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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 




Department 
of State 



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bulletin 



•January 1979 



he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 79 / Number 2022 




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Department of State 

bulletin 

Volume 79 / Number 2022 / January 1979 



Cover Photos: 

President Carter 
Secretary Vance 
Warren Christopher 
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 
Charles William Maynes 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on 
developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include 
major addresses and news conferences 
of the President and the Secretary of 
State; statements made before congres- 
sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has deter- 
mined that the publication of this peri- 
odical is necessary in the transaction of 
the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for 
printing this periodical has been ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through 
January 31, 1981. 

NOTE: Contents of this publication 
are not copyrighted and items con- 
tained herein may be reprinted. Cita- 
tion of the Department of State 
Bulletin as the source will be appre- 
ciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Litera- 
ture. 

For sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 

Price: 

12 issues plus annual index — 

$18.00 (domestic) $22.50 (foreign) 

Single copy — 

$1.40 (domestic) $1.80 (foreign) 



CYRUS R. VANCE 

Secretary of State 

HODDING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 
Assistant Editor 



CONTENTS 



30th ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 

Remarks by President Carter, Secretary Vance, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Patricia M. 
Derian 

Bill of Rights Day, Hitman Rights Day and Week, 1978 (Proclamation) 

Basic Human Rights Documents 

Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Biographic Data) 



THE PRESIDENT 

8 News Conferences of Nov. 9 and 30 
and Dec. 12 

THE SECRETARY 

12 The U.S. -European Partnership 
16 Question-and-Answer Session Follow- 
ing London Address 

AFRICA 

18 U.S. Policy Toward South Africa 
(Anthony Lake) 



CANADA 



21 



Secretary Vance Visits Canada 
(Donald Jamieson, Secretary Vance) 

23 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 

1978 

DEPARTMENT 

24 New State Department Liaison Office 

With U.S. State and Local Govern- 
ments (White House Announcement) 

EAST ASIA 

25 U.S. Normalizes Relations With the 

People's Republic of China (Presi- 
dent Carter, Texts of Joint Com- 
munique and U.S. Statement) 

ECONOMICS 

27 The Role of Exports in U.S. Foreign 
Policy (Warren Christopher) 

30 The U.S. and the Third World: Partners 
or Plaintiffs? (David D. Newsom) 

33 Multinational Corporations (Foreign 

Relations Outline) 

EUROPE 

34 NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in 

Brussels (Warren Christopher, Text 
of Final Communique) 

36 Constitutional Referendum in Spain 

(President Carter) 

37 President Carter To Attend Guadeloupe 

Meeting 



MIDDLE EAST 

38 Visit of Moroccan King Hassan II 
(Joint Press Statement) 

38 Morocco — A Profile 

39 Secretary Vance's Middle East Visit 

NUCLEAR POLICY 

39 The U.S. Approach to Non- 
proliferation — Are We Making 
Progress? (Joseph S. Nye, Jr.) 

44 U.S. Policy on Reprocessing of U.S.- 
Origin Nuclear Material (Joseph S. 
Nye. Jr.) 

UNITED NATIONS 

46 What's Wrong With the U.N. and 
What's Right? (Charles William 
Maynes) 

50 U.N. Committee on the Palestinian 

People (Abraham A. Rihicoff, 
Andrew Young) 

51 Namibia (William H. Barton, Text of 

Resolution) 

52 Arms Control (Adrian S. Fisher) 

53 U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control 

(President Carter) 
55 Summaries of U.S. Statements 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

57 Nicaragua ( Warren Christopher) 

58 U.S. -Brazil Joint Group on Energy 

Technology (Joint Communique) 

TREATIES 

59 Current Actions 

61 PRESS RELEASES 

PUBLICATIONS 

62 1949 "Foreign Relations'' Volume 

VIII— "The Far East: China" 

INDEX 







President Carter addresses a group of domestic and international civil and human rights leaders 
in the East Room of the White House. 



30th ANNIVERSARY OF THE 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 



At a ceremony at the White House on December 6, 1978, commemorating the 
30th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
President Carter addressed a group of domestic and international civil and 
human rights leaders. His remarks followed those by Secretary Vance; Zbigniew 
Brzezinski. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and Patricia 
M. Derian, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. 



PRESIDENT CARTER 1 

What I have to say today is funda- 
mentally very simple. It's something 
I've said many times, including my ac- 
ceptance speech when I was nominated 
as President and my inaugural speech 
when I became President. But it cannot 
be said too often or too firmly or too 
strongly. 

As long as I am President, the Gov- 
ernment of the United States will con- 
tinue, throughout the world, to enhance 
human rights. No force on Earth can 
separate us from that commitment. 

This week we commemorate the 30th 
anniversary of the Universal Declara- 
tion of Human Rights. We rededicate 
ourselves — in the words of Eleanor 
Roosevelt, who was the chairperson of 
the Human Rights Commission — to the 
Universal Declaration as, and I quote 
from her, "... a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples of all na- 
tions." 

The Universal Declaration — and the 
human rights conventions that derive 
from it — do not describe the world as it 
is. But these documents are very im- 
portant, nonetheless. They are a bea- 
con, a guide to a future of personal se- 
curity, political freedom, and social 
justice. 

For millions of people around the 
globe that beacon is still quite 
distant — a glimmer of light on a dark 
horizon of deprivation and repression. 
The reports of Amnesty International, 
the International Commission of 
Jurists, the International League for 
Human Rights, and many other non- 
governmental human rights organiza- 
tions amply document the practices and 
conditions that destroy the lives and the 
spirit of countless human beings. 
Political killings, tortures, arbitrary 
and prolonged detention without trial 
or without a charge — these are the 
crudest and the ugliest of human rights 
violations. 

Of all human rights, the most basic 
is to be free of arbitrary violence — 
whether that violence comes from gov- 
ernments, from terrorists, from crimi- 



nals, or from self-appointed messiahs 
operating under the cover of politics or 
religion. 

But governments — because of their 
power which is so much greater than 
that of an individual — have a special 
responsibility. The first duty of a gov- 
ernment is to protect its own citizens, 
and when government itself becomes 
the perpetrator of arbitrary violence 
against its citizens, it undermines its 
own legitimacy. 

There are other violations of the 
body and the spirit which are especially 
destructive of human life. Hunger, dis- 
ease, poverty are enemies of human 
potential which are as relentless as 
any repressive government. The 
American people want the actions of 
their government — our government — 
both to reduce human suffering and to 
increase human freedom. 

That's why, with the help and en- 
couragement of many of you in this 
room, I have sought to rekindle the 
beacon of human rights in American 
foreign policy. Over the last 2 years 
we've tried to express these human 
concerns as our diplomats practice their 
craft and as our nation fulfills its own 
international obligations. We will 
speak out when individual rights are 
violated in other lands. The Universal 
Declaration means that no nation can 
draw the cloak of sovereignty over 
torture, disappearances, officially 
sanctioned bigotry, or the destruction 
of freedom within its own borders. 

The message that is being delivered 
by all our representatives abroad — 
whether they are from the Department 
of State or Commerce or Agriculture or 
Defense or whatever — is that the 
policies regarding human rights count 
very much in the character of our own 
relations with other individual coun- 
tries. 

In distributing the scarce resources 
of our foreign assistance programs, we 
will demonstrate that our deepest af- 
finities are with nations which commit 
themselves to a democratic path to de- 
velopment. Toward regimes which per- 
sist in wholesale violations of human 



rights, we will not hesitate to convey 
our outrage nor will we pretend that 
our relations are unaffected. 

In the coming year, I hope that Con- 
gress will take a step that has been long 
overdue for a generation — the ratifica- 
tion of the Convention on the Preven- 
tion and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. 

As you know the genocide conven- 
tion was also adopted by the U.N. 
General Assembly 30 years ago this 
week — one day before the adoption of 
the Universal Declaration. It was the 
world's affirmation that the lesson of 
the Holocaust would never be forgot- 
ten, but unhappily, genocide is not pe- 
culiar to any one historical era. 

Eighty-three other nations have 
ratified the genocide convention. The 
United States — despite the support of 
every President since 1948 — has not. 
In international meetings at the United 
Nations and elsewhere, when I meet 
with foreign leaders, we are often 
asked why. We do not have an accept- 
able answer. 

I urge the U.S. Senate to observe 
this anniversary in the only appropriate 
way — by ratifying the genocide con- 
vention at the earliest possible date. 

This action must be the first step to- 
ward the ratification of other human 
rights instruments, including those I 
signed a year ago. Many of the reli- 
gious and human rights groups repre- 
sented here have undertaken a cam- 
paign of public education on behalf of 
these covenants. I commend and ap- 
preciate your efforts. 

Refugees are the living, homeless 
casualties of one very important failure 
on the part of the world to live by the 
principles of peace and human rights. 
To help these refugees is a simple 
human duty. As Americans — as a 
people made up largely of the descen- 
dants of refugees — we feel that duty 
with special keenness. 

Our country will do its utmost to 
ease the plight of stranded refugees 
from Indochina and from Lebanon and 
of released political prisoners from 
Cuba and from elsewhere. I hope that 
we will always stand ready to welcome 
more than our fair share of those who 
flee their homelands because of racial, 
religious, or political oppression. 

The effectiveness of our human 
rights policy is now an established fact. 
It has contributed to an atmosphere of 
change — sometimes disturbing — but 



Department of State Bulletin 



which has encouraged progress in many 
ways and in many places. In some 
countries, political prisoners have been 
released by the hundreds, even 
thousands. In others, the brutality of 
repression has been lessened. In still 
others there's a movement toward 
democratic institutions or the rule of 
law when these movements were not 
previously detectable. 

To those who doubt the wisdom of 
our dedication. I say this: Ask the vic- 
tims. Ask the exiles. Ask the govern- 
ments which continue to practice re- 
pression. Whether in Cambodia or 
Chile, in Uganda or South Africa, in 
Nicaragua or Ethiopia or the Soviet 
Union, governments know that we in 
the United States care; and not a single 
one of those who is actually taking 
risks or suffering for human rights has 
ever asked me to desist in our support 
of basic human rights. From the pris- 
ons, from the camps, from the enforced 
exiles, we receive one message — speak 
up, persevere, let the voice of freedom 
be heard. 

I'm very proud that our nation stands 
for more than military might or politi- 
cal might. It stands for ideals that have 
their reflection in the aspirations of 
peasants in Latin America, workers in 
Eastern Europe, students in Africa, and 
farmers in Asia. 

We do live in a difficult and compli- 
cated world — a world in which peace is 
literally a matter of survival. Our 
foreign policy must take this into ac- 
count. Often, a choice that moves us 
toward one goal tends to move us fur- 
ther away from another goal. 

Seldom do circumstances permit me 
or you to take actions that are wholly 
satisfactory to everyone. But I want to 
stress again that human rights are not 
peripheral to the foreign policy of the 
United States. Our human rights policy 
is not a decoration. It is not something 
we've adopted to polish up our image 
abroad or to put a fresh coat of moral 
paint on the discredited policies of the 
past. 

Our pursuit of human rights is part of 
a broad effort to use our great power 
and our tremendous influence in the 
service of creating a better world — a 
world in which human beings can live 
in peace, in freedom, and with their 
basic needs adequately met. Human 
rights is the soul of our foreign policy. 
And I say this with assurance, because 
human rights is the soul of our sense of 
nationhood. 

For the most part, other nations are 
held together by common racial or 
ethnic ancestry or by a common creed 
or religion or by ancient attachments to 
the land that go back for centuries of 
time. Some nations are held together 



by the forces, implied forces, of a 
tyrannical government. We are differ- 
ent from all of those, and I believe that 
we in our country are more fortunate. 

As a people we come from every 
country and every corner of the Earth. 
We are of many religions and many 
creeds. We are of every race, every 
color, every ethnic and cultural back- 
ground. We are right to be proud of 
these things and of the richness that 
lend to the texture of our national life. 
But they are not the things which unite 
us as a single people. 

What unites us — what makes us 
Americans — is a common belief in 
peace, in a free society, and in a com- 
mon devotion to the liberties enshrined 
in our Constitution. That belief and 
that devotion are the sources of our 
sense of national community. 
Uniquely, ours is a nation founded on 
an idea of human rights. From our own 
history we know how powerful that 
idea can be. 

Next week marks another human 
rights anniversary — Bill of Rights Day. 
Our nation was "conceived in lib- 
erty," in Lincoln's words, but it has 
taken nearly two centuries for that lib- 
erty to approach maturity. 

For most of the first half of our his- 
tory, black Americans were denied 
even the most basic human rights. For 
most of the first two-thirds of our his- 
tory, women were excluded from the 
political process. Their rights and those 
of native Americans are still not con- 
stitutionally guaranteed and enforced. 
Even freedom of speech has been 
threatened periodically throughout our 
history. Only in the last 10-12 years 
have we achieved what Father Hes- 
burgh has called "the legal abandon- 
ment of more than three centuries of 
apartheid." [Father Theodore Hes- 
burgh. President of Notre Dame, is 
past Chairman of the U.S. Civil Rights 
Commission and now President of the 
Rockefeller Foundation.] And the 
struggle for full human rights for all 
Americans — black, brown, and white, 
male and female, rich and poor — is far 
from over. 

To me, as to many of you, these are 
not abstract matters or ideas. In the 
rural Georgia country where I grew up, 
the majority of my own fellow citizens 
were denied many basic rights — the 
right to vote, the right to speak freely 
without fear, the right to equal treat- 
ment under the law. I saw at firsthand 
the effects of a system of deprivation of 
rights. I saw the courage of those who 
resisted that system. And finally, I saw 
the cleansing energies that were re- 
leased when my own Vegion of this 
country walked out of darkness and 
into what Hubert Humphrey in the year 



of the adoption of the Universal Dec- 
laration called "the bright sunshine of 
human rights. " 

The American Bill of Rights is 187 
years old and the struggle to make it a 
reality has occupied every one of those 
187 years. The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights is only 30 years old. 
In the perspective of history, the idea 
of human rights has only just been 
broached. 

I do not draw this comparison be- 
cause I want to counsel patience. I 
draw it because I want to emphasize, in 
spite of difficulties, steadfastness and 
commitment. 

One hundred and eighty-seven years 
ago, as far as most Americans were 
concerned, the Bill of Rights was a bill 
of promises. There was no guarantee 
that those promises would ever be ful- 
filled. We did not realize those prom- 
ises by waiting for history to take its 
inevitable course. We realize them be- 
cause we struggled. We realized them 
because many sacrificed. We realized 
them because we persevered. 

For millions of people around the 
world today the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights is still only a decla- 
ration of hope. Like all of you, I want 
that hope to be fulfilled. The struggle 
to fulfill it will last longer than the 
lifetimes of any of us; indeed, it will 
last as long as the lifetime of humanity 
itself. But we must persevere. And we 
must persevere by insuring that this 
country of ours, leader in the world 
which we love so much, is always in 
the forefront of those who are strug- 
gling for that great hope, the great 
dream of universal human rights. 



SECRETARY VANCE 2 

We are gathered here to celebrate the 
30th anniversary of the Universal Dec- 
laration of Human Rights. This historic 
document embodies the fundamental 
tenet that international law creates ob- 
ligations which all governments owe to 
their citizens, and it helps define uni- 
versally recognized principles of 
human rights. 

In the three decades since the birth 
of the declaration, the United Nations 
has built on these principles in other 
important human rights agreements — 
the genocide convention; the conven- 
tion on racial discrimination; the Inter- 
national Covenant on Civil and Politi- 
cal Rights; and the International 
Covenant on Social, Economic, and 
Cultural Rights. Together with the 
Universal Declaration, these docu- 
ments create an international legal 
structure with protection of individual 
rights. 



January 1979 

I hope that the U.S. Senate will soon 
approve the genocide convention and 
undertake early hearings to permit 
ratification of the other three instru- 
ments. 

International law, as reflected in 
these agreements and covenants, has 
guided this Administration's human 
rights policy. Although the policy re- 
flects basic American ideals, it is not 
an attempt to impose uniquely Ameri- 
can values. 

The rights about which we are 
concerned — the right to be free from 
torture, to be free from arbitrary arrest, 
rights of political expression, the rights 
to basic economic needs — are recog- 
nized in the U.N. Charter and in other 
international agreements as being uni- 
versal in their application throughout 
the world. 

We are gathered here today to re- 
dedicate ourselves to the principles of 
the Universal Declaration. As Members 
of Congress and leaders of private 
groups, your efforts have contributed 
to the creation of the basis in interna- 
tional law for protecting human rights. 
With your help, we will continue to 
work for their universal implementa- 
tion, and with your help we will con- 
tinue to advance the cause of human 
freedom everywhere. 



DR. BRZEZINSKI 

Let me make to you three basic prop- 
ositions regarding human rights and 
then develop them briefly. 

The first is that human rights is the 
genuine historical inevitability of our 
times. The second is that human rights 
is a central facet in America's rele- 
vance to this changing world. And the 
third is that there has been progress in 
the effort to enhance the human condi- 
tion insofar as human rights are con- 
cerned. 

Historical Inevitability 

I started by saying that human rights 
is the genuine historical inevitability of 
our times. I used those words very de- 
liberately, for we live in an age very 
much influenced by concepts of his- 
torical inevitability. Indeed, one of the 
most powerful, moving concepts in 
world affairs today is the notion that 
there is a certain inevitability in his- 
torical progression toward a world rev- 
olution which is doctrinely defined, 
and that idea has had a powerful impact 
on global consciousness. 

And yet, events increasingly are 
proving it wrong; the notion of world 
revolution is too simplistic a concept 



for a world as diverse and as pluralistic 
as ours. It could only have been born in 
the narrow confines of 19th century 
Europe undergoing the early pang>. of 
the industrial revolution and then 
generalized from that basis allegedly in 
terms of universal relevance 

What we are seeing today in the 
world is the increasing self 
assertiveness of man, the increasing 
political awakening of man, and 
thereby also the increasing assertion of 
the diversity of man. And thus, the 
concept of the world that some day will 
emerge based on a similar social- 
political organization achieved for a 
common revolutionary experience is 
becoming increasingly unreal. Indeed, 
many of the difficulties that today beset 
the Communist world in their own in- 
terstate relations are due to the funda- 
mental error of the basic historical as- 
sumption. 

What is, however, becoming evident 
is that as man or mankind abandons his 
centuries-long lethargy, he begins to 
seek actively a meaningful and just — 
and I emphasize the word "just" — 
definition of the proper relationship 
between man and society and between 
society and government. It is an issue 
as old as political philosophy, but it is 
an issue which has been an esoteric one 



BILL OF RIGHTS DAY, 
HUMAN RIGHTS DAY 
AND WEEK, 1978 

A Proclamation* 

Two great events in the history of human 
liberty will be commemorated in December: 
the ratification, on December 15, 1791, of 
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the 
United States, and the adoption, on De- 
cember 10. 1948, of the Universal Declara- 
tion of Human Rights by the United Nations 
General Assembly. 

The anniversary of the Bill of Rights re- 
minds us that our Nation is a continuing ex- 
periment in human freedom. Because of the 
Bill of Rights, we have been able to weather 
187 years of tumultuous social and techno- 
logical change without losing our fundamen- 
tal liberties. Indeed, those liberties have ac- 
tually expanded in scope, and have grown to 
encompass a steadily larger proportion of our 
people. We can be proud of what we have 
achieved. But we cannot be complacent, for 
too many Americans are still denied a fair 
opportunity to enjoy the rights and rewards 
of our society. That is why Bill of Rights 
Day should be a day of rededication as well 
as of commemoration. 

This year, we mark the 30th anniversary of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 



The Declaration is the cornerstone of a 

developing international consensus on human 
rights. It is also the authoritative statement of 
the meaning of the United Nations Charter, 
through which member nations undertake to 
promote, respect and observe human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all. without 
discrimination. A long and difficult road 
must be travelled before the reality of human 
rights in the world matches the words of the 
Declaration. The Declaration will light that 
road and give strength to all who follow it. 

The Universal Declaration is the heart of a 
body of important United Nations human 
rights documents: the Convention on the Pre- 
vention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul- 
tural Rights. The United States signed the 
Genocide Convention in 1948 and the Racial 
Discrimination Convention in 1966. I signed 
the other two Covenants on October 4. 1977. 
I hope that the United States Senate will soon 
approve the Genocide Convention at last, and 
will undertake early hearings to permit our 
Nation's adherence to the three remaining in- 
struments. There could be no more appro- 
priate gesture to mark the anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration. 



I also signed the American Convention on 
Human Rights on June 1, 1977. I am proud 
that since then, eleven nations of the 
Americas have ratified it. thus bringing it 
into force. 

The great and noble struggle to realize the 
rights of all men and women goes on. In the 
face of injustice and oppression, human be- 
ings continue to sacrifice and strive for jus- 
tice and for human dignity 

Now, Therefore. I, Jimmy Carter, 
President of the United States of America, do 
hereby proclaim December 10, 1978, as 
Human Rights Day and December 15. 1978. 
as Bill of Rights Day. and call on all Ameri- 
cans to observe Human Rights Week begin 
ning December 10. 1978. Let us reaffirm our 
dedication to the promise of this Nation for 
all citizens. And let us renew our efforts as 
members of the world community on behalf 
of the human rights of all people everywhere. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto 
set my nana this twenty-eighth day of 
November, in the year of our Lord nineteen 
hundred seventy-eight, and of the Independ- 
ence of the United States of America the two 
hundred and third. 

Jimmy Carter 



♦No. 4609 (text from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of Dec 4, 1978). 



Department of State Bulletin 



BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS 
DOCUMENTS 

Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights 

The declaration was the work of the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights which met in 
January 1947 under the chairmanship of Mrs. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Universal Dec- 
laration of Human Rights they drew up was 
adopted and proclaimed by the General As- 
sembly on December 10. 1948. It was the 
first effort to set common standards of 
achievement in human rights for all peoples 
of all nations. 

Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide 

Drawn up in the immediate wake of World 
War II, this convention forbids states or in- 
dividuals to commit acts with the specific 
intent to destroy, wholly or partially, a na- 
tional, ethnic, racial, or religious group. The 
convention was adopted by the U.N. General 
Assembly in 1948; the United States signed 
it, and it was submitted to the Senate for ad- 
vice and consent to ratification in 1949 and 
resubmitted in 1970. Eighty-three nations are 
parties to the convention, but it has not yet 
been ratified by the United States. Hearings 
have been held before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. 

International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination 

The convention forbids racial and ethnic 
discrimination in all fields of public life. Its 
terms, for the most part, parallel U.S. con- 
stitutional and statutory law and policy. The 
convention was adopted by the U.N. General 
Assembly in 1965; Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. 
Permanent Representative to the United Na- 
tions, signed for the United States in 1966. 
One hundred and one nations have adhered to 
the convention. President Carter transmitted 
it to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent 
to ratification on February 23, 1978. 

International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights 

The covenant affirms a series of standards 
in economic, social, and cultural activities. 
Formulated as statements of goals to be 
achieved progressively rather than im- 
mediately, these standards are in general ac- 
cord with U.S. law and practice. The coven- 
ant was adopted by the U.N. General Assem- 



bly in 1966, and 54 nations are parties. The 
United States has signed it. and President 
Carter transmitted it to the Senate for advice 
and consent to ratification on February 23, 
1978. 

International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 

Of the four U.N. treaties, this covenant is 
the most similar in conception to the U.S. 
Constitution and Bill of Rights. It consists 
primarily of limitations upon the power of 
the state to impose its will on the people 
under its jurisdiction and, in large measure, 
guarantees those civil and political rights 
with which the United States and the Western 
democratic tradition have always been as- 
sociated. The covenant was adopted by the 
U.N. General Assembly in 1966, and 52 na- 
tions are parties. The United States has 
signed it, and President Carter transmitted it 
to the Senate for advice and consent to ratifi- 
cation on February 23, 1978. 

Optional Protocol 

The Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was 
approved by the U.N. General Assembly on 
December 16, 1966. It is closely related to 
the covenant but is a separate treaty to which 
only 21 of the parties to the covenant have 
adhered. 

American Convention 
on Human Rights 
("Pact of San Jose") 

The American convention, like the U.N. 
treaties, gives legally binding expression to 
human rights that are. for the most part, ac- 
cepted in U.S. law and practice. It was 
adopted by the Organization of American 
States in 1969 and was signed for the United 
States on June 1, 1977. Twelve countries of 
the OAS have ratified, and one country has 
adhered to, the convention. President Carter 
transmitted it to the Senate for advice and 
consent to ratification on February 23, 1978. 



♦The full texts of these documents are 
printed in the Department of State's Selected 
Documents No. 5 (Revised), entitled 
"Human Rights." Copies of this 62-page 
Selected Documents may be obtained for 
$2.40 each from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, DC. 20402. (Orders of 
100 or more copies of the same publication 
mailed to the same address are sold at a 25% 
discount.) Remittances in the form of a check 
or money order payable to the Superintendent 
of Documents must accompany orders. 



of interest only to a few for much of 
the political history of mankind. 

It is only in our age, indeed in our 
own lifespan, that this issue has 
dramatically surfaced on a global scale. 
And it has done so in a variety of ways. 
There is no doubt that the World Wars 
were tremendous catalysts for political 
awakening. There is no doubt that the 
spread of literacy and education has 
had an awakening impact on the politi- 
cal consciousness of men and women. 
There is no doubt that the achievement 
of new nations has given more mean- 
ingful political expression for one's 
quest for individual expression. 

But the cumulative impact of that has 
been to make human rights the most 
central item on the global agenda. 
When I say "human rights," I recog- 
nize the fact that in a globally diverse 
world, in a culturally diverse world, 
there will be different emphases, and 
what we stress may be defined and ex- 
pressed differently in different parts of 
the world. 

And yet there is a common theme to 
the aspirations and the yearnings of 
people — be it in Latin America or be it 
in the southern part of Africa or be it in 
the Middle East or be it in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union or be it in 
the Far East. 

I found it to be remarkable that in the 
recent effervescence of political ex- 
pression in the central square in 
Peking — in a country as isolated as 
China has been for decades — one of the 
resounding cries was for Socialist de- 
mocracy, for freedom of expression; in 
effect for human rights, for a definition 
of the proper relationship among man 
and society and government. 

This is the wave of the present. This 
is the central form in which mankind is 
expressing its new political awakening, 
and it is terribly important to recognize 
this. It is very important to be iden- 
tified with it, for it is, as I started to 
say, the genuine historic inevitability 
of our time. 

That brings me to my second point, 
namely, that it is a central facet of our 
relevance to the changing world. 

Relevance to the Changing World 

Consider the circumstances in which 
this country was born — a small group 
of colonies, 13 on the eastern seaboard; 
isolated by weeks distance, by more 
time than it takes you today to get to 
the Moon. It had one thing in common, 
however, with another small sector of 
humanity, that part of humanity which 
lived at the time in western Europe. 
And in both places there was an idea 
which was up in the air, which was 
percolating in the intellectual world, 



mary 1979 



and that was the idea of personal lib- 
erty. It was a new idea fundamentally 
and an increasingly important and 
powerful idea. 

What is unique about this country is 
that it was the first country ever in the 
history of mankind to consciously 
come together and shape itself around a 
central philosophical idea; namely, the 
idea of the independence and freedom 
of man. 

I would not insist for a minute that 
by accomplishing our independence, by 
signing the Bill of Rights, we fulfilled 
that idea. Far from it. The next 200 
years of our history has been one of an 
unending quest to make that idea a re- 
ality, and we did it through the strug- 
gles for suffrage, through the exten- 
sion of civil rights, through the break- 
ing of racial barriers, through the 
elimination of inequality between the 
sexes, through increasing the scope of 
political participation to groups 
hitherto excluded, such as the trade 
unions. 

And the struggle still goes on. But 
the point is that we created a 
framework in our society which was 
congenial to the struggle and which 
legitimized it. And this is the genius of 
the historical success of America. And 
it is more than that. It is the key to 
America's relevance to the world, for 
we are not just a geographical entity. 
We do not have, as other nations, an 
organic past which we share. We are 
united together by a compact with the 
future, and it brings us together be- 
cause we share certain common ideals. 

This is what makes us Americans ul- 
timately. We are Americans because 
we do not share a past, but we share a 
future. We share a future which is as- 
sociated with certain fundamental 
philosophical assumptions about what 
is the nature of man and, to repeat, 
what is the proper relationship among 
man, society, and government. 

Today, these ideas are becoming 
universal in their appeal, and it is, 
therefore, just and right, morally cor- 
rect, historically well-grounded and 
politically useful — and I am not hesi- 
tant in saying that — for the United 
States to carry high the standard of 
human rights, for we are then in the 
forefront of a powerful movement 
which, indeed, has worldwide appeal. 
And we gain from it. 

We first of all redeem our own es- 
sence. We rededicate ourselves to our 
inner meaning when we commit our- 
selves as Americans, and we greatly 
enhance the appeal of this country 
worldwide. 

American foreign policy depends not 
on material wealth or financial 
power — and neither of these should be 



underestimated — but it also depends a 
great deal on the spiritual attraction as 
well, and that attraction traditionally 
has been scorned. It has waned in re- 
cent years. One of the things of which I 
am particularly proud is to be as- 
sociated with a President who has done 
so much to revitalize that significant 
element of America's relevance to the 
world. 

I think it has already contributed to 
overcoming what was doubtless a crisis 
of the spirit in this society. That crisis 
of the spirit was derived from funda- 
mental divisions about proper courses 
of action, but this division of proper 
courses of action was also associated 
with profound moral and philosophical 
differences, the consequence of which 
was to generate in this society an his- 
torical sense of pessimism and moral 
unease. 

Progress in Enhancing 
Human Rights 

I think it is remarkable how much 
has been accomplished in 2 years to 
overcome that. We face enormous di- 
lemmas in world affairs, and each day 
compounds the difficulties. And yet we 
approach them again with a renewed 
sense of historical optimism and a 
sense of moral ease within ourselves. 
And that is terribly important, and it 
has to be differentiated from self- 
righteousness; it isn't self-right- 
eousness. 

There are a great many things wrong 
with this society. But to realize — in 
spite of these wrongs which, within the 
framework of the Constitution we have 
created, we are trying to correct — we 
are associated with a basic yearning of 
man is a tremendous political asset. 
Thus, I would stress very heavily, very 
strongly, that in the context of this 
politically awakening world which is 
seeking readjustments in political and 
economic distribution of power, for us 
to be concerned with human rights is to 
be concerned with a central human 
concern and a human aspiration which 
is both real and just. That is a very 
powerful combination. 

But beyond that, I would argue that 
on the practical level we have made 
progress. Patt [Derian], who has been 
directly involved in this, who has been 
in the forefront of this, will speak to it 
more precisely. But let me say just in 
general that we have succeeded in or- 
ganizing this government to be more 
sensitive to questions of human rights. 
We have now a structure — not a perfect 
one, to be sure, but a structure 
nonetheless — which makes certain that 
human rights concerns are given new 
consideration in the shaping of our 



policy. That is a tangible and concrete 
expression. 

Secondly, we have tried to increase 
global awareness of the importance of 
this issue, particularly in other gov- 
ernments that have to deal with us. And 
there is today not a government in the 
world that does not know that how it 
behaves in regard to human rights will 
affect its relationship with us. Again, I 
use my words advisedly — "will af- 
fect," not determine in its entirety, be- 
cause we have to be cognizant of the 
fact that there are other considerations 
also involved in dealing with other 
governments — regional interests, spe- 
cific bilateral interests, security con- 
cerns which may dictate different 
arrangements — even if these govern- 
ments in some cases are unresponsive. 

But no government can today afford 
the luxury of thinking that we do not 
care and that it is entirely immune to 
some consequences if it is indifferent 
to the cause of human rights. And thus, 
I think on a practical global level we 
have made the issue of human rights a 
genuinely present issue on the global 
agenda. 

I was struck, in traveling with the 
President to different parts of the 
world, with the extent to which even 
leaders initially skeptical about our 
human rights policy increasingly iden- 
tified themselves with the issue of 
human rights and addressed themselves 
to it — in most cases genuinely, in some 
cases less so. But even hypocrisy is ? 
bow to virtue, and the fact they felt 
compelled to acknowledge tnc human 
rights concept is not without signifi- 
cance. 

Last year has seen some tangible 
progress in the human condition. There 
are different ways of assessing that 
progress. There are different groups 
which, from time to time, make esti- 
mates. Collating some of these reports 
together, we do have the impression 
that not because of our efforts, either 
alone or at all, but because of this in- 
creasing relevance of the human rights 
condition which we have helped to 
stimulate, there has been progress in a 
number of countries. 

It is difficult to measure it but as a 
rough approximate estimate I would 
say in at least 40 countries around the 
world in which two and a half billion 
people live there has been tangible 
progress — in some cases more, in some 
cases less, in some cases certainly not 
enough, but progress nonetheless. And 
it has expressed itself in even greater 
respect for rights or less oppression of 
political opposition or in the release of 
victims or in a generally more sensitive 
attitude toward established procedures. 

This is something of which we can 



be proud, though of which we should 
not take credit. We are part of the 
process. We are part of a political and 
historical process, and we live in a time 
which is often short in hopeful 
perspectives in the future. I would 
submit to you that this is one of the 
more important reassuring ones be- 
cause it tells us something about what a 
human being is. It tells us that ulti- 
mately the human being in whatever 
the social, economic, or cultural con- 
ditions, yearns for something transcen- 
dental, yearns for some self-definition 
with respect to his uniqueness, yearns 
for something which dignifies him as a 
spiritual being. And if that, in fact, is 
increasingly the human condition, it 
ought to be a source of tremendous 
pride and reassurance to us as Ameri- 
cans. 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERIAN 

To the how, why. and what of our 
policy, there generally are four ques- 
tions: How we are implementing it; 
why are we doing it, or why do we do 
what we do; and what has been 
achieved? Then the fourth one that 
never goes away is do we really mean 
it? 

I think by the time this event is over, 
after hearing what we have just heard, 
after hearing the President's statement. 



I think that maybe that question will be 
laid to rest forever. However, I do be- 
lieve that the integrity of the policy, 
the decisions we make in the name of 
the policy, will always be questioned. 
And I think, frankly, that that is a 
necessity, that people have to care 
enough about it to watch, to complain, 
to push, to press, to say this is what we 
want, this doesn't match our standard, 
we are not satisfied with it, do better, 
do better, do better. 

If that doesn't continue, then 15 or 
20 years down the pike this will just be 
something else that happened or still 
has a little office percolating some- 
where. It really depends on the people 
who are gathered here today. You are 
the human rights establishment. You 
are the authors of human rights in 
American foreign policy sitting right 
here in the front row. 

There is no question that we have got 
it and that we intend to hang onto it. 
Just make sure that everybody else who 
comes wants to hang onto it or is 
caused to. 

In our bilateral relations we discuss 
human rights issues formally with 
Presidents and Prime Ministers. This is 
a change. It used to be that this hap- 
pened quietly in the hall or over a glass 
of brandy or between sets on a tennis 
court, because human rights things 
were not generally thought to be possi- 
ble to discuss in diplomatic formal 



Patricia M. Derian is the Assistant Secre- 
tary of State for Human Rights and Human- 
itarian Affairs. She was sworn in on June 17, 
1977, as the Coordinator for Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Affairs; as a result of a 
reorganization in the Department of State in 
August 1977. she assumed the title of Assist- 
ant Secretary. 

Ms. Derian, a native of Virginia, resided 
in Jackson, Mississippi, from 1959 until her 
present appointment. She attended Radford 
College in Virginia and is a graduate of the 
University of Virginia School of Nursing. 

She has long been active in civil rights re- 
lated work and Democratic Party organiza- 
tion. She has served as the president of the 
Southern Regional Council and as an OEO 
project director. Ms. Derian was a member 
of the Executive Committee of the ACLU 
and a founder of the Mississippi Civil Liber- 
ties Union. She was a member of the Na- 
tional Prison Project Steering Committee, the 
Board of Directors of the Center for Commu- 
nity Justice, and the Mississippi Council on 
Human Relations. 

In 1968 she was elected Mississippi's 
Democratic National Committeewoman and 
reelected in 1972 and 1976. She was one of 
the founders of the Loyalist Mississippi 




Democratic Party and the Democratic Na- 
tional Committeewomen's Caucus. 

During the presidential campaign she was 
an adviser to Jimmy Carter and a deputy di- 
rector of the Carter-Mondale campaign and 
served on the HEW policy planning group of 
the Carter-Mondale transition team. 



Department of State Bulletin 

negotiations. That has changed. That 
happens now. 

People are still a little bit uneasy and 
nervous about it, because talking about 
torture and disappearances and no 
charges and no trials to the people who 
are responsible for those things hap- 
pening makes everybody a little un- 
easy. The ones you are talking to don't 
like to hear it, and the ones who are 
saying it are hoping that they can say it 
and get the message across and not 
erect such a barrier that no communi- 
cation can take place. But we are all 
learning how to do that. 

Our approach has not been limited to 
quiet diplomacy. We have practiced 
vigorous diplomacy in which all avail- 
able instruments are used. They include 
symbolic affirmations of our concern. 
The President says something, the 
Secretary says something, it is in a 
speech, it is in a press conference, it is 
in a press release, it is in a casual 
comment, it is in a letter, it is whatever 
way you can find at some point when it 
seems like the right instrument to have 
a strong public gesture. When there is 
no response to quiet expression of 
human rights concerns and when there 
is no response to a symbolic speaking 
out, our law and our policy demand 
that we examine our assistance 
relationships, both economic and 
military. 

We will continue to assert human 
rights concerns as vigorously as we 
have during the past 2 years in our 
dealings with all governments. The 
fundamental objective of this policy is 
to do what we can as a government and 
as a people to improve the observation 
of human rights by governments toward 
their people. That is essentially what it 
is that this policy is to do, and we do 
that in all the ways that you know. 

At the same time, the human rights 
policy has another important effect; it 
strengthens our position and influence 
in the world. Human rights is an area 
where our ideals and our self-interest 
strongly coincide. 

The fact of it is that that is a side 
effect and the only way we really get 
that side benefit is to be as straight as it 
is possible to be with our policy im- 
plementation. That is our intention. 
That is our endeavor. That is our con- 
stant struggle, because I don't need to 
tell anyone in this room that it is also 
incredibly complex to balance all of the 
things that are of great concern to the 
United States with all the other things. 
Human rights now sits at the table and 
that is a change. 

Our well-being and security are en- 
hanced when there is greater respect for 
human rights in the world. Our policy 
is important to the health and integrity 



January 1979 



of this society within the United States. 
Support for or indifference to oppres- 
sion in other countries weakens the 
foundation of our democracy at home. 

We have increased awareness of and 
concern for human rights among gov- 
ernments and peoples throughout the 
world and in international organiza- 
tions such as the United Nations. 

Finally, besides growing awareness, 
there are indications of concrete prog- 
ress for many regions. The U.S. Gov- 
ernment is careful not to claim credit 
for influencing specific steps. When a 
country is making improvements, it is 
the result of decisions made by its gov- 
ernment and people. And how many 
events would have occurred in the ab- 
sence of U.S. human rights policy, we 
have no idea. But the policy has helped 
create a climate in which such changes 
are more likely. 

I might just run down a few of these. 
In Africa three countries now under 
military rule have pledged themselves 
to hold elections and reestablish 
majority rule. They include Nigeria. 
Mali, and Ghana. Another, Upper 
Volta, has already returned to a mul- 
tiparty and civilian democratic system. 
Nigeria has called for the creation of an 
African human rights commission. And 
the African Bar Association, in its most 
recent meeting, called for greater re- 
spect for human rights and was moved 
to call for greater respect, because a 
person got up and wanted to speak 
against the human rights policy, 
whereupon the Bar Association took a 
very strong and principled position in 
favor of human rights. 

In Asia, Indonesia has released 
15,000 political prisoners over the past 
18 months and has pledged to release 
all remaining over the next year. 
Thousands of political prisoners have 
been released in Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
Guinea, Bolivia, Haiti, and elsewhere. 

India, the world's largest democ- 
racy, clearly rejected authoritarian rule 
in last year's election and is joined 
with us in pressing the cause of human 
rights. 

In Latin America, the Dominican 
Republic held fair and open elections. 
Military regimes in Peru and Ecuador 
are moving to restore democracy. At its 
last meeting, the Organization of 
American States passed by an over- 
whelming majority a resolution to sup- 
port the advancement of human rights 



and to strengthen the Inter-American 
Human Rights Commission. The 
Commission has visited Panama, El 
Salvador, Haiti, and Nicaragua, and 
more trips are slated. 

In NATO, every member of the 
Western alliance is a democracy. And 
in Eastern Europe, through the Bel- 
grade conference and other diplomatic 
channels, we continue to press the 
countries of the Warsaw Pact to abide 
by the Helsinki accords. 

The Helsinki Final Act has assumed 
a life of its own. Monitoring groups 
help insure a full discussion of gaps 
between current practices and promises 
of Helsinki. There is no question that 
those monitoring groups have mighty 
hard sledding, and it is part of our re- 
sponsibility to speak on their behalf, to 
give them what support we can. and to 
at least supply an echo for those brave 
voices in those dreadful and frightening 
circumstances. 

But the fact is that most of the prog- 
ress is yet to come. Legions of people 
all over the world suffer at the hands of 
their governments. Too many are im- 
prisoned without being charged. Their 
families often don't know where they 
are. They are certainly not tried in 
those circumstances. Too many are de- 
nied basic freedoms of expression, the 
right to participate in their government. 

But we are really at the beginning, 
and we are hopeful that in all the years 
that it will take, that we will continue 
to see and be able to recount year after 
year a little more movement, a little 
more movement. 

If we should find the time when we 
are able to make a lot of movement, 
that would be superb. But in the ab- 
sence of dramatic events — even in the 
presence of dramatic events — we must 
continue to press and press and press, 
just slug it out one day at a time. 

I would like to end with a word 
about the U.S. refugee program, which 
is an integral part of our human rights 
policy. 

There is special urgency today con- 
cerning the refugees from Indochina. 
Their desperate plight is underlined 
daily in the newspapers where there are 
reports of little boats sinking, people 
drowning, being pushed away, living 
out God knows what kind of future in a 
present that is an overcrowded refugee 
camp. 

While every effort is made to make 



the camps safe, habitable, the fact is 
that as these numbers increase, the 
camps are getting overcrowded, health 
conditions are becoming very serious, 
and food conditions are a problem, too. 

The search of these refugees for 
temporary safe haven is an interna- 
tional problem demanding an interna- 
tional solution. With other govern- 
ments, the United States will take part 
in a high-level consultation on In- 
dochinese refugees in Geneva on De- 
cember 11 and 12 under the leadership 
of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Paul Hartling. We hope 
other governments will join us in in- 
creasing their level of acceptance of 
refugees, in providing material support 
for them in the countries where they 
first land, and for aiding in their per- 
manent resettlement. 

For our part, the United States is in- 
creasing acceptance to an annual total 
of 54,000 in the months ahead. This 
total includes 25,000 authorized for 
parole earlier this year; 625 Cambodian 
refugees a month, following specific 
expressions of concern by the Con- 
gress; a special admission of 2,500 in 
response to the Hai Hong crisis when 
the refugee vessel was stranded off the 
coast of Malaysia; an additional 8,000 
conditional entry numbers; and 15,000 
for boat refugees on which parole ac- 
tion has been taken by the Attorney 
General in consultation with the Con- 
gress. 

A final word on our commitment to 
ratification of the genocide and the 
other human rights covenants. They are 
crucial to the international credibility 
of this country's human rights policy. 
It is ludicrous for us to base an enor- 
mous part of our foreign policy on the 
fundamentals of human rights and fail 
to ratify the implementing instruments 
that are in the international world. 

That is a little early lobbying for 
people who don't need it, but I hope 
that you will understand the commit- 
ment that this Administration has to it, 
certainly that many members of the 
Congress have to it. And it is now time 
for us to act. □ 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Dec. 1 1. 1978. 

■Text of remarks by Secretary Vance. Dr. 
Brzezinski. and Assistant Secretary Derian taken 
from White House press release of Dec. 6. 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT: News 

Conferences of i¥oi?. 9 and 30 

and Dec* 12 (Excerpts) 



NOV. 9, KANSAS CITY 1 



Q. As you draw up the budget for 
next year, which you will be doing 
the next few weeks, you're facing the 
choice between, to some extent, guns 
and butter. We've committed to our 
NATO allies to let the military 
budget grow. At the same time, you 
want to hold down, decrease the 
Federal deficit to $30 billion or 
below. 

Is it true, as reported, that you've 
decided to let the whole military 
budget grow by about 3% faster than 
the rate of inflation while ordering a 
$4 billion, $5 billion cut of the pro- 
jected gross of social programs? And 
if so, where are those cuts going to 
come from — Amtrak subsidies or 
Federal pensions or farm programs 
or where? 

A. I've been working on the 1980 
fiscal year budget for months. I had my 
first hearings, preliminary hearings, 
with the agency heads last April or 
May, and now almost daily, I meet 
with the Office of Management and 
Budget on future decisions to be made 
in the budget itself. I won't make final 
decisions on the fiscal year '80 budget 
until sometime next month, after 
meeting with the heads of the different 
agencies and departments of the Fed- 
eral Government to let them appeal, in 
effect, decisions that the OMB — Office 
of Management and Budget — and I 
have made together. 

There's no way that I can cut down 
the ability of our nation to defend it- 
self. Our security obviously comes 
first. And we have encouraged our 
NATO allies in particular to increase 
their expenditures for a joint defense of 
Europe and, therefore, us by 3% a year 
above the inflation rate. I intend to 
honor that commitment. The final fig- 
ures, though, on individual depart- 
ments, and clearly the Defense De- 
partment, have not yet been decided. 

I might point out I will meet my 
goal, which I announced in the anti- 
inflation speech a couple of weeks ago, 
of having a budget deficit less than half 
what it was when I was running for 
President. The budget deficit will be 
below $30 billion. It's going to be a 
very tight, very stringent, very difficult 



budget to achieve, but I will achieve it. 
And I'm sure Congress will back me in 
this effort. I'm also continuing a freeze 
on hiring of Federal employees. I have 
limited this year, with the Congress 
approval, the pay increases for Federal 
employees — there is no increase at all 
for executives in the Federal Govern- 
ment. And I'll do other things as well 
to control inflation. 



For texts of the Joint Com- 
munique on the Establishment of 
Diplomatic Relations Between 
the United States and the 
People's Republic of China, the 
President's address and remarks, 
and the U.S. statement of De- 
cember 15, 1978, see p. 25. 



I consider it to be my top domestic 
commitment, and I don't intend to fail. 

Q. Do you intend to sign the meat 
import bill, and if not, why not? 

A. The bill has not gotten to my desk 
yet. And I expect to receive it tomor- 
row or Saturday. I'll make a decision 
then. 

I might point out that I'm strongly in 
favor of the countercyclical approach 
to beef imports, where on a predictable 
basis, when the supply of beef in this 
country is high, that imports would be 
lower, and vice versa. 

There are some factors that concern 
me about the beef import bill. One is 
the — I understand to be a severe lim- 
itation on the President's right to make 
decisions in case of emergency. But I'll 
have to assess the bill in its entirety. If 
I should make a decision against the 
legislation, however, because of the 
feature that I just described to you, 
then I would work with the Congress to 
include early next year a countercycli- 
cal approach. I think it's a very good 
approach. And I'll just have to make a 
decison before the end of this week. 2 



Q. Do you agree with President 
Sadat's view that the two 
agreements — the one on the West 
Bank and the agreement now being 
negotiated for peace between Israel 
and Egypt — have to be linked in 
some way? 



A. There's never been any doubt in 
my mind, nor President Sadat's, nor 
Prime Minister Begin 's, that one of the 
premises for the Camp David negotia- 
tions was a comprehensive peace set- 
tlement that includes not just an iso- 
lated peace treaty between Israel and 
Egypt but includes a continuation of a 
solution for the West Bank, Gaza Strip, 
and ultimately for the Golan Heights as 
well. There is some difference of 
opinion between the two leaders about 
how specifically it should be expressed 
in the Sinai treaty. 

I personally favor the presently 
negotiated language, which in the 
preamble does say that both nations 
commit themselves to carry out the 
comprehensive peace agreement as was 
agreed at Camp David. This is a matter 
for negotiation between the two lead- 
ers. 

I have heard Prime Minister Begin 
say in my presence that he did not de- 
sire a separate peace treaty with Egypt. 
And. of course, this is also the opinion 
and strongly felt view of President 
Sadat. 

We've been negotiating on the 
Mideast peace agreement for months. I 
have personally put hundreds of hours 
into it. We have reached, on more than 
one occasion so far, agreement on the 
text between the negotiators them- 
selves. When they refer the text back to 
the leaders at home in Egypt and Israel, 
sometimes the work that has been done 
is partially undone. But I think that the 
present language as approved by the 
negotiators is adequate, and our pre- 
sumption is to adhere to that language 
as our preference. But I would like to 
point out that we are not trying to im- 
pose our will on the leaders themselves 
or on those nations, and we hope that 
they will rapidly reach a conclusion. 

There's no doubt in my mind that 
this kind of difference in language and 
how a linkage is actually expressed is a 
matter for negotiation. It does not vio- 
late the commitments made at Camp 
David, no matter what the decision 
might be as reached jointly by Egypt 
and Israel. 



Q. You're being confronted with a 
growing number of pleas to help 
bring about a mediated peace in the 
Latin American country of 
Nicaragua. Is the United States going 
to act to prevent further bloodshed 
and repression, or do you feel that 
your hands are tied because you 
don't want to interfere in the inter- 
nal affairs of another country? What 
can you do? 

A. We are participating actively and 



January 1979 

daily in the negotiations to bring about 
a settlement in Nicaragua. I get daily 
reports from Mr. Bowdler. He was one 
of the three major negotiators there. 
We're working in harmony with two 
other Latin American countries in this 
effort. 3 

We are trying to bring about a res- 
olution of the Nicaraguan question. 
And I think you know in the last few 
weeks since these negotiations began, 
the bloodshed has certainly been dras- 
tically reduced. It's one of the most 
difficult tasks that we've undertaken. 

And we proposed others to be the 
negotiators at first. We were unable to 
find an acceptable group. With our ab- 
sence, both sides — I guess all sides, 
there are many more than two — wanted 
the United States to be negotiators. So, 
we are negotiating actively now to 
reach an agreement in Nicaragua to 
control bloodshed, to minimize dis- 
putes, and to set up a government there 
that will have the full support of the 
Nicaraguan people. 



NOV. 30 4 



Q. Do you plan to stay with your 
pledge to increase your defense 
budget by 3% despite your anti- 
inflation drive? And also on defense, 
there are published reports that 
you're going to change your nuclear 
strategy to focus more on massive 
retaliation. Is that true? 

A. Let me answer the last part first. 
Our nuclear policy basically is one of 
deterrence; to take actions that are well 
known by the American people and 
well known by the Soviets and other 
nations; that any attack on us would re- 
sult in devastating destruction by the 
nation which launched an attack against 
us. So, the basic policy is one of de- 
terrence. 

We, obviously, constantly assess the 
quality of our own nuclear weapon 
systems as times change, as techno- 
logical advances are made, and as the 
change takes place in the Soviet 
Union's arsenal. We keep our weapons 
up to date; we improve our communi- 
cations and command and information 
systems. But we will maintain basically 
a deterrent policy rather than to change 
the basic policy itself. 

The other answer to your question is 
that our goal and that of other NATO 
nations is to increase the real level of 
defense expenditures. This is our goal. 
Each expenditure on defense, each 
system for which we spend the tax- 



payer's money will be much more 
carefully assessed this year to make 
sure that we are efficient and effective 
in the funds that we do expend. 

Over the last number of years, in- 
cluding since I've been in office even, 
the percentage of our total budget and 
our gross national product that goes 
into defense has been decreasing. And 
at the conclusion of the budget cycle, 
when I make the budget public to the 
Congress and to the people in about 6 
weeks, I know that I'll be responsible 
to make sure that the social and other 
domestic needs of our nation are met, 
our international obligations are ful- 
filled, and an adequate defense is as- 
sured, and that there be a proper bal- 
ance among these different, sometimes 
conflicting, demands. 

So, I'll be responsible, and I will as- 
sure you and other Americans that 
when the budget is assessed that I will 
carry out my responsibilities well. 

Q. I'd like to ask you about China. 
What is your timetable for reaching 
full normalization of relations with 
China, and have the recent events 
that are now going on in China — 
have those altered that policy? And 
do you envision China as a potential 
military ally at any time against the 
Soviet Union? 

A. We don't have any intention of 
selling any weapons to either China or 
the Soviet Union. We are improving 
our relationships with the People's Re- 
public of China as time goes on, even 
short of complete diplomatic normali- 
zation. Our goal, however, is to move 
toward normalization in accordance 
with the Shanghai communique agree- 
ments. The attitude of China, the 
domestic situation in China, has 
changed, and we watch it with great 
interest. 



Q. Is it correct that you have de- 
cided to go ahead with the M-X 
mobile missile and the Trident II in 
the next budget? And will you com- 
ment on the suggestion that that de- 
cision, if you take it, the decision on 
civil defense, is actually a part of a 
plan to sort of pull the fangs of the 
anti-SALT [Strategic Arms Limita- 
tion Talks] people, that it's part of a 
SALT dance, rather than an inde- 
pendent action? 

A. I don't think it's part of a SALT 
dance. I have not decided yet on what 
types of new weapons systems, if any, 
we will advocate in the 1980 fiscal year 
budget for our strategic arms arsenal. 

The press reports about a $2-billion 
civil defense program have been com- 



pletely erroneous, and I have never 
been able to find where the origin of 
that story might have derived. No pro- 
posal has even been made to me for a 
civil defense program of that mag- 
nitude. 

We are considering the advisability 
of pursuing some civil defense assess- 
ments, including the fairly long-term 
evacuation of some of our major cities 
if we should think a nuclear war would 
be likely, which is obviously not a very 
likely project in itself, a proposal in it- 
self. 

But I have not yet decided when to 
move on the M-X or if to move on the 
M-X, what to do about making sure 
that our present silo missiles are se- 
cure. The Soviet missiles, as have ours 
in recent years, have been improved in 
their quality, particularly in their ac- 
curacy. And this makes the one leg of 
our so-called triad more vulnerable, 
that is, the fixed silo missiles. 

We are addressing this question with 
a series of analyses, but I've not yet 
made a decision on how to do it 



Q. Do you see the events in China 
as an outcome of your human rights 
policy? 

A. I could make a career out of re- 
sponding to all the criticisms [laughter] 
that are made and comments made by 
other political figures, even including 
ex-Presidents. I don't intend to do so. 

I personally think the human rights 
policy of our government is well ad- 
vised and has had broad-ranging, ben- 
eficial effect. I don't claim credit for 
the American human rights policy 
when political prisoners are released 
from certain countries or when those 
countries move toward more 
democratic means, or even when — as is 
in the case of China now — there are 
public and apparently permitted de- 
mands or requests for more democratic 
government policies and enhanced 
human rights. 

But I think our policy is right. It's 
well founded. It's one that I will 
maintain tenaciously, and I think it's 
demonstrated around the world that it's 
already had good effect. 



Q. Where do we stand on a Middle 
East accord between Egypt and Is- 
rael, and what can you or are you 
doing to try to bring the two parties 
together? 

A. We are negotiating and com- 
municating with both the leaders of Is- 
rael and Egypt on a constant and sus- 
tained basis. I have been dissatisfied 



10 



and disappointed at the length of time 
required to bring about a peace treaty 
that was signed by both Israel and 
Egypt. I've already outlined in the past 
my assessment of why this delay has 
taken place, as contrasted with Camp 
David. I'm not dealing directly with 
the principals simultaneously, and a lot 
of the negotiation has, unfortunately, 
been conducted through the press be- 
cause of political reasons, domestically 
speaking or other reasons. 

Although I'm somewhat discour- 
aged, we are certainly not going to give 
up on the effort. Tomorrow, I will be 
meeting with the Prime Minister of 
Egypt, Mr. Khalil, who's coming, I 
understand, with a personal message to 
me from President Sadat. 

We have a need, obviously, to get a 
treaty text pinned down and approved 
by both governments, and to resolve 
the very difficult question of the so- 
called linkage, whether or not certain 
acts in the West Bank, Gaza Strip have 
to be taking place at the same time the 
Sinai agreement is consummated. 

But regardless of temporary disap- 
pointments and setbacks that we've ex- 
perienced since Camp David, they are 
no more serious nor of any greater con- 
cern than some that I experienced at 
Camp David. And we will continue to 
pursue our efforts to bring about a 
peace treaty there. 

My reason for what optimism I keep 
is that I know for certain that both 
President Sadat and Prime Minister 
Begin want a peace treaty. I know that 
their people want a peace treaty. And I 
think as long as this determination on 
their part is extant, that our own good 
offices are very likely to be fruitful. 
So, I will continue the effort, no matter 
how difficult it might be in the future. 



Q. I'd like to ask you about the 
MIG's in Cuba. Have you come to a 
decision yet on whether the MIG- 
23's in Cuba represent any increased 
threat to the United States? Have you 
asked the Russians to take them out? 
And do you believe the 1962 under- 
standings with the Soviet Union have 
been violated? 

A. There have been MIG-23's in 
Cuba for a long time. There is a model 
of the MIG-23 that's been introduced 
there late last spring which we have 
been observing since that time. 

We would consider it to be a very 
serious development if the Soviet 
Union violated the 1962 agreement. 
When we have interrogated the Soviet 
Union through diplomatic channels, 
they have assured us that no shipments 
of weapons to the Cubans have or will 



violate the terms of the 1962 agree- 
ment. We will monitor their com- 
pliance with this agreement very care- 
fully, which we have been doing in the 
past, both as to the quality of weapons 
sent there and the quantity of weapons 
sent there, to be sure that there is no 
offensive threat to the United States 
possible from Cuba. 

I might add that we have no evidence 
at all, no allegation that atomic 
weapons are present in Cuba. 

Q. Is there any reason that you 
feel that the Shah is justifiably in 
trouble with his people? 

A. I think the Shah understands the 
situation in Iran very clearly and the 
reasons for some of the problems that 
he has experienced recently. He has 
moved forcefully and aggressively in 
changing some of the ancient religious 
customs of Iran, for instance, and some 
of the more conservative or traditional 
religious leaders deplore this change 
substantially. Others of the Iranian citi- 
zens who are in the middle class, who 
have a new prosperity brought about by 
enhanced oil prices and extra income 
coming into the country, I think feel 
that they ought to have a greater share 
of the voice in determining the affairs 
of Iran. Others believe that the de- 
mocratization of Iran ought to proceed 
more quickly. 

The Shah, as you know, has offered 
the opposition groups a place in a coa- 
lition government. They have rejected 
that offer and demand more complete 
removal from the Shah of his authority. 

We trust the Shah to maintain stabil- 
ity in Iran, to continue with the de- 
mocratization process, and also to con- 
tinue with the progressive change in the 
Iranian social and economic structure. 
But I don't think either I or any other 
national leader could ever claim that 
we have never made a mistake or have 
never misunderstood the attitudes of 
our people. We have confidence in the 
Shah, we support him and his efforts to 
change Iran in a constructive way, 
moving toward democracy and social 
progress. And we have confidence in 
the Iranian people to make the ultimate 
judgments about their own govern- 
ment. 

We do not have any intention of in- 
terfering in the internal affairs of Iran, 
and we do not approve any other nation 
interfering in the internal affairs of 
Iran. 



Q. When you came to office, there 
was a lot of criticism of the intelli- 
gence agencies about the methods 
they were using, and now since the 
Iran thing there's a good deal of 



Department of State Bulletin i 

criticism, it seems, about their 
evaluation. 

How concerned were you about the 
intelligence evaluations in Iran? And 
could you give us a general comment 
about what you think the state of the 
intelligence arts is today? 

A. I've said several times that one of 
the pleasant surprises of my own Ad- 
ministration has been the high quality 
of work done by the intelligence com- 
munity. When I interrogate them about 
a specific intelligence item or when I 
get general assessments of intelligence 
matters, I've been very pleased with 
the quality of their work. 

Recently, however, I have been con- 
cerned that the trend that was estab- 
lished about 15 years ago to get intelli- 
gence from electronic means might 
have been overemphasized, sometimes 
to the detriment of the assessment of 
the intelligence derived and also the 
intelligence derived through normal 
political channels, not secret intelli- 
gence; sometimes just the assessment 
of public information that's known in 
different countries around the world. 
And recently I wrote a note — which is 
my custom; I write several every 
day — to the National Security Council, 
the State Department, and the CIA 
leaders, and asked them to get together 
with others and see how we could im- 
prove the quality of our assessment 
program and also, particularly, politi- 
cal assessments. 

Since I've been in office, we have 
substantially modified the order of 
priorities addressed by the intelligence 
community in its totality. When I be- 
came President, I was concerned, dur- 
ing the first few months, that quite 
often the intelligence community itself 
set its own priorities. As a supplier of 
intelligence information, I felt that the 
customers, the ones who receive the 
intelligence information, including the 
Defense Department, myself, and 
others, ought to be the ones to say, 
"This is what we consider to be most 
important." That effort has been com- 
pleted, and it's now working very well. 

So, to summarize, there is still some 
progress to be made. I was pleased 
with the intelligence community's work 
when I first came into office, and it's 
been improved since I became Presi- 
dent. 



DEC. 12 5 

Q. Can you confirm reports that a 
tentative agreement has been reached 
on SALT with the Soviets, that you 
may meet at the summit with 
Brezhnev in January, and also, if 



January 1979 



11 



these are true, can you say what 
caused the breakthrough? 

A. We've made good progress on 
SALT. I can't say that we've reached 
agreement. A statement will be made 
later on today by the State Department 
and by the Soviets simultaneously 
about a possible meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers. 6 

I think that there has been steady 
progress made in the last almost 2 
years. I can't recall any time when 
there was a retrogression or a pause in 
the commitment to reach a SALT 
agreement. Our position has been 
clear. We have harmony, I believe, 
among the Defense Department, State 
Department and the White House on 
what should be the U.S. position. If the 
Soviets are adequately forthcoming, we 
will have an agreement without further 
delay. If they are not forthcoming, then 
we'll continue to negotiate. 

Q. And how about the summit? 

A. I think that as we approach the 
time when we are sure that the items 
have been resolved that are still under 
negotiation, at that time we will have a 
summit meeting and at that summit 
meeting we will discuss not only con- 
cluding the SALT agreement officially 
but also having a broad agenda of other 
items that are of mutual interest to us 
and the Soviet Union. 



Q. The other day you took a very 
serious view of Israel and Egypt 
going past the 17th of this month 
without concluding a treaty, that's 
the date they themselves set for it. 
Now with 5 days left, what's your be- 
lief, or hunch, as to whether they'll 
meet that deadline; and do you still 
think it's sort of a "now or never" 
proposition? 

A. I don't think it's now or never. 
And you very accurately described this 
deadline date as one established by Is- 
rael and Egypt in the most solemn 
commitment at Camp David. 

Secretary Vance reports to me from 
Cairo good progress having been made 
between him and President Sadat. He 
has not begun further negotiations with 
the Israelis yet because of Mrs. Meir's 
funeral. He will return to Egypt, try to 
conclude his discussions with President 
Sadat, and then go back to Israel for 
discussions with the Israelis [see p. 39]. 

I consider the deadline date to be 
quite important. If the Egyptians and 
Israelis cannot keep a commitment on a 
3-month conclusion of a peace treaty 
when they themselves are the only two 
nations involved, serving as a mediator 
in the process, then I think it would be 



very difficult for them to expect the 
terms of the treaty they are negotiating 
to be carried out with assurance. It sets 
a very bad precedent for Israel and 
Egypt not to reach a conclusion. 

I think the differences that presently 
divide Israel and Egypt are minor, cer- 
tainly compared to the resolution of 
major differences in the past. And I 
believe that President Sadat has recon- 
firmed his intention, his commitment, 
to Secretary Vance to conclude the 
negotiations without further delay. My 
hope is, and my expectation is, that the 
Israelis will have the same attitude. 



Q. At year's end, how do you as- 
sess the last 11, ll 1 .- 2 months, the 
pluses and the minuses as you see 
them, the hits and the errors, and, 
particularly, would you speak a little 
bit about the errors? 

A. As a completely nonbiased 
analyst, I would say that the pluses far 
outweigh the minuses .... In interna- 
tional affairs, our country has injected 
itself. I think wisely, into regional dis- 
putes where we have no control over 
the outcome. But we've added our 
good services, in some instances with 
almost no immediate prospect of suc- 
cess. My own reputation has been at 
stake and that of our country. 

In Nicaragua, I think instead of 
having violent and massive bloodshed 
we now have the parties negotiating 
directly with one another for the first 
time on the terms of a plebescite and 
whether or not there should be general 
amnesty. In Namibia we are making 
some good progress, I believe. The 
South Africans have now accepted the 
terms set up by the Secretary General 
of the United Nations. We are waiting 
for SWAPO [South West Africa 
People's Organization] to respond. [In 
fact, SWAPO accepts the relevant 
U.N. resolutions on Namibia. The 
President's intention was to call for 
their continued support. The United 
States is waiting for South Africa to in- 
dicate in definitive terms its acceptance 
of the proposal and a date for the ar- 
rival of the U.N. transition assistance 
group.] Cyprus, very minimal but 
steadily increasing prospects. Mideast, 
you're well acquainted with that. 

And I think that on SALT and other 
major international items we have 
made steady progress. So in balance, 
I'm pleased with the last 1 1 months and 
don't underestimate the difficulties still 
facing us. 



Q. We seem to be headed for a 
record trade deficit this year, at a 



time when a major new market for 
U.S. exports is opening in Com- 
munist China. 

A. Yes. 

Q. Now there are a number of re- 
strictions in U.S. trade laws which 
inhibit our trading with Communist 
countries, some aspects of the 
Export-Import Bank Act, the 
Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 
1974 Trade Act. My question is, do 
you intend to try to change and re- 
move some of those restrictions next 
year? 

A. We are constantly assessing the 
advisability of maintaining administra- 
tive restraints. 

Of course, we have to put trade in a 
proper perspective. We can't assess 
trade itself completely separated from 
our overall relationships with Com- 
munist countries, particularly those 
who are potential adversaries of ours, 
like the Soviet Union. We want to have 
increased trade with the Soviet Union 
and with the People's Republic of 
China. 1 think the statistics will show 
that recently we have had increasing 
trade with both those countries com- 
pared to last year or several years ago. 

If we, in the future, have normal re- 
lationships with China, diplomatic re- 
lationships, this would open up in- 
creased opportunities for trade with 
those people. In this present time, short 
of diplomatic relations, we still have 
major trade missions going to China, 
Chinese trade missions coming to our 
country. And I think that this is bearing 
good results. 

We have one more point, and that is 
security restraints. If there is a sale of 
high technology items to the Soviet 
Union, or the People's Republic of 
China proposed, then not only do the 
Commerce Department and the State 
Department and the National Security 
Council assess this, but I refer it to the 
Defense Department as well, to be sure 
that we are not deliberately, or inad- 
vertently, giving to those countries a 
means by which their military 
capabilities would be greatly escalated. 
This would be contrary to the existing 
law. But within the bounds of those re- 
straints, we are attempting to improve 
our relationships with the People's Re- 
public of China and with the Soviet 
Union. And in the process, as part of a 
stream of increased interrelationships, 
improved relationships, enhanced 
trade. 

Q. You said last week that if Prime 
Minister Begin and President Sadat 
had been able to negotiate together 
on some of these questions over the 
past few weeks, that there would not 



12 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY: The U.S. -European 

Partnership 



Secretary Vance visited London De- 
cember 8-10, J978, and then pro- 
ceeded to the Middle East December 
10-15 (see p. 39). Following is an ad- 
dress before the Royal Institute of In- 
ternational Affairs in London on De- 
cember 9, 1978.' 

More than three decades ago the 
United States and the nations of West- 
ern Europe joined together to rebuild a 
devastated continent and to create a 
military alliance to protect freedom. 

On both sides of the Atlantic, those 
who fashioned the Marshall Plan and 
worked to create NATO possessed a vi- 
sion of a strong America and a strong 
Europe bound by common interests. 
From this vision, they created a self- 
renewing partnership that derives con- 



tinuing vitality from the values and 
hopes that we share. 

We have passed through a particu- 
larly difficult period during the 1970's. 
But we have navigated these turbulent 
waters. Although the course ahead re- 
mains demanding, the progress we 
have made should give us great confi- 
dence in our future. 

• For the first time in its history, all 
members of the NATO alliance are 
democracies. 

• NATO is strong and growing 
stronger. 

• We have not only resisted the 
worst protectionist pressures in a gen- 
eration; we are working together to 
shape a healthier and more open world 
trading system. 



• We have established a pattern of 
closer consultation on economic and se- 
curity matters than at any point in re- 
cent history. 

• European integration is proceed- 
ing, confirming our belief that a strong 
Europe is good for a strong America. 

• And we are moving toward more 
normal relations with the nations of 
Eastern Europe. Progress toward this 
goal has reflected our support for full 
implementation of the Helsinki Final 
Act and recognition of the sovereignty 
and independence of the nations of this 
area. 

Today, I want to discuss with you 
how, building on this solid foundation, 
we can continue to assure our mutual 
security and foster a healthy resurgence 



News Conferences (Cont'd) 

have been some of the problems that 
have arisen. My question is, if all 
else fails, would you consider calling 
the two leaders back to Camp David 
or some other place to negotiate di- 
rectly with you to resolve this mat- 
ter? 

A. Let me say that I don't have any 
present plans to do that. If all else 
failed — and I felt that we could get to- 
gether again — I would not hesitate to 
do so. But I don't envision that taking 
place. 



Q. What will be the domestic and 
international effect if the Shah fails 
to maintain power in Iran? 

A. I fully expect the Shah to main- 
tain power in Iran and for the present 
problems in Iran to be resolved, al- 
though there have been certainly de- 
plorable instances of bloodshed which 
we would certainly want to avoid, or 
see avoided. I think the predictions of 
doom and disaster that came from some 
sources have certainly not been 
realized at all. The Shah has our sup- 
port and he also has our confidence. 

We have no intention of interfering 
in the internal affairs of Iran and we 
have no intention of permitting others 
to interfere in the internal affairs of 
Iran. The difficult situation there has 
been exacerbated by uncontrolled 
statements made from foreign nations 
that encourage blood baths and vio- 



lence. This is something that really is 
deplorable and I would hope would 
cease after this holy season passes. 

I think it's good to point out that the 
Iranian people for 2,500 years, perhaps 
as long as almost any nation on earth, 
have had the ability for stable self- 
government. There have been changes 
in the government, yes, sometimes 
violence, but they have a history of an 
ability to govern themselves, and be- 
cause of that and other factors which 
I've just described, I think the situation 
in Iran will be resolved successfully. 

Q. To what extent are you con- 
cerned over the prospect of the 
OPEC [Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries] nations raising 
the price of oil this weekend — reports 
are it will be in the neighborhood of 
5% — the impact this would have on 
inflation, and do you contemplate 
any future actions to curb oil im- 
ports? 

A. Most of our problems with the 
adverse trade balances can be attributed 
to oil imports, although we have other 
problems as well. I certainly hope that 
the OPEC nations will decide not to 
raise the price of oil. If they do, I hope 
it would be minimal. 

We have tried to convince them that 
this is in the best interests of the world 
economy, and also in the best interests 
of the OPEC nations themselves, to 
have a stable world economy with a 
minimum of inflation jn the future. 
We're trying to set a good example in 
our own nation, both in controlling in- 



flation and also in stabilizing the value 
of the dollar on which the price of oil is 
based. 

The countries in the OPEC nations 
have suffered somewhat because for a 
time the dollar value was going down 
very rapidly. It has recovered since the 
first of November. So I would hope, 
first of all, to repeat myself, that there 
will be no increase in the price of oil. 
If they must increase the price of oil, I 
think it ought to be minimal for their 
own benefit and for the benefit of the 
world. 

□ 



'Held at the Muehlebach Hotel; for full text, 
see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments of Nov. 13, 1978, p. 1986. 

2 On Nov. 10. the President signed a memo- 
randum of disapproval of the Meat Import Act of 
1978 (H.R. 11545); for text of that memoran- 
dum, see Weekly Compilation of Nov. 20, p. 
2009. 

'Ambassador William G. Bowdler, Director 
of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, is 
the U.S. representative on the international 
mediation team for Nicaragua. The other two 
representatives are from Guatemala and the 
Dominican Republic. 

4 For full text, see Weekly Compilation of 
Dec. 4, 1978, p. 2096. 

s For full text, see Weekly Compilation of 
Dec. 18, 1978, p. 2219. 

6 On Dec. 12. 1978, Department spokesman 
Hodding Carter III annnounced that Secretary 
Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko 
will meet in Geneva Dec. 21-22, 1978, to con- 
tinue discussions on SALT. 



January 1979 

of our economies. These are the most 
pressing items on our common agenda. 
But even as we concentrate on these 
vital concerns, which have been the 
constant threads of our partnership, our 
common interests compel us to address 
together a broadened international 
agenda. For there are longer term 
challenges to our security and well- 
being that also demand serious and 
sustained attention. 

• How will the international eco- 
nomic system, as well as our own 
economies, adapt to changing patterns 
of international trade and commerce? 

• How can we meet increasing 
energy needs without heightening the 
risk of nuclear proliferation? 

• How can we help meet the legiti 
mate security needs of nations while 
seeking agreed limitations on the 
growth of conventional arms sales? 

• And how can we find the political 
will to act now on issues which will 
have a profound impact on the world 
we leave our children, issues such as 
population growth and environmental 
protection? 

These issues will tax our creativity 
and persistence to the fullest. For we 
approach all of these issues in a 
changing and pluralistic international 
system, with over 150 independent na- 
tions and emerging new power centers. 
No single nation, or group of nations, 
can dictate solutions to these complex 
problems. They are truly international 
in their origins and in the necessary 
scope of their solutions. Increasingly, 
our leadership must therefore take the 
form of inspiring other nations to work 
with us toward goals we share and can 
best achieve in concert. And on each of 
these issues, we look to our European 
allies as a core around which we must 
build these cooperative efforts. 

Our ability to address this broader 
agenda will depend on the essential vi- 
tality of our partnership — and specif- 
ically on our economic and military 
strength. 

Economic Security for Our Peoples 

For most of our countries, the most 
pressing demand today is to revitalize 
our economies and to restore a sense of 
confidence in our economic system. 

When the economic history of the 
last 5 years is written, two important 
trends will stand out. The United States 
and Europe, and indeed the indus- 
trialized democracies as a whole, have 
experienced the most severe economic 
problems of the last quarter century. 
These included sharp increases in 
world oil prices and inflation followed 



13 



by a serious recession and high un- 
employment. 

Yet despite these serious problems, 
we have been successful in 
strengthening our economic and politi- 
cal cooperation. Instead of sliding back 
into the beggar-thy-neighbor psychol- 
ogy that destroyed the global economy 
in the 1930's, we have created new and 
more effective mechanisms for serious, 
concerted actions. The institution of 
periodic summit meetings on economic 
matters, closer collaboration among 
monetary authorities, the creation of 
the International Energy Agency and a 
more active Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) — all these efforts reflect con- 
fidence in our capacities not despair in 
the face of difficulties. 



The U.S. Economy 



The United States fully recognizes 
the importance of a strong and vital 
American economy to building greater 
economic security for Europe, Japan 
and other nations of the world. What 
we do in Washington can affect the 
lives of citizens of London or Rome, 
just as the decisions of other govern- 
ments affect the well-being of Ameri- 
cans. 

Accordingly, the domestic economic 
policies of the United States are 
fashioned with a view toward the eco- 
nomic interests of the Atlantic commu- 
nity as a whole. Fundamental to this 
effort are the commitments made by 
President Carter at the Bonn summit 
last July. He pledged the United States 



We are increasing our economic coordination with one another for a 
simple reason: Because we all now understand that the economic 
health of each of us is important to the economic health of us all. 



We are increasing our economic 
coordination with one another for a 
simple reason: Because we all now un- 
derstand that the economic health of 
each of us is important to the economic 
health of us all. This is especially true 
in times of economic difficulty. Pres- 
sures increase to protect domestic mar- 
kets, competition sharpens, and we are 
all tempted to resolve our individual 
problems at the expense of our 
neighbors. But it is precisely then that 
we must be particularly sensitive to the 
impact our decisions at home will have 
on others abroad. If we make those de- 
cisions without sufficient regard for the 
problems of others, we only invite re- 
taliation and a spiral of compensating 
actions. All of us will lose ground; all 
of us will be worse off. 

As a result, we all have clearly rec- 
ognized that only through the develop- 
ment of a common strategy, to which 
each country contributes, can we en- 
hance the well-being of every nation. 

Cooperating in this way can be dif- 
ficult and frustrating. Domestic politi- 
cal support for tough economic deci- 
sions often comes slowly in democra- 
cies. In some cases, results fall short of 
our expectations and we must redouble 
our efforts. But actions by each of us, 
together with greater transatlantic 
cooperation, have placed the United 
States and the other industrialized 
nations on the path to sustained, 
noninflationary growth. Success will 
enhance our ability to expand indi- 
vidual opportunity and social justice, 
which are the greatest strengths of our 
democracies. 



to a major effort to reduce inflation and 
to an energy policy which significantly 
reduces U.S. oil imports. 

We are taking specific actions to 
fulfill these commitments. On October 
24, President Carter announced a 
broad-based program to fight inflation. 
It includes monetary restraint, sharp 
reductions in governmental spending, 
and explicit standards for wage and 
price increases. The President's new 
budget will put a very tight lid on pub- 
lic expenditures and reduce our federal 
deficit to less than half that of 1976. 

The President has stressed that con- 
trolling inflation is our overriding 
domestic priority. We will persist until 
we have achieved that objective. On 
November 1 , we undertook further 
far-reaching actions to reinforce the 
anti-inflation effort and strengthen the 
dollar. We have tightened monetary 
conditions significantly. The United 
States also joined with the three major 
surplus countries — Germany, Japan, 
and Switzerland — in coordinating di- 
rect intervention in the foreign ex- 
change market to correct the excessive 
decline of the dollar. We will continue 
to cooperate in a forceful and coordi- 
nated way to assure stability in ex- 
change markets. To finance its share, 
the United States is mobilizing an un- 
precedented $30 billion which will be 
used, together with resources of the 
other countries, to intervene massively 
if necessary to achieve our objectives. 
The United States has also expanded its 
gold sales program. 

We expect that with the fundamental 
improvements in the U.S. economic 



14 



Department of State Bulletin i 



position now underway, these actions 
will exert a continuing positive effect 
on the dollar. On November 9, the 
President signed legislation which lays 
the basis for a sounder U.S. energy 
policy. This legislation should result in 
oil import savings of roughly 2.5 mil- 
lion barrels per day by 1985. We are 
already improving our energy situation. 
U.S. energy prices have risen signifi- 
cantly closer to world levels. And 
growth in energy consumption is now 
running well below growth in our 
GNP. We are also working to reduce 
our balance-of-payments deficit through 
a more vigorous export promotion pro- 
gram. 

President Carter is determined to 
build political support for serious ac- 
tions to deal with our economic prob- 
lems. That support is growing. Neither 
the President, Congress, nor the 
American people will be satisfied until 
we show marked progress in fighting 
inflation, strengthening the dollar, and 
creating a sound energy economy. 

U.S. -European Economic 
Cooperation 

While the first task for each of us is 
to put our domestic house in order, we 
must at the same time undertake those 
joint efforts that are needed to sustain 
our economic growth. There is no more 
immediate or more crucial test of our 
ability to join together for our common 
gain than the successful completion, 
this month, of the multilateral trade 
negotiations. 



the political cooperation that we have 
painstakingly achieved. 

A major objective of the trade 
negotiations is to provide for an agreed 
framework to govern subsidies and 
countervailing duties. When our Con- 
gress convenes next month, the Presi- 
dent will seek legislation to extend the 
authority to waive countervailing duties 
to cover the period needed to imple- 
ment the Tokyo Round agreements. 
And we will take measures to minimize 
the disruptive effects that could flow 
from expiration of the waivers on 
January 3. 

Our negotiators in Geneva will strive 
to conclude their talks this month. But 
even as we gain ground toward a more 
open and better operating trading sys- 
tem, we must avoid piecemeal retreats 
toward protectionism which could 
undermine that progress. In each coun- 
try, various groups will continue to ask 
governments to intervene in the trading 
system for economic, political, and so- 
cial reasons. Our countries have recog- 
nized the importance of resisting 
demands which impede effective 
economic adjustment to change. Our re- 
sponse to such demands must be within 
the context of the trading framework 
we have designed together. Our 
policies must facilitate positive adjust- 
ment of our economies to changing 
economic conditions, rather than hin- 
dering such adjustment or shifting the 
burden onto others. 

Beyond the immediate need to 
strengthen the world trading system, 
we all have a basic interest in promot- 



. . . the central fact of world security has been strategic nuclear 
parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. We and our 
partners have managed this situation without allowing either our 
deterrent or our will to be eroded. 



During the last three decades, we 
have worked together to build a more 
open and better functioning world 
trading system. Now we have an op- 
portunity to consolidate the progress 
we have made and further improve the 
structure of our trading relationships. 
In so doing, we can construct for the 
future a trading environment with 
greater certainty and confidence — one 
which will foster the continued expan- 
sion of world commerce. If we suc- 
ceed, there will be economic gains for 
us all. If we fail, we will jeopardize the 
economic progress we have made. 
Failure would fuel our inflation, slow 
our growth, and make it more difficult 
for developing nations to play a full 
part in the world trading system. And if 
we fail, we will have also jeopardized 



ing the emerging role of the European 
Community in international economic 
affairs. In the United States, we admire 
the vision of men and women who are 
working to broaden and deepen cooper- 
ation among the nations of Europe. We 
welcome and support this development, 
for a strong European Community is in 
America's interest as well as in the 
interests of all European nations; it 
provides a dynamic new force in inter- 
national economic and political rela- 
tions. 

The new European monetary ar- 
rangements for closer monetary 
cooperation within the European 
Community, announced on December 5, 
represent an important step toward the 
economic integration of Europe we have 
long supported. We believe that the 



new arrangements will be implemented | 
in a way which will contribute to sus- 
tainable growth in the world economy 
and a stable international monetary 
system. The United States looks for- 
ward to continued close consultations 
with its European trading partners as 
these arrangements evolve. 

In general, the next few years will be 
critical ones for Europe, as the Com- 
munity works toward closer economic 
integration, expands its membership, 
holds its first direct elections to the 
European parliament, and assumes a 
growing responsibility for the political 
and economic well-being of Europe as 
a whole. 

All the Western democracies share in 
support and concern for the democra- 
cies in southern Europe. We in the 
United States respect the political 
commitment of Community leaders to 
open its membership to these states and 
to deal with the economic problems 
that will come with such a step. 

As prospering Western democracies, 
we should recognize a special respon- 
sibility to those democracies in the re- 
gion threatened by a faltering 
economy — where the short-term pros- 
pects are bleak but where, with a 
helping hand, economies can be put on 
a sound footing and the long-term 
prospects can be bright. There are es- 
tablished mechanisms to provide 
needed assistance — the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
Some situations may also call for com- 
plementary informal or ad hoc ar- 
rangements. The consortium for Por- 
tugal is an example. Those nations in a 
position to help should concert their 
energies and resources. Supportive ac- 
tion before it is too late is an invest- 
ment in the future of freedom. 

Relations With the Developing World 

As we consider means to strengthen 
the economic bonds among the de- 
veloped countries, we must recognize 
that our interests — and our respon- 
sibilities — do not end there. Meeting 
the desire of our citizens for economic 
security and a rising standard of living 
requires us to respond more fully to the 
aspirations of peoples in developing na- 
tions. Increasingly, their economic 
well-being is indispensable to our own. 

Together, the world's developing 
countries account for roughly one-third 
of total trade for the OECD nations. 
These countries provide the most 
rapidly expanding markets for exports 
of the industrial world — markets on 
which millions of jobs in our nations 
depend. Developing countries provide 
us with critical raw materials. And we 
need their cooperation to solve such 



luary 1979 



15 



critical global problems as energy and 
food. 

In short, we cannot build a strong 
international economic system without 
steady economic progress by the de- 
veloping nations. Together, we must 
attempt to push aside the ideological 
debates which often have characterized 
the relationship between the developing 
and industrial nations. We must seek 
practical and concrete measures to ad- 
dress the basic needs of roughly 800 
million people who live in absolute 
poverty. 

There is no more important challenge 
to the world's long-term well-being, to 
our political security, and to our essen- 
tial values as free peoples than working 
together with the developing nations to 
foster their economic progress. 

Security Issues 

The cornerstone of our prosperity is 
the confidence we have in our security. 
This security depends essentially on 
maintaining strong military forces; on 
managing effectively the West's rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union; on seeking 
to limit and reduce arms in both East 
and West; and on the strength of the 
Atlantic partnership. 

We can find cause for concern in the 
continuing increases in Soviet military 
programs and deployments. But we can 
also find cause for confidence in the 
steps we in the alliance are taking to 
preserve the military balance. 

For some years now, the central fact 
of world security has been strategic nu- 
clear parity between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. We and our 
partners have managed this situation 
without allowing either our deterrent or 
our will to be eroded. 

The fact of strategic parity remains. 
Just as we will match Soviet increases, 
so we must assume that the Soviets are 
resolved to match us. Thus, the pursuit 
of superiority by either side would re- 
sult in frustration, waste, increased 
tension, and in the end reduced security 
for all. 

Our common security rests on three 
underlying principles. 

First, just as we must remain alert 
and resolute about Soviet actions, so 
we must also be ready to explore and 
expand areas of mutual interest. To 
allow our fears to obscure our need to 
seek common ground is to condemn 
ourselves to unrelenting tension. But 
neither can we let our desire for better 
relations lead us into arrangements that 
will not adequately protect our national 
interests. 

Second, we must be prepared to do 
what is necessary to assure our secu- 



rity, while preferring to maintain a bal- 
ance at lower levels of armaments. 
Both the military and arms control 
paths have figured centrally in the his- 
tory of NATO's pursuit of security. 

Arms control is complicated and 
frustrating. Our goals and our efforts 
will inevitably be criticized by some 
who believe there is too little disarma- 
ment and by others who believe the 



Allied interests have been pro- 
tected [in SALT] because allied 
interests are our interests. 



Soviets are taking advantage of arms 
control agreements. Let us be clear and 
realistic about what we are seeking to 
accomplish. Arms control cannot put 
an end to military competition. But we 
can, and do, use arms control to cap 
arms buildups, to begin the difficult 
process of reductions and qualitative 
restraints, and to sustain a needed 
dialogue. 

Arms control, correctly understood 
and wisely applied, is yet another 
way — a complementary way — to pur- 
sue security. We should not let our in- 
ability to accomplish everything im- 
mediately discourage us from signifi- 
cant steps we can achieve. 

Third, while the United States will 
remain unsurpassed in military 
strength, we all must remain constantly 
aware that our security requires collec- 
tive allied effort, and that our defense is 
indivisible. As an alliance, we share in 
decisions on security questions, just as 
we share in the burdens and risks of a 
common defense. Western strength — in 
a military sense and also in a larger 
sense — depends upon the health of our 
partnership and in our self-confidence 
about the future. 

These fundamental principles guide 
our security decisions. A look at the 
actual military situation and trends and 
at how the United States and its allies 
manage the condition of strategic par- 
ity, shows that we face great challenges 
and we are meeting them through co- 
operative action. 

U.S. strategic modernization plans 
span the land, sea, and air components 
of our forces. We are developing a new 
intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM), and options for new ICBM 
basing are under intensive review to 
allow us to choose the best among the 
various alternatives. We will begin de- 
ploying a new submarine-based missile 
next year, and we are building a new 
strategic submarine. We have a vigor- 
ous long-range cruise missile program 



underway, including not only the air 
launched version but sea- and 
ground-launched versions as well. 
These programs will insure that the al- 
liance's strength will continue to be 
sufficient to deter attack and protect 
our common interests. 

SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks] is another instrument for 
bolstering security. SALT I and the 
ABM treaty [Treaty on Limiting Anti- 
Ballistic Missile Systems] began the 
important process of limiting strategic 
arms. Without these agreements, we 
would have been launched into a defen- 
sive arms race on top of an unlimited 
race in offensive arms. 

SALT II will be a major brake on the 
momentum of strategic arms competi- 
tion. Facing a more regulated and pre- 
dictable future, we will be able to de- 
vote more of our attention, talent, and 
resources to improving conventional 
and theater nuclear forces for NATO. 
SALT II will establish the principle of 
equality in the number of strategic de- 
livery vehicles. And it will put a limit 
on the number of MIRV'd [multiple 
independently-targetable reentry ve- 
hicle] ICBM's, which are potentially 
most harmful to stability. 

At the same time, SALT II will not 
rule out the force programs we have 
underway to meet the challenges that 
will remain even with an agreement. 
We have preserved all our major 
strategic force options. Other programs 
that can strengthen deterrence in 
NATO can go forward. Allied interests 
have been protected because allied 
interests are our interests. 

Let me emphasize that in both our 
defense efforts and our arms control 
negotiations, our basic aim is to 
strengthen the security of the United 
States and that of our allies. This has 
been and will always be the funda- 
mental touchstone of our policy. 

That is why we are involved in 
SALT — because a sound agreement 
will improve Western and global secu- 
rity. Without an agreement our tech- 
nological and economic strength would 
enable us to match any Soviet strategic 
buildup. But a good agreement can 
provide more security with lower risk 
and cost. And we recognize that with- 
out SALT the strategic competition 
could infect the entire East-West politi- 
cal relationship, damaging the effort to 
create a less dangerous world which is 
at the heart of Western foreign 
policies. 

The emerging SALT II agreement 
will not solve all our problems. It will 
not, for example, reverse the trend to- 
ward increased vulnerability of fixed, 
land-based missiles, a problem in the 
long run for both sides. Necessary 



16 

strategic force modernization must and 
will move forward, just as the SALT 
process must and will move forward. In 
SALT III we will work for further re- 
ductions and qualitative limits. 

We cannot discuss the management 
of strategic parity without coming to 
grips with the issue of how NATO 
should respond to Soviet improvements 
in their nuclear forces targeted against 
Europe. Though the linkage to Ameri- 
can strategic forces remain NATO's 
ultimate deterrent, the Soviets must 
understand that we will not let a weak- 
ness develop at any point along the 
continuum of our deterrent, including 
theater nuclear forces. We have several 
theater nuclear modernization programs 
in process. We are exploring whether 
arms control efforts could be of bene- 
fit. Although no decisions have been 
reached regarding force requirements 
or arms control, we are consulting in- 
tensively within the alliance to fashion 
a common plan. 

At the conventional level, improve- 
ments in Soviet forces continue. Here 
too the West is responding effectively. 
The May 1978 summit meeting in 
Washington agreed to a Long-Term 
Defense Program designed to improve 
the ability of NATO to function as a 
defense coalition. NATO is placing top 
priority on improving conventional 
forces. In the last few years, the United 
Stites has increased its forces in 
Europe by roughly 10.000. NATO is 
broadly engaged in a determined effort 
to increase readiness and capabilities 
for sustained defense. Wisely, we are 
emphasizing improvements which draw 
upon our collective technological 
strengths, and which will result in 
greater effectiveness rather than simply 
larger forces. Many of these steps are 
not glamorous; they do not attract 
headlines. But they are serious steps 
taken by a serious alliance, resolved to 
muster the resources and will to build a 
better common defense. 

Here, too, we are striving to 
negotiate restraints based on parity — 
1978 has brought movement by both 
sides in the 5-year-old MBFR [mutual 
and balanced force reductions] negoti- 
ations. Difficult problems remain. But 
gaining Soviet agreement to reduce 
forces to equal collective levels is 
worth a further sustained effort. Let us 
hope that the achievement of a strategic 
arms limitations agreement can impart 
a new momentum to the MBFR 
negotiations. 

Of course, Western security con- 
cerns and interests are wider than 
NATO. We must also ask whether, in 
an age of strategic parity, we are at a 
disadvantage in competing with the 
Soviet Union in the Third World. The 



Department of State Bulletin 



Question-and-Answer Session 
Following London Address 



Q. We have heard in some detail 
the American objective in the world 
mainly by matching the Soviet arms 
strength. I would like to know if 
America is taking positive steps to 
remove distrust by negotiations with 
the Soviets on points of difference? 

A. The United States, as I believe 
many of you know, is involved in a 
series of negotiations with the Soviet 
Union in many areas. We are involved, 
as I have indicated, of course, in the 
negotiations dealing with strategic 
arms. Those discussions are coming 
into their final stages right now. and I 
believe in the accomplishing of a sound 



agreement. And we will not sign that 
agreement unless it is a sound agree- 
ment. It will be a major step toward 
achieving a more stable world. We are 
involved in discussions with Great 
Britain and the Soviet Union looking to 
a comprehensive test ban. When those 
negotiations are concluded — and I be- 
lieve they will be concluded 
satisfactorily — I believe this will be 
another major step along the road to 
world peace. In cases of the Third 
World, we discuss these matters with 
the Soviet Union, trying to urge them 
to cooperate with us when we can, and 
making very clear our views so that 
there can be no misunderstanding of 



answer is no. While Soviet capabilities 
for projecting military power have im- 
proved, the United States retains not 
only unequalled naval forces and other 
forms of military power but also enjoys 
economic and political advantages. 

We also welcome the growing spirit 
of national independence in the de- 
veloping nations. They have demon- 
strated, time and again, their determi- 
nation and ability to avoid domination 
by any outside powers. 

Since 1960, the decolonization proc- 
ess, now nearly complete, has pro- 
duced some 65 new nations, with 
widely differing political, economic 
and social systems. During these years, 
outside influence has waxed and waned 
in different countries and at different 
times. There have not been the perma- 
nent Communist advances many once 
feared. 

This diversity and the irrepressible 
thirst for national freedom among the 
Third World nations are the surest 
barriers to foreign domination. We can 
best promote our own interests in these 
areas of the world by welcoming this 
diversity and respecting this spirit. 

The economic, political, cultural, 
and security ties between the West and 
the Third World have supported this 
spirit of independence. We must 
strengthen those ties by continuing to 
support the economic development 
and, when necessary, the military se- 
curity of these nations through our as- 
sistance; by pressing the Soviets and 
their allies to exercise restraint in trou- 
bled areas: and by working to resolve 
diplomatically those disputes which 
offer opportunities for foreign interfer- 
ence. 



In the long run, it is the ability of the 
West to offer practical support to Third 
World nationalism, self-determination, 
and economic growth that should make 
us very confident about our future 
relations. 

Conclusion 

In each of the areas I have addressed 
today, whether economic, political, or 
military, one finds extraordinary chal- 
lenges. But together, America and 
Europe have extraordinary resources 
with which to meet them. 

The physical, industrial, and tech- 
nological resources of our alliance are 
unequaled. If we have the will to de- 
velop our economies with equity and 
maintain our defenses with determina- 
tion, we can achieve a safer and more 
stable world. And we have that will. 

In the end, our alliance is held to- 
gether not simply by what we are 
against, but by what we are for. Our 
greatest strengths are the ties that bind 
us together. These ties are founded on 
a vision of the rights and dignity of the 
individual, on political justice, and 
freedom for all people. The negotia- 
tions in which we are engaged, and the 
policies we pursue, lack meaning un- 
less our foreign policies are in accord 
with these basic values of our peoples. 

Winston Churchill spoke once of the 
need to pull together and firmly grasp 
the larger hopes of humanity. His 
charge remains, today, our chal- 
lenge. □ 



'Introductory paragraph omitted; text from 
press release 446. 



January 1979 

our determination, and what we believe 
in respect to these matters. 

There is another wide range of 
negotiations that we have with the 
Soviet Union in nonmilitary, non- 
strategic matters, and it would take a 
very long time to encompass all of 
those. But if 1 understand your question 
correctly, we are engaged across the 
board in a series of discussions on both 
political, economic, and military mat- 
ters with them. 

Q. I'd like to ask you about Iran. 
Can you tell us whether you still be- 
lieve that the Shah of Iran is the best 
chance for stability in that country, 
and whether there are circumstances 
in which you might be prepared to 
give him military assistance in his 
predicament? 

A. We have stated very clearly that 
we support stability in Iran and we 
support the Shah. We have indicated, 
however, that we are not going to 
interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. 
The Shah has indicated that he plans to 
move toward elections in the latter half 
of the year 1979. We support that ob- 
jective; we think that that is a sound 
objective. We support his program in 
moving toward democracy and to 
liberalizing conditions within his 
country. 

Q. Do you see any virtue in the 
idea of pressuring Ian Smith [Prime 
Minister of the white regime in 
Southern Rhodesia] to end unilater- 
ally declared independence by sur- 
rendering to British though it is ar- 
gued the Anglo-American plan could 
be implemented by fear and hope- 
fully with the advice and support of 
the front-line states from the United 
Nations? 

A. The United States and Great Brit- 
ain, I am sure, as all of you know, 
have been working closely together on 
the problems of southern Africa in- 
cluding the problems of Rhodesia. The 
current situation in Rhodesia is one 
which is, to say the least, cloudy and 
rather gloomy at this moment. The ef- 
forts which we have made to try and 
bring the parties together so as to see if 
we could not reach a peaceful solution 
based upon a free vote have not borne 
fruit. 

The Prime Minister has sent to 
southern Africa his personal represen- 
tative who is reviewing the situation 
there and upon his return will report 
and make his recommendations to the 
Prime Minister. We shall await the re- 
sults of that trip. We, of course, are 
keeping very closely in touch with our 
British colleagues on a daily basis; but 
I think it would be premature for me to 



make any expression until we see the 
results of that trip. 

Q. I would like to press you again 
on the question about Iran [inaudi- 
ble] and secondly, what prospects do 
you see for making any progress in 
the Middle East during your trip 
there? 

A. As far as Iran is concerned, the 
matter is in the hands of the Shah and 
the Government of Iran, and we shall 
have to see what develops there. 

Insofar as the Middle East is con- 
cerned, the President has asked me to 
go to the Middle East to meet with 
President Sadat and Prime Minister 
Begin, to see whether we can find a 
way to overcome the obstacles which 
are blocking the conclusion of negotia- 
tions which have now been going on 
for almost 3 months. 1 In less than 2 
weeks it will have been the full 3 
months that were set forth in the Camp 
David accords to conclude an agree- 
ment with respect to the matters under 
negotiation. 

There are basically two matters 
which are the obstacles at this point. 
One relates to the question of the 
timetable for the holding of elections 
and establishing a self-governing au- 
thority on the West Bank and in Gaza. 
The other relates to a provision of the 
treaty text which deals with the ques- 
tion of the relationship of that treaty to 
existing treaties which either nation 
may have. We believe that it should be 
possible to find a way through these 
two problems. 

I do not believe that peace should be 
denied to the people in the Middle East 
by a failure to resolve these problems. 
So, we are going to see if we can do 
anything to help by working with these 
leaders to overcome these obstacles. I 
can't make any prediction as to 
whether this is possible. I can say, 
without any doubt in my mind, that 
achieving a resolution — a prompt res- 
olution of these issues — is clearly in 
the interest of the Arabs, the interests 
of the people of Israel, the people of 
the region, and to the people of the 
world. We shall do everything within 
our power to try and help them bring 
this to a satisfactory conclusion. 

Q. Do you intend to shuttle be- 
tween the two countries? [inaudible] 

A. The question was, do I plan to 
shuttle back and forth between Cairo 
and Jerusalem, and secondly, do I 
think that it can be accomplished 
within the 3 months which expire on 
December 17. The answer is that I plan 
to go first to Cairo and then to 
Jerusalem. If after doing that it appears 
that a shuttle process would be helpful. 



17 



I am prepared to do that. As to whether 
or not I think that there can be a solu- 
tion by the 17th, that depends on the 
parties. They are the ones that have to 
make the decision. They are the ones 
who will sign the peace treaty. So, the 
decisions will have to be made by the 
governments of those two nations. 

Q. After Camp David [inaudible] 
sharp disagreement between Carter 
and Mr. Begin on the question of 
settlements. As you said, the 3-month 
period is now soon over, and Mr. 
Begin [inaudible] what would be the 
American reaction if, after signing 
the peace treaty, Mr. Begin will dis- 
solve the military administration as 
the first step in the direction of au- 
tonomy, but simultaneously set up, 
let's say, 20 new settlements thereby 
[inaudible] and depriving the Pales- 
tinians and the Jordanians from 
[inaudible]? 

A. I don't know if you all heard the 
question or not. It's a long question, so 
I am not going to try to restate it. On 
the question of the establishment of the 
military government and the dismant- 
ling of the military government by 
withdrawing it from the West Bank and 
Gaza, that is provided for in the gen- 
eral framework which was signed as a 
result of the Camp David meetings, and 
that is a solemn undertaking which, 
when the agreement is reached, I would 
expect both parties to carry out. With 
respect to the question of settlements, 
we believe that the agreement which 
was reached on the question of settle- 
ments is that there would be no new 
settlements in the West Bank until the 
conclusion of the negotiations with re- 
spect to the setting up of the self- 
governing authority. 

The Prime Minister takes a different 
view. I do not know what the Israeli 
Government will or will not do, and I 
don't want to predict the future. But 
those are the facts and that's the way 
they stand. 

Q. Can I raise one other question 
which you didn't mention in your 
speech? There is the question of 
China, which is a matter of consider- 
able interest to Europe at this time. 
We are really, I think, the countries 
of Europe, trying very hard to con- 
sider what our attitude to China 
should be and as you know the 
British Government is in particular 
trying to decide whether it ought to 
sell a lot of very expensive arms, 
airplanes, and I know the French 
have just signed an agreement with 
the Chinese for a very large trade 
deal. Now what is your advice to us 
as Europeans in relation to our rela- 
tions with China? 



Department of State Bulletin I 



AFRICA: U.S. Policy 
Toward South Africa 



by Anthony Lake 

Address before the Conference on 
U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa in San 
Francisco on October 31, J978. Mr. 
Lake is Director of the Policy Planning 
Staff. 

As we consider U.S. policy toward 
South Africa, it is important that we 
keep in mind three basic facts. 

• The problem of racial polarization 
in South Africa is serious and is grow- 
ing. 

• Change will come in South Africa. 
The welfare of the people there, and 
American interests, will be profoundly 



affected by the way in which it comes. 
The question is whether it will be 
peaceful or not. 

• Our efforts to promote construc- 
tive and peaceful change have involved 
both cooperation and strong differences 
with South Africa. Over the years, the 
differences have grown as the problems 
in South Africa have grown. 

I would like to discuss each of these 
briefly. 

Increased Racial Polarization 

Over the years, a system has been 
built in South Africa which mandates 
racial separation and perpetuates in- 



Question-and- Answer Session (Cont'd) 

A. Let me say I am very hesitant to 
give advice to another sovereign na- 
tion. Let me tell you what our policy is 
and let me state our views with respect 
to the Chinese situation. Insofar as the 
question of military sales is concerned, 
it has been and will continue to be our 
policy that we will not sell military 
weapons or equipment to China or to 
the Soviet Union. Insofar as other na- 
tions are concerned, that is a decision 
which they must make for themselves. 

Secondly, with respect to the ques- 
tion of the future, insofar as we are 
concerned, we stated at the outset of 
our Administration that one of the 
goals of this Administration would be 
to normalize relations with the People's 
Republic of China. That remains one of 
the main goals of our Administration. 
As to the timing and the modalities of 
accomplishing this, this is a matter that 
is difficult because in doing this we 
want to make sure that if this is done, 
the well-being of the people of Taiwan 
is not jeopardized. So, we will con- 
tinue to discuss these matters and 
hopefully come to a conclusion which 
will permit us to reach our goals and 
normalize relations with the People's 
Republic of China. Was there another 
part of the question I didn't get? 

Q. Can you tell us how far the 
United States will go in its support of 
Romania? 

A. Romania is an independent nation 
with whom we have excellent relations. 
Our relations have improved continu- 
ously over the last several years, and 
we will continue to strive to improve 
those relations. 



Q. The chairman characterized 
your speech as being an optimistic 
one, but isn't the sentence in your 
speech that there have not been the 
permanent Communist advances 
many once feared rather over- 
optimistic in the light of the Com- 
munist successes in Angola, in the 
Horn of Africa, and recently in Af- 
ghanistan, the situation in Turkey, 
would that not suggest — not to men- 
tion the pickings for the Soviet Union 
should the Shah be toppled in Iran? 
Would that not suggest some revision 
of policy in the light of these appar- 
ent Communist advances? 

A. We have, of course, followed 
each of the events to which you re- 
ferred with the greatest of care and 
thought. We are concerned about the 
situation in a number of the areas 
which you pointed out, but I think one 
has to take a look across the broader 
spectrum. If you take a look and see 
what the situation is in Africa as com- 
pared with several years ago, you will 
find quite a different picture. I think 
one has to take a look at the long run 
and to design one's policy with respect 
to the long future rather than simply 
reacting to individual situations. That 
does not mean that in a given situation 
it may not be necessary to take a spe- 
cific action. But. I think that when I 
said what I said there, I was talking 
across the broad spectrum of the world, 
and not trying to pick out any particular 
region. □ 



Press release 446A of Dec. IU1978. 

'For material relating to Secretary Vance's 
visit to Egypt and Israel, see p. 39. 



equality; the problems within South 
Africa are therefore growing. 

• In distribution of the land, 13% is 
reserved for the 71% of the population 
who are black; 87% is reserved for the 
17% who are white. 

• Over 60% of the black population 
lives in areas reserved for whites. 
Think for a moment what this means 
for those people; All of them must 
carry passes; most would be forced to 
overcrowded so-called "homelands" if 
they lost their jobs; their families are 
often not allowed to live with them. 

• The average black income is less 
than one-eighth of average white earn- 
ings. 

• Education is compulsory and free 
for white students. It is neither com- 
pulsory nor free for blacks; and spend- 
ing per child in white schools is over 
15 times that in black schools. 

• Basic facilities — housing, elec- 
tricity, plumbing, health care — are 
woefully inadequate for blacks, far in- 
ferior to those for whites. 

• South African blacks who live and 
work in white areas have no say in 
making the laws which so dominate 
every area of their lives. They are de- 
fined by the South African Government 
as citizens of small and fragmented 
homelands which they may never have 
seen; they have no citizenship rights 
where they live and work and form an 
essential part of economic life. 

The white Afrikaners who dominate 
the politics of South Africa have their 
own historic roots and their own fears 
for the future. Their forebears came to 
South Africa in the 16th century; they 
have developed their own language, 
culture, and religion. If their security 
were jeopardized in South Africa, they 
would have nowhere else to go. They, 
too, are Africans. 

Our hope must be that they can be 
convinced, while there is still time, 
that racial progress will do more to se- 
cure their future than to threaten it. 
There has been, and there may continue 
to be, some relaxation in the practice of 
apartheid in South Africa. Some hotels, 
restaurants, bars, and theaters have 
been integrated. "Whites Only" bar- 
riers in some public facilities have been 
removed. It has been made easier for 
blacks to own homes in white areas. 

We should welcome these changes. 
But most black South Africans see little 
sign that fundamental change is being 
achieved. For generations, most black 
South African leaders have tried to en- 
gage white leaders in constructive 
dialogue on the future of the country; 
they have sought to reason and per- 
suade; they have attempted to find a 
way to work together with whites to- 



January 1979 

ward greater political and economic 
equality. Yet many of these leaders 
have been detained. Their organiza- 
tions have been banned. 

With each failure to achieve prog- 
ress, blacks have become more doubt- 
ful about a strategy of dialogue and 
peaceful demonstrations. Events in re- 
cent months have added greatly to this 
bitterness and may have convinced 
many, particularly of the younger gen- 
eration, that efforts to achieve peaceful 
change are futile. The killing of stu- 
dents during the Soweto uprisings, the 
deaths in detention of Steven Biko and 
other young leaders, and finally the 
bannings and detentions of numerous 
black leaders and organizations on 
October 19 of last year have left a deep 
legacy of bitterness. 



Promoting Peaceful Change 

Recognizing that our influence is 
limited, it is deeply in our interest to 
do what we can to halt this trend to- 
ward racial polarization and violence 
and to promote serious, peaceful 
change. 

It is clear that change will come in 
South Africa. But if significant peace- 
ful progress does not begin soon, the 
gap between black and white could be- 
come irremediable. This would have 
tragic consequences for the people of 
South Africa and for the region. If an 
organic, irreversible crisis developed, 
we would have fewer and fewer policy 
choices. And it would have a serious 
impact on our own national interests. 

• Such a crisis could produce strains 
in our relations with other African na- 
tions. Our ties — economic and 
political — to these countries are in- 
creasingly important. 

• A growing racial confrontation in 
South Africa could have serious 
domestic repercussions for the United 
States. 

• South Africa has great natural 
wealth and is an important source of 
key raw materials. We and the rest of 
the world have an interest in economic 
stability in South Africa and in the de- 
velopment of all her human as well as 
natural resources. 

• Growing racial conflict in South 
Africa would provide an opportunity 
for intervention by outside powers and 
could bring ideological as well as racial 
polarization. 

I think most Americans agree that we 
should do what we can to promote 
peaceful change in South Africa, al- 
though some are more concerned that it 
be peaceful, others that it be change. 
The major arguments come with regard 
to how best we can use our in- 



fluence — recognizing its limits — to 
promote peaceful change. I look for- 
ward to exploring those arguments with 
you this morning. 

Broadly speaking, there have been, 1 
believe, two poles in approaches to this 
question: on the one hand pressure and 
isolation; on the other, communication 
and persuasion. 

Over the past three decades, some 
have argued that through closer ties 
with South Africa, we can help the 
whites find a way to liberalize South 
African society. Our economic ties, 
they would argue, help provide oppor- 
tunities for blacks; and higher positions 
for blacks in the economy, particularly 
in skilled jobs and management, will 
eventually lead to political rights. They 
would also point to the positive exam- 
ple which American companies can set 
by following fair employment prac- 
tices, as in the code developed by the 
Reverend Leon Sullivan and endorsed 
by a number of American companies. 

A second school rejects this theory. 



19 



South African Government toward res- 
olution of all three of the region's criti- 
cal problems: Rhodesia, Namibia, and 
apartheid in South Africa itself. There 
must be progress on all of these issues. 
We will welcome and recognize South 
African efforts to achieve progress on 
any of them. 

We will do whatever we can to sup- 
port meaningful change in South Af- 
rica; but we recognize that we cannot 
dictate the precise nature of change. It 
is for the people of South Africa 
themselves — all the people — to deter- 
mine the future of their society. We 
have urged that leaders in the South 
African Government soon begin a seri- 
ous dialogue with representative lead- 
ers of all the people to explore ways to 
resolve the country's growing prob- 
lems. 

But if there is not significant prog- 
ress in South Africa, relations between 
our two countries will inevitably de- 
teriorate. This is a fact, not a prefer- 
ence. Our own values, the fundamental 



Change will come in South Africa. The welfare of the people there, 
and American interests, will be profoundly affected by the way in 
which it comes. The question is whether it will be peaceful or not. 



primarily on the grounds that three 
decades of economic growth have not 
produced fundamental change in South 
Africa; that foreign economic invest- 
ment has helped strengthen a repressive 
system; and that the only course which 
can bring the whites to allow real 
change is to use economic leverage 
against them. They would argue that 
the South African Government must be 
isolated from the international commu- 
nity if it persists in a system which all 
regard as unjust; and that strong, clear 
opposition by the world community to 
apartheid will provide encouragement 
to the majority within South Africa 
who have been denied their freedom. 

The primary charges leveled against 
this approach have been that cutting off 
our economic and other relations with 
South Africa could not force change, 
since the South Africans could survive 
such measures; and that we would 
therefore only be damaging our own 
economic interests while driving the 
white South Africans further behind a 
defensive and rigid shell. 

Our own approach has been to try to 
make the following points clear to the 
South African Government. 

We hope that a deterioration in 
American relations with South Africa 
can be avoided — this would not be in 
our interest or South Africa's. 

We wish to work together with the 



national commitment of the American 
people to the political, civil, and eco- 
nomic rights of every individual born 
on this Earth, as well as our standing in 
the international community and our 
long-term interests in the region, re- 
quire our disassociation from racial 
discrimination and a denial of basic 
human rights. We would prefer, of 
course, a future in which progress 
within South Africa allowed us to 
strengthen our ties to that country. 
Such a future would be better for the 
people of South Africa, for the region, 
and for us. It depends, as I have said, 
on the decisions of the South African 
Government. 

Basic U.S. Efforts 

Over the years, we have sought to 
encourage this peaceful change in four 
basic ways. 

First, we have sought to demonstrate 
in constructive ways our strong com- 
mitment to racial equality. 

• We have brought South African 
representatives of all races to the 
United States to obtain a first-hand un- 
derstanding of our outlook and our 
commitment to racial equality. 

• Through investment guidelines, we 
have encouraged American firms in 
South Africa to follow fair employment 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



practices. And we have supported the 
Sullivan code. 

• Our diplomatic representatives as a 
matter of policy have integrated their 
social functions. 

Second, we have expressed our con- 
cern about the impact of apartheid on 
the lives of black South Africans and 
have sought to maintain ties with the 
black South African community. 

• Our Embassy has been in the 
forefront among diplomatic missions in 
demonstrating opposition to political 
repression and support for black lead- 
ership. 

• Ours was the only foreign ambas- 
sador to attend the funerals of Robert 
Sobukwe and Steve Biko. 

• We have consistently protested 
detentions and bannings of political 
leaders. 

• We have tried to keep in contact 
with students, labor and political lead- 
ers, religious leaders, and other rep- 
resentatives of the black community. 

• We maintain a library in Soweto. 

• We have provided refugee assist- 
ance for the students who have fled 
South Africa to Botswana and Lesotho. 



ways that protect the rights of all indi- 
viduals, black and white — it could 
have a significant impact on how South 
Africans regard internal change. 

Fourth, we have indicated to South 
Africa the fact that if it does not make 
significant progress toward racial 
equality, its relations with the interna- 
tional community, including the United 
States, are bound to deteriorate. 

• Over the years, we have tried 
through a series of progressive steps to 
demonstrate that the United States can- 
not and will not be associated with the 
continued practice of apartheid. 

• In 1962 the United States imposed 
a voluntary arms embargo against 
South Africa, strengthened in 1963. 

• In 1964 we restricted Export- 
Import Bank (Eximbank) financing to 
South Africa to exclude any support for 
trade with the government and ended 
direct loans. 

• In 1967 we terminated all U.S. 
naval ship visits to South African 
ports. 

• In November of last year we sup- 
ported the U.N. mandatory arms em- 
bargo on South Africa. This February, 



Our efforts to promote constructive and peaceful change have in- 
volved both cooperation and strong differences with South Africa. Over 
the years, the differences have grown as the problems in South Africa 
have grown. 



Third, in encouraging the South Af- 
rican Government to work toward 
peaceful resolution of the Namibian 
and Rhodesian conflicts, we could have 
some impact on the nature of change in 
South Africa itself. 

• These efforts demonstrate clearly 
the value of peaceful change as op- 
posed to mounting racial conflict. They 
also demonstrate our willingness to 
work cooperatively with the South Af- 
rican Government in implementing 
change. 

• These negotiations show that there 
will be broad international support for 
efforts to bring peace and justice in 
southern Africa; and that the interna- 
tional community will work to find rea- 
sonable compromises in resolving these 
difficult problems. 

• If change can be brought peace- 
fully in Rhodesia and Namibia — in 



regulations were issued implementing 
our own decision to prohibit all sales of 
any kind to the South African military 
or police. 

• We have recently tightened proce- 
dures on the sale of civilian aircraft to 
South Africa, to help assure that they 
will not be used for paramilitary pur- 
poses. 

• Recently, Congress passed legis- 
lation further restricting Eximbank 
facilities for South Africa, stating that 
they could only be made available to 
firms which are proceeding toward im- 
plementation of fair employment prac- 
tices. 

• And we have refused to recognize 
the "homelands" which the South Af- 
rican government has declared to be 
"independent." 

There are limits to our ability to en- 



courage change in South Africa. We 
cannot dictate a blueprint or a timetable 
for progress, nor should we. It is for 
the people of South Africa — both black 
and white — to determine their own fu- 
ture. 

We have tried in such policies both 
to make clear that we cannot support 
apartheid and to demonstrate that we 
are concerned about the rights of all 
South Africans. It is not white South 
Africans as human beings that we op- 
pose but a system of racial separation 
and inequality. We believe that the best 
way to assure the future rights and se- 
curity of all South Africans is for them 
to begin a progressive transformation 
of that system. 

In 1962 ex-Chief Albert Luthuli, an 
extraordinary leader and winner of the 
1960 Nobel peace prize, wrote that a 
future of anguish and suffering for 
people of all races in South Africa 
could be avoided. "We seek no ven- 
geance," he wrote. "More than other 
continents, perhaps, and as much as 
any other nation on this continent, we 
need the ways of peace, the ways of 
industry, the ways of concord." 
"Will," he asked, "the outstretched 
hand be taken?" 

Sixteen years have passed. Divisions 
run deeper. It is fundamentally in our 
interest to work all the more for the 
grasping of that hand, while it still may 
be offered. 

The course I have described is the 
policy which we believe brings the best 
chance of encouraging the peaceful 
change so much in everyone's interest. 
It avoids. I believe, the dangers pre- 
sented either by policies which would 
convince South Africa's whites that we 
are implacably hostile to them, and that 
they must therefore go it alone without 
regard for our concerns or policies 
which falsely imply that we could ever 
be indifferent to the plight of the vic- 
tims of institutionalized racial injus- 
tice. 

These are the best policies we have 
found. I do not pretend that they are 
the only possible policies, or that they 
will necessarily succeed. Our influence 
is limited. We must therefore use it 
with all the skill we can find. We must 
continue to put our minds to the com- 
plexities of issues that our hearts — as 
well as our brains — tell us are terribly 
important. That is why I look forward 
so much to hearing and learning from 
your comments today. □ 



January 1979 



21 



CANADA: Visit by 
Secretary Vance 



Secretary Vance was in Ottawa 
November 21-22, 1978. Following is a 
news conference held by the Secretary 
and Secretary of State for External Af- 
fairs Donald Jamieson on Novem- 
ber 22. ' 

Minister Jamieson. Ladies and 
gentlemen, because we do not have an 
inordinate amount of time, I will keep 
the opening statement very short, being 
well aware that I will not be covering 
all the points that we dealt with today. 

There were some 20-odd items on 
the agenda ranging from relatively 
small ones to perhaps the two biggest 
ones in bilateral terms — the question of 
the maritime boundaries and fisheries 
and the Alaska pipeline. We spent a 
good deal of time on each of these 
subjects, and, in both cases, I think I 
can report that there was substantial 
progress. 

Because we have just finished, the 
statement relating to the boundaries 
question is not yet ready; but I can 
paraphrase it for you briefly and say 
that the Secretary and I have instructed 
our negotiators to complete the negoti- 
ations by the end of this year. We have 
given them a deadline by which to 
complete. We are quite satisfied, as a 
result of the talks that went on today, 
that we can make very significant 
progress by that time on a fisheries 
agreement, and we have indicated to the 
negotiators that if there are unresolved 
problems by the end of the year, they 
are to report these for disposal by the 
Secretary and by myself or by the two 
governments concerned. In other words, 
we have concluded that the process must 
be concluded by that time. 

The only other point on which, 
again, I say I regrettably have to cut 
this short to give you some opportunity 
to ask questions of the Secretary is that 
on the pipeline both governments have 
reaffirmed their very strong support for 
the pipeline and their conviction that it 
is a most important project and that it 
can and indeed will go ahead as rapidly 
as possible. 

I think beyond that I would be cut- 
ting too much into your time and the 
Secretary's. So perhaps I might ask 
Mr. Vance to say a word, simply, 
however, ending by expressing in a 
very genuine way what a pleasure it has 
been to have him with us and what a 
very worthwhile day it has been in 
terms of moving ahead on a wide range 
of Canada-U.S. matters as well those 



matters on which we are mutually con- 
cerned on the international scene. 

Secretary Vance. I want to echo 
what Don has said with respect to the 
usefulness of our discussions today and 
yesterday. We covered, as Don has 
said, a very wide variety of subjects 
which are of interest to us, both bilat- 
erally and internationally. We, I think, 
made good progress in our discussions. 
I also want to particularly mention the 
fact that I was most appreciative to 
have the opportunity to meet at lunch 
today with the Prime Minister and to 
discuss with him a number of subjects 
of broad international interest. 

Again, Don, I want to express my 
thanks to you for inviting me to come 
to Ottawa and to be able to sit and meet 
with you and with your colleagues for 
what I consider to be a very fruitful 
meeting. 

Q. You spoke last night in favor of 
a united Canada. The people of the 
Province of Quebec sometime next 
year will vote in a referendum bear- 
ing on the question of independence. 

In the event that the people of 
Quebec and the majority voted at 
some point in favor of independence, 
how would the United States resolve 
the difficulty of respecting the right 
of the Quebec people to self- 
determination and its interests in 
defending a united Canada? 

Secretary Vance. I do not want to 
speculate about what the future may or 
may not bring. I expressed my views 
about the importance of a united 
Canada. The question of what will be 
done is an internal matter for Canada, 
and I think it would be inappropriate 
for me to speculate about the future 
which none of us can predict at this 
point. 

Q. A question to both Ministers 
with regard to Rhodesia. I wonder if 
you could give your reaction to 
Prime Minister Smith's decision to 
postpone majority rule and say 
whether you think it will have any 
effect in any way on the proposal, 
your proposal, the British-American 
proposal, for an all-parties confer- 
ence? 

Secretary Vance. The proposal of 
Great Britain and the United States for 
an all-parties conference remains on 
the table. The problem of holding an 



all-parties conference has become in- 
creasingly difficult because of actions 
taken on both sides. I give, for exam- 
ple, the shooting down of the Viscount 
plane by the patriotic front. 

On the other hand, across-border 
raids by the Salisbury government have 
created problems on the other side, and 
as a result of this the chance of bring- 
ing the parties to the table for an all- 
parties conference has been greatly 
complicated at this particular period of 
time. 

However, our proposals remain on 
the table. We shall remain in contact 
with the parties and see whether or not 
something can be brought to a conclu- 
sion. I think it is essential that a 
peaceful solution be found to this 
problem. If one is not found, in my 
judgment, the fighting will increase, 
the violence and the bloodshed will in- 
crease, and it will be not only tragic for 
the people of Rhodesia but also for the 
people of the region as well. 

Q. Could I ask Mr. Jamieson to 
briefly give his reaction to Mr. 
Smith? 

Minister Jamieson. There is nothing 
by way of a substantive difference be- 
tween Mr. Vance's views and mine. 
We discussed this today along with the 
whole question of southern Africa. Our 
Namibian initiative, which we both 
said today we must press on with, we 
believe it too is the most effective way 
to go; and indeed, if we can show in 
Namibia that a peaceful resolution is 
possible to one of these problems, it 
will have a salutary effect as far as 
Rhodesia is concerned. 

Q. On the maritime boundary dis- 
pute, could I ask both of you to give 
us some appraisal of whether there 
have been any discussions concerning 
the naming of a third party, an in- 
ternational arbitrator, to resolve the 
Atlantic boundary? 

Minister Jamieson. I said in the 
House some weeks ago and I repeat 
now that the prospect of one or 
more — the boundary questions being 
referred to a third party has always 
been there. We have always understood 
from the beginning that that was a pos- 
sibility. 

When you get the statement — and it 
should be distributed shortly — you will 
see that basically what we are now 
concentrating on is a comprehensive 
fisheries agreement. We believe that if 
the fishermen and the fishing interests 
on both coasts are in a situation where 
they are satisfied with the arrangements 
that have been worked out to insure 
that their livelihoods are preserved — 
and that applies to fishermen of both 



22 

countries — then the boundary question 
as such, while not diminished in im- 
portance, certainly is diminished 
somewhat in urgency. 

And, while there is a linkage be- 
tween these two issues — namely, the 
fisheries agreement and the ultimate 
disposition of the boundaries — the em- 
phasis, as you will see here in the 
statement, is on getting a fisheries 
agreement first because conceivably 
then that would give us more time to 
deal with the boundary question. But 
there is a clear linkage between the 
two. 

Incidentally, Mr. Vance and I will 
be meeting again in Brussels at the 
time of NATO in about 10 days or so, 
and we would hope that we can take a 
further look at the situation then be- 
cause the negotiators will have met in 
the meantime. 

Secretary Vance. I would say that I 
subscribe to what Mr. Jamieson has 
said, and I am very hopeful that by the 
time we meet in Brussels on the 7th 
and 8th of December, we will have ad- 
ditional information which may help us 
move forward more rapidly as a result 
of their conversations. 2 

Q. You mentioned a minute ago in 
regard to Canadian unity that you 
did not intend to interfere in the 
domestic policies of Canada. 
Nonetheless, we would like to know 
what was the anxiety that caused you 
to make that statement? 

Secretary Vance. As I said last 
night, as an observer of the Canadian 
scene and as a close neighbor, we ob- 
viously follow with interest what is 
happening in your country. I, as the 
President has before me, wanted to in- 
dicate clearly that we believed it is im- 
portant that there be a united Canada 
but also to make clear that this is an 
internal matter, and we do not intend to 
interfere in the internal affairs of 
Canada. 

Q. Both sides of the question — a 
united Canada and an independent 
Quebec — have been lobbied in your 
country; one by Mr. Trudeau, the 
other by Mr. Levesque who has been 
several times to make speeches in 
support of the view of the Govern- 
ment of Quebec. Do you favor using 
the U.S. audience for lobbying what 
you call an internal question for 
Canada? 

Secretary Vance. In the United 
States we believe very strongly in free- 
dom of speech, and anybody who 
comes to the United States certainly is 
welcome and free to express whatever 
views they wish to put forward. 



Q. Your country takes a great 
interest in situations further away 
from it, notably the Middle East in 
which you played such a key part. 
How can you hold yourself aloof 
from a situation that may affect your 
security along the whole of your 
nothern border? How can you say 
that you want to stay aloof from that 
when you are so involved in Africa 
and the Middle East and every place 
else in the world? 

Secretary Vance. With respect to 
the Middle East, all of the parties have 
asked us to work with them to try and 
help them find a solution to that prob- 
lem. We have been willing to do so 
and, I believe and hope, have played a 
constructive role in that respect. 

Q. On the Great Lakes Water 
Quality Agreement, which has been 
made essentially more stringent, 
what reason for optimism do you 
have that you are going to be able to 
clean up the Great Lakes, consider- 
ing the record of the companies in- 
volved so far? 

Minister Jamieson. I don't think 
that either Mr. Vance or I are scientifi- 
cally minded enough to give you a very 
specific answer on that. I can only an- 
swer against the record which we heard 
something about today and which indi- 
cated that there have been considerable 
improvements in many areas of pollu- 
tion since the 1972 agreement was 
signed. I think perhaps you would have 
to ask the experts what other measures 
they now feel will help the matter still 
further. We did hear today that there 
had been a very considerable improve- 
ment in the situation. 

I appreciate, by the way, the ques- 
tion because it reminds me to make 
another announcement or comment 
about our meetings today which I had 
neglected to say; namely, that we have 
now undertaken to engage at once in 
talks with regard to air pollution. And 
these talks will begin hopefully before 
the end of the present year. This is a 
new element of the border problem 
which we are now prepared to tackle. 

Q. Could you say please what 
progress if any you have made to 
stop the government bidding war for 
investment under the auto pact? 

Secretary Vance. We discussed at 
length the auto pact, and we are 
awaiting the report of the Royal Com- 
mission which I believe will be forth- 
coming in the very near future. Ob- 
viously the first thing which we will 
wish to do is to study that report very 
carefully. There have been discussions 
going on between the Assistant Secre- 



Department of State Bulletin 

tary of State for Economic and Busi- 
ness Affairs and his counterpart in the 
Foreign Ministry here. Once we have 
had a chance to inform ourselves with 
respect to the report and the recom- 
mendations and suggestions that are 
made there, we will pick up the discus- 
sions and proceed to try and make 
progress in clearing away the differ- 
ences that exist. 

Minister Jamieson. To add to that, 
in the discussion this afternoon the 
Canadian view was expressed that the 
American Ambassador, Mr. Enders, 
had made a point, with which we 
agreed, in a recent speech in which he 
talked about the desirability of ending 
the so-called bidding war to which you 
referred. So I think there is a basis 
there for moving toward a more formal 
means through which that can be 
achieved. 

Q. There is no agreement — 

Minister Jamieson. No, not at the 
moment because, of course, there are 
so many elements in play, not the least 
of which are the multilateral trade 
negotiations which have an element of 
countervail and that type of thing in 
them and, of course, the inability of 
our government on the one hand and 
the U.S. Government on the other to 
totally bind Provinces and States unless 
we have some mechanism by which we 
can do so and that I would acknowl- 
edge does not exist at the moment. 

Q. Since you have set the deadline 
on the fisheries and boundaries 
agreement, what happens if the 
negotiators do not reach an agree- 
ment? And, secondly, you have 
mentioned that the Alaska pipeline is 
one of the key bilateral issues. Would 
you tell us a little more about what 
are the outstanding issues concerning 
the Alaska pipeline? 

Minister Jamieson. On the 

fisheries, first of all it is not always 
wise to be a prophet in these matters. 
But the point with regard to the dead- 
line was that Mr. Vance and I con- 
cluded this morning that there was 
enough light in sight that there is no 
inordinate reason to be worried about a 
settlement on a fisheries agreement, 
and that is one of the reasons why we 
felt confident in putting a deadline on 
them. 

The second one was, of course, that 
these matters always proceed more ef- 
fectively if everyone knows that there 
is a specific cut-off date. In order to in- 
sure that that date is not passed this 
time, we have said: "OK, do as much 
as you can. " And we think that will be 
very considerable. If there are out- 



January 1979 



23 



Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement 1978 



Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and 
Canadian Secretary of State for Exter- 
nal Affairs Donald Jamieson on 
November 22, 1978, signed a revised 
agreement between Canada and the 
United States on water quality of the 
Great Lakes. 

The new U.S. -Canada agreement 
reaffirms the determination of both 
countries to restore and enhance Great 
Lakes water quality. It was signed by 
Mr. Jamieson and Mr. Vance in a brief 
ceremony at the Lester B. Pearson 
Building, headquarters of the Depart- 
ment of External Affairs in Ottawa. 

The Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement 1978 brings up to date the 
provisions contained in the original 
agreement signed in Ottawa in April 
1972. That agreement has resulted in 
considerable progress toward im- 
provement of Great Lakes water qual- 
ity. Under its terms, a review was to be 
undertaken within 5 years to see how 
effectively it was working and where 
improvements could be made. 

The review was carried out by U.S. 
and Canadian negotiators, with the ad- 
vice and recommendations of the Inter- 



national Joint Commission, and with 
involvement of the eight Great Lakes 
States, the Provinces of Ontario and 
Quebec, and the public in both coun- 
tries. 

The new agreement strengthens the 
1972 agreement by calling for various 
additional programs and measures to 
meet problems in Great Lakes pollution 
which were not evident or fully under- 
stood at the time. It includes: 

• Programs to strengthen and renew 
the commitment of both countries to 
control pollution from municipal and 
industrial sources; 

• More effective control of persist- 
ent toxic substances and other pollut- 
ants; 

• Identification of airborne pollut- 
ants entering the Great Lakes; 

• Identification and control of pol- 
lution from agricultural, forestry, and 
other land-use activities; 

• Better surveillance and monitoring 
mechanisms; 

• Provisions aimed at further reduc- 
ing phosphorus loadings; and 

• Placing new limits on radioactiv- 
ity. 



standing issues at that time, don't con- 
tinue the negotiations in an effort to 
solve those. In effect, put them in the 
lap of the two responsible ministers, 
and we will have to cope with them 
from there. 

On the pipeline, I suppose the most 
important element now is this issue of 
the incremental pricing arrangement on 
which some of you who have been 
following that are familiar, where there 
are studies going on and representa- 
tions being made. That is essentially, I 
guess, the most important single key 
issue in that regard. 

Secretary Vance. I have nothing 
further to add except that we both, as 
Don Jamieson has said, support very, 
very strongly the importance of moving 
forward with this and making a success 
of the project. 

Q. I just wanted to ask whether 
the report that Canada and the 
United States are talking about some 
sort of a trade-off between the 
Beaufort Sea and the Dickson En- 
trance is accurate. Are you talking 
about that, and what sort of a 



trade-off were you speaking about at 
this time? 

Minister Jamieson. I do not recall 
having used the word trade-off. 

Q. An exchange of whatever it is. 

Minister Jamieson. We did not 

today try to set up any single formula- 
tion. I emphasized at the beginning that 
there is a fisheries issue which is vital 
and immediate: How do you apportion 
the fish stock so that each side feels 
that they are getting a reasonable ac- 
cess? I believe, and I think Secretary 
Vance agrees, that once we have that 
settled or once that is in place, to put it 
crudely, how you draw a line on the 
bottom of the ocean ceases to have the 
same urgency and immediacy although 
no less important. So we did not get 
into the idea of whether there were 
going to be, to use your expression, 
trade-offs against Beaufort Sea or west 
coast-east coast; those were not the 
sorts of things that we spent our time 
discussing. □ 



1 Press release 434. 

2 Subsequently Deputy Secretary Warren 
Christopher attended the NATO meeting. 



The valuable role of the International 
Joint Commission in monitoring the 
implementation of the agreement will 
be continued. 

The agreement was cosigned by Len 
Marchand, Canada's Minister of State 
(Environment), and Barbara Blum, 
Deputy Administrator of the U.S. En- 
vironmental Protection Agency. Dr. 
Harry Parrot, Minister of the Environ- 
ment of the Province of Ontario, also 
took part in the ceremony. 

The 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement represented significant 
progress in coordinated environmental 
management by Canada and the United 
States. Since its signature, both coun- 
tries have devoted great effort and sub- 
stantial resources to the restoration and 
enhancement of water quality in the 
Great Lakes. While much remains to be 
done, there is no doubt that benefits to 
both users of the water and the general 
public have been great. 

In its fifth annual report on Great 
Lakes water quality, the International 
Joint Commission concluded that the 
continued degradation of the lakes has 
been substantially checked and that the 
development of coordinated programs 
of research, surveillance, and remedial 
measures has been a major accom- 
plishment of the two governments. 

The 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement builds on 6 years of experi- 
ence under the Great Lakes Water 
Quality Agreement of 1972. Since it 
came into effect, there has been a sig- 
nificant improvement in understanding 
of the technical and scientific aspect of 
water quality, the presence and effects 
of toxic substances in the Great Lakes 
system, and the extent of nonpoint 
source pollution. Thus the 1978 agree- 
ment contains the following significant 
revisions or improvements over the 
1972 agreement: 

• Provision of revised and new water 
quality objectives, both general and 
specific; 

• Provisions to largely eliminate dis- 
charge of toxic substances into the 
Great Lakes and to establish warning 
systems which will point up those that 
may become evident; 

• Dates on which municipal (De- 
cember 31, 1982) and industrial (De- 
cember 31, 1983) pollution control 
programs are to be completed and 
operating are set; 

• Improved monitoring and surveil- 
lance requirements to enable assess- 
ment of the effectiveness of remedial 
programs; 

• Provisions for dealing with pollu- 
tion from land-use activities and for 
examining the problem of airborne 
pollutants; 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 



• A definition of new, interim phos- 
phorus loadings with provisions for an 
18-month review and new strategies for 
controlling phosphorus as necessary; 
and 

• Provision for an annual public in- 
ventory of discharges and pollution 
control requirements. 

The agreement states the purpose of 
the two signatories to be a commitment 
to a maximum effort to obtain a better 
understanding of the Basin ecosystem 
and to reduce or eliminate the dis- 
charge of pollutants into the system, 
with a prohibition on the discharge of 
toxic pollutants. This purpose is to be 
met through programs which, as under 
the original agreement, have general 
and specific objectives. General objec- 
tives are broad descriptions of desirable 
water quality conditions, while specific 
objectives are designations of 
maximum or minimum desired levels 
of a substance or effect, to protect the 
beneficial uses of the waters. 

Among the general objectives are 
keeping the waters free from: 

• Sewage discharges, oil, and other 
debris; 

• Materials which adversely affect 
color, odor, taste, or other conditions; 
and 

• Materials which produce toxic 
conditions or provide nutrients for the 
growth of algae which interfere with 
the beneficial uses of the Lakes. 

The lengthy list of specific objec- 
tives, detailed in annex 1 of the agree- 
ment, provides that specified levels or 
concentrations of persistent or nonper- 
sistent chemical and physical sub- 
stances not be exceeded to the injury of 
property and health. Based on work by 
experts in both countries under the aus- 
pices of the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Board of the International Joint Com- 
mission, the specific objectives of the 
1978 agreement are far more com- 
prehensive and stringent than those of 
the 1972 agreement. 

The agreement outlines a number of 
programs which are necessary to meet 
the general and specific objectives. 
Among these are programs which call 
for: 

• The preparation of an inventory of 
pollution abatement requirements, ex- 
pressed as effluent limitations; 

• Controls to be placed on the use of 
pest control products to limit their 
input into the Lakes; require control of 
pollution from animal husbandry oper- 
ations and from the hauling and dis- 
posal of liquid and solid wastes. Other 
measures will be required in connection 
with land-use activities in an effort to 



reduce this significant contribution to 
Lakes' pollution; 

• The establishment of measures to 
control pollution from shipping 
sources, including both oil and vessel 
waste discharges; 

• The continuation of the joint pol- 
lution contingency plan for the Lakes; 

• Measures for control of pollution 
from dredging activities and the dis- 
posal of polluted dredge sediments; 

• Measures for the control of pollu- 
tion from onshore and offshore 
facilities, such as materials transporta- 
tion within the Basin, and gas drilling 
operations; 

• Additional protection for pollution 
from hazardous polluting substances 
and toxic chemicals; 

• The introduction of measures for 
the control of inputs of phosphorus 
and other nutrients to prevent harmful 
algal growth; 

• A program aimed at identifying the 
contribution of airborne pollutants to 
the Lakes; and 



• The further implementation of a 
coordinated surveillance and monitor- 
ing program to determine the extent to 
which the general and specific objec- 
tives are being achieved. 

The International Joint Commission 
will continue to play an important role 
under the 1978 agreement. It will assist 
governments in implementing the 
agreement by tendering advice; col- 
lecting, analyzing, and disseminating 
data; and undertaking public informa- 
tion activities. In addition, the Com- 
mission will send a full report to gov- 
ernments on the progress toward 
achievement of the general and specific 
objectives every other year. The 1978 
agreement also specifies more precisely 
the terms of reference of the joint in- 
stitutions established to assist the 
Commission in performing functions 
related to the agreement. □ 



Press release 432 of Nov. 22. 1978. 



DEPARTMENT: Y<*ir Liaison Office 

With I .S. State and Local 

Governments 



WHITE HOUSE 
ANNOUNCEMENT, NOV. 



16' 



The President today announced his 
intention to nominate W. Beverly Car- 
ter, Jr., to be Ambassador at Large to 
head a new State Department Office for 
Liaison with State and Local Govern- 
ments. Mr. Carter, 57, of Philadelphia, 
Pa., is Ambassador to the Republic of 
Liberia. 

As head of the Office for Liaison 
with State and Local Governments, 
Ambassador Carter will report directly 
to the Secretary of State, and will also 
work closely with Jack Watson, Assist- 
ant to the President for Inter- 
governmental Affairs. 

The responsibilities of the new office 
will include facilitating state and local 
governments' priority international 
interests; arranging briefings and other 
communications for governors and key 
local government leaders on interna- 
tional issues of special interest to them 
and conveying their views on such is- 
sues to the President and the Secretary 
of State; assisting senior state and local 
government officials in planning their 
official overseas travel and the visits of 
foreign officials; coordinating assign- 
ments with state and local governments 



for Foreign Service officers; and de- 
veloping the State Department's 
capabilities to identify and to report to 
state and local governments on how 
other societies at the national or subna- 
tional level understand and resolve 
common problems of major impor- 
tance. 

Prior to his present assignment in 
Liberia, Mr. Carter served as Ambas- 
sador to Tanzania (1972-1975) and 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs (1969-1972). A career 
Foreign Service information officer, he 
has served in public affairs and area 
positions in both the former U.S. In- 
formation Agency and the State De- 
partment. 

David H. Shinn has been selected as 
deputy to Ambassador Carter and will 
be in charge of the new office until 
Mr. Carter's return in mid-January. Mr. 
Shinn, a career Foreign Service Officer, 
was most recently detailed to the 
mayor's office in Seattle under the Pear- 
son amendment domestic assignment 
program. □ 



•Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Nov. 20, 1978. 



January 1979 



25 



EAST ASIA: U.S. Normalizes Relations 
With the People's Republic of China 



Following are the texts of December 
15. 1978, of the joint communique be- 
tween the United States and the 
People's Republic of China, President 
Carter's address to the nation and re- 
marks to reporters following the ad- 
dress, and the U.S. statement on nor- 
malization. ' 



PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS : 

I would like to read a joint com- 
munique which is being simultaneously 
issued in Peking at this very moment 
by the leaders of the People *s Republic 
of China. 

[At this point, the President read the 
text of the joint communique.] 

Yesterday, our country and the 
People's Republic of China reached 
this final historic agreement. On 
January 1, 1979, a little more than 2 
weeks from now, our two governments 
will implement full normalization of 
diplomatic relations. 

As a nation of gifted people who 
comprise about one-fourth of the total 
population of the Earth, China plays, 
already, an important role in world af- 
fairs, a role that can only grow more 
important in the years ahead. 

We do not undertake this important 
step for transient tactical or expedient 
reasons. In recognizing the People's 
Republic of China, that it is the single 
Government of China, we are recog- 
nizing simple reality. But far more is 
involved in this decision than just the 
recognition of a fact. 

Before the estrangement of recent 
decades, the American and the Chinese 
people had a long history of friendship. 
We've already begun to rebuild some 
of those previous ties. Now our rapidly 
expanding relationship requires the 
kind of structure that only full diplo- 
matic relations will make possible. 

The change that I'm announcing to- 
night will be of great long-term benefit 
to the peoples of both our country and 
China — and, I believe, to all the 
peoples of the world. Normalization — 
and the expanded commercial and cul- 
tural relations that it will bring — will 
contribute to the well-being of our own 
nation, to our own national interest, 
and it will also enhance the stability of 
Asia. These more positive relations 
with China can beneficially affect the 
world in which we live and the world 



in which our children will live. 

We have already begun to inform our 
allies and other nations and the Mem- 
bers of the Congress of the details of 
our intended action. But I wish also to- 
night to convey a special message to 
the people of Taiwan — I have already 
communicated with the leaders in 
Taiwan — with whom the American 
people have had and will have exten- 
sive, close, and friendly relations. This 
is important between our two peoples. 

As the United States asserted in the 
Shanghai communique of 1972, 3 issued 
on President Nixon's historic visit, we 
will continue to have an interest in the 
peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 
issue. I have paid special attention to 
insuring that normalization of relations 
between our country and the People's 
Republic will not jeopardize the well- 
being of the people of Taiwan. The 
people of our country will maintain our 
current commercial, cultural, trade, 
and other relations with Taiwan 
through nongovernmental means. Many 
other countries in the world are already 
successfully doing this. 

These decisions and these actions 
open a new and important chapter in 
our country's history and also in world 
affairs . 

To strengthen and to expedite the 
benefits of this new relationship be- 



tween China and the United States, I 
am pleased to announce that Vice Pre- 
mier Teng has accepted my invitation 
and will visit Washington at the end of 
January. His visit will give our gov- 
ernments the opportunity to consult 
with each other on global issues and to 
begin working together to enhance the 
cause of world peace. 

These events are the final result of 
long and serious negotiations begun by 
President Nixon in 1972 and continued 
under the leadership of President Ford. 
The results bear witness to the steady, 
determined, bipartisan effort of our 
own country to build a world in which 
peace will be the goal and the respon- 
sibility of all nations. 

The normalization of relations be- 
tween the United States and China has 
no other purpose than this: the ad- 
vancement of peace. It is in this spirit, 
at this season of peace, that I take spe- 
cial pride in sharing this good news 
with you tonight. 



PRESIDENT'S REMARKS 4 

I wanted to come by and let you 
know that I believe this to be an ex- 
tremely important moment in the his- 
tory of our nation. It's something that I 
and my two predecessors have sought 



JOINT COMMUNIQUE, 
DEC. 15 

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON 

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 

JANUARY 1, 1979 

The United States of America and the 
People's Republic of China have agreed to rec- 
ognize each other and to establish diplomatic 
relations as of January 1, 1979. 

The United States of America recognizes the 
Government of the People's Republic of China 
as the sole legal Government of China. Within 
this context, the people of the United States will 
maintain cultural, commercial, and other unof- 
ficial relations with the people of Taiwan. 

The United States of America and the 
People's Republic of China reaffirm the princi- 
ples agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai 
Communique and emphasize once again that: 



• Both wish to reduce the danger of interna- 
tional military conflict. 

• Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia- 
Pacific region or in any other region of the 
world and each is opposed to efforts by any 
other country or group of countries to establish 
such hegemony. 

• Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf 
of any third party or to enter into agreements or 
understandings with the other directed at other 
states. 

• The Government of the United States of 
America acknowledges the Chinese position 
that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of 
China. 

• Both believe that normalization of Sino- 
American relations is not only in the interest of 
the Chinese and American peoples but also 
contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the 
world. 

The United States of America and the 
People's Republic of China will exchange Am- 
bassadors and establish Embassies on March 1 . 
1979. 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 



avidly. We have maintained our own 
U.S. position firmly, and only since 
the last few weeks has there been an 
increasing demonstration to us that 
Premier Hua and Vice Premier Teng 
have been ready to normalize relations. 
I think the interests of Taiwan have 
been adequately protected. One of the 
briefers will explain the details to you. 

Our Ambassador there. [Chief of the 
U.S. Liaison Office] Leonard Wood- 
cock, has done a superb job in pre- 
senting our own views strongly and 
clearly to the officials of the People's 
Republic of China. I will be preparing 
myself adequately for the visit of Vice 
Premier Teng. We invited him on one 
day; he accepted the next, without 
delay; and I think he's looking forward 
to this trip with a great deal of antici- 
pation and pleasure. 

I have talked personally this evening 
to Prime Minister Ohira [of Japan]. 
Early this morning we notified the offi- 
cials in Taiwan, and we have also 
notified many of the leaders around the 
world of this long-awaited development 
in international diplomacy. 

I think that one of the greatest bene- 
fits that will be derived from this is the 
continuation of strong trade, cultural 
relationships with Taiwan — the people 
of Taiwan — and a new vista for pros- 
perous trade relationships with almost a 
billion people in the People's Republic 
of China. This is also, of course, en- 
hanced by the new opportunities for us 
to understand the people of China, and 
to work avidly for peace in that region 
and for world peace. 

This afternoon the Soviet Union of- 
ficials were notified through their Am- 
bassador here, Mr. Dobrynin. And I 
think the Soviets were familiar with the 
fact that we were anticipating normali- 
zation whenever the Chinese were 
willing to meet our reasonable terms, 
and they were not surprised. As you 
well know, the Soviet Union and 
People's Republic of China have dip- 
lomatic relations between themselves. 

My own assessment is that this will 
be well received in almost every nation 
of the world, perhaps all of them, be- 
cause it will add to stability. And the 
Soviets and others know full well, be- 
cause of our own private explanations 
to them, not just recently but in months 
gone by, that we have no desire what- 
soever to use our new relationships 
with China to the disadvantage of the 
Soviets or anyone else. We believe this 
will enhance stability and not cause in- 
stability in Asia and the rest of the 
world. 

I'm very pleased with it. And I ob- 
viously have to give a major part of the 



credit to President Nixon and to Presi- 
dent Ford, who laid the groundwork for 
this successful negotiation. And most 
of the premises that were spelled out in 
the Shanghai communique 6 years ago 
or more have been implemented now. 

You can tell that I'm pleased, and I 
know that the world is waiting for your 
accurate explanation of the results. 

Q. How did the congressional 
leaders take it? 

A. With mixed response. Some of 
the congressional leaders who were 
there have long been very strong per- 
sonal friends of the officials in Taiwan. 
They are not as thoroughly familiar 
with the officials in the People's Re- 
public of China. 

One of the most long-debated issues 
was whether or not we would 
peremptorily terminate our defense 
treaty with Taiwan, or whether we 
would terminate that treaty in accord- 
ance with its own provisions. And the 
People's Republic officials agreed with 
our position that we would give Taiwan 
a 1-year notice and that the defense 
treaty would prevail throughout 1979. I 
think that alleviated some of the con- 
cerns among the Senators. 

And another concern expressed by 
them was whether or not we could 
continue cultural relationships, trade 
relationships with the people of 
Taiwan. I assured them that we could, 
that the Chinese knew this. And we 
will ask the Congress for special legis- 
lation quite early in the session to per- 
mit this kind of exchange with the 
people of Taiwan. This would include 
authorization for the Export-Import 
Bank and Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation to guarantee and to help 
with specific trade negotiations. 

I think that many of their concerns 
have been alleviated, although there 
certainly will be some Members of the 
Congress who feel that we should have 
maintained the status quo. 

Q. You said the response to your 
speech would be "massive applause 
throughout the nation." What do 
you think the response to your 
speech will be in Taiwan? 

A. I doubt if there will be massive 
applause in Taiwan, but we are going 
to do everything we can to assure the 
Taiwanese that we put at top — as one 
of the top priorities in our own re- 
lationships with the People's Republic 
and them — that the well-being of the 
people of Taiwan will not be damaged. 

To answer the other question, I don't 
think this will have any adverse effect 
at all on the SALT [Strategic Arms 



Limitation Talks] negotiations as an 
independent matter. And I think that 
the Soviets, as I said earlier, have been 
expecting this development. They were 
not surprised, and we have kept them 
informed recently. Their reaction has 
not been adverse, and we will proceed 
aggressively as we have in recent 
months, in fact throughout my own 
Administration, to conclude a suc- 
cessful SALT agreement. 



U.S. STATEMENT 

As of January I, 1979, the United States of 
America recognizes the People's Republic of 
China as the sole legal government of China. On 
the same date, the People's Republic of China 
accords similar recognition to the United States 
of America. The United States thereby estab- 
lishes diplomatic relations with the People's Re- 
public of China. 

On that same date. January 1. 1979, the 
United States of America will notify Taiwan that 
it is terminating diplomatic relations and that the 
Mutual Defense Treaty between the United 
States and the Republic of China is being termi- 
nated in accordance with the provisions of the 
Treaty. The United States also states that it will 
be withdrawing its remaining military personnel 
from Taiwan within four months. 

In the future, the American people and the 
people of Taiwan will maintain commercial, 
cultural, and other relations without official 
government representation and without diplo- 
matic relations. 

The Administration will seek adjustments to 
our laws and regulations to permit the mainte- 
nance of commercial, cultural, and other non- 
governmental relationships in the new circum- 
stances that will exist after normalization. 

The United States is confident that the people 
of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future. 
The United States continues to have an interest 
in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue 
and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled 
peacefully by the Chinese themselves. 

The United States believes that the establish- 
ment of diplomatic relations with the People's 
Republic will contribute to the welfare of the 
American people, to the stability of Asia where 
the United States has major security and eco- 
nomic interest, and to the peace of the entire 
world. D 



'Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Dec. 18, 1978. 

2 The address was broadcast live on radio and 
television from the Oval Office at the White 
House. 

"For text of the Shanghai communique, see 
Bulletin of Mar. 20, 1972, p. 435. 

4 Held with reporters in the White House 
Briefing Room. Following the President's re- 
marks. Administration officials held a back- 
ground briefing on the announcement. 



January 1979 



27 



ECONOMICS: The Role of Exports 
in ZJ.S. Foreign Policy 



by Warren Christopher 

Address before the 65th National 
Foreign Trade Convention in New 
York on November 13, 1978. Mr. 
Christopher is Deputy Secretary of 
State. 

I am pleased to have an opportunity 
to talk with you today about the re- 
lationship of U.S. exports to our 
foreign policy. I approach this subject 
as "a staunch advocate of global 
commerce," to use President Carter's 
phrase. I want to divide my discussion 
into two parts: first, to describe why 
expanding U.S. exports is important to 
our foreign policy and how we are 
going about it; and second, to explain 
how we are trying to integrate this goal 
of expanding exports with other fun- 
damental foreign policy objectives. 

For the vast majority of our exports, 
we have only one basic foreign policy 
objective — to encourage and assist 
them. For these exports, there are no 
other competing foreign policy inter- 
ests that must be taken into account, 
and our efforts can be concentrated on 
assisting U.S. exporters in selling 
abroad and on working to reduce 
foreign trade barriers. 

At the Bonn summit last summer, 
the United States and our major indus- 
trial partners agreed to a coordinated 
strategy for economic progress. An es- 
sential element in this strategy is to ex- 
pand U.S. exports. Increased exports 
will reduce our trade deficit and 
strengthen the dollar abroad, which in 
turn will help fight inflation at home. 

At the same time, increased exports 
promote essential political relationships 
abroad. A strong U.S. economy and a 
sound dollar are crucial to maintain the 
confidence of our allies. Moreover, the 
bonds of trade and commerce 
strengthen ties with our friends and 
help to lessen tensions with others. 

Like the other important economic 
tasks you will discuss here, improving 
our export performance will require a 
major long-term effort from business 
and from government. I believe the 
program President Carter recently an- 
nounced is an important contribution to 
this joint effort. That program includes 
a number of significant measures. 

• It provides additional funds for 
Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) 
financing and agricultural export cred- 
its. 



• It expands export development 
programs to help U.S. firms, particu- 
larly small and medium businesses, in 
marketing abroad. 

• It reaffirms our key objectives in 
the multilateral trade negotiations 
(MTN), such as reducing both tariff 
and nontariff trade barriers and limit- 
ing the use of government subsidies for 
exports. 

• It launches efforts outside the 
MTN for a more widespread interna- 
tional agreement to limit excessive 
government financing for exports. 

• It seeks to insure that exporters 
have clear guidelines on the application 
of our laws relating to foreign bribery, 
antitrust, and environmental matters. 

Taken together, these measures will 
increase direct assistance to U.S. ex- 
porters and reduce foreign and domes- 
tic barriers to exports. 

The strength of the President's com- 
mitment to this program is reflected by 
actions he has taken in the last few 
days. He signed into law a bill in- 
creasing Eximbank 's financing author- 
ity from $25 to $40 billion and ex- 
tending the Bank's charter for 5 years. 
He also vetoed protectionist measures 



some countries — Cuba, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, North Korea, Southern 
Rhodesia, and, as a result of legislation 
enacted in the last Congress, Uganda. 
But these broad prohibitions are the ex- 
ception, not the rule. 

For example, last year there were 
well over 50,000 applications for 
licenses to export controlled items 
other than military equipment. Fewer 
than 350 of these license applications 
were denied — only about two-thirds of 
1% of all applications. Of the more 
than 50,000 licenses that were ap- 
proved, all but about 1,300 — or about 
2Vz% — were approved in less than 90 
days. 

I recognize that other applications 
may not have been submitted because 
exporters believed that licenses would 
not be issued. But I also think that an 
approval ratio of more than 999c for 
these applications shows that in our 
balancing of foreign policy interests, 
the scale is not rigged against exports. 

Second, the primary reason for im- 
posing trade controls is to maintain our 
national security. While our concern 
with Communist countries remains a 
dominant theme, our concept of na- 
tional security has evolved in recent 



Winning a larger share of world trade for our exporters is important 
to the strength of our economy and to the perception of American lead- 
ership throughout the world. 



relating to meat and textile imports, 
demonstrating his commitment to pres- 
ervation of an open world trading sys- 
tem and to successful conclusion of the 
MTN at the earliest possible date. 

Foreign Policy Concerns 

Turning to the second aspect of my 
approach, let me change my focus and 
consider the narrow categories of ex- 
ports where it is necessary to balance 
our strong interest in promoting exports 
with other fundamental foreign policy 
interests — in short, the small fraction 
of our exports which is subject to con- 
trols. Before I discuss some of the spe- 
cific areas where these controls apply, 
let me offer some general observations. 

First, controls should not be equated 
with prohibitions. Of course, the 
United States does embargo trade with 



years to include a concern with the 
spread of nuclear explosives and the 
sale of highly sophisticated conven- 
tional weapons. The character of our 
export controls has evolved along with 
this changing concept. As we have ex- 
tended new controls to promote new 
objectives, we have relaxed controls in 
other areas where their use has become 
less essential. 

Third, the overwhelming majority of 
the exports subject to controls are 
military related. A large portion of 
these exports are arms or other military 
equipment. Congress and the American 
people have understandably required us 
to apply close supervision to military 
sales abroad, while leaving almost all 
nonmilitary exports free of controls. 
Occasionally, of course, the line be- 
tween military and nonmilitary exports 
is blurred by dual-use items, such as 



28 

nuclear technology or highly sophisti- 
cated computers, that have both com- 
mercial and military applications. 
Some of these dual-use items are also 
subject to controls. But where they are 
controlled, Congress has mandated 
fewer specific prohibitions than for 
arms sales, and we in the executive 
branch operate with a strong presump- 
tion in favor of allowing the exports. 

Let me turn now to consider briefly 
five important areas in which controls 
apply. 

East-West Trade. The first is 
East-West trade. For the past three 
decades, the dominant element in our 
system of export controls has been re- 
strictions on trade with Communist 
countries. In the period after World 
War II, our export controls reflected 
our overriding concern with the threat 
from the Soviet Union. In coordination 
with our NATO allies, we prohibited 
exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe of a wide range of industrial 
products and technology that could 
have a military application. Similar 
national security concerns, and in some 
cases armed hostilities, led to adoption 
of embargoes on trade with North 
Korea, North Vietnam, the People's 
Republic of China (PRC), and Cuba. 

As cold war tensions have lessened, 
restrictions on these nonmilitary ex- 
ports have been relaxed. We have re- 
duced the number of items subject to 
restriction and narrowed the criteria for 
determining whether an export could 
affect our national security. We are 
now considering the removal of con- 
trols on a variety of additional prod- 
ucts, while continuing to control 
transfers of critical technologies used 
to manufacture these products. 

As a result of this liberalization of 
controls and other factors, our exports 



with the Soviet Union and the PRC. A 
number of Cabinet-level delegations 
have visited the PRC to discuss in- 
creasing economic cooperation in 
energy, agriculture, and other areas. 
Secretary [of Energy James R.] 
Schlesinger has just returned and Sec- 
retary [of Agriculture Bob] Bergland is 
there now. On the Soviet side, we hope 
that the trip by Secretaries [of the 
Treasury W. Michael] Blumenthal and 
[of Commerce Juanita M.] Kreps to 
Moscow next month for an important 
set of trade meetings will provide fur- 
ther opportunities for expansion of 
trade . 

Nuclear-Weapons Technology. A 

second area of controls relates to the 
increasing danger to our security from 
the spread of nuclear-weapons technol- 
ogy. Twenty years ago, there were only 
three nuclear-weapon nations. Today, 
there are more than a dozen nations 
which could develop a nuclear weapon 
within 2 years of a decision to do so. 
On taking office. President Carter con- 
cluded that this problem would no 
longer be left on the back burner of 
American foreign policy. 

As a result, while we continue to en- 
courage peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy, we are making important new 
efforts to prevent the spread of the 
capacity to make nuclear explosives. 
We supported legislation enacted ear- 
lier this year to tighten controls on nu- 
clear exports. And we have taken a 
number of steps, including streamlined 
licensing procedures, to facilitate ex- 
ports of nuclear reactors and fuel to 
countries that share our nonprolifera- 
tion objectives. 

We have not limited ourselves to 
measures affecting our own nuclear ex- 
ports. We have worked to develop and 
strengthen a common set of guidelines 



The basic foreign policy purpose which exports serve is to improve 
the trade balance, strengthen the dollar, and build closer relations 
with our trading partners. Any restriction on exports for other foreign 
policy purposes bears a heavy burden of proof . 



to the Soviet Union increased more 
than tenfold between 1970 and 1977. 
We are committed to continuing the 
growth of East- West trade. Secretary 
Vance has made clear our view that 
trade can perform a useful function in 
easing tensions in our relationships 
with the Soviet Union and other coun- 
tries. 

Speaking to the International 
Chamber of Commerce last month. 
President Carter reaffirmed his deter- 
mination to increase trade substantially 



for nuclear exports accepted by the 
major nuclear suppliers. We have 
brought together 44 nations to explore 
safer nuclear energy alternatives. And 
we have tried to persuade a number of 
countries that their energy needs can be 
met with safe nuclear energy technol- 
ogies. 

Conventional Arms Sales. A third 
area of controls involves the dangers 
posed by the spread of advanced con- 
ventional weapons systems. Since 



Department of State Bulletin 

1970, arms suppliers have made com- 
mitments totaling about S140 billion to 
developing countries. When these arms 
are delivered, they will change the face 
of world politics. For the first time, 
many states throughout the world will 
have arms of much the same sophisti- 
cation and quality as those of the major 
powers. 

While the need for restraint on con- 
ventional arms sales has become in- 
creasingly clear, the fact remains that 
important foreign policy interests re- 
quire arms transfers in certain cases. 
The problem is how to strike the ap- 
propriate balance. 

This requires a closer scrutiny of 
arms sales to insure that they do serve 
an important foreign policy interest. 
Congress has enacted legislation in re- 
cent years mandating this closer 
examination. In addition. President 
Carter has imposed a ceiling on arms 
sales to Third World countries, where 
resources are scarce and the pos- 
sibilities for armed conflict are many. 
We have also developed guidelines to 
limit the sophistication of arms exports 
to these countries. 

In this effort, we recognize that U.S. 
action alone cannot achieve meaningful 
restraint. So we have gone to other 
nations — both suppliers and pur- 
chasers — to persuade them to join us. 
It is a long road, but we are encouraged 
by the prospects that joint efforts can 
ease the heavy burden of armaments. 

Human Rights. The fourth and fifth 
aspects of foreign policy that give rise 
to export controls — human rights and 
antiterrorism concerns — have a much 
smaller impact on U.S. exports, both in 
terms of countries and dollar amounts. 

The promotion of human rights is a 
fundamental tenet of the foreign policy 
of the Carter Administration. We be- 
lieve our underlying principles and 
values must be reflected in American 
foreign policy if that policy is to have 
the support of our people and if it is to 
be effective. The pursuit of this cause 
is not an ideological luxury cruise with 
no practical port of call. Widening the 
circle of countries which share our 
human rights values is at the very core 
of our security interests, because such 
nations make strong allies. 

In our efforts to promote human 
rights, we are using a wide range of 
tools — private diplomatic approaches 
in our bilateral relations with other 
countries; public statements where pri- 
vate approaches are unavailable or un- 
availing; multilateral approaches in the 
United Nations, the Organization of 
American States, the International De- 
velopment Banks, and elsewhere; and 
adjustment of our foreign assistance 



January 1979 

programs to take into account human 
rights conditions in the recipient coun- 
tries. 

We strongly prefer to use positive 
measures, but where these have no ef- 
fect, we must consider restrictions on 
the flow of our military and economic 
aid. In some instances, our human 
rights policy has involved restrictions 
on U.S. exports, although here, as in 
other areas of export controls, it is al- 
most entirely military-related sales 
which are affected. And here again we 
are implementing our policy in collab- 
oration and consultation with Con- 
gress, which has specified areas where 
human rights considerations must be 
brought to bear on exports. 

We are attempting to comply with 
the letter and spirit of the law that pro- 
hibits, except in "extraordinary cir- 
cumstances," sales of military equip- 
ment to countries where there are gross 
and consistent human rights violations. 
Congress strengthened that prohibition 
this year and extended it to cover ex- 
ports of police equipment. Moreover, 
Congress has become sufficiently con- 
cerned about human rights conditions 
in several countries that it has prohib- 
ited all military sales in any circum- 
stances to those countries. In addition, 
the United States has complied with the 
arms embargo imposed on South Africa 
by the United Nations last year and 
taken the further step of prohibiting all 
U.S. exports to the South African 
police or military. 

Antiterrorism Efforts. A fifth as- 
pect of our foreign policy affecting 
U.S. exports is our effort to combat 
international terrorism. Like our human 
rights policy, our antiterrorism efforts 
involve the restriction of only a rela- 
tively small dollar volume of exports, 
to only a relatively few countries. 
Existing legislation restricts military 
sales to countries that harbor terrorists, 
and proposed legislation would bar 
many nonmilitary exports to a wider 
range of countries that support ter- 
rorism. Here again we recognize that to 
be effective, our efforts must be mul- 
tilateral. A major step in international 
cooperation on this problem was taken 
at the Bonn summit, where the par- 
ticipating countries pledged to termi- 
nate air service with any country that 
harbors aircraft hijackers. 

Limitations on U.S. Government 
Financing 

Let me turn from discussing controls 
on exports to a different but related 
subject — limitations not on actual ex- 
port transactions but on U.S. Govern- 
ment financing for our exports. 

Whether restrictions on export 



financing should be used to further 
these or other foreign policy objectives 
is a difficult question. On the one 
hand, export financing is provided by 
the U.S. Government, usually on 
generous terms and often as a direct 
loan to a foreign government. There- 
fore it is viewed by some as a proper 
instrument for pursuing noncommercial 
U.S. interests, much as foreign assist- 
ance programs are used. On the other 
hand, the primary reason for providing 
export financing is to enable U.S. ex- 
porters to compete with other trading 
nations. Therefore, others argue, it is 
an integral part of purely commercial 
transactions that should not be inter- 
fered with on foreign policy grounds. 

There is undoubtedly merit to each 
side of this debate. But the fact is that 
Congress has enacted specific lim- 
itations on Export-Import Bank 
financing to reflect each of the five 
foreign policy concerns I have dis- 
cussed in connection with export con- 
trols. In carrying out these legal re- 
quirements, we believe that restrictions 
on export financing should be used for 
foreign policy reasons only in highly 
exceptional circumstances. 

Let me illustrate this point using 
human rights restrictions as an exam- 
ple. Since 1974 Eximbank has been 
prohibited by law from financing ex- 
ports to Communist countries which re- 
strict the right of their citizens to 
emigrate. This year the Congress fur- 
ther restricted the Bank's authority to 
finance exports to South Africa. But 
aside from these specific statutory pro- 
hibitions, there are only two other 
countries in which human rights prob- 
lems have led the Bank to refuse to 
make loans. 

Problems of Export Controls 

This has been a very brief review of 
the categories of exports in which the 
strong presumption in favor of exports 
must be balanced against other impor- 
tant foreign policy interests. I hope that 
the review has demonstrated that these 
categories are extremely limited when 
compared to our overall exports of 
more than $120 billion. And within 
these categories, the balancing does not 
often result in denials or substantial 
delays of exports. Nevertheless, we in 
government recognize that any such 
denials or delays create hardships and 
difficulties for U.S. companies seeking 
to sell abroad. Here are some specific 
problems that inevitably arise with any 
set of export controls. 

Difficult Cost/Benefit Assessments. 

One problem is the difficulty of as- 
sessing the costs and benefits of any 
particular restriction. We can calculate 



29 



the cost of any one lost sale, but we 
can not readily calculate how many 
sales are lost because a denial of one 
transaction may discourage potential 
buyers and sellers from coming for- 
ward with other transactions. 

It is equally difficult to evaluate the 
effectiveness of any denial in promot- 
ing a particular foreign policy objec- 
tive. One important reason for this dif- 
ficulty is the possibility that the item 
can be purchased from a supplier in 
another country. 

It is clear that the more countries that 
participate in an export sanction, the 
more effective that sanction will be. 
Many of the export restrictions I have 
discussed have been adopted by other 
countries. In other instances, we are 
making determined efforts to obtain 
multilateral support — for example, in 
our arms transfer and nonproliferation 
policies. 

Of course we will continue to take 
into account the availability of a prod- 
uct from other foreign suppliers before 
we decide to restrict its export. But 
foreign availability cannot be disposi- 
tive in all cases. We cannot commit 
ourselves to permit exports wherever 
some other exporter can be found who 
is willing to make the sale. There will 
be cases where the United States must 
take the first step in restricting a sale 
and then encourage others to follow. 

There are also instances where the 
use of export restrictions serves pur- 
poses beyond preventing another coun- 
try from getting the product involved. 
For example, terrorist organizations 
will be able to buy submachine guns 
even if the United States refuses to sell 
them. But nonetheless we will continue 
to refuse to sell such equipment to 
countries that support international 
terrorism. 

To give us a better measure of our 
policies, we are presently engaged in a 
systematic review of the costs and 
benefits of export restrictions. One way 
to improve this assessment is a closer 
exchange of views between government 
and business. President Carter has re- 
constituted a more broadly based ex- 
port council to assist in this exchange, 
and we want to encourage other means 
to this end. 

Uncertain Effects of Controls. 

Another problem inherent in the use of 
export controls is uncertainty over what 
exports will be affected. There are a 
few situations where broad prohibitions 
on exports are required — for example, 
a wartime embargo. 

In many cases, however, the need to 
balance a number of important foreign 
policy interests, including a strong pre- 
sumption in favor of exports, calls for 



30 



The U.S. and the Third World: 
Partners or Plaintiffs 



by David D. Newsom 

Address before the International 
Relations Section of the Common- 
wealth Club and the World Affairs 
Council of Northern California in San 
Francisco on November 16, 1978. 
Ambassador Newsom is Under Secre- 
tary for Political Affairs. 

Eight years ago I spoke to the Com- 
monwealth Club on the subject "The 
United States and the Third World." 
That was in 1970, the year of the 25th 
anniversary of the founding of the 
United Nations. My remarks at that 
time dwelt on the growing influence of 
the newly independent nations in the 
United Nations and in world affairs 
generally. I dwelt also on growing dif- 
ferences which were appearing between 
the views of these countries and those 
of the United States. This was true with 
respect to the process of decoloniza- 
tion, trade, and racial discrimination. 

In 1970 most Americans were only 
vaguely aware of the potential power 
and influence of the developing coun- 
tries. The general opinion was that the 
newly independent countries of this 
century would not, for many years to 
come, be major factors in either eco- 
nomic or political affairs. 

A series of events over the last 6 
years has shaken that view. In 1973 the 
Arab oil-producing states successfully 
mounted an embargo against the United 



States. Once the oil-producing states 
understood their power as a result of 
the embargo, they moved successfully 
to raise the price of oil dramatically. 
Other developing countries, instead of 
expressing dismay at the impact of the 
price rises on their own economies, 
saw benefits for the developing world 
in general in relating similar tactics to 
other commodities. In 1974 in Algiers 
the new international economic order 
was born with its strong demands for 
greater equality in economic relations 
between the developed and the de- 
veloping countries. 

North-South Dialogue 

The new international economic 
order in the form of a declaration of 
U.N. purposes and of the obligations of 
industrialized states to make sweeping 
changes in trade, aid, and investment 
policy, was brought before the sixth 
special session of the United Nations in 
1974. The United States found itself 
virtually isolated as European countries 
expressed at least rhetorical sympathy 
for the thrust of this new order. That 
session brought home starkly to Ameri- 
can policymakers for the first time the 
potential impact of these demands on 
our political as well as our economic 
relations with the developing world. 

The next 2 years, then, saw the be- 
ginning of a fundamental reassessment 
of how the have and have-not nations 



Department of State Bulletin 

would relate to each other. At the 
seventh special session, in September 
of 1975, with the memory of the fruit- 
less confrontations the previous year 
still fresh in their minds, both sides 
began to rethink their respective posi- 
tions and to search for areas of con- 
structive dialogue and possible cooper- 
ation. One of the results was the for- 
mation, in December of that year, of 
the Conference on International Eco- 
nomic Cooperation (CIEC) with 8 
members from the developed world and 
19 from the developing world. While 
CIEC did not, over the some 18 months 
of its existence, succeed in finding ac- 
commodation between all of the issues 
where the North and South differ, it did 
contribute measurably to the ongoing 
dialogue and resulted in concrete 
progress on some issues such as food 
and agriculture and technical assist- 
ance. And while CIEC did narrow 
some gaps between the North and the 
South, many of the developing coun- 
tries were unhappy with their exclusion 
from the limited membership of the 
CIEC. 

As a result, CIEC was succeeded by 
the Committee of the Whole which in- 
cludes all member states of the United 
Nations. This is now an important 
forum for discussion of economic mat- 
ters relating to the North-South 
dialogue. The developing countries 
would like to give it a decisionmaking 
role. We continue to believe decisions 
on major economic issues should be 
made by existing organizations having 
responsibilities in the specific func- 
tional areas, for example, the GATT 
[General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade] for trade, the IMF [International 
Monetary Fund] for monetary affairs. 



Role of Exports (Cont'd) 

decisions on a case-by-case basis. And 
the active role of the Congress is 
another factor that adds uncertainty. 

As we refine and explain our 
policies, there are some things the gov- 
ernment can do to reduce uncertainties 
in the minds of exporters. We will con- 
sult with the business community more 
closely on areas of concern that could 
lead to the use of controls. We will 
provide exporters with clear reasons for 
why a particular license was denied. 
And we will try harder to identify for 
the business community broad 
categories of exports which are not 
likely to interfere with other important 
foreign policy interests. 

Processing Delays. A final problem 
with controls is the delays that some- 
times accompany the granting or denial 
of an export license. Often these delays 



result from the need to develop regula- 
tions and procedures to carry out a new 
legal restriction. Sometimes a delay 
makes possible the issuance of a 
license that would otherwise have to be 
denied for foreign policy reasons. 
Other times the delay is caused by a re- 
quest from the exporter or other in- 
terested party that the government re- 
consider a decision not to allow an ex- 
port. 

We understand that, whatever the 
cause, a delay works a hardship on the 
exporter who has deadlines to meet. 
While, as I mentioned earlier, more 
than 97% of nonmilitary export 
licenses were issued within 90 days last 
year, we are determined to improve on 
that record. We are working both 
within the State Department and with 
other agencies to minimize delays, to 
process licenses quickly, and to re- 
spond in a helpful way to other re- 



quests for guidance from the export 
community. 

Conclusion 

As I have tried to describe today, the 
role of exports in U.S. foreign policy is 
a strongly positive one. The basic 
foreign policy purpose which exports 
serve is to improve the trade balance, 
strengthen the dollar, and build closer 
relations with our trading partners. Any 
restriction on exports for other foreign 
policy purposes bears a heavy burden 
of proof. 

Winning a larger share of world 
trade for our exporters is important to 
the strength of our economy and to the 
perception of American leadership 
throughout the world. We in govern- 
ment want to work with you in the 
business community toward that com- 
mon objective. □ 



January 1979 

There were other elements to the 
dialogue. The year 1976 saw the 
Nairobi meeting of the U.N. Confer- 
ence on Trade and Development, 
known as UNCTAD 4. While provid- 
ing its share of confrontation, this 
meeting saw the United States con- 
tinuing to signal its willingness to 
maintain a constructive dialogue re- 
garding the demands of the developing 
countries. This willingness to engage 
in dialogue was, however, clearly 
separated from any affirmation of the 
legitimacy of all the other demands of 
these countries. Subsequently, at Co- 
lombo, Sri Lanka, the nonaligned na- 
tions met and found that economic is- 
sues had replaced political issues as the 
prime vehicles for expressing their as- 
pirations and frustrations. 

I have been speaking to you about 
the Third World. I know that there are 
those who question the validity of this 
term. They rightly point out that there 
is a tremendous difference between the 
least developed and the middle coun- 
tries. This is true. Nevertheless, the 
strong feelings which exist among 
these countries arising from a common 
heritage of colonialism, from their per- 
ception of themselves as economically 
developing nations and from a feeling 
that they lack a voice in major eco- 
nomic decisions affecting them, give 
these countries a solidarity which is a 
reality. That solidarity withstood dif- 
ferences over the oil crisis. It has with- 
stood general differences of view, for 
example, between those countries that 
are interested in debt relief and those 
countries which are more concerned 
about their international credit stand- 
ing. 



Importance of the North-South 
Relationship 

It has been my experience that audi- 
ences attuned to the more exciting 
political aspects of foreign affairs do 
not find equal stimulation in discus- 
sions of economic issues. Yet, the av- 
erage American citizen — concerned for 
his job, his standard of living, and the 
value of the dollar at home and 
abroad — has good reason to pay atten- 
tion to the demands, sometimes exces- 
sive, of the Third World nations. Only 
a few statistics will illustrate why. 

• In 1977, 35% of total U.S. 
exports — $42 billion — went to de- 
veloping countries. 

• The United States sells more man- 
ufactured goods to the developing 
countries than to Western Europe, 
Japan, and all the Communist countries 
combined. 

• The developing countries ac- 



counted for more than half of all U.S. 
exports of industrial machinery, elec- 
trical machinery, and aircraft. 

• They bought 50% of our wheat ex- 
ports, 60% of our cotton exports, 70% 
of our rice exports, and 90% of our 
coal exports. 

• The United States imported goods 
worth $67 billion from developing 
countries in 1977 — 45% of our total 
imports. 

These are impressive statistics, but 
they are hard to relate to our everyday 
lives. It perhaps comes closer to home 
if we address the importance of the 
North-South relationship in terms of 
questions like: 

• Will your gas tank be full? 

• How much will it cost to fill it up? 

• How much more would you need 
to pay for a chocolate bar, for coffee, 
for copper wire, if the developing 
countries should seek to emulate the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries and restrict supplies or raise 
prices? 

• How many workers would be laid 
off in your community if developing 
countries shifted their purchases from 
the United States to other suppliers? 

Each issue has implications for our 
daily lives as well as for our relation- 
ship with two-thirds of the peoples of 
the world. The developing nations have 
addressed themselves to several key is- 
sues. Each one presents us with prob- 
lems, particularly in a time of eco- 
nomic difficulties. Approval of new 
departures for any one of them could 
face strong opposition in the Congress. 
Yet each one is a key to whether we 
shall be partners or adversaries in our 
relations with the developing world. 
Let me take briefly each one in turn. 



Economic Issues 

Trade. The first is trade. The de- 
veloping countries want improved ac- 
cess to our markets for their exports. 
They want special and preferential 
treatment for their manufactured prod- 
ucts. 

We believe improved market access 
is desirable and in our own interest. In 
the event of injury to domestic indus- 
try, of course, we must take temporary 
measures to protect jobs and producers, 
preferably through adjustment assist- 
ance or, if necessary, through restric- 
tions at the borders. 

There has been hard bargaining with 
many developing countries in the mul- 
tilateral trade negotiations which have 
just wound up work in Geneva. These 
extended and complex negotiations 
have offered the developing countries 



31 

an opportunity to gain benefits. Un- 
fortunately, we feel they have not fully 
availed themselves of these opportuni- 
ties. 

Foreign Aid. The developing coun- 
tries also seek an increase in the trans- 
fer of resources which they need for 
economic development. They wish a 
level of economic assistance from de- 
veloped countries which would repre- 
sent seven-tenths of 1% of such coun- 
tries' gross national product. The im- 
plications of this demand are illustrated 
by two simple facts. 

• The enthusiasm for foreign aid in 
the United States is declining. In 1970 
we ranked seventh among the de- 
veloped countries in the percentage of 
our gross national product transferred 
concessionally to developing countries. 
Today we have dropped to twelfth. 

• We have changed our approach to 
foreign aid in part as a result of con- 
gressional legislation. In the face of a 
continued need by many countries for 
infrastructure assistance, particularly in 
Africa, we are concentrating more and 
more on the needs of the poor. We look 
to the multilateral institutions to pro- 
vide infrastructure assistance. We are 
unable to supply straight budgetary as- 
sistance to meet the special problem of 
middle-income countries. This problem 
is particularly acute in the Caribbean. 

Some of the most active negotiations 
have related to commodities. The de- 
veloping countries have given a high 
priority to stabilizing broad fluctua- 
tions in commodity prices which have 
such a profound effect on countries de- 
pending almost entirely on one or two 
primary products. 

We have now indicated our accept- 
ance in principle of the idea of a com- 
mon fund which would be used to help 
commodity agreements to stabilize 
commodity prices. We still have differ- 
ences over the form of such a fund and 
whether it would also be used to pro- 
vide resources not directly related to 
stabilization of commodity prices. 
Those who follow both our relations 
with the developing countries and our 
relations with Congress will hear more 
of the common fund in the days 
ahead. 

Debt Relief. Debt is a highly im- 
portant and highly emotional issue, as 
it is with individuals. We have always 
taken the position that debt relief 
should be conditioned upon a debtor 
country promising to undertake a com- 
prehensive sound economic develop- 
ment or stabilization program, one that 
would insure that excesses in resource 
mismanagement are not repeated. 
Many feel strongly that the developed 



32 

countries have an obligation to relieve 
them of their debt burden. We are now 
committed to debt forgiveness for the 
poorest countries and are studying how 
much relief we should provide in 1980. 
The two principal multilateral finan- 
cial institutions — the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund — 
were founded well before the creation 
of most of the nations in the United 
Nations today. Newly independent 
countries and many other Third World 
countries as well wish to move away 
from voting in international institutions 
based on financial contributions toward 
a one state, one vote system giving a 
preponderant voice to the developing 
countries. Such a move in the minds of 
many in the United States would repre- 
sent a departure from the objectivity 
and nonpolitical character of these in- 
stitutions. 

Technology Transfers. Developing 
countries today must often pay very 
large amounts in order to obtain the 
rights to technology which they feel 
important for their industrial develop- 
ment. They are seeking to liberalize the 
transfer of technology believing that 
this would speed up the closing of the 
gap between rich nations and poor na- 
tions. They also seek support for ex- 
panding their indigenous capacity to 
develop and adopt such technology. 

There is, of course, a vast quantity 
of technology which is noncommer- 
cially held, and we have ongoing pro- 
grams which seek to make that avail- 
able to the developing countries. On 
the other hand, technology of commer- 
cial value held by firms in the investing 
nations has a value which these firms, 
understandably, do not wish to relin- 
quish without a return on their invest- 
ment. Various ways by which this 
privately owned technology can be 
more easily transferred are under con- 
sideration. The matter remains a sig- 
nificant and controversial issue. 

Foreign direct investments are an 
important source of economic resources 
and technology for the developing 
countries. Differing views exist, how- 
ever, on whether such investments are 
beneficial to the developing nations. 
For more than a year the U.N. Com- 
mission on Transnational Corporations 
has sought to elaborate a code of con- 
duct within which such corporations 
could operate to the satisfaction of both 
sides. In the view of the developed 
world, private foreign investment rep- 
resents one of the best and least politi- 
cal means by which transfers of both 
capital and technology can be affected. 
And while the corporate investors are 
willing to accommodate to demands for 
sharing of ownership and management 
which will provide greater benefits and 



opportunities for the people of the 
countries involved, they must ask and 
receive some kind of assurance that, 
once having invested their capital, the 
rules of the game will not be changed 
in ways which result in the loss of their 
investment. 

Political Issues 

I have dwelt today upon the eco- 
nomic issues which are under constant 
discussion between the developed na- 
tions of the North and the developing 
countries of the South. When nations 
gather, increasingly these are the con- 
cerns that trouble them most. And 
these concerns have a direct impact on 
political relations which in turn can 
affect the climate in which the eco- 
nomic issues are resolved. One soon 
finds that there is no distinction be- 
tween political and economic affairs 
when the livelihood and security of na- 
tions is involved. 

The strong efforts of the United 
States to resolve the problems in the 
Middle East have a direct bearing upon 
our access to the vital resources of this 
region and to the economic health of 
the nations processing these resources. 

The political issues of South Africa, 
Namibia, and Southern Rhodesia can 
cloud our dialogue with African states 
on other issues, even when our position 
on such matters as trade, development 
assistance, commodity policy, and debt 
rescheduling is clear and positive. 

The danger of political instability in 
key areas threatening our national se- 
curity is ever present. One needs only 
to look at events in Iran and consider 
the effects of a change in the orienta- 
tion of that country on our strategic and 
economic interests in the area, or to 
look at Nicaragua and think about the 
implications of spreading unrest in 
Central America, our doorstep, to un- 
derstand the political-economic inter- 
relationship. 

Finally, there are a whole series of 
foreign policy issues of prime impor- 
tance to us — nuclear nonproliferation, 
human rights, arms control — which 
cannot be moved forward in a mean- 
ingful fashion without the cooperation 
of the Third World countries. 

Ultimately, in our national interest, 
we wish to do what we can to see that 
Third World societies evolve in ways 
which are compatible with the kind of 
world we wish to live in and leave to 
our children. If we ignore these coun- 
tries, their needs, and their aspirations, 
we will forfeit our ability to exert this 
influence which can be so important to 
our own future. 

So, the issues that we face in dealing 
with the Third World have implications 
not just for our daily lives, but also for 



Department of State Bulletin 

our national security now and our fu- 
ture in the society of men. Thus, the 
fostering and strengthening of the 
dialogue between the North and the 
South is extremely important to all of 
us. 



Fostering a Positive Dialogue 

The coming year will see a large 
number of international conferences 
devoted to fundamental questions of 
relations between developed and de- 
veloping countries. Negotiations have 
recently begun under UNCTAD aus- 
pices on a new international wheat 
agreement; in April the law of the sea 
conference will resume consideration 
of who controls the vast mineral re- 
sources of the deep seabeds; in June 
UNCTAD 5 convenes in Manila; in 
August the U.N. Conference on Sci- 
ence and Technology for Development 
begins in Vienna; and in 1980 we ex- 
pect a U.N. General Assembly special 
session on development. Moreover, 
progress is being made in developing a 
positive dialogue with the Third World. 

One can point to the Association of 
the South East Asian Nations. These 
five nations — Indonesia, the Philip- 
pines, Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Thailand — are important friends and 
trading partners particularly of the 
states on the west coast. They are 
keenly interested in all of the North- 
South issues. They have taken a lead- 
ing and constructive role in the inter- 
national discussions of these issues. 
They have had direct dialogues with 
the United States, the European Eco- 
nomic Community, Japan, Canada, and 
Australia. In addition, they are recon- 
ciling difficult trade matters among 
themselves. They are demonstrating by 
their own growth the very great poten- 
tial which exists in the developing 
countries. They have received and de- 
served strong support from us. Their 
progress demonstrates that despite the 
complexity of these issues, dialogue 
can bring positive results for both. 

In 1978 relations between the United 
States and the Third World remain a 
significant part of our foreign policy 
agenda. As much as any other issue 
these matters bear directly on your 
daily life and mine. It is the hope of 
those of us who deal with them that, 
despite the complex nature of these is- 
sues, they will receive the serious at- 
tention of those concerned with foreign 
affairs. We hope in turn that organiza- 
tions such as those represented here 
today will lend their support for a 
positive and constructive role for the 
United States in this ongoing discus- 
sion with nations which represent 
three-fifths of the world's popula- 
tion. □ 



January 1979 



33 



Multinational Corporations 



Foreign Relations Outline* 

Multinational corporations (MNC's) 
have been the focus of national and in- 
ternational attention. Certain aspects of 
MNC behavior have been criticized in 
the developed countries; however, they 
have recognized the positive contribu- 
tions of MNC's and have continued 
their general support of the basic ob- 
jective of preserving an international 
system in which trade and capital flows 
are largely market determined. In con- 
trast, some developing countries as- 
sume the existence of an adversary re- 
lationship between MNC's and host 
countries, with the former's economic 
power pitted against the latter's al- 
legedly weaker sovereign power. A 
number of developing countries main- 
tain that the system needs to be 
changed to strengthen their bargaining 
power vis-a-vis MNC's and to increase 
their share of the benefits of interna- 
tional investment. 

U.S. Policy 

The United States has long held that 
a largely open international economic 
system without government interven- 
tion provides the most efficient alloca- 
tion of resources. The fundamental 
U.S. policy on international invest- 
ment, therefore, is neither to promote 
nor discourage inward or outward in- 
vestment through government inter- 
vention. We respect each country's 
right to determine the climate in which 
foreign investment takes place within 
its borders, although a liberal and sta- 
ble investment climate clearly facili- 
tates international flows of capital and 
technology. 

The United States supports the de- 
velopment of principles of behavior for 
governments and MNC's. Such 
guidelines can affirm standards of good 
practice for both enterprises and gov- 
ernments, contribute to improved rela- 
tions between them, and limit unilat- 
eral government intervention in 
investment. They can reduce conflicts 
between governments over investment 
issues, thereby strengthening the liberal 
climate for international direct invest- 
ment. The United States can support 
guidelines or codes relating to MNC's 
that are voluntary; do not discriminate 
against MNC's in favor of purely na- 
tional enterprises; are balanced to in- 
clude references to the responsibilities 



of governments as well as of MNC's; 
and apply to all enterprises regardless 
of whether their ownership is private, 
government, or mixed. 

International Action 

Many international organizations 
have MNC issues under review, but the 
most significant activities have taken 
place in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), the United Nations, and the 
International Labor Organization 
(ILO). 

The OECD has developed guidelines 
for MNC's as part of a broader under- 
standing on investment issues. In June 
1976 the OECD ministers signed a 
declaration on international investment 
and multinational enterprises, which 
includes: 

• Reaffirmation by OECD members 
that a liberal international investment 
climate is in the countries' common 
interest; 

• Agreement that they should give 
equal treatment to foreign-controlled 
and national enterprises; 

• A decision to cooperate to avoid 
"beggar-thy-neighbor" actions pulling 
or pushing particular investments in or 
out of their jurisdictions; 

• Voluntary guidelines, defining 
standards for good business conduct 
which the ministers collectively rec- 
ommended to MNC's operating in their 
territories; and 

• A consultative process under each 
of the above elements. 

In 1979 the OECD will formally re- 
view the MNC guidelines and other 
portions of the investment package and 
consider possible revisions. 

U.N. focus on MNC's is in its 
Commission on Transnational Corpo- 
rations and the related Center on 
Transnational Corporations. The 
Commission agreed in March 1976 to 
give top priority to formulating a code 
of conduct for MNC's. Because of fun- 
damental differences between de- 
veloped and developing countries over 
the substance of the proposed code, the 
spring 1978 target date for a draft code 
was not met. The Commission ex- 
tended the working group's mandate 
through 1979, however, and the 
dialogue on a future code of conduct 
will continue. 

The ILO, like the OECD, has made 



significant progress for future relations 
between governments and MNC's. A 
tripartite declaration of principles con- 
cerning multinational enterprises and 
social policy was completed in April 
1977 and approved by the tripartite ad- 
visory committee the same month. The 
ILO Governing Council approved the 
declaration in November 1977. A con- 
structive and balanced document, it 
strongly supports such principles as 
freedom of association and equality of 
treatment in employment. It also em- 
bodies a number of principles con- 
tained in the OECD investment pack- 
age. Although the United States no 
longer belongs to the ILO, we support 
the incorporation of the tripartite dec- 
laration into a future U.N. code of 
conduct to cover employment and in- 
dustrial relations. 

Illicit Payments 

The problem of illicit payments has 
added to the controversy over the role 
of MNC's. We have pressed for vigor- 
ous domestic and international correc- 
tive action. Following a U.S. initiative, 
the U.N. Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) decided in August 1976 to 
establish a group of experts to work on 
an international agreement to deter 
such payments. The working group was 
expanded in 1977 and prepared a draft 
treaty. 

In July 1978, ECOSOC established a 
preparatory committee to advance the 
final work toward a diplomatic confer- 
ence to conclude an international 
agreement on illicit payments. Planned 
for 1980, the conference is subject to a 
definitive decision by ECOSOC at its 
summer 1979 session. □ 



'Taken from a Department of State publica- 
tion in the GIST series, released in Sept. 1978. 
This outline is designed to be a quick reference 
aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended 
as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy state- 
ment. 



34 



EUROPE: JVATO Ministerial 
Meeting Held in Brussels 



Deputy Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher headed the U.S. delega- 
tion to the semiannual ministerial 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
in Brussels on December 7-8, 1978. 
Following are Deputy Secretary 
Christopher' s news conference in 
Brussels and text of the final com- 
munique of December 8. 



NEWS CONFERENCE ' 

From my perspective — which I has- 
ten to say is not quite as experienced as 
the last man who was at this 
podium — from my perspective it was a 
very valuable and constructive meet- 
ing. I think that it served as a good re- 
minder and an illustration that NATO 
is indeed the foundation of U.S. 
foreign policy. We went over a number 
of subjects which are important to the 
alliance. I thought that, as I evaluated 
it, the discussion was both informed 
and informative. I will be glad to try to 
answer any questions that you might 
have. 

Q. During your discussions 
[inaudible] the economic problems 
facing Turkey and, if so, what sort of 
measures need to be taken? 

A. We did have a substantial discus- 
sion of the economic problems of Tur- 
key as well as other members of the al- 
liance. It was emphasized in our dis- 
cussion that although the alliance is 
primarily for defensive purposes, 
nevertheless, the economy of each of 
the members of the alliance is an im- 
portant element in its general health 
and well-being. The communique, 
which I know you have, stresses that 
the member nations will do what they 
are in a position to do both in a bilat- 
eral and multilateral way. With respect 
to Turkey, the United States earlier this 
week signed agreements providing $50 
million in balance-of-payments support 
and also providing for rescheduling of 
the Turkish debt to the United States or 
to U.S. entities. We will be continuing 
to consider ways in which we might 
help the Turkish Government deal with 
the problems of its economy. Turkey is 
a very important member of the al- 
liance, and we are anxious to help it 
deal with its present economic prob- 
lems which are, by common under- 
standing, severe. 



Q. What was the American re- 
sponse to [British Foreign Secretary] 
Dr. Owens' proposal for a meeting at 
foreign minister level with Warsaw 
Pact leaders? 

A. I don't believe we responded di- 
rectly in the meeting. Our view about it 
is that that is a kind of meeting that can 
take place at some point in the future, 
but that very careful study in prepara- 
tion would be needed in the MBFR 
[mutual and balanced force reductions] 
context. A good deal more progress 
than has yet been made would need to 
be made in order to justify that kind of 
a meeting. 

Q. During your visit to Athens a 
few months ago, you were quoted in 
the press as saying that you were ex- 
pecting the Cyprus problem to be re- 
solved within a few months — 4 or 5 
months maybe; and also you were 
fairly optimistic about Greece's re- 
integration into the alliance. Would 
you care to make a statement on this 
as a result of the meetings? 

A. On the Cyprus question, I don't 
recall being quite as optimistic as you 
recall my being but I am glad to ad- 
dress the question. Now that the Tur- 
kish embargo has been removed and is 
behind us, and now that the Security 
Council has passed its resolution [440 
of November 27] and. the U.N. General 
Assembly debate is behind us, it seems 
to me that it's a good time to try to 
make some progress on Cyprus. My 
view is that it would be very desirable 
for the parties, under the auspices of 
the Secretary General of the United 
Nations, at an early date to reconvene 
the intercommunal talks. I hope they 
will do so. I hope that 1979 will be a 
year of real progress on Cyprus. It 
stands out as an important humanitarian 
problem that continues to create a cer- 
tain unease in relations in the eastern 
Mediterranean, so I look forward to the 
parties under the aegis and auspices of 
the Secretary General making progress 
in 1979 on that longstanding problem. 
One of my colleagues said that I may 
have misspoken. I was referring to 
Kurt Waldheim, the U.N. Secretary 
General. 

With respect to the other part of your 
question, and that is the full reentry of 
Greece into the NATO military coun- 
cils, I express the strong hope that 



Department of State Bulletin 

Greece will reenter under circum- 
stances that are satisfactory to Greece 
and to the alliance as a whole. That 
problem is being worked on in the ap- 
propriate military committees, and I 
hope that an early solution will be 
found. That would be the strong desire 
of the United States. 

Q. I quite realize that Dr. Kis- 
singer does not speak for the present 
Administration. Nevertheless, 
something he said this week in a 
published interview is very germane 
to this meeting, and I quote it. It is 
just two sentences. "We and our al- 
lies must have a capacity for regional 
defense inside and outside the NATO 
area. If we don't develop this, then 
in the '80's we are going to pay a 
very serious price. The first install- 
ments are already visible." 

Now my question is the following: 
Is the present Administration think- 
ing along similar lines, and, if so, 
have you made proposals on this to 
the NATO allies? And, if so, what 
has been their response? 

A. I didn't read the Kissinger inter- 
view to which you speak, and I really 
don't know enough of the context to be 
able to respond to your question. We 
discussed a wide variety of defense 
alignments and defense relationships, 
but beyond that I think I wouldn't have 
any comment. 

Q. With regard, sir, to the MBFR 
talks and the discussion that took 
place on those today, do the NATO 
nations plan now to respond to the 
latest proposals, or counter propos- 
als, of the Warsaw Pact before the 
question of data is settled? 

A. No, we think that there needs to 
be considerable progress on the data 
front before we would be in a position, 
to respond to the proposals that have 
been put forward. We're glad to ac- 
knowledge that there has been some 
movement in that area, but we need to 
have a good deal more progress on the 
data front before we will be in a posi- 
tion to deal substantively with the 
matter. 

Q. What reassurance could you 
give to the allies on the subject of the 
3% increase in net defense spending, 
if any? 

A. I do not have anything to say on 
that subject beyond what Secretary [of 
Defense Harold] Brown said. I am sure 
you read his press conference. He gave 
that press conference as I was in the air 
coming here, and I can't add anything 
to what Harold Brown said. 



January 1979 



35 



Q. Do you think that in the present 
situation, I mean speaking of the 
Soviet Union, taking into account the 
strains on the Chinese front and 
overall the present situation of Soviet 
diplomacy, the Soviet Union could be 
inclined to be more flexible on 
negotiations, on disarmament 
negotiations, on Europe? 

A. We are engaged in a rather wide 
range of negotiations with the Soviet 
Union on various disarmament matters. 
As you know, the SALT [Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks] negotiations 
are going forward, and we hope that 
they will come to a successful conclu- 
sion in the near future. We don't have a 
timetable for that. We don't feel under 
the gun of any time pressure on it, but 
we hope that those negotiations which 
do affect Europe in important respects 
will reach a conclusion. 

We are engaged in conventional 
arms talks with the Soviet Union in 
Mexico City at the present time 
[December 5-15, 1978]. And once 
again although Europe is not directly 
involved in those talks, we hope that 
some progress can be made there and 
then that the progress there can be ex- 
panded to include other supplier coun- 
tries and eventually recipient countries. 

We find the Soviet Union to be a 
very determined, well-informed, tough 
negotiating partner in all of our arms 
discussions with them. And we don't 
notice any change in their attitude 
which is one of being willing to discuss 
the matter but, on their side as on ours, 
a very firm interlocutor. 

Q. What can you say about your 
views of the developments in 
Romania; and what should NATO, 
or could NATO, do to encourage 
Romania in its defiance of the other 
Warsaw Pact countries? 

A. I think that we are witnessing in 
Eastern Europe a trend toward some 
greater independence on the part of the 
countries of the Warsaw Pact. Romania 
is a sovereign country and is exercising 
its rights of sovereignty. I think that 
the United States, as well as the other 
members of NATO, finds it in its inter- 
est to deal individually with those 
countries — to particularly enjoy a 
dialogue with those countries — which 
exercise a degree of independence and 
which in dealing with their own citi- 
zens have an increasing recognition of 
the human rights of their citizens. But, 
having said that, I would also indicate 
that the situation is changing only 
slowly and only in a matter of degree. 

Q. I believe you discussed the 
Middle East in the light of Mr. 



Vance's efforts on the weekend. 
What is the position exactly now re- 
garding the Camp David [inaudible]? 
Is there any hope that it will be 
signed before the deadline? 

A. The United States places a good 
deal of symbolic emphasis at least on 
the date of December 17. 3 months 
after the Camp David agreements were 
announced. We have not given up hope 
that agreement can be reached by that 
time. As you know. Secretary Vance 
will be leaving tonight to come to Lon- 
don and then on to the Middle East [see 
p. 39]. The parties are close together 
on the text of the treaty, and they have 
some distance to go to find an agree- 
ment on the side letter and on the 
timetable aspects of the side letter. But 
we have by no means given up hope 
that an agreement can be reached by 
that important anniversary date. I hope 
it will seem as important to the other 
two parties who are most directly con- 
cerned, as important to them as it does 
to us. 

Q. President Carter only last night 
warned the Israelis and the Egyp- 
tians that they should meet the dead- 
line and they should sign; otherwise 
there would be contrary effects on 
the peace in the Middle East. Can 
you explain this; what exactly did he 
mean? 

A. When you are shooting at a target 
date, like the date of the 17th of De- 
cember, and that date comes and you 
don't achieve your goal, then there is a 
risk of some loss of momentum and 
some possible unravelling; and I as- 
sume that was what the President had 
in mind. That's really what the Secre- 
tary and I have in mind. We think it is 
important to keep our eye on that target 
date in the hope that will enable the 
parties to get over those last few dif- 
ficult issues and to reach a conclusion 
on the first part of the Camp David 
framework. 

Q. In view of the follow-up CSCE 
[Conference on Security and Cooper- 
ation in Europe] meeting in Madrid in 
1980, what kind of place did the dis- 
cussions over human rights take in 
the [North Atlantic] Council, and 
what degree of agreement or common 
line was there in all the member 
countries? 

A. That was one of the most in- 
teresting aspects of the meeting from 
my standpoint. Perhaps stimulated by 
the fact that the press, yesterday 
morning, carried the account of Presi- 
dent Carter's statement on the 30th an- 
niversary of the U.N. human rights 



universal declaration [see p. I], there 
was a rather long discussion of human 
rights yesterday. I believe it probably 
took up about half of the restricted ses- 
sion. It was a stimulating, wide- 
ranging, valuable exchange. An im- 
portant part of that exchange was the 
reference to the Madrid meeting in 
1980. I think the ministers emphasized 
the importance of that meeting as a way 
to make further progress. 

As you will notice, in the draft 
communique there is an indication of a 
hope on the part of the ministers that 
enough improvement will be made so 
that the participating states can be rep- 
resented at Madrid at the political 
level. I think that this is a reflection of 
the heightened importance given to the 
Madrid meeting which was developed 
in the course of our discussions. I 
would want to emphasize that it will 
take a reciprocal degree of interest on 
the part of the other participants for our 
wish for the success of that meeting to 
come true; and I hope that the Warsaw 
Pact countries and the other partici- 
pants in the Madrid meeting will give it 
the same kind of importance that we 
give it, and that was recognized in the 
course of the meeting here. 

Q. What will the United States 
think or do when the European 
countries of NATO would decide to 
elaborate their own position on 
things like SALT III, or Euro- 
strategy in the nuclear field, before 
discussing it in the NATO 
framework? 

A, The United States has had, I 
think, an unparalleled degree of coop- 
eration and coordination with its allies 
on the kind of subjects that you men- 
tion. I hope I am accurate in saying 
that our NATO colleagues feel that we 
have fully briefed them about the de- 
velopments in SALT, and I have not 
noticed any lack of coordination in this 
field. I think we recognize the need to 
keep each other informed and to have 
our dialogue on these crucial defense 
matters fully informed and fully coor- 
dinated. 

Q. Could you give us some idea of 
the subjects discussed during your 
meetings with the Foreign Ministers 
of Greece and Turkey? And two, in 
view of the strong American desire 
you have expressed for the integra- 
tion of Greek forces into the NATO 
Command, have you advanced any 
suggestions to them that they might 
discuss Turkish objections to this 
before some opinions of them on the 
command of the Aegean have been 
settled one way or another? 



36 

A. I did meet with both Foreign 
Minister Rallis of Greece and Foreign 
Minister Okcun of Turkey. The meet- 
ing of Foreign Minister Rallis of 
Greece was a followup on the trip that I 
had to Athens a few weeks ago. We 
discussed primarily bilateral matters of 
mutual interest. We had discussed, 
when 1 was in Athens, cooperation in 
the field of science and technology and 
we referred briefly to that discussion. 
We discussed other matters of bilateral 
interest such as the foreign military 
sales credits that the United States has 
made available in the last Congress to 
Greece. At the Foreign Minister's re- 
quest, I also gave him a brief update on 
the Middle East negotiations, which of 
course, are a matter of particular inter- 
est to Greece because of its geograph- 
ical position. 

In my meeting with Foreign Minister 
Okcun of Turkey, we once again dis- 
cussed mainly matters of bilateral 
interest. He explained to me at some 
length the serious financial conditions 
being faced by Turkey. I discussed 
with him the aid that we had been able 
to give in the last year, and we dis- 
cussed in a general way what the pros- 
pects might be for the future. I 
explained to him, which of course he 
knew, that our budget discussions are 
only now going on in Washington and 
we will be presenting our budget to 
Congress shortly after the first of the 
year. 

We did not discuss in any detail the 
reintegration issues. I believe that both 
of the parties understand those issues 
and I believe they have discussed them 
with each other. But as I said earlier, it 
is our hope that Greece will be fully 
reintegrated into NATO on a basis that 
is satisfactory both to Greece and to all 
the members of the alliance. 

You had a second part to that ques- 
tion which I am sorry to say I may have 
forgotten. Do you want to follow up on 
that or have I — 

Q. If you have advanced any 
suggestions to them to try to settle 
these things between themselves? 

A. No, we did not. I believe that 
matter is being discussed in the appro- 
priate military committees of NATO; 
and at this point we have not tried to be 
helpful on that question — at least that 
was not involved in my discussions. 

Q. According to [NATO] Secretary 
General Luns, the Dutch proposal 
for more consultation with the Euro- 
pean partners on the modernization 
of the theater nuclear forces drew a 
positive response. Could you elabo- 
rate the U.S. stand? 

A. Not very much. That subject was 



touched only fleetingly in the meetings 
but I would simply affirm the U.S. 
willingness to be involved in those dis- 
cussions within the context of the 
alliance. 



FINAL COMMUNIQUE 2 

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministe- 
rial session in Brussels on 7th and 8th De- 
cember. 1978. 

Ministers reaffirmed their resolve to preserve 
and strengthen the solidarity of the North At- 
lantic Alliance as the indispensable guarantor 
of their security, freedom and well-being, and 
as an important contribution to international 
peace and stability. They underlined their faith 
in the principles and purposes of the Alliance 
which have their foundation in the values of 
democracy, human rights, justice and social 
progress. 

Ministers examined the Secretary General's 
study on economic cooperation and assistance 
within the Alliance which was undertaken at 
the request of the Council meeting in Wash- 
ington in May. in view of the economic dif- 
ficulties of some member countries. 

Bearing in mind the close relationship be- 
tween defense and the economy, as well as the 
fundamental importance of economic and social 
improvement for a stable democracy, they em- 
phasized once again the need to secure a sound 
basis for the economies of these countries and 
to assist them in their economic growth. 

As an expression of their solidarity and in 
the light of Article 2 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty. Ministers agreed on the urgent neces- 
sity of increasing financial assistance and eco- 
nomic cooperation by member governments 
which are in a position to do so through bilat- 
eral and multilateral channels. They requested 
the Council in permanent session to continue its 
consultations on this important question and to 
report to them. 

Ministers discussed the current state of 
East-West relations in all its aspects and re- 
called especially the East-West Study adopted 
by Allied leaders at the meeting in Washington 
last May. They reaffirmed their resolve to seek 
further improvement in East- West relations and 
their continued commitment to a policy of de- 
tente as the best means of promoting stable and 
mutually beneficial relations between govern- 
ments and better and more frequent contacts 
between individuals. In doing so they em- 
phasized once again the indivisibility of de- 
tente, pointing out that disregard for this would 
inevitably jeopardize improvement in East- 
West relations. They stressed the need for 
peaceful solutions in all problem areas. 

Ministers expressed again their firm convic- 
tion that full implementation of all sections of 
the CSCE Final Act is an essential element for 
promoting detente. They noted with regret cer- 
tain negative developments in its implementa- 
tion during 1978 especially in the field of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and in 
that of information. They stressed the need for 



Department of State Bulletin 

improvement in implementation to be shown 
between now and the Madrid meeting so that 
the participating states could take part on the 
political level. They emphasized that this 
meeting would provide a valuable opportunity 
for undertaking a further review of the im- 
plementation of the Final Act and for consid- 
ering future progress. They agreed on the im- 
portance of careful preparation of the Madrid 
meeting and, to that end. expressed their inten- 
tion to consult closely both among the Allies 
and with other CSCE participating states. They 
noted the positive outcome of the recent Bonn 
meeting on the preparation of a scientific 
forum. 

Ministers reviewed the developments con- 
cerning Berlin and Germany as a whole. They 
noted with satisfaction the improvement of the 
economic situation in Berlin and welcomed the 
efforts undertaken in the last few months to 



Constitutional 

Referendum 

in Spain 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
DEC. 7 1 

All people who love freedom and 
believe in democracy won a victory in 
Spain yesterday. 

The Spanish electorate decisively 
approved in a national referendum the 
draft democratic constitution placed 
before them by their elected par- 
liamentary representatives. This occa- 
sion marks the culmination of coura- 
geous and determined efforts by the 
Spanish people, their representatives, 
and King Juan Carlos to establish a 
framework for Spanish democracy 
which meets with the approval of all 
Spaniards. 

The success of the transition to de- 
mocracy in Spain, and the manifest 
will of Spaniards across the political 
spectrum to establish a democratic 
system, have earned the admiration of 
people the world over who share simi- 
lar ideals. 

Yesterday's referendum symbolizes 
a remarkable and praiseworthy 
achievement. We want to congratulate 
the Spanish people on this occasion, 
and to reaffirm the hope and support of 
the American people and their govern- 
ment for continued success in this his- 
toric effort. □ 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Dec. 11. 



January 1979 



37 



strengthen the economic basis for the viability 
of the city. The continuation of an undisturbed 
climate in Berlin and on the access routes le- 
mains an essentia] element of detente in 
Europe. Ministers noted with satisfaction the 
conclusion of agreements and arrangements 
with the German Democratic Republic on 16th 
November. 1978, which are an important con- 
tribution to the stability of the Berlin situation 
and to detente in Europe in general. 

Ministers noted with concern the continuing 
buildup of Warsaw Pact forces and armaments, 
both conventional and nuclear, notwithstanding 
repeated Eastern assurances that their aim is 
not to seek military superiority. In the face of 
these developments, and while seeking con- 
crete and verifiable measures of arms control. 
Ministers stressed the need to continue to de- 
vote the resources necessary to modernize and 
strengthen Allied capabilities to the extent re- 
quired for deterrence and defense. They re- 
viewed with satisfaction the actions to this end 
taken by the Allies since the Washington 
meeting. 

Ministers welcomed the increasing emphasis 
being placed on cooperative equipment pro- 
grams aimed at achieving a more effective use 
of available resources. They also welcomed the 
efforts being made to achieve a more balanced 
relationship among the North American and the 
European members of the Alliance in sharing in 
the development and production of new defense 
equipment, and to enhance the quantity and 
quality of standardized or interoperable sys- 
tems. They instructed national armaments di- 
rectors to pursue this approach, bearing in mind 
the special concerns of the less industrialized 
countries of the Alliance. 

Ministers welcome the agreement reached by 
the governments now participating in the 
NATO Airborne Early Warning Program, the 
largest cooperative equipment project so far 
launched within the Alliance. 

Ministers reaffirmed their conviction that 
concrete and verifiable arms control and disar- 
mament measures would contribute signifi- 
cantly to security, stability and peace. They 
therefore welcomed the increasing world-wide 
attention being paid to arms control and disar- 
mament, as exemplified by important current 
negotiations, as well as the United Nations 
Special Session on Disarmament and the forth- 
coming first meeting in Geneva of the Com- 
mittee on Disarmament in which Alliance 
members will actively participate. Ministers 
recalled their agreement to make fuller use of 
the Alliance machinery for thorough consulta- 
tion on arms control and disarmament issues 
and noted with satisfaction that such consulta- 
tions have been intensified. In this connection, 
they had a useful exchange of views on the 
French proposal for a conference on disarma- 
ment in Europe and on the prospects that this 
proposal might offer for confidence-building 
and security in the area. 

The Ministers discussed the U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. They wel- 
comed the progress made in the negotiations 
and expressed support for U.S. efforts to bring 



them to a successful conclusion. Ministers 
continue to believe that a SALT Agreement, 
which enhances strategic stability, maintains 
deterrence and responds to the security inter- 
ests and concerns of the Alliance, will be in the 
common interest. 

The Ministers of countries which participate 
in the negotiations on Mutual Balanced Force 
Reductions reaffirmed their commitment to 
these negotiations and reemphasized their de- 
termination to bring them to a successful con- 
clusion. They confirmed as the goal of these 
negotiations the establishment of approximate 
parity in ground forces in the form of a com- 
mon collective ceiling on the manpower of each 
side and the reduction of the disparity in main 
battle tanks. The achievement of this aim 
would contribute to a more stable relationship 
and to the strengthening of peace and security 
in Europe. These Ministers recall that to this 
end an important Western initiative had been 
introduced in April of this year. The Eastern 
response to these proposals, while containing 
some welcome movement in matters of struc- 
ture and concept, leaves important differences 
of substance unresolved. Both sides should 
now address these open issues progressively 
and constructively. 

These Ministers welcomed the Eastern 
movement towards agreement on the concept of 
approximate parity. They stressed, however, 
that this has made the clarification of the data 
base, which they always regarded as essential 
for substantial progress, even more urgent. 
They called on the Eastern side to respond 
positively to recent Western efforts relating to 
the data discussion designed to identify the rea- 
sons for the discrepancy between Western fig- 
ures and Eastern data regarding existing man- 
power levels in the area of reductions. 

These Ministers also recalled the announce- 
ment made by Allied leaders in Washington in 
May on a meeting of the negotiations at the 
foreign minister level. It was their view that, 
despite the movement, the requirements stated 
at that time for such a meeting had not yet been 
met but they agreed to keep this matter under 
review. 

These Ministers continue to attach impor- 
tance to the inclusion in an MBFR Agreement 
of associated measures which should also 
ensure undiminished security for the flank 
participants. 

The Ministers welcomed the continuation of 
the dialogue started as a result of the Montreux 
Summit Meeting between the Prime Ministers 
of Greece and Turkey. They expressed their 
hope that this constructive step taken by the 
two governments will produce positive and 
early results through further joint efforts, and 
the reaffirmation, where necessary, of their 
political will to attain this goal. 

Ministers took note of the report on the situ- 
ation in the Mediterranean and underlined again 
the necessity of maintaining the balance of 
forces in the whole Mediterranean region. They 
requested the Council in permanent session to 
pursue its consultations on this question and to 
report again at their next meeting. 



President Carter 

To Attend 

Guadeloupe Meeting; 



The White House announced on De- 
cember 7, 1978, that French President 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing has invited 
President Carter, Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, and Prime Minister James 
Callaghan of the United Kingdom to 
personal and informal conversations on 
political matters and international de- 
velopments of special interest to their 
mutual relations. Each chief of state or 
government will be accompanied by 
one assistant. The meeting will take 
place at Guadeloupe on January 5 and 
6, 1979. □ 



Ministers reviewed developments in the 
Middle East and expressed the hope that all 
parties concerned would take the fullest ad- 
vantage of the opportunities for a just and last- 
ing peace offered by the current negotiations. 
They expressed hope for an early successful 
conclusion of these negotiations as a major step 
towards a comprehensive peace in the Middle 
East and expressed support for United States 
efforts for such a comprehensive settlement. 

Ministers took note of the progress made by 
the Committee on the Challenges of Modern 
Society (CCMS) and in particular its efforts to 
strengthen international cooperation aimed at 
enhancing the environment and improving the 
quality of life. Ministers further noted with 
satisfaction that the Science Committee con- 
tinues to serve as an effective mechanism and 
forum for international cooperation in areas of 
major scientific and technological concern to 
Allied countries. 

In viewing world economic conditions 
Ministers noted that they remained unsettled, 
with all countries still adjusting to the recent 
adverse trends in the economic climate. They 
observed that vigorous efforts have been made 
by Allied countries in support of a more equit- 
able world economic system, including 
strengthened world trade and payment ar- 
rangements, within the context of renewed 
growth. These efforts are continuing. 

Ministers agreed that the next ministerial 
session of the North Atlantic Council will be 
held in the Hague on 30th and 31st May. 1979. 
They noted that 1979 will mark the 30th An- 
niversary of the Foundation of the North At- 
lantic Alliance and that since its creation it has 
enabled Europe to live in peace □ 



1 Text from press release 450 of Dec. 12. 
! Text from press release 451 of Dec. 12. 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



MIDDLE EAST: Visit oi 
Moroccan King Hassan MI 



King Hassan II of Morocco made a 
state visit to Washington November 
14-15. 1978, to meet with President 
Carter and other government officials. 
Following is a joint press statement is- 
sued by the White House on November 
17. ' 

At the invitation of President Jimmy Carter. 
His Majesty Hassan II, King of Morocco, made 
a state visit to Washington November 14-15. 
1978. In the course of this visit. His Majesty had 
discussions with President Carter as well as with 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and other mem- 
bers of the American Government. The discus- 
sions took place in an atmosphere of friendship 
and of mutual cooperation. They dealt with 
bilateral relations as well as with major interna- 
tional problems of common interest. 

The President and His Majesty noted with 
satisfaction that the centuries old ties linking the 
United States and Morocco are developing in an 
harmonious fashion. The two Chiefs of State re- 
viewed the many areas of cooperation between 
Morocco and the United States, particularly those 
relating to cultural, scientific, and technical 
cooperation. They decided that the development 
of energy resources is a sector in which new ef- 
forts would be mutually advantageous. They 
agreed to technical exchanges on the exploitation 



of shale oil reserves and on the utilization of 
solar energy and other renewable forms of 
energy. The two countries expect to sign in the 
near future a bilateral nuclear cooperation 
agreement. Such an agreement, which will be in 
the context of the adherence by both parties to 
the Nonproliferation Treaty, will permit im- 
plementation of a contract for construction of a 
nuclear research reactor. 

President Carter and His Majesty King Hassan 
also agreed that their governments should seek 
to expand academic exchanges between Morocco 
and the United States. They agreed that their 
governments will jointly sponsor a meeting be- 
tween academic leaders of the two countries to 
recommend ways in which educational ex- 
changes could be expanded. 

The two parties reaffirmed their desire to see 
private American firms give their support in the 
various sectors of social and economic develop- 
ment where Morocco is making considerable 
efforts. They agreed that the required conditions 
exist in Morocco for a more active American 
participation and undertook to facilitate such 
participation. The two Chiefs of State decided 
that in the near future a mission under the direc- 
tion of the U.S. Secretary of Commerce would 
be sent to Morocco in order to explore the pos- 
sibilities to develop bilateral trade and to in- 
crease investments. The mission will include 



representatives of the private and public sectors. 

President Carter and His Majesty King Hassan 
acknowledged their identity of view concerning 
the international problems they examined. For 
Morocco as for the United States, international 
relations must be founded on respect for national 
independence and for the territorial integrity of 
nations, as well as on willingness to contribute 
by cooperation and dialogue to the establishment 
of peace in the world. Within this context, the 
President expressed appreciation for Morocco's 
non-aligned, independent policy, and His 
Majesty welcomed American efforts to resolve 
global problems. 

The two Chiefs of State examined the situa- 
tion in Africa. The President thanked His 
Majesty for his description of the situation in 
northwest Africa and expressed his appreciation 
for the efforts undertaken by Morocco to end the 
tension existing there and to create conditions 




President Carter with King Hassan II 



MOROCCO— A PROFILE 

Geography 

Area: 171,953 sq. mi. 

Capital: Rabat (pop. 680,000—1977 est.). 

People 

Population: 18.6 million (1977). 

Annual Growth Rate: 3%. 

Ethnic Groups: 99.1% Arabs and Berbers, 
.7% French. .2% Jews. 

Religions: Muslim (Islam is the state reli- 
gion), Christian, Jewish. 

Languages: Arabic (official). French. Berber 
dialects. 

Literacy: 24% (males), 15% (females). 

Government 

Official Name: Kingdom of Morocco. 
Type: Constitutional monarchy. 
Date of Independence: March 2, 1956. 
Date of Constitution: March 10, 1972. 
Branches: Executive-King (Chief of State), 

Prime Minister (Head of Government). 

other ministers. Legislative — unicameral 

Parliament (264 members elected to 4-yr. 

terms). Judicial-Supreme Court. 



Political Parties: Istiqlal, Socialist Union of 
Popular Forces (USPF). Popular Move- 
ment (MP), Action Party (PA), Constitu- 
tional and Democratic Popular Movement 
(MPCD). 

Suffrage: Universal over age 20. 

Administrative Subdivisions: 30 Provinces, 2 
urban Prefectures, 3 Provinces in the 
Western Sahara. 

Economy 

GNP: $9.55 billion (1977 est., current 
prices). 

Annual Growth Rate: 6.4% (1973-77). 

Per Capita Income: $520 (1977 est., current 
prices). 

Inflation Rate: 13% (1977 est.). 

Agriculture: Labor — 50%; products — barley, 
wheat, citrus fruits, vegetables, sugar 
beets, wool. 

Industry: Labor — 15%; types — mining, tex- 
tiles, fishing. 

Trade: Exports-Sl.3 billion (1977): phos- 
phate rock, phosphoric acid, citrus fruits, 
fresh vegetables, canned fruits and vege- 
tables, canned fish, carpets. 
Imports — $3.2 billion (1977): industrial 
capital goods, fuels, foodstuffs, consumer 



goods. Partners — France, Italy, F.R.G., 

U.S., Communist bloc. 
Official Exchange Rate: 4 dirham = US 

$1.00. 
U.S. Economic Aid: $855 million (1956-78). 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N., Organization of African Unity. Arab 
League. 

Principal Government Officials 

Morocco: Monarch — King Hassan II; Prime 
Minister — Ahmed Osman; Minister of 
Foreign Affairs — M'Hamed Boucetta; 
Ambassador to the U.S. — Ali Bengelloun. 

United States: Ambassador to Morocco — 
Richard B. Parker. 



Taken from the Department of State's October 
1978 edition of the Background Notes on 
Morocco. Copies of the complete Note may he 
purchased for 70$ from the Superintendent of 
Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washington. DC. 20402 (a 25% discount is 
allowed when ordering 100 or more Notes 
mailed to the same address). 



January 1979 



39 



NUCLEAR POLICY: The U.S. Approach to 
NonproUfcration — Are We Making Progress? 



by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 

Address before the Atomic Industrial 
Forum, Inc. in New York on October 
23, 1978. Mr. Nye is Deputy to the 
Under Secretary for Security Assist- 
ance. Science, and Technology. 

I have been asked essentially to give 
a "mid-term grade" to the Carter Ad- 
ministration's efforts to slow the spread 
of nuclear weapons. The task is dif- 
ficult for two reasons. First, as a gov- 
ernment official, I have access to in- 
formation not available to the public, 
but at the same time my role as a gov- 
ernment participant is a possible source 
of bias. Second, we are trying to make 
a short-term assessment of what is by 
definition a long-term process. 



Moreover, progress has to be judged in 
the light of estimates of what otherwise 
would have been the situation. 

Obviously there is no neat solution 
to these difficulties, but a good way to 
start is by making clear what the U.S. 
Government is trying to achieve. The 
goals of our nonproliferation policy are 
to slow the rate of spread of nuclear 
weapons, preferably to zero, and to 
construct a stable international regime 
for the governance of nuclear energy. 
These goals can be judged by whether 
the Administration efforts have con- 
tributed to a rate of proliferation lower 
than it otherwise would have been, a 
nuclear fuel cycle which is more prolif- 
eration resistant than it otherwise 
would have been, and strengthened in- 
stitutions for a stable international re- 



for the establishment of fruitful cooperation 
between the countries of the region. They agreed 
that the OAU is the most appropriate framework 
for the resolution of African problems, and they 
expressed satisfaction at the decision of the 
OAU to establish a Committee of Wisemen. Re- 
viewing other points of tension which exist in 
Africa, the two Chiefs of State condemned 
foreign intervention and the arms races which 
have been their result. 

The two leaders discussed at length recent de- 
velopments concerning the Middle East. Presi- 



Secretary Vance's 
middle East Visit 



After Secretary Vance's visit to 
London December 8-10, 1978 (see p. 
12), he traveled to Cairo and Jerusalem 
to explore ways of resuming the dis- 
cussions between Egypt and Israel on 
the frameworks for peace in the Middle 
East. The Secretary visited Cairo De- 
cember 10-13, Jerusalem December 
13-14. and returned to Cairo De- 
cember 14-15. During the visit he flew 
from Egypt to Israel to attend the fun- 
eral of former Israeli Prime Minister 
Golda Meir on December 12. Secretary 
Vance departed for Washington De- 
cember 15. 

Press releases related to this trip are 
Nos. 445 (December 8), 452 (De- 
cember 13). and 456 (December 14). □ 



dent Carter, after having outlined to His Majesty 
the status of the discussions currently underway, 
explained the American objectives in the peace 
process, and he reiterated the willingness of the 
United States to continue to play a role leading 
to the establishment in the region of a just, dura- 
ble, and global peace. His Majesty the King, in 
reaffirming that the Palestinian problem consti- 
tutes a fundamental element in the search for a 
solution and for the establishment of peace in the 
area, explained that the Moroccan position is 
based on the decisions made at the Arab Summit 
meeting held at Rabat in 1974. 

With respect to the situation in Lebanon, the 
two parties noted their commitment to respect 
the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of 
that country. They renewed their support for the 
work of national reconciliation undertaken under 
the aegis of President Sarkis. 

His Majesty the King expressed his deep 
thanks to President Carter for the warm welcome 
and great friendship shown him during his visit 
to the United States as well as that extended to 
the members of the Royal Family and to the 
Moroccan delegation. 

His Majesty invited President Carter to visit 
Morocco. The President thanked His Majesty 
and accepted the invitation, with the date and 
details of the visit to be arranged through diplo- 
matic channels. □ 



1 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Nov. 20, 1978. For re- 
marks made at the welcoming ceremony on the 
South Lawn of the White House and an ex- 
change of toasts at the state dinner on Nov. 14. 
see Weekly Compilation of Nov. 20. pp. 2031 
and 2033 respectively. 



gime. Later I will provide evidence of 
significant progress on each of these 
dimensions, but before I do so, I wish 
to clear away some misunderstandings 
of our policy and describe what I think 
would have happened in the absence of 
the new U.S. approach. 

Some critics have charged the Carter 
Administration with failing to see that 
proliferation is a political problem and 
seeking a technical fix through aboli- 
tion of reprocessing. They argue that 
the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle is not a 
source of proliferation because there 
are more efficient ways to develop a 
weapon. Thus, in their view, the 
American initiatives have simply 
created turmoil, reduced American ex- 
ports, isolated the United States, and 
created incentives for proliferation. 

It is true that the more newsworthy 
Carter initiatives have focused on the 
fuel cycle, but it is not true that the 
political dimensions have been ig- 
nored. We have always regarded pro- 
liferation as basically a political prob- 
lem. What is more, we have not re- 
garded the fuel cycle as the largest part 
of the problem. But neither is it a trivial 
part. For example, a recent General 
Accounting Office report issued strong 
support for the Carter Administration's 
view that large commercial reprocess- 
ing plants with inadequate safeguards 
present a greater proliferation risk than 
small clandestine plants. 

In addition, let us hope that recent 
press revelations will finally lay to rest 
the spurious argument that because 
there are more efficient ways to 
weapons than through misuse of the 
fuel cycle, no state would misuse the 
fuel cycle. That a priori argument, 
heard so frequently in the past, has 
proven to be the real example of a 
technical case without political context. 

Measures To Deal With Incentives 

The proliferation problem has both a 
supply and demand aspect. Sound pol- 
icy has to address both the supply of 
capabilities and the demand for 
weaponry. The fact that policy meas- 
ures focused on capabilities have at- 
tracted more recent publicity does not 
mean that policy measures addressed to 
incentives have not been given equal 
weight internally. As Sherlock Holmes 
once noted, the fact that a dog does not 
bark in the night may be the more im- 
portant clue. In practice, we regarded 



40 



the security guarantees that the United 
States provides to its allies as the most 
important nonproliferation policy in- 
struments we have. Critics miss this 
point when they complain that the Ad- 
ministration failed to pursue disputes 
over reprocessing with our allies be- 
cause it feared to destabilize the al- 
liances. Any policy pursued to the 
point of severely shaking those al- 
liances would be a failure in nonprolif- 
eration terms. A cooperative approach 
with our allies is not only good alliance 
policy, it is also good nonproliferation 
policy. 

Similarly, we have been concerned 
to protect the multilateral instruments 
that have been laboriously constructed 
over the past two decades to address 
security motivations. Most important, 
of course, is the Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT) which 105 nations have 
now ratified. The treaty has helped to 
create an international regime in which 
states agree that their security interests 
can be better served by avoiding the 
further spread of the bomb. It provides 
important reassurances that potential 
adversaries are confining their nuclear 
activities to peaceful purposes. 

The NPT is a delicate international 
arrangement. Countries without nuclear 
weapons have accepted an explicitly 
unequal status in the military area, on 
the condition that they be treated 
equally with regard to civil nuclear 
cooperation. Thus we have rejected a 
number of suggestions for policies on 
the civil side that would have 
weakened the fabric of the treaty as one 
of the key nonproliferation institutions. 

Another multilateral instrument is 
the nuclear-weapons-free zone. The 
most important example is the Latin 
American nuclear- weapons-free zone, 
which was established in the 1960's by 
the treaty of Tlatelolco, but which 
lacked several adherents, including 
U.S. ratification of its first protocol, 
before becoming fully effective. Early 
in his term and without much fanfare, 
President Carter announced that the 
United States would ratify the protocol. 
Subsequently Argentina declared its 
intent to ratify the treaty, and the 
U.S.S.R. and France announced inten- 
tions to ratify the relevant protocols. 
Then only Cuban action will be neces- 
sary before the treaty enters fully into 
force, and even that precondition could 
be waived. Finally, American efforts to 
control the vertical proliferation of nu- 
clear arsenals through the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks and comprehen- 
sive test ban negotiations have an im- 
portant indirect effect on nonprolifera- 
tion incentives. In short, there has been 
significant, if less noticeable, progress 
relating to incentives. 



Efforts To Separate Peaceful 
From Military Capabilities 

Incentives can be reduced but they 
cannot be eliminated as long as na- 
tional rivalries and security concerns 
exist. We must also deal with 
capabilities to develop nuclear explo- 
sives. The fact that civil nuclear tech- 
nology and material can be used to de- 
velop nuclear weaponry has presented a 
dilemma that we have recognized since 
1945. We have gone through four 
phases in our efforts to limit the spread 
of nuclear explosive capability. The 
first was the Baruch plan to create a 
strong international authority to de- 
velop nuclear energy. It was a more 
ambitious step than international 
realities at the time would permit. 
American policy then turned to a pos- 
ture of seeking to protect its monopoly 



Our approach is evolutionary 
rather than prohibitory. 



by severely restricting the export of 
any nuclear technology. In December 
1953, President Eisenhower launched a 
third approach with his Atoms-for- 
Peace program. The idea of the 
Atoms-for-Peace approach was to assist 
countries in their development of 
civilian nuclear energy, in return for 
their guarantees that they would use 
such assistance only for peaceful pur- 
poses and under safeguards. 

In practice, the early Atoms-for- 
Peace policy failed to achieve the right 
balance, but its philosophy made sense 
as a long-term strategy. Essentially, the 
United States was offering to share the 
fruits of its then long technological 
lead at an accelerated pace, in return 
for the acceptance by other countries of 
conditions and institutions designed to 
control any destabilizing effects from 
such sharing. Specifically, the major 
accomplishments were the institution 
of a system of international safeguards 
administered by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
later the Nonproliferation Treaty which 
came into force in 1970. 

In the early 1970's the proliferation 
situation seemed quiescent, but com- 
placency was shattered by two events 
that ushered in the fourth period of 
turmoil that has been with us since 
1974. One was the Indian explosion of 
a "peaceful" nuclear device using 
plutonium derived from a Canadian- 
supplied research reactor — an event 
viewed as violating the spirit if not the 
letter of the loosely written 1950's- 



Department of State Bulletin 

vintage Canadian-Indian agreement. 
The Indian explosion gave rise to 
strong demands for stricter export 
policies in both the Canadian Parlia- 
ment and the U.S. Congress. 

The other big event was the oil em- 
bargo and fourfold increase in oil 
prices which created widespread inse- 
curity in energy supply. Problems with 
oil led to a resurgence of expectations 
about the importance of nuclear energy 
and raised questions about the suffi- 
ciency of uranium fuel. This was 
exacerbated by the 1974 decision of the 
Atomic Energy Commission to close 
the order books for enrichment until 
they could be certain that supply would 
equal demand. The net effect was to 
stimulate independent enrichment 
projects — incidentally, long before 
President Carter came into office. 

Another effect was to reinforce plans 
for early commercial use of plutonium 
fuel. In several troubling cases, re- 
processing plants were ordered by 
countries before they had built their 
first thermal reactor. Moreover the 
IAEA projected some 46 countries 
would have reprocessing needs by 
1990. All this would occur before ap- 
propriate technology and institutions 
had been developed. The implications 
for the fragile regime of international 
safeguards threatened to be disastrous. 

Recovering from a late start, the 
Ford Administration undertook impor- 
tant initiatives in 1975-76. It began to 
organize the nuclear supplier govern- 
ments to agree on a code of conduct for 
nuclear exports. And in the final days 
before the 1976 election. President 
Ford announced a moratorium on 
commercial reprocessing of spent fuel 
in the United States pending further 
evaluation. 

At the same time, a number of con- 
gressional initiatives were undertaken 
to tighten the conditions for nuclear 
exports from the United States and sev- 
eral private studies of the nuclear fuel 
cycle, notably the so-called Ford-Mitre 
report and the American Physical Soci- 
ety report, were coming to the conclu- 
sion that the commercial use of 
plutonium was economically premature 
and potentially dangerous. 

When the Carter Administration 
came into office, there was a wide- 
spread but by no means universal per- 
ception that the spread of sensitive nu- 
clear facilities (particularly uranium 
enrichment and reprocessing) and the 
planned early and wide-scale use of 
plutonium as a nuclear fuel threatened 
to erode the delicate instrument of the 
IAEA safeguards system and to make 
increasingly porous the barrier between 
peaceful and nonpeaceful applications 
of nuclear energy. 



January 1979 



41 



The new Administration did not 
create the period of turmoil in interna- 
tional nuclear cooperation. Rather it 
inherited a highly unstable situation. 
Another major setback to nonprolifera- 
tion might very well have brought the 
end of the international regime so la- 
boriously constructed in the 1950's and 
1960's. The task before us was to re- 
store and strengthen a regime that 
would balance legitimate energy re- 
quirements and nonproliferation con- 
cerns. 

The Administration recognized that 
there was no single technological fix 
that would create a safe fuel cycle but 
rather sought to move toward a series 
of technological and institutional steps 
which would lessen the risks while al- 
lowing legitimate energy needs to be 
met. To gain the time necessary to de- 
velop technological and institutional 
arrangements, the Administration 
urged that premature commercializa- 
tion of fuel cycles utilizing plutonium 
be avoided and announced that the 
United States, for its part, would defer 
its own plans for commercial reproc- 
essing and recycle of plutonium. 

The Administration was and remains 
strongly against recycle of plutonium 
in thermal reactors as posing a clear 
and present proliferation danger in re- 
turn for, at best, marginal economic 
and supply assurance gains. Breeder 
reactors, however, are a significant 
potential long-term energy alternative, 
and we have been careful not to oppose 
breeder research and development pro- 
grams at home or abroad. We have ex- 
pressed reservations about their com- 
mercial deployment before prolifera- 
tion-resistant technological and institu- 
tional alternatives are investigated. 

We recognized that we could not uni- 
laterally impose our will on others 
concerning how the nuclear fuel cycle 
should be structured and that we did 
not have all the answers ourselves. For 
this reason, six of the seven points in 
President Carter's April 7, 1977, non- 
proliferation statement dealt with issues 
within our domestic jurisdiction. 1 The 
seventh point was to lay the basis for 
the development of an international re- 
gime of norms and institutions that will 
provide the widest possible separation 
between peaceful applications and po- 
tential military uses while enabling 
countries to meet their energy needs. A 
key element in bringing about such a 
development was the suggestion for an 
International Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Evaluation (INFCE). The idea of 
INFCE evolved from the prior Admin- 
istration's reprocessing evaluation pro- 
gram. The Carter Administration 
broadened this idea to include other 
nations and to encompass all aspects of 



the fuel cycle, not just reprocessing. 

INFCE has been described as a 
pioneering effort at international as- 
sessment. Certainly, the United States 
sees INFCE as a cooperative effort to 
evaluate the role of nuclear energy 
technology and institutions in an inter- 
national context and help develop an 
objective appreciation of the nonprolif- 
eration, economic, and other implica- 
tions of different fuel cycle ap- 
proaches. INFCE provides a 2-year 
period in which nations can reexamine 
assumptions and search for ways to 
reconcile their somewhat different as- 
sessments of the risks involved in and 
the timescale for commercialization of 
the various aspects of the nuclear fuel 
cycle. While INFCE has a predomi- 
nantly technical cast, it is part of the 
political process of laying a basis for a 
stable international regime to govern 
nuclear energy through the end of the 
century. 

While it is too early to predict the 
outcome of this 2-year assessment, the 
United States has indicated, in broad 
outline, the type of political solution 
that we believe can bring an end to the 
period of turmoil over the nuclear fuel 
cycle issue. A stable regime should be 
designed to minimize the global dis- 
tribution of weapons-usable materials 
and reduce the vulnerability of sensi- 
tive points in the fuel cycle, while 
adequately meeting the energy needs of 
all countries. As I suggested in my 
speech to the Uranium Institute in Lon- 
don earlier this year, 2 we envisage five 
basic norms for a strengthened interna- 
tional regime: 

• Full-scope safeguards; 

• Avoidance of the unnecessary 
spread of sensitive facilities; 

• Use of diversion-resistant technol- 
ogies; 

• Institutionalized control of sensi- 
tive facilities; and 

• Institutions to insure the availabil- 
ity of the benefits of nuclear energy. 



Decreasing the Rate of Proliferation 

I would now like to assess the prog- 
ress that we have made in light of the 
three tests I mentioned earlier. The 
basic test is whether the Carter initia- 
tives will have caused the rate of pro- 
liferation to be higher or lower than it 
otherwise would have been. While I 
cannot get into the specific cases that 
support my conclusion that it will be 
lower, I believe a good case can also be 
made in general terms. Basically, pro- 
liferation is less likely to become a 
cheap option. If nothing else, the high 
priority that the Carter Administration 



has given to the issue has raised second 
thoughts among those who might have 
wanted to approach the option because 
it cost little. 

The attention of both suppliers and 
consumers has been called to the dan- 
gers of proliferation. The very vocab- 
ulary at INFCE meetings — "pro- 
liferation resistance" and "weap- 
ons-usable materials'" — indi- 
cates change. The publication of 
the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines ear- 
lier this year, including the provision 
for safeguards, special restraint on sen- 
sitive exports and for supplier consul- 
tations on possible sanctions if recip- 
ient countries violate safeguards, have 
made it apparent to a potential pro- 
liferator that questionable activities are 
unlikely to go unnoticed and that there 
are likely to be significant costs in- 
volved in "crossing over the line." 

Section 307 of the U.S. Nonprolifer- 
ation Act of 1978 reinforces this by re- 
quiring termination of U.S. nuclear 
cooperation to states that detonate a 
nuclear explosive device; abrogate, 
terminate, or violate safeguards; or en- 
gage in activities directly related to 
manufacture or acquisition of nuclear 
explosive devices. The deterrent effects 
of international safeguards are a func- 
tion of the likelihood of detection to- 
gether with the cost of ensuing sanc- 
tions. In effect the sanctions aspect and 
thus the deterrent effect of safeguards 
has been strengthened over the last 2 
years. 

Promoting a Proliferation- 
Resistant Fuel Cycle 

The second test is whether the fuel 
cycle will be made safer than would 
otherwise have been the case as a result 
of the U.S. initiatives. In terms of what 
has been accomplished in developing a 
consensus on a more proliferation- 
resistant fuel cycle, the U.S. approach 
has stimulated a general reanalysis of 
long-held assumptions and reconsid- 
eration of previously rejected alterna- 
tives. A number of key governments 
are now studying options to increase 
proliferation resistance rather than pro- 
ceeding on a "business as usual" 
basis. Industry at home and abroad has 
also begun to look at ways to reduce 
proliferation risks. 

In more specific terms, we are be- 
ginning to see a reconsideration by a 
number of states of the need for recycle 
of plutonium in thermal reactors. If this 
develops into a near consensus, it will 
mean that plutonium in large quantities 
will not be needed until the breeder is 
ready for commercial deployment, 
which, for the vast majority of coun- 
tries, is decades away. This provides 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



additional time to reduce the risks as- 
sociated with these reactors and/or to 
develop alternatives and strengthened 
institutions. 

Reprocessing and the breeder are not 
of course the only vulnerable points in 
the fuel cycle. We must find technical 
and institutional combinations to re- 
duce the dangers at each potentially 
sensitive point in the fuel cycle. At 
each point, there are technical and in- 
stitutional choices that present different 
degrees of resistance against diversion 
and seizure of weapons-usable mate- 
rials from peaceful nuclear activities. 

There are three basic components to 
reducing vulnerability: economic jus- 
tification, technical design minimizing 
risks and assuring effective safeguards, 
and international institutional arrange- 
ments such as joint or multilateral con- 
trol. The appropriate "mix" of these 
components will depend on the kind of 
activity involved and the circumstances 
of the specific case involved. 

Activities associated with short times 
from diversion to weapons develop- 
ment and/or with low detectability will 
need additional international 
frameworks to be considered safe. If 
there is a sound economic jus- 
tification — but the activity and the 
technical design does not assure effec- 
tiveness of safeguards — institutional 
arrangements such as multinational 
control should be a prerequisite for 
going ahead with the activity. Of 
course the matrix covering all the pos- 
sible combinations is complex, but a 
series of prudent choices at each sensi- 
tive point in the fuel cycle can contrib- 
ute significantly to the goal of main- 
taining the distance between peaceful 



noticed with interest efforts by other 
governments to suggest the broad out- 
lines of solutions. For example, the 
delegate of the Federal Republic of 
Germany recently told the IAEA gen- 
eral conference: 

There is a growing feeling that specific tech- 
nical amendments of isolated institutional ar- 
rangements will not solve the existing problems. 
It rather appears to be desirable, and also possi- 
ble, to identify a bouquet of coordinated meas- 
ures which at the end of the evaluation might be 
submitted — with a high degree of consensus — to 
the Governments for their decisions. Without 
prejudging the further development, one might 
expect to find among these measures some of the 
following items: 

• further technical development of safeguards; 

• increasing reliability of fuel supply for nu- 
clear power stations; 

• criteria for the use of highly enriched 
uranium in research reactors and new reactor 
types; 

• closer investigation of possible modifica- 
tions in some current back-end of fuel cycle 
technologies; 

• establishment of a regime for the deposit of 
excess plutonium as provided in the Agency's 
Statute; 

• mechanisms for international or regional in- 
stitutional cooperation. 

Strengthening Institutions 

The third measure of progress that I 
mentioned earlier is how we are doing 
in strengthening existing norms and in- 
stitutions and developing new ones for 
building up the international regime. 
International safeguards administered 
by the IAEA are of course the funda- 
mental norm, and progress has been 



The goals of our nonproliferation policy are to slow the rate of spread 
of nuclear weapons, preferably to zero, and to construct a stable inter- 
national regime for the governance of nuclear energy. 



and military uses of nuclear energy that 
otherwise very likely would have 
eroded. 

In INFCE and elsewhere, consider- 
able progress has been made in some of 
the above areas, such as reducing the 
risk associated with the use of highly 
enriched uranium in research reactors. 
Solutions to others will be more con- 
troversial because they are likely to in- 
volve added safeguards, costly techni- 
cal modifications, or the creation of in- 
stitutional arrangements. Discussions 
now being carried on in INFCE relate 
to all of these points and appropriate 
"mixes" for each activity. We have 



made both in strengthening the effec- 
tiveness of these safeguards and ex- 
panding their application. For the first 
time the Agency issued a safeguards 
implementation report which addressed 
problems that it has encountered in 
carrying out its responsibilities. This 
report will be undertaken annually, and 
work is already underway in remedying 
the deficiencies that have been iden- 
tified and developing methods to 
safeguard new types of nuclear ac- 
tivities. 

The avoidance of commercial com- 
petition that would weaken the appli- 
cation of safeguards has been assured 



by the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines. 
Moreover, several countries, including 
the United States, have adopted a re- 
quirement that a recipient country have 
all its nuclear activities under interna- 
tional safeguards as a condition of nu- 
clear supply (full-scope safeguards). 
Only a handful of countries do not meet 
this standard, and after informal con- 
sultations with other governments, we 
believe that there is a good prospect for 
widespread acceptance of such 
safeguards by both suppliers and re- 
cipients at the end of the INFCE 
period. 

Beyond strenthening the present 
safeguards regime, we have begun to 
develop institutions to implement the 
principle of assurance of benefits. Sup- 
ply assurances (such as a fuel bank) 
and international spent fuel repositories 
are examples of institutional arrange- 
ments that can reduce the incentives for 
countries with small programs to de- 
velop unnecessary enrichment and re- 
processing facilities. We have been 
pleased by the initial positive responses 
to the idea of a fuel bank consisting of 
a stockpile of fuel to be released to 
countries which have all their facilities 
under safeguards, have a clean prolif- 
eration record, and have chosen not to 
develop sensitive facilities on a na- 
tional basis. 

Development of international spent 
fuel storage regimes is also important. 
For some states, long-term away- 
from-reactor storage at home is not a 
viable alternative because of political, 
environmental, and geological consid- 
erations. The United States has indi- 
cated its willingness to take a limited 
amount of foreign spent fuel for storage 
in the United States and is engaged in 
the discussion of international re- 
positories in working group 6 of 
INFCE. 

In addition to these institutional ar- 
rangements which are designed to re- 
duce the incentives and concerns which 
would lead to premature development 
of sensitive nuclear facilities, we have 
begun studies and discussions of in- 
stitutions for effective joint control of 
those sensitive facilities that are eco- 
nomically essential and difficult to 
safeguard nationally. This is particu- 
larly applicable to enrichment and re- 
processing and perhaps plutonium stor- 
age regimes where some type of multi- 
national ownership and management 
and possibly new rules of operation 
might help reinforce the effectiveness 
of international safeguards. Discussion 
of such possible arrangements is 
underway in INFCE, and we will de- 
vote increasing attention to this as we 
work toward a consensus on managing 
the fuel cycle. 



January 1979 



43 



Conclusion 

In short, I believe that we have seen 
credible progress on each of the three 
crucial measures that I mentioned. On 
the other hand, there are those who 
argue that whatever short-term progress 
we have achieved in controlling prolif- 
eration, the '"restrictive" policies we 
are pursuing will over the longer term 
trigger a rush to independent nuclear 
fuel cycle capability, undermining the 
interdependence of the international 
fuel cycle and thereby reducing the 
barriers to proliferation. 

This line of argument represents, I 
am afraid, a rather fundamental misun- 
derstanding of U.S. policy. We do not 
seek to "turn off" the development of 
sensitive technology necessary to meet 
present and projected energy require- 
ments or to delay the deployment of 
facilities embracing such technology 
when there is a clear economic justifi- 
cation for them. We do not have the 
leverage to accomplish this even if it 
were our objective. We do believe, 
however, that the number of sensitive 
facilities should be limited to those 
necessary to meet actual energy re- 
quirements, and that appropriate 
safeguards and institutional arrange- 
ments are legitimate "costs" that must 
be factored into the development of 
these facilities. Our approach is 
evolutionary rather than prohibitory. 

Avoiding premature spread of sensi- 
tive facilities that involve weapons- 
usable materials is a common interest 
of nations that want a stable interna- 
tional regime. To support premature 
spread before safer technology and in- 
stitutions have developed works against 
the general interest. It is worth remem- 
bering the criterion set for 19th century 
hospitals: "At least they should not 
spread disease!" 

Moreover, I see little evidence that 
the new U.S. approach has stimulated 
development of additional national 
facilities. Reprocessing plans were 
underway in the United Kingdom, 
France, Japan, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, and other countries well be- 
fore our policy was formulated, as 
were arrangements to transfer this 
technology to other states. On the con- 
trary I note that the four countries 
mentioned above have indicated a 



willingness to consider technological 
and institutional modifications in the 
interest of nonproliferation, and that 
France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom have all announced that 
henceforth they do not expect to export 
reprocessing plants. As I indicated 
above, we are beginning to see simi- 
larity as well as differences in the many 
discussions in INFCE and elsewhere on 
ways to meet energy needs without in- 
creasing the risk of proliferation. 

To summarize my evaluation of the 
progress over the last 2 years: 

First, the recent U.S. initiatives 
have increased recognition within the 
international community of the costs 



Fourth, rather than sitting back and 
accepting erosion in the face of tech- 
nological change and spread, steps 
have been taken to strengthen the IAEA 
safeguards system which is central to 
any nonproliferation regime, and work 
has begun on other institutional ar- 
rangements to complement the 
safeguards system. 

Obviously, these are interim judg- 
ments. Controlling the risk of prolifer- 
ation is and will continue to be a 
dynamic exercise as we adjust to 
changing energy requirements, secu- 
rity, and political perceptions and tech- 
nological developments. The struggle 
will not be finished by the end of 



Avoiding premature spread of sensitive facilities that involve 
weapons-usable materials is a common interest of nations that want a 
stable international regime. To support premature spread before safer 
technology and institutions have developed works against the general 
interest . 



involved in "crossing the line" from 
peaceful nuclear activity to nonpeace- 
ful applications. Proliferation is less 
likely to become a cheap option. This 
has added to the deterrent effect of the 
international safeguards system. 

Second, there has been a heightened 
awareness of the dangers of continuing 
development of the nuclear fuel cycle 
based upon past assumptions, and an 
increased readiness to reexamine these 
assumptions and to look for alterna- 
tives. 

Third, international and domestic 
evaluations of these alternatives have 
been undertaken and continue. We rec- 
ognize that there is no single answer, 
either technological or institutional, to 
the problems we face. We cannot look 
for a completely "risk-free" nuclear 
fuel cycle. However, we can rea- 
sonably expect a series of improve- 
ments in various aspects of the fuel 
cycle that will add up to a significant 
gain in preventing erosion of the bar- 
riers between peaceful application of 
nuclear energy and nonpeaceful uses. 



INFCE, not during the life of this Ad- 
ministration, and perhaps not in our 
lifetime. The important thing is that the 
international community is making a 
renewed attack on this fundamental 
issue. I believe that there is consider- 
able hope that we will find ways to in- 
sure that this essential technology con- 
tinues to serve mankind rather than 
threaten it. 

The point was well put by Sir Her- 
mann Bondi before the Atomic Indus- 
trial Forum/British Nuclear Forum 
meeting in London last month. 

The world owes it to President Carter that by 
his concentration on this vital issue he has made 
us all think afresh about it at the right time, and 
put at the top of the international agenda an item 
whose difficulty has often urged postponement 
of action, but where the risks make it imperative 
to use our best intellectual and political en- 
deavors to banish the spectre of widespread pro- 
liferation. D 



'For text, see Bulletin of May 2, 1977. 
p. 429. 

2 For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 1978. p. 38. 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



1/.S. Policy on Reprocessing 
of t J§> --Or iff in Nuclear Material 



by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on International Economic Policy and 
Trade of the House Committee on In- 
ternational Relations on October 3, 
1978. Mr. Nye is Deputy to the Under 
Secretary for Security Assistance, Sci- 
ence, and Technology. 1 

I am pleased to be here today to dis- 
cuss U.S. policy on retransfer of 
U.S. -origin nuclear material for re- 
processing in the United Kingdom and 
France. Before discussing the cases 
which are before us, I would like to re- 
view briefly how our policy on re- 
transfers relates to our broader non- 
proliferation objectives. 

The basic objective of U.S. non- 
proliferation policy is to develop an 
international framework that will 
minimize both the incentives and op- 
portunities for nuclear proliferation. To 
this end, we are working toward the 
development of an international regime 
of norms and institutions that will pro- 
vide the widest possible separation 
between peaceful applications and po- 
tential military uses, while enabling 
countries to meet their energy needs. 
One key element in bringing about such 
a development is the International Nu- 
clear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) 
which is examining more pro- 
liferation-resistant alternatives to the 
present nuclear fuel cycle. 

The United States sees INFCE as a 
cooperative effort to evaluate the role 
of nuclear energy technology in an in- 
ternational context and help develop an 
objective appreciation of the nonprolif- 
eration, economic, and other implica- 
tions of different fuel cycle ap- 
proaches. INFCE provides a 2-year 
period in which nations can re-examine 
assumptions and find ways to reconcile 
their somewhat different assessments 
of the risks involved in and the time- 
scale for commercialization of the 
various aspects of the nuclear fuel 
cycle. While INFCE has a technical 
cast, it is part of the process of laying a 
basis for a stable international regime 
to govern nuclear energy through the 
end of the century. 

A stable regime should be designed 
to minimize the global distribution of 
weapons-usable materials and vulnera- 
ble points in the fuel cycle while 
adequately meeting the energy needs of 
all countries. One can visualize five 
basic norms for a strengthened interna- 



tional regime: full-scope safeguards, 
avoidance of the unnecessary spread of 
sensitive facilities, use of diversion- 
resistant technologies, multinational 
control of sensitive facilities, and in- 
stitutions to insure the availability of 
the benefits of nuclear energy. 

The United States does not, of 
course, have all the answers for how a 
safer nuclear order may be structured, 
nor are we in a position to dictate the 
norms to be followed. Indeed, success 
in building a safer nuclear order de- 
pends critically on the cooperation of 
other countries. It is in this broader 
context that we look at the specific 
matter of U.S. policy on requests for 
the retransfer of U.S. -origin material 
for reprocessing in the United Kingdom 
and France during this 2-year period of 
INFCE. 

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 
1978 sets forth criteria in addition to 
other requirements of the law to be 
applied to requests for retransfers for 
reprocessing. The law specifies that: 

• With respect to facilities which 
had not processed power reactor fuel 
assemblies or been the subject of a sub- 
sequent arrangement prior to March 10, 
1978, the Secretary of Energy may not 
enter into a subsequent arrangement for 
such retransfer for reprocessing of any 
special nuclear material exported by 
the United States unless, in his judg- 
ment, and that of the Secretary of 
State, such reprocessing or retransfer 
will not result in a significant increase 
of the risk of proliferation beyond that 
which exists at the time that approval is 
requested. Among the factors in mak- 
ing this judgment, foremost consid- 
eration will be given to whether or not 
the reprocessing or retransfer will take 
place under conditions that will insure 
timely warning to the United States of 
any diversion well in advance of the 
time at which the non-nuclear-weapon 
state could transform the material into 
a nuclear explosive device. 

• For facilities that have processed 
power reactor fuel or been subject to a 
subsequent arrangement prior to March 
10, 1978, the Secretary of Energy will 
attempt to insure that such reprocessing 
or retransfer will take place under con- 
ditions comparable to those above. 

Retransfer to the United Kingdom 

In both cases now before us, we be- 
lieve that the above criteria for ap- 
proval are met. In the Tokyo Electric 



Power Company (TEPCO) case we 
have addressed this question in the re- 
vised analysis under section 131 (b) (2) 
of the act. 

In addition to the requirements of the 
law, the President has established pol- 
icy criteria regarding requests for re- 
transfer for reprocessing. Approval of 
such requests has been on a case-by- 
case basis when there is clear showing 
of need (i.e. spent fuel congestion), 
and then only provided that the United 
States retains the right of approval over 
subsequent transfer of the separated 
plutonium and the requesting country 
has made appropriate efforts to expand 
its spent fuel storage capacity. Three 
approvals have been made under these 
criteria since April 1977. 

The Tokyo Electric Power Company 
requests to transfer approximately 24 
tons of spent nuclear power reactor fuel 
to Great Britain for reprocessing at 
Windscale would be the fourth such 
case. The basis for our determination 
that there is a need for the transfer has 
been spelled out in the analysis for- 
warded to the committee. 

Both Japan and the United Kingdom 
have also been cooperative in non- 
proliferation areas. Both are parties to 
the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 
both are active participants in the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), in the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group, and more recently in INFCE, 
and both have a strong political com- 
mitment to preventing the further 
spread of nuclear weapons. They have 
both worked to further common non- 
proliferation objectives. 

Furthermore, in connection with 
INFCE and as reflected in the Tokai- 
Mura communique of last September, 
Japan stated that it shares the view that 
plutonium poses a serious proliferation 
danger, that its recycle in light-water 
reactors is not ready at present for 
commercial use, and that its premature 
commercialization should be avoided. 
Japan also agreed to undertake experi- 
mental coprocessing work at its opera- 
tional test laboratory and, if such co- 
processing is found to be technically 
feasible and effective in light of this 
work and INFCE, to convert the Tokai 
reprocessing facility to coprocessing at 
the end of the initial period of opera- 
tion. In addition, Japan has agreed to 
defer the construction of its planned 
plutonium conversion facility at 
Tokai-Mura for 2 years and is now 
studying possible alterations for a 
combined uranium/plutonium product. 
Japan is also working with the IAEA at 
the Tokai reprocessing facility to test 
the application of advanced safeguards 
instrumentation. 

This is not to say that our policies 
and those of the other countries in- 



January 1979 

volved in these transfers are always 
identical. There was, for example, a 
frank difference of opinion between the 
United States and the United Kingdom 
over the timing of the Windscale/Thorp 
project, with the United States prefer- 
ring deferral of the project at least 
pending the outcome of INFCE. As the 
committee knows, the project has not 
been deferred. However, in par- 
liamentary debate supporting the proj- 
ect, the British Government noted that, 
since actual construction of the reproc- 
essing plant itself would not begin be- 
fore 1981 or 1982. the design could 
still be adjusted to accommodate any 
results of INFCE. 

Finally, we believe that the proposed 
retransfer for reprocessing will not re- 
sult in a significant increase in the risk 
of proliferation, with due consideration 
of whether we would have timely 
warning of any diversion well in ad- 
vance of the time at which the 
non-nuclear-weapon state could trans- 
form the diverted material into a nu- 
clear explosive device. We believe this 
conclusion is supported, among other 
considerations, by the nonproliferation 
credentials of the countries involved, 
by where the reprocessing will occur, 
and by the fact that the derived 
plutonium may not be returned to Japan 
or transferred to another country with- 
out specific U.S. consent. 



Retransfer to France 

The second case which I would like 
to discuss with you today, the request 
by Japan's Kansai Electric Power for 
the transfer of 29 tons of spent fuel to 
France for reprocessing in the existing 
UP-2 Cogema facility differs from the 
cases previously approved. While it 
meets all other aspects of our approval 
criteria, it is not based on a spent fuel 
storage congestion problem. For this 
reason, the matter was forwarded to the 
President with a recommendation of the 
State Department, Department of 
Energy, and Arms Control and Dis- 
armament Agency that our nonprolifer- 
ation objectives would be best served 
by approval. The President agreed with 
this recommendation. 

Kansai and the Japanese Government 
have asked for approval of this transfer 
on the basis that the contract concern- 
ing the shipment was concluded in 
1975, before the current U.S. policy 
had been enunciated; that public assur- 
ances had been given to the local com- 
munity, on the basis of the contract, 
that the spent fuel would be trans- 
ferred; and that it will have to pay sub- 
stantial financial penalties if the spent 
fuel does not move on schedule. Al- 
though the utility was aware that U.S. 
approval for the retransfer would be re- 



quired to fulfill the contract, it could 
not have foreseen that U.S. policy 
would change from a permissive policy 
on retransfers to a policy where ap- 
proval would be granted only as a "last 
resort. " 

The executive branch has carefully 
weighed all aspects of this matter and 
has determined that approval would 
best serve U.S. nonproliferation and 
broader foreign policy interests. This 
decision does not represent any basic 
change in the U.S. view of reprocess- 
ing. Requests for retransfers for re- 
processing will continue to be consid- 
ered on their merits and on a case-by- 
case basis, giving primacy to the test of 
"need. " 

However, the President has decided 
that the Administration will consider 
approval of this limited set of requests 
that involve contracts predating 1977 if 
the requesting country is actively 
cooperating in exploring more 
proliferation-resistant methods of spent 
fuel disposition and if approval would 
directly further nonproliferation objec- 
tives. In this regard we have Japanese 
agreement to join the United States in 
discussions of possible international 
spent fuel storage centers. These dis- 
cussions will complement studies in the 
United States and INFCE on develop- 
ing spent fuel storage regimes, some- 
thing that is essential if we are to be 
successful in deferring reprocessing. 

U.S. Considerations 

In every case, we would continue, 
among other things, to retain a veto 
over transfer of plutonium. This lim- 
ited change in our policy was explained 
to the countries concerned when we 
notified them of the decision on the 
TEPCO and Kansai requests. 

We have added "pre-existing con- 
tracts" as a factor to be considered in 
approving reprocessing for the follow- 
ing reasons. 

• As the President made clear in his 
April 7, 1977, statement, our policy 
has never assumed that ongoing ac- 
tivities in the United Kingdom, France, 
West Germany, and Japan would be 
"turned off" during INFCE. The 
INFCE communique provides that 
INFCE will be carried out without 
jeopardizing other countries' fuel cycle 
policies or international cooperation, 
agreements, and contracts. 

• Holders of reprocessing contracts 
entered into prior to current U.S. pol- 
icy can argue with some justification 
that they have been caught in the mid- 
dle when the rules changed. This mod- 
ification will allow us to take this fac- 
tor into consideration while we con- 
tinue to encourage the expansion of 
spent fuel storage capacity. 



45 

• Only four countries have reproc- 
essing contracts which predate our 
policy (Japan, Switzerland. Sweden, 
and Spain). Moreover, several of the 
concerned facilities are expanding their 
spent fuel storage capacities (in part 
due to our urging in previous retransfer 
approvals). This will limit the number 
of requests we are faced with during 
the INFCE period. 

Most importantly, our approach to 
such reprocessing requests is inextrica- 
bly related to achievement of a funda- 
mental objective of our nonprolifera- 
tion strategy that I described above: the 
development of an international con- 
sensus on norms for a more prolifera- 
tion-resistant framework for nuclear 
energy. Achieving this objective de- 
pends on the cooperation of other 
countries. The results of INFCE are 
beginning to be shaped and total in- 
flexibility now in dealing with key 
participants is likely to give us less in- 
fluence over the shape of the outcome. 

Thus we believe that this interim ap- 
proach to handling requests for reproc- 
essing in the United Kingdom and 
France during the INFCE period is con- 
sistent with our longer term nuclear 
nonproliferation objectives and, at the 
same time, affords sufficient protection 
against the erosion of our policy on re- 
processing. To take the alternative 
course, would, in our view, have 
weakened the prospects for developing 
the cooperative framework on which 
the achievement of our larger non- 
proliferation objectives depends. 



Spent Fuel Storage in U.S. 

The example the United States sets 
in its own programs is also key to ef- 
fective pursuit of our nonproliferation 
program. In this context I would like to 
address the questions of spent fuel 
storage in the United States, in par- 
ticular the development of an away- 
from-reactor (AFR) spent fuel storage 
capacity to implement the President's 
spent fuel policy announced in October 
1977. 

On March 13, 1978, the President 
established an interagency nuclear 
waste management task force to for- 
mulate recommendations for Adminis- 
tration policy with respect to long-term 
management of nuclear wastes. This 
interagency task force is chaired by the 
Department of Energy and includes 
State and other concerned agencies. 

The task force is now in the process 
of preparing a draft report for the 
President which we expect to circulate 
for public comment in early October. 
Early availability of additional AFR 
capacity would demonstrate concrete 
progress in our domestic program and 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



UNITED NATIONS: Wliai's Wrong Willi the l/JV. 

and What's Right? 



by Charles William Maynes 

Address before the Board of Direc- 
tors of the United Nations Association 
in New York on November 20. 1978. 
Mr. Maynes is Assistant Secretary for 
International Organization Affairs. 

I have always welcomed opportuni- 
ties to speak before the United Nations 
Association. Who can pass up an op- 
portunity these days to address an or- 
ganization that brings together those in 
the country who insist on a higher 
standard for foreign policy than a con- 
tinuous calculation of cold, short-term 
gain? So when your President. Bob 
Ratner, asked me if I would be willing 
to talk to you today, I accepted 
immediately. 

But as the meeting drew near, my 
approach changed dramatically. Why? 
Because in the last several weeks the 
United Nations has been faced with a 
new crisis. As a result of surprise 
legislation passed in the final days of 
the last Congress, as of January 1, 
1979, for the first time in its history the 
United States probably will be unable 
to make any of its assessed contribu- 
tions to the United Nations and many 
of the specialized agencies. 

The details of this law are complex. 
Suffice it to say, the U.S. Congress has 
deleted from next year's budget re- 
quest, in violation of our treaty obliga- 



tions, $27.7 million that could be 
clearly identified as the U.S. share of 
technical assistance in the regular 
budgets of U.N. agencies. And then it 
legislated that no part of the remaining 
funds appropriated to pay U.S. obliga- 
tions to the U.N. agencies could be 
used to finance technical assistance. 
This was done in spite of the fact that 
the charters and financial regulations of 
the United Nations and its specialized 
agencies prevent them from accepting 
earmarked or limited-use funds. And if 
the United Nations did accept condi- 
tional contributions, we would be wit- 
nessing the beginning of the end of the 
United Nations itself. For if the United 
States is permitted to take this step, 
then every other member state could 
follow suit. The United Nations would 
be paralyzed and prevented from doing 
anything. 

I would like to pause for a moment 
to reflect on the enormity of what has 
been done. The Congress of the United 
States has not simply followed the 
example of the Soviet Union — as bad 
as that example is — and refused to pay 
for a portion of the U.N. budget with 
which it disagreed. It has gone beyond 
this by insisting on attaching conditions 
to the rest of the U.S. contributions — a 
step no other member state has ever 
taken. It is potentially the most 
damaging blow any member state has 
directed against the United Nations. 



Let us remember that this is the organi- 
zation which two of our greatest Presi- 
dents, Wilson and Roosevelt, helped 
inspire. It is an institution which, for 
all of its faults, continues to serve the 
larger interests of mankind through its 
work in peacekeeping, economic de- 
velopment, and the promotion of co- 
operative approaches to vital global 
issues — all of which are of central im- 
portance to this country. 

Because of the stakes involved, the 
President and the Secretary of State 
have established as a priority goal 
when the new Congress convenes the 
deletion of the prohibitory language in 
the legislation. I have no doubt that we 
will be successful in achieving this 
goal because, in fact, the decision was 
made in haste and, it seems increas- 
ingly clear, with no understanding of 
the larger implications of the language 
which was adopted. 

But there will be lasting damage, and 
the very fact that the legislation passed 
should give all of us pause. Something 
is clearly wrong when the Congress, 
with so little care and forethought, can 
pass such a revolutionary amendment. 
We must, therefore, look behind the 
legislation to the larger problem of de- 
clining U.S. support — particularly 
congressional support — for the United 
Nations itself. 

Today I would like to confront di- 
rectly the sources of our discontent. 



Reprocessing Cont'd 

is highly desirable if we are to focus 
international attention on alternatives 
to reprocessing, including the eco- 
nomic and technical feasibility of stor- 
ing spent fuel in the interest of com- 
mon nonproliferation goals. 

In addition to this task force, we 
continue to argue in INFCE that spent 
fuel can be stored safely and securely 
for long periods and that reprocessing 
is not a requirement for effective waste 
management. While we have not made 
any specific commitments, direct or in- 
direct, regarding acceptance of foreign 
power reactor spent fuel in the United 
States, and are mindful that the law 
would require congressional review of 
any such commitment, we are con- 
tinuing to discuss the possibility of 
multilateral and bilateral waste man- 



agement questions with other coun- 
tries. 

Long-term solutions to all the com- 
plex problems we face in regard to nu- 
clear energy will require international 
cooperation. The policy that I have de- 
scribed today is designed to strengthen 
the prospects for such cooperation. 

Summary 

In closing, I would like to sum- 
marize this policy. For the interim 
INFCE period, we will approve re- 
transfer for reprocessing on a case-by- 
case basis under the following carefully 
defined conditions. 

• Requests involving a clear show- 
ing of need (i.e. spent fuel congestion) 
will continue to be approved on a 
case-by-case basis if the requesting 
country has made appropriate efforts to 



expand its spent fuel storage capacity; 

• Requests not meeting the physical 
need standard, but involving contracts 
predating 1977. such as the Kansai re- 
quest, will be considered for approval 
on a case-by-case basis if the request- 
ing country is actively cooperating in 
exploring more proliferation-resistant 
methods of spent fuel disposition and 
approval will directly further major 
nonproliferation objectives; 

• We will continue to require prior 
U.S. approval over the subsequent 
transfer, including return to the country 
which has title to the material, of any 
plutonium resulting from the reproc- 
essing. □ 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, 
D.C. 20402. 



January 1979 

These sources appear to be based on 
the following accusations about the 
United Nations. 

• That it is anti-Israeli. 

• That it is antiwhite. 

• That it is antidemocratic. 

• That it is anti-American. 

These are all volatile accusations for 
Americans. Each one sends a shock 
through our political system. Collec- 
tively, they constitute a damning in- 
dictment, one calling for refutation or 
reform. And today I want to answer 
that call. Let's look at these accusa- 
tions one at a time. 



Is the U.N. Anti-Israeli? 

Accusation number one: that the 
United Nations is anti-Israeli. Many 
events in the United Nations would 
cause one to believe this. But is it 
really? Let's look at the record. 

On the one hand, U.N. members 
have made an historically unpre- 
cedented collective contribution to the 
security and welfare of Israel. In the 30 
years of Israel's existence, member 
states have contributed three-fourths of 
a billion dollars to maintain peace on 
Israel's borders. Troops from 21 coun- 
tries have served in U.N. peacekeeping 
forces in the Middle East; 169 U.N. 
soldiers have died in the defense of 
peace on Israel's borders. Through the 
years, U.N. members have contributed 
$1.2 billion in the care and feeding of 
refugees created by the many wars of 
the Middle East. It's fair to say that 
there is no other case in history of such 
a sustained international interest and 
sacrifice for the security of a small 
foreign country. 

Nor do figures alone tell the story. 
Despite the intense passions which the 
Middle East issue has constantly 
aroused in the United Nations, Sec- 
retariat officials dealing with the issue 
have repeatedly shown themselves over 
the years able to meet the standards of 
impartiality, courage, and determina- 
tion that must be the hallmark of an 
international secretariat. In southern 
Lebanon, for example, the U.N. 
peacekeeping force demonstrated that it 
would attempt to carry out its mission 
impartially in its dealings with the 
Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) or any other group or country 
acting in a way which did not conform 
to the UNIFIL [U.N. Interim Force in 
Lebanon] mandate. [Israeli] Foreign 
Minister Dayan, in his recent General 
Assembly statement, singled out the 
"constructive role" U.N. forces in the 
Middle East have played in the 
framework of the various agreed ar- 
rangements in the region. Finally, we 



should recall the role of the United Na- 
tions in legitimizing the very existence 
of Israel through membership in the 
United Nations and in providing a 
framework for peace through Resolu- 
tions 242 and 338 of the Security 
Council. 

Yet there is another side to the coin. 
What about condemnation of Israel 
without investigation or due process.' 
What about the Special Unit on Pales- 
tinian Rights, which people fear will 
propagandize the PLO cause? 

Condemnations prior to investigation 
or without due process are certainly to 
be deplored. Yet a look at the record is 
instructive. Repeatedly, the issue is 
posed in the following way: The U.N. 
Secretariat usually undertakes an in- 
vestigation of Israeli practices with the 
objectivity and impartiality which one 
must demand from an international 
civil service. Subsequently, in a 
number of organizations, the Arab 
states have persuaded a majority of the 
membership to refuse to accept the 
Secretariat's report or to ignore its 
findings in reaching judgments about 
Israel's behavior in the occupied 
territories. 

I believe we may be seeing a replay 
of this process with respect to the PLO 
unit. We strongly opposed the creation 
of this unit and will continue to work 
for its elimination. Meanwhile there is, 
in this country, an outcry over a film 
about the Palestinians which no one has 
yet seen. And reports suggest that 
many Arab delegations are extremely 
unhappy about it because the Sec- 
retariat is attempting to be too objec- 
tive. Last week even the PLO de- 
nounced the film which now may never 
appear. 

In other words, with rare exceptions, 
the record of the international Sec- 
retariat is admirable, while the record 
of the majority is sometimes 
deplorable. 

So we come to the heart of the 
problem. On the one hand, the over- 
whelming majority of U.N. members 
agrees with Israel on the essential issue 
of Israel's existence. That is Israel's 
historic achievement, and one to which 
the United Nations has made an im- 
portant contribution. But on the other 
hand, the majority does not agree with 
Israel regarding the occupied ter- 
ritories. Regrettably, in their frustra- 
tion over diplomatic stalemate, the 
majority of U.N. members resorts to 
tactics which, if not exposed to critics, 
will damage the United Nations itself. 

I believe in these cases of abuse we 
must all work harder to point the finger 
in the right direction. We should be 
alarmed by the kind of voting excesses 
that reflect adversely on the United 



47 

Nations itself. But if we permit the 
public to be confused about the differ- 
ence between the institution and its 
members, people will forget which is 
the irresponsible party. We must not 
allow states to do their damage and es- 
cape with little diplomatic cost, while 
the blame is cast on the United Na- 
tions. 

One reason we can no longer allow 
this to happen is that the United Na- 
tions will likely be called upon to play 
a vital role in any final settlement of 
the Middle East problem. It is not ar- 
dent support for the United Nations 
from Prime Minister Begin or President 
Sadat which explains their insistence 
that the United Nations play a crucial 
role in the security arrangements for 
the Sinai envisioned by the Camp 
David framework agreement. It is, 
rather, their recognition that the in- 
stitution has developed unique 
capabilities in providing the kind of 
neutral monitoring force which any 
peace agreement in that troubled part of 
the world requires. 

So it is in the interests of all who 
support peace in the Middle East to 
avoid statements and actions that 
weaken the United Nations. We must 
denounce member states responsible 
for those statements and actions. But 
we must spare the institution. The 
choice is not between a secure Israel 
and a strong United Nations. The 
former will be much more likely if we 
insure that we have the latter. And we 
can have both. 

Is the U.N. Antiwhite? 

Accusation number two: That the 
United Nations is antiwhite. Here 
people are more reluctant to speak 
frankly, but the argument goes like 
this: "Africa is ruled by dictators, who 
spread violence, death, and repression 
everywhere. South Africa has a free 
press and standards of political life that 
no African allegedly can match. Yet 
the United Nations picks on South Af- 
rica and ignores much greater abuses in 
the rest of Africa." 

Can there be any defense? How deep 
is the double standard? We must begin 
with the Freedom House survey of the 
state of freedom in the world. To our 
amazement we see that by the strict 
Standards of that publication there are 
at least 12 countries, representing 
one-third of Africa's population, with a 
somewhat better record than South 
Africa — mainly Egypt, Kenya, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Upper Volta, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Lesotho, Mada- 
gascar, the Comoros Islands, Zambia, 
and Djibouti. Moreover, in the over- 
whelming majority of these African 
states. Freedom House finds that the 



48 

local trends are hesitatingly toward 
more freedom. This means that a large 
portion of Africa is moving slowly in 
the direction of more freedom, not less. 

Meanwhile, in South Africa itself. 
Freedom House reports that local 
trends are moving in the direction of 
more repression. Moreover, freedom in 
South Africa, increasingly limited as it 
is, is freedom for the whites almost ex- 
clusively. Often U.N. critics say the 
rest of Africa must move to South Afri- 
can political standards before criticism 
of South Africa can begin. The Free- 
dom House survey suggests that South 
Africa is actually behind some of the 
leading African states, and that these 
are improving instead of regressing. 

Even so, with our eyes more open, 
one might say this: Granted that we 
have not shown sufficient discrimina- 
tion in our assessment of freedom in 
Africa, still why condemn South Africa 
and not, say, Uganda? The answer is 
that we should and we do urge action 
on both. African states have tradition- 
ally resisted Western judgments on Af- 
rican affairs, claiming — with some 
historical justification — that Western 
colonial activities contributed to the 
situations in which they find them- 
selves. Unfortunately, this approach 
has also served to deter effective inter- 
national action against Amin. But the 
kind of mass murder that has taken 
place in Uganda is unconscionable, and 



we must press the world community 
and Africa to speak out. 

At the same time, we must also at- 
tempt to comprehend why — from a 
human rights perspective — South Af- 
rica poses such a special problem. 
There are many lessons we might have 
derived from World War II but one les- 
son we clearly did derive: That in the 
wake of the holocaust, never again 
could the world permit millions of 
people to be judged legally by their 
fellow countrymen on the basis of the 
color of their skin or their ethnic ori- 
gin, as opposed to their individual ac- 
tions or political beliefs. It is in this re- 
spect, and this respect alone, that 
South Africa stands apart in the world 
and must be judged apart. (I might add 
that one reason the Soviet Jewry issue 
is so sensitive is precisely because 
some Soviet actions appear to violate 
this bedrock moral principle.) A fail- 
ure, therefore, to see what is at stake in 
South Africa connotes a moral blind- 
ness that ignores the past and misreads 
the future. 

Yet, in the face of this moral issue 
where the choices seem so compelling, 
I find it reassuring that the world and 
Africa are still willing to reach out to 
South Africa. Neither the African 
states nor the United Nations has ever 
proclaimed that the whites in South 
Africa should not remain in Africa. 
The white settlers in South Africa have 



Department of State Bulletin 

never been viewed in the same light as 
white colonialists elsewhere in the 
continent. They have been seen as 
people who oppress others and who 
should stop. But they have also been 
seen as people who have a legitimate 
right to remain, not as people who con- 
quered others and therefore should 
leave. 



Is the U.N. Undemocratic? 

Accusation number three: That the 
United Nations is undemocratic. Senator 
Moynihan [Daniel P. Moynihan, 
former U.S. Representative to the 
United Nations] addressed this issue in 
his final speech to the U.N. General 
Assembly. On December 17, 1975, he 
stated: 

The crisis of the United Nations is not to be 
found in the views of the majority of its mem- 
bers. Rather, it resides in the essential incom- 
patibility of the system of government which 
the charter assumes will rule the majority of its 
members and the system of government to 
which the majority in fact adheres. 

His implication appeared to be that if 
only a majority of members of the 
United Nations were democratic, our 
difficulties with the organization would 
recede. Is this so? 

In one vital respect, Ambassador 
Moynihan was right. At the heart of 
any democratic system lies a profound 



U.N. FINANCING ISSUE 

In September 1978, just prior to ad- 
journment, the Congress passed the appro- 
priations bill for the Department of State for 
fiscal year 1979, including an amendment 
introduced earlier by Senator Jesse Helms 
(R-N.C). The amendment deleted $27.7 
million from the amount which the United 
States is obligated by various treaties and 
conventions to contribute to U.N. agencies. 
It further specified that, of the total funds 
appropriated, "no part may be made avail- 
able for the furnishing of technical assist- 
ance by the United Nations or any of its 
specialized agencies.*' 

President Carter signed the bill on Oc- 
tober 10, 1978, issuing a statement which 
said, in part: 

"Although I have signed this appropria- 
tion bill, I strongly oppose a provision 
which compromises this Government's 
ability to fulfill its legally binding financial 
obligations to the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies. The Congress has 
enacted unacceptable prohibitory language 
.... If allowed to stand, this action would 
cause the United States to violate its treaty 
obligations to support the organizations of 
the United Nations system. Withholding of. 



or assigning conditions to U.S. contribu- 
tions to assessed budgets of these organiza- 
tions would make it virtually impossible for 
these organizations to accept such contribu- 
tions, would seriously impair their financial 
and political viability, and is contrary to the 
policy of collective financial responsibility 
continuously advocated by this Government 
since establishment of the United Nations 
system. 

This precedent would also weaken the 
ability of organizations of the United Na- 
tions to withstand efforts by other govern- 
ments to impede their effective work. The 
United States has consistently opposed the 
Soviet Union's withholding of its assessed 
contributions to those programs of the 
United Nations which the Soviet Union has 
found politically unpalatable. Our efforts to 
stem such politicization of organizations of 
the United Nations would be severely 
weakened if the action of the Congress is 
allowed to stand. 

Accordingly, I intend to recommend 
promptly to the Congress the restoration of 
funds for this appropriation and the 
elimination of the language which jeopar- 
dizes our ability to support these interna- 
tional organizations. . . . "\ 

In November, the U.N. Administrative 



Committee on Coordination, which includes 
the executive heads of all the organizations 
and programs of the U.N. system, issued a 
statement which said, in part: 

"The constitution of each organization 
refers to the budget as a whole and makes 
no provision for earmarking within, or at- 
taching conditions to, assessed contribu- 
tions to the regular budget. The withholding 
of assessed contributions, or parts thereof, 
thus clearly violates the international legal 
obligations which every Member State con- 
tracted when it joined an organization in the 
United Nations system and formally ac- 
cepted its charter or constitution. 

For the same reasons the attachment of 
conditions to the payment of assessed con- 
tributions purporting to restrict their use by 
an organization cannot be recognized as 
valid under the Charter of the United Na- 
tions and the constitutions of the other or- 
ganizations. Member States do not have the 
right to designate those parts of the regular 
budget or program which are to be, or are 
not to be financed by their assessed contri- 
bution, and the secretariats do not have the 
right to earmark assessed contributions in 
such a manner as to prevent their being used 
to finance any specific activity or 
program. " 



January 1979 

respect for law and procedure which 
unfortunately we see violated all too 
often by member states in the United 
Nations. Regrettably, we cannot expect 
governments which have contempt for 
law or procedure in domestic institu- 
tions to show excessive zeal in their re- 
spect for law and procedure in interna- 
tional institutions. 

Yet, in at least two fundamental as- 
pects. Ambassador Moynihan was 
wrong. First, no one can seriously be- 
lieve that many of the substantive po- 
sitions adopted by the United Nations 
which have at times troubled American 
administrations do not represent 
majority opinions in the rest of the 
world. The U.N. resolutions on the 
new international economic order — 
much of which has even U.S. 
support — undoubtedly do represent 
majority opinion in the world. The in- 
ternational community — even at the 
grassroots level — probably does sup- 
port the broad outlines of U.N. deci- 
sions on South Africa and the Middle 
East. The problem with the United Na- 
tions, as the London "Economist" 
once pointed out, is that its decisions 
usually reflect 70% plus of the views 
of the world's population. This is an 
awkward fact with which we must 
contend. It doesn't necessarily mean 
we are wrong, but it certainly offers us 
no presumption that we are right. 

Second, one of the strengths of the 
United Nations is precisely that its 
structure and ideology are democratic 
even when its membership is not. At 
times, this structure and ideology are 
disconcerting. Even on the home front, 
popular views are not always the right 
views; majority decisions are some- 
times more worthy of study than sup- 
port. I acknowledge that we might look 
on this at the United Nations as a factor 
to be criticized, but I believe we can 
also cite it as a note to be celebrated. 
Thanks to extraordinary American in- 
fluence in the post-war era, the United 
Nations does rest upon democratic as- 
sumptions. That is the hidden advan- 
tage of our country in its participation 
in international organizations. 

At times we may have been guilty of 
allowing, without sufficient under- 
standing of what was taking place, 
other countries to expropriate our own 
symbols. Nowhere is this attempted as 
often as in the United Nations itself. 
But expropriators are always in danger 
that substance will subsequently be im- 
parted to the symbols. Indeed, this is 
happening throughout the world. One 
of the most heartening developments in 
recent years has been the trend toward 
more democracy in two of the great 
giants of the developing world — India 
and Nigeria. Meanwhile, we see a 



trend toward greater liberalism in 
Brazil. In China, wall posters are ap- 
pearing which state "We cannot toler- 
ate human rights and democracy being 
slogans belonging only to the Western 
bourgeoisie while the Eastern pro- 
letariat supposedly needs nothing but 
dictatorship." Heartening as well is the 
way that individuals in European 
Communist countries have attempted to 
impart substance to the symbols their 



49 

delegate, acting on both surprise and 
good memory, blurted out that this was 
the first successful American initiative 
in the Security Council in more than a 
decade. 

But that success does not stand in 
isolation. The United States has also 
been successful in persuading the Se- 
curity Council to call for a ceasefire in 
Beirut. With others, it cosponsored a 
resolution adopted by the Security 



[We must] concent rate less on how the United States alone might ac- 
complish what we believe has to be done and more on how we can 
build the kinds of international coalitions that would permit us to get 

moving. 



leaders so cavalierly expropriated 
through Helsinki agreements and U.N. 
resolutions. 

Is the U.N. Anti-American? 

Accusation number four: That the 
United Nations is anti-American. The 
critics' case goes like this: "The 
United States is pilloried in the United 
Nations. No one respects our opinions 
or our representatives. American val- 
ues are mocked. American interests are 
disregarded. " 

Is this true? We might again look at 
the record. If we examine the general 
debate statements in the General As- 
sembly, there is hardly evidence for 
this kind of conclusion. It's true that a 
handful of countries that are almost 
pathologically anti-American in their 
current political orientation — Cuba, 
Albania, Kampuchea, Libya, and 
Iraq — use the occasion of their general 
debate statements to launch diatribes 
against the United States. 

But the number of states which have 
done this has dropped dramatically in 
the past 2 years compared to the period 
1972-76. In fact, overall we have seen 
a significant change in America's posi- 
tion in the United Nations. As 
memories of Vietnam fade, as Ameri- 
can efforts to resolve difficult problems 
of the Middle East and southern Africa 
are appreciated, as our efforts to im- 
prove communications with the 
nonaligned are increased, America's 
position of embattled and embittered 
isolation has changed. 

Indeed, in the last several months, 
the United States has found itself in a 
position to take a leadership role in the 
United Nations for the first time in 
years on a number of critical issues. In 
March 1978 the United States pro- 
posed, sponsored, and led the Security 
Council effort to create the United Na- 
tions Interim Force in Lebanon. One 



Council to provide a compromise pro- 
posal on Namibia. 

Nor has the change been limited to 
the Security Council. For the first time 
in its history the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission seems to be moving 
away — hesitatingly, I acknowledge — 
from a noxious double standard and 
toward the objective approach that the 
United States would like to see firmly 
in place for the greater promotion of 
human rights. For many years, the only 
countries in the world whose human 
rights record could be addressed by the 
Commission were Chile, Israel, and 
South Africa. But at its last session, 
the Human Rights Commission decided 
to review the human rights situation in 
several other countries. Though the 
pace is painfully slow, the direction 
seems appropriate and right. 

Also, the 1977 General Assembly 
passed by consensus the first resolution 
in U.N. history against aerial hijack- 
ing, another strong U.S. concern. We 
have now joined forces with a number 
of other interested countries to follow 
up on that resolution by urging U.N. 
member states to ratify the key inter- 
national conventions against hijacking. 
The U.N. resolution has provided the 
kind of previously missing rationale 
which has persuaded a larger number of 
countries to sign these important 
documents. 

The Special Session on Disarmament 
in May 1978 was an extraordinarily 
important meeting. The largest disar- 
mament meeting in history, it helped 
chart the course for the U.N.'s work in 
the disarmament field over the next 
several years — a critical period as a 
growing number of nonaligned coun- 
tries are approaching several important 
military policy thresholds. Will they 
develop nuclear weapons? Will they 
acquire new generations of conven- 
tional weapons? The session to 
everyone's surprise reached agreement 



50 

on a consensus document which can 
help to guide constructively the course 
of disarmament negotiations in the 
years ahead and work toward U.S. ob- 
jectives in this area. 



Department of State Bulletin 



I '. Y. Committee on the 
Palestinian People 



The Steps Ahead 

I could go on about the ways that 
American interests are served by the 
United Nations. But somehow, let's 
face it, the real message about the 
value of the United Nations is not get- 
ting through. The public seems to be 
listening better. Opinion polls demon- 
strate that the public mood is increas- 
ingly positive. But within American 
leadership groups there remains a 
post- Vietnam sourness or indifference 
which is making it more and more dif- 
ficult for this country to address the 
longer run issues on the global agenda. 

Needed, I believe, is a vigorous 
public education campaign to remind 
the American people, and particularly 
key leadership groups, of what we gain 
from this system and of what we ought 
to stand for as its most prominent 
member. 

The American people ought to know 
that the United States is again capable 
of playing a leadership role, as we did 
this year on issues involving Lebanon. 

The American people ought to know 
that they fly more safely, raise larger 
crops, and suffer less damage from 
storms because our weather service has 
been able to double the amount of data 
it receives, thanks to the World 
Weather Watch of the World Meteor- 
ological Organization. 

They ought to know that they save 
$200 million every year because the 
World Health Organization has 
abolished smallpox. 

They ought to know that the stand- 
ards set by the International Civil Avi- 
ation Organization determine the com- 
petitiveness of American aviation 
equipment and thus significantly — and 
thus far very positively — affect export 
orders for our aviation industry. 

They ought to know that the innova- 
tive work on the basic human needs 
strategy for development was not done 
in the U.S. Government nor the World 
Bank but in the International Labor Or- 
ganization which we left. 

They ought to know that U.N agen- 
cies, in the face of criticism by the 
Socialist countries, advance Western 
techniques and attitudes toward de- 
velopment not because the United Na- 
tions is biased in our direction, but be- 
cause the developing countries them- 
selves have found our experience and 
approaches to be the more relevant to 
their conditions and needs. 

They ought to know that the United 



Following is an exchange of letters 
between Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff, 
a U.S. delegate to the 33d U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly, and Ambassador An- 
drew Young, U.S. Permanent Repre- 
sentative to the United Nations, con- 
cerning the U.N. Committee on the 
Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of 
the Palestinian People. ' 

October 18. 1978 
The Honorable Andrew Young 
United States Ambassador to 

the United Nations 
New York. New York. 

Dear Mr. Ambassador: 

As a Representative of the United States 
Mission to the United Nations. I am concerned 



that the United Nations reinforce the Camp 
David framework for peace in the Middle East. 
It is extremely disturbing that while peace is 
being established in the Middle East, the 
United Nations is providing a major irritant to 
peace in the form of the "Committee on the 
Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Pales- 
tinian People." The Member Nations who have 
launched this work must accept the responsi- 
bility for its adverse effects on a possible basic 
settlement. 

If the United Nations has a universal mean- 
ing to the people of the world it is to serve as a 
forum for world peace. President Carter, Presi- 
dent Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin have 
created a framework for peace in an area which 
has been preoccupied with war ever since the 
U.N. was created. The Member Nations have 



Nations is primarily staffed — from 
50% to 80% — by professionals not 
from the developing countries nor from 
the Communist countries but from the 
Western developed countries. 

But most of all, the American people 
ought to recall why these organizations 
exist in the first place. They exist as a 
result of common international need 
and enlightened American purpose. I 
agree that the days are gone when, in 
the words of a former French Perma- 
nent Representative to the United Na- 
tions, the United States served as the 
sole "locomotive for reform" in the 
international system. Today, the global 
policy train is too long to be propelled 
by a single locomotive. Like those in- 
tercontinentals that arrive at the edge of 
the Rockies, where I grew up, today's 
international policy train requires more 
than one locomotive to get over the 
top. Yet, the U.S. locomotive cannot 
remain too long in the yard for repair. 
Our help is clearly needed if we are to 
move the world community across the 
policy divide on the global issues that 
affect us all. 

What I think all of us must do in the 
months and years ahead is concentrate 
less on how the United States alone 
might accomplish what we believe has 
to be done and more on how we can 
build the kinds of international coali- 
tions that would permit us to get mov- 
ing. There are, as we all know, several 
powerful locomotives that remain to be 
more adequately harnessed. If the 
United States can no longer be ex- 
pected to do the job alone on interna- 
tional economic issues, for example, in 



concert with Western Europe, Canada, 
and Japan there is little that cannot be 
accomplished. Together we have suffi- 
cient leverage on the international 
economic system to make a real 
difference. 

Similarly, I believe organizations 
like the U.N. Association should be 
thinking of how they can work with 
their sister organizations in Western 
countries and Japan to bring a more 
global perspective to the policies of all 
their respective governments. It is a 
sign of the age that the latest commis- 
sion on world development policy is 
headed not by a distinguished Ameri- 
can like Robert McNamara, who 
headed a similar effort in the 1960's, 
but by a distinguished German political 
figure, former Chancellor Willy 
Brandt. The model is there. We need to 
find ways to copy it. 

Yet while others must do more, let 
us state again that America itself can- 
not do less. Moreover, as we work with 
others, we could well recall the words 
of a President whose name is perma- 
nently associated with international or- 
ganizations. In 1911, Woodrow Wilson 
said: 

America is not a mere body of [commercial] 
traders; it is a body of free men. Our greatness is 
built upon our freedom — is moral, not material. 
We have a great ardor for gain; but we have a 
deep passion for the rights of man. 

If we recall those words as we work 
with others, we can insure that the 
world will not only be a better place for 
ourselves but for others. □ 



January 1979 



51 



probably spent more time on the Middle East 
than any other subject in the U.N.'s history. 
Now is the time for Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Lebanon, and the other concerned na- 
tions to seize this opportunity and to work with 
the Palestinian people and with the Govern- 
ments of Egypt, Israel and the United States so 
that the next thirty years will not bring four 
more wars and countless volumes of debate 
here at the U.N. 

The tragedy of this Committee on the Pales- 
tinian People is twofold. First, it draws atten- 
tion to divisions and hardens positions exactly 
at the time when we should all be stressing the 
possibility of coming together and softening 
previous hard lines. Secondly, the use of the 
United Nations for a propaganda exercise is 
further politicization which can only serve to 
weaken respect for an institution designed to be 
a forum for peace, not an advocate for prop- 
aganda. It would indeed be sad if an organiza- 
tion designed to bring peace were weakened 
and in one specific and internationally impor- 
tant instance of realizing peace this committee 
and its promotional participants in the peace 
process into even more hardened adversaries of 
peace. 

Mr. Ambassador, in the closing days of this 
recent session of Congress several of my col- 
leagues underscored their concern for this ad- 
verse use of the United Nations system and I 
fully share their concern. 1 hope that the United 
States will not participate in the International 
Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People 
on November 29 and will not send a message to 
be read at that meeting as we have been invited 
to do. I urge, rather, that the United States 
make clear its strong opposition to this misuse 
of the United Nations and its disappointment 
that such a U.N. activity should hamper the 
most promising opportunity for peace in the 
Middle East in the past thirty years. 

Sincerely, 

(signed) 
Abe Ribicoff 



Namibia 



October 26. 1978 

The Honorable Abraham A. Ribicoff 
United States Senator 
United States Mission to the 
United Nations 

Dear Senator: 

Thank you for your letter of October 18, 
1978. expressing your concerns about the UN 
"Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable 
Rights of the Palestinian People." I fully share 
your view that our efforts to achieve peace in 
the Middle East must be directed at seizing the 
opportunity for a comprehensive peace which 
the Camp David Framework Agreements have 
created. 

The United States strongly opposed the crea- 
tion in 1975 of this Committee and the annual 
extension of its mandate on the grounds that (a) 
it was a misuse of UN funds and (b) it diverted 
attention from the peace process by raising a 



Following is a statement by Ambas- 
sador William H. Barton, Canadian 
Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations, made on behalf of the 
contact group on Namibia (Canada, 
France, Federal Republic of Germany, 
United Kingdom, and United States) in 
the Security Council on November 13, 
1978. ' 

Our five delegations understand the 
bewilderment, share the frustration at 
the uncertainty of the present situation, 
and also feel the deep sense of disap- 
pointment which underlies the resolu- 
tion which has just been adopted. 

We have worked for 19 months in an 
endeavor to devise arrangements which 
would enable Namibia to attain an in- 
dependence which is internationally 
acceptable. The adoption of Security 
Council Resolution 435 2 approving the 
Secretary General's report for the im- 
plementation of our five governments' 
proposal was a very significant step in 
this process. We believed then and do 
now that the best procedure would be 



new controversy around the Palestinian people 
without doing anything effective to help them 
achieve their legitimate goals. For the same 
reasons, we opposed the establishment of the 
Special Unit on Palestinian Rights in 1977. 
One-third of the member states of the UN, in- 
cluding many of our allies, refused to support 
the creation of these bodies. Nevertheless. 
two-thirds of the membership did support the 
creation of the Committee and the Special Unit 
and the Secretary General must act accord- 
ingly. 

The United States Delegation will not par- 
ticipate in the UN celebrations of the Interna- 
tional Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian 
People on November 29. I called on Secretary 
General Waldheim on October 12 to inform him 
of this fact and to reiterate our opposition to the 
Committee and the Special Unit as a misuse of 
UN funds. We will continue to urge other 
member states to support this position. 

Sincerely, 

(signed) 
Andrew Young □ 



' USUN press release 108 of Oct. 31, 1978. 



to go forward on the basis of the Sec- 
retary General's report. However, even 
as we adopted that resolution, we were 
all aware of the difficulties to be over- 
come. 

In recognition of this, our five dele- 
gations were asked not to consider that 
our work was done but to continue our 
efforts to bring about the object that is 
common to all members of the 
Council — the independence of Namibia 
through free and fair elections under 
U.N. supervision and control. 

And we have continued our efforts. 
Faced with the South Africans' refusal 
to accept the Secretary General's report 
and their intention to hold unilateral 
elections that could, in no way. be rec- 
onciled with our proposal or Resolution 
435, Ministers of the five traveled to 
Pretoria. The Ministers were able, we 
believe, to gain the acceptance of the 
South African Government to those as- 
pects of the Secretary General's report 
which that government had questioned. 
The South Africans agreed to resume 
discussions concerning the U.N. super- 
vised election within the framework of 
Resolution 435. 

To our governments' disappointment 
and regret the South African Govern- 
ment maintained their intention to pro- 
ceed with unilateral elections. How- 
ever, our Ministers made our position 
plain. We do not accept the validity of 
those elections, and we would consider 
those elections null and void. We do 
not consider them as having any sig- 
nificance. We will not accord any rec- 
ognition to the outcome. Those elec- 
tions cannot be considered free and fair 
and are irrelevant to the progress of 
Namibia to an internationally accept- 
able independence. We share the ap- 
prehensions expressed in this debate, 
and most notably by our African col- 
leagues, that this unilateral process 
might be used to frustrate the im- 
plementation of Resolution 435. 

Nevertheless, South Africa still has 
an opportunity to demonstrate that it 
will cooperate with the United Nations 
and to allay the concerns which under- 
lie this resolution. At Pretoria the 
South African Government, in agreeing 
that discussions be resumed, accepted 
that the aim of those discussions would 
be to carry forward the planning of the 
proposed U.N. -supervised elections 
within the framework of Resolution 
435 and to fix a date for the elections. 



52 

Moreover, the South Africans stated 
their view that it is appropriate to rec- 
ommend to the Secretary General that 
he begin consultations on the composi- 
tion of the military component of the 
U.N. Transition Assistance Group. It is 
these processes, to which South Africa 
has agreed, which in our view offer the 
way forward toward the implementa- 
tion of Resolution 435. 

Time is short. South Africa should 
be under no illusions as to our determi- 
nation. We have abstained on this res- 
olution because we believe that our 
efforts should be directed to obtaining 
and supporting the efforts of the Sec- 
retary General to secure their coopera- 
tion rather than to prejudging the pos- 
sible outcome, as does paragraph 6 of 
this resolution. However, it would be a 
mistake to interpret our abstention as a 
lack of sympathy for the resolution or 
the direction in which it points the 
Council in the event South Africa fails 
to cooperate in the implementation of 
Resolution 435. We will make our 
judgments on the facts at the appro- 
priate time and act accordingly. 

We reaffirm our commitment to 
Resolution 435. We will continue our 
efforts, and we will give all our support 
to the Secretary General in his en- 
deavors to obtain the cooperation of 
South Africa in the little time remain- 
ing. 



SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION 439 3 

The Security Council, 

Recalling its resolutions 385 (1976), 431 
(1978), 432 (1978) and 435 (1978), 

Having considered the report submitted by the 
Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 7 of 
resolution 435 (1978) (S/ 12903), 

Taking note of the relevant communications 
addressed to the Secretary-General and the 
President of the Security Council (S/ 12900 and 
S/ 12902), 

Having heard and considered the statement by 
the President of the United Nations Council for 
Namibia. 

Taking note also of the communication dated 
23 October 1978 from the President of the South 
West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) 
addressed to the Secretary-General (S/12913), 

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the 
United Nations over Namibia and its continued 
commitment to the implementation of Security 
Council resolution 385 (1976), in particular, the 
holding of free elections in Namibia under 
United Nations supervision and control. 

Reiterating the view that any unilateral meas- 
ure taken by the illegal administration in 
Namibia in relation to the electoral process, in- 
cluding unilateral registration of voters or 
transfer of power, in contravention of the 
above-mentioned resolutions of the Security 



Department of State Bulletin 



Arms Control 



by Adrian S. Fisher 

Statement in Committee 1 {Political 
and Security) of the U.N. General As- 
sembly on October 19, 1978. Ambas- 
sador Fisher is U.S. Representative to 
the Committee on Disarmament. ' 

We are met to renew debate in this 
committee on questions basic to the 
survival and prosperity of mankind. 
These are not new questions. We have 
reasoned long together, in past years, 
in search of ways to minimize the risk 
and destructiveness of armed conflict 
and to assure that the resources, human 
and material, devoted to the means of 
war are progressively redirected to 
man's social and economic betterment. 

The obstacles we face remain awe- 
some. 

• The accumulation of arms, by both 
developed and developing countries, 
continues largely unchecked. 

• The antipathies and fears which at 
once drive the arms race and are driven 
by it have not abated. 

• Technological progress both en- 
hances the destructive potential of arma- 
ments and makes more difficult the 
task of achieving balanced, verifiable 
agreements to limit and reduce them. 

Yet the response of the world com- 
munity to the challenges of arms con- 



trol and disarmament is probably more 
vigorous and promising now than it has 
ever been. The United States, for its 
part, is engaged in a program of 
negotiations of unprecedented scope, 
variety, and import. 

Since we last met in this committee, 
the community of nations has passed an 
important milestone in its quest for a 
better and a safer world: the first spe- 
cial session of the United Nations de- 
voted to disarmament. Vice President 
Mondale, addressing delegates to the 
Special Session on Disarmament 
(SSOD) shortly after its opening, 
called it a symbol of hope. Looking 
back at the accomplishments of the 
special session, I think we may now 
fairly say that it has also given cause 
for hope. 

• At the special session, consensus 
agreement was reached on a program of 
action which covers a broad spectrum 
of disarmament issues — a remarkable 
and precious achievement. 

• Practical measures were agreed 
upon to strengthen the multilateral 
machinery for disarmament delibera- 
tions and negotiations. 

• For all who participated in the ses- 
sion, there was a raising of conscious- 
ness, both of our varying perspectives 
and emphases in the search for ways to 
control and reduce arms and of our 



Council and this resolution is null and void. 

Gravely concerned at the decision of the Gov- 
ernment of South Africa to proceed with unilat- 
eral elections in Namibia in clear contravention 
of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 
435 (1978). 

1 . Condemns the decision of the South African 
Government to proceed unilaterally with the 
holding of elections in the Territory from 4 to 8 
December 1978 in contravention of Security 
Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978); 

2. Considers that this decision constitutes a 
clear defiance of the United Nations and. in par- 
ticular, the authority of the Security Council; 

3. Declares those elections and their results 
null and void and that no recognition will be ac- 
corded either by the United Nations or any 
Member States to any representatives or organ 
established by that process; 

4. Calls upon South Africa immediately to 
cancel the elections it has planned in Namibia in 
December 1978; 

5. Demands once again that South Africa co- 



operate with the Security Council and the 
Secretary-General in the implementation of its 
resolutions 385 (1976). 431 (1978) and 435 
(1978); 

6. Warns South Africa that its failure to do so 
would compel the Security Council to meet 
forthwith to initiate appropriate actions under the 
Charter of the United Nations, including Chapter 
VII thereof, so as to ensure South Africa's com- 
pliance with the aforementioned resolutions; 

7. Calls on the Secretary-General to report on 
the progress of the implementation of this res- 
olution by 25 November 1978. □ 



1 Text from USUN press release 117. 

2 For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 1978, p. 57. 

3 U.N. doc. S/RES/439(1978); adopted by the 
Council on Nov. 13, 1978, by a vote of 10 to 0, 
with 5 abstentions (Canada, France, F.R.G., 
U.K., U.S.). 



January 1979 

shared responsibility for the process. 

• In his plenary statement to this 
General Assembly, Secretary Vance 
spoke of what the United States regards 
as another important achievement of 
the special session: the decision by 
several nuclear powers to give assur- 
ances about the non-use of nuclear 
weapons in order to strengthen the se- 
curity of non-nuclear-weapon states. 

Assurances on Non-Use of Nuclear 
Weapons 

In the case of the United States — and 
I suspect the same is true of some of 
the other nuclear-weapon states as 
well — this decision was taken as a di- 
rect consequence of the raised con- 
sciousness to which I have just re- 
ferred. In October 1977, President 
Carter declared before this Assembly 
that the United States would not use 
nuclear weapons except in self- 
defense — a guarantee that no nation 
need fear being made the victim of nu- 
clear aggression or blackmail by the 
United States. 

Before and during the special ses- 
sion, my government gave careful 
thought to what further assurance the 
United States might provide those na- 
tions which have foresworn nuclear 
weapons. Vice President Mondale told 
the special session that we were there 
"to listen to the voices of other na- 
tions" as well as to speak our own 
views. We did listen, and one result, 
decided upon after careful review of 
our security requirements and alliance 
commitments, was the further elabora- 
tion of the U.S. position on security as- 
surances announced by Secretary 
Vance on June 12, an elaboration 
which built substantially upon Presi- 
dent Carter's earlier statement. Secre- 
tary Vance stated that the President de- 
clared, and I quote: 

The United States will not use nuclear 
weapons against any non-nuclear-weapons state 
party to the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] or 
any comparable internationally binding com- 
mitment not to acquire nuclear explosive de- 
vices, except in the case of an attack on the 
United States, its territories or armed forces, or 
its allies, by such a state allied to a nuclear- 
weapons state or associated with a nuclear- 
weapons state in carrying out or sustaining the 
attack. 

Speaking to the General Assembly 
last month. Foreign Minister Gromyko 
described this pledge and a similar as- 
surance given at the special session by 
the Government of the United King- 
dom as "replete with all kinds of res- 
ervations rendering them valueless." 
The governments of non-nuclear- 
weapon states which have given 



thought to these carefully considered, 
solemn declarations know better. They 
know that their security has been fur- 
ther vouchsafed, that the significance 
of their decision to abjure nuclear 
weapons has been more sufficiently 
acknowledged. 

Together, the solemn pledges given 
by the nuclear powers during the spe- 
cial session represent an important 
measure of security for the non- 
nuclear-weapon states. For this rea- 
son, as Secretary Vance stated in the 
General Assembly on September 29, 
the United States believes the Security 
Council should take formal note of 
them. At the same time, we do not be- 
lieve that these pledges can be forced 
into a common mold. It would be un- 
realistic to anticipate that a single 
formulation could be found which 



I/JV. Fund for 

Drug Abuse 

Control 

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 22 1 

For over 70 years, the United States 
of America has supported international 
measures to control drug abuse. Today, 
it is more important than ever to con- 
tinue this support. 

This Administration recognizes that 
drug problems cannot be solved unilat- 
erally but require concerted action by 
the world community. Drug abuse is 
exacting an ever greater toll on the citi- 
zens of developed and developing 
countries. It affects our economies, our 
societies, and, most of all, our culture. 

The U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse 
Control has played a central role in this 
international effort. Despite limited 
funds it has been remarkably effective 
in finding cooperative ways for nations 
to work together on this international 
problem. Today I am pleased to an- 
nounce that the United States will con- 
tribute $3 million to the Fund in 1978. 
With the contribution, I want to extend 
my best wishes to Dr. Bror Rexed, the 
new Executive Director of the Fund. 

The United States remains deeply 
committed to the cause of international 
drug control. We will continue to sup- 
port the efforts of the Fund, the United 
Nations, and other governments. □ 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Sept. 25. 1978. 



53 



would be generally acceptable and 
meet the diverse security requirements 
not only of each of the nuclear powers 
but also of the non-nuclear-weapon 
states, for many of which relationships 
with specific nuclear states are an es- 
sential ingredient in their national se- 
curity. 

My government continues to sup- 
port the concept of nuclear-weapon- 
free zones as a further means of 
strengthening the security of non- 
nuclear-weapon states, preventing the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, and 
enhancing stability in regions where 
appropriate conditions exist. The 
United States, with other nuclear pow- 
ers, has of course already made a 
treaty commitment not to use nuclear 
weapons against parties to the treaty 
of Tlatelolco. 

The achievements of the special 
session — an agreed program of action, 
strengthened multilateral machinery, 
heightened awareness and commit- 
ment, broadened security assurances 
for the non-nuclear-weapon states — 
are cause for encouragement. It is our 
responsibility now to follow up on the 
conclusions and recommendations of 
the session, sharpening the definition 
of our goals, and narrowing our dif- 
ferences over the steps we must take 
to achieve them. 



Accomplishments Since the SSOD 

I think we may take heart at what 
has already been accomplished in the 
brief 3VS months since consensus 
adoption of the Final Document: 2 

• Thanks in large part to the perse- 
verance and diplomacy of President 
Mojsov of the 32d U.N. General As- 
sembly to whom I join others in pay- 
ing tribute, the membership of the 
Committee on Disarmament has been 
agreed upon and the committee will 
begin its work in January. Drawing 
upon the experience of the Conference 
of the Committee on Disarmament but 
with a broadened and more represen- 
tative membership, the Committee on 
Disarmament will provide a continu- 
ing forum for serious multilateral 
negotiation of important disarmament 
issues. We particularly welcome the 
decision of France to take its place in 
the committee. We look forward to the 
day when China too will take its 
place. 

• Since the special session also, the 
revived U.N. Disarmament Commis- 
sion has held its organizational meet- 
ing. Pending the decision of the Gen- 
eral Assembly, it will hold its first 
substantive meeting in May and June 
of next year. The United States looks 



54 

forward to the opportunity the Disar- 
mament Commission will give for 
more extensive and profound discus- 
sion of the central issues of disarma- 
ment, complementing the resolution- 
oriented debate of this committee. 

• The U.N. study on disarmament 
and development mandated by the 
special session is already under way 
with good prospects of being com- 
pleted on schedule or earlier. 

• Nations have nominated a number 
of truly eminent persons to serve on a 
board which will advise the Secretary 
General on aspects of studies to be 
carried out under the auspices of the 
United Nations in the field of arms 
control and disarmament. 

• My own government has taken 
steps to implement and seek funding 
for the expanded programs of peaceful 
nuclear assistance announced by Vice 
President Mondale and described in 
detail by Ambassador Young. [U.S. 
Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations]. 

• My government is pleased also to 
note the progress made since the spe- 
cial session by the nations of Latin 
America toward coming to grips with 
the problem of controlling conven- 
tional arms. While not a direct out- 
come of the special session, this re- 
flects the new sense of urgency and 
purpose which the session has given 
us all. Having already provided the 
world a model for regional 
"suffocation" — to borrow Prime 
Minister Trudeau's apt term — of the 
nuclear arms race, Latin Americans 
have begun a process which the United 
States hopes will provide a model also 
for restricting the transfer of conven- 
tional weapons and dealing regionally 
with other conventional arms issues. 
The United States welcomes and sup- 
ports these efforts. 

Continuing Efforts 

At this General Assembly we may 
expect a larger number of resolutions 
dealing with disarmament than ever 
before. Agreed to by consensus, the 
Final Document of the special session 
expressed our shared vision of the fun- 
damental imperatives of disarmament. 
It did not, it could not, reflect the par- 
ticular, detailed perspectives and 
emphases which different nations 
brought to the debate. Many specific 
proposals and suggestions submitted by 
individual nations did not achieve con- 
sensus. The Final Document recog- 
nized that a number of these deserved 
to be studied more thoroughly. The 
United States is prepared to give care- 
ful consideration to all serious propos- 



als, in this Assembly or in other appro- 
priate deliberative and negotiating 
bodies. That consideration will begin 
here. 

For its part, my government hopes, 
in particular, that this session of the 
General Assembly will recommend to 
the Security Council the action re- 
garding nuclear non-use assurances 
about which I have already spoken. 

We hope it will also take concrete 
measures to advance the work already 
underway to develop a system for uni- 
form, international measurement and 
reporting of military expenditures and 
thereby begin to build a foundation for 
negotiated limitation and reduction of 
military budgets. I listened with inter- 
est to the suggestion made by our dis- 
tinguished colleague, the Foreign 
Minister of the Philippines, that it 
would be advisable for the pilot test of 
the reporting instrument of military ex- 
penditures to have the participation of 
at least one state from each political 
system or geographical area. This is an 
interesting idea and deserves careful 
consideration. 

We would like to see further atten- 
tion and impetus given to regional ap- 
proaches to arms control and disarma- 
ment, particularly to what have been 
called confidence-building or stabiliz- 
ing measures: that is, measures de- 
signed to increase the transparency of 
military activities, reduce the chances 
of miscalculation, complicate the task 
of achieving surprise in attack, and al- 
leviate the condition of mutual ignor- 
ance in which force postures are based 
on worst-case estimates of what others 
are doing. 

We are confident that this Assembly 
will give appropriate recognition and 
endorsement to preparations for the 
Nonproliferation Treaty review confer- 
ence and the Biological Weapons Con- 
vention review conference which are to 
take place in 1980. 

In our deliberations here we have an 
obligation not only to follow up on the 
work of the special session but to seek 
to preserve the unity of purpose and vi- 
sion which was achieved there. This 
will require restraint, a willingness to 
forego polarizing resolutions which 
could undermine the consensus 
achieved in the Declaration and the 
Program of Action. It will also require 
patience — a recognition that the disar- 
mament process is not a sprint, to be 
completed with short bursts of zeal, but 
a marathon requiring sustained effort. 

We must all recognize the complex- 
ity of the process and the futility of 
grandiose schemes which ignore secu- 
rity realities. We hear from some that 
only "political will 'Ms required to 



Department of State Bulletin 

achieve sweeping agreements; but an 
essential element of that political will 
must be a willingness to provide the 
information about programs and forces 
on which concrete, practicable meas- 
ures of disarmament must be based, 
and a commitment to measures of 
openness and inspection essential to 
verify mutual compliance with agree- 
ments affecting the security, the inde- 
pendence, and even the survival of na- 
tions. We must be prudent in our 
institution-building. The proliferation 
of structures for which a cogent pur- 
pose and realistic role have not been 
clearly defined can only devalue our 
efforts. 

Preservation of the shared sense of 
purpose, broad priorities, and commit- 
ment which I believe was achieved at 
the special session will be vital to the 
success of our future multilateral ef- 
forts in this forum and in others — in the 
Committee on Disarmament and in the 
revived U.N. Disarmament Commis- 
sion; at the review conferences for the 
Nonproliferation Treaty and the 
Biological Weapons Convention; at the 
U.N. conference on specific conven- 
tional weapons; in the continuing work 
of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Evaluation; as well as in regional 
forums already constituted, such as the 
Conference on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe. The multilateral disar- 
mament calendar is full, the scope of 
the agenda more inclusive than it has 
ever been. 

Disarmament is a universal responsi- 
bility. Political interdependence and 
the ubiquity of arms accumulation 
make it so. At the same time, the 
United States recognizes and accepts 
the special responsibilities in the dis- 
armament process imposed on it by its 
status as a nuclear- weapon state, one of 
the world's two principal military pow- 
ers, and a major supplier of arms to 
other nations. 

We share the disappointment that all 
feel that a comprehensive test ban has 
not yet been concluded. Despite the 
complexity of these negotiations we are 
making steady progress toward an 
agreement which will ban any 
nuclear-weapon-test explosion in any 
environment, which will include as an 
integral part of the treaty a protocol 
prohibiting nuclear explosions for 
peaceful purposes, which will apply 
equally to all states parties, those with 
nuclear weapons as well as those with- 
out them, and which we hope will 
achieve the widest possible interna- 
tional adherence. 

At the U.N. Special Session on Dis- 
armament Vice President Mondale put 
forward a set of what he called "bold 



January 1979 

objectives and realistic steps" to guide 
our arms control efforts. The Director 
of the U.S. Arms Control and Disar- 
mament Agency, Paul Warnke, de- 
scribed in detail the steps the United 
States is already taking, in negotiations 
currently underway, including those on 
the limitation of strategic arms and on a 
comprehensive test ban. 

Secretary Vance also spoke of pro- 
gress in the SALT [Strategic Arms Lim- 
itation Talks] negotiations in his state- 
ment before the General Assembly on 
September 29 of this year. 

The hope has been expressed that the 
negotiators in the ongoing bilateral and 
trilateral negotiations would be able to 
set dates for the successful conclusion 
of these negotiations. The statement 
that I have just completed does not 
offer any promise as to precisely when 
the negotiations will be concluded. 
This is not out of neglect but rather due 
to the realities of international negotia- 
tions. Experience has shown that in 
international negotiations on issues of 
importance and concern to each 
member of the international commu- 
nity, an attempt to prescribe in advance 
a set deadline is more apt to be coun- 
terproductive than helpful. Therefore, 
the United States is not able, at this 
time, to give a specific date for the 
conclusion of our talks without jeopar- 
dizing the progress of these ongoing 
negotiations, the success of which is so 
important to us all. 

Nevertheless. I can now report en- 
couraging progress in what is perhaps 
the most consequential of those negoti- 
ations, the SALT talks between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 
There are still a number of differences 
remaining between the sides. But the 
United States is hopeful that as a result 
of next week's discussions in Moscow 
[October 21-24], which Secretary 
Vance and Director Warnke will at- 
tend, we will be able to complete a 
SALT II agreement in the near future. 

Today we take up in this committee 
the work left to us by the special ses- 
sion. As we do so, let me assure you 
that the United States will not shirk its 
reponsibilities; that its commitment to 
the objectives set forth by Vice Presi- 
dent Mondale and reflected in the Pro- 
gram of Action of the special session is 
unwavering; and that it is ready to 
work with all nations to make those 
objectives reality. □ 



■Text from USUN press release 96. 

2 For text of Final Document and other mate- 
rial relating to the SSOD, see Bulletin of Aug. 
1978, p. 42. 



Summaries of 
r.S. Statements 



Foreign Economic Interests 
in Southern Africa 

In examining the resolution adopted 
by the Special Committee on foreign 
economic interests in southern Africa 
and other colonial territories, the 
United States finds that its primary 
goals — the hastening of independence 
for Zimbabwe and Namibia, the elimi- 
nation of apartheid, and the end of 
exploitation in non-self-governing 
territories — coincide totally with the 
goals of the U.S. Government. Al- 
though we share these goals, we do 
differ with the resolution on the role of 
foreign economic interests in the de- 
colonization process. 

In the U.S. view, the Special Com- 
mittee's resolution fails to distinguish 
between the situation in southern Af- 
rica and the situations which exist in 
other non-self-governing territories. In 
addition, we believe that the language 
of the resolution has an unfortunate 
effect, on the one hand, of obliging the 
administering powers to promote the 
economic development of the inhabit- 
ants of their territories while on the 
other hand, with its blanket condemna- 
tions, seemingly rules out the kinds of 
economic activities which make such 
development possible. 

Consequently, we are unable to sup- 
port what appears to be a basic propo- 
sition of this resolution; namely that 
economic interests and other economic 
activities in non-self-governing ter- 
ritories are, by their nature, detrimental 
to the interests of the people of those 
territories. We strongly believe such 
activities can make a significant contri- 
bution to the development of these ter- 
ritories prior to independence and that 
each situation must be considered on an 
individual basis. 

In the case of Rhodesia, the question 
of economic activities is governed by 
relevant Security Council resolutions 
which provide for mandatory economic 
sanctions. The United States fully sup- 
ported economic sanctions at the time 
they were invoked and will continue to 
support them. There is no U.S. trade 
with Rhodesia other than humanitarian 
trade permitted under those resolu- 
tions. 

The situation in Namibia is also gov- 
erned by U.N. resolutions and Interna- 
tional Court of Justice rulings which 
oblige member states to insure that in 



55 

their economic and political relations 
with South Africa, they do not convey 
legal recognition to its administration 
of Namibia. The United States supports 
these resolutions and rulings. 

The impact of foreign economic 
interests on the situation in South Af- 
rica is a much more complex question, 
with sound arguments on both sides. 
We understand the viewpoint that only 
a total trade embargo against South 
Africa will compel that government to 
reconsider its current racist policies. 
Last fall, the United States undertook a 
thorough review of its economic rela- 
tions with South Africa and decided 
that, for the present — and in relation to 
the question of apartheid — trade and 
investment restrictions of the kind ad- 
vocated by many states should be 
adopted only if there is compelling evi- 
dence that South Africa would achieve 
their goal of ameliorating apartheid. 
We have not yet concluded that such 
would be the case. 

Although the United States has been 
disappointed by the South African re- 
sponse to date, we continue to believe 
that economic relations with South Af- 
rica can be a positive force for pro- 
moting change in that society, provided 
that the companies operating there act 
as agents for positive change. We are 
closely following the efforts of those 
American companies which have vol- 
untarily agreed to adhere to a strict 
code of fair employment practices. 

The United States has made it clear 
to the South African Government that 
unless there is progress toward elimi- 
nation of apartheid, relations between 
our two countries would deteriorate, 
and we reserve the option of taking ap- 
propriate action in the economic sphere 
if and when we conclude such actions 
would be effective. 

Regarding the section of the Special 
Committee's resolution which con- 
demns all nuclear cooperation with 
South Africa, it is the U.S. view that 
the purpose of this provision is to pre- 
vent South Africa from developing a 
nuclear- weapon capability; this is also 
a priority goal of the United States. We 
have repeatedly urged South Africa to 
adhere to the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty and to accept adequate interna- 
tional safeguards over all its nuclear 
facilities. U.S. compliance with this 
resolution, however, would have the 
opposite effect; it would have nations 
cut off the possibility of the kind of 
safeguards we believe essential to in- 
sure world confidence in South Af- 
rica's peaceful nuclear intentions. 

On the question of how foreign eco- 
nomic interests impact on the small 
non-self-governing territories, the 



56 

United States does not believe that the 
Special Committee's resolution takes 
into account the positive impact these 
economic interests can have in terms of 
transferring resources and technology, 
in providing jobs, and in helping to de- 
velop the economies of these ter- 
ritories. Such development — properly 
managed — can hasten the decoloniza- 
tion process by promoting economic 
and social development. We are unable 
to accept a principal premise of the 
resolution that foreign economic inter- 
ests impede the process of independ- 
ence. (John Hechinger in Committee 
IV on Oct. 18; USUN press release 
95.) 

Middle East 

The United States commended the 
significant contribution made by the 
U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UN- 
IFIL) since its establishment in March 
1978 and acknowledged an important 
task remaining — assistance to Lebanon 
in the restoration of its effective au- 
thority over the area. On September 
18, 1978, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 434 (sponsored by the 
United States) to renew UNIFIL's 
mandate for a period of 4 months (until 
January 19, 1979). (Ambassador An- 
drew Young in the Security Council on 
Sept. 18; USUN press release 81.) 

The United States supported the ex- 
tension of the U.N. Emergency Force 
(UNEF) in the Middle East. On Oc- 
tober 23, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 438 to renew UNEF's man- 
date until July 24, 1979. (Ambassador 
James F. Leonard in the Security 
Council on Oct. 23; USUN press release 
103.) 

On October 24, the United States in- 
creased its 1978 contribution to the 
U.N. Relief and Works Agency, 
(UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in 
the Near East by $9 million, bringing 
its total contribution to $51.5 million. 
Earlier this year, the U.S. Government 
pledged a regular contribution of $42.5 
million. (USUN press release 104.) 

Outer Space 

President Carter has stated that in its 
space policy, the United States will 
pursue a balanced approach, em- 
phasizing both the application of space 
technology that we hope will bring im- 
portant benefits to mankind and the 
continued exploration of space to build 
a more complete knowledge of its 
properties and understanding of its rel- 
evance to our needs on Earth. The 
United States has conducted a number 
of important activities in the peaceful 
uses of outer space. 



• Payload allocations for the first 29 
Shuttle launches (taking us through 
1982) have been essentially completed. 
Negotiations are underway with 
Canada, West Germany, India, Iran, 
and Intelsat to launch application-type 
satellites, as well as international co- 
operative and reimbursable Spacelab 
missions using the Shuttle. 

• The United States launched Land- 
sat 3 in March 1978 to join Landsat 2 
in Polar orbit to expand NASA's pro- 
gram for cataloging the Earth's re- 
sources and monitoring changing en- 
vironmental conditions. 

• The first spacecraft built to test the 
feasibility of measuring variations in 
the Earth's temperature was launched 
in April 1978. 

• Several planning sessions on an 
experimental program of multinational 
satellite-aided search and rescue have 
been completed. 

• The Viking landers and orbiters 
are continuing to provide data from 
Mars. 

• NASA launched two Voyager 
spacecraft in 1977 to conduct com- 
parative studies of the planetary sys- 
tems of Jupiter and Saturn and to per- 
form studies of the interplanetary 
medium between Earth and Saturn. 

• The United States signed space 
science projects agreements in 1977 
with the Netherlands, the United King- 
dom, the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, and the European Space Agency 
for an infrared astronomy satellite, the 
Galileo Jupiter orbiter probe, and the 
space telescope. 

• The International Sun-Earth 
Explorer Mission was launched in Oc- 
tober 1977. 

• The International Ultraviolet 
Explorer was launched by the United 
States in January 1978. 

• The United States launched two 
pioneer spacecraft toward Venus in 
May and August of 1978. 

Since 1972 the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its 
legal subcommittee have been consid- 
ering a treaty concerning the Moon and 
other celestial bodies to further de- 
velopment of international law with re- 
spect to outer space. 

Another issue of considerable dis- 
cussion in the legal subcommittee is 
direct television broadcasting from 
satellites. The United States has no 
plans to engage in international direct 
broadcasting by satellite, and our posi- 
tion is that any guidelines drawn up for 
broadcasters must not infringe upon the 
internationally recognized right to 
seek, receive, and impart information 
and ideas through any media and re- 
gardless of frontiers. 



Department of State Bulletin 

Remote sensing is proving to be an 
area in which international cooperation 
in the beneficial application of space 
technology is prompting widespread 
interest. The United States has estab- 
lished a policy of open dissemination 
of the data from its Landsat program. 

Some states believe that a definition 
of outer space would be useful and that 
there is a convenient and appropriate 
altitude at which a demarcation line 
could be drawn. However, there is no 
agreement among these states on what 
that altitude should be. The U.S. view 
is that there has not yet been identified 
any compelling legal or technical need 
or justification for such a definition. 
We are, of course, prepared to continue 
to participate in the discussions related 
to this issue. 

An issue ancillary to the question of 
defining outer space is the status of the 
geostationary orbit. The United States 
does not find merit, either on scientific 
or legal grounds, that the geostationary 
orbit is subject to claims of national 
sovereignty. We are firmly convinced 
that this orbit lies in outer space and 
that its status is governed by the 1967 
outer space treaty. 

The United States supports the sec- 
ond U.N. conference on outer space 
which will be held in several years. We 
fully concur in the major objectives of 
the conference which emphasize sci- 
ence and technology for space research 
and application, the elaboration of 
benefits from space technology, and 
the need for international cooperation 
in the study of benefits from space ap- 
plications. (Ambassador Richard W. 
Petree in the Special Political Com- 
mittee on Oct. 17; USUN press release 
94.) 



Solomon Islands 

The United States on September 19 
welcomed the Solomon Islands as the 
150th member of the United Nations. 
(Ambassador Andrew Young in the 
General Assembly; USUN press release 
82.) 



U.S. Financial Contributions 

At the U.N. pledging conference for 
development activities on November 7, 
the United States pledged a total of 
$163 million to the following U.N. op- 
erational activities for the period 
January 1 -December 31, 1979: 

• $126 million to the U.N. De- 
velopment Program (including funds 
for UNIDO), up from $100 million 2 
years ago, underlining the U.S. con- 
viction that UNDP should be the prin- 
cipal funding mechanism and coor- 



January 1979 

dinator of technical cooperation efforts 
with the U.N. system; 

• An additional $3 million special 
contribution to UNDP to be used for 
curbing postharvest agricultural losses 
which is being undertaken by FAO; 

• $2 million to the U.N. Capital De- 
velopment Fund; 

• $30 million to UNICEF; and 

• $2 million to the voluntary fund 
for the U.N. Decade for Women. 

(Minister-Counselor William Stibravy 
in the U.N. pledging conference for 
development activities; USUN press 
release 114.) 

Women 

The issue of women's rights touches 
all nations; it can no longer be regarded 
as a phenomenon occurring only in de- 
veloping societies. While the nations of 
the world readily agree that no effort 
should be spared in eliminating all 
forms of discrimination on the basis of 
race, religion, and national origin, 
complete substantive action to elimi- 
nate discrimination against women is 
lacking. 

In the majority of the developing 
countries, women are the cornerstone 
of most transactions which contribute 
to the national economies. This is a 
power phenomenon which is rewarded 
by denying women full rights of par- 
ticipation in the economic, social, and 
political decisionmaking processes af- 
fecting their lives. And although the 
proportion of women in the labor mar- 
ket has increased over the last 20 years, 
there remains a large gap in male/ 
female earnings. Even though more 
time is being devoted to focusing on 
the issue of equal rights for women, 
many of the male-led nations — with 
traditionally patriarchal societies — 
refuse to believe and sincerely accept 
the validity of this struggle; the time 
for paying lip-service as support for the 
struggle has ended. 

The United States has carefully 
studied the report of the Joint Inspec- 
tion Unit and considers it to be a con- 
structive contribution to efforts to im- 
prove the employment opportunities of 
women in the United Nations and the 
specialized agencies. We endorse the 
report's recommendations and regard 
them as a framework whereby rhetoric 
can be transformed into reality. 

The United States would like the 
United Nations to take immediate ac- 
tion to correct a continuing injustice 
against women working within the 
U.N. Secretariat, against women 
working in meetings devoted to world 
peace and economic and social justice. 
This situation is unacceptable, espe- 
cially now that we are approaching the 



57 



WESTER* HEMISPHERE: 

\i<'ffrcir/tfCf 



by Warren Christopher 

Statement before the meeting of con- 
sultation of the Organization of Ameri- 
can States (OAS) foreign ministers in 
Washington, D.C., on September 21, 
1978. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Sec- 
retary of State. 

The tragedy of Nicaragua moves us 
all. We cannot be indifferent to the 
terrible human cost of recent 
events — the bloodshed, the destruction, 
and the toll in innocent lives. 
Thousands of afflicted individuals call 
to us all for help. 

We have all seen the message di- 
rected to this and other international 
organizations from representatives of a 
broad spectrum of groups in Nicaragua, 
including leaders of the church. In that 
message, these representatives said, in 
part: 

Especially, we address ourselves to the na- 
tions of our hemisphere which share the suf- 
ferings of the Nicaraguan people, so that this 
cry of anxiety will impel them to take direct 
action through international political and hu- 
manitarian organizations to aid our victims and 
achieve peace. 

We cannot ignore that anguished cry. 
Together, we must take effective action 
to respond to this appeal. 



First, we call for urgent and gener- 
ous support for the work of the Inter- 
national Committee of the Red Cross, 
its local affiliates, and other relief or- 
ganizations in Nicaragua as well as in 
Costa Rica and Honduras. In this way, 
necessary relief supplies, particularly 
medicine and food, can be distributed 
promptly to those in need. My govern- 
ment is prepared to contribute to such 
an effort. In addition, we urge the OAS 
to join us in encouraging the efforts of 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refu- 
gees to aid the Nicaraguan refugees in 
Costa Rica and Honduras. 

Second, we deplore and urge an end 
to the killing and bloodshed which has 
scarred Nicaragua in the past several 
weeks. The reports of mass arrests and 
detentions, torture, and even indis- 
criminate killing of civilians must be 
investigated fully. If they are true, they 
deserve the condemnation of this body. 
There is already ample evidence to 
warrant our deepest concern. Attacks 
on noncombatants and the carrying out 
of summary executions would be in 
violation of article 3 of the 1949 
Geneva conventions on humanitarian 
law in armed conflict. If condoned by 
government, they would violate obli- 
gations under the U.N. and OAS char- 
ters to promote universal respect for 



midway point of the U.N. Decade for 
Women. 

The General Assembly has re- 
peatedly expressed its concern about 
the treatment afforded to women within 
the Secretariat. One excuse frequently 
used is that the U.N.'s failure to make 
progress in increasing the employment 
and advancement of women in the Sec- 
retariat is due to the failure of member 
states to propose suitable women can- 
didates for employment. The United 
States and other governments have 
proposed qualified women candidates 
only to have them rejected by the Sec- 
retariat. We urge all governments to 
assist the Secretary General to remedy 
the current imbalance between men and 
women by nominating more qualified 
women candidates and by encouraging 
recruitment missions that go beyond 
the usual government apparatus. 

The United States believes, as the 
Joint Inspection Unit suggests, that 
steps should be taken to remedy the 
current imbalance. 



• The Secretary General and the 
executive heads of all specialized 
agencies should issue firm policy 
guidelines which would be designed to 
increase the number of women in 
senior positions in the Secretariat. 

• Affirmative action techniques 
should be employed to increase the 
number of women in international 
service and to assure, once they are 
employed, that they enjoy equal op- 
portunities to fully develop their pro- 
fessional capabilities. 

The United States believes that the 
Joint Inspection Unit should continue 
to play a role and recommends that the 
unit continue to monitor progress in 
carrying out the policy of this assem- 
bly. We suggest that the unit report 
again, perhaps to the General Assem- 
bly in 1980, thus providing ample time 
for the Secretariat to put these recom- 
mendations into practice. (Ambassador 
Andrew Young in Committee V on 
Oct. 13; USUN press release 93.) □ 



58 



Department of State Bulletin 



and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedom. 

We call upon the Inter-American 
Human Rights Commission and the 
Government of Nicaragua to agree to 
an early and expedited visit by the 
Commission to that country so that the 
Commission may promptly investigate 
the tragic events that have occurred and 
report its findings to this body. And we 
urge that this meeting of consultation 
maintain itself in existence at least until 
it has received the report of the Com- 
mission. 

Third, my government is deeply 
concerned at the regional implications 
of the situation in Nicaragua. We 
strongly support the initiative of the 
Permanent Council in dispatching a 
factfinding mission to the Costa 
Rican-Nicaraguan border. We hope 
that the mission will report to us soon 
from the affected area and that this 
meeting of consultation will ask the 
mission to continue monitoring events 
along the border. 

Fourth, in view of the wide gulf 
separating the Government of 
Nicaragua from the opposition groups, 
we believe special efforts are needed to 
help resolve the crisis. In particular, 
we believe the good offices of con- 
cerned governments should be offered. 
The United States is prepared to par- 
ticipate in such an effort. This ap- 
proach, in our view, offers the best 
hope for a peaceful and just solution. It 
would be our hope that through such an 
effort the Nicaraguan people them- 
selves could engage in a peaceful and 
democratic process that would result in 
an end to their suffering and resolve the 
issues that currently divide them so 
deeply. 

We believe it would be appropriate 
and highly desirable for this body to 
endorse such an effort and to call for its 
acceptance by both the Government of 
Nicaragua and opposition groups 
within Nicaraguan society. My gov- 
ernment believes that only an effort of 
this kind can end the bloodshed and 
violence and avoid a recurrence of in- 
ternational incidents such as those that 
have already occurred. 

In setting out my government's po- 
sition, I have sought to make clear our 
grave concern for the suffering of the 
people of Nicaragua and our hope for 
peace in the region. My government is 
prepared to cooperate fully with the 
other members of this Organization. 

To reiterate, my government urges 
an effective, urgent expression of con- 
cern by this body which would: 

• Support humanitarian relief to the 
people of Nicaragua who have been 



U.S.-BrazU Joint Group 
on Energy Technology 



Following is the joint communique 
issued on October 4, 1978, of the sec- 
ond meeting of the U.S. -Brazil Joint 
Group on Energy Technology held in 
Washington, D.C., October 2^, 1978. 

The U.S. -Brazil Joint Group on Energy Tech- 
nology met for the second time October 2-4 at 
the Departments of State and Energy in Wash- 
ington. DC. The first meeting of the Joint 
Group was in Brasilia, September 16-17, 1976, 
shortly after the group was established pursuant 
to the February 1976 Memorandum of Under- 
standing between the two governments to consult 
on matters of mutual interest. 

Minister Carlos Augusto de Proenca Rosa, 
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs of the 
Brazilian Ministry of External Relations, and 
Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, Assistant 
Secretary for Oceans and International Environ- 
mental and Scientific Affairs of the U.S. De- 
partment of State, co-chaired the meeting. 

This Joint Group meeting represents one effort 
among others by both countries to build upon a 
tradition of friendship and cooperation, to de- 
termine new areas where interests converge, and 
to forge new ties based on mutual benefit and 
shared objectives and goals. The meeting is the 
first step in the realization of the agreement be- 
tween Presidents Carter and Geisel, announced 
in their Joint Communique of March 30, 1978. 
to establish a program of cooperation in energy 
research and development as an expression of 
the interest both countries have in reducing their 
dependence on imported oil. 

The Joint Group discussed a program of coop- 



eration in the three energy technology fields 
specified by Presidents Carter and Geisel: 1) 
coal mining, processing and conversion, 2) pro- 
duction of alcohol from sugar and other agricul- 
tural products, and 3) industrial and transporta- 
tion conservation. Three technical working 
groups were formed in these respective fields to 
define possible projects and work out a detailed 
plan of action for approval by the Joint Group 
and the two governments. 

The cooperative program which the Joint 
Group agreed to includes exchanges of experts 
and information and meetings in the three fields 
of cooperation. However, in the biomass area, 
the program is designed to go beyond tradi- 
tional information exchange. It is intended to 
lead to identification of a joint project to design 
and construct one or more research and de- 
velopment facilities which incorporate the 
latest technology for conversion or utilization. 
The joint program of cooperation in fuels from 
biomass includes 1) participation by both sides 
in program reviews of current research de- 
velopment; 2) participation in design reviews 
of specific agreed upon projects; and 3) a for- 
malized exchange of information designed to 
coordinate the research programs of the two 
countries. 

The program in coal technology includes the 
possibility of testing Brazilian coals in the U.S. 
Solvent Refined Coal liquefaction process and 
Brazilian testing and analysis of U.S. -produced 
solvent refined coal. Information exchanges in 
coal mining, preparation and gasification were 
also agreed to. 

Finally, in the conservation field, coopera- 



affected by the fighting of the past sev- 
eral weeks and, as may be necessary, 
to the Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras 
and Costa Rica; 

• Support the mandate of the In- 
ter-American Human Rights Commis- 
sion and urge that it investigate forth- 
with the allegations of serious viola- 
tions in Nicaragua; 

• Support and extend the mandate of 
the factfinding mission in an effort to 
keep further violence from spilling 
across international borders; and 

• Urge the Government of Nicaragua 
and the opposition groups that have 
called for international conciliation to 
accept an offer of good offices to help 
find an enduring and democratic solu- 
tion. 

We have submitted a resolution em- 
bodying these proposals for considera- 
tion by this body. 



I know the concerns of my govern- 
ment are shared by all those govern- 
ments represented here today. I am 
sure that this meeting will produce a 
number of ideas, in addition to those I 
have presented, for ending the tragic 
suffering in Nicaragua and restoring 
peace to the region. We shall be eager 
to receive those ideas. 

The question before us was 
eloquently posed by Nicaraguan Arch- 
bishop Obando y Bravo: 

How now to contribute, with generosity, to 
the end of mourning and anguish, massacre and 
hatred, so that returned to the people of 
Nicaragua may be peace, civilized dialogue, the 
enthusiasm of participation in their history and 
the eternal happiness of living their own destiny. 

We believe that this organization 
must respond, promptly and compas- 
sionately, to this challenge. D 



January 1979 

tion will include information exchange, visits 
by experts, and participation in national pro- 
gram review meetings in the areas of transpor- 
tation conservation (electric and hybrid ve- 
hicles as well as heat engines and other aspects 
of highway vehicle systems) and industrial 
process conservation in manufacturing indus- 
tries including cement, pulp and paper, steel 
and aluminum, textiles and food processing. 

This program is a significant cooperative 
effort in a field of vital interest, which em- 
phasizes both nations' areas of advanced ex- 
pertise and ensures a two-way flow of benefits. 

The Joint Group agreed to meet annually to 
review the cooperative program and to formu- 
late programs for further cooperation. □ 



TREATIES: 

Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

International plant protection convention. Done 
at Rome Dec. 6. 1951. Entered into force 
Apr. 3, 1952; for the U.S. Aug. 18. 1972. 
TIAS 7465. 
Ratification deposited: Thailand. Aug. 16. 

1978. 
Accession deposited: Bangladesh, Sept. I, 

1978. 

Antarctica 

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of 
principles and objectives of the Antarctic 
treaty. Adopted at London Oct. 7, 1977. at 
the Ninth Consultative Meeting. 1 
Notifications of approval: Belgium. July 18. 
1978; New Zealand. Oct. 18, 1978; and 
South Africa, Nov. 17, 1978. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful sei- 
zure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 16, 
1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 1971. 
TIAS 7192. 
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg. Nov. 

22. 1978. 
Accession deposited: The Gambia. Nov. 28, 
1978. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at 
Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force 
Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Accession deposited: The Gambia, Nov. 28, 
1978. 

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text of 
the convention on international civil aviation 
(Chicago. 1944) (TIAS 1591). with annex. 
Done at Montreal Sept. 30, 1977. ' 
Signature: Upper Volta (subject to accept- 
ance). Nov. 27. 1978. 

Collisions 

Convention on the international regulations for 
preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with reg- 
ulations. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972. 
Enteftd into force July 15. 1977. TIAS 8587. 
Accession deposited: Senegal, Oct. 27, 
1978. 



Cultural Property 

Convention on the means of prohibiting and 
preventing the illicit import, export, and 
transfer of ownership of cultural property. 
Adopted at Paris Nov. 14, 1970. at the 16th 
session of the UNESCO General Conference. 
Entered into force April 24, 1972. : 
Ratification deposited: Italy, Oct. 2, 1978. 

Finance 

Agreement establishing the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development. Done at Rome 
June 13. 1976. Entered into force Nov. 30. 
1977. TIAS 8765. 

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, Nov. 16, 
1978. 

Human Rights 

International covenant on civil and political 
rights. Done at New York Dec. 16. 1966. 
Entered into force Mar. 23. 1976. 2 
Ratification deposited: Netherlands. Dec. 
11. 1978. 

International covenant on economic, social, 
and cultural rights. Done at New York Dec. 

16. 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. 2 
Accession deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, 

Dec. 8, 1978. 
Ratification deposited: Netherlands. Dec. 11, 
1978. 
International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development 

Articles of agreement for the international bank 
for reconstruction and development formu- 
lated at Bretton Woods Conference July 
1-22, 1944. Opened for signature at Wash- 
ington Dec. 27, 1945. Entered into force 
Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1502. 
Signature and acceptance: Cape Verde, 
Nov. 20, 1978. 

International Monetary Fund 

Articles of agreement of the international 
monetary fund, formulated at the Bretton 
Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Opened 
for signature at Washington Dec. 27, 1945. 
Entered into force Dec. 27. 1945. TIAS 
1501. 

Signatures and acceptances: Cape Verde, 
Nov. 20, 1978; Dominica, Dec. 12, 1978. 

Judicial Assistance 

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in 
civil or commercial matters. Done at The 
Hague March 18, 1970. Entered into force 
Oct. 7. 1972. TIAS 7444. 
Accession deposited: Singapore, Oct. 27, 
1978.' 

Maritime Matters 

Inter-American convention on facilitation of 
international waterborne transportation, with 
annex. Signed at Mar del Plata June 7. 
1963. 1 

Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic. 
Nov. 9, 1978. 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 
1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490), 
on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consul- 
tative Organization. Done at London Oct. 

17, 1974. Entered into force Apr. 1. 1978. 
TIAS 8606. 

Acceptance deposited: Ireland, Nov. 6, 
1978. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done 
at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force 
Aug. 16. 1976. 2 



59 

Ratifications deposited: Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic. Nov. 20. 1978; Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, Nov. 3, 
1978." 

Patents, Plant Varieties 

International convention for the protection of 
new varieties of plants of Dec. 2, 1961. as 
revised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978. 
Open for signature until Oct. 31, 1979. En- 
ters into force 1 month after not less than 
five instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
approval, or accession have been deposited 
by states parties to the 1961 convention. 

Phonograms 

Convention for the protection of producers of 
phonograms against unauthorized duplication 
of their phonograms. Done at Geneva Oct. 
29, 1971. Entered into force Apr. 18, 1973; 
for the U.S. Mar. 10, 1974. TIAS 7808. 
Notification from World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization that acceptance depos- 
ited: El Salvador. Nov. 9. 1978; Paraguay. 
Nov. 13, 1978. 

Property, Industrial 

Nice agreement concerning the international 
classification of goods and services for the 
purposes of the registration of marks of June 
15. 1957. as revised (TIAS 7418, 7419). 
Done at Geneva May 13, 1977. 
Ratifications deposited: Ireland. Oct. 31, 

1978; Sweden, Nov. 6. 1978. 
Enters into force: Feb. 6, 1979. 5 

Reciprocal Assistance — Inter- American 

Protocol of amendment to the Inter-American 
treaty of reciprocal assistance (Rio Pact). 
Done at San Jose July 26, 1975. ' 
Ratification deposited: Guatemala, Oct. 4. 
1978.' 

Refugees (Protocol) 

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. 
Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered 
into force Oct. 4. 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1. 
1968. TIAS 6577. 

Notification of succession: Suriname. Nov. 
29, 1978. 

South Pacific Commission 

Agreement establishing the South Pacific 
Commission. Signed at Canberra Feb. 6, 
1947. Entered into force July 29, 1948. TIAS 
2317. 

Accession deposited: Solomon Islands. Nov. 
21, 1978. 

Space 

Convention on registration of objects launched 
into outer space. Done at New York Jan. 14. 
1975. Entered into force Sept. 15, 1976. 
TIAS 8480. 

Ratification deposited: Poland. Nov. 22, 
1978. 

Trade 

Protocol extending the arrangement regarding 
international trade in textiles of Dec. 20, 
1973. Done at Geneva Dec. 14, 1977. En- 
tered into force Jan. 1, 1978. TIAS 8939. 
Ratifications deposited: Austria, June 23. 
1978; Canada, Oct. 24, 1978; 6 Switzer- 
land, Oct. 25, 1978. 
Acceptance deposited: Portugal on behalf of 

Macau, Nov. 16, 1978. 
Provisional accession: Bolivia. Oct. 31, 
1978. 



60 



War 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the protec- 
tion of victims of international armed con- 
flicts (Protocol I|, with annexes. Done at 
Geneva June 8, 1977. Enters into force Dec. 

7. 1978. 5 

Signatures: Cyprus, July 12, 1978; 
Madagascar, Oct. 13, 1978; Niger, June 
16, 1978; San Marino, June 22, 1978. 
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the protec- 
tion of victims of noninternational armed 
conflicts (Protocol II). Done at Geneva June 

8. 1977. Enters into force Dec. 7, 1978. 5 
Signatures: Madagascar, Oct. 13, 1978; 

Niger. June 16, 1978; San Marino, June 
22, 1978. 

Whaling 

Amendments to the schedule to the interna- 
tional convention for the regulation of whal- 
ing, 1946. Adopted at London June 26-30, 
1978. 
Entered into force: Oct. 20, 1978. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the 
wheat trade convention (part of the interna- 
tional wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington Apr. 26, 1978. Entered 
into force June 24, 1978, with respect to 
certain provisions, July 1, 1978, with respect 
to other provisions. 

Acceptance deposited: Japan, Nov. 15. 
1978. 

Protocol modifying and further extending the 
food aid convention (part of the international 
wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done 
at Washington Apr. 26, 1978. Entered into 
force June 24, 1978, with respect to certain 
provisions, July 1, 1978, with respect to 
other provisions. 

Acceptance deposited: Japan (with reserva- 
tion), Nov. 15, 1978. 

World Health Organization 

Amendment to Article 74 of the World Health 
Organization constitution, as amended [to 
add Arabic as an authentic text]. Adopted at 
Geneva May 18. 1978. Enters into force for 
all members when accepted by two-thirds of 
the members. 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the 
world cultural and natural heritage. Done at 
Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 
17, 1975. TIAS 8226. 

Ratification deposited: Libya, Oct. 13, 
1978. 

BILATERAL 

Bangladesh 

Agreement relating to investment guaranties, 
with related letters. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Dacca Jan. 17 and 20, 1975. Entered 
into force Oct. 30, 1978. 

Bulgaria 

Program of cultural, educational, scientific, 
and technological exchanges for 1979 and 
1980. Signed at Sofia Oct. 26. 1978. Entered 
into force Oct. 26, 1978, effective Jan. 1, 
1979. 

Canada 

Agreement on Great Lakes water quality, 1978, 
with annexes and terms of reference. Signed 



at Ottawa Nov. 22. 1978. Entered into force 
Nov. 22, 1978. 

China, Republic Of 

Memorandum of agreement relating to the pro- 
vision of flight inspection services. Signed at 
Washington and Taipei Aug. 21 and Oct. 1, 
1978. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1978. 

Egypt 

General agreement for technical cooperation 
under Point Four Program, and proces verbal 
of signature, as amended (TIAS 2479, 2986). 
Signed at Cairo May 5, 1951. Entered into 
force Aug. 15, 1951. TIAS 2479. 
Terminated: Oct. 15, 1978. 

Agreement relating to development assistance. 
with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Cairo Nov. 6. 1954. Entered into force Nov. 
6, 1954. TIAS 3156. 
Terminated: Oct. 15, 1978. 

Economic, technical, and related assistance 
agreement, with exchanges of notes. Signed 
at Cairo Aug. 16. 1978. Entered into force 
Oct. 15, 1978. 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of June 7, 
1974 (TIAS 7855), with agreed minutes. 
Signed at Cairo Nov. 8, 1978. Entered into 
force Nov. 8, 1978. 

Agreement on procedures for mutual assistance 
in connection with matters relating to the 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Signed 
at Washington Nov. 29, 1978. Entered into 
force Nov. 29, 1978. 

Germany, Federal Republic of 

Protocol amending the air transport agreement 
of July 7, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3536, 
6434), with understandings. Signed at 
Washington Nov. 1, 1978. Entered into force 
provisionally Nov. 1, 1978. 

Greece 

Arrangement for the exchange of technical in- 
formation and cooperation in nuclear safety 
matters, with addendum. Signed at Athens 
Oct. 18, 1978. Entered into force Oct. 18. 
1978. 

Hong Kong 

Understanding relating to trade in nonrubber 
footwear, with annexes. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Hong Kong Oct. 24, 
1978. Entered into force Oct. 24, 1978. 

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 8, 
1977, as amended (TIAS 8936), relating to 
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber 
textiles. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Hong Kong Nov. 13 and 24, 1978. Entered 
into force Nov. 24, 1978. 

Hungary 

Understanding concerning research cooperation 
in the field of transportation. Signed at 
Budapest Oct. 11. 1978. Entered into force 
Oct. 11, 1978. 

Agreement on tariff matters, with annexes and 
exchange of letters. Signed at Budapest Nov. 
18, 1978. Enters into force on the 30th day 
following the parties' written notification to 
each other that, upon successful conclusion 
of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, a satisfactory overall balance 
of concessions has been achieved between 
them. 

India 

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 
30, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9036), relating 



Department of State Bulletin 

to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber 
textiles and textile products. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Washington Nov. 10 and 
13. 1978. Entered into force Nov. 13. 1978. 

Indonesia 

Agreement for cooperation in scientific re- 
search and technological development, with 
exchange of letters. Signed at Washington 
Dec. 11, 1978. Enters into force on the date 
of the receipt of the note by which Indonesia 
communicates to the U.S. that the agreement 
has been approved in accordance with In- 
donesia's constitutional procedure. 

Israel 

Memorandum of understanding on education, 
with annex. Signed at Jerusalem Nov. 15, 
1978. Entered into force Nov. 15, 1978. 

Jordan 

Project loan agreement for Amman water and 
sewerage. Signed at Amman Aug. 28. 1978. 
Entered into force Aug. 28, 1978. 

Korea 

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting 
and protection of the right of priority on pat- 
ents. Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul 
Oct. 30. 1978. Entered into force Oct. 30, 
1978. 

Lebanon 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of Mar. 23, 1978. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Beirut Nov. 
24, 1978. Entered into force Nov. 24, 1978. 

Malaysia 

Agreement amending the agreement of May 17 
and June 8, 1978 relating to trade in cotton, 
wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile 
products. Effected by exchange of letters at 
New York and Washington Oct. 20 and Nov. 
29. 1978. Entered into force Nov. 29, 1978. 

Mexico 

Agreement amending the agreement of Nov. 9, 
1972, as amended (TIAS 7697, 8152, 8301, 
8412), concerning frequency modulation 
broadcasting in the 88 to 108 MHz band. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Tlatelolco 
and Mexico Mar. 20 and Nov. 9, 1978. En- 
tered into force Nov. 9. 1978. 

Agreement extending the agreement of June 23, 
1976 (TIAS 8533) on procedures for mutual 
assistance in the administration of justice in 
connection with the General Tire and Rubber 
Company and the Firestone Tire and Rubber 
Company matters to include the International 
Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) 
and its subsidiaries and affiliates. Effected 
by exchange of letters at Washington Nov. 
17 and Dec. 5, 1978. Entered into force Dec. 
5, 1978. 

Pakistan 

Agreement amending the loan agreement of 
Mar. 9. 1976, as amended Jan. 18, 1977, 
(TIAS 8547) relating to agricultural inputs. 
Signed at Islamabad Nov. 8, 1978. Entered 
into force Nov. 8. 1978. 

Portugal 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of Aug. 4, 1978. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon I 
Aug. 30. and 31. 1978. Entered into force I 
Aug. 31, 1978. 

Saudi Arabia 

Project agreement for technical cooperation in 



January 1979 

executive management development. Signed 
at Jeddah Nov. 18. 1978. Enters into force 
after the deposit by Saudi Arabia of the sum 
described in Article IX. 

Project agreement for technical cooperation in 
agricultural bank management and training, 
with annex. Signed at Jeddah Nov. 18, 1978. 
Enters into force after deposit by Saudi 
Arabia of the sum described in Article 8. 

Project agreement for technical cooperation in 
transportation, with annex. Signed at Jeddah 
Nov. 18, 1978. Enters into force upon de- 
posit by Saudi Arabia of the sum described in 
Article 9. 

Singapore 

Memorandum of agreement relating to the pro- 
vision of flight inspection services. Signed at 
Washington and Singapore Aug. 16 and Oct. 
25, 1978. Entered into force Oct. 25. 1978; 
effective Oct. 1. 1978. 

Thailand 

Agreement amending the agreement of Oct. 4. 
1978. relating to trade in cotton, wool, and 
manmade fiber textiles and textile products. 
Effected by exchange of letters at Bangkok 
Nov. 3 and 13, 1978. Entered into force 
Nov. 13. 1978. 

United Kingdom 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on estates of deceased per- 
sons and on gifts. Signed at London Oct. 19. 
1978. Enters into force 30 days following the 
date on which instruments of ratification are 
exchanged. 

Venezuela 

Agreement extending the agreement of May 31, 
1977 (TIAS 8623) on procedures for mutual 
assistance in connection with the Boeing 
Company matter to include the McDonnell 
Douglas Corporation. Effected by exchange 
of letters at Washington Dec. 6 and 8, 1978. 
Entered into force Dec. 8, 1978. D 



1 Not in force. 

: Not in force for the U.S. 

3 With reservations. 

4 With reservations and declarations. 

5 Not for the U.S. 

6 With declaration. 



PRESS RELEASES: 

Department of State 



November 15-December 17 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State. 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*428 11/15 Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee (SCO, Subcom- 
mittee on Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS), working 
group on life-saving 
appliances, Dec. 12, 13. 
and 14. 



*429 11/16 U.S., India amend textile *449 12/11 

agreement, Nov. 10 and 

13. 450 12/12 

*430 11/17 U.S. Organization for the 

International Telegraph 451 12/12 

and Telephone Consulta- 
tive Committee (CC1TT). 

study group 2, Dec. 7. *452 12/13 

*431 11/21 U.S., Consultative Shipping 

Group agreed record on *453 12/13 

their Nov. 15-17 meeting 

in London. 
*432 11/22 U.S., Canada sign revised *454 12/14 

Great Lakes water quality 

agreement, Nov. 22. 
*433 11/22 Advisory Committee on *455 12/14 

Transnational Enterprises, 

working group on restric- *456 12/14 

tive business practices. 

Dec. 8. *457 12/14 

434 11/22 Vance, Jamieson: news con- 
ference, Ottawa. 
*435 11/27 Program for the official visit t458 12/17 

of Tunisian Prime Minister 

Nouira, Nov. 28-Dec. 5. 

*436 11/27 SCC, SOLAS, working group 

on standards of training 

and watchkeeping, Dec. 

19. 
*437 11/29 State Department to open 

Houston passport agency, 

Dec. 14. 
*438 11/30 Foreign fishery allocations 

determined for 1979. 
*439 12/4 Amb. Warnke to address 

conference on U.S. secu- 
rity and the Soviet chal- 
lenge. Phoenix, Dec. 14. 
*440 12/5 U.S., Malaysia amend textile 

agreement, Oct. 20 and 

No. Date 

Nov. 29. 
*441 12/7 CCITT. study group 1, *93 10/13 

Jan. 4. 
*442 12/7 SCC, SOLAS, working group *94 10/17 

on safety of navigation, 

Jan. 3. 
*443 12/7 Amb. Warnke to address 

conference on U.S. secu- *95 10/18 

rity and the Soviet chal- 
lenge, Wilmington, Del., 96 10/19 

Dec. 15. 
*444 12/8 Vance: statement on the *97 10/19 

death of Golda Meir. 
*445 12/8 Vance: departure remarks. 

Andrews Air Force Base. *98 10/20 

446 12/9 Vance: address before the 

Royal Institute of Interna- *99 10/18 

tional Affairs, London. 
446A 12/11 Vance: question-and-answer 100 10/20 

session following London 

address. Dec. 9. 
*447 12/11 U.S. Organization for the 

International Radio Con- 101 10/20 

sultative Committee 

(CCIR), study group 7, 

Jan. 10. 102 10/20 

*448 12/11 Joint statement on U.S.- 
Finland civil aviation 

negotiations. 



61 

U.S.. Indonesia sign science 
and technology agreement. 

Christopher: news confer- 
ence. Brussels, Dec. 8. 

Final communique of the 
North Atlantic Council, 
Brussels, Dec. 8. 

Vance: news conference, 
Cairo. Dec. 11. 

Foreign policy conference on 
U.S. interests in the Mid- 
dle East, Boston, Jan. 25. 

U.S., Hong Kong amend 
bilateral textile agreement, 
Nov. 13 and 24. 

U.S., Thailand amend textile 
agreement, Nov. 3 and 18. 

Vance, Dayan: remarks to the 
press, Jerusalem, Dec. 13. 

Advisory Committee on the 
1979 World Administrative 
Radio Conference. Jan. 9. 

Vance: interview on NBC's 
"Meet the Press. " D 



*Not printed in the Bulletin. 
tTo be printed in a later issue. 



I/JS.I/JV. 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the 
United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, 
New York. N.Y. 10017. 



Subject 

Young: women in the U.N., 
Committee V. 

Petree: report of the Com- 
mittee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space. Spe- 
cial Political Committee. 

Hechinger: foreign economic 
interests. Committee IV. 

Fisher: arms control. Com- 
mittee I. 

Young: development and in- 
ternational economic coop- 
eration, plenary. 

Ribicoff: technical coopera- 
tion, Committee II. 

Graham: southern Africa, 
Committee IV. 

Joint South African Gov- 
ernment-Western five 
Foreign Ministers state- 
ment on Namibia, Pretoria. 

Western five Foreign Minis- 
ters statement on Namibia, 
Pretoria. 

Joint U.S. -U.K. statement is- 
sued at the State Depart- 
ment on Southern Rho- 
desia. 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



•103 10/23 

*104 10/24 

*105 10/25 

*106 10/26 

*107 10/30 

108 10/31 



•109 10/30 

* 1 10 11/2 
♦111 11/3 

* 1 12 11/3 
113 11/7 

•114 11/7 



*1 15 11/8 
*116 11/9 



Leonard, renewal of U.N. 
Emergency force. Security 
Council. 

U.S. contributes additional 
$9 million to UNRWA. 

Matteson: self-determination. 
Committee III. 

Momjian: self-determination. 
Committee III. 

Stahl: UNRWA, Special 
Political Committee 

Exchange of letters between 
Ambassador Young and 
Senator Ribicoff concern- 
ing the International Day 
of Solidarity with the 
Palestinian People. 

Morgenthau: social develop- 
ment. Committee III. 

Petree: nuclear energy, ple- 
nary. 

Mowle: foreign economic 
interests. Committee IV. 

Fisher: arms control. Com- 
mittee I. 

Hechinger: Southern Rho- 
desia. Committee IV. 

Stibravy: pledging confer- 
ence for development ac- 
tivities. 

Petree: Cyprus, UNGA. 

Petree: Cyprus, UNGA. □ 



* Not printed in the Bulletin. 



PUBLICATIONS 



1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume 
VIII— "The Far East: China" 1 

The Department of State released on 
August 11, 1978. "Foreign Relations 
of the United States," 1949, volume 
VIII. "The Far East: China." The 
"Foreign Relations" series has been 
published continuously since 1861 as 
the official record of American foreign 
policy. 

The volume presents 1,353 pages of 
previously unpublished documentation 
(much of it newly declassified) relating 
to the political and military situations 
in China, the question of extension of 
aid to the new regime in Peking, and 
the problems encountered by the 
American Embassy and consulates in 
areas occupied by Communist forces. 
The companion volume IX dealing with 
China was released in 1975. Volume 
VIII is the last of nine volumes to be 
published covering the year 1949, 
completing the record for that year. 

"Foreign Relations," 1949, volume 



VIII, was prepared in the Office of the 
Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Department of State. Copies of volume 
VIII (Department of State publication 
8886) may be obtained for $13.75 
(domestic postpaid). Checks or money 
orders should be sent to the U.S. Gov- 
ernment Book Store, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. □ 



'Press release 324. 



GPO Sales 



Publications may be ordered by catalog or 
slock number from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
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INDEX 



JANUARY 1979 
VOL. 79, No. 2022 

Arms Control 

Arms Control (Fisher) 52 

NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in Brussels 

(Christopher, final communique) 34 

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov 9 

and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8 

Question-and-Answer Session Following London 

Address ( Vance) 16 

The US -European Partnership (Vance) 12 

Brazil. US -Brazil Joint Group on Energy 

Technology (joint communique) 58 

Canada 

Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 1978 . . .23 

Secretary Vance Visits Canada (Jamieson. 

Vance) 21 

China 

1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume VIII — "The 

Far East: China" 62 

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9 

and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8 

Question-and-Answer Session Following London 

Address (Vance) 16 

U.S. Normalizes Relations With the People's 

Republic of China (Carter, joint communique. 

U.S. statement) 25 

Congress. U.S. Policy on Reprocessing of U.S.- 

Origin Nuclear Material (Nye) 44 

Cyprus. NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in 
Brussels (Christopher, final communiquel .34 

Cuba. President Carter's News Conferences of 
Nov. 9 and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8 

Department and Foreign Service. New State 
Department Liaison Office With U.S. State 
and Local Governments (White House an- 
nouncement) 24 

Developing Countries 

Multinational Corporations (foreign relations 
outline) 33 

The U.S. and the Third World: Partners or 
Plaintiffs (Newsom) 30 

Economics 

Multinational Corporations (foreign relations 
outline) 33 

The US -European Partnership (Vance) 12 

Egypt 

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9 
and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8 

Question-and-Answer Session Following London 
Address ( Vance) 16 

Secretary Vance's Middle East Visit 39 

Energy. U.S. -Brazil Joint Group on Energy 
Technology (joint communique) 58 

Environment. Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement 1978 23 

Europe 

NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in Brussels 
(Christopher, final communique) 34 

President Carter To Attend Guadeloupe Meet- 
ing 37 

The U.S. -European Partnership (Vance) 12 

Fisheries. Secretary Vance Visits Canada 
(Jamieson, Vance) 21 

Foreign Aid. The U.S. and the Third World: 
Partners or Plaintiffs (Newsom) 30 



Greece. NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in 

Brussels (Christopher, final communique) 34 

Human Rights 

Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Hu- 
manitarian Affairs Patricia M Derian (biographic 

data) 6 

Basic Human Rights Documents 4 

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and 

Week. 1978 (proclamation) 3 

30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights (Brzezinski. Carter, Derian, 

Vance) 1 

What's Wrong With the U.N and What's Right? 

(Maynes) 46 

Iran 

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9 

and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8 

Question-and Answer Session Following London 

Address (Vance) 16 

Israel 

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9 

and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8 

Question-and-Answer Session Following London 

Address ( Vance) 16 

Secretary Vance's Middle East Visit 39 

What's Wrong With the UN and What's Right? 

(Maynes) 46 

Japan. U.S. Policy on Reprocessing of U.S.- 

Origin Nuclear Material (Nye) 44 

Middle East 

NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in Brussels 

(Christopher, final communique) 34 

U.N. Committee on the Palestinian People 

(Ribicoff, Young) 50 

Military Affairs 

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9 

and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8 

The U.S. -European Partnership (Vance) 12 

Morocco 

Morocco — A Profile 38 

Visit of Moroccan King Hassan II (joint press 

statement) 38 

Namibia 

Namibia (Barton, text of resolution) 51 

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9 

and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8 

Secretary Vance Visits Canada (Jamieson, 

Vance) 21 

Narcotics. U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control 

(Carter) 53 

Nicaragua 

Nicaragua (Christopher) 57 

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9 

and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in Brussels 

(Christopher, final communique) 34 

The U.S. -European Partnership (Vance) 12 

Nuclear Policy 

The Role of Exports in U.S. Foreign Policy 

(Christopher) 27 

The U.S. Approach to Nonproliferation — Are 

We Making Progress? (Nye) 39 

U.S. Policy on Reprocessing of U.S. -Origin Nu- 
clear Material (Nye) 44 

Organization of American States. Nicaragua 

(Christopher) "57 

Presidential Documents 

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and 

Week, 1978 (proclamation) 3 

Constitutional Referendum in Spain 36 

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9 
and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8 



30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights I 

U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control 53 

U.S. Normalizes Relations With the People's 

Republic of China 25 

Visit of Moroccan King Hassan II 38 

Publications 

GPO Sales Publications 62 

1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume VIII— "The 

Far East: China" 62 

Refugees. 30th Anniversary of the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights (Brzezinski. 

Carter, Derian, Vance) I 

Romania 

NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in Brussels 

(Christopher, final communique) 34 

Question-and-Answer Session Following London 

Address (Vance) 16 

South Africa. U.S. Policy Toward South Africa 

(Lake), (g 

Southern Rhodesia 

Question-and-Answer Session Following London 

Address ( Vance) 16 

Secretary Vance Visits Canada (Jamieson. 

Vance) 21 

Spain. Constitutional Referendum in Spain 

(Carter) 36 

Trade 

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9 

and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8 

The Role of Exports in US Foreign Policy 

(Christopher) 27 

The U.S. and the Third World: Partners or 

Plaintiffs (Newsom) 30 

The U.S. -European Partnership (Vance) 12 

Treaties. Current Actions 59 

Turkey. NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in 

Brussels (Christopher, final communique) ... .34 
U.S.S.R. 
NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in Brussels 

(Christopher, final communique) 34 

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9 

and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8 

Question-and-Answer Session Following London 

Address (Vance) 16 

United Nations 

Arms Control (Fisher) 52 

Namibia (Barton, text of resolution) 51 

Summaries of U.S. Statements 55 

U.N. Committee on the Palestinian People 

(Ribicoff. Young) 50 

U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control (Carter) 53 

What's Wrong With the U.N. and What's Right? 

(Maynes) 46 



Name Index 

Barton. William H 51 

Brzezinski. Zbigniew 1 

Carter, President 1 , 3. 8. 25. 36. 53 

Christopher, Warren 27, 34, 57 

Derian. Patricia M 1 

Fisher. Adrian S 52 

Jamieson. Donald 21 

Lake. Anthony 18 

Maynes, Charles William 46 

Newsom, David D 30 

Nye, Joseph S , Jr 39, 44 

Ribicoff, Abraham A 50 

Vance, Secretary 1 , 12. 16. 21 

Young, Andrew 50 



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Department 



if of State im If J • 

bulletin 



February 1979 



he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 79 / Number 2023 




Department of State 

bulletin 

Volume 79 / Number 2023 / February 1979 



Cover Photos: 

President Carter 
Secretary Vance 
Richard C. Holbrooke 
Harold H. Saunders 
John E. Reinhardt 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
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foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
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developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include 
major addresses and news conferences 
of the President and the Secretary of 
State; statements made before congres- 
sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
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January 31, 1981. 

NOTE: Contents of this publication 
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Price: 

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Single copy- 
Si. 40 (domestic) $1.80 (foreign) 



CYRUS R. VANCE 

Secretary of State 

HODDING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 
Assistant Editor 



CONTENTS 



THE PRESIDENT 

1 State of the Union Address 

3 News Conference of January 17 

5 Trip to Mexico 

5 Interview of December 19 

THE SECRETARY 

7 News Conference of January 1 ] 

10 Visit to Europe 

11 Interview on "Meet the Press*' 

ARMS CONTROL 

12 Conventional Arms Transfers (Joint 

Communique) 



EAST ASIA 



14 



15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 



U.S. Role in East Asia's Stability (Sec- 
retary Wince. Secretary Blumenthal, 
Secretary Kreps, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski) 

President Carter's Message to Premier 
Hua Guofeng 

Premier Hua Guofeng's Message to 
President Carter 

President Carter's Message to Vice 
Premier Deng Xiaoping 

Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's Mes- 
sage to President Carter 

Secretary Vance's Message to Foreign 
Minister Huang Hua 

Foreign Minister Huang Hua's Message 
to Secretary Vance 

United States. People's Republic of 
China Celebrate Diplomatic Recog- 
nition (Chai Zemin, Vice President 
Mandate, Leonard Woodcock, Vice 
Premier Deng Xiaoping) 
23 Diplomatic Relations With the P.R.C. 
and Future Relations With Taiwan 

President Carter's Memorandum Re- 
garding Relations With the People on 
Taiwan 

Taiwan — The Mutual Defense Treaty 
f White House Fact Sheet) 

Economic and Commercial Relation- 
ships With Taiwan (Foreign Rela- 
tions Outline) 

Taiwan — A Profile 

U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan (Foreign 
Relations Outline) 

Korea and the United States — The Era 
Ahead (Richard C. Holbrooke) 

U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of 
Korea William H. Gleysteen, Jr. 
(Biographic Data) 

Republic of Korea — A Profile 

ECONOMICS 



24 



25 



27 



27 
28 

29 

31 



32 



34 International Trade Agreements (Mes- 
sage from President Carter) 

34 President Carter Meets With President 
of the Commission of European 
Communities (White House State- 
ment) 



EDUCATIONAL AFFAIRS 

35 Hubert H. Humphrey North-South 
Scholarship Program (President 
Carter) 

ENERGY 

35 OPEC Price Increase (White House 

Statement) 

EUROPE 

36 President Carter Attends Guadeloupe 

Meeting {President Ciscard d' Es- 
taing, Prime Minister Callaghan, 
President Carter, Chancellor 
Schmidt) 
38 U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union 
40 Implementing the CSCE Final Act 
( Memorandum from President Car- 
ter) 

43 Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction 

Talks (Foreign Relations Outline) 

44 Tenth Report on Cyprus (President 

Carter) 

MIDDLE EAST 

45 The Situation in Iran and Its Implica- 

tions (Harold H. Saunders) 

47 Letters of Credence (Israel, Lebanon) 

48 Visit of Tunisian Prime Minister 

Nouria (Joint Communique) 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 

49 Arms Transfer Levels (President Car- 



ter) 



UNITED NATIONS 



2 



50 The Challenge for Communications 
Development (John E. Reinhardt) 

54 UNESCO Declaration on the Mass 

Media (Declaration, Department 
Statement) 

55 Arms Control (James P. Pearson) 

57 U.S. Participation in the U.N.. 1977 

( Message from President Carter) 
57 Peacekeeping (John W . Hechinger) 

59 Human Rights (Andrew Young) 

60 Namibia (Donald F . Mc Henry) 

61 Apartheid (James F . Leonard) 

62 Palestinian Question (Abraham A. 

Ribicoff, Andrew Young) 

63 Occupied Territories (Angelique O. 

Stahl) 

64 Assistance to Palestinians (Angelique 

O. Stahl) 

TREATIES 

65 Current Actions 

66 PRESS RELEASES 
INDEX 



China and Mexico in next month's 
BULLETIN: 




China 

Material relating to Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping' s visit to the 
United States including: 

• Remarks made on various occasions while in Washington; 

• Itinerary highlights of the Vice Premier's stops in U.S. cities; 

• Profile on the P.R.C. with maps; 

• Economic data on the P.R.C; 

• List of P.R.C. officials; 

• Outline on U.S. -P.R.C. economic relations. 





# 





Mexico 

Documentation on President Carter's mid-February visit to Mexico 
including: 

• Address before a joint session of the Mexican Congress; 

• Profile on Mexico with map; 

• Economic data on Mexico. 



THE PRESIDENT: State of the Union (Excerpts) 



Address before a joint session of the 
Congress on January 23, 1979. ' 

Tonight I want to examine in a broad 
sense the state of our American 
Union — how we are building a new 
foundation for a peaceful and prosper- 
ous world. 

Our children born this year will 
come of age in the 21st century. What 
kind of society, what kind of world are 
we building for them? Will we our- 
selves be at peace? Will our own chil- 
dren enjoy a better quality of life? Will 
a strong and united America still be a 
force for freedom and prosperity 
around the world? 

Tonight, there is every sign that the 
state of our Union is sound. Our econ- 
omy offers greater prosperity to more 
of our people than ever before. Real 
per capita income and real business 
profits have risen substantially. Farm 
exports are setting all-time records, and 
farm income last year was up more 
than 25%. Our liberties are secure. Our 
military defenses are strong and grow- 
ing stronger. And more importantly to- 
night. America is at peace. 

Our earliest national commitments 
modified and reshaped by succeeding 
generations have served us well. But 
the problems we face today are differ- 
ent in nature from those that confronted 
earlier generations of Americans. They 
are more subtle, more complex, more 
interrelated. At home, few of these 
problems can be solved by government 
alone. Abroad, few of them can be 
solved by the United States alone. 

But Americans as a united 
people — working with our allies and 
friends — have never been afraid to face 
and to solve problems either here or 
abroad. The challenge to us is to build 
a new and firmer foundation for the 
future — for a sound economy, for a 
more effective government, for politi- 
cal trust, and for a stable peace — so 
that the America our children inherit 
will be even stronger and better than 
our own. We cannot resort to simplistic 
or extreme solutions which substitute 
myths for common sense. 



Global Cooperation 

A strong economy and an effective 
government will restore confidence 
here in America. But the path to the 
future must be charted in peace. We 



must continue to build a new and firm 
foundation for a stable world commu- 
nity. 

We are building that new foundation 
from a position of national 
strength — the strength of our own de- 
fenses, of our friendship with other na- 
tions, and of our oldest ideals. 
America's military power is a major 
force for security and stability in the 
world. We must maintain our strategic 
capability and continue the progress of 
the last 2 years with our NATO allies, 
with whom we have increased our 
readiness, modernized our equipment, 
and strengthened our defense forces in 
Europe. I urge you to support the 
strong defense budget I have proposed. 

But national security in our age re- 
quires more than military might. In less 
than a lifetime, world population has 
doubled; colonial empires have disap- 
peared; and 100 new nations have been 
born. Mass communications, literacy, 
and migration to the world's cities have 
all awakened new yearnings for eco- 
nomic justice and human rights among 
people everywhere. 

In such a world, the choice is not 
which superpower will dominate the 
world. None can and none will. The 
choice instead is between a world of 
anarchy and destruction, or a world of 
cooperation and peace. 

In such a world, we seek not to stifle 
inevitable change, but to influence its 
course in helpful and constructive ways 
that enhance our values, our national 
interests, and the cause of peace. 

Towering over all this volatile 
changing world, like a thundercloud in 
a summer sky, looms the awesome 
power of nuclear weapons. We will 
continue to help shape the forces of 
change; to anticipate emerging prob- 
lems of nuclear proliferation and of 
conventional arms sales; and to use our 
great strength and influence to settle 
international conflicts in other parts of 
the world before they erupt and spread. 
We have no desire to be the world's 
policeman. America does want to be 
the world's peacemaker. 

We are building the foundation for 
truly global cooperation — not only 
with Western and industrial nations, 
but with the developing countries as 
well. Our ties with Japan and our 
European allies are stronger than 
ever — and so are our friendly relations 
with the people of Latin America, Af- 
rica, and the Western Pacific and Asia. 



We have won new respect in this 
hemisphere with the Panama Canal 
treaties. We have gained new trust 
within the developing world through 
our opposition to racism, our commit- 
ment to human rights, and our support 
for majority rule in Africa. 

The multilateral trade negotiations 
are now reaching a successful conclu- 
sion, and congressional approval is es- 
sential to the economic well-being of 
our country and of the world. This will 
be one of our top priorities in 1979. 

We are entering a hopeful era in our 
relations with one-fourth of the world's 
people who live in China. The visit of 
Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping next 
week will help to inaugurate that new 
era. And with prompt congressional 
action on authorizing legislation, we 
will continue our commitment to a 
prosperous, peaceful, and secure life 
for the people of Taiwan. 

I am grateful that in the past 
year — as in the year before — no 
American had died in combat anywhere 
in the world. And in Iran, Nicaragua, 
Cyprus, Namibia, and Rhodesia, our 
country is working for peaceful solu- 
tions to dangerous conflicts. 

In the Middle East — under most dif- 
ficult circumstances — we have sought 
to help ancient enemies lay aside 
deep-seated differences that have pro- 
duced four bitter wars in this century. 
Our firm commitment to Israel's sur- 
vival and security is rooted in our 
deepest convictions and in our knowl- 
edge of the strategic importance to our 
own nation of a stable Middle East. To 
promote peace and reconciliation in the 
region, we must retain the trust and 
confidence both of Israel and of the 
Arab nations that are sincerely search- 
ing for peace. I am determined to use 
the full beneficial influence of our na- 
tion so that the precious opportunity for 
lasting peace between Israel and Egypt 
will not be lost. 

SALT II 

The new foundation of international 
cooperation we seek excludes no na- 
tion. Cooperation with the Soviet 
Union serves the cause of peace, for in 
the nuclear age, world peace must in- 
clude peace between the super- 
powers — and it must mean the control 
of nuclear arms. 

Ten years ago, the United States and 
the Soviet Union made the historic de- 



Department of State Bulletin 



cision to open the Strategic Arms Lim- 
itation Talks, or SALT. The purpose of 
SALT, then as now, is not to gain a 
unilateral advantage for either nation 
but to protect the security of both na- 
tions, to reverse the costly and danger- 
ous momentum of the arms race, to 
preserve a stable balance of nuclear 
forces, and to demonstrate to a con- 
cerned world that we are determined to 
help preserve the peace. 

The first SALT agreement was con- 
cluded in 1972. Since then, during 6 
years of negotiation — by both Republi- 
can and Democratic leaders — nearly all 
issues of SALT II have been resolved. 
If the Soviet Union continues to 
negotiate in good faith, a responsible 
agreement will be reached. 

It is important that the American 
people understand the nature of the 
SALT process. SALT II is not based on 
sentiment. It is based on self- 
interest — of the United States and the 
Soviet Union. Both nations share a 
powerful common interest in reducing 
the threat of a nuclear war. I will sign 
no agreement which does not enhance 
our national security. 

SALT II will not rely on trust. It will 
be verifiable. We have very sophisti- 
cated, proven means — including our 
satellites — to determine for ourselves 
whether the Soviet Union is meeting its 
treaty obligations. I will sign no 
agreement which cannot be verified. 

The American nuclear deterrent will 
remain strong after SALT II. For 
example, just one of our relatively in- 
vulnerable Poseidon submarines — less 
than 27c of our total nuclear force of 
submarines, aircraft, and land-based 
missiles — carries enough warheads to 
destroy every large and medium-sized 
city in the Soviet Union. Our deterrent 
is overwhelming — and I will sign no 
agreement unless our deterrent force 
will remain overwhelming. 

A SALT agreement cannot substitute 
for wise diplomacy or a strong defense. 



nor will it end the danger of nuclear 
war. But it will certainly reduce that 
danger. It will strengthen our efforts to 
ban nuclear tests and to stop the spread 
of atomic weapons to other nations. 
And it can begin the process of 
negotiating new agreements which will 
further limit nuclear arms. 

The path of arms control backed by a 
strong defense — the path our nation 
and every President has walked for 30 
years — can lead to a world of law and 
of international negotiation and con- 
sultation, in which all peoples might 
live in peace. 

In this year, 1979, nothing is more 
important than that the Congress and 
the people of the United States resolve 
to continue with me on that path of nu- 
clear arms control and peace. I have 
outlined some of the changes that have 
transformed the world and which are 
continuing as we meet here tonight. 
But we need not fear change. The val- 
ues on which our nation was 
founded — individual liberty, self- 
determination, the potential for human 
fulfillment in freedom — all of these 
endure. We find these democratic prin- 
ciples praised even in books smuggled 
out of totalitarian nations and on wall 
posters in lands we thought were closed 
to our influence. 



Human Rights 

Our country has regained its special 
place of leadership in the worldwide 
struggle for human rights. And that is a 
commitment we must keep at home, as 
well as abroad. The civil rights revolu- 
tion freed all Americans, black and 
white, but its full promise remains un- 
realized. I will continue to work with 
all my strength for equal opportunity 
for all Americans and for affirmative 
action for those who carry the extra 
burden of past denial of equal opportu- 
nity. We remain committed to improv- 
ing our labor laws to better protect the 



rights of all American workers. And 
bur nation must make it clear that the 
legal rights of women as citizens are 
guaranteed under the laws of our land 
by ratifying the equal rights amend- 
ment. 

As long as I am President, at home 
and around the world, America's 
example and America's influence will 
be marshalled to advance the cause of 
human rights. To establish those val- 
ues, two centuries ago a bold genera- 
tion of Americans risked their prop- 
erty, position, and life itself. 

We are their heirs. And they are 
sending us a message across the cen- 
turies. The words they made so vivid 
are now growing faintly indistinct, be- 
cause they are not heard often enough. 
They are words like justice, equality, 
unity, sacrifice, liberty, faith, and 
love. 

These words remind us that the duty 
of our generation of Americans is to 
renew our nation's faith — not focused 
just against foreign threats, but against 
selfishness, cynicism, and apathy. 

The new foundation I have discussed 
tonight can help us build a nation and a 
world where every child is nurtured 
and can look to the future with hope; 
where the resources now wasted on war 
can be turned toward human needs; 
where all people have enough to eat, a 
decent home, and protection from dis- 
ease. It can help us build a nation and a 
world where all people are free to seek 
the truth and to add to human under- 
standing, so that all of us may live our 
lives in peace. 

Tonight I ask you to join me in 
building that new foundation — a better 
foundation — for our country and our 
world. □ 



'Text as prepared for delivery from White 
House press release of Jan. 23. 1979; for com- 
plete text as delivered, see Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of Jan. 29. 



;bruary 1979 



News Conference of 
January 17 (Excerpts) 



Q. What will the posture of our 
government be now toward the vari- 
ous contending factions in Iran that 
even continue to vie for power over 
there? 

A. We have very important relation- 
ships with Iran — past, present, and I 
hope in the future. And I expect in the 
future. They have been good allies of 
ours and I expect this to continue in the 
future. 

In accordance with the provisions of 
the Iranian Constitution, a change in 
government has now been accom- 
plished. Under Mr. [Prime Minister 
Shapour] Bakhtiar, whose government 
we do support; the Majlis, the lower 
house of Parliament; and the upper 
house, the Senate, have approved his 
government and his Cabinet. 

We have encouraged to the limited 
extent of our own ability the public 
support for the Bakhtiar government, 
for the restoration of stability, for an 
end of bloodshed and for the return of 
normal life in Iran. 

As you know, the Shah has left Iran 
[on January 16, 1979]; he says for a 
vacation. How long he will be out of 
Iran, we have no way to determine. 
Future events and his own desires will 
determine that. He's now in Egypt, and 
he will later come to our own country. 
But we would anticipate and would 
certainly hope that our good relation- 
ships with Iran will continue in the fu- 
ture. 

Q. A month ago, at a news confer- 
ence, you said the Shah would 
maintain power. How could you be so 
wrong and is it typical of our intelli- 
gence elsewhere in the world? And 
are you in touch with [Ayatpllah 
Ruohollah] Khomeini [prominent 
Shi'a religious leader] in case he 
winds up at the top of the heap? 

A. It is impossible for anyone to an- 
ticipate all future political events. And 
I think that the rapid change of affairs 
in Iran has not been predicted by any- 
one so far as I know. 

Our intelligence is the best we can 
devise. We share intelligence data and 
diplomatic information on a routine 
basis with other nations. And this is a 
constant process whenever a problem 
arises in a country throughout the 
world. I have confidence in the Iranian 
people to restore a stable government 



and to restore their economic circum- 
stances for the future. 

No. we have not communicated di- 
rectly with Mr. Khomeini. Our views 
have been expressed publicly that he 
support stability and an end to 
bloodshed in Iran. And no matter what 
his deep religious convictions might 
be — and I don't doubt their sin- 
cerity — that he permit the government 
that has now been established by the 
legal authorities in Iran and under the 
constitution to have a chance to suc- 
ceed. We do know that the Iranian 
military and many of the religious and 
political opponents to the Shah have 
given their pledge of support to the 
Bakhtiar government. And that's our 
hope. 

And I would like to add one other 
thing. We have no intention, neither 
ability nor desire, to interfere in the 
internal affairs of Iran, and we cer- 
tainly have no intention of permitting 
other nations to interfere in the internal 
affairs of Iran. 

Q. If we had had better intelli- 
gence in Iran, is there anything that 
we could have done to save the Shah? 
And there's a second part to that 
question. You just referred to Iran as 
allies. Would you authorize new 
weapons shipments to the Bakhtiar 
regime? 

A. Even if we had been able to an- 
ticipate events that were going to take 
place in Iran or other countries, ob- 
viously our ability to determine those 
events is very limited. The Shah, his 
advisers, great military capabilities, 
police, and others, couldn't completely 
prevent rioting and disturbances in 
Iran. 

Certainly we have no desire nor 
ability to intrude massive forces into 
Iran or any other country to determine 
the outcome of domestic political is- 
sues. This is something that we have no 
intention of ever doing in another 
country. We've tried this once in Viet- 
nam. It didn't work well, as you well 
know. 

We have some existing contracts for 
delivery of weapons to Iran since 
sometimes the deliveries take as long 
as 5 years after the orders are placed. 
Our foreign military sales policy is now 
being continued. We have no way to 
know what the attitude of the Bakhtiar 
government is. We've not discussed 
this with them. 



After the Iranian Government is sta- 
ble, after it assuages the present disturb- 
ances in Iran, then I'm sure they'll let 
us know how they want to carry out 
future military needs of their own 
country. It is important to Iran, for 
their own security and for the inde- 
pendence of the people of Iran, that a 
strong and stable military be main- 
tained, and I believe that all the leaders 
of Iran, whom I have heard discuss this 
matter, agree with the statement that 
I've just made. 

Q. There is a suggestion that if 
Iranian oil supplies do not begin 
flowing again, perhaps within 2 
months, there may be a shortage and 
perhaps a price increase for us. Does 
our intelligence indicate that might 
happen, or is there such a prospect 
as you see it? 

A. We derive about 57c of our oil 
supplies from Iran in recent months — 
much less than many other countries, 
as you know, who are more heavily 
dependent on Iranian oil. I think an 
extended interruption of Iranian oil 
shipments would certainly create in- 
creasingly severe shortages on the in- 
ternational market. 

So far, other oil-producing nations 
have moved to replace the lost Iranian 
oil supplies. If this should continue, it 
would just reemphasize the basic com- 
mitment that our nation has tried to 
carry out in the last 2 years. That is, to 
have a predictable energy policy to re- 
duce consumption of energy in toto, 
certainly to reduce dependence on 
foreign oil and to eliminate waste of 
oil. 

I don't think there's any doubt that 
we can cut back consumption of oil by 
5% without seriously damaging our 
own economy. And I would hope that 
all Americans who listen to my voice 
now would do everything possible 
within their own capabilities to cut 
down on the use of oil and the waste of 
all energy supplies. 

I think that this restoration of Iranian 
oil shipments is a desire by all the reli- 
gious and political leaders in Iran who 
have an influence over the future. We 
have seen, since the OPEC [Organiza- 
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries] 
price increases, even before the Iranian 
supplies were interrupted, some short- 
age of spot shipments of oil. 

The present price of oil even with in- 
creased production from other suppliers 
is now slightly above the established 
OPEC price. But our hope is that oil 
prices will go down at least to some 
degree as Iranian supplies are rein- 
troduced. 



Q. On your negotiations with 
China over normalization of diplo- 
matic relations, did you at any point 
ask the Chinese to provide a binding 
written pledge that they would not 
try to seize Taiwan by force? And if 
you did request that, why didn't you 
get it? And if you didn't, why didn't 
you ask for it? [Laughter] 

A. Yes. One of our goals in the negoti- 
ation was to get a public commitment 
on the part of China that the differences 
with Taiwan would be resolved peace- 
fully. This was not possible to achieve. 
The final outcome of that was that we 
would make a unilateral statement that 
we expect any differences between 
Taiwan and China to be resolved 
peacefully, and the agreement was that 
the leaders in China would not con- 
tradict that statement. 

Since the announcement of normali- 
zation. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping 
and others have made public comments 
that substantiate the statement that I 
have made. 

It's a matter internally for the 
Chinese to resolve, but I think Mr. 
Deng has made several statements 
saying that it ought to be resolved 
peacefully. 

We were also insistent upon the fact 
that the treaty between us and Taiwan 
would not be peremptorily or im- 
mediately canceled or abrogated. The 
treaty will be terminated in accordance 
with its own provisions with a 1-year 
notice to Taiwan. The Chinese did not 
agree with this originally but they fi- 
nally accepted that fact. 

Another insistence that we had, 
which was finally agreed to, was that 
we would go ahead with normal trade, 
cultural relationships with Taiwan, and 
also that existing treaties other than the 
defense treaty would continue in effect. 

One point on which we did not agree 
with the Chinese was that we will, after 
this year, continue to sell defensive 
weapons to Taiwan, to provide for their 
security needs. The Chinese leaders do 
not agree with this policy, but they un- 
derstand that is is our policy and, 
knowing that, they went ahead with 
normalization. So there were some 
differences between us, but I think this 
is one of the major achievements for 
peace in the world, and particularly to 
cement our relationship with the na- 
tions in the Western Pacific. And I 
think we had a very good outcome for 
the long negotiations. 

Q. Next month you are going to 
meet, supposedly, with the Prime 
Minister of Thailand [Gen. 
Kriangsak Chamanan] who is the 
head of a nation that is now 
threatened by the Vietnamese. I need 



to know two things, if you could. 
One, what is the U.S. prepared to 
offer Thailand to ease their concerns 
about the Vietnamese? Will it be 
money, economic aid, military 
weapons, or American-piloted air- 
craft? Number two, have you per- 
sonally been in touch with the leaders 
of China and the Soviet Union to see 
what they plan to do to help ease the 
situation? 

A. We are very interested in seeing 
the integrity of Thailand protected, the 
borders not endangered or even 
threatened by the insurgent troops from 
Vietnam in Cambodia. We have joined 
in with almost all other nations of the 
world in the United Nations in con- 
demning the intrusion into Cambodia 
by Vietnamese forces. 

This obviously involves the adjacent 
country of Thailand. Mr. Kriangsak 
will be coming here to visit with me, 
and during that time, we will reassure 
him that our interests are in a stable 
and secure and peaceful Thailand. 

We have continuing trade relation- 
ships with Thailand. We provide them 
with some military arms for defensive 
purposes, as have been negotiated for a 
long period of time. We don't detect 
any immediate threat to the borders of 
Thailand. In some instances, the in- 
vading forces into Cambodia have de- 
liberately stayed away from the border 
itself and of course the Chinese give 
Thailand very strong support. 

The Soviet Union has expressed their 
support for Vietnam, as you know. 
And in our efforts, along with others in 
the United Nations, we have warned 
both the Vietnamese and also the 
Soviets who supply them and who sup- 
port them against any danger that they 
might exhibit toward Thailand. 

Q. You have invited former Presi- 
dent Richard Nixon to the White 
House for the dinner for Chinese 
leader Deng Xiaoping. During your 
campaign, you said Mr. Nixon had 
disgraced this country, and about a 
year ago you said that you thought 
he had indeed committed impeach- 
able offenses. Why are you honoring 
him in this way now? 

A. As you know, the consequences 
of the Watergate actions by President 
Nixon have already been determined by 
the Congress and by the actions of Mr. 
Nixon himself, having been pardoned 
by President Ford. 

In preparing for the upcoming visit 
by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, I felt 
that it was a fair thing and a proper 
thing to invite both President Nixon 
and President Ford to the White House 
for the banquet at which Mr. Deng will 
be honored. 



Department of State Bulletin 

As you know, as President, one of 
the major achievements of President 
Nixon was to open up an avenue of 
communications and consultation and 
negotiation with the Chinese which re- 
sulted ultimately in normal relation- 
ships. 

I think it's entirely proper that he be 
there. In addition to that, the Chinese 
officials, including Vice Premier Deng 
himself, had asked for an opportunity 
to meet with President Nixon and to 
express their thanks personally to him 
for the role he played in opening up 
Chinese-U.S. relationships. 

So I have no apology to make. I 
think it was a proper thing to do and 
I'm very pleased that President Nixon 
has accepted our invitation. 

Q. Do you see any danger of our 
losing our intelligence listening posts 
in Iran? And if we do lose those posts 
will we have enough back-up capa- 
bility so that you can assure Con- 
gress that we can verify a new SALT 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] 
agreement if you get one? 

A. There is obviously, in any coun- 
try where we have intelligence sources, 
a danger for those sources to be mod- 
ified or lost. We had this occur, as you 
know, a few years ago in Turkey when 
we had an embargo against the sale of 
military weapons to Turkey. And this 
has happened from time to time in an 
evolutionary way. 

We have constantly been able and 
determined to provide increasing capa- 
bility for surveillance which would 
allow us to compensate for those 
changes that are inevitable in any 
changing society. 

So I can assure the public and the 
Congress that no matter what happens 
to the specific intelligence sources in 
Iran, we can adequately compensate for 
their change and provide adequate ver- 
ification for the compliance by the 
Soviet Union with SALT agreements. 

Q. There seem to be a lot of people 
who think that the Soviets now are 
gaining a military edge over us. 

A. Yes. 

Q. Now, isn't this perception basic 
to the problem of getting a SALT 
treaty ratified? 

A. I don't think the perception is ac- 
curate. I think that militarily, we are 
certainly equal to or superior to the 
Soviet Union in our own capability. 
Certainly in addition to that, we have 
harmony with our neighbors, which the 
Soviet Union lacks. And our allies are 
free and independent and tied to us 
philosophically, with a deep commit- 



February 1979 

merit, as is the case with NATO and 
other alliances. 

The Soviets can't match that depend- 
ability and independence among their 
allies. Economically, politically. I 
think our systems are superior to the 
Soviet Union. There is no doubt, how- 
ever, that the approval of the SALT 
treaty by the American people and by 
the Congress will certainly be influ- 
enced by perceptions that we are in- 
deed now and we will indeed in the 
future be secure and that our military 
strength and capability in its totality 
will be adequate to meet any Soviet 
threat, and there is no doubt that we 
will be able to meet any such threat now 
or in the future. 

Q. Following up again on China, 
shortly after your announcement last 
month, you said in a television inter- 
view that [Soviet] President 
Brezhnev's response in a private mes- 
sage to you had been positive. 

A. Yes. 

Q. TASS then took issue with you 
and this week in an interview pub- 
lished in Time , Mr. Brezhnev said that 
it was like playing with Fire to encour- 
age China's militancy. In view of these 
statements, do you still feel that the 
Kremlin is positive about your China 
policy? 

A. I have reread the original dispatch 
that I got from President Brezhnev and 
I've also read the TASS statements and 
happen to have read last night the inter- 
view with President Brezhnev in Time. I 
think my interpretation of Brezhnev's 
original statement was accurate. He did 
point out the fact that they had relation- 
ships with China that could be contribu- 
tory to peace. He expressed in his origi- 
nal statement a desire or an intention to 
monitor future relationships between our- 
selves and China, and expressed some 
concern about a possibility of our using 
this new relationship against the Soviet 
Union. 

This is not our intention; we never in- 
tend to use our improved relationships 
with China against the Soviet Union or 
the relationships with the Soviet Union, 
which I hope to improve, as a factor to 
endanger or to threaten China. So that 
was a proviso put in his first dispatch. 
But I think still in balance it was con- 
structive. It was certainly constructive 
and positive compared to the anticipation 
that I had from the Soviet Union. 



Q. With Iran off line now on oil 
production, and your worrying about 
spot shortages, there are a lot of sci- 
entists who see Saudi Arabia down 



there and Mexico. Yet we seem to be 
turning our back on natural gas pro- 
duction in Mexico; some question 
about whether they want to have sub- 
stantial gas in the American market. 
How do you reconcile that? 

A. We are very interested in Mexican 
oil and natural gas to be purchased by 
our own nation. The decisions, however, 
on how rapidly to produce and to market 
their oil and natural gas is a decision to 
be made by Mexico. They are under- 
standably very independent in this re- 
spect and we would not try to encroach 
on their independence nor try to encour- 
age them to more rapidly produce gas and 
oil than they themselves desire. 

We have immediate needs and also 
long-range needs, sometimes not quite 
the same. In the immediate future, the 
next few months, there is no urgency 
about acquiring Mexican natural gas. We 
have at this moment a surplus of natural 
gas in our own country and the state- 
ments made by the Secretary of Energy 
[James R. Schlesinger] were related to 
that fact. 

He has encouraged large users of oil 
and gas to use gas instead of oil, but, for 
instance, new power plants to be built in 
the future have to be designed to use 
coal. And we also have the problem of 
using efficiently gas produced in the 48 
States of our country and in the future 
how to bring the natural gas that is avail- 
able from Alaska down through Canada 
to our nation. It's a very complicated 
thing. And when I go to Mexico next 
February, this will obviously be one of 
the matters that I will discuss. 

But I'm not going down there to 
negotiate the price of natural gas. We'll 
be talking, myself and President Lopez 
Portillo, more on long-range strategic 
approaches on how we might best pro- 
vide a good market for Mexican oil and 
gas that they want to sell to us. □ 



For full text see Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Jan. 22, 1979. p. 50. 



President Carter's 
Trip 



The White House announced on 
November 13, 1978, that the President 
had accepted the invitation of President 
Lopez Portillo to visit Mexico February 
14-16, 1979. Material relating to this 
visit will be published in the March 
1979 Bulletin. □ 



interview 
of December 19 



On December 19, 1978, President 
Carter was interviewed by Walter 
Cronkite of the Columbia Broadcasting 
System for later broadcast on the CBS 
television network. ' 

Q. We have no commitment from 
Peking [now Beijing] that it will not 
use force to take Taiwan. Secretary 
of State Vance has said only that we 
have the expectation that it will not. 
But if the present Peking govern- 
ment or some future Peking govern- 
ment tried to reunify Taiwan by 
force, would we feel free to use force 
to help Taiwan resist? 

A. In the first place, the People's 
Republic of China does not have the 
capability of launching a 120-mile at- 
tack across the ocean against Taiwan, 
who are heavily fortified and also 
heavily armed. And we have made it 
clear to the People's Republic that after 
this year, when the treaty does 
expire — this coming year — that we will 
sell to Taiwan defensive weapons. 

I think it is accurate to say also that 
the major interest that the People's Re- 
public of China has in the western 
Pacific is peace and good relationships 
with us. They know our firm expecta- 
tions, clearly expressed to them, that 
the differences between China and 
Taiwan will be settled peacefully. And 
I think to violate that understanding 
with us would be to wipe out all the 
benefits to them and to Asia of peace 
and their new relationship with us. 

We have obviously a desire and a 
commitment to maintain peace in the 
western Pacific. And as would be the 
case with an altercation between any 
two peoples, we would certainly be 
deeply concerned. But I don't want to 
speculate on under what circumstances 
we might take military action because I 
think it's an absolutely unnecessary 
speculation, because the people of 
China want peace, they want good re- 
lationships with us, and because 
Taiwan is so strong and will stay 
strong. 

Q. Well, clearly, if the situation 
changed drastically in our relations 
with any of these two other units, the 
Chinese Government and Taiwan, we 
can take a new look at the situation, 
I suppose. 

A. That's always an option. And I 
think, as you know, political circum- 



stances change around the world con- 
stantly, and we would have to reassess 
them as they do occur. But I don't have 
any doubt that we made the right deci- 
sion. We have made our intentions and 
our expectations clear to the people of 
China and to Taiwan. 

My reports from Taiwan, in the last 
day or few hours, has been that they 
studied the agreements with the 
People's Republic, that their original 
concerns have been substantially al- 
leviated, and I don't think that the 
people of Taiwan are any more con- 
cerned about future peace than they 
were before. In addition, we will 
maintain trade relationships, cultural 
relationships with the people of 
Taiwan, as has been the case in the 
past. 

Q. Have you had any recent con- 
versations with any Soviet officials or 
have you heard from Moscow as to 
what their reaction is in the last few 
hours, bringing us up to date? 

A. Yes, I've had a personal message 
delivered to me this afternoon from 
President Brezhnev expressing his un- 
derstanding that our commitment is to 
peace in the entire world, acknow- 
ledging the fact that the American po- 
sition is that our new relationship with 
the People's Republic of China will 
contribute to world peace, and 
acknowledging the fact that the proper 
relationship between major sovereign 
nations is to have full diplomatic 
relations. 

I would characterize his personal 
message to me as being very positive in 
tone. And I can say without any doubt 
that our new relationship with China 
will not put any additional obstacles in 
the way of a successful SALT agree- 
ment and also will not endanger our 
good relationships with the Soviet 
Union. 

Q. What about the slight protocol 
problem of timing visits from Teng 
Hsiao-ping [Deng Xiaoping], the Vice 
Chairman, who's due here from 
Peking on January 29, and a possible 
visit from Chairman Brezhnev to 
sign a SALT agreement? Can 
Chairman Brezhnev come after Teng 
has been here? 

A. I can't set the schedule for him. 
My hope is that President Brezhnev 
would come before Mr. Teng comes to 
Washington. 

As you know, Secretary Vance will 
be meeting with Foreign Minister 
Gromyko day after tomorrow, the 21st, 
and at that time we'll see if the SALT 
agreements are coming to a successful 
conclusion. If so, we will extend im- 
mediately again an invitation to Presi- 



dent Brezhnev to come here during the 
middle part of January. 

The two visits would, obviously, not 
overlap or conflict, and I think I'll be 
well prepared, in studying the prospec- 
tive agenda, to meet with both of them 
in the same month. 

Q. What about return visits from 
you? 

A. We have not made any plans for 
that. And I would presume that both 
leaders might invite me to come to 
their countries sometime in the future. 
And I would look with favor on those 
invitations, but not anytime soon. 

Q. Do you feel that this agreement 
with China puts any pressure on the 
Soviet Union to come to any early 
conclusion with the SALT talks? 

A. No, I really can't assess any in- 
terrelationship between the two. The 
agreement with China was not designed 
to put any sort of pressure on the 
Soviet Union. I think the outcome of 
the new relationship between ourselves 
and the billion people of China and 
their government is constructive and 
positive and contributes toward the 
lessening of tension rather than the 
building up of additional tension. And 
that applies to our relationship with 
the Soviet Union as well as to other 
countries. 

Q. Some Members of Congress, 
including Democrats and some lib- 
eral Republicans, are claiming that 
you failed to live up to an Adminis- 
tration pledge to consult with Con- 
gress before taking any such action 
as you have toward Taiwan and 
Peking. And now, there's a threat of 
a court challenge to the constitution- 
ality of your cancelling the treaty 
without congressional approval. How 
seriously do you view this? Do you 
feel that either Congress or the 
courts could block this arrangement 
with both Taiwan and Peking? 

A. No. My constitutional responsi- 
bility in establishing relationships with 
foreign countries is clear and cannot be 
successfully challenged in court. 

We have had constant consultations 
with the Congress over the past 2 
years. And our goal in establishing 
normal relations with China has been 
made clear on numerous occasions by 
me personally. When Secretary Vance 
went to China and came back, he gave 
the Congress leaders and Members a 
thorough briefing. Dr. Brzezinski did 
the same thing after his visit to China. I 
have met with all the Members of the 
Congress who would come to sessions 
here at the White House. 



Department of State Bulletin 

One of the deliberate items on my 
own agenda in explaining to them and 
answering their questions was about the 
terms under which we would normalize 
relationships with China. I might add 
that when numerous delegations of 
congressional leaders have gone to the 
People's Republic and come back, they 
have also given me and Secretary of 
State Vance their views on what ought 
to be done. Almost invariably their 
recommendation was to proceed ex- 
peditiously with normalization of rela- 
tions with China. 

So, there's been a clear understand- 
ing, really ever since 1972, of the pol- 
icy of our government toward China, a 
desire to normalize relations, and also 
a clear expression of my views both 
publicly and privately to the Members 
of Congress about our goals and the 
plans for accomplishing this goal. 

I might say in complete candor that 
in the last 2 or 3 weeks, when the 
negotiations were building up to a 
climax in an unanticipated degree of 
rapidity of movement, we did not con- 
sult with anyone outside of a very tiny 
group within the executive branch of 
government about the prospective suc- 
cess. But what did happen should not 
be a surprise to anyone. The congres- 
sional views were well known to me. 
My views were well known to the 
Members of Congress. 

Q. What was the need for such 
haste? Why could you not have con- 
sulted with the congressional leaders 
first, before making the final com- 
mitment? 

A. My experience in negotiating sen- 
sitive and complicated agreements with 
foreign leaders, including the experi- 
ence at Camp David and otherwise, is 
that to negotiate through the news 
media, through public pronouncements 
and with wide divergencies of views 
expressed by different leaders in a 
country, is not conducive to success. 
And I'm authorized and directed by the 
Constitution and my responsibility is to 
conduct negotiations of this kind. 

We did not depart from the estab- 
lished policy of our country that's been 
extant since President Nixon went to 
China in 1972. And I think had we 
caused a public debate in our country 
about all the ramifications of the 
negotiations at the very time we were 
trying to conclude these discussions 
with the Chinese, it would have re- 
sulted in failure. And our country 
would have lost a wonderful opportu- 
nity to a great stride forward and all the 
benefits that will be derived from this 
agreement. 

I don't have any doubt that what I 
did was right and correct. I don't have 



February 1979 

any doubts that had we made a public 
issue of it. it would have complicated 
the issue unnecessarily. 

Q. On the matter of the court 
challenge, the challenge is not your 
right to recognize or to withdraw 
recognition of a government, but of 
your right to cancel a treaty. Does 
that change your view any of the 
validity of that challenge? 

A. No. The treaty is being termi- 
nated in exact conformance with the 
terms of the treaty itself. Had I can- 
celed the treaty or abrogated the treaty 
peremptorily as of the first day of 
January — which was the Chinese re- 
quest to us, or demand from us 
originally — there may have been some 
justification for that court challenge. 
But the treaty provides that either side 
can terminate the effectiveness of the 
treaty by giving a 1-year notice. And 
that's exactly what we are doing with 
the people of Taiwan, telling them that 
after a year the treaty will no longer be 
in effect. It's completely in accordance 
with the terms of the treaty itself. 

Q. Since the Constitution requires 
the Senate to approve by a two-thirds 
vote the making of a treaty, you 
don't feel that there might be an im- 
plication in the Constitution that the 
same two-thirds would apply to can- 
celing a treaty. 

A. No. I think this gets into a com- 
plicated legal discussion, and I'm not 
qualified for it. But as of the first of 
January, we will have relations with 
and acknowledge the nationhood of 
China. And Taiwan will no longer be a 
nation in the view of our own country. 
And whether or not a treaty can exist 
with an entity which is no longer a na- 
tion is a legal question in itself. But we 
have gone a second mile to protect the 
integrity of our own country by ex- 
tending the terms of the peace treaty 
for a full year, even after we recognize 
the China mainland Government as the 
government. 

I think that we have more than hon- 
ored the terms of the treaty, and I see 
no basis for a successful court chal- 
lenge. I think what we've done is right. 
It's better for our country. It's better 
for the people of China. It does not 
hurt the people of Taiwan. It's good for 
world peace. I think we've benefited 
greatly, and I'm very proud of it. 

Q. Do you think that putting the 
Chinese question on the agenda of 
the next session of Congress might 
complicate the confirmation of a 
SALT treaty? 

A. No, I think not. What we will ask 
the Congress to do next session is to 



THE SECRETARY: 

News Conference of January 1 1 



Before taking questions, I would like 
to say a few words about our approach 
to the situation in Iran. The United 
States has a strong and continuing 
interest in the free, stable, and inde- 
pendent Iran in this strategic region. 
This is a policy we have consistently 
and actively pursued over the past 
generation. 

In this recent crisis, we have encour- 
aged the restoration of order so that the 
bloodshed would end and the people of 
Iran could return to normal life. Only 
in such circumstances can there be ra- 
tional discussion of a political solution 
to Iran's current problems. 

It has been our objective throughout 
this current crisis to insure the 
maximum of stability in a time of 
change by preserving the institutional 
framework of Iran under its constitu- 
tion. The Shah has said that he plans to 
leave Iran on vacation. That has been 
his decision, worked out with his Ira- 
nian colleagues. The Shah remains the 
constitutional head of state, and we 
continue to work with him in that 
capacity. 

The Shah has said that when he 
leaves, he will do so in the way pre- 
scribed by the Iranian Constitution by 
appointing a Regency Council to serve 
in his absence. At the same time, a new 
civilian government under Prime 
Minister '[Shapour] Bakhtiar has been 
named. We believe that the new gov- 
ernment should be given every chance 
to reconcile the differences in Iran and 
find a peaceful political solution. 

Iran's Armed Forces remain essential 
to the security and independence of 
Iran and as a necessary complement to 
a legitimate civilian government. We 
have urged that everything be done to 
insure their integrity and their support 
by the people of Iran. 

We have urged that leaders of all 
elements in Iran find ways of working 



out together a peaceful solution to the 
present problems. The decisions on 
Iran's future must be made by the Ira- 
nians themselves. No outside govern- 
ment should seek to interfere. We hope 
for a return to peaceful conditions and 
a functioning economy that will make 
possible an orderly and constructive 
solution of Iran's problems. 

Q. What — apart from the state- 
ment you have just made — is the 
United States prepared to do to in- 
sure that a civilian government will 
be able to survive in Iran? 

A. We have indicated to the Prime 
Minister that we will cooperate with 
him and with his government, and that 
we will keep very closely in touch with 
him so that we may be helpful wher- 
ever we can. 

Q. Has the United States changed 
its view of Libya as a supporter of 
terrorism? And could you give us, 
please, your opinion of the Presi- 
dent's brother acting as a front 
man — or as a tour guide, 
perhaps — for Libyans here trying to 
improve Libya's image in the United 
States? 

A. With respect to Libya and ter- 
rorism, Libya has now signed the three 
conventions with respect to hijacking 
in the air — which is different from the 
past. We are continuing to watch and 
observe the situation there. 

I am not familiar at all with the facts 
on the second half of your question. 

Q. I wonder, sir, could you bring 
us up to date on the Middle East 
talks and give us your estimate of 
when you expect they might resume? 

A. Yes, I'd be very happy to do that. 
As you know, following the meeting in 
Brussels which I had with Prime 
Minister Khali! and Foreign Minister 



pass special legislation to permit us to 
continue our cultural relations with 
Taiwan, our trade relations with 
Taiwan, the application of the Exim- 
bank, and the support of loans to 
China — to the people of Taiwan, 
rather — and also to authorize us to sell 
weapons to Taiwan after the defense 
treaty expires. 

I think that even those who oppose 
the normalization of relations with 



China will favor the continued relation- 
ships with Taiwan, which this legisla- 
tion will have to authorize. I don't 
think this will complicate the other is- 
sues in Congress. They're almost as 
complicated as they can get anyhow. I 
don't think this will hurt at all. □ 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Dec. 25. 1978. 



Dayan, each of them had to go back 
and consult with their governments. 
Following those consultations, each 
has communicated with us, setting 
forth their thoughts about how the 
negotiating process might be resumed. 
Each has made it clear that they do 
want to resume negotiations. We are, 
therefore, now discussing the best ways 
of getting the negotiations going again. 
What we want to be sure is that, in 
doing this, we do it by a process that 
will give the negotiations the best 
chance to be successful. Therefore, we 
are taking our time and exploring the 
best way to try and deal with some of 
the more minor problems before we 
proceed to sitting down together to try 
and thrash out the more difficult issues. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger this week has 
been critical of American reluctance 
to take the Soviets to task, both for 
their alleged involvement in Iran — 
the disruptive role in Iran — and in 
the Indochina arena. Could you tell 
us whether you feel the Soviets have 
been a disruptive force in Iran and 
the extent to which in Indochina a 
great power rivalry is developing 
that could endanger the peace, and 
whether or not you have held the 
Soviets to account, or plan to hold 
them to account, for any of these 
actions? 

A. Let me answer your question by 
first saying a few words about the situ- 
ation in Indochina. We have made it 
very clear that the invasion of Cam- 
bodia threatens regional peace and sta- 
bility and violates the fundamental 
principle of the integrity of interna- 
tional boundaries. We have repeatedly 
stated our support for a stable system 
of independent states in Southeast 
Asia; and we believe that this system 
includes an independent Cambodia, de- 
spite the strength of our concern over 
the human rights situation in that 
country, a situation which we have 
consistently condemned and sought to 
improve by accepted international 
procedures. 

During the past year, as the conflict 
between Vietnam and Cambodia — or 
Kampuchea, as it is now called — was 
intensifying, we expressed our con- 
cern, made clear our decision not to 
take sides, and urged that it be resolved 
peacefully. 

I would remind you that the United 
States was the first to call the attention 
of the United Nations to the dangers in 
this situation in a letter which was sent 
to the Security Council in November of 
this past year. 

We believe that all countries in- 
terested in peace, stability, and inde- 
pendence should make clear their op- 



position to this invasion which has 
taken place, work toward a withdrawal 
of the invading foreign forces from the 
country, and to act to insure the integ- 
rity of all states in the area. 

Now, coming to the second half of 
your question, the role that the Soviet 
Union may or may not have played in 
that is as yet unclear. Most of the 
equipment, or a lot of the equipment, 
which was used in the invasion was 
equipment which had been captured 
when the American forces left Viet- 
nam, so it is not yet clear how much 
support came from outside forces. 

We have made very clear to all of 
the parties concerned our concern for 
this conflict as it mounted during the 
past year. We have made it clear to the 
Vietnamese and to the Soviet Union. 

Q. You don't hold the Soviet 
Union responsible in any way for en- 
couraging the Vietnamese to launch 
this invasion of Cambodia? 

A. Let me say, I do not know what 
the facts are with respect to that. 

Q. I noticed that in your opening 
statement on Iran, sir, you said that 
the United States has a strong and 
continuing interest in Iran. In a re- 
cent interview in The New York Times, 
Dr. Brzezinski, I believe, described it 
as a vital American interest. Perhaps 
this is just semantics, but do you be- 
lieve that Iran is a vital interest of 
the United States? 

A. I think it is very clear that we 
have vital interests in the region. I 
would point out that the oil which 
comes through the Strait of Hormuz 
which, as you know, is on the southern 
Iranian border, comprises about 50% of 
the oil which goes to the free world. 
Our trade with Iran and Saudi Arabia 
over this past year amounted to some 
$7 billion, a very substantial amount. 
And obviously this is very important in 
a period in which we have balance-of- 
payments problems and we have to in- 
crease our exports. 

It is also clear that what happens in 
Iran is being closely followed by others 
in the Middle East, and that includes 
those nations which are involved in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict; so, therefore, it is 
very clear that our interests in Iran and 
in the region are vital interests. 

Q. Do you see any possibility of 
American military involvement in 
Iran as a result of the need to protect 
those vital interests? 

A. I do not see any need for Ameri- 
can military involvement. With respect 
to the vital interests, we are following 
the situation carefully. We are in con- 
stant communication with the many 



Department of State Bulletin 

friendly neighbors and allies that we 
have who are also following, on a daily 
basis, the tragic events that have un- , 
folded in Iran; and we will continue to 
do so. 

Q. To follow up on the Middle 
East, can you tell us, have the parties 
modified their positions in any way 
on the autonomy and linkage ques- 
tions and on the controversial arti- 
cles? Also, will the Foreign Ministers 
be invited back here, and do you rule 
out a resumption of the talks next 
week? 

A. On the details of the positions of 
the parties, I am not going to go into 
that matter. This is a matter that should 
be discussed in private negotiations 
between the two parties and ourselves. 
And I would not only not be helping 
the situation; I think I would be hin- 
dering the situation by going into the 
details of what their positions are. 

Secondly, with respect to when we 
might meet, this is still under discus- 
sion. One of the things which we are 
thinking of is perhaps having ex- 
changes, further exchanges, through 
the Ambassadors in the two capitals 
there to try and clear away some of the 
more minor matters, as I indicated, 
before setting the time for the meeting 
at the higher level between the Minis- 
ters and myself. 

As to the place, when we come to 
holding the meeting, everybody has 
said that as far as they are concerned, 
they are willing to have it anywhere. 
The important thing is to have it and to 
make progress. 

Q. There seem to be two main in- 
terpretations in town of why, on the 
morning of the 23d of December, 
when you came out of the Soviet Mis- 
sion in Geneva, you said you had 
made very little progress. One re- 
lates to the Soviet attitude toward 
U.S. establishment of relations with 
China and the [Vice Premier] Deng 
Xiaoping visit; the other relates to 
the Soviets trying to get more conces- 
sions out of the United States at the 
last minute. These are not necessar- 
ily mutually exclusive, but I wonder 
if you could tell us how you see the 
balance and how you see the prob- 
lems that now stand in terms of what 
Soviet motivation might be? 

A. Let me say that I said that we had 
made very little progress because we 
had made very little progress. We had 
made good progress the 2 days before, 
but that morning we just didn't make 
any progress. And I wanted to make it 
very clear that that was the fact. As to 
what the motivation was for the failure 
to make progress that morning, it 



February 1979 

would be pure speculation on my part 
to guess at it now. 

Let me emphasize that in those 
meetings as a whole, we, as the 
Foreign Minister and I said, cleared 
away most of the issues which re- 
mained between us. Since the meeting, 
we have been in touch with each other 
to see what we could do to deal with 
those remaining issues and to expedite 
the work of the two delegations in 
Geneva. That work is proceeding. Our 
conversations through the ambassado- 
rial channels are proceeding. We are 
both — we and the Soviet Union — 
committed to find a conclusion in the 
nearest future. We said that before, and 
I repeat it again today. 

Q. Do you and the members of the 
Department for which you are re- 
sponsible feel bound by the campaign 
promise of the President, reiterated 
on national television on December 
14, not to lie to or mislead the 
American people? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Could you tell us, sir, what 
dealings you have had, aside from 
normal journalistic contacts, with 
The New York Times, of which you 
were a director before you assumed 
your current position — that is, aside 
from normal journalistic contacts, 
for instance, with Mr. Gwertzman, 
on matters of editorial policy and 
similar concerns? 

A. I have had merely the normal 
contacts. I have talked to Mr. 
Gwertzman, as I have other members 
of the press corps here. I have talked to 
Mr. Reston on occasion. Mr. Reston is 
one of the most distinguished colum- 
nists in the United States — indeed in 
the world. And I have, I think, on one 
or two occasions talked to Mr. Frankel. 
Those are the extent of my contacts. 

Q. How much responsibility do 
you think the United States has to 
bear for the events in Iran, either 
through blind support of the Shah in 
the past or more recently through 
statements urging liberalization and 
talking about human rights in a way 
that might have encouraged those 
who were in favor of insurrection? 

A. Let me say that the situation in 
Iran is one which comes about over a 
long period of time as a result of fun- 
jdamental changes which have been 
taking place — economic moderniza- 
tion, social change, demands for wider 
political involvement. And these are, 
primarily, internal problems that have 
to be worked out by the people of Iran 
and the leaders in the political process 
in that country. 



Several Administrations have 
worked with Iran and the Government 
of Iran over the last 20 or 30 years. 
And we have done, during that period 
of time, what we believed would help 
to try and advance the interests of the 
people of that country. But the decision 
as to what their political future must be 
is a question for them to determine, 
and they are the ones that are going to 
have to make that choice. 

Q. Prime Minister Callaghan [of 
the United Kingdom] reportedly said 
the United States might be reluctant 
to stay with the Anglo-American 
proposal for settlement in Rhodesia. 
What is the U.S. position in sup- 
porting or pursuing the Anglo- 
American proposal? 

A. We remain firmly behind the 
Anglo-American proposal. 

Q. When you talk about the politi- 
cal future of Iran as a subject for the 
Iranian people themselves to decide, 
could you describe fully the extent of 
U.S. advice to the Shah, of U.S. 
contacts with the generals, of U.S. 
military movements in the region, all 
of which has been packaged by the 
Soviet Union and described as U.S. 
interference in Iran? 

A. Yes, I would be happy to. We 
have obviously been in contact with the 
Shah frequently, as the events unfolded 
over the last several weeks and months 
and have discussed with him matters as 
they arose and as they might affect the 
future. 

We have had contacts with the Ira- 
nian military through our military as- 
sistance group that is there, and we 
have in addition to that, recently had 
additional contacts through General 
Huyser [General Robert Huyser, Dep- 
uty Commander in Chief of U.S. 
Forces in Europe], who has come to 
Tehran and has been working with 
Ambassador Sullivan [U.S. Ambas- 
sador to Iran William H. Sullivan]. 

As you know. General Huyser has 
discussed not only technical matters, 
such as those relating to foreign mili- 
tary sales and the continuation of those 
sales in an even way to meet the needs 
of the Iranian military, but has also 
urged them to support the civilian gov- 
ernment in coping with the problems 
which Iran faces. 

Q. Is it your view then that none of 
this constitutes interference in Iran's 
affairs? 

A. I believe it does not constitute 
interference. 

Q. There have been conflicting in- 
dications of whether there was an 



intelligence failure with regard to 
Iran. As a policymaker do you feel 
that you had adequate notice of the 
fundamental social changes and their 
potential impact on the Shah's re- 
gime? And, if you did, why was there 
no evidence, or at least nothing ap- 
parent, of American efforts to influ- 
ence the Shah into the types of ac- 
tions early on in '77 and early '78, 
which might have prevented the 
present crisis? 

A. I think on the whole that the in- 
telligence which we have received has 
been adequate to foresee events as they 
developed. The question of dealing 
with these problems in terms of finding 
solutions to those problems is a very 
difficult one; and again it is one that 
has to be resolved by the Iranian people 
and their leaders. 

This is a situation in which we can 
discuss the matters with them, when 
asked give our advice with respect to 
how we think they can best be coped 
with. But the decisions have to be 
made by the Iranians and not by the 
Americans. 

Q. As a result of Sino-U.S. nor- 
malization, do you foresee any im- 
provement in the security situation 
on the Korean Peninsula? 

A. I believe that as a result of nor- 
malization of relations between the 
United States and the People's Repub- 
lic of China stability in the area will be 
strengthened in the months and years 
ahead. And I would include in that the 
situation on the Korean Peninsula. 

I think that it is well known that the 
People's Republic of China has had a 
close relationship with North Korea 
and we, of course, are a long time ally 
of South Korea. I think that as a result 
of those facts, and the fact that we now 
have normalization with a full and free 
and open dialogue between the 
People's Republic of China and our- 
selves, that this can help in terms of 
stabilizing the situation in that area. 

Q. When Chinese Vice Premier 
Deng Xiaoping comes here at the end 
of this month, do you have in mind to 
discuss with him occupation of 
Korea, and reducing tension in 
Korea and Asia? 

A. I am sure that one of the issues 
which will be discussed with Vice 
Premier Deng Xiaoping will be the 
situation in Korea. We will be discus- 
sing with him, of course, bilateral 
matters, but we will also be discussing 
global issues and regional issues. Ob- 
viously, one of the most important re- 
gional issues is the situation on the 
Korean Peninsula. 



10 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. You said in your opening 
statement that the Shah has said he 
planned to take a vacation and there 
would be a Regency Council put in 
his place. Do I take it that the United 
States concurs that this would be a 
good action by the Shah to take and, 
if so, how long do you expect him to 
be out of the country? Is it a tempo- 
rary or is it a semipermanent thing? 

A. On the first half of your question, 
the Shah has made this decision, we 
think it is a sound decision, and we 
concur in that decision. 

As to the second half, how long will 
he be out of the country: I don't have 
that answer. That is a question the 
Shah himself will have to answer. 

Q. Do we expect this Regency 
Council to be named today or tomor- 
row or soon, so that he can leave the 
country soon? 

A. I think that the Regency Council 
will be named in the next few days. 

Q. And he will leave the country 
after the Regency Council is named? 



A. He has said that he will leave the 
country after having established the 
Regency Council. 

Q. Several people have said that 
the security situation, the overall 
strategic situation, in the entire In- 
dian Ocean-Persian Gulf region has 
deteriorated from the Western point 
of view. Obviously, the Saudi leaders 
have been publicly concerned and 
presumably the reason the F-15's 
are being sent to Saudi Arabia is be- 
cause of this concern. 

What is your view as to all the de- 
velopments in that region — 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, that whole 
area? Is the West at a disadvantage 
now? 

A. There are several elements that go 
into answering that question. First, as I 
pointed out a few moments ago, fun- 
damental changes are taking place in 
the area in terms of economic moderni- 
zation, social changes, and demands 
for wider political involvement. And 
those factors affect not only Iran, 
which I was referring to when I made 



Secretary Vance Visits Europe 



Secretary Vance departed Washington 
on December 20, 1978, for meetings 
with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko 
in Geneva (December 21-23) and with 
Egyptian Prime Minister Khalil and 
Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan in 
Brussels (December 23-24). Follow- 
ing is a statement by Secretary Vance 
upon his return to Washington on 
December 24. ' 

Despite all the advances in interna- 
tional communication, there are still 
occasions when there is no substitute 
for face-to-face contact in dealing with 
difficult international problems. 

This was true in dealing with two 
important issues fundamental to peace 
on my present trip — the regulation of 
the nuclear weapons competition with 
the Soviet Union and the continuing 
search for a peaceful solution to the 
problems of the Middle East. 

In Geneva Mr. Gromyko and I and 
our colleagues were able to essentially 
reach agreement on most of the issues 
which had not yet been resolved. Both 
sides will do their best in order that the 
preparation for a signing of the final 
agreement may be completed in the 
nearest future. We shall be working 
vigorously through our Geneva delega- 
tions and through diplomatic channels 



to resolve the remaining issues. We are 
conscious of the importance to peace 
that a SALT agreement be reached 
without delay, but we are not working 
against any deadline. And our prime 
concern is that the agreement be a 
sound one. 

As we also announced yesterday, we 
have reached agreement in principle 
concerning a meeting between Presi- 
dent Carter and President Brezhnev. 
The question of the timing of this 
meeting remains to be worked out in 
Washington with Moscow. 

In the meetings in Brussels on the 
Middle East, direct contact with the 
representatives of Israel and Egypt 
proved once again to be helpful. Our 
purpose was to explore the nature of 
the next steps to be taken in the negoti- 
ations and not to get a date for the re- 
sumption of negotiations. We had a 
useful and full exchange of views with 
Prime Minister Khalil of Egypt and 
Foreign Minister Dayan of Israel. Each 
party will be reporting to his head of 
government and will then be back in 
touch with us to discuss views and next 
steps to be taken. □ 



'Press release 468. Other press releases re- 
lated to the visit are Nos. 461 of Dec. 20, 462 
and 464 of Dec . 2 1 . and 467 of Dec . 23 . 



the statement, but to the region gener- 
ally. 

I think it does not help to over- 
simplify the problem that leads us away 
from realistic policies toward these 
problems. In this connection, I would 
point out that we have different coun- 
tries here, and although you have 
common factors which affect these 
various countries, that does not mean 
that the problem is identical in each of 
these countries. 

Our policy for over 30 years has 
been to work with the countries which 
are undergoing these profound changes 
and to try and help find constructive 
solutions to the problems which they 
face. Our policy is that no outside 
power, should exploit this instability for 
its own purposes and for its own ad- 
vantage. Each of the nations should 
have freedom to work out its own solu- 
tions to these problems without 
exploitation from any outside powers. 

Our position remains that we will 
remain very close to the many friendly 
countries in this area, who share our 
concern, who wish to see stability, who 
wish to see the maintenance of inde- 
pendence, and wish to see security 
maintained in the area. 

So that, taking into account all of 
these factors. I think that the policies 
which we are following are a sound 
policy and a policy which must be 
applied with care and precision. And 
we must not fall into the trap of ac- 
cepting oversimplified generalities as 
applying to differing situations. 

Q. Soviet President Brezhnev sev- 
eral weeks ago warned the United 
States not to interfere in the Iranian 
situation. The Soviet news agencies 
have indicated that some of the steps 
we have taken in the region, includ- 
ing our consultation with the Shah, 
including the planned movement of 
military aircraft, are, in effect, 
interference. 

Have we had direct communication 
with the Soviet Government, with 
President Brezhnev, regarding the 
Iranian situation and steps we are 
taking? And do you feel that the 
Soviet Government feels that this 
constitutes interference on the part 
of the United States? 

A. The answer is yes, we have had 
direct communication with the Gov- 
ernment of the Soviet Union with re- 
spect to Iran on many occasions. 

I think it goes without saying that it 
is our clear view that the consultations ! 
which we have been having and the ac- 
tions which we have been taking with 
respect to the Iranian situation are not 
interference in any way whatsoever. 
They are merely cooperative efforts 



February 1979 



which we have been carrying out with 
the government and with the people of 
that country, and we have made this 
very clear to our Soviet colleagues. 

Q. Do you think enough progress 
is being made in these discussions 
you are having on the remaining is- 
sues of SALT [Strategic Arms Lim- 
itation Talks] that there is a good 
chance for it to be wrapped up prior 
to the visit here by the Chinese Vice 
Premier, Mr. Deng Xiaoping? 

And secondly, how is the United 
States going to modulate and carry 
out this new and rather exciting re- 
lationship with China, especially the 
Deng visit, in a way that does not ad- 
versely affect our relationship with 
China's rival, the Soviet Union? 

A. Let me take the second half of 
your question first, because I think it is 
a very important issue. It is U.S. policy 
that we will treat the People's Republic 
of China and the Soviet Union in a bal- 
anced way. Our policy toward them 
will be balanced and there will be no 
tilts one way or the other, and this is an 
absolutely fundamental principle and a 
very important one that we must always 
keep in mind in managing our relation- 
ship with these two countries. 

Coming back to your first question 
now, will I make a prediction on — 

Q. No. Do you think there is a 
good chance? 

A. I am not going to guess on that 
one. We are continuing to work vigor- 
ously at trying to clear away the prob- 
lems as rapidly as we can, and all I will 
say is that I repeat what Foreign 
Minister Gromyko and I said, that we 
are both striving to conclude the re- 
maining matters in the nearest future. 

Q. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping 
has said that when he comes to the 
United States he would not like to 
discuss human rights. Is this a wish 
that you are going to respect, or do 
you think it should be free for you to 
raise any subject you wish? 

A. In our discussions with the Vice 
Premier when he comes here, we will 
be reviewing our entire views with re- 
spect to the international problems, in- 
cluding all of the global problems. We 
will be stating our position and our 
views with respect to human rights. In 
that connection, because our position 
with respect to human rights is at the 
core of our foreign policy. 

Q. Do you see any progress in ef- 
forts being made with regard to the 
solution to the Nicaragua crisis? 

A. On the Nicaraguan matter, as you 
know, the Americans, along with rep- 



intervietv on "Meet the Press" 



Secretary Vance was interviewed on 
NBC's "Meet the Press" on December 
17, 1978, by Bill Monroe, NBC News; 
Carl T. Rowan, Chicago Sun Times; 
George F. Will, syndicated columnist; 
and Steve Delaney, NBC News. 1 

Q. Our guest today on "Meet the 
Press" is Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance, who has just returned from 
Israel and Egypt. He tried unsuc- 
cessfully to help those countries meet 
the goals set at Camp David to con- 
clude a peace treaty by today. 

Secretary Vance, there is so much 
going on I would like to start with 
China and then come to the Middle 
East. George Bush, just a few years 
ago, was our unofficial Ambassador 
to Peking. Today he is a likely GOP 
Presidential candidate. He is one of 
those who has criticized the agree- 
ment with China, and he has said we 
gave all and got nothing. Would you 
respond to that. 

A. I must disagree with George on 
what he has said. I think that the nor- 
malization of relationships with the 
People's Republic of China is a very 
major — indeed, an historic — step 
which will move us toward peace, to 
greater stability in the region, and will 
improve our relationships bilaterally 
between our two nations. 

It will also promote increased trade 
between our country and that country, 
and it is part of an overall program 
which the United States has been car- 
rying out during the Carter Adminis- 



tration of trying to move toward peace 
by dealing with specific situations such 
as the Middle East, where we have 
come in and tried to help the parties, 
move them closer together. In such 
things as we have done in moving for- 
ward and carrying out our obligations 
which have been going on for a number 
of years, in trying to resolve the 
Panama Canal situation. 

A situation arose here where the 
conditions which were necessary for us 
to be able to go forward and normalize 
relationships were accepted by the ac- 
tion which the Government of the 
People's Republic of China has taken. 
We accepted and seized that opportu- 
nity, and I think that the result is going 
to be a very positive one for the region, 
for the United States, its people, and 
for the people of Taiwan because we 
are insisting that insofar as the people 
of Taiwan are concerned normal re- 
lationships on an unofficial basis in 
cultural, trade, and other matters will 
be maintained. 

We have expressed very clearly our 
deep concern that the welfare of the 
people of Taiwan be protected and that 
the Taiwan solution be a peaceful solu- 
tion. This has not been contradicted by 
the People's Republic of China. Let 
me, if I may. just say one or two more 
words. 

In addition, we made it clear that we 
would continue in the period of post- 
normalization to supply a limited 
number of defensive weapons to the 
people of Taiwan, and we will continue 
to do so. And of great importance is the 



resentatives of Guatemala and the 
Dominican Republic, have been serv- 
ing as intermediaries, a negotiating 
group, trying to help mediate the 
problem. 

This mediation effort has been going 
on for weeks. The mediators are cur- 
rently in Nicaragua and are meeting 
with the parties there in an effort to try 
and overcome the remaining problems. 

The solution is now centering around 
the question of whether agreement can 
be reached on a national plebiscite. 
There is a difference between the par- 
ties yet on this. The negotiators are 
seeing whether they can bridge the re- 
maining gap; and following that set of 
meetings they will be issuing their re- 



port which they are in the process of 
preparing. How this is going to come 
out, I don't know. But I think it is es- 
sential that this mediation effort has 
gone on. 

The reason that the mediation effort 
was started was because blood was 
being spilled. The country was 
polarizing. There appeared to be in- 
creasing radicalization, and it was felt 
necessary by the Organization of 
American States that an effort be made 
to try and see if a peaceful way could 
not be found to try and bring about a 
solution to the problem; and we agreed 
to help in that effort. □ 



Press release II. 



12 

fact that we insisted that the treaty will 
be terminated in accordance with its 
terms and not terminated immediately 
as the Chinese — the People's Republic 
of China — would have liked it to 
become. 

Q. In the Middle East, could you 
tell us what is behind the current 
snag in negotiations and tell us how 
serious you look on it as being? 

A. First, let me say the parties have 
come a long, long way, and the issues 
which remain are very few and of much 
lesser importance than the issues which 
have been resolved. Indeed, there are 
only a handful of issues. Let me tell 
you what they are. 

I think perhaps the best way to do it 
is to describe my recent trip to the 
Middle East. When I went to the Mid- 
dle East, there were about four or five 
issues separating the parties. The 
President and I decided that what we 
should do is go first to Egypt and see 
whether or not we could, in discussions 
with them, get a resolution of some of 
these issues which could then be dis- 
cussed with the Government of Israel. 

One of the issues was the question of 
the interpretation of article IV of the 
proposed draft treaty. That, as cur- 
rently drafted, provides that either 
party may — and I underscore 
"may" — ask the other party to review 
the provisions of that treaty and that 
when such review takes place amend- 
ments to the treaty can only be made by 
mutual agreement of the parties. 

A question has been raised as to 
whether or not the word "may" left 
the parties in a situation where if one 
asked, the other could say: "Thank you 
very much. I have heard your request, 
but I will not sit down and discuss it. " 

President Sadat agreed during the 
discussions which we had that he 
wanted to clarify that, not change the 
language as it existed but to make sure 
that when one party asked, that the 
other party would sit down and discuss 
it. And that was agreed, and that is all 
that that clarification does. 

The second clarification was a very 
simple one-sentence statement relating 
to another article in the treaty which 
indicated that this clarification would 
make it clear that the treaty was not in 
contradiction of what had already been 
stated in the preamble; namely, that 
this treaty was in the context of the 
overall Camp David framework. 

The third open item was the question 
of how to deal with ambassadors. On 
the question of ambassadors, there had 
been a quid pro quo between the par- 
ties. In the earlier discussions it had 
been agreed that ad referendum to the 
governments of the two countries there 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL: Conventional 
Arms Transfers 



JOINT COMMUNIQUE, 
DEC. 19 1 

The delegations of the U.S.A. and 
the U.S.S.R. held a scheduled round of 
talks concerning the limitation of con- 
ventional arms transfers in Mexico 
City, Mexico, December 5-15, 1978. 
The U.S. delegation was headed by 
Mr. Leslie H. Gelb, Director of the 
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, 
Department of State. The U.S.S.R. 
delegation was headed by Mr. L.I. 
Mendelevich, Ambassador at Large. 
The discussions were serious, frank, 
and substantive. 

The U.S. and U.S.S.R. Delegations 
were welcomed by the President of 
Mexico, Lie. Jose Lopez Portillo, and 
by the Secretary of Foreign Relations, 
Lie. Santiago Roel, who set forth the 



Mexican position on disarmament and 
described the Latin American and 
Caribbean initiative on regional self- 
restraint with regard to conventional 
weapons. 

Both delegations noted with interest 
the positions taken by different coun- 
tries with regard to measures aimed at 
limiting conventional weapons in vari- 
ous parts of the world, particularly in 
Latin America, based on the principle 
of undiminished security of the parties 
concerned, as envisaged in the final 
document of the U.N. General Assem- 
bly Special Session on Disarmament. 

The next round of talks will be held 
in Helsinki, Finland. □ 



'Read to news correspondents by Acting De- 
partment spokesman Tom Reston. 



would be an accelerated withdrawal 
from the Sinai, particularly the area 
around Al Arish. In a response to that, 
the Egyptians had said: "If that early 
accelerated withdrawal takes place, 
then I will be prepared to accelerate the 
exchange of ambassadors." 

When the Cabinet in Israel turned 
down the accelerated withdrawal, Sadat 
then withdrew his quid pro quo for 
that; namely, the accelerated with- 
drawal, exchange of ambassadors. 

Finally, the fourth issue related to a 
letter that would cover the procedures 
for proceeding to set up a self- 
governing authority on the West Bank 
and Gaza, and the proposal there was 
to work out a letter which would be 
agreeable to the parties. Such a letter 
was worked out. I then took these pro- 
posals to Israel and discussed them 
with the Israeli Defense Committee, 
and I think you are all familiar with the 
fact that they have been turned down at 
this point. Where we go from here, we 
will have to see. 

I do not think this means an end to 
the negotiations. We will continue to 
be willing to work with the parties to 
try to bring these to a successful 
conclusion. 

Q. Critics are saying that the 
United States has dishonored a sol- 
emn commitment and jeopardized 
the people of Taiwan. Are you just 
hoping or do you have some implied 
agreement with Peking that they will 
not move with force against Taiwan? 



A. We stated in the President's 
statement that we expected that the 
problem of Taiwan would be resolved 
in a peaceful way. 2 This has not been 
contradicted by the People's Republic 
of China. 

In addition, as a practical matter, it 
simply does not make sense for the 
People's Republic of China to do any- 
thing which would try and solve the 
problem of the ultimate resolution in 
anything other than a peaceful fashion. 

The outreach of this new government 
in the People's Republic of China has 
been clear in that it is seeking to estab- 
lish better relationships with the United 
States and with other nations through- 
out the world. It would be totally in- 
consistent for them to take action 
which is contrary to what we have indi- 
cated is of essential importance to us. 

Q. Are you suggesting that the 
people of Taiwan are going to go on 
living about the same, with about the 
same amount of autonomy, the only 
difference being that we won't have 
an embassy there? 

A. Insofar as the people of Taiwan 
are concerned, their relationships with 
the United States will continue in the 
cultural, trade, and other areas. We 
will have no official mission there; we 
will have an unofficial office there that 
will deal with these matters. But in- 
sofar as our day-to-day relationships 
would be concerned in trade, com- 
merce, and the like, they will continue 
as they were before. 



February 1979 



13 



Q. The United States met three 
demands of China: We severed dip- 
lomatic relations; we are going to 
remove our forces; and we are going 
to cancel the defense treaty, in ex- 
change for which we issued our ex- 
pectation that the issue would be re- 
solved peacefully, and we retain the 
right to sell arms. 

You have said we expect it to be 
solved peacefully and that was not 
contradicted. Did we ask Peking to 
do more than not contradict that but 
to positively affirm that it would be 
resolved peacefully? 

A. As you know, the discussions 
with respect to the Taiwan issue have 
been going on for many years, in three 
different Administrations. The Chinese 
have made it very clear all along that 
they will not state that the resolution of 
the problem is a problem for anybody 
else to determine other than them. 
They say it is an internal problem. We 
stated very clearly what our expecta- 
tions were, and they have not con- 
tradicted that. 

Q. On the matter of selling arms to 
Taiwan, is the Administration pre- 
pared to say it will sell an adequate 
supply of arms to Taiwan for how- 
ever long as is necessary to insure 
that the resolution of the dispute will 
be peaceful? 

A. I would like to be very clear on 
this. We have said that we will con- 
tinue to supply arms to the people of 
Taiwan in the future. The arms to be 
supplied during 1979 will be arms 
which are already in the pipeline. In 
the post- 1979 period we will be meet- 
ing new orders that come in: but they 
will be limited to defensive-type 
weapons, those that would not tend to 
destabilize the peace in the area. 

Q. In 1975 your predecessor was 
trying to arrange the Sinai II agree- 
ment by which further separation of 
forces would go on between Egypt 
and Israel, and there was a period in 
March where the thing seemed to 
break down and we were in a holding 
pattern for about 6 months. And 
then in September essentially the 
same deal was made as rejected by 
the Israelis in March. 

Is there a parallel in the situation 
we are in now? Are we going to have 
to have a cooling off period followed 
by a resumption and essentially the 
same deal being struck? 

A. I think that the suggestions which 
I took with me to Jerusalem were con- 
structive suggestions. As I indicated, 
two of them are simply clarifications. I 
think those clarifications ought to be 



able to be worked out between the 
parties. 

The question with respect to the 
West Bank-Gaza letter is one which has 
as its most difficult issue and, really. 
the only substantive issue; whether or 
not there will be the specification of a 
target date, not a fixed date but a target 
date, for the accomplishment of the 
elections and inauguration of the self- 
governing authority. It seems to me 
this should not be a problem the parties 
can't resolve. 

Q. When we were in the Middle 
East a few days ago, there were some 
indications that at least some of the 
Israeli Cabinet members were 
theoretically prepared to accept a 
target date and that the fact that it 
didn't go through the Cabinet was 
belied to some extent by the ex- 
pressed willingness of the Israeli 
Government to consider new ar- 
rangements. Is that an opening, an 
opening toward the resolution of that 
question of the target date? 

A. I hope that is what it means. 
There was, as you indicate, in the 
statement issued by the Cabinet an in- 
dication that with respect to that par- 
ticular letter they were prepared to 
have further discussions; and I hope 
that that means there is a willingness to 
discuss the question of the target date. 

Q. Can all this be boiled down 
then to the status of being the timing 
of sending an ambassador to Israel 
against the timing of an autonomy 
election in the West Bank? 

A. That, I think, is the most difficult 
issue, as I see it, in the aftermath of the 
discussions which I had. And I would 
come back to the basic nature of the 
problem there. This is the question of 
the bargain that had tentatively been 
struck before but fell apart when the 
accelerated withdrawal could not take 
place, and then the quid pro quo for 
that was withdrawn. I think that is the 
most difficult of the issues, yes. 

Q. The Israelis have accused the 
United States of one-sidedness as 
between Israel and Egypt. A moment 
ago you mentioned several modifica- 
tions in the treaty favored by the 
Egyptians and made them sound 
rather reasonable. Do you feel that 
Israeli inflexibility is a major factor 
in the breakdown of the negotia- 
tions? 

A. I feel that the proposals that I 
took to Jerusalem were reasonable pro- 
posals. I so stated. I think it is the duty 
of a mediator not only to move between 
the parties and try and find a way to 
bridge the gaps between them but also. 



when we see either of them taking a 
position which we think is a reasonable 
position, to state it as a reasonable po- 
sition. And that is what we have done. 
I think and hope there will be further 
consideration of the proposals which I 
took and that the discussions will be 
able to get started again. 

Q. By implication are you stating 
that you don't feel the Israelis are 
now in a reasonable position? 

A. I think that I was saddened, let 
me say, at the fact and disappointed 
that the proposals were apparently 
turned down so flatly at the end of my 
trip. 

Q. After conversations with the 
President, the Senate Majority 
Leader, Robert Byrd, said that the 
Congress might deny aid to Israel if 
they continue to put settlements in 
occupied territory. Is the Adminis- 
tration supporting this kind of pres- 
sure on Israel? 

A. Senator Byrd is a very distin- 
guished Majority Leader of the Con- 
gress. When he returned from his trip 
to the Middle East, he made this public 
statement with respect to the question 
you have mentioned. Those reflect his 
views as the Majority Leader. He is not 
speaking for the Administration with 
respect to that. 

We have said with respect to the 
question of settlements that we con- 
sider this to be a fundamental issue and 
one in which we disagree with the 
Government of Israel. We believe that 
the establishment of settlements is il- 
legal, but when Senator Byrd was 
speaking he was speaking for Senator 
Byrd, not for the Administration. 

Q. On the subject of the alleged 
illegality of the settlements, the State 
Department recognizes indeed as its 
basis of negotiations in southern Af- 
rica the authority of the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice with regard to 
Namibia. There are those who argue 
that the principle implicit in that 
negotiating basis, applied to the con- 
tinuing validity of the Palestine man- 
date, indicates clearly that the set- 
tlement of the Jews in the West Bank 
is permissible until the unallocated 
portion of the Palestine mandate is 
allocated through negotiations. 

Isn't there a conflict between your 
acceptance of the principle in south 
Africa and your rejection of it in the 
Middle East? 

A. No, there is not. I think this is 
clearly covered by the provisions of the 
Geneva IV conference which dealt with 
the question of the establishment of 
settlements in occupied territory. We 



14 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA: U.S. Role in its Stability 



On January 15, 1979, the Depart- 
ment of State held a special briefing for 
chief executives and other senior offi- 
cials from member firms of the Na- 
tional Council for U.S. -China Trade 
and the US A I ROC Economic Council. 
Addressing this group were Secretary 
Vance, Treasury Secretary W . Michael 
Blumenthal, Commerce Secretary 
Juanita M. Kreps, and Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs 
Zbigniew Brzezinski. 

SECRETARY VANCE' 

I am delighted that so many of you 
have joined us today. I particularly 
want to thank the two main business 
organizations represented here, and 
especially their leadership, for their 
efforts in advancing public under- 
standing of a major foreign policy 
issue. Both Councils have played — and 
will continue to play — important roles 
in strengthening our economic 
relations. 

It is now 1 month since the President 
announced that the United States and 
the People's Republic of China had 
reached agreement on the establishment 
of full and normal diplomatic rela- 
tions. 2 Today I would like to share 
with you some of the background 
leading up to the President's historic 



decision and outline what we believe it 
means for the United States and for the 
world. 

Few other foreign policy issues have 
so long divided Americans as "the 
China question." In the 1930's, 
Americans became deeply aware and 
often passionately concerned with the 
tragedy and suffering of China. In the 
early 1940's, our two nations fought 
together against the Axis Powers. In 
the late 1940's we tried — ultimately 
without success — to help the two sides 
in the Chinese civil war find a peaceful 
settlement to their conflict. 

Relations between the People's Re- 
public of China and the United States 
reached a nadir in the 1950's. Our ar- 
mies clashed in Korea, and at home the 
China issue left a deep mark on the 
domestic political landscape. One of 
the tragedies of that period was the de- 
struction of the careers of some out- 
standing Foreign Service officers be- 
cause they reported events in Asia as 
they saw them. 

The impasse in our relations with 
Peking persisted despite the emergence 
during the 1960's of incontestable evi- 
dence of serious rivalry between the 
Soviet Union and China. The United 
States, enmeshed in military involve- 
ment in Southeast Asia, and China, 



Interview (Cont'd) 

have examined this on a number of oc- 
casions and have had, through many 
Administrations — several Adminis- 
trations — a clear legal view that the es- 
tablishment of the settlements is illegal. 

Q. We have heard the SALT II 
negotiations are not "in the bag," so 
to speak. We have also heard it said 
that the new opening toward the 
People's Republic of China shouldn't 
have any effect on that search for an 
accommodation on arms. How do we 
know that? How do we know that (1) 
it won't have any effect on SALT and 
(2) it won't have any effect on the 
Russians seeking a broader influence 
throughout the Middle East and the 
gulf states, perhaps in reaction to an 
American-Chinese coming together? 

A. I have discussed the question of 
our relationships with China from time 
to time with the senior officials of the 
Soviet Union, as I have vice versa with 
respect to our relationships with China, 
with them. They have indicated to me 



that they expect, as we have said, that 
one of our objectives is to normalize 
relations with the People's Republic of 
China. When we notified them the 
other day that this was to take place, 
they were not surprised. 

I think they have expected all along 
this would happen. So I do not think it 
is going to have any effect upon the 
negotiations which we are going to be 
picking up again in our meetings in 
Geneva with Foreign Minister 
Gromyko. 

Insofar as those negotiations are 
concerned, we have made progress 
since Foreign Minister Gromyko and I 
last met. There are still unresolved 
questions; but, on the basis of the 
progress we have made to date, I hope 
we can make still further progress and 
lay the framework for a conclusion now 
of a SALT II agreement. □ 



1 Press release 458 of Dec. 17, 1978. 
2 For text of the Presidents statement of Dec. 
15, 1978, see Bulletin of Jan. 1979, p. 25. 



preoccupied with the Cultural Revolu- 
tion, were unable to make progress to- 
ward overcoming our differences. 

The year 1971 marked the beginning 
of a new phase. Across a vast gulf of 
misunderstanding and mutual distrust, 
the Governments of Peking and the 
United States began a dialogue, start- 
ing with Henry Kissinger's dramatic 
trip to Peking in 1971 and President 
Nixon's visit in 1972. The Shanghai 
com m,u nique of that year set a 
framework for our new relationship. 3 

But that dialogue was incomplete. 
The United States still formally recog- 
nized the Republic of China — whose 
defacto control encompassed only 
Taiwan and a few adjacent islands — as 
the legal Government of China. De- 
spite this, we were able to begin con- 
tacts and ultimately, in 1973, even es- 
tablish Liaison Offices in Washington 
and Peking. But the nature of the re- 
lationship with Peking remained lim- 
ited in scope and depth by the political, 
legal, and economic implications of our 
lack of mutual recognition. 

Nonrecognition — the delicate state in 
which we dealt with Peking in the 6 
years after the Shanghai communi- 
que — presented daily practical prob- 
lems. Although both sides made major 
efforts to minimize these limitations, 
they became increasingly inhibiting. 
Discussions with the Chinese often 
foundered on the fact that in the ab- 
sence of recognition, many activities 
either could not proceed at all or had to 
be conducted at a low level. Contacts 
were constrained, including those that 
might have produced greater under- 
standing on global issues. Trade was 
limited, and opportunities often would 
go elsewhere. Legal problems hung 
over commercial transactions because 
of American claims and frozen P.R.C. 
assets dating back to 1950. More im- 
portantly, not to try to move forward 
would have been to risk moving 
backward — and backward movement in 
U.S. -Chinese relations would have 
caused serious damage to our global 
position. 

So even before he was inaugurated, 
President Carter made his first China 
decision. In an act of continuity with 
two previous Presidents, he reaffirmed 
the Shanghai communique as the basis 
for our relationship and specifically 
reaffirmed its commitment to work to- 
ward normal relations. 

We were not at all certain at that 



February 1979 

time that we could, indeed, reach that 
ultimate goal. But we felt it essential to 
try, and we were prepared to take as 
much time as was necessary to achieve 
it on an acceptable basis. 

With this in mind, we began discus- 
sions within the Administration, as 
well as an intensive series of consulta- 
tions both with Members of Congress 
and with a wide cross-section of 
American businessmen, scholars, and 
others. From our consultations and re- 
view, two central thrusts, and several 
specific concerns, emerged. 

These basic thrusts could not have 
been clearer. On the one hand, a sub- 
stantial majority of Americans wished 
to see the United States and the 
People's Republic of China establish 
diplomatic relations; but at the same 
time, an equally large majority had 
deep concerns about Taiwan's future 
prosperity, security, and stability. We 
shared these concerns. The President 
decided that we would only establish 
diplomatic relations with Peking if 
such an action could be accomplished 
in a way that did not damage the well- 
being of the people on Taiwan or re- 
duce the chances for a peaceful settle- 
ment of the Taiwan question by the 
Chinese themselves. 

Beyond these basic considerations, 
several specific concerns emerged. 



First, there was widespread and 
legitimate concern over Peking's in- 
sistence that prior to normalization the 
United States must unilaterally abro- 
gate the Mutual Defense Treaty with 
Taiwan rather than terminate it in ac- 
cordance with its own provisions, to 
which the United States and Taiwan 
had agreed in 1954. Furthermore, we 
wished to establish that after normali- 
zation, even in the absence of diplo- 
matic relations with Taiwan, all other 
agreements and treaties would remain 
in effect. 

Second, we shared with Congress 
and the American public a deep con- 
cern over the strong assertions by 
Chinese officials concerning their right 
to "liberate" Taiwan in any way they 
saw fit. From an American point of 
view, the peaceful settlement of the 
Taiwan issue by the Chinese them- 
selves was of critical importance; we 
could not move forward if Peking con- 
tinued to talk and think about the 
Taiwan issue in such inflammatory 
terms. 

Third, a consensus rapidly emerged, 
inside and outside the government, that 
it was essential that we continue a wide 
range of relations with the people on 
Taiwan on a nongovernmental basis 
after normalization. In particular, these 
postnormalization relations would have 



MESSAGE TO 

PREMIER HUA GUOFENG, 

JAN. 1* 

Today, after a generation of isolation 
from each other, the United States of 
America and the People's Republic of 
China establish full diplomatic relations 
between our governments. The cause of 
world peace will be served by this his- 
toric act of reconciliation. 

The estrangement of our peoples has 
sometimes produced misunderstanding, 
confrontation and enmity. That era is be- 
hind us. We can now establish normal 
patterns of commerce, and scholarly and 
cultural exchange. Through common ef- 
fort, we can deepen the new ties of 
friendship between our peoples, and we 
can jointly contribute to the prosperity 
and stability of Asia and the Pacific 
region. 

Precisely because our two countries 
have different traditions, cultures, and 
political and economic systems, we have 
much to gain from each other. The United 
States prizes the great variety of opinions 
and origins among its own citizens. 
Similarly, the United States desires a 
world of diversity in which each nation is 
free to make a distinctive contribution to 
express the manifold aspirations, cul- 



tures, traditions, and beliefs of mankind. 

The American people value the enor- 
mous contributions the Chinese people 
have made to the achievements of hu- 
manity. And we welcome the growing in- 
volvement of the People's Republic of 
China in world affairs. We consider 
China as a key force for global peace. 

We wish to cooperate closely with the 
creative Chinese people on the problems 
that confront all people. 

Your Excellency, in our country, the 
first day of the New Year is a time of re- 
dedication and resolve. In that spirit, we 
pledge during the coming years: 

• To continue as an enlightened Asian 
and Pacific power, determined to help 
maintain peace and stability in the region; 

• To enrich the lives of our peoples, 
both spiritually and materially, through 
expanded trade, tourism, and student and 
cultural exchanges, and cooperation in 
the sciences, all on a basis of equality and 
mutual benefit; and 

• To extend our hands across the 
Pacific to you in friendship and peace. 

Jimmy Carter 



"Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Jan. 8. 1979. 



15 

to include continued sale of defensive 
weapons to Taiwan. 

With these priorities emerging, I 
visited Peking in August of 1977, and 
Dr. Brzezinski went there in May of 

1978. We found a newly confident 
leadership emerging in Peking as a 
period of intense internal turmoil sub- 
sided. We found many points of com- 
mon interest on global matters, al- 
though on some important issues we 
continued to have differences. Our dis- 
cussions on normalization were of an 
exploratory nature. These overall dis- 
cussions reinforced our view that a 
strong, secure, and peaceful China was 
in the interest of world peace. 

In the early summer. President Car- 
ter instructed Ambassador Leonard 
Woodcock, Chief of the Liaison Office 
in Peking, to begin a series of presen- 
tations outlining our views on normali- 
zation. In five meetings, Ambassador 
Woodcock laid out the American 
position. 

On September 19, President Carter 
met with the new head of the Chinese 
Liaison Office in Washington, Ambas- 
sador Chai Zemin. Involving himself 
directly in the discussions for the first 
time, the President told the Chinese 
that we were ready to normalize rela- 
tions if our concerns about the future 
well-being of the people on Taiwan 
were met. 

In completing his presentations on 
November 4, Ambassador Woodcock 
indicated to the Chinese that we would 
be willing to work toward a January 1. 

1979, target date for normalization if 
our concerns were met. The Chinese 
began their response in early De- 
cember. In mid-December, negotia- 
tions intensified with Vice Premier 
Deng Xiaoping becoming personally 
involved. Finally, on December 14, we 
reached agreement that met our funda- 
mental concerns, and the announce- 
ment of our decision to establish 
diplomatic relations was made on 
December 15. 

We have been able to establish full 
diplomatic relations with the People's 
Republic of China in a way that pro- 
tects the well-being of the people on 
Taiwan. The importance of this is fully 
reflected in the arrangements that we 
have been and will be establishing. 

First, the United States will not ab- 
rogate the Mutual Defense Treaty. 
Rather we have given notice that we 
will exercise our right to terminate the 
treaty with Taiwan in accordance with 
its provisions, which permits termina- 
tion by either party after 1 year's 
notice. All other treaties and agree- 
ments will remain in effect. 



16 

Second is the critical question of the 
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan 
question by the Chinese themselves. It 
is clear from the actions and statements 
of the P.R.C. in the last month that 
normalization has, in fact, enhanced 
the possibilities that whatever the ulti- 
mate resolution of the issue may be, it 
will be pursued by peaceful means. 

Since the normalization of relations, 
the P.R.C. has adopted a markedly 
more moderate tone on the Taiwan 
issue. 

• On January 9 of this year, Vice 
Premier Deng told Senators Nunn, 
Glenn, Hart, and Cohen that: "The so- 
cial system on Taiwan will be decided 
by the people of Taiwan. Changes 
might take 100 years or 1,000 years. 
By which I mean a long time. We will 
not change the society by force." 

• On New Year's Day, after 25 
years, the P.R.C. ceased firing prop- 
aganda artillery shells at the offshore 
islands of Quemoy and Matsu. 

Third and finally, after the termi- 
nation of the Mutual Defense Treaty on 
December 31, 1979, we will continue 
our previous policy of selling carefully 
selected defensive weapons to Taiwan. 
While the P.R.C. said they disap- 
proved of this, they nevertheless 
moved forward with normalization with 
full knowledge of our intentions. 

In constructing a new relationship 
with the people on Taiwan, we are 
taking practical steps to insure con- 
tinuity of trade, cultural, and other un- 
official relations. The President has 
taken steps to assure the uninterrupted 
continuation of such relations from 
January 1, 1979. In the future these 
relations will be conducted through a 
nonprofit nongovernmental corporation 
called the American Institute in 
Taiwan. This corporation will facilitate 
ongoing and, we are confident, ex- 
panding ties between the American 
people and the people on Taiwan. 
Taipei will handle its unofficial rela- 
tions with this country in similar fash- 
ion. 

Let me say a word or two about the 
American Institute in Taiwan, the 
legislation it requires, and its opera- 
tions. Congress will be asked to ap- 
prove an omnibus bill that will 
authorize the funding of the American 
Institute in Taiwan and confirm its au- 
thority to act in a wide range of areas. I 
hope we will have your active support 
for expeditious passage of that bill. 

The institute will have its headquar- 
ters in Washington with field offices in 
Taiwan. It will provide the full range 
of commercial and other services that 



MESSAGE TO 
PRESIDENT CARTER, 
JAN. 1 

On behalf of the Chinese Government 
and people and in my own name, I wish 
to extend warm congratulations to you, 
Mr. President, and through you to the 
U.S. Government and the American 
people on this occasion of the establish- 
ment of diplomatic relations between the 
People's Republic of China and the 
United States of America. 

I believe that the establishment of dip- 
lomatic relations between China and the 
United States is a historic event in our 
bilateral relations, which not only accords 
with the fundamental interests of the 
Chinese and American peoples but will 
exert a favorable influence on the inter- 
national situation. I am confident that it 
will also open up broad vistas for the 
deepening of the friendship between the 
Chinese and American peoples and the 
good relations between the two countries. 

Hua Guofeng 

Premier of the State Council 

People's Republic of China 



have been previously provided through 
official channels to businessmen, both 
from the United States and from 
Taiwan. In your private business deal- 
ings on Taiwan, you may freely contact 
the institute's staff for advice or can 
deal directly with local firms and the 
authorities there. In short, we see no 
change necessary in the way private 
American business has been conducted 
on Taiwan up to now. Eximbank loans, 
OPIC [Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation] guarantees, and other im- 
portant arrangements will continue. 

With these new arrangements in 
place, we expect Taiwan to continue to 
prosper. Taiwan's dynamic economic 
growth is one of the most impressive 
stories of the last decade; it is now our 
eighth largest trading partner, and per 
capita income is among the highest in 
Asia. 

As anyone who has studied the issue 
can attest, normalization of relations 
with Peking was not an easy step to 
take. The difficulties always argued for 
themselves, and further delay was al- 
ways an inviting option for any Presi- 
dent. But we all recognized that sooner 
or later we would have to move. As I 
have already said, failure to try to 
move forward would have left us in 
danger of moving backward — at great 
cost to our global position. By the time 
we took the decisive step, every other 
member of NATO, our two treaty 
partners in ANZUS [Australia and New 



Department of State Bulletin 

Zealand], and Japan had long since 
recognized the P.R.C, as had most 
other nations of the world. They were 
ready for our action — and most of 
them, including all the members of the 
Association of South East Asian Na- 
tions (ASEAN), applauded it. 

When we acted, we did so in a way 
that enhances significantly the pros- 
pects for stability and peace in Asia 
and the Pacific. We acted in a way that 
will move us toward our objective of a 
stable system of independent nations in 
Asia and that will also increase the 
chances of maintaining a stable 
equilibrium among the United States, 
Japan, China, and the Soviet Union. 

The United States will continue to 
play an active role in order to maintain 
that stable equilibrium. For reasons of 
geography, history, and economics, we 
are as much a Pacific nation as an At- 
lantic nation, with deep and abiding 
national interests in the region. We will 
maintain balanced and flexible military 
forces in the region, as the recent suc- 
cessful conclusion of the base agree- 
ments with the Philippines so clearly 
demonstrates. And we will not hesitate 
to act, as required, to protect our vital 
national interests. 

The rapidly expanding relations be- 
tween our two nations in science, 
trade, and exchanges require the kind 
of structure that diplomatic relations 
can provide. It will allow a much freer 
exchange between our cultures. And 
with full relations, we are in a far bet- 
ter position to encourage China's role 
as a constructive member of the world 
community. We will be discussing all 
of these matters with Vice Premier 
Deng when he visits us in 2 weeks. 

It is particularly useful on this occa- 
sion to note some of the economic 
benefits we expect to flow from the 
establishment of diplomatic relations 
with the P.R.C. These include our par- 
ticipation as a regular supplier of ag- 
ricultural commodities to China; the 
ability of U.S. exporters to compete on 
an equal basis with other suppliers; and 
the resumption of shipping, air, bank- i 
ing, and other normal economic rela- 
tions with China. 

Let me emphasize that in normaliz- 
ing relations we acted in a way that 
does not threaten any other nation but 
can increase the sense of community of 
nations that we seek to encourage. 

We believe that China has an im- 
portant role to play in the search for 
global peace and stability. The same is 
true for the Soviet Union. Our national 
interests are best served when we seek 
to improve relations with both nations I 
while protecting our vital strategic 
interests. This was the case during the 
late winter and spring of 1972, a period 



February 1979 

during which both the Shanghai com- 
munique and SALT I were achieved. 
Equilibrium and stability, not isolation, 
are our strategic objectives. For this 
reason, we also look forward to the 
early conclusion of the SALT agree- 
ment with the Soviet Union and to im- 
provement of our trade relations with 
the Soviets as well as the Chinese. 

In conclusion, let me urge you to 
support the President's decision and the 
legislation to continue relations with 
the people on Taiwan. We seek your 
support in explaining the strategic and 
historic necessity of this action. And 
we encourage you to develop greater 
trade and contact with both the 
People's Republic of China and the 
people on Taiwan. 

It was just short of 7 years from the 
Shanghai communique to normalization 
of relations. Through a difficult period, 
two great nations began to restore con- 
tact and shape a new relationship. We 
all recognize that a new era is upon us. 
Opportunities previously denied to us 
have now begun to take shape. 

The nations grouped in and around 
the world's largest ocean — the 
Pacific — contain close to half the 
world's population. These nations must 
decide whether to choose the path of 
greater cooperation and growth or to 
enter into a period of unresolved strug- 
gles for influence. 

For our part, the United States will 
enter the closing decades of the 20th 
century ready to play a leading role in 
the search for peace and economic 
well-being. The lack of diplomatic re- 
lations between the United States and 
China was an obstacle to progress for 
many years. Having now surmounted 
it, we face the tremendous challenge 
ahead with a sense of excitment and 
hope. 



SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL 4 

I am extremely pleased to be here 
today before this unprecedented 
gathering of American business leaders 
representing the promise of our new 
economic ties with China and our con- 
tinuing economic ties with Taiwan. 

It is particularly important to meet 
with you now. At this historic time in 
our relationship with China, when we 
have normalized our political relation- 
ship, we now have the equally chal- 
lenging task of normalizing our eco- 
nomic relationship. You have all heard 
Secretary Vance's description of how 
these events unfolded and what it 
means to us politically. It is our 
task — yours as businessmen and mine 
as a government official — to complete 
this process on the economic front. 



China's ambitious economic goals to 
spur modernization and its recent 
liberalization of foreign trade and fi- 
nance policies have marked an "open- 
ing to the West" which has invited 
Western governments and private in- 
dustry alike to take advantage of its 
numerous commercial opportunities. 
We have gotten off to a late start in this 
game, but we now have the opportunity 
at least to begin making up lost ground. 

Obviously we still have many obsta- 
cles to overcome. A normal economic 
relationship between China and the 
United States is hindered by such is- 
sues as the claims/assets problem and 
absence of MFN [most-favored-nation] 
and credit facilities. In the coming 
weeks and months we will be addres- 
sing the entire range of our bilateral 
economic relationship — not only the is- 
sues I have just mentioned but other 
important issues, indeed the whole 
range of issues that form the basis of an 
economic relationship between two na- 
tions. 

These questions involve a whole host 
of complicated legal and legislative is- 
sues. The settlement of the claims issue 
in particular will require some time and 
careful consultation with the Congress 



MESSAGE TO 

VICE PREMIER DENG 

XIAOPING, JAN. 1* 

On this New Year's Day, I welcome 
the establishment of full diplomatic rela- 
tions between the United States of 
America and the People's Republic of 
China. 

New tasks now await us. The new 
Sino-American relationship offers great 
potential benefit to the welfare of our 
peoples, to the promotion of peace and 
prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, and 
to stability throughout the world. 

The American people — and I 
personally — look forward to your forth- 
coming visit to the United States. In 
Washington, we can talk seriously with 
each other about both global and bilateral 
matters. 

Together, we can seize the opportunity 
your visit affords us to foster a construc- 
tive and enduring relationship between 
our two peoples. To that end, Mrs. Carter 
joins me in wishing you and Madame Zhuo 
Lin a Happy New Year, and we look for- 
ward to greeting you in the United States. 

Jimmy Carter 



*Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Jan. 8. 1979. 



17 

as well as the Chinese. Our goal is to 
accomplish appropriate compensation 
for our claimants. This will take time 
and will require patience. Neverthe- 
less, I am encouraged by the responses 
I have met so far and am optimistic of 
the eventual outcome. 

In striving for the normalization of 
trade with China, the Administration 
realizes the need for balance in its re- 
lations with others. The present legisla- 
tion that governs the granting of 
most-favored-nation status to all na- 
tions must be applied evenhandedly; 
we cannot afford to improve relations 
with one trading partner at the expense 
of a deterioration of relations with 
another. The United States needs to 
expand its exports to all countries. We 
are striving to reduce our balance-of- 
payments deficit and to fortify the U.S. 
dollar. And to this end, we need your 
help. The American business commu- 
nity needs trade: the Carter Adminis- 
tration wants it. We can ill-afford to 
cast a blind eye to the vast potential 
for exports provided by the Chinese, 
the Soviet, or any other market as long 
as those exports take adequate account 
of our legitimate national concerns. 

It is to expedite the development of 
an economic relationship with 
China — as well as to participate in the 
first official exchange of ambassa- 
dors — that President Carter has asked 
me to lead a delegation of our top fi- 
nance and trade people to Beijing 
[Peking] in late February. 

My trip is part of a comprehensive 
and coordinated effort. Vice Premier 
Deng visits the United States at the end 
of this month. In providing the oppor- 
tunity to exchange preliminary views on 
our future economic relationship, his 
visit here will form the basis for my 
trip. Hopefully this will lead to sub- 
stantial progress toward a claims/assets 
settlement and a dialogue on broader 
economic matters while I am in China. 
We would anticipate continuing this 
dialogue after my trip. Secretary 
Kreps, who will go to China in late 
April, will pick up the ball at that 
point, continuing and initiating new 
discussions on trade and commercial 
matters. 

While moving forward with our new 
economic ties with the People's Re- 
public of China, I want to assure you 
that our commercial commitments with 
Taiwan have had our highest priority. 
These are essential. The Administra- 
tion's fundamental aim is to insure 
continuity, stability, and growth in 
these economic ties, which now en- 
compass over $500 million of U.S. pri- 
vate direct investment and roughly $7 
billion in two-way trade. The Presi- 
dential memorandum issued on 



18 

December 30 provides for the continu- 
ation of all current programs, agree- 
ments, and arrangements with Taiwan, 
and we will introduce legislation to 
make provision for the continuation of 
unofficial relations. 

Taiwan is one of the most striking 
examples in the world today of suc- 
cessful rapid economic development. 
This very impressive growth has been 
achieved through the efforts of a strong 
private sector and enlightened official 
policies. Thus, as other important 
trading partners have shifted diplomatic 
recognition from Taipei to Beijing, 
trade and other commercial relations 
with Taiwan have continued to 
flourish. There is every reason to ex- 
pect that economic relations between 
the United States and Taiwan will con- 
tinue to expand. 

We are entering a dramatic and ex- 
citing new era in our China relation- 
ship. The opportunity is before us to 
create new and vital economic ties with 
a China that is bent on entering the 
front ranks of the world's economic 
powers by the end of the century — and 
at the same time expand our commer- 
cial ties with the prosperous and thriv- 
ing economy of Taiwan. As long as we 
approach this opportunity realistically, 
work together, and help each other in 
support of common goals, I am confi- 
dent we will succeed. 



SECRETARY KREPS 5 

Diplomatic recognition, China's in- 
creasing involvement in world markets, 
and the aggressive response of today's 
audience to rising trade opportunities 
have ushered in a new era of economic 
relations with China. At the same time 
the President has acted firmly to 
safeguard our important trade and in- 
vestment interests on Taiwan. The net 
effect of these steps, with government 
and business working together, will be 
a marked contribution to fulfillment of 
our national export policy and im- 
provement in our trade and payments 
balances. 

As you are aware, over the past sev- 
eral months, a number of American 
companies have concluded significant 
agreements or contracts with the 
People's Republic of China. These are 
auspicious signals for a new stage of 
development in Sino-American trade. 

We welcome the changes in Chinese 
policy which have made such transac- 
tions possible. China has adopted am- 
bitious modernization plans for indus- 
try and agriculture which call for 120 
key projects in addition to the upgrad- 
ing of selected existing facilities. Of 
even greater significance in evaluating 



Department of State Bulletin 



total market size is the Chinese lead- 
ership's clear indication of interest in 
importing foreign equipment and 
technology. 

Our current estimate based on 
Chinese plan goals is that the P.R.C. 
likely will import $50 billion of com- 
plete plant, and the full capital equip- 
ment bill could run $70-85 billion in 
the period 1978-85. We believe that 
U.S. exports to the P.R.C. may total 
$10 billion over the next 5 years. 

For our trade to achieve its potential, 
however, a number of significant hur- 
dles must be overcome. Establishment 
of normal diplomatic relations was the 
necessary first step. At the present 
time, U.S. exports to China cannot be 
financed by Eximbank credits, and 
Chinese exports to the United States do 
not receive most-favored-nation tariff 
treatment. Extension of these basic 
trade facilities will require the settle- 
ment of our respective financial claims 
and the negotiation of a trade agree- 
ment. In addition, such questions as of 
export licensing, commercial repre- 
sentation, and patent protection, among 
others, must be addressed. 

We all share a sense of excitement 
over the dimensions of this growth in 
trade with China. But in our en- 
thusiasm and optimism, we should be 
realistic. Under the best conditions, 
this trade will be highly competitive, 
and other industrial trading countries, 
utilizing in some cases extremely 
low-interest credits, already have won 
a significant share of the market. There 
are also marked limitations on Chinese 
hard currency earning capacity. For 
these reasons, the negotiations during 
the visit of the Vice Premier will be 
very important, as will the further steps 
laid out by Secretaries Vance and 
Blumenthal. 

Perhaps I should comment briefly on 
the purposes of my visit to the P.R.C. 
which will follow a short time after 
Secretary Blumenthal's. 

The precise objectives for my trip 
will, of course, depend on the progress 
we have achieved in the interim. I 
shall, of course, follow up on some 
matters on which Secretary Blumenthal 
will have initiated discussions. 

My fundamental goal will be to ob- 
tain Chinese agreement on the condi- 
tions under which private and 
governmentally-sponsored commercial 
operations will be conducted. I plan to 
discuss various trade facilitation ques- 
tions, commercial exhibits, and pres- 
entation of technical seminars. On 
some of these issues, I expect that 
agreement can be reached during my 
trip. I hope also to discuss the possible 
establishment of a governmental busi- 
ness development center in Beijing. In 



MESSAGE TO 
PRESIDENT CARTER, 
JAN. 1 

I wish to extend to you my warm con- 
gratulations on the establishment of dip- 
lomatic relations between the People's 
Republic of China and the United States 
of America. 

Both the Chinese and American 
peoples are happy over the normalization 
of Sino-American relations on the basis 
of the Shanghai Communique. 

I am looking forward to meeting with 
you during my visit to the United States 
in late January and bringing to the Ameri- 
can .people a message of friendship from 
the Chinese people. 

Deng Xiaoping 

Vice Premier of the State Council 

People's Republic of China 



addition, agreement should be possible 
by then on a number of scientific proj- 
ects and exhanges for which the De- 
partment of Commerce is responsible. 

Judging from the inquiries directed 
to our P.R.C. division — running now at 
250 calls per day — American business 
has been quick to grasp the significance 
of these new opportunities. I have dou- 
bled the staff available to answer your 
inquiries. Revised publications taking 
account of the fast changing situation 
will shortly be off the presses. We 
stand ready to advise and assist you in 
your efforts. 

At the same time, we recognize the 
substantial U.S. business stake in 
Taiwan. The Cabinet is operating under 
the President's December 30 memoran- 
dum directing that, pending new legis- 
lation, we maintain our commercial 
relations on a "business-as-usual" 
basis. My hope and expectation is that 
the Presidential memorandum and the 
follow-on legislation will lead to con- 
tinued rapid growth in our trade and 
investment relations with Taiwan. 

My optimism about the future of our 
trade with Taiwan is based on the solid 
experience of our allies. For example, 
the trade between Canada and Taiwan 
has increased 540% since 1970 when 
Canada normalized its relations with 
the P.R.C. More recently Japan's has 
increased 230% since 1972. Those fig- 
ures are impressive evidence that this 
change in relationship has definitely 
not impeded a dramatic increase in 
trade with Taiwan's booming economy. 
I should also point out that Taiwan will 
continue under the present legislation 
to receive all the trade benefits that it 



February 1979 

now enjoys. These include MFN. 
Eximbank privileges, OPIC privileges, 
and the present tariff schedule which 
governs our trade. We are determined 
to take whatever steps are necessary to 
see that these healthy important rela- 
tions are not jeopardized by this latest 
move. 

I am heartened by David Kennedy's 
[President, USA/ROC Economic 
Council] reassurances to the Adminis- 
tration regarding the plans of U.S. 
business on Taiwan. I think it is clear 
from his assessment, as well as other 
remarks that we have had from dozens 
of businessmen with investments on 
Taiwan, that their intentions are to 
continue with the sound and healthy 
economic ties which have already been 
established. 

Our gains with the People's Republic 
are not at the expense of the people on 
Taiwan. I believe firmly that the Presi- 
dent's decision has strengthened the 
U.S. national interest at all levels. I 
think this will become increasingly 
evident as our relations unfold in the 
future. 

Clearly, the Administration is eager 
to support your business efforts in the 
P.R.C. and on Taiwan. In turn, your 
support for the policies necessary to 
place our economic relations on a 
sound footing is essential. We shall 
need to work together if we are to in- 
crease our role in this rapidly growing 
but quite competitive market. The 
gains to American business can be sub- 
stantial, as many of you know from 
your own experience. We must re- 
member that growth in our trade with 
China can also be of great value to the 
economy, particularly in its favorable 
effect on our unfavorable deficit. We 
shall look forward to sharing this joint 
venture with you. 



DR. BRZEZINSKF 

My purpose is to place our China 
policy in a wider context. As I address 
you, a number of troubling develop- 
ments dominate the headlines. 

• The Shah of Iran is planning to 
depart for a rest, leaving behind him a 
new administration which will seek to 
return tranquility to an unsettled coun- 
try in which the United States has an 
enormous stake. 

• Vietnam has invaded its neighbor, 
Cambodia. Through an act of aggres- 
sion, it has imposed a subservient re- 
gime upon a Cambodian people 
wearied of the inhumane, callous rule 
of Pol Pot. 

• Among the first governments to 
recognize the new Vietnamese- 
installed regime in Phnom Penh was 
Afghanistan, a strategically important 
country which borders on Iran and 
Pakistan and in which Soviet influence 
has increased significantly in recent 
months. 

• The situation in the Horn of Africa 
and in South Yemen, Angola, and 
southern Africa remains uncertain, as 
Cuban troops continue to promote 
Soviet interests. 

• Indeed, all the developing coun- 
tries in the arc from northeast Asia to 
southern Africa continue to search for 
viable forms of government capable of 
managing the process of moderniza- 
tion. Their instability, uncertainty, and 
weakness can be exploited and inten- 
sified by outside powers. 

Balanced against these unsettling de- 
velopments, however, are a number of 
quieter yet more significant, positive 
developments. 

• Progress has been made in bring- 



MESSAGE TO 
FOREIGN MINISTER 
HUANG HUA, JAN. 1 

The establishment of full diplomatic 
relations between the United States and 
the People's Republic of China is of ex- 
ceptional importance. It renews the ties of 
friendship which the people of the United 
States have valued for more than two 
centuries. It marks the end of a period of 
animosity and conflict. It signals the be- 
ginning of a new era in which increas- 
ingly broad exchanges between our two 
countries can consolidate and strengthen 
our relationships and contribute to peace 
and stability in Asia and throughout the 
world. 

As we have moved over the last seven 



years toward this day, the associations 
between our two countries have steadily 
grown. Our new relations will enable us 
to work together more effectively on the 
broad range of bilateral and international 
issues which our two countries and all 
mankind face in the years ahead. I look 
forward to working with you in these 
endeavors. 

We share a common world, we share a 
common interest in peace, and we share a 
common dedication to the dignity and 
prosperity of our peoples. We dedicate 
ourselves in this New Year to working 
with the People's Republic of China to- 
ward these goals. 

Cyrus R. Vance 
Secretary of State 



19 

ing peace to the Middle East. The 
progress is slow and often painful. But 
through the persistent diplomacy of 
President Carter and Secretary Vance, 
we are, I believe, inexorably moving 
toward the realization of the Camp 
David accords. We are promoting rec- 
onciliation to one of the most volatile 
disputes in the world. 

• In Latin America, U.S. policy has 
undergone significant change, and our 
relations with most countries in the re- 
gion are at or near all time highs. The 
ratification of the Panama Canal 
treaties was an historical milestone. 

• We have significantly improved 
the nature of our relations with black 
African countries. 

• Our relations with India have 
never been better; and we are retaining 
our ties of friendship with Pakistan. 

• In East Asia, a delicate balance of 
power exists favorable to our interests. 
We have normalized relations with 
China, in part, to consolidate the bal- 
ance. 

• Such regional organizations as 
ASEAN and the Organization of Afri- 
can Unity are playing an increasingly 
positive role in bringing stability to 
their regions. 

• In recognition of the growing con- 
ventional military capability of the 
Soviet Union, we are increasing our 
military expenditures — as are our 
NATO allies — to make sure our Euro- 
pean defenses remain strong. 

• While we have not yet managed to 
establish a more stable world monetary 
and trading system, we have made 
progress in recent months in stabilizing 
the dollar and in creating a more or- 
derly and growing world market 
through MTN. 

• We will reach a SALT II agree- 
ment which will place a cap on the de- 
ployment of new and more missiles and 
which introduces a note of stability in 
the precarious strategic balance be- 
tween the Soviet Union and the United 
States. 

Added to these favorable develop- 
ments are those of the spirit. After the 
debilitating decade of Vietnam and 
Watergate, our people are returning to 
their social moorings and exhibiting 
their traditional will and idealism. 
Worldwide, too, we have once again 
assumed the mantle of moral lead- 
ership, with the importance we attach 
to human rights, nuclear nonprolifera- 
tion, and limitation of conventional 
arms sales. Certainly as much as and 
probably more than any other major 
power, the United States is addressing 
in a forthright manner the problems of 
our age. We remain an innovative soci- 
ety and a worldwide source of inspira- 
tion. 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



These positive developments are the 
result of the President's commit- 
ment — as he enunciated at Notre Dame 
more than a year ago — to a policy of 
constructive global engagement, a 
policy of trying to influence the 
changes of our era in directions that are 
compatible with our interests and val- 
ues. Under that broad heading, we have 
crystallized seven fundamental objec- 
tives for our foreign policy: 

• To enhance our military security; 

• To reinforce our ties with our key 
allies and promote a more cooperative 
world system; 

• To respond in a positive way to the 
economic and moral challenge of the 
so-called North-South relationship; 

• To improve relations between East 
and West; 

• To help resolve the more 
threatening regional conflicts and 
tensions; 

• To cope with such emerging global 
issues as nuclear proliferation and arms 
dissemination; and 

• To reassert traditional American 
values — especially human rights. 

At the outset, I should note that 
American foreign policy confronts a 
fundamental analytical question: Are 
the issues of the moment which I men- 
tioned earlier — Iran, Indochina, the 
Horn, Afghanistan — indications of 
longer term trends? Do we respond to 
these issues not only with the sense of 
urgency which is obviously called for 
but with a sense of historical despair as 
well? Or are the positive developments 
more indicative of our era? Should we 
continue on course? In short, is an op- 
timistic or pessimistic view of history 
justified? It seems to me that this issue 
underlies the emerging foreign policy 
debate in the United States. 

Without being Pollyannaish, this 
Administration is basically optimistic. 
We recognize the future is ours only 
with effort. Continued American vigi- 
lance, preparedness, and decisiveness 
are necessary to grasp the better future 
before us. But an optimistic view of 
history and of America's future lies at 
the heart of this Administration's 
foreign policy and of our China policy. 

I do not mean to downplay or belittle 
the seriousness of the current foreign 
policy challenges. Important, indeed 
vital, issues are at stake. But in each 
situation, we are developing responses 
appropriate to the challenges involved. 
The United States will suffer occa- 
sional setbacks, but we will continue to 
be able to offset our losses with gains 
elsewhere — such as those that have oc- 
curred in recent years in our relations 
with India, Egypt, Eastern Europe, 
Ghana, the Sudan, and East Asia. 



MESSAGE TO 
SECRETARY VANCE, 
JAN. 1 

I wish to extend my warm congratula- 
tions to Your Excellency on this occasion 
when formal diplomatic relations are es- 
tablished between the People's Republic 
of China and the United States of 
America. 

The normalization of Sino-U.S. rela- 
tions is of major and far-reaching signifi- 
cance. It not only accords with the com- 
mon aspiration of our two peoples, but 
also contributes to the cause of peace of 
the people of Asia and the world. 

It is my conviction that our bilateral 
relations will make significant progress 
on this basis. 

Huang Hua 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
People's Republic of China 



What we emphatically reject are 
apocalyptic visions about the future 
ability of the United States to pursue 
and defend our interests abroad. The 
pessimism that one hears from many 
quarters conveys a sense of Armaged- 
don and of the need to rush to the bar- 
ricade at every challenge without 
forethought. 

Today, we seek neither a world order 
based on a Pax Americana nor an order 
based on a Soviet-American con- 
dominium. Neither order is possible or 
just. 

Rather, we are in the process of 
creating a diverse and stable commu- 
nity of independent states. Working 
with our traditional allies — for we can- 
not do the job alone — we are beginning 
to create a framework for wide-ranging 
international cooperation involving the 
United States, Western Europe, Japan, 
and many of the emerging regional 
powers such as Mexico, Venezuela, 
Brazil, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, India, 
and Indonesia. And with the establish- 
ment of full diplomatic relations with 
the People's Republic of China, we 
very significantly increase the scope of 
international cooperation. 

We wish, of course, to include the 
Soviet Union in that framework of 
cooperation. Indeed, a fundamental 
choice the Soviet Union faces is 
whether to become a responsible part- 
ner in the creation of a global system of 
genuinely independent states or 
whether to exclude itself from global 
trends and derive its security exclu- 
sively from its military might and its 
domination of a few clients. We hope 
and encourage the Soviet Union to be 



cooperative, but, whichever path the 
Soviet Union chooses, we will continue 
our efforts to shape a framework for 
global cooperation based not on domi- 
nation but on respect for diversity. 

We recognize that the world is 
changing under the influence of forces 
no government can control. The 
world's population is experiencing a 
political awakening on a scale without 
precedent in its history. The global 
system is undergoing a significant re- 
distribution of political and economic 
power. 

The record of the past 2 years 
suggests, however, that the United 
States need not fear this change. To the 
contrary, the record shows that we can 
shape this change to our benefit and 
attain security in a world of diversity. 

Not only does the record of the past 
2 years suggest realistic optimism is 
warranted. Our own past and the qual- I 
ity of our people also encourage confi- I 
dence. For our national experience as a I 
nation of diverse origins and of change I 
speaks to the emerging global condi- | 
tion. Not just our wealth, not just our 
military might, but our history as a 
pluralistic people and our commitment 
to the values of freedom and independ- 
ence which now stir all of mankind 
give us a naturally key role in shaping 
the trends of our time. 

Given our assessment of history and 
the goals of the Administration, these 
points should be made about our China 
policy. 

• We see normalization as having 
long-term, historic significance. It 
comprises part of our effort to consoli- f 
date and improve our relations with all I 
the emerging powers in the world. And 
none of these powers is more important 
than China, with its nearly billion I 
people and third largest defense budget 
in the world. 

• We did not normalize out of tacti- 
cal or expedient considerations; rather 
we recognized reality. The People's 
Republic of China is going to play an 
increasing role in world affairs, and it 
was important for us to have a con- | 
tinuing, broadened, and structured re- < 
lationship with this government. 

• We recognize that the P.R.C. and 
we have different ideologies and eco- 
nomic and political systems. We rec- 
ognize that to transcend the differences 
and to make our new relationship suc- 
cessful will require patience, wisdom, 
and understanding. We harbor neither 
the hope nor the desire that through 
extensive contacts with China we can 
remake that nation into the American 
image. 

• Indeed, we accept our differences. 
Normalization is an important part of 
our global effort to create a stable 



;bruary 1979 



21 



community of diverse and independent 
nations. As President Carter stated in 
his cable to Premier Hua Guofeng on 
January 1: ". . .the United States de- 
sires a world of diversity in which each 
nation is free to make a distinctive 
contribution to . . . the manifold aspi- 
rations ... of mankind ... we wel- 
come the growing involvement of the 
People's Republic of China in world 
affairs. " 

• We consider China as a key force 
for global peace simply by being 
China: an independent and strong na- 
tion reaching for increased contact with 
the rest of the world while remaining 
basically self-reliant and resistant of 
any efforts by others to dominate it. 

• As Vice President Mondale stated 
on January 1: "We feel bonds of 
friendship, but sentiment alone cannot 
bridge the gap between us. What has 
brought us together is an awareness of 
our parallel interests in creating a 
world of economic progress, stability, 
and peace." 

The community of interest we share 
with China is particularly evident in 
Asia, where we both desire peace, sta- 
bility, and nations free of outside 
domination. 

East, Southeast, and South Asia is 
one of the most important regions of 
the world today. The economies of the 
area are booming; the people are 
dynamic. The United States has great 
economic and security interests around 
the rim of Asia: in Japan, South Korea, 
all the Pacific islands down to the 
Philippines, and in Southeast Asia as 
well. 

To protect our interests, we retain a 
strong military presence in the region, 
we maintain appropriate weapon sales 
throughout the region, and we are pre- 
pared to act on our interests should the 
need arise. 

Few actions will contribute more to 
the security and stability of our impor- 
tant positions around the rim of Asia, 
however, than a constructive involve- 
ment with China. As we improve our 
relations with Beijing, China will also 
wish to keep us involved in the region 
and not, as in the past, seek to drive us 
away. 

For the first time in decades, we can 
enjoy simultaneously good relations 
with both China and Japan. It is dif- 
ficult to overstress the importance of 
this fact. Normalization consolidates a 
favorable balance of power in the Far 
East and enhances the security of our 
friends. 

Now the Chinese are turning outward 
and extending their hand to the West. 
We are prepared to respond less in 
confidence that in the future their hand 



United States, 

People's Republic of China 

Celebrate Diplomatic Recognition 



On January 1 , 1979, to celebrate the 
establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the United States and the 
People's Republic of China, toasts 
were exchanged between Ambassador 
Chai Zemin, Chief of the Liaison Of- 
fice of the People's Republic of China, 
and Vice President Mondale in Wash- 
ington, and between Ambassador 
Leonard Woodcock, Chief of the U.S. 
Liaison Office, and Vice Premier Deng 
Xiaoping in Beijing (Peking). 



AMBASSADOR CHAI ZEMIN 

Tonight it is a great honor and plea- 
sure for us to have American Govern- 
ment officials. Senators, Congressmen, 
and friends from various circles spare 
your time for attending our reception in 
celebration of the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the 
People's Republic of China and the 
United States of America. First of all, 
on behalf of the entire staff of the 
Chinese Liaison Office and in my own 
name, I'd like to express our warm 
welcome and heartfelt thanks to all the 
distinguished guests and friends. 

This New Year's Day is not only a 
traditional holiday but also a great ju- 
bilant day of the establishment of the 
formal diplomatic relations between the 
People's Republic of China and the 



United States of America. It is of spe- 
cial significance for the Chinese and 
American peoples. I would like to avail 
myself of this opportunity to extend 
festive greetings to all our friends and 
the American people, wishing you a 
happy New Year and a happy life. May 
the friendship between our two peoples 
and the new relationship of the two 
countries continuously consolidate and 
develop. 

The realization of normalization of 
Sino-U.S. relations is the outcome of 
the joint efforts of the leaders, the 
Governments, and peoples of the two 
countries. Our great leader. Chairman 
Mao Zedong, and esteemed Premier 
Zhou Enlai in their lifetimes formu- 
lated the strategic policy of opening the 
door to Sino-U.S. relations and made 
sustained efforts to that end. 

During the visit of President Nixon 
to China in 1972, the Chinese and U.S. 
sides issued the Shanghai communique, 
thus starting the process of normalizing 
relations between the two countries. 
President Ford, many U.S. Senators 
and Congressmen, and American 
friends from all walks of life have all 
played their part toward this end. 

After President Carter took office, he 
said repeatedly that normalization in 
accordance with the spirit of the 
Shanghai communique was the objec- 
tive of the U.S. Government. Through 



will remain extended than in the 
knowledge that without a reciprocal 
gesture, their hand would certainly be 
withdrawn. And by developing bonds 
of commerce and shared understand- 
ing, we reduce the chances of future 
animosity. 

That is why we have completed the 
process of normalization begun by 
President Nixon, President Ford, and 
Secretary Kissinger. 

Normalization, therefore, is an act 
rooted in historical optimism and 
political realism. This change in our 
China policy does not represent retreat 
or abandonment of our previous posi- 
tions; rather, it reflects our determina- 
tion to be globally engaged, to wel- 
come diversity, and to shape our 
future. 

For a generation, we said "no" to 
the reality of East Asia. We refused to 
recognize reality, we sought to isolate 



China, and we lived by myths — with 
two wars and with incalculable cost to 
the region and to us. Now, we say 
"yes" to reality. We are confident that 
as an Asian and Pacific power with a 
positive relationship with Beijing, we 
will significantly contribute to the 
peace and prosperity of the American 
people and of all peoples in the 
region. □ 



'Press release 13. 

2 For text see Bulletin of January 1979. p 
25. 

'For text of the joint communique issued in 
Shanghai on Feb. 27, 1972, see Bulletin of 
Mar. 20, p. 435. 

4 Text from Treasury Department press re- 
lease. 

'Text from Commerce Department press re- 
lease. 

6 Text from White House press release. 



22 

the concerted efforts of the Chinese and 
American sides, this objective has fi- 
nally been realized. President Carter, 
Secretary of State Vance, and Dr. 
Brzezinski have all made valuable 
contributions to that goal. For this we 
express our great appreciation. 

The establishment of Sino-U.S. 
diplomatic relations is an event of his- 
toric significance. The normalization of 
Sino-U.S. relations is not only in con- 
formity with the aspiration and inter- 
ests of the Chinese and American 
peoples but also will certainly play an 
active role in combating the expansion 
and aggression of hegemonism and up- 
holding peace and stability in Asia and 
the world. 

As is well put by our wise leader 
Chairman Hua [Guofeng], the estab- 
lishment of diplomatic relations be- 
tween China and the United States 
"opens up broad vistas for enhancing 
the understanding and friendship be- 
tween the two peoples and promoting 
peace and stability in Asia and the 
world as a whole."' As is also well put 
by President Carter, the establishment 



CHINESE PROPER NAMES 

The State Council of the People's Repub- 
lic of China has adopted the Chinese 
phonetic alphabet (Pinyin) to standardize the 
romanization of P.R.C. names and places. 
The following is a list of the new spellings 
used in this issue of the Bulletin; a more 
complete list will be published next month: 

Beijing (Peking) 

Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-pingl 
Hua Guofeng (Hua Kuo-feng) 
Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) 
Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) 



of diplomatic relations between China 
and the United States "... will be of 
. . . long-term benefit to the peoples of 
both [the United States and] China and 
... to all the peoples of the world." 
And "normalization . . . will enhance 
the stability of Asia." 

The normalization of Sino-U.S. re- 
lations constitutes the irresistible his- 
torical current representing the feelings 
of the people and the general trend of 
the situation. The issuance of the joint 
communique has gained the broad sup- 
port and enthusiastic backing of the 
Chinese and American peoples and re- 
ceived warm welcome from the peoples 
and all the peace-loving countries all 
over the world. That is, indeed, the 
forceful evidence. 

The Chinese and American peoples 



are great peoples. There exists a tradi- 
tional friendship between them. 
January 1, 1979, marks the day when 
the Sino-U.S. relations enter a new 
stage. At the invitation of President 
Carter. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping 
will pay an official visit to the United 
States in January 1979, the first visit 
by a leader of our country to the United 
States. This will be another major 
political move in the international af- 
fairs. It is our firm conviction that as 
the time goes by, the friendship of the 
Chinese and American peoples and the 
good relations of the two countries will 
certainly continue to be consolidated 
and strengthened. 



VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE 

Today marks the establishment of 
formal diplomatic relations between the 
People's Republic of China and the 
United States of America. On behalf of 
President Carter and his entire Admin- 
istration, I am delighted to be here. 

Harry Truman succinctly described 
the process that has brought us together 
here on this historic occasion: "Men 
make history and not the other way 
'round. In periods where there is no 
leadership, society stands still. Prog- 
ress occurs when courageous, skillful 
leaders seize the opportunity to change 
things for the better." 

President Carter, Premier Hua, and 
Vice Premier Deng have exhibited 
courageous and visionary leadership in 
agreeing to establish diplomatic rela- 
tions between our two governments on 
this day. An abnormal situation that 
persisted too long has ended, and the 
vision of the Shanghai communique has 
been realized. Our two great peoples 
are reconciled, and we can enjoy the 
prospect of friendship, expanding 
commerce, tourism, and cultural and 
scholarly exchange between our two 
peoples. 

The President clearly enunciated his 
China policy at Notre Dame University 
in May 1977 when he stated: "We see 
the American-Chinese relationship as a 
central element of our global policy, 
and China as a key force for global 
peace. We wish to cooperate closely 
with the creative Chinese people on 
the problems that confront all man- 
kind . . . ." 

The touchstones of this new and 
historic chapter in Sino-American rela- 
tions are equality and realism. The 
more than 200-year history between 
our peoples has too often been charac- 
terized by estrangement, misun- 
derstanding, and confrontation. As one 
of our greatest students of Sino- 
American relations has said: Expecta- 



Department of State Bulletin 

tions of a warm relationship fed by 
sentiment went unfulfilled in the harsh 
reality of world affairs, and the dashed 
hopes led to incriminations and bitter- 
ness. 

Now our nations have the good for- 
tune to be dealing with each other in a 
positive spirit and as equals. We wel- 
come this, and we recognize that this 
new relationship to be successful will 
require patience, wisdom, and under- 
standing. 

Let us recall at the outset, therefore, 
that the Chinese and Americans in this 
room have different ideologies and 
cultures; our political and economic 
systems are different. We feel bonds of 
friendship, but sentiment alone cannot 
bridge the gap between us. What has 
brought us together is an awareness of 
our parallel interests in creating a 
world of economic progress, stability, 
and peace. 

With a realistic sense of our interests 
at stake and with a commitment to a 
relationship based on equality and 
mutual benefit, I believe today, indeed, 
marks the dawn of a new and bountiful 
era in Sino-American relations, of an 
unparalleled era of peace and stability 
in the Asia Pacific region, and of a 
constructive contribution by our 
peoples to a more just and stable 
world. 



AMBASSADOR WOODCOCK 

Today is an historic day in the rela- 
tions between the Chinese and Ameri- 
can peoples. The joint communique 
which enters into effect today brings to 
a close a period of nearly 30 years 
marked by the absence of formal dip- 
lomatic relations between our two gov- 
ernments. The breakdown in communi- 
cation between our two countries 
interrupted a long tradition of 
friendship and mutually beneficial 
cooperation between the Chinese and 
American peoples and adversely af- 
fected the cause of world peace. The 
step we are taking today can, in the 
words of President Carter, "... bene- 
ficially affect the world in which we 
live and the world in which our chil- 
dren will live. " 

To try to acknowledge the role of all 
who have contributed to this process 
would take many pages. I will simply 
note that leaders from both parties in 
the United States have recognized the 
importance of the goal we are realizing 
today. The visit by President Nixon to 
China in 1972, and the Shanghai com- 
munique which resulted, established a 
new basis for seeking to overcome the 
legacies from the past that divided us. 
President Ford and President Carter 



February 1979 

both renewed our commitment to the 
normalization of relations with the 
People's Republic of China. Through 
our mutual efforts, we are now able to 
concentrate our energies on building 
the more permanent and effective in- 
stitutions that full diplomatic relations 
make possible. 

The first day of the new year is a 
time for looking to the future. The 
American and Chinese peoples share a 
common heritage of creativity and of 
respect for diligence and hard work. 
We believe that today marks the begin- 
ning of a new era in our relations that 
will contribute to the well-being of 
both countries and of all mankind. 

We are especially pleased that this 
new page in our relations will begin 
with the official visit to the United 
States by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping. 
President Carter and the American 
people look forward to welcoming him 
to our country. 



VICE PREMIER DENG XIAOPING 

New Year's Day 1979 is a particu- 
larly memorable day for the Chinese 
and American peoples. It marks the end 
of the prolonged abnormal state in 
Sino-U.S. relations and the' fulfilment 
of the ardent wish of the two peoples 
for the establishment of formal diplo- 
matic relations between the two coun- 
tries. On this historic occasion, I wish 
to convey a message of warm con- 
gratulations and cordial greetings from 
the Chinese people to the American 
people on the opposite shore of the 
Pacific. 

The normalization of Sino-U.S. re- 
lations is an historic event in the annals 
of our bilateral relations and a major 
event of far-reaching influence in in- 
ternational affairs. In announcing the 
establishment of Sino-U.S. diplomatic 
relations, President Carter said that the 
United States did not undertake this 
important step for transient tactical or 
expedient reasons. I appreciate this 
far-sighted view. The Chinese Gov- 
ernment has all along regarded Sino- 
American relations in a long-term 
political and strategic perspective. I 
feel certain that the far-reaching influ- 
ence the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between our two countries 
exerts upon the development of our 
bilateral relations and upon the defense 
of world peace will become more and 
more evident with the passage of time. 

I will soon be paying an official visit 
to the United States at the invitation of 
President Carter. I hope that my con- 
tacts and talks with the leaders of the 
United States and the American people 
will further enhance understanding and 



23 



Diplomatic Relations With the P.R.C* 
and Future Relations With Taiwan 



President Carter's announcement on 
December 15 that the United States and 
the People's Republic of China had 
agreed to establish full diplomatic rela- 
tions was the culmination of long 
negotiations begun by President Nixon 
and continued by President Ford. In the 
Shanghai communique, issued during 
President Nixon's visit to Beijing (Pek- 
ing) in 1972, the United States ac- 
knowledged "... that all Chinese on 
either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain 
there is but one China and that Taiwan 
is a part of China." In that document, 
the United States also reaffirmed its 
interest in a peaceful settlement of the 
Taiwan question by the Chinese them- 
selves. The two sides made clear that 
normalization of relations was their 
common goal. 

Soon after coming into office Presi- 
dent Carter endorsed the Shanghai 
Communique and stated: "... normali- 
zation is the goal of our policy. I be- 
lieve that the United States and the 
People's Republic have common inter- 
ests in many places in the world. Given 
these and our bilateral interests, I look 
forward to strengthened cooperation 
between our two countries." The Ad- 
ministration's China policy has em- 
bodied three aims: (a) to enhance our 
consultative relations on matters of 
common international concern; (b) to 
expand our bilateral relations; and (c) 
to establish normal diplomatic rela- 
tions. The Administration has been 
prepared to move forward in any of 
these areas at an appropriate pace, 
while making clear that U.S. relations 



were not directed against any third 
party and that the United States re- 
tained an interest in the peaceful and 
prosperous future of the people of 
Taiwan. 

During the past year China, under 
the leadership of Premier Hua Guofeng 
and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, has 
moved rapidly to carry out an ambi- 
tious program of modernization and ex- 
panded contacts with the West. 
Domestically, Beijing has acted to rec- 
tify the damage to its political and eco- 
nomic structure caused by the cultural 
revolution. Chinese leaders have trav- 
eled extensively abroad. The P.R.C. 
has recently concluded, for example, 
economic agreements with the Euro- 
pean Community and Japan and a 
peace and friendship treaty with Japan. 

Our relationships with the P.R.C. 
have expanded rapidly in the past 6 
months. We have agreed to joint proj- 
ects in energy, space, medicine, ag- 
riculture, and other fields. The first of 
what is expected to be more than 500 
Chinese students and research scholars 
have begun arriving in this country, 
and American students will soon leave 
for China. At least six U.S. oil firms 
are negotiating with the P.R.C. for co- 
operative exploration of China's off- 
shore oil reserves. Trade with the 
P.R.C. more than tripled this year over 
last to exceed $1 billion, and U.S. 
grain sales will exceed $500 million. 
China's foreign purchases of capital 
equipment between now and 1985 are 
expected to reach $80 billion. 

In August of 1977 Secretary Vance 



friendship between our two peoples and 
promote our amicable bilateral ties and 
cooperation in the scientific-techno- 
logical, economic, cultural, and many 
other fields. 

In marking the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between China and 
the United States, we deeply honor the 
memory of the Chinese people's great 
leader, the late Chairman Mao Zedong, 
and the esteemed late Premier Zhou 
Enlai, who paved the way for the nor- 
malization of Sino-U.S. relations. Nat- 
urally, the efforts to promote 
Sino-U.S. relations made over the 
years by former President Nixon, 
former President Ford, Dr. Kissinger, 
many Senators and Congressmen, and 
other friends from all walks of life will 
also be remembered. We highly esteem 



the valuable contribution made by 
President Carter, Dr. Brzezinski, and 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in fi- 
nally achieving the normalization of 
Sino-American relations. 

We would like to express our thanks 
to the Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office, 
Mr. Woodcock, his predecessors, and 
his colleagues for their active efforts 
in promoting understanding and friend- 
ship between the Chinese and Ameri- 
can peoples and the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the two 
countries. 

In conclusion, I would like to take 
this opportunity to express our wel- 
come to American friends from the 
House of Representatives and the press 
who have come to visit China from 
afar. □ 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 



visited Beijing for exploratory talks on 
normalization with the new Chinese 
leadership. Secretary Vance also met 
with the Chinese Foreign Minister in 
New York that fall. He and Dr. 
Brzezinski met on many occasions with 
the chief of the Chinese Liaison Office 
here. During Dr. Brzezinski's visit to 
Beijing in May of this year, the United 
States indicated that Ambassador 
Leonard Woodcock, Chief of the 
Liaison Office in Beijing, was ready to 
begin serious discussions with Foreign 
Minister Huang Hua to see whether 
normalization could be achieved on 
mutually acceptable terms. 

Three Key Issues 

Throughout the discussions, the 
President felt he had to reach a clear 
understanding with the Chinese on 
three important issues: (1) unofficial 
American presence in Taiwan after 
normalization; (2) the substance of the 
American commercial, cultural, and 
other relations with Taiwan after nor- 
malization; and (3) our respective ex- 
pectations concerning the future of 
Taiwan. 

Both sides were aware that the 
Taiwan issue was the major stumbling 
block to normalization. President Carter 
made clear that the Administration 
must be confident of a peaceful and 
prosperous future for the people of 
Taiwan. The President, who personally 
approved all instructions to Ambassador 
Woodcock, met with the Chinese 
Liaison Office Chief, Ambassador 
Chai, on September 19. In that meet- 
ing, as in other discussions of this vital 
matter, the President left no doubt that 
Taiwan had to be able to purchase 
selected defensive weapons in the 
United States. 

In early November, we offered the 
P.R.C. a draft of a possible joint com- 
munique. After further negotiations 
Ambassador Woodcock was invited to 
meet with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping 
on December 13. This was the crucial 
meeting. The Vice Premier indicated 
that the P.R.C. was prepared to nor- 
malize on the basis of a position ac- 
ceptable to the United States. After 
further discussions, the two sides 
agreed on the December 15 announce- 
ment. 

Joint Communique 

The joint communique announcing 
the establishment of diplomatic rela- 
tions reaffirms the principles agreed on 
by the two governments in the Shan- 
ghai communique, and while acknowl- 
edging the Chinese position that there 
is but one China and Taiwan is part of 



China, states that "... the people of 
the United States will maintain cul- 
tural, commercial, and other unofficial 
relations with the people of Taiwan." 
Simultaneously with the communique, 
the United States issued a formal 
statement expressing its confidence that 
the people of Taiwan face a peaceful 
and prosperous future and stating that 
the United States "... continues to 
have an interest in the peaceful resolu- 
tion of the Taiwan issue and expects 
that the Taiwan issue will be settled 
peacefully by the Chinese them- 
selves." The parallel Chinese state- 
ment, released simultaneously, reaf- 
firmed the P.R.C. position that the way 
of reunifying the country is "entirely 
China's internal affair." It did not, 
however, contradict the U.S. stand on 
a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan 
question. 

The United States also declared that 
it is terminating the Mutual Defense 
Treaty in accordance with the terms of 
the treaty, which provides for termina- 
tion upon one year's notice by either 
party. The United States is not "ab- 
rogating" the treaty. The U.S. notice 
of intent to terminate the treaty will be 
effective January 1, 1979, and the 



treaty will cease to be in force on De- 
cember 31. 1979. 

In the course of negotiations on nor- 
malization the United States made clear 
its intention to continue the sale of de- 
fensive weapons to Taiwan on a re- 
strained basis after termination of the 
defense treaty. Premier Hua Guofeng, 
in his press conference on December 
16, stated that the People's Republic of 
China could not agree to this, "but 
nevertheless, the joint communique 
was reached. " 

Under the terms of the communique, 
formal diplomatic relations between the 
United States and the People's Repub- 
lic of China will be established on 
January 1. 1979. and diplomatic rela- 
tions with the Republic of China will 
be terminated. On March 1, 1979, the 
United States and the People's Repub- 
lic of China will establish Embassies in 
each other's capitals and exchange 
Ambassadors. Remaining U.S. military 
personnel in Taiwan — down to about 
700 noncombat personnel from the 
10,000 there when the Shanghai com- 
munique was issued — will be removed 
from the island before the end of April. 
The whole process of readjusting our 
relations with Taiwan will be com- 



PRESIDENT'S MEMORANDUM 
FOR ALL DEPARTMENTS 
AND AGENCIES, DEC. 30* 

Subject: Relations with the People on Taiwan 

As President of the United States. I have 
constitutional responsibility for the conduct 
of the foreign relations of the nation. The 
United States has announced that on January 
1, 1979, it is recognizing the government of 
the People's Republic of China as the sole 
legal government of China and is terminating 
diplomatic relations with the Republic of 
China. The United States has also stated that, 
in the future, the American people will 
maintain commercial, cultural, and other re- 
lations with the people of Taiwan without 
official government representation and with- 
out diplomatic relations. I am issuing this 
memorandum to facilitate maintaining those 
relations pending the enactment of legislation 
on the subject. 

I therefore declare and direct that: 

(A) Departments and agencies currently 
having authority to conduct or carry out pro- 
grams, transactions, or other relations with 
or relating to Taiwan are directed to conduct 
and carry out those programs, transactions, 
and relations beginning January 1. 1979. in 
accordance with such authority and, as ap- 
propriate, through the instrumentality re- 
ferred to in paragraph D below. 

(B) Existing international agreements and 
arrangements in force between the United 



States and Taiwan shall continue in force and 
shall be performed and enforced by depart- 
ments and agencies beginning January 1 . 
1979. in accordance with their terms and. as 
appropriate, through that instrumentality. 

(C) In order to effectuate all of the provi- 
sions of this memorandum, whenever any 
law. regulation, or order of the United States 
refers to a foreign country, nation, state, 
government, or similar entity, departments 
and agencies shall construe those terms and 
apply those laws, regulations, or orders to 
include Taiwan. 

(D) In conducting and carrying out pro- 
grams, transactions, and other relations with 
the people on Taiwan, interests of the people 
of the United States will be represented as 
appropriate by an unofficial instrumentality 
in corporate form, to be identified shortly. 

(E) The above directives shall apply to and 
be carried out by all departments and agen- 
cies, except as I may otherwise determine. 

I shall submit to the Congress a request for 
legislation relative to non-governmental re- 
lationships between the American people and 
the people on Taiwan. 

This memorandum shall be published in 
the Federal Register. 

Jimmy Carter 



Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Jan. 8, 1979. 



February 1979 

pleted by the end of 1979. Vice Pre- 
mier Deng Xiaoping will visit Wash- 
ington on January 29. 

Future Relations With Taiwan 

As the President made clear, the 
people of the United States will main- 
tain their current commercial, cultural, 
and other relations with Taiwan 
through nonofficial means, much as 
Japan and other countries have done. 
Except for the defense treaty, we ex- 
pect all other agreements with Taiwan 
to remain in force, until any substitute 
arrangements are reached. This will 
permit the continuation on an unofficial 
basis of the many mutually beneficial 
relations the American people and the 
people of Taiwan now enjoy. Ameri- 
cans will continue to travel to Taiwan 
to trade, to invest, and to study. Vis- 
itors from Taiwan will be able to do the 
same. 

It is anticipated that all necessary 
arrangements will be made, pursuant to 
agreement with Taiwanese authorities, 
to provide services now being provided 
by U.S. officials there. These services 
would include receiving applications 
for visas and passports and providing 
welfare, protection, and similar serv- 
ices. 

Notwithstanding the establishment of 
U.S.-P.R.C. relations, travel and im- 
migration between Taiwan and the 
United States will continue, and indi- 
viduals planning to visit the United 
States in the near future will be proc- 
essed as before. After January 1, the 
date of recognition, consular services 
between Taiwan and the United States 
will be handled as previously, pending 
establishment of nonofficial agencies 
by both sides. 

An important component of 
Taiwan's security has been its ability to 
maintain modern military forces and to 
have adequate armaments for its self- 
defense. Over the years, the United 
States has given Taiwan access to 
carefully chosen defensive military 
equipment. The United States will 
continue this policy after the termination 
of the defense treaty. 

China's self-interest lies in construc- 
tive relations with the United States, 
Japan, and other nations of the world. 
The P.R.C. has a major stake in 
avoiding actions that would put those 
relationships at grave risk, particularly 
as it devotes its primary attention to 
modernization. Although China has a 
large military force, it is organized and 
equipped primarily for land warfare 
and defense of the mainland. Fur- 
thermore, China has major concerns 
about military threats elsewhere. 

The economy of Taiwan is sound. 



25 



Tcfiir«ii-Tli<» /tfitfiffff Defense Treaty 



The following is taken from a White 
House fact sheet issued on January 5, 
1979. ' 

Background 

My constitutional authority in establishing 
relationships with foreign countries is clear and 
cannot be successfully challenged in court. 

1 think that we have more than honored the 
terms of the treaty, and I see no basis for a suc- 
cessful court challenge. I think what we've done 
is right. It's better for our country. It's better for 
the people of China. It does not hurt the people 
of Taiwan. It's good for world peace [President 
Carter interview. Dec. 19, 1978. p. 5] 

On December 15. President Carter 
announced the United States and the 
People's Republic of China would have 
full diplomatic relations effective 
January 1, 1979. The President gave 1 
year's notice of termination of the 
Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. 

The Mutual Defense Treaty was 
negotiated by the United States and 
Taiwan about 6 years after General 
Chiang Kai-shek removed his defeated 
Nationalist government to Taiwan. The 
treaty went into effect on March 3. 
1955. 

After the President's announcement, 
some questions were raised about the 
President's authority to terminate a 
treaty without the prior advice and con- 
sent of the Senate or without congres- 
sional action. 



Foreign exchange reserves amount to 
almost $7 billion, and its people enjoy 
the third highest per capita GNP in 
Asia. Taiwan's total foreign trade is 
forecast at about $23.3 billion for 1978 
of which the United States will have 
roughly one-third, or $7.3 billion. A 
number of leading U.S. corporations 
presently do business in Taiwan, and 
are expected to continue to do so. 
These include such major banks as the 
Bank of America, Chase Manhattan 
Bank, Citicorp, and American Express; 
large U.S. industrial firms include 
Ford, RCA, Union Carbide, Zenith, 
and Corning Glass. There is every rea- 
son to believe U.S. economic ties to 
Taiwan will continue to grow. For 
example, Japan's trade with Taiwan 
grew over 233% since they normalized 
relations with the P.R.C; Australia's 
grew by 370%; and Canada's by 
539%. □ 



Article 10 of the treaty provides that: 
"Either Party may terminate it one year 
after notice has been given to the other 
Party." It was under this article that 
the President issued the 1 year notice of 
termination. The treaty makes no refer- 
ence to the Senate or Congress, or the 
need for approval of the legislative 
branch in order for notice to be given 
of termination of the treaty. 

Administration's Position 

The treaty is being terminated in exact con- 
formance with the terms of the treaty itself. Had 
I cancelled the treaty or abrogated the treaty 
preemptorily as of the first day of January — 
which was a Chinese request to us. or demand 
from us originally — there may have been some 
justification for that court challenge. But the 
treaty provides that either side can terminate the 
effectiveness of the treaty by giving a 1 year 
notice. [President Carter interview, Dec. 19. 
1978.] 

It is the Administration's position, 
after considerable research, that the 
President's authority to terminate a 
treaty derives from the President's au- 
thority and responsibility — as stated in 
the Constitution — to conduct the na- 
tion's foreign affairs and to execute the 
laws. 

The President is responsible to see 
that the terms of a treaty are carried 
out. The Administration further be- 
lieves that the Senate's power to advise 
and consent to a treaty is fulfilled when 
the treaty is made. Thereafter, the 
execution and performance of a treaty's 
terms, including terms relating to its 
duration or termination, are delegated 
by the Constitution to the President. 
Where the treaty provides for the ter- 
mination by notice, the President has 
the power to give such notice. 

The treaty with Taiwan, approved by 
the Senate on February 9, 1955, does 
not contain reference to congressional 
action in the implementation or termi- 
nation of the treaty, nor does the 
treaty's legislative history indicate the 
Senate anticipated prior consultation or 
approval before the termination clause 
could be used by a President. 

Opinions of Various Authorities 

Here are opinions expressed by vari- 
ous scholars and authorities who have 
studied this issue. 

Professor Louis Henkin, Hamilton 
Fish Professor of International Law at 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 



Columbia University, states in his book 
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 
(1972): 

Once the Senate has consented, the President is 
free to make (or not to make) the treaty and the 
Senate has no further authority in respect of it. 
Attempts by the Senate to withdraw, modify or 
interpret its consent after a treaty is ratified have 
no legal weight; nor has the Senate any au- 
thoritative voice in interpreting a treaty or in 
terminating it. 

Dr. Elbert M. Byrd. Jr., of the Uni- 
versity of Maryland, has written in his 
book Treaties and Executive Agree- 
ments in the United States (1960): 

. . . from a constitutional view, it is much easier 
to terminate treaties than to make them. A 
treaty, by definition in constitutional law. can 
come into existence only by positive action by 
the President and two-thirds of the Senate, but a 
simple majority of both Houses with the Presi- 
dent's approval can terminate them, and they 
may be terminated by the President alone 

Professor Laurence H. Tribe, of the 
Harvard Law School, has written in his 
recently published American Constitu- 
tional Law (1978): 

Although influenced (often decisively) by con- 
gressional action or constitutional restraint, the 
President . . . has exclusive responsibility for 
announcing and implementing military policy; 
for negotiating, administering, and terminating 
treaties or executive agreements; for establishing 
and breaking relations with foreign governments; 
and generally for applying the foreign policy of 
the United States. 

Mr. Wallace McClure, in his work 
entitled International Executive 
Agreement (1941), wrote: 

It is customary for treaties to carry provisions 
laying down the steps to be taken if one of the 
participating governments wishes to divest itself 
of the obligations which have been assumed; for 
instance, a year's notice by one party to the 
other or others. But treaties do not specify the 
organ of the national government by which such 
notice is to be given. In the United States the 
Executive gives the notice. Sometimes he has 
given it on his own initiative solely. 

In treaty making the Senate may be said to act 
merely as executive adviser and check against 
positive action; negative action, not being feared 
by the constitution makers, was left to the re- 
pository of general executive power, that is. to 
the President. 

Professor Myres S. McDougal, Wil- 
liam K. Townsend Professor of Law at 
the Yale Law School, wrote as follows 
in his study with Asher Lans on 
"Treaties and Congressional-Executive 
or Presidential Agreements: Inter- 
changeable Instruments of National 
Policy," 54 Yale Law Journal 336 
(1945): 



. . . termination [of treaties] may be effected by 
executive denunciation, with or without prior 
Congressional authorization. 

Professor Randall H. Nelson, of 
Southern Illinois University, in an arti- 
cle entitled "The Termination of 
Treaties and Executive Agreements by 
the United States: Theory and Prac- 
tice,'* 42 Minnesota Law Review 
(1958) wrote: 

Diplomatic practice coupled with judicial opin- 
ion demonstrates that the President, as the chief 
organ of foreign relations, has the primary re- 
sponsibility with respect to the termination of 
treaties He may perform this function alone or 
in conjunction with the Congress or the Senate. 

The late Professor Jesse S. Reeves. 
of the University of Michigan, in an 
article entitled "The Jones Act and the 
Denunciation of Treaties," 15 Ameri- 
can Journal of International Law 
(1921), stated: 

It seems to be within the power of the President 
to terminate treaties by giving notice on his own 
motion without previous Congressional or Sen- 
atorial action. It would seem, on the other hand, 
that the President cannot be forced by Congress 
or by the Senate to perform the international act 
of giving notice. 

Professor Westel Willoughby, late of 
Johns Hopkins University, wrote in his 
work The Constitutional Law of the 
United States (1929): 

It would seem indeed, that there is no constitu- 
tional obligation upon the part of the Executive 
to submit his treaty denunciations to the Con- 
gress for its approval and ratification although, 
as has been seen, this has been done several 
times. 

Court Decisions 

The Constitution does not specif- 
ically address the question of treaty 
termination. 

There have been no court decisions 
which passed on the question of the 
President's power to act pursuant to 
termination provisions of a treaty with- 
out Senate or Congressional approval. 

Historical Precedent 

. . . I'm authorized and directed by the Con- 
stitution and my responsibility is to conduct 
negotiations of this kind. [President Carter inter- 
view, Dec. 19, 1978.] 

Here are some examples of Presi- 
dential termination of treaties over the 
years. 

• In 1815 President Madison ex- 
changed correspondence with the 
Netherlands which has been construed 
by the United States as establishing 
that the 1782 Treaty of Amity and 



Commerce between the two countries 
had been annuled. 

• In 1899 President McKinley gave 
notice to the Swiss Government of the 
U.S. intent "to arrest the operations" 
of certain articles of the 1850 Conven- 
tion of Friendship. Commerce and Ex- 
tradition with Switzerland. 

• In 1920 President Wilson by 
agreement terminated the 1891 Treaty 
of Amity, Commerce and Navigation 
with Belgium concerning the Congo. 

• In 1927 President Coolidge gave 
notice of termination of the 1925 
Treaty with Mexico on the Prevention 
of Smuggling. 

• In 1933 President Roosevelt deliv- 
ered to the League of Nations a decla- 
ration of the U.S. withdrawal from the 
1927 multilateral Convention for the 
Abolition of Import and Export Pro- 
hibitions and Restrictions. 

• In 1933 President Roosevelt gave 
notice of termination (which was with- 
drawn subsequently) of the 1931 Treaty 
of Extradition with Greece. 

• In 1936 President Roosevelt ap- 
proved a protocol (deemed to be notice 
of termination) terminating the 1871 
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation 
with Italy. 

• In 1939 President Roosevelt gave 
notice of termination of the 1911 
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation 
with Japan. 

• In 1944 President Roosevelt gave 
notice of denunciation of the 1929 
Protocol to the Inter-American Con- 
vention for Trademark and Commercial 
Protection. 

• In 1954 President Eisenhower gave 
notice of withdrawal from the 1923 
Convention on Uniformity of 
Nomenclature for the Classification of 
Merchandise. 

• In 1962 President Kennedy gave 
notice of termination of the 1902 Con- 
vention on Commercial Relations with 
Cuba. 

• In 1965 President Johnson gave 
notice of denunciation, subsequently 
withdrawn, of the 1929 Warsaw con- 
vention concerning international air 
travel. □ 



February 1979 



Economic and Commercial 
Relationships With Taiwan 



Foreign Relations Outline' 

In recent years Taiwan, with a 
population of slightly over 17 million, 
has had one of the world's most suc- 
cessful developing economies. Per 
capita income has grown from subsis- 
tence levels in the early 1950's to about 
$1,200 in 1978. Enlightened policies 
have fostered the rapid development of 
economic and social infrastructure. A 
strong private sector has prospered 
along with many major public sector 
enterprises. The economy has shifted 
from an agricultural to an industrial 
base, and exports of light manufactured 
goods have made the island an impor- 
tant factor in world trade. This swift 
economic transformation is reaching 
virtually every stratum of society. Even 
by developed country standards, 
income distribution is remarkably 
equitable. 

Taiwan's gross national product in 
1978 was about $22 billion, while its 
real rate of economic growth during the 
year was estimated at 13%. Foreign ex- 
change reserves are sufficient to pay 
for 6 months of imports. Life expect- 
ancy and literacy have nearly attained 



the levels of Western countries. 

The United States has contributed to 
Taiwan's economic growth and moder- 
nization more as an important export 
market than as a source of foreign aid. 
Total U.S. economic assistance to 
Taiwan from 1949 — including grants, 
loans, and food aid — amounted to only 
about $1 .7 billion, or roughly one-third 
of our 1978 imports from Taiwan. The 
U.S. Agency for International De- 
velopment mission in Taipei closed in 
1965. 



Current Economic Relations 
With the U.S. 

Trade and other ties between Ameri- 
cans and the people on Taiwan have 
been increasing substantially in recent 
years. Taiwan is now among our top 10 
trading partners; in East Asia, it is sec- 
ond only to Japan. 

• Total U.S. trade with Taiwan in 
1978 is estimated at $7.3 billion. Our 
exports to Taiwan are less than half the 
value of our imports from the island, 
making the growing U.S. trade deficit 
with Taiwan a serious problem. The 



TAIWAN— A PROFILE 

Geography 

Area: 14,000 sq. mi. (about one-third the 

size of Ohio). 
Capital: Taipei (pop. 2.2 million). 
Other Cities: Kaohsiung (1 million). 

Taichung (562.000). Keelung (543.000). 

Tainan (537.000). 

People 

Population: 17 million (1978 est.). 
Annual Growth Rate: 2.1% (1977). 
Ethnic Groups: Han Chinese 98%, less than 

2% aborigines. 
Religions: Confucianism. Buddhism. 

Taoism. Christianity. 
Languages: Mandarin Chinese (official); 

local dialects — Taiwanese. Hokkien. 

Hakka. 
Literacy: 89%. 
Life Expectancy: 70 yrs. 

Economy 

GNP: $23 billion (1978). 
Annual Growth Rate: 9.1% (1970-78 aver- 
age). 



Per Capita Income: $1 .200 ( 1978). 
Inflation Rate: 5% (1977 average). 

Agriculture: Products — sugarcane, sweet 
potatoes, rice, vegetables, asparagus, 
mushrooms, citrus fruits, pineapples, 
bananas, cassava. 

Manufacturing: Types — textile, electronics, 
plastics, furniture, other consumer goods, 
cement. 

Natural Resources: Small deposits of coal, 
natural gas. limestone, marble. 

Trade (1977): Exports— $9.3 billion: tex- 
tiles, machinery, plastics, metal products, 
plywood, wood products. Partners — U.S. 
($3.6 billion), Japan ($1.1 billion). Hong 
Kong ($634 million). Imports — $8.5 bil- 
lion: food and raw materials, crude oil. 
capital goods. Partners — Japan ($2.6 bil- 
lion). U.S. ($2 billion), Kuwait ($685 
million). 

Official Exchange Rate: 36 New Taiwan 
dollars = US $1.00. 

Economic Aid: Received — $2.1 billion 
(1949-73); $1.5 billion from U.S. (AID 
program ended in 1965). Extended — 
technical aid to 49 countries since 1961. 



27 

United States accounts for almost 
one-third of Taiwan's total trade and 
provides a market for 40% of its ex- 
ports. Taiwan's worldwide exports 
comprise 48% of GNP; exports to the 
United States are 19% of GNP. 

• American investment in the island, 
based on Taiwan data, exceeds $550 
million, or 30% of total foreign in- 
vestment there. U.S. companies have 
concentrated investments in the electri- 
cal and electronics, chemicals and 
plastics, and banking and other service 
industries. Many leading firms, such as 
Ford, IBM. Goodyear, RCA, Zenith. 
and Texas Instruments, have invest- 
ments on the island, and over a dozen 
U.S. banks are represented in Taipei. 

• The Export-Import Bank, with 
loans and guarantees totaling almost 
$1.8 billion, has its third highest expo- 
sure worldwide in Taiwan. Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) 
exposure in Taiwan is nearly $140 mil- 
lion. 

• In December 1978 a bilateral trade 
agreement was concluded with Taiwan. 
We obtained important tariff and non- 
tariff concessions to balance those that 
Taiwan, a beneficiary of most- 
favored-nation treatment, will receive 
from us following conclusion of the 
current round of multilateral trade 
negotiations in Geneva. We have other 
agreements with the Taiwan authorities 
that restrict export to this country of 
various categories of textiles, footwear, 
and color TV's. 



Future Economic Relations 
With Taiwan 

U.S. diplomatic ties with the 
People's Republic of China and the end 
of official relations with Taipei are not 
expected to have much effect on the 
U.S. economic relationship with 
Taiwan. The growth in Taiwan's trade 
with other countries was not inter- 
rupted by severance of relations. In 
fact, Taiwan's two-way trade with 
Japan, Canada, Australia, and other 
countries has since multiplied several 
times. 

In announcing the decision to recog- 
nize and establish diplomatic relations 
with the P.R.C.. President Carter 
stressed that commercial, cultural, and 
other relations will be maintained with 
the people of Taiwan. Leaders of the 
large resident U.S. business commu- 
nity have publicly expressed their in- 
tention and that of their companies to 
remain in Taiwan. 

The staff of the former U.S. Em- 
bassy at Taipei will continue to func- 
tion unofficially through February 
1979. Thereafter, American economic 



l/J§. 1 r*ns Sit Irs 
to I a in* cm 



Department of State Bulletin 

FMS commitments, some involving 
items not due for delivery until 1983, is 
about $500 million. 

The following data summarize our 
arms sales to Taiwan over the past 5 
years: 



Foreign Relations Outline ' 

American interest in the peaceful 
resolution of the Taiwan question was a 
key element of the U.S. statement in 
the February 1972 Shanghai com- 
munique and has remained at the heart 
of the U.S. position since then. 

The Mutual Defense Treaty with 
Taiwan will terminate on December 31 , 
1979. However, the United States, in 
its unilateral statement of December 
15. 1978, declared that it ". . . con- 
tinues to have an interest in the peace- 
ful resolution of the Taiwan issue and 
expects that the Taiwan issue will be 
settled peacefully by the Chinese them- 
selves." 2 This statement was issued 
concurrently with the joint com- 
munique, recognizing and establishing 
diplomatic relations with the People's 
Republic of China (P.R.C.). The 
P.R.C. was aware in advance of our 
position, and their statement, released 
simultaneously, did not take issue with 
it. 



Taiwan (Cont'd) 

and commercial interaction with the 
people of Taiwan will be facilitated 
through a nongovernmental 
institute — the American Institute in 
Taiwan. The institute, headquartered in 
Washington, will establish offices in 
Taiwan to provide essential services to 
businessmen and others. 

Taiwan's future economic well-being 
will, therefore, be affected little by the 
loss of governmental ties with the 
United States. It depends rather on the 
health of the world economy and the 
ability of major trading partners — 
especially the United States — to keep 
protectionist forces under control. As 
the island's industry moves from light 
manufactured goods to more sophisti- 
cated production, its people will have 
to learn to compete in export markets 
long dominated by the more advanced 
economies of North America, Western 
Europe, and Japan. □ 



'Taken from a Department of State publica- 
tion in the GIST series, released in January 
1979. This outline is designed to be a quick ref- 
erence aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not 
intended as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy 
statement. 



Peaceful Resolution 
of the Taiwan Issue 

The P.R.C. has compelling reasons 
not to seek a military settlement of the 
Taiwan issue. It has a major stake in 
avoiding actions that would risk its 
constructive relations with the United 
States, Japan, and other nations. Fur- 
thermore, the P.R.C. does not have — 
and for the foreseeable future will not 
have — the military capability to take 
Taiwan by force. 

In an official statement on January 1 , 
1979, the P.R.C. announced an end to 
the bombardment of Quemoy and other 
islands and proposed talks with the 
Taiwan authorities to end military 
confrontation and the "artificial ten- 
sion" caused by it. It said it was doing 
so "to create the necessary prerequi- 
sites and a secure environment for the 
two sides" in order to make contact, 
restore transportation and postal serv- 
ices, conduct exchanges, trade, and 
cooperate in "reunifying the mother- 
land." This statement did not mention 
possible forceful "liberation" of 
Taiwan, and the P.R.C. pledged to 
"respect the status quo on Taiwan" in 
"settling the question of reunifica- 
tion." 

Military Sales 

An important component of 
Taiwan's security has been its ability to 
maintain modern military forces and to 
have adequate arms for its self-defense. 
Over the years, the United States has 
given Taiwan access through foreign 
military sales (FMS) and commercial 
channels to carefully chosen defensive 
military equipment, with particular 
emphasis on air and naval defenses. 
Despite the P.R.C. 's disagreement, we 
will continue to supply such equipment 
after termination of the defense treaty, 
including provision of follow-on sup- 
port for U.S. military equipment pre- 
viously transferred. 

We are now completing processing 
formalities, including the requisite 
notification to Congress, for the sale to 
Taiwan of those major items of military 
equipment approved in 1978. Major 
commitments to military sales in 
Taiwan include additional F-5E inter- 
ceptor aircraft with improved 
weaponry, such as precision-guided 
munitions and Maverick missiles. We 
are also processing FMS and commer- 
cial cases for many other previously 
committed items. Total value of major 







Commercial 






Export 




FMS 


Licenses 




($ millions) 


($ millions) 


FY 1974 






Orders 


88.7 




Deliveries 


93.3 


8.1 


FY 1975 






Orders 


144.8 




Deliveries 


115.0 


45.0 


FY 1976 






Orders 


324.0 




Deliveries 


136.5 


42.5 


FY 1977 






Orders 


153.0 




Deliveries 


142.4 


46.1 


FY 1978 






Orders 


346.3 




Deliveries 


131.1 


174.5 □ 



'Taken from a Department of State publica- 
tion in the GIST series, released in January 
1979. This outline is designed to be a quick ref- 
erence aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not 
intended as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy 
statement. 

-For full text, see Bulletin of Jan. 1979, p. 
26. 



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February 1979 



29 



Korea cine! the United Sttites 
The Era Ahead 



by Richard C. Holbrooke 

Address before the Far East- 
American Council and the U.S. -Korea 
Economic Council in New York on De- 
cember 6. 1978. Mr. Holbrooke is As- 
sistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs. ' 

Today, for the first time since I 
began my present job, I propose to 
speak about relations between the 
United States and a single nation of 
Asia. One reason is that this nation and 
our relationship with it have undergone 
a fundamental transition in just a few 
years' time. 

To set the scene and put my sub- 
sequent remarks in context, I want first 
to review with you the issues which 
have strained U.S. -Korean relations 
and distorted our perceptions of each 
other. I then propose to consider how 
we should look at Korea, and at 
U.S. -Korea relations, in the era ahead. 
This new era, it seems to me, will be 
dominated by four main factors: 

• The U.S. -Korean alliance 
itself — for some time the Koreans have 
been making an increasingly important 
contribution, while the commitment of 
our military power to the security of 
the region continues; 

• South Korea's emergence as a 
country of tremendous economic 
dynamism with an enormous potential 
for future growth and, we hope, a con- 
tinually broadening base of popular 
support; 

• The shadow still cast by the for- 
midable threat from the north, 
tempered by the likelihood that the 
Communist superpowers would not en- 
courage and do not favor a renewed 
North Korean attack; and 

• The most important — our experi- 
ence in recent years in coping with 
great difficulties in U.S. -Korea rela- 
tions has revealed a reservoir of 
strength in the relationship that bodes 
well for our ability to solve the prob- 
lems of the future. 



The Triple Crisis in 
Korean-American Relations 

In these past few years three serious 
issues simultaneously threatened sub- 
stantial damage to the Korean-American 
relationship. These three issues, which 
put extraordinary strain on our relation- 



ship with a close ally, were: one, some 
misunderstandings over our troop with- 
drawal policy; second, the set of scan- 
dals often referred to as Koreagate; and 
third, human rights. 

Troop Withdrawal. When the new 
Administration in the spring of 1977 
announced its plan for phased with- 
drawal of ground combat forces in 
South Korea our intentions were 
somewhat misunderstood by some 
people, both in Northeast Asia and in 
the United States. In retrospect, we 
perhaps did not adequately explain our 
plans at the outset. 

Today, these concerns, if not en- 
tirely dispelled, have been largely 
contained. In both the United States 
and Northeast Asia there is a growing 
understanding of the Administration's 
policy. 

Our withdrawals, as outlined by 
President Carter, will be limited to our 
ground combat troops. An infantry 
battalion and some support troops, to- 
taling about 3,400 men, are now de- 
parting. Two more combat battalions 
are scheduled to come out in 1979, 
completing the phase one withdrawal 
of one brigade of 6,000 men. At the 
end of the planned redeployment in 
1981 or 1982, about 7,000 U.S. Army 
personnel will remain in the Republic 
of Korea (R.O.K.), consisting of intel- 
ligence, logistics, and communications 
personnel, as well as personnel in such 
headquarters as the U.N. command 
with its armistice responsibilities. An 
additional 9,000 Air Force personnel 
will remain in country. 

The U.S. Congress has approved 
President Carter's request for authority 
to transfer significant ground force 
equipment to the Korean Armed Forces 
as U.S. units redeploy to the United 
States. The President has also directed 
the redeployment to be carried out in a 
manner that preserves the military bal- 
ance. Should circumstances affecting 
security change significantly, we will 
assess those changes in close consulta- 
tion with Congress, the Republic of 
Korea, and our other Asian allies. Our 
plans will be adjusted if developments 
so warrant. 

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 
recently returned from important dis- 
cussions in Korea. During his visit an 
additional squadron of U.S. F-4 fight- 
ers arrived to enhance our Air Force. 
He and President Park also inaugurated 



a Combined Forces Command, which 
in addition to reflecting the greater 
Korean contribution to their own de- 
fense, provides new flexibility and 
sophistication in joint U.S.-R.O.K. 
defense planning and coordination. 

The Korean Armed Forces can now 
look forward to a more self-reliant de- 
fense posture. Along with its growing 
economic and industrial strength, 
South Korea is assuming a greater por- 
tion of its defense burden. This is a 
natural evolution following on the ear- 
lier reductions of U.S. forces and phase 
out of the U.S. grant military assist- 
ance program. 

Koreagate. The second issue that 
shook Seoul and Washington was 
Koreagate. (Even in government we fi- 
nally came to use that shorthand term 
coined by the press, however poor the 
analogy.) 

Koreagate had its origins in misper- 
ceptions, misguided actions, and lack 
of timely or adequate remedial meas- 
ures. Efforts to investigate the actions 
of Americans imposed a virtually un- 
precedented necessity for the full coop- 
eration of foreigners and foreign 
institutions not subject to U.S. juris- 
diction. Ultimately, the degree of as- 
sistance provided by the Korean Gov- 
ernment, while substantial, fell short of 
what many had hoped. 

Let me be very clear on this issue. 
There never was nor can there ever be, 
any excuse for malfeasance in office. 
For the executive branch, for the Con- 
gress, for the government of a close 
ally, this truly was a dark period. Al- 
though these abuses took place several 
years earlier, it fell to the Justice De- 
partment to pursue investigations, and 
to the executive branch to assist the 
Congress in its own efforts. Thus the 
executive branch fully supported, even 
at the risk at times of the bilateral re- 
lationship, a full investigation of the 
charges. Our only constraint was that 
we act in accordance with well- 
established international practice, em- 
bodied in treaties ratified by the U.S. 
Senate. 

Some aspects of these matters are not 



Biographic data on Richard C. 
Holbrooke was published in the 
August 1978 Bulletin on page 
1. 



30 

yet fully resolved. Additional actions 
may still occur, in the courts and 
elsewhere. It will still take time to 
overcome the damage, but we believe 
that the issue is no longer threatening 
the very fabric of our alliance. And 
from the point of view of our national 
interest in stability in Northeast Asia, 
this is surely a good thing. 

Human Rights. The third volatile 
issue of recent years has been human 
rights. Some have misperceived our 
expressed concerns for human rights 
and interpreted them as a partisan ex- 
pression of support for this or that 
domestic opposition faction. In turn, 
we Americans have not always been 
entirely discriminating in our criticisms 
or perceptions of Korea. These distor- 
tions of understanding are now consid- 
erably reduced on both sides. Others 
are now more clearly aware that our 
human rights stance is based on princi- 
ple. We recognize that no society is 
perfect, our own certainly included. 
Correspondingly, there is a more bal- 
anced perspective in the U.S. of the 
realities — both problems and 
accomplishments — in South Korea. 

We continue, however, to have 
legitimate concerns about practices that 
are incompatible with a generally free 
society and with close and friendly ties 
between our nations. We have been 
pleased to note some positive and con- 
structive steps this past year to reduce 
these problems. We hope that this 
process will continue. It is important 
that it do so — important for the Repub- 
lic of Korea, which can thus be 
strengthened as a nation, and important 
for the healthy and close cooperation 
which should exist between us. We 
shall continue our dialogue with the re- 
public on this subject. 



The New Reality 

Having reviewed past problems — 
now resolved or on the way to 
resolution — let me turn to the exciting 
reality of Korea today, almost, un- 
noticed by the American media and al- 
most unknown to most Americans 
whose perceptions of Korea stem from 
the Korean war or Koreagate headlines. 

The last 16 years of economic de- 
velopment in the Republic of Korea 
have been an unprecedented success. A 
rural, subsistence agricultural economy 
is being rapidly transformed into an in- 
dustrial, technological society. 

Supporting this industrial growth is 
one of the world's largest national 
commitments to education. With a 
population of 37 million, university 
enrollment will be 180,000 next year. 
Research centers and scholarly think 



tanks in Seoul and a number of other 
centers rival in facilities and brain 
power the best of similar institutions in 
Washington or New York. 

For 15 years real GNP growth in 
South Korea has averaged more than 
10% per year. At that compounding 
rate of increase it is not surprising that 
Americans who thought they knew 
Korea only a few short years ago would 
no longer recognize much of the coun- 
try. The latest Fortune 500 listing in- 
cludes 9 Korean firms among the top 
500 business organizations in the 
world. One has already reached the 
first 100. 

Two years ago. the World Bank es- 
timated that \l c k of all manufactured 
goods entering world trade from de- 
veloping countries were of Korean ori- 
gin. Korea's industrialization is already 
rapidly moving beyond early labor- 
intensive successes into capital- and 
technology-intensive petrochemicals, 
steel, shipbuilding, and a wide range 
of other heavy industry. The huge 
heavy industry complex at Changwon 
stands on what were rice fields only 5 
years ago. Today it is perhaps the 
largest single heavy industry complex 
in the world, with at least one new 
factory opening every month. 

Korea is not rich, however. This 
year the per capita GNP will reach 
$1,000. If that is an impressive rate of 
growth, it does not yet provide a satis- 
factory standard of living. However, 
Korean citizens have seen their welfare 
improve steadily and dramatically over 
recent years as a result of their own 
energy and toil. They have every in- 
tention of continuing to improve their 
lot. 

We have the testimony of the World 
Bank that Korea's success in distribut- 
ing the fruits of this growth is unex- 
celled in the developing world. Growth 
in real wages after inflation averaged 
20% last year. Labor income as a per- 
centage of national income has been 
steadily increasing. In contrast to the 
situation in many developing countries, 
rising rural family income has kept 
pace with urban family income. 

With this export-led economic 
dynamism. South Korea is taking a 
significant place among the world's 
trading nations. In 1977 its exports 
were worth over $10 billion. To distin- 
guish Korea and a few others like 
Taiwan and Brazil from the "less de- 
veloped" status from which they have 
climbed, we now speak of the "newly 
industrializing nations" or "advanced 
developing nations." 

While its economic growth has been 
fueled by exports, Korea's overall 
trade balance remains in deficit. This 
year. South Korea made a conscious 



Department of State Bulletin 

and courageous decision to begin 
liberalizing imports only 1 year after it 
first achieved a current account 
surplus. South Korea's early attention 
to import liberalization — its intention 
to reduce the protection afforded its 
young industries — is a highly en- 
couraging development. 

Our economic relations with South 
Korea have entered a new era. Our 
economic aid program of the past as- 
sisted Korean development of a suc- 
cessful plural economy and open soci- 
ety. But U.S. economic aid has long 
since ceased to be necessary. Now 
U.S. -Korean bilateral trade has reached 
the level of $7 billion per year and is 
rapidly growing. 

Our pwn trade with Korea is some- 
what in deficit, even though Korea is 
becoming a significant market for U.S. 
goods, from nuclear power plants and 
aircraft to machinery, raw materials, 
and agricultural commodities. While 
seeking more balanced global trade, we 
do not expect a bilateral balance in 
every case. Nevertheless, American 
producers and businessmen have sig- 
nificant opportunities to provide a 
greater share of Korea's growing im- 
ports. I also urge U.S. businesses to 
establish themselves in Korea to take 
advantage of these opportunities. U.S. 
firms with American representatives on 
the spot have improved their sales 
dramatically. 

I hope you will spread the word that 
Korea is where the economic action 
very definitely is. Consumption levels 
are rising rapidly, as are expectations. 
We welcome Korea's plans to improve 
trade access to its market, and we hope 
its liberalization efforts will expand 
and be made a part of Korea's contri- 
bution to the multilateral trade negotia- 
tions which are now in their final 
phases in Geneva. 

Korea's emergence as a trading 
power poses a competitive challenge to 
some domestic U.S. industries. As we 
seize the opportunities as well as wres- 
tle with the difficulties of adjustment, 
we have an important responsibility to 
avoid succumbing to negatively pro- 
tectionist pressures. On its side Korea 
must recognize that sudden and large 
surges in exports of some particular 
commodity can provoke a protectionist 
reaction. 



Where Do We Go? 

We have had our problems, but we 
have also shown we can manage them. 
It should be clear to everyone that what 
some have referred to as a patron/client 
relationship is past. 

We can now look to a future in 



February 1979 



31 



which the Republic of Korea takes its 
place as a successful and dynamic actor 
on the world stage. The R.O.K. has 
worked for and earned the respect of 
the world. 

While our security cooperation is of 
crucial importance, many other inter- 
ests bind us together as well. We al- 
ready have developed a multibillion- 
dollar trade, lending, and investment 
relationship in Korea. Some 1,500 
American firms are now doing business 
there. As Korea itself has become a de- 
veloped, industrialized nation, its 
international responsibilities are in- 
creasing. The United States and other 
nations now seek Korea's cooperation 
in dealing with multinational issues 
such as international trade policy, 
monetary reform. Third World assist- 
ance programs, nuclear proliferation, 
environment pollution, and law of the 
sea. 

After 30 years of close mutual con- 
tact, the people of our two nations have 
developed a complex network of per- 
sonal and professional relations. Our 
universities have mutual research re- 
lationships and scholarly exchange 
programs; alumni from all major 
American universities are found in all 
the Korean professions. 

Already Korea's skilled engineers 
and artisans are erecting economic 
projects in the Middle East and 
elsewhere, sometimes in productive 
coordination or joint partnership with 
American firms. Aware of its own past 
reliance on others for development aid, 
Korea is now investigating possibilities 
for technical assistance to other 
nations. 

This new reality is one in which we 
expect to cooperate as allies and 
friends on an even more mutually ben- 
eficial basis than the past. We will not 
always agree. There will be important 
issues, even as there are now, on which 
we have different views. But I am con- 
fident that the trust and respect with 
which we have mutually weathered 
these past 2 years will continue. 

Peace on the Korean Peninsula 

If the Republic of Korea is in the 
vanguard of rapidly developing states, 
peace remains the essential element for 
the welfare of all people on the Korean 
peninsula, as well as for all nations of 
the region. 

North Korea's leaders might well 
take a lesson from their counterparts in 
the south. While starting from a much 
stronger natural resource base and a 
more highly developed infrastructure. 
North Korea has fallen increasingly be- 
hind the South in the economic race. 
The reason is not difficult to find. The 



William H. Gleysteen, Jr., was born May 
8. 1926. in Beijing (Peking), China (of 
American parents). He received a B.A. de- 
gree in 1949 and an M.A. in 1951 from 
Yale University. He spent 1 year as a Senior 
Fellow at the Harvard Center in Interna- 
tional Affairs beginning in 1965. 

Ambassador Gleysteen joined the De- 
partment of State in 1951. Overseas, he 
served in Taiwan (1956-58 and 1971-74). 
Japan (1958-62). and Hong Kong 
(1962-65). In Washington, he served in the 
Department's Executive Secretariat 
(1951-55), International Organization Af- 
fairs (1966-69), and the Bureau of Intelli- 
gence and Research ( 1969-71). He was also 
a member of the staff of the National Secu- 
rity Council (1976-77). 

From 1977 to 1978 Ambassador Gley- 
steen was senior Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs with an 
area of responsibility including China. 
Mongolia. Taiwan, Hong Kong. Japan, and 



*Ot^' 




Korea. He received the Department of 
State's Superior Honor award in 1971. 

He was sworn in as U.S. Ambassador to 
the Republic of Korea on July 1 1 . 1978. 



same great cultural energies and talents 
that have been responsible for the eco- 
nomic miracle in the South have been 
applied in the North to building a for- 
midable military machine, equipped 
and organized for assault. The firm 
U.S. commitment to the defense of 
South Korea underlines the human 
wastefulness, indeed the futility, of 
North Korea's sacrifice of all other 
considerations to the unremitting pur- 
suit of military superiority. 

We have made clear repeatedly that 
we are ready to participate with the 
governments of both North Korea and 
South Korea in discussing ways to re- 
duce the level of tension on the Korean 
Peninsula. North Korea continues, 
however, to ignore the reality of the 
dynamic and self-confident society in 
the south, and to pretend that it can 
arrange the future of the peninsula with 
us and without direct participation of 
the Republic of Korea. 

On occasion, I have been asked why 
we do not accept the North Korean 
suggestion. After all, we generally 
favor discussions with our adversaries. 

The answer is simple. The only sig- 
nificant matter for discussion with 
Pyongyang is the reduction of tensions 
on the Korean Peninsula. Such talks 
without full South Korean participation 
would serve no useful purpose. On the 
contrary, they would simply give cre- 
dence to unreal North Korean preten- 
sions and create difficulties for our 
treaty ally and the relations between 
us. 

The Republic of Korea has proposed 
that channels of trade with the north be 
opened up, either through nonofficial 



business contacts, or with the assist- 
ance of meetings at the government 
level. The south stands ready to resume 
direct dialogue with the north on the 
whole range of tension-reducing meas- 
ures. At any time that the two parties 
desire, we are prepared to participate in 
such discussions without preconditions. 

Short of bloody military conquest — 
obviously impossible in the face of 
South Korean strength and our firm se- 
curity support — Korean hopes for 
reunification can only be fostered 
through knitting together the sundered 
societies through a gradual step-by-step 
dialogue that produces mutual confi- 
dence and permits reducing the tre- 
mendous armaments burden. 

Four major powers — China, Japan, 
the Soviet Union, and the United 
States — have vital stakes in peace and 
in reducing tensions on the Korean 
peninsula. We have proposed four- 
power or eventually six-power meet- 
ings to enable all directly concerned 
nations to participate in a balanced 
dialogue. Others have proposed a 
tripartite framework if China and the 
Soviet Union do not wish to be in- 
volved. Pyongyang nevertheless con- 
tinues to reject any realistic discussion 
with Seoul. We believe that China and 
the Soviet Union could both play a 
more constructive role in reducing ten- 
sions on the peninsula than they have 
yet chosen to do. 

We have also offered to expand our 
relationships with North Korea if 
Pyongyang's principal allies are willing 
to take corresponding steps in their re- 
lations with the Republic of Korea. 
There are opportunities for pragmatic 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



and realistic evolution of the relation- 
ships of these major powers, short of 
the difficult step represented by formal 
diplomatic recognition. 

At some point, the North Koreans 
will have to face up to the implications 
of South Korean progress for their own 
narrowly based and repressive regime. 
The offers we have made over the years 
are reasonable ones. If, however. 
North Korea persists in its unaccept- 
able position, it will remain an isolated 
nation, buffeted by the winds of rivalry 
and tension between its larger Com- 
munist neighbors. 

It is our hope that the North Koreans 
will respond positively to the opportu- 
nities for reducing tensions on the 
peninsula. No development in North- 
east Asia could open up brighter 
prospects for the region as a whole than 
progress toward resolution of the dif- 
ferences between Koreans on both 
sides of the demilitarized zone. 

Whatever the future holds for rela- 
tions between North Korea and South 
Korea, we will continue to cooperate 
with the R.O.K. to deter any threat of 
aggression. The future is bright for 
South Korea itself, and for the relation- 
ships between us. even though we must 
anticipate from time to time in the fu- 
ture, as in the past, moments of diffi- 
culty and stress. 

Changing Perceptions 

There is much our two societies do 
not understand about each other. A re- 
cent study of American opinion pro- 
duced the conclusion that the current 
Korean image in the United States is 
poor. 

We need to develop ways in which 
we can improve our understanding and 
knowledge of each other. The private 
sector, represented by persons such as 
yourselves, should not leave it solely to 
governments to support exchanges and 
contacts. Consideration, for example, 
should be given to expanding two-way 
exchanges and to supporting the de- 
velopment of further Korean studies 
programs at American universities. 
Another major arena of understanding 
is provided by the media. While there 
is a relatively large number of Korean 
correspondents in the United States, 
there are no permanent U.S. media 
representatives in Korea. 

We see a positive situation in South 
Korea — significantly different from 
most of the dire predictions which have 
long been part of the Korean scene. 
Korea, no longer a poor dependent of 
Japan and the West, is emerging into 
its own. It still has much to accom- 
plish, but the road it has already trav- 



REPUBLIC OF KOREA— 
A PROFILE 

Geography 

Area: 38,000 sq. mi. 

Capital: Seoul (pop. 7.8 million, 1978). 

Terrain: Rugged. 

Climate: Continental. 

People 

Population: 37 million (1978 est.). 
Annual Growth Rate: 1.7%. 
Ethnic Group: Chinese (30,000). 
Religions: Buddhism. Confucianism, Chris- 
tianity. 
Language: Korean. 
Literacy: Over 90%. 

Government 

Official Name: Republic of Korea. 

Type: Republic (power centralized in a 

strong executive). 
Date of Constitution: 1948 (revised 1962 and 

1972). 
Branch: Executive — President (Chief of 

State). Legislative — Unicameral National 

Assembly. Judicial — Supreme Court, 

Constitutional Court. 
Political Parties: Democratic Republic Party 

(DRP), New Democratic Party (NDP), 

Democratic Unification Party (DUP). 
Suffrage: Universal over 20. 
Political Subdivisions: 9 Provinces, 2 special 

cities. 

Economy 

GNP: $45.3 million (1978 est.). 

Real Growth Rate: 13% (1978). 

Per Capita Income: $122.5 (1978 est). 

Average Annual Rate of Inflation (last 5 

yrs.): Approx. 18%. 
Agriculture: Land — 23%. Labor — 40%. 

Products — rice, barley, wheat. 
Industry: Products — textiles and clothing, 

electronics, shipbuilding, steel, food proc- 



essing, chemical fertilizers, plywood, 
chemicals. 

Natural Resources: Coal, tungsten, graphite. 

Trade: Exports— $12.7 billion (1978 est.): 
textiles and clothing, electrical machinery, 
plywood, footwear, ships, steel. Imports 
— $14.6 billion (1978 est.): oil, ships, 
steel, wood, grains, organic chemicals, 
machinery. Major Partners — Japan, 
U.S. 

Official Exchange Rate: 484 won = U.S.$l 
(since Dec. 1974). 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

Asian African Legal Consultative Commit- 
tee, Asian Development Bank. Asian Par- 
liamentary Union. Asian People's Anti- 
Communist League. Asian and Pacific 
Council, Colombo Plan, IAEA, IBRD. 
ICAO, IDA. IFC. IHB. IMCO. INTEL- 
SAT, Interpol, ITU, International Whaling 
Commission. UNESCO. U.N. Special 
Fund. UPU, WHO, WMO. FAO, GATT, 
ESCAP. World Anti-Communist League, 
nonmember of U.N. (official observer at- 
tends U.N. sessions). 



Principal Officials 

South Korea: President — Park Chung Hee; 

Prime Minister — Choi Kyu Hah; Foreign 

Minister — Pong Jin Park; Ambassador to 

U.S.— Kim Yong Shik. 
United States: Ambassador to Republic of 

Korea — William H. Gleysteen, Jr. 



Taken from the Department of State's revised 
edition of the Background Notes on South 
Korea to be published in 1979. Copies of the 
complete Note may be purchased for 70$ 
from the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. 
Government Printing Office. Washington, 
D.C. 20402 (a 25% discount is allowed when 
ordering 100 or more Notes mailed to the 
same address). 



eled can only leave one hopeful about 
the future. We look forward also to 
continued progress in human dignity 
and personal freedom of expression. 

We believe that with the difficulties 
of the recent past now under control, 
1979 will be the time for the Republic 
of Korea and the United States to move 
their relationship forward into a new 
phase. At the same time we must make 
every effort to insure that the new 
realities of our relationship are widely 
understood by the public of both coun- 
tries. 

We hope in 1979 for positive de- 
velopments not only in the fields of 



trade, high-level consultations, and 
human dignity, but also that most dif- 
ficult of all things to achieve: a change 
in perceptions, in both Korea and the 
United States. This Administration is 
now ready for such an effort. □ 



1 Introductory paragraph omitted. 



February 1979 



33 




517917 12 75 



34 



ECONOMICS: International 
Trade Agreements 



MEMORANDUM FROM THE 
PRESIDENT, JAN. 4 1 

Memorandum for the Special Representative 
for Trade Negotiations 

I have today sent the attached notices to the 
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives 
and the President of the Senate. These notices 
shall be published in the Federal Register. 

Jimmy Carter 



Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:) 

We have an important opportunity this year 
to build a new and better approach to interna- 
tional trade. The first important step depends 
on acceptance and implementation by the Con- 
gress of the agreements reached in the Tokyo 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations. We 
are now within sight of a successful conclusion 
to these negotiations. I am confident that the 
results will embody the U.S. objectives out- 
lined by the Congress in the Trade Act of 1974 
and developed in close consultation with mem- 
bers of the Congress, their staffs, and our 
private-sector advisors. Neither Bob Strauss, 
my Special Trade Representative, nor I will ac- 
cept anything less on behalf of the United 
States. 

The progress of the negotiations is such that 
I can notify the Congress at this time of our 
intention to enter into several international 
agreements dealing mainly with non-tariff trade 
matters. These agreements, to which Congress 
gave a high priority in its mandate for the 
negotiations, are intended primarily to ensure 
that the international trading system is both fair 
and open. The agreements are listed and iden- 
tified below and are described more fully in an 
attachment to this letter. 

• An agreement on subsidies and counter- 
vailing duties will limit trade-distorting subsidy 
practices and will enunciate more clearly the 
right of the United States and others to coun- 
teract such practices. The agreement may pro- 
vide for a number of conforming changes in the 
international Anti-dumping Code. 

• An agreement on safeguards in response to 
a specific Congressional directive, will ensure 
that countries observe international trading 
rules when temporarily limiting imports that 
are injuring domestic industries. 

• An agreement on technical barriers to 
trade or standards will require countries to use 
fair and open procedures in the adoption of 
product standards and related practices that af- 
fect international trade. 

• An agreement on government procure- 
ment will increase opportunities for American 
and other exporters to bid for sales to foreign 
governments. 

• An agreement on licensing will reduce the 
extent to which unnecessary or unduly compli- 



cated import licensing requirements impede 
trade. 

• An agreement on government procure- 
encourage more uniform methods of appraising 
imports for the purpose of applying import 
duties. 

• An agreement on commercial counterfeit- 
ing will promote cooperation and uniform ap- 
proaches for this growing trade problem. 

• An agreement on aircraft will provide a 
basis for fairer trade in this important U.S. ex- 
port sector. 

• Agreements to improve the international 



Department of State Bulletin 

trading framework will tighten the handling of 
international trade disputes, respond to needs 
of developing countries in a fair and balanced 
manner, modernize the international rules ap- 
plicable to trade measures taken in response to 
balance-of-payments emergencies, and provide 
a basis for examining the existing international 
rules on export and import restraints, while 
currently strengthening those rules through im- 
provements in the dispute-settlement proce- 
dures. 

Several other agreements on tariff and non- 
tariff matters have been negotiated in response 
to specific requests that were made by the 
United States or other countries. These agree- 
ments are described in the attachments. 

In addition, members of the Administration 
will be consulting with the Congress about the 
implementation of several agreements on ag- 
ricultural trade that we intend to enter into at 



President Carter Meets Willi 

President of the Commission 

of European Communities 



On December 14, 1978, President 
Carter met with Roy Jenkins, President 
of the Commission of the European 
Communities. Following is a White 
House statement issued at the conclu- 
sion of that meeting . 

1. International Trade. They wel- 
comed the progress being achieved in 
Geneva on negotiation of a multilateral 
trade agreement. They expressed the 
hope that substantial and balanced 
agreement would be reached before the 
end of the year. President Carter ex- 
pressed his determination to seek con- 
gressional action to assure continued 
application of the waiver on counter- 
vailing duties. Both President Carter 
and President Jenkins agreed that the 
success of the negotiations would pro- 
mote economic recovery and the exten- 
sion of international trade between both 
industrial and developing countries, 
thus raising living standards and in- 
creasing jobs. 

2. European Monetary System. 

President Carter indicated that he 
viewed the European Monetary System 
(EMS) as an important step toward the 
European integration that the United 
States has long supported. The Presi- 
dent of the European Commission em- 
phasized that the creation of such a 
system was designed not only to estab- 
lish a zone of monetary stability in 
Europe but also to contribute to greater 
stability in the world monetary system 
as a whole, of which a strong dollar is 



an essential part. He underlined that 
the European Monetary System was 
entirely compatible with the relevant 
articles of the International Monetary 
Fund, which enjoyed full European 
confidence and support. 

3. Science and Technology. Presi- 
dent Carter and the President of the 
European Commission agreed to 
explore the possibilities for cooperation 
between the United States and the 
European Communities in research in 
certain areas of science and technol- 
ogy. They both strongly felt the need 
for the United States and the Commu- 
nity to strengthen their powers of inno- 
vation in this field, while cooperating 
with each other and others to share 
knowledge and cost to their mutual 
advantage. 

The particular areas they had in mind 
are nuclear fusion; management of 
radioactive waste; handling and control 
of fissile materials; and biological and 
medical research, including definition 
of standards for use of toxic sub- 
stances; and definition of carcinogens. 
President Carter indicated that the 
United States intended to increase its 
role in strengthening the scientific and 
technological capacities of developing 
countries through the intended founda- 
tion for international technological 
cooperation. □ 



1 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Dec. 18, 1978; list of partici- 
pants omitted. 



February 1979 



35 



about the time the Tokyo Round is concluded. 
These agreements will provide for a fairer in- 
ternational sharing of the burdens in interna- 
tional wheat trade, and will encourage consul- 
tations and cooperation on international trade 
in coarse grains, meat, and certain dairy prod- 
ucts. The agricultural agreements are also ex- 
pected to improve the application of accepted 
international trading rules to agricultural trade. 

In accordance with procedures specified in 
the Trade Act, the United States will not enter 
into the agreements outlined above for the next 
90 calendar days. After the agreements have 
been signed, they will be submitted for Con- 
gressional approval, together with whatever 
legislation and administrative actions may be 
needed to implement the agreements in the 
United States. The agreements will not take 
effect with respect to the United States, and 
will have no domestic legal force, until the 
Congress has specifically approved them and 
enacted any approprate implementing legisla- 
tion. 

During Congressional consideration of these 
agreements, we will also supply information on 
the related negotiations to reduce, harmonize, 
or eliminate tariff barriers, and on the recent 
establishment of an International Steel Agree- 
ment in the Organization for Economic Coop- 
eration and Development. 

The success of the Tokyo Round and its im- 
plementation will be the product of a good 
working relationship among the Congress, the 
Administration, and the American public. 
Through these agreements and their domestic 
implementation, we can construct trade policies 
and institutions that advance our national inter- 
est and enhance the prosperity of our people. I 
look forward to our working together to com- 
plete this effort. 

Sincerely. 

Jimmy Carter □ 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Jan. 8, 1979; also printed 
in the Federal Register of Jan. 8. 



EDUCATIONAL AFFAIRS: 

Hubert If. Humphrey North-South 
Scholarship Program 



PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, 
DEC. 5 1 

First of all, let me say that I and 
Senator Muriel Humphrey, John 
Reinhardt [Director of the International 
Communication Agency], and others 
are very delighted to have you here this 
afternoon for what I believe is the ini- 
tiation of a very precious and valuable 
new program for our own country. 

It's completely appropriate that the 
program should have been conceived 
and named because of and after Senator 
Hubert Humphrey. He always 
exemplified what this program is sup- 
posed to accomplish, that is, a deep 
belief in the human spirit, the value of 
human progress, hope in the face of at 
least partial discouragement and some- 
times even despair, the breaking down 
of barriers that exist between people 
because of difference in heritage or 
race or country of origin or formal op- 
portunity of their families. 

Senator Humphrey also believed that 
the crucial element in the growth of a 
person was in education, formal edu- 
cation, of course, but the stretching of 
one's mind and heart in every conceiv- 
able way. I think we all realize that to 
the limit of his great ability, he strove 
for better international understanding, 
for peace, for the end of wars and the 
prevention of war. 

I believe that our country has a great 



ENERGY: OPEC Price increase 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
DEC. 17 » 

We regret the OPEC [Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries] de- 
cision and hope that it will be reconsid- 
ered before the next steps take effect. 

Market conditions do not warrant a 
price increase of this magnitude, since 
the current tightness in the world oil 
market is a temporary situation that 
does not reflect underlying demand 
forces. 



This large price hike will impede 
programs to maintain world economic 
recovery and to reduce inflation. Re- 
sponsibility for the success of these 
programs is shared by the oil-producing 
countries. □ 



1 Issued following an announcement that 
OPEC members, meeting in Abu Dhabi. United 
Arab Emirates, had voted to increase oil prices 
at 3-month intervals to a total of H.S'/r by the 
end of 1979 (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 25, 1978). 



deal to offer that has not yet been ac- 
cepted by people from other nations. 
I've said on many occasions that in 
years gone by I always dreaded seeing 
the U.N. General Assembly convene, 
because our country was the target of 
every attack and the butt of every joke 
from 100 nations on Earth. And it was 
very embarrassing to me and to all 
Americans who observed this annual 
affair. 

That has changed. I believe there's a 
new willingness, in some cases eager- 
ness for the leaders and the ordinary 
citizens of other nations now to not 
only learn more about the United States 
but also to have a closer political, so- 
cial, cultural relationship with us. 

This is a fairly modest program, but 
it can have a profound impact. And I 
think it will help a great deal to al- 
leviate the ignorance of other people 
toward us or about us. Senator Hum- 
phrey said that if freedom cannot live 
with ignorance, then between the two 
the choice is very clear. And we are 
trying to alleviate that, whether some- 
one is highly educated but still doesn't 
understand our country and, therefore, 
is ignorant about us, or because some- 
one is deprived and very narrow in his 
opportunities and doesn't know much 
about us. 

But I think this program will be an 
avenue toward a greatly magnified op- 
portunity for the enhancement of better 
relationships. It will mean a lot to a 
President. We'll have about 250 highly 
motivated, extremely competent, de- 
serving young people coming from na- 
tions all over the Earth, particularly in 
the Third World — the developing 
nations — to our country at the graduate 
level, already being well conversant 
through formal education and experi- 
ence with their own nations, to come 
here to learn about ours. 

As many of you undoubtedly know, 
the orginator for the concept of the 
Peace Corps was Hubert Humphrey. 
And that was a program to send hun- 
dreds of young and old Americans to 
foreign countries to serve and to learn 
and to take our culture there for exam- 
ination in the personality of the Peace 
Corps volunteer. 

This is kind of a Peace Corps in re- 
verse; highly motivated, fortunate 
young people will come to our nation 
to serve their countries, to help serve 
us, and to learn about us. And, of 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE: President Carter 
Attends Guadeloupe Meeting 



At the invitation of French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, President Car- 
ter joined West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and British Prime Minister 
James Callaghan on January 5-6, 1979, on the island of Guadeloupe to partici- 
pate in personal and informal conversations on matters of special interest. At the 
conclusion of their meeting on January 6, the four leaders made the following 
remarks to reporters. ' 



PRESIDENT GISCARD 
D'ESTAING 

I will now give you the results of our 
talks. First, I would like to emphasize 
the personal and trusting nature of our 
conversations. We have, in fact, stuck 
to the initial objective of this meeting, 
which was to have a political and 
global consideration of the situation, 
and in particular, we did not go into 
such matters as economic and monetary 
considerations. For me — and like my 
colleagues, I've taken part in a number 
of international meetings — I would like 
to say that I consider that our discus- 
sions went into considerable substance 
and depth. We found no divergence 
among us concerning the assessment of 
the situation. Naturally, there were 
differences in the stresses placed on 
certain features, but there was no 
divergence. 

Our talks have brought to light a dual 
objective, which is, first, to increase 
security and. secondly, to reduce ten- 
sion in the world. 

We considered that the legitimate 
recognition of the realities of the 



present-day world should be accom- 
panied by the pursuit of efforts de- 
signed to improve the world situation 
and, in particular, the pursuit of the 
efforts toward detente and the efforts 
toward limitations of armaments and, 
in particular, expressing the hope for 
an early conclusion of the SALT 
agreement. Finally, special attention 
was devoted to the development of the 
North-South relations. 

Now, if you want me to engage in 
the usual exercise of trying to find ap- 
propriate adjectives to qualify a meet- 
ing, I would say that the adjectives that 
come to mind would be as follows: The 
meeting has been frank, friendly, and 
useful. 



PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN 



I would like to begin by thanking 
President Giscard for his initiative in 
calling us together and inviting us for 
what has been a very valuable and in- 
formal occasion. And, also, I'm sure 
I'm allowed to say our thanks to the 



people of Guadeloupe for entertaining 
us in this most delightful and beautiful 
island. 

I think I can almost forgive the 
French for recovering it from the 
British, although, no doubt, though, 
the occasion will come when we shall 
have to call for it back again. [Laugh- 
ter.] 

Secondly, I'd like to echo what 
President Giscard said about the nature 
of the discussions. They have been 
conducted between four of us who trust 
each other, who have confidence in 
each other, and who, I think it is fair to 
say, are friends. And that makes a very 
great deal of difference to the quality 
of the discussion and to the way in 
which it's conducted. And, as Presi- 
dent Giscard said, the discussions have 
been direct; they have been frank; they 
have been open. But I think we've all 
been working toward the same common 
objectives. And when you are friends, 
discussing matters with each other, 
there can be differences of emphasis or 
nuance which are slight in relation to 
the attitudes between ourselves but 
which, if we were not talking as 
friends, if we were talking elsewhere, 
would be regarded as very substantial. 
That has not been the case here, and I 
want to emphasize this because so 
often differences of emphasis are writ- 
ten up as though they are very great 
differences of objective. That is simply 
not true. 



Scholarships (Cont'd) 

course, we in the process will learn 
about them. 

These scholarships will be eagerly 
sought. The competition will be high. 
The value to our country will be great, 
and if the program works well, the 
value to the students' countries will be 
much greater. 

We want to make it work and work 
well. And when the first group comes 
to our nation next year, John, I would 
like — although I haven't talked to you 
about this — I would like to have them 
come by in a group and meet with me 
and to get some acquaintance not only 
with the President of the United States 
but with our government, our Capital 
City for just a few hours or perhaps a 
day or two. And then I understand at 
the end of our program they will go to 
the Hubert Humphrey Institute in Min- 



nesota to get an encapsulation of what 
they can do in political motivation 
when they return back home. 

This is not designed to do anything 
but serve others. And I think the rela- 
tively low costs will be greatly mag- 
nified. Rabbi Hillel said that one can- 
dle can light a thousand others and not 
diminish itself. And that's what we 
hope to accomplish in this program; 
each focal point of high education, 
knowledge about our nation, compe- 
tence, leadership in the persons of the 
students involved will go back to their 
own nations and greatly expand their 
own influence and, directly and indi- 
rectly, the beneficial influence of our 
own country. And in the process our 
nation certainly will not be diminished. 

Let me thank you, again, for being 
willing to come here. The program will 
be described to you in some detail later 
on. You'll get a briefing on the East- 



West relationships and the North-South 
relationships that presently exist be- 
tween our country and others. You'll 
be able not only to learn about the em- 
bryonic program but also, hopefully, to 
give advice, counsel, and constructive 
criticisms. I think that as we evolve the 
final arrangements for the program, 
your voices will be very valuable to us 
all. Your institutions are great in them- 
selves. I hope this program will add to 
their greatness. 

Thank you, again, for letting me 
participate. I know Hubert Humphrey, 
a great man, a great American, would 
be proud if he knew about what is 
going on today, and my belief is that he 
knows. □ 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Dec. 11. 1978. 



February 1979 

And I think this has been a most val- 
uable meeting, as far as I am con- 
cerned. It certainly added to our 
knowledge of each other's point of 
view. I've heard from my three col- 
leagues their analysis of the world 
scene in many different facets, and that 
in itself is an invaluable help in ena- 
bling Britain to formulate its own anal- 
ysis. I think we have, in certain cir- 
cumstances, been able to comment on 
each other's analysis and to. perhaps, 
modify our own positions as a result of 
it. 

But as the President said, we were 
not reaching decisions here. But the 
effect will be felt in the discussions 
that we shall have with all our partners 
and the various organizations, interna- 
tional organizations, to which we 
belong. 

Now. just two things, if I may. First 
of all. we heard from President Carter 
about the SALT agreement. It is 
reaching its final stages now. He gave 
us his analysis of the position. Of 
course, during the whole process there 
has been continuous consultation. I 
would like to urge — speaking as some- 
one who is on the other side of the 
Atlantic — Iwould like to urge the 
speedy ratification, the conclusion of 
the agreement and speedy ratification 
on both sides, that is, on the U.S. side 
and on the Soviet Union. 

I think it would be a very sad day if 
this agreement were not ratified, and 
the Administration will have our sup- 
port in their efforts when they place it 
before the American people. And we 
look foward to the development of a 
SALT III negotiation, which we be- 
lieve will be of benefit to us. 

I'd like to say just. I think, two other 
words. First of all. we did review some 
of the trouble spots of the world. And 
they are deeply disturbing. Neverthe- 
less, I think it would not be unfair to 
say that there's a general conclusion 
that if you take out these highlights that 
are deeply disturbing, that perhaps the 
general position of our part of the 
world is rather more satisfactory — I 
qualify it in that sense — is rather more 
satisfactory than it was 2 or 3 years 
ago, and we met against that atmos- 
phere. And I say that in order to put the 
matter in perspective. 

Finally, I'd like to say that we spent 
a considerable amount of time on our 
relations with China. We welcome 
them into the comity of nations. We do 
so because she is a great country, but 
we do not improve our relations with 
China at the expense of any other 
country. 

Our relations with the Soviet Union 
are as important to us as our relations 
with China, and indeed, our relations 



37 




From left to right: President Giscard d'Eslaing, Prime Minister Callaghan, President Carter, 
and Chancellor Schmidt during one of their meetings on Guadeloupe. 



with the Soviet Union are central to the 
development of detente, which is so 
important to us in Europe. So, I con- 
clude by thanking President Giscard 
again very much, and thank my col- 
leagues for helping me to get a better 
understanding of the world during the 
last 48 hours. 

PRESIDENT CARTER 

First. I'd like to add my voice of 
thanks to Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the 
people of France, and particularly 
those of Guadeloupe, who have made 
our visit so delightful, enjoyable, and 
profitable. Because of the unstructured 
agenda and the informality of the dis- 
cussions and the almost unprecedented 
harmony that exists among us. I have 
never attended a conference which was 
more beneficial to me. nor more sub- 
stantive in nature. 

One of the dearest and most valuable 
assets of the American people — and 
perhaps even most of the world — is the 
close harmony, the easy communica- 
tion, and the common purpose of those 
peoples who are represented here by 
myself, by Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt, by President Giscard d'Estaing, 
and by Prime Minister Callaghan. 

Most of our discussions were about 
regional problems and about global is- 
sues, because the differences which 
exist among us bilaterally are very 
minor and of little consequence. 

We have been determined to 
strenghten even further the valuable 
ties of friendship and cooperation 
militarily — for common defense and 



for peace — politically, culturally, and 
economically. 

Our commitment is to contribute to 
global peace. And we have observed 
with interest and gratification that in 
the last few years, there has been an 
enhancement in the normalization of 
relationships among the nations of the 
world. Former enemies have become 
friends; potential enemies have sought 
to avoid violence by close consultation 
and negotiations; and existing 
friendships have been strengthened. 

We're all in agreement that the 
emergence of the People's Republic of 
China toward the outside world — the 
Western world — has been one of con- 
structive development. And we are all 
determined to enhance this develop- 
ment and to assure that it never be- 
comes an obstacle to detente, and that 
it might possibly be used in the future, 
we hope, as an avenue of even 
strengthening our ties of friendship and 
harmony with the people of the Soviet 
Union. 

We discussed the potential trouble 
spots of the world, and we tried to 
capitalize upon the unique opportunity 
that one or several of us have to al- 
leviate tension, to let the people of 
those regions find for themselves, with 
our assistance on occasion, an avenue 
toward peace, so that stability and de- 
velopment of a better quality of life and 
enhanced human rights might he con- 
tinuing throughout those regions where 
our influence might be felt. 

And finally, I would like to thank 
these experienced leaders for their ad- 
vice and counsel for me and their con- 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



structive support for the efforts in the 
SALT negotiations and other important 
international measures in which the 
American people have taken the lead. 
This is always of great benefit to me 
and to my people. And I'm deeply 
grateful for the relationships that we 
have enjoyed and, I pray, will continue 
to enjoy in an enhanced degree in the 
years to come. 



CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT 

To speak as the last in a row of four, 
it's not so very easy to add anything 
new to what my colleagues already 
have said, especially when, as it is the 
case. I'm in full agreement with the 
remarks you already have heard. 

Now I would like — in dealing with 
the cordiality, the directness, the co- 
operative friendship in which our dis- 
cussions have been led — I would like to 
concede that we made one mistake. We 
should have had the press invited for at 
least one session, in order to let it be 
witnessed by yourselves how friendly 
the atmosphere really was. [Laughter] 

Representing nations who belong to 
the same alliance, it was. of course, 
natural that we at some length dealt 
with security questions among which, 
of course, was of great importance the 
report that we were given by the 
American President — by Jimmy 
Carter — on the progress of SALT II. 
And I would like to join my British 
colleague here in stressing that in our 
view, SALT II is going to be a very 
important contribution toward stabiliz- 
ing world peace. 

I do hope for early conclusion and, 
also, for swift ratification thereafter. 
And as far as my country is concerned, 
we will take the appropriate opportu- 
nity to make this very clear to every- 
body in the world. 

President Giscard d'Estaing already 
indicated that we also talked about 
other matters in the field of arms con- 
trol, which was a chance for me to ex- 
press my desire to bring about progress 
also in the field of mutual and balanced 
force reductions. And in this context, 
of course, we also dealt with the 
French proposal for a European confer- 
ence on arms limitation. 

Naturally, France, Great Britain, and 
Germany, having had diplomatic rela- 
tions with the People's Republic of 
China already, all of us considered it to 
be a contribution to normalization in 
the world that there now should also be 
diplomatic relationships between the 
United States and the People's Repub- 
lic of China. 

I think one could sum up this part of 
our deliberations in telling you that we 



(/•£• f *of i<*i| Toward the 
Soviet Union 



Following is the report of December 
31, 1978, on U.S. policy toward the 
Soviet Union prepared in accordance 
with Section 24(b) of the International 
Security Assistance Act of 1978. It was 
approved by President Carter and 
transmitted to Congress by Secretary 
Vance on January 4, 1979. 

This report is in response to Section 
24(b) of the International Security As- 
sistance Act of 1978, which calls for a 
review of U.S. policy toward the 
Soviet Union. 



Objectives of U.S. Policy 
Toward the Soviet Union 

The fundamental objectives of U.S. 
policy toward the Soviet Union have 
been set out by President Carter in a 
series of foreign policy addresses, 
which are included as appendices to 
this paper.' In his speech at Annapolis 
on June 7, the President stated: 

To be stable, to be supported by the American 
people, and to be a basis for widening the scope 
of cooperation, then detente must be broadly 
defined and truly reciprocal. Both nations must 
exercise restraint in troubled areas and in trou- 
bled times. Both must honor meticulously those 



agreements which have already been reached to 
widen cooperation, naturally and mutually limit 
nuclear arms production, permit the free move- 
ment of people and the expression of ideas, and 
to protect human rights. Neither of us should 
entertain the notion that military supremacy can 
be attained or that any transient military advan- 
tage can be politically exploited. Our principal 
goal is to help shape a world which is more re- 
sponsive to the desires of people everywhere for 
economic well-being, social justice, political 
self-determination, and basic human rights. 

We seek a world of peace. But such a world 
must accommodate diversity — social, political, 
and ideological. Only then can there be genuine 
cooperation among many nations and among 
cultures. 

The President listed the following 
principal elements of American policy 
toward the Soviet Union: 

• To continue to maintain equiva- 
lent nuclear strength at levels as mod- 
erate as may prove possible through 
negotiations; 

• To maintain a prudent and sus- 
tained level of military spending, 
keyed to a stronger NATO; 

• To support organizations dedi- 
cated to enhancing international har- 
mony; 

• To restrain Soviet intervention in 



did agree on the global necessity to 
stabilize the equilibrium of the world 
and to carry on detente with the Soviet 
Union, of course, especially so, in- 
cluding limitation of armanaments. 

In confirming that we have talked 
about a number of trouble spots in the 
world of today, I would, as well, wish 
to stress what already has been said by 
two previous speakers, namely, that we 
all are confident on the present stability 
of the world, which we consider to be 
improved as compared with the situa- 
tion a couple of years ago. 

Stability of the world did, of course, 
include the relationship between in- 
dustrialized and developing countries, 
which gave me a chance to directly re- 
port to the other three gentlemen about 
a conference which I recently was par- 
ticipating in, not far away from here, 
on the invitation of Prime Minister 
Manley of Jamaica. 

In concluding, I wish to express my 
gratitude to the host of this 
meeting — my friend, the French 
President — especially for his hospital- 



ity, especially for the initiative which 
has been taken by him, which has led 
us here. I would express my personal 
gratitude to the two Presidents and the 
British Prime Minister for this very 
personal exchange of views, of judg- 
ments, of information, which I'm quite 
certain will improve the foundations 
for decisions which one will have to 
take in the later course of 1979. 

I must confess that I've learned a lot 
in this meeting, would like to thank the 
host, to thank the other participants 
and, in the end, like to thank the 
people on this wonderful island for the 
hospitality they have shown to all of 
us. □ 



'These remarks were made at the Meridien 
Hotel in Saint-Francois, Guadeloupe; President 
Giscard d'Estaing spoke in French, and his re- 
marks were translated by an interpreter (text 
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments of Jan. 15, 1979). The 2-day series of 
meetings was held at the Hamak. a resort located 
on the southern coast of Grand Terre. 
Guadeloupe. 



February 1979 



39 



Africa and other Third World areas; 
and 

• To seek better communication and 
understanding, cultural and scientific 
exchanges, and increased trade. 

The Foundation of the 
Relationship 

In the generation following World 
War II, the world witnessed the 
emergence of two nuclear superpowers 
whose competition evolved within the 
context of increasing interrelationships 
among nations. The two-superpower 
system has become increasingly com- 
plex with the emergence of other nu- 
clear powers, the assertiveness of the 
Third World, the growing importance 
of North-South relations, and the es- 
tablishment of nuclear parity. In gen- 
eral these changes have worked to limit 
Soviet-American rivalry and have 
created a need for restraint and cooper- 
ation. 

Soviet-American interests are com- 
petitive in important respects — 
militarily, politically, economically, 
and ideologically. Though controlled in 
some areas, the arms competition con- 
tinues. The Soviet Union continues to 
seek to expand its influence in the 
world. The values which govern Soviet 
policies and our own remain at odds in 
important respects. These elements of 
competition will remain for a long time 
and we must have no illusions about 
them. However, we and the U.S.S.R. 
both have a strong interest in main- 
taining peace. 

Thus, Soviet-American relations will 
continue to be characterized by both 
competition and cooperation. The 
challenge for American foreign policy 
is to respond effectively to the former 
and encourage the latter, seeking to 
foster attitudes of restraint and respect 
for Western interests among the Krem- 
lin leaders. The process is a long-term 
one since it involves the gradual mod- 
ification of deeply ingrained political 
attitudes, overlaid by a dogmatic ideol- 
ogy and a highly authoritarian govern- 
ment. It is important that in pursuing 
these general objectives, we avoid 
undue discouragement or excessive op- 
timism. What we require is persistence 
and determination. 



The Strategic and Military 
Dimension 

The strategic and military dimension 
of our relationship with the U.S.S.R. is 
fundamental. It poses the greatest 
danger to our security and is at the core 
of existing power relationships. 

The years since World War II have 
witnessed steady accretion of Soviet 



SUMMARY OF REPORT 

The introduction points out that despite 
efforts to expand cooperation in recent years. 
the values that govern Soviet policies and 
actions remain at odds with ours in important 
respects. As a result. Soviet-U.S. relations 
continue to be characterized by both compe- 
tition and cooperation. The challenge to U.S. 
foreign policy is to respond effectively to the 
former and encourage the latter. 

Our strategic and military relationship with 
the U.S.S.R. poses the greatest danger to our 
security and is at the core of existing power 
relationships. Today a situation of rough 
parity exists. However, the steady accretion 
of Soviet military strength over the last dec- 
ade has made a two-fold policy necessary: 
(1) to maintain unsurpassed military strength 
adequate to defend our interests, while (2) 
seeking to reduce the threat of nuclear war 
through arms control agreements. In pursuit 
of these goals, the United States has sought a 
SALT agreement which is equitable, bal- 
anced, and stabilizing. At the same time, the 
Administration is also pursuing new pro- 
grams to guarantee a viable deterrent against 
nuclear attack. The Administration has com- 
mitted itself to a 3% per annum real increase 
in defense spending and undertaken efforts to 
improve cooperation with our allies on mod- 
ernizing and standardizing equipment. 

Commercial and economic ties are an im- 
portant aspect of U.S. -Soviet relations. The 
prospects for expansion of trade with the 
Soviet Union will in part depend on progress 
in overall relations. 

In keeping with its longstanding support 
for the free flow of information and people, 
the United States has also engaged in an in- 
creasing number of educational, cultural, and 
scientific exchange programs with the Soviet 



Union. In all programs, the American par- 
ticipants have pressed for reciprocity and 
productivity, seeking to insure a mutually 
advantageous balance of benefits. 

The United States is committed to an im- 
provement in the human rights situation, 
wherever abuses occur. Given the funda- 
mental conflict in values between our two 
societies, greater Soviet respect for human 
rights can best be achieved through a con- 
stant, careful effort across the whole range of 
our relations, private and governmental. 

In the Third World. U.S. -Soviet relations 
have been deeply troubled by Soviet inter- 
vention, particularly in Angola and Ethiopia. 
At the same time U.S. efforts to facilitate an 
Egyptian-Israeli settlement and the negative 
Soviet response to this effort have signifi- 
cantly reduced Soviet influence in the Middle 
East. In the Far East the Administration has 
recently moved to normalize relations with 
China. In doing this it has made clear that it 
intends to pursue good relations with both 
Moscow and Peking on their own merits. It 
does not intend to take sides in the dispute 
between China and the Soviet Union or to 
purposely exacerbate tensions between the 
two Communist powers. 

In the years ahead internal factors, par- 
ticularly leadership changes, are likely to 
affect Soviet policy, though it is difficult to 
predict exactly how. The Administration 
keeps the policy goals toward the Soviet 
Union under constant review through 
mechanisms such as the Special Coordinating 
Committee of the National Security Council 
and Interagency Coordinating Committee on 
U.S. -Soviet Affairs as well as through 
periodic consultations with Congress. Such 
endeavors help to insure that U.S. policy to- 
ward the Soviet Union remains coherent and 
effective. 



military strength across a broad spec- 
trum ranging from strategic to conven- 
tional forces. Without going into the 
historic evolution of force structure on 
both sides, it can be generalized that 
the situation today is one of rough par- 
ity. Our policy is twofold: (1) to 
maintain unsurpassed military strength 
adequate to protect our interests while 
(2) seeking balanced and stabilizing 
arms control agreements to reduce the 
danger of war. As for the strategic bal- 
ance, our new programs — Trident, 
cruise missiles, improved interconti- 
nental ballistic missiles — are designed 
to guarantee us a powerful deterrent 
against nuclear attack. The purpose of 
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT) is to curb a wasteful and po- 
tentially dangerous nuclear arms race 
by reducing levels of arms, removing 
uncertainty in our force planning, and 
enhancing strategic stability. Building 



on the antiballistic missile treaty in 
1972 we have sought to limit strategic 
offensive arms qualitatively and quan- 
titatively. Our goal is a SALT II 
agreement which will be equitable, 
balanced, and stabilizing. 

The difficulty in negotiating an 
agreement reflects the intrinsic con- 
straints of our relations with the 
U.S.S.R., as well as the vital security 
issues at stake. Despite wariness on 
both sides, in 9 years the United States 
and the U.S.S.R. have gradually be- 
come more accustomed to talking with 
each other about the highly sensitive 
subject of strategic arms and have had 
the opportunity to develop a better un- 
derstanding of each other's premises 
and concerns. The Standing Consulta- 
tive Commission established in 1972, 
in particular, has proved a valuable 
mechanism for clarifying questions re- 
lating to verification of compliance 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



with the first SALT agreements. 

The Soviet conventional force build- 
up and the projection of Soviet con- 
ventional forces beyond Soviet borders 
have caused disquiet, to us and our al- 
lies. We have committed ourselves to a 
3% per annum real increase in defense 
spending in part to meet the threat. We 
have also intensified efforts to improve 
cooperation with our allies on moder- 
nizing and standardizing equipment. 
Here too, however, we are pursuing a 
policy of detente along with defense. 
While the mutual and balanced force 
reduction talks in Vienna have pro- 
ceeded slowly, we remain committed to 
their success. 

Consistent with this Administration's 
policy of arms transfer restraint, the 
United States initiated discussions with 
the U.S.S.R., the world's second 
largest supplier of arms, to examine the 
possibility of establishing an overall 
framework to restrain conventional 
arms transfers. Thus far, four meetings 
have taken place. Since the subject is. 
new for both sides and especially com- 
plex in its ramifications, progress will 
require patience and care. 

Since November 1977 the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and the 
U.S.S.R. have been negotiating toward 
a comprehensive test ban prohibiting 
all nuclear explosions. Considerable 
progress has been made but important 
verification issues have yet to be re- 
solved. Verification remains the chief 
obstacle to agreement in the U.S.- 
Soviet talks on banning chemical 
weapons. Progress has been made in 
bilateral negotiations on banning 
radiological weapons though some 
differences remain. A sharp increase in 
Soviet naval presence in the Indian 
Ocean as well as Soviet and Cuban ac- 
tions in the Horn of Africa led to ad- 
journment of the U.S. -Soviet Indian 
Ocean arms limitation talks, aimed at 
stabilization of the U.S. -Soviet military 
presence in the area, after the fourth 
meeting. The question of resumption is 
under review, but Soviet intentions 
with regard to the Arabian Peninsula 
and the Horn of Africa remain of con- 
cern. The United States and the 
U.S.S.R. have met once to consider the 
question of limiting antisatellite 
weapons, and will meet again early in 
1979. 

The military balance must be sub- 
jected to constant scrutiny since it can 
be changed not only by technological 
breakthroughs but by changing at- 
titudes of other nations. There is no 
single subject on which the Adminis- 
tration devotes more energy and atten- 
tion than to assure that we meet mili- 
tary challenges where necessary and re- 
strain them where possible. 



The Third World 

U.S. -Soviet relations have been 
deeply troubled by Soviet intervention 
in a number of conflicts in the Third 
World. Soviet introduction of arms and 
Cuban forces into Ethiopia and Angola 
and insertion of military armaments in 
areas of turbulence in Africa are mat- 
ters of serious concern. At the same 
time, U.S. efforts to facilitate an 
Egyptian-Israeli settlement and the 
critical response of the Soviet Union to 
this effort have significantly reduced 
Soviet influence in the Middle East. 

Soviet policy toward the Third 
World is motivated by four basic con- 
siderations: 

• Desire to enhance Soviet influ- 
ence, while reducing U.S., Western 
European, and Chinese presence; 

• Strategic concerns and an interest 
in obtaining forward bases for Soviet 
military activities; 

• Support for Marxist governments 



and political groups whose positions 
are consonant with Soviet foreign pol- 
icy objectives; and 

• Achievement of economic bene- 
fits through access to natural resources 
and potential markets for exports. 

In its dealings with the Third World, 
the Soviet Union has demonstrated the 
ability to move decisively when op- 
portunities arise. For example, the 
U.S.S.R. moved quickly to support the 
new regime in Afghanistan, expanded 
its postcoup presence in South Yemen, 
and capitalized on the China- 
Vietnam-Cambodia conflict to for- 
malize and strengthen ties to Hanoi. At 
the same time, the Soviet Union has 
suffered setbacks, as evinced by its ex- 
pulsion from Somalia, Sudan, and 
Egypt, and the efforts of several states, 
notably India and Guinea, to lessen 
their dependence on Moscow. 

This Administration's policy toward 
the Third World has been characterized 
by efforts to seek peaceful solutions to 



Implementing the 
CSCE Final Act 



MEMORANDUM FROM THE 
PRESIDENT, DEC. 6 1 

This Administration attaches the greatest sig- 
nificance to achieving full implementation of the 
Final Act of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This document 
contains solemn political pledges by the leaders 
of the 35 States of Europe and North America 
which participated in the 1975 Helsinki 
Summit — pledges to work toward lowering the 
barriers between East and West and improving 
the everyday lives of their people. 

1 believe that our own record of implementa- 
tion has been second to none among the 35 par- 
ticipating States, but our work is not complete. 
The Final Act pledges us to strive constantly for 
improvement both domestically, in the area of 
civil and economic rights, and internationally, in 
the expansion of our cooperation with the other 
participating States. Other governments, in- 
cluding the Soviet Union, will better understand 
the depth of our concern for the full implemen- 
tation of the Helsinki pledges if we demonstrate 
that we are working hard at home to fulfill even 
more effectively our side of the Helsinki 
bargain. 

The work of each of your departments and 
agencies touches upon important aspects of our 
final Act commitments, and I ask you to keep 
these commitments in mind as you develop your 
programs. You should work with the Department 
of State, and cooperate with the Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, as they 



carry out their respective responsibilities to as- 
sess implementation and identify areas where 
American performance can be improved. To 
facilitate this task. I request that you designate 
an official at the Assistant Secretary or the Dep- 
uty Assistant Secretary level to serve as CSCE 
contact. I will appreciate your full cooperation 
with the Department of State as it prepares the 
Administration's semi-annual reports on CSCE 
implementation as well as offering your full 
cooperation to the Commission, which is pre- 
paring its own special report on United States 
implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. 

Jimmy Carter □ 



'Memorandum for the Vice President; the 
Secretary of State; the Secretary of the Treasury; 
the Secretary of Defense; the Attorney General; 
the Secretary of the Interior; the Secretary of 
Agriculture; the Secretary of Commerce; the 
Secretary of Labor; the Secretary of Health. 
Education and Welfare; the Secretary of Trans- 
portation; the Secretary of Energy; the Director, 
International Communication Agency; the Ad- 
ministrator, Environmental Protection Agency; 
the Chairman, Board for International Broad- 
casting; the Chairman, Commission on Civil 
Rights; the Chairman, Equal Employment Op- 
portunity Commission; the Chairman, Interna- 
tional Trade Commission; the President, 
National Academy of Sciences; the Chairman, 
National Endowment for the Arts; the Chairman, 
National Endowment for the Humanities; and the 
Chairman, National Science Foundation; text 
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments of Dec. 11, 1978. 



February 1979 

regional conflicts and to improve eco- 
nomic, social, and cultural relations 
with developing states. Our efforts to 
achieve peace in the Middle East on the 
basis of the Camp David accords are 
continuing. Through support for the 
Anglo-American peace plan for 
Rhodesia and the U.N. settlement for 
Namibia we have sought, at a 
minimum, to provide African leaders 
with an alternative to reliance on 
Soviet/Cuban military assistance. 
These initiatives have provided a clear 
message to Third World leaders that 
the United States is committed to 
seeking ways to reduce conflict and 
obtain lasting solutions to international 
problems. We have also stressed to the 
U.S.S.R. that our bilateral relations are 
affected by its behavior in third areas. 

China 

U.S. policy is to pursue relations 
with both the Soviet Union and China 
on their own merits. It is not in the 
American interest to exacerbate Sino- 
Soviet tensions, nor to encourage either 
to believe that the United States is pre- 
pared to take sides in the dispute. As 
President Carter stated in his December 
15 announcement, "The normalization 
of relations between the United States 
and China has no other purpose than 
this: the advancement of peace." 2 

The decision by the United States to 
normalize ties with the People's Re- 
public of China (P.R.C.) is one the 
U.S.S.R. has long regarded as inevita- 
ble. Soviet leaders have stated, 
nevertheless, that they will be watching 
developments in U.S. -P.R.C. relations 
closely. The P.R.C. s effort to expand 
and improve relations with Eastern and 
Western Europe, Africa, India, and 
Japan has stimulated Soviet concern. 
The U.S.S.R. has continued to build up 
its military strength along the Chinese 
border. At the present time, a signifi- 
cant rapprochement between Peking 
and Moscow is extremely unlikely. 

Soviet Internal Developments and 
Their Effect on Foreign Policy 

Many internal forces will interact, in 
the years ahead, to affect Soviet inter- 
nal development and hence Soviet 
policies. The effects of modernization, 
greater access and exposure to quality 
consumer goods, systemic economic 
problems in industry and agriculture, a 
possible decline in oil and energy re- 
serves, a declining birth rate, continued 
pressures for emigration, dissent, and 
nationality tensions will all have their 
effect. Changes among top leadership 
are also likely in coming years. 

It is virtually impossible, however. 



for outside observers accurately to pre- 
dict the effect of Soviet internal de- 
velopments on foreign policy. The 
Soviet authoritarian mode of leadership 
and closed social system do not allow 
much scope for analysis before the 
fact, though it is sometimes possible to 
trace a connection after the fact. What 
does remain clear is the need for the 
West to keep its basic goals clearly in 
mind and to keep lines of communica- 
tion and options open. So that when an 
opportunity arises, we will be in a po- 
sition to respond and to influence the 
course of events in a favorable direc- 
tion. 



Trade and Economic Relations 

The United States favors the expan- 
sion of peaceful trade with the Soviet 
Union. Our policy is in keeping with 
the "Basic Principles of Relations," 
agreed upon in May 1972, which states 
that: 

The USA and the USSR regard commercial 
and economic ties as an important and necessary 
element in the strengthening of their bilateral 
relations and thus will actively promote the 
growth of such ties. 3 

But economic relations do not take 
place in isolation. They affect and are 
in turn affected by the political climate. 
The prospects for expanded trade will 
depend in large part on progress in 
overall relations. 

American-Soviet trade has increased 
markedly in this decade. Since 1971 
our cumulative trade surplus with the 
U.S.S.R. has amounted to approxi- 
mately $8.4 billion. In 1976, trade 
turnover totaled $2.5 billion and will 
probably reach that level again in 1978. 
However, the trend has been uneven 
because of large fluctuations in Soviet 
purchases of American grain. 

Trade has developed at a relatively 
brisk pace despite legislative barriers 
and other obstacles to commerce on 
both sides. The Trade Act of 1974 
contained provisions which link 
most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment 
and the extension of official credits by 
the U.S. Government to freedom of 
emigration. The U.S.S.R. has refused 
to accept those conditions. 

In addition, American exports to the 
U.S.S.R. are subject to export control 
regulations that restrict the export of 
goods and technologies which make a 
significant contribution to Soviet mili- 
tary potential. These regulations further 
require that exports of oil and gas 
equipment and technology to the 
U.S.S.R. must be consistent with U.S. 
foreign policy objectives. Soviet hard 
currency indebtedness, the U.S.S.R. s 
limited export capacity, and its cen- 



41 

tralized economic apparatus also tend 
to inhibit trade. 

At the same time, bilateral agree- 
ments, such as the maritime and grain 
agreements concluded in 1975, provide 
a stimulus to trade. Meetings of the 
Cabinet-level U.S. -U.S.S.R. Joint 
Commercial Commission and the 
U.S. -U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic 
Council (most recently in December 
1978) have likewise helped promote 
the establishment of effective commer- 
cial arrangements between the two 
countries. 

Assuming a favorable political 
climate — which is very much affected 
by our security relationship — the pros- 
pects for continued growth in U.S.- 
Soviet trade are promising, but their 
realization depends on a series of com- 
plex factors, some of which are outside 
the control of either government. For 
example, projects to exploit Soviet 
natural resources, especially in Siberia, 
are complicated by sheer size, as well 
as by the differences between the two 
economic and political systems. 

Scientific and Technical 
Relations 

Since 1972, the United States and 
the U.S.S.R. have concluded 11 inter- 
governmental agreements covering 
cooperation in scientific and technical 
fields. These are: science and technol- 
ogy, environmental protection, medical 
sciences and public health, exploration 
of outer space for peaceful purposes, 
transportation, world oceans, peaceful 
uses of atomic energy, agriculture, 
energy, housing and other construc- 
tion, and artificial heart research. Ac- 
tivities under the programs include the 
exchange of technical information, ob- 
servation visits by specialists, joint 
working groups, parallel research, and 
in a few cases actual joint work. More 
than 250 projects have been jointly 
identified as areas of mutual interest. 

While experience has varied among 
the individual programs, on balance the 
spectrum of activities in its entirety has 
demonstrated potential for developing 
scientific benefits. This is particularly 
true when resources in one country 
complement those of the other, in such 
fields as the magnetohydrodynamic 
production of electricity, for example, 
and epidemiology. In all programs, the 
American participants have pressed for 
reciprocity and productivity, seeking to 
maintain a mutually advantageous bal- 
ance in the exchanges and to increase 
substantive benefits. 

In addition to prospects for scientific 
benefits in particular areas, it is very 
much in the U.S. national interest that 
our two nations, able to bring the 



42 

greatest resources and the most intense 
concentration to a whole spectrum of 
national endeavor, work with each 
other on areas of global concern, such 
as the environment and peaceful space 
research. This broader concern under- 
lies our efforts in individual fields. 

By its nature, however, American- 
Soviet collaboration will not result in 
spectacular gains for either side. This 
fact limits the potential for using the 
exchange and cooperative programs to 
try to affect Soviet Government policy. 
Implementation of the agreements pro- 
vides opportunities to communicate 
American concern on human rights and 
other issues. The most direct example 
occurred in the summer of 1978, when 
individual scientists and certain official 
U.S. delegations canceled or postponed 
their visits to the U.S.S.R. after the 
trials of Soviet dissidents. But to make 
the programs hostage to other issues, 
such as human rights, would put at risk 
the channels of communication with 
little chance of achieving systemic 
change within the U.S.S.R. 

Cultural and Education 
Relations 

A series of intergovernmental 
agreements since 1958 provides the 
framework for educational and cultural 
exchanges between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. In addition to 
official government programs, the Na- 
tional Academy of Sciences and the 
American Council of Learned Societies 
have long conducted exchanges with 
the Soviet Academy of Sciences. While 
the flow of participants is far greater 
today than in 1958, the level of ex- 
changes remains modest. 

Educational exchanges involve 
chiefly programs of individual study 
and research by senior scholars, 
graduate students and language 
teachers. Cultural exchanges involve a 
wider spectrum of activities, including 
two-way visits by individual experts or 
delegations of specialists and activities 
reaching a larger segment of the popu- 
lation, such as tours by performing arts 
groups, official traveling exhibits, and 
the distribution of official magazines. 

The United States has long supported 
the concept that a free flow of ideas 
and persons helps make for a better 
world. Exchanges permit Americans 
entry into a closed society and permit 
some Soviet citizens to learn about 
America directly from Americans. 
While the exchanges programs are af- 
fected in a minor way by the political 
climate, in essence they are not suffi- 
ciently vital to the receiving govern- 
ment to provide the sending side effec- 
tive leverage. 



Human Rights 

The President, in his 1977 address at 
the University of Notre Dame, as in his 
remarks on Human Rights Day this 
month [December 6, 1978], reaffirmed 
America's commitment to human rights 
as a fundamental tenet of our foreign 
policy. He further observed that: "This 
does not mean that we can conduct our 
foreign policy by rigid moral 
maxims. . . . We have no illusion that 
changes will come easily or soon." 
Greater Soviet respect for human rights 
can be achieved only through constant, 
careful effort across the whole range of 
our relations, private and governmen- 
tal. 

Specifics on the U.S. Government's 
policies and activities with regard to 
human rights conditions in the 
U.S.S.R. are provided in the Presi- 
dent's semiannual report to the Com- 
mission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, assessing the implementation 
of the Final Act of the Helsinki Con- 
ference, dated December 1978. In gen- 
eral terms, we pursue the cause of 
human rights in multilateral fora, such 
as the Belgrade conference on the Final 
Act of October 1977 to March 1978 
and preparations for the Madrid confer- 
ence scheduled for November 1980; 
through work with international or- 
ganizations; by briefings for individu- 
als having contact with Soviet citizens, 
such as participants in exchange pro- 
grams; and in the government-to- 
government bilateral channel. 

Bargaining Power and Linkage 

The complex, subtle questions of 
bargaining power and linkage cannot 
be considered in a vacuum, but must be 
addressed in specific contexts. The 
enormous strength of this country in 
every field — military, industrial, ag- 
ricultural, scientific, technological, 
ethical — gives the United States fully 
adequate bargaining strength to protect 
and enhance its interests in bargaining 
negotiations with the U.S.S.R. There is 
no need to resort to artificial linkage 
between issues, though it is clear that 
actions in one area can affect the 
political climate in others. Our 
pluralistic society and representational 
system of government give us an addi- 
tional measure of strength in times of 
crisis when we stand together to 
mobilize the full resources of our soci- 
ety to defend ourselves and our allies. 

Improvements in Institutions 
and Procedures 

An important recent change in 
executive branch institutions and pro- 
cedures pertaining to U.S. policy to- 



Department of State Bulletin 

ward the Soviet Union was the estab- 
lishment in August 1977 of the Inter- 
agency Coordinating Committee on 
U.S. -Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA). This 
committee, with members drawn from 
Departments and agencies which deal 
with the Soviet Union, provides a 
channel to assure that policy is uni- 
formly implemented throughout the 
U.S. Government. Through its monthly 
meetings, policy makers in turn are ap- 
prised of the concerns of those in the 
21 agencies which have programs in- 
volving the Soviet Union, varying from 
the International Communication 
Agency to the Department of Defense, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
and the Department of Health. Educa- 
tion and Welfare. The committee has 
proven a useful mechanism, and pos- 
sibilities to expand its operation are 
considered as they arise. 

The closer cooperation between the 
executive and legislative branches of 
recent years is apparent in the exten- 
sive consultations, briefings, and 
hearings carried out on the subject of 
U.S. -Soviet relations. The Subcom- 
mittee on Domestic and International 
Scientific Planning, Analysis, and 
Cooperation of the House Committee 
on Science and Technology held hear- 
ings in October on the conduct of sci- 
entific exchanges with the Soviet 
Union. In preparation for the recent 
parliamentary visit by 10 U.S. Senators 
to the U.S.S.R., the participants and 
the Department of State worked to- 
gether closely. The Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee has prepared an 
extensive independent study on U.S.- 
Soviet relations which involved travel 
to the U.S.S.R. and consultations with 
U.S. officials in Moscow and Wash- 
ington. These are only the most recent 
and prominent examples of the network 
of cooperative effort now in place be- 
tween the two branches of the govern- 
ment. 

As is apparent from the scope of this 
review, U.S. -Soviet relations are com- 
plex and multifaceted. The Adminis- 
tration keeps the foreign policy goals 
of the United States toward the Soviet 
Union, and how best to pursue them, 
under constant review. Through 
mechanisms such as the Special Coor- 
dinating Committee of the National Se- 
curity Council and the Interagency 
Coordinating Committee on U.S.- 
Soviet Affairs, current issues are dis- 
cussed in fora where all concerned of- 
ficials may participate. In consultation 
with the Congress and informed mem- 
bers of the public, special studies and 
discussions of key issues are organized 
to provide the best possible guidance to 
policymakers. Enormous resources are 
devoted to every aspect of U.S. -Soviet 



February 1979 



Mutual and Balanced 
Force Reduction Talks 



43 

• In wartime, NATO could draw on 
civilian equipment and supplies. 

• Warsaw Pact offensive power de- 
pends on the questionable reliability of 
Eastern European armed forces. 



Foreign Relations Outline' 

The mutual and balanced force re- 
ductions (MBFR) negotiations — the 
principal arms control effort in 
Europe — began in Vienna in November 
1973. Their purpose is to increase 
European security by enhancing mili- 
tary stability in central Europe. They 
focus on ways to reduce active duty air 
and ground forces in Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, the Federal 
Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) on the 
NATO side and the German Democra- 
tic Republic (G.D.R.), Czechoslo- 
vakia, and Poland on the Warsaw Pact 
side. Other direct participants are the 
United States, United Kingdom, 
Canada, and the U.S.S.R. because 
their forces are stationed in the agreed 
area. Eight special participants — whose 
forces would not be reduced — are 
Denmark, Greece. Italy, Norway, and 
Turkey on the Western side and Bul- 
garia, Romania, and Hungary on the 
Eastern side. 



Need for Arms Control 
in Europe 

U.S. security is inextricably bound 
to the freedom and independence of a 
strong Western Europe. In this context, 
central Europe is of vital strategic im- 
portance to us and our allies. Because 
of geography and population density, 
the potential for destruction in any new 



relations, from the most minute to the 
farthest ranging question, to insure that 
our policy is coherent and effective. □ 



1 For President Carter's foreign policy ad- 
dresses included as appendices to this report, 
see: 

• "The United States and the Soviet Union,'' 
Annapolis. Md , June 7, 1978 (Bulletin of 
July 1978, p. 14); 

• "National Security Interests.'' Winston- 
Salem. N.C.. Mar. 17, 1978 (Bulletin of Apr. 
1978, p. 17); 

• "President Carter Outlines the U.S. -Soviet 
Relationship." Charleston, S.C., July 21. 1977 
(Bulletin of Aug. 15, 1977, p. 193); 

• "A Foreign Policy Based on America's Es- 
sential Character." South Bend. Ind.. May 22, 
1977 (Bulletin of June 13, 1977, p. 621). 

2 For text of the joint communique between 
the U.S. and the P.R.C., the President's ad- 
dress, and related material, see Bulletin of 
Jan. 1979, p. 25. 

3 For text, see Bulletin of June 26, 1972. p. 
898. 



war there would be staggering. 

Moreover, a European war could 
lead to general nuclear war between the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. To re- 
duce this possibility, NATO must 
maintain a strong deterrent. Although 
we have recently initiated steps to 
strengthen this deterrent in response to 
growing Pact capabilities, the West 
believes that negotiations to reach 
equitable and verifiable arms control 
agreements offer the best long-term 
prospect to improve stability in 
Europe. 

European Military Balance 

There are significant disparities 
favoring the Warsaw Pact in the center 
of Europe. Pact forces in the G.D.R., 
Poland, and Czechoslovakia total over 
925,000 ground force personnel, about 
16,000 operational main battle tanks, 
and 3,000 tactical aircraft. Of these, 
over 460,000 ground force personnel, 
more than 9,000 main battle tanks, and 
about 1,200 tactical aircraft are Soviet. 

Against this, NATO forces in the 
F.R.G. , Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg comprise over 780,000 
ground force personnel (including 
about 200,000 U.S. troops), about 
6.000 operational main battle tanks, 
and 1 ,300 tactical aircraft. 

Of particular concern to NATO is the 
Pact's capability — because of these 
disparities — to launch a surprise, un- 
reinforced attack. The disparities 
would be compounded if. in a crisis, 
the Pact mobilized reserves and rein- 
forced with the Soviet units before 
NATO could mobilize. In particular, 
the United States would need to trans- 
port its mobilized forces over 3,000 
miles from North America to central 
Europe, while the U.S.S.R. 's reserves 
are only 500 miles from the potential 
battle area. However, NATO's defen- 
sive posture helps mitigate some East- 
ern numerical advantages, since an at- 
tacker generally requires a 3 to 1 
superiority over the defender. Other 
factors also benefit NATO. 

• NATO can confront the Pact's ar- 
mored forces by supplementing its 
tanks with antitank guided missiles, in 
which the West is quantitatively and 
qualitatively superior. 

• The Pact's numerical advantage in 
tactical aircraft is partially offset by 
NATO's technologically superior air- 
craft. 



Western Position 

NATO has proposed that the out- 
come of the reductions be rough parity. 
A collective ceiling would be set for 
each side's overall ground and air 
manpower. The large imbalance in 
tanks would be diminished at the out- 
set, and there would be separate ceil- 
ings on Soviet (and U.S.) forces. This 
would effectively reduce the Soviet 
offensive threat in central Europe. The 
collective ceiling preserves NATO 
flexibility and would be reached in two 
phases. 

The first would result in removal of 
68,000 Soviet ground personnel, in- 
cluding five divisions and 1,700 tanks 
on the Eastern side; and 29,000 U.S. 
ground force personnel, 1,000 U.S. 
nuclear warheads, 54 F-4 nuclear ca- 
pable aircraft, and 36 Pershing 
surface-to-surface missile launchers on 
the NATO side. 

In the second phase, all direct par- 
ticipants would help achieve the col- 
lective ceiling. The West has indicated 
that it might be established at about 
700,000 men in ground forces and 
900,000 in air and ground forces 
combined. 

Other measures would be needed to 
verify compliance, build confidence, 
improve warning, and assure that 
forces withdrawn from the central re- 
gion were not used to increase the 
threat to nations on the northern and 
southern flanks. 

In April 1978, the Western partici- 
pants introduced a major new initiative 
to break the negotiating deadlock. It 
dealt with two basic issues: commit- 
ments on the amount and timing of 
phase II reductions by the Europeans 
and the manner of U.S. /U.S.S.R. 
withdrawal in phase I. 

Eastern Position 

The initial Eastern position proposed 
equal percentage reductions in three 
stages — about 17% in ground and air 
forces and all types of armaments, in- 
cluding nuclear weapons — for direct 
participants. There would be national 
ceilings on the forces of all countries in 
the area. This would have preserved 
the Pact's ground force advantage, im- 
posing absolute limits on European ar- 
mies but not on the Soviets. In 1976 
the Pact agreed that the United States 
and the U.S.S.R. could withdraw in 
phase I but retained other proposals un- 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



acceptable to the West. The East, in 
June 1978, accepted the principle of a 
common ceiling on ground and air 
force manpower. However, the East 
denies that any significant manpower 
asymmetry now exists and thus rejects 
the asymmetrical manpower reductions 
needed to reach parity in manpower. 
Moreover, the East continues to seek to 
limit the flexibility of our European al- 
lies. The Eastern position has other 
significant deficiencies as well. 

Current Status 

The Eastern proposal is now close to 
the Western position on some signifi- 
cant issues. However, the data discrep- 
ancy is central to the negotiations and 
must be resolved. Before the West can 
agree to reductions or numerical limits, 
both sides must agree on the number of 
forces subject to reductions. The West 
cannot accept the East's assertion that 
rough numerical equality in each side's 
military manpower already exists. □ 



■Taken from a Department of State publica- 
tion in the Gist series, released in Oct. 1978. 
This outline is designed to be a quick reference 
aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended 
as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy state- 
ment. 



Tenth Report 
on Cyprus 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
NOV. 30 ' 

In accordance with the provisions of Public 
Law 95-384, I am reporting on progress made 
toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution to 
the Cyprus problem. 

While direct negotiations between the two 
Cypriot communities under the auspices of the 
United Nations Secretary General have not yet 
resumed, there is a growing awareness, espe- 
cially among the parties directly concerned, that 
the time is now ripe for determined action de- 
signed to break the Cyprus deadlock. Moreover, 
it is increasingly accepted that a just and lasting 
settlement can come only through intensive, 
sustained face-to-face negotiations. Public 
statements, general resolutions and intermittent 
talks are not adequate to solve the Cyprus prob- 
lem. For this reason our recent efforts have con- 
centrated on encouraging the two Cypriot parties 
to work with the Secretary General of the United 
Nations on an early reconvening of intercom- 
munal talks. Repeal of the Turkish arms em- 
bargo has created fresh opportunities for prog- 
ress on the Cyprus issue. 

Secretary of State Vance spoke of this policy 



before the United Nations General Assembly on 
September 29. We "... would welcome and 
actively support," he said, "a renewed effort by 
Secretary General Waldheim to help the parties 
reach agreement on a sovereign, bicommunal. 
nonaligned federal Republic of Cyprus ..." 
To back up this call. Administration officials 
have been conferring with high-level representa- 
tives of both Cypriot communities, with the Tur- 
kish, Greek and other friendly governments, and 
also with principal officers of the United Nations 
Secretariat. I had a useful discussion of the 
Cyprus issue with President Kyprianou on Oc- 
tober 6, and Secretary Vance met with President 
Kyprianou, Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash, 
and the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey 
on the margin of the United Nations General 
Assembly. 

These contacts and many others have given us 
a fairly clear picture of the practical possibilities 
for forward movement and of the aims and ob- 
jectives of the two sides. Both Greek and Tur- 
kish Cypriots have underscored to us their desire 
to see a resumption of negotiations, although 
they still differ on how to do it. 

In our talks with the Cypriot parties and with 
United Nations officials, we have gone into 
some detail on how to bridge the gap between 
the parties, so as to arrive at a mutually accept- 
able basis for negotiations. We cannot yet tell 
whether the efforts of our government. Secretary 
General Waldheim, and other friendly govern- 
ments will bear fruit, but we are doing our best 
to encourage regular intercommunal negotiations 
early in the new year. 

After the arms embargo repeal, the Govern- 
ment of Turkey restated its desire to help 
negotiate a rapid resolution of the Cyprus prob- 
lem. Moreover, in his speech to the United Na- 
tions General Assembly on October 3, Turkish 
Foreign Minister Okcun reconfirmed his Gov- 
ernment's commitment to withdrawing all of its 
armed forces from Cyprus, except those mutu- 
ally agreed upon by the parties concerned, in 
connection with a final settlement. We believe 
that Turkey will do its best to help the Secretary 
General bring about a resumption of the inter- 
communal negotiations. 

The annual General Assembly debate on the 
Cyprus question took place in the United Nations 
during the week of November 6. The United 
States Representative stated that "enhancing the 
prospects for sustained and productive . . . 
negotiations should be our foremost objec- 
tive." and that, "All parties interested in 
promoting a settlement on Cyprus should now 
concentrate their efforts on encouraging these 
talks and fostering an atmosphere that will 
contribute to their success." The United States 
abstained on the resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly because it contained ele- 
ments which were clearly not conducive to a 
resumption of negotiations. As this report was 
being prepared the Cyprus question was also 
being considered within the Security Council. 
Jimmy Carter □ 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Dec. 4, 1978. 



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February 1979 



45 



MIDDLE EAST: The Situation 
in Iran and its implications 



by Harold H. Saunders 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Committee on International 
Relations on January 17. 1979. Mr. 
Saunders is Assistant Secretary for 
Near Eastern and South Asian Af- 
fairs. ' 

This hearing provides an opportunity 
for us to review together the present 
situation in Iran and some of its impli- 
cations for the future of U.S. policy to- 
ward Iran and the Middle East. 

I propose to deal with the following 
questions in this introductory presenta- 
tion. 

• What have been the interests and 
role of the United States in Iran? 

• What is the present situation, and 
how did it arise? 

• What are the regional and global 
implications of these developments in 
Iran? 

• What is the U.S. posture toward 
this situation? 

• What lies ahead? 

In short, I will be developing the 
following points. 

• The United States remains firmly 
committed — as has every American 
Administration since World War II — to 
a free, stable, and independent Iran. 
Iran's independence is critical in pro- 
tecting the freedom of other nations in 
the Middle East. Fifty percent of the 
petroleum consumed by the free world 
passes through the Strait of Hormuz 
on Iran's southern flank. 

• Iran, like other nations that have 
developed rapidly, has experienced 
fundamental and accelerating change 
over the past two decades — economic 
development, widespread social 
change, and demands for greater pop- 
ular involvement in shaping the deci- 
sions which affect Iran's life and fu- 
ture. In the course of this process of 
rapid modernization, economic prog- 
ress has outpaced the development of 
political institutions. Some Iranians 
have felt that their traditional roles and 
religious convictions have been 
threatened by these developments and 
by the introduction of an unfamiliar 
culture. Many are now insisting on a 
wider sharing of political power as well 
as economic benefits. This is the crux 
of the problem in Iran today. 



• Our policy over three decades has 
been to work with Iran, as with other 
nations undergoing these profound 
changes, to help it find constructive 
solutions to the problems it faces, 
emerge from periods of change with 
new stability, and preserve its national 
independence. Our strongly held view 
is that no outside power should try to 
dictate Iran's course, exploit instability 
for its own ends, or seek control of any 
kind in this area. Each nation should 
have the freedom to work out its future 
free from outside interference. 

• The entire area of western Asia is 
characterized by growth and change. 
Change produces opportunity as well as 
instability and crisis. The issue is how 
to channel change along paths leading 
to stability and strength. Our position 
in the area is strong. Most of the states 
there share our objectives for this 
region — the security and national inde- 
pendence of each state in the area and 
the opportunity to choose its own ways 
to build better lives for its people. Be- 
cause we share those objectives and 



. . . Iran has been through a dec- 
ade and a half of rapid growth 
and social change while its politi- 
cal institutions have not evolved 
commensurately . 



seek no domination, we believe U.S. 
help in appropriate ways will be sought 
in the future as in the past as nations of 
the area work out their futures. We are 
in close touch with governments in the 
region and elsewhere whose interests 
are also affected by this situation. 

American Interests and Role 

The interests of the United States in 
Iran have remained constant over the 
past generation. 

Because of Iran's importance to the 
security of the gulf region, the future of 
the Middle East, and the production of 
oil, we have a strong interest in a free, 
stable, and independent Iran. We have 
persistently and actively pursued this 
objective since World War II. 

Working within the limits set by the 
Government of Iran in areas of com- 
mon interest, we have helped Iran 
strengthen itself economically in two 



ways: (1) We have participated in 
Iran's modernization, first through de- 
velopment assistance and then through 
the cooperation of private American 
firms. (2) American and other Western 
companies have worked closely in the 
development of Iran's oil production 
and marketing, thereby helping to pro- 
vide the revenues which have been the 
main engine of Iran's economic 
development. 

As is often the case with govern- 
ments where authority is highly cen- 
tralized and where important economic 
and strategic interests are at stake, our 
ability to maintain contact with all 
elements of the society and press ef- 
fectively and consistently for construc- 
tive change has been limited. Where 
we saw social and political pressures 
building up within the society, we 
called attention to them, but the pace of 
development has been set by the Gov- 
ernment and circumstances in Iran. 

We have also responded to Iran's re- 
quests to help modernize its armed 
forces, which have played and will 
continue to play an important role in 
Iran's defense. Following British with- 
drawal in 1971 from a special role in 
the Persian Gulf, we have encouraged 
cooperation among the states of that 
region to strengthen security there. In 
part to compensate for British with- 
drawal, we expanded our security as- 
sistance relationship. The Iranian 
Armed Forces, in addition to helping 
neighboring Oman defend against in- 
surgency, have helped protect Western 
access to oil suppliers. 

We have also encouraged Iran's 
contribution to global economic prog- 
ress and stability. Until recently Iran 
has contributed not only by producing 
oil for the world's energy needs but 
also by giving substantial aid to other 
countries, investing in both the de- 
veloped and developing world and 
playing a significant role in the world 
economy. 

In international diplomacy, Iran has 
made numerous positive contributions: 
peacekeeping in Vietnam and the Mid- 
dle East, supporting moderate solutions 
to conflicts in Africa and elsewhere, 
and working to resolve some of its 
longstanding disputes with neighbors. 

As a consequence of our other inter- 
ests in Iran, we have an interest also in 
Iran's internal development and stabil- 
ity. But in any effort to pursue this 
interest, we must in the future, as we 



46 

have in the past, respect the rights of 
Iranians to decide how they shall order 
their own future. 



How the Present Situation 
Came About 

If we are to understand fully the na- 
ture of the present situation, we need to 
examine how it came about. 

Modernization. Iran has experi- 
enced since World War II many of the 
pressures and internal strains generated 
by modernization that have proved de- 
stabilizing in other countries. Some of 
these problems are familiar ones — 
rapid population growth, a massive 
shift of population from rural to urban 
areas, large numbers of unemployed 
and underemployed urban workers and 
students, and a host of other problems 
that arise when a nation as diverse as 
Iran pushes for development on a 



bitious scale of development produced 
a new elite of those charged with plan- 
ning and carrying out the new 
programs, but plans were made and 
implemented with little public consul- 
tation. Expansion in the private sector 
gave rise to a new class of entre- 
preneurs, while the interest of bazaar 
merchants and other traditional ele- 
ments of society were neglected. There 
were increased opportunities for edu- 
cation, but restrictions still limited the 
participation of the newly educated in 
the political process, and more were 
trained than could be employed in po- 
sitions they found rewarding. 

Confidence and Growth (1963-76). 

The economic successes of the "white 
revolution" heavily overshadowed the 
absence of a parallel advance in the 
political system. By 1976 it appeared 
to most observers of the Iranian scene 
that Iran's approach to modernization 



The main issue for the Iranian Government is to end the bloodshed 
and restore order so a new national consensus can be forged on how 
Iran should be governed and what its priorities at home and abroad 
should be. 



number of fronts simultaneously. Of 
particular significance in Iran has been 
the increasing alienation between those 
leading and benefitting from the mod- 
ernization and others whose position in 
society and deeply held religious con- 
victions are threatened by it. 

The "White Revolution" 
(1962-63). By the 1960's, Iranian 
leaders had become keenly aware of 
growing discontent, a sense of drift in 
Iran, and demands for far-reaching re- 
forms within a more broadly based, re- 
sponsive, nonauthoritarian political 
system. In order to channel these pres- 
sures into constructive rather than rev- 
olutionary change, the government 
launched a program of evolutionary 
reform and development pressed from 
the top at a forced-draft pace. This 
"white revolution" aimed at social and 
economic modernization with the Shah 
himself as the major agent in the re- 
form process. 

The reform program, fueled by rising 
revenues in the 1960's, quickly re- 
sulted in far-reaching changes, sub- 
stantially improving the lives of many 
citizens but damaging the position of 
others. Land redistribution, for exam- 
ple, weakened the power of the big 
landlords and also weakened the 
clergy, removing their independent 
source of income and making them de- 
pendent on private donations. The am- 



had produced substantial progress. As a 
result of the reform program, Iran was 
being transformed into a modern eco- 
nomic power. The future looked bright. 
Prosperity seemed assured through 
rapidly increasing oil revenues. By 
1976 there was solid achievement, al- 
though economic and political de- 
velopment continued to move on sepa- 
rate tracks at very different speeds. 

Problems and Pressures (1976-78). 
The new prosperity did not entirely 
mask the problems produced by the 
concentration of political power at the 
apex of government and the absence of 
political institutions that could deal 
with the trauma of modernization. 
Most prominent among the causes of 
dissatisfaction were popular resentment 
of what was seen as widespread cor- 
ruption, harsh repression, some inep- 
titude in high places, disregard for the 
deep religious feelings of the popula- 
tion, imbalances between revenues and 
expenses, shortcomings in planning 
and carrying out ambitious projects, 
rising unemployment in the cities as the 
construction boom began to subside, 
insufficient job opportunities for ever 
larger numbers of graduating students, 
inequitable distribution of the benefits 
of development, sacrifice of civilian 
programs for military procurement, and 
a high rate of inflation that outstripped 
wage increases and frustrated expecta- 



Department of State Bulletin 

tions for a steadily rising standard of 
living. These grievances and the ab- 
sence of political outlets for affecting 
government policy led moderate secu- 
lar opposition leaders to make common 
cause with significant elements of the 
Muslim clergy. 

In response to increasing political 
ferment and criticism in 1976 and 
1977, the government sponsored cam- 
paigns against corruption in the public 
and private sectors, reorganized itself 
to curb waste and promote efficiency, 
and gave an official political party a 
greater role without infringing on royal 
authority. Moves to improve the human 
rights situation were directed at 
eliminating torture and extreme 
punishments in the prisons and amnes- 
tying political prisoners rather than at 
establishing new political institutions. 
The government's measures eventually 
included encouragement of "construc- 
tive criticism" to promote citizen par- 
ticipation in government, as well as 
efforts to slow down the rapid rate of 
economic growth that had caused se- 
vere dislocations in the society. These 
changes, however, did not satisfy the 
demands of large numbers of Iranians 
for a more open political system. 

By the end of 1977, Iranian and 
foreign observers saw these moves as 
the first results of the official policy of 
liberalizing Iranian political life that 
had started in 1976. Those steps, how- 
ever, did not yet include movement to- 
ward basic political change. 

By early 1978, widespread disrup- 
tions had begun, and sympathy was 
shown by student demonstrations 
abroad. By midyear it was clear that a 
new political dynamic was emerging. 
Religious figures took the lead in ex- 
pressing opposition to the government. 
The Shah publicly stated his intention 
to pursue liberalization, looking toward 
free elections. By late August, how- 
ever, it was apparent that the govern- 
ment had underestimated the depth of 
dissatisfaction. A new government was 
installed at that time which promised 
freedom of activity for legitimate 
political parties. A few days later it 
was forced to declare martial law in 
Tehran and 1 1 other cities in response 
to massive demonstrations. By the end 
of October, strikes and disorders had 
become widespread. Oil production 
had dropped dramatically, and the gov- 
ernment apparatus was ceasing to 
function. With massive rioting in early 
November, the crisis had become 
fullblown, and a military government 
was installed. 

Today. The situation in Iran as we 
see it at this moment consists of the 
following elements. Widespread strikes 
and demonstrations have brought the 



February 1979 

Iranian economy to a near halt. Many 
people, at least in the main cities, are 
not working and are suffering shortages 
of key commodities. The banking sys- 
tem has not been functioning, and pe- 
troleum production does not meet 
domestic needs. Activist religious 
leaders and many members of the 
political opposition have been pressing 
for the Shah's immediate departure 
from Iran or for his abdication. The 
Shah has left Iran on vacation. A repre- 
sentative Regency Council has been 
named to perform its constitutional 
functions in the absence of the Shah. 
Prime Minister Bakhtiar's new gov- 
ernment faces the tasks of restoring 
normal life in the country and recon- 
ciling political elements that have op- 
posed each other. 

In short, Iran has been through a 
decade and a half of rapid growth and 
social change while its political in- 
stitutions have not evolved commen- 
surately. The people most affected by 
change are now demanding a greater 
role in determining Iran's future but 
have not yet found orderly ways of ex- 
pressing their views on Iran's future 
course and shaping their own destiny. 

Why an Explosion Now? With 
hindsight, the story appears deceptively 
clear and simple, but it is not so sim- 
ple. Some analysts, both in and out of 
government, have pointed over the 
years to various points of weakness in 
the Iranian economic, social, and 
political systems. By mid- 1976, just as 
the leadership in Iran began to react to 
growing discontent, analysts in Wash- 
ington were pointing out that Iran's 
rapid economic growth had not pro- 
duced political participation to match 
and that the government would find it 
necessary to share political power more 
broadly. 

Since 1976 a number of develop- 
ments have reinforced each other to 
deepen existing dissatisfactions and to 
accelerate the crisis in unpredictable 
ways. Some of those issues were 
stimulated by the very success of the 
economic modernization itself. An 
economic downturn with sharply in- 
creased unemployment and inflation 
added to discontent as well as to a pool 
of unemployed who no longer had a 
stake in existing economic activity. 

While the Iranian Government was 
taking certain steps to allow freer ex- 
pression of criticism and to improve its 
performance in assuring human rights, 
basic grievances remained. In this 
context, massive antigovernment dem- 
onstrations protesting aspects of the 
Shah's program took place in early 
1978, the beginning of the cycle of ac- 
tion and counteraction that has charac- 
terized the Iranian scene since then. 



The Issues Ahead. The main issue 
for the Iranian Government is to end 
the bloodshed and restore order so a 
new national consensus can be forged 
on how Iran should be governed and 
what its priorities at home and abroad 
should be. The immediate challenge is 
for the Regency Council and the new 
civilian government to win enough 
popular support so that the violence can 
be ended and normal economic activity 
can be restored. In addition to ending 
the suffering which people have ex- 
perienced in recent months, it is essen- 
tial to create an environment for ra- 
tional deliberations on a long-term 
political solution for Iran's problems. 

In a country as complex as Iran, 
quick solutions are not to be expected. 
In a country which has suffered so 
much violence, there will be no pain- 
less answers. Domestic peace and 
probably considerable time will be 
needed for the Iranian people to work 
out a new consensus on their political 
future. It is important that this process 
be orderly. We cannot predict what 
direction Iran will choose, but Iranians 
alone must make the decision. 



Regional Implications 

The question most frequently posed 
about the implications of the current 
crisis in Iran is: Do we see the instabil- 
ity in Iran along with recent develop- 
ments in Afghanistan, North and South 
Yemen, the Horn of Africa as pieces in 
a pattern of instability which will 
change the political orientation of the 
strategic Middle East? Four points need 
to be stated. 

First, we, of course, recognize that 
fundamental changes are taking place 
across this area of western Asia and 
northeastern Africa — economic modern- 
ization, social change, a revival of 
religion, resurgent nationalism, de- 
mands for broader popular participation 
in the political process. These changes 
are generated by forces within each 
country. We must differentiate among 



Letters 
of Credence 



On November 16, 1978, and January 
11. 1979, respectively. President Car- 
ter accepted the credentials of Khalil 
Itani of Lebanon and Ephraim Evron of 
Israel as their countries' newly ap- 
pointed Ambassadors to the United 
States. □ 



47 

them and resist the impulse to over- 
simplify. Economic, social, and politi- 
cal development are complex processes 
which we still do not fully understand. 
Our policy in the future as in the past 
30 years will be to work as we can with 
the countries undergoing these changes 
to help them find constructive solutions 
and to emerge from periods of change 
with new stability. As long as these 
nations are genuinely independent and 
free to pursue their own policies with- 
out intimidation, this will contribute to 
the kind of world which is the goal of 
the United States. 

Second, instability in any country in 
a strategic area becomes a factor in 
global politics. We are in close touch 
with our friends and allies in the Mid- 
dle East and elsewhere and share their 
concern that the solution of the prob- 
lems in Iran not increase the danger to 
their own independence. We will con- 
tinue to work with all of them to 
minimize that danger. We will continue 
to make clear our view that we share 
with them the objectives of assuring the 
stability, the security, and the national 
independence of each nation in the 
area. We believe our common purpose 
will provide the basis for further close 
cooperation. 

Third, our position in this strategi- 
cally important area will remain strong 
over the long run as long as most of the 
countries there are allowed to pursue 
their own paths to development and 
progress free from outside interference. 
Our respect for diversity and pluralism, 
our encouragement of human freedoms 
and liberties, the appeal of Western 
economic and technological strength, 
and our dedication to democratic prin- 
ciples all evoke a strong resonance 
among the peoples and nations 
throughout the area. They also know 
that we are prepared to support their 
own efforts to strengthen their defen- 
sive capabilities without seeking a spe- 
cial position for ourselves that they do 
not want. 

Fourth, the changes we are witness- 
ing across this area of western Asia 
and northeastern Africa contain the 
seeds of progress as well as the causes 
of crisis. Some parts of this area are 
among the fastest growing and 
resource-rich nations of the world. 
Some are among the most traditional 
and the poorest. The challenge we and 
our friends face is how to seize the op- 
portunity to channel change toward 
constructive results — not simply to 
react to it as an unwelcome source of 
instability and conflict. In saying this, 
we do not minimize the dangers for 
American interests, but we want also to 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



keep our sights on what will be the 
interests of the people in this area. 



U.S. Policy 

U.S. policy toward Iran has been 
based on three consistent principles as 
events there have evolved over the past 
several months. 

• We have repeatedly made it clear 
that decisions affecting the future of 
Iran and the relationship between the 
Iranian people and their government 
are decisions which must be made in 
Iran by Iranians. We seek no role in 
deciding those questions, and we con- 
sider any external influence improper. 

• The U.S. Government has worked 
within the institutional framework of 
Iran under its Constitution with the 
duly established authorities of Iran as 
specified in the Iranian Constitution. 
There are constitutional provisions for 
change, and we support the decisions 
of the Iranian Government wherever 
and however we can appropriately be 
helpful. 

• We have supported Iran's inde- 
pendence. We have taken the position 
that no outside power should exploit 
instability in Iran — or any other 
country — for its own advantage. The 
overriding American objective for Iran 
is simply that it should have the free- 
dom to work out its own future free 
from such interference. 

These principles have been applied 
consistently throughout the last year of 
turmoil in Iran, and they will continue 
to be our guidelines in the future. 

Within the general context of those 
principles we have pursued these key 
objectives. 

First, we hope to see the end of 
bloodshed, so the people of Iran can 
return to normal life. Only in such cir- 
cumstances can there be rational dis- 
cussion of a political solution to Iran's 
current problems which will restore 
stability there. We will encourage all 
parties to seek political ends by 
peaceful means. 

Second, we want to maintain a close 
and friendly relationship with an inde- 
pendent, stable, and secure Iran. We 
believe the interests of Iran and of the 
United States are closely intertwined, 
and we seek an environment of mutual 
respect and positive cooperation. We 
believe this will serve the interests of 
Iran, of the United States, and of the 
free world. 

Third, we seek a stable and prosper- 
ous Iran which can play its rightful role 
in the region and the international 
community. We are prepared to help 



Iran — on the technical level, on the 
governmental level, and on the diplo- 
matic level — to restore its productivity 
and to regain the international confi- 
dence it has earned over the past dec- 
ade. The resumption of major oil ex- 
ports will be important both to the 
economy of Iran and to the economy of 
the world. 

We believe that these objectives 
serve not only the interests of our own 
country but also the interests of the 
Iranian people. We believe they offer a 
practical basis for cooperation. 

What Lies Ahead? 

Iran is in the midst of a major social 
crisis. We have no illusions that this 
process will be resolved easily, and it 
would serve no purpose for us to 
speculate on future twists and turns of 
events. 

The American people and the people 
of Iran share basic agreement on four 
fundamental values. 

• We both have strong religious 
heritages. The people of both countries 
believe in the importance of a life that 
is guided by moral principles. We be- 
lieve those principles must guide a 
government that is truly just. 

• We share a belief in the right of 
the people to express themselves politi- 
cally through institutions constituted by 
them. We both believe that it is for the 
Iranian people to decide how they will 
govern themselves, just as it is for the 
American people to choose their own 
government. 

• Both of us believe in the use of our 
national wealth for the betterment of 
our people. The United States remains 
willing to help Iran develop the poten- 
tial of the country. 

• Both Americans and Iranians want 
to see an Iran that is truly independent. 
We have no aspiration to dictate the 
policies of the Iranian government. 

On the basis of these shared views 
and our common interests, we will 
make every effort to assure a continued 
close relationship between the United 
States and Iran. 

In looking to the future, the United 
States will continue to work with the 
leaders of Iran in their effort to con- 
solidate the civilian government with 
popular support for restoring order and 
normal life and building a sound politi- 
cal foundation for Iran's continued 
progress and independence. □ 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments. U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, DC. 20402. 



Visit of Tunisian 

Prime Minister 
Nouira 



Prime Minister Hedi Nouira of 
Tunisia made an official visit to the 
United States November 28 -December 
5, 1978. While in Washington 
November 28- December 1, he met 
with President Carter and other gov- 
ernment officials. Following is a joint 
communique issued by the White House 
on December 1 . ' 

At the invitation of President Jimmy Carter, 
Prime Minister Hedi Nouira currently is mak- 
ing an official visit to the United States. He ar- 
rived on November 28 and will depart on De- 
cember 5. 

The Prime Minister, who is accompanied by 
his wife and a delegation which includes Mr. 
Mohamed Fitouri. Foreign Minister. Mr. Has- 
san Belkhodja. Minister of Agriculture, and 
Mr. Mustapha Zaanouni. Minister of Planning, 
received a warm and friendly welcome. 

During his stay the Prime Minister met with 
President Carter. The discussions were fol- 
lowed by a working luncheon at the White 
House with the President. The Prime Minister 
also met with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 
and with other government officials and with 
Members of the Congress. 

In the course of his stay in Washington, the 
Prime Minister also had talks with leaders of 
economic, financial, and academic institutions. 
He will also visit agricultural enterprises in 
Texas, Arizona, and California. He also will 
meet with the authorities of these states to dis- 
cuss the utilization of American technology in 
the development of arid lands, with a view to 
promoting future Tunisian-American coopera- 
tion in this field. 

The President and Prime Minister expressed 
their pleasure at the excellent bilateral relations 
which have existed for almost two centuries. 
The President asked the Prime Minister to con- 
vey to President Bourguiba his gratitude for the 
steadfast friendship he has demonstrated for the 
United States since Tunisia regained its inde- 
pendence. 

The President reiterated to the Prime Minis- 
ter the continuing interest of the United States 
in the stability, independence and security of 
Tunisia. 

The two leaders agreed to intensify efforts to 
increase economic cooperation between their 
two nations, to encourage investment, to pro- 
mote the transfer of technology, and to develop 
commercial and cultural exchange. 

President Carter congratulated Prime Minis- 
ter Nouira on the rapid rate of development 
Tunisia has experienced under the eight years 
of his administration. Citing Tunisia as a model 
recipient for sound use of American assist- 
ance, the President reiterated his Government's 



February 1979 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE: 
I r nis Transfer Levels 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
NOV. 29 ' 

Conventional arms transfer restraint 
is an important objective of this Ad- 
ministration and the Congress. To in- 
sure U.S. leadership and to supplement 
existing legislation, I established for 
the first time a set of quantitative and 
qualitative standards by which arms 
transfer requests considered by this 
government would be judged. The 
principal consideration in the applica- 
tion of these standards is whether the 
transfer in question promotes our secu- 
rity and the security of our close 
friends. 

I am pleased to announce that this 
government has kept its pledge to take 
the leadership in restraining arms sales. 
Under the ceiling I established. U.S. 
Government transfers of weapons and 
related items to countries other than 
NATO, Japan, Australia, and New 
Zealand, which totaled $8.54 billion in 
FY 1978, were reduced by 8% (or ap- 
proximately $700 million measured in 
constant dollars) from the comparable 
FY 1977 level. 

When I set this goal last year, I said 
that I would make further reductions in 
the next fiscal year. Today, I am an- 



nouncing an additional cut of approxi- 
mately $733 million, 2 or 8% for FY 
1979 measured in constant dollars. 
This means that for the fiscal year that 
began on October 1, 1978, and which 
will end on September 30, 1979, new 
commitments under the foreign military 
sales (FMS) and military assistance 
programs (MAP) for weapons and 
weapons-related items to all countries 
except NATO, Japan, Australia, and 
New Zealand will not exceed $8.43 
billion. This cut is consistent with our 
national security interests, including 
our historic interest in the security of 
the Middle East. 

When I addressed the United Nations 
General Assembly in October 1977, I 
emphasized that the United States had 
taken the first steps at conventional 
arms restraint but that we could not go 
very far alone. Multilateral cooperation 
remains essential to the achievement of 
meaningful restraint measures. We 
continue to believe that all nations have 
an interest in restraining transfers of 
conventional weaponry which threaten 
the stability of various regions of the 
world and divert recipient resources 
from other worthy objectives without 
necessarily enhancing national secu- 
rity. We are making a maximum effort 



intention to continue and to develop American 
participation in Tunisia's economic growth. 

To this end the United States-Tunisian Joint 
Commission will meet in Tunis, in late January 
1979. 

In their discussion of international issues. 
President Carter and Prime Minister Nouira 
concentrated especially on the situation in the 
Middle East. The President expressed his ap- 
preciation for the encouragement President 
Bourguiba and the Prime Minister have given 
him to continue his personal efforts to facilitate 
a peace settlement. 

The two leaders stressed that participation of 
the Palestinian people is a fundamental element 
in the search for peace, and agreed that a com- 
prehensive, just and durable peace must pro- 
vide for the realization of the legitimate rights 
for which all Palestinian people have been 
striving. President Carter stated his belief that 
Tunisia's constructive approach to international 
issues gives Tunisia an important role within 
the international community. 

The President assured the Prime Minister 
that the United States will continue to promote 
resolution of conflict through peaceful means. 

Reviewing the problems of decolonization in 



Africa both parties expressed their deep worry 
over the growing deterioration of the situation 
in southern Africa as a result of the persistence 
of minority regimes in pursuing the policy and 
practices of apartheid and racial discrimina- 
tion. They reaffirmed their commitment to sup- 
port the rights of self-determination, dignity, 
and justice for the people of Zimbabwe. 
Namibia, and South Africa. 

The Tunisian delegation expressed its ap- 
preciation for the positive action of the United 
States in its efforts to direct the problems of 
Rhodesia and Namibia into a channel leading to 
peaceful settlements and expressed the hope 
that these efforts soon will prove productive. 

The Prime Minister on behalf of President 
Bourguiba invited President Carter to make a 
state visit to Tunisia. President Carter accepted 
this invitation with pleasure. The date will be 
determined later by mutual agreement. □ 



49 

to achieve multilateral cooperation on 
the arms restraint issue. 

My decision on U.S. arms transfer 
levels for FY 1980 will depend on the 
degree of cooperation we receive in the 
coming year from other nations, par- 
ticularly in the area of specific 
achievements and evidence of concrete 
progress on arms transfer restraint. □ 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Dec. 4, 1978. For re- 
marks made at the welcoming ceremony on the 
South Lawn of the White House, see Weekly 
Compilation of Dec. 4, p. 2091. 



1 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Dec. 4. 1978. 

2 FY 1979 ceiling on conventional arms 
transfers (in $ millions): 

Fiscal year 1978 ceiling $8,551 

Inflation (7.2%) +616 

Fiscal year 1978 ceiling in fiscal year 

1979 dollars 9,167 

Policy reduction -733 

Fiscal year 1979 ceiling $8,434 



PUBLICATIONS 



GPO SALES 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or 
stock number from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington. DC. 20402. A 25% discount is 
made on orders for 100 or more copies of any 
one publication mailed to the same address. 
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of 
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices 
shown below, which include domestic postage, 
are subject to change . 

Helwan-Talka Gas Turbine Project. Agree- 
ment with Egypt. TIAS 8700. 15 pp. 900. (Cat. 
No. S9. 10:8700.) 
Cement Plant Construction. Agreement with 

Egypt. TIAS 8702. 17 pp. 900. (Cat. No. 

S9. 10:8702.) 
Air Transport Services. Agreement with 

Lebanon. TIAS 8722. 3 pp. 600. (Cat. No. 

S9. 10:8722.) 
Multiple-Entry Nonimmigrant Visas. 

Agreement with Iran. TIAS 8751. 5 pp. 

600. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8751.) 
Rural Health Services. Agreement with Egypt. 

TIAS 8775. 20 pp. $1. (Cat. No. 

S9. 10:8775.) 
Sorghum and Millet Crop Improvement. 

Agreement with the Yemen Arab Republic. 

TIAS 8787. 55 pp. 600. (Cat. No. 

S9. 10:8787.) 
Development Administration Training Pro- 
gram. Agreement with Jordan. TIAS 8802. 

3 pp. 700. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8802.) 
Science and Technology Research. Agree- 
ment with Egypt. TIAS 8830. 57 pp. $1.90. 
(Cat. No. S9. 10:8830.) 

Military Mission to Iran. Agreement with 
Iran, extending the agreement of October 6. 
1947, as amended and extended. TIAS 8843. 

4 pp. 700. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8843.) □ 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



UNITED NATIONS: The Challenge 
ior Communieations Development 



by John E. Reinhardt 

General policy statement before the 
20th General Conference of the U.N. 
Educational . Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) in Paris on 
November 3, 1978. Ambassador 
Reinhardt is Director of the Interna- 
tional Communication Agency. 

In his opening remarks at this gen- 
eral conference, the President of our 
19th session reminded us that 2 years 
ago there had been a ''spirit of 
Nairobi," which helped us over dif- 
ficult times to retain the atmosphere of 
accommodation that is essential to our 
activities; and he hoped that we might 
continue that spirit here in Paris, to aid 
us in our deliberations at this 20th gen- 
eral conference. 

I join in that hope. I propose that we 
all once again set aside rhetorical poli- 
tics and defensive expedients in favor 
of constructive action based on positive 
principles. With that recaptured spirit, 
I submit, we can achieve both unity 
and progress. 

UNESCO has shown us the way over 
the past 2 years by its significant 
achievements in the field of human 



racism. This new instrument of our 
unity should command the fullest sup- 
port and adherence of all governments 
devoted to human rights. It will con- 
tribute to our common endeavors not 
only at this conference but for genera- 
tions to come. The United States urges 
unanimous support of the declaration. 

UNESCO has also been making 
progress in other important areas. It 
has begun its own preparations for 
major participation in the U.N. Confer- 
ence on Science and Technology for 
Development, a conference on which 
my government places great signifi- 
cance. During the past 2 years, UN- 
ESCO has sought to broaden and 
strengthen its programs to enhance the 
status of women and their role in our 
changing societies; its medium-plan 
statement on this subject is commenda- 
ble. 

On all those matters, and on numer- 
ous others in the fields of education, 
science, and culture — which UNESCO 
was created to promote — the United 
States has been pleased to take an ac- 
tive part. We hope that programs now 
moving in a promising direction will be 
carried through to successful culmina- 
tion. For what we need to strengthen 



. . . it is freedom of information, and not its control by the state, that 
is best calculated to achieve the elimination of racism and to promote 
the attainment of economic and political rights. 



rights. It has adopted the strongest pro- 
cedures of any U.N. agency for the 
handling of human rights complaints, 
thereby guaranteeing full and fair in- 
ternational review for the rights en- 
shrined in the UNESCO Constitution. 
This represents an important landmark 
in UNESCO's work in this, the 30th 
anniversary of the Universal Declara- 
tion on Human Rights. We have also 
made a very important contribution to 
the international struggle to eliminate 
racism by adopting, through a consen- 
sus of the intergovernmental confer- 
ence held last March, a draft declara- 
tion on race and racial prejudice. When 
confirmed by this general conference, 
that declaration will become a major 
weapon in the continuing struggle, to 
which we are all dedicated, against 



most of all is the sense of direction we 
recovered in Nairobi, and toward this 
end to join effective action with the 
spirit of cooperation. 

This general theme — the move to a 
more effective program of action — will 
be developed by our delegation in each 
of the program commissions as we ad- 
dress ourselves to the proposed pro- 
gram and budget presented by the Di- 
rector General [Amadou Mahtar 
M'Bow of Senegal]. In education, we 
look to increasing the links between 
schooling and the world of work, to the 
extension of educational opportunities 
to all segments of society, and to an 
expansion in the program for popula- 
tion education. In the natural sciences, 
we will call for a greater focus on 
priority projects and for the building of 



scientific capabilities in developing 
countries. In the social sciences, we 
will join with others to define major 
projects and to concentrate efforts on 
them. In culture, we want to participate 
in strengthening the sense of cultural 
identity of all peoples and to recognize, 
at the same time, the contributions of 
all cultures to the life of all human- 
kind. 

Apprbach to Communications 
Development 

As I have said, the members of our 
delegation will develop our views on 
these matters in the various program 
commissions. It has always been the 
view of my government that it is on 
these matters — the E, the S, and the C 
of UNESCO — that our major emphasis 
should be placed. Today, however, I 
shall of necessity concentrate my at- 
tention on the questions that we face in 
the field of communications. For here 
we can see the clearest challenge to the 
continued "spirit of Nairobi." What 
are the possibilities for effective ac- 
tion, and how do we find our way from 
the negative and divisive toward the 
positive and harmonious? 

What we have before us first of all is 
the sound and generally agreed UN- 
ESCO medium-term objectives and the 
implementing plan of action proposed 
by the Director General. These give us 
the opportunity for much-needed re- 
search and study and calm reflection, 
as we seek to relate the extraordinary 
potential of communications to a 
human scale. The United States sup- 
ports that program. But there are other 
documents on our desks, which aim to 
force decisions upon us that cannot, by 
their very nature, have been fully 
thought through. What are the most 
pressing communication needs of the 
various developing countries? How can 
they best be met — through restrictive 
declarations or positive cooperation? 
What are the best ways of addressing 
those troubling questions? I shall try in 
my statement to deal with each of these 
unresolved problems. 

We have only just received the 
interim report of the International 
Commission for the Study of Com- 
munication Problems, and my govern- 
ment has not yet had an opportunity to 
formulate its reactions in full. Our 
comments will be provided, as re- 
quested, to the Commission. I can say, 



February 1979 



51 



however, that we find much to admire 
in the descriptive portions of the re- 
port, which comprise its principal part. 
The diagnosis is in large measure 
scholarly and balanced. Our own as- 
sessment of world communication im- 
portance and needs is — as you will 
hear shortly — closely congruent with 
that set forth in the interim report. To 
that extent we believe a good beginning 
has been made. 

But when it comes to the report's 
prescriptions, especially those that 
imply state controls on the operations 
of the mass media, we find ourselves 
unpersuaded. No adequate foundation 
in fact or in principle has been laid for 
such prescriptions, nor is there any ac- 
knowledgement of the losses — to na- 
tional development, to peace, to inter- 
national understanding — that they 
would entail. The closing few pages of 
the interim report contrast markedly in 
this respect with those that precede 
them. They are less balanced, less well 
grounded, and I trust will accordingly 
receive the personal attention of Com- 
mission members. 

In his introductory remarks on the 
mass media declaration, the Director 
General called for a constructive 
dialogue that could lead to a consensus. 
Mr. M'Bow also made reference to the 
horrors of racism inflicted on the world 
through the state-controlled media of 
the Nazi regime; and he reminded us 
that UNESCO was created in part to 
prevent any repetition of such acts. 
This reflects my government's position 
precisely — that it is state controls that 
have been primarily associated with the 
propagation of war and hostility and 
racialism, and that for UNESCO to 
sponsor a return to this stifling of 
human conscience would be to turn its 
back on its own charter. 

Contemporary examples of this basic 
point are not difficult to find. The gov- 
ernments in southern Africa have 
reacted to demands for full enjoyment 
of political and economic rights by 
closing down newspapers owned by or 
sympathetic to black Africans. They 
have also moved to prohibit the circu- 
lation of information about the extent 
and effects of racism in that region. We 
have recently witnessed similar at- 
tempts by governments in other regions 
to suppress the circulation of docu- 
ments that draw attention to the viola- 
tion of human rights. It seems clear 
from these illustrations that it is free- 
dom of information, and not its control 
by the state, that is best calculated to 
achieve the elimination of racism and 
to promote the attainment of economic 
and political rights. 

Of course freedom must be coupled 
with justice. We have been learning 



that ourselves in the United States. 
America is not a single, monolithic so- 
ciety, and its diversity cannot be fully 
represented by the major newspapers or 
networks. And so we have been mak- 
ing major efforts in recent years to en- 
courage ownership and operation of 
media outlets by blacks, women, His- 
panics. and others to the end that the 
distinctive voice of each of these de- 
veloping groups within our own society 
can make itself heard in its own way. It 



The Need for Cooperation 

This movement toward constructive 
and principled and unifying action is in 
the continuing spirit of Nairobi. So 
also is what I have to say today on the 
subject of practical cooperation. 

Two years ago when I addressed this 
general conference in Nairobi, I ac- 
knowledged the existence of dependen- 
cies, disparities, and imbalances in and 
among national communication 



. . . let us work constructively with each other to strengthen cultural 
pluralism and to enrich the variety of information and points of view 
that are exchanged. 



is slow work sometimes, but it is de- 
velopment with and toward freedom. 

Let me invite your attention at this 
point to two statements from the report 
of a task force on the international flow 
of news, issued just a few days ago. 
This group of distinguished communi- 
cation practitioners and scholars, 
drawn I must emphasize from both the 
developed and developing worlds, had 
this to say. 

It is our unanimous and deeply held belief that 
freedom of information and economic and politi- 
cal development are inextricably intertwined and 
mutually reinforcing. 

And as the concluding words of the 
report: 

We reject out of hand the view that freedom is 
something that only the developed nations of the 
West can afford — and that it is a superfluous 
luxury for the developing nations. The practices 
of a free press may be erratic, even in the West, 
but the aspirations of freedom should ultimately 
serve to unite the West and the Third World. 

We ourselves would hope ultimately 
to persuade many other countries of the 
merits of this point of view. But we do 
not now seek to impose that view on 
other governments. We know how 
dynamically various are the relation- 
ships of these governments to their own 
mass media and how insusceptible they 
are to being captured within any single 
formula or code. If there is diversity, 
let it continue in the spirit voiced by 
John F. Kennedy 15 years ago, when 
he issued a call to make the world safe 
for diversity. UNESCO is par excel- 
lence a home for diversity, a shelter for 
many creeds. Let it so continue, and let 
us work constructively with each other 
to strengthen cultural pluralism and to 
enrich the variety of information and 
points of view that are exchanged. 



capabilities. On that occasion I pro- 
posed that measures might be taken by 
the United States and other developed 
countries, together with their private 
sectors and the multilateral institutions, 
to help other states strengthen their in- 
formation and communication systems 
in accordance with their needs. Today I 
want to describe what has been and is 
being done on our part, and then move 
beyond that to propose a system for 
improved cooperation among all the 
nations that can, I believe, move us 
purposefully and measurably toward 
the realization of our common goals. 

Let me begin by recalling the scope 
and dimension of those goals. As I said 
in 1976, the central issue is to achieve 
growth with equity and to pay special 
attention to the poorest of the poor 
within the nations and among nations. 
Internal and international disparities 
often go hand in hand. Of the 400 mil- 
lion telephones in the world, for exam- 
ple, only 40 million — a bare \09c — 
are to be found in all of Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America combined. What 
does this imply for the scope of partici- 
pation in the life of those societies or 
for two-way information flows within 
them? 

A presently pending UNESCO report 
to the General Assembly devotes simi- 
lar attention to the unevenness of 
communications development within 
societies, and also points up the exist- 
ence of gross quantitative disparities 
among the nations of the world. It re- 
veals that 30 developing countries still 
have no television service at all nor the 
technical skills to develop one; in about 
40 developing countries, fewer than 
5% of the people ever see a newspaper; 
and in more than 60 countries, where 
radio broadcasting may be the instru- 
ment chosen for nation-building, more 
than half the population has no radio 



52 

sets. To this must be added a pervasive 
shortage of skilled technicians and 
teachers to build up and extend com- 
munication capacities. 

It should be apparent from this brief 
recitation that the challenge of com- 
munications development is not one 
that can be met by simple or random 
infusions of assistance or by the im- 
mediate adoption of any formula for a 
new world order. If we are to have any 
serious impact, we must proceed in a 
far more systematic, long-range, and 
concerted fashion than any we have 
previously pursued. And we must at- 
tract cooperation from every quarter I 
mentioned 2 years ago — the more 
prosperous nations, the private sector 



contribution by recounting what the 
U.S. Government has been doing in 
this field since Nairobi. 

Our regular foreign assistance pro- 
gram has, in the course of the past 2 
years, committed $18 million to the 
cooperative improvement of basic tele- 
communications infrastructures in 
developing countries. A further $19 
million has been committed to the 
communications and information com- 
ponents of some 70 projects throughout 
Africa, Asia, the Near East, and Latin 
America in the fields of education, 
population, health care, nutrition, ag- 
riculture, and disaster relief. 

We have expended another $4 mil- 
lion on two-way exchanges of com- 



This is UNESCO's mission: to provide the means for enhancing prac- 
tical cooperation in education, the sciences, culture, and communica- 
tion . 



in those nations, the multilateral in- 
stitutions, and the disadvantaged coun- 
tries themselves. 

Why should we collectively take on 
this burden? 

• Because information is increas- 
ingly recognized as a basic 
resource — intangible and inexhaustible 
but otherwise akin to energy and 
materials — that is essential to full par- 
ticipation in the modern world. 

• Because in the face of this recog- 
nition it would be unthinkable for us to 
allow our nations and our peoples to 
drift by neglect into two separate and 
distinct camps, the "information rich" 
versus the "information poor." 

• Because there are some common 
goals in which we do agree and around 
which we can construct an action 
agenda that draws us together and that 
emphasizes the value of our common 
institutions, like UNESCO. Those 
goals include the steady reduction of 
disparities and dependencies and im- 
balances in communication capacities 
and the progressive fostering of many- 
sided dialogues rather than monologues 
in internal as well as international 
communication structures. 



U.S. Efforts 

What can be done, then, to get 
things started? Two years ago I 
suggested a collegia! effort. The re- 
sponses we have been hearing at this 
conference thus far are heartening. 
More will no doubt be heard, and a 
great deal more is required if we are to 
move appreciably towards the attain- 
ment of our goal. Let me begin my own 



munication students, teachers, and 
practitioners; on studies and confer- 
ences; and on media materials — all 
aimed at improving mutual under- 
standing of communication perspec- 
tives. These efforts have directly en- 
gaged roughly 1 ,000 participants from 
88 developing countries. 

We have continued our technical as- 
sistance with communications satel- 
lites, of which the most prominent 
example remains the Indian site project 
I described to you 2 years ago. Its 
value has been underscored by the re- 
cent decision of the Indian Government 
to establish its own domestic com- 
munications satellite system INSAT, to 
be launched in 1981. 

A number of U.S. Government 
agencies are engaged in sharing com- 
munication resources and information- 
system design capacity with their 
developing-country counterparts in 
specific fields of common interest. 
These include scientific and technical 
information, weather and disaster 
warning, health and environmental 
data, and agricultural information. 
Other agencies have been working on a 
regional basis. We have, for example, 
assisted in the development of regional 
health information centers in Latin 
America and the Middle East, in coop- 
eration with local governments and 
with the Pan American and World 
Health Organizations. We provide 
professional consultation by, and prac- 
tical training in, U.S. communication 
institutions at the request of foreign 
government officials or under the aus- 
pices of the International Telecom- 
munications Union. 

Our private sector has also been 



Department of State Bulletin 

helping. On the media side, there is 
one press group that was formed as a 
result of the Nairobi general confer- 
ence, with broadly international par- 
ticipation, and that has now raised 
more than half of its projected million 
dollar treasury for a variety of projects 
to assist Third World media develop- 
ment. Our two major wire services 
have similarly volunteered their serv- 
ices to help in the establishment of na- 
tional news agencies. On the very im- 
portant telecommunications side, we 
have no comparably specific or coordi- 
nated data, but clearly the development 
potential of this industry's export and 
investment transactions is very large. 

We also need to recognize the con- 
tributions of the U.S. private, nonprofit 
sector, principally the charitable foun- 
dations and the universities. Some of 
them serve in a consulting capacity to 
UNESCO, others underwrite the work 
of such scholarly bodies as the Interna- 
tional Institute of Communications and 
the International Association for Mass 
Communication Research, while still 
others actually produce the studies and 
conferences and reports that will help 
us gain a better understanding of the 
communication issues we are faced 
with. In my own country, there is an 
effort now underway for the first time 
to design a comprehensive and readily 
accessible clearinghouse of all com- 
munication policy research undertaken 
in the various relevant disciplines; 
upon eventual completion, this should 
be suitable for interconnection with 
national research centers in other 
countries through the UNESCO- 
affiliated network known as COMNET. 

There are other institutional de- 
velopments taking place at the govern- 
ment level in my country with definite 
implications for communications de- 
velopment. One of these is the creation 
last April of the International Com- 
munication Agency, which has been 
specifically charged by President Car- 
ter to promote two-way communication 
between our people and those of other 
lands. The new agency has been asked 
to engage in the development and 
execution of a comprehensive national 
policy on international communica- 
tions. "Such a policy," President 
Carter stated, "must take into consid- 
eration the needs and interests of 
others, as well as our own needs." 
This represents, I submit, a significant 
evolution in the attitude of the United 
States toward communications 
development — and one that has taken 
place since we last met in Nairobi. 

A second and equally important in- 
stitutional development was, as many 
of you know, announced by President 
Carter in a speech to the Venezuelan 
Congress in Caracas last March. This 



February 1979 

involves the creation of a U.S. founda- 
tion for international technological 
cooperation. As its name suggests, the 
foundation will work on a cooperative 
basis to build technological self- 
reliance within developing countries. It 
will work to end dependencies at the 
same time as it lessens disparities. 
Since President Carter's announce- 
ment, the process of creating the new 
foundation has moved forward steadily. 
We expect to be in operation within the 
coming year. I am pleased to tell you 
today that one of the key programs of 
the foundation will be devoted specif- 
ically to cooperation in the field of in- 
formation and communications. I per- 
sonally have high hopes that its efforts 
with other nations in this sector can 
make a substantial contribution to our 
common goals. 



New U.S. Initiatives 

These developments reflect a 
genuine commitment on the part of our 
new U.S. Administration. So do the 
two specific new projects, growing out 
of that commitment, that I wish to an- 
nounce to this conference. The first 
will devote American assistance, both 
public and private, to suitably iden- 
tified regional centers of professional 
education and training in broadcasting 
and journalism in the developing 
world, where such assistance could 
help the centers equip themselves to 
produce fully qualified practitioners for 
the media in the region. Our role will 
be to work with the faculties and the 
institutions on their premises. We will 
undertake to send a senior faculty 
member or dean of communications to 
each center for a year's service as a 
faculty adviser on curriculum or re- 
source development. Private U.S. news 
organizations will underwrite the visit 
to the centers of senior correspondents 
and editors, on rotating 3-month as- 
signments, to demonstrate professional 
skills. 

As equipment needs are identified, 
efforts will be made to locate available 
consoles or studio facilities or printing 
presses that can be donated to the cen- 
ters. Institutional funding needs, if 
any, will be reviewed and assistance 
offered in presenting them to suitable 
funding agencies. The visiting profes- 
sors and journalists will stay no longer 
than requested; but so long as they are 
there, they themselves will be learning 
about Third World development needs 
and perspectives, in a way that will 
stay with them when they return to 
their regular jobs as teachers and 
gatekeepers of American journalism. 

This should be a broadly cooperative 
undertaking. We have assurances of 
positive participation from media or- 



ganizations. We solicit the advice and 
will welcome the participation of other 
experienced countries. It must of 
course be the developing countries 
themselves who identify the regional 
centers that seem best qualified to 
serve the joint purposes we would be 
pursuing. We are working actively with 
the UNESCO Secretariat to implement 
the necessary processes. 

The second new U.S. project is a 
major effort to apply the benefits of 
advanced communications technol- 
ogy — specifically communications 
satellites — to economic and social 
needs in the rural areas of developing 
nations. 

This program will be implemented 
with the funding of the U.S. Agency 
for International Development, using 
facilities of INTELSAT [International 
Telecommunications Satellite Consor- 
tium] or other appropriate satellite 
systems, and will enable nations in the 
developing world to disseminate valu- 
able information to people in remote 
areas. My government — in cooperation 
with officials in developing areas — will 
work to design projects to promote 
basic literacy for children and adults 
and to share information on basic 
health care and other subjects vital to 
rural development. The basic result 
should be to take important informa- 
tion — much of which is already avail- 
able in urban centers of developing 
nations — and distribute it to remote 
sections where people have little or no 
access to knowledge that can improve 
their way of life. 

The project I am announcing today 
will build on the lessons — and the 
hopes — which have come out of the In- 
dian satellite project and similar 
smaller experiments in recent years. A 
major part of the American contribu- 
tion will be the provision of technical 
assistance, equipment, and training to 
promote fully informed use of satellite 
capacity in the developing nations. 

We expect to learn much from this 
new project. But it is much more than a 
technological demonstration. It is a 
committed U.S. effort to build com- 
munication skills and experience which 
will enable developing countries to 
strengthen their own global, regional, 
and national communications systems. 
The programming will be managed by 
the recipient countries themselves to 
help meet the basic human needs 
priorities which they identify. The 
project will be aimed at building per- 
manent communication technology 
skills in these countries. At its conclu- 
sion, all aspects of management and 
control will be turned over to the re- 
cipient nations, and throughout all of 
this we hope that the project will de- 
velop expertise that will be transferable 



53 

to other parts of the world. 

We believe that this can mark an in- 
novative, productive approach to ur- 
gent problems of rural development 
and communications, and we are 
pleased that this project will be moving 
forward in the months ahead. 

Coordinating International Efforts 

These are the major new initiatives 
that the United States is taking to help 
develop a better balance of communi- 
cations capability throughout the 
world. But as I have stressed re- 
peatedly, we need more. We need in 
particular to gather the strength and 
purpose that can come from the inter- 
change of insights, experiences, and 
plans — whether bilateral, multilateral, 
public sector, or private — and from the 
systematized presentation of develop- 
ment objectives. 

A large part of communications de- 
velopment is now accomplished 
through bilateral cooperation. It is in 
this sector that collaborative consulta- 
tion could serve to detect gaps and 
overlaps, and to strengthen the pres- 
ently fragmented process. The bilateral 
character of such activities need not be 
changed, but ways should be found to 
focus them on priority needs in a co- 
operative way with identifiable goals 
and measurements of progress. Our 
study has suggested to us that the inter- 
national community may have already 
discovered at least a partial precedent 
for what is required, in the organiza- 
tion and work of the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural 
Research. 

The applicability of this precedent to 
our purposes is not perfect. The ag- 
ricultural research centers had been in 
existence for several years before their 
funding was coordinated, so that the 
sponsoring institutions took over a 
fully proven concept. We have nothing 
like that at present in the field of com- 
munications assistance. But is the 
analogy nonetheless perhaps worth pur- 
suing? My government believes it may 
be. 

The present consultative group is 
jointly sponsored by the Food and Ag- 
riculture Organization (FAO), the 
World Bank, and the U.N. Develop- 
ment Program. We could substitute 
UNESCO for FAO as a sponsor. Like 
the existing group, we could establish 
an integrated and effective membership 
consisting of both developed and de- 
veloping countries, the regional banks, 
concerned multilateral agencies, and 
nonprofit foundations. Other appro- 
priate international organizations could 
certainly be invited to participate. Out 
of the meetings and studies of a com- 
munication consultative group there 



54 



( M SC O Declaration 
on the Mass Media 



Following are the texts of articles 
I--XI of the declaration on the mass 
media adopted by consensus vote by the 
General Conference of the U.N. Edu- 
cational, Scientific and Cultural Or- 
ganization < U NESCO ) in Paris on 
November 28, 1978, and the Depart- 
ment statement of November 22. ' 

DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL 

PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE 

CONTRIBUTION OF THE MASS MEDIA TO 

STRENGTHENING PEACE AND 

INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING. THE 

PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND TO 

COUNTERING RACIALISM, APARTHEID 

AND INCITEMENT TO WAR 

Article I 

The strengthening of peace and international 
understanding, the promotion of human rights 
and the countering of racialism, apartheid and 
incitement to war demand a free flow and a 
wider and better balanced dissemination of in- 
formation. To this end, the mass media have a 
leading contribution to make. This contribution 
will be the more effective to the extent that the 
information reflects the different aspects of the 
subject dealt with 
Article II 

1. The exercise of freedom of opinion, ex- 
pression and information, recognized as an in- 
tegral part of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, is a vital factor in the strengthening 
of peace and international understanding. 



2. Access by the public to information 
should be guaranteed by the diversity of the 
sources and means of information available to 
it, thus enabling each individual to check the 
accuracy of facts and to appraise events objec- 
tively. To this end, journalists must have free- 
dom to report and the fullest possible facilities 
of access to information. Similarly, it is im- 
portant that the mass media be responsive to 
concerns of peoples and individuals, thus 
promoting the participation of the public in the 
elaboration of information. 

3. With a view to the strengthening of peace 
and international understanding, to promoting 
human rights and to countering racialism, 
apartheid and incitement to war, the mass 
media throughout the world, by reason of their 
role, contribute effectively to promoting human 
rights, in particular by giving expression to op- 
pressed peoples who struggle against col- 
onialism, neo-colonialism, foreign occupation 
and all forms of racial discrimination and op- 
pression and who are unable to make their 
voices heard within their own territories. 

4. If the mass media are to be in a position to 
promote the principles of this Declaration in 
their activities, it is essential that journalists 
and other agents of the mass media, in their 
own country or abroad, be assured of protec- 
tion guaranteeing them the best conditions for 
the exercise of their profession. 

Article III 

1. The mass media have an important contri- 
bution to make to the strengthening of peace 
and international understanding and in coun- 



Communications (Cont'd I 

should emerge a shared sense of de- 
velopment priorities and of the effec- 
tiveness of existing and proposed rem- 
edies. More than that, we would with 
the help of the sponsoring institu- 
tions — including UNESCO — engender 
cooperation on a scale that simply is 
not possible under presently existing 
arrangements. My government would 
invite our fellow members to consider 
this possibility with us. 

The chief obstacle to this kind of 
constructive endeavor, as I see it, has 
been the introduction of extraneous 
political elements. I hope that will 
change. I hope we can discover and 
display the seriousness of purpose that 
alone will attract the sponsorship of 
serious international bodies. Therefore, 
I invite the Director General to convene 
a planning meeting within the next 6 
months at which government delega- 
tions can seek to reach agreement on a 



specific proposal that can be presented 
on behalf of developing and developed 
countries alike to the institutions whose 
coordinating sponsorship we would 
seek. My government is prepared to 
take full part in these deliberations. 

My concluding hope is that we will 
come to agreement — on the communi- 
cation issues and on all the others we 
confront — so that together we can 
move toward making UNESCO a more 
effective instrument for meeting his- 
toric challenges. For it is through such 
strengthening of our common purposes 
that UNESCO makes its contribution to 
the cause of peace and international 
understanding. The minds of men and 
women are stirred by purposeful par- 
ticipation in programs of effective 
action — not by mere rhetoric or politi- 
cal posturing. This is UNESCO's mis- 
sion: to provide the means for enhanc- 
ing practical cooperation in education, 
the sciences, culture, and communica- 
tion. Let us get on with the job. □ 



Department of State Bulletin 

tering racialism, apartheid and incitement to 
war. 

2. In countering aggressive war. racialism, 
apartheid and other violations of human rights 
which are inter alia spawned by prejudice and 
ignorance, the mass media, by disseminating 
information on the aims, aspirations, cultures 
and needs of all people, contribute to eliminate 
ignorance and misunderstanding between 
peoples, to make nationals of a country sensi- 
tive to the needs and desires of others, to en- 
sure the respect of the rights and dignity of all 
nations, all peoples and all individuals without 
distinction of race, sex, language, religion or 
nationality and to draw attention to the great 
evils which afflict humanity, such as poverty, 
malnutrition and diseases, thereby promoting 
the formulation by States of policies best able 
to promote the reduction of international ten- 
sion and the peaceful and the equitable settle- 
ment of international disputes. 

Article IV 

The mass media have an essential part to 
play in the education of young people in a spirit 
of peace, justice, freedom, mutual respect and 
understanding, in order to promote human 
rights, equality of rights as between all human 
beings and all nations, and economic and social 
progress. Equally they have an important role 
to play in making known the views and aspira- 
tions of the younger generation. 

Article V 

In order to respect freedom of opinion, ex- 
pression and information and in order that in- 
formation may reflect all points of view, it is 
important that the points of view presented by 
those who consider that the information pub- 
lished or disseminated about them has seriously 
prejudiced their effort to strengthen peace and 
international understanding, to promote human 
rights or to counter racialism, apartheid and in- 
citement to war be disseminated. 

Article VI 

For the establishment of a new equilibrium 
and greater reciprocity in the flow of informa- 
tion, which will be conducive to the institution 
of a just and lasting peace and to the economic 
and political independence of the developing 
countries, it is necessary to correct the in- 
equalities in the flow of information to and 
from developing countries, and between those 
countries. To this end, it is essential that their 
mass media should have conditions and re- 
sources enabling them to gain strength and ex- 
pand, and to co-operate both among themselves 
and with the mass media in developed coun- 
tries. 

Article VII 

By disseminating more widely all of the in- 
formation concerning the objectives and princi- 
ples universally accepted which are the bases of 
the resolutions adopted by the different organs 
of the United Nations, the mass media contrib- 
ute effectively to the strengthening of peace 
and international understanding, to the promo- 
tion of human rights, as well as to the estab- 
lishment of a more just and equitable interna- 
tional economic order. 



February 1979 



55 



Article VIII 

Professional organizations, and people who 
participate in the professional training of jour- 
nalists and other agents of the mass media and 
who assist them in performing their functions 
in a responsible manner should attach special 
importance to the principles of this Declaration 
when drawing up and ensuring application of 
their codes of ethics. 
Article IX 

In the spirit of this Declaration, it is lor the 
international community to contribute to the 
creation of the conditions for a free flow and 
wider and more balanced dissemination of in- 
formation, and the conditions for the protec- 
tion, in the exercise of their functions, of jour- 
nalists and other agents of the mass media. 
UNESCO is well placed to make a valuable 
contribution in this respect. 
Article X 

1 . With due respect for constitutional provi- 
sions designed to guarantee freedom of infor- 
mation and for the applicable international in- 
struments and agreements, it is indispensable to 
create and maintain throughout the world the 
conditions which make it possible for the or- 
ganizations and persons professionally in- 
volved in the dissemination of information to 
achieve the objectives of this Declaration. 

2. It is important that a free flow and wider 
and better balanced dissemination of informa- 
tion be encouraged. 

3. To this end, it is necessary that States 



should facilitate the procurement, by the mass 
media in the developing countries, of adequate 
conditions and resources enabling them to gain 
strength and expand, and that they should sup- 
port co-operation by the latter both among 
themselves and with the mass media in de- 
veloped countries. 

4. Similarly, on a basis of equality of rights, 
mutual advantage, and respect for the diversity 
of cultures which go to make up the common 
heritage of mankind, it is essential that bilat- 
eral and multilateral exchanges of information 
among all States, and in particular between 
those which have different economic and social 
systems be encouraged and developed. 
Article XI 

For this Declaration to be fully effective it is 
necessary, with due respect for the legislative 
and administrative provisions and the other ob- 
ligations of Member States, to guarantee the 
existence of favourable conditions for the oper- 
ation of the mass media, in conformity with the 
provisions of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and with the corresponding prin- 
ciples proclaimed in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in 
1966. D 



'For full text of the declaration on the mass 
media, see UNESCO Doc. 20 c/20 Rev. of 
Nov. 21. 1978. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
NOV. 22* 

The United States joined in the consensus 
approval of a UNESCO [U.N. Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization] Dec- 
laration on Fundamental Principles Con- 
cerning the Contribution of the Mass Media 
to Strengthening Peace and International 
Understanding, the Promotion of Human 
Rights, and to Countering Racialism. 
Apartheid and Incitement to War. The ac- 
tion was taken in Commission IV, Culture 
and Communication, of the UNESCO Gen- 
eral Conference, now convened in its 20th 
session in Paris. Formal adoption by the full 
general conference is expected within the 
next few days. 

The result of intensive negotiations, it is 
a text which not only is stripped of all lan- 
guage implying state authority over the 
mass media but also includes positive lan- 
guage on freedom of information. Instead of 
imposing duties and responsibilities upon 
journalists, as various drafts attempted, it 
proclaims the necessity for them to enjoy 
the best conditions for the exercise of their 
profession. It recognizes that the exercise of 
freedom of opinion, expression, and infor- 
mation is an integral part of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and it asserts 
the public's right of access to information 
through a diversity of sources. 



It charges states with the responsibility of 
providing favorable conditions for the oper- 
ation of the mass media. It affirms the 
necessity to help the developing countries 
overcome their handicaps in communication 
development as a means of helping to cor- 
rect the 'information imbalance'' 
worldwide. 

With a commitment to freedom of infor- 
mation as its foundation state, the declara- 
tion represents an acceptable accommoda- 
tion by UNESCO members on a number of 
mass media issues. As such it can make a 
significant contribution to the global free 
flow of information and liberty of expres- 
sion. It also sets a cordial tone for an era of 
cooperation between developed and de- 
veloping countries in a more equitable 
sharing of the benefits of modern communi- 
cation systems. 

The Department has worked closely with 
leaders of the U.S. media community in 
dealing with this issue and is grateful for 
the solid support and valuable counsel they 
have supplied. The Department also wishes 
to commend the Director General of 
UNESCO for the positive role he played in 
the final negotiations. 



* Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment spokesman Hodding Carter III. 



Imt.s Control 



by James P. Pearson 

Statement in Committee I (Political 
and Security) of the U.N. General As- 
sembly on November 22, 1978. Senator 
Pearson is the U.S. representative on 
that committee. ' 

This Assembly has before it the 
largest number of resolutions pertain- 
ing to disarmament in its history. These 
resolutions touch on virtually every as- 
pect of the problem of increasing inter- 
national security through the control, 
reduction, or elimination of arma- 
ments, as well as the improvement of 
mankind's well-being through the di- 
version of the world's resources from 
armaments to economic and social 
development. 

My country shares the deep concern 
of others in all these aspects of disar- 
mament. Today, 1 want to focus my 
remarks on the area which is in the 
forefront of our concerns — how to ar- 
rest and then reverse the increase in 
nuclear armaments. 

There have been many sug- 
gestions — most of which were incor- 
porated in one way or another in the 
Final Document of the 10th special 
session — for specific measures to deal 
with the problem of the vast accumula- 
tion of nuclear weapons. Many of these 
proposals are aimed at achieving ob- 
jectives which the United States fully 
shares. But we are convinced that nu- 
clear disarmament must be carried out 
in carefully conceived and im- 
plemented stages. Not only would pre- 
cipitate nuclear disarmament be impos- 
sible from a technical standpoint, it 
would be dangerous to international 
stability and security, which it is our 
first duty to preserve. Nuclear deter- 
rence has worked in these first decades 
of the nuclear era, although we ob- 
viously must work to find a less poten- 
tially dangerous way to insure that gen- 
erations yet unborn will escape the 
catastrophe of a nuclear war. 

With these thoughts in mind, the 
United States has, from the dawn of the 
nuclear era, stood ready to find ways of 
diminishing the possibility of nuclear 
war without diminishing the security of 
any nation. We have made our views 
known to the other nuclear powers and 
have entered into negotiations with 
which those in this chamber are famil- 
iar, which negotiations we see as vital 
early steps in the process of mastering 



56 

the problem of controlling the ac- 
cumulation of nuclear arms. 

The SALT negotiations are at this 
moment at the center of that process, 
and rightly so for they deal with both 
the most dangerous weapons and with 
the most important implements of de- 
terrence. The negotiations for SALT II 
are in a final and delicate stage. There 
is little I feel I can or should add today 
to what has been said by the responsi- 
ble officials in both the United States 
and the Soviet Union concerning this 
most important negotiation. All those 
involved hope and expect agreement to 
emerge soon. 

I would like to turn my attention now 
to another important current develop- 
ment in limiting nuclear armaments. 
The cessation of nuclear testing would 
complement in a significant way the 
effort in SALT II and in the anticipated 
SALT III negotiations to cap the 
build-up of strategic nuclear weapons 
and to begin reducing their numbers 
and restraining their qualitative de- 
velopment. Here again in negotiations 
involving three of the five nuclear 
powers, we have made substantial 
progress in developing the basis for a 
comprehensive test ban treaty to which 
all states could subscribe. The United 
States appreciates and shares the desire 
of the great majority of the members of 
the United Nations for an early end to 
nuclear testing. 

This urge to move forward rapidly, 
however, must be tempered by the rec- 
ognition that a comprehensive test ban, 
in order to promote stability and mutual 
confidence among its participants, 
must be based on adequate measures of 
verification. In the trilateral negotia- 
tions in Geneva, we are engaged in the 
technically complex process of 
elaborating such measures. As in all 
negotiations involving both new tech- 
nical problems and the fundamental se- 
curity interests of the parties, progress 
has been painstakingly slow but we 
have seen progress nonetheless. 

We are conscious of the impatience 
of other nations to see the results of 
these trilateral negotiations. At the 
same time, we are mindful that these 
negotiations are breaking new ground 
in nuclear arms control and that the 
importance of constructing a fair, bal- 
anced, and verifiable agreement must 
take precedence over attempting to 
meet some arbitrary completion date. 

Other nations, too, have recognized 
this requirement and have turned their 
attention to interim measures like an 
immediate moratorium on nuclear 
testing as a means of achieving the ob- 
jective of a comprehensive test ban 
while the provisions of a formal 
agreement are still being hammered 



out. As U.S. spokesmen have stated in 
this forum, we understand the motives 
of those who have called for a 
moratorium and, indeed, sympathize 
with them. We cannot agree, however, 
that this is the way to achieve our 
common goal — that is, the earliest 
possible achievement of a comprehen- 
sive test ban that can truly promote 
mutual confidence among its parties. 
An immediate cessation of nuclear 
testing could seriously complicate ef- 
forts to complete satisfactory arrange- 
ments for verification of a comprehen- 
sive test ban. It could even have the 
effect of lengthening the negotiations 
process. The United States, therefore, 
continues to hold the position that the 
surest and most effective way to reach 
an early and satisfactory comprehen- 
sive test ban is through vigorous pur- 
suit of the Geneva negotiations. I offer 
assurances that my government is 
making and will continue to make 
every effort to bring those negotiations 
to a prompt and satisfactory conclu- 
sion. 

Avoidance of the danger of nuclear 
warfare does not involve dealing only 
with existing arsenals; it means insur- 
ing that no new ones are created. One 
of the major events looming on the in- 
ternational disarmament calendar is the 
1980 review conference of the non- 
proliferation treaty (NPT), preparations 
for which are already beginning as we 
meet here. The NPT is not the only 
means at our disposal to insure against 
the spread of nuclear weapons, but it is 
the instrument in which well over 100 
nations have put their trust. The United 
States and many other nations continue 
to hope for the widest possible adher- 
ence to this important treaty. 

It is in the context of the NPT and 
nonproliferation in general, that I refer 
again to the significance of our efforts 
to achieve a comprehensive test ban. It 
is apparent that adherence by all na- 
tions to such a ban would be a major 
achievement in nonproliferation. 
Moreover, adherence by nuclear- 
weapon states would oblige them to 
give up something tangible — the op- 
tion to test nuclear explosive devices. 
The renunciation of this option would, 
in our view, further demonstrate that 
nuclear-weapon states are carrying out 
both the letter and the spirit of the NPT 
which, among other things, calls on the 
parties to pursue negotiations on effec- 
tive measures relating to cessation of 
the nuclear arms race. Both SALT II 
and a comprehensive test ban are 
measures in this category. Their suc- 
cess will pave the way for further steps 
toward reduction of nuclear arsenals 
without endangering the security of any 
nation and will help prevent the spread 



Department of State Bulletin 

of nuclear weapons to other parts of the 
globe. 

Finally, I would like to draw atten- 
tion once again to the commitment 
taken by the United States to strengthen 
the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon 
states that nuclear weapons will not be 
used against them. The Presidential 
declaration announced by Secretary of 
State Vance on June 12 during the spe- 
cial session devoted to disarmament 
elaborated my government's position 
on security assurances, building on the 
policy statement by President Carter in 
his address to the General Assembly in 
October 1977. The June declaration 
was a recognition by the United States 
of the desire of states which have 
foresworn nuclear weapons for greater 
assurance of their security. Our ap- 
proach took into account the fact that 
the nuclear-weapon states, as well as 
the non-nuclear-weapon states, have 
diverse security requirements. For 
many of the non-nuclear-weapon 
states, their relationship with nuclear- 
weapon states is an essential ingredient 
in their national security. 

The measures I have mentioned 
today are not the only ones the United 
States has taken in the nuclear disar- 
mament field. I could cite, for exam- 
ple, its signature of Protocol I and 
adherence to Protocol II of the treaty of 
Tlatelolco — the Latin American 
nuclear-weapon-free zone — and its 
support for similar zones in certain 
other parts of the world. The record is 
clear: The United States is responding 
to the call sounded in the Final Docu- 
ment of the special session devoted to 
disarmament . . . "To halt and reverse 
the nuclear arms race and all its aspects 
in order to avert the danger of war in- 
volving nuclear weapons. " We shall be 
unflagging in our efforts to achieve that 
goal. □ 



'Text from USUN press release 128. 



February 1979 



I ..S. Participation 
in the l/JV., 1977 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
JAN. 18 1 

I am pleased to send Congress this report of 
United States Government activities in the 
United Nations and its affiliated agencies dur- 
ing calendar year 1977. 

This 32nd annual report strengthens my con- 
viction that the United Nations is of great and 
growing importance to the conduct of U.S. 
foreign relations. We cannot effectively ad- 
vance world peace and our other national inter- 
ests if we ignore the potential of this global 
organization. 

Ambassador Andrew Young called the 1977 
General Assembly the "most constructive ses- 
sion in many years." It was largely free of the 
wasteful tactics of confrontation that had mar- 
red other recent sessions. 

The other organs of the United Nations and 
the various specialized agencies also made 
progress on many of the difficult issues that 
humanity faces. 

I am proud of the role we played in en- 
couraging this constructive atmosphere. We are 
committed to resolving problems through rea- 
son and discussion, not confrontation. 

Our national interests are best served by such 
cooperation, and by listening with respect to 
the problems of all nations, large and small. 
Our delegations paid particular attention to the 
views of those developing nations which make 
up two-thirds of the UN's membership and 
worked with them to identify points of common 
concern. 

The interests of America and of many other 
UN members coincided in the search for peace 
in the Middle East and southern Africa, the 
promotion of human rights, the Panama Canal 
Treaties, and economic development to help 
meet the basic human needs of more than a bil- 
lion of the world's people. 

One of my first acts as President was to in- 
vite UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim to 
the White House, and I have discussed interna- 
tional issues with him on a number of occasions 
since then. During 1977, I was also privileged 
to speak at the United Nations twice — once 
during March, and again at the opening of the 
32nd General Assembly in September. Also 
while in New York, I took the occasion to sign 
the two United Nations human rights covenants 
which for many years had lacked U.S. 
signature. 

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance has taken 
extraordinary pains — including direct partici- 
pation in Security Council and General Assem- 
bly meetings — to make the United Nations an 
increasingly vital factor in the conduct of this 
country's foreign relations. And Ambassador 
Young has worked with great skill and unusual 
effectiveness in improving our relationship 
with the UN and its member states. 



Events in the United Nations system will not 
always go the way that this country might de- 
sire. The changing makeup of these organiza- 
tions, the increasing diffusion of global power 
and the growing complexities of all issues 
make this inevitable. But those occasions 
should not make us withdraw our support, for 
the UN reflects the reality of the world in 
which we must live. We should, instead, feel 
challenged to develop imaginative and 
thoughtful new approaches in our diplomacy so 
as to advance our interests, and to play a con- 
structive role in the world community. In par- 
ticular, we need to continue demonstrating our 
faith in the basic purposes of an organization 
whose strength and effectiveness are essential 
to us and to the world. 

The attached report details U.S. positions 
and policies on the issues which arose in the 
UN system during 1977. It includes: 

• the extensive conduct of the so-called 
"North-South" dialogue — the discussion of 
economic and other issues between indus- 
trialized countries and the developing nations; 

• our support for the social and economic 
development activities — including those of the 
UN Development Program. Some 90 percent of 
the funds expended by the UN system benefit 
these activities; 

• U.S. efforts to support new progress on 
human rights throughout the UN system; 

• preparations for the 1978 special General 
Assembly session devoted to disarmament; 

• the adoption by consensus of a General As- 
sembly resolution on aircraft hijacking, to 
make the world's airways safer for people 
everywhere; 

• the beginning of extensive efforts against 
great odds to pursue peaceful settlements in 
Namibia and Rhodesia; and 

• U.S. ratification and support of a new UN 
specialized agency — the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development — which will provide 
new resources to improve food production and 
nutrition in low-income countries and can 
benefit us by stabilizing the global food 
market. 

Also included in this document is an analysis 
of the U.S. decision to withdraw from the In- 
ternational Labor Organization in November 
1977. I took this decision with regret, since 
U.S. interests in international organizations are 
better met through membership and active par- 
ticipation than through withdrawal. Neverthe- 
less, since announcement in 1975 of U.S. 
intention to withdraw, we believed that insuffi- 
cient progress had been made in resolving a 
number of difficulties in operation of the ILO. I 
still hope that the United States can return to 
the ILO when its operations clearly return to 
the organization's basic purposes. 

Finally, among the activities of 1977 — but 



57 

not included in this report — was steady work 
within the Administration on ways that the 
United States can work to strengthen the United 
Nations. My report on that topic, sent to the 
Congress on March 2, 1978, outlines reforms 
which can make the United Nations even more 
effective as the world's major forum for discus- 
sion and action on global issues. 

I welcome the continuing interest of the 
Congress in U.S. participation in the United 
Nations, and I urge its increased moral backing 
and financial support as the United States ad- 
dresses in the United Nations the increasingly 
difficult issues that lie ahead. 

Jimmy Carter □ 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Jan. 23, 1979. Copies of 
the 335-page report, entitled "U.S. Participa- 
tion in the U.N. — Report by the President to 
the Congress for the Year 1977," are available 
from the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
DC. 20402, for $4.50 each. Remittance must 
accompany order. 



Peacekeeping 



by John W. Hechinger 

Statement in the Special Political 
Committee of the U.N. General As- 
sembly on November 30, 1978. Mr. 
Hechinger is a U.S. delegate to the 
33d U.N. General Assembly. ' 

I am most pleased to be addressing 
the Special Political Committee of the 
General Assembly as we discuss 
peacekeeping — an essential aspect of 
the maintenance of international peace 
and security, which is a chiefc raison 
d'etre for the United Nations itself. 
The evolution of peacekeeping through 
the introduction of forces of U.N. 
member nations to prevent the renewal 
of localized hostilities is undeniably 
one of the major accomplishments of 
the United Nations; one that we must 
look upon with mutual pride. 

It is not surprising that with the 
complex situations which develop, this 
evolution has been attended by con- 
troversy and that not all the early hesi- 
tant steps taken by the Organization and 
its members were unqualified succes- 
ses. Fortunately, however, further ex- 
perience has made the peacekeeping 
operations of the United Nations an in- 
dispensable tool for the maintenance of 
stability in important areas of the 



58 

world. As Secretary General Waldheim 
noted in his annual report this fall, 
there were then about 12,700 officers 
and men from 27 countries involved 
in ongoing U.N. peacekeeping 
operations. 

My government would like to take 
this opportunity to pay tribute to the 
devotion and courage of these men who 
have performed and continue to per- 
form their duties in an exemplary 
fashion in often difficult circumstances 
for the sake of world peace. 

There were those who feared dire 
consequences when the United Nations 
first embarked on peacekeeping. Some 
felt the United Nations should do 
nothing until it could do everything, 
including the full creation of an on-call 
security force under the direct control 
of the United Nations pursuant to arti- 
cle 43. There were those who would 
have had us treat the charter as a 
straight jacket, not as a constitutional 
document which must be interpreted in 
a flexible and sophisticated manner to 
permit the evolutionary change that is 
the hallmark of a strong institution. 

The genius of Lester Pearson of 
Canada and his U.N. colleagues in 
1956 in achieving agreement on the 
establishment of the U.N. Emergency 
Force lay in building on the earlier, 
somewhat more limited, missions of 
U.N. Truce Supervisory Missions and 
finding what could be done in accord- 
ance with the charter to fulfill the pri- 
mary functions of the United Nations 
under the circumstances of the time. 
Primarily in the two decades since 
then, the United Nations has conducted 
peacekeeping operations in a variety of 
regions, political situations, and logis- 
tics circumstances. In short, 
peacekeeping has become an indis- 
pensable adjunct to peacemaking. 

We now need to tap this rich heritage 
of peacekeeping experience and find 
ways to make the institution we have 
created work more smoothly. We need 
to devote more time to developing the 
practical basis for U.N. peacekeeping 
operations. The refining of the broad 
principles for peacekeeping into so- 
called guidelines is, in our view, a sec- 
ondary consideration. The principles 
for peacekeeping are well grounded in 
the charter and have been clarified by 
consistent practice. The Committee of 
33 has existed for 13 years with little to 
show for its efforts in its attempt to re- 
fine peacekeeping "guidelines." Dur- 
ing this time, the current peacekeeping 
operations in Lebanon (UN1FIL), in the 
Sinai (UNEF), in the Golan Heights 
(UNDOF), in Cyprus (UNFICP), and 
those that preceded these ongoing ac- 
tivities were agreed to relatively ex- 
peditiously. The mandates covering 



these operations are firmly based on 
practice and precedent and provide 
adequate guidance for the future. 

It is time to focus on more mean- 
ingful and productive work; that is, on 
practical measures to assist the United 
Nations in doing an even better and 
more efficient job in carrying out 
peacekeeping operations. 

It is worth noting from Secretary 
General Waldheim 's report to the Gen- 
eral Assembly his hope that member 
governments would work toward im- 
proving techniques for providing the 
necessary assistance, arrangements, 
and support to make such operations 
less improvised and more efficient in 
the future. 

Replying to the Secretary General's 
request for national views on 
peacekeeping, as commissioned by the 
General Assembly last year in Resolu- 
tion 32/106, my own government 
suggested that member countries might 
wish to provide the Secretary General 
with an indication of the types of mili- 
tary units or civilian logistics or other 
support units that it was prepared to 
hold in readiness for possible use in 
U.N. peacekeeping operations. We 
also recommended improved, more 
standardized training in peacekeeping 
for cadre personnel of these units and 
observer mission personnel. Further, 
we suggested that this training might 
include 1 or 2 months at U.N. Head- 
quarters in New York. 

We are gratified to note that many of 
these ideas are reflected in Draft Res- 
olution A/SPC/33/L.19 introduced by 
the distinguished representative of the 
Federal Republic of Germany on behalf 
of the members of the European Com- 
munity and cosponsored by the U.S. 
delegation and many other nations. 
Specifically, we wish to call attention 
to paragraphs 3,5, and 6 of the resolu- 
tion, which appeal to members to sup- 
plement U.N. peacekeeping capa- 
bilities and invite them to have con- 
tinuous training of their personnel for 
peacekeeping; to submit reports on ex- 
perience gained; and to provide up-to- 
date information on the standby 
capacities, including logistics, that 
they might be able to make available. 
These are voluntary actions by states 
which commit them to do nothing more 
than to be ready to assist in the most 
useful possible manner should they de- 
cide to participate in a peacekeeping 
operation. 

I would also like to address para- 
graph 2 of the resolution, which deals 
with financing. Costs of the current 
major operations alone — UNEF, 
UNDOF, UNIFIL, and UNFICYP— 
approximate $250 million per year. My 
country has borne far more than its 



Department of State Bulletin 

regular assessed share of the U.N. 
budget for peacekeeping operations to 
date. We have done so willingly, in the 
belief that the cause of peace being 
served was of direct benefit to us as 
well as all U.N. members and to the 
United Nations' historic purpose. We 
have done so on the understanding that 
U.N. peacekeeping operations repre- 
sent duly constituted decisions of the 
United Nations and that the responsi- 
bility for them — including financial 
responsibility — must be shared. 

I need scarcely recall to delegates 
present here and in our total Assembly 
of 150 nations that article 17 of the 
chapter stipulates that: "The expenses 
of the Organization shall be borne by 
the Members as apportioned by the 
General Assembly." If the entire body 
does not accept the responsibility to fi- 
nance these operations, then it does not 
accept collective security; to deny fis- 
cal responsibility is to deny the respon- 
sibility of the United Nations for peace 
and security. Paragraph 2 of Draft Res- 
olution A/SPC/33/L.19 is a strong re- 
minder of the collective nature of fi- 
nancial responsibility for U.N. 
peacekeeping. 

I would like to make special note of 
the leadership, patience, and diligence 
shown by the delegation of the Federal 
Republic of Germany in the difficult 
and protracted process that has led to 
broad support and cosponsorship of the 
test of this resolution. It is our hope 
that the resolution and the cooperation 
among U.N. members on peacekeeping 
that it encourages will provide a basis 
for further action in the 34th General 
Assembly next year toward further 
strengthening the operational base of 
peacekeeping. 

Again may I add this personal 
note — that I feel that the resolution 
before us represents one of the most 
constructive steps that I have witnessed 
in this session of the General Assem- 
bly, standing out in strong contrast to 
the multiplicity of angry resolutions of 
condemnation of one group of member 
nations against others; resolutions 
which move us not one whit closer to 
the lofty purpose for which this Or- 
ganization was founded. This resolu- 
tion, in contrast, is constructive and 
will advance the art of peaceful settle- 
ment of disputes and collective 
security. I urge its acceptance by 
consensus. D 



'Text from USUN press release 142. 



February 1979 



59 



Human Rights 



by Andrew Young 

Statement in plenary on December 
14, 1978. Ambassador Young is U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations. ' 

The world-awakening to human 
rights and fundamental freedoms that 
emerged in 1948 in the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
has taken on a new urgency in the past 
few years. For perhaps the first time in 
history we can truly say that there is a 
worldwide human rights movement, 
and it is steadily gaining force. 

Mahatma Gandhi in 1921 wrote that 
every good movement passes through 
five stages: indifference, ridicule, 
abuse, repression, and, finally, respect. 
We know that human rights abuses are 
usually, when first noted, regarded 
with indifference. Then will come the 
ridicule, then the abuse, and perhaps 
even the repression. This is the path of 
progress. It has been true in the United 
States, India, across the African Conti- 
nent. It is no less true in the East or 
Middle East than it has been in the 
West and South. It is part of the proc- 
ess of widening participation in the 
public dialogue, of expanding the con- 
cerns and concepts we use when we 
develop public and international 
policy. 

There is no room for self- 
righteousness and self-congratulation in 
the field of human rights. Each of our 
nations has people of vision and people 
of fear, those who create and those who 
repress and torture. I believe we should 
identify particular problems and work 
together toward solving them. It is 
better to solve one small problem than 
to engage in political fireworks about 
the grand issues of our time. We have 
the potential of a new pragmatism in 
these halls, and I hope it grows. 

Behind this new pragmatism is, I 
think, the growing realization that we, 
indeed, have common goals and that if 
we stop fearing and fighting each other 
i we might find some practical solutions. 
The task is too serious to waste our 
effort in nonproductive exercises. We 
are faced with the necessity of pro- 
moting worldwide rapid, peaceful so- 
cial change if we are to move toward 
the goals of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. 

In 1967. a few months before his 
death, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., re- 
flected on the next steps of the struggle 



for full human rights and came to the 
conclusion that the crisis of the modern 
world is international in scope and that 
this is a crisis that "involves the poor, 
the dispossessed, and the exploited of 
the whole world. " 

Today, more than 1 billion people 
live in conditions of abject poverty — 
starving, idle, and numbed by igno- 
rance. Life expectancy in the poorest 
countries is only slightly greater than 
half that in the industrialized countries. 

The sad fact is that most of the 
people in these countries who were 
born in the year we adopted the Uni- 
versal Declaration of Human Rights are 
not around anymore to celebrate this 
occasion. And most of those who are 
still here have very little to celebrate. 
Three quarters of their number in these 
countries do not have access to safe 
water. They cannot read the speeches 
we make today honoring human rights. 
They earn less money in a year than 
most of us in this hall of the United 
Nations earn in 1 day — and even that is 
only a figure of speech, since most of 
them have never been paid at all for 
their work. 

The birthright of these people has 
been disregarded, denied, and violated, 
although it was done not by torturers, 
not by jailers, not by persecution, and 
not by repressive government. As 
President Carter reminded us a week 
ago: "Hunger, disease, poverty are 
enemies of human potential which are 
as relentless as any repressive govern- 
ment." 2 

The freedoms from arbitrariness, 
torture, and cruel punishment are the 
rights of everyone by the simple fact 
that he or she is born. The freedom of 
thought, speech, religion, press, and 
participation in public affairs are so 
fundamental that they enhance the 
quality of our life and character as in- 
dividuals. Their exercise cannot be 
made dependent on any other consid- 
erations. But we must understand too 
that these rights are hollow for any in- 
dividual who starves to death. There- 
fore, the human rights struggle is not 
only a defense of our individual liberty 
but also a struggle to protect life. 

The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights is a call for worldwide move- 
ments to promote human rights. This 
call is often heard with alarm by many 
who believe that there is far more to 
lose than to gain by encouraging politi- 
cal, economic, and social change. 



Perhaps, in the short run, there is some 
cost for those who have special 
privilege or for those who have an in- 
vestment in thinking of themselves — as 
a nation or class or race — as superior or 
more advanced than others. But the 
plain lesson of history is that as the cir- 
cle of participation in society widens, 
almost everyone profits. They profit 
not just in a better standard of living 
for everyone but in the productivity of 
the economy, in better social services 
for everyone, in wider political partici- 
pation, and in more freedom and more 
protection for human rights. 

The process of change entails risks. 
But change is inevitable. It is not a 
question of being able to withstand 
change or even of directing it; it is a 
question of understanding change and 
cooperating with it. The change of our 
time, the basic dynamic of our time, 
leads to more participation by more 
people in society. Poverty is the basic 
obstacle to the realization of human 
rights for most people in the world 
today. Where poverty is the problem, 
participation is the answer, participa- 
tion in the economic life of the society. 
Economic growth must be pursued with 
equity in mind and not just for the 
profit of the few at the top or for the 
power of the state and the government. 
The ultimate goal of economic de- 
velopment must be equity, with 
broader participation in production and 
consumption by all as the main objec- 
tive. Speaking before the opening ses- 
sion of the 8th General Assembly of the 
Organization of American States [June 
21, 1978], President Carter said: "The 
challenge of economic development is 
to help the world's poor lift themselves 
out of misery." 

He called upon that Assembly to join 
together the concepts of economic de- 
velopment and social justice: "We 
must also devote our common energies 
to economic development and the cause 
of social justice. Benefits of the 
world's economy must be more fairly 
shared, but the responsibilities must be 
shared as well. " 

To share responsibility is to make 
more participation possible. The more 
participation, the wiser will be the 
government. Prime Minister Manley 
made a stirring affirmation of his own 
faith in democracy when he spoke to us 
in October. He was, you will recall, 
urging us to united efforts in the strug- 
gle against apartheid. He said: "We 
believe that any government which has 
the courage to mobilize its people and 
tell the truth will receive the over- 
whelming support of its citizens." I 
also believe that. We must let our 
people hear the truth, the whole truth. 
And we must not be afraid to mobilize 



60 

our citizens to participate more fully in 
the political and economic processes. 

Expanding participation should not 
be limited, however, to government 
initiative. There is an important role 
for nongovernmental organizations. 
For the last year the Government of 
India has been reminding us of the im- 
portance of autonomous — and I stress 
that word — autonomous national 
human rights institutions. 

We need not fear change if we build 
into it more equity and more participa- 
tion. Indeed, fear of social change is 
the thing we need to fear the most. If 
we are afraid of it and try to preserve 
that which is already eroding beneath 
our feet, we will fail, because the 
dynamic of history is to widen the cir- 
cle of those who participate in society. 
Whether the struggle is for medical 
care for those who do not have it, bread 
for those who are hungry, freedom 
from prison for those imprisoned for 
conscience's sake, freedom of the press 
to print dissenting opinions, a job for 
those who are unemployed, the right to 
self-determination of majorities oppres- 
sed by minorities, the right of workers 
to organize, the right to speak one's 
own language in one's own school — 
all of these are demands for more par- 
ticipation and more dignity. 

If we invest just half as much energy 
and imagination in building a world 
community of the people as we have 
wasted in resisting the aspirations of 
the people, we will overcome. 

I believe that we are at the end of the 
period of cold wars, in the middle of 
the era of detente, and just beginning to 
find ways to build the structures of 
cooperation. Cooperation will demand 
a different substance and different style 
than confrontation. It will take a while 
for us to learn how to change, and I am 
afraid that we will all carry with us for 
some years some of the characteristics 
of confrontational politics. But it is 
more rewarding for everyone, even if it 
is more difficult and demanding, to 
practice the art of building community 
and cooperation for the common good. 
I believe we can get just as excited 
about building something as we can 
about protecting something. I believe 
that cooperation for the common good 
of humankind can be as powerful an 
incentive to our imaginations as fear 
for our survival. Indeed, I submit that 
cooperation for the common good, for 
the protection and promotion of human 
rights, is the way to survival. 

Perhaps some neglected methods can 
be of great help to us in the struggle to 
promote and protect human rights. 

First, an emphasis on autonomous, 
national institutions. We have not 
given due credit, nor due attention, to 



the creative role of independent, pri- 
vate institutions, dedicated to the pro- 
tection and promotion of human rights. 
My own experience was with the civil 
rights movement and the churches of 
this country, and I know what they 
were able to do in a few short years. 
Also, the role of a free and responsible 
press needs to be recognized. The press 
can be a guardian of the public interest 
and a critic of the abuses — where they 
exist — of public power, and of private 
power, for that matter. 

A second way to promote human 
rights is the use of the United Nations 
and of government authority and influ- 
ence as a catalyst and agent of goodwill 
in stimulating a process of participation 
by those who have common interests 
and concerns. The United Nations and 
interested nations are doing this in the 
case of Zimbabwe and Namibia, where 
the effort is not to impose a solution 
but to facilitate the building of com- 
munication among all the parties which 
are concerned, so that by talking to one 
another they learn to formulate their 
own solutions to their own problems. 

This is what the United States has 
been trying to do in the Middle East; 
acting not as a judge between Egypt 
and Israel but as a mediator, trying to 
be a catalyst in a process of ever- 
expanding conversation and coopera- 
tion. This is what the United States, the 
Dominican Republic, and Guatemala 
are trying to do in Nicaragua; not the 
imposition of an external answer but 
the strengthening of the process of con- 
sultation among all parties involved so 
they can find their own answers. 

I believe we can be even more active 
in this way than we have been at the 
United Nations. It is not enough to halt 
conflicts and to provide buffer or 
peacekeeping forces. It is not enough 
to denounce problems or supposed cul- 
prits. We must find a positive, creative 
role, of being the catalyst of change, of 
promoting the process of wider partici- 
pation where there are conflicts so that 
all the parties are involved. 

In the struggle to make all people 
free, we ourselves must become free. 
Freedom is not some distant state of 
affairs when there will be no more 
problems and history will have arrived 
at some Utopia, some paradise, some 
order of perfect justice. Freedom is 
solidarity with those who are less free 
than we are. Freedom is taking the risk 
of working for social justice for all 
people. 

The United Nations was brought 
forth as a result of the struggle for 
freedom against tyranny. There are 
many forms of tyranny, and none of us 
are exempt from the temptation to con- 
spire with tyranny against freedom by 



Department of State Bulletin 

remaining indifferent to the struggle of 
others to be free. But our very human- 
ity rests in our capacity to identify with 
the other and to join in the struggle to 
make all persons free. 

The United Nations is now chal- 
lenged to take the next steps that can 
move us forward in the struggle of 
humankind for peace, justice, and free- 
dom. If we accept this challenge, I be- 
lieve we will all be free someday. □ 



'Text from USUN press release 161. 

2 Made at a ceremony on Dec. 6. 1978. com- 
memorating the adoption of the Universal Dec- 
laration (for full text, see Bulletin of Jan. 
1979, p. 1.) 



XumibUt 



Following is a statement by Ambas- 
sador Donald F. McHenry, Deputy 
U.S. Representative to the Security 
Council, made on behalf of the contact 
group on Namibia (Canada, France, 
Federal Republic of Germany, United 
Kingdom, and United States) in the Se- 
curity Council on December 4, 1978. ' 

The delegations of Canada, France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States 
may wish to take the floor in the Secu- 
rity Council at a later stage in order to 
make a fuller statement of our views 
concerning the current situation in 
Namibia. However, at this first meet- 
ing of the Council on Namibia in De- 
cember we consider ourselves obliged 
to emphasize certain things that are 
basic to the thinking of our govern- 
ments. 

First, we want to reiterate the state- 
ment made by the Foreign Ministers of 
the five in Pretoria on October 19 that: 
"... they saw no way of reconciling 
such elections with the proposal which 
they put forward and which the Secu- 
rity Council has endorsed. Any such 
unilateral measure in relation to the 
electoral process will be regarded as 
null and void." We have repeatedly 
made clear our concern over these il- 
legal elections. 

Indeed, the Security Council will re- 
call that on November 13 when it 
adopted Resolution 439 the Permanent 
Representative of Canada, speaking on 
behalf of the five, referred to the so- 
called "internal elections" as follows: 
"We do not consider them as having 
any significance. We will not accord 
any recognition to the outcome. Those 
elections cannot be considered free and 



February 1979 

fair and are irrelevant to the progress of 
Namibia to an internationally accept- 
able independence. We share the ap- 
prehensions expressed in this debate 
and most notably by our African col- 
leagues that this unilateral process 
might be used to frustrate the im- 
plementation of Resolution 435." 
That, as I say, was a statement made 
on behalf of the five on November 13. 

The second observation I wish to 
make is that we are deeply concerned 
by the actions of the police authorities 
during the course of this weekend in 
detaining without explanation promi- 
nent members of SWAPO [South West 
Africa People's Organization] who 
make their homes in and around Wind- 
hoek. These actions have deprived a 
number of leading members of a par- 
ticular sector of the spectrum of politi- 
cal opinion within Namibia of their 
basic human liberties of speech, 
movement, press, and assembly. We 
know a number of the men and women 
who have been detained and hope that 
they will learn of our deep concern at 
their detention. 

Third, the five must express that 
they deplore the resort to intimidation, 
force, and violence in Namibia. 
Though not having available to us the 
facts necessary to base an opinion as to 
responsibility, we strongly regret the 
acts of violence which took place in 
Namibia this weekend. Such actions 
and the responses which they generate 
run directly against the effort to bring 
about the fair, peaceful, and open 
democratic elections under interna- 
tional supervision that are called for in 
the proposal by the five for the settle- 
ment of the Namibian question. 

Finally, we should like to note from 
the current report of the Secretary Gen- 
eral the statement conveyed by the 
Deputy Representative of South Africa 
on December 2nd that "South Africa 
reaffirms that it will retain authority in 
Namibia pending the implementation of 
the proposal." The five attach impor- 
tance to this explicit recognition by 
South Africa of its responsibility for 
the unfolding of events in Namibia. We 
shall continue to address the variety of 
questions raised in the context in which 
I have just spoken. □ 



lp« rlli c» id 



'Text from USUN press release 150. 



by James F . Leonard 

Statement in the General Assembly 
on November 22, 1979. Ambassador 
Leonard was acting U.S. Perma- 
nent Representative to the United 

Nations. ' 

It is an honor and pleasure to address 
the Assembly today on this matter of 
great international importance and con- 
cern. 

The system of apartheid is a clear 
affront to the dignity and decency of 
man and to the principles enshrined in 
the Charter of the United Nations and 
the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Apartheid is abhorrent to the 
people of the United States; it con- 
tradicts the very values and standards 
which we hold dear and the principles 
of freedom and equality on which our 
nation was founded. 

The U.S. Government has made our 
view clear to the Government of South 
Africa. We have stressed our commit- 
ment to human rights. We have called 
for the elimination of apartheid and for 
the full political participation of all 
South Africans on an equal basis. We 
do not expect these changes to occur 
overnight, but we have stated that 
without evident progress in this direc- 
tion, our relations with South Africa 
would deteriorate. As President Carter 
said in his most recent State of the 
Union message to the Congress on 
January 19, 1978: ". . . unless [South 
Africa] begins a progressive transfor- 
mation toward full political participa- 
tion for all its people, our relations will 
suffer." 2 

We hope that no further deterioration 
of our relations will be necessary. Our 
aim is not confrontation with South 
Africa but the achievement of progres- 
sive change in South Africa. As Sec- 
retary Vance stated in June: 

Our policy toward South Africa should not be 
misunderstood. We have no wish to see the 
whites driven from the home of their forbears. 
We suggest only that they seek a way to live in 
peace and justice with the majority of their 
fellow citizens. South Africans of all races, and 
not just its white citizens, should decide their 
country's future. We do not seek to impose 
either a timetable or a blueprint for this prog- 
ress. But I hope, as do all who have sympathy 
for the problems any society encounters in 
facing fundamental change, that the beginning 
of basic progress will soon be seen. 



61 



We are looking anxiously for signs 
of that progress. The South African 
Government has a newly elected Prime 
Minister. Mr. P.W. Botha, who has a 
great opportunity to lead his nation in 
new directions; to work constructively 
for peaceful change in his country and 
its region of the world; to embrace 
peaceful solutions to problems which 
will otherwise surely result in increased 
violence and conflict. 

We believe that the majority of 
South Africans, including those within 
the Nationalist Party, want peace, want 
international respect for their nation re- 
stored, and want to avoid the gloomy 
future which static policies would fore- 
cast. We hope that Mr. Botha shares 
these desires, and we look to him to 
exhibit the vision, leadership, and 
basic sense of fairness needed to move 
South Africa in a direction of greater 
harmony with the rest of the world. 

Yet at present the oppression and 
suffering in South Africa go on. The 
South African Government is planning 
for the destruction shortly of the 
Crossroads community outside Cape 
Town. The United States deplores this 
potential human tragedy and calls on 
South Africa to cancel such plans. 
Bannings and detentions without 
charge continue unabated. On October 
25, we learned of the detention of Sally 
Motlana, a prominent member of the 
Soweto community and a Vice Presi- 
dent of the South African Council of 
Churches. Detained without charge, 
Ms. Motlana has not had access to 
counsel, family, or other visitors. 

International concern for Ms. Mot- 
lana's well-being is growing rapidly. It 
is unfortunate that international atten- 
tion focuses on bannings and detentions 
in South Africa only when the promi- 
nent are involved, and yet it is fortu- 
nate that the detentions of the promi- 
nent draw attention to similar or worse 
treatment of the less known — draw at- 
tention to the egregious policy under 
which these actions take place. 

We are watching events in South 
Africa closely for signs of change. We 
are actively trying to influence and per- 
suade South Africa to change its 
policies. We look to South Africa for 
signs that it will cease bannings and 
detentions without charge; abolish the 
pass laws and all other forms of dis- 
crimination; give an equal opportunity 
to all for employment, job promotion, 
and education; and provide for the full 
political participation of all its citizens, 
regardless of race or color. 

As I said before, we do not expect 
these changes to occur overnight, but 
we do expect signs of significant 
change soon. The present unswerving 
direction of the South African Gov- 



62 



Palestinian Question 



SENATOR RIBICOFF, 
PLENARY, NOV. 30 1 

The complex problem of the 
Palestinian question has been before 
the United Nations for 30 years. It has 
been debated earnestly by people of 
good intentions and deep convictions. 
But that debate has not brought us 
closer to resolution of the problem. 

I have listened to many of the speak- 
ers this year. While there is a sense of 
historical continuity to this debate, it is 
a sad debate. Lives and property have 
been lost and violence has persisted be- 
cause the core issues have not been 
settled. There is another aspect to the 
Palestinian question: It is the lack of 
progress, the sterility of language, and 
the repetition of words that could have 
been spoken at any time since 1948. 

We must break through this pattern. 
We must accord the Palestinians a role 
in determining their future. And their 
future must be in a peaceful solution in 
the Middle East. If we don't do so, 
speakers will follow us on this podium 
year after year to discuss this subject 
like Sisyphus pushing his stone up the 
hill. There are practical means to attack 
this problem. What we need is the will 
to engage in the practical hard work of 
finding solutions. There is a peace ef- 
fort making progress today. Member 
nations can either reinforce and guide 
the progress of that effort or repeat 
historical points and relive the 
tragedies we know too well. 

The United States shares with most 
of the governments represented here — 
and certainly with most Palestinians — a 



Apartheid (Cont'd) 

ernment raises grave doubts about its 
future actions. Those doubts can only 
be reduced by evidence of a progres- 
sive change in South African policies. 
It is such evidence which is so im- 
mediately needed. □ 



'Text from USUN press release 131. 

; This message described Administration 
priorities in the areas not fully covered in his 
address before the Congress of the same day; 
the complete text is printed in the Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 
23. 1978. p. 98. 



deep desire to achieve practical prog- 
ress toward a resolution of the Palesti- 
nian question in all its aspects. I hope 
we also share a common sense that the 
time is long overdue to move away 
from the ideological and frequently 
emotional plane of debate. The time 
has come to take effective measures to 
resolve this problem in ways that will 
both assure the security of all states in 
the area and be judged by most Palesti- 
nians to be just and equitable. 

Efforts to solve the Palestinian 
problem must proceed from the recog- 
nition that there are today more than 3 
million people who identify themselves 
as Palestinians. Approximately one- 
third of them are in the West Bank and 
Gaza. Many of them share a sense of 
grievance that must be taken into ac- 
count by peacemakers, as well as a 
sense of community and a longing for a 
recognized identity. The task is to find 
and negotiate solutions which take ac- 
count of these realities of the Middle 
East. 

The initial response of the interna- 
tional community to the plight of the 
Palestinian people in the years since 
1948 was essentially a humanitarian 
one, dealing with their needs and dif- 
ficulties as refugees. This effort, to 
which the United States and other na- 
tions have contributed over the years, 
assumed that a resolution of the con- 
flict and of the Palestinian question 
could be achieved in the short term. 
The list of initiatives and measures un- 
dertaken by the United Nations to cope 
with this problem is lengthy. This body 
has adopted many resolutions, some of 
which have provided practical benefits 
for the Palestinians. Others, because 
they were extreme and divorced from 
reality, were ineffective and raised 
false expectations among this suffering 
people. No one, least of all the 
Palestinians, needs to be reminded that 
none has been successful, whatever the 
efforts and sacrifices, in bringing 
peace, security, and dignity to the 
Palestinian people. 

It has become increasingly clear 
since June 1967 that the Palestinian 
issue must be addressed as a political 
as well as a humanitarian question. No 
party to the conflict today disputes that 
the strong sense of Palestinian identity 
must be taken into account. That is 
why President Carter, President Sadat, 
and Prime Minister Begin spent so con- 
siderable a portion of their intensive 



Department of State Bulletin 

efforts at Camp David devising a 
framework for further progress, 
through negotiations, toward a just and 
equitable solution to the Palestinian 
question. 

These peace efforts have been and 
will continue to be firmly rooted in 
guidelines established by the Security 
Council in Resolutions 242 and 338. It 
always has been conceded, however, 
that these resolutions point the way to 
peace but cannot in themselves achieve 
it. Negotiations must take a working 
framework based on these principles 
and make of it a structure for peace. 

The agreements reached at Camp 
David provide a more detailed state- 
ment of the principles and procedures 
that would govern those negotiations. 
The results of the Camp David summit 
do represent two important milestones 
on the road to a broader peace. For the 
first time, they provided the means for 
Palestinians, particularly but not exclu- 
sively in the West Bank and Gaza, to 
have an effective voice in the determi- 
nation of their own future. At the same 
time, the Camp David accords de- 
veloped the logic of Resolution 242 
with regard to the Palestinians, recog- 
nizing explicitly that there are dimen- 
sions of the question beyond the hu- 
manitarian which must be addressed if 
there is to be a solution. 

It is essential that we take full ad- 
vantage of what is the most intensive 
and the most promising effort ever 
made to resolve the Palestinian ques- 
tion. My purpose is to emphasize not 
only the central importance of this 
issue to a just, comprehensive, and 
lasting peace in the Middle East but 
also the commitment of the United 
States, and of President Carter person- 
ally in cooperation with men of good- 
will on all sides, to achieve the goal of 
peace to which the U.N. Charter binds 
us. 

The cause of peace and justice is too 
important to allow those who only 
contribute empty propaganda and one- 
sided condemnations to dictate its 
course. The member nations of this Or- 
ganization must forgo the euphoria of 
sloganeering which can only detract 
from the central issues of the peace 
process. They must lend support to the 
efforts of those engaged in the less 
dramatic but infinitely more effective 
and exciting challenges of peacemak- 
ing. The legitimate rights and just re- 
quirements of the Palestinian people 
are recognized, but they can be 
achieved only through the long and 
difficult course of negotiations, in 
which we intend they should partici- 
pate. 

As we proceed in the effort to re- 
solve the difficult question of the 



February 1979 



63 



Palestinian people, it is apparent that a 
comprehensive solution must deal with 
its many aspects. It must deal with the 
question of the Palestinian people, 
whether they are living on the West 
Bank and Gaza or elsewhere. For those 
concentrated in the West Bank and 
Gaza, the United States believes that 
they are entitled to live under an au- 
thority that responds to their needs and 
aspirations. At Camp David, we de- 
veloped a process for establishing a 
self-governing body on the West Bank 
and Gaza in which the Palestinian in- 
habitants would play a leading role. 
They would then help create the condi- 
tions that will enable the final status of 
the West Bank and Gaza to be resolved 
within 5 years. 

The United States has a vision of a 
true peace in the Middle East and has 
the will and determination to pursue it. 
Those who wish to join us need only 
accept peace and recognition among 
neighbors as the declared objective of 
the process of contacts and negotia- 
tions. 

This is no less true for the Palestin- 
ian people than for the states of the 
area which already have accepted Res- 
olution 242 as the touchstone for their 
negotiations and a comprehensive set- 
tlement as their objective. We ac- 
knowledge that Resolution 242 does 
not deal with the political dimension of 
the Palestinian issue, and at Camp 
David we tried to meet that need. Ac- 
ceptance of the peace process does not 
bind any party to accept a particular 
solution, but it does obligate them to 
negotiate in good faith and to forgo, as 
the Charter of the United Nations re- 
quires, the use or threat of force as a 
policy instrument. 

Despite the difficulties that remain 
ahead in attempting to resolve the mul- 
tifaceted Palestinian question, the ef- 
fort must be made for the sake of re- 
gional and world peace and for the sake 
of generations yet unborn. The United 
States is prepared, under President 
Carter's personal leadership, to con- 
tinue a sustained and energetic effort to 
realize a just and lasting peace. The 
participation of the Palestinian people 
in this effort is an essential prerequisite 
of its full success. We are ready to 
work in this historic endeavor with any 
and all Palestinians who are prepared to 
accept Resolution 242 and to accept 
that the ultimate purpose of the negoti- 
ations is to achieve peace and recogni- 
tion between the Palestinian and Israeli 
peoples on bases that reasonable men 
will judge to be fair. The Camp David 
accords give us, for the first time, the 
guidelines to translate these principles 
into concrete arrangements. A unique 
opportunity is before us. I pray that 



succeeding generations will not judge 
that it was lost because we preferred 
ringing declarations to the toil of prac- 
tical negotiation. 



AMBASSADOR YOUNG, 
PLENARY, DEC. 7 2 

Only a few days ago, Senator 
Ribicoff, a distinguished Member of 
the Senate of the United States, speak- 
ing on behalf of my government at this 
Assembly, made it clear that the United 
States supports and will continue to 
support "... practical progress toward 
a resolution of the Palestinian question 
in all its aspects. " 

My government has expressed over 
and over again the view, which we be- 
lieve is shared by most of the members 
of this Organization, that such progress 
can only be pursued through peaceful 
negotiations, as long and as difficult as 
they may be. We have made it equally 
clear that we are prepared to work vig- 
orously for peace with all who will ac- 
cept Resolution 242 and, in the words 
of the distinguished Member of the 
U.S. Senate, ". . . accept that the ul- 
timate purpose of the negotiations is to 
achieve peace and recognition between 
the Palestinian and Israeli peoples on 
bases that reasonable men will judge to 
be fair." 

My government will vote against the 
three resolutions (A/33/L.11 A. B, and 
C) submitted under the item "Question 
of Palestine" precisely because these 
resolutions do not advance the cause of 
peace. It is unacceptable that the res- 
olutions, in purporting to support the 
aspirations of the Palestinian people, 
attempt to advance the cause of an or- 
ganization which has not accepted as 
the basis for peace Resolution 242 and 
the concept of peaceful negotiations to 
realize peace. 

The United Nations should be in the 
forefront of efforts to promote a just 
and lasting peace in the Middle East. It 
should not allow itself to be swayed by 
political doctrines which claim to ad- 
vance peace but only hinder it. This 
body cannot ignore developments in 
the area which promise progress toward 
peace; it should support them. Its 
members should certainly not attempt 
to undermine them in the way the pres- 
ent resolutions so clearly aim to do. 

It's also important that the United 
Nations should not allow its limited fi- 
nancial resources to be used for parti- 
san, unconstructive, one-sided ac- 
tivities such as those performed by the 
General Assembly committee and the 
Secretariat's special unit for whose 
continuation the resolutions provide. 
One of the strengths of the U.N. 



Secretariat — so evident in its 
peacekeeping and mediatory efforts — is 
its reputation for impartiality and pro- 
fessionalism. Without, that reputation 
the U.N.'s effectiveness is severely 
limited. This is what is involved in this 
matter. Will the majority of member 
states support the continuation of a unit 
whose very mandate conflicts with the 
underlying purpose of the Organiza- 
tion? Or will they have the strength to 
say: "We will express our views in 
another way."? We will not permit the 
United Nations itself to be weakened. 

My government will continue to op- 
pose this unit as strongly as it will 
continue to support activities genuinely 
and effectively aimed at promoting true 
and lasting peace in the Middle East.D 



'Text from USUN press release 144. Senator 
Abraham A. Ribicoff is a U.S. delegate to the 
33d U.N. General Assembly. 

2 Text from USUN press release 155. Andrew 
Young is U.S. Ambassador to the United Na- 
tions. 



Occupied 
Territories 



by Angelique O. Stahl 

Statement in the Special Political 
Committee of the U.N. General As- 
sembly on November 27, 1978. Ms. 
Stahl is a U.S. delegate to the 33d 
U.N. General Assembly. ' 

I am pleased to have the opportunity 
to explain the U.S. vote on the three 
resolutions we have had under consid- 
eration today. I believe that my state- 
ment will demonstrate clearly the 
strong commitment of the United States 
to the cause of peace in the Middle East 
and to the principle of peaceful negoti- 
ation of disputes as well. 

The United States has voted in favor 
of Resolution A/SPC/33/L.16 regarding 
Israeli civilian settlements in the ter- 
ritories occupied in 1967. This matter 
is one of serious concern to my gov- 
ernment, and we have made our posi- 
tion clear on a number of occasions 
since 1967. 

As Ambassador Young stated last 
year in speaking to the General Assem- 
bly, we are opposed to settlements in 
occupied territory first, because we be- 
lieve they could be perceived as pre- 
judging the outcome of negotiations to 
deal with the territorial aspects of final 
peace treaties, and second, because we 



64 

believe they are inconsistent with in- 
ternational law as defined in the fourth 
Geneva convention. We believe this 
issue must be dealt with in the course 
of peace negotiations. 

The resolution on which we have just 
voted is consistent in most respects 
with the U.S. position. And 1 must note 
our satisfaction with the fact that, in 
contrast to similar resolutions in the 
past, it states a position of principle 
with which most nations would agree, 
but it does not attempt to institute 
measures by the Secretary General, this 
Assembly, or the Security Council 
which would hinder the process of 
negotiations toward peace now under- 
way. Rather, the resolution sets forth 
in clear language the views of the in- 
ternational community on the question 
of civilian settlements in the occupied 
territories and lays down a standard 
which we believe must be respected by 
all. 

I must be frank in saying that this 
resolution is not constructive in all its 
aspects. We believe that its language is 
not as balanced or as lofty as it might 
be when one considers the important 
issues that it addresses. More impor- 
tantly, the resolution does not suffi- 
ciently take into account significant 
developments and the progress that has 
been made toward real and lasting 
peace in the Middle East in the past 
several months. The Camp David ac- 
cords, signed by President Sadat of 
Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of Is- 
rael on September 17 this year, set 
forth a framework within which the 
problem we are considering can be re- 
solved through peaceful negotiation 
among the parties involved. 

Our consideration of the issue of 
settlements would not be realistic or 
complete if we did not note that Israel 
has undertaken a solemn commitment 
to withdraw from the Sinai returning 
the area to the full exercise of Egyptian 
sovereignty. Now should we neglect 
the fact that Egypt and Israel have 
agreed to procedures with regard to the 
West Bank and Gaza which are rel- 
evant, indeed key, to our discussion 
today. It is our view that it will be 
necessary for the parties, in those 
negotiations looking toward a relation- 
ship of peace, to define the mutual 
rights of inhabitants to do business, to 
work, to live, and to carry on other 
transactions in each other "s territory. 

Regarding the language describing 
occupied territories as "Palestinian and 
other occupied Arab territories," the 
United States does not read this to 
prejudge in any way the outcome of the 
negotiations on the final status of the 
West Bank and Gaza. The United 



States believes the inhabitants of the 
West Bank and Gaza must participate 
in the determination of the future of 
those areas. We see the resolution as 
consistent with this view, but we have 
abstained on operative paragraphs 1 
and 2. 

My government would have pre- 
ferred that the resolution we have just 
passed take note of these important de- 
velopments. Nonetheless, because its 
thrust and intent accord with the policy 
of the United States in most respects, 
we have voted in favor of it. 

The United States has voted in favor 
of Resolution A/SPC/33L.15 since we 
have long held that the fourth Geneva 
convention is applicable throughout the 
territories occupied since 1967. 

We have voted against Resolution 
A/SPC/33/L.17 Rev. 1 because we be- 
lieve it makes allegations which have 
not been adequately verified and be- 
cause the report on which it is based is, 
in our view, biased and one-sided. We 
do not believe the report or the resolu- 
tion contributes to the cause of peace in 
the area. □ 



'Text from USUN press release 140 of Nov. 
28, 1978. 



\ssistanee to 
Palestinians 



by Angelique O. Stahl 

Statement in plenary on December 
20. 1978. Ms. Stahl is a U.S. delegate 
to the 33d U.N. General Assembly.* 

As I believe the debate on this res- 
olution in Committee II illustrated, the 
issue at stake here is not assistance to 
the Palestinian people. If it were, this 
resolution would be adopted by con- 
sensus, which the United States would 
eagerly join. We support assistance to 
the Palestinian people and contribute to 
U.N. programs designed to help them 
directly as in the case of UNRWA 
[U.N. Relief and Works Agency] and 
through programs worked out with host 
governments in the case of UNDP 
[U.N. Development Program], the 
World Food Program. UNICEF, and 
others. Our commitment in this regard 
should be beyond question. 

Our efforts in Committee II were 
to amend the resolution to 
eliminate references to controversial 
texts of the past while leaving intact 



Department of State Bulletin 

the operative language on establishing 
concrete projects designed to improve 
the lot of the Palestinian people. By 
passing such a resolution the Assembly 
could have established a clear mandate 
for intensified efforts to provide hu- 
manitarian and development assistance 
which would benefit the Palestinian 
people. But this proved impossible to 
agree on. 

The issue underlying this debate — as 
clearly highlighted by the PLO [Pales- 
tinian Liberation Organization] Ob- 
server in the Committee II debate — is 
whether voluntary U.N. assistance 
should be channeled through the PLO, 
not whether such assistance should be 
provided to the Palestinians. The 
United States strongly opposes any 
move to so harness U.N. assistance 
programs for political purposes. We 
believe this distorts the purpose of 
these programs and undermines support 
for them. 

Developed and developing countries 
have a mutual interest in supporting 
and expanding U.N. voluntary assist- 
ance programs. They lead to economic 
growth and expanded trade, the key 
elements of a more equitable and pros- 
perous world economy. Yet support for 
these programs rests on a mutual con- 
sensus. 

Donors have accepted that they can- 
not dictate local development priorities 
to recipients who can best determine 
their own development needs. Simi- 
larly, recipient countries must accept 
that they cannot compel a donor to 
support politicized programs which its 
government, parliament, and people 
strongly oppose. This is an issue which 
goes well beyond this resolution or the 
question of the role of the PLO, but it 
is one my government believes all 
should reflect upon. 

As to the significance of this resolu- 
tion, it is, of course, a recommendation 
which the governing bodies and heads 
of UNDP and the other agencies of the 
U.N. system will have to interpret. In 
our view it provides no justification for 
any action which would put the interest 
of any political group above the inter- 
ests of the Palestinian people them- 
selves, the host governments con- 
cerned, or the developing world as a 
whole. The task of the U.N. system as 
underlined in this resolution is to im- 
prove the social and economic needs of 
the Palestinian people, and in this re- 
gard the United Nations has our sup- 
port. □ 



'Text from USUN press release 165. 



February 1979 



65 



TREATIES: 

Current .let ions 

MULTILATERAL 



Antarctica 

Recommendations, including agreed measures 
for conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora 
Adopted at Brussels June 2-13, 1964. at the 
Third Consultative Meeting. Entered into 
force July 27, 1966, except for III- VII, III- 
VIII; Sept. 1, 1966, for I1I-IX. TIAS 6058. 
Notification of approval: U.S., Dec. 22, 1978 

for III- VII. 
Entered into force: Dec. 22, 1978. for I II— 
VII. 

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of 
principles and objectives of the Antarctic 
treaty. Adopted at London Oct. 7, 1977, at the 
Ninth Consultative Meeting. 1 
Notification of approval: U.S., Nov. 8. 1978. 

Automotive Traffic 

Convention on road traffic, with annexes and 
protocol. Done at Geneva Sept. 19, 1949. 
Entered into force March 26, 1952 TIAS 
2487. 

Accession deposited: Bangladesh, Dec. 6. 
1978. 

Aviation 

Convention on international civil aviation. Done 
at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into force 
Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. 
Adherence deposited: Botswana. Dec. 28, 
1978. 

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the 
convention on international civil aviation, 
Chicago, 1944 (TIAS 1591), with annex. 
Done at Buenos Aires Sept. 24, 1968. Entered 
into force Oct. 24, 1968. TIAS 6605. 
Acceptance deposited: Barbados, Dec. 20, 
1978. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful sei- 
zure of aircraft Done at The Hague Dec. 16. 
1970. Entered into force Oct. 14. 1971. TIAS 
7192. 

Accessions deposited: Botswana. Dec. 28, 
1978; Nepal, Jan. 10, 1979. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at 
Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force 
Jan 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Accession deposited: Nepal, Jan. 10, 1979. 
Ratification deposited: Botswana, Dec. 28, 
1978. 

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text of 
the convention on international civil aviation 
Chicago, 1944 (TIAS 1591), with annex. 
Done at Montreal Sept. 30, 1977.' 
Acceptances deposited: Barbados, Dec. 20, 
1978; Finland, Dec. 22, 1978. 

Customs 

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with 
annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 
1972. Entered into force Dec. 6, 1975. 2 
Accession deposited: Algeria, Dec. 14, 1978. 

Finance 

Agreement establishing the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development. Done at Rome 



June 13. 1976. Entered into force Nov. 30, 

1977. TIAS 8765. 

Ratifications deposited: Greece and Portugal, 

Nov. 30. 1978. 
Accession deposited: Guatemala, Nov. 30, 

1978. 

International Monetary Fund 

Articles of agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund, formulated at the Bretton 
Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Opened 
for signature at Washington Dec. 27, 1945. 
Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501. 
Signature and acceptance: Djibouti, Dec. 29. 
1978. 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in 
civil or commercial matters. Done at The 
Hague Mar. 18, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 
7. 1972. TIAS 7444. 
Extended to: Gibraltar. Nov. 21, 1978. :i - 4 - 5 

Patents, Plant Varieties 

International convention for the protection of 
new varieties of plants of Dec. 2, 1961 , as re- 
vised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978.' 
Signatures: Belgium. Denmark. France, Ger- 
many (Fed. Rep.), Italy, Netherlands, 
South Africa. Switzerland. U.K., and U.S., 
Oct. 23. 1978. 

Privileges and Immunities 

Agreement regarding the status, privileges, and 
immunities in Switzerland of the tribunal of 
arbitration established pursuant to the com- 
promise signed at Washington July 11, 1978. 
between the US and France, and of persons 
participating in the work of the tribunal 
Signed at Bern Dec 6, 1978. Entered into 
force Dec. 6, 1978 

Property, Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual 
Property Organization. Done at Stockholm 
July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 
1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 
6932. 
Accessions deposited: Mongolian People's 

Republic, Nov. 28. 1978; Korea. Dec. 1. 

1978. 

Space 

Convention on registration of objects launched 
into outer space. Done at New York Jan. 14, 
1975. Entered into force Sept. 15, 1976. TIAS 
8480. 
Accession deposited: Spain, Dec. 20. 1978. 

Sugar 

International sugar agreement, 1977. with an- 
nexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. Entered 
into force provisionally Jan. 1. 1978. 
Ratifications deposited: El Salvador, Nov. 22, 

1978; Korea, Dec. 5, 1978; Panama, Dec. 

19, 1978. 

Telecommunications 

Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio 
Conference for the planning of the 
broadcasting-satellite service in frequency 
bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3) 
and 11.7-12.5 GHz (in Region 1). with an- 
nexes. Done at Geneva Feb. 13, 1977. En- 
tered into force Jan. I, 1979. 
Notifications of approval deposited: Den- 
mark, Sept. 22, 1978; Switzerland, Oct. 4, 
1978. 



Trade 

Protocol amending the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on 
trade and development, and to amend Annex 
I. Done at Geneva Feb. 8, 1965. Entered into 
force June 27. 1966. TIAS 6139. 
Acceptance deposited: France. Nov. 27, 
1978. 

Whaling 

International whaling convention and schedule 
of whaling regulations. Opened for signature 
at Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into 
force Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849. 
Notification of adherence: Korea, Dec. 29. 
1978. 

Protocol to the international convention for the 
regulation of whaling signed at Washington 
Dec. 2. 1946 (TIAS 1849). Done at Wash- 
ington Nov. 19. 1956 (TIAS 4228). 
Notification of adherence: Korea. Dec. 29, 
1978. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the 
wheat trade convention (part of the interna- 
tional wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington Apr. 26. 1978. Entered 
into force June 24, 1978, with respect to cer- 
tain provisions. July 1, 1978, with respect to 
other provisions. 
Ratifications deposited: Finland. Dec. 22. 

1978; Spain. Dec. 28. 1978; Vatican City 

State. Dec. 20, 1978. 
Accession deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, 

Dec. 15. 1978. 



BILATERAL 



Cape Verde 

Agreement amending and extending the memo- 
randum of agreement of Oct. 13 and Nov. 19, 
1976 (TIAS 8742) relating to the provision of 
site test, commissioning and/or periodic flight 
checks of air navigation aids by the Federal 
Aviation Administration. Signed at Washing- 
ton and Praia Aug. 17 and Oct. 18, 1977. En- 
tered into force Oct. 18, 1977; effective Oct. 
1, 1977. 

Agreement amending and extending the memo- 
randum of agreement of Oct. 13 and Nov. 19. 
1976, as amended and extended (TIAS 8742), 
relating to the provision of site test, commis- 
sioning and/or periodic flight checks of air 
navigation aids by the Federal Aviation Ad- 
ministration. Signed at Washington and Praia 
Mar. 10 and Apr. 4, 1978. Entered into force 
Apr. 4, 1978; effective Apr. 1, 1978. 

China (Taiwan) 

Mutual defense treaty. Signed at Washington 

Dec. 2, 1954. Entered into force Mar. 3. 

1955. TIAS 3178. 
Notice of termination delivered by the U.S. on 

Dec. 23, 1978, effective on and as of Jan 1. 

1979. The treaty will terminate on Jan. 1, 

1980. 

France 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation 
and the prevention of fiscal evasion with re- 
spect to taxes on estates, inheritances, and 
gifts. Signed at Washington Nov. 24, 1978. 
Enters into force on the first day of the second 



66 



month following the month in which the ex- 
change of instruments of ratification takes 
place. 
Protocol to the convention with respect to taxes 
on income and property of July 28, 1967, as 
amended by the protocol of Oct. 12, 1970 
(T1AS 6518, 7270), with exchange of notes. 
Signed at Washington Nov. 24, 1978; effec- 
tive Jan. 1. 1979. Enters into force 1 month 
after the date of exchange of the instruments 
of ratification. 

Indonesia 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of May 17, 1977 
(TIAS 8677), and the exchange of letters of 
Dec. 16, 1977 (TIAS 8984), concerning de- 
velopment projects. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Jakarta Dec. 6, 1978. Entered into 
force Dec. 6, 1978. 

Malaysia 

Agreement relating to a cooperative program to 
combat the spread of heroin addiction and 
other forms of drug abuse in Malaysia. Ef- 
fected by an exchange of notes at Kuala Lum- 
pur Nov. 16 and Dec. 8. 1978. Entered into 
force Dec. 8, 1978. 

Netherlands 

Memorandum of understanding concerning prin- 
ciples governing mutual cooperation in re- 
search and development, production, and pro- 
curement of conventional defense equipment. 
Signed at Washington and The Hague July 25 
and Aug. 24. 1978. Entered into force Aug. 
24, 1978. 

Romania 

Program of cooperation and exchanges in educa- 
tional, cultural, scientific, technological, and 
other fields for the years 1979 and 1980. with 
annex and exchange of letters. Signed at 
Washington Dec 7. 1978. Entered into force 
Dec. 7, 1978; effective Jan. 1, 1979. 

Saudi Arabia 

Agreement for technical cooperation in increas- 
ing the electrical power generating capacity of 
the Nasseriah power station. Signed at Wash- 
ington and Riyadh Nov. 9 and 13, 1978. En- 
tered into force Nov. 13, 1978. 

Spain 

Procedural annexes XI and XII to the agreement 
of Jan. 31, 1976 (TIAS 8361), in implemen- 
tation of the treaty of friendship and coopera- 
tion of Jan. 24, 1976 (TIAS 8360), with ex- 
change of notes. (Petroleum facilities). Signed 
at Madrid Dec. 19, 1978. Entered into force 
Dec. 19, 1978. 

Turkey 

Loan agreement for balance-of-payments 
financing. Signed at Ankara Dec. 5. 1978. 
Entered into force Dec. 5, 1978. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Agreement relating to privileges and immunities 
of all members of the Soviet and American 
embassies and their families, with agreed 
minute. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Dec. 14, 1978. Entered into force 
Dec. 14, 1978; effective Dec. 29, 1978. 

Agreement concerning the extension of diplo- 
matic privileges and immunities to nondip- 
lomatic personnel. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Moscow Oct. 17, 1967. and Mar. 1. 
1968. Entered into force Mar. 1. 1968. TIAS 
8115. 
Termination: Dec. 29. 1978. 



United Kingdom 

Reciprocal fisheries agreement, with agreed 

minute. Signed at Washington June 24, 1977. 

Entered into force Nov. 7. 1978. 

Proclaimed by the President : Dec. 15, 

1978. □ 



1 Not in force. 

2 Not in force for the U.S. 

'With reservation. 

4 With designations. 

■ With declarations. 



PRESS RELEASES: 

Department of State 



December 19-January 17 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington. DC. 20520. 

No. Dal; Subject 

*459 12/19 U.S. -Canadian talks on air 
quality. Dec. 15. 

*460 12/19 U.S. Organization for the 
International Telegraph 
and Telephone Consulta- 
tive Committee (CCITT), 
study group 4, Jan. 12. 

*461 12/20 Vance: departure statement. 
Andrews Air Force Base. 

*462 12/21 Vance: arrival remarks. 

Geneva. 

*463 12/22 Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee (SCO. Subcom- 
mittee on Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS), working 
group on ship design and 
equipment, Jan. 16 

*464 12/21 Vance; remarks to press, 
Geneva. 

*465 12/22 U.S., Macao amend textile 
agreement, Aug. 10 and 
Oct. 26, 1978. 

*466 12/22 SCC. SOLAS, working group 
on radiocommunications, 
Jan. 18. 

*467 12/23 Vance, Gromyko: remarks to 
press. Geneva. 

468 12/24 Vance: arrival statement, 
Andrews Air Force Base. 

*469 12/28 SCC, SOLAS, working group 
on bulk chemicals, Jan. 
18. 

*470 12/28 Christopher: arrival state- 
ment, Taipei, Dec. 27. 
*1 1/2 SCC, SOLAS, working group 

on ship design and equip- 
ment, Jan. 17. 
*2 1/2 U.S.. France civil aviation 

arbitration concluded, Dec. 
9. 
*3 1/3 Advisory Committee on In- 

ternational Investment, 
Technology, and De- 
velopment, working group 
on transborder data flows, 
Jan. 29. 
*4 1/3 Advisory Committee on In- 

ternational Investment 



*7 



•10 

11 

'12 



13 



•14 



"15 



16 



•17 



Department of State Bulletin 

Technology, and De- 
velopment, working group 
on transfer of technology 
and UN/OECD investment 
undertakings, Jan. 23. 

1/5 U.S., Republic of Korea 

amend textile agreement. 
Dec. 28. 

1/22 U.S.. Taiwan amend textile 

agreement, Dec. 28. 

1/5 CCITT. study group 1, Feb. 

1. 

1/5 U.S. Organization for the 

International Radio Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCIR), study group 2, 
Jan. 31. 

1/9 Secretary Vance and other 

Administration officials to 
hold special briefing on 
normalization of U.S. re- 
lations with China at the 
State Dept.. Jan. 15. 

1/15 CCIR. study group 6, Feb. 8. 

1/11 Vance: news conference. 

1/11 Ocean Affairs Advisory 

Committee, Antarctic sec- 
tion. Mar. 2. 

1/15 Vance: address at a briefing 

for officials of the National 
Council for U.S. -China 
Trade and the USA/ROC 
Economic Council. 

1/15 Leslie Gelb. Director of the 

Bureau of Politico-Military 
Affairs, to address town 
forum on American-Soviet 
relations. Riverside, 
Calif., Jan. 31. 

1/17 Advisory committees' charter 

renewals. 

1/17 SCC. SOLAS, working group 

on radiocommunications, 
Feb. 15 

1/17 CCIR, study group 1, Feb. 

21. 

1/17 SCC, SOLAS, working group 

on international mul- 
timodal transport and con- 
tainers, Feb. 13. □ 



* Not printed in the Bulletin. 



1/JS.l/JV. 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Public Affairs Office. U.S. Mission to the 
United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, 
New York, N.Y. 10017. 



Dale 



Subject 



117 11/13 Barton: Namibia, Security 
Council. 

'118 11/14 Momjian: refugees. Com- 
mittee III. 

"119 11/14 Wells: operational activities 
and food. Committee II. □ 



*Not printed in the Bulletin. 



INDEX 



FEBRUARY 1979 
VOL. 79, NO. 2023 

Arms Control 

Arms Control ( Pearson ) 55 

Conventional Arms Transfers (joint com- 
munique) 12 

Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks 
(foreign relations outline) 43 

President Carter Attends Guadeloupe Meeting 
(Callaghan. Carter. Giscard d'Estaing. 
Schmidt) 36 

President Carter's Interview of December 
19 5 

President Carter's News Conference of January 
1 7 (excerpts) 3 

President Carter's State of the Union Address 
(excerpts) 1 

Secretary Vance Visits Europe (Vance) ... 10 

U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union 38 

U.S. Role in East Asia's Stability (Blumenthal. 
Brzezinski. Kreps. Vance) 14 

Asia. U.S. Role in East Asia's Stability (Blu- 
menthal. Brzezinski. Kreps. Vance) .... 14 

Cambodia 

News Conference of January 1 1 (Vance) ... 7 

President Carter's News Conference of January* 
17 (excerpts) 3 

China 

Chinese Proper Names 22 

Diplomatic Relations With the P.R.C. and Fu- 
ture Relations With Taiwan 23 

Economic and Commercial Relationships With 
Taiwan (foreign relations outline) 27 

Exchange of Messages (Carter, Deng) . 17, 18 

Exchange of Messages (Carter, Hua) .. 15, 16 

Exchange of Messages (Huang. Vance) ■ ■ • 19. 20 

News Conference of January 11 (Vance) ... 7 

President Carter Attends Guadeloupe Meeting 
(Callaghan. Carter, Giscard d'Estaing, 
Schmidt) 36 

President Carter's Interview of December 
19 5 

President Carter's Memorandum Regarding 
Relations With the People on Taiwan .24 

President Carter's News Conference of January 
1 7 (excerpts) 3 

Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Meet the 
Press" 11 

Taiwan — A Profile 27 

Taiwan — The Mutual Defense Treaty (White 
House fact sheet) 25 

United States, People's Republic of China 
Celebrate Diplomatic Recognition (Chai, 
Deng, Mondale, Woodcock) 21 

U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan (foreign relations 
outline) 28 

U.S. Role in East Asia's Stability (Blumenthal. 
Brzezinski. Kreps, Vance) 14 

Communications 

The Challenge for Communications Develop- 
ment (Reinhardt) 50 

UNESCO Declaration on the Mass Media (text 
of declaration. Department statement) ... 54 

Congress 

The Situation in Iran and Its Implications 
( Saunders) 45 

Tenth Report on Cyprus (Carter) 44 

U.S. Participation in the U.N.. 1977 (message 
from President Carter) 57 

U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union 38 



Cyprus. Tenth Report on Cyprus (Carter) ... 44 
Economics 

President Carter Meets With President of the 
Commission of European Communities 

(White House statement) 34 

U.S. Role in East Asia's Stability (Blumenthal, 

Brzezinski. Kreps, Vance) 14 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Hubert H. 
Humphrey North-South Scholarship Program 

(Carter) 35 

Energy. OPEC Price Increase (White House 

statement) 35 

Europe 

Implementing the CSCE Final Act (Carter) .... 40 

Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks 

(foreign relations outline) 43 

President Carter Meets With President of the 
Commission of European Communities 

(White House Statement) 34 

France. President Carter Attends Guadeloupe 
Meeting (Callaghan. Carter, Giscard d'Es- 
taing, Schmidt) 36 

Germany. President Carter Attends Guadeloupe 
Meeting (Callaghan, Carter, Giscard d'Es- 
taing, Schmidt) 36 

Human Rights 

The Challenge for Communications Develop- 
ment (Reinhardt) 50 

Human Rights (Young) 59 

Implementing the CSCE Final Act (Carter). ... 40 
President Carter's State of the Union Address 

(excerpts) 1 

U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union 38 

Iran 

News Conference of January 11 (Vance) ... 7 

President Carter's News Conference of January 

1 7 (excerpts) 3 

The Situation in Iran and Its Implications 

(Saunders) 45 

Israel. Letter of Credence (Evron) 47 

Korea 

Korea and the United States — The Era Ahead 

(Holbrooke) 29 

News Conference of January 11 (Vance) ... 7 

Republic of Korea — A Profile 32 

U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea 
William H. Gleysteen, Jr. (biographic 

data) 31 

Lebanon. Letter of Credence (Itani) 47 

Libya. News Conference of January 1 1 

(Vance) 7 

Mexico 

Conventional Arms Transfers (joint com- 
munique) 12 

President Carter's News Conference of January 

1 7 (excerpts) 3 

President Carter's Trip to Mexico 5 

Middle East 

Assistance to Palestinians (Stahl) 64 

News Conference of January 1 1 (Vance) ... 7 

Occupied Territories (Stahl) 63 

Palestinian Question (Ribicoff, Young) .... 62 
Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Meet the 

Press" 11 

Secretary Vance Visits Europe (Vance) ... 10 

Military Affairs. Korea and the United 

States — The Era Ahead (Holbrooke) .... 29 

Namibia. Namibia (McHenry) 60 

Nicaragua. News Conference of January 1 1 

(Vance) 7 

Presidential Documents 

Arms Transfer Levels 49 

Exchange of Messages (Carter, Deng) . 17, 18 
Exchange of Messages (Carter, Hua) . . 15, 16 
Hubert H. Humphrey North-South Scholarship 

Program 35 

Implementing the CSCE Final Act 40 

International Trade Agreements 34 

Interview of December 19 5 



Memorandum Regarding Relations With the 

People on Taiwan 24 

News Conference of January 17 (excerpts) . . 3 
President Carter Attends Guadeloupe Meet- 
ing 36 

State of the Union Address (excerpts) 1 

Tenth Report on Cyprus 44 

U.S. Participation in the U.N., 1977 57 

Publications. GPO Sales 28, 44. 49 

Science and Technology. The Challenge for 
Communications Development* Rein- 
hardt) 50 

Security Assistance 

Arms Transfer Levels (Carter) 49 

Taiwan — The Mutual Defense Treaty (White 

House fact sheet) 25 

U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan (foreign relations 

outline) 28 

South Africa. Apartheid (Leonard) 61 

Thailand. President Carter's News Conference 

of January 17 (excerpts) 3 

Trade 

International Trade Agreements (Carter) ... 34 

Korea and the United States — The Era Ahead 

(Holbrooke) 29 

U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union 38 

Treaties. Current Actions 65 

Tunisia. Visit of Tunisian Prime Minister 

Nouria (joint communique) 48 

U.S.S.R. U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet 

Union 38 

United Kingdom. President Carter Attends 
Guadeloupe Meeting (Callaghan. Carter. 

Giscard d'Estaing. Schmidt) 36 

United Nations 

Apartheid (Leonard) 61 

Arms Control (Pearson) 55 

Assistance to Palestinians (Stahl) 64 

The Challenge for Communications Develop- 
ment (Reinhardt) 50 

Human Rights ( Young) 59 

Namibia ( McHenry) 60 

Occupied Territories (Stahl) 63 

Palestinian Question (Ribicoff. Young) .... 62 

Peacekeeping ( Hechinger) 57 

UNESCO Declaration on the Mass Media (text 

of declaration. Department statement) ... 54 

U.S. Participation in the U.N., 1977 (message 

from President Carter) 57 

Name Index 

Blumenthal, W. Michael 14 

Brzezinski. Zbigniew 14 

Callaghan. James 36 

Carter, President 1. 3, 5, 15, 17. 24. 

34. 35. 36. 40, 44, 49, 57 

Chai Zemin 21 

Deng Xiaoping 18,21 

Evron. Ephraim 47 

Giscard d'Estaing. Valery 36 

Hechinger. John W 57 

Holbrooke, Richard C 29 

Hua Guofeng 16 

Huang Hua 20 

Itani, Khalil 47 

Kreps. Juanita M 14 

Leonard, James F 61 

McHenry. Donald F 60 

Mondale, Vice President 21 

Pearson. James P 55 

Reinhardt, John E 50 

Ribicoff, Abraham A 62 

Saunders. Harold H 45 

Schmidt, Helmut 36 

Stahl, Angelique O 63. 64 

Vance, Secretary 7. 10. 11. 14. 19 

Woodcock. Leonard 21 

Young, Andrew 59. 62 



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Depart til en t 



m of state -j m t m j & 

bulletin 



Mareh 1979 



fhe Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 79 / Number 2024 



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Department of State 

bulletin 

Volume 79 / Number 2024 / March 1979 



Cover Photos: 

Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping in Houston 

I Black Star photo ) 

President Carter in Mexico 

( While House photo by Bill Fitz Patrick 1 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on 
developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include 
major addresses and news conferences 
of the President and the Secretary of 
State; statements made before congres- 
sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has deter- 
mined that the publication of this peri- 
odical is necessary in the transaction of 
the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for 
printing this periodical has been ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through 
January 31, 1981. 

NOTE: Contents of this publication 
are not copyrighted and items con- 
tained herein may be reprinted. Cita- 
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Bulletin as the source will be appre- 
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For sale by the Superintendent of 
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Price: 

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Single copy— 

$1.40 (domestic) $1.80 (foreign) 



CYRUS R. VANCE 

Secretary of State 

HODDING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 

Assistant Editor 



CONTENTS 



I CHINESE VICE PREMIERS DENG XIAOPING AND FANG YI VISIT 
THE UNITED STATES 

1 Remarks by President Carter and Vice Premier Deng 

6 Texts of Agreements and Joint Press Communique 

12 President Carter's Interview by Central TV, People's Republic of China 

15 China— A Profile 

19 U.S.-P.R.C. Economic Relations (Foreign Relations Outline) 

20 Letter of Credence (China) 



THE PRESIDENT 

21 America's Role in a Turbulent World 
24 State of the Union Message to the Con- 
gress 
30 News Conferences of January 26 and 
February 12 

THE SECRETARY 

34 Foreign Assistance and U.S. Policy 
39 Overview of Major Foreign Policy Is- 
sues 
42 American Foreign Policy in a Changing 
World 



AFRICA 



43 



(De- 



Namibia and Southern Rhodesia 
partment Statement) 

43 Letters of Credence (Congo. Gabon) 

EAST ASIA 

44 Relations With the People on Taiwan 

(President Carter, Warren Chris- 
topher, texts of proposed legislation 
and analysis) 



MIDDLE EAST 

48 Challenges and Opportunities for Peace 

in the Middle East (Harold H . Saun- 
ders) 

49 Middle East Peace Talks (Department 

Statement) 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

52 President Carter's Visit to Mexico 
(President Carter, Jose Lopez Por- 
tillo. Text of Joint Communique) 

55 Mexico — A Profile 

64 New Patterns in Inter-American Coop- 
eration (Viron P. Vaky) 

TREATIES 

67 Current Actions 

CHRONOLOGY 

70 January 1979 



For corrections on population and inter- 
national trade agreements, see p. 50 



.•- V' 






s»* 






:d» 









Q& 



O* 



<o^ 






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All photo-. courte<.> of the While House 



Clockwise from above left: 

The President and Mrs. Carter with Vice Premier Deng 
Xiaoping and his wife Madame Zhuo Lin, Adviser of 
the General Office of the Military Affairs Commission, 
on the White House balcony. (Ji Chaozhu, Vice Pre- 
mier Deng's interpreter and Deputy Director of Inter- 
national Conferences and Treaty and Law Department, 
stands behind the Vice Premier.) 

Members of the White House Honor Guard. 

Vice Premier Deng presents a gift from China. 

Vice Premier Deng, accompanied by Ji Chaozhu, greets 
children during Kennedy Center performance of 
American arts. 



CHINESE VICE PREMIERS DENG XIAOPING 
AND FANG VI VISIT THE UNITED STATES 



Vice Premiers Deng Xiaoping and Fang Yi of the People's Republic of China 
made an official visit to the United States January 29-February 4, 1979. After 
visiting Washington, DC, January 28-February I, they toured Atlanta, Hous- 
ton, and Seattle February 1-5. Vice Premier Fang also visited Los Angeles Feb- 
ruary 3^4. Vice Premiers Deng and Fang departed the United States on Feb- 
ruary 5. 

Following are remarks made by President Carter and Vice Premier Deng 
Xiaoping on various occasions during the visit, texts of the documents signed on 
January 31, the joint press communique of February I, and an interview of 
President Carter by China's Central TV on January 25 . ' 



EXCHANGE OF REMARKS, 
WELCOMING CEREMONY, 
JAN. 29 2 

President Carter 

Vice Premier Deng, Madame Zhuo 
]Lin, distinguished Chinese guests, fel- 
\low Americans, and friends: 

On behalf of the people of my coun- 
j try , I welcome you, Mr. Vice Premier, 
!to the United States of America. 

Today we take another step in the 
historic normalization of relations 
which we have begun this year. We 
share in the hope which springs from 
(reconciliation and the anticipation of a 
common journey. 

The United States of America has 
major interests in the Asian and in the 
JPacific regions. We expect that nor- 
malization of relations between our two 
'countries will help to produce an at- 
mosphere in the Asian and Pacific area 
in which the right of all peoples to live 
in peace will be enhanced. 

We expect that normalization will 
help to move us together toward a 
world of diversity and of peace. For 
Ittoo long, our two peoples were cut off 
from one another. Now we share the 
llprospect of a fresh flow of commerce, 
ideas, and people, which will benefit 
;both our countries. 

Under the leadership of Premier Hua 
■Guofeng and of you. Mr. Vice Pre- 
mier, the People's Republic of China 
Ihas begun to move boldly toward mod- 
lernization. You have chosen to broaden 
your cultural, trade, and diplomatic ties 
with other nations. We welcome this 
jopenness. As a people, we firmly be- 
jlieve in open discussion with others 
I and a free exchange of ideas with 
others. 

Our nation is made up of people of 
many backgrounds, brought together 
jby a common belief in justice, indi- 
| vidual liberty, and a willingness to set- 
tle differences peaceably. So, we par- 
ticularly welcome the opportunity to ex- 



change students and scholars and to 
improve our trade, technological, sci- 
entific, and cultural contacts. We are 
eager for you and your people to see 
and to experience our nation and for 
our people to experience yours. 

There is a Chinese saying that seeing 
once is worth more than a hundred de- 
scriptions. For too long, the Chinese 
and the American peoples have not 
been able to see each other for them- 
selves. We are glad that time is past. 

China is one of the nations to which 
a significant number of Americans, our 
own citizens, trace their ancestry. The 
American people have warm feelings 
for the Chinese. From an earlier time 
when I visited China, 30 years ago, I 
recall days of close contact and of 
friendship and hospitality. 

But history also teaches us that our 
peoples have not always dealt with 
each other wisely. For the past century 
and more, our relations have often been 



marred by misunderstanding, false 
hopes, and even war. 

Mr. Vice Premier, let us pledge to- 
gether that both the United States and 
China will exhibit the understanding, 
patience, and persistence which will be 
needed in order for our new relation- 
ship to survive. 

Our histories and our political and 
economic systems are vastly different. 
Let us recognize those differences and 
make them sources not of fear, but of 
healthy curiosity; not as a source of di- 
visiveness, but of mutual benefit. 

As long as we harbor no illusions 
about our differences, our diversity can 
contribute to the vitality of our new 
relationship. People who are different 
have much to learn from each other. 

Yesterday, Mr. Vice Premier, was 
the lunar New Year, the beginning of 
your Spring Festival, the traditional 
time of new beginnings for the Chinese 
people. On your New Year's Day, I am 
told, you open all doors and windows 
to give access to beneficient spirits. It's 
a time when family quarrels are for- 
gotten, a time when visits are made, a 
time of reunion and reconciliation. 

As for our two nations, today is a 
time of reunion and new beginnings. 
It's a day of reconciliation, when win- 
dows too long closed have been 
reopened. 

Vice Premier Deng, you, your wife, 
your party are welcome to our great 



President Carter and Vice Premier Deng at the welcoming ceremony. 




country. Thank you for honoring us 
with your visit. 

Vice Premier Deng 

Mr. President and Mrs. Carter, 
ladies and gentlemen: 

First of all, I wish to thank the 
President and Mrs. Carter for this 
grand and warm welcome, which we 
consider to be a token of the American 
people's friendship for the Chinese 
people. We, on our part, have brought 
the American people a message of 
friendship from the Chinese people. 

The history of friendly contacts be- 
tween our two peoples goes back for 
nearly 200 years, and what is more, we 
fought shoulder to shoulder in the war 
against fascism. Though there was a 



period of unpleasantness between us 
for 30 years, normal relations between 
China and the United States have at last 
been restored, thanks to the joint ef- 
forts of our two governments and 
peoples. In this respect. President 
Carter's farsighted decision played a 
key role. 

Great possibilities lie ahead for de- 
veloping amicable cooperation between 
China and the United States. In the 
next few days, we will be exploring 
with your government leaders and with 
friends in all walks of life ways to de- 
velop our contacts and cooperation in 
the political, economic, scientific, 
technological, and cultural fields. 

Normalization opens up broad vistas 
for developing these contacts and 
cooperation to our mutual benefit. We 



HIGHLIGHTS OF ITINERARY 
OF VICE PREMIERS DENG 
XIAOPING AND FANG YI 

The two Vice Premiers adhered to the 
same schedule while in the United States 
except: italics denote Vice Premier Fang's 
separate activities, and an * denotes Vice 
Premier Fang's absence. 

WASHINGTON, D.C.— JAN. 28-FEB. 1 

Sunday, Jan. 28 

Arrival at Andrews Air Force Base 

Monday, Jan. 29 

Welcoming ceremony at White House 
Meeting with President Carter 
Luncheon with Secretary Vance 

Meeting with Dr. Frank Press, 
Director of the Office of Science 
and Technology Policy 

2d meeting with the President 
State dinner at White House 
Kennedy Center performance of American 
arts 

Tuesday, Jan. 30 

3d meeting with the President 

Luncheon hosted by Senate Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee 

Meeting with Senate Majority Leader 
Robert Byrd 

Meeting with Speaker of the House Thomas 
P. O'Neill, Jr. 

Receptions by citizen's groups 

Wednesday, Jan. 31 

Breakfast with U.S. Cabinet officials 

Sightseeing 

Acceptance of Honorary Doctorate from 

Temple University* 
Talks with former President Richard Nixon 

Luncheon hosted by Dr. Press 

TV interview by television network an- 
chormen* 



Document-signing ceremony at White 

House 
Reception at the P.R.C. Liaison Office 

Thursday, Feb. 1 

Breakfast with Henry Kissinger 

ATLANTA, FEB. 1 

Luncheon hosted by the Southern Center for 

International Studies 
Visit to Ford Motor Company plant* 

Tour of Georgia Institute of Tech- 
nology 

Dinner hosted by the Governor of Georgia 

HOUSTON, FEB. 2-3 

Tour of NASA space center 
Luncheon with NASA officials 

Tour of Texas Medical Center and 
Methodist Hospital 

Barbecue and rodeo 

Breakfast with regional editors and pub- 
lishers 
Visit to Hughes Tool Company plant 

SEATTLE, FEB. 3-5 

Luncheon with area leaders 
Tour of Boeing 747 plant* 

LOS ANGELES, FEB. 3~t 

Tour of Lockheed facilities in 

Palmdale 
Reception by Mayor of Los 

Angeles 
Tour of Disneyland, an off-shore 

oil rig in Long Beach harbor, 

and McDonnell Douglas Plant 
SEATTLE, FEB. 4-5 

Dinner with regional businessmen 
Breakfast with regional editors and pub- 
lishers 

DEPARTURE, FEB. 5 



Department of State Bulletin 

have every reason to expect fruitful re- 
sults. 

The significance of normalization' 
extends far beyond our bilateral rela-l 
tions. Amicable cooperation between i 
two major countries, situated on oppo- | 
site shores of the Pacific, is undoubt- 
edly an important factor working fori 
peace in this area and in the world as a | 
whole. The world today is far from < 
tranquil. There are not only threats to 
peace, but the factors making for war 
are visibly growing. The people of the 
world have the urgent task of redou- i 
bling their efforts to maintain world 
peace, security, and stability. And our i 
two countries are duty-bound to work J 
together and make our due contribution I 
to that end. 

Mr. President, we share the sense of 
being on an historic mission. Sino-U.S. 
relations have reached a new begin- 
ning, and the world situation is at a 
new turning point. China and the J 
United States are great countries, and i 
the Chinese and American peoples, two I 
great peoples. Friendly cooperatior 
between our two peoples is bound tc i 
exert a positive and far-reaching influ- I 
ence on the way the world situation 
evolves. 

I sincerely thank you for your wel- ] 
come. 



EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, 
JAN. 29 3 

President Carter 

Vice Premier Deng, Madame Zhuo 
Lin, distinguished visitors from the 
People' s Republic of China, President 
Nixon, my fellow Americans, and 
friends: 

This house belongs to all Americans,;! 
people who are firmly dedicated to a, 
world of friendship and peace. And 
Vice Premier Deng, on behalf of all] 
Americans, I welcome you here to our j 
house. 

Your visit here, Mr. Vice Premier, is 
an important milestone in the develop- I 
ment of friendly relations between the | 
United States of America and the> 
People's Republic of China. I'm | 
gratified that after too many years of j 
estrangement, that our two countries 
have now grasped the opportunity toll 
reestablish these vital, formal links that | 
exist between us. 

In the past year, more than 120 dele-;j 
gations from the People's Republic of 
China have come here to the United 
States to visit us. And an even greater 
number of American groups have left 
here and gone to visit China. Ex- 
changes have already begun in the nat- 
ural sciences, in space, in agriculture, 



March 1979 

in medicine, in science, in technology, 
and other fields. And now with the es- 
tablishment of normal diplomatic rela- 
tions, the exploratory nature of these 

flmany exchanges can give way to a 

|more valuable and a more permanent 
relationship. This will serve the inter- 
ests of both our nations and will also 
serve the cause of peace. 

Today, for the first time since the 
establishment of normal diplomatic re- 
lations, the Governments of the United 
States of America and the People's Re- 
public of China have begun official 
discussions at the highest level. Our 
discussions are fruitful and they are 

^constructive, because both of us are 
keenly aware that what we do now will 
establish precedents for future peaceful 
relationships. 

We've not entered this new relation- 
ship for any short-term gains. We have 

•a long-term commitment to a world 
community of diverse nations and in- 

' dependent nations. We believe that a 
strong and a secure China will play a 
cooperative part in developing that type 

.of world community which we envi- 
sion. Our new relationship particularly 
can contribute to the peace and stability 
of the Asia-Pacific region. 

Your nation. Vice Premier Deng, 
like ours, has been created by the hard 
work of ordinary men and women. De- 
spite our cultural, political, and eco- 
nomic differences, there's much for us 
to build on together. 

The United States, born out of a rev- 
olution for freedom, is a young country 
with an independent history of only 

'200 years. But our Constitution is the 
oldest continuing written constitution 
in the entire world. 

Chinese civilization, with more than 
4,000 years of recorded history, is one 
of the oldest cultures in the world. But 

las a modern nation, China is quite 

•young. We can learn much from each 
other. 

There are many hundreds of 
thousands of Americans of Chinese 
origin, and their contributions to our 
society have been even greater than 
their numbers could possibly suggest. 

^Our national life has been enriched by 
the works of Chinese American ar- 
chitects, artists, and scientists — 
including three recent winners of the 
Nobel Prize. 

Like you, Mr. Vice Premier, I'm a 

■farmer, and like you, I'm a former 
military man. In my little farming 
community, when I grew up, our ag- 

, ricultural methods and our way of life 
were not greatly different from those of 

'.centuries earlier. I stepped from that 
world into the planning and outfitting 
of nuclear submarines. And when I 
later returned to the land, I found that 



U.S. AMBASSADOR TO P.R.C 

Leonard Woodcock of Providence, Rhode 
Island, was born on February 15, 1911. He 
attended Wayne State University from 1928 
to 1930 and later became Governor 
Emeritus of the same university. 

Ambassador Woodcock was president of 
the United Automobile Workers Union from 
1970 to 1977. He was chairman of the 
President's special commission to Hanoi 
March 13-22, 1977. He served as chairman 
of the Committee on National Health Insur- 
ance and as a member of the board of di- 
rectors of the NAACP, the American Civil 
Liberties Union, and the National Urban 
Coalition. Ambassador Woodcock also was 
a member of the Council on Foreign Rela- 
tions, the Trilateral Commission, and the 
Economic Club of Detroit. 

He was sworn in as Chief of the U.S. 
Liaison Office in Beijing (Peking) on July 
11. 1977. and has the personal rank of am- 
bassador. On February 26, 1979. the Senate 
confirmed President Carter's nomination of 
Leonard Woodcock to be the first U.S. Am- 
bassador to China, and he was sworn in on 




February 28. The United States and the 
People's Republic of China exchanged Am- 
bassadors and established Embassies in 
Beijing and Washington. DC. on March 1, 
1979. 



farming had been absolutely trans- 
formed in just a few years by new sci- 
entific knowledge and by technology. 

I know the shocks of change in my 
own life, and I know the sometimes 
painful adjustments required when 
change occurs, as well as the great po- 
tential for good that change can bring 
to both individuals and to nations. 

I know, too, that neither individuals 
nor nations can stifle change. It is far 
better to adapt scientific and techno- 
logical advantages to our needs, to 
learn to control them, and to reap their 
benefits while minimizing their poten- 
tial adverse effects. 

And I know that the Chinese people 
and you, Mr. Vice Premier, understand 
these things about change very well. 
Your ambitious modernization effort in 
four different areas of human life at- 
tests to that. The American people wish 
you well in these efforts, and we are 
looking forward to cooperating with 
you and with the people of China. 

In his final message, the day before 
he died, Franklin Roosevelt — who 
would have been 97 years old 
tomorrow — wrote these words: ". . . if 
civilization is to survive, we must cul- 
tivate the science of human 
relationships — the ability of all 
peoples, of all kinds, to live together 
and work together, in the same world, 
at peace." 

In that spirit, Mr. Vice Premier, I 
would like to propose a toast: To the 
newly established diplomatic relation- 



ships between the United States of 
America and the People's Republic of 
China; to the health of Premier Hua 
Guofeng; to the health of Vice Premier 
Deng and Madame Zhuo Lin; and to 
the further development of friendship 
between the people of China and the 
people of the United States of America. 

Vice Premier Deng 

Mr. President and Mrs. Carter, 
ladies and gentlemen: 

We thank the President and Mrs. 
Carter for hosting this grand dinner in 
our honor. Allow me to take this op- 
portunity to extend good wishes to the 
American Government and the people 
on behalf of the Chinese Government 
and people. Premier Hua Guofeng, and 
in my own name. 

Our arrival in the United States coin- 
cides with the Spring Festival in China. 
From time immemorial, the Chinese 
people have celebrated this festival 
marking "the beginning of the annual 
cycle and rejuvenation of all things in 
nature." Here, on this occasion, we 
share with our American friends pres- 
ent the feeling that a new era has begun 
in Sino-U.S. relations. 

For 30 years, our two nations were 
estranged and opposed to each other. 
This abnormal state of affairs is over at 
last. At such a time we cherish, in par- 
ticular, the memory of the late Chair- 
man Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) and 
Premier Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) who 



Department of State Bulletin^ 



blazed a trail for the normalization of 
Sino-U.S. relations. 

Naturally, we think also of the ef- 
forts made by former President Nixon, 
former President Ford, Dr. Kissinger, 
many U.S. Senators and Congressmen, 
and friends in all walks of life. We 
think highly of the valuable contribu- 
tions of President Carter, Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance, and Dr. Brzezinski 
to the ultimate normalization of our 
relations. 

Our two countries have different so- 
cial systems and ideologies, but both 
governments are aware that the inter- 
ests of our peoples and of world peace 
require that we view our bilateral rela- 
tions in the context of the overall inter- 
national situation and with a long-term 
strategic perspective. This was the rea- 
son why the two sides easily reached 
agreement on normalization. 

Moreover, in the Joint Communique 
on the Establishment of Diplomatic 
Relations 4 our two sides solemnly 
committed themselves that neither 
should seek hegemony and each was 
opposed to efforts by any other country 
or group of countries to establish such 
hegemony. This commitment restrains 
ourselves and adds to our sense of re- 
sponsibility for world peace and stabil- 
ity. We are confident that the amicable 
cooperation between the Chinese and 
American peoples is not only in the 
interest of our two countries' develop- 
ment but will also become a strong 
factor working for the preservation of 
world peace and the promotion of 
human progress. 

I ask you to join me in drinking to 
the health of the President and Mrs. 
Carter; to the health of the Secretary of 
State and Mrs. Vance; to the health of 
Dr. and Mrs. Brzezinski; to the health 
of all friends present; to the great 
American people; to the great Chinese 
people; to friendship between the 
Chinese and American peoples; and to 
the peace and progress of the people of 
the world. 



EXCHANGE OF REMARKS, 
KENNEDY CENTER, 
JAN. 29 5 

President Carter 

All of us are fortunate in being able 
to participate in a truly momentous and 
historic occasion, the formal cementing 
of friendship now and permanently in 
the future between the 220 million 
Americans and the more than 900 mil- 
lion Chinese. We are grateful for this 
opportunity to extend our welcome to 
Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, to 
Madame Zhuo Lin, to all the delegation 
who've come here from China. 



We are grateful for the opening up of 
new avenues of scientific, trade, cul- 
tural exchange. And there could be no 
better way to demonstrate what our na- 
tion is, what we have to offer, than the 
wonderful performers who have joined 
us tonight to give them just a tiny 
glimpse, but a beautiful glimpse of 
some of the superb talent of great 
American performers. 

Mr. Vice Premier, it's indeed a great 
honor for me, as President of a great 
country, to welcome you, the Vice 
Premier of another great country, to the 
people of America. Thank you for 
coming. 

God bless all of you. We thank you 
for being with us as we join our two 
nations together on this formal occa- 
sion. 

Vice Premier Deng 

Thank you, Mr. President and Mrs. 
Carter, for arranging this magnificent 
performance by American artists, 
which gives us an enjoyable evening 
and leaves on us an indelible impres- 
sion. 

This occasion reminds me of what 
Lu Xun, the great Chinese thinker, 
once said. He said, "It would be best if 
mankind could avoid lack of mutual 
understanding and show concern for 
one another." 



CHIEFS OF LIAISON 
OFFICES ' 

United States 

David K.E. Bruce 

May 25, 1973-September 25, 1974 
George Bush 

October 21. 1974-December 7, 1975 
Thomas S. Gates, Jr. 

May 6, 1976-May 8, 1977 
Leonard Woodcock 

July 26, 1977-Present 2 

China 



Huang Zhen (Huang Cheng) 
May 29. 1973-November 18, 

Chai Zemin (Chai Tse-min) 
August 9, 1978-Present 3 



1977 



1 Dates are the arrival and departure 
from the liaison office. 

2 On February 26, 1979, the Senate 
confirmed President Carter's nomination 
of Leonard Woodcock to be the first 
U.S. Ambassador to China, and he was 
sworn in on February 28. 

3 On March 1, 1979, Ambassador Chai 
Zemin presented his credentials to 
President Carter as the first P.R.C. Am- 
bassador to the United States. 



Art and literature will provide the I 
best means toward that goal. 

The art and literature of each nation 
is unique. International exchanges in 
this area will contribute to mutual un- 
derstanding between peoples, to 
flourishing of art and literature of each 
country, and to world peace and human 
progress. 

No doubt there should be active cul- , 
tural exchanges between China and the 
United States following normalization. 
Here I'm happy to inform you that the 
Boston Symphony Orchestra, as the 
first cultural exchange item since the 
establishment of diplomatic relations 
between China and the United States, 
will visit China in March. 

We hope that more American musi- 
cians, dancers, actors, and other artists 
will come to China on performing 
tours. We on our part, will send more 
Chinese artists here to perform for the 
American people. 



REMARKS TO REPORTERS, 
JAN. 30 6 



President Carter 

Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping and I 
will meet again tomorrow afternoon to 
conclude the signing of agreements that 
will be worked out between now and 
then. Our discussions yesterday and 
today have been far-reaching. They 
have been very frank and honest. 
They've been very cordial and har- 
monious, and they've been extremely 
beneficial and constructive. 

We have, I think, established a re-' 
lationship for future routine consulta- 
tion which will bring great benefits to 
the people of the United States of 
America and to the People's Republic 
of China. 

Again, we consider this visit one of 
the most historic events in our nation's 
history, and we are grateful for the 
progress that has been made already 
and for the prospects of even greater 
benefits in the future. 



Vice Premier Deng 

As for myself, I agree to every word 
that the President has just said. And I 
also believe that through these discus- 
sions and through this visit, we have 
enhanced our mutual understanding and 
friendship. And through this visit, I am 
even more convinced that China and 
the United States and the Chinese 
people and the American people have 
broad prospects in various fields — 
politically, economically, in the sci-' 
ence and technological fields, and in 
the cultural field, et cetera. 

Of course, the reception which is 



March 1979 



being accorded to me and my party by 
the American Government and people 
has not yet concluded. But up to the 
present, I would still like to express 
our sincere thanks and appreciation for 
the kind reception given to us and 
given to me personally by the Presi- 
dent, Mrs. Carter, and the American 
Government and people, and for their 
friendship which they expressed to us. 
Let us shake hands once again, a 
handshake between the two peoples. 



EXCHANGE OF REMARKS, 
SIGNING CEREMONY, 
JAN. 31 7 

President Carter 

Mr. Vice Premier, American and 
Chinese friends: 

What we have accomplished in the 
last 3 days is truly exceptional. But our 
'aim is to make this kind of exchange 
between our countries no longer the 
exception, but the norm; no longer a 
matter of headlines and historians, but 
a routine part of the everyday lives of 
both the Chinese and the American 
people. With the signing of these 
'agreements, we have begun to do just 
exactly that. 

After too many eras in which one or 
the other of our nations has sought to 
dominate the relations between us, 
China and the United States of America 
are now meeting on a basis of equality, 
with full diplomatic relations. We've 
charted a new and irreversible course 
»:oward a firmer, more constructive, 
and a more hopeful relationship. 

I have come to know Vice Premier 
Deng well in the hours we have spent, 
together. He speaks his mind, and he 
values results. In our conversations 
about world affairs, we have found that 

• we share many common perspectives. 
While we pursue independent foreign 

i policies, our separate actions in many 
places can contribute to similar goals. 
These goals are a world of security and 
peace, a world of both diversity and 
stability, a world of independent na- 
.tions free of outside domination. 

Both our countries have a special 

interest in promoting the peace and 

prosperity of the people of East Asia. 

We have agreed to consult regularly on 

> matters of common global interest. The 

: security concerns of the United States 

,do not coincide completely, of course, 

• with those of China, nor does China 
share our responsibilities. But a strong 

■ and secure China which contributes 
constructively to world affairs is in our 
•interest, and a globally engaged, confi- 
dent, and strong America is, obviously, 
in China's interest. 
The agreements that we have just 




Participants in White House meeting (seated, from left to right): Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping; 
Vice Premier Fang Yi; Ambassador Chai Zemin, special assistant Qian Siju, Director of the 
Protocol Department Wei Yongging, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Richard Holbrooke. Vice President Mondale. Secretary Vance, and President Carter. 



signed for cultural, scientific, and 
technological exchanges, and for con- 
sular arrangements will bring the tan- 
gible benefits of normalization to in- 
creasing numbers of both our peoples. 
We look forward to an early settlement 
of the issue of claims and assets, to the 
reunification of families, to expanded 
tourism, and to the development of a 
healthy and vigorous trading relation- 
ship between our countries. 

In the near future, because of these 
agreements, American consulates will 
open in Shanghai and Guangzhou 
(Canton), and Chinese consulates will 
open in Houston and San Francisco. 
Hundreds of American students will 
study and will learn in China, and hun- 
dreds of Chinese students will further 
their education in the United States. 

Our National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, NASA, will launch a 
civilian communications satellite, paid 
for by China, that will bring color tele- 
vision and expanded communications 
to all of the people of China for the 
first time. 

Mr. Vice Premier, your stay in 
Washington is nearly over, but your 
trip to the United States has just begun. 
You leave tomorrow for three of the 
most interesting cities in our country: 
Atlanta, Houston, and Seattle. You 
will see something of the way Ameri- 
cans work and live. 

And as you travel from one end of 
our country to the other, I think you 
will find that the American people are 
eager to get to know you and to join in 
building the new relationship between 
our two countries. 

You leave Washington with many 
new friends, and you will return to 
China with a great many more. And 



when you return to your homeland, I 
hope that you will convey my best 
wishes to Premier Hua Guofeng and to 
the people of China. 

Vice Premier Deng 

Mr. President and Mrs. Carter, 
ladies and gentlemen: 

First of all, allow me to express my 
thanks to you, Mr. President, for the 
many friendly words which you have 
just said with regard to developing the 
relations of friendship and cooperation 
between our two countries and two 
peoples. We have just done a signifi- 
cant job. But this is not the end, but a 
beginning. 

We anticipated that following the 
normalization of relations, there would 
be a rapid development of friendly 
cooperation between our two countries 
in many broad fields. The agreements 
we have just signed are the first fruits 
of our endeavors. There are many more 
areas of bilateral" cooperation and many 
more channels waiting: for us to de- 
velop. We have to continue our efforts. 

It is my belief that extensive contacts 
and cooperation among nations and in- 
creased interchanges and understanding 
between peoples will make the world 
we live in more safe, more stable, and 
more peaceful. 

Therefore, the work we have just 
done is not only in the interests of the 
Chinese and American peoples but of 
the peoples of the world as well. It is 
with these remarks that I mark the 
signing of the agreement between 
China and the United States on scien- 
tific and technological cooperation, the 
cultural agreements, and other docu- 
ments. 



Finally, 1 would like once again to 
express sincere thanks to Mr. President 
and Mrs. Carter for your very warm 
and kind reception which you have 
given us in Washington. And I look 
forward to meeting with Mr. President 
and Mrs. Carter in the near future in 
China. 



TEXTS OF DOCUMENTS 



Science and Technology Agreement 

AGREEMENT BETWEEN 

THE GOVERNMENT 

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 

ON COOPERATION IN SCIENCE 

AND TECHNOLOGY 

The Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the People's 
Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the 
Contracting Parties); 

Acting in the spirit of the Joint Communique 
on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 
between the United States of America and the 
People's Republic of China; 

Recognizing that cooperation in the fields of 
science and technology can promote the well- 
being and prosperity of both countries; 

Affirming that such cooperation can 
strengthen friendly relations between both coun- 
tries; 

Wishing to establish closer and more regular 
cooperation between scientific and technical en- 
tities and personnel in both countries; 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article 1 

1 . The Contracting Parties shall develop 
cooperation under this Agreement on the basis of 
equality, reciprocity and mutual benefit. 

2. The principal objective of this Agreement 
is to provide broad opportunities for cooperation 
in scientific and technological fields of mutual 
interest, thereby promoting the progress of sci- 
ence and technology for the benefit of both 
countries and of mankind. 

Article 2 

Cooperation under this Agreement may be un- 
dertaken in the fields of agriculture, energy, 
space, health, environment, earth sciences, en- 
gineering, and such other areas of science and 
technology and their management as may be 
mutually agreed, as well as educational and 
scholarly exchange. 

Article 3 

Cooperation under this Agreement may in- 
clude: 



a. Exchange of scientists, scholars, specialists 
and students; 

b. Exchange of scientific, scholarly, and 
technological information and documentation; 

c. Joint planning and implementation of pro- 
grams and projects; 

d. Joint research, development and testing, 
and exchange of research results and experience 
between cooperating entities; 

e. Organization of joint courses, conferences 
and symposia; 

f. Other forms of scientific and technological 
cooperation as may be mutually agreed. 

Article 4 

Pursuant to the objectives of this Agreement, 
the Contracting Parties shall encourage and 
facilitate, as appropriate, the development of 
contacts and cooperation between government 
agencies, universities, organizations, institu- 
tions, and other entities of both countries, and 
the conclusion of accords between such bodies 
for the conduct of cooperative activities. Both 
sides will further promote, consistent with such 
cooperation and where appropriate, mutually 
beneficial bilateral economic activities. 

Article 5 

Specific accords implementing this Agreement 
may cover the subjects of cooperation, proce- 
dures to be followed, treatment of intellectual 
property, funding and other appropriate matters. 
With respect to funding, costs shall be borne as 
mutually agreed. All cooperative activities under 
this Agreement shall be subject to the availabil- 
ity of funds. 

Article 6 

Cooperative activities under this Agreement 
shall be subject to the laws and regulations in 
each country. 

Article 7 

Each Contracting Party shall, with respect to 
cooperative activities under this Agreement, use 
its best efforts to facilitate prompt entry into and 
exit from its territory of equipment and person- 
nel of the other side, and also to provide access 
to relevant geographic areas, institutions, data 
and materials. 

Article 8 

Scientific and technological information de- 
rived from cooperative activities under this 
Agreement may be made available, unless 
otherwise agreed in an implementing accord 
under Article 5, to the world scientific commu- 
nity through customary channels and in accord- 
ance with the normal procedures of the par- 
ticipating entities. 

Article 9 

Scientists, technical experts, and entities of 
third countries or international organizations 
may be invited, upon mutual consent of both 



Department of State Bulletin 

sides, to participate in projects and program^ 
being carried out under this Agreement. 



Article 10 

1 . The Contracting Parties shall establish a 
US-PRC Joint Commission on Scientific and 
Technological Cooperation, which shall consist 
of United States and Chinese parts. Each Con- 
tracting Party shall designate a co-chairman and 
its members of the Commission. The Commis- 
sion shall adopt procedures for its operation, and 
shall ordinarily meet once a year in the United 
States and the People's Republic of China alter- f 
nately. 

2. The Joint Commission shall plan and coor- | 
dinate cooperation in science and technology, j 
and monitor and facilitate such cooperation. The I 
Commission shall also consider proposals for the , 
further development of cooperative activities in I 
specific areas and recommend measures and 
programs to both sides. 

3. To carry out its functions, the Commission I 
may when necessary create temporary or perma- J 
nent joint subcommittees or working groups. 

4. During the period between meetings of the I 
Commission, additions or amendments may be I 
made to already approved cooperative activities. 
as may be mutually agreed. 

5. To assist the Joint Commission, each Con- A 
trading Party shall designate an Executive 1 
Agent. The Executive Agent on the United | 
States side shall be the Office of Science anc 
Technology Policy; and on the side of tht 
People's Republic of China, the State Scientific , 
and Technological Commission. The Executive 
Agents shall collaborate closely to promott 
proper implementation of all activities and pro- I 
grams. The Executive Agent of each Contracting 
Party shall be responsible for coordinating the! 
implementation of its side of such activities anc.l 
programs. 

Article 1 1 

1 . This Agreement shall enter into force upon I 
signature and shall remain in force for five I 
years. It may be modified or extended by mutual i 
agreement of the Parties. 

2. The termination of this Agreement shall not j 
affect the validity or duration of any imple- I 
menting accords made under it. 



Done at Washington this 31st day of January 
1979, in duplicate in the English and Chinesi 
languages, both equally authentic. 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 

Jimmy Carter 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 

Deng Xiaoping 



March 1979 



Letter Implementing Understandings 
Under the Agreement on Science 
and Technology 

January 31. 1979 

His Excellency 
Fang Yi 

Minister in Charge 
The State Scientific and 

Technological Commission 
Beijing 

Dear Mr. Minister: 

With reference to the Agreement Between the 
United States of America and the People's Re- 
public of China on Cooperation in Science and 
Technology, signed in Washington today, it is 
the understanding of the Government of the 
United States of America that existing under- 
standings in the fields of education, agriculture 
and space will become a part of the formal spe- 
cific accords to be concluded in those fields 

; under Article 5 of the Agreement. 

I Attached as annexes to this letter are the Un- 
derstanding on the Exchange of Students and 
Scholars reached in Washington in October 
1978, the Understanding on Agricultural Ex- 
change reached in Beijing in November 1978, 
and the Understanding on Cooperation in Space 
Technology reached in Washington in December 

l 1978. 

If the Government of the People's Republic of 
China confirms this understanding and the texts 
of the understandings annexed hereto, this letter 
and the letter of confirmation of the People's 
Republic of China will constitute an agreement 
relating to these fields between our two govern- 
ments. 

Sincerely. 

Frank Press 

Director 

Office of Science 

and Technology Policy 



I UNDERSTANDING ON THE EXCHANGE OF 

STUDENTS AND SCHOLARS BETWEEN 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 

An understanding on educational exchanges 
between the United States and China was 
reached in Washington. DC. in October 1978 
during discussions between the Chinese educa- 
tion delegation headed by Dr. Chou Pei-yuan 
[Zhou Peiyuan], Acting Chairman of the PRC 
Science and Technology Association, and the 
U.S. education delegation headed by Dr. 
Richard C. Atkinson, Director of the National 
Science Foundation, as follows: 

1. Both sides agreed they would pursue a pro- 
gram of educational exchange in accordance 
with and in implementation of the spirit of the 
Shanghai Communique; 

2. There will be a two-way scientific and 



scholarly exchange which will provide mutual 
benefit to both countries; 

3. The exchanges will include students, 
graduate students and visiting scholars for pro- 
grams of research and study in each country; 

4. The two sides exchanged lists of fields in 
which its students and scholars are interested and 
lists of institutions where they wish to work. 
Each side will use its best efforts to fulfill the 
requests of the other for study and research op- 
portunities. Each side will expeditiously grant 
visas for such exchanges in accordance with its 
laws and regulations; 

7. Each side will be responsible for the im- 
plementation of the program in its territory, in- 
cluding responsibility for providing advice to the 
other side and relevant information and materials 
about the universities and research institutions 
concerned; 

8. The two sides agreed that the students and 
scholars sent by both sides should observe the 
laws and regulations and respect the customs of 
the receiving country; 

9. The Chinese side indicated it wishes to 
send a total of 500 to 700 students and scholars 
in the academic year 1978-1979. The United 
States side indicated it wishes to send 10 stu- 
dents in its national program in January 1979 
and 50 students in its national program by Sep- 
tember 1979 as well as such other numbers as the 
Chinese side is able to receive. Both sides 
agreed to use their best efforts to implement 
such programs; 

10. To set each year the number of students 
and scholars to be exchanged and to discuss the 
progress of the program of exchanges, the two 
sides will meet when necessary. Consultations 
on important matters may also be held by the 
governments of the two countries. In addition, 
both sides will encourage direct contacts be- 
tween the universities, research institutions, and 
scholars of their respective countries; 



11. Both sides believe that the discussions 
mark a good beginning and have opened up the 
prospect of broadened opportunities for ex- 
changes between the two countries in the fields 
of science, technology and education as relations 
between them improve. Both sides also believe 
that such exchanges are conducive to the promo- 
tion of friendship and understanding between 
their two peoples. 



UNDERSTANDING ON 

AGRICULTURAL EXCHANGE BETWEEN 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 

During a visit to China of a delegation led by 
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Robert Bergland 
in November 1978, discussions were held with 
Chinese officials which resulted in understand- 
ings concerning US-PRC agricultural exchange. 
It was agreed that it would be of mutual benefit 
to promote cooperation in agricultural technol- 
ogy, economic information, science and educa- 
tion, and trade in agricultural products, and that 
contacts between organizations and institutions 
of all types in these fields should be facilitated. 

It was noted that study groups had already 
been exchanged in the fields of science and re- 
search, farm machinery, citrus fruits, wheat and 
vegetables. It was agreed that areas in which 
further exchanges should occur would include 
germ plasm (seed research and selection), 
biological control of pests, livestock and veteri- 
nary science, and agricultural education and re- 
search management methods.lt was also agreed 
that, within the next two or three years, cooper- 
ation would be carried out in the fields of fores- 
try, agricultural engineering, improvement of 
grasslands and management of pasturelands, 
cultivation of fruit trees, medicinal plants, and 
the application of remote sensing and computer 



President Carter and Vice Premier Deng at the signing ceremony. 




8 

technology to agriculture. Such cooperation 
would include mutual visits of, and joint re- 
search by, students, scientists and technicians. 

The U.S. side agreed to facilitate contacts 
between officials of the People's Republic of 
China and U.S. manufacturers of agricultural 
equipment and supplies. Each side expressed its 
interest in the statistical methods of agricultural 
economics and experience in agricultural man- 
agement of the other side. It was agreed also 
that, through the cooperator program of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, further discussions 
should be held regarding the products and tech- 
nology best suited to conditions in China and 
that USDA teams would begin visiting China in 
early 1979. Reciprocal scientific teams from the 
PRC will also begin U.S. study visits in 1979. 

It was agreed that the development of ag- 
ricultural trade between the two countries was in 
the mutual interest and that its prospects were 
bright. 

It was agreed that when study teams or techni- 
cal trainees are exchanged on a one-for-one 
basis, the host country would pay in-country 
costs; and that when the exchange is not recip- 
rocal, the sending country will pay all costs. 



UNDERSTANDING ON COOPERATION 

IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY BETWEEN 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 

During a visit to the United States in 
November and December 1978 by a delegation 
headed by Dr. Jen Hsin-min [Ren Ximmin], 
Director of the Chinese Academy of Space 
Technology, an understanding in principle was 
reached with a delegation headed by Dr. Robert 
A. Frosch, Administrator of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, on 
U.S. -Chinese cooperation in the peaceful utili- 
zation of space technology. 

This understanding includes: 

1. Cooperation in the development of the 
civil broadcasting and communications system 
of the PRC. The PRC intends, under suitable 
conditions, to purchase a U.S. satellite broad- 
casting and communications system, including 
the associated ground receiving and distribu- 
tion equipment. The space portion of the sys- 
tem will be launched by NASA and placed in 
geostationary orbit by a U.S. contractor, with 
continued operation to be carried out by China; 
and 

2. The intended purchase, under suitable 
conditions, by the PRC of a U.S. ground sta- 
tion capable of receiving earth resources infor- 
mation from the NASA Landsat remote sensing 
satellites, including the Landsat now under de- 
velopment. 

It was also agreed that, through further dis- 
cussions and correspondence, both sides would 
develop the details of the understanding de- 
scribed above and consider other fields of civil 
space cooperation which could be of mutual 
interest and benefit. 



Accord Implementing Cooperation 
in High Energy Physics Under the 
Agreement on Science and Technology 

IMPLEMENTING ACCORD BETWEEN THE 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OF THE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

AND THE STATE SCIENTIFIC AND 

TECHNOLOGICAL COMMISSION OF THE 

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 

ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD 

OF HIGH ENERGY PHYSICS 

The Department of Energy of the United 
States of America and the State Scientific and 
Technological Commission of the People's Re- 
public of China (hereinafter referred to as the 
Parties), for the purpose of promoting coopera- 
tion and collaboration in the field of high 
energy physics subject to the Agreement Be- 
tween the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the People's 
Republic of China on Cooperation in Science 
and Technology, signed in Washington. DC. 
on January 31, 1979, have agreed as follows: 

Article 1 

The objective of this Accord is to further the 
energy programs of the Parties by establishing 
a framework for cooperation in the field of high 
energy physics, including theoretical and ex- 
perimental research, accelerator design and 
construction techniques; and related technology 
areas as may be mutually agreed. 

Article 2 

Cooperation under this Accord may include 
the following forms: 

1. Exchange and provision of information on 
scientific and technical developments, ac- 
tivities, and practices; 

2. Research and development activities in 
the form of experiments, tests, and other tech- 
nical collaborative activities; 

3. Exchange of scientists, engineers, and 
other specialists; including visits by specialist 
teams or individuals to the facilities of the 
other Party, and exchange of personnel for 
training purposes; 

4. Exchange and provision of samples, ma- 
terials, instruments, and components for testing 
and evaluation; 

5. Such other forms of cooperation as are 
mutually agreed. 

Article 3 

Specific undertakings, obligations and condi- 
tions with respect to the conduct of each activity 
under Article 2 including responsibility for pay- 
ment of costs shall be agreed by authorized en- 
tities on a case-by-case basis. 

Article 4 

1 For the purpose of coordinating activities 
pursuant to this Accord, a Committee on High 



Department of State Bulletin: 

ing of representatives of the Parties and such 
other persons from each Party's national re- 
search community as it may designate. Each 
Party shall designate one person to act as its 
co-chairperson on the Committee. 

2. The Committee will encourage contacts 
between scientists, universities, and labora- 
tories of the two nations. 

3. The Committee each year shall develop 
and maintain a listing of joint activities to be 
carried out, and, as requested by the par- 
ticipating institutions and scientists, shall assist 
with arrangements for the listed activities. 
Items may be listed by consensus at meetings 
of Commitee, or, between meetings, by agree- 
ment of the co-chairpersons. 

4. Each Party shall designate its members of 
the Committee within two months of the effec- 
tive date of this Accord. The first meeting of 
the Committee should be held, if possible, 
within three months thereafter at an agreed site. 
Subsequently, the Committee shall meet in the 
United States and the People's Republic of 
China alternately at intervals of about 12 
months or as agreed by the co-chairpersons. 

5. The Committee shall be subject to the di- 
rection of the US-PRC Joint Commission on 
Scientific and Technological Cooperation es- 
tablished under the aforesaid Agreement of 
January 31, 1979. and shall periodically report 
the Status of its program to that Commission. 

6. The Committee may assume other duties 
as mutually agreed by the Parties. 

Article 5 

The application or use of any information 
exchanged or transferred between the Parties 
under this Accord shall be the responsibility of 
the Party receiving it. and the transmitting 
Party does not warrant the suitability of such 
information for any particular use or applica- 
tion. 

Article 6 

The Parties recognize the need to agree upon I 
provisions concerning protection of copyrights I 
and treatment of inventions or discoveries made < 
or conceived in the course of or under this Ac- 1 
cord in order to facilitate specific activities! 
hereunder. Accordingly, the Parties shall ap- 1 
point experts in these two fields who shall | 
separately recommend to the Parties detailed I 
provisions which, if the Parties agree, shall be | 
made an Annex to this Accord. 

Article 7 

Both Parties agree that in the event equip- I 
ment is to be exchanged, or supplied by one 
Party to the other for use in cooperative ac- 
tivities, they shall enter into specific under- 
standings on a case-by-case basis. 

Article 8 

I. Whenever an attachment of staff is con-i 
templated under this Accord each Party shall 



Energy Physics is hereby established, consist- ensure that staff with necessary skills and com- 



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petence are selected for attachment to the other 
Party. 

2. Each attachment of staff shall be the sub- 
ject of an exchange of letters between the par- 
ticipating institutions, covering funding and 
other matters of interest not otherwise specified 
in this Accord. 

3. Each Party shall provide all necessary as- 
sistance to the attached staff (and their 
families) of the other Party as regards adminis- 
trative formalities, travel arrangements and ac- 
commodations. 

4. The staff of each Party shall conform to 
the general rules of work and safety regulations 
in force at the host establishment, or as agreed 
in separate attachment of staff agreements. 

Article 9 
1. All questions related to this Accord or ac- 



tivities carried out hereunder shall be settled by 
mutual agreement of the Parties. 

2. Each Party will accept liability to the ex- 
tent authorized by its national laws for damages 
arising from cooperative activities under this 
Accord. 

Article 10 

1. This Accord shall enter into force upon 
signature, and. unless terminated earlier in ac- 
cordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, shall 
remain in force for a five-year period. It may 
be amended or extended by mutual agreement 
of the Parties. 

2. This Accord may be terminated at any 
time at the discretion of either Party, upon 6 
months advance notification in writing by the 
Party seeking to terminate the Accord. 

3. The termination of this Accord shall not 



affect the validity or duration of specific ac- 
tivities being undertaken hereunder. 

Done at Washington this 31st day of January 
1979, in duplicate in the English and Chinese 
languages, both equally authentic. 

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 

James R. Schlesinger 

FOR THE STATE SCIENTIFIC AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL COMMISSION OF THE 
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 

Fang Yi 



10 



Department of State Bulletin 




Secretary Vance and Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua signing consular agreement. 



Cultural Agreement 

CULTURAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN 

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 

The Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the People's 
Republic of China, 

Noting with satisfaction that better under- 
standing between peoples of both countries has 
been brought about through contacts and ex- 
changes in culture, arts, humanities, jour- 
nalism, sports, and other fields; 

For the purpose of promoting wider contacts 
between the two peoples in the interest of con- 
solidating and developing friendly relations 
between the two countries, and enhancing 
mutual understanding through encouraging and 
promoting cultural exchanges between the two 
countries in the spirit of the Joint Communique 
on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 
between the United States of America and the 
People's Republic of China, and on the basis of 
the principles of equality, reciprocity and 
mutual benefit; 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article I 

The two governments will encourage a 
deeper knowledge of their respective histories, 
cultures, literatures, arts, languages, sports and 
other areas including attention to general 
knowledge in addition to more specialized 



study. Through cooperative programs as well 
as exchanges, the two governments will pro- 
mote and assist their respective efforts to this 
end. 

Article II 

The two governments will encourage and 
facilitate further development of contacts and 
exchanges between the peoples of the two 
countries, including but not limited to inter- 
changes between representatives of profes- 
sional groups, cultural organizations, news and 
public information organizations, radio and 
television organizations and academic institu- 
tions and persons on the basis of shared inter- 
ests. 

Article III 

The two governments will encourage, 
through mutually agreed programs and ex- 
changes, enhanced understanding between the 
two peoples. Programs and activities to further 
this objective may include, but would not be 
limited to, the publication and distribution of 
books, magazines, and other printed materials; 
production and dissemination of films, re- 
cordings, and other audio-visual materials; as 
well as exhibitions relating to history, culture, 
arts and contemporary life; presentations of 
musical, dramatic and dance performances; and 
sports. In order to make such presentations and 
materials more readily understood in the other 
country, each government will encourage the 
development of activities such as translation 
programs. 



Article IV 

The two governments will encourage the 
broadest participation and support by non- 
government as well as governmental institu- 
tions for programs and activities covered by 
this Agreement. 

Article V 

On behalf of the Government of the United 
States of America, the Executive Agency for 
this Agreement shall be the International 
Communication Agency; on behalf of the Gov- 
ernment of the People's Republic of China, the 
Executive Agency for this Agreement shall be 
the Ministry of Culture of the People's Repub- 
lic of China. 

The two Executive Agencies shall communi- 
cate with one another to review and assist in 
the implementation of this Agreement and may 
meet periodically as they may agree. They may 
reach understandings with one another regard- 
ing specific programs for agreed periods of 
time, which will guide the implementation of 
this Agreement. 

The two Executive Agencies will encourage 
and facilitate, as appropriate, the development 
of contacts and cooperation between govern- 
ment agencies, institutions of higher learning, 
research institutes and other entities of the two 
countries and the conclusion of agreements 
between such bodies for mutually beneficial 
activities. 

Article VI 

This Agreement shall come into force on the 
date of signature for a period of five years. It 
shall be automatically renewed for another five 
years unless one of the Governments gives 
written notice of termination to the other at 
least six months prior to the expiration of the 
period, and shall be renewable accordingly 
thereafter. 

Done at Washington this 31st day of 
January. 1979. in duplicate in the English and 
Chinese languages, both equally authentic. 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 

Jimmy Carter 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 

Deng Xiaoping 

Consular Agreement 

AGREEMENT BETWEEN 

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 

ON THE MUTUAL ESTABLISHMENT 

OF CONSULAR RELATIONS 

AND THE OPENING 
OF CONSULATES GENERAL 

The Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the People's 



March 1979 



II 



Republic of China agree to establish consular 
relations, open consular offices by each side in 
the other's territory, promote the well-being of 
each side's citizens in the other's territory, and 
foster family reunion, tourism, commercial, 
scientific-technological, cultural and other rela- 
tions between the peoples of the United States 
and China. The Government of the United States 
of America agrees to the opening of Consulates 
General by the Government of the People's Re- 
public of China in San Francisco and Houston. 
The Government of the People's Republic of 
China agrees to the opening of Consulates Gen- 
eral by the Government of the United States of 
America in Guangzhou and Shanghai. For prac- 
tical arrangements, see Annex. These Consulates 
General will be opened at mutually agreed times 
in the future. 

Done at Washington this 31st day of January, 
1979, in duplicate in the English and Chinese 
languages, both equally authentic. 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 

Cyrus R. Vance 



FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 

Huang Hua 

Annex on Practical Arrangements 

The Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the People's 
Republic of China agree that consular relations 
will be conducted on a basis of reciprocity and 
mutual benefit and in accordance with the gen- 

. eral principles and practice of international law. 
In the event of disagreements, both governments 
undertake to resolve them through consultations 
in a spirit of mutual understanding and coopera- 

' tion, drawing on the principles of customary in- 
ternational law embodied in the Vienna Conven- 
tion on Consular Relations of 1963. 

Pending entry into force of a Consular Agree- 
ment to be negotiated, the two sides agree to the 
following interim practical arrangements: 

1. The two governments agree to facilitate the 
reunion of families and will process all applica- 
tions as quickly as possible under mutually 
agreed arrangements and in accordance with 
each side's laws and regulations. 

2. The two governments agree to facilitate 
travel between their respective countries of per- 
sons who may claim simultaneously the nation- 
ality of the United States of America and the na- 

, tionality of the People's Republic of China. Exit 
formalities and documentation shall be dealt 
with in accordance with the laws of the country 
in which the person concerned resides. Entry 
formalities and documentation shall be dealt 
with in accordance with the laws of the country 
to which the person concerned wishes to travel. 

3. United States citizens entering the People's 
Republic of China on the basis of United States 
travel documents containing Chinese entry visas 



will, during the period for which their status has 
been accorded, and in accordance with the visa's 
validity, be considered United States nationals 
by the appropriate Chinese authorities for the 
purpose of ensuring consular access and protec- 
tion. Such persons shall have the right of depar- 
ture from the People's Republic of China with- 
out further documentation, regardless of whether 
they may also be regarded as citizens of the 
People's Republic of China, nor shall they lose 
the right of consular protection or the right of 
departure without further documentation if the 
period of validity for which the status has been 
accorded has expired during the course of judi- 
cial or administrative proceedings which prevent 
their earlier departure. 

4. Citizens of the People's Republic of China 
entering the United States using travel docu- 
ments of the People's Republic of China con- 
taining United States entry visas will, during the 
period for which their status has been accorded, 
and in accordance with the visa's validity, be 
considered nationals of the People's Republic of 
China by the appropriate United States au- 
thorities for the purpose of ensuring consular ac- 
cess and protection. Such persons shall have the 
right of departure from the United States without 
further documentation, regardless of whether 
they may also be regarded as citizens of the 
United States, nor shall they lose the right of 
consular protection or the right of departure 
without further documentation if the period of 
validity for which the status has been accorded 
has expired during the course of judicial or ad- 
ministrative proceedings which prevent their 
earlier departure. 

5. If a citizen of the sending country is ar- 
rested or detained in any manner, the authorities 
of the receiving country shall, without delay, 
notify the consular post or embassy accordingly 
of the arrest or detention of the person and per- 
mit access by a consular officer of the sending 
state to the citizen who is under arrest or de- 
tained in custody. 

6. Persons residing in the People's Republic 
of China who are entitled to receive financial 
benefits from the Government of the United 
States of America shall receive their benefits 



SELECTED DOCUMENTS 

The full texts of selected material con- 
cerning U.S. policy on China are printed 
in the Department of State's Selected 
Documents No. 9 entitled "U.S. Policy 
Toward China July 15, 1971-January 15. 
1979" (stock no. 044-000-01721-1). 
Copies of this 64-page publication may 
be obtained for $2.20 each from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, 
DC. 20402. (Orders of 100 or more 
copies of the same publication mailed to 
the same address are sold at a 25% dis- 
count.) Remittances in the form of a 
check or money order payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents must ac- 
company orders. 



under mutually agreed arrangements and in ac- 
cordance with each side's laws and regulations. 

7. Persons residing in the United States of 
America who are entitled to receive financial 
benefits from the Government of the People's 
Republic of China shall receive their benefits 
under mutually agreed arrangements and in ac- 
cordance with each side's laws and regulations. 

8. In addition to consular offices whose 
opening has already been agreed upon, the two 
sides agree to discuss the opening of consular 
offices in other cities as the need arises. 



JOINT PRESS COMMUNIQUE, 
FEB. 1 

At the invitation of the President ot the 
United States of America and Mrs. Carter, 
the Vice-Premier of the State Council of the 
People's Republic of China Deng Xiaoping 
and Madame Zhuo Lin are on an official 
visit to the United States which lasts from 
January 29 to February 4, 1979. Vice- 
Premier Deng and President Carter held 
talks on questions of mutual interest in 
Washington. Accompanying Vice-Premier 
Deng in the talks were Vice-Premier Fang 
Yi, Foreign Minister Huang Hua and others. 
Accompanying President Carter in the talks 
were Vice President Mondale, Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance, Assistant to the Presi- 
dent for National Security Affairs Zbigniew 
Brzezinski and others. 

The talks were cordial, constructive and 
fruitful. The two sides reviewed the inter- 
national situation and agreed that in many 
areas they have common interests and share 
similar points of view. They also discussed 
those areas in which they have differing 
perspectives. They reaffirm that they are 
opposed to efforts by any country or group 
of countries to establish hegemony or domi- 
nation over others, and that they are deter- 
mined to make a contribution to the mainte- 
nance of international peace, security and 
national independence. The two sides con- 
sider that the difference in their social sys- 
tems should not constitute an obstacle to 
their strengthening friendly relations and 
cooperation. They are resolved to work to- 
ward this end, and they firmly believe that 
such cooperation is in the interest of their 
two peoples and also that of peace and sta- 
bility in the world and the Asia-Pacific re- 
gion in particular. 

Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping on behalf of 
the Government of the People's Republic of 
China and President Carter on behalf of the 
United States Government signed an 
Agreement on Cooperation in Science and 
Technology and a Cultural Agreement. 
Vice-Premier Fang Yi and the President's 
Science Adviser Frank Press signed and ex- 
changed letters of understanding on cooper- 
ation between the two countries in educa- 
tion, agriculture and space. Vice-Premier 
Fang Yi and Secretary of Energy James 
Schlesinger signed an Accord between the 



12 



Department of State Bulletin 



two countries on Cooperation in the Field ot 
High Energy Physics. Foreign Minister 
Huang Hua and Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance signed an Agreement on the Mutual 
Establishment of Consular Relations and the 
Opening of Consulates General in each 
other's country. 

Each side agreed to facilitate the ac- 
creditation of resident journalists by the 
other side. 

The two sides agreed to conclude trade, 
aviation, and shipping agreements. These 
will be discussed during the visits to the 
People's Republic of China by Secretary of 
the Treasury Michael Blumenthal and Sec- 
retary of Commerce Juanita Kreps. 

On behalf of the Chinese Government and 
Premier Hua Guofeng, Vice-Premier Deng 
Xiaoping extended an invitation to Presi- 
dent Carter to visit China at a time conve- 
nient to him. President Carter accepted this 
invitation. President Carter extended an in- 
vitation to Premier Hua Guofeng to visit the 
United States. Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping 
accepted this invitation on behalf of Premier 
Hua Guofeng. The specific time for these 
visits by the top leaders of the two countries 
will be discussed and decided upon at a later 
time. 



INTERVIEW WITH 
PRESIDENT CARTER, JAN. 25 

Following is the President's 
question-and-answer session with Zhao 
Zhongxiang of Central TV, People's 
Republic oj China. 6 

Q. First of all, we would like to 
express our appreciation for giving 
us this opportunity to have this 
interview. 

A. It's a great honor and privilege 
for me to have a chance to talk to the 
millions of Chinese people who are 
once again our very important, very 
close friends. 

Q. You have made positive contri- 
butions to the normalization of rela- 
tions between China and the United 
States. The Chinese people are most 
happy about the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between our two 
countries. What do you think is the 
significance of normalization of 
Sino-U.S. relations? How would you 
assess the outlook for our relation- 
ship after the normalization? 

A. The normalization of relations 
between China and the United States is 
a development of great historical im- 
portance. After long years of estrange- 
ment between our people, we now have 
a new and exciting, very happy oppor- 
tunity to strengthen the ties of 



COMMERCE HANDBOOK 

The Department of Commerce released 
in February 1979 a new handbook Doing 
Business With China. It contains infor- 
mation on market research, foreign trade 
corporations, contract negotiations, ship 
ping and insurance, P.R.C. tariffs, a sec- 
tion on travel in China, and other topics 
of interest to Americans who want to do 
business with China. The publication may 
be purchased for $1.80 from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. Remittances in the form of a 
check or money order payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents must ac- 
company orders. 



friendship which our people have 
longed for. 

This also opens up opportunities for 
political discussions between our lead- 
ers for improved cultural exchange, 
better trade relationships and also, of 
course, scientific opportunities where 
both our nations would have great 
mutual benefit. This original opening 
of relations will also permit future 
growth in all these aspects of a better 
quality of life for our people and will 
lay a foundation for the enhancement 
of peace in the entire Asian region and, 
indeed, throughout the entire world. It 
will let our people cooperate with one 
another on goals of mutual interest to 
the people of China and the people of 
the United States of America. 

Q. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping is 
coming to the United States soon for 
a friendly, official visit at your invi- 
tation. This is going to be the first 
visit by a Chinese state leader in this 
country. What do you expect from 
this visit? 

A. The most important element of 
his visit, from my perspective, is the 
extensive and private conversations 
between Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping 
and myself. We will have a broad 
agenda of issues to be discussed of 
great mutual interest to our people. 

We will have an opportunity to 
show, through the welcome extended to 
Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, his wife, 
and his entire party of leaders of China, 
the friendship of the American people 
for the people of China. 

The Vice Premier will have an op- 
portunity, as well, to discuss issues 
with the Members of the Congress of 
the United States, and will have a 
chance to visit some of our very fine 
cities — Atlanta, Houston, Seattle. This 



is an important element of the Chinese 
ability to understand the peace-loving 
nature of Americans and the common 
purposes that we obviously share. 

I believe that this visit will be excit- 
ing, enjoyable, and a wonderful op- 
portunity to show the entire world that 
the new friendship that exists between 
our countries and our people is impor- 
tant to us and will be of increasing im- 
portance in the future. 

Q. What is your assessment of the 
outlook for the world situation in the 
new year? 

A. Obviously, there are some very 
disturbing trouble spots around the 
world where people are not at peace. 
And we obviously have a need to ex- 
tend the beneficial effect of the desire 
for peace that exists among our people 
to those troubled areas. 

We have great need for an improved 
quality of life for those who are hun- 
gry, who don't have adequate shelter or 
health care, who are struggling for 
more freedom, and who desire to ex- 
pand their range of knowledge of the 
entire world and, therefore, their bene- 
ficial effect. 

We have, I think, a good opportu- 
nity, however, with the new relations 
between China and our own country to 
influence those troubled areas toward a 
more peaceful existence, to prevent the 
spread of violence to adjacent areas, 
and to let people live in harmony, one 
with another. 




March 1979 



13 



PINYIN— THE NEW CHINESE SYSTEM OF ROMANIZATION 



As of January 1. 1979, the State Council 
of China has decided that the Chinese 
phonetic alphabet, Pinyin, will be used ex- 
clusively in China to standardize the 
romanization of Chinese names and places. 
Pinyin replaces the Wade-Giles system 
(named for two 19th century linguists). The 
U.S. Government also adopted Pinyin on 
January 1 and former spellings now appear 
in parentheses for the convenience of read- 
ers during a transitional period. 

The new system means that the Roman 
alphabet will be used to spell out Chinese 
characters according to standard Chinese 



pronunciation — for example, Peking be- 
comes Beijing. In romanizing names of 
Chinese persons, the surname (always 
placed before the given name) is separated 
from the given name, and no hyphen is used 
in polysyllabic names. For example, the 
name of China's Premier (Hua Kuo-feng) is 
now spelled as Hua Guofeng and the Vice 
Premier (Teng Hsiao-ping) as Deng Xiaop- 
ing. 

The State Council maintains that the tra- 
ditional spelling of certain historical places 
and persons need not be changed, but if 
possible the new spelling should be used 



and the former spelling given in pa- 
rentheses. The name of China, however, 
will not be changed to the Pinyin 
version — Zhongguo. The Council states that 
Pinyin is suited to all languages using the 
Roman alphabet, including English. French. 
German. Spanish, and Esperanto. 

In August 1978 the U.N. conference on 
the standardization of geographical names 
adopted the Chinese delegation's proposal 
to use Pinyin as the standard international 
system for romanizing the spelling of 
Chinese geographical names. 



PROVINCE-LEVEL NAMES AFFECTED BY PINYIN 



Conventional 


Characters 


Pinyin 


Pronunciation 


Conventional 

Kweichow 


Characters 

Km 


Pinyin 

Guizhou 


Pronunciation 


Anhwei 


£ft 


Anhui 


ahn - way 


g way - joe 


Chekiang 


ma. 


Zhejiang 


)uh - jee_ong 


Liaomng 


it? 


Liaomng 


lee ow - ning 


Fukien 


m» 


Fujian 


foo - jeeen 


Ningsia 


T* 


Ningxia 


ning - she_ah 


Heilungkiang 


SSSil 


Heilongjiang 


hay - loong - jee_ong 


Peking 


Jfcsc 


Bei|ing 


bay - jing 


Honan 


MM 


Henan 


huh - non 


Shanghai 


hm 


Shanghai 


shong - hi 


Hopeh 


nz 


Hebei 


huh - bay 


Shansi 


ill Pi 


Shanxi 


shahn - she 


Hunan 


mm 


Hunan 


hoo - nan 


Shantung 


lit* 


Shandong 


shahn - doong 


Hupeh 


M 


Hubei 


hoo - bay 


Shensi 


Rft 


Shaanxi 


shun - she 


Inner Mongolia 


rt*S 


Nei Monggol 


nay - mung - goo 


Sinkiang 


#i* 


Xinjiang 


shin - jeeong 


Kansu 


tr* 


Gansu 


gahn - soo 


Szechwan 


QUI 


Sichuan 


ssu - ch_wan 


Kiangsi 


am 


Jiangxi 


jeeong - she 


Tibet 


ft* 


Xizang 


she - dzong 


Kiangsu 


as 


Jiangsu 


jee_ong - su 


Tientsin 


*i* 


Tianjin 


te_en - jin 


Kirin 


n W 


Jilin 


jee - lynn 


Tsinghai 


**> 


Qinghai 


ching - hi 


Kwangsi 


re 


Guangxi 


gwong - she 


Yunnan 


c* 


Yunnan 


yu oon - nan 


Kwangtung 


r* 


Guangdong 


gwong - doong 











I think, in general, the world is in a 
peaceful state. The trouble spots can be 
brought to peace with our combined 
efforts. And we'll be working with 
China and other nations to let this in- 
fluence be as great as possible for 
peace. 

Q. This is the first opportunity for 
the Central TV of the People's Re- 
public of China to have an interview 
with a U.S. President. We would like 
to express once again our apprecia- 
tion. Do you have any message to 
, convey to the Chinese TV audience? 

A. Yes. This is my opportunity to 
speak to the largest audience I've ever 
had. And I'm very delighted, on behalf 
of the 220 million people in our nation, 
ito extend my personal thanks for the 
inew, friendly relations between our 
people. 

I might point out that this opportu- 



nity has not just resulted from the last 
few weeks of negotiation between my- 
self, as President of our country, and 
Premier Hua and Vice Premier Deng 
Xiaoping in China. It's a culmination 
of years of negotiation between Chair- 
man Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai of 
China, and my predecessors. Presidents 
Nixon and Ford, in this country. And 
this represents a broad degree of sup- 
port from many great leaders and also 
the people ourselves. 

I know there's a great feeling of 
gratitude in China and the United 
States for this new, wonderful relation- 
ship. And that gratitude is expressed 
not only from our own people, but 
from the nations around the world who 
see our new friendship as a basis for 
increased friendship, harmony, and 
peace throughout the world. 

So, best wishes to all the people of 
China, and we are very grateful for this 
new opportunity for increasing 



friendship and peace in the years 
ahead. □ 



'Vice Premier Deng's remarks were made in 
Chinese and translated by an interpreter. Text of 
President Carter's interview with China's Cen- 
tral TV from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Jan. 29, 1979; all other texts 
from Weekly Compilation of Feb. 5. 

2 Made at the welcoming ceremony on the 
South Lawn of the White House and broadcast 
live on radio and television. 

3 Made at the state dinner at the White House. 

4 For text of joint communique and related 
material, see Bulletin of Jan. 1978, p. 25. 

5 Made following a performance on American 
arts at the Kennedy Center. 

6 Made on the South Grounds of the White 
House. 

'Made following the document-signing cere- 
mony in the East Room at the White House. 

"The interview took place in the Cabinet 
Room at the White House and was taped for later 
broadcast in the People's Republic of China. Mr. 
Zhao spoke in Chinese, and his remarks were 
translated by an interpreter. 



14 



Department of State Bulletin 




CHINA 



O 



Major industrial areas 

Oil basins 

Oilfields 

Major coal deposits 

Major iron ore deposits 



International boundaries 
Major rail lines 
The "Great Wall" 



Primary Agricultural Areas: 

30% or more of the land surface 
under cultivation 

10% 29% of the land surface 
under cultivation 



327B 3-79 STATE(RGE) 



March 1979 



15 



China— A Profile 



People 

Population: Estimates range from 900 
million to over 1 billion. 

Annual Growth Rate: 1-2% (est.). 

Ethnic Groups: 947c Han Chinese; 
others include Zhuang, Uygur, Hui, 
Yi, Tibetan, Miao, Manchu, Mon- 
gol, Buyyi, Korean. 

Religions: Officially atheist; declining 
numbers of Buddhists, Muslims, 
Christians, and adherents to Chinese 
folk religions (varying amalgams of 
Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, 
and ancestor worship). 

Languages: Standard Chinese (based on 
the Beijing dialect); major dialects 
include Cantonese, Fukienese, Shan- 
ghai, Hakka. 

Education: Minimum — 5 yrs.; 1968 
goal is 8 yrs. in rural areas and 10 
yrs. in cities. Literacy — over 50% 
(est.). 

Life Expectancy: 61 yrs. (est.). 

Work Force (560 million): 
Agriculture — 85%. Industry and 
Service — 15%. 

Geography 

Area: 9,600,000 sq. km. (3,706,000 
sq. mi; U.S.— 3,615,122 sq. mi.) 

Capital: Beijing (Peking) (pop. 8.5 
million). 

Cities: Shanghai — 12 million, Tianjin 
(Tienstin) — 7.2 mil., Gaungzhou 
(Canton)— 5.2 mil., Shenyang — 4.8 
mil., Wuhan — 4.4 mil. 

Terrain: Varied. 

Climate: Varied continental. 



Government 

Official Name: People's Republic of 
China. 



*m 



Type: Communist State. 

Constitution: 1978 (earlier versions — 

1954, 1975). 
Party Congresses: 1956 (8th), 1971 

(9th), 1973 (10th), 1977 (11th). 
National People's Congresses: 1954 

(1st), 1958 (2d), 1964 (3d), 1975 

(4th), 1978 (5th). 



Political Parties: Chinese Communist 
Party — about 35 million members; 8 
minor parties. 

Suffrage: Universal over 18. 

Administrative Subdivisions: 21 Prov- 
inces, 5 Autonomous Regions, 3 
special municipalities. 

Defense: 10% of GNP (1977 est.). 

Economy 

GNP: $373 billion (1977 est.). 

Annual Growth Rate: (1957-77): 
5.57%. 

Per Capita Income: $379. 

Natural Resources: Coal, iron, petro- 
leum, mercury, tin, tungsten, anti- 
mony, manganese, molybdenum, 
magnetite, aluminum, lead, zinc, 
uranium, hydroelectric potential. 

Agriculture: Products — rice, wheat, 
other grains, cotton. 

Industry: Types — iron and steel, coal, 
machinery, light industrial, arma- 
ment. 

Trade (1977 est.): Exports— $7 .9 bil- 
lion: agricultural goods, textiles, 
light industrial products, nonferrous 
metals, petroleum, iron and steel. 
Imports — $6.9 billion: grain, chemi- 
cal fertilizer, industrial raw mate- 
rials, machinery and equipment. 
Partners — Japan, Hong Kong, 
F.R.G., Romania, France, Singa- 
pore, Malaysia, U.S., Canada, Aus- 
tralia, U.K. 

Official Exchange Rate: 1.7 
yuan=U.S.$1.00. 

Economic Aid Sent (1956-77): $4.3 
billion. 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

UN, FAO, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, IDA, 
IFL, IHO, IMCO, ITU, Red Cross, 
UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO, and 
others. 

U.S.-P.R.C. Relations 

Following the establishment of the 
People's Republic of China in October 

1949, American diplomats remained in 
China to see what the new govern- 
ment's attitude would be toward the 
United States. The new regime demon- 
strated no interest in an official Ameri- 
can presence, and all U.S. Government 
representation was withdrawn in early 

1950. Any lingering hope of improving 
relations was ended by the Korean 
conflict. 



Partly because of the Korean conflict 
and the mutual antagonism it produced, 
there was little opportunity throughout 
the 1950's to improve relations, al- 
though some efforts were made. In 
1954 bilateral contacts were instituted, 
first between consular officials at 
Geneva and then in 1955 at the ambas- 
sadorial level — again at Geneva and 
later at Warsaw, Poland. On September 
10, 1955, the P.R.C. and the United 
States issued an announcement, agreed 
to jointly, concerning the repatriation 
of nationals. 

This was the only concrete arrange- 
ment reached by the two sides in the 
talks. But while these talks failed to 
produce important changes in the rela- 
tions of the two nations, they at least 




served to give both governments a 
clearer understanding of each other's 
views on questions of mutual interest, 
such as reducing the hazard of war by 
miscalculation. The last session of the 
talks was held in February 1970. 

In the late 1960's the U.S. Govern- 
ment began taking steps designed to 
relax tension between the two coun- 
tries. These steps ultimately included 
the elimination of restrictions on the 
use of U.S. passports for travel to the 
P.R.C. and removal of the 20-year em- 
bargo on trade by permitting imports 
from the P.R.C. and authorizing ex- 
ports on the same basis as to most other 
Communist countries. 

On July 15, 1971, President Richard 
M. Nixon announced that he had sent 
his Assistant for National Security Af- 
fairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger, to Beijing 
for meetings with Premier Zhou Enlai 
(Chou En-lai) July 9-11. Dr. Kissinger 
returned to the United States with an 
invitation from the Premier for Presi- 
dent Nixon to visit the P.R.C. 

Shanghai Communique. Another 
trip to Beijing in October 1971 by Dr. 
Kissinger paved the way for President 
Nixon's historic visit to the P.R.C. in 
February 1972. A joint communique 



16 



Department of State Bulletin 



PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT 
AND PARTY OFFICIALS 

Politburo 

Standing Committee Members 

Hua Guofeng (Hua Kuo-feng) — Chairman 
of the Chinese Communis! Party Central 
Committee (CCP-CCI, Premier of the 
State Council 

Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) — Vice 
Chairman of the CCP-CC. Chairman of 
the National People's Congress (NPC) 
Standing Committee 

Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping) — Vice 
Chairman of the CCP-CC, Vice Premier 
of the State Council 

Li Xiannian (Li Hsien-nien) — Vice Chair- 
man of the CCP-CCC. Vice Premier of 
the State Council 

Wang Dongxing (Wang Tung-hsing) — Vice 
Chairman of the CCP-CC 

Chen Yun (Chen Yun) — Vice Chairman of 
the NPC Standing Committee, Vice 
Chairman of the CCP-CC 

Other Full Politburo Members 

Chen Xilian (Chen Hsi-lien) — Vice Premier 
of the State Council. Commander of the 
Beijing (Peking) Military Region 

Chen Yonggui (Chen Yung-kuei) — Vice 
Premier of the State Council 

Deng Yingchao (Teng Ying-chao) — Vice 
Chairman of the NPC Standing Commit- 
tee 

Fang Yi (Fang I) — Vice Premier of the State 
Council, Minister in Charge of the State 
Scientific and Technological Commis- 
sion 

Geng Biao (Keng Piao) — Vice Premier of 
the State Council 

Hu Yaobang (Hu Yao-pang) — Secretary 
General of the CCP 

Ji Dengkui (Chi Teng-kuei) — Vice Premier 
of the State Council 

Li Desheng (Li Te-sheng) — Commander of 
the Shenyang Military Region 

Liu Bocheng (Liu Po-cheng) — Vice Chair- 
man of the NPC Standing Committee 



Ni Zhifu (Ni Chih-fu) — Second Secretary, 
Peking Municipal CCP Committee and 
Shanghai Municipal CCP Committee 

Nie Rongzhen (Nieh Jung-chen) — Vice 
Chairman of the NPC Standing Commit- 
tee 

Peng Chong (Peng Chung) — Third Secre- 
tary, Shanghai Municipal CCP Commit- 
tee 

Su Zhenhua (Su Chen-hua) — First Secre- 
tary. Shanghai Municipal CCP Commit- 
tee, First Political Commissar of the 
Navy 

Wang Zhen (Wang Chen) — Vice Premier of 
the State Council 

Wei Guoqing (Wei Kuo-ching) — Vice 
Chairman of the NPC Standing Commit- 
tee, First Secretary, Guangdong 
(Kwangtung) Provincial CCP Committee 

Xu Shiyou (Hsu Shih-yu) — Commander of 
the Guangzhou (Canton) Military Region 

Xu Xiangqian (Hsu Hsiang-chien) — Vice 
Premier of the State Council Minister of 
National Defense 

Yu Qiuli (Yu Chiu-Ii) — Vice Premier of the 
State Council. Minister in Charge of the 
State Planning Commission 

Zhang Tingfa (Chang Ting-fa) — 
Commander of the Air Force 

Alternate Politburo Members 

Chen Muha (Chen Mu-hua) — Vice Premier 
of the State Council. Minister of Eco- 
nomic Relations with Foreign Countries 

Seypidin (Saifudin) — Vice Chairman of the 
NPC Standing Committee 

Zhao Ziyang (Chao Tzu-yang) — First Sec- 
retary, Sichuan (Szechwan) Provincial 
CCP Committee 

Ministers 

Huang Hua (Huang Hua) — Foreign Affairs 

Xu Xiangqian (Hsu Hsiang-chien) — 
National Defense 

Yu Qiuli (Yu Chiu-li)— State Planning 
Commission 

Kang Shien (Kang Shih-en) — State Eco- 
nomic Commission 

Gu Mu (Ku Mu) — State Capital Construc- 
tion Commission 



Fang Yi (Fang I) — State Scientific and 

Technological Commission 
Yang Jingren (Yang Ching-jen) — 

Nationalities Affairs Commission 
Zhao Cangbi (Chao Tsang-pi) — Public Se- 
curity 
Cheng Zihua (Cheng Tzu-hua)— Civil Af- 
fairs 
Li Qiang (Li Chiang) — Foreign Trade 
Chen Muhua (Chen Mu-hua) — Economic 

Relations with Foreign Countries 
Yang Ligong (Yang Li-kung) — Agriculture 

and Forestry 
Tang Ke (Tang Ko) — Metallurgical Industry 
Zhou Zijian (Chou Tze-chien) — First 

Ministry of Machine Building 
Liu Wei (Liu Wei) — Second Ministry of 

Machine Building 
Lu Dong (Lu Tung) — Third Ministry of 

Machine Building 
Qian Min (Chien Min) — Fourth Ministry of 

Machine Building 
Zhang Zhen (Chang Chen) — Fifth Ministry 

of Machine Building 
Chai Shufan (Chai Shu-fan) — Sixth Minis- 
try of Machine Building 
Song Renqiong (Sung Jen-chiung) — 

Seventh Ministry of Machine Building 
Xiao Han (Hsiao Han) — Coal Industry 
Song Zhenming (Sung Chen-ming) — 

Petroleum Industry 
Sun Jingwen (Sun Ching-wen) — Chemical 

Industry 
Qian Zhengying (Chien Cheng-ying) — 

Water Conservancy and Power 
Qian Zhiguang (Chien Chih-kuang) — 

Textile Industry 
Liang Lingguang (Liang Ling-kuang) — 

Light Industry 
Guo Weicheng (Kuo Wei-cheng) — Railways 
Ye Fei (Yeh Fei) — Communications 
Wang Zigang (Wang Tzu-kang) — Posts and 

Telecommunications 
Zhang Jingfu (Chang Ching-fu) — Finance 
Yao Yilin (Yao I-lin) — Commerce 
Huang Zhen (Huang Chen) — Culture 
Liu Xiyao (Liu Hsi-yao) — Education 
Jiang Yizhen (Chiang I-chen) — Public 

Health 
Wang Meng (Wang Meng) — Physical Cul- 
ture and Sports Commission 



was issued in Shanghai at the end of 
the President's visit (and is popularly 
known by the name of that city).' It 
noted that: 

There are essential differences between [the 
P.R.C.] and the United States in their social 
systems and foreign policies. However, the two 
sides agreed that countries, regardless of their 
social systems, should conduct their relations 
on the principles of respect for the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of all states, non- 
aggression against other states, non- 
interference in the internal affairs of other 
states, equality and mutual benefit, and peace- 
ful coexistence. 



The communique outlined a number 
of other agreed principles, which 
President Nixon described as a 
framework for our relations and a 
yardstick by which to measure each 
other's performance. The principles 
show U.S.-P.R.C. agreement that: 

• International disputes should be 
settled without the threat or use of 
force. 

• Progress toward the normalization 
of relations between China and the 
United States is in the interest of all 
countries. 



• Both wish to reduce the danger of 
international military conflict. 

• Neither should seek hegemony in 
the Asia-Pacific region and that each is 
opposed to any efforts to establish such 
hegemony. 

• Neither is prepared to negotiate on 
behalf of any third party nor to enter 
into agreements with the other directed 
at other states. 

Both sides further agreed to: 

• Expand exchanges in such fields as 
science, technology, culture, sports, 
and journalism; 



March 1979 



17 



• Facilitate the development of 
bilateral trade; and 

• Stay in contact through various 
official channels. 

The two sides also reviewed the 
longstanding serious disputes between 
them. The P.R.C. stated that Taiwan is 
a province of China, that the liberation 
of Taiwan is China's internal affair, 
and that all U.S. forces and military in- 
stallations must be withdrawn from the 
island. 

The United States acknowledged that 
all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan 
Strait maintain there is but one China 
of which Taiwan is a part, declared that 
it does not challenge that position, and 
reaffirmed its interest in a peaceful set- 
tlement of the Taiwan question by the 
Chinese themselves. With the prospect 
of such a settlement in mind, the 
United States affirmed the ultimate 
objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. 
forces and military installations from 
Taiwan, pledging in the meantime to 
reduce progressively our military pres- 
ence in Taiwan as tension in the area 
diminishes. 

After President Nixon's visit, both 
sides pursued the normalization of their 
relations in accordance with the Shang- 
hai communique: 

• Many thousands of U.S. citizens 
visited the P.R.C. 

• Increasing numbers of U.S. busi- 
nessmen visited the semiannual 
Guangzhou (Canton) trade fair. 

• U.S. trade with the P.R.C. rose 
from $95 million in 1972 to $754 mil- 
lion in 1972 and reached a level of 
$934 million the following year. Due 
to reduced Chinese grain purchases 
from the United States, trade declined 
rapidly to $336 million in 1976, before 
moving back up to $375 million in 
1977. 

Trade in 1978 is expected to hit a 
new peak of over $1 billion largely due 
to the resumption of U.S. grain ex- 
ports. Further increases in trade are ex- 
pected in 1979. Chinese contracts for 
U.S. plants and equipment will main- 
tain the upward momentum of trade. 
Contracts signed in 1978 with the 
United States totaled more than $2 bil- 
lion and many other negotiations are 
underway. 

• More than 105 exchanges were 
facilitated between the two govern- 
ments, including the 1978 China pe- 
troleum delegation hosted by the De- 
partment of Energy and the 1975 
exhibition in the United States of the 



Archeological Finds of the P.R.C. 
These exchanges have covered a broad 
range of cultural, scientific, and edu- 
cational concerns. Other exchanges 
have been arranged directly between 
the Chinese and private American indi- 
viduals and groups. 

• Liaison Offices were established at 
Beijing (Peking) and Washington, 
D.C.. in May 1973. 

Continuing Discussions. Secretary 
Kissinger visited Beijing for talks with 
Chinese leaders on June 1, 1972, Feb- 
ruary 1973, November 1973, 
November 1974, and October 1975. 
President Ford visited Beijing in De- 
cember 1975. 

Soon after entering office in January 
1977, President Carter endorsed the 
Shanghai communique and reiterated 
the U.S. commitment to the goal of 
normalizing relations with the People's 
Republic of China. Secretary of State 
Vance made the first visit by a high 
official of the Carter Administration in 
August 1977, immediately after the 
ljth Chinese Communist Party Con- 
gress. President Carter's Assistant for 
National Security Affairs, Dr. Zbig- 
niew Brzezinski, visited Beijing in 
May 1978. 

Ambassador Leonard Woodcock, 
Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office at 
Beijing, held discussions with Chinese 
leaders on normalization of relations 
beginning in the summer of 1978. 
These discussions culminated in 
agreement, immediately after which, 
on December 15, 1978, the United 
States and the People's Republic of 
China issued a joint communique an- 
nouncing the establishment of diplo- 
matic relations as of January 1, 1979. 2 

The communique reaffirmed the 
principles of the Shanghai communique 
and stated that the United States 
". . . acknowledges the Chinese posi- 
tion that there is but one China and 
Taiwan is part of China." The com- 
munique further stated that ". . .the 
people of the United States will main- 
tain cultural, commercial, and other 
unofficial relations with the people on 
Taiwan." Under the terms of the com- 
munique, the United States and the 
P.R.C. exchanged Ambassadors and 
established Embassies on March 1, 
1979. □ 



CHINA: COMMODITY 


COMPOSITION OF TRADE 


1977 








Million 


"c Of 




U.S. $ 


Total 


EXPORTS (f.o.b.) 


7,955 


100 


Agricultural 


2,840 


36 


Animals, meal, and fish 


650 


8 


Grain 


455 


6 


Fruits and vegetables 


490 


6 


Oilseeds 


90 


1 


Textile fibers 


290 


4 


Crude animal materials 


330 


4 


Other 


535 


7 


Extractive 


1,000 


13 


Crude minerals and metals 


120 


2 


Crude oil 


785 


10 


Coal 


95 


1 


Manufacturing 


4,115 


51 


Petroleum products 


230 


3 


Chemicals 


380 


5 


Metals and metal products 


355 


4 


Machinery and equipment 


270 


3 


Textile yarn and fabric 


1.300 


16 


Clothing and footwear 


625 


8 


Other light manufactures 


955 


12 


IMPORTS (c.i.f.) 


7,100 


100 


Foodstuffs 


1.230 


17 


Grain 


745 


10 


Sugar 


320 


5 


Other 


165 


2 


Industrial supplies 


4,545 


65 


Rubber 


225 


3 


Textile fibers 


500 


7 


Chemicals 


885 


12 


Iron and steel 


1,570 


22 


Nonferrous metals 


265 


4 


Metal products 


55 


1 


Other 


1,045 


15 


Capital goods 


1,290 


18 


Nonelectric machinery 


455 


6 


Electric machinery 


105 


1 


Transport equipment 


640 


9 


Other 


90 


1 


Consumer goods 


35 


Negl 


SOURCE: "China: International Trade 


1977-78," CIA. Dec. 197$ 


. 





Taken from the Department of State's January 
1979 edition of the Background Notes on 
China. Copies of the complete Note may be 
purchased for 70( from the Superintendent of 



Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washington. DC. 20402 (a 25% discount is al- 
lowed when ordering 100 or more Notes mailed 
to the same address). 

'For text of the Shanghai communique, see 
Bulletin of Mar. 20, 1972, p. 435. 

2 For text of the joint communique and other 
related material, see Bulletin of Jan. 1979, 
p. 25. 



Department of State Bulletin 





CHINA: TRADE BY AREA AND SELECTED COUNTRIES 1 
















(million 


U.S. $) 




















1976 






1977 






Total 


Exports 


Imports 


Balance 


Total 


Exports 


Imports 


Balance 


TOTAL (ALL COUNTRIES) 




13,275 


7,265 


6,010 


1,255 


15,055 


7,955 


7,100 


855 


Non-Communist Countries 






10,930 


6,025 


4,905 


1,120 


12,530 


6,580 


5,950 


630 


Developed Countries 






6.805 


2,695 


4,110 


-1,415 


7,450 


2,925 


4,525 


1,600 


East Asia and Pacific 






3,470 


1,420 


2,050 


-630 


4.205 


1,620 


2,585 


-965 


Australia 






380 


102 


278 


-176 


631 


124 


507 


-383 


Japan 






3,052 


1,306 


1,746 


-440 


3,509 


1.473 


2.036 


-562 


Western Europe 2 






2,675 


985 


1,690 


-705 


2,395 


1,025 


1,370 


-345 


France 






571 


169 


402 


-233 


278 


169 


110 


59 


Italy 






278 


135 


143 


-8 


240 


140 


100 


-40 


United Kingdom 






277 


136 


141 


-5 


284 


159 


125 


34 


West Germany 






952 


236 


716 


-480 


826 


250 


576 


-325 


North America 






660 


290 


370 


-80 


850 


280 


570 


-290 


United States 






351 


202 


149 


53 


391 


203 


188 


14 


Canada 






309 


90 


219 


-129 


459 


77 


381 


-304 


Less Developed Countries 






2,465 


1,700 


765 


935 


3.250 


1.865 


1.385 


480 


Southeast Asia 






860 


660 


200 


460 


1,135 


720 


415 


305 


Malaysia 






147 


97 


50 


47 


260 


134 


126 


8 


Singapore 






295 


254 


41 


213 


324 


262 


62 


200 


South Asia 






280 


180 


100 


80 


325 


210 


115 


95 


Iran 






95 


89 


6 


83 


95 


75 


20 


55 


Pakistan 






79 


61 


18 


43 


88 


70 


18 


52 


Middle East 






440 


285 


155 


130 


520 


375 


145 


230 


Iraq 






101 


51 


50 


1 


65 


45 


20 


25 


Kuwait 






82 


72 


10 


62 


100 


75 


25 


50 


North Africa 






175 


110 


65 


45 


225 


130 


90 


40 


Egypt 






98 


39 


59 


-20 


90 


45 


45 





Morocco 






21 


18 


3 


15 


42 


23 


19 


4 


Sub-Saharan Africa 






515 


415 


100 


315 


555 


385 


170 


215 


Nigeria 






129 


128 


1 


127 


135 


130 


5 


125 


Sudan 






53 


26 


27 


-1 


89 


27 


62 


-35 


Latin America 






200 


60 


140 


-80 


495 


45 


450 


-410 


Argentina 






3 


Negl 


3 


-3 


117 


1 


117 


-116 


Brazil 






10 


Negl 


10 


-10 


179 


Negl 


179 


-179 


Hong Kong and Macao 3 






1,660 


1,630 


30 


1,600 


1.840 


1,795 


45 


1,750 


Communist Countries 






2,345 


1,240 


1,105 


135 


2,520 


1,370 


1.150 


225 


USSR 






417 


179 


238 


-59 


338 


177 


161 


16 


Eastern Europe 






985 


435 


550 


-115 


1,220 


600 


625 


-25 


Czechoslovakia 






126 


56 


70 


-14 


138 


66 


72 


-6 


East Germany 






200 


96 


104 


-8 


225 


110 


115 


-5 


Romania 






451 


202 


249 


-47 


600 


300 


300 





Far East 4 






620 


460 


160 


300 


630 


420 


210 


210 


Other 5 






320 


165 


155 


10 


330 


175 


155 


25 


'Data for individual countries are rounded to nearest $1 million. All other data are 


rounded to the nearest $5 


million. Because of rounding. 


components may not add to the totals 


shown. 


















2 Including Spain, Portuga 


, Greece 


and Malta 


















''Including entrepot trade 


with third 


countries; 


Hong Kor 


g reexports 


to third countries of $493 


million in 1976 and $534 


million in 


1977; 


reexports to China of $25 m 


llion in 1976 and $38 million 


in 1977. 














4 Including North Korea, Mongolia, 


Vietnam, 


Cambodia 


and Laos. 














5 Including Yugoslavia, Cuba, and Albania. 


















SOURCE: Based on "China 


International Trade 


1977-78. 


- CIA, Dec 


1978. 













March 1979 



19 



1/.S.-P.RX. Economic Relations 



Foreign Relations Outline 1 

During the Korean War, commercial 
relations between the United States and 
the People's Republic of China 
(P.R.C.) were severed. The U.S. Gov- 
ernment froze P.R.C. assets in the 
United States and prohibited trade and 
U.S. dollar transactions with China. At 
the same time Beijing (Peking) 
nationalized U.S. assets in China. 
Following President Nixon's visit to 
China in February 1972, direct trade 
relations were restored. The Shanghai 
communique pledged both nations to 



work toward increasing trade, and U.S. 
Government restrictions on trade, ship- 
ping, and financial transactions with 
China were lifted. 



Trade Flows 

Trade soared as China turned to the 
United States in 1973-74 for agricul- 
tural imports. Delivery of U.S. grain, 
cotton, and soybeans was the major 
factor in boosting U.S. exports to 
China to $807 million in 1974. Other 
major U.S. exports have included 10 
Boeing 707 aircraft, 8 ammonia plants. 



and sizable amounts of oil-drilling and 
exploration equipment. The People's 
Republic of China, enjoying improved 
harvests and facing balance-of- 
payments problems, phased out imports 
of U.S. agricultural products in 1975. 
U.S. exports to China fell to $135 mil- 
lion in 1976 and recovered slightly to 
$172 million in 1977, when cotton de- 
liveries resumed. 

U.S. imports from China have grown 
at a steady but more moderate pace, 
rising to $203 million in 1977. These 
imports have consisted largely of tex- 
tiles, bristles and feathers, fireworks, 
antiques and handicrafts, and nonfer- 
rous metals. With the resumption of 
U.S. grain sales, two-way trade in 
1978 jumped to an estimated $1.4 bil- 
lion. U.S. exports will total about $950 
million, of which over $600 million 
will be agricultural products. 



Highlights of U.S.-China Trade 1 

Million U.S. $ 
4nn 


_,./-, Cotton and Grain Shipments Peak / 


300 / \ / 


„„ l\ Wheat Deliveries End / 

/ 1 A 


?nn I \ / 1 


Exports/ 


/ * 1 Fertilizer Plant Deliveries 




isn / I 


Cotton Shipments Begin / I Cotton 

x/ I 

mn / 1 


Deliveries End / 
„ China Buys Aluminum S 


Grain Shipments Begin / Boeing Aircraft 1 

\ / Deliveries 1 ^^ 


1 N[ Agricultural 
\ / \ Exports Resume 


/ 

# • 
# • 
/ • 

• 


^ Export Controls Lifted j.^^/ | / 


^* -••- \ -• \**«i 


/ 1 •* ***V* " 1/ 
Import / / .••**•••..•• ** \ /^n/ 


••* 

Imports 


i I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 II III IV 1 II III IV 1 II III IV 1 II III IV 1 II III IV 1 II III IV 1 II III IV 1 II III IV 

1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 

1 . Data is from U.S. Department of Commerce and shows both exports and imports on an fob. basis. 

Source: "China: International Trade 1977-78." Central Intelligence Agency, Dec. 1978 (chart updated with data for 1978 quarters III and IV) 



20 



CHINA: TOP 10 TRADING 


PARTNERS 




Tola 


1 Trade 


(Million US St 


1976 


1977 


Japan 3,052 


3.509 


Hong Kong 1,620 


1,799 


West Germany 952 


826 


Australia 380 


631 


Romania 451 


600 


Canada 309 


459 


United States 351 


391 


U.S.S.R. 417 


338 


Singapore 295 


324 


United Kingdom 277 


284 


SOURCE: "China: International 


Trade, 


1977-78," CIA, Dec. 1978. 





Postnormalization Prospects 
for U.S.-China Trade 

The current Chinese leadership is 
committed to economic modernization 
and has set up an ambitious 10-year 
plan (1975-85) to pursue this goal. 
Major targets include constructing 120 
industrial projects and producing 400 
million tons of grain and 60 million 
tons of steel by 1985. Foreign trade, 
particularly acquisition of foreign tech- 
nology, has high priority. Contracts for 
Western plants and equipment worth 
more than $8 billion have been signed; 
further negotiations could push the 
total to $40-50 billion in the next few 
years. China's foreign trade, estimated 
at $20 billion in 1978, is expected to 
increase 10% to 20% per year. 

Normalization of relations will im- 
prove the existing good prospects for 
U.S.-China trade. Two-way trade is 
expected to reach $1.6 billion in 1979. 
Continued large sales of agricultural 
products will push U.S. exports to over 
$1.2 billion. U.S. firms have already 
begun to benefit from Beijing's wide- 
ranging search for advanced technol- 
ogy. Major agreements signed thus far 
include: 



• Iron ore mines and processing 
facilities from U.S. Steel — $1 billion, 
Bethlehem Steel — more than $100 mil- 
lion, and Kaiser Engineers — $5 mil- 
lion; 

• Fifteen 1 ,000-room hotels from 
Intercontinental Hotels and Hyatt worth 
over $1 billion; 

• Copper mine development by 
Fluor worth $800 million; and 

• Three Boeing 747 aircraft worth 
$150 million. 

Immediate Benefits 

The most immediate benefit from 
normalization will be the change in the 
P.R.C.'s policy of treating the United 
States as a residual supplier — 
purchasing U.S. goods only when 
comparable products were not available 
from suppliers in countries with which 
Beijing had established relations. Nor- 
malization should pave the way for 
settlement of the claims/assets prob- 
lem, which would open up direct 
banking and shipping relations. Nor- 
malization also provides an opportunity 
to address other trade and credit issues 
that have hindered our economic re- 
lationship, such as Export-Import Bank 



CHINA 


: BALANCE OF 






TRADE 








(Billion U.S 


5) 








Exports 


Imports 


Balance 


1970 




2.1 


2.2 


-0.2 


1971 




2.5 


2.3 


0.2 


1972 




3.2 


2.8 


0.3 


1973 




5.1 


5.2 


-0.2 


1974 




6.7 


7.4 


-0.8 


1975 




7.2 


7.4 


-0.2 


1976 




7.3 


6.0 


1.3 


1977 




8.0 


7.1 


0.9 


1978* 




10.2 


10.6 


-0.4 


*Prelimi 


nary 








SOURCE: ' 


China: 


nternational 


Trade , ' ' 


CIA, 


Dec. 1978 (1978 


update 


providec 


by Dept. of State). 





Department of State Bulletin 

credits and most-favored-nation status 
for P.R.C. exports. In addition, regular 
government-level contacts will help in 
other areas of trade facilitation and 
promotion. 

U.S. trade with China should post 
substantial gains over the next several 
years. A wide range of projects are 
under discussion with U.S. firms, in- 
cluding offshore oil development, 
mining projects, a steel plant, hy- 
droelectric facilities, agricultural pro- 
grams, and transport and communica- 
tions equipment. 

Trade Problems 

Trade growth will be a function of 
China's ability to finance and absorb 
large amounts of foreign technology. 
China has an excellent credit rating and 
is capable of handling a larger debt 
burden. On the export side, China is 
seeking to improve the quantity and 
quality of its export goods to improve 
demand in developed country markets. 
Some Chinese exports, such as textiles, 
have caused market disruption in the 
United States. Direct links with Beijing 
will permit negotiation of these prob- 
lems. For example, talks are scheduled 
with the Chinese to discuss orderly de- 
velopment in textile exports. □ 



'Taken from a Department of State publica- 
tion in the Gist series, released in Jan. 1979. 
This outline is designed to be a quick reference 
aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended 
as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy state- 
ment. 



Letter 
of Credence 



On March 1, 1979, President Carter 
accepted the credentials of Chai Zemin 
of the People's Republic of China as 
the newly appointed Ambassador to the 
United States. □ 



March 1979 



21 



THE PRESIDENT: America's Role 
in a Turbulent World 



Address upon receiving an Honorary 
Doctor of Engineering degree from the 
Georgia Institute of Technology in At- 
lanta on February 20. ' 

I remember when I first came to 
Tech, the entire world was at war. Our 
nation was under attack on two fronts 
and was desperately gearing up for a 
total war effort that we had not kn