 
hooks."  Cruise  missiles  and  backfire 
bombers  don't  offer  nearly  the  national 
security  that  comes  from  a  full  harvest 
and  well-fed,  well-educated,  and  pro- 
ductive fanners.  All  of  our  cities  are 
exploding  with  anxiety  and  discontent 


Department  of  State  Bulle 

while  a  rural  opportunity  for  peace  a 
prosperity  beckons. 

We  can  fulfill  these  goals  in  our  tin 
American  students  have  begun  to  foe 
on  an  end  to  world  hunger  by  1985. 
was  the  creative  power  of  our  yoi 
which  successfully  challenged  raci 
and  discrimination  in  the  1960's  a 
ended  our  involvement  in  Vietnam 
the  1970's.  Surely  the  youth  of  the  wo: 
with  our  help  can  end  world  hunger 
the  1980's. 

If  that  dream  can  be  realized,  it  is  i 
too  visionary  to  believe  that  true  fo 
security  for  the  peoples  and  nations 
this  planet  be  a  reality  by  the  end  of  tl 
century. 


'Statement  at  the  Food  and  Agriculture  Orgs 
zation  in  Rome  as  part  of  the  McDougall  Led 
on  Nov,  14,  1977;  Ambassador  Young  is  L 
Pemianent  Representative  to  the  United  Nati 
(text  from  USUN  press  release  1 16  of  Nov.  15 


J 


Food  Aid 


Foreign  Relations  Outline' 

Since  World  War  II  the  United  Su. 
has  supplied  extensive  food  aid  to  m 
nations.  Although  joined  by  Cana^ 
Australia,  and  several  Western  Eu 
pean  nations,  we  remain  by  far 
most  important  food  donor.  The  m< 
vehicle  for  U.S.  assistance  is  the  H 
Agricultural  Trade  Development  i 
Assistance  Act  (Public  Law  480). 
the  past  PL  480  served  as  a  method 
market  support  for  the  United  Sta 
and  as  a  means  to  meet  a  deficit  coi 
try's  immediate  needs  for  food.  Its  m 
purposes  today  are  twofold: 

•  Meet  the  nutritional  needs  of    " 
poorest  people.  This  aim  is  served 
PL   480  Title   II   grant    aid,   whi) 
supplies  free  food  to  those  unable 
buy  it  and 

•  Encourage  agricultural  develcl 
ment  in  the  less  developed  countri'I 
This  objective  is  met  by  PL  480  Titl  ^ 
concessional  sales  of  commodities 
the  local  market;  funds  realized  fnl 
these     sales    finance     developmej 
measures. 

The  World  Food  Program  and  U 
voluntary  agencies  normally  adminisf 
Title  II  programs  and  oversee  food  dj| 
tribution  in  the  recipient  nations. 
FY    1977,  PL  480  food  shipments! 
more  than  6  million  tons — ^will  toij 


anuary  1978 


37 


bout  $800  million  in  sales  and  over 
400  million  in  grants.  FY  1978  levels 
re  expected  to  be  similar,  but  grant 
id  will  be  increased. 

J.N.  World  Food  Conference 

Convened  in  Rome  in  1974  to  focus 
ttcntion  on  global  food  problems,  the 
onference  adopted  several  resolutions, 
u-iuding  a  target  for  distributing  as  aid 
minimum  of  10  million  metric  tons  of 
rain  per  year.  We  agreed  to  contribute 
ur  fair  share  of  this  amount.  The  con- 
;rence  also  concluded  that  food  pro- 
uction  in  the  poorer  nations  must  be 
icreased  rapidly  if  hunger  and  malnu- 
ition  are  to  be  eliminated.  We  are  at- 
;mpting  to  encourage  this  necessary 
icrease  in  production  through  food  and 
:her  aid. 

The  conference  further  recommended 
lat  an  international  system  of  nation- 
ly  held  grain  reserves  be  established 
<  prevent  recurrence  of  the  food  short- 
ies and  highly  volatile  price  situation 
the  early  1970's.  We  support  this 
"oposal  and  favor  negotiating  a  new  in- 
mational  wheat  agreement  that  would 
)ntain  an  international  security  re- 
■rve  feature.  Finally,  the  conference 
oposed  that  barriers  to  international 
od  trade  be  liberalized  to  stimulate 
oduction  and  help  stabilize  prices, 
le  United  States  is  actively  pushing 
is  objective  at  the  multilateral  trade 
;gotiations  in  Geneva. 

L  480  Legislation 

In  August  1977  Congress  made  sev- 
al  major  changes  in  PL  480,  includ- 
g  an  increase  in  the  minimum  ship- 
ents  required  under  Title  II. 
Food  for  Development.  The  most 
iportant  change  was  the  establishment 
Title  III  (Food  for  Development), 
hich  permits  signing  agreements  with 
cipient  countries  for  a  specified  an- 
ial  value  of  agricultural  commodi- 
es — to  be  delivered  over  a  1-5  year 
jriod.  If  planners  can  be  assured  a 
jrtain  level  of  assistance  over  a  longer 
;riod  than  the  present  1  year,  they 
in  better  integrate  that  aid  into  their 
itional  development  programs. 
To  qualify  for  Title  III  concessional 
lies  assistance,  a  country  must  meet 
e  International  Development  Associa- 
3n's  poverty  criterion — now  $550  per 
jpita  GNP — and  demonstrate  a  need 
ir  food  aid.  The  recipient  must  also 
;ree  to  improve  agricultural  productiv- 
y  as  well  as  the  situation  of  its  rural 
Dor.  Funds  generated  from  PL  480 
)mmodity  sales  are  to  be  placed  in  a 
lecial  account  to  finance  these  proj- 
|:ts;  the  amount  disbursed  will  consti- 
ite  repayment  of  the  amount  owed  the 
nited  States  for  the  imports. 


Human  Rights.  Another  change  in 
PL  480  prohibits  Title  I  and  III  assist- 
ance to  countries  grossly  violating 
human  rights,  unless  it  would  directly 
benefit  the  needy  people  of  those 
countries. 

Improved  Administration.  In  re- 
sponse to  criticism  of  food  aid  adminis- 
tration. Congress  required  the  executive 
branch  to  determine,  before  PL  480  as- 
sistance is  supplied,  that  adequate 
storage  facilities  are  available  and  dis- 
tribution of  the  commodities  will  not 
create  a  substantial  disincentive  to  food 
production  in  the  recipient  country. 

Title  II.  This  grant  program  is  to  be 
increased  from  a  minimum  distribution 
of  1.3  million  to  1.6  million  tons  in  FY 
1978  through  FY  1980,  to  1.65  million 
in  1981,  and  to  1.7  million  thereafter. 
The  amount  of  this  assitance  to  be  dis- 
tributed through  voluntary  agencies  and 
the  World  Food  Program  is  also 
increased. 


Benefits 

PL  480  food  aid  has  been  a  vital  part 
of  America's  foreign  assistance  effort 
for  over  20  years.  It  has  not  only  bene- 
fited other  nations  but  has  also  assisted 
American  farmers  and  created  U.S. 
jobs.  With  the  recently  adopted  im- 
provements, PL  480  should  be  an  even 
better  tool  for  helping  to  improve  food 
production  and  distribution  in  devel- 
oping countries.  Almost  all  nations 
now  realize  that  such  an  improvement, 
concomitant  with  a  limitation  of 
population  growth,  is  the  only  way  to 
solve  their  food  and  malnutrition 
problems.  D 


'Based  on  a  Department  of  State  publication 
in  the  GIST  series,  released  in  October  1977. 
This  outline  is  designed  to  be  a  quick  reference 
aid  on  U.S.  foreign  relations.  It  is  not  intended 
as  a  comprehensive  U.S.  foreign  policy 
statement. 


HUMAN  RIGHTS:  U.S.  Observes 

Human  Rights  Day 

at  Belgrade  Conference 


by  Arthur  J.  Goldberg^ 

It  is  altogether  fitting  that  this  Bel- 
grade meeting  take  proper  recognition 
that  tomorrow  is  Human  Rights  Day. 
My  government  and  most  other  mem- 
bers of  the  United  Nations,  as  well  as 
many  groups  and  individuals,  will  be 
observing  the  29th  anniversary  of  the 
adoption  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights,^  which  as  I  noted  in  a 
prior  intervention,  is  incorporated  by 
reference  in  the  Final  Act.^  Today  I 
would  like  to  suggest  that  the  par- 
ticipating states  of  the  Helsinki  accord 
have  a  special  opportunity  to  do  more 
than  "observe"  this  event  of  transcend- 
ent importance.  Separately  and  to- 
gether, we  can — if  we  have  the  political 
will — translate  the  rhetoric  of  celebra- 
tion into  the  concluding  document  and 
into  actions  that  will  benefit  our  citi- 
zens as  individuals  and  our  nations  as 
members  of  a  stable  worldwide  commu- 
nity. 

At  the  heart  of  the  Universal  Decla- 
ration is  its  recognition  that  "the  inher- 
ent dignity  and  ...  the  equal  and  inal- 
ienable rights  of  all  members  of  the 
human  family"  lie  at  "the  foundation  of 
freedom,  justice  and  peace  in  the 
world."  That  same  concept  animates 


the  Final  Act.  It  is  paraphrased  in  the 
preamble,  detailed  in  principle  7,  and 
specified  in  the  act's  humanitarian  pro- 
visions. 

As  a  concept,  the  line  between  the 
dignity  of  the  individual  and  the  just 
ordering  of  the  society  in  which  he 
lives  is  an  old  precept  for  many  of  our 
societies.  As  a  foundation  of  interna- 
tional order,  it  is  a  relatively  innovative 
idea,  a  vision  bom  of  two  World  Wars, 
and  the  determination  to  promote  jus- 
tice, liberty,  and  economic  security. 
The  Universal  Declaration  speaks  of 
"barbarous  acts  which  have  outraged 
the  conscience  of  mankind"  and  ties 
their  prevention  to  the  promotion  of 
"friendly  relations  between  nations." 

Our  conference  in  Belgrade  has  been 
exploring  ways  in  which  to  deepen 
those  relations,  not  the  least  through 
the  promotion  of  the  human  rights  the 
Universal  Declaration  proclaimed.  We 
are  approaching  the  time  for  action — 
the  drafting  of  our  final  document 
based  on  this  review  of  our  shortcom- 
ings as  well  as  the  advances  we  have 
made  and  the  proposals  tabled.  It  is 
appropriate  to  summarize  the  pos- 
sibilities and  challenges  before  us. 

The  U.S.  delegation  has  consistently 
adhered  to  the  view  that  this  meeting 


38 

has  been  and  is  required  frankly  and 
honestly  to  review  the  record  of  the  im- 
plementation by  all  of  the  signatory 
states,  as  well  as  to  consider  new  pro- 
posals to  further  implementation.  We 
also  are  of  the  view  that  we  are  obli- 
gated individually  and  collectively  to 
reaffirm  our  determination  to  fulfill  our 
solemn  undertakings  in  the  Final  Act. 
Further,  we  firmly  believe  that  we  must 
give  adequate  consideration  to  the 
Final  Act's  innovative  commitment  on 
respect  for  human  rights  and  fundamen- 
tal freedoms,  including  the  freedom  of 
thought,  conscience,  religion,  or  belief, 
and  we  must  comply  with  these  provi- 


sions. To  this  end  my  delegation, 
joined  by  others,  has  sponsored  pro- 
posal BM/60  reaffirming  principle  7 
and  seven  other  resolutions  emphasiz- 
ing and  endorsing  other  specific  hu- 
manitarian measures  of  the  Final  Act. 

We  should,  in  the  opinion  of  my 
delegation,  and  in  fidelity  to  the  Final 
Act,  also  give  special  and  collective 
acknowledgement  to  the  valuable  and 
privileged — and  what  should  be  the 
protected — role  of  individuals  and  or- 
ganizations in  furthering  the  process  of 
implementation  through  their  public 
scrutiny  of  developments  and  practices 
in  their  own  and  in  other  signatory 


Bill  of  Rights  Day^ 
Human  Rights  Day  and  Week 


A  Proclamation^ 


This  month  marks  the  anniversaries 
rf  two  great  events  in  the  long  struggle 
for  the  rights  of  human  beings:  the 
ratification  of  the  American  Bill  of 
Rights  on  December  15,  1791,  and  the 
adoption  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights  by  the  United  Nations 
General  Assembly  on  December  10, 
1948. 

The  Bill  of  Rights  culminated  the 
Founders'  efforts  to  create  for  their  new 
country  a  national  life  grounded  in  lib- 
erty and  respect  for  individual  rights. 
The  Declaration  of  Independence  pro- 
claimed the  inalienable  rights  of  life, 
liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness. 
The  Constitution  formed  a  "more  per- 
fect Union"  in  which  those  rights  could 
be  fulfilled.  And  the  first  ten  amend- 
ments to  the  new  Constitution  placed 
the  keystone  on  this  new  edifice  of 
human  rights.  The  immediate  applica- 
tion of  those  rights  extended  only  to 
one  country,  and  only  to  some  of  the 
people  in  it.  But  because  those  rights 
were  proclaimed  as  the  natural  birth- 
right of  all  human  beings,  the  docu- 
ments that  embodied  them  were  rightly 
seen  to  have  a  profound  and  universal 
significance. 

It  is  a  lesson  of  history  that  no 
enumeration  of  rights,  however 
eloquent,  can  alone  ensure  their  protec- 
tion in  practice.  We  Americans  strug- 
gled, sometimes  bloodily,  to  make  the 
rights  promised  in  our  founding  docu- 
ments a  reality  for  all  our  people.  That 
experience  of  successful  struggle  for 
human  rights  in  our  own  country  was 
both  painful  and  ennobling,  and  it 
propelled  us  into  a  leading  role  in  the 
adoption  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of 


Human  Rights  by  the  United  Nations. 
As  a  people,  we  believe  what  that  Dec- 
laration says:  that  the  promotion  of  re- 
spect for  human  rights  is  the  shared  re- 
sponsibility of  the  world  community. 
We  call  on  the  governments  of  other  na- 
tions to  join  us  in  discharging  this  re- 
sponsibility. 

Everywhere  on  earth,  men  and 
women  have  made  great  personal  sac- 
rifices, even  to  the  laying  down  of  their 
lives,  in  the  long  struggle  for  justice 
and  human  dignity.  By  their  sacrifices, 
they  have  already  hallowed  the  human 
rights  anniversaries  I  proclaim  today. 

Now,  Therefore,  I,  Jimmy  Carter, 
President  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  do  hereby  proclaim  December 
10,  1977,  as  Human  Rights  Day  and 
December  15,  1977,  as  Bill  of  Rights 
Day,  and  call  on  all  Americans  to  ob- 
seive  Human  Rights  Week  beginning 
December  10,  1977.  Let  us  reflect  on 
the  significance  of  the  Bill  of  Rights, 
which  has  given  purpose  to  our  national 
life,  and  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights,  which  holds  the  prom- 
ise of  greater  liberty  in  the  lives  of  all 
the  inhabitants  of  our  planet.  Let  us  re- 
commit ourselves,  as  individuals  and  as 
a  Nation,  to  the  realization  of  these 
rights,  the  guarantee  of  which  we  hold 
to  be  the  essential  purpose  of  the  civil 
order. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have 
hereunto  set  my  hand  this  ninth  day  of 
December,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  nine- 
teen hundred  seventy-seven,  and  of  the 
Independence  of  the  United  States  of 
America  the  two  hundred  and  second. 
Jimmy  CarterD 


jlD 
li- 
Ijil 

0 


'No.  4542,  42  Fed.  Reg.  62467. 


Department  of  State  BuUetis 

countries.  This  too  is  the  subject  of  : 
proposal  which  we  and  others  havt 
tabled. 

And  we  should  also  jointly  pledge 
our  energetic  efforts  both  to  protect  th( 
rights  of  religious  believers  among  ou: 
citizens  and  to  facilitate  Internationa 
contact  among  them,  as  the  Final  Ac 
stipulates. 

Our  giving  of  such  commitments  wil 
be  understood  around  the  world  as 
fresh  contribution  to  the  process  begui 
in  the  Universal  declaration  of  Humai 
Rights  and  the  Final  Act.  We  all  rec 
ognize  that  much  of  the  Final  Act  de 
pends  for  its  realization  on  the  unilat 
eral  actions  of  each  of  our  states.  In  th 
area  of  human  rights  and  fundamenta 
freedoms,  the  initiative  and  responsibil 
ity  for  action  lies  very  much  at  home 
subject,  however,  to  the  type  of  inter 
national  accounting  we  have  been  seek* 
ing  in  the  important  review  we  are  con 
ducting  at  this  meeting. 

In  the  United  States,  the  agenda  c 
unfinished  human  rights  business  is  no 
fully  realized,  although  we  are  proud  c 
our  overall  record.  It  includes  action  o< 
ratification  of  certain  international 
agreements  in  the  field  of  human  rights 
which  President  Carter  signed  at  thi 
United  Nations  on  October  5.^  It  in 
eludes  programs — none  of  them  ye 
perfected,  but  all  of  them  already  soli« 
governmental  policy  commitments — t 
advance  the  equal  rights  of  minoritie 
and  the  economic  security  of  all  cit: 
zens.  And,  finally,  it  includes  th' 
search  for  better  ways  to  implement  thi 
policy,  enshrined  in  such  legislation  ai 
our  Foreign  Assistance  Act,  of  promoi 
ing  "the  increased  observance  of  intei 
nationally  recognized  human  rights." 
The  effort  the  United  States  is  mak 
ing  is  a  sincere  one.  We  would  hop 
that  other  nations  would,  in  the  sam 
spirit,  examine  their  conduct  to  see,  b 
way  of  illustration,  whether  the  right  l 
religious  education  is  truly  fostered 
whether  believers  can  freely  profes 
and  practice  their  faith,  whether  oppor 
tunities  for  free  association  of  believer 
to  worship  and  celebrate  their  religioi 
are  honored  in  fact  as  well  as  words.  I 
is  a  fact  of  life  that  in  some  nations  o 
Eastern  Europe  those  conditions  do  no 
obtain.  This  is  a  matter  of  grave  con 
cem  to  the  United  States.  One  hundrei 
and  forty  million  Americans  are  iden 
tified  with  Protestant,  Catholic 
Jewish,  Moslem,  Buddhist,  and  othe 
religious  groups  of  their  own  choosing 
This  is  safeguarded  by  the  firs 
amendment  to  our  Constitution  whicl 
guarantees  the  free  exerci.se  of  religion 
Our  people  share  the  belief  of  the  poe 
Tennyson,  who  once  wrote  that 
"More  things  are  wrought  by  praye 
than  this  world  dreams  of."  We  regre 


i 


uary  1978 


39 


fact  that  grave  violations  of  basic 

nan  rights  and  fundamental  free- 

ns — including  freedom  of  thought, 

iscience,  religion,  and  belief — exist 

iome  of  the  countries  of  the  East. 

fundamental  to  the  pursuit  of  human 

ht--  is  the  unfettered  expression  of 

orient  and  peaceful  views.  Tomor- 

.  nbserving  an  anniversary  of  great 

:  vrtance  to  the  promotion  of  human 

iits,  let  us  not  foreg  those  who  have 

i.n  unjustly  punished  simply  for  ex- 

1  ssing  what  is  characterized  as  dis- 

,tt.  A  number  of  the  signatories  of 

.N  meeting  have   such  prisoners  of 

>  science. 

'omorrow's  anniversary  is  an  impor- 

!  occasion  to  recommit  our  confer- 

_  e  to  advance  toward  the  human 

riits  goals  of  the  Final  Act.  As  the 

S  retary  General  of  the  United  Na- 

is  said  in  his  statement  on  the  occa- 

bii  of  Human  Rights  Day,  "...  the 

p  tection  and  promotion  of  human 

riits  is  now  among  our  most  urgent 

p  >rities.  Much  has  been  accomplished 

u  r  the  years,  but  regrettably  much 

St  I  remains  to  be  done.   Disturbing 

V  lalions  in  various  parts  of  the  world 

a  tradict  the  goals  and  ideals  we  have 

p  claimed  not  only  in  the  Declaration, 

b\  in  the  Charter  of  the  United  Na- 

tiis,  and  they  stand  as  serious  barriers 

it  he  way  of  international  peace  and 

s«  jrity."" 

v'e  have  cited  specific  cases, 
:i;gories,  and  countries  during  the  re- 
vi  V  of  implementation  at  this  meeting 
di  ling  with  significant  and  regrettable 
a;  sets  of  human  rights'  violations,  and 
Psident  Carter  on  December  5,  in  re- 
p<  ing  to  our  CSCE  Commission,  has 
ci  d  in  great  detail  both  the  progress 
ai  ,  as  the  Secretary  General  of  the 
U  ted  Nations  has  pointed  out,  the 
di  urbing  violations  of  human  rights 
N  ch  occurred  and  are  still  all  too 
pwalent  in  various  parts  of  the  world. 
U  delegation  will  make  President 
C  ter's  report,  citing  chapter  and 
vi,e,  available  to  all  delegations.^ 

I  would  be  fitting — in  the  spirit  of 

th  day  and  of  the  obligation  the  Final 

puts  on  each  participant — for  ap- 

^riate  authorities  to  examine  again 

r  compliance  in  light  of  the  Univer- 

^  Declaration  and  the  Final  Act  and 

tctake  appropriate  remedial  action. 

A  \  we  have  a  special  obligation  in 

connection  in  light  of  the  specific 

I  lan  rights  and  humanitarian  provi- 

sns  of  the  Final  Act. 

Ve  should  respond  to  Secretary  Gen- 
e!|  Waldheim's  call  for  "...  all  Gov- 
e  ments,  non-governmental  organiza- 
ti  is  and  peoples  in  every  nation  to 
aimemorate  the  historic  occasion  we 
11^  k  today  by  rededicating  themselves 
ttisecuring  the  fundamental  freedoms 


set  forth  in  the  Declaration."  The  Final 
Act  mandates  us  to  do  so. 

I  have  suggested  some  actions  our 
states  can  take  here  in  Belgrade  and 
elsewhere  to  give  fitting  tribute  to  to- 
morrow's anniversary.  I  can  only  add 
that  lipservice  is  not  real  observance  of 
human  rights;  actions  and  practices  are 
the  true  test  of  a  society's  commitment 
to  its  ideals.  As  His  Excellency,  the 
Honorable  Lazar  Mojsov,  President  of 
the  32d  session  of  the  General  Assem- 
bly, said  in  his  remarks  commemorat- 
ing this  occasion:  "The  oppression  of 
man  and  non-respect  for  human  rights 
have  always  been  negative  omens  of  so- 
cial unrest  and  even  international  con- 
flict. In  the  interest  of  peaceful  and 
progressive  advancement  to  a  better, 
more  secure  and  more  just  world,  the 
human  community  as  a  whole  must, 
once  and  for  all,  do  away  with  such 
manifestations  which  jeopardize  funda- 
mental human  rights." 

In  light  of  the  comments  made  by 
delegates  representing  some  of  the 
countries  of  the  East  questioning  the 
relationship  between  human  rights  and 
security,  the  comments  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Assembly  and  the  Secretary 
General  of  the  United  Nations  provide  a 
definitive  answer. 


As  the  remarks  by  Secretary  General 
Waldheim  and  General  Assembly  Pres- 
ident Mojsov  so  eloquently  point  out, 
peace,  security,  and  human  rights  are 
indeed  indivisible,  and  all  those  who 
seek  detente  must  recognize  that  the 
detente  we  seek  must  have  a  human 
face  if  it  is  to  be  effective  and  en- 
during. □ 


'  Address  at  the  plenary  session  of  the  Confer- 
ence on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe 
(CSCE)  in  Belgrade  on  Dec.  9,  1977;  Ambassador 
Goldberg  is  Chairman  of  the  U.S.  Delegation  to 
the  CSCE. 

'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Dec.  19,  1948, 
p.  752. 

'  For  text  of  the  Final  Act  of  the  Conference 
on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe  (CSCE) 
signed  at  Helsinki  on  Aug.  1,  1975,  see  Bulle- 
tin of  Sept.  1,  1975.  p. 323. 

'  For  remarks  of  President  Carter  upon  signing 
the  International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social 
and  Cultural  Rights  and  the  International  Coven- 
ant on  Civil  and  Political  Rights,  see  Bulletin  of 
Oct.  31,  1977.  p.  586;  for  texts  of  covenants, 
see  Bulletin  of  Jan.  16.  1967,  p.  107. 

'  Copies  of  the  report  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Correspondence  Management  Division,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State,  Washington, 
DC.  20520. 


Release  oi  PoUtical  Prisoners  ^ 


The  State  Department  welcomes  the 
release  on  December  31  by  the  Korean 
Government  of  all  but  one  of  the  so- 
called  Myongdong  prisoners  as  the 
latest  in  a  recent  series  of  positive  ac- 
tions which  mean  that  a  large  number 
of  persons  will  start  the  new  year  in 
freedom. 

Acting  Secretary  of  State  Warren 
Christopher  said  that  the  Department 
takes  encouragement  from  this  and  re- 
lated developments  and  hopes  they  pre- 
sage a  year  of  progress  in  1978  in  the 
enhancement  of  human  rights. 

The  Myongdong  prisoners  who  were 
released  today  in  Korea  were  opposi- 
tion political  and  religious  figures  ar- 
rested in  connection  with  promulgation 
of  an  antigovernment  manifesto  at 
Myongdong  Cathedral  in  Seoul  in 
March  1976.  Former  presidential  can- 
didate Kim  Dae-jung,  the  one 
Myongdong  prisoner  not  released,  has 
been  moved  to  Seoul  University  hospi- 
tal for  medical  treatment. 

Among  the  other  recent  actions  was 
the  release  by  the  Government  of 
Indonesia  of  some    10,000  political 


prisoners,  as  part  of  that  government's 
announced  3-year  plan  to  release  the 
remaining  political  prisoners  currently 
being  held.  The  releases  were  notewor- 
thy in  that  prisoners  were  permitted  to 
return  to  their  homes  and  were  not  as- 
signed to  transmigration  centers  as 
originally  anticipated. 

In  addition,  the  Government  of  Paki- 
stan also  announced  recently  the  re- 
lease of  some  11,000  political  prison- 
ers who  had  been  detained — according 
to  the  Government  of  Pakistan — under 
the  previous  Administration. 

Earlier  this  month  the  Government  of 
Bangladesh  announced  the  release  of 
935  political  prisoners. 

While  welcoming  these  most  recent 
prisoner  releases,  the  Department  rec- 
ognizes that  the  human  rights  situation 
worldwide,  including  the  problems  of 
political  prisoners,  remains  a  matter  of 
deep  and  continuing  concern.  The 
United  States  will  continue  to  urge,  and 
to  work  for,  improvement  in  all  aspects 
of  human  rights.  D 


Press  release  586  of  Dec.  31,  1977. 


40 


Department  of  State  BulleJi 


MIDDLE  EAST:  Visit  of  Secretary  Vance 


B 


Following  his  trip  to  Brussels  to  attend  the  North  Atlantic  Council  ministerial 
meeting,  Secretary  Vance  visited  the  Middle  East  December  9-15  and  met  with  gov- 
ernment officials  in  Egypt  (December  9-10).  Israel  (December  10-12),  Jordan  (De- 
cember 12-13),  Lebanon  (December  13),  Syria  (December  13-14),  and  Saudi  Arabia 
(December  14-15).  Following  are  news  conferences  by  Secretary  Vance  and  foreign 
leaders  on  various  occasions  during  the  trip,  as  well  as  Secretary  Vance's  statement 
upon  his  return  to  tlie  United  States. ' 


NEWS  CONFERENCE,  CAIRO, 
DEC.  10 2 

Secretary  Vance:  I  have  had  the 
pleasure  this  morning  of  meeting  with 
President  Sadat  and  exchanging  views 
with  respect  to  the  forthcoming  Cairo 
meetings  and  our  joint  search  for  a 
peaceful  solution  to  the  problems  of  the 
Middle  East.  I  told  President  Sadat  of 
the  great  admiration  and  respect  which 
all  of  us  have  for  the  historic  events 
which  he  set  in  motion  with  his  courage- 
ous trip  to  Jerusalem.  A  new  momentum 
has  been  given  to  the  peace  process  by 
this  bold  initiative,  and  we  in  the 
United  States  shall  do  everything  within 
our  power  to  help  maintain  that  momen- 
tum. 

Our  objective  remains  a  comprehen- 
sive settlement.  There  are  many  things 
which  have  to  be  done  to  pave  the  way 
to  an  ultimate  meeting  at  which  a  com- 
prehensive settlement  can  be  reached. 
The  Geneva  meetings  will  be  the  ulti- 
mate meeting  at  which  that  could  be  ar- 
rived at.  The  Cairo  meetings  will  be  a 
step  on  the  way  and  will  pave  the  ground 
here  at  these  meetings  toward  the  ulti- 
mate comprehensive  proposal. 

Q.  Do  you  have  an  indication  that 
the  Soviet  Union  is  going  to  main- 
tain its  role  as  cosponsor  of  the 
peace  talks? 

Secretary  Vance:  The  Soviet  Union 
has  indicated  that  it  will  remain  as  a 
cochairman  of  the  Geneva  conference.  It 
has  indicated  that  it  will  not  participate 
in  the  Cairo  meetings.  We  had  hoped 
that  they  would  participate  in  these 
meetings  because  we  believe  that  the 
Cairo  meetings  can  and  will  perform  a 
very  constructive  role  in  paving  the  way 
toward  an  ultimate  Geneva  conference. 

Q.  What  is  the  American  role  in 
the  coming  future  steps,  either  in 
Cairo  or  in  Geneva  or  in  the  final 
settlement?  What  are  the  American 
commitments? 

Secretary  Vance:  We  will  be  play- 
ing a  supportive  role  to  the  initiative 
which  has  been  taken — the  bold  initia- 


tive by  President  Sadat  and  Prime 
Minister  Begin. 

Q.  Are  you  hopeful  that  the  Cairo 
conference  will  produce  a  set  of 
principles  for  a  comprehensive  set- 
tlement that  will  commend  them- 
selves to  some  of  the  other  Arab 
leaders  in  this  area? 

President  Sadat:  We  are  working.  I 
have  already  proposed  this  Cairo  meet- 
ing to  work  toward  this  end.  Instead  of 
starting  discussing  procedural  arrange- 
ments in  Geneva,  we  should  agree  upon 
all  these  points  and  prepare  the  whole 
approach  and  the  land,  like  the  Secre- 
tary said,  for  Geneva  to  succeed. 

Q.  What  do  you  expect  of  the 
American  role? 

President  Sadat:  Someone  said  that 
after  my  initiative  and  after  I  visited 
Jerusalem  that  the  American  role  is  of 
less  importance;  I  say  no.  The  American 
role  after  my  visit  is  much  more  con- 
firmed, like  I  said  it  before.  And  no  one 
can  imagine  that  in  30  hours'  visit  to 
Jerusalem  and  having  discussions  with 
the  Israelis  resfXDnsible  have  solved  al- 
ready the  30  years' — the  last  30 
years" — difficulties  that  we  had  among 
us.  So  the  American  role,  as  I  said,  is 
confirmed  rather  than  minimized. 

Q.  How  long  do  you  think  the 
Cairo  meeting  will  go  on  for?  When 
do  you  think  a  Geneva  conference 
could  now  be  convened? 

President  Sadat:  Let  us  hope  that 
they  reach  the  end  that  we  are  agreed 
upon;  that  is,  preparation  for  Geneva. 
The  time  is  open.  The  discussion  also  is 
open.  That  is  what  I  have  agreed  already 
today  with  Secretary  Vance.  Really,  you 
should  always  skip  any  fixing  of  dates  or 
so,  as  much  as  the  Cairo  conference  is 
working  and  preparing  and  paving  the 
way  toward  Geneva.  The  peace  process 
is  in  momentum,  and  that  is  what  we  are 
alter,  all  of  us. 

Q.  Do  you  need  the  United  States' 
help  to  negotiate  with  Israel,  or  will 
you  take  care  of  all  the  negotiations 
yourself? 

President  Sadat:  The  United  States 


lis 
to  n' 


is,  number  one,  cochairman.  Numb 
two,  the  United  States  enjoys  the  conf 
dence  of  me  and  the  Israelis.  And  this 
of  great  importance,  because  as  1 
you,  whenever  we  need  to  bring  our 
cussions  to,  I  mean,  a  proper  way 
whenever  there  is  a  gulf  between  us,  tl 
United  States  for  sure  can  bring  us  K 
gather. 

Q.  Could  you  please  tell 
whether  or  not  you  are  pleased  mi 
the  Israeli  response  to  your  initi 
tive  that  has  resulted — the  Israi 
response  over  the  past  2  weeks? 

President  Sadat:  Not  yet.  Thfi 
haven't  answered. 

Q.  What  specifically  do  you  wai 
the  Israelis  to  do  at  this  stage? 

President  Sadat:  I  shouldn't  say 
before  the  microphones  and  so  forth. 

Q.  At  what  point  do  you  expei 
Syria  and  Jordan  to  come  back  ini 
this  process? 

President  Sadat:  In  the  meeting  \ 
have  arranged  their  places  for  them 
come,  and  whenever  they  choose 
come  we  shall  be  very  happy  to  ha» 
them  with  us.  I  told  King  Hussein  [ 
Jordan]  yesterday  and  I  told  him  to  tan 
his  time.  I'm  not  urging  him. 

Q.  Are  you  at  all  upset  or  dii 
mayed  at  the  continuing  criticism 
your  initiative  by  some  Arab  go> 
ernments  and  by  the  Soviet  Union'i 

President  Sadat:  Not  at  all  It  h 
happened  before,  even  much  more  v 
hement  than  this  time  you  rememb 
after  the  second  disengagement  agre 
ment;  for  one  year  and  a  half  they  co 
tinned,  but  it  doesn't  worry  me  at  ai 
And,  unfortunately,  this  is  our  habit. 

Q.  There  is  a  great  deal  of  spec 
lation  that  if  the  other  Arab  leade- 
do  not  approve  a  set  of  principl 
for  a  comprehensive  settlement  thu 
you  will  then  seek  a  separate  pea 
with  Israel.  Is  that  accurate  or  not' 

President  Sadat:  Not  at  all,  not 
all.  I  would  have  fulfilled  it  either  b' 
fore  Jerusalem  or  during  my  visit 
after  that.  Really,  our  aim  will  ahvai 
be  a  comprehensive  settlement. 

Q.  You  spoke  twice  of  Geneva 
the  ultimate  meeting  at  the  end 
this  process  that  is  being  launch) 
now.  Does  that  mean  that  you  nOi 
see  Geneva  as  a  place  to  ratify  i 
confirm  agreements  reached  pr 
viously  and  no  longer  the  plat 
where  the  agreements  have  to  I 
worked  out? 

Secretary  Vance:  What  I  meant  I 


B 


iLiarv 


1978 


41 


I  was  that,  as  both  President  Sadat 
I  I  have  said,  there's  a  great  deal  of 
ik  to  be  done  to  pave  the  way  to 
iiL\a  so  that  Geneva  can  be  fruitful 
i  productive.  That  does  not  mean  that 
re  would  be  no  substantive  negotia- 
is  at  Geneva. 

J.  Is  it  contemplated  that  this 

cnference  will    expand   to  the 

fJeign  minister  level  in  the  next 

ninth  or  so? 

President  Sadat:  Let  us  hope  so. 

ihis  will  depend  upon  the  develop- 

III  after  the  meetings  take  place  here, 

I  It  is  a  possiblity,  yes. 

).  Have  you  agreed  with  King 

Fssein  on  the  Palestinian  question? 

'resident  Sadat:  King  Hussein  and 

^ree  to  the   strategy  that  has  been 

;  pled  by  the  Arab  summit  in  Rabat. 

lis   strategy   contains   two  points: 

nmber  one,  the  withdrawal  from  the 

111  occupied  after   1967;  number  two, 

I  ing  the  Palestinian  question,  all  the 

1  eels  of  the  Palestinian  question.  It  is 

1    a   humanitarian  question  anymore. 

Pt  of  it  is  humanitarian — 1  mean  the 

'siiice  problem — but  still  the  solving  of 

problem  in  itself.  So  King  Hussein 

i    i.  when  we  have  our  discussions,  we 

h  e  discussed  all  these  issues  accord- 

t(i  this  strategy. 

).  At  what  point  do  you  expect  to 
bng  the  Palestinians  into  the  dis- 
Cisions? 

'resident  Sadat:  Let  me  say  this. 
V  are  ready  to  have  them  with  us;  their 
p  ;e  will  be  prepared  for  them  when- 
e'  r  they  choose  to  come. 

}.  Back  in  1973  the  whole  idea 
oliaving  cochairmen  at  the  Geneva 
ciference  was  that  the  United 
S  tes  was  the  closest  friend  of  your 
e.'my  Israel  and  the  Soviet  Union 
»>  thought  to  be  the  closest  friend 

0  Egypt.  Have  events  moved  so 
Fit.  has  your  relationship  with  Mos- 
ctv  changed  so  much  that  this 
stiicutre  is  no  longer  useful? 

'resident  Sadat:  I  fear  that  you  are 
i>  following  what  is  happening  really. 
^  difficulties  with  the  Soviet  Union 
*  e  long  before  the  October  war.  And 
3  this  same  issue  they  wanted  to  be  my 
ilkesman  or  my  guardian.  And  I  re- 
^;d.  And  I  still  refuse  this.  This  has 

'pened  long  before  the  October  war 

!  tontinued  after  the  October  war. 

,?.  [Inaudible]  Rabat  summit  deci- 
Sn  about  the  Palestinians,  that 
fbat  decision  to  which  you  refer. 

1  It  the  Palestine  Liberation  Or- 
Biization  (PLO)  is  the  sole  repre- 
siitative  of  the  Palestinians.  Is  it 
tie,  still  now,  for  you? 

President  Sadat:  That  the  PLO  is 

t!  representative?  Yes.  Yes,  in  spite  of 

fact  that  the  Tripoli  conference 


in   its  decisions   has  canceled   this. 

Q.  Did  you  ask  Mr.  Vance  this 
morning  for  specific  help  on  prepar- 
ing the  agenda  for  the  Cairo  confer- 
ence? 

President  Sadat:  I  must  tell  you 
this.  We  are  in  constant  contact  ex- 
changing points  of  view  all  the  time.  But 
there  is  nothing  specific  that  I  asked  the 
Secretary  today.  We  have  discussed  the 
whole  thing  and  all  the  alternatives. 

Q.  You  said  that  the  Tripoli  con- 
ference had  canceled  the  under- 
standings of  the  Rabat  conference. 
In  what  way? 

President  Sadat:  In  the  field  of  the 
PLO  and  in  the  field  of  working  toward  a 
peaceful  settlement  because  we  have 
agreed  in  Rabat  to  push  the  peace  proc- 
ess to  achieve  those  goals. 

Q.  Do  you  mean  that  after 
Tripoli,  that  the  PLO  is  no  longer 
the  sole  representative  of  the  Pales- 
tinian people? 

President  Sadat:  No,  I  didn't  say 
this  at  all.  I  said  that  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  they  have  canceled  this  in  Tripoli, 
King  Hussein  and  I  are  sticking  to  the 
Rabat  decisions. 

Q.  How  has  the  direct  negotia- 
tions between  Israel  and  Egypt 
changed  the  American  role?  In  what 
ways,  as  you  see  the  American  role, 
has  it  changed  and  how  has  it 
changed? 

Secretary  Vance:  From  the  very 
first  and  for  many  years  the  United 
States  has  said  that  we  believe  that  a 
settlement  of  the  Middle  East  problem 
must  be  reached  by  negotiation  between 
the  parties  themselves.  We  have  always 
said  that  the  United  States  wanted  to  do 


all  in  its  power  to  facilitate  such  discus- 
sions. That  remains  our  position. 

We  welcome  direct  discussions  be- 
tween the  parties  such  as  those  that  will 
be  taking  place  between  Egypt  and  Is- 
rael, and  we  will  continue  to  do  what  we 
can  to  facilitate  that  process. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
JERUSALEM,  DEC.  IV 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  There  is  rea- 
son to  be  optimistic.  Now,  on  behalf  of 
the  Government  of  Israel  and  the  people 
of  Israel,  may  I  welcome  our  honored 
guest  and  dear  friend.  Secretary  of  State 
Mr.  Vance,  to  Jerusalem  and  to  our 
country  and  his  friends  and  colleagues 
who  accompany  him  on  this  very  impor- 
tant journey  to  the  Middle  East. 

Before  President  Sadat  arrived  in 
Jerusalem,  I  sent  a  cable  to  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  in  which  I 
said,  inter  alia:  "People  in  our  country 
and  abroad  contend  that  this  is  an  his- 
toric moment.  You  have  created  it,  Mr. 
President." 

Tonight  I  think  it's  a  propitious  mo- 
ment to  repeat  that  appreciation  we,  the 
Israelis,  have  for  the  President,  for  the 
Secretary  of  State,  for  the  Government 
of  the  United  States,  and  the  Congress 
in  both  Houses  in  connection  with  these 
momentous  developments  in  the  Middle 
East — the  unprecedented  visit  of  Presi- 
dent Sadat  to  Israel  and.  to  the  same  ex- 
tent, the  unprecedented  reception  ac- 
corded to  him  in  this  country  by  our  Par- 
liament, our  government,  and  our 
people. 

We  are  now  in  the  midst  of  the 


Efiypiiun  Presicleni  Sadut  am!  Secret, ii\   Wiiiee  meet  at  the  President  s  rest  house  outside  Cairo. 


42 

peacemaking  process.  We  are  now  mak- 
ing a  serious  real  effort  to  achieve  and 
to  establish  peace  in  the  Middle  East.  I 
would  like  to  stress  that  it  is  the  ac- 
cepted policy  of  the  Governments  of  the 
United  States,  of  Israel,  and  of  Egypt 
that  the  efforts  are  for  a  comprehensive 
peace  settlement,  that  there  is  no  inten- 
tion to  have  two  countries  reaching 
peace  and  signing  a  peace  treaty  and 
leaving  the  other  countries  out  of  this  ef- 
fort. To  the  contrary,  we  intend  to  do 
our  utmost  and  best  to  bring  about  the 
establishment  of  peace  the  signing  of 
peace  treaties  between  Israel  and  all  her 
neighbors — to  the  south,  to  the  east, 
and  to  the  north.  And  in  this  effort,  we 
are  helped  to  a  very  great  extent  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  Nations  [sic], 
by  the  Government  of  the  United  States, 
by  the  President,  and  the  Secretary  of 
State. 

It  is  in  this  spirit,  Mr.  Secretary,  that 
we  welcome  you  again  in  Jerusalem. 
You  are  not  a  novice  to  this  city,  you  are 
almost  one  of  the  family,  and  we  have 
met  many  times  in  this  hotel.  May  I  say 
that  the  Secretary  of  State  actually  trav- 
eled the  same  road  President  Sadat  did 
3  weeks  ago,  and  the  Secretary  came 
from  Cairo  to  Jerusalem  and  then  went 
to  the  King  David  Hotel  and  then  we 
had  a  private  talk.  It's  all  almost  a 
repetition  of  what  happened  3  weeks 
ago  and  again  all  has  been  done  in 
friendship,  in  understanding,  in  pur- 
suit of  peace. 

Secretary  Vance:  Thank  you  very 
much,  Mr.  Prime  Minister,  for  your 
very  kind  words. 

I  bring  with  me  the  appreciation, 
the  gratitude,  and  the  admiration  of 
President  Carter  and  of  all  Americans. 
The  leadership  which  you  and  Presi- 
dent Sadat  have  given  to  the  movement 
for  peace  is  something  which  history 
will  record  for  generations  to  come.  I 
am  terribly  pleased  that  I  am  able  to 
be  here  at  this  point  to  meet  with  you 
and  to  discuss  what  we  can  do  to  help 
follow  the  leadership  which  you  and 
President  Sadat  have  given  to  the 
search  for  peace.  I  feel  that  our  dis- 
cussions today  which  have  been,  as 
always,  friendly  and  fruitful  have 
helped  very  much  in  guiding  our  steps 
in  a  supportive  role  in  the  days  ahead. 
So  I  thank  you  again  on  behalf  of  my- 
self, my  colleagues,  and  the  President, 
and  I  share  your  hope.  I  think  that 
there  is  a  chance  of  moving  forward 
now  toward  real  peace,  a  true  and  last- 
ing peace. 

Q.  You've  been  to  Egypt  and  Is- 
rael; can  you  tell  us  how  things  will 
go  beginning  Wednesday  in  Cairo, 
what  you  see  happening  at  least  as 
far  as  you  can  into  the  future? 


Secretary  Vance:  On  Wednesday 
the  meeting  of  Cairo  will  commence. 
The  meeting,  as  President  Sadat  has 
indicated,  is  an  open  meeting.  It  has 
no  fixed  date  within  which  to  accom- 
plish its  task.  1  anticipate  that  there 
will  be  discussed  at  the  meeting  mat- 
ters of  substance  as  well  as  matters  of 
procedure.  I  believe  that  it  is  possible 
in  those  meetings  to  chart  the  course, 
to  pave  the  way  toward  an  ultimate 
comprehensive  settlement  as  the  Prime 
Minister  has  said.  Our  objective — the 
objective  which  we  all  share — is  that 
we  may  achieve  a  comprehensive  set- 
tlement of  all  of  the  issues  which  have 
troubled  the  Middle  East  for  so  long 
and  that  this  step  will  be  a  very  impor- 
tant step  along  that  road. 

Q.  Based  on  what  the  Secretary 
has  told  you,  do  you  see  at  the 
moment  any  realistic  possibility 
that  Syria  and  Jordan  or  either  one 
of  them  will  take  part  in  the  Cairo 
conference  toward  this  com- 
prehensive peace  that  you  both  say 
you  see? 

Secretary  Vance:  At  this  moment 
both  Syria  and  Jordan  have  indicated 
that  they  do  not  intend  to  participate 
in  the  Cairo  conference.  This  is  a  de- 
cision which  each  must  take  as  an  in- 
dependent sovereign  nation.  What  the 
future  will  hold,  I  do  not  think  any  of 
us  can  predict.  We  hope  that  they  will 
keep  an  open  mind  and,  as  the  peace 
process  moves  forward,  that  they  will 
decide  to  join  the  peace  process.  But 
we  must  look  to  them  to  make  that 
decision. 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  I  can  only 
express  hope  that  both  Syria  and  Jor- 
dan will  join  in  the  effort.  You  re- 
member in  the  Knesset  I  invited  them 
already  for  the  third  time,  either  to 
come  to  Jerusalem  as  President  Sadat 
did,  or  if  they  would  prefer  me  to  go  to 
see  them,  I  will  go  any  place  and  meet 
them.  But  1  understand  that  this  is  a 
part  of  the  American  effort  now,  and, 
therefore,  the  Secretary  of  State  is 
here  and  will  visit  both  Amman  and 
Damascus  to  try  indeed  to  convince 
the  leaders  of  the  two  countries  that 
they  can  join.  Of  course,  it  is  up  to 
them.  We  want  them  to  participate  in 
the  effort  together  with  us. 

Q.  Is  it  possible  that  you  can  get 
these  other  parties  that  Mr.  Begin 
just  mentioned  to  participate  after 
an  interval,  perhaps  after  the  first 
of  the  year  when  the  Cairo  confer- 
ence might  possibly  take  another 
level  or  another  dimension? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  think  that  it  is 
possible  that  these  other  countries  may 
decide  at  .some  point  to  join  the  peace 
process  as  the  Prime  Minister  said.  All 
of  us  hope  that  this  would  be  the  case, 


Department  of  State  Bullet' 

and  we  will  continue  to  urge  that  thi|| 
keep  an  open  mind  and  join  the  peac 
process  and  try  and  help  in  achievii 
the  common  goal  which  all  of  us  shari 
because  I  do  believe  that  they,  tO( 
want  peace. 

Q.  [Inaudible!  one  of  the  thin; 
that  might  make  it  easier  to  chanj 
either  the  form  or  the  venue  of  tl. 
Cairo  conference? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  think  that  wi 
must  proceed  with   the  Cairo  confei 
ence  and  see  what  happens  as  we  j 
along  that  road.  The  peace  process 
a  continuing  process  and  hopefully, 
some  point,  the  others  will  join. 

Q.  You  opened  by  saying  there 
reason  to  be  optimistic.  Whi 
cause  do  you  have  for  optimism? 

Prime  Minister   Begin:  What 
would  like  to  say,  and  the  Secreta 
will  also  confirm  it,  is  that  this  is  tl 
first  time  for  29  years  that  Israel  at 
the   largest  Arab  state,   the   stronge     ' 
Arab  state,  embarked  on  direct,  fac 
to-face  negotiations  with  a  purpose- 
the  declared  goal  by  both  of  them — 
sign  peace  treaties.  Let  us  not  forg 
this  very  important  fact.  It  is  a  turnii 
point  in  the  history  of  both  these  cou 
tries.    Now,    there   is   a   negati\ 
phenomenon,  the  Tripolitanians.  B- 
we  believe  it  is  passing,  because  th^ 
are  interested  and  should  be  interest^ 
in  joining  these  efforts.   Now,  v^ 
meet,  we  talk.  We  shall  go  on  mea 
ing.  We  clarify  matters.  We  make 
effort,  an  intellectual  effort,  all  of  ii 
And  therefore,  there  is  reason  to 
optimistic. 

Q.  The  Israeli  Office  of  Inform 
tion  put  out  an  extract  of  an  edit 
rial  from  the  New  York  Tim 
today  which  said,  and  I  quote:  ' 
durable  peace  means  Israeli  conci 
sions  that  will  go  beyond  Sinai,  th 
will  include  security  arrangemer 
with  Syria  and  Jordan,  too.  Tl 
price  for  security:  abandonment  i 
the  demand  for  sovereignty  over  t  j. 
West  Bank."  I  wonder  if  you  ha 
a  comment  on  that. 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  Whatev    ' 
detail  will  be  proposed  by  any  of  yo 
I  will  give  the  following  answer.  It  is 
very   serious  answer,  may  I   say.   V 
are  now  in  the  midst  of  the  most  d£    , 
icate   negotiation   to  establish   peai!  i 
after  so  long,  protracted  years  of  wai 
fare  between  the  countries.  Give 
chance  to  that  negotiation.  And  ever 
thing   is,   as  I   said   time  and  agaii 
negotiable;  of  course,  except  the  d 
struction  of  Israel.  And  everything  wi 
be  negotiated.   But  the  negotiatioi 
will  take  place  in  Cairo,   in  Genev. 
in  Jerusalem,  with  all  due  respec 
not     before     the     camera     of    oi 


luary  1978 

I'ighty  friend,  the  television. 
3.  With  all  deference  to  your 
(i.sire  not  to  conduct  negotiations 
hire,  can  you,  without  going  into 
*tail,  tell  us  whether  since  the 

dat   visit   there   has  been  new 

nking  concerning  Israel's  posi- 
)ns  with   regard   to  the  West 
Ink? 

Prime  Minister   Begin:  New  or 

.  thinking;  this  is  the  issue.  And 

are  thinking. 

}.  I'd  like  to  know  whether  you 
tink  that  unanimity  in  the  Arab 
»rld  is  a  prerequisite  for  the 
ahievement  of  progress  in 
Gneva,  in  Cairo,  in  Jerusalem. 
Ad  the  contrary,  whether  prog- 
ris  in  those  places  is  contingent 
uon  unanimity  in  the  Arab  world. 
,;^d  I  would  like  to  ask  the  Secre- 
ti  y  particularly  this  question:  Is 
til  United  States  concerned  about 
tl!  deep  split  in  the  Arab  world 
bcause  of  recent  events?  If  so, 
CJld  he  please  tell  us  why? 

Secretary  Vance:  We  would  all 
le  to  see  unanimity  because  the 
Siiner  unanimity  is  achieved,  the 
nre  rapid  the  progress  would  be  to- 
*  d  peace.  That  does  not  mean,  how- 
e  r,  that  progress  cannot  be  made 
e  n  though  one  has  less  than  unanim- 
it 

fes,  it's  obvious  that  there  has  been 
aplit  in  the  Arab  world.  However,  as 
tie  moves  forward.  I  think  all  of  us 
hie  and  believe  that  there  is  a  possi- 
bity  that  that  split  can  be  healed, 
ci  disappear,  and  that  one  can  find  a 
g  ater  degree  of  unanimity  than  there 
i;at  the  present  time.  But  I  think 
tire  is  a  chance  for  real  peace,  and 
w  must  get  started  on  that  course. 

3.  Is  there  a  complete  under- 

s  nding,  an  agreement  between  Is- 

^^l  and  America  regarding  Israel's 

''  s  nding  and  attitude  in  the  Cairo 

cnference? 

Secretary  Vance:  We  have  no  dif- 
f  ences  of  view  with  respect  to  the 
Ciro  conference.  We  have  been  meet- 
ii  during  the  last  2  days  to  talk  about 
b:h  the  substance  and  the  details  of 
tl  Cairo  conference,  and  I  look  for- 
vrd  to  a  fruitful  conference. 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  I  concur. 

Q.  Is  it  desirable  from  your 
pint  of  view  and  do  you  think  it 
Muld  be  possible  for  the  Cairo 
» nference  to  produce  a  set  of 
I  inciples  for  a  comprehensive 
!  tiement? 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  Yes,  I 
link  this  is  really  the  purpose  of  the 
(jiro  conference.  Now  the  delega- 
l,ns,  both  of  Egypt  and  of  Israel,  will 
-  ilal  with  the  basic  principles  of  the 
uace  treaties  to  be  negotiated,  con- 


43 


U.S.  and  Israeli  officials  hold  a  working  dinner  in  Jerusalem  during  ihe  Secretary's  visit.  From 
left  to  right:  Secretary  Vance.  Israeli  Defense  Minister  Ezer  Weizman,  Director  of  Ihe  State 
Department's  Bureau  of  Intelligence  and  Research  Harold  H.  Saunders.  Political  Adviser  to  the 
Prime  Minister  Yehuda  Avner.  U.S.  Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Political  Affairs  Philip  C. 
Habib.  Prime  Minister  Begin.  Israeli  Foreign  Minister  Moshe  Dayan. 


eluded,  and  ultimately  signed.  And,  as 
you  know,  under  international  law, 
there  are  many  chapters  and  articles, 
sections  and  subsections  of  a  peace 
treaty  of  very  great  value  to  the  future 
of  any  nation  which  signs  such  a  very 
important  document  of  international 
standing  and  value.  And  this  is  going 
to  be  discussed  in  Cairo,  and  again  I 
want  to  stress,  it  will  be  a  sample  for 
the  peace  treaties  to  be  signed  with  all 
our  neighbors  to  the  peacemaking 
process  which  starts  now  in  Cairo. 
Under  no  circumstances  will  it  be  the 
end;  it  will  be  the  beginning  of  that 
process  which  ultimately  must  bring 
about  the  establishment  of  permanent 
peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

Q.  The  whole  set  of  principles — 
should  they  also  include  the  Pales- 
tinian issue? 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  The  prob- 
lem of  the  Palestinian  Arabs  will  be 
discussed,  debated;  we  think  of  it,  and 
I'm  sure  we  shall  find  a  solution  for 
this  problem. 

Q.  In  the  absence  of  other  Arab 
governments  at  Cairo,  would  you 
be  inclined  to  regard  President 
Sadat  as  a  person  who  can  reflect 
their  views  and,  indeed,  discuss  is- 
sues which  apply  not  only  to  Egypt 
but  to  the  other  governments  with 
which  you  wish  to  make  peace  at 
some  later  stage? 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  While  in 
Jerusalem,  President  Sadat  said  that 
when  we  start  talking  directly  about 
peace,  he  would  like  to  represent,  if  I 
may  say  so,  the  Arab  cause,  and  we 
agree.  So  I  have  no  doubt  whatsoever 


that  in  Cairo  our  delegations  will  talk 
not  only  about  the  bilateral  relations 
between  Egypt  and  Israel  but  also 
about  the  problems  concerning  other 
countries  in  the  Middle  East  neighbor- 
ing with  Israel. 

I  can  only  imagine  that  President 
Sadat  will  not  claim  that  he  can  speak, 
for  instance  now,  on  behalf  of  Presi- 
dent Asad  [of  Syria],  because  Presi- 
dent Asad  doesn't  agree  to  talk  with 
us.  So  this  is  a  problem,  indeed,  of 
the  peacemaking  process.  Let  us  have 
some  patience. 

If  for  the  time  being  there  are  those 
who  take  a  negative  attitude,  we 
should  be  optimistic.  It  will  change — I 
believe  it  will  change — and  they  will 
join  in  that  effort.  It's  a  problem  of 
time;  let  us  give  ourselves  some  time. 

Q.  We've  seen  Secretaries  of 
State  coming  through  the  Middle 
East  now  fairly  often  on  sometimes 
successful,  sometimes  unsuccessful 
missions  but  always  in  a  role  of 
mediator.  Now  that  there  are  di- 
rect face-to-face  negotiations,  how 
do  you  gentlemen,  especially  after 
the  talks  in  Cairo  and  here,  envis- 
age the  role  of  the  United  States  in 
the  future  in  these  discussions? 

Secretary  Vance:  The  United 
States  is  delighted  that  we  have  face- 
to-face  discussions  going  on  between 
Israel  and  Egypt.  It  has  been  our  hope 
for  years  that  the  time  would  come 
when  the  parties  could  sit  down  to- 
gether face-to-face  and  discuss  the 
serious  issues  that  had  to  be  resolved 
in  order  to  get  peace.  We  have  said 
time  and  again  that  that's  the  only  way 


44 


Department  of  State  Bulle> 


you're  going  to  achieve  a  real  peace. 

Our  role  continues  that  of  a 
mediator,  a  facilitator;  that  is  the  role 
we  intend  to  play.  We  want  to  be  sup- 
portive of  the  discussions  face-to-face 
among  the  parties. 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  You  said 
that  the  Secretary  of  State  is  visiting 
the  Middle  East  often.  As  a  citizen  of 
one  of  the  host  countries,  I  will  add: 
Not  often  enough! 

Secretary  Vance:  Thank  you  Mr. 
Prime  Minister.  [Laughter] 

Q.  President  Sadat  was  asked 
yesterday  in  Cairo  whether  he  was 
pleased  with  the  Israeli  response  to 
this  initiative.  He  said,  no,  not  yet. 
They  haven't  answered.  My  ques- 
tion is,  one,  do  you  intend  to  an- 
swer, and,  two,  when  do  you  intend 
to  answer?  Would  that  be  after 
Cairo  or  before  Cairo? 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  You  might 
have  seen  that  we  do  not  go  into  pub- 
lic polemics  about  any  statements 
whatsoever.  I  think  it's  a  healthy  at- 
titude. The  real  response  is  negotia- 
tions, and  negotiations  will  start  on 
Wednesday  in  Cairo. 

Q.  As  Israel's  chief  ally  and 
friend,  what  is  the  United  States 
advising  Israel  to  dp  at  this  historic 
moment? 

Secretary  Vance:  America,  as  Is- 
rael's historic  friend,  is  counseling 
with  Israel  to  find  out  what  we  can  do 
to  be  most  helpful  in  the  direct  negoti- 
ations which  are  going  on  face-to-face 
between  Israel  and  Egypt. 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  May  I  pay 
tribute  to  the  efforts  made  by  the  Pres- 
ident of  the  United  States  and  the 
Government  of  the  United  States 
throughout  the  years,  and  mainly  dur- 
ing this  year,  to  bring  about  these 
momentous  developments.  And  let  me 
also  add,  even  the  visit  itself  by  Pres- 
ident Sadat  to  Jerusalem  was  made 
possible  by  the  help  of  the  United 
States  Government.  So  I  would  like  to 
pay  tribute  to  this  effort. 

Q.  President  Sadat  said  in  an 
interview  yesterday  the  Israeli  po- 
sition on  the  Palestinian  question 
would  have  to  change  if  peace  is  to 
be  achieved  in  the  Middle  East. 
Have  you  worked  out  a  new  posi- 
tion on  the  Palestinian  question, 
and  is  Mr.  Vance  carrying  any 
message  on  this  subject  to  the 
other  Arab  countries,  or  is  he  car- 
rying any  message  from  you  to  the 
other  Arab  countries? 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  There  is  a 
problem  of  the  Palestinian  Arabs.  I 
said  so  in  the  presence  of  President 
Sadat  in  the  I  nesset,  and  we  will  find 
a  solution  for  this  problem. 


A 

1 
1 

j^^^ 

Qgpyt.^^BW?^  ^^^^^vj 

JoriUinian  King  Hussein  and  Secretary   Vance 
a!  the  Royal  Palace  in  Amman,     wide  World  Phoio 

Q.  The  second  part  of  my  ques- 
tion, is  Mr.  Vance  carrying  any 
message  from  you  to  the  Arab 
countries  on  this  question  of — 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  Do  you  ex- 
pect me  to  reply  to  you?  [Laughter] 

Q.  You  made  a  strong  statement 
in  support  of  Arab  unity.  Do  you 
plan  on  this  trip  and  in  subsequent 
weeks  to  try  to  facilitate  the  Egyp- 
tians and  the  other  Arabs  coming 
together?  Have  you  discussed  this 
with  Mr.  Sadat  to  find  some  way  of 
bringing  the  Arabs  together? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  have  discussed 
with  President  Sadat  the  questions  of 
the  divisions  that  exist  within  the  Arab 
world.  He,  like  all  of  us,  would  like  to 
see  those  divisions  healed  and  disap- 
pear. I  will,  in  my  talks  with  the  other 
Arab  leaders,  urge  them,  as  we  have 
from  the  outset,  to  participate  in  the 
peace  process.  We  have  said  this  to 
them  from  the  moment  that  the  Cairo 
conference  was  proposed.  They  have 
indicated  that  they,  too,  seek  the  same 
end  objective:  namely,  a  comprehen- 
sive peace  which  will  settle  the  ques- 
tions of  the  Middle  East.  And,  there- 
fore, I  will  continue  to  pursue  our  po- 
sitions with  respect  to  this  and  discuss 
that  matter  with  them. 

Q.  Do  you  think  Arab  unity 
helps  the  peace  process,  or  some 
Israelis  in  the  past  have  suggested 
a  divided  Arab  world  actually  helps 
Israel? 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  I  do  not 
agree  with  the  theory  that  a  divided 
Arab  world  will  help  Israel.  To  the 
contrary,  we  believe  that  we  should 
have  peace  on  all  the  borders  of  Is- 
rael, sign  peace  treaties  with  all  our 
four  neighbors — Egypt,  Jordan,  Syria, 
and  Lebanon.  All  the  four  neighbors 
should  live  in  peace  with  Israel,  and 


Israel  wants  to  live  in  peace  wif 
them.  We  do  not  drive  wedges,  we  t 
not  believe  in  that  famous  prece[ 
known  in  Latin:  Divide  et  empera.  W| 
don't  want  to  divide,  and  we  doiii 
want  to  rule.  We  want  peace.  This  i 
what  we  believe  in. 

Q.  At  the  Tripoli  conference,  th 
Palestinians  took — according  t 
President  Sadat — a  more  extrem 
position  that  they  would  not  pai 
ticipate  in  negotiations  at  all.  Hi 
this  made  you  more  optimist! 
that,  as  you  look  down  the  road  H 
negotiations,  the  Palestinians  ha\' 
in  fact  taken  themselves  out  of  th 
picture? 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  Tripo 
cannot  make  anybody  optimistic 
When  I  spoke  about  optimism,  I  meai 
the  trend,  the  development,  the  hop 
to  overcome  the  negation  of  th 
Tripolitanians,  and  of  course,  it  is  i 
most  negative  phenomenon  for  the  tin 
being.  What  did  they  say  in  Tripol 
No  recognition  of  the  State  of  Israe 
no  negotiations  with  Israel,  no  pea( 
with  Israel.  Actually,  another  pronui 
ciamento  was  made  there  that  Israi 
should  be  destroyed.  This  is  negati\ 
of  course. 

The  Soviet  Union  is  behind  th: 
negative  attitude,  which  is  very  n 
grettable  because  the  Soviet  Union  is 
great  power  and  is  a  cochairman  of  tl 
Geneva  conference.  But  this  ha| 
pened,  let  me  say,  2  weeks  ago,  ai 
that  does  not  decide  the  issue.  Ma 
kind  will  march  forward.  War  is  evit 
ble;  peace  is  inevitable.  So  we  shz 
overcome  with  a  common  effort  Ih 
hurdle,  too,  and  Syria  and  Lebam 
and  Jordan  will  join  in  the  peace  e 
fort,  and  ultimately  we  shall  ha\ 
peace  throughout  the  region.  This 
our  belief. 

Q.  You  said  that  it  is  your  undei 
standing  that  the  Cairo  conferent 
will  discuss  substance  and  proci 
dures.  The  Palestinian  issue  ii 
volves  both  matters.  In  your  tall 
in  Egypt  and  here  in  Israel,  ha^ 
you  heard  any  thoughts,  ideas,  ( 
proposals  which  will  indicate  thei 
is  already  movement  toward  brid) 
ing  the  gap — the  very  wide  gap- 
between  the  Arab  and  the  Israe 
positions  on  the  Palestinians? 

Secretary  Vance:  Let  me  say  that 
believe  that  the  Palestinian  questic 
will  be  among  the  issues  which  will  t 
discussed  in  the  Cairo  conference. 

Q.  Do  you  agree  with  Prim 
Minister  Begin  that  the  Sovii 
Union  is  behind  the  most  Arab  eii 
tremists  positions? 

Secretary  Vance:  With  referenc, 
to  the  Soviet  Union,  the  Soviet  Uniojl 
is  the  cochairman  of  the  Geneva  corjl 


luary  1978 

ence.  They  have  a  serious  responsi- 
ity,  as  we  do,  as  cochairman.  They 
^e  said  that  they  intend  to  discharge 
t  responsibility.  I  do  not  want  to 
nment  on  their  motives  and,  there- 
,  will  not  do  so. 


:WS  CONFERENCE,  BEIRUT, 
e;c.  13^ 

"ve  just  had  a  very  good  conversa- 
tin  with  President  Sarkis,  with  the 
Pme  Minister,  and  with  the  Foreign 
Vnister.  We  had  a  chance  to  discuss 
nny  issues  relating  to  the  Middle 
Est  problem  and  to  the  situation  in 
Loanon  itself.  On  the  basis  of  my 
civersation  with  President  Sarkis,  I 
a  confident  that  Lebanon  will  be  able 
U  surmount  its  problems  and  resume 
tl  traditional  role  which  it  has  played 
iiihe  area. 

Ve  have  noted  the  progress  which 
h;  been  made  with  respect  to  re- 
fa  Iding  the  institutions  within  the 
c  mtry  and  particularly  the  progress 
tit  is  being  made  with  respect  to  the 
n  uilding  of  the  army.  We  will  con- 
tiie  to  help  in  connection  with  this 
p  ject  and  with  other  steps  that  may 
b  helpful  in  the  reconstruction  of  the 
c  intry. 

wish  to  reaffirm  our  very  strong 
s  port  for  President  Sarkis  in  the  ef- 
fcs  which  he  is  making  to  achieve 
tl  se  goals  for  your  country. 

}.  Do  you  thinH  that  the  Israeli 
C  vernment  is  willing  to  give  some 
cicessions  to  the  Arab  countries? 

i.  I  think  that  the  Israelis  are  pro- 
c  ding  with  seriousness;  they  are  en- 
tt  ng  into  discussions  starting  tomor- 
in'  and  direct  face-to-face  talks  with 
E'pt.  They  have  stated  that  they  are 
p:pared  to  and  wish  to  attend  a 
C  leva  conference  at  which  there  can 
b  reached  a  comprehensive  settle- 
nnt.  They  have  affirmed  that  their 
0  ective,  as  is  the  objective  of  the 
^ib  states,  is  a  comprehensive  set- 
tJTient  of  the  Middle  East  problem, 
al  I  believe  that  there  is  hope  that 
tit  objective  can  be  obtained. 

[).  Will  Lebanon  be  going  to  a 
(  neva  conference? 

V.  That  is  a  judgment  which  Leba- 
Dn  will  have  to  take  itself  and,  I 
tnk,  will  be  made  at  the  time  that 
t;re  would  be  a  call  for  a  Geneva 
ciference. 

Q.  Can  we  know  why  the  United 
fates  did  not  try  to  solve  the 
1  oblems  of  south  Lebanon? 

\.  The  problems  in  the  south  of 
Ibanon  are  very  difficult  problems. 
^i  have,  throughout  the  months  in 

ich  I  have  been  involved  with  the 


problems  of  the  Middle  East,  tried  to 
play,  and  I  believe  we  have  played,  a 
helpful  role  in  acting  as  an  inter- 
mediary between  the  various  parties 
that  are  involved  in  that  very  complex 
and  difficult  set  of  issues.  And  we  will 
continue  to  play  a  constructive  role. 

Q.  We  know  that  there  was  a 
proposal  to  station  U.N.  forces  on 
the  borders  of  Lebanon.  What 
happened  to  this  proposal? 

A.  The  last  time  I  was  here  there 
was  some  general  discussion  with  re- 
spect to  the  possibility  of  U.N.  forces 
in  the  southern  area.  That  question 
was  discussed  among  the  various  par- 
ties. For  various  reasons  a  decision 
was  taken  by  the  parties  not  to  pro- 
ceed with  that. 

The  principal  action  which  needs  to 
be  taken  at  this  point  is  to  implement 
the  third  stage  of  the  Chtaura  agree- 
ment. I  would  hope  that  it  might  be 
possible  that  there  could  be  agreement 
reached  to  put  the  third  stage  into  ef- 
fect, because  that  could  have  a  very 
important  and  beneficial  effect  should 
that  be  done.'^ 

Q.  Are  you  hopeful  after  your 
last  2  days  of  talks  in  Jordan  and 
in  Lebanon  that  the  circle  of  par- 
ticipants in  the  Cairo  talks  might 
be  enlarged  at  some  stage? 

A.  I  have  said  that  with  respect  to 
the  Cairo  talks  that  I  did  not  believe 
that  it  was  realistic  to  expect  that 
there  were  going  to  be  changes  with 
respect  to  the  participation  in  the 
Cairo  meetings  which  start  tomorrow. 
I  still  believe  that  that  is  the  case.  I 
am,  however,  encouraged  by  the  fact 
that  everyone  that  I  have  talked  to 
says  that  an  ultimate  comprehensive 
settlement  in  Geneva  is  the  objective 
of  each  of  them.  And  if  we  can  con- 
tinue to  work  toward  that,  I  think  that 
the  Cairo  meetings  can  be  very  help- 
ful in  paving  the  way  to  that  objective 
at  the  end  of  the  road. 


STATEMENT,  RIYAHD, 
DEC.  15  " 

Secretary  Vance:  The  United 
States  and  Saudi  Arabia  are  partners 
in  the  pursuit  of  peace  and  economic 
stability.  There  is  a  long  history  of 
friendship  and  close  cooperation  be- 
tween our  countries.  President  Carter 
and  I  are  particularly  grateful  for  the 
opportunity  to  be  able  to  consult  with 
and  receive  the  wise  advice  of  His 
Majesty  King  Khalid,  His  Highness 
Crown  Prince  Fahd,  His  Highness 
Prince  Sa'ud,  and  their  colleagues.  I 
particularly  have  appreciated  the  op- 
portunity again  to  meet  with  them  dur- 
ing this  all  too  short  visit.  I  shall  be 


45 


returning  to  the  United  States  directly 
today  and  will  be  reporting  to  the  Pres- 
ident on  my  trip  through  the  Middle 
East.  We  are  committed  to  the  search 
for  a  just,  permanent,  and  comprehen- 
sive settlement  in  the  Middle  East, 
and  we  will  remain  diligent  in  our  ef- 
forts to  achieve  that  goal. 

Q.  Were  you  able  to  bridge  the 
differences  among  the  Arab  coun- 
tries you  have  visited? 

Secretary  Vance:  The  various 
countries  which  1  have  visited,  of 
course,  are  all  sovereign  and  inde- 
pendent nations.  They  must  make  their 
own  determinations  with  respect  to 
their  future  courses  of  action.  I  believe 
that  all  of  them  are  committed  to  the 
achievement  of  a  just  and  lasting 
peace  in  the  Middle  East,  but  each  of 
them  will  have  to  speak  for  itself  with 
respect  to  its  course  of  action. 

Q.  In  your  recent  trip  to  the 
area  you  have  visited  Jerusalem. 
Does  that  mean  any  change  in  the 
American  attitude  toward 
Jerusalem?  Because  it  is  known 
that  the  U.S.  Government  did  not 
recognize  Jerusalem  as  the  capital 
of  Israel. 

Secretary  Vance:  The  United 
States  does  not  recognize  Jerusalem  as 
the  capital  of  Israel.  The  fact  that  I  vi- 
sited Jerusalem  in  no  way  changes  our 
position  with  respect  to  that  issue. 

Q.  Could  you  give  us  an  idea  of 
the  current  view  of  the  Saudi  Gov- 
ernment about  the  initiatives  un- 
dertaken by  President  Sadat  of 
Egypt,  the  Cairo  conference,  and 
his  trip  to  Jerusalem? 

Prince  Sa'ud:  If  I  may  comment  on 
these  issues  which  you  have  stated,  I 
think  that  Saudi  Arabia  believes  that 
any  judgement  has  to  follow  the  results 
of  any  action  undertaken.  Until  now 
the  results  from  the  action  that  has 
been  undertaken  is  not  present,  and, 
therefore,  we  hold  judgement  on  that 
until  some  result  is  viewed. 

Q.  Were  you  encouraged  by  Mr. 
Vance's  report  on  his  talks  in  Is- 
rael, and  do  you  believe  that  there 
is  additional  flexibility  in  Israel 
from  what  you've  heard  from  Mr, 
Vance? 

Prince  Sa'ud:  I  might  say  that  I 
was  cautiously  optimistic  after  the  dis- 
cussions I've  had  with  the  Secretary.  I 
would  link,  however,  this  optimism 
completely  with  the  solidarity  that 
could  be  achieved  between  the  Arab 
countries  in  the  pursuit  of  peace. 

Q.  During  your  traveling  among 
the  capitals  of  the  area,  what  kind 
of  result  do  you  expect,  and  do 
you  think  that  you  are  optimistic? 


46 


Secretary  Vance:  I,  like  His  Royal 
Highness,  am  cautiously  optimistic. 
The  purpose  of  my  trip  was  to  see  what 
the  United  States  could  do  to  support 
the  momentum  toward  peace  which  has 
been  created  and.  furthermore,  to  ex- 
change views  with  the  leaders  in  the 
area  and  to  learn  from  them  their 
views  with  respect  to  the  ways  in 
which  the  United  States  can  contribute 
to  the  achievement  of  a  just  and  last- 
ing peace,  and  it  was  also  to  maintain 
the  channels  of  communication  with  all 
of  the  countries  in  this  area.  I  believe 
that  the  results  of  the  trip  achieved 
those  purposes. 


STATEMENT,   ANDREWS  AIR 
FORCE  BASE,  DEC.  15  ' 

Vice  President  Mondaie:  On  be- 
half of  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  we  want  to  welcome  our  Secre- 
tary of  State,  Cyrus  Vance,  back  home 
again  and  thank  him  for,  what  we  have 
come  to  expect,  an  extraordinarily 
gifted  job  representing  our  country 
with  skill  and  with  dignity. 

Secretary  Vance:  Thank  you  very 
much,  Mr.  Vice  President. 

Good  evening,  ladies  and  gentle- 
men. It  has  been  a  very  good  and  use- 
ful trip.  I  will  be  going  directly  from 
here  to  the  White  House  to  report  in 
detail  to  the  President. 

The  President  asked  me  to  go  to  the 
Middle  East  to  do  three  things:  to  dis- 
cuss with  the  leaders  of  the  area  how 
we  can  help  to  maintain  the  momentum 
toward  peace  generated  by  President 
Sadat's  visit  to  Israel  and  Israel's  re- 
sponse to  that  initiative;  to  learn  their 
views  on  the  steps  necessary  to  ad- 
vance the  peace  negotiations;  and  to 
keep  open  the  lines  of  communication 
with  all  of  the  governments  that  must 
be  involved  in  a  negotiated  peace. 

My  talks  began  with  President  Sadat 
and  Prime  Minister  Begin.  I  found 
both  men  ready  to  deal  directly  and 
promptly  with  the  key  issues.  They  are 
both  committed  to  achieving  peace, 
and  both  encourage  us  to  remain  in 
our  active  role. 

President  Sadat  believes  his  trip  to 
Israel  demonstrated  his  sincere  com- 
mitment to  peace.  He  believes  that  the 
way  has  now  been  opened  to  the 
achievement  of  a  just  and  lasting 
peace,  that  what  has  taken  place  has 
dramatically  shown  the  possibilities 
that  lie  in  a  peaceful  relationship  be- 
tween Israel  and  its  neighbors. 

Prime  Minister  Begin  believes  that 
President  Sadat  has  taken  a  courage- 
ous step  which  Israel  has  welcomed 
warmly.  He  has  said  that  he  intends  to 


sustain  the  momentum  toward  peace.  I 
expect  this  matter  will  be  discussed 
when  he  meets  with  the  President  to- 
morrow . 

President  Sadat's  visit  to  Israel  has 
unquestionably  had  a  deep  impact  on 
the  people  in  both  Egypt  and  Israel.  I 
believe  all  of  them,  from  senior  gov- 
ernment officials  to  the  man  and 
woman  in  the  street,  are  convinced 
that  an  historic  opportunity  lies  before 
them  in  the  quest  for  a  just  and  dura- 
ble peace.  In  my  talks  with  President 
Sadat  and  Prime  Minister  Begin,  I 
stressed  the  United  States'  firm  com- 
mitment to  a  comprehensive  peace.  I 
found  both  in  complete  agreement  and 
ready  to  move  forward  on  that  basis. 

In  my  meetings  with  the  leaders  of 
Jordan,  Lebanon,  Syria,  and  Saudi 
Arabia,  I  found  intense  interest  in 
momentous  events  of  recent  weeks. 
Even  where  there  is  sharp  disagree- 
ment over  the  course  taken  by  Presi- 
dent Sadat,  I  found  a  commitment  to 
a  comprehensive  peace  and  a  strong 
desire  to  maintain  close  contact  with 
the  United  States.  These  leaders  do 
not  see  the  future  of  their  countries  in 
war.  I  hope  that  each  will  find  ways 
to  contribute  to  a  peaceful  settlement 
in  the  most  appropriate  manner  for 
his  country. 

The  opening  of  the  Cairo  conference 
coincided  with  the  final  leg  of  my  trip, 
a  trip  which  helped  crystalize  thinking 
on  how  to  improve  the  prospect  for 
positive  results  from  this  historic  meet- 
ing. We  regard  the  Cairo  conference 
as  a  constructive  and  an  important 
step  forward.   We  have  pledged  to  do 


1 


Department  of  State  Bullet! 

everything  we  can  at  Cairo  to  help  t/l(>' 
parties  reach  agreement.  Once  W  i-'' 
proper  agreements  have  been  reache'lr-^' 
on  general  principles  and  on  matters  I 
procedure,  we  would  expect  the  tall 
to  shift  to  a  broader  framework. 

In  each  of  the  countries  that  I  vi 
ited,  I  affirmed  the  continued  con 
mitment  of  the  United  States  to  tt 
search  for  peace.  1  made  clear  that  v 
will  give  our  fullest  support  to  the  e 
forts  now  underway  and  to  those  th 
will  follow. 

Despite  the  difficult  decisions  thi 
must   still   be  made  and   the  hai 
negotiations  ahead,  we  have  before  i 
a  unique  opportunity  to  achieve  peai 
in  the  Middle  East.  It  would  be  trag 
to  lose  this  opportunity.  This  view 
shared  by  the  people  of  the  region.  V. 
must  pray  for  the  statesmanship  ai| 
the  vision  that  will  gain  for  the  peep 
of  the  Middle  East  and  for  the  wor 
the   peace   that   has   so   long  bet 
sought. 


I 


'  Other  press  releases  relating  to  Secretj 
Vance's  trip  are  Nos.  553  of  Dec.  9;  555.  5.' 
557.  and  558  of  Dec.  12;  563.  564.  565,  a 
567  of  Dec.  13;  and  568  and  569  of  Dec.  14, 

'  Text  from  press  release  554  of  Dec.  I 
1977. 

'  Text  from  press  release  559  of  Dec.  1 
1977. 

'  Text  from  press  release  566  of  Dec.  I 
1977. 

*  The  Chiaura  agreement  regulates  the  Pal 
tinian  presence  in  Lebanon.  The  United  Sui 
is  not  a  party  to  it. 

"  Text  from  press  release  574  of  Dec.  I 
1977, 

'  Text  from  press  release  577  of  Dec.  1 
1977. 


Assistant    Secretary    Athertoi 
Intervietved  on  the  ^^Totfaif"  Show 


Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  Eastern 
and  South  Asian  Affairs  Alfred  L. 
Atherton,  Jr.,  was  interviewed  on  the 
"Today"  Show  on  December  7,  1977, 
by  Bob  Abernathy,  "Today"  corre- 
spondent in  Washington. 

Q.  Things  have  been  moving  so 
quickly  lately  in  the  Middle  East — 
President  Sadat's  trip  to  Israel,  the 
denunciation  of  that  by  many  Arab 
countries  and  the  Soviet  Union,  the 
coming  meeting  in  Cairo.  Any  way  to 
tell  whose  move  it  is  now? 

A.  I  think  clearly  that  the  focus  now 
is  on  the  conference  in  Cairo  where 
President  Sadat  and  Prime  Minister 


Begin  have  said  that  they  want  tht 
delegations  to  try  to  do  some  prepar 
tory  work  for  the  Geneva  Middle  Es, 
Peace  Conference,  , 

Q.  A  lot  of  people  would  say  th^ 
after  Mr.  Sadat  took  all  the  chanc^ 
that  he  did — going  to  Jerusalem — it| 
now  the  turn  of  the  Israelis  to  ( 
something  equally  significant.  Wh 
do  you  think?  Is  it  time  for  the  I 
raelis  to  make  some  very  significai' 
gesture  or  concession  in  return? 

A.   I  think  both  sides  are  going 
have  to  be  flexible  to  make  concessiof 
to  try  to  accommodate  their  positions 
the  positions  of  the  other  in  the  Caii 
talks.  I  would  think,  what's  more,  th' 


.^ary  1978 

1  sides  recognize  this  and  are  going 
e  Cairo  conference  with  this  frame 
ind. 
'\  But  each  side  equally,  in  your 
U4;nient?  Or  is  it  now  the  turn  of 
^Israelis? 
.  There  is  something  that  each  side 
IS  from  the  other.   Egypt  clearly 
s  Israeli  commitments  on  the  re- 
I   of  occupied  territories  and  on 
(12  kind  of  a  solution  for  the  Palesti- 
a  problem.  The  Israelis  want  from 
le^rabs,  and  from  Egypt  in  particular 
ii  lis  case,  commitments  to  peace, 
oial  relations.  And  I  think  there  are 
0  g  to  have  to  be  accommodations  in 
these  areas  on  the  part  of  both 

•  .  President  Sadat  told  the  New 
ck  Times  yesterday  that  in  the 
Sling  negotiations  he  would  carry 
mugh  to  the  end  with  Israel  alone 
f  'cessary  if  the  other  Arab  coun- 
ri  refuse  to  go  along  with  his  ap- 
inch.  Prime  Minister  Begin  indi- 
au  he  would  do  the  same.  Would 
lu  United  States  have  any  objection 

0  separate  deal  between  Israel  and 
4  jt  by  themselves? 

,  I  think  it's  premature  really  to 
il  about  that.  It's  true  that  there  has 
i&  a  lot  of  speculation  about  separate 
e.  e  settlements,  but  let's  go  back  and 
X  at  what  both  the  Egyptians  and  the 
sr  lis  are  saying.  They're  saying  that 
ie  purpose  of  the  Cairo  conference  is 
3  epare  for  a  Geneva  conference  to 
i)  he  basis  for  a  comprehensive  peace 
sCment  on  all  fronts.  Clearly,  this  is 
u^reference.  We  think  it  would  lead 
)  much  stabler  Middle  East  to  have 
e  e  on  all  fronts. 

.  But  if  you  can't  get  that — 

.  I  wouldn't  want  to  cross  that 
ri^e  yet.  I  really  think  it's  premature 
)  /en  talk  in  those  terms.  Obviously 

lu  get  to  a  point  where  some  of  the 
a  es  are  not  interested  in  a  peace 
51  ement — as  the  President  said  in  his 
ns  conference  last  week — then  you 
ai  to  consider  alternatives.  But 
'«  e  not  there  at  this  point. 

.  The  Cairo  meeting  between 
ijpt  and  Israel  begins  Decem- 
e  14.  You'll  be  there  representing 

1  United  States.  I'm  interested  in 
K^tly  what  you  imagine  you'll  be 
a  id  upon  to  do.  How  do  you  see 
»  country  helping? 

.  Let's  first  go  back  and  understand 
'■"t  the  Cairo  conference  is  now.  The 
io  conference  has  been  called  by  the 
Cident  of  Egypt.  Egypt  is  the  host. 
)  of  the  principal  parties  to  the 
3-Israeli  conflict  and  to  the  Geneva 
£;e  conference  are  going  to  be  there. 
I  impression  is  that  they  are  coming 
1  e  eager  to  begin  to  negotiate  with 


each  other.  And  we  do  not  see  our  role 
as  a  lead  role  in  this  conference  but  cer- 
tainly as  a  supportive  role.  We  are 
there  as  friends  of  both  sides  to  help 
both  sides  in  any  way  that  they  think 
we  can  help  to  make  progress. 

Q.  Suppose  in  trying  to  put  to- 
gether the  interests  of  both  that  you 
talked  about  before,  suppose  you  are 
asked  as  the  representative  of  the 
United  States,  are  we  prepared  to 
help  guarantee  Israel's  security? 
How  do  you  answer  that? 

A.  We've  always  said  that  we  would 
be  prepared  to  participate  in  any  system 
of  guarantees  of  a  peace  settlement.  In 
that  context,  we  have  an  open  mind  and 
would  consider  any  system  of  guaran- 
tees that  the  parties  themselves  thought 
would  give  them  a  sense  of  security 
and  would  help  make  the  agreement 
more  viable. 

Q.  Involving  U.S.  troops? 

A.  We  haven't  come  to  that  point,  of 
course,  in  our  considerations,  but  I  be- 
lieve that  the  Secretary  of  State  said  re- 
cently that  we  would  not  rule  out  the 
concept  of  a  defense  treaty  if  that  were 
necessary  to  help  make  the  peace  set- 
tlements secure.  But  obviously  it  is 
something  that  would  have  to  be  done 
in  accordance  with  our  constitutional 
processes  and  consultation  with  Con- 
gress. 

Q.  Suppose  you're  asked  exactly 
what  the  United  States  would  do  in 
the  way  of  a  homeland  for  the  Pales- 
tine Arabs.  Would  we  support  not 


47 


just  an  entity  or  a  homeland  as  Pres- 
ident Carter  has  said,  but  would  we 
also  support  the  idea  of  a  full-fledged 
independent  state? 

A.  We  have  said  that  we  would  not 
prefer  an  independent  Palestinian  state, 
that  we  think  a  Palestinian  homeland  in 
some  kind  of  association  or  linkage 
with  Jordan  would  be  a  better  solution. 
But  in  the  final  analysis  this  is  a  ques- 
tion that  is  going  to  have  to  be  resolved 
in  the  negotiations  by  the  parties  to  the 
conflict.  And  we  have  not  taken  a  U.S. 
position  on  what  the  precise  solution  of 
the  Palestinian  question  should  be. 
We've  set  out  a  concept. 

Q.  What  is  the  Soviet  Union  up  to? 
Are  they  very  critical  of  what  Sadat 
has  done?  We've  had  the  Under  Sec- 
retary of  State  [for  Political  Aftairs 
Philip  C.  Habib  ]  in  Moscow  talking  to 
them.  What  are  they  doing? 

A.  The  Soviets  are  a  cochairman  of 
the  Geneva  conference,  and  we  talk  to 
them  as  the  other  cochairman.  We  have 
assumed  that  they  have  an  interest  in  a 
Geneva  conference  ultimately  and  in  a 
peace  settlement.  We  have  not  found 
their  recent  comments  helpful,  their 
criticism  of  Sadat's  move — which  we 
think  is  an  important  breakthrough — 
their  support  for  the  position  of  the  crit- 
ics of  Sadat — quite  frankly,  we  have 
not  found  this  helpful.  And  our  own 
view  is  that  they  should  play  a  respon- 
sible role,  and  we  are  going  to  wait  and 
see  if  they  do  come  to  play  a  responsi- 
ble role.  D 


Cairo  Preparatory  Jfieettng  Opens 


by  Alfred  L.  Atherton,  Jr. ' 

It  is  an  honor  to  represent  the  United 
States  on  this  historic  occasion. 

I  would  like  first  to  extend  congratu- 
lations to  the  Governments  of  both 
Egypt  and  Israel  whose  commitment  to 
peace  has  made  it  possible  for  this 
meeting  to  convene.  It  is  a  particular 
pleasure  to  be  sitting  at  this  table  today 
with  friends  from  Egypt  and  Israel  and 
with  Gen.  Siilasvuo  [of  Finland],  who  is 
present  to  represent  Secretary  General 
Waldheim. 

In  sending  me  here,  President  Carter 
made  it  clear  that  the  U.S.  Government 
sees  the  convening  of  this  meeting  in 
Cairo  as  a  constructive  step  on  the  road 
to  peace.  We  are  ready  to  do  whatever 
we  can  to  facilitate,  support,  and  en- 
courage the  negotiations  here  to  pre- 
pare the  way  for  the  Geneva  Middle 


East  Peace  Conference  and  the 
achievement  of  a  comprehensive,  just, 
and  durable  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

For  nearly  30  years  the  Middle  East 
conflict  has  reaped  a  terrible  harvest  of 
lives,  resources,  and  energies  of  Arabs 
and  Israelis  alike.  It  is  true  that  during 
this  period  there  have  been  some  steps 
forward:  Security  Council  Resolutions 
242  and  338,  the  convening  of  the 
Middle  East  Peace  Conference  in 
Geneva  in  1973,  and  the  conclusion  of 
three  limited  agreements  under  the  aus- 
pices of  that  conference,  all  testified  to 
the  increasing  commitment  by  the  par- 
ties to  the  search  for  a  peaceful  settle- 
ment. 

Yet,  in  spite  of  this  progress,  the 
remaining  psychological  obstacles  have 
imposed  formidable  barriers,  as  the  at- 
tempt has  been  made  this  year  to  take 
the  logical  next  step  of  opening  negoti- 


48 


ations  for  a  final  peace  settlement  at 
Geneva. 

The  momentous  events  of  recent 
weeks  have  fundamentally  altered  that 
situation  and  have  provided  new  hope 
that  the  objective  of  an  overall  settle- 
ment embodied  in  peace  treaties  can,  in 
fact,  be  achieved.  With  one  bold  stroke 
President  Sadat  has  broken  through  the 
barrier  and  imparted  new  momentum 
toward  peace.  With  farsightedness  and 
statesmanship.  Prime  Minister  Begin 
has  responded  in  a  manner  that  makes 
it  clear  that  Israel,  for  its  part,  does  not 
intend  to  allow  this  unique  opportunity 
to  be  lost.  These  two  strong  and  crea- 
tive leaders  have  brought  about  a  sea 
change  in  attitudes  both  in  Israel  and  in 
the  Arab  countries,  and  today 
solutions — a  month  ago  considered 
unattainable — have  been  suddenly 
brought  within  the  realm  of  possibility. 

Today  few  nations  in  the  world 
would  challenge  the  proposition  that 
these  developments  have  created  a 
unique  opportunity  for  successful 
negotiations  leading  to  peace  in  the 
Middle  East.  The  idea  of  peace  has 
captured  the  imagination  and  ignited 
the  hopes  of  a  war- weary  region.  The 
government  leaders  who  are  charged 
with  the  responsibility,  as  well  as  the 
challenge,  of  negotiating  can  do  so 
with  the  confidence  that  there  is  today 
an  overwhelming  public  constituency 
in  the  region  for  peace. 

All  of  us  in  this  room  would  agree 
that  we  must  not  allow  the  momentum 
of  these  events  to  be  lost.  President 
Sadat  has  called  this  meeting  to  prepare 
for  a  reconvening  of  the  Geneva  confer- 
ence, the  objective  of  which  remains 
the  negotiation,  among  all  the  parties 
to  the  conflict,  of  a  final  peace  settle- 
ment on  the  basis  of  Resolutions  242 
and  338. 

I  must  record  my  government's  re- 
gret that  others  invited  to  this  meeting 
have  felt  unable  to  accept  the  invitation 
to  attend.  Ultimately,  I  believe  those 
absent  will  see  that  the  process  begun 
here  is  in  their  benefit.  We  are  all 
agreed  the  door  remains  open  for  others 
to  join  at  any  time. 

My  government — indeed  each  of  the 
governments  represented  here — has 
emphasized  on  numerous  occasions 
that  our  objective  is  the  negotiation  of 
a  comprehensive  peace  settlement. 
Central  to  my  government's  policy 
over  the  years  is  the  concept  that  this 
peace  can  only  be  achieved  through 
negotiations  between  the  parties.  Secu- 
rity Council  Resolution  242  established 
the  principles  for  those  negotiations. 
Resolution  338,  which  made  a  conven- 
ing of  the  conference  in  Geneva  possi- 
ble, established  the  process.  We  have 


always  held  the  view  that  wherever  and 
whenever  the  parties  can  start  talking 
with  one  another,  it  is  in  the  spirit  of 
that  mandate. 

We  see  the  discussions  getting 
underway  today  in  Cairo  as  an  integral 
and  contributory  step  toward  a  recon- 
vening of  the  Geneva  conference  and 
the  negotiation  of  a  comprehensive 
peace.  We  do  not  agree  that  these  pro- 
ceedings are  contradictory  to  the 
Geneva  conference.  As  President  Car- 
ter said  [November  30]:  "The  road  to- 
ward peace  has  already  led  through 
Jerusalem,  will  now  go  to  Cairo,  and 
ultimately,  we  believe,  to  a  com- 
prehensive consultation  at  Geneva." 

In  calling  for  this  preparatory  meet- 
ing. President  Sadat  has  indicated  two 
basic  objectives:  Making  progress  to- 
ward resolving  the  substantive  prob- 
lems and  overcoming  the  remaining  un- 
resolved procedural  obstacles  to  a 
Geneva  conference.  We  believe  these 
are  realistic  and  obtainable  goals  and 
that  valuable  work  can  be  done  here. 
We  will  do  everything  we  can  to  help 
the  two  negotiating  parties  make  prog- 
ress. It  is  for  them  to  define  in  the  first 
instance  the  subject  matter  of  these  dis- 
cussions, but  we  will  remain  available 
to  offer  counsel,  suggestions,  or  any 
other  assistance  the  parties  may  feel 
they  need. 

We  are  opening  these  talks  at  a 
unique  moment.  All  of  us  here  must 
not  only  hope  we  have  reached  a  turn- 
ing point  in  history  but  also  must  make 
our  contribution  to  insure  that  it  will 
indeed  prove  to  be  a  lasting  turning 
point.  The  leaders  of  our  respective 
governments — and  our  peoples — are 


Department  of  State  Bullc 

expecting  us  to  achieve  solid  results 
this  meeting,  and  we  should  not  ft 
them.  As  President  Carter  recently  sa 
[November  2]:  "We  may  be  facir 
now  the  best  opportunity  for  a  perm 
nent  Middle  East  peace  settlement 
our  lifetime.  We  must  not  let  it  si 
by." 

In  closing  I  hope  you  will  permit  n 
to  indulge  in  a  brief  personal  refle 
tion.  For  many  years  I  have  labored,  (  j 
behalf  of  my  government  and  wi  |- 
countless  colleagues — some  of  who 
have  given  their  lives  in  the  effort — 
help  our  Arab  and  Israeli  friends  find 
breakthrough  to  peace.  I  have  shari 
and,  I  think,  have  acquired  some  u 
derstanding  of  the  agonies  both  sid 
experience  as  they  face  decisions  fat 
ful  for  the  future  of  their  peoples — an 
indeed,  for  the  world.  It  is  a  great  pe 
sonal  satisfaction  to  be  part  of  the 
talks  which  hold  out  so  much  hope  th 
the  long-sought  breakthrough  has  be 
achieved.  The  negotiation  of  deep 
rooted  differences  involving  vital  r 
tional  interests  is  never  a  smooth 
easy  task,  and  we  can  expect  moments 
discouragement.  These  must  and  can  S 
overcome,  however,  if  the  gover  ^ 
ments  we  serve,  and  we  personal) 
keep  before  us  the  vision  we  all  sh< 
today  of  a  peaceful  and  prospero 
Middle  East.  My  government  is  fu 
dedicated  to  that  vision. 


'  Remarks  made  at  the  opening  session  of 
preparatory  meeting  for  the  Geneva  peace  c  i 
ference  in  Cairo  on  Dec.  14,  1977;  Mr.  Alher^ 
is  Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  Eastern 
South  Asian  Affairs  (text  from  press  release  '. 
of  Dec.  15). 


Prime  Minister  Begin 
Visits  l/JS.  December  14-19 


White  House  Statements 

December  16' 

The  President  was  happy  to  have 
the  opportunity  to  welcome  Prime 
Minister  Begin  again  to  the  United 
States. 

The  Prime  Minister  and  the  Presi- 
dent met  privately  for  an  hour  and 
subsequently  others  joined.  The  entire 
discussions  lasted  2  hours.  The  Presi- 
dent was  able  to  hear  firsthand  from 
Prime  Minister  Begin  his  impressions 
and  evaluations  of  the  momentous 
events  in  the  Middle  East  set  in  train 
by  President  Sadat's  historic  visit  to 


Jerusalem  and  his  reception  by  t 
people,  parliament,  and  Governmt    I 
of  Israel. 

All  aspects  of  the  current  Midc 
East  situation  were  discussed  in  I    i 
context  of  the   search  for  a  coi 
prehensive  peace.  | 

Obviously,  a  particular  focus  v.    \ 
on  the  direct  talks  which  have  co     | 
menced  between  Egypt  and  Israi 
The  Prime  Minister  and  the  Preside     I 
discussed  the  most  effective  ways  < 
continue  the  momentum  and  to  turn  >   I 
the  broader  goal  of  negotiating' 
comprehensive  peace. 

In  this  respect,  the  Prime  Minis' 
and  the  President  discussed  under 


auary  1978 

Ig  principles  which  could  guide  fu- 
Ire  negotiations.  The  Prime  Minister 
Titlined  proposals  concerning  the  fu- 
Ire  relations  between  Egypt  and  Is- 
lel  and  a  process  for  resolving  the 
Isue  of  Palestinian  Arabs. 
J  The  President  thanked  the  Prime 
linister  for  his  thoughts  in  both  of 
lese  areas  and  promised  to  give  them 
•rious  consideration. 

The  President  told  Prime  Minister 
egin  that  the  United  States  is  con- 
inced  that  the  course  of  direct 
jgotiations  on  which  Prime  Minister 
egin  and  President  Sadat  have  em- 
irked  offers  a  unique  opportunity  for 
iace.  We,  of  course,  recognize  that 
I  these  new  circumstances  the  test  of 
ixeptability  of  the  provisions  of  a 
;gotiated  settlement  will  lie  in  the 
dgments  of  those  who  will  ulti- 
ately  sign  the  peace  treaties.  The 
nited  States  will  continue  to  remain 

the  closest  possible  consultation 
ith  both  sides  in  the  effort  to  help 
em  find  common  ground. 
The  President  and  the  Prime  Minis- 
r  will  meet  again  tomorrow  evening 
7  p.m. 

ecember  17' 

The  President  and  Prime  Minister 
egin  and  their  advisers  tonight  con- 
fiued  the  round  of  discussions  begun 
:sterday  morning.   They  explored 
irther  Prime  Minister  Begin's  latest 
oposals  for  progress  toward  com- 
ehensive  peace  in  the  Middle  East 
id  the  next  steps  to  be  taken  to  ad- 
ince  the  peace  negotiations.   The 
resident  expressed  his  appreciation 
>r  the  Prime  Minister's  constructive 
Dproach  and  his  conviction  that 
rime  Minister  Begin  and  President 
adat,  together,  are  taking  important 
eps  down  the  road  to  a  just  and 
jmprehensive  peace. 
President  Carter  welcomed  the  di- 
:ct  talks  which  will  soon  be  held  be- 
veen  Prime  Minister  Begin  and  Pres- 
lent  Sadat.  President  Carter  told  the 
rime  Minister  that  he  believes  the 
urrent  discussions  between  Israel  and 
gypt,  based  on  the  good  will  and 
edication  to  peace  both  have  man- 
ested,  now  more  than  ever  hold  out 
romise  of  real  progress.  The  United 
tates  considers  that  the  understand- 
ng  and  statesmanship  which  the 
Time  Minister  is  demonstrating  make 
notable  contribution. 
The  President  pledged  the  continu- 
ng  cooperation  of  the  United  States 
11  whatever  ways  the  parties  find  use- 
ul.  The  President  undertook  to  re- 
nain  in  close  touch  with  Prime  Minis- 
er  Begin  and  President  Sadat  and 


49 


will  look  forward  to  learning  of  their 
further  progress  in  the  mutual  search 
for  a  comprehensive  peace.  The  Pres- 
ident shares  with  them  their  dedica- 
tion to  fulfilling  this  historic  opportu- 
nity to  bring  peace  to  a  region  too 
long  burdened  with  misunderstanding 
and  war.  n 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Dec.  19.  1977. 

'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Secretary 
Vance  at  the  White  House  following  the  meet- 
ing. Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Dec.  26,  1977 


Middle  EiBSt 
PefiM^e  Efiorts 


Department  Statement ' 

We  are  still  in  the  process  of  re- 
ceiving and  accessing  the  reports  on 
the  meetings  December  25  and  26  be- 
tween Prime  Minister  Begin  and  Pres- 
ident Sadat.  U.S.  Ambassador  to  Is- 
rael Samuel  W.  Lewis  and  U.S.  Am- 
bassador to  Egypt  Hermann  F.  Eilts 
did  see  Prime  Minister  Begin  and 
President  Sadat  respectively  earlier 
today. 

It  seems  to  us  important  at  this 
point  to  maintain  perspective  on  the 
meetings  which  have  taken  place.  It 
has  been  our  objective,  working  with 
the  Middle  Eastern  parties,  to  estab- 
lish a  process  of  negotiation  which 
could  lead  to  a  comprehensive  peace. 
As  1977  ends,  there  are  now  direct 
negotiations  dealing  with  the  princi- 
ples that  would  cover  a  comprehen- 
sive settlement  and  other  substantive 
and  procedural  matters  that  would  be 
parts  of  an  overall  settlement. 

We  are  pleased  that  progress  has 
been  made  at  the  recent  meeting  and 
that  concrete  steps  have  been  agreed 
on  for  continuation  of  substantive 
discussions.  We  have  always  recog- 
nized that  the  beginning  of  negotia- 
tion, while  a  crucial  step,  would  not 
by  itself  resolve  all  of  the  difficult 
problems.  That  is  now  the  work 
which  lies  ahead. 

We  continue  to  support  the  objec- 
tive of  a  comprehensive  settlement. 
That  is  also  the  objective  of  Prime 
Minister  Begin  and  President  Sadat. 
Establishing  a  negotiating  framework 
for  a  comprehensive  settlement  will 
be  one  of  the  important  items  on  the 
agenda  in  the  weeks  ahead.  D 


Chronology  of 
Recent  Events 


Dec.  1 


Dec.  2 


Dec.  4 


Dec.  5 


Dec.  6 


Dec.  7 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  on  Dec.  27,  1977, 
by  acting  Department  spokesman  Tom  Reston. 


Jordan  accepts   U.N.   Secretary 
General  Waldheim's  proposal 
to  hold  preparatory  talks  at  the 
U.N.    Syria   and   Egypt   also 
favorably  receive  the  proposal. 
Two-day  conference  begins  in 
Tripoli,   Libya,   attended   by 
Algeria,   Iraq,   Libya,   Syria, 
South  Yemen,  and  the  Pales- 
tine Liberation  Organization 
(including  the   "rejectionist" 
organizations  led  by  the  Popu- 
lar Front  for  the  Liberation  of 
Palestine). 
Prime  Minister  Begin  visits  the 
United   Kingdom  (Dec.   2-7) 
for    talks    with    government 
leaders. 
Egypt  calls  home  its  ambassadors 
to  Algeria,  Iraq,  South  Yemen, 
Syria,  and  the  USSR. 
Under  Secretary  for  Political  Af- 
fairs Philip  C.  Habib  arrives  in 
the  U.S.S.R.  to  discuss  recent 
events  in  the  Middle  East  with 
Soviet  officials  (Dec.  5-6). 
Tripoli  conference  concludes. 
Algeria,  Libya,  South  Yemen, 
Syria,  and  the  PLO  sign  a  joint 
communique    and    form   new 
Arab  "front  for  resistance  and 
confrontation"   and   "freeze" 
all  political  and  diplomatic  re- 
lations with  Egypt.  Iraq  rejects 
communique  and  walks  out  of 
meeting. 
Egypt  breaks  diplomatic  relations 
with    Algeria,    Iraq,    Libya, 
South  Yemen,  and  Syria. 
Secretary    Vance   announces   a 
6-day    trip    (Dec.    9-15)    to 
Egypt,   Israel,   Jordan,   Leba- 
non, Saudi  Arabia,  and  possi- 
bly Syria  (noon  press  brief- 
ing). 
Diplomats    of    Algeria,     Iraq, 
Libya,     South     Yemen,     and 
Syria  leave  Egypt. 
Egypt  announces  closing  of  cul- 
tural centers  operated  in  Cairo 
by  the   USSR.,   East  Ger- 
many. Hungary,  and  Czecho- 
slovakia and  closing  of  Soviet, 
East  German,  Czechoslovak, 
and     Polish     consulates     in 
Alexandria;  Soviet  and  Polish 
consulates  in  Port  Said;  and 
the  Soviet  consulate  in  Aswan. 
Consulates   in   Cairo   remain 
open  as  well  as  Egypt's  consu- 
lates in  Soviet  bloc  countries. 


50 


Dec.  8 


Dec.  9 


Dec.  10 


Dec.  12 


Dec.  13 


Dec.  14 


Dec.  15 


King  Hussein  meets  with  Presi- 
dent Asad  of  Syria  in  Damas- 
cus. 

President  Gaafar  Muhammed 
Nimeiri  of  Sudan  publicly  sup- 
ports President  Sadat's  visit  to 
Israel. 

Prime  Minister  Begin  returns  to 
Israel. 

King  Hussein  meets  with  Presi- 
dent Sadat  in  Egypt. 

President  Asad  visits  Saudi 
Arabia  on  first  stop  of  a  4-day 
trip  to  Arabian  peninsula 
states. 

Secretary  Vance  arrives  in  Cairo 
for  meetings  with  President 
Sadat  and  other  government  of- 
ficials. 

Secretary  Vance  arrives  in  Israel 
for  meetings  with  Prime  Minis- 
ter Begin  and  other  govern- 
ment officials. 

Secretary  Vance  meets  with  King 
Hussein  who  states  in  a  press 
conference  that  Jordan  will  not 
attend  the  Cairo  conference  but 
may  join  negotiations  for  an 
overall  settlement  at  a  later 
date. 

Israeli  delegation  arrives  in 
Egypt. 

Prime  Minister  Begin  announces 
that  he  will  arrive  in  New  York 
on  December  14  and  meet  with 
President  Carter  in  Washing- 
ton, DC,  on  December  16. 

Secretary  Vance  meets  with  Pres- 
ident Sarkis  and  other  govern- 
ment officials  in  Lebanon. 

Secretary  Vance  meets  with  Pres- 
ident Asad  and  other  govern- 
ment officials  in  Syria.  Presi- 
dent Asad  reaffirms  his  opposi- 
tion to  the  Cairo  meeting. 

First  session  of  Cairo  peace  con- 
ference begins.  The  delegation 
heads  are:  Ahmed  Esmat  Abdel 
Meguid,  Permanent  Represen- 
tative to  the  United  Nations,  of 
Egypt;  Eliyahu  Ben-Elissar, 
Director  General  of  the  Prime 
Minister's  Office,  of  Israel; 
Alfred  L.  Atherton,  Jr.,  As- 
sistant Secretary  for  Near 
Eastern  and  South  Asian  Af- 
fairs, of  the  United  States.  The 
U.N.  observer  is  Gen.  Ensio 
Siilasvuo,  Chief  Coordinator 
for  U.N.  Peacekeeping  Ac- 
tivities in  the  Middle  East. 

Secretary  Vance  meets  with  King 
Khalid  and  other  government 
officials  in  Saudi  Arabia 
Prime  Minister  Begin  arrives  in 
New  York. 

Secretary   Vance  returns  to  the 

United  States. 
President  Carter  holds  a  news 


conference  largely  concerned 

with  the  Middle  East.  Dec    26 

Dec.  16  Prime  Minister  Begin  meets  with 

President  Carter  to  discuss   Is- 
raeli peace  proposals. 
President  Carter  phones  President 
Sadat. 

Dec.  17  Prime    Minister    Begin    meets 

again  with  President  Carter. 

Dec.  18  Prime  Minister  Begin  announces 

that  he  will  meet  with  Presi- 
dent Sadat  in  Egypt  late  this 
week  or  early  next  week. 
Prime  Minister  Begin  states 
that  he  came  to  Washington, 
D.C.,  to  obtain  "good  will  and 
understanding"  toward  his 
peace  proposals  and  that  is 
what  he  received  from  Presi- 
dent Carter  (interview  on  CBS 
"Face  the  Nation").  Dec.  27 

King  Hussein  flies  to  Saudi 
Arabia  and  plans  to  visit  other 
Arab  states  to  discuss  Middle 
East  peace  developments. 

Dec.  19  Prime  Minister  Begin  announces 

that  he  will  meet  with  Presi- 
dent Sadat  on  December  25  in 
Ismailia,  Egypt.  Dec.  28 

Prime  Minister  Begin  ends  his 
5-day  visit  to  the  United 
States. 
The  PLO  issues  a  statement  re- 
jecting Prime  Minister  Begin's 
peace  proposals. 

Dec.  20  Israeli  Minister  of  Defense  Ezer 

Weizman  meets  in  Egypt  with 
Egyptian  President  Sadat  and 
Minister  of  War  and  War  Pro- 
duction Mohamed  Abdel  Ghani 
el-Gamassi. 

Dec.  21  Israeli   Defense   Minister  Weiz- 

man meets  again  with  Presi- 
dent Sadat.  Dec.  31 

Dec.  22  Israeli  Cabinet  unanimously  en- 

dorses Prime  Minister  Begin's 
peace  proposals. 

Dec.  24  Prime   Minister  Begin  flies  to 

Egypt  for  talks  with  President 
Sadat  at  Ismailia. 
Mohamed  Ibrahim  Kamel   is  ap- 
pointed   Foreign    Minister  of 
Egypt. 

Dec.  25  Prime    Minister    Begin    meets 


Department  of  State  Bulletr 

with  President  Sadat. 

Prime  Minister  Begin  and  Pres 
dent  Sadat  end  their  2-da 
meeting  with  a  joint  news  coi 
ference  in  which  they  pledge  i 
continue  their  efforts  towai 
peace.  . 

Military  Committees  and  Polit|l 
cal  Committees  are  createt 
The  Military  Committees  wi 
be  headed  by  Defense  Mini 
ters  Ezer  Weizman  of  Israi 
and  Mohamed  Abdel  Ghai 
el-Gamassi  of  Egypt  and  wi 
meet  in  Cairo.  The  Politic 
Committees  will  be  headed  1 
Foreign  Ministers  Most 
Dayan  of  Israel  and  MohanK 
Ibrahim  Kamel  of  Egypt  ar 
will  meet  in  Jerusalem. 

The  Cairo  conference  goes  in 
recess. 

U.S.  Ambassador  to  Egypt  Hd 
mann  F.  Eilts  meets  with  Pre 
ident  Sadat  in  Egypt. 

U.S.  Ambassador  to  Israi 
Samuel  W.  Lewis  meets  wi' 
Prime  Minister  Begin  in  Israel 

The  Israeli   Parliament  votes 
support  Prime  Minister  Begir 
peace    proposals    (60   for, 
against,  and  40  abstentions). 

Prime  Minister  Begin  makes  pm 
lie  the  text  of  the  Israeli  peai 
plan. 

President  Carter  endorses  "b« 
and  courageous"  moves 
President  Sadat  and  Prii 
Minister  Begin  toward  a  co 
prehensive  peace  in  the  Midt 
East  and  restates  the  Americ 
position  on  the  Palestini 
question  (television  interview 

President  Carter,  on  one  stop 
his  six-nation  trip,  arrives 
Iran  for  talks  with  the  Shah 
Iran  and  King  Hussein  of  J( 
dan 

President  Carter  announces  tl 
after  his  visit  to  Saudi  Arab 
he  will  meet  with  Preside 
Sadat  in  Egypt  on  January 
and  then  continue  as  schedul 
to  France. 


U]\ITED  ]\ATIO]\S: 

(/J§>.  Approaches  and  initiatives 


by  Charles  William  Maynes ' 

We  meet  today  in  an  active  and  fas- 
cinating period  for  the  United  Nations. 
After  years  of  neglect,  or  indifference, 
toward  the  United  Nations,  our  gov- 
ernment has  shown  new  interest  and 


concern.  In  the  last  few  months,  f 
Administration  has  paid  unprecedent 
attention  to  that  organization.  No  oth 
President  has  spent  2  full  days  at  t' 
United  Nations.  Secretary  of  Sta 
Vance  went  to  New  York  and  co;J 
ducted  bilateral  discussions  with  sor|j 


I 


nuary  1978 

)  foreign  ministers.  Secretary  of  Ag- 
culture  Bergland  recently  led  our 
•;legation  to  the  conference  of  the 
)od  and  Agriculture  Organization, 
icretary  of  Transportation  Adams 
esented  a  major  set  of  proposals 
.incerning  hijacking  to  the  general 
.inference  of  the  International  Civil 
A'iation  Organization.  The  President 
IS  asked  the  Secretaries  of  other 
omestic  agencies  to  play  an  equally 
itive  role  in  the  work  of  the  United 
lations. 

Within  the  General  Assembly  and 

ie  Security  Council,  there  has  been  a 

lirst  of  activity  on  such  issues  as  air- 

le  hijacking;  a  mandatory  arms  em- 

Urgo  on  South  Africa;  proposals  to 

isolve   the  conflicts  in  Rhodesia, 

amibia,  and  the  Middle  East;  and 

achinery   to  extend   the  economic 

lalogue  between  the  rich  countries 

;d  the  poor  countries.   In  addition, 

ere  have  been  debates  and  significant 

: solutions  on  human  rights,  disarma- 

;;nt,  outer  space,  law  of  the  sea,  re- 

•ucturing  of  the  United  Nations  sys- 

Ti,  and  even  unidentified  flying  ob- 

i;ts. 

i  It's  against  this  background  that  I 
3uld  like  to  talk  to  you  today  about 
;  role  of  the  United  Nations  in  the 
nduct  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  and  ini- 
itives  that  this  Administration  has 
Icen  to  strengthen  that  role. 
We  all  know  that  America  was  the 
ief  proponent  of  the  United  Nations 
1  years  ago.  The  foresight  and 
ealism  that  American  statesmen  dis- 
ayed  at  the  time  were  a  source  of 
eat  pride  for  our  country.  Indeed,  it 
n  be  argued  that  the  only  new  idea 
international  affairs  in  this  century 
IS  been  the  creation  of  first  the 
;ague  of  Nations  and  then  the  United 
ations.  Both  were  uniquely  American 
structure  and  inspiration.  No  won- 
;r  that  Americans  were  proud  the 
nited  Nations  was  in  the  United 
ates. 

What  then  happened?  We  all  know 
at  this  view  of  the  United  Nations  is 
ited.  Americans  in  the  last  few  years 
ive  not  been  proud  of  the  United  Na- 
3ns.  A  few  have  even  been  disgusted 
ith  it.  What  caused  the  change? 
I  could  offer  many  explanations,  all 
ausible,  but  I  would  like  to  suggest 
ist  one:  the  foreign  policy  conse- 
Jences  of  neglect.  That  factor,  more 
lan  any  other  in  my  opinion,  explains 
ir  difficulties  in  the  United  Nations, 
'he  easy  excuse  for  America's  prob- 
'ms  in  the  United  Nations  has  been 
jie  rise  in  Third  World  influence  and 
le  disadvantages  to  us  of  a  policy  of 
Ine  nation,  one  vote  in  a  world  body. 
iut  the  truth  is  that  such  an  explana- 
on  is  really  just  an  excuse. 


Why?  Because  there  is  no  signifi- 
cant longrun  conflict  of  interest  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  de- 
veloping countries  on  many  issues  be- 
fore the  United  Nations.  On  the 
contrary — provided  the  United  States 
adopts  a  policy  that  is  both  responsible 
and  responsive — America  finds,  as  we 
have  learned  in  recent  months,  an  un- 
accustomed degree  of  support  in  the 
Third  World.  But  for  the  last  10 
years — and  this  is  a  fact  we  must  all 
understand — our  U.N.  policy  has  been 
less  a  policy  than  an  afterthought. 

One  can  say  this  without  making 
judgments.  During  most  of  this  period, 
we  were  at  war;  and  whenever  there  is 
war,  everything  else  is  an  afterthought 
and  necessarily  subordinate.  My  pur- 
pose in  pointing  out  this  obvious  yet 
overlooked  fact  is  not  to  persuade  you 
to  criticize  earlier  Administrations  but 
to  induce  us  all  to  remember  the  set- 
ting in  which  the  substantial  falling 
out  between  the  United  States  and  the 
United  Nations  took  place.  Our 
foreign  policy  priorities  have  now 
changed,  and  I  think  that  is  a  key  rea- 
son that  we  are  making  more  progress 
in  the  United  Nations  now  than  we 
have  in  some  time. 

It  is  on  the  basis  of  this  10-year 
period  of  neglect,  however,  that  we 
have  to  judge  three  of  the  most  dis- 
cussed appointments  in  the  postwar 
years — that  of  Daniel  Patrick  Moyni- 
han,  that  of  William  Scranton,  and 
that  of  Andrew  Young,  Jr. — all  major 
national  figures,  all  men  who,  it  was 
suggested,  "could  have  had  something 
better,"  all  U.N.  Ambassadors.  At 
first  blush,  they  have  little  in  com- 
mon. They  have  different  styles,  dif- 
ferent foreign  policy  priorities,  yet 
they  all  did  share  one  central  insight 
that  virtually  everyone  else  in  this 
period  had  forgotten:  that  in  addition 
to  military  power  and  trade  balances,  a 
nation  must  be  concerned  about  the 
way  others  see  it.  And  they  all  recog- 
nized in  that  connection  that  the 
United  Nations  was  of  vital  concern  to 
U.S.  foreign  policy.  All  three  men 
recognized  that  it  must  be  taken  seri- 
ously and  argued  this  f)oint  with  their 
colleagues  in  Washington. 

Coping  With  Change 

Against  what  factors  did  these  three 
Ambassadors  have  to  work?  It  is 
sometimes  helpful  to  understand  where 
one  has  been  so  he  can  understand 
where  he  wants  to  go. 

One  ingredient  in  our  policy  of  ne- 
glect, certainly,  has  been  the  turnover 
in  American  representation.  In  a 
period  of  9  years,  the  United  States 
had  eight  different  Ambassadors  at  the 


51 


United  Nations,  in  part  reflecting  the 
relative  disinterest  in  the  United  Na- 
tions of  our  Presidents  in  that  period. 

Another  special  factor,  certainly, 
was  the  issue  of  the  Middle  East,  aris- 
ing in  countless  forms,  in  countless 
forums,  very  much  deterring  progress 
in  other  fields.  The  injection  of  this 
bitter  political  issue  into  almost  every 
U.N.  arena  has  caused  growing  disillu- 
sionment about  the  United  Nations  in 
this  country,  particularly  among  the 
more  politically  attentive,  and  to  a 
large  extent  it  still  does.  In  a  very  real 
sense,  it  may  be  said  that  the  way  the 
Middle  East  issue  has  been  fought  out 
in  international  forums  is  poisoning  the 
entire  international  system  and  by  defi- 
nition the  United  Nations  system.. But 
that  argues  not  for  getting  out  of  the 
U.N.  system  or  for  ignoring  the  Middle 
East  issue  but  rather  for  getting  on  with 
the  settlement  of  that  question.  The 
sooner  it  is  resolved,  the  earlier  we  will 
be  able  to  make  significant  strides  in 
other  areas. 

Another  highly  significant  turn  of 
events  has  been  the  evolution  of  the 
Third  World  alliance.  A  striking 
phenomenon  in  recent  years  has  been 
the  growing  power  of  key  Third  World 
countries — nations  like  Algeria, 
Brazil,  Egypt,  India,  Iran,  Mexico, 
Nigeria,  Pakistan,  Saudi  Arabia,  Tan- 
zania, and  Yugoslavia.  Gifted  with 
talented  officials  and  their  own  views 
of  global  issues,  they  have  acquired 
policy  impact  well  beyond  their  own 
regions. 

The  coalition  of  less  developed 
countries  began  to  gain  strength  in  the 
1960's.  This  was  inevitable.  Not  only 
were  there  more  nations  in  the  United 
Nations  but  there  were  also  important 
shifts  in  the  international  balance  of 
power.  Thus,  in  1950  the  United 
States  accounted  for  60%  of  the  indus- 
trial production  of  the  world,  50%  of 
its  military  spending,  and  50%  of  its 
monetary  reserves.  By  1976  these  fig- 
ures were  30%,  25%,  and  7%.  Much 
of  this  new  power  gathered  in  the 
hands  of  our  traditional  allies  in  West- 
ern Europe  and  Japan.  But  the  de- 
veloping countries  also  gained.  India 
and  Brazil  now  rank  as  the  10th  and 
11th  industrial  powers  in  the  world, 
and  Iran  and  Saudi  Arabia  are  major 
resource  powers. 

Yet  even  though  the  Third  World 
coalition  began  to  gain  strength  in  the 
early  1960's,  its  power  did  not  burst 
upon  the  world  scene  with  full  force 
until  1973-75.  Several  vital 
psychological  factors  provided  the  im- 
petus: a  new  war  in  the  Middle  East, 
restored  pride  to  the  Arabs,  the  grant- 
ing of  overdue  independence  to  the 


52 


Department  of  State  Bullet. 


Portuguese  colonies,  and  the 
worldwide  dislocations  caused  by  just 
a  few  Third  World  nations  through  an 
embargo  on  oil. 

These  same  years,  1973-1975,  by 
some  form  of  historical  mischief,  were 
also  the  years  that  marked  the  nadir  of 
U.S.  commitment  and  self-confidence. 
It  was  in  these  years  that  Saigon  fell, 
Watergate  began,  and  America  tem- 
porarily lost  its  way. 

One  can  scarcely  imagine  a  worse 
environment  for  international  accom- 
modation and  compromise.  The  Third 
World  increased  its  demands.  The 
United  States  dug  in  its  heels.  Con- 
frontation rose  to  unprecedented 
heights.  Politically  oriented  resolutions 
multiplied  in  specialized  agencies. 
Highly  charged  issues  were  debated  in 
the  General  Assembly.  The  paralyzing 
effects  of  the  resolutions  linking 
Zionism  and  racism  astonished 
everyone — even  those  who  originally 
sponsored  them. 

Many  believe  that  what  happened  at 
the  United  Nations  in  this  period  was 
not  so  much  a  change  in  international 
circumstances  but  simply  a  case  of 
Third  World  rhetoric  outstripping  real- 
ity. But  I  believe  there  is  a  more  fun- 
damental factor  at  work.  In  my  opin- 
ion, it  is  without  dispute  that  the  role 
of  the  developing  nations  in  the  United 
Nations  and  in  world  affairs  has  in- 
creased dramatically.  The  Third  World 
now  represents  74%  of  the  world's 
people.  It  has  58%  of  the  world's 
armed  forces.  It  is  a  veritable 
storehouse  of  the  world's  resources. 
As  the  number  of  global  issues  in- 
creases, the  diplomatic  leverage  of  the 
developing  nations  also  grows. 

Even  so,  I  would  be  among  the  first 
to  urge  that  we  place  matters  in 
perspective.  Collectively,  the  West 
continues  to  represent  60%  of  the 
world's  gross  national  product.  It  pro- 
vides 80%  of  the  official  development 
assistance  and  accounts  for  85%  of  the 
total  financial  flow  to  developing  na- 
tions and  the  multilateral  agencies. 
Just  as  we  must  take  into  account  their 
growing  importance,  they  must  take 
account  of  our  continuing  significance. 
What  has  this  Administration  done  in 
the  face  of  these  developments? 

Administration  Policy 

The  Carter  Administration's  ap- 
proach to  the  United  Nations  has  been 
characterized  by  changes  in  three 
major  areas. 

The  style  has  been  changed  primar- 
ily through  the  presence  of  Andy 
Young  and  his  energetic  efforts  to  cul- 
tivate leaders  in  the  Third  World  and 
to   broaden   our   comprehension    of 


shared  interests.  But  there  are  other 
steps,  including  the  President's  deci- 
sions to  give  two  major  addresses  here 
at  the  United  Nations,  to  invite  Secre- 
tary General  Waldheim  to  Washington 
at  a  very  early  stage  in  his  Administra- 
tion, and  to  spend  2  full  days  here  at 
the  United  Nations  in  October. 

The  substance  of  our  relations  with 
the  United  Nations  has  changed 
through  our  recognition  that  the  United 
Nations  is  a  vital  ingredient  in  the 
conduct  of  the  world's  business  and  by 
our  determination  to  make  greater  use 
of  all  of  its  machinery. 

The  funding  aspect  of  our  policy  has 
shifted  as  we  have  tried  to  reverse  10 
years  of  decline  in  American  contribu- 
tions to  components  of  the  U.N.  sys- 
tem to  the  point  where  many  of  our 
voluntary  contributions,  percentage- 
wise, are  now  below  our  assessed  con- 
tributions. 

Our  contribution  to  the  U.N.  De- 
velopment Program,  for  example,  was 
38%  of  the  total  in  1965;  it  is  less  than 
20%  today.  We  have  succeeded  in 
stimulating  many  other  governments  to 
carry  a  larger  share  of  the  burden.  We 
would  still  like  to  encourage  more 
contributions  from  the  Organization  of 
Petroleum  Exporting  Countries  and 
from  a  few  developed  nations,  but  ba- 
sically it  is  now  time  for  us  to  carry 
our  fair  share  in  order  to  solidify  this 
common  approach. 

On  many  issues — such  as  the  Mid- 
dle East,  southern  Africa,  and  North- 
South  relations — let  us  acknowledge, 
even  as  we  use  the  United  Nations, 
that  the  process  is  difficult.  The 
United  Nations  cannot  "solve"  these 
issues.  That  is  not  to  say,  however, 
that  United  Nations  involvement  is  ir- 
relevant. Work  at  the  United  Nations 
can  facilitate  negotiations,  clarify 
problems,  hasten  dialogue,  and 
legitimize  solutions.  It  shouldn't  need 
repeating,  but  it  is  clear  that  all 
parties — both  the  great  powers  and  the 
smaller  nations — have  much  to  gain 
from  using  the  United  Nations  for 
these  purposes.  And  if  we  all  recog- 
nize our  common  interest  in  using  the 
United  Nations,  it  will  function  better. 

The  United  Nations  is  particularly 
vital  to  most  of  the  smaller  nations.  It 
is  the  collective  source  of  much  of 
their  diplomatic  influence,  the  basic 
outlet  for  their  foreign  relations  initia- 
tives. They  want  to  be  included  in  the 
councils  of  power,  where  they  clearly 
have  a  right  to  be.  The  United  Nations 
provides  them  the  policy  voice  they 
seek. 

The  stronger  powers  also  have  a 
vital  interest  in  the  United  Nations  be- 
cause they  have  the  most  to  gain  from 
a  stable  international  order.  The  Mid- 


dle  East    and    southern   Africa   ai 
flashpoints  that  could  trigger  major  if 
ternational  conflicts.  The  North-Soui 
dialogue  is  not  a  matter  of  charit\ 
The    developing   countries    are    th 
source  of  many  of  the  raw  materia 
needed  by  us.  They  provide  over  om 
third  of  our  trade,  and  the  volume 
growing  both  absolutely  and  in  reh 
tion  to  our  trade  with  Western  Eurof 
and  Japan.   This   is  not  a  zero-suii 
game.  Indeed,  the  economy  of  the  ei  I 
tire  world  is  not  likely  to  get  movir 
again  unless  we  cooperate  to  stimula  . 
the   economic    development   of  tl 
Third  World. 

That  we  are,  in  fact,  economical! 
and  politically  interdependent  wil 
these  nations  is  a  hard  lesson  f( 
Americans  to  learn.  Economically,  w 
tend  to  think  we  are  self-sufficien 
even  though  we  all  stood  in  tl 
gasoline  lines  in  1973  after  the  An 
oil  embargo,  and  we  all  suffered  prii 
increases  on  heat,  light,  and  tl 
thousands  of  products  in  our  socie- 
that  depend  on  petroleum.  Politicall; 
we  like  to  think  we  can  act  aloH' 
even  though  we  face  an  array  of  glob' 
issues  where  the  most  skillful  or  d 
termined  national  policy  can  be  re 
dered  ineffectual  if  others  do  n 
cooperate. 


Preparing  for  the  Future 

The  new  attitude  of  the  Carter  A 
ministration  toward  the  United  Natic 
on  these  issues — at  least  so  far- 
proving  to  be  productive.  I  believe  a 
fair  review  of  the  last  10  months  w 
confirm  that. 

We  are  working  with  the  Africans 
the  settlement  of  issues  in  the  southt 
part  of  their  continent.  While  we  ha 
had  disagreements,  we  believe  we  < 
developing  a  new  and  positive  worki 
relationship  with  a  continent  that 
eludes  one-third  of  the  United  Natic 
membership.  Certainly  a  large  part 
the  credit  for  this  belongs  to  An 
Young,  whose  energetic  and  op 
style  of  diplomacy  is  building  a  ni 
basis  for  understanding  betwe 
Americans  and  the  Africans. 

As  we  move  forward  on  African 
sues,  we  are  working  with  Israel  a 
the  Arabs  in  bringing  more  permam 
peace  to  the  Middle  East.  We  are 
nally  moving  toward  a  treaty 
Panama  and  thereby  resolving  an  iss 
that  has  been  a  sore  point  in  our  rci 
tions  with  the  entire  Third  World  1 
decades.  On  economic  questions,  d 
ficulties  remain  but  we  hope  bo 
sides  are  learning  to  listen  better 
to  be  more  open  in  their  dialogue, 
having  done  all  this,  where  are  ' 
headed?  f 


,arv  1978 


53 


addition  to  pursuing  the  efforts 

f-tioned,  we  remain  concerned  about 

lents  of  counterproductive  politici- 

in  that  continue  to  creep  into  U.N. 

IS  in  all  its  forums.  We  need  to  be 

■St.  Every  nation  has  been  guilty 

le  practice,  ourselves  included.  I 

X  it  may  be  fairly  said  that  both  we 

the  Soviet  Union  were  excessive 

ur  introduction  of  cold  war  at- 

.,:es  into  virtually  every  aspect  of 

. .  work  in  the  past. 

n  an  advantage  of  detente  is  that 

eind  the  Soviets  are  trying  harder  to 

iciase  the  number  of  bilateral  rela- 

ohips  from  which  political  consid- 

:  ons  can  be  excluded.   This  has 

;i    healthy  for  the  United  Nations, 

jjsuperpower  confrontation  often 

r(uced  paralysis  just  as  Arab-Israeli 

Dirontation  is  doing  today.  We  need 

)  se  every  effort  to  keep  the  U.N. 

ficies  focused  on  the  substantive  is- 

1     that    are    their    chief   respon- 

"  ities. 

.idgetary  concerns  will  also  be  on 
u! agenda  for  the  future.  We  need  to 
re  efficient  management  of  the 
.  system  while  at  the  same  time 
t  eek  to  insure  sufficient  funds  and 
iCDudgetary  flexibility  necessary  to 
«:  the  unexpected  problems  that 
oitantly  arise  in  the  U.N.  context. 
)e  ing  with  congressional  concerns 
bi  t  the  effectiveness  of  the  United 
-'a  Dns  will  be  part  of  our  effort. 

It  there  is  one  problem  of  overrid- 
i|  mportance  for  the  future,  and  that 
i  deal  with  the  continuing  inclina- 
0  of  many  in  this  country  to  think 
M  America  can  go  it  alone.  We  see 
li  view  in  suggestions  that  we  do  not 
&  international  institutions  or  in  the 
ii  aided  belief  that  all  other  nations 
'i  automatically  pay  heed  to  us 
d  out  our  attempting  to  take  their 
itests  into  account  as  well.  We  talk 
bit  interdependence  but,  like  the 
/ether,  nobody  does  very  much 
but  it. 

le  fact  is  that  in  a  growing  number 
f  reas,  international  relations  are 
o  beyond  the  effective  policy  reach 
f  le  nation-state.  All  countries,  in- 
king the  superpowers,  must  rely  to 
01 ;  extent  on  other  nations  for  essen- 
aiingredients  in  their  economies,  liv- 
D;  standards,  or  security.  As  an 
k?;n  Institute  study  recently  noted, 
'ere  is  a  complex  interconnection 
efveen  the  issues  of  population, 
fgy,  resources,  pollution,  food, 
Mey  supply,  economic  growth,  and 
fijilopment.  A  problem  in  one  sphere 
gavates  problems  in  others.  Popula- 
i«^,  for  instance,  affects  all  the  other 
a'ars.  So  does  availability  or  scarcity 
t  nergy." 
n  the  personal  level,  as  noted  by 


Steve  Bailey  of  the  American  Council 
on  Education,  we  live  in  "a  world  in 
which  rebellion  in  Chile  can  cause  an 
assassination  in  Vienna,  in  which  Tur- 
kish fHjppies  can  produce  muggings  in 
Montreal,  in  which  industrial  effluents 
in  Detroit  can  cause  cancer  in 
Windsor,  Ontario,  in  which  crimes  on 
Hawaii  Five-0  can  stimulate  re- 
cidivism in  Boston." 

We  all  need  to  find  new  ways  to 
cope  with  interdependence  of  this  sort. 
The  U.N.  system  is  but  one  of  the 
many  devices  in  which  people  around 
the  world  are  talking  to  each  other, 
searching  for  common  solutions.  There 
are  149  nation-states,  a  hundred  major 
transnational  corporations,  and  dozens 
of  nonprofit  multinational  organiza- 
tions, and  their  representatives  get  to- 
gether in  some  800  intergovernmental 
conferences  and  more  than  3,000  in- 
ternational association  meetings  every 
year. 

The  agenda  of  problems  that  faces 
us  on  a  global  scale  is  monumental. 
We  should  have  no  illusions  that  we 
can  deal  with  these  issues  ourselves. 
One  of  my  predecessors.  Ambassador 
Harlan  Cleveland,  recently  sum- 
marized the  challenge  in  this  way: 

Somehow  the  community  of  nations — or  at 
least  of  those  most  concerned — will  need  to 
create  a  food  reserve,  assure  energy  supplies, 
depress  fertility  rates,  stabilize  commodity 
markets,  protect  the  global  environment,  man- 
age the  ocean  and  its  deep  seabed,  control  the 
modification  of  weather  at  human  command, 
rewrite  the  rules  of  trade  and  investment,  re- 
form the  monetary  system,  mediate  disputes, 
reduce  the  cost  of  military  stalemate,  control 
conflict  in  a  world  of  proliferating  weapons. 


keep  the  peace  when  it  is  threatened,  and  re- 
store peace  when  it  is  broken. 

Clearly  the  task  is  staggering. 
Global  diplomacy  is  harder  than  dollar 
diplomacy.  It  takes  more  skill  to  suc- 
ceed if,  as  is  now  the  case,  the  United 
Nations  no  longer  towers  above  others 
to  the  same  degree  from  the  standpoint 
of  wealth,  influence,  and  interest. 

Times  have  changed.  Others  do 
have  wealth.  They  do  exercise  influ- 
ence. And  they  clearly  have  an  interest 
in  playing  a  larger  role.  It,  therefore, 
takes  new  determination  and  special 
skills  to  practice  effective  diplomacy. 

Certainly  ignoring  vital  U.N.  agen- 
cies which  are  dealing  with  these  top- 
ics is  not  the  way  to  make  progress. 
The  United  Nations  needs  more  atten- 
tion, not  less.  Our  support  of  the  U.N. 
agencies  must  increase.  We  must  work 
to  strengthen  them  in  their  capacity  to 
relate  to  these  world  problems. 

We  are  not  talking  about  world  gov- 
ernment but  world  governance.  We  are 
searching  for  ways  to  deal  with  inter- 
national problems  which  nation-states, 
acting  in  traditional  ways,  can  no 
longer  solve. 

I  think  we  are  making  a  good  start 
in  the  United  Nations  in  the  Carter 
Administration.  I  want  you  to  know 
that  at  all  times  we  welcome  your 
viewpoints  and  suggestions  for  new 
initiatives,  for  it  is  only  with  your 
help  that  we  will  be  able  to  push  this 
effort  forward  with  the  full  momentum 
that  it  deserves.  □ 


'  Address  before  the  American  Association 
of  University  Women  in  New  York  on  Dec.  3, 
1977;  Mr.  Maynes  is  Assistant  Secretary  for  In- 
ternational Organization  Affairs. 


Internationai  Civil  Aviation  Safety 


STATEMENT  BY  MR.  KENNEDY" 

My  delegation  joined  in  the  consen- 
sus on  the  Chairman's  resolution  on 
this  subject  and  raised  no  objection  to 
the  additions  to  the  chairman's  text 
because  we  believe  it  urgent  that  the 
international  community  express  itself 
in  clear  terms  on  the  unacceptability  of 
violent  interference  with  civil  aviation. 
We  wholeheartedly  support  the  resolu- 
tion's condemnation  of  violent  inter- 
ference. The  fact  that  the  scope  of  the 
condemnation  covers  all  who  might 
perpetrate  such  acts  is  a  clear  expres- 
sion of  the  outrage  of  the  international 
community  at  any  such  acts. 


We  furthermore  believe  the  requests 
to  the  International  Civil  Aviation 
Organization  (ICAO)  and  to  states  to 
take  measures  to  prevent  the  occur- 
rence of  such  acts  will  assist  in  avoid- 
ing the  occurrence  of  these  despicable 
incidents. 

We  believe  it  is  in  the  interest  of  the 
entire  world  community  to  take  effec- 
tive collective  action  against  hijacking 
and  other  unlawful  acts  which  interfere 
with  civil  aviation.  We  are  con- 
sequently gratified  that  the  resolution 
has  been  adopted  by  consensus.  Of 
course,  the  actions  of  members  of  this 
Organization  in  implementing  the  res- 
olution will  be  more  important  than 


54 


the  words  we  have  all  approved.  States 
should  take  joint  and  separate 
action — including  ratifying  the  existing 
Tokyo,  Hague,  and  Montreal  conven- 
tions— and  work  with  ICAO  to  develop 
better  security  procedures  and  stand- 
ards. 

We  would  also  wish  to  thank  Mr. 
Assad  Kotaite,  President  of  the  Coun- 
cil of  ICAO,  and  Capt.  Derry  F. 
Pearce,  President  of  the  International 
Federation  of  Airline  Pilots  Associa- 
tions, for  their  lucid  and  persuasive 
statements  which  so  accurately  de- 
scribed the  nature  and  magnitude  of 
the  problem. 

In  sum,  the  United  States  believes 
that  all  members  of  the  world  commu- 
nity must  act,  individually  and  collec- 
tively, to  combat  the  threat  of  hijack- 
ing and  other  illegal  acts  involving 
civil  aviation. 

Finally,  one  delegation  saw  fit  to 
raise  a  question  with  regard  to  a  cer- 
tain individual  presently  in  the  United 
States.  The  individual  is  not  being 
sheltered.  After  it  was  found  he  was 
ineligible  for  a  U.S.  visa  because  of 
the  act  he  had  committed,  he  entered 
the  United  States  illegally  under  false 
papers;  proceedings  are  underway  to 
deport  him  in  accordance  with  U.S. 
law.  We  believe  that  no  cause  justifies 
the  hijacking  of  planes.  Much  as  we 
sympathize  with  those  who  flee  re- 
pression to  seek  freedom,  we  do  not 
condone  hijacking  or  terrorist  acts  as  a 
means  to  this  end.  We  are  committed  to 
the  extradition  or  prosecution  system 
contained  in  The  Hague,  Montreal,  and 
protection  of  diplomats  conventions. 


STATEMENT  BY  CONGRESSMAN 
WOLFF' 

My  government  holds  the  view,  as 
it  has  for  many  years,  that  the  entire 
world  community,  without  exception, 
has  an  immediate  and  direct  interest  in 
taking  effective  collective  action 
against  hijacking  and  other  unlawful 
acts  which  interfere  with  civil  avia- 
tion. 

It  is  appropriate,  and  most  timely, 
that  the  United  Nations  has  given  seri- 
ous attention  to  this  issue  which  cuts 
across  all  frontiers  and  threatens  the 
lives  of  citizens  of  every  country,  irre- 
spective of  its  political  structure  or 
orientation. 

To  what  extent  does  the  resolution 
which  we  have  adopted  advance  the 
international  struggle  against  hijack- 
ing? 

•  First,  I  would  stress  that  my  gov- 
ernment welcomes  the  resolution's 


clear  and  unequivocal  denunciation  of 
hijacking.  The  strong  international 
consensus  expressed  in  this  resolution 
condemning  such  lawless  actions  will 
have  an  important  deterrent  effect 
upon  those  who  would  resort  to  this 
particularly  abhorrent  form  of  violence 
against  the  innocent  and  the  defense- 
less and  also  upon  those  who  would 
support  such  actions.  In  addition,  our 
action  here  should  serve  as  further  en- 
couragement to  states  to  take  the  sort 
of  vigorous  action  against  hijacking 
which,  unfortunately,  has  been  lacking 
in  some  cases. 

•  Second,  the  resolution  makes  it 
clear  that  member  states  and  the  ICAO 
should  move  promptly  to  implement 
more  effectively  the  security  stand- 
ards, practices,  and  procedures  for 
airports  which  have  been  established 
through  ICAO's  security  annex  [17]. 

•  Third,  the  resolution  calls  upon 
all  states  which  have  not  yet  adhered 
to  the  three  existing  ICAO  conventions 
against  hijacking  promptly  to  adhere  to 
and  ratify  those  conventions.  There 
can  be  no  reason  for  delay  on  this  mat- 
ter. The  mutual  advantages  from  this 
form  of  cooperation  are  increasingly 
evident. 

•  Finally,  the  resolution  recognizes 
that  the  members  of  this  Organization, 
working  within  the  framework  of 
ICAO,  should  give  the  highest  priority 
to  the  development  of  additional 
measures  to  enhance  the  security  of 
civil  aviation. 

My  government  is  pleased  with  the 
resolution  which  we  have  adopted.  To 
be  sure,  it  contains  some  phraseology 
which  we  believe  unnecessary  and  ir- 
relevant. Nevertheless,  on  balance, 
this  resolution  represents  a  major  step 
forward  in  the  collective  fight  against 
hijacking,  because  it  embodies  a 
unanimous  and  categoric  determination 
by  the  international  community  to  take 
further  steps  to  prevent  the  use  of  ter- 
ror, for  whatever  purpose,  against 
those  involved  in  international  civil 
aviation.  My  government  concludes 
that  the  resolution  represents  an  under- 
taking that  no  state  will  cooperate  with 
hijackers. 

One  might  ask  whether  the  sorts  of 
actions  which  this  resolution  envisages 
will  really  have  much  impact  on 
hijacking.  In  our  view,  the  answer  to 
any  such  questions  can  only  be  an  em- 
phatic yes.  I  would  cite  in  this  connec- 
tion the  experience  of  the  United 
States  in  its  successful  effort  against 
hijacking  domestically.  In  1969,  prior 
to  the  establishment  of  security  meas- 
ures designed  to  prevent  incidents  of 
this  type,  there  were  40  attempts  to 
hijack  U.S.   civilian  aircraft,   33  of 


Department  of  State  Bull*, , 

which  were  successful.  In  1973,  , 
first  full  year  after  stringent  secur 
procedures  were  made  mandatory 
all  U.S.  airports,  the  number  of  si 
incidents  fell  to  two.  In  1976  as  W( 
there  were  only  two  incidents.  Th' 
figures  speak  for  themselves. 

Lx)oking  at  the  current  situation  o 
worldwide  basis,   we  find  that  ' 
number  of  hijacking  incidents  is  o: 
again  on  the  rise  and  that  lax  secuii ; 
procedures  at  airports  have  been 
sponsible  for  most  of  them.  The 
ures  are  striking.   Of  the  28  airllK 
hijackings  thus  far  this  year — as 
posed  to   16  during  all  of  1976— i 
can  be  attributed  to  failures  in  p 
senger  screening  procedures.   Si 
1973  there  have  been  no  hijacking!] 
the  United  States  which  resulted  fi  i 
a  failure  to  detect  guns  and  ot 
weapons  during  the  screening  proc( 
1   might   point   out   that  the   Unil 
States  has  been  and  continues  to : 
willing  to  share  its  experience  in   i 
area  with  other  interested  countr 
For  instance,  the  United  States  has  h 
fered  to  share  its  screening  pre 
dures,  equipment,  and  testing  m* 
ures  with  other  countries,  and  thus 
36  countries  have  taken  advantage 
this  offer. 

In  calling  upon  the  competent  ! 
cialized  U.N.  agency,  ICAO,  to 
velop  additional  measures  to  incrfl 
international  civil  aviation  secur 
the  resolution  we  have  adopted  cl 
the  way  for  new  initiatives  in  that 
spected  and  impartial  Organizati 
Among  the  steps  which  we  beli 
ICAO  should  take  are  the  followinJ^ 


(1)  Strengthening  of  the  curi 
ICAO  standard  on  passenger  screei- 
to  require  specifically  the  screenin 
all  passengers  and  all  carry-on  I 
gage  for  all  airline  flights,  t 
foreign  and  domestic; 

(2)  Elevation  of  certain  ICAO 
ommended  practices  dealing  with 
curity  to  the  status  of  standards, 
eluding:  (a)  provision  of  law  enfo 
ment  support  for  aviation  security 
(b)  provision  of  security  for  aire 
under  hijacking  or  sabotage  threat; 

(3)  Continuing  emphasis  by  IC^ 
on  universal  adherence  to  and  ratit^ 
tion  of  The  Hague  (hijacking) 
Montreal  (sabotage)  conventions.  5 
action  would  effectively  eliminate 
havens  for  aviation  criminals. 

In    adopting    this   resolution, 
United  Nations  has  taken  a  major 
forward.    Nevertheless,   we  have  : 
ous  work  before  us.  It  would  be  a  | 
service    to    the    interests    of   e^■*^ 


member  of  this  Organization  if  theP 
portunity  to  strengthen  the  safet;'" 


f 


Jiiary  1978 

ITnational  civil  aviation  is  not  trans- 
J  into  practical  terms,  using  the 
ting  international  and  bilateral 
icwork  available  for  this  purpose, 
government  stands  ready  to  sup- 
the  spirit  and  the  letter  of  this 
lution.  We  look  to  others  to  join 
n  achieving,  for  the  benefit  of  all 

isrnational  travelers  on  civil  aircraft, 
-eater  measure  of  security  against 

a^rist  hijackings. 


4.  Calls  upon  the  International  Civil  Avia- 
tion Organization  to  undertake  urgently  further 
efforts  with  a  view  to  ensuring  the  security  of 
air  travel  and  preventing  the  recurrence  of  acts 
of  the  nature  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  above, 
including  the  reinforcement  of  annex  17  to  the 
Convention  on  International  Civil  Aviation, 
signed  at  Chicago  on  7  December  1944; 

5.  Appeals  to  all  Governments  to  make  seri- 
ous studies  of  the  abnormal  situation  related  to 
hijacking.  D 


55 


"  Made  in  the  Special  Political  Committee  of 
the  U.N.  General  Assembly  on  Nov.  2,  1977; 
John  Clifford  Kennedy  is  a  U.S.  Representative 
to  the  32d  General  Assembly  (text  from  USUN 
press  release  95  of  Nov.  2). 

'  Made  in  plenary  session  of  the  U.N.  Gen- 
eral Assembly  on  Nov.  3,  1977;  Congressman 
Lester  L.  Wolff  (of  New  York)  is  a  U.S.  Rep- 
resentative to  the  32d  General  Assembly  (text 
from  USUN  press  release  98  of  Nov.  3). 

'  Adopted  by  the  General  Assembly  by  con- 
sensus on  Nov.  3,  1977. 


«>OLUTION  32/8' 

ii  'v  of  international  civil  aviation 

t   General  Assembly, 
■uniting  that  the  orderly  functioning  of 

iijlional  civil  air  travel  under  conditions 
;u  inteeing  the  safety  of  its  operations  is  in 
i<  nterest  of  all  peoples  and  promotes  and 

1  r\cs  friendly  relations  among  States, 
.calling  its  resolution  2645  (XXV)  of  25 

<c:mber   1970,  in  which  it  recognized  that 

!  aerial  hijacking  or  other  wrongful  inter- 

.  with  civil  air  travel  jeopardize  the  lives 

.a  >afety  of  passengers  and  crew  and  consti- 

ul  a  violation  of  their  human  rights, 

calling  also  its  resolution  2551  (XXIV)  of 

2  ecember  1969  as  well  as  Security  Council 
^iution  286  (1970)  of  9  September  1970  and 
ihi  Council's  decision  of  20  June  1972, 

Reiterates  and  reaffirms  its  condemnation 

'  ts  of  aerial  hijacking  or  other  interference 

;  civil  air  travel  through  the  threat  or  use  of 

and  all  acts  of  violence  which  may  be 

,  led  against  passengers,  crew  and  aircraft, 

»l  her  committed  by  individuals  or  States; 

Calls  upon  all  States  to  take  all  necessary 
n  ,  taking  into  account  the  relevant  recom- 
TO  lations  of  the  United  Nations  and  the  In- 
ei  tional  Civil  Aviation  Organization,  to  pre- 
'e  acts  of  the  nature  referred  to  in  paragraph 
I  1  5ve,  including  the  improvement  of  security 
IT  igements  at  airports  or  by  airlines  as  well 
a  e  exchange  of  relevant  information,  and  to 
;h' end  to  take  joint  and  separate  action,  sub- 
;e(  to  respect  for  the  purposes  and  principles 
nf  e  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  for  the 
re  'ant  United  Nations  declarations,  coven- 
111  and  resolutions  and  without  prejudice  to 
■■  sovereignty  or  territorial  integrity  of  any 
,  in  co-operation  with  the  United  Nations 
ihe  International  Civil  Aviation  Organiza- 
10  ensure  that  passengers,  crew  and  air- 
engaged  in  civil  aviation  are  not  used  as  a 
ns  of  extorting  advantage  of  any  kind; 
Appeals  to  all  States  which  have  not  yet 
b«ime  parties  to  the  Convention  on  Offences 
w  Certain  Other  Acts  Committed  on  Board 

*  raft,  signed  at  Tokyo  on  14  September 
',  Ihe  Convention  for  the  Suppression  of 
iwful  Seizure  of  Aircraft,  signed  at  The 
lie  on  16  December  1970,  and  the  Conven- 

for  the   Suppression  of  Unlawful   Acts 

•  list  the  Safety  of  Civil  Aviation,  signed  at 
Nlitreal  on  23  September  1971,  to  give  urgent 
csideration  to  ratifying  or  acceding  to  those 
.  ventions; 


Operatnonai  Activities 


by  Charles  W.  Whalen' 

The  several  distinct  operational  pro- 
grams under  review  account  for  a  major 
part  of  the  budget  and  the  field  ac- 
tivities of  the  entire  U.N.  system. 
Through  cooperating  governments, 
they  strive  to  reach  out  to  the  ordinary 
people  of  our  globe  in  very  practical 
terms.  My  government  is  gratified  to 
be  able  to  play  an  active  part  in  the  im- 
plementation of  these  programs. 

Along  with  the  growing  pains,  we 
have  seen  substantial  progress — 
qualitatively  and  quantitatively — 
during  the  relatively  few  years  since 
this  unprecedented  and  highly  construc- 
tive development  effort  was  begun. 
U.N.  operational  activities  have  be- 
come an  important  element  in  the  realm 
of  international  economic  cooperation, 
a  fact  made  clear  by  the  informative 
statements  presented  by  the  distin- 
guished gentlemen  who  head  the  pro- 
grams under  review.  My  delegation 
would  like  to  thank  them  for  their  sig- 
nificant contributions  in  this  regard. 

We  naturally  would  like  to  see  the 
U.N.  development  system  make  even 
more  progress  in  expanding  and  im- 
proving its  field  programs.  With  that 
end  in  mind,  it  might  be  helpful  to 
summarize  my  government's  policy 
toward  the  U.N.  development  system 
and  how  we  believe  we  can  best  par- 
ticipate in  it. 

•  First,  we  seek  strengthened  co- 
operative efforts  that  are  devised 
clearly  and  specifically  to  meet  the 
basic  needs  of  the  world's  poor  major- 
ity, wherever  they  are  found.  We  also 
place  high  priority  on  enhancing  the 
role  of  women  in  development. 

•  Second,  we  seek  improved  per- 
formance and  efficiency  in  U.N.  de- 
velopment efforts. 


•  Third,  if  the  United  Nations  can 
make  substantial  progress  in  achieving 
these  objectives,  we  are  prepared  to 
consider  greater  support  for  such  pro- 
grams over  longer  periods  of  time. 

I  would  like  to  comment  selectively 
on  the  numerous  matters  before  our 
Committee. 

At  the  conclusion  of  this  month's 
Pledging  Conference,  the  U.N.  De- 
velopment Program's  (UNDP)  very 
able  Administrator,  Bradford  Morse, 
noted  that  the  Program  is  now  back  on 
a  stable  financial  footing.  My  govern- 
ment, of  course,  is  pleased  at  this  posi- 
tive turn  of  events.  We  look  forward  to 
seeing  UNDP  build  on  the  improved 
situation  by  strengthening  its  essential 
role  as  the  U.N.  development  system's 
central  funding  and  coordinating  body. 
This  is  key  to  assuring  the  coherence, 
efficiency,  and  effectiveness  of  the 
overall  system  and,  as  such,  is  strongly 
in  the  interest  of  all  concerned  govern- 
ments and  U.N.  agencies.  The  UNDP 
Governing  Council,  at  its  June  1977 
session,  appropriately  recognized  and 
endorsed  this  position  in  its  careful  re- 
view and  approval  of  the  resolution 
dealing  with  the  role  and  activities  of 
the  UNDP.  We  believe  that  the  joint 
planning  and  other  common  efforts  the 
UNDP  is  organizing  with  the  coopera- 
tion of  its  agency  partners  are  addi- 
tional steps  in  the  right  direction. 

While  welcoming  UNDP's  return  to 
fiscal  good  health,  we  nevertheless  re- 
main concerned  regarding  the  continu- 
ing lack  of  progress  in  dealing  with  cer- 
tain longstanding  problems.  Among 
these  are: 

•  First,  the  need  to  arrive  at  more 
equitable  cost-sharing  on  the  part  of  all 
member  states  financially  able  to  sup- 
port the  program  either  through  general 


56 

voluntary  contributions  or  by  defraying 
local  program  costs; 

•  Second,  the  need  for  voluntary 
contributions  to  be  made  in  readily  us- 
able currencies,  in  accord  with  the 
UNDP's  financial  rules  and  regulations 
and  in  line  with  the  clear  logic  of  the 
Program's  requirements.  We  continue 
to  believe  that  arrangements  must  be 
made  to  use  the  $35  million  in  noncon- 
vertible,  nonusable  funds  now  on  hand 
at  UNDP  for  their  original  purposes  but 
on  a  nonpreferential  basis;  and 

•  Third,  the  need  to  reduce  arrear- 
ages, which  total  about  $30  million  at 
present. 

Progress  on  these  fronts  will 
strengthen  UNDP's  financial  base, 
permit  the  Program  to  respond  more  ef- 
fectively to  the  needs  of  the  developing 
countries,  and  increase  its  general  at- 
tractiveness and  support  among 
member  governments. 

Other  important  steps  which,  in  our 
view,  would  enhance  UNDP's  position 
include  limiting  the  amount  of  techni- 
cal assistance  financed  by  the  assessed 
budgets  of  the  agencies,  adding  to  the 
protection  of  UNDP  against  a  recur- 
rence of  the  recent  grave  financial  dif- 
ficulties by  building  a  strengthened 
reserve  for  emergency  purposes,  and 
expanding  UNDP's  role  in  joint  opera- 
tions involving  both  multilateral  and 
bilateral  funds,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
Sahel  program. 

Our  concluding  note  on  UNDP  is  to 
recall  that  we  announced  at  the  recent 
Pledging  Conference  an  increase  for 
1978  of  15%  over  our  1977  contribu- 
tion of  $100  million.  Also  at  that  Con- 
ference, we  were  pleased  to  announce 
our  initial  pledge — S2  million — to  the 
U.N.  Capital  Development  Fund  as 
well  as  $1  million  to  the  U.N.  Revolv- 
ing Fund  for  Natural  Resources  Explora- 
tion. These  pledges,  along  with  our 
continuing  support  of  the  U.N.  Volun- 
teers Program  which  we  consider  an 
appropriate  mechanism  for  meeting 
basic  needs,  demonstrate  our  interest  in 
encouraging  new  U.N.  initiatives  of 
technical  cooperation  with  the  develop- 
ing countries.^ 

Let  me  next  touch  upon  the  United 
Nations  Children's  Fund  (UNICEF),  its 
operations,  and  the  1977  executive 
board  meeting  and  report.  In  our  view, 
UNICEF  continues  to  perform  its  vital 
functions  in  an  exemplary  manner 
under  the  able  leadership  of  its  Execu- 
tive Director,  Henry  Labouisse.  The 
25%  increase  this  year  in  our  contribu- 
tion to  UNICEF  reflects  our  confidence 
in  this  organization's  capacity  to  utilize 
effectively  significant  resource 
increases. 

The  International  Year  of  the  Child 


(lYC)  will  place  new  responsibilities 
not  only  on  UNICEF  but  also  on  the 
other  elements  of  the  U.N.  system. 
Full  cooperation  from  all  concerned 
U.N.  bodies  is  essential  if  we  are  to 
seize  upon  the  Year  as  an  opportunity 
to  highlight  and  assess  the  needs  of 
children  and  to  strengthen  programs  to 
meet  them.  We  are  confident  that  such 
cooperation  will  be  forthcoming. 

In  terms  of  national  activities,  the 
U.S.  Government  has  formed  an  Inter- 
national Year  of  the  Child  interagency 
committee  to  coordinate  official  U.S. 
participation  in  the  Year.  All  depart- 
ments and  agencies  of  government  with 
an  interest  in  children  are  represented 
on  the  committee.  We  look  forward  to 
a  fruitful,  cooperative  relationship  and 
exchange  of  views  with  the  recently 
appointed  U.N.  Special  Representative 
for  the  Year,  Dr.  Estefania  Aldab-Lim 
[of  the  Philippines],  and  the  lYC  Sec- 
retariat. As  you  know,  we  recently 
pledged  $250,000  for  1977  for 
worldwide  lYC  activities. 

The  United  States  participated  ac- 
tively at  the  1977  UNICEF  board  meet- 
ing. We  considered  it  a  most  useful 
dialogue  between  board  members  and 
the  UNICEF  Secretariat  on  a  wide 
range  of  subjects.  One  decision  taken 
at  the  board  session  was  agreement  that 
the  Secretariat  would  prepare,  for  the 
next  session,  a  comprehensive  over- 
view statement  of  UNICEF  assistance 
policies  and  priorities,  a  review  of  the 
functional  categories  of  UNICEF  as- 
sistance, and  indications  of  future 
trends.  We  look  forward  with  interest 
to  that  statement,  as  well  as  the  other 
studies  agreed  upon  at  the  1977 
session. 

Permit  me  now  to  turn  to  U.N.  Fund 
for  Population  Activities  (UNFPA), 
which  my  country  has  been  glad  to 
support  since  its  inception.  One  clear 
measure  of  UNFPA's  utility  to  de- 
veloping countries  is  that,  as  reported 
by  the  Fund's  most  distinguished 
Executive  Director,  Rafael  Salas,  it  is 
facing  a  gap  between  the  cost  of  spe- 
cific projects  ready  for  implementation 
and  the  level  of  financial  resources 
available  to  it.  Accordingly,  it  is  in- 


Department  of  State  BuUe. 

cumbent  upon  member  states  to  cc 
sider  increasing  substantially  th^ 
pledges  to  the  Fund.  This  situation  ai 
underlines  the  need  for  U.N.  agenc 
cooperating  with  the  Fund  to  redu 
their  charges  to  it  for  overhead  co 
and  infrastructural  support. 

My  government,  which  regulai 
has  provided  its  proportional  share 
the  Fund's  resources,  has  just  i 
nounced  a  special  $4  million  contril 
tion  to  help  it  meet  outstanding  assi 
ance  requests.  Along  with  the  Fum 
impressive  record,  we  nevertheless 
several  areas  in  need  of  further  i 
provement.  These  include  develop! 
basic  country  programs  and,  throu 
them,  intercountry  programs;  focus: 
on  core  programs;  establishi 
priorities  for  future  allocation  of 
sources;  and  increasing  the  share 
country  programs  and  decreasing  t 
of  regional  or  global  programs. 

The  United  Nations  itself  is  the  Sf- 
ond  largest  UNDP  executing  agen(« 
We  commend  the  United  Nations  for 
operational  activities,  especially  for 
focus  on  the  least  developed  countr 
and  its  promotion  of  integration 
women  in  development.  However, 
must  stress  our  view  that  no  regu 
U.N.   funds  should  be  budgeted 
these  operations.  Instead,  they  shoi" 
be  financed  by  UNDP,  the  U.N.  Fu< 
for  Drug  Abuse  Control,  and  the  U. 
Trust  Fund  for  Southern  Africa. 

Finally  I  would  like  to  emphasize 
government's  support  of  the  Wo 
Food  Program.  Previously  we  have 
pressed  our  reservations  regarding 
established  Program  target  of  $950  w 
lion  for  1979-80.  Despite  this,  we 
tend  to  increase  the  level  of  our  c( 
tribution  to  $220  million  for  tl' 
period. 


'  Statement  made  in  Committee  II  (Econo 
and  Financial)  of  the  U.N.  General  Asseir* 
on  Nov.  15,  1977;  Congressman  Whalen 
Ohio)  is  the  U.S.  Representative  in  that  C 
mittee  (text  from  USUN  press  release  IIJ 
Nov.  15). 

'  For  text  of  the  statement  made  at  the  Pie 
ing  Conference  on  Nov.  2.  1977.  see  BuLLEl 
of  Dec.  12,  p.  872. 


Outer  Space  Programs 


by  Marjorie  Craig  Benton ' 

The  year  1977  was  one  of  significant 
accomplishments  in  the  exploration  of 
outer  space  and  productive  work  by  the 
U.N.   Committee  on  the  Peaceful 


Uses  of  Outer  Space.  The  United  Stas 
has  regularly  reported  major  develi- 
ments  in  our  national  and  intematio|l 
space  programs  to  the  Outer  Sp<; 
Committee  and  its  subcommittees,  ii 
I  would  like  to  draw  the  attention  of  ' 


ry  1978 

ral  Assembly  to  some  of  the  high- 
s  of  our  ongoing  and   planned 
programs. 

are  pleased  to  report  that  the 
!  Transportation  System,  includ- 
he  reusable  National  Aeronautics 
Space  Administration's  (NASA) 
!  shuttle  orbiter  and  the  Spacelab 
:  developed  by  the  European  Space 
cy  (ESA),  is  progressing  satisfac- 
.  The  first  shuttle  orbiter  success- 
completed  its  approach  and  land- 
jsts  in  October, 
mid-year  1979,  an  engineering 
1  of  Spacelab,  consisting  of  two 
itory  modules  and  two  experiment- 
ing pallets,  should  arrive  from 
oe.  The  first  flight  unit  is  sched- 
to  arrive  in  Florida  by  the  end  of 
imber  1979.  The  shuttle  orbiter  it- 
will  become  operational  by  mid- 
.  An  early  operational  flight  will 
th  the  first  Spacelab  in  a  joint 
lA/ESA    mission    in    December 
Experimenters  from   16  nations 
Ibeen  selected  to  fly  their  experi- 
is  as  contributions  to  the  first 
ilab  pay  load. 
the  applications  area,  I  would  like 
immarize  briefly  our  experimental 
T  te  sensing  activities.   Data  ob- 
J  by  NASA's  Landsat  satellites 
iv  supported  research  projects  spon- 
Ti  by  agencies  in  some  50  countries 
international  organizations.  In  ad- 
tii,  users  from  about  100  countries 
cv  purchased  Landsat  data  from  the 
a    Resource  Observation  Systems 
a    Center  at  Sioux  Falls,  South 
alta. 

I  idsat  ground  stations  now  operate 
unada,  Brazil,  and  Italy  receiving 
It  directly  from  U.S.  satellites.  An 
Wional  station  is  under  construction 
an  and  others  are  planned  in 
rjntina,  Chile,  and  Sweden.  We  ex- 
W  that  Japan,  Australia,  India,  and 
is  may  be  joining  the  Landsat 
end  station  system  in  the  near 
ti:. 

5  ice  the  Landsat  satellites  now  in 
b  are  nearing  the  end  of  their  opera- 
Mi  lifetimes,  NASA  plans  to  launch 
q  bird  Landsat  satellite — Landsat 
-n  February  1978.  Funding  has 
:{  approved  for  a  fourth  Landsat 
••lite  in  the  early  1980's.  These  new 
tlites  should  assure  continuous 
•  ability  of  remote  sensing  data. 
'le  first  remote  sensing  satellite 
i^:ated  to  oceanographic  studies — 
'at-A — is  scheduled  to  be  launched 
"iASA  in  May  1978.  Seasat  will 
i8;r  data  on  changes  in  ocean  topog- 
^'y  due  to  tides,  currents,  gravity 
I'ltions,  etc.;  the  extent  and  move- 
i.  of  sea  ice;  ocean  dynamics;  and 
Bher. 
Jf  applications  program  also  in- 


cludes ongoing  experiments  using 
communications  satellites.  The  Appli- 
cations Technology  Satellite  series  con- 
tinues to  demonstrate  new  and  different 
kinds  of  communications  services. 
These  include  TV  broadcasting  to 
small  receivers  and  mobile  communica- 
tions to  ships,  aircraft  vehicles,  and 
hand-held  equipment.  Experiments  are 
also  being  conducted  in  the  communi- 
cations area  in  a  joint  project  with 
Canada  using  the  Communications 
Technology  Satellite  (CTS). 

We  are  makmg  good  progress  toward 
the  test  and  demonstration  of  a  search- 
and-rescue  satellite  system  for  the  loca- 
tion and  assistance  of  distressed  aircraft 
and  ships.  The  project  has  been 
planned  with  Canada,  and  the  Soviet 
Union  has  agreed  to  participate.  A  pro- 
posal has  also  been  received  from 
France  to  join  in  this  project.  Wide  in- 
ternational use  of  such  a  search-and- 
rescue  system  could  be  anticipated 
after  the  initial  experimental  phase. 

We  are  especially  pleased  to  report 
three  important  new  international  co- 
operative space  agreements  which  were 
reached  in  recent  weeks. 

Officials  in  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  have  entered  into  an  agree- 
ment with  NASA  to  take  an  important 
part  in  a  Jupiter  orbiter  probe  mission, 
scheduled  for  early  1982.  This  mission 
is  designed  to  conduct  the  most  de- 
tailed scientific  investigation  yet  of 
Jupiter — its  environment  and  moons — 
including  the  first  direct  measurements 
of  the  planet's  atmosphere. 

Moreover,  NASA  and  the  Nether- 
lands Agency  for  Aerospace  Programs 
have  entered  into  an  agreement  for  a 
cooperative  infrared  astronomical  satel- 
lite project.  The  United  Kingdom  also 
will  participate  in  this  program.  Sched- 
uled for  launch  in  1981,  this  mission 
will  conduct  the  first  astronomical  sur- 
vey of  the  entire  sky  at  infrared 
wavelengths  undetectable  by  Earth- 
based  telescopes  because  of  the  obscur- 
ing effects  of  the  atmosphere. 

Finally,  the  European  Space  Agency 
has  signed  an  agreement  with  NASA 
for  substantial  contributions  to  and  par- 
ticipation in  an  extended  space  tele- 
scope program.  In  1983  a  2.4-meter 
space  telescope  will  be  carried  into 
Earth's  orbit  by  NASA's  space  shuttle 
and  will  be  used  to  study  the  universe 
with  much  higher  resolution  than  has 
ever  been  possible  before.  With  the 
new  space  telescope,  astronomers 
should  be  able  to  observe  some  350 
times  more  volume  of  space  than  can 
be  seen  now  with  the  largest  ground- 
based  telescope. 

During  1977,  the  Viking  mission  to 
Mars  entered  a  phase  that  will  permit 
scientific  observations  through  an  en- 


57 

tire  Martian  year  of  25  months,  thereby 
observing  important  seasonal  changes. 
Viking  I  orbiter  cameras  took  detailed 
pictures  of  Mars'  tiny  moon  Fhobos 
from  a  distance  of  48  km. 

A  high-energy  astrophysics  research 
program  began  in  1977  with  the  launch 
of  an  observatory — the  High  Energy 
Astronomical  Observatory  I — to  per- 
form a  detailed  X-ray  survey  of  the 
celestial  sphere.  This  is  the  first  of  a 
series  of  three  planned  spacecraft  to  do 
high-energy  studies. 

NASA  also  launched  two  Voyager 
spacecraft  this  past  summer  for  an  ex- 
tensive survey  of  the  outer  planets. 
Over  a  10-year  period  they  may  visit  as 
many  as  15  major  celestial  bodies,  in- 
cluding Jupiter,  Saturn,  several  moons 
of  both  planets,  and  possibly  Uranus. 
The  great  distances  across  which  radio 
signals  between  Earth  and  Voyagers 
must  travel  and  the  long  lifetime  of  the 
mission  require  that  the  spacecraft  be 
able  to  care  for  themselves  and  perform 
long,  detailed,  and  complex  scientific 
surveys  without  continual  commanding 
from  the  ground. 

The  international  Sun-Earth 
Explorers — a  so-called  mother-daughter 
double  spacecraft  on  a  single 
rocket — were  launched  in  October  in  a 
cooperative  program  between  NASA 
and  the  European  Space  Agency.  The 
project's  objective  is  to  gain  a  better 
understanding  of  how  the  Sun  interacts 
with  the  Earth's  near-space  environ- 
ment. Circling  Earth  for  3  years  or 
more,  the  instrument-laden  spacecraft 
are  expected  to  provide  detailed  data  on 
how  solar  wind  particles  behave  in  the 
boundaries  between  Earth  space  and  in- 
terplanetary space. 

We  wish  to  commend  and  endorse 
the  work  of  the  Outer  Space  Committee 
[U.N.  doc.  A/32/20]  and  work  of  the 
Scientific  and  Technical  and  the  Legal 
Subcommittees  as  reflected  in  their  re- 
spective reports.  The  subcommittees 
have  done  particularly  valuable  work 
this  year  in  carrying  out  their  mandates 
from  the  parent  committee  and  from 
the  General  Assembly.  I  do  not  intend 
to  discuss  here  all  of  the  issues  covered 
in  these  reports,  as  our  views  are  on 
record  in  the  debates  which  led  to  their 
adoption.  However,  we  would  like  to 
make  a  few  remarks  in  regard  to  the 
principal  topics  discussed. 

The  Legal  Subcommittee  has  con- 
tinued consideration  of  several  com- 
plex and  difficult  issues.  Negotiation  of 
a  draft  treaty  dealing  with  the  Moon 
and  other  celestial  bodies  has  continued 
in  earnest.  An  important  question  in 
that  regard  concerns  the  exploration 
and  exploitation  of  the  natural  re- 
sources of  such  bodies.  We  believe  that 
efforts  toward  resolving  this  question 


58 


should  be  continued  in  1978. 

The  elaboration  of  principles  guiding 
the  direct  broadcast  of  television  by 
satellite  has  evoked  considerable  inter- 
est. In  this  connection,  I  would  like  to 
note  that  while  we  share  in  general  a 
positive  evaluation  of  the  work  on  di- 
rect television  broadcast  satellites  that 
is  underway  in  the  Legal  Subcommit- 
tee, we  think  it  would  be  wrong  to 
underestimate  the  difficulties  which 
must  be  resolved  in  order  to  reach 
agreement  on  a  mutually  acceptable 
and  comprehensive  set  of  guidelines  for 
this  new  technology. 

It  is  well  known  that  many  states 
wish  to  include  in  the  guidelines  a 
principle  that  would  require  prior  con- 
sent before  broadcasting  begins.  Others 
have  joined  with  the  United  States  in 
opposing  any  such  requirement  as  in- 
compatible with  the  fundamental  con- 
cept of  free  and  unfettered  exchange  of 
information  and  ideas  between  coun- 
tries, peoples,  and  individuals.  Still 
others  have  proposed  formulations  of  a 
possible  principle  that  would  seek  to 
bridge  the  gap  between  these  positions. 
The  gap  is  wide  and  it  will  require  the 
earnest  efforts  of  all  members  of  the 
Outer  Space  Committee  to  overcome  it. 
The  process  of  exploring  and  under- 
standing the  complex  matters  involved 
in  this  subject  should  be  continued  in 
the  Legal  Subcommittee. 

Remote  sensing  of  the  natural  envi- 
ronment of  the  Earth  from  space  is  prov- 
ing to  be  one  of  the  most  beneficial 
practical  applications  of  space  technol- 
ogy. In  addition  to  its  usefulness  in  the 
location  and  management  of  natural  re- 
sources, cartographic  applications,  and 
land-use  planning,  remote  sensing 
holds  promise  in  the  fields  of  environ- 
mental monitoring  and  in  disaster  pre- 
diction and  research. 

The  United  States  has  been  exploring 
a  full  range  of  these  applications  and  is 
particularly  pleased  to  note  the  increas- 
ing interest  of  many  countries  in  deriv- 
ing benefits  from  this  technology.  We 
look  forward  to  a  productive  discussion 
in  the  Outer  Space  Committee  of  the 
application  of  remote  sensing  to  the  de- 
tection and  monitoring  of  pollution. 

The  era  of  space-based  remote  sens- 
ing of  the  Earth's  natural  environment 
began  in  1972  with  the  launch  of  the 
first  of  the  U.S.  Landsat  satellites.  As 
I  have  noted  earlier,  more  than  5  years" 
success  has  been  realized  in  this  ex- 
perimental program  involving  two 
satellites  now  in  orbit,  a  third  to  be 
launched  early  next  year,  and  a  fourth 
presently  being  engineered. 

In  view  of  the  benefits  already  de- 
rived from  Landsat  and  the  great  inter- 
est in  the  subject  on  the  part  of  the  in- 
ternational community,  some  form  of 


Department  of  State  Bui'  D 


operational  remote  sensing  undoubt- 
edly will  be  established  in  the  future. 
It  will  be  very  important  for  the  Outer 
Space  Committee  to  continue  its  de- 
tailed consideration  of  technical  and 
organizational  aspects  of  remote  sens- 
ing to  encourage  obtaining  the  greatest 
possible  benefits  from  this  technology. 
The  Legal  Subcommittee  should  con- 
tinue its  development  of  draft  princi- 
ples guiding  remote  sensing  activities 
with  due  account  of  the  wide  range  of 
potential  configurations  involving  gov- 
ernments and  nongovernmental 
entities. 

A  number  of  countries  have  ex- 
pressed an  interest  in  holding  a  U.N. 
conference  on  outer  space  matters 
oriented  toward  development  needs. 
The  United  States  is  particularly  aware 
of  the  value  of  science  and  technology 
to  development  and  strongly  supports 
the  planned  1979  U.N.  Conference  on 
Science  and  Technology  for  Develop- 
ment. Countries  will  have  an  opportu- 
nity in  that  conference  to  focus  on  the 
aspects  of  science  and  technology  they 


b 


feel  are  most  important  for  their  * 
velopment.  Thus,  the  confere  ^ 
should  provide  countries  an  oppo 
nity  to  consider  all  areas  of  science 
technology  according  to  their  woi 
ness  in  competition  for  scarce  finar 
resources.  A  special  U.N.  space  i 
ference  could  be  designed  on  the  fc 
of  needs  shown  by  the  1979  conferer 
Before  closing  I  would  like  to 
press  our  appreciation  to  Dr.  Perek 
his  associates  in  the  Outer  Space 
fairs  Division  of  the  U.N.  Secretai  ■■' 
We  all  know  that  their  continuous 
forts  behind  the  scenes  are  indispe 
ble  to  the  successful  work  of  the  0 
Space  Committee  and  its  subcom 
tees.  We  look  forward  to  our  cont 
ing  productive  association  with  t 
and  with  these  committees  in  the 
ahead. 


'  Statement  made  in  Committee  1  (Pol 
and  Security)  of  the  U.N.  General  Assemb 
Nov,   22;  Ms.   Benton  is  the  U.S.   Alte 
Representative  in  that  Committee  (text 
USUN  press  release  120  of  Nov.  22). 


.\j 


WESTER]\  HEMISPHERE: 

Jamaican  Prime  Minister 
Visits  United  States 


White  House  Statement ' 

Prime  Minister  Manley  of  Jamaica 
and  President  Carter  met  today  for  an 
hour  and  15  minutes  in  the  Cabinet 
Room  and  then  proceeded  to  a  working 
luncheon  for  an  hour  and  a  half.  They 
discussed  a  wide  range  of  subjects  of 
mutual  interest.  Mr.  Manley  was  in- 
vited to  have  lunch  at  the  White  House 
by  Mrs.  Carter  during  her  visit  to 
Kingston  in  May  of  this  year,  and  the 
December  16  date  was  selected  as  the 
time  most  convenient  to  both  the  Presi- 
dent and  Prime  Minister  Manley. 

The  Prime  Minister  and  President 
Carter  discussed  multilateral  and  bilat- 
eral issues  during  their  meeting  and 
luncheon.  Jamaica,  as  chairman  of  the 
Group  of  77.-'  plays  an  important  role 
as  spokesman  for  many  developing 
countries.  The  Prime  Minister  and  the 
President  reviewed  the  general  state  of 
the  North-South  dialogue,  as  well  as 
several  individual  issues  of  importance 
including  the  assistance  needs  of  de- 
veloping countries  and  the  negotiations 
on  a  common  fund. 

The  two  leaders  also  discussed  cer- 
tain bilateral  issues,  including  our  ef- 
forts to  assist  Jamaica  resolve  its  eco- 


nomic  difficulties   and   Jamai( 
contribution  to  a  broader  hemisph 
commitment  to  human  rights.   Sev 
important  regional    issues   were 
cussed,  including  the  question  of 
lize.   Prime  Minister  Manley  rece 
hosted  a  conference  of  seven  L 
American  and  Caribbean  leaders  to 
cuss  the  future  status  of  Belize,  and 
Prime   Minister  related   some  of 
conclusions  of  that  conference  to 
President,  and  they  explored  in  gen 
terms  ways  to  insure  a  peaceful 
durable  settlement  to  that  problem, 
two  leaders  also  discussed  the  Pan 
Canal  treaties  and  regional  cooperai 
in  the  Caribbean. 
The  meeting  was  extremely  cordii 
Attending  on  the  Jamaican  side  w 
Prime  Minister  Manley,  Mrs.  Mam 
P.  J.  Patterson,  Minister  of  Foreign 
fairs.   Foreign  Trade  and  Touri 
Alfred  Rattray,  Jamaican  Ambassac 
Richard  Fletcher,    Minister  of  St  C," 
Ministry   of   Finance;    Keith    Roi 
Member  of  Parliament:  Owen  Jetf- 
son.    Director,    Program    Divisii 
Ministry   of  Finance   and   Planni; 
Gordon   Wells,   Permanent  Secretii'. 
Office  of  the  Prime  Minister;  E.  Fnk 
Francis,  Permanent  Secretary,  Minify 


ilary  1978 

oreign  Affairs,  Foreign  Trade  and 

iMiK  and  Herbert  Walker,  Perma- 
Representative   to  the  Jamaican 

ion  to  the  Specialized  Agencies  of 
iiited  Nations  at  Geneva. 

lending  on  the   U.S.    side  were 

idcnt  Carter;  Vice  President  Mon- 
Secretary  of  State  Cyrus  Vance; 

mew  Brzezinski,  Assistant  to  the 
udent  for  National  Security  Affairs; 

il  Aaron.  Deputy  Assistant  to  the 
jdent  for  National  Security  Affairs; 
2  nee  A.  Todman,  Assistant  Secre- 
r  of  State  for  Inter-American  Af- 

;  Frederick  Irving,  American  Am- 
.  ador  to  Jamaica;  and  Robert  Pas- 
n  National  Security  Council  staff 


member.  The  following  U.S.  officials 
also  attended  the  luncheon:  Anthony 
M.  Solomon,  Under  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  for  Monetary  Affairs;  and 
Guy  Erb,  National  Security  Council 
staff  member.  □ 


'  Prime  Minister  Manley  visited  Washington 
December  14-19,  1977  Text  of  statement  dated 
Dec.  16  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  Dec.  19. 

-  The  Group  of  77  is  a  caucus  of  developing 
countries  formed  in  1964  at  the  first  U.N.  Con- 
ference on  Trade  and  Development  to  present  a 
unified  bargaining  position  in  their  negotiations 
with  industrialized  countries.  It  is  now  com- 
posed of  1 15  developing  countries. 


TREATIES:  l/JS.,  1/ J^. 
Aviation  Agreement 


ulius  L.  Katz^ 

am  pleased  to  appear  before  you 

f  to  discuss  the  vital  question  of 

international  aviation  policy  in 

of  the  recently  concluded  U.S.- 

.  Air  Services  Agreement.  I  under- 

d  that  the  committee  wishes  to 

MS  on  this  agreement  in  these  hear- 

i{  and  to  address  other  aviation  pol- 

■^:}uestions  at  further  hearings  to  be 

i  at  a  later  date. 

is  important  to  consider  the  specif- 
s  f  that  agreement  because  its  provi- 
c  i  govern  one  of  the  largest  single 
II  national  air  transportation  markets 
n  affect  many  parties  of  interest,  in- 
lling  airlines,  travelers  and  shippers, 
omunities,  and  our  workers.  It  is 
l!  important,  however,  to  view  the 
gement  in  an  historical  and  overall 
o:y  context. 

has  been  asserted  by  some  that 
•;  itional  U.S.  aviation  policy  has 
ei  to  negotiate  more  for  the  benefit 
fur  airlines  than  for  the  consuming 
l|iic  in  such  areas  as  expanding  the 
Uiber  of  U.S.  cities  receiving  inter- 
flonal  service  and  assuring  the  lowest 
Ciible  cost  to  travelers  and  shippers. 
.'1  new  U.S. -U.K.  agreement  has 
lii  held  out  by  some  as  an  example 
tihis  policy. 

i/hether  the  agreement  is  good  or 
M ,  or  somewhere  in  between,  is  a 
y  stion  of  judgment  and  of  assessment 
iivhat  the  alternatives  were.  But  it  is 
>  ;ntly  wrong  to  charge  that  U.S.  avi- 
wn  policy  is  now,  or  has  been,  one  of 
istecting  our  airlines  at  the  expense  of 
jl  consumers. 

he  United  States  was  the  original 
1  ocate  of  an  open  skies  approach 


after  World  War  II.  We  sponsored  a 
multilateral  convention  for  this  purpose 
and,  in  the  negotiations  leading  to  the 
original  U.S. -U.K.  agreement  of  1946, 
we  opposed  any  requirement  that 
capacity  and  tariffs  be  subject  to  prior 
agreement  among  either  airlines  or 
governments.  We  had  to  abandon  the 
multilateral  convention  because  of 
united  foreign  opposition  to  it,  and  we 
ultimately  reached  a  compromise  with 
the  British  in  the  original  Bermuda 
agreement  on  capacity  and  tariffs,  ac- 
cepting prior  control  of  the  latter  but 
not  the  former.  Postwar  U.S.  interna- 
tional aviation  prospered  under  the  lib- 
eral Bermuda-type  agreement,  to  the 
benefit  of  airlines  and  consumers  alike, 
despite  the  fact  -that  only  the  United 
States  continued  to  use  the  Bermuda- 
type  agreement  as  a  model. 

The  United  States  has  negotiated 
over  50  bilateral  air  transport  agree- 
ments, virtually  all  of  which  follow  the 
Bermuda  precedent.  On  occasion,  we 
have  had  to  accept  less  liberal  condi- 
tions than  we  wanted  because  of 
foreign  opposition  to  certain  policies 
we  sought.  It  needs  to  be  emphasized 
in  this  connection  that  most  foreign 
countries  have  a  single  national  airline 
engaged  in  international  service,  that 
these  airlines  are  often  protected  as  a 
matter  of  national  policy,  and  that 
many  foreign  countries  simply  do  not 
believe  in  open  competition  in  the  field 
of  aviation. 

I  believe  these  foreign  perceptions 
are  wrong,  but  the  United  States  cannot 
force  its  views  on  the  rest  of  the  world. 
The  United  States  has,  however,  done 
more  to  contribute  to  a  healthy  interna- 
tional aviation  environment  than  any 


59 


other  country  through  our  emphasis  on 
a  competitive  market  structure  and 
through  the  development,  manufacture, 
and  export  of  safe,  efficient,  and  reli- 
able commercial  aircraft. 

In  any  negotiation  where  there  is 
serious  disagreement,  the  bottom-line 
question  is  what  the  alternatives  are.  Do 
we  insist  on  our  position  and  run  the 
risk  of  a  confrontation  including  unilat- 
erally imposed  restrictions  on,  or  sus- 
pension of,  air  services,  or  do  we  try  to 
make  the  best  compromise  possible? 
There  can  be  no  general  answer  to  this 
question,  but  I  suggest  that  those  who 
believe  we  should  hold  out  for  all  or 
nothing  should  consider  the  public 
interest  consequences  of  getting 
nothing. 

I  believe  it  is  generally  recognized 
that  U.S.  aviation  policy  has  favored 
competition  in  international  aviation, 
that  this  has  been  a  longstanding  U.S. 
policy,  and  that  opposition  to  it  has  not 
come  from  within  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment but  from  abroad.  But  you  want  to 
know,  and  you  are  right  in  asking, 
whether  the  new  U.S. -U.K.  agreement 
adequately  protects  competition  and 
consumer  interests. 

The  British  served  notice  of  termina- 
tion of  the  1946  agreement  because 
they  had,  for  some  time,  been  dissatis- 
fied with  that  agreement.  We  had  been 
having  aviation  difficulties  with  the 
United  Kingdom  at  least  since  the  early 
1970's,  stemming  for  the  most  part 
from  what  the  United  Kingdom  be- 
lieved was  the  excess  capacity  of  U.S. 
airlines  and  from  differences  of  views 
on  interpretation  of  the  agreement.  The 
actual  notice  of  termination  did  not, 
therefore,  come  as  a  complete  surprise 
to  us,  which  is  not  to  say  that  we  ac- 
cepted the  validity  of  United  Kingdom 
dissatisfaction.  In  fact,  the  first  6 
months  of  negotiations  were  largely 
devoted  to  attempting  to  convince  the 
United  Kingdom  that  it  would  fare  bet- 
ter under  a  liberal  agreement  than  the 
restrictionist  one  it  sought.  We  did  not 
wholly  convince  the  British  side,  but 
we  did  lay  the  basis  for  the  minimum 
U.S.  demands  in  the  negotiations. 

The  basic  issue  was  really  quite  sim- 
ple. The  United  Kingdom  wanted  an 
agreement  which  would  reduce  the 
risks  of  imbalance  as  much  as  possible. 
Although  the  United  Kingdom  formally 
denied  that  it  wanted  a  guarantee  of 
50-50  market  share,  its  insistence  on 
complete  predetermination  of  capacity, 
one  airline  per  country  per  route,  and 
turnaround  U.S. -U.K.  routes  with  no 
beyond  rights  amounted  to  the  same 
thing.  For  our  part,  we  opposed  the 
concept  of  guaranteed  balance  on 
grounds  that  it  would  thwart  market 
development  and  increase  costs  and. 


60 

therefore,  the  price  to  the  consumer. 
We  argued  that  a  system  which  might 
be  suited  to  the  United  Kingdom  and  its 
airlines  was  not  suited  to  the  U.S.  in- 
ternational air  transport  system  or  to 
U.S.  travelers  and  shippers. 

In  the  final  agreement  reached,  we 
did  not  achieve  all  our  objectives  but 
neither  did  the  British.  Our  basic 
strategy  was  to  trade  those  elements 
which  were  not  crucial  for  those  that 
were.  Thus,  we  refused  to  accept  the 
right  of  one  side  to  have  an  absolute 
veto  over  any  increase  in  capacity.  The 
capacity  procedures  we  finally  ac- 
cepted always  allow  some  increase  and 
moreover  these  procedures  are  appli- 
cable only  on  North  Atlantic  routes  and 
only  for  passenger  services. 

North  Atlantic  all-cargo  services  and 
the  Pacific,  Bermuda,  and  Caribbean 
routes  are  not  subject  to  any  prior 
capacity  control.  We  had  to  accept 
some  limitations  on  designation  of  air- 
lines, but  even  here  there  is  a  right  to 
add  another  airline  if  a  market  reaches 
a  certain  size.  On  routes,  we  held  fast 
to  retaining  rights  to  carry  traffic  to 
points  beyond  the  United  Kingdom  and 
its  territory  where  such  rights  are  cru- 
cial, and  we  obtained  rights  to  carry 
transit  and  connecting  traffic  beyond 
the  United  Kingdom  to  any  points.  We 
gave  up  beyond  rights  not  being  used 
and  others  of  marginal  value. 

In  an  agreement  as  important  as  this 
one,  there  are  bound  to  be  differences 
of  view  over  whether  the  right  trade- 
offs were  made.  But  trade-offs  had  to 
be  made.  Neither  side  had,  after  all,  an 
absolute  voice  in  dictating  solutions. 
We  had  to  be  mindful  of  British  desires 
as  they  had  to  be  of  ours.  The  bottom 
line  issue  was  whether  we  could  have 
done  better  and,  if  so,  should  we  have 
broken  off  the  negotiations  and  sus- 
pended air  services  in  order  to 
maximize  our  leverage.  Personally,  I 
doubt  that  the  United  States  could  have 
achieved  a  significantly  better  overall 
agreement  had  we  broken  off  negotia- 
tions and  suspended  air  services. 

I  can  testify  that  it  was  a  close  ques- 
tion; we  could  have  as  easily  taken  the 
plunge  and  it  was  tempting  to  do  so. 
But  what  would  have  happened  then? 
The  traveling  public  would  have  been 
greatly  inconvenienced,  our  airlines 
would  have  incurred  additional  costs 
from  rerouting  flights,  and  our  foreign 
commerce  would  have  been  affected. 
This  situation  could  not  have  been  al- 
lowed to  continue  indefinitely.  Both 
governments  would  have  resumed 
negotiations  and  faced  the  same  issues, 
and  it  is  unrealistic  to  assume  that 
either  government  would  have  capitu- 
lated to  the  other. 

The  new  U.S. -U.K.   Air  Services 


Agreement  has  been  given  the  short- 
hand of  Bermuda  II  which  implies  that, 
since  Bermuda  I  became  the  standard 
for  other  agreements,  so  should  Ber- 
muda II  become  the  new  standard.  This 
is  unfortunate  and  misleading.  In  1946 
the  Bermuda  agreement  was  a 
precedent-setting  event  because  it  was 
the  first  major  postwar  agreement  and 
it  was  concluded  with  a  country  whose 
overseas  territories  made  it,  by  any 
test,  the  most  important  link  in  the 
U.S.  international  transportation  sys- 
tem. Thirty  years  later,  this  is  no 
longer  true.  The  new  U.S. -U.K. 
agreement  is  now  merely  one  of  almost 
60  U.S.  agreements  and  the  United 
Kingdom  no  longer  has  extensive  over- 
seas territories  where  we  need  aviation 
rights. 

It  is  often  part  of  the  bargaining 
process  for  one  country  to  demand 
rights  comparable  to  those  given 
another  country  where  this  tactic  hap- 
pens to  suit  a  country's  interest.  I  am 
not  concerned  that  some  foreign  coun- 
tries are  asking  for  a  Bermuda  Il-type 
agreement. 

•  First,  they  will  want  to  have  it 
both  ways  by  demanding  that  we  ac- 
cord them  the  same  treatment  as  the 
British  got  only  in  areas  which  are  to 
their  advantage  while  seeking  to  be 
more  restrictive  than  Bermuda  II  in 
other  areas. 

•  Secondly,  we  are  not  about  to  ac- 
cept the  most-favored-nation  principle 
in  exchanging  aviation  rights  any  more 
than  other  countries  do. 

•  And  thirdly,  the  U.S. -U.K.  market 
and  air  transport  structure  has  its  own 
characteristics  which  are  not  necessar- 
ily applicable  elsewhere. 

The  central  question  remains.  Does 
the  new  agreement  with  the  United 
Kingdom  adequately  protect  competi- 
tion and  consumer  interests  or  is  it  an 
aberration  inconsistent  with  our 
policies?  I  believe  that,  when  viewed  in 
light  of  a  hardheaded  appraisal  of  the 
realities  and  the  alternatives,  it  does 
adequately — and  I  stress  the  word 
"adequately" — protect  our  interests. 
At  the  same  time,  we  have  developed 
some  new  insights  which  will  stand  us 
in  good  stead  for  the  future.  The  most 
significant  of  these  is  that  we  are  deal- 
ing with  a  total  international  air  trans- 
portation system  which  includes  both 
scheduled  and  charter  air  services.  We 
should,  and  we  will,  insist  on  negotiat- 
ing to  increase  the  opportunities  in  both 
areas  of  transportation  in  package 
agreements.  Achievement  of  this  objec- 
tive is  all  the  more  important  now  be- 
cause of  the  impact  which  the  recently 
introduced  deep  discount  air  fares  may 


Department  of  State  Bull 

have  on  the  viability  of  charter 
services. 

We  also  intend  to  focus  our  attend 
on  opportunities  to  expand  intei 
tional  air  services  to  more  U.S.  ci 
and  communities,  including  services 
foreign  airlines,  if  we  can  obtain  c 
cessions  in  return  which  liberalize 
air  transportation  environment  in  s 
areas  as  low  air  fares  and  removai 
capacity  controls.  As  has  been  a 
stated,  we  want  to  trade  opportunil 
not  restrictions.  These  approaches  ! 
focus  on  particular  elements  more  1 
they  have  in  the  past,  but  the  cat 
theme  of  a  liberal,  competiti 
oriented  U.S.  policy  is  not  fundan 
tally  different  today  than  it  was 
years  ago.  We  face  formidable  fort 
opposition  to  these  policies,  as  we  I 
in  the  past.  However,  I  am  confi< 
that  through  determination  and  pep 
sion  and  by  offering  real  benefit 
foreign  countries,  we  can  achievp 
increasingly  better  international  ai 
tion  system  which  serves  the  best  ii' 
ests  of  the  public,  of  our  foreign  c 
merce,  and  of  our  airline  compa 
and  workers. 


'  Statement  made  before  the  SubcommitU 
Aviation  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Comin 
Science,  and  Transportation  on  Dec.  1,  197'^ 
Katz  is  Assistant  Secretary  for  Economii 
Business  Affairs. 


Current  Actiov 


MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention  on  international  civil  aviation 
at  Chicago  December  7,   1944.  Entcrec 
force  April  4,  1947.  TIAS  1591. 
Adherence   deposited:    Guinea-Bi' 
December  15,  1977. 

Protocol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the  ci 
tion  on   international  civil   aviation  ( 
1591).   Done  at  Rome  September   15, 
Entered  into  force  September  11.  1975. 
8162. 

Ralificalions  deposited:  Lebanon,  Jul; 
1977;  Turkey,  September  14.  1977. 

Convention  on  offenses  and  certain  othe^j 
committed  on  board  aircraft.  Done  at  1 
September  14,  1963.  Entered  into  forc^ 
ccmber  4.  1969.  TIAS  6768 
Accessions  deposited:  Mauritania,  Jum 
1977;  Zaire.  July  20,  1977. 

Protocol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the  co 
tion  on  international  civil  aviation  ( 
1591).  Done  at  Vienna  July  7,  1971  Er 
into  force  December  19.  1974.  TIAS  SO' 


iSiary  1978 

iificalions  deposited:  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany.  September  16.  1977;  Jamaica. 
September  9.   1977;  Turkey.  September  14, 

Kol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the  conven- 
I  n   on   international   civil   aviation   (TIAS 

'■III    Done  at  Montreal  October  16,  1974." 
iiiiications  deposited:  Ecuador,  October  25, 

,1977;  Indonesia,  November  18.  1977, 

Doms 

ion  concerning  the  international  union 

,.iL  publication  of  customs  tariffs,  regula- 

tns  lor  the  execution  of  the  convention,  and 

tal  declarations.   Done  at  Brussels  July  5, 

L)(i     Entered  into  force  April    1,    1891. 

\4. 

nation  of  denunciation  deposited: 
;ruguay.  May  20,  1977;  effective  April  1, 
QS2. 

-  convention  regarding  E.C.S.  carnets 

.,'mmercial  samples,  with  annex  and  pro- 

i  ol  of  signature.  Done  at  Brussels  March  1, 

id    Entered  into  force  October  3,  1957;  for 

1   United  States  March  3,  1969.  TIAS  6632. 

/  lification  of  denudation  deposited:  Nether- 

ands.  October  28,    1977;  effective  Janu- 

ry  28,  1978. 

1  ice 

;;  ment  establishing  the  International  Fund 
1  Agricultural  Development.  Done  at  Rome 
.  e  13,  1976.  Entered  into  force  November 

1977. 
I  ifuations  deposited:  Ghana,  December  5, 
977;  Peru,  December  6,  1977;  Italy,  De- 
ember  10,  1977;  Austria,  France,  Iran,  Su- 
lan,  Yugoslavia,  December  12,  1977;  Hon- 
luras,  Iraq,  December  13,  1977. 
/  essions  deposited:  Comoros,  Gambia, 
iuyana,  Lesotho,  Malawi,  Niger,  Qatar, 
amoa,  Vietnam,  Yemen  (Aden),  De- 
ember  13,  1977. 

o  and  Agriculture  Organization 

0  titution  of  the  Food  and  Agriculture  Or- 

I  nzation  of  the  United  Nations.   Signed  at 

I  ebec  October  16,  1945.  Entered  into  force 

Mober  16,  1945.  TIAS  1554. 

.'  natures:  Angola,  Comoros,  Democratic 

'copies  Republic  of  Korea,   Djibouti, 

viozambique,   Namibia,   Sao  Tome  and 

'rincipe,  and  Seychelles.   November   14. 

1977. 

o   Lines 

ni  national  convention  on  load  lines,    1966. 

ne  at  London  April  5,   1966.  Entered  into 

:e  July  21,  1968.  TIAS  6331,  6629,  6720. 

ession  deposited:    Honduras,   November 

16,  1977. 

flitime  Matters 

ention  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
nsultative  Organization.  Done  at  Geneva 
irch  6,  1948.  Entered  into  force  March  17, 
.^8,  TIAS  4044. 

leptance  deposited:   Guinea-Bissau,    De- 
ember  6,  1977. 

ndments  to  the  convention  of  March  6, 
48,  as  amended,  on  the  Intergovernmental 


Maritime  Consultative  Organization  (TIAS 
4044,  6285,  6490).  Adopted  at  London  Oc- 
tober 17,  1974.  Enters  into  force  April  1, 
1978.  TIAS  8606. 

Acceptances  deposited:  Gabon,  November  15, 
1977;  Guinea-Bissau,  December  6,  1977. 

Nuclear  Weapons-Nonproliferation 

Treaty  on  the  nonproliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons.  Done  at  Washington,  London,  and 
Moscow  July  I,  1968.  Entered  into  force 
March  5,  1970.  TIAS  6839. 
Accession  deposited:  Portugal,  December  15, 
1977. 

Oil  Pollution 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for 
the  prevention  of  pollution  of  the  sea  by  oil, 
1954,  as  amended  (TIAS  4900,  6109). 
Adopted  at  London  October  21.  1969.  Enters 
into  force  January  20,  1978.  TIAS  8505. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Chile.  November  2, 
1977. 

Patients 

Patent  cooperation  treaty,   with  regulations. 

Done  at  Washington  June   19,   1970.  Enters 

into  force  January  24,  1978. 

Proclaimed  by  the  President:  December  14, 
1977  (with  declarations). 

Ratification  deposited:  France  (with  declara- 
tions),^ November  25,  1977. 

Red  Cross 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions  of 
12  August  1949,  and  relating  to  the  protection 
of  victims  of  international  armed  conflicts 
(Protocol  I),  with  annexes.  Adopted  at  Geneva 
June  8,  1977.  Open  for  signature  at  Bern  De- 
cember 12,  1977,  to  December  12,  1978.  En- 
ters into  force  6  months  after  two  instruments 
of  ratification  or  accession  have  been  depos- 
ited. 
Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions  of 
12  August  1949,  and  relating  to  the  protection 
of  victims  of  noninternational  armed  conflicts 
(Protocol  II).   Adopted  at  Geneva  June  8. 
1977.  Open  for  signature  at  Bern  December 
12.  1977  to  December  12,   1978.  Enters  into 
force  6  months  after  two  instruments  of  ratifi- 
cation or  accession  have  been  deposited. 
Signatures:     Austria,  Belgium,  Byelorussian 
Soviet  Socialist  Republic,  Canada,  Chile, 
Denmark,  Ecuador,  Egypt,  El  Salvador, 
Finland,   German  Democratic  Republic, 
Ghana,  Guatemala,  Holy  See,  Honduras, 
Hungary,  Iceland,  Iran,  Ireland,  Italy.  Ivory 
Coast,  Jordan,  Liechtenstein,  Luxembourg, 
Mongolia,        Morocco,        Netherlands. 
Nicaragua,   Norway,   Pakistan,   Panama. 
Peru.    Philippines,     Poland.    Portugal. 
Senegal.   Sweden,  Switzerland.  Trinidad 
and  Tobago.  Tunisia,   Ukrainian  Soviet 
Socialist    Republic.    Union    of    Soviet 
Socialist   Republics.   United   Kingdom, 
United  States,   Vietnam,   Yugoslavia.  De- 
cember 12.  1977. 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at 


61 


sea.    1974,   with  annex.   Done  at  London 

November  1,  1974.' 

Ratifications  deposited:   Liberia.  November 

14,    1977;  United  Kingdom,   October  7, 

1977. 

Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement,  1977.  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  Geneva  October  7.  1977.  Open 
for  signature  at  U.  N.  Headquarters  October 
28  until  December  31.  1977.  Enters  into  force 
January  1.  1978.  provided  that  certain  condi- 
tions have  been  met. 

Signatures:  Philippines.  November  18.  1977; 
Panama.  November  29.  1977;  Mauritius. 
November  30.  1977;  Guatemala.  Madagas- 
car, December  1,  1977;  Honduras, 
Paraguay.  December  7,  1977;  Argentina, 
December  8,  1977;  United  States,  De- 
cember 9,  1977;  Brazil,  December  13, 
1977. 
Notification  of  provisional  application  depos- 
ited: Argentina,  December  8,  1977;  Brazil, 
December  13,  1977;  Guatemala,  Madagas- 
car, December  1,  1977;  Panama,  November 
29,  1977. 

Telecommunications 

International  telecommunication  convention, 
with  annexes  and  protocols.  Done  at  Malaga- 
Torremolinos  October  25,  1973.  Entered  into 
force  January  1,  1975;  for  the  United  States 
April  7,  1976.  TIAS  8572. 
Ratification  deposited:  Pakistan,  September  26, 

1977. 
Partial  revision  of  the  radio  regulations,  Geneva, 
1959,  as  amended  (TIAS  4893,  5603,  6332, 
6590,  7435),  to  establish  a  new  frequency  al- 
lotment plan  for  high-frequency  radio- 
telephone coast  stations,  with  annexes  and 
final  protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  June  8,  1974. 
Entered  into  force  January  1,  1976;  for  the 
United  States  April  21,  1976.  TIAS  8599. 
Notification  of  approval:  Yugoslavia,  October 

6.  1977. 

World  Heritage 

Convention  concerning  the  protection  of  the 
world  cultural  and  natural  heritage.  Done  at 
Paris  November  23,  1972.  Entered  into  force 
December  17,  1975.  TIAS  8226. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Brazil  (with  declara- 
tion). September  I.  1977. 

World  Meteorological  Organization 

Convention  of  the  World  Meteorological  Or- 
ganization. Done  at  Washington  October  11, 
1947.  Entered  into  force  March  23,  1950. 
TIAS  2052. 

Accession  deposited:   Guinea-Bissau,   De- 
cember 15,  1977. 


BILATERAL 

Afghanistan 

Project  grant  agreement  relating  to  Central 
Helmand  drainage  (phase  II).  Signed  at 
Kabul  August  29.  1977.  Entered  into  force 
August  29,  1977. 


62 


Agreement  concerning  the  prohibition  of  opium 
poppy  cultivation  in  the  project  area  of  the 
Central  Helmand  drainage  project  (phase  II). 
Signed  at  Kabul  August  29.  1977.  Entered 
into  force  August  29.  1977. 

Agreement  concerning  the  prohibition  ot  opium 
poppy  cultivation  in  the  project  area  of  the 
integrated  wheat  development  project. 
Signed  at  Kabul  September  29.  1977.  En- 
tered into  force  September  29,  1977. 

Cuba 

Maritime  boundary  agreement.  Signed  at  Wash- 
ington December  16.  1977.  Enters  into  force 
provisionally  January  1,  1978;  definitively 
on  the  date  of  exchange  of  instruments  of 
ratification. 

Haiti 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  March 
22  and  23,  1976,  as  amended,  relating  to 
trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber 
textiles  and  textile  products,  with  annexes. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 
November  23,  1977.  Entered  into  force 
November  23,  1977. 

Turkey 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  July  8, 


Department  of  State  Bull  i 


1976,  (TIAS  8371)  on  procedures  for  mutual 
assistance  in  the  administration  of  justice  in 
connection  with  the  Lockheed  Aircraft  Cor- 
poration and  the  McDonnell  Douglas  Corpo- 
ration matters.  Effected  by  exchange  of  let- 
ters at  Washington  December  6,  1977.  En- 
tered into  force  December  6,  1977;  effective 
July  8,  1977 

Yugoslavia 

Air  transport  agreement,  with  memorandum  of 
understandings.  Signed  at  Washington  De- 
cember 15.  1977.  Entered  into  force  provi- 
sionally December  15.  1977;  definitively  on 
the  date  of  an  exchange  of  notes  indicating 
that  the  agreement  has  been  approved  by  the 
parties  in  accordance  with  their  constitu- 
tional requirements. 

Agreement  amending  the  nonscheduled  air 
service  agreement  of  September  27.  1973 
(TIAS  7819).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Washington  December  15.  1977.  Entered 
into  force  December  15,  1977.  D 


'  Not  i  n  force . 

-  Applicable  to  the  territory  of  the  French  Re- 
public, including  the  Overseas  Departments  and 
Territories. 


PRE!§»!$  RELEASES: 

Department  of  State 


No. 

Dale 

554 

12/12 

555 

12/12 

556 

12/12 

557 

12/12 

December  12-January  6 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations.  Department  of  State,      *562       12/12 
Washington,  DC.  20520. 

*563       12/13 
Subject 

Vance,  Sadat:  news  confer- 
ence, Cairo,  Dec.  10.  *564       12/13 

Vance:   departure  remarks, 
Cairo.  Dec.  10.  *565       12/13 

Vance:   arrival   statement, 
Tel  Aviv.  Dec.  10.  566       12/13 

Vance:   remarks  following 
first  meeting  with  Prime      '567       12/13 
Minister  Begin,  Jerusa- 
lem, Dec.  10.  *568       12/14 

Vance.  Begin:  exchange  of 
toasts,  Jerusalem,  Dec.  11.         *  569       12/14 

Vance,  Begin:  news  confer- 
ence. Jerusalem.  Dec.  11.         570       12/15 

Shipping  Coordinating 
Committee  (SCO,  Sub- 
committee on  Safety  of  *571  12/15 
Life  at  Sea  (SOLAS), 
working  group  on 
radiocommunications .  *572  12/15 
Jan.  10. 

see,    SOLAS,    working 


*558 

559 

*560 


12/12 
12/12 
12/12 


*56I       12/12 


group  on  international 
multimodal  transport  and 
containers.  Feb.  1 . 

U.S.,  Haiti  amend  textile 
agreement. 

Vance,  Dayan:  remarks  to 
the  press,  Ben  Gurion 
Airport,  Dec.  12. 

Vance:  arrival  statement, 
Amman,  Dec.  12. 

Vance:  departure  statement, 
Amman. 

Vance:  press  conference, 
Beirut. 

Vance:  arrival  statement, 
Damascus. 

Vance:  remarks  to  press. 
Damascus.  Dec.  13. 

Vance:  departure  state- 
ment, Dama.scus. 

U.S. -Hungarian  joint  com- 
munique on  the  return  of 
the  Crown  of  St.  Stephen. 

National  Women's  Confer- 
ence, Washington,  D.C., 
Dec.  15. 

sec  SOLAS,  working 
group  on  standards  of 
training  and   watchkeep- 


*573  12/15 

574  12/15 

575  12/15 

*576  12/16 

577  12/16 

*578  12/19 

*579  12/20 

*580  12/20 

t581  12/20 

*582  12/21 

*583  12/21 

*584  12/22 

*585  12/27 


586  12/31 

*1  1/3 

*2  1/4 

*3  1/5 

*4  1/6 

*5  1/6 


t 


ing,  Jan.  12  and  Jan.  . 
Study  group  5  of  the  I 
National  Committee 
the  International  Rs 
Consultative  Commit 
Jan.   12. 

Vance:  departure  statem,, 
Riyadh 

Atherton:  remarks  at  a 
ing  session  of  the  C 
preparatory  meeting 
the  Geneva  peace  coi 
ence.  Dec.  14. 

U.S..  Yugoslavia  Mgn 
transport  agreement 

Mondale,  Vance:  rem 
upon  Secretary's  arriv 
Andrews  Air  Force  K 
Dec.   15. 

U.S.    Advisory  Conim  t 
on  Folk  Music  and  J 
Jan.  17. 

U.S.,  Cuba  sign  boun  J 
agreement.  Dec.  16 

U.S..  USSR.  exch.|| 
views  on  limitation  o  I- 
ternational  arms  trade 

U.S..   Mexico  initial 
aviation  agreements 

Advisory  Committee  i 
Transnational  Enterpi  fc 
Jan.  18.  i 

Study  Group  9  of  the    i 
Organization  for  the  1  : 
national   Radio  Cons 
tive  Committee,  Jan. 

U.S.,   Republic  of  C 
sign  interim  textile  a»| 
ment,  Dec.  16. 

Study  Group  1  of  the 
National  Committee  t 
International  Teleg 
and  Telephone  Con.s  )■ 
tive  Committee  ) 
24-25. 

Release  of  political  pr  i- 
ers. 

U.S..  Thailand  amend  i 
tile  agreement.  Oci    ( 

U.S..  Korea  sign  tc  i( 
agreement,  Dec.  2 ' 

see,  SOLAS,  w.r 

group    on    life     ^.i 
appliances.  Jan.  M' 

William  L.  Slayton  swc  '• 
as  Deputy  Assistant  S  < 
tary  for  Foreign  Buil<  > 
Operations   (biogra 
data). 

Glen   O.    Robinson   n; '^ 
chairman    of   the    1' 
delegation   to   the 
World   AdminiMtj 
Radio  Conference  i 
graphic  data). 


*  Not  printed 

t  Held  for  a  later  edition  of  the  Bulletin 


I]\DEX 


JARY  1978 
78,  NO.  2010 

Control 

'erview  of  U.S. -Soviet  Relations 

Iman) 

and  the  Test  Ban — Cause  for  Op- 

>m  (Warnke) 

iry  Vance  Attends  NATO  Ministe- 
iaMeeting  in  Brussels  (Vance,  final 

0  nunique) 

ion  Interview  (Carter)    


jtltional  Civil  Aviation  Safety  (Ken- 

.  Wolff,  resolution)    

K-  Aviation  Agreement  (Katz)    . 

■fidesh.  Release  of  Political  Prison- 


1^  ia.  U.S.,  Bulgaria  Lift  Travel  Re- 
ritions  on  Diplomats  (Department 
t;  ment) 

n  ?ss.  Crown  of  St.  Stephen  (Kaiser, 
■iL'tz.  Puja.  joint  communique) 

pU.  Secretary  Vance  Attends  NATO 
.1  isterial  Meeting  in  Brussels 
\  ce.  final  communique) 

v<  ping  Countries 

If  ng  A  Basic  Human  Right  (Young) 
:  nited  Slates  and  the  Third  World 
Le) 

01  Tiics 

n  t  Practices,  Investment  Disclosure 

C  ter) 

e  nited  States  and  the  Third  World 

Le) 

S  balance  of  Trade  and  Payments 
C  ter)  

y 

<i  int  Secretary  Atherton  Interviewed 

H  le  "Today"  Show 

ir  Preparatory  Meeting  Opens  (Ather- 

.0   

-■t  jry  Vance's  News  Conference  of 

0  ;mber  6  

si  jf  Secretary   Vance  (Begin.  Mon- 

1;  ,  Sadat,  Sa'ud,  Vance)   

lely.  Television  Interview  (Carter)    .  , 

re 
^•nt  Carter's  News  Conference  of 

u  ember  15  (excerpts) 

cary  Vance  Attends  NATO  Ministe- 
"i  Meeting  in  Brussels  (Vance,  final 

:■  munique) 

"^  )bserves  Human  Rights  Day  at  Bel- 

-  le  Conference  (Goldberg)    

ijid.  Letters  of  Credence  (Iloniemi)  . 

Aid  (foreign  relations  outline) 

l^ing  A  Basic  Human  Right  (Young) 

?n  Aid.  The  United  States  and  the 
^  'd  World  (Lake) 


1 

20 


53 
59 

39 


32 
31 

28 

33 

24 

27 
24 
27 

46 

47 

17 

40 
9 

12 


37 
30 

36 
33 

24 


France.  Letters  of  Credence  (Laboulaye)         30 

Human  Rights 

Bill  of  Rights   Day.   Human   Rights   Day 

and  Week  (proclamation) 38 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of 

December  15  (excerpts) 12 

Release  of  Political  Prisoners 39 

Television  Interview  (Carter)    9 

U.S.  Observes  Human  Rights  Day  at  Bel- 
grade Conference  (Goldberg)   37 

Hungary 

Crown  of  St.    Stephen  (Kaiser,   Nimetz, 

Puja.  joint  communique)   31 

Secretary   Vance's  News  Conference  of 

December  6  17 

Indonesia.  Release  of  Political  Prisoners         39 

Israel 

Assistant  Secretary  Atherton  Interviewed 

on  the  "Today"  Show 46 

Cairo  Preparatory  Meeting  Opens  (Ather- 
ton)            47 

Prime  Minister  Begin  Visits  U.S.  De- 
cember 14-19  (White  House  state- 
ments)           48 

Secretary   Vance's  News  Conference  of 

December  6  17 

Visit  of  Secretary  Vance  (Begin,  Mon- 
dale,  Sadat,  Sa'ud.  Vance)    40 

Jamaica.  Jamaican  Prime  Minister  Visits 

United  States  (White  House  statement)  58 

Jordan.  Visit  of  Secretary  Vance  (Begin, 

Mondale.  Sadat,  Sa'ud.  Vance)    40 

Korea.  Release  of  Political  Prisoners  ...         39 

Lebanon.  Visit  of  Secretary  Vance  (Be- 
gin, Mondale.  Sadat,  Sa'ud,  Vance)  .         40 

Middle  East 

Assistant  Secretary  Atherton  Interviewed 

on  the  "Today"  Show 46 

Cairo  Preparatory  Meeting  Opens  (Ather- 
ton)            47 

Chronology  of  Recent  Events 49 

Middle  East  Peace  Efforts  (Department 

statement) 49 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of 
December  15  (excerpts) 12 

Prime  Minister  Begin  Visits  U.S.  De- 
cember 14-19  (White  House  state- 
ments)           48 

Secretary  Vance  Attends  NATO  Ministe- 
rial Meeting  in  Brussels  (Vance,  final 
communique) 28 

Secretary   Vance's  News  Conference  of 

December  6  17 

Television  Interview  (Carter)   9 

North   Atlantic  Treaty   Organization. 

Secretary  Vance  Attends  NATO 
Ministerial  Meeting  in  Brussels 
(Vance,  final  communique) 28 

Pakistan.  Release  of  Political  Prisoners  .         39 

Panama.  Television  Interview  (Carter)  .  .  9 

Petroleum.   US.   Balance  of  Trade  and 

Payments  (Carter) 27 

Presidential  Documents 

Bill  of  Rights  Day,  Human  Rights  Day 

and  Week  (proclamation) 38 

Carter  Administration's  First- Year  Ac- 
complishments (White  House  sum- 
mary)           15 


Corrupt  Practices,  Investment  Disclosure  27 
News  Conference  of  December   15  (ex- 
cerpts)    12 

Television  Interview 9 

U.S.  Balance  of  Trade  and  Payments   ...  27 

Saudi  Arabia.  Visit  of  Secretary  Vance 
(Begin.  Mondale,  Sadat.  Sa'ud. 
Vance)    40 

South  Africa.  Secretary  Vance's  News 

Conference  of  December  6   17 

Southern   Rhodesia.   Secretary   Vance's 

News  Conference  of  December  6 17 

Space.  Outer  Space  Programs  (Benton)    .         56 

Syria.  Visit  of  Secretary  Vance  (Begin, 

Mondale,  Sadat.  Sa'ud,  Vance)    40 

Terrorism.    International   Civil   Aviation 

Safety  (Kennedy,  Wolff,  resolution)  .  .         53 

Trade.  U.S.  Balance  of  Trade  and  Pay- 
ments (Carter)  27 

Treaties 

Current  Actions 60 

U.S..  U.K.  Aviation  Agreement  (Katz)   .         59 

U.S.S.R. 

An  Overview  of  U.S. -Soviet  Relations 

(Shulman) 1 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of 

December  15  (excerpts) 12 

SALT  and  the  Test  Ban — Cause  for  Op- 
timism ( Warnke) 20 

Summit  Meetings    8 

USSR.— A  Profile 3 

U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  U.S.S.R.  (bio- 
graphic data)     5 

United   Kingdom.  US.  UK     Aviation 

Agreement  (Katz)   59 

United  Nations 

Fulfilling  A  Basic  Human  Right  (Young)  33 
International  Civil  Aviation  Safety  (Ken- 
nedy, Wolff,  resolution)    53 

Operational  Activities  (Whalen) 55 

Outer  Space  Programs  (Benton) 56 

U.S.     Approaches    and    Initiatives 

(Maynes) 50 

Name  Index 

Atherton.  Alfred  L  .  Jr    46,  47 

Begin,  Menahem 40 

Benton,  Marjorie  Craig  56 

Carter,  President   9,  12,  27,  38 

Goldberg,  Arthur  J 37 

Iloniemi,  Jaakko  Olavi 30 

Kaiser,  Philip  M 31 

Katz.  Julius  L   59 

Kennedy,  John  Clifford 53 

Laboulaye.  Francois  de  30 

Lake.  Anthony 24 

Maynes.  Charles  William   50 

Mondale,  Waller  F 40 

Nimetz,  Matthew    31 

Prince  Sa'ud  bin  Faisal   40 

Puja.  Frigyes 31 

Sadat,  Anwar  al- 40 

Shulman,  Marshall  D I 

Vance.  Secretary 17,  28,  40 

Warnke,  Paul  C 20 

Whalen,  Charles  W 55 

Wolff,  Lester  L 53 

Young,  Andrew 33 


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Departtnent 
of  State 


Fehruarti  WTH 

f  e  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  78  /  Number  2011 


#1 


/ 


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Panama  Canal  Treaties  /  56 


Departitivnt  of  State 

bulletin 


Volume  78  /  Number  2011  /  February  1978 


Cover  Photo; 
Warsaw  greeting. 


The  Department  of  State  Bul- 
letin, published  by  the  Bureau  of 
Pubhc  Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of 
U.S.  foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to 
provide  the  public,  the  Congress,  and 
government  agencies  with  information 
on  developments  in  U.S.  foreign  rela- 
tions and  the  work  of  the  Department 
of  State  and  the  Foreign  Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include 
major  addresses  and  news  conferences 
of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
State;  statements  made  before  congres- 
sional committees  by  the  Secretary 
and  other  senior  State  Department  of- 
ficials; special  features  and  articles  on 
international  affairs;  selected  press  re- 
leases issued  by  the  White  House,  the 
Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
other  agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party. 

The  Secretary  of  State  has  deter- 
mined that  the  publication  of  this  peri- 
odical is  necessary  in  the  transaction  of 
the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  Use  of  funds  for 
printing  this  periodical  has  been  ap- 
proved by  the  Director  of  the  Office 
of  Management  and  Budget  through 
January  31,  1981. 

NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication 
are  not  copyrighted  and  items  con- 
tained herein  may  be  reprinted.  Cita- 
tion of  the  Department  oi-  State 
Bulletin  as  the  source  will  be  appre- 
ciated. The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Litera- 
ture. 

For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402 

Price: 

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$18,00  (domestic)  $22.50  (foreign) 

Single  copy— 

$1.40  (domestic)  $1.80  (foreign) 


CYRUS  R.  VANCE 

Secretary  of  State 

HODDING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Aff 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 

Consulting  Editor 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

COLLEEN  SUSSMAN 
Assistant  Editor 


CO]\TE]\TS 


THE  PRESIDENT 

1  Visit  to  Europe,  South  Asia,  and  the  Middle  East 

20  State  of  the  Union 

21  News  Conference,  January  12 

22  War  Powers  Bill 

THE  SECRETARY 

23  Foreign  Policy  Decisions  for  1978 

ECONOMICS 

25  U.S.,  Japan  Trade  Agreement  (White  House  Statement) 

ENERGY 

26  Prospects  for  the  Next  Decade  (Richard  N.  Cooper) 

28  Discussion  Paper  on  Energy 

EUROPE 

29  Crown  of  St.  Stephen  (Secretary  Vance) 

30  Secretary  Vance  Visits  Turkey  and  Greece 

31  Sixth  Report  on  Cyprus  (Message  from  President  Carter) 

32  Italy  (Department  Statement) 

HUMAN  RIGHTS 

32  Cambodia  (Warren  Christopher) 

MIDDLE  EAST 

33  Secretary  Vance  Visits  Israel  and  Egypt,  January  16-22 
37      Chronology  of  Recent  Events 

OCEANS 

39      Law  of  the  Sea  Conference  (Elliot  L.  Richardson) 
42      Visions  of  the  Future  (Patsy  T.  Mink) 

44  Foreign  Fishery  Allocations 

POPULATION 

45  World  Trends  (Marshall  Green) 

UNITED  NATIONS 

48      Benefits  from  the  U.N.  Agencies  (Charles  William  Maynes) 
52      Assessment  of  the  32d  U.N.  General  Assembly  (Andrew  Young) 

55  Summary  of  U.S.  Statements 

WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

56  Panama  Canal  Treaties  (Secretary  Vance,  Elliot  L.  Richardson) 
59      Letters  of  Credence  (El  Salvador,  Grenada,  Guatemala) 

TREATIES 

59  U.S.,  Mexico  Initial  Aviation  Agreements 

60  Current  Actions  ,, 

^  -  Library 

61  PRESSRELEASES  Si!per;r...;va.r.l  of  Dccumsats 


INDEX 


•3  0 


^201978 

ORY 


""^Hi^ 


"^^  / 


^ 


With  President  Giscard  d' Eslainv  on  Normandv  beachhead 


.:i^ruary  1978 


THE  PREIi^IDEI^T:  Visit  to  Europe^  South  Asla^ 

and  the  Middle  East 


President  Carter  left  Washington  December  29,  1977,  on  a  trip  to  Poland, 
jn,  India,  Saudi  Arabia,  Egypt,  France,  and  Belgium.  He  returned  on  January 
1978. 

Following  are  remarks  by  President  Carter  made  on  various  occasions  during 
z  trip — including  his  news  conference  in  Warsaw  and  his  addresses  in  New 
?lhi  and  Paris — as  well  as  the  texts  of  the  joint  U .S. -Poland  communique  and 
t?  Delhi  Declaration . ' 


lEPARTURE,  THE  WHITE 
lOUSE,  DEC.  29^ 

I  depart  today  on  a  journey  that  re- 

Icts  both  the  diversity  of  the  world 

<;  live  in  and  also  our  own  nation's 

jility  and  desire  to  deal  creatively  and 

(HStructively  with  that  diversity. 

It's  a  rapidly  changing  world,  a 

')rld  in  which  the  old  ideological 

hels  have  less  meaning  than  ever,  in 

•lich  the  universal  desire  for  freedom 

id  for  a  better  life  is  being  expressed 

1  )re  strongly  and  in  more  ways  than 

(er  before,  a  world  in  which  political 

i'akening,  economic   independence, 

d   technological   progress   have 

i;ated  new  demands  on  the  foreign 

I  licy  of  our  people. 

The  variety  of  places  that  we  will 

iit  over  the  next  9  days  is  symbolic 

I   the  breadth  and  the  variety  of 

.nerican  interest  in  this  new  world. 

In  France  and  in  Western  Europe,  we 

•  11  reaffirm  the  historic  bonds  and  our 

immon  values,  and  we  will  explore 

lys  to  meet  the  common  problems  of 

;  industrial  democracies. 

In  Poland,  the  ancestral  home  of  mil- 

.m%  of  Americans,  we  will  nourish  the 

iproving  relationships  between  the 

lited  States  and  the  peoples  of  East- 

I  n  Europe . 

In  Iran  and  in  Saudi  Arabia,  we  will 
i'scuss  key  economic  relationships  and 
.ess  for  a  continuation  of  the  dramatic 
T  ogress  that  is  being  made  in  bringing 

ace  to  the  Middle  East. 
;  In  India,  which  is  the  largest  democ- 
;  cy  on  Earth,  we  will  seek  new  paths 
;  '  cooperation  and  communication  be- 
■  'een  the  developing  nations  of  the 
odd  and  the  industrial  north. 
And  in  all  these  places,  we  will  be 
affirming  our  dedication  to  peace  and 
ir  support  of  justice  and  of  human 
'ghts. 

'  It  is  a  changing  world,  a  different 
orld,  and,  I  believe,  that  it's  also  a 
fferent  America  whose  message  we 
ill  carry,  an  America  more  confident 
id  more  united,  at  peace  with  other 
itions  and  also  at  peace  with  itself,  an 

ui 


America  which  is  ready  and  able  to 
cooperate  wherever  possible  and  to 
compete  when  necessary. 

After  a  long  period  of  doubt  and 
turmoil  here,  we  are  finding  our  way 
back  to  the  values  that  made  us  a  great 
nation.  And  in  this  new  spirit  we  are 
eager  to  work  with  all  countries  and  all 
peoples  in  building  the  kind  of  world 
and  the  kind  of  world  community  that 
serves  the  individual  and  common 
needs  of  all. 

We  undertake  this  trip  to  express  our 
own  views  clearly  and  proudly  but  also 
to  learn  and  to  understand  the  opinions 
and  the  desires  of  others.  We  will  try  to 
represent  our  nation  and  our  people 
well,  and  I'll  take  the  good  will  of 
America  everywhere  we  go. 


ARRIVAL,  WARSAW, 
DEC.  29^ 


First  Secretary  Gierek 

On  behalf  of  the  highest  authorities 
of  the  Polish  People's  Republic,  in  the 
name  of  our  people,  I  greet  you  cor- 
dially, Mr.  President,  on  the  Polish 
soil. 

We  are  happy  to  be  able  to  play  host 
to  you  and  Mrs.  Carter  as  well  as  to 
persons  accompanying  you.  We  are 
welcoming  and  greeting  you,  Mr. 
President,  as  the  highest  representative 
of  the  great  American  people  for  which 
we  entertain  our  sentiments  of 
friendship. 

History  has  linked  our  two  nations 
by  manifold  ties.  They  were  molded  by 
the  great  sons  of  the  Polish  people 
through  their  participation  in  the  strug- 
gle for  American  independence.  They 
were  shaped  by  the  scores  of  Polish 
emigrants  who  have  contributed  their 
significant  and  valuable  share  to  the 
development  and  might  of  the  United 
States.  They  have  been  further 
strengthened  in  our  joint  strife  for  the 
freedom  of  all  peoples  within  the  great 
anti-Nazi  coalition. 

Our  desire  is  to  cultivate  those  tradi- 


tions in  the  present-day  peaceful  and 
friendly  Polish- American  cooperation. 

We  trust  your  visit  will  contribute  to 
its  further  expansion,  beneficial  to  our 
peoples  and  promoting  the  dearest 
cause  to  all  nations,  the  cause  of  peace. 

You  are  arriving  in  Poland,  Mr. 
President,  at  a  time  when  the  process 
of  international  detente — so  important 
as  it  is  to  all  mankind  and  the  world  at 
large — has  been  again  rejuvenated  by 
the  constructive  dialogue  of  states  and 
the  expectations  of  nations. 

You  no  doubt  understand,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, that  to  the  people  of  Poland, 
which  has  so  dreadfully  experienced 
the  atrocities  of  war,  security  is  the  su- 
preme value,  while  life  and  peace  is  the 
fundamental  right. 

We  view  your  present  visit,  Mr. 
President,  as  a  reaffirmation  of  the 
friendly  feelings  of  the  American 
people  toward  Poland  and  an  expres- 
sion of  the  interest  in  our  active  peace- 
ful policies.  We  see  in  it,  too,  a  mani- 
festation of  your  personal  involvement 
in  the  further  expansion  of  Polish- 
American  cooperation  in  cultivating  the 
traditional  friendship  between  our 
nations. 

We  are  glad,  indeed,  that  we  shall  be 
able  to  acquaint  you  with  the  record  of 
accomplishment  of  Socialist  Poland, 
with  its  plans  and  aspirations  with  all 
that  at  a  price  of  a  relentless  effort, 
painstaking  and  self-sacrificing  labors 
our  nation  has  built  on  the  ruins  and 
ashes. 

Ours  is  the  desire  that  your  visit  to 
Poland  serve  actions  which  link  our 
peoples  together  and  that  it  may  en- 
grave well  in  the  good  memories  of 
yourself,  Mr.  President,  Mrs.  Carter, 
and  the  members  of  your  party. 

Welcome  on  the  Polish  soil,  Mr. 
President,  in  the  spirit  of  the  Polish 
hospitality. 


President  Carter 

We  are  delighted  to  be  in  your  great 
country.  When  I  left  the  United  States 
this  morning,  I  told  the  people  of  my 
nation  that  this  journey  reflects  the  di- 
versity of  a  rapidly  changing  world.  It 
is  a  world  in  which  old  ideological 
labels  have  lost  their  meaning  and  in 
which  the  basic  goals  of  friendship, 
world  peace,  justice,  human  rights,  and 
individual  freedom  loom  more  impor- 
tant than  ever. 

I  am  proud  to  begin  this  journey  in 


Poland — friend  of  the  United  States 
since  the  time  our  nation  was  founded. 
Poland  is  the  ancestral  home  of  more 
than  6  million  Americans,  partner  in  a 
common  effort  against  war  and  depri- 
vation. 

Relations  are  changing  between 
North  and  South,  between  East  and 
West.  But  the  ties  between  Poland  and 
the  United  States  are  ancient  and 
strong. 

Not  far  from  our  home  in  the  State  of 
Georgia,  a  great  patriot  of  both  our  na- 
tions, Casimir  Pulaski,  was  mortally 
wounded  while  leading  a  cavalry  legion 
in  the  fight  for  American  independ- 
ence. The  home  of  my  son's  wife  is 
Pulaski  County,  Georgia,  named  for 
this  hero  from  Poland. 

Also,  for  his  military  skill  and  brav- 
ery, Thaddeus  Kosciuszko  won  the  re- 
spect of  our  first  President,  George 
Washington,  during  wartime.  And  for 
his  commitment  to  freedom  and  justice, 
he  won  the  admiration  of  our  third 
President,  Thomas  Jefferson,  in  time  of 
peace. 

These  brave  men  fought  alongside 
Americans  in  the  era  which  produced 
three  of  the  great  documents  in  the 
struggle  for  human  rights.  One  was  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  from 
America.  The  second  was  the  Declara- 
tion of  the  Rights  of  Man  from  France. 
And  the  third  was  the  Polish  Constitu- 
tion of  May  3,  1791. 

Our  shared  experience  in  battle  has 
also  taught  us  the  paramount  impor- 
tance of  preventing  war,  which  has 
brought  devastation  to  Poland  twice  in 
this  century.  At  the  end  of  World  War  I, 
a  great  American,  Herbert  Floover, 
came  to  Poland  to  help  you  ease  the 


suffering  of  war  and  to  observe  the 
reestablishment  of  an  independent  Po- 
land. Circumstances  were  different  and 
the  struggle  was  long,  but  Hoover  said, 
and  I  quote,  "'If  history  teaches  us  any- 
thing, it  is  that  from  the  unquenchable 
vitality  of  the  Polish  race,  Poland  will 
rise  again  from  these  ashes.""  And  his 
prediction  came  true. 

I  have  come  not  only  to  express  our 
own  views  to  the  people  of  Poland  but 
also  to  learn  your  opinions  and  to  un- 
derstand your  desires  for  the  future. 
Building  on  the  historical  ties  between 
us,  recognizing  the  new  and  changing 
realities  of  life,  I  look  forward  to 
strengthening  Polish-American  friend- 
ship on  my  visit  here  in  Warsaw. 

We  deeply  appreciate  the  warm  wel- 
come extended  to  us  tonight  by  First 
Secretary  Gierek  and  by  the  Polish 
people. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE,  WARSAW, 
DEC.  30* 

It's  a  great  honor  for  me  to  be  here 
in  Poland  to  reaffirm  and  to  strengthen 
the  historic  and  strong  ties  of  friend- 
ship and  mutual  purpose  which  exist 
between  our  two  countries.  I  have  had 
very  fruitful  discussions  with  First  Sec- 
retary Gierek  and  the  other  officials  of 
Poland  on  bilateral  questions,  on  ques- 
tions involving  NATO  and  the  Warsaw 
Pact  countries,  matters  relating  to  the 
Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 
(SALT),  mutual  and  balanced  force  re- 
ductions, and  general  commitments  to 
peace  in  the  future. 

This  morning  I  had  a  chance  to  visit 
memorials  to  the  brave  people  of  Po- 


Department  of  State  Bull 

land,  and  particularly  of  Warsaw 
doubt  that  there  is  any  nation  on  E; 
which  has  suffered  more  from  the  i 
ages  of  war.  In  the  Second  World  \ 
the  Nazis  killed  800,000  people 
Warsaw  alone  and  6  million  Poles.  I 
1  was  able  to  pay  homage  to  their  cc 
age  and  bravery. 

I  also  visited  the  Ghetto  Monumt 
a  memorial  to  Polish  Jews  who  sti 
alone  to  face  the  Nazis  but  who  ' 
forever  live  in  the  conscience  of 
world. 

This  afternoon  1  would  like  to 
swer  questions  from  the  reporters 
sembled  here.  There  were  a  few  v 
wanted   to  attend   who  were   not  \\ 
mitted  to  come.  Their  questions  wil 
answered  by  me  in  writing. 

Q  [in  Polish].  Poland  and  the 
tire  world  has  attached  great  imp 
tance  to  the  relations  between 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Unii 
Could  you  answer  what  is  your 
sessment  of  the  chance  for  a  pron 
conclusion  on  SALT  talks  andl 
other  discussions  on  strategic 


ITINERARY 


Dec    29-31 
Dec.  -Il-Jan.   1 
Jan.   1-3 
Jan.  3-4 
Jan.  4 
Jan.  4-6 
Jan.  6 


Warsaw,  Poland 
Tehran,  Iran 
New  Delhi,  India  * 
Riyadh.  .Saudi  Arabi 
Aswan.  Egypt 
Paris,  France** 
Brussels,  Belgium 
Washington,  D.C. 


*On  Jan.  3  President  and  Mr.s.  Carter  \ 
ited  the  farming  village  of  Daulatp 
Nasirabad,  which  was  officially  renan 
Carter-Poori  (Carter  Place)  in  honor  of  th 
visit. 

**On  Jan.  5  President  Carter  visit 
Noritiandy  Beach  and  Bayeux  and  attcnc 
an  evening  reception  at  the  Chateau 
Versailles. 


It 


.j||)ruary  1978 


,  and  how  in  this  respect  do  you 
ss  the  latest  pronouncement  by 
nid  Brezhnev  in  an  interview  for 
Pravda  Daily? 

L  In  the  last  few  months,  the  United 

tes  and  the  Soviet  Union  have  made 

at  progress  in  dealing  with  a  long 
of  important  issues,  the  most  im- 
jtant  of  which  is  to  control  the  de- 

lyment  of  strategic  nuclear  weapons, 
hope  to  conclude  the  SALT  II  talks 
year,  hopefully  in  the  spring.  We 

e  resolved  many  of  the  major  is- 
|i|s.   A  few  still  remain.   We  have 

ide  good  progress  in  recent  months. 

\t  the  same  time,  we  have  made 

gress  for  the  first  time  in  establish- 
principles  on  which  there  can  be  a 
cil  prohibition  against  all  tests  of  nu- 
:  if  explosives  in  the  future.  We've 
I  de  progress  on  prohibiting  addi- 
iial  military  buildup  in  the  Indian 
I;an,  recently  commenced  talks  to 
(  uce  the  sale  of  conventional 
Aipons  to  other  nations  in  the  world. 
'J  1  will  pursue  this  same  subject 
-  h  President  Giscard  [d'Estaing  of 

nee]  next  week. 

n  addition,  the  Soviets  and  we  are 
T^ing  progress  in  how  we  can  prevent 
I  use  in  the  future  of  chemical  and 
3  logical  warfare,  and  we  hope  that 
R  can  reinstigate  progress  in  the 
itual  and  balanced  force  reductions 
viich  have  been  stalemated  in  Vienna 
'"(  a  number  of  years.  So,  I  would  say 
:l  t  in  summary  I  am  very  encouraged 
a  he  new  progress  that  I  have  witnes- 
*  personally  among  our  negotiators. 

Vhen  [Soviet]  Foreign  Minister 
C)myko  was  in  Washington  recently, 
ii  1  few  hours  we  resolved  many  of  the 
tl'icult  issues.  Our  negotiators  are  at 
wrk  on  all  those  subjects  at  this  pres- 
s  time.  There  has  been  no  cessation 
0 effort.  And  I  believe  that  1978  will 
S'  a  resolution  of  many  of  these 
iiies. 

J.  Are  you  likely  to  go  to  Egypt 
Hit  Wednesday,  and  if  you  do,  will 
i  be  primarily  because  President 
$dat  has  urged  you  to  go,  or  for 
sne  other  purpose,  or  why? 

\.  1  have  a  standing  invitation  from 
f;sident  Sadat  to  visit  Egypt  that  he 
e  ended  to  me  on  his  trip  to  Washing- 
ti.  And  he's  reemphasized  it  several 
ties  since  that  date.  We  have  had  no 
licussions  with  President  Sadat  on 
lit  particular  visit  to  Egypt  while  I'm 
'  this  trip.  We  will  try  to  keep  our 
:iedule  flexible.  If  it's  mutually  con- 
':nient  and  desirable,  we  would  cer- 
'inly  consider  it.  But  we  have  no  plans 
;ithis  time  to  stop  in  Egypt  next  Wed- 
;isday  or  any  other  time  on  this  trip. 
jl  might  say  that  our  own  relations 

th  the  Arab  nations,  including,  cer- 

nly,  Egypt,  are  very  good  and  har- 


Firs!  news  conference  held  by  an  American  President  in  Eastern  Europe 


monious.  There  has  been  no  change  in 
our  own  position  relating  to  the  Middle 
Eastern  talks.  And  we  communicate 
almost  daily  with  the  Egyptian  and  Is- 
raeli leaders.  And  as  you  know,  I  will 
be  meeting  King  Hussein  [of  Jordan]  in 
Tehran  on  our  next  stop  on  this  trip. 

Q.  You  said  you  often  don't  intend 
and  don't  desire  to  dictate  the  terms 
of  a  Middle  East  settlement. 

A. Yes.  This  is  true. 

Q.  And  yet  President  Sadat  seems 
to  think  that  you  have  pulled  the  rug 
out  from  under  him  and  that  you 
are,  in  fact,  dictating  terms  when 
you  are  backing  an  Israeli  military 
presence  on  the  West  Bank  at  Gaza 
after  there  would  be  a  settlement. 

A.  We  don't  back  any  Israeli  mili- 
tary settlement  in  the  Gaza  Strip  or  on 
the  West  Bank.  We  favor,  as  you 
know,  a  Palestinian  homeland  or  entity 
there.  Our  own  preference  is  that  this 
entity  be  tied  in  to  Jordan  and  not  be  a 
separate  and  independent  nation.  That 
is  merely  an  expression  of  preference 
which  we  have  relayed  on  numerous 
occasions  to  the  Arab  leaders,  includ- 
ing President  Sadat  when  he  was  with 
me  in  Washington.  I've  expressed  the 
same  opinion  to  the  Israelis,  to  King 
Hussein,  and  to  President  Asad  [of 
Syria],  and  also  to  the  Saudi  Arabians. 

We  have  no  intention  of  attempting 
to  impose  a  settlement.  Any  agreement 
which  can  be  reached  between  Israel 
and  her  Arab  neighbors  would  be  ac- 
ceptable to  us.  We  are  in  a  posture  of 
expressing  opinions,  trying  to  promote 
intimate  and  direct  negotiations  and 


communications,  expediting  the  proc- 
ess when  it  seems  to  be  slow,  and  add- 
ing our  good  offices  whenever  re- 
quested. But  we  have  no  intention  or 
desire  to  impose  a  settlement. 

Q  [in  Polish].  Let  me  welcome  you 
not  only  as  the  President  of  the 
United  States  but  as  an  eminent 
American  Baptist.  I  am  a  Baptist 
myself.  I  am  preoccupied  with  edit- 
ing a  Baptist  magazine  in  Poland, 
and  I  would  like  to  express  my  glad- 
ness that  you  have  been  elected  to  the 
post  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  as  a  man,  as  a  believer  who  is 
not  ashamed  of  it  and  of  his  evangeli- 
cal convictions.  This  prompts  me  to 
wish  you  and  your  family  the  best  of 
the  very  best  in  1978  and  also  in  your 
activity  in  strengthening  peace  the 
world  over. 

And  now  over  to  our  question.  We 
all  know  that  you  are  a  practicing 
Christian,  as  every  Baptist  should 
be — as  every  good  Baptist  should  be. 
And  I  would  like  to  ask  whether  your 
religious  convictions  help  you  in 
executing  the  job  of  a  President  of 
such  a  big  country.  Can  you  quote  an 
example  in  how  the  evangelical  prin- 
ciples helped  you  in  solving  any  com- 
plicated problem? 

And  the  second  question,  we  the 
Polish  Baptists  live  in  an  extra- 
Catholic  country,  and  on  occasions 
we  are  discriminated  against.  As  a 
believer,  as  a  Baptist,  can  you  influ- 
ence the  change  of  a  situation? 

A.  As  you  know,  the  United  States 
believes  in  religious  freedom.  And  I'm 


Department  of  State  BuUe   W 


very  grateful  for  the  degree  of  religious 
freedom  that  also  exists  in  Poland. 

Dr.  Brzezinski,  my  national  security 
adviser,  and  my  wife,  Rosalynn,  had  a 
visit  with  Cardinal  Wyszynski  this 
morning  and  did  this  as  an  expression 
of  our  appreciation  for  the  degree  of 
freedom  to  worship  in  this  country. 

This  is  a  matter  of  conscience,  as  a 
Baptist  and  as  an  American  leader.  We 
believe  in  separation  of  church  and 
state,  that  there  should  be  no  unwar- 
ranted influence  on  the  church  or  reli- 
gion by  the  state,  and  vice  versa.  My 
own  religious  convictions  are  deep  and 
personal.  1  seek  divine  guidance  when  I 
make  a  difficult  decision  as  President 
and  also  am  supported,  of  course,  by  a 
common  purpose  which  binds  Chris- 
tians together  in  a  belief  in  the  human 
dignity  of  mankind  and  in  the  search 
for  worldwide  peace — recognizing,  of 
course,  that  those  who  don't  share  my 
faith  quite  often  have  the  same  desires 
and  hopes. 

My  own  constant  hope  is  that  all  na- 
tions would  give  maximum  freedom  of 
religion  and  freedom  of  expression  to 
their  people,  and  I  will  do  all  I  can 
within  the  bounds  of  propriety  to  bring 
that  hope  into  realization. 

Q.  During  those  Presidential  de- 
bates, in  a  celebrated  exchange. 
President  Ford  claimed  that  Eastern 
Europe  was  not  under  Soviet  domi- 
nation. And  you  replied,  "Tell  it  to 
the  Poles."  Well,  now  that  you're 
here,  is  it  your  view  that  this  domi- 
nation will  continue  almost  into  per- 


petuity, or  do  you  see  a  day  when  Po- 
land may  be  actually  free?  And  if  so, 
how  would  that  come  about? 

A.  This  is  obviously  a  decision  for 
the  Polish  leaders  and  the  Polish  people 
to  make.  Our  nation  is  committed  to 
the  proposition  that  all  countries  would 
be  autonomous,  they  would  all  be  in- 
dependent, and  they  would  all  be  free 
of  unwanted  interference  and  entan- 
glements with  other  nations. 

The  Polish  people  have  been  bound 
very  closely  to  the  Soviet  Union  since 
the  Second  World  War,  and  they  be- 
long to  a  Warsaw  Pact  military  al- 
liance, which  is,  of  course,  different 
from  the  NATO  relationship  to  which 
we  belong. 

My  own  assessment  within  the  Euro- 
pean theater — Eastern  European 
theater — is  that  here,  compared  to 
some  other  nations,  there  is  a  great  re- 
ligious freedom  and  otherwise,  and  I 
think  this  is  a  hope  that  we  all  share 
and  cherish.  I  think  this  has  been  the 
origin  of  the  Polish  nation  more  than  a 
thousand  years  ago,  and  it's  a  deep 
commitment  of  the  vast  majority  of  the 
Polish  people,  a  desire  and  a  commit- 
ment not  to  be  dominated. 

Q.  You  don't  deny  that  they  are 
dominated  here? 

A.  I  think  I've  commented  all  I  wish 
on  that  subject. 

Q  [in  Polish].  What  is  the  potential 
for  realization  of  the  Helsinki  Final 
Act  as  an  integral  entity,  especially 
in  the  view  of  the  Belgrade  meeting? 
And  what  is  your  opinion  about 


JOINT  U.S.-POLAND 
COMMUNIQUE,  DEC.  31^ 

The  President  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  Mrs.  Carter  paid  an  official 
visit  to  Poland  December  29-31,  1977,  at  the 
invitation  of  the  highest  authorities  of  the 
Polish  People's  Republic.  The  President  was 
accompanied  by  Secretary  of  State  Cyrus  R. 
Vance  and  by  Assistant  to  the  President  for 
National  Security  Affairs  Zbigniew 
Brzezinski. 

The  President  laid  a  wreath  at  the  Tomb  of 
the  Unknown  Soldier  and  placed  flowers  at 
the  Nike  Monument  to  the  Heroes  of  Warsaw 
and  at  the  Monument  to  the  Heroes  of  the 
Ghetto.  He  also  saw  some  districts  of  War- 
saw, acquainting  himself  with  its  recon- 
struction and  development 

During  the  visit,  the  President  held  talks 
with  the  First  Secretary  of  the  Central  Com- 
mittee of  the  Polish  United  Workers'  Party, 
Edward  Gierek. 

In  the  plenary  talks,  which  were  chaired  by 
the  President  and  the  First  Secretary,  there 
took  part:  From  the  American  side:  Secretary 


of  State  Cyrus  R  Vance.  Assistant  to  the 
President  Zbigniew  Brzezinski,  and  other  of- 
ficials. From  the  Polish  side:  The  Chairman 
of  the  Council  of  State,  Henryk  Jablonski, 
Chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  Piotr 
Jaroszewicz,  and  other  officials. 

Secretary  of  State  Cyrus  R.  Vance  also 
held  talks  with  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
Emil  Wojtaszek. 

The  President  and  the  First  Secretary  ex- 
pressed their  satisfaction  with  the  conversa- 
tions they  had  held  as  well  as  their  conviction 
that  continued  visits  at  the  highest  levels,  as 
well  as  visits  by  other  leading  personalities 
of  both  countries,  serve  the  interests  of  both 
countries  and  the  development  of  detente  and 
international  cooperation. 

President  Carter  expressed  his  gratitude  to 
the  First  Secretary  and  to  Mrs.  Gierek  for  the 
splendid  hospitality  accorded  in  Poland  to 
him,  Mrs.  Carter,  and  the  entire  delegation. 

President  Carter  invited  First  Secretary 
Gierek  to  visit  the  United  Stales.  The  invita- 
tion was  accepted  with  pleasure.  The  dates 
for  this  visit  will  be  agreed  upon  through  dip- 
lomatic channels. 


0 
I 

3<: 

ii 


liJ 


H 


[West  German]  Chancel! 
Schmidt's  proposal  to  repeat  in  c 
or  another  form  the  meeting  on  ( 
top  level? 

A.   I  think  the  Helsinki  agreeme 
which  calls  for  cooperation  and  sei 
rity  in  Europe  and  which  has,  as  a 
called  third  basket  component,  an  ins 
tence  upon  maximum  enhancement  a 
preservation  of  human  rights,   is 
agreement  that  is  important  to  the  Po 
and  also  to  our  country  and  other  s    !.i 
natories  of  that  treaty. 

We  believe  that  the  Belgrade  conf 
ence  has  been  productive.  This  i; 
question  that  must  be  approached  oi 
multinational  basis.  The  treaty  ter 
provide  for  open  and  frank  criticism 
other  signatories  when  standards  ; 
not  met.  There  has  been  a  free  t 
change  of  opinion  between  oursel' 
and  the  Soviet  Union  and,  indeed, 
the  nations  involved. 

We  hope  that  this  session  will  co 
to  a  rapid  and  successful  conclusi 
and  that  there  will  be  repeated  scht 
uled  meetings  based  upon  the  Beign 
conference  that  would  be  held  in  the 
ture  so  that  all  nations  who  participa 
in  the  Helsinki  agreement  and  all  the 
who  didn't  become  signatories  woi 
have  a  constant  reminder  before  th 
of  the  importance  of  cooperatic 
mutual  security,  the  sharing  of  inf 
mation,  the  recombination  of  famili 
free  emigration,  and  the  preservation 
basic  human  rights. 

So,  I  hope  that  this  will  be  a  contii 
ing  process  scheduled  repeatedly  i 
that  this  issue  of  human  rights  w 
never  be  forgotten. 

Q.  Then  how  satisfied  are  you  tb 
your  concept  of  the  preservation 
human  rights  is  currently  being  he 
ored  here  in  Poland? 

A.  I  think  that  our  concept  of  hum 
rights  is  preserved  in  Poland,  as  1' 
said,  much  better  than  some  oth 
European  nations  with  which  I 
familiar.  There  is  a  substantial  degi 
of  freedom  of  the  press  exhibited 
this  conference  this  afternoon;  a  su 
stantial  degree  of  freedom  of  religic 
demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  appro 
mately  90'7r  of  the  Polish  peop 
profess  faith  in  Christ;  and  an  open 
lationship  between  Poland  and  c 
country  and  Poland  and  Western  Eur 
pean  countries  in  trade,  technolo; 
cultural  exchange,  student  exchan 
tourism. 

So,  I  don't  think  there's  any  dou 
that  the  will  of  the  Polish  people 
complete  preservation  and  enhan^ 
ment  of  human  rights  is  the  same  as  o 
own. 

Q.  What  steps,  then,  do  you 
lieve  should  be  taken  here  in  Polai 


T 


'«i)ruary  1978 

.     come  closer  to  reaching  your 
icept? 

\.  I  think  Poland  shares  with  us  a 
nmitment,  which  is  sometimes  em- 
■"  Tassing  for  us  and  them,  to  have  our 
n  faults  publicized  evocatively  at 
iferences  like  the  one  in  Belgrade, 
lere  there's  a  free  and  open  discus- 
n  and  criticism  and  a  singular  point- 
;  out  of  violations  of  high  standards 
human  rights  preservation.  We  have 
;n  criticized  at  Belgrade,  sometimes 
itimately;  sometimes,  I  think,  mis- 
oilienly.  The  same  applies  to  nations  in 
stern  Europe  and  to  the  Soviet 
lion. 

And  I  think  this  is  the  best  thing  that 
can  do  at  this  point,  is  to  continue 
insist  upon  a  rigid  enforcement  and 
erpretation  of  the  human  rights  sec- 
n  of  the  Helsinki  agreement. 
Q  [in  Polish].  The  United  States  is 
f;ing  an  energy  crisis  which  is  also 
I  international  problem.  How  can 
)u  see  the  possibilities  of  solving 
t  it  crisis,  like  a  multilateral  confer- 
(ce,  a  European  conference  or 
I  ateral  agreements,  and  are  you  of 
I;  opinion  that  the  cooperation  be- 
leen  the  United  States  and  Poland 
i  this  respect  is  possible? 
\.  One  of  the  worst  domestic  prob- 
I  ns  that  we  have  is  the  overconsump- 
t  n  and  waste  of  energy.  1  have  no 
( ubt  that  every  country  I  visit  on  this 
I  ir  will  be  pressing  us  on  the  question 
(  what  will  the  United  States  do  to 
;  /e  energy  and  not  to  import  too  much 
(  very  scarce  oil,  in  particular,  which 
i  available  on  the  world  markets.  We 
i;  addressing  this  as  a  top  priority 
l[iiong  domestic  issues. 
,  Poland   is,   as  you  know,   self- 
i,!fficient  in  both  hard  coal  and  also 
Ijwn  coal,  which  is  increasing  in  pro- 
I  ction  in  Poland  itself.  We  call  it  lig- 
:e  in  our  own  country.  One  of  the 
ngs  that  we  can  do  is  on  a  worldwide 
I  sis  to  try  to  hold  down  unnecessary 
I  mand  for  oil  and  natural  gas,  there- 
re  providing  stable  prices. 
Another  is  to  consume  those  energy 
urces  which  we  have  most  available 
our  country  and  in  yours,  coal;  shift 
permanent   sources  of  energy, 
imarily  those  derived  from  solar 
)wer;  and  share  research  and  de- 
;lopment  information  and  commit- 
ents,  a  subject  which  I  was  discus- 
jOg  early  today  with  First  Secretary 
ierek. 

How  to  burn  lignite  coal  so  that  it 
ill  have  minimum  effect  on  the  envi- 
jinment  and  also  have  maximum  heat 
privation  is  a  question  of  importance 
'  you  and  to  us.  We  are  now  shifting 
I  the  production  and  consumption  of 
gnite  coal  in  our  own  country,  for  in- 
ance,  and  so  are  you.   So,  I  think 


sharing,  on  an  international  basis,  of 
data  and  technological  advantages  and 
progress  in  the  energy  field  and  con- 
servation of  scarce  energy  sources  for 
all  nations  would  be  the  two  basic 
things  which  we  could  do  jointly. 

Q  [in  Polish].  What  is  involved  in 
the  entity  of  Polish-American  coop- 
eration, so  far,  and  what  is  your 
opinion  as  far  as  this  cooperation  be- 
tween Poland  and  the  United  States 
is  concerned,  and  how  in  the  light  of 
today's  talks  can  you  see  the  pros- 
pects for  the  development  of  such 
cooperation  as  well  as  what  the 
United  States  wants  to  do  to  contrib- 
ute to  this  development? 

A.  We  already  have  a  good  relation- 
ship with  Poland  in  cultural  exchange, 
in  technological  and  scientific  coopera- 
tion, and  in  a  rapidly  growing  level  of 
trade.  About  4  years  ago  we  had  a  total 
trade  with  Poland  of  only  about  $500 
million.  In  1978  the  level  of  trade  will 
probably  exceed  $1  billion. 

I  have  just  informed  First  Secretary 
Gierek  that  in  addition  to  the  $300  mil- 
lion in  commodity  credit  grain  sales 
that  has  been  authorized  by  our  own 
country,  that  we  will  increase  that  by 
$200  million  more  worth  of  food  and 
feed  grains. 

Poland  has  had  a  devastating  and  un- 
precedented 4  years  of  crop  failure  be- 
cause of  adverse  weather  conditions;  3 
years  of  drought,  the  last  year,  of  ex- 
cessive floods.  We,  on  the  other  hand, 
have  had  very  good  and  bountiful  har- 
vests. And  we  want  to  share  our  grain 
with  Poland  on  legal  credit  terms  which 
have  already  been  established  by  our 
government. 

I  think  another  thing  that  Poland  can 
help  with  is  to  improve  even  further  the 
better  relationships  that  we  are  working 
out  with  the  Soviet  Union.  Poland  is  a 
nation  that  has  good  communications 
and  cooperation  with  the  nations  in 
Western  Europe — with  Germany,  Bel- 
gium, Holland,  France  and  others — and 
also  is  an  integral  part  of  the  Warsaw 
Pact  nations.  And  I  think  this  ease  of 
communication  and  this  natural  and 
historical  friendship  is  a  basis  on  which 
Poland  can  provide  additional  coopera- 
tion and  communication  between  our- 
selves and  the  Soviet  Union. 

I  don't  say  this  to  insinuate  that  we 
have  a  lack  of  communication  now. 
But  Poland's  good  offices  can  be  of 
great  benefit  to  us. 

Q.  In  your  discussions  earlier 
today  with  First  Secretary  Gierek 
and  other  Polish  leaders,  did  they  in 
your  mind  express  any  viewpoints  on 
international  questions  that  diverged 
in  tone  or  substance  from  the  view- 
points generally  expressed  by  the 
Soviet  Union? 


A.  We  discussed  a  wide  range  of 
subjects.  I  didn't  detect  any  significant 
differences  of  opinion  between  our- 
selves and  the  Polish  leaders,  and  we 
did  not  go  into  detail  on  matters  that 
now  are  not  resolved  between  ourselves 
and  the  Soviets. 

For  instance,  the  details  of  the  SALT 
negotiations  and  the  comprehensive 
test  ban  were  not  discussed  by  me  and 
Mr.  Gierek.  So,  I  would  say  that  we 
found  no  disharmonies  of  any  signifi- 
cance between  ourselves  and  the  Poles, 
or  between  the  Poles  and  the  Soviet 
Union. 

Mr.  Gierek  did  express  a  concern 
that  there  might  be  a  bilateral  agree- 
ment between  Israel  and  Egypt  in  the 
Middle  East,  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
other  Arab  countries.  This  is  an  opin- 
ion also  held  by  the  Soviet  Union.  It's 
an  opinion  also  held  by  us  and  by  Israel 
and  Egypt. 

I  pointed  out  to  Mr.  Gierek  that  had 
the  Egyptians  and  Israelis  wanted  to 
seek  a  solution  only  for  the  Sinai  re- 
gion and  the  Egyptian-Israeli  relation- 
ship, they  could  probably  already  have 
consummated  such  an  agreement.  But 
President  Sadat  and  Prime  Minister 
Begin  do  not  want  such  an  agreement.  I 
pointed  out  this  to  Mr.  Gierek,  and  he 
was  relieved  to  hear  this. 

He  also  was  quite  concerned  about 
the  lack  of  progress  on  the  mutual  and 
balanced  force  reductions,  which  have 
been  stalemated  in  Vienna  for  years. 
He  pointed  out  that  the  primary  respon- 
sibility lay  on  the  shoulders  of  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union. 

This  is  not  exactly  the  case,  because 
we  consult  very  closely  with  our 
NATO  allies  before  any  common  opin- 
ion or  proposition  is  put  forward.  I 
hope  to  relieve  this  stalemate  shortly. 
And  we  are  consulting  closely  with  the 
Germans  and  others  in  the  Western 
European  theater  and  also  with  the 
Soviets  on  this  matter. 

He  was  very  pleased  that  we  want  to 
reduce  international  sales  of  convention- 
al weapons.  This  is  a  subject  on  which 
we  have  just  begun  to  talk  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  perhaps  Poland  is 
ahead  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  this 
particular  subject.  But  I  hope  that  they 
will  be  amenable  to  that  same 
suggestion. 

So,  the  answer  is,  I  don't  know  of 
any  disagreements  between  the  Poles 
and  the  Soviets  that  came  out  this 
morning,  nor  do  I  know  any  significant 
disagreements  that  came  out  between 
ourselves  and  the  Poles. 

Q  [in  Polish].  The  Soviet  leader, 
Leonid  Brezhnev  has  put  forward  a 
suggestion  recently  that  the  Eastern 
and  Western  countries  renounce  the 
neutron  bomb  together.  Would  you 


be  ready  to  accept  such  a  proposal? 

A.  One  of  the  disturbing  failures  up 
until  this  point  in  nuclear  weaponry  has 
been  a  complete  absence  of  discussions 
concerning  tactical  or  theater  nuclear 
weapons.  The  only  discussions  that 
have  ever  been  held  between  ourselves 
and  the  Soviets  related  only  to  strategic 
weapons,  those  that  can  be  fired  from 
one  continent  to  another  or  from  the 
sea  into  a  continent. 

I  would  hope  that  as  a  result  of  the 
SALT  II  talks  we  might  agree  with  the 
Soviets  to  start  addressing  the  question 
of  the  so-called  tactical  nuclear 
weapons,  of  which  the  enhanced  radia- 
tion or  neutron  bomb  would  be  one. 

This  weapon  is  much  less  destabiliz- 
ing in  its  effect,  if  it  should  be  de- 
ployed, than,  for  instance,  some  of  the 
advanced  new  Soviet  weapons  like  the 
SS-20  missile,  which  is  much  more  de- 
structive than  any  weapon  held  by  the 
NATO  allies  and  has  a  much  greater 
range. 

So,  my  hope  is  that  in  general  we 
can  reduce  the  threat  of  nuclear  de- 
struction in  the  European  area.  There 
are  now  several  thousand  tactical  nu- 
clear weapons  already  deployed  on 
both  sides  in  the  European  theater.  And 
the  whole  matter  must  be  addressed  in 
its  entirety  rather  than  one  weapon  at 
the  time. 

We  would  not  deploy  the  neutron 
bomb  or  neutron  shells  unless  it  was  an 
agreement  by  our  NATO  allies.  That's 
where  the  decision  will  be  made.  But 
there  are  other  new  weapons,  including 
the  SS-20.  much  more  threatening  to  the 
balance  that  presently  exists. 

Q.  You  said  that  you  have  agreed 
to  expand  the  agricultural  credits  to 
Poland.  In  talking  with  us  the  other 
day,  your  advisers  have  linked  that 
with  a  human  rights  concern, 
namely,  that  the  reunification  of 
families  between  the  Eastern  and 
Western  blocs  be  improved  in  Po- 
land. Have  the  Poles  agreed  to  do 
that?  Have  they  given  you  any  satis- 
faction that  this,  too,  would  be  done? 

A.  One  of  the  first  subjects  which  I 
discussed  with  First  Secretary  Gierek 
in  our  private  talks  today  was  the 
reunification  of  families  between  Po- 
land and  the  United  States.  In  the  last  4 
years  there  have  been  about  15,000 
Poles  who  have  been  permitted  to 
emigrate  to  our  country.  We  still  have 
about  250  families — we  call  them  nu- 
clear families,  that  is,  a  father,  mother, 
and  children — who  desire  to  be  unified, 
and  permission  has  not  yet  been 
obtained. 

First  Secretary  Gierek  said  that  he 
would  give  his  own  personal  attention 
to  alleviating  this  problem.  And  he  di- 


IVilh  Jurdainun  King  Hiusctn  and  the  Shah  and  Shahhanou  in  Tehran 


rected  his  Foreign  Minister  and  I  di- 
rected our  Secretary  of  State  to  proceed 
with  this  discussion  during  this  after- 
noon. Their  assurance  was  that  our 
concern  would  be  alleviated. 


ARRIVAL,  TEHRAN, 
DEC.  31" 


His  Imperial  Majesty 

Mr.  President,  on  behalf  of  the 
Shahbanou  and  myself  and  the  Iranian 
people,  I  welcome  you,  Mrs.  Carter, 
and  your  delegation  on  Iranian  soil. 

We  cherish  your  arrival  as  the  head 
of  state  of  a  country  with  which  Iran 
always  had  unshakable  bonds  and  the 
best  of  relations  and  at  the  same  time 
as  an  exalted  friend  and  a  most  es- 
teemed guest. 

We  sincerely  hope  that  you  will  take 
back  with  you  happy  memories  of  your 
short  visit  to  our  country,  and  in  the 
meantime  we  sincerely  hope  that  all  the 
stages  of  your  present  trip  will  be 
marked  by  the  best  of  successes. 

For  the  Shahbanou  and  I,  it  is  a  great 
pleasure  to  be  your  host  only  a  few 
weeks  after  our  trip  to  your  country. 
Your  distinguished  personality,  sincer- 
ity, good  will,  moral  virtues,  your  hos- 
pitality, and  also  the  kindness  of  Mrs. 
Carter  have  remained  close  to  our 
hearts. 

On  behalf  of  all  the  people  of  Iran, 
welcome  to  our  country. 

President  Carter 

My  own  nation  has  been  blessed  this 
year  by  an  official  visit  of  His  Imperial 
Majesty,  the  Shah,  and  by  the 
Shahbanou,  Empress  Farah.  This  was  a 


fine  gesture  of  friendship.  And  we  al 
benefited  from  extensive  discussio 
between  the  Shah  and  myself  of  impc 
tant  issues  for  Iran  and  for  the  Unit 
States.  I  am  proud  and  pleased  to 
able  to  come  to  Iran  at  the  end  of  tl 
year,  my  first  year  in  office,  and,  I  t 
lieve,  your  37th  year  as  a  leader  of  tl 
great  nation  and  to  begin  another  nt 
year  with  our  close  friends  and  allies 

In  these  times  of  endings  and  begi 
nings,  I  look  forward  to  consulti 
with  the  Shah  about  two  of  the  issu 
that  have  most  dominated  our  thougl 
in  the  year  just  past  and  will  requ 
our  best  actions  in  the  years  ahead. 

One  is  finding  solutions  to  the  ec 
nomic  problems  of  the  world's  rich  a 
the  world's  poor.  None  of  these  pre 
lems  is  more  important  than  that 
energy.  Neither  producer  nor  consuir 
nations  can  survive  and  prosper  if  i 
recklessly  exhaust  the  world's  limit  y,, 
supplies  of  oil,  and  neither  group  of  r^, 
tions  can  solve  the  problem  without  t 
cooperation  of  the  other.  It  is  becau 
my  nation  takes  this  problem  serious 
that  we  are  determined  soon  to  have 
comprehensive  energy  plan  designed 
eliminate  waste  and  to  develop  altti™, 
nate  sources  of  energy  supplies.  We  a^ 
cooperating  closely  with  Iran,  and  it 
because  I  respect  the  leadership  of  t 
Shah  in  this  area  that  I  have  come 
him  for  consultation  and  for  advice. 

The  other  great  issue  is  bringii 
peace  to  the  troubled  areas  of  the  wor 
and  turning  back  the  rising  tide  of  i 
mamcnts  and  dissension.  The  Shah  ai 
1  share  the  hope  that  peace  will  con 
soon  to  the  Middle  East  and  that  as  o 
military  alliance  remains  unshakabl 
we  may  help  to  reduce  the  level  of  tei 
sion  and  armaments  throughout  tl 
world. 


I 


FSruary  1978 

The  interests  of  our  nations  are  built 

the  interests  of  individuals.  And  in 

of  our  discussions,  both  public  and 

\  ate,  we  emphasize  guaranteeing  our 

/ens  the  fullest  economic  and  politi- 

luiman  rights. 

i  come  with  warm,  personal  feelings 

;    the  leaders  of  Iran,  and  I  bring  best 

^w  Year  greetings  from  the  United 

Sites  for  the  people  of  this  great  coun- 

u. 

Thank  you  very  much.  Your  Majesty, 
f  this  warm  and  hospitable  welcome. 


F;MARKS  to  INDIAN 
I.RLIAMENT,  NEW  DELHI, 

JN.  2' 

stand  before  you  in  this  house,  the 
Sit  of  one  of  the  world's  greatest 
li  islatures,  with  feelings  of  profound 
f  indship  and  respect. 

'  bring  with  me  the  warm  greetings 
ai  good  wishes  of  the  people  of  the 
s  ond  largest  democracy  on  Earth,  the 
I  ited  States  of  America,  to  the  people 
c  the  largest  democracy,  the  Republic 
c  India. 

Vot  long  ago,  both  of  our  people's 
|vernments  passed  through  grave 
cses.  In  different  ways,  the  values  for 
\  ich  so  many  have  lived  and  died 
\  re  threatened.  In  different  ways,  and 
c  opposite  sides  of  the  world,  these 
\  ues  have  now  been  triumphant. 

(t  is  sometimes  argued  that  the  mod- 
ei  industrial  state — with  its  mate- 
ilism,  its  centralized  bureaucracies, 
£l  the  technological  instruments  of 
cntrol  available  to  those  who  hold 
{ wer — must  inevitably  lose  sight  of 
t   democratic  ideal. 

The  opposite  argument  is  made  even 
lire  frequently.  There  are  those  who 
S/  that  democracy  is  a  kind  of  rich 
tin's  plaything  and  that  the  poor  are 
t)  preoccupied  with  survival  to  care 
sout  the  luxury  of  freedom  and  the 
I  ht  to  choose  their  own  government. 

This  argument  is  repeated  all  over 
t;  world — mostly,  I  have  noticed,  by 
irsons  whose  own  bellies  are  full  and 
MO  speak  from  positions  of  privilege 
id  power  in  their  own  societies. 

Their  argument  reminds  me  of  a 
iitement  made  by  a  great  President  of 
';  United  States,  Abraham  Lincoln. 

;  said,  "Whenever  I  hear  anyone  ar- 

ing  for  slavery,  I  feel  a  strong  im- 

Ise  to  see  it  tried  on  him  person- 

y-" 

The  evidence,  both  in  India  and  in 
nerica,  is  plain.  It  is  that  there  is 
ore  than  one  form  of  hunger,  and 
ither  the  rich  nor  the  poor  will  feel 
tisfied  without  being  fed  in  body  and 
spirit. 
Is  democracy  important?  Is  human 


freedom  valued  by  all  people? 

India  has  given  her  affirmative  ac- 
tion and  answer  in  a  thunderous  voice, 
a  voice  heard  around  the  world.  Some- 
thing momentous  happened  here  last 
March — not  because  any  party  in  par- 
ticular won  or  lost,  but  rather,  I  think, 
because  the  largest  electorate  on  Earth 
freely  and  wisely  chose  its  leaders  at 
the  polls.  In  this  sense,  democracy  it- 
self was  the  victor  in  your  country. 

Together,  we  understand  that  in  the 
field  of  politics,  freedom  is  the  engine 
of  progress.  India  and  America  share 
practical  experience  with  democracy. 

We  in  the  United  States  are  proud  of 
having  achieved  political  union  among 
a  people  whose  ancestors  come  from  all 
over  the  world.  Our  system  strives  to 
respect  the  rights  of  a  great  variety  of 
minorities,  including,  by  the  way,  a 
growing  and  productive  group  of 
families  from  your  own  country,  India. 

But  the  challenge  of  political  union 
is  even  greater  here  in  your  own  coun- 
try. In  the  diversity  of  languages,  reli- 
gions, political  opinions,  and  racial  and 
cultural  groups,  India  is  comparable  to 
the  continent  of  Europe,  which  has  a 
total  population  about  the  same  size  as 
your  own.  Yet  India  has  forged  her  vast 
mosaic  of  humanity  into  a  single  great 
nation  that  has  weathered  many  chal- 
lenges to  survival  both  as  a  nation  and 
as  a  democracy.  This  is  surely  one  of 
the  greatest  political  achievements  of 
this  century  or  any  other  century. 

India  and  the  United  States  are  at  one 
in  recognizing  the  right  of  free 
speech — which  Mahatma  Gandhi  called 
"the  foundation-stone  of  Swaraj"  or 
self-government — and  the  rights  of  aca- 
demic freedom,  trade  union  organiza- 
tion, freedom  of  the  press,  and  freedom 
of  religion. 

All  these  rights  are  recognized  in  in- 
ternational covenants.  There  are  few 
governments  which  do  not  at  least  pay 
lipservice  to  them.  And  yet,  to  quote 
Gandhi  once  more,  "No  principle 
exists  in  the  abstract.  Without  its  con- 
crete application  it  has  no  meaning." 

In  India,  as  in  the  United  States, 
these  rights  do  have  concrete  applica- 
tion, and  they  have  real  meaning,  too. 
It  is  to  preserve  these  rights  that  both 
our  nations  have  chosen  similar  politi- 
cal paths  to  the  development  of  our  re- 
sources and  to  the  betterment  of  the  life 
of  our  people. 

There  are  differences  between  us  in 
the  degree  to  which  economic  growth  is 
pursued  through  public  enterprise  on 
one  hand  and  private  enterprise  on  the 
other  hand.  But  more  important  than 
these  differences  is  our  shared  belief 
that  the  political  structure  in  which  de- 
velopment takes  place  should  be  demo- 
cratic and  should  respect  the  human 


7 


rights  of  each  and  every  citizen  in  our 
countries. 

Our  two  nations  also  agree  that 
human  needs  are  inseparable  from 
human  rights;  that  while  civil  and  polit- 
ical liberties  are  good  in  themselves, 
they  are  much  more  useful  and  much 
more  meaningful  in  the  lives  of  people 
to  whom  physical  survival  is  not  a  mat- 
ter of  daily  anxiety. 

To  have  sufficient  food  to  live  and  to 
work;  to  be  adequately  sheltered  and 
clothed;  to  live  in  a  healthy  environ- 
ment and  to  be  healed  when  sick;  to 
learn  and  to  be  taught — these  rights, 
too,  must  be  the  concerns  of  our  gov- 
ernments. To  meet  these  ends,  orderly 
economic  growth  is  crucial.  And  if  the 
benefits  of  growth  are  to  reach  those 
whose  need  is  greatest,  social  justice  is 
critical  as  well. 

India  is  succeeding  in  this  historic 
task.  Your  economic  challenges  are  no 
secret,  and  their  seriousness  is  well  un- 
derstood in  the  West. 

But  what  is  far  less  well  understood 
is  the  degree  to  which  Indian  social  and 
economic  policy  has  been  such  a  suc- 
cess. In  the  single  generation  since 
your  independence  was  gained,  ex- 
traordinary progress  has  been  made. 

Economic  Progress 

India  is  now  a  major  industrial 
power.  Your  economy  ranks  among  the 
10  largest  in  the  whole  world.  You  are 
virtually  self-assured  and  self-sufficient 
in  consumer  goods  and  in  a  wide  vari- 
ety of  other  products,  such  as  iron  and 
steel. 

There  have  been  notable  increases  in 
production  in  nearly  every  important 
sector  of  your  economy — increases 
which  reflect  an  economy  of  great 
technological  sophistication.  This  kind 
of  growth  is  doubly  important  to  try  to 
reduce  trade  barriers  and  to  promote 
both  bilateral  trade  and  mutual  respon- 
sibility for  the  whole  world's  trading 
system. 

But  most  important  are  the  advances 
in  human  welfare  that  have  touched  the 
lives  of  ordinary  Indians.  Life  expec- 
tancy has  increased  by  20  years  since 
your  independence.  The  threat  of  major 
epidemics  has  receded.  The  literacy 
rate  in  your  country  has  doubled. 
While  only  a  third  of  Indian  children 
went  to  school  in  the  years  just  after 
independence,  nearly  90%  of  primary- 
age  Indian  children  now  receive  school- 
ing. Nine  times  as  many  students  go  to 
universities  as  they  did  before. 

I  mention  these  gains  that  we  tend  to 
overlook  in  our  preoccupation  with  the 
problems  that  quite  properly  face  and 
engage  our  attention. 

India's  difficulties,  which  we  often 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


In  "Carter-Poori" 


experience  ourselves  and  which  are 
typical  of  the  problems  faced  in  the  de- 
veloping world,  remind  us  of  the  tasks 
which  lie  ahead. 

But  India's  successes  are  just  as  im- 
portant, because  they  decisively  refute 
the  theory  that  in  order  to  achieve  eco- 
nomic and  social  progress,  a  develop- 
ing country  must  accept  an  authorita- 
rian or  a  totalitarian  government  with 
all  the  damage  to  the  health  of  the 
human  spirit  which  comes  with  it. 

We  are  eager  to  join  with  you  in 
maintaining  and  improving  our  valu- 
able and  mature  partnership  of  political 
and  economic  cooperation. 

It's  a  sobering  fact,  for  instance,  that 
in  a  nation  of  so  many  hundreds  of  mil- 
lions of  people,  only  a  few  American 
business  leaders  are  now  involved,  on  a 
daily  basis,  in  the  economic  and  com- 
mercial life  of  your  country. 

We  need  to  identify  more  areas 
where  we  can  work  together  for  mutual 
benefit  and,  indeed,  for  the  benefit  of 
the  whole  world. 

In  the  area  of  development,  I  am 
deeply  impressed  with  the  creative  di- 
rection that  the  Government  of  India 
has  taken  in  the  new  economic  state- 
ment. You  have  committed  your  nation 
unequivocally  to  rural  improvement 
and  the  creation  of  rural  employment. 
This  policy  now  faces  a  test  of  im- 


plementation and,  especially,  the  test 
of  bringing  its  benefits  to  the  very 
poorest  areas  of  your  rural  population. 
The  seriousness  and  the  determination, 
however,  of  your  commitment  is  a 
cause  for  optimism. 

We  want  to  learn  from  you  and  to 
work  with  you  however  we  can. 

Agricultural  Productivity 

In  agriculture,  there  are  also  exciting 
new  areas  of  technology  on  which  we 
can  work  together.  After  a  decade  of 
importing  grain,  India  now  stands  with 
a  surplus  of  nearly  20  million  tons. 
This  is  a  tribute  to  the  growing  produc- 
tivity of  your  agriculture  and  the  com- 
petence, also,  of  your  administrative 
services. 

We  applaud  the  grain  reserve  pro- 
gram that  you've  begun,  and  we  would 
welcome  the  opportunity  to  share  with 
you  our  resources  and  our  experience  in 
dealing  with  storage  problems  that 
surpluses  bring  with  them. 

Our  countries  must  be  in  the  fore- 
front of  the  effort  to  bring  into  exist- 
ence the  international  food  reserve  that 
would  mitigate  the  fear  of  famine  in  the 
rest  of  the  world.  At  the  same  time,  we 
must  recognize  that  today's  surpluses 
are  likely  to  be  a  temporary  phenome- 
non. The  best  estimates  indicate  that 


li 


unless  new  productive  capacity  is  c 
veloped,  the  whole  world,  with  .1 
rapidly  growing  population,   may   if 
facing  large  food  shortages  in  t|  k 
mid-1980's. 

The  greatest  opportunities  to  i 
crease  agricultural  productivity  ex^ 
here  in  India  and  elsewhere  in  the  d 
veloping  world.  These  opportuniti 
must  be  seized  not  just  so  that  India  i 
can  eat  better  but  so  that  India  can  1 
main  self-sufficient  and,  perhaps,  ev 
continue  to  export  food  to  countri 
with  less  agricultural  potential  than  y 
have. 

In  the  past,  America  and  India  ha^ 
scored  monumental  achievements 
working  together  in  the  agricultuii 
field.   But  there  is  still  a  vast,  uJkl 
realized  potential  to  be  tapped. 

I  would  like  to  see  an  intensified  a^U 
ricultural  research  program  aimed  be 
at  improving  productivity  in  India  a 
at  developing  processes  that  could  th 
be  used  elsewhere.  This  program  coi 
be  based  on  the  agricultural  universit 
of  our  two  countries  but  would  also  c 
tend  across  the  whole  frontier  of  1 
search.  And  beyond  research,  I  woi 
like  to  identify  joint  development  pn 
ects  where  research  can  be  tested  a 
put  to  work.  Perhaps  Prime  Minis 
Desai  and  I  may  now  instruct  our  gc 
ernments  to  focus  on  these  matters  a 
to  come  up  with  specific  propos; 
within  the  next  few  months.  y.? 

One  of  the  most  promising  areas  nil 
international  cooperation,  which  I  ha 
already  discussed  with  your  Prii 
Minister,  is  in  the  regions  of  eastc 
India  and  Bangladesh,  where  alteri 
ting  periods  of  drought  and  flood  i  ki 
cruelly  into  food  production.   Seve:"': 
hundred  million  people  live  in  tl 
area.  They  happen  to  be  citizens  of  I 
dia,  Bangladesh,  and  Nepal. 

Great  progress  has  already  bei 
made  between  your  nations  in  resolvi 
questions  concerning  water.   And  \M 
are  prepared  to  give  our  support  wh-^ 
the  regional  states  request  a  study  th 
will  define  how  the  international  coi 
munity,  in  cooperation  with  the  natio 
of  South  Asia,  can  help  the  peoples 
this  area  use  water  from  the  rivers  ai 
the  mountains  to  achieve  the  product! 
ity  that  is  inherent  in  the  land  and  t 
people. 

Energy  Resources 

Sustained  economic  growth  requir 
a  strong  base  in  energy  as  well  as 
agriculture.  Energy  is  a  serious  pro 
lem  in  both  our  countries,  for  both 
us  import  oil  at  levels  that  can  threat! 
our  economic  health  and  expose  1 
even  to  danger  if  supplies  are  inte 


Ijbruary  1978 

ipted.  American  firms  are  already 
v)rking  with  Indians  in  developing  the 
('•-producing  area  off  the  shores  of 
Ijia,  near  Bombay. 
We  also  have  a  long  record  of  coop- 
{;ition  in  the  development  of  nuclear 
f;wer,  another  important  element  of 
Idia's  energy  plans.  Our  work  to- 
gther  will  continue  in  this  field,  as 
vll.  This  is  a  cold,  technological  sub- 
jt.  But  Prime  Minister  Desai  and  I 
hd  warm  and  productive  discussions 
aout  this  field.  We  have  notified  him 
tit  shipments  of  nuclear  fuel  will  be 
ride  for  the  Tarapur  reactor.  And  be- 
CJse  of  an  accident  that  did  occur  in 
jur  heavy  water  production  plant,  we 
\11  make  available  to  India,  also, 
spplies  from  our  reserves  of  heavy 
\iter. 

Additionally,  we  stand  ready  to  work 
\th  you  in  developing  renewable 
<ergy  resources,  especially  solar 
esrgy.  There  is  no  shortage  of  sun- 
I  ht  in  India.  And  the  lack  of  a  mas- 
s  e,  existing  infrastructure  tied  to  fos- 
i  fuel  use  will  make  the  application  of 
slar  and  solar-related  energy  vastly 
<der  here  than  it  will  be  in  my  own 
(Lintry,  where  we  are  so  heavily  de- 
indent  upon  other  sources  of  energy. 
1  )wever,  the  inherently  decentralized 
I  lure  of  solar  energy  makes  it  ideal  as 
I  complement  to  your  government's 
less  on  developing  self-reliant  vil- 
];es  and  communities. 
The  silent  void  of  space  may  seem 
mote  from  these  challenges.  But  the 
i  ricate  electronics  of  a  space  satellite 
I  n  be  as  useful  to  earthbound  farmers 
i  a  new  plow. 

The  Indian  and  American  Govern- 

::nts  will  tomorrow  exchange  diplo- 

utic  notes  confirming  that  the  United 

.ates  will  program  its  LANDSAT 

iirth  resources  satellite  to  transmit 

I  ta  directly  to  a  ground  receiving  sta- 

m  that  India  will  own  and  operate. 

This  satellite   service   will   provide 

dia  with  comprehensive  topographic 

id  minerals  information  and  timely 

ita  on  the  ever-changing  condition  of 

eather,  agricultural,  water,  and  other 

itural  resources.  Under  the  terms  of 

e  agreement,  India  will  make  avail- 

ile  to  neighboring  countries  any  in- 

rmation  that  affects  them. 

Also,  India  has  already  reserved 

)ace  on  board  the  American  space 

luttle  in   1981  to  initiate  a  domestic 

)mmunications  satellite  system,  using. 

satellite  designed  to  Indian  specifica- 

ons. 

i  We  are  very  pleased  that  our  space 
:chnology,  together  with  India's 
iperb  space  communications  capabil- 
y,  will  serve  the  cause  of  practical 
rogress  in  your  country. 


Shared  Interests  and  Obligations 

Our  scholarly  exchanges  have  al- 
ready enriched  the  lives  of  Americans 
who  participated  in  them.  And  I  hope 
the  same  has  been  true  of  Indian  partic- 
ipants. 

In  matters  of  culture  and  the 
arts,  we  know  how  much  we  have  to 
gain.  Not  only  India  but  also  the  rest  of 
Asia  and  Africa  and  the  Middle  East 
have  much  to  offer  us.  I  hope  to  ex- 
pand the  opportunities  for  our  own  citi- 
zens to  appreciate  and  to  enjoy  the 
strong  and  varied  culture  in  the  nations 
of  your  part  of  the  world. 

In  global  politics,  history  has  cast 
our  countries  in  different  roles.  The 
United  States  is  one  of  the  so-called 
superpowers;  India  is  the  largest  of  the 
nonaligned  countries.  But  each  of  us 
respects  the  other's  conception  of  its 
international  responsibilities,  and  the 
values  that  we  do  share  provide  a  basis 
for  cooperation  in  attacking  the  great 
global  problems  of  economic  justice. 


human  rights,  and  the  prevention  of 
war. 

This  pursuit  of  justice  and  peace  and 
the  building  of  a  new  economic  order 
must  be  undertaken  in  ways  that  pro- 
mote constructive  development  rather 
than  fruitless  confrontation.  Every 
country  will  suffer  if  the  North-South 
dialogue  is  permitted  to  founder. 

Because  India  is  both  a  developing 
country  and  also  an  industrial  power, 
you  are  in  a  unique  position  to  promote 
constructive  international  discussion 
about  trade,  energy,  investment,  bal- 
ance of  payments,  technology,  and 
other  questions.  I  welcome  your  play- 
ing this  worldwide  leadership  role. 

I  know  that  there  will  be  times  when 
we  will  disagree  on  specific  issues  and 
even  on  general  approaches  to  larger 
problems.  But  I  hope  and  believe  that 
our  shared  interests  and  our  common 
devotion  to  democratic  values  will  help 
us  to  move  toward  agreement  on  impor- 
tant global  and  bilateral  issues. 

But  neither  of  us  seeks  to  align  with 


DELHI  DECLARATION, 
JAN.  3' 

India  and  the  United  States  of  America, 
despite  differences  of  history  and  culture,  are 
one  in  the  recognition  that  the  ultimate  sanc- 
tion of  power  and  of  public  policy  rests  in  the 
respect  for  the  dignity  and  well-being  of  the 
individual.  Regardless  of  race,  sex,  religion 
or  social  status,  every  human  being  is  enti- 
tled to  life  and  liberty,  to  freedom  from  want 
and,  without  threat  or  coercion,  to  freedom 
of  expression  and  worship. 

We  share  an  unwavering  faith  in  the  demo- 
cratic form  of  government,  which  guarantees 
to  all  citizens  fundamental  freedoms  under 
law  and  the  right  to  choose  their  representa- 
tives and  determine  their  own  future. 

At  the  same  time,  we  believe  that  a  co- 
operative and  stable  world  order  depends  on 
the  right  of  each  people  to  determine  its  own 
form  of  government  and  each  nation  its  own 
political,  social  and  economic  policies. 

We  are  gratified  that  the  process  of  decol- 
onization has  democratized  the  international 
state-system,  giving  most  nations  for  the  first 
time  an  opportunity  to  participate  in  making 
decisions  relating  to  international  peace  and 
cooperation. 

The  disparities  in  economic  strength  that 
exist  among  nations  must  be  bridged  and  a 
more  equitable  international  economic  order 
fashioned  if  we  are  to  secure  international 
peace . 

We  recognize  that  broad  economic  de- 
velopment is  essential  for  a  modern  state,  but 
also  that  such  progress  is  hollow  if  its  bene- 
fits do  not  reach  all  the  people. 


The  present-day  world  commands  scien- 
tific and  technological  skills  to  enrich  the 
quality  of  life  and  give  greater  social  justice 
within  and  among  nations.  We  call  on  an 
inter-dependent  community  of  nations  to 
work  together  to  protect  and  nurture  the 
common  heritage  of  our  planet's  resources 
and  environment. 

We  declare  that  war  is  not  an  acceptable 
means  to  settle  political  disputes.  Our  coun- 
tries will  do  their  utmost  to  resolve  disputes 
with  others  amicably  and,  within  the 
framework  of  the  United  Nations,  to  help  in 
resolving  the  disputes  of  others. 

The  spectre  of  war  has  hung  over  the  world 
for  too  long.  Existing  stockpiles  of  nuclear 
weapons  must  be  reduced  and  eventually 
eliminated,  and  the  danger  of  proliferation  of 
nuclear  weapons  must  be  arrested.  Further, 
every  effort  must  be  made  to  progressively 
reduce  conventional  arms  and  to  redirect  the 
productive  forces  so  released  to  the  better- 
ment of  mankind.  We  commit  ourselves  to 
work  towards  these  ends. 

Beyond  the  realms  of  politics  and  econom- 
ics, the  world  today  affords  opportunities  for 
freer  and  fuller  intellectual  and  scientific  ex- 
changes. Freedom  of  ideas  and  the  promotion 
of  cultural  and  artistic  interplay,  in  a  world 
where  the  mind  is  without  fear,  can  create  an 
environment  where  tolerance  and  understand- 
ing can  flourish. 

Beyond  the  traditional  ideas  of  state-craft, 
Indians  and  Americans  recognize  an  obliga- 
tion to  themselves  and  to  others  that  ends  can 
never  justify  evil  means.  Nations,  like  indi- 
viduals, are  morally  responsible  for  their 
actions. 


10 


Department  of  State  Bulle' 


the  other  except  in  the  pursuit  of  peace 
and  justice.  We  can  even  help  each 
other  to  alleviate  differences  which 
might  exist  between  ourselves  and 
other  nations. 

Our  two  countries  are  part  of  a 
democratic  world  that  includes  nations 
in  all  stages  of  development,  from 
Sweden  and  Japan  to  Sri  Lanka  and 
Costa  Rica. 

We  share  many  common  problems. 
But  we  also  share  an  obligation  to  ad- 
vance human  rights — not  by  interfering 
in  the  affairs  of  other  nations,  not  by 
trying  to  deny  other  nations  the  right  to 
choose  their  own  political  and  social 
system,  but  by  speaking  the  truth  as  we 
see  it  and  by  providing  an  admirable 
example  of  what  democracy  can  mean 
and  what  it  can  accomplish. 

The  danger  of  war  threatens 
everyone,  and  the  United  States  is  try- 
ing to  help  reduce  that  danger — in  the 
SALT  negotiations  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  in  talks  aimed  at  a  comprehen- 
sive ban  of  the  testing  of  all  nuclear 
explosives  anywhere  on  Earth,  and  in 
our  own  policy  of  restraint  on  conven- 
tional arms  transfers.  We  are  also 
working  hard  to  restrict  the  prolifera- 
tion of  nuclear  explosives. 

We  are  seeking  to  help  the  process  of 
peace  in  Africa  and  the  Middle  East. 
And  we  are  taking  steps  to  forestall, 
along  with  the  Soviets,  great  power 
rivalry  and  the  escalation  of  military 
presence  in  your  own  Indian  Ocean. 

India  is  pledged  to  peaceful  coopera- 
tion with  your  neighbors,  and  India  is 
an  important  part  of  almost  any  U.N. 
peacekeeping  force.  India  is  a  present 
and  frequent  member  of  the  Security 
Council  and  has  been  in  the  forefront 


Departure  from  Riyailh 


of  campaigns  against  colonialism  and 
against  apartheid. 

The  motto  of  my  country  is  "In  God 
We  Trust":  India's  is  Sciiyanu'va 
Jayte — "Truth  Alone  Prevails."  1  be- 
lieve that  such  is  the  commonality  of 
our  fundamental  values  that  your  motto 
could  be  ours,  and  perhaps  our  motto 
could  also  be  yours. 

Our  nations  share  the  goals  of  peace 
in  the  world  and  human  development  in 
our  own  societies.  And  we  share,  as 
well,  the  conviction  that  the  means  that 
we  employ  to  reach  these  goals  must  be 
as  much  in  keeping  with  the  principles 
of  freedom  and  human  dignity  and  so- 
cial justice  as  are  the  goals  themselves. 

This  affinity  of  belief  is  as  strong  a 
tie  as  there  can  be  between  any  two  na- 
tions on  Earth.  The  values  that  Ameri- 
cans and  Indians  share  have  deeply  af- 
fected my  own  life.  I  come  to  you,  as  a 
national  leader,  yes,  in  the  hope  that 
my  visit  will  mark  a  new  and  a  higher 
stage  in  the  steadily  improving  rela- 
tions between  our  two  countries.  But  in 
a  more  personal  sense — a  sense  that  is 
very  close  to  my  own  heart — I  come 
also  as  a  pilgrim. 

This  morning  I  had  the  honor  of  lay- 
ing a  wreath  on  the  memorial  to 
Mahatma  Gandhi.  In  that  sacred  place, 
so  simple  and  so  serene,  I  recalled 
anew  the  ways  in  which  Gandhi's 
teachings  have  touched  the  lives  of  so 
many  millions  of  people  in  my  own 
country. 

When  I  was  growing  up  on  a  farm  in 
the  State  of  Georgia,  in  the  heart  of  the 
southern  United  States,  an  invisible 
wall  of  racial  segregation  stood  be- 
tween me  and  my  black  classmates, 
schoolmates,  playmates,  when  we  were 


»\\\mm>w'\mi\^ 


.^J^P^i- 


old  enough  to  know  what  segregati' 
was.  But  it  seemed  then  as  if  that  w^jJ 
between  us  would  exist  forever.  T 

But  it  did  not  stand  forever.  It  crui 
bled  and  fell.  And  though  the  rubt 
has  not  yet  been  completely  remove 
it  no  longer  separates  us  from  o 
another,  blighting  the  lives  of  those 
both  sides  of  it. 

Among  the  many  who  marched  a 
suffered  and  bore  witness  against  t 
evil  of  racial  prejudice,  the  greatt 
was  Dr.  Martin  Luther  King,  Jr.  1 
was  a  son  of  Georgia  and  a  spiriti 
son  of  Mahatma  Gandhi. 

The  most  important  influence  in  t 
life  and  work  of  Dr.  King,  apart  frc 
his  own  religious  faith,  was  the  life  a 
work  of  Gandhi.  Martin  Luther  Ki 
took  Gandhi's  concepts  of  nonviolen 
and  truth-force  and  put  them  to  work 
the  American  South. 

Like  Gandhi,  King  believed  th 
truth  and  love  are  the  strongest  fore 
in  the  universe.  Like  Gandhi,  he  knt 
that  ordinary  people,  armed  only  w 
courage  and  faith,  could  overcome  : 
justice  by  appealing  to  the  spark 
good  in  the  heart  even  of  the  evildoe 

Like  Gandhi,  we  all  learned  that 
system  of  oppression  damages  those 
the  top  as  surely  as  it  does  those  at  I 
bottom.  And  for  Martin  Luther  Kir 
like  Mahatma  Gandhi,  nonviolence  w 
not  only  a  political  method,  it  was 
way  of  life  and  a  spiritual  path  to  uni 
with  the  ultimate. 

These  men  set  a  standard  of  coura 
and  idealism  that  few  of  us  can  me 
but  from  which  all  of  us  can  draw 
spiration  and  sustenance. 

The  nonviolent  movement  for  rac 
justice  in  the  United  States,  a  mo' 
ment  inspired  in  large  measure  by  t 
teachings  and  examples  of  Gandhi  a 
other  Indian  leaders — some  of  wh( 
are  here  today — changed  and  enrich 
my  own  life  and  the  lives  of  many  nn 
lions  of  my  countrymen. 

I  am  sure  you  will  forgive  me  f 
speaking  about  this  at  some  length, 
do  so  because  I  want  you  all  to  und( 
stand  that  when  I  speak  of  friendsh 
between  the  United  States  and  India 
speak  from  the  heart  as  well  as  t 
head.  I  speak  from  a  deep,  firstha 
knowledge  of  what  the  relationship  t 
tween  our  two  countries  has  meant 
the  past  and  how  much  more,  even, 
can  mean  for  all  of  us  in  the  future. 

For  the  remainder  of  this  century  a 
into  the  next,  the  democratic  countri 
of  the  world  will  increasingly  turn  ' 
each  other  for  answers  to  our  mc 
pressing  common  challenge:  how  o' 
political  and  spiritual  values  can  pr 
vide  the  basis  for  dealing  with  the  s 
cial  and  economic  strains  to  which  th'i 
will  unquestionably  be  subjected. 


I 


^bruary  1978 

The  experience  of  democracy  is  like 
le  experience  of  life  itself — always 
hanging,  infinite  in  its  variety, 
imetimes  turbulent,  and  all  the  more 
aluable  for  having  been  tested  by 
iversity. 

We  share  that  experience  with  you, 
id  we  draw  strength  from  it.  What- 
yer  the  differences  between  my  coun- 
|y  and  yours,  we  are  moving  along  the 
kth  of  democracy  toward  a  common 
jDal  of  human  development.  I  speak 
)r  all  Americans  when  1  say  that  I  am 
;eply  grateful  that  you  and  I  travel 
lat  road  together. 


RRIVAL,  RIYADH, 

M.  King  Khalid 

Mr.  President,  I  welcome  Your  Ex- 
;llency  in  our  country  as  a  great 
lend,  and  I  thank  you  for  your  efforts 

find  a  just  and  lasting  solution  for 
e  problem  of  the  Middle  East.  I  wish 
[our  Excellency  a  pleasant  stay  in  this 
iendly  country  and  success  in  your 
ip  and  commendable  endeavors. 

resident  Carter 

Alsalamii  elkum.  Peace  be  unto  you. 
he  primary  purpose  of  my  trip  and 
is  visit  is  peace. 

The  first  meeting  between  the  lead- 
s  of  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  United 
ates  of  America  was  when  President 

anklin  Roosevelt  came  to  the  Gulf  of 
iez  to  meet  with  King  Abdul  Aziz, 
his  friendship  has  now  grown  to  en- 
jmpass  the  millions  of  people  in  our 
\io  nations.  We  work  together  now, 
id  we  plan  together  for  the  future, 
he  ties  which  bind  us  together  are 
rong  and  unbreakable. 

Although  our  time  here  is  all  too 
rief,  I  have  already  learned  much 
cm  Crown  Prince  Fahd  [bin  Abdul 
,ziz.  First  Deputy  Prime  Minister], 
rince  Sa"ud  [bin  Faisal,  Saudi  Foreign 
linister],  and  other  leaders  from  Saudi 
.rabia  who  have  recently  visited  me  in 
ly  own  country.  Now  I  am  glad  to 
leet  with  Your  Majesty  for  close  con- 
ultation  on  matters  of  great  mutual 
iterest  to  our  people. 

As  Your  Majesty  has  already  said,  a 
lost  important  subject  which  will  be 
iscussed  is  the  early  achievement  of  a 
JSt  and  lasting  peace  in  the  Middle 
iast. 

I  recall  the  traditional  Arabic  wel- 
ome,  Ahlan  wa  sahlan.  It  is  beautiful 
nd  simple.  And  my  understanding  is 
hat  it  means,  "You  are  among  your 
iwn  people,  and  your  steps  will  be  un- 
lindered."  Seeing  the  generosity  of 


11 


Willi  I'ri'iuU'til  S<iil<il 

this  welcome,  I  feel  that  I  am  among 
my  own  people  and  know  that  my  steps 
will  not  be  hindered,  because  I  walk 
the  same  path  as  Your  Majesty,  King 
Khalid,  toward  a  common  goal  of  even 
greater  friendship  among  our  people, 
between  our  two  countries,  and  of 
peace  for  all  the  people  of  the  world. 

Your  Majesty,  we  are  glad  to  be  in 
your  great  country. 


EXCHANGE  OF  REMARKS, 
ASWAN,  JAN.  4" 

President  Sadat 

I  want  to  tell  you  that  it  is  a  very 
happy  occasion  for  me  and  for  my 
people,  also,  to  receive  our  dear  friend. 
President  Carter,  here  on  the  Egyptian 
land.  We  would  have  liked  that  this 
visit  would  have  lasted  a  bit  longer,  but 
we  know  his  commitments. 

We  had  a  very  intensive  and  fruitful 
talk  upon  the  whole  arena — in  particu- 
lar, the  conflict  here  in  the  Middle  East 
and  the  whole  international  position 
and  our  bilateral  relations.  I  am  very 
happy  to  say  that  our  views  were  iden- 
tical, and  we  have  agreed  upon  certain 
steps  to  keep  the  momentum  of  the 
peace  process. 

All  I  ask  is  let  us  have  in  a  very  short 
time  the  opportunity  to  welcome  Presi- 
dent Carter  and  to  show  him  the 
gratitude  of  my  people  and  myself. 

In  the  same  time,  may  I  say  that  in 
the  peace  process  we  welcome  all  the 
parties  concerned.  And  they  are  wel- 
come whenever  they  find  it  convenient 
to  them,  because  this  time,  as  I  have 
already  repeated  before,  we  are  head- 


ing toward  peace  and  real  peace  in  the 
area,  permanent  peace. 


President  Carter 

It  is  an  honor  and  a  pleasure  for  us  to 
be  in  this  great  country,  led  by  such  a 
strong  and  courageous  man. 

Mr.  President,  your  bold  initiative  in 
seeking  peace  has  aroused  the  admira- 
tion of  the  entire  world.  One  of  my 
most  valued  possessions  is  the  warm, 
personal  relationship  which  binds  me 
and  President  Sadat  together  and  which 
exemplifies  the  friendship  and  the 
common  purpose  of  the  people  of 
Egypt  and  the  people  of  the  United 
States  of  America. 

The  Egyptian-Israeli  peace  initiative 
must  succeed,  while  still  guarding  the 
sacred  and  historic  principles  held  by 
the  nations  who  have  suffered  so  much 
in  this  region.  There  is  no  good  reason 
why  accommodation  cannot  be 
reached. 

In  my  own  private  discussions  with 
both  Arab  and  Israeli  leaders,  I  have 
been  deeply  impressed  by  the  unani- 
mous desire  for  peace.  My  presence 
here  today  is  a  direct  result  of  the 
courageous  initiative  which  President 
Sadat  undertook  in  his  recent  trip  to 
Jerusalem. 

The  negotiating  process  will  con- 
tinue in  the  near  future.  We  fully  sup- 
port this  effort,  and  we  intend  to  play 
an  active  role  in  the  work  of  the  Politi- 
cal Committee  of  Cairo,  which  will 
soon  reconvene  in  Jerusalem. 

We  believe  that  there  are  certain 
principles,  fundamentally,  which  must 
be  observed  before  a  just  and  a  com- 
prehensive peace  can  be  achieved. 


12 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


With  Wesi  German  Chancellor  Helmut  Schmidt 
in  Aswan 

•  First,  true  peace  must  be  based  on 
normal  relations  among  the  parties  to 
the  peace.  Peace  means  more  than  just 
an  end  to  belligerency. 

•  Second,  there  must  be  withdrawal 
by  Israel  from  territories  occupied  in 
1967  and  agreement  on  secure  and  rec- 
ognized borders  for  all  parties  in  the 
context  of  normal  and  peaceful  rela- 
tions in  accordance  with  U.N.  Resolu- 
tions 242  and  338. 

•  Third,  there  must  be  a  resolution 
of  the  Palestinian  problem  in  all  its  as- 
pects. The  problem  must  recognize  the 
legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian 
people  and  enable  the  Palestinians  to 
participate  in  the  determination  of  their 
own  future. 

Some  flexibility  is  always  needed  to 
insure  successful  negotiations  and  the 
resolution  of  conflicting  views.  We 
know  that  the  mark  of  greatness  among 
leaders  is  to  consider  carefully  the 
views  of  others  and  the  greater  benefits 
that  can  result  among  the  people  of  all 
nations  which  can  come  from  a  suc- 
cessful search  for  peace. 

Mr.  President,  our  consultations  this 
morning  have  reconfirmed  our  common 
commitment  to  the  fundamentals  which 
will,  with  God's  help,  make  1978  the 
year  for  permanent  peace  in  the  Middle 
East. 


REMARKS  AT  THE 
PALAIS  DES  CONGRES, 
PARIS,  JAN.  4'» 

This  afternoon  I  laid  a  wreath, 
along  with  the  President  of  France,  on 
the  grave  of  the  soldier  who  commemo- 
rated the  bravery  of  the  French  people. 
And  standing  on  my  left  was  a  group  of 
men  in  the  same  regiment  who  fought 
with  George  Washington  at  Yorktown 
200  years  ago. 


When  our  democracy  was  born, 
France  was  there.  And  for  more  than 
200  years,  our  two  nations  have  shared 
the  same  ideals  and  the  same  culture. 

There  is  one  belief  above  all  others 
that  has  made  us  what  we  are.  This  is 
the  belief  that  the  rights  of  the  indi- 
vidual inherently  stand  higher  than  the 
claims  or  demands  of  the  state.  This  is 
the  message  that  the  American  and 
French  peoples,  each  in  turn,  carried 
forward  to  the  world  two  centuries  ago, 
and  these  are  the  values  which  the 
world  still  depends  upon  us  to  affirm. 

Democracy  was  then  a  new  and  an 
untried  concept.  Now  it  is  a  standard 
for  our  Western  civilization.  The 
American  Declaration  of  Independ- 
ence, inspired  so  greatly  by  French  phi- 
losophy, spoke  of  the  "unalienable 
rights"  of  persons,  of  life  and  liberty 
and  the  pursuit  of  happiness.  These 
rights  were  controversial  then,  and  now 
they  are  the  measure  by  which  the 
faithfulness  of  governments  is  tested. 
Democracy  is  indeed  a  compelling 
idea,  an  idea  so  attractive  that  even  its 
enemies  now  attempt  to  cloak  repres- 
sion with  false  democratic  labels. 

But  our  democratic  order  has  come 
under  challenge.  There  are  those  who 
question  whether  democratic  values  are 
appropriate  for  contemporary  circum- 
stances. Voices  in  the  developing 
world  ask  whether  notions  of  free 
speech,  personal  liberty,  freely  chosen 
governments  should  not  be  pushed 
aside  in  the  struggle  to  overcome  pov- 
erty. Voices  in  the  industrialized  world 
ask  whether  democracy  equips  us  for 
the  frenzied  pace  of  change  in  our  own 
modern  lives. 

We've  heard  warnings  that  a  demo- 
cratic society  cannot  impose  on  itself 
the  restraint  and  self-discipline  which 
is  necessary  to  cope  with  persistent 
economic  problems.  We've  heard  that 
the  disparate  elements  of  our  societies 
cannot  cohere  in  a  democratic  system. 
Governments  everywhere  have  begun 
to  seem  remote  and  impersonal,  in- 
competent. Many  people  question 
whether  any  government  can  hear  their 
distant  and  solitary  voices. 

These  problems  are  real,  and  we 
must  admit  their  existence.  But  we 
must  also  bear  the  burden  that  demo- 
cratic society  imposes  on  those  like  us 
who  are  part  of  it.  That  is  to  proclaim 
our  unshaken  faith  in  the  values  of  our 
democratic  nations  and  our  belief  that 
those  values  are  still  relevant — to  the 
rich  and  the  poor,  the  North  and  South, 
East  and  West,  as  constant  now  as  they 
were  when  our  forebears  signed  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  and  your 
forebears  proclaimed  the  Declaration  of 
the  Rights  of  Man. 

We  defend  these  values  because  they 


are  right,  because  there  is  no  high 
purpose  for  the  state  than  to  preser 
these  rights  for  its  citizens.  But  we  c 
fend  them  also  in  the  faith  that  there 
no  contradiction  between  preservi 
our  democratic  values  on  the  one  ha 
and  meeting  challenges  which  face  c 
modern  societies. 

It's  precisely  when  democracy  is 
against  difficult  challenges  that 
leaders  must  show  firmness  in  resisti 
the  temptation  of  finding  solutions 
nondemocratic  forces. 

This  week,  in  India,  I  discussed  c 
belief  that  only  through  respect  for  i 
dividual  liberties  can  developing  n 
tions  achieve  their  full  economic  a 
political  potential.  That  is  our  fail 
And  India,  the  world's  large 
democracy — they  are  proving  that  it 
still  true. 

Here  in  France  we  meet  as  indi 
trial ized  powers  to  affirm  that  our  cc 
fidence  in  a  democratic  future  for  the 
developed  societies  is  equally  strong 

Democracy  is  not  merely  right  a 
just.   It's  also  the  system  that  is  t 
most  consistent  with  human  nature.  I 
the  most  effective  way  to  organize  vm 
ciety  for  the  common  good.  | 

Where  the  state  dominates  ever 
thing,  only  the  narrow  talents  of  I 
bureaucrat  are  free  to  flower.  But  i 
pluralistic  society  that  exists  withir 
democracy  allows  for  a  broad  range 
succeed — in  government,  in  the  arts, 
labor,  in  technology,  in  the  scienc 
and  in  the  marketplace  as  well. 

Democracy  unleashes  the  inn; 
creative  energy  of  each  of  us.  We  ne 
look  no  further  back  than  the  last  thi 
decades  to  see  unparalleled  succe 
These  years  have  been  extraordinary 
the  time  for  France,  for  Weste 
Europe,  the  United  States,  and  otl' 
democratic  nations. 

France  and   its  partners  in   Westc 
Europe  rose  from  the  destruction  a 
the  turmoil  of  World  War  II  to  bu 
economies  and  societies  more  thrivi ; 
and  productive  than  ever  before  and  ' 
regain  positions  of  world  leaders^ 
very  rapidly. 

Never  have  so  many  new  jobs  and  • 
much  new  wealth  been  created  or  < 
much  change  in  people's  lives  bei 
managed  so  effectively  and  yet  with  < 
much  freedom. 

All  of  this  is  no  accident.   NatiO' 
with  other  political  systems,  in  spite  " 
their  great   human   and   natural  r 
sources,  have  not  done  as  well. 

And  democracy  protects  us  al 
against  the  excesses  of  modernizatic 
It  helps  us  constantly  to  reduce  t! 
rising  complexity  of  modern  life  i 
human  terms.  At  a  time  when  the  coi 
puter  makes  total  state  control  mc^ 
possible  than  ever — processing  peep 


•  tbruary  1978 


13 


:  jke  numbers — democracy  stands 
ijard,  protecting  the  uniqueness  of  the 
dividual. 

This  is  why  the  great  trend  of  emi- 
lition  is  from  those  states  which  deny 
isic  rights  to  their  people  and  toward 
e  free  nations  of  the  West.  That's 
Ihy  India,  under  the  greatest  trial  and 
■nsion,  has  reaffirmed  its  commitment 
rule  by  the  people,  and  that's  why 
irtugal  and  Spain  and  Greece  have  re- 
ined the  ranks  of  Europe's  democra- 
:  nations. 

eed  for  Responsive  Government 

We  do  not  fear  the  challenges  which 
St  our  chosen  form  of  government. 
Jt  today  we  need  a  new  agenda  for 
■mocracy.  The  first  task  on  this 
enda  is  to  devise  ways  in  which  gov- 
nment  and  social  institutions  can  bet- 
r  and  more  quickly  respond  to  the 
igher  standards  of  leadership  and  serv- 
;  which  are  now  being  demanded  by 
ir  people. 

It's  a  time  of  testing.  Already  the 
ried  experiments  are  underway,  ac- 
irding  to  the  unique  traditions  and 
eds  of  each  individual  country.  In 
estern  Europe  successful  sharing  of 
e  fruits  of  economic  growth  at  all 
vels  has  provided  a  way  to  help  in 
ciety  overcoming  mounting  social 
oblems. 

•  In  France  you  are  making  a  young 
)nstitution  work  in  balancing  au- 
ority  between  the  executive  and  the 
gislature. 

•  In  some  countries,  like  Germany 
id  Scandinavia,  there  are  continuing 
cperiments  in  new  forms  of  inter- 
■lationship  between  labor  and 
anagement. 

•  The  member  nations  of  the  Euro- 
:an  Community  are  planning  to  hold 
rect  elections  among  the  nations  for 
e  European  Parliament. 

•  In  my  own  nation,  we  are  trying  to 
^duce  government  regulation  in  areas 
stter  left  to  private  enterprise  or  to  the 
idividuals. 

•  And  in  several  nations,  including 
Dme  of  our  own,  there  is  emphasis  on 
trengthening  the  role  of  local  govern- 
lent,  on  decentralizing  power,  and  on 
'orking  through  voluntary  associations 
3  meet  particular  problems  and  needs. 

In  these  and  other  ways  we  can  make 
overnment  more  responsive,  account- 
ble,  and  also  closer  to  the  people, 
iostering  a  renewed  sense  of  confi- 
ence  in  our  national  and  in  our  local 
ommunities. 

■  We  can  also  find  new  answers  to  the 
['Id  problems  of  combining  freedom 
vith  responsibility.   As  President  Gis- 


Rt'ltiniitii^  lo  Paris  b\  train  from  Normamly 


card  d'Estaing  wrote  in  his  book, 
"Towards  a  New  Democracy":  "The 
pluralism  of  power  guarantees  free- 
dom. .  .  .  Democratic  progress  does 
not  result  in  disorder,  but  in  a  better 
balance  of  order  within  freedom  and 
responsibility." 

Economic  Challenge 

The  second  item  on  the  new  agenda 
for  democracy  is  the  economic  chal- 
lenge. We  must  not  only  restore 
growth,  control  inflation,  and  reduce 
unemployment;  we  must  also  demon- 
strate that  our  democratic  economic 
system  can  adapt  to  the  demands  that 
are  constantly  changing  and  placed 
upon  it.  This  means  proving  again  that 
we  have  the  self-discipline  to  pursue 
our  future,  no  less  than  our  current 
interests,  so  that  contending  domestic 
groups  will  not  produce  chaos  and  dis- 
cord but  a  new  harmony  of  effort  for 
the  common  good. 

It  means  increasing  our  efforts  to  in- 
sure that  the  fruits  of  economic  growth 
reach  all  parts  of  society  so  that  each 
individual  will  share  in  the  benefits  of 
economic  progress.  And  it  means  using 
our  resources  to  promote  human 
development — not  just  growth  for  its 
own  sake. 

Our  democratic  economies  now  have 
unprecedented  strength  to  meet  this 
challenge.  We  have  skilled  work 
forces.  We  have  productive  plants  and 
equipment,  effective  management,  and 
the  will  and  the  means  to  cooperate 
closely  with  one  another — both  within 
nations  and  also  among  nations. 

And  in  the  free  market  we  have  a 
means  of  matching  production  to 
human  needs  that  is  swifter  and  more 
subtle  than  any  computer,  more  sensi- 


tive to  society's  requirements  than  any 
state  committee. 

My  country  is  able  and  willing  to 
join  with  its  partners  in  building  on  that 
strength,  to  put  the  global  economy  on 
the  path  to  growth  and  to  rising  pros- 
perity. America's  efforts  will  be  di- 
rected toward  maintaining  the  strength 
of  the  dollar,  continuing  steady  prog- 
ress against  unemployment  and 
inflation,  and  stimulating  private 
investment. 

This  year  we  will  cut  taxes  substan- 
tially for  both  business  and  consumers, 
and  we'll  take  these  steps  primarily  be- 
cause they  are  in  our  own  interests,  but 
also  because  we  recognize  the  impor- 
tance of  continued  noninflationary  re- 
covery in  the  United  States  to  the 
economies  of  the  rest  of  the  world. 

We  are  working  with  our  economic 
partners  also  in  the  Geneva  trade 
negotiations  to  reach  rapid  agreement 
that  will  improve  the  open  trading  sys- 
tem, expand  commerce,  and  create  new 
jobs.  And  following  the  French  exam- 
ple, we  are  hard  at  work  on  a  com- 
prehensive energy  program  which  will 
lessen  our  imports  of  foreign  oil,  re- 
duce undue  dependence,  and  cut  the 
deficit  in  our  balance  of  trade. 

France  and  America  and  the  other 
industrial  democracies  are  emerging 
from  the  economic  recession  of  recent 
years.  Some  of  us  can  turn  our  atten- 
tion at  once  to  noninflationary  growth, 
like  the  United  States.  Others  must  first 
take  painful  measures  simply  to  reduce 
inflation.  As  more  nations  are  able  to 
pursue  higher  growth,  our  economies 
will  create  more  jobs,  and  unemploy- 
ment will  go  down. 

Confidence  in  steady  growth  will  re- 
duce pressures  for  trade  restrictions, 
protectionism,  make  it  easier  for  us  to 


14 


Department  of  State  Bulle* 


adapt  to  changes  within  our  societies, 
help  us  to  make  more  efficient  use  of 
energy,  and  make  it  easier  for  countries 
with  payments  surpluses  to  open  their 
markets  to  developed  and  developing 
nations  alike. 

But  there  are  also  many  other  eco- 
nomic needs  today.  The  economic  in- 
stitutions that  served  us  well  in  the  past 
need  to  be  strengthened.  We  must 
reach  a  better  understanding  of  basic 
economic  forces  so  that  we  can  solve 
the  problems  simultaneously  of  infla- 
tion and  unemployment.  We've  not  yet 
been  able  to  do  this. 

We  must  devote  much  greater  effort 
to  further  advances  in  high  technology 
to  help  all  our  nations  compete  effec- 
tively in  tomorrow's  markets. 

We  must  develop  new  and  produc- 
tive industries  and  services  so  that  we 
can  moderate  the  impact  on  our  peoples 
of  change  imposed  by  increased  global 
competition  for  jobs  and  markets  that's 
sure  to  come.  And  we  must  solve  the 
problem  of  youth  unemployment.  Un- 
less we  do,  an  entire  generation  could 
be  estranged  from  our  democratic 
societies. 

We  must  take  steps  to  avoid  export- 
ing our  economic  difficulties  to  other 
nations,  whether  rich  or  poor.  And  we 
must  use  the  tools  of  shared  freedom  to 
increase  the  choices  and  opportunities 
of  our  economic  system.  We  can  share 
our  experience  in  social  development, 
in  education,  health  care,  social  serv- 
ices, and  the  organization  and  man- 
agement of  farms  and  factories. 

At  the  heart  of  all  these  efforts  is 
continued  cooperation,  along  with  our 
other  economic  partners,  in  such  ways 
as  the  economic  summits,  which  were 
first  proposed  by  France.  This  coopera- 
tion should  recognize  the  individuality 
of  each  nation,  while  acknowledging 
that  our  economic  well-being  will  rise 
or  fall  together. 


Mutual  Security 

The  third  task  on  the  new  agenda  for 
democracy  is  to  provide  for  our  mutual 
security. 

I  come  to  France  today  recognizing 
that  our  two  nations  share  a  basic 
commitment  to  preserve  our  hard-won 
freedom.  We  are  able,  with  our  allies, 
to  keep  our  freedom  precisely  because 
we  are  militarily  strong. 

Our  central  security  system  today 
and  our  central  problem  is  maintaining 
our  will  to  keep  the  military  strength 
we  need,  while  seeking  at  the  same 
time  every  opportunity  to  build  a  better 
peace.  Military  power  without  detente 
may  lead  to  conflict,  but  detente  would 
be  impossible  without  the  NATO  al- 


liance and  popular  support  for  a  strong 
defense. 

Both  France  and  America  prove  that 
the  peoples  of  a  democracy  can  and 
will  support  these  joint  goals  of  con- 
stant strength  and  also  a  commitment  to 
peace.  The  commitment  of  the  Ameri- 
can Government  and  the  American 
people  to  the  security  of  Europe  is  ab- 
solute. There  should  be  no  doubt  that 
we  will  maintain  in  Europe  whatever 
forces  are  needed  to  meet  that  com- 
mitment. We  are  also  grateful  that 
France  maintains  and  improves  its 
forces  that  are  essential  for  defense. 

But  we  also  see  the  need  to  move 
beyond  confrontation,  to  resolve  the 
differences  between  East  and  West, 
and  to  progress  toward  arms  control 
and  disarmament. 

We  are  determined  to  seek  balanced 
and  mutual  limits  on  both  qualitative 
and  quantitative  deployment  of  nuclear 
weapons,  and  then  substantial  reduc- 
tions, leading  to  the  eventual  elimina- 
tion of  nuclear  weapons  as  a  potential 
destructive  force  among  the  nations  of 
the  world. 

We  are  determined  to  seek  early 
agreement  on  a  comprehensive  ban  of 
the  testing  of  all  nuclear  explosives, 
both  military  weapons  and  also  the  so- 
called  peaceful  nuclear  devices.  And 
we  are  determined  to  seek  a  substantial 
reduction  of  the  international  com- 
merce in  conventional  weapons. 

We'll  work  with  other  nations  to 
achieve  the  advantages  which  such 
agreements  can  bring.  While  the  ap- 
proaches of  France  and  the  United 
States  to  these  issues  may  sometimes 
differ,  our  desire  to  build  a  more  stable 
peace  is  one  and  the  same.  And  in  all 
these  efforts,  we  will  consult  and  coop- 
erate closely  with  you  and  with  our 
other  allies,  recognizing  the  independ- 
ence of  each  nation  but  also  our  mutual 
interests  and  our  mutual  commitments. 


European  Community 

The  fourth  task  on  democracy's  new 
agenda  is  the  effort  of  Europeans  to 
shape  your  future.  For  the  goal  that 
you've  set  for  yourselves,  with  your 
partners  in  the  European  Community, 
is  nothing  less  than  to  transform — in  an 
unprecedented  fashion  in  history — and 
to  improve  relations  among  states  with 
ancient  traditions,  unique  histories,  and 
legitimate  pride  in  national 
achievement. 

The  United  States  will  give  its  un- 
qualified support  to  what  you  and  your 
partners  in  the  Nine  are  doing  to 
strengthen  European  cooperation,  for 
we  see  European  strength  and  unity  as 
a  boon  and  not  as  a  threat  to  us.  The 


real  threat  to  the  interests  of  us  aij 
would  be  economic   weakness  ar 
disunity. 


North-South  Relations 

The  fifth  and  the  final  item  on  th 
new  agenda  for  democracy  is  to  coop 
erate  among  ourselves  in  adapting  tE 
global  change.  The  same  factors  whic 
led  to  our  economic  successes  over  th 
past  two  generations — science,  tech 
nology,  education,  health,  will  an 
wisdom  of  our  people — have  also  a 
tered  the  interrelationship  between  tl 
industrial  democracies  on  the  one  han 
and  the  developing  world  on  the  othei 

European  nations,  individually  or  t( 
gether,  also  have  an  increasing  role  I 
play  beyond  this  continent,  particularl 
in  reordering  relations  between  Non 
and  South. 

It  was  less  than  100  years  ago  th. 
the  European  powers  met  and  divide 
the  continent  of  Africa  among  you,  ar 
yet  today  colonialism  has  nearly  endec 
Before  World  War  11,  80%  of  th 
world's  land  mass  and  75%  of  i 
people  were  under  Western  authorit; 
but  today  there  are  more  than  100  ne 
nations,  each  with  insistent  needs  ar 
insistent  demands.  A  few  years  agi 
the  West  made  virtually  all  the  dec 
sions  about  the  global  economy,  b 
now  important  resources  are  also  und 
the  control  of  the  developir 
countries — as  the  energy  crisis  h; 
made  very  clear.  The  councils  of  eC' 
nomic  action  can  no  longer  be  limit( 
just  to  a  few. 

During  this  trip,  I've  seen  how  tl 
developing  nations  are  creating  a  ne 
role  for  themselves  in  the  world's  ec 
nomic  system,  redistributing  glob 
power,  posing  new  global  problem 
and  assuming  new  rights  and  ne 
responsibilities. 

We've  long  understood  that  great 
individual  equality  can  bring  for 
greater  prosperity  in  our  domest 
societies.  But  now  we  also  see  ho 
greater  equality  among  nations  a 
promote  the  health  of  the  global  ecoi 
omy,  including  our  own.  No  natioi 
nor  any  small  group  of  nations,  can  ar 
longer  shape  its  destiny  alone. 

In  proposing  the  North-South  coi 
ference.  President  Giscard  spoke  ( 
creating  new  forms  of  internation 
cooperation.  What  he  said  then  stam 
as  a  watchword  of  all  our  efforts  t( 
gether,  and  I  quote  him  again:  "(Thi 
should  not  constitute  a  victory  for  son 
countries  over  others,  achieved  by  tal 
ing  advantage  of  temporary  power  rel; 
tionships.  Rather  it  must  be  a  victory  ( 
mankind  over  itself.  .  .  ." 

If  we  move  in  that  spirit  and  direi 


ebruary  1978 


15 


ur  efforts  together  to  solving  the  prob- 
:ms  that  face  the  nations  of  the  world, 
hen  we  shall  surely  gain  that  victory  of 
,'hich  he  spoke.  We  will  vindicate  our 
eep  and  abiding  faith  in  the  strength 
f  democracy  to  grow  and  to  develop 
/ith  the  times. 

Six  days  ago,  I  left  the  United  States 
n  a  tour  whose  constant  theme  has 
leen  the  universal  vitality  of  democ- 
acy.  In  Poland,  Iran,  Saudi  Arabia, 
igypt,  India,  and  now  in  France,  I've 
mphasized  that  our  modern  struggle  is 
ot  only  to  establish  peace  but  also  to 
rotect  the  individual  from  abuse  by 
le  state. 

Tomorrow,  with  President  Giscard 
"Estaing,  I  will  leave  Paris  to  visit  the 
eaches  at  Normandy.  If  the  names 
)maha,  Utah,  Juno,  Gold,  and  Sword 
'ill  always  live  in  the  memories  of 
oth  our  peoples,  it's  because  they  re- 
lind  us  at  what  cost  our  liberties  have 
een  purchased  and  what  a  precious 
eritage  has  been  left  for  us  to  attend 
nd  to  defend.  These  names  remind  us 
lat  liberty  is  not  secured  with  just  one 
efense  but  must  be  struggled  for  again 
nd  again  and  again. 

Our  ancestors  made  their  defense 
'ith  principles  and  with  revolution, 
eople  of  my  parents'  generation,  and 
f  my  own,  bore  arms  in  the  name  of 
reedom.  Many  of  them  were  left  at 
lonnandy  Beach  and  at  the  thousands 
f  other  shrines  to  liberty  across  the 
/orld. 

Though  we  will  always  be  prepared, 
/e  pray  that  their  sacrifice  in  battle 
eed  never  be  repeated.  And  we  know 
lat  war  need  not  come  again  so  long 
s  we  transmit  our  devotion  to  those 
alues  of  free  people,  strengthened  and 
enewed,  to  each  succeeding  generation 
lat  comes  after  us. 


«:marks,  commission  of  the 
european  communities, 
brussels,  jan.  6' 

I  am  glad  to  meet  with  you  today  and 
o  continue  the  discussions  that  began 
vhen  my  Administration  was  only  a 
ew  hours  old.  Before  my  first  week  in 
)ffice  was  over.  Vice  President  Mon- 
lale  began  his  visit  to  our  traditional 
lilies,  stopping  first  of  all  in  Brussels, 
lome  of  those  international  institutions 
hat  represent  our  shared  hope  for  a  se- 
:ure  and  prosperous  future. 

As  the  first  American  President  to 
I'isit  the  headquarters  of  the  European 
Community,  I  believe  this  meeting 
symbolizes  America's  abiding  com- 
;nitment  to  a  strong  and  united  Europe 
ind  to  the  European  Community. 

It  has  been  my  pleasure  to  meet  often 


with  the  Community's  leaders.  In  addi- 
tion to  meeting  President  Jenkins  [Roy 
Jenkins,  President  of  the  Commission] 
both  at  the  London  economic  summit 
and  in  Washington,  I  benefited  from 
meeting  with  Prime  Ministers  Cal- 
laghan  [of  the  United  Kingdom]  and 
Tindemans  [of  Belgium]  during  their 
countries'  term  in  the  presidency  of  the 
Council. 

As  I  have  traveled  in  these  last  9 
days,  crossing  continents  and  cultures, 
discussing  different  systems  of  politics 
and  economics,  seeing  humanity  in  its 
full,  diverse  array,  I  have  reaffirmed 
certain  constant  themes  time  after  time. 
I  have  stressed  the  importance  of 
democratic  political  values  and  the 
steps  needed  to  defend  them,  the  eco- 
nomic challenges  we  face  in  our  rela- 
tions with  the  developing  world,  and 
the  need  to  cope  with  problems  of  our 
own.  We  must  also  open  our  hearts  to 
improve  the  chances  for  peace,  while 
always  maintaining  the  strong  right  arm 
of  our  defense. 

I  have  repeated  these  themes  because 
they  need  repetition,  because  they  ex- 
press to  the  world  the  values  my  nation 
most  deeply  holds. 

I  am  proud  today  to  add  another — 
that  the  United  States  welcomes  a 
strong,  united  Europe  as  a  common 
force  for  the  values  our  peoples  share. 
The  United  States  will  do  its  part  to 
work  with  you. 

Our  economy  is  prosperous  and 
growing,  continuing  its  steady  recov- 
ery. Because  we  have  confidence  in  the 
fundamental  strength  of  our  economy, 
we  have  confidence  in  the  fundamental 
strength  of  the  dollar,  now  and  for  the 
future.  But,  we  are  also  aware  of  the 
degree  to  which  our  own  prosperity  de- 
pends more  than  ever  on  international 
economic  cooperation. 

We  are  prepared  to  work  with  the 
Community  in  a  wide  variety  of  ways, 
in  order: 

•  To  promote  the  economic  growth 
of  nations  so  as  to  control  inflation,  re- 
duce unemployment,  and  achieve 
monetary  stability; 

•  To  reach  a  rapid  and  successful 
conclusion  to  the  multilateral  trade 
negotiations  and  thus  to  expand  inter- 
national trade,  create  more  jobs  in  all 
countries,  and  help  us  all  resist  protec- 
tionist pressures; 

•  To  work  creatively  toward  mutu- 
ally beneficial  relations  with  the  de- 
veloping nations; 

•  To  cooperate  in  providing  a  role 
for  nuclear  technology  in  meeting  our 
energy  needs  without  hazarding  our 
children's  future  through  the  threat  of 
nuclear  proliferation;  and 

•  To  find  answers  together  to  social 


and  economic  problems  facing  each  of 
our  societies. 

As  I  said  in  Paris  2  days  ago,  we 
must  use  the  tools  of  shared  freedom  to 
increase  the  choices  and  opportunities 
in  our  economic  system. 

We  can  share  our  experience  in  so- 
cial development — in  education,  health 
care,  social  services,  the  organization 
and  management  of  factory  and  farm. 

As  the  world's  largest  trading  unit, 
the  Community  shares  with  us  a  clear 
interest  in  a  successful  conclusion  to 
the  multilateral  trade  negotiations. 
They  are  progressing  well,  though 
much  remains  to  be  done. 

I  welcome  the  success  of  the  par- 
ticipating nations  in  reaching  the  goal 
set  last  May  in  London:  substantial 
progress  by  the  end  of  1977.  What  has 
been  achieved  already  should  enable 
the  negotiations  to  end  this  year.  Speed 
is  important  if  these  negotiations  are  to 
improve  the  world  trading  system  and 
remove  pressure  for  protectionism. 

We  need  a  broad  package  of  agree- 
ments, with  major  reductions  in  tariffs 
and  nontariff  barriers  and  with  provi- 
sions for  agriculture. 

We  know  that  each  country  will  face 
problems  of  transition  to  a  freer  trading 
system.  But  those  are  a  small  price  to 
pay  for  the  benefits  of  more  open  trade. 
And  they  are  small,  too,  in  comparison 
to  the  danger  of  protectionism  if  we  fail 
to  reach  a  comprehensive  agreement. 

Our  nations  also  share  concern  for 
developing  comprehensive  energy  pro- 
grams. Two  months  ago,  I  postponed 
my  visit  here  to  Brussels  in  order  to  do 
everything  possible  to  enact  an  energy 
program  in  the  United  States.  My  coun- 
try must  waste  less  energy  and  develop 
alternative  sources  of  supply.  As  soon 
as  I  return,  I  will  resume  work  on  this 
crucial  legislation. 

I  am  confident  that  the  United  States 
will  soon  be  setting  an  example  for  re- 
sponsible energy  policy. 

The  European  Community  and  the 
United  States  also  share  a  deep  interest 
in  promoting  relations  with  developing 
countries,  and  our  cooperation  has  led 
to  constructive  results. 

We  must  continue  to  work  together 
to  draw  these  countries  more  fully  into 
the  global  economy.  They  too  must  be 
able  to  share  more  equitably  in  the 
benefits  and  responsibilities  of  global 
economic  progress  and  to  play  an  ap- 
propriate role  in  making  global  eco- 
nomic decisions. 

We  in  the  United  States  also  wel- 
come the  growing  political  and  eco- 
nomic role  of  the  Community  beyond 
Western  Europe.  The  role  of  the  Com- 
munity contributes  vitally  to  reaching 
goals  we  share.  Most  recently,  I  have 


Department  of  State  Bulle* 


been  particularly  pleased  by  the  close 
cooperation  between  us — and  by  the 
firm  leadership  shown  by  the  members 
of  the  Community — at  the  Belgrade 
Review  Conference  on  Security  and 
Cooperation  in  Europe. 

Finally,  in  stressing  our  commitment 
to  European  unity,  I  look  forward  to 
continuing  a  close  and  productive  as- 
sociation between  the  United  States  and 
the  European  Community  in  the  years 
ahead.  And  1  can  think  of  no  more  fit- 
ting tribute  to  what  you  are  doing  than 
to  cite  the  words  of  Jean  Monnet,  the 
father  of  European  unity:  "You  are  not 
making  a  coalition  of  states;  you  are 
uniting  peoples." 


REMARKS,  NORTH  ATLANTIC 
COUNCIL,  BRUSSELS, 
JAN.  6  ' 

I  am  happy  to  meet  again  with  the 
North  Atlantic  Council,  after  our  suc- 
cessful discussions  in  London  last 
May. 

I  come  to  see  you  at  the  end  of  a 
journey  which  has  taken  me  to  seven 
nations  and  which,  from  beginning  to 
end.  has  reminded  me  of  the  causes  for 
which  our  alliance  was  formed. 

At  every  point  on  this  journey,  in 
East  and  West,  in  nations  trying  to 
cope  with  their  poverty  and  those  adjust- 
ing to  the  consequences  of  material 
wealth,  I  have  emphasized  the  vitality 
of  democratic  rule,  individual  free- 
doms, human  rights. 

We  in  this  hall  understand  those  val- 
ues well.  Without  them,  the  West 
stands  for  nothing  at  all.  And  we  also 
know,  too  often  from  personal  experi- 
ence, the  cost  the  defense  of  these 
liberties  can  demand. 

Yesterday,  I  walked  with  President 
Giscard  d'Estaing  along  the  beaches  of 
Normandy — as  I  might  also  have 
walked  in  Anzio,  in  Verdun,  or  here  in 
Belgium  in  Flanders  Field.  If  those 
names  fill  us  simultaneously  with 
mourning  and  with  pride,  it  is  because 
they  remind  us  of  the  price  that  has 
been  paid  for  our  freedom  before,  the 
price  we  hope  never  to  have  to  pay 
again. 

No  one  who  recalls  those  sacrifices 
can  wish  them  ever  to  be  repeated.  The 
ancient  soil  of  Europe  bears  constant, 
visible  evidence  of  the  carnage  that  war 
inevitably  brings.  In  Warsaw,  I  saw 
brave  people  who  have  rebuilt  much  of 
the  graceful  city  that  war  took  from 
them;  but  what  is  new  only  emphasizes 
how  much  of  the  old  was  lost.  Here  in 
Belgium,  too  often  the  battlefield  of 
Europe,  every  family  knows  of  friends, 
homes,  dreams  that  have  been  crushed 
by  war. 


That  is  the  challenge  for  our  alliance: 
to  defend  our  values  fearlessly,  while 
tirelessly  working  to  prevent  war. 

We  know  that  the  path  to  lasting 
peace  depends  on  human  understand- 
ings, negotiated  agreements,  acts  of 
good  will;  the  brave  initiatives  in  the 
Middle  East  shine  a  ray  of  hope  onto 
all  international  efforts.  But  we  are 
united  in  believing  that  our  defense 
must  always  be  strong  enough  to  deter 
any  thoughts  of  aggression — that  we 
must  be  prepared  for  combat  we  always 
hope  to  avoid. 

When  I  met  with  the  leaders  of  the 
alliance  in  London  this  past  May,  I  was 
impressed  with  the  allies'  seriousness 
of  purpose  and  by  our  common  deter- 
mination to  prepare  NATO  for  the  chal- 
lenges of  the  next  decade. 

At  that  meeting,  we  agreed  to  em- 
bark on  four  major  efforts: 

•  Short-term  measures  to  meet  im- 
mediate military  problems; 

•  A  long-term  defense  program,  sur- 
veying NATO's  requirements  in  10 
specific  areas; 

•  An  East- West  study  to  gain  better 
understanding  of  trends  in  Eastern 
Europe  and  the  Soviet  Union,  an  over- 
all assessment  of  Warsaw  Pact  power, 
and  the  implications  for  the  NATO  al- 
liance; and 

•  Intensified  effort  to  improve  coop- 
eration in  defense  procurement. 

We  have  already  taken  major  steps  in 
all  four  areas.  I  was  pleased  by  reports 
of  the  recent  ministerial  meeting  of  the 
Defense   Planning  Committee  and  the 


Last  slop   Brussels — President  Carter  ad- 
dresses NATO  meeting 


North  Atlantic  Council,  and  I  lo( 
forward  to  the  trans-Atlantic  dialog' 
on  defense  trade  that  the  Independe 
European  Program  Group  h; 
proposed. 

Together,  we  are  setting  the  NAT 
alliance  on  a  course  that  will  reaffir 
our  shared  commitment  to  peace,  to 
strong  and  vital  alliance,  and  to  mee 
ing  any  challenge  to  our  strength  ai 
cohesion  in  the  years  ahead.  ^.. 

The  leaders  of  the  alliance  will  haw 
the  opportunity  to  review  the  results  < 
our  efforts  in  a  summit-level  NAT 
conference  this  spring.  I  am  happy 
renew  my  invitation  to  the  alliance 
hold  that  meeting  in  Washington  t 
May  30  and  31. 

The  defense  budget  that  I  will  \ 
submitting  to  the  Congress  later  th 
month  will  provide  for  real  increases 
U.S.  defense  spending,  more  th; 
compensating  for  the  effects  of  infl 
tion.  Even  more  important,  a  maj 
part  of  this  effort  will  respond  direct 
to  our  objectives  in  the  long-term  d 
fense  program  and  will  improve  tl 
U.S.  military  commitment  to  tl 
alliance. 

The  number  of  U.S.   soldiers  i 
Europe  will  increase  by  more  th; 
8,000  in  the  next  year  and  a  half,  at    ^ 
we  will  substantially  improve  our  rei^ 
forcement  capability.  f 

We  have  made  these  efforts  in  tl  - 
name  of  the  alliance.  We  hope  th 
with  a  far-reaching,  realistic,  long-tei 
defense  program,  the  alliance  as 
whole  will  match  or  exceed  the  ir 
provements  which  we  ourselves  a 
now  undertaking. 

The  United  States  will  continue 
maintain — undiminished — its    fir 
commitment  to  NATO  and  will  co 
tinue  to  provide  the  forces  needed 
back  up  that  commitment. 

We  will  continue  to  subscribe  to  tl 
doctrine,  strategy,  and  policies  of  tl 
alliance,  including  forward  defense  ar 
tTexible  response. 

We  will  work  with  you  to  mainta 
deterrence  across  the  entire  spectrum  i 
strategic,  theater  nuclear,  and  convei 
tional  forces  so  that  the  Warsaw  Pa 
states  will  know  that  all  of  us  ai 
united  in  commitment  to  defense  of  a 
the  territories  of  NATO  members. 

There  will  be  no  flagging  of  Amer 
can  will  or  ability  to  meet  all  of  oi 
NATO  commitments,  which  have  tl 
firm  support  of  the  American  people. 

There  are  other  responsibilities  fac 
ing  the  alliance. 

We  have  set  an  excellent  record  ( 
consulting  with  one  another  on  a  wid 
range  of  issues.  That  can  and  shoul 
continue,  and  the  United  States  will  ir 
creasingly  draw  the  NATO  allies  int 
its  counsels. 


■ebruary  1978 

As  SALT  II  proceeds  toward  an 

greement,  which  we  hope  will  come 

oon,  we  will  intensify  our  consulta- 

ons  with  all  of  you,  recognizing  that 

le  Council  is  the  focus  of  our  delibera- 

on's.  As  we  move  beyond  SALT  II, 

e  will  undertake  broad  discussions 

ere  on  all  allied  security  issues. 

We  must  approach  these  issues  to- 

ether,  as  an  alliance,  and  judge  each 

uestion  in  the  context  of  our  overall 

;curity  requirements  for  the  next 

ecade. 

We  must  assure  that  our  force  plan- 
ing and  arms  control  strategies  serve 
le  same  purpose.  In  seeking  to  reduce 
■nsions  and  to  build  a  more  stable 
sace.  the  alliance  should  continue  to 
ive  high  priority  to  the  mutual  and 
alanced  force  reduction  talks  in 
;  I  ienna.   We  believe  our  negotiating 
11.  iroposals  would  lead  to  a  more  stable 
111- lilitary  situation  in  central  Europe, 
'  lith  lower  force  levels  on  both  sides. 
We  in  the  alliance  are  prepared  to  be 
exible  in  seeking  progress  toward  a 
1  lalanced  outcome  that  protects  our 
iterests.  But  serious  interest  in  mov- 
ig  the  talks  forward  cannot  be  one 
ded;  we  look  for  an  equal  commit- 
ent  and  contribution  toward  progress 
*  I  the  talks  from  the  Warsaw  Pact 
;  ates. 

Lastly,  as  allies,  we  must  continue  to 

I   omote  our  strength  in  other  areas— 

r.  ;onomic,  political,  social,  moral.  It  is 

;■  -ecisely  when  the  challenge  to  de- 

1   ocracy  is  greatest  that  our  leaders 

1  ust  most  firmly  resist  nondemocratic 

1  )lutions. 

I  have  every  confidence  that  the  na- 

3ns  of  the  alliance,  and  NATO  itself, 

ill  be  more  than  equal  to  these  tasks.' 

I  return  to  the  United  States  confi- 

;nt  of  the  prospects  for  a  peaceful 

orld  which  respects  human  rights;  I 

low  that  the  security  of  our  alliance  is 

le  rock  on  which  that  hope  is  built. 


17 


EWS  CONFERENCE  (EXCERPTS) 
BOARD  AIR  FORCE  ONE, 
4N.  6  ' 

Q.  Would  you  give  us  your  assess- 
lent  of  the  trip  and  what  you  think 
ou  accomplished? 

A.  I  wanted  to  project  the  image  of  a 
ation  that  stands  for  what  is  right  and 
ecent  and  good,  strengthen  the  con- 
spt  of  democracy,  both  in  the  develop- 
ig  and  the  developed  nations,  try  to 
lake  progress  on  resolving  the  Middle 
astern  dispute.  And  one  thing  that 
volved  everywhere  I  went  was  an  ex- 
ression  of  interest  or  concern  on  the 
art  of  the  foreign  leaders  about  how 
'e  were  going  to  address  the  energy 
uestion. 


Additionally,  of  course,  I  wanted  to 
strengthen,  if  possible,  the  friendship 
in  varying  degrees  that  existed  origi- 
nally between  our  own  nation  and  the 
other  countries  that  we  visited. 

I  had  never  been  before  to  India  or 
the  Middle  East— or  the  countries  that 
we  went  to  in  the  Middle  East.  These 
were  the  four  or  five  things  that  I  had 
in  mind.  I  think  we  did  a  fairly  good 
job. 

Q.  I  know  that's  what  you  in- 
tended to  do,  but  do  you  think  you 
accomplished  those?  What,  in  par- 
ticular, do  you  think  you  have 
accomplished? 

A.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  friend- 
ship between  ourselves  and  Poland, 
ourselves  and  India,  ourselves  and 
Saudi  Arabia,  ourselves  and  Iran,  our- 
selves and  Egypt,  ourselves  and 
France,  and  Belgium  were  enhanced. 
And  this  was  accomplished. 

I  believe  that  we  made  some  prog- 
ress in  the  Middle  East.  So  far  as  I 
know,  there  are  no  differences  that 
separate  us  from  Sadat,  for  instance. 
We  reemphasized  the  same  basic  prin- 
ciples that  we  proposed  6  or  8  months 
ago  to  the  Arab  and  the  Israeli  leaders. 
In  this  respect,  the  trip  was  successful. 
I  made  two  or  three  major  speeches, 
too:  one  on  democracy  as  it  relates  to 
the  developing  nations  in  the  world 
under  changing  circumstances;  the 
other  one,  democracy  as  it  relates  to 
the  developed  or  industrialized  nations 
in  the  world  in  changing  circum- 
stances. It's  hard  to  say  whether  the 
speech  has  made  any  impact  or  not. 

I  think  we  also  put  forward  the 
image  of  a  nation  that  is  strong  and  se- 
cure and  self-confident  but  which 
doesn't  have  to  prove  our  strength  by 
taking  advantage  of  other  nations  that 
are  not  so  strong  or  forceful  or  secure 
as  are  we. 

The  personal  relationships  that  I 
evolved  between  myself  and  the 
foreign  leaders  was  very  gratifying. 

I  would  say  the  most  emotional  day 
was  yesterday  with  the  visit  to  Nor- 
mandy and  the  reception  of  the  people 
in  Bayeux  and  the  response  of  the 
French  people  along  the  streets  of  Paris 
and  the  tremendous  crush  of  people 
that  showed  up  last  night  at  the  Palais 
de  Versailles.  It  was  a  very  deeply 
moving  experience. 


Q.  Do  you  think  that  there  were  a 
couple  of  gaffes— I  guess  it's  the 
word? 

A.  Yes.  There  were. 

Q.  In  the  Polish  translation,  the 
open  mike  in  New  Delhi— did  that 
cause  you  any  problems  in  dealing 


with  the  leaders,  or  will  it  cause  any 
permanent  problem  in  relations  with 
these  countries? 

A.  Both  were  inadvertent,  of  course. 
Gierek,  I  thought,  made  a  very  fine 
statement  afterward.  He  said,  "In  Po- 
land we  don't  criticize  women  or  trans- 
lators." [Laughter]  That  happened  the 
first  time  I  met  Gierek,  and  afterward 
we  had  a  very  fine  personal  relation- 
ship. He  never  commented  on  it  except 
just  to  smile  and  say,  "Well,  it  was 
kind  of  ancient  Polish  and  had  a  Rus- 
sian influence."  But  I  don't  think  it 
had  any  lasting  effect. 

And  I  have  read  the  news  reports  of 
the  statements  of  the  Indian  leaders 
after  we  left,  and  I  think,  perhaps, 
without  trying  to  be  overly  optismistic, 
that  It  kind  of  helped  me  and  [Prime 
Minister]  Desai  both.  I  was  very  force- 
ful about  our  nonproliferation  program, 
pointed  out  to  him  very  frankly  and 
bluntly  that  the  Congress  was  likely  to 
pass  stringent  requirements  on  fuel 
supplies  in  the  future,  with  my  ap- 
proval. And  I  wanted  him  to  know  at 
least  18  months  ahead  of  time  that  it 
would  affect  India. 

And  he  and  I  made  a  joke  of  it  sev- 
eral times  after  that  in  a  perfectly  easy 
way.  And  after  we  departed,  their  re- 
ports to  the  press  were  that  it  was  a 
very  constructive  visit. 

I  think  it  showed  Desai  was,  as  I  re- 
ferred to  him,  adamant  in  the  Indian 
position.  We  tried  to  evolve  some  solu- 
tion to  this  potential  conflict  about  in- 
ternational safeguards  on  production  of 
nuclear  power  versus  an  adequate  sup- 
ply of  fuel.  One  possibility  that  we  will 
explore  is  that  if  we  and  the  Soviets, 
the  British,  can  conclude  a  comprehen- 
sive test  ban,  that  this  would  be  an 
adequate  new  factor  to  permit  Desai  to 
accept  comprehensive  safeguards  with- 
out having  to  violate  the  principles  of 
autonomy  or  independence. 

But  I  regret  that  the  open  mike  thing 
occurred.   I  can't  mislead  you  about 
that.  Between  me  and  Desai,  it  was  al- 
ways a  matter  of  humor  and  good  re- 
ception. I  think  anybody  that  observed 
me  and  him  closely  saw  that  there  was 
a  genuine  feeling  of  mutual  respect. 
Q.  Let  me  just  follow  up  here. 
A.  Please  do.  But  it  was  a  mistake. 
Q.  Yes,  sir,  it  was  probably  a  mis- 
take, but  was  it  a  mistake  because  of 
the  way  the  press  operates  or  was  it  a 
mistake  on  your  part? 

A.  It  was  a  mistake  on  my  part.  I 
should  have  said  "a  very  frank  and  fac- 
tual letter"  and  not  "a  blunt  and  cold 
letter."  But  what  I  was  trying  to  talk 
about  to  Cy  Vance — obviously  I  had 
nothing  of  ill-feeling  toward  Desai — 
what  I  was  talking  about  was  it  was  a 
cold,  technical  subject,  and  it  ought  to 


18 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


be  described  to  the  Indians  in  no  uncer- 
tain terms  so  that  they  would  know 
what  to  expect  18  months  after  the 
legislation  takes  place. 

Q.  I  am  intrigued  that  you — I 
don't  want  to  belabor  the  Middle 
East  episode,  but  it  certainly  did 
overshadow  the  trip  in  many  ways; 
developments  kept  going — you  say 
that — Sadat  said  that  you  have  an 
identity  of  views,  and  you  say  that 
you  don't  seem  to  have  any  differ- 
ences. Does  that  put  you — and  Sadat 
has  differences  with  Begin — so  where 
does  that  put  you  with  Begin? 

A.  I  read  the  news  reports  after  my 
statement  at  Aswan,  and  Begin  ex- 
pressed approval  of  what  I  said.  There 
is  a  fairly  good  agreement  between 
Begin  and  Sadat  on  matters  concerning 
the  definition  of  peace. 

Sadat  told  me  that  when  he  met  in 
April  with  me  in  Washington  and  I  out- 
lined the  three  basic  principles,  one 
was  complete  peace  between  Egypt  and 
Israel — open  borders,  diplomatic  rec- 
ognition, ambassadorial  exchange,  free 
trade,  tourist  and  student  and  cultural 
exchanges.  And  he  told  me  it  would 
never  happen  in  his  lifetime,  which  he 
did — he  told  me  that  in  April. 

He  told  me  the  other  morning  in 
Aswan  that  he  was  completely  wrong, 
that  not  only  was  he  well  accepted  in 
Israel  but  he  was  a  hero  when  he  came 
back  to  Egypt,  that  when  the  Israeli 
negotiators  came  to  Cairo,  that  they 
were  embraced  and  the  Egyptians  wept. 
And  he  said  to  me,  "My  people  were 
far  ahead  of  me,  and  what  you  pro- 
posed in  April  that  I  thought  was  never 
possible  has  already  proven  to  be  pos- 
sible." That's  one  aspect. 

The  withdrawal  of  Israeli  forces 
from  the  West  Bank,  with  minor  excep- 
tions on  the  western  boundary,  is  a 
principle  that  we  espoused  back  in  Feb- 
ruary or  March  publicly.  And  I  think 
this  is  still  an  acceptable  approach  to 
the  Arabs,  although  publicly  I  wouldn't 
expect  them  to  espouse  it  now  because 
it  violates,  in  effect,  the  statements  in 
Rabat.  They  are  able  and,  obviously, 
willing  to  speak  for  themselves.  But 
this  is  something  we've  been  very  clear 
on. 

The  other  question,  the  resolution  of 
the  Palestinian  problem,  I  think,  can  be 
resolved  with  an  interim  solution  for  a 
joint  administration.  I  don't  want  to  be 
definitive  about  it,  but  possibilities  in- 
cluding Israel,  Jordan,  the  West  Bank, 
Gaza  Strip,  Palestinians,  perhaps  the 
United  Nations  for  a  period  of  time, 
specifically  outlined  ahead  of  time,  and 
then  the  right  of  the  Palestinians  to  de- 
cide their  own  future  between  whether 
they  should  continue  that  kind  of  ad- 
ministration or  affiliate  with  Jordan — 


those  are  the  kinds  of  principles  that  we 
have  described  very  clearly  and  in  writ- 
ing beginning  8  months  ago. 

The  details  are  going  to  be  a  prob- 
lem. But  on  those  expressions  of  prin- 
ciple, I  don't  know  of  any  differences 
that  separate  me  and  Sadat. 

Q.  Do  you  call  that  self- 
determination? 

A.  Yes,  I  don't  think  it's — I  have 
never  thought  and  do  not  think  that  it's 
advisable  for  us,  for  the  Middle  Eastern 
countries,  or  for  the  world  to  have  an 
independent  Palestinian  nation  located 
between  Israel  and  Jordan.  I  think  they 
would  be  a  target  of  subversion.  I  think 
there  would  be  a  concentrated  influ- 
ence, perhaps,  exerted  there  by  some 
of  the  more  radical  other  leaders  of  the 
world.  And  I  think  that  that  Palestinian 
entity  or  homeland  ought  to  be  tied  in 
at  the  least  in  a  very  strong  federation 
or  confederation  with  Jordan. 

But  now  I  want  to  say  that's  our 
preference.  And  if  Israel  and  Jordan 
and  the  Palestinians  and  Egypt  should 
work  out  something  different,  we 
would  not  object.  But  that's  our  posi- 
tion. And  we  made  it  very  clear  from 
the  very  beginning  of  my  Administra- 
tion to  the  Israelis  and  the  Arabs  that 
that's  our  preference. 

Q.  I  was  wondering,  were  there 
any  unexpected  gains  or  losses 
throughout  the  past  9  days? 

A.  That's  hard  to  describe.  You 
know,  I'm  not  an  objective  analyst. 
But  I  felt  that  the  progress  we  made 
with  India  was  extraordinary. 

Q.  In  what  specific  area? 

A.  Under  Mrs.  Gandhi,  there  is  no 
doubt  that  the  orientation  of  India, 
which  has  been  an  historic  friend  of 
ours,  has  been  away  from  us,  perhaps 
toward  the  Soviets. 

I  felt  like  Desai  and  his  government 
has  at  least  come  back  to  a  completely 
neutral  or  nonaligned  position.  And 
there  was  a  genuine  feeling  of  com- 
patibility and  friendship,  based  on  deep 
religious  convictions,  a  commitment  to 
democracy,  the  principle  of  human 
rights,  that  was  very  encouraging  to 
me. 

It  was  more  than  I  had  anticipated.  I 
don't  want  to  analyze  it  myself,  but  the 
French  news  media  have  said  that  we 
have  never  had  better  relationships 
with  France  in  this  past  hundred  years 
than  we  have  right  now.  I  feel  very 
close  to  Giscard  d'Estaing. 

I  think  the  French  outpouring  of 
emotion  and  friendship  toward  us  and 
the  tremendous  crowds  that  evolved  on 
the  streets  of  Paris — Giscard  d'Estaing 
said  that's  a  very  rare  occasion. 

The  French  are  almost  as  blase  about 
foreign  visitors  as  are  the  people  in 
Washington,  because  it's  such  a  center 


for  diplomatic  visits.  But  I  thought 
was    a    very    good    expression 
friendship. 

And  as  I  said  earlier,  I  thought  t 
community  of  memories,  of  history  e 
pressed  on  the  beach  near  Omaha  yt 
terday  was  something  that  you  can't  e 
ticipate  and  you  can't  contrive, 
thought  it  was  really  genuine.  The 
are  a  couple  of  things  that  impress . 
me. 

Rosalynn's  and  Dr.   Brzezinski 
visit  with  Cardinal  Wyszynski  show: 
that  there's  a  pluralism  in  the  Polii 
society  that  is  not  frequently  ackno\ 
edged  in  an  Eastern  European  countrj 

It's  obvious  that  as  far  as  the  inf 
ence  on  the  minds  and  hearts  and  futi : 
of  the  Polish  people  that  there's  a  sh  ■ 
ing  between  a  great  religious  leader  a  I 
the  political  leader.  And  privately  tf' 
expressed  admiration  for  each  oth  . 
And  I  think  this  is  a  good,  kind  o  i 
pleasant,  surprise  to  know  more  abi  I 
the  nations  behind  the  Iron  Curtain. 

I  think  the  curtain  is  being  parted  1 
think  it's  a  good  step  forward.  We  c(  • 
summated  an  additional  proper  act:  i 
today  by  returning  the  crown  to  Hi  - 
gary.'"  We're  not  trying  to  drive  i 
wedge  between  those  Warsaw  Pact  - 
tions  and  the  Soviet  Union.  But  we  ; 
trying  to  get  them  to  look  to  us  > 
friends  who  want  peace,  who  recogn  ; 
the  horrible  suffering  that  they've  - 
perienced,  and  who  are  building  a  be  > 
for  friendship  and  trade  and  mut  I 
exchange. 

We  signed  a  nuclear  agreement  v,  i 
the  Iranians  that  will  provide  billions  f 
dollars  of  trade  for  American  indust , 
a  lot  of  jobs  for  American  people,  1 1 
won't  violate  at  all  our  nonproliferat  ) 
policies. 

There  were  some  things  that  : 
hadn't  really  laid  down  on  the  agei  i 
ahead  of  time  that  occurred.  But  s 
hard  for  me  to  be  objective  about  it. 

Q.  What  about  any  kind  of  nej  ■ 
tive  aspects?  Were  you  surprised  i 
anything  that  didn't  go  as  well  as  }  i 
thought  it  might  have? 

A.  No.  I  can't  think  of  anything.  1 1 
perhaps  you  can. 

Q.  As  a  followup  on  your  disc  - 
sions  about  Poland,  I  have  two  qu  - 
tions:  One  is  why  didn't  you  younf 
see  Cardinal  Wyszynski,  and  did  }i 
make  any  efforts  to  suggest  to  IV- 
Gierek  that  he  should  allow  his  d- 
sident  journalists  into  your  pris 
conference? 

A.  Yes.  We  requested  that  the  pns 
conference  be  open  ahead  of  tin. 
That's  his  country.  He  made  that  de- 
sion.  And  I  made  the  decision  to  ce- 
ment on  it  publicly.  And  he  made  'i 
decision.  I  presume,  for  my  comm(t 
to  be  published  very  freely  in  tJ 


Ilfiebruary  1978 


J  'olish  newspapers  and  also  on  the  tele- 
1  .lision  that  evening. 
',  We  extended  an  invitation  to  Cardi- 
al Wyszynski  to  come  and  meet  with 
le.  But  he  said  it  was  not  proper  for  a 
,  ardinal  to  come  to  pay  his  respects  to 
,ie.  So,  we  thought  it  was  a  good  solu- 
(  on  there,  at  the  last  moment  I  might 
iay,  for  Rosalynn  to  accompany  Dr. 
;,  ilrzezinski,  who  had  planned  to  see 

Cardinal  Wysznyski  all  the  time. 

it,  I  I  wrote  him  a  private  message.  He 

jj/rote  me  a  little  note,  and  it  was  a 

(il,  jiutually  beneficial  thing.  But  I  think 

,),  |ie  contact  with  him  through  Zbig  and 

IP  i.osalynn  was  adequate. 

,1    Q.  Can  you  be  more  specific — 

I  |iaybe  you  don't  want  to  be — on 

'hat  you  mean  when  you  say  Pales- 

;  ,inians  have  the  right  to  participate 

f  il  their  own  self-determination? 

it  I  A.  I  don't  really  want  to  spell  out  in 

,  jHy  more  detail  what  the  procedure 

^  |Ught  to  be.  Dayan  [Foreign  Minister 

,    loshe  Dayan  of  Israel]   and   Kamel 

f  ^oreign  Minister  Ibrahim  Kamel  of 

,  gypt]  will  be  meeting  in  Jerusalem  on 

;,  |ie  15th  of  January.  Cy  Vance  will  be 

Ij  ,iere.  We'll  offer  our  good  offices. 

[     My  own  preference  is  that  the  Is- 

I  iielis  and  Egyptians  negotiate  that 

,   iterim  procedure  with  a  final  referen- 

;   urn  themselves.  We'll  try  to  find  some 

,  Dmpromise  between  them.   I  think  if 

;   'e  can  evolve  an  acceptable  set  of 

i,,  rinciples,  then  it  would  be  much 

.  asier  for  King  Hussein  and,  perhaps 

Iter  on,  the  Syrians  to  join  in  the  dis- 

,  ussions.  I  did  not  try  to  convince  Hus- 

j  ;in  to  participate  now. 

_    I  feel  and  he  feels  also  that  Sadat  is 

.  dequately  representing  the  Arab  posi- 

,,  on.  And  I  think  Sadat,  in  an  almost 

nique  way,  not  only  has  the  trust  of 

is  own  people  and  the  rest  of  the 

J.  'orld  but  also,  to  a  substantial  degree, 

le  trust  of  the  Israeli  citizens. 

All  of  us  feel  for  now,  until  Sadat 

J  pecifically  requests  it,  that  Hussein 

J  hould  stay  out  of  the  direct  negotia- 

I   ons.  The  Shah  will  be  supportive,  the 

■audis  were  very  encouraging  about 

:  le  future,  and  Hussein,  and  we  agree 

ompletely. 

And  so,  I  think  that  the  present  pos- 

'   are  is  a  good  one.  But  exactly  how  the 

ote  should  be  handled  or  when  or 

I  yhat  the  options  might  be  offered  to 

j  lie  Palestinians,  I  don't  want  to  say.  I 

lon't  know. 

Q.  Can  I  also  ask  you,  do  you 
hink  that  as  a  result  of  your  visit 
here,  that  Sadat's  position  with  the 
lardline  critics  of  the  Arab  world 
las  been  improved  and  that  he's 
>trengthened  his  hand  as  a  result  of 
his? 
.  j  A.  I  don't  think  I  would  be  violating 
liny  confidence  to  say  that  all  the  Arab 


leaders  with  whom  I  met  said  they  sup- 
port Sadat  unequivocally.  Now,  the 
feeling  of  Syria  is  something  that  I 
can't  assess.  I  didn't  happen  to  talk  to 
Asad  lately,  but  the  feeling  of  Iraq  and 
Libya  and  the  more  radical  Arabs  is 
obvious.  They  don't  want  peace  to  pre- 
vail. They  don't  want  a  settlement  to 
be  reached.  They  don't  want  the 
Geneva  conference  to  be  concluded. 
And  many  of  them  still  have  as  a 
unique  purpose  the  destruction  of 
Israel. 

I  don't  think  that  Asad  or  King  Hus- 
sein or  Sadat  or  the  Saudis — the  ones 
with  whom  I've  talked — I  don't  think 
any  of  them  feel  that  way.  I  think  they 
all  are  perfectly  willing  to  accept  Israel 
now  as  a  permanent  entity  in  the  Mid- 
dle East,  living  in  peace. 

Q.  Before  we  left,  you  said  you 
were  going  to  talk  about  human 
rights,  and  you  certainly  did,  I 
think,  just  about  every  place  we 
went.  But  since  we  were  in  Poland, 
where  you  told  us  about  Gierek's 
commitment  to  you  on  emigration 
rights,  I  don't  think  we  had  any 
specific  information  that  any  of  the 
leaders  have  given  to  you,  any  reac- 
tion to  your  own  position.  Is  there 
anything  specific?  In  particular  I  am 
thinking  about  Iran.  Have  there  been 
any  concessions  that  we  haven't 
learned  about? 

A.  No.  Obviously,  we  don't  seek 
concessions  on  human  rights  in  Bel- 
gium or  Egypt  or  France.  In  Iran,  the 
Shah  and  I  have  had  very  all- 
encompassing  discussions  about  human 
rights.  I  am  not  inclined  to  reveal  the 
private  conversations.  But  the  basic 
question  in  Iran  is  the  law  that  exists 
that  outlaws  the  Communist  Party  and 
that  outlaws  communism  are  very  simi- 
lar to  the  laws  that  we  have  enforced  in 
the  past  very  rigidly.  And  this  is  the 
basis  for  the  problem. 

But  the  Shah  is  very  deeply  con- 
cerned about  human  rights,  and  I  men- 
tioned human  rights  in  my  statement  in 
Iran.  But  we've  seen  in  Iran,  in  many 
ways,  the  opening  up  of  the  rights  of 
women,  the  welcoming  of  disparate  re- 
ligious and  racial  groups  to  Iran — a 
very  fine  movement  forward,  I  would 
say,  equivalent  to  what  we've  done  in 
the  last  20  years. 


Q.  Do  you  think  you  would  have 
liked  to  have  been  Viceroy  of  India? 
[Laughter] 

A.  I  don't  know.  I  tried  to  learn 
while  I  was  in  India  what  their  feelings 
are  toward  the  British.  And  my  sense 
was  that  they  have  a  genuine  apprecia- 
tion of  what  the  British  did,  that  the 
viceroys'  administrations  were  in  gen- 


19 


eral  very  benevolent.  There  was  no 
India  before  the  British  came.  It  was 
just  a  collection  of  a  large  number  of 
independent  states  in  all  forms.  The 
British  brought  the  subcontinent  to- 
gether in  unity. 

After  Gandhi's  historic  and  unbe- 
lievable crusade,  the  British  left  with 
good  spirits.  They  turned  over  the 
power  to  Nehru  on  their  departure. 

And  they  were  very  proud  to  take  me 
to  a  room,  for  instance,  where  no 
American  or  European  has  ever  been. 
It's  a  beautiful  portrait  gallery,  under- 
neath the  palace  where  we  stayed,  of 
all  the  British  viceroys  and  other  ad- 
ministrators who  had  been  there  and 
their  wives.  Every  portrait  is,  I'd  say, 
twice  life-size.  And  it's  very  beauti- 
fully done,  and  it  shows  the  respect 
that  the  Indians  feel  toward  the  British, 
So,  I  didn't  have  any  yearning  to  be  a 
viceroy.  [Laughter]  I'd  rather  be  Presi- 
dent. [Laughter]  I  think  the  British  left 
with  a  good  feeling  among  the  Indians. 

.      D 


'  Remarks  by  President  Carter  made  on  occa- 
sions during  the  trip  other  than  those  printed 
here  are  in  the  Weekly  Compilations  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  Jan.  2  and  9,  1978. 

-  Vice  President  Mondale's  remarks  omitted 
(text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Jan.  2). 

'  Exchange  of  remarks  were  made  at  the  Civil- 
ian Terminal,  Okecie  International  Airport.  First 
Secretary  Edward  Gierek  spoke  in  Polish  (text 
from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Docu- 
ments of  Jan.  2). 

■*  Held  in  the  Grand  Ballroom  at  the  Victoria 
Hotel,  It  was  broadcast  live  via  satellite  on  radio 
and  television  in  the  United  Slates  and  was  taped 
for  broadcast  later  thai  evening  in  Poland.  Sev- 
eral reporters  spoke  in  Polish,  and  their  ques- 
tions were  translated  by  an  interpreter  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents 
of  Jan.  2). 

*  Issued  at  the  conclusion  of  President  Car- 
ter's visit  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Jan.  2). 

*  Exchange  of  remarks  were  made  at  the  Im- 
perial Pavilion  at  Mehrabad  International  Airport 
(text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Jan.  2).  On  Jan.  1  President  Car- 
ter met  with  King  Hussein  I  of  Jordan  in  Tehran. 

'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  Jan.  9. 

*  Exchange  of  remarks  were  made  at  Riyadh 
Airport.  His  Highness  spoke  in  Arabic  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents 
of  Jan.  9). 

"  Made  at  Aswan  Airport  following  their 
meeting  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pres- 
idential Documents  of  Jan.  9). 

'"  Made  before  an  audience  invited  under  the 
auspices  of  several  French-American  business, 
civic,  and  cultural  societies  (text  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of 
Jan.  9). 

"  The  Crown  of  St.  Stephen  and  other  Hunga- 
rian cornation  regalia  were  returned  to  the  Hun- 
garian people  by  a  delegation  headed  by  Secre- 
tary Vance  at  a  ceremony  in  Budapest  on  Jan.  6. 


20 


State  of  the  Union  (Excerpts) 


In  our  foreign  policy  the  separation 
of  people  from  government  has  been, 
in  the  past,  a  source  of  weakness  and 
error.  In  a  democratic  system  liice  ours, 
foreign  policy  decisions  must  be  able  to 
stand  the  test  of  public  examination  and 
public  debate.  If  we  make  a  mistake  in 
this  Administration,  it  will  be  on  the 
side  of  frankness  and  openness  with  the 
American  people. 

In  our  modern  world,  when  the 
deaths  of  literally  millions  of  people 
can  result  from  a  few  terrifying  seconds 
of  destruction,  the  path  of  national 
strength  and  security  is  identical  to  the 
path  of  peace. 

Tonight  I  am  happy  to  report  that  be- 
cause we  are  strong,  our  nation  is  at 
peace  with  the  world. 

We  are  a  confident  nation.  We've  re- 
stored a  moral  basis  for  our  foreign  pol- 
icy. The  very  heart  of  our  identity  as  a 
nation  is  our  firm  commitment  to 
human  rights. 

We  stand  for  human  rights  because 
we  believe  that  government  has  a  pur- 
pose to  promote  the  well-being  of  its 
citizens.  This  is  true  in  our  domestic 
policy;  it  is  also  true  in  our  foreign  pol- 
icy. The  world  must  know  that  in  sup- 
port of  human  rights,  the  United  States 
will  stand  firm. 

We  expect  no  quick  or  easy  results, 
but  there  has  been  significant  move- 
ment toward  greater  freedom  and  hu- 
manity in  several  parts  of  the  world. 
Thousands  of  political  prisoners  have 
been  freed.  The  leaders  of  the  world — 
even  our  ideological  adversaries — now 
see  that  their  attitude  toward  fundamen- 
tal human  rights  affects  their  standing 
in  the  international  community,  and  it 
affects  their  relations  with  the  United 
States. 

To  serve  the  interests  of  every 
American,  our  foreign  policy  has  three 
major  goals. 

U.S.  Security 

The  first  and  prime  concern  is  and 
will  remain  the  security  of  our  country. 
Security  is  based  on  our  national  will, 
and  .security  is  based  on  the  strength  of 
our  armed  forces.  We  have  the  will, 
and  militarily  we  are  very  strong. 

Security  also  comes  through  the 
strength  of  our  alliances.  We  have  re- 
confirmed our  commitment  to  the  de- 
fense of  Europe,  and  this  year  we  will 
demonstrate  that  commitment  by  fur- 


ther modernizing  and  strengthening  our 
military  capabilities  there. 

Security  can  also  be  enhanced  by 
agreements  with  potential  adversaries 
which  reduce  the  threat  of  nuclear  dis- 
aster while  maintaining  our  own  rela- 
tive strategic  capability.  In  areas  of 
peaceful  competition  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  we  will  continue  to  more  than 
hold  our  own.  At  the  same  time,  we  are 
negotiating  with  quiet  confidence, 
without  haste,  with  careful  determina- 
tion, to  ease  the  tensions  between  us 
and  to  insure  greater  stability  and 
security. 

The  Stragetic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 
have  been  long  and  difficult.  We  want 
a  mutual  limit  on  both  the  quality  and 
the  quantity  of  the  giant  nuclear  arse- 
nals of  both  nations — and  then  we  want 
actual  reductions  in  strategic  arms  as  a 
major  step  toward  the  ultimate  elimina- 
tion of  nuclear  weapons  from  the  face 
of  the  Earth.  If  these  talks  result  in  an 
agreement  this  year — and  I  trust  they 
will — I  pledge  to  you  that  the  agree- 
ment will  maintain  and  enhance  the 
stability  of  the  world's  strategic  bal- 
ance and  the  security  of  the  United 
States. 

For  30  years  concerted  but  unsuc- 
cessful efforts  have  been  made  to  ban 
the  testing  of  atomic  explosives — both 
military  weapons  and  peaceful  nuclear 
devices.  We  are  hard  at  work  with 
Great  Britain  and  the  Soviet  Union  on 
an  agreement  which  will  stop  testing 
and  will  protect  our  national  security 
and  provide  for  adequate  verification  of 
compliance.  We  are  now  making,  I  be- 
lieve, good  progress  toward  this  com- 
prehensive ban  on  nuclear  explosions. 

We  are  also  working  vigorously  to 
halt  the  proliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons  among  the  nations  of  the 
world  which  do  not  now  have  them  and 
to  reduce  the  deadly  global  traffic  in 
conventional  arms  sales.  Our  stand  for 
peace  is  suspect  if  we  are  also  the  prin- 
cipal arms  merchant  of  the  world.  So 
we've  decided  to  cut  down  our  arms 
transfer  to  abroad  on  a  year-by-year 
basis  and  to  work  with  other  major 
arms  exporters  to  encourage  their  simi- 
lar constraint. 

Regional  Security 

Every  American  has  a  stake  in  our 
second  major  goal — a  world  at  peace. 
In  a  nuclear  age,  each  of  us  is 
threatened  when  peace  is  not  secured 


Department  of  State  Bullet 

everywhere.  We  are  trying  to  promu 
harmony  in  those  parts  of  the  woi 
where  major  differences  exist  amoi 
other  nations  and  threaten  intemation 
peace. 

In  the  Middle  East  we  are  contribi 
ing  our  good  offices  to  maintain  tl 
momentum  of  the  current  negotiatio 
and  to  keep  open  the  lines  of  commur 
cation  among  the  Middle  East  leader 
The  whole  world  has  a  great  stake 
the  success  of  these  efforts. 

This  is  a  precious  opportunity  for  ; 
historic  settlement  of  a  longstandii 
conflict — an  opportunity  which  m; 
not  come  again  in  our  lifetime.  O 
role  has  been  difficult  and  sometim 
thankless  and  controversial,  but  it  h 
been  constructive  and  it  has  be< 
necessary  and  it  will  continue. 

Economic  Security 

Our  third  major  foreign  policy  gc 
is  one  that  touches  the  life  of  eve 
American  citizen  every  day — wor 
economic  growth  and  stability. 

This  requires  strong  economic  pc 
formance  by  the  industrialized  demc 
racies  like  ourselves  and  progress  in  i 
solving  the  global  energy  crisis.  L; 
fall,  with  the  help  of  others,  we  st 
ceeded  in  our  vigorous  efforts  to  mai 
tain  the  stability  of  the  price  of  oil.  E 
as  many  foreign  leaders  have  ei 
phasized  to  me  personally  and,  I  ; 
sure,  to  you,  the  greatest  future  cont 
bution  that  America  can  make  to  t 
world  economy  would  be  an  effecti 
energy  conservation  program  here 
home.  We  will  not  hesitate  to  take  t 
actions  needed  to  protect  the  integr 
of  the  American  dollar. 

We  are  trying  to  develop  a  more  ji 
international  system.  And  in  this  spir 
we  are  supporting  the  struggle  f 
human  development  in  Africa,  in  Asi 
and  in  Latin  America. 

Finally  the  world  is  watching  to  s 
how  we  act  on  one  of  our  most  impc 
tant  and  controversial  items 
business — approval  of  the  Panan 
Canal  treaties.  The  treaties  now  befo 
the  Senate  are  the  result  of  the  work 
four  Administrations — two  Democr 
tic,  two  Republican.  They  guarant' 
that  the  canal  will  be  open  always  f 
unrestricted  use  by  the  ships  of  tl 
world.  Our  ships  have  the  right  to  go 
the  head  of  the  line  for  priority  of  pa 
sage  in  times  of  emergency  or  nee 
We  retain  the  permanent  right  to  d 
fend  the  canal  with  our  own  milita 
forces,  if  necessary,  to  guarantee  i 
openness  and  its  neutrality. 

The  treaties  are  to  the  clear  adva 
tage  of  ourselves,  the  Panamanian 
and  the  other  users  of  the  canal.  Ratif 
ing  the   Panama  Canal   treaties  wi 


February  1978 

ilemonstrate  our  good  faith  to  the 
world,  discourage  the  spread  of  hostile 
ideologies  in  this  hemisphere,  and  di- 
rectly contribute  to  the  economic 
well-being  and  the  security  of  the 
'United  States. 

'  There  were  two  moments  on  my  re- 
cent journey  which,  for  me,  confirmed 
the  final  aims  of  our  foreign  policy  and 
what  it  always  must  be. 

One  was  in  a  village  in  India  where  I 
imet  a  people  as  passionately  attached 
!:o  their  rights  and  liberties  as  we  are 
l)ut  whose  children  have  a  far  smaller 
chance  for  good  health  or  food  or  edu- 
!:ation  or  human  fulfillment  than  a  child 

-  Dom  in  this  country. 

:  I  The  other  moment  was  in  Warsaw, 
i;apital  of  a  nation  twice  devastated  by 
Afar  in  this  century.  There,  people  have 
ebuilt  a  city  which  war's  destruction 
ook  from  them;  but  what  was  new  only 


emphasized  clearly  what  was  lost. 

What  I  saw  in  those  two  places  crys- 
tal ized  for  me  the  purposes  of  our  own 
country's  policy:  to  insure  economic 
justice,  to  advance  human  rights,  to 
solve  conflicts  without  violence,  and  to 
proclaim  in  our  great  democracy  our 
constant  faith  in  the  liberty  and  dignity 
of  human  beings  everywhere. 

.       D 


'  Address  before  a  joint  session  of  the  Con- 
gress on  Jan.  19,  1978  (for  complete  text,  see 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents 
of  Jan.  23.  p.  90).  On  Jan.  19  President  Carter 
also  transmitted  a  separate,  more  detailed  State 
of  the  Union  message  to  the  Congress  which  de- 
scribes Administration  priorities  in  the  areas  not 
fully  covered  in  his  address;  the  complete  text  of 
that  message  is  printed  in  the  Weekly  Compila- 
tion referred  to  above,  p.  98.  Also  printed  as  H. 
Doc.  95-273. 


l^ietvs  Conference 
of  January  12  (Excerpts) 


Much  has  been  said  about  the  mes- 
ages  that  I  carried  on  behalf  of  the 
American  people  to  leaders  of  the  na- 
ions  which  I  visited  on  the  recent  trip. 
Jut  it's  also  important  to  focus  on  the 
nessage  that  I  received  from  them  and 
•rought  back  home. 

They  are  looking  to  our  country  to 
ee  whether  we  have  the  will,  the  re- 
olve  to  deal  squarely  with  our  energy 
troblems,  which  are  also  becoming 
heir  problems.  It's  clear  that  our  will- 
ngness  to  curb  the  enormous  American 
lational  appetite  for  imported  oil  will 
le  a  consideration,  for  instance,  in  fu- 
ure  OPEC  [Organization  of  Petroleum 
ixporting  Countries]  oil  prices. 

As  a  nation,  we  are  increasing  our 
lemands  for  foreign  oil.  We  may  have 
onservation  forced  on  us  by  unex- 
lected  and  rapid  increases  in  oil  prices 
n  the  future.  Our  consumers  and  our 
ndustries  will  pay  more  and  more  to 
oreign  countries,  and  with  those  dol- 
ars  that  go  overseas  we  are,  in  effect, 
;xporting  American  jobs. 

In  Paris  and  in  Brussels,  our  own  al- 
ies  expressed  concern  about  whether 
ve  can  and  will  enact  strong  energy 
egislation.  If  our  own  economy  is  not 
trong,  if  our  strength  is  being  sapped 
>y  excessive  imports,  then  we  can't 
)rovide  the  kind  of  leadership  and  sta- 
>ility  on  which  the  economic  well- 
)eing  of  the  Western  democracies  rests 
io  heavily. 

The  United  States  has  had,  and  is 
itill  faced  with,  a  very  large  trade  defi- 
:it  which  has  led  recently  to  exchange 


market  disorders  and  exchange  rate 
speculation.  It's  clear  that  our  heavy 
dependence  on  imported  oil  is  a  main 
part  of  our  trade  problem  and  that  our 
failure  to  adopt  a  comprehensive 
energy  program  has  badly  weakened 
confidence  in  our  ability  to  deal  with 
that  problem. 

Almost  every  foreign  leader  stressed 
the  importance  of  our  energy  program 
in  terms  of  our  responsibilities  for  in- 
ternational monetary  order  and  the 
maintenance  of  the  integrity  of  the 
dollar. 

We  all  recognize  that  while  the 
energy  program  will  not  reduce  our  oil 
imports  overnight,  that  it  will  reduce 
our  dependence  on  foreign  oil  over  the 
long  pull  and  also  permanently.  It 
would  improve  our  trade  position,  our 
national  economy,  the  strength  of  the 
dollar  in  a  fundamental  way. 

I  believe  that  we  do  have  the  resolve 
and  the  national  will  to  deal  with  the 
energy  problem.  The  debate  in  the 
Congress  has  been  long  and  devisive 
and  arduous.  It  has,  at  times,  tried  the 
patience  of  all  of  us.  And  delay  has  de- 
ferred action,  unfortunately,  on  a 
number  of  other  important  national 
priorities. 

But  when  we  do  succeed — and  I  be- 
lieve we  have  an  excellent  chance  to 
succeed  early  in  this  session — we  will 
have  accomplished  something  in  which 
we  can  take  pride,  not  just  here  at 
home  but  before  the  other  nations  of 
the  world  as  well. 


21 


Q.  Everywhere  you  traveled,  ex- 
cept Poland,  we  were  told  that  you 
and  the  leaders  talked  about  Soviet 
and  Cuban  penetration  in  the  Horn 
of  Africa,  but  we  only  got  very 
generalized  and  vague  statements  on 
this.  Can  you  enunciate  the  depth  of 
our  concern,  and  what  can  we  do 
about  it  except  jawbone? 

A.  We've  taken  a  position  concern- 
ing Africa  that  we  would  use  our  influ- 
ence to  bring  about  peace  without  ship- 
ping arms  to  the  disputing  parties  and 
without  our  injecting  ourselves  into 
disputes  that  could  best  be  resolved  by 
Africans,  both  those  parties  that  are  in 
dispute  and  the  Organization  of  African 
Unity.  The  Soviets  have  done  just  the 
opposite. 

They,  in  effect,  contributed  to  the 
war  that's  presently  taking  place  be- 
tween Somalia  and  Ethiopia.  They  sold 
excessive  quantities  of  arms  and 
weapons  both  to  Somalia  and  to 
Ethiopia.  The  war  began  using  Soviet 
weapons,  and  now  they  are  shipping 
large  quantities  of  weapons,  some  men, 
and  they  are  also  dispatching  Cubans 
into  Ethiopia,  perhaps  to  become  com- 
batants themselves.  We  have  expressed 
our  concern  to  the  Soviets  in  very 
strong  terms. 

We  have  shared  the  concerns  that  we 
feel  with  the  leaders  that  I  have  visited, 
both  the  cumulative  group  of  countries 
that  join  with  us  in  the  NATO  alliance, 
and  specifically  with  France,  the  Mid- 
dle Eastern  countries,  and  India.  We've 
had  unanimous  response  from  them 
sharing  our  concern  about  the  Soviet 
Union's  unwarranted  involvement  in 
Africa.  I  am  very  concerned  about  the 
loss  of  life  now. 

Our  hope  is  that  the  Somalians  might 
call  publicly  for  negotiations  to  begin 
immediately  to  resolve  the  Ogaden 
dispute.  One  possibility,  of  course, 
would  be  to  go  to  the  Security  Council 
of  the  United  Nations  or  to  the  perma- 
nent members  of  the  Security  Council. 
But  the  basic  negotiation  ought  to  take 
place  between  those  two  nations 
themselves. 

I  think  that  there  are  things  that  we 
can  do  to  express  our  concern  publicly, 
to  offer  our  good  services  in  support  of 
the  African  nations  who  are  responsi- 
ble, to  support  the  Organization  of 
African  Unity,  and  in  the  United  Na- 
tions to  let  our  voice  be  heard.  But  I 
hope  that  we  can  induce  the  Soviets 
and  the  Cubans  not  to  send  either  sol- 
diers or  weapons  into  that  area  and  call 
for  and  achieve  a  rapid  initiation  of 
negotiations. 


Q.  When  talking  about  the  aggra- 
vation of  oil  imports,  the  U.S.  Gov- 


22 


ernment's  strategic  petroleum 
stockpile — I  think  your  decision  is  to 
acquire  1  billion  barrels  of  oil — 

A.  That's  correct. 

Q.  — on  the  world  market.  Now, 
the  GAO  [General  Accounting  Of- 
fice] and  others  have  recommended 
that  we  use  oil  we  already  own,  in 
the  Elk  Hills  Naval  Petroleum  Re- 
serve, and  that  would  save,  I  think, 
as  youVe  going  now,  to  about  $20 
billion  you're  going  to  spend  on 
foreign  oil.  We  could  reduce  this  by 
half,  a  $10  billion  saving,  if  we  used 
our  existing  naval  supplies.  Why 
don't  we  do  that? 

A.  We  are,  in  effect,  increasing  the 
production  of  American  oil  to  cut  down 
on  the  amount  that  we  have  to  pur- 
chase. At  Elk  Hills,  at  Teapot  Dome, 
we're  trying  to  increase  the  importing 
of  oil  to  the  continental  United  States 
from  Alaska.  We're  trying  to  maintain 
the  production  of  oil,  sour  oil,  to  some 
degree,  in  California  in  addition  to  re- 
ducing overall  consumption  of  oil  and 
energy  and  shifting  to  coal. 

And  at  the  same  time,  it's  very  im- 
portant to  us  to  have  stability  in  the 
world  oil  market  and  protect  us  from 
some  interruption  in  the  future  over 
which  we  have  no  control. 

We've  set  a  goal  for  ourselves  that 
by  1985,  we'll  have  a  billion  barrels  of 
oil  stored  in  a  secure  place  in  salt 
domes  in  the  United  States  so  that  we 
can  have  an  8-  or  10-month  supply  in 
case  overseas  oil  is  interrupted  in  com- 
ing to  us. 

The  sum  total  of  what  we  propose  is 
to  do  exactly  what  you  describe. 
Whether  domestic  oil  actually  goes  into 
the  supply  system  of  our  country  and 
foreign  oil  goes  into  the  underground 
storage  is  really  of  no  consequence, 
because  the  overall  consumption  of  oil 
plus  the  import  or  use  of  oil  to  build  up 
our  reserves  is  the  factor  that  controls 
how  much  we  import. 

Q.  My  question  is — what  it  goes  to 
the  point  of — the  $10  billion  savings. 
We  already  own  the  Elk  Hills  naval 
oil  reserve. 

A.  When  we  sell  that  oil,  if  it's  on 
the  commercial  market,  the  Federal 
Treasury  gets  the  money  back  for  that 
oil.  So,  there's  just  really  swapping 
dollars.  It  may  be  very  difficult  to 
transport  the  oil  from  Elk  Hills  and 
identify  a  particular  gallon  or  barrel  of 
oil  that  has  to  go  into  a  salt  dome  in 
Louisiana. 

Q.  They  talked  about  swap  ar- 
rangements, particularly  with  Japan. 
Japan  would  be  very  happy  to  have 
that  very  sweet  Elk  Hills  oil,  and 
they'd  give  us  their  Mideast  oil. 

A.  I  understand.  But  we're  trying  to 


do  what  I've  just  said:  build  up  the 
adequate  supply  of  oil  for  reserve  and 
cut  down  consumption  and  imports  at 
the  same  time. 


Q.  When  you  were  in  Egypt  meet- 
ing with  President  Sadat,  President 
Sadat  emerged  from  that  meeting 
saying  that  your  views  and  his  on  the 
Middle  East  were  essentially  identi- 
cal. Does  that  mean  that  you  think 
the  Israelis  should  withdraw  from  all 
20  settlements  they  have  in  the  Sinai 
plus  their  West  Bank  settlements  be- 
fore there  can  be  peace  in  the  Middle 
East? 

A.  It's  not  for  me  to  decide  the  spe- 
cifics of  an  ultimate  settlement,  either 
between  Israel  and  Egypt  or  Israel  and 
Jordan  or  Israel  and  the  other  nations 
involved  or  the  Palestinians. 

I  think  that  it's  accurate  that  Presi- 
dent Sadat  and  I  see  the  Middle  East 
question  almost  identically.  I've  not 
been  involved  and  don't  intend  to  get 
involved  in  the  military  settlement 
that's  now  being  negotiated  in  Cairo. 
The  position  of  our  government  is  now 
and  has  been  that  Israeli  settlements  on 
occupied  territory  are  illegal  and  that 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 

they  contravene  the  Geneva  conferenc 
decisions  that  were  made. 

The  U.N.  Resolution  242  is  the  basi 
for  the  ultimate  decision.  All  the  na 
tions  involved  have  espoused  242,  an 
338  later  on,  which  set  up  the  Genev 
conference  with  ourselves  and  th 
Soviets  as  chairmen.  We  have  in  thj 
language  that  says  Israel  will  withdra\ 
from  occupied  territories. 

Combined  with  that  requirement 
though,  is  that  Israel  will  have  secur 
borders  including  a  realization  of  secu 
rity  from  the  attitude  of  her  neighbors  I 
This  is  an  extremely  complicated  sub 
ject  as  you  well  know.  I  can't  say  the 
on  every  specific  instance  that  Presi 
dent  Sadat  and  I  will  agree  on  details 
We  didn't  discuss  those  details. 

And  I  think  that  it's  best  for  us  juS' 
to  add  our  good  offices  when  we  car 
support  both  men  as  they  go  to  thi 
negotiating  table.  Secretary  Vance  wi' 
be  in  Jerusalem  with  the  foreign  minis 
ters  of  the  two  countries  involved,  am 
our  position  on  the  settlements  has  no 
changed.  L' 


'  For  full  text,  see  Weekly  Compilation  ( 
Presidential  Documents  of  Jan.  16,  1978,  p.  5' 


War  Potvers  BUM 


Statement  by  President  Carter' 

I  am  today  signing  H.R.  7738,  an  act 
"with  respect  to  the  powers  of  the 
President  in  time  of  war  or  national 
emergency." 

H.R.  7738  is  the  result  of  a  coopera- 
tive effort  by  the  Congress  and  this 
Administration.  Its  broad  purpose  is  to 
differentiate  between  those  economic 
powers  available  to  the  President  in 
time  of  war  and  those  available  in  time 
of  declared  national  emergency.  The 
bill  is  largely  procedural.  It  places  ad- 
ditional constraints  on  use  of  the  Presi- 
dent's emergency  economic  powers  in 
future  national  emergencies  and  insures 
that  the  Congress  and  the  public  will  be 
kept  informed  of  activities  carried  out 
under  these  powers.  Enactment  of  the 
bill  will  not  affect  embargoes  now 
being  exercised  against  certain  coun- 
tries, nor  does  it  affect  the  blockage  of 
assets  of  nationals  of  those  and  other 
countries. 

In  approving  the  bill,  I  must  note  my 
serious  concern  over  the  provision  con- 


jl 


^ 


tained  in  section  207(b),  which  woul* 
allow  Congress  to  terminate  a  natiom 
emergency  declared  by  the  President  b 
concurrent  resolution. 

Provisions  such  as  these  raise  pro 
found  constitutional  questions,  sine 
Article  I,  Section  7,  of  the  Constitutio 
requires  that  congressional  action  hav 
ing  the  force  of  law  be  presented  to  th 
President  for  his  signature  or  veto.  Ii 
addition,  such  provisions  have  the  po 
tential  of  involving  Congress  in  thi 
execution  of  the  laws — a  responsibilit; 
reserved  exclusively  to  the  Presiden 
under  the  Constitution.  This  feature  o 
the  bill  may  be  unconstitutional.  I  wi! 
therefore  treat  the  provision  as  requir 
ing  only  that  I  "notify  and  wait"  wit! 
respect  to  national  emergencies  cov 
ered  by  section  207(b)  of  this  act.     C 


'  Made  on  signing  H.R.  7738  into  law  on 
Dec.  28.  1977  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  ol 
Presidential  Documents  of  Jan.  2,  1978).  As 
enacted  H.R  7738  is  Public  Law  95-223  ap- 
proved Dec.  28. 


'ebruary  1978 


23 


THE  SECRETARY:  Foreign  Policy  Decisions 

for  1978  ' 


Our  country,  within  sight  and  mem- 
'''ory  of  some  Americans  still  living,  has 
been  transformed  from  a  largely  agrar- 
ian society  to  the  world's  greatest  in- 
dustrial power — one  in  which  eco- 
nomic, political,  and  social  mobility 
are  the  accepted  order  of  the  day.  The 
fantastic  stories  of  Horatio  Alger,  as 
well  as  those  of  H.  G.  Wells,  have 
:ome  true.  Of  course,  there  is  still  pov- 
2rty  in  America.  There  is  still  lack  of 
sufficient  opportunity  for  many.  There 
is  still  discrimination. 

But,  day  by  day,  and  despite  a  few 
deplorable  detours,  we  have  held  re- 
narkably  to  the  journey  begun  by  our 
bounding  Fathers — toward  a  new  na- 
ion  in  a  new  world  in  which  each  citi- 
■en  might  stand  free  and  equal  beside 
lis  neighbor,  able  to  make  the  most  of 
!iis  or  her  human  potential. 

When  I  am  asked  about  the  Ameri- 
;an  people — as  I  often  am  by  leaders  of 
other  countries — I  say  that  as  a  people 
ve  have  today  a  renewed  faith  in  our 
)ld  dreams,  and  this  is  something  Pres- 
dent  Carter  and  I  believe  in  very 
ieeply.  Because  of  who  and  what  we 
u"e,  both  the  basic  interests  and  the 
deals  of  our  people  must  be  present  in 
)ur  foreign  policy,  or  it  will  not  be 
ong  sustained. 

•  We  must  maintain  a  defense  estab- 
ishment  modem  and  strong  enough  to 
protect  ourselves  and  our  allies. 

•  We  must  protect  American  in- 
/estment  overseas  and  insure  continu- 
ng  access  to  vital  raw  materials. 

•  We  must  be  strongly  competitive 
jconomically  so  that  American  families 
;an  continue  to  enjoy  their  standard  of 
iving. 

•  We  must  maintain  our  close  rela- 
ions  with  our  allies,  while  we  seek  at 
he  same  time  improved  contacts  with 
jur  main  competitor,  the  Soviet  Union, 
ind  with  the  nonaligned  nations. 

All  of  this,  and  more,  can  be 
pursued — as  we  pursue  our  national 
nterest — while  still  expressing  the 
deeper  ideals  and  aspirations  that  have 
led  us  to  our  remarkable  economic  and 
iocial  progress  here  at  home. 

Our  strength  lies  not  only  in  our 
ideals  but  in  the  practical  way  we  iden- 
;ify  problems  and  work  systematically 
:oward  their  solution.  We  do  the  best 
when  we  are  true  to  ourselves. 
I  That  is  why  America  was  at  her  best 
|in  the  Marshall  plan,  why  we  have  felt 
iit  home  with  Food  for  Peace  and  the 


Peace  Corps.  That  is  why  I  find  such 
broad  public  support  for  President  Car- 
ter's emphasis  upon  human  rights — 
including  not  only  rights  to  the  integ- 
rity of  the  person  and  political  rights 
but  the  rights  to  food,  clothing,  shelter, 
housing,  health,  and  education. 

That  is  why,  with  all  its  difficulties, 
we  have  embarked  on  a  course  of  di- 
plomacy in  the  Middle  East  which  may 
help  bring  peace  to  the  people  of  that 
region. 

That  is  why  we  are  trying  to  help 
bring  solutions — not  our  solutions  but 
solutions  through  free  elections — in 
Rhodesia  and  in  Nambia  so  that  people 
there  will  have  their  chance  for  human 
emancipation  and  development. 

That  is  why  we  seek  arms  control  ar- 
rangements through  negotiations  and 
have  adopted  a  conscious  policy  of  re- 
straint on  conventional  arms  transfers. 

That  is  why  we  took  tangible  first 
steps  in  1977  toward  other  goals,  as 
well:  to  stop  further  nuclear  prolifera- 
tion; to  reach  agreements  on  the  control 
of  strategic  weapons,  agreements  that 
will  enhance  the  security  of  our  nation 
and  all  the  world;  to  reach  agreement 
with  our  Western  industrial  partners  on 
policies  leading  to  economic  revival 
and  growth;  to  reaffirm  our  commit- 
ment to  normalization  of  relations  with 
the  People's  Republic  of  China;  to  re- 
duce military  competition  in  the  Indian 
Ocean;  to  emphasize  our  support  for 
racial  equality  and  full  political  partici- 
pation of  all  the  people  of  South 
Africa. 

The  Carter  Administration  in  1977 
made  a  conscious  and  deliberate  effort 
to  construct  a  foreign  policy  based 
upon  American  interests  and  upon 
American  values  and  ideals. 

In  1978,  there  are  actions,  decisions, 
and  choices  which  we  must  make  here 
in  America  —  some  of  them 
difficult — which  will  help  determine 
how  such  a  policy  can  be  nourished  and 
further  evolve. 

Panama  Canal  Treaties 

One  involves  the  decision  of  the 
U.S.  Senate  on  the  Panama  Canal 
treaties — treaties  which  are  the  culmi- 
nation of  14  years'  work  by  four 
American  Presidents  of  both  major 
political  parties  and  their  Secretaries  of 
State.  This  is  a  decision  which  is  being 
watched  not  only  by  all  the  nations  of 
Latin  America — all  of  which  favor  the 


treaties — but  by  other  nations  around 
the  world. 

Through  these  treaties,  we  can 
secure — definitively  and  permanent- 
ly— our  right  to  use  the  canal  and  to 
protect  it.  It  is  a  place  for  us  to  put  the 
lie,  once  and  for  all,  to  the  wornout 
charge  that  we  Americans  are  in- 
terested only  in  making  the  Southern 
Hemisphere  safe  for  our  own  economic 
interests. 

Imagine,  if  you  will,  that  a  foreign 
country  controlled  and  administered  a 
10-mile-wide  strip  of  land  running  the 
length  of  the  Mississippi  River.  How 
long  do  you  think  the  people  of  this 
country  would  willingly  accept  such  a 
situation?  This  is  an  issue  requiring 
understanding  and  foresight. 

If  we  ratify  the  treaties,  we  can  make 
clear  to  the  world  that  disputes  can  and 
should  be  settled  peaceably — through 
the  rule  of  law  and  negotiation.  And, 
most  importantly,  we  can  insure  and 
safeguard  the  long-term  usefulness  and 
viability  of  the  canal  itself  to  all  who 
use  it,  including  ourselves. 

Economic  Relations 

Another  decision  we  must  make  is 
one  regarding  our  economic  relations 
with  the  rest  of  the  world. 

In  1978  we  shall  be  moving  toward  a 
conclusion  of  the  Tokyo  Round  of  trade 
negotiations  with  other  importing  and 
exporting  countries. 

In  1962,  when  President  Kennedy 
argued  for  the  passage  of  the  historic 
Trade  Expansion  Act,  which  led  to  10 
years  of  worldwide  economic  expan- 
sion, he  rightly  pointed  out  that  "a  ris- 
ing tide  lifts  all  boats." 

Today  the  world  is  badly  in  need  of 
economic  recovery.  Other  major  na- 
tions are  suffering  rates  of  inflation  and 
unemployment  which  rival  or  are  even 
higher  than  ours.  The  Tokyo  Round,  of 
and  by  itself,  will  not  instantly  restore 
worldwide  economic  prosperity.  It 
will,  however,  encourage  new  invest- 
ment and  profitable  exchange.  If  it  fails 
and  falls  victim  to  a  new  wave  of  inter- 
national protectionism,  we  can  be  sure 
that  many  of  the  "boats"  will  founder 
and  some  may  sink. 

I  know  that  this  is  not  an  abstract, 
theoretical  matter  for  the  American 
worker  or  businessman  or  farmer  who 
depends  for  his  family's  living  on  pro- 
duction of  steel,  CB  radios,  color  tele- 
vision sets,  microwave  ovens,  textiles. 


24 


footwear,  automobiles,  computers, 
sugar,  and  many  other  items.  The 
changing  world  economy  has  made 
other  nations  competitive  in  production 
of  these  products,  and  we  are  feeling 
the  result  of  it. 

The  Carter  Administration  knows 
this  and  is  doing  its  best  to  help  the 
American  industries  and  people  af- 
fected. The  new  steel  program,  an- 
nounced in  December,  is  a  part  of  that. 
So  are  our  present  discussions  with 
Japan  on  reducing  its  import  barriers 
and  increasing  its  rate  of  growth. 

But  we  and  others  must  help  our- 
selves in  ways  that  do  not  throw  the 
world  back  into  the  kind  of  disastrous 
protectionist  spiral  that  we  all  experi- 
enced in  the  Great  Depression. 

Under  economic  pressure,  one  coun- 
try, and  then  another,  in  the  1930"s 
closed  its  borders  to  foreign  goods. 
High  tariffs  increased  the  price  of  ev- 
erything to  everyone,  everywhere. 
Then  we  closed  our  banks  and  our 
businesses  and  our  farms  as  we  fell  into 
worldwide  depression.  The  great  ports 
of  our  country  were,  as  you  well  know, 
empty  and  forlorn  places. 

A  new  wave  of  protectionism  would 
imperil  the  American  profits  and  10 
million  jobs  which  depend  on  those  ex- 
ports. The  hardest  hit  of  all  would  be 
the  American  farmer,  who  is  having  a 
hard  time  staying  in  the  black  right 
now.  California  is  an  agricultural  state. 

I  have  just  learned  that  there  is  more 
acreage  under  cultivation  in  the  United 
States  to  produce  food  which  we  sell  to 
Japan  than  there  is  total  acreage  under 
cultivation  in  Japan.  If  Japan,  for  in- 
stance, were  to  close  its  borders  to  our 
food  and  fiber  as  part  of  a  trade  war, 
farms  and  rural  communities  in  this 
State  and  elsewhere  in  America  would 
be  severely  harmed. 

So  we  must  make  the  necessary  deci- 
sion to  keep  our  commitment  to  both 
domestic  and  world  economies  which 
are  open  to  competition  and  which  re- 
ward productivity.  That  will  involve 
knocking  down  barriers  to  our  products 
elsewhere  in  the  world.  But  it  will  also 
involve  our  acceptance  of  the  fact  that 
to  buy  from  us,  other  countries  must  be 
able  to  sell  to  us. 

Third  World 

We  also  have  decisions  to  make — 
beyond  those  surrounding  the  Panama 
Canal  treaties  and  the  Tokyo  Round — 
about  a  whole  range  of  relations  with 
the  so-called  Third  World.  These  coun- 
tries, most  of  them  gaining  their  inde- 
pendence after  World  War  II,  are  in- 
creasingly involved  in  our  daily  lives. 

You  know  how  the  amount  and  cost 


of  oil  from  these  countries  affect  this 
country. 

We  also  get  more  than  50%  of  the 
tin,  aluminum,  and  manganese  we  need 
from  less  developed  countries  and  sub- 
stantial amounts  of  our  lead,  tungsten, 
and  copper. 

In  addition,  we  depend  on  the  emerg- 
ing countries  for  an  important  share  of 
our  exports.  Recent  figures  show,  for 
instance,  we  exported  $29  billion  in 
goods  to  the  non-oil-producing  de- 
veloping countries.  This  was  three 
times  the  1970  figure,  three  times  our 
exports  to  Japan,  and  $3  billion  more 
than  our  exports  to  all  of  industrialized 
Europe.  These  exports,  of  course, 
mean  American  jobs. 

At  the  same  time,  it  is  in  the  de- 
veloping world  that  many  of  the  so- 
called  global  problems  are  most 
evident  and  threatening. 

Inefficient  and  wasteful  use  of  the 
Earth's  resources,  pollution  of  the 
oceans  and  atmosphere,  nuclear  prolif- 
eration, unchecked  arms  competi- 
tions— all  of  these  are  problems  which 
involve  not  only  these  countries  but 
also  the  safety  of  the  human  race. 

Most  countries  of  the  Third  World 
have  too  little  food;  many  lack  the 
means  to  produce  enough  of  their  own. 
Almost  all  have  exploding  populations. 

Even  the  most  optimistic  projections 
for  the  future  point  to  population  in- 
creases in  the  Third  World  of  some 
75%  by  the  year  2000.  Perhaps  even 
more  troubling,  this  growth  seems  cer- 
tain to  be  concentrated  in  already 
hard-pressed  urban  centers.  Imagine,  if 
you  will,  as  the  projections  indicate,  a 
Mexico  City  with  32  million  people; 
Sao  Paulo  with  26  million;  and  Cal- 
cutta, Bombay.  Rio  de  Janeiro,  Seoul, 
Peking,  and  Shanghai  each  with  some 
19  million  in  22  years. 

In  the  years  immediately  ahead, 
many  of  the  key  nations  of  the  Third 
World  will  be  even  more  a  part  of  our 
daily  dialogue  than  they  are  today.  We 
must  decide  how  we  shall  relate  to 
them. 

These  countries  believe  that  they 
should  no  longer  be  the  "hewers  of 
wood  and  drawers  of  water"  for  the 
rich  Western  nations,  and  we  under- 
stand this.  In  the  past  year,  we  have 
reduced  their  suspicion  of  the  United 
States  and,  thereby,  lessened  the  likeli- 
hood that  we  could  be  faced  with  at- 
tempts at  new  cartels,  built  around  raw 
materials  and  commodities  other  than 
oil,  and  unending  political  and  eco- 
nomic hostility. 

The  countries  of  the  Third  World 
now  feel  that  we  regard  them  as  impor- 
tant and  sovereign  nations  and  that  we 
identify  with  their  human  aspirations. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

The  emerging  nations  of  the  world  can, 
be  constructive  partners  of  the  United 
States. 

Make  no  mistake  about  it.  These 
countries  are  not  early-day  miniatures 
of  the  United  States.  Many  will  choose 
paths  of  political  and  economic  de- 
velopment which  we  will  not  approve. 
But  a  majority,  at  least,  will  be  looking 
to  us  for  understanding  and  assistance 
as  they  seek  to  build  modern  societies. 

Will  we  be  willing  to  share  our  tech- 
nology with  these  countries?  Will  we 
be  ready  to  help  stabilize  the  basic 
commodity  prices  on  which  many  of 
their  economies  are  based?  Will  we 
treat  their  products  fairly  in  the  interna- 
tional marketplace?  Will  we  be  willing 
to  support  their  national  economic  de- 
velopment plans  when  they  do  not  al- 
ways suit  our  own  tastes?  All  these 
questions  are  complex  and  some  pose 
difficult  problems.  But  this  Administra- 
tion fully  realizes  that  we  shall  harm 
our  own  interests  and  we  shall  not  be 
true  to  our  own  values  if  we  fail  to  ad- 
dress these  issues  sympathetically. 

Southern  Africa 

An  immediate  and  tangible  test  ol 
our  intentions  toward  the  Third  Work 
lies  in  southern  Africa.  I  speak  of  the 
three  principal  problems  of  Rhodesia 
Namibia,  and  the  situation  within  South 
Africa  itself.  We  cannot  impose  solu 
tions  in  southern  Africa.  We  canno 
dictate  terms  to  any  of  the  parties;  oui 
leverage  is  limited. 

But  we  are  among  the  few  govern 
ments  in  the  world  that  can  talk  to  botl 
white  and  black  Africans  frankly  anc 
yet  with  a  measure  of  trust.  We  wouU 
lose  our  ability  to  be  helpful  if  we  los 
that  trust.  It  is,  therefore,  essential  tha 
our  policies  of  encouraging  justice  foi 
people  of  all  races  in  southern  Africs 
be  clear  to  all. 

After  careful  consideration,  this 
Administration  is  actively  pursuing  so- 
lutions to  all  three  southern  Africa: 
problems.  These  problems  must  bt 
addressed  together,  for  they  art 
intertwined. 

Some  have  argued  that  apartheid  in 
South  Africa  should  be  ignored  for  the 
time  being  in  order  to  concentrate  on 
achieving  progress  on  Rhodesia  and 
Namibia.  Such  a  policy  would  be  wrong 
and  would  not  work.  It  would  be  blind 
to  the  reality  that  the  beginning  ol 
progress  must  be  made  soon  within 
South  Africa  if  there  is  to  be  a  possibil- 
ity of  peaceful  .solutions  in  the  longer 
run.  It  could  mislead  the  South  Afri- 
cans about  our  real  concerns.  It  would 
prejudice  our  relations  with  our  African 
friends.  It  would  do  a  disservice  to  our 


I 


I 


ebruary  1978 

wn  beliefs.  And  it  would  discourage 
lose  of  all  races  who  are  working  for 
eaceful  progress  within  South  Africa. 

We  believe  that  we  can  effectively 
ifluence  South  Africa  on  Rhodesia 
nd  Namibia  while  expressing  our  con- 
srns  about  apartheid. 

We  believe  that  whites  as  well  as 
lacks  must  have  a  future  in  Namibia, 
imbabwe,  and  South  Africa.  We  also 
elieve  that  their  security  lies  in  prog- 
;ss.  Intransigence  will  only  lead  to 
reater  insecurity. 

We  will  welcome  and  recognize 
ositive  action  by  South  Africa  on  each 
f  these  three  issues.  But  the  need  is 
;al  for  progress  on  all  of  them,  and  we 
lall  need  the  continued  support  of  the 
merican  people  for  a  policy  which 
an  encourage  and  press  for  that 
regress. 

rms  Limitation 

Another  decision  facing  us,  as  a 
eople,  is  one  which  is  now  reflected 
I  our  discussions  on  strategic  arms 
mitation  with  the  Soviet  Union.  Secu- 
ty  is  the  issue  here.  We  pursue  our 
rcurity  in  two  ways: 

•  By  maintaining  a  military  estab- 
shment  which  will  see  to  the  safety  of 
arselves  and  our  allies  and 

•  By  arms  control. 

What  we  cannot  achieve  by  mutual, 
jual  limitations,  we  insure  by  our  own 
rength. 

Thus,  we  have  to  think  of  the 
trategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 
SALT)  as  a  process.  It  is  a  process  of 
[scovering  whether  we  can  work  out 
)me  of  our  security  problems  with  the 
oviet  Union.  It  is  a  process  also  in  the 
;nse  that  we  try  to  solve  what  strategic 
'oblems  we  can  at  each  stage;  then, 
e  move  on  to  the  next  stage  and  the 
;xt  level  of  problems. 

We  do  not  seek  reductions  in  arms 
)r  their  own  sake  but  only  when  reduc- 
ons  promote  security.  But  there  can 
e  an  important  result  from  arms  reduc- 
ons  alongside  an  increase  in  our  secu- 
ty:  the  potential  for  us  and  for  others, 
icluding  those  in  the  developing 
'orld,  to  cut  spending  on  armaments 
nd  to  reorder  priorities. 

If  we  have  the  courage  and  patience 
)  see  it  through,  I  believe  we  can  both 
3wer  the  threshold  of  international 
anger  and  release  new  resources  for 
le  works  of  peace  through  SALT  and 
ther  such  negotiations.  But  we  must 
ummon  the  will  to  do  it.  For  it  is  in 
ur  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union  that 
/ar  and  peace  issues  and  decisions  are 
lost  involved. 

Our  policies  toward  the  Soviet  Union 


are  based  upon  a  realistic  appreciation 
that  this  is  a  serious  competitive  rela- 
tionship and  that  Soviet  objectives  in 
the  world  are  very  different  from  ours. 
It  is  also  important  to  recognize,  how- 
ever, that  there  are  specific  matters  on 
which  our  interests  are  not  in 
conflict — not  least,  in  the  avoidance  of 
nuclear  war. 

In  the  cause  of  peace  and  of  our  own 
interest,  we  have  engaged  the  Soviet 
Union  on  a  wide  range  of  concrete  mat- 
ters intended  in  the  first  instance  to 
stabilize  the  military  competition  and 
to  regulate  the  political  competition. 
These  are  our  first  objectives,  because 
they  go  to  the  heart  of  the  issue  of  war 
and  peace. 

Beyond  these  objectives,  we  seek  to 
enlarge  areas  of  common  understanding 
and  common  action  on  a  range  of  inter- 
national issues,  including  human 
rights;  cooperation  on  matters  affecting 
the  lives  of  people  everywhere,  such  as 
disease,  food  supply,  pollution  of  the 
environment,  and  the  application  of 
science  and  technology. 

Progress  in  these  fields  is  uneven 
and  may  take  a  long  time,  but  we  draw 
patience  and  a  long-term  perspective 
from  our  realization  of  how  far  we  have 
come  from  the  intense  and  dangerous 
cold  war  spirit  that  prevailed  only  a 
few  decades  ago. 

The  alternative  to  this  active 
dialogue  with  the  Soviets  implies  a  re- 
turn to  the  tensions  and  mutual  isola- 
tion of  the  cold  war.  Many  of  you  and 
the  leadership  of  this  Administration 
remember  what  that  period  was  like.  In 
good  conscience,  we  cannot  recom- 


25 


mend  that  we  lead  the  country  back  to 
the  troubles  and  fear  of  that  era. 

Middle  East 

Tomorrow  I  leave  for  Jerusalem  to 
assist  at  an  event  that  we  all  would 
have  regarded  as  impossible  just  a  few 
short  months  ago.  The  Foreign  Minis- 
ters of  Egypt  and  Israel  will  sit  down 
together,  around  a  conference  table,  to 
start  the  detailed  negotiation  of  peace 
between  Israel  and  the  Arab  states. 
After  three  decades  of  estrangement 
and  hostility,  the  process  of  reconcilia- 
tion has  begun. 

I  am  sure  that  you,  as  all  Americans 
and  peoples  the  world  over,  have  been 
as  moved  as  I  was  by  the  dramatic 
events  of  the  weeks  just  past.  President 
Sadat's  sudden  and  spectacular  visit  to 
Jerusalem  captured  the  imagination  of 
all  of  us;  it  was  an  act  of  vision  and 
statesmanship.  The  warmth  of  his  re- 
ception by  Prime  Minister  Begin  and 
the  people  of  Israel,  surmounting  the 
bitter  memories  of  four  wars  which 
had  brought  tragedy  to  every  family, 
gave  clear  testimony  to  the  desire  for 
peace. 

President  Sadat's  initiative  and 
Prime  Minister  Begin 's  response  have 
set  in  motion  a  negotiating  process 
which  began  with  the  Cairo  preparatory 
conference  in  December  and  will  con- 
tinue at  ministerial  level  in  a  Military 
Committee  in  Cairo  and  a  Political 
Committee  in  Jerusalem.  Both  Egypt 
and  Israel  have  emphasized  that  they 
view  the  negotiations  now  underway  as 
laying  the  groundwork  for  negotiations 
among  all  parties  to  the  Arab-Israeli 


ECONOMICS:  U^.^  Japan 
Trade  Agreement 


White  House  Statement  ' 

The  President  is  pleased  by  the 
agreement  reached  between  Ambas- 
sadors Strauss  and  Ushiba  on  behalf  of 
the  U.S.  and  Japanese  Governments 
regarding  trade  and  other  economic  is- 
sues of  common  concern.-  The  Presi- 
dent believes  that  the  agreed  measures 
constitute  a  promising  development  in 
the  two  countries'  efforts  to  strengthen 
economic  relations;  he  is  gratified  at 
the  provision  for  followup  meetings  to 
discuss  both  implementation  of  this 
agreement  and  further  progress. 

This  agreement  should  strengthen  the 
bonds  of  friendship  between  the  two 
countries,   underlining  their  will   and 


ability  to  cooperate  with  each  other  and 
with  other  nations  in  devising  common 
actions  to  meet  common  problems.  The 
President  is  gratified  at  the  role  played 
by  Prime  Minister  Fukuda  in  helping  to 
bring  about  this  outcome.  He  looks 
forward  to  working  in  concert  with  the 
Prime  Minister  in  regard  to  continuing 
efforts  to  promote  a  healthy  world 
economy.  □ 


'  Issued  on  Jan.  13.  1978  (text  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of 
Jan,  23). 

-  Robert  S.  Strauss  is  the  U.S.  Special  Repre- 
sentative for  Trade  Negotiations;  Nobuniho 
Ushiba  is  Japanese  Minister  of  State  for  External 
Economic  Affairs. 


26 


conflict,  looking  toward  a  comprehen- 
sive peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

After  his  discussion  with  President 
Sadat  last  week.  President  Carter  made 
clear  the  task  facing  the  Middle  Eastern 
Political  Committee  meeting  in 
Jerusalem. 

•  First,  true  peace  must  be  based  on 
normal  relations  among  the  parties  to 
the  peace.  Peace  means  more  than  just 
an  end  to  belligerency. 

•  Second,  there  must  be  withdrawal 
by  Israel  from  territories  occupied  in 
1967  and  agreement  on  secure  and  rec- 
ognized borders  for  all  parties  in  the 
context  of  normal  and  peaceful  rela- 
tions in  accordance  with  U.N.  Resolu- 
tions 242  and  338. 

•  Third,  there  must  be  a  resolution 
of  the  Palestinian  problem  in  all  its  as- 
pects; it  must  recognize  the  legitimate 
rights  of  the  Palestinian  people  and  en- 
able the  Palestinians  to  participate  in 
the  determination  of  their  own  future. 

I  believe  that  these  principles,  as 
stated  by  the  President,  should  be  ac- 
ceptable to  the  governments  and 
peoples  on  both  sides  of  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict. 

To  move  from  principles  to  concrete 
achievement  will  require  flexibility  and 
courage,  qualities  of  statesmanship  of 
which  the  leaders  of  Egypt  and  Israel 


have  already  given  full  display. 

For  our  part,  we  stand  ready  to  help 
Arabs  and  Israelis  achieve  their  peace. 
It  is  important  to  our  national  interests 
that  we  do  so;  our  values  and  character 
as  a  people  demand  no  less  than  our 
greatest  effort  to  help  resolve  this 
tragic  conflict. 

We  will  participate  actively  in  the 
work  of  the  Jerusalem  meeting,  as  the 
parties  have  asked  us  to  do.  When  dif- 
ficulties in  the  negotiations  arise,  we 
may  be  able  to  make  some  helpful 
suggestions  to  bridge  the  gaps  between 
the  parties;  however,  we  will  not  im- 
pose a  blueprint  for  resolution  of  issues 
which  ultimately  only  the  peoples  of 
the  area  can  resolve. 

There  can  be  no  turning  back  from 
Jerusalem.  Arab  and  Israeli  peoples 
would  bitterly  resent  a  diplomatic  fail- 
ure now  that  these  long-hostile  nations 
have  found  the  will  and  the  capacity  to 
approach  each  other  in  mutual  respect. 

From  what  I  have  said  today,  I  be- 
lieve that  you  can  tell  that  I  am  ba- 
sically optimistic  about  our  foreign  pol- 
icy and  the  chances  for  future  advances 
in  the  cause  of  peace. 

Despite  our  problems,  this  is  a 
strong  and  free  country  and  one  which 
is  filled  with  hope  and  vitality. 

Some  33  years  into  the  nuclear  age, 
the  world  has  not  blown  itself  up.  In- 
deed, we  have  in  those  years,  through 


Department  of  State  Bulleti'l 

diplomacy  and  international  leadership. 
lessened  the  chances  of  that  eve; 
happening. 

We  have,  since  World  War  II,  seer 
more  than  100  new  countries  entei 
nationhood.  They  are  becoming  pro 
ductive,  self-sustaining  members  of  tht 
international  community. 

The  task  ahead,  as  I  see  it,  will  be  tc 
persevere  on  the  course  we  have 
charted.  This  is  a  time  when  politica 
and  economic  change  is  taking  place  sc 
rapidly — Peter  Drucker  has  aptly  callec 
this  "an  age  of  discontinuity" — that  i 
might  tempt  some  to  retreat  to  our  old 
inward  fortress  America  habitudes. 

However,  we  are  now  being  true  tc 
ourselves,  and  faithful  to  what  ont 
200-year-old  document  called  "i 
decent  respect  for  the  opinions  of  man 
kind."  In  the  past  year.  President  Car 
ter  has  led  us  to  make  the  hard  deci 
sions  that  have  shown  again  that  ou 
country  has  not  lost  its  faith  in  man': 
perfectability. 

We  have  great  strength.  Properl) 
channeled,  our  strength  can  be  a  cataly 
tic  and  vital  force  in  bringing  peace 
opportunity,  and  material  well-being  t( 
millions  of  people — in  America  as  wel 
as  abroad.  C 


'  Address  before  the  Los  Angeles  World  Af  | 
fairs  Council  on  Jan.  13,  1978  (press  release  1 
of  Jan.   13). 


EIVERGY:  Prospects  for  the  ]%ext  Deecuie 


by  Richard  N.  Cooper' 

Four  years  ago,  the  energy  crisis 
was  visible  at  every  gas  station.  Last 
winter  the  energy  crisis  was  felt  in 
cold  homes  and  closed  factories.  But 
in  between  emergencies,  the  energy 
crisis  becomes  a  matter  of  statistics 
and  political  argument  rather  than 
palpable  distress.  I  am  concerned  that 
we  as  a  nation  are  not  aware  of  the 
full  peril  we  face.  As  imported  oil 
approaches  50%  of  our  domestic  con- 
sumption, for  example,  only  about 
half  of  the  American  people  even 
realize  that  we  must  import  oil.  And  a 
recent  poll  indicated  that  only  12%  of 
the  public  thinks  there  could  be  a 
shortage  of  oil  within  the  next  15 
years. 

This  lack  of  awareness  is  in  some 
ways  understandable.  Not  only  are 
there  no  lines  at  the  gasoline  stations 
today,  but  there  is  more  worldwide 
capacity  to  produce  oil  at  present  than 


there  is  demand  at  prices  set  by  the 
14-nation  Organization  of  Petroleum 
Exporting  Countries  (OPEC).  With 
new  sources  of  production  from 
Alaska  and  the  North  Sea,  we  may 
have  a  few  years  of  a  soft  oil  market. 
But  as  we  enter  the  I980's,  there  is 
every  reason  to  believe  that  the  mar- 
ket will  get  tighter — unless  we  take 
tough  action  now  to  curb  demand  and 
increase  domestic  supply. 

In  1985,  according  to  recent 
studies,  the  total  demand  for  OPEC 
oil  by  the  non-Communist  countries, 
assuming  present  energy  policies  con- 
tinue, could  range  between  44  and  49 
million  barrels  per  day.  Although 
OPEC's  productive  capacity  might 
amount  to  as  much  as  40-45  million 
barrels  per  day,  its  likely  level  of 
production,  due  to  economic  and 
political  considerations,  might  be 
more  on  the  order  of  36  million  bar- 
rels per  day,  up  from  31  million  bar- 
rels per  day  in   1977.  We,  therefore. 


have  a  potential  daily  shortfall  of  u| 
to  13  million  barrels.  This  prospec 
five  shortfall  translates  into  the  threa 
of  another  leap  in  prices,  with  all  tha 
went  with  the  last  one — inflation 
recession,  and  prolonged  economii 
disruption. 

I  hardly  need  remind  you  how  dif* 
ferent  the  impact  of  an  increase  in  th« 
price  of  oil  is  from  that  of  othe 
commodities.  A  drastic  rise  in  th(« 
price  of  strawberries  may  cause  an 
guish  among  strawberry  lovers  anc 
may  compel  some  minor  adjustment: 
among  the  consumption  habits  of  thft 
public  at  large.  But  the  economy  as  i 
whole  would  not  be  affected.  Oil  i: 
different.  A  price  rise  here  is  perva 
sive  in  its  inflationary  impact,  boti 
directly  and  indirectly  through  thri 
prices  of  many  other  products' 
Perhaps  paradoxically,  it  also  has  i 
powerful  deflationary — or  perhap 
one  should  say  contractionary — effeci 
on  aggregate  economic  activity.  An 


■ 

"f 


'ebruary  1978 

he  process  of  adjusting  our  economy 
nd  society  to  sharply  higher  energy 
osts  is  particularly  long  and  difficult. 

Our  physical  capital  stock  has  been 
)uilt  up  over  the  past  30  years  on  the 
issumption  of  cheap  and  plentiful  oil 
ind  gas.  We  can  see  this  in  the  style 
ind  location  of  our  homes  and  build- 
ngs,  the  structure  of  our  cities,  our 
ransportation  systems,  and  the  choice 
)f  productive  techniques  in  our  fac- 
ories  and  on  our  farms.  Because  the 
ssumption  of  cheap  energy  is  so 
leeply  rooted  in  the  current  structure 
if  our  economy,  adjustment  to  a 
leriod  of  shortage  is  exceedingly  dif- 
icult.  (By  "shortage"  I  use  the 
conomist's  conception,  which  will 
ot  typically  involve  physical  short- 
ges  if  prices  are  free  to  move; 
ather,  the  hardship  takes  the  form  of 
harply  higher  energy  bills  and  pain- 
ul  induced  retrenchment  of  demand.) 
o  avoid  sharply  higher  prices, 
orced-pace  adjustment,  and  severe 
ocial  and  economic  dislocations,  we 
lust  anticipate  the  coming  crisis  be- 
jre  we  get  all  of  the  market  signals. 

The  pain  of  adjustment  can  be 
reatly  reduced  if  it  can  be  spread 
ver  a  period  of  time  and  adapted  to 
le  natural  capacity  of  our  economy 
)  adjust.  We  need  to  make  sacrifices 
ow — to  alter  lifestyles  and  business 
ractices — to  enable  us  to  meet  and 
vercome  a  crisis  looming  in  the 
omewhat  distant  future.  Anticipating 
jture  calamities  is  perhaps  the  most 
ifficult  challenge  for  a  democracy, 
lut  it  is  a  challenge  that  we,  as  well 
s  our  allies,  must  meet  if  our  eco- 
omic  and  political  systems  are  to 
jmain  healthy  and  vigorous  in  the 
980's. 


iobal  Dependence  on  Oil 

The  domestic  and  international  as- 
ects  of  the  energy  problem  are  in- 
jrtwined.  Whatever  our  problems, 
le  situation  of  other  industrialized 
emocracies  is  more  precarious.  Most 
re  far  more  dependent  on  imported 
il,  and  since  most  now  use  energy 
lore  sparingly  than  do  we,  they  have 
ar  less  fat  to  shed  before  their 
conomies  become  hostage  to  a  short- 
ge  of  oil.  They  are  limited,  how- 
ver,  in  what  they  can  do  on  their 
wn  to  improve  their  situation,  and 
tieir  financial  circumstances  are  typi- 
ally  weaker  than  ours. 

I  have  emphasized  thus  far  the 
roblems  arising  from  a  likely  short- 
ge  of  oil  in  the  mid-1980's.  I  do  not 
eed  to  remind  you  that  we  may  not 
ave  to  wait  until  then  to  experience 
hese  problems.  We  are  presently 
ulnerable  to  disruption  in  the  supply 


of  oil  from  any  source,  whether  it  be 
from  a  politically  motivated  embargo 
or  even  a  significant  terrorist  disturb- 
ance. Our  vulnerability  was  dramati- 
cally demonstrated  in  late  19/3;  it  is 
far  greater  now.  Even  the  mere  possi- 
bility of  a  supply  disruption  has  a 
significant  effect  not  only  on  eco- 
nomic decisons  but  also  on  national 
security  considerations.  A  concen- 
trated dependence  on  foreign  sources 
for  any  vital  material  reduces  our 
freedom  of  action  and  leaves  us  open 
to  threats.  The  potential  effects  are, 
of  course,  even  greater  on  our  allies 
with  their  greater  dependence  on  im- 
ported oil.  Their  sense  of  vulnerabil- 
ity to  disruption  of  oil  supplies  in- 
creases considerably  the  burden  upon 
us. 

With  only  6%  of  the  world's  popu- 
lation, we  consume  one-third  of  the 
world's  energy  production  at  a  rate  of 
the  equivalent  of  a  barrel  of  oil  per 
week  per  person.  We  use  twice  as 
much  energy  per  person  as  Germany 


27 


or  Sweden — nations  with  roughly  our 
standard  of  living.  Although  our  own 
production  is  still  substantial,  we 
now,  in  addition,  absorb  nearly  one- 
third  of  total  OPEC  oil  production. 

The  United  States  is  the  world's 
largest  energy  consumer  and  the 
largest  oil  importer.  If  we  do  little  to 
reduce  our  dependence  on  imported 
oil,  the  most  ambitious  efforts  of  the 
other  industrialized  nations  to  prevent 
a  future  shortfall  will  be  futile.  De- 
spite this  fundamental  truth,  our  ef- 
forts to  reduce  our  dependence  will 
not  prevent  a  shortage  if  others  con- 
tinue to  significantly  expand  their  oil 
consumption. 

If  our  nations  do  not  prepare  for 
the  oil  shortfall  in  the  1980's,  the 
framework  of  international  coopera- 
tion which  we  have  worked  so  hard  to 
build  since  World  War  II  will  be  im- 
periled. Severe  economic  disturbances 
would  be  followed  in  some  countries 
by  political  instability.  The  trend  to- 
ward freer  international  trade,  which 


U.S.  OIL  CONSUMPTION  BY  SOURCE 


1955 


1960 


1965 


1970 


1974 


1976 


1977 

Est. 


85% 


15% 


DOMESTIC 

IMPORTS 

81% 


19% 


79% 


21% 


77% 


23% 


63% 


37% 


58% 


42% 


53% 


47% 


10 


15 


20 


(mmb/d) 

Source:  Department  of  Energy 


28 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


has  been  responsible  for  much  of  our 
post-World  War  II  prosperity,  would 
surely  be  reversed  under  conditions  of 
recession  and  oil-induced  balance- 
of-payments  difficulties.  The  prosper- 
ity and  cohesion  of  the  Western  in- 
dustrialized nations  would  be  at 
stake,  putting  in  jeopardy  our  own 
security  and  ultimately  our  way  of 
life. 

The  non-oil-producing  developing 
countries  would  also  be  hard  hit  eco- 
nomically. These  nations  are  not  prof- 
ligate energy  users;  they  use  very  lit- 
tle energy,  but  their  economic 
development — both  in  industry  and  in 
agriculture — depends  on  the  availabil- 
ity of  imported  energy.  If  oil  prices 
are  rising,  the  burden  on  the  already 
fragile  external  financial  condition  of 
these  countries  could  become  insup- 
portable. The  cost  of  their  imports 
would  rise,  and  in  world  recession 
their  exports  would  contract.  Eco- 
nomic development  would  stop  if  not 
regress. 

To  prepare  for  the  energy  crisis  as 
it  affects  us  now,  and  will  affect  us 
even  more  seriously  in  the  future. 
President  Carter  determined  that  one 
of  the  first  priorities  of  this  Adminis- 
tration would  be  to  develop  a  com- 
prehensive energy  program  that  will 
cut  the  growth  of  our  energy  con- 
sumption and  reduce  the  demand  for 
imported  oil.  The  President's  program 
aims  at  lowering  the  annual  growth  of 
energy  consumption  in  the  United 
States  to  less  than  2%  by  1985,  com- 
pared to  an  average  of  3.5%  from 
1950  to  1973.  And  it  would  reduce 
our  oil  imports  in  1985  from  a  possi- 
ble 12  million  barrels  per  day  to  6 
million. 

This  program  would  have  the  not 
merely  incidental  benefit  of  helping 
to  reduce  our  huge  trade  deficit, 
which  with  oil  imports  now  costing 
$45  billion  a  year  is  more  than  fully 
accounted  for  by  our  recent  heavy  de- 
pendence on  imported  oil. 

Our  energy  program  is  only  part  of 
a  broader  effort  to  insure  that  the 
energy  crisis  does  not  suddenly  over- 
whelm the  entire  international  system. 

We  intend  to  continue  our  nation's 
leading  role  in  the  work  of  the  Inter- 
national Energy  Agency  (lEA),  an  or- 
ganization that  includes  Canada,  Ja- 
pan, and  most  of  the  industrialized 
democracies  of  Western  Europe,  as 
well  as  the  United  States.  The  lEA 
has  already  done  much  to  transform 
the  energy  problem  from  a  potentially 
divisive  force  into  a  unifying  one.  It 
has  developed  an  emergency  plan 
which  would  insure  that  the  burden  of 
supply  disruptions  would  be  borne 
equitably,  thus  avoiding  a  repetition 


In  November  1977  the  Department  of  State 
released  a  discussion  paper  entitled  The 
Untied  Stales  and  World  Energy.  It  was  pre- 
pared by  Ralph  Stuart  Smith,  a  special  ad- 
viser in  the  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs. 

Generously  illustrated  with  tables,  charts, 
and  photographs,  this  39-page  paper  (with 
bibliography)  reviews  some  of  the  interre- 
lated diplomatic,  commercial,  and  technical 
aspects  of  the  energy  question,  with  their  im- 
plications for  the  United  States  and  its 
foreign  policy.  It  chronicles  the  events  lead- 
ing up  to  and  following  the  crisis  of  1973- 
74;  describes  the  impact  that  crisis  had  on  the 
industrial  democracies,  the  oil-producing 
countries,  the  non-oil  developing  countries, 
and  the  Communist  countries;  and  reviews 
the  types  of  energy  resources  available — oil, 
natural  gas.  shale  oil,  coal,  nuclear,  solar, 
and  geothermal. 

The  paper  concludes  that:  "Large  in- 
creases in  domestic  oil  production  seem 
clearly  ruled  out,  apart  from  the  contribution 


of  Alaska;  and  a  substantial  part  of  our 
foreign  sources  are  located  in  the  Middle 
East,  an  area  of  high  political  tension  and 
risk.  A  basic  objective  of  our  foreign  policy 
has  been  and  must  be  to  bring  about  peace 
and  security  in  that  area;  but  regardless  of 
what  success  we  may  have  in  such  efforts, 
the  fact  remains  that  oil  located  abroad  is  not 
under  our  control.  We  cannot  rely  on  its 
being  invariably  available  in  quantities  which 
will  insure  that  its  price  is  one  we  can  afford 
to  pay . ' ' 

This  discussion  paper  is  not  a  statement 
of  policy;  rather  it  is  an  attempt  to  bring  to- 
gether, for  convenient  reference,  some  es- 
sential facts  and  alternative  views  on 
energy. 

Single  copies  of  this  paper  are  available 
without  charge  from  the  Correspondence 
Management  Division,  Office  of  Public 
Communication,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs, 
Department  of  State,  Washington,  DC. 
20520. 


of  the  uncoordinated  and  collectively 
harmful  reaction  to  the  1973  oil 
embargo. 

The  lEA  is  also  vitally  concerned 
with  reducing  its  members'  depend- 
ence on  imported  oil.  Ministers  of  the 
lEA  nations,  including  Secretary  of 
Energy  James  R.  Schlesinger,  agreed 
recently  in  Paris  to  hold  their  total  oil 
import  demand  to  not  more  than  26 
million  barrels  a  day  by  1985;  down 
from  a  probable  figure  of  36  million 
barrels  if  current  policies  continue. 

Obviously,  this  goal  has  to  be 
backed  up  by  strong  domestic  action 
by  each  of  the  member  nations,  or  it 
will  simply  float  off  to  join  so  many 
other  well-intentioned  but  ineffectual 
objectives  uttered  at  international 
forums.  We  and  other  members  intend 
to  examine  closely  the  energy  policies 
of  all  lEA  nations  and  to  treat  seri- 
ously any  lack  of  progress  toward 
reaching  our  collective  goal.  But  the 
United  States  is  the  key  country;  un- 
like any  other  nation,  if  we  alone  fail 
to  do  our  share,  the  goal  will  never 
be  reached. 

We  are  urging  the  non-oil- 
producing  developing  countries  to 
make  maximum  use  of  private  sector 
resources  to  expand  their  production 
of  energy.  To  help  meet  the  financial 
requirements  of  such  an  effort,  we  are 
supporting  an  increase  in  World  Bank 
lending  for  energy  development. 

And  in  the  coordination  of  interna- 
tional economic  policy  with  our  major 
allies,  we  are  trying  to  insure  that  the 
efforts  of  individual  countries  to  cope 
with  the  burden  of  oil  debt  do  not 
result   in  trade  protectionism  or 


exchange  restrictions  that  could  ulti 
mately  undermine  the  liberal  interna 
tional  economic  system. 

Consuming  nations  are,  of  course 
only  one  side  of  the  energy  equation 
Actions  of  the  oil-producing  nations 
particularly  the  members  of  OPEC 
are  critical  to  the  world  economy  ani 
to  the  future  of  the  world's  energ; 
supply.  In  our  view,  Internationa 
energy  policy  must  be  a  cooperativi 
endeavor.  The  oil-consuming  nations 
particularly  the  United  States,  have  . 
responsibility  to  the  rest  of  th( 
world — as  well  as  to  themselves — 1( 
control  their  consumption  and  to  de 
velop  alternative  sources  of  energy 
The  oil-producing  nations,  in  turn 
must  take  into  account  the  effect  o 
their  price  and  supply  actions  on  thi 
world  economy.  It  is  in  their  owi 
interest,  as  well  as  that  of  the  de 
veloping  and  developed  worlds,  t( 
avoid  further  disruption  in  worh 
trade  and  prosperity. 

Thus,  there  is  a  kind  of  inescapablt 
bargain  which  must  be  made  betweei 
oil  producing  and  oil  consuming  na 
tions.  It  is  an  arrangement  based  or 
deeds,  not  words  or  agreements,  anc 
it  is  dictated  both  by  the  self-interes 
of  each  side  and  by  the  economic 
facts  of  life.  The  terms  are  simple 
Consumers  must  restrain  demand 
producers  must  restrain  prices  anc 
expand  production  to  meet  tha 
demand. 

The  basis  for  this  relationship  car 
be  clearly  seen  by  considering  the  al 
ternative.  If  consumers  do  not  restrair 
demand,  production  will  be  in- 
adequate and  prices  may  take  anothei 


February  1978 


29 


dramatic  leap.  If  producers  raise 
prices  continually  and  without  eco- 
nomic justification,  the  world  econ- 
omy will  suffer  cumulatively  increas- 
ing damage,  and  the  financial  and 
political  stability  will  be  undermined. 


Domestic  Energy  Plan 

I  would  now  like  to  return  briefly 
to  the  President's  energy  plan.  As 
you  know,  it  operates  both  on  the 
supply  and  demand  for  oil  and  the 
supply  and  demand  for  energy.  The 
two  do  not  always  correspond.  An  in- 
crease in  the  demand  for  energy  need 
not  be  accompanied  by  an  increase  in 
the  demand  for  oil.  In  fact,  the  plan 
provides  for  modest  growth  in  energy 
use  while  it  would  hold  oil  consump- 
tion to  just  slightly  above  the  1976 
level. 

With  respect  to  demand  for  energy, 
the  potential  for  additional  conserva- 
tion is  clear.  As  noted  above,  we  use 
twice  as  much  energy  per  person  as 
Germany  or  Sweden.  Some  of  that 
energy  use  is  careless  waste,  reflect- 
ing a  bygone  era  of  cheap  energy. 
Much  is  built  into  existing  structures 
and  location  patterns.  Reducing 
energy  demand  in  these  sectors  often 
is  not  free;  it  requires  investment  and 
should  be  judged  by  a  test  of  cost- 
effectiveness.  Measured  by  that  test, 
there  is  enormous  potential  for  profit- 
able investment  in  conservation — 
home  insulation,  new  energy  control 
techniques  in  existing  plants,  new 
plants  and  equipment  which  are  op- 
timized according  to  current  and  fu- 
ture energy  prices.  Conservation  is 
not  simply  a  slogan  or  an  exhortation 
to  good  citizenship.  It  is  a  field  of 
opportunity  for  investment  and  inno- 
vation by  American  business  and 
homeowners. 

Many  of  the  programs  you  have 
adopted  in  California — utility  rate  re- 
form, incentives  for  utilities  to  under- 
take vigorous  conservation  programs 
and  for  customers  to  purchase  solar 
equipment — have  helped  shape  the  na- 
tional energy  plan  and  can  be  a  model 
for  other  States. 

Supply  is  an  equally  important  fea- 
ture of  the  President's  energy 
strategy.  The  plan  calls  for  an  in- 
crease by  two-thirds  in  the  production 
of  coal,  to  more  than  a  billion  tons 
per  year  by  1985.  It  provides  steps  to 
stimulate  substitution  of  coal  for  oil 
and  natural  gas,  as  well  as  to  over- 
come some  of  the  present  economic, 
social,  and  environmental  constraints 
upon  its  use. 

The  production  of  nuclear  energy  is 
projected  to  increase  significantly. 
iThe  plan  is  directed  toward  use  of  the 


light  water  reactor  and  defers  the 
early  commercialization  of  technol- 
ogies which  have  not  been  fully  de- 
veloped or  safeguarded  against  poten- 
tial misuse,  particularly  the  breeder 
reactor.  Expansion  of  the  production 
of  nuclear  energy  is  an  essential  part 
of  the  effort  of  the  United  States  and 
other  industrialized  nations  to  reduce 
our  collective  dependence  upon  im- 
ported oil.  We  believe  it  can  be 
done  in  a  manner  which  will  not 
threaten  our  safety  or  our  environ- 
ment. 

The  plan  also  provides  incentives 
for  the  development  of  new  sources 
of  domestic  oil  and  natural  gas.  Con- 
trary to  widespread  misinterpretation, 
the  price  incentives — after  allowance 
for  taxes — are  generous  by  any  rea- 
sonable standard — more  generous,  in 
fact,  than  incentives  to  produce  new 
oil  and  gas  almost  anywhere  else  in 
the  world. 

We  cannot  afford,  however,  to  lull 
ourselves  into  the  expectation  that 
domestic  drilling  will  tap  vast  new  re- 
serves of  oil  or  gas.  Our  nation  has 
probably  been  explored  as  thoroughly 
as  any  other.  We  can  expect  to  in- 
crease production  somewhat  over  the 
next  10  years,  but  for  the  supply  of 
domestically  produced  energy  to  fuel 
an  expanding  economy,  we  will  have 
to  look  to  coal,  nuclear,  and  other 
sources. 

We  must  also  keep  in  mind  that  oil 
and  natural  gas  may  ultimately  be 
most  valuable  to  us  as  raw  materials. 
They  are  used  as  feedstocks  for  pet- 
rochemicals, fibers,  plastics,  and 
pharmaceuticals  as  well  as  in  lubri- 
cants, waxes,  and  asphalt.  While  we 
have  now  and  expect  to  develop  al- 
ternatives for  many  of  the  uses  of  oil 
and  gas  as  fuels,  it  may  be  more  dif- 


ficult or  more  costly  to  find  adequate 
substitutes  for  these  other  uses. 

A  longrun  solution  to  the  energy 
problem  involves  more  than  oil  and 
gas.  The  world  economy  must  shift 
over  time  to  nonfossil  fuels,  particu- 
larly to  renewable  resources.  Sources 
which  once  seemed  exotic,  and  which 
are  now  small-scale  or  experimental, 
will  one  day  be  routine.  Solar  energy, 
for  example,  offers  enormous  poten- 
tial for  the  future  and  specific,  cost 
effective  applications  for  today.  Solar 
water  heating  is  already  competitive 
with  gas  or  electricity  in  parts  of  the 
country.  Costs  of  photovoltaic  cells 
are  declining  substantially,  and  this 
form  of  solar  electricity  may  soon  be 
practical  for  numerous  remote  areas. 
Wind  and  geothermal  energy  could 
make  a  useful  contribution  by  the 
year  2000.  And  the  U.S.  Government 
is  actively  pursuing,  along  with  other 
nations,  advanced  forms  of  nuclear 
fusion  and  fission  which  would  meet 
our  concerns  about  the  nonprolifera- 
tion  of  nuclear  weapons. 

For  as  far  as  we  can  see  into  the  fu- 
ture, we  shall  have  to  make  difficult 
decisions  about  energy.  There  is  no 
"quick  fix,"  no  single  policy  cure- 
all.  Instead  there  are  a  series  of  prac- 
tical measures  that  we  can  take  now 
in  order  to  preserve  our  chances  for 
prosperity  and  security  for  the  years 
to  come.  It  is  a  privileged  position  for 
any  generation  to  be  able  to  foresee 
and  adapt  to  the  problems  of  the  fu- 
ture. We  should  not  miss  that  oppor- 
tunity. D 


'  Address  before  the  annual  Business  Fore- 
casting Conference  at  the  University  of 
California  in  Los  Angeles  on  Dec.  8,  1977; 
Mr.  Cooper  is  Under  Secretary  for  Economic 
Affairs. 


EUROPE:  Crown  of 
St.  Stephen 


by  Secretary  Vance^ 

It  is  often  said  that  America  is  a  na- 
tion of  nations,  and  indeed  we  have 
grown  and  prospered  because  of  the 
contributions  of  people  from  all  over 
the  world.  We  have  drawn  courage  and 
inspiration  from  those  who  have  come 
from  other  nations  to  settle  in  America, 
or  to  give  us  their  help. 

Throughout  two  centuries,  the  des- 
tinies of  the  Hungarian  and  American 
peoples  have  frequently  been  linked. 
Our  infant  republic,  struggling  in  its 


war  of  independence,  welcomed  Col. 
Michael  Kovats  who  helped  to  found 
and  train  the  cavalry  forces  of  Gen. 
George  Washington.  Col.  Kovats  gave 
his  life  for  American  independence  at 
the  battle  of  Charleston,  South 
Carolina.  Hungarian  journals  of  the  day 
were  filled  with  detailed  reports  of 
America's  struggle  for  independence. 

Slightly  more  than  half  a  century 
later,  Americans  saw  the  founding  of 
the  Hungarian  republic.  Not  only  did 
our  republic  recognize  the  Hungarian 
republic  but  became  the  only  country  to 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  • 


accredit  a  diplomatic  minister  to  that 
government. 

When  the  republic  was  crushed, 
America  welcomed  with  open  arms  the 
struggle's  greatest  hero,  Louis  Kos- 
suth. The  impact  of  this  great  man  and 
his  ideals  is  reflected  in  the  many 
American  cities,  villages,  and  counties 
which  bear  his  proud  name. 

A  century  ago,  the  pull  of  new  land 
and  new  opportunity  in  the  United 
States  beckoned  many  people  of  Hun- 
gary. Indeed,  this  first  great  wave  of 
immigration  to  the  United  States  from 
Hungary — which  lasted  until  the  be- 
ginning of  the  First  World  War — 
brought  tens  of  thousands  of  Hungar- 
ians to  our  country.  They  became 
farmers  and  skilled  workers;  they  be- 
came businessmen  and  scientists  and 
leaders  in  the  arts. 

In  1944,  as  the  battle  lines  moved 
westward  into  Hungary,  the  Crown  of 
St.  Stephen  and  other  coronation  re- 
galia were  moved  from  their  traditional 
place  of  safekeeping  in  Budapest  to 
western  Hungary  under  the  protection 
of  their  custodial  guard.  In  March 
1945,  they  were  moved  by  the  guard 
from  Hungarian  soil  into  Austria. 
Later,  the  guard  turned  over  the  crown 
and  regalia  to  elements  of  the  U.S. 
Army  for  safekeeping. 

We  accepted  this  responsibility  in 
the  knowledge  that  the  crown  belongs 
to  the  Hungarian  people.  This  histori- 
cal and  religious  treasure,  which  has 


played  a  central  role  in  the  history  of 
the  nation  for  nearly  1,000  years, 
should  be  in  Hungary  for  its  people  to 
cherish. 

President  Carter  has  written  to  your 
President  a  letter  in  which  he  states: 

It  is  with  a  genuine  sense  of  pride  tliat  I  am 
able  to  return  to  the  people  of  Hungary  this 
priceless  treasure,  which  the  United  Stales  has 
been  privileged  to  shelter  since  the  terrible  dev- 
astation of  the  Second  World  War  1  see  in  this 
act  the  reaffirmation  of  the  traditional  bonds  of 
friendship  between  our  two  peoples. 

The  return  of  the  crown  reflects  the 
improved  relations  between  our  peoples 
and  governments  and  responds  to  the 
national  hopes  of  the  Hungarian 
people.  We  also  believe  that  it  will 
foster  the  spirit  of  the  Helsinki  Final 
Act,  to  which  the  American  and  Hun- 
garian peoples  are  fundamentally 
dedicated. 

It  is  my  unique  privilege,  on  behalf 
of  President  Carter  and  the  people  of 
the  United  States,  represented  here  by 
distinguished  Members  of  the  Congress 
of  the  United  States  and  other  distin- 
guished American  citizens,  to  return  to 
the  people  of  Hungary  the  Holy  Crown 
of  St.  Stephen.  D 


'Statement  made  at  the  ceremony  on  (he  return 
of  the  Crown  of  St.  Stephen  and  other  corona- 
tion regalia  in  Budapest  on  Jan.  5,  1978  (press 
release  7  of  Jan.  7). 


Secretary  ^^ance  Visits 
Turkey  and  Greece 


Before  returning  to  the  United  States 
from  his  trip  to  the  Middle  East,  Secre- 
tary Vance  visited  Turkey  and  Greece 
(Jan.  20-22)  to  meet  with  government 
officials.  Following  are  remarks  to  the 
press  by  Turkish  Foreign  Minister 
Gunduz  Okcun  and  the  Secretary  upon 
the  latter' s  arrival  in  Ankara  and  re- 
marks by  Greek  Prime  Minister  Con- 
stantine  Caramanlis  and  the  Secretary 
in  Athens. ' 


ANKARA,  JAN.  20  - 

Foreign  Minister  Okcun:  I  want  to 
welcome  Mr.  Cyrus  Vance,  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  the 
United  States  and  would  like  to  wish 
him  a  good,  a  pleasant  stay  in  Turkey. 
Mr.  Vance  is  a  very  famous  statesman 
in  the  international  field,  and  he  is 
known  as  a  troubleshooter  No.  1  in  in- 
ternational affairs. 


We  have  some  trouble  spots  in  the 
region,  but  I  don't  think  that  Mr. 
Vance  would  have  time  to  be  interested 
in  some  trouble  spots  like  Cyprus  and 
the  Turkish-Greek  relations.  We  be- 
lieve that  these  issues  could  be  solved 
by  the  parties  interested  to  these  issues 
without  any  interference  or  involve- 
ment by  any  foreign  and/or  major 
power. 

The  trouble  spot  which  Mr.  Vance 
would  be  interested  in,  I  think,  will  be 
the  Turkish-American  relations,  which 
have  had  a  low  profile  recently.  We 
would  like  to  develop  these  relations, 
and  we  would  like  to  discuss  the  prob- 
lems of  common  interest  and  to  find 
out  solutions  which  would  be  to  the 
interest  of  both  nations.  I  believe — I'm 
sure  that  a  statesman  like  Mr.  Vance,  a 
statesman  of  high  standing  and  long 
experience  in  international  fields, 
would  contribute  to  the  development  of 
Turkish-American  relations.  1  welcome 


him  and  his  wife  and  his  colleagues, 
and  again  I  wish  him  success  and  a 
pleasant  stay  in  Turkey. 

Secretary  Vance:  I  am  delighted  to 
return  to  Turkey  at  the  kind  invitation 
of  Prime  Minister  Ecevit.  I  am  ex- 
tremely pleased  that  the  Prime  Minis- 
ter's gracious  invitation  provided  an 
early  opportunity  for  me  to  come  to 
Ankara  to  review  with  the  Prime  Minis- 
ter and  the  Foreign  Minister  a  broad 
range  of  world  problems  and  issues  that 
face  our  two  countries. 

Let  me  emphasize  that  the  U.S. 
Government,  and  the  American  people, 
value  very  highly  our  relationship  with 
Turkey  and  our  longstanding  alliance. 
We  share  a  very  strong  and  deep  com- 
mitment to  democratic  ideals  and 
values, 

I  am  sure  that  I  will  benefit  greatly 
from  the  discussions  which  I  will  be 
having  tonight  and  tomorrow  with  the 
Prime  Minister  and  other  members  of 
his  government.  I  look  forward  very 
much  to  those  discussions  and  thank 
him  again  for  his  kind  invitation  and 
inviting  me  to  come  to  your  country. 

Q.  [Unofficial  translation]  After 
the  Ecevit  government  came  to 
power,  the  spokesman  of  the  U.S. 
State  Department  gave  some  optimis- 
tic and  positive  statements  on  the 
subject  of  Ecevit's  approach  to  world 
issues  and  Turkish-Greek  relations. 
Therefore,  I  wonder  whether  the 
American  Government  hopes  that 
the  defense  agreement  will  pass  more 
easily  through  Congress. 

Secretary  Vance:  Let  me  say  that 
we  will  be  discussing  a  whole  range  of 
issues  with  the  Foreign  Minister  and 
the  Prime  Minister.  I'm  sure  that  one 
of  the  issues  which  will  be  coming  up 
will  be  the  issue  of  our  relationships. 
That  is  a  very  important  relationship  to 
us.  It  always  has  been  in  the  past;  it 
will  be  in  the  future.  1  think  the  atmos- 
phere between  our  two  governments  is 
a  very  good  one,  and  I  look  forward  to 
a  very  fruitful  relationship  between  our 
two  nations. 

Q.  I  talked  with  [U.N.  Secretary 
General]  Mr.  Waldheim  last  week  in 
Tehran.  He  was  very  hopeful  with 
respect  to  the  Cyprus  matter.  Are 
you  as  hopeful  to  solve  this  problem 
as  Mr.  Secretary  General  in  Tehran? 
He  assured  me  the  problem  will  be 
solved  by  the  end  of  1978. 

Secretary  Vance:  I'm  delighted  to 
hear  that.  I  had  a  chance  to  talk  with 
him,  too.  He  and  I  had  a  phone  conver- 
sation when  he  was  in  Tehran.  He  was 
very  pleased  with  his  conversations 
when  he  was  here  in  Ankara  and  was 
encouraged  as  a  result  of  those  discus- 
sions. I  hope  very  much  that  these 
hopes  for  the  future  will  be  achieved, 


February  1978 

because  I  think  they're  the  hopes  of 
everyone.  Everyone  would  like  to  see 
progress  in  that  longstanding  and  dif- 
ficult problem. 


ATHENS,  JAN.  22  ^ 

Q.  Will  you  tell  us  about  the  issues 
that  you  reviewed? 

Prime  Minister  Caramanlis:  That 
is  what  we  will  do.  That  is  why  we  are 
here.  First,  I  would  like  to  say  how 
happy  I  am  about  Mr.  Vance's  visit  to 
Greece  and  also  to  express  my  satisfac- 
tion about  the  talks  we  had. 

As  we  know,  Mr.  Vance  is  in  our 
country  as  a  guest  of  the  Greek  Gov- 
ernment. Consequently,  he  has  not 
come  to  propose  solutions  to  our  prob- 
lems; but  he  came  to  exchange  views 
with  us  on  issues  of  mutual  concern. 

First,  we  discussed  with  Mr.  Vance  bi- 
lateral issues,  such  as  the  aid  provided  by 
America  to  Greece — which  will  amount 
to  $175  million  this  year — as  well  as  the 
question  of  the  military  facilities  Greece 
is  providing  to  America. 

We  also  discussed  the  questions  of 
NATO  and  ascertained  that  this  ques- 
tion is  connected  with  the  settlement  of 
the  Cyprus  issue. 

Next,  we  reviewed  developments  in 
the  Cyprus  issue.  Regarding  this  last 
question,  Mr.  Vance  stated  to  me  that 
his  government,  because  it  is  con- 
cerned about  peace  in  this  area  of  the 
world,  would  like  an  early  and  just  so- 
lution to  be  found  but  does  not  intend 
to  propose  or  recommend  solutions. 
The  U.S.  Government  will,  neverthe- 
less, be  at  the  disposal  of  the  U.N. 
Secretary  General  in  order  to  help  if  the 
interested  parties  find  this  useful. 

I  had  the  opportunity  to  tell  Mr. 
Vance — or  rather  to  give  Mr. 
Vance — an  account  of  the  position  of 
the  Greek  Government  on  all  these  is- 
sues as  outlined  in  my  election  plat- 
form. And  I  can  say  with  satisfaction 
that  I  was  met  with  understanding. 

Finally,  we  discussed  current  inter- 
national problems  and,  more  specif- 
ically, the  developments  in  the  Middle 
East. 

The  conclusion  is  I  had  a  very  useful 
discussion  with  Mr.  Vance,  carried  out 
in  an  atmosphere  characteristic  of  the 
traditional  friendship  which  binds  our 
two  peoples. 

Q.  Did  Mr.  Vance  bring  you  any 
proposals  on  behalf  of  the  Turkish 
Government? 

Prime  Minister  Caramanlis:  He 
brought  no  proposals.  But  he  gave  me 
his  impressions  of  the  discussions  he 
held  in  Ankara.  However,  from  what  I 
have  been  told  I  can  make  no  predic- 
i lions  about  the  future. 


31 


Q.  What  does  that  mean;  that  you 
are  pessimistic? 

Prime   Minister   Caramanlis: 

Neither  optimistic  nor  pessimistic.  If 
the  proposals  which  Mr.  Ecevit  prom- 
ised to  make  should  lead  to  an  honora- 
ble and  just  solution  of  our  differences, 
they  will  be  sure  to  meet  with  a  favora- 
ble Greek  response  because  Greece — as 
I  have  often  declared — sincerely  wants 
to  restore  good  relations  with  Turkey. 
If  the  aim  of  Ankara  is  only  to  create 
impressions,  then  I  might  say  that  it  is 
a  mistake,  because  to  deny  the  hopes 
which  it  creates  would  aggravate  the 
situation. 

Q.  Will  there  be  another  meeting 
with  Mr.  Vance  before  his 
departure? 

Prime  Minister  Caramanlis:  No, 
we  have  finished.  We  said  all  we  had 
to  say.  This  proves  that  we  had  no  dif- 
ficulties. The  fact  that  we  need  not 
have  a  further  meeting  proves  that  we 
had  no  difficulties. 

Q.  Do  the  views  put  forth  by  Mr. 
Vance  greatly  differ  from  the  Greek 
views? 

Prime  Minister  Caramanlis:   You 

have  been  answered  already.  He  [Mr. 
Vance]  showed  understanding.  [Unof- 
ficial translation] 

Secretary  Vance:  Let  me  just  make 
a  very  brief  statement.  I  appreciate 
very  much  the  opportunity  to  meet  with 
the  Prime  Minister  and  to  discuss  the 
issues  which  have  been  reviewed  for 
you.  I  have  found  it  most  informative 
and  useful,  and  it  will  be  very  helpful 
to  me  and  to  President  Carter  in  our 
understanding  of  these  issues  which  are 
of  great  importance. 

With  respect  to  the  bilateral  issues, 
of  course,  we  both  have  a  mutual  inter- 
est in  seeing  these  issues  resolved  in  a 
mutually  satisfactory  way.  And  in  that 
regard,  I  found  our  discussions  also 
very  useful. 

So  again,  let  me  express  my  deep 
thanks  to  the  Prime  Minister  for  his 
kindness  in  inviting  me  to  come  with 
him  and  exchange  views  on  these  bilat- 
eral issues  and  on  the  international  is- 
sues of  broad,  worldwide  scope. 

Q.  Did  you  discuss  the  new  Am- 
bassador's appointment? 

Secretary  Vance:  That  subject  did 
come  up  and  we  discussed  it. 

Prime  Minister  Caramanlis:   We 
discussed  it  and  we  found  a  solution. 
[In  English] 
Secretary  Vance:  That's  right.         D 


'Other  press  releases  relating  to  Secretary 
Vance's  trip  are  Nos.  42  and  43  of  Jan.  21, 
1978;  44  and  47  of  Jan.  23;  and  46  of  Jan.  25. 

-Press  release  41  of  Jan.  21. 

^Press  release  45  of  Jan.  22. 


Sixth  Report 
on  Cyprus 

Message  to  the  Congress ' 

As  required  by  Public  Law  94-104,  this  re- 
port describes  the  progress  that  has  been  made 
during  the  last  sixty  days  towards  a  negotiated 
settlement  on  Cyprus, 

In  my  last  such  report  to  the  Congress,  sub- 
mitted on  October  28,  I  described  with  cautious 
optimism  the  efforts  that  the  Administration 
had  been  undertaking  to  promote  an  early  re- 
sumption of  meaningful  intercommunal  negoti- 
ations under  the  auspices  of  the  United  Na- 
tions. Over  the  past  sixty  days  we  have  con- 
tinued to  discuss  the  Cyprus  issue  extensively 
with  Turkish,  Greek  and  Cypriot  representa- 
tives and  with  U.N.  officials,  our  purpose  re- 
maining that  of  persuading  the  parties  to  re- 
sume intercommunal  talks  at  the  earliest  possi- 
ble date  and  to  be  prepared  to  come  to  the  table 
with  substantive,  negotiable  proposals. 

The  Cyprus  situation  was  discussed  in  the 
bilateral  meetings  that  Secretary  Vance  held 
with  Greek  Foreign  Minister  Papaligouras  and 
Turkish  Foreign  Minister  Caglayangil  in  Brus- 
sels in  early  December  These  conversations 
and  contacts  with  the  two  Cypriot  communities 
have  fortified  our  belief  that  a  Cyprus  settle- 
ment is  earnestly  desired  by  the  parties  con- 
cerned, and  that  they  accept  the  need  to  resume 
negotiations  to  this  end.  Foreign  Ministers 
Papaligouras  and  Caglayangil  also  met  bilater- 
ally in  Brussels,  and  in  a  joint  communique 
stated  that  Greece  and  Turkey  would  continue 
to  encourage  a  prompt  resumption  of  negotia- 
tions as  a  means  of  promoting  a  comprehensive 
solution  of  the  Cyprus  problem. 

We  hope  that  the  recent  elections  in  Greece 
will  give  new  momentum  to  the  search  for  a 
Cyprus  settlement.  Prime  Minister  Caramanlis 
said  in  his  policy  statement  to  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  in  Athens  on  December  14  that  his 
government  "will  continue  to  support  the  in- 
tercommunal talks  under  U.N.  aegis  and  will 
provide  its  full  support  to  the  people  of 
Cyprus  .  .  ." 

The  Turkish  Government  has  in  recent  weeks 
given  public  evidence  of  its  favorable  attitude 
towards  a  settlement  on  Cyprus.  In  a  series  of 
public  interviews  late  in  November,  Foreign 
Minister  Caglayangil  declared  his  support  for 
an  early  resumption  of  negotiations  and  indi- 
cated Turkish  flexibility  with  respect  to  both 
territorial  and  constitutional  aspects  of  a  pack- 
age agreement.  He  also  called  for  economic 
cooperation  between  the  two  Cypriot  com- 
munities, and  reaffirmed  the  Turkish  Govern- 
ment's intent  to  withdraw  its  troops  from  the 
island  once  a  settlement  is  in  effect.  This  ad- 
ministration has  welcomed  Foreign  Minister 
Caglayangil's  statements  as  containing  a 
number  of  positive  elements,  and  we  have  also 
noted  as  steps  in  the  right  direction  the  Turkish 


32 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Government's  decisions  to  withdraw  an  air 
force  unit  and  700  of  its  ground  forces  from 
Cyprus.  It  is  our  hope  and  expectation,  based 
on  the  Turkish  Government's  announcement, 
that  additional  troop  withdrawals  will  be  made. 
Steps  such  as  these  might  improve  the  general 
atmosphere  so  as  to  encourage  the  sense  of 


Italy 


Department  Statement^ 

U.S.  Ambassador  to  Italy  Richard  N. 
Gardner's  visit  to  Washington  has  pro- 
vided an  occasion  for  a  general  policy 
review  with  senior  Administration 
officials. 

There  has  been  no  change  in  the 
Administration's  attitude  toward  West- 
ern European  Communist  Parties,  in- 
cluding that  of  Italy,  although  recent 
developments  in  Italy  have  increased 
the  level  of  our  concern. 

As  the  President  and  other  members 
of  the  Administration  have  publicly 
stated  on  a  number  of  occasions,  our 
Western  European  allies  are  sovereign 
countries  and,  rightly  and  properly,  the 
decision  on  how  they  are  governed 
rests  with  their  citizens  alone.  At  the 
same  time,  we  believe  we  have  an  ob- 
ligation to  our  friends  and  allies  to  ex- 
press our  views  clearly. 

Administration  leaders  have  re- 
peatedly expressed  our  views  on  the 
issue  of  Communist  participation  in 
Western  European  governments.  Our 
position  is  clear:  We  do  not  favor  such 
participation  and  would  like  to  see 
Communist  influence  in  any  Western 
European  country  reduced. 

As  we  have  said  in  the  past,  we  be- 
lieve the  best  way  to  achieve  these 
goals  rests  with  the  efforts  of  democra- 
tic parties  to  meet  the  aspirations  of 
their  people  for  effective,  just,  and 
compassionate  government. 

The  United  States  and  Italy  share 
profound  democratic  values  and  inter- 
ests, and  we  do  not  believe  that  the 
Communists  share  those  values  and 
interests. 

As  the  President  said  last  week  in 
Paris:  "It's  precisely  when  democracy 
is  up  against  difficult  challenges  that  its 
leaders  must  show  firmness  in  resisting 
the  temptation  of  finding  solutions  in 
nondemocratic  forces."  D 


trust  required  to  make  meaningful  talks  possi- 
ble. 

Since  late  October  the  Administration  has  ac- 
tively encouraged  the  two  Cypriot  communities 
to  reach  agreement  on  formulation  of  a  joint 
committee — with  International  Red  Cross 
participation — to  investigate  cases  of  persons 
reported  as  missing  and  unaccounted  for  since 
the  intercommunal  violence  of  the  I960's  and 
the  Turkish  intervention  of  1974.  Work  to- 
wards establishment  of  such  a  committee  is 
proceeding.  Tracing  missing  persons  is,  of 
course,  a  humanitarian  rather  than  a  political 
matter.  Nevertheless,  the  experience  of  these 
past  two  months  demonstrates  that  practical  so- 
lutions to  the  problems  that  divide  Greek  and 
Turkish  Cypriots  might  indeed  be  attainable. 
The  readiness  of  both  Cypriot  parties  to  accept 
a  simple  and  non-controversial  resolution  on 
missing  persons  in  the  U.N.  General  Assem- 
bly's Third  Committee  testified  to  a  construc- 
tive attitude  on  this  issue. 

The  United  Nations  General  Assembly  con- 
ducted its  annual  debate  on  Cyprus  November 
7-9,  and  the  Security  Council  approved  on  De- 


cember 15  the  extension  for  a  further  six 
months  of  the  mandate  of  the  U.N.  peacekeep- 
ing force  on  Cyprus  (UNFICYP),  The  General 
Assembly  debate  provided  the  opportunity  for  a 
thorough  debate  of  the  issues  involved  in  the 
Cyprus  dispute.  Renewal  of  the  UNFICYP 
mandate,  in  itself  an  important  step,  was  signif- 
icant also  for  the  commendable  spirit  of  com- 
promise displayed  by  the  several  parties  con- 
cerned. 

Resolute  movement  towards  intensified 
negotiations  is  still  required,  and  in  the  weeks 
and  months  ahead  we  will  persist  in  our  efforts 
to  achieve  this  goal.  We  believe  we  are  pro- 
ceeding in  the  right  direction,  and  we  remain 
hopeful  that  substantive  progress  towards  a  jusi 
and  lasting  Cyprus  settlement  can  be  achieved. 

Jimmy  Carter.    D 


'Transmitted  on  Jan.  20,  1978;  this  report 
covers  the  period  Nov. -Dec.  1977  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents 
of  Jan.  23). 


HUMA]\  RIGHTS:  Cambodia 


by  Warren  Christopher^ 


While  there  is  not  time  for  a  review 
of  human  rights  conditions  around  the 
world,  I  do  want  to  call  your  attention 
to  what  is  among  the  most  flagrant  and 
massive  abuses  of  human  rights  to  be 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting  De- 
partment spokesman  John  Trattner  on  Jan.  12, 
1978. 


The  Bureau  of  Human  Rights  and 
Humanitarian  Affairs  is  the  focal  point 
for  the  advocacy  of  human  rights  and 
humanitarian  concerns  within  the  De- 
partment of  State  It  is  actively  involved 
in  day-to-day  policy  development  and 
the  implementation  of  imporlani  foreign 
policy  decisions. 

Public  Law  95-105  requires  a  report 
on  the  current  mandate  and  operations  of 
that  bureau,  the  mandate  and  operations 
of  its  predecessor  offices,  and  proposals 
for  the  reorganization  of  the  Department 
of  Slate  that  would  strengthen  human 
rights  and  humanitarian  considerations 
in  the  conduct  of  U.S.  foreign  policy 
and  promote  the  ability  of  the  United 
States  to  participate  effectively  in  inter- 
national humanitarian  efforts.  This  re- 
port was  submitted  to  the  Congress  by 
Secretary  Vance  on  January  31,  1978, 
and  was  printed  in  the  Congressional 
Record  of  February  7.  p.  51422. 


found  in  the  world  today — those  in 
Cambodia. 

No  one  outside  Cambodia  can  know 
the  full  dimensions  of  the  systematic 
terror  and  grinding  down  of  the  Cam- 
bodian people  which  has  taken  place 
under  those  who  have  seized  power 
there.  The  many  detailed  firsthand  re- 
ports from  the  stream  of  refugees  flee- 
ing that  country  provide  a  picture  of  a 
regime  bent  on  destroying  virtually 
every  vestige  of  the  existing  society  in 
order  to  impose  its  will  upon  the  popu- 
lation. Hundreds  of  thousands  of 
human  beings — not  only  supporters  of 
the  former  regime  but  people  from  all 
elements  of  society — have  perished 
under  this  regime. 

While  the  United  States  has  no  rela- 
tionship whatsoever  with  Cambodia, 
we  condemn  what  has  taken  place  there 
and  will  take  every  suitable  opportunity 
to  speak  out,  lest  by  our  silence  we 
seem  to  acquiesce  in  the  unspeakable 
human  rights  abuses  that  are  occurring 
there.  Moreover,  we  will  be  supporting 
international  efforts  to  call  attention  to 
this  egregious  situation. 

D 


I 


'Excerpt  from  remarks  before  the  National 
Foreign  Policy  Conference  for  Editors  and 
Broadcasters  at  the  Department  of  State  on 
Jan.  18,  1978;  Mr.  Christopher  is  Deputy  Sec- 
retary of  State. 


February  1978 


33 


MIDDLE  EAST:  Sein'etary  Vatiee  Visits 
Israel  and  Egypt^  January  lG-22 


Secretary  Vance  visited  Israel  (Jan.  16-20)  and  Egypt  (Jan.  20-22)  to  meet 
with  Prime  Minister  Begin  and  President  Sadat.  He  headed  the  U.S.  delegation 
at  the  opening  session  of  the  Political  Committee  in  Jerusalem.  Following  are 
remarks  and  news  conferences  by  Secretary  Vance  and  foreign  leaders  on  various 
occasions  during  the  trip,  as  well  as  the  texts  of  a  White  House  statement  on  the 
Secretary's  report  to  the  President  and  Secretary  Vance's  statement  before  the 
House  Committee  on  International  Relations. ' 


OPENING  SESSION, 
POLITICAL  COMMITTEE, 
JERUSALEM,  JAN.  W 

Let  me  first  express  to  you,  our  host, 
my  delegation's  appreciation  for  the  ar- 
rangements that  have  been  made  for  the 
meetings  that  are  opening  today. 

We  owe  a  deep  debt  of  gratitude  to 
President  Sadat  and  to  Prime  Minister 
Begin  for  their  steps  toward  peace 
which  have  brought  us  to  this  room. 
We  are  here  because  of  the  courage  and 
vision  of  President  Sadat  and  Prime 
Minister  Begin  in  sweeping  aside  the 
barriers  that  for  so  long  separated 
Arabs  from  Israelis,  barriers  that  have 
caused  so  many  wars  and  so  much 
bloodshed.  We  are  here  to  work  to 
bring  to  fruition  the  task  begun  by  Pres- 
ident Sadat  and  Prime  Minister  Begin 
in  Jerusalem  and  in  Ismailia  and  in  the 
Cairo  conference,  of  which  this  com- 
mittee is  an  outgrowth. 

President  Carter  has  sent  me  to  rep- 
resent the  United  States  at  the  opening 
of  these  talks  to  demonstrate  the  impor- 
tance that  we  attach  to  them  and  to 
their  success.  Since  the  very  beginning 
of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict,  we  have 
played  an  active  role  in  the  search  for  a 
settlement.  Our  friendships  with  all  of 
the  parties  are  warm  and  strong.  For 
the  meetings  that  begin  this  morning, 
we  pledge  to  support  the  efforts  of  the 
parties  to  reach  agreement. 

The  common  goal  of  all — Egypt,  Is- 
rael, the  United  States,  and  those  ab- 
sent today  but  who  we  hope  will  soon 
join  in  our  efforts — is  a  just,  lasting, 
and  comprehensive  peace.  If  this  com- 
mittee is  to  succeed  in  its  goal  of  pre- 
paring the  way  for  such  a  peace,  it 
must  come  to  grips  with  the  difficult 
problems  of  substance  which  continue 
to  separate  the  parties.  As  President 
Carter  has  said,  we  believe  there  are 
certain  principles  which  must  be  ob- 
served before  a  just  and  comprehensive 
peace  can  be  achieved. 

•  First,  true  peace  must  be  based  on 
normal  relations  among  the  parties  to 


the  peace.  Peace  means  more  than  just 
the  end  to  belligerency. 

•  Second,  there  must  be  withdrawal 
by  Israel  from  territories  occupied  in 
1967  and  agreement  on  secure  and  rec- 
ognized borders  for  all  parties  in  the 
context  of  normal  and  peaceful  rela- 
tions in  accordance  with  U.N.  Resolu- 
tions 242  and  338. 

•  Third,  there  must  be  a  resolution 
of  the  Palestinian  problem  in  all  its  as- 
pects. The  solution  must  recognize  the 
legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian 
people  and  enable  the  Palestinians  to 
participate  in  the  determination  of  their 
own  future. 

Those  of  us  here  today  bear  a  special 
and  very  heavy  responsibility  as  repre- 
sentatives of  our  governments  and  as 
individuals.  We  must  deal  with  and 
overcome  many  difficult  problems.  We 
will  be  held  accountable — today  by 
world  opinion,  tomorrow  by  history. 
We  will  not  be  judged  lightly  if  we 
fail. 

It  is  entirely  fitting  that  this  work  be 
done  in  Jerusalem — Jerusalem,  city  of 
peace,  city  which  has  known  so  much 
strife  and  bloodshed,  city  holy  to  our 
three  religions.  We  must  carry  forward 
here  the  work  already  begun.  As  Presi- 
dent Carter  recently  suggested,  the 
road  to  peace  can  lead  through 
Jerusalem  and  Cairo  ultimately  to  a 
comprehensive  peace. 

It  is  also  fitting  that  this  work  should 
begin  as  Israel  approaches  its  30th  an- 
niversary. There  could  be  no  greater 
gift  to  the  people  of  Israel  and  to  the 
people  of  the  Arab  world  than  to  make 
this  anniversary  the  birthday  of  peace. 

So  in  this  place  and  at  this  time,  let 
us  strive  to  make  a  reality  of  the  peace 
for  which  the  peoples  of  this  area  have 
so  long  yearned. 


TOAST,  JERUSALEM,  JAN.  W 

This  is  my  fifth  visit  to  this  beautiful 
and  historic  city  in  the  period  of  just  1 
year  that  I  have  been  the  Secretary  of 


State.  This  visit  is  a  very  special  one. 
What  makes  it  special  is  that  today  the 
Foreign  Ministers  of  Israel  and  of 
Egypt  have  begun  the  process  of  seri- 
ous, direct,  substantive  negotiations, 
and  all  of  us  have  a  sense  of  the  impor- 
tance of  this  day  and  of  this  moment. 

The  meetings  which  we  began  today 
will  have  to  deal  with  many  difficult 
and  serious  issues  which  will  affect  the 
national  interests  of  all  parties.  We 
have  before  us  an  historic  opportunity 
for  peace.  We  know  this  opportunity 
must  be  seized  or  it  may  slip  from  our 
grasp.  But  we  must  ever  keep  in  mind 
that  no  truly  important  problem  is  ever 
solved  without  perseverance,  hard 
work,  and  flexibility  on  both  sides.  I 
am  sure  that,  in  the  work  which  began 
today,  we  will  have  times  of  success 
and  moments  of  difficulty.  We  must 
build  on  the  momentum  which  has  been 
created  and  not  allow  moments  of  dif- 
ficulty to  discourage  us.  We  must  keep 
constantly  in  front  of  us  the  goal  which 
all  of  us  seek — namely,  a  just  and  last- 
ing peace. 

Let  me  conclude  with  a  brief  per- 
sonal observation.  The  direct  contacts 
that  are  now  taking  place  offer  the  op- 
portunity for  a  new  dimension  that  has 
been  absent  in  all  past  efforts  to  resolve 
this  conflict.  I  refer  to  the  opportunity 
to  listen  and  to  make  a  genuine  effort 
to  understand  the  perceptions  and 
points  of  views  of  others.  The  impor- 
tance of  this  new  dimension  should  not 
be  underestimated. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  ask  you  to 
raise  your  glasses  to  the  two  great  lead- 
ers to  whose  statesmanship  we  owe  our 
presence  here  this  evening — Prime 
Minister  Begin  and  President  Sadat. 
Let  us  take  inspiration  from  their  cour- 
age, their  vision,  and  dedicate  our- 
selves to  the  task  that  they  have  put  in 
our  hands. 


REMARKS  TO  THE  PRESS, 
JERUSALEM,  JAN.  19^ 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  The  Foreign 
Minister  [Moshe  Dayan]  and  I  just 
finished  a  conversation  with  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  Mr.  Atherton  [Assistant 
Secretary  for  Near  Eastern  and  South 
Asian  Affairs  Alfred  L.  Atherton,  Jr.], 
and  with  Ambassador  Lewis  [U.S. 
Ambassador  to  Israel  Samuel  W. 
Lewis].  It  was  one  of  the  best  talks.  All 


34 

of  them  are  good  ones,  but  this  was 
even  better. 

Tomorrow  the  Secretary  of  State  will 
go  to  Cairo  and  will  see  President 
Sadat.  The  Secretary  was  gracious 
enough  to  take  it  upon  himself  to  try  to 
convince  President  Sadat  that  the 
negotiations  within  the  framework  of 
the  Political  Committee  should  be  re- 
newed. 

As  far  as  the  Military  Committee  is 
concerned — from  our  point  of  view 
they  are  intertwined — the  Cabinet  of  Is- 
rael will  take  the  proper  decision  after 
we  are  informed  by  the  Secretary  of  the 
results  of  his  talks  in  Cairo.  We  hope 
that  the  mission — very  important  mis- 
sion of  the  Secretary  in  Cairo — will  be 
successful.  We  wish  him  Godspeed  and 
full  success. 

Secretary  Vance:  I  appreciate  very 
much  your  kindness  in  coming  today  to 
meet  with  us.  We  did,  indeed,  have  a 
very  good  discussion  of  the  situation 
and  the  plans  for  the  future.  I  will  be 
reporting  to  the  Prime  Minister  and  to 
the  Foreign  Minister  after  my  talks  to- 
morrow, and  then  we  shall  determine 
how  we  proceed  from  there. 

Q.  In  other  words,  from  now  on 
everything  is  up  to  President  Sadat. 

Secretary  Vance:  No,  I  wouldn't 
say  that.  We  first  want  to  hear  what  he 
has  to  say  and  hear  his  views  as  to  how 
we  should  proceed.  Of  course,  he  is 
one  of  the  parties,  and  this  is  for  all  of 
the  parties  to  decide. 

Q.  If  he  says  no,  that's  the  end  of 
the  Political  Committee  and  the 
foreign  ministers'  conference. 

Secretary  Vance:  1  think  you  are 
jumping  to  conclusions  at  this  point. 

Q.  Does  that  mean  you  are  coming 
back  here  personally? 

Secretary  Vance:  No,  I  am  going  to 
be  going  from  Cairo,  directly  to  Ank- 
ara. 1  promised  to  spend  a  night  and 
part  of  2  days  in  Ankara  on  my  way 
back  to  the  United  States  and  also  the 
same  in  Athens,  and  I  shall  be  going 
from  Athens  back. 

Mr.  Atherton  is  going  to  be  staying 
here  along  with  the  other  members  of 
our  delegation,  and,  as  I've  said  many 
times  on  many  occasions  before,  that 
should  it  be  useful  for  me  to  come  back 
again  at  any  time,  I'll  come  back. 

Q.  During  the  talks  have  you 
explored  the  possibility  of  another 
summit  between  Prime  Minister 
Begin  and  President  Sadat  or  even 
more  a  possible  summit  inviting  Mr. 
Begin,  Mr.  Sadat,  and  President 
Carter? 

Secretary  Vance:  No,  we  have  not 
explored  that  at  this  point. 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  would  be  a 
worthwhile  idea? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  think  that's  up  to 


the  principals  to  comment  on. 
Q.  [Inaudible] 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  If  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  invites  me  to 
come  to  Washington  to  meet  him,  I 
will  with  gratitude  accept  his  invita- 
tion. If  he  invites  me  to  come  to  Wash- 
ington together  with  President  Sadat, 
the  representative  of  Israel  will  be 
there. 

Q.  You  just  said  that  if  Mr.  Sadat 
went  to  Washington  and  if  you  were 
invited  by  President  Carter,  that 
there  would  be  a  representative  of  Is- 
rael. Does  that  mean — 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  No,  I  said 
the  representative.  I  represent  Israel. 
[Laughter] 

Secretary  Vance:  Good  for  you. 
Q.  So  that  we  can  gauge  the 
chances  of  renewing  these  talks,  can 
you  tell  us,  having  spoken,  I  know, 
with  the  President  and  with  others, 
why  were  the  talks  broken  off? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  don't  really 
frankly  know  the  answer  to  that  ques- 
tion. President  Sadat  said  he  would 
discuss  that  with  me  tomorrow,  and  I'll 
be  able  to  give  you  a  better  answer  to- 
morrow. 

Q.  I  understand  that  President 
Carter  is  interested  in  seeing  the 
military  talks  continue.  This  was  his 
position,  if  I  understand  it,  is  that  we 
are  prepared  to  see  the  political  talks 
continue,  and  we  haven't  yet  decided 
about  the  military  talks.  Does  this 
mean  that  the  resumption  of  the  mili- 
tary talks  is  dependent  on  the  re- 
sumption of  the  political  talks? 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  We  reserved 
yesterday  the  decision  which  we  will 
take  after  we  hear  from  the  Secretary 
and  perhaps  also  we  shall  hear  Presi- 
dent Sadat's  speech  on  Saturday.  There 
was  a  publication  to  the  effect  that  our 
Defense  Minister  has  been  invited  to 
come  to  Cairo  on  Shabbat.  We  don't 
travel  on  Shabbat.  So  this  is  excluded, 
and  in  the  meantime  we  shall  listen  to 
the  speech  by  President  Sadat.  To- 
gether we  shall  be  able  perhaps— I  have 
to  make  this  reservation — at  the  weekly 
Cabinet  session,  which  convenes  usu- 
ally at  10  o'clock  in  the  morning  on 
Sunday,  to  take  a  decision  about  our 
participation  in  the  Military  Commit- 
tee. 

Q.  What  do  you  think  the  United 
States — what  do  you  think  the 
Americans  could  do  to  restore  the 
negotiating  process? 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  You  heard 
the  Secretary  of  State.  He  can  do 
much,  so  America  will  do  much. 

Q.  But  I  want  to  know  what  you 
think  the  United  States  could  and 
should  do  to  restore  the  process. 
Prime  Minister  Begin:  I  already 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

said  the  Secretary  of  State  will  go  to- 
morrow to  Cairo  and  speak  to  Sadat.  I 
think  it  is  very  much  indeed.  We  only 
expect  good  results. 

Q,  [Unofficial  translation].  You 
stated  this  afternoon  that  Israel  has 
reached  agreement  on  five  issues  out 
of  seven  on  the  first  paragraph  of  the 
agenda.  Could  you  indicate  what  are 
the  five  points  of  agreement? 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  The  numbers 
are  not  so  important.  We  even 
examined  them  together,  the  Foreign 
Secretary  of  Israel  and  the  Secretary  of 
State,  and  our  colleagues  and  myself, 
the  draft  declaration  of  principles,  and 
we  found  that  real  progress  was  made. 
Some  issues  are  outstanding  and  should 
be  subject  to  further  negotiations. 
Within  the  framework  of  the  Political 
Committee — may  I  be  allowed  to  finish 
another  sentence?  I  don't  think  it  would 
be  advisable  now,  useful  to  the  public 
interest  to  go  into  the  details.  What  I 
can  say,  and  the  Secretary  of  State  will 
bear  me  out,  is  that  we  made  real  prog- 
ress, and  there  are  still  some  problems 
to  negotiate  about. 

Q.  Would  you  prefer  the  resuming 
of  the  Political  Committee  or  would 
you  prefer  a  new,  less  public 
framework  would  be  more  advisa- 
ble? 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  There  is  no 
need  to  look  for  new  formulas.  The 
formula  of  a  Political  Committee  and  a 
Military  Committee,  which  met  with 
Mr.  Sadat's  approval  in  Ismailia,  is 
very  reasonable.  We  have  political 
problems.  We  have  security  problems, 
i.e.,  military  problems.  Therefore,  we 
have  established  the  two  committees, 
and  both  should  be  resumed. 

Q.  Both  you  and  the  Prime  Minis- 
ter categorized  the  talks  this  after- 
noon as  good  and  very  good.  What 
was  so  good  about  them? 

Secretary  Vance:  We  went  into  the 
various  issues  which  have  to  be  consid- 
ered and  determined.  We  explored 
them  in  depth.  We  found  a  great  deal 
of  agreement  on  these  issues,  and  there 
was  a  full  exchange  of  views,  and  I 
considered  them  to  be  very  good  talks. 
Q.  The  atmosphere  to  many  observ- 
ers seems  strained  here.  There've 
been  suggestions  that  improper 
speeches  have  been  made  in  the 
wrong  place  and  that  guests  of  the 
Israeli  Government  are  saying  things 
that  maybe  they  shouldn't  say.  I 
would  like  to  hear  your  estimate  of 
the  social  niceties  with  particular 
reference  to  the  way  you  found  out 
about  the  Egyptian  Foreign  Minister 
being  withdrawn.  Were  you  in- 
formed in  a  proper  way? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  found  out  by 


I   February  1978 

•I  somebody  telling  me  that  there  had  just 
been  reported  over  the  radio  that  the 
Minister  of  Information  of  Egypt  had 
said  that  the  delegation  was  being 
called  back  to  Cairo.  I  really  don't 
want  to  comment  on  whether  that  was 
appropriate  or  not. 

Let  me  say  I  think  we  have  just  got 
to  keep  our  eye  on  the  task  that  we 
really  all  have  ahead  of  us  and  that  is  to 
get  the  talks  going  again  and  try  and 
find  a  solution. 

Q.  You  made  a  very  strong  speech 
today.  Do  you  think  this  is  the  time 
for  strong  speeches? 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  If  it  was  a 
strong  speech  it  means  that  it  was  a 
good  speech,  and  this  is  the  time  for 
good  speeches. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  what  you  will 
say  to  President  Sadat  that  could 
make  him  reverse  his  position? 

Secretary  Vance:  You  know  I  can't 
answer  that  question,  and  it  would  be 
inappropriate  for  me  to  do  it.  I  really 
can't. 

Q.  Do  you  see  the  possibility  that  a 
new  framework  other  than  the  exist- 
ing Political  and  Military  Commit- 
tees could  be  decided  upon  in  order 
to  continue  the  talks?  Some  other 
framework? 

Secretary  Vance:  The  two  commit- 
tees still  exist.  There  has  been  a 
suggestion  that  the  Military  Committee 
will  resume  its  discussions  on  Sunday 
or  Monday  of  next  week.  That's  a  deci- 
sion which  has  to  be  taken.  Insofar  as 
the  Political  Committee  is  concerned, 
when  the  Foreign  Minister  left  yester- 
day, he  indicated  that  he  did  not  con- 
sider the  talks  broken  off  nor  the  Polit- 
ical Committee  dissolved;  so  they  both 
.    still  exist. 

I  Q.  Do  you  see  another  framework 
possible  at  this  point? 

Secretary  Vance:  Anything  can 
happen,  but  I  think  we've  got  these 
two,  and  I  think  you  ought  to  deal  with 
the  two  we've  got. 

Q.  Including  your  shuttling  back 
and  forth  between  the  two  capitals? 

Secretary  Vance:  1  don't  see  that  is 
needed  at  this  point.  I'm  going  to  take 
this  one  trip,  and  1  said  if  I  have  to 
come  back,  I  will. 

Q.  On  the  status  of  the  declaration 
of  principles,  was  there  additional 
work  done  between  yourself  and  the 
'  Prime  Minister  on  that  document  so 
I  that  when  you  go  to  see  Mr.  Sadat, 
you  can  inform  him  of  the  situation 
where,  at  least  as  far  as  Israel  is  con- 
cerned, it  could  accept  some  ideas 
put  forth  by  the  United  States  on  the 
remaining  problems? 

Secretary  Vance:  We  had  further 
discussion  about  that  document.   Any 


ultimate  decision,  of  course,  will  have 
to  be  a  decision  taken  by  the  Israeli 
Cabinet  when  there  is  such  a  document 
and  the  same  thing  would  be  true  of 
Egypt.  Any  decision  would  have  to  be 
taken  by  the  President  of  Egypt. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  ask  a  personal 
question  which  is  not  of  strict  refer- 
ence to  politics.  Would  you  ever 
think  for  a  second  this  afternoon, 
while  you  were  delivering  the  speech, 
that  President  Sadat  was  on  the  other 
side  of  the  television  just  staring  at 
you  and  trying  to  find  out  what  was 
behind  your  words? 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  You  know 
when  I  make  a  speech,  I  think  about 
the  speech.  And  the  audience  is  vast! 
And,  of  course,  I  always  bear  in  mind 
that  people  listen  to  my  speeches.  I 
think  it  was  a  good  and  constructive 
speech.  This  is  my  opinion  and  my 
conviction. 

Q.  Do  you  in  any  way  feel  that  the 
public  dialogue  between  you  and 
President  Sadat  as  manifested  in 
your  speeches  has  hampered  negotia- 
tions in  either  of  the  two  committees? 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  I  had  a  long 
discussion  on  this  with  the  Foreign 
Minister  of  Egypt  yesterday  when  he 
came  to  see  me.  We  sat  together  for 
some  75  minutes,  and  we  really  dis- 
cussed this  problem.  I  don't  want  now 
to  go  into  details,  but  you  should  re- 
member, as  the  facts  go,  that  suddenly 
there  appeared  an  article  in  the  Egyp- 
tian press  with  some  name-calling, 
which  I  don't  want  to  repeat.  And,  of 
course,  it  hurts. 

Then  there  appeared  an  article  in 
which  we  were  threatened  with  another 
October.  As  you  remember,  to  every- 
body concerned,  not  to  threaten  us  at 
all,  because  war  threats  cannot  influ- 
ence our  attitude.  Nobody  frightens  us 
with  threats  otherwise  where  are  we  go- 
ing. This  is  the  attitude  of  the  whole 
people  of  Israel. 

We  want  to  negotiate,  we  produced  a 
peace  plan — a  positive  plan — we  heard 
the  most  complimentary  adjectives 
about  our  plan  in  the  United  States,  in 
Great  Britain,  elsewhere.  And  on  this 
we  proved  here  our  good  will,  and  then 
suddenly  we  hear  threats,  so  we  didn't 
go  into  polemics.  We  only  appealed  not 
to  issue  such  threats. 

Then,  in  fact  there  was  an  interview 
given  by  President  Sadat  to  the  weekly, 
called  October,  which  was  also  very 
regrettable.  And  again  we  didn't  want 
to  go  into  polemics. 

Yes,  ultimately  that  when  we  hear  a 
guest  saying  that  we  must  give  up  our 
capital  city,  the  heart  of  our  people,  of 
course  it  was  not  only  our  right  but  our 
duty  to  tell  him  what  we  think  about  it, 
at  the  proper  place,  at  the  proper  mo- 


35 


ment.  So  this  is  the  actual  develop- 
ment. 

Time  and  again  we  suggested  that 
the  negotiations  should  be  conducted  in 
a  calm  atmosphere.  Time  and  again  on 
American  television  you  heard  me  sev- 
eral times. 

Now  as  the  Egyptian  Government  is- 
sued its  statement  yesterday,  which  I 
read,  it  is  a  very,  may  I  say,  extreme 
statement.  I  suggest  to  you  read  it.  Of 
course,  our  government  had  to  issue  its 
statement  and  to  put  the  position  clear. 

Yes,  today  I  spoke  to  a  delegation 
from  France.  It  was  after  the  disruption 
of  the  talks  in  the  framework  of  the 
committee — of  the  Political  Commit- 
tee— and  I  had  to  make  a  statement.  It 
was  a  public  meeting,  and  I  did  my 
best. 

As  far  as  the  future  is  concerned,  I 
can  assure  you  from  our  point  of  view, 
if  the  Secretary  is  successful  in  con- 
vincing President  Sadat  that  both  com- 
mittees should  renew  negotiations  and 
we  continue,  we  shall  then  be  prepared 
to  refrain  from  any  public  statement. 
Of  course,  in  the  basis  of  reciprocity, 
and  let  the  two  committees,  in  calm 
atmosphere,  negotiate. 

Q.  As  a  mediator,  an  arbitrator, 
would  you  say  that  the  basic  problem 
Hes  in  the  fact  that  you're  dealing  on 
one  hand  with  an  emotional  people, 
on  the  other  hand  with  a  pragmatic 
people?  In  other  words,  on  the  one 
side,  one  that  can  be  swept  by  a 
dramatic  peace  initiative;  on  the 
other  side,  one  that  says:  "No,  wait  a 
minute.  What  do  you  mean,  ac- 
tually?" 

Secretary  Vance:  No,  I  wouldn't 
characterize  it  that  way.  I  think  that  the 
difficulty  is  that  we  are  dealing  with 
very  difficult  and  deep-seated  issues 
that  are  very  hard  to  reconcile,  and  that 
is  the  problem.  One  has  to  find  the 
bridge  between  the  positions  on  these 
very  tough  issues. 

Q.  Do  you  think  you  have  a  na- 
tional consensus  in  favor  of  maintain- 
ing these  settlements  in  northeastern 
Sinai  the  way  you  have  a  consensus 
against  the  establishment  of  a  Pales- 
tinian state? 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  Like  I  said, 
it  is  a  national  consensus  that  these  set- 
tlements cannot  be  removed,  and  I 
think  I  can  also  say  that  in  the  presence 
of  my  colleague,  the  Foreign  Minister, 
that  any  government  of  Israel  which 
would  take  a  decision  to  remove  the 
settlements  would  fall  in  Parliament, 
would  have  a  vote  of  no  confidence. 
And  as  we  want  to  continue  with  our 
service,  so  we  told  openly,  as  I  said  to 
President  Sadat  at  Ismailia,  the  settle- 
ments have  to  stay,  and  we  have  a 


36 


principle  that  we  have  to  give  Jewish 
settlements  Israeli  defense. 

That  is  what  I  said  to  President  Sadat 
at  Ismailia.  He  heard  it  from  me  and 
was  taking  the  minutes.  I  can  inform 
you  about  my  statement.  Of  course,  1 
cannot  tell  you  what  President  Sadat 
said.  It  is  up  to  him.  I  will  not  divulge 
our  private  talk  from  his  point  of  view. 

Q.  In  all  the  forums  that  have 
taken  place  since  President  Sadat 
came  to  Jerusalem,  he  was  remarka- 
bly consistent.  He  has  said  the  price 
of  peace  is  Israeli  acceptance  of  all 
his  demands,  notably,  the  return  of 
all  Arab  land  including  East 
Jerusalem,  a  Palestinian  state,  etc. 
Do  you  have  any  reason  to  believe 
that  Sadat  doesn't  mean  exactly  what 
he  said? 

Prime  Minister  Begin:  Why  should 
I?  But  I  would  like  to  remind  you  that 
the  day  before  President  Sadat  arrived 
here — excuse  me,  several  days  before 
he  arrived  here — he  made  that  state- 
ment to  the  effect  that  Israel  must 
withdraw  from  all  the  territories,  as  the 
name  goes,  and  agree  to  a  Palestinian 
state  to  be  formed,  in  my  language,  in 
Judea,  Samaria,  and  the  Gaza  district. 
And  I  answered  him  that  both  demands 
are  absolutely  unacceptable  by  Israel 
and  will  not  be  accepted  by  Israel.  I 
added,  if  you  Mr.  President,  want  to 
come  to  Jerusalem  and  put  out  those 
two  demands,  you  are  entitled  to,  but 
you  should  know  they  would  be  unac- 
ceptable to  us. 

On  these  terms.  President  Sadat  ar- 
rived in  Jerusalem.  Everyone  of  us 
knew  his  stand.  In  the  Knesset  he  made 
a  speech  to  the  same  effect,  but  I  an- 
swered him  and  again  explained  our 
position.  Now,  what  did  we  decide  to 
do,  both  in  Jerusalem  and  at  Ismailia? 
We  agreed  that  we  have  differences  of 
opinion,  and  we  agreed  to  start  negotia- 
tions knowing  that  we  have  differences 
of  opinion.  And  it  is  absolutely  natural. 

If  you  study  all  the  negotiations  to 
conclude  peace  treaties  after  the  First 
World  War,  after  the  Second  World 
War,  in  many  parts  of  the  world,  you 
will  see,  and  the  Secretary  of  State  will 
bear  me  out.  He  himself  was  involved 
in  negotiations  in  Korea  and  about 
Vietnam.  All  the  negotiations  start 
from  difference  of  opinion.  Therefore, 
that  was  and  that  is  the  hope.  We  start 
from  differences  of  opinion,  and  we  do 
our  best  to  reach  an  agreement.  This 
principle  stands. 

Q.  What  is  your  assessment  on  the 
same  point?  Do  you  think  that  the 
Egyptians  are  prepared  to  give  on 
these  demands? 

Secretary  Vance:  There  are  still  dif- 
ferences on  views  on  some  of  the  issues 
involved,  and  insofar  as  their  position 


is  concerned,  I  think  it  would  be  inap- 
propriate for  me,  while  we're  deeply 
involved  in  private  discussions,  to  dis- 
close what  their  position  is. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
BARRAGES,  EGYPT,  JAN.  20' 

President  Sadat:  Really,  I  must 
seize  President  Carter  and  Secretary 
Vance  for  the  very  genuine  efforts  that 
they  have  done  in  the  last  few  days  to 
bridge  whatever  differences  have  arisen 
between  us  and  the  Israelis.  Foreign 
Minister  Kamel  has  reported  to  me  yes- 
terday, and  I  have  expressed  to  Secre- 
tary Vance  my  gratitude  for  all  the  help 
that  he  has  done  there. 

I  think  the  peace  process  should  head 
toward  what  we  always  are  after  and 
that  is  peace.  Peace  cannot  be  achieved 
through  imposing  settlements  on 
others'  land  and  also,  not  only  imposed 
but  to  be  defended  also.  This  is  really 
something,  some  logic  that  no  one  can 
understand  in  the  world.  The  door  to 
peace  is  not  closed.  But  there  should 
be,  in  this  moment,  a  reevaluation  of 
the  whole  thing  because  peace  con- 
tradicts with  any  tread  on  sovereignty 
or  land.  This  should  be  clear. 

I  don't  want  to  answer  or  comment 
on  what  Premier  Begin  said  yesterday 
in  the  Knesset.  But  I  think  anyone  who 
reads  his  speech  there  can  feel  that  I 
was  right,  because  they  want  land,  they 
want  security,  they  want  everything, 
and  they  are  not  ready,  1  mean,  to  un- 
derstand that  peace  cannot  be  achieved 
except  when  it  is  built  on  justice. 

We  don't  seek  peace  at  any  price, 
not  at  all.  They  will  be  wrong  in  Israel 
if  they  thought  of  this  and,  as  I  said, 
whenever  they  want  to  be  in  this  area  in 
cooperation  and  recognize,  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  Mr.  Begin,  in  his  arrogant 
way,  said  in  the  Knesset  that  he  doesn't 
need  the  recognition  of  anyone  here. 
Very  well,  let  us  not  start  commenting 
on  this  because  this  is  still  the  old  ar- 
rogant way,  and  today  or  tomorrow  he 
will  see  that  Israel  will  not  gain  by  it  at 
all. 

But  peace,  as  everyone  in  the  whole 
world  knows,  means  that  no  one  will 
tread  on  the  land  or  sovereignty  of  the 
other,  These  are  principles  that  should 
be  known  in  this  precise  moment. 

I  must  tell  you  also  that  in  our  dis- 
cussions. Secretary  Vance  and  me,  as 
you  may  have  never  known  and  after 
President  Carter  contacted  him  and 
contacted  me,  we  have  agreed  that  the 
Military  Committee  resume  its  hard 
work  here  in  Cairo  like  it  was  agreed 
on  before,  and  we  have  agreed  also  that 
constant  contact  should  take  place  be- 
tween us  in  the  future  like  it  has  taken 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

place  before.  And  he  has  conveyed  to 
me  messages  from  President  Carter. 
And  1  also  asked  him  to  convey  to  Pres- 
ident Carter  certain  precise  messages. 

Secretary  Vance:  I  want  to  express 
my  great  thanks  to  President  Sadat  for 
receiving  me  today.  We  had  a  very 
good  opportunity  to  exchange  views 
fully  on  the  situation  as  it  now  stands 
and  on  the  prospects  for  the  future. 

As  President  Sadat  indicated,  the 
door  for  peace  is  not  closed.  We  all 
have  the  same  objective  of  achieving  a 
just  and  lasting  peace.  Insofar  as  the 
United  States  is  concerned,  we  will 
continue  to  work  with  the  parties  to  fur- 
ther this  objective.  And  we  will  keep  in 
the  closest  of  contact  to  bring  about 
this  result. 

Q.  The  President's  views  will  un- 
doubtedly be  communicated  by  you 
to  the  Israelis.  Now  that  you've 
cranked  the  peace  talks  down  one 
notch,  what  are  the  conditions  for 
getting  the  full  talks  going  again? 

President  Sadat:  1  fear  you  are 
using  the  same  phrasing  of  conditions. 
It's  not  conditions  at  all.  I'm  saying 
this:  Peace  means  that  no  one  treads  on 
land  or  sovereignty  of  the  other. 

Q.  Does  that  mean  a  declaration 
from  the  Israelis  softening  their  posi- 
tion on  settlements  in  the  Sinai? 

President  Sadat:  Which  one  decla- 
ration? 

Q.  I'm  saying,  if  you  say  the  con- 
ditions to  get  the  talks  going  again 
are  that  neither  impose  on  the 
sovereignty  of  the  other,  does  that 
mean  that  Israel  give  up  its  insistence 
in  keeping  settlements  in  the  Sinai  on 
Egyptian  soil? 

President  Sadat.  Yes,  until  now,  I 
didn't  receive  any  change  in  this  posi- 
tion, and  as  I  told  you  from  my  side 
really,  I  think  it  is  a  joke  rather  than  a 
fact. 

Q.  If  the  Israelis  will  pull  back  on 
that  position  and  say  that  they'll  give 
up  the  settlements  in  Sinai,  Egypt 
will  return  to  the  political  talks,  the 
full  peace  talks? 

President  Sadat:  Whenever  Israel 
chooses  to  agree  to  the  principles  not  to 
tread  on  other's  land  of  sovereignty, 
everything  can  be  resumed  again. 

Q  [Inaudible).  Would  you  accept 
that  the  question  of  self- 
determination  for  the  Palestinians  be 
the  result  by  evolution  of  the  process 
of  peace?  Or  do  you  insist  that  this 
political  decision  should  be  taken 
right  now  even  before  there  is  the 
beginning  of  peace  between  Egypt 
and  Israel? 

President  Sadat:  I  don't  see  really 
the  meaning  of  this  question.  We  were 
working,  all  of  us,  upon  a  declaration 


t  February  1978 

I  of  principles  in  which  Israel  shows  its 
determination  to  end  the  occupation  of 
the  land  occupied  after  1967  and  the 
self-determination  for  the  Palestinians. 
I  don't  know  what  do  you  mean  by 
peace  is  not  achieved  between  Egypt 
and  Israel  so  that  they  can  agree  upon 
this. 

We  are  working,  as  I  told  you,  upon 
a  comprehensive  settlement.  The 
needed  minimum  for  continuing  our 
work  on  straight  lines  should  be  this 
declaration  of  principles,  the  land  of 
1967,  withdrawal  from  it,  and  the 
I  self-determination.  Whatever  time  is 
needed  to  perform  this,  it  is  a  matter  of 
negotiation,  and  it  can  be  agreed  upon 
or  it  can  be  negotiated  in  a  less  danger- 
ous situation  like  Israel  is  raising  now. 

Q.  Do  you  think  a  declaration  of 
principles  should  include  the  right  of 
Palestinians  to  determine  their  own 
future  the  same  way  you  put  it  in 
your  statement  at  the  Political  Com- 
mittee and  as  Mr.  Carter  stated  it  in 
Aswan? 

Secretary  Vance:  The  statement 
made  by  President  Carter  at  Aswan  re- 
flects the  views  of  the  United  States.  In 
that  statement  we  clearly  stated  that  we 
believe  that  provision  should  be  made 
whereby  the  Palestinians  should  be  en- 
abled to  participate  in  the  determina- 
tion of  their  own  future. 

Q.  Is  your  delegation  going  back  to 
Jerusalem  after  Ankara  and  Greece? 

Secretary  Vance:  Yes,  Mr.  Ather- 
ton  will  be  going  back  to  Jerusalem, 
and  there  will  be  two  or  three  others 
who  are  part  of  that  delegation  who 
will  be  there. 

Q.  Could  you  indicate  to  us  what 
went  wrong  since  the  Ismailia  sum- 
mit between  you  and  Mr.  Begin? 

President  Sadat:  I  think  if  you  read 
the  statement  of  Premier  Begin  during 
the  dinner  of  2  days  before  and  then 
read  his  speech  again  in  the  Knesset 
yesterday,  I  think  you  shall  find  what 
you  are  after. 

Q.  To  clarify  a  previous  question, 
it  means  that  there  can  be  no  peace 
treaty  on  the  Sinai  without  a  declara- 
tion of  principles  being  first  issued? 

President  Sadat:  We  are  not  after  a 
peace  treaty  on  the  Sinai,  as  I  say.  We 
are  after  a  comprehensive  settlement. 
And  in  this  comprehensive  settlement 
certain  principles  should  be  agreed 
upon. 

Q.  The  American  side — Mr. 
Vance — has  he  presented  to  you  any 
alternatives  and  are  they  acceptable 
for  the  declaration  of  principles? 

President  Sadat:   As  a  matter  of 
fact,  yes.  And  we  shall  be  studying  it, 
I  and  we  shall  be  in  contact,  as  I  said, 
'  with  him. 

Q.  According  to  Mr.  Begin,  there 


are  only  two  questions  remaining  in 
the  Political  Committee  which  didn't 
reach  any  agreement.  Do  both  of  you 
agree  to  this  assessment? 

Secretary  Vance:  There  are  several 
questions  or  principles  involved  in  a 
draft  of  declaration  of  principles  which 
we  have  been  working  upon.  I  don't 
want  to  go  into  detail  except  to  say  that 
there  has  been  one  principle  which  is 
the  most  difficult  of  all  and  that  is  the 
one  which  deals  with  the  Palestinian 
problem  and  that  is  the  one  in  which 
the  differences  remain  and  which  is  the 
most  difficult  of  the  issues. 


37 


President  Sadat:  I  quite  agree  with 
what  the  Secretary  says. 

Q.  Can  we  understand  that  you 
have  reached  any  kind  of  agreement 
here  in  Cairo  which  Mr.  Atherton 
will  be  carrying  back  to  Jerusalem, 
and  if  you  have  reached  any  kind  of 
understanding  with  the  Israelis  for 
further  steps  or  there  is  no  change  in 
the  Israeli  position? 

Secretary  Vance:  Yesterday  I  had 
conversations  with  the  Prime  Minister 
and  with  the  Foreign  Minister.  I  had 
further  conversations  with  the  Foreign 
Minister,   Mr.    Dayan.   As  a  result  of 


Chronology  of  Recent  Events 


Jan.     3 


Jan. 


Jan,   11 


Jan.   13 


Jan.  14 


Jan.  15 


Jan.  16 


Jan. 
Jan. 


17 
18 


President  Carter  meets  with  King 
Khalid  and  other  government  of- 
ficials in  Saudi  Arabia.  Jan.  19 

President  Carter  meets  with  Presi- 
dent  Sadat    in    Aswan.    Egypt.      Jan.  20 
President  Carter  makes  departure 
statement  dealing  with  the  Pales- 
tinian problem.  Jan.  21 

President  Carter  departs  for  France. 

Military  Committees  headed  by  De- 
fense Ministers  Mohamed  Abdel 
Ghani  el-Gamassi  of  Egypt  and 
Ezer  Weizman  of  Israel  begin 
talks  in  Cairo. 

Israel   and   Egypt  recess  Military      Jan.  22 
Committees'  meeting. 

Defense  Minister  Weizman  returns 
to  Israel. 

Secretary  Vance  postpones  depar- 
ture for  Jerusalem;  he  was  to  at-  Jan.  23 
tend  meeting  of  Political  Com- 
mittees (headed  by  Foreign 
Ministers  Moshe  Dayan  of  Israel 
and  Mohamed  Ibrahim  Kamel  of  Jan.  26 
Egypt)  scheduled  to  begin 
January  16. 

Political  Committees'  meeting  de- 
layed until  January  17. 

Secretary     Vance     departs     for     Jan.  27 
Jerusalem. 

Secretary  Vance  arrives  in 
Jerusalem.  He  meets  with  Prime 
Minister  Begin  and  other  gov-  Jan.  28 
ernment  officials  and  gives  the 
Prime  Minister  a  letter  from  Pres- 
ident Carter.  Jan.  29 

Political  Committees  begin  talks  in 
Jerusalem. 

President  Sadat  recalls  Egyptian      Jan.  30 
delegation  to  the  Political  Com- 
mittees' Jerusalem  meeting  and 
announces  that   the  scheduled      Jan.  31 
January   19  meeting  of  the  Mili- 
tary Committees  will  not  be  held. 


President  Carter  telephones  Pres- 
ident Sadat. 

Secretary  Vance  meets  with  Prime 
Minister  Begin  in  Israel. 

Secretary  Vance  meets  with  Presi- 
dent Sadat  in  Egypt. 

Secretary  Vance  departs  for  Turkey. 

President  Sadat  states  that  he  will 
continue  his  peace  efforts 
(speech  to  the  Egyptian  Parlia- 
ment). 

Assistant  Secretary  Atherton  leaves 
Secretary  Vance's  party  and  re- 
turns to  Jerusalem. 

Israeli  Cabinet  unanimously  agrees 
to  delay  returning  the  delegation 
to  the  Cairo  Military  Commit- 
tees' talks  which  had  been  post- 
poned until  January  22. 

Prime  Minister  Begin  makes  a 
speech  to  the  Israeli  Parliament 
dealing  with  the  status  of  the 
peace  negotiations. 

Assistant  Secretary  Atherton  and 
U.S.  Ambassador  to  Israel 
Samuel  W.  Lewis  meet  with 
Prime  Minister  Begin  and  other 
government  officials  in  Israel. 

President  Carter  invites  President 
Sadat  to  visit  the  U.S.  for  extended 
talks  on  February  4-5.  President 
Sadat  accepts  the  invitation. 

Assistant  Secretary  Atherton  pays  a 
courtesy  call  on  King  Hussein  in 
Amman.  Jordan. 

Israeli  Cabinet  unanimously  votes 
to  resume  participation  in  Mili- 
tary Committees'  talks  in  Cairo. 

Assistant  Secretary  Atherton  ar- 
rives in  Cairo  to  meet  with  Egyp- 
tian government  officials. 

Israeli  Defense  Minister  Weizman 
arrives  in  Cairo  to  resume  Mili- 
tary Committees'  meetings.        D 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


those  conversations,  I  think  we  made 
progress.  I  have  reported  what  took 
place  in  those  conversations  to  Presi- 
dent Sadat.  We  had  a  very  good  ex- 
change of  views  on  that.  I  think  as  to 
what  follows  from  here,  this  should  be 
carried  out  by  quiet  conversations  and 
it  would  not  be  appropriate  for  me  to 
talk  about  them  in  a  public  press 
conference. 

Q.  You  began  today  by  expressing 
your  gratitude  to  President  Carter 
and  Secretary  Vance  for  the  help 
that  they  have  given  you  in  the  last 
couple  of  days.  Have  they  given  you 
help  on  substance  as  well  as  proce- 
dure? Can  you  enlighten  us  about 
what  the  Americans  have  done  for 
you? 

President  Sadat:  I  don't  think  it  is 
easy  to  tell  the  details  of  what  has 
taken  place,  but  I  seize  this  opportunity 
really  to  express  my  gratitude  because 
Secretary  Vance  really  has  made  tre- 
mendous efforts  to  bridge  whatever  dif- 
ferences that  have  arisen  between  us 
and  it  is  a  fact,  but  this  closing,  what 
has  taken  place,  there  may  be  some 
time  moment. 

Q.  When  you  came  back  from 
Jerusalem,  you  said  that  if  you  were 
not  successful  in  the  peace  process 
you  would  go  before  your  National 
Assembly  and  offer  your  resignation. 
It  has  been  speculated  now  that  that 
is  precisely  what  you  plan  to  do  to- 
morrow when  you  meet  with  your 
National  Assembly.  Is  this  so,  and  if 
not,  what  are  you  going  to  tell  them? 

President  Sadat:  It  is  a  matter  of 
less  than  24  hours,  or  a  little  more, 
when  I  shall  be  giving  my  speech  to- 
morrow in  the  afternoon  in  my  assem- 
bly, and  I  advise  you  to  wait  until  you 
hear  my  speech. 

Q.  Just  for  clarification,  you  talk 
about  the  door  to  peace  being  open. 
Do  I  understand  you  correctly  to  say 
that  if  the  Israelis  were  to  make  a 
statement  on  the  settlements,  that 
could  revive  the  peace  talks?  And 
what  kind  of  statement  precisely 
would  you  want? 

President  Sadat:  I  feel  you  have  not 
got  the  real  conception  of  what  I  have 
already  said.  It  is  exactly  as  Secretary 
Vance  has  answered  now.  There  is  a 
very  vital  point — and  this  is  concerning 
the  Palestinians — that  we  didn't  agree 
upon.  The  matter  of  settlements  and  so 
is  another  point  of  difference,  but 
really,  what  worries  me  really  is  this: 
The  whole  approach  to  peace  is  being 
twisted  because  we  are  losing  time  on 
discussing,  for  instance,  this  settlement 
problem.  And  wc  shouldn't  lose  any 
time  on  it  because,  as  I  said,  it  is  a 
joke.  No  one  can  agree  for  anyone  to 


impose  settlements  in  his  land  and  also 
continue  in  arrogance  and  say  that  we 
shall  defend  it  there.  I  mean  the  correct 
approach  is  not,  from  the  Israeli  side, 
is  not  serious  at  all,  to  build  peace 
based  on  justice.  So  let  us  try  and  find 
the  proper  approach  again  and  I  think  it 
is,  in  its  dimension,  this  approach  is 
much  bigger  than  the  settlement  prob- 
lem also. 

Q.  Do  you  accept  what  President 
Carter  said  on  the  Palestinians  about 
their  legitimate  rights  and  their 
being  enabled  to  participate  in  the 
determination  of  their  own  future? 
Does  that  word-for-word,  satisfy 
you?  And  if  the  Israelis  accepted  that 
word-for-word,  would  you  agree  to 
that? 

President  Sadat:  We  have  agreed 
upon  this  fact  in  Aswan;  about  the 
statement  President  Carter  gave  in  As- 
wan. Still,  I  must  tell  you  this:  The 
spirit  behind  the  initiative  is  not  cor- 
rectly understood  among  Premier  Begin 
and  his  aides.  For  that,  I  think  the 
peace  process  would  be  useless  now  to 
continue  on  false  principles. 

Q.  There  is  a  feeling  in  Israel  that 
you  are  using  the  reconvening  and 
suspension  of  the  Political  Committee 
in  order  to  create  some  pressure  on 
Israel  upon  the  ongoing  of  the 
negotiations.  Wouldn't  it  be  prefera- 
ble to  use  the  framework  of  the  Polit- 
ical Committee  in  order  to  settle  dis- 
putes of  this  nature? 

President  Sadat:  This  logic  also 
again.  It  is  not  pressure  at  all  when  I 
say  that  peace  cannot  be  built  when 
someone  is  treading  on  others'  land  and 
sovereignty,  and  you  are  just  using  the 
same  logic  they  use  there  in  Israel.  We 
don't  agree  to  this  at  all.  If  the  princi- 
ple itself  is  agreed  upon  that  no  one 
should  tread  on  others'  land  or 
sovereignty  and  these  are  principles, 
not  conditions,  and  very  essential  for 
any  understanding  to  come  in  the  fu- 
ture, well,  everything  will  be  easy  after 
that. 


CORRECTION 

On  page  9(0  of  the  Dec.  26,  1977.  issue  of 
the  Bulletin,  Amir  Abbas  Hoveyda  is  listed 
under  "Principal  Government  Officials"  in 
the  profile  on  Iran  as  Prime  Minister.  Al- 
though he  held  that  position  in  Dec.  1976 
(the  date  of  the  Background  Note  from 
which  the  profile  was  taken).  Jamshid 
Amou/egar  was  appointed  Prime  Minister  of 
Iran  in  Aug.   1977 

The  Editor 


Q.  Isn't  the  place  for  such  a  dis- 
pute in  the  framework  of  the  Political 
Committee  in  Jerusalem? 

President  Sadat:  As  I  told  you,  it 
appears  that  the  proper  channel  that  we 
should  have  adopted — the  proper 
approach — has  been  twisted.  For  that  I 
ask  for  this  stand.  I'm  not  putting  pres- 
sure or  conditions;  I'm  just  putting  a 
logic.  Can  peace  be  achieved  when 
someone  treads  on  others'  land  and 
even  proceeds  in  his  arrogance  and 
says  that  he  will  defend  it,  also,  on  my 
land?  Can  peace  be  achieved  by  this? 
Or  by  treading  on  others'  sovereignty? 
These  are  not  conditions.  And  if  it  is 
like  your  Foreign  Minister's  speech  the 
other  day  saying  that  we  sit  together 
and  negotiate  and  bargain  and  then 
come  half  way  or  so.  What  is  the  half 
way  for  us?  The  halfway  for  us  is  los- 
ing land,  losing  sovereignty?  No,  if 
this  is  the  form  that  you  want  us  to 
work  in,  no. 

Q.  Do  you  think  these  mutual  ar- 
guments about  arrogance  are  con- 
tributing to  the  peace  process? 

President  Sadat:  Premier  Begin 
used  even  much  more  harsh  language 
than  this. 


ARRIVAL,  ANDREWS  AIR  FORCE 
BASE,  JAN.  21*' 

I  have  just  completed  a  week  of  in- 
tensive discussions  on  the  Arab-Israeli 
peace  negotiations  in  Jerusalem  and 
Cairo  and  a  very  useful  review  of  our 
relations  with  Greece  and  Turkey. 

I  said  in  Jerusalem,  and  I  repeat 
again  here,  that  you  have  to  expect  ups 
and  downs  in  negotiations  which  deal 
with  issues  vital  to  the  negotiating  par- 
ties. The  United  States  has  played  this 
week,  and  will  continue  to  play,  an  ac- 
tive role  in  helping  to  steady  the  course 
of  Arab-Israeli  negotiations.  Difficult 
decisions  will  have  to  be  made  as  the 
negotiations  continue.  We  are  deter- 
mined to  do  all  that  we  can  to  help  the 
parties  move  forward. 

The  parties  have  made  it  clear  the  door 
to  peace  is  open.  We  have  urged  both 
parties  to  resume  their  discussions  in  the 
Security  Committee  of  the  Cairo  confer- 
ence as  soon  as  possible.  Assistant  Secre- 
tary Atherton  will  remain  in  Jerusalem  to 
help  them  prepare  for  the  resumption  of 
discussions  in  the  Political  Committee. 
We  believe  it  is  essential  the  parties  put 
behind  them  the  public  exchanges  of  re- 
cent days  and  try  to  recapture  the  spirit 
of  a  common  search  for  peace. 

I  will  report  to  President  Carter  tomor- 
row and  to  the  appropriate  committees  of 
the  House  and  of  the  Senate  later  this 
week. 


'ebruary  1978 

WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JAN.  23' 

Secretary  Vance  reported  this  even- 
ing to  the  President  on  his  trip  last 
week  to  the  Middle  East  to  attend  the 
opening  sessions  of  the  Political  Com- 
mittee of  the  Cairo  conference  in 
Jerusalem  and  on  his  visits  to  Greece 
and  Turkey  this  past  weekend. 

On  the  Middle  East,  Secretary  Vance 
described  for  the  President  the  work  on 
a  declaration  of  principles  which  would 
govern  the  negotiation  of  a  comprehen- 
sive peace  settlement  in  the  Middle 
East  that  had  begun  in  the  Political 
Committee  before  the  Egyptian  delega- 
tion was  withdrawn. 

The  Secretary  expressed  his  judge- 
ment that,  while  the  work  of  the  Politi- 
cal Committee  is  temporarily  sus- 
pended, the  negotiating  process  can 
continue.  Both  the  President  and  the 
Secretary  have  urged  that  discussions 
between  Egypt  and  Israel  in  the  Secu- 
rity Committee  of  the  Cairo  conference 
:ontinue.  They  hope  that  these  talks 
may  resume  soon.  The  President 
stressed  that  we  are  prepared  to  con- 
tinue the  exchanges  with  Prime  Minis- 
ter Begin  and  President  Sadat  that  the 
Secretary  began  last  week  on  a  declara- 
tion of  principles.  Assistant  Secretary 
\therton  is  staying  in  the  Middle  East 
to  be  helpful  in  this  effort. 

The  President  and  the  Secretary  ex- 
Dressed  the  hope  that  the  public  ex- 
;hanges  of  recent  days  are  now  behind 
is  and  that  every  effort  will  be  made  to 
■ecapture  the  spirit  that  followed  recent 
Tieetings  between  Prime  Minister 
Begin  and  President  Sadat  and  to  turn 
ull  attention  through  quiet  diplomacy 
0  the  substance  of  the  negotiations. 


STATEMENT,  HOUSE 
COMMITTEE  ON 
INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS, 
JAN.  24« 

First,  [in  the  Military  Committee 
meetings  in  Cairo]  there  are  only  repre- 
sentatives of  Israel  and  Egypt;  there  is 
no  American  representative  sitting  in 
on  those  meetings. 

Second  is  the  Political  Committee. 
The  meeting  of  the  Political  Committee 
was  held  last  Tuesday  in  Jerusalem. 
There  was  a  delay  of  one  day  in  the 
commencement  of  those  discussions  as 
a  result  of  differences  of  view  with  re- 
spect to  the  agenda  for  that  meeting. 
They  were  resolved,  however,  and  we 
were  able  to  get  started  on  Tuesday 
morning. 

At  the  Tuesday  session,  we  first  had 
lour  opening  statements  in  the  plenary 


meeting.  Subsequently  we  went  into 
closed  session,  at  which  time  there  was 
a  preliminary  discussion  and  there  was 
an  exchange  between  the  parties  of 
drafts  of  a  declaration  of  principles.  In 
addition,  the  Israelis  tabled  the  self- 
rule  proposal  which  Mr.  Begin  had 
previously  exposed  prior  to  the 
meeting. 

The  remainder  of  the  discussions  at 
the  Jerusalem  meetings  were  held  in 
closed  sessions  or  in  informal  discus- 
sions between  the  parties.  There  was  a 
large  number  of  informal  discussions 
between  the  parties  themselves  and  be- 
tween each  of  the  parties  and  our- 
selves. We  addressed  our  activities  dur- 
ing those  2  days  exclusively  to  the 
issue  of  the  declaration  of  principles. 
We  made  progress  during  that  period. 
There  are  still  difficult  issues  which 
remain  to  be  resolved  which  relate  to 
the  declaration  of  principles.  Bui,  as 
you  know,  the  talks  were  suspended  as 
a  result  of  a  decision  by  President 
Sadat  to  recall  to  Cairo  his  delegation 
for  consultations  with  him. 

Subsequent  to  that,  I  remained  for  a 
day  in  Jerusalem  to  continue  my  talks 
with  the  Israelis,  including  a  long  talk 
with  the  Prime  Minister  and  the 
Foreign  Minister.  I  subsequently  went 
to  Cairo  and  met  with  the  President  for 


39 

several  hours,  and  then  we  had  a  meet- 
ing with  him  and  members  of  his  staff. 
The  situation  at  this  point  is  that  both 
the  Security  Committee  talks  and  the 
Political  Committee  talks  are  in  recess. 
It  is  our  hope  that  these  talks  can  be 
resumed  in  the  not-too-distant  future.  I 
think  that  one  of  the  most  important 
things  that  can  be  done  now  is  to  have 
a  period  of  quiet  in  which  we  can  get 
down  to  discussions  in  closed  sessions 
where  there  can  be  direct  and  quiet  dis- 
cussion of  the  very  difficult  and  deli- 
cate issues.  D 


'Other  press  releases  relating  to  Secretary 
Vance's  trip  are  Nos.  26  of  Jan.  17,  1978;  30  of 
Jan.  18;  31  and  32  of  Jan.  19;  and  35  of  Jan.  20. 

-Press  release  28  of  Jan.  17. 

'Press  release  29  of  Jan.  18  (remarks  by  Is- 
raeli Prime  Minister  Begin  and  Egyptian  Foreign 
Minister  Kamal  omitted). 

"Press  release  39  of  Jan.  20. 

'Press  release  40  of  Jan.  21. 

"■Press  release  47  of  Jan.  23  (closing  paragraph 
and  question  and  answer  omitted). 

'White  House  press  release  of  Jan.  23  (last 
paragraph  concerning  the  Secretary's  visit  to 
Turkey  and  Greece  omitted). 

^Press  release  50  of  Jan.  24.  The  complete 
transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  published  by 
the  committee  and  will  be  available  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington.  D.C.  20402. 


OCEANS:  Law  of  the  Sea 
Conference 


by  Elliot  L.  Richardson  ' 

In  the  life  of  international  confer- 
ences, a  moment  arrives  when  the  ele- 
ments of  negotiations  are  so  arranged 
after  exhaustive  and  exhausting  debate 
that  a  fair  compromise  comes  within 
reach.  If  not  seized,  the  opportunity  for 
striking  a  final  bargain  which  rea- 
sonably accommodates  the  fundamental 
interests  of  all  may  quickly  and  com- 
pletely vanish.  Such  a  moment  has 
been  reached  by  the  Third  U.N.  Con- 
ference on  the  Law  of  the  Sea.  We 
shall  soon  know  whether  the  delegates 
to  this  conference  have  the  resource- 
fulness and  whether  their  governments 
have  the  political  will  to  find  the  for- 
mula for  success. 

This  conference,  unique  in  diploma- 
tic history,  is  entering  its  fifth  year.  Al- 
though some  observers  have  disparaged 
it  as  a  tedious  talkathon,  the  conference 
has  in  fact  made  remarkable  progress 
on  a  vast  range  of  issues  of  vital  impor- 
tance to  the  United  States  and  the 


world  community.  Provisions  have 
been  negotiated  which  safeguard  tradi- 
tional high  seas  freedoms  within  the 
200-mile  economic  zone  except  for 
specific  resource-related  rights  ac- 
corded coastal  states  by  the  conven- 
tion. The  generally  satisfactory  texts  on 
transit  passage  of  straits  have  survived. 
There  have  been  improvements  over 
previous  texts  in  respect  of  environ- 
mental control  and  settlement  of 
disputes. 

Deep  Seabed  Mining 

It  is  precisely  because  so  much  prog- 
ress has  been  made  that  it  would  be  bit- 
ter irony  if  the  conference  were  to  fail 
to  resolve  the  single  most  difficult 
problem  facing  it — an  international  re- 
gime for  the  mining  of  the  deep  seabed. 

You  will  recall  the  sense  of  frustra- 
tion and  disappointment  we  felt  at  the 
end  of  the  last  session  of  the  confer- 
ence [May  23- July  15]-  because  the  text 
of  the  exploitation  and  governance  of 


40 

the  seabeds  area  grafted  at  the  last 
moment  onto  the  Informal  Composite 
Negotiating  Text  (ICNT)  departed  so 
radically  from  the  compromise  drafts 
which  had  emerged  from  full,  fair,  and 
open  discussion.  And  yet,  although  the 
ICNT  provisions  on  seabeds  are  totally 
unacceptable  to  the  United  States,  the 
ingredients  of  a  fair  and  reasonable 
compromise  are  still  within  the  grasp  of 
the  conference. 

The  compromise,  which  I  am  con- 
vinced we  can  achieve,  must  accom- 
modate the  essential  interests  of  the 
proponents  of  contending  philosophies. 
Further,  it  must  be  premised  on  accept- 
ance of  the  fact  that  the  maximum  ob- 
jectives of  neither  can  be  fully  realized. 
The  key  to  producing  the  requisite 
change  in  the  dynamics  of  the  confer- 
ence is  the  readiness  to  concede  that 
politics — international  or  national — is 
still  the  art  of  the  possible. 

That  the  search  for  consensus  on 
seabed  mining  should  be  the  most  con- 
troversial, complex,  and  difficult  busi- 
ness still  before  the  conference  is 
hardly  surprising.  Unlike  much  of  the 
work  of  the  conference,  drafting  a  con- 
stitution for  the  seabeds  is  not  an 
exercise  in  codification  of  existing  or 
emerging  international  law,  but  rather 
an  effort  de  novo  to  create  by  consen- 
sus new  international  institutions  in  a 
field  where  there  is  no  prior  experience 
or  legal  precedent. 

The  conference  unanimously  agrees 
that  the  resources  of  the  deep  seabed 
are  the  common  heritage  of  mankind.  It 
agrees  that  their  exploitation  should  be 
managed  on  behalf  of  all  mankind  by 
an  appropriately  designed  international 
authority.  It  also  agrees  that  the  de- 
veloping countries  should  share  in  the 
proceeds  of  mining  the  deep  seabeds. 

Key  Issues 

Disagreement  centers  on  three  prin- 
cipal issues. 

•  The  first  is  the  system  of  exploita- 
tion of  the  seabed.  This  issue  opposes 
those  whose  optimum  position  calls  for 
unlimited  access  to  mine  sites  for  qual- 
ified companies  and  state  enterprises 
against  those  who  would  prefer  to  see 
all  exploitation  reserved  for  the  interna- 
tional equivalent  of  a  government 
monopoly.  The  issue  posed  is  essen- 
tially one  of  economic  pluralism  versus 
state  centralism  projected  on  a  global 
scale. 

•  The  second  is  the  resource  policy 
which  guides  and  regulates  seabed  pro- 
duction. This  issue  involves  many 
complex  international  economic  ques- 
tions, such  as  whether  all  minerals  on 
the  seabed  are  subject  to  control  by  the 


[International  Seabed  Resource]  Au- 
thority and  whether  the  Authority's 
powers  should  extend  to  fixing  prices 
and  regulating  markets.  The  question 
which  perhaps  most  sharply  divides  the 
conference  is  the  extent  to  which  the 
production  of  seabed  minerals  should 
be  limited.  Here  the  interests  of  con- 
sumers of  these  minerals — mainly  nic- 
kel and  copper — clash  with  those  of 
land-based  producers  of  the  same  min- 
erals. Consumer  interests  would  benefit 
from  a  liberal  policy  of  unfettered  pro- 
duction of  seabed  minerals;  land-based 
producer  interests,  conversely,  would 
benefit  from  a  restrictive  policy  of  lim- 
ited production. 

•  The  third  contentious  issue  is  the 
question  of  the  governance  of  the  inter- 
national institutions  created  to  manage 
seabed  mining.  This  too  is  a  multifa- 
ceted  problem.  The  point  of  most  in- 
tense dispute  concerns  the  degree  to 
which  the  international  authority 
should  be  controlled  on  a  one  nation, 
one  vote  basis  versus  the  degree  to 
which  recognition  should  be  accorded 
to  such  major  interests  as  those  in  pro- 
duction, investment,  and  consumption. 

A  country's  position  on  any  one  of 
these  three  issues  does  not  in  itself,  of 
course,  determine  the  country's  posi- 
tion on  either  of  the  other  two.  For 
example,  some  land-based  producers 
favor  a  pluralistic  exploitation  system 
and  rigid  production  controls.  Some 
developing-nation  consumers  favor  a 
monopolistic  approach  to  exploitation 
but  a  liberal  resource  policy. 

Despite  these  disparate  interests,  the 
seabeds  debate  has  tended  to  divide  all 
participants  in  the  conference  into  two 
groups.  The  first  group  favors  a 
pluralistic  exploitation  system,  a  liberal 
resource  policy,  and  a  council  which 
encourages  production.  The  second 
group  takes  the  opposite  position  on  all 
three  issues. 

The  first  position  would  in  combina- 
tion have  the  effect  of  transforming  the 
concept  of  the  common  heritage  of 
mankind  from  a  noble  aspiration  into  a 
reality  for  the  practical  benefit  of  all. 
The  second  position,  in  contrast,  would 
leave  the  common  heritage  a  promise 
unfulfilled. 

One  might  suppose  that  the  aevelop- 
ing  nations  would  take  an  approach 
which  would  give  practical  meaning  to 
the  idea  of  the  common  heritage.  That 
they  have  not  consistently  done  so  is 
surprising.  The  result  is  a  triumph  for 
ideology  over  economic  interest.  It  has 
led,  ironically,  to  an  artificial  division 
between  the  developed  and  developing 
countries.  All  developing  countries  are 
consumers;  few  are  land-based  produc- 
ers.   All    developing    countries. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

moreover,  could  share  in  the  proceeds 
of  seabed  mining.  Despite  conference 
rhetoric  that  has  so  often  assumed  the 
contrary,  the  seabed  mining  issue  does 
not  on  its  merits  lead  to  confrontation 
between  developed  and  developing 
countries.  To  the  extent  that  confronta- 
tion has  developed,  it  has  been  in  spite 
of  the  real  interests  of  the  great  major- 
ity of  states. 

These  underlying  interests  have 
helped,  nevertheless,  to  bring  the  three 
key  issues  of  exploitation,  resource 
policy,  and  governance  to  the  point  of 
possible  resolution.  But  there  is 
another  reason  why  compromises 
should  now  be  achievable.  It  is  that  the 
negotiations  to  date  have  demonstrated 
that  neither  side  of  the  conference  can 
impose  on  the  other  its  preferred  ap- 
proach with  respect  to  these  issues. 

Exploitation.  As  to  the  system  of 
exploitation,  those  who  favor  an  inter- 
national monopoly  have  realized  that 
their  approach  will  certainly  condemn 
exploitation  of  seabed  minerals  under 
an  international  regime  at  least  to  indef- 
inite postponement,  for  such  a  regime 
will  not  attract  investment  and  cannot 
generate  technology.  The  monopolists 
have  therefore  had  to  yield  to  economic 
realities.  Those  who  favor  a  pluralistic 
approach  have  had  to  recognize  that  th( 
developing  countries  cannot  accept 
system  under  which  they  will  share  in 
the  proceeds  of  seabed  mining  but  not 
in  its  operation  and  development. 
Awareness  of  these  realities  has  forced' 
the  negotiation  in  the  direction  of  a» 
dual  system  embracing  both  modes  of) 
exploitation.  All  that  is  now  necessary 
for  a  final  bargain  is  for  each  side  to 
agree  that  the  other's  half  of  the  dual 
system  must  be  made  workable  and  thai 
both  halves  will  be  permanent  until  and 
unless  otherwise  agreed  at  a  review 
conference. 

For  such  an  understanding  to  become 
a  reality,  two  mutually  binding  condi- 
tions must  be  met. 

•  The  economic  viability  of  the 
pluralistic  side  must  not  be  undercut  by 
such  deterrents  to  investment  as  unrea- 
sonably burdensome  financial  arrange- 
ments, impossibly  vague  terms  fon 
negotiation  of  contracts,  or  unrestrictedl 
discretion  in  the  international  Author- 
ity. Any  constraint  on  deep  seabedl 
mineral  production  must  be 
straightforwardly  set  forth  in  the  re- 
source policy,  not  smuggled  in  through i 
a  side  door. 

•  By  the  same  token,  the  interna- 
tional entity  (the  "Enterprise")  must 
be  given  the  practical  means  of  getting 
into  production,  not  stifled  at  birth  by 
inability  to  gain  access  to  funds  or 
technology.  This  is  why,  in  response  to 


February  1978 

the  fears  of  the  developing  countries 
'that  without  startup  financing  for  its 
first  site  the  Enterprise  could  be  an 
empty  shell,  we  offered  some  time  ago 
to  assist  in  such  financing. 

Resource  Policy.  With  regard  to  re- 
source policy,  the  developed  countries 
believed  that  they  had  made  a  major 
concession  when  they  agreed  that  sea- 
bed production  might  be  limited  to  the 
cumulative  growth  of  the  world  market 
for  nickel,  thus  protecting  land-based 
producers  from  adverse  consequences 
to  their  economies  as  a  result  of  seabed 
production.  Unfortunately,  the  land- 
based  nickel  producers  pressed  their 
advantage,  unreasonably  we  think,  and 
insisted  that  they  should  be  guaranteed 
half  the  growth  of  the  nickel  market 
without  regard  to  economic  factors. 
They  were  able,  moreover,  to  enlist  the 
support  of  the  land-based  producers  of 
copper,  although  seabed  production  of 
copper  will  not  significantly  affect  the 
world  copper  market  in  the  foreseeable 
Future.  Given  current  estimates  of  the 
rate  of  growth  of  the  nickel  market,  the 
result  would  be  a  ceiling  on  seabed 
production  so  low  as  to  prevent  both  its 
efficient  development  and  its  equitable 
sharing.  The  degree  of  protection 
which  the  land-based  producers  seek  is, 
n  our  view,  far  greater  than  they  need 
3r  should  reasonably  expect. 

In  this  area,  too,  there  will  be  no 
ivay  out  if  either  side  persists  in  an  ex- 
reme  approach.  Stringent  controls 
A'hich  stifle  production  simply  cannot 
md  will  not  be  accepted  by  the  indus- 
rialized  importing  countries. 

Governance.  Regarding  governance 
rf  the  institutions  to  manage  seabed  op- 
erations, the  dispute  centers  on  the  ques- 
ion  of  how  best  to  afford  adequate 
•ecognition  to  interests  which  it  is  es- 
iential  for  the  world  community,  not 
nerely  the  developed  countries,  to  fos- 
er  and  promote. 

As  it  now  stands,  the  ICNT  would 
:reate  an  assembly  with  "supreme" 
legislative  and  regulatory  power.  The 
assembly  would  be  founded  on  what  is 
It  best  an  anomalous  principle — one 
aation,  one  vote — which  bears  no  ra- 
tional relationship  either  to  the  princi- 
ples of  democracy  or  to  the  distribution 
of  power,  values,  and  interests.  The 
issue  is  not  one  of  a  "majority"  versus 
a  "minority."  It  is  a  question,  rather, 
of  the  identification  and  the  balancing 
of  the  valid  interests  at  stake — those  of 
consumers,  producers,  investors, 
regional  groups,  and  developing  coun- 
tries. "Sovereign  states"  are  only  sur- 
rogates for  such  interests,  and  imper- 
fect ones  at  best.  To  allow  resources 
constituting  the  common  heritage  of 


mankind  to  be  disposed  of  by  a  nose- 
count  of  nations  would  be  a  bad  prece- 
dent for  the  international  institution- 
building  of  the  future. 

The  conference  itself,  be  it  noted, 
has  recognized  that  no  true  consensus 
can  be  produced  by  majoritarian  proce- 
dures. It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  con- 
ference rules  permit  a  vote  only  when 
every  effort  to  achieve  consensus  has 
been  exhausted.  It  is  for  this  reason 
also  that  the  leaders  of  the  conference 
share  the  aim  of  deferring  all  voting 
until  the  last  possible  moment  and  of 
restricting  it  then  to  the  smallest  possi- 
ble number  of  issues.  If  fair  com- 
promises are  reached  on  the  first  two  of 
the  key  seabeds  issues — exploitation 
and  the  resource  policy — it  will  be  on 
the  basis  of  accommodations  fairly  re- 
flecting legitimate  interests  in  due 
proportion  to  their  true  weight.  It  fol- 
lows that  a  fair  compromise  on  the 
issue  of  governance  must  rest  on  the 
creation  of  a  council  which  operates  as 
the  executive  branch  of  the  Authority 
with  membership,  powers,  and  voting 
procedures  that  can  achieve  the  same 
kind  of  accommodation. 

Given  a  readiness  to  strike  fair  bar- 
gains on  each  of  the  three  key  issues  I 
have  outlined,  the  deep  seabed  mining 
problem  can  be  solved. 

Future  Prospects 

What  are  the  prospects  that  this  will 
happen?  The  intersessional  meeting  of 
the  conference  to  be  held  in  New  York 
early  in  February  may  provide  some 
answers.  This  will  be  the  first  real  test 
since  last  summer  of  the  readiness  of 
the  conferees  to  entertain  compromise 
solutions  on  major  substantive  issues. 
We  have  some  reason  to  be  encour- 
aged. Recent  informal  consultations 
showed  strong,  broadly  based  senti- 
ment in  favor  of  procedural  arrange- 
ments which  could  facilitate  agree- 
ment. Such  procedural  innovations,  if 
carried  into  effect,  should  meet  the 
concerns  about  due  process  in  the  de- 
liberations of  the  conference  which  I 
expressed  at  the  end  of  the  last  session. 
The  consultations  also  reached  agree- 
ment on  a  list  of  specific  difficulties 
with  the  seabeds  part  of  the  current 
negotiating  text.  These  are  precisely 
the  ones  which  the  United  States  be- 
lieves require  urgent  attention;  collec- 
tively they  will  comprise  one  of  the 
three  agenda  items  at  the  intersessional 
meeting. 

I  must  say  in  all  candor,  however, 
that  the  road  to  successful  conclusion 
of  the  conference  will  be  arduous. 
Sharply  divergent  economic  and 
ideological  perceptions  still  prevail. 


41 

Communication  across  the  lines  that 
divide  the  participants  remains  dif- 
ficult. And  yet,  as  I  have  tried  to  show, 
the  elements  of  a  fair  deal  are  present 
nonetheless. 

Do  the  parties  really  want  one? 
There  is  a  pervasive  sentiment  among 
most  that  successful  conclusion  of  the 
conference  is  so  important  as  a  prece- 
dent for  constructive  international 
cooperation  that  the  conference  cannot 
be  allowed  to  fail. 

The  United  States  will  do  its  part  to 
achieve  an  equitable  and  durable  out- 
come. We  will  go  halfway  to  meet 
those  with  whom  we  differ.  To  go  be- 
yond that  would  be  not  only  to  sacrifice 
our  own  essential  interests  but  to  ac- 
quiesce in  a  global  system  incompatible 
with  the  interest  of  all  countries  in  en- 
couraging efficiency  and  innovation.  I 
will  not  support,  nor  would  I  commend 
to  the  President,  a  treaty  which  creates 
a  regime  for  the  seabed  that  I  cannot 
honestly  defend  as  offering  a  reason- 
able basis  for  American  companies  to 
risk  the  enormous  investments  de- 
manded by  deepsea  mining. 

Rather  than  accept  outcomes  which 
we  consider  wrong  for  the  United 
States  and,  we  believe,  would  be 
wrong  for  the  world  community  as 
well,  we  would  reluctantly  choose  to 
forego  a  treaty.  The  United  States  does 
not  need  a  comprehensive  treaty  more 
than  other  nations.  Seabed  mining  can 
and  will  go  forward  with  or  without 
such  a  treaty.  We  have  the  means  at 
our  disposal  to  protect  our  oceans 
interests  if  the  conference  should  fail, 
and  we  shall  protect  those  interests  if  a 
comprehensive  treaty  eludes  us. 

If,  however,  others  are  prepared  to 
bring  understanding,  good  will,  and 
common  sense  to  the  effort  to  achieve  a 
fair  and  broadly  acceptable  comprehen- 
sive treaty,  the  United  States  is  pre- 
pared to  join  in  that  effort.  For  such  a 
treaty  in  our  view  is  objectively  the 
best  assurance  that  there  will  be  predic- 
tability, stability,  and  order  in  the  uses 
and  management  of  ocean  resources. 

If  these  past  4  years  of  travail  are  fi- 
nally crowned  with  success,  as  I  hope 
they  will  be,  the  results  will  be  felt  far 
beyond  the  oceans  in  every  endeavor 
where  nations  come  together  in  an  at- 
tempt to  bring  a  sense  of  sanity,  order, 
and  stability  to  a  troubled  world.        D 


'  Address  to  the  Seapower  Symposium  of  the 
Cincinnati  Council  of  the  Navy  League  of  the 
United  States,  Cincinnati,  Jan.  18;  Ambassador 
at  Large  Richardson  is  Special  Representative 
of  the  President  for  the  Law  of  the  Sea 
Conference. 

'  For  Ambassador  Richardson's  statement  to 
the  press  on  July  20,  see  Bulletin  of  Sept.  19, 
1977,  p.  389, 


42 


\isions  of  the  Future 


by  Patsy  T.  Mink  ' 

I  am  particularly  pleased  to  have  the 
opportunity  to  take  part  in  this  most  aus- 
picious gathering.  "Oceans  "11." 
both  this  conference  and  the  particular 
concept  which  it  represents,  provides  a 
unique  occasion  to  view  the  oceans  not 
only  from  our  own  contemporary 
perspective  but  also  to  assess  the  role 
of  the  oceans  in  the  future. 

We  live  in  a  precarious  age,  an  age 
of  uncertainty.  Our  global  commonality 
is  based  upon  the  simple  fact  that  we 
share,  in  the  words  of  one  leading 
commentator,  a  community  of  danger. 
The  most  characteristic  feature  of  our 
period  is  its  multiple  dilemmas.  Ours  is 
a  time  in  which  humanity  has  reached  a 
critical  crossroads,  an  historical 
juncture  where  hard  choices  and  dif- 
ficult decisions  must  be  confronted. 
Diverse  and  complex  dilemmas  even 
now  pervade  and  dominate  our  public 
life. 

•  We  exert  every  national  effort  to 
insure  peace,  not  only  for  ourselves  but 
among  all  nations  of  the  world.  Yet,  at 
the  same  time,  we  continuously  prepare 
for  war,  devising  increasingly  sophisti- 
cated weaponry,  the  production  of 
which  consumes  substantial  quantities 
of  our  national  resources  and  creativ- 
ity. 

•  We  are,  by  any  given  index,  the 
most  powerful  nation  on  Earth;  yet,  we 
often  seem  to  be  unable  to  effectively 
use  this  power.  In  a  world  of  unbridled 
sovereignty  and  untempered 
nationalism,  we  sometimes  fail  to  in- 
fluence even  small  states  from  political 
abberrations  at  home — especially  in  the 
area  of  human  rights — and  military  ad- 
venturism abroad. 

•  We,  both  developed  and  develop- 
ing societies,  are  deluged  by  a  rising 
tide  of  demands  and  expectations,  issu- 
ing both  from  our  national  and  interna- 
tional environments;  yet  we  face 
squarely  the  reality  of  insufficient  dis- 
posable resources. 

•  We  live  in  a  world  of  obvious 
interdependence — indeed  some  would 
speculate  that  we  are  even  now  witnes- 
sing the  emergence  of  a  truly  global 
society;  yet  our  international  institu- 
tions and  processes  are  still 
characterized — as  the  recently  con- 
cluded sixth  session  of  the  Law  of  the 
Sea  Conference  amply  demonstrates — 
by  political,  economic,  and  ideological 
fragmentation. 


•  We — and  here,  1  think,  the  United 
States  can  be  fairly  excluded  from  this 
generic  category — cling  to  an  interna- 
tional diplomacy  which  postulates  con- 
flict and  confrontation  as  cardinal  val- 
ues; yet  the  global  problems  and  issues 
which  we  face — and  which  may  yet 
consume  us — require  the  maximum  of 
multilateral  collaboration  and  coopera- 
tion for  their  resolution. 

Contrasting  Views 

Opposing  trends  and  contrasting  val- 
ues in  our  contemporary  national  and 
international  existence  have  thus  given 
rise  to  diametric  visions  of  our  future. 
Ironically,  our  present  age  of  uncer- 
tainty has  fostered  optimism  in  some 
and  pessimism  in  others.  Indeed,  there 
are  two  prominent  visions  of  our  future 
world,  both  buttressed  by  attitudinal 
assumptions  and  presuppositions,  both 
molded  by  the  character  of  our  times, 
and  both  pertinent — indeed  central — to 
the  role  of  the  oceans  in  our  future 
global  development. 

The  first  vision  holds  that  we  are 
moving  toward  a  postindustrial  soci- 
ety, an  age  of  growing  technological 
wonder,  a  nirvana  of  ever-increasing 
growth  and  development.  The  advo- 
cates of  this  view  are  20th  century  fol- 
lowers of  the  cult  of  enlightenment,  the 
progency  of  our  own  technological  era. 
They  come  from  areas  developed, 
technologically  advanced,  and  heavily 
industrialized  as  well  as  areas  still  in 
the  throes  of  development. 

Disciples  of  this  view  believe 
strongly  in  the  curative  powers  of  sci- 
ence and  technology  and  embrace 
progress,  advancement,  and  growth  as 
a  global  creed — an  ideological  motif 
which  they  see  as  the  salvation  of  man- 
kind and  to  which  they  cling  with  abso- 
lute confidence.  They  are  certain  that 
the  twin  pillars  of  science  and  technol- 
ogy can  and  will  solve  the  world's 
problems,  whether  localized  or  of 
planetary  dimensions.  They  see  no  per- 
ceivable impediments  to  growth  and,  if 
any  exist,  they  believe  we  can  over- 
come them  through  either  the  prospec- 
tive abundance  of  extraterrestrial  re- 
gions or  from  resources  on  Earth — 
from  areas  such  as  the  oceans — which 
will  soon  become  available  for  man's 
wide-ranging  exploitation  and  intensive 
use. 

This  view  holds  that  with  our  current 
technological  potential,  growth  is — and 
will  remain — purely  a  matter  of  human 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

choice.  If  one  accepts  this  concept, 
then  rather  than  a  desperate  hour  of 
crisis,  we  are  now  at  the  threshold  of  a 
global  renaissance — the  most  creative 
and  expansive  period  of  our  history. 

There  is,  of  course,  a  contrasting 
view.  In  this  second  vision — the  at- 
titude of  unbounded  optimism,  the  por- 
trait of  unlimited  growth  and 
development — the  prospect  of  "more 
and  better  for  everyone"  is  considered 
unrealistic  and  perhaps  irresponsible. 
The  Earth,  in  this  somewhat  pessimis- 
tic view,  cannot  sustain  unlimited 
growth  and  expansion,  economically 
and/or  demographically.  Advocates  of 
this  view,  who  adhere  to  the  concept  of 
limited  growth,  therefore  assert  that 
our  first  vision  of  the  future  is  not  only 
incorrect  in  its  prognosis  but  also  es- 
sentially false  in  its  assumptions.  The 
message  which  they  bring  echoes  a 
common  theme:  If  we  unwittingly  and 
mindlessly  proceed  with  unfettered 
growth  and  development,  we  shall  be 
advancing  toward  a  global  precipice 
(perhaps  a  universal  Armageddon) 
marked  by  famine,  resource  depletion, 
and  environmental  collapse. 

Thus,  we  must  now  begin  to  recog- 
nize that  the  Earth  is  both  finite  and 
exhaustible;  that  it  is  subject  to  irrevers- 
ible disruption,  disorder,  and  perhaps 
even  collapse  if  care  is  not  taken  to 
maintain  its  essential  integrity.  Should 
we  fail  to  perceive  correctly  the  limited 
carrying  capacity  of  our  global  envi- 
ronment, should  we  fail  to  recognize 
limits  to  our  own  human  propagation, 
we  may  imperil  our  own  survival. 
Their  call,  therefore,  is  for  rational  ac- 
tion and  planning  on  a  global  scale,  a 
long-term  programmatic  approach  to 
growth  and  development — one  which 
highlights,  in  a  rather  urgent  and 
dramatic  way,  the  need  for  a  detente 
between  society  and  nature. 

These,  then,  are  the  contrasting 
views  we  must  consider.  As  public  of- 
ficials charged  with  a  mandate  to  pro- 
tect a  wide  variety  of  national  interests, 
both  present  and  future,  while  at  the 
same  time  recognizing  that  our  very 
survival  as  a  nation — or  even  humani- 
ty's survival — may  depend  on  the 
choices  we  now  make,  we — this 
Administration — have  assumed  a  tre- 
mendous responsibility. 

In  recognition  of  this,  President  Car- 
ter, in  his  May  23  environmental  mes- 
sage, directed  the  Council  on  Environ- 
mental Quality  and  the  Department  of 
State — working  in  cooperation  with  the 
Environmental  Protection  Agency,  the 
National  Oceanic  and  Atmospheric 
Administration,  and  other  appropriate 
agencies — to  make  a  1-year  study  of 
the  probable  changes  in  the  world's 
population,  natural  resources,  and  en- 


February  1978 

vironment  through  the  end  of  the  cen- 
tury in  an  effort  to  assess  the  state  of 
the  future.  This  study  will  serve  as  the 
foundation  for  longer  term  planning. 
Thus,  the  imagination  and  energies  of 
the  highest  political  authorities  of  our 
land  are  now  focused  on  these  prob- 
lems. But  what  of  the  warning  sounded 
by  the  limits-of-growth  advocates? 

Although  many  of  you  may  disagree 
with  their  conclusions  (of  the  limits- 
to-growth  scenario)  you  cannot  deny 
the  validity  of  certain  trends  in  our  con- 
temporary global  development. 

•  Population,  on  a  global  scale,  is 
steadily  increasing.  If  we  maintain 
the  current  growth  rate  of  2%,  we  can 
expect  that  world  population  will 
double  every  35  years.  This  means 
that  by  the  year  2011,  the  world's 
populace  will  have  increased  from  its 
current  4  billion  to  8  billion  people. 
If  this  average  growth  rate  were  to  be 
maintained  until  this  time  next  cen- 
tury, it  would  take  only  1  year  to  add 
1  billion  to  the  existing  population 

i  and  only  4  years  to  add  the  equivalent 
of  our  present  world  population. 

•  Resources  are  being  depleted. 
Even  the  most  conservative  estimates 
are  projecting  that  we  will  literally 
run  out  of  certain  mineral  and  energy 
resources,  given  anticipated  world 
rates  of  consumption,  within  the  next 
three  decades.  In  a  world  of  uncon- 
trolled population  increase,  this  trend 
is  indicative  of  the  magnitude  of  chal- 
lenges which  coming  generations  will 
face. 

•  Although  more  difficult  to  quan- 
tify, ecological  imbalance  has  indeed 
become  an  issue  of  grave  concern  and 
unforeseeable  consequences.  Ominous 
warnings  of  environmental  degrada- 
tion are  issued  daily.  Some  predict 
that  we  are  depleting  our  protective 
ozone  layers.  Headlines  warn  of  our 
global  despoliation  of  rivers,  lakes, 
and  streams.  The  flow  of  pollutants 
through  rivers  and  the  atmosphere  is 
responsible  for  80%  of  the  contamina- 
tion of  the  world's  oceans.  Increas- 
ingly frequent  spills  of  oil  and  chemi- 
cals are  growing  and  disturbing  oc- 
currences. Continued  rapid  and  pro- 
gressive depletion  of  our  forest  and 
vegetative  cover  could  produce,  in  the 
long  term,  dire  environmental  and  ag- 
ricultural consequences.  And  the  un- 
known ability  of  our  oceans  and  at- 
mosphere to  continually  absorb  the 
20-plus    billion    tons    of   carbon 

idioxide,  emitted  annually  from 
fossil-fuel  combustion,  is  an  issue  of 
major  public  and  political  concern. 

The  causes  of  these  phenomena  are 
international  in  origin  and  transna- 
tional in  scope  and  impact.  They  have 


become  major  concerns  of  multilateral 
diplomacy  and  constitute  an  important 
element  in  American  foreign  policy. 
They  are,  therefore,  important  issues 
not  only  on  the  agenda  of  America 
but  also  on  the  agenda  of  the  world. 

These  cataclysmic  warnings  of  our 
future — warnings  which  have  ema- 
nated primarily  from  within  the  scien- 
tific and  technological  community — 
confirm  that  we  have  reached  a  criti- 
cal period  in  human  history. 

Role  of  the  Oceans 

Given  our  two  visions  of  the  future 
and  our  current  state  of  uneasiness 
and  uncertainty,  what  is  the  role  of 
the  oceans  and  their  possible  de- 
velopment in  promoting  a  desired  fu- 
ture world?  Can  the  oceans  help  us  in 
our  efforts  to  avert  future  global  dis- 
asters? Are  they  a  boundless  pool  of 
resources  which  will  sustain  man- 
kind's needs  for  generations  to  come? 

For  those  concerned  with  ocean  af- 
fairs, these  are  questions  of  some 
urgency.  This  is  especially  true  since 
we  are  now  entering  a  new  stage  of 
ocean  development — a  period  of  vast 
potentialities  as  well  as  possibly  un- 
foreseen dangers.  Almost  certainly 
the  oceans  can  help  in  solving  some 
of  the  world's  present  and  impending 
problems.  However,  depending  upon 
our  long-term  efforts  at  management, 
preservation,  and  conservation,  we 
could,  at  the  same  time,  intensify  and 
broaden  the  dimensions  of  our  present 
dilemmas.  In  the  oceans,  as  on  land, 
we  are  thus  confronted  with  a  situa- 
tion of  grave  decision  and  choice. 

The  oceans  can,  given  substantial 
commitments  of  capital  and  the  req- 
uisite scientific  and  technological 
breakthroughs,  help  in  supplying  the 
food  and  nutritional  requirements  of  a 
growing  world  population.  However, 
given  current  population  trends,  the 
specter  of  a  neo-Malthusian  world 
will  continue  to  persist.  This  specter, 
this  alarming  expectation  of  an  im- 
pending population  crisis,  can  only  be 
dispelled  through  more  vigorous  na- 
tional actions — especially  by  those 
developing  countries  most  affected — 
coupled  with  enhanced  international 
assistance  to  accelerate  social  and 
economic  development  and  to  curtail 
population  growth. 

Although  we  will  certainly  augment 
our  agricultural  and  other  food- 
producing  resources  in  the  long  term, 
this  prospective  achievement  cannot 
successfully  and  totally  defuse  the 
population  timebomb.  Nor  for  that 
matter  can  we  simply  insure  the 
worldwide  availability  of  affordable 
contraceptive  means  and  expect  to 


43 


limit  population  growth  thereby 
within  reasonable  bounds.  What  is 
needed — indeed  what  is  imperative — 
are: 

•  First,  a  simultaneous  attack  on 
poverty  and  population  growth  with 
all  of  the  attendant  economic,  politi- 
cal, social,  and  agricultural  reforms 
inherent  therein;  and 

•  Second,  conscious  and  collective 
efforts  and  policies  which  seek  to 
balance  population  with  available  re- 
sources. 

Unless  and  until  these  efforts  are 
undertaken,  continued  population 
growth  implies  the  possibility  of 
wide-spread  famine,  increased  en- 
vironmental degradation,  turbulent 
civil  disorder  and  political  fragmenta- 
tion, and  a  consequent  destabilization 
of  international  order  and  progress. 

Food  from  the  sea  can  help  to  delay 
and  perhaps  alleviate  some  of  the 
problems.  Although  we  now  harvest 
an  average  world  fish  catch  of  70  mil- 
lion tons,  many  experts  believe  that 
this  total  can  be  considerably  in- 
creased. Estimates  vary,  but  many 
agree  that  a  future  annual  global  fish 
catch  could  be  doubled  or  even  tri- 
pled. 

This  would  require  the  exploitation 
of  new  areas  and  presently  un- 
exploited  resources — unconventional 
species  such  as  midwater  fish  or 
krill — as  well  as  the  application  of 
new  technology.  There  are  a  host  of 
anticipated  improvements  in  fishing 
methods  and  technology,  including 
new  ship  and  gear  designs  and  the 
application  of  novel  location  and  cap- 
ture techniques.  Such  increased  effi- 
ciency when  achieved  on  a  large  scale 
will,  of  course,  redound  to  the  benefit 
of  the  consumer,  both  here  and 
abroad,  resulting  in  an  enhanced 
availability  of  nutritionally  rich 
foods,  at  lower  costs,  in  an  increas- 
ingly protein-short  world. 

In  another  area,  the  full  potentials 
of  mariculture  have  not  yet  been 
adequately  studied.  One  source,  al- 
though perhaps  overly  optimistic,  has 
calculated  that  there  are  about  1  bil- 
lion acres  of  coastal  wetlands  in  the 
world.  If  only  10%  of  these— 100 
million  acres — were  put  into  simple 
extensive  mariculture  projects,  this 
could  result  in  the  production  of  100 
million  metric  tons  of  fish  per  year. 

Of  course,  living  resources  of  the 
oceans  are  not  a  panacea  for  an  im- 
pending world  population  explosion. 
However,  foreseeable  developments 
in  fish  culture  and  technology — which 
can  only  be  made  possible  by  farsight- 
ed  policy  decisions  and  the  necessary 
advances  in  science  and  technology — 


44 


could  give  us  a  much  needed  leadtime 
until  a  runaway  population  growth  is 
slowed,  in  much  the  way  the  "green 
revolution"  has  provided  a  respite. 
Moreover,  as  the  rate  of  population 
growth  decreases,  food  from  the  seas 
could  provide  a  reasonable  hope  that 
future  problems  of  world  hunger  and 
nutritional  deficiency  can  be  alleviated 
and  perhaps  even  overcome. 

We  have  another  problem  where 
the  oceans  may  help  us.  With  di- 
minishing supplies  of  land-based  min- 
erals and  energy,  the  oceans  contain 
vast  unrealized  reserves  which  we 
may  be  able  to  increasingly  draw 
upon  to  meet  energy  and  resource 
needs  in  both  developed  and  develop- 
ing countries.  This  is  an  aspect  of 
oceans  development  which  impinges 
directly  upon  the  national  security 
and  economic  prosperity  of  the 
United  States.  Our  dependence  upon 
foreign  sources  of  petroleum  is 
growing — 42%  of  our  oil  was  im- 
ported in  1976;  projections  estimate 
that  imports  will  exceed  50%  by 
1980.  Consequently,  we  will  and 
must,  in  the  interest  of  our  own  na- 
tional security  and  welfare,  increas- 
ingly turn  to  the  oceans  for  our 
needed  energy  supplies.  Currently, 
U.S.  offshore  oil  and  gas  production 
constitutes  about  20%  of  total  U.S. 
production.  If  we  assume  an  expe- 
dited Outer  Continental  Shelf  leasing 
schedule,  offshore  production  could, 
according  to  some  sources,  reach  a 
peak  of  1.5  billion  barrels  a  year  by 
1990.  Given  current  projections,  this 
would  represent  approximately  14% 
of  our  total  national  consumption  by 
1990. 

Globally,  offshore  crude  oil  pro- 
duction has  and  is  expected  to  con- 
tinue to  expand  at  a  comparable  rate. 
For  example,  between  1969  and  1973 
global  offshore  production  increased 
from  6.2  million  barrels  per  day — or 
15%  of  global  production — to  10.4 
million  barrels  per  day — or  18%  of 
total  world  production.  Also,  new 
offshore  discoveries  of  oil  and  gas  are 
being  made  at  a  steady  pace. 

In  addition  to  traditional  energy 
sources,  the  oceans  also  house  a  po- 
tentially inexhaustible  reservoir  of 
energy  in  the  form  of  hydroelectrical 
power  from  wave  and  tidal  motion, 
mechanical  energy  from  the  exploita- 
tion of  oceanic  temperature  and/or  sa- 
linity differentials,  and  the  possible 
conversion  of  marine  plants  into  use- 
ful fuel  (e.g.,  methanol)  or  fuel- 
extenders.  These  ocean-generated 
power  sources,  although  still  in  the 
experimental  stages  of  development, 
are  possible  sources  of  energy  which 
may  in  the  future  be  harvested  for  so- 


ciety's benefit  and  utilization. 

We  also  know  that  the  bounty  of 
the  oceans  in  terms  of  mineral  re- 
sources approximates  the  magnitude 
of  its  wealth  in  fossil  fuels.  Prospec- 
tive deep  seabed  mining  for  man- 
ganese nodules,  as  we  are  all  well 
aware,  is  currently  a  focal  point  of 
world  attention.  From  a  national 
perspective,  the  United  States  is  a  net 
importer  of  all  of  the  metal  compo- 
nents recoverable  from  the  nodules. 
We  import  nearly  98%  of  our  total  na- 
tional consumption  of  manganese  and 
cobalt  and  with  regard  to  nickel  and 
copper,  about  70%  and  10%,  respec- 
tively. Because  of  the  various  uses  to 
which  these  metals  are  put,  they  are 
considered  by  many  as  strategic  to 
our  national  security  and  economic 
well-being. 

Furthermore,  the  oceans  contain — 
in  unconsolidated  sediments,  brines, 
seawater,  and  subfloor  deposits — a 
host  of  other  minerals  and  chemicals 


Foreign  Fishery 
AUocatlans^ 


Under  the  Fishery  Conservation  and 
Management  Act  of  1976,  the  De- 
partment of  State,  in  cooperation  with 
the  Department  of  Commerce,  annu- 
ally determines  the  allocation  among 
foreign  countries  of  the  total  allowa- 
ble level  of  foreign  fishing  within  200 
miles  off  the  coasts  of  the  United 
States. 

Due  to  the  increasing  U.S.  fishing 
capacity  and  the  poor  condition  of 
certain  stocks,  foreign  allocations  for 
fish  off  the  Atlantic  coast  have  de- 
clined over  50%  from  1977.  The  1978 
Pacific  allocations  are  approximately 
the  same  as  for  1977. 

Each  country  with  an  allocation  has 
signed  a  governing  international 
fisheries  agreement  with  the  United 
States  which  establishes  the  principles 
and  procedures  under  which  a  country 
may  apply  to  catch  a  portion  of  any 
surplus  resources  available  for  foreign 
fishing.  Foreign  countries  can  only 
fish  for  resources  which  are  beyond 
the  present  harvesting  capacities  of 
U.S.  fishermen  and  must  fish  in  ac- 
cordance with  U.S.  regulations  and 
permit  procedures.  The  main  fisheries 
on  the  Atlantic  are  hake  and  squid;  on 
the  Pacific  they  are  hake,  cod,  floun- 
der, pollock,  and  squid.  D 


'  Tables  on  1978  fi.shery  allocations  by 
species  for  each  country  are  omitted;  for  full 
text,  see  press  release  541  of  Dec.  2,  1977. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

which  may  also  help  to  ward  off  im- 
pending mineral  shortages  or  deple- 
tions. A  characteristic  list  of  these 
mineral  and  chemical  resources  would 
include  phosphorite,  silica,  sand  and 
gravel,  gold,  tin,  platinum,  zircon, 
sulfur,  monazite,  magnetite, 
diamonds,  iron  ore,  titanium, 
chloride,  magnesium,  sodium, 
bromide,  and  a  variety  of  toxins, 
drugs,  and  pharmaceuticals  from  a 
diverse  spectrum  of  marine  or- 
ganisms. 

This  list  of  ocean  resources,  both 
potential  and  actual,  could  obviously 
be  expanded,  but  most  of  you  here 
are  better  schooled  than  I  in  these 
technicalities  and  details.  My  purpose 
is  simply  to  underline  the  increasing 
importance  of  the  oceans  in  any  fu- 
ture world  view. 


Danger  of  Exploitation 

But  a  cautionary  note  must  be 
sounded:  There  are  as  many  inherent 
dangers  as  potentials  in  our  develop- 
ment of  the  oceans.  Without  proper 
planning  and  coordination,  we  could 
overfish,  overexploit,  overcontami- 
nate,  and,  consequently,  further  de- 
grade the  oceans  in  our  efforts  to  re- 
trieve their  bounty. 

•  We  could  view — or  continue  to 
view — the  oceans  as  an  immense  dis-  ■ 
posal  with  unlimited  capacity  for  en- 
gorging our  seemingly  interminable 
flow  of  wastes. 

•  We  could  forget  that  the  oceans' 
natural  ability  to  treat  and  recycle 
manmade  wastes  is  a  global  neces- 
sity. 

•  We  could  disregard  the  reality 
that  the  oceans  are  a  central  factor  in 
the  total  world  ecological  equation. 

•  We  could,  in  other  words,  in  our 
hasty  pursuit  of  growth,  forget  that 
the  oceans  too  have  their  limits.  This 
lack  of  vision,  this  lapse  in  ecological 
consciousness,  could  only  quicken  the 
reality  of  a  global  crisis. 

In  earlier  times,  when  human  needs 
could  not  totally  be  met  on  the  land 
we  occupied,  we  turned  to  the  sea. 
These  earlier  ventures  led  to  great 
explorations,  new  discoveries,  and 
exciting  vistas.  New  empires  were 
built.  The  oceans  opened  to  us  a  for- 
midable frontier  which  we  have  since 
overexploited  to  the  point  that  many 
are  now  beginning  to  question  the 
continued  endurance  of  our  planet. 

Today  we  look  to  the  oceans  for 
help.  (The  terms  of  reference  have 
changed  somewhat.)  We  no  longer 
seek  to  conquer  the  oceans  to  find 
treasures  of  gold,  silver,  and  spices  in 
foreign  lands.  Now  we  are  in  pursuit 


-ehruary  1978 

jf  fish,  oil,  and  natural  gas;  nonfossil 
iources  of  energy,  manganese 
lodules,  and  a  host  of  other  minerals. 

We  are  now  at  a  new  era.  We  seek 
lot  the  horizons  but  the  wealth  of  the 
)ceans  themselves.  We  seek  not  to 
naster  the  oceans  but  rather  to  be- 
:ome  partners  for  the  benefit  of  man- 
;ind  as  a  whole. 

In  the  oceans,  as  on  the  land,  we 
ace  a  classic  dilemma:  We  can  plun- 
ler  or  preserve,  protect  or  pollute. 
iVe  can  forcibly  take  the  ocean's  re- 
ources  or,  with  her  acquiescence, 
;ently  nudge  them  from  her  embrace, 
■rom  my  vantage  point,  our  choice  is 
ather  clear. 


This  evening,  I  call  upon  you — 
scientists,  technical  experts,  environ- 
mentalists, and  corporate  executives — 
to  summon  up  the  courage,  concern, 
creativity,  and  conscience  to  learn  to 
live  in  harmony  with  the  oceans.  If 
generations  which  follow  us  are  to  in- 
herit at  least  our  world,  my  call  is  more 
than  an  issue  of  challenge,  more  than 
an  expression  of  hope;  it  is  truly  a 
moral  imperative  and  a  question  of 
human  survival  into  the  year  2000.     D 


'  Address  before  the  Oceans  '11  Conference 
in  Los  Angeles  on  Oct.  18,  1977;  Ms.  Mink  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Oceans  and  Interna- 
tional Environmental  and  Scientific  Affairs, 


POPULATIO]\:  World  Trends 


y  Marshall  Green ' 

I  greatly  appreciate  the  privilege  of 
eing  included  in  this  distinguished 
athering  to  discuss  world  population 
;sues  and  their  impact  upon  the  lives 
f  all  of  us  and  especially  upon  the  for- 
jnes  of  our  children  and  grandchil- 
ren. 

My  comments  will  be  directed  to- 
'ard  the  world  at  large,  with  special 
mphasis  on  the  less  developed  re- 
ions.  That  is  where  population- 
enerated  and  population-exacerbated 
roblems  are  most  acute.  Developed 
ountries  have  their  own  population 
roblems,  but  they  are  of  a  different 
/pe  and  scale. 

There  are  two  aspects  of  this  confer- 
nce  that  deserve  special  mention. 

•  One  is  that  participants  are  drawn 
■om  so  many  walks  of  life,  promi- 
ently  including  economists  and  busi- 
ess  leaders.  As  a  rule,  population  is 
le  rather  exclusive  domain  of  demog- 
iphers,  doctors,  and — I  might  say — 
oomsayers  as  well.  But  it  must  also 
iclude  diplomats,  development  plan- 
ers, and  dozens  of  other  disciplines, 
ibove  all,  it  must  engage  the  interests, 
ommitment,  and  active  involvement 
f  the  political  leaders  of  the  world. 

•  The  other  noteworthy  feature  of 
lis  conference  is  the  context  in  which 
opulation  issues  are  raised.  We  are 
ere  to  talk  about  the  relationship  be- 
ween  demographic  trends,  employ- 
lent,  change,  and  the  quality  of  life. 

Too  often  we  think  of  population 
rowth  in  the  all  too  narrow  Malthusian 
brms  of  food  and  population — that  is. 


whether  there  will  be  enough  food  to 
go  around  for  a  world  that  is  currently 
adding  over  200,000  more  human  be- 
ings every  day.  I  do  not  wish  to 
minimize  the  crucial  importance  of  the 
food-population  ratio,  bearing  in  mind 
the  problem  of  chronic  malnutrition  in 
less  developed  countries  (LDC's)  and 
its  grim  ramifications;  the  recent  up- 
turns in  death  rates  in  parts  of  India, 
Bangladesh,  and  elsewhere  due  to  local 
food  shortages;  and  also  bearing  in 
mind  the  dependence  of  less  developed 
countries  on  grain  imports  which  help 
drive  the  poorer  among  them  ever 
deeper  into  debt.  Even  with  decelerat- 
ing growth  rates — projected  under  the 
somewhat  outdated  but  still  broadly 
useful  U.N.  medium  variant — LDC 
population  will  be  adding  some  78  mil- 
lion a  year  in  the  beginning  of  the 
1980's.  Toward  the  end  of  this  century, 
this  increment  may  gradually  rise  to 
over  90  million  a  year. 

Other  Implications 

So  food  is  obviously  a  vital  concern, 
but  there  are  other  serious  implications 
of  these  aggregate  numbers. 

Family  Hardship.  First  and  foremost, 
rapid  population  growth  creates  im- 
measurable hardship  on  the  family,  par- 
ticularly the  wife  and  mother.  Women 
in  many  LDC's  have  little  function  in 
life  save  constant  childbearing  and 
drudgery.  Maternal  mortality  is  still 
very  high.  A  large  proportion  of  chil- 
dren die  before  reaching  adulthood. 
And  the  larger  the  family,  the  dimmer 
the  prospects  of  surviving  children. 

Ecological  Deterioration.  On  the 


45 


national  level,  there  is  the  problem  of 
ecological  deterioration  whose  relation- 
ship to  population  pressure  is  just  be- 
ginning to  be  appreciated  and  studied. 
Europe,  North  America,  and  Japan  are 
the  big  polluters,  but  desperate  efforts 
by  developing  nations  to  keep  food 
production  in  step  with  both  the  grow- 
ing population  and  rising  demand  have 
resulted  in  slash-and-burn  farming, 
overcropping,  and  overgrazing.  To- 
gether with  the  destruction  of  forests 
for  fuel,  these  practices  have  resulted 
in  the  removal  of  millions  of  hectares  of 
forest  cover  and  the  attendant  loss  of 
irreplaceable  topsoil  washed  away  by 
rains. 

It  would  be  no  exaggeration  to  de- 
scribe Nepal,  Haiti,  Java,  and  other 
places  as  ecological  disaster  areas. 
Likewise,  overgrazing  in  the  Sahelian 
Africa  and  firewood  collection  contrib- 
ute to  advancing  deserts  and  a  total  des- 
iccation process  that  affects  virtually 
all  countries  of  Northern  Africa,  even  in- 
cluding the  coastal  states  on  the  Gulf  of 
Guinea.  The  United  Nations  Environ- 
mental Programme  estimates  that  dur- 
ing the  fourth  quarter  of  this  century, 
twice  as  many  hectares  will  be  lost  to 
urbanization  and  soil  degradation 
(mainly  erosion)  as  will  be  added  to 
land  under  cultivation. 

Frustrated  Development.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  underscore  before  this  au- 
dience the  fact  that  excessive  popula- 
tion growth  frustrates  economic  de- 
velopment and  the  fact  that  production 
increases  are  literally  eaten  up  by  the 
rapidly  increasing  number  of  mouths 
and  by  swelling  costs  for  social  infra- 
structure. I  heard  that  Bangladesh,  for 
example,  has  to  provide  350,000  more 
tons  of  grain  each  year  to  feed  its  grow- 
ing population.  It  likewise  must  pro- 
vide each  year  something  on  the  order 
of  300,000  more  dwellings  and 
700,000  more  jobs  just  to  accommo- 
date the  additional  population.  How 
does  development  proceed  when  infra- 
structure costs  are  so  high? 

Urban  Overpopulation.  Perhaps  the 
most  vividly  perceived  ills  of  over- 
population in  less  developed  countries 
can  be  found  in  their  cities.  During  the 
first  half  of  this  decade,  the  rate  of 
growth  of  urban  populations  acceler- 
ated to  an  average  of  4.0%  a  year, 
compared  with  a  2.3%  growth  rate  for 
the  total  LDC  population.  Due  to  a 
combination  of  natural  increase  (excess 
of  births  over  deaths)  and  heavy  immi- 
gration from  rural  areas  (estimated  at 
over  70  million  between  1970  and  1975), 
the  total  LDC  urban  population  has  now 
surpassed  the  absolute  number  of  urban 
dwellers  in  the  highly  urbanized  de- 
veloped countries. 

This  demographic  milestone  is  par- 


46 

ticularly  significant  because,  despite 
the  huge  absolute  size,  the  urban  com- 
ponent in  LDC's  still  comprises  only  a 
little  over  one-fourth  of  the  total  popu- 
lation, compared  with  two-thirds  in  the 
developed  world.  Moreover,  despite 
the  heavy  outflow  of  people  to  urban 
areas  in  search  of  jobs  and  higher 
standards  of  living,  the  LDC  rural 
population,  due  to  high  birth  rates,  was 
still  increasing  by  an  average  annual 
rate  of  1.7%  during  the  early  1970's. 
By  sharp  contrast,  rural  population  in 
the  developed  regions  has  been  declin- 
ing over  the  past  IVi  decades. 

The  surge  of  humanity  from  rural 
areas,  combined  with  high  birth  rates, 
has  also  produced  unprecedented  con- 
centrations of  people  in  single  urban 
agglomerations.  As  an  example  of  an 
urban  planner's  nightmare,  we  may 
take  note  of  one  U.N.  projection  which 
envisages  a  Mexico  City  of  32  million 
inhabitants  by  the  year  2000.  All  the 
while,  as  observed  in  a  1977  report  by 
the  Economic  and  Social  Commission 
for  Asia  and  the  Pacific,  "pressure  on 


arable  land  and  poverty  in  the  rural 
areas  is  increasing,  while  problems  of 
unemployment,  squatters,  and  shan- 
tytowns  in  the  urban  areas  are  becom- 
ing immense."  There  is  little  doubt 
that  deplorable  living  conditions — 
whether  in  rural  or  urban  localities — 
spawns  unrest,  crime,  and  political 
extremism.  Many  governments  feel 
constrained  in  this  situation  to  increase 
authoritarian  controls  to  preserve  law 
and  order. 

Increasing  Unemployment.  Now 
we  come  to  a  major  concern  of  this 
conference — population  and  employ- 
ment. Most  less  developed  countries 
face  a  prolonged  period  of  rapid  expan- 
sion in  the  size  of  their  population  of 
working  ages.  Taking  LDC's  as  a 
whole  (excluding  China),  population 
15-64  years  of  age  will  be  growing  at 
an  annual  average  rate  of  about  2.9% 
throughout  the  remainder  of  this  cen- 
tury. In  the  next  25  years,  working-age 
populations  in  LDC's  will  more  than 
double.  During  the  same  period  the  so- 
cially   and    politically    volatile. 


POPULATION  GROWTH 
BY  MAJOR  REGIONS 

1975  and  2000 


AFRICA 


LATIN  AMERICA 
and  CARIBBEAN 


NORTH  AMERICA 


EAST  ASIA 


SOUTH  ASIA 


MIDDLE  EAST 


EUROPE 


(MEDIUM  VARIANT) 


1,960.7 


OCEANIA 


USSR 


India  I  I  837  8 


1,501.2 


21.3 
32.7 


255.0 


315.0 


WORLD  TOTAL 

1975     3,967  million 
2000     6,253  million 


SOURCE:   UN   POPULATION  DIVISION 


Department  of  State  BuUetii 

unemployment-stricken  age  group 
15-24  years,  is  projected  to  grow  al 
most  as  rapidly,  even  with  the  built-i 
assumption  of  moderately  decreasin: 
fertility. 

The  rate  of  growth  of  the  labor  forci 
in  less  developed  countries  is  expecte( 
to  accelerate  in  the  next  20  years.  Witl 
due  regard  to  the  perils  of  estimatin; 
future  labor  participation  rates,  espe 
cially  among  young  people  an( 
women,  the  International  Labor  Or 
ganization  projects  an  increase  in  thi 
rate  of  growth  of  the  labor  force  fron 
2.4%  a  year  between  1975  and  1980  ti 
2.6%  in  the  early  1990's.  As  high  a 
this  pace  of  expansion  is,  we  must  bea 
in  mind  that  about  two-thirds  of  th' 
total  LDC  labor  force  is  still  in  agricul 
ture.  Thus,  the  much  more  rapidly  ex 
panding  requirements  for  job  creatioi 
outside  the  agricultural  sector  are  likel; 
to  outpace  in  many  LDC's  the  growti 
of  necessary  capital.  Clearly,  direc 
remedial  and  broadly  developmenta 
policies  will  have  to  deal  with  both  th. 
increasing  backlog  of  unemployed  am 
underemployed  and  with  the  large  an 
nual  in-flows  of  new  entrants  into  th 
labor  market. 

Here  I  wish  to  enter  a  note  of  cautio 
with  regard  to  what  advanced  technol 
ogies  can  do  to  alleviate  unemploy 
ment.  In  fact,  they  can  aggravate  ur 
employment.  When  I  was  Ambassadc 
to  Indonesia  [1965-69],  I  joined  Presi 
dent  Suharto  one  year  in  the  annual  ric 
harvesting  ceremonies.  Together  wit 
countless  hundreds  of  thousands  o 
Javanese  farmers,  we  all  began  to  ci 
the  rice,  one  single  stalk  at  a  time,  wit 
a  little  knife  (called  ani-ani)  tied  acros 
the  middle  finger  of  the  right  hand.  N 
agricultural  machinery  was  used,  nc 
even  scythes  and  sickles.  Had  such  in- 
plements  been  used,  it  would  have  con 
tributed  to  a  major  expansion  o 
unemployment  and  underemployment 
tearing  apart  the  social  fabric  of  over 
crowded  Java,  an  island  with  a  popula 
tion  today  of  85  million.  Similarly 
powered  fishing  vessels  could  throv 
thousands  of  Javanese  fishermen  out  o 
work. 

I  am  not  concluding  that  tht 
Javanese  and  others  in  poorer  countrie 
are  doomed  to  continuing  forever  sucl 
low-productivity  methods  of  farmin] 
and  fishing  and  other  pursuits,  but  I  an 
suggesting  that  there  are  great  socia 
and  political  difficulties  involved  ii 
any  change  in  present  low-technolog; 
methods. 

On  the  whole,  the  labor  supply  situa 
tion  is  virtually  irreversible  in  this  cen 
tury.  Birth  control  can  have  no  effec 
on  the  number  of  potential  job  seeker 
already  born.  Intensified  efforts  to  re 


-ebruary  1978 

Juce   current   fertility   levels   are, 
ne\ertheless,  essential: 

•  As  a  means  of  controlling  total 
.onsumption  to  forestall  deterioration 
Df  the  still  inadequate  per  capita  con- 
sumption levels; 

•  As  a  means  of  maintaining  the 
,'iability  of  family  life;  and 

•  As  a  means  of  laying  the  founda- 
ion  for  a  situation  with  which  our  suc- 
essors  can  cope  and  perhaps  succeed 
n  providing  productive  jobs,  adequate 
ood,  shelter,  and  other  essentials  of 
ife  in  a  habitable  environment.  After 
ill,  it  is  not  only  a  matter  of  how  many 
)eople  can  survive  on  this  planet  but 
low  many  can  live  on  it  decently. 

Controlling  Population  Growth 

Let  me  now  turn  to  what  is  being 
ione  to  control  population  growth.  For- 
unately,  there  has  been,  over  the  past 
!  decades,  growing  concern  in  many 
juarters  over  excessive  population 
;rowth.  Programs  of  corrective  action 
lave  been  undertaken  in  more  than  30 
oncerned  nations.  These  programs 
lave  received  increasing  amounts  of 
upport  from  donor  nations,  interna- 
ional  organizations  (especially  the 
J.N.  Fund  for  Population  Activities 
nd  the  World  Bank),  as  well  as  from 
lozens  of  international  and  national 
irivate  voluntary  organizations. 

As  a  result  of  this  upsurge  of  interest 
ind  support,  over  three-quarters  of  the 
leople  in  developing  nations  now  live 
n  countries  whose  governments  have 
dopted  population  programs  to  reduce 
ertility  in  the  interest  of  national  eco- 
lomic  development.  Of  the  remaining 
ine-fourth  or  so,  the  great  majority  live 
n  countries  where  private  family  plan- 
ing programs  are  encouraged  or  at 
;ast  tolerated  in  the  interest  of  family 
ealth  and  welfare. 

The  greatest  single  LDC  success 
tory  in  reducing  population  growth  is 
irobably  occurring  right  now  in  the 
'eople's  Republic  of  China,  although 
vc  have  no  official  information  with 
vhich  to  quantify  our  conclusions  or  to 
;auge  the  means  by  which  this  success 
s  being  achieved. 

Elsewhere  in  the  developing  world, 
ignificant  declines  in  birth  rates  have 
aken  place  in  the  rapidly  modernizing 
iong  Kong  and  city-state  of  Singapore; 
ilso  in  South  Korea  and  Taiwan.  There 
ire  also  significant  reductions  now 
)eing  registered  in  some  of  the  more 
lopulous  nations  like  Colombia,  Thai- 
and,  Indonesia,  and  the  Philippines,  as 
veil  as  in  smaller  countries  like  Costa 
lica,  Tunisia,  Trinidad  and  Tobago, 
ind  Mauritius. 

These  are  welcome  and  hopeful  signs 


indeed.  They  must  not,  however, 
create  an  unwarranted  sense  of  relief 
and,  even  less  so,  complacency. 
Clearly,  far  more  needs  to  be  done. 

It  is  a  particular  matter  of  concern 
that,  according  to  recent  surveys,  the 
average  couple  in  Asia  and  Latin 
America  desires  a  completed  family 
size  of  four  children;  in  Africa,  it  is 
six.  As  long  as  most  couples  want 
families  of  four,  five,  and  six  children, 
rather  than  one,  two,  or  three,  it  will  be 
impossible  humanely  to  bring  down  av- 
erage fertility  to  a  replacement  level — a 
level  necessary  for  eventual  cessation 
of  population  growth. 

And  even  if,  through  some  almost 
miraculous  transformation,  it  were  pos- 
sible to  achieve  by  the  end  of  this  cen- 
tury an  average  of  a  little  over  two 
children  per  woman  in  the  developing 
world  (fertility  rates  in  the  developed 
world  are  already  hovering  around  re- 
placement levels),  the  world's  popula- 
tion, now  over  4  billion,  would  not 
cease  to  grow  before  exceeding  8  bil- 
lion people. 

If,  as  is  much  more  likely,  the  re- 
placement level  fertility  were  not 
achieved  throughout  the  world  until  the 
early  2020"s,  world  population  would 
halt  its  growth  at  about  11  billion. 
Thus,  accelerating  fertility  reduction  by 
2  decades  would  reduce  that  dangerous 
pressure  on  world  resources  by  approx- 
imately 3  billion  people. 

So,  the  crucial  question  comes  down 
to  how  to  achieve  as  soon  as  possible 
average  family  sizes  of  two  rather  than 
the  five-six  children  which  are  now 
prevailing  in  Asia,  Latin  America,  and 
Africa. 

Obviously,  this  cannot  be  achieved 
by  family  planning  programs  alone,  no 
matter  how  widespread,  how  freely 
available,  and  how  acceptable  and  ef- 
fective the  means  of  birth  control.  To 
be  sure,  improving  family  planning 
services  and  better  methods  of  con- 
traception must  be  given  high  priority. 
There  is  ample  evidence  that  public 
provision  of  these  services  has  signifi- 
cantly accelerated  the  diffusion  of  fam- 
ily planning  practices  in  some  three 
dozen  LDC's.  Whether  it  can  initiate  a 
fertility  decline  is  much  less  certain. 

Of  greatest  importance,  then,  is  the 
question  of  motivation,  of  inducing 
people  to  want  to  have  smaller 
families.  This  is  obviously  a  vastly 
complex  undertaking,  involving  such 
wide-ranging  and  basic  issues  as  reduc- 
tions in  infant  and  child  mortality,  the 
full  integration  of  women  into  the  de- 
velopment process,  a  vigorous  growth 
in  national  product,  wide  educational 
opportunities  for  both  sexes,  delayed 
marriages,  and,  of  course,  development 


47 


of  a  kind  that  benefits  the  masses 
through  more  equitable  distribution  of 
income  and  land.  These  requirements 
have  been  spelled  out  in  the  World 
Population  Plan  of  Action,  a  document 
agreed  to  by  the  consensus  of  136  na- 
tions represented  at  the  World  Population 
Conference  of  1974.- 

Of  course,  it  is  not  that  these  things 
should  be  accomplished  exclusively  for 
purposes  of  moderating  fertility.  They 
should  be  done  anyway.  Yet,  a  slow- 
down in  population  growth  would  be  a 
major  byproduct  of  these  measures 
whose  primary  purpose  would  be  to 
improve  the  quality  of  life  for  countless 
millions  around  the  world. 

Hopefully,  the  world's  population 
can  be  stabilized  at  levels  closer  to  8 
than  1 1  billion.  But  in  order  to  do  this, 
it  will  be  most  important  that  world 
leaders  bestir  themselves  and  become 
more  involved;  also,  that  the  village 
and  the  community  become  more  in- 
strumental in  developing  and  imple- 
menting their  own  family  planning 
program,  with  rewards  and  incentives 
being  given  to  the  most  successful 
among  them;  and  also,  that  paramedics 
be  trained  to  provide  simple  health 
services — including  family  planning — 
in  villages,  however  remote,  where 
these  paramedics  are  known  and 
trusted. 

There  may  be  scant  prospects  for  any 
absolute  closing  of  the  income  gap  be- 
tween rich  and  poor  nations,  but  there 
can  be  a  significant  narrowing  of  this 
gap  through  a  combination  of: 

•  Developing  nations  putting  their 
own  houses  in  order,  nurturing  and  en- 
gaging the  talents  of  all  their  people; 
and 

•  Greater  assistance  and  support  by 
developed  nations. 

At  the  same  time,  I  think,  we  should 
give  further  thought  as  to  what  our  as- 
sistance goals  are  all  about.  Is  it  some- 
thing that  can  be  measured  in  economic 
terms  like  per  capita  GNP?  Or  in  terms 
of  quantifiable  quality-of-Iife  indices 
like  high  educational  attainment,  low 
infant  mortality,  extended  life  expec- 
tancy? Or  are  there  unquantifiable 
quality-of-life  factors  that  are  equally 
important — perhaps  more  so — such  as 
kinship,  participation  of  the  individual 
in  his  community's  affairs,  social  mo- 
bility, freedom  to  move  and  to  create? 

I  do  not  argue  that  a  high  material 
level  of  living  is  a  goal  which  surpasses 
all  others.  I  recognize  that  the  rich  may 
be  poor  in  many  ways,  and  the  poor 
rich  in  other  ways.  Yet,  there  are  cer- 
tain basic  human  needs  that  everyone 
absolutely  requires  and  craves.  Perhaps 
the  best  summation  of  what   we  all 


48 


seek — and  need — is  set  forth  in  that 
memorable  passage  in  the  U.S.  Decla- 
ration of  Independence: 

We  hold  these  Truths  to  be  self-evident,  that 
all  Men  are  created  equal,  that  they  are  endowed 
by  their  Creator  with  certain  unalienable  Rights, 
that  among  these  are  Life,  Liberty,  and  the  Pur- 
suit of  Happiness.  .  .  . 

Excessive  population  growth, 
perhaps  more  than  any  other  single 
phenomenon  on  the  world  scene, 
threatens  denial  to  our  children  and 


their  children  and  endless  generations 
to  come  of  those  very  goals  which 
mankind  seeks:  life,  liberty,  and  the 
pursuit  of  happiness.  D 


'  Address  to  the  International  Setninar  on 
Population,  Employment,  and  Change  in  La 
Hulpe,  Belgium,  on  Nov.  3,  1977;  Ambassador 
Green  is  Coordinator  of  Population  Affairs. 

^  For  U.S.  statements  at  the  World  Population 
Conference  at  Bucharest  Aug.  19-20,  1974,  and 
text  of  the  World  Population  Plan  of  Action,  see- 
BULLETIN  of  Sept.  30,  1974,  p.  429. 


IJIVITED  ]\ATIO]^S:  Benefits  From 
the  U.1%.  Agencies 


by  Charles  William  Maynes  ' 

At  the  beginning  of  November,  the 
U.S.  Government  chose — for  the  first 
time  in  its  history — to  withdraw  from  a 
major  U.N.  institution.  A  decision  of 
such  watershed  proportions  demands  an 
explanation. 

America's  interest  in  and  support  for 
the  United  Nations  and  its  affiliated 
agencies  has  never  been  higher.  Not  for 
several  decades  have  the  President  and 
the  top  leadership  of  our  government 
been  so  committed  to  multilateral  ap- 
proaches to  peace  and  economic  prog- 
ress. President  Carter  expressed  this 
determination  to  rise  above  traditional 
bilateral  diplomacy  even  before  he  took 
office;  and  since  then — in  both  style 
and  substance — he  has  gone  out  of  his 
way  to  insure  that  America  makes 
greater  use  of  the  diplomatic  machinery 
that  is  available  through  the  U.N.  sys- 
tem and  to  strengthen  American  sup- 
port for  the  vital  work  of  its  family  of 
agencies.  How,  then,  do  we  explain  the 
decision  to  leave  the  International 
Labor  Organization  (ILO)? 

We  all  know  that  the  ILO  is  a  highly 
unique  institution  among  U.N.  agen- 
cies, the  only  one  based  upon  a  tripar- 
tite membership  system  where,  in  prin- 
ciple, each  nation  is  represented  not 
only  by  its  government  but  also  by 
delegations  of  workers  and  employers. 
We  also  should  all  know  that  the 
ILO  does  valuable  work.  We  can  take 
the  field  of  development  as  an  exam- 
ple. The  World  Employment  Program 
of  the  ILO  has  been  of  tremendous  im- 
portance to  our  own  Agency  for  Inter- 
national Development  in  policy  de- 
velopment and  has  had  a  significant 
impact  on  policy  formulation  in  such 
multilateral  institutions  as  the  World 
Bank.  The  ILO  pioneered  the  strategy 
of  focusing  development  assistance  on 


"basic  human  needs,"  a  strategy 
which  has  influenced  development 
planning  around  the  globe. 

Our  own  efforts  to  develop  alterna- 
tive technologies  for  the  developing 
countries  build  on  ILO  experience.  The 
ILO  pioneered  innovative  development 
measures  and  the  establishment  of  uni- 
form technical  standards  for  the  im- 
plementation of  labor-intensive  de- 
velopmcr.;  projects. 

We  could  list  similar  achievements 
in  the  fields  of  human  rights,  industrial 
relations,  and  workers'  rights,  and  all 
of  them  contributed  to  ILO's  award  of 
the  Nobel  Peace  Prize  in  1969.  How. 
then,  could  the  United  States  leave  an 
organization  that  so  clearly  makes  a 
major  contribution  to  a  more  peaceful 
and  decent  international  system? 

To  answer  this  question,  we  have  to 
examine  some  of  the  difficulties  the 
ILO  has  experienced  in  carrying  out 
one  of  its  principal  functions — the 
monitoring  of  compliance  with  ILO 
conventions.  One  fundamental  purpose 
of  the  ILO — perhaps  the  fundamental 
purpose — is  to  observe  and  report  on 
compliance  with  these  voluntarily  ac- 
cepted conventions.  Now  it  has  always 
seemed  clear  that  this  could  only  be 
done  effectively  if  it  were  done  objec- 
tively.  Were  states  to  begin  lo 
politicize  the  compliance  process,  it 
would  begin  to  lose  much  of  its  effec- 
tiveness. Yet  over  the  years  precisely 
this  kind  of  politicization  began  to 
creep  into  the  work  of  the  ILO. 

In  considering  compliance  with  ILO 
conventions  on  forced  labor  and  free- 
dom of  association,  the  membership 
applied  one  set  of  standards  against 
Communist  countries  and  another  set 
against  non-Communist  countries.  The 
ILO  Group  of  Experts  would  objec- 
tively call  into  question  Soviet  com- 
pliance, but  the  membership  would  ig- 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


nore  the  report.  Then,  the  same 
phenomenon  of  the  double  standard 
began  to  develop  in  the  ILO  considera- 
tion of  Middle  East  issues. 

Against  this  background,  one  begins 
to  understand  why  in  November  1975 
the  United  States  informed  the  ILO  thai 
it  intended  to  withdraw  from  the  or- 
ganization unless  conditions  could  be 
created  to  restore  to  the  ILO  its  tradi- 
tions of  due  process,  objectivity,  and  a 
single  standard  of  compliance  for  all 
states.  Regrettably,  the  response  of  the 
majority  at  the  June  1977  conference 
was  to  refuse  to  confirm  some  reform 
steps  taken  earlier,  and  then,  for  only 
the  second  time  in  ,iO  years,  to  refuse 
to  endorse  the  report  of  the  Conference 
Committee  on  the  Application  ol 
Conventions  and  Standards — a  report 
which  itself  did  represent  an  objective 
review  of  the  degree  to  which  the  ILC 
members  had  adhered  to  ILC 
conventions. 

It  is  rare  that  any  single  question  car 
produce  such  an  intensive  coalescenct 
of  foreign  affairs  and  domestic  view 
points  and  pressures  as  this  one  involv 
ing  the  ILO  did.  The  issue  concernec 
the  balance  between  benefits  of  mem; 
bership,  which  were  considerable,  am 
trends  in  the  organization,  which  wen 
alarming.  The  President  pondered  thi 
problem  up  until  almost  the  final  hou> 
and  then  decided  the  United  State 
should  let  its  letter  of  withdrawal  tak( 
effect.  He  did  so,  however,  in  the  spiri 
that  the  United  States  will  return  to  tht 
ILO  if  its  performance  improves.  Wi 
are  currently  exploring  the  condition;* 
under  which  we  would  decide  t( 
return.' 

The  very  difficulty  of  the  decision 
however,  forces  us  to  consider  mon 
carefully  our  overall  policy  toward  the- 
specialized  agencies  and  other  pro 
grams  in  the  U.N.  system.  There  is  feai 
in  some  quarters  that  the  ILO  decisioi 
will  encourage  those  who  would  like 
America  to  get  out  of  more  organiza 
tions,  or  even  out  of  the  United  Nation: 
itself.  A  prominent  columnist  has  ever 
suggested  that  complete  withdraws 
from  the  United  Nations  would  be  a  de- 
sirable result.  My  own  personal  view  i; 
that  such  suggestions  develop  from  ; 
profound  ignorance  of  the  real  advan 
tages  that  the  United  States  derive: 
from  membership  in  the  U.N.  family  o: 
institutions,  and  I  would  like  to  spenc 
much  of  my  remaining  time  today  de- 
.scribing  these  benefits. 

I  can  start  by  noting  that  the  U.N, 
system  is  important  to  the  United  State; 
from  two  critical  points  of  view. 


•  First,  it  provides  a  variety  of  irre 
placeable  mechanisms  for  the  pursuit  ol 
America's  foreign  policy  goals. 


February  1978 

Second,  it  provides  many  concrete 
benefits  to  this  country. 

;;hannels  for  U.S.  Policy 

President  Carter's  reaffirmation  of 
'he  importance  of  the  U.N.  role  in 
America's  foreign  policy  has  been  an 
mportant  departure  for  this  Adminis- 
ration.  It  was  not  a  decision  he  took 
ightly.  The  hard  reality  is  that  a  grow- 
ng  number  of  the  world's  pressing 
ssues  cannot  be  handled  by  nations 
icting  alone,  or  even  through  small  co- 
ilitions  with  others.  Use  of  universal 
ora  such  as  those  provided  by  the 
J.N.  agencies  often  is  an  irreplaceable 
md  central  part  of  our  overall  strategy 
or  the  solution  of  many  key  issues. 
j  Thus,  facilitating  the  dialogue  be- 
iween  the  rich  countries  and  the  poor 
ountries  is  one  of  the  most  important 
oles  the  United  Nations  plays.  Here 
\merica  has  a  direct  and  high  national 
nterest  in  more  effective  cooperation, 
'he  less  developed  nations  are  the 
3CUS  of  many  of  the  raw  materials 
ceded  by  us;  they  provide  many  im- 
ortant  and  steadily  growing  markets 
or  our  products.  About  a  third  of  our 
oreign  trade  is  now  with  the  develop- 
ng  nations.  These  countries  provide 
MT  fastest  growing  export  markets, 
low  they  live  can  affect  very  directly 
tie  quality  of  life  in  this  country.  The 
Jnited  Nations  and  its  family  of  agen- 
ies  stand  ready  to  serve  as  vehicles  to 
iromote  the  economic  dialogue  and 
Togress  that  are  so  vital. 

The  importance  of  the  United  Na- 
ions  is  also  growing  in  the  political 
rea.  Our  initiatives  to  bring  about 
leaceful  settlements  in  Namibia  and 
Ihodesia  have  been  taken  in  part 
vithin  the  U.N.  framework.  This  has 
leen  done  not  because  of  any  doc- 
rinaire  belief  that  the  United  Nations 
nust  be  involved  but  because  the  par- 
ies most  directly  concerned  are  anx- 
ous  to  see  the  United  Nations  seized 
vith  the  issue. 

The  peacekeeping  efforts  undertaken 
)y  the  Security  Council  reflect  still 
mother  way  that  a  multilateral  forum 
:an  achieve  something  that  no  single 
lation  could  do  alone.  The  two 
)eacekeeping  forces  in  the  Middle  East 
lave  been  essential  to  the  maintenance 
)f  the  cease-fire,  and  they  have  created 
in  atmosphere  in  which  negotiations 
or  a  peaceful  settlement  could  occur. 
There  is  no  way  to  price  the  benefits 
f/e  derive  from  the  U.N.'s  peacekeep- 
,ng  efforts. 

The  annual  convening  of  the  General 
iAssembly  in  New  York — in  our  own 
country — provides  us  with  another  vital 
(diplomatic  instrument.  Critics  deride 
]the  United  Nations  as  a  "debating  so- 


ciety," and,  of  course,  it  is  much  more 
than  that.  But  diplomacy,  after  all,  is 
debate — debate  which  provides  struc- 
ture, debate  which  promotes  consen- 
sus, debate  which  identifies  and  iso- 
lates differences.  The  United  Nations 
can  be  unmatchable  in  this  regard.  If 
we  wish  to  use  the  opportunities  that  it 
presents — and  this  Administration 
does — we  will  find  it  of  inestimable 
value. 

Specialized  Agencies  and  Programs 

Let  us  turn  to  the  specialized  agen- 
cies and  programs  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, however.  They  add  a  dimension 
to  our  diplomacy  which  is  simply  not 
appreciated.  Without  them  we  would 
lose  a  functional  edge  to  our  diplomatic 
efforts  which  would  make  it  impossible 
to  carry  out  some  critical  initiatives 
that  are  profoundly  in  our  national 
interest. 

Our  interest  in  economic  develop- 
ment in  other  nations  is  furthered  by 
the  U.N.  Development  Program 
(UNDP),  the  World  Bank,  and  the 
regional  development  banks,  and 
monetary  stability  is  provided  by  the 
International  Monetary  Fund.  We  all 
recognize  that  developmental  assist- 
ance often  is  more  palatable  to  both 
recipient  and  donor  when  there  is  a 
multilateral  agency  serving  as  inter- 
mediary. These  agencies  are  making 
significant  strides  in  the  direction  of 
America's  own  foreign  assistance  ob- 
jectives. Both  the  humanitarian  and 
economic  interests  that  America  has  in 
the  developing  nations  are  well  served 
by  the  program  activities  of  these 
agencies. 

In  particular,  the  UNDP,  with  proj- 
ects in  more  than  140  countries  and  ter- 
ritories, has  been  working  hard  to  meet 
our  own  goal  of  improving  the  living 
situations  of  the  world's  poorest 
people — those  without  clean  water, 
food,  clothing,  shelter,  or  health  care. 
Administered  by  former  U.S.  Con- 
gressman Brad  Morse,  UNDP  serves  as 
a  channel  for  development  assistance  to 
individual  nations  and  regions.  It  does 
preinvestment  work  for  projects  to  be 
funded  later  by  the  World  Bank,  re- 
gional banks,  bilateral  aid  programs,  or 
the  private  sector  and  also  provides  fel- 
lowships and  training.  From  1972  to 
1976,  for  example,  UNDP  stimulated 
some  $19  billion  worth  of  followup 
investment  activity.  In  natural  re- 
sources projects  alone  during  1976, 
UNDP  promoted  followup  investment 
valued  at  nearly  $1.4  billion.  This  in- 
cluded some  $256  million  in  opportuni- 
ties for  private  sector  investment, 
mostly  undertaken  by  private  firms 
from  the  United  States. 


49 

UNDP  has  helped  to  uncover  $20 
billion  worth  of  mineral  deposits  for 
the  benefit  not  only  of  the  developing 
nations,  where  most  sites  are  located, 
but  also  of  mineral  consumer  countries 
like  the  United  States.  The  discoveries 
include  100  million  tons  of  bauxite  in 
the  South  Pacific,  a  copper  belt  that 
stretches  from  Yugoslavia  to  Pakistan, 
and  a  vein  containing  40  billion  tons  of 
iron  ore  in  the  mountains  of  Bolivia. 
And  while  it  is  promoting  the  economic 
development  of  poor  nations  around  the 
world,  the  UNDP  is,  in  fact,  spending 
in  excess  of  $100  million  in  the  United 
States  each  year  in  fellowships  to  citi- 
zens of  other  nations  for  study  or  train- 
ing here,  in  contracts  with  United 
States  consulting  firms,  for  employ- 
ment of  American  experts,  for  equip- 
ment purchases,  and  for  headquarters 
expenses. 

America's  chief  interest  is  in  support 
of  programs  that  benefit  the  entire 
membership  of  the  U.N.  Educational, 
Scientific  and  Cultural  Organization 
(UNESCO).  But  UNESCO  makes 
countless  contributions  to  this  country. 
In  recent  years  these  have  gone  virtu- 
ally unnoticed  in  the  face  of  congres- 
sional attacks,  the  cutoff  of  U.S.  funds 
in  violation  of  our  treaty  agreements, 
and  reduced  public  support  in  this 
country  because  of  some  admittedly 
misguided  resolutions  in  UNESCO 
meetings,  mainly  dealing  with  Israel. 

I  need  not  recount  the  domestic  im- 
pact of  UNESCO  before  this  audience 
or  the  reasons  that  the  United  States 
needs  to  remain  a  fully  active  member 
and  supporter,  but  brief  mention  of  a 
few  items,  I  think,  will  serve  as  a  use- 
ful reminder. 

Probably  the  most  important  area  is 
science.  America  derives  benefits  and 
opportunities  that  would  be  available 
only  at  far  greater  expense  and  effort, 
if  they  were  available  at  all.  The  "Man 
and  the  Biosphere"  program  is  giving 
us  vital  information  on  management  of 
the  nation's  forests,  on  avalanche  pre- 
diction in  the  Rocky  Mountains,  and  on 
reduction  of  the  encroachment  of  desert 
areas  in  the  southwest.  Other  scientific 
programs  are  providing  assistance  in 
earthquake  prediction,  which  will  be  of 
vital  benefit  to  our  Western  States,  re- 
search on  the  protection  of  ocean  re- 
sources, and  on  the  identification  of 
economically  exploitable  foreign 
sources  of  minerals  of  which  we  are  a 
major  importer. 

UNESCO  also  provides  American 
scientists  with  information  and  oppor- 
tunities that  enable  them  to  maintain 
leadership  in  their  fields,  as  well  as  to 
help  shape  the  conditions  for  interna- 
tional exchange  of  information  in  the 
future.  Indeed,  for  the  25%  input  that 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


America  makes  to  UNESCO's  budget, 
we  get  access  to  100%  of  the  research 
output  of  its  scientific  bodies.  We  must 
recall  that  only  a  minority  share  of  the 
world's  nondefense  basic  research  is 
now  done  within  the  United  States,  so 
we  very  much  need  as  many  scientific 
ties  to  the  rest  of  the  world  as  possible. 

On  the  cultural  side,  the  Smithsonian 
Institution — and  thus  all  of  the  Ameri- 
can people — has  been  a  major  benefi- 
ciary of  UNESCO  facilities  for  the 
exchange  of  cultural  property.  And 
UNESCO's  work  in  preserving  and  re- 
storing elements  of  man's  natural  and 
cultural  heritage,  such  as  the  Nubian 
monuments  in  Egypt,  will  enable  future 
generations  of  Americans — the  scien- 
tist, the  educator,  and  the  ordinary 
citizen — to  visit,  enjoy,  and  learn  from 
these  important  factors  in  mankind's 
historical  development. 

On  the  educational  side,  a  notable 
element  of  American  benefit  is  present 
right  here  in  Detroit  at  Wayne  State 
University.  At  the  request  of  Wayne 
State,  UNESCO  last  year  sent  a  mis- 
sion of  specialists  in  university  educa- 
tion for  adults  to  conduct  a  study  which 
focused  on  Wayne  State's  weekend  col- 
lege program.  The  impact  of  the  study 
will  extend  far  beyond  Wayne  State, 
but  the  university  here  will  be  the  prin- 
cipal beneficiary  of  the  work. 

In  sum,  our  participation  in  UN- 
ESCO proves  the  fallacy  of  ethnocen- 
tric tendencies  which  seem  to  appear 
all  too  frequently  in  our  society. 
America  does  not  have  all  the  answers 
to  all  the  world's  problems,  even  to 
our  own  problems.  We  do  have  much 
to  learn  from  other  nations,  in  many 
areas,  and  UNESCO  is  helping  us  do 
so. 

Let  us  remember  also  areas  of  the 
U.N.  system  which  we  take  for  granted 
but  which  touch  us  all  everyday — the 
mail,  the  telephone  and  telegraph  sys- 
tem, and  international  radio  and  TV. 
The  functioning  of  these  systems  may 
seem  relatively  automatic  to  the  man  in 
the  street,  but  complex  international  ar- 
rangements are  needed  to  make  them 
happen.  The  Universal  Postal  Union 
(UPU)  and  the  International  Tele- 
graph Union  (ITU),  both  U.N.  agen- 
cies, are  what  make  this  possible. 
Direct  television  broadcasts  of  the 
dramatic  Begin-Sadat  meetings  in 
Jerusalem  in  November,  beamed  not 
just  here  but  all  over  the  world,  were 
possible  in  part  because  of  the  exist- 
ence of  an  agreed  upon  international 
system  of  frequency  allocations  and 
broadcast  standards  and  regulations 
that  are  set  up  by  the  ITU. 
Americans — as  the  world's  greatest 
users  of  international  mail,  telephone, 
telegraph,  radio,  and  television — get 


ample  benefits  for  the  minimal  amounts 
that  we  invest. 

Weather  is  also  something  we  take 
for  granted,  and  we  tend  to  assume 
there  is  not  very  much  we  can  do  about 
it.  But  the  World  Weather  Watch,  op- 
erated by  the  U.N.'s  World 
Meteorological  Organization 
(WMO),  is  providing  important  data 
for  U.S.  meteorological,  hydrological, 
and  ocean-related  services.  Through 
the  World  Weather  Watch,  the  U.S. 
Weather  Bureau  has  been  able  to  dou- 
ble the  amount  of  data  it  has  available 
to  predict  whether  rain  will  fall  or 
storms  will  strike.  One  result,  for  U.S. 
aviation,  is  better  route  forecasting  for 
trans-Atlantic  and  trans-Pacific  flights, 
and  that  means  fewer  accidents  and 
more  comfortable  flights.  Another  re- 
sult, for  U.S.  shipping,  is  wind  and 
wave  analyses  that  provide  forecasts  of 
minimuni-time-and-distance  for  spe- 
cific voyages.  And  another  result,  for 
all  of  us,  is  a  vastly  improved  ability  to 
prepare  for  approaching  weather 
problems — severe  winters  in  the  East, 
droughts  in  the  West,  and  similar  prob- 
lems all  over  the  world — and  to  avert 
what  could  be  genuine  disasters.  This 
means  fewer  lives  lost,  fewer  crops 
destroyed. 

The  scientific  research  of  the  WMO 
is  also  providing  us  with  important  in- 
formation about  long-term  climate 
change,  which  is  essential  to  future 
U.S.  agriculture  and  other  economic 
activity,  as  well  as  information  on  at- 
mospheric pollution  and  the  status  of 
the  highly  important  ozone  layer. 

The  U.N.  Environmental  Program 
(UNEP)  has  begun  development  of  a 
global  environmental  monitoring  sys- 
tem which  will  assess  critical  environ- 
mental factors  on  a  worldwide  basis. 
And  UNEP's  worldwide  surveillance 
system  called  Earthwatch  is  using  a 
network  of  national  and  international 
programs  to  check  on  conditions  and 
changes  in  our  environment,  including 
pollution  of  air  and  water  in  this  coun- 
try. This  may  enable  mankind  to  avoid 
making  the  kind  of  serious  environmen- 
tal mistakes  from  which  there  is  no 
recovery. 

As  airline  hijacking  continues  to  get 
prominence  and  to  endanger  the  lives 
of  not  only  Americans  but  citizens  of 
all  nations,  the  importance  to  us  of  the 
U.N.'s  International  Civil  Aviation 
Organization  (ICAO)  increases.  U.S. 
flag  carriers  account  for  nearly  half  of 
all  international  air  traffic.  Americans 
travel  more  than  any  other  people  in 
the  world.  And  the  United  States  man- 
ufactures much  of  the  world's  civil  avi- 
ation fleet.  The  role  of  ICAO  is,  there- 
fore, highly  vital  to  us.  Largely  at  U.S. 
initiative,  ICAO  has  persuaded  member 


states  to  upgrade  security  at  interna- 
tional airports  in  order  to  reduce  ter- 
rorism. It  is  also  promoting  interna- 
tional standards  on  control  of  aircraft 
noise  and  on  pollution  from  aircraft 
engines. 

Also,  ICAO  is  about  to  make  a  deci- 
sion on  worldwide  standards  for  the 
microwave  landing  system,  which  will 
provide  increased  safety  for  aircraft 
landing  in  adverse  weather.  This  deci- 
sion could  result  in  major  equipment 
exports  for  the  United  States,  and  our 
continued  involvement  here  is  highly 
vital. 

In  maritime  affairs,  the  United  States 
is  the  world's  largest  generator  of 
oceanborne  traffic,  and  it  has  more 
than  12,000  miles  of  coastline.  As  a  re- 
sult, the  United  States  receives  substan- 
tial benefit  from  its  participation  in  the 
U.N.'s  Inter-Governmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization  (IMCO), 
even  though  it  pays  only  4.09%  ol 
IMCO's  costs.  Each  year  more  thar 
1-1/3  million  tons  of  oil  are  discharged 
or  spilled  into  the  oceans  of  the 
world — 85%  of  it  intentionally — and 
IMCO  is  working  to  develop  new  con- 
ventions which  will  prohibit  these  dis- 
charges. Since  there  is  no  way  that  the 
United  States  could  unilaterally  control 
or  prevent  such  discharges  that  occui 
on  the  high  seas,  we  must  recognize 
that  it  is  only  through  an  international  or 
ganization  which  includes  all  of  the 
ship-operating  countries  that  effective 
standards  can  be  accepted  anc 
enforced. 

The  World  Health  Organizatior 
(WHO)  has  made  phenomenal  progress 
in  combating  disease  in  other  nations. 
After  a  10-year  campaign,  it  is  neai 
total  victory  over  smallpox  and  hopes 
to  eradicate  it  completely  in  the  coming 
months.  Although  smallpox  has  beer 
virtually  unknown  in  this  country  foi 
many  years,  this  dramatic  development 
has  great  significance  to  the  United 
States.  WHO  spent  about  $95  million 
in  this  10-year  effort  to  eliminate 
smallpox.  In  comparison,  the  United 
States  used  to  spend  SI 20  million  each 
year  simply  for  smallpox  surveillance, 
vaccinations,  and  quarantine  measures. 
With  the  eradication  of  smallpox, 
routine  vaccinations  are  no  longer  re- 
quired, and  the  United  States  is  realiz- 
ing significant  financial  savings. 

WHO  has  also  established  a 
worldwide  network  to  warn  against  the 
outbreak  of  flu  and  other  contagious 
diseases.  It  has  undertaken  a  major 
study  in  India  to  prove  that  tuberculosis 
patients  can  be  ambulatory  and  need 
not  be  confined  in  hospitals  and 
sanitoria;  the  result  will  be  large  sav- 
ings in  all  nations,  including  this  one. 
And  WHO  is  doing  important  work 


-ebruarv  1978 


51 


in    cancer    and    on    cardiovascular 
esearch. 

Health  care  is  one  of  those  areas 
vhcre  we  tend  to  believe  that  America 
las  nothing  to  learn.  We  spend  pheno- 
nenal  amounts  of  money  on  health 
are— in  1976  a  total  of  $132  billion, 
ir  more  than  $600  per  person.  We  have 
I  physician-to-population  ratio  of  ap- 
•roximately  1  to  700,  when  the  world 
atio  is  1  to  50.000.  Yet  America  still 
ags  behind  many  countries  in  terms  of 
iverall  health  status.  In  infant  mortal- 
ly, we  have  only  the  16th  place  among 
eveloped  nations.  Our  life  expectancy 
s  lower  than  that  in  14  other  countries. 
,ife  expectancy  for  residents  of  the 
)istrict  of  Columbia  is  actually  lower 
nan  for  residents  of  Sri  Lanka,  a  coun- 
-y  with  a  per  capita  income  of  less 
lan  $200  a  year.  What  this  tells  us  is 
lat  we  do  indeed  have  much  to  learn 
"om  the  experience  of  other  nations, 
nd  our  participation  in  the  World 
lealth  Organization  is  helping  us  do 
ist  that. 

Also  in  the  health  field,  it  is  worth 
oting  that  the  International  Labor 
Organization,  which  we  have  just  left, 
;  developing,  at  the  request  of  the 
'.S.  Department  of  Labor,  an  interna- 
onal  health  hazard  alert  system  which 
'ill  facilitate  the  issuance  of  interna- 
onal  warnings  about  newly  discovered 
ccupational  hazards  and  to  collect  in- 
irmation  on  techniques  dealing  with 
ach  problem.  Despite  our  withdrawal, 
'c  intend  to  continue  our  cooperation 
ecause  it  is  in  our  interests. 

And  while  the  chief  focus  of  the 
cod  and  Agriculture  Organization 
FAO)  is  on  stimulating  agricultural 
evelopment  and  alleviating  food 
lortages  in  other  nations,  much  of  its 
'ork  also  has  favorable  impact  on  the 
'nited  States.  It  has  an  early  warning 
/stem  that  uses  remote  sensing  and 
round  contacts  to  give  information  on 
npending  crop  and  food  shortages, 
he  FAO's  Codex  Alimentarius  Com- 
lission  is  the  only  international  body 
Jtting  criteria  for  fish  products  and  is 
specially  important  to  the  United 
tates  as  a  nation  which  imports 
0-80%  of  the  fish  it  consumes.  The 
AO's  research  work  in  tropical  forest- 
/  may  be  of  critical  importance  to  us 
1  the  mid- 1980 "s  when  America's  de- 
land  for  forestry  products  is  expected 
)  outstrip  our  productive  capacity. 

Contributions  of  U.N.  Agencies 

Finally,  there  are  three  general  con- 
ibutions  of  the  U.N.  agencies  across 
lie  board  which  are  of  great  impor- 
ince  to  the  U.S. 

One  is  the  current  work  on  codes  of 
mdmt  which  will  affect  many  aspects 


of  American  private  enterprise.  Among 
the  various  U.N.  forums,  codes  are 
being  developed  with  topics  ranging 
from  multinational  corporations  to 
technology.  UNESCO,  as  you  know,  is 
circulating  a  draft  code  on  the  use  of 
the  mass  media,  and  it  currently  raises 
important  questions  about  possible  in- 
trusions on  the  independence  of  the 
mass  media.  In  all  of  these  instances, 
America's  energetic  participation  is  es- 
sential. We  need  to  be  present  to  pro- 
tect our  interests. 

The  second  general  product  is  the 
highly  valuable  information,  statistics, 
and  documents  which  flow  out  of  virtu- 
ally all  of  the  U.N.  agencies.  The  U.N. 
agencies  are  able  to  gather  information 
around  the  world  without  the  impedi- 
ment of  national  sponsorship,  and  it  is 
data  which  simply  would  not  otherwise 
be  available  to  researchers  in  this  coun- 
try or  anywhere  else.  The  U.N.'s 
Statistical  Office  produces  materials 
that  are  invaluable  to  U.S.  scholars,  to 
the  government,  and  to  many  private 
sector  agencies.  They  include  a 
monthly  bulletin  of  statistics,  a  statisti- 
cal yearbook,  a  demographic  yearbook, 
a  yearbook  of  national  accounts  statis- 
tics, a  yearbook  of  industrial  statistics, 
a  compendium  of  housing  statistics, 
and  much  more.  An  appreciation  of  the 
effectiveness  of  UNESCO's  programs 
in  exchanging  information  can  be 
gained  from  the  fact  that  they  generated 
$140  million  in  book  and  journal  sales 
in  the  United  States  alone  from  1949  to 
1970. 

And  the  third  major  product  is  the 
overall  contribution  to  international 
cooperation  and  the  reduction  of  ten- 
sions that  results  from  the  individual 
programs  of  the  U.N.  agencies.  This  is 
a  product  that  is  hard  to  measure.  But 
by  bringing  together  educators,  scien- 
tists, cultural  leaders,  development  ex- 
perts, economists,  professionals  in 
many  fields,  and  government  leaders  of 
many  nations,  the  U.N.  agencies  in- 
evitably build  a  growing  global  com- 
munications network.  It  is  a  network  of 
people  who  have  learned  to  cooperate 
toward  some  shared  objective  and  who, 
in  the  process,  have  learned  much 
about  each  other  and  even  about  each 
other's  countries — removing  ster- 
eotypes and  reducing  misunderstand- 
ings. Their  national  governments  may 
even  be  unfriendly,  but  on  an  indi- 
vidual basis  the  participants  in  this  ac- 
tivity are  able  to  continue  to  communi- 
cate and  gradually  to  strengthen  the  ties 
between  nations  which  will  make 
armed  conflict  steadily  unthinkable. 

In  short,  I  think  we  can  all  feel  very 
good  about  America's  contributions  to 
these  agencies.  In  most  of  them  we 


play  a  leading  role.  Our  involvement 
helps  them  to  do  important  work 
which,  among  other  things,  certainly 
provides  valuable  benefits  to  the 
United  States. 

Future  Ties 

I  acknowledge  that  there  have  been 
problems  in  some  of  these  agencies, 
and  there  has  been  dismay  about  them 
in  some  quarters  here.  There  has,  of 
course,  been  introduction  of  irrelevant 
political  issues  in  agencies  that  should 
be  kept  immune  from  those  consid- 
erations. All  of  us  need  to  keep  in  mind 
that  this  type  of  politicization  generally 
takes  place  only  in  the  once-a-year 
meetings  of  the  general  conferences  of 
these  agencies;  for  most  of  each  year, 
these  agencies  continue  to  carry  out 
their  important  substantive  respon- 
sibilities. Nevertheless,  we  will  all 
keep  working  to  reduce  and  eliminate 
this  phenomenon  of  unnecessary 
politicization,  and  I  would  note  that  we 
have  made  significant  progress  in  the 
last  18  months.  In  many  instances  we 
are  being  helped  by  other  nations.  And 
the  secretariats  of  many  of  the  agencies 
are  making  outstanding  efforts  to  keep 
the  organizations  focused  on  the  sub- 
stantive issues  which  they  were  in- 
tended to  pursue. 

We  are  also  working  to  strengthen 
the  management  of  those  agencies 
which  are  undergoing  some  of  the  trad- 
itional problems  of  rapid  growth  and 
hew  responsibilities.  When  the  agen- 
cies were  young  and  the  budgets  were 
small,  there  may  have  been  less  moti- 
vation to  pursue  sound  management 
techniques.  But  we  are  now  talking 
about  big  business,  big  budgets,  big 
payrolls.  The  "big  four"  agencies — 
ILO,  UNESCO,  FAO,  and  WHO— in 
1976  had  assessed  budgets  totaling  in 
excess  of  $400  million,  and  they  also 
had  sizable  inputs  through  special  pro- 
grams and  voluntary  contributions.  In 
the  early  days  of  the  United  Nations — 
in  1947 — the  total  budget  for  all  pur- 
poses was  $124  million.  In  1976  it  was 
nearly  $2.5  billion.  With  that  kind  of 
funding,  the  United  Nations  has  the 
capacity  for  major  impact,  and  indeed 
it  has  become  a  significant  force  in  the 
world's  developmental  process. 

As  a  result  of  that  growing  financial 
capability,  the  nations  which  have  pro- 
vided the  most  support  have  begun  to 
look  more  insistently  at  management 
improvements  and  effective  work  pro- 
ducers. Nearly  89%  of  the  financing  of 
the  United  Nations  is  provided  by  only 
27  countries,  just  17%  of  the  member- 
ship. In  the  specialized  agencies 
financing  arrangements  are  similar. 
These  are  the  governments  that  have 


52 


the  greatest  stake  in  the  orderly  man- 
agement of  the  international  system 
which  the  United  Nations  promotes, 
and  they  want  to  know  and  have  a  right 
to  know  how  their  funds  are  being 
spent. 

For  this  reason  we  are  working  to 
promote  greater  coordination  among 
the  various  agencies  in  order  to 
minimize  wasteful  duplication  of  effort 
and  potential  overlap.  We  are  seeking 
to  improve  systems  of  planning,  budg- 
eting, and  evaluation  to  strengthen 
personnel  management  and  to  effect 
various  other  reforms.  We  are  urging 
improvements  in  these  agencies  pre- 
cisely because  we  care  about  them  very 
deeply.  And  we  intend  to  keep  working 
in  that  direction. 

These  agencies  provide  the  United 
States  with  a  tremendous  opportunity 
for  leadership  in  foreign  affairs  fields 
where  it  is  important  that  we  maintain  a 
central  policy  voice.  Although  it  is 
true,  as  I  hope  I  have  shown,  that  we 
derive  substantial  direct  benefits  from 
the  United  Nations  system,  our  chief 
reason  for  participating  in  United  Na- 
tions agencies  is  not  these  immediate 
benefits;  rather,  it  is  the  vital  opportu- 
nity for  leadership. 

Thus  our  involvement  helps  us  to  in- 
sure that  America's  foreign  policy 
goals  are  achieved  in  the  most  practical 
way.  Our  involvement  provides  us  with 
the  flexibility  to  use  either  bilateral  or 
multilateral  approaches  to  important 
issues — or  both,  depending  on  which  is 
most  appropriate.  Our  involvement  en- 
ables us  to  insure  that  the  components 
of  the  international  system  evolve  in  a 
way  that  is  compatible  with  our  system 


of  government,  our  moral  standards, 
and  our  place  of  leadership  in  the 
world.  Our  involvement  enables  us  to 
influence  developments  in  areas  that 
are  central  to  our  political  and  eco- 
nomic well-being  and  that  will  have  in- 
creasing impact  on  us  as  the  world 
grows  more  and  more  interdependent 
with  the  passage  of  time. 

A  major  challenge  before  us  now  is 
to  persuade  the  American  public  and 
the  Congress  of  the  continued  vitality 
and  importance  of  these  agencies  and 
programs.  The  President  is  very  in- 
terested in  this  task.  He  has  instructed 
the  members  of  his  Cabinet  to  help  in 
the  process  of  explaining  these  benefits 
to  the  American  public.  But  we  need 
the  help  of  private  citizens  too.  We 
need  the  help  of  you  in  the  U.S.  Na- 
tional Commission  for  UNESCO,  the 
World  Affairs  Council  chapters,  the 
United  Nations  Association  chapters, 
and  other  influential  people  in  other 
organizations  which  are  interested  in 
the  role  that  America  plays  in  these 
organizations. 

It  is  only  with  your  help  that  we  will 
be  able  to  play  the  leadership  role  that 
others  expect  us,  as  a  great  power,  to 
assume.  It  is  only  with  your  help  that 
we  can  succeed  in  maximizing  the  ef- 
fectiveness of  the  U.N.  system  and  its 
contributions  to  us  all.  D 


'  Address  before  the  U.S.  National  Commis- 
sion for  UNESCO  in  Detroit  on  Dec.  8,  1977: 
Mr.  Maynes  is  Assistant  Secretary  for  Interna- 
tional Organization  Affairs. 

-  For  text  of  President  Carter's  statement  on 
the  termination  of  U.S.  membership,  see  Bul- 
letin of  Dec    26,  1977.  p.  912. 


Assessment  of 
32d  (/.]¥•  General  Assembly 


by  Andrew  Young^ 

I  am  pleased  to  say  that  1  believe  we 
have  achieved  an  important  and  hope- 
ful shift  in  the  development  of  the 
General  Assembly.  We  are  drawing  to 
a  close  what  has  been,  in  many  ways, 
the  most  constructive  session  in  many 
years.  In  this  General  Assembly  we 
have  seen  a  clearer  consensus  of  the 
concerned  emerge  to  replace  some  of 
the  politics  of  frustration  which  seemed 
often  to  drive  the  work  of  the  Assembly 
in  the  past. 

This  year  we  all  saw  an  obvious 
change  of  mood,  a  sign  that  all  of  our 
governments  and  delegates  are  begin- 
ning to  question  the  value  of  the  slo- 


gans and  cliches  which  have  governed 
their  activities  so  often  during  the  past 
several  years.  I  sense  an  increasing 
agreement  that  slogans  lead  nowhere, 
that  purely  political  and  tactical  ma- 
neuvers in  isolation  from  the  substance 
not  only  are  wasteful  and  damaging  to 
this  institution  but  they  engender  un- 
productive confrontation  which  inhibits 
progress  toward  solution  of  the  crucial 
problems  of  mankind. 

In  short,  this  has  been  a  good  As- 
sembly. It  may  even  have  been  histori- 
cally important  because  of  progress  on 
.several  fronts  but  mainly  because  of 
this  new  will  to  talk  together  about  re- 
solving our  common  problems.  This  is 
a  solid  record  that  my  government  val- 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 

ues  highly  and  a  record  that  I  intend  to 
convey  to  the  American  people  in  the 
months  ahead. 


Middle  East 

What  has  this  Assembly  accom- 
plished, and  why  did  this  occur? 

First,  let  us  turn  to  the  area  where 
the  United  Nations  has.  for  30  years, 
borne  special  responsibilities  for  main- 
taining peace  and  security — the  Middk 
East.  This  fall  we  saw  in  Presiden 
Sadat's  visit  to  Jerusalem  one  of  tht 
most  courageous  moves  in  the  histor) 
of  modem  diplomacy.  His  action,  anc 
the  response  of  Prime  Minister  Begin 
have  created  an  unprecedented  oppor 
tunity.  Their  visit  demonstrated  the 
profound  desire  for  peace  by  people: 
who  have  undergone  the  devastation  o 
four  tragic  wars. 

On  most  other  issues  this  fall,  thi: 
Assembly  gave  the  impression  of  beinj 
closely  conscious  of,  and  relevant  to 
real  events.  But  resolutions  which  wen 
adopted  in  the  Middle  East  tended  t( 
reflect  the  unhelpful  rhetoric  of  the  pas 
rather  than  the  refreshing  and  hopefu 
developments  of  the  present.  Then 
seemed  a  very  real  possibility  that  thi 
world  was  passing  the  United  Nation 
by. 

In  all  fairness,  1  think  that  the  dele 
gates  and  their  governments  may  hav 
sometimes  found  it  difficult,  becaus 
of  the  swift  pace  of  developments,  t 
reflect  in  New  York  the  dynamic  ne\ 
possibilities  for  progress  in  the  Middl 
East. 

Despite  the  unreality  of  some  o 
these  debates,  the  role  of  the  Unitei 
Nations  as  an  institution  in  Middle  Eas 
affairs  remained  important  and  con 
structive.  We  must  all  keep  this  i 
mind,  as  Prime  Minister  Begin  dii 
when  he  called  on  the  Secretary  Gen 
eral  to  discuss  the  contribution  thi 
United  Nations  can  make  to  the  peac' 
process.  U.N.  peacekeeping  efforts  fo 
many  years  now  have  helped  provide 
the  breathing  space  which  is  necessar 
to  permit  the  parties  concerned  ti 
hammer  out  the  terribly  difficult  bu 
essential  decisions  which  must  be  takei 
if  we  are  to  have  an  enduring  peace — a 
long  last — in  the  Middle  East. 

Amidst  the  headlines  this  fall,  a  fac 
overlooked  was  that  the  Security  Coun 
cil  renewed  without  controversy  thi 
mandate  of  the  Disengagement  Ob 
server  Force  in  the  Middle  East,  . 
process  that  in  the  past  has  beei 
drawn-out  and  painful.  Nor  did  thi 
world  or  the  media  focus  on  the  fac 
that  General  Assembly  approval  o 
funding  for  the  Middle  East  peacekeep 
ing  efforts  this  year,  in  contrast  to  th( 
past,  was  routine  and  noncontroversial 


-ebruary  1978 

Nor  did  the  public  place  sufficient 
mponance  on  the  U.N.  role  this  fall  in 
jnabling  intensive  consultations  to  take 
jlace  among  the  leaders  of  the  govern- 
nents  principally  concerned  with  a 
Vliddle  East  settlement.  This  included 
he  opportunity  for  U.S.  and  Soviet 
'oreign  ministers  to  further  their  talks 
on  this  subject. 

All  of  these  developments  helped 
)repare  the  way  for  the  kind  of  agree- 
nents  on  meaningful  measures  which 
ire  required  for  the  ultimate  settlement 
ve  all  desire  in  the  Middle  East. 


touthern  Africa 

An  important  part  of  the  new  atmos- 
iihere  in  this  General  Assembly  was 
ngendered  by  what  my  government 
onsiders  to  be  significant  movement 
if  the  U.N.  community  toward  a  new 
legree  of  consensus  on  the  common 
;oals  in  the  southern  African  issues.  I 
m  proud  that  my  government  and  the 
neople  of  the  United  States  have  drawn 
loser  in  association  and  cooperation 
/ith  our  African  friends. 

The  world  community  is  virtually 
nanimous  in  its  support  for  the  goals 
f  liberation  of  the  people  in  southern 
ifrica.  There  are  few  who  would  reject 
lie  work  that  has  been  launched  to 
uarantee  freedom,  independence,  and 
elf-rule  for  all  of  the  people  of  this  re- 
ion.  My  government  is  committed  to 
lis  monumental  task. 

In  Rhodesia  we  have  been  sharply 
ware  of  the  breathing  room  granted 
le  U.K. -U.S.  effort  by  the  way  the 
leneral  Assembly  treated  this  problem 
1  all  its  debates,  in  committee  as  well 
s  plenary.  We  also  understand  and  ac- 
ept  the  significance  of  the  postpone- 
lent  of  further  debate  in  the  Security 
.'ouncil. 

The  tragic  actions  of  the  Government 
f  South  Africa  this  fall  sparked  a  justi- 
iable  explosion  of  protest  from  around 
ne  world  that  found  its  expression  in 
nis  Organization  through  the  unani- 
lous  decision  of  the  Security  Council  to 
mpose  mandatory  sanctions  on  South 
vfrica — the  first  time  sanctions  under 
hapter  VII  of  the  charter  have  been 
mposed  on  a  member  state  of  the 
Jnited  Nations.  This  was  a  true  con- 
ensus.  It  was  an  historic  step  forward 
ly  the  United  Nations  in  its  long  effort 
0  achieve  freedom  and  human  dignity 
..n  Africa. 


i 


economic  and  Social  Issues 

On  economic  and  social  issues,  we 
>ave  reached  two  important  milestones 
ooted  in  consensus.  We  have  achieved 
greement  on  a  mechanism  to  oversee 
he  continuing  dialogue  between  the 


industrialized  and  the  developing  na- 
tions. Many  thought  we  would  not  be 
able  to  come  to  terms  on  even  the  pro- 
cedure for  carrying  on  this  dialogue — 
for  we  had  failed  numerous  times  in  the 
past — but  we  were  able  to  carry  it  off. 

In  addition,  after  a  2-year  study  on 
restructuring  of  the  economic  and  so- 
cial functions  of  the  United  Nations, 
we  reached  agreement  on  some  highly 
significant  changes  that  should  clearly 
improve  the  efficiency  and  effective- 
ness of  these  operations  and  insure  that 
the  delivery  of  services  of  the  U.N. 
agencies  to  the  world's  poor  is  greatly 
enhanced. 

We  have  also  made  some  progress  on 
human  rights.  This  was  the  Assembly 
at  which  the  President  of  the  United 
States  signed  the  International  Cove- 
nants on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights  and  Civil  and  Political  Rights.  It 
was  the  Assembly  at  which  broad  co- 
sponsorship  of  the  proposal  to  create 
the  position  of  High  Commissioner  for 
Human  Rights  reflected  support  in 
most  geographic  regions,  even  though 
ultimate  passage  was  not  possible  this 
year.  This  was  also  the  Assembly  at 
which  delegations  from  a  number  of 
regions  made  significant  human  rights 
proposals.  I  think  we  have  taken  impor- 
tant steps  toward  achievement  of  more 
awareness  and  agreement  on  action  in 
this  sensitive  but  critical  field  than  we 
have  ever  had.  At  the  same  time,  we 
have  much  work  to  do. 


Arms  Control 

One  of  the  most  encouraging  things 
about  this  fall's  General  Assembly  was 
the  extent  of  agreement  we  reached  on 
arms  control  issues. 

On  a  comprehensive  test  ban,  for 
example,  the  key  resolution  com- 
manded very  broad  support — not  only 
from  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United 
States  but  also  from  almost  all  of  the 
nonnuclear  nations. 

On  nonproliferation,  there  was  a 
genuine  readiness  to  exchange  views 
seriously  and  to  develop  an  acceptable 
resolution  that  recognizes  the  broad  re- 
sponsibility of  all  nations  not  to  con- 
tribute to  proliferation. 

Resolutions  calling  for  nuclear  free 
zones  in  Africa,  the  Middle  East,  and 
South  Asia  commanded  strong  accept- 
ance, and  my  government  was  pleased 
to  be  able  to  support  them.  And  both 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviets  were 
to  vote  for  a  resolution  endorsing  goals 
in  the  Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks. 

The  action  of  this  Assembly  in 
adopting  by  consensus — I  emphasize 
by  consensus — a  resolution  on  aircraft 
hijacking  was  a  particularly  significant 
achievement  of  this  session,  making 


53 

the  world's  airways  safer  for  peoples  of 
all  nations. 

In  addition,  this  fall  negotiations  in 
the  United  Nations  have  made  substan- 
tial progress  toward  establishing  a  joint 
committee  on  missing  persons  in  Cy- 
prus, a  positive  indication  that  there  is 
willingness  on  both  sides  to  resolve 
differences  through  negotiation. 

We  have  taken  steps  to  support  the 
important  recommendations  of  the  In- 
ternational Civil  Service  Commission 
for  improvements  in  the  staffing  of  the 
United  Nations.  We  have  expanded  the 
U.N.  membership  as  we  work  toward  the 
ultimate  goal  of  universality.  We 
reached  a  consensus  resolution  on 
Guam  and  avoided  the  confrontational 
resolutions  of  the  past.  We  have  even 
taken  radical  steps  to  curb  first-class  air 
travel  for  all  U.N.  employees  below 
the  level  of  the  Secretary  General 
himself. 


Positive  Assembly  Record 

The  reasons  for  this  quite  positive 
record  are  many.  I  do  not  need  to  recite 
them  to  delegates  here,  but  I  believe  it 
is  particularly  important  for  people  out- 
side this  body  to  focus  on  them. 

First,  1  think,  is  the  emerging 
agreement  that  the  time  for  oppor- 
tunism on  many  issues  before  the 
United  Nations  is  passing.  The  issues 
are  too  pressing,  the  dangers  too  great. 
This  year's  Assembly  gives  us  more 
hope  that  this  body  has  taken  a  new  and 
positive  course.  While  we  clearly  can- 
not agree  on  all  precise  policy  prescrip- 
tions, there  is  growing  agreement  that 
it  is  incumbent  on  all  of  us  to  advance 
serious  proposals  for  dealing  with  criti- 
cal issues. 

Second,  there  is,  I  believe  growing 
agreement  among  members  that  the  de- 
veloped and  the  developing  countries 
have  fundamental,  long-term  interests 
that  converge  more  often  than  they  di- 
verge. In  my  own  country,  for  exam- 
ple, changes  of  policy  have  resulted  in 
deeper  interest  in  the  problems  of 
southern  Africa,  progress  on  a  Panama 
Canal  treaty,  renewed  concern  about 
human  rights,  and  closer  relations  with 
many  countries  in  the  developing 
world.  There  are  differences,  to  be 
sure,  and  some  are  hard  to  bridge.  But 
for  all  nations — large  and  small — it  is 
increasingly  absurd  to  refuse  to  recog- 
nize the  impact  we  all  have  on  one 
another. 

On  economic  issues,  for  example, 
my  country,  which  has  historically 
been  oriented  toward  our  industrialized 
trading  partners,  now  finds  that  the  de- 
veloping nations  constitute  its  fastest 
growing  markets  and  continue  to  be  a 
prime  source  of  many  of  its  raw  mate- 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


rials.  So  we  find  that  all  regions  are  of 
growing  importance  to  America's  wel- 
fare and  interests. 

In  turn,  the  developing  countries  are 
finding  that  the  industrialized  societies 
offer  indispensable  markets,  needed 
capital,  and  vital  technical  assistance. 
Increasingly,  we  have  to  understand 
jointly  that  our  task  is  not  to  pressure 
one  another — both  sides,  after  all,  are 
quite  capable  of  resisting  pressure — but 
to  find  a  much  better  process  to  help 
both  sides  to  discern  and  develop  their 
common  interests  in  cooperation.  This 
is  why  the  agreement  of  this  Assembly 
to  an  overview  mechanism  for  the 
North-South  dialogue  is  so  critical. 

Third — and  this  will  be  disputed  by 
some,  although  I  strongly  believe  it  is 
true — we  are  moving  toward  a  more 
widely  shared  set  of  common  values 
and  interests.  Thirty  years  ago,  few  in 
the  developed  world  cared  one  way  or 
the  other  about  economic  or  social 
conditions  in  the  developing  nations.  In 
that  period,  few  in  the  developing 
countries  realized  that  internal  domes- 
tic policies  of  the  industrialized  coun- 
tries could  have  such  significant  impact 
on  economic  conditions  in  their  own 
faraway  lands.  Today  there  is  an  in- 
tense international  debate  about  the 
best  means  for  achieving  a  new  interna- 
tional economic  order  which  will  be 
more  just  and  healthy.  Two  questions 
is  not  whether  we  should  do  this,  but 
how . 

Fourth — and  the  world  largely  ig- 
nores this — effective  new  forms  of  de- 
cisionmaking have  been  employed  in 
compiling  our  record  at  this  General 
Assembly.  One  is  the  important  de- 
velopment of  small-group  techniques  of 
reaching  agreement  on  potentially  divi- 
sive issues.  So-called  contact  groups, 
consisting  of  representatives  of  the  var- 
ious interest  groups  or  "friends  of  the 
chairmen"  of  larger  committees,  have 
been  able  to  make  important  progress 
in  informal  sessions. 

The  other  major  procedural  tech- 
nique that  deserves  mention  is  that  of 
consensus  decisionmaking.  The  public 
tends  to  focus  on  disagreements  among 
us,  but  over  the  past  2  years  about  63% 
of  the  decisions  in  the  General  Assem- 
bly have  been  taken  by  consensus.  Al- 
though important  differences  are  some- 
times inappropriately  covered  over  by 
consensus  decisions,  in  most  cases  the 
differences  have  been  so  narrowed  by 
intensive  negotiation  and  debate  that  it 
is  not  even  necessary  to  take  a  vote  on 
these  issues.  Consensus  decisions  dur- 
ing the  current  Assembly  have,  I  be- 
lieve, been  even  more  frequent  than 
last  year. 

If  we  are  striking  a  more  construc- 
tive and  cooperative  tone  in  the  con- 


duct of  our  deliberations  here,  1  do  not 
mean  to  suggest  that  we  be  complacent. 
We  have  a  difficult  agenda  facing  us  in 
the  12  months  ahead. 

The  Future  Agenda 

On  the  vital  issues  of  maintaining  the 
peace,  first  of  all,  we  must  keep  the 
momentum  going.  Almost  all  of  us 
agree  that  the  time  is  right  for  move- 
ment. We  must  maintain  that  consen- 
sus, and  this  is  only  possible  by  con- 
tinuing our  efforts  to  clarify  the  issues 
and  achieve  agreements  on  the  prob- 
lems that  threaten  us  all. 

In  the  Middle  East,  let  us  build  on 
the  historic  steps  already  taken,  aban- 
don destructive  positions,  and  seize  an 
unprecedented  opportunity  for  peace. 
Let  us  set  our  minds,  in  the  interses- 
sional  months  ahead,  to  contribute  our 
ideas,  our  information,  and  our  wisdom 
in  conducting  the  affairs  of  the  United 
Nations  to  support  the  moves  toward 
peace. 

In  Cyprus,  now  that  the  parties  have 
moved  close  to  agreement  on  one  im- 
portant issue — the  committee  on  miss- 
ing persons — let  us  in  the  United  Na- 
tions maintain  the  momentum  to 
broaden  the  areas  of  agreement  and 
reach  a  lasting  settlement. 

In  Rhodesia,  the  supportive  consen- 
sus created  here  by  this  body  has  un- 
doubtedly played  a  major  role  in  bring- 
ing Ian  Smith  to  understand  that  he 
must  step  down  in  favor  of  a  legitimate 
majority  government  elected  by  the 
people  of  Zimbabwe.  We  continue  to 
believe  that  the  initiative  which  the 
United  States  has  been  pursuing  in 
support  of  the  United  Kingdom  remains 
the  best  framework  for  an  internation- 
ally acceptable  transition  to  majority 
rule.  Let  us  continue  to  work  together 
to  bring  about  the  necessary  peaceful 
conclusion  to  this  effort. 

In  Namibia,  the  five  Western  ambas- 
sadors have  just  completed  another 
round  of  talks  with  the  front  line  states, 
the  South  West  Africa  People's  Or- 
ganization, Nigeria,  and  South  Africa. 
The  differences  between  the  parties 
have  been  narrowed  considerably  over 
the  last  several  months  since  our  con- 
tact group  began  functioning.  But  the 
remaining  issues  stubbornly  resist  final 
agreement  between  the  parties.  Let  us 
continue  to  work  together  in  pursuance 
of  an  internationally  acceptable  settle- 
ment which  will  lead  to  true  self- 
determination  and  independence  for  the 
people  of  Namibia. 

In  South  Africa  itself,  let  us  build  on 
the  new  consensus — not  merely  on  the 
utter  unacceptability  of  apartheid  but 
also  on  the  need  to  convince  South  Af- 
rica to  move  in  a  progressive  direction. 


The  consensus  of  the  world  community 
is  more  solid  and  sweeping  than  ever 
before.  Let  us  make  clear  that  our  goal 
is  not  to  isolate  South  Africa  but  to  en- 
courage the  kind  of  meaningful  social 
change  that  can  bring  full  participation 
by  all  South  African  citizens  in  their 
own  governance  and  national  life. 

Next  year  we  will  mark  the  30th  an- 
niversary of  the  signing  of  the  Univer- 
sal Declaration  of  Human  Rights.  Its 
adoption  was  accomplished  at  a  ver\ 
early  stage  of  the  life  of  this  Organiza 
tion.  It  was  virtually  our  first  priorit\ 
in  those  days.  While  there  has  beer 
some  progress  in  human  rights  sinct. 
then,  we  still  have  a  long  way  to  go 
There  are  still  far  too  many  abuses.  A; 
we  mark  this  significant  anniversary 
let  us  restore  to  high  priority  this  Or 
ganization's  concern  for  human  rights 
and  let  us  resolve  that  next  year's  Gen- 
eral Assembly  will  be  a  high  point  foi 
constructive  collective  action  to  ad 
vance  this  vital  cause. 

Next  year  will  also  provide  us  with  a 
significant  opportunity  for  progress  or 
arms  control  issues.  Our  Special  Ses- 
sion on  Disarmament  next  May  anc 
June  is  unprecedented.  Never  before 
has  the  United  Nations  sponsored  ; 
gathering  of  this  magnitude  on  this  sub 
ject.  Never  before  have  we  had  i 
chance  to  concentrate  the  attention  o; 
all  nations  on  these  life-and-death  ques 
tions  in  this  way.  This  is  no  longer  ; 
concern  of  only  the  nations  of  the  Eas 
and  West:  The  developing  countries 
the  nonnuclear  countries — indeed  al 
countries — have  an  important  stake  ir 
these  discussions.  Let  us  all  pledge  tc 
work  within  our  governments  to  make  ; 
major  effort  to  bring  this  Special  Ses- 
sion successfully  to  meaningful  under- 
standings and  practical  ways  to  en- 
hance our  disarmament  goals. 

This  session  of  the  Assembly  was 
another  major  step  in  the  improved 
economic  dialogue  between  the  de- 
veloping countries  and  the  indus- 
trialized countries.  As  the  resumed  31st 
session  of  this  Assembly  ended,  just 
prior  to  the  opening  of  this  one,  it  was 
clear  to  all  that  a  major  task  would  be 
to  find  a  mutually  acceptable 
framework  for  the  continuation  of  a 
high-level  overview  of  economic  coop- 
eration within  the  U.N.  system.  The 
32d  General  Assembly  has  met  this 
challenge;  let  us  all  work  for  construc- 
tive discussions  in  the  Committee  of 
the  Whole  we  have  agreed  upon. 

For  the  United  States,  expectations 
will  be  high.  If  the  construction  of  a 
new  international  economic  order  is  to 
be  a  growing  consensus  and  not  a  ver- 
bal contest,  each  group  of  countries — 
East  and  West,  oil  producers  and  con- 
sumers, industrialized,  industrializing, 


ebruary  1978 

id  agricultural — must  explore  ways  in 
hich  change  can  be  achieved  consist- 
it  with  economic  security  for  all.  We 
low  each  others"  needs  and  concerns. 
'e  have  learned  even  more  about  them 
jring  this  Assembly.  Let  us  get  on 
ith  the  work  that  remains  to  be  done. 
In  many  areas  once  characterized  by 
isagreement,  we  have  achieved  con- 
insus.  In  others,  we  have  thus  far 
:iled. 

One  area  in   which  more  work  re- 

lains  to  be  done  relates  to  the  negotia- 

Dns  for  a  common  fund  under  the  aus- 

]ces  of  the  U.N.  Conference  on  Trade 

:id  Development.   The  suspension  of 

e  negotiations  in  Geneva  took  place 

ither  late  in  our  session;  with  so  much 

)se  under  way,  it  was  certainly  a  dif- 

l;ult  task  for  all  of  us  here  in  New 

jrk  to  provide  a  real  impetus  for  their 

I  nstructive  resumption. 

Unfortunately,  we  were  not  able  to 

lach  agreement  on  a  resolution  which 

■juld  have  facilitated  resumption  of 

le  negotiations.   As  you  know,  we 

irked  toward  a  resolution  in  the  Sec- 

(  d  Committee  last  week  that  would 

I  ve  permitted  the  negotiations  to  be 

Humed  on  a  constructive  basis.  Re- 

jitably.  it  was  not  possible  to  achieve 

iiositive  nonprejudicial  statement.  Let 

I,  therefore,  work  together  to  find  a 

'ly  to  minimize  polemics  and  to  con- 

(  ct  a  balanced  and  dispassionate 

;  cessment  of  the  important  issues  in- 

'  Ived.   We  believe  that  such  an  as- 

issment   is  necessary  before  any 

lather  progress  can  be  made. 

Let  me  mention  one  final  area  that 

urits  urgent  attention  next  year. 

The  budget  we  have  just  approved  is 

:  arly  a  30%  increase  over  that  of  the 

ht  biennium.  We  have  approved  many 

,'od  programs  and  projects.   Indeed, 

I  arly  all  of  them  are  good.   But  the 

N.'s  resources  are  not  unlimited.  I 

link  it  is  fair  to  say  we  are  sponsoring 

lo  many  conferences,  too  many  spe- 

ul  interest  programs,  too  many  "pri- 

■te  bills"  of  assistance  in  individual 

luntries  when  such  steps  should  be  re- 

irved  for  only  the  most  critical  cases. 

I  will  be  the  first  to  admit  that  my 

[ivemment  has  not  always  followed  a 

I'licy  of  fiscal  restraint  itself.  But  the 

led  for  fiscal  stringency  is  paramount. 

1  applies  to  all  of  us.  We  need  to  get 

■iorities,  carefully  analyze  all  propos- 

>,  clarify  our  objectives,  and  restrain 

irselves  on  expenditures  until  we 

ve  sorted  out  for  ourselves  exactly 

lich  actions  are  the  most  pressing. 

A  consensus  resolution  of  this  As- 

mbly  last  year  expressed  concern 

'Out  this  problem  and  requested  the 

isistance  of  the  Secretary  General  in 

entifying  expenditure  priorities.  The 

!.N.  system  budget  was  $124  million 


in  1947.  It  was  nearly  $2.5  billion  in 
1976.  These  are  significant  sums  which 
we  all  know  can — with  proper  pro- 
gramming and  management — be  better 
used.  Let  us  commit  ourselves  to  this 
task  in  the  coming  year. 

In  short,  we  have  a  difficult  agenda 
before  us.  The  problems  do  not  vanish 
with  the  sound  of  the  last  gavel.  But 
with  the  consensus  of  the  concerned 
that  has  clearly  emerged  at  this  year's 
General  Assembly,  we  have  begun  to 
search  for  the  common  elements  of  our 
own  interests,  to  stop  shouting  and  to 
do  more  listening. 

A  senior  official  of  another  govern- 
ment told  me  early  in  this  Assembly 
that  the  United  Nations  seemed  to  be 
catching  its  "second  wind."  I  think 
that  is  clearly  true.  This  emerging  con- 
sensus on  how  to  work  together  on 
world  issues  provides  us  all  with  a 
source  of  new  hope  and  optimism.  That 
is  good  for  the  United  Nations.  It  is 
good  for  the  world.  It  is  good  for  the 
people  we  represent.  D 


'  Statement  in  plenary  at  the  close  of  the  32d 
UN.  General  Assembly  on  Dec.  21.  1977  (closing 
paragraphs  omitted);  text  from  USUN  press  release 
150  of  Dec.  21.  Andrew  Young  is  U.S.  Permanent 
Representative  to  the  United  Nations. 


Summaries  of 
I7J§>«  Statements 


During  the  closing  weeks  of  the  32d 
U.N.  General  Assembly,  members  of 
the  U.S.  delegation  made  numerous 
statements  on  a  wide  range  of  sub- 
jects. Following  are  summaries  of 
those  statements  taken  from  selected 
USUN  press  releases.' 

Decade  for  Women 

The  United  States  contributed  $3 
million  to  the  programs  for  the  U.N. 
Decade  for  Women.  (Koryne  Kaneski 
Horbal  in  the  Pledging  Conference  on 
the  Voluntary  Fund  for  the  U.N.  Dec- 
ade for  Women  on  Nov.  8,  1977; 
USUN  press  release  104,  Nov.  8.) 

Food 

In  support  of  global  efforts  for  a  vi- 
able world  food  policy,  the  United 
States  has:  (1)  committed  $200  million 
toward  the  $1  billion  International 
Fund  for  Agricultural  Development, 
(2)  established  a  domestic  food  grain 
reserve  program,  (3)  contributed  up  to 
125,000  tons  to  the  international 
emergency  food  reserve,  and  (4)  in- 


55 


creased  our  pledge  to  the  World  Food 
Program  from  $188  million  in  1977- 
78  to  $220  million  for  1979-80.  (Dr. 
Ruth  Schacter  Morgenthau  in  Commit- 
tee II  on  Nov.  3,  1977;  USUN  press 
release  97,  Nov.  3.) 

Human  Rights 

The  United  States  cosponsored  a 
resolution  concerning  the  situation  of 
human  rights  in  Chile.  It  was  adopted 
by  the  General  Assembly  on  Dec.   16, 

1977,  as  A/RES /32/1 18.  (USUN  press 
release  138,  Dec.  8.) 

Refugees 

At  a  meeting  of  the  Ad  Hoc  Com- 
mittee for  the  Announcement  of  Vol- 
untary Contributions  to  UNRWA  on 
Dec.  6,  1977,  the  United  States 
pledged  $42.5  million  for  1978. 
(Charles  W.  Whalen,  Jr.;  USUN  press 
release  134,  Dec.  6.) 

Southern  Africa 

Zimbabwe,  Namibia.  The  United 
States  is  deeply  committed  to  the  in- 
dependence, self-determination,  and 
majority  rule  in  southern  Africa.  In 
concert  with  other  Western  powers 
and  with  African  support,  it  is  en- 
gaged in  a  series  of  negotiations  aim- 
ing toward  equitable  and  lasting  solu- 
tions resulting  in  the  independence  for 
Zimbabwe  and  Namibia.  While  suc- 
cess is  not  assured,  negotiations  are 
proceeding. 

In  Zimbabwe  pressures  of  the  armed 
struggle  and  international  action  have 
played  and  continue  to  play  an  impor- 
tant role  in  the  efforts  to  reach  a  just 
solution.  Now  is  the  appropriate  mo- 
ment to  let  the  negotiating  process 
work;  if  it  stalls  or  fails,  that  is  the 
time  to  increase  the  pressures  on  the 
Smith  regime.  In  that  case,  the  United 
States  is  prepared  to  take  those  steps 
and  participate  in  measures  necessary 
to  secure  cooperation  by  all  parties  to 
implement  the  settlement  proposal. 

The  U.S.  Government  holds  a  simi- 
lar position  on  Namibia.  Exploratory 
talks  have  been  held  with  the  South 
West  Africa  People's  Organization 
and  the  South  African  Government,  in 
cooperation  with  other  Western  pow- 
ers. 

For  these  reasons  the  United  States 
announced  that  it  would  vote  against  a 
draft  resolution  requesting  all  states 
to:  refrain  from  any  investments  in,  or 
loans  to,  minority  regimes  in  southern 
Africa  and  agreements  to  promote 
trade;  take  effective  measures  to  end 
the  supply  of  funds  and  other  forms  of 
assistance,  including  military  supplies 


56 


and  equipment;  and  cease  all  exports 
of  crude  oil  and  petroleum  to  southern 
Africa.  (Marjorie  Craig  Benton  in 
Committee  IV  on  Oct.  28;  USUN 
press  release  86,  Oct.  28.) 

The  draft  resolution  was  adopted  by 
Committee  IV  on  Oct.  28,  1977,  and 
by  the  General  Assembly  on  Nov.  28 
as  A/RES/32/35. 

Southern  Rhodesia.  The  United 
States  supports  completely  the  propos- 
als outlined  in  the  British  White  Paper 
on  Rhodesia  and  will  continue  its  ac- 
tive pursuit  of  a  settlement  based  on 
these  proposals.  (The  full  text  of  that 
paper  is  printed  in  the  Bulletin  of 
Oct.  3,  1977,  p.  417.)  It  believes  that 
these  proposals  represent  the  best 
available  option  for  providing  all  the 
people  of  Zimbabwe  with  an  opportu- 
nity to  choose  their  own  political  lead- 
ership and  to  bring  freedom  and 
majority  rule  to  that  country  in  a  way 
which  will  restore  the  peace  and  foster 
economic  progress.  (Charles  W.  Wha- 
len,  Jr.,  in  Committee  IV  on  Dec.  9, 
1977:  USUN  press  release  142, 
Dec.  9.) 

Apartheid.  Concerning  a  series  of 
15  resolutions  on  apartheid,  the  U.S. 
"no"  and  "abstention"  votes  were 
explained,  and  our  representative 
noted  the  reservations  on  those  resolu- 
tions which  the  United  States  en- 
dorsed. The  General  Assembly 
adopted  Resolutions  32/105-A-N  on 
Dec.  14,  1977,  and  32/105-0  on  Dec. 
16.  (Charles  W.  Whalen,  Jr.,  in  ple- 
nary session  on  Dec.  14;  USUN  press 
release  146,  Dec.  14.) 

Torture 

The  United  States  supported  a  draft 
resolution  against  torture  and  other 


cruel,  inhuman,  or  degrading  treat- 
ment or  punishment  out  of  a  deep 
sense  of  outrage  over  the  number  of 
persons  who  have  died  in  recent  years 
while  detained  in  South  Africa's  pris- 
ons. The  General  Assembly  adopted, 
by  consensus,  that  draft  resolution  on 
Dec.  8,  1977,  as  A/RES/32/65.  (Ed- 
ward M.  Mezvinsky  in  plenary  session 
on  Dec.  8;  USUN  press  release  139, 
Dec.  8.) 

Three  other  draft  resolutions  on  tor- 
ture were  adopted  by  the  General  As- 
sembly on  Dec.  8  and  were  strongly 
supported  by  the  United  States:  (1)  a 
request  to  the  Human  Rights  Commis- 
sion to  draw  up  a  draft  convention 
against  torture  (A/RES/32/62),  (2)  a 
request  to  the  Secretary  General  to  in- 
ventory the  efforts  of  various 
governments  to  combat  torture  (A/- 
RES/32/63),  and  (3)  a  request  to 
members  to  unilaterally  adhere  to  the 
declaration  against  torture  (A/RES/- 
32/64).  (Edward  Mezvinsky  in  Com- 
mittee III  on  Nov.  2,  1977;  USUN 
press  release  94,  Nov.  2.) 

UNICEF 

For  the  calendar  year  1978  the 
United  States  pledged  $25  million,  a 
25%  increase  over  1977.  In  addition 
we  are  contributing  $250,000  for  the 
International  Year  of  the  Child.  (Her- 
bert G.  Wing  in  the  U.N.  Pledging 
Conference  on  the  U.N.  Children's 
Fund  on  Nov.  3,  1977;  USUN  press 
release  99,  Nov.  3.)  D 


'  The  full  texts  of  the  press  releases  may  be 
obtained  from  the  U.S.  Mission  to  the  United 
Nations,  799  U.N.  Plaza,  New  York,  N.Y. 
10017. 


WESTERI\  HEMISPHERE: 

Pananta  Canal  Treaties 


by  Secretary  Vance ' 

I  appreciate  this  opportunity  to  come 
to  New  Orleans  tonight  to  talk  to  you 
about  a  major  decision  we  now  face  as 
a  nation.  In  a  few  weeks,  the  U.S. 
Senate  will  decide  whether  to  ratify  the 
treaties  that  have  been  negotiated  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Panama  to 
provide  for  the  future  of  the  Panama 
Canal.-  It  is  a  decision  that  has  aroused 
strong  feelings,  although  I  think  most 
Americans  have  reserved  final  judg- 
ment until  they  have  considered  all  the 
arguments. 


The  debate  over  the  treaties  has  been 
lively,  at  times  even  heated.  It  draws 
us  back  to  a  story  Abraham  Lincoln 
used  to  tell  when  discussions  in  his 
Oval  Office  began  to  boil  over.  Lincoln 
would  interrupt  and  tell  the  story  of  a 
hunter  who  got  lost  in  the  forest  when  a 
fierce  storm  broke.  The  hard  rain  made 
it  almost  impossible  for  him  to  see 
where  he  was  going.  Night  soon  fell 
and  he  had  to  fight  the  darkness  as  well 
as  the  rain  to  find  his  way.  The  thunder 
was  deafening.  Only  occasional  flashes 
of  lightning  showed  him  the  trail.  Fi- 
nally, wet,  tired,  and  frustrated,  he  fell 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 

to  his  knees  in  prayer:  "If  it's  all  tht 
same  to  You,  Lord,"  he  cried,  'T'c 
appreciate  a  little  less  noise  and  a  Id 
more  light." 

Perhaps  some  of  you  have  consid 
ered  a  similar  prayer  as  you  have  lis 
tened  to  the  canal  debate.  I 

This  evening,  I  want  to  describe  the  I 
treaties  for  you  and  then  respond  di 
rectly  to  many  of  the  concerns   tha 
have  been  expressed.  I  hope  I  will  shec 
more  light  than  noise. 

From  the  day  we  started  constructioi 
over  70  years  ago,  the  Panama  Cana 
has  always  had  an  extra  dimension  fo 
us,  beyond  its  basic  military  and  com 
mercial  importance.  Building  the  cana 
was  a  remarkable  feat  for  a  young  ant 
emerging  nation.  Others  had  failed 
Yet  we  were  able  to  cut  through  th( 
mountains,  cross  the  swamps,  and  con 
trol  the  diseases  to  complete  a  water 
way  that  finally  linked  the  Atlantic  ant 
the  Pacific.  The  canal  came  to  repre 
sent  American  perseverance  and  in 
genuity,  qualities  that,  to  this  day,  con 
tinue  to  be  among  our  most  valuabh 
assets  as  a  nation. 

But  we  all  recognize  as  well  that  ii 
the  final  analysis,  the  Panama  Canal  i 
not  a  monument.  It  is  a  navigationa 
link  that  is  important  to  this  country' 
national  interests.  Our  first  concen 
must  be  to  assure  our  continued  abilit 
to  use  the  canal  in  the  future. 

It  was  that  concern  which  led  Presi 
dent  Johnson  in  1964,  after  consultin 
with  former  Presidents  Truman  an^ 
Eisenhower,  to  begin  negotiations  for 
new  treaty.  Every  American  Presider 
since  has  concluded  that  a  new  treat 
was  necessary  to  secure  the  futur 
availability  of  the  canal  for  the  ships  o 
all  nations.  For  that  same  reason,  Pres 
ident  Carter,  on  September  7th,  signet 
the  treaties  that  resulted  from  those  1- 
years  of  negotiations. 

Actually,  two  treaties  have  beei 
negotiated.  The  first  provides  for  thi 
operation  and  defense  of  the  canal  unti 
the  end  of  this  century  [Panama  Cana 
Treaty].  The  second  treaty  provides  fo 
the  permanent  neutrality  of  the  cana 
and  has  no  termination  date  [Treat; 
Concerning  the  Permanent  Neutralit; 
and  Operation  of  the  Panama  Canal]. 

Under  the  terms  of  the  first  treaty 
the  United  States  will  continue  to  oper 
ate  the  canal  until  the  year  2000.  / 
U.S.  government  agency,  to  be  callec 
the  Panama  Canal  Commission,  wil 
run  the  canal  and  will  decide,  in  ac 
cordance  with  U.S.  law,  such  matter; 
as  tolls  and  employment  practices.  A 
majority  of  its  governing  board  must  be 
American  citizens.  Panama  will  assume 
jurisdiction  over  the  area  of  the  preseni 
Canal  Zone — the  5-mile  strip  on  eithei 
side  of  the  canal — and  the  Canal  Zone 


^'ebruary  1978 

s  such  will  cease  to  exist.  However, 

ntil  the  end  of  this  century,  American 

ases   and   troops    will   remain   in 

anama,   and  the   United   States   will 

ave  primary  responsibility  for  defend- 

ig  the  canal. 

After  the  year  2000,  Panama  will  be 

^sponsible  for  operating  the  canal. 

Veil  over  70%  of  the  canal  workforce 

Iready  is  Panamanian.  Over  the  next 

■vo  decades,    we   will   be   training 

anamanians  in  all  aspects  of  operating 

nd  managing  the  canal. 

The  treaty  provides  extensive  protec- 

ons  and  privileges  for  the  Americans 

ho  will  be  working  in  Panama  in  con- 

jction  with  the  canal  until  the  year 

300  and  provides  priority  job  place- 

ent  and  liberalized  early  retirement 

)r  Americans   now   working  on  the 

inal  whose  jobs  ultimately  will  be 

lied  by  Panamanians. 

The   second   treaty — the   neutrality 

eaty — is  of  unlimited  duration.  It  will 

main  in  effect  even  after  the  year 

)00.  It  commits  each  of  the  parties — 

e  United  States  and  Panama — to  de- 

nd  the  canal  and  to  keep  it  open  to 

e  ships  of  all  nations. 

Under  the  neutrality  treaty — and  I 

ant  to  make  this  point  very  clear — the 

nited  States  has  the  right  to  take  any 

:tion   we   decide   is   necessary  — 

eluding  the  use  of  troops — to  meet 

ly  threat  or  aggression  directed  either 

;ainst  the  canal  or  against  the  passage 

any  ship — ours  or  anyone  else's — 
rough  the  canal.  That  does  not  mean 
at  we  have  the  right  to  meddle  in  the 
ternal  affairs  of  Panama.  It  does 
ean,  however,  that  we  can  defend  and 
otect  the  canal  before  and  after  the 
:ar  2000. 

The  neutrality  treaty  also  provides 
r  expeditious  passage  through  the 
inal  for  American  and  Panamanian 
ilitary  vessels.  In  case  of  need  or 
nergency,  our  military  ships  can  pass 
rough  the  canal  more  quickly  than 
;ual,  and  if  necessary  they  can  go  to 
e  head  of  the  line. 

Our  interpretation  of  these  rights  is 
entical  to  Panama's.  In  October, 
■esident  Carter  and  General  Torrijos 
'  Panama  issued  a  statement  of  under- 
anding  which  confirmed,  in  authorita- 
vt  terms,  these  clear  rights.^ 

There  are  other  provisions  in  the 
eaties.  One  of  them  deals  with  the 
jssibility  of  building  a  new  sea-level 
inal.  The  existing  canal  is  too  small 
ir  many  of  the  modern  supertankers 
id  the  giant  new  aircraft  carriers, 
pveral  years  ago,  the  United  States 
Ijnducted  a  study  to  determine  whether 
I  would  be  feasible  and  economical  to 
uild  a  new  and  larger  canal.  This 
udy  indicated  that,  if  we  were  to  go 
prward  with  plans  for  a  new  canal,  the 


least  expensive  option  by  far — and  the 
only  feasible  option  that  would  not  re- 
quire nuclear  explosives — would  be  to 
build  such  a  canal  in  Panama.  Under 
the  new  treaties,  we  have  agreed  to 
reexamine — together  with  Panama — the 
feasibility  of  a  new  sea-level  canal. 
The  Panamanian  Government  has 
agreed  that  it  will  permit  no  one  other 
than  the  United  States  to  construct  an 
interoceanic  canal  in  Panama  for  the 
remainder  of  this  century  without  our 
consent.  We,  in  turn,  have  agreed  that 
we  will  not  build  a  new  interoceanic 
canal  anywhere  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere except  Panama  during  this  same 
period. 

The  treaties  also  commit  the  United 
States  and  Panama  to  carry  out  their 
treaty  responsibilities  in  a  manner  con- 
sistent with  protecting  the  natural  envi- 
ronment of  Panama,  and  they  establish 
a  Joint  Commission  [on  the  Environ- 
ment] to  advise  both  governments  on 
these  essential  environmental  ques- 
tions. 

There  are  other  provisions  in  the 
treaties,  but  those  are  their  basic  terms. 

A  number  of  questions  and  concerns 
have  been  raised  about  the  treaties.  I 
want  to  address  them  directly. 

Military  Concerns 

It  has  been  asked  whether  these 
treaties  adequately  provide  for  our  mili- 
tary needs.  Do  they  safeguard  our  right 
to  protect  and  defend  the  canal?  The 
first  place  to  look  for  an  answer  to 
these  questions  is  to  our  top  military 
advisers — the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff. 
They  have  the  initial  responsibility  for 
our  military  defense.  The  Joint  Chiefs 
worked  closely  with  our  negotiators 
every  step  of  the  way.  In  their  judg- 
ment, these  treaties  fully  satisfy  our 
military  interests.  They  afford  us  the 
rights  we  need  to  defend  the  canal  and 
to  assure  that  it  remains  open. 

In  fact,  it  is  the  view  of  the  Joint 
Chiefs  that  these  treaties  not  only  pro- 
tect our  military  position,  they  improve 
it.  There  are  several  reasons  why. 

•  First,  in  the  process  of  negotiating 
the  new  treaties,  we  have  separated  out 
what  is  important  to  us — that  is,  con- 
tinued use  of  the  canal — from  what  is 
not  important  to  our  national  inter- 
est— such  as  who  has  jurisdiction  over 
traffic  violations  on  the  roads  near  the 
canal.  We  thus  avoid  the  possibility  of 
being  drawn  into  disputes  over  matters 
that  do  not  directly  affect  American 
interests. 

•  Second,  the  treaties  enhance  our 
ability  to  defend  the  canal  because,  if 
that  were  ever  necessary,  we  would  be 
doing  so  based  on  agreements  freely 


57 


entered  into  by  both  parties  and  sup- 
ported by  the  nations  of  Latin  America 
and  by  world  opinion. 

•  Finally,  our  military  position  is 
enhanced  because  we  would  be  defend- 
ing the  canal  along  with  the  govern- 
ment and  people  of  Panama.  Panama's 
interest  in  defending  the  canal,  and 
keeping  it  open,  would  be  as  great  as 
our  own.  The  old  treaty  does  not  have 
the  support  of  the  Panamanian  people. 
For  them,  it  means  their  nation  is  di- 
vided in  two.  It  means  that  a  Panama- 
nian traveling  from  one  side  of  the 
country  to  the  other  must  pass  through 
foreign  jurisdiction.  It  means  that  they 
cannot  call  all  of  their  country  their 
own.  We  do  not  think  of  our  presence 
in  Panama  as  colonial,  but  the  Pana- 
manians do. 

All  of  these  elements  of  an  outmoded 
relationship  would  be  eliminated  with 
the  new  treaties.  The  longstanding 
dream  of  the  Panamanian  people  for  a 
nation  undivided  would  be  fulfilled. 
The  people  of  Panama  would  receive  a 
fair  share  of  the  revenue  from  the  canal 
which  is,  after  all,  their  most  valuable 
national  resource. 

Two-thirds  of  the  Panamanian  voters 
in  their  recent  plebiscite  [October  23] 
expressed  their  support  for  these 
treaties.  Many  of  those  who  voted 
against  the  treaties  did  so  because  they 
were  concerned  that  Panama  had  con- 
ceded too  much  to  the  United  States. 
Nonetheless,  it  is  clear  that  these 
treaties  have  the  broad  approval  of  the 
Panamanian  people. 

If  we  ever  have  to  defend  the  canal, 
we  will  do  so.  But  by  standing  together 
with  Panama  in  defense  of  the  canal, 
we  reduce  the  risk  that  our  soldiers  will 
ever  be  called  upon  to  fight  and  to  die 
defending  the  canal. 


Commercial  Interests 

What  about  our  commercial  interests 
in  the  canal?  What  effect  will  the  new 
treaties  have  on  the  American  econ- 
omy? And  what  effect  will  it  have  on 
the  Port  of  New  Orleans?  The  primary 
consideration  for  businessmen  who  use 
the  canal  is  to  assure  that  it  remains 
open  and  efficiently  operated,  that  tolls 
remain  reasonable,  and  that  ships  pass- 
ing through  the  canal  are  safe.  Com- 
panies that  use  the  canal  also  want 
certainty  about  the  future;  they  want  a 
stable  situation  for  the  canal  so  that 
they  can  plan  effectively.  The  treaties 
promote  those  interests. 

As  I  have  noted,  the  United  States 
will  operate  the  canal  until  the  end  of 
this  century.  During  this  period, 
Panamanians  will  gradually  move  into 
all  aspects  of  canal  operation.  Running 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulletit 


ELLIOT  L.  RICHARDSON* 


It  is  no  secret  that  in  1976  I  supported  the 
Ford  Administration  in  its  negotiations  with 
the  Panamanian  Government  toward  a  new 
Panama  Canal  treaty.  Today.  I  support  the 
treaties  negotiated  by  the  present  Administra- 
tion. My  support  for  the  treaties  is  not  based 
on  some  considerations  which  I  regard  as 
more  important  than  national  security.  On  the 
contrary.  I  support  the  treaties  precisely  and 
primarily  because  I  believe  that  their  ratifica- 
tion will  enhance  our  national  security — in 
the  canal  itself  and  in  the  vital  Caribbean 
region. 


Let  us  examine  the  possible  threats  to  our 
continued  use  of  the  canal. 

•  First,  there  is  a  strategic  nuclear  threat. 
Presumably,  nuclear  arms  would  be  used 
against  the  canal  only  in  the  context  of  a 
general  nuclear  exchange  which  would  give 
us  problems  much  more  serious  than  just  the 
defense  of  the  canal.  But  the  point  is  that  no 
force  stationed  in  what  is  now  the  Canal 
Zone  could  by  itself  prevent  such  an  attack. 
General  Torrijos  has  pointed  out  that  the 
canal  is  "'as  defenseless  as  a  newborn  babe," 
It  could  be  argued  that,  if  anything,  the  canal 
is  less  likely  to  be  a  nuclear  target  if  it  is  not 
under  American  control. 

•  Second,  hypolhetically  there  is  a  con- 
ventional naval  threat  to  the  canal.  But  the 
United  States  retains  overwhelming  naval 
preponderance  in  the  area  and  can  protect  the 
approaches  to  the  canal. 

•  Third,  there  is  the  threat  of  guerrilla 
warfare,  terrorism,  or  sabotage.  Defense 
against  such  a  threat,  in  the  jungle  terrain  of 


the   canal   area,    would   be  extremely   dif- 
ficult. .  .  . 

With  or  without  the  new  treaties,  no  one 
can  promise  you  a  foolproof  defense  against 
sabotage  But  the  new  treaties  would  give  the 
Panamanian  people  a  greater  stake  in  keeping 
the  canal  open  and  would  give  the  Panama- 
nian Government  an  increasing  role  in  its  op- 
eration and  defense.  The  incentive  for  sabo- 
tage by  individual  Panamanians  would  be 
diminished;  the  capability  and  the  motivation 
of  the  Panamanian  Government  to  deter  sabo- 
tage would  be  increased. 

I  have  tried  to  show  why  I  think  that  the 
new  treaties  would  enhance  our  national  se- 
curity interests  in  the  canal  itself.  But  our 
decision  on  ratification  of  the  treaties  will 
have  an  effect  on  the  nations  of  the  Carib- 
bean (in  which  1  include  Mexico  and  Central 
America)  which  is  perhaps  equally  important 
to  our  national  security. 

We  continue  to  regard  the  Caribbean  as 
important  to  us  strategically.  We  are  ex- 
tremely sensitive  to  Soviet  and  Cuban  ac- 
tivities aimed  at  the  other  nations  of  the  re- 
gion. But  we  also  rely  on  the  Caribbean  for 
our  imports  of  commodities  from  bauxite  to 
bananas.  And  like  other  independent  nations, 
they  have  the  ability  to  influence  the  resolu- 
tion of  many  of  the  new  issues  of  interna- 
tional interdependence,  such  as  the  law  of  the 
sea — in  which  I  am  deeply  involved — 
energy,  food,  population,  the  environment, 
and  so  forth. 

Since  the  Caribbean  countries  are  impor- 
tant to  us.  and  since  we  can  no  longer  simply 
impose  our  will  on  them,  it  is  in  our  interest 
to  pay  attention  to  what  they  think.  And  from 
their  point  of  view,  American  influence  in 


their  countries  has  not  always  been  benign. 
They  prize  their  national  sovereignty  and 
self-determination — concepts  which  we  were 
the  first  to  realize  in  the  New  World — but 
they  find  that  their  economic  underdevelop- 
ment and  dependence  on  the  outside  world, 
particularly  on  us,  threatens  their  ability 
really  to  determine  their  future.  There  exists 
within  the  Caribbean  the  potential  that 
nationalist  forces  would  take  an  anti- 
American  form,  as  they  did  in  Cuba. 


While  it  would  be  absurd  to  say  that  a  res- 
olution of  the  Panama  Canal  issue  would  also 
resolve  the  problems  of  the  Caribbean,  it  is 
quite  accurate  to  say  that  our  ratification  of 
these  treaties  would  have  a  powerful  effect 
on  opinion  in  the  area  toward  the  United 
States.  It  would  show  the  peoples  of  the  re- 
gion that  the  United  States  is  prepared  to  be 
fair  in  its  dealings  with  smaller  and  poorer 
nations.  Our  enemies  would  find  it  much 
more  difficult  to  blame  all  the  region's  prob- 
lems on  "Yankee  imperialism."  And  our 
friends  in  the  region  would  find  it  easier  to 
cooperate  with  us  in  solving  those  problems. 


*  Excerpts  from  an  address  to  the  Kansas 
City  Lawyers  Association  in  Kansas  City  on 
Jan.  12,  1978  (complete  text  of  the  "Panama 
Canal  Treaties — A  National  Security  Impera- 
tive" may  be  obtained  from  the  Corre- 
spondence Management  Division,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs.  Department  of  State,  Wash- 
ington, DC.  20520);  Ambassador  at  Large 
Richardson  is  Special  Representative  of  the 
President  for  the  Law  of  the  Sea  Conference 
and  was  formerly  Secretary  of  Health,  Edu- 
cation, and  Welfare;  Secretary  of  Defense; 
Attorney  General;  Secretary  of  Commerce; 
and  Deputy  Secretary  of  State. 


the  canal  i.s  a  complex  job,  but  the  abil- 
ity to  perform  the  many  tasks  involved 
is  not  a  question  of  nationality;  it  is  a 
question  of  training.  The  treaty  ar- 
rangements insure  that  Panama  will  be 
fully  prepared  to  operate  the  canal  ef- 
fectively by  the  end  of  this  period. 

Keeping  the  canal  open  and  running 
smoothly  will  be  an  economic  impera- 
tive for  Panama.  It  already  derives 
more  than  10%  of  its  gross  domestic 
product  from  canal-related  activities. 
Moreover  under  the  new  treaties,  un- 
like the  present  situation.  Panama's 
earnings  from  the  canal  will  be  directly 
related  to  the  amount  of  traffic  which 
passes  through  the  canal.  More  ships 
will  mean  more  money  for  Panama. 
For  Panama  to  cut  off  access  to  any 
country,  let  alone  to  close  the  canal, 
would  be  for  it  to  inflict  a  terrible 
wound  on  itself.  As  much  as  anything, 
that  practical  fact  of  life  safeguards  fu- 


ture access  to  the  canal  for  the  ships  of 
all  nations. 

The  United  States  insisted  during  the 
negotiations  that  all  payments  to 
Panama  for  its  contribution  to  the  canal 
enterprise  be  drawn  from  the  canal's 
revenues.  To  accomplish  this  and  main- 
tain the  canal  on  a  self-sustaining 
basis,  some  increase  in  the  toll  rate  will 
be  necessary.  Our  current  study  of  the 
likely  size  of  that  increase  is  not  yet 
completed,  but  it  appears  that  it  will  be 
on  the  order  of  30'^.  Is  such  an  in- 
crease justified?  And  what  will  it  mean 
for  U.S.  consumers  and  exporters? 

Over  the  last  40  years,  canal  tolls 
have  increased  less  than  40(?  per  canal 
ton — from  90C  to  $1.29.  These  charges 
are  far  lower  than  tolls  for  the  Suez 
Canal.  The  economic  impact  of  the 
likely  toll  increase  will  not  be  substan- 
tial. For  a  bushel  of  Iowa  corn  being 
shipped  to  Japan  from  New  Orleans,  a 


40%  increase  in  canal  tolls  would  in 
crease  current  transportation  costs 
which  are  approximately  660,  by  les 
than  1/2  cent  per  bushel.  In  terms  o 
the  overall  purchase  price,  such  a  tol 
increase  would  represent  a  small  frac 
tion  of  1%. 

Based  upon  analysis  that  we  havi 
undertaken,  a  toll  increase  on  this  orde 
would  produce  no  significant  impac 
upon  the  volume  of  trade  to  and  fron 
the  Port  of  New  Orleans.  Tolls  onl; 
make  up  a  small  part  of  the  total  cost  o 
shipping  a  product  or  commodity. 

But  this  port  and  this  city  and  thi: 
entire  region  could  be  adversely  af 
fected  if  we  don't  act  now  to  assure  i 
secure  future  for  the  canal.  Most  of  thi: 
country's  grain  exports  are  shippec 
from  gulf  coast  ports.  Virtually  all  o 
the  grain  exported  to  the  Far  Eas 
passes  through  the  canal.  Thousands  o: 
jobs  rely  on  that  trade. 


I 

1 


•ebruary  1978 

That  trade — and  those  jobs — will  be 
ar  more  secure  under  the  new  treaties 
han  the  old. 

The  treaties  mean  far  greater  assur- 
mce  that  the  canal  will  always  remain 
tpen,  that  our  use  of  it  will  never  be 
nterrupted,  that  ships  passing  through 
he  canal  will  be  safe,  and  that  it  will 
ontinue  to  operate  as  an  important 
vorld  trade  route.  I  think  that  is  impor- 
ant  to  each  of  us. 

What  about  the  cost  of  these  treaties'? 
t  has  been  said  that  we  are  "paying 
'anama  to  take  it."  That  simply  is  not 
rue. 

Under  the  new  treaties,  Panama  will 
•e  receiving  greater  earnings  from  the 
anal.  But  the  payments  to  Panama  for 
ts  contribution  to  the  canal  enterprise 
/ill  be  drawn  from  the  canaPs  rev- 
nues.  The  treaties  require  no  payments 
f  tax  dollars  from  the  U.S.  Treasury 
3  Panama,  either  now  or  in  the  future. 

Separate  from  the  treaties,  we  have 
greed  to  seek  certain  loans,  guaran- 
:;es,  and  credits  to  assist  Panama's  de- 
elopment.  All  of  these  loans  must  be 
jpaid.  They  are  not  grants.  They  will 
e  used  largely  to  finance  U.S.  trade 
Jnd  U.S.  investment  in  Panama. 


olitical  Concerns 

Some  people  have  asked  what  hap- 
ens  if  a  Communist  government  takes 
ver  in  Panama?  What  would  happen  to 
le  canal?  The  fact  is  there  is  little 
'ommunist  influence  in  Panama.  Con- 
nued  disagreement  with  Panama  over 
le  canal  will  only  have  the  effect  of 
icreasing  that  influence.  Panama  has  a 
ee  enterprise  economy.  Its  closest 
•lends  are  the  democratic  governments 
f  Venezuela,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica, 
nd  Mexico.  Its  ties  to  the  United 
tates  are  strong.  And  most  important, 
s  the  canal  becomes  something  that 
le  Panamanian  people  value  as  much 
s  we  do  now,  the  advantages  of 
xploiting  it  for  political  purposes  will 
e  substantially  diminished. 

Finally,  it  is  asked  whether  these 
reaties  represent  an  American  with- 
rawal  from  the  world?  Are  they  a  sign 
f  U.S.  retreat?  Just  the  opposite  is 
rue.  These  treaties  are  entered  into  by 
n  America  that  is  looking  to  the  fu- 
ure.  They  are  entered  into  by  an 
America  that  is  confident  of  its  strength 
nd  prepared  to  act  as  a  responsible 
vorld  power. 

The  treaties  look  to  the  future  of 
American  trade.  They  promote  the 
3ng-term  interests  of  the  United  States 
|S  well  as  other  maritime  nations  that 
enefit  from  an  open  and  secure  canal. 

The  treaties  reflect  America's  future 
lilitary  requirements.  They  modernize 
|nd  protect  our  right  to  defend  the 


canal  and  they  enhance  our  ability  to 
defend  it  if  that  is  ever  necessary. 

The  treaties  look  to  the  future  of  our 
relations  with  our  neighbors  in  this 
hemisphere.  The  other  nations  of  Latin 
America  share  Panama's  opposition  to 
the  old  treaty.  They  share  Panama's 
support  for  the  new  treaties. 

I  believe  most  Americans  want  to  es- 
tablish a  more  mature  partnership  with 
Latin  America — one  that  is  based  on 
mutual  respect  and  admiration.  Strong 
common  interests  bind  the  people  and 
nations  of  Latin  America  and  the 
United  States.  Our  economies  need  that 
relationship.  Latin  America  is  a  major 
market  for  U.S.  exports  and  an  impor- 
tant supplie;  of  valuable  natural 
resources. 

By  eliminating  a  major  source  of  irri- 
tation that  has  existed  between  us,  the 
new  treaties  enable  us  to  strengthen  our 
relationships  throughout  Latin  America 
and  reassert  the  most  powerful  source, 
our  influence — our  reputation  for  fair- 
ness and  justice. 

Finally,  the  treaties  look  to  the  fu- 
ture of  our  relations  with  the  rest  of  the 
world. 

•  They  say  to  all  the  world  that  we 
will  define  our  national  interests  care- 
fully and  we  will  protect  those  inter- 
ests. 

•  They  say  to  the  world  that 
disputes — even  between  large  countries 
and  small  ones — can  be  resolved  peace- 
fully. 

•  And  they  say  that  we  will  act  in 
the  world  in  a  way  that  is  true  to  our 
values  as  a  nation. 

The  same  resourcefulness  and  in- 
genuity that  enabled  us  to  build  the 
Panama  Canal  now  leads  us  to  build  a 


59 


new  arrangement  for  the  canal  that  re- 
flects present-day  realities  and  provides 
for  the  future. 

We  are  a  nation  that  has  been  able  to 
change  with  changing  times.  We  have 
never  rested  on  our  laurels.  We  have 
always  seized  the  opportunity  to  make 
things  better. 

The  treaties  serve  America's  inter- 
ests. It  is  vitally  important  that  they  be 
approved  by  the  United  States  Senate. 
Every  American  has  a  stake  in  the  fu- 
ture they  secure.  □ 


'Address  in  New  Orleans  on  Jan.  12.  1978 
(press  release  14  of  Jan.  12). 

-For  text  of  treaties  and  related  materials,  see 
Bulletins  of  Oct.  17,  1977,  p.  481  and  Nov.  7. 
p.  bLS. 

'For  text  of  statement  of  understanding  of 
Oct.  14,  1977,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  7.  p.  631. 


Letters 
oi  Credence 


The  following  newly  appointed 
Ambassadors  recently  presented  their 
credentials  to  President  Carter: 

November  22' 

Grenada — Franklyn  O'Brien  Dolland 

January  18- 

El  Salvador — Roberto  Quinonez  Meza 

Guatemala — Jorge  Lamport  Rodil       D 


'  For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's  remarks  and 
the  President's  reply,  see  Department  of  State 
press  release  of  Nov.  22,  1977. 

-  For  texts  of  the  Ambassadors'  remarks  and 
the  President's  replies,  see  Department  of  State 
press  releases  of  Jan.  18,  1978. 


TREATIES:  U.S.,  Mexico 
Initial  Aviation  Agreement  ^ 


Delegations  representing  the  United 
States  and  Mexico  initialed  a  new  air- 
line route  agreement  and  understanding 
relating  to  reduced  fares  and  charter 
services  on  December  19,  1977,  in 
Washington.  The  U.S.  delegation  was 
chaired  by  Joel  W.  Biller,  Deputy  As- 
sistant Secretary  of  State  for  Transpor- 
tation, Telecommunications,  and 
Commercial  Affairs.  The  Mexican 
delegation  was  chaired  by  Jorge  Cen- 
dejas  Quesada,  Director  General  of 
Civil  Aeronautics  of  Mexico. 

The  proposed  agreements  will  be 
implemented  by  an  exchange  of  diplo- 


matic notes  after  appropriate  internal 
clearance  procedures  are  completed  by 
the  respective  governments. 

The  new  route  agreement  expands 
airline  service  between  the  United 
States  and  Mexico.  New  or  improved 
service  by  U.S.  and  Mexican  airlines 
will  be  available  for  33  U.S.  cities  and 
21  cities  and  resort  points  in  Mexico. 
These  U.S.  cities  are  San  Francisco, 
Oakland,  San  Jose,  Los  Angeles,  Seat- 
tle, Albuquerque,  El  Paso,  Houston, 
Dallas,  Fort  Worth,  San  Antonio,  Har- 
lingen,  Chicago,  Minneapolis,  St. 
Paul,  Kansas  City,  Denver,  Boston, 


60 


New  York,  Washington,  Baltimore, 
Philadelphia,  Cleveland,  Detroit,  At- 
lanta, New  Orleans,  Memphis,  Tampa, 
San  Juan,  San  Diego,  Tucson, 
Phoenix,  and  St.  Louis. 

The  Mexican  points  to  which  new  or 
improved  services  will  be  provided  are 
existing  and  new  resort  points  on  the 
east  and  west  coasts  of  Mexico  (Man- 
zanillo,  Zihauatenejo.  Mazatlan, 
Puerto  Vallarta,  Acapulco,  Loreto,  La 
Paz,  San  Jose  de  Cabo.  Cancun. 
Cozumel,  and  Guayamas);  the  major 
air  traffic  centers  of  Mexico  City, 
Guadalajara,  Monterrey,  Tampico,  and 
Merida;  and  other  cities  such  as  Oaxa- 
ca,  Bahia  Kino,  Hermosillo,  Mexicali, 
and  Tijuana. 

The  United  States  will  also  obtain 
expanded  rights  for  its  airlines  to  oper- 
ate beyond  Mexico  to  Central  and 
South  America  on  flights  from  New 
York,  Washington,  Baltimore,  Dallas, 
Fort  Worth,  San  Antonio,  and  Los 
Angeles. 

The  proposed  agreement  will  also 


remove  most  of  the  existing  restrictions 
on  the  operation  of  U.S.  routes. 

Both  governments  agreed  to  encour- 
age and  facilitate  airlines  to  propose 
and  implement  innovative,  reduced 
fares  for  scheduled  services. 

A  charter  services  understanding 
contains  acceptance  of  the  country-of- 
origin  rules  for  charterworthiness  of 
flights,  designation  of  U.S.  scheduled 
and  supplemental  airlines  to  operate 
charters,  and  a  declaration  of  intent  to 
accept  charter  flights  liberally.  A  con- 
sultative mechanism  is  established  to 
handle  any  outstanding  issues.  The 
agreement  and  the  understandings  will 
be  in  force  until  December  31,  1982. 

These  agreements,  resulted  from 
negotiations  which  covered  the  past  7 
years.  The  most  recent  rounds  of  talks 
were  held  September  12-21  in  Wash- 
ington, November  29-December  2  in 
Mexico  City,  and  December  13-19  in 
Washington.  □ 


Press  release  581  of  Dec.  20.  1977. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance  of 
the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarctic 
treaty  of  December  1,  1959.  TIAS  4780. 
Adopted  at  Oslo  June  20,  1975  at  the  Eighth 
Consultative  Meeting.' 

Nolificalion  of  approval:    Union  of  Soviet 
Socialist  Republics,  November  14,  1977. 

Aviation 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  sei- 
zure of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague  December 
16,  1970.  Entered  into  force  October  14. 
1971.  TIAS  7192. 

Accession  deposited:  Cape  Verde,  October  20. 
1977. 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.  Done  at 
Montreal  September  23.  1971.  Entered  into 
force  January  26,  1973.  TIAS  7570. 
Accessions  deposited:  Cape  Verde,  October 
20,  1977;  Lebanon,  December  23.  1977. 

Containers 

International  convention  for  safe  containers 
(CSC),  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  De- 
cember 2,  1972.  Entered  into  force  Septem- 
ber 6,  1977. 


Ratification  deposited:  United  States.  Janu- 
ary 3,  1978. 

Enters  into  force  for  the  United  States: 
January  3,  1979. 

Cultural  Relations 

Agreement  on  the  importation  of  educational, 
scientific,  and  cultural  materials,  and  pro- 
tocol. Done  at  Lake  Success  November  22, 
1950.  Entered  into  force  May  21,  1952;  for 
the  United  States  November  2,  1966.  TIAS 
6129. 

Accession  deposited:  Oman,  December  19. 
1977. 

Diplomatic  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  diplomatic  relations. 
Done  at  Vienna  April  18,  1961.  Entered  into 
force  April  24,  1964;  for  the  United  States 
December  13,  1972.  TIAS  7502. 
Accession  deposited:  Bolivia.  December  28, 
1977. 

Environmental  Modification 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  military  or  any 
other  hostile  use  of  environmental   modifica- 
tion techniques,  with  annex.   Done  at  Geneva 
May  18.  1977,' 
Sii-nalurc:  India,  December  10,  1977. 

Finance 

Agreement  establishing  the   International   Fund 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 

for  Agricultural  Development.  Done  at  Ron 
June  13,  1976.  Entered  into  force  Novembi 
30,  1977. 

Signature:  Costa  Rica,  December  20.  1977 
Ratifications  deposited:  Senegal,  Decen 
ber  13.  1977;  Turkey,  December  14,  197' 
Accessions  deposited:  Djibouti,  Upper  Volt 
December  14,  1977;  Uruguay,  Zambia,  D 
cember  16,  1977;  Haiti.  December  1' 
1977;  Cyprus,  December  20,  1977. 


Health 

Amendments  to  Articles  24  and  25  of  the  Co 
stitution  of  the  World  Health  Organization 
July  22,  1946,  as  amended  (TIAS  1808,  464 
8086,  8534).   Adopted  at  Geneva  May   1 
1976.' 

Acceptance  deposited:  Ivory  Coast,  Decei 
ber  16,  1977. 

Human  Rights 

American  convention  on  human  rights.  Done 
San  Jose  November  22.  1969.' 
Ratification  deposited:   Ecuador.   Decer 
ber  28,  1977. 


Postal 

Second  additional  protocol  to  the  constitution 
the  Universal  Postal  Union  of  July  10.  19« 
(TIAS  5881,  7150),  general  regulations  wi» 
final  protocol  and  annex,  and  the  universi 
postal  convention  with  final  protocol  and  d» 
tailed  regulations.  Done  at  Lausanne  July 
1974  Entered  into  force  January  I.  197* 
TIAS  8231. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Bulgaria,  October  2 

1977;   China,   People's   Republic  o 

November  30.  1977;  Greece,  September  2 

1977;  Indonesia,  August  31,    1977;  No 

Zealand,   September  26.    1977;=   Polanm 

February  4,  1977. 

Money  orders  and  postal   travellers'  chech 

agreement,  with  detailed  regulations.  Done 

Lausanne  July  5.   1974.   Entered  into  fore 

January  1,  1976.  TIAS  8232. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Bulgaria.  October  2! 

1977;  Greece,   September  26,    1977;  I 

donesia.  August  31,    1977;  Poland,  AugU' 

31,  1977. 

Accession  deposited:  Iraq,  August  30,  1977 


Space 

Convention  on  registration  of  objects  launche 
into  outer  space.  Done  at  New  York  Janua 
14.  1975  Entered  into  force  September  1! 
1976.  TIAS  8480. 
Accession  deposited:  Seychelles.  Decel 
ber  28,  1977. 

Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement.   1977,  with  a 
nexes.  Done  at  Geneva  October  7,   1977.  E 
lered   into  force   provisionally.   January 
1978. 

Signatures:   Cuba,  Ecuador,   December  I 
1977;  Kenya,  Nicaragua,  December  1 
1977;  Barbados,  Peru,  December  16,  1977 
Haiti,   South  Africa,  December   19.   1977 
Australia,  Costa  Rica,  Hungary,  Decembc 


'ebruary  1978 

20.  1977;  United  Kingdom,  December  20. 
1977;'  Swaziland.  Trinidad  and  Tobago. 
December  21.  1977;  New  Zealand.  De- 
cember 22.  1977. 

Ratification  deposited:  Barbados.  December 
16.  1977;  Swaziland.  December  21.  1977. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Mauritius.  Decem- 
ber 20.  1977. 

Notifications  of  provisional  application  depos- 
ited: Nicaragua.  December  15.  1977;  Aus- 
tralia. Guatemala.  Hungary.  December  20, 
1977;  Costa  Rica.  December  22.  1977; 
United  States,  December  28,  1977. 

elecommunications 

iternational  telecommunication  convention, 
with  annexes  and  protocols.  Done  at  Malaga- 
Torremolinos  October  25,  1973.  Entered  into 
force  January  1,  1975;  for  the  United  States 
April  7,  1976.  TIAS  8572. 
Accession  deposited:  Djibouti,  November  22. 
1977. 

rade 

leventh  proces-verbal  extending  the  declaration 
on  the  provisional  accession  of  Tunisia  to  the 
GATT.  Done  at  Geneva  November  11.  1977. 
Enters  into  force  between  Tunisia  and  any  par- 
ticipating government  as  soon  as  it  shall  have 
been  accepted  by  Tunisia  and  such  govern- 
ment. 

■cond  proces-verbal  extending  the  declaration 
of  the  provisional  accession  of  the  Philippines 
to  the  GATT.  Done  at  Geneva  November  11, 
1977.  Enters  into  force  between  the  Philip- 
pines and  any  participating  government  as 
soon  as  it  shall  have  been  accepted  by  the 
Philippines  and  such  government. 
Tangement  regarding  international  trade  in  tex- 
tiles, with  annexes  Done  at  Geneva  De- 
cember 20,  1973.  Entered  into  force  January 
1.  1974,  except  for  Article  2,  paragraphs  2.  3. 
and  4  which  entered  into  force  April  1,  1974 
TIAS  7840. 

Acceptance  deposited:    Peru.   November  7. 
II      1977. 


ILATERAL 


razil 


greement  relating  to  equal  access  to  ocean  car- 
riage of  government-controlled  cargoes.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  letters  at  Washington 
November  17.  1977.  Entered  into  force 
November  17.  1977. 

inada 

emorandum  of  understanding  concerning  re- 
ciprocal recognition  of  Great  Lakes  load  lines. 
Signed  at  Ottawa  November  21.  1977.  Entered 
into  force  November  21.  1977. 

lad 

loject  grant  agreement  relating  to  human  re- 
{sources  development,  with  annexes.  Signed  at 
N'Djamena  August  25.  1977.  Entered  into 
force  August  25.  1977. 


Republic  of  China 

Interim  agreement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton, 
wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile 
products,  with  annexes.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Washington  December  16.  1977. 
Entered  into  force  December  16,  1977. 

Dominican  Republic 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat  im- 
ports from  the  Dominican  Republic  during 
calendar  year  1978.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Washington  December  21   and  28, 

1977.  Entered  into  force  December  28,  1977, 

Egypt 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities, 
relating  to  the  agreement  of  June  7,  1974 
(TIAS  7855),  with  agreed  minutes  and  related 
letter.  Signed  at  Cairo  December  7,  1977.  En- 
tered into  force  December  7,  1977. 

Arrangement  amending  the  arrangement  of  April 
13  and  25.  1974.  as  amended  (TIAS  7859, 
8169).  to  make  it  applicable  to  hydrographic 
survey  operations  in  environs  of  Port  Said  and 
Gulf  of  Suez  and  contiguous  waters.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  letters  at  Cairo  December  2 
and  17.  1977.  Entered  into  force  Decem- 
ber 17.  1977. 

Finland 

Agreement  modifying  the  air  transport  agree- 
ment of  March  29,  1949,  to  permit  experimen- 
tal implementation  of  low-cost  fares.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Helsinki  December  5 
and  9,  1977.  Entered  into  force  December  9. 
1977. 

Guatemala 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat  im- 
ports from  Guatemala  during  calendar  year 

1978.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Wash- 
ington December  21  and  28,  1977.  Entered 
into  force  December  28,  1977. 

Guinea 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities, 
relating  to  the  agreement  of  April  21,  1976, 
with  memorandum  of  understanding.  Signed 
at  Conakry  December  10,  1977.  Entered  into 
force  December  10,  1977. 

Haiti 

Agreement  relating  to  limitation  of  meat  imports 
from  Haiti  during  calendar  year  1978.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 
December  21  and  30,  1977.  Entered  into  force 
December  30,  1977. 

Honduras 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat  im- 
ports from  Honduras  during  calendar  year 
1978.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Wash- 
ington December  21  and  30,  1977.  Entered 
into  force  December  30.  1977. 

India 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  products, 
with  annexes.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Washington  December  30,  1977.  Entered 
into  force  December  30,  1977;  effective 
January  1.  1978. 


61 


Israel 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities, 
relating  to  the  agreement  of  December  16. 
1974.   Signed  at  Washington  December  21. 

1977.  Entered  into  force  December  21,  1977. 

Jamaica 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  textiles,  with  an- 
nex. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Wash- 
ington November  22  and  December  20.  1977. 
Entered  into  force  December  20.  1977. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  August  8.  1977. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Kingston  De- 
cember 2  and  21,  1977.  Entered  into  force 
December  21,  1977. 

Republic  of  Korea 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  products, 
with  annexes  and  related  letter.  Effected  by 
exchanges  of  notes  at  Washington  Decem- 
ber 23.  1977.  Entered  into  force  December 
23.  1977;  effective  January  1,  1978. 

Mexico 

Agreement  concerning  fisheries  off  the  coasts  of 
the  United  States.  Signed  at  Washington  Au- 
gust 26.  1977. 
Entered  into  force:  December  29,  1977. 

Nicaragua 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat  im- 
ports from   Nicaragua  during  calendar  year 

1978.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Wash- 
ington December  21  and  26,  1977.  Entered 
into  force  December  26.  1977. 

Pakistan 

Agreement  modifying  the  air  services  agreement 
of  November  14.  1946  (TIAS  1586),  to  permit 
experimental  implementation  of  low-cost 
fares.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Is- 
lamabad October  16  and  November  15,  1977. 
Entered  into  force  November  15,  1977. 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities, 
relating  to  the  agreement  of  November  23. 
1974  (TIAS  7971).  with  minutes.  Signed  at  Is- 
lamabad December  22.  1977.  Entered  into 
force  December  22.  1977. 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton  textiles, 
with  annexes.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Washington  January  4  and  9.  1978.  Entered 
into  force  January  9,  1978;  effective  Janu- 
ary 1,  1978. 

Philippines 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  October 
15.  1975.  as  amended  and  extended  (TIAS 
8179).  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  products. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Manila 
December  27.  1977.  Entered  into  force 
December  27.  1977.  D 


'  Not  in  force. 

'  Applicable  to  the  Cook  Islands.  Niue.  and 
Tokelau. 

'  In  respect  to  Belize  and  Saint 
Christopher-Nevis- Anguilla. 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulletr 


Ofpuritnent  of  State 


*8 

1/7 

*9 

1/7 

*10 

1/9 

January  6-February  6 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  DC.  20520. 

No.  Date  Subject 

*6  1/6  U.S..   Jamaica   sign   textile 

agreement,   Nov.   22,   Dec. 
20. 
7  1/7  Vance:  statement  at  ceremony 

to  return  the  Crown  of  St. 
Stephen,  Budapest,  Jan.  5 
U.S.,     India     sign     textile 

agreement,  Dec.  30. 
Vance:         dinner         toast, 

Budapest,  Jan.  6. 
Young  Hispanic  Leadership 
Seminar,   Washington,  Jan. 
16-17. 

*11  1/9  Conference  on   U.S.,   Carib- 

bean trade,  investment,  and 
development,  Miami.  Jan. 
19-20. 

*12  1/11         Vance:  address  at  Morris  Har- 

vey College,  Charleston, 
W.  Va. 

*13  1/12        Vance;  address  in  Louisville. 

*13A       1/13        Vance:  question-and-answer 
session  following  address  in 
Louisville,  Jan.  12. 
14  1/12        Vance:   address   in   New   Or- 

leans. 

*15  1/12        U.S.,  Thailand  amend  textile 

agreement,  Apr.  4,  May  20. 

*16  1/12        U.S.,   Macau   amend   texiile 

agreement,  Aug.  4  and  17. 
Oct.  20  and  29. 

*17  1/12        U.S.,  Pakistan  sign  cotton  tex- 

tile    agreement.     Jan.      4 
and  9. 
18  1/13        Vance:   address  before   Los 

Angeles  World  Affairs 
Council. 

*18A  1/16  Vance:  question-and-answer 
session  following  address  in 
Los  Angeles.  Jan.  13. 

*19  1/13        U.S.,   Canadian  negotiations 

on  the  Atikokan  generating 
station. 

*20  1/13  Advisory  Committee  on  the 
Law  of  the  Sea;  closed  ses- 
sion Mar.  2,  open  and 
closed  .sessions  Mar.  3. 

*21  I/I3        U.S.,   Philippines  amend  tex- 

tile agreement,  Dec.  27. 

*22  1/16        New   U.S.-U.S.S.R.   hotline 

activated. 


*23 


*24 


*25 

*26 
*27 

28 
29 


*30 

1/18 

*3I 

1/19 

*32 

1/19 

*33 

1/19 

*34 

*35 
*36 

*37 

*38 
39 
40 


1/14  Vance:  telephone  interview  to 
town  hall  meeting, 
Springfield,  Mass. 

1/15  Dr.  Vincent  E.  McKelvey 
named  Senior  Scientific 
Advisor  to  U.S.  delegation 
to  the  Law  of  the  Sea  Con- 
ference and  Deputy  U.S. 
Representative  (biographic 
data). 

1/16  U.S.,  Singapore  amend  textile 
agreement.  Mar.  29,  June 
17,  Nov.  10  and  23. 

I/I7  Vance:  arrival  remarks. 
Jerusalem,  Jan.  16. 

1/17  Study  Group  6  of  the  U.S.  Or- 
ganization for  the  Interna- 
tional Radio  Consultative 
Committee  (CCIR),  Feb. 
14-15. 

1/17  Vance:  statement  at  opening 
session  of  the  Political 
Committee,  Jerusalem. 

1/18        Vance,    Begin.    Kamel:   ex- 
change of  toasts.  Jerusalem. 
Jan.  17. 
Vance:  remarks  to  the  press, 

Jerusalem. 
Vance:  remarks  to  the  press, 

Jerusalem.  Jan.  18. 
Vance:  remarks  to  the  press, 

Jerusalem,  Jan.  18. 
Study  Group  7  of  the  U.S.  Or- 
ganization for  the  Interna- 
tional Radio  Consultative 
Committee  (CCIR),  Feb. 
22. 

I/I9  U.S.  Advisory  Commission  on 
International  Educational 
and  Cultural  Affairs,  Feb. 
27. 

1/20  Vance,  Dayan:  departure  re- 
marks, Tel  Aviv. 

1/20  Advisory  Committee  on  Pri- 
vate International  Law, 
study  group  on  maritime 
law  matters,  Feb.  15. 

1/20  Shipping  Coordinating  Com- 
mittee, Subcommittee  on 
Safety  of  Life  at  Sea,  work- 
ing group  on  radiocom- 
munications.  Feb.   16. 

1/20  Vice  President  signs  air  trans- 
port agreement  between  the 
U.S.  and  Mexico. 

1/20  Vance,  Begin:  remarks  to  the 
press  following  their  meet- 
ing, Jerusalem,  Jan.   19. 

I/2I         Vance,  Sadat:  joint  news  coa- 


41 

1/21 

*42 

1/21 

'43 

1/21 

•44 

1/23 

45 

1/22 

*46 

1/25 

47 
t48 
♦49 

50 

*51 

*52 
*53 

♦54 


♦58 

♦59 

♦60 
♦61 

♦62 


1/23 
1/23 
1/23 

1/24 
1/24 

1/24 
1/27 

1/30 


♦55 

1/30 

♦56 

i/30 

♦57 

1/30 

1/30 

1/31 

2/1 
2/2 

2/6 


ference.      the      Barrage 

Egypt.  Jan.  20. 
Vance.    Okcun:    arrival   r« 

marks.  Ankara.  Jan.  20. 
Vance,  Ecevit:  remarks  befo 

working   dinner,   Ankara 

Jan.  20. 
Vance:  departure  statemen 

Ankara. 
Vance,    Papaligouras:    arriv 

remarks,  Athens,  Jan.  21. 
Vance.  Caramanlis:   remarl 

to  the  press.  Athens. 
Vance.   Papaligouras:   depa 

tare  statement.  Athens.  Jai 

22. 
Vance:  arrival  remarks,  Ai 

drews  Air  Force  Base,  Jai 

22. 
Vance:   statement  before  tl 

Senate   Governmental   A 

fairs  Committee. 
Vance:  remarks  to  the  pre 

following  his  statement  b 

fore  the  Senate  Governme 

tal  Affairs  Committee. 
Vance:  statement  before  tl 

House  Committee  on  Inle 

national  Relations. 
Vance:  remarks  to  the  pre 

following  his  statement  b 

fore  the  House  Commitli 

on  International  Relations 
U.S.,  Philippines  amend  te 

tile  agreement,  Jan.  4. 
Acting  Secretary  requests  Se 

retary   of  the    Interior 

withdraw  from  sale  ceria 

oil  and  gas  leases  in  Gulf 

Maine. 
Advisory  Committee  on  Pi 

vate  International  Law,  Fe 

22. 
U.S.,     Egypt     sign     texti 

agreement,  Dec.  7  and  28 
U.S.,    Poland    sign    texti 

agreement.  Jan.  9  and  12. 
Vance.  Dinitz:  remarks  to  tl 

press  following  their  mce 

ing,  Jan.  27. 
James  R.  Atwood  sworn  in 

Deputy  Assistant  Secrelai 

for  Transportation  Affai 

(biographic  data). 
Ocean      Affairs      Advisoi 

Committee,   marine  sciem 

section.  Mar.   16. 
U.S.,   Romania   sign   texti 

agreement,  Jan.  6. 
Program   for  official   visit  i 

Egyptian   President  Sada 

Feb.  3-8. 
Department  of  State  Bulleti 

overhauled.  ' 


*  Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  edition  of  the  Bulletin. 


Il^DEX 


FEBRUARY  1978 
^OL.  78,  NO.  2011 

Vfrica 

Vssessment  of  32d   UN     General  Assembly 

(Young)  52 

•oreign  Policy  Decisions  for  1978  (Vance)  ...  23 
'resident  Carter's  News  Conference  of  January 

12  (excerpts)     21 

irms  Control 

Assessment  of  32d   U.N.   General   Assembly 

I   (Young)  52 

roieign  Policy  Decisions  for  1978  (Vance)  ...  23 

;,tate  of  the  Union  (excerpts)    20 

jkviation.  U.S.,  Mexico  Initial  Aviation 
I   Agreements     59 

telgium.  President  Carter's  Visit  to  Europe, 
South  Asia,  and  the  Middle  East  (Carter, 
Gierek,  Khalid.  Pahlavi,  Sadat,  U.S. -Poland 
communique,  Delhi  Declaration)    1 

:ainbodia.  Human  Rights  in  Cambodia  (Chris- 
topher)     32 

.'ongress 

ecretary's  Report  on  the  Bureau  of  Human 
Rights  and  Humanitarian  Affairs   32 

ecretary  Vance  Visits  Israel  and  Egypt, 
January  16-22  (Begin,  Sadat,  Vance)     .  .   33 

ixth  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  from  Presi- 
dent Carter)     31 

tate  of  the  Union  (excerpts)    20 

/ar  Powers  Bill  (statement  by  President  Car- 
ter)     22 

yprus 

ecretary  Vance  Visits  Turkey  and  Greece 
(Caramanlis,  Okcun,  Vance)    30 

ixth  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  from  Presi- 
dent Carter)     31 

•epartment  and  Foreign  Service.  Secretary's 
Report  on  the  Bureau  of  Human  Rights  and 
Humanitarian  Affairs    32 

leveloping  Countries 

oreign  Policy  Decisions  for  1978  (Vance)  ...  23 

/orld  Population  Trends  (Green)    45 

conomics 

.ssessmeni  of  32d  U.N.  General  Assembly 
(Young)   52 

oreign  Policy  Decisions  for  1978  (Vance)     23 

resident  Carter's  Visit  to  Europe,  South  Asia, 
and  the  Middle  East  (Carter,  Gierek.  Khalid, 
Pahlavi,  Sadat,  U.S. -Poland  communique, 
Delhi  Declaration)     1 

tale  of  the  Union  (excerpts)    20 

•gyp« 

resident  Carter's  Visit  to  Europe,  South  Asia, 
and  the  Middle  East  (Carter,  Gierek.  Khalid. 
Pahlavi.  Sadat,  U.S. -Poland  communique, 
Delhi  Declaration)     1 

ecretary  Vance  Visits  Israel  and  Egypt, 
January  16-22  (Begin,  Sadat,  Vance)     ..   33 

;i  Salvador.  Letter  of  Credence  (Quinonez 
Meza)     59 

inergy 


J 


)iscussion  Paper  on  Energy    28 


President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  January 

12  (excerpts)    21 

President  Carter's  Visit  to  Europe,  South  Asia, 
and  the  Middle  East  (Carter,  Gierek,  Khalid, 
Pahlavi,   Sadat,  U.S. -Poland  communique, 

Delhi  Declaration)     1 

Prospects  for  the  Next  Decade  (Cooper)    .  .   26 

State  of  the  Union  (excerpts)    20 

Fisheries.  Foreign  Fishery  Allocations    ...  44 

France.   President  Carter's   Visit  to  Europe. 

South  Asia,  and  the  Middle  East  (Carter, 

Gierek,  Khalid,  Pahlavi,  Sadat,  U.S. -Poland 

communique,  Delhi  Declaration)   1 

Greece.   Secretary   Vance   Visits  Turkey  and 

Greece  (Caramanlis,  Okcun,  Vance)     ...   30 

Grenada.  Letter  of  Credence  (Dolland)  59 

Guatemala.   Letter  of  Credence  (Lamport 

Rodil)     59 

Human  Rights 

Assessment  of  32d  U.N.   General  Assembly 

(Young)  52 

Foreign  Policy  Decisions  for  1978  (Vance)   ...   23 

Human  Rights  in  Cambodia  (Christopher)   ....  32 

President  Carter's  Visit  to  Europe,  South  Asia, 

and  the  Middle  East  (Carter.  Gierek.  Khalid, 

Pahlavi,   Sadat,   U.S. -Poland  communique, 

Delhi  Declaration)     1 

Secretary's  Report  on  the  Bureau  of  Human 

Rights  and  Humanitarian  Affairs   32 

State  of  the  Union  (excerpts)    20 

Hungary.  Crown  of  St.  Stephen  (Vance)    29 

India.  President  Carter's  Visit  to  Europe, 
South  Asia,  and  the  Middle  East  (Carter, 
Gierek,  Khalid,  Pahlavi,  Sadat,  U.S. -Poland 

communique,  Delhi  Declaration)    1 

Iran.  President  Carter's  Visit  to  Europe.  South 
Asia,  and  the  Middle  East  (Carter.  Gierek, 
Khalid,  Pahlavi,  Sadat.  U.S. -Poland  com- 
munique. Delhi  Declaration)     1 

Israel.  Secretary  Vance  Visits  Israel  and 
Egypt,    January     16-22    (Begin,    Sadat, 

Vance)     33 

Italy.  Italy  (Department  statement)     32 

Japan.   US,  Japan  Trade  Agreement  (White 

House  statement)   25 

Law  of  the  Sea.   Law  of  the  Sea  Conference 

(Richardson)     39 

Mexico.  U.S.,  Mexico  Initial  Aviation  Agree- 
ments       59 

Middle  East 

Assessment  of  32d  U.N.   General  Assembly 

(Young)  52 

Chronology  of  Recent  Events   37 

Foreign  Policy  Decisions  for  1978  (Vance)     23 
President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  January 

12  (excerpts)    21 

State  of  the  Union  (excerpts)    20 

Military  Affairs.  War  Powers  Bill  (statement 

by  President  Carter)    22 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  Presi- 
dent Carter's  Visit  to  Europe.  South  Asia, 
and  the  Middle  East  (Carter.  Gierek.  Khalid, 
Pahlavi,    Sadat,   U.S. -Poland   communique, 

Delhi  Declaration)     1 

Nuclear  Policy 

President  Carter's  Visit  to  Europe,  South  Asia, 
and  the  Middle  East  (Carter,  Gierek,  Khalid, 
Pahlavi,   Sadat,  U.S. -Poland  communique, 

Delhi  Declaration)     1 

State  of  the  Union  (excerpts)    20 


Oceans 

Law  of  the  Sea  Conference  (Richardson)     ...  39 

Visions  of  the  Future  (Mink)    42 

Panama 

Foreign  Policy  Decisions  for  1978  (Vance)     23 

Panama      Canal      Treaties      (Richardson, 

Vance)     56 

State  of  the  Union  (excerpts)    20 

Poland.  President  Carter's  Visit  to  Europe, 
South  Asia,  and  the  Middle  East  (Carter, 
Gierek,  Khalid,  Pahlavi.  Sadat.  U.S. -Poland 

communique.  Delhi  Declaration)    1 

Population 

Foreign  Policy  Decisions  for  1978  (Vance)     23 

World  Trends  (Green)     45 

Presidential  Documents 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  January 

12  (excerpts)     ,.   21 

President  Carter's  Visit  to  Europe.  South  Asia, 

and  the  Middle  East    1 

Sixth  Report  on  Cyprus    31 

State  of  the  Union  (excerpts)    20 

War  Powers  Bill    22 

Publications.  Discussion  Paper  on  Energy  28 
Saudi  Arabia.  President  Carter's  Visit  to 
Europe,  South  Asia,  and  the  Middle  East 
(Carter,  Gierek,  Khalid,  Pahlavi.  Sadat, 
U.S. -Poland  communique,  Delhi  Declara- 
tion)         1 

Trade.   U.S.,  Japan  Trade  Agreement  (White 

House  statement)  25 

Treaties 

Current  Actions   60 

U.S.,  Mexico  Initial  Aviation  Agreements    ...  59 
Turkey.  Secretary   Vance  Visits  Turkey  and 
Greece  (Caramanlis,  Okcun,  Vance)     ...   30 
U.S.S.R. 

Foreign  Policy  Decisions  for  1978  (Vance).  .  .   23 
President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  January 

12  (excerpts)    21 

United  Nations 

Assessment  of  32d  U.N.   General  Assembly 

(Young)  52 

Benefits       From       the       U.N.       Agencies 

(Maynes)   48 

Summary  of  U.S.  Statements  at  the  United 
Nations    55 


Name  Index 

Begin,  Menahem   33 

Caramanlis,  Constantine    30 

Carter,  President  I,  20,  21.  22,  31 

Christopher,  Warren   32 

Cooper.  Richard  N    26 

Dolland,  Franklyn  O'Brien   59 

Gierek,  Edward    1 

Green,  Marshall     45 

King  Khalid  bin  Abdul  Aziz  1 

Lamport  Rodil,  Jorge   59 

Maynes,  Charles  William    48 

Mink.  Patsy  T    42 

Okcun,  Gunduz    30 

Pahlavi,  Mohammad  Reza  Shah  I 

Quinonez  Meza,  Roberto  59 

Richardson,  Elliot  L    39,  56 

Sadat,  Anwar  al-    1,33 

Vance,  Secretary    23,  29,  30,  33,  56 

Young,  Andrew  52 


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ii 


Deparitnent 


buUetBn 


MiUH'h  W7H 


Tie  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  78  /  Number  2012 


Ih'partmvnt  of  Sttiie 

bulletin 


Volume  78  /  Number  2012  /  March  1978 


Cover  Photos: 

Julius  L.  Katz 
Warren  Christopher 
Lucy  Wilson  Benson 
Secretary  Vance 
President  Carter 


The  Department  of  State  Blt - 
LETIN,  published  by  the  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of 
U.S.  foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to 
provide  the  public,  the  Congress,  and 
government  agencies  with  information 
on  developments  in  U.S.  foreign  rela- 
tions and  the  work  of  the  Department 
of  State  and  the  Foreign  Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include 
major  addresses  and  news  conferences 
of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
State;  statements  made  before  congres- 
sional committees  by  the  Secretary 
and  other  senior  State  Department  of- 
ficials; special  features  and  articles  on 
international  affairs;  selected  press  re- 
leases issued  by  the  White  House,  the 
Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
other  agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party. 

The  Secretary  of  State  has  deter- 
mined that  the  publication  of  this  peri- 
odical is  necessary  in  the  transaction  of 
the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  Use  of  funds  for 
printing  this  periodical  has  been  ap- 
proved by  the  Director  of  the  Office 
of  Management  and  Budget  through 
January  31,  1981. 

NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication 
are  not  copyrighted  and  items  con- 
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Bui  I  EiiN  as  the  source  will  be  appre- 
ciated. The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers"  Guide  to  Periodical  Litera- 
ture. 

For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402 

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CYRUS  R.  VANCE 

Secretary  of  State 

HODDING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affai 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 

Consulting  Editor 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

COLLEEN  SUSSMAN 

Assistant  Editor 


coivTEivrs 


INTERNATIONAL  COMMODITY  POLICY  (Julius  L.  Kat-J 


THE  PRESIDENT 

7  News  Conference.  January  30 

8  Foreign  Intelligence  Activities 

THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 

9  Visit  to  Canada  and  Mexico 

THE  SECRETARY 

13         News  Conference,  February  10 

18         General  Overview  of  1977  Activities 

AFRICA 

20  Namibia 

21  Southern  Rhodesia  (Department  Statement) 

ECONOMICS 

22  U.S.  Embargo  Policy  (Julius  L.  Katz) 

24  International  Aviation  Policy  (Richard  N.  Cooper) 

25  Debts  Owed  to  the  U.S.  (Robert  D.  Hormats) 

EUROPE 

27         Summary  of  U.S. -European  Relations  (George  S.  Vest) 

HUMAN  RIGHTS 

30         The  Diplomacy  of  the  First  Year  (Warren  Christopher) 
33         Indochinese  Refugees  (Patricia  M.  Derian) 

MIDDLE  EAST 

35         Visit  of  Egyptian  President  Sadat  ( White  House  Statements) 
37         Middle  East  Aircraft  Sales  (Secretary  Vance) 

37  Israeli  Settlements 

SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 

38  Technology  Transfer  Policies  (Joseph  S.  Nye,  Jr.) 

41  U.N.  Conference  on  Science  and  Technology  for  Development  (Foreign  Rela- 

tions Outline) 

SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 

42  Conventional  Arms  Transfer  Policy  (Lucy  Wilson  Benson) 

45         Administration  Officials  Testify  on  Arms  Transfer  Policy  (Lucy  Wilson  Benson, 

Barry  M.  Blechman.  Lt.  Gen.  H.M.  Fish.  Leslie  H.  Gelb) 
47         President  Carter's  Statement  on  Arms  Transfer  Policy 

TERRORISM 

53         Scope  of  the  Threat  and  Need  for  Effective  Legislation  (Secretary  Vance) 

WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

55         Panama  Canal  Treaties  (President  Carter) 

TREATIES  ^^ ',,,.«*  of  1 

58         Current  Actions 

61  PUBLICATIONS  r.rlN    ' 

62  PRESS  RELEASES  ppOSlT^ 
INDEX 


U.S.  COMMODITY  IMPORT  DEPENDENCE  AND  SOURCES  (1977  est.) 


Petroleum 

f     42%     j 


Cobalt 


f     97%    j 


Arab  OPEC  AS'/o  Zaire  AT'/o 

Non-Arab  OPEC  34%         Belgium  and  Luxembourg  24% 
(incl.  Iran  7.8%) 


Asbestos 

(     85%    j 

Canada  96% 


Manganese  Ore 


Zinc 


Canada  57%  \ 


Antimony 

(     52%     j 

Metal— P.R.C.  18% 
Mexico  16% 

Ore— South  Africa  44% 
Bolivia  20% 

Oxide— South  Africa  41% 
U.K.  22% 

Bauxite  (exc.  alumina) 

f     99%     j 

Jamaica  48% 
Surinam  18% 


Tin 

(       86%       j 

Malaysia  50% 
Thailand  14% 
Bolivia  14% 


Nickel 

(      70%      j 

Canada  60% 


Natural  Rubber 


Indonesia  45% 
Malaysia  30% 


Diamonds  (Industrial  stones) 
(1976) 


South  Africa  53% 
Zaire  11% 


NOTE:  Percentages  following  country  names  represent 
percentages  of  U.S.  imports,  not  consumption. 


Abaca 


Philippines  70% 
Ecuador  30% 


Ctiromium 

(     89%     j 

CHROMITE 
South  Africa  39% 
U.S.S.R.  24% 

FERROCHROMIUM 
South  Africa  34% 
Southern  Rhodesia  24% 


fcrch  1978 


II\TER]\ATIO]\AL  COMMODITY  POLICY 


{Julius  L.  Katz 

am  pleased  to  have  this  opportunity 
testify  before  your  subcommittee  in 
|)port  of  H.R.  9486,  a  bill  to  au- 
rize  a  contribution  of  up  to  5,000 
trie  tons  of  tin  metal  to  the  buffer 
ick  operated  by  the  International  Tin 
reement.  To  set  this  question  in  its 
'per  context,  I  would  like  to  outline 
administration's  general  interna- 
lal  commodity  policy  and  the  status 
current  international  discussions  on 
eral  other  key  commodities. 
The  United  States  is  a  major  Con- 
ner and  producer  of  many  critical 
/  materials — both  mineral  and  ag- 
iltural.  We  have  a  stake  in  the  effi- 
nt  functioning  of  the  international 
rkets  for  such  commodities.  Our  ob- 
tives  are  two-fold  and  address 
rt-term  and  long-term  problems  of 
ance  between  market  supply  and 
nand. 

n  the  short  term  we  recognize  that 
reme  and  erratic  fluctuations  in 
nmodity  prices  can  damage  our 
;rests  and  those  of  developing  coun- 
s  which  depend  on  the  export  of  a 
'  major  commodities.  This  problem 
i  made  clear  during  the  great  com- 
dity  boom-bust  cycle  of  1973-75 
ich  paralleled  the  onset  of  the  petro- 
m  crisis.  Sharp  boosts  in  commodity 
:es  can  add  impetus  to  domestic  in- 
tion  in  our  economy  through 
ssure  on  manufacturing  costs  and 
ges.  The  rise  in  costs  becomes  em- 
Ided  in  the  economic  structure  and 
sists  long  after  commodity  prices 
ve  downward.  The  sharp  declines  in 
/  material  prices,  which  usually  fol- 
/  peaks  in  the  commodity  price  cy- 
,  also  injure  producers  and  cause 
Bjor  drops  in  the  foreign  exchange 
ernings  of  developing  country 
fiducers. 

n  the  longer  term  we  have  an  inter- 

e  in  assuring  needed  supplies  of  basic 

fv  materials  at  reasonable  prices.  This 

r  uires  adequate  flows  of  new  invest- 

•  nt  to  insure  that  new  supplies  can  be 

Hight  into  the  market  to  keep  pace 

N  h  rising  demand.  Excessive  price  in- 

.'  bility  works  against  this  interest  by 

('  ating  uncertainty  on  the  part  of  in- 

stors  about  expected  returns  from 

)jects. 

This    long-term   global    supply 

allenge — in  agricultural  and  nonag- 

liultural  commodities — is  being  met 

'  rtly  through  domestic  investment  but 


also  through  a  variety  of  international 
mechanisms,  including  bilateral  aid. 
investment  insurance,  international  fi- 
nancial institutions,  and  private  foreign 
investment. 

Sources  of  Financing 

Private  multinational  corporations 
will  undoubtedly  remain  essential  to 
achieving  adequate  supplies  of  raw  ma- 
terials for  the  global  economy  in  the 
foreseeable  future.  Recognizing  that 
prospect,  and  the  fact  that  developing 
countries  are  likely  to  provide  a  grow- 
ing share  of  global  reserves  of  key  raw 
materials,  investment  insurance  pro- 
grams, such  as  those  of  the  Overseas 
Private  Investment  Corporation 
(OPIC),  help  create  conditions  condu- 
cive to  sound  investments.  By 
ameliorating  political  risk  factors, 
OPIC  enables  prospective  investors  to 
make  decisions  based  mainly  on  eco- 
nomic criteria  and  in  this  way  contrib- 
utes to  a  more  efficient  allocation  of 
capital  resources. 

Despite  the  continued  importance  of 
foreign  investment,  national  resource 
exploitation   in  developing  countries 


has,  in  recent  years,  been  marked  by  a 
growing  role  for  national  governments. 
The  traditional  long-term  concession 
agreement  between  the  host  country 
and  foreign  investor  has  given  way  to  a 
variety  of  complex  contractual  ar- 
rangements which  have  resulted  in 
more  active  government  participation, 
if  not  control.  Furthermore,  in  the  face 
of  rapidly  escalating  costs,  the  major 
source  of  financing  has  shifted  from  in- 
ternally generated  capital  of  private 
corporations  to  debt. 

Under  these  changing  circumstances, 
international  financial  institutions,  such 
as  the  World  Bank,  with  our  support 
are  providing  new  sources  of  invest- 
ment capital.  World  Bank  participation 
can  also  act  as  a  catalyst  to  private  in- 
vestment in  some  cases  by  providing  a 
buffer  between  the  host  government 
and  prospective  private  operators  or 
commercial  creditors. 

The  Integrated  Program 

The  United  States  is  now  engaged  in- 
ternationally in  a  comprehensive  effort 
to  deal  with  these  problems  of  com- 
modity trade  in  the  so-called  Integrated 


Julius  h  Katz  was  born  in  New  York  Cily 
on  March  9,  1925.  He  received  his  B.A,  de- 
gree from  the  George  Washington  University 
and  served  with  U.S.  Amiy  in  Europe  from 
1943-45. 

Mr.  Katz  began  his  career  with  the  De- 
partment of  State  in  1950,  holding  several 
positions  dealing  with  U.S.  economic  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union,  Yugoslavia,  Po- 
land, and  other  countries  of  Eastern  Europe. 

He  was  designated  Deputy  Director  of  the 
Office  of  International  Trade  in  1963  and 
promoted  to  Director  in  1965.  In  this  capac- 
ity he  was  primarily  concerned  with  the  Ken- 
nedy Round  of  trade  negotiations  under  the 
auspices  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade  and  attended  a  number  of  meetings 
and  working  parties  of  the  GATT.  His  re- 
sponsibilities also  involved  bilateral  negotia- 
tions and  legislative  activities  in  the  trade 
field  In  1967  Mr.  Katz  was  named  Director 
of  the  Office  of  International  Commodities. 

Mr.  Katz  was  appointed  the  senior  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Economic  and  Busi- 
ness in  April  1974.  From  July  1968  until 
April  1976  he  was  Deputy  Assistant  Secre- 
tary for  International  Resources  and  Food 
Policy — serving  in  a  dual  capacity  from  1974 


to  1976.  Mr.  Katz  was  sworn  in  as  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Economic  and  Business  Affairs 
in  September  1976.  Mr.  Katz  is  the  recipient 
of  the  Department's  Superior  Service  Award 
(1965)  and  the  Distinguished  Honor  Award 
(19761.  the  Department's  highest  award. 


Department  of  State  Bull  i 


Program  for  Commodities.  This  pro- 
gram was  first  put  forward  in  1975  in 
the  United  Nations  Conference  on 
Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD)  by 
the  UNCTAD  Secretariat  with  the 
strong  support  of  the  developing  coun- 
tries. Implementation  of  the  program 
was  called  for  at  UNCTAD  IV  in 
Nairobi  in  May  1976. 

The  program  involves  technical  dis- 
cussions in  UNCTAD  of  market  condi- 
tions for  IX  major  commodities.  These 
technical  discussions  are  to  be  followed 
where  appropriate  by  efforts  to 
negotiate  international  price  stabiliza- 
tion agreements  and  other  measures  to 
improve  the  functioning  of  the  market. 
We  have  been  participating  actively  in 
these  discussions  since  1976,  and  they 
will  continue  throughout  1978. 

The  Administration  believes  that  in- 
ternational price  stabilization  arrange- 
ments should  be  considered  for  specific 
commodities  where  such  arrangements 
are  feasible  and  appropriate.  Where 
markets  do  not  permit  smooth  adjust- 
ments to  shifts  in  supply  and  demand, 
there  may  be  a  case  for  international 
agreements  to  improve  the  way  in 
which  a  particular  commodity  market 
operates.  We  prefer  to  use  instruments 
which  enhance,  rather  than  replace, 
market  mechanisms.  The  technical  ob- 
jective in  any  given  case  would  be  to 
stabilize  the  market  price  of  the  com- 
modity around  its  long-term  trend,  as 
determined  by  the  forces  of  supply  and 
demand.  We  are  opposed  to  arrange- 
ments which  introduce  artificially  rigid 
mechanisms  to  replace  fully  operative 
markets  or  which  try  to  peg  prices  at 
artificially  high  levels. 

Ideally,  we  would  prefer  to  stabilize 
commodity  prices  through  the  opera- 
tion of  internationally  constituted  and 
financed  buffer  stocks.  Such  buffer 
stocks  would  seek  to  reduce  price  fluc- 
tuations around  long-term  market 
trends.  A  buffer  stock  would  buy  the 
commodity  to  defend  the  minimum 
price  objectives  and  would  release 
stocks  to  the  market  to  protect  the 
maximum  price  objectives.  This  tech- 
nique permits  market  forces  to  operate 
within  the  agreed  price  objectives.  Dis- 
tortions of  the  market  can  thus  be 
minimized  so  that  producers  and  inves- 
tors can  respond  to  market  signals  in 
making  decisions  on  investment  and  re- 
source allocations. 

But  the  establishment  of  buffer 
stocks  is  not  a  simple  matter,  given  the 
complexities  of  the  particular  market 
and  the  international  negotiation  proc- 
ess. It  is  often  difficult,  in  practice,  to 
formulate  a  stabilization  system  based 
on  a  pure  buffer  stock  model.  Long- 
term  market  trends  are  frequently  dif- 
ficult to  determine.   The  width  of  the 


price  band  and  the  calculation  of  the 
size  of  the  buffer  stock  required  to  de- 
fend the  band  can  be  difficult  technical 
problems.  These  problems  are  com- 
pounded when  one  tries  to  decide  on 
such  details  in  negotiations  with  other 
governments  which  often  have  differ- 
ing views  on  these  issues. 

Objective  conditions  prevailing  in 
particular  markets  may  also  require  the 
use  of  other  mechanisms.  "Pure"'  buf- 
fer stocks  are  not  always  appropriate. 
Not  all  commodities  can  be  easily 
stored,  and  costs  may  sometimes  make 
an  international  stocking  arrangement 
infeasible.  In  such  instances,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  new  International  Sugar 
Agreement,  it  may  be  necessary  to 
adopt  market-sharing  arrangements, 
with  export  quotas  for  producers 
backed  by  nationally  held  and  interna- 
tionally coordinated  reserve  stocks. 
Such  a  system  provides  for  stocks  to 
absorb  a  portion  of  surplus  production 
which  is  then  available  to  protect  the 
ceiling  price  in  the  agreement.  Arbi- 
trary and  rigid  controls  on  production 
can  thus  be  avoided.  Such  controls,  as 
1  will  later  mention  with  respect  to  the 
tin  agreement,  are  generally  destabiliz- 
ing. By  holding  down  production  and 
investment,  they  prevent  the  buildup  of 
stocks  which  respond  to  excessive  price 
increases. 

I  might  point  out  here  that,  in  the 
debate  over  the  relative  merits  of  buffer 
stocking  as  opposed  to  supply  man- 
agement, the  issue  of  the  cost  of  buffer 
stocking  is  often  overstated.  The  capi- 
tal costs  of  a  buffer  stock  (e.g.,  cop- 
per) are  often  thrown  up  as  a  major 
argument  against  such  devices.  A  bal- 
anced argument,  however,  must  take 
into  account  the  economic  benefits 
which  might  flow  from  such  a  stock  as 
well  as  the  costs.  Stabilization  through 
such  a  mechanism  may  give  rise  to  net 
benefits  through  reduced  inflation; 
greater  assurance  of  adequate  supply  at 
reasonable  prices;  and,  over  the  long 
run,  more  stable  export  earnings  for 
producers. 

Price  stabilization  measures,  how- 
ever, are  not  necessary  or  appropriate 
for  all  commodities.  For  example, 
there  are  some  commodities,  such  as 
jute,  which  suffer  from  a  long-term  de- 
cline in  demand.  In  such  cases,  other 
measures  may  be  called  for,  such  as 
market  promotion  and  research  and  de- 
velopment for  new  products  or  new 
uses.  In  the  case  of  commodities, 
which  are  in  chronic  oversupply,  di- 
versification programs  to  promote  pro- 
duction of  other  commodities  may  be 
needed. 

The  choice  among  these  approaches 
will  depend  on  a  rigorous  analysis  of 
each  commoditv  market   to  determine 


what  imperfections  exist  and  \. 
techniques  might  be  most  suitabl, 
correct  them.  There  is  no  single 
mula  that  can  be  applied  in  every  c 
Whatever  the  approach,  our  comi 
ment  is  to  work  seriously  with  o 
governments  to  develop  workal 
beneficial  means  of  handling  comrr 
ity  trade  problems. 

Compensatory  Finance 

Aside  from  the  commodity-spec 
framework  of  UNCTAD,  we  have  ; 
been  addressing  the  more  gene 
balance-of-payments  problems  wf 
developing  countries  often  confron 
unstable  raw  material  markets.  Sine 
was  liberalized   in    1975,  fhe  Intei 
tional  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  Comp 
satory  Finance  Facility  has  provided 
fective  relief  in  the  form  of  loan  fu 
to  countries  experiencing   short-tin 
export  earnings   shortfalls.    If,    ■ 
example,  a  country's  overall  ex| 
earnings  decline  for  a  particular  yea  s 
a  result  of  a  cyclical   slump  in  wi  il 
prices  or  demand  for  raw  materi  . 
that  country  can  receive  IMF  finant  e 
to  help  compensate  for  the   short! 
This  mechanism  thus  alleviates  the 
pact  of  commodity  market  fluctuati 
on  foreign  exchange  earnings  and  j 
mils  governments  to  plan  their  own 
velopment  programs  with  greater 
tainty  about  the  resources  that  wil 
available. 


Specific  Commodity  Issues 

I  want  to  turn  now  to  some  exami 
of  specific  commodity  agreements 
negotiations  in  which  we  are  invol 
to  illustrate  the  problems  that  arist 
moving  from  general  principles  to 
practical  problems  of  commodity  n. 
kets. 

Tin.  The  United  Stales  joined 
Fifth  International  Tin  Agreem 
(ITA)  in  1976,  and  we  have  pari 
pated  actively  since  then  in  the  Inter 
tional  Tin  Council  (ITC),  the  IT 
executive  body.  We  entered  the  agi 
ment  because  we  judged  that  U.S.  [ 
ticipation  would  help  to  further  our 
ternational  economic  and  politi 
interests.  On  the  economic  side. 
United  States  is  the  leading  consul 
of  tin.  We  acquire  more  than  SOV* 
our  current  tin  consumption  fr 
abroad,  with  the  remainder  com 
from  domestic  secondary  productii 
The  metal  is  an  important  basic  in 
for  key  industrial  uses,  especially 
the  steel  and  solder  industries. 

The  tin  trade  is  even  more  import 
for  the  exporting  countries  in  i 
ITA — particularly  Malaysia,  Boliv 
and   Thailand — where   it   is  a  ma 


irch  1978 


irce  of  domestic  employment,  gov- 
iment  revenue,  and  export  earnings, 
joining  the  tin  council,  the  United 
jltes  put  itself  in  a  better  position  to 
illuence  the  council's  policies  affect- 
;  the  long-term  supply  of  tin,  thus 
itecting  both  American  industry  and 
isumers.  Our  decision  clearly  dem- 
itrated  our  commitment  to  the  idea 
joint  producer-consumer  cooperation 
international  raw  materials  problems 
i  also  reaffirmed  our  willingness  to 
pond   forthrightly   to  the   legitimate 
ids  of  the  developing  world. 
The  intent  of  the  ITA  is  to  balance 
;mational  supply  and  demand  of  tin, 
bilizing  the  price  within  an  agreed 
id  at  levels  deemed  to  be  both  re- 
inerative  for  producers  and  fair  to 
isumers.  To  the  extent  that  the  ITA 
be  effective  in  achieving  those  ob- 
tives,   it  can  contribute  to  the  eco- 
mic   health  of  the   participating 
intries   and   also  demonstrate   the 
sibility  of  international  cooperation 
dealing  with  major  trade   and  de- 
Dpmental  problems. 
The  purpose  of  the  bill  now  before 
committee  is  to  help  rectify  several 
^or  problems  which  have  hampered 
ITA  historically.  The  most  impor- 
of  these  is  that  the  buffer  stock  op- 
fed  by  the  agreement  has  been  too 
MI  to  stabilize  the  world  tin  price  ef- 
tively.   In  periods  of  slack  demand 
I  falling  prices,  the  buffer  stock 
a  Id  not  absorb  enough  metal  from  the 
irket  to  defend  the  floor  price.  This 
h    led  the  tin  council  to  rely  exces- 
s:;ly  on  export  controls,   the  other 
n  or  component  of  the  ITA's  stabili- 
i  ion  machinery,  to  keep  the  price 
c  the  floor  level.   Conversely, 
-jn  shortages  have  appeared   and 
pi:es  have  hit  the  price  ceiling,  the 
b  fer  stock  has  had  insufficient  metal 
t(  release  into  the  market  to  dampen 
tl  price  rise. 

application  of  these  controls  has 
teied  to  inhibit   production  and  dis- 
ci rage  new  investment  in  the  tin  in- 
i  try.  Over  the  short  term,  export 
<:<  trols  are  inherently  more  cumber- 
sue  and  slower  to  take  effect  in  the 
■^'ket  than  are  buffer  stock  purchases 
^ales.  There  are  long  lags  between 
imposition  and  subsequent  relaxa- 
1  of  such  controls  and  any  actual 
luact  on  market  supplies  and  prices. 
1 ;  result  has  been  the  development  of 
c  onic  tin  shortages  and  a  tripling  of 
t>  tin  price  over  the  past  5  years.  This 
s  aation   has  been   made   worse,   of 
-  rse,  by  the  exhaustion  of  the  ITA's 
ter  stock  in  the  face  of  such  price 
iijreases. 

Another  important  factor  which  in- 
t'lferes  with  price  stabilization  and 
spply  growth  is  the  imposition  of  ex- 


cessively high  production  taxes  and  re- 
strictive licensing  practices  by  some 
producing  country  governments. 

The  combination  of  export  controls 
and  production  limitations,  together 
with  restrictive  domestic  tax  and  in- 
vestment policies,  has  produced  a  per- 
sistent deficit  between  tin  metal  pro- 
duction and  consumption.  Production 
of  tin  concentrates  has  dropped  from  a 
peak  of  196,000  metric  tons  in  1972  to 
185,000  tons  in  1977.  In  1977  the  gap 
between  current  world  tin  metal  pro- 
duction and  consumption  was  approxi- 
mately 20,000  metric  tons,  a  figure 
which  is  not  expected  to  decline  ap- 
preciably in  1978. 

This  deficit  will  persist  at  least  until 
1980  and  will  generate  continued  pres- 
sure on  tin  prices,  in  the  absence  of  in- 
fusions of  metal  into  the  market  from 
the  General  Services  Administration 
(GSA)  stockpile  and  other  sources. 
While  the  average  New  York  price  in 
1972  was  Si. 77  per  pound,  the  latest 
price  is  around  $5.30  a  pound.  This  is 
above  the  $4.60  ceiling  price  of  the 
ITA's  price  band,  a  situation  which  has 
prevailed  for  the  last  14  months  in  spite 
of  several  upward  shifts  in  the  band 
during  that  period.  The  obvious  failure 
of  supply  to  respond  to  these  price  in- 
creases clearly  shows  the  effects  of  the 
export  control  policies  followed  by  the 
ITA  and  the  major  producers.  In  sum, 
the  world  tin  market  is  not  functioning 
efficiently. 

The  contribution  to  the  tin  buffer 
stock  which  H.R.  9486  would  au- 
thorize is  intended  to  help  alleviate  this 
situation  and  to  make  the  ITA  a  more 
effective  stabilization  instrument.  It 
should  also  support  the  efforts  of  im- 
porting countries  to  persuade  the  major 
producers  that  a  modification  of  their 
tax  and  investment  policies  is  essential 
to  our  joint  efforts  to  insure  stable 
long-run  growth  in  the  tin  market. 

The  ITA  provides  for  a  buffer  stock 
with  a  nominal  level  of  40,000  metric 
tons.  Half  of  this  is  to  be  in  the  form  of 
mandatory  contributions  from  produc- 
ers with  the  rest  made  up  of  voluntary 
contributions  of  metal  or  the  cash 
equivalent  from  consuming  countries. 
Six  other  consuming  countries  have 
thus  far  contributed  or  pledged  the 
equivalent  of  about  4,000  metric  tons. 
Our  contribution  would,  we  believe, 
encourage  other  consumers  to  contrib- 
ute. It  would  also  demonstrate,  in  con- 
crete fashion,  the  seriousness  of  our 
commitment  to  participate  in  workable 
international  commodity  arrangements. 

Since  we  consider  that  the  ITA  has 
economic  benefits  for  us,  both  with  re- 
spect to  short-term  stabilization  and 
long-term  assurance  of  reasonably 
priced  supplies,  we  should  share  the 


cost  of  making  it  work.  We  have  stated 
that  the  same  principle  of  mutual 
producer-consumer  responsibility 
applies  as  well  to  other  commodity 
agreements  which  we  have  recently 
joined  or  may  join. 

An  increase  in  the  buffer  stock  will 
also  strengthen  our  arguments  within 
the  tin  council  against  the  excessive 
and  prolonged  use  of  export  controls. 
A  larger  buffer  stock  should  permit  the 
ITA  to  moderate  the  price  volatility 
which  has  plagued  the  tin  industry  dur- 
ing the  1970's.  Over  the  longer  run, 
such  enhanced  price  stability,  along 
with  appropriate  tax  and  investment 
policies  in  producing  countries,  should 
help  bring  about  the  new  investment 
necessary  to  assure  adequate  supplies 
of  tin  in  the  1980's  and  beyond. 

The  provisions  of  H.R.  9486  would 
assist  us  to  carry  out  our  objectives 
with  regard  to  the  ITA.  The  bill  would 
authorize  the  President  to  direct  the 
Administrator  of  the  General  Services 
Administration  to  transfer  up  to  5,000 
metric  tons  of  tin  metal  to  the  Interna- 
tional Tin  Council.  The  contribution 
would  be  made  from  metal  which  is 
surplus  to  our  needs  under  the  Strategic 
and  Critical  Materials  Stock  Piling  Act. 
At  the  moment,  GSA  holds  some 
168,000  tons  of  surplus  tin  out  of  a 
total  stockpile  of  201,000  tons,  so  that 
the  bill  would  have  no  impact  on  our 
strategic  needs  for  the  metal. 

Based  on  the  number  of  votes  we 
have  in  the  tin  council  {269c  of  total 
consumer  votes)  our  pro  rata  share  of 
the  20,000  tons  of  consumer  contribu- 
tions provided  for  in  the  agreement  is 
5,220  tons.  This  quantity  at  the  current 
ITC  floor  price  would  have  a  value  of 
$43.5  million  which  is  the  valuation 
given  to  our  contribution  for  purposes 
of  liquidation  and  repayment  to  the 
United  States  upon  termination  of  the 
agreement.  At  current  market  prices, 
however,  $43.5  million  would  equate 
to  approximately  3,500  tons  of  tin 
metal.  It  is  this  quantity,  therefore,  that 
the  United  States  would  contribute  in 
the  present  circumstances.  Should 
either  the  market  or  ITC  floor  price 
change  prior  to  the  contribution,  how- 
ever, the  amount  of  the  contribution 
would  be  adjusted  accordingly.  We  an- 
ticipate that  the  tin  will  remain  physi- 
cally in  the  United  States  and  will  be 
sold  here. 

This  contribution  will  not  disrupt  the 
tin  market.  As  I  noted  earlier,  the  mar- 
ket price  is  substantially  above  the 
ITA's  present  price  ban.  The  release  of 
additional  tin  metal  through  our  contri- 
bution will  help  to  dampen  these  high 
market  prices.  Some  producer  countries 
themselves,  realizing  that  excessively 
high  prices  will  cause  a  long-term  shift 


in  consumption  away  from  tin.  wel- 
come our  proposed  addition  to  the  tin 
buffer  stock. 

1  would  note  here  that  while  we  have 
used  the  term  "'contribution,'"  we  are 
in  effect  making  an  investment  in  the 
tin  buffer  stock.  This  investment  will 
be  returned  to  us  at  the  termination  of 
the  agreement  in  1981,  along  with  our 
pro  rata  share  of  any  profits  resulting 
from  buffer  stock  operations.  While  a 
profit  is  not  guaranteed,  contributions 
have  earned  an  average  return  of  8% 
per  annum  in  past  agreements. 

Wheat.  As  you  know,  a  negotiating 
conference  convened  in  Geneva  last 
week  to  begin  negotiations  on  a  new  In- 
ternational Wheat  Agreement  that 
would  replace  the  1971  International 
Wheat  Agreement,  which  lapses  this 
June.  The  conference  will  consider 
both  a  new  wheat  trade  convention  and 
a  new  agreement  of  food  aid  to  food- 
deficit  developing  countries.  Our  prin- 


cipal objective  in  these  talks  is  to  ob- 
tain an  agreement  that  will  help  to 
stabilize  world  wheat  prices,  expand 
trade  in  wheat,  and  enhance  world  food 
security. 

We  are  the  largest  wheat-exporting 
country.  Our  share  in  total  world  wheal 
exports  for  the  current  crop  year  will  be 
around  407c — down  from  477f  in 
1972-75  but  still  crucial  for  our  overall 
trade  position  and  the  well-being  of  our 
domestic  producers.  Our  dominant  po- 
sition in  wheat  trade,  however,  has  car- 
ried with  it  certain  costs.  Because  some 
countries  insulate  their  domestic  mar- 
kets from  world  trade,  we  have  borne  a 
disproportionate  share  of  the  burden  of 
adjusting  world  supplies  to  shifts  in 
demand.  We  have  held  the  world's 
wheat  reserve  stock,  and  it  is  our  farm- 
ers who  have  had  to  adjust  production 
to  meet  major  variations  in  world  de- 
mand for  wheat. 

I  cannot  now  describe  in  detail  the 


Department  of  State  BuUi 

provisions  which  will  emerge  from 
negotiations.  The  text  under  considt 
tion.  however,  includes  all  the  mi 
elements  we  proposed  in  the  Inter 
tional  Wheat  Council  last  year.  1 
system,  in  our  view,  should  be  ba 
upon  nationally  held,  internationi 
coordinated  wheat  reserve  stocks  wh 
would  be  used  to  stabilize  the  wc 
wheat  price  within  a  wide  price  bai 
We  are  opposed  to  setting  rij 
maximum  and  minimum  trading  pri 
since  experience  shows  that  such  ri 
limits  could  not  work  without  eqUL 
rigid  market-sharing  provisions.  Si 
an  agreement  would  not  be  accepta 
to  any  of  the  major  participants  in 
negotiations. 

Any   wheat  agreement   needs  to 
accompanied    by    provisions 
liberalizing  the  world  grain  trade, 
should   insure  that  efficient  produc. 
have  an  incentive  to  maintain  prod 
tive  capacity.   One  or  two  countn 


V, 


In 


DEVELOPING  COUNTRY  DEPENDENCE  ON  PRIMARY  PRODUCTS  FOR  FOREIGN  EXCHANGE  EARNINGS 


LflTin  pmERicfl 

BOLIVIA 

CHILE 

COLOMBIA 

DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC 

ECUADOR 

PANAMA 

URUGUAY 
VENEZUELA 

nEftR  efl/T 

IRAN 

IRAQ 

KUWAIT 

SAUDI  ARABIA 

/OUTH  fi/m 

SRI  LANKA 
BANGLADESH 

efl/T  fl/ifl 

INDONESIA 
MALAYSIA 


Source:  International  Financial  Statistics.  1976. 


flFRICfl 

ALGERIA 

BURUNDI 

CENT.  AFRICAN  EMP. 

ETHIOPIA 

GAMBIA 

GHANA 

LIBERIA 

LIBYA 

MAURITANIA 

MAURITIUS 

RWANDA 

SENEGAL 

SIERRA  LEONE 

SOMALIA 

SUDAN 

UGANDA 

ZAIRE 

ZAMBIA 


cotton    col  Bn 
skins/hides  i 


iro 


h  1978 


iiiki  not  he  forced  to  carry  the  major 
iiion   of  adjustment    to    market 

IIILICS. 

^(iffee.  Coffee  is  a  commodity  for 

kIi  we  already  have  an  agreement. 

hict,  the  United  States  has  partici- 

cd   in   three   International   Coffee 

! cements  since    1962.   The  charac- 

sucs  of  the  coffee  economy  and  its 

rkct  conditions  dictated  a  market- 

iiiig  approach   in   this  case   rather 

.1  buffer  stock  approach.  Coffee 

^Linents  have  relied   primarily  on 

I'll  quotas  to  insure  orderly  market- 

iif  surplus  production  and  stocks 

,i^li  prevailed  for  most  of  the  I960"s. 

r-    1962   and    1968  agreements  suc- 

:  ded  in  their  objectives  of  preventing 

ol lapse  of  coffee  prices  to  disaster 

_,ls  and  of  encouraging  exporters 

move  into  other  products  offering 

her  returns.   In  retrospect  it  seems 

the  disincentives  to  new   invest- 

11^  were  excessive  as  was  the  de- 

e  in  stocks  during  this  period.  Thus 

world  was  ill-prepared  for  the  sharp 

Auction    losses   in    Brazil    and 

\^here  in  1975,  resulting  in  record 

1  prices. 

he    1976   International   Coffee 

\  eement  is  essentially  a  standby 

1    eiiient.  intended  to  encourage  a  re- 

er\    of  production  from  the  tight 

I  pl\  situation  brought  on  by  the  1975 

Bziiian  frost  and  temporary  declines 

•Droduction  in  other  producing  coun- 

^    The  export  quotas  provided  for  in 

:  aj:reement  are  in  suspense  and  will 

m  come  into  effect  until  the  market 

pi  e  descends  to  the  trigger  levels  set 

ir  he  agreement. 

he  formula  employed  currently 
w  lid  place  the  trigger  levels  between 
6  5C  and  77.50  per  pound,  although 
t\  /  can  be  adjusted  by  mutual  agree- 
irnt  of  producing  and  consuming 
Ci  ntries.  Export  quotas  would  be  dis- 
ti  uted  among  producers  largely  on 
th  basis  of  their  historical  export  per- 
f(  nance  in  the  postfrost  period  and 
a.)  according  to  their  proportion  of 
ttil  world  stocks. 

"his  arrangement  is  meant  to  en- 

ci  rage  producers  to  market  available 

SI  plies  in  the  short  run   and   in  the 

Uger  term   to  follow   more  rational 

king  policies.   The  latter  point  is 

eeially  important  because  a  buildup 

jarryover  stocks  will  moderate  fu- 

price  escalation.   The  agreement 

•  includes  a  provision  for  the  sus- 

iMon  of  export  quotas   when   the 

ikct  price  has  risen    15%  above 

eiier  the  average  for  the  previous  year 

0  an  agreed  price  range.  This  provi- 

1  should  permit  accumulated  stocks 

:nter  the  market  and  moderate  the 

e  rise.  The  existence  of  adequate 

-ks  in   producer  countries  will  be 


crucial  to  the  success  of  this 
mechanism. 

The  members  of  the  agreement  have 
also  begun  a  study  of  the  feasibility  of 
putting  national  stocks  under  some 
form  of  international  control.  This 
study  is  provided  for  by  one  of  the  pro- 
visions of  the  agreement.  We  partici- 
pated fully  in  the  first  meeting  of  the 
study  group.  There  are  many  problems 
that  need  to  be  explored  in  detail.  Still, 
we  welcome  a  thorough  examination  of 
all  the  possibilities  for  pursuing  the 
goals  of  the  agreement  through  interna- 
tional stocking  arrangements. 

While  prices  reached  extraordinarily 
high  levels  during  1977  as  a  result  of 
catastrophic  frost  in  Brazil  and  produc- 
tion disturbances  in  other  countries, 
coffee  production  is  now  recovering 
from  the  low  levels  of  1975,  1976,  and 
1977,  especially  in  Brazil.  As  a  result, 
prices  have  begun  to  decline. 

Rubber.  International  discussions  on 
the  stabilization  of  the  world  market 
for  natural  rubber  have  been  going  on 
since  early  1977  under  the  sponsorship 
of  UNCTAD.  Technical  work  on  the 
operation  of  the  market  and  possible 
elements  of  a  workable  stabilization 
agreement  are  well  advanced,  and  at 
their  next  meeting  beginning  February 
27,  producing  and  consuming  countries 
are  expected  to  decide  to  convene 
negotiations  on  an  agreement  later  this 
year. 

Our  interest  in  such  an  agreement 
would  be  to  seek  to  stabilize  the  price 
of  natural  rubber  and  to  encourage  the 
investment  we  believe  will  be  needed 
to  increase  production  in  the  mid- 
1980  "s  when  shortages  of  natural  rub- 
ber are  forecast.  Higher  synthetic  rub- 
ber prices  and  greater  use  of  radial  tires 
have  increased  demand  for  natural  rub- 
ber, and  we  have  an  interest  in  helping 
to  assure  a  growing  supply  of  natural 
rubber  at  stable  prices. 

There  is  still  no  consensus  among 
producers  and  consumers,  however, 
about  the  details  of  an  acceptable  rub- 
ber agreement.  On  the  basis  of  the 
studies  done  within  the  executive 
branch,  as  well  as  the  international 
consultations  which  have  been  held,  we 
have  concluded  that  it  could  be  feasible 
to  establish  an  international  buffer 
stock  for  natural  rubber  which  could 
stabilize  prices  within  a  reasonable 
range.  We  are,  therefore,  prepared  to 
participate  actively  in  the  negotiations 
for  a  natural  rubber  agreement  and  to 
recommend  U.S.  participation  if  a 
satisfactory  agreement  is  concluded. 

Copper.  International  discussions  on 
the  need  for  stabilization  of  the  world 
copper  market  have  been  going  on  for 
more  than  a  year  under  UNCTAD 
sponsorship.   Copper  is  one   of  the 


major  commodities  in  international 
trade,  with  more  than  $5  billion  traded 
in  1976.  We  are  the  world's  largest 
producer  and  consumer  of  copper.  Al- 
though we  are  not  heavily  dependent  on 
foreign  sources  of  supply,  excessive 
instability  in  the  world  copper  market 
does  have  a  serious  effect  on  our  pro- 
ducers and  consumers  of  copper. 

Prices  worldwide  are  currently  de- 
pressed as  a  result  of  slow  economic 
growth  in  major  consuming  countries 
and  continued  high  levels  of  produc- 
tion, particularly  by  developing  coun- 
try producers.  The  large  overhang  of 
supply  has  pushed  prices  below  aver- 
age U.S.  production  costs  and  has  led 
to  a  recent  upswing  in  imports.  Our  net 
imports  of  copper  amounted  to  about 
207c  of  our  consumption  in  1976-77, 
up  from  about  M^c  over  the  previous 
several  years.  This  situation  is  a  phase 
of  a  typical  copper  cycle;  the  copper 
market  has  tended  to  be  closely  tied  to 
the  general  business  cycle  and  has  long 
been  marked  by  wide  swings  in  prices. 

We  are  now  engaged  within  the  gov- 
ernment and  in  the  UNCTAD  talks  in 
the  analysis  of  the  underlying  problems 
of  the  copper  market  and  the  feasibility 
of  international  measures  to  correct 
them.  The  feasibility  of  an  interna- 
tional buffer  stock  to  moderate  price 
fluctuations  will  depend  largely  on 
technical  factors — including  competi- 
tion from  substitutes  and  the  identifica- 
tion of  an  acceptable  price  indicator. 
We  would  particularly  want  to  assure 
ourselves  that  any  international  stabili- 
zation measures  on  copper  take  full  ac- 
count of  the  interests  of  our  domestic 
industry  and  do  not  encourage  uneco- 
nomic shifts  of  consumption  from  cop- 
per to  other  products. 

Earlier  this  month,  the  third  UNC- 
TAD preparatory  meeting  on  copper 
agreed  to  establish  a  producer- 
consumer  forum  to  continue  this  inter- 
national study  of  the  copper  situation. 
The  producer-consumer  forum  will 
carry  out  additional  technical  analyses  of 
the  copper  market  and  study  alternative 
stabilization  schemes.  It  will  also  serve 
to  improve  the  quality  and  flow  of  in- 
formation concerning  conditions  in  the 
market.  This  latter  step  alone  could 
contribute  to  improved  functioning  of 
the  market.  If  the  producer-consumer 
forum  later  determines  that  additional 
international  action  may  be  feasible,  it 
could  recommend  the  convening  of 
negotiations  for  an  international 
stabilization  agreement. 

Sugar.  With  respect  to  sugar,  the 
President  sent  the  new  International 
Sugar  Agreement  to  the  Senate  last 
month  [January  25.  1978]  for  advice 
and  consent  to  ratification.  We  intend 
to  submit  implementing  legislation  to 


the  Congress  shortly.  The  agreement 
was  concluded  last  October,  after  very 
difficult  negotiations,  and  entered  into 
force  provisionally  on  January  I.  It  is 
intended  to  stabilize  the  world  market 
price  of  sugar. 

In  contrast  to  the  situation  in  coffee, 
the  sugar  agreement  must  initiate  ac- 
tion that  will  cause  the  depressed  mar- 
ket price  to  rise  up  into  the  agreed 
range  of  II-21(Z  per  pound.  Later,  it 
will  function  to  prevent  the  sort  of  ex- 
treme price  peak  experienced  in  1974 
when  prices  rose  above  60^'.  The 
agreement  depends  on  a  system  of  na- 
tionally held,  internationally  coordi- 
nated stocks  combined  with  export  con- 
trols. A  special  stock  of  2.5  million 
tons — built  up  over  a  3-year  period 
when  prices  are  low — would  be  placed 
on  the  market  when  the  world  price  rose 
above  19Q.  thus  helping  to  protect  con- 
sumers against  excessive  price  increases. 

Of  particular  interest  is  an  innovative 
scheme  for  financing  sugar  stocks. 
Each  time  sugar  is  traded  on  the  free 
market  by  a  member  country  of  the 
agreement,  a  nominal  fee  will  be  col- 
lected for  the  stock  financing  fund. 
This  fee — about  '/i  of  a  cent  per 
pound — amounts  to  only  1/100  of  the 
retail  price  of  sugar  in  the  United 
States.  Collection  of  these  fees  will 
build  a  fund  amounting  to  .$400-500 
million  over  a  5-year  period.  Interest- 
free  loans  from  this  fund  will  be  made 
to  exporters  for  the  cost  of  carrying 
special  sugar  stocks.  The  exporters  will 
receive  l.5(Z  each  year  for  each  pound 
of  sugar  held  in  the  special  stock.  The 
loans  will  be  repayable  when  the  stocks 
are  released  at  a  time  of  high  sugar 
prices. 

The  stock-financing  plan  demon- 
strates that  financing  need  not  be  a 
problem  in  international  commodity 
agreements.  The  sugar  plan  involves  no 
cost  to  the  U.S.  Government  and  only 
an  insignificant  cost  to  the  U.S.  con- 
sumer. In  return  it  provides  strong  pro- 
tection against  high  sugar  prices. 

We  expect  the  agreement  to  bring 
supply  into  balance  with  demand  in 
1978  and  the  world  price  to  rise  from 
the  70  a  pound  level  which  prevailed 
late  last  year  to  the  110  minimum.  The 
U.S.  import  price  should  thereby  rise 
to  a  level  that  would  permit  both  U.S. 
and  foreign  producers  to  earn  a  reason- 
able return  on  their  investment.  When 
this  level  is  reached,  the  President  will 
be  able  to  lift  at  least  part  of  the  5.50 
per  pound  import  charges  which  he  re- 
cently imposed  as  part  of  our  domestic 
price  support  program. 

The  International  Sugar  Agreement 
is  superior  to  a  domestic  program  in 
several  respects.  The  agreement  can 
provide  the   same   price   stabilization 


benefits  to  producers  as  a  domestic 
program  without  significant  budgetary 
expenditures  or  without  the  high  tariffs 
that  lead  to  problems  in  our  foreign  re- 
lations. Further,  the  agreement  can 
provide  protection  for  consumers 
against  high  sugar  prices.  Domestic 
programs  do  not  have  the  ability  to 
limit  sugar  price  increases. 

The  Common  Fund 

In  addition  to  the  discussions  on  in- 
dividual commodities,  the  UNCTAD 
Integrated  Program  for  Commodities 
includes  a  proposal  to  set  up  a  common 
fund  to  support  international  com- 
modity agreements.  The  Adminis- 
tration supports  a  fund  that  would 
facilitate  the  efficient  financing  of  in- 
ternational buffer  stock  agreements. 

With  that  objective  in  mind,  the 
United  States  and  other  industrialized 
countries  agreed  at  last  year's  eco- 
nomic summit  conference  in  London 
that  there  should  be  a  common  fund.' 
This  conclusion  was  underscored  at  the 
Paris  Conference  on  International  Eco- 
nomic Cooperation  [May  30-June  2, 
1 977 1,  at  which  we  approved  a  final 
communique  affirming  that  a  common 
fund  should  be  established,  with  its 
"purposes,  objectives  and  other  con- 
stituent elements'"  to  be  nesotiated  in 
UNCTAD. - 

In  preparation  for  these  negotiations, 
the  industrialized  countries  developed  a 
proposal  in  the  Organization  for  Eco- 
nomic Cooperation  and  Development 
for  a  financially  viable  common  fund 
that  would  consolidate  the  financial  ac- 
tivities of  participating  international 
commodity  agreements  by  pooling  their 
cash  resources  and  borrowing  against 
callable  capital  or  guarantees  pledged 
to  the  fund  through  the  individual 
agreements.  The  latter  would  retain 
basic  responsibility  for  raising  the 
necessary  finance  for  buffer  stocking 
and  would  also  be  autonomous  in  their 
policy  and  operational  decisions. 

There  are  two  ways  in  which  this 
scheme  would  lighten  the  burden  of 
buffer  stocking  operations  for  all  con- 
cerned. 

•  First,  it  would  realize  financial 
economies  as  a  result  of  the  offsetting 
price  movements  of  different  com- 
modities associated  with  the  fund. 
These  economies  derive  from  the  fact 
under  normal  circumstances,  price 
cycles  do  not  coincide  for  all  com- 
modities, so  that  an  international 
commodity  agreement  in  a  buying 
phase  and  needing  cash  could — 
through  the  fund  —  borrow  from 
another  commodity  agreement  in  a 
selling  phase  and  accumulating  cash. 


Department  of  State  Bull* 

•  Second,  by  consolidating  the  t 
rowing  operations  of  participat 
agreements,  the  fund  would  realize 
nancial  savings  in  borrowing  on  cap 
markets. 

With  regard  to  measures  other  tl 
price-stabilizing  buffer  stocks,  the 
dustrialized  countries  have  stres 
their  importance — particularly 
commodities  facing  declini 
demand — but  have  argued  that  si 
measures  can  be  effectively  hand 
through  producer-consumer  commoo 
organizations,  existing  international 
nancial  institutions  such  as  the  Wc 
Bank.  U.N.  agencies,  and  bilateral 
sistance  programs.  We  do  not  exch 
the  possibility  that  some  improveme 
in  current  activities  in  this  area  may 
desirable,  nor  do  we  exclude  so 
role — such  as  coordination  of  the 
tivities  of  producer-consum 
bodies — for  a  common  fund. 

The  developing  countries  are  see.k' 
a  common  fund  financed  primarily 
direct  capital  subscriptions  from  g, 
ernments,  as  distinct  from  a  pooling: 
rangement  based  on  internatio' 
commodity  agreements.  The  fii 
would  finance  not  only  commoq 
stocks  but  also  a  wide  range  of  otH 
nonbuffer  stocking  measures,  some* 
which  are  of  a  development  type. 

The  negotiations  are  currently  at 
impasse.   The  second  session  of 
negotiating  conference  in  Geneva 
November  was  suspended  at  the  reqn 
of  the  developing  countries  one  day 
fore  its  scheduled  conclusion.  We 
pressed  regret  at  the  suspension  and 
currently  exploring  with  other  govqH 

!tl 


ments  and  the  UNCTAD  Secret 
General  whether  a  satisfactory  bi 
can  be  found  for  resumption  of 
negotiations  later  this  year.  We  bell' 
a  satisfactory  outcome  to  any  fut' 
negotiations,  however,  will  depend  1 
large  extent  on  whether  the  develop' 
countries  are  prepared  to  give  serii 
consideration  to  the  proposal  the  ind 
trialized  countries  have  on  the  table. 


Bused  on  a  shilemenl  before  Ihe  Suhcommf 
nil  Imeniatioiuil  Economic  Policy  and  Tracts 
ilic  House  Commillee  on  Iniernaiional  Relali 
on  Fell.  21.  1978.  The  complete  Iranscripl  oj- 
hearings  will  be  published  by  the  committee 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
Documents.  U.S.  Government  Printing  Offi 
Washington.  D.C.  20402.  Mr.  Kat:  is  Assis 
Secretary  for  Economic  and  Business  Affairs 

'  For  material  relating  to  Ihe  economic  s 
mit  meeting,  see  Bulletin  of  June  6.  1^ 
p.  5S1. 

-  For  text  of  final  communique  and  rel 
material,  see  Bulletin  of  June  20,  19 
p.  645. 


6 


( 


irch  1978 


THE  PRESIDE1\T:  ]¥etrs  Conierence^ 
January  30  (Excerpts) 


The  other  thing  I  would  like  to  do 
y  briefly  is  to  outline  the  history  of 
Soviet  satellite,  the  Cosmos  954. 
This  satellite,  which  had  a  nuclear 
ver  source  on  it,  was  launched  on 
18th  of  September,  last  year.  It  was 
/ious  to  us  later  on  that  the  Soviets 
re  having  trouble  controlling  the 
illite.  On  the  19th  of  December,  we 
up  a  small  task  force  in  the  White 
use.  On  the  6th  of  January,  we  felt 
t  control  had  been  lost,  and  I  de- 
ed personally  to  notify  the  Soviets 
the  12th  of  January  that  we  were 
are  of  their  problems,  to  offer  our 
p  in  monitoring  the  path  of  the  satel- 
,  and  to  begin  preparing  jointly  to 
diet  where  it  would  fall  and  also  to 
pare  for  handling  it  if  it  should  con- 

the  Earth. 

"he  Soviets  replied  that  it  was  de- 

ned  so  that  it  would  be  destroyed  as 

ame  back  into  Earth,  and  it  was  de- 

(led  also  so  there  was  no  possibility 

bn  atomic  explosion. 

))n  the  17th  and  18th  of  January,  we 

ified  the  key  congressional  leaders, 

lie  of  our  allies  around  the  world 

D  were  capable  of  joining  us  in  a 

tiking  effort.  And  the  Soviets  a  day 

1;  r,  on  the  19th,  repeated  their  com- 

n  It  it  will  not  explode. 

)n  the  22d  of  January,  we  went  back 

!ic  Soviets  to  ask  them  to  give  us  an 

ale  to  confirm  the  information  we 

from  monitoring  sources.  And  on 

It  23d  of  January,  the  Soviets  notified 

u  that  it  would  probably  enter  the  at- 

II sphere  the  following  day,  which  is 

tf  24th. 

iarly  on  the  morning  of  the  24th,  I 

«^  notified   that   the   satellite   would 

-■I   the  atmosphere  quite  early.   We 

u   not  know  whether  it  would  hit  be- 

tven  Hawaii  on  a  very  high  curve  up 

tcthe  northern  part  of  Canada  or  the 

w stern  coast  of  Africa,  because  some- 

cs  the  satellites  can  skip  from  one 

.c  to  another  as  they  enter  the  at- 

Nphere.  It,  as  you  know,  entered  the 

1  losphere  in  Canada. 

immediately  called  Prime  Minister 

^  rrc  Trudeau,  informed  him  about  the 

Moximate   location,   which   later 

I' led  out  to  be  accurate.  And  on  the 

2  h,  as  you  know,  just  recently,  the 
mains  of  the  satellite  have  been 
r  overed. 

The  last  satellite  we  put  into  Earth 
ciit  with  an  atomic  power  source  was 


in  1965.  This  satellite,  at  the  conclu- 
sion of  its  useful  life,  was  raised  into  a 
higher  orbit  that  has  a  lifespan  of  at 
least  4.000  years. 

I  think  we  need  to  have  more  rigid 
safety  precautions  assured  among  all 
nations  in  Earth-orbiting  satellites.  In 
fact,  we  would  be  glad  to  forgo  the  de- 
ployment of  any  such  satellite  al- 
together and  will  pursue  that  option 
along  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  only  time  a  satellite  needs  a 
longlasting  power  source  thafs  free  of 
the  use  of  solar  energy,  which  can  be 
derived  from  the  Sun,  is  when  you  go 
into  deep  outer  space;  for  instance,  if 
we  send  a  probe  to  the  outer  planets, 
there  would  not  be  adequate  source  of 
energy  from  the  Sun  to  trigger  our  solar 
cells.  And  we  might  need  power  from 
atomic  sources  then. 

But  I  see  no  reason  for  us  to  continue 
with  the  option  of  nations  to  have 
Earth-orbiting  satellites  unless  much 
more  advanced  safety  precautions  can 
be  initiated. 

Q.  Since  I  assume  the  subject  will 
come  up  when  you  meet  with  Presi- 
dent Sadat,  could  you  give  us  a  gen- 
eral outline  of  your  view  toward  our 
helping  Egypt  acquire  arms? 

A.  We  have  been,  of  course,  facing 
the  continuing  prospect  for  a  number  of 
years  of  providing  some  weapons  into 
the  Mideast,  heavily  to  Israel,  also  to 
Saudi  Arabia,  to  Iran,  and  to  some  de- 
gree, the  nonattack  weapons  to  Egypt. 

All  these  nations  have  requests  to  us 
for  weapons.  They've  been  committed 
to  those  nations  to  some  degree  by  my 
two  predecessors  and  reconfirmed  in 
some  instances  by  me. 

The  National  Security  Council  will 
make  a  report  to  me  early  this  week 
recommending  from  the  State  Depart- 
ment, from  the  Defense  Department, 
from  the  national  security  adviser, 
what  weapons  to  recommend  to  the 
Congress.  After  that  point,  the  Con- 
gress will  have  a  30-day  plus  a  21 -day 
period  to  respond  affirmatively  or  not. 
I  will  decide  later  on  this  week  what  to 
recommend  to  the  Congress. 

The  Egyptians  have,  in  the  past,  re- 
quested F-5E  fighter  planes,  one  that  is 
used  extensively  around  the  world  for 
export  purposes  primarily,  and  Israel 
and  Saudi  Arabia  have  requested  other 
weapons.  They  have  some  F-5"s. 


Q.  Do  you  have  a  clear  idea  now 
from  Prime  Minister  Begin  as  to 
whether  or  not  he  will  authorize  new 
settlements  in  the  West  Bank  and  in 
the  Sinai,  and  do  you  believe  that  Is- 
rael, over  a  period  of  time,  ought  to 
phase  out  those  settlements  in  return 
for  real  peace? 

A.  I've  covered  this  many  times. 
Our  position  on  settlements  in  the  oc- 
cupied territory  has  been  that  they  are 
illegal,  that  they  are  an  obstacle  to 
peace.  When  Prime  Minister  Begin  was 
over  here  and  when  Foreign  Minister 
Dayan  was  here,  this  question  arose. 
And  my  understanding  of  their  com- 
mitment was  that  no  new  settlements 
would  be  authorized  by  the  govern- 
ment, that  any  increase  in  settlers 
would  be  an  expansion  of  existing  set- 
tlements as  much  as  possible  within  the 
aegis  of  the  military. 

The  Geneva  conference  agreement  is 
that  civilians  should  not  go  in  to  settle 
permanently  in  occupied  territories.  I 
think  the  Israeli  Government  has  not 
authorized  the  Shiloh  settlement  other 
than  as  an  archeological  exploration 
project.  And  I've  not  yet  heard  from 
Prime  Minister  Begin  directly,  but  I 
have  had  information  that  this  is  a  pol- 
icy of  the  Israeli  Government,  that  this 
is  not  an  authorized  settlement. 


Q.  Do  you  have  an  overall  view  of 
the  final  borders  you  would  like  to 
see  for  Israel?  Do  you  expect  Israel 
to  return  to  the  1967  borders  in  ail 
aspects,  especially  in  east  Jerusalem? 

A.  No.  I  don't  have  a  map  or  a  plan 
that  ought  to  be  the  final  border  deline- 
ation between  Israel  and  her  neighbors. 
I  have  always  operated  and  made  my 
statements  under  the  framework  and 
within  the  constraints  of  U.N.  Resolu- 
tion 242,  which  calls  for  Israel  to  with- 
draw from  occupied  territories. 

Israel  interprets  this  language  differ- 
ently, of  course,  from  the  Arab 
neighbors.  The  Arab  neighbors  say  that 
Israel  ought  to  withdraw  from  all  oc- 
cupied territories.  Israel  says  that 
there's  some  flexibility  there  and  that 
the  thrust  of  U.N.  Resolution  242  is  an 
exchange,  in  effect,  for  portions  of  the 
occupied  territory  for  guaranteed 
peace. 

The  three  elements  that  I've  pursued 
are,  one,  a  delineation  of  final  borders; 
secondly,  a  feeling  or  conviction  on  the 


8 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


part  of  the  Israelis  that  their  security 
was  preserved,  which  would  involve 
both  their  own  military  strength,  the 
delineation  of  the  borders,  and  the  at- 
titude now  and  in  the  future  of  their 
neighbors. 

The  second  question,  of  course,  is 
the  definition  of  real  peace.  What  does 
peace  mean?  Does  it  simply  mean  a 
cessation  of  hostility  or  belligerency, 
or  does  it  mean  open  borders,  trade, 
tourism,  diplomatic  exchange,  the  loca- 
tion of  ambassadors,  and  so  forth? 

I've  taken  the  more  definitive  defini- 
tion as  my  own  preference.  And  the 
other  thing,  of  course,  is  to  deal  in  all 
its  aspects  with  the  Palestinian 
question. 

But  I  have  never  tried  to  put  forward 
in  my  own  mind  or  to  any  of  the 
Mideastern  leaders  a  map  in  saying  this 
is  where  the  lines  should  be  drawn. 


Q.  Regarding  your  concern  about 
satellites  and  the  safety  precautions, 
in  taking  this  up  with  the  Russians, 
will  you  try  to  dissuade  them  from 
their  practice  of  putting  nuclear 
reactors  into  space  in  the  future? 

A.  Yes,  certainly  in  Earth  orbit.  I 
think  that  this  is  something  that  we 
should  explore.  There  are  two  factors 
though.  One  is  to  try  to  evolve  a  sure- 
fire safety  requirement  that  would  pre- 
vent a  recurrence  of  any  atomic  active 
material  reaching  the  Earth  or  the  at- 
mosphere where  human  beings  might 
breathe  it.  If  we  cannot  evolve  those 
fail-safe  methods,  then  I  think  there 
ought  to  be  a  total  prohibition  against 
Earth-orbiting  satellites. 

I  would  favor  at  this  moment  an 
agreement  with  the  Soviets  to  prohibit 
Earth-orbiting  satellites  with  atomic 
radiation  material  in  them. 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  idea  what  the 
deal  is  on  that  satellite  up  there?  We 
get  all  these  reports.  One  day  it's  not 
radioactive;  the  next  day  it  is.  Do  you 
have  any  late  information  about  just 
what  the  status  of  that  thing  is?  Or 
whether  there  is  any  danger? 

A.  No,  I  know  nothing  at  this  point 
that  hasn't  already  been  put  into  the 
press.  One,  I  do  know  that  they've  lo- 
cated a  crater,  about  a  9-foot  dimen- 
sion, that  it  is  radioactive  and  that  a 
search  group  from  one  of  our  own  heli- 
copters working  with  the  Canadians  is 
at  the  site.  But  the  configuration  of  the 


remains  of  the  satellite  or  whether  or 
not  they  are  now  retrieving  it  from  the 
riverbed  where  it's  located,  1  do  not 
know. 

Q.  Last  August  in  your  immigra- 
tion message,  you  said  you  were  not 
considering  reintroduction  of  a 
bracero-type  program  for  the  tem- 
porary importation  of  farm  work- 
ers." 

Last  week,  Secretary  [of  Agricul- 
ture] Bergland  down  in  Mexico  City 
had  an  airport  press  conference  at 
which  he  apparently  gave  some  Mex- 
ican newspapers  the  idea  that  we 
were  considering  such  a  program 
and  were  considering  importing  3 
million  braceros,  and  they've  been 
writing  a  lot  of  stories  about  it.  He 
has  tried  to  deny  it.  Could  you  state 
your  position  on  it? 

A.  We  have  no  plans  whatsoever  to 


reinitiate  a  hracero  program.  Our  o 
proposal  to  deal  with  the  u 
documented  workers  or  illegal  all 
question  has  already  been  submitted' 
the  public,  and  that  encompasses  wl 
we  proposed.  It  does  not  compristi 
/;/(;cero-type  program. 

Q.  There  are  reports  that 
Soviets  have  or  soon  will  have 
capability  to  disrupt  our  sending! 
military  orders  by  satellites.  Can  ji 
tell  us  whether  they  are  accurate 
not? 

A.  My  information  is  that  that  rep 
is  not  accurate. 


Fur  full  lext.  see  Weekly  Compilulion  of  Pp 
itentiul  Documents  of  Feb.  6.  I97H.  p.  243, 
'  For  text  of  President  Carter's  message  to 
Congress  of  Aug.  4,  1977,  see  BULLETIN' 
Sept    5,  p.  -316 


Foreign  Intelligence  Activities 


On  January  24,  1978,  President  Car- 
ter issued  Executive  Order  12036  con- 
cerning the  organization  and  control  of 
U.S.  foreign  intelligence  activities. 
The  most  important  features  of  this 
Executive  order  are: 

1.  The  National  Security  Council  and 
its  two  standing  committees — the  Spe- 
cial Coordination  Committee  (SCO 
and  the  Policy  Review  Committee 
(PRO — will,  short  of  the  President, 
provide  the  highest  level  review  of  and 
guidance  for  the  policies  and  practices 
of  the  intelligence  community. 

2.  The  authorities  and  respon- 
sibilities of  all  departments,  agencies, 
and  senior  officials  engaged  in  foreign 
intelligence  and  counterintelligence  ac- 
tivities are  being  made  public.  Those 
implementing  directives  which  must 
remain  classified  for  security  reasons 
will  be  made  available  to  the 
appropriate  congressional  oversight 
committees. 

3.  Our  intelligence  agencies  have  a 
critical  role  to  play  in  collecting  and 
analyzing  information  important  to  our 
national  security  interests  and,  on  oc- 
casion,  acting   in   direct   support  of 


major  foreign  policy  objectives.  It' 
equally   important,   however,   that  ij 
methods  employed   by  these   agenc 
meet  constitutional  standards  protect: 
the  privacy  and  civil  liberties  of  U 
persons  and  are  in  full  compliance  w 
the  law.  To  accomplish  this  objectiv 
major  section  of  the  Executive  ordei 
devoted  entirely  to  setting  forth 
tailed  restrictions  on   intelligence  c* 
lection,  covert  activities  in  support 
foreign  policy  objectives,  experimen 
tion,  contracting,  assistance  to  law 
forcement   authorities,    personi 
assigned  to  other  agencies,  indirect  p 
ticipation  in  prohibited  activities,  d 
semination  and  storage  of  informatio 
and  a  prohibition  on  assassinations. 

4.  As  an  added  protection  agaii 
abuses  and  to  help  insure  effective  p( 
formance,  the  intelligence  oversig 
process  is  strengthened. 


The  full  lext  of  Executive  Order  1 2036.  as 
lis  President  Carter' s  statement  on  this  sul 
issued  hy  the  White  House  on  Jan.  24.  1971 
printed  in  the  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presit 
tiiil  Documents  of  Jan.  30. 


Inarch  1978 


I 


THE  VICE  PRESIDE]\T: 

Visit  to  Citunda  and  Mexico 


/ice  President  Mondale  visited  Canada  (January  17-18)  and  Mexico  (January 
22)  to  consult  with  Prime  Minister  Pierre-Elliott  Trudeau  and  President  Jose 

fez  Portillo  and  other  officials  of  their  governments.  Following  are  the  texts  of 
addresses  he  nuide  during  those  trips. 


CANADA' 

Jhroughout  my  public  life,  I've  tried 
t' emphasize  the  vita!  importance  of 
I-  closest  possible  consultation  be- 
t;en  the  United  States  and  Canada, 
/d  I've  been  proud  to  be  a  member  of 
aiew  Administration  in  Washington 
wich  has  joined  with  your  leaders  to 
new  our  friendship  to  a  level  of  bal- 
a:e  unparalleled  in  our  common  his- 
h  y . 

Almost  a  year  ago  today,  President 
Orter  stood  before  the  American 
jijple  for  the  first  time  as  their  highest 
cicial.  He  called  for  a  "new  spirit" 
i  the  relationship  between  nations, 
b  ed  not  on  power  politics  but  on  a 
d.'p  respect  and  deference  for  the 
s  ereignty  and  independence  of  every 
n  ion  on  Earth. 

"he  clearest  example  of  that  policy 
i;the  U.S.  longstanding  friendship 
V  h  its  neighbors  to  the  north  and 
S  th.  The  first  two  heads  of  govern- 
n  nt  invited  to  Washington — only  a 
n  nth   after   President   Carter   took 

0  ice — were  Prime  Minister  Trudeau 
aJ  President  Lopez  Portillo  of 
N  xico.  These  meetings  were  not  the 
ire  formalities  of  statecraft;  they 
y-  e  an  unmistakable  symbol  of  a  new 
s  rit  in  the  friendship  between  our  na- 
tiis.  They  brought  forth  a  new  com- 
n  ment  to  work  together  as  equal 
ptners  to  solve  the  problems  which 
c  llenge  a  shared  future  on  this  conti- 
nit. 

n  12  short  months  we  have  accom- 
pihed  more  together  than  we  imag- 
iid  possible.  Old  irritants  and  petty 
f  rtions  have  been  replaced  by  the 
s  rit  of  compromise  and  accommoda- 
tii.  President  Carter  and  Prime  Minis- 
t(  Trudeau  have  established  a  continu- 
ii  dialogue.  Half  a  dozen  American 
Cbinet  members  have  traveled  to 
C  nada — and  an  even  greater  number 
c  your  Ministers  have  come  to  the 
'  tes — to  pursue  the  task  of  managing 
c   neighborhood  together. 

fhey  have  already  made  good  prog- 
r  s:  in  safeguarding  the  environment 
i\ng  our  borders  and  revising  the  toll 
sicture  of  the  St.  Lawrence  Seaway, 

1  Jeveloping  the  concept  of  joint  man- 
nient  of  some  of  our  fishing  stocks 


and  determining  our  four  seaward 
boundaries  to  maintain  fishing  patterns 
without  disrupting  operations  on  either 
side,  and,  in  record  time,  we  are  mak- 
ing the  first  steps  in  a  great  new  joint 
enterprise — the  overland  gas  pipeline. 

At  every  level  of  our  societies — in 
business  and  government,  commerce 
and  culture — Americans  and  Canadians 
are  talking  and  learning  and  working 
together  with  a  new  feeling  of  confi- 
dence. And  now,  I  have  come  to 
Canada  at  the  start  of  our  second  year 
to  leave  no  doubt  that  the  course  which 
we  have  begun  so  successfully,  we 
shall  follow  in  the  years  ahead. 

We  share  a  common  history  which  is 
also  a  blueprint  for  the  future.  It  is  the 
history  of  an  experiment  in  freedom  on 
this  continent  and  of  a  mutual  commit- 
ment to  respect  diversity  and  differ- 
ence. Ours  are  among  the  few  nations 
on  Earth  which  are  nations  not  because 
of  a  common  culture  but  because  of  a 
common  commitment  to  a  single 
ideal — the  supremacy  of  the  human 
spirit. 

More  than  anything  else,  that  fun- 
damental commitment  is  the  source  of 
our  closeness  as  peoples.  It  is  the  foun- 
dation for  a  level  of  interchange  unique 
in  history.  We  share  by  far  the  largest 
tide  of  trade  between  any  two  nations 
on  Earth.  We  share  what  External  Af- 
fairs Minister  Don  Jamieson  has  called 
"a  network  of  contacts  and  communi- 
cations which  exceeds  that  of  any 
(other  countries)."  We  share  an  inti- 
mate daily  association  at  every  level  of 
society. 

Canadians  cross  our  common  border 
35  million  times  a  year,  and  equivalent 
numbers  of  Americans  make  the  jour- 
ney north.  They  come  to  do  business, 
to  visit  friends  and  families,  to  see  the 
matchless  beauty  of  the  northern  coun- 
tryside, and  to  taste  a  foreign  culture  as 
different  and  exciting  as  it  is  friendly. 

•  Together  we  built  one  of  the 
world's  great  transportation  systems — 
the  St.  Lawrence  Seaway. 

•  We  have  pioneered  international 
efforts  to  preserve  the  environment,  by 
conceiving  and  maintaining  one  of  the 
world's  oldest  bilateral  tribunals — the 
International  Joint  Commission. 


•  We  stand  together  not  only  in  the 
defense  of  the  continent  that  is  our 
home  but  with  13  other  nations  in  the 
defense  of  Europe — the  home  of  many 
of  our  ancestors. 

•  We  have  brought  a  new  level  of 
industrial  growth  and  stability  to  both 
nations  through  the  auto  pact  of  1965. 

•  And  as  Prime  Minister  Trudeau 
told  our  Congress  last  year  in  his  excel- 
lent message,  we  have  worked  together 
to  create  original  techniques  of  en- 
vironmental management;  of  emer- 
gency and  disaster  assistance;  of  air 
and  sea  traffic  control;  and  of  transport- 
ing people,  goods,  and  services. 

These  programs  are  symbolic  of  the 
vital  truth.  Our  common  progress  de- 
pends upon  the  preservation  of  our 
separate  identities  as  nations.  In  shared 
interests  and  interdependence  there  is 
strength  and  promise.  Dependence  is 
only  stagnation.  We  will  never  permit 
the  abrogation  of  sovereignty  on  either 
side  of  the  border. 

We  have  learned  the  art  of  being 
good  neighbors.  First,  this  means  ad- 
vance consultation  and  accommoda- 
tion. Second,  it  means  speaking  our 
minds  forthrightly.  Third,  it  means  re- 
sponding to  the  views  of  our  citizens  as 
befits  representative  democracies,  and 
we  each  want  to  be  heard  in  the  world 
in  our  own  voice. 

And  as  nations  built  on  federal  prin- 
ciples, our  progress  depends  upon  the 
harmony  and  unity  of  our  countrymen. 
Working  together  means  participation 
by  all  our  peoples  and  regions  within 
our  respective  federal  frameworks.  In 
this  way  different  interests  can  be  rec- 
onciled while  we  shape  our  separate  na- 
tional destinies. 

Economic  Challenges 

It  is  our  destiny  to  face  common 
challenges. 

We  face  an  energy  crisis  which  has 
brought  to  Canada  the  first  oil  trade 
deficit  in  almost  a  decade  and  which  is 
bleeding  the  United  States  of  $45  bil- 
lion a  year  for  foreign  oil.  We  both 
need  to  keep  that  money  at  home,  to 
build  schools  and  housing  and  transpor- 
tation facilities.  And  here,  as  in  so 
many  other  areas,  my  nation  can  profit 
by  Canada's  example. 

When  my  countrymen  saw  the 
energy  crisis  on  charts  and 
blackboards,  your  leaders  were  taking 


10 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


action.  You've  already  inaugurated  a 
home  insulation  program,  a  forward- 
looking  internal  price  policy  on  oil  and 
gas,  and  a  comprehensive  strategy  for 
conserving  existing  resources  and  de- 
veloping new  ones. 

In  the  United  States,  President  Carter 
has  taken  action,  too.  He  is  pledged  to 
reduce  American  reliance  on  all  exter- 
nal sources  of  energy.  But  still  the 
shape  of  our  program  awaits  the  out- 
come of  legislative  bargaining — and 
still  we  grow  more  dependent  on 
foreign  sources  half  a  world  away. 

I  am  sure  we  will  succeed  in  getting 
an  effective  and  fair  energy  bill  from 
Congress,  one  that  will  enable  us  to 
play  our  part  in  the  global  effort  to 
meet  the  energy  challenge. 

There's  an  old  saying  that  a  good 
neighbor  doubles  the  value  of  a  house, 
and  the  same  is  true  of  our  countries  as 
we  face  the  energy  problem. 

•  We  can  both  profit  from  reciprocal 
electricity  arrangements,  from  oil 
swaps  to  compensate  for  regional  dis- 
locations. 

•  Gur  gas  pipeline  agreement  is 
striking  evidence  of  the  power  and  po- 
tential of  such  cooperation.  It  promises 
to  save  both  countries  billions  of  dol- 
lars in  comparison  with  independent  al- 
ternatives. And  the  same  friendship  and 
good  faith  which  produced  that  agree- 
ment will  govern  its  execution — 
assuring  each  nation  a  fair  and  just  re- 
turn in  jobs  and  industrial  orders  on  its 
part  of  the  pipeline. 

•  We  both  need  oil  storage  facilities 
to  guard  against  emergencies,  and  there 
may  be  advantages  in  building  them  to- 
gether. Prime  Minister  Trudeau  and  I 
discussed  that  option  yesterday,  and 
we've  agreed  to  undertake  an  expedi- 
tious jomt  study  of  common  facilities 
in  Newfoundland  and  Nova  Scotia. 

•  Our  nations  can  also  profit  from 
joint  arrangements  concerning  the  pro- 
duction and  distribution  of  existing  re- 
sources. In  the  next  few  years  Alberta 
may  enjoy  supplies  of  natural  gas 
which  are  surplus  to  provincial  and 
Canadian  needs. 

Both  nations  can  profit  from  cooper- 
ation in  the  production  and  consump- 
tion of  existing  resources.  Prime  Minis- 
ter Trudeau  and  I  agreed  yesterday  that 
we  should  encourage  new  gas  con- 
tracts, with  a  swap-back  option,  with  a 
view  toward  facilitating  the  early  build- 
ing of  the  lower  sections  of  the  gas 
pipeline.  Over  the  short-term — and  this 
could  only  be  determined  by  the  appro- 
priate regulatory  bodies — Alberta  may 
enjoy  further  supplies  of  natural  gas 
which  are  surplus  to  provincial  and 
Canadian  needs. 


The  United  States  could  use  that  gas, 
if  it  were  available,  to  give  time  for  our 
measures  to  cut  gas  consumption  and  to 
increase  gas  production  to  take  effect. 
We  have  a  common  interest  in  seeing 
that  the  pipeline  is  financed  and  built 
on  schedule,  and  the  swap-back  provi- 
sion would  protect  the  Canadian  energy 
position  as  needed.  This  afternoon  I 
hope  to  discuss  this  question  with  Pre- 
mier Lougheed  [Peter  Lougheed,  Pre- 
mier of  Alberta]. 

We  can  also  join  forces  in  a  general 
effort  to  insure  the  growth  and  prosper- 
ity of  our  economies.  Full  employment 
here  would  create  thousands  of  new 
jobs  in  the  United  States,  and  full 
employment  in  the  States  would  create 
thousands  of  new  jobs  here.  Because 
our  prosperity  is  so  linked.  Prime 
Minister  Trudeau  and  I  have  agreed 
that  our  senior  economic  officials  will 
meet  in  March  to  begin  a  process  of  in- 
tensified consultations  on  economic 
problems  facing  both  countries. 

We  can  work  together  for  growth 
and  progress.  We  sell  each  other  $55 
billion  worth  of  goods  and  services 
every  year.  Thus,  consumers  in  both 
countries  will  benefit  from  lower 
prices.  We  understand  that  far  more 
than  internal  domestic  progress,  it  is  in- 
ternational trade  which  has  fueled  the 
world's  economy  in  the  last  30  years. 
We  understand  that  tariff  barriers  can 
only  foster  more  deficits  and  more  in- 
flation and  more  unemployment.  And 
we  are  pledged  to  resist,  with  all  our 
powers,  retrenchment  to  protectionism. 

That  is  the  spirit  which  our  nations 
must  take  to  the  latest  round  of  mul- 
tilateral trade  negotiations  in  Geneva. 
Canada  and  the  United  States  are  lead- 
ers in  both  the  nontariff  and  tariff- 
cutting  sessions,  and  we  should  stand 
together  in  pursuit  of  freer  trade 
throughout  the  world.  We  can  set  the 
standard  for  that  effort  with  serious 
bilateral  discussions  about  our  own 
trading  relationship. 

When  offers  are  placed  on  the  table 
in  Geneva  this  week,  the  United  States 
will  propose  substantial  cuts  on  prod- 
ucts of  interest  to  Canada.  We  hope 
that  Canada  and  other  countries  will  re- 
ciprocate by  offering  formula  cuts,  so 
we  can  maintain  our  proposal  during 
the  course  of  negotiations  and  reduce 
tariffs  on  the  dutiable  items  which 
cross  our  border  every  day. 

We  can  do  that  in  the  context  of  mul- 
tilateral discussions  in  which  we  both 
have  vital  interests;  for  example,  ef- 
forts to  develop  an  international  prod- 
ucts standards  code  and  an  equitable 
and  universal  system  for  responding  to 
the  unfair  practices  of  export  subsidy 
and  favoritism  in  government  procure- 
ment.   We   stand  together  on   those 


issues — in  opposition  to  any  poli 
which  gives  any  business  or  nation 
unfair  trading  advantage. 

The   United  States  also  stands  wi 
Canada — not  only  at  Geneva  but  also 
the   International   Wheat   Council 
London — in  support  of  greater  acce 
to  world  grain  markets.  This  Provin 
has  a  special  interest  in  those  effort 
As  the  world's  foremost  grain  expc 
ters,  our  two  countries  are  working 
London  to  achieve  trade  liberalizatio 
price  stability,  and  food  security.  Th 
will  bring  more  certainty  and  growth 
our  markets  while  better  assuring  re 
able   grain   supplies   to   importers 
especially   the   developing   countri 
which  need  that  grain  the  most. 

Even  as  we  work  to  liberalize  pr 
vailing  trading  practices  in  industry  ai 
agriculture,  we  must  continue  to  devi 
other  means  for  insuring  the  intern 
economic  strength  of  our  tradii 
partners.  In  all  of  these  endeavors,  tl 
key  to  our  success  is  not  only  the  ha 
work  of  our  leaders  or  the  Tightness  i 
their  positions;  it  is  just  as  much  tl' 
spirit  of  friendship  and  common  pu 
pose  which  motivates  our  effort 
Every  time  we  reach  agreement,  evei 
time  we  effect  a  solution,  we  are  pr 
claiming  the  strength  and  success  of  i 
dustrial  democracy.  And  we  are  raisir 
the  foundations  of  a  stable  and  secu 
world  order — a  system  of  intelligent  ii 
teraction  between  nations  which  is  tl 
best  hope  we  have  for  a  truly  lastii 
peace. 

In  economic  cooperation  among  n. 
tions,  and  in  our  life  together  on  th 
continent,  we  are  friends  and  partner 
We  look  to  the  problems  we  face  as  oi 
common  agenda  for  the  months  an 
years  ahead.  We've  made  good  pro;, 
ress  in  preserving  the  beauty  of  our  ei 
vironment.  Now  we  must  complete  th 
Great  Lakes  cleanup  and  match  oi 
concern  for  rivers  and  lakes  with  pn 
grams  that  deal  with  air  pollutio 
across  our  common  border. 

Both  countries  want  to  resolve  dil 
ferences  in  the  administration  of  th 
auto  pact,  even  as  both  recognize  it 
over-all  success.  Our  trade  in  autos  an 
parts  rose  from  $1  billion  in  1965  i 
,S17  billion  in  1976. 

And  because  we  \alue  greatly  ou 
vigorous  two-way  trade  in  agricultural 
products,  it  is  important  that  we  ad 
dress  promptly  and  directly  problem' 
which  may  arise  in  this  trade,  such  a 
we  have  seen  in  beef  and  cattle.  i 

The  Prime  Minister  and  I  have! 
therefore,  agreed  that  Secretary  of  Agi 
riculture  Bob  Bergland  should  mee 
very  soon  with  his  Canadian  colleague;! 
to  consult  on  the  steps  required  foil 
mutually  satisfactory  answers.  | 

These  are  all   important  problems' 


,arch  ^)78 


II 


ley  demand  our  careful  attention,  and 
ey  will  receive  it.  But  if  these  prob- 
ms  constitute  the  most  pressing  dif- 
:ulties  between  us,  then  we  are  doing 
ry  well  indeed. 

uman  Rights 

Our  cooperation  makes  us  better  able 

serve  the  cause  of  human  rights  and 
jogress  throughout  the  world.  The 
1:edoms  we  are  blessed  with  compel 
I  to  raise  our  voices  against  tyranny 
id  oppression  wherever  we  see  them, 
'e  are  blessed  also  with  matchless 
I  man  and  material  resources;  that 
irmits  and  demands  of  us  that  we  join 
le  struggle  against  poverty  and 
ilplessness  wherever  they  exist. 

We  are  joined  in  a  new  dedication  to 
1  Iping  our  southern  neighbors  im- 
pve  the  quality  of  their  lives.  Cana- 
( in  efforts  to  assist  in  Caribbean 
( v'elopment  have  been  a  model  of  hu- 
nnitarian  commitment  for  every  na- 
1  n.  They  are  matched  by  broader 
(  nadian  participation  in  multilateral 
{  orts — not  only  in  the  Caribbean  but 
I  oughout  Latin  America — to  provide 
'  technical  and  material  assistance 
'  ich  can  advance  hope  and  progress. 

ur  country's  recent  participation  in 
1  consultative  group  for  the  Carib- 
I  in  was  an  important  contribution  to 
It  inter- American  effort,  and  it  sig- 
I  s  a  new  era  of  productive  participa- 
t  n  in  Latin  America. 

We  have  also  worked  together  to  de- 
I  id  freedom  and  pursue  peace 
t  oughout  the  world.  We  have  cooper- 
<  d  in  efforts  to  diminish  tensions  be- 
t  ;en  nations  and  to  reduce  transfers  of 
i  ns  which  may  deepen  tension  and 
c  iflict.  We  have  worked  for  inde- 
[  idence  and  free  elections  in  Namibia 
id  to  promote  peaceful  change 
t  oughout  southern  Africa.  We  have 
\  rked  to  keep  alive  the  North-South 
( ilogue  begun  in  Paris — so  ably 
c  lired  for  the  North  by  Deputy  Prime 
f  nister  Allan  MacEachen — and  the 
(  ort  to  bridge  the  gap  between  rich 
I  ions  and  poor. 

n  all  of  these  endeavors,  we  are 
§  ided  by  a  common  and  overriding 
CTimitment  to  the  human  rights  and 
t  nan  dignity  of  the  people  of  every 
r  ion.  We  have  come  to  view  our  rela- 
t  nship  with  other  countries — in  trade 
si  arms  negotiations  and  in  interna- 
tnal  forums — not  only  in  our  own 
'■  f-interest  but  also  in  response  to  the 
t  icern  of  those  countries  for  the  needs 
i  i  rights  of  their  own  people. 

"or  both  countries,  that  posture  is 
I  natural  legacy  of  common  tradition 
ijpursuit  of  human  rights  that  is  liter- 
sly  unparalleled   in   human   history. 

d  for  the  American  people,  that  leg- 


acy is  the  root  of  our  close  bonds  to 
Canadians. 

President  Carter  pointed  out  the 
striking  results  of  a  recent  Gallup  poll 
which  asked  Americans  to  list  the  na- 
tions for  which  they  had  the  greatest  af- 
fection and  respect.  As  might  be  ex- 
pected, 957c  named  their  own  country 
first.  But  91%  named  Canada  next,  and 
that  overwhelming  sentiment  is  the 
product  of  more  than  geographic  prox- 
imity or  economic  interdependence. 

The  American  people  see  in  Canada 
one  of  the  great  successes  in  constitu- 
tional democracy.  They  have  seen  a  na- 
tion which,  for  30  years,  has  refused  to 
use  its  wealth  and  technology  for  build- 
ing nuclear  weapons  but  instead  has 
participated  in  every  U.N.  peacekeep- 
ing operation  since  World  War  II.  They 
have  seen  your  nation  devote  a  great 
percentage  of  its  gross  national  product 
to  aiding  Third  World  countries.  And 
they  have  seen  your  borders  opened  to 
the  homeless  and  the  dissident  from 
every  corner  of  the  globe,  most  re- 
cently to  refugees  from  the  tragic  war 
in  Vietnam. 

The  American  people  have  been 
touched  by  the  willingness  of  your 
country  to  export  precious  natural  gas 
during  our  severest  winter  shortages. 
Thousands  have  been  deeply  touched 
by  your  Bicentennial  gift  to  our 
nation — the  pictorial  representation  of 
our  peoples  and  our  common  land, 
"Between  Friends/Entre  Amis.""  And 
we  have  felt  the  closest  bonds  of 
friendship  in  watching  a  proud  and  free 
nation  striving  to  maintain  its  pledge  to 
honor  cultural  and  individual 
diversity — in  the  face  of  disagreements 
which  diversity  necessarily  entails. 

Prime  Minister  Trudeau  has  said  that 
Canada  stands  today  on  the  threshold 
of  greatness.  By  the  measure  of  what 
the  American  people  have  felt  and  seen 
in  their  neighbor,  that  is  a  modest  ap- 
praisal. By  the  measures  of  wisdom 
and  humanity  and  love  of  freedom, 
there  is  no  greater  nation  on  Earth.  We 
are  proud  to  be  your  friend  and  partner. 


MEXICO  - 

For  the  United  States  and  Mexico, 
the  principle  of  mutual  respect  is  the 
basis  of  our  relations.  We  have  learned 
that  power  and  wealth  do  not  confer  a 
monopoly  on  wisdom.  And  we  have 
learned  that  our  common  hopes  and 
plans  as  neighbors  are  far  stronger  than 
our  differences. 

Our  countries  share  a  peaceful  bor- 
der of  nearly  2,000  miles.  Trade  across 
that  border  is  of  enormous  economic 
importance  to  both  countries.  There  is 
a  daily  stream  of  tourists  and  travelers 


both  ways.  Students  and  researchers 
share  the  resources  of  our  great  univer- 
sities. We  share  common  roots  as  the 
children  of  revolution  and  because  16 
million  Spanish-speaking  citizens  live 
in  the  United  States.  Most  of  all,  we 
share  a  common  commitment  to  the  in- 
dividual freedom  and  dignity  of  all  our 
citizens. 

For  the  first  time  in  a  quarter  of  a 
century,  the  peoples  of  Mexico  and  the 
United  States  have  elected  new  Presi- 
dents at  the  same  moment  in  their  his- 
tory. That  event  is  symbolic  of  a  fresh 
start  in  our  relationship. 

The  meeting  between  our  two  Presi- 
dents [February  1977]  signaled  far 
more  than  the  courtesies  of  acquaint- 
ance. It  reflected  just  as  much  the  high 
priority  which  President  Carter  attaches 
to  America"s  relationship  with  its 
southern  neighbor  and  his  deep  respect 
and  admiration  for  the  extraordinary 
public  servant  whom  the  people  of 
Mexico  have  chosen  as  their  leader. 

I  was  privileged  a  year  ago  to  intro- 
duce President  Lopez  Portillo  to  ad- 
dress the  Congress  of  the  United 
States.  He  said  then  that  his  mission  to 
my  country  was  to  "seek  understand- 
ing, balance,  and  respect""  in  the  rela- 
tionship between  the  United  States  and 
Mexico.  This  has  been  the  basis  for  a 
year  of  unparalleled  accomplishment 
between  our  two  countries — a  year  in 
which  equal  partnership  became  the 
guiding  spirit  of  our  future  growth  and 
progress. 

We  pursue  such  a  course  because  it 
is  right.  But  we  also  believe,  with 
equal  conviction,  that  the  best  hope  we 
have  for  progress  and  peace  is  not  the 
domination  of  one  country  by  another 
but  rather  sovereign  nations  pursuing 
common  goals. 


Tangible  Accomplishments 

My  journey  to  Mexico  City  seems 
very  short  in  comparison  with  the  dis- 
tance we  have  traveled  together  in  only 
12  months. 

When  President  Lopez  Portillo  re- 
turned from  Washington  after  his  visit 
last  year,  he  took  with  him  the  respect 
and  affection  of  an  American  Presi- 
dent. The  closeness  which  has  quickly 
grown  between  our  President  "s  family 
and  yours  is  a  symbol  of  the  deeper, 
more  balanced  and  mature  relationship 
that  has  developed  between  Mexico  and 
the  United  States. 

This  new  spirit  by  itself  would  have 
been  an  important  achievement.  But  we 
have  put  it  to  work.  We  have  taken  a 
number  of  concrete  bilateral  steps  to 
improve  our  relations  further. 

•  President  Carter  and  President 


12 


Lopez  Portillo  at  their  meeting  a  year 
ago  set  up  a  consultative  mechanism  to 
consider  our  common  problems  in 
trade,  investment,  energy  and  miner- 
als, tourism,  and  social  problems.  It  is 
a  vital  functioning  instrument. 

•  In  1977  we  signed  a  tropical  prod- 
ucts agreement,  an  important  precedent 
for  the  world  trading  system.  It  com- 
bines for  the  first  time  in  practice  the 
twin  objectives  of  trade  reciprocity 
with  the  need  for  special  consideration 
for  developing  countries.  By  this 
agreement,  we  will  cut  tariffs  on  items 
of  special  interest  to  Mexico — like 
fruits,  fiber,  and  vegetables — which 
represent  $63  million  in  Mexican  ex- 
ports to  the  United  States  and  $36  mil- 
lion in  your  imports  from  the  United 
States.  That  action  signals  our  mutual 
dedication  to  freer  trade  throughout  the 
world.  It  will  serve  as  a  model  for  both 
industrialized  and  developing  countries 
as  we  pursue  the  multilateral  trade 
negotiations  in  Geneva. 

•  In  1977  we  also  ratified  and  im- 
plemented an  exchange  of  sanctions 
treaty — a  unique  humanitarian  agree- 
ment for  permitting  Americans  impris- 
oned in  Mexico  and  Mexicans  impris- 
oned in  the  United  States  to  serve  the 
remainder  of  their  sentences  in  their 
own  countries.  The  first  transfer  during 
Christmas  was  a  poignant  moment 
which  both  our  people  will  long  re- 
member. Like  our  trade  agreements,  it 
has  served  as  a  model  for  agreements 
with  other  nations. 

•  In  1977  we  concluded  a  civil  avia- 
tion agreement  to  enable  the  airlines  of 
both  countries  to  expand  their  services 
and  thereby  increase  and  enhance  the 
interchange  between  our  peoples.  It 
represents  the  greatest  expansion  of  air 
services  ever  undertaken  by  two  na- 
tions. The  agreement  is  symbolic  of  the 
larger  effort  to  expand  the  interaction 
and  deepen  the  friendship  between  us.  I 
was  proud  to  sign  it  today  on  behalf  of 
the  United  States. 

•  Tourism  helps  bring  our  nations 
together.  And  we  appreciate  its  eco- 
nomic importance  to  Mexico.  We  are 
raising  the  ceiling  of  duty-free  entry  of 
goods  that  an  American  may  bring 
from  other  nations  to  the  United  States 
from  $100  to  $250  per  month.  Addi- 
tionally, President  Carter's  tax  reform 
proposals  will  contain  provisions  that 
should  ease  Mexican  concerns  over  our 
foreign  convention  tax  regulations. 

•  In  1977  we  enacted  a  new 
fisheries  agreement,  creating  clear 
rules  for  managing  our  fishing 
resources. 

•  And  in  1977,  we  increased  and 
improved  our  cooperative  efforts  to  at- 
tack the  illicit  flow  of  narcotics  across 
our  border.  We  share  a  great  interest  in 


the  swift  and  complete  eradication  of 
this  poison.  The  American  people  are 
grateful  for  the  massive  commitment  of 
human  and  material  resources  to  that 
effort  by  the  Mexican  Government. 
Our  senior  officials  continue  to  discuss 
new  programs  to  use  new  and  promis- 
ing technologies  for  eliminating  this 
source  of  so  much  misery. 

In  only  one  year,  together  we  have 
built  a  remarkable  record  of  accom- 
plishment. My  purpose  in  coming  to 
Mexico,  as  we  enter  the  second  year  of 
our  two  Administrations,  is  to  em- 
phasize the  importance  of  our  continu- 
ing together  the  course  which  we  have 
taken  so  productively. 

Future  Agenda 

We  still  have  before  us  a  full 
agenda — one  which  will  challenge  our 
wisdom,  talents,  and  determination. 
We  must  each  find  ways  to  create  more 
jobs.  Smuggling  of  narcotics  and  other 
goods  must  be  stopped.  Obstacles  to 
mutually  beneficial  trade  and  invest- 
ment must  be  reduced.  Improved  coop- 
eration is  the  only  path  to  achieve  these 
goals. 

Not  only  cooperation  but  candor  and 
understanding  must  be  brought  to  all 
our  tasks.  In  this  spirit,  I  want  to  dis- 
cuss the  problem  of  undocumented 
workers — people  who  enter  the  United 
States  to  seek  employment  without 
visas  or  proper  documentation. 

Undocumented  Workers.  Every 
government  has  a  responsibility  to  its 
citizens  to  regulate  the  entrance  of 
people  as  well  as  goods.  That  is  what 
we  are  trying  to  do.  The  citizens  of  my 
country  want  our  laws  on  entry  en- 
forced; this  is  the  responsibility  of  any 
American  Government.  But  we  want  to 
do  this  without  creating  problems  for 
Mexico. 

We  recognize  the  many  dimensions 
of  the  problem,  and  we  are  prepared  to 
work  with  you  to  address  them.  For  our 
part,  the  President  has  proposed  a 
comprehensive  program  regarding  un- 
documented workers  presently  living  in 
the  United  States  and  the  flow  of  new 
workers. 

The  program  begins  by  recognizing 
that  the  human  rights  of  the  un- 
documented workers  already  in  the 
United  States  must  be  protected.  There- 
fore, the  proposal  would  grant  legal 
status  to  all  who  arrived  before  January 
1,  1977 — permitting  them  to  work  and 
live  without  fear  of  arrest.  Those  who 
have  been  in  the  United  States  since 
before  1970  will  be  able  to  apply  for 
permanent  resident  status  and  eventual 
citizenship.  Those  who  arrived  between 
1970  and  January  1 ,  1977.  will  be  enti- 


Department  of  State  Bull.in 

tied   to  a  5-year  temporary   resid  i 
status.  There  will  be  no  massive  dep 
tations  or  roundups. 

In  addition,  the  Carter  Adminis 
tion  is  supporting  legislation  wh 
would  increase  the  immigration  qii 
between  Mexico  and  Canada  to  50, i 
per  year.  Since  Canada  has  so  few 
migrants  to  the  United  States,  the 
feet  of  this  legislation  would  be  a  s 
stantial  increase  in  Mexico's  ann 
legal  immigration  to  the  United  Stal 

The   proposal   also  recognizes  t  [ 
employers  in  our  country  who  enci 
age  undocumented  workers  are  a  sou  t 
of  the   problem.   The  President's  p 
gram   imposes  civil   sanctions   agai  [ 
such  employers  and  also  increases  e 
number  of  personnel   who  patrol 
border. 

At  the  same  time,  we  understand 
reasons  for  the  flow  of  undocumei 
workers  to  the  United  States.   We 
willing  to  help  Mexico  as  it  desire 
obtaining  support  for  its  efforts  to 
velop   its   economy.    The   story 
Mexico's  postwar  economic  progres 
very  impressive.  In  the  three  decu  s 
since  Franklin  Roosevelt  visited  M  • 
terey,   you've   made  great   strides  i 
producing  goods  and  services  and  r: 
ing  per  capita  income.  That  progi  - 
took    place    within    a   democra  . 
framework,  creating  a  model  for    ■ 
veloping  nations  in  every  corner  of 
globe. 

On  behalf  of  President  Carter.  I  h  ; 
informed  President  Lopez  Portillo  i  i 
the  United  States  is  ready  and  eage 
do  all  it  can,  including  support  for 
panded  efforts  by  the  World  Bank    1 
the  Inter-American  Development  B  . 
to  increase  rural  development  effort'  i 
Mexico.  These  institutions  have 
sured  us  that  they  are  prepared  to 
pand  significantly  their  efforts  in  s 
with   Mexico's  commitment  to  tac 
these  problems  as  a  matter  of  the  hi 
est  priority. 

The  challenges  of  economic  ( 
velopment,  social  justice,  and  hun 
rights  that  we  face  in  our  two  counti 
also  confront  the  other  nations  of  i 
hemisphere  and  the  international  co 
munity.  The  United  States  and  Mex 
must  work  together  and  with  others 
meet  these  challenges. 

North  American  Community.  T 
opportunity  to  visit  America's  clos' 
neighbors  this  week  has  shown  me  v 
idly  how  much  we  have  in  commc 
and  how  much  our  countries  are 
coming  increasingly  interdepende; 
We  occupy  a  continent  rich  in  natu 
and  human  resources.  We  share  Atli 
tic  and  Pacific  interests,  as  well 
interests  in  the  Caribbean.  We  share 
common  belief  in  human  rights 
political  democracy. 


rch  1978 


13 


While  this  interdependence  offers 
;at  benefits,  it  also  imposes  great  re- 
jnsibilities.  The  economies  and  the 
;ieties  of  Mexico.  Canada,  and  the 
'liited  States  have  become   so  in- 
twined  that  developments  in  one  part 
the  continent  have  direct  and   im- 
idiate  repercussions  in  others.  This 
;t  of  life  compels  us  to  carefully  as- 
iS  the  consequences  of  our  actions 
1  to  search  continually  for  new  forms 
cooperation.  We  can  do  that  by  con- 
ting  closely  with  each  other. 
'  Global   Problems.   We  must  not 
".get  that  our  common  problems  have 
1  respect  for  national  or  even  conti- 
iitai  boundaries.   They  confront  us 
{iially  as  members  of  the  world  com- 
mity.   As  the  citizens  of  representa- 
.-  democracies,   our  nations  have  a 
,  cial  responsibility  to  the  life  and 
.0  of  this  planet.  We  can  fulfill  that 
•  ponsibility  by  the  power  of  our 
.'  niple  here  at  home  and  by  the  wis- 
In  and  determination  of  our  mutual 
:  iris  in  the  world  of  nations. 

Uter  the  Cuban  missile  crisis  in 
I  i2.  Mexico  took  the  initiative  in 
1  otiating  a  treaty  at  TIateloIco  to  ban 
1  lear  weapons  from  Latin  America. 
1  May  26.  in  the  presence  of  your 
F  eign  Minister  Santiago  Roel,  Presi- 
1  t  Carter  signed  Protocol  I  of  that 
iity.  pledging  the  United  States  not 
.•deploy  nuclear  weapons  in  Latin 
4ierica.  We  hope  to  work  closely 
>  h  \ou  next  year  to  insure  the  speedy 
nlcmentation  of  the  treaty  of 
r  leloico  and  to  make  Latin  America 
:1  first  nuclear  weapons-free  zone  in 
i  world. 

Ve  are  also  strongly  committed  to 
1  ting  the  proliferation  of  nuclear 
« ipons  capabilities  and  to  restraining 
tl  international  sale  of  conventional 
a  IS.  The  U.N.  Special  Session  on 
C  armament  will  offer  us  an  opportu- 
a    to  pursue  that  objective  together. 

Ve  support  the  dialogue  between  the 

iiustrialized  and  the  developing  coun- 

ti  s  and  the  effort  to  make  the  interna- 

uil  economic  system  more  equitable 

just.  We  welcome  the  leadership  of 

\ico  as  we  work  toward  specific 

iNures  which  build  upon  the  respon- 

lity  we  all  share  for  the  effective 

ffiagement  of  the  world  economy. 

,ast  December,   our  two  countries 

led  with  28  others  and    15  interna- 

lal  institutions  in  a  multilateral  ef- 

tci  help  develop  the  nations  of  the 

ibbean  and  to  increase  cooperation 

ween   the   island   nations   of  the 

1-,  ibbean  and  their  neighbors.  This  is 

Sjther  area  in  which  we  are  eager  to 

»''k  with  you. 

)ur  Presidents  have  committed 

\ieo  and  the  United  States  to  pursue 

eause  of  human  rights  wherever  we 


encounter  tyranny  and  oppression.  For 
too  many  people,  the  promise  of  human 
destiny  is  dwarfed  by  the  reality  of  sub- 
jugation. Our  nations  have  worked  to- 
gether to  proclaim  their  unyielding  op- 
position to  any  governmental  policy 
which  would  suppress  or  enslave  the 
human  spirit.  The  important  resolutions 
passed  by  the  General  Assembly  of  the 
Organization  of  American  States  and 
the  strengthening  of  the  Inter-American 
Commission  on  Human  Rights  bear 
concrete  testimony  to  that  cooperation. 
We  must  continue  to  work  together  to 
insure  that  1978  will  be  not  only  the 
year  that  TIateloIco  is  implemented  but 
also  the  year  when  the  American  Con- 
vention on  Human  Rights  becomes  a 
working  reality. 

We  must  also  continue  to  define  our 
relationship  with  other  countries — in 
trade,  in  arms  negotiations,  and  in  the 
world  community  in  general — not  only 
in  terms  of  self-interest  but  in  response 


to  the  concern  of  those  countries  for  the 
needs  and  rights  of  their  own  people. 

We  have  taken  great  strides  in  the 
past  year.  We  have  coupled  new  re- 
spect for  our  individual  sovereignty 
with  concrete  progress  in  solving 
mutual  problems.  In  the  process,  we 
have  strengthened  the  fabric  of  a  work- 
ing, cooperative  partnership.  We  wel- 
come that  partnership,  the  respon- 
sibilities it  imposes,  and  the  benefits  it 
offers  for  our  separate  destinies  as  na- 
tions and  for  our  common  future  as 
friends  and  neighbors.  Together,  we 
will  make  that  future  more  prosperous 
and  more  hopeful  for  the  peoples  of 
both  our  lands.  D 


'  Address  al  a  luncheon  at  the  Edmonton 
Plaza  Hotel  in  Edmonton,  Alberta,  on  Jan.  18, 
1978  (opening  paragraphs  omitted). 

-  Address  at  a  luncheon  at  the  Hotel  Pres- 
idente  Chapultepec  in  Mexico  City  on  Jan.  20, 
1978  (opening  paragraphs  omitted). 


THE  SECRETARY: 

]%ews  Conference^  February  10 


Q.  Prime  Minister  Begin  said  in 
Geneva  the  other  day  that  the  United 
States'  supplying  arms  to  Egypt 
would  be  a  negative  development. 
Would  you  agree  with  that? 

A.  I  think  that  the  question  of  arms 
sales  in  the  area  is  a  very  complicated 
one.  As  you  know  from  the  outset,  we 
have  applied  certain  criteria  with  re- 
spect to  the  approval  of  arms  sales. 
Those  criteria  I  have  outlined  to  you 
many  times,  and  we  will  continue  to 
apply  those  criteria  in  connection  with 
the  requests  for  arms  sales  which  have 
been  made  to  us  at  this  time  by  the  var- 
ious parties.  We  have  not  yet  reached  a 
final  decision  on  what  we  are  going  to 
do.  We  will  be  doing  so  shortly,  and 
this  will  be  announced  by  the  President 
when  those  decisions  are  made. 

Insofar  as  the  specific  question  you 
asked  is  concerned,  I  think  that  if  the 
criteria  which  we  have  been  applying 
all  along  are  applied,  then  it  is  possible 
to  make  arms  sales  which  are  not  dis- 
ruptive. 

Q.  As  President  Sadat  left,  the 
United  States  put  out  a  statement 
reaffirming  its  commitment  to  Is- 
rael's security,  also  reading  [U.N. 
Resolution]  242  as  requiring  with- 
drawal of  Israeli  military  forces  from 
what  some  people  refer  to  as  oc- 
cupied Arab  lands.  I  wondered  if 
such  a  withdrawal  does,  indeed, 
tamper  with  or  decrease  Israel's  se- 


curity, and  I  also  wonder  if  arms 
sales  to  Egypt  would  square  with  the 
American  commitment  to  Israel's  se- 
curity? 

A.  With  respect  to  the  question  of 
withdrawals  from  occupied  territories, 
242  is  the  basic  document  under  which 
all  of  the  parties  have  agreed  that  the 
negotiations  for  a  Middle  East  settle- 
ment should  be  conducted.  [Re- 
solution] 242  refers  to,  specifically, 
withdrawal  from  occupied  territories, 
and  "occupied  territories'"  includes  all 
fronts  involved  in  the  1967  conflict. 

Insofar  as  security  matters  are  con- 
cerned, I  believe  that  they  can  be  taken 
care  of  within  the  framework  of  242 
and  within  the  framework  of  with- 
drawal from  occupied  territories.     . 

As  to  your  second  question,  as  I  in- 
dicated a  moment  ago,  I  believe  that 
arms  sales  to  the  various  parties  have  to 
be  taken  a  look  at  in  the  overall  balance 
in  the  region  and  that,  therefore,  the 
decision  whether  or  not  to  make  a  par- 
ticular arms  sale,  including  that  to 
Egypt,  has  to  be  looked  at  from  the 
overall  standpoint. 

Q.  Are  there  any  conditions  under 
which  the  United  States  would  con- 
sider supplying  arms  to  Somalia — for 
example,  if  there  were  to  be  a  major 
counteroffensive  not  solely  against 
the  Ogaden  but  against  Somalia  it- 
self? 

A.  Let  me  respond  by  giving  you  a 


14 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


broader  answer  to  your  question. 

We  are  concerned  with  the  increas- 
ing conflict  in  the  Ogaden.  It  continues 
to  accelerate  in  pace  and  in  the  number 
of  arms  which  are  moving  into  the 
area.  We  believe  that  there  should  be  a 
negotiated  settlement  of  this  problem; 
we  believe  that  there  should  be  a 
cease-fire;  we  believe  that  there  should 
be  a  withdrawal  of  the  Somali  forces 
from  the  Ogaden;  and  in  return,  we  be- 
lieve that  there  should  be  a  withdrawal 
of  Soviet  and  Cuban  forces  from 
Ethiopia.  We  believe  it  is  fundamental 
that  there  be  a  recognition  and  a  respect 
by  all  parties  for  the  internationally 
recognized  borders,  and  we  also  be- 
lieve that  there  should  be  agreement  in 
principle  and  negotiations  looking  to 
the  solution  in  the  future  of  the  prob- 
lem of  the  Ogaden. 

We  will  continue  our  present  course 


of  action  with  respect  to  not  supplying 
arms  to  either  side.  Let  me  say,  if  there 
were  a  crossing  of  borders,  that  would 
present  a  new  and  different  situation, 
and  we  would  have  to  consider  it  at  that 
time. 

Q.  There  is  a  wire  report  today 
that  the  Western  allies  have  agreed 
that  if  there  is  a  crossing  of  the  bor- 
der, that  there  will  be  Western  arms 
supplied,  including  American  arms, 
to  Somalia.  Is  there  any  such  agree- 
ment? 

A.  What  I  would  say  on  that  is — and 
I  think  that  is  what  was  said  in  the  arti- 
cle as  I  glanced  at  it  before  I  came 
down  here — that  this  would  present  a 
different  situation,  and  it  would  have  to 
be  considered  under  the  circumstances 
that  existed  at  that  time. 

Q.  The  Administration  has  said 
frequently  that  it  is  committed  to  the 


territorial  integrity  of  Lebanon  a 
supports  the  building  of  the  Lebanf 
army.  What  is  the  present  Americ 
role  right  now  in  the  Lebanese  u 
flict  between  the  Syrian  troops  a 
the  Lebanese  troops? 

A.  The  American  role  in  Lebanon 
that   we  continue  to  support  the  Go 
ernment  of  Lebanon.    We   support 
territorial  integrity.  We  support  its 
dependence.  We  are  continuing  to  . 
sist   in  the  supplying  of  arms  for  I 
building  of  a  Lebanese  army.  That  p' 
gram  continues  as  it  was  outlined  all 
discussed  with  the  Lebanese  authorit 
at  that  time,  and  the  plans  are  to  ci 
tinue  along  those  same  guidelines. 

Q.  The  Syrians  entered  Lebant 
The  United  States  accepted  the  S 
ians  as  a   peacekeeping  force 
Lebanon,  and  right  now  they  hs' 
violated  that  truce. 


TELEVISION  INTERVIEW 

Sci  rcuiry  Vcincc  iidilccl  llw  folhnvi ni; 
comments  i>n  the  Middle  East  when  he  was 
interviewed  on  television  by  news  corre- 
spondents Robert  Mac  Neil  and  James 
Lehrer  oj  PBS  on  February  14.  1978. 


Q.  The  Carter  Administration  today 
appeared  to  bow  a  little  to  the  personal 
diplomacy  of  President  Sadat  and  agreed 
to  sell  Egypt  some  of  the  jet  fighters  he 
wants,  but  the  llniled  States  refused  to 
supply  Sadat  with  the  most  advanced 
Tighters  that  it  sells  to  Israel. 

In  his  recent  visit  to  Washington,  the 
Egyptian  leader  argued  strongly  that 
sophisticated  U.S.  arms  supplies  made  Is- 
rael inflexible  in  the  current  peace  negotia- 
tions. Egypt  needed  the  same  weapons  to 
create  a  better  balance.  Specifically,  Sadat 
asked  for  F-5's,  a  fighter  supplied  to  some 
25  foreign  countries  but  not  used  by  the 
U.S.  Air  Force. 

The  State  Department  said  today  that 
we  would  sell  Egypt  the  F-5's  but  not  the 
more  advanced  planes  Sadat  also  wanted, 
the  F-15  and  F-16.  both  of  which  we 
agreed  to  supply  to  Israel. 

However,  the  aircraft  decision  marks  a 
significant  change  of  American  policy  to 
Egypt  just  when  relations  with  Israel  have 
soured  somewhat.  Why  was  the  decision 
made  to  sell  planes  to  Egypt? 

A.  We  had  outstanding  for  a  long  while 
requests  for  sales  of  aircraft  from  Israel, 
Egypt,  and  from  Saudi  Arabia.  Some  ofthe.se 
went  back  as  far  as  a  year  or  two  in  the  past 


We  determined  that  we  should  deal  with 
these  issues,  make  a  decision,  and,  move 
forward  in  this  particular  area.  In  doing  so 
we  took  a  look  at  three  basic  factors. 

•  First,  would  these  be  conducive  to  the 
continuation  of  and  progress  in  the  peace 
negotiations? 

•  Secondly,  would  they  be  consistent  with 
the  security  requirements  of  the  various 
countries'' 

•  Thirdly,  would  they  be  consistent  with 
the  basic  military  balance  within  the  Middle 
East  or  would  they  change  that  balance? 

After  a  very  careful  examination  of  all 
these  factors  we  came  up  with  a  package 
today  which  was  approved  by  the  President 
which  we  think  meets  all  of  these  various  re- 
quirements. Indeed,  we  believe  that  rather 
than  hindering  the  negotiations,  the  decisions 
which  have  been  made  today  will  foster  and 
be  supportive  of  them, 

Q.  Was  Israel  informed  of  the  Egypt 
decision  before  it  was  announced  publicly? 

A.   Yes.  It  was. 

Q.  At  a  high  level  of  communication? 

A.  We  inlcirmed  each  of  the  governments 
last  night. 

Q.  What  was  the  reaction  from  Israel  to 
the  Egypt  decision? 

A.  As  one  might  expect,  the  Israelis  were 
unhappy  about  that  decision.  They  have,  as 
far  as  I  know,  made  no  public  statement  on 
that,  but  they  have  made  no  bones  in  advance 
—  when  there  was  rumor  that  this  decision 
might  be  forthcoming — that  they  did  not  like 
it. 

Q.  I  notice  that  an  Israeli  official 
testified  this  morning  in  Congress  after  the 


decision  was  known  and  said  that: 
sale  to  Egypt  would  be  a  radical  and  a  v  ;, 
significant  destabilizing  factor  to  the  IV> 
die  East  military  situation." 

A.  1  completely  disagree  wtih  that  com 
sion.  1  don't  think  it  is  a  radically  destabi 
ing  element. 

One  has  to  take  a  look  at  the  situation  fi 
the  standpoint  of  the  Egyptians.  The  Ej, 
tians  made  a  decision  2  years  or  more  a 
which  they  decided  that  they  were  goinj 
take  a  certain  course  of  action  with  respec 
the  Middle  East  and  negotiations  in  the  N» 
die  East  and  as  a  result  of  that  they  lost  t 
principal  arms  supplier,  which  was  the  So 
L'nion,  Since  then  they  have  had  to  rely> 
the  West  for  their  requirements, 

Q.   In   these  preliminary  communil 
tions,   as  you  say,   Israel   was  told 
forehand  that  these  planes  were  going 
be  sold  to  Egypt.  Were  you  told — was 
United  States  told  then  that,  hey,  look, 
don't  like  it  and  there  are  going  to  be  pi 
lie  statements  made?  In  other  words, 
they  going  to  make  a  big  deal  about  thil 

A.  We  were  told  that  they  were  unha[i 
about  this  and  would  not  like  it  and  we  w> 
told  by  the  Egyptians  that  they  were  very 
happy  that  they  wouldn't  be  getting  eve 
thing  that  they  were  asking  for.  So.  I  th 
there  is  a  little  bit  of  unhappiness  on  ei 
side,  but  we  think  the  decisions  are  soi 
decisions. 

Q.  Why  is  Egypt  not  getting  the  t 
vanced  fighters  that  are  going  to  Sat 
Arabia  and  Israel?  What  is  the  logic 
that  difference? 

A.  Wc  believe  that  they  do  not  rcqUi 
these  for  their  defense  requirements.  We  1 


larch  1978 

A.  The  situation  in  Lebanon  is,  in- 
eed,  a  very  difficult  and  troublesome 
ne  at  this  point.  Fighting  has  broken 

Iut  again  in  the  north  as  well  as 
joradic  fighting  in  the  south.  It  is  a 
'latter  which  we  are  watching  with  the 
reatest  of  care  and  caution.  We  are  in 
lose  touch  with  the  parties  involved 
id  are  continuing  to  provide  the  kind 
r  services  that  we  have  in  the  past — 
orking  with  the  various  parties  trying 
I  help  in  damping  down  the  conflict. 

Q.  Could  you  tell  us,  please,  how 
liany  Cuban  and  Soviet  military  ad- 
isers  are  now  in  Ethiopia,  the  extent 
F  their  involvement  actually  in  com- 
at,  and  what  effect  would  this 
eepening  Soviet  and  Cuban  in- 
Dlvement  have  upon  the  develop- 
ment of  America's  relationship  with 
oth  of  those  countries? 

A.  You've  asked  me  three  questions. 


Let  me  go  one-by-one  on  the  various 
questions. 

I  guess  your  first  question  was,  how 
many  Cuban  and  Soviet  military  per- 
sonnel or  advisers  are  there  in 
Ethiopia?  The  best  estimates  which  we 
have  at  the  present  time  are  that  there 
are  approximately  800-1,000  Soviet 
military  adviser-types  in  the  area. 
There  are  approximately  3,000  Cubans, 
of  which  approximately  2,000  are  ac- 
tually involved  in  combat  at  this  time, 
and  we  believe  that  there  are  further 
Cubans  on  their  way  to  Ethiopia. 

Q.  How  deep  are  they  involved  in 
combat,  what  kind  of  combat  roles 
are  they  performing? 

A.  It  is  our  best  information  that  the 
Cubans  have  been  flying  aircraft  and, 
indeed,  have  been  involved  in  other 
ground  activities  as  well  as  the  flying 
of  planes. 


15 


Q.  What  effect  does  all  of  this 
have — the  apparently  deeper  Soviet 
and  Cuban  involvement  have — on  the 
relationship  the  United  States  seeks 
with  both  of  these  countries? 

A.  This,  obviously,  cannot  help  but 
have  an  effect  upon  the  relationship  be- 
tween our  countries.  It  affects  the  polit- 
ical atmosphere  between  the  United 
States  and  those  two  countries.  It  is  a 
matter  which  we  will,  obviously,  keep 
in  mind  as  we  proceed  with  the  talks  on 
the  Indian  Ocean,  because  what  seems 
to  be  happening  there  is  inconsistent 
with  a  limitation  of  forces  in  the  area, 
which  is  what  we  are  seeking  insofar  as 
the  Indian  Ocean  talks  are  concerned. 
We  will  continue  with  those  talks,  but 
obviously  it  affects  the  political  atmos- 
phere in  which  those  talks  are  carried 
forward. 

Q.  When  the  United  States  express- 


\e  thai  the  F-5's  will  meet  their  defense 
.juirements  and  will  not  upset  the  military 
lance  in  the  area. 

Q.  Could  you  describe  that  military 
alance  in  a  little  more  detail?  I  mean  how 
ill  it  not  upset  the  balance  to  have  Egypt 
ith  a  rather  obsolete  air  force  and 
'  ipplied  with  a  plane  that  President  Sadat 
Imself  described  as  a  tenth-rate  plane, 
le  F-5E,  when  he  was  here  in  an  inter- 
ew?  Why  would  it  not  upset  the  balance 
I  have  its  neighbors  with  much  more 
iphisticated  planes? 

A.  Well,  insofar  as  Egypt  is  concerned,  it 
111  has  a  number  of  the  more  advanced 
Ig  aircraft.  It  has  been  short  of  spare  parts, 
it  It  Is  making  some  steps  now  to  develop 
i  own  capability,  providing  substitute  spare 
irts  for  those  which  it  does  not  have. 
In  addition  to  thai,  the  F-5  Is  really  a  very 
)od  aircraft.  It  is  really  not  a  tenth-rate  air- 
aft.  It  Is  one  of  the  best  short-range  light 
ghters  thai  exists,  and  I  think  that  It  will  fill 
'd  provide  what  Is  needed  for  the  Egyptian 
r  defense  capability. 

Q.  If  it  is  such  a  good  aircraft,  why 
oesn't  our  Air  Force  use  it? 

A.  Our  Air  Force  has  different  requlre- 
lents.  There  are  many,  many  other  nations 
round  the  world  who  do  use  It  and  think 
ery,  very  highly  of  It, 

Q.  Why  are  we  giving  the  Saudis  60 
-15's  which  is  regarded,  I  think,  as  the 
I  lost  advanced  fighter  in  the  world? 

A.  About  3  years  ago  a  study  was  made  of 

audi  defense  requirements.   Including  their 

lir  requirements,  and  il  was  concluded  at  that 

mc  that  because  of  the  fact  that  iheir 


Lightning  aircraft  which  they  had  gotten 
from  Great  Britain  were  becoming  outmoded, 
that  they  would  require  an  advanced  intercep- 
tor In  the  future. 

Subsequently.  Ihey  came  to  the  United  States 
and  examined  the  various  possibilities.  In 
addition  to  that  a  team  was  sent.  I  think  In 
1976,  to  Saudi  Arabia  to  take  a  look  at  the 
situation  there  and  then  they  were  offered 
Iheir  choice  among  the  various  interceptor  - 
type  fighter  aircraft.  They  at  that  time  indi- 
cated they  wanted  the  F-15's,  and  since  then 
they  have  stuck  to  that  conclusion. 

Sixty  aircraft  Is  not  a  great  number  of  air- 
craft for  that  country  and  the  threat  which  it 
potentially  faces.  It  Is  a  large  country  In 
terms  of  area.  It  has  very  Important  resources 
within  its  country.  It  has  a  small  army.  And 
yet  it  faces  from  certain  of  Its  radical 
neighbors  a  potential  threat. 

Q.  As  I  said  at  the  beginning  of  the  pro- 
gram, Mr.  Sadat  made  the  argument  when 
he  was  here  both  in  Congress  and  re- 
portedly also  in  his  talks  with  you  and  the 
President  that  because  Israel  got  such 
sophisticated  weapons  it  helped  Israel  to 
be  inflexible  in  these  negotiations,  and  he 
needed  to  balance  that  out  with  some  more 
sophisticated  arms.  Do  you  buy  that 
argument? 

A.  No.  I  really  do  not  buy  that  argument 
because  1  believe  that  providing  it  with  the 
arms  which  are  necessary  to  give  it  the  capa- 
bility to  protect  its  own  security  gives  it 
self-confidence  rather  than  giving  It  an  over- 
confidence  which  prohibits  progress  in 
negotiation. 

Q.  Should  we  regard  this  decision  to  sell 
the  F-5's  to  Egypt  as  a  symbolic  decision  to 


show  our  support  for  Mr.  Sadat's  diplo- 
matic initiatives? 

A.  I  think  it  Is  more  than  that.  I  think  It 
also  does  meet  a  genuine  requrlement  which 
the  Egyptians  have  In  terms  of  their  military 
requirement. 

Q.  Now,  all  this  comes,  as  you  know,  at 
a  time  when  Israel  is  already  accusing  you 
and  the  Administration  of  taking  sides  on 
the  Israeli  settlements  and  the  Sinai  issue 
and  was  triggered — I  don't  have  to  tell  you 
this,  of  course  —  it  was  triggered  by  your 
statement  Friday  where  you  said:  "... 
these  settlements  are  contrary  to  interna- 
tional law  and  that,  therefore,  they  should 
not  exist."  That  is  your  position;  is  that 

correct? 

A.  That  is  correct. 

Q.  All  right.  Why  are  they  contrary  to 
international  law?  How  are  they,  I  should 
say? 

A.  The  Geneva  Convention,  the  so-called 
Fourth  Geneva  Convention,  considered  this 
question  and  concluded  that  the  creation  of 
settlements  in  occupied  territory  was  contrary 
to  International  law  because  it  was  occupied 
territory  and  that  Is  generally  recognized  In- 
ternational law. 

Q.  And  there  is  no  question  about  that? 

A.  There  Is  no  question  about  that. 

Q.  All  right,  when  you  say  "should  not 
exist,"  what  do  you  mean  by  that? 

A.  What  I  mean  Is  if  something  is  Illegal, 
then  it  follows  that  they  should  not  exist.  But 
I  went  on  to  point  out  what  was  going  to  be 
done  about  this  was  a  matter  for  the  parties  to 
work  out. 


Press  release  76  of  Feb.  14.  1978. 


16 


es  concern,  as  it  did  the  other  day  in 
the  communique  from  the  White 
House  over  Israeli  settlement  activ- 
ity, does  this  mean  literally  that  you 
want  to  see  the  bulldozers  halted  in 
the  Sinai  settlements  and  the 
amateur  archeologists  sent  home 
from  Shiloh? 

A.  We  believe  that  the  settlement  ac- 
tivity, including  the  construction  and 
the  new  activities  that  are  concerned, 
does  create  an  obstacle  to  peace,  and 
we  believe  that  peace  will  be  fostered  if 
this  is  stopped. 

Q.  And  likewise,  should  the  ar- 
cheologists be  sent  home  from 
Shiloh,  in  your  view? 

A.  If.  indeed,  this  is  merely  ar- 
cheological,  that  would  be  one  thing.  It 
is  not  clear  that  that  is  the  case. 

Q.  After  your  talks  with  Mr. 
Sadat,  are  you  now  in  a  position,  as 
the  mediator  in  the  Middle  East  dis- 
pute, to  tell  the  Israelis  that  further 
settlement  activity  could  cause  a 
breakdown  in  the  peace  talks? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  characterize  it  in 
the  terms  which  you  have  set  forth.  Let 
me  say  again,  however,  that  1  do  be- 
lieve it  creates  an  obstacle  to  peace  and 
that  this  must  be  faced  up  to  and  dealt 
with  in  order  to  make  progress  in  the 
talks. 

Q.  On  the  Ogaden,  in  your  discus- 
sions with  the  Soviets,  have  you  re- 
ceived any  assurances  that  they  do 
not  have  any  intention  of  supporting 
an  Ethiopian  drive  beyond  the  bor- 
ders of  Ethiopia? 

And  secondly,  do  you  limit  the 
area  in  which  you  think  Soviet- 
American  relationships  might  be  af- 
fected, by  their  conduct  in  Africa,  to 
the  Indian  Ocean  talks? 

A.  We  have  received  assurances  that 
the  Ethiopians  would  not  cross  beyond 
the  border  of  Ethiopia  into  Somalia, 
and  1  hope  and  expect  that  that  will  be 
carried  out. 

Secondly,  with  respect  to  the  impact 
of  what  is  happening  there  on  the  over- 
all relationship  between  the  Soviet 
Union  and  ourselves,  I  am  not  suggest- 
ing any  direct  linkage,  but  I  do  suggest 
it  affects  the  political  atmosphere  in 
which  these  discussions  take  place. 

Q.  For  most  of  this  week  the  Ad- 
ministration has  been  giving  brief- 
ings to  members  of  the  American 
Jewish  community,  to  Members  of 
Congress  who  are  known  to  be  sym- 
pathetic to  Israel's  cause. 

What  is  it  you  would  like  these 
people  to  say  to  Mr.  Begin?  Or  what 
will  you  be  saying  to  Mr.  Begin  in 
coming  weeks?  What  is  it  that  Israel 
could  do  particularly  to  contribute  to 
the  peace  efforts? 


On  the  Sinai,  for  instance,  would 
you  like  Israel  to  agree  that  the  set- 
tlements would  be  disbanded  over  a 
period  of  time?  On  the  West  Bank, 
what  is  it  that  the  Administration  is 
looking  for? 

A.  We  have  been  talking  to  various 
Members  of  Congress  and  various  indi- 
viduals here  in  the  United  States  to 
bring  them  up  to  date  on  what  has 
taken  place  during  the  talks  with  Presi- 
dent Sadat  so  that  they  can  understand 
the  actual  condition  of  the  negotiations 
at  this  point  and  the  obstacles  and  prob- 
lems that  remain,  in  order  to  make  con- 
tinuing progress  in  the  talks. 

We  are  pleased  that  as  a  result  of  the 
talks  which  we  had  with  President 
Sadat  when  he  was  here,  he  has  said 
that  he  will  persevere  in  the  talks  and 
that  he  remains  committed  to  peace  and 
that  the  door  to  peace  remains  open. 

In  our  discussions  with  the 
Israelis — and  1  shall  be  meeting  with 
Foreign  Minister  Dayan  on  the  16th 
when  he  will  be  here  in 
Washington — we  will  be  talking  about 
the  discussions  which  we  have  had  with 
President  Sadat  and  what  we  believe, 
in  light  of  those  discussions,  are  the 
key  points  that  have  to  be  dealt  with. 
They,  clearly,  are  two  in  number;  One 
is  the  question  of  settlements,  and  the 
other  is  the  question  of  West  Bank- 
Gaza  and  the  intertwined  Palestinian 
question. 

What  we  will  try  and  do  is  see  if 
we  cannot,  in  our  discussions  between 
them  and  ourselves,  find  ways  of  bridg- 
ing the  differences,  because  these  two 
problems  must  be  overcome  if  we  are 
going  to  make  any  real  progress  in  the 
negotiations.  I  think  it  is  possible  to 
make  progress  in  these  areas  and  that  is 
the  reason  why  we  are  sending  Roy 
Atherton  [Alfred  L.  Atherton,  Jr..  As- 
sistant Secretary  for  Near  Eastern  and 
South  Asian  Affairs]  back  to  the  Mid- 
dle East,  following  Mr.  Dayan 's  visit 
here,  so  that  he  can  pick  up  our  mediat- 
ing role  in  an  active  way,  moving  be- 
tween the  various  capitals. 

Q.  After  you  have  discussed  this, 
as  you  said,  with  people  who  aren't 
normally  having  classified  clear- 
ances, could  you  share  it  a  bit 
broadly  with  more  people? 

And  specifically,  would  the  United 
States  like  Israel  to  agree  on  the 
Sinai  settlements,  to  agree  to  closing 
them  down  over  a  period  of  time? 

And  on  the  West  Bank,  where  do 
you  stand,  particularly  on  the 
American  formula  for  a  temporary 
internationalization  of  the  area — I 
gather  over  5  years — and  do  you  still 
propose  some  kind  of  referendum  of 
that  at  the  ending  of  that  period? 


Department  of  State  Bullet  || 

A.  First,  with  respect  to  the  Sin 
settlements,  we  have  said  that  we  b 
lieve  that  all  of  these  settlements  a 
contrary  to  international  law  and  thi 
therefore,  they  should  not  exist.  I  thii 
our  position,  therefore,  is  quite  cle 
with  respect  to  that.  This,  however, 
a  problem  that  has  to  be  resolved  by  tl 
parties.  They  are  going  to  have 
negotiate  it  themselves. 

Secondly,  with  respect  to  the  We 
Bank,   we   have   indicated  previous   j 
that  we  believe  that  there  should  be  i 
homeland  for  the  Palestinians  and  th 
it  should  be  linked  with  Jordan. 

We  have  suggested  to  the  parties  f( 
their  consideration  the  possibility  of  i 
interim  arrangement  covering  a  peric 
of  years  in  which  the  parties  woul 
have  a  chance  to  work  out  all  of  th 
very  complicated  and  intricate  detai 
which  would  be  involved  in  a  We 
Bank-Gaza-Palestinian  settlement,  ar 
we  still  believe  that  a  formula  of  th. 
type  is  one  which  should  receive  th 
most  careful  and  serious  consideratic 
by  the  parties. 

Q.  Just  about  a  year  ago,  you 
Ambassador  to  the  United  Natior 
referred  to  Cuban  troops  in  Africa 
being  a  stabilizing  influence.  I  won 
der  if  you  could  explain  to  us  what 
is  that  has  happened  over  the  pai 
few  months  that  has  caused  th 
United  States  now  to  so  drasticall 
change  its  attitude? 

A.  When  we  first  started  talking  I 
the  Cubans  last  year,  we  indicated  I 
them  that  we  hoped  that  it  might  b 
possible  to  move  forward  in  a  measure 
way  toward  an  improvement  of  re 
tions  between  our  two  countries.  W 
indicated,  however,  that  there  wer 
certain  problem  areas  that  existed  be 
tween  us  that  had  to  be  discussed.  On 
of  those  problem  areas  was  the  pres 
ence,  and  the  increasing  presence,  o 
Cuban  forces  in  Africa. 

We  expressed  the  hope  at  that  tim 
that  this  would  change  because  we  fe 
that  this  was  not  conducive  to  bringin 
about  peaceful  conditions  in  the  area 

Since  that  time  we  have  been  disap 
pointed  in  what  we  have  seen.  Rathe 
than  a  decrease  of  forces,  which  wi 
think  would  have  been  helpful  an 
leading  toward  peace  in  the  area,  then 
has  been  an  increase  in  forces.  As 
consequence  of  this,  we  think  that  thi 
situation  has  been  further  complicated 

We  are  not  suggesting  this  becaus( 
we  want  to  see  the  Cubans  make  an 
concession  to  us.  What  we  are  seekin} 
is  an  action  which  will  be  helpful  i 
leading  to  peace  in  the  area  rather  that 
fueling  the  conflagration. 

Q.   Former  Secretary   Kissinger 
opposed  the  U.S.  troop  withdrawal 


rch  1978 

(orea  on  the  ground  that  it  would 
destabilizing,  and  it  could  be  mis- 
lerstood  by  the  North  Koreans. 
s  was  reported  quite  recently  by 
NHK  [Nippon  TV  Network 
•p.]  interview  with  Dr.  Kissinger. 
ild  you  give  us  what  is  the  benefit 
he  United  States,  do  you  think,  by 
ling  out  U.S.  troops  in  Korea? 
I.  I  am  not  sure  that  you  have  accu- 
ly  stated  Secretary  Kissinger's  posi- 
I,  but  I  will,  therefore,  put  that 
le  and  speak  to  the  specific  question 
ch  you  have  put  to  me:  What  do  1 
k  is  the  benefit  of  a  phased  with- 
wal  of  U.S.  troops  from  South 
ea? 

/e  believe  that  if  these  troops  are 

idrawn  over  a  period  of  time,  a 

od  of  years — 5  years,  say — and  that 

is  done  on  a  phased  basis  while  at 

same  time  making  sure  that  the 

th  Korean  forces  are  able  to  build 

jtheir  own   troops,   that   this   will 

r  te  a  stronger  and  more  self-reliant 

cth  Korea.  We  believe  that  this  can 

e  one  without  any  danger  to  the  secu- 

I  of  South  Korea. 

e  indicated  further  that  we  would 

:  iKiintaining  strong  and  substantial 

.   air  units  in  the  area  and   naval 

5,  and  as  a  result  of  that,  I  think 

there  should  be  no  fear  about  the 

igth  of  America's  commitment  to 

Republic  of  South  Korea  under  the 

kial  defense  agreement  which  we 

:  signed  many  years  ago.  Nobody 

aid  have  any  doubts  about  that,  and 

t)uld  be  very  unwise  if  anybody,  in- 

Hing  the   North   Koreans,   should 

;  any  doubt  about  the  strength  of 

y  convictions  there. 

.  Do  you  detect  an  increased  pat- 
■  of  Communist  espionage,  with 
1  V  ietnamese  spy  case  here  and  the 
Milsion  of  the  Soviet  diplomats 
r  1  Canada?  And,  if  so,  is  there  a 
rit  concern  in  the  United  States 
V    these  events? 

.   I   would  separate  the  two.   The 

a   that  we  are  dealing  with  here  is  a 

a    that  dealt   specifically   with  the 

iiimese,  and  I  do  not,  therefore, 

11  with  anything  which  Canada  has 

o;  with  respect  to  the  Soviet  Union. 

e  had  a  very  specific  case  to  deal 

there,  a  case  under  which  an  in- 

iicnt  had  been  handed  down  with 

;  eel  to  espionage  activities  in  which 

'.  head  of  the  U.N.   delegation  for 

nam  was  named  as  an  unindicted 

inspirator.    Under  those  circum- 

ccs  we  felt  that  it  was  clear  that  the 

;  ilcges   which   the   various  people 

are  at  the  United  Nations  serving 

Ik-  missions  have,   had  been  vio- 

I,  and,  therefore,  it  was  clear  that 

hiiLild  be  asked  to  leave  the  coun- 


try, as  we  have  done  in  other  cases. 
That  was  done,  and  his  government  has 
indicated  they  will  withdraw  him. 

Q.  Could  I  follow  up  on  that  spe- 
cific question,  because  intelligence 
activities  are  rather  common,  but  the 
expulsion  of  such  a  high-ranking  dip- 
lomat is  not.  Could  you  give  us  more 
of  your  thinking  as  to  why  you  did 
order  it,  and  also  what  impact  you 
might  think  it  would  have  on  future 
relations  with  Vietnam? 

A.  Yes.  In  this  case,  this  particular 
individual  was  named  by  a  grand  jury 
as  an  unindicted  coconspirator.  That 
means  that  he  had  an  active  part  in 
what  was  going  on.  Therefore,  it  is  a 
different  situation  from  other  situations 
that  have  occurred  in  the  past. 

Insofar  as  what  will  happen  in  the  fu- 
ture, obviously  this  cannot  be  helpful 
in  our  bilateral  relationships,  but  we 
hope  that  it  would  not  impede  them  in 
such  a  way  as  to  preclude  in  the  future 
at  some  point  moving  forward  with  our 
discussions  which  we  have  started. 

Q.  Can  you  clarify  whether  the 
new  Panama  Canal  treaty,  in  com- 
parison to  the  existing  situation,  will 
cost  the  U.S.  Treasury  anything  in 
expenditures  or  in  lost  revenue? 
And,  if  so,  how  much,  in  approxi- 
mate terms? 

A.  As  to  the  Panama  Canal,  let  me 
try  and  divide  this  down  into  the  vari- 
ous pieces  so  that  we  can  all  under- 
stand it  clearly. 

The  treaties  require  no  appropria- 
tions of  taxpayers'  dollars  for  payments 
to  Panama.  Payments  to  Panama  will 
be  drawn  from  the  canal's  revenues  and 
only  from  the  canal's  revenues. 

We  have  agreed,  secondly,  outside 
of  the  treaties  to  seek  certain  loans  and 
credits  for  Panama.  These  loans  and 
credits,  which  I  believe  total  approxi- 
mately $345  million,  must  be  paid 
back;  they  are  not  grants.  They  will  be 
used  primarily  to  finance  U.S.  trade 
and  investment  in  Panama. 

There  will  be,  in  addition  to  that, 
certain  expenses  which  will  be  incurred 
for  consolidation  of  military  facilities 
and  early  retirement  programs  for  our 
employees,  should  they  desire  to  exer- 
cise that  option. 

None  of  the  money  expended  for 
these  purposes  would  go  to  Panama, 
and  the  United  States  is  free  to  deter- 
mine the  nature  of  these  expenditures. 
These  programs  will  be  determined  by 
the  Congress  and  the  executive  in  the 
implementing  legislation  which  will 
follow  ratification  of  the  Panama  Canal 
treaties. 

Q.  I  seem  to  recall  the  Carter  Ad- 
ministration repeatedly  announcing 
that  ratification  of  the  treaties  will 


17 


not  cost  the  American  taxpayers  any 
money,  but  the  recent  testimony  of 
the  Comptroller  General,  the  Gover- 
nor of  the  Canal  Zone,  as  well  as 
Senate  Majority  Leader  Byrd,  seems 
to  indicate  that  ratification  will,  in- 
deed, cost  the  taxpayers  money.  And 
I  was  wondering,  do  you  believe 
these  men  are  all  wrong,  or  will  the 
Carter  Administration  retract  or  re- 
vise— 

A.  No,  I  don't.  I  think,  if  you  will 
take  a  look  at  the  testimony — and  I 
know  what  I  have  said  in  my  own 
speeches — I  have  referred  specifically 
to  payments  to  Panama,  and  I  have 
never  said  that  there  would  be  no  cost 
to  the  American  taxpayer  with  respect 
to  such  things  as  the  consolidations  that 
have  to  be  taken  care  of  in  respect  of 
the  military  facilities  and  in  connection 
with  the  early  retirement  provisions.  I 
think  Senator  Byrd  made  this  very  clear 
when  he  summarized  these  matters  in 
his  speech  on  the  floor  yesterday. 

Q.  In  his  speech  at  the  National 
Press  Club  on  Monday,  President 
Sadat  approached  the  subject  of  a 
nuclear-free  zone  in  the  Middle  East. 
Was  this  discussed  with  Mr.  Sadat 
when  he  was  here? 

And,  secondly,  is  it  your  opinion 
now  that  the  Middle  East  is  a 
nuclear-free  zone  except  for  those 
nuclear  or  atomic  weapons  which 
may  be  in  the  area  and  under  the 
control  of  a  known  nuclear  power, 
such  as  the  United  States,  the  Soviet 
Union,  Great  Britain,  France, 
China,  and  India? 

A.  No.  I  did  not  discuss  this  matter 
with  President  Sadat.  This  he  raised 
himself  in  connection  with  his  discus- 
sions at  the  meeting  to  which  you  refer. 

Insofar  as  what  is  in  the  area  at  this 
time,  we  have  nothing  that  I  can  add  to 
what  has  already  been  said  on  this 
previously. 

Q.  What  is  the  American  view  of 
Israel's  reported  attempts  to  move 
closer  economically  to  South  Africa? 
And  what  influence,  if  any,  will  that 
have  on  our  future  relations  with 
that  country? 

A.  I  think  that  is  a  question  that  I 
really  should  not  speak  to  and  that 
should  be  answered  by  Israel  itself.  I 
would  not  necessarily  accept  the  state- 
ment which  you  made  as  being  an  ac- 
curate one,  but  I  think  you  ought  to  put 
that  question  to  the  Israelis  and  not  to 
me. 

Q.  Is  the  United  States  trying  to 
set  up  a  three-way  summit  involving 
Mr.  Begin  and  Mr.  Sadat,  as  was  re- 
ported today  in  the  Jerusalem  Post? 

A.  We  have  not  yet  suggested  that. 
On  the  other  hand,  as  we  move  on 


18 


Department  of  State  Built 


down  the  road,  we  remain  totally  flexi- 
ble, and  anything  that  is  going  to  move 
the  peace  process  forward,  we  would 
certainly  consider.  At  this  particular 
moment,  it  doesn't  seem  necessary  to 
do  this. 

Q.  Could  I  follow  up  on  one  detail 
on  Somalia?  These  Cubans  that  you 
number  there,  are  they  being  drawn 
down  from  Angola  or  are  they  com- 
ing in  fresh?  In  other  words,  is  the 
total  amount  of  Cubans  in  Africa 
going  up? 

A.  It  would  appear  that  they  are 
coming  from  both  sources. 

Q.  In  connection  with  the  Cubans, 
you  mentioned  that  the  U.S.  relations 
with  the  Soviet  Union  might  be  af- 
fected in  terms  of  negotiations  on  the 


Indian  Ocean.  Are  there  any  specific 
areas  in  which  U.S.  relations  with 
Cuba  might  be  affected? 

A.  All  I  can  say  is  that  President 
Sadat  kindly,  as  a  courtesy,  offered  to 
let  me  read  his  speech  before  he  made 
it  at  the  press  club.  I  did  read  it.  I  did 
make  some  suggestions  to  him.  He  then 
made  his  own  decisions  with  respect  to 
what  his  speech  was  going  to  be,  as  he 
quite  properly  should. 

Q.  Your  assurances  on  the  cross- 
ing of  the  border,  do  they  come  from 
the  Soviets,  the  Cubans,  the  Ethio- 
pians, or  specifically  whom? 

A.  From  the  Soviets.  D 


Press  release  71  of  Feb.  JO.  1977. 


Cr<»tic»rcil  Overvii*w 
of  1977  Actiritws 


by  Secretary  Vance 

I  am  delighted  to  appear  before  you 
as  you  consider  the  fiscal  year  1979 
budget  for  the  Department  of  State.' 

I  want  to  spend  most  of  the  time  we 
have  this  morning  answering  your 
questions.  But  I  would  like  to  take  a 
few  minutes  at  the  outset  to  give  you  a 
general  overview,  as  we  see  it,  of  the 
year  that  has  just  passed  and  the  year  to 
come. 

In  many  respects,  the  past  year  has 
been  one  of  continuity  in  foreign  pol- 
icy. 

•  We  built  upon  the  record  of  13 
years  of  painstaking  and  difficult 
negotiations  to  conclude  an  agreement 
with  Panama  for  the  future  of  the 
Panama  Canal. 

•  We  have  pursued,  with  great  care 
and  attention,  the  Strategic  Arms  Lim- 
itation Talks  (SALT)  with  the  Soviets, 
and  we  have  made  substantial  progress 
toward  an  agreement. 

•  We  have  strongly  reaffirmed 
America's  commitment  to  our  tradi- 
tional alliances  and  the  importance  of 
working  to  modernize  and  strengthen 
those  relationships. 

•  We  have  continued  to  play  an  ac- 
tive role  in  the  efforts  to  achieve  peace 
in  the  Middle  East  and  southern  Africa. 

New  emphasis  has  been  given  to 
other  aspects  of  America's  foreign  pol- 
icy over  the  past  year.  As  we  look 
ahead  to  the  1980's — and  beyond — we 
are,  as  a  nation,  beginning  to  address 
the  problems  that  will  affect  the  re- 


mainder of  our  lives  and  the  next  gen- 
eration. 

Arms  Control 

We  want  a  world  that  is  not  con- 
stantly threatened  by  the  possession — 
by  dozens  of  countries — of  the  capabil- 
ity of  starting  a  nuclear  war.  The  risks 
of  such  a  prospect,  in  a  world  filled 
with  regional  disputes  of  great  emotion 
and  volatility,  are  grave. 

The  President  has  brought  into  sharp 
focus  the  urgency  of  taking  steps  now 
to  stop  further  proliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons  technology.  In  our  domestic 
nuclear  programs,  and  in  our  consulta- 
tions with  other  supplier  and  recipient 
nations,  we  have  begun  to  investigate 
new  technologies  and  examine  new  in- 
stitutional arrangements  that  will  en- 
able the  nations  of  the  world  to  harness 
nuclear  energy  without  spreading  the 
most  deadly  instruments  of  war. 

We  recognize  the  drain  on  scarce  re- 
sources created  by  the  global  traffic  in 
conventional  arms.  We  see  also  the 
constant  danger  that  local  arms  races 
can  fuel  regional  disputes,  which  all 
too  easily  can  flare  into  regional  wars. 

As  the  world's  largest  supplier  of 
conventional  weapons,  we  have  recog- 
nized our  responsibility  to  review  more 
rigorously  requests  for  such  arms.  We 
will  continue,  of  course,  to  utilize  arms 
transfers  to  advance  our  own  security 
and  that  of  close  friends.  But  in  the  fu- 
ture, the  burden  of  persuasion  will  be 
on  those  who  favor  a  particular  arms 
sale  rather  than  those  who  oppose  it. 

To  be  effective  in  the  long  run,  the  ef- 


fort to  restrain  regional  arms  ra 
must  involve  other  nations.  We  h 
been  meeting  with  other  ar 
suppliers,  including  the  Soviet  Uni 
to  discuss  possible  measures  for  n 
tilateral  action.  And  we  have  encc 
aged  the  purchaser  nations  to  adopt 
gional  agreements  that  limit  arms 
ports. 

World  Economy 

We  recognize  that  the  econor 
well-being  of  the  American  people 
creasingly  is  influenced  by  a  glo 
web  of  decisions.  The  vitality  of 
economy  is  attuned  to  the  health  of 
world  economy.  Economic  decisi 
by  the  advanced  industrial  nations  n 
increasingly  be  made  with  close  atl 
tion  to  the  interests  and  concerns  of 
developing  nations.  The  condition 
the  world  economy  makes  it  essen 
that  nations  work  together  to  f 
inutually  beneficial  solutions  to  gk 
economic  problems. 

Last  year  at  the  London  summit, 
gave  renewed  emphasis  to  closer  c( 
dination  among  our  traditional  e 
nomic  partners  to  build  a  more  sti 
and  durable  recovery.  Our  talks  v 
the  Japanese  have  been  particuh 
useful  in  strengthening  their  comi 
ment  to  bring  their  current  acco 
surplus  into  equilibrium,  to  incre 
their  real  growth  rate,  and  to  open  tl 
markets.  The  multilateral  trade  negc 
tions  in  Geneva  have  been  resurr 
and  offers  have  been  tabled.  A  fair 
balanced  agreement  will,  we  hope, 
completed  this  year.  One  of  our  pr 
ity  objectives  in  international  econo 
policy  during  the  latter  months  of  1' 
was  an  oil  price  freeze  by  the  Organ 
tion  of  Petroleum  Exporting  Countn 
this  was  accomplished. 

At  the  Conference  on  Internatio 
Economic  Cooperation  in  Paris, 
pledged  special  attention  to  the  pn 
ing  needs  of  the  developing  natio 
especially  in  our  trade  and  financial 
sistance  policies.  And  we  began 
fashion  longer  term  policies — for  Tl" 
World  energy  development,  for  exp 
sion  of  International  Monetary  Fund 
sources,  and  for  establishment  of  ad 
tionai  commodity  stabilization  agr 
ments.  We  also  began  negotiations 
a  common  fund  to  finance  buffer  stoi 
and  will  soon  begin  discussions  on 
international  wheat  agreement. 

Human  Rights 

Finally,  we  have,  over  the  past  ye 
focused  greater  attention  in  our  own  i 
liberations  and  in  those  of  other  natic 
on  the  conditions  of  human  rigl 
around  the  world. 


jtch  1978 


19 


f/e  have  come  to  recognize  that 
lerica  is  strongest  in  the  world  when 
s  true  to  the  values  of  its  people.  Re- 
el for  the  individual,  abhorrence  of 
/ernment  torture  or  arbitrary  denials 
freedom,  the  rejection  of  racism,  the 
ht  to  the  economic  necessities  of 
;,  and  the  opportunity  to  participate 
jne's  government — these  are  convic- 
ns  which  are  widely  shared  by 
^'lericans. 

Ve  are  finding  the  most  constructive 
\\s  to  advance  these  goals.  Our  own 
iiisions — on  aid,  on  votes  for  loans 

I  the  international  development 
'  k^.  on  military  assistance  and  even 

s  -are  reviewed  for  their  potential 
r'uci  on  human  rights  conditions. 

V'c   are   working   to   improve   the 

lan  rights  machinery  of  the  United 
slums  and  the  Organization  of 
^  encan  States  and,  with  the  help  and 
):  icipation  of  Chairman  Fascell  [Rep- 
entative  Dante  B.  Fascell,  chairman 
>•  he  joint  congressional  Commission 

security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe] 

II  others  in  the  Congress,  to  review 
II  secure  better  implementation  of  the 
man  rights  provisions  of  the  Confer- 

:  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in 

nil  interest  is  in  results,  and  thus  we 
:not  be  rigid  or  doctrinaire.  Ulti- 
icl\.  our  policy  will  be  measured  by 

iiipact  on  people's  lives. 

he  decisions  which  the  Administra- 
II.  Congress,  and  the  American 
xpie  face  in  1978  will  be  made,  in 
a  e  measure,  within  the  context  of  the 
;( Is  we  set  for  ourselves  during  1977. 
\  will  persist  in  our  efforts  to  pro- 
ne human  rights,  to  check  nuclear 
v  pons  proliferation,  and  to  restrain 
h  growth  in  conventional  arms  traf- 
i'  In  addition,  our  nation  faces  par- 
K  larly  important  decisions  in  several 
IS  in  the  coming  year. 

Vnda  for  1978 

anama   Canal   Treaties.   The 

r  ties  demonstrably  promote  our  na- 

al   interests,   and  for  this  reason  I 

■ve\e  they  will  be  approved  by  the 

I'ate.  They  protect  and  enhance  our 

lit  to  defend  the  canal,   by  use  of 

\  erican  troops   if  necessary.   They 

ll.e  that  defense  on  more  solid  foot- 

ti  since  we  would  be  acting  on  the 

^  of  agreements  supported  by  the 

pie  of  Panama  and  by  world  opin- 

'}    bringing    Panama    into   full 

1.  nership  with  us  in  the  canal  enter- 

e.  the  treaties  insure  that  the  canal 

always  remain  open  and  efficient. 
I  hy  eliminating  those  arrangements 

have  been  considered  vestiges  of 
>nialism  throughout  Latin  America, 


we  create  a  new  atmosphere  in  our  rela- 
tions that  will  enable  us  to  strengthen 
our  ties  to  our  neighbors  in  this  hemi- 
sphere. 

In  short,  the  treaties  secure  the  fu- 
ture of  the  canal,  and  that  serves  our 
military  needs,  our  commercial  inter- 
ests, and  our  international  objectives. 

Strategic  Arms  Control.  We  will 
continue  during  the  coming  months  to 
pursue  an  agreement  with  the  Soviets 
that  will  strengthen  our  security,  as 
well  as  that  of  our  allies. 

Faced  with  a  continuing  competition 
in  strategic  forces  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  we  have  two  choices:  We  can 
match  those  forces — and  there  can  be 
no  question  we  would  do  so — or  we 
can  pursue  a  new  SALT  agreement 
which  will  establish  the  principle  of 
equality  in  strategic  weapons  and 
strengthen  the  strategic  balance  be- 
tween our  two  countries.  Such  an 
agreement  would  not  only  place  limits 
on  Soviet  forces  but  would  force  actual 
reductions  from  their  current  levels. 

We  also  seek  to  impose  constraints 
on  the  development  of  newer,  more 
deadly  systems.  In  addition,  we  will 
continue  to  press  for  a  comprehensive 
ban  on  nuclear  testing. 

We  will  pursue  these  agreements 
with  the  Soviets  because  we  seek  to 
stabilize  the  military  competition.  At 
the  same  time  we  recognize  that  there 
will  continue  to  be  elements  of  both 
competition  and  cooperation  in  our 
overall  relations  with  the  Soviets. 

Middle  East  and  Southern  Africa. 
Our  diplomatic  efforts  toward  peaceful 
and  just  resolutions  to  the  conflicts  in 
the  Middle  East  and  southern  Africa 
will  continue  and  will  require  public 
understanding  and  support.  We  will 
work  for  solutions  to  these  difficult 
problems  that  will  find  the  support  of 
those  directly  involved  and  that  will 
endure. 

Domestic  Energy  Program.  An  ef- 
fective American  energy  program  must 
be  enacted  in  the  coming  weeks.  The 
United  States  is  the  world's  greatest 
user,  greatest  waster,  and  greatest  im- 
porter of  oil.  Our  unchecked  appetite 
for  foreign  oil — on  which  we  spend 
$44.6  billion  per  year,  or  30%  of  our 
total  import  bill — undermines  our  own 
economy  and  threatens  the  welfare  of 
others  abroad. 

Trade  Negotiations.  In  consultation 
with  Congress  and  the  public,  we  will 
be  seeking  in  the  multilateral  trade 
negotiations  to  design  a  more  open 
trading  system,  one  that  will  bolster 
our  economy  and  the  well-being  of 
both  the  industrialized  and  developing 
world. 

Foreign  Aid.  Through  a  more  effec- 
tive foreign  aid  program,  we  will  en- 


courage the  growth  and  well-being  of 
the  developing  societies.  Their  eco- 
nomic progress  will  advance  our  own. 

The  agenda  for  1978  is  a  heavy  one, 
reflecting  the  diverse  challenges  we 
face  as  a  nation.  But  we  face  these 
challenges  from  a  position  of  unparal- 
leled strength,  with  extraordinary 
human  and  physical  resources. 

The  decisions  of  1978  provide  us 
with  the  opportunity  to  demonstrate 
that  a  strong  America  has  recaptured  its 
confidence,  the  confidence  to  play  a 
positive  role  of  world  leadership.  It  is  a 
role  we  must  play  if  the  world  is  to 
come  to  grips  with  the  complex  prob- 
lems that  otherwise  could  engulf  us. 

All  of  the  challenges  we  face  will 
demand  the  full  measure  of  our  skill 
and  resources.  In  that  connection,  let 
me  briefly  address  two  other  matters 
which  concern  me  and  in  which  this 
subcommittee  has  demonstrated  par- 
ticular interest — maintaining  the  qual- 
ity of  the  Foreign  Service  and 
strengthening  our  consular  services 
abroad. 

Foreign  Service 

The  United  States  has  the  finest 
Foreign  Service  in  the  world.  Those 
who  serve  our  nation  in  its  Foreign 
Service  do  so  with  great  dedication  and 
competence,  often  under  the  most  se- 
vere and  dangerous  conditions.  They 
serve  not  just  the  Department  of  State 
but  the  American  people,  conducting 
their  official  business,  protecting  their 
interests — and  sometimes  their  lives — 
overseas.  Maintaining  the  highest 
standard  for  our  diplomatic  personnel 
is  essential  to  the  successful  conduct  of 
American  foreign  policy  and  to  the 
well-being  of  every  American. 

In  the  past,  the  Foreign  Service  has 
been  able  to  attract  and  retain  unusu- 
ally high  caliber  people  by  offering  the 
prospect  of  steady  advancement  to  jobs 
of  increasing  challenge  and  responsibil- 
ity. We  have  recently  been  faced,  how- 
ever, with  a  series  of  developments 
which  have  had  a  significant  impact  on 
the  personnel  structure  of  the  Foreign 
Service.  The  executive  pay  raise  of  last 
February  has  resulted  in  a  substantial 
decline  in  voluntary  retirements.  The 
recent  court  decision  striking  down  the 
mandatory  retirement-at-60  provision 
of  the  Foreign  Service  Act  has  aggra- 
vated the  problem,  and  the  Solicitor 
General,  at  our  request,  is  appealing 
the  decision. 

I  want  this  subcommittee  to  know — 
and  we  seek  your  support  and 
counsel — that  we  will  do  all  that  we 
can  to  ameliorate  the  impact  of  these 
developments.  We  will  take  those  steps 
that  are  available  to  us  to  provide 


20 


broader  career  opportunities  and  to 
strengthen  the  skills  that  have  been  the 
haUnuirk  of  our  American  diplomacy. 

At  the  same  time,  we  will  continue 
to  pursue  a  vigorous  affirmative  action 
program  to  bring  about  a  more  repre- 
sentative diplomatic  corps.  Early  last 
year,  I  established  a  task  force  to 
examine  equal  employment  opportuni- 
ties in  the  Department  of  Stale  and  to 
make  recommendations  for  a  specific 
program  for  affirmative  action.  I  have 
accepted  the  report  of  that  committee, 
and  we  are  working  actively  to  imple- 
ment its  recommendations.  They  in- 
clude increasing  the  hiring  goals  for 
existing  affirmative  action  programs; 
centralizing  Department  recruiting  and 
hiring;  appointing  more  women  and 
minorities  to  executive-level  positions, 
to  Foreign  Service  Selection  Boards, 
and  to  Civil  Service  promotion  panels; 
and  establishing  affirmative  action  as  a 
factor  in  performance  evaluations  and 
promotions. 

Consular  Services 

As  we  work  to  strengthen  the 
Foreign  Service,  we  must  also  address 
the  need  to  improve  and  modernize  our 
consular  services  abroad.  In  this  con- 
nection. 1  want  to  express  again  my  ap- 
preciation for  the  strong  leadership  and 
support  this  subcommittee  has  demon- 
strated in  this  area. 

The  continuing  growth  of  travel 
abroad,  and  this  Administration's 
commitment  to  facilitate  the  ability  of 
all  peoples  to  move  freely  in  the  world, 
give  renewed  importance  to  the  quality 
of  our  consular  resources. 

As  part  of  our  efforts  to  improve 
these  services,  on  which  the  American 
people  have  come  to  rely  more  heavily. 
we  are  working  to  improve  the  man- 
agement and  use  of  our  existing  re- 
sources. 

•  Since  1973  the  personnel  re- 
.sources  devoted  to  the  consular  func- 
tion have  increased  by  approximately 
13%.  The  commitment  of  additional  re- 
sources will  continue,  particularly  to 
posts  where  the  problems  are  most  se- 
vere. 

•  We  are  improving  the  quality  of 
the  consular  work  force.  We  have  ex- 
panded the  training  courses  available 
for  consular  officers,  and  in  1977  the 
Department  opened  a  new  consular 
training  facility  as  part  of  the  Foreign 
Service  Institute. 

•  We  are  working  to  provide  better 
promotion  opportunities  and  other  in- 
centives for  our  consular  officers. 

•  We  are  expanding  and  reorganiz- 
ing the  office  of  the  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Consular  Affairs  to  enable  us  to  al- 


Department  of  State  Bulb 


AFRICA:  mnnihia 


Secretary  Vance  visited  New  York 
February  11-12.  1978,  to  meet  with 
representatives  of  the  contact  ^roup  on 
Namibia  {Canada,  France,  West  Ger- 
many, United  Kiiiiidom,  and  United 
States),  the  South  West  Africa  People's 
Orf^anization  (SWAPO).  the  South  Af- 
rican Government,  and  other  African 
states  to  discuss  an  internationally  ac- 
ceptable transition  to  independence  for 
Namibia.  Followini'  are  remarks  to  the 
press  by  Secretary  Vance  and  the 
Foreign  Ministers  of  Canada  (Donald 
Jamieson),  France  (Louis  de  Guirin- 
gaitd).  West  Germany  (Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher),  and  the  United  Kin^idom 
(David  Owen)  on  February  12. 

Secretary  Vance:  I  think  that  this 
has  been  a  useful  2  days  that  we  have 
had  with  the  parties  and  a  chance  to 
discuss  the  proposals  we  have  made  in 
respect  to  Namibia.  We  have  had  a 
number  of  suggestions  made  by  both 
sides  with  respect  to  the  proposals  we 
have  made.  The  discussions  which  we 
have  had  on  those  issues  have  now 
clarified  the  problems  as  they  appear  to 
both  sides.  We  will  be  working  on 
clarification  of  the  issues  which  have 
been  raised  and  will  be  in  touch  with 
both  the  South  Africans  and  the  South 
West  Africa  People's  Organization 
(SWAPO)  in  the  very  near  future. 

1  would  say  on  the  whole  that  I  think 
we  have  made  some  progress;  there  are 
some  difficult  issues  yet  to  be  resolved. 
but  I  am  pleased  that  we  have  had  what 


I  think  has  been  a  very  useful  meet 
during  the.se  last  2  days. 

Foreign  Secretary  Owen:  I  th 
the  only  thing  I  can  say  is  that  it' 
very  serious  issue — the  chance  of  ; 
ting  Namibia  to  independence  with 
ternational  acceptance  is  a  major  pt 
which  would  have  profound  cor 
quences  for  southern  Africa.  I  think 
fact  that  we've  seen  together  five  W' 
ern  Foreign  Ministers.  Foreign  Mii 
ters  from  many  of  the  front-line  co 
tries,  other  African  states,  the  So 
African  Foreign  Minister  [R.F.  BotI 
and  everybody  coming  to  discuss 
creation  of  a  new  independent  si 
within  the  framework  of  U.N.  rest, 
tions  is  of  itself  a  really  remarks 
fact  of  life. 

In  my  judgment,  the  different 
that  exist  between  the  parties  are   ! 
such  that  it's  not  possible  to  close  ii 
gap,  and  the  prize  in  my  judgmen 
too  great  to  allow  an  unwillingness; 
make  the  necessary  compromises 
stand   in  its  way.   So  I  leave  here 
think  this  business  of  being  optimi 
or  pessimistic  is  almost  impossible 
assess.  There  is  a  chance  that  Nam 
could  go  to  independence  under  an 
ternationally  acceptable  framework 
with  the  involvement  of  the  United 
tions.   That's  a  very  big  prize,  v 
worth  that  effort. 

State  Secretary  Jamieson:  I  d( 
think  there  is  anything  I  can  u 
fully  add  other  than  to  reaffi 
the   fact   that   this  has  been   for  t 


locate  better  available  consular  re- 
sources. 

•  We  are  expanding  the  automation 
capabilities  for  issuing  passports  and 

visas. 

But  the  difficult  problems  remain. 
The  strains  on  available  consular  re- 
sources continue  to  build,  deriving 
from  several  sources.  These  include: 

•  New  statutory  demands  on  con- 
sular services,  such  as  refugee  reproc- 
essing, return  of  Americans  imprisoned 
overseas,  and  emergency  medical  and 
dietary  assistance  to  Americans  abroad; 

•  "The  ever-increasing  numbers  of 
Americans  now  traveling  abroad  and 
foreign  citizens  traveling  in  America, 
both  of  which  should  increase  even  fur- 
ther with  lower  cost  airfares;  and 

•  The  inagnitude  of  the  un- 
documented alien  problem. 


The  simple  fact  is,  additional 
sources  are  needed  for  this  vital  f u  ' 
tion,  and,  accordingly,  we  have  soul 
new    funds   for  this   activity    in  ' 
budget  request. 

As  you  consider  this  request,  ali 
with  the  entire  budget,  we  stand  re. 
to  cooperate  with  you  fully  and  to 
sist  you  in  any  way  that  we  can. 


Stalement  before  ihe  Suluammitlee  on  Intel 
lioncil  Operation.'^  of  the  House  Comminee  on 
lernauonal  Relations  on  Fct>.  S.  I97S  (le.xl f 
press  release  66  of  Feb.  H).  The  complele  li 
script  of  tile  tiearini^s  will  he  published  by 
committee   and   will  he  available  from 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Governn 
Printing  Office.  Washington.  D.C.  20402. 
'  This  request  refers  to  $1.3  billion  for 
parlnieni   of  State   operating  expenses  [ 
$56. .3  million  for  migration  and  refugee  ass 
ance. 


ularch  1978 


ind  I'm  sure  for  my  colleagues,  a  wel- 
ome  opportunilv .  I  think  if  one  had  to 
dentify  what  the  real  advantage  has 
leen,  it  has  certainly  been  to  focus  the 
ssue  very  clearly,  to  give  us — as  the 
epresentatives  of  our  countries — a 
omprehensive  overview  of  just  exactly 
(vhat  is  involved,  to  identify  the  areas 
f  problems  that  still  exist  and  that  are 
1  he  resolved.  But  on  balance,  I  think 
,c  have  moved  significantly  over  these 
isi  2  or  3  days.  As  Mr.  Owen  has 
aid.  it  may  not  be  appropriate  to  de- 
:nbe  it  as  optimistic  or  pessimistic, 
lit  certainly  I  believe  that  we  have  the 
lomentum  going  here  that  can  produce 
le  desired  results  within  a  very  quick 
me  frame. 

Foreign  Minister  Genscher:  [Unof- 
icial  translation]  When  I  left  Ger- 
lain ,  I  was  asked  whether  I  thought 
lat  there  would  be  a  breakthrough  at 
ur  meeting,  and  I  replied  by  saying  I 
id  not  think  there  would  be  a  break- 
muigh  but  that  there  would  be  prog- 
:ss  Now,  shortly  before  I  will  be 
■a\ing  New  York,  I  can  rightly  say 
Kit  there  has  been  progress  made  in 
ic  talks  which  we  have  had.  I  consider 
Kit  it  was  a  very  important  event 
hich  made  five  Foreign  Ministers, 
hose  countries  are  members  of  the 
jcurity  Council,  meet  here  for  a  seri- 
js  effort  to  bring  about  a  solution  in  a 
ifficult  international  question. 

It  was  likewise  of  great  importance 
lat  for  the  same  reason.  African 
cireign  Ministers  and  politicians  also 
inie  here  to  meet  with  us.  There  is 
so  the  presence  of  the  president  of 
WAPO  [Sam  Njoma]  and  of  the 
3Uth  African  Foreign  Minister,  which 
eans  that  all  these  personalities  see  a 
lance  which  they  all  would  like  to 
ive  made  the  best  possible  use  of.  Our 
m  is  to  set  an  example  for  a  solution 
.cording  to  which  in  a  country  elec- 
ons  can  be  organized  with  security 
id  while  maintaining  order,  so  that 
lis  country  can  come  to  independence. 
his  event  will  show  that  all  patience 
id  all  endeavors  made  were  worth- 
hile  and  that  this  country  is  indeed 
;ing  led  toward  independence  and 
eedom. 

Foreign  Minister  De  Guiringaud:  I 

link  there  is  little  1  can  add  to  what 

as  already  been  said.  With  respect  to 

le  progress  of  the  meeting.  I  think  it 

as  worth  meeting,  the  five  of  us,  here 

)gether  with  the  Foreign   Minister  of 

outh  Africa  and  together  with  several 

oreign  Ministers  of  important  African 

iountries.  We  did  not  expect  to  achieve 

jomplete   agreement   when   we  came 

ver  here;  no  one  of  us  expected  it.  But 

e  expected  that  we  would  make  prog- 

:ss  and  that  more  comprehension  of 


the  problem  would  be  reached  on  both 
parts — by  all  parties. 

I  think  this  has  been  achieved;  the 
last  conversation  we  had  with  the  pres- 
ident of  SWAPO  is  a  very  good  exam- 
ple of  that.  We  were  in  a  position  a  few 
months  ago  where  nobody  knew  what 
would  happen  in  Namibia,  that  a  proc- 
ess could  have  started  whereby  some 
kind  of  political  solution  in  Namibia 
would  have  developed  which  would 
have  been  to  the  detriment  of  the 
people  and  would  have  put  [inaudible] 
in  a  rather  difficult  position.  I'm  con- 
vinced tonight  that  the  effort  which  has 
been  deployed  by  the  contract  group  of 
the  five  has  been  extremely  useful  and 
that  the  effort  which  we  have  deployed 
in  the  last  2  days  has  added  to  this. 
Now  there  is  a  fair  chance  that  Namibia 
will  accede  to  independence  within  the 
framework  of  U.N.  resolutions. 

Q.  We  have  heard  here  last  week 
and  this  week  that  all  the  parties 
have  made  significant  modifications 
in  their  positions.  We  have  also 
heard  that  SWAPO  has  made  some 
concessions.  We  have  heard  that 
South  Africa  pretty  much  accepted 
the  same  position  and  is  going  [back] 
to  South  Africa  to  consult.  What  I 
would  like  to  know  is  if  there  aren't 
further  concessions  from  South  Africa, 
how  likely  are  sanctions  against  South 
Africa  in  the  Security  Council? 

Secretary  Vance:  Let  me  first  an- 
swer by  saying  that  as  far  as  South  Af- 
rica is  concerned,  there  have  been  con- 
cessions on  the  part  of  South  Africa  as 
there  have  been  concessions  or  flexibil- 
ity on  the  part  of  SWAPO  as  well.  So  I 
think  on  both  sides  there  have  been — 
there  has  been  demonstrated  a  willing- 
ness to  try  and  move  in  a  fashion  which 
is  necessary  if  there  is  going  to  be  the 
kind  of  compromise  which  is  necessary 
in  any  set  of  negotiations. 

Insofar  as  the  question  of  sanctions 
is  concerned,  1  think  we  ought  to  wait 
and  see  what  happens  as  we  proceed 
forward  during  the  next  weeks  to  see 
whether  we  cannot  make  progress  in 
this  particular  area.  I  think  it  is  much 
too  early  to  draw  conclusions  about 
what  the  future  holds,  and.  therefore.  I 
would  think  it  is  too  early  to  respond  to 
the  question  you  asked. 

Perhaps  some  of  my  colleagues 
would  like  to  speak. 

State  Secretary  Jamieson:  We  can 
agree. 

Q.  [Inaudible — concerns  when 
South  Africans  might  move  toward 
an  internal  settlement] 

Secretary  Vance:  I  really  can't  an- 
swer that  with  precision — I  wish  I 
could.  The  South  Africans  have  talked 
about  an   internal   solution  or  settle- 


ment. On  the  other  hand.  I  think  it  is 
important  to  note  that  when  the  South 
Africans  went  back  for  further  consul- 
tations they  did  not  indicate  that  they 
were  going  back  to  discuss  the  ques- 
tion of  an  internal  settlement  or  solu- 
tion. They  went  back  to  consult  with 
respect  to  what  might  be  done  in  terms 
of  the  propositions  which  have  been 
made  and  how  they  could  be  handled  in 
the  future.  So,  therefore,  I  would  not 
like  to  try  and  guess  or  predict  at  this 
point  how  much  time  there  is. 

Q.  Is  the  end  of  the  year  an  actual 
deadline  for  the  independence  of 
Namibia,  or  could  you  move  that  up? 
Why  did  you  choose  that  deadline? 

State  Secretary  Jamieson:  To  the 
best  of  my  knowledge,  I  don't  think 
anybody  from  our  side  has  ever  put  a 
deadline  or  has  said  the  end  of  the 
year.  I  think  there  has  been  a  general 
observation  that  1978  was,  in  fact,  the 
year  in  which  independence  should  be 
achieved.  But,  I  don't  recall — certainly 
not  in  these  last  days — anybody  speak- 
ing about  a  very  specific  date.  Ob- 
viously, the  faster,  the  better. 


Sotithern 
Rhodesia 


Department  Statement 

In  consultation  with  all  the  parties 
concerned,  the  British  and  American 
Governments  developed  a  plan  de- 
signed to  avoid  the  problems  that  frus- 
trated previous  settlement  efforts  in 
Rhodesia.  We  believe  this  plan  offers 
an  opportunity  for  the  people  of  Zim- 
babwe to  choose  their  own  leadership 
fairly  and  openly.  It  sets  the  standard 
against  which  any  settlement  proposals 
should  be  measured. 

To  the  extent  that  last  week's  Salis- 
bury announcement  offers  the  possibil- 
ity of  an  early  end  to  the  white  minori- 
ty's  domination  of  the  political 
process,  it  is  a  significant  step.  We 
lack  information,  however,  on  impor- 
tant details  of  the  agreement,  and  there 
are  complex  and  significant  aspects 
that  remain  to  be  worked  out  among  the 
parties. 

We  remain  dedicated  to  working 
with  all  of  the  parties,  both  those  in 
Salisbury  and  outside  of  the  country,  to 
promote  a  peaceful  settlement  with 
majority  rule.  D 


Read  lo  news  correspondents  on  Feb.  22,  1978, 
h\  Deparlmeni  spokesman  Nodding  Carter  III . 


22 


Department  of  State  Bulleti' 


Q.  In  the  proposal  there  is  a 
date — December  31,  1978 — for  inde- 
pendence. Is  that  date  no  longer 
valid? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  would  say  that 
that  is  a  target  date.  Everybody,  as  the 
Foreign  Minister  said,  would  like  to 
see  it  happen  as  soon  as  possible,  but 
that  is  a  target  date  rather  than  a  final 
date. 

Q.  Ambassador  [Donald  F.] 
McHenry  [U.S.  Deputy  Representa- 
tive on  the  U.N.  Security  Council] 
told  us  earlier  that  you  are  now  in 
the  process  of  constantly  revising 
some  of  the  proposals.  If  so,  it  ap- 
pears that  [inaudible]. 

Secretary  Vance:  I  would  describe 
it  as  clarifications  that  are  being  made 
with  respect  to  the  proposals  which  the 
five  have  put  forward.  1  think  that  what 
he  is  doing  is  taking  back  the  issues 
which  exist  as  a  result  of  the  discussion 
and  the  reports  which  we  have  made  to 
him  with  respect  to  the  positions  of  the 
other  side.  We  have  indicated  that  we 
will  send  to  him  our  suggestions  with 
respect  to  clarifications,  as  we  will  to 
SWAPO,  and  we  will  then  receive  the 
views  of  both  of  them  and  determine 
what  changes,  if  any,  might  be  made 
with  respect  to  our  proposals.  But,  I 
would  really  call  them  clarifications 
more  than  revisions. 

Q.  Could  you  give  us  some  indica- 
tion as  to  what  the  range  of  options 
are  in  terms  of  what  is  unacceptable 
from  either  party? 

Foreign  Minister  Genscher:  The 
negotiations  are  upstairs.  [Laughter] 

Foreign  Secretary  Owen:  I  hate  to 
get  too  formally  committed  here.  This 
is  best  done  privately.  If  we  firm  up 
our  positions  then  we  will  firm  up  the 
opposition  and  firm  up  the  inability  of 
people  to  move  into  the  center.  We  are 
trying  to  keep  everybody  from  getting 
into  too  rigid  positions.  One  of  the 
things  in  any  negotiation  is  that  people 
often  find  it  easier  to  make  that  com- 
promise when  they  see  the  package  as  a 
whole  emerge.  If  you  start  isolating  in- 
dividual claims  and  making  sticking 
points  you  gradually  build  up  a  situa- 
tion where  you  haven't  got  any  flexibil- 
ity in  the  negotiations.  Everybody 
knows  the  main  central  problems  as 
always  in  these  issues — and  we  have 
had  it  in  Rhodesia  and  elsewhere — and 
you  get  down  to  law  and  order  issues. 
This  is  the  problem.  The  question  of 
the  armies — the  way  and  the  control — 
these  are  the  things  that  are  the  central 
core  of  the  problem. 

Q.  How  would  a  settlement  in 
Namibia  affect  the  prospects  for  a 
settlement  in  Rhodesia? 


Foreign  Secretary  Owen:  I  think 
that  if  we  could  show  in  Namibia  that 
you  could  bring  a  country  to 
independence — internationally  agreed 
and  with  a  major  role  of  the  United 
Nations — this  will  all  do  very  well  for 
an  internationally  acceptable  solution 
in  Rhodesia.  1  think  that  if  the  South 
Africans  can  accept  one  man,  one  vote 
without  qualifications,   and  they  have 


expressed  a  readiness  to  accept  a  roll 
of  the  United  Nations,  then  there  is  n< 
real  reason  why  the  Rhodesians,  blacl 
and  white,  should  not  accept  the  same 
But,  as  for  the  timing,  these  issue 
have  moved  across  in  time  over  the  las 
few  months  quite  often,  and  no  doub 
they  will  again.  C 


Press  release  73  of  Feb.  14.  1978. 


ECO]\0]IIICS: 

U»S»  Embargo  Policy 


by  Julius  L.  Katz 

I  welcome  the  opportunity  to  appear 
before  you  to  consider  questions  relat- 
ing to  proposals  for  an  economic  em- 
bargo against  Uganda  in  the  context  of 
U.S.  experience  with  embargoes 
against  other  countries. 

I  would  like  to  emphasize  that  there 
can  be  no  question  about  the  concern  of 
this  Administration  with  the  violation 
of  human  rights  in  Uganda.  We  have 
made  clear,  and  will  continue  to  make 
clear,  our  opposition  to  an  abhorrence 
of  the  flagrant  disregard  of  fundamen- 
tal human  rights  and  denial  of  specific 
human  dignity  in  that  country. 

Both  the  executive  and  legislative 
branches  of  the  U.S.  Government  have 
made  clear  in  numerous  ways  the  im- 
portance of  minimizing  restrictions  on 
international  trade.  Such  a  policy  has 
contributed  significantly  to  the  growth 
of  the  economic,  political,  and  military 
strength  of  our  country.  This  basic  phi- 
losophy has  served  us  well.  Therefore, 
we  believe  trade  restrictions  of  any 
kind  are  not  to  be  entered  into  lightly. 

An  economic  sanction  is  generally 
regarded  as  an  action  toward  another 
nation  intended  to  force  it  into  a  de- 
sired course.  It  might  take  the  form  of 
a  trade  embargo,  lesser  forms  of  re- 
strictions on  trade,  or  withholding 
loans.  Prospects  of  effectiveness  are 
increased  through  multilateral  action. 
But  it  is  often  difficult  to  reach  interna- 
tional agreement  on  the  application  of 
sanctions.  And  even  internationally 
agreed  sanctions  may  not  change  the 
policies  of  the  targeted  country.  A 
broad  embargo  is  the  most  restrictive 
form  of  economic  sanction  and,  there- 
fore, most  harmful  to  trade  interests. 
Economic  sanctions,  especially  a  uni- 
lateral embargo,  should  be  imposed 
only  where  there  are  extraordinarily 
serious  reasons  for  doing  so. 

The  United  States  has,  of  course,  be- 
lieved that  embargoes  have  been  jus- 


tified in  certain  exceptional  circum 
stances  in  the  past.  Chief  among  thes 
are  armed  hostilities. 

Most  past  U.S.  embargoes,  includini 
several  still  in  effect,  have  been  inst' 
tuted  for  this  reason.  During  the  Kc 
rean  conflict  we  imposed  an  embarg. 
against  North  Korea.  Similarly,  durin 
the  Vietnam  war  we  embargoed  trad 
with  Communist-controlled  portions  c 
that  country.  This  embargo  was  ev 
tended  to  all  of  Vietnam,  and  Cam 
bodia,  when  the  Communists  took  ove' 
complete  control  in  1975.  The  embarg.; 
against  Cuba  came  at  a  time  whe 
Cuban  actions  presented  a  seriouc 
threat  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

In  other  situations  we  have  impose 
embargoes  as  a  result  of  U.N.  Securit 
Council  findings  under  Chapter  VII  c 
the  U.N.  Charter.  Thus,  the  Unite 
States  is  participating  in  multilateri 
Rhodesian  sanctions  and  in  a  U.N' 
agreed  mandatory  prohibition  of  thi 
sale  of  munitions  to  South  Africa. 

For  many  years  we  have  restrictei 
the  export  of  strategic  goods  and  tech 
nologies  to  countries  threatening  ou- 
security.  Together  with  other  NATO 
countries  and  Japan,  we  have  prohib- 
ited the  export  of  items  which  wouli 
make  a  significant  contribution  to  th» 
military  potential  of  the  U.S.S.R. 
other  Warsaw  Pact  countries,  and  th* 
People's  Republic  of  China  whicl 
would  prove  detrimental  to  our  secu. 
rity. 

Effects  of  an  Embargo 

The  economic  effects  of  embargoes 
prohibiting  virtually  all  U.S.  trade  with 
Cuba,  Vietnam,  Cambodia,  and  North 
Korea  have  been  limited.  This  has  been 
in  part  because  other  countries  have  noi 
joined  us  in  restricting  trade.  The  effect 
on  Cuba  was  relatively  greater  than  on 
the  East  Asian  countries  because  of  the 
proximity  of  Cuba  to  the  United  States 
and  the  extent  of  economic  ties  before 


larch  1978 


23 


le  revolutionary  government  came  to 
ower.  Cuba  lost  a  major  market  for  its 
igar,  but  the  U.S.S.R.  took  up  most 
I  the  slack.  Cuba  and  Vietnam  have 
,'en  deprived  of  spare  parts  for  equip- 
lent  previously  imported  from  the 
nited  States.  U.S.  trade  with  Cam- 
odia  and  with  North  Korea  was  not 
gnificant  even  before  the  embargoes. 
In  the  case  of  Rhodesia,  the  embargo 
.IS  been  accompanied  by  sanctions 
.asion  by  South  Africa  and  earlier  by 
ortugal's  African  colonies.  The 
hodesians  have  also  concentrated  on 
le  development  of  indigenous  industry 
nee  the  imposition  of  sanctions.  Con- 
ols  on  exports  to  South  Africa  and  to 
le  U.S.S.R.,  other  Warsaw  Pact  coun- 
ies,  and  the  P.R.C.  are  not  designed 
I  have  an  economic  impact. 
The  political  effects  of  these  embar- 
)es  have  also  been  limited.  In  some 
ises  a  targeted  country  changed  its 
iternal  or  foreign  policies  in  the 
rong  direction.  For  instance,  Cuba 
id  Vietnam  moved  closer  to  the 
.S.S.R.  following  imposition  of  the 
S.  embargoes,  although  they  proba- 
y  would  have  done  so  even  in  the  ab- 
I  nee  of  our  trade  restrictions.  The  em- 
irgo  of  Cuba  may  have  helped  to  con- 
in  the  spread  of  Communist  influence 
the  Western  Hemisphere,  but  this 
oposition  cannot  be  proven  nor  dis- 
oven. 

In  the  case  of  Rhodesia,  however, 
ere  is  strong  evidence  to  suggest  that 
e  adherence  to  U.N.  sanctions  by 
ost  nations,  coupled  with  the  strains 
iposed  by  an  ongoing  guerrilla  war, 
ive  seriously  damaged  the  Rhodesian 
:onomy  and  significantly  influenced 
;velopments  there.  Restrictions  on 
(ports  of  strategic  items  to  the 
.S.S.R.,  its  allies,  and  the  P.R.C. 
ive  had  only  the  modest  impact  of 
imewhat  slowing  the  transfer  to  them 
'  advanced  Western  technology. 


urrent  Rationale 

The  committee  has  asked  for  a 
atement  on  the  current  rationale  for 
le  embargoes  still  in  effect.  I  shall  at- 


ECONOMIC  REPORT 
OF  THE  PRESIDENT 

On  January  29,  1978,  President  Carter 
sent  a  message  lo  the  Congress  outlining 
his  fundamental  domestic  and  interna- 
tional economic  goals  and  his  strategy  for 
attaining  them.  The  full  text  of  this  mes- 
sage is  printed  in  the  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  January  23, 
1978,  p.  129. 


tempt  to  respond  by  describing  condi- 
tions under  which  it  might  be  wise  to 
remove  existing  embargoes.  The  cir- 
cumstances which  prompted  imposition 
of  some  of  them  have  changed  some- 
what over  the  years.  However,  it  would 
be  irresponsible  to  discard  them  on  that 
basis  alone.  Ending  an  embargo  is  a 
dramatic  action  with  significant  policy 
ramifications. 

•  In  the  case  of  Cuba,  full  normali- 
zation of  trade  and  diplomatic  relations 
hinges  in  our  view  upon  Cuba's  will- 
ingness to  address,  among  other  issues, 
compensation  for  American  citizens 
whose  property  was  expropriated  by 
the  Cuban  Government  and  restraint  in 
Africa. 

•  In  the  case  of  Vietnam,  we  are 
prepared  to  end  the  embargo  at  such 
time  as  normal  diplomatic  relations  are 
established  and  ambassadors  are  in 
place. 

•  Cambodia  does  not  seem  to  be  in- 
terested in  considering  whether  a  simi- 
lar arrangement  might  be  possible 
there. 

•  Continuing  North  Korean  intransi- 
gence makes  any  accommodation  un- 
likely in  the  near  future. 

In  all  four  of  these  cases  controls  on 
the  export  of  strategic  items  would  be 
continued  for  national  security  pur- 
poses even  if  other  controls  were  re- 
moved. Whether  or  not  to  remove  these 
other  controls  inevitably  becomes  a 
question  of  foreign  policy,  which 
should  take  the  totality  of  our  relations 
with  the  targeted  country  into  account. 

With  respect  to  Rhodesia  and  South 
Africa,  the  United  States  is  complying 
with  U.N.  Security  Council  resolutions 
on  sanctions.  Unilateral  U.S.  controls 
against  South  Africa  going  beyond 
U.N.  resolutions  consist  of  restrictions 
on  exports  to  the  police  and  the  mili- 
tary aimed  at  dissociating  ourselves 
from  their  apartheid-motivated  repres- 
sive measures. 

There  has  been  no  development 
which  would  warrant  discontinuing  the 
strategic  embargo  against  the 
U.S.S.R.,  Eastern  Europe,  and  the 
P.R.C. 


Relevance  to  Uganda 

What  is  the  relevance  of  all  this  to 
Uganda?  As  I  said  at  the  outset,  it  is 
our  view  that  sweeping  economic  sanc- 
tions, particularly  embargoes,  should 
be  entered  into  only  under  extraordi- 
nary circumstances.  As  was  stated  by 
the  Department's  witness  at  the  Feb- 
ruary 2  session  of  these  hearings,  it  is 
the  Administration's  view  that  the  tak- 
ing of  such  a  step  with  respect  to 
Uganda  at  this  time  is  not  likely  to  be 


effective,  particularly  given  the  improb- 
ability of  endorsement  of  or  participa- 
tion in  such  a  move  by  the  international 
community  as  a  whole.  The  United 
States  is  neither  a  unique  nor  an  essen- 
tial source  for  Uganda's  imports.  Cof- 
fee is  Uganda's  principal  export,  and 
Uganda  would  have  little  or  no  trouble 
finding  other  customers  for  the  coffee 
it  now  sells  to  American  firms. 

Does  this  mean  that  we  should  do 
nothing  in  the  trade  field  to  show  our 
displeasure  with  human  rights  viola- 
tions in  Uganda?  No.  It  is  quite  proper 
for  us  to  prohibit  the  export  to  Uganda 
of  items  which  could  reasonably  be 
used  to  repress  the  people  of  that  coun- 
try. This  we  are  doing.  It  is  also  quite 
proper  for  us  to  encourage  increased  in- 
ternational attention  to  the  human 
rights  situation  in  Uganda,  including 
international  pressure  on  the  Ugandan 
Government  to  improve  its  human 
rights  performance,  as  we  are  also  do- 
ing. But  we  do  not  believe  that  it  would 
be  wise  to  impose  a  unilateral  embargo 
on  Uganda.  □ 


Statement  before  the  House  Committee  on  In- 
ternational Relations  on  Feb.  9.  1978.  The 
complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  pub- 
lished by  the  committee  and  will  be  available 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office.  Washington,  D.C. 
20402.  Mr.  Katz  is  Assistant  Secretary  for  Eco- 
nomic and  Business  Affairs. 


DOCUMEl^TS 


Temporary  Suspension  of  the  Duty  on  Certain 
Latex  Sheets,  and  Other  Matters.  Report  of 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Finance  lo  accom- 
pany H.R.  2850.  S.  Rept.  95-419.  Sept.  9, 
1977.  5  pp. 

Duty-Free  Treatment  for  Imports  of  Copying 
Lathes  Used  for  Making  Shoe  Lasts,  and 
Other  Matters.  Report  of  the  Senate  Commit- 
tee on  Finance  to  accompany  H.R.  3093.  S. 
Rept.  95-421.  Sept.  9,  1977.  7  pp. 

Temporary  Suspension  of  the  Import  Duty  on 
Certain  Horses,  and  Other  Matters.  Report  of 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Finance  to  accom- 
pany H.R.  3259.  S.  Rept.  95-422.  Sept.  9, 
1977.  6  pp. 

Suspension  of  the  Import  Duty  on  Intravenous 
Fat  Emulsion,  and  Other  Matters.  Report  of 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Finance  to  accom- 
pany H.R.  1904.  S.  Rept.  95-432.  Sept.  15, 
1977.  6  pp. 

Extension  of  Suspension  of  Duties  on  Certain 
Classifications  of  Silk  Yarns,  and  Other  Mat- 
ters. Report  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Fi- 
nance to  accompany  H.R.  3373.  S.  Rept. 
95-434.  Sept.  15,  1977.  7  pp. 


24 


Mnternaiional  Aviation  Policy 


by  Richard  N.  Cooper 

These  are  lively  times  for  interna- 
tional aviation — times  of  change  for  the 
industry  and  the  government.  But  be- 
fore addressing  these  changes,  I  would 
like  to  say  a  word  about  what  is  un- 
changed in  U.S.  international  aviation 
policy. 

The  enduring  objective  of  the  United 
States  in  international  aviation  is  to 
serve  the  national  interest  in  efficient, 
reliable  air  service;  in  a  viable  U.S. 
carrier  industry:  and  in  a  regime  of  fair 
rules  and  expanding  competitive  oppor- 
tunity for  both  U.S.  and  foreign  car- 
riers. These  objectives  parallel  our 
goals  in  foreign  commerce  generally: 
We  seek  to  remove  unnecessary  restric- 
tions; to  enlarge  the  possibilities  of 
competition:  and  to  maximize  the  bene- 
fits of  competition  for  the  consuming 
public,  industry,  and  labor. 

These  generalities  have,  in  recent 
months,  taken  on  a  new  and  specific 
form.  New  entry  and  price  competition 
among  carriers  in  the  North  Atlantic 
has  resulted  in  substantial  fare  reduc- 
tions and  in  extraordinary  range  of  op- 
portunities for  travelers  of  ordinary 
means.  Decisions  by  the  Civil 
Aeronautics  Board  and  the  President 
have  encouraged  innovations  and  low 
fares  in  scheduled  service  and 
liberalized  the  rules  for  charters.  In 
aviation  agreements  with  Mexico,  Bel- 
gium, Singapore,  four  African  coun- 
tries, Yugoslavia,  and  Paraguay  we 
have  secured  expanded  rights  for  both 
charter  and  scheduled  service. 

Political  scientists  dispute  whether  it 
is  events  that  create  policy  or  policy 
that  controls  and  shapes  events.  Fre- 
quently both  propositions  are  true; 
these  changes  in  the  marketplace  and  in 
government  regulation  are  a  case  in 
point. 

Forces  Behind  Recent  Changes 

In  recent  years,  the  main  economic 
problems  of  international  aviation  have 
been  too  many  empty  seats  and,  on 
many  routes,  unduly  high  rates.  The 
problems  have  reinforced  each  other: 
High  rates  have  reduced  the  growth  of 
travel,  while  empty  seats  have  pro- 
duced losses  and  the  impetus  to  raise 
rates  even  higher.  In  the  world  of 
theoretical  economics,  this  circle 
would  be  broken  by  competitive  fare 
reductions.  But  the  real  world  of  inter- 


national aviation  is  not  the  theorist's 
model  of  perfect  competition.  In  some 
areas  of  the  world,  low  load  factors 
have  led,  at  times,  to  rebating  rather 
than  to  lower  authorized  fares.  In  other 
areas,  fare  reduction  and  innovation 
have  not  been  seen  as  in  the  interests  of 
governments  or  carriers.  And  some 
countries  have  not  permitted  the  liberal 
charter  operations  which  act  as  a  spur 
to  competition  among  scheduled  car- 
riers. 

On  North  Atlantic  routes,  these  bar- 
riers to  competition  have  been  partially 
overcome  by  market  forces.  The  de- 
mand for  low-cost  travel  is  enormous. 
Millions  of  travelers  have  shown  them- 
selves willing  to  accept  some 
inconvenience — fixed  return  dates,  ad- 
vance purchases,  or  the  uncertainties  of 
standby  status — in  return  for  dis- 
counted fares.  This  demand  for  nonbusi- 
ness travel  created  the  charter  indus- 
try, led  to  scheduled  fare  innovations, 
and  in  recent  months  has  made  possible 
active  price  competition  on  the  North 
Atlantic. 

While  the  marketplace  has  been 
changing  so  have  public  and  official 
views  about  the  proper  role  of  regula- 
tion in  the  aviation  industry.  For 
domestic  aviation,  there  has  been  in- 
creasing agreement  that  regulation 
should  be  modified  to  allow  substan- 
tially greater  freedom  for  new  entry 
and  price  competition.  The  problems  of 
international  aviation,  though  in  ways 
more  complex,  are  broadly  similar. 

In  the  past,  nations  have  avowed  two 
basic  reasons  for  restricting  entry, 
operating  rights,  and  price  competition 
in  international  aviation.  They  have 
viewed  the  entire  international  aviation 
system  as  what  economists  call  an  "in- 
fant industry,"  needing  the  nurturance 
of  government  for  its  survival  and 
growth.  And  in  particular,  they  have 
promoted  national  flag  carriers,  and 
protected  them  from  competition,  as  a 
means  of  serving  broad  political  as  well 
as  economic  goals. 

Whatever  the  merits  of  these  restric- 
tive policies  in  the  past,  they  are  in- 
creasingly inappropriate  to  the  interna- 
tional aviation  industry  of  today.  The 
industry  has  reached  maturity.  Its 
growth  has  been  spectacular.  In  the  last 
decade,  international  passenger  traffic 
has  doubled,  and  cargo  has  nearly  tre- 
bled. Over  two  dozen  flag  carriers  op- 
erate over  intercontinental  route  net- 
works.  In  this  new  context,  govern- 


ri 


:ii 


!« 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 

ments  can  take  a  step  back  and  let  th 
key  decisions  be  made  by  competin 
airlines  rather  than  by  administrativ 
dictate. 

The  basic  case  for  reduced  restrictio 
can  be  made  from  a  comparison  c 
fares  over  similar  routes.  The  one-wa 
economy  fare  from  Los  Angeles  to  Sa 
Francisco  is  $28. 10;  the  distance  is  33 
miles.  California  allowed  free  competi 
tion  and  entry  until  the  mid- 1 960 "s  an< 
still  has  a  less  restrictive  framewor 
than  the  interstate  system.  On  an  in 
terstate  route  of  334  miles — Chicago  t 
Minneapolis — the  fare  is  $52. 

In  Europe  fares  for  comparable  dis 
tances  are  similar  or  higher:  London 
Glasgow,  a  326-mile  route,  has  a  far 
of  $58,  and  the  slightly  shorte 
Lisbon-Madrid  route  is  $56.  Or  if  wi 
look  at  a  longer  route — for  exampi 
Paris-Rome — we  can  calculate  the  pro 
rated  cost  of  337  miles  to  be  about  $77 

To  be  sure,  traffic  density  on  the  Lo 
Angeles-San  Francisco  route  is  excep 
tionally  high.  But  careful  and  repeatet 
study  has  shown  that  the  basic  explana< 
tion  for  the  low  fare  is  competitive  efl 
ficiency  rather  than  good  weather  oi 
high  market  potential. 

The  task,  then,  for  the  United  Statep 
is  to  work  with  other  countries  t" 
achieve  the  benefits  of  competition  ana 
to  remove  needless  restrictions.  Be 
cause  international  aviation  rights  af 
defined  by  bilateral  agreements,  thu 
expansion  of  competitive  opportunity  i 
necessarily  a  process  rather  than 
single  decision.  In  economic  terms,  th> 
aviation  market  between  two  countrie 
is  a  bilateral  monopoly.  Both  side 
must  agree  to  the  terms  and  condition 
of  airline  operation.  Since  agreement 
are  a  result  of  bargaining,  at  any  givei 
time  the  aviation  agreements  applyinj 
to  different  markets  will  not  be  per 
fectly  parallel  or  consistent.  But  not 
withstanding  this  obvious  point,  then 
is  one  overriding  economic  force  which 
will  aid  our  attempt  to  achieve  libera 
aviation  rules — geographic  competi- 
tion. As  the  international  aviation  net- 
work has  expanded,  the  choice  of  rout 
ing  available  to  passengers  has  vastly 
increased.  Winter  tourists  from  the  east 
coast  can  choose  among  dozens  ol 
sunny  destinations.  The  traveler  to 
Europe  has  a  broad  choice  of  U.S 
gateways  and  European  intermediate 
points.  Restrictive  rules  in  one  market 
will  lead  to  relative  decline  for  that 
market  and  increased  prosperity  for  its 
competitors. 

Negotiating  Policy 

The  Administration  is  committed  to  a 
forceful  and  vigorous  program  of  inter- 
national aviation  negotiations  designed 


rch 


1478 


25 


cMcnd  and  formalize  the  scope  of 
tipctition.  Four  principles  charac- 
/c  our  negotiating  policy. 

»  We  are  committed   to  expanding 

V  I  are  opportunities  for  the  traveling 

ilk    In  my  own  view,  the  market  for 

>  cost  travel  has  barely  been  tapped 

[side   the   North   Atlantic.    Within 

vscnt   arrangements   there   is  great 

111  for  low-fare  innovation  and  com- 

iii\e  pricing,  which  we  will  encour- 

,'     in  negotiating  new  and  revised 

I  cements,  the  United  States  has  reaf- 

iKil  this  permissive  policy  and  ob- 

.icii  clear  commitments  to  low-cost 

il  innovative  rates.   By  the  terms  of 

tise  agreements,  approval  of  low  fares 

nl  not  depend  on  whether  these  rates 

I  e  been  set  by  intercarrier  agree- 
111  We  encourage  U.S.  flag  carriers 
.iko  advantage  of  the  new  opportuni- 

I  1  iberal   charter  rules  should   be 

:  ranteed  as  an  integral  part  of  bilat- 

1   aviation  agreements.   In  the  past, 

h  agreements  have  often  dealt  with 

Iters  and  scheduled  services  sepa- 

l\  or  have  covered  only  scheduled 

..ices.  But  we  have  come  to  recog- 

11 :  that  charter  service  is  not  an  inci- 

d  tal  appendage  to  the  international 

a  .ition  system  but  one  of  its  central 

•'.lures.   The  opportunity   for  charter 

ipetition  under  liberal  rules  must  be 

II  \  guaranteed,  not  merely  to  serve 
tl  needs  of  charter  customers  but  to 
p  serve  competitive  conditions  among 
sieduled  carriers.  Removing  unneces- 
v;  restrictions  on  charter  service  is 
tl  s  a  prime  objective  of  U.S.  policy. 

'  We  must  insure  that  the  system  of 
'■'  tes,   rights,   and  designation   for 

eduled  carriers  permits  full  scope 
M  competition.  Airline  routes  should 
b  expanded  to  meet  potential  demand 

1  :  should  be  free  of  limitations  on 
acity  or  frequency  and  arbitrary  re- 
ctions  on  operating  rights.  The  an- 

-  I  to  empty  airline  seats  lies  not  with 
gernment  restrictions  on  capacity  but 
"h  lower  fares  through  competition 
with  reduced  restrictions  on  routes 
J .  operating  rights. 

To  maximize  the  possibility  for 
cnpetition,  we  will  press  for  multiple 
d  ignation  of  U.S.  carriers  in  all  suit- 

2  e  markets,  as  well  as  multiple 
^  istop  gateways   for   international 

el  Again,  we  believe  that  vigorous 
\  ice  and  price  competition  among 
I  lers,    rather   than   the   award   of 

■  nopoly  rights,  is  the  best  way  of 

r  eting  the  needs  of  shippers  and 

t;v'elers. 
'•  The  United  States  is  committed  in 

!  ation  negotiations  to  be  forthcoming 
offering  foreign  countries  new  op- 
ttmities  in  exchange  for  new  oppor- 


tunities for  our  own  travelers,  shippers, 
and  carriers.  We  want  to  join  our 
negotiating  partners  in  enhancing  the 
aviation  market  rather  than  restric- 
ting that  market  through  mutual 
protectionism. 

These  are  ambitious  objectives,  but  I 
believe  that  they  are  reasonable  and 
that  they  can  be  attained.  Their 
achievement  will  require  hard  and 
coordinated  work  by  U.S.  agencies.  I 
am  told  that  we  are  in  a  period  of  un- 
usual accord  among  agencies  on  our 
objectives  in  international  aviation. 
The  number  of  meetings  per  agreed 
word  is  at  a  record  low.  Yet  inter- 
agency harmony  is  high.  We  are. 
perhaps,  in  a  new  era  when  agencies 
agree  and  airlines  compete,  rather  than 
the  other  way  around. 


For  our  part,  the  State  Department 
will  continue  to  work  closely  with 
other  agencies  in  preparing  our 
negotiating  position  and  in  the  negotia- 
tions themselves.  We  will  continue  to 
seek  the  assistance  of  the  aviation  in- 
dustry and  of  the  consuming  public. 
Together,  I  believe  we  have  an  historic 
opportunity  to  make  the  technological 
marvel  of  international  air  travel  a  real- 
ity for  the  average  American.  It  is  in 
this  sense — of  making  the  world  acces- 
sible to  tens  of  millions — that  a  free 
and  competitive  international  aviation 
system  is  most  profoundly  a  part  of 
American  foreign  policy.  D 


Address  before  the  hnernalioital  Avialion  Club 
in  Washingion.  D.C..  on  Jan.  IS.  1978:  Mr. 
Cooper  is  Under  Secretary  for  Economic  Af- 
fairs. 


Debts  Owed  to  the  U.S. 


by  Robert  D.  Hormats 

As  of  September  30,  1977,  outstand- 
ing indebtedness  on  U.S.  Government 
credits  (exclusive  of  indebtedness  aris- 
ing from  World  War  I)  totaled  approx- 
imately $42.1  billion,  of  which  $41.6 
billion  related  to  long-term  debt  with 
an  original  maturity  of  over  1  year. 
This  debt  includes  many  loan 
categories,  with  the  terms  of  lending 
reflecting  the  purpose  of  the  program 
under  which  the  loan  was  extended. 
Humanitarian  or  development  loans, 
representing  almost  60%  of  our  debt, 
are,  for  example,  highly  concessional. 

On  the  other  hand,  loans  by  the 
Export-Import  Bank,  which  account  for 
roughly  28%  of  our  outstanding  debt, 
are  at  market-related  rates  consistent 
with  the  Bank's  legislative  mandate  to 
provide  official  financing  for  U.S.  ex- 
ports comparable  to  that  of  our  major 
competitors. 

Approximately  54%  of  our  long-term 
debt  is  attributable  to  the  non-OPEC 
developing  countries.  OPEC  countries 
account  for  8%.  industrialized  coun- 
tries (including  Israel)  for  34%,  and  the 
Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe  for 
4%.  Aside  from  Ecuador,  Indonesia, 
and  Nigeria  the  bulk  of  the  debt  owed 
by  OPEC  countries  is  related  to 
Export-Import  Bank  lending.  This  is 
also  the  case  for  lending  to  other  indus- 
trialized countries.' 

The  objective  of  U.S.  foreign  policy 
is  to  protect  the  interests  of  the  United 
States — among  which  are  the  assets 


represented  by  foreign  debts.  Indi- 
vidual lending  or  creditor  agencies 
have  the  primary  responsibility  for  in- 
suring debtor-country  compliance  with 
agreed  repayment  schedules.  In  situa- 
tions where  these  agencies  encounter 
collection  difficulties  and  request  as- 
sistance, the  Department  of  State  and 
U.S.  embassies  overseas  have  the  re- 
sponsibility for  pursuing  collection. 

We  take  these  responsibilities  very 
seriously  and  pursue  such  delinquen- 
cies vigorously.  Among  the  areas  of 
progress  over  the  last  18  months  were 
collections  of  overdue  payments  from 
Hungary  ($4.3  million),  the  Dominican 
Republic  ($1.4  million),  and  Uganda 
($500,000). 

In  the  vast  majority  of  cases,  debts 
owed  to  the  United  States  since  World 
War  II  have,  in  fact,  been  paid  on  time. 
Repayments,  including  interest,  on 
long-term  credits  extended  since  1940 
now  exceed  $45  billion.  As  of  Sep- 
tember 30,  1977,  principal  and  interest 
due  and  unpaid  90  days  or  more  totaled 
$591  million. 

I  note  that  in  spite  of  the  difficult  fi- 
nancial situation  faced  by  many  debtor 
countries,  the  level  of  outstanding  ar- 
rearages reflects  an  improvement  over 
the  $652  million  figure  discussed  at 
this  subcommittee's  last  hearing  2 
years  ago.  While  this  reflects  primarily 
the  seriousness  foreign  governments  at- 
tach to  honoring  agreed  obligations,  it 
also  reflects  the  importance  and  high 
priority  given  to  debt-collection  efforts 
by  the  U.S.  Government. 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


While  debtor  countries  worldwide 
have  a  generally  good  record  in  main- 
taining their  debt  servicing  payments  to 
the  United  States,  I  assure  you  that  we 
will  continue  to  press  for  improved 
results. 

Major  Arrearages 

It  is  important  to  recognize,  how- 
ever, that  a  large  portion  of  current  de- 
linquencies relate  to  a  few  unique  situa- 
tions where  circumstances  currently 
impede  our  ability  to  collect.  For 
example,  approximately  70%  of  current 
arrearages  relate  to  Korea  conflict 
logistical  support  claims  and  debt 
owed  by  China,  Cuba,  the  Khmer  Re- 
public, and  Vietnam. 

Arrearages  relating  to  logistical  sup- 
port provided  by  the  United  States  to 
other  nations  during  the  Korean  con- 
flict total  $200  million.  They  arose  be- 
cause, while  we  concluded  formal 
agreements  for  repayment  of  such  as- 
sistance with  14  countries,  the  validity 
of  the  claims  of  six  countries  (Colom- 
bia, Ethiopia,  Greece,  the  Philippines, 
Thailand,  Turkey)  cannot  be  clearly  es- 
tablished. The  history  of  these  claims 
is  complex,  and  we  are  about  to  begin 
consultations  with  Congress  regarding 
the  initiation  of  legislation  which 
would  remove  the  claims  from  the  cat- 
egory of  outstanding  debt.  This  course 
of  action  conforms  fully  to  a  1976  rec- 
ommendation of  the  House  Committee 
on  Government  Operations. 

The  delinquencies  attributable  to  the 
Republic  of  China  total  $108  million 
and  are  largely  related  to  lend  lease  and 
other  war  accounts  settlements.  The 
debts  involve  a  number  of  difficult  is- 
sues including  the  proper  allocation  of 
claims  between  the  Republic  of  China 
and  the  People's  Republic  of  China, 
the  correct  evaluation  of  the  claims, 
and  the  problems  of  government  suc- 
cession. Cuba's  arrearages  total  $74 
million,  most  of  which  is  owed  to  the 
Export-Import  Bank.  As  our  relation- 
ships with  the  People's  Republic  of 
China  and  Cuba  evolve,  we  will  con- 
sider how  we  might  handle  the  question 
of  these  and  related  debts. 

Political  factors  also  hinder  settle- 
ment of  $25  million  now  owed  by  the 
Khmer  Republic  and  Vietnam.  In  this 
context,  it  should  be  noted  that  our  per- 
formance in  assuring  debt  repayment  is 
best  in  countries  where  we  maintain 
good  bilateral  relations.  And  con- 
versely, situations  where  bilateral  rela- 
tions bear  the  legacy  of  historic 
animosity  or  are  clouded  by  serious 
friction  often  constitute  serious  debt- 
collection  problems. 

Arrearages  other  than  the  five  cases 
cited  above  total  approximately  $184 


million.  The  largest  of  these  are  at- 
tributable to  Iran  ($36  million)  and 
Zaire  ($25  million).  In  the  case  of  Iran, 
the  United  States  has  made  extensive 
efforts  to  collect  arrearages  owed  on  two 
surplus  property  agreements  signed  in 
1945  and  1948.  Iran  made  payments  to- 
taling $1 1  million  on  these  debts  during 
the  late  1940's  but  halted  them  during 
the  period  of  instability  in  the  1950's. 
As  a  result  of  recent  negotiations,  Iran 
made  payments  of  $75^0,000  (March 
1973)  and  $1.8  million  (October  1975). 

Iran  has,  however,  made  future 
payments  conditional  on  progress  in 
settling  a  claim  they  have  against  the 
United  States  for  damages  to  Iranian 
railways  by  Allied  military  forces  dur- 
ing World  War  II.  They  place  their 
claim  at  $172  million.  We  have  advised 
Iran  that  the  evidence  they  have  sub- 
mitted to  date  does  not  substantiate  a 
claim  against  the  United  States.  We 
have  also  stressed  our  position  that  the 
long  established  surplus  property  debt, 
the  validity  of  which  is  not  in  question, 
should  be  paid  off  without  reference  to 
the  unconnected  Iranian  claim.  We 
have  noted,  however,  that  we  remain 
willing  to  give  the  Iranian  claim — 
which  is  further  complicated  by  the 
issue  of  the  division  of  financial  re- 
sponsibility in  Iran  during  World  War 
II  between  the  United  States  and  the 
United  Kingdom — a  full  hearing.  It  is 
our  intention  to  continue  pursuing  this 
matter  at  an  appropriately  high  gov- 
ernment level. 

The  Zairian  arrearage  is  a  reflection 
of  the  serious  economic  situation  which 
has  affected  that  country  since  1974. 
This  situation  has  been  characterized 
by  substantial  balance-of-payments 
deficits,  a  prolonged  pause  in  economic 
growth,  and  a  large  accumulation  of  ar- 
rearages on  foreign  debt.  It  was  the 
view  of  the  International  Monetary 
Fund  that  a  rescheduling  of  Zaire's  ex- 
ternal debt  was  an  essential  element  in 
economic  recovery.  This  analysis  was 
shared  by  all  of  Zaire's  official  cred- 
itors which  have  subsequently 
negotiated  two  Paris  Club  rescheduling 
agreements  covering  a  large  portion  of 
the  1976  and  1977  maturities.  Until 
such  time  as  the  United  States  and 
Zaire  conclude  an  implementing 
agreement  on  1977  maturities,  these 
payments  are  technically  recorded  as 
arrearages. 

Apart  from  the  debt  owed  by  Zaire 
and  Iran,  a  large  portion  of  the  remain- 
ing arrearages  constitute  technical  and 
administrative  problems  rather  than  any 
intentional  failure  to  pay. 

Recognizing  that  extraordinary  cir- 
cumstances may  require  a  modification 
of  loan  terms  to  reflect  a  change  in 
conditions  in  a  borrowing  country,  the 


Congress  has  provided   authority 
debt  renegotiation  for  each  U.S.  Gc 
ernment  lending  program. 

Debt  Renegotiations 

Even  with  this  authority,  however, 
is  U.S.  policy  to  confine  the  use  of  tl 
authority  to  extraordinary  situatio 
where  necessary  to  assure  repaymei 
Eligibility  for  debt  relief  has  traditic 
ally  been  based  on  a  "case-by-cas 
examination  of  individual  debt  pro 
lems  as  they  arise.  This  is  normal 
done  in  a  multilateral  framework  to  ' 
sure  equal  treatment  among  creditors^ 

The  incidence  of  serious  deb 
servicing  problems  requiring  multili 
eral  debt  relief  continues  to  be  confin' 
to  a  few  countries.  Although  the  peri' 
1974-77  has  been  a  particularly  d' 
ficult  one  for  the  developing  world, 
vast  majority  of  developing  countri 
have  continued  to  service  fully  their  i 
ficial  debts.  During  this  4-year  perit 
only  six  countries  required  multilatei 
debt  renegotiation,  with  the  Uniti 
States  participating  in  the  agreemen 
for  four  of  the  countries — India,  Pah 
Stan,  Chile,  and  Zaire. 

Multilateral  debt  renegotiations 
feet    government     or    governmem 
guaranteed  debt.    Usually   short-tei 
credits,   all   unguaranteed  bank  credJ 
and  loans  from  the  multilateral  lendi 
institutions   (World   Bank,   etc.)  ha» 
been  excluded.  The  United  States  b 
no  legal  authority  to  bind  private  era 
itors  to  these  agreements.  As  a  resu. 
the   U.S.   participation   has  been  cO' 
ditioned  on  debtor-country  agreemff 
to  make  all  reasonable  efforts  to  rec 
ganize  unguaranteed  private  credits 
terms  comparable   to   those  coveri; 
government  credits.   This  reflects  O'. 
view  that  the  principle  of  comparab 
treatment  of  both  public   and  privai 
creditors  is  appropriate  and   that  it 
highly  important  that  the  risks  of  lem 
ing  be  shared  by  both. 

We  do  not  believe  public  credito 
should  ""bail  out"  their  private  cou 
terparts.  In  addition  to  establishing  ;l 
unfair  burden  on  taxpayers,  such 
■'bail  out"  could  lower  the  general 
current  high  level  of  lending  standan 
by  giving  both  private  lenders  ai 
debtor  countries  the  false  imprcssic 
that  creditor  governments  are  willing 
assume  responsibility  for  the  repa; 
ment  of  private  debt. 

I  would  like  to  restate  my  belief  th 
debt  problems  are  neither  widespre; 
nor  unmanageable.  Given  a  reasonab 
international  economic  environmen 
debt  problems  over  the  next  seven 
years  should  be  confined  to  a  relative) 
few  countries.  On  the  collection  of  a 
rearages  and  prudent  use  of  debt  u 


rch  1978 


27 


EUROPE:      ;§;tfttttttrfri|  of 
U.S.'European  Relations 


George  S.  Vest 


Since  my  predecessor.  Art  Hartman. 
istified  here  last  May.  many  things 
\it  were  then  still  novel  or  nascent  in 

iiL-rican  policy  toward  Europe  and 
^inada  have  emerged  into  vigorous. 
■  early  defined  growth.  During  the 
me  period,  our  commitment  to  other 

iditional  elements  of  policy  has  not 
1  In  been  reaffirmed  but  reinforced  by 
;tion.   In  each  of  the  main  areas  of 

teres!  to  the  United  States — Western 
; lidarity.  the  military  defense  of  the 
jest,  and  relations  with  the  East — we 

:  using  the  new  features  of  our  work- 

a  diplomacy  in  the  service  of  estab- 

hed  basic  purposes. 

•  We  have  placed  fresh  emphasis  on 
:  political  and  economic  ties  which 
ikc  the  Western  democracies  a  coher- 
t  lorce. 

•  We  are  cooperating  with  the 
iropean  Community  (EC)  to  find  so- 
:ions  to  common  problems  we  face 
oughout  the  world. 

•  We  are  working  with  our  allies  in 
.'  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

complete  a  vigorous  appraisal  of 
\TO's  requirements,  and  we  are  re- 
lancing  our  own  defense  effort  in  a 
iy  which  moves  NATO  closer  to  the 
re  of  our  activities. 

•  We  continue  to  aim  for  more  con- 
ructive  relations  with  the  Soviet 
lion  and  the  states  of  Eastern  Europe, 
though   it   is  plain   that   the  overall 

S.-U.S.S.R.  relationship  remains 
mpetitive. 

•  At  the  same  time,  we  have  made  it 
iniistakably  clear  that  American  con- 
rn  for  human  rights  is  not  going  to 
cede  and  that  it  is  a  factor  which  will 
ive  to  be  reckoned  with  seriously. 

estern  Solidarity 

As  the  President  said  in  his  State  of 
e  Union  message,  we  have  moved  to 
store  our  traditional  friends  and  allies 


to  the  center  of  our  foreign  policy.  It  is 
our  purpose  to  keep  Western  ties  strong 
and  to  build  outward  from  them  to  ad- 
dress the  wider  problems  we  must  face 
together.  International  agencies  and 
multilateral  techniques  are  increasingly 
important  in  this  effort.  Nevertheless, 
the  starting  point  and  the  heart  of  our 
diplomacy  is  to  keep  up  the  closest 
possible  bilateral  ties  with  our  friends. 
We  have  been  making  a  constant  effort 
to  do  so. 

Our  relations  with  Canada  are  excel- 
lent, whether  we  look  at  Canada  as  our 
major  trading  partner,  as  our  military 
ally,  or  as  a  participant  in  the  affairs  of 
this  hemisphere.  High-level  visits  be- 
tween both  countries,  including  Vice 
President  Mondale"s  recent  trip,  have 
underscored  our  close  bonds.  We  have 
a  positive  relationship  with  France 
based  on  mutual  respect,  which  the 
President's  recent  visit  did  much  to  en- 
large and  dramatize.  In  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  we  have  a 
strong,  ably  led  ally  committed  to  the 
unity  of  the  Western  alliance  and  to  its 
defense  of  democratic  values.  Our  ties 
to  Great  Britain  are  marked  by  a  deep 
harmony  of  basic  outlook  and  by  ac- 
tive collaboration  on  many  world 
issues. 

We  have  drawn  closer  to  our  smaller 
allies  and  friends  as  well,  in  order  to 
benefit  from  their  strength  and  counsel. 
Consultations  here  by  Prime  Ministers 
Tindemans  [Belgium]  and  Thorn 
[Luxembourg],  and  the  President's 
visit  to  Belgium,  exemplify  this  ap- 
proach. We  will  be  consulting  closely 
with  the  Danish  presidency  of  the 
European  Community,  in  expectation 
that  during  its  6-month  term.  Denmark 
will  provide  not  only  sound  Commu- 
nity leadership  but  through  its  presi- 
dency, an  important  channel  for  close 
U.S.  cooperation  with  the  EC  on  prob- 
lems of  urgent  common  interest.  Aus- 
tria, Switzerland,  and  Sweden, 
though  neutral  and  not  members  of  the 
EC,   have   maintained  close,   regular 


■gotiation,  we  think  our  record  is  a 
)od  one  but  will  continue  to  press  for 
iproved  results  wherever  possible.    D 


atfinciu  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Taxation 
id  Debt  Management  Generally  of  the  Senate 
committee  on  Finance  on  Jan.  23.  1978.  The 
\>mplete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  pub- 


lished by  the  committee  and  will  be  available 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents.  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office.  Washington.  DC. 
20402.  Mr.  Hormats  is  Deputy  Assistant  Secre- 
tary for  Economic  and  Business  .Affairs. 

'  Members  of  the  Organization  of  Petroleum 
Exporting  Countries  (OPEC)  are  Abu  Dtiabi. 
Algeria.  Ecuador,  Gabon,  Indonesia.  Iran.  Iraq, 
Kuwait,  Libya,  Nigeria,  Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia, 
and  Venezuela. 


contact  with  us  at  all  official  levels. 
There  is  a  healthy  resonance  in  these 
countries  for  our  initiatives  in  the  area 
of  human  rights,  which  accords  so  well 
with  their  own  values  and  policies. 

In  the  south  of  Europe,  the  continued 
progress  of  democracy  in  Greece, 
Spain,  and  Portugal  is  encouraging. 
Now  that  a  new  Portuguese  government 
has  been  formed,  we  believe  that  Por- 
tugal will  be  able  to  move  quickly  to 
address  its  urgent  economic  problems, 
and  the  United  States  is  prepared — with 
others — to  be  of  help. 

In  the  eastern  Mediterranean,  Secre- 
tary Vance  had  most  helpful  and  com- 
prehensive conversations  in  Ankara  and 
Athens  [January  20-22].  With  regard 
to  Cyprus,  we  welcome  indications  by 
Turkish  Prime  Minister  Ecevit  that  the 
Turkish  side  is  developing  new  propos- 
als to  provide  a  basis  for  resumption  of 
the  Cyprus  intercommunal  talks  under 
auspices  of  the  U.N.  Secretary  Gen- 
eral. Greek-Turkish  talks  about  the 
Aegean  Continental  Shelf  are  sched- 
uled to  resume  February  12,  and  Greek 
Prime  Minister  Caramanlis  has  ac- 
cepted in  principle  Ecevit  "s  proposal 
for  a  summit  meeting  later  this  year. 
The  strengthening  of  our  bilateral  and 
alliance  relations  with  both  countries  is 
a  high  priority  concern,  and  we  con- 
tinue to  believe  that  defense  coopera- 
tion agreements  are  a  sound  basis  for 
building  the.se  relationships. 

Much  has  been  said  recently  about 
the  political  situation  which  has  arisen 
in  Italy  as  the  result  of  the  Italian 
Communist  Party's  demand  for  partici- 
pation in  the  government.  Our  respect 
for  the  democratic  process  means  that 
as  a  matter  of  principle  the  United 
States  relies  on  the  decision  of  the  elec- 
torates concerned.  However,  as  the 
President  and  other  members  of  the 
Administration  have  stated,  when  it 
comes  to  the  issue  of  Communist  par- 
ticipation in  West  European  govern- 
ments, noninterference  should  not  be 
understood  as  indifference  or  equanim- 
ity. We  do  not  believe  that  Communist 
Parties  may  safely  be  trusted  in  na- 
tional office  to  respect  the  principles 
and  values  which  are  the  basis  of 
democratic  political  life,  and  we  are 
concerned  about  the  effects  of  their  ac- 
cession to  power  on  Western  military 
security,  political  solidarity,  and  eco- 
nomic ties. 

Economic  Growth 

The  diminished  appeal  of  governing 
parties  in  some  parts  of  Europe  is  not 
only  the  result  of  special  circumstances 
in  each  country  concerned  but  is  also 
part  of  a  broader  pattern  involving  a 
much-noted  sense  of  malaise  and  lack 


28 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


of  confidence.  I  believe  there  is  a  di- 
rect connection  between  such  trends 
and  the  prolonged  period  of  economic 
recession  and  drift  we  have  experi- 
enced in  the  West.  The  question  of  how 
we  can  ail  enter  a  new  period  of  sound 
general  growth  is,  therefore,  not  only 
the  most  urgent  economic  issue  of  the 
day  but  relates  closely  to  the  problem 
of  how  to  relieve  many  of  the  most 
disturbing  social  and  political  situa- 
tions in  Europe.  Fortunately,  however, 
this  is  an  area  where  American  action 
is  welcomed. 

At  the  economic  summit  last  May, 
the  United  States  and  other  advanced 
industrial  states  expressed  commitment 
to  joint  action  for  recovery.  There  will 
be  another  summit  this  summer,  pre- 
ceded by  a  ministerial-level  meeting  of 
the  Organization  for  Economic  Coop- 
eration and  Development.  American 
domestic  economic  policies  are  geared 
to  keep  recovery  here  moving.  At  pres- 
ent, we  are  one  of  the  mainstays  of  re- 
covery in  the  Western  world,  but  we 
are  not  in  a  position  to  provide  suffi- 
cient stimulus  for  the  other  indus- 
trialized countries  by  ourselves.  The 
United  States  has  been  working  with 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and 
with  Japan  to  find  ways  to  assure  a 
more  balanced  and  more  sustained  ap- 
proach to  noninflationary  economic 
growth.  It  is  entirely  natural  that  there 
should  be  differences  of  view. 
Nevertheless,  the  major  Western 
economies  are,  in  fact,  attempting  to 
develop  along  mutually  supportive 
lines. 

1  think  it  would  be  hard  to  overstress 
the  importance  to  this  effort  of  main- 
taining liberal  trade  policies,  despite 
temptations  to  resort  to  protectionism. 
One  country  cannot  resort  to  beggar- 
thy-neighbor  practices  without  inviting, 
and  even  forcing,  other  countries  to  do 
the  same.  Protectionism  is  a  hazardous 
remedy  in  international  economic  rela- 
tions, and  once  we  start  to  employ  it, 
experience  during  the  Great  Depression 
tells  us  a  good  deal  about  what  we  can 
expect. 

The  U.S. -Japanese  trade  com- 
munique released  in  Tokyo  this  month 
is  an  extremely  hopeful  indication  that 
the  dangers  of  the  situation  are  under- 
stood and  that  the  industrial  economies 
will  be  able  to  find  the  basis  for  com- 
mon positive  action.  Similarly,  but  on 
a  still  wider  scale,  it  is  apparent  that 
participants  in  the  multilateral  trade 
negotiations  (MTN)  in  Geneva  also 
understand  that  delay  invites  disorder. 
We  believe  that  an  MTN  agreement 
significantly  liberalizing  world  trade 
can  be  completed  by  this  summer,  de- 
spite all  difficulties. 

Because  energy  is  the  foundation  of 
our  economy,  it  is  vitally  important 


that  the  United  States  put  into  effect  a 
national  energy  policy,  to  reduce 
American  reliance  on  imported  fuel  and 
to  assure  timely  action  to  adapt  our 
economy  to  the  longer  term  prospect  of 
diminishing  global  oil  reserves  and 
higher  energy  costs.  Such  a  program  is 
not  only  necessary  for  us  but  is  vital  to 
maintenance  of  a  healthy  world 
economy. 

Just  as  coal  is  to  play  a  major  part  in 
our  energy  plans  for  the  future,  so  nu- 
clear energy  will  be  of  comparable  im- 
portance to  many  of  our  friends  in 
Europe.  For  nuclear  energy  expansion 
to  progress  on  a  sound  basis,  we  must 
reconcile  such  growth  with  security  and 
environmental  requirements.  The  re- 
cently promulgated  London  Suppliers" 
Group  guidelines  and  the  agreement 
last  fall  to  start  the  2-year  International 
Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle  Evaluation  are  both 
important  steps  in  this  direction. 

President  Carter's  visit  to  the  head- 
quarters of  the  Commission  of  the 
European  Community  [January  6] — the 
first  by  an  American  President — was 
his  way  not  only  of  signifying  the  im- 
portance we  attach  to  relations  with  the 
EC  but  of  affirming  continued  Ameri- 
can support  for  the  goal  of  European 
unification.  The  EC  as  it  stands  is  al- 
ready our  largest  trading  partner  after 
Canada.  We  have  run  a  trade  surplus 
with  the  Community  every  year  but  one 
since  its  inception  in  1957.  and  our  di- 
rect investment  in  it  is  on  the  order  of 
$44  billion. 

Beyond  that,  however,  every  Ameri- 
can Administration  since  the  end  of 
World  War  II  has  believed  that  the  way 
to  a  new  period  of  sustained  European 
dynamism  is  through  the  process  of 
unification.  This  process  has  slowed, 
but  it  has  not  stopped.  The  EC  has 
under  consideration  Greek,  Spanish, 
and  Portuguese  applications  for  admis- 
sion. Direct  elections  to  the  European 
Parliament  are  approaching.  The  ques- 
tion of  monetary  union  is  alive.  Al- 
though the  modalities  for  any  of  these 
steps  are  up  to  Europeans,  it  is  impor- 
tant for  us  to  make  clear,  as  President 
Carter  did.  that  we  look  to  the  Euro- 
pean Community  as  a  vital  kindred 
force . 

Military  Security 

I  know  how  familiar  you  are  with 
our  conviction  that  the  Atlantic  alliance 
is  of  cardinal  importance  to  our  secu- 
rity. In  the  face  of  growing  Soviet  mili- 
tary power  in  Europe,  it  is  as  necessary 
now  as  at  any  earlier  time  for  the 
United  States  and  the  countries  of 
Western  Europe  to  look  to  our  de- 
fenses. The  United  States  has  reaf- 
firmed its  support  for  NATO's  basic 
strategic  doctrines  of  deterrence,   for- 


I 


ward  defense,  and  flexible  respons 
However,  we  have  also  made  it  cU 
that  we  believe  the  alliance  needs 
carry  out  improvements  in  the  struct! 
and  composition  of  its  forces  to  insi 
the  viability  of  this  strategy. 

The  President  gave  early  proof  of 
support  for  such  an  effort  by  request; 
an  additional  S500  million  for  NA' 
purposes  in  his  FY  78  budget.  Expen^ 
tures  pertinent  to  NATO  will  increi 
in  FY  78  by  37( ,  in  accordance  w 
guidelines  agreed  to  in  the  allian 
Last  May,  at  the  London  summit,  i 
President  proposed  a  four-point  agen 
which  is  now  a  vital  part  of  the 
liance's  overall  schedule.  Looking 
ward  the  pending  NATO  summit 
Washington  in  May,  we  are  maki 
substantial  progress  on  that  program 

In  order  to  improve  our  ability 
deal  with  the  opening  phases  of  an 
tack,  we  have  developed  an  approa 
based  on  more  antitank  capabilities 
better  positioning  of  military  stock 
This  approach  is  being  implemente 
With  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ge 
many's  cooperation,  we  are  relocati 
certain  U.S.  combat  units  to  mo 
northerly  positions.  These  elements  a 
the  spearheads  of  a  force  which  cou 
be  rapidly  expanded  and  will  signi 
cantly  improve  NATO's  first  line 
defense  in  a  critical  area.  The  Preside 
also  announced,  in  his  visit  to  t 
North  Atlantic  Council  on  January  6i 
that  there  would  be  an  8,000-man  i 
crease  in  Army  manpower  in  Eurof 
His  FY  79  budget  clearly  reflects  a  nt 
priority  for  NATO.  We  expect  that 
lied  defense  investment  will  also  reg 
ter  gains. 

To  improve  cooperation  in  the  c 
velopment,  production,  and  procui 
ment  of  defense  equipment,  we  a 
pressing  on  with  a  dialogue  betwe 
ourselves  and  the  Canadians  and  o 
European  allies.  We  hope  to  have  co 
Crete  results  from  this  process,  rec 
nizing  that  it  can  lead  to  increas 
overall  combat  effectiveness  at  ai 
given  level  of  investment.  The  advan^ 
of  military  technology  has  been 
rapid,  moreover,  thai  the  alliance 
decided  it  needs  and  is  making  a  ma 
effort  to  delineate  sound  plans  for  t 
longer  term.  Meanwhile,  as  a  logic 
complement  to  this  effort,  the  alliam 
is  well  into  a  major  assessment 
trends  which  may  affect  the  Sovi 
Union  and  its  allies,  and  their  possib 
implications  for  NATO. 

While  looking  to  our  defenses,  til 
alliance  is  also  continuing  its  effort 
improve  military  stability  and  securi 
through  arms  control.  The  talks 
mutual  and  balanced  force  reductioi 
(MBFR)  are  being  seriously  pursued 
Vienna.  Over  the  past  year,  we  haM 
engaged  the  Warsaw  Pact  in  a  discui 


/larch  1978 

ion  of  manpower  data,  aimed  at  reacti- 
ng agreement  on  ttie  relative  size  of 
orces  deployed  in  the  area  of  which 
he  MBFR  negotiations  are  focused, 
'^here  are  great  difficulties  in  the  way 
if  an  agreement,  but  we  hope  the 
o\iets  and  their  allies  will  show  readi- 
less  to  work  constructively  on  the 
iroblem  of  manpower  data. 
,  As  the  outlines  of  a  SALT  11 
iStrategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks] 
Igreement  become  more  distinct,  we 
re  increasingly  consulting  with  our  al- 
ics  to  make  sure  that  their  informed 
lews  on  the  negotiations  are  available 
<o  us  and  that  there  is  a  consensus  in 
JATO  which  supports  our  approach  to 
ssues  of  special  concern  to  Europeans. 
Uthough  SALT  is  a  bilateral  negotia- 
on  with  the  Soviets,  the  United  States 
lews  it  within  the  context  of  overall 
Western  security  requirements.  We  un- 
erstand  that  very  fundamental  inter- 
sts  of  our  allies  are  involved,  and  we 
re  determined  that  SALT  II  will  do 
othing  to  prejudice  our  collective  se- 
urity.  Looking  beyond  SALT  II,  we 
xpect  to  be  working  with  our  NATO 
Hies  to  resolve  questions  about  force 
osture  requirements  over  the  next 
ecade. 

Our  planning,  however,  must  be 
rongly  influenced  by  the  fact  that 
oviet  and  Warsaw  Pact  forces  con- 
nue  to  grow  in  numbers  and  in  techno- 
)gical  sophistication.  Experts  in  the 
/est  have  differing  views  about  the 
leaning  we  should  attribute  to  this 
:  recess  when  we  try  to  assess  ultimate 
oviet  intentions.  It  is  clear  to  all,  in 
ny  case,  that  the  Soviet  Union  is 
lyering  new  and  more  powerful  sys- 
•ms  on  top  of  existing,  already  ample, 
apabilities.  U.S.  and  NATO  policy  of- 
;rs  the  Soviet  Union  an  alternative  to 
lis  long-established  pattern.  What 
eeds  to  be  kept  in  mind,  however,  is 
lat  if  such  a  shift  in  Soviet  policy  does 
ot  take  place,  the  alliance  has  the  re- 
Durces  to  meet  the  challenge.  Clearly, 
le  critical  variable  is  not  in  the  area  of 
ealth  or  technology  but  political 
lorale.  As  the  President  said  in  Paris 
3n  Jan.  4]; 

Our  central  security  system  today  ...  is 
laintaining  our  will  to  keep  the  military  strength 
e  need,  while  seeking  .  .  .  every  opportunity  to 
uild  a  better  peace. 


^ast-West  Relations 

Since  mid-year,  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  rela- 
lons  have  shown  some  improvement, 
I  specially  in  the  area  of  arms  control. 
IIALT  is  making  progress  and  chances 
or  a  treaty  this  year  are  good.  I  have 
|lready  referred  to  the  status  of  MBFR. 
'Serious  work  is  underway  between  the 
Jnited  States,  the  United  Kingdom, 


and  the  Soviet  Union  on  a  comprehen- 
sive test  ban.  Good  progress  is  being 
made  in  U.S. -Soviet  negotiations  on  a 
chemical  weapons  treaty.  The  Indian 
Ocean  talks  have  also  been  marked  by 
a  businesslike  and  technically  well- 
developed  Soviet  approach,  although 
events  in  the  Horn  of  Africa  raise  ques- 
tions concerning  Soviet  purposes. 

We  have  just  completed  an  explora- 
tory round  of  discussions  with  the 
Soviets  in  Washington  on  possible 
forms  of  supplier  restraint  and  coopera- 
tion to  reduce  the  flow  of  conventional 
weapons  to  many  parts  of  the  world. 
Meanwhile,  the  Soviet  Union  has,  for 
some  time,  been  a  strong  supporter  of 
nuclear  nonproliferation  efforts  and 
has — despite  differences  over 
tactics — acted  vigorously  as  a  member 
of  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency's  Board  of  Governors  and  in 
the  London  Suppiers"  Group.  The 
Soviet  Union  is  also  a  full  participant 
in  the  International  Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle 
Evaluation. 

The  United  States  has  1 1  formal  sci- 
entific programs  of  joint  cooperation 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  We  value  these 
not  only  because  of  their  practical 
worth  but  because  they  are  also  the 
basis  for  a  broad  network  of  profes- 
sional and  official  contacts  with  a  soci- 
ety which  once  was  almost  imperme- 
able to  the  outside  world.  This  month, 
at  the  invitation  of  Congress,  a  large 
group  of  Soviet  parliamentarians  began 
a  visit  to  the  United  States,  which 
exemplifies  the  possibilities  we  now 
have  for  conveying  to  influential  Soviet 
citizens  a  more  accurate  perception  of 
our  country  and  of  its  purposes. 

The  gradual  development  of  U.S.- 
Soviet trade  is  beneficial  to  both  sides. 
Our  exports  to  the  U.S.S.R.  were  down 
last  year,  but  we  still  enjoyed  a  favor- 
able trade  balance  of  well  over  $1  bil- 
lion. The  Administration  will  continue 
to  consult  with  the  Congress  on  the 
question  of  how  and  under  what  condi- 
tions we  should  move  to  normalize 
economic  relations.  It  is  important  to 
keep  in  mind,  however,  that  Soviet 
economic  interdependence  with  the 
world  economy  is  already  at  the  point 
where  neither  they  nor  we  can  be  disin- 
terested in  and  unaffected  by  develop- 
ments in  each  other's  economic  sys- 
tems. A  vigorous  Western  economy  is 
of  increasing  importance  to  the  Soviet 
Union,  to  the  extent  that  the  latter's 
plans  for  development  depend  on  ac- 
cess to  Western  technology  and  on  hard 
currency  earnings  from  exports  to  the 
West  or  on  Western  government- 
backed  credits. 

While  there  are  areas  where  U.S. 
and  Soviet  interests  overlap  in  com- 
plementary fashion  there  are  many 
others  where  the  relationship  remains 


29 


adversary  and  competitive.  Human 
rights  will  continue  to  be  a  major 
source  of  disagreement,  since  our  dif- 
ferences of  view  are  the  consequence 
of  profoundly  diverging  philosophies, 
political  structures,  and  historical  ex- 
perience. At  the  Review  Meeting  of  the 
Conference  on  Security  and  Coopera- 
tion in  Europe  (CSCE)  in  Belgrade,  we 
and  our  allies,  with  support  from  neu- 
tral and  nonaligned  participants,  have 
conducted  a  full,  candid,  but  non- 
polemical  discussion  of  the  record  of 
all  the  signatories  of  the  CSCE  Final 
Act  in  implementing  its  provisions.  We 
have  used  this  opportunity  to  drive 
home  to  the  Soviet  Union  and  to  the 
Eastern  European  states  the  importance 
of  human  rights  in  East-West  political 
relations  and  to  underscore  the  fact  that 
human  rights  are  a  legitimate  subject 
for  international  consideration. 

In  Eastern  Europe,  we  seek  more 
normal  relations.  We  do  not  foresee 
dramatic  changes  in  the  character  of  re- 
lations between  any  of  the  states  in  that 
region  and  the  West  generally,  or  with 
the  United  States  in  particular.  The 
United  States  will,  however,  be  re- 
sponsive to  any  state  which  evidences  a 
desire  to  help  moderate  the  competitive 
aspects  of  East-West  relations  and  to 
states  whose  human  rights  practices 
show  sensitivity  to  their  obligations  as 
signatories  to  the  CSCE  Final  Act. 

The  President's  visit  to  Warsaw  and 
the  return  of  the  Crown  of  St.  Stephen 
to  Hungary  demonstrate  the  potential 
for  gradual  progress.  We  expect  to  con- 
tinue our  fruitful  economic  and  politi- 
cal ties  with  Romania. 

Relations  with  nonaligned  Yugo- 
slavia have  been  strengthened  by  Vice 
President  Mondale's  visit  there  last 
May;  from  meetings  which  Edvard 
Kardelj — who  is  a  member  of  the 
Yugoslav  Presidency — had  with  Presi- 
dent Carter,  the  Vice  President,  and 
other  officials  and  Members  of  Con- 
gress during  a  visit  to  Washington  last 
fall;  and  from  Defense  Secretary 
Brown's  talks  with  Yugoslav  leaders. 
Consultations  with  Yugoslavia  on  the 
Middle  East.  Africa,  international  eco- 
nomic issues,  and  other  matters  have 
been  frank,  illuminating,  and  helpful  in 
charting  U.S.  policy  toward  the 
nonaligned  and  developing  countries.  D 


Shilement  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Europe 
and  the  Middle  East  of  the  House  Committee  on 
International  Relations  on  Jan.  31.  1978.  The 
complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  pub- 
lished by  the  committee  and  will  be  available 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents.  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington.  D.C. 
20402.  Mr.  Vest  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
European  Affairs. 


30 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


HIJMA]\  RIGHTS: 

The  Diplomacy  of  the  First  Year 


by  Warren  Christopher 

1  am  delighted  to  be  here  today 
among  so  many  old  friends.  Last  Au- 
gust, I  had  the  good  fortune  of  address- 
ing the  Gavel  Awards  luncheon  at  the 
American  Bar  Association  convention.' 
On  that  occasion  I  discussed  the  princi- 
ples that  guide  one  of  the  most  impor- 
tant foreign  policy  initiatives  of  the 
Carter  Administration — the  human 
rights  policy. 

Today,  after  1  year's  experience 
with  that  policy.  I  would  like  to  talk 
about  how  those  principles  have  been 
put  into  practice — to  talk  about  the  di- 
plomacy of  human  rights. 

Before  doing  so,  let  me  remind  you 
that  our  policy  concerns  three 
categories  of  rights: 

•  The  right  to  be  free  from  gov- 
ernmental violations  of  the  integrity  of 
the  person; 

•  The  right  to  fulfill  one's  vital 
needs  such  as  food,  shelter,  health 
care,  and  education;  and 

•  Civil  and  political  rights. 

In  his  inaugural  address.  President 
Carter  set  the  tone  for  a  foreign  policy 
based  firmly  on  our  values  as  a  nation. 
"Because  we  are  free,"  he  said,  "we 
can  never  be  indifferent  to  the  fate  of 
freedom  elsewhere."-  In  this  single  sen- 
tence, from  which  so  much  has  flowed, 
the  President  was  expressing  an  old  and 
sometimes  ignored  truth  with  new 
vigor. 

Our  strength  as  a  nation  and  our 
magnetism  to  the  world  at  large  are 
predicated  on  our  commitment  to 
human  rights.  It  is  only  proper  that  the 
human  rights  considerations  so  impor- 
tant to  our  national  life  be  reflected  in 
our  international  life  as  well.  This 
means  they  must  be  fully  integrated 
into  our  diplomacy. 

The  pursuit  of  this  cause  is  not  an 
ideological  luxury  cruise  with  no  prac- 
tical port  of  call.  Our  idealism  and  our 
self-interest  coincide.  Widening  the 
circle  of  countries  which  share  our 
human  rights  values  is  at  the  very  core 
of  our  security  interests.  Such  nations 
make  strong  allies.  Their  commitment 
to  human  rights  gives  them  an  inner 
strength  and  stability  which  causes 
them  to  stand  steadfastly  with  us  on  the 
most  difficult  issues  of  our  time. 

In  this  first  year,  I  have  been  im- 
pressed by  what  a  subtle,  creative,  and 
flexible  process  diplomacy  can  be  in 


advancing  the  cause  of  human  rights. 
Diplomacy  is  not  just  words — though 
words  can  be  highly  effective.  It  is  also 
an  impressive  variety  of  intangible 
symbols  and  gestures,  as  well  as  tangi- 
ble measures. 

Diplomacy  can  be  a  rich  mix,  in- 
deed. In  the  case  of  our  human  rights 
objectives,  we  have  evolved  a  mix  that 
is  proving  effective. 

Capsule  View  of  the  Diplomacy 

Frank  Discussion.  The  primary  in- 
gredient of  human  rights  diplomacy  has 
a  seeming  simplicity:  We  frankly  dis- 
cuss human  rights  in  our  consultations 
with  foreign  diplomats  and  leaders.  An 
obvious  technique,  yes.  Just  words, 
yes.  But  I  must  tell  you  that  many  of  us 
have  been  amazed  at  its  effectiveness. 

A  career  Foreign  Service  Officer  told 
me  recently  that  until  last  January  it 
would  have  been  unusual  for  our  am- 
bassador to  raise  with  the  leader  of 
another  country,  in  face-to-face  con- 
versation, the  fate  of  political  prison- 
ers. Our  diplomats  tended  to  shy  away 
from  direct  high-level  dialogue  on  such 
sensitive  human  rights  issues. 

That  has  changed.  Time  after  time  in 
the  past  year  we  have  had  such  conver- 
sations. And  very  often  these  very 
frank  discussions  have  led  to  beneficial 
results.  Sovereign  governments  have 
reexamined  conditions  in  their  capitals 
and  provinces,  and  releases  of  prison- 
ers and  other  positive  actions  have 
followed. 

When  we  raise  human  rights  with 
another  government,  we  take  an  af- 
firmative stance.  We  explain  that  our 
people,  our  Congress,  and  our  govern- 
ment are  deeply  troubled  by  the  human 
rights  abuses  we  believe  to  be  occur- 
ring. And  we  ask  for  the  other  govern- 
ment's assessment  of  the  situation  and 
the  prospects  for  improvement.  Some- 
times, it  is  true,  the  response  is  trucu- 
lent and  defensive.  Sometimes,  we  are 
charged  with  "intervening"  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  another  sovereign 
state. 

But  much  more  often,  the  response  is 
a  real  effort  to  join  issue  on  the  merits. 
Frequently,  there  is  candid  acknowl- 
edgment of  the  validity  of  our 
interest — an  interest  rooted  in  solemn 
international  agreements  that  make  the 
way  a  government  treats  its  own  citi- 
zens a  matter  of  legitimate  international 
concern. 


Just  as  frequently  there  is  disagret 
ment  over  the  degree  and  the  causes  c 
the  problem.  It  is  often  asserted,  fc 
example,  that  terrorism  justifies  repre: 
sion.  But  usually  these  differences  i 
perspective  are  overtaken  by  a  consii 
eration  of  possible  improvements, 
consideration,  for  example,  of  whethe 

•  Those  held  without  trial,  often  ir 
communicado  and  for  lengthy  period: 
can  soon  be  relea.sed  or  at  least  charge 
and  tried; 

•  The  return  to  civilian  rule  can  pre 
ceed  on  schedule;  or 

•  Those  responsible  for  mistreatin 
prisoners  will  be  prosecuted. 

Sometimes  we  achieve  explicit  ur< 
derstandings  on  such  issues.  Moi 
commonly  there  is  an  implicit  recogn 
tion  of  the  need  for  improvement  an 
for  further  consultations  as  the  situatic 
evolves.  Either  way,  the  raising  of  th 
issue  has  profound  significance.  Ratht 
than  being  conveniently  ignorec 
human  rights  abuses  are  brought  to  tf* 
center  of  the  diplomatic  interchangt 
There,  they  must  be  addressed. 

I  believe  the  almost  geometric  it 
crease  in  world  awareness  of  humt 
rights  issues  is  perhaps  the  major  ai 
complishment  of  our  human  rights  di] 
lomacy.  This  new  consciousness  nt 
only  helps  curb  existing  human  righ 
abuses,  it  also  acts  as  a  deterrent 
new  violations. 

Symbolic  Acts.  The  words  of  huma 
rights  diplomacy  can  effectively  t 
joined  with  symbolic  acts.  For  exan 
pie,  trips  to  other  countries  by  oi 
senior  officials  and  official  invitatior 
to  the  leaders  of  other  nations  to  vis 
the  United  States  can  be  used  to  ac 
vance  our  human  rights  objective; 
Such  visits  can  mark  our  recognitio 
that  a  country  has  an  outstandin 
human  rights  record  or  provide  the  of 
portunity  to  discuss  human  rights  prob 
lems  with  the  leader  of  a  country  wher 
improvements  are  urgently  needed. 

There  are  a  host  of  other  measure 
that  can  be  used  symbolically  to  sen 
the  desired  signal,  such  as:  cultural  an< 
educational  exchanges;  selection  of  th 
site  of  international  conferences;  th 
level  of  our  representation  at  diploma 
tic  events;  port  visits  by  our  fleet 
Carefully  used,  such  symbols  and  ges 
tures  can  help  advance  the  cause  o 
human  rights. 

There  is  also  significance  in  our  will 
ingness  to  meet,  on  appropriate  occa 


larch  1978 


31 


lions,  with  opposition  leaders  from 
lountries  with  serious  human  rights 
problems.  My  colleagues  and  I  have 
let  with  a  number  of  such  leaders  in 
Washington — including  some  who  are 
iving  in  exile  from  their  homeland. 
ind  abroad,  our  ambassadors  regularly 
leet  with  opposition  leaders. 

These  meetings  enable  us  to  hear 
!'Oth  sides  of  the  story,  to  learn  how  a 
luman  rights  problem  is  seen  by  those 
irectly  affected,  and  to  demonstrate 
hat  we  are  concerned  about  all  the 
eople  of  the  country  involved,  not  just 
nose  in  power. 

Public  Comment.  Beyond  private 
iplomatic  discourse  and  important 
\mbolic  steps,  the  diplomacy  of 
uman  rights  must  sometimes  include 
riticism  of  regimes  implicated  in  seri- 
us  human  rights  violations. 

Public  comment  by  our  government 
,  an  official  act  that  directs  the  atten- 
on  of  the  entire  world  to  the  objec- 
onable  practices  of  another  govern- 
lent.  We  believe  that  such  criticism 
an  have  some  inhibiting  effect  on  such 
o\ernments.  We  do  not  generally  pre- 
:r  this  approach  but  neither  will  we 
hrink  from  it. 

Needless  to  say,  public  comment  has 
een  our  first  line  of  approach  with  re- 
pect  to  countries  like  Cambodia  and 
Iganda,  where  we  have  little  or  no  dip- 
)matic  contact  but  yet  where  unspeak- 
ble  violations  of  human  rights  are  oc- 
urring  as  a  matter  of  deliberate  state 
olicy.  We  deplore  these  policies.  We 
ope  other  governments  which  have  the 
ontact  that  we  lack  can  make  known 
le  extent  of  international  concern  and 
ring  about  improvements. 

We  have  also,  of  course,  spoken 
penly  and  forthrightly  at  the  Belgrade 
leeting  that  has  been  reviewing  im- 
lementation  of  the  Helsinki  Final 
vet.'  That  document  contemplates  a 
uU  and  frank  review  of  whether  the 
ignatories  have  lived  up  to  their 
luman  rights  commitments.  It  is  clear 
hat  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  East 
European  countries,  in  varying  de- 
rees,  have  not  done  so.  We  have  not 
lesitated  to  say  so  publicly,  to  request 
n  explanation,  and  to  seek 
ompliance. 

Our  comments  and  those  of  West 
European  governments  have  helped 
ustain  the  Helsinki  accord  as  a  living 
orce  in  the  cause  of  human  rights,  an 
ngine  for  keeping  constant  pressure  on 
;overnments  to  respect  the  rights  of 
heir  people.  Our  silence  would  have 
'ffectively  permitted  that  force  to  fade 
iway. 

In  speaking  of  our  public  efforts,  I 
.hould  note  that  we  are  actively  using 
)ur  public  diplomacy  tools  such  as  the 
J.S.    Information  Agency   to  convey 


our  human  rights  concerns  to  various 
nongovernmental  audiences  abroad. 
The  Voice  of  Ainerica  has  increased  its 
attention  to  these  issues.  Our  embassies 
and  offices  abroad  have  organized 
seminars  in  which  thoughtful  Ameri- 
cans can  directly  express  their  human 
rights  concerns  to  people  from  similar 
walks  of  life  in  foreign  countries. 

Our  human  rights  initiative  has  given 
recognition  and  a  new  stimulus  to  the 
longstanding  efforts  of  private  non- 
governmental organizations  in  this 
field.  We  applaud  these  endeavors  and 
recognize  that  over  time  they  may  well 
outdistance  any  governmental  effort. 

Appropriate  Action.  When  our  rela- 
tionship with  another  government  in- 
cludes economic  and  military  assist- 
ance, we  are  prepared  to  take  tangible 
steps  to  recognize  good  human  rights 
performance  or  to  manifest  our  concern 
over  human  rights  violations.  When 
appropriate  or  necessary,  in  other 
words,  we  will  support  our  words  with 
actions.  In  taking  such  steps,  we  are 
guided  and  strengthened  by  important 
legislative  provisions  enacted  by  a 
Congress  overwhelmingly  committed 
to  the  cause  of  human  rights. 

Taking  due  account  of  the  needs  of 
the  poorest,  we  have  made  a  fundamen- 
tal decision  gradually  to  channel  a 
growing  share  of  our  economic  assist- 
ance to  countries  that  respect  the 
human  rights  of  their  people. 

On  the  other  hand,  when  countries 
we  assist  consistently  curtail  human 
rights,  and  where  our  preferred  diplo- 
matic efforts  have  been  unavailing,  we 
must  consider  restrictions  on  the  flow 
of  our  aid,  both  overall  levels  and  indi- 
vidual loans  or  grants.  Thus,  over  the 
course  of  the  past  year  we  have,  for 
example: 

•  Deferred  bilateral  economic  as- 
sistance to  certain  countries; 

•  Opposed  loans  by  the  World  Bank 
and  the  other  international  financial  in- 
stitutions to  countries  that  engage  in 
flagrant  violations  of  human  rights;  and 

•  Taken  steps  to  insure  that  food  aid 
provided  to  countries  with  serious 
human  rights  problems  will  reach  the 
needy. 

We  have  also  advised  other  depart- 
ments of  the  government  on  human 
rights  conditions  abroad  that  may  affect 
their  activities.  For  example,  a  recently 
enacted  statute  calls  for  the  Export- 
Import  Bank  to  take  human  rights  con- 
siderations into  account,  and  the  Bank 
regularly  seeks  advice  on  this  issue. 

Human  rights  performance  is  also  an 
important  factor  in  our  decisions  on 
military  assistance  and  commercial 
arms  sales  subject  to  government  li- 
censing. We  have  reduced  or  declined 


to  increase  our  military  aid  to  a  number 
of  countries  and  refused  to  issue 
licenses  in  a  variety  of  instances. 

The  diversity  of  cultures  and  the  dif- 
ferent stages  of  economic  and  political 
maturity  tend  to  produce  agonizing, 
almost  incredibly  complex,  choices  in 
granting  or  withholding  aid.  Moreover, 
human  rights,  while  a  fundamental  fac- 
tor in  our  foreign  policy,  cannot  always 
be  the  decisive  factor.  But  the  diffi- 
culty of  the  decisions  will  not  deter  us 
from  supporting  our  words  with  action. 

International  Support.  It  is  impor- 
tant to  note  that  we  are  not  alone  in 
pursuing  the  diplomacy  of  human 
rights.  Increasingly,  other  governments 
are  standing  with  us.  In  the  United  Na- 
tions, in  the  Organization  of  American 
States,  and  in  other  contexts  we  have 
strong  partners  in  the  cause  of  human 
rights.  Recently,  we  initiated  consulta- 
tions with  our  West  European  allies 
and  others  on  how  to  promote  broader 
international  cooperation  in  support  of 
human  rights.  In  general,  we  are  find- 
ing strong  support  for  giving  human 
rights  a  higher  priority  in  international 
relations. 

Human  Rights  Data  Base.  As  I  re- 
flect on  the  first  year  of  human  rights 
diplomacy,  there  is  one  area  in  which  I 
would  like  to  ask  for  the  creative 
thinking  and  counsel  of  this  great  as- 
sociation. I  refer  to  the  need  I  perceive 
for  an  objective,  authenticated  data 
base  on  human  rights  conditions  in  all 
countries. 

Let  me  put  the  problem  in  perspec- 
tive. With  the  aid  of  our  embassies 
around  the  world,  we  are  constantly 
trying  to  gather  reliable  and  extensive 
human  rights  data.  Nevertheless,  the 
validity  of  our  information  on  human 
rights  conditions  in  other  countries  is 
frequently  challenged.  Probably  it  is 
inevitable  that  the  data  collected  by  any 
one  country  would  be  suspect.  Cover- 
age is  bound  to  be  limited,  and  there 
may  be  the  suspicion  that  the  collecting 
country  has  an  ax  to  grind. 

What  is  needed  is  an  objective, 
widely  respected  clearinghouse  for 
human  rights  information  on  all  coun- 
tries of  the  world.  This  would  be  an 
important  resource  for  us  and  others  in- 
terested in  taking  human  rights  condi- 
tions in  other  countries  into  account  in 
policymaking.  It  would  thus  both  in- 
form our  decisions  and  authenticate  the 
existence  and  severity  of  human  rights 
problems. 

Perhaps  you  will  be  able  to  suggest 
how  such  a  clearinghouse  might  be 
created.  It  is  clear  that  it  must  be  inter- 
national in  scope.  What  is  not  so  clear 
is  whether  it  should  be  sponsored  by  a 
private  organization  or  by  a  group  of 
countries  or  an  international  organiza- 


32 


tion.  Once  created,  I  could  visualize 
that  such  an  entity  might  also  play  an 
important  educational  role  in  improv- 
ing human  rights  conditions  around  the 
world.  We  stand  ready  to  help  in  creat- 
ing such  an  organization. 

U.S.  Concerns 

This  then  is  a  capsule  view  of  the 
diplomacy  of  human  rights.  It  is  a  dip- 
lomacy that  refuses  to  "'be  indifferent 
to  the  fate  of  freedom  elsewhere. "  It  is 
a  diplomacy  that  has  permitted  the 
United  States  to  seize  the  initiative  for 
human  progress  once  again.  Surveys 
conducted  abroad  have  shown  time  and 
time  again  that  the  renewed  interest  in 
human  values  expressed  by  the  Presi- 
dent and  implemented  by  our  diploma- 
tic efforts  has  had  an  enormously  posi- 
tive impact  on  the  view  people  in 
foreign  countries  hold  of  America  and 
our  role  in  the  world. 

We  are  daily  concerned  with  our 
government's  response  to  human  rights 
conditions  in  other  countries.  But  our 
credibility — and  indeed  the  inner  health 
of  our  society — depends  upon  facing  up 
to  our  problems  here  at  home  and  seek- 
ing to  improve  our  own  human  rights 
situation. 

Much  of  President  Carter's  domestic 
program  is  directed  toward  the  en- 
hancement of  the  human  rights  of 
Americans.  Proposals  for  welfare  re- 
form, efforts  to  cut  the  cost  of  health 
care,  and  the  commitment  to  full 
employment  are  obvious  examples.  We 
should  also  note  that,  within  the  past 
year,  travel  restrictions  for  American 
citizens  abroad  have  been  eliminated, 
and  visa  requirements  for  foreigners 
coming  to  this  country  have  been  sig- 
nificantly eased. 

It  is  well  to  remember  that  we  are  far 
from  perfect.  Our  ample  due  process 
with  all  its  guarantees  does  not  afford 
perfect  justice.  But  whatever  our 
shortcomings,  they  are  faced  frankly 
and  openly.  The  three  constitutional 
branches  of  government  have  the  re- 
sponsibility to  do  so.  And  the  ""fourth 
branch"  is  there  to  insure  that  that  re- 
sponsibility is  met. 

Progress  to  Date 

In  making  human  rights  a  fundamen- 
tal tenet  of  our  foreign  policy  and 
greatly  increasing  sensitivity  to  human 
rights  concerns,  we  have  helped  to 
create  an  atmosphere  in  which  human 
rights  progress  is  much  more  likely  to 
occur.  We  do  not  take  credit  for  par- 
ticular improvements,  but  we  note  the 
tangible  evidence  from  every  continent 
that  the  condition  of  large  numbers  of 
people — of  individual,    identifiable 


human  beings — is  less  oppressive  now 
than  it  seemed  one  year  ago. 

Africa.  There  have  been  releases  of 
substantial  numbers  of  political  de- 
tainees; for  example,  Sudan,  Nigeria, 
Upper  Volta,  Mali,  and  Ghana  are 
moving  toward  re  establishment  of 
civilian  governments.  Most  African 
leaders  have  intensified  their  efforts  to 
promote  agricultural  development. 
Nigeria  and  other  African  nations  are 
supporting  creation  of  an  African 
human  rights  commission  under  U.N. 
auspices. 

Near  East.  Morocco  moved  toward 
political  liberalization  after  nearly  a 
decade  of  rule  by  decree.  Restrictions 
on  freedom  of  the  press  were  lifted  and 
significant  numbers  of  political  prison- 
ers were  released.  Tunisia  authorized 
establishment  of  the  Tunisian  League 
for  the  Rights  of  Man  which  has  been 
permitted  to  investigate  allegations  of 
human  rights  violations.  Iran  released  a 
substantial  number  of  political  prison- 
ers and  agreed  to  a  visit  by  the  Interna- 
tional Committee  of  the  Red  Cross 
(ICRC). 

South  Asia.  There  was  in  India  a 
magnificent  resurrection  of  democracy. 
Nepal  released  political  prisoners  and 
lifted  newspaper  curbs.  Sri  Lanka 
changed  its  government  for  the  sixth 
time  since  independence  through  the 
free  choice  of  its  people.  Pakistan  re- 
leased over  1 1,000  political  prisoners. 

East  Asia.  The  Indonesian  Govern- 
ment released  10,000  political  de- 
tainees, confirmed  its  intent  to  release 
20.000  more  in  accordance  with  its 
previously  announced  release  schedule, 
and  agreed  to  resumption  of  ICRC  vis- 
its. South  Korea  released  all  but  one  of 
the  Myong  Dong  prisoners — opposition 
political  and  religious  leaders  who  had 
opposed  the  government.  The  Philip- 
pine Government  eased  some  of  its 
martial  law  restrictions  and  released 
some  detainees.  The  new  Government 
of  Thailand  has  eased  press  restric- 
tions, improved  trial  procedures,  and 
stated  its  intent  to  seek  general  elec- 
tions early  next  year. 

Latin  America.  Political  prisoners 
were  released  in  Haiti,  the  Dominican 
Republic,  Paraguay,  Argentina,  and 
Peru.  The  military  governments  of 
Peru,  Ecuador,  and  Bolivia  announced 
that  elections  will  be  held  in  1978. 
States  of  siege  were  lifted  in  El  Sal- 
vador and  Nicaragua.  Most  Latin 
American  governments  have  allocated 
increased  resources  to  improving  the 
living  standards  and  productivity  of 
their  poor  farmers.  Some  restrictive 
laws  have  been  repealed  in  Panama. 
And  El  Salvador,  Haiti,  and  Paraguay 
agreed  to  visits  by  the  Inter-American 
Commission  on  Human  Rights. 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 

Europe.  For  the  first  time  i 
NATO's  history,  every  member  of  th 
alliance  is  a  democracy.  New  churche 
have  been  constructed  in  Poland.  Cer 
tain  countries  of  Eastern  Europe  hav 
eased  their  restrictions  on  emigratio 
and  family  reunification.  Some  huma 
rights  activists  in  Poland  and  Romani 
have  been  released  from  prison.  An 
live  television  programs  in  Hungar 
have  allowed  prominent  Westerners  t 
voice  their  views  on  political  issues 

Problems 

Despite  these  many  improvement 
and  others  like  them,  the  fact  remain 
that  the  distance  covered  is  dwarfed  b 
the  distance  that  remains  to  be  trav 
eled.  I  could  recount  in  detail  the  ret 
rograde  human  rights  developments  c 
the  past  year,  as  well  as  the  horrendou 
human  rights  violations  that  persis 
across  the  globe — in  many  of  the  coun 
tries  I  have  just  mentioned  as  well  ai 
elsewhere. 

•  Suffice  it  to  say  that  in  all  quarter 
of  the  world,  too  many  people  are  sti 
subject  to  torture  and  are  suffering  i 
squalid  prisons,  uncharged  and  untried 

•  Too  many  people  are  hungry,  hav 
inadequate  shelter,  and  lack  medicc 
care  and  educational  opportunity. 

•  Too  many  people  are  living  unde 
martial  law  or  are  otherwise  barre 
from  political  participation. 

•  Too  many  are  denied  the  right  t 
emigrate  or  even  to  travel  freely  withi 
their  own  country. 

These  problems  are  the  challenges  c 
the  future.  They  will  not  be  solved  eas 
ily.  But  our  experience  with  I  year  c 
human  rights  diplomacy  convinces  u 
that  while  the  journey  is  long  it  is  nc 
impossible. 

Of  course  none  of  us  can  know  fo 
sure  where  the  progress  of  huma 
rights  may  lead.  But  every  so  oftei 
during  the  past  year,  as  I  have  strug 
gled  to  understand  the  deep  meaning  o 
human  rights,  I  have  felt  a  fleeting  in 
timation  of  what  untold  spiritual  an( 
material  riches  may  lie  ahead — perhap' 
centuries  ahead — in  a  world  of  true 
universal  human  freedom.  Justic< 
Holmes  perhaps  had  a  simila 
feeling — and  certainly  expressed  i 
much  better  than  I  ever  could — whet 
he  said: 

I  think  it  not  improbable  that  man.  like  the 
grub  that  prepares  a  chamber  for  the  wingec 
thing  it  never  has  seen  but  is  to  be — that  mar 
may  have  cosmic  destinies  that  he  does  not  un- 
derstand. And  so  beyond  the  vision  of  battling 
races  and  an  impoverished  earth  I  catch  a  dream- 
ing glimpse  of  peace. 

I  think  that  in  the  last  analysis  the 


March  1978 


33 


cause  of  human  rights  has  power  and 
will  succeed  because,  no  matter  what 
the  obstacle,  it  tenaciously  allows  the 
wiMld's  people  to  ""catch  a  dreaming 
glimpse  of  peace."  D 


iililress  before  the  American  Bar  Associalion  in 
\\w  Orleans  on  Feb.  IS.  1978:  Mr.  Christ- 
,'l'licr  is  Depiiiy  Secrelary  of  Stare. 


'  For  text  of  address,  see  Bulletin  of  Aug.  29. 
1977.  p.  269. 

-  For  full  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Feb.  14. 
1977,  p.  121. 

'  For  an  outline  of  the  Conference  on  Security 
and  Cooperation  in  Europe  (CSCE)  Final  Act. 
see  Bulletin  of  Sept.  26.  1977.  p.  405;  for  full 
text  of  the  CSCE  Final  Act,  see  Bulletin  of 
Sept.   1.  1975.  p.  323. 


indofhUtffse  Refugees 


hy  Patricia  M.  Derian 

1  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  ap- 
pear before  the  committee  today  to 
support  the  Department's  recommenda- 
tion for  the  parole  into  the  United 
States  of  an  additional  7,000  In- 
dochinese  refugees  who  have  escaped 
Uom  their  homeland  by  boat.  When  the 
Department  testified  in  August  in  sup- 
port of  a  parole  for  15,000  Indochinese 
refugees.'  we  had  hoped  that  number 
uould  suffice  until  consultations  could 
he  held  and  agreement  reached  with  the 
Congress  on  a  long-term  plan  for  deal- 
ing with  the  problem  of  Indochinese 
refugees. 

Unfortunately,  the  rate  of  escape  of 
refugees — those  fleeing  by  land  and  by 
small  craft — was  rising  dramatically  in 
August  even  as  we  were  consulting  on 
that  parole.  We  cited  a  rate  of  escape 
of  500  per  month  by  sea  and  1 ,200  per 
month  by  land.  In  the  August- 
December  period,  escapes  ranged  from 
I  ,(X)0  to  1 ,500  per  month  by  sea  and 
about  3,000  per  month  by  land. 

This  sharp  increase  has  had  an  ex- 
tremely negative  effect  on  the  attitudes 
of  countries  in  the  region,  especially 
that  of  Thailand.  With  a  present  camp 
population  of  95,000  Indochinese  refu- 
gees, a  substantial  additional  number  in- 
terspersed in  the  population  and  a  steady 
flow  across  the  Mekong  from  Laos,  the 
attitude  of  the  Thai  Government  has  be- 
come increasingly  negative. 

While  the  government  has  not  ac- 
tually returned  refugees  forcibly,  they 
have  instituted  a  separate  camp  system 
for  refugees  arriving  after  Novem- 
ber 15,  1977.  These  refugees  are  not 
placed  under  the  care  of  the  U.N.  High 
Commissioner  for  Refugees  (UNHCR). 
and  the  Thai  Government  has  an- 
nounced plans  for  the  screening  of 
j  these  refugees  to  determine  whether 
j  they  are  political  or  economic  refugees. 
While  it  is  not  clear  that  those 
categorized  as  economic  refugees 
would  be  forcibly  repatriated,  the  new 
system   is  indicative  of  Thai  concern 


and  of  the  precarious  position  of  the 
post-November  15  refugees. 

For  our  part,  we  believe  it  would  be 
extremely  difficult  to  separate  political 
and  economic  refugees  from  a  flow  of 
refugees  fleeing  a  country  in  political 
turmoil  as  the  new  Communist  gov- 
ernment reorders  the  society  in  its  im- 
age. Further,  regardless  of  the  motive 
for  escape,  the  forcible  return  of  such 
refugees  would  surely  subject  them  to 
persecution. 

The  Thai  reaction  to  the  increased 
flow  of  boat  refugees  was  even 
sharper.  When  we  testified  in  August, 
we  felt  we  had  adequate  numbers  to 
cover  all  refugees  stranded  on  the 
beaches  of  Southeast  Asia  and  that  the 
plans  of  other  countries  to  accept  some 
of  these  refugees  would  provide  a 
breathing  spell  during  which  consulta- 
tions with  the  Congress  on  the  long 
term  could  take  place.  When  the  rate  of 
escape  by  boat  rose  to  1,500  per 
month,  however,  this  breathing  spell 
was  lost  and  while  the  boat  refugee 
population  has  dropped  some,  it  re- 
mains relatively  high. 

In  November  the  Thai  began  to  hold 
larger  refugee  boats  off  shore  and  by 
the  end  of  that  month  had  forced  boats 
carrying  a  total  of  255  refugees  back  to 
sea.  Other  boats  with  additional  refu- 
gees were  also  turned  back,  but  when 
the  boats  proved  unseaworthy  the  refu- 
gees were  let  ashore.  The  Malaysian 
Government,  with  a  large  and  growing 
caseload  of  about  3,000  boat  refugees 
also  began  to  stiffen  its  attitude,  it  be- 
came apparent  that  an  interim  parole 
would  be  needed  while  a  long-term  ap- 
proach to  the  problem  is  being  worked 
out  with  the  Congress. 

Although  we  have  also  identified  ad- 
ditional refugees  who  have  escaped  by 
land  who  we  believe  would  have  been 
eligible  under  previous  programs,  we 
are  limiting  this  parole  proposal  to  ref- 
ugees escaping  by  boat.  This  is  because 
of  the  desperate  situation  in  which  the 
boat  refugees  find  themselves  and  the 
interim  nature  of  the  parole.  There  are 


currently  about  5,000  boat  refugees  in 
Southeast  Asia  without  resettlement  of- 
fers. The  escape  rate  is  uncertain — with 
worsening  weather  in  the  South  China 
Sea,  it  has  dropped  off  in  the  last  month 
to  about  1,000.  In  light  of  the  plans  of 
other  countries,  we  expect  that  a  parole 
of  7,000  boat  refugees  will  give  us  a 
period  of  a  few  months  during  which 
consultations  with  the  Congress  can  be 
carried  out  on  a  long-range  program. 

International  Participation 

I  know  that  you  will  be  interested  to 
know  how  we  have  fared  in  our  efforts 
to  increase  international  participation 
in  the  Indochinese  refugee  problem 
since  we  testified  before  this  committee 
in  August.  We  have  not  been  idle  and, 
in  fact,  we  have  had  some  success.  De- 
partment officials  visited  Ottawa  and 
Paris  to  discuss  this  problem  with 
officials  there.  Our  embassies  have 
made  bilateral  approaches  to  a  number 
of  other  countries  of  traditional 
resettlement. 

•  The  French  program  continues  as  a 
major  factor  in  meeting  this  problem, 
accounting  for  about  1,000  refugees 
per  month — most  from  the  inland 
camps  holding  refugees  from  Laos  and 
Cambodia  but  also  increasing  numbers 
of  boat  refugees. 

•  The  Canadian  Government  has  re- 
newed its  commitment  to  the  In- 
dochinese refugees  with  plans  to  accept 
50  families  a  month  in  addition  to  their 
existing  program  for  up  to  2,000  In- 
dochinese refugees. 

•  The  Australians  have  taken  about 
2,600  boat  refugees  in  the  past  5 
months  and  plan  to  continue  taking 
substantial  numbers. 

•  We  have  also  made  efforts  in  in- 
ternational forums. 

The  UNHCR  in  late  September  is- 
sued a  formal  appeal  through  the 
Inter-Governmental  Maritime  Consulta- 
tive Organization  to  international  mer- 
chant ships  to  pick  up  refugees  in  dis- 
tress at  sea.  In  October  the  UNHCR 
executive  committee  adopted  unani- 
mously, at  our  initiative,  a  recommenda- 
tion calling  on  the  High  Commissioner 
to  renew  and  continue  to  strengthen  his 
efforts  to  obtain  resettlement  offers  for 
the  Indochinese  refugees. 

A  similar  U.S.  initiative  at  the 
November  meeting  of  the  33-member 
council  of  the  Inter-Governmental 
Committee  for  European  Migration 
(ICEM)  in  Geneva  resulted  in  a  unani- 
mous resolution  by  the  delegates  of 
ICEM's  governing  body  to  promote  the 
cause  of  assistance  to  Indochinese  ref- 
ugees. We  have  also  taken  this  matter 
up  with  NATO  members  during  the  re- 


34 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


cent  council  meeting,  urging  our  allies 
to  increase  their  contribution  to  the  so- 
lution of  this  problem. 

On  January  31,  a  regional  meeting  in 
Kuala  Lumpur  has  been  called  by 
UNHCR  representative  Sampatkumar, 
inviting  representatives  of  13  nations 
involved  in  this  problem.  We  are  hop- 
ing that  this  meeting  will  not  only 
prove  useful  for  coordination  purposes 
but  also  in  stimulating  new  resettle- 
ment opportunities. 

As  you  know  a  new  High  Commis- 
sioner for  Refugees,  Mr.  Poul  Hartiing. 
has  just  been  elected.  On  my  return 
from  visiting  the  refugee  camps  in 
Thailand  last  week,  I  called  on  the 
High  Commissioner  in  Geneva  to  urge 
on  him  the  seriousness  with  which  we 
regard  the  charge  of  the  executive 
committee  to  the  High  Commissioner 
to  actively  support  the  resettlement  of 
Indochinese  refugees.  We  will  continue 
to  discuss  with  the  High  Commissioner 
ways  of  increasing  international  par- 
ticipation in  meeting  this  problem  both 
with  financial  assistance  and  resettle- 
ment opportunities.  We  remain  open  to 
the  possibility  of  an  international  con- 
ference on  Indochinese  refugees  but  we 
continue  to  believe  that  the  initiative 
for  such  a  conference  should  come 
from  the  High  Commissioner. 

Finally,  we  have  been  very  active 
both  bilaterally  and  through  interna- 
tional organizations  to  urge  countries 
of  first  asylum  to  allow  these  unfortu- 
nates to  have  temporary  asylum.  This 
has  always  been  difficult,  but  we  have 
had.  for  the  most  part,  at  least  a  tenu- 
ous and  fragile  success  in  this  respect. 
We  must  remember  always,  however, 
that  these  countries  will  only  accept 
boat  refugees  for  so  long  as  they  are 
certain  that  their  stay  is  temporary  and 
this,  in  turn,  hinges  on  the  adequacy  of 
permanent  resettlement  offers. 

In  this  connection.  Deputy  Secretary 
[Warren]  Christopher  discussed  with 
Prime  Minister  Lee  [Kuan  Yew  of  Sin- 
gapore] the  possibility  of  a  temporary 
asylum  center  for  Indochinese  refugees 
in  Singapore.  He  agreed  to  such  a  cen- 
ter under  UNHCR  auspices,  but,  as  I 
found  in  my  discussions  in  Singapore, 
he  requires  that  the  UNHCR  have  in 
hand  adequate  advance  guarantees  from 
countries  of  permanent  resettlement  to 
assure  that  the  refugees'  stay  is  tem- 
porary. It  has  not  yet  been  possible  to 
work  this  out,  but  we  are  hopeful  that  it 
will  be  since  such  a  center  could  have  a 
major  effect  on  the  decisions  of  ship- 
masters to  assist  refugees  in  distress  at 
sea.  We  continue  to  get  reports  of  ships 
passing  by  such  refugees,  no  doubt  to  a 
considerable  degree  because  their  next 
port-of-call  is  Singapore  where  such 
refugees  cannot  presently  be  landed. 


Hies     Long-Term  Policy 


While  the  present  hearing  concerns 
the  proposal  to  parole  7,000  In- 
dochinese boat  refugees  on  an  interim 
emergency  basis,  it  is  difficult  to  dis- 
cuss this  problem  without  alluding  to 
its  longer  range  aspects.  If  you  would 
permit,  therefore,  I  would  like  to 
sketch  briefly  our  preliminary  thoughts 
on  the  longer  term  problem. 

Central  to  the  formation  of  a  long- 
term  policy  is  agreement  on  the  nature 
of  the  commitment  which  we  wish  to 
make.  In  this  respect,  the  Interagency 
Task  Force  recommended  last  fall  that 
such  a  commitment  must  be  expressed 
in  terms  of  classes  or  types  of  refugees 
rather  than  numbers.  As  we  have  seen, 
escape  rates  rise  and  tall.  This  is,  in 
fact,  generally  true  and  is  not  unique  to 
the  Indochinese  refugee  program. 
While  for  planning  purposes  we  must 
make  forecasts,  these  are  largely  unre- 
liable. Therefore,  we  have  identified 
two  classes  of  refugees  which  we  and 
the  Congress  have  agreed  in  the  past 
should  receive  assistance  from  the 
United  States. 

The  first  of  these  consists  of  refugees 
who  have  escaped  by  boat  and  for 
whom  no  other  valid  resettlement  offer 
exists.  We  believe  that  other  countries 
operating  resettlement  programs  will 
continue  to  make  their  contribution  in 
cooperation  with  us.  Indeed,  we  be- 
lieve continued  resettlement  by  the 
United  States  will  encourage  a  high 
rate  of  third-country  offers.  The 
UNHCR  will  have  to  be  called  upon  to 
help  assure  that  full  coordination  of  na- 
tional programs  is  achieved  in  order 
that  third-country  offers  receive 
maximum  utilization.  Already,  we 
have  enforced  the  rule  that  refugees  of- 
fered resettlement  elsewhere  are  auto- 
matically ineligible  to  come  to  the 
United  States  unless  they  have  close 
relatives  here. 

Bui,  in  the  final  analysis,  we  have  in 
recent  programs,  dealing  with  refugees 
escaping  by  boat,  felt  that  we  must  take 
those,  not  ineligible  under  the  Immi- 
gration and  Nationality  Act,  who  are 
not  offered  resettlement  opportunities 
elsewhere.  As  we  said  in  August,  when 
testifying  on  the  earlier  parole  request 
for  7,000  boat  people  of  the  15,000  to- 
tal, we  did  not  believe  restrictive 
criteria  should  be  applied.  We  do  not 
recommend  it  in  the  current  proposal 
for  7,000  additional  boat  refugees  and 
do  not  believe  they  should  be  applied 
in  the  future. 

The  second  group  of  refugees  whom 
we  have  helped  in  every  program  to 
date  are  those  selected  refugees,  escap- 
ing by  land,  who  have  close  relatives  in 
the  United  States  or  who  have  a  demon- 


•y 

i 


strated  past  association  with  the  United 
States  for  which  they  were  disadvan- 
taged in  their  homelands  under  the  new 
governments.  This  group  would  be 
drawn  almost  entirely  from  the  camps 
of  Thailand.  Restrictive  criteria  are 
necessary  and  while  we  believe  they 
should  be  roughly  similar  to  those 
applied  in  past  programs,  we  look  for 
ward  to  discussing  them  further  in  con 
sulfations  in  the  hope  that  they  can  be 
more  clearly  defined. 

In  considering  how  to  deal  with  thi 
problem,  the  Interagency  Task  Force 
noted  that  there  were  two  major  ways 
of  dealing  with  the  entry  into  the 
United  States  of  those  refugees  whom 
we  wished  to  support.  One  would  be 
through  the  exercise  of  the  Attorney  s 
General's  parole  power  either  by  con- 
tinuing the  present  ad  hoc  emergency 
paroles  or  through  advance  consulta- 
tions on  the  expected  flow  over  the  fol- 
lowing year.  The  present  procedures 
are  very  unsatisfactory  because  they 
require  that  an  emergent  refugee  situa- 
tion reach  a  crisis  stage  before  action  is 
taken.  Advance  consultations  could, 
however,  prove  quite  a  satisfactory 
way  of  dealing  with  a  continuing  flow 
of  refugees  toward  whom  the  United  I 
States  feels  a  special  concern. 

The  second  way  of  getting  at  the 
problem,  of  course,  would  be  through: 
legislation.  The  task  force  noted  thi 
possibility  of  special  legislation  to  deal 
with  this  problem  alone.  It  also  notei 
the  possibility  of  freeing  conditional 
entry  numbers  from  hemispheric  lim- 
itations. While  useful,  this  latter 
change  would  only  free  up  an  estimated 
6,000  additional  numbers  annually  and, 
thus,  would  be  inadequate  in  the  face 
of  the  refugee  flow  in  Asia  and  Europe. 
We  have  also  noted  the  possibility  of 
seeking  a  solution  for  this  and  other 
refugee  problems  through  H.R.  7175 
submitted  by  yourself,  Mr.  Chairman 
]Joshua  Eilberg  of  Pennsylvania]. 
While  we  have  some  reservations  re- 
specting certain  points  in  H.R.  7175, 
the  Department  is  working  toward  an 
Administration  position  which  we  hope 
will  make  agreement  on  new  legislation 
easier. 

The  task  force  did  not  attempt  to 
choose  among  these  alternatives.  After 
defining  the  groups  of  refugees  to 
whom  we  have  in  the  past  extended  as- 
sistance, the  task  force  recommended 
that  the  type  of  authority  for  such  as- 
sistance should  be  left  for  decision 
after  consultations  could  be  carried  out 
with  the  Congress.  We,  therefore,  look 
forward  to  pursuing  this  subject  further 
with  the  staff  and  members  of  the 
committee  and  will  be  prepared  to  re- 
turn for  further  testimony  if  further 
hearings  are  called. 


/larch  1978 


35 


teport  on  Parole  Program 

I  would  ;ilso  like  lo  take  this  oppor- 
unit)  to  present  to  you  a  brief  report 
)n  the  implementation  of  the  parole  for 
5.000  Indochinese  refugees  au- 
horized  on  August  II,  1977.  Almost 
ill  7.000  boat  refugees  were  selected 
ind  cleared  by  the  Immigration  and 
"Jaturalization  Service  (INS)  officers 
i\  December.  Of  these,  sponsors  are 
low  available  for  nearly  6.000  of 
vhom  over  3.500  have  actually  arrived 
n  the  United  Slates.  We  expect  all 
loat-case  refugees  will  have  entered 
he  United  States  by  the  end  of  Feb- 
LLtr\ .  In  view  of  the  security  and  other 
cqiiirements  of  the  program  and  the 
act  that  the  refugees  move  directly 
rom  the  camp  in  Asia  to  the  sponsor  in 
he  United  States,  it  takes  some  time  to 
omplete  processing.  The  UNHCR, 
owever.  provides  care  and  mainte- 
ance  for  the  refugees  during  the  wait- 
ng  period  and,  once  the  United  States 
an  guarantee  that  a  specific  number  of 
jfugees  will  be  taken,  the  host  gov- 
rnment  is  reasonably  patient  about  the 
rocessing  time. 

With  respect  to  the  8.000  land-camp 
efugees  authorized  in  August,  a  more 
omplicated  process  must  be  undertak- 
n.  A  complete  screening  of  95.000 
efugees  in  the  Thai  camps  had  to  be 
ompleted  in  order  to  identify  those 
ualified  for  the  8.000  numbers.  Initial 
creening  and  identification  of  those 
vith  some  claim  to  inclusion  in  the 
vnierican  program  was  made  by  volun- 
ir\  agenc>  personnel  under  contract  to 
he  Office  of  Refugee  and  Migration 
affairs.  This  initial  group  was  further 
efined  by  refugee  officers  qualified  in 
he  language  of  refugees  concerned. 

A  last  screening  will  be  done  on  a 
ase-by-case  basis  jointly  by  refugee 
ifficers  and  INS  personnel  prior  to 
inal  interview  and  clearance  by  INS. 
'reliminary  indications  are  that  sub- 
lantially  more  refugees  than  expected 
lave  close  relatives  in  the  United 
itaies  and  that  up  to  6.000  of  the  8.000 
and-camp  refugees  fall  in  this  cate- 
:ory.  Preliminary  findings  also  indicate 
hat  there  will  be  a  substantial  number 
if  qualified  land  refugees  for  whom 
ipace  will  not  be  available  under 
he  present  program,  perhaps  some 
housands. 

The  Immigration  and  Naturalization 

service  should  complete  the  clearance 

)f  all  land-camp  refugees  by  March. 

uid  we  hope  all  will  enter  the  United 

states  by  the  end  of  June.  The  volun- 

ary   agencies  assure  us  that  sponsor- 

lihips  continue  to  be  available  and  that 

'hey  feel  this  will  also  be  true  for  the 

!  oreseeable  future. 

Department   of  State  expenses  for 


MIDDLE  EA!i»T:  \nsU  of 
Egyptian  President  Sadat 


President  Anwar  al-Sadcit  of  Egypt 
made  an  official  visit  to  Washington 
February  3-8  to  meet  with  President 
Carter  and  other  government  officials. 
Following  are  the  texts  of  two  state- 
ments issued  h\  the  White  House. ' 


FEB.  5' 

President  Sadat  and  President  Carter 
have  completed  2  days  of  extensive 
talks  at  Camp  David  in  which  they  con- 
sidered carefully  the  further  steps 
necessary  to  achieve  a  comprehensive 
peace  settlement  in  the  Middle  East. 


this  program  will  come  from  refugee 
emergency  funds.  As  in  the  case  of  the 
parole  presently  being  implemented. 
costs  to  the  Department  of  State  will 
amount  to  approximately  $900  per 
capita,  made  up  of  transportation  costs 
incurred  by  the  Inter-Governmental 
Committee  for  European  Migration, 
costs  of  screening  and  processing 
abroad,  and  grants  of  $300  per  capita 
to  the  voluntary  agencies  for  resettle- 
ment services.  We  estimate  the  total 
cost  to  the  Department  of  State  at  $6.3 
million. 

In  closing,  I  wish  to  express  our  de- 
sire to  move  rapidly  forward  with  the 
Congress  toward  a  more  orderly  long- 
range  method  of  dealing  with  this  prob- 
lem. This  would  certainly  be  more  de- 
sirable for  planning  purposes.  It  would 
benefit  the  refugees.  Above  all.  it 
would  remove  an  important  national 
concern  from  its  present  ad  hoc  treat- 
ment and  place  it  on  a  solid  base  of 
mutual  agreement  as  to  our  desired 
goals  and  means  in  helping  these  refu- 
gees, n 


Slarement  before  the  Suhcommillcc  on  liniiiif;ra- 
fion.  Citizenship  and  liilcnuilional  Law  of  the 
House  Committee  on  International  Relations  on 
Jan.  24,  1978.  The  complete  transcript  of  the 
Itearings  will  he  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents.  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  Ms.  Derian  is  Assist- 
ant Secretary  for  Human  Rights  and  Humanitar- 
ian .Affairs 

'  For  text  of  statement  by  Assistant  Secretary 
for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  Richard  C. 
Holbrooke  on  August  4.  1977.  see  Bulletin  of 
September  26.  p.  411. 


President  Carter  reaffirmed  his  con- 
viction that  the  events  set  in  train  by 
President  Sadat's  initiative  in  going  to 
Jerusalem  have,  after  decades  of  con- 
flict, opened  the  prospect  of  real  peace 
in  the  Middle  East. 

The  two  Presidents  are  agreed  that 
no  obstacles  must  be  allowed  to  pre- 
vent the  achievement  of  a  just  and  last- 
ing settlement.  They  believe  that  an 
important  beginning  has  been  made  in 
breaking  through  the  psychological 
barriers  to  peace  between  Arabs  and  Is- 
raelis and  that  unremitting  efforts  must 
continue  to  overcome  the  remaining 
legacy  of  mistrust  resulting  from  30 
years  of  conflict. 

Recognizing  the  overriding  impor- 
tance of  peace  to  the  future  of  the  Mid- 
dle East  and  its  peoples,  they  stressed 
the  importance  of  maintaining  the 
negotiating  momentum  generated  over 
the  past  few  months.  Both  Presidents 
recognized  that  their  efforts  in  the 
cause  of  peace  will  be  of  fundamental 
importance  not  only  for  the  immediate 
future  but  for  generations  to  come. 
Their  overriding  conviction  is  that  a 
peaceful  solution  must  be  found  to 
spare  the  people  of  the  Middle  East  the 
agony  of  another  war. 

As  a  result  of  their  extensive  talks. 
President  Carter  feels  that  he  has  a  bet- 
ter understanding  of  President  Sadat's 
concerns  about  the  need  for  the  peace 
process  to  move  forward  without  delay. 

He  also  took  the  occasion  of  these 
talks  to  explain  in  detail  to  President 
Sadat  how  the  United  States  envisages 
its  role  and  responsibilities  in  the  peace 
process  as  a  friend  of  both  sides  with  a 
strong  interest  in  peace  and  stability  in 
the  region.  President  Carter  reaffirmed 
the  commitment  of  the  United  States  to 
play  an  active  role  in  the  search  for 
peace  and  to  redouble  its  efforts  to  in- 
sure that  progress  is  made  in  the  weeks 
ahead. 

In  the  course  of  their  long  discus- 
sions. President  Sadat  and  President 
Carter  reviewed  the  reasons  for  the 
slow  pace  of  progress  and  the  factors 
which  have  hampered  the  achievement 
of  substantive  agreement.  They  found 
themselves  in  accord  that  efforts  should 
remain  focused  on  creating  conditions 
which  are  conducive  to  the  achieve- 
ment of  tangible  results  and  the 
broadening  of  negotiations,  looking 
toward  the  realization  of  a  comprehen- 
sive settlement.  To  this  end,  the  two 
Presidents  examined  ways   in   which 


36 


these  objectives  can  be  accomplished. 
They  will  further  refine  their  views  in 
the  exchanges  between  their  representa- 
tives over  the  next  few  days,  as  well  as 
in  their  final  meeting  on  Wednesday. 

As  part  of  their  effort  to  continue  the 
peace  process,  the  two  Presidents 
agreed  that  Assistant  Secretary  [for 
Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs 
Alfred  L.l  Atherton  should  return  to 
the  area  in  the  near  future  to  continue 
the  work  that  has  been  underway,  look- 
ing toward  completion  of  a  declaration 
of  principles.  They  view  such  a  decla- 
ration as  an  important  step  in  establish- 
ing the  framework  for  comprehensive 
peace  in  the  area. 

The  two  Presidents  also  discussed 
other  issues  of  mutual  concern  to  Egypt 
and  the  United  States,  such  as  the 
dangerous  situation  in  the  Horn  of  Af- 
rica. 

Both  President  Sadat  and  President 
Carter  expressed  their  satisfaction  that 
the  Camp  David  meetings  had  provided 
the  opportunity  for  such  thorough  and 
fruitful  examination  of  all  aspects  of 
the  Middle  East  problem  and  had 
created  a  basis  of  mutual  understanding 
and  agreement  for  the  continuing  coop- 
eration of  their  two  governments  in  the 
search  for  peace. 

FEB.  8 

President  Carter  and  President  Sadat 
had  a  final  meeting  this  afternoon. 


President  Carter  and  President  Sadat 
continued  their  talks  today  in  the  same 
spirit  of  friendship  and  openness  which 
characterized  their  stay  together  at 
Camp  David  over  the  weekend.  The 
hours  they  have  spent  together,  both 
alone  and  with  their  advisers,  have 
provided  the  essential  opportunity  both 
sought  for  a  relaxed  and  thorough  re- 
view of  the  Middle  East  situation.  They 
have  concluded  that  the  mutual  trust 
and  understanding  between  them, 
which  were  reinforced  by  these  meet- 
ings, will  be  extremely  useful  in  help- 
ing to  maintain  momentum  toward  their 
common  goal  of  peace  in  the  Middle 
East. 

During  the  course  of  their  meetings 
over  the  past  5  days.  President  Carter 
reaffirmed  to  President  Sadat  the  broad 
principles  which  underlie  United  States 
participation  in  the  search  for  that 
peace: 

•  The  United  States  will  remain 
faithful  to  its  historic  commitments  to 
the  security  of  Israel  and  to  the  right  of 
every  state  in  the  area  to  live  in  peace 
within  secure  and  recognized  bound- 
aries. 

•  Helping  the  parties  achieve  a 
negotiated  comprehensive  settlement  of 
the  Middle  East  conflict  remains  of 
highest  importance  in  American  policy, 
and  President  Carter  will  spare  no  ef- 
fort in  seeking  ways  to  move  the  peace 
process  forward. 

•  A  peace   settlement  must   go  be- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

yond  the  mere  termination  of  belliger- 
ency. It  must  provide  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  normal  peaceful  relations 
between  Israel  and  its  neighbors. 

•  The  peace  settlement  should  be 
comprehensive  and  should  be  embodied 
in  peace  treaties  between  Israel  and 
each  of  its  neighbors. 

•  The  settlement  must  be  based  on 
all  the  principles  of  Security  Council 
Resolution  242,  including  withdrawal 
of  Israeli  Armed  Forces  from  territories 
occupied  in  1967  and  the  right  of  every 
state  in  the  area  to  live  in  peace  within 
secure  and  recognized  boundaries 
Resolution  242  is  applicable  to  all 
fronts  of  the  conflict. 

•  There  can  be  no  just  and  lasting 
peace  without  resolution  of  the 
Palestinian  problem. 

The  President  reaffirmed  what  he 
said  at  his  meeting  with  President  Sadat 
in  Aswan  January  4;  There  must  be  a 
resolution  of  the  Palestinian  problem  in 
all  its  aspects;  it  must  recognize  the 
legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian 
people  and  enable  the  Palestinians  to 
participate  in  the  determination  of  their 
own  future. 

President  Carter  also  reaffirmed  the 
longstanding  U.S.  view  that  Israeli  set 
tiements  in  occupied  territory  are  con- 
trary to  international  law  and  an  obsta 
cle  to  peace  and  that  further  settlement 
activity  would  be  inconsistent  with  the 
effort  to  reach  a  peace  settlement. 

President   Sadat   affirmed   that   the 


NOMINATIONS  OF 
ATHERTON  AND  SAUNDERS 

The  President  Intends  to  nominate 
Alfred  L.  Atherton,  Jr.,  to  be  Ambas- 
sador at  Large  with  special  responsibility 
for  Middle  East  peace  negotiations.  Mr. 
Atherton  is  currently  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs. 
To  succeed  Mr.  Atherton  in  thai  position, 
the  President  intends  to  nominate  Harold 
H.  Saunders,  presently  Director  of  the 
Bureau  of  Intelligence  and  Research. 

Mr  Atherton  was  born  in  Pittsburgh  in 
1921.  He  received  B.S.  and  MA.  de- 
grees in  history  from  Harvard  University. 
During  World  War  II  he  served  as  an  ar- 
tillery officer  with  the  U.S.  Army  in 
Europe. 

Mr.  Atherton  was  appointed  a  Foreign 
Service  Officer  in  1947  and  has  served  In 
Stuttgart,  Bonn.  Damascus.  Aleppo,  and 
Calcutta.  He  has  also  served  as  Officer  in 
Charge  of  Cyprus  Affairs;  Country  Direc- 
tor for  Lebanon,  Jordan,  the  Syrian  Arab 
Republic,  and  Iraq;  and  Country  Director 
for  Israel  and  Arab-Israel  Affairs.  In  1961 
he   was  detailed   to   the    University   of 


Alfred  L.  ■■Riiy' 
Alherlon,  Jr. 


Harold  H. 
Saunders 


California  for  advanced  economic 
studies.  He  has  been  Assistant  Secretary 
since  1974. 

Mr.  Saunders  was  born  in  Philadelphia 
in  19.S0.  He  received  an  A.B.  degree 
from  Princeton  and  a  Ph.D.  from  Yale. 
He  served  in  the  U.S.  Air  Force  for  2 
years  and  was  detailed  to  the  Central  In- 
telligence Agency.  He  remained  with  that 
Agency  for  2  years  following  his  release 
from  active  duty, 

Mr.  Saunders  joined  the  National  Secu- 
rity Council  Staff  In  1961 .  working  on  the 
Middle  Eastern.  South  Asian,  and  North 
African  area  and  became  senior  staff 
member  for  the  area  in  1967.  In  1974  he 
became  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs, 
concentrating  on  the  Middle  East,  He  has 
been  Director  of  the  Bureau  of  Intelli- 
gence and  Research  since  December 
197.S.  He  participated  in  the  Arab-lsr.ieli 
negotiations  of  1973-75  and  has  accom- 
panied Secretaries  Vance  and  Kissinger 
on  most  of  their  Middle  East  trips. 


Press  release  82  of  Feb.  20.  1978. 


larch  1978 


37 


or  remains  open  to  negotiations  and 
at  Egypt  will  continue  to  do  its  part 
assure  continuity  in  this  negotiating 
ocess  in  an  atmosphere  conducive  to 
ngible  progress. 

The  two  Presidents  also  spent  some 
ne  reviewing  the  current  situation  in 
e  Horn  of  Africa  and  agreed  that 
intinuing  conflict  and  instability  there 
.e  of  concern  to  them  both.  President 
(trter  and  President  Sadat  have  agreed 
1  consult  with  other  countries  on  this 
latter. 

Finally,  the  two  Presidents  com- 
litted  themselves  to  remain  in  close 
jrsonal  touch  through  direct  corre- 
londence  and  diplomatic  channels.  In 
lis  way  they  are  determined  to  insure 
mtinuing,  full  understanding  between 
i;m  both  in  the  peace  process  and  in 
1  ateral  relations  between  Egypt  and 
t;  United  States.  D 


Texts  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
I  Documents  of  Feb.  13.  1978.  For  an  ex- 
(inge  of  remarks  between  President  Carter  and 
I  sident  Sadat  at  the  arrival  ceremony  on  the 
i  ilh  Lawn  of  the  White  House  on  Feb.  3,  see 
'  ekly  Compilation  of  Feb.  6,  p.  274;  for  Pres- 
i  nt  Carter's  remarks  on  returning  from  his 
tetings  with  President  Sadat  at  Camp  David, 
I  .  on  Feb.  5  and  their  exchange  of  remarks 
1  in  the  latter's  departure  on  Feb.  8,  see 
'  ekly  Compilation  of  Feb.  13,  pp.  279  and 
.  I,  respectively. 

List  of  U.S.  and  Egyptian  participants  in  the 
I  ;tings  omitted. 


Middle  East 
Aircraft  Sales 


i  Secretary  Vance 

Consistent  with  our  policy  that  arms 

1  nsfers  will  be  used  to  promote  our 

itional  security  and  that  of  our  close 

lends.  I  have  recommended  to  the 

lesident  and  he  has  approved  sales  of 

(rtain  aircraft  to  Israel,   Egypt,  and 

udi  Arabia,  subject  to  the  usual  con- 

issional  review.   Next  week  we  will 

gin  the  official  process  of  informing 

d  consulting  with  the  Congress.  The 

■mal  notifications  will  not  be  sub- 

tted  until  after  the  Easter  recess  in 

ier  to  give  Congress  an  opportunity 

review  fully  the  proposed  sales. 

These  sales  will  be  undertaken  over  a 

riod  of  several  years.    Deciding  to 

ike  the  sales  was  a  very  complex  de- 

lion,  and  I  want  to  share  our  views 

this   matter   with   the   American 

lople. 

Any  new  aircraft  sales  to  this  region 
ist  be  seen  in  the  context  of  both  the 


negotiating  process  and  our  objective 
of  a  peace  settlement.  We  have  consid- 
ered carefully  this  aspect  of  the  matter 
and  concluded  that  our  interests  in 
Middle  East  peace  and  security  will  be 
best  served  if  we  go  forward  with  some 
part  of  the  aircraft  sales  requested  by 
these  countries. 

Our  commitment  to  Israel's  security 
has  been  and  remains  firm.  Israel  must 
have  full  confidence  in  its  ability  to  as- 
sure its  own  defense.  In  particular,  this 
means  Israel  must  be  able  to  plan  for 
the  continued  modernization  of  its  air 
force.  The  President's  decision  gives 
particular  emphasis  to  these  points. 

Egypt,  too,  must  have  reasonable  as- 
surance of  its  ability  to  defend  itself  if 
it  is  to  continue  the  peace  negotiations 
with  confidence.  When  President  Sadat 
made  his  decision  several  years  ago  to 
follow  a  course  in  foreign  affairs  that 
involved  a  change  in  his  country's  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union,  he  lost  his 
major  source  of  military  equipment. 
This  was  particularly  the  case  in  Egyp- 
tian defensive  aircraft  capability.  We 
believe  we  have  a  basic  interest  in  re- 
sponding to  Egypt's  legitimate  needs. 

Saudi  Arabia  is  of  immense  impor- 
tance in  promoting  a  course  of  modera- 
tion in  the  Middle  East — with  respect 
to  peacemaking  and  other  regional 
initiatives — and  more  broadly  in  world 
affairs,  as  in  petroleum  and  financial 
policy.  The  Saudi  Government  has  a 
legitimate  requirement  to  modernize  its 
very  limited  air  defenses.  For  several 
years,  we  and  they  have  recognized  the 
need  to  modernize  their  air  force  with 
an  advanced  interceptor.  They  have 
asked  for  a  limited  number  of  F-15's, 
the  first  of  which  would  not  be  deliv- 
ered for  several  years.  We  believe  their 
request  is  reasonable  and  in  our  interest 
to  fulfill. 

We  have  concluded,  therefore,  that 
the  sales  of  these  aircraft  to  the  coun- 
tries in  question  will  help  to  meet  their 
legitimate  security  requirements,  will 
not  alter  the  basic  military  balance  in 
the  region,  and  will  be  consistent  with 
the  overriding  objective  of  a  just  and 
lasting  peace. 

Accordingly,  the  Administration 
plans  to  notify  Congress  of  our  intent 
to  make  the  following  sales: 

•  For  Israel,  15  F-15's,  in  addition 
to  the  25  previously  sold,  and  75 
F-16's; 

•  For  Egypt,  50  F-5's;  and 

•  For  Saudi  Arabia,  60  F-15's. 

We  will  be  signing  contracts  for 
these  aircraft  over  the  next  several 
years.  These  sales  will  be  consistent 
with  the  President's  global  arms  trans- 
fer policy  and  will  be  within  the  dollar 
volume  ceiling  that  he  has  established. 


The  details  will  be  reported  to  Con- 
gress when  the  statutory  notifications 
are  provided. 

All  of  these  sales  are  directly  support- 
ive of  our  overall  objectives  in  the 
Middle  East.  Members  of  the  Adminis- 
tration will  be  testifying  before  a 
number  of  congressional  committees  in 
support  of  this  package  so  that  Con- 
gress will  have  full  opportunity  to 
make  its  judgment  during  the  period  of 
its  review.  D 


Announcement  of  Feb.   14.   I^JN  (pre.s.s  release 
75  of  Feb.  14). 


Israeli 
Settletnents 


With  reference  to  the  allegation 
that  the  United  States  did  not  object 
seriously  to  the  latest  Israeli  settle- 
ments, the  chronology  is  as  follows. 

•  On  January  5,  1978,  Prime 
Minister  Begin  and  Foreign  Minister 
Day  an  informed  the  U.S.  Ambassador 
in  Israel  of  Israeli  settlement  plans  in 
the  Sinai  and  the  West  Bank. 

•  On  January  6  the  Administration 
sent  a  strong  reply  to  Prime  Minister 
Begin's  and  Dayan's  January  5  in- 
formation. The  reply  expressed  our 
concern  about  new  settlement  reports, 
particularly  those  of  the  Sinai.  This 
reply  was  in  the  form  of  a  personal 
message  from  the  President  — 
dispatched  from  Air  Force  One. 

•  On  January  9  Prime  Minister 
Begin  informed  the  President  of  his 
government's  decisions  concerning 
Israeli  settlement  activities  in  the 
Sinai  and  the  authorization  of  four 
new  settlements  in  military  sites  on 
the  West  Bank. 

•  On  January  10  the  President  sent 
a  letter  to  Prime  Minister  Begin  re- 
sponding to  his  letter  of  the  9th,  re- 
stating our  concern  about  the  settle- 
ments and  the  effect  they  would  have 
on  the  peace  process. 

•  On  January  23  a  number  of  Gush 
Emunim  settlers  declared  that  a  per- 
manent civilian  settlement  would  be 
erected  at  Shiloh. 

•  On  January  27  the  President  sent 
a  short  message  to  Prime  Minister 
Begin  regarding  the  Shiloh  settlement 
and  restating  the  U.S.  position.  D 


Made  available  to  the  press  by  the   Depart- 
ment of  Stale  in  early  February  1978. 


38 


SCIE]\CE  AND  TECHI\OLOGY: 

Technology  Transfer  Policies 


by  Joseph  S.  Nye,  Jr. 


The  subject  of  technology  transfer 
has  become  increasingly  important  in 
international  economic  affairs  in  recent 
years.  The  U.S.  Government  and  the 
various  elements  of  the  private 
sector — industry  and  labor — are  con- 
cerned about  the  subject.  This  is  cer- 
tainly evident  from  the  interest  in  this 
2-day  meeting.  The  subject  has  also  re- 
ceived much  attention  in  meetings  of 
international  organizations  like  the 
U.N.  Conference  on  Trade  and  De- 
velopment (UNCTAD).  the  U.N.  In- 
dustrial Development  Organization,  the 
U.N.  Commission  on  Transnational 
Corporations,  and  the  Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Develop- 
ment (OECD).  Our  policy  is  currently 
being  reviewed  in  an  interagency  study 
by  the  executive  branch  in  response  to 
a  request  by  the  President.  We  expect 
the  first  part  of  this  review  to  be  com- 
pleted early  next  year. 

Technology  transfer  occurs  through  a 
diverse  set  of  mechanisms  and  in  a  va- 
riety of  situations.  For  example. 
East-West.  North-South,  and  West- 
West  conditions  of  technology  transfer 
are  all  quite  different.  Any  general  de- 
scription of  our  policy  can  only  define 
the  central  trend,  not  describe  each 
situation. 

By  and  large  the  government  takes  a 
neutral  position  in  regard  to  the  largest 
part  of  technology  transfer — that  is. 
virtually  all  except  East- West  transfer 
and  that  involving  military  technology. 
Most  American  technology  is  trans- 
ferred across  international  boundaries 
through  private  trade  and  investment  by 
American  corporations.  Thus  the  fun- 
damental policy  of  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment toward  technology  transfer 
derives  in  the  first  instance  from  its  at- 
titude toward  international  invest- 
ment— that  is,  to  neither  promote  nor 
discourage  inward  and/or  outward  in- 
vestment flows  or  activities. 

The  government  ideally  tries  to 
avoid  measures  which  would  give  spe- 
cial incentives  or  disincentives  to  in- 
vestment flows  and  normally  does  not 
intervene  in  the  activities  of  individual 
companies  regarding  international  in- 
vestment. This  principle  of  neutrality 
flows  from  our  longstanding  commit- 
ment to  a  generally  open  international 
economic  system,  and  to  a  considerable 


extent  it  covers  the  transfer  of  technol- 
ogy. But  the  exceptions  are  sometimes 
as  important  as  the  rule,  and  the  under- 
lying philosophy  is  somewhat  more 
complex. 

The  basic  philosophy  of  an  open  in- 
ternational economic  system  that 
underlies  our  policy  toward  the  largest 
component  of  technology  transfer  as- 
sumes a  positive  sum  game — that  all 
nations  are  better  off  as  a  result  of  the 
transfers  that  occur.  There  is  a  strong 
logic  behind  this  position.  The  logic  is 
strongest  in  relation  to  technology 
flows  among  developed  countries.  But 
a  number  of  problems  arise  in  East- 
West  and  North-South  transfer  of  tech- 
nology. To  understand  these  problems 
we  must  go  beyond  economics  and 
realize  that  technology  is  an  important 


.  .  .  technology  is  not  like  a  pre- 
cious metal  to  be  hoarded.  It  is 
more  like  a  fine  Rhine  wine.  He 
who  hoards  it  too  long  is  left  with 
bottles  of  worthless  vinegar. 


source  of  the  relative  power  of  the 
United  States  in  world  politics.  Many 
aspects  of  power  politics  resemble  a 
zero  sum  game — where  one  nation's 
gain  is  another's  loss. 

The  most  familiar  aspect  of  the  poli- 
tics of  technology  transfer  and  the  most 
frequent  source  of  exceptions  to  the 
general  rule  relate  to  military  security. 
The  strategic  nuclear  balance  depends 
on  mutual  assured  deterrence.  One  rea- 
son we  maintain  a  triad  of  land-,  sea-, 
and  air-based  strategic  nuclear  systems 
is  to  use  redundancy  as  protection 
against  destabilizing  technological 
breakthroughs.  For  the  same  reason, 
we  use  export  licensing  to  inhibit  trans- 
fer of  technology  that  could  signifi- 
cantly contribute  to  Soviet  military 
potential. 

We  also  restrict  the  transfer  of  cer- 
tain aspects  of  nuclear  technology  that 
provide  direct  access  to  weapons- 
usable  material  because  of  the  dangers 
to  our  security  posed  by  the  potential 
proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons.  We 
also  control  the  export  of  conventional 


t 


Department  of  State  Bulletir, 

armaments  to  avoid  introducing  de- 
stabilizing military  technologies  intc 
regional  relationships  that  could  ulti- 
mately affect  our  security.  A  number  ot 
important  initiatives  have  been  taker 
by  the  Carter  Administration  in  relation 
to  those  military-security  exceptions  to 
the  free  transfer  of  technology. 

The  political  aspects  of  technology 
transfer  go  beyond  the  military  signifi- 
cance alone.  For  one  thing,  a  stron 
technological  lead  by  the  United  State; 
contributes  to  our  overall  economi 
strength.  We  are  concerned  to  maintai 
our  overall  technological  strength.  I 
addition,  there  are  many  issues 
world  politics  today  where  militar 
force  is  not  particularly  useful  i 
achieving  our  objectives — for  exampl 
communications  satellites,  ocean  n 
sources,  environmental  cooperatio 
Yet  in  each  of  these  areas,  our  ai 
vanced  technology  provides  us  with 
potential  instrument  for  political  bai 
gaining.  Technological  leadership  cai 
provide  usable  power. 

A  popular  tendency  in  thinking  aboi 
technology  as  a  source  of  power  is  tj 
think  in  simple  terms  of  restricting  : 
export.  But  technology  is  not  like 
precious  metal  to  be  hoarded.   It 
more  like  a  fine  Rhine  wine.  He  wh 
hoards  it  too  long  is  left  with  bottles 
worthless   vinegar.    With   time,   an 
technology    will    spread — as    Britai 
found  out  with  the  textile  technology  ii 
the  18th  century  and  the  United  State! 
discovered  with  nuclear  technology  in 
the  1940's. 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  the  most 
important  aspect  of  technology  transfei 
is  the  sure  knowledge  that  somethin] 
can  be  done.  From  then  on,  diffusion  i.^ 
a  matter  of  time.  Thus  a  sense  of  tim- 
ing is  crucial  to  deriving  power  advan- 
tages from  any  eroding  asset  such  aS' 
technological  leads.  Individual  firms* 
know  this  and  act  accordingly  in  theii* 
product  cycles.  A  critical  policy  ques 
tion  is  whether  the  government  is  capa^ 
ble  of  making  refined  decisions  about 
proper  timing  and  the  positive  use  ol 
technology  transfer  controls. 

Many  doubt  that  our  governmenti 
machinery  —  both  executive  an 
legislative — is  capable  of  such  finel; 
calculated  decisions.  In  the  absence 
an  adequate  process,  they  argue,  thi 
best  government  stance  is  one  of  neu-i 
trality  with  the  burden  of  proof  put 
upon  those  wishing  to  restrict  exports 
In  practice,  this  burden,  particularly  in 
the  ca.se  of  Ea.st-West  trade,  has  tended 
to  be  placed  upon  military  security 
arguments.  Yet  even  in  this  area,  wc 
often  encounter  difficulties  in  making 
carefully  balanced  and  refined 
judgments. 


•irch  1978 


39 


isl-West  Transfer 

0\cr  the  past  5  years,  the  United 

lies   and   the   Soviet   Union  have 

all)  expanded  their  economic  rela- 
enship  in  the  field  of  trade  although 
\    lag  behind  other  Western  exporters 

many  areas.  From  an  economic  point 
,  \iew,  increased  trade  with  the 
IS.S.R.  benefits  the  U.S.  through 
h:her  employment,  an  improved  bal- 
a:e  of  trade,  and  access  to  valuable 

\  materials.  Politically,  it  also  in- 
,.ases  contact  between  our  two 
fjples.  gives  the  U.S.S.R.  an  incen- 
t:e  to  relax  its  traditional  isolation  and 
p  \  a  more  normal  role  in  the  world 
emomy,  and  adds  an  element  of  sta- 

ii\  to  our  political  relations.  In 
L.iperation  with  other  Western  na- 
tns.  we  restrict  export  of  goods  and 
t'  hnological  data  which  would  make  a 
snificant  contribution  to  the  military 
ptential  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  prove 
c  rimental  to  our  security  and  that  of 
i.  ■  .lilies. 

J  S. -Soviet  trade  has  expanded  con- 
-LMably  since  1971.  Two-way  trade 
taled  only  $220  million  in  1971  but 
sod  at  $2.5  billion  in  1976.  Last  year 
t  balance  of  trade  was  strongly  in  our 
f  or;  exports  were  roughly  $2.3  bil- 
In  and  imports  about  $220  million, 
ime  two-thirds  of  our  exports,  how- 
«;r.  consisted  of  agricultural  products 
\  ich  involved  little  transfer  of  tech- 
ilogy.  Moreover,  U.S. -Soviet  trade 
5  1  accounts  for  a  small  percentage  of 
t  al  U.S.  trade.  Our  1976  exports  to 
r  U.S.S.R.  accounted  for  only  2%  of 
ir  total  exports,  and  the  U.S.  share  of 
(iCD  technology  exports  to  the 
IS.S.R.  remains  far  below  the  U.S. 
ure  of  such  exports  to  other  markets. 

In  October  1972  the  United  States 
!;ned  a  trade  agreement  with  the 
IS.S.R.  granting  most-favored-nation 
I  iff  treatment  to  Soviet  goods  in  re- 
In  for  certain  Soviet  commitments:  a 
(claration  of  intent  to  place  large  or- 
irs  for  U.S.  agricultural  and  industrial 
j'Ods,  provision  for  third-country 
tmmercial  arbitration,  and  improved 
l;ilities  for  U.S.  businessmen  in  Mos- 
iw.  This  agreement  required  legisla- 
iin  which  became  public  law  with  the 
issage  of  the  1974  Trade  Act.  But  this 
Igislation  contained  an  amendment 
Mich  linked   Soviet  emigration  prac- 

es  to  the  nature  of  our  trade  relation- 

ip.   This  was  not  acceptable  to  the 

iviet  Union. 

However,  since  1972  the  two  gov- 
jnments  have  entered  into  a  number  of 

onomic   agreements  and  have  ex- 

nded  the  framework  for  their  com- 

ercial  relations.   A  number  of  U.S. 

ivate  companies  have  undertaken  im- 


portant initiatives.  The  U.S. -U.S.S.R. 
Trade  and  Economic  Council  composed 
of  200  U.S.  firms  and  100  Soviet  or- 
ganizations was  formed  in  1973.  It  has 
offices  in  New  York  and  Moscow  to 
expand  U.S. -Soviet  trade.  Twenty-five 
U.S.  firms  have  received  permission  to 
open  offices  in  Moscow  and  at  least  55 
American  firms  have  entered  into 
cooperation  agreements  with  the  Soviet 


The  transfer  of  technology  is 
viewed  by  the  developing  coun- 
tries as  critical  to  achieving 
long-term  economic  growth  and 
development . 


State  Committee  on  Science  and  Tech- 
nology under  our  basic  science  and 
technology  agreement.  Not  all  of  these 
agreements  have,  however,  been 
implemented. 

A  number  of  problems  in  East- West 
technology  transfer  are  under  current 
consideration.  One  problem,  raised  by 
the  Bucy  report  submitted  to  the  De- 
fense Department  last  year,  concerns 
control  of  key  technologies.  How  to 
select  the  really  critical  technologies  is 
a  complex  issue.  A  closely  related 
problem  is  how  to  maintain  cohesion 
among  the  Western  members  of  the 
Coordinating  Committee  for  East- West 
Trade  Policy  (COCOM)  when  there  is  a 
feeling  among  COCOM  members  that 
the  COCOM  list  and  procedures  are 
unduly  restrictive  and  ill-suited  to  the 
military  security  problem  posed  by  the 
Soviet  Union. 

Yet  another  problem  is  how  to  refine 
internal  decisionmaking  procedures  so 
that  a  broader  conception  of  national 
security  is  used  to  make  decisions. 
Under  current  procedures,  precise  ar- 
guments that  a  technology  transfer  has 
military  significance,  no  matter  how 
slight,  tend  to  prevail  easily  over  im- 
portant but  fuzzy  arguments  based 
upon  broader  national  security  consid- 
erations. These  issues  and  the  impor- 
tant tradeoffs  they  involve  are  currently 
under  discussion  and  review  as  part  of 
the  interagency  study  I  mentioned 
earlier. 

North-South  Transfer 

The  other  politically  difficult  area  in 
the  transfer  of  technology  is  the 
North-South  area.  The  transfer  of  tech- 
nology is  viewed  by  the  developing 
countries  as  critical  to  achieving  long- 
term  economic  growth  and  develop- 


ment. They  would  like  to  see  some 
basic  changes  in  the  present  process  of 
technology  transfer  including  a  large 
measure  of  governmental  control  over 
the  terms  and  conditions  of  commercial 
technology  transfer  from  the  developed 
countries.  They  claim  that  their  right  of 
access  to  technology  which  they  regard 
as  the  '"common  heritage  of  mankind"" 
has  been  limited  and  restricted  unrea- 
sonably and  that  this  is  the  main  reason 
for  their  being  underdeveloped. 

Some  of  these  countries  have  estab- 
lished measures  under  their  national 
laws  to  prohibit  technology  suppliers 
from  imposing  any  restrictions  on  re- 
cipients for  the  use  of  this  technology. 
Through  UNCTAD  they  have  pressed 
for  a  mandatory  code  of  conduct  cover- 
ing all  forms  of  technology  transfer  to 
regulate  the  conditions  under  which 
owners  of  patents  and  other  technology 
can  license  and  sell  their  technology 
abroad. 

On  the  other  hand,  U.S.  labor  unions 
have  raised  the  issue  of  the  adverse  ef- 
fects of  foreign  technology  transfers  on 
U.S.  employment  levels.  The  idea  is 
that  the  flow  of  technology  abroad  ena- 
bles goods  to  be  produced  in  foreign 
countries  which  would  otherwise  have 
been  produced  in  this  country  and,  as  a 
consequence,  jobs  are  lost  in  the 
United  States.  The  Congress  has  re- 
quested a  study  of  the  domestic  eco- 
nomic consequences  of  the  transfer  of 
technology  abroad  in  recently  enacted 
amendments  to  the  Export  Administra- 
tion Act. 

It  is,  of  course,  difficult  to  answer 
the  question  of  impact  of  technology 
transfer  on  balance  of  payments  and  on 
the  U.S.  labor  market.  These  are  sub- 
jects that  will  be  addressed  in  substan- 
tial detail  in  the  course  of  this  meeting. 
There  are  a  number  of  factors  involved 
which  may  have  a  tendency  to  balance 
each  other.  While  it  is  true  that  the 
transfer  of  technology  from  the  United 
States  to  a  foreign  country  does  enable 
that  country  to  produce  goods  that 
otherwise  might  have  been  produced  in 
the  United  States,  it  is  also  true  that  the 
boost  given  to  the  economic  and  social 
conditions  in  the  recipient  country  will 
increase  its  absorptive  capacity  for 
other  U.S.  goods  and  that  effect  may 
equal  or  surpass  the  loss  in  market  due 
to  the  additional  production  within  that 
country.  Furthermore,  studies  con- 
ducted at  the  Harvard  Business  School 
show  that  the  net  effect  depends  upon 
the  likely  alternatives  to  the  transfer, 
and  these  alternatives  depend  upon  the 
stage  of  the  product  cycle.  Since  it  is 
often  difficult  to  state  with  certainty 
what  the  alternative  might  have  been,  it 
is  not  surprising  to  find  a  certain 


40 


amount  of  political  acrimony  in  par- 
ticular cases. 

Looking  at  the  other  side  of  the  coin, 
we  believe  that  over  the  long  run,  the 
economic  and  technological  develop- 
ment of  lesser  developed  nations  is  in 
our  national  interest.  We  continue  to 
believe  that  North-South  investment 
flows  can  be  an  important  form  of 
transferring  technology  for 
development. 

We  respect  the  right  of  each  country 
to  determine  the  environment  in  which 
foreign  investment  takes  place  in  that 
country.  At  the  same  time,  once 
foreign  investments  have  been  made  on 
this  basis,  these  governments  should 
not  discriminate  against  established 
firms  on  the  basis  of  nationality  or  de- 
prive such  firms  of  their  rights  under 
international  law. 

On  the  question  of  codes  of  conduct 
for  multinational  enterprises,  we  be- 
lieve that  they  must,  of  necessity,  be 
broad  in  nature  and,  consequently,  they 
do  not  lend  themselves  easily  to  legally 
binding  arrangements.  However,  we 
believe  they  can  serve  a  useful  purpose 
by  providing  a  basis  for  firmer  expecta- 
tions of  accepted  behavior  for  both  in- 
vestors and  host  governments.  In  sum- 
mary, we  believe  that  broad  codes  of 
conduct  should  be  voluntary  in  nature; 
should  be  balanced  in  reference  to  the 
responsibilities  of  governments  and 
multinational  enterprises;  should  not  be 
used  as  a  basis  for  discrimination; 
should  abide  by  international  law  con- 
cerning foreigners"  property  rights;  and 
should  apply  to  all  enterprises,  whether 
private,  government,  or  mixed. 

The  only  internationally  agreed  code 
of  conduct  at  present  is  the  package 
agreed  to  by  the  OECD  ministers  in 
June  1976.  We  believe  this  was  a  major 
step  toward  realizing  our  goal  of 
clarifying  the  rules  for,  and  strengthen- 
ing cooperation  on,  international 
investment. 

The  most  important  current  forum 
for  dealing  with  North-South  invest- 
ment issues  is  in  the  U.N.  Commission 
on  Transnational  Corporations  and  its 
Intergovernmental  Working  Group  on  a 
Code  of  Conduct.  Here  we  are  coming 
to  grips  with  some  issues  that  divide 
developed  and  developing  countries — 
permanent  sovereignty  of  the  state  ver- 
sus standards  of  equitable  treatment 
and  compensation  traditionally  main- 
tained in  international  law,  a  binding 
versus  a  voluntary  code  of  conduct, 
and  responsibilities  of  firms  versus  re- 
sponsibilities of  governments. 

I  have  explained  in  some  detail  the 
general  position  of  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment with  respect  to  technology  trans- 
fer through  the  private  sector.   It  is 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


essentially  a  noninterference  policy  un- 
less the  security  or  other  vital  interest 
of  the  United  States  is  involved.  We 
believe  this  is  the  right  policy  for  us  to 
follow.  Loss  of  leadership  in  science 
and  technology  will  not  occur  in  this 
country  because  of  normal  commercial 
exchange  in  the  course  of  doing  busi- 
ness on  an  international  scale.  On  the 
contrary,  the  risk  of  loss  of  leadership 
would  be  much  greater  if  we  were  to 
adopt  a  protectionist  policy  with  re- 
spect to  our  science  and  technology. 
We  believe  in  the  ability  of  this  country 
to  continue  to  compete  vigorously  in  an 
open  international  economic  system. 

In  the  long  run  developing  countries 
can  and  will  expand  and  improve  their 
own  industrialization  through  their  own 
efforts  as  well  as  the  normal  action  of 
private  firms  competing  in  a  global 
economy.  Government  measures  that 
obstruct  technology  transfer  do  not 
serve  the  long-term  development  inter- 
ests we  share  with  the  less  developed 
countries. 

The  U.S.  Government  can  play  a 
positive  role  through  helping  to 
strengthen  the  universities  and  research 
institutes  in  these  developing  countries 


.  .  .  the  risk  of  loss  of  [U.S.] 
leadership  would  be  much  greater 
if  we  were  to  adopt  a  protec- 
tionist policy  with  respect  to  our 
science  and  technology. 


to  make  them  better  able  to  absorb 
technology  and  to  develop  their  own 
technology.  We  can  also  examine  ways 
to  facilitate  the  tTow  of  public  sector 
technologies.  Several  kinds  of  technol- 
ogy are  largely  in  the  public  domain 
and  others  would  not  be  competitive 
with  American  industrial  or  commer- 
cial interests.  In  the  past  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment has  provided  some  technical 
assistance  in  these  areas,  but  the  effort 
could  probably  be  considerably 
increased. 

First,  the  United  States  could  pro- 
mote the  transfer  of  public  technologies 
that  build  up  the  economic  and  social 
infrastructure  necessary  for  moderniza- 
tion. This  effort  could  cover  technol- 
ogies for  electric  power;  public  trans- 
portation; education;  preventive  and 
curative  health  care;  agricultural  pro- 
ductivity; water,  air,  and  land  conser- 
vation; natural  disaster  planning;  and 
others. 

Second,  there  is  a  large  pool  of  un- 
used technology  now  in  the  public  do- 
main, some  of  which  is  in  the  form  of 


I 


expired  patents  not  now  being  comm 
cially  exploited  but  much  of  which  ; 
well-developed  technologies  that  wt 
put  aside  at  a  time  when  they  were  r 
competitive.  A  promising  example 
the  use  of  forest  products  and  agrici 
tural  residues  for  the  manufacture  ol 
vast  range  of  useful  materials  which  i 
now  derived  from  petrochemical 
Some  of  these  ignored,  and  now  pu 
lie.  technologies  are  clearly  useful  a 
others  are  not.  All  need  to  be  exami 
critically  and  many  might  be  impro 
by  cooperative  ventures  in  research  a1 
development  which  could  ultimati 
bring  mutual  benefit  to  both  developi 
and  less  developed  nations. 

Third,  we  believe  that  the  nonpi 
prietary  technologies  of  food  processii 
could  effectively  be  transferred  to  e 
tablish  the  basis  of  small,  rural  indusi 
in  developing  countries.  Such  transfj 
would  hardly  be  competitive  w 
American  industry  or  agriculture  i 
world  which  faces  overall  food  shi 
ages  for  the  foreseeable  future. 

Of  course,  the  areas  in   which  tli 
shall  need  to  build  up  expertise 
vary  widely  from  country  to  cou 
depending  on  their  present  capabilit: 
their  own  needs,  their  own  natural 
sources  and  human  resources,  and  tl 
future  commercial  opportunities 
process  will  be  a  long  one,  but  we 
lieve  it  is  the  effective  way  to  impn 
social  and  economic  conditions  in  thi 
countries.  There  is  no  quick  and  ei 
road  to  industrialization.   It  would 
well  to  supplement  the  term  technolo, 
transfer  in  this  context  with  technol 
development.    We  expect  these  q 
tions  to  be  treated  in  the  U.N.  Con: 
ence  on   Science  and  Technology 
Development  to  be  held  in  1979. 

It  is  altogether  appropriate  that 
ask  ourselves  why  the  United  Stal 
should  be  helpful  in  strengthening  tl 
educational  and  technological  infr 
structure  of  developing  countries.  Tl 
reason  is  that  over  the  long  run,  we  sc 
the  development  of  Third  World  coui 
tries  as  reinforcing  our  national  intere 
through  contributing  to  a  more  stab 
world  order.  Whatever  the  near-ter 
conflicts,  we  should  see  North-Soul 
transfer  of  technology  as  a  positive  sui 
game  in  the  long  run.  We  believe  th; 
technology  transfer: 

•  Will  contribute  to  meeting  humaJ 
needs  and  developing  human  capacities 
and  to  upward  mobility  through  th 
growth  of  indigenous   technical   an 
managerial  skills; 

•  Will  promote  less  developed  coun 
try  internal  economic  development  an^ 
independence  and  reduce  their  depend 
ence  on  current  aid-type  programs;       i 


v1;irch  1978 

•  Will  enable  the  less  developed 
■oiintries  themselves  to  exploit  their  re- 
>ouices  and  thus  maintain  world  supply 
)t'  important  materials;  and 

•  Will  promote  the  integration  of 
CSS  developed  countries  into  the  world 
■cmiomic  community  where,  as  part  ot 
hat  community,  they  can  attain  the 
ransfer  of  technology  needed  for  their 
lc\clopment.  remove  feelings  of  colo- 
lial  subordination,  and  participate  in 
nore  of  the  positive  benefits  of 
ncreased  economic  and  political 
ntctjration. 


I  believe  the  workshops  which  will 
follow  in  the  course  of  today  and  to- 
morrow will  provide  elaboration  of  the 
several  points  I  hMv^  mentioned.  I  hope 
that  I  have  given  you  some  indication 
of  the  broad  doctrine  and  policy  of  the 
U.S.  Government  on  the  important  sub- 
ject of  technology  in  world  affairs.     D 


Address  before  the  Electronic  Industries  As- 
sociati<yn  in  Washinnlnn.  DC.  on  Dec.  7. 
1977:  Mr.  Nye  is  Deputy  to  the  Under  Secre- 
tary for  Security  Assistance ,  Science,  and 
Technology. 


I7.]V.  Conforenct*  on  St^ient'e 
and  Tc*c*liiiolof/i|  for  Deveiopmtntt 


Foreign  Relations  Outline 

Efforts  of  the  developing  countries 
io  achieve  self-sustaining  growth  have 
been  hindered  by  the  lack  of  an  indig- 
enous scientific  and  technical  base. 
Without  such  a  base,  their  economies 
cannot  be  integrated  or  competitive  in 
Ihe   international   system.    Develop- 

ent  and  transfer  of  science  and 
lechnology  have  emerged  as  major 
oals  of  the  developing  countries,  and 
:hey  are  increasingly  determined  to 
evolve  their  own  capabilities  in  these 
preas  and  to  gain  greater  access  to  the 
business  know-how  of  the  indus- 
rialized  world. 

Considerations  such  as  these  led 
the  U.N.  General  Assembly's  Seventh 
Special  Session  (September  1975)  to 
propose  convening  a  U.N.  Conference 
on  Science  and  Technology  for  De- 
velopment (UNCSTD).  The  confer- 
ence— following  ^  series  of  U.N. 
global  meetings  on  environment. 
Food,  population,  urban  settlements. 
International  Women's  Year,  water, 
and  desertification — is  scheduled  to 
convene  in  Vienna  in  late  summer  of 
1979.  An  earlier  U.N.  Conference  on 
the  Application  of  Science  and  Tech- 
nology for  the  Benefit  of  the  Less 
Developed  Areas  was  held  in  1963  in 
Geneva,  but  increased  awareness  of 
the  links  between  science  and  de- 
velopment was  not  translated  into 
practical  action. 

Purpose 

The  main  objectives  of  the 
UNCSTD  are  to: 

•  Strengthen    the    developing 


world's   scientific   and   technological 
capacity; 

•  Determine  ways  to  accelerate 
economic  and  social  development 
through  science  and  technology;  and 

•  Create  appropriate  instruments  of 
international  cooperation  for  trans- 
ferring the  necessary  capacities  and 
techniques. 

The  conference  is  not  intended  to 
highlight  the  latest  scientific  advances 
but  rather  to  analyze  development 
problems  that  might  be  resolved  with 
the  aid  of  scientific  and  technical  ex- 
pertise. It  will  focus  on  the  interrela- 
tionships among  the  political,  scien- 
tific, and  technological  components 
of  socioeconomic  development. 

International  Preparations 

The  preparatory  period  for 
UNCSTD,  which  began  in  1977,  is  a 
complex  process  involving  each  coun- 
try in  a  detailed  examination  of  its 
goals,  priorities,  and  experiences  in 
applying  science  and  technology  to 
development.  An  integral  part  of  the 
conference,  these  preparations  involve 
activities  at  the  national,  regional, 
and  interregional  levels. 

National  papers,  to  be  submitted  to 
the  United  Nations  by  every  member 
by  May  1,  1978.  are  central  to  con- 
ference preparations.  In  essence,  they 
are  descriptive  and  will  examine  each 
country's  experience,  needs,  poten- 
tial, and  goals  in  science  and  technol- 
ogy. (The  national  paper  should  not 
be  confused  with  U.S.  position  papers 
which  will  be  drawn  up  later  on  spe- 
cific agenda  items  and  issues.)  The 
U.N.'s  five  regional  commissions  will 
review  the  national  papers.   Priorities 


41 


that  emerge  globally  will  determine 
the  conference  agenda. 

U.S.  Preparations 

U.S.  preparations  will  involve  a 
broad  cross-section  of  the  American 
public,  including  business  and  indus- 
try, universities,  labor,  and  non- 
governmental organizations.  These 
groups  are  expected  to  make  an  im- 
portant contribution  to  preparing  our 
national  paper.  The  National  Research 
Council  is  preparing  background 
studies  for  the  U.S.  paper  on  five 
areas  of  concern  to  developing  coun- 
tries. These  are; 

•  Population,  health,  and  nutrition; 

•  Energy,  natural  resources,  and 
environment; 

•  Food,  climate,  soil,  and  water; 

•  Employment,  trade,  and  indus- 
trialization; and 

•  Urbanization,  transportation,  and 
communications. 

U.S.  Policy 

The  United  States  has  long  sup- 
ported the  developing  countries  in 
building  a  scientific  and  technological 
infrastructure  for  economic  growth 
and  industrialization.  We  believe  that 
technology  development  and  delivery, 
involving  education  and  training 
among  other  factors,  can  contribute  to 
an  improved  North-South  relation- 
ship. Equally  important,  technology 
development  can  help  realize  human 
potential.  We  also  believe  that  the 
development  effort  is  and  remains  the 
primary  responsibility  of  the  develop- 
ing countries  themselves.  Where  and 
how  proprietary  know-how  will  be 
transferred  is  basically  the  responsi- 
bility of  American  private  enterprise, 
which  creates  and  controls  most  pro- 
prietary technology  in  this  country. 

The  United  States  is  fully  com- 
mitted to  UNCSTD  and  believes  that 
it  can  be  a  useful  step  in  aiding  Third 
World  development.  It  is  the  function 
of  the  office  of  the  U.S.  Coordinator 
[Ambassador  Jean  Wilkowski]  for  the 
conference  in  the  State  Department  to 
enlist  the  cooperation  of  public  and 
private  groups  and  seek  advice  from 
them,  to  coordinate  U.S.  preparations 
and  positions,  and  to  maintain  a  na- 
tional dialogue  on  the  role  of  science 
and  technology  in  development.         D 


Based  on  a  Department  of  State  publication  in 
the  GIST  series,  released  in  January  1978. 
This  outline  is  designed  to  be  a  quick  refer- 
ence aid  on  U.S.  foreign  relations.  It  is  not 
intended  as  a  comprehensive  U.S.  foreign  pol- 
icy statement. 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE: 

ConvGnHonai  Arms  Transfer  Policy 


by  Lucy  Wilson  Benson 

For  those  of  you  who  are  not  familiar 
with  the  organizational  structure  of  the 
Department  of  State,  my  respon- 
sibilities cover  three  distinct  but  related 
areas: 

•  Our  security  assistance  program, 
which  is  shorthand  for  U.S.  Govern- 
ment activities  in  military  assistance 
and  the  export  of  conventional  arms; 

•  Nuclear  nonproliferation — our  ef- 
forts to  slow  the  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons'  capabilities  and  to  manage 
any  destabilizing  effects  that  may  ac- 
company the  diffusion  of  nuclear  tech- 
nology: and 

•  Science  and  technology  and  its  in- 
tegration into  foreign  policy. 

There  is  obviously  a  tight  relation- 
ship between  conventional  arms  trans- 
fers and  nonproliferation  and  a  some- 
what looser  connection  between  arms 
transfers  and  science  and  technology. 

I  will  today  delve  into  our  past 
year's  activities  in  the  first  of  these 
responsibilities — arms  transfers.  This  is 
a  subject  of  particular  importance,  not 
to  say  controversy,  in  the  aeronautical 
industry. 

Background 

As  all  of  you  know,  President  Carter 
came  into  office  a  year  ago  with  a 
commitment  to  control,  and  indeed  re- 
duce, U.S.  activities  in  the  interna- 
tional arms  market.  The  enormous 
growth  of  that  market  in  the  mid- 
1970's,  and  the  fact  that  the  United 
States  had  such  a  dominant  position 
within  it,  had  created  a  sense  of  unease 
no  incoming  Administration  could  ig- 
nore. 

The  world  trade  in  arms  was  running 
at  something  over  $20  billion  a  year, 
and  the  United  States  was  doing  about 
one-half  this  business,  much  of  it  in 
sophisticated  aircraft.  Moreover,  the 
greatest  growth  in  the  market  was  cen- 
tered on  the  most  sensitive  and  unstable 
area  in  the  world,  the  Middle  East. 
Three  countries  in  particular — Israel, 
Iran,  and  Saudi  Arabia — were  buying 
each  year  $6  billion  worth  of  weapons, 
equipment,  and  military-related  serv- 
ices. Their  purchases  averaged  60%  of 
all  U.S.  arms  sales. 

In  the  public  mind,  and  certainly  in 
the  Congress,  there  was  a  growing  be- 
lief that  much  was  amiss,  that  the  U.S. 


Government  had  somehow  lost  control 
over  the  activities  of  the  American 
arms  industry.  Many  people  believed 
that  the  government  deliberately  and 
unwisely  was  using  arms  sales  to  soak 
up  petrodollars  or  to  promote  American 
business  or  to  reduce  unit  costs  for  the 
U.S.  military  services — purposes  that 
had  little  to  do  with  basic  U.S.  security 
or  foreign  policy  objectives.  To  many 
it  seemed  that  the  long-term  conse- 
quences of  pouring  arms  into  the  politi- 
cally volatile  underdeveloped  world 
were  being  ignored  for  the  sake  of 
short-term  benefits.  President  Carter's 
campaign  promise,  therefore,  to  change 
American  arms  transfer  practices, 
struck  a  responsive  chord. 

Almost  immediately  after  his  inaugu- 
ration, the  President  ordered  an  inter- 
agency study  of  arms  transfer  ac- 
tivities. It  was  a  complex  study,  in- 
volving 10  separate  agencies  of  the 
Federal  Government,  each  with  a  spe- 
cial expertise  and  knowledge  to  offer. 
There  were  many  competing,  but 
legitimate,  interests  involved.  To  rec- 
oncile them  and  produce  a  coherent 
policy  was  a  monumental  task,  but  it 
was  accomplished,  and  on  the  19th  of 
May  the  President  publicly  announced 
a  new  policy  based  on  that  study. 

Stripped  of  its  rhetoric  and  special 
exclusions,  the  policy  said: 

•  We  will  sell  fewer  arms  in  1978 
than  in  1977; 

•  We  will  apply  a  number  of  restric- 
tions on  what  we  sell,  how  we  sell,  and 
to  whom  we  sell;  and 

•  We  will  also  try  to  convince  our 
competitors  in  the  arms  market  to  do 
likewise. ' 

The  President's  new  policy  was  am- 
bitious; it  was  also  feasible.  It  re- 
sponded to  an  obvious  and  long  over- 
due requirement  to  lay  out  a  com- 
prehensive and  coherent  policy  in  an 
area  that  until  then  never  had  one. 

It  has  not  been  easy.  We  expected  to 
find  conflicting  interests  and 
convictions — not  only  between  and 
among  agencies  but  also  within  agen- 
cies, and  we  did.  They  not  only  made 
the  original  study  complicated  and  dif- 
ficult, but  they  arose  ail  over  again 
when  it  came  time  to  implement  the 
new  restraint  policy. 

It  is  important  to  keep  in  mind  that 
arms  transfers  are  not  the  responsibility 
of  a  single  agency.  State  develops  and 
oversees  the  general  policy  and  its  im- 


plementation. Defense  manages  the  ac- 
tual transfers.  Other  agencies  have 
their  own  well-defined  input  to  make. 
It  has  been  my  major  preoccupation 
during  the  last  year  to  organize  the 
governmental  effort  to  carry  out  the 
provisions  laid  down  by  the  President. 

There  are  10  separate  agencies  repre- 
sented on  the  interagency  group  that  is 
becoming  the  focus  of  our  arms  trans- 
fer policy  deliberation — the  Arms  Ex- 
port Control  Board  (AECB).  Its  most 
important  task  for  the  past  8  months 
has  been  to  set  up  the  mechanisms 
necessary  to  carry  out  the  stated  policy. 
Through  the  Arms  Export  Control 
Board,  we  have,  among  other  things, 
written  new  regulations,  defined  some 
critical  terms,  developed  new  inter-| 
agency  clearance  procedures,  provided 
new  guidelines  to  industry  and  U.S. 
Government  officials  for  dealing  with 
foreign  governments  on  arms  transfers 
matters,  and  established  a  management 
system  to  insure  that  the  dollar  volume 
ceiling  and  the  other  controls  estab- 
lished by  the  President's  policy  are  en- 
forced. With  10  agencies  to  deal  with, 
this  has  proven  to  be  a  time-consuming 
task,  but  the  system  is  now  in  place  and 
functioning. 

Many  claim  that  the  first  6  months  of 
the  new  policy  have  produced  only 
failures.  They  point  to  the  fact  that  this 
Administration  has  sold  more  arms  in 
its  first  year  than  any  previous  Admin- 
istration— over  $11  billion  worth  and 
that  15%  of  that  went  to  Saudi  Arabia, 
Iran,  and  Israel. 

The  facts  are  undeniable,  but  they  do 
not  support  the  charge  that  the  policy 
has  failed.  There  are  good  and  suffi- 
cient reasons  why  the  figures  were  not 
smaller — not  the  least  of  which  was  the 
requirement   to  fulfill   commitments 


i» 


ARMS  EXPORT 
CONTROL  BOARD 

Department  of  State 
Department  of  Defense 
Central  Intelligence  Agency 
National  Security  Council 
Office  of  Management 

and  Budget 
Department  of  the  Treasury 
Department  of  Commerce 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 
Arms  Control  and 

Disarmament  Agency 
Agency  for  International 

Development 


' 


^arch  1978 

lade  before  this  Administration  took 
ffice.  Nonetheless,  the  policy  has  not 
reduced  instant  and  spectacular  suc- 
esses.  1  do  not  wonder  that  there  may 
e  some  question  about  whether  the 
onderous  "supertanker"" — arms 
xports — is  responding  to  its  navigator 
r  whether,  indeed,  it  has  a  navigator. 

There  is  a  pilot  and  a  chart  aboard. 
)ver  the  next  year  this  arms  sales 
viathan  will  slowly  be  warped  around 

the  new  course  the  President  has  set 
jr  it. 

Let  me  give  you  a  tew  examples.  In 

few  days,  the  President  will  send  his 
mdget  message  to  Congress.  It  will  in- 
lude  the  security  assistance  budget 
nd  its  various  components.  Each  of 
hese  components  will  show  significant 
eductions  from  the  requests  sent  to  the 
"ongress  last  year.  This  budget,  of 
curse,  reflects  only  one  part  of  our 
irms  transfer  activities — the  roughly 
10%   which  is  financed  by  U.S.   Gov- 

frnmenl  long-term  credits  or  grants, 
he  other  80%  is  the  arms  trade  we 
larry  on  for  cash. 

The  President  promised  he  would  re- 
luce  the  dollar  volume  of  all  transfers 
n  this  fiscal  year  below  those  of  fiscal 
(977.  Last  week  he  announced  that  his 
pal  was  an  8%  cut  and  that  the  $9.3 
lillion  of  weapons  related  items  we 
bid  last  year  to  nonexempt  countries 
i/ould  be  reduced  to  $8.6  billion, 
fhere  is  no  question  in  my  mind  that 
i^e  will  meet  that  ceiling  figure. 

I  should  emphasize  here  that  the  pol- 
fcy  is  not  concerned  only  with  limiting 
he  dollar  volume  of  what  we  export, 
tny  dollar  ceiling  will  be  a  fairly  arbi- 
rary  and  crude  measure  of  the  extent  to 
i'hich  the  Administration  succeeds  in 
fcstraining  aggregate  sales.  The  "ceil- 
hg""  has  received  a  great  deal  of  pub- 
icity,  but  it  says  nothing  about  the 
(ualitative  aspects  of  restraint  which 
^e  the  real  structure  of  the  President's 
(olicy  and  which  are,  in  the  long  run. 
nuch  more  important. 

I  stress  this  point  because  there 
jxists  in  American  society  a  great 
preoccupation  with  numbers,  particu- 
larly large  numbers  of  dollars.  We  tend 
10  treat  them  as  revealed  truth.  In  fact, 
(umbers  demonstrate  very  little  in  the 
business  of  arms  transfers  and  to  focus 
!)nly  on  the  money  side  of  arms  sales  is 
O  obscure  the  more  basic  elements  of 
Ihe  policy  that  touch  directly  on  our  se- 
curity and  political  relationships 
ibroad,  on  regional  military  balances, 
md  regional  stability. 

i^pplicable  Controls 

These  basic  elements  of  the  Presi- 
ient's  arms  transfer  policy  are  the  six 
qualitative  controls  applicable  to  all 


countries  except  our  NATO  partners, 
Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  Japan. 

•  First,  the  United  States  will  not  be 
the  first  supplier  to  introduce  into  a  re- 
gion newly  developed  advanced 
weapons  which  would  create  a  new  or 
higher  combat  capability. 

•  Second,  we  will  not  sell  such 
weapons  unless  they  are  operationally 
deployed  with  U.S.  forces. 

•  Third,  we  will  not  permit  de- 
velopment of  advanced  weapons  solely 
for  export. 

•  Fourth,  we  will  not  permit  co- 
production  by  other  countries  of  signifi- 
cant weapons,  equipment,  or  major 
components. 

•  Fifth,  we  will  not  allow  U.S. 
weapons  or  equipment  to  be  transferred 
to  third  countries  without  our  consent. 
The  transfer  of  certain  weapons  will  be 
prohibited  altogether. 

•  Sixth,  we  will  not  permit  our  em- 
bassy and  military  representatives 
abroad  to  promote  the  sale  of  arms.  In 
fact,  we  will  not  permit  them  even  to 
discuss  potential  sales  without  prior 
approval. 

The  qualitative  dimension  of  the  pol- 
icy is  far  less  visible  than  the  dollar 
ceiling,  and  it  is  difficult  to  find  news- 
worthy examples  to  excite  public  imag- 
ination, but  there  are  three  cases  that 
we  have  described  in  public  which  il- 
lustrate that  in  fact  the  policv  is  taking 
hold. 

Last  summer  we  turned  down  a  re- 
quest from  Pakistan  for  a  large  sale  of 
attack  aircraft  basically  on  the  grounds 
that  it  would  introduce  a  new  capability 
into  the  subcontinent.  We  similarly 
disapproved  a  request  from  Iran  for 
F-I8  aircraft  on  the  grounds  that  that  is 
an  airplane  not  yet  in  the  hands  of  U.S. 
forces.  The  third  example  was  our  dis- 
approval of  an  Israeli  request  to  sell  a 
sophisticated  Israeli  jet  fighter, 
equipped  with  American  engines,  to 
Ecuador.  We  applied  the  third  country 
transfer  restriction  in  this  case. 

There  have  been  a  number  of  other 
turn-downs  as  well,  but  I  cannot  de- 
scribe them  in  a  public  meeting  since 
the  governments  which  were  refused 
the  items  in  question  have  chosen  them- 
selves not  to  make  the  matter  public. 

As  the  President  acknowledged,  ac- 
tual reductions  in  ihe  worldwide  arms 
traffic  will  require  the  cooperation  of 
other  nations.  We  have  begun  discus- 
sions with  other  principal  suppliers  of 
arms  in  Western  Europe  and  with  the 
U.S.S.R.  to  explain  our  policies  and  to 
ask  that  they  cooperate  with  us  in  prac- 
ticing restraint.  Clearly  this  will  be  a 
long-term  effort,  and  early  success  is 
not  to  be  looked  for  but  we  are  off  to  a 
solid  start. 


43 


Domestic  Reforms 

We  are  also  making  substantial  prog- 
ress in  reforming  ourselves — that  is, 
reforming  the  arms  transfer  community 
within  the  government  and  industry. 
This  is  not  a  trivial  issue  since  for  a 
good  many  years  both  the  private  and 
public  sectors  were  operating  without 
comprehensive  policy  guidance.  There 
were  certain  legal  restrictions  to  be  ob- 
served, but  everyone  assumed  that  re- 
fusals to  sell  would  be  rare.  Thus  both 
industry  and  government  officials  were 
in  a  position  to  promote  arms  sales 
abroad  with  a  fairly  free  hand.  In  fact, 
in  the  early  1960"s  they  were  encour- 
aged to  do  so  as  a  matter  of  govern- 
ment policy. 

As  I  mentioned  earlier,  the  Arms 
Export  Control  Board  has  devised  new 
regulations  to  cover  industrial  promo- 
tion abroad.  It  has  also  developed  new 
internal  directives  to  regulate  the  ac- 
tivities of  government  officials.  There 
is  unmistakable  evidence  that  these  are 
already  having  some  effect — industry 
has  publicly  described  our  new  instruc- 
tions to  embassy  personnel  governing 
their  cooperation  with  U.S.  defense  in- 
dustry representatives  abroad  as  the 
"leprosy  directive. "' 

None  of  these  qualitative  or  pro- 
cedural restraints  has  a  particularly 
newsworthy  quality.  Unfortunately, 
much  of  the  news  reporting  and  com- 
mentary since  May  19  has  tended  to 
emphasize  a  presumed  gap  between 
policy  and  practice  and  to  suggest  that 
nothing  has  changed  in  the  transfer 
field.  As  a  result,  skepticism  about  the 
policy  has  been  expressed  in  many 
quarters.  Part  of  this  problem  is  our 
fault.  We  appear  to  have  promised 
rather  more  than  we  could  reasonably 
deliver,  at  least  in  the  short  run,  and 
we  expressed  the  whole  issue  of  arms 
restraint  with  perhaps  too  much  initial 
fervor.  Clearly,  we  violated  Tal- 
leyrand's famous  advice  to  diplomats: 
"Above  all,  not  too  much  zeal."' 

Perhaps  I  can  best  illustrate  the  point 
by  quoting  the  passage  from  the  basic 
policy  statement  [of  May  19]: 

.  .  .  the  United  Stales  will  henceforth  view 
arms  transfers  as  an  exceptional  foreign  policy 
implement,  to  be  used  only  in  instances  where 
it  can  be  clearly  demonstrated  that  the  transfer 
contributes  to  our  national  security  interests. 
We  will  continue  to  utilize  arms  transfers  to 
promote  our  close  friends.  But  in  the  future  the 
burden  of  persuasion  will  be  on  those  who 
favor  a  particular  arms  sale  rather  than  on  those 
who  oppose  it. 

There  are  four  important  policy 
points  in  that  paragraph. 

•  It  defines  arms  transfers  as  an  ex- 
ceptional policy  instrument. 


44 


•  It  establishes  the  criterion  that 
transfers  must  contribute  to  our  na- 
tional security  interests. 

•  It  sets  forth  the  concept  of  requir- 
ing proponents  to  justify  sales  propos- 
als. 

•  It  reconfirms  that  the  United  States 
will  continue  to  use  transfers  to  pro- 
mote our  own  security  and  the  security 
of  our  close  friends. 

In  the  months  since  the  Administra- 
tion's policy  was  announced  there  has 
built  up  in  the  minds  of  people  who 
watch  this  area  of  public  policy  the 
idea  that  all  arms  transfers  will  be  con- 
sidered exceptional  and  that  the  word 
"exceptional""  is  synonymous  with  the 
word  "rare."" 

I  argue  that  you  cannot  take  the 
phrase  "exceptional  instrument"  as  the 
only  description  of  the  policy.  The 
President  states  very  clearly  we  will 
continue  to  maintain  our  alliance  rela- 
tionships and  to  transfer  arms  to  allies 
and  friends  for  security  reasons. 
Moreover,  the  policy  specifically 
exempts  all  of  NATO,  Japan,  Austra- 
lia, and  New  Zealand  from  the  policy 
controls.  When  you  combine  these 
exemptions  and  our  commitment  to  up- 
hold our  treaty  agreements,  you  have 
already  justified  a  substantial  arms 
transfer  program — none  of  which  could 
be  considered  exceptional  in  the  sense 
of  being  rare. 

What  I  understand  the  word  "excep- 
tional"" to  mean  is  that  as  requests  for 
transfers  come  to  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment, we  will  not  treat  them  as  routine 
matters  of  business.  We  will  review 
them  as  something  uniquely  important 
to  our  foreign  and  security  policy,  not 
something,  however,  as  uniquely  rare. 

Security  Relationships 

That  they  are  an  exceptionally  im- 
portant instrument  of  policy  cannot  be 
questioned.  Much  of  the  free  world  has 
looked  for  30  years  to  the  United  States 
as  guarantor  of  its  security.  But  in  re- 
cent years,  both  as  a  matter  of  explicit 
policy  and  as  a  matter  of  historical  cir- 
cumstances, the  United  States  has  been 
gradually  contracting  the  scope  of  its 
activities  in  mutual  security  arrange- 
ments. Look  at  the  record. 

Fifteen  years  ago  in  Europe  we  had 
420,000  troops;  today  we  have 
300,000.  In  the  early  1960"s  the  Navy 
patrolled  the  world's  oceans  with  a 
force  of  over  900  ships;  it  is  less  than 
500  today.  We  no  longer  have  any 
U.S.  forces  on  the  Southeast  Asian 
mainland,  we  have  told  the  Koreans 
that  we  intend  to  remove  all  U.S. 
ground  forces  from  the  peninsula  in  the 
next  few  years,  and  our  overseas  base 
structure  has  been  steadily  reduced. 


1  do  not  argue  with  the  wisdom  ot 
this  gradual  contraction  of  our  overseas 
presence,  but  I  cite  it  to  illustrate  the 
point  that  we  have  changed  the  nature 
of  our  mutual  security  relationships. 
Where  earlier  we  were  both  able  and 
willing  to  provide  ships,  troops,  and 
aircraft  as  a  peacetime  deterrent  force 
throughout  the  world,  we  now  look  to 
allies  to  furnish  much  of  that  force — a 
policy  that  was  made  explicit  in  the 
Guam  Doctrine  announcement  of  1969. 

But  if  our  allies  are  to  fulfill  those 
responsibilities  in  a  way  that  satisfies 
our  shared  security  interests,  then  their 
guaranteed  access  to  arms  is  essential, 
and  the  United  States  is  the  natural 
supplier.  This  is  so  not  only  because  of 
our  long  historical  relationship  with  the 
countries  of  Europe,  Asia,  and  the 
Middle  East  but  also  because  of  our 
reputation  for  the  best  equipment,  the 
best  terms,  and  the  best  training  and 
logistic  support. 

We  became  the  world's  largest  seller 
of  arms  not  because  we  were  the  mas- 
ters of  the  hard  sell  but  because  we 
adopted  a  security  policy  which  de- 
manded more  allied  self-reliance  in  our 
bilateral  security  relationships.  To 
make  it  work  we  were  obliged  to  sup- 
ply the  necessary  hardware.  That  obli- 
gation to  our  friends  and  allies 
remains. 

As  the  policy  states,  we  will  con- 
tinue to  utilize  arms  transfers  to  pro- 
mote our  security  and  the  security  of 
our  close  friends.  Thus,  our  business 
is  not  to  take  ourselves  out  of  the 
arms  market  but  to  manage  our  share 
responsibly. 

Definitions  of  responsible  conduct 
will  vary,  but  I  think  we  can  all  agree 
that  careful  adherence  to  the  six  con- 
trols set  forth  in  the  policy  is  a  good 
beginning.  But  that  in  itself  will  not  be 
enough. 

Human  Rights  Aspects 

Both  law  and  policy  require  that  we 
conduct  our  arms  transfers  in  a  way 
that  will  promote  and  advance  human 
rights.  Our  approach  to  this  element  of 
the  policy  has  been  to  set  up  a  review 
system  within  the  Department  of  State 
that  requires  explicit  consideration  by 
the  Department  "s  Bureau  of  Human 
Rights  and  Humanitarian  Affairs  of 
each  proposed  arms  transfer  to  a  coun- 
try with  human  rights  problems.  When 
there  are  basic  differences  of  view — 
and  it  does  occur — the  case  will  come 
to  me  or  to  the  Secretary  for  resolution. 

We  have  much  to  learn  about  the 
delicate  process  of  using  arms  transfer 
policy  to  promote  human  rights.  Ad- 
vancement of  human  rights  is  one  im- 
portant objective  of  our  foreign  policy. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

But  there  are  others — mutual   security 
being  one.  The  challenge  is  to  advance 
both — simultaneously   and   as  consist-  * 
ently  as  possible.  It  will  be  a  matter  ot  '*' 
judgment  whether  the  carrot  or  the  »' 
stick  will  have  the  most  effect.  Do  we 
reward  by   furnishing  arms  or  do  we  "* 
punish  by  denying  them?   And   what 
criteria  should   we   apply  to  help  us 
make  that  decision'.'  These  are  difficult 
questions,  but  I  believe  we  have  made 
a  creditable   start   in  answering  them, 
and  I  expect  our  performance  to  im- 
prove with  experience. 


ti 


Regional  Stability 

Responsible  conduct  also  requires  us 
to  look  carefully  at  the  question  of  re- 
gional stability.  Arms  can  do  much  toi 
enhance  stability  of  local  military  and' 
political  balances,  or  it  can  destroy 
them.  In  the  Middle  East,  in  the  sub- 
continent, in  North  Africa,  in  Eastt 
Asia,  we  have  any  number  of  politi- 1' 
cally  tense  and  militarily  explosive 
situations  whose  peaceful  resolution  is 
important  to  us  and  to  the  world  at 
large.  Arms  play  a  critical  role;  they 
can  strengthen  responsible  govern- 
ments, enhance  deterrence  and  thus 
contribute  to  stability,  or  they  can  trig- 
ger arms  competition  and  encourage 
violent  rather  than  peaceful  solutions  to 
outstanding  problems.  Obvious  weak- 
ness can  invite  preemptive  attack,  but 
overwhelming  strength  can  create  espe- 
cially dangerous  instabilities.  As  is  al- 
ways the  case,  there  are  no  mechanical 
rules  and  criteria  that  can  be  applied  to 
solve  the  equation  of  whether  to  ap- 
prove an  arms  transfer  case.  It  will 
often  be  a  difficult  judgmental  call. 


Economic  Consequences 

Finally,  we  have  a  responsibility  to 
look  at  the  economic  consequences  of 
arms  transfers  to  the  less  developed 
world.  What  is  the  impact  of  arms  sales 
on  resource  allocation  for  develop- 
ment' What  sort  of  long-term  economic 
burden  is  acquired  by  a  country  buying 
military  equipment  whose  eventual 
operating  costs  will  exceed  by  many 
times  the  original  purchase  price? 
The.se  and  related  economic  questions 
are  easy  to  ask  but  very  difficult  to  an- 
swer. What  little  work  has  been  done  in 
the  field  is  inadequate,  in  part  because 
our  experience  is  quite  limited,  and  it 
is  difficult  to  apply  generally.  For  in- 
stance, our  experience  in  Korea  and 
Taiwan — two  heavily  armed  countries 
with  extraordinary  development 
records — is  simply  not  applicable  to  a 
country  like  Thailand  or  Zaire. 

For  the  first  time  in  three  decades  we 
have  a  comprehensive  arms  sales  pol- 


rch  1978 


45 


That  in  itself  is  a  great  step  for- 
d.  I  think  it  is  a  good  policy.  Its 
jctives  are  sound  and  its  provisions 
kable.  It  is  designed  to  let  us  stay 
)onsibly  in  the  arms  business  where 
can  demonstrate  that  our  national 
rests  will  be  served.  This  is  not  an 
sasonable  condition  to  impose  on 
activities. 

,t  the  same  time,  we  must  recognize 
:  there  are  no  absolutes  in  this 
ness — as  indeed  there  are  none  in 
ign  affairs.  We  must  be  prepared 
0 uncertainty — the  unexpected  crisis, 
h  unanticipated  problem,   the  unfor- 


seen  event.  Our  arms  policy  provides 
us  with  reasonable  guidelines  for  deci- 
sion and  a  capacity  to  adjust  to  circum- 
stances. With  patience  and  common 
sense  I  believe  we  can  reach  the  Presi- 
dent's  stated  objectives  in  good 
order.  D 


Address  before  the  14th  annual  American  Insti- 
tute of  Aeronautics  and  Astronautics  Confer- 
ence in  Washington.  DC.  on  Feb.  9,  I97H: 
Ms.  Benson  is  Under  Secretary  for  Security- 
Assistance.  Science,  and  Technology. 

'  For  full  text  of  President  Carter's  state- 
ment, see  Bulletin  of  June  13,  1977.  p.  625. 


Adtnhustration  Ofiicials  Testify 
on  Anns  Transfer  Policy 


'II  February  1 .   1978.  the  Subcom- 

■  cc   on    Iniernalional  Security  and 

'iiflc  Affairs  of  the  House  Commit- 

rii    Inlernational   Relations   heard 

iiumy  by  several  Administration  of- 

I  ih  on  the  U.S.  arms  transfer  pol- 

I  (>llowing  are  excerpts  from  the 

.  iiients  by  four  of  those  officials. 


M.  BENSON' 

he  members  of  this  committee  are 
a  iiiar  with  President  Carter's  May  19 
•  nient  concerning  our  arms  transfer 
-  c\  It  is  a  policy  designed  to  im- 
)ie  discipline  and  restraint  on  our 
II  s  transfer  activities  abroad  and  at 
h  same  time  to  enable  us  to  use  arms 
ri  sfers  to  support  our  important  na- 
i<  al  security  and  foreign  policy  inter- 
;5 .  The  policy's  intent  is  not  to  hin- 
Ic  us  in  the  fulfillment  of  our  interna- 
ii  a!  responsibilities  but  to  let  us  ful- 
i;  them  in  a  more  responsible  way. 
^  thus  will  continue  to  meet  the 
e  timate  defense  requirements  of 
r  ids  and  allies,  as  indeed  we  have 
)tn  doing  for  over  30  years.  It  re- 
fnds  to  a  number  of  congressional 
ccerns  that  have  been  evident  for 
e;ral  years;  in  fact,  many  of  the  poli- 
\.  specific  provisions  were  first  put 
ovard  by  this  body. 

low  I  would  like  to  describe  for  you 
V  it  we  have  done  to  implement  the 
A,'  \9  statement. 

i-ns  Export  Control  Board 

>nc  of  our  first  acts  was  to  create  the 
iragency  Arms  Export  Control 
5  rd.  under  my  chairmanship.  This  is 
Mdvisory  body  designed  to  assist  me 
■  laking  recommendations  to  the  Sec- 

ir\  of  State  on  arms  transfer 
.  ters. 


There  are  10  separate  agencies  repre- 
sented on  the  board,  usually  at  the  as- 
sistant secretary  level.  All  of  the  10 
agencies  have  a  direct  responsibility  for 
one  or  another  aspect  of  our  interna- 
tional arms  transfer  activities.  The 
board  has  met  six  times  in  the  last  6 
months  and  has  dealt  both  with  pro- 
gram issues,  such  as  the  FY  1979  secu- 
rity assistance  budget,  and  with  man- 
agement issues,  such  as  the  develop- 
ment of  mechanisms  to  execute  the  pol- 
icy. The  latter  group  of  issues  has, 
understandably,  taken  a  major  share 
of  the  board's  time  since  its 
establishment. 

In  addition  to  the  board  itself,  the 
AECB  has  five  working  groups.  They 
are: 

•  Arms  Transfer  Policy  Planning 
Group  chaired  by  State; 

•  Security  Assistance  Program 
Review  Group  also  chaired  by  State; 

•  Administration  and  Management 
Review  Group  chaired  by  Defense; 

•  Middle  East  Arms  Transfer 
Group  chaired  by  State;  and 

•  Arms  Control  Impact  Group 
chaired  by  the  Arms  Control  and  Dis- 
armament Agency. 

It  is  in  these  groups  that  the 
staffwork  of  the  AECB  is  done.  The 
Policy  Planning  Group  and  Security 
Assistance  Program  Review  Group 
have  been  particularly  active,  because 
they  have  been  so  deeply  engaged  in 
the  development  of  both  a  system  and 
procedures  for  executing  the  policy  and 
the  FY  1979  security  assistance  pro- 
gram . 

The  Policy  Planning  Group  activity 
has  involved: 

•  Revising  the  International  Traffic 
in  Arms  Regulations  (ITAR)  to  require 
private  concerns  to  obtain  State  De- 


partment approval  prior  to  engaging  in 
activities  designed  to  induce  sales  of 
significant  military  equipment  to  a 
foreign  country; 

•  Developing  guidance  for  U.S.  dip- 
lomatic and  military  personnel  overseas 
to  insure  that  their  activities  are  con- 
sistent with  and  support  the  new  policy; 

•  Reviewing  departmental  and 
agency  procedures  and  practices  to  in- 
sure that  they,  too,  are  consistent  with 
the  policy; 

•  Codifying  internal  and  interagency 
clearance  procedures  for  handling  spe- 
cific arms  transfer  proposals.  This  was 
necessary  because  of  the  requirement  to 
review  each  proposal  not  only  in  terms 
of  its  political  and  security  dimensions 
but  also  in  terms  of  its  impact  on 
human  rights,  arms  control,  and,  in 
some  cases,  economic  developinent; 

•  Developing  the  definitions  re- 
quired to  implement  the  policy,  e.g., 
how  the  government  will  define 
"weapons  and  weapons-related"  for 
purposes  of  the  policy  and  how  it  will 
define  various  other  key  terms  and 
phrases  that  appear  in  the  published 
policy  statement. 

Ceiling  Management 

In  addition,  the  AECB  Policy  Plan- 
ning Group  has  developed  a  system  for 
managing  the  dollar  volume  of  sales  in 
order  to  meet  the  President's  commit- 
ment to  reduce  sales  of  weapons  and 
weapons-related  items  to  nonexempt 
countries  from  last  year's  total.  Lt. 
Gen.  Howard  Fish  will  discuss  the  ceil- 
ing management  accounting  system  in 
his  presentation.  But  let  me  briefly 
cover  the  basics. 

We  estimate  that  the  ceiling  control 
level  for  FY  1978  will  be  $9.3  billion. 
This  figure  was  derived  from  the  1977 
base  year  as  follows; 

Million  $ 

Total  new  commitments 

in  FY  1977  11,469 

Less  transfers  to  NATO,  Aus- 
tralia, New  Zealand,  Japan        1,221 

Less  nonweapons  and  weapons- 
related  items  1 ,479 

Total  FY  1977  ceiling  control 

figure  8,769 

Ceiling  control  figure  adjusted 
for  inflation  from  FY 
1977  to  FY  1978  9,295 

As  of  today,  we  do  not  have  the  size 
of  the  reduction.  When  the  President 
makes  that  determination,  we  will,  of 
course,  provide  it  to  the  committee. 

The  FY  1978  ceiling  will  require 
very  careful  management.  Over  half  of 
the  ceiling  dollars  are  already  pretty 
much  committed.  These  commitments 
include: 


46 

•  About  $100  million  of  FY  1978 
military  assistance  program  for 
weapons  and  weapons-related  items  for 
nonexempt  countries  and 

•  Approximately  $2.4  billion  in  let- 
ters of  offer  either  signed  since  1  Oc- 
tober, when  the  fiscal  year  began,  or 
issued  but  still  unsigned.  Of  this  figure 
$1 .3  billion  is  accounted  for  by  the  Ira- 
nian airborne  warning  and  control 
system. 

In  addition  to  these  commitments, 
which  total  $2.5  billion,  we  need  to  set 
aside  roughly  $2.8  billion  to  cover: 
(a)  spare  parts,  technical  support,  and 
ammunition  for  equipment  previously 
sold,  (b)  ongoing  multiyear  contracts 
to  which  we  are  committed,  (c)  possi- 
ble scope  changes  in  prior  year  con- 
tracts, and  (d)  those  arms  sales  that  do 
not  have  to  be  reported  to  the  Congress 
pursuant  to  Section  36(b)  of  the  Arms 
Export  Control  Act.  The  residual,  be- 
fore any  policy  reduction,  is  about  $4 
billion. 

What  is  left  after  the  policy  reduc- 
tion is  the  discretionary  sum  that  we 
will  apply  to  new  major  sales  of  de- 
fense articles  and  services. 

We  have  examined  a  number  of  op- 
tions for  managing  this  discretionary 
balance  in  a  way  that  allows  us  to  cover 
priority  requests  that  serve  the  impor- 
tant security  interests  of  the  United 
States  but  at  the  same  time  insures  that 
we  do  not  exceed  the  presidentially  de- 
termined ceiling. 

A  consensus  developed  among  the 
AECB  members  that  we  cannot  con- 
sider requests  on  a  first  come,  first 
served  basis  until  we  run  out  of  ceiling 
dollars  but  that  we  had  to  develop  an 
estimate  of  the  likely  requests  we  will 
receive  during  the  fiscal  year  and  to 
examine  them  in  terms  of  their  priority 
for  U.S.  foreign  policy  objectives.  Ob- 
viously, any  predictive  system  involves 
a  large  number  of  uncertainties,  and  we 
will  constantly  be  revising  our  esti- 
mates of  who  is  likely  to  want  what  and 
when. 

One  of  the  major  uncertainties  is  that 
historically  some  20-25%  of  the  arms 
sales  cases  in  which  serious  interest  is 
expressed  never  result  in  a  signed  letter 
of  offer.  For  whatever  reason,  foreign 
governments  often  change  their  minds 
at  a  late  stage  in  the  process.  Also  we 
can  expect  new  cases  to  arise  to  which 
we  may  have  to  give  priority. 

To  deal  with  this  particular  problem 
and  to  insure  that  we  are  able  to  cover 
our  highest  priority  requests,  we  may 
well  decide  to  send  to  the  Congress, 
under  Section  36(b)  of  the  Arms  Export 
Control  Act,  an  aggregate  number  of 
cases  whose  value  will  exceed  the  es- 
tablished ceiling.   We  will   not,  how- 


Department  of  State  Bulleflitll 


ever,  issue  letters  of  offer  in  excess  of 
the  established  ceiling,  and  the  Defense 
Department's  accounting  system  will 
insure  that  we  can  keep  track  of  the 
letters-of-offer  process  in  order  that  we 
stay  within  that  figure. 

I  should  emphasize  at  this  point  that 
the  policy  is  not  concerned  only  with 
limiting  the  dollar  volume  of  what  we 
export.  Any  dollar  ceiling  will  be  a 
fairly  arbitrary  and  crude  measure  of 
the  extent  to  which  the  Administration 
succeeds  in  restraining  sales  to 
nonexempt  countries.  Moreover,  as  is 
clear  from  recent  press  stories,  there  is 
some  confusion  about  what  the  ceiling 
is  and  how  it  is  defined. 

Briefly,  the  $13.2  billion  estimate 
for  the  foreign  military  sales  trust  fund 
that  appeared  in  the  President's  budget 
is  not  an  estimate  of  the  ceiling,  as 
some  have  assumed.  It  includes  $4.3 
billion  of  estimated  sales  that  are  not, 
by  definition,  within  the  ceiling:  $1.7 
billion  of  that  $4.3  billion  is  for 
exempt  countries  (NATO,  Japan,  Aus- 
tralia, New  Zealand)  and  $2.6  billion  is 
for  nonweapons-related  construction  in 
Saudi  Arabia.  The  remaining  $8.9  bil- 
lion relates  to  the  ceiling,  but  even 
here,  our  experience  last  year  suggests 
that  almost  10%  of  this  amount  would 
not  fall  within  the  weapons  and 
weapons-related  definition  and  thus 
would  not  count  toward  the  ceiling. 

I  know  there  is  a  natural  tendency  to 
focus  only  on  the  money  side  of  arms 
sales.  Numbers  always  receive  a  good 
deal  of  attention,  but  it  is  important  not 
to  let  this  preoccupation  with  the  ceil- 
ing obscure  the  other  elements  of  the 
policy,  e.g.,  the  specific  controls  nor 
the  role  played  by  arms  transfers  in 
protecting  and  strengthening  our  impor- 
tant .security  interests  and  political  rela- 
tionships abroad. 


Relations  With  Defense  Industries 

The  U.S.  defense  industry,  of 
course,  has  a  deep  interest  in  our  arms 
transfer  policy  and  concern  about  some 
aspects  of  it. 

•  It  is  worried  about  the  possibility 
of  European  suppliers  filling  any  vac- 
uum left  by  the  United  States  as  a  con- 
sequence of  the  policy's  controls. 

•  It  finds  unnecessarily  discrimina- 
tory our  internal  directive  to  our  posts 
abroad  that  mission  personnel,  in  deal- 
ing with  commercial  firms  selling  de- 
fense articles  and  services,  "should  not 
facilitate  sale  of  significant  combat 
equipment  by  providing  such  services 
as  advice  on  tactics  for  making  a  sale, 
assistance  in  appointments  with  host 
government  officials,  or  a  special  sup- 


I'tllC 


a 


I' 


port  of  any  kind  which  might  imi 
that  the  U.S.  Government  endorse; 
particular  sale  or  is  likely  to  provi 
U.S.  Government  financing  when  tH 
fact  has  not  been  established." 

•  It  is  becoming  impatient  with  t 
length  of  time  it  is  taking  the  gover 
ment  bureaucracy  to  review  and  get) 
decision  on  arms  transfer  cases. 


I  understand  these  concerns.  In 
effort  to  keep  myself  informed  on  i 
dustry  problems  and  reciprocally  to  i 
sure  that  it  understands  what  it  is  < 
are  trying  to  do,  I  have  twice  chair 
government  panels  before  trai 
association-sponsored  seminars,  and 
encourage  my  department  colleagues 
take  full  advantage  of  similar  opport 
nities  to  inform  and  be  informed  by  tl 
important  sector  of  the  arms  transt- 
universe. 

I  think  the  defense  industries  as' 
whole  are  satisfied  that  they  can  gel 
fair  hearing  from  me  or  my  associal.  ^^ 
in  the  arms  transfer  field  when  thaj^jj 
have  a  problem.  I  am  less  certain  tK™ 
we  are  always  able  to  provide  wh 
they   would   consider  acceptab 
solutions. 

We  are  also  making  an  effort  to  pi 
licize,  to  the  extent  we  can,  all  din 
tives,  procedures,  definitions,  and  pt 
icy  guidance  that  would  be  useful  f 
industry  for  planning  and  operations 

On  the  question  of  processing 
lays,  it  is  a  serious  problem  for  whicl 
see  no  simple  solution.  The  revi^ 
process  is  far  more  complicated  a 
thorough  today  than  it  was  prior  to  t 
passage  in    1976  of  the   Arms  Expi 
Control  Act  and  prior  to  the  promulgi 
tion  of  the  President's  policy.  We 
however,   sensitive  to  the   industrie 
need   for  expeditious  decisionmakiii' 
and  we  will  do  our  best  to  tighten  up  t 
process  wherever  it  is  possible  to  do  sd 


MR.  GELB^ 

The  President  has  committed  th 
United  States  to  a  policy  of  restraint . 
a  first  step  toward  reducing  tl 
worldwide  traffic  in  arms.  In  our  viev 
our  ability  to  sustain  our  own  policy  i 
reductions  over  the  long  run  will 
quire  multilateral  cooperation. 

Achieving  multilateral  cooperatic 
will  be  a  difficult  task  because  am 
transfers  have  been  and  will  remain 
key  foreign  policy  instrument  for  othi 
major  suppliers.  Arms  transfers  invoh 
domestic,  economic,  and  political  coi 
siderations  in  most  supplier  states,  ju 
as  they  do  in  the  United  States.  Fu 
thermore,  recipient  countries  ha^ 
legitimate  defense  needs  that  must  ' 


.-arch  1978 


47 


et.  In  seeking  to  induce  other 
ippliers  or  recipients  to  reduce  sales 

•  purchases  of  arms,  therefore,  we 
lust  convince  them  that  their  security 

policy  interests  will  not  be  adversely 
fected.   and  could   be  enhanced,   by 
easured  steps  toward  restraint. 
In  developing   our   approach   to 
ultilateral   cooperation,    we   have 

(tablished   the   following  near-term 

(ijectives: 

•  First,  to  set  an  example  of  restraint 
irough  our  own  reduction  and  thereby 
leate  an  international  climate  more 
Ivorable  to  arms  transfer  restraint; 

•  Second,  to  engage  suppliers  and 
rcipients  in  a  dialogue  on  restraint; 
,d 

•  Third,  to  build  common  interests 
;d  common  principles  for  restraint. 

Common  principles  might  take  the 
lllowing  forms: 

•  Development  of  norms  of  supplier 
^traint.   This  might  reflect  our  own 

;  licy  guidelines,  such  as  no  first  in- 
Dduction  of  advanced  weapons  sys- 
;ns  into  a  region  which  creates  a  new 
I  significantly  higher  combat  capabil- 
j  in  the  area  and  restrictions  on  co- 
pduction  and  retransfers; 
••  Development  of  norms  for  recip- 
it  restraint; 

<•  Establishment  of  consultative 
ijchanisms  to  enhance  the  exercise  of 
litraint; 


•  Integration  of  restraint  efforts  with 
diplomatic  efforts  to  resolve  regional 
disputes;  and 

•  Reduction  of  possibilities  for  sub- 
stitution by  suppliers  where  others  have 
exercised  restraint. 

This  whole  enterprise  will  obviously 
require  the  closest  cooperation  with  a 
wide  variety  of  countries.  From  the 
outset,  we  foresaw  the  need  to  involve 
the  Soviet  Union  and  its  allies,  other 
Western  suppliers,  and  recipients. 

Approach  to  Suppliers 

The  United  States  has  begun  a 
dialogue  on  arms  transfer  restraint  with 
the  Soviet  Union,  the  world's  second 
leading  supplier  of  arms.  It  was  my  re- 
sponsibility to  lead  the  U.S.  delegation 
at  the  preliminary  talks  held  here  in 
Washington  December  14-19,  1977. 
This  was  the  start  of  what  we  hope  will 
be  a  continuing  dialogue  with  the 
Soviets  on  this  issue.  We  explained  the 
new  U.S.  arms  transfer  policy  to  the 
Soviets  and  responded  to  their  ques- 
tions. We  emphasized  what  we  consid- 
ered to  be  the  parallel  U.S. -Soviet 
interest  in  avoiding  confrontations  in 
Third  World  areas  because  of  competi- 
tive transfers. 

We  believe  the  fact  that  we  have 
begun  a  dialogue  with  the  Soviets  is 
important,  although  we  recognize  that 
we  obviously  have  a  long  way  to  go. 
Since  the  preliminary  talks  were  held  at 


our  initiative,  we  did  not  expect  the 
Soviets  to  make  a  major  contribution  at 
this  stage.  However,  we  are  hopeful 
that,  as  we  seek  to  continue  and  inten- 
sify consultations  with  them  this  year, 
their  responsiveness  will  grow  given 
the  importance  of  the  issue. 

The  United  States  has  also  been  in 
contact  with  other  suppliers.  We  have 
emphasized  the  importance  of  and  need 
for  a  coordinated,  multilateral  approach 
to  restraint  if  we  expect  the  effort  to  be 
successful.  We  are  hopeful  that  these 
other  suppliers  will  recognize  their 
interest  in  continuing  to  consult  further 
with  us. 

At  the  same  time  we  realize  that,  in 
the  case  of  certain  suppliers,  the  viabil- 
ity of  their  defense  industry  is  in  the 
U.S.  interest.  This  is  a  fundamental 
tenet  of  our  NATO  standardization  and 
rationalization  policies.  Reduction  in 
their  arms  exports  could  have  propor- 
tionally greater  consequences  for  their 
domestic  economies  and  technological 
base  than  the  same  reductions  would 
have  for  the  United  States. 


Recipients 

I  would  now  like  to  turn  to  U.S.  ob- 
jectives with  regard  to  arms  recipients. 
Our  objectives  are  to: 

•  Establish  the  general  acceptability 
of  limitations  on  arms  transfers; 

•  Develop  supplier-recipient  groups 
to  explore  regional  restraint;  and 


PRESIDENT  CARTER 

The  U.S.  Government,  the  executive 
branch,  and  the  Congress  are  pledged  to 
bring  about  a  reduction  in  the  trade  in  con- 
ventional arms.  Last  year,  I  promised  to 
begin  reducing  U.S.  arms  sales  as  a  neces- 
sary first  step.  I  will  continue  that  policy 
this  year. 

In  the  last  fiscal  year,  the  previous  Ad- 
ministration and  my  Administration  made 
sales  commitments  totaling  many  billions  of 
dollars  While  high,  however,  the  total  was 
considerably  less  than  it  would  have  been  in 
the  absence  of  new  restraints  we  introduced, 
particularly  in  sales  commitments  to  the  de- 
veloping countries  of  the  world.  Between 
January  20  and  the  close  of  the  fiscal  year,  1 
approved  and  sent  to  Congress  arms  sales 
totaling  $5,7  billion,  which  is  less  than  half 
the  total  approved  during  the  same  period  in 
,    1976. 

B  Today,  1  am  announcing  that  arms  trans- 
fer agreements  covered  by  the  ceiling  which 
I  have  established  will  be  reduced  by  $740 
million  in  fiscal  year  1978,  This  means  that 
for  the  fiscal  year  which  began  on  Octo- 
ber I,  1977,  and  which  will  end  on  Septem- 
ber 30,   1978.  new  commitments  under  the 


foreign  military  sales  and  military  assist- 
ance programs  for  weapons  and  weapons- 
related  items  to  all  countries  except  NATO. 
Japan,  Australia,  and  New  Zealand  will  not 
exceed  $8.6  billion.  The  comparable  figure 
for  fiscal  year  1977  was  $9.3  billion.  This 
is  a  reduction  of  8%  figured  on  constant  fis- 
cal year  1976  dollars. 

A  larger  cut  in  the  ceiling  would  violate 
commitments  already  made,  including  our 
historic  interest  in  the  security  of  the  Mid- 
dle East,  and  would  ignore  the  continuing 
realities  of  world  politics  and  risk  the  con- 
fidence and  security  of  those  nations  with 
whom  the  United  States  has  vital  and  shared 
foreign  policy  and  security  interests.  A 
smaller  reduction  would  neglect  our  respon- 
sibility to  set  an  example  of  restraint  that 
others  might  follow. 

I  intend  to  make  further  reductions  in  the 
next  fiscal  year.  The  extent  of  next  year's 
reduction  will  depend  upon  the  world  politi- 
cal situation  and  upon  the  degree  of  cooper- 
ation and  understanding  of  other  nations, 

I  want  to  emphasize  that  the  restraint  pol- 
icy 1  announced  on  May  19,  1977,  was  not 
aimed  exclusively  at  the  volume  of  arms 
transfers.  Equally  important  is  restraint  in 
the  sophistication  of  arms  being  transferred 


and  on  the  spreading  capability  to  produce 
armaments.  Therefore,  in  addition  to  the 
ceiling,  I  established  five  specific  controls 
applicable  to  all  transfers  except  those  to 
our  NATO  allies,  Japan,  Australia,  and 
New  Zealand.  These  controls  include:  (1)  a 
control  on  the  first  introduction  of  certain 
advanced  systems  into  an  area;  (2)  a  prohibi- 
tion on  advanced  systems  for  export  only; 
(3)  a  prohibition  on  various  types  of  co- 
production  arrangements;  (4)  tighter  con- 
trols on  retransfer;  and  (5)  special  controls 
on  sales  promotions. 

These  guidelines  are  at  the  heart  of  my 
decisions  to  approve  or  disapprove  an  arms 
transfer. 

As  I  slated  in  my  October  4  speech  to  the 
United  Nations,  genuine  progress  in  this 
area  will  require  multilateral  efforts.  But  we 
are  committed  to  taking  the  first  steps  alone 
to  stop  the  spiral  of  increasing  arms  trans- 
fers. I  call  upon  suppliers  and  recipients 
alike  to  join  us  in  a  determined  effort  to 
make  the  world  a  safer  place  in  which  to 
live. 


Statement  issued  by  the  White  House  on 
Feb.  I,  1978  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  Feb.  6). 


48 

•  Introduce  restraint  into  dangerous 
subregional  conflicts.  The  conflict  be- 
tween Ethiopia  and  Somalia  is  the  type 
of  situation  which  the  United  States  be- 
lieves could  benefit  from  restraint  on 
the  part  of  both  suppliers  and  recip- 
ients. The  President  has  recently  made 
this  point  clear. 

Current  indications  are  that  persuad- 
ing recipients  that  restraint  is  in  their 
interest  will  not  be  easy.  Arms  recip- 
ients among  the  developing  countries 
have,  in  the  past,  voiced  their  opposi- 
tion to  supplier-imposed  restraint.  They 
have  argued  that  restraint  will  deprive 
them  of  the  means  of  self-defense,  and 
advocacy  of  conventional  arms  re- 
straint is  an  attempt  to  divert  attention 
from  nuclear  arms  control  issues  which 
are  central  to  global  security.  Our  ap- 
proach to  recipients  will  have  to  deal 
with  these  arguments  against  restraint 
and  offer  some  practical  approaches  to 
their  security  concerns. 

Indeed,  our  own  policy  is  not  to 
eliminate  U.S.  arms  transfers  but  rather 
to  reduce  them  in  a  manner  that  is  con- 
sistent with  our  own  security  interests 
and  that  does  not  disadvantage  our 
friends  and  allies  if  others  are  arming 
their  adversaries. 

Multilateral  forums,  in  particular  the 
U.N.  Special  Session  on  Disarmament 
scheduled  for  May,  will  provide  us 
with  the  opportunity  to  express  our 
views. 

•  The  United  States  recognizes  that 
legitimate  self-defense  needs  must  be 
met,  and  we  are  not  advocating  curbs 
that  would  prevent  this. 

•  Restraint  is  in  the  interests  of  both 
recipients  and  suppliers;  it  enables  both 
to  conserve  scarce  resources  for  such 
worthier  purposes  as  economic  and 
human  development. 

•  The  United  States  recognizes  that 
the  problem  of  neighbors  engaging  in 
mutual  arms  buildups  demands  a  spe- 
cial subregional  approach  to  restraint. 

We  believe  it  will  be  important  to 
explain  U.S.  policy  more  fully  and  to 
reassure  buyers  that  the  United  States 
does  not  intend  to  sacrifice  the  legiti- 
mate security  needs  of  the  developing 
countries. 

As  I  indicated  earlier,  we  did  not  an- 
ticipate it  would  be  easy  to  orchestrate 
a  multilateral  arms  transfer  restraint  ef- 
fort. However,  we  recognized  that  we 
would  have  to  take  the  initiative,  since 
we  are  the  leading  supplier  of  arms. 
We  have  taken  that  initiative.  We  also 
recognized  the  complexities  of  restrain- 
ing arms  transfers  and  the  importance 
ascribed  to  arms  transfers  by  both 
suppliers  and  recipients.  Our  approach. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


nevertheless,  recognizes  these  inter- 
ests; we  are  moving  ahead.  However,  I 
would  be  less  than  candid  if  I  stated 
that  we  have  made  great  progress  to 
date.  We  have  begun  the  process.  We 
intend  to  keep  it  going  and  increase  the 
momentum.  This  Administration  be- 
lieves that  the  time  has  come  to  address 
conventional  arms  transfer  issues  with 
the  same  seriousness  of  purpose  that 
we  devote  to  nuclear  arms  limitation. 


LT.  GEN.  FISH=' 

The  President's  policy  statement  on 
conventional  arms  transfers  of  May  19, 
1977,  announced  that  the  Secretary  of 
Defense  would  continue  to  review  gov- 
ernment procedures,  particularly  pro- 
curement procedures,  which  may  pro- 
mote the  sale  of  arms. 

As  a  first  step  in  responding  to  the 
President's  request,  the  Secretary  of 
Defense  asked  the  heads  of  all  of  the 
relevant  components  within  the  De- 
fense Department  to  review  and  com- 
ment on  the  procedures  of  the  Defense 
Department.  He  also  asked  the  heads  of 
other  government  departments  and 
agencies  to  review  and  comment  on 
their  procedures.  The  Secretary  wished 
to  examine  not  only  those  procedures 
which  might  directly  promote  the  sale 
of  arms  but  also  those  procedures 
which,  while  intended  for  other  pur- 
poses, might  be  perceived  by  some 
within  government,  by  contractors,  or 
by  prospective  foreign  customers  as  in- 
centives for  promoting  arms  sales. 

The  responses  that  he  received  pro- 
vided the  basis  for  a  report  covering 
three  broad  areas. 

•  First,  it  identified  procedures 
which  are  designed  to  facilitate  the  sale 
of  arms  to  meet  U.S.  national  security 
objectives. 

•  Second,  it  reviewed  a  number  of 
procedures  that  have  been  revised  in 
recent  years,  particularly  during  the 
studies  that  led  to  the  President's  pol- 
icy statement,  to  remove  possible  in- 
centives for  arms  sales. 

•  Third,  it  suggested  a  number  of 
areas  where  further  action  could  be 
taken  to  remove  possible  incentives — 
or  perceived  incentives — to  promote 
arms  sales. 

The  Secretary  directed  the  report  be 
forwarded  to  the  President,  together 
with  recommendations  where  existing 
procedures  could  be  tightened  to  avoid 
possible  incentives  for  arms  sales  and 
to  exert  earlier,  more  effective  control 
over  the  development  of  prospective 
sales. 


Facilitating  Arms  Sales 


Collective  security  has  been  tht 
keystone  of  U.S.  national  security  pol 
icy  for  three  decades.  The  defensiv 
strength  of  the  United  States  is  inex 
tricably  linked  to  the  defensive  streng 
of  its  close  friends  and  allies.  This  fun 
damental  principle  was  reaffirmed  i 
the  President's  policy  statement  oi 
May  19.  While  calling  for  restraint 
arms  sales,  the  President  made  clea 
that  it  is  in  the  national  interest  to  con 
tinue  to  provide  those  arms  needed  by 
our  allies  and  friends  to  meet  thei 
legitimate  defense  requirements.  Cer^ 
tain  procedures,  developed  over  tht 
years,  are  designed  to  help  meet  thest 
requirements. 

Under  authority  granted  by  the  Con 
gress,  the  Defense  Department  de 
veloped  procedures  by  which  othe: 
countries  could  buy  equipment  from 
U.S.  stocks  and  use  the  procuremen 
agencies  of  the  Defense  Department  to 
purchase  defense  articles  and  service!| 
from  U.S.  contractors.  The  participat 
ing  governments  benefit  from  completi 
package  acquisition,  fair  pricing,  qual 
ity  control,  audit  services,  and  othe 
practices  designed  for  the  U.S.  Armec 
Forces  in  their  relations  with  U.S.  con 
tractors.  In  return,  the  participatinj 
governments  pay  all  costs  associate( 
with  their  purchases,  including  an  ad' 
ministrative  surcharge,  which  insurei 
administration  of  the  program  at  no  ex 
pense  to  the  U.S.  taxpayer. 

The  Defense  Department  also  has 
developed  supply  support  arrangement! 
under  which  a  participating  country  ii 
able  to  use  the  logistics  system  support 
ing  U.S.  forces.  This  simplifies  mar 
kedly  the  problems  of  assuring  tha 
follow-on  support  will  be  available  or 
a  timely  and  economical  basis.  For  thii 
service,  a  participating  government 
makes  an  initial  payment  to  cover  it! 
equity  in  the  system,  plus  payments  foi 
drawdowns  from  the  system  and  ar 
administrative  surcharge.  Payments  bj 
the  participating  governments  cover  the 
full  cost  of  the  services  rendered— 
again,  at  no  cost  to  the  U.S.  taxpayer. 

To  assist  less  developed  friends  an 
allies  meet  their  defense  needs.  th< 
Congress  enacted  legislation  which  en 
ables  the  executive  branch  to  provide 
financing  for  arms  sales,  as  a  substitute 
for  grant  aid,  either  through  direct 
credit  out  of  funds  made  available  from 
the  U.S.  Treasury  or  by  credit  guaran- 
tees using  the  facilities  of  private  len- 
ders or  the  Federal  Financing  Bank 
[under  the  U.S.  Treasury].  The  ability  to 
extend  credit  financing  has  enabled  a 
number  of  countries  to  meet  their  de- 
fensive requirements  without  U.S. 
grant  assistance. 


Vlarch  1978 

Also,  to  facilitate  standardization 
ind  coproduction  objectives,  the  Con- 
:ress  has  authorized  the  waiver  of  cer- 
ain  training  costs  under  reciprocal  ar- 
angements  within  our  NATO  allies 
ind  permitted  the  waiver  or  reduction 
if  nonrecurring  research  and  develop- 
nent  and  production  costs  in  cases  that 
vould  contribute  significantly  to 
slATO  standardization. 

Each  of  these  procedures,  properly 
■ontrolled.  further  U.S.  interests  by 
lelping  meet  the  legitimate  defense 
leeds  of  allies  and  friends  in  an  eco- 
loniical.  effective  fashion. 


Existing  Safeguards 

There  are  a  number  of  measures,  in- 
luding   several   adopted   during  the 
ourse  of  the  interagency  review  lead- 
ng  to  the  formulation  of  the  Adminis- 
ration's  policy  on  arms  sales,  which 
erve  to  guard  against  unwarranted 
mis  sales. 
First,  all  sales  are  under  the  direct 
'olicy  control  of  the  State  Department 
nd  are  subject  to  approval   or  disap- 
roval  by  that  department.  In  addition, 
11  major  proposed  sales  are  subject  to 
multiple-review  process. 
Second,  the  State  Department,  in 
onjunction  with  the  Treasury  Depart- 
lent  and  other  agencies,  exercises  pol- 
:y  control  over  the  extension  of  credit 
inancing  in  all  cases,  including  financ- 
ng  guarantees. 
Third,    Defense   personnel   are 
xplicitly   barred   from   engaging   in 
Tomotional  activities  to  further  foreign 
ales,  except  where  the  Secretaries  of 
tate  and  Defense,  or  the  President,  de- 
ermine  that  it  is  in  the  national  interest 
0  promote   a  sale — e.g..    F-16"s   to 
JATO. 

Fourth,  the  State  Department  has  is- 
ued  detailed  guidance  limiting  the 
ypes  of  assistance  that  U.S.  diplomatic 
nissions  can  render  U.S.  contractors 
nd  cautioning  against  any  activities 
vith  host  government  officials  which 
ould  influence  the  possible  sale  of 
najor  defense  equipment  that  has  not 
>een  fully  approved  or  transferred  to 
he  country  concerned.  Current  proce- 
lures  also  provide  for  prior  State  De- 
lartment  approval  of  Commerce  De- 
)artment  assistance  to  U.S.  contractors 
or  significant  prospective  arms 
•ales— except  for  sales  to  NATO,  Aus- 
ralia.  Japan,  and  New  Zealand. 

Fifth,  the  Defense  Department  has 
;liminated  certain  practices  designed  in 
he  mid- 1 960  "s  to  serve  as  incentives  to 
U.S.  manufacturers  to  sell  their  arms 
ibroad.  It  has: 

•Eliminated  the  I -47c  additional 
profit  factor  that  had  been  previously 


authorized  for  foreign  military  sales; 

•  Restricted  rent-free  use  of  U.S. 
Government  property  by  contractors 
producing  defense  items  for  foreign 
governments;  and 

•  Provided  new.  more  stringent  con- 
trol over  agents'  fees  related  to  foreign 
military  sales  contracts. 

Sixth,  Defense  Department  proce- 
dures place  early  management  em- 
phasis on  defining  the  potential  impact 
of  proposed  sales  on  programs  to  meet 
the  requirements  of  U.S.  forces,  the 
degree  of  risk  to  other  Defense  De- 
partment interests,  including  the  impact 
on  its  technology  base,  and  anticipated 
coproduction. 

Seventh,  surveys  under  U.S.  spon- 
sorship to  assist  other  governments  in 
determining  their  equipment  require- 
ments are  very  carefully  controlled  by 
the  Departments  of  State  and  Defense 
since  the  results  could  be  construed  as 
U.S.  approval  of  the  requirements  cited 
in  the  survey,  despite  any  disclaimers 
to  the  contrary. 

Eighth,  the  Agency  for  International 
Development  now  requires  regular  as- 
sessments of  the  impact  of  defense  ex- 
penditures on  each  aid  recipient's  eco- 
nomic and  developmental  plans — an 
important  step  since  both  security  sup- 
porting assistance  and  development  as- 
sistance are  intended  to  help  bolster 
economic  and  social  development, 
goals  that  would  be  hindered  by  the  di- 
version of  limited  resources  to  unrealis- 
tic defense  spending. 

Ninth,  all  sales  of  $25  million  or 
more  involving  major  defense  equip- 
ment must  go  through  government-lo- 
government  channels  (foreign  military 
sales)  except  those  for  NATO.  Austra- 
lia. Japan,  and  New  Zealand.  This 
helps  give  the  government  early  control 
over  major  sales.  Under  previous  pro- 
cedures, U.S.  contractors  could  con- 
clude major  sales  agreements  without 
notice  to  the  government  until  the  con- 
tractor sought  an  export  license,  often 
years  after  the  original  sales  agreement 
had  been  concluded. 

Tenth,  all  major  proposed  sales  are 
subject  to  a  multiple-review  process 
that  should  assure  a  thorough  airing  of 
all  relevant  factors  bearing  on  a  pro- 
posed sale  (thus  also  serving  to  deter 
those  who  might  sponsor  a  dubious 
sale).  The  process  involves  a  review  of 
all  major  proposed  foreign  military 
sales  or  other  potentially  sensitive 
cases  by: 

•  Various  interested  executive 
branch  agencies; 

•  The  President  for  those  proposed 
sales  that  must  be  referred  to  the  Con- 
gress under  existing  legislation;  and 


49 


•  The  Congress  for  all  proposed 
government-to-government  sales 
(foreign  military  sales)  totaling  $25 
million  or  more,  or  in  the  ca.se  of  major 
defense  equipment,  totaling  $7  million 
or  more.  The  Congress  has  at  least  30 
days  in  which  to  indicate  its  disagree- 
ment of  the  proposed  sale  through  the 
passage  of  a  concurrent  resolution. 
(The  Congress  also  receives  30-days' 
notice  of  proposed  export  licenses  for 
exports  above  the  same  thresholds  to 
authorized  countries  through  commer- 
cial channels.) 

Eleventh,  the  newly  established 
Arms  Export  Control  Board  provides  a 
forum  comprising  all  executive  branch 
agencies  with  an  interest  in  arms  sales 
for  advising  the  Secretary  of  State  on 
security  assistance  matters,  including 
arms  sales. 

Twelfth,  the  President's  policy 
statement  that  the  future  use  of  arms 
sales  as  a  foreign  policy  tool  would  be 
the  exception  rather  than  the  rule,  with 
the  burden  of  proof  now  on  those  favor- 
ing a  proposed  sale,  should  prove  a 
major  factor  in  reducing  "incentives" 
for  arms  sales. 


Other  Recommended  Safeguards 

The  review  of  procedures  within  De- 
fense and  those  followed  by  other 
agencies  identified  several  areas  where 
those  procedures  could  be  tightened  to 
avoid  acting  as  incentives — or  seeming 
to  act  as  incentives — for  arms  sales  and 
to  exert  earlier,  more  effective  control 
over  the  development  of  prospective 
sales.  Most  of  the  recommendations 
made  have  been  approved  for  im- 
mediate implementation;  several  have 
been  referred  to  the  Arms  Export  Con- 
trol Board  for  further  review  before 
implementation. 

•  The  Defense  Department  is  con- 
sidering legislation  that  would  require 
the  deposit  into  the  Treasury's  miscel- 
laneous receipts  account  of  sums  re- 
ceived by  Defense  Department  agen- 
cies from  foreign  sales  as  reimburse- 
ment for  nonrecurring  research,  de- 
velopment, and  production  costs.  If 
passed  by  the  Congress,  this  legislation 
would  eliminate  any  perception  of 
"windfalls"  from  arms  sales  to  the 
service  budgets. 

•  The  Defense  Department  has  is- 
sued instructions  that  will  place  tight 
control  over  the  bailment  of  U.S. 
Government-owned  equipment  to  U.S. 
contractors  for  sales  promotion  pur- 
poses. This  step  will  restrict  the  past 
practice  of  permitting  U.S.  contractors 
to  use  equipment  produced  at  U.S. 
Government  expense — particularly  pro- 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


totypes  that  competed  unsuccessfully 
lor  selection  by  the  U.S.  services — in 
promoting  sales  to  foreign  markets. 
There  is  sufficient  flexibility,  however, 
to  permit  the  bailment  of  equipment 
when  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  or  his 
designee,  determines  that  the  bailment 
would  specifically  further  the  national 
interest,  such  as  standardization  of 
selected  equipment  within  NATO  or 
with  other  allies. 

•  The  Defense  Department  also  has 
issued  instructions  that  place  very  tight 
control  over  activities  in  support  of  in- 
ternational shows  involving  items  on 
the  munition  list,  such  as  air  shows 
featuring  military  aircraft.  In  the  past, 
such  support  included  the  bailment  of 
government  equipment,  granting  export 
licenses  for  demonstration  purposes, 
and  attendance  by  high-level  U.S.  mili- 
tary and  civilian  Defense  officials. 
Again,  this  restraint  will  be  exercised 
with  sufficient  flexibility  to  permit 
such  activities  when  the  Departments 
of  State  and  Defense  determine  that 
they  will  be  in  the  national  interest, 
such  as  support  for  standardization 
efforts. 

•  The  State  Department  has 
amended  its  international  traffic  in 
arms  regulations,  effective  September 
1,  1977,  to  require  prior  U.S.  Govern- 
ment approval  before  U.S.  contractors 
may  make  any  proposal  or  presentation 
designed  to  constitute  a  basis  for  a  de- 
cision by  a  foreign  government  to  pur- 
chase significant  combat  equipment  on 
the  munitions  list  under  a  contract  for 
$7  million  or  more  for  use  by  its  armed 
forces.  Unless  such  activities  are  cur- 
tailed, the  U.S.  Government  runs  the 
risk  of  being  confronted  with  the  di- 
lemma of  either  approving  a  sale  which 
it  might  not  otherwise  consider  to  be  in 
its  interest  or  risking  the  displeasure  of 
the  foreign  government  which  had  en- 
tered into  a  sales  arrangement  in  an- 
ticipation of  its  approval  by  the  U.S. 
Government.  The  Defense  Department 
has  issued  instructions  that  any  viola- 
tions by  industry  perceived  by  Defense 
officials  should  be  reported  im- 
mediately to  the  Director,  Defense 
Security  Assistance  Agency,  who 
will  immediately  advise  the  State 
Department. 

•  The  State  Department  has  taken 
steps  to  require  foreign  countries — 
aside  from  NATO,  Australia,  Japan, 
New  Zealand,  and  others  when  specif- 
ically designated — to  use  diplomatic 
channels  in  forwarding  requests  for 
purchases  of  major  defense  equipment. 
This  requirement  should  eliminate  the 
diversity  of  channels  that  had  been 
used  by  other  governments  in  forward- 
ing arms  requests  which  opened  pos- 
sibilities for  confusion  and  to  adminis- 


trative delays  and  potential  commit- 
ments, implied  or  real,  before  sales  re- 
quests could  be  reviewed  by  all  in- 
terested agencies.  It  also  should  help 
assure  that  the  requests  have  been 
given  thorough  consideration  by  appro- 
priate agencies  within  the  requesting 
government  rather  than  merely  reflect- 
ing the  desires  of  the  foreign  military 
service  involved. 

•  The  Departments  of  State  and  De- 
fense have  designated  points  of  contact 
to  work  with  industry  on  policy  matters 
regarding  proposed  sales  or  the  im- 
plementation of  approved  sales  agree- 
ments. This  step  should  help  eliminate 
the  variety  of  channels  now  used  by  in- 
dustry in  dealing  with  government 
agencies  in  industry's  efforts  to  pro- 
mote sales.  It  also  should  assure  that 
industry  receives  consistent  policy 
guidance. 

•  Under  the  aegis  of  the  Arms  Ex- 
port Control  Board,  member  agencies 
are  taking  steps  to  extend  the  Defense 
Department  "standards  of  conduct"  to 
govern  relations  between  all  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment personnel  involved  with  arms 
sales  and  industry.  When  done,  there 
will  be  a  comprehensive,  stringent  set 
of  standards  for  all  personnel  dealing 
wtih  industry  on  arms  sales  matters. 

•  The  U.S.  Government  will  curtail 
its  involvement — except  for  NATO, 
Australia,  Japan,  and  New  Zealand — in 
offset  arrangements  under  which  given 
levels  of  procurement  in  a  foreign 
country  by  the  United  States  or  its  con- 
tractors would  partially  compensate  for 
a  foreign  government's  purchases  from 
the  United  States.  The  Departments  of 
State  and  Defense  and  other  interested 
agencies  will  consider  each  proposed 
offset  arrangement  to  assure  that  it  will 
not  be  used  as  an  incentive  for  arms 
sales — except  where  there  are  specific 
national  interests  that  will  be  furthered, 
such  as  NATO  standardization  or  where 
it  would  otherwise  be  extremely 
difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for  our  al- 
lies to  meet  their  legitimate  needs  with 
U.S.  equipment. 

As  1  mentioned  earlier,  several  of  the 
recommendations  are  now  before  the 
Arms  Export  Control  Board  lor  further 
review  before  implementation.  These 
recommendations  include  speeding  up 
the  interagency  review  process  of  all 
significant  arms  requests,  thus  helping 
guard  against  a  proposed  sale  develop- 
ing a  life  of  its  own  before  the  review 
process  is  completed. 

The  recommendations  under  review- 
also  include  measures  to  help  assure 
that  credit  financing  extended  by  the 
U.S.  Government  does  not  act  as  incen- 
tive for  arms  sales,  while  at  the  same 
time  permitting  our  less  developed  al- 


lies and  friends  to  meet  their  legitimii 
defense  needs  in  economical  fashit 
(but  with  no  cost  to  the  U.S.  taxpa\ei 
Finally,  the  AECB  also  has  under  r 
view  steps  to  remove  certain  tax  ben 
fits  that  serve  as  incentive  to  U.S  i 
dustry  to  export  arms. 

We  will  be  able  to  report  further  t 
each  of  these  measures  when  the  Arr 
Export  Control  Board  completes  its  r 
view.  Meanwhile,  I  think  it  fair  to  si 
that  each  of  these  steps  that  I  ha- 
mentioned  should  serve  to  remoN. 
whatever  incentives  —  real  c| 
perceived — there  might  have  been 
government  procedures  tending 
promote  unwarranted  arms  sales.  Tb 
net  result  should  also  lead  to  tightej 
more  effective  control  over  sales 
they  develop.  We  will  continue  to 
alert  to  new  incentives  that  migl!| 
emerge.  But,  as  a  result  of  the  recor 
mendations  to  the  President,  tl 
framework  of  government  procedurd 
governing  arms  sales  should  be  coiij 
sistent  with  the  President's  policy 
restraint. 

Guidance  for  Industry 

Industry  is  keenly  interested  in  an 
policies  or  regulations  that  may  affeJ 
its  participation  in  foreign  militaiff 
sales.  Industry  will  be  directly  ai 
fected.  for  example,  by  some  of  tl 
changes  in  procedures  resulting  fro 
the  recommendations  to  the  President. 
will  describe  briefly  how  we,  in  tl 
executive  branch,  go  about  informir 
industry  on  matters  of  interest  to  it  ri 
garding  foreign  military  sales. 

The  principal  source  of  informatic 
and  policy  guidance  to  industry  is  tl 
Bureau  of  Politico-Military  Affairs 
the  State  Department,  particularly  i 
Office  of  Munitions  Control.  That  o 
fice  is  responsible  for  maintaining  tl 
international  traffic  in  arms  reguli 
tions.  which  provide  the  basi 
guidelines  for  industry  regarding  thos 
items  and  services  which  require 
license  or  "approval"  before  they  ma 
be  exported. 

It  also  delineates  other  constraints  o 
contractor  activities  in  dealing  wit 
foreign  governments  in  this  area.  F( 
all  practical  purposes,  the  regulatiot 
are  the  "Bible"  for  industry  on  foreig 
military  sales  matters. 

In  addition,  the  Office  of  Munitioni 
Control  periodically  issues  newsletter! 
for  industry  keeping  it  abreast  of  pn 
posed  major  changes  to  the  regulatiot 
and   of  major  policy   development! 
such  as  the   President's  statement 
conventional   arms   transfer  policy  o 
last  May.  At  the  request  of  other  agent 
cies,  the  newsletter  will  also  inform  in 
dustry  of  changes  in  the  procedures  o; 


iUaich  1978 


51 


lose  agencies  that  may  affect  indus- 
;,-y's  involvement  in  foreign  sales.   In 
sriis  regard,   the   Defense   Department 
■  /ill  ask  that  various  changes  resulting 
t  rom  Secretary  Brown  "s  recommenda- 
ton  to  the  President  be  covered  in  fu- 
jre  editions  of  the  newsletter. 
The   Defense   Department   provides 
Tiuidance  to  industry  through  the  armed 
itsrvices    procurement   regulations. 
s:l'hese  regulations  describe  in  detail  De- 
fense  Department   procurement   ac- 
1  vities  and   procedures,   which   also 
pply   to  procurement   on   behalf  of 
l)reign  governments.  In  addition,  they 
irovide  guidance  on  matters  peculiar  to 
ireign  military  sales,  such  as  whether 
;  lere  might  be  additional    "allowable 
3sts"'   attributable  to  such  transac- 
:  ons.  The  procurement  regulations  are 
!  ivailable  to  contractors  through  the 
E  overnment  Printing  Office. 
:    The  Defense  Department  also  pub- 
;  shes  the  military  assistance  and  sales 
lanual.  It  is  the  best  single  source  of 
iformation  regarding  guidelines  and 
rocedures  under  which  the   foreign 
lilitary  sales  system  operates.  It  is  in- 
nded  primarily  for  use  by   Defense 
epartment  agencies  but  is  available  to 
intractors. 
:    Aside  from  that.   Defense  Depart- 
lent  representatives  participate,  upon 
;  :quest.   as  speakers  or  panelists  in 
)rums  brought  together  by  industry  to 
iscuss  foreign  military  sales  matters, 
hese  occasions  provide  excellent  op- 
[  Drtunities  to  tell  industry  more  about 
.S.   Government  policies  and  to  re- 
3ond   to  questions  as  to  how  those 
alicies  may  affect  industry. 

I 

accounting  System 

Under  Secretary   Benson  has  de- 

;ribed  the  ceiling  set  by  the  President 

n   the    transfer   of  weapons    and 

eapons-related   items   in  the  current 

seal  year.   She  also  noted  the  com- 

lexities  of  trying  to  manage  transfers 

ithin  the  ceiling  in  a  fair  and  equita- 

le  manner — and  in  a  way  that  will  best 

:rve  U.S.  interests.  To  assist  the  State 

department  in  this  intricate  task,   the 

>efense  Department  has  developed  a 

siling  management  accounting  system 

)  assure  that  the  State  Department  will 

ave  the  most  accurate,  up-to-date  in- 

jrmation  regarding  the  status  of  pro- 

osed  or  completed   transfers  at  any 

jiven  point  during  the  fiscal  year.  The 

,)efense  Department  also  has  provided 

lertain   estimates   of   anticipated 

;ales — based  on  past  experience  and 

:ther  available  data — against  which  the 

i'tate  Department  can  gauge  the  impact 

jf  proposed  sales  against  the  ceiling 

iDtal. 

The  ceiling  management   system 


comprises  three  different  accounts. 

•  The  first  account  includes  all 
foreign  military  sales  transactions  to 
nonexempt  countries  involving 
weapons  or  weapons-related  items  that 
are  under  $25  million  or.  if  they  in- 
volve major  defense  equipment,  are 
under  $7  million.  In  other  words,  this 
account  includes  all  cases  not  subject 
to  the  reporting  requirements  of  Sec- 
tion 36(b)  of  the  Arms  Export  Control 
Act.  Most  of  these  cases  involve  rela- 
tively small  dollar  amounts. 

•  The  second  account  includes 
foreign  military  sales  transactions  of 
weapons  and  weapons-related  items  to 
nonexempt  countries  in  excess  of  the 
above  monetary  thresholds  which  pro- 
vide follow-on  support  for  weapons 
systems  previously  provided  to 
nonexempt  countries. 

•  The  third  account  includes  all 
other  foreign  military  sales  transactions 
involving  weapons  or  weapons-related 
items  to  nonexempt  countries  that  total 
$25  million  or  more  or,  in  the  case  of 
major  defense  equipment,  total  $7  mil- 
lion or  more. 

The  reason  for  keeping  the  second 
and  third  accounts  separately  is  that  the 
second  account  for  follow-on  support 
items  is  less  flexible  than  the  third  ac- 
count. The  United  States  has  an  im- 
plied commitment  to  provide  follow-on 
support  for  equipment  that  it  had  pre- 
viously sold  to  another  country — 
unless,  of  course,  policy  considerations 
develop  to  the  contrary.  Accordingly, 
it  is  the  third  account  that  covers  those 
items  where,  as  Under  Secretary 
Benson  noted,  the  government  has  the 
greatest  discretion  in  managing  the 
ceiling. 

A  transaction  is  entered  as  a  "com- 
mitment" against  the  first  account  as 
soon  as  a  firm  letter  of  offer  is  ex- 
tended to  a  foreign  government.  Trans- 
actions in  the  other  two  accounts  are 
handled  differently.  The  Congress  must 
be  given  at  least  30-days"  formal 
notice — and  normally  is  given  an  addi- 
tional 20-day s'  advance  notice — before 
a  letter  of  offer  may  be  extended  for  a 
transaction  that  would  fall  into  either 
account.  Accordingly,  when  Congress 
is  notified,  the  transaction  is  entered 
into  the  second  or  third  account  as 
"reserved. " 

Later,  after  the  congressional  period 
has  passed  and  a  letter  of  offer  has 
been  issued,  the  transaction  moves 
from  the  "reserved"  to  the  "com- 
mitted" column  of  its  respective  ac- 
count. Once  a  letter  of  offer  is  ac- 
cepted, it  is  recorded  as  a  completed 
transaction  against  the  President's  ceil- 
ing; if  it  is  not  accepted  within  the  pre- 
scribed period,  the  letter  of  offer  lapses 


by  its  own  terms,  and  the  transaction  is 
deleted  from  the  account. 

Once  the  ceiling  management  ac- 
counting system  is  fully  operational, 
the  three  accounts  will  show  those  let- 
ters of  offer  that  are  pending  before  the 
Congress  and  those  letters  of  offer  that 
have  been  extended  and  accepted  or  are 
still  outstanding.  They  will  show  the 
status  at  any  given  point.  But  they  are 
not  reliable  for  projecting  the  total 
transactions  that  might  be  expected  to 
fall  into  each  account  at  the  end  of  the 
year.  The  pace  and  levels  of  sales 
transactions  vary.  Consequently,  the 
Defense  Department  has  provided  the 
State  Department  with  certain  estimates 
that  may  be  used  as  yardsticks. 

It  has  given  the  State  Department 
estimates — based  on  past  experience 
and  other  available  data — of  the  level 
of  transactions  that  might  be  expected 
to  fall  under  the  first  account  during 
the  current  fiscal  year;  that  is,  the  total 
value  of  letters  of  offer  that  might  be 
expected  during  the  fiscal  year  for 
foreign  military  sales  transactions  to 
nonexempt  countries  under  $25  million 
or,  in  the  case  of  major  defense  equip- 
ment, under  $7  million.  It  also  pro- 
vided the  State  Department  with 
estimates  —  again.  based  on 
experience — of  the  level  of  transactions 
above  those  monetary  thresholds  that 
might  be  expected  during  the  course  of 
the  fiscal  year  for  follow-on  support 
cases  directly  related  to  weapons  sys- 
tems previously  provided  to  other  coun- 
tries (account  two). 

The  total  of  the  two  estimates — plus 
the  value  of  grants  of  weapons  and 
weapons-related  items  to  nonexempt 
countries — gives  the  State  Department 
a  basis  for  calculating  what  amounts 
under  the  President's  ceiling  would  be 
available  to  the  third  account  or  cate- 
gory of  transactions. 

The  concept  of  the  accounting  sys- 
tem is  simple,  but  it  requires  careful 
management  and  quick,  reliable  report- 
ing. The  Defense  Security  Assistance 
Agency  countersigns  all  letters  of  offer 
to  insure  that  the  items  involved  are 
properly  described  against  the  appro- 
priate account.  All  acceptances  of  let- 
ters of  offer — or  their  rejection — must 
be  reported  to  the  agency  within  5  days, 
whereupon  the  accounts  are  adjusted 
immediately.  Any  changes  in  scope — 
that  is,  increases  or  decreases  in  the 
quantity  of  a  letter  of  offer — must  be 
similarly  reported  so  that  the  accounts 
can  be  adjusted.  The  system  should  as- 
sure that  the  value  of  letters  of  offer 
signed  or  outstanding  never  exceeds  the 
President's  ceiling. 

The  system  is  designed  as  a  man- 
agement tool  and,  in  this  respect,  dif- 
fers from  the  accounting  system  used  to 


52 


carry  out  billing  and  payment  func- 
tions. The  purposes  of  the  new  system 
are  to  assure  that  the  information 
needed  by  the  State  Department  and  the 
White  House  for  effective  management 
of  the  Administration's  policy  is  accu- 
rate, up-to-date,  and  readily  at  hand 
and  to  assure  that  the  President's  ceil- 
ing is  never  exceeded. 


MR.  BLECHMAN* 

Transfers  of  military  equipment  from 
the  United  States  to  other  countries  can 
serve  important  military  and  political 
purposes.  These  purposes  are  well- 
known  and  often  discussed  before  this 
committee  and  elsewhere  in  the 
government. 

Perhaps  less  often  expressed,  how- 
ever, is  the  fact  that  transferring  mili- 
tary equipment  from  the  United  States 
to  other  countries  sometimes  can  prove 
to  be  disadvantageous — politically  and 
militarily. 

•  Arms  transfers  potentially  can  re- 
sult in  the  spread  of  advanced  technol- 
ogies to  countries  that  might  someday 
oppose  us  or  the  diversion  of  military 
equipment  to  terrorists. 

•  Transfers  can  link  the  United 
States  with  regimes  that  violate  basic 
human  rights  and  fundamental  free- 
doms and,  thereby,  tarnish  the  reputa- 
tion of  the  United  States  in  democra- 
cies abroad. 

•  Transfers  can  help  to  stimulate 
local  arms  races  and  contribute  to  in- 
stabilities in  regional  balances  of 
power;  if  military  conflicts  result,  the 
United  States — as  the  military  supplier 
to  one  or  more  of  the  participants — 
may  be  directly  or  indirectly  involved. 

•  Transfers  divert  scarce 
resources — human,  financial,  and 
natural — from  fundamental  economic 
and  social  needs;  in  the  longrun  this 
may  lead  to  instabilities  in  various 
parts  of  the  world  that  could  threaten 
our  security. 

•  Transfers  can  sometimes  draw  the 
United  States  into  unwanted  confronta- 
tions with  other  great  powers,  leading 
to  needless  strains  in  our  relations  and 
dangerous  tensions. 

There  is  also  a  more  intangible  nega- 
tive aspect  to  transfers.  The  role  of  the 
United  States  as  the  world's  arsenal,  as 
opposed  to  the  arsenal  of  democracy, 
does  not  sit  well  with  the  American 
people.  They  recognize  that,  after  all, 
the  currency  of  arms  trade  is  weapons 
of  war.  Yet,  the  public  nowadays  is  too 
sophisticated  to  think  all  arms  sales  are 
immoral. 

Thus  the  challenge  is  to  chart  a 
course  which  incorporates  the  core  val- 


ues of  our  society  in  a  way  consonant 
with  international  realities.  Unfortu- 
nately, in  contemplating  proposed  arms 
transfers,  what  often  are  most  visible 
are  the  immediate  political  costs  of 
turning  down  a  request  and  the  short- 
term  economic  and  political  benefits  of 
establishing  an  arms  supply  relation- 
ship. Less  obvious,  but  just  as  real,  are 
the  longer  term  disadvantages  and  dan- 
gers of  transfers.  Political  honeymoons 
sometimes  turn  into  bitter  divorce.  And 
apparently  minor  military  relations 
with  other  states  sometimes  lead  to 
deeper  involvements  that  can  compli- 
cate and  strain  our  relations  with  both 
local  nations  and  distant  powers. 

We,  the  Soviet  Union,  and  other 
suppliers  have  experienced  these  prob- 
lems; this  Administration's  policy  of 
restraint  in  arms  transfers  is  meant  to 
help  us  avoid  repeating  these  lessons. 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  have  armed  opposing  sides  in 
many  conflicts  in  the  Third  World; 
sometimes  these  opposing  involve- 
ments have  resulted  in  strained  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and  the 
U.S.S.R.  and  a  worsened  climate  for 
progress  in  arms  control  and  other 
negotiations.  The  Vietnam  war,  the 
Arab-Israeli  war  of  1973,  and  the  An- 
golan conflict  are  all  examples. 

At  other  times,  both  the  United 
States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  have  found 
themselves  in  the  position  of  having 
provided  arms  to  both  sides  of  conflict. 
The  result  can  be  strained  relations 
with  both  belligerents.  The  United 
States  faced  such  difficulties  in  the 
Indo-Pakistani  war  of  1965  and  more 
recently  in  the  Greek-Turkish  conflict 
over  Cyprus.  Last  year,  the  Soviet 
Union  was  faced  with  the  use  of  Soviet 
supplied  arms  by  both  parties  to  the 
Egyptian-Libyan  conflict;  presently, 
the  U.S.S.R.  faces  a  similar  situation 
on  the  Horn  of  Africa. 

Indeed,  the  present  situation  on  the 
Horn  dramatically  illustrates  how 
fragile  an  instrument  of  political  influ- 
ence arms  transfers  can  be.  The 
longstanding  U.S.  arms  supply  rela- 
tionship with  Ethiopia  failed  to  prevent 
the  emergence  of  a  new  regime  hostile 
to  the  United  States.  Similarly,  the 
Soviet  Union  was  not  able  to  deter 
Somalia  from  waging  war  against 
Ethiopia,  despite  the  many  years  of 
Soviet  arms  shipments  to  Somalia.  The 
lesson  to  be  learned  from  the  Horn  of 
Africa  is  that  a  supplier  often  cannot 
control  what  the  recipient  docs  with  its 
arms.  Once  the  arms  are  in  the  client's 
possession,  words  and  blandishments 
may  not  be  sufficient  to  limit  their  use. 

Cognizant  of  these  problems,  this 
Administration  has  committed  itself  to 
arms  transfer  restraint;  the  commitment 


Department  of  State  Bullet 

is  deep  and  sincere.  As  President  Ca  i 
ter  has  said,  conventional  arms  contr.  I 
is  not  a  matter  of  the  future — not  eve 
of  the  near  future — but  of  the  in 
mediate  present.  At  the  same  time,  w 
recognize  that  restraint  must  con 
gradually,  that  there  are  risks  involve 
in  a  policy  of  restraint,  and  that  certa 
arms  transfers  can  result  in  real  polit 
cal  and  military  benefits.  For  these  re; 
sons,  our  policy  is  defined  in  rathi 
specific  terms:  We  aim  to  reduce  tl 
dollar  volume  of  transfers  t 
nonexempt  countries,  but  not  necessa 
ily  all  arms  sales. 

Obviously,  we  cannot  pursue  a  po 
icy  of  unilateral  restraint  indefinitel; 
To  some  extent,  our  ability  to  susta> 
restraint  depends  on  the  restraint  i 
others.  If  the  other  major  supplie 
move  in  to  fill  the  void  that  our  r 
straint  creates,  we  will  have  made  r 
lasting  contribution  to  reducing  tf 
worldwide  arms  trade;  we  only  wi 
have  penalized  American  firms,  labo 
and  our  balance  of  payments. 

Once  a  request  is  made  it  is  polit' 
cally  difficult  to  turn  it  down;  thus  ■ 
seek   to  establish  an  environment 
which  fewer  requests  will  be  forthcon 
ing.  The  key  objective  of  our  policy 
to  convince  both  other  suppliers  ar 
recipients  to  restrain  their  own  am 
transfers  and  purchases.  The  obstacl 
in  persuading  suppliers  and  recipien 
of  the  benefits  of  restraint  are  formid 
ble,   but  U.S.   leadership  can  make 
difference.  This  Administration  is  d 
termined  to  make  a  try.   Because  tl 
Soviets  are  the  second  largest  arni 
suppliers,  we  have  entered  into  discu 
sions  of  possible  arms  restraint   wi 
them.  Our  discussions  were  frank  at 
useful,  but  the  subject  is  difficult  ar 
the  process  will  be  a  long  one. 

As  the  world's  leading  arm 
supplier,  the  United  States  has  a  sp» 
cial  obligation  to  take  the  first  ste{ 
toward  restraining  arms  sales.  We  ha\ 
accepted  this  responsibility.  We  are  n 
straining  our  transfers  now,  and  w 
will  continue  to  do  so. 

We  have  taken  steps  to  reduce  th 
volume  of  U.S.  transfers  to  the  Thii 
World.  The  first  step  is  our  firm  coir 
mitment  to  reduce  the  total  value  c 
transfers  of  weapons  and  weapons 
related  items  to  nonexempt  countries 
fiscal  year  1978,  as  compared  to  th 
comparable  total  in  fiscal  year  197' 
Sales  of  services  that  do  not  directl 
contribute  to  military  capabilities- 
primarily  construction — and  all  sales  t 
our  NATO  allies  and  to  Japan,  Austrf 
lia,  and  New  Zealand  are  exempte 
from  this  ceiling. 

The  total  value  of  U.S.  arms  trans 
fers  in  fiscal  year   1978  may  rise 
compared  to  fiscal  year  1977,  but  if  so 


[arch  1978 


53 


TERRORISM:  Scope  of  the  Threat 
and  l^ieed  for  Effective  Legislation 


t  Secretary  Vance 

I  am  pleased  to  appear  before  you 
day  to  discuss  a  subject  of  the  great- 
it  concern  and  urgency;  how  to  defend 
IT  citizens  and  our  national  interests 
jainst  threats  of  terrorism  around  the 
orld.  Congress  and  the  Administra- 
on  must  work  closely  on  this  vital 
sue  so  that  as  a  government  we  are 
epared  to  deal  with  terrorist  acts 
pidly,  decisively,  and  effectively. 
Terrorism  is  one  of  the  most  in- 
imane  phenomena  of  our  time.  We 
ust  do  everything  we  can  to  combat 
is  problem.  As  your  first  witness,  let 
e  present  the  Administration's  posi- 
)n  on  the  overall  problem  of  terrorism 
d  the  need  for  effective  legislation. 
It  is  clear  from  the  pending  legisla- 
>n  that  the  Administration  and  Con- 
ess  share  common  goals;  to  deter 
Torist  attacks,  to  discourage  other 


governments  from  cooperating  with  or 
giving  refuge  to  terrorists,  to  capture 
and  prosecute  those  who  participate  in 
such  crimes,  and  to  do  this  in  coopera- 
tion with  other  governments. 

Strong  legislation  can  help  achieve 
these  goals.  It  will  demonstrate  to  the 
world  that  the  American  Government 
and  people  will  not  tolerate  such  vio- 
lence and  that  we  are  prepared  to  act 
promptly  and  firmly.  Effective  legisla- 
tion can  strengthen  our  ability  to  work 
together  with  other  governments  to- 
ward this  shared  goal. 

Let  me  begin  by  describing  the  scope 
of  the  terrorist  threat,  as  we  see  it  to- 
day. 

•  International  airplane  hijackings 
have  increased  in  the  past  2  years,  after 
a  brief  pause  in  their  frequency. 

•  Worldwide,  the  number  of  ter- 
rorist attacks — including  bombings,  as- 


it  would  not  indicate  a  failure  of  our 
licy.  If  the  total  does  rise,  it  will  be 
:ause  of  greater  sales  to  NATO  and 
ler  exempted  countries  and  possible 
:reases  in  sales  of  construction  serv- 
•s.  It  is  not  the  intention  of  our  pol- 
.  nor  in  the  national  interest  at  this 
le,  to  reduce  the  volume  of  these 
;mpted  sales.  That  which  we  want  to 
luce — sales  to  nonexempt  countries 
nonexempt  goods  and  services — will 
reduced. 

Fhe  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament 
ency  plays  an  important  role  in  the 
mulation  and  implementation  of 
ns  transfer  policy.  The  agency  vig- 
)usly  fulfills  its  statutory  obligations 
advise  tlie  Secretary  of  State,  the  Na- 
nal  Security  Council,  and  the  Presi- 
it  of  the  arms  control  ramifications 
proposed  transfers.  We  are  involved 
the  development  of  arms  transfer 
licy  itself,  we  advise  and  counsel 
ly  in  the  decision  process,  and  we 
ly  a  central  role  in  all  relevant  inter- 
ional  negotiations. 

1  would  like  to  conclude  my  prepared 
timony  by  discussing  the  forthcom- 
;  U.N.  Special  Session  on  Disarma- 
nt.  We  believe  that  this  occasion 
3vides  an  opportunity  to  think  of 
ns  transfers  within  the  broader  con- 
t  of  disarmament  and  development, 
e  prime  motivation  behind  the  con- 
ning of  the  special  session  is  wide- 
cad  Third   World   discontent   with 


both  the  disappointing  records  of 
socioeconomic  development  of  many 
less  developed  countries  and  only  slow 
progress  in  arms  control  and  disarma- 
ment. Factual  or  not,  these  are  the  per- 
ceptions held  in  most  nations  of  the 
world. 

The  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
State  already  have  stated  the  basic  posi- 
tion of  the  United  States;  We  will  ap- 
proach the  special  session  in  a  forth- 
coming fashion  and  will  play  a  positive 
and  constructive  role.  The  United 
States  seeks  better  economic  conditions 
in  the  Third  World;  we  believe  that 
human  dignity  demands  that  individu- 
als have  greater  opportunity  to  better 
their  lives,  to  fulfill  their  potentials  and 
aspirations.  Toward  this  end,  we  are 
determined  to  do  all  within  our  power 
to  create  a  climate  of  understanding, 
support,  and  forbearance  on  the  part  of 
both  suppliers  and  buyers  of  arms.      D 


The  complele  transcript  of  the  hearings  will  he 
piihlisheil  by  the  committee  and  will  be  avail- 
able from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U .S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
DC.  20402. 

'  Lucy  Wilson  Benson  is  Under  Secretary  for 
Security  Assistance,  Science,  and  Technology. 

-  Leslie  H.  Gelb  is  Director  of  the  Bureau  of 
Politico-Military  Affairs. 

'  Lt.  Gen.  H.M.  Fish  (USAF)  is  Director  of 
the  Defense  Security  Assistance  Agency. 

"  Barry  M.  Blechman  is  Assistant  Director, 
Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Agency. 


sassinations,  ambushes,  and  arson — 
has  been  higher  in  the  past  2  years  than 
in  any  previous  comparable  period. 

•  There  has  been  a  shift  away  from 
attacks  against  U.S.  Government  offi- 
cials and  property  to  attacks  on  Ameri- 
can businessmen  and  corporate 
facilities.  The  indications  are  that  these 
threats  on  overseas  facilities  of  U.S. 
corporations  and  their  employees  could 
continue  at  least  at  their  present  level. 

•  Cooperation  among  terrorist 
groups,  with  totally  different  goals, 
appears  to  be  growing.  Groups  such  as 
the  Popular  Front  for  the  Liberation  of 
Palestine,  the  Japanese  Red  Army,  and 
the  Baader-Meinhof  Gang  increasingly 
cooperate  in  lethal  attacks  against  in- 
nocent victims  regardless  of  their 
nationality. 

Some  terrorist  groups  find  their  ide- 
ology in  a  radical  nationalism  that  al- 
lows no  compromise.  Others  seek  to 
destroy  the  political  order  of  their 
countries,  either  because  they  reject  all 
authority  or  because  they  seek  to  in- 
timidate the  established  authorities. 
While  the  motivations  of  individual  ter- 
rorists vary,  however,  it  is  clear  that 
there  is  one  common  thread;  They  will 
attack  the  forms  of  organized  society 
by  all  the  means  they  can  command. 

In  their  common  pursuit  of  violence, 
they  share  information,  weapons, 
money,  and,  at  times,  logistical  sup- 
port. In  the  expression  of  that  violence, 
they  threaten  the  personal  freedom  and 
security  of  us  all. 


International  Response 

Before  I  talk  about  what  the  United 
States  is  doing  to  combat  this  threat,  let 
me  briefly  discuss  the  international  re- 
sponse that  is  emerging,  for  as  much  as 
any  other  problem  we  face,  the  fight 
against  terrorism  must  be  international 
in  scope. 

There  have  been  some  encouraging 
developments. 

•  Hijackers  find  they  can  no  longer 
count  on  landing  in  countries  which 
once  gave  them  sanctuary.  During  the 
recent  Japan  Air  Lines  and  Lufthansa 
hijackings,  nearly  every  nation  in  the 
Middle  East  where  the  hijackers  sought 
refuge  turned  them  away.  We  must, 
nonetheless,  gain  universal  acceptance 
of  the  responsibility  of  nations  to  pros- 
ecute or  extradite  terrorists  ap- 
prehended within  their  jurisdiction,  as 


54 


prescribed  by  the  Hague  and  Montreal 
Conventions. 

•  On  November  3,  1977,  the  U.N. 
General  Assembly  passed  a  resolution 
1  A/32  1/320  and  Corr.  1]  condemning 
hijacking  and  urging  the  adoption  of  ef- 
fective measures  to  combat  it.  The 
approval  of  this  consensus  resolution 
reflects  a  growing  appreciation  by  na- 
tions throughout  the  world  of  the  need 
for  more  effective  action  against  this 
lorm  of  political  violence. 

•  The  successful  actions  of  the  Is- 
raelis at  Entebbe  and  the  West  Germans 
at  Mogadiscio  demonstrated  that  ter- 
rorists can  be  defeated  by  a  combina- 
tion of  appropriate  rescue  capacity, 
flexible  contingency  planning,  and 
skillful  tactics.  We  should  recognize, 
however,  that  such  operations  entail 
great  risk  to  the  hostages  and  may  not 
always  be  feasible. 

U.S.  Response 

For  our  part,  the  United  States  has 
taken  strong  actions  on  a  number  of 
fronts. 

First,  we  have  made  clear  to  all  that 
we  will  reject  terrorist  blackmail.  We 
have  clearly  and  repeatedly  stated  our 
intention  to  reject  demands  for  ransom 
or  for  the  release  of  prisoners. 

Second,  in  this  and  past  Administra- 
tions, we  have  strengthened  airport  se- 
curit\  within  the  United  Stales.  There 
has  been  only  one  successful  hijacking 
of  a  U.S.  scheduled  air  carrier  since 
November  1972.  We  will  continue 
these  essential  security  measures. 

Third,  we  have  improved  safety 
measures  to  protect  U.S.  officials  and 
property  abroad.  We  have  provided 
protective  armor  for  official  vehicles 
and  mandated  security  training  for  all 
personnel  posted  overseas.  Together 
with  the  Department  of  Commerce,  the 
State  Department  is  advising  private 
corporations  and  their  employees  on 
how  to  protect  themselves  and  their 
property  against  terrorist  attacks.  In 
most  cases,  we  have  been  able  to  carry 
out  these  measures  in  close  cooperation 
with  foreign  governments. 

Fourth,  through  action  initiated  this 
fall  by  Secretary  |of  Transportation 
Brock]  Adams  at  the  International  Civil 
Aviation  Organization,  we  have  been 
working  to  upgrade  the  international 
standards  for  airport  security.  The  pri- 
mary focus  of  this  effort  is  to  require 
mandatory  preflight  inspection  of  all 
passengers  and  accompanying  baggage. 

Fifth,  we  have  intensified  our  efforts 
to  move  other  countries  to  ratify  the 
Tokyo,  Hague,  and  Mt)ntreal  Conven- 
tions. As  you  know,  these  conventions 
provide  for  the  apprehension,  prosecu- 
tion, and  extradition  of  those  who 


. 


hijack  or  sabotage  commercial  aircraft. 
To  date,  62  countries  have  ratified  all 
three  conventions;  55  have  ratified 
none.  We  are  not  satisfied  with  these 
numbers;  worldwide  acceptance  of 
these  basic  principles  is  essential. 

Sixth,  we  have  developed,  and  are 
improving,  procedures  for  cooperating 
and  exchanging  information  among  law 
enforcement  agencies  around  the 
world.  For  example,  during  the  hijack- 
ings of  the  Japan  Air  Lines  and  Luf- 
thansa aircraft  last  fall,  we  provided 
background  information  on  terrorist 
groups  and  their  past  operations  and 
guidelines  for  protecting  and  obtaining 
the  release  of  hostages. 

Seventh,  we  have  made  major  or- 
ganizational changes  within  the  execu- 
tive branch  that  are  designed  to  im- 
prove our  ability  to  combat  terrorism. 
Shortly  after  assuming  office,  the  Pres- 
ident reorganized  the  structure  of  the 
National  Security  Council  (NSC). 
Among  the  actions  taken  was  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  Special  Coordination 
Committee  (SCO  to  handle,  among 
other  matters,  crisis  management.  The 
Assistant  to  the  President  for  National 
Security  Affairs  [Zbigniew  Brzezinski] 
chairs  this  committee;  its  members  are 
the  statutory  members  of  the  NSC  and 
other  senior  officials  as  necessary. 

In  a  crisis  situation,  the  SCC  would 
convene  immediately.  This  committee 
insures  that  necessary  decisions  will  be 
made  at  the  highest  levels  of  the 
government. 

The  Special  Coordination  Committee 
supervises  a  senior-level  interagency 
group  to  insure  coordination  among 
agencies  dealing  with  terrorism.  The 
interagency  group  has  an  executive 
committee  consisting  of  representatives 
from  the  Departments  of  State,  De- 
fense, Justice,  Treasury,  Transpor- 
tation, Energy,  and  the  Central  Intelli- 
gence Agency  and  the  NSC  staff.  It  is 
chaired  by  the  representative  of  the 
State  Department;  the  deputy  chairman 
is  the  representative  of  the  Department 
of  Justice.  It  has  met  frequently  since  it 
was  established  in  September  1977. 

To  fulfill  our  responsibilities  within 
this  framework,  the  State  Department 
has  developed  its  own  procedures.  Our 
Operations  Center  is  fully  staffed  on  a 
24-hour  basis  to  manage  crisis  situa- 
tions. It  has  instantaneous  communica- 
tions to  all  parts  of  the  government,  di- 
rect access  to  top  officials,  and  prompt 
communication  to  all  posts  overseas.  It 
has  performed  well  in  the  past,  and  it 
will  do  so  in  the  future. 

Our  procedures  are  designed  to  an- 
ticipate terrorist  attempts  as  well  as  to 
deal  with  ongoing  incidents.  Spe- 
cialized units  in  the  U.S.  intelligence 
community,  as  well  as  other  agencies 


Department  of  State  BuIIe' 

of  the  Federal  Government,  place  hij! 
priority  on  the  collection  and  evalu 
tion  of  necessary  intelligence.  We  a. 
working  to  improve  the  effectivene 
and  promptness  with  which  we  e; 
change  this  information  with  friend) 
agencies  abroad. 

When  U.S.  citizens  in  foreign  com 
tries  are  threatened,  we  immediate) 
communicate  with  foreign  governmeni 
and  make  available  to  them  oi 
information,  advice,  and  experience  ; 
assist  them  in  carrying  out  the 
responsibilities. 

Eighth,  cooperation  on  antiterrorisi 
has  become  an  important  part  of  ot 
bilateral  relations  with  other  nationi 
We  are  urging  other  governments 
take  appropriate  steps  to  combat  te 
rorism  and  bring  terrorists  to  justice. 

Obstacles  to  effective  cooperaticl 
among  governments   remain.    Son"! 
governments,  sympathetic  to  the  aJ 
serted  cause  of  particular  terrorist  o| 
ganizations,   not  only  provide  sail 
haven  but  also  arm.  train,  and  provicl 
cover.  Others  shy  away  from  resolu 
action  to  avoid  jeopardizing  relatioi 
with  countries  that  support  terrorist  o- 
ganizations;  still  others  prefer  to  avo 
the  apprehension  or  prosecution  of  tC' 
rorists  for  fear  of  new  terrorist  attach 
aimed  at  freeing  comrades.  We  wi 
continue  to  press  these  governments 
assume  the  full  measure  of  their  inte 
national  responsibilities. 

The  Administration  and  this  commi 
tee  have  the  same  goals — stopping  te 
rorism.  We  will  continue  to  woi, 
closely  with  you  as  you  develop  effec 
tive  legislation. 


Legislative  Provisions 

Let  me  address  the  provisions  w 
hope  will  be  embodied  in  such  legisl; 
tion. 

•  We  are  prepared  to  submit  reguli 
reports  to  Congress  on  acts  of  interni 
tional  terrorism  that  affect  America 
citizens  or  interests.  We  suggest  th< 
these  reports  be  issued  quarterly  and 

a  form  that  can  be  made  public  so  thj 
all  concerned  Americans  will  have  at 
thoritative  and  current  data  on  terror!: 
incidents.  The  Department  of  Justic 
will  address  these  reporting  require 
ments  in  greater  detail  in  its  testimony 

•  We  will  appear  periodically  befon 
this  committee  to  supplement  thesi 
written  reports.  I  know  that  the  cor 
mittee  will  appreciate  that  much  of  thi 
information  will  be  sensitive.  As  a  re 
suit,  we  strongly  urge  that  these  brief 
ings  be  in  closed  sessions  and  on 
classified  basis. 

•  The  Administration  supports  th 
concept  of  a  public  list  of  countrie 


iarch  1978 


55 


WE|i^TERI\  HEMISPHERE: 

Panama  Canal  Treaties 


'  President  Carter 

I  Seventy-five  years  ago,  our  nation 
jned  a  treaty  which  gave  us  rights  to 
iiild  a  canal  across  Panama,  to  take 
e  historic  step  of  joining  the  Atlantic 
id  Pacific  Oceans.  The  results  of  the 
;reement  have  been  of  great  benefit  to 
<irselves  and  to  other  nations  through- 
it  the  world  who  navigate  the  high 
as. 

The  building  of  the  canal  was  one  of 
e  greatest  engineering  feats  of  his- 
ry.  Although  massive  in  concept  and 
instruction,  it's  relatively  simple  in 
sign  and  has  been  reliable  and  effi- 
;nt  in  operation.  We  Americans  are 
stly  and  deeply  proud  of  this  great 
hievement. 

The  canal  has  also  been  a  source  of 
ide  and  benefit  to  the  people  of 
mama — but  a  cause  of  some  continu- 
g  discontent.  Because  we  have  con- 
illed  a  10-mile-wide  strip  of  land 
ross  the  heart  of  their  country  and 
cause  they  considered  the  original 
rnis  of  the  agreement  to  be  unfair,  the 
ople  of  Panama  have  been  dissatis- 
;d  with  the  treaty.  It  was  drafted  here 


in  our  country  and  was  not  signed  by 
any  Panamanian.  Our  own  Secretary  of 
State  who  did  sign  the  original  treaty 
said  it  was  ".  .  .  vastly  advantageous 
to  the  United  States  and  .  .  .  not  so  ad- 
vantageous to  Panama." 

In  1964.  after  consulting  with  former 
Presidents  Truman  and  Eisenhower, 
President  Johnson  committed  our  na- 
tion to  work  toward  a  new  treaty  with 
the  Republic  of  Panama.  And  last 
summer,  after  14  years  of  negotiation 
under  two  Democratic  Presidents  and 
two  Republican  Presidents,  we  reached 
and  signed  an  agreement  that  is  fair  and 
beneficial  to  both  countries.  The  U.S. 
Senate  will  soon  be  debating  whether 
these  treaties  should  be  ratified." 

Throughout  the  negotiations,  we 
were  determined  that  our  national  secu- 
rity interests  would  be  protected;  that 
the  canal  would  always  be  open  and 
neutral  and  available  to  ships  of  all  na- 
tions; that  in  time  of  need  or  emer- 
gency our  warships  would  have  the 
right  to  go  to  the  head  of  the  line  for 
priority  passage  through  the  canal;  and 
that  our  military  forces  would  have  the 
permanent  right  to  defend  the  canal  if  it 


Ihich  aid  or  abet  terrorist  actions.  Pub- 
;  exposure  and  condemnation  can  be 
ffective  in  discouraging  support  for 
Irrorist  activities.  Removal  of  a  coun- 
jy  from  the  list  would  signal  a  change 
')ward  greater  responsibility  and 
tstraint. 

•  We  are  prepared  to  support  appro- 
'iate  sanctions  against  countries  ap- 
;aring  on  such  a  list;  indeed,  we  al- 
■ady  impose  sanctions  against  certain 
juntries  which  have  been  identified 
ith  terrorist  operations.  We  believe 
lat  any  such  sanctions  should  be  con- 
dered  on  a  case-by-case  basis  taking 
ito  account  probable  effectiveness;  the 
iterests  of  U.S.  citizens  living  abroad; 
nd  our  overall  political,  security,  and 
:onomic  relationships.  In  addition,  to 
e  effective,  sanctions  must  be 
ishioned  so  that  they  can  be  altered  or 
ifted  in  response  to  evidence  of 
hange. 

•  We  support  the  objective  of  pub- 
shing  a  list  of  airports  that  are  defi- 
ient  in  their  security  measures.  How- 
ver,  we  must  recognize  that  there  are 
ignificant  technical  constraints  on 
valuating  the  security  of  foreign  air- 
orts  and  that  we  must  work  together 
■  ith  the  responsible  government  to  up- 


grade these  procedures.  The  Depart- 
ment of  Transportation  will  address 
this  issue  in  greater  detail  in  its 
testimony. 

•  We  hope  that  Congress  will  enact 
enabling  legislation  that  will  result  in 
full  U.S.  compliance  with  the  terms  of 
the  Montreal  Convention  on  aircraft 
sabotage.  In  this  connection,  we  seek 
provisions  for  civil  penalties  to  com- 
plement the  criminal  penalties  already 
available  under  aircraft  security  legisla- 
tion. 

•  And  finally,  it  is  our  hope  that  the 
legislation  developed  by  this  committee 
will  be  consistent  with  the  NSC-SCC 
reorganization  I  have  described. 

Let  me  say  again  that  we  welcome 
the  action  of  this  committee,  and  we 
will  cooperate  with  you  fully  in  the  de- 
velopment of  legislation  that  will  be  ef- 
fective in  dealing  with  this  dangerous 
threat.  D 


Suilemenl  before  the  Senate  Committee  on  Gov- 
ernmental Affairs  on  Jan.  23,  1978.  The  com- 
plete transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  published 
by  the  committee  and  will  be  available  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents.  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office.  Wa.sbington.  D.C.  20402. 


should  ever  be  in  danger.   The  new 
treaties  meet  all  of  these  requirements. 

Terms  of  the  Agreement 

Let  me  outline  the  terms  of  the 
agreement.  There  are  two  treaties — one 
covering  the  rest  of  this  century  and  the 
other  guaranteeing  the  safety,  open- 
ness, and  neutrality  of  the  canal  after 
the  year  1999,  when  Panama  will  be  in 
charge  of  its  operation. 

For  the  rest  of  this  century,  we  will 
operate  the  canal  through  a  nine-person 
board  of  directors.  Five  members  will 
be  from  the  United  States  and  four  will 
be  from  Panama.  Within  the  area  of  the 
present  Canal  Zone,  we  have  the  right 
to  select  whatever  lands  and  waters  our 
military  and  civilian  forces  need  to 
maintain,  to  operate,  and  to  defend  the 
canal. 

About  ly/c  of  those  who  now  main- 
tain and  operate  the  canal  are  Panama- 
nians; over  the  next  22  years,  as  we 
manage  the  canal  together,  this  per- 
centage will  increase.  The  Americans 
who  work  on  the  canal  will  continue  to 
have  their  rights  of  employment,  pro- 
motion, and  retirement  carefully 
protected. 

We  will  share  with  Panama  some  of 
the  fees  paid  by  shippers  who  use  the 
canal.  As  in  the  past,  the  canal  should 
continue  to  be  self-supporting. 

Support  for  the  Treaties 

This  is  not  a  partisan  issue.  The 
treaties  are  strongly  backed  by  Presi- 
dent Gerald  Ford  and  by  former  Sec- 
retaries of  State  Dean  Rusk  and  Henry 
Kissinger.  They  are  endorsed  by  our 
business  and  professional  leaders, 
especially  those  who  recognize  the 
benefits  of  good  will  and  trade  with 
other  nations  in  this  hemisphere.  And 
they  were  endorsed  overwhelmingly  by 
the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Commit- 
tee which,  this  week,  moved  closer  to 
ratification  by  approving  the  treaties, 
although  with  some  recommended 
changes  which  we  do  not  feel  are 
needed. 

And  the  treaties  are  supported  en- 
thusiastically by  every  member  of  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff — General  George 
Brown,  the  Chairman;  General  Bernard 
Rogers,  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Army; 
Admiral  James  Holloway,  Chief  of 
Naval  Operations;  General  David 
Jones,  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Air  Force; 


56 

and  General  Lewis  Wilson,  Comman- 
dant of  the  Marine  Corps — responsible 
men  whose  profession  is  the  defense  of 
this  nation  and  the  preservation  of  our 
security. 

The  treaties  also  have  been  over- 
whelmingly supported  throughout  Latin 
America,  but  predictably,  they  are  op- 
posed abroad  by  some  who  are  un- 
friendly to  the  United  Slates  and  who 
would  like  to  see  disorder  in  Panama 
and  a  disruption  of  our  political,  eco- 
nomic, and  military  ties  with  our 
friends  in  Central  and  South  America 
and  in  the  Caribbean. 

I  know  that  the  treaties  also  have 
been  opposed  by  many  Americans. 
Much  of  that  opposition  is  based  on 
misunderstanding  and  misinformation. 
I've  found  that  when  the  full  terms  of 
the  agreement  are  known,  most  people 
are  convinced  that  the  national  interests 
of  our  country  will  be  served  best  by 
ratifying  the  treaties. 

Major  Questions 

Tonight,  I  want  you  to  hear  the  facts. 
I  want  to  answer  the  most  serious  ques- 
tions and  tell  you  why  I  feel  the 
Panama  Canal  treaties  should  be  ap- 
proved. 

The  most  important  reason — the  only 
reason — to  ratify  the  treaties  is  that 
they  are  in  the  highest  national  interest 
of  the  United  States  and  will  strengthen 
our  position  in  the  world.  Our  security 
interests  will  be  stronger.  Our  trade 
opportunities  will  be  improved.  We 
will  demonstrate  that  as  a  large  and 
powerful  country,  we  are  able  to  deal 
fairly  and  honorably  with  a  proud  but 
smaller  sovereign  nation.  We  will 
honor  our  commitment  to  those  en- 
gaged in  world  commerce  that  the 
Panama  Canal  will  be  open  and  avail- 
able for  use  by  their  ships — at  a  rea- 
sonable and  competitive  cost — both 
now  and  in  the  future. 

Let  me  answer  specifically  the  most 
common  questions  about  the  treaties. 

Will  our  nation  have  the  right  to 
protect  and  defend  the  canal  against 
any  armed  attack  or  threat  to  the  se- 
curity of  the  canal  or  of  ships  going 
through  it? 

The  answer  is  yes  and  is  contained  in 
both  treaties  and  also  in  the  statement 
of  understanding  between  the  leaders  of 
our  two  nations. - 

The  first  treaty  says,  and  I  quote: 

The  United  States  of  America  and  the  Repub- 
lic of  Panama  commit  themselves  to  protect  and 
defend  the  Panama  Canal.  Each  Party  shall  act, 
in  accordance  with  its  constitutional  processes, 
to  meet  the  danger  resulting  from  an  armed  at- 
tack or  other  actions  which  threaten  the  security 
of  the  Panama  Canal  or  [of]  ships  transiting  it. 


The  neutrality  treaty  says,  and  I  quote 
again: 

The  United  Stales  of  America  and  the  Repub- 
lic of  Panama  agree  to  maintain  the  regime  of 
neutrality  established  in  this  Treaty,  which  shall 
be  maintained  in  order  that  the  Canal  shall  re- 
main permanently  neutral,  .  .  . 

And  to  explain  exactly  what  thai 
means,  the  statement  of  understanding 
says,  and  I  quote  again: 

Under  .  .  .  (the  Neutrality  Treaty).  Panama 
and  the  United  States  have  the  responsibility  to 
assure  that  the  Panama  Canal  will  remain  open 
and  secure  to  ships  of  all  nations.  The  correct 
interpretation  of  this  principle  is  thai  each  of  the 
two  countries  shall,  in  accordance  with  their  re- 
spective constitutional  processes,  defend  the 
Canal  against  any  threat  to  the  regime  of  neu- 
trality and  consequently  [shall]  have  the  right  to 
act  against  the  Canal  or  against  the  peaceful 
transit  of  ves.sels  through  the  Canal. 

It  is  obvious  that  we  can  take  what- 
ever military   action   is  necessary  to 


The  treaties  will  increase  our  na- 
tion's  influence  in  this  hemi- 
sphere, will  help  to  reduce  any 
mistrust  and  disagreement,  and 
they  will  remove  a  major  source 
of  anti-American  feeling. 


make   sure   that   the  canal   always  re- 
mains open  and  safe. 

Of  course,  this  does  not  give  the 
United  Stales  any  right  to  intervene  in 
the  internal  affairs  of  Panama,  nor 
would  our  military  action  ever  be  di- 
rected against  the  territorial  integrity  or 
the  political  independence  of  Panama. 

Military  experts  agree  that  even  with 
the  Panamanian  Armed  Forces  joined 
with  us  as  brothers  against  a  common 
enemy,  it  would  take  a  large  number  of 
American  troops  lo  ward  off  a  heavy  at- 
tack. I,  as  President,  would  not  hesitate 
to  deploy  whatever  armed  forces  are 
necessary  to  defend  the  canal,  and  I 
have  no  doubt  that  even  in  a  sustained 
combat,  that  we  would  be  successful. 
But  there  is  a  much  better  way  than 
.sending  our  sons  and  grandsons  lo  fight 
in  the  jungles  of  Panama. 

We  would  serve  our  interests  better 
by  implemenling  the  new  treaties,  an 
action  that  will  help  lo  avoid  any  attack 
on  the  Panama  Canal. 

What  we  want  is  the  permanent  right 
to  use  the  canal — and  we  can  defend 
this  right  through  the  treaties — through 
real  cooperation  with  Panama.  The 
citizens  of  Panama  and  their  govern- 
ment have  already  shown  their  support 
of  the  new  partnership,  and  a  protocol 


Department  of  State  Bullet 

to  the  neutrality  treaty  will  be  sign; 
by  many  other  nations,  thereby  sho' 
ing  their  strong  approval. 

The   new   treaties   will    natural!   ; 
change  Panama  from  a  passive  at  I 
sometimes  deeply   resentful   bystand    ' 
into  an  active  and   interested  parinc 
whose  vital  interests  will  be  served  1 
a  well-operated  canal.  This  agreeme 
leads  to  cooperation  and  not  confront 
lion  between  our  country  and  Panam;i 

Another  question  is:  Why  should  v 
give  away  the  Panama  Canal  Zon«j 
As  many  people  say,    '"We  bought 
we  paid  for  it;  it's  ours."" 

I  must  repeat  a  very  important  poin 
We  do  not  own  the  Panama  Can. 
Zone.  We  have  never  had  sovereign! 
over  it.  We  have  only  had  the  right 
use  it. 

The  Canal  Zone  cannot  be  compare 
with  U.S.  territory.  We  bought  Alasl» 
from  the  Russians,  and  no  one  has  evi 
doubted  that  we  own  it.  We  bought  th 
Louisiana  Purchases — territories  froi 
France,  and  thal"s  an  integral  part  ( 
the  United  States. 

From  the  beginning,  we  have  mad 
an  annual  payment  to  Panama  to  us 
their  land.  You  do  not  pay  rent  on  yoi 
own  land.  The  Panama  Canal  Zone  hi. 
always  been  Panamanian  territory.  Th 
U.S.  Supreme  Court  and  previou 
American  Presidents  have  repeated! 
acknowledged  the  sovereignty  c 
Panama  over  the  Canal  Zone. 

We"ve  never  needed  to  own  th 
Panama  Canal  Zone,  any  more  than  w 
need  lo  own  a  10-mile-wide  strip  c 
land  all  the  way  through  Canada  froi' 
Alaska  when  we  build  an  inlernalion; 
gas  pipeline. 

The  new  treaties  give  us  what  we  d 
need — not  ownership  of  the  canal  bu 
the  right  lo  use  it  and  to  protect  it.  A. 
the  Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  o 
Staff  has  said,  "'The  strategic  value  o 
the  canal  lies  in  its  use. "" 

There "s  another  question:  Can  ou> 
naval  ships,  our  warships,  in  time  o 
need  or  emergency,  get  through  th 
canal  immediately  instead  of  waitin 
in  line? 

The  treaties  answer  that  clearly  b) 
guaranteeing  that  our  ships  will  alway; 
have  expeditious  transit  through  tht 
canal.  To  make  sure  that  there  could  be 
no  possible  disagreement  about  whai 
these  words  mean,  the  joint  slatemeni 
says  that  expeditious  transit,  and 
quote, 

...  is  intended  ...  to  assure  the  transit  of 
such  vessels  through  the  Canal  as  quickly 
possible,  without  any  impediment,  with  expe- 
dited treatment,  and  in  Ithe]  case  of  need  or 
emergency,  lo  go  to  the  head  of  the  line  of  ves- 
sels in  order  to  transit  the  Canal  rapidly. 

Will  the  treaties  affect  our  stand- 


arch  1978 

i  g  in  Latin  America?  Will  they 
■eate  a  so-called  power  vacuum, 
hich  our  enemies  might  move  in  to 

I? 

They  will  do  just  the  opposite.  The 

Miies  will  increase  our  nation's  influ- 

cc  in  this  hemisphere,   will   help  to 

LJiice  any  mistrust  and  disagreement, 

il  they  will  remove  a  major  source  of 

II  American  feeling. 

riic  new  agreement  has  already  pro- 

•JcJ  vivid  proof  to  the  people  of  this 

•flmisphere  that  a  new  era  of  friendship 

;d  cooperation  is  beginning  and  that 

lai  they  regard  as  the  last  remnant  of 

.  eyed  American  colonialism  is  being 

1  inned. 

L.ist  fall,  I  met  individually  with  the 
liders  of  18  countries  in  this  hemi- 
;here.  Between  the  United  States  and 
1  tin  America  there  is  already  a  new 
msc  of  equality,  a  new  sense  of  trust 
;d  mutual  respect  that  exists  because 
I  the  Panama  Canal  treaties.  This 
I  ens  up  a  fine  opportunity  for  us  in 
od  will,  trade,  jobs,  exports,  and 
I  lineal  cooperation. 
If  the  treaties  should  be  rejected,  this 
Hild  all  be  lost,  and  disappointment 
,  J  despair  among  our  good  neighbors 
id  traditional  friends  would  be  severe. 
In  the  peaceful  struggle  against  alien 
i:()logies  like  communism,  these 
I  aties  are  a  step  in  the  right  direction. 
l)lhing  could  strengthen  our  compet- 
1  rs  and  adversaries  in  this  hemisphere 
nre  than  for  us  to  reject  this 
ireement. 

What  if  a  new  sea-level  canal 
iould  be  needed  in  the  future?  This 
(cstion  has  been  studied  over  and 
'CI  throughout  this  century,  from  be- 
;  e  the  time  the  canal  was  built  up 
rough  the  last  few  years.  Every  study 
I  s  reached  the  same  conclusion — that 
I-  best  place  to  build  a  sea-level  canal 
I  in  Panama. 

The  treaties  say  that  if  we  want  to 
I  ild  such  a  canal,  we  will  build  it  in 
Inama,  and  if  any  canal  is  to  be  built 
i  Panama,  that  we,  the  United  States, 
'  11  have  the  right  to  participate  in  the 
1  ijcct. 

This  is  a  clear  benefit  to  us,  for  it 

^u^es  that,  say,   10  or  20  years  from 

u  ,  no  unfriendly  but  wealthy  power 

II  be  able  to  purchase  the  right  to 

1  ild  a  sea-level  canal,  to  bypass  the 

:  isting  canal,   perhaps   leaving   that 

her  nation  in  control  of  the  only  us- 

le  waterway  across  the  isthmus. 

Are  we  paying  Panama  to  take  the 

iinal?  We  are  not.   Under  the  new 

|;aty,  any  payments  to  Panama  will 

lime  from  tolls  paid  by  ships  which 

le  the  canal. 

What  about  the  present  and  the  fu- 
re  stability  and  the  capability  of 
le  Panamanian  Government?   Do 


the  people  of  Panama  themselves 
support  the  agreement? 

Well,  as  you  know.  Panama  and  her 
people  have  been  our  historical  allies 
and  friends.  The  present  leader  of 
Panama  has  been  in  office  for  more 
than  9  years,  and  he  heads  a  stable 
government  which  has  encouraged  the 
development  of  free  enterprise  in 
Panama.  Democratic  elections  will  be 
held  this  August  to  choose  the  members 
of  the  Panamanian  Assembly,  who  will 
in  turn  elect  a  President  and  a  Vice 
President  by  majority  vote.  In  the  past, 
regimes  have  changed  in  Panama,  but 
for  75  years,  no  Panamanian  govern- 
ment has  ever  wanted  to  close  the 
canal. 

Panama  wants  the  canal  open  and 
neutral — perhaps  even  more  than  we 
do.  The  canal's  continued  operation  is 
very  important  to  us,  but  it  is  much 
more  than  that  to  Panama.  To  Panama, 
it's  crucial.  Much  of  her  economy 
flows  directly  or  indirectly  from  the 
canal.  Panama  would  be  no  more  likely 
to  neglect  or  to  close  the  canal  than  we 
would  be  to  close  the  interstate  high- 
way system  here  in  the  United  States. 

In  an  open  and  free  referendum  last 
October,   which   was  monitored  very 


The  Panama  Canal  is  a  vast, 
heroic  expression  of  that  age-old 
desire  to  bridge  the  divide  and  to 
bring  people  closer  together.  This 
is  what  the  treaties  are  all  about. 


carefully  by  the  United  Nations,  the 
people  of  Panama  gave  the  new  treaties 
their  support. 

The  major  threat  to  the  canal  comes 
not  from  any  government  of  Panama 
but  from  misguided  persons  who  may 
try  to  fan  the  flames  of  dissatisfaction 
with  the  terms  of  the  old  treaty. 

There's  a  final  question — about 
the  deeper  meaning  of  the  treaties 
themselves,  to  us  and  to  Panama. 

Recently,  I  discussed  the  treaties 
with  David  McCulIough,  author  of  the 
Path  Between  the  Sects  [:  the  Creation 
of  the  Panama  Canal  1870-1914].  the 
great  history  of  the  Panama  Canal.  He 
believes  that  the  canal  is  something 
that  we  built  and  have  looked  after 
these  many  years;  it  is  "ours"  in  that 
sense,  which  is  very  different  from  just 
ownership. 

So,  when  we  talk  of  the  canal, 
whether  we  are  old,  young,  for  or 
against  the  treaties,  we  are  talking 
about  very  deep  and  elemental  feelings 
about  our  own  strength. 


57 


Still,  we  Americans  want  a  more 
humane  and  stable  world.  We  believe 
in  good  will  and  fairness,  as  well  as 
strength.  This  agreement  with  Panama 
is  something  we  want  because  we  know 
it  is  right.  This  is  not  merely  the  surest 
way  to  protect  and  save  the  canal;  it's  a 
strong,  positive  act  of  a  people  who  are 
still  confident,  still  creative,  still  great. 

This  new  partnership  can  become  a 
source  of  national  pride  and  self- 
respect  in  much  the  same  way  that 
building  the  canal  was  75  years  ago. 
It's  the  spirit  in  which  we  act  that  is  st) 
very  important. 

Theodore  Roosevelt,  who  was  Presi- 
dent when  America  built  the  canal,  saw 
history  itself  as  a  force,  and  the  history 
of  our  own  time  and  the  changes  it  has 
brought  would  not  be  lost  on  him.  He 
knew  that  change  was  inevitable  and 
necessary.  Change  is  growth.  The  true 
conservative,  he  once  remarked,  keeps 
his  face  to  the  future. 

But  if  Theodore  Roosevelt  were  to 
endorse  the  treaties,  as  I'm  quite  sure 
he  would,  it  would  be  mainly  because 
he  could  see  the  decision  as  one  by 
which  we  are  demonstrating  the  kind  of 
great  power  we  wish  to  be. 

"We  cannot  avoid  meeting  great  is- 
sues," Roosevelt  said.  "All  that  we 
can  determine  for  ourselves  is  whether 
we  shall  meet  them  well  or  ill." 

The  Panama  Canal  is  a  vast,  heroic 
expression  of  that  age-old  desire  to 
bridge  the  divide  and  to  bring  people 
closer  together.  This  is  what  the 
treaties  are  all  about. 

We  can  sense  what  Roosevelt  called 
".  .  .  the  lift  toward  nobler  things 
which  marks  a  great  and  generous 
people." 

In  this  historic  decision,  he  would 
join  us  in  our  pride  for  being  a  great 
and  generous  people,  with  the  national 
strength  and  wisdom  to  do  what  is  right 
for  us  and  what  is  fair  to  others.         □ 


Address  to  the  nation  broadcast  live  on  radio 
and  television  on  Fely.  1 .  197H  [text  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of 
Feb.  6). 

'  For  texts  of  the  Panama  Canal  Treaty  and 
the  Treaty  Concerning  the  Permanent  Neutrality 
and  Operation  of  the  Panama  Canal,  see 
Bulletin  of  Oct.  17.  1977.  p.  481. 

-  For  text  of  statement  of  understanding  of 
Oct.  14,  1977.  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  7,  p.  631. 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulk 


TREATIES: 

Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Recommendations,  including  agreed  measures 
for  conservation  of  Antarctic  fauna  and  flora. 
Adopted  at  Brussels  June  2-13.  1964.  al  the 
Third  Antarctic  Treaty  Consultative  Meeting. 
Entered  into  force  July  27.  1966.  except  for 
III-VU.  III-Vlll;  September  1.  1966.  for 
Ill-XI  TiAS  6058. 
,\{ilificcilion  of  cippriniil:    Belgium.  January 

26.  1978.  for  Recommendation  lil-VIII. 
Measures  relating  to  the  furtherance  of  the  prin- 
ciples and  purposes  of  the  Antarctic  treaty. 
Adopted  at  Paris  November  29.  1968,  al  the 
Fifth  Consultative  Meeting.  Entered  into  force 
May  26.  1972.  for  V-l  through  V-4  and  V-9: 
July  31.  1972.  for  V-7  and  V-8.  TIAS  7692 
Notificciuon  of  cipproviil:    Belgium.   Januarv 

26.  1978.  for  Recommendations  V-5,  V-6. 
Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance  of 
the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarctic 
treaty.  Adopted  at  Wellington  November  10. 
1972.  at  the  Seventh  Consultative  Meeting. 
Entered  into  force  May  29,  1975.  for  VII-1 
through  Vll-3,  Vll-6  through  VII-8.  TIAS 
8500. 
Nolificulioii  of  approval:   Belgium,  January 

26.  1978.  for  Recommendation  VII-5. 
Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance  of 
the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarctic 
treaty.  Adopted  at  Oslo  June  20,  1975,  at  the 
Eighth  Consultative  Meeting.' 
Nolificiition  of  approval:    Belgium,   January 

26.    1978,   for   Recommendations    VTII-l, 

VIlI-2.  VIII-5. 

Aviation 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation     Done  at 
Montreal  September  23,    1971.   Entered  into 
force  January  26,  1973.  TIAS  7570. 
RalificutUms  cleposiietl:   Federal   Republic  of 
Germany,  '   '  February  3,  1978;  Switzer- 
land, January   17,   1978. 
Protocol   on  the  authentic  quadrilingual   text  of 
the  convention  on  international  civil  aviation 
(Chicago,    1944)  (TIAS    1591),  with  annex. 
Done  at  Montreal  September  30,  1977.' 
Acveptaiue  ileposiivil:    Ecuador,   January    19, 
1978. 

Cultural  Property 

Convention  on  the  means  of  prohibiting  and  pre- 
venting the  illicit  import,  export,  and  transfer 
of  ownership  of  cultural  property.  Done  at 
Paris  November  14,  1970.  Entered  into  force 
April  24.  1972.^ 

Ralificarionx  ilvposilecl:  Tanzania,   August  2, 
1977;  Uruguay.  August  9.  1977. 

Conservation 

Agreement  on  the  conservation  of  polar  bears. 


Done   at  Oslo  November   15.    1973.   Entered 
into  force  May  26,  1976;  for  the  United  States 
November  1,  1976.  TIAS  8409. 
Raiificaiion  deposited:  Denmark,  January  25, 
1978. 

Consular  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  consular  relations.   Done 
at  Vienna  April  24,  1963.  Entered  into  force 
March   19.    1967;  for  the  United  States  De- 
cember 24,  1969.  TIAS  6820 
Norification    of  succession:    Bangladesh, 

January  13.  1978. 
Accession  deposited:  Haiti.  February  2.  1978. 

Copyright 

Universal  copyright  convention,  as  revised. 
Done  at  Paris  July  24.  1971.  Entered  into 
force  July  10.  1974.  TIAS  7868. 

Protocol  1  annexed  to  the  universal  copyright 
convention,  as  revised,  concerning  the  appli- 
cation of  that  convention  to  works  of  stateless 
persons  and  refugees.  Done  at  Paris  July  24. 
1971.  Entered  into  force  July  10.  1974.  TIAS 
7868. 

Protocol  2  annexed  to  the  universal  copyright 
convention,  as  revised,  concerning  the  appli- 
cation of  that  convention  to  the  works  of  cer- 
tain international  organizations.  Done  at  Paris 
July  24,  1971.  Entered  into  force  July  10. 
1974.  TIAS  7868. 

Accession  deposited:  Australia.  November  29. 
1977. 

Customs 

Customs  convention  on  the  international  transit 
of  goods  (ITI  convention).  Done  at  Vienna 
June  7.  1971.' 

Accession  deposited:  Morocco.  November  17. 
1977, 

Diplomatic  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  diplomatic  relations. 
Done  at  Vienna  April   18.   1961.  Entered  into 
force  April   24.    1964;   for  the   United   States 
December  13.  1972.  TIAS  7502. 
Notification    of  succession :    Bangladesh. 

January  13.  1978. 
Accession  deposited:  Haiti.  February  2.  1978. 

Finance 

Articles  of  agreement  of  the  International  Bank 
for  Reconstruction  and  Development.   Done 
at  Washington  December  27.   1945.  Entered 
into  force  December  27,  1945.  TIAS  1502. 
Signature  and  acceptance:  Maldives,  January 

13,  1978. 
Articles  of  agreement  of  the  International  Bank 
for  Reconstruction  and   Development.    Done 
at  Washington  December  27.   1945.  Entered 
into  force  December  27,  1945.  TIAS  1502. 
Signature  and  acceptance:  Maldives,  January 

13,  1978. 


Agreement  establishing  the  International  Ft 
for  Agricultural  Development    Done  at  Ro 
June  13,   1976.  Entered  into  force  Novenii 
30,  1977. 
Signature:   Papua  New   Guinea,   January 

1978. 
Acceptance  deposited:  United  Arab  Emiral 

December  28,  1977. 
Ratifications  deposited:    Belgium,   Luxe 

bourg.    December   9,    1977;    Moroct 

Uruguay,  December  16,  1977;  Bolivia,  I 

cember  30,  1977;  Israel,  January  10,  19" 
Accessions  deposited:    Benin,   December 

1977;   Dominican  Republic,   December 

1977. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerninj 
study  of  the  compensation  systems  of  the 
ternational  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  I 
velopment  and  the  International  Monet- 
Fund,  with  terms  of  reference,  declaration, 
lated  agreements,  and  arrangement.  Done  I 
cember  15.  1977.  Entered  into  force  t 
cember  15.  1977. 
Signatures:   Federal   Republic  of  Germai 

France.  Japan,   United  Kingdom,  Unit 

States,  December  15,  1977. 

Health 

Amendments  to  Articles  24  and  25  of  the  C( 
stitution  of  the  World  Health  Organization 
July  22,  1946,  as  amended  (TIAS  1808,  46& 
8086,   8534).    Adopted   at   Geneva   May    I 
1976.' 

Acceptances  deposited:  Cape  Verde,  Janui 
13,  1978;  India,  Laos,  January  23,  19' 
Uganda,  January  10,  1978. 

Human  Rights 

International   covenant   on   civil   and   politii 

rights.   Done  at  New  York   December   I 

1966.  Entered  into  force  March  23,  1976.- 

Ratification  deposited:   Guinea,   January 

1978. 

International  covenant  on  economic,  social,  a 

cultural  rights    Done  at  New  York  Decemt 

16,  1966.  Entered  into  force  January  3,  197( 

Ratification  deposited:   Guinea,   January   2 

1978. 

Marriage 

Convention  on  consent  to  marriage,  minimu 
age  for  marriage,  and  registration  of  ms 
riages.  Done  at  New  York  December  1 
1962  Entered  into  force  December  9,  1964. 
Ratification  deposited:  Guinea,  January  2 
1978. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Single  convention  on  narcotic  drugs,  1961    Dor 
at  New  York  March  30,   1961     Entered  in 
force  December   13.    1964;  for  the   Llnite 
States  June  24.  1967.  TIAS  6298. 
Accession  deposited:   Austria.   February 
1978. 

Protocol  amending  the  single  convention  on  nai 
cotic  drugs,  1961.  Done  at  Geneva  March  2.' 
1972.  Entered  into  force  August  8,  1975 
TIAS  8118. 
Accession  deposited:  Austria,  February  I 
1978. 

Convention  on  psychotropic  substances.  Done  i 


arch  1978 

/ienna  February  21,  1971.  Entered  into  loree 
August  16,  1976.'' 

iccession  cleposiicci:   Korea.  January    12, 
1978. 

tents 

lent  cooperation  treaty,   with  regulations. 
Done  at  Washington  June   19.    1970.   Entered 
nto  force  January  24.   1978  (except  for  chap- 
erll).  TIAS  8733 
lalificalions  deposited:    Brazil,   January   9. 

1978;  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Repuhlics, 

December  29.  1977. 
chapter  II  enters  into  force:    March   29. 

1978.-' 

tents — Microorganisms 

dapesl  treaty  on  the  international  recognition 
)f  the  deposit  of  microorganisms  for  the  pur- 
joses  of  patent  procedure,  with  regulations, 
Done  at  Budapest  April  28,  1977.' 
Signatures:  Austria,  December  22,  1977; 
Luxembourg,  December  8,  1977;  Senegal, 
December  17,  1977;  Sweden,  November 
14,  1977;  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Repub- 
lics, December  30,  1977. 

onograms 

ivention  for  the  protection  of  producers  of 
ihonograms  against  unauthorized  duplication 
f  their  phonograms  Done  at  Geneva  October 
>9,  1971  Entered  into  force  April  18,  1973; 
or  the  United  States  March  10,  1974.  TIAS 
•808. 

lotification  from  World  Intellecliuil  Property 
Organization  that  instrument  of  accession 
deposited:  Egypt.  January  23,  1978. 

etal 

(ditional  protocol  lo  the  constitution  of  the 
Postal  Union  of  the  Americas  and  Spain,  gen- 
ial regulations,  regulations  governing  the  In- 
(ernational  Office  and  the  Transfer  Office,  and 
(Onvention  with  final  protocol  and  detailed 
(egulations.  Done  al  Lima  March  18.  1976. 
intered  into  force  October  I,  1976,  with  re- 
(pect  to  certain  provisions;  March  18,  1976, 
ivith  respect  to  other  provisions. 
Adherence  deposited:  Surinam.  January  I, 
1978. 

(Bperty — Industrial 

:e  agreement  concerning  the  international 
lassification  of  goods  and  services  for  the 

ourposes  of  the  registration  of  marks  of  June 

15,  1957.  as  revised  (TIAS  7418.  7419).  Done 

«  Geneva  May  13.  1977.' 

iignatures:  Australia.  December  21.  1977; 
Austria.  December  30.  1977;  Belgium.  Oc- 
tober 11.  1977;  German  Democratic  Repub- 
lic (with  a  declaration),  November  24. 
1977;  Ireland.  December  29.  1977;  Luxem- 
bourg. December  1.  1977;  Morocco,  Oc- 
tober 28.  1977;  Norway.  November  14. 
1977;  Sweden.  October  3.  1977. 

Ratification  deposited:  Australia.  January  4. 
1978. 

i  Cross 

Dtocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions  of 
12  August  1949.  and  relating  to  the  protection 
of  victims  of  international  armed  conflicts 


(Protocol   1),   with  annexes.    Done   at   Geneva 

June  8.  1977.' 

Signatures:    Federal   Republic  of  Germany. 

December  23.  1977;'  Upper  Volta.  January 

II,  1978. 
Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions  of 
12  August  1949.  and  relating  to  the  protection 
of  victims  of  noninternational  armed  conflicts 
(Protocol  II).  Done  at  Geneva  June  8.  1977.' 
Signatures:    Federal   Republic  of  Germany. 

December  23.  1977;'  Upper  Volta.  January 

11.  1978. 

Refugees 

Convention   relating  to  the  status  of  refugees, 

with  schedule  and  annex.  Done  at  Geneva  July 

28,  1951.  Entered  into  force  April  22,  1954." 

Accession  deposited:  Sao  Tome  and  Principe, 

February  1,  1978. 

Protocol  relating  to  the  status  of  refugees.  Done 
at  New  York  January  31.  1967.  Entered  into 
force  October  4,  1967;  for  the  United  States 
November  1.  1968.  TIAS  6577. 
Accession  deposited:  Sao  Tome  and  Principe. 
February  1.  1978. 

Safety  at  Sea 

Convention  on  the  international  regulations  for 
preventing  collisions  at  sea,   1972.   Done  at 
London  October  20,  1972.  Entered  into  force 
July  15,  1977.  TIAS  8587. 
Ratification  deposited:  Ireland.  December  19. 

1977. 
Accessions  deposited:  Chile.  August  2,  1977; 
Ecuador,  December  8.  1977;  Pakistan.  De- 
cember 14,  1977;  Sri  Lanka.  January  4, 
1978. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Republic  of  Korea, 
July  29.  1977. 

Seals — Antarctic 

Convention  for  the  conservation  of  Antarctic 
seals,  with  annex  and  final  act.  Done  at  Lon- 
don June  1.  1972. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Belgium,  February  9, 
1978;  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics. 
February  8,  1978. 
Entered  into  force:  March  II,  1978. 

Space 

Convention  on  registration  of  objects  launched 
into  outer  space.  Done  at  New  York  January 
14,  1975.  Entered  into  force  September  15, 
1976.  TIAS  8480. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Byelorussian  Soviet 
Socialist  Republic,  January  26.  1978;  Union 
of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  January  13, 
1978. 

Sugar 

International   sugar  agreement.    1977.   with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  Geneva  October  7.   1977.  En- 
tered into  force  provisionally  January  1,  1978. 
Signatures:   Jamaica.  Japan.   Norway,  Thai- 
land,  Venezuela.   December  23,   1977;  El 
Salvador.   Indonesia,  Sweden.  December 
28,    1977;   Fiji,   Guyana.   Korea.   Malawi. 
Portugal.    Singapore,    Uganda,    Union   of 
Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  Yugoslavia,  De- 
cember 29.    1977;   Bangladesh.   Bulgaria, 
Canada,  Dominican  Republic,  Egypt,  Ethio- 


59 

pia,   Finland.    India.   December   30.    1977; 
Mexico.  Nigeria,  December  31,  1977. 

Ratifications  deposited :  South  Africa, 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  December  28,  1977 
Fiji,  New  Zealand,  December  29,  1977 
Canada,  Peru.  December  30.  1977 
Ecuador.  January  4.  1978;  Guyana.  Philip- 
pines. Singapore,  Uganda,  January  16, 
1978. 

Notifications  of  provtsiomil  application  depos- 
ited: Jamaica.  Japan.  Thailand,  December 
23,  1977;  Cuba,  El  Salvador.  New  Zealand, 
Sweden,  United  Kingdom,'^  December  28, 
1977;  Korea,  Venezuela,  December  29, 
1977;  Finland,  India,  Union  of  Soviet 
Socialist  Republics,  December  30.  1977; 
Honduras,  January  3,  1978;  Indonesia. 
Mexico.  January  16,  1978;  Portugal, 
January  18,  1978. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Malawi,  January  19, 
1978. 

Telecommunications 

International  telecommunications  convention, 
with  annexes  and  protocols.  Done  at  Malaga- 
Torremolinos  October  25,  1973  Entered  into 
force  January  I.  1975;  for  the  United  States 
April  7.  1976.  TIAS  8572, 
Ratification  deposited:  Mongolia,  October  18, 
1977. 

Tonnage  Measurement 

International  convention  on  tonnage  measure- 
ment of  ships.  1969.  with  annexes.  Done  at 
London  June  23,  1969.' 

Accession  deposited:  New  Zealand,  January  6, 
1978  (not  applicable  lo  Cook  Islands,  Niue, 
and  Tokelau) 

United  Nations — Privileges  and  Immunities 

Convention  on  the  privileges  and  immunities  of 
the  United  Nations.  Done  at  New  York  Feb- 
ruary 13,  1946.  Entered  into  force  September 
17,  1946;  for  the  United  States  April  29, 
1970.  TIAS  6900. 

Notification  of  succession:  Bangladesh, 
January  13.  1978, 

Women 

Convention  on  the  political  rights  of  women. 
Done  at  New  York  March  31.  1953.  Entered 
into  force  July  7.  1954;  for  the  United  States 
July  7.  1976. 

Ratification  deposited:  Guinea,  January  24. 
1978. 


BILATERAL 

Afghanistan 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, with  minutes  of  understanding. 
Signed  at  Kabul  December  28,  1977.  Entered 
into  force  December  28,  1977. 

Bangladesh 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of 
October  4.  1974  (TIAS  7949).  with  agreed 
minutes.  Signed  at  Dacca  January  13.  1978. 
Entered  into  force  January  13.  1978. 


60 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


Canada 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  April  2 
and  May  9.  1974  (TIAS  8137).  relating  to  the 
installation,  operation,  and  maintenance  of  a 
seismograph  station  near  Kluane  Lake.  Yukon 
Territory.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Ottawa  October  13  and  November  7.  1977 
Entered  into  force  November  7.  1977. 

Understanding  relating  to  trade  in  beef  and  veal 
between  Canada  and  the  United  States  in 
1978.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at  Wash- 
ington January  16  and  23.  1978.  Entered  into 
force  January  23,  1978. 

Colombia 

Memorandum  of  agreement  relating  to  jet  fuel 
prices.  Signed  at  Bogota  January  11.  1978. 
Entered  into  force  January  1 1 .  1978;  effective 
January  15.  1978. 

Dominican  Republic 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  September  28. 
1977.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Santo 
Domingo  December  13  and  20.  1977.  Entered 
into  force  December  20.  1977 

Egypt 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  textiles  and  textile 
products.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Cairo  December  7  and  28,  1977.  Entered  into 
force  December  28.  1977;  effective  January  1. 
1978. 

Guinea 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  September  22. 
197(1  (TIAS  8585).  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Conakry  June  13  and  15.  1977.  En- 
tered into  force  June  15,  1977. 

Guyana 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities. 
Signed  at  Georgetown  January  27.  1978.  En- 
tered into  force  January  27.  1978. 

India 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning  ac- 
cess by  an  Indian  ground  station  to  NASA's 
Landsat  satellites  and  availability  to  NASA 
and  others  of  data  acquired,  with  related  note. 
Signed  at  New  Delhi  January  3.  1978.  Entered 
into  force  January  3,  1978. 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities, 
with  agreed  minutes.  Signed  at  New  Delhi 
January  27,  1978.  Entered  into  force  January 
27.  1978. 

Indonesia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  May  17.  1977 
(TIAS  8677),  with  exchange  of  letters  and 
agreed  minutes.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Jakarta  December  16,  1977,  Entered  into 
force  December  16,  1977. 

Inter-American  Development  Bank 

Agreement  establishing  the  Inter-American  De- 
velopment Bank,  with  annexes.  Done  at 
Washington  April  8,  1959.  Entered  into  force 
December  30.  1959.  TIAS  4397 
Sigiuiiure  and  acceplance  deposiiccl: 
Bahamas,  December  15,  1977. 


Agreement  extending  the  military  mission 
agreement  of  October  6,  1947  (TIAS  1666),  as 
amended  and  extended.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Tehran  October  8,  1977.  and 
January  19,  1978,  effective  March  21.  1978. 

Agreement  relating  to  a  cooperative  program  to 
improve  and  modernize  the  Iranian 
Meteorological  Services,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Tehran  November  26,  1977.  Entered 
into  force  November  26.  1977. 

Jordan 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities, 
relating  to  the  agreement  of  November  27. 
1974  (TIAS  7995),  with  minutes  of  negotia- 
tion. Signed  at  Amman  January  10,  1978.  En- 
tered into  force  January  10,  1978. 

Korea 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  February  18,  1976 
(TIAS  8261 ).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Seoul  December  7,  1977.  Entered  into  force 
December  7,  1977. 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  products, 
with  annexes  and  related  letter.  Effected  by 
exchanges  of  notes  at  Washington  December 
23,  1977.  Entered  into  force  provisionally  De- 
cember 23,  1977;  effective  January  1,  1978. 
Definitive  entry  into  force:  February  7,  1978. 

Joint  statement  regarding  cooperation  concern- 
ing the  case  of  Mr.  Tongsun  Park,  with  related 
agreement.   Signed  at  Seoul  December  31, 

1977,  Entered  into  force  December  31,  1977. 

Mexico 

Agreement  modifying  the  air  transport  agree- 
ment of  August  15,  1960  (TIAS  4675),  to 
permit  experimental  implementation  of  low- 
cost  fares.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Mexico  and  TIateloIco  November  7  and  De- 
cember 21,  1977.  Entered  into  force  De- 
cember 21,  1977. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  February 
16,  1977,  as  amended,  relating  to  additional 
cooperative  arrangements  to  curb  the  illegal 
production  and  traffic  in  narcotics.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  letters  at  Mexico  December 
19,  1977.  Entered  into  force  December  19, 
1977. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  February 
16,  1977.  as  amended,  relating  to  additional 
cooperative  arrangements  to  curb  the  illegal 
production  and  traffic  in  narcotics.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  letters  at  Mexico  January  3, 

1978.  Entered  into  force  January  3,  1978. 
Agreement  relating  to  reduced  air  lares  and  char- 
ter air  services.  Effected  by  exchange  of  let- 
ters at  Mexico  January  20,  1978.  Entered  into 
force  January  20,  1978. 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the  air 
transport  agreement  of  August  15,  I960,  as 
amended  and  extended  (TIAS  4675,  7167). 
Signed  at  Mexico  January  20.  1978.  Entered 
into  force  provisionally,  January  20.  1978;  de- 
finitively, upon  receipt  by  the  United  Slates  of 
notification  from  Mexico  that  the  formalities 


required   by   national    legislation   have   bt' 
completed. 

New  Zealand 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meal  i 
ports  from  New  Zealand  during  calendar  yi 
1978.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Wa; 
inglon  December  21.  1977.  and  January  1 
1978.  Entered  into  force  January  18,  1978; 
fective  January  1,  1978. 

Norway 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Februi 
5.  1957  (TIAS  3769).  relating  to  certificai 
of  airworthiness  for  imported  aircraft.  [ 
fected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  WashingI 
January  24.  1978.  Entered  into  force  Janui 
24.  1978. 

Pakistan 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  Se 
tember  9.  1977  (TIAS  8724),  on  procedui 
for  mutual  assistance  in  connection  with  m 
ters  relating  to  the  Lockheed  Aircraft  Corpoi 
tion  and  the  Boeing  Company  to  the  McDc 
nell  Douglas  Corporation  and  its  subsidiar; 
and  affiliates.  Effected  by  exchange  of  lettc 
at  Washington  January  6  and  10.  1978.  P 
tered  into  force  January  10.  1978, 

Panama 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat  i 
ports  from  Panama  during  calendar  year  197 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washingt 
December  21,  1977,  and  January  17,  19'i 
Entered  into  force  January  17.  1978. 

Philippines 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Octo? 
15.  1975.  as  amended  and  extended  (TI 
8179).  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  ;. 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  produc 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Manila  I' 
cember  27,  1977.  Entered  into  force  E 
cember  27,  1977 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Octol 
15,  1975,  as  amended  and  extended  (TI. 
8179),  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  a 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  produc 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Manila  [ 
cember  28,  1977.  Entered  into  force  C 
cember  28,  1977;  effective  January  1,  1978' 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Octob 
15.  1975,  as  amended  and  extended  (TI/ 
8179),  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  a 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  produc 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Mani 
January  4,  1978.  Entered  into  force  January 
1978. 

Agreement    amending    the    agreement 
November  9,   1972,  as  amended,  for  transf 
of  agricultural  commodities  to  the  Philippine 
Signed  at  Manila  January   18,   1978.  Enter 
into  force  January  18.  1978. 

Poland 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  ai 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  product 
with  annexes.  Effected  by  exchange  of  noti 
at  Washington  January  9  and  12.  1978.  El 
tered  into  force  January  12.  1978;  effectiv 
January  1.  1978. 


arch  1978 


61 


mama 

reement  concerning  fisheries  off  the  coasts  of 
he  United  States,  with  agreed  minutes  and 
:xehange  of  letters.   Signed   at   Bucharest 
■Jovember  23.  1976. 
rwf rt'(/ ('I/O /<"■(■<'.■  January  18,  1978. 

idi  Arabia 

ject  agreement   for  technical  cooperation   in 

ighway  transportation.  Signed  at  Riyadh  and 

Vashington  August  16  and  26.  1977. 

ntered  into  force:  November  28.  1977. 

ject  agreement  for  cooperation  in  the  field  of 

olar  energy.   Signed  at  Riyadh  October  30, 

977. 

ntered  into  force:  January  11,  1978. 

Snalia 

.«  ecmeni  relating  to  the  transfer  of  agricultural 
oiiimodities  to  Somalia.  Signed  at  Mogadis- 
10  Llecember  18,  1977.  Entered  into  force 
iCLOniber  18,  1977. 

S  Lanka 

» tcment  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities. 
■Liimg  to  the  agreement  of  March  25.  1975. 
ith  agreed  minutes.  Signed  at  Colombo 
inuary  9.  1978.  Entered  into  force  January  9. 

J7.S. 


Sudan 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities. 
Signed  at  Khartoum  December  24,  1977.  En- 
ters into  force  upon  receipt  by  the  U.S.  Em- 
bassy of  notification  from  Sudan  that  its  con- 
stitutional procedures  for  ratification  have 
been  completed 

Thailand 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  De- 
cember 29.  1975.  as  amended  (TIAS  8288. 
8780).  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and 
nianmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  products. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Bangkok 
November  14.  1977.  Entered  into  force 
November  14.  1977. 

United  Kingdom 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat  im- 
ports from  Belize  during  calendar  year  1978. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 
December  21 ,  1977,  and  January  9.  1978.  En- 
tered into  force  January  9.  1978. 


'  Not  in  force. 

■  Applicable  to  Berlin  (West). 
'  With  declarations 
■*  Not  in  force  for  the  Untied  States. 
'  Applicable  to  Belize  and  St.  Christopher- 
Nevis-Anguilla. 


PUBLICATIO]\S 


i  O  SALES 


iililuulions  may  /)<■  ordered  by  catalog  or 

k    number  from   the  Superintendent  of 

iimcnts,   U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 

'•^lon.   D.C.   20402.   A  25%  discount  is 

''11  orders  for  100  or  more  copies  of  any 

Oi  publication  mailed  to  the  same  address. 

R  uiiances.  payable  to  the  Superintendent  of 

D  iinwnts.    must  accompany  orders.   Prices 

■I  VII  below,  which  include  domestic  postage, 

^iil'icct  to  change. 

B  kground  Notes:  Short,  factual  summaries 

^ch   describe  the   people,   history,   govern- 

I,  economy,  and  foreign  relations  of  each 

:iii\    Each  contains  a  map.  a  list  of  princi- 

•jn\ernment  officials  and   U.S.   diplomatic 

-  msular  officers,  and  a  reading  list.  (A 
picte  set  of  all  Background  Notes  currently 
I ...k— at  least  140— $21.80;  1-year  sub- 
pi  ion  service  for  approximately  77  updated 
uw  Notes— $24;  plastic  binder— $1 .50. ) 
-le  copies  of  those  listed  below  are  avail- 

.11  50c  each. 


No.  SI. 123:086 
8822  4  pp. 

No.  S1.123:J76 
7956  6  pp. 

No.  S1.123;M74/2 
8670  4  pp. 

No.  S1.123:N56/2 
7953  7  pp. 

No.  S1.123:Y3 
8170  4  pp. 


swana Cat.   No.    S1.123:B23 

Pub.  8046  4  pp. 

.zil Cat.   No.    S1.123:B73 

Pub.  7756  8  pp. 

(■nee  Cat.   No.   S1.123:F84 

Pub.  8209  8  pp. 


Grenada Cat. 

Pub. 
Jordan  Cat. 

Pub. 
Monaco   Cat. 

Pub. 
Nigeria Cat. 

Pub. 
North  Yemen Cat. 

Pub. 
Poland  Cat. 

Pub. 
Rwanda  Cat. 

Pub. 
Sudan Cat. 

Pub. 
Trinidad  Cat 

and  Tobago Pub. 

United  Kingdom  Cat. 

Pub. 
Colombia Cat. 

Pub. 


Major  Publications  of  the  Department  of 
State.  An  Annotated  Bibliography  published 
by  the  Office  of  the  Historian,  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs.  Books,  pamphlets,  and  periodicals 
listed  are  of  value  to  persons  interested  in 
foreign  policy  and  U.S.  international  relations. 
Pub.  7843.  General  Foreign  Policy  Series  200. 
27  pp.  $1.30.  (Cat.  No.  SI  .30/3:200). 


No. 

SI 

123:P75 

8020 

7  pp. 

No. 

SI 

123:R94 

7916 

4  pp. 

No. 

SI. 

123:SU2 

8022 

5  pp. 

No. 

SI 

123:173 

8306 

4  pp. 

No.S1.123:UN34K 

8099 

8  pp. 

No. 

SI 

123:C71 

7767 

8  pp. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with 
Haiti.  TIAS  8600.  21  pp.  $1.00.  (Cat.  No. 
S9. 10:8600). 

International  Tin  Agreement,  1975.  Agree- 
ment with  other  governments.  TIAS  8607.  398 
pp.  $4.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8607). 

Access  Roads  Construction.  Agreement  with 
Gabon.  TIAS  8612.  40  pp.  $1.50.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8612). 

Technical  Cooperation  in  Electrical  Power 
Planning.  Agreement  with  Saudi  Arabia.  TIAS 
8614.  20  pp.  $1.  (Cat.  No.  $9.10:8614), 

Relocations  of  the  Rio  Grande  Channel.  Act 

approving  minute  no.  257  of  the  International 
Boundary  and  Water  Commission,  between  the 
United  States  and  Mexico.  TIAS  8625.  6  pp. 
with  annexes.  $1.20.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8625). 

Maritime  Boundary.  Modus  vivendi  with 
Cuba.  TIAS  8627.  5  pp.  600.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8627). 

Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  with 
Mexico,  extending  the  agreement  of  August  15. 
1960.  TIAS  8630  3  pp.  60C.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8630). 

Atomic  Energy — Continuation  of  Safeguards 
and  Guarantee  Provisions.  Agreement  with 
Greece.  TIAS  8633.  4  pp.  600.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8633). 

Joint  Committee  on  Cultural  and  Educa- 
tional Cooperation.  Agreement  with  Japan. 
TIAS  8635.  12  pp  800.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8635). 

Trade  in  Cotton,  Wool  and  Man-Made  Fiber 
Textiles.  Agreement  with  the  Republic  of 
China,  modifying  the  agreement  of  May  21, 
1975.  TIAS  8636.  4  pp.  600.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8636). 

Cultural  Relations — Physical  Education  and 
Sports.  Protocol  with  Portugal.  TIAS  8637.  6 
pp.  600.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8637). 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with 
Tunisia.  TIAS  8638.  5  pp.  600.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8638). 

Trade  in  Cotton,  Wool  and  Man-Made  Fiber 
Textiles.  Agreement  with  Hong  Kong,  amend- 
ing the  agreement  of  July  25.  1974.  TIAS 
8639.  3  pp.  600.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8639). 

Scientific  Cooperation.  Agreement  with  the 
Hungarian  People's  Republic.  TIAS  8640.  10 
pp.  700.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8640). 

Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  with  the 
United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern 
Ireland.  T1A5  8641.  59  pp.  $1.80.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8641). 

Customs  Services.  Agreement  with  Mexico. 
TIAS  8642.  21  pp.  $1.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8642). 

Trade  in  Cotton,  Wool  and  Man-Made  Fiber 
Textiles  and  Textile  Products.  Agreement 
with  Haiti  amending  the  agreement  of  March  22 
and  23,  1976.  TIAS  8643.  3  pp.  600.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8643). 


62 


Trade  in  Cotton,  Wool  and  Man-Made  Fiber 
Textiles.  Agreemeni  wilh  Japan,  modifying  the 
arrangemeni  of  September  27.  1974,  as  mod- 
ified. TIA.S  8644,  13  pp.  XOC.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8644). 

Trade  in  Textiles — Consultations  on  Market 
Disruption.  Agreement  with  the  Czechoslovak 
Socialist  Republic.  TIAS  8645.  3  pp.  60C. 
(Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8645) 

Technical  Cooperation.  Agreement  with  Af- 
ghanistan amending  and  extending  the  agree- 
ment of  June  30.  1953.  as  extended.  TIAS 
8646.  4  pp.  60C.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8646). 

Educational  Programs.  Agreement  with 
Panama.  TIAS  8647,  100  pp  $2.50.  (Cat.  No. 
S9. 10:8647). 

Reciprocal  Fisheries.  Agreement  with 
Canada.  TIAS  8648  16  pp  SI  (Cat,  No. 
89.10:8648), 


Finance — Consolidation  and  Rescheduling  of 
Certain  Debts.  Agreement  with  Chile.  TIAS 
8649.  30  pp.  $1.20.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8649). 

Livestock  Development.  Agreement  with 
Kenya.  TIAS  8650.  53  pp.  $1.20.  (Cat.  No. 
S9. 10:8650) 

Research  on  Solar  Thermal  Conversion  Sys- 
tems. Memorandum  ol  understanding  with 
France.  TIAS  8653.  14  pp  80c.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8653). 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with 
Egypt,  amending  the  agreement  of  October  28. 
1975,  as  amended.  TIAS  8654.  4  pp.  600. 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:8654). 

Atomic  Energy — Research  Participation  and 
Technical  Exchange  in  Loss  of  Fluid  Test 
(LOFT)  Program.  Agreement  with  other  gov- 
ernments. TIAS  8655.  14  pp.  80c.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8655). 


PRESS  RELEASES: 

Dt*piirUn€*nt  of  Stnto 


February  7-March  .? 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  Ihc  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  Slate, 
Washington,  DC.  20520. 

No,  Dale  Subject 

*63  2/7         U.S..    Mexico    air    transport 

agreemeni.  Jan.  20. 

*64  2/7        Third   Conference   on    US- 

Central  American  Trade  and 
Investment,  New  Orleans, 
Feb.  15-17. 

*65  2/7         U.S.,  Philippines  amend  textile 

agreement,  Dec.  28,  1977. 
66  2/8        Vance:  statement  before  Sub- 

committee on  International 
Operations  of  the  House 
Committee  on  International 
Relations  in  which  he  re- 
viewed 1977  activities, 

*67  2/10  William  E.  Schaufele,  Jr., 
sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Poland  (biographic  data). 

*68  2/10       Study  Group  4  of  the  U.S.  Or- 

ganization of  the  Interna- 
tional Telegraph  Consulta- 
tive Committee  (CCITT), 
Mar.  9. 

*69  2/10  Study  Group  1  of  the  U.S.  Or- 
ganization of  the  CCITT, 
Mar.  9. 

*70         2/10       Study  Group  7  of  the  U.S.  Or- 
ganization of  the  CCITT, 
Mar.  15. 
71         2/10       Vance:  news  conference 

*72  2/13  Advisory  Committee  on  Trans- 
national Enterprises,  Mar.  14. 


73  2/14        Foreign  Ministers  of  the  U.S., 

Canada,  United  Kingdom, 
Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, and  France:  remarks 
to  press.  New  York, 
Feb.  12. 
*74  2/14        Richard  J.  Bloomfield  sworn  in 

as  Ambassador  to  Portugal 
(biographic  data). 

75  2/14        Vance;   announcement   on   sale 

of  aircraft  to  Middle  East 
countries 

76  2/14        Vance:    interview    on    Mac- 

Neil/Lehrer  Report  (PBS). 

*77  2/15  Advisory  Committee  on  Private 
International  Law,  study 
group  on  hotelkeepers'  lia- 
bilil>.  Mar    21 

*78  2/15        Study  Group  1  of  the  U.S.  Or- 

ganization for  the  Interna- 
tional Radio  Consultative 
Committee  (CCIR),  Mar,  9. 

*79  2/17  U.S.,  Thailand  amend  textile 
agreement,  Nov.  14,  1977. 

*80  2/17  Advisory  Panel  on  Academic 
Music  of  the  Advisory  Com- 
mittee on  Music,  Mar.  6. 

*81  2/17       Program  for  the  official  visit  to 

Washington,  DC,  of  Danish 
Prime  Minister  Anker 
Jorgensen,  Feb.  21-23 
82  2/20  President  to  nominate  Alfred  L. 
Atherton,  Jr.,  as  Ambas- 
sador at  Large,  Harold  H. 
Saunders  as  Assistant  Secre- 
tary for  Near  Eastern  and 
South  Asian  Affairs. 


*83 


*84 


*85 


*86 


*87 


*88 


*89 


*90 


*91 


*92 


*93 


*96 


2/21 


2/21 


i/->-i 


T/22 


2/23 


2/23 


9/24 


2/24 


2/27 


2/24 


93  A 

2/27 

'94 

2/27 

t95 

2/27 

2/27 


*97 

2/28 

+98 

2/28 

*99 

3/1 

•MOO 

3/1 

*IOI 

3/2 

■102 


Department  of  State  Bullel] 

Vance:  statement  before  » 
House  Committee  on  Intt 
national  Relations  on  forer 
assistance  for  1979. 

Advisory  Committee  on  Inti 
national  Enterprise 

Mar.   13 
Stud\  Group  2  of  the  US,  ( 
ganization   for  the  CCIl 
Mar.  22. 
Korea   notification  concerni 
entry  into  force  of  bilate 
textile     agreement,     De 
23,  1977. 
Study  Groups  10  and  11,  U.' 
Organization  for  the  CCI ' 
Mar.  15.  1 

Water  quality    in   the   Popl|, 
River,   exchange   of  letlf 
between  International  Joi, 
Commission  (Jan.   27)  a, 
U.S.  (Feb.  22).  , 

Vance:   statement   before  Si  ^ 
committee  on  Foreign  Ope 
tions.  House  Committee 
Appropriations  on   forei 
assistance  for  1979. 
Health   compensation   benel 
for  certain  former  inmates 
Nazi  concentration  camps 
Arthur  T.  Tienken  sworn  in 
Ambassador  to  Gabon  a 
Sao    Tome    and     Princi 
(biographic  data) 
U.N.   High  Commissioner 
Refugees  to  visit  Washii 
ton.  DC,  Feb.  25. 
U.S.,   Egypt  Joint   Worki 
Group  on  Technology,  1 
search,   and    Developmi 
meets  in  Cairo,  Feb.  ll-l 
Vance:  address  before  Natio 

Governor's  Association. 
Study  Group  8,  U.S.  Organi 
tion  for  the  CCIR.  Mar.  2 
Department      statement 
remarks       by        Presidi 
Brezhnev.  Feb.  25. 
New  members  appointed  to 
Board   of  Foreign   Schol 
ships. 
Human     rights     confereni 

Feb.  27-28. 
U.S..  Iran  Joint  Commissic 

Feb.  28. 
Special  Antarctic  treaty  cons 
talive  meeting  opens  in  C. 
berra.  Feb.  27. 
■Treaties  in  Force"  released 
Vance:  statement  before  Sen. 
Committee  on  Foreign  Re 
tions  on   foreign  assistan 
for  1979. 
Signing  of  extradition  trea 
wilh  Japan 


3/3 


*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 
tTo  be  printed  in  a  later  issue. 


1 


II\DEX 


URCH  1978 

(..  78.  NO.  2012 

■J.  Namibia  (Janiieson,  Genscher.  Guirin- 

.J.  l)wen.  Vance)   20 

ri.  Control 

drnistralion  Officials  Testify  on  Arms  Transfer 
Ik\        (Benson,        Blechman.        Fish. 

hi' 45 

cntional       Arms       Transfer       Policy 

nson)   42 

^ntional       Arms      Transfer       Policy 

(  Jterl   47 

umary    of    U.S. -European    Relations 

(est) 27 

ivltion.    International    Aviation    Policy 

(  loper) 24 

a  ida 

jniary    of    U.S. -European    Relations 

est) 27 

1    President's   Visit  to  Canada  and  Mexico 

I  ondale)    9 

omodities.  International  Commodity  Policy 
latz) 1 

0  '.ress 

la  inistration   Officials  Testify  on   Arms 
'insfer  Policy   (Benson,   Blechman,   Fish. 

I  lb) 4.5 

>e>  Owed  to  the  U.S.  (Hormals)   25 

HI  :hinese  Refugees  (Derian)  33 

III  national  Commodity  Policy  (Katz)  ....      1 
c  e  of  the  Terrorist  Threat  and  Need  for  Ef- 

tive  Legislation  (Vance)    53 

;i;mary    of    U.S. -European    Relations 

est)   27 

.    Embargo  Policy  (Katz)   22 

;<  mlar  Affairs.  General  Overview  of  1977 

tivities  (  Vance)   18 

'la.   Secretary    Vance's   News  Conference, 

bruary  10   13 

)i  artment  and  Foreign  Service 

i,  id  L.  Atherton,  Jr..  To  Be  Nominated  Am- 

ssador  at  Large;  Harold  H.  Saunders  To  Be 

iminated   Assistant   Secretary   for  Near 

istern  and  South  Asian  Affairs  (biographic 

•■ta) 36 

5  leral    Overview    of    1977    Activities 

/ance)   18 

)  eloping  Countries.  Technology  Transfer 

ilicies  (Nye) 38 

1  nomics 

2'ts  Owed  to  the  U.S.  (Hormats)   25 

E'nomic  Report  of  the  President   23 

jneral    Overview    of    1977    Activities 

Vance)   18 

I'  rnational  Aviation  Policy  (Cooper)  ....  24 
I  rnational  Commodity  Policy  (Katz)  ....  1 
inmary    of    U.S. -European    Relations 

Vest) 27 

I  i.  Embargo  Policy  (Katz)   22 

Ijfpt 

'  idle  East  Aircraft  Sales  ( Vance) 37 


Secretary  Vance's  News  Conference. 
February  10 13 

Television  Interview  (Vance)   14 

Visit  of  Egyptian  President  Sadat  (White 
House  statements) 35 

Ethiopia.  Secretary  Vance's  News  Confer- 
ence. February  10   13 

Europe.  Summary  of  U.S. -European  Relations 
(Vest) 27 

Human  Rights 

Conventional  Arms  Transfer  Policy 
(Benson) 42 

The  Diplomacy  of  the  First  Year  (Chris- 
topher)     30 

General  Overview  of  1977  Activities 
(Vance)    18 

Indochinese  Refugees  (Derian) 33 

Immigration.  President  Carter's  News  Confer- 
ence. January  30  (excerpts)  7 

Intelligence  Operations.  Foreign  Intelligence 
Activities 8 

Israel 

Israeli  Settlements 37 

Middle  East  Aircraft  Sales  (Vance) 37 

Secretary  Vance's  News  Conference.  February 
10   13 

Television  Interview  (Vance)    14 

Korea.  Secretary  Vance's  News  Conference. 
February  10     13 

Lebanon.  Secretary  Vance's  News  Confer- 
ence. February  10   13 

Mexico.  Vice  President's  Visit  to  Canada  and 
Mexico  (Mondale)   9 

Middle  East 

Alfred  L,  Atherton.  Jr..  To  Be  Nominated  Am- 
bassador at  Large;  Harold  H.  Saunders  To  Be 
Nominated  Assistant  Secretary  for  Near 
Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs  (biographic 
data)  36 

President  Carter's  News  Conference.  January 
30  (excerpts) 7 

Television  Interview  (Vance)    14 

Military  Affairs.  Summary  of  U.S. -European 
Relations  (Vest) 27 

Monetary  Affairs.  Debts  Owed  to  the  U.S. 
(Hormats) 25 

Namibia.  Namibia  (Jamieson.  Genscher, 
Guiringaud,  Owen,  Vance)   20 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  Sum- 
mary of  U  .S. -European  Relations 
(Vest)     27 

Nuclear  Policy.  Technology  Transfer  Policies 
(Nye)    38 

Panama 

Panama  Canal  Treaties  (Carter) 55 

Secretary     Vance's    News    Conference. 

February  10 13 

Presidential  Documents 

Conventional  Arms  Transfer  Policy 47 

Economic  Report  of  the  President   23 

Foreign  Intelligence  Activities    8 

Panama  Canal  Treaties  55 

President  Carter's  News  Conference.  January 

30  (excerpts)  7 

Publications 

Congressional  Documents    23 

GPO  Sales 61 

Refugees.  Indochinese  Refugees  (Derian)   .   33 


Saudi   Arabia.   Middle   East  Aircraft  Sales 

(Vance)   37 

Science  and  Technology 

Technology  Transfer  Policies  (Nye) 38 

U.N.  Conference  on  Science  and  Technology 
for  Development  (foreign  relations  out- 
line)     41 

Security  Assistance 

Administration  Officials  Testify  on  Arms 
Transfer  Policy  (Benson.  Blechman.  Fish, 
Gelb) 45 

Conventional  Arms  Transfer  Policy  (Ben- 
son)     42 

Conventional  Arms  Transfer  Policy  (Carter)   47 

General  Overview  of  1977  Activities 
(Vance)    18 

Middle  East  Aircraft  Sales  (Vance) 37 

President  Carter's  News  Conference.  January 
30  (excerpts) 7 

Secretary  Vance's  News  Conference. 
February  10 13 

Television  Interview  (Vance)    14 

Somalia.  Secretary  Vance's  News  Conference. 
Febru  ary  10     13 

South  Africa 

Namibia  (Jamieson,  Genscher,  Guiringaud, 
Owen,  Vance) 20 

Secretary  Vance's  News  Conference. 
February  10 13 

Southern   Rhodesia.    Southern   Rhodesia   (De- 


partment statement) 


21 


Space.  President  Carter's  News  Conference. 
January  30  (excerpts)    7 

Terrorism.  Scope  of  the  Threat  and  Need  for 
Effective  Legislation  (Vance) 53 

Treaties.  Current  Actions    58 

U.S.S.R. 

President  Carter's  News  Conference.  January 
30  (excerpts) 7 

Secretary  Vance's  News  Conference. 
February  10 13 

Summary  of  U.S. -European  Relations 
(Vest) 27 

Technology  Transfer  Policies  (Nye) 38 

United  Nations.  U.N.  Conference  on  Science 
and  Technology  for  Development  (foreign  re- 
lations outline)  41 


Name  Index 

Benson.  Lucy  Wilson 42,45 

Blechman.  Barry  M  45 

Carter,  President 7.  47,  55 

Christopher.  Warren 30 

Cooper.  Richard  N 24 

Derian .  Patricia  M  33 

Fish.  Lt.  Gen.  H.  M 45 

Gelb.  Leslie  H 45 

Genscher.  Hans-Dietrich 20 

Guiringaud.  Louis  de 20 

Hormats.  Robert  D 25 

Jamieson.  Donald 20 

Katz.  Julius  L 1 ,  22 

Mondale.  Walter  F 9 

Nye,  Joseph  S. ,  Jr  38 

Owen.  David 20 

Vance.  Secretary 13,  14,  18,  20,  37,  53 

Vest.  George  S  27 


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