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•January 1979

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Department of State

bulletin

Volume 79 / Number 2022 / January 1979

Cover Photos:

President Carter
Secretary Vance
Warren Christopher
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Charles William Maynes

The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public Com-
munication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and govern-
ment agencies with information on
developments in U.S. foreign relations
and the work of the Department of
State and the Foreign Service.

The Bulletin's contents include
major addresses and news conferences
of the President and the Secretary of
State; statements made before congres-
sional committees by the Secretary
and other senior State Department of-
ficials; special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press re-
leases issued by the White House, the
Department, and the U.S. Mission to
the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.

The Secretary of State has deter-
mined that the publication of this peri-
odical is necessary in the transaction of
the public business required by law of
this Department. Use of funds for
printing this periodical has been ap-
proved by the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget through
January 31, 1981.

NOTE: Contents of this publication
are not copyrighted and items con-
tained herein may be reprinted. Cita-
tion of the Department of State
Bulletin as the source will be appre-
ciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Litera-
ture.

For sale by the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Print-
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Price:

12 issues plus annual index —

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Single copy —

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CYRUS R. VANCE

Secretary of State

HODDING CARTER III

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL

Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

COLLEEN SUSSMAN
Assistant Editor

CONTENTS

30th ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS

Remarks by President Carter, Secretary Vance, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Patricia M.
Derian

Bill of Rights Day, Hitman Rights Day and Week, 1978 (Proclamation)

Basic Human Rights Documents

Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Biographic Data)

THE PRESIDENT

8 News Conferences of Nov. 9 and 30
and Dec. 12

THE SECRETARY

12 The U.S. -European Partnership
16 Question-and-Answer Session Follow-
ing London Address

AFRICA

18 U.S. Policy Toward South Africa
(Anthony Lake)

CANADA

21

Secretary Vance Visits Canada
(Donald Jamieson, Secretary Vance)

23 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement

1978

DEPARTMENT

24 New State Department Liaison Office

With U.S. State and Local Govern-
ments (White House Announcement)

EAST ASIA

25 U.S. Normalizes Relations With the

People's Republic of China (Presi-
dent Carter, Texts of Joint Com-
munique and U.S. Statement)

ECONOMICS

27 The Role of Exports in U.S. Foreign
Policy (Warren Christopher)

30 The U.S. and the Third World: Partners
or Plaintiffs? (David D. Newsom)

33 Multinational Corporations (Foreign

Relations Outline)

EUROPE

34 NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in

Brussels (Warren Christopher, Text
of Final Communique)

36 Constitutional Referendum in Spain

(President Carter)

37 President Carter To Attend Guadeloupe

Meeting

MIDDLE EAST

38 Visit of Moroccan King Hassan II
(Joint Press Statement)

38 Morocco — A Profile

39 Secretary Vance's Middle East Visit

NUCLEAR POLICY

39 The U.S. Approach to Non-
proliferation — Are We Making
Progress? (Joseph S. Nye, Jr.)

44 U.S. Policy on Reprocessing of U.S.-
Origin Nuclear Material (Joseph S.
Nye. Jr.)

UNITED NATIONS

46 What's Wrong With the U.N. and
What's Right? (Charles William
Maynes)

50 U.N. Committee on the Palestinian

People (Abraham A. Rihicoff,
Andrew Young)

51 Namibia (William H. Barton, Text of

Resolution)

52 Arms Control (Adrian S. Fisher)

53 U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control

(President Carter)
55 Summaries of U.S. Statements

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

57 Nicaragua ( Warren Christopher)

58 U.S. -Brazil Joint Group on Energy

Technology (Joint Communique)

TREATIES

59 Current Actions

61 PRESS RELEASES

PUBLICATIONS

62 1949 "Foreign Relations'' Volume

VIII— "The Far East: China"

INDEX

President Carter addresses a group of domestic and international civil and human rights leaders
in the East Room of the White House.

30th ANNIVERSARY OF THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

At a ceremony at the White House on December 6, 1978, commemorating the
30th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
President Carter addressed a group of domestic and international civil and
human rights leaders. His remarks followed those by Secretary Vance; Zbigniew
Brzezinski. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and Patricia
M. Derian, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.

PRESIDENT CARTER1

What I have to say today is funda-
mentally very simple. It's something
I've said many times, including my ac-
ceptance speech when I was nominated
as President and my inaugural speech
when I became President. But it cannot
be said too often or too firmly or too
strongly.

As long as I am President, the Gov-
ernment of the United States will con-
tinue, throughout the world, to enhance
human rights. No force on Earth can
separate us from that commitment.

This week we commemorate the 30th
anniversary of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. We rededicate
ourselves — in the words of Eleanor
Roosevelt, who was the chairperson of
the Human Rights Commission — to the
Universal Declaration as, and I quote
from her, "... a common standard of
achievement for all peoples of all na-
tions."

The Universal Declaration — and the
human rights conventions that derive
from it — do not describe the world as it
is. But these documents are very im-
portant, nonetheless. They are a bea-
con, a guide to a future of personal se-
curity, political freedom, and social
justice.

For millions of people around the
globe that beacon is still quite
distant — a glimmer of light on a dark
horizon of deprivation and repression.
The reports of Amnesty International,
the International Commission of
Jurists, the International League for
Human Rights, and many other non-
governmental human rights organiza-
tions amply document the practices and
conditions that destroy the lives and the
spirit of countless human beings.
Political killings, tortures, arbitrary
and prolonged detention without trial
or without a charge — these are the
crudest and the ugliest of human rights
violations.

Of all human rights, the most basic
is to be free of arbitrary violence —
whether that violence comes from gov-
ernments, from terrorists, from crimi-

nals, or from self-appointed messiahs
operating under the cover of politics or
religion.

But governments — because of their
power which is so much greater than
that of an individual — have a special
responsibility. The first duty of a gov-
ernment is to protect its own citizens,
and when government itself becomes
the perpetrator of arbitrary violence
against its citizens, it undermines its
own legitimacy.

There are other violations of the
body and the spirit which are especially
destructive of human life. Hunger, dis-
ease, poverty are enemies of human
potential which are as relentless as
any repressive government. The
American people want the actions of
their government — our government —
both to reduce human suffering and to
increase human freedom.

That's why, with the help and en-
couragement of many of you in this
room, I have sought to rekindle the
beacon of human rights in American
foreign policy. Over the last 2 years
we've tried to express these human
concerns as our diplomats practice their
craft and as our nation fulfills its own
international obligations. We will
speak out when individual rights are
violated in other lands. The Universal
Declaration means that no nation can
draw the cloak of sovereignty over
torture, disappearances, officially
sanctioned bigotry, or the destruction
of freedom within its own borders.

The message that is being delivered
by all our representatives abroad —
whether they are from the Department
of State or Commerce or Agriculture or
Defense or whatever — is that the
policies regarding human rights count
very much in the character of our own
relations with other individual coun-
tries.

In distributing the scarce resources
of our foreign assistance programs, we
will demonstrate that our deepest af-
finities are with nations which commit
themselves to a democratic path to de-
velopment. Toward regimes which per-
sist in wholesale violations of human

rights, we will not hesitate to convey
our outrage nor will we pretend that
our relations are unaffected.

In the coming year, I hope that Con-
gress will take a step that has been long
overdue for a generation — the ratifica-
tion of the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.

As you know the genocide conven-
tion was also adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly 30 years ago this
week — one day before the adoption of
the Universal Declaration. It was the
world's affirmation that the lesson of
the Holocaust would never be forgot-
ten, but unhappily, genocide is not pe-
culiar to any one historical era.

Eighty-three other nations have
ratified the genocide convention. The
United States — despite the support of
every President since 1948 — has not.
In international meetings at the United
Nations and elsewhere, when I meet
with foreign leaders, we are often
asked why. We do not have an accept-
able answer.

I urge the U.S. Senate to observe
this anniversary in the only appropriate
way — by ratifying the genocide con-
vention at the earliest possible date.

This action must be the first step to-
ward the ratification of other human
rights instruments, including those I
signed a year ago. Many of the reli-
gious and human rights groups repre-
sented here have undertaken a cam-
paign of public education on behalf of
these covenants. I commend and ap-
preciate your efforts.

Refugees are the living, homeless
casualties of one very important failure
on the part of the world to live by the
principles of peace and human rights.
To help these refugees is a simple
human duty. As Americans — as a
people made up largely of the descen-
dants of refugees — we feel that duty
with special keenness.

Our country will do its utmost to
ease the plight of stranded refugees
from Indochina and from Lebanon and
of released political prisoners from
Cuba and from elsewhere. I hope that
we will always stand ready to welcome
more than our fair share of those who
flee their homelands because of racial,
religious, or political oppression.

The effectiveness of our human
rights policy is now an established fact.
It has contributed to an atmosphere of
change — sometimes disturbing — but

Department of State Bulletin

which has encouraged progress in many
ways and in many places. In some
countries, political prisoners have been
released by the hundreds, even
thousands. In others, the brutality of
repression has been lessened. In still
others there's a movement toward
democratic institutions or the rule of
law when these movements were not
previously detectable.

To those who doubt the wisdom of
our dedication. I say this: Ask the vic-
tims. Ask the exiles. Ask the govern-
ments which continue to practice re-
pression. Whether in Cambodia or
Chile, in Uganda or South Africa, in
Nicaragua or Ethiopia or the Soviet
Union, governments know that we in
the United States care; and not a single
one of those who is actually taking
risks or suffering for human rights has
ever asked me to desist in our support
of basic human rights. From the pris-
ons, from the camps, from the enforced
exiles, we receive one message — speak
up, persevere, let the voice of freedom
be heard.

I'm very proud that our nation stands
for more than military might or politi-
cal might. It stands for ideals that have
their reflection in the aspirations of
peasants in Latin America, workers in
Eastern Europe, students in Africa, and
farmers in Asia.

We do live in a difficult and compli-
cated world — a world in which peace is
literally a matter of survival. Our
foreign policy must take this into ac-
count. Often, a choice that moves us
toward one goal tends to move us fur-
ther away from another goal.

Seldom do circumstances permit me
or you to take actions that are wholly
satisfactory to everyone. But I want to
stress again that human rights are not
peripheral to the foreign policy of the
United States. Our human rights policy
is not a decoration. It is not something
we've adopted to polish up our image
abroad or to put a fresh coat of moral
paint on the discredited policies of the
past.

Our pursuit of human rights is part of
a broad effort to use our great power
and our tremendous influence in the
service of creating a better world — a
world in which human beings can live
in peace, in freedom, and with their
basic needs adequately met. Human
rights is the soul of our foreign policy.
And I say this with assurance, because
human rights is the soul of our sense of
nationhood.

For the most part, other nations are
held together by common racial or
ethnic ancestry or by a common creed
or religion or by ancient attachments to
the land that go back for centuries of
time. Some nations are held together

by the forces, implied forces, of a
tyrannical government. We are differ-
ent from all of those, and I believe that
we in our country are more fortunate.

As a people we come from every
country and every corner of the Earth.
We are of many religions and many
creeds. We are of every race, every
color, every ethnic and cultural back-
ground. We are right to be proud of
these things and of the richness that
lend to the texture of our national life.
But they are not the things which unite
us as a single people.

What unites us — what makes us
Americans — is a common belief in
peace, in a free society, and in a com-
mon devotion to the liberties enshrined
in our Constitution. That belief and
that devotion are the sources of our
sense of national community.
Uniquely, ours is a nation founded on
an idea of human rights. From our own
history we know how powerful that
idea can be.

Next week marks another human
rights anniversary — Bill of Rights Day.
Our nation was "conceived in lib-
erty," in Lincoln's words, but it has
taken nearly two centuries for that lib-
erty to approach maturity.

For most of the first half of our his-
tory, black Americans were denied
even the most basic human rights. For
most of the first two-thirds of our his-
tory, women were excluded from the
political process. Their rights and those
of native Americans are still not con-
stitutionally guaranteed and enforced.
Even freedom of speech has been
threatened periodically throughout our
history. Only in the last 10-12 years
have we achieved what Father Hes-
burgh has called "the legal abandon-
ment of more than three centuries of
apartheid." [Father Theodore Hes-
burgh. President of Notre Dame, is
past Chairman of the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission and now President of the
Rockefeller Foundation.] And the
struggle for full human rights for all
Americans — black, brown, and white,
male and female, rich and poor — is far
from over.

To me, as to many of you, these are
not abstract matters or ideas. In the
rural Georgia country where I grew up,
the majority of my own fellow citizens
were denied many basic rights — the
right to vote, the right to speak freely
without fear, the right to equal treat-
ment under the law. I saw at firsthand
the effects of a system of deprivation of
rights. I saw the courage of those who
resisted that system. And finally, I saw
the cleansing energies that were re-
leased when my own Vegion of this
country walked out of darkness and
into what Hubert Humphrey in the year

of the adoption of the Universal Dec-
laration called "the bright sunshine of
human rights. "

The American Bill of Rights is 187
years old and the struggle to make it a
reality has occupied every one of those
187 years. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights is only 30 years old.
In the perspective of history, the idea
of human rights has only just been
broached.

I do not draw this comparison be-
cause I want to counsel patience. I
draw it because I want to emphasize, in
spite of difficulties, steadfastness and
commitment.

One hundred and eighty-seven years
ago, as far as most Americans were
concerned, the Bill of Rights was a bill
of promises. There was no guarantee
that those promises would ever be ful-
filled. We did not realize those prom-
ises by waiting for history to take its
inevitable course. We realize them be-
cause we struggled. We realized them
because many sacrificed. We realized
them because we persevered.

For millions of people around the
world today the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights is still only a decla-
ration of hope. Like all of you, I want
that hope to be fulfilled. The struggle
to fulfill it will last longer than the
lifetimes of any of us; indeed, it will
last as long as the lifetime of humanity
itself. But we must persevere. And we
must persevere by insuring that this
country of ours, leader in the world
which we love so much, is always in
the forefront of those who are strug-
gling for that great hope, the great
dream of universal human rights.

SECRETARY VANCE2

We are gathered here to celebrate the
30th anniversary of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights. This historic
document embodies the fundamental
tenet that international law creates ob-
ligations which all governments owe to
their citizens, and it helps define uni-
versally recognized principles of
human rights.

In the three decades since the birth
of the declaration, the United Nations
has built on these principles in other
important human rights agreements —
the genocide convention; the conven-
tion on racial discrimination; the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights; and the International
Covenant on Social, Economic, and
Cultural Rights. Together with the
Universal Declaration, these docu-
ments create an international legal
structure with protection of individual
rights.

January 1979

I hope that the U.S. Senate will soon
approve the genocide convention and
undertake early hearings to permit
ratification of the other three instru-
ments.

International law, as reflected in
these agreements and covenants, has
guided this Administration's human
rights policy. Although the policy re-
flects basic American ideals, it is not
an attempt to impose uniquely Ameri-
can values.

The rights about which we are
concerned — the right to be free from
torture, to be free from arbitrary arrest,
rights of political expression, the rights
to basic economic needs — are recog-
nized in the U.N. Charter and in other
international agreements as being uni-
versal in their application throughout
the world.

We are gathered here today to re-
dedicate ourselves to the principles of
the Universal Declaration. As Members
of Congress and leaders of private
groups, your efforts have contributed
to the creation of the basis in interna-
tional law for protecting human rights.
With your help, we will continue to
work for their universal implementa-
tion, and with your help we will con-
tinue to advance the cause of human
freedom everywhere.

DR. BRZEZINSKI

Let me make to you three basic prop-
ositions regarding human rights and
then develop them briefly.

The first is that human rights is the
genuine historical inevitability of our
times. The second is that human rights
is a central facet in America's rele-
vance to this changing world. And the
third is that there has been progress in
the effort to enhance the human condi-
tion insofar as human rights are con-
cerned.

Historical Inevitability

I started by saying that human rights
is the genuine historical inevitability of
our times. I used those words very de-
liberately, for we live in an age very
much influenced by concepts of his-
torical inevitability. Indeed, one of the
most powerful, moving concepts in
world affairs today is the notion that
there is a certain inevitability in his-
torical progression toward a world rev-
olution which is doctrinely defined,
and that idea has had a powerful impact
on global consciousness.

And yet, events increasingly are
proving it wrong; the notion of world
revolution is too simplistic a concept

for a world as diverse and as pluralistic
as ours. It could only have been born in
the narrow confines of 19th century
Europe undergoing the early pang>. of
the industrial revolution and then
generalized from that basis allegedly in
terms of universal relevance

What we are seeing today in the
world is the increasing self
assertiveness of man, the increasing
political awakening of man, and
thereby also the increasing assertion of
the diversity of man. And thus, the
concept of the world that some day will
emerge based on a similar social-
political organization achieved for a
common revolutionary experience is
becoming increasingly unreal. Indeed,
many of the difficulties that today beset
the Communist world in their own in-
terstate relations are due to the funda-
mental error of the basic historical as-
sumption.

What is, however, becoming evident
is that as man or mankind abandons his
centuries-long lethargy, he begins to
seek actively a meaningful and just —
and I emphasize the word "just" —
definition of the proper relationship
between man and society and between
society and government. It is an issue
as old as political philosophy, but it is
an issue which has been an esoteric one

BILL OF RIGHTS DAY,
HUMAN RIGHTS DAY
AND WEEK, 1978

A Proclamation*

Two great events in the history of human
liberty will be commemorated in December:
the ratification, on December 15, 1791, of
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the
United States, and the adoption, on De-
cember 10. 1948, of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights by the United Nations
General Assembly.

The anniversary of the Bill of Rights re-
minds us that our Nation is a continuing ex-
periment in human freedom. Because of the
Bill of Rights, we have been able to weather
187 years of tumultuous social and techno-
logical change without losing our fundamen-
tal liberties. Indeed, those liberties have ac-
tually expanded in scope, and have grown to
encompass a steadily larger proportion of our
people. We can be proud of what we have
achieved. But we cannot be complacent, for
too many Americans are still denied a fair
opportunity to enjoy the rights and rewards
of our society. That is why Bill of Rights
Day should be a day of rededication as well
as of commemoration.

This year, we mark the 30th anniversary of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Declaration is the cornerstone of a

developing international consensus on human
rights. It is also the authoritative statement of
the meaning of the United Nations Charter,
through which member nations undertake to
promote, respect and observe human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all. without
discrimination. A long and difficult road
must be travelled before the reality of human
rights in the world matches the words of the
Declaration. The Declaration will light that
road and give strength to all who follow it.

The Universal Declaration is the heart of a
body of important United Nations human
rights documents: the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights. The United States signed the
Genocide Convention in 1948 and the Racial
Discrimination Convention in 1966. I signed
the other two Covenants on October 4. 1977.
I hope that the United States Senate will soon
approve the Genocide Convention at last, and
will undertake early hearings to permit our
Nation's adherence to the three remaining in-
struments. There could be no more appro-
priate gesture to mark the anniversary of the
Universal Declaration.

I also signed the American Convention on
Human Rights on June 1, 1977. I am proud
that since then, eleven nations of the
Americas have ratified it. thus bringing it
into force.

The great and noble struggle to realize the
rights of all men and women goes on. In the
face of injustice and oppression, human be-
ings continue to sacrifice and strive for jus-
tice and for human dignity

Now, Therefore. I, Jimmy Carter,
President of the United States of America, do
hereby proclaim December 10, 1978, as
Human Rights Day and December 15. 1978.
as Bill of Rights Day. and call on all Ameri-
cans to observe Human Rights Week begin
ning December 10. 1978. Let us reaffirm our
dedication to the promise of this Nation for
all citizens. And let us renew our efforts as
members of the world community on behalf
of the human rights of all people everywhere.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto
set my nana this twenty-eighth day of
November, in the year of our Lord nineteen
hundred seventy-eight, and of the Independ-
ence of the United States of America the two
hundred and third.

Jimmy Carter

♦No. 4609 (text from Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents of Dec 4, 1978).

Department of State Bulletin

BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS
DOCUMENTS

Universal Declaration
of Human Rights

The declaration was the work of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights which met in
January 1947 under the chairmanship of Mrs.
Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights they drew up was
adopted and proclaimed by the General As-
sembly on December 10. 1948. It was the
first effort to set common standards of
achievement in human rights for all peoples
of all nations.

Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide

Drawn up in the immediate wake of World
War II, this convention forbids states or in-
dividuals to commit acts with the specific
intent to destroy, wholly or partially, a na-
tional, ethnic, racial, or religious group. The
convention was adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly in 1948; the United States signed
it, and it was submitted to the Senate for ad-
vice and consent to ratification in 1949 and
resubmitted in 1970. Eighty-three nations are
parties to the convention, but it has not yet
been ratified by the United States. Hearings
have been held before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.

International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination

The convention forbids racial and ethnic
discrimination in all fields of public life. Its
terms, for the most part, parallel U.S. con-
stitutional and statutory law and policy. The
convention was adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly in 1965; Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S.
Permanent Representative to the United Na-
tions, signed for the United States in 1966.
One hundred and one nations have adhered to
the convention. President Carter transmitted
it to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent
to ratification on February 23, 1978.

International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights

The covenant affirms a series of standards
in economic, social, and cultural activities.
Formulated as statements of goals to be
achieved progressively rather than im-
mediately, these standards are in general ac-
cord with U.S. law and practice. The coven-
ant was adopted by the U.N. General Assem-

bly in 1966, and 54 nations are parties. The
United States has signed it. and President
Carter transmitted it to the Senate for advice
and consent to ratification on February 23,
1978.

International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights

Of the four U.N. treaties, this covenant is
the most similar in conception to the U.S.
Constitution and Bill of Rights. It consists
primarily of limitations upon the power of
the state to impose its will on the people
under its jurisdiction and, in large measure,
guarantees those civil and political rights
with which the United States and the Western
democratic tradition have always been as-
sociated. The covenant was adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly in 1966, and 52 na-
tions are parties. The United States has
signed it, and President Carter transmitted it
to the Senate for advice and consent to ratifi-
cation on February 23, 1978.

Optional Protocol

The Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was
approved by the U.N. General Assembly on
December 16, 1966. It is closely related to
the covenant but is a separate treaty to which
only 21 of the parties to the covenant have
adhered.

American Convention
on Human Rights
("Pact of San Jose")

The American convention, like the U.N.
treaties, gives legally binding expression to
human rights that are. for the most part, ac-
cepted in U.S. law and practice. It was
adopted by the Organization of American
States in 1969 and was signed for the United
States on June 1, 1977. Twelve countries of
the OAS have ratified, and one country has
adhered to, the convention. President Carter
transmitted it to the Senate for advice and
consent to ratification on February 23, 1978.

♦The full texts of these documents are
printed in the Department of State's Selected
Documents No. 5 (Revised), entitled
"Human Rights." Copies of this 62-page
Selected Documents may be obtained for
$2.40 each from the Superintendent of
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of interest only to a few for much of
the political history of mankind.

It is only in our age, indeed in our
own lifespan, that this issue has
dramatically surfaced on a global scale.
And it has done so in a variety of ways.
There is no doubt that the World Wars
were tremendous catalysts for political
awakening. There is no doubt that the
spread of literacy and education has
had an awakening impact on the politi-
cal consciousness of men and women.
There is no doubt that the achievement
of new nations has given more mean-
ingful political expression for one's
quest for individual expression.

But the cumulative impact of that has
been to make human rights the most
central item on the global agenda.
When I say "human rights," I recog-
nize the fact that in a globally diverse
world, in a culturally diverse world,
there will be different emphases, and
what we stress may be defined and ex-
pressed differently in different parts of
the world.

And yet there is a common theme to
the aspirations and the yearnings of
people — be it in Latin America or be it
in the southern part of Africa or be it in
the Middle East or be it in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union or be it in
the Far East.

I found it to be remarkable that in the
recent effervescence of political ex-
pression in the central square in
Peking — in a country as isolated as
China has been for decades — one of the
resounding cries was for Socialist de-
mocracy, for freedom of expression; in
effect for human rights, for a definition
of the proper relationship among man
and society and government.

This is the wave of the present. This
is the central form in which mankind is
expressing its new political awakening,
and it is terribly important to recognize
this. It is very important to be iden-
tified with it, for it is, as I started to
say, the genuine historic inevitability
of our time.

That brings me to my second point,
namely, that it is a central facet of our
relevance to the changing world.

Relevance to the Changing World

Consider the circumstances in which
this country was born — a small group
of colonies, 13 on the eastern seaboard;
isolated by weeks distance, by more
time than it takes you today to get to
the Moon. It had one thing in common,
however, with another small sector of
humanity, that part of humanity which
lived at the time in western Europe.
And in both places there was an idea
which was up in the air, which was
percolating in the intellectual world,

mary 1979

and that was the idea of personal lib-
erty. It was a new idea fundamentally
and an increasingly important and
powerful idea.

What is unique about this country is
that it was the first country ever in the
history of mankind to consciously
come together and shape itself around a
central philosophical idea; namely, the
idea of the independence and freedom
of man.

I would not insist for a minute that
by accomplishing our independence, by
signing the Bill of Rights, we fulfilled
that idea. Far from it. The next 200
years of our history has been one of an
unending quest to make that idea a re-
ality, and we did it through the strug-
gles for suffrage, through the exten-
sion of civil rights, through the break-
ing of racial barriers, through the
elimination of inequality between the
sexes, through increasing the scope of
political participation to groups
hitherto excluded, such as the trade
unions.

And the struggle still goes on. But
the point is that we created a
framework in our society which was
congenial to the struggle and which
legitimized it. And this is the genius of
the historical success of America. And
it is more than that. It is the key to
America's relevance to the world, for
we are not just a geographical entity.
We do not have, as other nations, an
organic past which we share. We are
united together by a compact with the
future, and it brings us together be-
cause we share certain common ideals.

This is what makes us Americans ul-
timately. We are Americans because
we do not share a past, but we share a
future. We share a future which is as-
sociated with certain fundamental
philosophical assumptions about what
is the nature of man and, to repeat,
what is the proper relationship among
man, society, and government.

Today, these ideas are becoming
universal in their appeal, and it is,
therefore, just and right, morally cor-
rect, historically well-grounded and
politically useful — and I am not hesi-
tant in saying that — for the United
States to carry high the standard of
human rights, for we are then in the
forefront of a powerful movement
which, indeed, has worldwide appeal.
And we gain from it.

We first of all redeem our own es-
sence. We rededicate ourselves to our
inner meaning when we commit our-
selves as Americans, and we greatly
enhance the appeal of this country
worldwide.

American foreign policy depends not
on material wealth or financial
power — and neither of these should be

underestimated — but it also depends a
great deal on the spiritual attraction as
well, and that attraction traditionally
has been scorned. It has waned in re-
cent years. One of the things of which I
am particularly proud is to be as-
sociated with a President who has done
so much to revitalize that significant
element of America's relevance to the
world.

I think it has already contributed to
overcoming what was doubtless a crisis
of the spirit in this society. That crisis
of the spirit was derived from funda-
mental divisions about proper courses
of action, but this division of proper
courses of action was also associated
with profound moral and philosophical
differences, the consequence of which
was to generate in this society an his-
torical sense of pessimism and moral
unease.

Progress in Enhancing
Human Rights

I think it is remarkable how much
has been accomplished in 2 years to
overcome that. We face enormous di-
lemmas in world affairs, and each day
compounds the difficulties. And yet we
approach them again with a renewed
sense of historical optimism and a
sense of moral ease within ourselves.
And that is terribly important, and it
has to be differentiated from self-
righteousness; it isn't self-right-
eousness.

There are a great many things wrong
with this society. But to realize — in
spite of these wrongs which, within the
framework of the Constitution we have
created, we are trying to correct — we
are associated with a basic yearning of
man is a tremendous political asset.
Thus, I would stress very heavily, very
strongly, that in the context of this
politically awakening world which is
seeking readjustments in political and
economic distribution of power, for us
to be concerned with human rights is to
be concerned with a central human
concern and a human aspiration which
is both real and just. That is a very
powerful combination.

But beyond that, I would argue that
on the practical level we have made
progress. Patt [Derian], who has been
directly involved in this, who has been
in the forefront of this, will speak to it
more precisely. But let me say just in
general that we have succeeded in or-
ganizing this government to be more
sensitive to questions of human rights.
We have now a structure — not a perfect
one, to be sure, but a structure
nonetheless — which makes certain that
human rights concerns are given new
consideration in the shaping of our

policy. That is a tangible and concrete
expression.

Secondly, we have tried to increase
global awareness of the importance of
this issue, particularly in other gov-
ernments that have to deal with us. And
there is today not a government in the
world that does not know that how it
behaves in regard to human rights will
affect its relationship with us. Again, I
use my words advisedly — "will af-
fect," not determine in its entirety, be-
cause we have to be cognizant of the
fact that there are other considerations
also involved in dealing with other
governments — regional interests, spe-
cific bilateral interests, security con-
cerns which may dictate different
arrangements — even if these govern-
ments in some cases are unresponsive.

But no government can today afford
the luxury of thinking that we do not
care and that it is entirely immune to
some consequences if it is indifferent
to the cause of human rights. And thus,
I think on a practical global level we
have made the issue of human rights a
genuinely present issue on the global
agenda.

I was struck, in traveling with the
President to different parts of the
world, with the extent to which even
leaders initially skeptical about our
human rights policy increasingly iden-
tified themselves with the issue of
human rights and addressed themselves
to it — in most cases genuinely, in some
cases less so. But even hypocrisy is ?
bow to virtue, and the fact they felt
compelled to acknowledge tnc human
rights concept is not without signifi-
cance.

Last year has seen some tangible
progress in the human condition. There
are different ways of assessing that
progress. There are different groups
which, from time to time, make esti-
mates. Collating some of these reports
together, we do have the impression
that not because of our efforts, either
alone or at all, but because of this in-
creasing relevance of the human rights
condition which we have helped to
stimulate, there has been progress in a
number of countries.

It is difficult to measure it but as a
rough approximate estimate I would
say in at least 40 countries around the
world in which two and a half billion
people live there has been tangible
progress — in some cases more, in some
cases less, in some cases certainly not
enough, but progress nonetheless. And
it has expressed itself in even greater
respect for rights or less oppression of
political opposition or in the release of
victims or in a generally more sensitive
attitude toward established procedures.

This is something of which we can

be proud, though of which we should
not take credit. We are part of the
process. We are part of a political and
historical process, and we live in a time
which is often short in hopeful
perspectives in the future. I would
submit to you that this is one of the
more important reassuring ones be-
cause it tells us something about what a
human being is. It tells us that ulti-
mately the human being in whatever
the social, economic, or cultural con-
ditions, yearns for something transcen-
dental, yearns for some self-definition
with respect to his uniqueness, yearns
for something which dignifies him as a
spiritual being. And if that, in fact, is
increasingly the human condition, it
ought to be a source of tremendous
pride and reassurance to us as Ameri-
cans.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERIAN

To the how, why. and what of our
policy, there generally are four ques-
tions: How we are implementing it;
why are we doing it, or why do we do
what we do; and what has been
achieved? Then the fourth one that
never goes away is do we really mean
it?

I think by the time this event is over,
after hearing what we have just heard,
after hearing the President's statement.

I think that maybe that question will be
laid to rest forever. However, I do be-
lieve that the integrity of the policy,
the decisions we make in the name of
the policy, will always be questioned.
And I think, frankly, that that is a
necessity, that people have to care
enough about it to watch, to complain,
to push, to press, to say this is what we
want, this doesn't match our standard,
we are not satisfied with it, do better,
do better, do better.

If that doesn't continue, then 15 or
20 years down the pike this will just be
something else that happened or still
has a little office percolating some-
where. It really depends on the people
who are gathered here today. You are
the human rights establishment. You
are the authors of human rights in
American foreign policy sitting right
here in the front row.

There is no question that we have got
it and that we intend to hang onto it.
Just make sure that everybody else who
comes wants to hang onto it or is
caused to.

In our bilateral relations we discuss
human rights issues formally with
Presidents and Prime Ministers. This is
a change. It used to be that this hap-
pened quietly in the hall or over a glass
of brandy or between sets on a tennis
court, because human rights things
were not generally thought to be possi-
ble to discuss in diplomatic formal

Patricia M. Derian is the Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Human Rights and Human-
itarian Affairs. She was sworn in on June 17,
1977, as the Coordinator for Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs; as a result of a
reorganization in the Department of State in
August 1977. she assumed the title of Assist-
ant Secretary.

Ms. Derian, a native of Virginia, resided
in Jackson, Mississippi, from 1959 until her
present appointment. She attended Radford
College in Virginia and is a graduate of the
University of Virginia School of Nursing.

She has long been active in civil rights re-
lated work and Democratic Party organiza-
tion. She has served as the president of the
Southern Regional Council and as an OEO
project director. Ms. Derian was a member
of the Executive Committee of the ACLU
and a founder of the Mississippi Civil Liber-
ties Union. She was a member of the Na-
tional Prison Project Steering Committee, the
Board of Directors of the Center for Commu-
nity Justice, and the Mississippi Council on
Human Relations.

In 1968 she was elected Mississippi's
Democratic National Committeewoman and
reelected in 1972 and 1976. She was one of
the founders of the Loyalist Mississippi

Democratic Party and the Democratic Na-
tional Committeewomen's Caucus.

During the presidential campaign she was
an adviser to Jimmy Carter and a deputy di-
rector of the Carter-Mondale campaign and
served on the HEW policy planning group of
the Carter-Mondale transition team.

Department of State Bulletin

negotiations. That has changed. That
happens now.

People are still a little bit uneasy and
nervous about it, because talking about
torture and disappearances and no
charges and no trials to the people who
are responsible for those things hap-
pening makes everybody a little un-
easy. The ones you are talking to don't
like to hear it, and the ones who are
saying it are hoping that they can say it
and get the message across and not
erect such a barrier that no communi-
cation can take place. But we are all
learning how to do that.

Our approach has not been limited to
quiet diplomacy. We have practiced
vigorous diplomacy in which all avail-
able instruments are used. They include
symbolic affirmations of our concern.
The President says something, the
Secretary says something, it is in a
speech, it is in a press conference, it is
in a press release, it is in a casual
comment, it is in a letter, it is whatever
way you can find at some point when it
seems like the right instrument to have
a strong public gesture. When there is
no response to quiet expression of
human rights concerns and when there
is no response to a symbolic speaking
out, our law and our policy demand
that we examine our assistance
relationships, both economic and
military.

We will continue to assert human
rights concerns as vigorously as we
have during the past 2 years in our
dealings with all governments. The
fundamental objective of this policy is
to do what we can as a government and
as a people to improve the observation
of human rights by governments toward
their people. That is essentially what it
is that this policy is to do, and we do
that in all the ways that you know.

At the same time, the human rights
policy has another important effect; it
strengthens our position and influence
in the world. Human rights is an area
where our ideals and our self-interest
strongly coincide.

The fact of it is that that is a side
effect and the only way we really get
that side benefit is to be as straight as it
is possible to be with our policy im-
plementation. That is our intention.
That is our endeavor. That is our con-
stant struggle, because I don't need to
tell anyone in this room that it is also
incredibly complex to balance all of the
things that are of great concern to the
United States with all the other things.
Human rights now sits at the table and
that is a change.

Our well-being and security are en-
hanced when there is greater respect for
human rights in the world. Our policy
is important to the health and integrity

January 1979

of this society within the United States.
Support for or indifference to oppres-
sion in other countries weakens the
foundation of our democracy at home.

We have increased awareness of and
concern for human rights among gov-
ernments and peoples throughout the
world and in international organiza-
tions such as the United Nations.

Finally, besides growing awareness,
there are indications of concrete prog-
ress for many regions. The U.S. Gov-
ernment is careful not to claim credit
for influencing specific steps. When a
country is making improvements, it is
the result of decisions made by its gov-
ernment and people. And how many
events would have occurred in the ab-
sence of U.S. human rights policy, we
have no idea. But the policy has helped
create a climate in which such changes
are more likely.

I might just run down a few of these.
In Africa three countries now under
military rule have pledged themselves
to hold elections and reestablish
majority rule. They include Nigeria.
Mali, and Ghana. Another, Upper
Volta, has already returned to a mul-
tiparty and civilian democratic system.
Nigeria has called for the creation of an
African human rights commission. And
the African Bar Association, in its most
recent meeting, called for greater re-
spect for human rights and was moved
to call for greater respect, because a
person got up and wanted to speak
against the human rights policy,
whereupon the Bar Association took a
very strong and principled position in
favor of human rights.

In Asia, Indonesia has released
15,000 political prisoners over the past
18 months and has pledged to release
all remaining over the next year.
Thousands of political prisoners have
been released in Bangladesh, Pakistan,
Guinea, Bolivia, Haiti, and elsewhere.

India, the world's largest democ-
racy, clearly rejected authoritarian rule
in last year's election and is joined
with us in pressing the cause of human
rights.

In Latin America, the Dominican
Republic held fair and open elections.
Military regimes in Peru and Ecuador
are moving to restore democracy. At its
last meeting, the Organization of
American States passed by an over-
whelming majority a resolution to sup-
port the advancement of human rights

and to strengthen the Inter-American
Human Rights Commission. The
Commission has visited Panama, El
Salvador, Haiti, and Nicaragua, and
more trips are slated.

In NATO, every member of the
Western alliance is a democracy. And
in Eastern Europe, through the Bel-
grade conference and other diplomatic
channels, we continue to press the
countries of the Warsaw Pact to abide
by the Helsinki accords.

The Helsinki Final Act has assumed
a life of its own. Monitoring groups
help insure a full discussion of gaps
between current practices and promises
of Helsinki. There is no question that
those monitoring groups have mighty
hard sledding, and it is part of our re-
sponsibility to speak on their behalf, to
give them what support we can. and to
at least supply an echo for those brave
voices in those dreadful and frightening
circumstances.

But the fact is that most of the prog-
ress is yet to come. Legions of people
all over the world suffer at the hands of
their governments. Too many are im-
prisoned without being charged. Their
families often don't know where they
are. They are certainly not tried in
those circumstances. Too many are de-
nied basic freedoms of expression, the
right to participate in their government.

But we are really at the beginning,
and we are hopeful that in all the years
that it will take, that we will continue
to see and be able to recount year after
year a little more movement, a little
more movement.

If we should find the time when we
are able to make a lot of movement,
that would be superb. But in the ab-
sence of dramatic events — even in the
presence of dramatic events — we must
continue to press and press and press,
just slug it out one day at a time.

I would like to end with a word
about the U.S. refugee program, which
is an integral part of our human rights
policy.

There is special urgency today con-
cerning the refugees from Indochina.
Their desperate plight is underlined
daily in the newspapers where there are
reports of little boats sinking, people
drowning, being pushed away, living
out God knows what kind of future in a
present that is an overcrowded refugee
camp.

While every effort is made to make

the camps safe, habitable, the fact is
that as these numbers increase, the
camps are getting overcrowded, health
conditions are becoming very serious,
and food conditions are a problem, too.

The search of these refugees for
temporary safe haven is an interna-
tional problem demanding an interna-
tional solution. With other govern-
ments, the United States will take part
in a high-level consultation on In-
dochinese refugees in Geneva on De-
cember 11 and 12 under the leadership
of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, Paul Hartling. We hope
other governments will join us in in-
creasing their level of acceptance of
refugees, in providing material support
for them in the countries where they
first land, and for aiding in their per-
manent resettlement.

For our part, the United States is in-
creasing acceptance to an annual total
of 54,000 in the months ahead. This
total includes 25,000 authorized for
parole earlier this year; 625 Cambodian
refugees a month, following specific
expressions of concern by the Con-
gress; a special admission of 2,500 in
response to the Hai Hong crisis when
the refugee vessel was stranded off the
coast of Malaysia; an additional 8,000
conditional entry numbers; and 15,000
for boat refugees on which parole ac-
tion has been taken by the Attorney
General in consultation with the Con-
gress.

A final word on our commitment to
ratification of the genocide and the
other human rights covenants. They are
crucial to the international credibility
of this country's human rights policy.
It is ludicrous for us to base an enor-
mous part of our foreign policy on the
fundamentals of human rights and fail
to ratify the implementing instruments
that are in the international world.

That is a little early lobbying for
people who don't need it, but I hope
that you will understand the commit-
ment that this Administration has to it,
certainly that many members of the
Congress have to it. And it is now time
for us to act. □

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of Dec. 1 1. 1978.

■Text of remarks by Secretary Vance. Dr.
Brzezinski. and Assistant Secretary Derian taken
from White House press release of Dec. 6.

Department of State Bulletin

THE PRESIDENT: News

Conferences of i¥oi?. 9 and 30

and Dec* 12 (Excerpts)

NOV. 9, KANSAS CITY1

Q. As you draw up the budget for
next year, which you will be doing
the next few weeks, you're facing the
choice between, to some extent, guns
and butter. We've committed to our
NATO allies to let the military
budget grow. At the same time, you
want to hold down, decrease the
Federal deficit to $30 billion or
below.

Is it true, as reported, that you've
decided to let the whole military
budget grow by about 3% faster than
the rate of inflation while ordering a
$4 billion, $5 billion cut of the pro-
jected gross of social programs? And
if so, where are those cuts going to
come from — Amtrak subsidies or
Federal pensions or farm programs
or where?

A. I've been working on the 1980
fiscal year budget for months. I had my
first hearings, preliminary hearings,
with the agency heads last April or
May, and now almost daily, I meet
with the Office of Management and
Budget on future decisions to be made
in the budget itself. I won't make final
decisions on the fiscal year '80 budget
until sometime next month, after
meeting with the heads of the different
agencies and departments of the Fed-
eral Government to let them appeal, in
effect, decisions that the OMB — Office
of Management and Budget — and I
have made together.

There's no way that I can cut down
the ability of our nation to defend it-
self. Our security obviously comes
first. And we have encouraged our
NATO allies in particular to increase
their expenditures for a joint defense of
Europe and, therefore, us by 3% a year
above the inflation rate. I intend to
honor that commitment. The final fig-
ures, though, on individual depart-
ments, and clearly the Defense De-
partment, have not yet been decided.

I might point out I will meet my
goal, which I announced in the anti-
inflation speech a couple of weeks ago,
of having a budget deficit less than half
what it was when I was running for
President. The budget deficit will be
below $30 billion. It's going to be a
very tight, very stringent, very difficult

budget to achieve, but I will achieve it.
And I'm sure Congress will back me in
this effort. I'm also continuing a freeze
on hiring of Federal employees. I have
limited this year, with the Congress
approval, the pay increases for Federal
employees — there is no increase at all
for executives in the Federal Govern-
ment. And I'll do other things as well
to control inflation.

For texts of the Joint Com-
munique on the Establishment of
Diplomatic Relations Between
the United States and the
People's Republic of China, the
President's address and remarks,
and the U.S. statement of De-
cember 15, 1978, see p. 25.

I consider it to be my top domestic
commitment, and I don't intend to fail.

Q. Do you intend to sign the meat
import bill, and if not, why not?

A. The bill has not gotten to my desk
yet. And I expect to receive it tomor-
row or Saturday. I'll make a decision
then.

I might point out that I'm strongly in
favor of the countercyclical approach
to beef imports, where on a predictable
basis, when the supply of beef in this
country is high, that imports would be
lower, and vice versa.

There are some factors that concern
me about the beef import bill. One is
the — I understand to be a severe lim-
itation on the President's right to make
decisions in case of emergency. But I'll
have to assess the bill in its entirety. If
I should make a decision against the
legislation, however, because of the
feature that I just described to you,
then I would work with the Congress to
include early next year a countercycli-
cal approach. I think it's a very good
approach. And I'll just have to make a
decison before the end of this week.2

Q. Do you agree with President
Sadat's view that the two
agreements — the one on the West
Bank and the agreement now being
negotiated for peace between Israel
and Egypt — have to be linked in
some way?

A. There's never been any doubt in
my mind, nor President Sadat's, nor
Prime Minister Begin 's, that one of the
premises for the Camp David negotia-
tions was a comprehensive peace set-
tlement that includes not just an iso-
lated peace treaty between Israel and
Egypt but includes a continuation of a
solution for the West Bank, Gaza Strip,
and ultimately for the Golan Heights as
well. There is some difference of
opinion between the two leaders about
how specifically it should be expressed
in the Sinai treaty.

I personally favor the presently
negotiated language, which in the
preamble does say that both nations
commit themselves to carry out the
comprehensive peace agreement as was
agreed at Camp David. This is a matter
for negotiation between the two lead-
ers.

I have heard Prime Minister Begin
say in my presence that he did not de-
sire a separate peace treaty with Egypt.
And. of course, this is also the opinion
and strongly felt view of President
Sadat.

We've been negotiating on the
Mideast peace agreement for months. I
have personally put hundreds of hours
into it. We have reached, on more than
one occasion so far, agreement on the
text between the negotiators them-
selves. When they refer the text back to
the leaders at home in Egypt and Israel,
sometimes the work that has been done
is partially undone. But I think that the
present language as approved by the
negotiators is adequate, and our pre-
sumption is to adhere to that language
as our preference. But I would like to
point out that we are not trying to im-
pose our will on the leaders themselves
or on those nations, and we hope that
they will rapidly reach a conclusion.

There's no doubt in my mind that
this kind of difference in language and
how a linkage is actually expressed is a
matter for negotiation. It does not vio-
late the commitments made at Camp
David, no matter what the decision
might be as reached jointly by Egypt
and Israel.

Q. You're being confronted with a
growing number of pleas to help
bring about a mediated peace in the
Latin American country of
Nicaragua. Is the United States going
to act to prevent further bloodshed
and repression, or do you feel that
your hands are tied because you
don't want to interfere in the inter-
nal affairs of another country? What
can you do?

A. We are participating actively and

January 1979

daily in the negotiations to bring about
a settlement in Nicaragua. I get daily
reports from Mr. Bowdler. He was one
of the three major negotiators there.
We're working in harmony with two
other Latin American countries in this
effort.3

We are trying to bring about a res-
olution of the Nicaraguan question.
And I think you know in the last few
weeks since these negotiations began,
the bloodshed has certainly been dras-
tically reduced. It's one of the most
difficult tasks that we've undertaken.

And we proposed others to be the
negotiators at first. We were unable to
find an acceptable group. With our ab-
sence, both sides — I guess all sides,
there are many more than two — wanted
the United States to be negotiators. So,
we are negotiating actively now to
reach an agreement in Nicaragua to
control bloodshed, to minimize dis-
putes, and to set up a government there
that will have the full support of the
Nicaraguan people.

NOV. 304

Q. Do you plan to stay with your
pledge to increase your defense
budget by 3% despite your anti-
inflation drive? And also on defense,
there are published reports that
you're going to change your nuclear
strategy to focus more on massive
retaliation. Is that true?

A. Let me answer the last part first.
Our nuclear policy basically is one of
deterrence; to take actions that are well
known by the American people and
well known by the Soviets and other
nations; that any attack on us would re-
sult in devastating destruction by the
nation which launched an attack against
us. So, the basic policy is one of de-
terrence.

We, obviously, constantly assess the
quality of our own nuclear weapon
systems as times change, as techno-
logical advances are made, and as the
change takes place in the Soviet
Union's arsenal. We keep our weapons
up to date; we improve our communi-
cations and command and information
systems. But we will maintain basically
a deterrent policy rather than to change
the basic policy itself.

The other answer to your question is
that our goal and that of other NATO
nations is to increase the real level of
defense expenditures. This is our goal.
Each expenditure on defense, each
system for which we spend the tax-

payer's money will be much more
carefully assessed this year to make
sure that we are efficient and effective
in the funds that we do expend.

Over the last number of years, in-
cluding since I've been in office even,
the percentage of our total budget and
our gross national product that goes
into defense has been decreasing. And
at the conclusion of the budget cycle,
when I make the budget public to the
Congress and to the people in about 6
weeks, I know that I'll be responsible
to make sure that the social and other
domestic needs of our nation are met,
our international obligations are ful-
filled, and an adequate defense is as-
sured, and that there be a proper bal-
ance among these different, sometimes
conflicting, demands.

So, I'll be responsible, and I will as-
sure you and other Americans that
when the budget is assessed that I will
carry out my responsibilities well.

Q. I'd like to ask you about China.
What is your timetable for reaching
full normalization of relations with
China, and have the recent events
that are now going on in China —
have those altered that policy? And
do you envision China as a potential
military ally at any time against the
Soviet Union?

A. We don't have any intention of
selling any weapons to either China or
the Soviet Union. We are improving
our relationships with the People's Re-
public of China as time goes on, even
short of complete diplomatic normali-
zation. Our goal, however, is to move
toward normalization in accordance
with the Shanghai communique agree-
ments. The attitude of China, the
domestic situation in China, has
changed, and we watch it with great
interest.

Q. Is it correct that you have de-
cided to go ahead with the M-X
mobile missile and the Trident II in
the next budget? And will you com-
ment on the suggestion that that de-
cision, if you take it, the decision on
civil defense, is actually a part of a
plan to sort of pull the fangs of the
anti-SALT [Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks] people, that it's part of a
SALT dance, rather than an inde-
pendent action?

A. I don't think it's part of a SALT
dance. I have not decided yet on what
types of new weapons systems, if any,
we will advocate in the 1980 fiscal year
budget for our strategic arms arsenal.

The press reports about a $2-billion
civil defense program have been com-

pletely erroneous, and I have never
been able to find where the origin of
that story might have derived. No pro-
posal has even been made to me for a
civil defense program of that mag-
nitude.

We are considering the advisability
of pursuing some civil defense assess-
ments, including the fairly long-term
evacuation of some of our major cities
if we should think a nuclear war would
be likely, which is obviously not a very
likely project in itself, a proposal in it-
self.

But I have not yet decided when to
move on the M-X or if to move on the
M-X, what to do about making sure
that our present silo missiles are se-
cure. The Soviet missiles, as have ours
in recent years, have been improved in
their quality, particularly in their ac-
curacy. And this makes the one leg of
our so-called triad more vulnerable,
that is, the fixed silo missiles.

We are addressing this question with
a series of analyses, but I've not yet
made a decision on how to do it

Q. Do you see the events in China
as an outcome of your human rights
policy?

A. I could make a career out of re-
sponding to all the criticisms [laughter]
that are made and comments made by
other political figures, even including
ex-Presidents. I don't intend to do so.

I personally think the human rights
policy of our government is well ad-
vised and has had broad-ranging, ben-
eficial effect. I don't claim credit for
the American human rights policy
when political prisoners are released
from certain countries or when those
countries move toward more
democratic means, or even when — as is
in the case of China now — there are
public and apparently permitted de-
mands or requests for more democratic
government policies and enhanced
human rights.

But I think our policy is right. It's
well founded. It's one that I will
maintain tenaciously, and I think it's
demonstrated around the world that it's
already had good effect.

Q. Where do we stand on a Middle
East accord between Egypt and Is-
rael, and what can you or are you
doing to try to bring the two parties
together?

A. We are negotiating and com-
municating with both the leaders of Is-
rael and Egypt on a constant and sus-
tained basis. I have been dissatisfied

10

and disappointed at the length of time
required to bring about a peace treaty
that was signed by both Israel and
Egypt. I've already outlined in the past
my assessment of why this delay has
taken place, as contrasted with Camp
David. I'm not dealing directly with
the principals simultaneously, and a lot
of the negotiation has, unfortunately,
been conducted through the press be-
cause of political reasons, domestically
speaking or other reasons.

Although I'm somewhat discour-
aged, we are certainly not going to give
up on the effort. Tomorrow, I will be
meeting with the Prime Minister of
Egypt, Mr. Khalil, who's coming, I
understand, with a personal message to
me from President Sadat.

We have a need, obviously, to get a
treaty text pinned down and approved
by both governments, and to resolve
the very difficult question of the so-
called linkage, whether or not certain
acts in the West Bank, Gaza Strip have
to be taking place at the same time the
Sinai agreement is consummated.

But regardless of temporary disap-
pointments and setbacks that we've ex-
perienced since Camp David, they are
no more serious nor of any greater con-
cern than some that I experienced at
Camp David. And we will continue to
pursue our efforts to bring about a
peace treaty there.

My reason for what optimism I keep
is that I know for certain that both
President Sadat and Prime Minister
Begin want a peace treaty. I know that
their people want a peace treaty. And I
think as long as this determination on
their part is extant, that our own good
offices are very likely to be fruitful.
So, I will continue the effort, no matter
how difficult it might be in the future.

Q. I'd like to ask you about the
MIG's in Cuba. Have you come to a
decision yet on whether the MIG-
23's in Cuba represent any increased
threat to the United States? Have you
asked the Russians to take them out?
And do you believe the 1962 under-
standings with the Soviet Union have
been violated?

A. There have been MIG-23's in
Cuba for a long time. There is a model
of the MIG-23 that's been introduced
there late last spring which we have
been observing since that time.

We would consider it to be a very
serious development if the Soviet
Union violated the 1962 agreement.
When we have interrogated the Soviet
Union through diplomatic channels,
they have assured us that no shipments
of weapons to the Cubans have or will

violate the terms of the 1962 agree-
ment. We will monitor their com-
pliance with this agreement very care-
fully, which we have been doing in the
past, both as to the quality of weapons
sent there and the quantity of weapons
sent there, to be sure that there is no
offensive threat to the United States
possible from Cuba.

I might add that we have no evidence
at all, no allegation that atomic
weapons are present in Cuba.

Q. Is there any reason that you
feel that the Shah is justifiably in
trouble with his people?

A. I think the Shah understands the
situation in Iran very clearly and the
reasons for some of the problems that
he has experienced recently. He has
moved forcefully and aggressively in
changing some of the ancient religious
customs of Iran, for instance, and some
of the more conservative or traditional
religious leaders deplore this change
substantially. Others of the Iranian citi-
zens who are in the middle class, who
have a new prosperity brought about by
enhanced oil prices and extra income
coming into the country, I think feel
that they ought to have a greater share
of the voice in determining the affairs
of Iran. Others believe that the de-
mocratization of Iran ought to proceed
more quickly.

The Shah, as you know, has offered
the opposition groups a place in a coa-
lition government. They have rejected
that offer and demand more complete
removal from the Shah of his authority.

We trust the Shah to maintain stabil-
ity in Iran, to continue with the de-
mocratization process, and also to con-
tinue with the progressive change in the
Iranian social and economic structure.
But I don't think either I or any other
national leader could ever claim that
we have never made a mistake or have
never misunderstood the attitudes of
our people. We have confidence in the
Shah, we support him and his efforts to
change Iran in a constructive way,
moving toward democracy and social
progress. And we have confidence in
the Iranian people to make the ultimate
judgments about their own govern-
ment.

We do not have any intention of in-
terfering in the internal affairs of Iran,
and we do not approve any other nation
interfering in the internal affairs of
Iran.

Q. When you came to office, there
was a lot of criticism of the intelli-
gence agencies about the methods
they were using, and now since the
Iran thing there's a good deal of

Department of State Bulletin i

criticism, it seems, about their
evaluation.

How concerned were you about the
intelligence evaluations in Iran? And
could you give us a general comment
about what you think the state of the
intelligence arts is today?

A. I've said several times that one of
the pleasant surprises of my own Ad-
ministration has been the high quality
of work done by the intelligence com-
munity. When I interrogate them about
a specific intelligence item or when I
get general assessments of intelligence
matters, I've been very pleased with
the quality of their work.

Recently, however, I have been con-
cerned that the trend that was estab-
lished about 15 years ago to get intelli-
gence from electronic means might
have been overemphasized, sometimes
to the detriment of the assessment of
the intelligence derived and also the
intelligence derived through normal
political channels, not secret intelli-
gence; sometimes just the assessment
of public information that's known in
different countries around the world.
And recently I wrote a note — which is
my custom; I write several every
day — to the National Security Council,
the State Department, and the CIA
leaders, and asked them to get together
with others and see how we could im-
prove the quality of our assessment
program and also, particularly, politi-
cal assessments.

Since I've been in office, we have
substantially modified the order of
priorities addressed by the intelligence
community in its totality. When I be-
came President, I was concerned, dur-
ing the first few months, that quite
often the intelligence community itself
set its own priorities. As a supplier of
intelligence information, I felt that the
customers, the ones who receive the
intelligence information, including the
Defense Department, myself, and
others, ought to be the ones to say,
"This is what we consider to be most
important." That effort has been com-
pleted, and it's now working very well.

So, to summarize, there is still some
progress to be made. I was pleased
with the intelligence community's work
when I first came into office, and it's
been improved since I became Presi-
dent.

DEC. 125

Q. Can you confirm reports that a
tentative agreement has been reached
on SALT with the Soviets, that you
may meet at the summit with
Brezhnev in January, and also, if

January 1979

11

these are true, can you say what
caused the breakthrough?

A. We've made good progress on
SALT. I can't say that we've reached
agreement. A statement will be made
later on today by the State Department
and by the Soviets simultaneously
about a possible meeting of the Foreign
Ministers.6

I think that there has been steady
progress made in the last almost 2
years. I can't recall any time when
there was a retrogression or a pause in
the commitment to reach a SALT
agreement. Our position has been
clear. We have harmony, I believe,
among the Defense Department, State
Department and the White House on
what should be the U.S. position. If the
Soviets are adequately forthcoming, we
will have an agreement without further
delay. If they are not forthcoming, then
we'll continue to negotiate.

Q. And how about the summit?

A. I think that as we approach the
time when we are sure that the items
have been resolved that are still under
negotiation, at that time we will have a
summit meeting and at that summit
meeting we will discuss not only con-
cluding the SALT agreement officially
but also having a broad agenda of other
items that are of mutual interest to us
and the Soviet Union.

Q. The other day you took a very
serious view of Israel and Egypt
going past the 17th of this month
without concluding a treaty, that's
the date they themselves set for it.
Now with 5 days left, what's your be-
lief, or hunch, as to whether they'll
meet that deadline; and do you still
think it's sort of a "now or never"
proposition?

A. I don't think it's now or never.
And you very accurately described this
deadline date as one established by Is-
rael and Egypt in the most solemn
commitment at Camp David.

Secretary Vance reports to me from
Cairo good progress having been made
between him and President Sadat. He
has not begun further negotiations with
the Israelis yet because of Mrs. Meir's
funeral. He will return to Egypt, try to
conclude his discussions with President
Sadat, and then go back to Israel for
discussions with the Israelis [see p. 39].

I consider the deadline date to be
quite important. If the Egyptians and
Israelis cannot keep a commitment on a
3-month conclusion of a peace treaty
when they themselves are the only two
nations involved, serving as a mediator
in the process, then I think it would be

very difficult for them to expect the
terms of the treaty they are negotiating
to be carried out with assurance. It sets
a very bad precedent for Israel and
Egypt not to reach a conclusion.

I think the differences that presently
divide Israel and Egypt are minor, cer-
tainly compared to the resolution of
major differences in the past. And I
believe that President Sadat has recon-
firmed his intention, his commitment,
to Secretary Vance to conclude the
negotiations without further delay. My
hope is, and my expectation is, that the
Israelis will have the same attitude.

Q. At year's end, how do you as-
sess the last 11, ll1.- 2 months, the
pluses and the minuses as you see
them, the hits and the errors, and,
particularly, would you speak a little
bit about the errors?

A. As a completely nonbiased
analyst, I would say that the pluses far
outweigh the minuses .... In interna-
tional affairs, our country has injected
itself. I think wisely, into regional dis-
putes where we have no control over
the outcome. But we've added our
good services, in some instances with
almost no immediate prospect of suc-
cess. My own reputation has been at
stake and that of our country.

In Nicaragua, I think instead of
having violent and massive bloodshed
we now have the parties negotiating
directly with one another for the first
time on the terms of a plebescite and
whether or not there should be general
amnesty. In Namibia we are making
some good progress, I believe. The
South Africans have now accepted the
terms set up by the Secretary General
of the United Nations. We are waiting
for SWAPO [South West Africa
People's Organization] to respond. [In
fact, SWAPO accepts the relevant
U.N. resolutions on Namibia. The
President's intention was to call for
their continued support. The United
States is waiting for South Africa to in-
dicate in definitive terms its acceptance
of the proposal and a date for the ar-
rival of the U.N. transition assistance
group.] Cyprus, very minimal but
steadily increasing prospects. Mideast,
you're well acquainted with that.

And I think that on SALT and other
major international items we have
made steady progress. So in balance,
I'm pleased with the last 1 1 months and
don't underestimate the difficulties still
facing us.

Q. We seem to be headed for a
record trade deficit this year, at a

time when a major new market for
U.S. exports is opening in Com-
munist China.

A. Yes.

Q. Now there are a number of re-
strictions in U.S. trade laws which
inhibit our trading with Communist
countries, some aspects of the
Export-Import Bank Act, the
Jackson-Vanik amendment to the
1974 Trade Act. My question is, do
you intend to try to change and re-
move some of those restrictions next
year?

A. We are constantly assessing the
advisability of maintaining administra-
tive restraints.

Of course, we have to put trade in a
proper perspective. We can't assess
trade itself completely separated from
our overall relationships with Com-
munist countries, particularly those
who are potential adversaries of ours,
like the Soviet Union. We want to have
increased trade with the Soviet Union
and with the People's Republic of
China. 1 think the statistics will show
that recently we have had increasing
trade with both those countries com-
pared to last year or several years ago.

If we, in the future, have normal re-
lationships with China, diplomatic re-
lationships, this would open up in-
creased opportunities for trade with
those people. In this present time, short
of diplomatic relations, we still have
major trade missions going to China,
Chinese trade missions coming to our
country. And I think that this is bearing
good results.

We have one more point, and that is
security restraints. If there is a sale of
high technology items to the Soviet
Union, or the People's Republic of
China proposed, then not only do the
Commerce Department and the State
Department and the National Security
Council assess this, but I refer it to the
Defense Department as well, to be sure
that we are not deliberately, or inad-
vertently, giving to those countries a
means by which their military
capabilities would be greatly escalated.
This would be contrary to the existing
law. But within the bounds of those re-
straints, we are attempting to improve
our relationships with the People's Re-
public of China and with the Soviet
Union. And in the process, as part of a
stream of increased interrelationships,
improved relationships, enhanced
trade.

Q. You said last week that if Prime
Minister Begin and President Sadat
had been able to negotiate together
on some of these questions over the
past few weeks, that there would not

12

Department of State Bulletin

THE SECRETARY: The U.S. -European

Partnership

Secretary Vance visited London De-
cember 8-10, J978, and then pro-
ceeded to the Middle East December
10-15 (see p. 39). Following is an ad-
dress before the Royal Institute of In-
ternational Affairs in London on De-
cember 9, 1978.'

More than three decades ago the
United States and the nations of West-
ern Europe joined together to rebuild a
devastated continent and to create a
military alliance to protect freedom.

On both sides of the Atlantic, those
who fashioned the Marshall Plan and
worked to create NATO possessed a vi-
sion of a strong America and a strong
Europe bound by common interests.
From this vision, they created a self-
renewing partnership that derives con-

tinuing vitality from the values and
hopes that we share.

We have passed through a particu-
larly difficult period during the 1970's.
But we have navigated these turbulent
waters. Although the course ahead re-
mains demanding, the progress we
have made should give us great confi-
dence in our future.

• For the first time in its history, all
members of the NATO alliance are
democracies.

• NATO is strong and growing
stronger.

• We have not only resisted the
worst protectionist pressures in a gen-
eration; we are working together to
shape a healthier and more open world
trading system.

• We have established a pattern of
closer consultation on economic and se-
curity matters than at any point in re-
cent history.

• European integration is proceed-
ing, confirming our belief that a strong
Europe is good for a strong America.

• And we are moving toward more
normal relations with the nations of
Eastern Europe. Progress toward this
goal has reflected our support for full
implementation of the Helsinki Final
Act and recognition of the sovereignty
and independence of the nations of this
area.

Today, I want to discuss with you
how, building on this solid foundation,
we can continue to assure our mutual
security and foster a healthy resurgence

News Conferences (Cont'd)

have been some of the problems that
have arisen. My question is, if all
else fails, would you consider calling
the two leaders back to Camp David
or some other place to negotiate di-
rectly with you to resolve this mat-
ter?

A. Let me say that I don't have any
present plans to do that. If all else
failed — and I felt that we could get to-
gether again — I would not hesitate to
do so. But I don't envision that taking
place.

Q. What will be the domestic and
international effect if the Shah fails
to maintain power in Iran?

A. I fully expect the Shah to main-
tain power in Iran and for the present
problems in Iran to be resolved, al-
though there have been certainly de-
plorable instances of bloodshed which
we would certainly want to avoid, or
see avoided. I think the predictions of
doom and disaster that came from some
sources have certainly not been
realized at all. The Shah has our sup-
port and he also has our confidence.

We have no intention of interfering
in the internal affairs of Iran and we
have no intention of permitting others
to interfere in the internal affairs of
Iran. The difficult situation there has
been exacerbated by uncontrolled
statements made from foreign nations
that encourage blood baths and vio-

lence. This is something that really is
deplorable and I would hope would
cease after this holy season passes.

I think it's good to point out that the
Iranian people for 2,500 years, perhaps
as long as almost any nation on earth,
have had the ability for stable self-
government. There have been changes
in the government, yes, sometimes
violence, but they have a history of an
ability to govern themselves, and be-
cause of that and other factors which
I've just described, I think the situation
in Iran will be resolved successfully.

Q. To what extent are you con-
cerned over the prospect of the
OPEC [Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries] nations raising
the price of oil this weekend — reports
are it will be in the neighborhood of
5% — the impact this would have on
inflation, and do you contemplate
any future actions to curb oil im-
ports?

A. Most of our problems with the
adverse trade balances can be attributed
to oil imports, although we have other
problems as well. I certainly hope that
the OPEC nations will decide not to
raise the price of oil. If they do, I hope
it would be minimal.

We have tried to convince them that
this is in the best interests of the world
economy, and also in the best interests
of the OPEC nations themselves, to
have a stable world economy with a
minimum of inflation jn the future.
We're trying to set a good example in
our own nation, both in controlling in-

flation and also in stabilizing the value
of the dollar on which the price of oil is
based.

The countries in the OPEC nations
have suffered somewhat because for a
time the dollar value was going down
very rapidly. It has recovered since the
first of November. So I would hope,
first of all, to repeat myself, that there
will be no increase in the price of oil.
If they must increase the price of oil, I
think it ought to be minimal for their
own benefit and for the benefit of the
world.

□

'Held at the Muehlebach Hotel; for full text,
see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments of Nov. 13, 1978, p. 1986.

2On Nov. 10. the President signed a memo-
randum of disapproval of the Meat Import Act of
1978 (H.R. 11545); for text of that memoran-
dum, see Weekly Compilation of Nov. 20, p.
2009.

'Ambassador William G. Bowdler, Director
of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, is
the U.S. representative on the international
mediation team for Nicaragua. The other two
representatives are from Guatemala and the
Dominican Republic.

4For full text, see Weekly Compilation of
Dec. 4, 1978, p. 2096.

sFor full text, see Weekly Compilation of
Dec. 18, 1978, p. 2219.

6On Dec. 12. 1978, Department spokesman
Hodding Carter III annnounced that Secretary
Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
will meet in Geneva Dec. 21-22, 1978, to con-
tinue discussions on SALT.

January 1979

of our economies. These are the most
pressing items on our common agenda.
But even as we concentrate on these
vital concerns, which have been the
constant threads of our partnership, our
common interests compel us to address
together a broadened international
agenda. For there are longer term
challenges to our security and well-
being that also demand serious and
sustained attention.

• How will the international eco-
nomic system, as well as our own
economies, adapt to changing patterns
of international trade and commerce?

• How can we meet increasing
energy needs without heightening the
risk of nuclear proliferation?

• How can we help meet the legiti
mate security needs of nations while
seeking agreed limitations on the
growth of conventional arms sales?

• And how can we find the political
will to act now on issues which will
have a profound impact on the world
we leave our children, issues such as
population growth and environmental
protection?

These issues will tax our creativity
and persistence to the fullest. For we
approach all of these issues in a
changing and pluralistic international
system, with over 150 independent na-
tions and emerging new power centers.
No single nation, or group of nations,
can dictate solutions to these complex
problems. They are truly international
in their origins and in the necessary
scope of their solutions. Increasingly,
our leadership must therefore take the
form of inspiring other nations to work
with us toward goals we share and can
best achieve in concert. And on each of
these issues, we look to our European
allies as a core around which we must
build these cooperative efforts.

Our ability to address this broader
agenda will depend on the essential vi-
tality of our partnership — and specif-
ically on our economic and military
strength.

Economic Security for Our Peoples

For most of our countries, the most
pressing demand today is to revitalize
our economies and to restore a sense of
confidence in our economic system.

When the economic history of the
last 5 years is written, two important
trends will stand out. The United States
and Europe, and indeed the indus-
trialized democracies as a whole, have
experienced the most severe economic
problems of the last quarter century.
These included sharp increases in
world oil prices and inflation followed

13

by a serious recession and high un-
employment.

Yet despite these serious problems,
we have been successful in
strengthening our economic and politi-
cal cooperation. Instead of sliding back
into the beggar-thy-neighbor psychol-
ogy that destroyed the global economy
in the 1930's, we have created new and
more effective mechanisms for serious,
concerted actions. The institution of
periodic summit meetings on economic
matters, closer collaboration among
monetary authorities, the creation of
the International Energy Agency and a
more active Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development
(OECD) — all these efforts reflect con-
fidence in our capacities not despair in
the face of difficulties.

The U.S. Economy

The United States fully recognizes
the importance of a strong and vital
American economy to building greater
economic security for Europe, Japan
and other nations of the world. What
we do in Washington can affect the
lives of citizens of London or Rome,
just as the decisions of other govern-
ments affect the well-being of Ameri-
cans.

Accordingly, the domestic economic
policies of the United States are
fashioned with a view toward the eco-
nomic interests of the Atlantic commu-
nity as a whole. Fundamental to this
effort are the commitments made by
President Carter at the Bonn summit
last July. He pledged the United States

We are increasing our economic coordination with one another for a
simple reason: Because we all now understand that the economic
health of each of us is important to the economic health of us all.

We are increasing our economic
coordination with one another for a
simple reason: Because we all now un-
derstand that the economic health of
each of us is important to the economic
health of us all. This is especially true
in times of economic difficulty. Pres-
sures increase to protect domestic mar-
kets, competition sharpens, and we are
all tempted to resolve our individual
problems at the expense of our
neighbors. But it is precisely then that
we must be particularly sensitive to the
impact our decisions at home will have
on others abroad. If we make those de-
cisions without sufficient regard for the
problems of others, we only invite re-
taliation and a spiral of compensating
actions. All of us will lose ground; all
of us will be worse off.

As a result, we all have clearly rec-
ognized that only through the develop-
ment of a common strategy, to which
each country contributes, can we en-
hance the well-being of every nation.

Cooperating in this way can be dif-
ficult and frustrating. Domestic politi-
cal support for tough economic deci-
sions often comes slowly in democra-
cies. In some cases, results fall short of
our expectations and we must redouble
our efforts. But actions by each of us,
together with greater transatlantic
cooperation, have placed the United
States and the other industrialized
nations on the path to sustained,
noninflationary growth. Success will
enhance our ability to expand indi-
vidual opportunity and social justice,
which are the greatest strengths of our
democracies.

to a major effort to reduce inflation and
to an energy policy which significantly
reduces U.S. oil imports.

We are taking specific actions to
fulfill these commitments. On October
24, President Carter announced a
broad-based program to fight inflation.
It includes monetary restraint, sharp
reductions in governmental spending,
and explicit standards for wage and
price increases. The President's new
budget will put a very tight lid on pub-
lic expenditures and reduce our federal
deficit to less than half that of 1976.

The President has stressed that con-
trolling inflation is our overriding
domestic priority. We will persist until
we have achieved that objective. On
November 1 , we undertook further
far-reaching actions to reinforce the
anti-inflation effort and strengthen the
dollar. We have tightened monetary
conditions significantly. The United
States also joined with the three major
surplus countries — Germany, Japan,
and Switzerland — in coordinating di-
rect intervention in the foreign ex-
change market to correct the excessive
decline of the dollar. We will continue
to cooperate in a forceful and coordi-
nated way to assure stability in ex-
change markets. To finance its share,
the United States is mobilizing an un-
precedented $30 billion which will be
used, together with resources of the
other countries, to intervene massively
if necessary to achieve our objectives.
The United States has also expanded its
gold sales program.

We expect that with the fundamental
improvements in the U.S. economic

14

Department of State Bulletin i

position now underway, these actions
will exert a continuing positive effect
on the dollar. On November 9, the
President signed legislation which lays
the basis for a sounder U.S. energy
policy. This legislation should result in
oil import savings of roughly 2.5 mil-
lion barrels per day by 1985. We are
already improving our energy situation.
U.S. energy prices have risen signifi-
cantly closer to world levels. And
growth in energy consumption is now
running well below growth in our
GNP. We are also working to reduce
our balance-of-payments deficit through
a more vigorous export promotion pro-
gram.

President Carter is determined to
build political support for serious ac-
tions to deal with our economic prob-
lems. That support is growing. Neither
the President, Congress, nor the
American people will be satisfied until
we show marked progress in fighting
inflation, strengthening the dollar, and
creating a sound energy economy.

U.S. -European Economic
Cooperation

While the first task for each of us is
to put our domestic house in order, we
must at the same time undertake those
joint efforts that are needed to sustain
our economic growth. There is no more
immediate or more crucial test of our
ability to join together for our common
gain than the successful completion,
this month, of the multilateral trade
negotiations.

the political cooperation that we have
painstakingly achieved.

A major objective of the trade
negotiations is to provide for an agreed
framework to govern subsidies and
countervailing duties. When our Con-
gress convenes next month, the Presi-
dent will seek legislation to extend the
authority to waive countervailing duties
to cover the period needed to imple-
ment the Tokyo Round agreements.
And we will take measures to minimize
the disruptive effects that could flow
from expiration of the waivers on
January 3.

Our negotiators in Geneva will strive
to conclude their talks this month. But
even as we gain ground toward a more
open and better operating trading sys-
tem, we must avoid piecemeal retreats
toward protectionism which could
undermine that progress. In each coun-
try, various groups will continue to ask
governments to intervene in the trading
system for economic, political, and so-
cial reasons. Our countries have recog-
nized the importance of resisting
demands which impede effective
economic adjustment to change. Our re-
sponse to such demands must be within
the context of the trading framework
we have designed together. Our
policies must facilitate positive adjust-
ment of our economies to changing
economic conditions, rather than hin-
dering such adjustment or shifting the
burden onto others.

Beyond the immediate need to
strengthen the world trading system,
we all have a basic interest in promot-

. . . the central fact of world security has been strategic nuclear
parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. We and our
partners have managed this situation without allowing either our
deterrent or our will to be eroded.

During the last three decades, we
have worked together to build a more
open and better functioning world
trading system. Now we have an op-
portunity to consolidate the progress
we have made and further improve the
structure of our trading relationships.
In so doing, we can construct for the
future a trading environment with
greater certainty and confidence — one
which will foster the continued expan-
sion of world commerce. If we suc-
ceed, there will be economic gains for
us all. If we fail, we will jeopardize the
economic progress we have made.
Failure would fuel our inflation, slow
our growth, and make it more difficult
for developing nations to play a full
part in the world trading system. And if
we fail, we will have also jeopardized

ing the emerging role of the European
Community in international economic
affairs. In the United States, we admire
the vision of men and women who are
working to broaden and deepen cooper-
ation among the nations of Europe. We
welcome and support this development,
for a strong European Community is in
America's interest as well as in the
interests of all European nations; it
provides a dynamic new force in inter-
national economic and political rela-
tions.

The new European monetary ar-
rangements for closer monetary
cooperation within the European
Community, announced on December 5,
represent an important step toward the
economic integration of Europe we have
long supported. We believe that the

new arrangements will be implemented |
in a way which will contribute to sus-
tainable growth in the world economy
and a stable international monetary
system. The United States looks for-
ward to continued close consultations
with its European trading partners as
these arrangements evolve.

In general, the next few years will be
critical ones for Europe, as the Com-
munity works toward closer economic
integration, expands its membership,
holds its first direct elections to the
European parliament, and assumes a
growing responsibility for the political
and economic well-being of Europe as
a whole.

All the Western democracies share in
support and concern for the democra-
cies in southern Europe. We in the
United States respect the political
commitment of Community leaders to
open its membership to these states and
to deal with the economic problems
that will come with such a step.

As prospering Western democracies,
we should recognize a special respon-
sibility to those democracies in the re-
gion threatened by a faltering
economy — where the short-term pros-
pects are bleak but where, with a
helping hand, economies can be put on
a sound footing and the long-term
prospects can be bright. There are es-
tablished mechanisms to provide
needed assistance — the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
Some situations may also call for com-
plementary informal or ad hoc ar-
rangements. The consortium for Por-
tugal is an example. Those nations in a
position to help should concert their
energies and resources. Supportive ac-
tion before it is too late is an invest-
ment in the future of freedom.

Relations With the Developing World

As we consider means to strengthen
the economic bonds among the de-
veloped countries, we must recognize
that our interests — and our respon-
sibilities— do not end there. Meeting
the desire of our citizens for economic
security and a rising standard of living
requires us to respond more fully to the
aspirations of peoples in developing na-
tions. Increasingly, their economic
well-being is indispensable to our own.

Together, the world's developing
countries account for roughly one-third
of total trade for the OECD nations.
These countries provide the most
rapidly expanding markets for exports
of the industrial world — markets on
which millions of jobs in our nations
depend. Developing countries provide
us with critical raw materials. And we
need their cooperation to solve such

luary 1979

15

critical global problems as energy and
food.

In short, we cannot build a strong
international economic system without
steady economic progress by the de-
veloping nations. Together, we must
attempt to push aside the ideological
debates which often have characterized
the relationship between the developing
and industrial nations. We must seek
practical and concrete measures to ad-
dress the basic needs of roughly 800
million people who live in absolute
poverty.

There is no more important challenge
to the world's long-term well-being, to
our political security, and to our essen-
tial values as free peoples than working
together with the developing nations to
foster their economic progress.

Security Issues

The cornerstone of our prosperity is
the confidence we have in our security.
This security depends essentially on
maintaining strong military forces; on
managing effectively the West's rela-
tions with the Soviet Union; on seeking
to limit and reduce arms in both East
and West; and on the strength of the
Atlantic partnership.

We can find cause for concern in the
continuing increases in Soviet military
programs and deployments. But we can
also find cause for confidence in the
steps we in the alliance are taking to
preserve the military balance.

For some years now, the central fact
of world security has been strategic nu-
clear parity between the United States
and the Soviet Union. We and our
partners have managed this situation
without allowing either our deterrent or
our will to be eroded.

The fact of strategic parity remains.
Just as we will match Soviet increases,
so we must assume that the Soviets are
resolved to match us. Thus, the pursuit
of superiority by either side would re-
sult in frustration, waste, increased
tension, and in the end reduced security
for all.

Our common security rests on three
underlying principles.

First, just as we must remain alert
and resolute about Soviet actions, so
we must also be ready to explore and
expand areas of mutual interest. To
allow our fears to obscure our need to
seek common ground is to condemn
ourselves to unrelenting tension. But
neither can we let our desire for better
relations lead us into arrangements that
will not adequately protect our national
interests.

Second, we must be prepared to do
what is necessary to assure our secu-

rity, while preferring to maintain a bal-
ance at lower levels of armaments.
Both the military and arms control
paths have figured centrally in the his-
tory of NATO's pursuit of security.

Arms control is complicated and
frustrating. Our goals and our efforts
will inevitably be criticized by some
who believe there is too little disarma-
ment and by others who believe the

Allied interests have been pro-
tected [in SALT] because allied
interests are our interests.

Soviets are taking advantage of arms
control agreements. Let us be clear and
realistic about what we are seeking to
accomplish. Arms control cannot put
an end to military competition. But we
can, and do, use arms control to cap
arms buildups, to begin the difficult
process of reductions and qualitative
restraints, and to sustain a needed
dialogue.

Arms control, correctly understood
and wisely applied, is yet another
way — a complementary way — to pur-
sue security. We should not let our in-
ability to accomplish everything im-
mediately discourage us from signifi-
cant steps we can achieve.

Third, while the United States will
remain unsurpassed in military
strength, we all must remain constantly
aware that our security requires collec-
tive allied effort, and that our defense is
indivisible. As an alliance, we share in
decisions on security questions, just as
we share in the burdens and risks of a
common defense. Western strength — in
a military sense and also in a larger
sense — depends upon the health of our
partnership and in our self-confidence
about the future.

These fundamental principles guide
our security decisions. A look at the
actual military situation and trends and
at how the United States and its allies
manage the condition of strategic par-
ity, shows that we face great challenges
and we are meeting them through co-
operative action.

U.S. strategic modernization plans
span the land, sea, and air components
of our forces. We are developing a new
intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM), and options for new ICBM
basing are under intensive review to
allow us to choose the best among the
various alternatives. We will begin de-
ploying a new submarine-based missile
next year, and we are building a new
strategic submarine. We have a vigor-
ous long-range cruise missile program

underway, including not only the air
launched version but sea- and
ground-launched versions as well.
These programs will insure that the al-
liance's strength will continue to be
sufficient to deter attack and protect
our common interests.

SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks] is another instrument for
bolstering security. SALT I and the
ABM treaty [Treaty on Limiting Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems] began the
important process of limiting strategic
arms. Without these agreements, we
would have been launched into a defen-
sive arms race on top of an unlimited
race in offensive arms.

SALT II will be a major brake on the
momentum of strategic arms competi-
tion. Facing a more regulated and pre-
dictable future, we will be able to de-
vote more of our attention, talent, and
resources to improving conventional
and theater nuclear forces for NATO.
SALT II will establish the principle of
equality in the number of strategic de-
livery vehicles. And it will put a limit
on the number of MIRV'd [multiple
independently-targetable reentry ve-
hicle] ICBM's, which are potentially
most harmful to stability.

At the same time, SALT II will not
rule out the force programs we have
underway to meet the challenges that
will remain even with an agreement.
We have preserved all our major
strategic force options. Other programs
that can strengthen deterrence in
NATO can go forward. Allied interests
have been protected because allied
interests are our interests.

Let me emphasize that in both our
defense efforts and our arms control
negotiations, our basic aim is to
strengthen the security of the United
States and that of our allies. This has
been and will always be the funda-
mental touchstone of our policy.

That is why we are involved in
SALT — because a sound agreement
will improve Western and global secu-
rity. Without an agreement our tech-
nological and economic strength would
enable us to match any Soviet strategic
buildup. But a good agreement can
provide more security with lower risk
and cost. And we recognize that with-
out SALT the strategic competition
could infect the entire East-West politi-
cal relationship, damaging the effort to
create a less dangerous world which is
at the heart of Western foreign
policies.

The emerging SALT II agreement
will not solve all our problems. It will
not, for example, reverse the trend to-
ward increased vulnerability of fixed,
land-based missiles, a problem in the
long run for both sides. Necessary

16

strategic force modernization must and
will move forward, just as the SALT
process must and will move forward. In
SALT III we will work for further re-
ductions and qualitative limits.

We cannot discuss the management
of strategic parity without coming to
grips with the issue of how NATO
should respond to Soviet improvements
in their nuclear forces targeted against
Europe. Though the linkage to Ameri-
can strategic forces remain NATO's
ultimate deterrent, the Soviets must
understand that we will not let a weak-
ness develop at any point along the
continuum of our deterrent, including
theater nuclear forces. We have several
theater nuclear modernization programs
in process. We are exploring whether
arms control efforts could be of bene-
fit. Although no decisions have been
reached regarding force requirements
or arms control, we are consulting in-
tensively within the alliance to fashion
a common plan.

At the conventional level, improve-
ments in Soviet forces continue. Here
too the West is responding effectively.
The May 1978 summit meeting in
Washington agreed to a Long-Term
Defense Program designed to improve
the ability of NATO to function as a
defense coalition. NATO is placing top
priority on improving conventional
forces. In the last few years, the United
Stites has increased its forces in
Europe by roughly 10.000. NATO is
broadly engaged in a determined effort
to increase readiness and capabilities
for sustained defense. Wisely, we are
emphasizing improvements which draw
upon our collective technological
strengths, and which will result in
greater effectiveness rather than simply
larger forces. Many of these steps are
not glamorous; they do not attract
headlines. But they are serious steps
taken by a serious alliance, resolved to
muster the resources and will to build a
better common defense.

Here, too, we are striving to
negotiate restraints based on parity —
1978 has brought movement by both
sides in the 5-year-old MBFR [mutual
and balanced force reductions] negoti-
ations. Difficult problems remain. But
gaining Soviet agreement to reduce
forces to equal collective levels is
worth a further sustained effort. Let us
hope that the achievement of a strategic
arms limitations agreement can impart
a new momentum to the MBFR
negotiations.

Of course, Western security con-
cerns and interests are wider than
NATO. We must also ask whether, in
an age of strategic parity, we are at a
disadvantage in competing with the
Soviet Union in the Third World. The

Department of State Bulletin

Question-and-Answer Session
Following London Address

Q. We have heard in some detail
the American objective in the world
mainly by matching the Soviet arms
strength. I would like to know if
America is taking positive steps to
remove distrust by negotiations with
the Soviets on points of difference?

A. The United States, as I believe
many of you know, is involved in a
series of negotiations with the Soviet
Union in many areas. We are involved,
as I have indicated, of course, in the
negotiations dealing with strategic
arms. Those discussions are coming
into their final stages right now. and I
believe in the accomplishing of a sound

agreement. And we will not sign that
agreement unless it is a sound agree-
ment. It will be a major step toward
achieving a more stable world. We are
involved in discussions with Great
Britain and the Soviet Union looking to
a comprehensive test ban. When those
negotiations are concluded — and I be-
lieve they will be concluded
satisfactorily — I believe this will be
another major step along the road to
world peace. In cases of the Third
World, we discuss these matters with
the Soviet Union, trying to urge them
to cooperate with us when we can, and
making very clear our views so that
there can be no misunderstanding of

answer is no. While Soviet capabilities
for projecting military power have im-
proved, the United States retains not
only unequalled naval forces and other
forms of military power but also enjoys
economic and political advantages.

We also welcome the growing spirit
of national independence in the de-
veloping nations. They have demon-
strated, time and again, their determi-
nation and ability to avoid domination
by any outside powers.

Since 1960, the decolonization proc-
ess, now nearly complete, has pro-
duced some 65 new nations, with
widely differing political, economic
and social systems. During these years,
outside influence has waxed and waned
in different countries and at different
times. There have not been the perma-
nent Communist advances many once
feared.

This diversity and the irrepressible
thirst for national freedom among the
Third World nations are the surest
barriers to foreign domination. We can
best promote our own interests in these
areas of the world by welcoming this
diversity and respecting this spirit.

The economic, political, cultural,
and security ties between the West and
the Third World have supported this
spirit of independence. We must
strengthen those ties by continuing to
support the economic development
and, when necessary, the military se-
curity of these nations through our as-
sistance; by pressing the Soviets and
their allies to exercise restraint in trou-
bled areas: and by working to resolve
diplomatically those disputes which
offer opportunities for foreign interfer-
ence.

In the long run, it is the ability of the
West to offer practical support to Third
World nationalism, self-determination,
and economic growth that should make
us very confident about our future
relations.

Conclusion

In each of the areas I have addressed
today, whether economic, political, or
military, one finds extraordinary chal-
lenges. But together, America and
Europe have extraordinary resources
with which to meet them.

The physical, industrial, and tech-
nological resources of our alliance are
unequaled. If we have the will to de-
velop our economies with equity and
maintain our defenses with determina-
tion, we can achieve a safer and more
stable world. And we have that will.

In the end, our alliance is held to-
gether not simply by what we are
against, but by what we are for. Our
greatest strengths are the ties that bind
us together. These ties are founded on
a vision of the rights and dignity of the
individual, on political justice, and
freedom for all people. The negotia-
tions in which we are engaged, and the
policies we pursue, lack meaning un-
less our foreign policies are in accord
with these basic values of our peoples.

Winston Churchill spoke once of the
need to pull together and firmly grasp
the larger hopes of humanity. His
charge remains, today, our chal-
lenge. □

'Introductory paragraph omitted; text from
press release 446.

January 1979

our determination, and what we believe
in respect to these matters.

There is another wide range of
negotiations that we have with the
Soviet Union in nonmilitary, non-
strategic matters, and it would take a
very long time to encompass all of
those. But if 1 understand your question
correctly, we are engaged across the
board in a series of discussions on both
political, economic, and military mat-
ters with them.

Q. I'd like to ask you about Iran.
Can you tell us whether you still be-
lieve that the Shah of Iran is the best
chance for stability in that country,
and whether there are circumstances
in which you might be prepared to
give him military assistance in his
predicament?

A. We have stated very clearly that
we support stability in Iran and we
support the Shah. We have indicated,
however, that we are not going to
interfere in the internal affairs of Iran.
The Shah has indicated that he plans to
move toward elections in the latter half
of the year 1979. We support that ob-
jective; we think that that is a sound
objective. We support his program in
moving toward democracy and to
liberalizing conditions within his
country.

Q. Do you see any virtue in the
idea of pressuring Ian Smith [Prime
Minister of the white regime in
Southern Rhodesia] to end unilater-
ally declared independence by sur-
rendering to British though it is ar-
gued the Anglo-American plan could
be implemented by fear and hope-
fully with the advice and support of
the front-line states from the United
Nations?

A. The United States and Great Brit-
ain, I am sure, as all of you know,
have been working closely together on
the problems of southern Africa in-
cluding the problems of Rhodesia. The
current situation in Rhodesia is one
which is, to say the least, cloudy and
rather gloomy at this moment. The ef-
forts which we have made to try and
bring the parties together so as to see if
we could not reach a peaceful solution
based upon a free vote have not borne
fruit.

The Prime Minister has sent to
southern Africa his personal represen-
tative who is reviewing the situation
there and upon his return will report
and make his recommendations to the
Prime Minister. We shall await the re-
sults of that trip. We, of course, are
keeping very closely in touch with our
British colleagues on a daily basis; but
I think it would be premature for me to

make any expression until we see the
results of that trip.

Q. I would like to press you again
on the question about Iran [inaudi-
ble] and secondly, what prospects do
you see for making any progress in
the Middle East during your trip
there?

A. As far as Iran is concerned, the
matter is in the hands of the Shah and
the Government of Iran, and we shall
have to see what develops there.

Insofar as the Middle East is con-
cerned, the President has asked me to
go to the Middle East to meet with
President Sadat and Prime Minister
Begin, to see whether we can find a
way to overcome the obstacles which
are blocking the conclusion of negotia-
tions which have now been going on
for almost 3 months.1 In less than 2
weeks it will have been the full 3
months that were set forth in the Camp
David accords to conclude an agree-
ment with respect to the matters under
negotiation.

There are basically two matters
which are the obstacles at this point.
One relates to the question of the
timetable for the holding of elections
and establishing a self-governing au-
thority on the West Bank and in Gaza.
The other relates to a provision of the
treaty text which deals with the ques-
tion of the relationship of that treaty to
existing treaties which either nation
may have. We believe that it should be
possible to find a way through these
two problems.

I do not believe that peace should be
denied to the people in the Middle East
by a failure to resolve these problems.
So, we are going to see if we can do
anything to help by working with these
leaders to overcome these obstacles. I
can't make any prediction as to
whether this is possible. I can say,
without any doubt in my mind, that
achieving a resolution — a prompt res-
olution of these issues — is clearly in
the interest of the Arabs, the interests
of the people of Israel, the people of
the region, and to the people of the
world. We shall do everything within
our power to try and help them bring
this to a satisfactory conclusion.

Q. Do you intend to shuttle be-
tween the two countries? [inaudible]

A. The question was, do I plan to
shuttle back and forth between Cairo
and Jerusalem, and secondly, do I
think that it can be accomplished
within the 3 months which expire on
December 17. The answer is that I plan
to go first to Cairo and then to
Jerusalem. If after doing that it appears
that a shuttle process would be helpful.

17

I am prepared to do that. As to whether
or not I think that there can be a solu-
tion by the 17th, that depends on the
parties. They are the ones that have to
make the decision. They are the ones
who will sign the peace treaty. So, the
decisions will have to be made by the
governments of those two nations.

Q. After Camp David [inaudible]
sharp disagreement between Carter
and Mr. Begin on the question of
settlements. As you said, the 3-month
period is now soon over, and Mr.
Begin [inaudible] what would be the
American reaction if, after signing
the peace treaty, Mr. Begin will dis-
solve the military administration as
the first step in the direction of au-
tonomy, but simultaneously set up,
let's say, 20 new settlements thereby
[inaudible] and depriving the Pales-
tinians and the Jordanians from
[inaudible]?

A. I don't know if you all heard the
question or not. It's a long question, so
I am not going to try to restate it. On
the question of the establishment of the
military government and the dismant-
ling of the military government by
withdrawing it from the West Bank and
Gaza, that is provided for in the gen-
eral framework which was signed as a
result of the Camp David meetings, and
that is a solemn undertaking which,
when the agreement is reached, I would
expect both parties to carry out. With
respect to the question of settlements,
we believe that the agreement which
was reached on the question of settle-
ments is that there would be no new
settlements in the West Bank until the
conclusion of the negotiations with re-
spect to the setting up of the self-
governing authority.

The Prime Minister takes a different
view. I do not know what the Israeli
Government will or will not do, and I
don't want to predict the future. But
those are the facts and that's the way
they stand.

Q. Can I raise one other question
which you didn't mention in your
speech? There is the question of
China, which is a matter of consider-
able interest to Europe at this time.
We are really, I think, the countries
of Europe, trying very hard to con-
sider what our attitude to China
should be and as you know the
British Government is in particular
trying to decide whether it ought to
sell a lot of very expensive arms,
airplanes, and I know the French
have just signed an agreement with
the Chinese for a very large trade
deal. Now what is your advice to us
as Europeans in relation to our rela-
tions with China?

Department of State Bulletin I

AFRICA: U.S. Policy
Toward South Africa

by Anthony Lake

Address before the Conference on
U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa in San
Francisco on October 31, J978. Mr.
Lake is Director of the Policy Planning
Staff.

As we consider U.S. policy toward
South Africa, it is important that we
keep in mind three basic facts.

• The problem of racial polarization
in South Africa is serious and is grow-
ing.

• Change will come in South Africa.
The welfare of the people there, and
American interests, will be profoundly

affected by the way in which it comes.
The question is whether it will be
peaceful or not.

• Our efforts to promote construc-
tive and peaceful change have involved
both cooperation and strong differences
with South Africa. Over the years, the
differences have grown as the problems
in South Africa have grown.

I would like to discuss each of these
briefly.

Increased Racial Polarization

Over the years, a system has been
built in South Africa which mandates
racial separation and perpetuates in-

Question-and- Answer Session (Cont'd)

A. Let me say I am very hesitant to
give advice to another sovereign na-
tion. Let me tell you what our policy is
and let me state our views with respect
to the Chinese situation. Insofar as the
question of military sales is concerned,
it has been and will continue to be our
policy that we will not sell military
weapons or equipment to China or to
the Soviet Union. Insofar as other na-
tions are concerned, that is a decision
which they must make for themselves.

Secondly, with respect to the ques-
tion of the future, insofar as we are
concerned, we stated at the outset of
our Administration that one of the
goals of this Administration would be
to normalize relations with the People's
Republic of China. That remains one of
the main goals of our Administration.
As to the timing and the modalities of
accomplishing this, this is a matter that
is difficult because in doing this we
want to make sure that if this is done,
the well-being of the people of Taiwan
is not jeopardized. So, we will con-
tinue to discuss these matters and
hopefully come to a conclusion which
will permit us to reach our goals and
normalize relations with the People's
Republic of China. Was there another
part of the question I didn't get?

Q. Can you tell us how far the
United States will go in its support of
Romania?

A. Romania is an independent nation
with whom we have excellent relations.
Our relations have improved continu-
ously over the last several years, and
we will continue to strive to improve
those relations.

Q. The chairman characterized
your speech as being an optimistic
one, but isn't the sentence in your
speech that there have not been the
permanent Communist advances
many once feared rather over-
optimistic in the light of the Com-
munist successes in Angola, in the
Horn of Africa, and recently in Af-
ghanistan, the situation in Turkey,
would that not suggest — not to men-
tion the pickings for the Soviet Union
should the Shah be toppled in Iran?
Would that not suggest some revision
of policy in the light of these appar-
ent Communist advances?

A. We have, of course, followed
each of the events to which you re-
ferred with the greatest of care and
thought. We are concerned about the
situation in a number of the areas
which you pointed out, but I think one
has to take a look across the broader
spectrum. If you take a look and see
what the situation is in Africa as com-
pared with several years ago, you will
find quite a different picture. I think
one has to take a look at the long run
and to design one's policy with respect
to the long future rather than simply
reacting to individual situations. That
does not mean that in a given situation
it may not be necessary to take a spe-
cific action. But. I think that when I
said what I said there, I was talking
across the broad spectrum of the world,
and not trying to pick out any particular
region. □

Press release 446A of Dec. IU1978.

'For material relating to Secretary Vance's
visit to Egypt and Israel, see p. 39.

equality; the problems within South
Africa are therefore growing.

• In distribution of the land, 13% is
reserved for the 71% of the population
who are black; 87% is reserved for the
17% who are white.

• Over 60% of the black population
lives in areas reserved for whites.
Think for a moment what this means
for those people; All of them must
carry passes; most would be forced to
overcrowded so-called "homelands" if
they lost their jobs; their families are
often not allowed to live with them.

• The average black income is less
than one-eighth of average white earn-
ings.

• Education is compulsory and free
for white students. It is neither com-
pulsory nor free for blacks; and spend-
ing per child in white schools is over
15 times that in black schools.

• Basic facilities — housing, elec-
tricity, plumbing, health care — are
woefully inadequate for blacks, far in-
ferior to those for whites.

• South African blacks who live and
work in white areas have no say in
making the laws which so dominate
every area of their lives. They are de-
fined by the South African Government
as citizens of small and fragmented
homelands which they may never have
seen; they have no citizenship rights
where they live and work and form an
essential part of economic life.

The white Afrikaners who dominate
the politics of South Africa have their
own historic roots and their own fears
for the future. Their forebears came to
South Africa in the 16th century; they
have developed their own language,
culture, and religion. If their security
were jeopardized in South Africa, they
would have nowhere else to go. They,
too, are Africans.

Our hope must be that they can be
convinced, while there is still time,
that racial progress will do more to se-
cure their future than to threaten it.
There has been, and there may continue
to be, some relaxation in the practice of
apartheid in South Africa. Some hotels,
restaurants, bars, and theaters have
been integrated. "Whites Only" bar-
riers in some public facilities have been
removed. It has been made easier for
blacks to own homes in white areas.

We should welcome these changes.
But most black South Africans see little
sign that fundamental change is being
achieved. For generations, most black
South African leaders have tried to en-
gage white leaders in constructive
dialogue on the future of the country;
they have sought to reason and per-
suade; they have attempted to find a
way to work together with whites to-

January 1979

ward greater political and economic
equality. Yet many of these leaders
have been detained. Their organiza-
tions have been banned.

With each failure to achieve prog-
ress, blacks have become more doubt-
ful about a strategy of dialogue and
peaceful demonstrations. Events in re-
cent months have added greatly to this
bitterness and may have convinced
many, particularly of the younger gen-
eration, that efforts to achieve peaceful
change are futile. The killing of stu-
dents during the Soweto uprisings, the
deaths in detention of Steven Biko and
other young leaders, and finally the
bannings and detentions of numerous
black leaders and organizations on
October 19 of last year have left a deep
legacy of bitterness.

Promoting Peaceful Change

Recognizing that our influence is
limited, it is deeply in our interest to
do what we can to halt this trend to-
ward racial polarization and violence
and to promote serious, peaceful
change.

It is clear that change will come in
South Africa. But if significant peace-
ful progress does not begin soon, the
gap between black and white could be-
come irremediable. This would have
tragic consequences for the people of
South Africa and for the region. If an
organic, irreversible crisis developed,
we would have fewer and fewer policy
choices. And it would have a serious
impact on our own national interests.

• Such a crisis could produce strains
in our relations with other African na-
tions. Our ties — economic and
political — to these countries are in-
creasingly important.

• A growing racial confrontation in
South Africa could have serious
domestic repercussions for the United
States.

• South Africa has great natural
wealth and is an important source of
key raw materials. We and the rest of
the world have an interest in economic
stability in South Africa and in the de-
velopment of all her human as well as
natural resources.

• Growing racial conflict in South
Africa would provide an opportunity
for intervention by outside powers and
could bring ideological as well as racial
polarization.

I think most Americans agree that we
should do what we can to promote
peaceful change in South Africa, al-
though some are more concerned that it
be peaceful, others that it be change.
The major arguments come with regard
to how best we can use our in-

fluence— recognizing its limits — to
promote peaceful change. I look for-
ward to exploring those arguments with
you this morning.

Broadly speaking, there have been, 1
believe, two poles in approaches to this
question: on the one hand pressure and
isolation; on the other, communication
and persuasion.

Over the past three decades, some
have argued that through closer ties
with South Africa, we can help the
whites find a way to liberalize South
African society. Our economic ties,
they would argue, help provide oppor-
tunities for blacks; and higher positions
for blacks in the economy, particularly
in skilled jobs and management, will
eventually lead to political rights. They
would also point to the positive exam-
ple which American companies can set
by following fair employment prac-
tices, as in the code developed by the
Reverend Leon Sullivan and endorsed
by a number of American companies.

A second school rejects this theory.

19

South African Government toward res-
olution of all three of the region's criti-
cal problems: Rhodesia, Namibia, and
apartheid in South Africa itself. There
must be progress on all of these issues.
We will welcome and recognize South
African efforts to achieve progress on
any of them.

We will do whatever we can to sup-
port meaningful change in South Af-
rica; but we recognize that we cannot
dictate the precise nature of change. It
is for the people of South Africa
themselves — all the people — to deter-
mine the future of their society. We
have urged that leaders in the South
African Government soon begin a seri-
ous dialogue with representative lead-
ers of all the people to explore ways to
resolve the country's growing prob-
lems.

But if there is not significant prog-
ress in South Africa, relations between
our two countries will inevitably de-
teriorate. This is a fact, not a prefer-
ence. Our own values, the fundamental

Change will come in South Africa. The welfare of the people there,
and American interests, will be profoundly affected by the way in
which it comes. The question is whether it will be peaceful or not.

primarily on the grounds that three
decades of economic growth have not
produced fundamental change in South
Africa; that foreign economic invest-
ment has helped strengthen a repressive
system; and that the only course which
can bring the whites to allow real
change is to use economic leverage
against them. They would argue that
the South African Government must be
isolated from the international commu-
nity if it persists in a system which all
regard as unjust; and that strong, clear
opposition by the world community to
apartheid will provide encouragement
to the majority within South Africa
who have been denied their freedom.

The primary charges leveled against
this approach have been that cutting off
our economic and other relations with
South Africa could not force change,
since the South Africans could survive
such measures; and that we would
therefore only be damaging our own
economic interests while driving the
white South Africans further behind a
defensive and rigid shell.

Our own approach has been to try to
make the following points clear to the
South African Government.

We hope that a deterioration in
American relations with South Africa
can be avoided — this would not be in
our interest or South Africa's.

We wish to work together with the

national commitment of the American
people to the political, civil, and eco-
nomic rights of every individual born
on this Earth, as well as our standing in
the international community and our
long-term interests in the region, re-
quire our disassociation from racial
discrimination and a denial of basic
human rights. We would prefer, of
course, a future in which progress
within South Africa allowed us to
strengthen our ties to that country.
Such a future would be better for the
people of South Africa, for the region,
and for us. It depends, as I have said,
on the decisions of the South African
Government.

Basic U.S. Efforts

Over the years, we have sought to
encourage this peaceful change in four
basic ways.

First, we have sought to demonstrate
in constructive ways our strong com-
mitment to racial equality.

• We have brought South African
representatives of all races to the
United States to obtain a first-hand un-
derstanding of our outlook and our
commitment to racial equality.

• Through investment guidelines, we
have encouraged American firms in
South Africa to follow fair employment

20

Department of State Bulletin

practices. And we have supported the
Sullivan code.

• Our diplomatic representatives as a
matter of policy have integrated their
social functions.

Second, we have expressed our con-
cern about the impact of apartheid on
the lives of black South Africans and
have sought to maintain ties with the
black South African community.

• Our Embassy has been in the
forefront among diplomatic missions in
demonstrating opposition to political
repression and support for black lead-
ership.

• Ours was the only foreign ambas-
sador to attend the funerals of Robert
Sobukwe and Steve Biko.

• We have consistently protested
detentions and bannings of political
leaders.

• We have tried to keep in contact
with students, labor and political lead-
ers, religious leaders, and other rep-
resentatives of the black community.

• We maintain a library in Soweto.

• We have provided refugee assist-
ance for the students who have fled
South Africa to Botswana and Lesotho.

ways that protect the rights of all indi-
viduals, black and white — it could
have a significant impact on how South
Africans regard internal change.

Fourth, we have indicated to South
Africa the fact that if it does not make
significant progress toward racial
equality, its relations with the interna-
tional community, including the United
States, are bound to deteriorate.

• Over the years, we have tried
through a series of progressive steps to
demonstrate that the United States can-
not and will not be associated with the
continued practice of apartheid.

• In 1962 the United States imposed
a voluntary arms embargo against
South Africa, strengthened in 1963.

• In 1964 we restricted Export-
Import Bank (Eximbank) financing to
South Africa to exclude any support for
trade with the government and ended
direct loans.

• In 1967 we terminated all U.S.
naval ship visits to South African
ports.

• In November of last year we sup-
ported the U.N. mandatory arms em-
bargo on South Africa. This February,

Our efforts to promote constructive and peaceful change have in-
volved both cooperation and strong differences with South Africa. Over
the years, the differences have grown as the problems in South Africa
have grown.

Third, in encouraging the South Af-
rican Government to work toward
peaceful resolution of the Namibian
and Rhodesian conflicts, we could have
some impact on the nature of change in
South Africa itself.

• These efforts demonstrate clearly
the value of peaceful change as op-
posed to mounting racial conflict. They
also demonstrate our willingness to
work cooperatively with the South Af-
rican Government in implementing
change.

• These negotiations show that there
will be broad international support for
efforts to bring peace and justice in
southern Africa; and that the interna-
tional community will work to find rea-
sonable compromises in resolving these
difficult problems.

• If change can be brought peace-
fully in Rhodesia and Namibia — in

regulations were issued implementing
our own decision to prohibit all sales of
any kind to the South African military
or police.

• We have recently tightened proce-
dures on the sale of civilian aircraft to
South Africa, to help assure that they
will not be used for paramilitary pur-
poses.

• Recently, Congress passed legis-
lation further restricting Eximbank
facilities for South Africa, stating that
they could only be made available to
firms which are proceeding toward im-
plementation of fair employment prac-
tices.

• And we have refused to recognize
the "homelands" which the South Af-
rican government has declared to be
"independent."

There are limits to our ability to en-

courage change in South Africa. We
cannot dictate a blueprint or a timetable
for progress, nor should we. It is for
the people of South Africa — both black
and white — to determine their own fu-
ture.

We have tried in such policies both
to make clear that we cannot support
apartheid and to demonstrate that we
are concerned about the rights of all
South Africans. It is not white South
Africans as human beings that we op-
pose but a system of racial separation
and inequality. We believe that the best
way to assure the future rights and se-
curity of all South Africans is for them
to begin a progressive transformation
of that system.

In 1962 ex-Chief Albert Luthuli, an
extraordinary leader and winner of the
1960 Nobel peace prize, wrote that a
future of anguish and suffering for
people of all races in South Africa
could be avoided. "We seek no ven-
geance," he wrote. "More than other
continents, perhaps, and as much as
any other nation on this continent, we
need the ways of peace, the ways of
industry, the ways of concord."
"Will," he asked, "the outstretched
hand be taken?"

Sixteen years have passed. Divisions
run deeper. It is fundamentally in our
interest to work all the more for the
grasping of that hand, while it still may
be offered.

The course I have described is the
policy which we believe brings the best
chance of encouraging the peaceful
change so much in everyone's interest.
It avoids. I believe, the dangers pre-
sented either by policies which would
convince South Africa's whites that we
are implacably hostile to them, and that
they must therefore go it alone without
regard for our concerns or policies
which falsely imply that we could ever
be indifferent to the plight of the vic-
tims of institutionalized racial injus-
tice.

These are the best policies we have
found. I do not pretend that they are
the only possible policies, or that they
will necessarily succeed. Our influence
is limited. We must therefore use it
with all the skill we can find. We must
continue to put our minds to the com-
plexities of issues that our hearts — as
well as our brains — tell us are terribly
important. That is why I look forward
so much to hearing and learning from
your comments today. □

January 1979

21

CANADA: Visit by
Secretary Vance

Secretary Vance was in Ottawa
November 21-22, 1978. Following is a
news conference held by the Secretary
and Secretary of State for External Af-
fairs Donald Jamieson on Novem-
ber 22. '

Minister Jamieson. Ladies and
gentlemen, because we do not have an
inordinate amount of time, I will keep
the opening statement very short, being
well aware that I will not be covering
all the points that we dealt with today.

There were some 20-odd items on
the agenda ranging from relatively
small ones to perhaps the two biggest
ones in bilateral terms — the question of
the maritime boundaries and fisheries
and the Alaska pipeline. We spent a
good deal of time on each of these
subjects, and, in both cases, I think I
can report that there was substantial
progress.

Because we have just finished, the
statement relating to the boundaries
question is not yet ready; but I can
paraphrase it for you briefly and say
that the Secretary and I have instructed
our negotiators to complete the negoti-
ations by the end of this year. We have
given them a deadline by which to
complete. We are quite satisfied, as a
result of the talks that went on today,
that we can make very significant
progress by that time on a fisheries
agreement, and we have indicated to the
negotiators that if there are unresolved
problems by the end of the year, they
are to report these for disposal by the
Secretary and by myself or by the two
governments concerned. In other words,
we have concluded that the process must
be concluded by that time.

The only other point on which,
again, I say I regrettably have to cut
this short to give you some opportunity
to ask questions of the Secretary is that
on the pipeline both governments have
reaffirmed their very strong support for
the pipeline and their conviction that it
is a most important project and that it
can and indeed will go ahead as rapidly
as possible.

I think beyond that I would be cut-
ting too much into your time and the
Secretary's. So perhaps I might ask
Mr. Vance to say a word, simply,
however, ending by expressing in a
very genuine way what a pleasure it has
been to have him with us and what a
very worthwhile day it has been in
terms of moving ahead on a wide range
of Canada-U.S. matters as well those

matters on which we are mutually con-
cerned on the international scene.

Secretary Vance. I want to echo
what Don has said with respect to the
usefulness of our discussions today and
yesterday. We covered, as Don has
said, a very wide variety of subjects
which are of interest to us, both bilat-
erally and internationally. We, I think,
made good progress in our discussions.
I also want to particularly mention the
fact that I was most appreciative to
have the opportunity to meet at lunch
today with the Prime Minister and to
discuss with him a number of subjects
of broad international interest.

Again, Don, I want to express my
thanks to you for inviting me to come
to Ottawa and to be able to sit and meet
with you and with your colleagues for
what I consider to be a very fruitful
meeting.

Q. You spoke last night in favor of
a united Canada. The people of the
Province of Quebec sometime next
year will vote in a referendum bear-
ing on the question of independence.

In the event that the people of
Quebec and the majority voted at
some point in favor of independence,
how would the United States resolve
the difficulty of respecting the right
of the Quebec people to self-
determination and its interests in
defending a united Canada?

Secretary Vance. I do not want to
speculate about what the future may or
may not bring. I expressed my views
about the importance of a united
Canada. The question of what will be
done is an internal matter for Canada,
and I think it would be inappropriate
for me to speculate about the future
which none of us can predict at this
point.

Q. A question to both Ministers
with regard to Rhodesia. I wonder if
you could give your reaction to
Prime Minister Smith's decision to
postpone majority rule and say
whether you think it will have any
effect in any way on the proposal,
your proposal, the British-American
proposal, for an all-parties confer-
ence?

Secretary Vance. The proposal of
Great Britain and the United States for
an all-parties conference remains on
the table. The problem of holding an

all-parties conference has become in-
creasingly difficult because of actions
taken on both sides. I give, for exam-
ple, the shooting down of the Viscount
plane by the patriotic front.

On the other hand, across-border
raids by the Salisbury government have
created problems on the other side, and
as a result of this the chance of bring-
ing the parties to the table for an all-
parties conference has been greatly
complicated at this particular period of
time.

However, our proposals remain on
the table. We shall remain in contact
with the parties and see whether or not
something can be brought to a conclu-
sion. I think it is essential that a
peaceful solution be found to this
problem. If one is not found, in my
judgment, the fighting will increase,
the violence and the bloodshed will in-
crease, and it will be not only tragic for
the people of Rhodesia but also for the
people of the region as well.

Q. Could I ask Mr. Jamieson to
briefly give his reaction to Mr.
Smith?

Minister Jamieson. There is nothing
by way of a substantive difference be-
tween Mr. Vance's views and mine.
We discussed this today along with the
whole question of southern Africa. Our
Namibian initiative, which we both
said today we must press on with, we
believe it too is the most effective way
to go; and indeed, if we can show in
Namibia that a peaceful resolution is
possible to one of these problems, it
will have a salutary effect as far as
Rhodesia is concerned.

Q. On the maritime boundary dis-
pute, could I ask both of you to give
us some appraisal of whether there
have been any discussions concerning
the naming of a third party, an in-
ternational arbitrator, to resolve the
Atlantic boundary?

Minister Jamieson. I said in the
House some weeks ago and I repeat
now that the prospect of one or
more — the boundary questions being
referred to a third party has always
been there. We have always understood
from the beginning that that was a pos-
sibility.

When you get the statement — and it
should be distributed shortly — you will
see that basically what we are now
concentrating on is a comprehensive
fisheries agreement. We believe that if
the fishermen and the fishing interests
on both coasts are in a situation where
they are satisfied with the arrangements
that have been worked out to insure
that their livelihoods are preserved —
and that applies to fishermen of both

22

countries — then the boundary question
as such, while not diminished in im-
portance, certainly is diminished
somewhat in urgency.

And, while there is a linkage be-
tween these two issues — namely, the
fisheries agreement and the ultimate
disposition of the boundaries — the em-
phasis, as you will see here in the
statement, is on getting a fisheries
agreement first because conceivably
then that would give us more time to
deal with the boundary question. But
there is a clear linkage between the
two.

Incidentally, Mr. Vance and I will
be meeting again in Brussels at the
time of NATO in about 10 days or so,
and we would hope that we can take a
further look at the situation then be-
cause the negotiators will have met in
the meantime.

Secretary Vance. I would say that I
subscribe to what Mr. Jamieson has
said, and I am very hopeful that by the
time we meet in Brussels on the 7th
and 8th of December, we will have ad-
ditional information which may help us
move forward more rapidly as a result
of their conversations.2

Q. You mentioned a minute ago in
regard to Canadian unity that you
did not intend to interfere in the
domestic policies of Canada.
Nonetheless, we would like to know
what was the anxiety that caused you
to make that statement?

Secretary Vance. As I said last
night, as an observer of the Canadian
scene and as a close neighbor, we ob-
viously follow with interest what is
happening in your country. I, as the
President has before me, wanted to in-
dicate clearly that we believed it is im-
portant that there be a united Canada
but also to make clear that this is an
internal matter, and we do not intend to
interfere in the internal affairs of
Canada.

Q. Both sides of the question — a
united Canada and an independent
Quebec — have been lobbied in your
country; one by Mr. Trudeau, the
other by Mr. Levesque who has been
several times to make speeches in
support of the view of the Govern-
ment of Quebec. Do you favor using
the U.S. audience for lobbying what
you call an internal question for
Canada?

Secretary Vance. In the United
States we believe very strongly in free-
dom of speech, and anybody who
comes to the United States certainly is
welcome and free to express whatever
views they wish to put forward.

Q. Your country takes a great
interest in situations further away
from it, notably the Middle East in
which you played such a key part.
How can you hold yourself aloof
from a situation that may affect your
security along the whole of your
nothern border? How can you say
that you want to stay aloof from that
when you are so involved in Africa
and the Middle East and every place
else in the world?

Secretary Vance. With respect to
the Middle East, all of the parties have
asked us to work with them to try and
help them find a solution to that prob-
lem. We have been willing to do so
and, I believe and hope, have played a
constructive role in that respect.

Q. On the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement, which has been
made essentially more stringent,
what reason for optimism do you
have that you are going to be able to
clean up the Great Lakes, consider-
ing the record of the companies in-
volved so far?

Minister Jamieson. I don't think
that either Mr. Vance or I are scientifi-
cally minded enough to give you a very
specific answer on that. I can only an-
swer against the record which we heard
something about today and which indi-
cated that there have been considerable
improvements in many areas of pollu-
tion since the 1972 agreement was
signed. I think perhaps you would have
to ask the experts what other measures
they now feel will help the matter still
further. We did hear today that there
had been a very considerable improve-
ment in the situation.

I appreciate, by the way, the ques-
tion because it reminds me to make
another announcement or comment
about our meetings today which I had
neglected to say; namely, that we have
now undertaken to engage at once in
talks with regard to air pollution. And
these talks will begin hopefully before
the end of the present year. This is a
new element of the border problem
which we are now prepared to tackle.

Q. Could you say please what
progress if any you have made to
stop the government bidding war for
investment under the auto pact?

Secretary Vance. We discussed at
length the auto pact, and we are
awaiting the report of the Royal Com-
mission which I believe will be forth-
coming in the very near future. Ob-
viously the first thing which we will
wish to do is to study that report very
carefully. There have been discussions
going on between the Assistant Secre-

Department of State Bulletin

tary of State for Economic and Busi-
ness Affairs and his counterpart in the
Foreign Ministry here. Once we have
had a chance to inform ourselves with
respect to the report and the recom-
mendations and suggestions that are
made there, we will pick up the discus-
sions and proceed to try and make
progress in clearing away the differ-
ences that exist.

Minister Jamieson. To add to that,
in the discussion this afternoon the
Canadian view was expressed that the
American Ambassador, Mr. Enders,
had made a point, with which we
agreed, in a recent speech in which he
talked about the desirability of ending
the so-called bidding war to which you
referred. So I think there is a basis
there for moving toward a more formal
means through which that can be
achieved.

Q. There is no agreement —

Minister Jamieson. No, not at the
moment because, of course, there are
so many elements in play, not the least
of which are the multilateral trade
negotiations which have an element of
countervail and that type of thing in
them and, of course, the inability of
our government on the one hand and
the U.S. Government on the other to
totally bind Provinces and States unless
we have some mechanism by which we
can do so and that I would acknowl-
edge does not exist at the moment.

Q. Since you have set the deadline
on the fisheries and boundaries
agreement, what happens if the
negotiators do not reach an agree-
ment? And, secondly, you have
mentioned that the Alaska pipeline is
one of the key bilateral issues. Would
you tell us a little more about what
are the outstanding issues concerning
the Alaska pipeline?

Minister Jamieson. On the

fisheries, first of all it is not always
wise to be a prophet in these matters.
But the point with regard to the dead-
line was that Mr. Vance and I con-
cluded this morning that there was
enough light in sight that there is no
inordinate reason to be worried about a
settlement on a fisheries agreement,
and that is one of the reasons why we
felt confident in putting a deadline on
them.

The second one was, of course, that
these matters always proceed more ef-
fectively if everyone knows that there
is a specific cut-off date. In order to in-
sure that that date is not passed this
time, we have said: "OK, do as much
as you can. " And we think that will be
very considerable. If there are out-

January 1979

23

Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement 1978

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and
Canadian Secretary of State for Exter-
nal Affairs Donald Jamieson on
November 22, 1978, signed a revised
agreement between Canada and the
United States on water quality of the
Great Lakes.

The new U.S. -Canada agreement
reaffirms the determination of both
countries to restore and enhance Great
Lakes water quality. It was signed by
Mr. Jamieson and Mr. Vance in a brief
ceremony at the Lester B. Pearson
Building, headquarters of the Depart-
ment of External Affairs in Ottawa.

The Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement 1978 brings up to date the
provisions contained in the original
agreement signed in Ottawa in April
1972. That agreement has resulted in
considerable progress toward im-
provement of Great Lakes water qual-
ity. Under its terms, a review was to be
undertaken within 5 years to see how
effectively it was working and where
improvements could be made.

The review was carried out by U.S.
and Canadian negotiators, with the ad-
vice and recommendations of the Inter-

national Joint Commission, and with
involvement of the eight Great Lakes
States, the Provinces of Ontario and
Quebec, and the public in both coun-
tries.

The new agreement strengthens the
1972 agreement by calling for various
additional programs and measures to
meet problems in Great Lakes pollution
which were not evident or fully under-
stood at the time. It includes:

• Programs to strengthen and renew
the commitment of both countries to
control pollution from municipal and
industrial sources;

• More effective control of persist-
ent toxic substances and other pollut-
ants;

• Identification of airborne pollut-
ants entering the Great Lakes;

• Identification and control of pol-
lution from agricultural, forestry, and
other land-use activities;

• Better surveillance and monitoring
mechanisms;

• Provisions aimed at further reduc-
ing phosphorus loadings; and

• Placing new limits on radioactiv-
ity.

standing issues at that time, don't con-
tinue the negotiations in an effort to
solve those. In effect, put them in the
lap of the two responsible ministers,
and we will have to cope with them
from there.

On the pipeline, I suppose the most
important element now is this issue of
the incremental pricing arrangement on
which some of you who have been
following that are familiar, where there
are studies going on and representa-
tions being made. That is essentially, I
guess, the most important single key
issue in that regard.

Secretary Vance. I have nothing
further to add except that we both, as
Don Jamieson has said, support very,
very strongly the importance of moving
forward with this and making a success
of the project.

Q. I just wanted to ask whether
the report that Canada and the
United States are talking about some
sort of a trade-off between the
Beaufort Sea and the Dickson En-
trance is accurate. Are you talking
about that, and what sort of a

trade-off were you speaking about at
this time?

Minister Jamieson. I do not recall
having used the word trade-off.

Q. An exchange of whatever it is.

Minister Jamieson. We did not

today try to set up any single formula-
tion. I emphasized at the beginning that
there is a fisheries issue which is vital
and immediate: How do you apportion
the fish stock so that each side feels
that they are getting a reasonable ac-
cess? I believe, and I think Secretary
Vance agrees, that once we have that
settled or once that is in place, to put it
crudely, how you draw a line on the
bottom of the ocean ceases to have the
same urgency and immediacy although
no less important. So we did not get
into the idea of whether there were
going to be, to use your expression,
trade-offs against Beaufort Sea or west
coast-east coast; those were not the
sorts of things that we spent our time
discussing. □

1 Press release 434.

2Subsequently Deputy Secretary Warren
Christopher attended the NATO meeting.

The valuable role of the International
Joint Commission in monitoring the
implementation of the agreement will
be continued.

The agreement was cosigned by Len
Marchand, Canada's Minister of State
(Environment), and Barbara Blum,
Deputy Administrator of the U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency. Dr.
Harry Parrot, Minister of the Environ-
ment of the Province of Ontario, also
took part in the ceremony.

The 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement represented significant
progress in coordinated environmental
management by Canada and the United
States. Since its signature, both coun-
tries have devoted great effort and sub-
stantial resources to the restoration and
enhancement of water quality in the
Great Lakes. While much remains to be
done, there is no doubt that benefits to
both users of the water and the general
public have been great.

In its fifth annual report on Great
Lakes water quality, the International
Joint Commission concluded that the
continued degradation of the lakes has
been substantially checked and that the
development of coordinated programs
of research, surveillance, and remedial
measures has been a major accom-
plishment of the two governments.

The 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement builds on 6 years of experi-
ence under the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement of 1972. Since it
came into effect, there has been a sig-
nificant improvement in understanding
of the technical and scientific aspect of
water quality, the presence and effects
of toxic substances in the Great Lakes
system, and the extent of nonpoint
source pollution. Thus the 1978 agree-
ment contains the following significant
revisions or improvements over the
1972 agreement:

• Provision of revised and new water
quality objectives, both general and
specific;

• Provisions to largely eliminate dis-
charge of toxic substances into the
Great Lakes and to establish warning
systems which will point up those that
may become evident;

• Dates on which municipal (De-
cember 31, 1982) and industrial (De-
cember 31, 1983) pollution control
programs are to be completed and
operating are set;

• Improved monitoring and surveil-
lance requirements to enable assess-
ment of the effectiveness of remedial
programs;

• Provisions for dealing with pollu-
tion from land-use activities and for
examining the problem of airborne
pollutants;

24

Department of State Bulletin

• A definition of new, interim phos-
phorus loadings with provisions for an
18-month review and new strategies for
controlling phosphorus as necessary;
and

• Provision for an annual public in-
ventory of discharges and pollution
control requirements.

The agreement states the purpose of
the two signatories to be a commitment
to a maximum effort to obtain a better
understanding of the Basin ecosystem
and to reduce or eliminate the dis-
charge of pollutants into the system,
with a prohibition on the discharge of
toxic pollutants. This purpose is to be
met through programs which, as under
the original agreement, have general
and specific objectives. General objec-
tives are broad descriptions of desirable
water quality conditions, while specific
objectives are designations of
maximum or minimum desired levels
of a substance or effect, to protect the
beneficial uses of the waters.

Among the general objectives are
keeping the waters free from:

• Sewage discharges, oil, and other
debris;

• Materials which adversely affect
color, odor, taste, or other conditions;
and

• Materials which produce toxic
conditions or provide nutrients for the
growth of algae which interfere with
the beneficial uses of the Lakes.

The lengthy list of specific objec-
tives, detailed in annex 1 of the agree-
ment, provides that specified levels or
concentrations of persistent or nonper-
sistent chemical and physical sub-
stances not be exceeded to the injury of
property and health. Based on work by
experts in both countries under the aus-
pices of the Great Lakes Water Quality
Board of the International Joint Com-
mission, the specific objectives of the
1978 agreement are far more com-
prehensive and stringent than those of
the 1972 agreement.

The agreement outlines a number of
programs which are necessary to meet
the general and specific objectives.
Among these are programs which call
for:

• The preparation of an inventory of
pollution abatement requirements, ex-
pressed as effluent limitations;

• Controls to be placed on the use of
pest control products to limit their
input into the Lakes; require control of
pollution from animal husbandry oper-
ations and from the hauling and dis-
posal of liquid and solid wastes. Other
measures will be required in connection
with land-use activities in an effort to

reduce this significant contribution to
Lakes' pollution;

• The establishment of measures to
control pollution from shipping
sources, including both oil and vessel
waste discharges;

• The continuation of the joint pol-
lution contingency plan for the Lakes;

• Measures for control of pollution
from dredging activities and the dis-
posal of polluted dredge sediments;

• Measures for the control of pollu-
tion from onshore and offshore
facilities, such as materials transporta-
tion within the Basin, and gas drilling
operations;

• Additional protection for pollution
from hazardous polluting substances
and toxic chemicals;

• The introduction of measures for
the control of inputs of phosphorus
and other nutrients to prevent harmful
algal growth;

• A program aimed at identifying the
contribution of airborne pollutants to
the Lakes; and

• The further implementation of a
coordinated surveillance and monitor-
ing program to determine the extent to
which the general and specific objec-
tives are being achieved.

The International Joint Commission
will continue to play an important role
under the 1978 agreement. It will assist
governments in implementing the
agreement by tendering advice; col-
lecting, analyzing, and disseminating
data; and undertaking public informa-
tion activities. In addition, the Com-
mission will send a full report to gov-
ernments on the progress toward
achievement of the general and specific
objectives every other year. The 1978
agreement also specifies more precisely
the terms of reference of the joint in-
stitutions established to assist the
Commission in performing functions
related to the agreement. □

Press release 432 of Nov. 22. 1978.

DEPARTMENT: Y<*ir Liaison Office

With I .S. State and Local

Governments

WHITE HOUSE
ANNOUNCEMENT, NOV.

16'

The President today announced his
intention to nominate W. Beverly Car-
ter, Jr., to be Ambassador at Large to
head a new State Department Office for
Liaison with State and Local Govern-
ments. Mr. Carter, 57, of Philadelphia,
Pa., is Ambassador to the Republic of
Liberia.

As head of the Office for Liaison
with State and Local Governments,
Ambassador Carter will report directly
to the Secretary of State, and will also
work closely with Jack Watson, Assist-
ant to the President for Inter-
governmental Affairs.

The responsibilities of the new office
will include facilitating state and local
governments' priority international
interests; arranging briefings and other
communications for governors and key
local government leaders on interna-
tional issues of special interest to them
and conveying their views on such is-
sues to the President and the Secretary
of State; assisting senior state and local
government officials in planning their
official overseas travel and the visits of
foreign officials; coordinating assign-
ments with state and local governments

for Foreign Service officers; and de-
veloping the State Department's
capabilities to identify and to report to
state and local governments on how
other societies at the national or subna-
tional level understand and resolve
common problems of major impor-
tance.

Prior to his present assignment in
Liberia, Mr. Carter served as Ambas-
sador to Tanzania (1972-1975) and
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs (1969-1972). A career
Foreign Service information officer, he
has served in public affairs and area
positions in both the former U.S. In-
formation Agency and the State De-
partment.

David H. Shinn has been selected as
deputy to Ambassador Carter and will
be in charge of the new office until
Mr. Carter's return in mid-January. Mr.
Shinn, a career Foreign Service Officer,
was most recently detailed to the
mayor's office in Seattle under the Pear-
son amendment domestic assignment
program. □

•Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Nov. 20, 1978.

January 1979

25

EAST ASIA: U.S. Normalizes Relations
With the People's Republic of China

Following are the texts of December
15. 1978, of the joint communique be-
tween the United States and the
People's Republic of China, President
Carter's address to the nation and re-
marks to reporters following the ad-
dress, and the U.S. statement on nor-
malization. '

PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS :

I would like to read a joint com-
munique which is being simultaneously
issued in Peking at this very moment
by the leaders of the People *s Republic
of China.

[At this point, the President read the
text of the joint communique.]

Yesterday, our country and the
People's Republic of China reached
this final historic agreement. On
January 1, 1979, a little more than 2
weeks from now, our two governments
will implement full normalization of
diplomatic relations.

As a nation of gifted people who
comprise about one-fourth of the total
population of the Earth, China plays,
already, an important role in world af-
fairs, a role that can only grow more
important in the years ahead.

We do not undertake this important
step for transient tactical or expedient
reasons. In recognizing the People's
Republic of China, that it is the single
Government of China, we are recog-
nizing simple reality. But far more is
involved in this decision than just the
recognition of a fact.

Before the estrangement of recent
decades, the American and the Chinese
people had a long history of friendship.
We've already begun to rebuild some
of those previous ties. Now our rapidly
expanding relationship requires the
kind of structure that only full diplo-
matic relations will make possible.

The change that I'm announcing to-
night will be of great long-term benefit
to the peoples of both our country and
China — and, I believe, to all the
peoples of the world. Normalization —
and the expanded commercial and cul-
tural relations that it will bring — will
contribute to the well-being of our own
nation, to our own national interest,
and it will also enhance the stability of
Asia. These more positive relations
with China can beneficially affect the
world in which we live and the world

in which our children will live.

We have already begun to inform our
allies and other nations and the Mem-
bers of the Congress of the details of
our intended action. But I wish also to-
night to convey a special message to
the people of Taiwan — I have already
communicated with the leaders in
Taiwan — with whom the American
people have had and will have exten-
sive, close, and friendly relations. This
is important between our two peoples.

As the United States asserted in the
Shanghai communique of 1972, 3 issued
on President Nixon's historic visit, we
will continue to have an interest in the
peaceful resolution of the Taiwan
issue. I have paid special attention to
insuring that normalization of relations
between our country and the People's
Republic will not jeopardize the well-
being of the people of Taiwan. The
people of our country will maintain our
current commercial, cultural, trade,
and other relations with Taiwan
through nongovernmental means. Many
other countries in the world are already
successfully doing this.

These decisions and these actions
open a new and important chapter in
our country's history and also in world
affairs .

To strengthen and to expedite the
benefits of this new relationship be-

tween China and the United States, I
am pleased to announce that Vice Pre-
mier Teng has accepted my invitation
and will visit Washington at the end of
January. His visit will give our gov-
ernments the opportunity to consult
with each other on global issues and to
begin working together to enhance the
cause of world peace.

These events are the final result of
long and serious negotiations begun by
President Nixon in 1972 and continued
under the leadership of President Ford.
The results bear witness to the steady,
determined, bipartisan effort of our
own country to build a world in which
peace will be the goal and the respon-
sibility of all nations.

The normalization of relations be-
tween the United States and China has
no other purpose than this: the ad-
vancement of peace. It is in this spirit,
at this season of peace, that I take spe-
cial pride in sharing this good news
with you tonight.

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS4

I wanted to come by and let you
know that I believe this to be an ex-
tremely important moment in the his-
tory of our nation. It's something that I
and my two predecessors have sought

JOINT COMMUNIQUE,
DEC. 15

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

JANUARY 1, 1979

The United States of America and the
People's Republic of China have agreed to rec-
ognize each other and to establish diplomatic
relations as of January 1, 1979.

The United States of America recognizes the
Government of the People's Republic of China
as the sole legal Government of China. Within
this context, the people of the United States will
maintain cultural, commercial, and other unof-
ficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

The United States of America and the
People's Republic of China reaffirm the princi-
ples agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai
Communique and emphasize once again that:

• Both wish to reduce the danger of interna-
tional military conflict.

• Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-
Pacific region or in any other region of the
world and each is opposed to efforts by any
other country or group of countries to establish
such hegemony.

• Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf
of any third party or to enter into agreements or
understandings with the other directed at other
states.

• The Government of the United States of
America acknowledges the Chinese position
that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of
China.

• Both believe that normalization of Sino-
American relations is not only in the interest of
the Chinese and American peoples but also
contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the
world.

The United States of America and the
People's Republic of China will exchange Am-
bassadors and establish Embassies on March 1 .
1979.

26

Department of State Bulletin

avidly. We have maintained our own
U.S. position firmly, and only since
the last few weeks has there been an
increasing demonstration to us that
Premier Hua and Vice Premier Teng
have been ready to normalize relations.
I think the interests of Taiwan have
been adequately protected. One of the
briefers will explain the details to you.

Our Ambassador there. [Chief of the
U.S. Liaison Office] Leonard Wood-
cock, has done a superb job in pre-
senting our own views strongly and
clearly to the officials of the People's
Republic of China. I will be preparing
myself adequately for the visit of Vice
Premier Teng. We invited him on one
day; he accepted the next, without
delay; and I think he's looking forward
to this trip with a great deal of antici-
pation and pleasure.

I have talked personally this evening
to Prime Minister Ohira [of Japan].
Early this morning we notified the offi-
cials in Taiwan, and we have also
notified many of the leaders around the
world of this long-awaited development
in international diplomacy.

I think that one of the greatest bene-
fits that will be derived from this is the
continuation of strong trade, cultural
relationships with Taiwan — the people
of Taiwan — and a new vista for pros-
perous trade relationships with almost a
billion people in the People's Republic
of China. This is also, of course, en-
hanced by the new opportunities for us
to understand the people of China, and
to work avidly for peace in that region
and for world peace.

This afternoon the Soviet Union of-
ficials were notified through their Am-
bassador here, Mr. Dobrynin. And I
think the Soviets were familiar with the
fact that we were anticipating normali-
zation whenever the Chinese were
willing to meet our reasonable terms,
and they were not surprised. As you
well know, the Soviet Union and
People's Republic of China have dip-
lomatic relations between themselves.

My own assessment is that this will
be well received in almost every nation
of the world, perhaps all of them, be-
cause it will add to stability. And the
Soviets and others know full well, be-
cause of our own private explanations
to them, not just recently but in months
gone by, that we have no desire what-
soever to use our new relationships
with China to the disadvantage of the
Soviets or anyone else. We believe this
will enhance stability and not cause in-
stability in Asia and the rest of the
world.

I'm very pleased with it. And I ob-
viously have to give a major part of the

credit to President Nixon and to Presi-
dent Ford, who laid the groundwork for
this successful negotiation. And most
of the premises that were spelled out in
the Shanghai communique 6 years ago
or more have been implemented now.

You can tell that I'm pleased, and I
know that the world is waiting for your
accurate explanation of the results.

Q. How did the congressional
leaders take it?

A. With mixed response. Some of
the congressional leaders who were
there have long been very strong per-
sonal friends of the officials in Taiwan.
They are not as thoroughly familiar
with the officials in the People's Re-
public of China.

One of the most long-debated issues
was whether or not we would
peremptorily terminate our defense
treaty with Taiwan, or whether we
would terminate that treaty in accord-
ance with its own provisions. And the
People's Republic officials agreed with
our position that we would give Taiwan
a 1-year notice and that the defense
treaty would prevail throughout 1979. I
think that alleviated some of the con-
cerns among the Senators.

And another concern expressed by
them was whether or not we could
continue cultural relationships, trade
relationships with the people of
Taiwan. I assured them that we could,
that the Chinese knew this. And we
will ask the Congress for special legis-
lation quite early in the session to per-
mit this kind of exchange with the
people of Taiwan. This would include
authorization for the Export-Import
Bank and Overseas Private Investment
Corporation to guarantee and to help
with specific trade negotiations.

I think that many of their concerns
have been alleviated, although there
certainly will be some Members of the
Congress who feel that we should have
maintained the status quo.

Q. You said the response to your
speech would be "massive applause
throughout the nation." What do
you think the response to your
speech will be in Taiwan?

A. I doubt if there will be massive
applause in Taiwan, but we are going
to do everything we can to assure the
Taiwanese that we put at top — as one
of the top priorities in our own re-
lationships with the People's Republic
and them — that the well-being of the
people of Taiwan will not be damaged.

To answer the other question, I don't
think this will have any adverse effect
at all on the SALT [Strategic Arms

Limitation Talks] negotiations as an
independent matter. And I think that
the Soviets, as I said earlier, have been
expecting this development. They were
not surprised, and we have kept them
informed recently. Their reaction has
not been adverse, and we will proceed
aggressively as we have in recent
months, in fact throughout my own
Administration, to conclude a suc-
cessful SALT agreement.

U.S. STATEMENT

As of January I, 1979, the United States of
America recognizes the People's Republic of
China as the sole legal government of China. On
the same date, the People's Republic of China
accords similar recognition to the United States
of America. The United States thereby estab-
lishes diplomatic relations with the People's Re-
public of China.

On that same date. January 1. 1979, the
United States of America will notify Taiwan that
it is terminating diplomatic relations and that the
Mutual Defense Treaty between the United
States and the Republic of China is being termi-
nated in accordance with the provisions of the
Treaty. The United States also states that it will
be withdrawing its remaining military personnel
from Taiwan within four months.

In the future, the American people and the
people of Taiwan will maintain commercial,
cultural, and other relations without official
government representation and without diplo-
matic relations.

The Administration will seek adjustments to
our laws and regulations to permit the mainte-
nance of commercial, cultural, and other non-
governmental relationships in the new circum-
stances that will exist after normalization.

The United States is confident that the people
of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future.
The United States continues to have an interest
in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue
and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled
peacefully by the Chinese themselves.

The United States believes that the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations with the People's
Republic will contribute to the welfare of the
American people, to the stability of Asia where
the United States has major security and eco-
nomic interest, and to the peace of the entire
world. D

'Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Dec. 18, 1978.

2The address was broadcast live on radio and
television from the Oval Office at the White
House.

"For text of the Shanghai communique, see
Bulletin of Mar. 20, 1972, p. 435.

4Held with reporters in the White House
Briefing Room. Following the President's re-
marks. Administration officials held a back-
ground briefing on the announcement.

January 1979

27

ECONOMICS: The Role of Exports
in ZJ.S. Foreign Policy

by Warren Christopher

Address before the 65th National
Foreign Trade Convention in New
York on November 13, 1978. Mr.
Christopher is Deputy Secretary of
State.

I am pleased to have an opportunity
to talk with you today about the re-
lationship of U.S. exports to our
foreign policy. I approach this subject
as "a staunch advocate of global
commerce," to use President Carter's
phrase. I want to divide my discussion
into two parts: first, to describe why
expanding U.S. exports is important to
our foreign policy and how we are
going about it; and second, to explain
how we are trying to integrate this goal
of expanding exports with other fun-
damental foreign policy objectives.

For the vast majority of our exports,
we have only one basic foreign policy
objective — to encourage and assist
them. For these exports, there are no
other competing foreign policy inter-
ests that must be taken into account,
and our efforts can be concentrated on
assisting U.S. exporters in selling
abroad and on working to reduce
foreign trade barriers.

At the Bonn summit last summer,
the United States and our major indus-
trial partners agreed to a coordinated
strategy for economic progress. An es-
sential element in this strategy is to ex-
pand U.S. exports. Increased exports
will reduce our trade deficit and
strengthen the dollar abroad, which in
turn will help fight inflation at home.

At the same time, increased exports
promote essential political relationships
abroad. A strong U.S. economy and a
sound dollar are crucial to maintain the
confidence of our allies. Moreover, the
bonds of trade and commerce
strengthen ties with our friends and
help to lessen tensions with others.

Like the other important economic
tasks you will discuss here, improving
our export performance will require a
major long-term effort from business
and from government. I believe the
program President Carter recently an-
nounced is an important contribution to
this joint effort. That program includes
a number of significant measures.

• It provides additional funds for
Export-Import Bank (Eximbank)
financing and agricultural export cred-
its.

• It expands export development
programs to help U.S. firms, particu-
larly small and medium businesses, in
marketing abroad.

• It reaffirms our key objectives in
the multilateral trade negotiations
(MTN), such as reducing both tariff
and nontariff trade barriers and limit-
ing the use of government subsidies for
exports.

• It launches efforts outside the
MTN for a more widespread interna-
tional agreement to limit excessive
government financing for exports.

• It seeks to insure that exporters
have clear guidelines on the application
of our laws relating to foreign bribery,
antitrust, and environmental matters.

Taken together, these measures will
increase direct assistance to U.S. ex-
porters and reduce foreign and domes-
tic barriers to exports.

The strength of the President's com-
mitment to this program is reflected by
actions he has taken in the last few
days. He signed into law a bill in-
creasing Eximbank 's financing author-
ity from $25 to $40 billion and ex-
tending the Bank's charter for 5 years.
He also vetoed protectionist measures

some countries — Cuba, Vietnam,
Cambodia, North Korea, Southern
Rhodesia, and, as a result of legislation
enacted in the last Congress, Uganda.
But these broad prohibitions are the ex-
ception, not the rule.

For example, last year there were
well over 50,000 applications for
licenses to export controlled items
other than military equipment. Fewer
than 350 of these license applications
were denied — only about two-thirds of
1% of all applications. Of the more
than 50,000 licenses that were ap-
proved, all but about 1,300 — or about
2Vz% — were approved in less than 90
days.

I recognize that other applications
may not have been submitted because
exporters believed that licenses would
not be issued. But I also think that an
approval ratio of more than 999c for
these applications shows that in our
balancing of foreign policy interests,
the scale is not rigged against exports.

Second, the primary reason for im-
posing trade controls is to maintain our
national security. While our concern
with Communist countries remains a
dominant theme, our concept of na-
tional security has evolved in recent

Winning a larger share of world trade for our exporters is important
to the strength of our economy and to the perception of American lead-
ership throughout the world.

relating to meat and textile imports,
demonstrating his commitment to pres-
ervation of an open world trading sys-
tem and to successful conclusion of the
MTN at the earliest possible date.

Foreign Policy Concerns

Turning to the second aspect of my
approach, let me change my focus and
consider the narrow categories of ex-
ports where it is necessary to balance
our strong interest in promoting exports
with other fundamental foreign policy
interests — in short, the small fraction
of our exports which is subject to con-
trols. Before I discuss some of the spe-
cific areas where these controls apply,
let me offer some general observations.

First, controls should not be equated
with prohibitions. Of course, the
United States does embargo trade with

years to include a concern with the
spread of nuclear explosives and the
sale of highly sophisticated conven-
tional weapons. The character of our
export controls has evolved along with
this changing concept. As we have ex-
tended new controls to promote new
objectives, we have relaxed controls in
other areas where their use has become
less essential.

Third, the overwhelming majority of
the exports subject to controls are
military related. A large portion of
these exports are arms or other military
equipment. Congress and the American
people have understandably required us
to apply close supervision to military
sales abroad, while leaving almost all
nonmilitary exports free of controls.
Occasionally, of course, the line be-
tween military and nonmilitary exports
is blurred by dual-use items, such as

28

nuclear technology or highly sophisti-
cated computers, that have both com-
mercial and military applications.
Some of these dual-use items are also
subject to controls. But where they are
controlled, Congress has mandated
fewer specific prohibitions than for
arms sales, and we in the executive
branch operate with a strong presump-
tion in favor of allowing the exports.

Let me turn now to consider briefly
five important areas in which controls
apply.

East-West Trade. The first is
East-West trade. For the past three
decades, the dominant element in our
system of export controls has been re-
strictions on trade with Communist
countries. In the period after World
War II, our export controls reflected
our overriding concern with the threat
from the Soviet Union. In coordination
with our NATO allies, we prohibited
exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe of a wide range of industrial
products and technology that could
have a military application. Similar
national security concerns, and in some
cases armed hostilities, led to adoption
of embargoes on trade with North
Korea, North Vietnam, the People's
Republic of China (PRC), and Cuba.

As cold war tensions have lessened,
restrictions on these nonmilitary ex-
ports have been relaxed. We have re-
duced the number of items subject to
restriction and narrowed the criteria for
determining whether an export could
affect our national security. We are
now considering the removal of con-
trols on a variety of additional prod-
ucts, while continuing to control
transfers of critical technologies used
to manufacture these products.

As a result of this liberalization of
controls and other factors, our exports

with the Soviet Union and the PRC. A
number of Cabinet-level delegations
have visited the PRC to discuss in-
creasing economic cooperation in
energy, agriculture, and other areas.
Secretary [of Energy James R.]
Schlesinger has just returned and Sec-
retary [of Agriculture Bob] Bergland is
there now. On the Soviet side, we hope
that the trip by Secretaries [of the
Treasury W. Michael] Blumenthal and
[of Commerce Juanita M.] Kreps to
Moscow next month for an important
set of trade meetings will provide fur-
ther opportunities for expansion of
trade .

Nuclear-Weapons Technology. A

second area of controls relates to the
increasing danger to our security from
the spread of nuclear-weapons technol-
ogy. Twenty years ago, there were only
three nuclear-weapon nations. Today,
there are more than a dozen nations
which could develop a nuclear weapon
within 2 years of a decision to do so.
On taking office. President Carter con-
cluded that this problem would no
longer be left on the back burner of
American foreign policy.

As a result, while we continue to en-
courage peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, we are making important new
efforts to prevent the spread of the
capacity to make nuclear explosives.
We supported legislation enacted ear-
lier this year to tighten controls on nu-
clear exports. And we have taken a
number of steps, including streamlined
licensing procedures, to facilitate ex-
ports of nuclear reactors and fuel to
countries that share our nonprolifera-
tion objectives.

We have not limited ourselves to
measures affecting our own nuclear ex-
ports. We have worked to develop and
strengthen a common set of guidelines

The basic foreign policy purpose which exports serve is to improve
the trade balance, strengthen the dollar, and build closer relations
with our trading partners. Any restriction on exports for other foreign
policy purposes bears a heavy burden of proof .

to the Soviet Union increased more
than tenfold between 1970 and 1977.
We are committed to continuing the
growth of East- West trade. Secretary
Vance has made clear our view that
trade can perform a useful function in
easing tensions in our relationships
with the Soviet Union and other coun-
tries.

Speaking to the International
Chamber of Commerce last month.
President Carter reaffirmed his deter-
mination to increase trade substantially

for nuclear exports accepted by the
major nuclear suppliers. We have
brought together 44 nations to explore
safer nuclear energy alternatives. And
we have tried to persuade a number of
countries that their energy needs can be
met with safe nuclear energy technol-
ogies.

Conventional Arms Sales. A third
area of controls involves the dangers
posed by the spread of advanced con-
ventional weapons systems. Since

Department of State Bulletin

1970, arms suppliers have made com-
mitments totaling about S140 billion to
developing countries. When these arms
are delivered, they will change the face
of world politics. For the first time,
many states throughout the world will
have arms of much the same sophisti-
cation and quality as those of the major
powers.

While the need for restraint on con-
ventional arms sales has become in-
creasingly clear, the fact remains that
important foreign policy interests re-
quire arms transfers in certain cases.
The problem is how to strike the ap-
propriate balance.

This requires a closer scrutiny of
arms sales to insure that they do serve
an important foreign policy interest.
Congress has enacted legislation in re-
cent years mandating this closer
examination. In addition. President
Carter has imposed a ceiling on arms
sales to Third World countries, where
resources are scarce and the pos-
sibilities for armed conflict are many.
We have also developed guidelines to
limit the sophistication of arms exports
to these countries.

In this effort, we recognize that U.S.
action alone cannot achieve meaningful
restraint. So we have gone to other
nations — both suppliers and pur-
chasers— to persuade them to join us.
It is a long road, but we are encouraged
by the prospects that joint efforts can
ease the heavy burden of armaments.

Human Rights. The fourth and fifth
aspects of foreign policy that give rise
to export controls — human rights and
antiterrorism concerns — have a much
smaller impact on U.S. exports, both in
terms of countries and dollar amounts.

The promotion of human rights is a
fundamental tenet of the foreign policy
of the Carter Administration. We be-
lieve our underlying principles and
values must be reflected in American
foreign policy if that policy is to have
the support of our people and if it is to
be effective. The pursuit of this cause
is not an ideological luxury cruise with
no practical port of call. Widening the
circle of countries which share our
human rights values is at the very core
of our security interests, because such
nations make strong allies.

In our efforts to promote human
rights, we are using a wide range of
tools — private diplomatic approaches
in our bilateral relations with other
countries; public statements where pri-
vate approaches are unavailable or un-
availing; multilateral approaches in the
United Nations, the Organization of
American States, the International De-
velopment Banks, and elsewhere; and
adjustment of our foreign assistance

January 1979

programs to take into account human
rights conditions in the recipient coun-
tries.

We strongly prefer to use positive
measures, but where these have no ef-
fect, we must consider restrictions on
the flow of our military and economic
aid. In some instances, our human
rights policy has involved restrictions
on U.S. exports, although here, as in
other areas of export controls, it is al-
most entirely military-related sales
which are affected. And here again we
are implementing our policy in collab-
oration and consultation with Con-
gress, which has specified areas where
human rights considerations must be
brought to bear on exports.

We are attempting to comply with
the letter and spirit of the law that pro-
hibits, except in "extraordinary cir-
cumstances," sales of military equip-
ment to countries where there are gross
and consistent human rights violations.
Congress strengthened that prohibition
this year and extended it to cover ex-
ports of police equipment. Moreover,
Congress has become sufficiently con-
cerned about human rights conditions
in several countries that it has prohib-
ited all military sales in any circum-
stances to those countries. In addition,
the United States has complied with the
arms embargo imposed on South Africa
by the United Nations last year and
taken the further step of prohibiting all
U.S. exports to the South African
police or military.

Antiterrorism Efforts. A fifth as-
pect of our foreign policy affecting
U.S. exports is our effort to combat
international terrorism. Like our human
rights policy, our antiterrorism efforts
involve the restriction of only a rela-
tively small dollar volume of exports,
to only a relatively few countries.
Existing legislation restricts military
sales to countries that harbor terrorists,
and proposed legislation would bar
many nonmilitary exports to a wider
range of countries that support ter-
rorism. Here again we recognize that to
be effective, our efforts must be mul-
tilateral. A major step in international
cooperation on this problem was taken
at the Bonn summit, where the par-
ticipating countries pledged to termi-
nate air service with any country that
harbors aircraft hijackers.

Limitations on U.S. Government
Financing

Let me turn from discussing controls
on exports to a different but related
subject — limitations not on actual ex-
port transactions but on U.S. Govern-
ment financing for our exports.

Whether restrictions on export

financing should be used to further
these or other foreign policy objectives
is a difficult question. On the one
hand, export financing is provided by
the U.S. Government, usually on
generous terms and often as a direct
loan to a foreign government. There-
fore it is viewed by some as a proper
instrument for pursuing noncommercial
U.S. interests, much as foreign assist-
ance programs are used. On the other
hand, the primary reason for providing
export financing is to enable U.S. ex-
porters to compete with other trading
nations. Therefore, others argue, it is
an integral part of purely commercial
transactions that should not be inter-
fered with on foreign policy grounds.

There is undoubtedly merit to each
side of this debate. But the fact is that
Congress has enacted specific lim-
itations on Export-Import Bank
financing to reflect each of the five
foreign policy concerns I have dis-
cussed in connection with export con-
trols. In carrying out these legal re-
quirements, we believe that restrictions
on export financing should be used for
foreign policy reasons only in highly
exceptional circumstances.

Let me illustrate this point using
human rights restrictions as an exam-
ple. Since 1974 Eximbank has been
prohibited by law from financing ex-
ports to Communist countries which re-
strict the right of their citizens to
emigrate. This year the Congress fur-
ther restricted the Bank's authority to
finance exports to South Africa. But
aside from these specific statutory pro-
hibitions, there are only two other
countries in which human rights prob-
lems have led the Bank to refuse to
make loans.

Problems of Export Controls

This has been a very brief review of
the categories of exports in which the
strong presumption in favor of exports
must be balanced against other impor-
tant foreign policy interests. I hope that
the review has demonstrated that these
categories are extremely limited when
compared to our overall exports of
more than $120 billion. And within
these categories, the balancing does not
often result in denials or substantial
delays of exports. Nevertheless, we in
government recognize that any such
denials or delays create hardships and
difficulties for U.S. companies seeking
to sell abroad. Here are some specific
problems that inevitably arise with any
set of export controls.

Difficult Cost/Benefit Assessments.

One problem is the difficulty of as-
sessing the costs and benefits of any
particular restriction. We can calculate

29

the cost of any one lost sale, but we
can not readily calculate how many
sales are lost because a denial of one
transaction may discourage potential
buyers and sellers from coming for-
ward with other transactions.

It is equally difficult to evaluate the
effectiveness of any denial in promot-
ing a particular foreign policy objec-
tive. One important reason for this dif-
ficulty is the possibility that the item
can be purchased from a supplier in
another country.

It is clear that the more countries that
participate in an export sanction, the
more effective that sanction will be.
Many of the export restrictions I have
discussed have been adopted by other
countries. In other instances, we are
making determined efforts to obtain
multilateral support — for example, in
our arms transfer and nonproliferation
policies.

Of course we will continue to take
into account the availability of a prod-
uct from other foreign suppliers before
we decide to restrict its export. But
foreign availability cannot be disposi-
tive in all cases. We cannot commit
ourselves to permit exports wherever
some other exporter can be found who
is willing to make the sale. There will
be cases where the United States must
take the first step in restricting a sale
and then encourage others to follow.

There are also instances where the
use of export restrictions serves pur-
poses beyond preventing another coun-
try from getting the product involved.
For example, terrorist organizations
will be able to buy submachine guns
even if the United States refuses to sell
them. But nonetheless we will continue
to refuse to sell such equipment to
countries that support international
terrorism.

To give us a better measure of our
policies, we are presently engaged in a
systematic review of the costs and
benefits of export restrictions. One way
to improve this assessment is a closer
exchange of views between government
and business. President Carter has re-
constituted a more broadly based ex-
port council to assist in this exchange,
and we want to encourage other means
to this end.

Uncertain Effects of Controls.

Another problem inherent in the use of
export controls is uncertainty over what
exports will be affected. There are a
few situations where broad prohibitions
on exports are required — for example,
a wartime embargo.

In many cases, however, the need to
balance a number of important foreign
policy interests, including a strong pre-
sumption in favor of exports, calls for

30

The U.S. and the Third World:
Partners or Plaintiffs

by David D. Newsom

Address before the International
Relations Section of the Common-
wealth Club and the World Affairs
Council of Northern California in San
Francisco on November 16, 1978.
Ambassador Newsom is Under Secre-
tary for Political Affairs.

Eight years ago I spoke to the Com-
monwealth Club on the subject "The
United States and the Third World."
That was in 1970, the year of the 25th
anniversary of the founding of the
United Nations. My remarks at that
time dwelt on the growing influence of
the newly independent nations in the
United Nations and in world affairs
generally. I dwelt also on growing dif-
ferences which were appearing between
the views of these countries and those
of the United States. This was true with
respect to the process of decoloniza-
tion, trade, and racial discrimination.

In 1970 most Americans were only
vaguely aware of the potential power
and influence of the developing coun-
tries. The general opinion was that the
newly independent countries of this
century would not, for many years to
come, be major factors in either eco-
nomic or political affairs.

A series of events over the last 6
years has shaken that view. In 1973 the
Arab oil-producing states successfully
mounted an embargo against the United

States. Once the oil-producing states
understood their power as a result of
the embargo, they moved successfully
to raise the price of oil dramatically.
Other developing countries, instead of
expressing dismay at the impact of the
price rises on their own economies,
saw benefits for the developing world
in general in relating similar tactics to
other commodities. In 1974 in Algiers
the new international economic order
was born with its strong demands for
greater equality in economic relations
between the developed and the de-
veloping countries.

North-South Dialogue

The new international economic
order in the form of a declaration of
U.N. purposes and of the obligations of
industrialized states to make sweeping
changes in trade, aid, and investment
policy, was brought before the sixth
special session of the United Nations in
1974. The United States found itself
virtually isolated as European countries
expressed at least rhetorical sympathy
for the thrust of this new order. That
session brought home starkly to Ameri-
can policymakers for the first time the
potential impact of these demands on
our political as well as our economic
relations with the developing world.

The next 2 years, then, saw the be-
ginning of a fundamental reassessment
of how the have and have-not nations

Department of State Bulletin

would relate to each other. At the
seventh special session, in September
of 1975, with the memory of the fruit-
less confrontations the previous year
still fresh in their minds, both sides
began to rethink their respective posi-
tions and to search for areas of con-
structive dialogue and possible cooper-
ation. One of the results was the for-
mation, in December of that year, of
the Conference on International Eco-
nomic Cooperation (CIEC) with 8
members from the developed world and
19 from the developing world. While
CIEC did not, over the some 18 months
of its existence, succeed in finding ac-
commodation between all of the issues
where the North and South differ, it did
contribute measurably to the ongoing
dialogue and resulted in concrete
progress on some issues such as food
and agriculture and technical assist-
ance. And while CIEC did narrow
some gaps between the North and the
South, many of the developing coun-
tries were unhappy with their exclusion
from the limited membership of the
CIEC.

As a result, CIEC was succeeded by
the Committee of the Whole which in-
cludes all member states of the United
Nations. This is now an important
forum for discussion of economic mat-
ters relating to the North-South
dialogue. The developing countries
would like to give it a decisionmaking
role. We continue to believe decisions
on major economic issues should be
made by existing organizations having
responsibilities in the specific func-
tional areas, for example, the GATT
[General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade] for trade, the IMF [International
Monetary Fund] for monetary affairs.

Role of Exports (Cont'd)

decisions on a case-by-case basis. And
the active role of the Congress is
another factor that adds uncertainty.

As we refine and explain our
policies, there are some things the gov-
ernment can do to reduce uncertainties
in the minds of exporters. We will con-
sult with the business community more
closely on areas of concern that could
lead to the use of controls. We will
provide exporters with clear reasons for
why a particular license was denied.
And we will try harder to identify for
the business community broad
categories of exports which are not
likely to interfere with other important
foreign policy interests.

Processing Delays. A final problem
with controls is the delays that some-
times accompany the granting or denial
of an export license. Often these delays

result from the need to develop regula-
tions and procedures to carry out a new
legal restriction. Sometimes a delay
makes possible the issuance of a
license that would otherwise have to be
denied for foreign policy reasons.
Other times the delay is caused by a re-
quest from the exporter or other in-
terested party that the government re-
consider a decision not to allow an ex-
port.

We understand that, whatever the
cause, a delay works a hardship on the
exporter who has deadlines to meet.
While, as I mentioned earlier, more
than 97% of nonmilitary export
licenses were issued within 90 days last
year, we are determined to improve on
that record. We are working both
within the State Department and with
other agencies to minimize delays, to
process licenses quickly, and to re-
spond in a helpful way to other re-

quests for guidance from the export
community.

Conclusion

As I have tried to describe today, the
role of exports in U.S. foreign policy is
a strongly positive one. The basic
foreign policy purpose which exports
serve is to improve the trade balance,
strengthen the dollar, and build closer
relations with our trading partners. Any
restriction on exports for other foreign
policy purposes bears a heavy burden
of proof.

Winning a larger share of world
trade for our exporters is important to
the strength of our economy and to the
perception of American leadership
throughout the world. We in govern-
ment want to work with you in the
business community toward that com-
mon objective. □

January 1979

There were other elements to the
dialogue. The year 1976 saw the
Nairobi meeting of the U.N. Confer-
ence on Trade and Development,
known as UNCTAD 4. While provid-
ing its share of confrontation, this
meeting saw the United States con-
tinuing to signal its willingness to
maintain a constructive dialogue re-
garding the demands of the developing
countries. This willingness to engage
in dialogue was, however, clearly
separated from any affirmation of the
legitimacy of all the other demands of
these countries. Subsequently, at Co-
lombo, Sri Lanka, the nonaligned na-
tions met and found that economic is-
sues had replaced political issues as the
prime vehicles for expressing their as-
pirations and frustrations.

I have been speaking to you about
the Third World. I know that there are
those who question the validity of this
term. They rightly point out that there
is a tremendous difference between the
least developed and the middle coun-
tries. This is true. Nevertheless, the
strong feelings which exist among
these countries arising from a common
heritage of colonialism, from their per-
ception of themselves as economically
developing nations and from a feeling
that they lack a voice in major eco-
nomic decisions affecting them, give
these countries a solidarity which is a
reality. That solidarity withstood dif-
ferences over the oil crisis. It has with-
stood general differences of view, for
example, between those countries that
are interested in debt relief and those
countries which are more concerned
about their international credit stand-
ing.

Importance of the North-South
Relationship

It has been my experience that audi-
ences attuned to the more exciting
political aspects of foreign affairs do
not find equal stimulation in discus-
sions of economic issues. Yet, the av-
erage American citizen — concerned for
his job, his standard of living, and the
value of the dollar at home and
abroad — has good reason to pay atten-
tion to the demands, sometimes exces-
sive, of the Third World nations. Only
a few statistics will illustrate why.

• In 1977, 35% of total U.S.
exports — $42 billion — went to de-
veloping countries.

• The United States sells more man-
ufactured goods to the developing
countries than to Western Europe,
Japan, and all the Communist countries
combined.

• The developing countries ac-

counted for more than half of all U.S.
exports of industrial machinery, elec-
trical machinery, and aircraft.

• They bought 50% of our wheat ex-
ports, 60% of our cotton exports, 70%
of our rice exports, and 90% of our
coal exports.

• The United States imported goods
worth $67 billion from developing
countries in 1977 — 45% of our total
imports.

These are impressive statistics, but
they are hard to relate to our everyday
lives. It perhaps comes closer to home
if we address the importance of the
North-South relationship in terms of
questions like:

• Will your gas tank be full?

• How much will it cost to fill it up?

• How much more would you need
to pay for a chocolate bar, for coffee,
for copper wire, if the developing
countries should seek to emulate the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries and restrict supplies or raise
prices?

• How many workers would be laid
off in your community if developing
countries shifted their purchases from
the United States to other suppliers?

Each issue has implications for our
daily lives as well as for our relation-
ship with two-thirds of the peoples of
the world. The developing nations have
addressed themselves to several key is-
sues. Each one presents us with prob-
lems, particularly in a time of eco-
nomic difficulties. Approval of new
departures for any one of them could
face strong opposition in the Congress.
Yet each one is a key to whether we
shall be partners or adversaries in our
relations with the developing world.
Let me take briefly each one in turn.

Economic Issues

Trade. The first is trade. The de-
veloping countries want improved ac-
cess to our markets for their exports.
They want special and preferential
treatment for their manufactured prod-
ucts.

We believe improved market access
is desirable and in our own interest. In
the event of injury to domestic indus-
try, of course, we must take temporary
measures to protect jobs and producers,
preferably through adjustment assist-
ance or, if necessary, through restric-
tions at the borders.

There has been hard bargaining with
many developing countries in the mul-
tilateral trade negotiations which have
just wound up work in Geneva. These
extended and complex negotiations
have offered the developing countries

31

an opportunity to gain benefits. Un-
fortunately, we feel they have not fully
availed themselves of these opportuni-
ties.

Foreign Aid. The developing coun-
tries also seek an increase in the trans-
fer of resources which they need for
economic development. They wish a
level of economic assistance from de-
veloped countries which would repre-
sent seven-tenths of 1% of such coun-
tries' gross national product. The im-
plications of this demand are illustrated
by two simple facts.

• The enthusiasm for foreign aid in
the United States is declining. In 1970
we ranked seventh among the de-
veloped countries in the percentage of
our gross national product transferred
concessionally to developing countries.
Today we have dropped to twelfth.

• We have changed our approach to
foreign aid in part as a result of con-
gressional legislation. In the face of a
continued need by many countries for
infrastructure assistance, particularly in
Africa, we are concentrating more and
more on the needs of the poor. We look
to the multilateral institutions to pro-
vide infrastructure assistance. We are
unable to supply straight budgetary as-
sistance to meet the special problem of
middle-income countries. This problem
is particularly acute in the Caribbean.

Some of the most active negotiations
have related to commodities. The de-
veloping countries have given a high
priority to stabilizing broad fluctua-
tions in commodity prices which have
such a profound effect on countries de-
pending almost entirely on one or two
primary products.

We have now indicated our accept-
ance in principle of the idea of a com-
mon fund which would be used to help
commodity agreements to stabilize
commodity prices. We still have differ-
ences over the form of such a fund and
whether it would also be used to pro-
vide resources not directly related to
stabilization of commodity prices.
Those who follow both our relations
with the developing countries and our
relations with Congress will hear more
of the common fund in the days
ahead.

Debt Relief. Debt is a highly im-
portant and highly emotional issue, as
it is with individuals. We have always
taken the position that debt relief
should be conditioned upon a debtor
country promising to undertake a com-
prehensive sound economic develop-
ment or stabilization program, one that
would insure that excesses in resource
mismanagement are not repeated.
Many feel strongly that the developed

32

countries have an obligation to relieve
them of their debt burden. We are now
committed to debt forgiveness for the
poorest countries and are studying how
much relief we should provide in 1980.
The two principal multilateral finan-
cial institutions — the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund —
were founded well before the creation
of most of the nations in the United
Nations today. Newly independent
countries and many other Third World
countries as well wish to move away
from voting in international institutions
based on financial contributions toward
a one state, one vote system giving a
preponderant voice to the developing
countries. Such a move in the minds of
many in the United States would repre-
sent a departure from the objectivity
and nonpolitical character of these in-
stitutions.

Technology Transfers. Developing
countries today must often pay very
large amounts in order to obtain the
rights to technology which they feel
important for their industrial develop-
ment. They are seeking to liberalize the
transfer of technology believing that
this would speed up the closing of the
gap between rich nations and poor na-
tions. They also seek support for ex-
panding their indigenous capacity to
develop and adopt such technology.

There is, of course, a vast quantity
of technology which is noncommer-
cially held, and we have ongoing pro-
grams which seek to make that avail-
able to the developing countries. On
the other hand, technology of commer-
cial value held by firms in the investing
nations has a value which these firms,
understandably, do not wish to relin-
quish without a return on their invest-
ment. Various ways by which this
privately owned technology can be
more easily transferred are under con-
sideration. The matter remains a sig-
nificant and controversial issue.

Foreign direct investments are an
important source of economic resources
and technology for the developing
countries. Differing views exist, how-
ever, on whether such investments are
beneficial to the developing nations.
For more than a year the U.N. Com-
mission on Transnational Corporations
has sought to elaborate a code of con-
duct within which such corporations
could operate to the satisfaction of both
sides. In the view of the developed
world, private foreign investment rep-
resents one of the best and least politi-
cal means by which transfers of both
capital and technology can be affected.
And while the corporate investors are
willing to accommodate to demands for
sharing of ownership and management
which will provide greater benefits and

opportunities for the people of the
countries involved, they must ask and
receive some kind of assurance that,
once having invested their capital, the
rules of the game will not be changed
in ways which result in the loss of their
investment.

Political Issues

I have dwelt today upon the eco-
nomic issues which are under constant
discussion between the developed na-
tions of the North and the developing
countries of the South. When nations
gather, increasingly these are the con-
cerns that trouble them most. And
these concerns have a direct impact on
political relations which in turn can
affect the climate in which the eco-
nomic issues are resolved. One soon
finds that there is no distinction be-
tween political and economic affairs
when the livelihood and security of na-
tions is involved.

The strong efforts of the United
States to resolve the problems in the
Middle East have a direct bearing upon
our access to the vital resources of this
region and to the economic health of
the nations processing these resources.

The political issues of South Africa,
Namibia, and Southern Rhodesia can
cloud our dialogue with African states
on other issues, even when our position
on such matters as trade, development
assistance, commodity policy, and debt
rescheduling is clear and positive.

The danger of political instability in
key areas threatening our national se-
curity is ever present. One needs only
to look at events in Iran and consider
the effects of a change in the orienta-
tion of that country on our strategic and
economic interests in the area, or to
look at Nicaragua and think about the
implications of spreading unrest in
Central America, our doorstep, to un-
derstand the political-economic inter-
relationship.

Finally, there are a whole series of
foreign policy issues of prime impor-
tance to us — nuclear nonproliferation,
human rights, arms control — which
cannot be moved forward in a mean-
ingful fashion without the cooperation
of the Third World countries.

Ultimately, in our national interest,
we wish to do what we can to see that
Third World societies evolve in ways
which are compatible with the kind of
world we wish to live in and leave to
our children. If we ignore these coun-
tries, their needs, and their aspirations,
we will forfeit our ability to exert this
influence which can be so important to
our own future.

So, the issues that we face in dealing
with the Third World have implications
not just for our daily lives, but also for

Department of State Bulletin

our national security now and our fu-
ture in the society of men. Thus, the
fostering and strengthening of the
dialogue between the North and the
South is extremely important to all of
us.

Fostering a Positive Dialogue

The coming year will see a large
number of international conferences
devoted to fundamental questions of
relations between developed and de-
veloping countries. Negotiations have
recently begun under UNCTAD aus-
pices on a new international wheat
agreement; in April the law of the sea
conference will resume consideration
of who controls the vast mineral re-
sources of the deep seabeds; in June
UNCTAD 5 convenes in Manila; in
August the U.N. Conference on Sci-
ence and Technology for Development
begins in Vienna; and in 1980 we ex-
pect a U.N. General Assembly special
session on development. Moreover,
progress is being made in developing a
positive dialogue with the Third World.

One can point to the Association of
the South East Asian Nations. These
five nations — Indonesia, the Philip-
pines, Singapore, Malaysia, and
Thailand — are important friends and
trading partners particularly of the
states on the west coast. They are
keenly interested in all of the North-
South issues. They have taken a lead-
ing and constructive role in the inter-
national discussions of these issues.
They have had direct dialogues with
the United States, the European Eco-
nomic Community, Japan, Canada, and
Australia. In addition, they are recon-
ciling difficult trade matters among
themselves. They are demonstrating by
their own growth the very great poten-
tial which exists in the developing
countries. They have received and de-
served strong support from us. Their
progress demonstrates that despite the
complexity of these issues, dialogue
can bring positive results for both.

In 1978 relations between the United
States and the Third World remain a
significant part of our foreign policy
agenda. As much as any other issue
these matters bear directly on your
daily life and mine. It is the hope of
those of us who deal with them that,
despite the complex nature of these is-
sues, they will receive the serious at-
tention of those concerned with foreign
affairs. We hope in turn that organiza-
tions such as those represented here
today will lend their support for a
positive and constructive role for the
United States in this ongoing discus-
sion with nations which represent
three-fifths of the world's popula-
tion. □

January 1979

33

Multinational Corporations

Foreign Relations Outline*

Multinational corporations (MNC's)
have been the focus of national and in-
ternational attention. Certain aspects of
MNC behavior have been criticized in
the developed countries; however, they
have recognized the positive contribu-
tions of MNC's and have continued
their general support of the basic ob-
jective of preserving an international
system in which trade and capital flows
are largely market determined. In con-
trast, some developing countries as-
sume the existence of an adversary re-
lationship between MNC's and host
countries, with the former's economic
power pitted against the latter's al-
legedly weaker sovereign power. A
number of developing countries main-
tain that the system needs to be
changed to strengthen their bargaining
power vis-a-vis MNC's and to increase
their share of the benefits of interna-
tional investment.

U.S. Policy

The United States has long held that
a largely open international economic
system without government interven-
tion provides the most efficient alloca-
tion of resources. The fundamental
U.S. policy on international invest-
ment, therefore, is neither to promote
nor discourage inward or outward in-
vestment through government inter-
vention. We respect each country's
right to determine the climate in which
foreign investment takes place within
its borders, although a liberal and sta-
ble investment climate clearly facili-
tates international flows of capital and
technology.

The United States supports the de-
velopment of principles of behavior for
governments and MNC's. Such
guidelines can affirm standards of good
practice for both enterprises and gov-
ernments, contribute to improved rela-
tions between them, and limit unilat-
eral government intervention in
investment. They can reduce conflicts
between governments over investment
issues, thereby strengthening the liberal
climate for international direct invest-
ment. The United States can support
guidelines or codes relating to MNC's
that are voluntary; do not discriminate
against MNC's in favor of purely na-
tional enterprises; are balanced to in-
clude references to the responsibilities

of governments as well as of MNC's;
and apply to all enterprises regardless
of whether their ownership is private,
government, or mixed.

International Action

Many international organizations
have MNC issues under review, but the
most significant activities have taken
place in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the United Nations, and the
International Labor Organization
(ILO).

The OECD has developed guidelines
for MNC's as part of a broader under-
standing on investment issues. In June
1976 the OECD ministers signed a
declaration on international investment
and multinational enterprises, which
includes:

• Reaffirmation by OECD members
that a liberal international investment
climate is in the countries' common
interest;

• Agreement that they should give
equal treatment to foreign-controlled
and national enterprises;

• A decision to cooperate to avoid
"beggar-thy-neighbor" actions pulling
or pushing particular investments in or
out of their jurisdictions;

• Voluntary guidelines, defining
standards for good business conduct
which the ministers collectively rec-
ommended to MNC's operating in their
territories; and

• A consultative process under each
of the above elements.

In 1979 the OECD will formally re-
view the MNC guidelines and other
portions of the investment package and
consider possible revisions.

U.N. focus on MNC's is in its
Commission on Transnational Corpo-
rations and the related Center on
Transnational Corporations. The
Commission agreed in March 1976 to
give top priority to formulating a code
of conduct for MNC's. Because of fun-
damental differences between de-
veloped and developing countries over
the substance of the proposed code, the
spring 1978 target date for a draft code
was not met. The Commission ex-
tended the working group's mandate
through 1979, however, and the
dialogue on a future code of conduct
will continue.

The ILO, like the OECD, has made

significant progress for future relations
between governments and MNC's. A
tripartite declaration of principles con-
cerning multinational enterprises and
social policy was completed in April
1977 and approved by the tripartite ad-
visory committee the same month. The
ILO Governing Council approved the
declaration in November 1977. A con-
structive and balanced document, it
strongly supports such principles as
freedom of association and equality of
treatment in employment. It also em-
bodies a number of principles con-
tained in the OECD investment pack-
age. Although the United States no
longer belongs to the ILO, we support
the incorporation of the tripartite dec-
laration into a future U.N. code of
conduct to cover employment and in-
dustrial relations.

Illicit Payments

The problem of illicit payments has
added to the controversy over the role
of MNC's. We have pressed for vigor-
ous domestic and international correc-
tive action. Following a U.S. initiative,
the U.N. Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) decided in August 1976 to
establish a group of experts to work on
an international agreement to deter
such payments. The working group was
expanded in 1977 and prepared a draft
treaty.

In July 1978, ECOSOC established a
preparatory committee to advance the
final work toward a diplomatic confer-
ence to conclude an international
agreement on illicit payments. Planned
for 1980, the conference is subject to a
definitive decision by ECOSOC at its
summer 1979 session. □

'Taken from a Department of State publica-
tion in the GIST series, released in Sept. 1978.
This outline is designed to be a quick reference
aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended
as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy state-
ment.

34

EUROPE: JVATO Ministerial
Meeting Held in Brussels

Deputy Secretary of State Warren
Christopher headed the U.S. delega-
tion to the semiannual ministerial
meeting of the North Atlantic Council
in Brussels on December 7-8, 1978.
Following are Deputy Secretary
Christopher' s news conference in
Brussels and text of the final com-
munique of December 8.

NEWS CONFERENCE '

From my perspective — which I has-
ten to say is not quite as experienced as
the last man who was at this
podium — from my perspective it was a
very valuable and constructive meet-
ing. I think that it served as a good re-
minder and an illustration that NATO
is indeed the foundation of U.S.
foreign policy. We went over a number
of subjects which are important to the
alliance. I thought that, as I evaluated
it, the discussion was both informed
and informative. I will be glad to try to
answer any questions that you might
have.

Q. During your discussions
[inaudible] the economic problems
facing Turkey and, if so, what sort of
measures need to be taken?

A. We did have a substantial discus-
sion of the economic problems of Tur-
key as well as other members of the al-
liance. It was emphasized in our dis-
cussion that although the alliance is
primarily for defensive purposes,
nevertheless, the economy of each of
the members of the alliance is an im-
portant element in its general health
and well-being. The communique,
which I know you have, stresses that
the member nations will do what they
are in a position to do both in a bilat-
eral and multilateral way. With respect
to Turkey, the United States earlier this
week signed agreements providing $50
million in balance-of-payments support
and also providing for rescheduling of
the Turkish debt to the United States or
to U.S. entities. We will be continuing
to consider ways in which we might
help the Turkish Government deal with
the problems of its economy. Turkey is
a very important member of the al-
liance, and we are anxious to help it
deal with its present economic prob-
lems which are, by common under-
standing, severe.

Q. What was the American re-
sponse to [British Foreign Secretary]
Dr. Owens' proposal for a meeting at
foreign minister level with Warsaw
Pact leaders?

A. I don't believe we responded di-
rectly in the meeting. Our view about it
is that that is a kind of meeting that can
take place at some point in the future,
but that very careful study in prepara-
tion would be needed in the MBFR
[mutual and balanced force reductions]
context. A good deal more progress
than has yet been made would need to
be made in order to justify that kind of
a meeting.

Q. During your visit to Athens a
few months ago, you were quoted in
the press as saying that you were ex-
pecting the Cyprus problem to be re-
solved within a few months — 4 or 5
months maybe; and also you were
fairly optimistic about Greece's re-
integration into the alliance. Would
you care to make a statement on this
as a result of the meetings?

A. On the Cyprus question, I don't
recall being quite as optimistic as you
recall my being but I am glad to ad-
dress the question. Now that the Tur-
kish embargo has been removed and is
behind us, and now that the Security
Council has passed its resolution [440
of November 27] and. the U.N. General
Assembly debate is behind us, it seems
to me that it's a good time to try to
make some progress on Cyprus. My
view is that it would be very desirable
for the parties, under the auspices of
the Secretary General of the United
Nations, at an early date to reconvene
the intercommunal talks. I hope they
will do so. I hope that 1979 will be a
year of real progress on Cyprus. It
stands out as an important humanitarian
problem that continues to create a cer-
tain unease in relations in the eastern
Mediterranean, so I look forward to the
parties under the aegis and auspices of
the Secretary General making progress
in 1979 on that longstanding problem.
One of my colleagues said that I may
have misspoken. I was referring to
Kurt Waldheim, the U.N. Secretary
General.

With respect to the other part of your
question, and that is the full reentry of
Greece into the NATO military coun-
cils, I express the strong hope that

Department of State Bulletin

Greece will reenter under circum-
stances that are satisfactory to Greece
and to the alliance as a whole. That
problem is being worked on in the ap-
propriate military committees, and I
hope that an early solution will be
found. That would be the strong desire
of the United States.

Q. I quite realize that Dr. Kis-
singer does not speak for the present
Administration. Nevertheless,
something he said this week in a
published interview is very germane
to this meeting, and I quote it. It is
just two sentences. "We and our al-
lies must have a capacity for regional
defense inside and outside the NATO
area. If we don't develop this, then
in the '80's we are going to pay a
very serious price. The first install-
ments are already visible."

Now my question is the following:
Is the present Administration think-
ing along similar lines, and, if so,
have you made proposals on this to
the NATO allies? And, if so, what
has been their response?

A. I didn't read the Kissinger inter-
view to which you speak, and I really
don't know enough of the context to be
able to respond to your question. We
discussed a wide variety of defense
alignments and defense relationships,
but beyond that I think I wouldn't have
any comment.

Q. With regard, sir, to the MBFR
talks and the discussion that took
place on those today, do the NATO
nations plan now to respond to the
latest proposals, or counter propos-
als, of the Warsaw Pact before the
question of data is settled?

A. No, we think that there needs to
be considerable progress on the data
front before we would be in a position,
to respond to the proposals that have
been put forward. We're glad to ac-
knowledge that there has been some
movement in that area, but we need to
have a good deal more progress on the
data front before we will be in a posi-
tion to deal substantively with the
matter.

Q. What reassurance could you
give to the allies on the subject of the
3% increase in net defense spending,
if any?

A. I do not have anything to say on
that subject beyond what Secretary [of
Defense Harold] Brown said. I am sure
you read his press conference. He gave
that press conference as I was in the air
coming here, and I can't add anything
to what Harold Brown said.

January 1979

35

Q. Do you think that in the present
situation, I mean speaking of the
Soviet Union, taking into account the
strains on the Chinese front and
overall the present situation of Soviet
diplomacy, the Soviet Union could be
inclined to be more flexible on
negotiations, on disarmament
negotiations, on Europe?

A. We are engaged in a rather wide
range of negotiations with the Soviet
Union on various disarmament matters.
As you know, the SALT [Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks] negotiations
are going forward, and we hope that
they will come to a successful conclu-
sion in the near future. We don't have a
timetable for that. We don't feel under
the gun of any time pressure on it, but
we hope that those negotiations which
do affect Europe in important respects
will reach a conclusion.

We are engaged in conventional
arms talks with the Soviet Union in
Mexico City at the present time
[December 5-15, 1978]. And once
again although Europe is not directly
involved in those talks, we hope that
some progress can be made there and
then that the progress there can be ex-
panded to include other supplier coun-
tries and eventually recipient countries.

We find the Soviet Union to be a
very determined, well-informed, tough
negotiating partner in all of our arms
discussions with them. And we don't
notice any change in their attitude
which is one of being willing to discuss
the matter but, on their side as on ours,
a very firm interlocutor.

Q. What can you say about your
views of the developments in
Romania; and what should NATO,
or could NATO, do to encourage
Romania in its defiance of the other
Warsaw Pact countries?

A. I think that we are witnessing in
Eastern Europe a trend toward some
greater independence on the part of the
countries of the Warsaw Pact. Romania
is a sovereign country and is exercising
its rights of sovereignty. I think that
the United States, as well as the other
members of NATO, finds it in its inter-
est to deal individually with those
countries — to particularly enjoy a
dialogue with those countries — which
exercise a degree of independence and
which in dealing with their own citi-
zens have an increasing recognition of
the human rights of their citizens. But,
having said that, I would also indicate
that the situation is changing only
slowly and only in a matter of degree.

Q. I believe you discussed the
Middle East in the light of Mr.

Vance's efforts on the weekend.
What is the position exactly now re-
garding the Camp David [inaudible]?
Is there any hope that it will be
signed before the deadline?

A. The United States places a good
deal of symbolic emphasis at least on
the date of December 17. 3 months
after the Camp David agreements were
announced. We have not given up hope
that agreement can be reached by that
time. As you know. Secretary Vance
will be leaving tonight to come to Lon-
don and then on to the Middle East [see
p. 39]. The parties are close together
on the text of the treaty, and they have
some distance to go to find an agree-
ment on the side letter and on the
timetable aspects of the side letter. But
we have by no means given up hope
that an agreement can be reached by
that important anniversary date. I hope
it will seem as important to the other
two parties who are most directly con-
cerned, as important to them as it does
to us.

Q. President Carter only last night
warned the Israelis and the Egyp-
tians that they should meet the dead-
line and they should sign; otherwise
there would be contrary effects on
the peace in the Middle East. Can
you explain this; what exactly did he
mean?

A. When you are shooting at a target
date, like the date of the 17th of De-
cember, and that date comes and you
don't achieve your goal, then there is a
risk of some loss of momentum and
some possible unravelling; and I as-
sume that was what the President had
in mind. That's really what the Secre-
tary and I have in mind. We think it is
important to keep our eye on that target
date in the hope that will enable the
parties to get over those last few dif-
ficult issues and to reach a conclusion
on the first part of the Camp David
framework.

Q. In view of the follow-up CSCE
[Conference on Security and Cooper-
ation in Europe] meeting in Madrid in
1980, what kind of place did the dis-
cussions over human rights take in
the [North Atlantic] Council, and
what degree of agreement or common
line was there in all the member
countries?

A. That was one of the most in-
teresting aspects of the meeting from
my standpoint. Perhaps stimulated by
the fact that the press, yesterday
morning, carried the account of Presi-
dent Carter's statement on the 30th an-
niversary of the U.N. human rights

universal declaration [see p. I], there
was a rather long discussion of human
rights yesterday. I believe it probably
took up about half of the restricted ses-
sion. It was a stimulating, wide-
ranging, valuable exchange. An im-
portant part of that exchange was the
reference to the Madrid meeting in
1980. I think the ministers emphasized
the importance of that meeting as a way
to make further progress.

As you will notice, in the draft
communique there is an indication of a
hope on the part of the ministers that
enough improvement will be made so
that the participating states can be rep-
resented at Madrid at the political
level. I think that this is a reflection of
the heightened importance given to the
Madrid meeting which was developed
in the course of our discussions. I
would want to emphasize that it will
take a reciprocal degree of interest on
the part of the other participants for our
wish for the success of that meeting to
come true; and I hope that the Warsaw
Pact countries and the other partici-
pants in the Madrid meeting will give it
the same kind of importance that we
give it, and that was recognized in the
course of the meeting here.

Q. What will the United States
think or do when the European
countries of NATO would decide to
elaborate their own position on
things like SALT III, or Euro-
strategy in the nuclear field, before
discussing it in the NATO
framework?

A, The United States has had, I
think, an unparalleled degree of coop-
eration and coordination with its allies
on the kind of subjects that you men-
tion. I hope I am accurate in saying
that our NATO colleagues feel that we
have fully briefed them about the de-
velopments in SALT, and I have not
noticed any lack of coordination in this
field. I think we recognize the need to
keep each other informed and to have
our dialogue on these crucial defense
matters fully informed and fully coor-
dinated.

Q. Could you give us some idea of
the subjects discussed during your
meetings with the Foreign Ministers
of Greece and Turkey? And two, in
view of the strong American desire
you have expressed for the integra-
tion of Greek forces into the NATO
Command, have you advanced any
suggestions to them that they might
discuss Turkish objections to this
before some opinions of them on the
command of the Aegean have been
settled one way or another?

36

A. I did meet with both Foreign
Minister Rallis of Greece and Foreign
Minister Okcun of Turkey. The meet-
ing of Foreign Minister Rallis of
Greece was a followup on the trip that I
had to Athens a few weeks ago. We
discussed primarily bilateral matters of
mutual interest. We had discussed,
when 1 was in Athens, cooperation in
the field of science and technology and
we referred briefly to that discussion.
We discussed other matters of bilateral
interest such as the foreign military
sales credits that the United States has
made available in the last Congress to
Greece. At the Foreign Minister's re-
quest, I also gave him a brief update on
the Middle East negotiations, which of
course, are a matter of particular inter-
est to Greece because of its geograph-
ical position.

In my meeting with Foreign Minister
Okcun of Turkey, we once again dis-
cussed mainly matters of bilateral
interest. He explained to me at some
length the serious financial conditions
being faced by Turkey. I discussed
with him the aid that we had been able
to give in the last year, and we dis-
cussed in a general way what the pros-
pects might be for the future. I
explained to him, which of course he
knew, that our budget discussions are
only now going on in Washington and
we will be presenting our budget to
Congress shortly after the first of the
year.

We did not discuss in any detail the
reintegration issues. I believe that both
of the parties understand those issues
and I believe they have discussed them
with each other. But as I said earlier, it
is our hope that Greece will be fully
reintegrated into NATO on a basis that
is satisfactory both to Greece and to all
the members of the alliance.

You had a second part to that ques-
tion which I am sorry to say I may have
forgotten. Do you want to follow up on
that or have I —

Q. If you have advanced any
suggestions to them to try to settle
these things between themselves?

A. No, we did not. I believe that
matter is being discussed in the appro-
priate military committees of NATO;
and at this point we have not tried to be
helpful on that question — at least that
was not involved in my discussions.

Q. According to [NATO] Secretary
General Luns, the Dutch proposal
for more consultation with the Euro-
pean partners on the modernization
of the theater nuclear forces drew a
positive response. Could you elabo-
rate the U.S. stand?

A. Not very much. That subject was

touched only fleetingly in the meetings
but I would simply affirm the U.S.
willingness to be involved in those dis-
cussions within the context of the
alliance.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE2

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministe-
rial session in Brussels on 7th and 8th De-
cember. 1978.

Ministers reaffirmed their resolve to preserve
and strengthen the solidarity of the North At-
lantic Alliance as the indispensable guarantor
of their security, freedom and well-being, and
as an important contribution to international
peace and stability. They underlined their faith
in the principles and purposes of the Alliance
which have their foundation in the values of
democracy, human rights, justice and social
progress.

Ministers examined the Secretary General's
study on economic cooperation and assistance
within the Alliance which was undertaken at
the request of the Council meeting in Wash-
ington in May. in view of the economic dif-
ficulties of some member countries.

Bearing in mind the close relationship be-
tween defense and the economy, as well as the
fundamental importance of economic and social
improvement for a stable democracy, they em-
phasized once again the need to secure a sound
basis for the economies of these countries and
to assist them in their economic growth.

As an expression of their solidarity and in
the light of Article 2 of the North Atlantic
Treaty. Ministers agreed on the urgent neces-
sity of increasing financial assistance and eco-
nomic cooperation by member governments
which are in a position to do so through bilat-
eral and multilateral channels. They requested
the Council in permanent session to continue its
consultations on this important question and to
report to them.

Ministers discussed the current state of
East-West relations in all its aspects and re-
called especially the East-West Study adopted
by Allied leaders at the meeting in Washington
last May. They reaffirmed their resolve to seek
further improvement in East- West relations and
their continued commitment to a policy of de-
tente as the best means of promoting stable and
mutually beneficial relations between govern-
ments and better and more frequent contacts
between individuals. In doing so they em-
phasized once again the indivisibility of de-
tente, pointing out that disregard for this would
inevitably jeopardize improvement in East-
West relations. They stressed the need for
peaceful solutions in all problem areas.

Ministers expressed again their firm convic-
tion that full implementation of all sections of
the CSCE Final Act is an essential element for
promoting detente. They noted with regret cer-
tain negative developments in its implementa-
tion during 1978 especially in the field of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and in
that of information. They stressed the need for

Department of State Bulletin

improvement in implementation to be shown
between now and the Madrid meeting so that
the participating states could take part on the
political level. They emphasized that this
meeting would provide a valuable opportunity
for undertaking a further review of the im-
plementation of the Final Act and for consid-
ering future progress. They agreed on the im-
portance of careful preparation of the Madrid
meeting and, to that end. expressed their inten-
tion to consult closely both among the Allies
and with other CSCE participating states. They
noted the positive outcome of the recent Bonn
meeting on the preparation of a scientific
forum.

Ministers reviewed the developments con-
cerning Berlin and Germany as a whole. They
noted with satisfaction the improvement of the
economic situation in Berlin and welcomed the
efforts undertaken in the last few months to

Constitutional

Referendum

in Spain

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
DEC. 71

All people who love freedom and
believe in democracy won a victory in
Spain yesterday.

The Spanish electorate decisively
approved in a national referendum the
draft democratic constitution placed
before them by their elected par-
liamentary representatives. This occa-
sion marks the culmination of coura-
geous and determined efforts by the
Spanish people, their representatives,
and King Juan Carlos to establish a
framework for Spanish democracy
which meets with the approval of all
Spaniards.

The success of the transition to de-
mocracy in Spain, and the manifest
will of Spaniards across the political
spectrum to establish a democratic
system, have earned the admiration of
people the world over who share simi-
lar ideals.

Yesterday's referendum symbolizes
a remarkable and praiseworthy
achievement. We want to congratulate
the Spanish people on this occasion,
and to reaffirm the hope and support of
the American people and their govern-
ment for continued success in this his-
toric effort. □

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Dec. 11.

January 1979

37

strengthen the economic basis for the viability
of the city. The continuation of an undisturbed
climate in Berlin and on the access routes le-
mains an essentia] element of detente in
Europe. Ministers noted with satisfaction the
conclusion of agreements and arrangements
with the German Democratic Republic on 16th
November. 1978, which are an important con-
tribution to the stability of the Berlin situation
and to detente in Europe in general.

Ministers noted with concern the continuing
buildup of Warsaw Pact forces and armaments,
both conventional and nuclear, notwithstanding
repeated Eastern assurances that their aim is
not to seek military superiority. In the face of
these developments, and while seeking con-
crete and verifiable measures of arms control.
Ministers stressed the need to continue to de-
vote the resources necessary to modernize and
strengthen Allied capabilities to the extent re-
quired for deterrence and defense. They re-
viewed with satisfaction the actions to this end
taken by the Allies since the Washington
meeting.

Ministers welcomed the increasing emphasis
being placed on cooperative equipment pro-
grams aimed at achieving a more effective use
of available resources. They also welcomed the
efforts being made to achieve a more balanced
relationship among the North American and the
European members of the Alliance in sharing in
the development and production of new defense
equipment, and to enhance the quantity and
quality of standardized or interoperable sys-
tems. They instructed national armaments di-
rectors to pursue this approach, bearing in mind
the special concerns of the less industrialized
countries of the Alliance.

Ministers welcome the agreement reached by
the governments now participating in the
NATO Airborne Early Warning Program, the
largest cooperative equipment project so far
launched within the Alliance.

Ministers reaffirmed their conviction that
concrete and verifiable arms control and disar-
mament measures would contribute signifi-
cantly to security, stability and peace. They
therefore welcomed the increasing world-wide
attention being paid to arms control and disar-
mament, as exemplified by important current
negotiations, as well as the United Nations
Special Session on Disarmament and the forth-
coming first meeting in Geneva of the Com-
mittee on Disarmament in which Alliance
members will actively participate. Ministers
recalled their agreement to make fuller use of
the Alliance machinery for thorough consulta-
tion on arms control and disarmament issues
and noted with satisfaction that such consulta-
tions have been intensified. In this connection,
they had a useful exchange of views on the
French proposal for a conference on disarma-
ment in Europe and on the prospects that this
proposal might offer for confidence-building
and security in the area.

The Ministers discussed the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. They wel-
comed the progress made in the negotiations
and expressed support for U.S. efforts to bring

them to a successful conclusion. Ministers
continue to believe that a SALT Agreement,
which enhances strategic stability, maintains
deterrence and responds to the security inter-
ests and concerns of the Alliance, will be in the
common interest.

The Ministers of countries which participate
in the negotiations on Mutual Balanced Force
Reductions reaffirmed their commitment to
these negotiations and reemphasized their de-
termination to bring them to a successful con-
clusion. They confirmed as the goal of these
negotiations the establishment of approximate
parity in ground forces in the form of a com-
mon collective ceiling on the manpower of each
side and the reduction of the disparity in main
battle tanks. The achievement of this aim
would contribute to a more stable relationship
and to the strengthening of peace and security
in Europe. These Ministers recall that to this
end an important Western initiative had been
introduced in April of this year. The Eastern
response to these proposals, while containing
some welcome movement in matters of struc-
ture and concept, leaves important differences
of substance unresolved. Both sides should
now address these open issues progressively
and constructively.

These Ministers welcomed the Eastern
movement towards agreement on the concept of
approximate parity. They stressed, however,
that this has made the clarification of the data
base, which they always regarded as essential
for substantial progress, even more urgent.
They called on the Eastern side to respond
positively to recent Western efforts relating to
the data discussion designed to identify the rea-
sons for the discrepancy between Western fig-
ures and Eastern data regarding existing man-
power levels in the area of reductions.

These Ministers also recalled the announce-
ment made by Allied leaders in Washington in
May on a meeting of the negotiations at the
foreign minister level. It was their view that,
despite the movement, the requirements stated
at that time for such a meeting had not yet been
met but they agreed to keep this matter under
review.

These Ministers continue to attach impor-
tance to the inclusion in an MBFR Agreement
of associated measures which should also
ensure undiminished security for the flank
participants.

The Ministers welcomed the continuation of
the dialogue started as a result of the Montreux
Summit Meeting between the Prime Ministers
of Greece and Turkey. They expressed their
hope that this constructive step taken by the
two governments will produce positive and
early results through further joint efforts, and
the reaffirmation, where necessary, of their
political will to attain this goal.

Ministers took note of the report on the situ-
ation in the Mediterranean and underlined again
the necessity of maintaining the balance of
forces in the whole Mediterranean region. They
requested the Council in permanent session to
pursue its consultations on this question and to
report again at their next meeting.

President Carter

To Attend

Guadeloupe Meeting;

The White House announced on De-
cember 7, 1978, that French President
Valery Giscard d'Estaing has invited
President Carter, Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt of the Federal Republic of
Germany, and Prime Minister James
Callaghan of the United Kingdom to
personal and informal conversations on
political matters and international de-
velopments of special interest to their
mutual relations. Each chief of state or
government will be accompanied by
one assistant. The meeting will take
place at Guadeloupe on January 5 and
6, 1979. □

Ministers reviewed developments in the
Middle East and expressed the hope that all
parties concerned would take the fullest ad-
vantage of the opportunities for a just and last-
ing peace offered by the current negotiations.
They expressed hope for an early successful
conclusion of these negotiations as a major step
towards a comprehensive peace in the Middle
East and expressed support for United States
efforts for such a comprehensive settlement.

Ministers took note of the progress made by
the Committee on the Challenges of Modern
Society (CCMS) and in particular its efforts to
strengthen international cooperation aimed at
enhancing the environment and improving the
quality of life. Ministers further noted with
satisfaction that the Science Committee con-
tinues to serve as an effective mechanism and
forum for international cooperation in areas of
major scientific and technological concern to
Allied countries.

In viewing world economic conditions
Ministers noted that they remained unsettled,
with all countries still adjusting to the recent
adverse trends in the economic climate. They
observed that vigorous efforts have been made
by Allied countries in support of a more equit-
able world economic system, including
strengthened world trade and payment ar-
rangements, within the context of renewed
growth. These efforts are continuing.

Ministers agreed that the next ministerial
session of the North Atlantic Council will be
held in the Hague on 30th and 31st May. 1979.
They noted that 1979 will mark the 30th An-
niversary of the Foundation of the North At-
lantic Alliance and that since its creation it has
enabled Europe to live in peace □

1 Text from press release 450 of Dec. 12.
!Text from press release 451 of Dec. 12.

38

Department of State Bulletin

MIDDLE EAST: Visit oi
Moroccan King Hassan MI

King Hassan II of Morocco made a
state visit to Washington November
14-15. 1978, to meet with President
Carter and other government officials.
Following is a joint press statement is-
sued by the White House on November
17. '

At the invitation of President Jimmy Carter.
His Majesty Hassan II, King of Morocco, made
a state visit to Washington November 14-15.
1978. In the course of this visit. His Majesty had
discussions with President Carter as well as with
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and other mem-
bers of the American Government. The discus-
sions took place in an atmosphere of friendship
and of mutual cooperation. They dealt with
bilateral relations as well as with major interna-
tional problems of common interest.

The President and His Majesty noted with
satisfaction that the centuries old ties linking the
United States and Morocco are developing in an
harmonious fashion. The two Chiefs of State re-
viewed the many areas of cooperation between
Morocco and the United States, particularly those
relating to cultural, scientific, and technical
cooperation. They decided that the development
of energy resources is a sector in which new ef-
forts would be mutually advantageous. They
agreed to technical exchanges on the exploitation

of shale oil reserves and on the utilization of
solar energy and other renewable forms of
energy. The two countries expect to sign in the
near future a bilateral nuclear cooperation
agreement. Such an agreement, which will be in
the context of the adherence by both parties to
the Nonproliferation Treaty, will permit im-
plementation of a contract for construction of a
nuclear research reactor.

President Carter and His Majesty King Hassan
also agreed that their governments should seek
to expand academic exchanges between Morocco
and the United States. They agreed that their
governments will jointly sponsor a meeting be-
tween academic leaders of the two countries to
recommend ways in which educational ex-
changes could be expanded.

The two parties reaffirmed their desire to see
private American firms give their support in the
various sectors of social and economic develop-
ment where Morocco is making considerable
efforts. They agreed that the required conditions
exist in Morocco for a more active American
participation and undertook to facilitate such
participation. The two Chiefs of State decided
that in the near future a mission under the direc-
tion of the U.S. Secretary of Commerce would
be sent to Morocco in order to explore the pos-
sibilities to develop bilateral trade and to in-
crease investments. The mission will include

representatives of the private and public sectors.

President Carter and His Majesty King Hassan
acknowledged their identity of view concerning
the international problems they examined. For
Morocco as for the United States, international
relations must be founded on respect for national
independence and for the territorial integrity of
nations, as well as on willingness to contribute
by cooperation and dialogue to the establishment
of peace in the world. Within this context, the
President expressed appreciation for Morocco's
non-aligned, independent policy, and His
Majesty welcomed American efforts to resolve
global problems.

The two Chiefs of State examined the situa-
tion in Africa. The President thanked His
Majesty for his description of the situation in
northwest Africa and expressed his appreciation
for the efforts undertaken by Morocco to end the
tension existing there and to create conditions

President Carter with King Hassan II

MOROCCO— A PROFILE

Geography

Area: 171,953 sq. mi.

Capital: Rabat (pop. 680,000—1977 est.).

People

Population: 18.6 million (1977).

Annual Growth Rate: 3%.

Ethnic Groups: 99.1% Arabs and Berbers,
.7% French. .2% Jews.

Religions: Muslim (Islam is the state reli-
gion), Christian, Jewish.

Languages: Arabic (official). French. Berber
dialects.

Literacy: 24% (males), 15% (females).

Government

Official Name: Kingdom of Morocco.
Type: Constitutional monarchy.
Date of Independence: March 2, 1956.
Date of Constitution: March 10, 1972.
Branches: Executive-King (Chief of State),

Prime Minister (Head of Government).

other ministers. Legislative — unicameral

Parliament (264 members elected to 4-yr.

terms). Judicial-Supreme Court.

Political Parties: Istiqlal, Socialist Union of
Popular Forces (USPF). Popular Move-
ment (MP), Action Party (PA), Constitu-
tional and Democratic Popular Movement
(MPCD).

Suffrage: Universal over age 20.

Administrative Subdivisions: 30 Provinces, 2
urban Prefectures, 3 Provinces in the
Western Sahara.

Economy

GNP: $9.55 billion (1977 est., current
prices).

Annual Growth Rate: 6.4% (1973-77).

Per Capita Income: $520 (1977 est., current
prices).

Inflation Rate: 13% (1977 est.).

Agriculture: Labor — 50%; products — barley,
wheat, citrus fruits, vegetables, sugar
beets, wool.

Industry: Labor — 15%; types — mining, tex-
tiles, fishing.

Trade: Exports-Sl.3 billion (1977): phos-
phate rock, phosphoric acid, citrus fruits,
fresh vegetables, canned fruits and vege-
tables, canned fish, carpets.
Imports — $3.2 billion (1977): industrial
capital goods, fuels, foodstuffs, consumer

goods. Partners — France, Italy, F.R.G.,

U.S., Communist bloc.
Official Exchange Rate: 4 dirham = US

$1.00.
U.S. Economic Aid: $855 million (1956-78).

Membership in
International Organizations

U.N., Organization of African Unity. Arab
League.

Principal Government Officials

Morocco: Monarch — King Hassan II; Prime
Minister — Ahmed Osman; Minister of
Foreign Affairs — M'Hamed Boucetta;
Ambassador to the U.S. — Ali Bengelloun.

United States: Ambassador to Morocco —
Richard B. Parker.

Taken from the Department of State's October
1978 edition of the Background Notes on
Morocco. Copies of the complete Note may he
purchased for 70$ from the Superintendent of
Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office.
Washington. DC. 20402 (a 25% discount is
allowed when ordering 100 or more Notes
mailed to the same address).

January 1979

39

NUCLEAR POLICY: The U.S. Approach to
NonproUfcration — Are We Making Progress?

by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

Address before the Atomic Industrial
Forum, Inc. in New York on October
23, 1978. Mr. Nye is Deputy to the
Under Secretary for Security Assist-
ance. Science, and Technology.

I have been asked essentially to give
a "mid-term grade" to the Carter Ad-
ministration's efforts to slow the spread
of nuclear weapons. The task is dif-
ficult for two reasons. First, as a gov-
ernment official, I have access to in-
formation not available to the public,
but at the same time my role as a gov-
ernment participant is a possible source
of bias. Second, we are trying to make
a short-term assessment of what is by
definition a long-term process.

Moreover, progress has to be judged in
the light of estimates of what otherwise
would have been the situation.

Obviously there is no neat solution
to these difficulties, but a good way to
start is by making clear what the U.S.
Government is trying to achieve. The
goals of our nonproliferation policy are
to slow the rate of spread of nuclear
weapons, preferably to zero, and to
construct a stable international regime
for the governance of nuclear energy.
These goals can be judged by whether
the Administration efforts have con-
tributed to a rate of proliferation lower
than it otherwise would have been, a
nuclear fuel cycle which is more prolif-
eration resistant than it otherwise
would have been, and strengthened in-
stitutions for a stable international re-

for the establishment of fruitful cooperation
between the countries of the region. They agreed
that the OAU is the most appropriate framework
for the resolution of African problems, and they
expressed satisfaction at the decision of the
OAU to establish a Committee of Wisemen. Re-
viewing other points of tension which exist in
Africa, the two Chiefs of State condemned
foreign intervention and the arms races which
have been their result.

The two leaders discussed at length recent de-
velopments concerning the Middle East. Presi-

Secretary Vance's
middle East Visit

After Secretary Vance's visit to
London December 8-10, 1978 (see p.
12), he traveled to Cairo and Jerusalem
to explore ways of resuming the dis-
cussions between Egypt and Israel on
the frameworks for peace in the Middle
East. The Secretary visited Cairo De-
cember 10-13, Jerusalem December
13-14. and returned to Cairo De-
cember 14-15. During the visit he flew
from Egypt to Israel to attend the fun-
eral of former Israeli Prime Minister
Golda Meir on December 12. Secretary
Vance departed for Washington De-
cember 15.

Press releases related to this trip are
Nos. 445 (December 8), 452 (De-
cember 13). and 456 (December 14). □

dent Carter, after having outlined to His Majesty
the status of the discussions currently underway,
explained the American objectives in the peace
process, and he reiterated the willingness of the
United States to continue to play a role leading
to the establishment in the region of a just, dura-
ble, and global peace. His Majesty the King, in
reaffirming that the Palestinian problem consti-
tutes a fundamental element in the search for a
solution and for the establishment of peace in the
area, explained that the Moroccan position is
based on the decisions made at the Arab Summit
meeting held at Rabat in 1974.

With respect to the situation in Lebanon, the
two parties noted their commitment to respect
the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of
that country. They renewed their support for the
work of national reconciliation undertaken under
the aegis of President Sarkis.

His Majesty the King expressed his deep
thanks to President Carter for the warm welcome
and great friendship shown him during his visit
to the United States as well as that extended to
the members of the Royal Family and to the
Moroccan delegation.

His Majesty invited President Carter to visit
Morocco. The President thanked His Majesty
and accepted the invitation, with the date and
details of the visit to be arranged through diplo-
matic channels. □

1 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Nov. 20, 1978. For re-
marks made at the welcoming ceremony on the
South Lawn of the White House and an ex-
change of toasts at the state dinner on Nov. 14.
see Weekly Compilation of Nov. 20. pp. 2031
and 2033 respectively.

gime. Later I will provide evidence of
significant progress on each of these
dimensions, but before I do so, I wish
to clear away some misunderstandings
of our policy and describe what I think
would have happened in the absence of
the new U.S. approach.

Some critics have charged the Carter
Administration with failing to see that
proliferation is a political problem and
seeking a technical fix through aboli-
tion of reprocessing. They argue that
the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle is not a
source of proliferation because there
are more efficient ways to develop a
weapon. Thus, in their view, the
American initiatives have simply
created turmoil, reduced American ex-
ports, isolated the United States, and
created incentives for proliferation.

It is true that the more newsworthy
Carter initiatives have focused on the
fuel cycle, but it is not true that the
political dimensions have been ig-
nored. We have always regarded pro-
liferation as basically a political prob-
lem. What is more, we have not re-
garded the fuel cycle as the largest part
of the problem. But neither is it a trivial
part. For example, a recent General
Accounting Office report issued strong
support for the Carter Administration's
view that large commercial reprocess-
ing plants with inadequate safeguards
present a greater proliferation risk than
small clandestine plants.

In addition, let us hope that recent
press revelations will finally lay to rest
the spurious argument that because
there are more efficient ways to
weapons than through misuse of the
fuel cycle, no state would misuse the
fuel cycle. That a priori argument,
heard so frequently in the past, has
proven to be the real example of a
technical case without political context.

Measures To Deal With Incentives

The proliferation problem has both a
supply and demand aspect. Sound pol-
icy has to address both the supply of
capabilities and the demand for
weaponry. The fact that policy meas-
ures focused on capabilities have at-
tracted more recent publicity does not
mean that policy measures addressed to
incentives have not been given equal
weight internally. As Sherlock Holmes
once noted, the fact that a dog does not
bark in the night may be the more im-
portant clue. In practice, we regarded

40

the security guarantees that the United
States provides to its allies as the most
important nonproliferation policy in-
struments we have. Critics miss this
point when they complain that the Ad-
ministration failed to pursue disputes
over reprocessing with our allies be-
cause it feared to destabilize the al-
liances. Any policy pursued to the
point of severely shaking those al-
liances would be a failure in nonprolif-
eration terms. A cooperative approach
with our allies is not only good alliance
policy, it is also good nonproliferation
policy.

Similarly, we have been concerned
to protect the multilateral instruments
that have been laboriously constructed
over the past two decades to address
security motivations. Most important,
of course, is the Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) which 105 nations have
now ratified. The treaty has helped to
create an international regime in which
states agree that their security interests
can be better served by avoiding the
further spread of the bomb. It provides
important reassurances that potential
adversaries are confining their nuclear
activities to peaceful purposes.

The NPT is a delicate international
arrangement. Countries without nuclear
weapons have accepted an explicitly
unequal status in the military area, on
the condition that they be treated
equally with regard to civil nuclear
cooperation. Thus we have rejected a
number of suggestions for policies on
the civil side that would have
weakened the fabric of the treaty as one
of the key nonproliferation institutions.

Another multilateral instrument is
the nuclear-weapons-free zone. The
most important example is the Latin
American nuclear- weapons-free zone,
which was established in the 1960's by
the treaty of Tlatelolco, but which
lacked several adherents, including
U.S. ratification of its first protocol,
before becoming fully effective. Early
in his term and without much fanfare,
President Carter announced that the
United States would ratify the protocol.
Subsequently Argentina declared its
intent to ratify the treaty, and the
U.S.S.R. and France announced inten-
tions to ratify the relevant protocols.
Then only Cuban action will be neces-
sary before the treaty enters fully into
force, and even that precondition could
be waived. Finally, American efforts to
control the vertical proliferation of nu-
clear arsenals through the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks and comprehen-
sive test ban negotiations have an im-
portant indirect effect on nonprolifera-
tion incentives. In short, there has been
significant, if less noticeable, progress
relating to incentives.

Efforts To Separate Peaceful
From Military Capabilities

Incentives can be reduced but they
cannot be eliminated as long as na-
tional rivalries and security concerns
exist. We must also deal with
capabilities to develop nuclear explo-
sives. The fact that civil nuclear tech-
nology and material can be used to de-
velop nuclear weaponry has presented a
dilemma that we have recognized since
1945. We have gone through four
phases in our efforts to limit the spread
of nuclear explosive capability. The
first was the Baruch plan to create a
strong international authority to de-
velop nuclear energy. It was a more
ambitious step than international
realities at the time would permit.
American policy then turned to a pos-
ture of seeking to protect its monopoly

Our approach is evolutionary
rather than prohibitory.

by severely restricting the export of
any nuclear technology. In December
1953, President Eisenhower launched a
third approach with his Atoms-for-
Peace program. The idea of the
Atoms-for-Peace approach was to assist
countries in their development of
civilian nuclear energy, in return for
their guarantees that they would use
such assistance only for peaceful pur-
poses and under safeguards.

In practice, the early Atoms-for-
Peace policy failed to achieve the right
balance, but its philosophy made sense
as a long-term strategy. Essentially, the
United States was offering to share the
fruits of its then long technological
lead at an accelerated pace, in return
for the acceptance by other countries of
conditions and institutions designed to
control any destabilizing effects from
such sharing. Specifically, the major
accomplishments were the institution
of a system of international safeguards
administered by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
later the Nonproliferation Treaty which
came into force in 1970.

In the early 1970's the proliferation
situation seemed quiescent, but com-
placency was shattered by two events
that ushered in the fourth period of
turmoil that has been with us since
1974. One was the Indian explosion of
a "peaceful" nuclear device using
plutonium derived from a Canadian-
supplied research reactor — an event
viewed as violating the spirit if not the
letter of the loosely written 1950's-

Department of State Bulletin

vintage Canadian-Indian agreement.
The Indian explosion gave rise to
strong demands for stricter export
policies in both the Canadian Parlia-
ment and the U.S. Congress.

The other big event was the oil em-
bargo and fourfold increase in oil
prices which created widespread inse-
curity in energy supply. Problems with
oil led to a resurgence of expectations
about the importance of nuclear energy
and raised questions about the suffi-
ciency of uranium fuel. This was
exacerbated by the 1974 decision of the
Atomic Energy Commission to close
the order books for enrichment until
they could be certain that supply would
equal demand. The net effect was to
stimulate independent enrichment
projects — incidentally, long before
President Carter came into office.

Another effect was to reinforce plans
for early commercial use of plutonium
fuel. In several troubling cases, re-
processing plants were ordered by
countries before they had built their
first thermal reactor. Moreover the
IAEA projected some 46 countries
would have reprocessing needs by
1990. All this would occur before ap-
propriate technology and institutions
had been developed. The implications
for the fragile regime of international
safeguards threatened to be disastrous.

Recovering from a late start, the
Ford Administration undertook impor-
tant initiatives in 1975-76. It began to
organize the nuclear supplier govern-
ments to agree on a code of conduct for
nuclear exports. And in the final days
before the 1976 election. President
Ford announced a moratorium on
commercial reprocessing of spent fuel
in the United States pending further
evaluation.

At the same time, a number of con-
gressional initiatives were undertaken
to tighten the conditions for nuclear
exports from the United States and sev-
eral private studies of the nuclear fuel
cycle, notably the so-called Ford-Mitre
report and the American Physical Soci-
ety report, were coming to the conclu-
sion that the commercial use of
plutonium was economically premature
and potentially dangerous.

When the Carter Administration
came into office, there was a wide-
spread but by no means universal per-
ception that the spread of sensitive nu-
clear facilities (particularly uranium
enrichment and reprocessing) and the
planned early and wide-scale use of
plutonium as a nuclear fuel threatened
to erode the delicate instrument of the
IAEA safeguards system and to make
increasingly porous the barrier between
peaceful and nonpeaceful applications
of nuclear energy.

January 1979

41

The new Administration did not
create the period of turmoil in interna-
tional nuclear cooperation. Rather it
inherited a highly unstable situation.
Another major setback to nonprolifera-
tion might very well have brought the
end of the international regime so la-
boriously constructed in the 1950's and
1960's. The task before us was to re-
store and strengthen a regime that
would balance legitimate energy re-
quirements and nonproliferation con-
cerns.

The Administration recognized that
there was no single technological fix
that would create a safe fuel cycle but
rather sought to move toward a series
of technological and institutional steps
which would lessen the risks while al-
lowing legitimate energy needs to be
met. To gain the time necessary to de-
velop technological and institutional
arrangements, the Administration
urged that premature commercializa-
tion of fuel cycles utilizing plutonium
be avoided and announced that the
United States, for its part, would defer
its own plans for commercial reproc-
essing and recycle of plutonium.

The Administration was and remains
strongly against recycle of plutonium
in thermal reactors as posing a clear
and present proliferation danger in re-
turn for, at best, marginal economic
and supply assurance gains. Breeder
reactors, however, are a significant
potential long-term energy alternative,
and we have been careful not to oppose
breeder research and development pro-
grams at home or abroad. We have ex-
pressed reservations about their com-
mercial deployment before prolifera-
tion-resistant technological and institu-
tional alternatives are investigated.

We recognized that we could not uni-
laterally impose our will on others
concerning how the nuclear fuel cycle
should be structured and that we did
not have all the answers ourselves. For
this reason, six of the seven points in
President Carter's April 7, 1977, non-
proliferation statement dealt with issues
within our domestic jurisdiction.1 The
seventh point was to lay the basis for
the development of an international re-
gime of norms and institutions that will
provide the widest possible separation
between peaceful applications and po-
tential military uses while enabling
countries to meet their energy needs. A
key element in bringing about such a
development was the suggestion for an
International Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Evaluation (INFCE). The idea of
INFCE evolved from the prior Admin-
istration's reprocessing evaluation pro-
gram. The Carter Administration
broadened this idea to include other
nations and to encompass all aspects of

the fuel cycle, not just reprocessing.

INFCE has been described as a
pioneering effort at international as-
sessment. Certainly, the United States
sees INFCE as a cooperative effort to
evaluate the role of nuclear energy
technology and institutions in an inter-
national context and help develop an
objective appreciation of the nonprolif-
eration, economic, and other implica-
tions of different fuel cycle ap-
proaches. INFCE provides a 2-year
period in which nations can reexamine
assumptions and search for ways to
reconcile their somewhat different as-
sessments of the risks involved in and
the timescale for commercialization of
the various aspects of the nuclear fuel
cycle. While INFCE has a predomi-
nantly technical cast, it is part of the
political process of laying a basis for a
stable international regime to govern
nuclear energy through the end of the
century.

While it is too early to predict the
outcome of this 2-year assessment, the
United States has indicated, in broad
outline, the type of political solution
that we believe can bring an end to the
period of turmoil over the nuclear fuel
cycle issue. A stable regime should be
designed to minimize the global dis-
tribution of weapons-usable materials
and reduce the vulnerability of sensi-
tive points in the fuel cycle, while
adequately meeting the energy needs of
all countries. As I suggested in my
speech to the Uranium Institute in Lon-
don earlier this year,2 we envisage five
basic norms for a strengthened interna-
tional regime:

• Full-scope safeguards;

• Avoidance of the unnecessary
spread of sensitive facilities;

• Use of diversion-resistant technol-
ogies;

• Institutionalized control of sensi-
tive facilities; and

• Institutions to insure the availabil-
ity of the benefits of nuclear energy.

Decreasing the Rate of Proliferation

I would now like to assess the prog-
ress that we have made in light of the
three tests I mentioned earlier. The
basic test is whether the Carter initia-
tives will have caused the rate of pro-
liferation to be higher or lower than it
otherwise would have been. While I
cannot get into the specific cases that
support my conclusion that it will be
lower, I believe a good case can also be
made in general terms. Basically, pro-
liferation is less likely to become a
cheap option. If nothing else, the high
priority that the Carter Administration

has given to the issue has raised second
thoughts among those who might have
wanted to approach the option because
it cost little.

The attention of both suppliers and
consumers has been called to the dan-
gers of proliferation. The very vocab-
ulary at INFCE meetings — "pro-
liferation resistance" and "weap-
ons-usable materials'" — indi-
cates change. The publication of
the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines ear-
lier this year, including the provision
for safeguards, special restraint on sen-
sitive exports and for supplier consul-
tations on possible sanctions if recip-
ient countries violate safeguards, have
made it apparent to a potential pro-
liferator that questionable activities are
unlikely to go unnoticed and that there
are likely to be significant costs in-
volved in "crossing over the line."

Section 307 of the U.S. Nonprolifer-
ation Act of 1978 reinforces this by re-
quiring termination of U.S. nuclear
cooperation to states that detonate a
nuclear explosive device; abrogate,
terminate, or violate safeguards; or en-
gage in activities directly related to
manufacture or acquisition of nuclear
explosive devices. The deterrent effects
of international safeguards are a func-
tion of the likelihood of detection to-
gether with the cost of ensuing sanc-
tions. In effect the sanctions aspect and
thus the deterrent effect of safeguards
has been strengthened over the last 2
years.

Promoting a Proliferation-
Resistant Fuel Cycle

The second test is whether the fuel
cycle will be made safer than would
otherwise have been the case as a result
of the U.S. initiatives. In terms of what
has been accomplished in developing a
consensus on a more proliferation-
resistant fuel cycle, the U.S. approach
has stimulated a general reanalysis of
long-held assumptions and reconsid-
eration of previously rejected alterna-
tives. A number of key governments
are now studying options to increase
proliferation resistance rather than pro-
ceeding on a "business as usual"
basis. Industry at home and abroad has
also begun to look at ways to reduce
proliferation risks.

In more specific terms, we are be-
ginning to see a reconsideration by a
number of states of the need for recycle
of plutonium in thermal reactors. If this
develops into a near consensus, it will
mean that plutonium in large quantities
will not be needed until the breeder is
ready for commercial deployment,
which, for the vast majority of coun-
tries, is decades away. This provides

42

Department of State Bulletin

additional time to reduce the risks as-
sociated with these reactors and/or to
develop alternatives and strengthened
institutions.

Reprocessing and the breeder are not
of course the only vulnerable points in
the fuel cycle. We must find technical
and institutional combinations to re-
duce the dangers at each potentially
sensitive point in the fuel cycle. At
each point, there are technical and in-
stitutional choices that present different
degrees of resistance against diversion
and seizure of weapons-usable mate-
rials from peaceful nuclear activities.

There are three basic components to
reducing vulnerability: economic jus-
tification, technical design minimizing
risks and assuring effective safeguards,
and international institutional arrange-
ments such as joint or multilateral con-
trol. The appropriate "mix" of these
components will depend on the kind of
activity involved and the circumstances
of the specific case involved.

Activities associated with short times
from diversion to weapons develop-
ment and/or with low detectability will
need additional international
frameworks to be considered safe. If
there is a sound economic jus-
tification— but the activity and the
technical design does not assure effec-
tiveness of safeguards — institutional
arrangements such as multinational
control should be a prerequisite for
going ahead with the activity. Of
course the matrix covering all the pos-
sible combinations is complex, but a
series of prudent choices at each sensi-
tive point in the fuel cycle can contrib-
ute significantly to the goal of main-
taining the distance between peaceful

noticed with interest efforts by other
governments to suggest the broad out-
lines of solutions. For example, the
delegate of the Federal Republic of
Germany recently told the IAEA gen-
eral conference:

There is a growing feeling that specific tech-
nical amendments of isolated institutional ar-
rangements will not solve the existing problems.
It rather appears to be desirable, and also possi-
ble, to identify a bouquet of coordinated meas-
ures which at the end of the evaluation might be
submitted — with a high degree of consensus — to
the Governments for their decisions. Without
prejudging the further development, one might
expect to find among these measures some of the
following items:

• further technical development of safeguards;

• increasing reliability of fuel supply for nu-
clear power stations;

• criteria for the use of highly enriched
uranium in research reactors and new reactor
types;

• closer investigation of possible modifica-
tions in some current back-end of fuel cycle
technologies;

• establishment of a regime for the deposit of
excess plutonium as provided in the Agency's
Statute;

• mechanisms for international or regional in-
stitutional cooperation.

Strengthening Institutions

The third measure of progress that I
mentioned earlier is how we are doing
in strengthening existing norms and in-
stitutions and developing new ones for
building up the international regime.
International safeguards administered
by the IAEA are of course the funda-
mental norm, and progress has been

The goals of our nonproliferation policy are to slow the rate of spread
of nuclear weapons, preferably to zero, and to construct a stable inter-
national regime for the governance of nuclear energy.

and military uses of nuclear energy that
otherwise very likely would have
eroded.

In INFCE and elsewhere, consider-
able progress has been made in some of
the above areas, such as reducing the
risk associated with the use of highly
enriched uranium in research reactors.
Solutions to others will be more con-
troversial because they are likely to in-
volve added safeguards, costly techni-
cal modifications, or the creation of in-
stitutional arrangements. Discussions
now being carried on in INFCE relate
to all of these points and appropriate
"mixes" for each activity. We have

made both in strengthening the effec-
tiveness of these safeguards and ex-
panding their application. For the first
time the Agency issued a safeguards
implementation report which addressed
problems that it has encountered in
carrying out its responsibilities. This
report will be undertaken annually, and
work is already underway in remedying
the deficiencies that have been iden-
tified and developing methods to
safeguard new types of nuclear ac-
tivities.

The avoidance of commercial com-
petition that would weaken the appli-
cation of safeguards has been assured

by the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines.
Moreover, several countries, including
the United States, have adopted a re-
quirement that a recipient country have
all its nuclear activities under interna-
tional safeguards as a condition of nu-
clear supply (full-scope safeguards).
Only a handful of countries do not meet
this standard, and after informal con-
sultations with other governments, we
believe that there is a good prospect for
widespread acceptance of such
safeguards by both suppliers and re-
cipients at the end of the INFCE
period.

Beyond strenthening the present
safeguards regime, we have begun to
develop institutions to implement the
principle of assurance of benefits. Sup-
ply assurances (such as a fuel bank)
and international spent fuel repositories
are examples of institutional arrange-
ments that can reduce the incentives for
countries with small programs to de-
velop unnecessary enrichment and re-
processing facilities. We have been
pleased by the initial positive responses
to the idea of a fuel bank consisting of
a stockpile of fuel to be released to
countries which have all their facilities
under safeguards, have a clean prolif-
eration record, and have chosen not to
develop sensitive facilities on a na-
tional basis.

Development of international spent
fuel storage regimes is also important.
For some states, long-term away-
from-reactor storage at home is not a
viable alternative because of political,
environmental, and geological consid-
erations. The United States has indi-
cated its willingness to take a limited
amount of foreign spent fuel for storage
in the United States and is engaged in
the discussion of international re-
positories in working group 6 of
INFCE.

In addition to these institutional ar-
rangements which are designed to re-
duce the incentives and concerns which
would lead to premature development
of sensitive nuclear facilities, we have
begun studies and discussions of in-
stitutions for effective joint control of
those sensitive facilities that are eco-
nomically essential and difficult to
safeguard nationally. This is particu-
larly applicable to enrichment and re-
processing and perhaps plutonium stor-
age regimes where some type of multi-
national ownership and management
and possibly new rules of operation
might help reinforce the effectiveness
of international safeguards. Discussion
of such possible arrangements is
underway in INFCE, and we will de-
vote increasing attention to this as we
work toward a consensus on managing
the fuel cycle.

January 1979

43

Conclusion

In short, I believe that we have seen
credible progress on each of the three
crucial measures that I mentioned. On
the other hand, there are those who
argue that whatever short-term progress
we have achieved in controlling prolif-
eration, the '"restrictive" policies we
are pursuing will over the longer term
trigger a rush to independent nuclear
fuel cycle capability, undermining the
interdependence of the international
fuel cycle and thereby reducing the
barriers to proliferation.

This line of argument represents, I
am afraid, a rather fundamental misun-
derstanding of U.S. policy. We do not
seek to "turn off" the development of
sensitive technology necessary to meet
present and projected energy require-
ments or to delay the deployment of
facilities embracing such technology
when there is a clear economic justifi-
cation for them. We do not have the
leverage to accomplish this even if it
were our objective. We do believe,
however, that the number of sensitive
facilities should be limited to those
necessary to meet actual energy re-
quirements, and that appropriate
safeguards and institutional arrange-
ments are legitimate "costs" that must
be factored into the development of
these facilities. Our approach is
evolutionary rather than prohibitory.

Avoiding premature spread of sensi-
tive facilities that involve weapons-
usable materials is a common interest
of nations that want a stable interna-
tional regime. To support premature
spread before safer technology and in-
stitutions have developed works against
the general interest. It is worth remem-
bering the criterion set for 19th century
hospitals: "At least they should not
spread disease!"

Moreover, I see little evidence that
the new U.S. approach has stimulated
development of additional national
facilities. Reprocessing plans were
underway in the United Kingdom,
France, Japan, the Federal Republic of
Germany, and other countries well be-
fore our policy was formulated, as
were arrangements to transfer this
technology to other states. On the con-
trary I note that the four countries
mentioned above have indicated a

willingness to consider technological
and institutional modifications in the
interest of nonproliferation, and that
France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom have all announced that
henceforth they do not expect to export
reprocessing plants. As I indicated
above, we are beginning to see simi-
larity as well as differences in the many
discussions in INFCE and elsewhere on
ways to meet energy needs without in-
creasing the risk of proliferation.

To summarize my evaluation of the
progress over the last 2 years:

First, the recent U.S. initiatives
have increased recognition within the
international community of the costs

Fourth, rather than sitting back and
accepting erosion in the face of tech-
nological change and spread, steps
have been taken to strengthen the IAEA
safeguards system which is central to
any nonproliferation regime, and work
has begun on other institutional ar-
rangements to complement the
safeguards system.

Obviously, these are interim judg-
ments. Controlling the risk of prolifer-
ation is and will continue to be a
dynamic exercise as we adjust to
changing energy requirements, secu-
rity, and political perceptions and tech-
nological developments. The struggle
will not be finished by the end of

Avoiding premature spread of sensitive facilities that involve
weapons-usable materials is a common interest of nations that want a
stable international regime. To support premature spread before safer
technology and institutions have developed works against the general
interest .

involved in "crossing the line" from
peaceful nuclear activity to nonpeace-
ful applications. Proliferation is less
likely to become a cheap option. This
has added to the deterrent effect of the
international safeguards system.

Second, there has been a heightened
awareness of the dangers of continuing
development of the nuclear fuel cycle
based upon past assumptions, and an
increased readiness to reexamine these
assumptions and to look for alterna-
tives.

Third, international and domestic
evaluations of these alternatives have
been undertaken and continue. We rec-
ognize that there is no single answer,
either technological or institutional, to
the problems we face. We cannot look
for a completely "risk-free" nuclear
fuel cycle. However, we can rea-
sonably expect a series of improve-
ments in various aspects of the fuel
cycle that will add up to a significant
gain in preventing erosion of the bar-
riers between peaceful application of
nuclear energy and nonpeaceful uses.

INFCE, not during the life of this Ad-
ministration, and perhaps not in our
lifetime. The important thing is that the
international community is making a
renewed attack on this fundamental
issue. I believe that there is consider-
able hope that we will find ways to in-
sure that this essential technology con-
tinues to serve mankind rather than
threaten it.

The point was well put by Sir Her-
mann Bondi before the Atomic Indus-
trial Forum/British Nuclear Forum
meeting in London last month.

The world owes it to President Carter that by
his concentration on this vital issue he has made
us all think afresh about it at the right time, and
put at the top of the international agenda an item
whose difficulty has often urged postponement
of action, but where the risks make it imperative
to use our best intellectual and political en-
deavors to banish the spectre of widespread pro-
liferation. D

'For text, see Bulletin of May 2, 1977.
p. 429.

2For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 1978. p. 38.

44

Department of State Bulletin

1/.S. Policy on Reprocessing
of t J§> --Or iff in Nuclear Material

by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

Statement before the Subcommittee
on International Economic Policy and
Trade of the House Committee on In-
ternational Relations on October 3,
1978. Mr. Nye is Deputy to the Under
Secretary for Security Assistance, Sci-
ence, and Technology.1

I am pleased to be here today to dis-
cuss U.S. policy on retransfer of
U.S. -origin nuclear material for re-
processing in the United Kingdom and
France. Before discussing the cases
which are before us, I would like to re-
view briefly how our policy on re-
transfers relates to our broader non-
proliferation objectives.

The basic objective of U.S. non-
proliferation policy is to develop an
international framework that will
minimize both the incentives and op-
portunities for nuclear proliferation. To
this end, we are working toward the
development of an international regime
of norms and institutions that will pro-
vide the widest possible separation
between peaceful applications and po-
tential military uses, while enabling
countries to meet their energy needs.
One key element in bringing about such
a development is the International Nu-
clear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE)
which is examining more pro-
liferation-resistant alternatives to the
present nuclear fuel cycle.

The United States sees INFCE as a
cooperative effort to evaluate the role
of nuclear energy technology in an in-
ternational context and help develop an
objective appreciation of the nonprolif-
eration, economic, and other implica-
tions of different fuel cycle ap-
proaches. INFCE provides a 2-year
period in which nations can re-examine
assumptions and find ways to reconcile
their somewhat different assessments
of the risks involved in and the time-
scale for commercialization of the
various aspects of the nuclear fuel
cycle. While INFCE has a technical
cast, it is part of the process of laying a
basis for a stable international regime
to govern nuclear energy through the
end of the century.

A stable regime should be designed
to minimize the global distribution of
weapons-usable materials and vulnera-
ble points in the fuel cycle while
adequately meeting the energy needs of
all countries. One can visualize five
basic norms for a strengthened interna-

tional regime: full-scope safeguards,
avoidance of the unnecessary spread of
sensitive facilities, use of diversion-
resistant technologies, multinational
control of sensitive facilities, and in-
stitutions to insure the availability of
the benefits of nuclear energy.

The United States does not, of
course, have all the answers for how a
safer nuclear order may be structured,
nor are we in a position to dictate the
norms to be followed. Indeed, success
in building a safer nuclear order de-
pends critically on the cooperation of
other countries. It is in this broader
context that we look at the specific
matter of U.S. policy on requests for
the retransfer of U.S. -origin material
for reprocessing in the United Kingdom
and France during this 2-year period of
INFCE.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of
1978 sets forth criteria in addition to
other requirements of the law to be
applied to requests for retransfers for
reprocessing. The law specifies that:

• With respect to facilities which
had not processed power reactor fuel
assemblies or been the subject of a sub-
sequent arrangement prior to March 10,
1978, the Secretary of Energy may not
enter into a subsequent arrangement for
such retransfer for reprocessing of any
special nuclear material exported by
the United States unless, in his judg-
ment, and that of the Secretary of
State, such reprocessing or retransfer
will not result in a significant increase
of the risk of proliferation beyond that
which exists at the time that approval is
requested. Among the factors in mak-
ing this judgment, foremost consid-
eration will be given to whether or not
the reprocessing or retransfer will take
place under conditions that will insure
timely warning to the United States of
any diversion well in advance of the
time at which the non-nuclear-weapon
state could transform the material into
a nuclear explosive device.

• For facilities that have processed
power reactor fuel or been subject to a
subsequent arrangement prior to March
10, 1978, the Secretary of Energy will
attempt to insure that such reprocessing
or retransfer will take place under con-
ditions comparable to those above.

Retransfer to the United Kingdom

In both cases now before us, we be-
lieve that the above criteria for ap-
proval are met. In the Tokyo Electric

Power Company (TEPCO) case we
have addressed this question in the re-
vised analysis under section 131 (b) (2)
of the act.

In addition to the requirements of the
law, the President has established pol-
icy criteria regarding requests for re-
transfer for reprocessing. Approval of
such requests has been on a case-by-
case basis when there is clear showing
of need (i.e. spent fuel congestion),
and then only provided that the United
States retains the right of approval over
subsequent transfer of the separated
plutonium and the requesting country
has made appropriate efforts to expand
its spent fuel storage capacity. Three
approvals have been made under these
criteria since April 1977.

The Tokyo Electric Power Company
requests to transfer approximately 24
tons of spent nuclear power reactor fuel
to Great Britain for reprocessing at
Windscale would be the fourth such
case. The basis for our determination
that there is a need for the transfer has
been spelled out in the analysis for-
warded to the committee.

Both Japan and the United Kingdom
have also been cooperative in non-
proliferation areas. Both are parties to
the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),
both are active participants in the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), in the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, and more recently in INFCE,
and both have a strong political com-
mitment to preventing the further
spread of nuclear weapons. They have
both worked to further common non-
proliferation objectives.

Furthermore, in connection with
INFCE and as reflected in the Tokai-
Mura communique of last September,
Japan stated that it shares the view that
plutonium poses a serious proliferation
danger, that its recycle in light-water
reactors is not ready at present for
commercial use, and that its premature
commercialization should be avoided.
Japan also agreed to undertake experi-
mental coprocessing work at its opera-
tional test laboratory and, if such co-
processing is found to be technically
feasible and effective in light of this
work and INFCE, to convert the Tokai
reprocessing facility to coprocessing at
the end of the initial period of opera-
tion. In addition, Japan has agreed to
defer the construction of its planned
plutonium conversion facility at
Tokai-Mura for 2 years and is now
studying possible alterations for a
combined uranium/plutonium product.
Japan is also working with the IAEA at
the Tokai reprocessing facility to test
the application of advanced safeguards
instrumentation.

This is not to say that our policies
and those of the other countries in-

January 1979

volved in these transfers are always
identical. There was, for example, a
frank difference of opinion between the
United States and the United Kingdom
over the timing of the Windscale/Thorp
project, with the United States prefer-
ring deferral of the project at least
pending the outcome of INFCE. As the
committee knows, the project has not
been deferred. However, in par-
liamentary debate supporting the proj-
ect, the British Government noted that,
since actual construction of the reproc-
essing plant itself would not begin be-
fore 1981 or 1982. the design could
still be adjusted to accommodate any
results of INFCE.

Finally, we believe that the proposed
retransfer for reprocessing will not re-
sult in a significant increase in the risk
of proliferation, with due consideration
of whether we would have timely
warning of any diversion well in ad-
vance of the time at which the
non-nuclear-weapon state could trans-
form the diverted material into a nu-
clear explosive device. We believe this
conclusion is supported, among other
considerations, by the nonproliferation
credentials of the countries involved,
by where the reprocessing will occur,
and by the fact that the derived
plutonium may not be returned to Japan
or transferred to another country with-
out specific U.S. consent.

Retransfer to France

The second case which I would like
to discuss with you today, the request
by Japan's Kansai Electric Power for
the transfer of 29 tons of spent fuel to
France for reprocessing in the existing
UP-2 Cogema facility differs from the
cases previously approved. While it
meets all other aspects of our approval
criteria, it is not based on a spent fuel
storage congestion problem. For this
reason, the matter was forwarded to the
President with a recommendation of the
State Department, Department of
Energy, and Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency that our nonprolifer-
ation objectives would be best served
by approval. The President agreed with
this recommendation.

Kansai and the Japanese Government
have asked for approval of this transfer
on the basis that the contract concern-
ing the shipment was concluded in
1975, before the current U.S. policy
had been enunciated; that public assur-
ances had been given to the local com-
munity, on the basis of the contract,
that the spent fuel would be trans-
ferred; and that it will have to pay sub-
stantial financial penalties if the spent
fuel does not move on schedule. Al-
though the utility was aware that U.S.
approval for the retransfer would be re-

quired to fulfill the contract, it could
not have foreseen that U.S. policy
would change from a permissive policy
on retransfers to a policy where ap-
proval would be granted only as a "last
resort. "

The executive branch has carefully
weighed all aspects of this matter and
has determined that approval would
best serve U.S. nonproliferation and
broader foreign policy interests. This
decision does not represent any basic
change in the U.S. view of reprocess-
ing. Requests for retransfers for re-
processing will continue to be consid-
ered on their merits and on a case-by-
case basis, giving primacy to the test of
"need. "

However, the President has decided
that the Administration will consider
approval of this limited set of requests
that involve contracts predating 1977 if
the requesting country is actively
cooperating in exploring more
proliferation-resistant methods of spent
fuel disposition and if approval would
directly further nonproliferation objec-
tives. In this regard we have Japanese
agreement to join the United States in
discussions of possible international
spent fuel storage centers. These dis-
cussions will complement studies in the
United States and INFCE on develop-
ing spent fuel storage regimes, some-
thing that is essential if we are to be
successful in deferring reprocessing.

U.S. Considerations

In every case, we would continue,
among other things, to retain a veto
over transfer of plutonium. This lim-
ited change in our policy was explained
to the countries concerned when we
notified them of the decision on the
TEPCO and Kansai requests.

We have added "pre-existing con-
tracts" as a factor to be considered in
approving reprocessing for the follow-
ing reasons.

• As the President made clear in his
April 7, 1977, statement, our policy
has never assumed that ongoing ac-
tivities in the United Kingdom, France,
West Germany, and Japan would be
"turned off" during INFCE. The
INFCE communique provides that
INFCE will be carried out without
jeopardizing other countries' fuel cycle
policies or international cooperation,
agreements, and contracts.

• Holders of reprocessing contracts
entered into prior to current U.S. pol-
icy can argue with some justification
that they have been caught in the mid-
dle when the rules changed. This mod-
ification will allow us to take this fac-
tor into consideration while we con-
tinue to encourage the expansion of
spent fuel storage capacity.

45

• Only four countries have reproc-
essing contracts which predate our
policy (Japan, Switzerland. Sweden,
and Spain). Moreover, several of the
concerned facilities are expanding their
spent fuel storage capacities (in part
due to our urging in previous retransfer
approvals). This will limit the number
of requests we are faced with during
the INFCE period.

Most importantly, our approach to
such reprocessing requests is inextrica-
bly related to achievement of a funda-
mental objective of our nonprolifera-
tion strategy that I described above: the
development of an international con-
sensus on norms for a more prolifera-
tion-resistant framework for nuclear
energy. Achieving this objective de-
pends on the cooperation of other
countries. The results of INFCE are
beginning to be shaped and total in-
flexibility now in dealing with key
participants is likely to give us less in-
fluence over the shape of the outcome.

Thus we believe that this interim ap-
proach to handling requests for reproc-
essing in the United Kingdom and
France during the INFCE period is con-
sistent with our longer term nuclear
nonproliferation objectives and, at the
same time, affords sufficient protection
against the erosion of our policy on re-
processing. To take the alternative
course, would, in our view, have
weakened the prospects for developing
the cooperative framework on which
the achievement of our larger non-
proliferation objectives depends.

Spent Fuel Storage in U.S.

The example the United States sets
in its own programs is also key to ef-
fective pursuit of our nonproliferation
program. In this context I would like to
address the questions of spent fuel
storage in the United States, in par-
ticular the development of an away-
from-reactor (AFR) spent fuel storage
capacity to implement the President's
spent fuel policy announced in October
1977.

On March 13, 1978, the President
established an interagency nuclear
waste management task force to for-
mulate recommendations for Adminis-
tration policy with respect to long-term
management of nuclear wastes. This
interagency task force is chaired by the
Department of Energy and includes
State and other concerned agencies.

The task force is now in the process
of preparing a draft report for the
President which we expect to circulate
for public comment in early October.
Early availability of additional AFR
capacity would demonstrate concrete
progress in our domestic program and

46

Department of State Bulletin

UNITED NATIONS: Wliai's Wrong Willi the l/JV.

and What's Right?

by Charles William Maynes

Address before the Board of Direc-
tors of the United Nations Association
in New York on November 20. 1978.
Mr. Maynes is Assistant Secretary for
International Organization Affairs.

I have always welcomed opportuni-
ties to speak before the United Nations
Association. Who can pass up an op-
portunity these days to address an or-
ganization that brings together those in
the country who insist on a higher
standard for foreign policy than a con-
tinuous calculation of cold, short-term
gain? So when your President. Bob
Ratner, asked me if I would be willing
to talk to you today, I accepted
immediately.

But as the meeting drew near, my
approach changed dramatically. Why?
Because in the last several weeks the
United Nations has been faced with a
new crisis. As a result of surprise
legislation passed in the final days of
the last Congress, as of January 1,
1979, for the first time in its history the
United States probably will be unable
to make any of its assessed contribu-
tions to the United Nations and many
of the specialized agencies.

The details of this law are complex.
Suffice it to say, the U.S. Congress has
deleted from next year's budget re-
quest, in violation of our treaty obliga-

tions, $27.7 million that could be
clearly identified as the U.S. share of
technical assistance in the regular
budgets of U.N. agencies. And then it
legislated that no part of the remaining
funds appropriated to pay U.S. obliga-
tions to the U.N. agencies could be
used to finance technical assistance.
This was done in spite of the fact that
the charters and financial regulations of
the United Nations and its specialized
agencies prevent them from accepting
earmarked or limited-use funds. And if
the United Nations did accept condi-
tional contributions, we would be wit-
nessing the beginning of the end of the
United Nations itself. For if the United
States is permitted to take this step,
then every other member state could
follow suit. The United Nations would
be paralyzed and prevented from doing
anything.

I would like to pause for a moment
to reflect on the enormity of what has
been done. The Congress of the United
States has not simply followed the
example of the Soviet Union — as bad
as that example is — and refused to pay
for a portion of the U.N. budget with
which it disagreed. It has gone beyond
this by insisting on attaching conditions
to the rest of the U.S. contributions — a
step no other member state has ever
taken. It is potentially the most
damaging blow any member state has
directed against the United Nations.

Let us remember that this is the organi-
zation which two of our greatest Presi-
dents, Wilson and Roosevelt, helped
inspire. It is an institution which, for
all of its faults, continues to serve the
larger interests of mankind through its
work in peacekeeping, economic de-
velopment, and the promotion of co-
operative approaches to vital global
issues — all of which are of central im-
portance to this country.

Because of the stakes involved, the
President and the Secretary of State
have established as a priority goal
when the new Congress convenes the
deletion of the prohibitory language in
the legislation. I have no doubt that we
will be successful in achieving this
goal because, in fact, the decision was
made in haste and, it seems increas-
ingly clear, with no understanding of
the larger implications of the language
which was adopted.

But there will be lasting damage, and
the very fact that the legislation passed
should give all of us pause. Something
is clearly wrong when the Congress,
with so little care and forethought, can
pass such a revolutionary amendment.
We must, therefore, look behind the
legislation to the larger problem of de-
clining U.S. support — particularly
congressional support — for the United
Nations itself.

Today I would like to confront di-
rectly the sources of our discontent.

Reprocessing Cont'd

is highly desirable if we are to focus
international attention on alternatives
to reprocessing, including the eco-
nomic and technical feasibility of stor-
ing spent fuel in the interest of com-
mon nonproliferation goals.

In addition to this task force, we
continue to argue in INFCE that spent
fuel can be stored safely and securely
for long periods and that reprocessing
is not a requirement for effective waste
management. While we have not made
any specific commitments, direct or in-
direct, regarding acceptance of foreign
power reactor spent fuel in the United
States, and are mindful that the law
would require congressional review of
any such commitment, we are con-
tinuing to discuss the possibility of
multilateral and bilateral waste man-

agement questions with other coun-
tries.

Long-term solutions to all the com-
plex problems we face in regard to nu-
clear energy will require international
cooperation. The policy that I have de-
scribed today is designed to strengthen
the prospects for such cooperation.

Summary

In closing, I would like to sum-
marize this policy. For the interim
INFCE period, we will approve re-
transfer for reprocessing on a case-by-
case basis under the following carefully
defined conditions.

• Requests involving a clear show-
ing of need (i.e. spent fuel congestion)
will continue to be approved on a
case-by-case basis if the requesting
country has made appropriate efforts to

expand its spent fuel storage capacity;

• Requests not meeting the physical
need standard, but involving contracts
predating 1977. such as the Kansai re-
quest, will be considered for approval
on a case-by-case basis if the request-
ing country is actively cooperating in
exploring more proliferation-resistant
methods of spent fuel disposition and
approval will directly further major
nonproliferation objectives;

• We will continue to require prior
U.S. approval over the subsequent
transfer, including return to the country
which has title to the material, of any
plutonium resulting from the reproc-
essing. □

'The complete transcript of the hearings will
be published by the committee and will be avail-
able from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington,
D.C. 20402.

January 1979

These sources appear to be based on
the following accusations about the
United Nations.

• That it is anti-Israeli.

• That it is antiwhite.

• That it is antidemocratic.

• That it is anti-American.

These are all volatile accusations for
Americans. Each one sends a shock
through our political system. Collec-
tively, they constitute a damning in-
dictment, one calling for refutation or
reform. And today I want to answer
that call. Let's look at these accusa-
tions one at a time.

Is the U.N. Anti-Israeli?

Accusation number one: that the
United Nations is anti-Israeli. Many
events in the United Nations would
cause one to believe this. But is it
really? Let's look at the record.

On the one hand, U.N. members
have made an historically unpre-
cedented collective contribution to the
security and welfare of Israel. In the 30
years of Israel's existence, member
states have contributed three-fourths of
a billion dollars to maintain peace on
Israel's borders. Troops from 21 coun-
tries have served in U.N. peacekeeping
forces in the Middle East; 169 U.N.
soldiers have died in the defense of
peace on Israel's borders. Through the
years, U.N. members have contributed
$1.2 billion in the care and feeding of
refugees created by the many wars of
the Middle East. It's fair to say that
there is no other case in history of such
a sustained international interest and
sacrifice for the security of a small
foreign country.

Nor do figures alone tell the story.
Despite the intense passions which the
Middle East issue has constantly
aroused in the United Nations, Sec-
retariat officials dealing with the issue
have repeatedly shown themselves over
the years able to meet the standards of
impartiality, courage, and determina-
tion that must be the hallmark of an
international secretariat. In southern
Lebanon, for example, the U.N.
peacekeeping force demonstrated that it
would attempt to carry out its mission
impartially in its dealings with the
Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) or any other group or country
acting in a way which did not conform
to the UNIFIL [U.N. Interim Force in
Lebanon] mandate. [Israeli] Foreign
Minister Dayan, in his recent General
Assembly statement, singled out the
"constructive role" U.N. forces in the
Middle East have played in the
framework of the various agreed ar-
rangements in the region. Finally, we

should recall the role of the United Na-
tions in legitimizing the very existence
of Israel through membership in the
United Nations and in providing a
framework for peace through Resolu-
tions 242 and 338 of the Security
Council.

Yet there is another side to the coin.
What about condemnation of Israel
without investigation or due process.'
What about the Special Unit on Pales-
tinian Rights, which people fear will
propagandize the PLO cause?

Condemnations prior to investigation
or without due process are certainly to
be deplored. Yet a look at the record is
instructive. Repeatedly, the issue is
posed in the following way: The U.N.
Secretariat usually undertakes an in-
vestigation of Israeli practices with the
objectivity and impartiality which one
must demand from an international
civil service. Subsequently, in a
number of organizations, the Arab
states have persuaded a majority of the
membership to refuse to accept the
Secretariat's report or to ignore its
findings in reaching judgments about
Israel's behavior in the occupied
territories.

I believe we may be seeing a replay
of this process with respect to the PLO
unit. We strongly opposed the creation
of this unit and will continue to work
for its elimination. Meanwhile there is,
in this country, an outcry over a film
about the Palestinians which no one has
yet seen. And reports suggest that
many Arab delegations are extremely
unhappy about it because the Sec-
retariat is attempting to be too objec-
tive. Last week even the PLO de-
nounced the film which now may never
appear.

In other words, with rare exceptions,
the record of the international Sec-
retariat is admirable, while the record
of the majority is sometimes
deplorable.

So we come to the heart of the
problem. On the one hand, the over-
whelming majority of U.N. members
agrees with Israel on the essential issue
of Israel's existence. That is Israel's
historic achievement, and one to which
the United Nations has made an im-
portant contribution. But on the other
hand, the majority does not agree with
Israel regarding the occupied ter-
ritories. Regrettably, in their frustra-
tion over diplomatic stalemate, the
majority of U.N. members resorts to
tactics which, if not exposed to critics,
will damage the United Nations itself.

I believe in these cases of abuse we
must all work harder to point the finger
in the right direction. We should be
alarmed by the kind of voting excesses
that reflect adversely on the United

47

Nations itself. But if we permit the
public to be confused about the differ-
ence between the institution and its
members, people will forget which is
the irresponsible party. We must not
allow states to do their damage and es-
cape with little diplomatic cost, while
the blame is cast on the United Na-
tions.

One reason we can no longer allow
this to happen is that the United Na-
tions will likely be called upon to play
a vital role in any final settlement of
the Middle East problem. It is not ar-
dent support for the United Nations
from Prime Minister Begin or President
Sadat which explains their insistence
that the United Nations play a crucial
role in the security arrangements for
the Sinai envisioned by the Camp
David framework agreement. It is,
rather, their recognition that the in-
stitution has developed unique
capabilities in providing the kind of
neutral monitoring force which any
peace agreement in that troubled part of
the world requires.

So it is in the interests of all who
support peace in the Middle East to
avoid statements and actions that
weaken the United Nations. We must
denounce member states responsible
for those statements and actions. But
we must spare the institution. The
choice is not between a secure Israel
and a strong United Nations. The
former will be much more likely if we
insure that we have the latter. And we
can have both.

Is the U.N. Antiwhite?

Accusation number two: That the
United Nations is antiwhite. Here
people are more reluctant to speak
frankly, but the argument goes like
this: "Africa is ruled by dictators, who
spread violence, death, and repression
everywhere. South Africa has a free
press and standards of political life that
no African allegedly can match. Yet
the United Nations picks on South Af-
rica and ignores much greater abuses in
the rest of Africa."

Can there be any defense? How deep
is the double standard? We must begin
with the Freedom House survey of the
state of freedom in the world. To our
amazement we see that by the strict
Standards of that publication there are
at least 12 countries, representing
one-third of Africa's population, with a
somewhat better record than South
Africa — mainly Egypt, Kenya,
Morocco, Nigeria, Upper Volta,
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Lesotho, Mada-
gascar, the Comoros Islands, Zambia,
and Djibouti. Moreover, in the over-
whelming majority of these African
states. Freedom House finds that the

48

local trends are hesitatingly toward
more freedom. This means that a large
portion of Africa is moving slowly in
the direction of more freedom, not less.

Meanwhile, in South Africa itself.
Freedom House reports that local
trends are moving in the direction of
more repression. Moreover, freedom in
South Africa, increasingly limited as it
is, is freedom for the whites almost ex-
clusively. Often U.N. critics say the
rest of Africa must move to South Afri-
can political standards before criticism
of South Africa can begin. The Free-
dom House survey suggests that South
Africa is actually behind some of the
leading African states, and that these
are improving instead of regressing.

Even so, with our eyes more open,
one might say this: Granted that we
have not shown sufficient discrimina-
tion in our assessment of freedom in
Africa, still why condemn South Africa
and not, say, Uganda? The answer is
that we should and we do urge action
on both. African states have tradition-
ally resisted Western judgments on Af-
rican affairs, claiming — with some
historical justification — that Western
colonial activities contributed to the
situations in which they find them-
selves. Unfortunately, this approach
has also served to deter effective inter-
national action against Amin. But the
kind of mass murder that has taken
place in Uganda is unconscionable, and

we must press the world community
and Africa to speak out.

At the same time, we must also at-
tempt to comprehend why — from a
human rights perspective — South Af-
rica poses such a special problem.
There are many lessons we might have
derived from World War II but one les-
son we clearly did derive: That in the
wake of the holocaust, never again
could the world permit millions of
people to be judged legally by their
fellow countrymen on the basis of the
color of their skin or their ethnic ori-
gin, as opposed to their individual ac-
tions or political beliefs. It is in this re-
spect, and this respect alone, that
South Africa stands apart in the world
and must be judged apart. (I might add
that one reason the Soviet Jewry issue
is so sensitive is precisely because
some Soviet actions appear to violate
this bedrock moral principle.) A fail-
ure, therefore, to see what is at stake in
South Africa connotes a moral blind-
ness that ignores the past and misreads
the future.

Yet, in the face of this moral issue
where the choices seem so compelling,
I find it reassuring that the world and
Africa are still willing to reach out to
South Africa. Neither the African
states nor the United Nations has ever
proclaimed that the whites in South
Africa should not remain in Africa.
The white settlers in South Africa have

Department of State Bulletin

never been viewed in the same light as
white colonialists elsewhere in the
continent. They have been seen as
people who oppress others and who
should stop. But they have also been
seen as people who have a legitimate
right to remain, not as people who con-
quered others and therefore should
leave.

Is the U.N. Undemocratic?

Accusation number three: That the
United Nations is undemocratic. Senator
Moynihan [Daniel P. Moynihan,
former U.S. Representative to the
United Nations] addressed this issue in
his final speech to the U.N. General
Assembly. On December 17, 1975, he
stated:

The crisis of the United Nations is not to be
found in the views of the majority of its mem-
bers. Rather, it resides in the essential incom-
patibility of the system of government which
the charter assumes will rule the majority of its
members and the system of government to
which the majority in fact adheres.

His implication appeared to be that if
only a majority of members of the
United Nations were democratic, our
difficulties with the organization would
recede. Is this so?

In one vital respect, Ambassador
Moynihan was right. At the heart of
any democratic system lies a profound

U.N. FINANCING ISSUE

In September 1978, just prior to ad-
journment, the Congress passed the appro-
priations bill for the Department of State for
fiscal year 1979, including an amendment
introduced earlier by Senator Jesse Helms
(R-N.C). The amendment deleted $27.7
million from the amount which the United
States is obligated by various treaties and
conventions to contribute to U.N. agencies.
It further specified that, of the total funds
appropriated, "no part may be made avail-
able for the furnishing of technical assist-
ance by the United Nations or any of its
specialized agencies.*'

President Carter signed the bill on Oc-
tober 10, 1978, issuing a statement which
said, in part:

"Although I have signed this appropria-
tion bill, I strongly oppose a provision
which compromises this Government's
ability to fulfill its legally binding financial
obligations to the United Nations and its
specialized agencies. The Congress has
enacted unacceptable prohibitory language
.... If allowed to stand, this action would
cause the United States to violate its treaty
obligations to support the organizations of
the United Nations system. Withholding of.

or assigning conditions to U.S. contribu-
tions to assessed budgets of these organiza-
tions would make it virtually impossible for
these organizations to accept such contribu-
tions, would seriously impair their financial
and political viability, and is contrary to the
policy of collective financial responsibility
continuously advocated by this Government
since establishment of the United Nations
system.

This precedent would also weaken the
ability of organizations of the United Na-
tions to withstand efforts by other govern-
ments to impede their effective work. The
United States has consistently opposed the
Soviet Union's withholding of its assessed
contributions to those programs of the
United Nations which the Soviet Union has
found politically unpalatable. Our efforts to
stem such politicization of organizations of
the United Nations would be severely
weakened if the action of the Congress is
allowed to stand.

Accordingly, I intend to recommend
promptly to the Congress the restoration of
funds for this appropriation and the
elimination of the language which jeopar-
dizes our ability to support these interna-
tional organizations. . . . "\

In November, the U.N. Administrative

Committee on Coordination, which includes
the executive heads of all the organizations
and programs of the U.N. system, issued a
statement which said, in part:

"The constitution of each organization
refers to the budget as a whole and makes
no provision for earmarking within, or at-
taching conditions to, assessed contribu-
tions to the regular budget. The withholding
of assessed contributions, or parts thereof,
thus clearly violates the international legal
obligations which every Member State con-
tracted when it joined an organization in the
United Nations system and formally ac-
cepted its charter or constitution.

For the same reasons the attachment of
conditions to the payment of assessed con-
tributions purporting to restrict their use by
an organization cannot be recognized as
valid under the Charter of the United Na-
tions and the constitutions of the other or-
ganizations. Member States do not have the
right to designate those parts of the regular
budget or program which are to be, or are
not to be financed by their assessed contri-
bution, and the secretariats do not have the
right to earmark assessed contributions in
such a manner as to prevent their being used
to finance any specific activity or
program. "

January 1979

respect for law and procedure which
unfortunately we see violated all too
often by member states in the United
Nations. Regrettably, we cannot expect
governments which have contempt for
law or procedure in domestic institu-
tions to show excessive zeal in their re-
spect for law and procedure in interna-
tional institutions.

Yet, in at least two fundamental as-
pects. Ambassador Moynihan was
wrong. First, no one can seriously be-
lieve that many of the substantive po-
sitions adopted by the United Nations
which have at times troubled American
administrations do not represent
majority opinions in the rest of the
world. The U.N. resolutions on the
new international economic order —
much of which has even U.S.
support — undoubtedly do represent
majority opinion in the world. The in-
ternational community — even at the
grassroots level — probably does sup-
port the broad outlines of U.N. deci-
sions on South Africa and the Middle
East. The problem with the United Na-
tions, as the London "Economist"
once pointed out, is that its decisions
usually reflect 70% plus of the views
of the world's population. This is an
awkward fact with which we must
contend. It doesn't necessarily mean
we are wrong, but it certainly offers us
no presumption that we are right.

Second, one of the strengths of the
United Nations is precisely that its
structure and ideology are democratic
even when its membership is not. At
times, this structure and ideology are
disconcerting. Even on the home front,
popular views are not always the right
views; majority decisions are some-
times more worthy of study than sup-
port. I acknowledge that we might look
on this at the United Nations as a factor
to be criticized, but I believe we can
also cite it as a note to be celebrated.
Thanks to extraordinary American in-
fluence in the post-war era, the United
Nations does rest upon democratic as-
sumptions. That is the hidden advan-
tage of our country in its participation
in international organizations.

At times we may have been guilty of
allowing, without sufficient under-
standing of what was taking place,
other countries to expropriate our own
symbols. Nowhere is this attempted as
often as in the United Nations itself.
But expropriators are always in danger
that substance will subsequently be im-
parted to the symbols. Indeed, this is
happening throughout the world. One
of the most heartening developments in
recent years has been the trend toward
more democracy in two of the great
giants of the developing world — India
and Nigeria. Meanwhile, we see a

trend toward greater liberalism in
Brazil. In China, wall posters are ap-
pearing which state "We cannot toler-
ate human rights and democracy being
slogans belonging only to the Western
bourgeoisie while the Eastern pro-
letariat supposedly needs nothing but
dictatorship." Heartening as well is the
way that individuals in European
Communist countries have attempted to
impart substance to the symbols their

49

delegate, acting on both surprise and
good memory, blurted out that this was
the first successful American initiative
in the Security Council in more than a
decade.

But that success does not stand in
isolation. The United States has also
been successful in persuading the Se-
curity Council to call for a ceasefire in
Beirut. With others, it cosponsored a
resolution adopted by the Security

[We must] concent rate less on how the United States alone might ac-
complish what we believe has to be done and more on how we can
build the kinds of international coalitions that would permit us to get

moving.

leaders so cavalierly expropriated
through Helsinki agreements and U.N.
resolutions.

Is the U.N. Anti-American?

Accusation number four: That the
United Nations is anti-American. The
critics' case goes like this: "The
United States is pilloried in the United
Nations. No one respects our opinions
or our representatives. American val-
ues are mocked. American interests are
disregarded. "

Is this true? We might again look at
the record. If we examine the general
debate statements in the General As-
sembly, there is hardly evidence for
this kind of conclusion. It's true that a
handful of countries that are almost
pathologically anti-American in their
current political orientation — Cuba,
Albania, Kampuchea, Libya, and
Iraq — use the occasion of their general
debate statements to launch diatribes
against the United States.

But the number of states which have
done this has dropped dramatically in
the past 2 years compared to the period
1972-76. In fact, overall we have seen
a significant change in America's posi-
tion in the United Nations. As
memories of Vietnam fade, as Ameri-
can efforts to resolve difficult problems
of the Middle East and southern Africa
are appreciated, as our efforts to im-
prove communications with the
nonaligned are increased, America's
position of embattled and embittered
isolation has changed.

Indeed, in the last several months,
the United States has found itself in a
position to take a leadership role in the
United Nations for the first time in
years on a number of critical issues. In
March 1978 the United States pro-
posed, sponsored, and led the Security
Council effort to create the United Na-
tions Interim Force in Lebanon. One

Council to provide a compromise pro-
posal on Namibia.

Nor has the change been limited to
the Security Council. For the first time
in its history the U.N. Human Rights
Commission seems to be moving
away — hesitatingly, I acknowledge —
from a noxious double standard and
toward the objective approach that the
United States would like to see firmly
in place for the greater promotion of
human rights. For many years, the only
countries in the world whose human
rights record could be addressed by the
Commission were Chile, Israel, and
South Africa. But at its last session,
the Human Rights Commission decided
to review the human rights situation in
several other countries. Though the
pace is painfully slow, the direction
seems appropriate and right.

Also, the 1977 General Assembly
passed by consensus the first resolution
in U.N. history against aerial hijack-
ing, another strong U.S. concern. We
have now joined forces with a number
of other interested countries to follow
up on that resolution by urging U.N.
member states to ratify the key inter-
national conventions against hijacking.
The U.N. resolution has provided the
kind of previously missing rationale
which has persuaded a larger number of
countries to sign these important
documents.

The Special Session on Disarmament
in May 1978 was an extraordinarily
important meeting. The largest disar-
mament meeting in history, it helped
chart the course for the U.N.'s work in
the disarmament field over the next
several years — a critical period as a
growing number of nonaligned coun-
tries are approaching several important
military policy thresholds. Will they
develop nuclear weapons? Will they
acquire new generations of conven-
tional weapons? The session to
everyone's surprise reached agreement

50

on a consensus document which can
help to guide constructively the course
of disarmament negotiations in the
years ahead and work toward U.S. ob-
jectives in this area.

Department of State Bulletin

I '. Y. Committee on the
Palestinian People

The Steps Ahead

I could go on about the ways that
American interests are served by the
United Nations. But somehow, let's
face it, the real message about the
value of the United Nations is not get-
ting through. The public seems to be
listening better. Opinion polls demon-
strate that the public mood is increas-
ingly positive. But within American
leadership groups there remains a
post- Vietnam sourness or indifference
which is making it more and more dif-
ficult for this country to address the
longer run issues on the global agenda.

Needed, I believe, is a vigorous
public education campaign to remind
the American people, and particularly
key leadership groups, of what we gain
from this system and of what we ought
to stand for as its most prominent
member.

The American people ought to know
that the United States is again capable
of playing a leadership role, as we did
this year on issues involving Lebanon.

The American people ought to know
that they fly more safely, raise larger
crops, and suffer less damage from
storms because our weather service has
been able to double the amount of data
it receives, thanks to the World
Weather Watch of the World Meteor-
ological Organization.

They ought to know that they save
$200 million every year because the
World Health Organization has
abolished smallpox.

They ought to know that the stand-
ards set by the International Civil Avi-
ation Organization determine the com-
petitiveness of American aviation
equipment and thus significantly — and
thus far very positively — affect export
orders for our aviation industry.

They ought to know that the innova-
tive work on the basic human needs
strategy for development was not done
in the U.S. Government nor the World
Bank but in the International Labor Or-
ganization which we left.

They ought to know that U.N agen-
cies, in the face of criticism by the
Socialist countries, advance Western
techniques and attitudes toward de-
velopment not because the United Na-
tions is biased in our direction, but be-
cause the developing countries them-
selves have found our experience and
approaches to be the more relevant to
their conditions and needs.

They ought to know that the United

Following is an exchange of letters
between Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff,
a U.S. delegate to the 33d U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly, and Ambassador An-
drew Young, U.S. Permanent Repre-
sentative to the United Nations, con-
cerning the U.N. Committee on the
Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of
the Palestinian People. '

October 18. 1978
The Honorable Andrew Young
United States Ambassador to

the United Nations
New York. New York.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

As a Representative of the United States
Mission to the United Nations. I am concerned

that the United Nations reinforce the Camp
David framework for peace in the Middle East.
It is extremely disturbing that while peace is
being established in the Middle East, the
United Nations is providing a major irritant to
peace in the form of the "Committee on the
Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Pales-
tinian People." The Member Nations who have
launched this work must accept the responsi-
bility for its adverse effects on a possible basic
settlement.

If the United Nations has a universal mean-
ing to the people of the world it is to serve as a
forum for world peace. President Carter, Presi-
dent Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin have
created a framework for peace in an area which
has been preoccupied with war ever since the
U.N. was created. The Member Nations have

Nations is primarily staffed — from
50% to 80% — by professionals not
from the developing countries nor from
the Communist countries but from the
Western developed countries.

But most of all, the American people
ought to recall why these organizations
exist in the first place. They exist as a
result of common international need
and enlightened American purpose. I
agree that the days are gone when, in
the words of a former French Perma-
nent Representative to the United Na-
tions, the United States served as the
sole "locomotive for reform" in the
international system. Today, the global
policy train is too long to be propelled
by a single locomotive. Like those in-
tercontinentals that arrive at the edge of
the Rockies, where I grew up, today's
international policy train requires more
than one locomotive to get over the
top. Yet, the U.S. locomotive cannot
remain too long in the yard for repair.
Our help is clearly needed if we are to
move the world community across the
policy divide on the global issues that
affect us all.

What I think all of us must do in the
months and years ahead is concentrate
less on how the United States alone
might accomplish what we believe has
to be done and more on how we can
build the kinds of international coali-
tions that would permit us to get mov-
ing. There are, as we all know, several
powerful locomotives that remain to be
more adequately harnessed. If the
United States can no longer be ex-
pected to do the job alone on interna-
tional economic issues, for example, in

concert with Western Europe, Canada,
and Japan there is little that cannot be
accomplished. Together we have suffi-
cient leverage on the international
economic system to make a real
difference.

Similarly, I believe organizations
like the U.N. Association should be
thinking of how they can work with
their sister organizations in Western
countries and Japan to bring a more
global perspective to the policies of all
their respective governments. It is a
sign of the age that the latest commis-
sion on world development policy is
headed not by a distinguished Ameri-
can like Robert McNamara, who
headed a similar effort in the 1960's,
but by a distinguished German political
figure, former Chancellor Willy
Brandt. The model is there. We need to
find ways to copy it.

Yet while others must do more, let
us state again that America itself can-
not do less. Moreover, as we work with
others, we could well recall the words
of a President whose name is perma-
nently associated with international or-
ganizations. In 1911, Woodrow Wilson
said:

America is not a mere body of [commercial]
traders; it is a body of free men. Our greatness is
built upon our freedom — is moral, not material.
We have a great ardor for gain; but we have a
deep passion for the rights of man.

If we recall those words as we work
with others, we can insure that the
world will not only be a better place for
ourselves but for others. □

January 1979

51

probably spent more time on the Middle East
than any other subject in the U.N.'s history.
Now is the time for Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Lebanon, and the other concerned na-
tions to seize this opportunity and to work with
the Palestinian people and with the Govern-
ments of Egypt, Israel and the United States so
that the next thirty years will not bring four
more wars and countless volumes of debate
here at the U.N.

The tragedy of this Committee on the Pales-
tinian People is twofold. First, it draws atten-
tion to divisions and hardens positions exactly
at the time when we should all be stressing the
possibility of coming together and softening
previous hard lines. Secondly, the use of the
United Nations for a propaganda exercise is
further politicization which can only serve to
weaken respect for an institution designed to be
a forum for peace, not an advocate for prop-
aganda. It would indeed be sad if an organiza-
tion designed to bring peace were weakened
and in one specific and internationally impor-
tant instance of realizing peace this committee
and its promotional participants in the peace
process into even more hardened adversaries of
peace.

Mr. Ambassador, in the closing days of this
recent session of Congress several of my col-
leagues underscored their concern for this ad-
verse use of the United Nations system and I
fully share their concern. 1 hope that the United
States will not participate in the International
Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People
on November 29 and will not send a message to
be read at that meeting as we have been invited
to do. I urge, rather, that the United States
make clear its strong opposition to this misuse
of the United Nations and its disappointment
that such a U.N. activity should hamper the
most promising opportunity for peace in the
Middle East in the past thirty years.

Sincerely,

(signed)
Abe Ribicoff

Namibia

October 26. 1978

The Honorable Abraham A. Ribicoff
United States Senator
United States Mission to the
United Nations

Dear Senator:

Thank you for your letter of October 18,
1978. expressing your concerns about the UN
"Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable
Rights of the Palestinian People." I fully share
your view that our efforts to achieve peace in
the Middle East must be directed at seizing the
opportunity for a comprehensive peace which
the Camp David Framework Agreements have
created.

The United States strongly opposed the crea-
tion in 1975 of this Committee and the annual
extension of its mandate on the grounds that (a)
it was a misuse of UN funds and (b) it diverted
attention from the peace process by raising a

Following is a statement by Ambas-
sador William H. Barton, Canadian
Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, made on behalf of the
contact group on Namibia (Canada,
France, Federal Republic of Germany,
United Kingdom, and United States) in
the Security Council on November 13,
1978. '

Our five delegations understand the
bewilderment, share the frustration at
the uncertainty of the present situation,
and also feel the deep sense of disap-
pointment which underlies the resolu-
tion which has just been adopted.

We have worked for 19 months in an
endeavor to devise arrangements which
would enable Namibia to attain an in-
dependence which is internationally
acceptable. The adoption of Security
Council Resolution 4352 approving the
Secretary General's report for the im-
plementation of our five governments'
proposal was a very significant step in
this process. We believed then and do
now that the best procedure would be

new controversy around the Palestinian people
without doing anything effective to help them
achieve their legitimate goals. For the same
reasons, we opposed the establishment of the
Special Unit on Palestinian Rights in 1977.
One-third of the member states of the UN, in-
cluding many of our allies, refused to support
the creation of these bodies. Nevertheless.
two-thirds of the membership did support the
creation of the Committee and the Special Unit
and the Secretary General must act accord-
ingly.

The United States Delegation will not par-
ticipate in the UN celebrations of the Interna-
tional Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian
People on November 29. I called on Secretary
General Waldheim on October 12 to inform him
of this fact and to reiterate our opposition to the
Committee and the Special Unit as a misuse of
UN funds. We will continue to urge other
member states to support this position.

Sincerely,

(signed)
Andrew Young □

' USUN press release 108 of Oct. 31, 1978.

to go forward on the basis of the Sec-
retary General's report. However, even
as we adopted that resolution, we were
all aware of the difficulties to be over-
come.

In recognition of this, our five dele-
gations were asked not to consider that
our work was done but to continue our
efforts to bring about the object that is
common to all members of the
Council — the independence of Namibia
through free and fair elections under
U.N. supervision and control.

And we have continued our efforts.
Faced with the South Africans' refusal
to accept the Secretary General's report
and their intention to hold unilateral
elections that could, in no way. be rec-
onciled with our proposal or Resolution
435, Ministers of the five traveled to
Pretoria. The Ministers were able, we
believe, to gain the acceptance of the
South African Government to those as-
pects of the Secretary General's report
which that government had questioned.
The South Africans agreed to resume
discussions concerning the U.N. super-
vised election within the framework of
Resolution 435.

To our governments' disappointment
and regret the South African Govern-
ment maintained their intention to pro-
ceed with unilateral elections. How-
ever, our Ministers made our position
plain. We do not accept the validity of
those elections, and we would consider
those elections null and void. We do
not consider them as having any sig-
nificance. We will not accord any rec-
ognition to the outcome. Those elec-
tions cannot be considered free and fair
and are irrelevant to the progress of
Namibia to an internationally accept-
able independence. We share the ap-
prehensions expressed in this debate,
and most notably by our African col-
leagues, that this unilateral process
might be used to frustrate the im-
plementation of Resolution 435.

Nevertheless, South Africa still has
an opportunity to demonstrate that it
will cooperate with the United Nations
and to allay the concerns which under-
lie this resolution. At Pretoria the
South African Government, in agreeing
that discussions be resumed, accepted
that the aim of those discussions would
be to carry forward the planning of the
proposed U.N. -supervised elections
within the framework of Resolution
435 and to fix a date for the elections.

52

Moreover, the South Africans stated
their view that it is appropriate to rec-
ommend to the Secretary General that
he begin consultations on the composi-
tion of the military component of the
U.N. Transition Assistance Group. It is
these processes, to which South Africa
has agreed, which in our view offer the
way forward toward the implementa-
tion of Resolution 435.

Time is short. South Africa should
be under no illusions as to our determi-
nation. We have abstained on this res-
olution because we believe that our
efforts should be directed to obtaining
and supporting the efforts of the Sec-
retary General to secure their coopera-
tion rather than to prejudging the pos-
sible outcome, as does paragraph 6 of
this resolution. However, it would be a
mistake to interpret our abstention as a
lack of sympathy for the resolution or
the direction in which it points the
Council in the event South Africa fails
to cooperate in the implementation of
Resolution 435. We will make our
judgments on the facts at the appro-
priate time and act accordingly.

We reaffirm our commitment to
Resolution 435. We will continue our
efforts, and we will give all our support
to the Secretary General in his en-
deavors to obtain the cooperation of
South Africa in the little time remain-
ing.

SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 439 3

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 385 (1976), 431
(1978), 432 (1978) and 435 (1978),

Having considered the report submitted by the
Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 7 of
resolution 435 (1978) (S/ 12903),

Taking note of the relevant communications
addressed to the Secretary-General and the
President of the Security Council (S/ 12900 and
S/ 12902),

Having heard and considered the statement by
the President of the United Nations Council for
Namibia.

Taking note also of the communication dated
23 October 1978 from the President of the South
West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)
addressed to the Secretary-General (S/12913),

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the
United Nations over Namibia and its continued
commitment to the implementation of Security
Council resolution 385 (1976), in particular, the
holding of free elections in Namibia under
United Nations supervision and control.

Reiterating the view that any unilateral meas-
ure taken by the illegal administration in
Namibia in relation to the electoral process, in-
cluding unilateral registration of voters or
transfer of power, in contravention of the
above-mentioned resolutions of the Security

Department of State Bulletin

Arms Control

by Adrian S. Fisher

Statement in Committee 1 {Political
and Security) of the U.N. General As-
sembly on October 19, 1978. Ambas-
sador Fisher is U.S. Representative to
the Committee on Disarmament. '

We are met to renew debate in this
committee on questions basic to the
survival and prosperity of mankind.
These are not new questions. We have
reasoned long together, in past years,
in search of ways to minimize the risk
and destructiveness of armed conflict
and to assure that the resources, human
and material, devoted to the means of
war are progressively redirected to
man's social and economic betterment.

The obstacles we face remain awe-
some.

• The accumulation of arms, by both
developed and developing countries,
continues largely unchecked.

• The antipathies and fears which at
once drive the arms race and are driven
by it have not abated.

• Technological progress both en-
hances the destructive potential of arma-
ments and makes more difficult the
task of achieving balanced, verifiable
agreements to limit and reduce them.

Yet the response of the world com-
munity to the challenges of arms con-

trol and disarmament is probably more
vigorous and promising now than it has
ever been. The United States, for its
part, is engaged in a program of
negotiations of unprecedented scope,
variety, and import.

Since we last met in this committee,
the community of nations has passed an
important milestone in its quest for a
better and a safer world: the first spe-
cial session of the United Nations de-
voted to disarmament. Vice President
Mondale, addressing delegates to the
Special Session on Disarmament
(SSOD) shortly after its opening,
called it a symbol of hope. Looking
back at the accomplishments of the
special session, I think we may now
fairly say that it has also given cause
for hope.

• At the special session, consensus
agreement was reached on a program of
action which covers a broad spectrum
of disarmament issues — a remarkable
and precious achievement.

• Practical measures were agreed
upon to strengthen the multilateral
machinery for disarmament delibera-
tions and negotiations.

• For all who participated in the ses-
sion, there was a raising of conscious-
ness, both of our varying perspectives
and emphases in the search for ways to
control and reduce arms and of our

Council and this resolution is null and void.

Gravely concerned at the decision of the Gov-
ernment of South Africa to proceed with unilat-
eral elections in Namibia in clear contravention
of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) and
435 (1978).

1 . Condemns the decision of the South African
Government to proceed unilaterally with the
holding of elections in the Territory from 4 to 8
December 1978 in contravention of Security
Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978);

2. Considers that this decision constitutes a
clear defiance of the United Nations and. in par-
ticular, the authority of the Security Council;

3. Declares those elections and their results
null and void and that no recognition will be ac-
corded either by the United Nations or any
Member States to any representatives or organ
established by that process;

4. Calls upon South Africa immediately to
cancel the elections it has planned in Namibia in
December 1978;

5. Demands once again that South Africa co-

operate with the Security Council and the
Secretary-General in the implementation of its
resolutions 385 (1976). 431 (1978) and 435
(1978);

6. Warns South Africa that its failure to do so
would compel the Security Council to meet
forthwith to initiate appropriate actions under the
Charter of the United Nations, including Chapter
VII thereof, so as to ensure South Africa's com-
pliance with the aforementioned resolutions;

7. Calls on the Secretary-General to report on
the progress of the implementation of this res-
olution by 25 November 1978. □

1 Text from USUN press release 117.

2 For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 1978, p. 57.

3U.N. doc. S/RES/439(1978); adopted by the
Council on Nov. 13, 1978, by a vote of 10 to 0,
with 5 abstentions (Canada, France, F.R.G.,
U.K., U.S.).

January 1979

shared responsibility for the process.

• In his plenary statement to this
General Assembly, Secretary Vance
spoke of what the United States regards
as another important achievement of
the special session: the decision by
several nuclear powers to give assur-
ances about the non-use of nuclear
weapons in order to strengthen the se-
curity of non-nuclear-weapon states.

Assurances on Non-Use of Nuclear
Weapons

In the case of the United States — and
I suspect the same is true of some of
the other nuclear-weapon states as
well — this decision was taken as a di-
rect consequence of the raised con-
sciousness to which I have just re-
ferred. In October 1977, President
Carter declared before this Assembly
that the United States would not use
nuclear weapons except in self-
defense — a guarantee that no nation
need fear being made the victim of nu-
clear aggression or blackmail by the
United States.

Before and during the special ses-
sion, my government gave careful
thought to what further assurance the
United States might provide those na-
tions which have foresworn nuclear
weapons. Vice President Mondale told
the special session that we were there
"to listen to the voices of other na-
tions" as well as to speak our own
views. We did listen, and one result,
decided upon after careful review of
our security requirements and alliance
commitments, was the further elabora-
tion of the U.S. position on security as-
surances announced by Secretary
Vance on June 12, an elaboration
which built substantially upon Presi-
dent Carter's earlier statement. Secre-
tary Vance stated that the President de-
clared, and I quote:

The United States will not use nuclear
weapons against any non-nuclear-weapons state
party to the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] or
any comparable internationally binding com-
mitment not to acquire nuclear explosive de-
vices, except in the case of an attack on the
United States, its territories or armed forces, or
its allies, by such a state allied to a nuclear-
weapons state or associated with a nuclear-
weapons state in carrying out or sustaining the
attack.

Speaking to the General Assembly
last month. Foreign Minister Gromyko
described this pledge and a similar as-
surance given at the special session by
the Government of the United King-
dom as "replete with all kinds of res-
ervations rendering them valueless."
The governments of non-nuclear-
weapon states which have given

thought to these carefully considered,
solemn declarations know better. They
know that their security has been fur-
ther vouchsafed, that the significance
of their decision to abjure nuclear
weapons has been more sufficiently
acknowledged.

Together, the solemn pledges given
by the nuclear powers during the spe-
cial session represent an important
measure of security for the non-
nuclear-weapon states. For this rea-
son, as Secretary Vance stated in the
General Assembly on September 29,
the United States believes the Security
Council should take formal note of
them. At the same time, we do not be-
lieve that these pledges can be forced
into a common mold. It would be un-
realistic to anticipate that a single
formulation could be found which

I/JV. Fund for

Drug Abuse

Control

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
SEPT. 221

For over 70 years, the United States
of America has supported international
measures to control drug abuse. Today,
it is more important than ever to con-
tinue this support.

This Administration recognizes that
drug problems cannot be solved unilat-
erally but require concerted action by
the world community. Drug abuse is
exacting an ever greater toll on the citi-
zens of developed and developing
countries. It affects our economies, our
societies, and, most of all, our culture.

The U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse
Control has played a central role in this
international effort. Despite limited
funds it has been remarkably effective
in finding cooperative ways for nations
to work together on this international
problem. Today I am pleased to an-
nounce that the United States will con-
tribute $3 million to the Fund in 1978.
With the contribution, I want to extend
my best wishes to Dr. Bror Rexed, the
new Executive Director of the Fund.

The United States remains deeply
committed to the cause of international
drug control. We will continue to sup-
port the efforts of the Fund, the United
Nations, and other governments. □

■Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Sept. 25. 1978.

53

would be generally acceptable and
meet the diverse security requirements
not only of each of the nuclear powers
but also of the non-nuclear-weapon
states, for many of which relationships
with specific nuclear states are an es-
sential ingredient in their national se-
curity.

My government continues to sup-
port the concept of nuclear-weapon-
free zones as a further means of
strengthening the security of non-
nuclear-weapon states, preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, and
enhancing stability in regions where
appropriate conditions exist. The
United States, with other nuclear pow-
ers, has of course already made a
treaty commitment not to use nuclear
weapons against parties to the treaty
of Tlatelolco.

The achievements of the special
session — an agreed program of action,
strengthened multilateral machinery,
heightened awareness and commit-
ment, broadened security assurances
for the non-nuclear-weapon states —
are cause for encouragement. It is our
responsibility now to follow up on the
conclusions and recommendations of
the session, sharpening the definition
of our goals, and narrowing our dif-
ferences over the steps we must take
to achieve them.

Accomplishments Since the SSOD

I think we may take heart at what
has already been accomplished in the
brief 3VS months since consensus
adoption of the Final Document:2

• Thanks in large part to the perse-
verance and diplomacy of President
Mojsov of the 32d U.N. General As-
sembly to whom I join others in pay-
ing tribute, the membership of the
Committee on Disarmament has been
agreed upon and the committee will
begin its work in January. Drawing
upon the experience of the Conference
of the Committee on Disarmament but
with a broadened and more represen-
tative membership, the Committee on
Disarmament will provide a continu-
ing forum for serious multilateral
negotiation of important disarmament
issues. We particularly welcome the
decision of France to take its place in
the committee. We look forward to the
day when China too will take its
place.

• Since the special session also, the
revived U.N. Disarmament Commis-
sion has held its organizational meet-
ing. Pending the decision of the Gen-
eral Assembly, it will hold its first
substantive meeting in May and June
of next year. The United States looks

54

forward to the opportunity the Disar-
mament Commission will give for
more extensive and profound discus-
sion of the central issues of disarma-
ment, complementing the resolution-
oriented debate of this committee.

• The U.N. study on disarmament
and development mandated by the
special session is already under way
with good prospects of being com-
pleted on schedule or earlier.

• Nations have nominated a number
of truly eminent persons to serve on a
board which will advise the Secretary
General on aspects of studies to be
carried out under the auspices of the
United Nations in the field of arms
control and disarmament.

• My own government has taken
steps to implement and seek funding
for the expanded programs of peaceful
nuclear assistance announced by Vice
President Mondale and described in
detail by Ambassador Young. [U.S.
Permanent Representative to the
United Nations].

• My government is pleased also to
note the progress made since the spe-
cial session by the nations of Latin
America toward coming to grips with
the problem of controlling conven-
tional arms. While not a direct out-
come of the special session, this re-
flects the new sense of urgency and
purpose which the session has given
us all. Having already provided the
world a model for regional
"suffocation" — to borrow Prime
Minister Trudeau's apt term — of the
nuclear arms race, Latin Americans
have begun a process which the United
States hopes will provide a model also
for restricting the transfer of conven-
tional weapons and dealing regionally
with other conventional arms issues.
The United States welcomes and sup-
ports these efforts.

Continuing Efforts

At this General Assembly we may
expect a larger number of resolutions
dealing with disarmament than ever
before. Agreed to by consensus, the
Final Document of the special session
expressed our shared vision of the fun-
damental imperatives of disarmament.
It did not, it could not, reflect the par-
ticular, detailed perspectives and
emphases which different nations
brought to the debate. Many specific
proposals and suggestions submitted by
individual nations did not achieve con-
sensus. The Final Document recog-
nized that a number of these deserved
to be studied more thoroughly. The
United States is prepared to give care-
ful consideration to all serious propos-

als, in this Assembly or in other appro-
priate deliberative and negotiating
bodies. That consideration will begin
here.

For its part, my government hopes,
in particular, that this session of the
General Assembly will recommend to
the Security Council the action re-
garding nuclear non-use assurances
about which I have already spoken.

We hope it will also take concrete
measures to advance the work already
underway to develop a system for uni-
form, international measurement and
reporting of military expenditures and
thereby begin to build a foundation for
negotiated limitation and reduction of
military budgets. I listened with inter-
est to the suggestion made by our dis-
tinguished colleague, the Foreign
Minister of the Philippines, that it
would be advisable for the pilot test of
the reporting instrument of military ex-
penditures to have the participation of
at least one state from each political
system or geographical area. This is an
interesting idea and deserves careful
consideration.

We would like to see further atten-
tion and impetus given to regional ap-
proaches to arms control and disarma-
ment, particularly to what have been
called confidence-building or stabiliz-
ing measures: that is, measures de-
signed to increase the transparency of
military activities, reduce the chances
of miscalculation, complicate the task
of achieving surprise in attack, and al-
leviate the condition of mutual ignor-
ance in which force postures are based
on worst-case estimates of what others
are doing.

We are confident that this Assembly
will give appropriate recognition and
endorsement to preparations for the
Nonproliferation Treaty review confer-
ence and the Biological Weapons Con-
vention review conference which are to
take place in 1980.

In our deliberations here we have an
obligation not only to follow up on the
work of the special session but to seek
to preserve the unity of purpose and vi-
sion which was achieved there. This
will require restraint, a willingness to
forego polarizing resolutions which
could undermine the consensus
achieved in the Declaration and the
Program of Action. It will also require
patience — a recognition that the disar-
mament process is not a sprint, to be
completed with short bursts of zeal, but
a marathon requiring sustained effort.

We must all recognize the complex-
ity of the process and the futility of
grandiose schemes which ignore secu-
rity realities. We hear from some that
only "political will 'Ms required to

Department of State Bulletin

achieve sweeping agreements; but an
essential element of that political will
must be a willingness to provide the
information about programs and forces
on which concrete, practicable meas-
ures of disarmament must be based,
and a commitment to measures of
openness and inspection essential to
verify mutual compliance with agree-
ments affecting the security, the inde-
pendence, and even the survival of na-
tions. We must be prudent in our
institution-building. The proliferation
of structures for which a cogent pur-
pose and realistic role have not been
clearly defined can only devalue our
efforts.

Preservation of the shared sense of
purpose, broad priorities, and commit-
ment which I believe was achieved at
the special session will be vital to the
success of our future multilateral ef-
forts in this forum and in others — in the
Committee on Disarmament and in the
revived U.N. Disarmament Commis-
sion; at the review conferences for the
Nonproliferation Treaty and the
Biological Weapons Convention; at the
U.N. conference on specific conven-
tional weapons; in the continuing work
of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Evaluation; as well as in regional
forums already constituted, such as the
Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe. The multilateral disar-
mament calendar is full, the scope of
the agenda more inclusive than it has
ever been.

Disarmament is a universal responsi-
bility. Political interdependence and
the ubiquity of arms accumulation
make it so. At the same time, the
United States recognizes and accepts
the special responsibilities in the dis-
armament process imposed on it by its
status as a nuclear- weapon state, one of
the world's two principal military pow-
ers, and a major supplier of arms to
other nations.

We share the disappointment that all
feel that a comprehensive test ban has
not yet been concluded. Despite the
complexity of these negotiations we are
making steady progress toward an
agreement which will ban any
nuclear-weapon-test explosion in any
environment, which will include as an
integral part of the treaty a protocol
prohibiting nuclear explosions for
peaceful purposes, which will apply
equally to all states parties, those with
nuclear weapons as well as those with-
out them, and which we hope will
achieve the widest possible interna-
tional adherence.

At the U.N. Special Session on Dis-
armament Vice President Mondale put
forward a set of what he called "bold

January 1979

objectives and realistic steps" to guide
our arms control efforts. The Director
of the U.S. Arms Control and Disar-
mament Agency, Paul Warnke, de-
scribed in detail the steps the United
States is already taking, in negotiations
currently underway, including those on
the limitation of strategic arms and on a
comprehensive test ban.

Secretary Vance also spoke of pro-
gress in the SALT [Strategic Arms Lim-
itation Talks] negotiations in his state-
ment before the General Assembly on
September 29 of this year.

The hope has been expressed that the
negotiators in the ongoing bilateral and
trilateral negotiations would be able to
set dates for the successful conclusion
of these negotiations. The statement
that I have just completed does not
offer any promise as to precisely when
the negotiations will be concluded.
This is not out of neglect but rather due
to the realities of international negotia-
tions. Experience has shown that in
international negotiations on issues of
importance and concern to each
member of the international commu-
nity, an attempt to prescribe in advance
a set deadline is more apt to be coun-
terproductive than helpful. Therefore,
the United States is not able, at this
time, to give a specific date for the
conclusion of our talks without jeopar-
dizing the progress of these ongoing
negotiations, the success of which is so
important to us all.

Nevertheless. I can now report en-
couraging progress in what is perhaps
the most consequential of those negoti-
ations, the SALT talks between the
United States and the Soviet Union.
There are still a number of differences
remaining between the sides. But the
United States is hopeful that as a result
of next week's discussions in Moscow
[October 21-24], which Secretary
Vance and Director Warnke will at-
tend, we will be able to complete a
SALT II agreement in the near future.

Today we take up in this committee
the work left to us by the special ses-
sion. As we do so, let me assure you
that the United States will not shirk its
reponsibilities; that its commitment to
the objectives set forth by Vice Presi-
dent Mondale and reflected in the Pro-
gram of Action of the special session is
unwavering; and that it is ready to
work with all nations to make those
objectives reality. □

■Text from USUN press release 96.

2 For text of Final Document and other mate-
rial relating to the SSOD, see Bulletin of Aug.
1978, p. 42.

Summaries of
r.S. Statements

Foreign Economic Interests
in Southern Africa

In examining the resolution adopted
by the Special Committee on foreign
economic interests in southern Africa
and other colonial territories, the
United States finds that its primary
goals — the hastening of independence
for Zimbabwe and Namibia, the elimi-
nation of apartheid, and the end of
exploitation in non-self-governing
territories — coincide totally with the
goals of the U.S. Government. Al-
though we share these goals, we do
differ with the resolution on the role of
foreign economic interests in the de-
colonization process.

In the U.S. view, the Special Com-
mittee's resolution fails to distinguish
between the situation in southern Af-
rica and the situations which exist in
other non-self-governing territories. In
addition, we believe that the language
of the resolution has an unfortunate
effect, on the one hand, of obliging the
administering powers to promote the
economic development of the inhabit-
ants of their territories while on the
other hand, with its blanket condemna-
tions, seemingly rules out the kinds of
economic activities which make such
development possible.

Consequently, we are unable to sup-
port what appears to be a basic propo-
sition of this resolution; namely that
economic interests and other economic
activities in non-self-governing ter-
ritories are, by their nature, detrimental
to the interests of the people of those
territories. We strongly believe such
activities can make a significant contri-
bution to the development of these ter-
ritories prior to independence and that
each situation must be considered on an
individual basis.

In the case of Rhodesia, the question
of economic activities is governed by
relevant Security Council resolutions
which provide for mandatory economic
sanctions. The United States fully sup-
ported economic sanctions at the time
they were invoked and will continue to
support them. There is no U.S. trade
with Rhodesia other than humanitarian
trade permitted under those resolu-
tions.

The situation in Namibia is also gov-
erned by U.N. resolutions and Interna-
tional Court of Justice rulings which
oblige member states to insure that in

55

their economic and political relations
with South Africa, they do not convey
legal recognition to its administration
of Namibia. The United States supports
these resolutions and rulings.

The impact of foreign economic
interests on the situation in South Af-
rica is a much more complex question,
with sound arguments on both sides.
We understand the viewpoint that only
a total trade embargo against South
Africa will compel that government to
reconsider its current racist policies.
Last fall, the United States undertook a
thorough review of its economic rela-
tions with South Africa and decided
that, for the present — and in relation to
the question of apartheid — trade and
investment restrictions of the kind ad-
vocated by many states should be
adopted only if there is compelling evi-
dence that South Africa would achieve
their goal of ameliorating apartheid.
We have not yet concluded that such
would be the case.

Although the United States has been
disappointed by the South African re-
sponse to date, we continue to believe
that economic relations with South Af-
rica can be a positive force for pro-
moting change in that society, provided
that the companies operating there act
as agents for positive change. We are
closely following the efforts of those
American companies which have vol-
untarily agreed to adhere to a strict
code of fair employment practices.

The United States has made it clear
to the South African Government that
unless there is progress toward elimi-
nation of apartheid, relations between
our two countries would deteriorate,
and we reserve the option of taking ap-
propriate action in the economic sphere
if and when we conclude such actions
would be effective.

Regarding the section of the Special
Committee's resolution which con-
demns all nuclear cooperation with
South Africa, it is the U.S. view that
the purpose of this provision is to pre-
vent South Africa from developing a
nuclear- weapon capability; this is also
a priority goal of the United States. We
have repeatedly urged South Africa to
adhere to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty and to accept adequate interna-
tional safeguards over all its nuclear
facilities. U.S. compliance with this
resolution, however, would have the
opposite effect; it would have nations
cut off the possibility of the kind of
safeguards we believe essential to in-
sure world confidence in South Af-
rica's peaceful nuclear intentions.

On the question of how foreign eco-
nomic interests impact on the small
non-self-governing territories, the

56

United States does not believe that the
Special Committee's resolution takes
into account the positive impact these
economic interests can have in terms of
transferring resources and technology,
in providing jobs, and in helping to de-
velop the economies of these ter-
ritories. Such development — properly
managed — can hasten the decoloniza-
tion process by promoting economic
and social development. We are unable
to accept a principal premise of the
resolution that foreign economic inter-
ests impede the process of independ-
ence. (John Hechinger in Committee
IV on Oct. 18; USUN press release
95.)

Middle East

The United States commended the
significant contribution made by the
U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UN-
IFIL) since its establishment in March
1978 and acknowledged an important
task remaining — assistance to Lebanon
in the restoration of its effective au-
thority over the area. On September
18, 1978, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 434 (sponsored by the
United States) to renew UNIFIL's
mandate for a period of 4 months (until
January 19, 1979). (Ambassador An-
drew Young in the Security Council on
Sept. 18; USUN press release 81.)

The United States supported the ex-
tension of the U.N. Emergency Force
(UNEF) in the Middle East. On Oc-
tober 23, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 438 to renew UNEF's man-
date until July 24, 1979. (Ambassador
James F. Leonard in the Security
Council on Oct. 23; USUN press release
103.)

On October 24, the United States in-
creased its 1978 contribution to the
U.N. Relief and Works Agency,
(UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East by $9 million, bringing
its total contribution to $51.5 million.
Earlier this year, the U.S. Government
pledged a regular contribution of $42.5
million. (USUN press release 104.)

Outer Space

President Carter has stated that in its
space policy, the United States will
pursue a balanced approach, em-
phasizing both the application of space
technology that we hope will bring im-
portant benefits to mankind and the
continued exploration of space to build
a more complete knowledge of its
properties and understanding of its rel-
evance to our needs on Earth. The
United States has conducted a number
of important activities in the peaceful
uses of outer space.

• Payload allocations for the first 29
Shuttle launches (taking us through
1982) have been essentially completed.
Negotiations are underway with
Canada, West Germany, India, Iran,
and Intelsat to launch application-type
satellites, as well as international co-
operative and reimbursable Spacelab
missions using the Shuttle.

• The United States launched Land-
sat 3 in March 1978 to join Landsat 2
in Polar orbit to expand NASA's pro-
gram for cataloging the Earth's re-
sources and monitoring changing en-
vironmental conditions.

• The first spacecraft built to test the
feasibility of measuring variations in
the Earth's temperature was launched
in April 1978.

• Several planning sessions on an
experimental program of multinational
satellite-aided search and rescue have
been completed.

• The Viking landers and orbiters
are continuing to provide data from
Mars.

• NASA launched two Voyager
spacecraft in 1977 to conduct com-
parative studies of the planetary sys-
tems of Jupiter and Saturn and to per-
form studies of the interplanetary
medium between Earth and Saturn.

• The United States signed space
science projects agreements in 1977
with the Netherlands, the United King-
dom, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, and the European Space Agency
for an infrared astronomy satellite, the
Galileo Jupiter orbiter probe, and the
space telescope.

• The International Sun-Earth
Explorer Mission was launched in Oc-
tober 1977.

• The International Ultraviolet
Explorer was launched by the United
States in January 1978.

• The United States launched two
pioneer spacecraft toward Venus in
May and August of 1978.

Since 1972 the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its
legal subcommittee have been consid-
ering a treaty concerning the Moon and
other celestial bodies to further de-
velopment of international law with re-
spect to outer space.

Another issue of considerable dis-
cussion in the legal subcommittee is
direct television broadcasting from
satellites. The United States has no
plans to engage in international direct
broadcasting by satellite, and our posi-
tion is that any guidelines drawn up for
broadcasters must not infringe upon the
internationally recognized right to
seek, receive, and impart information
and ideas through any media and re-
gardless of frontiers.

Department of State Bulletin

Remote sensing is proving to be an
area in which international cooperation
in the beneficial application of space
technology is prompting widespread
interest. The United States has estab-
lished a policy of open dissemination
of the data from its Landsat program.

Some states believe that a definition
of outer space would be useful and that
there is a convenient and appropriate
altitude at which a demarcation line
could be drawn. However, there is no
agreement among these states on what
that altitude should be. The U.S. view
is that there has not yet been identified
any compelling legal or technical need
or justification for such a definition.
We are, of course, prepared to continue
to participate in the discussions related
to this issue.

An issue ancillary to the question of
defining outer space is the status of the
geostationary orbit. The United States
does not find merit, either on scientific
or legal grounds, that the geostationary
orbit is subject to claims of national
sovereignty. We are firmly convinced
that this orbit lies in outer space and
that its status is governed by the 1967
outer space treaty.

The United States supports the sec-
ond U.N. conference on outer space
which will be held in several years. We
fully concur in the major objectives of
the conference which emphasize sci-
ence and technology for space research
and application, the elaboration of
benefits from space technology, and
the need for international cooperation
in the study of benefits from space ap-
plications. (Ambassador Richard W.
Petree in the Special Political Com-
mittee on Oct. 17; USUN press release
94.)

Solomon Islands

The United States on September 19
welcomed the Solomon Islands as the
150th member of the United Nations.
(Ambassador Andrew Young in the
General Assembly; USUN press release
82.)

U.S. Financial Contributions

At the U.N. pledging conference for
development activities on November 7,
the United States pledged a total of
$163 million to the following U.N. op-
erational activities for the period
January 1 -December 31, 1979:

• $126 million to the U.N. De-
velopment Program (including funds
for UNIDO), up from $100 million 2
years ago, underlining the U.S. con-
viction that UNDP should be the prin-
cipal funding mechanism and coor-

January 1979

dinator of technical cooperation efforts
with the U.N. system;

• An additional $3 million special
contribution to UNDP to be used for
curbing postharvest agricultural losses
which is being undertaken by FAO;

• $2 million to the U.N. Capital De-
velopment Fund;

• $30 million to UNICEF; and

• $2 million to the voluntary fund
for the U.N. Decade for Women.

(Minister-Counselor William Stibravy
in the U.N. pledging conference for
development activities; USUN press
release 114.)

Women

The issue of women's rights touches
all nations; it can no longer be regarded
as a phenomenon occurring only in de-
veloping societies. While the nations of
the world readily agree that no effort
should be spared in eliminating all
forms of discrimination on the basis of
race, religion, and national origin,
complete substantive action to elimi-
nate discrimination against women is
lacking.

In the majority of the developing
countries, women are the cornerstone
of most transactions which contribute
to the national economies. This is a
power phenomenon which is rewarded
by denying women full rights of par-
ticipation in the economic, social, and
political decisionmaking processes af-
fecting their lives. And although the
proportion of women in the labor mar-
ket has increased over the last 20 years,
there remains a large gap in male/
female earnings. Even though more
time is being devoted to focusing on
the issue of equal rights for women,
many of the male-led nations — with
traditionally patriarchal societies —
refuse to believe and sincerely accept
the validity of this struggle; the time
for paying lip-service as support for the
struggle has ended.

The United States has carefully
studied the report of the Joint Inspec-
tion Unit and considers it to be a con-
structive contribution to efforts to im-
prove the employment opportunities of
women in the United Nations and the
specialized agencies. We endorse the
report's recommendations and regard
them as a framework whereby rhetoric
can be transformed into reality.

The United States would like the
United Nations to take immediate ac-
tion to correct a continuing injustice
against women working within the
U.N. Secretariat, against women
working in meetings devoted to world
peace and economic and social justice.
This situation is unacceptable, espe-
cially now that we are approaching the

57

WESTER* HEMISPHERE:

\i<'ffrcir/tfCf

by Warren Christopher

Statement before the meeting of con-
sultation of the Organization of Ameri-
can States (OAS) foreign ministers in
Washington, D.C., on September 21,
1978. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Sec-
retary of State.

The tragedy of Nicaragua moves us
all. We cannot be indifferent to the
terrible human cost of recent
events — the bloodshed, the destruction,
and the toll in innocent lives.
Thousands of afflicted individuals call
to us all for help.

We have all seen the message di-
rected to this and other international
organizations from representatives of a
broad spectrum of groups in Nicaragua,
including leaders of the church. In that
message, these representatives said, in
part:

Especially, we address ourselves to the na-
tions of our hemisphere which share the suf-
ferings of the Nicaraguan people, so that this
cry of anxiety will impel them to take direct
action through international political and hu-
manitarian organizations to aid our victims and
achieve peace.

We cannot ignore that anguished cry.
Together, we must take effective action
to respond to this appeal.

First, we call for urgent and gener-
ous support for the work of the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross,
its local affiliates, and other relief or-
ganizations in Nicaragua as well as in
Costa Rica and Honduras. In this way,
necessary relief supplies, particularly
medicine and food, can be distributed
promptly to those in need. My govern-
ment is prepared to contribute to such
an effort. In addition, we urge the OAS
to join us in encouraging the efforts of
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refu-
gees to aid the Nicaraguan refugees in
Costa Rica and Honduras.

Second, we deplore and urge an end
to the killing and bloodshed which has
scarred Nicaragua in the past several
weeks. The reports of mass arrests and
detentions, torture, and even indis-
criminate killing of civilians must be
investigated fully. If they are true, they
deserve the condemnation of this body.
There is already ample evidence to
warrant our deepest concern. Attacks
on noncombatants and the carrying out
of summary executions would be in
violation of article 3 of the 1949
Geneva conventions on humanitarian
law in armed conflict. If condoned by
government, they would violate obli-
gations under the U.N. and OAS char-
ters to promote universal respect for

midway point of the U.N. Decade for
Women.

The General Assembly has re-
peatedly expressed its concern about
the treatment afforded to women within
the Secretariat. One excuse frequently
used is that the U.N.'s failure to make
progress in increasing the employment
and advancement of women in the Sec-
retariat is due to the failure of member
states to propose suitable women can-
didates for employment. The United
States and other governments have
proposed qualified women candidates
only to have them rejected by the Sec-
retariat. We urge all governments to
assist the Secretary General to remedy
the current imbalance between men and
women by nominating more qualified
women candidates and by encouraging
recruitment missions that go beyond
the usual government apparatus.

The United States believes, as the
Joint Inspection Unit suggests, that
steps should be taken to remedy the
current imbalance.

• The Secretary General and the
executive heads of all specialized
agencies should issue firm policy
guidelines which would be designed to
increase the number of women in
senior positions in the Secretariat.

• Affirmative action techniques
should be employed to increase the
number of women in international
service and to assure, once they are
employed, that they enjoy equal op-
portunities to fully develop their pro-
fessional capabilities.

The United States believes that the
Joint Inspection Unit should continue
to play a role and recommends that the
unit continue to monitor progress in
carrying out the policy of this assem-
bly. We suggest that the unit report
again, perhaps to the General Assem-
bly in 1980, thus providing ample time
for the Secretariat to put these recom-
mendations into practice. (Ambassador
Andrew Young in Committee V on
Oct. 13; USUN press release 93.) □

58

Department of State Bulletin

and observance of human rights and
fundamental freedom.

We call upon the Inter-American
Human Rights Commission and the
Government of Nicaragua to agree to
an early and expedited visit by the
Commission to that country so that the
Commission may promptly investigate
the tragic events that have occurred and
report its findings to this body. And we
urge that this meeting of consultation
maintain itself in existence at least until
it has received the report of the Com-
mission.

Third, my government is deeply
concerned at the regional implications
of the situation in Nicaragua. We
strongly support the initiative of the
Permanent Council in dispatching a
factfinding mission to the Costa
Rican-Nicaraguan border. We hope
that the mission will report to us soon
from the affected area and that this
meeting of consultation will ask the
mission to continue monitoring events
along the border.

Fourth, in view of the wide gulf
separating the Government of
Nicaragua from the opposition groups,
we believe special efforts are needed to
help resolve the crisis. In particular,
we believe the good offices of con-
cerned governments should be offered.
The United States is prepared to par-
ticipate in such an effort. This ap-
proach, in our view, offers the best
hope for a peaceful and just solution. It
would be our hope that through such an
effort the Nicaraguan people them-
selves could engage in a peaceful and
democratic process that would result in
an end to their suffering and resolve the
issues that currently divide them so
deeply.

We believe it would be appropriate
and highly desirable for this body to
endorse such an effort and to call for its
acceptance by both the Government of
Nicaragua and opposition groups
within Nicaraguan society. My gov-
ernment believes that only an effort of
this kind can end the bloodshed and
violence and avoid a recurrence of in-
ternational incidents such as those that
have already occurred.

In setting out my government's po-
sition, I have sought to make clear our
grave concern for the suffering of the
people of Nicaragua and our hope for
peace in the region. My government is
prepared to cooperate fully with the
other members of this Organization.

To reiterate, my government urges
an effective, urgent expression of con-
cern by this body which would:

• Support humanitarian relief to the
people of Nicaragua who have been

U.S.-BrazU Joint Group
on Energy Technology

Following is the joint communique
issued on October 4, 1978, of the sec-
ond meeting of the U.S. -Brazil Joint
Group on Energy Technology held in
Washington, D.C., October 2^, 1978.

The U.S. -Brazil Joint Group on Energy Tech-
nology met for the second time October 2-4 at
the Departments of State and Energy in Wash-
ington. DC. The first meeting of the Joint
Group was in Brasilia, September 16-17, 1976,
shortly after the group was established pursuant
to the February 1976 Memorandum of Under-
standing between the two governments to consult
on matters of mutual interest.

Minister Carlos Augusto de Proenca Rosa,
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs of the
Brazilian Ministry of External Relations, and
Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, Assistant
Secretary for Oceans and International Environ-
mental and Scientific Affairs of the U.S. De-
partment of State, co-chaired the meeting.

This Joint Group meeting represents one effort
among others by both countries to build upon a
tradition of friendship and cooperation, to de-
termine new areas where interests converge, and
to forge new ties based on mutual benefit and
shared objectives and goals. The meeting is the
first step in the realization of the agreement be-
tween Presidents Carter and Geisel, announced
in their Joint Communique of March 30, 1978.
to establish a program of cooperation in energy
research and development as an expression of
the interest both countries have in reducing their
dependence on imported oil.

The Joint Group discussed a program of coop-

eration in the three energy technology fields
specified by Presidents Carter and Geisel: 1)
coal mining, processing and conversion, 2) pro-
duction of alcohol from sugar and other agricul-
tural products, and 3) industrial and transporta-
tion conservation. Three technical working
groups were formed in these respective fields to
define possible projects and work out a detailed
plan of action for approval by the Joint Group
and the two governments.

The cooperative program which the Joint
Group agreed to includes exchanges of experts
and information and meetings in the three fields
of cooperation. However, in the biomass area,
the program is designed to go beyond tradi-
tional information exchange. It is intended to
lead to identification of a joint project to design
and construct one or more research and de-
velopment facilities which incorporate the
latest technology for conversion or utilization.
The joint program of cooperation in fuels from
biomass includes 1) participation by both sides
in program reviews of current research de-
velopment; 2) participation in design reviews
of specific agreed upon projects; and 3) a for-
malized exchange of information designed to
coordinate the research programs of the two
countries.

The program in coal technology includes the
possibility of testing Brazilian coals in the U.S.
Solvent Refined Coal liquefaction process and
Brazilian testing and analysis of U.S. -produced
solvent refined coal. Information exchanges in
coal mining, preparation and gasification were
also agreed to.

Finally, in the conservation field, coopera-

affected by the fighting of the past sev-
eral weeks and, as may be necessary,
to the Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras
and Costa Rica;

• Support the mandate of the In-
ter-American Human Rights Commis-
sion and urge that it investigate forth-
with the allegations of serious viola-
tions in Nicaragua;

• Support and extend the mandate of
the factfinding mission in an effort to
keep further violence from spilling
across international borders; and

• Urge the Government of Nicaragua
and the opposition groups that have
called for international conciliation to
accept an offer of good offices to help
find an enduring and democratic solu-
tion.

We have submitted a resolution em-
bodying these proposals for considera-
tion by this body.

I know the concerns of my govern-
ment are shared by all those govern-
ments represented here today. I am
sure that this meeting will produce a
number of ideas, in addition to those I
have presented, for ending the tragic
suffering in Nicaragua and restoring
peace to the region. We shall be eager
to receive those ideas.

The question before us was
eloquently posed by Nicaraguan Arch-
bishop Obando y Bravo:

How now to contribute, with generosity, to
the end of mourning and anguish, massacre and
hatred, so that returned to the people of
Nicaragua may be peace, civilized dialogue, the
enthusiasm of participation in their history and
the eternal happiness of living their own destiny.

We believe that this organization
must respond, promptly and compas-
sionately, to this challenge. D

January 1979

tion will include information exchange, visits
by experts, and participation in national pro-
gram review meetings in the areas of transpor-
tation conservation (electric and hybrid ve-
hicles as well as heat engines and other aspects
of highway vehicle systems) and industrial
process conservation in manufacturing indus-
tries including cement, pulp and paper, steel
and aluminum, textiles and food processing.

This program is a significant cooperative
effort in a field of vital interest, which em-
phasizes both nations' areas of advanced ex-
pertise and ensures a two-way flow of benefits.

The Joint Group agreed to meet annually to
review the cooperative program and to formu-
late programs for further cooperation. □

TREATIES:

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

International plant protection convention. Done
at Rome Dec. 6. 1951. Entered into force
Apr. 3, 1952; for the U.S. Aug. 18. 1972.
TIAS 7465.
Ratification deposited: Thailand. Aug. 16.

1978.
Accession deposited: Bangladesh, Sept. I,

1978.

Antarctica

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of
principles and objectives of the Antarctic
treaty. Adopted at London Oct. 7, 1977. at
the Ninth Consultative Meeting.1
Notifications of approval: Belgium. July 18.
1978; New Zealand. Oct. 18, 1978; and
South Africa, Nov. 17, 1978.

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful sei-
zure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 16,
1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 1971.
TIAS 7192.
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg. Nov.

22. 1978.
Accession deposited: The Gambia. Nov. 28,
1978.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at
Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force
Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Accession deposited: The Gambia, Nov. 28,
1978.

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text of
the convention on international civil aviation
(Chicago. 1944) (TIAS 1591). with annex.
Done at Montreal Sept. 30, 1977. '
Signature: Upper Volta (subject to accept-
ance). Nov. 27. 1978.

Collisions

Convention on the international regulations for
preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with reg-
ulations. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972.
Enteftd into force July 15. 1977. TIAS 8587.
Accession deposited: Senegal, Oct. 27,
1978.

Cultural Property

Convention on the means of prohibiting and
preventing the illicit import, export, and
transfer of ownership of cultural property.
Adopted at Paris Nov. 14, 1970. at the 16th
session of the UNESCO General Conference.
Entered into force April 24, 1972. :
Ratification deposited: Italy, Oct. 2, 1978.

Finance

Agreement establishing the International Fund
for Agricultural Development. Done at Rome
June 13. 1976. Entered into force Nov. 30.
1977. TIAS 8765.

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, Nov. 16,
1978.

Human Rights

International covenant on civil and political
rights. Done at New York Dec. 16. 1966.
Entered into force Mar. 23. 1976. 2
Ratification deposited: Netherlands. Dec.
11. 1978.

International covenant on economic, social,
and cultural rights. Done at New York Dec.

16. 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. 2
Accession deposited: Trinidad and Tobago,

Dec. 8, 1978.
Ratification deposited: Netherlands. Dec. 11,
1978.
International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development

Articles of agreement for the international bank
for reconstruction and development formu-
lated at Bretton Woods Conference July
1-22, 1944. Opened for signature at Wash-
ington Dec. 27, 1945. Entered into force
Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Signature and acceptance: Cape Verde,
Nov. 20, 1978.

International Monetary Fund

Articles of agreement of the international
monetary fund, formulated at the Bretton
Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Opened
for signature at Washington Dec. 27, 1945.
Entered into force Dec. 27. 1945. TIAS
1501.

Signatures and acceptances: Cape Verde,
Nov. 20, 1978; Dominica, Dec. 12, 1978.

Judicial Assistance

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in
civil or commercial matters. Done at The
Hague March 18, 1970. Entered into force
Oct. 7. 1972. TIAS 7444.
Accession deposited: Singapore, Oct. 27,
1978.'

Maritime Matters

Inter-American convention on facilitation of
international waterborne transportation, with
annex. Signed at Mar del Plata June 7.
1963.1

Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic.
Nov. 9, 1978.

Amendments to the convention of March 6,
1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490),
on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consul-
tative Organization. Done at London Oct.

17, 1974. Entered into force Apr. 1. 1978.
TIAS 8606.

Acceptance deposited: Ireland, Nov. 6,
1978.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done
at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force
Aug. 16. 1976. 2

59

Ratifications deposited: Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic. Nov. 20. 1978; Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, Nov. 3,
1978."

Patents, Plant Varieties

International convention for the protection of
new varieties of plants of Dec. 2, 1961. as
revised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978.
Open for signature until Oct. 31, 1979. En-
ters into force 1 month after not less than
five instruments of ratification, acceptance,
approval, or accession have been deposited
by states parties to the 1961 convention.

Phonograms

Convention for the protection of producers of
phonograms against unauthorized duplication
of their phonograms. Done at Geneva Oct.
29, 1971. Entered into force Apr. 18, 1973;
for the U.S. Mar. 10, 1974. TIAS 7808.
Notification from World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization that acceptance depos-
ited: El Salvador. Nov. 9. 1978; Paraguay.
Nov. 13, 1978.

Property, Industrial

Nice agreement concerning the international
classification of goods and services for the
purposes of the registration of marks of June
15. 1957. as revised (TIAS 7418, 7419).
Done at Geneva May 13, 1977.
Ratifications deposited: Ireland. Oct. 31,

1978; Sweden, Nov. 6. 1978.
Enters into force: Feb. 6, 1979. 5

Reciprocal Assistance — Inter- American

Protocol of amendment to the Inter-American
treaty of reciprocal assistance (Rio Pact).
Done at San Jose July 26, 1975. '
Ratification deposited: Guatemala, Oct. 4.
1978.'

Refugees (Protocol)

Protocol relating to the status of refugees.
Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered
into force Oct. 4. 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1.
1968. TIAS 6577.

Notification of succession: Suriname. Nov.
29, 1978.

South Pacific Commission

Agreement establishing the South Pacific
Commission. Signed at Canberra Feb. 6,
1947. Entered into force July 29, 1948. TIAS
2317.

Accession deposited: Solomon Islands. Nov.
21, 1978.

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched
into outer space. Done at New York Jan. 14.
1975. Entered into force Sept. 15, 1976.
TIAS 8480.

Ratification deposited: Poland. Nov. 22,
1978.

Trade

Protocol extending the arrangement regarding
international trade in textiles of Dec. 20,
1973. Done at Geneva Dec. 14, 1977. En-
tered into force Jan. 1, 1978. TIAS 8939.
Ratifications deposited: Austria, June 23.
1978; Canada, Oct. 24, 1978;6 Switzer-
land, Oct. 25, 1978.
Acceptance deposited: Portugal on behalf of

Macau, Nov. 16, 1978.
Provisional accession: Bolivia. Oct. 31,
1978.

60

War

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions
of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the protec-
tion of victims of international armed con-
flicts (Protocol I|, with annexes. Done at
Geneva June 8, 1977. Enters into force Dec.

7. 1978. 5

Signatures: Cyprus, July 12, 1978;
Madagascar, Oct. 13, 1978; Niger, June
16, 1978; San Marino, June 22, 1978.
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions
of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the protec-
tion of victims of noninternational armed
conflicts (Protocol II). Done at Geneva June

8. 1977. Enters into force Dec. 7, 1978. 5
Signatures: Madagascar, Oct. 13, 1978;

Niger. June 16, 1978; San Marino, June
22, 1978.

Whaling

Amendments to the schedule to the interna-
tional convention for the regulation of whal-
ing, 1946. Adopted at London June 26-30,
1978.
Entered into force: Oct. 20, 1978.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the
wheat trade convention (part of the interna-
tional wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144).
Done at Washington Apr. 26, 1978. Entered
into force June 24, 1978, with respect to
certain provisions, July 1, 1978, with respect
to other provisions.

Acceptance deposited: Japan, Nov. 15.
1978.

Protocol modifying and further extending the
food aid convention (part of the international
wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done
at Washington Apr. 26, 1978. Entered into
force June 24, 1978, with respect to certain
provisions, July 1, 1978, with respect to
other provisions.

Acceptance deposited: Japan (with reserva-
tion), Nov. 15, 1978.

World Health Organization

Amendment to Article 74 of the World Health
Organization constitution, as amended [to
add Arabic as an authentic text]. Adopted at
Geneva May 18. 1978. Enters into force for
all members when accepted by two-thirds of
the members.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the
world cultural and natural heritage. Done at
Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dec.
17, 1975. TIAS 8226.

Ratification deposited: Libya, Oct. 13,
1978.

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Agreement relating to investment guaranties,
with related letters. Effected by exchange of
notes at Dacca Jan. 17 and 20, 1975. Entered
into force Oct. 30, 1978.

Bulgaria

Program of cultural, educational, scientific,
and technological exchanges for 1979 and
1980. Signed at Sofia Oct. 26. 1978. Entered
into force Oct. 26, 1978, effective Jan. 1,
1979.

Canada

Agreement on Great Lakes water quality, 1978,
with annexes and terms of reference. Signed

at Ottawa Nov. 22. 1978. Entered into force
Nov. 22, 1978.

China, Republic Of

Memorandum of agreement relating to the pro-
vision of flight inspection services. Signed at
Washington and Taipei Aug. 21 and Oct. 1,
1978. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1978.

Egypt

General agreement for technical cooperation
under Point Four Program, and proces verbal
of signature, as amended (TIAS 2479, 2986).
Signed at Cairo May 5, 1951. Entered into
force Aug. 15, 1951. TIAS 2479.
Terminated: Oct. 15, 1978.

Agreement relating to development assistance.
with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at
Cairo Nov. 6. 1954. Entered into force Nov.
6, 1954. TIAS 3156.
Terminated: Oct. 15, 1978.

Economic, technical, and related assistance
agreement, with exchanges of notes. Signed
at Cairo Aug. 16. 1978. Entered into force
Oct. 15, 1978.

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of June 7,
1974 (TIAS 7855), with agreed minutes.
Signed at Cairo Nov. 8, 1978. Entered into
force Nov. 8, 1978.

Agreement on procedures for mutual assistance
in connection with matters relating to the
Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Signed
at Washington Nov. 29, 1978. Entered into
force Nov. 29, 1978.

Germany, Federal Republic of

Protocol amending the air transport agreement
of July 7, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3536,
6434), with understandings. Signed at
Washington Nov. 1, 1978. Entered into force
provisionally Nov. 1, 1978.

Greece

Arrangement for the exchange of technical in-
formation and cooperation in nuclear safety
matters, with addendum. Signed at Athens
Oct. 18, 1978. Entered into force Oct. 18.
1978.

Hong Kong

Understanding relating to trade in nonrubber
footwear, with annexes. Effected by ex-
change of letters at Hong Kong Oct. 24,
1978. Entered into force Oct. 24, 1978.

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 8,
1977, as amended (TIAS 8936), relating to
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber
textiles. Effected by exchange of letters at
Hong Kong Nov. 13 and 24, 1978. Entered
into force Nov. 24, 1978.

Hungary

Understanding concerning research cooperation
in the field of transportation. Signed at
Budapest Oct. 11. 1978. Entered into force
Oct. 11, 1978.

Agreement on tariff matters, with annexes and
exchange of letters. Signed at Budapest Nov.
18, 1978. Enters into force on the 30th day
following the parties' written notification to
each other that, upon successful conclusion
of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, a satisfactory overall balance
of concessions has been achieved between
them.

India

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec.
30, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9036), relating

Department of State Bulletin

to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber
textiles and textile products. Effected by ex-
change of letters at Washington Nov. 10 and
13. 1978. Entered into force Nov. 13. 1978.

Indonesia

Agreement for cooperation in scientific re-
search and technological development, with
exchange of letters. Signed at Washington
Dec. 11, 1978. Enters into force on the date
of the receipt of the note by which Indonesia
communicates to the U.S. that the agreement
has been approved in accordance with In-
donesia's constitutional procedure.

Israel

Memorandum of understanding on education,
with annex. Signed at Jerusalem Nov. 15,
1978. Entered into force Nov. 15, 1978.

Jordan

Project loan agreement for Amman water and
sewerage. Signed at Amman Aug. 28. 1978.
Entered into force Aug. 28, 1978.

Korea

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting
and protection of the right of priority on pat-
ents. Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul
Oct. 30. 1978. Entered into force Oct. 30,
1978.

Lebanon

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of Mar. 23, 1978.
Effected by exchange of notes at Beirut Nov.
24, 1978. Entered into force Nov. 24, 1978.

Malaysia

Agreement amending the agreement of May 17
and June 8, 1978 relating to trade in cotton,
wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile
products. Effected by exchange of letters at
New York and Washington Oct. 20 and Nov.
29. 1978. Entered into force Nov. 29, 1978.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of Nov. 9,
1972, as amended (TIAS 7697, 8152, 8301,
8412), concerning frequency modulation
broadcasting in the 88 to 108 MHz band.
Effected by exchange of notes at Tlatelolco
and Mexico Mar. 20 and Nov. 9, 1978. En-
tered into force Nov. 9. 1978.

Agreement extending the agreement of June 23,
1976 (TIAS 8533) on procedures for mutual
assistance in the administration of justice in
connection with the General Tire and Rubber
Company and the Firestone Tire and Rubber
Company matters to include the International
Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT)
and its subsidiaries and affiliates. Effected
by exchange of letters at Washington Nov.
17 and Dec. 5, 1978. Entered into force Dec.
5, 1978.

Pakistan

Agreement amending the loan agreement of
Mar. 9. 1976, as amended Jan. 18, 1977,
(TIAS 8547) relating to agricultural inputs.
Signed at Islamabad Nov. 8, 1978. Entered
into force Nov. 8. 1978.

Portugal

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of Aug. 4, 1978.
Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon I
Aug. 30. and 31. 1978. Entered into force I
Aug. 31, 1978.

Saudi Arabia

Project agreement for technical cooperation in

January 1979

executive management development. Signed
at Jeddah Nov. 18. 1978. Enters into force
after the deposit by Saudi Arabia of the sum
described in Article IX.

Project agreement for technical cooperation in
agricultural bank management and training,
with annex. Signed at Jeddah Nov. 18, 1978.
Enters into force after deposit by Saudi
Arabia of the sum described in Article 8.

Project agreement for technical cooperation in
transportation, with annex. Signed at Jeddah
Nov. 18, 1978. Enters into force upon de-
posit by Saudi Arabia of the sum described in
Article 9.

Singapore

Memorandum of agreement relating to the pro-
vision of flight inspection services. Signed at
Washington and Singapore Aug. 16 and Oct.
25, 1978. Entered into force Oct. 25. 1978;
effective Oct. 1. 1978.

Thailand

Agreement amending the agreement of Oct. 4.
1978. relating to trade in cotton, wool, and
manmade fiber textiles and textile products.
Effected by exchange of letters at Bangkok
Nov. 3 and 13, 1978. Entered into force
Nov. 13. 1978.

United Kingdom

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on estates of deceased per-
sons and on gifts. Signed at London Oct. 19.
1978. Enters into force 30 days following the
date on which instruments of ratification are
exchanged.

Venezuela

Agreement extending the agreement of May 31,
1977 (TIAS 8623) on procedures for mutual
assistance in connection with the Boeing
Company matter to include the McDonnell
Douglas Corporation. Effected by exchange
of letters at Washington Dec. 6 and 8, 1978.
Entered into force Dec. 8, 1978. D

1 Not in force.

: Not in force for the U.S.

3 With reservations.

4 With reservations and declarations.

5 Not for the U.S.

6 With declaration.

PRESS RELEASES:

Department of State

November 15-December 17

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of Press Relations, Department of State.
Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

*428 11/15 Shipping Coordinating Com-
mittee (SCO, Subcom-
mittee on Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS), working
group on life-saving
appliances, Dec. 12, 13.
and 14.

*429 11/16 U.S., India amend textile *449 12/11

agreement, Nov. 10 and

13. 450 12/12

*430 11/17 U.S. Organization for the

International Telegraph 451 12/12

and Telephone Consulta-
tive Committee (CC1TT).

study group 2, Dec. 7. *452 12/13

*431 11/21 U.S., Consultative Shipping

Group agreed record on *453 12/13

their Nov. 15-17 meeting

in London.
*432 11/22 U.S., Canada sign revised *454 12/14

Great Lakes water quality

agreement, Nov. 22.
*433 11/22 Advisory Committee on *455 12/14

Transnational Enterprises,

working group on restric- *456 12/14

tive business practices.

Dec. 8. *457 12/14

434 11/22 Vance, Jamieson: news con-
ference, Ottawa.
*435 11/27 Program for the official visit t458 12/17

of Tunisian Prime Minister

Nouira, Nov. 28-Dec. 5.

*436 11/27 SCC, SOLAS, working group

on standards of training

and watchkeeping, Dec.

19.
*437 11/29 State Department to open

Houston passport agency,

Dec. 14.
*438 11/30 Foreign fishery allocations

determined for 1979.
*439 12/4 Amb. Warnke to address

conference on U.S. secu-
rity and the Soviet chal-
lenge. Phoenix, Dec. 14.
*440 12/5 U.S., Malaysia amend textile

agreement, Oct. 20 and

No. Date

Nov. 29.
*441 12/7 CCITT. study group 1, *93 10/13

Jan. 4.
*442 12/7 SCC, SOLAS, working group *94 10/17

on safety of navigation,

Jan. 3.
*443 12/7 Amb. Warnke to address

conference on U.S. secu- *95 10/18

rity and the Soviet chal-
lenge, Wilmington, Del., 96 10/19

Dec. 15.
*444 12/8 Vance: statement on the *97 10/19

death of Golda Meir.
*445 12/8 Vance: departure remarks.

Andrews Air Force Base. *98 10/20

446 12/9 Vance: address before the

Royal Institute of Interna- *99 10/18

tional Affairs, London.
446A 12/11 Vance: question-and-answer 100 10/20

session following London

address. Dec. 9.
*447 12/11 U.S. Organization for the

International Radio Con- 101 10/20

sultative Committee

(CCIR), study group 7,

Jan. 10. 102 10/20

*448 12/11 Joint statement on U.S.-
Finland civil aviation

negotiations.

61

U.S.. Indonesia sign science
and technology agreement.

Christopher: news confer-
ence. Brussels, Dec. 8.

Final communique of the
North Atlantic Council,
Brussels, Dec. 8.

Vance: news conference,
Cairo. Dec. 11.

Foreign policy conference on
U.S. interests in the Mid-
dle East, Boston, Jan. 25.

U.S., Hong Kong amend
bilateral textile agreement,
Nov. 13 and 24.

U.S., Thailand amend textile
agreement, Nov. 3 and 18.

Vance, Dayan: remarks to the
press, Jerusalem, Dec. 13.

Advisory Committee on the
1979 World Administrative
Radio Conference. Jan. 9.

Vance: interview on NBC's
"Meet the Press. " D

*Not printed in the Bulletin.
tTo be printed in a later issue.

I/JS.I/JV.

Press releases may be obtained from the
Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the
United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza,
New York. N.Y. 10017.

Subject

Young: women in the U.N.,
Committee V.

Petree: report of the Com-
mittee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space. Spe-
cial Political Committee.

Hechinger: foreign economic
interests. Committee IV.

Fisher: arms control. Com-
mittee I.

Young: development and in-
ternational economic coop-
eration, plenary.

Ribicoff: technical coopera-
tion, Committee II.

Graham: southern Africa,
Committee IV.

Joint South African Gov-
ernment-Western five
Foreign Ministers state-
ment on Namibia, Pretoria.

Western five Foreign Minis-
ters statement on Namibia,
Pretoria.

Joint U.S. -U.K. statement is-
sued at the State Depart-
ment on Southern Rho-
desia.

62

Department of State Bulletin

•103 10/23

*104 10/24

*105 10/25

*106 10/26

*107 10/30

108 10/31

•109 10/30

* 1 10 11/2
♦111 11/3

* 1 12 11/3
113 11/7

•114 11/7

*1 15 11/8
*116 11/9

Leonard, renewal of U.N.
Emergency force. Security
Council.

U.S. contributes additional
$9 million to UNRWA.

Matteson: self-determination.
Committee III.

Momjian: self-determination.
Committee III.

Stahl: UNRWA, Special
Political Committee

Exchange of letters between
Ambassador Young and
Senator Ribicoff concern-
ing the International Day
of Solidarity with the
Palestinian People.

Morgenthau: social develop-
ment. Committee III.

Petree: nuclear energy, ple-
nary.

Mowle: foreign economic
interests. Committee IV.

Fisher: arms control. Com-
mittee I.

Hechinger: Southern Rho-
desia. Committee IV.

Stibravy: pledging confer-
ence for development ac-
tivities.

Petree: Cyprus, UNGA.

Petree: Cyprus, UNGA. □

* Not printed in the Bulletin.

PUBLICATIONS

1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume
VIII— "The Far East: China"1

The Department of State released on
August 11, 1978. "Foreign Relations
of the United States," 1949, volume
VIII. "The Far East: China." The
"Foreign Relations" series has been
published continuously since 1861 as
the official record of American foreign
policy.

The volume presents 1,353 pages of
previously unpublished documentation
(much of it newly declassified) relating
to the political and military situations
in China, the question of extension of
aid to the new regime in Peking, and
the problems encountered by the
American Embassy and consulates in
areas occupied by Communist forces.
The companion volume IX dealing with
China was released in 1975. Volume
VIII is the last of nine volumes to be
published covering the year 1949,
completing the record for that year.

"Foreign Relations," 1949, volume

VIII, was prepared in the Office of the
Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Department of State. Copies of volume
VIII (Department of State publication
8886) may be obtained for $13.75
(domestic postpaid). Checks or money
orders should be sent to the U.S. Gov-
ernment Book Store, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. □

'Press release 324.

GPO Sales

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are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries
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ment, economy, and foreign relations of each
country. Each contains a map, a list of princi-
pal government officials and U.S. diplomatic
and consular officers, and a reading list. (A
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044-000-91025-0

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United States Contributions to International
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tional organizations during fiscal year 1976.
Includes tables. Pub. 899. International Or-
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$2.75. (Stock No. 044-000-01689-0.)

The Eagle and the Shield: A History of the
Great Seal of the United States. By Richard
S. Patterson and Richardson Dougall. A thor-
ough investigation of the great seal from its
creation in 1782. Pub. 8900. Department and
Foreign Service Series 161. 637 pp. $12.
(Stock No. 044-000-01543-9.)

Information Exchange in Geothermal Energy
Development. Agreement with Italy. TIAS
8652. 3 pp. 60£. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8652).
Atomic Energy — Research and Development
in Liquid Metal-Cooled Fast Breeder Reac-
tors. Agreement with the Federal Republic of
Germany. TIAS 8657. 30 pp. $1.20. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8657).

School Construction. Agreement with Por-
tugal. TIAS 8667. 36 pp. $1.40. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8667).

Weather Stations. Agreement with Costa
Rica. TIAS 8669. 17 pp. $1. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8669).

Weather Stations. Agreements with Mexico,
extending the agreement of July 31. 1970. as
amended and extended. TIAS 8670. 6 pp. 600.
(Cat. No. S9. 10:8670).

Engineering of Road Links in the Lake Chad
Area. Agreement with the Lake Chad Basin
Commission. TIAS 8671. 21 pp. $1. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8671).

Technical Cooperation in Manpower Train-
ing and Development. Agreement with Saudi
Arabia. TIAS 8673. 25 pp. $1.20. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8673).

Industrial and Agricultural Production.

Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 8679. 26 pp.
$1.20. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8679).

North American Plant Protection Agree-
ment. Agreement with other governments.
TIAS 8680. 12 pp. 800. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8680).

Agricultural Cooperative Federations De-
velopment. Agreement with Peru. TIAS 8681.
77 pp. $2.10. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8681).

Atomic Energy — Loss of Fluid Test (LOFT)
Research Program. Agreement with Austria.
TIAS 8686. 7 pp. 700. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8686).

Trust Fund for Africa. Agreement with the
United Nations. TIAS 8694. 13 pp. 800. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:8694.)

Air Charter Services. Agreement with Switzer-
land. TIAS 8695. 12 pp. 800. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8695.)

Road Improvement. Agreement with Jordan.
TIAS 8696. 26 pp. $1.20. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8696.)

School Construction. Agreement with Jordan.
TIAS 8697. 27 pp. $1.20. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8697.)

Regional Onchocerciasis Area Land Satellite
(LANDSAT) Related Study. Agreement with
the African Development Bank. TIAS 8698. 8
pp. 700. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8698.)

Public and Private Sector Productive Enter-
prises. Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 8699. 18
pp. 900. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8699.)

Plant Protection. Agreement with Mexico.
TIAS 8701. 13 pp. 800. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8701 )D

INDEX

JANUARY 1979
VOL. 79, No. 2022

Arms Control

Arms Control (Fisher) 52

NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in Brussels

(Christopher, final communique) 34

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov 9

and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8

Question-and-Answer Session Following London

Address ( Vance) 16

The US -European Partnership (Vance) 12

Brazil. US -Brazil Joint Group on Energy

Technology (joint communique) 58

Canada

Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 1978 . . .23

Secretary Vance Visits Canada (Jamieson.

Vance) 21

China

1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume VIII — "The

Far East: China" 62

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9

and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8

Question-and-Answer Session Following London

Address (Vance) 16

U.S. Normalizes Relations With the People's

Republic of China (Carter, joint communique.

U.S. statement) 25

Congress. U.S. Policy on Reprocessing of U.S.-

Origin Nuclear Material (Nye) 44

Cyprus. NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in
Brussels (Christopher, final communiquel .34

Cuba. President Carter's News Conferences of
Nov. 9 and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8

Department and Foreign Service. New State
Department Liaison Office With U.S. State
and Local Governments (White House an-
nouncement) 24

Developing Countries

Multinational Corporations (foreign relations
outline) 33

The U.S. and the Third World: Partners or
Plaintiffs (Newsom) 30

Economics

Multinational Corporations (foreign relations
outline) 33

The US -European Partnership (Vance) 12

Egypt

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9
and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8

Question-and-Answer Session Following London
Address ( Vance) 16

Secretary Vance's Middle East Visit 39

Energy. U.S. -Brazil Joint Group on Energy
Technology (joint communique) 58

Environment. Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement 1978 23

Europe

NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in Brussels
(Christopher, final communique) 34

President Carter To Attend Guadeloupe Meet-
ing 37

The U.S. -European Partnership (Vance) 12

Fisheries. Secretary Vance Visits Canada
(Jamieson, Vance) 21

Foreign Aid. The U.S. and the Third World:
Partners or Plaintiffs (Newsom) 30

Greece. NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in

Brussels (Christopher, final communique) 34

Human Rights

Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Hu-
manitarian Affairs Patricia M Derian (biographic

data) 6

Basic Human Rights Documents 4

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and

Week. 1978 (proclamation) 3

30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights (Brzezinski. Carter, Derian,

Vance) 1

What's Wrong With the U.N and What's Right?

(Maynes) 46

Iran

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9

and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8

Question-and Answer Session Following London

Address (Vance) 16

Israel

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9

and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8

Question-and-Answer Session Following London

Address ( Vance) 16

Secretary Vance's Middle East Visit 39

What's Wrong With the UN and What's Right?

(Maynes) 46

Japan. U.S. Policy on Reprocessing of U.S.-

Origin Nuclear Material (Nye) 44

Middle East

NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in Brussels

(Christopher, final communique) 34

U.N. Committee on the Palestinian People

(Ribicoff, Young) 50

Military Affairs

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9

and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8

The U.S. -European Partnership (Vance) 12

Morocco

Morocco — A Profile 38

Visit of Moroccan King Hassan II (joint press

statement) 38

Namibia

Namibia (Barton, text of resolution) 51

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9

and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8

Secretary Vance Visits Canada (Jamieson,

Vance) 21

Narcotics. U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control

(Carter) 53

Nicaragua

Nicaragua (Christopher) 57

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9

and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in Brussels

(Christopher, final communique) 34

The U.S. -European Partnership (Vance) 12

Nuclear Policy

The Role of Exports in U.S. Foreign Policy

(Christopher) 27

The U.S. Approach to Nonproliferation — Are

We Making Progress? (Nye) 39

U.S. Policy on Reprocessing of U.S. -Origin Nu-
clear Material (Nye) 44

Organization of American States. Nicaragua

(Christopher) "57

Presidential Documents

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and

Week, 1978 (proclamation) 3

Constitutional Referendum in Spain 36

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9
and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8

30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights I

U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control 53

U.S. Normalizes Relations With the People's

Republic of China 25

Visit of Moroccan King Hassan II 38

Publications

GPO Sales Publications 62

1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume VIII— "The

Far East: China" 62

Refugees. 30th Anniversary of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights (Brzezinski.

Carter, Derian, Vance) I

Romania

NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in Brussels

(Christopher, final communique) 34

Question-and-Answer Session Following London

Address (Vance) 16

South Africa. U.S. Policy Toward South Africa

(Lake), (g

Southern Rhodesia

Question-and-Answer Session Following London

Address ( Vance) 16

Secretary Vance Visits Canada (Jamieson.

Vance) 21

Spain. Constitutional Referendum in Spain

(Carter) 36

Trade

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9

and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8

The Role of Exports in US Foreign Policy

(Christopher) 27

The U.S. and the Third World: Partners or

Plaintiffs (Newsom) 30

The U.S. -European Partnership (Vance) 12

Treaties. Current Actions 59

Turkey. NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in

Brussels (Christopher, final communique) ... .34
U.S.S.R.
NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in Brussels

(Christopher, final communique) 34

President Carter's News Conferences of Nov. 9

and 30 and Dec. 12 (excerpts) 8

Question-and-Answer Session Following London

Address (Vance) 16

United Nations

Arms Control (Fisher) 52

Namibia (Barton, text of resolution) 51

Summaries of U.S. Statements 55

U.N. Committee on the Palestinian People

(Ribicoff. Young) 50

U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control (Carter) 53

What's Wrong With the U.N. and What's Right?

(Maynes) 46

Name Index

Barton. William H 51

Brzezinski. Zbigniew 1

Carter, President 1 , 3. 8. 25. 36. 53

Christopher, Warren 27, 34, 57

Derian. Patricia M 1

Fisher. Adrian S 52

Jamieson. Donald 21

Lake. Anthony 18

Maynes, Charles William 46

Newsom, David D 30

Nye, Joseph S , Jr 39, 44

Ribicoff, Abraham A 50

Vance, Secretary 1 , 12. 16. 21

Young, Andrew 50

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Department

if of State im If J •

bulletin

February 1979

he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 79 / Number 2023

Department of State

bulletin

Volume 79 / Number 2023 / February 1979

Cover Photos:

President Carter
Secretary Vance
Richard C. Holbrooke
Harold H. Saunders
John E. Reinhardt

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CYRUS R. VANCE

Secretary of State

HODDING CARTER III

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL

Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

COLLEEN SUSSMAN
Assistant Editor

CONTENTS

THE PRESIDENT

1 State of the Union Address

3 News Conference of January 17

5 Trip to Mexico

5 Interview of December 19

THE SECRETARY

7 News Conference of January 1 ]

10 Visit to Europe

11 Interview on "Meet the Press*'

ARMS CONTROL

12 Conventional Arms Transfers (Joint

Communique)

EAST ASIA

14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

U.S. Role in East Asia's Stability (Sec-
retary Wince. Secretary Blumenthal,
Secretary Kreps, Zbigniew
Brzezinski)

President Carter's Message to Premier
Hua Guofeng

Premier Hua Guofeng's Message to
President Carter

President Carter's Message to Vice
Premier Deng Xiaoping

Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's Mes-
sage to President Carter

Secretary Vance's Message to Foreign
Minister Huang Hua

Foreign Minister Huang Hua's Message
to Secretary Vance

United States. People's Republic of
China Celebrate Diplomatic Recog-
nition (Chai Zemin, Vice President
Mandate, Leonard Woodcock, Vice
Premier Deng Xiaoping)
23 Diplomatic Relations With the P.R.C.
and Future Relations With Taiwan

President Carter's Memorandum Re-
garding Relations With the People on
Taiwan

Taiwan — The Mutual Defense Treaty
f White House Fact Sheet)

Economic and Commercial Relation-
ships With Taiwan (Foreign Rela-
tions Outline)

Taiwan — A Profile

U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan (Foreign
Relations Outline)

Korea and the United States — The Era
Ahead (Richard C. Holbrooke)

U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of
Korea William H. Gleysteen, Jr.
(Biographic Data)

Republic of Korea — A Profile

ECONOMICS

24

25

27

27
28

29

31

32

34 International Trade Agreements (Mes-
sage from President Carter)

34 President Carter Meets With President
of the Commission of European
Communities (White House State-
ment)

EDUCATIONAL AFFAIRS

35 Hubert H. Humphrey North-South
Scholarship Program (President
Carter)

ENERGY

35 OPEC Price Increase (White House

Statement)

EUROPE

36 President Carter Attends Guadeloupe

Meeting {President Ciscard d' Es-
taing, Prime Minister Callaghan,
President Carter, Chancellor
Schmidt)
38 U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union
40 Implementing the CSCE Final Act
( Memorandum from President Car-
ter)

43 Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction

Talks (Foreign Relations Outline)

44 Tenth Report on Cyprus (President

Carter)

MIDDLE EAST

45 The Situation in Iran and Its Implica-

tions (Harold H. Saunders)

47 Letters of Credence (Israel, Lebanon)

48 Visit of Tunisian Prime Minister

Nouria (Joint Communique)

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

49 Arms Transfer Levels (President Car-

ter)

UNITED NATIONS

2 0

50 The Challenge for Communications
Development (John E. Reinhardt)

54 UNESCO Declaration on the Mass

Media (Declaration, Department
Statement)

55 Arms Control (James P. Pearson)

57 U.S. Participation in the U.N.. 1977

( Message from President Carter)
57 Peacekeeping (John W . Hechinger)

59 Human Rights (Andrew Young)

60 Namibia (Donald F . Mc Henry)

61 Apartheid (James F . Leonard)

62 Palestinian Question (Abraham A.

Ribicoff, Andrew Young)

63 Occupied Territories (Angelique O.

Stahl)

64 Assistance to Palestinians (Angelique

O. Stahl)

TREATIES

65 Current Actions

66 PRESS RELEASES
INDEX

China and Mexico in next month's
BULLETIN:

China

Material relating to Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping' s visit to the
United States including:

• Remarks made on various occasions while in Washington;

• Itinerary highlights of the Vice Premier's stops in U.S. cities;

• Profile on the P.R.C. with maps;

• Economic data on the P.R.C;

• List of P.R.C. officials;

• Outline on U.S. -P.R.C. economic relations.

#

Mexico

Documentation on President Carter's mid-February visit to Mexico
including:

• Address before a joint session of the Mexican Congress;

• Profile on Mexico with map;

• Economic data on Mexico.

THE PRESIDENT: State of the Union (Excerpts)

Address before a joint session of the
Congress on January 23, 1979. '

Tonight I want to examine in a broad
sense the state of our American
Union — how we are building a new
foundation for a peaceful and prosper-
ous world.

Our children born this year will
come of age in the 21st century. What
kind of society, what kind of world are
we building for them? Will we our-
selves be at peace? Will our own chil-
dren enjoy a better quality of life? Will
a strong and united America still be a
force for freedom and prosperity
around the world?

Tonight, there is every sign that the
state of our Union is sound. Our econ-
omy offers greater prosperity to more
of our people than ever before. Real
per capita income and real business
profits have risen substantially. Farm
exports are setting all-time records, and
farm income last year was up more
than 25%. Our liberties are secure. Our
military defenses are strong and grow-
ing stronger. And more importantly to-
night. America is at peace.

Our earliest national commitments
modified and reshaped by succeeding
generations have served us well. But
the problems we face today are differ-
ent in nature from those that confronted
earlier generations of Americans. They
are more subtle, more complex, more
interrelated. At home, few of these
problems can be solved by government
alone. Abroad, few of them can be
solved by the United States alone.

But Americans as a united
people — working with our allies and
friends — have never been afraid to face
and to solve problems either here or
abroad. The challenge to us is to build
a new and firmer foundation for the
future — for a sound economy, for a
more effective government, for politi-
cal trust, and for a stable peace — so
that the America our children inherit
will be even stronger and better than
our own. We cannot resort to simplistic
or extreme solutions which substitute
myths for common sense.

Global Cooperation

A strong economy and an effective
government will restore confidence
here in America. But the path to the
future must be charted in peace. We

must continue to build a new and firm
foundation for a stable world commu-
nity.

We are building that new foundation
from a position of national
strength — the strength of our own de-
fenses, of our friendship with other na-
tions, and of our oldest ideals.
America's military power is a major
force for security and stability in the
world. We must maintain our strategic
capability and continue the progress of
the last 2 years with our NATO allies,
with whom we have increased our
readiness, modernized our equipment,
and strengthened our defense forces in
Europe. I urge you to support the
strong defense budget I have proposed.

But national security in our age re-
quires more than military might. In less
than a lifetime, world population has
doubled; colonial empires have disap-
peared; and 100 new nations have been
born. Mass communications, literacy,
and migration to the world's cities have
all awakened new yearnings for eco-
nomic justice and human rights among
people everywhere.

In such a world, the choice is not
which superpower will dominate the
world. None can and none will. The
choice instead is between a world of
anarchy and destruction, or a world of
cooperation and peace.

In such a world, we seek not to stifle
inevitable change, but to influence its
course in helpful and constructive ways
that enhance our values, our national
interests, and the cause of peace.

Towering over all this volatile
changing world, like a thundercloud in
a summer sky, looms the awesome
power of nuclear weapons. We will
continue to help shape the forces of
change; to anticipate emerging prob-
lems of nuclear proliferation and of
conventional arms sales; and to use our
great strength and influence to settle
international conflicts in other parts of
the world before they erupt and spread.
We have no desire to be the world's
policeman. America does want to be
the world's peacemaker.

We are building the foundation for
truly global cooperation — not only
with Western and industrial nations,
but with the developing countries as
well. Our ties with Japan and our
European allies are stronger than
ever — and so are our friendly relations
with the people of Latin America, Af-
rica, and the Western Pacific and Asia.

We have won new respect in this
hemisphere with the Panama Canal
treaties. We have gained new trust
within the developing world through
our opposition to racism, our commit-
ment to human rights, and our support
for majority rule in Africa.

The multilateral trade negotiations
are now reaching a successful conclu-
sion, and congressional approval is es-
sential to the economic well-being of
our country and of the world. This will
be one of our top priorities in 1979.

We are entering a hopeful era in our
relations with one-fourth of the world's
people who live in China. The visit of
Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping next
week will help to inaugurate that new
era. And with prompt congressional
action on authorizing legislation, we
will continue our commitment to a
prosperous, peaceful, and secure life
for the people of Taiwan.

I am grateful that in the past
year — as in the year before — no
American had died in combat anywhere
in the world. And in Iran, Nicaragua,
Cyprus, Namibia, and Rhodesia, our
country is working for peaceful solu-
tions to dangerous conflicts.

In the Middle East — under most dif-
ficult circumstances — we have sought
to help ancient enemies lay aside
deep-seated differences that have pro-
duced four bitter wars in this century.
Our firm commitment to Israel's sur-
vival and security is rooted in our
deepest convictions and in our knowl-
edge of the strategic importance to our
own nation of a stable Middle East. To
promote peace and reconciliation in the
region, we must retain the trust and
confidence both of Israel and of the
Arab nations that are sincerely search-
ing for peace. I am determined to use
the full beneficial influence of our na-
tion so that the precious opportunity for
lasting peace between Israel and Egypt
will not be lost.

SALT II

The new foundation of international
cooperation we seek excludes no na-
tion. Cooperation with the Soviet
Union serves the cause of peace, for in
the nuclear age, world peace must in-
clude peace between the super-
powers— and it must mean the control
of nuclear arms.

Ten years ago, the United States and
the Soviet Union made the historic de-

Department of State Bulletin

cision to open the Strategic Arms Lim-
itation Talks, or SALT. The purpose of
SALT, then as now, is not to gain a
unilateral advantage for either nation
but to protect the security of both na-
tions, to reverse the costly and danger-
ous momentum of the arms race, to
preserve a stable balance of nuclear
forces, and to demonstrate to a con-
cerned world that we are determined to
help preserve the peace.

The first SALT agreement was con-
cluded in 1972. Since then, during 6
years of negotiation — by both Republi-
can and Democratic leaders — nearly all
issues of SALT II have been resolved.
If the Soviet Union continues to
negotiate in good faith, a responsible
agreement will be reached.

It is important that the American
people understand the nature of the
SALT process. SALT II is not based on
sentiment. It is based on self-
interest — of the United States and the
Soviet Union. Both nations share a
powerful common interest in reducing
the threat of a nuclear war. I will sign
no agreement which does not enhance
our national security.

SALT II will not rely on trust. It will
be verifiable. We have very sophisti-
cated, proven means — including our
satellites — to determine for ourselves
whether the Soviet Union is meeting its
treaty obligations. I will sign no
agreement which cannot be verified.

The American nuclear deterrent will
remain strong after SALT II. For
example, just one of our relatively in-
vulnerable Poseidon submarines — less
than 27c of our total nuclear force of
submarines, aircraft, and land-based
missiles — carries enough warheads to
destroy every large and medium-sized
city in the Soviet Union. Our deterrent
is overwhelming — and I will sign no
agreement unless our deterrent force
will remain overwhelming.

A SALT agreement cannot substitute
for wise diplomacy or a strong defense.

nor will it end the danger of nuclear
war. But it will certainly reduce that
danger. It will strengthen our efforts to
ban nuclear tests and to stop the spread
of atomic weapons to other nations.
And it can begin the process of
negotiating new agreements which will
further limit nuclear arms.

The path of arms control backed by a
strong defense — the path our nation
and every President has walked for 30
years — can lead to a world of law and
of international negotiation and con-
sultation, in which all peoples might
live in peace.

In this year, 1979, nothing is more
important than that the Congress and
the people of the United States resolve
to continue with me on that path of nu-
clear arms control and peace. I have
outlined some of the changes that have
transformed the world and which are
continuing as we meet here tonight.
But we need not fear change. The val-
ues on which our nation was
founded — individual liberty, self-
determination, the potential for human
fulfillment in freedom — all of these
endure. We find these democratic prin-
ciples praised even in books smuggled
out of totalitarian nations and on wall
posters in lands we thought were closed
to our influence.

Human Rights

Our country has regained its special
place of leadership in the worldwide
struggle for human rights. And that is a
commitment we must keep at home, as
well as abroad. The civil rights revolu-
tion freed all Americans, black and
white, but its full promise remains un-
realized. I will continue to work with
all my strength for equal opportunity
for all Americans and for affirmative
action for those who carry the extra
burden of past denial of equal opportu-
nity. We remain committed to improv-
ing our labor laws to better protect the

rights of all American workers. And
bur nation must make it clear that the
legal rights of women as citizens are
guaranteed under the laws of our land
by ratifying the equal rights amend-
ment.

As long as I am President, at home
and around the world, America's
example and America's influence will
be marshalled to advance the cause of
human rights. To establish those val-
ues, two centuries ago a bold genera-
tion of Americans risked their prop-
erty, position, and life itself.

We are their heirs. And they are
sending us a message across the cen-
turies. The words they made so vivid
are now growing faintly indistinct, be-
cause they are not heard often enough.
They are words like justice, equality,
unity, sacrifice, liberty, faith, and
love.

These words remind us that the duty
of our generation of Americans is to
renew our nation's faith — not focused
just against foreign threats, but against
selfishness, cynicism, and apathy.

The new foundation I have discussed
tonight can help us build a nation and a
world where every child is nurtured
and can look to the future with hope;
where the resources now wasted on war
can be turned toward human needs;
where all people have enough to eat, a
decent home, and protection from dis-
ease. It can help us build a nation and a
world where all people are free to seek
the truth and to add to human under-
standing, so that all of us may live our
lives in peace.

Tonight I ask you to join me in
building that new foundation — a better
foundation — for our country and our
world. □

'Text as prepared for delivery from White
House press release of Jan. 23. 1979; for com-
plete text as delivered, see Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents of Jan. 29.

;bruary 1979

News Conference of
January 17 (Excerpts)

Q. What will the posture of our
government be now toward the vari-
ous contending factions in Iran that
even continue to vie for power over
there?

A. We have very important relation-
ships with Iran — past, present, and I
hope in the future. And I expect in the
future. They have been good allies of
ours and I expect this to continue in the
future.

In accordance with the provisions of
the Iranian Constitution, a change in
government has now been accom-
plished. Under Mr. [Prime Minister
Shapour] Bakhtiar, whose government
we do support; the Majlis, the lower
house of Parliament; and the upper
house, the Senate, have approved his
government and his Cabinet.

We have encouraged to the limited
extent of our own ability the public
support for the Bakhtiar government,
for the restoration of stability, for an
end of bloodshed and for the return of
normal life in Iran.

As you know, the Shah has left Iran
[on January 16, 1979]; he says for a
vacation. How long he will be out of
Iran, we have no way to determine.
Future events and his own desires will
determine that. He's now in Egypt, and
he will later come to our own country.
But we would anticipate and would
certainly hope that our good relation-
ships with Iran will continue in the fu-
ture.

Q. A month ago, at a news confer-
ence, you said the Shah would
maintain power. How could you be so
wrong and is it typical of our intelli-
gence elsewhere in the world? And
are you in touch with [Ayatpllah
Ruohollah] Khomeini [prominent
Shi'a religious leader] in case he
winds up at the top of the heap?

A. It is impossible for anyone to an-
ticipate all future political events. And
I think that the rapid change of affairs
in Iran has not been predicted by any-
one so far as I know.

Our intelligence is the best we can
devise. We share intelligence data and
diplomatic information on a routine
basis with other nations. And this is a
constant process whenever a problem
arises in a country throughout the
world. I have confidence in the Iranian
people to restore a stable government

and to restore their economic circum-
stances for the future.

No. we have not communicated di-
rectly with Mr. Khomeini. Our views
have been expressed publicly that he
support stability and an end to
bloodshed in Iran. And no matter what
his deep religious convictions might
be — and I don't doubt their sin-
cerity— that he permit the government
that has now been established by the
legal authorities in Iran and under the
constitution to have a chance to suc-
ceed. We do know that the Iranian
military and many of the religious and
political opponents to the Shah have
given their pledge of support to the
Bakhtiar government. And that's our
hope.

And I would like to add one other
thing. We have no intention, neither
ability nor desire, to interfere in the
internal affairs of Iran, and we cer-
tainly have no intention of permitting
other nations to interfere in the internal
affairs of Iran.

Q. If we had had better intelli-
gence in Iran, is there anything that
we could have done to save the Shah?
And there's a second part to that
question. You just referred to Iran as
allies. Would you authorize new
weapons shipments to the Bakhtiar
regime?

A. Even if we had been able to an-
ticipate events that were going to take
place in Iran or other countries, ob-
viously our ability to determine those
events is very limited. The Shah, his
advisers, great military capabilities,
police, and others, couldn't completely
prevent rioting and disturbances in
Iran.

Certainly we have no desire nor
ability to intrude massive forces into
Iran or any other country to determine
the outcome of domestic political is-
sues. This is something that we have no
intention of ever doing in another
country. We've tried this once in Viet-
nam. It didn't work well, as you well
know.

We have some existing contracts for
delivery of weapons to Iran since
sometimes the deliveries take as long
as 5 years after the orders are placed.
Our foreign military sales policy is now
being continued. We have no way to
know what the attitude of the Bakhtiar
government is. We've not discussed
this with them.

After the Iranian Government is sta-
ble, after it assuages the present disturb-
ances in Iran, then I'm sure they'll let
us know how they want to carry out
future military needs of their own
country. It is important to Iran, for
their own security and for the inde-
pendence of the people of Iran, that a
strong and stable military be main-
tained, and I believe that all the leaders
of Iran, whom I have heard discuss this
matter, agree with the statement that
I've just made.

Q. There is a suggestion that if
Iranian oil supplies do not begin
flowing again, perhaps within 2
months, there may be a shortage and
perhaps a price increase for us. Does
our intelligence indicate that might
happen, or is there such a prospect
as you see it?

A. We derive about 57c of our oil
supplies from Iran in recent months —
much less than many other countries,
as you know, who are more heavily
dependent on Iranian oil. I think an
extended interruption of Iranian oil
shipments would certainly create in-
creasingly severe shortages on the in-
ternational market.

So far, other oil-producing nations
have moved to replace the lost Iranian
oil supplies. If this should continue, it
would just reemphasize the basic com-
mitment that our nation has tried to
carry out in the last 2 years. That is, to
have a predictable energy policy to re-
duce consumption of energy in toto,
certainly to reduce dependence on
foreign oil and to eliminate waste of
oil.

I don't think there's any doubt that
we can cut back consumption of oil by
5% without seriously damaging our
own economy. And I would hope that
all Americans who listen to my voice
now would do everything possible
within their own capabilities to cut
down on the use of oil and the waste of
all energy supplies.

I think that this restoration of Iranian
oil shipments is a desire by all the reli-
gious and political leaders in Iran who
have an influence over the future. We
have seen, since the OPEC [Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries]
price increases, even before the Iranian
supplies were interrupted, some short-
age of spot shipments of oil.

The present price of oil even with in-
creased production from other suppliers
is now slightly above the established
OPEC price. But our hope is that oil
prices will go down at least to some
degree as Iranian supplies are rein-
troduced.

Q. On your negotiations with
China over normalization of diplo-
matic relations, did you at any point
ask the Chinese to provide a binding
written pledge that they would not
try to seize Taiwan by force? And if
you did request that, why didn't you
get it? And if you didn't, why didn't
you ask for it? [Laughter]

A. Yes. One of our goals in the negoti-
ation was to get a public commitment
on the part of China that the differences
with Taiwan would be resolved peace-
fully. This was not possible to achieve.
The final outcome of that was that we
would make a unilateral statement that
we expect any differences between
Taiwan and China to be resolved
peacefully, and the agreement was that
the leaders in China would not con-
tradict that statement.

Since the announcement of normali-
zation. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping
and others have made public comments
that substantiate the statement that I
have made.

It's a matter internally for the
Chinese to resolve, but I think Mr.
Deng has made several statements
saying that it ought to be resolved
peacefully.

We were also insistent upon the fact
that the treaty between us and Taiwan
would not be peremptorily or im-
mediately canceled or abrogated. The
treaty will be terminated in accordance
with its own provisions with a 1-year
notice to Taiwan. The Chinese did not
agree with this originally but they fi-
nally accepted that fact.

Another insistence that we had,
which was finally agreed to, was that
we would go ahead with normal trade,
cultural relationships with Taiwan, and
also that existing treaties other than the
defense treaty would continue in effect.

One point on which we did not agree
with the Chinese was that we will, after
this year, continue to sell defensive
weapons to Taiwan, to provide for their
security needs. The Chinese leaders do
not agree with this policy, but they un-
derstand that is is our policy and,
knowing that, they went ahead with
normalization. So there were some
differences between us, but I think this
is one of the major achievements for
peace in the world, and particularly to
cement our relationship with the na-
tions in the Western Pacific. And I
think we had a very good outcome for
the long negotiations.

Q. Next month you are going to
meet, supposedly, with the Prime
Minister of Thailand [Gen.
Kriangsak Chamanan] who is the
head of a nation that is now
threatened by the Vietnamese. I need

to know two things, if you could.
One, what is the U.S. prepared to
offer Thailand to ease their concerns
about the Vietnamese? Will it be
money, economic aid, military
weapons, or American-piloted air-
craft? Number two, have you per-
sonally been in touch with the leaders
of China and the Soviet Union to see
what they plan to do to help ease the
situation?

A. We are very interested in seeing
the integrity of Thailand protected, the
borders not endangered or even
threatened by the insurgent troops from
Vietnam in Cambodia. We have joined
in with almost all other nations of the
world in the United Nations in con-
demning the intrusion into Cambodia
by Vietnamese forces.

This obviously involves the adjacent
country of Thailand. Mr. Kriangsak
will be coming here to visit with me,
and during that time, we will reassure
him that our interests are in a stable
and secure and peaceful Thailand.

We have continuing trade relation-
ships with Thailand. We provide them
with some military arms for defensive
purposes, as have been negotiated for a
long period of time. We don't detect
any immediate threat to the borders of
Thailand. In some instances, the in-
vading forces into Cambodia have de-
liberately stayed away from the border
itself and of course the Chinese give
Thailand very strong support.

The Soviet Union has expressed their
support for Vietnam, as you know.
And in our efforts, along with others in
the United Nations, we have warned
both the Vietnamese and also the
Soviets who supply them and who sup-
port them against any danger that they
might exhibit toward Thailand.

Q. You have invited former Presi-
dent Richard Nixon to the White
House for the dinner for Chinese
leader Deng Xiaoping. During your
campaign, you said Mr. Nixon had
disgraced this country, and about a
year ago you said that you thought
he had indeed committed impeach-
able offenses. Why are you honoring
him in this way now?

A. As you know, the consequences
of the Watergate actions by President
Nixon have already been determined by
the Congress and by the actions of Mr.
Nixon himself, having been pardoned
by President Ford.

In preparing for the upcoming visit
by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, I felt
that it was a fair thing and a proper
thing to invite both President Nixon
and President Ford to the White House
for the banquet at which Mr. Deng will
be honored.

Department of State Bulletin

As you know, as President, one of
the major achievements of President
Nixon was to open up an avenue of
communications and consultation and
negotiation with the Chinese which re-
sulted ultimately in normal relation-
ships.

I think it's entirely proper that he be
there. In addition to that, the Chinese
officials, including Vice Premier Deng
himself, had asked for an opportunity
to meet with President Nixon and to
express their thanks personally to him
for the role he played in opening up
Chinese-U.S. relationships.

So I have no apology to make. I
think it was a proper thing to do and
I'm very pleased that President Nixon
has accepted our invitation.

Q. Do you see any danger of our
losing our intelligence listening posts
in Iran? And if we do lose those posts
will we have enough back-up capa-
bility so that you can assure Con-
gress that we can verify a new SALT
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]
agreement if you get one?

A. There is obviously, in any coun-
try where we have intelligence sources,
a danger for those sources to be mod-
ified or lost. We had this occur, as you
know, a few years ago in Turkey when
we had an embargo against the sale of
military weapons to Turkey. And this
has happened from time to time in an
evolutionary way.

We have constantly been able and
determined to provide increasing capa-
bility for surveillance which would
allow us to compensate for those
changes that are inevitable in any
changing society.

So I can assure the public and the
Congress that no matter what happens
to the specific intelligence sources in
Iran, we can adequately compensate for
their change and provide adequate ver-
ification for the compliance by the
Soviet Union with SALT agreements.

Q. There seem to be a lot of people
who think that the Soviets now are
gaining a military edge over us.

A. Yes.

Q. Now, isn't this perception basic
to the problem of getting a SALT
treaty ratified?

A. I don't think the perception is ac-
curate. I think that militarily, we are
certainly equal to or superior to the
Soviet Union in our own capability.
Certainly in addition to that, we have
harmony with our neighbors, which the
Soviet Union lacks. And our allies are
free and independent and tied to us
philosophically, with a deep commit-

February 1979

merit, as is the case with NATO and
other alliances.

The Soviets can't match that depend-
ability and independence among their
allies. Economically, politically. I
think our systems are superior to the
Soviet Union. There is no doubt, how-
ever, that the approval of the SALT
treaty by the American people and by
the Congress will certainly be influ-
enced by perceptions that we are in-
deed now and we will indeed in the
future be secure and that our military
strength and capability in its totality
will be adequate to meet any Soviet
threat, and there is no doubt that we
will be able to meet any such threat now
or in the future.

Q. Following up again on China,
shortly after your announcement last
month, you said in a television inter-
view that [Soviet] President
Brezhnev's response in a private mes-
sage to you had been positive.

A. Yes.

Q. TASS then took issue with you
and this week in an interview pub-
lished in Time , Mr. Brezhnev said that
it was like playing with Fire to encour-
age China's militancy. In view of these
statements, do you still feel that the
Kremlin is positive about your China
policy?

A. I have reread the original dispatch
that I got from President Brezhnev and
I've also read the TASS statements and
happen to have read last night the inter-
view with President Brezhnev in Time. I
think my interpretation of Brezhnev's
original statement was accurate. He did
point out the fact that they had relation-
ships with China that could be contribu-
tory to peace. He expressed in his origi-
nal statement a desire or an intention to
monitor future relationships between our-
selves and China, and expressed some
concern about a possibility of our using
this new relationship against the Soviet
Union.

This is not our intention; we never in-
tend to use our improved relationships
with China against the Soviet Union or
the relationships with the Soviet Union,
which I hope to improve, as a factor to
endanger or to threaten China. So that
was a proviso put in his first dispatch.
But I think still in balance it was con-
structive. It was certainly constructive
and positive compared to the anticipation
that I had from the Soviet Union.

Q. With Iran off line now on oil
production, and your worrying about
spot shortages, there are a lot of sci-
entists who see Saudi Arabia down

there and Mexico. Yet we seem to be
turning our back on natural gas pro-
duction in Mexico; some question
about whether they want to have sub-
stantial gas in the American market.
How do you reconcile that?

A. We are very interested in Mexican
oil and natural gas to be purchased by
our own nation. The decisions, however,
on how rapidly to produce and to market
their oil and natural gas is a decision to
be made by Mexico. They are under-
standably very independent in this re-
spect and we would not try to encroach
on their independence nor try to encour-
age them to more rapidly produce gas and
oil than they themselves desire.

We have immediate needs and also
long-range needs, sometimes not quite
the same. In the immediate future, the
next few months, there is no urgency
about acquiring Mexican natural gas. We
have at this moment a surplus of natural
gas in our own country and the state-
ments made by the Secretary of Energy
[James R. Schlesinger] were related to
that fact.

He has encouraged large users of oil
and gas to use gas instead of oil, but, for
instance, new power plants to be built in
the future have to be designed to use
coal. And we also have the problem of
using efficiently gas produced in the 48
States of our country and in the future
how to bring the natural gas that is avail-
able from Alaska down through Canada
to our nation. It's a very complicated
thing. And when I go to Mexico next
February, this will obviously be one of
the matters that I will discuss.

But I'm not going down there to
negotiate the price of natural gas. We'll
be talking, myself and President Lopez
Portillo, more on long-range strategic
approaches on how we might best pro-
vide a good market for Mexican oil and
gas that they want to sell to us. □

For full text see Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Jan. 22, 1979. p. 50.

President Carter's
Trip

The White House announced on
November 13, 1978, that the President
had accepted the invitation of President
Lopez Portillo to visit Mexico February
14-16, 1979. Material relating to this
visit will be published in the March
1979 Bulletin. □

interview
of December 19

On December 19, 1978, President
Carter was interviewed by Walter
Cronkite of the Columbia Broadcasting
System for later broadcast on the CBS
television network. '

Q. We have no commitment from
Peking [now Beijing] that it will not
use force to take Taiwan. Secretary
of State Vance has said only that we
have the expectation that it will not.
But if the present Peking govern-
ment or some future Peking govern-
ment tried to reunify Taiwan by
force, would we feel free to use force
to help Taiwan resist?

A. In the first place, the People's
Republic of China does not have the
capability of launching a 120-mile at-
tack across the ocean against Taiwan,
who are heavily fortified and also
heavily armed. And we have made it
clear to the People's Republic that after
this year, when the treaty does
expire — this coming year — that we will
sell to Taiwan defensive weapons.

I think it is accurate to say also that
the major interest that the People's Re-
public of China has in the western
Pacific is peace and good relationships
with us. They know our firm expecta-
tions, clearly expressed to them, that
the differences between China and
Taiwan will be settled peacefully. And
I think to violate that understanding
with us would be to wipe out all the
benefits to them and to Asia of peace
and their new relationship with us.

We have obviously a desire and a
commitment to maintain peace in the
western Pacific. And as would be the
case with an altercation between any
two peoples, we would certainly be
deeply concerned. But I don't want to
speculate on under what circumstances
we might take military action because I
think it's an absolutely unnecessary
speculation, because the people of
China want peace, they want good re-
lationships with us, and because
Taiwan is so strong and will stay
strong.

Q. Well, clearly, if the situation
changed drastically in our relations
with any of these two other units, the
Chinese Government and Taiwan, we
can take a new look at the situation,
I suppose.

A. That's always an option. And I
think, as you know, political circum-

stances change around the world con-
stantly, and we would have to reassess
them as they do occur. But I don't have
any doubt that we made the right deci-
sion. We have made our intentions and
our expectations clear to the people of
China and to Taiwan.

My reports from Taiwan, in the last
day or few hours, has been that they
studied the agreements with the
People's Republic, that their original
concerns have been substantially al-
leviated, and I don't think that the
people of Taiwan are any more con-
cerned about future peace than they
were before. In addition, we will
maintain trade relationships, cultural
relationships with the people of
Taiwan, as has been the case in the
past.

Q. Have you had any recent con-
versations with any Soviet officials or
have you heard from Moscow as to
what their reaction is in the last few
hours, bringing us up to date?

A. Yes, I've had a personal message
delivered to me this afternoon from
President Brezhnev expressing his un-
derstanding that our commitment is to
peace in the entire world, acknow-
ledging the fact that the American po-
sition is that our new relationship with
the People's Republic of China will
contribute to world peace, and
acknowledging the fact that the proper
relationship between major sovereign
nations is to have full diplomatic
relations.

I would characterize his personal
message to me as being very positive in
tone. And I can say without any doubt
that our new relationship with China
will not put any additional obstacles in
the way of a successful SALT agree-
ment and also will not endanger our
good relationships with the Soviet
Union.

Q. What about the slight protocol
problem of timing visits from Teng
Hsiao-ping [Deng Xiaoping], the Vice
Chairman, who's due here from
Peking on January 29, and a possible
visit from Chairman Brezhnev to
sign a SALT agreement? Can
Chairman Brezhnev come after Teng
has been here?

A. I can't set the schedule for him.
My hope is that President Brezhnev
would come before Mr. Teng comes to
Washington.

As you know, Secretary Vance will
be meeting with Foreign Minister
Gromyko day after tomorrow, the 21st,
and at that time we'll see if the SALT
agreements are coming to a successful
conclusion. If so, we will extend im-
mediately again an invitation to Presi-

dent Brezhnev to come here during the
middle part of January.

The two visits would, obviously, not
overlap or conflict, and I think I'll be
well prepared, in studying the prospec-
tive agenda, to meet with both of them
in the same month.

Q. What about return visits from
you?

A. We have not made any plans for
that. And I would presume that both
leaders might invite me to come to
their countries sometime in the future.
And I would look with favor on those
invitations, but not anytime soon.

Q. Do you feel that this agreement
with China puts any pressure on the
Soviet Union to come to any early
conclusion with the SALT talks?

A. No, I really can't assess any in-
terrelationship between the two. The
agreement with China was not designed
to put any sort of pressure on the
Soviet Union. I think the outcome of
the new relationship between ourselves
and the billion people of China and
their government is constructive and
positive and contributes toward the
lessening of tension rather than the
building up of additional tension. And
that applies to our relationship with
the Soviet Union as well as to other
countries.

Q. Some Members of Congress,
including Democrats and some lib-
eral Republicans, are claiming that
you failed to live up to an Adminis-
tration pledge to consult with Con-
gress before taking any such action
as you have toward Taiwan and
Peking. And now, there's a threat of
a court challenge to the constitution-
ality of your cancelling the treaty
without congressional approval. How
seriously do you view this? Do you
feel that either Congress or the
courts could block this arrangement
with both Taiwan and Peking?

A. No. My constitutional responsi-
bility in establishing relationships with
foreign countries is clear and cannot be
successfully challenged in court.

We have had constant consultations
with the Congress over the past 2
years. And our goal in establishing
normal relations with China has been
made clear on numerous occasions by
me personally. When Secretary Vance
went to China and came back, he gave
the Congress leaders and Members a
thorough briefing. Dr. Brzezinski did
the same thing after his visit to China. I
have met with all the Members of the
Congress who would come to sessions
here at the White House.

Department of State Bulletin

One of the deliberate items on my
own agenda in explaining to them and
answering their questions was about the
terms under which we would normalize
relationships with China. I might add
that when numerous delegations of
congressional leaders have gone to the
People's Republic and come back, they
have also given me and Secretary of
State Vance their views on what ought
to be done. Almost invariably their
recommendation was to proceed ex-
peditiously with normalization of rela-
tions with China.

So, there's been a clear understand-
ing, really ever since 1972, of the pol-
icy of our government toward China, a
desire to normalize relations, and also
a clear expression of my views both
publicly and privately to the Members
of Congress about our goals and the
plans for accomplishing this goal.

I might say in complete candor that
in the last 2 or 3 weeks, when the
negotiations were building up to a
climax in an unanticipated degree of
rapidity of movement, we did not con-
sult with anyone outside of a very tiny
group within the executive branch of
government about the prospective suc-
cess. But what did happen should not
be a surprise to anyone. The congres-
sional views were well known to me.
My views were well known to the
Members of Congress.

Q. What was the need for such
haste? Why could you not have con-
sulted with the congressional leaders
first, before making the final com-
mitment?

A. My experience in negotiating sen-
sitive and complicated agreements with
foreign leaders, including the experi-
ence at Camp David and otherwise, is
that to negotiate through the news
media, through public pronouncements
and with wide divergencies of views
expressed by different leaders in a
country, is not conducive to success.
And I'm authorized and directed by the
Constitution and my responsibility is to
conduct negotiations of this kind.

We did not depart from the estab-
lished policy of our country that's been
extant since President Nixon went to
China in 1972. And I think had we
caused a public debate in our country
about all the ramifications of the
negotiations at the very time we were
trying to conclude these discussions
with the Chinese, it would have re-
sulted in failure. And our country
would have lost a wonderful opportu-
nity to a great stride forward and all the
benefits that will be derived from this
agreement.

I don't have any doubt that what I
did was right and correct. I don't have

February 1979

any doubts that had we made a public
issue of it. it would have complicated
the issue unnecessarily.

Q. On the matter of the court
challenge, the challenge is not your
right to recognize or to withdraw
recognition of a government, but of
your right to cancel a treaty. Does
that change your view any of the
validity of that challenge?

A. No. The treaty is being termi-
nated in exact conformance with the
terms of the treaty itself. Had I can-
celed the treaty or abrogated the treaty
peremptorily as of the first day of
January — which was the Chinese re-
quest to us, or demand from us
originally — there may have been some
justification for that court challenge.
But the treaty provides that either side
can terminate the effectiveness of the
treaty by giving a 1-year notice. And
that's exactly what we are doing with
the people of Taiwan, telling them that
after a year the treaty will no longer be
in effect. It's completely in accordance
with the terms of the treaty itself.

Q. Since the Constitution requires
the Senate to approve by a two-thirds
vote the making of a treaty, you
don't feel that there might be an im-
plication in the Constitution that the
same two-thirds would apply to can-
celing a treaty.

A. No. I think this gets into a com-
plicated legal discussion, and I'm not
qualified for it. But as of the first of
January, we will have relations with
and acknowledge the nationhood of
China. And Taiwan will no longer be a
nation in the view of our own country.
And whether or not a treaty can exist
with an entity which is no longer a na-
tion is a legal question in itself. But we
have gone a second mile to protect the
integrity of our own country by ex-
tending the terms of the peace treaty
for a full year, even after we recognize
the China mainland Government as the
government.

I think that we have more than hon-
ored the terms of the treaty, and I see
no basis for a successful court chal-
lenge. I think what we've done is right.
It's better for our country. It's better
for the people of China. It does not
hurt the people of Taiwan. It's good for
world peace. I think we've benefited
greatly, and I'm very proud of it.

Q. Do you think that putting the
Chinese question on the agenda of
the next session of Congress might
complicate the confirmation of a
SALT treaty?

A. No, I think not. What we will ask
the Congress to do next session is to

THE SECRETARY:

News Conference of January 1 1

Before taking questions, I would like
to say a few words about our approach
to the situation in Iran. The United
States has a strong and continuing
interest in the free, stable, and inde-
pendent Iran in this strategic region.
This is a policy we have consistently
and actively pursued over the past
generation.

In this recent crisis, we have encour-
aged the restoration of order so that the
bloodshed would end and the people of
Iran could return to normal life. Only
in such circumstances can there be ra-
tional discussion of a political solution
to Iran's current problems.

It has been our objective throughout
this current crisis to insure the
maximum of stability in a time of
change by preserving the institutional
framework of Iran under its constitu-
tion. The Shah has said that he plans to
leave Iran on vacation. That has been
his decision, worked out with his Ira-
nian colleagues. The Shah remains the
constitutional head of state, and we
continue to work with him in that
capacity.

The Shah has said that when he
leaves, he will do so in the way pre-
scribed by the Iranian Constitution by
appointing a Regency Council to serve
in his absence. At the same time, a new
civilian government under Prime
Minister '[Shapour] Bakhtiar has been
named. We believe that the new gov-
ernment should be given every chance
to reconcile the differences in Iran and
find a peaceful political solution.

Iran's Armed Forces remain essential
to the security and independence of
Iran and as a necessary complement to
a legitimate civilian government. We
have urged that everything be done to
insure their integrity and their support
by the people of Iran.

We have urged that leaders of all
elements in Iran find ways of working

out together a peaceful solution to the
present problems. The decisions on
Iran's future must be made by the Ira-
nians themselves. No outside govern-
ment should seek to interfere. We hope
for a return to peaceful conditions and
a functioning economy that will make
possible an orderly and constructive
solution of Iran's problems.

Q. What — apart from the state-
ment you have just made — is the
United States prepared to do to in-
sure that a civilian government will
be able to survive in Iran?

A. We have indicated to the Prime
Minister that we will cooperate with
him and with his government, and that
we will keep very closely in touch with
him so that we may be helpful wher-
ever we can.

Q. Has the United States changed
its view of Libya as a supporter of
terrorism? And could you give us,
please, your opinion of the Presi-
dent's brother acting as a front
man — or as a tour guide,
perhaps — for Libyans here trying to
improve Libya's image in the United
States?

A. With respect to Libya and ter-
rorism, Libya has now signed the three
conventions with respect to hijacking
in the air — which is different from the
past. We are continuing to watch and
observe the situation there.

I am not familiar at all with the facts
on the second half of your question.

Q. I wonder, sir, could you bring
us up to date on the Middle East
talks and give us your estimate of
when you expect they might resume?

A. Yes, I'd be very happy to do that.
As you know, following the meeting in
Brussels which I had with Prime
Minister Khali! and Foreign Minister

pass special legislation to permit us to
continue our cultural relations with
Taiwan, our trade relations with
Taiwan, the application of the Exim-
bank, and the support of loans to
China — to the people of Taiwan,
rather — and also to authorize us to sell
weapons to Taiwan after the defense
treaty expires.

I think that even those who oppose
the normalization of relations with

China will favor the continued relation-
ships with Taiwan, which this legisla-
tion will have to authorize. I don't
think this will complicate the other is-
sues in Congress. They're almost as
complicated as they can get anyhow. I
don't think this will hurt at all. □

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of Dec. 25. 1978.

Dayan, each of them had to go back
and consult with their governments.
Following those consultations, each
has communicated with us, setting
forth their thoughts about how the
negotiating process might be resumed.
Each has made it clear that they do
want to resume negotiations. We are,
therefore, now discussing the best ways
of getting the negotiations going again.
What we want to be sure is that, in
doing this, we do it by a process that
will give the negotiations the best
chance to be successful. Therefore, we
are taking our time and exploring the
best way to try and deal with some of
the more minor problems before we
proceed to sitting down together to try
and thrash out the more difficult issues.

Q. Dr. Kissinger this week has
been critical of American reluctance
to take the Soviets to task, both for
their alleged involvement in Iran —
the disruptive role in Iran — and in
the Indochina arena. Could you tell
us whether you feel the Soviets have
been a disruptive force in Iran and
the extent to which in Indochina a
great power rivalry is developing
that could endanger the peace, and
whether or not you have held the
Soviets to account, or plan to hold
them to account, for any of these
actions?

A. Let me answer your question by
first saying a few words about the situ-
ation in Indochina. We have made it
very clear that the invasion of Cam-
bodia threatens regional peace and sta-
bility and violates the fundamental
principle of the integrity of interna-
tional boundaries. We have repeatedly
stated our support for a stable system
of independent states in Southeast
Asia; and we believe that this system
includes an independent Cambodia, de-
spite the strength of our concern over
the human rights situation in that
country, a situation which we have
consistently condemned and sought to
improve by accepted international
procedures.

During the past year, as the conflict
between Vietnam and Cambodia — or
Kampuchea, as it is now called — was
intensifying, we expressed our con-
cern, made clear our decision not to
take sides, and urged that it be resolved
peacefully.

I would remind you that the United
States was the first to call the attention
of the United Nations to the dangers in
this situation in a letter which was sent
to the Security Council in November of
this past year.

We believe that all countries in-
terested in peace, stability, and inde-
pendence should make clear their op-

position to this invasion which has
taken place, work toward a withdrawal
of the invading foreign forces from the
country, and to act to insure the integ-
rity of all states in the area.

Now, coming to the second half of
your question, the role that the Soviet
Union may or may not have played in
that is as yet unclear. Most of the
equipment, or a lot of the equipment,
which was used in the invasion was
equipment which had been captured
when the American forces left Viet-
nam, so it is not yet clear how much
support came from outside forces.

We have made very clear to all of
the parties concerned our concern for
this conflict as it mounted during the
past year. We have made it clear to the
Vietnamese and to the Soviet Union.

Q. You don't hold the Soviet
Union responsible in any way for en-
couraging the Vietnamese to launch
this invasion of Cambodia?

A. Let me say, I do not know what
the facts are with respect to that.

Q. I noticed that in your opening
statement on Iran, sir, you said that
the United States has a strong and
continuing interest in Iran. In a re-
cent interview in The New York Times,
Dr. Brzezinski, I believe, described it
as a vital American interest. Perhaps
this is just semantics, but do you be-
lieve that Iran is a vital interest of
the United States?

A. I think it is very clear that we
have vital interests in the region. I
would point out that the oil which
comes through the Strait of Hormuz
which, as you know, is on the southern
Iranian border, comprises about 50% of
the oil which goes to the free world.
Our trade with Iran and Saudi Arabia
over this past year amounted to some
$7 billion, a very substantial amount.
And obviously this is very important in
a period in which we have balance-of-
payments problems and we have to in-
crease our exports.

It is also clear that what happens in
Iran is being closely followed by others
in the Middle East, and that includes
those nations which are involved in the
Arab-Israeli conflict; so, therefore, it is
very clear that our interests in Iran and
in the region are vital interests.

Q. Do you see any possibility of
American military involvement in
Iran as a result of the need to protect
those vital interests?

A. I do not see any need for Ameri-
can military involvement. With respect
to the vital interests, we are following
the situation carefully. We are in con-
stant communication with the many

Department of State Bulletin

friendly neighbors and allies that we
have who are also following, on a daily
basis, the tragic events that have un- ,
folded in Iran; and we will continue to
do so.

Q. To follow up on the Middle
East, can you tell us, have the parties
modified their positions in any way
on the autonomy and linkage ques-
tions and on the controversial arti-
cles? Also, will the Foreign Ministers
be invited back here, and do you rule
out a resumption of the talks next
week?

A. On the details of the positions of
the parties, I am not going to go into
that matter. This is a matter that should
be discussed in private negotiations
between the two parties and ourselves.
And I would not only not be helping
the situation; I think I would be hin-
dering the situation by going into the
details of what their positions are.

Secondly, with respect to when we
might meet, this is still under discus-
sion. One of the things which we are
thinking of is perhaps having ex-
changes, further exchanges, through
the Ambassadors in the two capitals
there to try and clear away some of the
more minor matters, as I indicated,
before setting the time for the meeting
at the higher level between the Minis-
ters and myself.

As to the place, when we come to
holding the meeting, everybody has
said that as far as they are concerned,
they are willing to have it anywhere.
The important thing is to have it and to
make progress.

Q. There seem to be two main in-
terpretations in town of why, on the
morning of the 23d of December,
when you came out of the Soviet Mis-
sion in Geneva, you said you had
made very little progress. One re-
lates to the Soviet attitude toward
U.S. establishment of relations with
China and the [Vice Premier] Deng
Xiaoping visit; the other relates to
the Soviets trying to get more conces-
sions out of the United States at the
last minute. These are not necessar-
ily mutually exclusive, but I wonder
if you could tell us how you see the
balance and how you see the prob-
lems that now stand in terms of what
Soviet motivation might be?

A. Let me say that I said that we had
made very little progress because we
had made very little progress. We had
made good progress the 2 days before,
but that morning we just didn't make
any progress. And I wanted to make it
very clear that that was the fact. As to
what the motivation was for the failure
to make progress that morning, it

February 1979

would be pure speculation on my part
to guess at it now.

Let me emphasize that in those
meetings as a whole, we, as the
Foreign Minister and I said, cleared
away most of the issues which re-
mained between us. Since the meeting,
we have been in touch with each other
to see what we could do to deal with
those remaining issues and to expedite
the work of the two delegations in
Geneva. That work is proceeding. Our
conversations through the ambassado-
rial channels are proceeding. We are
both — we and the Soviet Union —
committed to find a conclusion in the
nearest future. We said that before, and
I repeat it again today.

Q. Do you and the members of the
Department for which you are re-
sponsible feel bound by the campaign
promise of the President, reiterated
on national television on December
14, not to lie to or mislead the
American people?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you tell us, sir, what
dealings you have had, aside from
normal journalistic contacts, with
The New York Times, of which you
were a director before you assumed
your current position — that is, aside
from normal journalistic contacts,
for instance, with Mr. Gwertzman,
on matters of editorial policy and
similar concerns?

A. I have had merely the normal
contacts. I have talked to Mr.
Gwertzman, as I have other members
of the press corps here. I have talked to
Mr. Reston on occasion. Mr. Reston is
one of the most distinguished colum-
nists in the United States — indeed in
the world. And I have, I think, on one
or two occasions talked to Mr. Frankel.
Those are the extent of my contacts.

Q. How much responsibility do
you think the United States has to
bear for the events in Iran, either
through blind support of the Shah in
the past or more recently through
statements urging liberalization and
talking about human rights in a way
that might have encouraged those
who were in favor of insurrection?

A. Let me say that the situation in
Iran is one which comes about over a
long period of time as a result of fun-
jdamental changes which have been
taking place — economic moderniza-
tion, social change, demands for wider
political involvement. And these are,
primarily, internal problems that have
to be worked out by the people of Iran
and the leaders in the political process
in that country.

Several Administrations have
worked with Iran and the Government
of Iran over the last 20 or 30 years.
And we have done, during that period
of time, what we believed would help
to try and advance the interests of the
people of that country. But the decision
as to what their political future must be
is a question for them to determine,
and they are the ones that are going to
have to make that choice.

Q. Prime Minister Callaghan [of
the United Kingdom] reportedly said
the United States might be reluctant
to stay with the Anglo-American
proposal for settlement in Rhodesia.
What is the U.S. position in sup-
porting or pursuing the Anglo-
American proposal?

A. We remain firmly behind the
Anglo-American proposal.

Q. When you talk about the politi-
cal future of Iran as a subject for the
Iranian people themselves to decide,
could you describe fully the extent of
U.S. advice to the Shah, of U.S.
contacts with the generals, of U.S.
military movements in the region, all
of which has been packaged by the
Soviet Union and described as U.S.
interference in Iran?

A. Yes, I would be happy to. We
have obviously been in contact with the
Shah frequently, as the events unfolded
over the last several weeks and months
and have discussed with him matters as
they arose and as they might affect the
future.

We have had contacts with the Ira-
nian military through our military as-
sistance group that is there, and we
have in addition to that, recently had
additional contacts through General
Huyser [General Robert Huyser, Dep-
uty Commander in Chief of U.S.
Forces in Europe], who has come to
Tehran and has been working with
Ambassador Sullivan [U.S. Ambas-
sador to Iran William H. Sullivan].

As you know. General Huyser has
discussed not only technical matters,
such as those relating to foreign mili-
tary sales and the continuation of those
sales in an even way to meet the needs
of the Iranian military, but has also
urged them to support the civilian gov-
ernment in coping with the problems
which Iran faces.

Q. Is it your view then that none of
this constitutes interference in Iran's
affairs?

A. I believe it does not constitute
interference.

Q. There have been conflicting in-
dications of whether there was an

intelligence failure with regard to
Iran. As a policymaker do you feel
that you had adequate notice of the
fundamental social changes and their
potential impact on the Shah's re-
gime? And, if you did, why was there
no evidence, or at least nothing ap-
parent, of American efforts to influ-
ence the Shah into the types of ac-
tions early on in '77 and early '78,
which might have prevented the
present crisis?

A. I think on the whole that the in-
telligence which we have received has
been adequate to foresee events as they
developed. The question of dealing
with these problems in terms of finding
solutions to those problems is a very
difficult one; and again it is one that
has to be resolved by the Iranian people
and their leaders.

This is a situation in which we can
discuss the matters with them, when
asked give our advice with respect to
how we think they can best be coped
with. But the decisions have to be
made by the Iranians and not by the
Americans.

Q. As a result of Sino-U.S. nor-
malization, do you foresee any im-
provement in the security situation
on the Korean Peninsula?

A. I believe that as a result of nor-
malization of relations between the
United States and the People's Repub-
lic of China stability in the area will be
strengthened in the months and years
ahead. And I would include in that the
situation on the Korean Peninsula.

I think that it is well known that the
People's Republic of China has had a
close relationship with North Korea
and we, of course, are a long time ally
of South Korea. I think that as a result
of those facts, and the fact that we now
have normalization with a full and free
and open dialogue between the
People's Republic of China and our-
selves, that this can help in terms of
stabilizing the situation in that area.

Q. When Chinese Vice Premier
Deng Xiaoping comes here at the end
of this month, do you have in mind to
discuss with him occupation of
Korea, and reducing tension in
Korea and Asia?

A. I am sure that one of the issues
which will be discussed with Vice
Premier Deng Xiaoping will be the
situation in Korea. We will be discus-
sing with him, of course, bilateral
matters, but we will also be discussing
global issues and regional issues. Ob-
viously, one of the most important re-
gional issues is the situation on the
Korean Peninsula.

10

Department of State Bulletin

Q. You said in your opening
statement that the Shah has said he
planned to take a vacation and there
would be a Regency Council put in
his place. Do I take it that the United
States concurs that this would be a
good action by the Shah to take and,
if so, how long do you expect him to
be out of the country? Is it a tempo-
rary or is it a semipermanent thing?

A. On the first half of your question,
the Shah has made this decision, we
think it is a sound decision, and we
concur in that decision.

As to the second half, how long will
he be out of the country: I don't have
that answer. That is a question the
Shah himself will have to answer.

Q. Do we expect this Regency
Council to be named today or tomor-
row or soon, so that he can leave the
country soon?

A. I think that the Regency Council
will be named in the next few days.

Q. And he will leave the country
after the Regency Council is named?

A. He has said that he will leave the
country after having established the
Regency Council.

Q. Several people have said that
the security situation, the overall
strategic situation, in the entire In-
dian Ocean-Persian Gulf region has
deteriorated from the Western point
of view. Obviously, the Saudi leaders
have been publicly concerned and
presumably the reason the F-15's
are being sent to Saudi Arabia is be-
cause of this concern.

What is your view as to all the de-
velopments in that region —
Afghanistan, Pakistan, that whole
area? Is the West at a disadvantage
now?

A. There are several elements that go
into answering that question. First, as I
pointed out a few moments ago, fun-
damental changes are taking place in
the area in terms of economic moderni-
zation, social changes, and demands
for wider political involvement. And
those factors affect not only Iran,
which I was referring to when I made

Secretary Vance Visits Europe

Secretary Vance departed Washington
on December 20, 1978, for meetings
with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
in Geneva (December 21-23) and with
Egyptian Prime Minister Khalil and
Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan in
Brussels (December 23-24). Follow-
ing is a statement by Secretary Vance
upon his return to Washington on
December 24. '

Despite all the advances in interna-
tional communication, there are still
occasions when there is no substitute
for face-to-face contact in dealing with
difficult international problems.

This was true in dealing with two
important issues fundamental to peace
on my present trip — the regulation of
the nuclear weapons competition with
the Soviet Union and the continuing
search for a peaceful solution to the
problems of the Middle East.

In Geneva Mr. Gromyko and I and
our colleagues were able to essentially
reach agreement on most of the issues
which had not yet been resolved. Both
sides will do their best in order that the
preparation for a signing of the final
agreement may be completed in the
nearest future. We shall be working
vigorously through our Geneva delega-
tions and through diplomatic channels

to resolve the remaining issues. We are
conscious of the importance to peace
that a SALT agreement be reached
without delay, but we are not working
against any deadline. And our prime
concern is that the agreement be a
sound one.

As we also announced yesterday, we
have reached agreement in principle
concerning a meeting between Presi-
dent Carter and President Brezhnev.
The question of the timing of this
meeting remains to be worked out in
Washington with Moscow.

In the meetings in Brussels on the
Middle East, direct contact with the
representatives of Israel and Egypt
proved once again to be helpful. Our
purpose was to explore the nature of
the next steps to be taken in the negoti-
ations and not to get a date for the re-
sumption of negotiations. We had a
useful and full exchange of views with
Prime Minister Khalil of Egypt and
Foreign Minister Dayan of Israel. Each
party will be reporting to his head of
government and will then be back in
touch with us to discuss views and next
steps to be taken. □

'Press release 468. Other press releases re-
lated to the visit are Nos. 461 of Dec. 20, 462
and 464 of Dec . 2 1 . and 467 of Dec . 23 .

the statement, but to the region gener-
ally.

I think it does not help to over-
simplify the problem that leads us away
from realistic policies toward these
problems. In this connection, I would
point out that we have different coun-
tries here, and although you have
common factors which affect these
various countries, that does not mean
that the problem is identical in each of
these countries.

Our policy for over 30 years has
been to work with the countries which
are undergoing these profound changes
and to try and help find constructive
solutions to the problems which they
face. Our policy is that no outside
power, should exploit this instability for
its own purposes and for its own ad-
vantage. Each of the nations should
have freedom to work out its own solu-
tions to these problems without
exploitation from any outside powers.

Our position remains that we will
remain very close to the many friendly
countries in this area, who share our
concern, who wish to see stability, who
wish to see the maintenance of inde-
pendence, and wish to see security
maintained in the area.

So that, taking into account all of
these factors. I think that the policies
which we are following are a sound
policy and a policy which must be
applied with care and precision. And
we must not fall into the trap of ac-
cepting oversimplified generalities as
applying to differing situations.

Q. Soviet President Brezhnev sev-
eral weeks ago warned the United
States not to interfere in the Iranian
situation. The Soviet news agencies
have indicated that some of the steps
we have taken in the region, includ-
ing our consultation with the Shah,
including the planned movement of
military aircraft, are, in effect,
interference.

Have we had direct communication
with the Soviet Government, with
President Brezhnev, regarding the
Iranian situation and steps we are
taking? And do you feel that the
Soviet Government feels that this
constitutes interference on the part
of the United States?

A. The answer is yes, we have had
direct communication with the Gov-
ernment of the Soviet Union with re-
spect to Iran on many occasions.

I think it goes without saying that it
is our clear view that the consultations !
which we have been having and the ac-
tions which we have been taking with
respect to the Iranian situation are not
interference in any way whatsoever.
They are merely cooperative efforts

February 1979

which we have been carrying out with
the government and with the people of
that country, and we have made this
very clear to our Soviet colleagues.

Q. Do you think enough progress
is being made in these discussions
you are having on the remaining is-
sues of SALT [Strategic Arms Lim-
itation Talks] that there is a good
chance for it to be wrapped up prior
to the visit here by the Chinese Vice
Premier, Mr. Deng Xiaoping?

And secondly, how is the United
States going to modulate and carry
out this new and rather exciting re-
lationship with China, especially the
Deng visit, in a way that does not ad-
versely affect our relationship with
China's rival, the Soviet Union?

A. Let me take the second half of
your question first, because I think it is
a very important issue. It is U.S. policy
that we will treat the People's Republic
of China and the Soviet Union in a bal-
anced way. Our policy toward them
will be balanced and there will be no
tilts one way or the other, and this is an
absolutely fundamental principle and a
very important one that we must always
keep in mind in managing our relation-
ship with these two countries.

Coming back to your first question
now, will I make a prediction on —

Q. No. Do you think there is a
good chance?

A. I am not going to guess on that
one. We are continuing to work vigor-
ously at trying to clear away the prob-
lems as rapidly as we can, and all I will
say is that I repeat what Foreign
Minister Gromyko and I said, that we
are both striving to conclude the re-
maining matters in the nearest future.

Q. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping
has said that when he comes to the
United States he would not like to
discuss human rights. Is this a wish
that you are going to respect, or do
you think it should be free for you to
raise any subject you wish?

A. In our discussions with the Vice
Premier when he comes here, we will
be reviewing our entire views with re-
spect to the international problems, in-
cluding all of the global problems. We
will be stating our position and our
views with respect to human rights. In
that connection, because our position
with respect to human rights is at the
core of our foreign policy.

Q. Do you see any progress in ef-
forts being made with regard to the
solution to the Nicaragua crisis?

A. On the Nicaraguan matter, as you
know, the Americans, along with rep-

intervietv on "Meet the Press"

Secretary Vance was interviewed on
NBC's "Meet the Press" on December
17, 1978, by Bill Monroe, NBC News;
Carl T. Rowan, Chicago Sun Times;
George F. Will, syndicated columnist;
and Steve Delaney, NBC News.1

Q. Our guest today on "Meet the
Press" is Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance, who has just returned from
Israel and Egypt. He tried unsuc-
cessfully to help those countries meet
the goals set at Camp David to con-
clude a peace treaty by today.

Secretary Vance, there is so much
going on I would like to start with
China and then come to the Middle
East. George Bush, just a few years
ago, was our unofficial Ambassador
to Peking. Today he is a likely GOP
Presidential candidate. He is one of
those who has criticized the agree-
ment with China, and he has said we
gave all and got nothing. Would you
respond to that.

A. I must disagree with George on
what he has said. I think that the nor-
malization of relationships with the
People's Republic of China is a very
major — indeed, an historic — step
which will move us toward peace, to
greater stability in the region, and will
improve our relationships bilaterally
between our two nations.

It will also promote increased trade
between our country and that country,
and it is part of an overall program
which the United States has been car-
rying out during the Carter Adminis-

tration of trying to move toward peace
by dealing with specific situations such
as the Middle East, where we have
come in and tried to help the parties,
move them closer together. In such
things as we have done in moving for-
ward and carrying out our obligations
which have been going on for a number
of years, in trying to resolve the
Panama Canal situation.

A situation arose here where the
conditions which were necessary for us
to be able to go forward and normalize
relationships were accepted by the ac-
tion which the Government of the
People's Republic of China has taken.
We accepted and seized that opportu-
nity, and I think that the result is going
to be a very positive one for the region,
for the United States, its people, and
for the people of Taiwan because we
are insisting that insofar as the people
of Taiwan are concerned normal re-
lationships on an unofficial basis in
cultural, trade, and other matters will
be maintained.

We have expressed very clearly our
deep concern that the welfare of the
people of Taiwan be protected and that
the Taiwan solution be a peaceful solu-
tion. This has not been contradicted by
the People's Republic of China. Let
me, if I may. just say one or two more
words.

In addition, we made it clear that we
would continue in the period of post-
normalization to supply a limited
number of defensive weapons to the
people of Taiwan, and we will continue
to do so. And of great importance is the

resentatives of Guatemala and the
Dominican Republic, have been serv-
ing as intermediaries, a negotiating
group, trying to help mediate the
problem.

This mediation effort has been going
on for weeks. The mediators are cur-
rently in Nicaragua and are meeting
with the parties there in an effort to try
and overcome the remaining problems.

The solution is now centering around
the question of whether agreement can
be reached on a national plebiscite.
There is a difference between the par-
ties yet on this. The negotiators are
seeing whether they can bridge the re-
maining gap; and following that set of
meetings they will be issuing their re-

port which they are in the process of
preparing. How this is going to come
out, I don't know. But I think it is es-
sential that this mediation effort has
gone on.

The reason that the mediation effort
was started was because blood was
being spilled. The country was
polarizing. There appeared to be in-
creasing radicalization, and it was felt
necessary by the Organization of
American States that an effort be made
to try and see if a peaceful way could
not be found to try and bring about a
solution to the problem; and we agreed
to help in that effort. □

Press release II.

12

fact that we insisted that the treaty will
be terminated in accordance with its
terms and not terminated immediately
as the Chinese — the People's Republic
of China — would have liked it to
become.

Q. In the Middle East, could you
tell us what is behind the current
snag in negotiations and tell us how
serious you look on it as being?

A. First, let me say the parties have
come a long, long way, and the issues
which remain are very few and of much
lesser importance than the issues which
have been resolved. Indeed, there are
only a handful of issues. Let me tell
you what they are.

I think perhaps the best way to do it
is to describe my recent trip to the
Middle East. When I went to the Mid-
dle East, there were about four or five
issues separating the parties. The
President and I decided that what we
should do is go first to Egypt and see
whether or not we could, in discussions
with them, get a resolution of some of
these issues which could then be dis-
cussed with the Government of Israel.

One of the issues was the question of
the interpretation of article IV of the
proposed draft treaty. That, as cur-
rently drafted, provides that either
party may — and I underscore
"may" — ask the other party to review
the provisions of that treaty and that
when such review takes place amend-
ments to the treaty can only be made by
mutual agreement of the parties.

A question has been raised as to
whether or not the word "may" left
the parties in a situation where if one
asked, the other could say: "Thank you
very much. I have heard your request,
but I will not sit down and discuss it. "

President Sadat agreed during the
discussions which we had that he
wanted to clarify that, not change the
language as it existed but to make sure
that when one party asked, that the
other party would sit down and discuss
it. And that was agreed, and that is all
that that clarification does.

The second clarification was a very
simple one-sentence statement relating
to another article in the treaty which
indicated that this clarification would
make it clear that the treaty was not in
contradiction of what had already been
stated in the preamble; namely, that
this treaty was in the context of the
overall Camp David framework.

The third open item was the question
of how to deal with ambassadors. On
the question of ambassadors, there had
been a quid pro quo between the par-
ties. In the earlier discussions it had
been agreed that ad referendum to the
governments of the two countries there

Department of State Bulletin

ARMS CONTROL: Conventional
Arms Transfers

JOINT COMMUNIQUE,
DEC. 191

The delegations of the U.S.A. and
the U.S.S.R. held a scheduled round of
talks concerning the limitation of con-
ventional arms transfers in Mexico
City, Mexico, December 5-15, 1978.
The U.S. delegation was headed by
Mr. Leslie H. Gelb, Director of the
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs,
Department of State. The U.S.S.R.
delegation was headed by Mr. L.I.
Mendelevich, Ambassador at Large.
The discussions were serious, frank,
and substantive.

The U.S. and U.S.S.R. Delegations
were welcomed by the President of
Mexico, Lie. Jose Lopez Portillo, and
by the Secretary of Foreign Relations,
Lie. Santiago Roel, who set forth the

Mexican position on disarmament and
described the Latin American and
Caribbean initiative on regional self-
restraint with regard to conventional
weapons.

Both delegations noted with interest
the positions taken by different coun-
tries with regard to measures aimed at
limiting conventional weapons in vari-
ous parts of the world, particularly in
Latin America, based on the principle
of undiminished security of the parties
concerned, as envisaged in the final
document of the U.N. General Assem-
bly Special Session on Disarmament.

The next round of talks will be held
in Helsinki, Finland. □

'Read to news correspondents by Acting De-
partment spokesman Tom Reston.

would be an accelerated withdrawal
from the Sinai, particularly the area
around Al Arish. In a response to that,
the Egyptians had said: "If that early
accelerated withdrawal takes place,
then I will be prepared to accelerate the
exchange of ambassadors."

When the Cabinet in Israel turned
down the accelerated withdrawal, Sadat
then withdrew his quid pro quo for
that; namely, the accelerated with-
drawal, exchange of ambassadors.

Finally, the fourth issue related to a
letter that would cover the procedures
for proceeding to set up a self-
governing authority on the West Bank
and Gaza, and the proposal there was
to work out a letter which would be
agreeable to the parties. Such a letter
was worked out. I then took these pro-
posals to Israel and discussed them
with the Israeli Defense Committee,
and I think you are all familiar with the
fact that they have been turned down at
this point. Where we go from here, we
will have to see.

I do not think this means an end to
the negotiations. We will continue to
be willing to work with the parties to
try to bring these to a successful
conclusion.

Q. Critics are saying that the
United States has dishonored a sol-
emn commitment and jeopardized
the people of Taiwan. Are you just
hoping or do you have some implied
agreement with Peking that they will
not move with force against Taiwan?

A. We stated in the President's
statement that we expected that the
problem of Taiwan would be resolved
in a peaceful way.2 This has not been
contradicted by the People's Republic
of China.

In addition, as a practical matter, it
simply does not make sense for the
People's Republic of China to do any-
thing which would try and solve the
problem of the ultimate resolution in
anything other than a peaceful fashion.

The outreach of this new government
in the People's Republic of China has
been clear in that it is seeking to estab-
lish better relationships with the United
States and with other nations through-
out the world. It would be totally in-
consistent for them to take action
which is contrary to what we have indi-
cated is of essential importance to us.

Q. Are you suggesting that the
people of Taiwan are going to go on
living about the same, with about the
same amount of autonomy, the only
difference being that we won't have
an embassy there?

A. Insofar as the people of Taiwan
are concerned, their relationships with
the United States will continue in the
cultural, trade, and other areas. We
will have no official mission there; we
will have an unofficial office there that
will deal with these matters. But in-
sofar as our day-to-day relationships
would be concerned in trade, com-
merce, and the like, they will continue
as they were before.

February 1979

13

Q. The United States met three
demands of China: We severed dip-
lomatic relations; we are going to
remove our forces; and we are going
to cancel the defense treaty, in ex-
change for which we issued our ex-
pectation that the issue would be re-
solved peacefully, and we retain the
right to sell arms.

You have said we expect it to be
solved peacefully and that was not
contradicted. Did we ask Peking to
do more than not contradict that but
to positively affirm that it would be
resolved peacefully?

A. As you know, the discussions
with respect to the Taiwan issue have
been going on for many years, in three
different Administrations. The Chinese
have made it very clear all along that
they will not state that the resolution of
the problem is a problem for anybody
else to determine other than them.
They say it is an internal problem. We
stated very clearly what our expecta-
tions were, and they have not con-
tradicted that.

Q. On the matter of selling arms to
Taiwan, is the Administration pre-
pared to say it will sell an adequate
supply of arms to Taiwan for how-
ever long as is necessary to insure
that the resolution of the dispute will
be peaceful?

A. I would like to be very clear on
this. We have said that we will con-
tinue to supply arms to the people of
Taiwan in the future. The arms to be
supplied during 1979 will be arms
which are already in the pipeline. In
the post- 1979 period we will be meet-
ing new orders that come in: but they
will be limited to defensive-type
weapons, those that would not tend to
destabilize the peace in the area.

Q. In 1975 your predecessor was
trying to arrange the Sinai II agree-
ment by which further separation of
forces would go on between Egypt
and Israel, and there was a period in
March where the thing seemed to
break down and we were in a holding
pattern for about 6 months. And
then in September essentially the
same deal was made as rejected by
the Israelis in March.

Is there a parallel in the situation
we are in now? Are we going to have
to have a cooling off period followed
by a resumption and essentially the
same deal being struck?

A. I think that the suggestions which
I took with me to Jerusalem were con-
structive suggestions. As I indicated,
two of them are simply clarifications. I
think those clarifications ought to be

able to be worked out between the
parties.

The question with respect to the
West Bank-Gaza letter is one which has
as its most difficult issue and, really.
the only substantive issue; whether or
not there will be the specification of a
target date, not a fixed date but a target
date, for the accomplishment of the
elections and inauguration of the self-
governing authority. It seems to me
this should not be a problem the parties
can't resolve.

Q. When we were in the Middle
East a few days ago, there were some
indications that at least some of the
Israeli Cabinet members were
theoretically prepared to accept a
target date and that the fact that it
didn't go through the Cabinet was
belied to some extent by the ex-
pressed willingness of the Israeli
Government to consider new ar-
rangements. Is that an opening, an
opening toward the resolution of that
question of the target date?

A. I hope that is what it means.
There was, as you indicate, in the
statement issued by the Cabinet an in-
dication that with respect to that par-
ticular letter they were prepared to
have further discussions; and I hope
that that means there is a willingness to
discuss the question of the target date.

Q. Can all this be boiled down
then to the status of being the timing
of sending an ambassador to Israel
against the timing of an autonomy
election in the West Bank?

A. That, I think, is the most difficult
issue, as I see it, in the aftermath of the
discussions which I had. And I would
come back to the basic nature of the
problem there. This is the question of
the bargain that had tentatively been
struck before but fell apart when the
accelerated withdrawal could not take
place, and then the quid pro quo for
that was withdrawn. I think that is the
most difficult of the issues, yes.

Q. The Israelis have accused the
United States of one-sidedness as
between Israel and Egypt. A moment
ago you mentioned several modifica-
tions in the treaty favored by the
Egyptians and made them sound
rather reasonable. Do you feel that
Israeli inflexibility is a major factor
in the breakdown of the negotia-
tions?

A. I feel that the proposals that I
took to Jerusalem were reasonable pro-
posals. I so stated. I think it is the duty
of a mediator not only to move between
the parties and try and find a way to
bridge the gaps between them but also.

when we see either of them taking a
position which we think is a reasonable
position, to state it as a reasonable po-
sition. And that is what we have done.
I think and hope there will be further
consideration of the proposals which I
took and that the discussions will be
able to get started again.

Q. By implication are you stating
that you don't feel the Israelis are
now in a reasonable position?

A. I think that I was saddened, let
me say, at the fact and disappointed
that the proposals were apparently
turned down so flatly at the end of my
trip.

Q. After conversations with the
President, the Senate Majority
Leader, Robert Byrd, said that the
Congress might deny aid to Israel if
they continue to put settlements in
occupied territory. Is the Adminis-
tration supporting this kind of pres-
sure on Israel?

A. Senator Byrd is a very distin-
guished Majority Leader of the Con-
gress. When he returned from his trip
to the Middle East, he made this public
statement with respect to the question
you have mentioned. Those reflect his
views as the Majority Leader. He is not
speaking for the Administration with
respect to that.

We have said with respect to the
question of settlements that we con-
sider this to be a fundamental issue and
one in which we disagree with the
Government of Israel. We believe that
the establishment of settlements is il-
legal, but when Senator Byrd was
speaking he was speaking for Senator
Byrd, not for the Administration.

Q. On the subject of the alleged
illegality of the settlements, the State
Department recognizes indeed as its
basis of negotiations in southern Af-
rica the authority of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice with regard to
Namibia. There are those who argue
that the principle implicit in that
negotiating basis, applied to the con-
tinuing validity of the Palestine man-
date, indicates clearly that the set-
tlement of the Jews in the West Bank
is permissible until the unallocated
portion of the Palestine mandate is
allocated through negotiations.

Isn't there a conflict between your
acceptance of the principle in south
Africa and your rejection of it in the
Middle East?

A. No, there is not. I think this is
clearly covered by the provisions of the
Geneva IV conference which dealt with
the question of the establishment of
settlements in occupied territory. We

14

Department of State Bulletin

EAST ASIA: U.S. Role in its Stability

On January 15, 1979, the Depart-
ment of State held a special briefing for
chief executives and other senior offi-
cials from member firms of the Na-
tional Council for U.S. -China Trade
and the US A I ROC Economic Council.
Addressing this group were Secretary
Vance, Treasury Secretary W . Michael
Blumenthal, Commerce Secretary
Juanita M. Kreps, and Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Zbigniew Brzezinski.

SECRETARY VANCE'

I am delighted that so many of you
have joined us today. I particularly
want to thank the two main business
organizations represented here, and
especially their leadership, for their
efforts in advancing public under-
standing of a major foreign policy
issue. Both Councils have played — and
will continue to play — important roles
in strengthening our economic
relations.

It is now 1 month since the President
announced that the United States and
the People's Republic of China had
reached agreement on the establishment
of full and normal diplomatic rela-
tions.2 Today I would like to share
with you some of the background
leading up to the President's historic

decision and outline what we believe it
means for the United States and for the
world.

Few other foreign policy issues have
so long divided Americans as "the
China question." In the 1930's,
Americans became deeply aware and
often passionately concerned with the
tragedy and suffering of China. In the
early 1940's, our two nations fought
together against the Axis Powers. In
the late 1940's we tried — ultimately
without success — to help the two sides
in the Chinese civil war find a peaceful
settlement to their conflict.

Relations between the People's Re-
public of China and the United States
reached a nadir in the 1950's. Our ar-
mies clashed in Korea, and at home the
China issue left a deep mark on the
domestic political landscape. One of
the tragedies of that period was the de-
struction of the careers of some out-
standing Foreign Service officers be-
cause they reported events in Asia as
they saw them.

The impasse in our relations with
Peking persisted despite the emergence
during the 1960's of incontestable evi-
dence of serious rivalry between the
Soviet Union and China. The United
States, enmeshed in military involve-
ment in Southeast Asia, and China,

Interview (Cont'd)

have examined this on a number of oc-
casions and have had, through many
Administrations — several Adminis-
trations— a clear legal view that the es-
tablishment of the settlements is illegal.

Q. We have heard the SALT II
negotiations are not "in the bag," so
to speak. We have also heard it said
that the new opening toward the
People's Republic of China shouldn't
have any effect on that search for an
accommodation on arms. How do we
know that? How do we know that (1)
it won't have any effect on SALT and
(2) it won't have any effect on the
Russians seeking a broader influence
throughout the Middle East and the
gulf states, perhaps in reaction to an
American-Chinese coming together?

A. I have discussed the question of
our relationships with China from time
to time with the senior officials of the
Soviet Union, as I have vice versa with
respect to our relationships with China,
with them. They have indicated to me

that they expect, as we have said, that
one of our objectives is to normalize
relations with the People's Republic of
China. When we notified them the
other day that this was to take place,
they were not surprised.

I think they have expected all along
this would happen. So I do not think it
is going to have any effect upon the
negotiations which we are going to be
picking up again in our meetings in
Geneva with Foreign Minister
Gromyko.

Insofar as those negotiations are
concerned, we have made progress
since Foreign Minister Gromyko and I
last met. There are still unresolved
questions; but, on the basis of the
progress we have made to date, I hope
we can make still further progress and
lay the framework for a conclusion now
of a SALT II agreement. □

1 Press release 458 of Dec. 17, 1978.
2For text of the Presidents statement of Dec.
15, 1978, see Bulletin of Jan. 1979, p. 25.

preoccupied with the Cultural Revolu-
tion, were unable to make progress to-
ward overcoming our differences.

The year 1971 marked the beginning
of a new phase. Across a vast gulf of
misunderstanding and mutual distrust,
the Governments of Peking and the
United States began a dialogue, start-
ing with Henry Kissinger's dramatic
trip to Peking in 1971 and President
Nixon's visit in 1972. The Shanghai
com m,u nique of that year set a
framework for our new relationship.3

But that dialogue was incomplete.
The United States still formally recog-
nized the Republic of China — whose
defacto control encompassed only
Taiwan and a few adjacent islands — as
the legal Government of China. De-
spite this, we were able to begin con-
tacts and ultimately, in 1973, even es-
tablish Liaison Offices in Washington
and Peking. But the nature of the re-
lationship with Peking remained lim-
ited in scope and depth by the political,
legal, and economic implications of our
lack of mutual recognition.

Nonrecognition — the delicate state in
which we dealt with Peking in the 6
years after the Shanghai communi-
que— presented daily practical prob-
lems. Although both sides made major
efforts to minimize these limitations,
they became increasingly inhibiting.
Discussions with the Chinese often
foundered on the fact that in the ab-
sence of recognition, many activities
either could not proceed at all or had to
be conducted at a low level. Contacts
were constrained, including those that
might have produced greater under-
standing on global issues. Trade was
limited, and opportunities often would
go elsewhere. Legal problems hung
over commercial transactions because
of American claims and frozen P.R.C.
assets dating back to 1950. More im-
portantly, not to try to move forward
would have been to risk moving
backward — and backward movement in
U.S. -Chinese relations would have
caused serious damage to our global
position.

So even before he was inaugurated,
President Carter made his first China
decision. In an act of continuity with
two previous Presidents, he reaffirmed
the Shanghai communique as the basis
for our relationship and specifically
reaffirmed its commitment to work to-
ward normal relations.

We were not at all certain at that

February 1979

time that we could, indeed, reach that
ultimate goal. But we felt it essential to
try, and we were prepared to take as
much time as was necessary to achieve
it on an acceptable basis.

With this in mind, we began discus-
sions within the Administration, as
well as an intensive series of consulta-
tions both with Members of Congress
and with a wide cross-section of
American businessmen, scholars, and
others. From our consultations and re-
view, two central thrusts, and several
specific concerns, emerged.

These basic thrusts could not have
been clearer. On the one hand, a sub-
stantial majority of Americans wished
to see the United States and the
People's Republic of China establish
diplomatic relations; but at the same
time, an equally large majority had
deep concerns about Taiwan's future
prosperity, security, and stability. We
shared these concerns. The President
decided that we would only establish
diplomatic relations with Peking if
such an action could be accomplished
in a way that did not damage the well-
being of the people on Taiwan or re-
duce the chances for a peaceful settle-
ment of the Taiwan question by the
Chinese themselves.

Beyond these basic considerations,
several specific concerns emerged.

First, there was widespread and
legitimate concern over Peking's in-
sistence that prior to normalization the
United States must unilaterally abro-
gate the Mutual Defense Treaty with
Taiwan rather than terminate it in ac-
cordance with its own provisions, to
which the United States and Taiwan
had agreed in 1954. Furthermore, we
wished to establish that after normali-
zation, even in the absence of diplo-
matic relations with Taiwan, all other
agreements and treaties would remain
in effect.

Second, we shared with Congress
and the American public a deep con-
cern over the strong assertions by
Chinese officials concerning their right
to "liberate" Taiwan in any way they
saw fit. From an American point of
view, the peaceful settlement of the
Taiwan issue by the Chinese them-
selves was of critical importance; we
could not move forward if Peking con-
tinued to talk and think about the
Taiwan issue in such inflammatory
terms.

Third, a consensus rapidly emerged,
inside and outside the government, that
it was essential that we continue a wide
range of relations with the people on
Taiwan on a nongovernmental basis
after normalization. In particular, these
postnormalization relations would have

MESSAGE TO

PREMIER HUA GUOFENG,

JAN. 1*

Today, after a generation of isolation
from each other, the United States of
America and the People's Republic of
China establish full diplomatic relations
between our governments. The cause of
world peace will be served by this his-
toric act of reconciliation.

The estrangement of our peoples has
sometimes produced misunderstanding,
confrontation and enmity. That era is be-
hind us. We can now establish normal
patterns of commerce, and scholarly and
cultural exchange. Through common ef-
fort, we can deepen the new ties of
friendship between our peoples, and we
can jointly contribute to the prosperity
and stability of Asia and the Pacific
region.

Precisely because our two countries
have different traditions, cultures, and
political and economic systems, we have
much to gain from each other. The United
States prizes the great variety of opinions
and origins among its own citizens.
Similarly, the United States desires a
world of diversity in which each nation is
free to make a distinctive contribution to
express the manifold aspirations, cul-

tures, traditions, and beliefs of mankind.

The American people value the enor-
mous contributions the Chinese people
have made to the achievements of hu-
manity. And we welcome the growing in-
volvement of the People's Republic of
China in world affairs. We consider
China as a key force for global peace.

We wish to cooperate closely with the
creative Chinese people on the problems
that confront all people.

Your Excellency, in our country, the
first day of the New Year is a time of re-
dedication and resolve. In that spirit, we
pledge during the coming years:

• To continue as an enlightened Asian
and Pacific power, determined to help
maintain peace and stability in the region;

• To enrich the lives of our peoples,
both spiritually and materially, through
expanded trade, tourism, and student and
cultural exchanges, and cooperation in
the sciences, all on a basis of equality and
mutual benefit; and

• To extend our hands across the
Pacific to you in friendship and peace.

Jimmy Carter

"Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Jan. 8. 1979.

15

to include continued sale of defensive
weapons to Taiwan.

With these priorities emerging, I
visited Peking in August of 1977, and
Dr. Brzezinski went there in May of

1978. We found a newly confident
leadership emerging in Peking as a
period of intense internal turmoil sub-
sided. We found many points of com-
mon interest on global matters, al-
though on some important issues we
continued to have differences. Our dis-
cussions on normalization were of an
exploratory nature. These overall dis-
cussions reinforced our view that a
strong, secure, and peaceful China was
in the interest of world peace.

In the early summer. President Car-
ter instructed Ambassador Leonard
Woodcock, Chief of the Liaison Office
in Peking, to begin a series of presen-
tations outlining our views on normali-
zation. In five meetings, Ambassador
Woodcock laid out the American
position.

On September 19, President Carter
met with the new head of the Chinese
Liaison Office in Washington, Ambas-
sador Chai Zemin. Involving himself
directly in the discussions for the first
time, the President told the Chinese
that we were ready to normalize rela-
tions if our concerns about the future
well-being of the people on Taiwan
were met.

In completing his presentations on
November 4, Ambassador Woodcock
indicated to the Chinese that we would
be willing to work toward a January 1.

1979, target date for normalization if
our concerns were met. The Chinese
began their response in early De-
cember. In mid-December, negotia-
tions intensified with Vice Premier
Deng Xiaoping becoming personally
involved. Finally, on December 14, we
reached agreement that met our funda-
mental concerns, and the announce-
ment of our decision to establish
diplomatic relations was made on
December 15.

We have been able to establish full
diplomatic relations with the People's
Republic of China in a way that pro-
tects the well-being of the people on
Taiwan. The importance of this is fully
reflected in the arrangements that we
have been and will be establishing.

First, the United States will not ab-
rogate the Mutual Defense Treaty.
Rather we have given notice that we
will exercise our right to terminate the
treaty with Taiwan in accordance with
its provisions, which permits termina-
tion by either party after 1 year's
notice. All other treaties and agree-
ments will remain in effect.

16

Second is the critical question of the
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan
question by the Chinese themselves. It
is clear from the actions and statements
of the P.R.C. in the last month that
normalization has, in fact, enhanced
the possibilities that whatever the ulti-
mate resolution of the issue may be, it
will be pursued by peaceful means.

Since the normalization of relations,
the P.R.C. has adopted a markedly
more moderate tone on the Taiwan
issue.

• On January 9 of this year, Vice
Premier Deng told Senators Nunn,
Glenn, Hart, and Cohen that: "The so-
cial system on Taiwan will be decided
by the people of Taiwan. Changes
might take 100 years or 1,000 years.
By which I mean a long time. We will
not change the society by force."

• On New Year's Day, after 25
years, the P.R.C. ceased firing prop-
aganda artillery shells at the offshore
islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

Third and finally, after the termi-
nation of the Mutual Defense Treaty on
December 31, 1979, we will continue
our previous policy of selling carefully
selected defensive weapons to Taiwan.
While the P.R.C. said they disap-
proved of this, they nevertheless
moved forward with normalization with
full knowledge of our intentions.

In constructing a new relationship
with the people on Taiwan, we are
taking practical steps to insure con-
tinuity of trade, cultural, and other un-
official relations. The President has
taken steps to assure the uninterrupted
continuation of such relations from
January 1, 1979. In the future these
relations will be conducted through a
nonprofit nongovernmental corporation
called the American Institute in
Taiwan. This corporation will facilitate
ongoing and, we are confident, ex-
panding ties between the American
people and the people on Taiwan.
Taipei will handle its unofficial rela-
tions with this country in similar fash-
ion.

Let me say a word or two about the
American Institute in Taiwan, the
legislation it requires, and its opera-
tions. Congress will be asked to ap-
prove an omnibus bill that will
authorize the funding of the American
Institute in Taiwan and confirm its au-
thority to act in a wide range of areas. I
hope we will have your active support
for expeditious passage of that bill.

The institute will have its headquar-
ters in Washington with field offices in
Taiwan. It will provide the full range
of commercial and other services that

MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT CARTER,
JAN. 1

On behalf of the Chinese Government
and people and in my own name, I wish
to extend warm congratulations to you,
Mr. President, and through you to the
U.S. Government and the American
people on this occasion of the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations between the
People's Republic of China and the
United States of America.

I believe that the establishment of dip-
lomatic relations between China and the
United States is a historic event in our
bilateral relations, which not only accords
with the fundamental interests of the
Chinese and American peoples but will
exert a favorable influence on the inter-
national situation. I am confident that it
will also open up broad vistas for the
deepening of the friendship between the
Chinese and American peoples and the
good relations between the two countries.

Hua Guofeng

Premier of the State Council

People's Republic of China

have been previously provided through
official channels to businessmen, both
from the United States and from
Taiwan. In your private business deal-
ings on Taiwan, you may freely contact
the institute's staff for advice or can
deal directly with local firms and the
authorities there. In short, we see no
change necessary in the way private
American business has been conducted
on Taiwan up to now. Eximbank loans,
OPIC [Overseas Private Investment
Corporation] guarantees, and other im-
portant arrangements will continue.

With these new arrangements in
place, we expect Taiwan to continue to
prosper. Taiwan's dynamic economic
growth is one of the most impressive
stories of the last decade; it is now our
eighth largest trading partner, and per
capita income is among the highest in
Asia.

As anyone who has studied the issue
can attest, normalization of relations
with Peking was not an easy step to
take. The difficulties always argued for
themselves, and further delay was al-
ways an inviting option for any Presi-
dent. But we all recognized that sooner
or later we would have to move. As I
have already said, failure to try to
move forward would have left us in
danger of moving backward — at great
cost to our global position. By the time
we took the decisive step, every other
member of NATO, our two treaty
partners in ANZUS [Australia and New

Department of State Bulletin

Zealand], and Japan had long since
recognized the P.R.C, as had most
other nations of the world. They were
ready for our action — and most of
them, including all the members of the
Association of South East Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN), applauded it.

When we acted, we did so in a way
that enhances significantly the pros-
pects for stability and peace in Asia
and the Pacific. We acted in a way that
will move us toward our objective of a
stable system of independent nations in
Asia and that will also increase the
chances of maintaining a stable
equilibrium among the United States,
Japan, China, and the Soviet Union.

The United States will continue to
play an active role in order to maintain
that stable equilibrium. For reasons of
geography, history, and economics, we
are as much a Pacific nation as an At-
lantic nation, with deep and abiding
national interests in the region. We will
maintain balanced and flexible military
forces in the region, as the recent suc-
cessful conclusion of the base agree-
ments with the Philippines so clearly
demonstrates. And we will not hesitate
to act, as required, to protect our vital
national interests.

The rapidly expanding relations be-
tween our two nations in science,
trade, and exchanges require the kind
of structure that diplomatic relations
can provide. It will allow a much freer
exchange between our cultures. And
with full relations, we are in a far bet-
ter position to encourage China's role
as a constructive member of the world
community. We will be discussing all
of these matters with Vice Premier
Deng when he visits us in 2 weeks.

It is particularly useful on this occa-
sion to note some of the economic
benefits we expect to flow from the
establishment of diplomatic relations
with the P.R.C. These include our par-
ticipation as a regular supplier of ag-
ricultural commodities to China; the
ability of U.S. exporters to compete on
an equal basis with other suppliers; and
the resumption of shipping, air, bank- i
ing, and other normal economic rela-
tions with China.

Let me emphasize that in normaliz-
ing relations we acted in a way that
does not threaten any other nation but
can increase the sense of community of
nations that we seek to encourage.

We believe that China has an im-
portant role to play in the search for
global peace and stability. The same is
true for the Soviet Union. Our national
interests are best served when we seek
to improve relations with both nations I
while protecting our vital strategic
interests. This was the case during the
late winter and spring of 1972, a period

February 1979

during which both the Shanghai com-
munique and SALT I were achieved.
Equilibrium and stability, not isolation,
are our strategic objectives. For this
reason, we also look forward to the
early conclusion of the SALT agree-
ment with the Soviet Union and to im-
provement of our trade relations with
the Soviets as well as the Chinese.

In conclusion, let me urge you to
support the President's decision and the
legislation to continue relations with
the people on Taiwan. We seek your
support in explaining the strategic and
historic necessity of this action. And
we encourage you to develop greater
trade and contact with both the
People's Republic of China and the
people on Taiwan.

It was just short of 7 years from the
Shanghai communique to normalization
of relations. Through a difficult period,
two great nations began to restore con-
tact and shape a new relationship. We
all recognize that a new era is upon us.
Opportunities previously denied to us
have now begun to take shape.

The nations grouped in and around
the world's largest ocean — the
Pacific — contain close to half the
world's population. These nations must
decide whether to choose the path of
greater cooperation and growth or to
enter into a period of unresolved strug-
gles for influence.

For our part, the United States will
enter the closing decades of the 20th
century ready to play a leading role in
the search for peace and economic
well-being. The lack of diplomatic re-
lations between the United States and
China was an obstacle to progress for
many years. Having now surmounted
it, we face the tremendous challenge
ahead with a sense of excitment and
hope.

SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL4

I am extremely pleased to be here
today before this unprecedented
gathering of American business leaders
representing the promise of our new
economic ties with China and our con-
tinuing economic ties with Taiwan.

It is particularly important to meet
with you now. At this historic time in
our relationship with China, when we
have normalized our political relation-
ship, we now have the equally chal-
lenging task of normalizing our eco-
nomic relationship. You have all heard
Secretary Vance's description of how
these events unfolded and what it
means to us politically. It is our
task — yours as businessmen and mine
as a government official — to complete
this process on the economic front.

China's ambitious economic goals to
spur modernization and its recent
liberalization of foreign trade and fi-
nance policies have marked an "open-
ing to the West" which has invited
Western governments and private in-
dustry alike to take advantage of its
numerous commercial opportunities.
We have gotten off to a late start in this
game, but we now have the opportunity
at least to begin making up lost ground.

Obviously we still have many obsta-
cles to overcome. A normal economic
relationship between China and the
United States is hindered by such is-
sues as the claims/assets problem and
absence of MFN [most-favored-nation]
and credit facilities. In the coming
weeks and months we will be addres-
sing the entire range of our bilateral
economic relationship — not only the is-
sues I have just mentioned but other
important issues, indeed the whole
range of issues that form the basis of an
economic relationship between two na-
tions.

These questions involve a whole host
of complicated legal and legislative is-
sues. The settlement of the claims issue
in particular will require some time and
careful consultation with the Congress

MESSAGE TO

VICE PREMIER DENG

XIAOPING, JAN. 1*

On this New Year's Day, I welcome
the establishment of full diplomatic rela-
tions between the United States of
America and the People's Republic of
China.

New tasks now await us. The new
Sino-American relationship offers great
potential benefit to the welfare of our
peoples, to the promotion of peace and
prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, and
to stability throughout the world.

The American people — and I
personally — look forward to your forth-
coming visit to the United States. In
Washington, we can talk seriously with
each other about both global and bilateral
matters.

Together, we can seize the opportunity
your visit affords us to foster a construc-
tive and enduring relationship between
our two peoples. To that end, Mrs. Carter
joins me in wishing you and Madame Zhuo
Lin a Happy New Year, and we look for-
ward to greeting you in the United States.

Jimmy Carter

*Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Jan. 8. 1979.

17

as well as the Chinese. Our goal is to
accomplish appropriate compensation
for our claimants. This will take time
and will require patience. Neverthe-
less, I am encouraged by the responses
I have met so far and am optimistic of
the eventual outcome.

In striving for the normalization of
trade with China, the Administration
realizes the need for balance in its re-
lations with others. The present legisla-
tion that governs the granting of
most-favored-nation status to all na-
tions must be applied evenhandedly;
we cannot afford to improve relations
with one trading partner at the expense
of a deterioration of relations with
another. The United States needs to
expand its exports to all countries. We
are striving to reduce our balance-of-
payments deficit and to fortify the U.S.
dollar. And to this end, we need your
help. The American business commu-
nity needs trade: the Carter Adminis-
tration wants it. We can ill-afford to
cast a blind eye to the vast potential
for exports provided by the Chinese,
the Soviet, or any other market as long
as those exports take adequate account
of our legitimate national concerns.

It is to expedite the development of
an economic relationship with
China — as well as to participate in the
first official exchange of ambassa-
dors— that President Carter has asked
me to lead a delegation of our top fi-
nance and trade people to Beijing
[Peking] in late February.

My trip is part of a comprehensive
and coordinated effort. Vice Premier
Deng visits the United States at the end
of this month. In providing the oppor-
tunity to exchange preliminary views on
our future economic relationship, his
visit here will form the basis for my
trip. Hopefully this will lead to sub-
stantial progress toward a claims/assets
settlement and a dialogue on broader
economic matters while I am in China.
We would anticipate continuing this
dialogue after my trip. Secretary
Kreps, who will go to China in late
April, will pick up the ball at that
point, continuing and initiating new
discussions on trade and commercial
matters.

While moving forward with our new
economic ties with the People's Re-
public of China, I want to assure you
that our commercial commitments with
Taiwan have had our highest priority.
These are essential. The Administra-
tion's fundamental aim is to insure
continuity, stability, and growth in
these economic ties, which now en-
compass over $500 million of U.S. pri-
vate direct investment and roughly $7
billion in two-way trade. The Presi-
dential memorandum issued on

18

December 30 provides for the continu-
ation of all current programs, agree-
ments, and arrangements with Taiwan,
and we will introduce legislation to
make provision for the continuation of
unofficial relations.

Taiwan is one of the most striking
examples in the world today of suc-
cessful rapid economic development.
This very impressive growth has been
achieved through the efforts of a strong
private sector and enlightened official
policies. Thus, as other important
trading partners have shifted diplomatic
recognition from Taipei to Beijing,
trade and other commercial relations
with Taiwan have continued to
flourish. There is every reason to ex-
pect that economic relations between
the United States and Taiwan will con-
tinue to expand.

We are entering a dramatic and ex-
citing new era in our China relation-
ship. The opportunity is before us to
create new and vital economic ties with
a China that is bent on entering the
front ranks of the world's economic
powers by the end of the century — and
at the same time expand our commer-
cial ties with the prosperous and thriv-
ing economy of Taiwan. As long as we
approach this opportunity realistically,
work together, and help each other in
support of common goals, I am confi-
dent we will succeed.

SECRETARY KREPS5

Diplomatic recognition, China's in-
creasing involvement in world markets,
and the aggressive response of today's
audience to rising trade opportunities
have ushered in a new era of economic
relations with China. At the same time
the President has acted firmly to
safeguard our important trade and in-
vestment interests on Taiwan. The net
effect of these steps, with government
and business working together, will be
a marked contribution to fulfillment of
our national export policy and im-
provement in our trade and payments
balances.

As you are aware, over the past sev-
eral months, a number of American
companies have concluded significant
agreements or contracts with the
People's Republic of China. These are
auspicious signals for a new stage of
development in Sino-American trade.

We welcome the changes in Chinese
policy which have made such transac-
tions possible. China has adopted am-
bitious modernization plans for indus-
try and agriculture which call for 120
key projects in addition to the upgrad-
ing of selected existing facilities. Of
even greater significance in evaluating

Department of State Bulletin

total market size is the Chinese lead-
ership's clear indication of interest in
importing foreign equipment and
technology.

Our current estimate based on
Chinese plan goals is that the P.R.C.
likely will import $50 billion of com-
plete plant, and the full capital equip-
ment bill could run $70-85 billion in
the period 1978-85. We believe that
U.S. exports to the P.R.C. may total
$10 billion over the next 5 years.

For our trade to achieve its potential,
however, a number of significant hur-
dles must be overcome. Establishment
of normal diplomatic relations was the
necessary first step. At the present
time, U.S. exports to China cannot be
financed by Eximbank credits, and
Chinese exports to the United States do
not receive most-favored-nation tariff
treatment. Extension of these basic
trade facilities will require the settle-
ment of our respective financial claims
and the negotiation of a trade agree-
ment. In addition, such questions as of
export licensing, commercial repre-
sentation, and patent protection, among
others, must be addressed.

We all share a sense of excitement
over the dimensions of this growth in
trade with China. But in our en-
thusiasm and optimism, we should be
realistic. Under the best conditions,
this trade will be highly competitive,
and other industrial trading countries,
utilizing in some cases extremely
low-interest credits, already have won
a significant share of the market. There
are also marked limitations on Chinese
hard currency earning capacity. For
these reasons, the negotiations during
the visit of the Vice Premier will be
very important, as will the further steps
laid out by Secretaries Vance and
Blumenthal.

Perhaps I should comment briefly on
the purposes of my visit to the P.R.C.
which will follow a short time after
Secretary Blumenthal's.

The precise objectives for my trip
will, of course, depend on the progress
we have achieved in the interim. I
shall, of course, follow up on some
matters on which Secretary Blumenthal
will have initiated discussions.

My fundamental goal will be to ob-
tain Chinese agreement on the condi-
tions under which private and
governmentally-sponsored commercial
operations will be conducted. I plan to
discuss various trade facilitation ques-
tions, commercial exhibits, and pres-
entation of technical seminars. On
some of these issues, I expect that
agreement can be reached during my
trip. I hope also to discuss the possible
establishment of a governmental busi-
ness development center in Beijing. In

MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT CARTER,
JAN. 1

I wish to extend to you my warm con-
gratulations on the establishment of dip-
lomatic relations between the People's
Republic of China and the United States
of America.

Both the Chinese and American
peoples are happy over the normalization
of Sino-American relations on the basis
of the Shanghai Communique.

I am looking forward to meeting with
you during my visit to the United States
in late January and bringing to the Ameri-
can .people a message of friendship from
the Chinese people.

Deng Xiaoping

Vice Premier of the State Council

People's Republic of China

addition, agreement should be possible
by then on a number of scientific proj-
ects and exhanges for which the De-
partment of Commerce is responsible.

Judging from the inquiries directed
to our P.R.C. division — running now at
250 calls per day — American business
has been quick to grasp the significance
of these new opportunities. I have dou-
bled the staff available to answer your
inquiries. Revised publications taking
account of the fast changing situation
will shortly be off the presses. We
stand ready to advise and assist you in
your efforts.

At the same time, we recognize the
substantial U.S. business stake in
Taiwan. The Cabinet is operating under
the President's December 30 memoran-
dum directing that, pending new legis-
lation, we maintain our commercial
relations on a "business-as-usual"
basis. My hope and expectation is that
the Presidential memorandum and the
follow-on legislation will lead to con-
tinued rapid growth in our trade and
investment relations with Taiwan.

My optimism about the future of our
trade with Taiwan is based on the solid
experience of our allies. For example,
the trade between Canada and Taiwan
has increased 540% since 1970 when
Canada normalized its relations with
the P.R.C. More recently Japan's has
increased 230% since 1972. Those fig-
ures are impressive evidence that this
change in relationship has definitely
not impeded a dramatic increase in
trade with Taiwan's booming economy.
I should also point out that Taiwan will
continue under the present legislation
to receive all the trade benefits that it

February 1979

now enjoys. These include MFN.
Eximbank privileges, OPIC privileges,
and the present tariff schedule which
governs our trade. We are determined
to take whatever steps are necessary to
see that these healthy important rela-
tions are not jeopardized by this latest
move.

I am heartened by David Kennedy's
[President, USA/ROC Economic
Council] reassurances to the Adminis-
tration regarding the plans of U.S.
business on Taiwan. I think it is clear
from his assessment, as well as other
remarks that we have had from dozens
of businessmen with investments on
Taiwan, that their intentions are to
continue with the sound and healthy
economic ties which have already been
established.

Our gains with the People's Republic
are not at the expense of the people on
Taiwan. I believe firmly that the Presi-
dent's decision has strengthened the
U.S. national interest at all levels. I
think this will become increasingly
evident as our relations unfold in the
future.

Clearly, the Administration is eager
to support your business efforts in the
P.R.C. and on Taiwan. In turn, your
support for the policies necessary to
place our economic relations on a
sound footing is essential. We shall
need to work together if we are to in-
crease our role in this rapidly growing
but quite competitive market. The
gains to American business can be sub-
stantial, as many of you know from
your own experience. We must re-
member that growth in our trade with
China can also be of great value to the
economy, particularly in its favorable
effect on our unfavorable deficit. We
shall look forward to sharing this joint
venture with you.

DR. BRZEZINSKF

My purpose is to place our China
policy in a wider context. As I address
you, a number of troubling develop-
ments dominate the headlines.

• The Shah of Iran is planning to
depart for a rest, leaving behind him a
new administration which will seek to
return tranquility to an unsettled coun-
try in which the United States has an
enormous stake.

• Vietnam has invaded its neighbor,
Cambodia. Through an act of aggres-
sion, it has imposed a subservient re-
gime upon a Cambodian people
wearied of the inhumane, callous rule
of Pol Pot.

• Among the first governments to
recognize the new Vietnamese-
installed regime in Phnom Penh was
Afghanistan, a strategically important
country which borders on Iran and
Pakistan and in which Soviet influence
has increased significantly in recent
months.

• The situation in the Horn of Africa
and in South Yemen, Angola, and
southern Africa remains uncertain, as
Cuban troops continue to promote
Soviet interests.

• Indeed, all the developing coun-
tries in the arc from northeast Asia to
southern Africa continue to search for
viable forms of government capable of
managing the process of moderniza-
tion. Their instability, uncertainty, and
weakness can be exploited and inten-
sified by outside powers.

Balanced against these unsettling de-
velopments, however, are a number of
quieter yet more significant, positive
developments.

• Progress has been made in bring-

MESSAGE TO
FOREIGN MINISTER
HUANG HUA, JAN. 1

The establishment of full diplomatic
relations between the United States and
the People's Republic of China is of ex-
ceptional importance. It renews the ties of
friendship which the people of the United
States have valued for more than two
centuries. It marks the end of a period of
animosity and conflict. It signals the be-
ginning of a new era in which increas-
ingly broad exchanges between our two
countries can consolidate and strengthen
our relationships and contribute to peace
and stability in Asia and throughout the
world.

As we have moved over the last seven

years toward this day, the associations
between our two countries have steadily
grown. Our new relations will enable us
to work together more effectively on the
broad range of bilateral and international
issues which our two countries and all
mankind face in the years ahead. I look
forward to working with you in these
endeavors.

We share a common world, we share a
common interest in peace, and we share a
common dedication to the dignity and
prosperity of our peoples. We dedicate
ourselves in this New Year to working
with the People's Republic of China to-
ward these goals.

Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of State

19

ing peace to the Middle East. The
progress is slow and often painful. But
through the persistent diplomacy of
President Carter and Secretary Vance,
we are, I believe, inexorably moving
toward the realization of the Camp
David accords. We are promoting rec-
onciliation to one of the most volatile
disputes in the world.

• In Latin America, U.S. policy has
undergone significant change, and our
relations with most countries in the re-
gion are at or near all time highs. The
ratification of the Panama Canal
treaties was an historical milestone.

• We have significantly improved
the nature of our relations with black
African countries.

• Our relations with India have
never been better; and we are retaining
our ties of friendship with Pakistan.

• In East Asia, a delicate balance of
power exists favorable to our interests.
We have normalized relations with
China, in part, to consolidate the bal-
ance.

• Such regional organizations as
ASEAN and the Organization of Afri-
can Unity are playing an increasingly
positive role in bringing stability to
their regions.

• In recognition of the growing con-
ventional military capability of the
Soviet Union, we are increasing our
military expenditures — as are our
NATO allies — to make sure our Euro-
pean defenses remain strong.

• While we have not yet managed to
establish a more stable world monetary
and trading system, we have made
progress in recent months in stabilizing
the dollar and in creating a more or-
derly and growing world market
through MTN.

• We will reach a SALT II agree-
ment which will place a cap on the de-
ployment of new and more missiles and
which introduces a note of stability in
the precarious strategic balance be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United
States.

Added to these favorable develop-
ments are those of the spirit. After the
debilitating decade of Vietnam and
Watergate, our people are returning to
their social moorings and exhibiting
their traditional will and idealism.
Worldwide, too, we have once again
assumed the mantle of moral lead-
ership, with the importance we attach
to human rights, nuclear nonprolifera-
tion, and limitation of conventional
arms sales. Certainly as much as and
probably more than any other major
power, the United States is addressing
in a forthright manner the problems of
our age. We remain an innovative soci-
ety and a worldwide source of inspira-
tion.

20

Department of State Bulletin

These positive developments are the
result of the President's commit-
ment— as he enunciated at Notre Dame
more than a year ago — to a policy of
constructive global engagement, a
policy of trying to influence the
changes of our era in directions that are
compatible with our interests and val-
ues. Under that broad heading, we have
crystallized seven fundamental objec-
tives for our foreign policy:

• To enhance our military security;

• To reinforce our ties with our key
allies and promote a more cooperative
world system;

• To respond in a positive way to the
economic and moral challenge of the
so-called North-South relationship;

• To improve relations between East
and West;

• To help resolve the more
threatening regional conflicts and
tensions;

• To cope with such emerging global
issues as nuclear proliferation and arms
dissemination; and

• To reassert traditional American
values — especially human rights.

At the outset, I should note that
American foreign policy confronts a
fundamental analytical question: Are
the issues of the moment which I men-
tioned earlier — Iran, Indochina, the
Horn, Afghanistan — indications of
longer term trends? Do we respond to
these issues not only with the sense of
urgency which is obviously called for
but with a sense of historical despair as
well? Or are the positive developments
more indicative of our era? Should we
continue on course? In short, is an op-
timistic or pessimistic view of history
justified? It seems to me that this issue
underlies the emerging foreign policy
debate in the United States.

Without being Pollyannaish, this
Administration is basically optimistic.
We recognize the future is ours only
with effort. Continued American vigi-
lance, preparedness, and decisiveness
are necessary to grasp the better future
before us. But an optimistic view of
history and of America's future lies at
the heart of this Administration's
foreign policy and of our China policy.

I do not mean to downplay or belittle
the seriousness of the current foreign
policy challenges. Important, indeed
vital, issues are at stake. But in each
situation, we are developing responses
appropriate to the challenges involved.
The United States will suffer occa-
sional setbacks, but we will continue to
be able to offset our losses with gains
elsewhere — such as those that have oc-
curred in recent years in our relations
with India, Egypt, Eastern Europe,
Ghana, the Sudan, and East Asia.

MESSAGE TO
SECRETARY VANCE,
JAN. 1

I wish to extend my warm congratula-
tions to Your Excellency on this occasion
when formal diplomatic relations are es-
tablished between the People's Republic
of China and the United States of
America.

The normalization of Sino-U.S. rela-
tions is of major and far-reaching signifi-
cance. It not only accords with the com-
mon aspiration of our two peoples, but
also contributes to the cause of peace of
the people of Asia and the world.

It is my conviction that our bilateral
relations will make significant progress
on this basis.

Huang Hua
Minister of Foreign Affairs
People's Republic of China

What we emphatically reject are
apocalyptic visions about the future
ability of the United States to pursue
and defend our interests abroad. The
pessimism that one hears from many
quarters conveys a sense of Armaged-
don and of the need to rush to the bar-
ricade at every challenge without
forethought.

Today, we seek neither a world order
based on a Pax Americana nor an order
based on a Soviet-American con-
dominium. Neither order is possible or
just.

Rather, we are in the process of
creating a diverse and stable commu-
nity of independent states. Working
with our traditional allies — for we can-
not do the job alone — we are beginning
to create a framework for wide-ranging
international cooperation involving the
United States, Western Europe, Japan,
and many of the emerging regional
powers such as Mexico, Venezuela,
Brazil, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, India,
and Indonesia. And with the establish-
ment of full diplomatic relations with
the People's Republic of China, we
very significantly increase the scope of
international cooperation.

We wish, of course, to include the
Soviet Union in that framework of
cooperation. Indeed, a fundamental
choice the Soviet Union faces is
whether to become a responsible part-
ner in the creation of a global system of
genuinely independent states or
whether to exclude itself from global
trends and derive its security exclu-
sively from its military might and its
domination of a few clients. We hope
and encourage the Soviet Union to be

cooperative, but, whichever path the
Soviet Union chooses, we will continue
our efforts to shape a framework for
global cooperation based not on domi-
nation but on respect for diversity.

We recognize that the world is
changing under the influence of forces
no government can control. The
world's population is experiencing a
political awakening on a scale without
precedent in its history. The global
system is undergoing a significant re-
distribution of political and economic
power.

The record of the past 2 years
suggests, however, that the United
States need not fear this change. To the
contrary, the record shows that we can
shape this change to our benefit and
attain security in a world of diversity.

Not only does the record of the past
2 years suggest realistic optimism is
warranted. Our own past and the qual- I
ity of our people also encourage confi- I
dence. For our national experience as a I
nation of diverse origins and of change I
speaks to the emerging global condi- |
tion. Not just our wealth, not just our
military might, but our history as a
pluralistic people and our commitment
to the values of freedom and independ-
ence which now stir all of mankind
give us a naturally key role in shaping
the trends of our time.

Given our assessment of history and
the goals of the Administration, these
points should be made about our China
policy.

• We see normalization as having
long-term, historic significance. It
comprises part of our effort to consoli- f
date and improve our relations with all I
the emerging powers in the world. And
none of these powers is more important
than China, with its nearly billion I
people and third largest defense budget
in the world.

• We did not normalize out of tacti-
cal or expedient considerations; rather
we recognized reality. The People's
Republic of China is going to play an
increasing role in world affairs, and it
was important for us to have a con- |
tinuing, broadened, and structured re- <
lationship with this government.

• We recognize that the P.R.C. and
we have different ideologies and eco-
nomic and political systems. We rec-
ognize that to transcend the differences
and to make our new relationship suc-
cessful will require patience, wisdom,
and understanding. We harbor neither
the hope nor the desire that through
extensive contacts with China we can
remake that nation into the American
image.

• Indeed, we accept our differences.
Normalization is an important part of
our global effort to create a stable

;bruary 1979

21

community of diverse and independent
nations. As President Carter stated in
his cable to Premier Hua Guofeng on
January 1: ". . .the United States de-
sires a world of diversity in which each
nation is free to make a distinctive
contribution to . . . the manifold aspi-
rations ... of mankind ... we wel-
come the growing involvement of the
People's Republic of China in world
affairs. "

• We consider China as a key force
for global peace simply by being
China: an independent and strong na-
tion reaching for increased contact with
the rest of the world while remaining
basically self-reliant and resistant of
any efforts by others to dominate it.

• As Vice President Mondale stated
on January 1: "We feel bonds of
friendship, but sentiment alone cannot
bridge the gap between us. What has
brought us together is an awareness of
our parallel interests in creating a
world of economic progress, stability,
and peace."

The community of interest we share
with China is particularly evident in
Asia, where we both desire peace, sta-
bility, and nations free of outside
domination.

East, Southeast, and South Asia is
one of the most important regions of
the world today. The economies of the
area are booming; the people are
dynamic. The United States has great
economic and security interests around
the rim of Asia: in Japan, South Korea,
all the Pacific islands down to the
Philippines, and in Southeast Asia as
well.

To protect our interests, we retain a
strong military presence in the region,
we maintain appropriate weapon sales
throughout the region, and we are pre-
pared to act on our interests should the
need arise.

Few actions will contribute more to
the security and stability of our impor-
tant positions around the rim of Asia,
however, than a constructive involve-
ment with China. As we improve our
relations with Beijing, China will also
wish to keep us involved in the region
and not, as in the past, seek to drive us
away.

For the first time in decades, we can
enjoy simultaneously good relations
with both China and Japan. It is dif-
ficult to overstress the importance of
this fact. Normalization consolidates a
favorable balance of power in the Far
East and enhances the security of our
friends.

Now the Chinese are turning outward
and extending their hand to the West.
We are prepared to respond less in
confidence that in the future their hand

United States,

People's Republic of China

Celebrate Diplomatic Recognition

On January 1 , 1979, to celebrate the
establishment of diplomatic relations
between the United States and the
People's Republic of China, toasts
were exchanged between Ambassador
Chai Zemin, Chief of the Liaison Of-
fice of the People's Republic of China,
and Vice President Mondale in Wash-
ington, and between Ambassador
Leonard Woodcock, Chief of the U.S.
Liaison Office, and Vice Premier Deng
Xiaoping in Beijing (Peking).

AMBASSADOR CHAI ZEMIN

Tonight it is a great honor and plea-
sure for us to have American Govern-
ment officials. Senators, Congressmen,
and friends from various circles spare
your time for attending our reception in
celebration of the establishment of
diplomatic relations between the
People's Republic of China and the
United States of America. First of all,
on behalf of the entire staff of the
Chinese Liaison Office and in my own
name, I'd like to express our warm
welcome and heartfelt thanks to all the
distinguished guests and friends.

This New Year's Day is not only a
traditional holiday but also a great ju-
bilant day of the establishment of the
formal diplomatic relations between the
People's Republic of China and the

United States of America. It is of spe-
cial significance for the Chinese and
American peoples. I would like to avail
myself of this opportunity to extend
festive greetings to all our friends and
the American people, wishing you a
happy New Year and a happy life. May
the friendship between our two peoples
and the new relationship of the two
countries continuously consolidate and
develop.

The realization of normalization of
Sino-U.S. relations is the outcome of
the joint efforts of the leaders, the
Governments, and peoples of the two
countries. Our great leader. Chairman
Mao Zedong, and esteemed Premier
Zhou Enlai in their lifetimes formu-
lated the strategic policy of opening the
door to Sino-U.S. relations and made
sustained efforts to that end.

During the visit of President Nixon
to China in 1972, the Chinese and U.S.
sides issued the Shanghai communique,
thus starting the process of normalizing
relations between the two countries.
President Ford, many U.S. Senators
and Congressmen, and American
friends from all walks of life have all
played their part toward this end.

After President Carter took office, he
said repeatedly that normalization in
accordance with the spirit of the
Shanghai communique was the objec-
tive of the U.S. Government. Through

will remain extended than in the
knowledge that without a reciprocal
gesture, their hand would certainly be
withdrawn. And by developing bonds
of commerce and shared understand-
ing, we reduce the chances of future
animosity.

That is why we have completed the
process of normalization begun by
President Nixon, President Ford, and
Secretary Kissinger.

Normalization, therefore, is an act
rooted in historical optimism and
political realism. This change in our
China policy does not represent retreat
or abandonment of our previous posi-
tions; rather, it reflects our determina-
tion to be globally engaged, to wel-
come diversity, and to shape our
future.

For a generation, we said "no" to
the reality of East Asia. We refused to
recognize reality, we sought to isolate

China, and we lived by myths — with
two wars and with incalculable cost to
the region and to us. Now, we say
"yes" to reality. We are confident that
as an Asian and Pacific power with a
positive relationship with Beijing, we
will significantly contribute to the
peace and prosperity of the American
people and of all peoples in the
region. □

'Press release 13.

2For text see Bulletin of January 1979. p
25.

'For text of the joint communique issued in
Shanghai on Feb. 27, 1972, see Bulletin of
Mar. 20, p. 435.

4Text from Treasury Department press re-
lease.

'Text from Commerce Department press re-
lease.

6Text from White House press release.

22

the concerted efforts of the Chinese and
American sides, this objective has fi-
nally been realized. President Carter,
Secretary of State Vance, and Dr.
Brzezinski have all made valuable
contributions to that goal. For this we
express our great appreciation.

The establishment of Sino-U.S.
diplomatic relations is an event of his-
toric significance. The normalization of
Sino-U.S. relations is not only in con-
formity with the aspiration and inter-
ests of the Chinese and American
peoples but also will certainly play an
active role in combating the expansion
and aggression of hegemonism and up-
holding peace and stability in Asia and
the world.

As is well put by our wise leader
Chairman Hua [Guofeng], the estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations be-
tween China and the United States
"opens up broad vistas for enhancing
the understanding and friendship be-
tween the two peoples and promoting
peace and stability in Asia and the
world as a whole."' As is also well put
by President Carter, the establishment

CHINESE PROPER NAMES

The State Council of the People's Repub-
lic of China has adopted the Chinese
phonetic alphabet (Pinyin) to standardize the
romanization of P.R.C. names and places.
The following is a list of the new spellings
used in this issue of the Bulletin; a more
complete list will be published next month:

Beijing (Peking)

Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-pingl
Hua Guofeng (Hua Kuo-feng)
Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung)
Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai)

of diplomatic relations between China
and the United States "... will be of
. . . long-term benefit to the peoples of
both [the United States and] China and
... to all the peoples of the world."
And "normalization . . . will enhance
the stability of Asia."

The normalization of Sino-U.S. re-
lations constitutes the irresistible his-
torical current representing the feelings
of the people and the general trend of
the situation. The issuance of the joint
communique has gained the broad sup-
port and enthusiastic backing of the
Chinese and American peoples and re-
ceived warm welcome from the peoples
and all the peace-loving countries all
over the world. That is, indeed, the
forceful evidence.

The Chinese and American peoples

are great peoples. There exists a tradi-
tional friendship between them.
January 1, 1979, marks the day when
the Sino-U.S. relations enter a new
stage. At the invitation of President
Carter. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping
will pay an official visit to the United
States in January 1979, the first visit
by a leader of our country to the United
States. This will be another major
political move in the international af-
fairs. It is our firm conviction that as
the time goes by, the friendship of the
Chinese and American peoples and the
good relations of the two countries will
certainly continue to be consolidated
and strengthened.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE

Today marks the establishment of
formal diplomatic relations between the
People's Republic of China and the
United States of America. On behalf of
President Carter and his entire Admin-
istration, I am delighted to be here.

Harry Truman succinctly described
the process that has brought us together
here on this historic occasion: "Men
make history and not the other way
'round. In periods where there is no
leadership, society stands still. Prog-
ress occurs when courageous, skillful
leaders seize the opportunity to change
things for the better."

President Carter, Premier Hua, and
Vice Premier Deng have exhibited
courageous and visionary leadership in
agreeing to establish diplomatic rela-
tions between our two governments on
this day. An abnormal situation that
persisted too long has ended, and the
vision of the Shanghai communique has
been realized. Our two great peoples
are reconciled, and we can enjoy the
prospect of friendship, expanding
commerce, tourism, and cultural and
scholarly exchange between our two
peoples.

The President clearly enunciated his
China policy at Notre Dame University
in May 1977 when he stated: "We see
the American-Chinese relationship as a
central element of our global policy,
and China as a key force for global
peace. We wish to cooperate closely
with the creative Chinese people on
the problems that confront all man-
kind . . . ."

The touchstones of this new and
historic chapter in Sino-American rela-
tions are equality and realism. The
more than 200-year history between
our peoples has too often been charac-
terized by estrangement, misun-
derstanding, and confrontation. As one
of our greatest students of Sino-
American relations has said: Expecta-

Department of State Bulletin

tions of a warm relationship fed by
sentiment went unfulfilled in the harsh
reality of world affairs, and the dashed
hopes led to incriminations and bitter-
ness.

Now our nations have the good for-
tune to be dealing with each other in a
positive spirit and as equals. We wel-
come this, and we recognize that this
new relationship to be successful will
require patience, wisdom, and under-
standing.

Let us recall at the outset, therefore,
that the Chinese and Americans in this
room have different ideologies and
cultures; our political and economic
systems are different. We feel bonds of
friendship, but sentiment alone cannot
bridge the gap between us. What has
brought us together is an awareness of
our parallel interests in creating a
world of economic progress, stability,
and peace.

With a realistic sense of our interests
at stake and with a commitment to a
relationship based on equality and
mutual benefit, I believe today, indeed,
marks the dawn of a new and bountiful
era in Sino-American relations, of an
unparalleled era of peace and stability
in the Asia Pacific region, and of a
constructive contribution by our
peoples to a more just and stable
world.

AMBASSADOR WOODCOCK

Today is an historic day in the rela-
tions between the Chinese and Ameri-
can peoples. The joint communique
which enters into effect today brings to
a close a period of nearly 30 years
marked by the absence of formal dip-
lomatic relations between our two gov-
ernments. The breakdown in communi-
cation between our two countries
interrupted a long tradition of
friendship and mutually beneficial
cooperation between the Chinese and
American peoples and adversely af-
fected the cause of world peace. The
step we are taking today can, in the
words of President Carter, "... bene-
ficially affect the world in which we
live and the world in which our chil-
dren will live. "

To try to acknowledge the role of all
who have contributed to this process
would take many pages. I will simply
note that leaders from both parties in
the United States have recognized the
importance of the goal we are realizing
today. The visit by President Nixon to
China in 1972, and the Shanghai com-
munique which resulted, established a
new basis for seeking to overcome the
legacies from the past that divided us.
President Ford and President Carter

February 1979

both renewed our commitment to the
normalization of relations with the
People's Republic of China. Through
our mutual efforts, we are now able to
concentrate our energies on building
the more permanent and effective in-
stitutions that full diplomatic relations
make possible.

The first day of the new year is a
time for looking to the future. The
American and Chinese peoples share a
common heritage of creativity and of
respect for diligence and hard work.
We believe that today marks the begin-
ning of a new era in our relations that
will contribute to the well-being of
both countries and of all mankind.

We are especially pleased that this
new page in our relations will begin
with the official visit to the United
States by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping.
President Carter and the American
people look forward to welcoming him
to our country.

VICE PREMIER DENG XIAOPING

New Year's Day 1979 is a particu-
larly memorable day for the Chinese
and American peoples. It marks the end
of the prolonged abnormal state in
Sino-U.S. relations and the' fulfilment
of the ardent wish of the two peoples
for the establishment of formal diplo-
matic relations between the two coun-
tries. On this historic occasion, I wish
to convey a message of warm con-
gratulations and cordial greetings from
the Chinese people to the American
people on the opposite shore of the
Pacific.

The normalization of Sino-U.S. re-
lations is an historic event in the annals
of our bilateral relations and a major
event of far-reaching influence in in-
ternational affairs. In announcing the
establishment of Sino-U.S. diplomatic
relations, President Carter said that the
United States did not undertake this
important step for transient tactical or
expedient reasons. I appreciate this
far-sighted view. The Chinese Gov-
ernment has all along regarded Sino-
American relations in a long-term
political and strategic perspective. I
feel certain that the far-reaching influ-
ence the establishment of diplomatic
relations between our two countries
exerts upon the development of our
bilateral relations and upon the defense
of world peace will become more and
more evident with the passage of time.

I will soon be paying an official visit
to the United States at the invitation of
President Carter. I hope that my con-
tacts and talks with the leaders of the
United States and the American people
will further enhance understanding and

23

Diplomatic Relations With the P.R.C*
and Future Relations With Taiwan

President Carter's announcement on
December 15 that the United States and
the People's Republic of China had
agreed to establish full diplomatic rela-
tions was the culmination of long
negotiations begun by President Nixon
and continued by President Ford. In the
Shanghai communique, issued during
President Nixon's visit to Beijing (Pek-
ing) in 1972, the United States ac-
knowledged "... that all Chinese on
either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain
there is but one China and that Taiwan
is a part of China." In that document,
the United States also reaffirmed its
interest in a peaceful settlement of the
Taiwan question by the Chinese them-
selves. The two sides made clear that
normalization of relations was their
common goal.

Soon after coming into office Presi-
dent Carter endorsed the Shanghai
Communique and stated: "... normali-
zation is the goal of our policy. I be-
lieve that the United States and the
People's Republic have common inter-
ests in many places in the world. Given
these and our bilateral interests, I look
forward to strengthened cooperation
between our two countries." The Ad-
ministration's China policy has em-
bodied three aims: (a) to enhance our
consultative relations on matters of
common international concern; (b) to
expand our bilateral relations; and (c)
to establish normal diplomatic rela-
tions. The Administration has been
prepared to move forward in any of
these areas at an appropriate pace,
while making clear that U.S. relations

were not directed against any third
party and that the United States re-
tained an interest in the peaceful and
prosperous future of the people of
Taiwan.

During the past year China, under
the leadership of Premier Hua Guofeng
and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, has
moved rapidly to carry out an ambi-
tious program of modernization and ex-
panded contacts with the West.
Domestically, Beijing has acted to rec-
tify the damage to its political and eco-
nomic structure caused by the cultural
revolution. Chinese leaders have trav-
eled extensively abroad. The P.R.C.
has recently concluded, for example,
economic agreements with the Euro-
pean Community and Japan and a
peace and friendship treaty with Japan.

Our relationships with the P.R.C.
have expanded rapidly in the past 6
months. We have agreed to joint proj-
ects in energy, space, medicine, ag-
riculture, and other fields. The first of
what is expected to be more than 500
Chinese students and research scholars
have begun arriving in this country,
and American students will soon leave
for China. At least six U.S. oil firms
are negotiating with the P.R.C. for co-
operative exploration of China's off-
shore oil reserves. Trade with the
P.R.C. more than tripled this year over
last to exceed $1 billion, and U.S.
grain sales will exceed $500 million.
China's foreign purchases of capital
equipment between now and 1985 are
expected to reach $80 billion.

In August of 1977 Secretary Vance

friendship between our two peoples and
promote our amicable bilateral ties and
cooperation in the scientific-techno-
logical, economic, cultural, and many
other fields.

In marking the establishment of
diplomatic relations between China and
the United States, we deeply honor the
memory of the Chinese people's great
leader, the late Chairman Mao Zedong,
and the esteemed late Premier Zhou
Enlai, who paved the way for the nor-
malization of Sino-U.S. relations. Nat-
urally, the efforts to promote
Sino-U.S. relations made over the
years by former President Nixon,
former President Ford, Dr. Kissinger,
many Senators and Congressmen, and
other friends from all walks of life will
also be remembered. We highly esteem

the valuable contribution made by
President Carter, Dr. Brzezinski, and
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in fi-
nally achieving the normalization of
Sino-American relations.

We would like to express our thanks
to the Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office,
Mr. Woodcock, his predecessors, and
his colleagues for their active efforts
in promoting understanding and friend-
ship between the Chinese and Ameri-
can peoples and the establishment of
diplomatic relations between the two
countries.

In conclusion, I would like to take
this opportunity to express our wel-
come to American friends from the
House of Representatives and the press
who have come to visit China from
afar. □

24

Department of State Bulletin

visited Beijing for exploratory talks on
normalization with the new Chinese
leadership. Secretary Vance also met
with the Chinese Foreign Minister in
New York that fall. He and Dr.
Brzezinski met on many occasions with
the chief of the Chinese Liaison Office
here. During Dr. Brzezinski's visit to
Beijing in May of this year, the United
States indicated that Ambassador
Leonard Woodcock, Chief of the
Liaison Office in Beijing, was ready to
begin serious discussions with Foreign
Minister Huang Hua to see whether
normalization could be achieved on
mutually acceptable terms.

Three Key Issues

Throughout the discussions, the
President felt he had to reach a clear
understanding with the Chinese on
three important issues: (1) unofficial
American presence in Taiwan after
normalization; (2) the substance of the
American commercial, cultural, and
other relations with Taiwan after nor-
malization; and (3) our respective ex-
pectations concerning the future of
Taiwan.

Both sides were aware that the
Taiwan issue was the major stumbling
block to normalization. President Carter
made clear that the Administration
must be confident of a peaceful and
prosperous future for the people of
Taiwan. The President, who personally
approved all instructions to Ambassador
Woodcock, met with the Chinese
Liaison Office Chief, Ambassador
Chai, on September 19. In that meet-
ing, as in other discussions of this vital
matter, the President left no doubt that
Taiwan had to be able to purchase
selected defensive weapons in the
United States.

In early November, we offered the
P.R.C. a draft of a possible joint com-
munique. After further negotiations
Ambassador Woodcock was invited to
meet with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping
on December 13. This was the crucial
meeting. The Vice Premier indicated
that the P.R.C. was prepared to nor-
malize on the basis of a position ac-
ceptable to the United States. After
further discussions, the two sides
agreed on the December 15 announce-
ment.

Joint Communique

The joint communique announcing
the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions reaffirms the principles agreed on
by the two governments in the Shan-
ghai communique, and while acknowl-
edging the Chinese position that there
is but one China and Taiwan is part of

China, states that "... the people of
the United States will maintain cul-
tural, commercial, and other unofficial
relations with the people of Taiwan."
Simultaneously with the communique,
the United States issued a formal
statement expressing its confidence that
the people of Taiwan face a peaceful
and prosperous future and stating that
the United States "... continues to
have an interest in the peaceful resolu-
tion of the Taiwan issue and expects
that the Taiwan issue will be settled
peacefully by the Chinese them-
selves." The parallel Chinese state-
ment, released simultaneously, reaf-
firmed the P.R.C. position that the way
of reunifying the country is "entirely
China's internal affair." It did not,
however, contradict the U.S. stand on
a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan
question.

The United States also declared that
it is terminating the Mutual Defense
Treaty in accordance with the terms of
the treaty, which provides for termina-
tion upon one year's notice by either
party. The United States is not "ab-
rogating" the treaty. The U.S. notice
of intent to terminate the treaty will be
effective January 1, 1979, and the

treaty will cease to be in force on De-
cember 31. 1979.

In the course of negotiations on nor-
malization the United States made clear
its intention to continue the sale of de-
fensive weapons to Taiwan on a re-
strained basis after termination of the
defense treaty. Premier Hua Guofeng,
in his press conference on December
16, stated that the People's Republic of
China could not agree to this, "but
nevertheless, the joint communique
was reached. "

Under the terms of the communique,
formal diplomatic relations between the
United States and the People's Repub-
lic of China will be established on
January 1. 1979. and diplomatic rela-
tions with the Republic of China will
be terminated. On March 1, 1979, the
United States and the People's Repub-
lic of China will establish Embassies in
each other's capitals and exchange
Ambassadors. Remaining U.S. military
personnel in Taiwan — down to about
700 noncombat personnel from the
10,000 there when the Shanghai com-
munique was issued — will be removed
from the island before the end of April.
The whole process of readjusting our
relations with Taiwan will be com-

PRESIDENT'S MEMORANDUM
FOR ALL DEPARTMENTS
AND AGENCIES, DEC. 30*

Subject: Relations with the People on Taiwan

As President of the United States. I have
constitutional responsibility for the conduct
of the foreign relations of the nation. The
United States has announced that on January
1, 1979, it is recognizing the government of
the People's Republic of China as the sole
legal government of China and is terminating
diplomatic relations with the Republic of
China. The United States has also stated that,
in the future, the American people will
maintain commercial, cultural, and other re-
lations with the people of Taiwan without
official government representation and with-
out diplomatic relations. I am issuing this
memorandum to facilitate maintaining those
relations pending the enactment of legislation
on the subject.

I therefore declare and direct that:

(A) Departments and agencies currently
having authority to conduct or carry out pro-
grams, transactions, or other relations with
or relating to Taiwan are directed to conduct
and carry out those programs, transactions,
and relations beginning January 1. 1979. in
accordance with such authority and, as ap-
propriate, through the instrumentality re-
ferred to in paragraph D below.

(B) Existing international agreements and
arrangements in force between the United

States and Taiwan shall continue in force and
shall be performed and enforced by depart-
ments and agencies beginning January 1 .
1979. in accordance with their terms and. as
appropriate, through that instrumentality.

(C) In order to effectuate all of the provi-
sions of this memorandum, whenever any
law. regulation, or order of the United States
refers to a foreign country, nation, state,
government, or similar entity, departments
and agencies shall construe those terms and
apply those laws, regulations, or orders to
include Taiwan.

(D) In conducting and carrying out pro-
grams, transactions, and other relations with
the people on Taiwan, interests of the people
of the United States will be represented as
appropriate by an unofficial instrumentality
in corporate form, to be identified shortly.

(E) The above directives shall apply to and
be carried out by all departments and agen-
cies, except as I may otherwise determine.

I shall submit to the Congress a request for
legislation relative to non-governmental re-
lationships between the American people and
the people on Taiwan.

This memorandum shall be published in
the Federal Register.

Jimmy Carter

Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Jan. 8, 1979.

February 1979

pleted by the end of 1979. Vice Pre-
mier Deng Xiaoping will visit Wash-
ington on January 29.

Future Relations With Taiwan

As the President made clear, the
people of the United States will main-
tain their current commercial, cultural,
and other relations with Taiwan
through nonofficial means, much as
Japan and other countries have done.
Except for the defense treaty, we ex-
pect all other agreements with Taiwan
to remain in force, until any substitute
arrangements are reached. This will
permit the continuation on an unofficial
basis of the many mutually beneficial
relations the American people and the
people of Taiwan now enjoy. Ameri-
cans will continue to travel to Taiwan
to trade, to invest, and to study. Vis-
itors from Taiwan will be able to do the
same.

It is anticipated that all necessary
arrangements will be made, pursuant to
agreement with Taiwanese authorities,
to provide services now being provided
by U.S. officials there. These services
would include receiving applications
for visas and passports and providing
welfare, protection, and similar serv-
ices.

Notwithstanding the establishment of
U.S.-P.R.C. relations, travel and im-
migration between Taiwan and the
United States will continue, and indi-
viduals planning to visit the United
States in the near future will be proc-
essed as before. After January 1, the
date of recognition, consular services
between Taiwan and the United States
will be handled as previously, pending
establishment of nonofficial agencies
by both sides.

An important component of
Taiwan's security has been its ability to
maintain modern military forces and to
have adequate armaments for its self-
defense. Over the years, the United
States has given Taiwan access to
carefully chosen defensive military
equipment. The United States will
continue this policy after the termination
of the defense treaty.

China's self-interest lies in construc-
tive relations with the United States,
Japan, and other nations of the world.
The P.R.C. has a major stake in
avoiding actions that would put those
relationships at grave risk, particularly
as it devotes its primary attention to
modernization. Although China has a
large military force, it is organized and
equipped primarily for land warfare
and defense of the mainland. Fur-
thermore, China has major concerns
about military threats elsewhere.

The economy of Taiwan is sound.

25

Tcfiir«ii-Tli<» /tfitfiffff Defense Treaty

The following is taken from a White
House fact sheet issued on January 5,
1979. '

Background

My constitutional authority in establishing
relationships with foreign countries is clear and
cannot be successfully challenged in court.

1 think that we have more than honored the
terms of the treaty, and I see no basis for a suc-
cessful court challenge. I think what we've done
is right. It's better for our country. It's better for
the people of China. It does not hurt the people
of Taiwan. It's good for world peace [President
Carter interview. Dec. 19, 1978. p. 5]

On December 15. President Carter
announced the United States and the
People's Republic of China would have
full diplomatic relations effective
January 1, 1979. The President gave 1
year's notice of termination of the
Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan.

The Mutual Defense Treaty was
negotiated by the United States and
Taiwan about 6 years after General
Chiang Kai-shek removed his defeated
Nationalist government to Taiwan. The
treaty went into effect on March 3.
1955.

After the President's announcement,
some questions were raised about the
President's authority to terminate a
treaty without the prior advice and con-
sent of the Senate or without congres-
sional action.

Foreign exchange reserves amount to
almost $7 billion, and its people enjoy
the third highest per capita GNP in
Asia. Taiwan's total foreign trade is
forecast at about $23.3 billion for 1978
of which the United States will have
roughly one-third, or $7.3 billion. A
number of leading U.S. corporations
presently do business in Taiwan, and
are expected to continue to do so.
These include such major banks as the
Bank of America, Chase Manhattan
Bank, Citicorp, and American Express;
large U.S. industrial firms include
Ford, RCA, Union Carbide, Zenith,
and Corning Glass. There is every rea-
son to believe U.S. economic ties to
Taiwan will continue to grow. For
example, Japan's trade with Taiwan
grew over 233% since they normalized
relations with the P.R.C; Australia's
grew by 370%; and Canada's by
539%. □

Article 10 of the treaty provides that:
"Either Party may terminate it one year
after notice has been given to the other
Party." It was under this article that
the President issued the 1 year notice of
termination. The treaty makes no refer-
ence to the Senate or Congress, or the
need for approval of the legislative
branch in order for notice to be given
of termination of the treaty.

Administration's Position

The treaty is being terminated in exact con-
formance with the terms of the treaty itself. Had
I cancelled the treaty or abrogated the treaty
preemptorily as of the first day of January —
which was a Chinese request to us. or demand
from us originally — there may have been some
justification for that court challenge. But the
treaty provides that either side can terminate the
effectiveness of the treaty by giving a 1 year
notice. [President Carter interview, Dec. 19.
1978.]

It is the Administration's position,
after considerable research, that the
President's authority to terminate a
treaty derives from the President's au-
thority and responsibility — as stated in
the Constitution — to conduct the na-
tion's foreign affairs and to execute the
laws.

The President is responsible to see
that the terms of a treaty are carried
out. The Administration further be-
lieves that the Senate's power to advise
and consent to a treaty is fulfilled when
the treaty is made. Thereafter, the
execution and performance of a treaty's
terms, including terms relating to its
duration or termination, are delegated
by the Constitution to the President.
Where the treaty provides for the ter-
mination by notice, the President has
the power to give such notice.

The treaty with Taiwan, approved by
the Senate on February 9, 1955, does
not contain reference to congressional
action in the implementation or termi-
nation of the treaty, nor does the
treaty's legislative history indicate the
Senate anticipated prior consultation or
approval before the termination clause
could be used by a President.

Opinions of Various Authorities

Here are opinions expressed by vari-
ous scholars and authorities who have
studied this issue.

Professor Louis Henkin, Hamilton
Fish Professor of International Law at

26

Department of State Bulletin

Columbia University, states in his book
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution
(1972):

Once the Senate has consented, the President is
free to make (or not to make) the treaty and the
Senate has no further authority in respect of it.
Attempts by the Senate to withdraw, modify or
interpret its consent after a treaty is ratified have
no legal weight; nor has the Senate any au-
thoritative voice in interpreting a treaty or in
terminating it.

Dr. Elbert M. Byrd. Jr., of the Uni-
versity of Maryland, has written in his
book Treaties and Executive Agree-
ments in the United States (1960):

. . . from a constitutional view, it is much easier
to terminate treaties than to make them. A
treaty, by definition in constitutional law. can
come into existence only by positive action by
the President and two-thirds of the Senate, but a
simple majority of both Houses with the Presi-
dent's approval can terminate them, and they
may be terminated by the President alone

Professor Laurence H. Tribe, of the
Harvard Law School, has written in his
recently published American Constitu-
tional Law (1978):

Although influenced (often decisively) by con-
gressional action or constitutional restraint, the
President . . . has exclusive responsibility for
announcing and implementing military policy;
for negotiating, administering, and terminating
treaties or executive agreements; for establishing
and breaking relations with foreign governments;
and generally for applying the foreign policy of
the United States.

Mr. Wallace McClure, in his work
entitled International Executive
Agreement (1941), wrote:

It is customary for treaties to carry provisions
laying down the steps to be taken if one of the
participating governments wishes to divest itself
of the obligations which have been assumed; for
instance, a year's notice by one party to the
other or others. But treaties do not specify the
organ of the national government by which such
notice is to be given. In the United States the
Executive gives the notice. Sometimes he has
given it on his own initiative solely.

In treaty making the Senate may be said to act
merely as executive adviser and check against
positive action; negative action, not being feared
by the constitution makers, was left to the re-
pository of general executive power, that is. to
the President.

Professor Myres S. McDougal, Wil-
liam K. Townsend Professor of Law at
the Yale Law School, wrote as follows
in his study with Asher Lans on
"Treaties and Congressional-Executive
or Presidential Agreements: Inter-
changeable Instruments of National
Policy," 54 Yale Law Journal 336
(1945):

. . . termination [of treaties] may be effected by
executive denunciation, with or without prior
Congressional authorization.

Professor Randall H. Nelson, of
Southern Illinois University, in an arti-
cle entitled "The Termination of
Treaties and Executive Agreements by
the United States: Theory and Prac-
tice,'* 42 Minnesota Law Review
(1958) wrote:

Diplomatic practice coupled with judicial opin-
ion demonstrates that the President, as the chief
organ of foreign relations, has the primary re-
sponsibility with respect to the termination of
treaties He may perform this function alone or
in conjunction with the Congress or the Senate.

The late Professor Jesse S. Reeves.
of the University of Michigan, in an
article entitled "The Jones Act and the
Denunciation of Treaties," 15 Ameri-
can Journal of International Law
(1921), stated:

It seems to be within the power of the President
to terminate treaties by giving notice on his own
motion without previous Congressional or Sen-
atorial action. It would seem, on the other hand,
that the President cannot be forced by Congress
or by the Senate to perform the international act
of giving notice.

Professor Westel Willoughby, late of
Johns Hopkins University, wrote in his
work The Constitutional Law of the
United States (1929):

It would seem indeed, that there is no constitu-
tional obligation upon the part of the Executive
to submit his treaty denunciations to the Con-
gress for its approval and ratification although,
as has been seen, this has been done several
times.

Court Decisions

The Constitution does not specif-
ically address the question of treaty
termination.

There have been no court decisions
which passed on the question of the
President's power to act pursuant to
termination provisions of a treaty with-
out Senate or Congressional approval.

Historical Precedent

. . . I'm authorized and directed by the Con-
stitution and my responsibility is to conduct
negotiations of this kind. [President Carter inter-
view, Dec. 19, 1978.]

Here are some examples of Presi-
dential termination of treaties over the
years.

• In 1815 President Madison ex-
changed correspondence with the
Netherlands which has been construed
by the United States as establishing
that the 1782 Treaty of Amity and

Commerce between the two countries
had been annuled.

• In 1899 President McKinley gave
notice to the Swiss Government of the
U.S. intent "to arrest the operations"
of certain articles of the 1850 Conven-
tion of Friendship. Commerce and Ex-
tradition with Switzerland.

• In 1920 President Wilson by
agreement terminated the 1891 Treaty
of Amity, Commerce and Navigation
with Belgium concerning the Congo.

• In 1927 President Coolidge gave
notice of termination of the 1925
Treaty with Mexico on the Prevention
of Smuggling.

• In 1933 President Roosevelt deliv-
ered to the League of Nations a decla-
ration of the U.S. withdrawal from the
1927 multilateral Convention for the
Abolition of Import and Export Pro-
hibitions and Restrictions.

• In 1933 President Roosevelt gave
notice of termination (which was with-
drawn subsequently) of the 1931 Treaty
of Extradition with Greece.

• In 1936 President Roosevelt ap-
proved a protocol (deemed to be notice
of termination) terminating the 1871
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
with Italy.

• In 1939 President Roosevelt gave
notice of termination of the 1911
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
with Japan.

• In 1944 President Roosevelt gave
notice of denunciation of the 1929
Protocol to the Inter-American Con-
vention for Trademark and Commercial
Protection.

• In 1954 President Eisenhower gave
notice of withdrawal from the 1923
Convention on Uniformity of
Nomenclature for the Classification of
Merchandise.

• In 1962 President Kennedy gave
notice of termination of the 1902 Con-
vention on Commercial Relations with
Cuba.

• In 1965 President Johnson gave
notice of denunciation, subsequently
withdrawn, of the 1929 Warsaw con-
vention concerning international air
travel. □

February 1979

Economic and Commercial
Relationships With Taiwan

Foreign Relations Outline'

In recent years Taiwan, with a
population of slightly over 17 million,
has had one of the world's most suc-
cessful developing economies. Per
capita income has grown from subsis-
tence levels in the early 1950's to about
$1,200 in 1978. Enlightened policies
have fostered the rapid development of
economic and social infrastructure. A
strong private sector has prospered
along with many major public sector
enterprises. The economy has shifted
from an agricultural to an industrial
base, and exports of light manufactured
goods have made the island an impor-
tant factor in world trade. This swift
economic transformation is reaching
virtually every stratum of society. Even
by developed country standards,
income distribution is remarkably
equitable.

Taiwan's gross national product in
1978 was about $22 billion, while its
real rate of economic growth during the
year was estimated at 13%. Foreign ex-
change reserves are sufficient to pay
for 6 months of imports. Life expect-
ancy and literacy have nearly attained

the levels of Western countries.

The United States has contributed to
Taiwan's economic growth and moder-
nization more as an important export
market than as a source of foreign aid.
Total U.S. economic assistance to
Taiwan from 1949 — including grants,
loans, and food aid — amounted to only
about $1 .7 billion, or roughly one-third
of our 1978 imports from Taiwan. The
U.S. Agency for International De-
velopment mission in Taipei closed in
1965.

Current Economic Relations
With the U.S.

Trade and other ties between Ameri-
cans and the people on Taiwan have
been increasing substantially in recent
years. Taiwan is now among our top 10
trading partners; in East Asia, it is sec-
ond only to Japan.

• Total U.S. trade with Taiwan in
1978 is estimated at $7.3 billion. Our
exports to Taiwan are less than half the
value of our imports from the island,
making the growing U.S. trade deficit
with Taiwan a serious problem. The

TAIWAN— A PROFILE

Geography

Area: 14,000 sq. mi. (about one-third the

size of Ohio).
Capital: Taipei (pop. 2.2 million).
Other Cities: Kaohsiung (1 million).

Taichung (562.000). Keelung (543.000).

Tainan (537.000).

People

Population: 17 million (1978 est.).
Annual Growth Rate: 2.1% (1977).
Ethnic Groups: Han Chinese 98%, less than

2% aborigines.
Religions: Confucianism. Buddhism.

Taoism. Christianity.
Languages: Mandarin Chinese (official);

local dialects — Taiwanese. Hokkien.

Hakka.
Literacy: 89%.
Life Expectancy: 70 yrs.

Economy

GNP: $23 billion (1978).
Annual Growth Rate: 9.1% (1970-78 aver-
age).

Per Capita Income: $1 .200 ( 1978).
Inflation Rate: 5% (1977 average).

Agriculture: Products — sugarcane, sweet
potatoes, rice, vegetables, asparagus,
mushrooms, citrus fruits, pineapples,
bananas, cassava.

Manufacturing: Types — textile, electronics,
plastics, furniture, other consumer goods,
cement.

Natural Resources: Small deposits of coal,
natural gas. limestone, marble.

Trade (1977): Exports— $9.3 billion: tex-
tiles, machinery, plastics, metal products,
plywood, wood products. Partners — U.S.
($3.6 billion), Japan ($1.1 billion). Hong
Kong ($634 million). Imports — $8.5 bil-
lion: food and raw materials, crude oil.
capital goods. Partners — Japan ($2.6 bil-
lion). U.S. ($2 billion), Kuwait ($685
million).

Official Exchange Rate: 36 New Taiwan
dollars = US $1.00.

Economic Aid: Received — $2.1 billion
(1949-73); $1.5 billion from U.S. (AID
program ended in 1965). Extended —
technical aid to 49 countries since 1961.

27

United States accounts for almost
one-third of Taiwan's total trade and
provides a market for 40% of its ex-
ports. Taiwan's worldwide exports
comprise 48% of GNP; exports to the
United States are 19% of GNP.

• American investment in the island,
based on Taiwan data, exceeds $550
million, or 30% of total foreign in-
vestment there. U.S. companies have
concentrated investments in the electri-
cal and electronics, chemicals and
plastics, and banking and other service
industries. Many leading firms, such as
Ford, IBM. Goodyear, RCA, Zenith.
and Texas Instruments, have invest-
ments on the island, and over a dozen
U.S. banks are represented in Taipei.

• The Export-Import Bank, with
loans and guarantees totaling almost
$1.8 billion, has its third highest expo-
sure worldwide in Taiwan. Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
exposure in Taiwan is nearly $140 mil-
lion.

• In December 1978 a bilateral trade
agreement was concluded with Taiwan.
We obtained important tariff and non-
tariff concessions to balance those that
Taiwan, a beneficiary of most-
favored-nation treatment, will receive
from us following conclusion of the
current round of multilateral trade
negotiations in Geneva. We have other
agreements with the Taiwan authorities
that restrict export to this country of
various categories of textiles, footwear,
and color TV's.

Future Economic Relations
With Taiwan

U.S. diplomatic ties with the
People's Republic of China and the end
of official relations with Taipei are not
expected to have much effect on the
U.S. economic relationship with
Taiwan. The growth in Taiwan's trade
with other countries was not inter-
rupted by severance of relations. In
fact, Taiwan's two-way trade with
Japan, Canada, Australia, and other
countries has since multiplied several
times.

In announcing the decision to recog-
nize and establish diplomatic relations
with the P.R.C.. President Carter
stressed that commercial, cultural, and
other relations will be maintained with
the people of Taiwan. Leaders of the
large resident U.S. business commu-
nity have publicly expressed their in-
tention and that of their companies to
remain in Taiwan.

The staff of the former U.S. Em-
bassy at Taipei will continue to func-
tion unofficially through February
1979. Thereafter, American economic

l/J§. 1 r*ns Sit Irs
to I a in* cm

Department of State Bulletin

FMS commitments, some involving
items not due for delivery until 1983, is
about $500 million.

The following data summarize our
arms sales to Taiwan over the past 5
years:

Foreign Relations Outline '

American interest in the peaceful
resolution of the Taiwan question was a
key element of the U.S. statement in
the February 1972 Shanghai com-
munique and has remained at the heart
of the U.S. position since then.

The Mutual Defense Treaty with
Taiwan will terminate on December 31 ,
1979. However, the United States, in
its unilateral statement of December
15. 1978, declared that it ". . . con-
tinues to have an interest in the peace-
ful resolution of the Taiwan issue and
expects that the Taiwan issue will be
settled peacefully by the Chinese them-
selves."2 This statement was issued
concurrently with the joint com-
munique, recognizing and establishing
diplomatic relations with the People's
Republic of China (P.R.C.). The
P.R.C. was aware in advance of our
position, and their statement, released
simultaneously, did not take issue with
it.

Taiwan (Cont'd)

and commercial interaction with the
people of Taiwan will be facilitated
through a nongovernmental
institute — the American Institute in
Taiwan. The institute, headquartered in
Washington, will establish offices in
Taiwan to provide essential services to
businessmen and others.

Taiwan's future economic well-being
will, therefore, be affected little by the
loss of governmental ties with the
United States. It depends rather on the
health of the world economy and the
ability of major trading partners —
especially the United States — to keep
protectionist forces under control. As
the island's industry moves from light
manufactured goods to more sophisti-
cated production, its people will have
to learn to compete in export markets
long dominated by the more advanced
economies of North America, Western
Europe, and Japan. □

'Taken from a Department of State publica-
tion in the GIST series, released in January
1979. This outline is designed to be a quick ref-
erence aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not
intended as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy
statement.

Peaceful Resolution
of the Taiwan Issue

The P.R.C. has compelling reasons
not to seek a military settlement of the
Taiwan issue. It has a major stake in
avoiding actions that would risk its
constructive relations with the United
States, Japan, and other nations. Fur-
thermore, the P.R.C. does not have —
and for the foreseeable future will not
have — the military capability to take
Taiwan by force.

In an official statement on January 1 ,
1979, the P.R.C. announced an end to
the bombardment of Quemoy and other
islands and proposed talks with the
Taiwan authorities to end military
confrontation and the "artificial ten-
sion" caused by it. It said it was doing
so "to create the necessary prerequi-
sites and a secure environment for the
two sides" in order to make contact,
restore transportation and postal serv-
ices, conduct exchanges, trade, and
cooperate in "reunifying the mother-
land." This statement did not mention
possible forceful "liberation" of
Taiwan, and the P.R.C. pledged to
"respect the status quo on Taiwan" in
"settling the question of reunifica-
tion."

Military Sales

An important component of
Taiwan's security has been its ability to
maintain modern military forces and to
have adequate arms for its self-defense.
Over the years, the United States has
given Taiwan access through foreign
military sales (FMS) and commercial
channels to carefully chosen defensive
military equipment, with particular
emphasis on air and naval defenses.
Despite the P.R.C. 's disagreement, we
will continue to supply such equipment
after termination of the defense treaty,
including provision of follow-on sup-
port for U.S. military equipment pre-
viously transferred.

We are now completing processing
formalities, including the requisite
notification to Congress, for the sale to
Taiwan of those major items of military
equipment approved in 1978. Major
commitments to military sales in
Taiwan include additional F-5E inter-
ceptor aircraft with improved
weaponry, such as precision-guided
munitions and Maverick missiles. We
are also processing FMS and commer-
cial cases for many other previously
committed items. Total value of major

Commercial

Export

FMS

Licenses

($ millions)

($ millions)

FY 1974

Orders

88.7

Deliveries

93.3

8.1

FY 1975

Orders

144.8

Deliveries

115.0

45.0

FY 1976

Orders

324.0

Deliveries

136.5

42.5

FY 1977

Orders

153.0

Deliveries

142.4

46.1

FY 1978

Orders

346.3

Deliveries

131.1

174.5 □

'Taken from a Department of State publica-
tion in the GIST series, released in January
1979. This outline is designed to be a quick ref-
erence aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not
intended as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy
statement.

-For full text, see Bulletin of Jan. 1979, p.
26.

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February 1979

29

Korea cine! the United Sttites
The Era Ahead

by Richard C. Holbrooke

Address before the Far East-
American Council and the U.S. -Korea
Economic Council in New York on De-
cember 6. 1978. Mr. Holbrooke is As-
sistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs. '

Today, for the first time since I
began my present job, I propose to
speak about relations between the
United States and a single nation of
Asia. One reason is that this nation and
our relationship with it have undergone
a fundamental transition in just a few
years' time.

To set the scene and put my sub-
sequent remarks in context, I want first
to review with you the issues which
have strained U.S. -Korean relations
and distorted our perceptions of each
other. I then propose to consider how
we should look at Korea, and at
U.S. -Korea relations, in the era ahead.
This new era, it seems to me, will be
dominated by four main factors:

• The U.S. -Korean alliance
itself — for some time the Koreans have
been making an increasingly important
contribution, while the commitment of
our military power to the security of
the region continues;

• South Korea's emergence as a
country of tremendous economic
dynamism with an enormous potential
for future growth and, we hope, a con-
tinually broadening base of popular
support;

• The shadow still cast by the for-
midable threat from the north,
tempered by the likelihood that the
Communist superpowers would not en-
courage and do not favor a renewed
North Korean attack; and

• The most important — our experi-
ence in recent years in coping with
great difficulties in U.S. -Korea rela-
tions has revealed a reservoir of
strength in the relationship that bodes
well for our ability to solve the prob-
lems of the future.

The Triple Crisis in
Korean-American Relations

In these past few years three serious
issues simultaneously threatened sub-
stantial damage to the Korean-American
relationship. These three issues, which
put extraordinary strain on our relation-

ship with a close ally, were: one, some
misunderstandings over our troop with-
drawal policy; second, the set of scan-
dals often referred to as Koreagate; and
third, human rights.

Troop Withdrawal. When the new
Administration in the spring of 1977
announced its plan for phased with-
drawal of ground combat forces in
South Korea our intentions were
somewhat misunderstood by some
people, both in Northeast Asia and in
the United States. In retrospect, we
perhaps did not adequately explain our
plans at the outset.

Today, these concerns, if not en-
tirely dispelled, have been largely
contained. In both the United States
and Northeast Asia there is a growing
understanding of the Administration's
policy.

Our withdrawals, as outlined by
President Carter, will be limited to our
ground combat troops. An infantry
battalion and some support troops, to-
taling about 3,400 men, are now de-
parting. Two more combat battalions
are scheduled to come out in 1979,
completing the phase one withdrawal
of one brigade of 6,000 men. At the
end of the planned redeployment in
1981 or 1982, about 7,000 U.S. Army
personnel will remain in the Republic
of Korea (R.O.K.), consisting of intel-
ligence, logistics, and communications
personnel, as well as personnel in such
headquarters as the U.N. command
with its armistice responsibilities. An
additional 9,000 Air Force personnel
will remain in country.

The U.S. Congress has approved
President Carter's request for authority
to transfer significant ground force
equipment to the Korean Armed Forces
as U.S. units redeploy to the United
States. The President has also directed
the redeployment to be carried out in a
manner that preserves the military bal-
ance. Should circumstances affecting
security change significantly, we will
assess those changes in close consulta-
tion with Congress, the Republic of
Korea, and our other Asian allies. Our
plans will be adjusted if developments
so warrant.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
recently returned from important dis-
cussions in Korea. During his visit an
additional squadron of U.S. F-4 fight-
ers arrived to enhance our Air Force.
He and President Park also inaugurated

a Combined Forces Command, which
in addition to reflecting the greater
Korean contribution to their own de-
fense, provides new flexibility and
sophistication in joint U.S.-R.O.K.
defense planning and coordination.

The Korean Armed Forces can now
look forward to a more self-reliant de-
fense posture. Along with its growing
economic and industrial strength,
South Korea is assuming a greater por-
tion of its defense burden. This is a
natural evolution following on the ear-
lier reductions of U.S. forces and phase
out of the U.S. grant military assist-
ance program.

Koreagate. The second issue that
shook Seoul and Washington was
Koreagate. (Even in government we fi-
nally came to use that shorthand term
coined by the press, however poor the
analogy.)

Koreagate had its origins in misper-
ceptions, misguided actions, and lack
of timely or adequate remedial meas-
ures. Efforts to investigate the actions
of Americans imposed a virtually un-
precedented necessity for the full coop-
eration of foreigners and foreign
institutions not subject to U.S. juris-
diction. Ultimately, the degree of as-
sistance provided by the Korean Gov-
ernment, while substantial, fell short of
what many had hoped.

Let me be very clear on this issue.
There never was nor can there ever be,
any excuse for malfeasance in office.
For the executive branch, for the Con-
gress, for the government of a close
ally, this truly was a dark period. Al-
though these abuses took place several
years earlier, it fell to the Justice De-
partment to pursue investigations, and
to the executive branch to assist the
Congress in its own efforts. Thus the
executive branch fully supported, even
at the risk at times of the bilateral re-
lationship, a full investigation of the
charges. Our only constraint was that
we act in accordance with well-
established international practice, em-
bodied in treaties ratified by the U.S.
Senate.

Some aspects of these matters are not

Biographic data on Richard C.
Holbrooke was published in the
August 1978 Bulletin on page
1.

30

yet fully resolved. Additional actions
may still occur, in the courts and
elsewhere. It will still take time to
overcome the damage, but we believe
that the issue is no longer threatening
the very fabric of our alliance. And
from the point of view of our national
interest in stability in Northeast Asia,
this is surely a good thing.

Human Rights. The third volatile
issue of recent years has been human
rights. Some have misperceived our
expressed concerns for human rights
and interpreted them as a partisan ex-
pression of support for this or that
domestic opposition faction. In turn,
we Americans have not always been
entirely discriminating in our criticisms
or perceptions of Korea. These distor-
tions of understanding are now consid-
erably reduced on both sides. Others
are now more clearly aware that our
human rights stance is based on princi-
ple. We recognize that no society is
perfect, our own certainly included.
Correspondingly, there is a more bal-
anced perspective in the U.S. of the
realities — both problems and
accomplishments — in South Korea.

We continue, however, to have
legitimate concerns about practices that
are incompatible with a generally free
society and with close and friendly ties
between our nations. We have been
pleased to note some positive and con-
structive steps this past year to reduce
these problems. We hope that this
process will continue. It is important
that it do so — important for the Repub-
lic of Korea, which can thus be
strengthened as a nation, and important
for the healthy and close cooperation
which should exist between us. We
shall continue our dialogue with the re-
public on this subject.

The New Reality

Having reviewed past problems —
now resolved or on the way to
resolution — let me turn to the exciting
reality of Korea today, almost, un-
noticed by the American media and al-
most unknown to most Americans
whose perceptions of Korea stem from
the Korean war or Koreagate headlines.

The last 16 years of economic de-
velopment in the Republic of Korea
have been an unprecedented success. A
rural, subsistence agricultural economy
is being rapidly transformed into an in-
dustrial, technological society.

Supporting this industrial growth is
one of the world's largest national
commitments to education. With a
population of 37 million, university
enrollment will be 180,000 next year.
Research centers and scholarly think

tanks in Seoul and a number of other
centers rival in facilities and brain
power the best of similar institutions in
Washington or New York.

For 15 years real GNP growth in
South Korea has averaged more than
10% per year. At that compounding
rate of increase it is not surprising that
Americans who thought they knew
Korea only a few short years ago would
no longer recognize much of the coun-
try. The latest Fortune 500 listing in-
cludes 9 Korean firms among the top
500 business organizations in the
world. One has already reached the
first 100.

Two years ago. the World Bank es-
timated that \lck of all manufactured
goods entering world trade from de-
veloping countries were of Korean ori-
gin. Korea's industrialization is already
rapidly moving beyond early labor-
intensive successes into capital- and
technology-intensive petrochemicals,
steel, shipbuilding, and a wide range
of other heavy industry. The huge
heavy industry complex at Changwon
stands on what were rice fields only 5
years ago. Today it is perhaps the
largest single heavy industry complex
in the world, with at least one new
factory opening every month.

Korea is not rich, however. This
year the per capita GNP will reach
$1,000. If that is an impressive rate of
growth, it does not yet provide a satis-
factory standard of living. However,
Korean citizens have seen their welfare
improve steadily and dramatically over
recent years as a result of their own
energy and toil. They have every in-
tention of continuing to improve their
lot.

We have the testimony of the World
Bank that Korea's success in distribut-
ing the fruits of this growth is unex-
celled in the developing world. Growth
in real wages after inflation averaged
20% last year. Labor income as a per-
centage of national income has been
steadily increasing. In contrast to the
situation in many developing countries,
rising rural family income has kept
pace with urban family income.

With this export-led economic
dynamism. South Korea is taking a
significant place among the world's
trading nations. In 1977 its exports
were worth over $10 billion. To distin-
guish Korea and a few others like
Taiwan and Brazil from the "less de-
veloped" status from which they have
climbed, we now speak of the "newly
industrializing nations" or "advanced
developing nations."

While its economic growth has been
fueled by exports, Korea's overall
trade balance remains in deficit. This
year. South Korea made a conscious

Department of State Bulletin

and courageous decision to begin
liberalizing imports only 1 year after it
first achieved a current account
surplus. South Korea's early attention
to import liberalization — its intention
to reduce the protection afforded its
young industries — is a highly en-
couraging development.

Our economic relations with South
Korea have entered a new era. Our
economic aid program of the past as-
sisted Korean development of a suc-
cessful plural economy and open soci-
ety. But U.S. economic aid has long
since ceased to be necessary. Now
U.S. -Korean bilateral trade has reached
the level of $7 billion per year and is
rapidly growing.

Our pwn trade with Korea is some-
what in deficit, even though Korea is
becoming a significant market for U.S.
goods, from nuclear power plants and
aircraft to machinery, raw materials,
and agricultural commodities. While
seeking more balanced global trade, we
do not expect a bilateral balance in
every case. Nevertheless, American
producers and businessmen have sig-
nificant opportunities to provide a
greater share of Korea's growing im-
ports. I also urge U.S. businesses to
establish themselves in Korea to take
advantage of these opportunities. U.S.
firms with American representatives on
the spot have improved their sales
dramatically.

I hope you will spread the word that
Korea is where the economic action
very definitely is. Consumption levels
are rising rapidly, as are expectations.
We welcome Korea's plans to improve
trade access to its market, and we hope
its liberalization efforts will expand
and be made a part of Korea's contri-
bution to the multilateral trade negotia-
tions which are now in their final
phases in Geneva.

Korea's emergence as a trading
power poses a competitive challenge to
some domestic U.S. industries. As we
seize the opportunities as well as wres-
tle with the difficulties of adjustment,
we have an important responsibility to
avoid succumbing to negatively pro-
tectionist pressures. On its side Korea
must recognize that sudden and large
surges in exports of some particular
commodity can provoke a protectionist
reaction.

Where Do We Go?

We have had our problems, but we
have also shown we can manage them.
It should be clear to everyone that what
some have referred to as a patron/client
relationship is past.

We can now look to a future in

February 1979

31

which the Republic of Korea takes its
place as a successful and dynamic actor
on the world stage. The R.O.K. has
worked for and earned the respect of
the world.

While our security cooperation is of
crucial importance, many other inter-
ests bind us together as well. We al-
ready have developed a multibillion-
dollar trade, lending, and investment
relationship in Korea. Some 1,500
American firms are now doing business
there. As Korea itself has become a de-
veloped, industrialized nation, its
international responsibilities are in-
creasing. The United States and other
nations now seek Korea's cooperation
in dealing with multinational issues
such as international trade policy,
monetary reform. Third World assist-
ance programs, nuclear proliferation,
environment pollution, and law of the
sea.

After 30 years of close mutual con-
tact, the people of our two nations have
developed a complex network of per-
sonal and professional relations. Our
universities have mutual research re-
lationships and scholarly exchange
programs; alumni from all major
American universities are found in all
the Korean professions.

Already Korea's skilled engineers
and artisans are erecting economic
projects in the Middle East and
elsewhere, sometimes in productive
coordination or joint partnership with
American firms. Aware of its own past
reliance on others for development aid,
Korea is now investigating possibilities
for technical assistance to other
nations.

This new reality is one in which we
expect to cooperate as allies and
friends on an even more mutually ben-
eficial basis than the past. We will not
always agree. There will be important
issues, even as there are now, on which
we have different views. But I am con-
fident that the trust and respect with
which we have mutually weathered
these past 2 years will continue.

Peace on the Korean Peninsula

If the Republic of Korea is in the
vanguard of rapidly developing states,
peace remains the essential element for
the welfare of all people on the Korean
peninsula, as well as for all nations of
the region.

North Korea's leaders might well
take a lesson from their counterparts in
the south. While starting from a much
stronger natural resource base and a
more highly developed infrastructure.
North Korea has fallen increasingly be-
hind the South in the economic race.
The reason is not difficult to find. The

William H. Gleysteen, Jr., was born May
8. 1926. in Beijing (Peking), China (of
American parents). He received a B.A. de-
gree in 1949 and an M.A. in 1951 from
Yale University. He spent 1 year as a Senior
Fellow at the Harvard Center in Interna-
tional Affairs beginning in 1965.

Ambassador Gleysteen joined the De-
partment of State in 1951. Overseas, he
served in Taiwan (1956-58 and 1971-74).
Japan (1958-62). and Hong Kong
(1962-65). In Washington, he served in the
Department's Executive Secretariat
(1951-55), International Organization Af-
fairs (1966-69), and the Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research ( 1969-71). He was also
a member of the staff of the National Secu-
rity Council (1976-77).

From 1977 to 1978 Ambassador Gley-
steen was senior Deputy Assistant Secretary
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs with an
area of responsibility including China.
Mongolia. Taiwan, Hong Kong. Japan, and

*Ot^'

Korea. He received the Department of
State's Superior Honor award in 1971.

He was sworn in as U.S. Ambassador to
the Republic of Korea on July 1 1 . 1978.

same great cultural energies and talents
that have been responsible for the eco-
nomic miracle in the South have been
applied in the North to building a for-
midable military machine, equipped
and organized for assault. The firm
U.S. commitment to the defense of
South Korea underlines the human
wastefulness, indeed the futility, of
North Korea's sacrifice of all other
considerations to the unremitting pur-
suit of military superiority.

We have made clear repeatedly that
we are ready to participate with the
governments of both North Korea and
South Korea in discussing ways to re-
duce the level of tension on the Korean
Peninsula. North Korea continues,
however, to ignore the reality of the
dynamic and self-confident society in
the south, and to pretend that it can
arrange the future of the peninsula with
us and without direct participation of
the Republic of Korea.

On occasion, I have been asked why
we do not accept the North Korean
suggestion. After all, we generally
favor discussions with our adversaries.

The answer is simple. The only sig-
nificant matter for discussion with
Pyongyang is the reduction of tensions
on the Korean Peninsula. Such talks
without full South Korean participation
would serve no useful purpose. On the
contrary, they would simply give cre-
dence to unreal North Korean preten-
sions and create difficulties for our
treaty ally and the relations between
us.

The Republic of Korea has proposed
that channels of trade with the north be
opened up, either through nonofficial

business contacts, or with the assist-
ance of meetings at the government
level. The south stands ready to resume
direct dialogue with the north on the
whole range of tension-reducing meas-
ures. At any time that the two parties
desire, we are prepared to participate in
such discussions without preconditions.

Short of bloody military conquest —
obviously impossible in the face of
South Korean strength and our firm se-
curity support — Korean hopes for
reunification can only be fostered
through knitting together the sundered
societies through a gradual step-by-step
dialogue that produces mutual confi-
dence and permits reducing the tre-
mendous armaments burden.

Four major powers — China, Japan,
the Soviet Union, and the United
States — have vital stakes in peace and
in reducing tensions on the Korean
peninsula. We have proposed four-
power or eventually six-power meet-
ings to enable all directly concerned
nations to participate in a balanced
dialogue. Others have proposed a
tripartite framework if China and the
Soviet Union do not wish to be in-
volved. Pyongyang nevertheless con-
tinues to reject any realistic discussion
with Seoul. We believe that China and
the Soviet Union could both play a
more constructive role in reducing ten-
sions on the peninsula than they have
yet chosen to do.

We have also offered to expand our
relationships with North Korea if
Pyongyang's principal allies are willing
to take corresponding steps in their re-
lations with the Republic of Korea.
There are opportunities for pragmatic

32

Department of State Bulletin

and realistic evolution of the relation-
ships of these major powers, short of
the difficult step represented by formal
diplomatic recognition.

At some point, the North Koreans
will have to face up to the implications
of South Korean progress for their own
narrowly based and repressive regime.
The offers we have made over the years
are reasonable ones. If, however.
North Korea persists in its unaccept-
able position, it will remain an isolated
nation, buffeted by the winds of rivalry
and tension between its larger Com-
munist neighbors.

It is our hope that the North Koreans
will respond positively to the opportu-
nities for reducing tensions on the
peninsula. No development in North-
east Asia could open up brighter
prospects for the region as a whole than
progress toward resolution of the dif-
ferences between Koreans on both
sides of the demilitarized zone.

Whatever the future holds for rela-
tions between North Korea and South
Korea, we will continue to cooperate
with the R.O.K. to deter any threat of
aggression. The future is bright for
South Korea itself, and for the relation-
ships between us. even though we must
anticipate from time to time in the fu-
ture, as in the past, moments of diffi-
culty and stress.

Changing Perceptions

There is much our two societies do
not understand about each other. A re-
cent study of American opinion pro-
duced the conclusion that the current
Korean image in the United States is
poor.

We need to develop ways in which
we can improve our understanding and
knowledge of each other. The private
sector, represented by persons such as
yourselves, should not leave it solely to
governments to support exchanges and
contacts. Consideration, for example,
should be given to expanding two-way
exchanges and to supporting the de-
velopment of further Korean studies
programs at American universities.
Another major arena of understanding
is provided by the media. While there
is a relatively large number of Korean
correspondents in the United States,
there are no permanent U.S. media
representatives in Korea.

We see a positive situation in South
Korea — significantly different from
most of the dire predictions which have
long been part of the Korean scene.
Korea, no longer a poor dependent of
Japan and the West, is emerging into
its own. It still has much to accom-
plish, but the road it has already trav-

REPUBLIC OF KOREA—
A PROFILE

Geography

Area: 38,000 sq. mi.

Capital: Seoul (pop. 7.8 million, 1978).

Terrain: Rugged.

Climate: Continental.

People

Population: 37 million (1978 est.).
Annual Growth Rate: 1.7%.
Ethnic Group: Chinese (30,000).
Religions: Buddhism. Confucianism, Chris-
tianity.
Language: Korean.
Literacy: Over 90%.

Government

Official Name: Republic of Korea.

Type: Republic (power centralized in a

strong executive).
Date of Constitution: 1948 (revised 1962 and

1972).
Branch: Executive — President (Chief of

State). Legislative — Unicameral National

Assembly. Judicial — Supreme Court,

Constitutional Court.
Political Parties: Democratic Republic Party

(DRP), New Democratic Party (NDP),

Democratic Unification Party (DUP).
Suffrage: Universal over 20.
Political Subdivisions: 9 Provinces, 2 special

cities.

Economy

GNP: $45.3 million (1978 est.).

Real Growth Rate: 13% (1978).

Per Capita Income: $122.5 (1978 est).

Average Annual Rate of Inflation (last 5

yrs.): Approx. 18%.
Agriculture: Land — 23%. Labor — 40%.

Products — rice, barley, wheat.
Industry: Products — textiles and clothing,

electronics, shipbuilding, steel, food proc-

essing, chemical fertilizers, plywood,
chemicals.

Natural Resources: Coal, tungsten, graphite.

Trade: Exports— $12.7 billion (1978 est.):
textiles and clothing, electrical machinery,
plywood, footwear, ships, steel. Imports
— $14.6 billion (1978 est.): oil, ships,
steel, wood, grains, organic chemicals,
machinery. Major Partners — Japan,
U.S.

Official Exchange Rate: 484 won = U.S.$l
(since Dec. 1974).

Membership in
International Organizations

Asian African Legal Consultative Commit-
tee, Asian Development Bank. Asian Par-
liamentary Union. Asian People's Anti-
Communist League. Asian and Pacific
Council, Colombo Plan, IAEA, IBRD.
ICAO, IDA. IFC. IHB. IMCO. INTEL-
SAT, Interpol, ITU, International Whaling
Commission. UNESCO. U.N. Special
Fund. UPU, WHO, WMO. FAO, GATT,
ESCAP. World Anti-Communist League,
nonmember of U.N. (official observer at-
tends U.N. sessions).

Principal Officials

South Korea: President — Park Chung Hee;

Prime Minister — Choi Kyu Hah; Foreign

Minister — Pong Jin Park; Ambassador to

U.S.— Kim Yong Shik.
United States: Ambassador to Republic of

Korea — William H. Gleysteen, Jr.

Taken from the Department of State's revised
edition of the Background Notes on South
Korea to be published in 1979. Copies of the
complete Note may be purchased for 70$
from the Superintendent of Documents. U.S.
Government Printing Office. Washington,
D.C. 20402 (a 25% discount is allowed when
ordering 100 or more Notes mailed to the
same address).

eled can only leave one hopeful about
the future. We look forward also to
continued progress in human dignity
and personal freedom of expression.

We believe that with the difficulties
of the recent past now under control,
1979 will be the time for the Republic
of Korea and the United States to move
their relationship forward into a new
phase. At the same time we must make
every effort to insure that the new
realities of our relationship are widely
understood by the public of both coun-
tries.

We hope in 1979 for positive de-
velopments not only in the fields of

trade, high-level consultations, and
human dignity, but also that most dif-
ficult of all things to achieve: a change
in perceptions, in both Korea and the
United States. This Administration is
now ready for such an effort. □

1 Introductory paragraph omitted.

February 1979

33

517917 12 75

34

ECONOMICS: International
Trade Agreements

MEMORANDUM FROM THE
PRESIDENT, JAN. 41

Memorandum for the Special Representative
for Trade Negotiations

I have today sent the attached notices to the
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate. These notices
shall be published in the Federal Register.

Jimmy Carter

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

We have an important opportunity this year
to build a new and better approach to interna-
tional trade. The first important step depends
on acceptance and implementation by the Con-
gress of the agreements reached in the Tokyo
Round of multilateral trade negotiations. We
are now within sight of a successful conclusion
to these negotiations. I am confident that the
results will embody the U.S. objectives out-
lined by the Congress in the Trade Act of 1974
and developed in close consultation with mem-
bers of the Congress, their staffs, and our
private-sector advisors. Neither Bob Strauss,
my Special Trade Representative, nor I will ac-
cept anything less on behalf of the United
States.

The progress of the negotiations is such that
I can notify the Congress at this time of our
intention to enter into several international
agreements dealing mainly with non-tariff trade
matters. These agreements, to which Congress
gave a high priority in its mandate for the
negotiations, are intended primarily to ensure
that the international trading system is both fair
and open. The agreements are listed and iden-
tified below and are described more fully in an
attachment to this letter.

• An agreement on subsidies and counter-
vailing duties will limit trade-distorting subsidy
practices and will enunciate more clearly the
right of the United States and others to coun-
teract such practices. The agreement may pro-
vide for a number of conforming changes in the
international Anti-dumping Code.

• An agreement on safeguards in response to
a specific Congressional directive, will ensure
that countries observe international trading
rules when temporarily limiting imports that
are injuring domestic industries.

• An agreement on technical barriers to
trade or standards will require countries to use
fair and open procedures in the adoption of
product standards and related practices that af-
fect international trade.

• An agreement on government procure-
ment will increase opportunities for American
and other exporters to bid for sales to foreign
governments.

• An agreement on licensing will reduce the
extent to which unnecessary or unduly compli-

cated import licensing requirements impede
trade.

• An agreement on government procure-
encourage more uniform methods of appraising
imports for the purpose of applying import
duties.

• An agreement on commercial counterfeit-
ing will promote cooperation and uniform ap-
proaches for this growing trade problem.

• An agreement on aircraft will provide a
basis for fairer trade in this important U.S. ex-
port sector.

• Agreements to improve the international

Department of State Bulletin

trading framework will tighten the handling of
international trade disputes, respond to needs
of developing countries in a fair and balanced
manner, modernize the international rules ap-
plicable to trade measures taken in response to
balance-of-payments emergencies, and provide
a basis for examining the existing international
rules on export and import restraints, while
currently strengthening those rules through im-
provements in the dispute-settlement proce-
dures.

Several other agreements on tariff and non-
tariff matters have been negotiated in response
to specific requests that were made by the
United States or other countries. These agree-
ments are described in the attachments.

In addition, members of the Administration
will be consulting with the Congress about the
implementation of several agreements on ag-
ricultural trade that we intend to enter into at

President Carter Meets Willi

President of the Commission

of European Communities

On December 14, 1978, President
Carter met with Roy Jenkins, President
of the Commission of the European
Communities. Following is a White
House statement issued at the conclu-
sion of that meeting .

1. International Trade. They wel-
comed the progress being achieved in
Geneva on negotiation of a multilateral
trade agreement. They expressed the
hope that substantial and balanced
agreement would be reached before the
end of the year. President Carter ex-
pressed his determination to seek con-
gressional action to assure continued
application of the waiver on counter-
vailing duties. Both President Carter
and President Jenkins agreed that the
success of the negotiations would pro-
mote economic recovery and the exten-
sion of international trade between both
industrial and developing countries,
thus raising living standards and in-
creasing jobs.

2. European Monetary System.

President Carter indicated that he
viewed the European Monetary System
(EMS) as an important step toward the
European integration that the United
States has long supported. The Presi-
dent of the European Commission em-
phasized that the creation of such a
system was designed not only to estab-
lish a zone of monetary stability in
Europe but also to contribute to greater
stability in the world monetary system
as a whole, of which a strong dollar is

an essential part. He underlined that
the European Monetary System was
entirely compatible with the relevant
articles of the International Monetary
Fund, which enjoyed full European
confidence and support.

3. Science and Technology. Presi-
dent Carter and the President of the
European Commission agreed to
explore the possibilities for cooperation
between the United States and the
European Communities in research in
certain areas of science and technol-
ogy. They both strongly felt the need
for the United States and the Commu-
nity to strengthen their powers of inno-
vation in this field, while cooperating
with each other and others to share
knowledge and cost to their mutual
advantage.

The particular areas they had in mind
are nuclear fusion; management of
radioactive waste; handling and control
of fissile materials; and biological and
medical research, including definition
of standards for use of toxic sub-
stances; and definition of carcinogens.
President Carter indicated that the
United States intended to increase its
role in strengthening the scientific and
technological capacities of developing
countries through the intended founda-
tion for international technological
cooperation. □

1 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of Dec. 18, 1978; list of partici-
pants omitted.

February 1979

35

about the time the Tokyo Round is concluded.
These agreements will provide for a fairer in-
ternational sharing of the burdens in interna-
tional wheat trade, and will encourage consul-
tations and cooperation on international trade
in coarse grains, meat, and certain dairy prod-
ucts. The agricultural agreements are also ex-
pected to improve the application of accepted
international trading rules to agricultural trade.

In accordance with procedures specified in
the Trade Act, the United States will not enter
into the agreements outlined above for the next
90 calendar days. After the agreements have
been signed, they will be submitted for Con-
gressional approval, together with whatever
legislation and administrative actions may be
needed to implement the agreements in the
United States. The agreements will not take
effect with respect to the United States, and
will have no domestic legal force, until the
Congress has specifically approved them and
enacted any approprate implementing legisla-
tion.

During Congressional consideration of these
agreements, we will also supply information on
the related negotiations to reduce, harmonize,
or eliminate tariff barriers, and on the recent
establishment of an International Steel Agree-
ment in the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development.

The success of the Tokyo Round and its im-
plementation will be the product of a good
working relationship among the Congress, the
Administration, and the American public.
Through these agreements and their domestic
implementation, we can construct trade policies
and institutions that advance our national inter-
est and enhance the prosperity of our people. I
look forward to our working together to com-
plete this effort.

Sincerely.

Jimmy Carter □

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Jan. 8, 1979; also printed
in the Federal Register of Jan. 8.

EDUCATIONAL AFFAIRS:

Hubert If. Humphrey North-South
Scholarship Program

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS,
DEC. 51

First of all, let me say that I and
Senator Muriel Humphrey, John
Reinhardt [Director of the International
Communication Agency], and others
are very delighted to have you here this
afternoon for what I believe is the ini-
tiation of a very precious and valuable
new program for our own country.

It's completely appropriate that the
program should have been conceived
and named because of and after Senator
Hubert Humphrey. He always
exemplified what this program is sup-
posed to accomplish, that is, a deep
belief in the human spirit, the value of
human progress, hope in the face of at
least partial discouragement and some-
times even despair, the breaking down
of barriers that exist between people
because of difference in heritage or
race or country of origin or formal op-
portunity of their families.

Senator Humphrey also believed that
the crucial element in the growth of a
person was in education, formal edu-
cation, of course, but the stretching of
one's mind and heart in every conceiv-
able way. I think we all realize that to
the limit of his great ability, he strove
for better international understanding,
for peace, for the end of wars and the
prevention of war.

I believe that our country has a great

ENERGY: OPEC Price increase

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
DEC. 17 »

We regret the OPEC [Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries] de-
cision and hope that it will be reconsid-
ered before the next steps take effect.

Market conditions do not warrant a
price increase of this magnitude, since
the current tightness in the world oil
market is a temporary situation that
does not reflect underlying demand
forces.

This large price hike will impede
programs to maintain world economic
recovery and to reduce inflation. Re-
sponsibility for the success of these
programs is shared by the oil-producing
countries. □

1 Issued following an announcement that
OPEC members, meeting in Abu Dhabi. United
Arab Emirates, had voted to increase oil prices
at 3-month intervals to a total of H.S'/r by the
end of 1979 (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 25, 1978).

deal to offer that has not yet been ac-
cepted by people from other nations.
I've said on many occasions that in
years gone by I always dreaded seeing
the U.N. General Assembly convene,
because our country was the target of
every attack and the butt of every joke
from 100 nations on Earth. And it was
very embarrassing to me and to all
Americans who observed this annual
affair.

That has changed. I believe there's a
new willingness, in some cases eager-
ness for the leaders and the ordinary
citizens of other nations now to not
only learn more about the United States
but also to have a closer political, so-
cial, cultural relationship with us.

This is a fairly modest program, but
it can have a profound impact. And I
think it will help a great deal to al-
leviate the ignorance of other people
toward us or about us. Senator Hum-
phrey said that if freedom cannot live
with ignorance, then between the two
the choice is very clear. And we are
trying to alleviate that, whether some-
one is highly educated but still doesn't
understand our country and, therefore,
is ignorant about us, or because some-
one is deprived and very narrow in his
opportunities and doesn't know much
about us.

But I think this program will be an
avenue toward a greatly magnified op-
portunity for the enhancement of better
relationships. It will mean a lot to a
President. We'll have about 250 highly
motivated, extremely competent, de-
serving young people coming from na-
tions all over the Earth, particularly in
the Third World — the developing
nations — to our country at the graduate
level, already being well conversant
through formal education and experi-
ence with their own nations, to come
here to learn about ours.

As many of you undoubtedly know,
the orginator for the concept of the
Peace Corps was Hubert Humphrey.
And that was a program to send hun-
dreds of young and old Americans to
foreign countries to serve and to learn
and to take our culture there for exam-
ination in the personality of the Peace
Corps volunteer.

This is kind of a Peace Corps in re-
verse; highly motivated, fortunate
young people will come to our nation
to serve their countries, to help serve
us, and to learn about us. And, of

36

Department of State Bulletin

EUROPE: President Carter
Attends Guadeloupe Meeting

At the invitation of French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, President Car-
ter joined West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and British Prime Minister
James Callaghan on January 5-6, 1979, on the island of Guadeloupe to partici-
pate in personal and informal conversations on matters of special interest. At the
conclusion of their meeting on January 6, the four leaders made the following
remarks to reporters. '

PRESIDENT GISCARD
D'ESTAING

I will now give you the results of our
talks. First, I would like to emphasize
the personal and trusting nature of our
conversations. We have, in fact, stuck
to the initial objective of this meeting,
which was to have a political and
global consideration of the situation,
and in particular, we did not go into
such matters as economic and monetary
considerations. For me — and like my
colleagues, I've taken part in a number
of international meetings — I would like
to say that I consider that our discus-
sions went into considerable substance
and depth. We found no divergence
among us concerning the assessment of
the situation. Naturally, there were
differences in the stresses placed on
certain features, but there was no
divergence.

Our talks have brought to light a dual
objective, which is, first, to increase
security and. secondly, to reduce ten-
sion in the world.

We considered that the legitimate
recognition of the realities of the

present-day world should be accom-
panied by the pursuit of efforts de-
signed to improve the world situation
and, in particular, the pursuit of the
efforts toward detente and the efforts
toward limitations of armaments and,
in particular, expressing the hope for
an early conclusion of the SALT
agreement. Finally, special attention
was devoted to the development of the
North-South relations.

Now, if you want me to engage in
the usual exercise of trying to find ap-
propriate adjectives to qualify a meet-
ing, I would say that the adjectives that
come to mind would be as follows: The
meeting has been frank, friendly, and
useful.

PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN

I would like to begin by thanking
President Giscard for his initiative in
calling us together and inviting us for
what has been a very valuable and in-
formal occasion. And, also, I'm sure
I'm allowed to say our thanks to the

people of Guadeloupe for entertaining
us in this most delightful and beautiful
island.

I think I can almost forgive the
French for recovering it from the
British, although, no doubt, though,
the occasion will come when we shall
have to call for it back again. [Laugh-
ter.]

Secondly, I'd like to echo what
President Giscard said about the nature
of the discussions. They have been
conducted between four of us who trust
each other, who have confidence in
each other, and who, I think it is fair to
say, are friends. And that makes a very
great deal of difference to the quality
of the discussion and to the way in
which it's conducted. And, as Presi-
dent Giscard said, the discussions have
been direct; they have been frank; they
have been open. But I think we've all
been working toward the same common
objectives. And when you are friends,
discussing matters with each other,
there can be differences of emphasis or
nuance which are slight in relation to
the attitudes between ourselves but
which, if we were not talking as
friends, if we were talking elsewhere,
would be regarded as very substantial.
That has not been the case here, and I
want to emphasize this because so
often differences of emphasis are writ-
ten up as though they are very great
differences of objective. That is simply
not true.

Scholarships (Cont'd)

course, we in the process will learn
about them.

These scholarships will be eagerly
sought. The competition will be high.
The value to our country will be great,
and if the program works well, the
value to the students' countries will be
much greater.

We want to make it work and work
well. And when the first group comes
to our nation next year, John, I would
like — although I haven't talked to you
about this — I would like to have them
come by in a group and meet with me
and to get some acquaintance not only
with the President of the United States
but with our government, our Capital
City for just a few hours or perhaps a
day or two. And then I understand at
the end of our program they will go to
the Hubert Humphrey Institute in Min-

nesota to get an encapsulation of what
they can do in political motivation
when they return back home.

This is not designed to do anything
but serve others. And I think the rela-
tively low costs will be greatly mag-
nified. Rabbi Hillel said that one can-
dle can light a thousand others and not
diminish itself. And that's what we
hope to accomplish in this program;
each focal point of high education,
knowledge about our nation, compe-
tence, leadership in the persons of the
students involved will go back to their
own nations and greatly expand their
own influence and, directly and indi-
rectly, the beneficial influence of our
own country. And in the process our
nation certainly will not be diminished.

Let me thank you, again, for being
willing to come here. The program will
be described to you in some detail later
on. You'll get a briefing on the East-

West relationships and the North-South
relationships that presently exist be-
tween our country and others. You'll
be able not only to learn about the em-
bryonic program but also, hopefully, to
give advice, counsel, and constructive
criticisms. I think that as we evolve the
final arrangements for the program,
your voices will be very valuable to us
all. Your institutions are great in them-
selves. I hope this program will add to
their greatness.

Thank you, again, for letting me
participate. I know Hubert Humphrey,
a great man, a great American, would
be proud if he knew about what is
going on today, and my belief is that he
knows. □

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of Dec. 11. 1978.

February 1979

And I think this has been a most val-
uable meeting, as far as I am con-
cerned. It certainly added to our
knowledge of each other's point of
view. I've heard from my three col-
leagues their analysis of the world
scene in many different facets, and that
in itself is an invaluable help in ena-
bling Britain to formulate its own anal-
ysis. I think we have, in certain cir-
cumstances, been able to comment on
each other's analysis and to. perhaps,
modify our own positions as a result of
it.

But as the President said, we were
not reaching decisions here. But the
effect will be felt in the discussions
that we shall have with all our partners
and the various organizations, interna-
tional organizations, to which we
belong.

Now. just two things, if I may. First
of all. we heard from President Carter
about the SALT agreement. It is
reaching its final stages now. He gave
us his analysis of the position. Of
course, during the whole process there
has been continuous consultation. I
would like to urge — speaking as some-
one who is on the other side of the
Atlantic — Iwould like to urge the
speedy ratification, the conclusion of
the agreement and speedy ratification
on both sides, that is, on the U.S. side
and on the Soviet Union.

I think it would be a very sad day if
this agreement were not ratified, and
the Administration will have our sup-
port in their efforts when they place it
before the American people. And we
look foward to the development of a
SALT III negotiation, which we be-
lieve will be of benefit to us.

I'd like to say just. I think, two other
words. First of all. we did review some
of the trouble spots of the world. And
they are deeply disturbing. Neverthe-
less, I think it would not be unfair to
say that there's a general conclusion
that if you take out these highlights that
are deeply disturbing, that perhaps the
general position of our part of the
world is rather more satisfactory — I
qualify it in that sense — is rather more
satisfactory than it was 2 or 3 years
ago, and we met against that atmos-
phere. And I say that in order to put the
matter in perspective.

Finally, I'd like to say that we spent
a considerable amount of time on our
relations with China. We welcome
them into the comity of nations. We do
so because she is a great country, but
we do not improve our relations with
China at the expense of any other
country.

Our relations with the Soviet Union
are as important to us as our relations
with China, and indeed, our relations

37

From left to right: President Giscard d'Eslaing, Prime Minister Callaghan, President Carter,
and Chancellor Schmidt during one of their meetings on Guadeloupe.

with the Soviet Union are central to the
development of detente, which is so
important to us in Europe. So, I con-
clude by thanking President Giscard
again very much, and thank my col-
leagues for helping me to get a better
understanding of the world during the
last 48 hours.

PRESIDENT CARTER

First. I'd like to add my voice of
thanks to Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the
people of France, and particularly
those of Guadeloupe, who have made
our visit so delightful, enjoyable, and
profitable. Because of the unstructured
agenda and the informality of the dis-
cussions and the almost unprecedented
harmony that exists among us. I have
never attended a conference which was
more beneficial to me. nor more sub-
stantive in nature.

One of the dearest and most valuable
assets of the American people — and
perhaps even most of the world — is the
close harmony, the easy communica-
tion, and the common purpose of those
peoples who are represented here by
myself, by Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt, by President Giscard d'Estaing,
and by Prime Minister Callaghan.

Most of our discussions were about
regional problems and about global is-
sues, because the differences which
exist among us bilaterally are very
minor and of little consequence.

We have been determined to
strenghten even further the valuable
ties of friendship and cooperation
militarily — for common defense and

for peace — politically, culturally, and
economically.

Our commitment is to contribute to
global peace. And we have observed
with interest and gratification that in
the last few years, there has been an
enhancement in the normalization of
relationships among the nations of the
world. Former enemies have become
friends; potential enemies have sought
to avoid violence by close consultation
and negotiations; and existing
friendships have been strengthened.

We're all in agreement that the
emergence of the People's Republic of
China toward the outside world — the
Western world — has been one of con-
structive development. And we are all
determined to enhance this develop-
ment and to assure that it never be-
comes an obstacle to detente, and that
it might possibly be used in the future,
we hope, as an avenue of even
strengthening our ties of friendship and
harmony with the people of the Soviet
Union.

We discussed the potential trouble
spots of the world, and we tried to
capitalize upon the unique opportunity
that one or several of us have to al-
leviate tension, to let the people of
those regions find for themselves, with
our assistance on occasion, an avenue
toward peace, so that stability and de-
velopment of a better quality of life and
enhanced human rights might he con-
tinuing throughout those regions where
our influence might be felt.

And finally, I would like to thank
these experienced leaders for their ad-
vice and counsel for me and their con-

38

Department of State Bulletin

structive support for the efforts in the
SALT negotiations and other important
international measures in which the
American people have taken the lead.
This is always of great benefit to me
and to my people. And I'm deeply
grateful for the relationships that we
have enjoyed and, I pray, will continue
to enjoy in an enhanced degree in the
years to come.

CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT

To speak as the last in a row of four,
it's not so very easy to add anything
new to what my colleagues already
have said, especially when, as it is the
case. I'm in full agreement with the
remarks you already have heard.

Now I would like — in dealing with
the cordiality, the directness, the co-
operative friendship in which our dis-
cussions have been led — I would like to
concede that we made one mistake. We
should have had the press invited for at
least one session, in order to let it be
witnessed by yourselves how friendly
the atmosphere really was. [Laughter]

Representing nations who belong to
the same alliance, it was. of course,
natural that we at some length dealt
with security questions among which,
of course, was of great importance the
report that we were given by the
American President — by Jimmy
Carter — on the progress of SALT II.
And I would like to join my British
colleague here in stressing that in our
view, SALT II is going to be a very
important contribution toward stabiliz-
ing world peace.

I do hope for early conclusion and,
also, for swift ratification thereafter.
And as far as my country is concerned,
we will take the appropriate opportu-
nity to make this very clear to every-
body in the world.

President Giscard d'Estaing already
indicated that we also talked about
other matters in the field of arms con-
trol, which was a chance for me to ex-
press my desire to bring about progress
also in the field of mutual and balanced
force reductions. And in this context,
of course, we also dealt with the
French proposal for a European confer-
ence on arms limitation.

Naturally, France, Great Britain, and
Germany, having had diplomatic rela-
tions with the People's Republic of
China already, all of us considered it to
be a contribution to normalization in
the world that there now should also be
diplomatic relationships between the
United States and the People's Repub-
lic of China.

I think one could sum up this part of
our deliberations in telling you that we

(/•£• f *of i<*i| Toward the
Soviet Union

Following is the report of December
31, 1978, on U.S. policy toward the
Soviet Union prepared in accordance
with Section 24(b) of the International
Security Assistance Act of 1978. It was
approved by President Carter and
transmitted to Congress by Secretary
Vance on January 4, 1979.

This report is in response to Section
24(b) of the International Security As-
sistance Act of 1978, which calls for a
review of U.S. policy toward the
Soviet Union.

Objectives of U.S. Policy
Toward the Soviet Union

The fundamental objectives of U.S.
policy toward the Soviet Union have
been set out by President Carter in a
series of foreign policy addresses,
which are included as appendices to
this paper.' In his speech at Annapolis
on June 7, the President stated:

To be stable, to be supported by the American
people, and to be a basis for widening the scope
of cooperation, then detente must be broadly
defined and truly reciprocal. Both nations must
exercise restraint in troubled areas and in trou-
bled times. Both must honor meticulously those

agreements which have already been reached to
widen cooperation, naturally and mutually limit
nuclear arms production, permit the free move-
ment of people and the expression of ideas, and
to protect human rights. Neither of us should
entertain the notion that military supremacy can
be attained or that any transient military advan-
tage can be politically exploited. Our principal
goal is to help shape a world which is more re-
sponsive to the desires of people everywhere for
economic well-being, social justice, political
self-determination, and basic human rights.

We seek a world of peace. But such a world
must accommodate diversity — social, political,
and ideological. Only then can there be genuine
cooperation among many nations and among
cultures.

The President listed the following
principal elements of American policy
toward the Soviet Union:

• To continue to maintain equiva-
lent nuclear strength at levels as mod-
erate as may prove possible through
negotiations;

• To maintain a prudent and sus-
tained level of military spending,
keyed to a stronger NATO;

• To support organizations dedi-
cated to enhancing international har-
mony;

• To restrain Soviet intervention in

did agree on the global necessity to
stabilize the equilibrium of the world
and to carry on detente with the Soviet
Union, of course, especially so, in-
cluding limitation of armanaments.

In confirming that we have talked
about a number of trouble spots in the
world of today, I would, as well, wish
to stress what already has been said by
two previous speakers, namely, that we
all are confident on the present stability
of the world, which we consider to be
improved as compared with the situa-
tion a couple of years ago.

Stability of the world did, of course,
include the relationship between in-
dustrialized and developing countries,
which gave me a chance to directly re-
port to the other three gentlemen about
a conference which I recently was par-
ticipating in, not far away from here,
on the invitation of Prime Minister
Manley of Jamaica.

In concluding, I wish to express my
gratitude to the host of this
meeting — my friend, the French
President — especially for his hospital-

ity, especially for the initiative which
has been taken by him, which has led
us here. I would express my personal
gratitude to the two Presidents and the
British Prime Minister for this very
personal exchange of views, of judg-
ments, of information, which I'm quite
certain will improve the foundations
for decisions which one will have to
take in the later course of 1979.

I must confess that I've learned a lot
in this meeting, would like to thank the
host, to thank the other participants
and, in the end, like to thank the
people on this wonderful island for the
hospitality they have shown to all of
us. □

'These remarks were made at the Meridien
Hotel in Saint-Francois, Guadeloupe; President
Giscard d'Estaing spoke in French, and his re-
marks were translated by an interpreter (text
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments of Jan. 15, 1979). The 2-day series of
meetings was held at the Hamak. a resort located
on the southern coast of Grand Terre.
Guadeloupe.

February 1979

39

Africa and other Third World areas;
and

• To seek better communication and
understanding, cultural and scientific
exchanges, and increased trade.

The Foundation of the
Relationship

In the generation following World
War II, the world witnessed the
emergence of two nuclear superpowers
whose competition evolved within the
context of increasing interrelationships
among nations. The two-superpower
system has become increasingly com-
plex with the emergence of other nu-
clear powers, the assertiveness of the
Third World, the growing importance
of North-South relations, and the es-
tablishment of nuclear parity. In gen-
eral these changes have worked to limit
Soviet-American rivalry and have
created a need for restraint and cooper-
ation.

Soviet-American interests are com-
petitive in important respects —
militarily, politically, economically,
and ideologically. Though controlled in
some areas, the arms competition con-
tinues. The Soviet Union continues to
seek to expand its influence in the
world. The values which govern Soviet
policies and our own remain at odds in
important respects. These elements of
competition will remain for a long time
and we must have no illusions about
them. However, we and the U.S.S.R.
both have a strong interest in main-
taining peace.

Thus, Soviet-American relations will
continue to be characterized by both
competition and cooperation. The
challenge for American foreign policy
is to respond effectively to the former
and encourage the latter, seeking to
foster attitudes of restraint and respect
for Western interests among the Krem-
lin leaders. The process is a long-term
one since it involves the gradual mod-
ification of deeply ingrained political
attitudes, overlaid by a dogmatic ideol-
ogy and a highly authoritarian govern-
ment. It is important that in pursuing
these general objectives, we avoid
undue discouragement or excessive op-
timism. What we require is persistence
and determination.

The Strategic and Military
Dimension

The strategic and military dimension
of our relationship with the U.S.S.R. is
fundamental. It poses the greatest
danger to our security and is at the core
of existing power relationships.

The years since World War II have
witnessed steady accretion of Soviet

SUMMARY OF REPORT

The introduction points out that despite
efforts to expand cooperation in recent years.
the values that govern Soviet policies and
actions remain at odds with ours in important
respects. As a result. Soviet-U.S. relations
continue to be characterized by both compe-
tition and cooperation. The challenge to U.S.
foreign policy is to respond effectively to the
former and encourage the latter.

Our strategic and military relationship with
the U.S.S.R. poses the greatest danger to our
security and is at the core of existing power
relationships. Today a situation of rough
parity exists. However, the steady accretion
of Soviet military strength over the last dec-
ade has made a two-fold policy necessary:
(1) to maintain unsurpassed military strength
adequate to defend our interests, while (2)
seeking to reduce the threat of nuclear war
through arms control agreements. In pursuit
of these goals, the United States has sought a
SALT agreement which is equitable, bal-
anced, and stabilizing. At the same time, the
Administration is also pursuing new pro-
grams to guarantee a viable deterrent against
nuclear attack. The Administration has com-
mitted itself to a 3% per annum real increase
in defense spending and undertaken efforts to
improve cooperation with our allies on mod-
ernizing and standardizing equipment.

Commercial and economic ties are an im-
portant aspect of U.S. -Soviet relations. The
prospects for expansion of trade with the
Soviet Union will in part depend on progress
in overall relations.

In keeping with its longstanding support
for the free flow of information and people,
the United States has also engaged in an in-
creasing number of educational, cultural, and
scientific exchange programs with the Soviet

Union. In all programs, the American par-
ticipants have pressed for reciprocity and
productivity, seeking to insure a mutually
advantageous balance of benefits.

The United States is committed to an im-
provement in the human rights situation,
wherever abuses occur. Given the funda-
mental conflict in values between our two
societies, greater Soviet respect for human
rights can best be achieved through a con-
stant, careful effort across the whole range of
our relations, private and governmental.

In the Third World. U.S. -Soviet relations
have been deeply troubled by Soviet inter-
vention, particularly in Angola and Ethiopia.
At the same time U.S. efforts to facilitate an
Egyptian-Israeli settlement and the negative
Soviet response to this effort have signifi-
cantly reduced Soviet influence in the Middle
East. In the Far East the Administration has
recently moved to normalize relations with
China. In doing this it has made clear that it
intends to pursue good relations with both
Moscow and Peking on their own merits. It
does not intend to take sides in the dispute
between China and the Soviet Union or to
purposely exacerbate tensions between the
two Communist powers.

In the years ahead internal factors, par-
ticularly leadership changes, are likely to
affect Soviet policy, though it is difficult to
predict exactly how. The Administration
keeps the policy goals toward the Soviet
Union under constant review through
mechanisms such as the Special Coordinating
Committee of the National Security Council
and Interagency Coordinating Committee on
U.S. -Soviet Affairs as well as through
periodic consultations with Congress. Such
endeavors help to insure that U.S. policy to-
ward the Soviet Union remains coherent and
effective.

military strength across a broad spec-
trum ranging from strategic to conven-
tional forces. Without going into the
historic evolution of force structure on
both sides, it can be generalized that
the situation today is one of rough par-
ity. Our policy is twofold: (1) to
maintain unsurpassed military strength
adequate to protect our interests while
(2) seeking balanced and stabilizing
arms control agreements to reduce the
danger of war. As for the strategic bal-
ance, our new programs — Trident,
cruise missiles, improved interconti-
nental ballistic missiles — are designed
to guarantee us a powerful deterrent
against nuclear attack. The purpose of
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT) is to curb a wasteful and po-
tentially dangerous nuclear arms race
by reducing levels of arms, removing
uncertainty in our force planning, and
enhancing strategic stability. Building

on the antiballistic missile treaty in
1972 we have sought to limit strategic
offensive arms qualitatively and quan-
titatively. Our goal is a SALT II
agreement which will be equitable,
balanced, and stabilizing.

The difficulty in negotiating an
agreement reflects the intrinsic con-
straints of our relations with the
U.S.S.R., as well as the vital security
issues at stake. Despite wariness on
both sides, in 9 years the United States
and the U.S.S.R. have gradually be-
come more accustomed to talking with
each other about the highly sensitive
subject of strategic arms and have had
the opportunity to develop a better un-
derstanding of each other's premises
and concerns. The Standing Consulta-
tive Commission established in 1972,
in particular, has proved a valuable
mechanism for clarifying questions re-
lating to verification of compliance

40

Department of State Bulletin

with the first SALT agreements.

The Soviet conventional force build-
up and the projection of Soviet con-
ventional forces beyond Soviet borders
have caused disquiet, to us and our al-
lies. We have committed ourselves to a
3% per annum real increase in defense
spending in part to meet the threat. We
have also intensified efforts to improve
cooperation with our allies on moder-
nizing and standardizing equipment.
Here too, however, we are pursuing a
policy of detente along with defense.
While the mutual and balanced force
reduction talks in Vienna have pro-
ceeded slowly, we remain committed to
their success.

Consistent with this Administration's
policy of arms transfer restraint, the
United States initiated discussions with
the U.S.S.R., the world's second
largest supplier of arms, to examine the
possibility of establishing an overall
framework to restrain conventional
arms transfers. Thus far, four meetings
have taken place. Since the subject is.
new for both sides and especially com-
plex in its ramifications, progress will
require patience and care.

Since November 1977 the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the
U.S.S.R. have been negotiating toward
a comprehensive test ban prohibiting
all nuclear explosions. Considerable
progress has been made but important
verification issues have yet to be re-
solved. Verification remains the chief
obstacle to agreement in the U.S.-
Soviet talks on banning chemical
weapons. Progress has been made in
bilateral negotiations on banning
radiological weapons though some
differences remain. A sharp increase in
Soviet naval presence in the Indian
Ocean as well as Soviet and Cuban ac-
tions in the Horn of Africa led to ad-
journment of the U.S. -Soviet Indian
Ocean arms limitation talks, aimed at
stabilization of the U.S. -Soviet military
presence in the area, after the fourth
meeting. The question of resumption is
under review, but Soviet intentions
with regard to the Arabian Peninsula
and the Horn of Africa remain of con-
cern. The United States and the
U.S.S.R. have met once to consider the
question of limiting antisatellite
weapons, and will meet again early in
1979.

The military balance must be sub-
jected to constant scrutiny since it can
be changed not only by technological
breakthroughs but by changing at-
titudes of other nations. There is no
single subject on which the Adminis-
tration devotes more energy and atten-
tion than to assure that we meet mili-
tary challenges where necessary and re-
strain them where possible.

The Third World

U.S. -Soviet relations have been
deeply troubled by Soviet intervention
in a number of conflicts in the Third
World. Soviet introduction of arms and
Cuban forces into Ethiopia and Angola
and insertion of military armaments in
areas of turbulence in Africa are mat-
ters of serious concern. At the same
time, U.S. efforts to facilitate an
Egyptian-Israeli settlement and the
critical response of the Soviet Union to
this effort have significantly reduced
Soviet influence in the Middle East.

Soviet policy toward the Third
World is motivated by four basic con-
siderations:

• Desire to enhance Soviet influ-
ence, while reducing U.S., Western
European, and Chinese presence;

• Strategic concerns and an interest
in obtaining forward bases for Soviet
military activities;

• Support for Marxist governments

and political groups whose positions
are consonant with Soviet foreign pol-
icy objectives; and

• Achievement of economic bene-
fits through access to natural resources
and potential markets for exports.

In its dealings with the Third World,
the Soviet Union has demonstrated the
ability to move decisively when op-
portunities arise. For example, the
U.S.S.R. moved quickly to support the
new regime in Afghanistan, expanded
its postcoup presence in South Yemen,
and capitalized on the China-
Vietnam-Cambodia conflict to for-
malize and strengthen ties to Hanoi. At
the same time, the Soviet Union has
suffered setbacks, as evinced by its ex-
pulsion from Somalia, Sudan, and
Egypt, and the efforts of several states,
notably India and Guinea, to lessen
their dependence on Moscow.

This Administration's policy toward
the Third World has been characterized
by efforts to seek peaceful solutions to

Implementing the
CSCE Final Act

MEMORANDUM FROM THE
PRESIDENT, DEC. 61

This Administration attaches the greatest sig-
nificance to achieving full implementation of the
Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This document
contains solemn political pledges by the leaders
of the 35 States of Europe and North America
which participated in the 1975 Helsinki
Summit — pledges to work toward lowering the
barriers between East and West and improving
the everyday lives of their people.

1 believe that our own record of implementa-
tion has been second to none among the 35 par-
ticipating States, but our work is not complete.
The Final Act pledges us to strive constantly for
improvement both domestically, in the area of
civil and economic rights, and internationally, in
the expansion of our cooperation with the other
participating States. Other governments, in-
cluding the Soviet Union, will better understand
the depth of our concern for the full implemen-
tation of the Helsinki pledges if we demonstrate
that we are working hard at home to fulfill even
more effectively our side of the Helsinki
bargain.

The work of each of your departments and
agencies touches upon important aspects of our
final Act commitments, and I ask you to keep
these commitments in mind as you develop your
programs. You should work with the Department
of State, and cooperate with the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, as they

carry out their respective responsibilities to as-
sess implementation and identify areas where
American performance can be improved. To
facilitate this task. I request that you designate
an official at the Assistant Secretary or the Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary level to serve as CSCE
contact. I will appreciate your full cooperation
with the Department of State as it prepares the
Administration's semi-annual reports on CSCE
implementation as well as offering your full
cooperation to the Commission, which is pre-
paring its own special report on United States
implementation of the Helsinki Final Act.

Jimmy Carter □

'Memorandum for the Vice President; the
Secretary of State; the Secretary of the Treasury;
the Secretary of Defense; the Attorney General;
the Secretary of the Interior; the Secretary of
Agriculture; the Secretary of Commerce; the
Secretary of Labor; the Secretary of Health.
Education and Welfare; the Secretary of Trans-
portation; the Secretary of Energy; the Director,
International Communication Agency; the Ad-
ministrator, Environmental Protection Agency;
the Chairman, Board for International Broad-
casting; the Chairman, Commission on Civil
Rights; the Chairman, Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission; the Chairman, Interna-
tional Trade Commission; the President,
National Academy of Sciences; the Chairman,
National Endowment for the Arts; the Chairman,
National Endowment for the Humanities; and the
Chairman, National Science Foundation; text
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments of Dec. 11, 1978.

February 1979

regional conflicts and to improve eco-
nomic, social, and cultural relations
with developing states. Our efforts to
achieve peace in the Middle East on the
basis of the Camp David accords are
continuing. Through support for the
Anglo-American peace plan for
Rhodesia and the U.N. settlement for
Namibia we have sought, at a
minimum, to provide African leaders
with an alternative to reliance on
Soviet/Cuban military assistance.
These initiatives have provided a clear
message to Third World leaders that
the United States is committed to
seeking ways to reduce conflict and
obtain lasting solutions to international
problems. We have also stressed to the
U.S.S.R. that our bilateral relations are
affected by its behavior in third areas.

China

U.S. policy is to pursue relations
with both the Soviet Union and China
on their own merits. It is not in the
American interest to exacerbate Sino-
Soviet tensions, nor to encourage either
to believe that the United States is pre-
pared to take sides in the dispute. As
President Carter stated in his December
15 announcement, "The normalization
of relations between the United States
and China has no other purpose than
this: the advancement of peace."2

The decision by the United States to
normalize ties with the People's Re-
public of China (P.R.C.) is one the
U.S.S.R. has long regarded as inevita-
ble. Soviet leaders have stated,
nevertheless, that they will be watching
developments in U.S. -P.R.C. relations
closely. The P.R.C. s effort to expand
and improve relations with Eastern and
Western Europe, Africa, India, and
Japan has stimulated Soviet concern.
The U.S.S.R. has continued to build up
its military strength along the Chinese
border. At the present time, a signifi-
cant rapprochement between Peking
and Moscow is extremely unlikely.

Soviet Internal Developments and
Their Effect on Foreign Policy

Many internal forces will interact, in
the years ahead, to affect Soviet inter-
nal development and hence Soviet
policies. The effects of modernization,
greater access and exposure to quality
consumer goods, systemic economic
problems in industry and agriculture, a
possible decline in oil and energy re-
serves, a declining birth rate, continued
pressures for emigration, dissent, and
nationality tensions will all have their
effect. Changes among top leadership
are also likely in coming years.

It is virtually impossible, however.

for outside observers accurately to pre-
dict the effect of Soviet internal de-
velopments on foreign policy. The
Soviet authoritarian mode of leadership
and closed social system do not allow
much scope for analysis before the
fact, though it is sometimes possible to
trace a connection after the fact. What
does remain clear is the need for the
West to keep its basic goals clearly in
mind and to keep lines of communica-
tion and options open. So that when an
opportunity arises, we will be in a po-
sition to respond and to influence the
course of events in a favorable direc-
tion.

Trade and Economic Relations

The United States favors the expan-
sion of peaceful trade with the Soviet
Union. Our policy is in keeping with
the "Basic Principles of Relations,"
agreed upon in May 1972, which states
that:

The USA and the USSR regard commercial
and economic ties as an important and necessary
element in the strengthening of their bilateral
relations and thus will actively promote the
growth of such ties.3

But economic relations do not take
place in isolation. They affect and are
in turn affected by the political climate.
The prospects for expanded trade will
depend in large part on progress in
overall relations.

American-Soviet trade has increased
markedly in this decade. Since 1971
our cumulative trade surplus with the
U.S.S.R. has amounted to approxi-
mately $8.4 billion. In 1976, trade
turnover totaled $2.5 billion and will
probably reach that level again in 1978.
However, the trend has been uneven
because of large fluctuations in Soviet
purchases of American grain.

Trade has developed at a relatively
brisk pace despite legislative barriers
and other obstacles to commerce on
both sides. The Trade Act of 1974
contained provisions which link
most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment
and the extension of official credits by
the U.S. Government to freedom of
emigration. The U.S.S.R. has refused
to accept those conditions.

In addition, American exports to the
U.S.S.R. are subject to export control
regulations that restrict the export of
goods and technologies which make a
significant contribution to Soviet mili-
tary potential. These regulations further
require that exports of oil and gas
equipment and technology to the
U.S.S.R. must be consistent with U.S.
foreign policy objectives. Soviet hard
currency indebtedness, the U.S.S.R. s
limited export capacity, and its cen-

41

tralized economic apparatus also tend
to inhibit trade.

At the same time, bilateral agree-
ments, such as the maritime and grain
agreements concluded in 1975, provide
a stimulus to trade. Meetings of the
Cabinet-level U.S. -U.S.S.R. Joint
Commercial Commission and the
U.S. -U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic
Council (most recently in December
1978) have likewise helped promote
the establishment of effective commer-
cial arrangements between the two
countries.

Assuming a favorable political
climate — which is very much affected
by our security relationship — the pros-
pects for continued growth in U.S.-
Soviet trade are promising, but their
realization depends on a series of com-
plex factors, some of which are outside
the control of either government. For
example, projects to exploit Soviet
natural resources, especially in Siberia,
are complicated by sheer size, as well
as by the differences between the two
economic and political systems.

Scientific and Technical
Relations

Since 1972, the United States and
the U.S.S.R. have concluded 11 inter-
governmental agreements covering
cooperation in scientific and technical
fields. These are: science and technol-
ogy, environmental protection, medical
sciences and public health, exploration
of outer space for peaceful purposes,
transportation, world oceans, peaceful
uses of atomic energy, agriculture,
energy, housing and other construc-
tion, and artificial heart research. Ac-
tivities under the programs include the
exchange of technical information, ob-
servation visits by specialists, joint
working groups, parallel research, and
in a few cases actual joint work. More
than 250 projects have been jointly
identified as areas of mutual interest.

While experience has varied among
the individual programs, on balance the
spectrum of activities in its entirety has
demonstrated potential for developing
scientific benefits. This is particularly
true when resources in one country
complement those of the other, in such
fields as the magnetohydrodynamic
production of electricity, for example,
and epidemiology. In all programs, the
American participants have pressed for
reciprocity and productivity, seeking to
maintain a mutually advantageous bal-
ance in the exchanges and to increase
substantive benefits.

In addition to prospects for scientific
benefits in particular areas, it is very
much in the U.S. national interest that
our two nations, able to bring the

42

greatest resources and the most intense
concentration to a whole spectrum of
national endeavor, work with each
other on areas of global concern, such
as the environment and peaceful space
research. This broader concern under-
lies our efforts in individual fields.

By its nature, however, American-
Soviet collaboration will not result in
spectacular gains for either side. This
fact limits the potential for using the
exchange and cooperative programs to
try to affect Soviet Government policy.
Implementation of the agreements pro-
vides opportunities to communicate
American concern on human rights and
other issues. The most direct example
occurred in the summer of 1978, when
individual scientists and certain official
U.S. delegations canceled or postponed
their visits to the U.S.S.R. after the
trials of Soviet dissidents. But to make
the programs hostage to other issues,
such as human rights, would put at risk
the channels of communication with
little chance of achieving systemic
change within the U.S.S.R.

Cultural and Education
Relations

A series of intergovernmental
agreements since 1958 provides the
framework for educational and cultural
exchanges between the United States
and the Soviet Union. In addition to
official government programs, the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences and the
American Council of Learned Societies
have long conducted exchanges with
the Soviet Academy of Sciences. While
the flow of participants is far greater
today than in 1958, the level of ex-
changes remains modest.

Educational exchanges involve
chiefly programs of individual study
and research by senior scholars,
graduate students and language
teachers. Cultural exchanges involve a
wider spectrum of activities, including
two-way visits by individual experts or
delegations of specialists and activities
reaching a larger segment of the popu-
lation, such as tours by performing arts
groups, official traveling exhibits, and
the distribution of official magazines.

The United States has long supported
the concept that a free flow of ideas
and persons helps make for a better
world. Exchanges permit Americans
entry into a closed society and permit
some Soviet citizens to learn about
America directly from Americans.
While the exchanges programs are af-
fected in a minor way by the political
climate, in essence they are not suffi-
ciently vital to the receiving govern-
ment to provide the sending side effec-
tive leverage.

Human Rights

The President, in his 1977 address at
the University of Notre Dame, as in his
remarks on Human Rights Day this
month [December 6, 1978], reaffirmed
America's commitment to human rights
as a fundamental tenet of our foreign
policy. He further observed that: "This
does not mean that we can conduct our
foreign policy by rigid moral
maxims. . . . We have no illusion that
changes will come easily or soon."
Greater Soviet respect for human rights
can be achieved only through constant,
careful effort across the whole range of
our relations, private and governmen-
tal.

Specifics on the U.S. Government's
policies and activities with regard to
human rights conditions in the
U.S.S.R. are provided in the Presi-
dent's semiannual report to the Com-
mission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, assessing the implementation
of the Final Act of the Helsinki Con-
ference, dated December 1978. In gen-
eral terms, we pursue the cause of
human rights in multilateral fora, such
as the Belgrade conference on the Final
Act of October 1977 to March 1978
and preparations for the Madrid confer-
ence scheduled for November 1980;
through work with international or-
ganizations; by briefings for individu-
als having contact with Soviet citizens,
such as participants in exchange pro-
grams; and in the government-to-
government bilateral channel.

Bargaining Power and Linkage

The complex, subtle questions of
bargaining power and linkage cannot
be considered in a vacuum, but must be
addressed in specific contexts. The
enormous strength of this country in
every field — military, industrial, ag-
ricultural, scientific, technological,
ethical — gives the United States fully
adequate bargaining strength to protect
and enhance its interests in bargaining
negotiations with the U.S.S.R. There is
no need to resort to artificial linkage
between issues, though it is clear that
actions in one area can affect the
political climate in others. Our
pluralistic society and representational
system of government give us an addi-
tional measure of strength in times of
crisis when we stand together to
mobilize the full resources of our soci-
ety to defend ourselves and our allies.

Improvements in Institutions
and Procedures

An important recent change in
executive branch institutions and pro-
cedures pertaining to U.S. policy to-

Department of State Bulletin

ward the Soviet Union was the estab-
lishment in August 1977 of the Inter-
agency Coordinating Committee on
U.S. -Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA). This
committee, with members drawn from
Departments and agencies which deal
with the Soviet Union, provides a
channel to assure that policy is uni-
formly implemented throughout the
U.S. Government. Through its monthly
meetings, policy makers in turn are ap-
prised of the concerns of those in the
21 agencies which have programs in-
volving the Soviet Union, varying from
the International Communication
Agency to the Department of Defense,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and the Department of Health. Educa-
tion and Welfare. The committee has
proven a useful mechanism, and pos-
sibilities to expand its operation are
considered as they arise.

The closer cooperation between the
executive and legislative branches of
recent years is apparent in the exten-
sive consultations, briefings, and
hearings carried out on the subject of
U.S. -Soviet relations. The Subcom-
mittee on Domestic and International
Scientific Planning, Analysis, and
Cooperation of the House Committee
on Science and Technology held hear-
ings in October on the conduct of sci-
entific exchanges with the Soviet
Union. In preparation for the recent
parliamentary visit by 10 U.S. Senators
to the U.S.S.R., the participants and
the Department of State worked to-
gether closely. The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee has prepared an
extensive independent study on U.S.-
Soviet relations which involved travel
to the U.S.S.R. and consultations with
U.S. officials in Moscow and Wash-
ington. These are only the most recent
and prominent examples of the network
of cooperative effort now in place be-
tween the two branches of the govern-
ment.

As is apparent from the scope of this
review, U.S. -Soviet relations are com-
plex and multifaceted. The Adminis-
tration keeps the foreign policy goals
of the United States toward the Soviet
Union, and how best to pursue them,
under constant review. Through
mechanisms such as the Special Coor-
dinating Committee of the National Se-
curity Council and the Interagency
Coordinating Committee on U.S.-
Soviet Affairs, current issues are dis-
cussed in fora where all concerned of-
ficials may participate. In consultation
with the Congress and informed mem-
bers of the public, special studies and
discussions of key issues are organized
to provide the best possible guidance to
policymakers. Enormous resources are
devoted to every aspect of U.S. -Soviet

February 1979

Mutual and Balanced
Force Reduction Talks

43

• In wartime, NATO could draw on
civilian equipment and supplies.

• Warsaw Pact offensive power de-
pends on the questionable reliability of
Eastern European armed forces.

Foreign Relations Outline'

The mutual and balanced force re-
ductions (MBFR) negotiations — the
principal arms control effort in
Europe — began in Vienna in November
1973. Their purpose is to increase
European security by enhancing mili-
tary stability in central Europe. They
focus on ways to reduce active duty air
and ground forces in Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, the Federal
Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) on the
NATO side and the German Democra-
tic Republic (G.D.R.), Czechoslo-
vakia, and Poland on the Warsaw Pact
side. Other direct participants are the
United States, United Kingdom,
Canada, and the U.S.S.R. because
their forces are stationed in the agreed
area. Eight special participants — whose
forces would not be reduced — are
Denmark, Greece. Italy, Norway, and
Turkey on the Western side and Bul-
garia, Romania, and Hungary on the
Eastern side.

Need for Arms Control
in Europe

U.S. security is inextricably bound
to the freedom and independence of a
strong Western Europe. In this context,
central Europe is of vital strategic im-
portance to us and our allies. Because
of geography and population density,
the potential for destruction in any new

relations, from the most minute to the
farthest ranging question, to insure that
our policy is coherent and effective. □

1 For President Carter's foreign policy ad-
dresses included as appendices to this report,
see:

• "The United States and the Soviet Union,''
Annapolis. Md , June 7, 1978 (Bulletin of
July 1978, p. 14);

• "National Security Interests.'' Winston-
Salem. N.C.. Mar. 17, 1978 (Bulletin of Apr.
1978, p. 17);

• "President Carter Outlines the U.S. -Soviet
Relationship." Charleston, S.C., July 21. 1977
(Bulletin of Aug. 15, 1977, p. 193);

• "A Foreign Policy Based on America's Es-
sential Character." South Bend. Ind.. May 22,
1977 (Bulletin of June 13, 1977, p. 621).

2 For text of the joint communique between
the U.S. and the P.R.C., the President's ad-
dress, and related material, see Bulletin of
Jan. 1979, p. 25.

3 For text, see Bulletin of June 26, 1972. p.
898.

war there would be staggering.

Moreover, a European war could
lead to general nuclear war between the
United States and the U.S.S.R. To re-
duce this possibility, NATO must
maintain a strong deterrent. Although
we have recently initiated steps to
strengthen this deterrent in response to
growing Pact capabilities, the West
believes that negotiations to reach
equitable and verifiable arms control
agreements offer the best long-term
prospect to improve stability in
Europe.

European Military Balance

There are significant disparities
favoring the Warsaw Pact in the center
of Europe. Pact forces in the G.D.R.,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia total over
925,000 ground force personnel, about
16,000 operational main battle tanks,
and 3,000 tactical aircraft. Of these,
over 460,000 ground force personnel,
more than 9,000 main battle tanks, and
about 1,200 tactical aircraft are Soviet.

Against this, NATO forces in the
F.R.G. , Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg comprise over 780,000
ground force personnel (including
about 200,000 U.S. troops), about
6.000 operational main battle tanks,
and 1 ,300 tactical aircraft.

Of particular concern to NATO is the
Pact's capability — because of these
disparities — to launch a surprise, un-
reinforced attack. The disparities
would be compounded if. in a crisis,
the Pact mobilized reserves and rein-
forced with the Soviet units before
NATO could mobilize. In particular,
the United States would need to trans-
port its mobilized forces over 3,000
miles from North America to central
Europe, while the U.S.S.R. 's reserves
are only 500 miles from the potential
battle area. However, NATO's defen-
sive posture helps mitigate some East-
ern numerical advantages, since an at-
tacker generally requires a 3 to 1
superiority over the defender. Other
factors also benefit NATO.

• NATO can confront the Pact's ar-
mored forces by supplementing its
tanks with antitank guided missiles, in
which the West is quantitatively and
qualitatively superior.

• The Pact's numerical advantage in
tactical aircraft is partially offset by
NATO's technologically superior air-
craft.

Western Position

NATO has proposed that the out-
come of the reductions be rough parity.
A collective ceiling would be set for
each side's overall ground and air
manpower. The large imbalance in
tanks would be diminished at the out-
set, and there would be separate ceil-
ings on Soviet (and U.S.) forces. This
would effectively reduce the Soviet
offensive threat in central Europe. The
collective ceiling preserves NATO
flexibility and would be reached in two
phases.

The first would result in removal of
68,000 Soviet ground personnel, in-
cluding five divisions and 1,700 tanks
on the Eastern side; and 29,000 U.S.
ground force personnel, 1,000 U.S.
nuclear warheads, 54 F-4 nuclear ca-
pable aircraft, and 36 Pershing
surface-to-surface missile launchers on
the NATO side.

In the second phase, all direct par-
ticipants would help achieve the col-
lective ceiling. The West has indicated
that it might be established at about
700,000 men in ground forces and
900,000 in air and ground forces
combined.

Other measures would be needed to
verify compliance, build confidence,
improve warning, and assure that
forces withdrawn from the central re-
gion were not used to increase the
threat to nations on the northern and
southern flanks.

In April 1978, the Western partici-
pants introduced a major new initiative
to break the negotiating deadlock. It
dealt with two basic issues: commit-
ments on the amount and timing of
phase II reductions by the Europeans
and the manner of U.S. /U.S.S.R.
withdrawal in phase I.

Eastern Position

The initial Eastern position proposed
equal percentage reductions in three
stages — about 17% in ground and air
forces and all types of armaments, in-
cluding nuclear weapons — for direct
participants. There would be national
ceilings on the forces of all countries in
the area. This would have preserved
the Pact's ground force advantage, im-
posing absolute limits on European ar-
mies but not on the Soviets. In 1976
the Pact agreed that the United States
and the U.S.S.R. could withdraw in
phase I but retained other proposals un-

44

Department of State Bulletin

acceptable to the West. The East, in
June 1978, accepted the principle of a
common ceiling on ground and air
force manpower. However, the East
denies that any significant manpower
asymmetry now exists and thus rejects
the asymmetrical manpower reductions
needed to reach parity in manpower.
Moreover, the East continues to seek to
limit the flexibility of our European al-
lies. The Eastern position has other
significant deficiencies as well.

Current Status

The Eastern proposal is now close to
the Western position on some signifi-
cant issues. However, the data discrep-
ancy is central to the negotiations and
must be resolved. Before the West can
agree to reductions or numerical limits,
both sides must agree on the number of
forces subject to reductions. The West
cannot accept the East's assertion that
rough numerical equality in each side's
military manpower already exists. □

■Taken from a Department of State publica-
tion in the Gist series, released in Oct. 1978.
This outline is designed to be a quick reference
aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended
as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy state-
ment.

Tenth Report
on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
NOV. 30 '

In accordance with the provisions of Public
Law 95-384, I am reporting on progress made
toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution to
the Cyprus problem.

While direct negotiations between the two
Cypriot communities under the auspices of the
United Nations Secretary General have not yet
resumed, there is a growing awareness, espe-
cially among the parties directly concerned, that
the time is now ripe for determined action de-
signed to break the Cyprus deadlock. Moreover,
it is increasingly accepted that a just and lasting
settlement can come only through intensive,
sustained face-to-face negotiations. Public
statements, general resolutions and intermittent
talks are not adequate to solve the Cyprus prob-
lem. For this reason our recent efforts have con-
centrated on encouraging the two Cypriot parties
to work with the Secretary General of the United
Nations on an early reconvening of intercom-
munal talks. Repeal of the Turkish arms em-
bargo has created fresh opportunities for prog-
ress on the Cyprus issue.

Secretary of State Vance spoke of this policy

before the United Nations General Assembly on
September 29. We "... would welcome and
actively support," he said, "a renewed effort by
Secretary General Waldheim to help the parties
reach agreement on a sovereign, bicommunal.
nonaligned federal Republic of Cyprus ..."
To back up this call. Administration officials
have been conferring with high-level representa-
tives of both Cypriot communities, with the Tur-
kish, Greek and other friendly governments, and
also with principal officers of the United Nations
Secretariat. I had a useful discussion of the
Cyprus issue with President Kyprianou on Oc-
tober 6, and Secretary Vance met with President
Kyprianou, Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash,
and the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey
on the margin of the United Nations General
Assembly.

These contacts and many others have given us
a fairly clear picture of the practical possibilities
for forward movement and of the aims and ob-
jectives of the two sides. Both Greek and Tur-
kish Cypriots have underscored to us their desire
to see a resumption of negotiations, although
they still differ on how to do it.

In our talks with the Cypriot parties and with
United Nations officials, we have gone into
some detail on how to bridge the gap between
the parties, so as to arrive at a mutually accept-
able basis for negotiations. We cannot yet tell
whether the efforts of our government. Secretary
General Waldheim, and other friendly govern-
ments will bear fruit, but we are doing our best
to encourage regular intercommunal negotiations
early in the new year.

After the arms embargo repeal, the Govern-
ment of Turkey restated its desire to help
negotiate a rapid resolution of the Cyprus prob-
lem. Moreover, in his speech to the United Na-
tions General Assembly on October 3, Turkish
Foreign Minister Okcun reconfirmed his Gov-
ernment's commitment to withdrawing all of its
armed forces from Cyprus, except those mutu-
ally agreed upon by the parties concerned, in
connection with a final settlement. We believe
that Turkey will do its best to help the Secretary
General bring about a resumption of the inter-
communal negotiations.

The annual General Assembly debate on the
Cyprus question took place in the United Nations
during the week of November 6. The United
States Representative stated that "enhancing the
prospects for sustained and productive . . .
negotiations should be our foremost objec-
tive." and that, "All parties interested in
promoting a settlement on Cyprus should now
concentrate their efforts on encouraging these
talks and fostering an atmosphere that will
contribute to their success." The United States
abstained on the resolution adopted by the
General Assembly because it contained ele-
ments which were clearly not conducive to a
resumption of negotiations. As this report was
being prepared the Cyprus question was also
being considered within the Security Council.
Jimmy Carter □

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of Dec. 4, 1978.

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February 1979

45

MIDDLE EAST: The Situation
in Iran and its implications

by Harold H. Saunders

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Europe and the Middle East of the
House Committee on International
Relations on January 17. 1979. Mr.
Saunders is Assistant Secretary for
Near Eastern and South Asian Af-
fairs. '

This hearing provides an opportunity
for us to review together the present
situation in Iran and some of its impli-
cations for the future of U.S. policy to-
ward Iran and the Middle East.

I propose to deal with the following
questions in this introductory presenta-
tion.

• What have been the interests and
role of the United States in Iran?

• What is the present situation, and
how did it arise?

• What are the regional and global
implications of these developments in
Iran?

• What is the U.S. posture toward
this situation?

• What lies ahead?

In short, I will be developing the
following points.

• The United States remains firmly
committed — as has every American
Administration since World War II — to
a free, stable, and independent Iran.
Iran's independence is critical in pro-
tecting the freedom of other nations in
the Middle East. Fifty percent of the
petroleum consumed by the free world
passes through the Strait of Hormuz
on Iran's southern flank.

• Iran, like other nations that have
developed rapidly, has experienced
fundamental and accelerating change
over the past two decades — economic
development, widespread social
change, and demands for greater pop-
ular involvement in shaping the deci-
sions which affect Iran's life and fu-
ture. In the course of this process of
rapid modernization, economic prog-
ress has outpaced the development of
political institutions. Some Iranians
have felt that their traditional roles and
religious convictions have been
threatened by these developments and
by the introduction of an unfamiliar
culture. Many are now insisting on a
wider sharing of political power as well
as economic benefits. This is the crux
of the problem in Iran today.

• Our policy over three decades has
been to work with Iran, as with other
nations undergoing these profound
changes, to help it find constructive
solutions to the problems it faces,
emerge from periods of change with
new stability, and preserve its national
independence. Our strongly held view
is that no outside power should try to
dictate Iran's course, exploit instability
for its own ends, or seek control of any
kind in this area. Each nation should
have the freedom to work out its future
free from outside interference.

• The entire area of western Asia is
characterized by growth and change.
Change produces opportunity as well as
instability and crisis. The issue is how
to channel change along paths leading
to stability and strength. Our position
in the area is strong. Most of the states
there share our objectives for this
region — the security and national inde-
pendence of each state in the area and
the opportunity to choose its own ways
to build better lives for its people. Be-
cause we share those objectives and

. . . Iran has been through a dec-
ade and a half of rapid growth
and social change while its politi-
cal institutions have not evolved
commensurately .

seek no domination, we believe U.S.
help in appropriate ways will be sought
in the future as in the past as nations of
the area work out their futures. We are
in close touch with governments in the
region and elsewhere whose interests
are also affected by this situation.

American Interests and Role

The interests of the United States in
Iran have remained constant over the
past generation.

Because of Iran's importance to the
security of the gulf region, the future of
the Middle East, and the production of
oil, we have a strong interest in a free,
stable, and independent Iran. We have
persistently and actively pursued this
objective since World War II.

Working within the limits set by the
Government of Iran in areas of com-
mon interest, we have helped Iran
strengthen itself economically in two

ways: (1) We have participated in
Iran's modernization, first through de-
velopment assistance and then through
the cooperation of private American
firms. (2) American and other Western
companies have worked closely in the
development of Iran's oil production
and marketing, thereby helping to pro-
vide the revenues which have been the
main engine of Iran's economic
development.

As is often the case with govern-
ments where authority is highly cen-
tralized and where important economic
and strategic interests are at stake, our
ability to maintain contact with all
elements of the society and press ef-
fectively and consistently for construc-
tive change has been limited. Where
we saw social and political pressures
building up within the society, we
called attention to them, but the pace of
development has been set by the Gov-
ernment and circumstances in Iran.

We have also responded to Iran's re-
quests to help modernize its armed
forces, which have played and will
continue to play an important role in
Iran's defense. Following British with-
drawal in 1971 from a special role in
the Persian Gulf, we have encouraged
cooperation among the states of that
region to strengthen security there. In
part to compensate for British with-
drawal, we expanded our security as-
sistance relationship. The Iranian
Armed Forces, in addition to helping
neighboring Oman defend against in-
surgency, have helped protect Western
access to oil suppliers.

We have also encouraged Iran's
contribution to global economic prog-
ress and stability. Until recently Iran
has contributed not only by producing
oil for the world's energy needs but
also by giving substantial aid to other
countries, investing in both the de-
veloped and developing world and
playing a significant role in the world
economy.

In international diplomacy, Iran has
made numerous positive contributions:
peacekeeping in Vietnam and the Mid-
dle East, supporting moderate solutions
to conflicts in Africa and elsewhere,
and working to resolve some of its
longstanding disputes with neighbors.

As a consequence of our other inter-
ests in Iran, we have an interest also in
Iran's internal development and stabil-
ity. But in any effort to pursue this
interest, we must in the future, as we

46

have in the past, respect the rights of
Iranians to decide how they shall order
their own future.

How the Present Situation
Came About

If we are to understand fully the na-
ture of the present situation, we need to
examine how it came about.

Modernization. Iran has experi-
enced since World War II many of the
pressures and internal strains generated
by modernization that have proved de-
stabilizing in other countries. Some of
these problems are familiar ones —
rapid population growth, a massive
shift of population from rural to urban
areas, large numbers of unemployed
and underemployed urban workers and
students, and a host of other problems
that arise when a nation as diverse as
Iran pushes for development on a

bitious scale of development produced
a new elite of those charged with plan-
ning and carrying out the new
programs, but plans were made and
implemented with little public consul-
tation. Expansion in the private sector
gave rise to a new class of entre-
preneurs, while the interest of bazaar
merchants and other traditional ele-
ments of society were neglected. There
were increased opportunities for edu-
cation, but restrictions still limited the
participation of the newly educated in
the political process, and more were
trained than could be employed in po-
sitions they found rewarding.

Confidence and Growth (1963-76).

The economic successes of the "white
revolution" heavily overshadowed the
absence of a parallel advance in the
political system. By 1976 it appeared
to most observers of the Iranian scene
that Iran's approach to modernization

The main issue for the Iranian Government is to end the bloodshed
and restore order so a new national consensus can be forged on how
Iran should be governed and what its priorities at home and abroad
should be.

number of fronts simultaneously. Of
particular significance in Iran has been
the increasing alienation between those
leading and benefitting from the mod-
ernization and others whose position in
society and deeply held religious con-
victions are threatened by it.

The "White Revolution"
(1962-63). By the 1960's, Iranian
leaders had become keenly aware of
growing discontent, a sense of drift in
Iran, and demands for far-reaching re-
forms within a more broadly based, re-
sponsive, nonauthoritarian political
system. In order to channel these pres-
sures into constructive rather than rev-
olutionary change, the government
launched a program of evolutionary
reform and development pressed from
the top at a forced-draft pace. This
"white revolution" aimed at social and
economic modernization with the Shah
himself as the major agent in the re-
form process.

The reform program, fueled by rising
revenues in the 1960's, quickly re-
sulted in far-reaching changes, sub-
stantially improving the lives of many
citizens but damaging the position of
others. Land redistribution, for exam-
ple, weakened the power of the big
landlords and also weakened the
clergy, removing their independent
source of income and making them de-
pendent on private donations. The am-

had produced substantial progress. As a
result of the reform program, Iran was
being transformed into a modern eco-
nomic power. The future looked bright.
Prosperity seemed assured through
rapidly increasing oil revenues. By
1976 there was solid achievement, al-
though economic and political de-
velopment continued to move on sepa-
rate tracks at very different speeds.

Problems and Pressures (1976-78).
The new prosperity did not entirely
mask the problems produced by the
concentration of political power at the
apex of government and the absence of
political institutions that could deal
with the trauma of modernization.
Most prominent among the causes of
dissatisfaction were popular resentment
of what was seen as widespread cor-
ruption, harsh repression, some inep-
titude in high places, disregard for the
deep religious feelings of the popula-
tion, imbalances between revenues and
expenses, shortcomings in planning
and carrying out ambitious projects,
rising unemployment in the cities as the
construction boom began to subside,
insufficient job opportunities for ever
larger numbers of graduating students,
inequitable distribution of the benefits
of development, sacrifice of civilian
programs for military procurement, and
a high rate of inflation that outstripped
wage increases and frustrated expecta-

Department of State Bulletin

tions for a steadily rising standard of
living. These grievances and the ab-
sence of political outlets for affecting
government policy led moderate secu-
lar opposition leaders to make common
cause with significant elements of the
Muslim clergy.

In response to increasing political
ferment and criticism in 1976 and
1977, the government sponsored cam-
paigns against corruption in the public
and private sectors, reorganized itself
to curb waste and promote efficiency,
and gave an official political party a
greater role without infringing on royal
authority. Moves to improve the human
rights situation were directed at
eliminating torture and extreme
punishments in the prisons and amnes-
tying political prisoners rather than at
establishing new political institutions.
The government's measures eventually
included encouragement of "construc-
tive criticism" to promote citizen par-
ticipation in government, as well as
efforts to slow down the rapid rate of
economic growth that had caused se-
vere dislocations in the society. These
changes, however, did not satisfy the
demands of large numbers of Iranians
for a more open political system.

By the end of 1977, Iranian and
foreign observers saw these moves as
the first results of the official policy of
liberalizing Iranian political life that
had started in 1976. Those steps, how-
ever, did not yet include movement to-
ward basic political change.

By early 1978, widespread disrup-
tions had begun, and sympathy was
shown by student demonstrations
abroad. By midyear it was clear that a
new political dynamic was emerging.
Religious figures took the lead in ex-
pressing opposition to the government.
The Shah publicly stated his intention
to pursue liberalization, looking toward
free elections. By late August, how-
ever, it was apparent that the govern-
ment had underestimated the depth of
dissatisfaction. A new government was
installed at that time which promised
freedom of activity for legitimate
political parties. A few days later it
was forced to declare martial law in
Tehran and 1 1 other cities in response
to massive demonstrations. By the end
of October, strikes and disorders had
become widespread. Oil production
had dropped dramatically, and the gov-
ernment apparatus was ceasing to
function. With massive rioting in early
November, the crisis had become
fullblown, and a military government
was installed.

Today. The situation in Iran as we
see it at this moment consists of the
following elements. Widespread strikes
and demonstrations have brought the

February 1979

Iranian economy to a near halt. Many
people, at least in the main cities, are
not working and are suffering shortages
of key commodities. The banking sys-
tem has not been functioning, and pe-
troleum production does not meet
domestic needs. Activist religious
leaders and many members of the
political opposition have been pressing
for the Shah's immediate departure
from Iran or for his abdication. The
Shah has left Iran on vacation. A repre-
sentative Regency Council has been
named to perform its constitutional
functions in the absence of the Shah.
Prime Minister Bakhtiar's new gov-
ernment faces the tasks of restoring
normal life in the country and recon-
ciling political elements that have op-
posed each other.

In short, Iran has been through a
decade and a half of rapid growth and
social change while its political in-
stitutions have not evolved commen-
surately. The people most affected by
change are now demanding a greater
role in determining Iran's future but
have not yet found orderly ways of ex-
pressing their views on Iran's future
course and shaping their own destiny.

Why an Explosion Now? With
hindsight, the story appears deceptively
clear and simple, but it is not so sim-
ple. Some analysts, both in and out of
government, have pointed over the
years to various points of weakness in
the Iranian economic, social, and
political systems. By mid- 1976, just as
the leadership in Iran began to react to
growing discontent, analysts in Wash-
ington were pointing out that Iran's
rapid economic growth had not pro-
duced political participation to match
and that the government would find it
necessary to share political power more
broadly.

Since 1976 a number of develop-
ments have reinforced each other to
deepen existing dissatisfactions and to
accelerate the crisis in unpredictable
ways. Some of those issues were
stimulated by the very success of the
economic modernization itself. An
economic downturn with sharply in-
creased unemployment and inflation
added to discontent as well as to a pool
of unemployed who no longer had a
stake in existing economic activity.

While the Iranian Government was
taking certain steps to allow freer ex-
pression of criticism and to improve its
performance in assuring human rights,
basic grievances remained. In this
context, massive antigovernment dem-
onstrations protesting aspects of the
Shah's program took place in early
1978, the beginning of the cycle of ac-
tion and counteraction that has charac-
terized the Iranian scene since then.

The Issues Ahead. The main issue
for the Iranian Government is to end
the bloodshed and restore order so a
new national consensus can be forged
on how Iran should be governed and
what its priorities at home and abroad
should be. The immediate challenge is
for the Regency Council and the new
civilian government to win enough
popular support so that the violence can
be ended and normal economic activity
can be restored. In addition to ending
the suffering which people have ex-
perienced in recent months, it is essen-
tial to create an environment for ra-
tional deliberations on a long-term
political solution for Iran's problems.

In a country as complex as Iran,
quick solutions are not to be expected.
In a country which has suffered so
much violence, there will be no pain-
less answers. Domestic peace and
probably considerable time will be
needed for the Iranian people to work
out a new consensus on their political
future. It is important that this process
be orderly. We cannot predict what
direction Iran will choose, but Iranians
alone must make the decision.

Regional Implications

The question most frequently posed
about the implications of the current
crisis in Iran is: Do we see the instabil-
ity in Iran along with recent develop-
ments in Afghanistan, North and South
Yemen, the Horn of Africa as pieces in
a pattern of instability which will
change the political orientation of the
strategic Middle East? Four points need
to be stated.

First, we, of course, recognize that
fundamental changes are taking place
across this area of western Asia and
northeastern Africa — economic modern-
ization, social change, a revival of
religion, resurgent nationalism, de-
mands for broader popular participation
in the political process. These changes
are generated by forces within each
country. We must differentiate among

Letters
of Credence

On November 16, 1978, and January
11. 1979, respectively. President Car-
ter accepted the credentials of Khalil
Itani of Lebanon and Ephraim Evron of
Israel as their countries' newly ap-
pointed Ambassadors to the United
States. □

47

them and resist the impulse to over-
simplify. Economic, social, and politi-
cal development are complex processes
which we still do not fully understand.
Our policy in the future as in the past
30 years will be to work as we can with
the countries undergoing these changes
to help them find constructive solutions
and to emerge from periods of change
with new stability. As long as these
nations are genuinely independent and
free to pursue their own policies with-
out intimidation, this will contribute to
the kind of world which is the goal of
the United States.

Second, instability in any country in
a strategic area becomes a factor in
global politics. We are in close touch
with our friends and allies in the Mid-
dle East and elsewhere and share their
concern that the solution of the prob-
lems in Iran not increase the danger to
their own independence. We will con-
tinue to work with all of them to
minimize that danger. We will continue
to make clear our view that we share
with them the objectives of assuring the
stability, the security, and the national
independence of each nation in the
area. We believe our common purpose
will provide the basis for further close
cooperation.

Third, our position in this strategi-
cally important area will remain strong
over the long run as long as most of the
countries there are allowed to pursue
their own paths to development and
progress free from outside interference.
Our respect for diversity and pluralism,
our encouragement of human freedoms
and liberties, the appeal of Western
economic and technological strength,
and our dedication to democratic prin-
ciples all evoke a strong resonance
among the peoples and nations
throughout the area. They also know
that we are prepared to support their
own efforts to strengthen their defen-
sive capabilities without seeking a spe-
cial position for ourselves that they do
not want.

Fourth, the changes we are witness-
ing across this area of western Asia
and northeastern Africa contain the
seeds of progress as well as the causes
of crisis. Some parts of this area are
among the fastest growing and
resource-rich nations of the world.
Some are among the most traditional
and the poorest. The challenge we and
our friends face is how to seize the op-
portunity to channel change toward
constructive results — not simply to
react to it as an unwelcome source of
instability and conflict. In saying this,
we do not minimize the dangers for
American interests, but we want also to

48

Department of State Bulletin

keep our sights on what will be the
interests of the people in this area.

U.S. Policy

U.S. policy toward Iran has been
based on three consistent principles as
events there have evolved over the past
several months.

• We have repeatedly made it clear
that decisions affecting the future of
Iran and the relationship between the
Iranian people and their government
are decisions which must be made in
Iran by Iranians. We seek no role in
deciding those questions, and we con-
sider any external influence improper.

• The U.S. Government has worked
within the institutional framework of
Iran under its Constitution with the
duly established authorities of Iran as
specified in the Iranian Constitution.
There are constitutional provisions for
change, and we support the decisions
of the Iranian Government wherever
and however we can appropriately be
helpful.

• We have supported Iran's inde-
pendence. We have taken the position
that no outside power should exploit
instability in Iran — or any other
country — for its own advantage. The
overriding American objective for Iran
is simply that it should have the free-
dom to work out its own future free
from such interference.

These principles have been applied
consistently throughout the last year of
turmoil in Iran, and they will continue
to be our guidelines in the future.

Within the general context of those
principles we have pursued these key
objectives.

First, we hope to see the end of
bloodshed, so the people of Iran can
return to normal life. Only in such cir-
cumstances can there be rational dis-
cussion of a political solution to Iran's
current problems which will restore
stability there. We will encourage all
parties to seek political ends by
peaceful means.

Second, we want to maintain a close
and friendly relationship with an inde-
pendent, stable, and secure Iran. We
believe the interests of Iran and of the
United States are closely intertwined,
and we seek an environment of mutual
respect and positive cooperation. We
believe this will serve the interests of
Iran, of the United States, and of the
free world.

Third, we seek a stable and prosper-
ous Iran which can play its rightful role
in the region and the international
community. We are prepared to help

Iran — on the technical level, on the
governmental level, and on the diplo-
matic level — to restore its productivity
and to regain the international confi-
dence it has earned over the past dec-
ade. The resumption of major oil ex-
ports will be important both to the
economy of Iran and to the economy of
the world.

We believe that these objectives
serve not only the interests of our own
country but also the interests of the
Iranian people. We believe they offer a
practical basis for cooperation.

What Lies Ahead?

Iran is in the midst of a major social
crisis. We have no illusions that this
process will be resolved easily, and it
would serve no purpose for us to
speculate on future twists and turns of
events.

The American people and the people
of Iran share basic agreement on four
fundamental values.

• We both have strong religious
heritages. The people of both countries
believe in the importance of a life that
is guided by moral principles. We be-
lieve those principles must guide a
government that is truly just.

• We share a belief in the right of
the people to express themselves politi-
cally through institutions constituted by
them. We both believe that it is for the
Iranian people to decide how they will
govern themselves, just as it is for the
American people to choose their own
government.

• Both of us believe in the use of our
national wealth for the betterment of
our people. The United States remains
willing to help Iran develop the poten-
tial of the country.

• Both Americans and Iranians want
to see an Iran that is truly independent.
We have no aspiration to dictate the
policies of the Iranian government.

On the basis of these shared views
and our common interests, we will
make every effort to assure a continued
close relationship between the United
States and Iran.

In looking to the future, the United
States will continue to work with the
leaders of Iran in their effort to con-
solidate the civilian government with
popular support for restoring order and
normal life and building a sound politi-
cal foundation for Iran's continued
progress and independence. □

' The complete transcript of the hearings will
be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments. U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC. 20402.

Visit of Tunisian

Prime Minister
Nouira

Prime Minister Hedi Nouira of
Tunisia made an official visit to the
United States November 28 -December
5, 1978. While in Washington
November 28- December 1, he met
with President Carter and other gov-
ernment officials. Following is a joint
communique issued by the White House
on December 1 . '

At the invitation of President Jimmy Carter,
Prime Minister Hedi Nouira currently is mak-
ing an official visit to the United States. He ar-
rived on November 28 and will depart on De-
cember 5.

The Prime Minister, who is accompanied by
his wife and a delegation which includes Mr.
Mohamed Fitouri. Foreign Minister. Mr. Has-
san Belkhodja. Minister of Agriculture, and
Mr. Mustapha Zaanouni. Minister of Planning,
received a warm and friendly welcome.

During his stay the Prime Minister met with
President Carter. The discussions were fol-
lowed by a working luncheon at the White
House with the President. The Prime Minister
also met with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
and with other government officials and with
Members of the Congress.

In the course of his stay in Washington, the
Prime Minister also had talks with leaders of
economic, financial, and academic institutions.
He will also visit agricultural enterprises in
Texas, Arizona, and California. He also will
meet with the authorities of these states to dis-
cuss the utilization of American technology in
the development of arid lands, with a view to
promoting future Tunisian-American coopera-
tion in this field.

The President and Prime Minister expressed
their pleasure at the excellent bilateral relations
which have existed for almost two centuries.
The President asked the Prime Minister to con-
vey to President Bourguiba his gratitude for the
steadfast friendship he has demonstrated for the
United States since Tunisia regained its inde-
pendence.

The President reiterated to the Prime Minis-
ter the continuing interest of the United States
in the stability, independence and security of
Tunisia.

The two leaders agreed to intensify efforts to
increase economic cooperation between their
two nations, to encourage investment, to pro-
mote the transfer of technology, and to develop
commercial and cultural exchange.

President Carter congratulated Prime Minis-
ter Nouira on the rapid rate of development
Tunisia has experienced under the eight years
of his administration. Citing Tunisia as a model
recipient for sound use of American assist-
ance, the President reiterated his Government's

February 1979

SECURITY ASSISTANCE:
I r nis Transfer Levels

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
NOV. 29 '

Conventional arms transfer restraint
is an important objective of this Ad-
ministration and the Congress. To in-
sure U.S. leadership and to supplement
existing legislation, I established for
the first time a set of quantitative and
qualitative standards by which arms
transfer requests considered by this
government would be judged. The
principal consideration in the applica-
tion of these standards is whether the
transfer in question promotes our secu-
rity and the security of our close
friends.

I am pleased to announce that this
government has kept its pledge to take
the leadership in restraining arms sales.
Under the ceiling I established. U.S.
Government transfers of weapons and
related items to countries other than
NATO, Japan, Australia, and New
Zealand, which totaled $8.54 billion in
FY 1978, were reduced by 8% (or ap-
proximately $700 million measured in
constant dollars) from the comparable
FY 1977 level.

When I set this goal last year, I said
that I would make further reductions in
the next fiscal year. Today, I am an-

nouncing an additional cut of approxi-
mately $733 million,2 or 8% for FY
1979 measured in constant dollars.
This means that for the fiscal year that
began on October 1, 1978, and which
will end on September 30, 1979, new
commitments under the foreign military
sales (FMS) and military assistance
programs (MAP) for weapons and
weapons-related items to all countries
except NATO, Japan, Australia, and
New Zealand will not exceed $8.43
billion. This cut is consistent with our
national security interests, including
our historic interest in the security of
the Middle East.

When I addressed the United Nations
General Assembly in October 1977, I
emphasized that the United States had
taken the first steps at conventional
arms restraint but that we could not go
very far alone. Multilateral cooperation
remains essential to the achievement of
meaningful restraint measures. We
continue to believe that all nations have
an interest in restraining transfers of
conventional weaponry which threaten
the stability of various regions of the
world and divert recipient resources
from other worthy objectives without
necessarily enhancing national secu-
rity. We are making a maximum effort

intention to continue and to develop American
participation in Tunisia's economic growth.

To this end the United States-Tunisian Joint
Commission will meet in Tunis, in late January
1979.

In their discussion of international issues.
President Carter and Prime Minister Nouira
concentrated especially on the situation in the
Middle East. The President expressed his ap-
preciation for the encouragement President
Bourguiba and the Prime Minister have given
him to continue his personal efforts to facilitate
a peace settlement.

The two leaders stressed that participation of
the Palestinian people is a fundamental element
in the search for peace, and agreed that a com-
prehensive, just and durable peace must pro-
vide for the realization of the legitimate rights
for which all Palestinian people have been
striving. President Carter stated his belief that
Tunisia's constructive approach to international
issues gives Tunisia an important role within
the international community.

The President assured the Prime Minister
that the United States will continue to promote
resolution of conflict through peaceful means.

Reviewing the problems of decolonization in

Africa both parties expressed their deep worry
over the growing deterioration of the situation
in southern Africa as a result of the persistence
of minority regimes in pursuing the policy and
practices of apartheid and racial discrimina-
tion. They reaffirmed their commitment to sup-
port the rights of self-determination, dignity,
and justice for the people of Zimbabwe.
Namibia, and South Africa.

The Tunisian delegation expressed its ap-
preciation for the positive action of the United
States in its efforts to direct the problems of
Rhodesia and Namibia into a channel leading to
peaceful settlements and expressed the hope
that these efforts soon will prove productive.

The Prime Minister on behalf of President
Bourguiba invited President Carter to make a
state visit to Tunisia. President Carter accepted
this invitation with pleasure. The date will be
determined later by mutual agreement. □

49

to achieve multilateral cooperation on
the arms restraint issue.

My decision on U.S. arms transfer
levels for FY 1980 will depend on the
degree of cooperation we receive in the
coming year from other nations, par-
ticularly in the area of specific
achievements and evidence of concrete
progress on arms transfer restraint. □

■Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Dec. 4, 1978. For re-
marks made at the welcoming ceremony on the
South Lawn of the White House, see Weekly
Compilation of Dec. 4, p. 2091.

1 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Dec. 4. 1978.

2FY 1979 ceiling on conventional arms
transfers (in $ millions):

Fiscal year 1978 ceiling $8,551

Inflation (7.2%) +616

Fiscal year 1978 ceiling in fiscal year

1979 dollars 9,167

Policy reduction -733

Fiscal year 1979 ceiling $8,434

PUBLICATIONS

GPO SALES

Publications may be ordered by catalog or
stock number from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington. DC. 20402. A 25% discount is
made on orders for 100 or more copies of any
one publication mailed to the same address.
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices
shown below, which include domestic postage,
are subject to change .

Helwan-Talka Gas Turbine Project. Agree-
ment with Egypt. TIAS 8700. 15 pp. 900. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:8700.)
Cement Plant Construction. Agreement with

Egypt. TIAS 8702. 17 pp. 900. (Cat. No.

S9. 10:8702.)
Air Transport Services. Agreement with

Lebanon. TIAS 8722. 3 pp. 600. (Cat. No.

S9. 10:8722.)
Multiple-Entry Nonimmigrant Visas.

Agreement with Iran. TIAS 8751. 5 pp.

600. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8751.)
Rural Health Services. Agreement with Egypt.

TIAS 8775. 20 pp. $1. (Cat. No.

S9. 10:8775.)
Sorghum and Millet Crop Improvement.

Agreement with the Yemen Arab Republic.

TIAS 8787. 55 pp. 600. (Cat. No.

S9. 10:8787.)
Development Administration Training Pro-
gram. Agreement with Jordan. TIAS 8802.

3 pp. 700. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8802.)
Science and Technology Research. Agree-
ment with Egypt. TIAS 8830. 57 pp. $1.90.
(Cat. No. S9. 10:8830.)

Military Mission to Iran. Agreement with
Iran, extending the agreement of October 6.
1947, as amended and extended. TIAS 8843.

4 pp. 700. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8843.) □

50

Department of State Bulletin

UNITED NATIONS: The Challenge
ior Communieations Development

by John E. Reinhardt

General policy statement before the
20th General Conference of the U.N.
Educational . Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) in Paris on
November 3, 1978. Ambassador
Reinhardt is Director of the Interna-
tional Communication Agency.

In his opening remarks at this gen-
eral conference, the President of our
19th session reminded us that 2 years
ago there had been a ''spirit of
Nairobi," which helped us over dif-
ficult times to retain the atmosphere of
accommodation that is essential to our
activities; and he hoped that we might
continue that spirit here in Paris, to aid
us in our deliberations at this 20th gen-
eral conference.

I join in that hope. I propose that we
all once again set aside rhetorical poli-
tics and defensive expedients in favor
of constructive action based on positive
principles. With that recaptured spirit,
I submit, we can achieve both unity
and progress.

UNESCO has shown us the way over
the past 2 years by its significant
achievements in the field of human

racism. This new instrument of our
unity should command the fullest sup-
port and adherence of all governments
devoted to human rights. It will con-
tribute to our common endeavors not
only at this conference but for genera-
tions to come. The United States urges
unanimous support of the declaration.

UNESCO has also been making
progress in other important areas. It
has begun its own preparations for
major participation in the U.N. Confer-
ence on Science and Technology for
Development, a conference on which
my government places great signifi-
cance. During the past 2 years, UN-
ESCO has sought to broaden and
strengthen its programs to enhance the
status of women and their role in our
changing societies; its medium-plan
statement on this subject is commenda-
ble.

On all those matters, and on numer-
ous others in the fields of education,
science, and culture — which UNESCO
was created to promote — the United
States has been pleased to take an ac-
tive part. We hope that programs now
moving in a promising direction will be
carried through to successful culmina-
tion. For what we need to strengthen

. . . it is freedom of information, and not its control by the state, that
is best calculated to achieve the elimination of racism and to promote
the attainment of economic and political rights.

rights. It has adopted the strongest pro-
cedures of any U.N. agency for the
handling of human rights complaints,
thereby guaranteeing full and fair in-
ternational review for the rights en-
shrined in the UNESCO Constitution.
This represents an important landmark
in UNESCO's work in this, the 30th
anniversary of the Universal Declara-
tion on Human Rights. We have also
made a very important contribution to
the international struggle to eliminate
racism by adopting, through a consen-
sus of the intergovernmental confer-
ence held last March, a draft declara-
tion on race and racial prejudice. When
confirmed by this general conference,
that declaration will become a major
weapon in the continuing struggle, to
which we are all dedicated, against

most of all is the sense of direction we
recovered in Nairobi, and toward this
end to join effective action with the
spirit of cooperation.

This general theme — the move to a
more effective program of action — will
be developed by our delegation in each
of the program commissions as we ad-
dress ourselves to the proposed pro-
gram and budget presented by the Di-
rector General [Amadou Mahtar
M'Bow of Senegal]. In education, we
look to increasing the links between
schooling and the world of work, to the
extension of educational opportunities
to all segments of society, and to an
expansion in the program for popula-
tion education. In the natural sciences,
we will call for a greater focus on
priority projects and for the building of

scientific capabilities in developing
countries. In the social sciences, we
will join with others to define major
projects and to concentrate efforts on
them. In culture, we want to participate
in strengthening the sense of cultural
identity of all peoples and to recognize,
at the same time, the contributions of
all cultures to the life of all human-
kind.

Apprbach to Communications
Development

As I have said, the members of our
delegation will develop our views on
these matters in the various program
commissions. It has always been the
view of my government that it is on
these matters — the E, the S, and the C
of UNESCO — that our major emphasis
should be placed. Today, however, I
shall of necessity concentrate my at-
tention on the questions that we face in
the field of communications. For here
we can see the clearest challenge to the
continued "spirit of Nairobi." What
are the possibilities for effective ac-
tion, and how do we find our way from
the negative and divisive toward the
positive and harmonious?

What we have before us first of all is
the sound and generally agreed UN-
ESCO medium-term objectives and the
implementing plan of action proposed
by the Director General. These give us
the opportunity for much-needed re-
search and study and calm reflection,
as we seek to relate the extraordinary
potential of communications to a
human scale. The United States sup-
ports that program. But there are other
documents on our desks, which aim to
force decisions upon us that cannot, by
their very nature, have been fully
thought through. What are the most
pressing communication needs of the
various developing countries? How can
they best be met — through restrictive
declarations or positive cooperation?
What are the best ways of addressing
those troubling questions? I shall try in
my statement to deal with each of these
unresolved problems.

We have only just received the
interim report of the International
Commission for the Study of Com-
munication Problems, and my govern-
ment has not yet had an opportunity to
formulate its reactions in full. Our
comments will be provided, as re-
quested, to the Commission. I can say,

February 1979

51

however, that we find much to admire
in the descriptive portions of the re-
port, which comprise its principal part.
The diagnosis is in large measure
scholarly and balanced. Our own as-
sessment of world communication im-
portance and needs is — as you will
hear shortly — closely congruent with
that set forth in the interim report. To
that extent we believe a good beginning
has been made.

But when it comes to the report's
prescriptions, especially those that
imply state controls on the operations
of the mass media, we find ourselves
unpersuaded. No adequate foundation
in fact or in principle has been laid for
such prescriptions, nor is there any ac-
knowledgement of the losses — to na-
tional development, to peace, to inter-
national understanding — that they
would entail. The closing few pages of
the interim report contrast markedly in
this respect with those that precede
them. They are less balanced, less well
grounded, and I trust will accordingly
receive the personal attention of Com-
mission members.

In his introductory remarks on the
mass media declaration, the Director
General called for a constructive
dialogue that could lead to a consensus.
Mr. M'Bow also made reference to the
horrors of racism inflicted on the world
through the state-controlled media of
the Nazi regime; and he reminded us
that UNESCO was created in part to
prevent any repetition of such acts.
This reflects my government's position
precisely — that it is state controls that
have been primarily associated with the
propagation of war and hostility and
racialism, and that for UNESCO to
sponsor a return to this stifling of
human conscience would be to turn its
back on its own charter.

Contemporary examples of this basic
point are not difficult to find. The gov-
ernments in southern Africa have
reacted to demands for full enjoyment
of political and economic rights by
closing down newspapers owned by or
sympathetic to black Africans. They
have also moved to prohibit the circu-
lation of information about the extent
and effects of racism in that region. We
have recently witnessed similar at-
tempts by governments in other regions
to suppress the circulation of docu-
ments that draw attention to the viola-
tion of human rights. It seems clear
from these illustrations that it is free-
dom of information, and not its control
by the state, that is best calculated to
achieve the elimination of racism and
to promote the attainment of economic
and political rights.

Of course freedom must be coupled
with justice. We have been learning

that ourselves in the United States.
America is not a single, monolithic so-
ciety, and its diversity cannot be fully
represented by the major newspapers or
networks. And so we have been mak-
ing major efforts in recent years to en-
courage ownership and operation of
media outlets by blacks, women, His-
panics. and others to the end that the
distinctive voice of each of these de-
veloping groups within our own society
can make itself heard in its own way. It

The Need for Cooperation

This movement toward constructive
and principled and unifying action is in
the continuing spirit of Nairobi. So
also is what I have to say today on the
subject of practical cooperation.

Two years ago when I addressed this
general conference in Nairobi, I ac-
knowledged the existence of dependen-
cies, disparities, and imbalances in and
among national communication

. . . let us work constructively with each other to strengthen cultural
pluralism and to enrich the variety of information and points of view
that are exchanged.

is slow work sometimes, but it is de-
velopment with and toward freedom.

Let me invite your attention at this
point to two statements from the report
of a task force on the international flow
of news, issued just a few days ago.
This group of distinguished communi-
cation practitioners and scholars,
drawn I must emphasize from both the
developed and developing worlds, had
this to say.

It is our unanimous and deeply held belief that
freedom of information and economic and politi-
cal development are inextricably intertwined and
mutually reinforcing.

And as the concluding words of the
report:

We reject out of hand the view that freedom is
something that only the developed nations of the
West can afford — and that it is a superfluous
luxury for the developing nations. The practices
of a free press may be erratic, even in the West,
but the aspirations of freedom should ultimately
serve to unite the West and the Third World.

We ourselves would hope ultimately
to persuade many other countries of the
merits of this point of view. But we do
not now seek to impose that view on
other governments. We know how
dynamically various are the relation-
ships of these governments to their own
mass media and how insusceptible they
are to being captured within any single
formula or code. If there is diversity,
let it continue in the spirit voiced by
John F. Kennedy 15 years ago, when
he issued a call to make the world safe
for diversity. UNESCO is par excel-
lence a home for diversity, a shelter for
many creeds. Let it so continue, and let
us work constructively with each other
to strengthen cultural pluralism and to
enrich the variety of information and
points of view that are exchanged.

capabilities. On that occasion I pro-
posed that measures might be taken by
the United States and other developed
countries, together with their private
sectors and the multilateral institutions,
to help other states strengthen their in-
formation and communication systems
in accordance with their needs. Today I
want to describe what has been and is
being done on our part, and then move
beyond that to propose a system for
improved cooperation among all the
nations that can, I believe, move us
purposefully and measurably toward
the realization of our common goals.

Let me begin by recalling the scope
and dimension of those goals. As I said
in 1976, the central issue is to achieve
growth with equity and to pay special
attention to the poorest of the poor
within the nations and among nations.
Internal and international disparities
often go hand in hand. Of the 400 mil-
lion telephones in the world, for exam-
ple, only 40 million — a bare \09c —
are to be found in all of Africa, Asia,
and Latin America combined. What
does this imply for the scope of partici-
pation in the life of those societies or
for two-way information flows within
them?

A presently pending UNESCO report
to the General Assembly devotes simi-
lar attention to the unevenness of
communications development within
societies, and also points up the exist-
ence of gross quantitative disparities
among the nations of the world. It re-
veals that 30 developing countries still
have no television service at all nor the
technical skills to develop one; in about
40 developing countries, fewer than
5% of the people ever see a newspaper;
and in more than 60 countries, where
radio broadcasting may be the instru-
ment chosen for nation-building, more
than half the population has no radio

52

sets. To this must be added a pervasive
shortage of skilled technicians and
teachers to build up and extend com-
munication capacities.

It should be apparent from this brief
recitation that the challenge of com-
munications development is not one
that can be met by simple or random
infusions of assistance or by the im-
mediate adoption of any formula for a
new world order. If we are to have any
serious impact, we must proceed in a
far more systematic, long-range, and
concerted fashion than any we have
previously pursued. And we must at-
tract cooperation from every quarter I
mentioned 2 years ago — the more
prosperous nations, the private sector

contribution by recounting what the
U.S. Government has been doing in
this field since Nairobi.

Our regular foreign assistance pro-
gram has, in the course of the past 2
years, committed $18 million to the
cooperative improvement of basic tele-
communications infrastructures in
developing countries. A further $19
million has been committed to the
communications and information com-
ponents of some 70 projects throughout
Africa, Asia, the Near East, and Latin
America in the fields of education,
population, health care, nutrition, ag-
riculture, and disaster relief.

We have expended another $4 mil-
lion on two-way exchanges of com-

This is UNESCO's mission: to provide the means for enhancing prac-
tical cooperation in education, the sciences, culture, and communica-
tion .

in those nations, the multilateral in-
stitutions, and the disadvantaged coun-
tries themselves.

Why should we collectively take on
this burden?

• Because information is increas-
ingly recognized as a basic
resource — intangible and inexhaustible
but otherwise akin to energy and
materials — that is essential to full par-
ticipation in the modern world.

• Because in the face of this recog-
nition it would be unthinkable for us to
allow our nations and our peoples to
drift by neglect into two separate and
distinct camps, the "information rich"
versus the "information poor."

• Because there are some common
goals in which we do agree and around
which we can construct an action
agenda that draws us together and that
emphasizes the value of our common
institutions, like UNESCO. Those
goals include the steady reduction of
disparities and dependencies and im-
balances in communication capacities
and the progressive fostering of many-
sided dialogues rather than monologues
in internal as well as international
communication structures.

U.S. Efforts

What can be done, then, to get
things started? Two years ago I
suggested a collegia! effort. The re-
sponses we have been hearing at this
conference thus far are heartening.
More will no doubt be heard, and a
great deal more is required if we are to
move appreciably towards the attain-
ment of our goal. Let me begin my own

munication students, teachers, and
practitioners; on studies and confer-
ences; and on media materials — all
aimed at improving mutual under-
standing of communication perspec-
tives. These efforts have directly en-
gaged roughly 1 ,000 participants from
88 developing countries.

We have continued our technical as-
sistance with communications satel-
lites, of which the most prominent
example remains the Indian site project
I described to you 2 years ago. Its
value has been underscored by the re-
cent decision of the Indian Government
to establish its own domestic com-
munications satellite system INSAT, to
be launched in 1981.

A number of U.S. Government
agencies are engaged in sharing com-
munication resources and information-
system design capacity with their
developing-country counterparts in
specific fields of common interest.
These include scientific and technical
information, weather and disaster
warning, health and environmental
data, and agricultural information.
Other agencies have been working on a
regional basis. We have, for example,
assisted in the development of regional
health information centers in Latin
America and the Middle East, in coop-
eration with local governments and
with the Pan American and World
Health Organizations. We provide
professional consultation by, and prac-
tical training in, U.S. communication
institutions at the request of foreign
government officials or under the aus-
pices of the International Telecom-
munications Union.

Our private sector has also been

Department of State Bulletin

helping. On the media side, there is
one press group that was formed as a
result of the Nairobi general confer-
ence, with broadly international par-
ticipation, and that has now raised
more than half of its projected million
dollar treasury for a variety of projects
to assist Third World media develop-
ment. Our two major wire services
have similarly volunteered their serv-
ices to help in the establishment of na-
tional news agencies. On the very im-
portant telecommunications side, we
have no comparably specific or coordi-
nated data, but clearly the development
potential of this industry's export and
investment transactions is very large.

We also need to recognize the con-
tributions of the U.S. private, nonprofit
sector, principally the charitable foun-
dations and the universities. Some of
them serve in a consulting capacity to
UNESCO, others underwrite the work
of such scholarly bodies as the Interna-
tional Institute of Communications and
the International Association for Mass
Communication Research, while still
others actually produce the studies and
conferences and reports that will help
us gain a better understanding of the
communication issues we are faced
with. In my own country, there is an
effort now underway for the first time
to design a comprehensive and readily
accessible clearinghouse of all com-
munication policy research undertaken
in the various relevant disciplines;
upon eventual completion, this should
be suitable for interconnection with
national research centers in other
countries through the UNESCO-
affiliated network known as COMNET.

There are other institutional de-
velopments taking place at the govern-
ment level in my country with definite
implications for communications de-
velopment. One of these is the creation
last April of the International Com-
munication Agency, which has been
specifically charged by President Car-
ter to promote two-way communication
between our people and those of other
lands. The new agency has been asked
to engage in the development and
execution of a comprehensive national
policy on international communica-
tions. "Such a policy," President
Carter stated, "must take into consid-
eration the needs and interests of
others, as well as our own needs."
This represents, I submit, a significant
evolution in the attitude of the United
States toward communications
development — and one that has taken
place since we last met in Nairobi.

A second and equally important in-
stitutional development was, as many
of you know, announced by President
Carter in a speech to the Venezuelan
Congress in Caracas last March. This

February 1979

involves the creation of a U.S. founda-
tion for international technological
cooperation. As its name suggests, the
foundation will work on a cooperative
basis to build technological self-
reliance within developing countries. It
will work to end dependencies at the
same time as it lessens disparities.
Since President Carter's announce-
ment, the process of creating the new
foundation has moved forward steadily.
We expect to be in operation within the
coming year. I am pleased to tell you
today that one of the key programs of
the foundation will be devoted specif-
ically to cooperation in the field of in-
formation and communications. I per-
sonally have high hopes that its efforts
with other nations in this sector can
make a substantial contribution to our
common goals.

New U.S. Initiatives

These developments reflect a
genuine commitment on the part of our
new U.S. Administration. So do the
two specific new projects, growing out
of that commitment, that I wish to an-
nounce to this conference. The first
will devote American assistance, both
public and private, to suitably iden-
tified regional centers of professional
education and training in broadcasting
and journalism in the developing
world, where such assistance could
help the centers equip themselves to
produce fully qualified practitioners for
the media in the region. Our role will
be to work with the faculties and the
institutions on their premises. We will
undertake to send a senior faculty
member or dean of communications to
each center for a year's service as a
faculty adviser on curriculum or re-
source development. Private U.S. news
organizations will underwrite the visit
to the centers of senior correspondents
and editors, on rotating 3-month as-
signments, to demonstrate professional
skills.

As equipment needs are identified,
efforts will be made to locate available
consoles or studio facilities or printing
presses that can be donated to the cen-
ters. Institutional funding needs, if
any, will be reviewed and assistance
offered in presenting them to suitable
funding agencies. The visiting profes-
sors and journalists will stay no longer
than requested; but so long as they are
there, they themselves will be learning
about Third World development needs
and perspectives, in a way that will
stay with them when they return to
their regular jobs as teachers and
gatekeepers of American journalism.

This should be a broadly cooperative
undertaking. We have assurances of
positive participation from media or-

ganizations. We solicit the advice and
will welcome the participation of other
experienced countries. It must of
course be the developing countries
themselves who identify the regional
centers that seem best qualified to
serve the joint purposes we would be
pursuing. We are working actively with
the UNESCO Secretariat to implement
the necessary processes.

The second new U.S. project is a
major effort to apply the benefits of
advanced communications technol-
ogy— specifically communications
satellites — to economic and social
needs in the rural areas of developing
nations.

This program will be implemented
with the funding of the U.S. Agency
for International Development, using
facilities of INTELSAT [International
Telecommunications Satellite Consor-
tium] or other appropriate satellite
systems, and will enable nations in the
developing world to disseminate valu-
able information to people in remote
areas. My government — in cooperation
with officials in developing areas — will
work to design projects to promote
basic literacy for children and adults
and to share information on basic
health care and other subjects vital to
rural development. The basic result
should be to take important informa-
tion— much of which is already avail-
able in urban centers of developing
nations — and distribute it to remote
sections where people have little or no
access to knowledge that can improve
their way of life.

The project I am announcing today
will build on the lessons — and the
hopes — which have come out of the In-
dian satellite project and similar
smaller experiments in recent years. A
major part of the American contribu-
tion will be the provision of technical
assistance, equipment, and training to
promote fully informed use of satellite
capacity in the developing nations.

We expect to learn much from this
new project. But it is much more than a
technological demonstration. It is a
committed U.S. effort to build com-
munication skills and experience which
will enable developing countries to
strengthen their own global, regional,
and national communications systems.
The programming will be managed by
the recipient countries themselves to
help meet the basic human needs
priorities which they identify. The
project will be aimed at building per-
manent communication technology
skills in these countries. At its conclu-
sion, all aspects of management and
control will be turned over to the re-
cipient nations, and throughout all of
this we hope that the project will de-
velop expertise that will be transferable

53

to other parts of the world.

We believe that this can mark an in-
novative, productive approach to ur-
gent problems of rural development
and communications, and we are
pleased that this project will be moving
forward in the months ahead.

Coordinating International Efforts

These are the major new initiatives
that the United States is taking to help
develop a better balance of communi-
cations capability throughout the
world. But as I have stressed re-
peatedly, we need more. We need in
particular to gather the strength and
purpose that can come from the inter-
change of insights, experiences, and
plans — whether bilateral, multilateral,
public sector, or private — and from the
systematized presentation of develop-
ment objectives.

A large part of communications de-
velopment is now accomplished
through bilateral cooperation. It is in
this sector that collaborative consulta-
tion could serve to detect gaps and
overlaps, and to strengthen the pres-
ently fragmented process. The bilateral
character of such activities need not be
changed, but ways should be found to
focus them on priority needs in a co-
operative way with identifiable goals
and measurements of progress. Our
study has suggested to us that the inter-
national community may have already
discovered at least a partial precedent
for what is required, in the organiza-
tion and work of the Consultative
Group on International Agricultural
Research.

The applicability of this precedent to
our purposes is not perfect. The ag-
ricultural research centers had been in
existence for several years before their
funding was coordinated, so that the
sponsoring institutions took over a
fully proven concept. We have nothing
like that at present in the field of com-
munications assistance. But is the
analogy nonetheless perhaps worth pur-
suing? My government believes it may
be.

The present consultative group is
jointly sponsored by the Food and Ag-
riculture Organization (FAO), the
World Bank, and the U.N. Develop-
ment Program. We could substitute
UNESCO for FAO as a sponsor. Like
the existing group, we could establish
an integrated and effective membership
consisting of both developed and de-
veloping countries, the regional banks,
concerned multilateral agencies, and
nonprofit foundations. Other appro-
priate international organizations could
certainly be invited to participate. Out
of the meetings and studies of a com-
munication consultative group there

54

( M SC O Declaration
on the Mass Media

Following are the texts of articles
I--XI of the declaration on the mass
media adopted by consensus vote by the
General Conference of the U.N. Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganization < U NESCO ) in Paris on
November 28, 1978, and the Depart-
ment statement of November 22. '

DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL

PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE

CONTRIBUTION OF THE MASS MEDIA TO

STRENGTHENING PEACE AND

INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING. THE

PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND TO

COUNTERING RACIALISM, APARTHEID

AND INCITEMENT TO WAR

Article I

The strengthening of peace and international
understanding, the promotion of human rights
and the countering of racialism, apartheid and
incitement to war demand a free flow and a
wider and better balanced dissemination of in-
formation. To this end, the mass media have a
leading contribution to make. This contribution
will be the more effective to the extent that the
information reflects the different aspects of the
subject dealt with
Article II

1. The exercise of freedom of opinion, ex-
pression and information, recognized as an in-
tegral part of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, is a vital factor in the strengthening
of peace and international understanding.

2. Access by the public to information
should be guaranteed by the diversity of the
sources and means of information available to
it, thus enabling each individual to check the
accuracy of facts and to appraise events objec-
tively. To this end, journalists must have free-
dom to report and the fullest possible facilities
of access to information. Similarly, it is im-
portant that the mass media be responsive to
concerns of peoples and individuals, thus
promoting the participation of the public in the
elaboration of information.

3. With a view to the strengthening of peace
and international understanding, to promoting
human rights and to countering racialism,
apartheid and incitement to war, the mass
media throughout the world, by reason of their
role, contribute effectively to promoting human
rights, in particular by giving expression to op-
pressed peoples who struggle against col-
onialism, neo-colonialism, foreign occupation
and all forms of racial discrimination and op-
pression and who are unable to make their
voices heard within their own territories.

4. If the mass media are to be in a position to
promote the principles of this Declaration in
their activities, it is essential that journalists
and other agents of the mass media, in their
own country or abroad, be assured of protec-
tion guaranteeing them the best conditions for
the exercise of their profession.

Article III

1. The mass media have an important contri-
bution to make to the strengthening of peace
and international understanding and in coun-

Communications (Cont'd I

should emerge a shared sense of de-
velopment priorities and of the effec-
tiveness of existing and proposed rem-
edies. More than that, we would with
the help of the sponsoring institu-
tions— including UNESCO — engender
cooperation on a scale that simply is
not possible under presently existing
arrangements. My government would
invite our fellow members to consider
this possibility with us.

The chief obstacle to this kind of
constructive endeavor, as I see it, has
been the introduction of extraneous
political elements. I hope that will
change. I hope we can discover and
display the seriousness of purpose that
alone will attract the sponsorship of
serious international bodies. Therefore,
I invite the Director General to convene
a planning meeting within the next 6
months at which government delega-
tions can seek to reach agreement on a

specific proposal that can be presented
on behalf of developing and developed
countries alike to the institutions whose
coordinating sponsorship we would
seek. My government is prepared to
take full part in these deliberations.

My concluding hope is that we will
come to agreement — on the communi-
cation issues and on all the others we
confront — so that together we can
move toward making UNESCO a more
effective instrument for meeting his-
toric challenges. For it is through such
strengthening of our common purposes
that UNESCO makes its contribution to
the cause of peace and international
understanding. The minds of men and
women are stirred by purposeful par-
ticipation in programs of effective
action — not by mere rhetoric or politi-
cal posturing. This is UNESCO's mis-
sion: to provide the means for enhanc-
ing practical cooperation in education,
the sciences, culture, and communica-
tion. Let us get on with the job. □

Department of State Bulletin

tering racialism, apartheid and incitement to
war.

2. In countering aggressive war. racialism,
apartheid and other violations of human rights
which are inter alia spawned by prejudice and
ignorance, the mass media, by disseminating
information on the aims, aspirations, cultures
and needs of all people, contribute to eliminate
ignorance and misunderstanding between
peoples, to make nationals of a country sensi-
tive to the needs and desires of others, to en-
sure the respect of the rights and dignity of all
nations, all peoples and all individuals without
distinction of race, sex, language, religion or
nationality and to draw attention to the great
evils which afflict humanity, such as poverty,
malnutrition and diseases, thereby promoting
the formulation by States of policies best able
to promote the reduction of international ten-
sion and the peaceful and the equitable settle-
ment of international disputes.

Article IV

The mass media have an essential part to
play in the education of young people in a spirit
of peace, justice, freedom, mutual respect and
understanding, in order to promote human
rights, equality of rights as between all human
beings and all nations, and economic and social
progress. Equally they have an important role
to play in making known the views and aspira-
tions of the younger generation.

Article V

In order to respect freedom of opinion, ex-
pression and information and in order that in-
formation may reflect all points of view, it is
important that the points of view presented by
those who consider that the information pub-
lished or disseminated about them has seriously
prejudiced their effort to strengthen peace and
international understanding, to promote human
rights or to counter racialism, apartheid and in-
citement to war be disseminated.

Article VI

For the establishment of a new equilibrium
and greater reciprocity in the flow of informa-
tion, which will be conducive to the institution
of a just and lasting peace and to the economic
and political independence of the developing
countries, it is necessary to correct the in-
equalities in the flow of information to and
from developing countries, and between those
countries. To this end, it is essential that their
mass media should have conditions and re-
sources enabling them to gain strength and ex-
pand, and to co-operate both among themselves
and with the mass media in developed coun-
tries.

Article VII

By disseminating more widely all of the in-
formation concerning the objectives and princi-
ples universally accepted which are the bases of
the resolutions adopted by the different organs
of the United Nations, the mass media contrib-
ute effectively to the strengthening of peace
and international understanding, to the promo-
tion of human rights, as well as to the estab-
lishment of a more just and equitable interna-
tional economic order.

February 1979

55

Article VIII

Professional organizations, and people who
participate in the professional training of jour-
nalists and other agents of the mass media and
who assist them in performing their functions
in a responsible manner should attach special
importance to the principles of this Declaration
when drawing up and ensuring application of
their codes of ethics.
Article IX

In the spirit of this Declaration, it is lor the
international community to contribute to the
creation of the conditions for a free flow and
wider and more balanced dissemination of in-
formation, and the conditions for the protec-
tion, in the exercise of their functions, of jour-
nalists and other agents of the mass media.
UNESCO is well placed to make a valuable
contribution in this respect.
Article X

1 . With due respect for constitutional provi-
sions designed to guarantee freedom of infor-
mation and for the applicable international in-
struments and agreements, it is indispensable to
create and maintain throughout the world the
conditions which make it possible for the or-
ganizations and persons professionally in-
volved in the dissemination of information to
achieve the objectives of this Declaration.

2. It is important that a free flow and wider
and better balanced dissemination of informa-
tion be encouraged.

3. To this end, it is necessary that States

should facilitate the procurement, by the mass
media in the developing countries, of adequate
conditions and resources enabling them to gain
strength and expand, and that they should sup-
port co-operation by the latter both among
themselves and with the mass media in de-
veloped countries.

4. Similarly, on a basis of equality of rights,
mutual advantage, and respect for the diversity
of cultures which go to make up the common
heritage of mankind, it is essential that bilat-
eral and multilateral exchanges of information
among all States, and in particular between
those which have different economic and social
systems be encouraged and developed.
Article XI

For this Declaration to be fully effective it is
necessary, with due respect for the legislative
and administrative provisions and the other ob-
ligations of Member States, to guarantee the
existence of favourable conditions for the oper-
ation of the mass media, in conformity with the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and with the corresponding prin-
ciples proclaimed in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations in
1966. D

'For full text of the declaration on the mass
media, see UNESCO Doc. 20 c/20 Rev. of
Nov. 21. 1978.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
NOV. 22*

The United States joined in the consensus
approval of a UNESCO [U.N. Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization] Dec-
laration on Fundamental Principles Con-
cerning the Contribution of the Mass Media
to Strengthening Peace and International
Understanding, the Promotion of Human
Rights, and to Countering Racialism.
Apartheid and Incitement to War. The ac-
tion was taken in Commission IV, Culture
and Communication, of the UNESCO Gen-
eral Conference, now convened in its 20th
session in Paris. Formal adoption by the full
general conference is expected within the
next few days.

The result of intensive negotiations, it is
a text which not only is stripped of all lan-
guage implying state authority over the
mass media but also includes positive lan-
guage on freedom of information. Instead of
imposing duties and responsibilities upon
journalists, as various drafts attempted, it
proclaims the necessity for them to enjoy
the best conditions for the exercise of their
profession. It recognizes that the exercise of
freedom of opinion, expression, and infor-
mation is an integral part of human rights
and fundamental freedoms, and it asserts
the public's right of access to information
through a diversity of sources.

It charges states with the responsibility of
providing favorable conditions for the oper-
ation of the mass media. It affirms the
necessity to help the developing countries
overcome their handicaps in communication
development as a means of helping to cor-
rect the 'information imbalance''
worldwide.

With a commitment to freedom of infor-
mation as its foundation state, the declara-
tion represents an acceptable accommoda-
tion by UNESCO members on a number of
mass media issues. As such it can make a
significant contribution to the global free
flow of information and liberty of expres-
sion. It also sets a cordial tone for an era of
cooperation between developed and de-
veloping countries in a more equitable
sharing of the benefits of modern communi-
cation systems.

The Department has worked closely with
leaders of the U.S. media community in
dealing with this issue and is grateful for
the solid support and valuable counsel they
have supplied. The Department also wishes
to commend the Director General of
UNESCO for the positive role he played in
the final negotiations.

* Read to news correspondents by De-
partment spokesman Hodding Carter III.

Imt.s Control

by James P. Pearson

Statement in Committee I (Political
and Security) of the U.N. General As-
sembly on November 22, 1978. Senator
Pearson is the U.S. representative on
that committee. '

This Assembly has before it the
largest number of resolutions pertain-
ing to disarmament in its history. These
resolutions touch on virtually every as-
pect of the problem of increasing inter-
national security through the control,
reduction, or elimination of arma-
ments, as well as the improvement of
mankind's well-being through the di-
version of the world's resources from
armaments to economic and social
development.

My country shares the deep concern
of others in all these aspects of disar-
mament. Today, 1 want to focus my
remarks on the area which is in the
forefront of our concerns — how to ar-
rest and then reverse the increase in
nuclear armaments.

There have been many sug-
gestions— most of which were incor-
porated in one way or another in the
Final Document of the 10th special
session — for specific measures to deal
with the problem of the vast accumula-
tion of nuclear weapons. Many of these
proposals are aimed at achieving ob-
jectives which the United States fully
shares. But we are convinced that nu-
clear disarmament must be carried out
in carefully conceived and im-
plemented stages. Not only would pre-
cipitate nuclear disarmament be impos-
sible from a technical standpoint, it
would be dangerous to international
stability and security, which it is our
first duty to preserve. Nuclear deter-
rence has worked in these first decades
of the nuclear era, although we ob-
viously must work to find a less poten-
tially dangerous way to insure that gen-
erations yet unborn will escape the
catastrophe of a nuclear war.

With these thoughts in mind, the
United States has, from the dawn of the
nuclear era, stood ready to find ways of
diminishing the possibility of nuclear
war without diminishing the security of
any nation. We have made our views
known to the other nuclear powers and
have entered into negotiations with
which those in this chamber are famil-
iar, which negotiations we see as vital
early steps in the process of mastering

56

the problem of controlling the ac-
cumulation of nuclear arms.

The SALT negotiations are at this
moment at the center of that process,
and rightly so for they deal with both
the most dangerous weapons and with
the most important implements of de-
terrence. The negotiations for SALT II
are in a final and delicate stage. There
is little I feel I can or should add today
to what has been said by the responsi-
ble officials in both the United States
and the Soviet Union concerning this
most important negotiation. All those
involved hope and expect agreement to
emerge soon.

I would like to turn my attention now
to another important current develop-
ment in limiting nuclear armaments.
The cessation of nuclear testing would
complement in a significant way the
effort in SALT II and in the anticipated
SALT III negotiations to cap the
build-up of strategic nuclear weapons
and to begin reducing their numbers
and restraining their qualitative de-
velopment. Here again in negotiations
involving three of the five nuclear
powers, we have made substantial
progress in developing the basis for a
comprehensive test ban treaty to which
all states could subscribe. The United
States appreciates and shares the desire
of the great majority of the members of
the United Nations for an early end to
nuclear testing.

This urge to move forward rapidly,
however, must be tempered by the rec-
ognition that a comprehensive test ban,
in order to promote stability and mutual
confidence among its participants,
must be based on adequate measures of
verification. In the trilateral negotia-
tions in Geneva, we are engaged in the
technically complex process of
elaborating such measures. As in all
negotiations involving both new tech-
nical problems and the fundamental se-
curity interests of the parties, progress
has been painstakingly slow but we
have seen progress nonetheless.

We are conscious of the impatience
of other nations to see the results of
these trilateral negotiations. At the
same time, we are mindful that these
negotiations are breaking new ground
in nuclear arms control and that the
importance of constructing a fair, bal-
anced, and verifiable agreement must
take precedence over attempting to
meet some arbitrary completion date.

Other nations, too, have recognized
this requirement and have turned their
attention to interim measures like an
immediate moratorium on nuclear
testing as a means of achieving the ob-
jective of a comprehensive test ban
while the provisions of a formal
agreement are still being hammered

out. As U.S. spokesmen have stated in
this forum, we understand the motives
of those who have called for a
moratorium and, indeed, sympathize
with them. We cannot agree, however,
that this is the way to achieve our
common goal — that is, the earliest
possible achievement of a comprehen-
sive test ban that can truly promote
mutual confidence among its parties.
An immediate cessation of nuclear
testing could seriously complicate ef-
forts to complete satisfactory arrange-
ments for verification of a comprehen-
sive test ban. It could even have the
effect of lengthening the negotiations
process. The United States, therefore,
continues to hold the position that the
surest and most effective way to reach
an early and satisfactory comprehen-
sive test ban is through vigorous pur-
suit of the Geneva negotiations. I offer
assurances that my government is
making and will continue to make
every effort to bring those negotiations
to a prompt and satisfactory conclu-
sion.

Avoidance of the danger of nuclear
warfare does not involve dealing only
with existing arsenals; it means insur-
ing that no new ones are created. One
of the major events looming on the in-
ternational disarmament calendar is the
1980 review conference of the non-
proliferation treaty (NPT), preparations
for which are already beginning as we
meet here. The NPT is not the only
means at our disposal to insure against
the spread of nuclear weapons, but it is
the instrument in which well over 100
nations have put their trust. The United
States and many other nations continue
to hope for the widest possible adher-
ence to this important treaty.

It is in the context of the NPT and
nonproliferation in general, that I refer
again to the significance of our efforts
to achieve a comprehensive test ban. It
is apparent that adherence by all na-
tions to such a ban would be a major
achievement in nonproliferation.
Moreover, adherence by nuclear-
weapon states would oblige them to
give up something tangible — the op-
tion to test nuclear explosive devices.
The renunciation of this option would,
in our view, further demonstrate that
nuclear-weapon states are carrying out
both the letter and the spirit of the NPT
which, among other things, calls on the
parties to pursue negotiations on effec-
tive measures relating to cessation of
the nuclear arms race. Both SALT II
and a comprehensive test ban are
measures in this category. Their suc-
cess will pave the way for further steps
toward reduction of nuclear arsenals
without endangering the security of any
nation and will help prevent the spread

Department of State Bulletin

of nuclear weapons to other parts of the
globe.

Finally, I would like to draw atten-
tion once again to the commitment
taken by the United States to strengthen
the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon
states that nuclear weapons will not be
used against them. The Presidential
declaration announced by Secretary of
State Vance on June 12 during the spe-
cial session devoted to disarmament
elaborated my government's position
on security assurances, building on the
policy statement by President Carter in
his address to the General Assembly in
October 1977. The June declaration
was a recognition by the United States
of the desire of states which have
foresworn nuclear weapons for greater
assurance of their security. Our ap-
proach took into account the fact that
the nuclear-weapon states, as well as
the non-nuclear-weapon states, have
diverse security requirements. For
many of the non-nuclear-weapon
states, their relationship with nuclear-
weapon states is an essential ingredient
in their national security.

The measures I have mentioned
today are not the only ones the United
States has taken in the nuclear disar-
mament field. I could cite, for exam-
ple, its signature of Protocol I and
adherence to Protocol II of the treaty of
Tlatelolco — the Latin American
nuclear-weapon-free zone — and its
support for similar zones in certain
other parts of the world. The record is
clear: The United States is responding
to the call sounded in the Final Docu-
ment of the special session devoted to
disarmament . . . "To halt and reverse
the nuclear arms race and all its aspects
in order to avert the danger of war in-
volving nuclear weapons. " We shall be
unflagging in our efforts to achieve that
goal. □

'Text from USUN press release 128.

February 1979

I ..S. Participation
in the l/JV., 1977

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
JAN. 181

I am pleased to send Congress this report of
United States Government activities in the
United Nations and its affiliated agencies dur-
ing calendar year 1977.

This 32nd annual report strengthens my con-
viction that the United Nations is of great and
growing importance to the conduct of U.S.
foreign relations. We cannot effectively ad-
vance world peace and our other national inter-
ests if we ignore the potential of this global
organization.

Ambassador Andrew Young called the 1977
General Assembly the "most constructive ses-
sion in many years." It was largely free of the
wasteful tactics of confrontation that had mar-
red other recent sessions.

The other organs of the United Nations and
the various specialized agencies also made
progress on many of the difficult issues that
humanity faces.

I am proud of the role we played in en-
couraging this constructive atmosphere. We are
committed to resolving problems through rea-
son and discussion, not confrontation.

Our national interests are best served by such
cooperation, and by listening with respect to
the problems of all nations, large and small.
Our delegations paid particular attention to the
views of those developing nations which make
up two-thirds of the UN's membership and
worked with them to identify points of common
concern.

The interests of America and of many other
UN members coincided in the search for peace
in the Middle East and southern Africa, the
promotion of human rights, the Panama Canal
Treaties, and economic development to help
meet the basic human needs of more than a bil-
lion of the world's people.

One of my first acts as President was to in-
vite UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim to
the White House, and I have discussed interna-
tional issues with him on a number of occasions
since then. During 1977, I was also privileged
to speak at the United Nations twice — once
during March, and again at the opening of the
32nd General Assembly in September. Also
while in New York, I took the occasion to sign
the two United Nations human rights covenants
which for many years had lacked U.S.
signature.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance has taken
extraordinary pains — including direct partici-
pation in Security Council and General Assem-
bly meetings — to make the United Nations an
increasingly vital factor in the conduct of this
country's foreign relations. And Ambassador
Young has worked with great skill and unusual
effectiveness in improving our relationship
with the UN and its member states.

Events in the United Nations system will not
always go the way that this country might de-
sire. The changing makeup of these organiza-
tions, the increasing diffusion of global power
and the growing complexities of all issues
make this inevitable. But those occasions
should not make us withdraw our support, for
the UN reflects the reality of the world in
which we must live. We should, instead, feel
challenged to develop imaginative and
thoughtful new approaches in our diplomacy so
as to advance our interests, and to play a con-
structive role in the world community. In par-
ticular, we need to continue demonstrating our
faith in the basic purposes of an organization
whose strength and effectiveness are essential
to us and to the world.

The attached report details U.S. positions
and policies on the issues which arose in the
UN system during 1977. It includes:

• the extensive conduct of the so-called
"North-South" dialogue — the discussion of
economic and other issues between indus-
trialized countries and the developing nations;

• our support for the social and economic
development activities — including those of the
UN Development Program. Some 90 percent of
the funds expended by the UN system benefit
these activities;

• U.S. efforts to support new progress on
human rights throughout the UN system;

• preparations for the 1978 special General
Assembly session devoted to disarmament;

• the adoption by consensus of a General As-
sembly resolution on aircraft hijacking, to
make the world's airways safer for people
everywhere;

• the beginning of extensive efforts against
great odds to pursue peaceful settlements in
Namibia and Rhodesia; and

• U.S. ratification and support of a new UN
specialized agency — the International Fund for
Agricultural Development — which will provide
new resources to improve food production and
nutrition in low-income countries and can
benefit us by stabilizing the global food
market.

Also included in this document is an analysis
of the U.S. decision to withdraw from the In-
ternational Labor Organization in November
1977. I took this decision with regret, since
U.S. interests in international organizations are
better met through membership and active par-
ticipation than through withdrawal. Neverthe-
less, since announcement in 1975 of U.S.
intention to withdraw, we believed that insuffi-
cient progress had been made in resolving a
number of difficulties in operation of the ILO. I
still hope that the United States can return to
the ILO when its operations clearly return to
the organization's basic purposes.

Finally, among the activities of 1977 — but

57

not included in this report — was steady work
within the Administration on ways that the
United States can work to strengthen the United
Nations. My report on that topic, sent to the
Congress on March 2, 1978, outlines reforms
which can make the United Nations even more
effective as the world's major forum for discus-
sion and action on global issues.

I welcome the continuing interest of the
Congress in U.S. participation in the United
Nations, and I urge its increased moral backing
and financial support as the United States ad-
dresses in the United Nations the increasingly
difficult issues that lie ahead.

Jimmy Carter □

■Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Jan. 23, 1979. Copies of
the 335-page report, entitled "U.S. Participa-
tion in the U.N. — Report by the President to
the Congress for the Year 1977," are available
from the Superintendent of Documents. U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington,
DC. 20402, for $4.50 each. Remittance must
accompany order.

Peacekeeping

by John W. Hechinger

Statement in the Special Political
Committee of the U.N. General As-
sembly on November 30, 1978. Mr.
Hechinger is a U.S. delegate to the
33d U.N. General Assembly. '

I am most pleased to be addressing
the Special Political Committee of the
General Assembly as we discuss
peacekeeping — an essential aspect of
the maintenance of international peace
and security, which is a chiefc raison
d'etre for the United Nations itself.
The evolution of peacekeeping through
the introduction of forces of U.N.
member nations to prevent the renewal
of localized hostilities is undeniably
one of the major accomplishments of
the United Nations; one that we must
look upon with mutual pride.

It is not surprising that with the
complex situations which develop, this
evolution has been attended by con-
troversy and that not all the early hesi-
tant steps taken by the Organization and
its members were unqualified succes-
ses. Fortunately, however, further ex-
perience has made the peacekeeping
operations of the United Nations an in-
dispensable tool for the maintenance of
stability in important areas of the

58

world. As Secretary General Waldheim
noted in his annual report this fall,
there were then about 12,700 officers
and men from 27 countries involved
in ongoing U.N. peacekeeping
operations.

My government would like to take
this opportunity to pay tribute to the
devotion and courage of these men who
have performed and continue to per-
form their duties in an exemplary
fashion in often difficult circumstances
for the sake of world peace.

There were those who feared dire
consequences when the United Nations
first embarked on peacekeeping. Some
felt the United Nations should do
nothing until it could do everything,
including the full creation of an on-call
security force under the direct control
of the United Nations pursuant to arti-
cle 43. There were those who would
have had us treat the charter as a
straight jacket, not as a constitutional
document which must be interpreted in
a flexible and sophisticated manner to
permit the evolutionary change that is
the hallmark of a strong institution.

The genius of Lester Pearson of
Canada and his U.N. colleagues in
1956 in achieving agreement on the
establishment of the U.N. Emergency
Force lay in building on the earlier,
somewhat more limited, missions of
U.N. Truce Supervisory Missions and
finding what could be done in accord-
ance with the charter to fulfill the pri-
mary functions of the United Nations
under the circumstances of the time.
Primarily in the two decades since
then, the United Nations has conducted
peacekeeping operations in a variety of
regions, political situations, and logis-
tics circumstances. In short,
peacekeeping has become an indis-
pensable adjunct to peacemaking.

We now need to tap this rich heritage
of peacekeeping experience and find
ways to make the institution we have
created work more smoothly. We need
to devote more time to developing the
practical basis for U.N. peacekeeping
operations. The refining of the broad
principles for peacekeeping into so-
called guidelines is, in our view, a sec-
ondary consideration. The principles
for peacekeeping are well grounded in
the charter and have been clarified by
consistent practice. The Committee of
33 has existed for 13 years with little to
show for its efforts in its attempt to re-
fine peacekeeping "guidelines." Dur-
ing this time, the current peacekeeping
operations in Lebanon (UN1FIL), in the
Sinai (UNEF), in the Golan Heights
(UNDOF), in Cyprus (UNFICP), and
those that preceded these ongoing ac-
tivities were agreed to relatively ex-
peditiously. The mandates covering

these operations are firmly based on
practice and precedent and provide
adequate guidance for the future.

It is time to focus on more mean-
ingful and productive work; that is, on
practical measures to assist the United
Nations in doing an even better and
more efficient job in carrying out
peacekeeping operations.

It is worth noting from Secretary
General Waldheim 's report to the Gen-
eral Assembly his hope that member
governments would work toward im-
proving techniques for providing the
necessary assistance, arrangements,
and support to make such operations
less improvised and more efficient in
the future.

Replying to the Secretary General's
request for national views on
peacekeeping, as commissioned by the
General Assembly last year in Resolu-
tion 32/106, my own government
suggested that member countries might
wish to provide the Secretary General
with an indication of the types of mili-
tary units or civilian logistics or other
support units that it was prepared to
hold in readiness for possible use in
U.N. peacekeeping operations. We
also recommended improved, more
standardized training in peacekeeping
for cadre personnel of these units and
observer mission personnel. Further,
we suggested that this training might
include 1 or 2 months at U.N. Head-
quarters in New York.

We are gratified to note that many of
these ideas are reflected in Draft Res-
olution A/SPC/33/L.19 introduced by
the distinguished representative of the
Federal Republic of Germany on behalf
of the members of the European Com-
munity and cosponsored by the U.S.
delegation and many other nations.
Specifically, we wish to call attention
to paragraphs 3,5, and 6 of the resolu-
tion, which appeal to members to sup-
plement U.N. peacekeeping capa-
bilities and invite them to have con-
tinuous training of their personnel for
peacekeeping; to submit reports on ex-
perience gained; and to provide up-to-
date information on the standby
capacities, including logistics, that
they might be able to make available.
These are voluntary actions by states
which commit them to do nothing more
than to be ready to assist in the most
useful possible manner should they de-
cide to participate in a peacekeeping
operation.

I would also like to address para-
graph 2 of the resolution, which deals
with financing. Costs of the current
major operations alone — UNEF,
UNDOF, UNIFIL, and UNFICYP—
approximate $250 million per year. My
country has borne far more than its

Department of State Bulletin

regular assessed share of the U.N.
budget for peacekeeping operations to
date. We have done so willingly, in the
belief that the cause of peace being
served was of direct benefit to us as
well as all U.N. members and to the
United Nations' historic purpose. We
have done so on the understanding that
U.N. peacekeeping operations repre-
sent duly constituted decisions of the
United Nations and that the responsi-
bility for them — including financial
responsibility — must be shared.

I need scarcely recall to delegates
present here and in our total Assembly
of 150 nations that article 17 of the
chapter stipulates that: "The expenses
of the Organization shall be borne by
the Members as apportioned by the
General Assembly." If the entire body
does not accept the responsibility to fi-
nance these operations, then it does not
accept collective security; to deny fis-
cal responsibility is to deny the respon-
sibility of the United Nations for peace
and security. Paragraph 2 of Draft Res-
olution A/SPC/33/L.19 is a strong re-
minder of the collective nature of fi-
nancial responsibility for U.N.
peacekeeping.

I would like to make special note of
the leadership, patience, and diligence
shown by the delegation of the Federal
Republic of Germany in the difficult
and protracted process that has led to
broad support and cosponsorship of the
test of this resolution. It is our hope
that the resolution and the cooperation
among U.N. members on peacekeeping
that it encourages will provide a basis
for further action in the 34th General
Assembly next year toward further
strengthening the operational base of
peacekeeping.

Again may I add this personal
note — that I feel that the resolution
before us represents one of the most
constructive steps that I have witnessed
in this session of the General Assem-
bly, standing out in strong contrast to
the multiplicity of angry resolutions of
condemnation of one group of member
nations against others; resolutions
which move us not one whit closer to
the lofty purpose for which this Or-
ganization was founded. This resolu-
tion, in contrast, is constructive and
will advance the art of peaceful settle-
ment of disputes and collective
security. I urge its acceptance by
consensus. D

'Text from USUN press release 142.

February 1979

59

Human Rights

by Andrew Young

Statement in plenary on December
14, 1978. Ambassador Young is U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations. '

The world-awakening to human
rights and fundamental freedoms that
emerged in 1948 in the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
has taken on a new urgency in the past
few years. For perhaps the first time in
history we can truly say that there is a
worldwide human rights movement,
and it is steadily gaining force.

Mahatma Gandhi in 1921 wrote that
every good movement passes through
five stages: indifference, ridicule,
abuse, repression, and, finally, respect.
We know that human rights abuses are
usually, when first noted, regarded
with indifference. Then will come the
ridicule, then the abuse, and perhaps
even the repression. This is the path of
progress. It has been true in the United
States, India, across the African Conti-
nent. It is no less true in the East or
Middle East than it has been in the
West and South. It is part of the proc-
ess of widening participation in the
public dialogue, of expanding the con-
cerns and concepts we use when we
develop public and international
policy.

There is no room for self-
righteousness and self-congratulation in
the field of human rights. Each of our
nations has people of vision and people
of fear, those who create and those who
repress and torture. I believe we should
identify particular problems and work
together toward solving them. It is
better to solve one small problem than
to engage in political fireworks about
the grand issues of our time. We have
the potential of a new pragmatism in
these halls, and I hope it grows.

Behind this new pragmatism is, I
think, the growing realization that we,
indeed, have common goals and that if
we stop fearing and fighting each other
i we might find some practical solutions.
The task is too serious to waste our
effort in nonproductive exercises. We
are faced with the necessity of pro-
moting worldwide rapid, peaceful so-
cial change if we are to move toward
the goals of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.

In 1967. a few months before his
death, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., re-
flected on the next steps of the struggle

for full human rights and came to the
conclusion that the crisis of the modern
world is international in scope and that
this is a crisis that "involves the poor,
the dispossessed, and the exploited of
the whole world. "

Today, more than 1 billion people
live in conditions of abject poverty —
starving, idle, and numbed by igno-
rance. Life expectancy in the poorest
countries is only slightly greater than
half that in the industrialized countries.

The sad fact is that most of the
people in these countries who were
born in the year we adopted the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights are
not around anymore to celebrate this
occasion. And most of those who are
still here have very little to celebrate.
Three quarters of their number in these
countries do not have access to safe
water. They cannot read the speeches
we make today honoring human rights.
They earn less money in a year than
most of us in this hall of the United
Nations earn in 1 day — and even that is
only a figure of speech, since most of
them have never been paid at all for
their work.

The birthright of these people has
been disregarded, denied, and violated,
although it was done not by torturers,
not by jailers, not by persecution, and
not by repressive government. As
President Carter reminded us a week
ago: "Hunger, disease, poverty are
enemies of human potential which are
as relentless as any repressive govern-
ment."2

The freedoms from arbitrariness,
torture, and cruel punishment are the
rights of everyone by the simple fact
that he or she is born. The freedom of
thought, speech, religion, press, and
participation in public affairs are so
fundamental that they enhance the
quality of our life and character as in-
dividuals. Their exercise cannot be
made dependent on any other consid-
erations. But we must understand too
that these rights are hollow for any in-
dividual who starves to death. There-
fore, the human rights struggle is not
only a defense of our individual liberty
but also a struggle to protect life.

The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is a call for worldwide move-
ments to promote human rights. This
call is often heard with alarm by many
who believe that there is far more to
lose than to gain by encouraging politi-
cal, economic, and social change.

Perhaps, in the short run, there is some
cost for those who have special
privilege or for those who have an in-
vestment in thinking of themselves — as
a nation or class or race — as superior or
more advanced than others. But the
plain lesson of history is that as the cir-
cle of participation in society widens,
almost everyone profits. They profit
not just in a better standard of living
for everyone but in the productivity of
the economy, in better social services
for everyone, in wider political partici-
pation, and in more freedom and more
protection for human rights.

The process of change entails risks.
But change is inevitable. It is not a
question of being able to withstand
change or even of directing it; it is a
question of understanding change and
cooperating with it. The change of our
time, the basic dynamic of our time,
leads to more participation by more
people in society. Poverty is the basic
obstacle to the realization of human
rights for most people in the world
today. Where poverty is the problem,
participation is the answer, participa-
tion in the economic life of the society.
Economic growth must be pursued with
equity in mind and not just for the
profit of the few at the top or for the
power of the state and the government.
The ultimate goal of economic de-
velopment must be equity, with
broader participation in production and
consumption by all as the main objec-
tive. Speaking before the opening ses-
sion of the 8th General Assembly of the
Organization of American States [June
21, 1978], President Carter said: "The
challenge of economic development is
to help the world's poor lift themselves
out of misery."

He called upon that Assembly to join
together the concepts of economic de-
velopment and social justice: "We
must also devote our common energies
to economic development and the cause
of social justice. Benefits of the
world's economy must be more fairly
shared, but the responsibilities must be
shared as well. "

To share responsibility is to make
more participation possible. The more
participation, the wiser will be the
government. Prime Minister Manley
made a stirring affirmation of his own
faith in democracy when he spoke to us
in October. He was, you will recall,
urging us to united efforts in the strug-
gle against apartheid. He said: "We
believe that any government which has
the courage to mobilize its people and
tell the truth will receive the over-
whelming support of its citizens." I
also believe that. We must let our
people hear the truth, the whole truth.
And we must not be afraid to mobilize

60

our citizens to participate more fully in
the political and economic processes.

Expanding participation should not
be limited, however, to government
initiative. There is an important role
for nongovernmental organizations.
For the last year the Government of
India has been reminding us of the im-
portance of autonomous — and I stress
that word — autonomous national
human rights institutions.

We need not fear change if we build
into it more equity and more participa-
tion. Indeed, fear of social change is
the thing we need to fear the most. If
we are afraid of it and try to preserve
that which is already eroding beneath
our feet, we will fail, because the
dynamic of history is to widen the cir-
cle of those who participate in society.
Whether the struggle is for medical
care for those who do not have it, bread
for those who are hungry, freedom
from prison for those imprisoned for
conscience's sake, freedom of the press
to print dissenting opinions, a job for
those who are unemployed, the right to
self-determination of majorities oppres-
sed by minorities, the right of workers
to organize, the right to speak one's
own language in one's own school —
all of these are demands for more par-
ticipation and more dignity.

If we invest just half as much energy
and imagination in building a world
community of the people as we have
wasted in resisting the aspirations of
the people, we will overcome.

I believe that we are at the end of the
period of cold wars, in the middle of
the era of detente, and just beginning to
find ways to build the structures of
cooperation. Cooperation will demand
a different substance and different style
than confrontation. It will take a while
for us to learn how to change, and I am
afraid that we will all carry with us for
some years some of the characteristics
of confrontational politics. But it is
more rewarding for everyone, even if it
is more difficult and demanding, to
practice the art of building community
and cooperation for the common good.
I believe we can get just as excited
about building something as we can
about protecting something. I believe
that cooperation for the common good
of humankind can be as powerful an
incentive to our imaginations as fear
for our survival. Indeed, I submit that
cooperation for the common good, for
the protection and promotion of human
rights, is the way to survival.

Perhaps some neglected methods can
be of great help to us in the struggle to
promote and protect human rights.

First, an emphasis on autonomous,
national institutions. We have not
given due credit, nor due attention, to

the creative role of independent, pri-
vate institutions, dedicated to the pro-
tection and promotion of human rights.
My own experience was with the civil
rights movement and the churches of
this country, and I know what they
were able to do in a few short years.
Also, the role of a free and responsible
press needs to be recognized. The press
can be a guardian of the public interest
and a critic of the abuses — where they
exist — of public power, and of private
power, for that matter.

A second way to promote human
rights is the use of the United Nations
and of government authority and influ-
ence as a catalyst and agent of goodwill
in stimulating a process of participation
by those who have common interests
and concerns. The United Nations and
interested nations are doing this in the
case of Zimbabwe and Namibia, where
the effort is not to impose a solution
but to facilitate the building of com-
munication among all the parties which
are concerned, so that by talking to one
another they learn to formulate their
own solutions to their own problems.

This is what the United States has
been trying to do in the Middle East;
acting not as a judge between Egypt
and Israel but as a mediator, trying to
be a catalyst in a process of ever-
expanding conversation and coopera-
tion. This is what the United States, the
Dominican Republic, and Guatemala
are trying to do in Nicaragua; not the
imposition of an external answer but
the strengthening of the process of con-
sultation among all parties involved so
they can find their own answers.

I believe we can be even more active
in this way than we have been at the
United Nations. It is not enough to halt
conflicts and to provide buffer or
peacekeeping forces. It is not enough
to denounce problems or supposed cul-
prits. We must find a positive, creative
role, of being the catalyst of change, of
promoting the process of wider partici-
pation where there are conflicts so that
all the parties are involved.

In the struggle to make all people
free, we ourselves must become free.
Freedom is not some distant state of
affairs when there will be no more
problems and history will have arrived
at some Utopia, some paradise, some
order of perfect justice. Freedom is
solidarity with those who are less free
than we are. Freedom is taking the risk
of working for social justice for all
people.

The United Nations was brought
forth as a result of the struggle for
freedom against tyranny. There are
many forms of tyranny, and none of us
are exempt from the temptation to con-
spire with tyranny against freedom by

Department of State Bulletin

remaining indifferent to the struggle of
others to be free. But our very human-
ity rests in our capacity to identify with
the other and to join in the struggle to
make all persons free.

The United Nations is now chal-
lenged to take the next steps that can
move us forward in the struggle of
humankind for peace, justice, and free-
dom. If we accept this challenge, I be-
lieve we will all be free someday. □

'Text from USUN press release 161.

2 Made at a ceremony on Dec. 6. 1978. com-
memorating the adoption of the Universal Dec-
laration (for full text, see Bulletin of Jan.
1979, p. 1.)

XumibUt

Following is a statement by Ambas-
sador Donald F. McHenry, Deputy
U.S. Representative to the Security
Council, made on behalf of the contact
group on Namibia (Canada, France,
Federal Republic of Germany, United
Kingdom, and United States) in the Se-
curity Council on December 4, 1978. '

The delegations of Canada, France,
the Federal Republic of Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States
may wish to take the floor in the Secu-
rity Council at a later stage in order to
make a fuller statement of our views
concerning the current situation in
Namibia. However, at this first meet-
ing of the Council on Namibia in De-
cember we consider ourselves obliged
to emphasize certain things that are
basic to the thinking of our govern-
ments.

First, we want to reiterate the state-
ment made by the Foreign Ministers of
the five in Pretoria on October 19 that:
"... they saw no way of reconciling
such elections with the proposal which
they put forward and which the Secu-
rity Council has endorsed. Any such
unilateral measure in relation to the
electoral process will be regarded as
null and void." We have repeatedly
made clear our concern over these il-
legal elections.

Indeed, the Security Council will re-
call that on November 13 when it
adopted Resolution 439 the Permanent
Representative of Canada, speaking on
behalf of the five, referred to the so-
called "internal elections" as follows:
"We do not consider them as having
any significance. We will not accord
any recognition to the outcome. Those
elections cannot be considered free and

February 1979

fair and are irrelevant to the progress of
Namibia to an internationally accept-
able independence. We share the ap-
prehensions expressed in this debate
and most notably by our African col-
leagues that this unilateral process
might be used to frustrate the im-
plementation of Resolution 435."
That, as I say, was a statement made
on behalf of the five on November 13.

The second observation I wish to
make is that we are deeply concerned
by the actions of the police authorities
during the course of this weekend in
detaining without explanation promi-
nent members of SWAPO [South West
Africa People's Organization] who
make their homes in and around Wind-
hoek. These actions have deprived a
number of leading members of a par-
ticular sector of the spectrum of politi-
cal opinion within Namibia of their
basic human liberties of speech,
movement, press, and assembly. We
know a number of the men and women
who have been detained and hope that
they will learn of our deep concern at
their detention.

Third, the five must express that
they deplore the resort to intimidation,
force, and violence in Namibia.
Though not having available to us the
facts necessary to base an opinion as to
responsibility, we strongly regret the
acts of violence which took place in
Namibia this weekend. Such actions
and the responses which they generate
run directly against the effort to bring
about the fair, peaceful, and open
democratic elections under interna-
tional supervision that are called for in
the proposal by the five for the settle-
ment of the Namibian question.

Finally, we should like to note from
the current report of the Secretary Gen-
eral the statement conveyed by the
Deputy Representative of South Africa
on December 2nd that "South Africa
reaffirms that it will retain authority in
Namibia pending the implementation of
the proposal." The five attach impor-
tance to this explicit recognition by
South Africa of its responsibility for
the unfolding of events in Namibia. We
shall continue to address the variety of
questions raised in the context in which
I have just spoken. □

lp« rlli c» id

'Text from USUN press release 150.

by James F . Leonard

Statement in the General Assembly
on November 22, 1979. Ambassador
Leonard was acting U.S. Perma-
nent Representative to the United

Nations. '

It is an honor and pleasure to address
the Assembly today on this matter of
great international importance and con-
cern.

The system of apartheid is a clear
affront to the dignity and decency of
man and to the principles enshrined in
the Charter of the United Nations and
the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Apartheid is abhorrent to the
people of the United States; it con-
tradicts the very values and standards
which we hold dear and the principles
of freedom and equality on which our
nation was founded.

The U.S. Government has made our
view clear to the Government of South
Africa. We have stressed our commit-
ment to human rights. We have called
for the elimination of apartheid and for
the full political participation of all
South Africans on an equal basis. We
do not expect these changes to occur
overnight, but we have stated that
without evident progress in this direc-
tion, our relations with South Africa
would deteriorate. As President Carter
said in his most recent State of the
Union message to the Congress on
January 19, 1978: ". . . unless [South
Africa] begins a progressive transfor-
mation toward full political participa-
tion for all its people, our relations will
suffer."2

We hope that no further deterioration
of our relations will be necessary. Our
aim is not confrontation with South
Africa but the achievement of progres-
sive change in South Africa. As Sec-
retary Vance stated in June:

Our policy toward South Africa should not be
misunderstood. We have no wish to see the
whites driven from the home of their forbears.
We suggest only that they seek a way to live in
peace and justice with the majority of their
fellow citizens. South Africans of all races, and
not just its white citizens, should decide their
country's future. We do not seek to impose
either a timetable or a blueprint for this prog-
ress. But I hope, as do all who have sympathy
for the problems any society encounters in
facing fundamental change, that the beginning
of basic progress will soon be seen.

61

We are looking anxiously for signs
of that progress. The South African
Government has a newly elected Prime
Minister. Mr. P.W. Botha, who has a
great opportunity to lead his nation in
new directions; to work constructively
for peaceful change in his country and
its region of the world; to embrace
peaceful solutions to problems which
will otherwise surely result in increased
violence and conflict.

We believe that the majority of
South Africans, including those within
the Nationalist Party, want peace, want
international respect for their nation re-
stored, and want to avoid the gloomy
future which static policies would fore-
cast. We hope that Mr. Botha shares
these desires, and we look to him to
exhibit the vision, leadership, and
basic sense of fairness needed to move
South Africa in a direction of greater
harmony with the rest of the world.

Yet at present the oppression and
suffering in South Africa go on. The
South African Government is planning
for the destruction shortly of the
Crossroads community outside Cape
Town. The United States deplores this
potential human tragedy and calls on
South Africa to cancel such plans.
Bannings and detentions without
charge continue unabated. On October
25, we learned of the detention of Sally
Motlana, a prominent member of the
Soweto community and a Vice Presi-
dent of the South African Council of
Churches. Detained without charge,
Ms. Motlana has not had access to
counsel, family, or other visitors.

International concern for Ms. Mot-
lana's well-being is growing rapidly. It
is unfortunate that international atten-
tion focuses on bannings and detentions
in South Africa only when the promi-
nent are involved, and yet it is fortu-
nate that the detentions of the promi-
nent draw attention to similar or worse
treatment of the less known — draw at-
tention to the egregious policy under
which these actions take place.

We are watching events in South
Africa closely for signs of change. We
are actively trying to influence and per-
suade South Africa to change its
policies. We look to South Africa for
signs that it will cease bannings and
detentions without charge; abolish the
pass laws and all other forms of dis-
crimination; give an equal opportunity
to all for employment, job promotion,
and education; and provide for the full
political participation of all its citizens,
regardless of race or color.

As I said before, we do not expect
these changes to occur overnight, but
we do expect signs of significant
change soon. The present unswerving
direction of the South African Gov-

62

Palestinian Question

SENATOR RIBICOFF,
PLENARY, NOV. 301

The complex problem of the
Palestinian question has been before
the United Nations for 30 years. It has
been debated earnestly by people of
good intentions and deep convictions.
But that debate has not brought us
closer to resolution of the problem.

I have listened to many of the speak-
ers this year. While there is a sense of
historical continuity to this debate, it is
a sad debate. Lives and property have
been lost and violence has persisted be-
cause the core issues have not been
settled. There is another aspect to the
Palestinian question: It is the lack of
progress, the sterility of language, and
the repetition of words that could have
been spoken at any time since 1948.

We must break through this pattern.
We must accord the Palestinians a role
in determining their future. And their
future must be in a peaceful solution in
the Middle East. If we don't do so,
speakers will follow us on this podium
year after year to discuss this subject
like Sisyphus pushing his stone up the
hill. There are practical means to attack
this problem. What we need is the will
to engage in the practical hard work of
finding solutions. There is a peace ef-
fort making progress today. Member
nations can either reinforce and guide
the progress of that effort or repeat
historical points and relive the
tragedies we know too well.

The United States shares with most
of the governments represented here —
and certainly with most Palestinians — a

Apartheid (Cont'd)

ernment raises grave doubts about its
future actions. Those doubts can only
be reduced by evidence of a progres-
sive change in South African policies.
It is such evidence which is so im-
mediately needed. □

'Text from USUN press release 131.

;This message described Administration
priorities in the areas not fully covered in his
address before the Congress of the same day;
the complete text is printed in the Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan.
23. 1978. p. 98.

deep desire to achieve practical prog-
ress toward a resolution of the Palesti-
nian question in all its aspects. I hope
we also share a common sense that the
time is long overdue to move away
from the ideological and frequently
emotional plane of debate. The time
has come to take effective measures to
resolve this problem in ways that will
both assure the security of all states in
the area and be judged by most Palesti-
nians to be just and equitable.

Efforts to solve the Palestinian
problem must proceed from the recog-
nition that there are today more than 3
million people who identify themselves
as Palestinians. Approximately one-
third of them are in the West Bank and
Gaza. Many of them share a sense of
grievance that must be taken into ac-
count by peacemakers, as well as a
sense of community and a longing for a
recognized identity. The task is to find
and negotiate solutions which take ac-
count of these realities of the Middle
East.

The initial response of the interna-
tional community to the plight of the
Palestinian people in the years since
1948 was essentially a humanitarian
one, dealing with their needs and dif-
ficulties as refugees. This effort, to
which the United States and other na-
tions have contributed over the years,
assumed that a resolution of the con-
flict and of the Palestinian question
could be achieved in the short term.
The list of initiatives and measures un-
dertaken by the United Nations to cope
with this problem is lengthy. This body
has adopted many resolutions, some of
which have provided practical benefits
for the Palestinians. Others, because
they were extreme and divorced from
reality, were ineffective and raised
false expectations among this suffering
people. No one, least of all the
Palestinians, needs to be reminded that
none has been successful, whatever the
efforts and sacrifices, in bringing
peace, security, and dignity to the
Palestinian people.

It has become increasingly clear
since June 1967 that the Palestinian
issue must be addressed as a political
as well as a humanitarian question. No
party to the conflict today disputes that
the strong sense of Palestinian identity
must be taken into account. That is
why President Carter, President Sadat,
and Prime Minister Begin spent so con-
siderable a portion of their intensive

Department of State Bulletin

efforts at Camp David devising a
framework for further progress,
through negotiations, toward a just and
equitable solution to the Palestinian
question.

These peace efforts have been and
will continue to be firmly rooted in
guidelines established by the Security
Council in Resolutions 242 and 338. It
always has been conceded, however,
that these resolutions point the way to
peace but cannot in themselves achieve
it. Negotiations must take a working
framework based on these principles
and make of it a structure for peace.

The agreements reached at Camp
David provide a more detailed state-
ment of the principles and procedures
that would govern those negotiations.
The results of the Camp David summit
do represent two important milestones
on the road to a broader peace. For the
first time, they provided the means for
Palestinians, particularly but not exclu-
sively in the West Bank and Gaza, to
have an effective voice in the determi-
nation of their own future. At the same
time, the Camp David accords de-
veloped the logic of Resolution 242
with regard to the Palestinians, recog-
nizing explicitly that there are dimen-
sions of the question beyond the hu-
manitarian which must be addressed if
there is to be a solution.

It is essential that we take full ad-
vantage of what is the most intensive
and the most promising effort ever
made to resolve the Palestinian ques-
tion. My purpose is to emphasize not
only the central importance of this
issue to a just, comprehensive, and
lasting peace in the Middle East but
also the commitment of the United
States, and of President Carter person-
ally in cooperation with men of good-
will on all sides, to achieve the goal of
peace to which the U.N. Charter binds
us.

The cause of peace and justice is too
important to allow those who only
contribute empty propaganda and one-
sided condemnations to dictate its
course. The member nations of this Or-
ganization must forgo the euphoria of
sloganeering which can only detract
from the central issues of the peace
process. They must lend support to the
efforts of those engaged in the less
dramatic but infinitely more effective
and exciting challenges of peacemak-
ing. The legitimate rights and just re-
quirements of the Palestinian people
are recognized, but they can be
achieved only through the long and
difficult course of negotiations, in
which we intend they should partici-
pate.

As we proceed in the effort to re-
solve the difficult question of the

February 1979

63

Palestinian people, it is apparent that a
comprehensive solution must deal with
its many aspects. It must deal with the
question of the Palestinian people,
whether they are living on the West
Bank and Gaza or elsewhere. For those
concentrated in the West Bank and
Gaza, the United States believes that
they are entitled to live under an au-
thority that responds to their needs and
aspirations. At Camp David, we de-
veloped a process for establishing a
self-governing body on the West Bank
and Gaza in which the Palestinian in-
habitants would play a leading role.
They would then help create the condi-
tions that will enable the final status of
the West Bank and Gaza to be resolved
within 5 years.

The United States has a vision of a
true peace in the Middle East and has
the will and determination to pursue it.
Those who wish to join us need only
accept peace and recognition among
neighbors as the declared objective of
the process of contacts and negotia-
tions.

This is no less true for the Palestin-
ian people than for the states of the
area which already have accepted Res-
olution 242 as the touchstone for their
negotiations and a comprehensive set-
tlement as their objective. We ac-
knowledge that Resolution 242 does
not deal with the political dimension of
the Palestinian issue, and at Camp
David we tried to meet that need. Ac-
ceptance of the peace process does not
bind any party to accept a particular
solution, but it does obligate them to
negotiate in good faith and to forgo, as
the Charter of the United Nations re-
quires, the use or threat of force as a
policy instrument.

Despite the difficulties that remain
ahead in attempting to resolve the mul-
tifaceted Palestinian question, the ef-
fort must be made for the sake of re-
gional and world peace and for the sake
of generations yet unborn. The United
States is prepared, under President
Carter's personal leadership, to con-
tinue a sustained and energetic effort to
realize a just and lasting peace. The
participation of the Palestinian people
in this effort is an essential prerequisite
of its full success. We are ready to
work in this historic endeavor with any
and all Palestinians who are prepared to
accept Resolution 242 and to accept
that the ultimate purpose of the negoti-
ations is to achieve peace and recogni-
tion between the Palestinian and Israeli
peoples on bases that reasonable men
will judge to be fair. The Camp David
accords give us, for the first time, the
guidelines to translate these principles
into concrete arrangements. A unique
opportunity is before us. I pray that

succeeding generations will not judge
that it was lost because we preferred
ringing declarations to the toil of prac-
tical negotiation.

AMBASSADOR YOUNG,
PLENARY, DEC. 72

Only a few days ago, Senator
Ribicoff, a distinguished Member of
the Senate of the United States, speak-
ing on behalf of my government at this
Assembly, made it clear that the United
States supports and will continue to
support "... practical progress toward
a resolution of the Palestinian question
in all its aspects. "

My government has expressed over
and over again the view, which we be-
lieve is shared by most of the members
of this Organization, that such progress
can only be pursued through peaceful
negotiations, as long and as difficult as
they may be. We have made it equally
clear that we are prepared to work vig-
orously for peace with all who will ac-
cept Resolution 242 and, in the words
of the distinguished Member of the
U.S. Senate, ". . . accept that the ul-
timate purpose of the negotiations is to
achieve peace and recognition between
the Palestinian and Israeli peoples on
bases that reasonable men will judge to
be fair."

My government will vote against the
three resolutions (A/33/L.11 A. B, and
C) submitted under the item "Question
of Palestine" precisely because these
resolutions do not advance the cause of
peace. It is unacceptable that the res-
olutions, in purporting to support the
aspirations of the Palestinian people,
attempt to advance the cause of an or-
ganization which has not accepted as
the basis for peace Resolution 242 and
the concept of peaceful negotiations to
realize peace.

The United Nations should be in the
forefront of efforts to promote a just
and lasting peace in the Middle East. It
should not allow itself to be swayed by
political doctrines which claim to ad-
vance peace but only hinder it. This
body cannot ignore developments in
the area which promise progress toward
peace; it should support them. Its
members should certainly not attempt
to undermine them in the way the pres-
ent resolutions so clearly aim to do.

It's also important that the United
Nations should not allow its limited fi-
nancial resources to be used for parti-
san, unconstructive, one-sided ac-
tivities such as those performed by the
General Assembly committee and the
Secretariat's special unit for whose
continuation the resolutions provide.
One of the strengths of the U.N.

Secretariat — so evident in its
peacekeeping and mediatory efforts — is
its reputation for impartiality and pro-
fessionalism. Without, that reputation
the U.N.'s effectiveness is severely
limited. This is what is involved in this
matter. Will the majority of member
states support the continuation of a unit
whose very mandate conflicts with the
underlying purpose of the Organiza-
tion? Or will they have the strength to
say: "We will express our views in
another way."? We will not permit the
United Nations itself to be weakened.

My government will continue to op-
pose this unit as strongly as it will
continue to support activities genuinely
and effectively aimed at promoting true
and lasting peace in the Middle East.D

'Text from USUN press release 144. Senator
Abraham A. Ribicoff is a U.S. delegate to the
33d U.N. General Assembly.

2 Text from USUN press release 155. Andrew
Young is U.S. Ambassador to the United Na-
tions.

Occupied
Territories

by Angelique O. Stahl

Statement in the Special Political
Committee of the U.N. General As-
sembly on November 27, 1978. Ms.
Stahl is a U.S. delegate to the 33d
U.N. General Assembly. '

I am pleased to have the opportunity
to explain the U.S. vote on the three
resolutions we have had under consid-
eration today. I believe that my state-
ment will demonstrate clearly the
strong commitment of the United States
to the cause of peace in the Middle East
and to the principle of peaceful negoti-
ation of disputes as well.

The United States has voted in favor
of Resolution A/SPC/33/L.16 regarding
Israeli civilian settlements in the ter-
ritories occupied in 1967. This matter
is one of serious concern to my gov-
ernment, and we have made our posi-
tion clear on a number of occasions
since 1967.

As Ambassador Young stated last
year in speaking to the General Assem-
bly, we are opposed to settlements in
occupied territory first, because we be-
lieve they could be perceived as pre-
judging the outcome of negotiations to
deal with the territorial aspects of final
peace treaties, and second, because we

64

believe they are inconsistent with in-
ternational law as defined in the fourth
Geneva convention. We believe this
issue must be dealt with in the course
of peace negotiations.

The resolution on which we have just
voted is consistent in most respects
with the U.S. position. And 1 must note
our satisfaction with the fact that, in
contrast to similar resolutions in the
past, it states a position of principle
with which most nations would agree,
but it does not attempt to institute
measures by the Secretary General, this
Assembly, or the Security Council
which would hinder the process of
negotiations toward peace now under-
way. Rather, the resolution sets forth
in clear language the views of the in-
ternational community on the question
of civilian settlements in the occupied
territories and lays down a standard
which we believe must be respected by
all.

I must be frank in saying that this
resolution is not constructive in all its
aspects. We believe that its language is
not as balanced or as lofty as it might
be when one considers the important
issues that it addresses. More impor-
tantly, the resolution does not suffi-
ciently take into account significant
developments and the progress that has
been made toward real and lasting
peace in the Middle East in the past
several months. The Camp David ac-
cords, signed by President Sadat of
Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of Is-
rael on September 17 this year, set
forth a framework within which the
problem we are considering can be re-
solved through peaceful negotiation
among the parties involved.

Our consideration of the issue of
settlements would not be realistic or
complete if we did not note that Israel
has undertaken a solemn commitment
to withdraw from the Sinai returning
the area to the full exercise of Egyptian
sovereignty. Now should we neglect
the fact that Egypt and Israel have
agreed to procedures with regard to the
West Bank and Gaza which are rel-
evant, indeed key, to our discussion
today. It is our view that it will be
necessary for the parties, in those
negotiations looking toward a relation-
ship of peace, to define the mutual
rights of inhabitants to do business, to
work, to live, and to carry on other
transactions in each other "s territory.

Regarding the language describing
occupied territories as "Palestinian and
other occupied Arab territories," the
United States does not read this to
prejudge in any way the outcome of the
negotiations on the final status of the
West Bank and Gaza. The United

States believes the inhabitants of the
West Bank and Gaza must participate
in the determination of the future of
those areas. We see the resolution as
consistent with this view, but we have
abstained on operative paragraphs 1
and 2.

My government would have pre-
ferred that the resolution we have just
passed take note of these important de-
velopments. Nonetheless, because its
thrust and intent accord with the policy
of the United States in most respects,
we have voted in favor of it.

The United States has voted in favor
of Resolution A/SPC/33L.15 since we
have long held that the fourth Geneva
convention is applicable throughout the
territories occupied since 1967.

We have voted against Resolution
A/SPC/33/L.17 Rev. 1 because we be-
lieve it makes allegations which have
not been adequately verified and be-
cause the report on which it is based is,
in our view, biased and one-sided. We
do not believe the report or the resolu-
tion contributes to the cause of peace in
the area. □

'Text from USUN press release 140 of Nov.
28, 1978.

\ssistanee to
Palestinians

by Angelique O. Stahl

Statement in plenary on December
20. 1978. Ms. Stahl is a U.S. delegate
to the 33d U.N. General Assembly.*

As I believe the debate on this res-
olution in Committee II illustrated, the
issue at stake here is not assistance to
the Palestinian people. If it were, this
resolution would be adopted by con-
sensus, which the United States would
eagerly join. We support assistance to
the Palestinian people and contribute to
U.N. programs designed to help them
directly as in the case of UNRWA
[U.N. Relief and Works Agency] and
through programs worked out with host
governments in the case of UNDP
[U.N. Development Program], the
World Food Program. UNICEF, and
others. Our commitment in this regard
should be beyond question.

Our efforts in Committee II were
to amend the resolution to
eliminate references to controversial
texts of the past while leaving intact

Department of State Bulletin

the operative language on establishing
concrete projects designed to improve
the lot of the Palestinian people. By
passing such a resolution the Assembly
could have established a clear mandate
for intensified efforts to provide hu-
manitarian and development assistance
which would benefit the Palestinian
people. But this proved impossible to
agree on.

The issue underlying this debate — as
clearly highlighted by the PLO [Pales-
tinian Liberation Organization] Ob-
server in the Committee II debate — is
whether voluntary U.N. assistance
should be channeled through the PLO,
not whether such assistance should be
provided to the Palestinians. The
United States strongly opposes any
move to so harness U.N. assistance
programs for political purposes. We
believe this distorts the purpose of
these programs and undermines support
for them.

Developed and developing countries
have a mutual interest in supporting
and expanding U.N. voluntary assist-
ance programs. They lead to economic
growth and expanded trade, the key
elements of a more equitable and pros-
perous world economy. Yet support for
these programs rests on a mutual con-
sensus.

Donors have accepted that they can-
not dictate local development priorities
to recipients who can best determine
their own development needs. Simi-
larly, recipient countries must accept
that they cannot compel a donor to
support politicized programs which its
government, parliament, and people
strongly oppose. This is an issue which
goes well beyond this resolution or the
question of the role of the PLO, but it
is one my government believes all
should reflect upon.

As to the significance of this resolu-
tion, it is, of course, a recommendation
which the governing bodies and heads
of UNDP and the other agencies of the
U.N. system will have to interpret. In
our view it provides no justification for
any action which would put the interest
of any political group above the inter-
ests of the Palestinian people them-
selves, the host governments con-
cerned, or the developing world as a
whole. The task of the U.N. system as
underlined in this resolution is to im-
prove the social and economic needs of
the Palestinian people, and in this re-
gard the United Nations has our sup-
port. □

'Text from USUN press release 165.

February 1979

65

TREATIES:

Current .let ions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Recommendations, including agreed measures
for conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora
Adopted at Brussels June 2-13, 1964. at the
Third Consultative Meeting. Entered into
force July 27, 1966, except for III- VII, III-
VIII; Sept. 1, 1966, for I1I-IX. TIAS 6058.
Notification of approval: U.S., Dec. 22, 1978

for III- VII.
Entered into force: Dec. 22, 1978. for I II—
VII.

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of
principles and objectives of the Antarctic
treaty. Adopted at London Oct. 7, 1977, at the
Ninth Consultative Meeting.1
Notification of approval: U.S., Nov. 8. 1978.

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes and
protocol. Done at Geneva Sept. 19, 1949.
Entered into force March 26, 1952 TIAS
2487.

Accession deposited: Bangladesh, Dec. 6.
1978.

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done
at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into force
Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Botswana. Dec. 28,
1978.

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the
convention on international civil aviation,
Chicago, 1944 (TIAS 1591), with annex.
Done at Buenos Aires Sept. 24, 1968. Entered
into force Oct. 24, 1968. TIAS 6605.
Acceptance deposited: Barbados, Dec. 20,
1978.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful sei-
zure of aircraft Done at The Hague Dec. 16.
1970. Entered into force Oct. 14. 1971. TIAS
7192.

Accessions deposited: Botswana. Dec. 28,
1978; Nepal, Jan. 10, 1979.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at
Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force
Jan 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Accession deposited: Nepal, Jan. 10, 1979.
Ratification deposited: Botswana, Dec. 28,
1978.

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text of
the convention on international civil aviation
Chicago, 1944 (TIAS 1591), with annex.
Done at Montreal Sept. 30, 1977.'
Acceptances deposited: Barbados, Dec. 20,
1978; Finland, Dec. 22, 1978.

Customs

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with
annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva Dec. 2,
1972. Entered into force Dec. 6, 1975. 2
Accession deposited: Algeria, Dec. 14, 1978.

Finance

Agreement establishing the International Fund
for Agricultural Development. Done at Rome

June 13. 1976. Entered into force Nov. 30,

1977. TIAS 8765.

Ratifications deposited: Greece and Portugal,

Nov. 30. 1978.
Accession deposited: Guatemala, Nov. 30,

1978.

International Monetary Fund

Articles of agreement of the International
Monetary Fund, formulated at the Bretton
Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Opened
for signature at Washington Dec. 27, 1945.
Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.
Signature and acceptance: Djibouti, Dec. 29.
1978.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in
civil or commercial matters. Done at The
Hague Mar. 18, 1970. Entered into force Oct.
7. 1972. TIAS 7444.
Extended to: Gibraltar. Nov. 21, 1978. :i- 4- 5

Patents, Plant Varieties

International convention for the protection of
new varieties of plants of Dec. 2, 1961 , as re-
vised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978.'
Signatures: Belgium. Denmark. France, Ger-
many (Fed. Rep.), Italy, Netherlands,
South Africa. Switzerland. U.K., and U.S.,
Oct. 23. 1978.

Privileges and Immunities

Agreement regarding the status, privileges, and
immunities in Switzerland of the tribunal of
arbitration established pursuant to the com-
promise signed at Washington July 11, 1978.
between the US and France, and of persons
participating in the work of the tribunal
Signed at Bern Dec 6, 1978. Entered into
force Dec. 6, 1978

Property, Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual
Property Organization. Done at Stockholm
July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26,
1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS
6932.
Accessions deposited: Mongolian People's

Republic, Nov. 28. 1978; Korea. Dec. 1.

1978.

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched
into outer space. Done at New York Jan. 14,
1975. Entered into force Sept. 15, 1976. TIAS
8480.
Accession deposited: Spain, Dec. 20. 1978.

Sugar

International sugar agreement, 1977. with an-
nexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. Entered
into force provisionally Jan. 1. 1978.
Ratifications deposited: El Salvador, Nov. 22,

1978; Korea, Dec. 5, 1978; Panama, Dec.

19, 1978.

Telecommunications

Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio
Conference for the planning of the
broadcasting-satellite service in frequency
bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3)
and 11.7-12.5 GHz (in Region 1). with an-
nexes. Done at Geneva Feb. 13, 1977. En-
tered into force Jan. I, 1979.
Notifications of approval deposited: Den-
mark, Sept. 22, 1978; Switzerland, Oct. 4,
1978.

Trade

Protocol amending the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on
trade and development, and to amend Annex
I. Done at Geneva Feb. 8, 1965. Entered into
force June 27. 1966. TIAS 6139.
Acceptance deposited: France. Nov. 27,
1978.

Whaling

International whaling convention and schedule
of whaling regulations. Opened for signature
at Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into
force Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849.
Notification of adherence: Korea, Dec. 29.
1978.

Protocol to the international convention for the
regulation of whaling signed at Washington
Dec. 2. 1946 (TIAS 1849). Done at Wash-
ington Nov. 19. 1956 (TIAS 4228).
Notification of adherence: Korea. Dec. 29,
1978.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the
wheat trade convention (part of the interna-
tional wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144).
Done at Washington Apr. 26. 1978. Entered
into force June 24, 1978, with respect to cer-
tain provisions. July 1, 1978, with respect to
other provisions.
Ratifications deposited: Finland. Dec. 22.

1978; Spain. Dec. 28. 1978; Vatican City

State. Dec. 20, 1978.
Accession deposited: Trinidad and Tobago,

Dec. 15. 1978.

BILATERAL

Cape Verde

Agreement amending and extending the memo-
randum of agreement of Oct. 13 and Nov. 19,
1976 (TIAS 8742) relating to the provision of
site test, commissioning and/or periodic flight
checks of air navigation aids by the Federal
Aviation Administration. Signed at Washing-
ton and Praia Aug. 17 and Oct. 18, 1977. En-
tered into force Oct. 18, 1977; effective Oct.
1, 1977.

Agreement amending and extending the memo-
randum of agreement of Oct. 13 and Nov. 19.
1976, as amended and extended (TIAS 8742),
relating to the provision of site test, commis-
sioning and/or periodic flight checks of air
navigation aids by the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration. Signed at Washington and Praia
Mar. 10 and Apr. 4, 1978. Entered into force
Apr. 4, 1978; effective Apr. 1, 1978.

China (Taiwan)

Mutual defense treaty. Signed at Washington

Dec. 2, 1954. Entered into force Mar. 3.

1955. TIAS 3178.
Notice of termination delivered by the U.S. on

Dec. 23, 1978, effective on and as of Jan 1.

1979. The treaty will terminate on Jan. 1,

1980.

France

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation
and the prevention of fiscal evasion with re-
spect to taxes on estates, inheritances, and
gifts. Signed at Washington Nov. 24, 1978.
Enters into force on the first day of the second

66

month following the month in which the ex-
change of instruments of ratification takes
place.
Protocol to the convention with respect to taxes
on income and property of July 28, 1967, as
amended by the protocol of Oct. 12, 1970
(T1AS 6518, 7270), with exchange of notes.
Signed at Washington Nov. 24, 1978; effec-
tive Jan. 1. 1979. Enters into force 1 month
after the date of exchange of the instruments
of ratification.

Indonesia

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of May 17, 1977
(TIAS 8677), and the exchange of letters of
Dec. 16, 1977 (TIAS 8984), concerning de-
velopment projects. Effected by exchange of
notes at Jakarta Dec. 6, 1978. Entered into
force Dec. 6, 1978.

Malaysia

Agreement relating to a cooperative program to
combat the spread of heroin addiction and
other forms of drug abuse in Malaysia. Ef-
fected by an exchange of notes at Kuala Lum-
pur Nov. 16 and Dec. 8. 1978. Entered into
force Dec. 8, 1978.

Netherlands

Memorandum of understanding concerning prin-
ciples governing mutual cooperation in re-
search and development, production, and pro-
curement of conventional defense equipment.
Signed at Washington and The Hague July 25
and Aug. 24. 1978. Entered into force Aug.
24, 1978.

Romania

Program of cooperation and exchanges in educa-
tional, cultural, scientific, technological, and
other fields for the years 1979 and 1980. with
annex and exchange of letters. Signed at
Washington Dec 7. 1978. Entered into force
Dec. 7, 1978; effective Jan. 1, 1979.

Saudi Arabia

Agreement for technical cooperation in increas-
ing the electrical power generating capacity of
the Nasseriah power station. Signed at Wash-
ington and Riyadh Nov. 9 and 13, 1978. En-
tered into force Nov. 13, 1978.

Spain

Procedural annexes XI and XII to the agreement
of Jan. 31, 1976 (TIAS 8361), in implemen-
tation of the treaty of friendship and coopera-
tion of Jan. 24, 1976 (TIAS 8360), with ex-
change of notes. (Petroleum facilities). Signed
at Madrid Dec. 19, 1978. Entered into force
Dec. 19, 1978.

Turkey

Loan agreement for balance-of-payments
financing. Signed at Ankara Dec. 5. 1978.
Entered into force Dec. 5, 1978.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement relating to privileges and immunities
of all members of the Soviet and American
embassies and their families, with agreed
minute. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Dec. 14, 1978. Entered into force
Dec. 14, 1978; effective Dec. 29, 1978.

Agreement concerning the extension of diplo-
matic privileges and immunities to nondip-
lomatic personnel. Effected by exchange of
notes at Moscow Oct. 17, 1967. and Mar. 1.
1968. Entered into force Mar. 1. 1968. TIAS
8115.
Termination: Dec. 29. 1978.

United Kingdom

Reciprocal fisheries agreement, with agreed

minute. Signed at Washington June 24, 1977.

Entered into force Nov. 7. 1978.

Proclaimed by the President : Dec. 15,

1978. □

1 Not in force.

2 Not in force for the U.S.

'With reservation.

4 With designations.

■ With declarations.

PRESS RELEASES:

Department of State

December 19-January 17

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington. DC. 20520.

No. Dal; Subject

*459 12/19 U.S. -Canadian talks on air
quality. Dec. 15.

*460 12/19 U.S. Organization for the
International Telegraph
and Telephone Consulta-
tive Committee (CCITT),
study group 4, Jan. 12.

*461 12/20 Vance: departure statement.
Andrews Air Force Base.

*462 12/21 Vance: arrival remarks.

Geneva.

*463 12/22 Shipping Coordinating Com-
mittee (SCO. Subcom-
mittee on Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS), working
group on ship design and
equipment, Jan. 16

*464 12/21 Vance; remarks to press,
Geneva.

*465 12/22 U.S., Macao amend textile
agreement, Aug. 10 and
Oct. 26, 1978.

*466 12/22 SCC. SOLAS, working group
on radiocommunications,
Jan. 18.

*467 12/23 Vance, Gromyko: remarks to
press. Geneva.

468 12/24 Vance: arrival statement,
Andrews Air Force Base.

*469 12/28 SCC, SOLAS, working group
on bulk chemicals, Jan.
18.

*470 12/28 Christopher: arrival state-
ment, Taipei, Dec. 27.
*1 1/2 SCC, SOLAS, working group

on ship design and equip-
ment, Jan. 17.
*2 1/2 U.S.. France civil aviation

arbitration concluded, Dec.
9.
*3 1/3 Advisory Committee on In-

ternational Investment,
Technology, and De-
velopment, working group
on transborder data flows,
Jan. 29.
*4 1/3 Advisory Committee on In-

ternational Investment

*7

•10

11

'12

13

•14

"15

16

•17

Department of State Bulletin

Technology, and De-
velopment, working group
on transfer of technology
and UN/OECD investment
undertakings, Jan. 23.

1/5 U.S., Republic of Korea

amend textile agreement.
Dec. 28.

1/22 U.S.. Taiwan amend textile

agreement, Dec. 28.

1/5 CCITT. study group 1, Feb.

1.

1/5 U.S. Organization for the

International Radio Con-
sultative Committee
(CCIR), study group 2,
Jan. 31.

1/9 Secretary Vance and other

Administration officials to
hold special briefing on
normalization of U.S. re-
lations with China at the
State Dept.. Jan. 15.

1/15 CCIR. study group 6, Feb. 8.

1/11 Vance: news conference.

1/11 Ocean Affairs Advisory

Committee, Antarctic sec-
tion. Mar. 2.

1/15 Vance: address at a briefing

for officials of the National
Council for U.S. -China
Trade and the USA/ROC
Economic Council.

1/15 Leslie Gelb. Director of the

Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs, to address town
forum on American-Soviet
relations. Riverside,
Calif., Jan. 31.

1/17 Advisory committees' charter

renewals.

1/17 SCC. SOLAS, working group

on radiocommunications,
Feb. 15

1/17 CCIR, study group 1, Feb.

21.

1/17 SCC, SOLAS, working group

on international mul-
timodal transport and con-
tainers, Feb. 13. □

* Not printed in the Bulletin.

1/JS.l/JV.

Press releases may be obtained from the
Public Affairs Office. U.S. Mission to the
United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza,
New York, N.Y. 10017.

Dale

Subject

117 11/13 Barton: Namibia, Security
Council.

'118 11/14 Momjian: refugees. Com-
mittee III.

"119 11/14 Wells: operational activities
and food. Committee II. □

*Not printed in the Bulletin.

INDEX

FEBRUARY 1979
VOL. 79, NO. 2023

Arms Control

Arms Control ( Pearson ) 55

Conventional Arms Transfers (joint com-
munique) 12

Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks
(foreign relations outline) 43

President Carter Attends Guadeloupe Meeting
(Callaghan. Carter. Giscard d'Estaing.
Schmidt) 36

President Carter's Interview of December
19 5

President Carter's News Conference of January
1 7 (excerpts) 3

President Carter's State of the Union Address
(excerpts) 1

Secretary Vance Visits Europe (Vance) ... 10

U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union 38

U.S. Role in East Asia's Stability (Blumenthal.
Brzezinski. Kreps. Vance) 14

Asia. U.S. Role in East Asia's Stability (Blu-
menthal. Brzezinski. Kreps. Vance) .... 14

Cambodia

News Conference of January 1 1 (Vance) ... 7

President Carter's News Conference of January*
17 (excerpts) 3

China

Chinese Proper Names 22

Diplomatic Relations With the P.R.C. and Fu-
ture Relations With Taiwan 23

Economic and Commercial Relationships With
Taiwan (foreign relations outline) 27

Exchange of Messages (Carter, Deng) . 17, 18

Exchange of Messages (Carter, Hua) .. 15, 16

Exchange of Messages (Huang. Vance) ■ ■ • 19. 20

News Conference of January 11 (Vance) ... 7

President Carter Attends Guadeloupe Meeting
(Callaghan. Carter, Giscard d'Estaing,
Schmidt) 36

President Carter's Interview of December
19 5

President Carter's Memorandum Regarding
Relations With the People on Taiwan .24

President Carter's News Conference of January
1 7 (excerpts) 3

Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Meet the
Press" 11

Taiwan — A Profile 27

Taiwan — The Mutual Defense Treaty (White
House fact sheet) 25

United States, People's Republic of China
Celebrate Diplomatic Recognition (Chai,
Deng, Mondale, Woodcock) 21

U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan (foreign relations
outline) 28

U.S. Role in East Asia's Stability (Blumenthal.
Brzezinski. Kreps, Vance) 14

Communications

The Challenge for Communications Develop-
ment (Reinhardt) 50

UNESCO Declaration on the Mass Media (text
of declaration. Department statement) ... 54

Congress

The Situation in Iran and Its Implications
( Saunders) 45

Tenth Report on Cyprus (Carter) 44

U.S. Participation in the U.N.. 1977 (message
from President Carter) 57

U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union 38

Cyprus. Tenth Report on Cyprus (Carter) ... 44
Economics

President Carter Meets With President of the
Commission of European Communities

(White House statement) 34

U.S. Role in East Asia's Stability (Blumenthal,

Brzezinski. Kreps, Vance) 14

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Hubert H.
Humphrey North-South Scholarship Program

(Carter) 35

Energy. OPEC Price Increase (White House

statement) 35

Europe

Implementing the CSCE Final Act (Carter) .... 40

Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks

(foreign relations outline) 43

President Carter Meets With President of the
Commission of European Communities

(White House Statement) 34

France. President Carter Attends Guadeloupe
Meeting (Callaghan. Carter, Giscard d'Es-
taing, Schmidt) 36

Germany. President Carter Attends Guadeloupe
Meeting (Callaghan, Carter, Giscard d'Es-
taing, Schmidt) 36

Human Rights

The Challenge for Communications Develop-
ment (Reinhardt) 50

Human Rights (Young) 59

Implementing the CSCE Final Act (Carter). ... 40
President Carter's State of the Union Address

(excerpts) 1

U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union 38

Iran

News Conference of January 11 (Vance) ... 7

President Carter's News Conference of January

1 7 (excerpts) 3

The Situation in Iran and Its Implications

(Saunders) 45

Israel. Letter of Credence (Evron) 47

Korea

Korea and the United States — The Era Ahead

(Holbrooke) 29

News Conference of January 11 (Vance) ... 7

Republic of Korea — A Profile 32

U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea
William H. Gleysteen, Jr. (biographic

data) 31

Lebanon. Letter of Credence (Itani) 47

Libya. News Conference of January 1 1

(Vance) 7

Mexico

Conventional Arms Transfers (joint com-
munique) 12

President Carter's News Conference of January

1 7 (excerpts) 3

President Carter's Trip to Mexico 5

Middle East

Assistance to Palestinians (Stahl) 64

News Conference of January 1 1 (Vance) ... 7

Occupied Territories (Stahl) 63

Palestinian Question (Ribicoff, Young) .... 62
Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Meet the

Press" 11

Secretary Vance Visits Europe (Vance) ... 10

Military Affairs. Korea and the United

States — The Era Ahead (Holbrooke) .... 29

Namibia. Namibia (McHenry) 60

Nicaragua. News Conference of January 1 1

(Vance) 7

Presidential Documents

Arms Transfer Levels 49

Exchange of Messages (Carter, Deng) . 17, 18
Exchange of Messages (Carter, Hua) . . 15, 16
Hubert H. Humphrey North-South Scholarship

Program 35

Implementing the CSCE Final Act 40

International Trade Agreements 34

Interview of December 19 5

Memorandum Regarding Relations With the

People on Taiwan 24

News Conference of January 17 (excerpts) . . 3
President Carter Attends Guadeloupe Meet-
ing 36

State of the Union Address (excerpts) 1

Tenth Report on Cyprus 44

U.S. Participation in the U.N., 1977 57

Publications. GPO Sales 28, 44. 49

Science and Technology. The Challenge for
Communications Development* Rein-
hardt) 50

Security Assistance

Arms Transfer Levels (Carter) 49

Taiwan — The Mutual Defense Treaty (White

House fact sheet) 25

U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan (foreign relations

outline) 28

South Africa. Apartheid (Leonard) 61

Thailand. President Carter's News Conference

of January 17 (excerpts) 3

Trade

International Trade Agreements (Carter) ... 34

Korea and the United States — The Era Ahead

(Holbrooke) 29

U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union 38

Treaties. Current Actions 65

Tunisia. Visit of Tunisian Prime Minister

Nouria (joint communique) 48

U.S.S.R. U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet

Union 38

United Kingdom. President Carter Attends
Guadeloupe Meeting (Callaghan. Carter.

Giscard d'Estaing. Schmidt) 36

United Nations

Apartheid (Leonard) 61

Arms Control (Pearson) 55

Assistance to Palestinians (Stahl) 64

The Challenge for Communications Develop-
ment (Reinhardt) 50

Human Rights ( Young) 59

Namibia ( McHenry) 60

Occupied Territories (Stahl) 63

Palestinian Question (Ribicoff. Young) .... 62

Peacekeeping ( Hechinger) 57

UNESCO Declaration on the Mass Media (text

of declaration. Department statement) ... 54

U.S. Participation in the U.N., 1977 (message

from President Carter) 57

Name Index

Blumenthal, W. Michael 14

Brzezinski. Zbigniew 14

Callaghan. James 36

Carter, President 1. 3, 5, 15, 17. 24.

34. 35. 36. 40, 44, 49, 57

Chai Zemin 21

Deng Xiaoping 18,21

Evron. Ephraim 47

Giscard d'Estaing. Valery 36

Hechinger. John W 57

Holbrooke, Richard C 29

Hua Guofeng 16

Huang Hua 20

Itani, Khalil 47

Kreps. Juanita M 14

Leonard, James F 61

McHenry. Donald F 60

Mondale, Vice President 21

Pearson. James P 55

Reinhardt, John E 50

Ribicoff, Abraham A 62

Saunders. Harold H 45

Schmidt, Helmut 36

Stahl, Angelique O 63. 64

Vance, Secretary 7. 10. 11. 14. 19

Woodcock. Leonard 21

Young, Andrew 59. 62

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
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Depart til en t

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bulletin

Mareh 1979

fhe Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 79 / Number 2024

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CHINA / 1

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Department of State

bulletin

Volume 79 / Number 2024 / March 1979

Cover Photos:

Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping in Houston

I Black Star photo )

President Carter in Mexico

( While House photo by Bill Fitz Patrick 1

The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public Com-
munication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and govern-
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developments in U.S. foreign relations
and the work of the Department of
State and the Foreign Service.

The Bulletin's contents include
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and other senior State Department of-
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leases issued by the White House, the
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The Secretary of State has deter-
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printing this periodical has been ap-
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NOTE: Contents of this publication
are not copyrighted and items con-
tained herein may be reprinted. Cita-
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Price:

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Single copy—

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CYRUS R. VANCE

Secretary of State

HODDING CARTER III

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL

Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

COLLEEN SUSSMAN

Assistant Editor

CONTENTS

I CHINESE VICE PREMIERS DENG XIAOPING AND FANG YI VISIT
THE UNITED STATES

1 Remarks by President Carter and Vice Premier Deng

6 Texts of Agreements and Joint Press Communique

12 President Carter's Interview by Central TV, People's Republic of China

15 China— A Profile

19 U.S.-P.R.C. Economic Relations (Foreign Relations Outline)

20 Letter of Credence (China)

THE PRESIDENT

21 America's Role in a Turbulent World
24 State of the Union Message to the Con-
gress
30 News Conferences of January 26 and
February 12

THE SECRETARY

34 Foreign Assistance and U.S. Policy
39 Overview of Major Foreign Policy Is-
sues
42 American Foreign Policy in a Changing
World

AFRICA

43

(De-

Namibia and Southern Rhodesia
partment Statement)

43 Letters of Credence (Congo. Gabon)

EAST ASIA

44 Relations With the People on Taiwan

(President Carter, Warren Chris-
topher, texts of proposed legislation
and analysis)

MIDDLE EAST

48 Challenges and Opportunities for Peace

in the Middle East (Harold H . Saun-
ders)

49 Middle East Peace Talks (Department

Statement)

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

52 President Carter's Visit to Mexico
(President Carter, Jose Lopez Por-
tillo. Text of Joint Communique)

55 Mexico — A Profile

64 New Patterns in Inter-American Coop-
eration (Viron P. Vaky)

TREATIES

67 Current Actions

CHRONOLOGY

70 January 1979

For corrections on population and inter-
national trade agreements, see p. 50

.•- V'

s»*

:d»

Q&

O*

<o^

->., ^HH ■ ■■

v*

&iM

All photo-. courte<.> of the While House

Clockwise from above left:

The President and Mrs. Carter with Vice Premier Deng
Xiaoping and his wife Madame Zhuo Lin, Adviser of
the General Office of the Military Affairs Commission,
on the White House balcony. (Ji Chaozhu, Vice Pre-
mier Deng's interpreter and Deputy Director of Inter-
national Conferences and Treaty and Law Department,
stands behind the Vice Premier.)

Members of the White House Honor Guard.

Vice Premier Deng presents a gift from China.

Vice Premier Deng, accompanied by Ji Chaozhu, greets
children during Kennedy Center performance of
American arts.

CHINESE VICE PREMIERS DENG XIAOPING
AND FANG VI VISIT THE UNITED STATES

Vice Premiers Deng Xiaoping and Fang Yi of the People's Republic of China
made an official visit to the United States January 29-February 4, 1979. After
visiting Washington, DC, January 28-February I, they toured Atlanta, Hous-
ton, and Seattle February 1-5. Vice Premier Fang also visited Los Angeles Feb-
ruary 3^4. Vice Premiers Deng and Fang departed the United States on Feb-
ruary 5.

Following are remarks made by President Carter and Vice Premier Deng
Xiaoping on various occasions during the visit, texts of the documents signed on
January 31, the joint press communique of February I, and an interview of
President Carter by China's Central TV on January 25 . '

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS,
WELCOMING CEREMONY,
JAN. 292

President Carter

Vice Premier Deng, Madame Zhuo
]Lin, distinguished Chinese guests, fel-
\low Americans, and friends:

On behalf of the people of my coun-
j try , I welcome you, Mr. Vice Premier,
!to the United States of America.

Today we take another step in the
historic normalization of relations
which we have begun this year. We
share in the hope which springs from
(reconciliation and the anticipation of a
common journey.

The United States of America has
major interests in the Asian and in the
JPacific regions. We expect that nor-
malization of relations between our two
'countries will help to produce an at-
mosphere in the Asian and Pacific area
in which the right of all peoples to live
in peace will be enhanced.

We expect that normalization will
help to move us together toward a
world of diversity and of peace. For
Ittoo long, our two peoples were cut off
from one another. Now we share the
llprospect of a fresh flow of commerce,
ideas, and people, which will benefit
;both our countries.

Under the leadership of Premier Hua
■Guofeng and of you. Mr. Vice Pre-
mier, the People's Republic of China
Ihas begun to move boldly toward mod-
lernization. You have chosen to broaden
your cultural, trade, and diplomatic ties
with other nations. We welcome this
jopenness. As a people, we firmly be-
jlieve in open discussion with others
I and a free exchange of ideas with
others.

Our nation is made up of people of
many backgrounds, brought together
jby a common belief in justice, indi-
| vidual liberty, and a willingness to set-
tle differences peaceably. So, we par-
ticularly welcome the opportunity to ex-

change students and scholars and to
improve our trade, technological, sci-
entific, and cultural contacts. We are
eager for you and your people to see
and to experience our nation and for
our people to experience yours.

There is a Chinese saying that seeing
once is worth more than a hundred de-
scriptions. For too long, the Chinese
and the American peoples have not
been able to see each other for them-
selves. We are glad that time is past.

China is one of the nations to which
a significant number of Americans, our
own citizens, trace their ancestry. The
American people have warm feelings
for the Chinese. From an earlier time
when I visited China, 30 years ago, I
recall days of close contact and of
friendship and hospitality.

But history also teaches us that our
peoples have not always dealt with
each other wisely. For the past century
and more, our relations have often been

marred by misunderstanding, false
hopes, and even war.

Mr. Vice Premier, let us pledge to-
gether that both the United States and
China will exhibit the understanding,
patience, and persistence which will be
needed in order for our new relation-
ship to survive.

Our histories and our political and
economic systems are vastly different.
Let us recognize those differences and
make them sources not of fear, but of
healthy curiosity; not as a source of di-
visiveness, but of mutual benefit.

As long as we harbor no illusions
about our differences, our diversity can
contribute to the vitality of our new
relationship. People who are different
have much to learn from each other.

Yesterday, Mr. Vice Premier, was
the lunar New Year, the beginning of
your Spring Festival, the traditional
time of new beginnings for the Chinese
people. On your New Year's Day, I am
told, you open all doors and windows
to give access to beneficient spirits. It's
a time when family quarrels are for-
gotten, a time when visits are made, a
time of reunion and reconciliation.

As for our two nations, today is a
time of reunion and new beginnings.
It's a day of reconciliation, when win-
dows too long closed have been
reopened.

Vice Premier Deng, you, your wife,
your party are welcome to our great

President Carter and Vice Premier Deng at the welcoming ceremony.

country. Thank you for honoring us
with your visit.

Vice Premier Deng

Mr. President and Mrs. Carter,
ladies and gentlemen:

First of all, I wish to thank the
President and Mrs. Carter for this
grand and warm welcome, which we
consider to be a token of the American
people's friendship for the Chinese
people. We, on our part, have brought
the American people a message of
friendship from the Chinese people.

The history of friendly contacts be-
tween our two peoples goes back for
nearly 200 years, and what is more, we
fought shoulder to shoulder in the war
against fascism. Though there was a

period of unpleasantness between us
for 30 years, normal relations between
China and the United States have at last
been restored, thanks to the joint ef-
forts of our two governments and
peoples. In this respect. President
Carter's farsighted decision played a
key role.

Great possibilities lie ahead for de-
veloping amicable cooperation between
China and the United States. In the
next few days, we will be exploring
with your government leaders and with
friends in all walks of life ways to de-
velop our contacts and cooperation in
the political, economic, scientific,
technological, and cultural fields.

Normalization opens up broad vistas
for developing these contacts and
cooperation to our mutual benefit. We

HIGHLIGHTS OF ITINERARY
OF VICE PREMIERS DENG
XIAOPING AND FANG YI

The two Vice Premiers adhered to the
same schedule while in the United States
except: italics denote Vice Premier Fang's
separate activities, and an * denotes Vice
Premier Fang's absence.

WASHINGTON, D.C.— JAN. 28-FEB. 1

Sunday, Jan. 28

Arrival at Andrews Air Force Base

Monday, Jan. 29

Welcoming ceremony at White House
Meeting with President Carter
Luncheon with Secretary Vance

Meeting with Dr. Frank Press,
Director of the Office of Science
and Technology Policy

2d meeting with the President
State dinner at White House
Kennedy Center performance of American
arts

Tuesday, Jan. 30

3d meeting with the President

Luncheon hosted by Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee

Meeting with Senate Majority Leader
Robert Byrd

Meeting with Speaker of the House Thomas
P. O'Neill, Jr.

Receptions by citizen's groups

Wednesday, Jan. 31

Breakfast with U.S. Cabinet officials

Sightseeing

Acceptance of Honorary Doctorate from

Temple University*
Talks with former President Richard Nixon

Luncheon hosted by Dr. Press

TV interview by television network an-
chormen*

Document-signing ceremony at White

House
Reception at the P.R.C. Liaison Office

Thursday, Feb. 1

Breakfast with Henry Kissinger

ATLANTA, FEB. 1

Luncheon hosted by the Southern Center for

International Studies
Visit to Ford Motor Company plant*

Tour of Georgia Institute of Tech-
nology

Dinner hosted by the Governor of Georgia

HOUSTON, FEB. 2-3

Tour of NASA space center
Luncheon with NASA officials

Tour of Texas Medical Center and
Methodist Hospital

Barbecue and rodeo

Breakfast with regional editors and pub-
lishers
Visit to Hughes Tool Company plant

SEATTLE, FEB. 3-5

Luncheon with area leaders
Tour of Boeing 747 plant*

LOS ANGELES, FEB. 3~t

Tour of Lockheed facilities in

Palmdale
Reception by Mayor of Los

Angeles
Tour of Disneyland, an off-shore

oil rig in Long Beach harbor,

and McDonnell Douglas Plant
SEATTLE, FEB. 4-5

Dinner with regional businessmen
Breakfast with regional editors and pub-
lishers

DEPARTURE, FEB. 5

Department of State Bulletin

have every reason to expect fruitful re-
sults.

The significance of normalization'
extends far beyond our bilateral rela-l
tions. Amicable cooperation between i
two major countries, situated on oppo- |
site shores of the Pacific, is undoubt-
edly an important factor working fori
peace in this area and in the world as a |
whole. The world today is far from <
tranquil. There are not only threats to
peace, but the factors making for war
are visibly growing. The people of the
world have the urgent task of redou- i
bling their efforts to maintain world
peace, security, and stability. And our i
two countries are duty-bound to work J
together and make our due contribution I
to that end.

Mr. President, we share the sense of
being on an historic mission. Sino-U.S.
relations have reached a new begin-
ning, and the world situation is at a
new turning point. China and the J
United States are great countries, and i
the Chinese and American peoples, two I
great peoples. Friendly cooperatior
between our two peoples is bound tc i
exert a positive and far-reaching influ- I
ence on the way the world situation
evolves.

I sincerely thank you for your wel- ]
come.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS,
JAN. 293

President Carter

Vice Premier Deng, Madame Zhuo
Lin, distinguished visitors from the
People' s Republic of China, President
Nixon, my fellow Americans, and
friends:

This house belongs to all Americans,;!
people who are firmly dedicated to a,
world of friendship and peace. And
Vice Premier Deng, on behalf of all]
Americans, I welcome you here to our j
house.

Your visit here, Mr. Vice Premier, is
an important milestone in the develop- I
ment of friendly relations between the |
United States of America and the>
People's Republic of China. I'm |
gratified that after too many years of j
estrangement, that our two countries
have now grasped the opportunity toll
reestablish these vital, formal links that |
exist between us.

In the past year, more than 120 dele-;j
gations from the People's Republic of
China have come here to the United
States to visit us. And an even greater
number of American groups have left
here and gone to visit China. Ex-
changes have already begun in the nat-
ural sciences, in space, in agriculture,

March 1979

in medicine, in science, in technology,
and other fields. And now with the es-
tablishment of normal diplomatic rela-
tions, the exploratory nature of these

flmany exchanges can give way to a

|more valuable and a more permanent
relationship. This will serve the inter-
ests of both our nations and will also
serve the cause of peace.

Today, for the first time since the
establishment of normal diplomatic re-
lations, the Governments of the United
States of America and the People's Re-
public of China have begun official
discussions at the highest level. Our
discussions are fruitful and they are

^constructive, because both of us are
keenly aware that what we do now will
establish precedents for future peaceful
relationships.

We've not entered this new relation-
ship for any short-term gains. We have

•a long-term commitment to a world
community of diverse nations and in-

' dependent nations. We believe that a
strong and a secure China will play a
cooperative part in developing that type

.of world community which we envi-
sion. Our new relationship particularly
can contribute to the peace and stability
of the Asia-Pacific region.

Your nation. Vice Premier Deng,
like ours, has been created by the hard
work of ordinary men and women. De-
spite our cultural, political, and eco-
nomic differences, there's much for us
to build on together.

The United States, born out of a rev-
olution for freedom, is a young country
with an independent history of only

'200 years. But our Constitution is the
oldest continuing written constitution
in the entire world.

Chinese civilization, with more than
4,000 years of recorded history, is one
of the oldest cultures in the world. But

las a modern nation, China is quite

•young. We can learn much from each
other.

There are many hundreds of
thousands of Americans of Chinese
origin, and their contributions to our
society have been even greater than
their numbers could possibly suggest.

^Our national life has been enriched by
the works of Chinese American ar-
chitects, artists, and scientists —
including three recent winners of the
Nobel Prize.

Like you, Mr. Vice Premier, I'm a

■farmer, and like you, I'm a former
military man. In my little farming
community, when I grew up, our ag-

, ricultural methods and our way of life
were not greatly different from those of

'.centuries earlier. I stepped from that
world into the planning and outfitting
of nuclear submarines. And when I
later returned to the land, I found that

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO P.R.C

Leonard Woodcock of Providence, Rhode
Island, was born on February 15, 1911. He
attended Wayne State University from 1928
to 1930 and later became Governor
Emeritus of the same university.

Ambassador Woodcock was president of
the United Automobile Workers Union from
1970 to 1977. He was chairman of the
President's special commission to Hanoi
March 13-22, 1977. He served as chairman
of the Committee on National Health Insur-
ance and as a member of the board of di-
rectors of the NAACP, the American Civil
Liberties Union, and the National Urban
Coalition. Ambassador Woodcock also was
a member of the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, the Trilateral Commission, and the
Economic Club of Detroit.

He was sworn in as Chief of the U.S.
Liaison Office in Beijing (Peking) on July
11. 1977. and has the personal rank of am-
bassador. On February 26, 1979. the Senate
confirmed President Carter's nomination of
Leonard Woodcock to be the first U.S. Am-
bassador to China, and he was sworn in on

February 28. The United States and the
People's Republic of China exchanged Am-
bassadors and established Embassies in
Beijing and Washington. DC. on March 1,
1979.

farming had been absolutely trans-
formed in just a few years by new sci-
entific knowledge and by technology.

I know the shocks of change in my
own life, and I know the sometimes
painful adjustments required when
change occurs, as well as the great po-
tential for good that change can bring
to both individuals and to nations.

I know, too, that neither individuals
nor nations can stifle change. It is far
better to adapt scientific and techno-
logical advantages to our needs, to
learn to control them, and to reap their
benefits while minimizing their poten-
tial adverse effects.

And I know that the Chinese people
and you, Mr. Vice Premier, understand
these things about change very well.
Your ambitious modernization effort in
four different areas of human life at-
tests to that. The American people wish
you well in these efforts, and we are
looking forward to cooperating with
you and with the people of China.

In his final message, the day before
he died, Franklin Roosevelt — who
would have been 97 years old
tomorrow — wrote these words: ". . . if
civilization is to survive, we must cul-
tivate the science of human
relationships — the ability of all
peoples, of all kinds, to live together
and work together, in the same world,
at peace."

In that spirit, Mr. Vice Premier, I
would like to propose a toast: To the
newly established diplomatic relation-

ships between the United States of
America and the People's Republic of
China; to the health of Premier Hua
Guofeng; to the health of Vice Premier
Deng and Madame Zhuo Lin; and to
the further development of friendship
between the people of China and the
people of the United States of America.

Vice Premier Deng

Mr. President and Mrs. Carter,
ladies and gentlemen:

We thank the President and Mrs.
Carter for hosting this grand dinner in
our honor. Allow me to take this op-
portunity to extend good wishes to the
American Government and the people
on behalf of the Chinese Government
and people. Premier Hua Guofeng, and
in my own name.

Our arrival in the United States coin-
cides with the Spring Festival in China.
From time immemorial, the Chinese
people have celebrated this festival
marking "the beginning of the annual
cycle and rejuvenation of all things in
nature." Here, on this occasion, we
share with our American friends pres-
ent the feeling that a new era has begun
in Sino-U.S. relations.

For 30 years, our two nations were
estranged and opposed to each other.
This abnormal state of affairs is over at
last. At such a time we cherish, in par-
ticular, the memory of the late Chair-
man Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) and
Premier Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) who

Department of State Bulletin^

blazed a trail for the normalization of
Sino-U.S. relations.

Naturally, we think also of the ef-
forts made by former President Nixon,
former President Ford, Dr. Kissinger,
many U.S. Senators and Congressmen,
and friends in all walks of life. We
think highly of the valuable contribu-
tions of President Carter, Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance, and Dr. Brzezinski
to the ultimate normalization of our
relations.

Our two countries have different so-
cial systems and ideologies, but both
governments are aware that the inter-
ests of our peoples and of world peace
require that we view our bilateral rela-
tions in the context of the overall inter-
national situation and with a long-term
strategic perspective. This was the rea-
son why the two sides easily reached
agreement on normalization.

Moreover, in the Joint Communique
on the Establishment of Diplomatic
Relations4 our two sides solemnly
committed themselves that neither
should seek hegemony and each was
opposed to efforts by any other country
or group of countries to establish such
hegemony. This commitment restrains
ourselves and adds to our sense of re-
sponsibility for world peace and stabil-
ity. We are confident that the amicable
cooperation between the Chinese and
American peoples is not only in the
interest of our two countries' develop-
ment but will also become a strong
factor working for the preservation of
world peace and the promotion of
human progress.

I ask you to join me in drinking to
the health of the President and Mrs.
Carter; to the health of the Secretary of
State and Mrs. Vance; to the health of
Dr. and Mrs. Brzezinski; to the health
of all friends present; to the great
American people; to the great Chinese
people; to friendship between the
Chinese and American peoples; and to
the peace and progress of the people of
the world.

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS,
KENNEDY CENTER,
JAN. 29 5

President Carter

All of us are fortunate in being able
to participate in a truly momentous and
historic occasion, the formal cementing
of friendship now and permanently in
the future between the 220 million
Americans and the more than 900 mil-
lion Chinese. We are grateful for this
opportunity to extend our welcome to
Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, to
Madame Zhuo Lin, to all the delegation
who've come here from China.

We are grateful for the opening up of
new avenues of scientific, trade, cul-
tural exchange. And there could be no
better way to demonstrate what our na-
tion is, what we have to offer, than the
wonderful performers who have joined
us tonight to give them just a tiny
glimpse, but a beautiful glimpse of
some of the superb talent of great
American performers.

Mr. Vice Premier, it's indeed a great
honor for me, as President of a great
country, to welcome you, the Vice
Premier of another great country, to the
people of America. Thank you for
coming.

God bless all of you. We thank you
for being with us as we join our two
nations together on this formal occa-
sion.

Vice Premier Deng

Thank you, Mr. President and Mrs.
Carter, for arranging this magnificent
performance by American artists,
which gives us an enjoyable evening
and leaves on us an indelible impres-
sion.

This occasion reminds me of what
Lu Xun, the great Chinese thinker,
once said. He said, "It would be best if
mankind could avoid lack of mutual
understanding and show concern for
one another."

CHIEFS OF LIAISON
OFFICES '

United States

David K.E. Bruce

May 25, 1973-September 25, 1974
George Bush

October 21. 1974-December 7, 1975
Thomas S. Gates, Jr.

May 6, 1976-May 8, 1977
Leonard Woodcock

July 26, 1977-Present2

China

Huang Zhen (Huang Cheng)
May 29. 1973-November 18,

Chai Zemin (Chai Tse-min)
August 9, 1978-Present3

1977

1 Dates are the arrival and departure
from the liaison office.

2On February 26, 1979, the Senate
confirmed President Carter's nomination
of Leonard Woodcock to be the first
U.S. Ambassador to China, and he was
sworn in on February 28.

3On March 1, 1979, Ambassador Chai
Zemin presented his credentials to
President Carter as the first P.R.C. Am-
bassador to the United States.

Art and literature will provide the I
best means toward that goal.

The art and literature of each nation
is unique. International exchanges in
this area will contribute to mutual un-
derstanding between peoples, to
flourishing of art and literature of each
country, and to world peace and human
progress.

No doubt there should be active cul- ,
tural exchanges between China and the
United States following normalization.
Here I'm happy to inform you that the
Boston Symphony Orchestra, as the
first cultural exchange item since the
establishment of diplomatic relations
between China and the United States,
will visit China in March.

We hope that more American musi-
cians, dancers, actors, and other artists
will come to China on performing
tours. We on our part, will send more
Chinese artists here to perform for the
American people.

REMARKS TO REPORTERS,
JAN. 306

President Carter

Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping and I
will meet again tomorrow afternoon to
conclude the signing of agreements that
will be worked out between now and
then. Our discussions yesterday and
today have been far-reaching. They
have been very frank and honest.
They've been very cordial and har-
monious, and they've been extremely
beneficial and constructive.

We have, I think, established a re-'
lationship for future routine consulta-
tion which will bring great benefits to
the people of the United States of
America and to the People's Republic
of China.

Again, we consider this visit one of
the most historic events in our nation's
history, and we are grateful for the
progress that has been made already
and for the prospects of even greater
benefits in the future.

Vice Premier Deng

As for myself, I agree to every word
that the President has just said. And I
also believe that through these discus-
sions and through this visit, we have
enhanced our mutual understanding and
friendship. And through this visit, I am
even more convinced that China and
the United States and the Chinese
people and the American people have
broad prospects in various fields —
politically, economically, in the sci-'
ence and technological fields, and in
the cultural field, et cetera.

Of course, the reception which is

March 1979

being accorded to me and my party by
the American Government and people
has not yet concluded. But up to the
present, I would still like to express
our sincere thanks and appreciation for
the kind reception given to us and
given to me personally by the Presi-
dent, Mrs. Carter, and the American
Government and people, and for their
friendship which they expressed to us.
Let us shake hands once again, a
handshake between the two peoples.

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS,
SIGNING CEREMONY,
JAN. 31 7

President Carter

Mr. Vice Premier, American and
Chinese friends:

What we have accomplished in the
last 3 days is truly exceptional. But our
'aim is to make this kind of exchange
between our countries no longer the
exception, but the norm; no longer a
matter of headlines and historians, but
a routine part of the everyday lives of
both the Chinese and the American
people. With the signing of these
'agreements, we have begun to do just
exactly that.

After too many eras in which one or
the other of our nations has sought to
dominate the relations between us,
China and the United States of America
are now meeting on a basis of equality,
with full diplomatic relations. We've
charted a new and irreversible course
»:oward a firmer, more constructive,
and a more hopeful relationship.

I have come to know Vice Premier
Deng well in the hours we have spent,
together. He speaks his mind, and he
values results. In our conversations
about world affairs, we have found that

• we share many common perspectives.
While we pursue independent foreign

i policies, our separate actions in many
places can contribute to similar goals.
These goals are a world of security and
peace, a world of both diversity and
stability, a world of independent na-
.tions free of outside domination.

Both our countries have a special

interest in promoting the peace and

prosperity of the people of East Asia.

We have agreed to consult regularly on

> matters of common global interest. The

: security concerns of the United States

,do not coincide completely, of course,

• with those of China, nor does China
share our responsibilities. But a strong

■ and secure China which contributes
constructively to world affairs is in our
•interest, and a globally engaged, confi-
dent, and strong America is, obviously,
in China's interest.
The agreements that we have just

Participants in White House meeting (seated, from left to right): Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping;
Vice Premier Fang Yi; Ambassador Chai Zemin, special assistant Qian Siju, Director of the
Protocol Department Wei Yongging, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Richard Holbrooke. Vice President Mondale. Secretary Vance, and President Carter.

signed for cultural, scientific, and
technological exchanges, and for con-
sular arrangements will bring the tan-
gible benefits of normalization to in-
creasing numbers of both our peoples.
We look forward to an early settlement
of the issue of claims and assets, to the
reunification of families, to expanded
tourism, and to the development of a
healthy and vigorous trading relation-
ship between our countries.

In the near future, because of these
agreements, American consulates will
open in Shanghai and Guangzhou
(Canton), and Chinese consulates will
open in Houston and San Francisco.
Hundreds of American students will
study and will learn in China, and hun-
dreds of Chinese students will further
their education in the United States.

Our National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, NASA, will launch a
civilian communications satellite, paid
for by China, that will bring color tele-
vision and expanded communications
to all of the people of China for the
first time.

Mr. Vice Premier, your stay in
Washington is nearly over, but your
trip to the United States has just begun.
You leave tomorrow for three of the
most interesting cities in our country:
Atlanta, Houston, and Seattle. You
will see something of the way Ameri-
cans work and live.

And as you travel from one end of
our country to the other, I think you
will find that the American people are
eager to get to know you and to join in
building the new relationship between
our two countries.

You leave Washington with many
new friends, and you will return to
China with a great many more. And

when you return to your homeland, I
hope that you will convey my best
wishes to Premier Hua Guofeng and to
the people of China.

Vice Premier Deng

Mr. President and Mrs. Carter,
ladies and gentlemen:

First of all, allow me to express my
thanks to you, Mr. President, for the
many friendly words which you have
just said with regard to developing the
relations of friendship and cooperation
between our two countries and two
peoples. We have just done a signifi-
cant job. But this is not the end, but a
beginning.

We anticipated that following the
normalization of relations, there would
be a rapid development of friendly
cooperation between our two countries
in many broad fields. The agreements
we have just signed are the first fruits
of our endeavors. There are many more
areas of bilateral" cooperation and many
more channels waiting: for us to de-
velop. We have to continue our efforts.

It is my belief that extensive contacts
and cooperation among nations and in-
creased interchanges and understanding
between peoples will make the world
we live in more safe, more stable, and
more peaceful.

Therefore, the work we have just
done is not only in the interests of the
Chinese and American peoples but of
the peoples of the world as well. It is
with these remarks that I mark the
signing of the agreement between
China and the United States on scien-
tific and technological cooperation, the
cultural agreements, and other docu-
ments.

Finally, 1 would like once again to
express sincere thanks to Mr. President
and Mrs. Carter for your very warm
and kind reception which you have
given us in Washington. And I look
forward to meeting with Mr. President
and Mrs. Carter in the near future in
China.

TEXTS OF DOCUMENTS

Science and Technology Agreement

AGREEMENT BETWEEN

THE GOVERNMENT

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

ON COOPERATION IN SCIENCE

AND TECHNOLOGY

The Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the People's
Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the
Contracting Parties);

Acting in the spirit of the Joint Communique
on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
between the United States of America and the
People's Republic of China;

Recognizing that cooperation in the fields of
science and technology can promote the well-
being and prosperity of both countries;

Affirming that such cooperation can
strengthen friendly relations between both coun-
tries;

Wishing to establish closer and more regular
cooperation between scientific and technical en-
tities and personnel in both countries;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

1 . The Contracting Parties shall develop
cooperation under this Agreement on the basis of
equality, reciprocity and mutual benefit.

2. The principal objective of this Agreement
is to provide broad opportunities for cooperation
in scientific and technological fields of mutual
interest, thereby promoting the progress of sci-
ence and technology for the benefit of both
countries and of mankind.

Article 2

Cooperation under this Agreement may be un-
dertaken in the fields of agriculture, energy,
space, health, environment, earth sciences, en-
gineering, and such other areas of science and
technology and their management as may be
mutually agreed, as well as educational and
scholarly exchange.

Article 3

Cooperation under this Agreement may in-
clude:

a. Exchange of scientists, scholars, specialists
and students;

b. Exchange of scientific, scholarly, and
technological information and documentation;

c. Joint planning and implementation of pro-
grams and projects;

d. Joint research, development and testing,
and exchange of research results and experience
between cooperating entities;

e. Organization of joint courses, conferences
and symposia;

f. Other forms of scientific and technological
cooperation as may be mutually agreed.

Article 4

Pursuant to the objectives of this Agreement,
the Contracting Parties shall encourage and
facilitate, as appropriate, the development of
contacts and cooperation between government
agencies, universities, organizations, institu-
tions, and other entities of both countries, and
the conclusion of accords between such bodies
for the conduct of cooperative activities. Both
sides will further promote, consistent with such
cooperation and where appropriate, mutually
beneficial bilateral economic activities.

Article 5

Specific accords implementing this Agreement
may cover the subjects of cooperation, proce-
dures to be followed, treatment of intellectual
property, funding and other appropriate matters.
With respect to funding, costs shall be borne as
mutually agreed. All cooperative activities under
this Agreement shall be subject to the availabil-
ity of funds.

Article 6

Cooperative activities under this Agreement
shall be subject to the laws and regulations in
each country.

Article 7

Each Contracting Party shall, with respect to
cooperative activities under this Agreement, use
its best efforts to facilitate prompt entry into and
exit from its territory of equipment and person-
nel of the other side, and also to provide access
to relevant geographic areas, institutions, data
and materials.

Article 8

Scientific and technological information de-
rived from cooperative activities under this
Agreement may be made available, unless
otherwise agreed in an implementing accord
under Article 5, to the world scientific commu-
nity through customary channels and in accord-
ance with the normal procedures of the par-
ticipating entities.

Article 9

Scientists, technical experts, and entities of
third countries or international organizations
may be invited, upon mutual consent of both

Department of State Bulletin

sides, to participate in projects and program^
being carried out under this Agreement.

Article 10

1 . The Contracting Parties shall establish a
US-PRC Joint Commission on Scientific and
Technological Cooperation, which shall consist
of United States and Chinese parts. Each Con-
tracting Party shall designate a co-chairman and
its members of the Commission. The Commis-
sion shall adopt procedures for its operation, and
shall ordinarily meet once a year in the United
States and the People's Republic of China alter- f
nately.

2. The Joint Commission shall plan and coor- |
dinate cooperation in science and technology, j
and monitor and facilitate such cooperation. The I
Commission shall also consider proposals for the ,
further development of cooperative activities in I
specific areas and recommend measures and
programs to both sides.

3. To carry out its functions, the Commission I
may when necessary create temporary or perma- J
nent joint subcommittees or working groups.

4. During the period between meetings of the I
Commission, additions or amendments may be I
made to already approved cooperative activities.
as may be mutually agreed.

5. To assist the Joint Commission, each Con- A
trading Party shall designate an Executive 1
Agent. The Executive Agent on the United |
States side shall be the Office of Science anc
Technology Policy; and on the side of tht
People's Republic of China, the State Scientific ,
and Technological Commission. The Executive
Agents shall collaborate closely to promott
proper implementation of all activities and pro- I
grams. The Executive Agent of each Contracting
Party shall be responsible for coordinating the!
implementation of its side of such activities anc.l
programs.

Article 1 1

1 . This Agreement shall enter into force upon I
signature and shall remain in force for five I
years. It may be modified or extended by mutual i
agreement of the Parties.

2. The termination of this Agreement shall not j
affect the validity or duration of any imple- I
menting accords made under it.

Done at Washington this 31st day of January
1979, in duplicate in the English and Chinesi
languages, both equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Jimmy Carter

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

Deng Xiaoping

March 1979

Letter Implementing Understandings
Under the Agreement on Science
and Technology

January 31. 1979

His Excellency
Fang Yi

Minister in Charge
The State Scientific and

Technological Commission
Beijing

Dear Mr. Minister:

With reference to the Agreement Between the
United States of America and the People's Re-
public of China on Cooperation in Science and
Technology, signed in Washington today, it is
the understanding of the Government of the
United States of America that existing under-
standings in the fields of education, agriculture
and space will become a part of the formal spe-
cific accords to be concluded in those fields

; under Article 5 of the Agreement.

I Attached as annexes to this letter are the Un-
derstanding on the Exchange of Students and
Scholars reached in Washington in October
1978, the Understanding on Agricultural Ex-
change reached in Beijing in November 1978,
and the Understanding on Cooperation in Space
Technology reached in Washington in December

l 1978.

If the Government of the People's Republic of
China confirms this understanding and the texts
of the understandings annexed hereto, this letter
and the letter of confirmation of the People's
Republic of China will constitute an agreement
relating to these fields between our two govern-
ments.

Sincerely.

Frank Press

Director

Office of Science

and Technology Policy

I UNDERSTANDING ON THE EXCHANGE OF

STUDENTS AND SCHOLARS BETWEEN

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

An understanding on educational exchanges
between the United States and China was
reached in Washington. DC. in October 1978
during discussions between the Chinese educa-
tion delegation headed by Dr. Chou Pei-yuan
[Zhou Peiyuan], Acting Chairman of the PRC
Science and Technology Association, and the
U.S. education delegation headed by Dr.
Richard C. Atkinson, Director of the National
Science Foundation, as follows:

1. Both sides agreed they would pursue a pro-
gram of educational exchange in accordance
with and in implementation of the spirit of the
Shanghai Communique;

2. There will be a two-way scientific and

scholarly exchange which will provide mutual
benefit to both countries;

3. The exchanges will include students,
graduate students and visiting scholars for pro-
grams of research and study in each country;

4. The two sides exchanged lists of fields in
which its students and scholars are interested and
lists of institutions where they wish to work.
Each side will use its best efforts to fulfill the
requests of the other for study and research op-
portunities. Each side will expeditiously grant
visas for such exchanges in accordance with its
laws and regulations;

7. Each side will be responsible for the im-
plementation of the program in its territory, in-
cluding responsibility for providing advice to the
other side and relevant information and materials
about the universities and research institutions
concerned;

8. The two sides agreed that the students and
scholars sent by both sides should observe the
laws and regulations and respect the customs of
the receiving country;

9. The Chinese side indicated it wishes to
send a total of 500 to 700 students and scholars
in the academic year 1978-1979. The United
States side indicated it wishes to send 10 stu-
dents in its national program in January 1979
and 50 students in its national program by Sep-
tember 1979 as well as such other numbers as the
Chinese side is able to receive. Both sides
agreed to use their best efforts to implement
such programs;

10. To set each year the number of students
and scholars to be exchanged and to discuss the
progress of the program of exchanges, the two
sides will meet when necessary. Consultations
on important matters may also be held by the
governments of the two countries. In addition,
both sides will encourage direct contacts be-
tween the universities, research institutions, and
scholars of their respective countries;

11. Both sides believe that the discussions
mark a good beginning and have opened up the
prospect of broadened opportunities for ex-
changes between the two countries in the fields
of science, technology and education as relations
between them improve. Both sides also believe
that such exchanges are conducive to the promo-
tion of friendship and understanding between
their two peoples.

UNDERSTANDING ON

AGRICULTURAL EXCHANGE BETWEEN

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

During a visit to China of a delegation led by
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Robert Bergland
in November 1978, discussions were held with
Chinese officials which resulted in understand-
ings concerning US-PRC agricultural exchange.
It was agreed that it would be of mutual benefit
to promote cooperation in agricultural technol-
ogy, economic information, science and educa-
tion, and trade in agricultural products, and that
contacts between organizations and institutions
of all types in these fields should be facilitated.

It was noted that study groups had already
been exchanged in the fields of science and re-
search, farm machinery, citrus fruits, wheat and
vegetables. It was agreed that areas in which
further exchanges should occur would include
germ plasm (seed research and selection),
biological control of pests, livestock and veteri-
nary science, and agricultural education and re-
search management methods.lt was also agreed
that, within the next two or three years, cooper-
ation would be carried out in the fields of fores-
try, agricultural engineering, improvement of
grasslands and management of pasturelands,
cultivation of fruit trees, medicinal plants, and
the application of remote sensing and computer

President Carter and Vice Premier Deng at the signing ceremony.

8

technology to agriculture. Such cooperation
would include mutual visits of, and joint re-
search by, students, scientists and technicians.

The U.S. side agreed to facilitate contacts
between officials of the People's Republic of
China and U.S. manufacturers of agricultural
equipment and supplies. Each side expressed its
interest in the statistical methods of agricultural
economics and experience in agricultural man-
agement of the other side. It was agreed also
that, through the cooperator program of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, further discussions
should be held regarding the products and tech-
nology best suited to conditions in China and
that USDA teams would begin visiting China in
early 1979. Reciprocal scientific teams from the
PRC will also begin U.S. study visits in 1979.

It was agreed that the development of ag-
ricultural trade between the two countries was in
the mutual interest and that its prospects were
bright.

It was agreed that when study teams or techni-
cal trainees are exchanged on a one-for-one
basis, the host country would pay in-country
costs; and that when the exchange is not recip-
rocal, the sending country will pay all costs.

UNDERSTANDING ON COOPERATION

IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY BETWEEN

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

During a visit to the United States in
November and December 1978 by a delegation
headed by Dr. Jen Hsin-min [Ren Ximmin],
Director of the Chinese Academy of Space
Technology, an understanding in principle was
reached with a delegation headed by Dr. Robert
A. Frosch, Administrator of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, on
U.S. -Chinese cooperation in the peaceful utili-
zation of space technology.

This understanding includes:

1. Cooperation in the development of the
civil broadcasting and communications system
of the PRC. The PRC intends, under suitable
conditions, to purchase a U.S. satellite broad-
casting and communications system, including
the associated ground receiving and distribu-
tion equipment. The space portion of the sys-
tem will be launched by NASA and placed in
geostationary orbit by a U.S. contractor, with
continued operation to be carried out by China;
and

2. The intended purchase, under suitable
conditions, by the PRC of a U.S. ground sta-
tion capable of receiving earth resources infor-
mation from the NASA Landsat remote sensing
satellites, including the Landsat now under de-
velopment.

It was also agreed that, through further dis-
cussions and correspondence, both sides would
develop the details of the understanding de-
scribed above and consider other fields of civil
space cooperation which could be of mutual
interest and benefit.

Accord Implementing Cooperation
in High Energy Physics Under the
Agreement on Science and Technology

IMPLEMENTING ACCORD BETWEEN THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AND THE STATE SCIENTIFIC AND

TECHNOLOGICAL COMMISSION OF THE

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD

OF HIGH ENERGY PHYSICS

The Department of Energy of the United
States of America and the State Scientific and
Technological Commission of the People's Re-
public of China (hereinafter referred to as the
Parties), for the purpose of promoting coopera-
tion and collaboration in the field of high
energy physics subject to the Agreement Be-
tween the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the People's
Republic of China on Cooperation in Science
and Technology, signed in Washington. DC.
on January 31, 1979, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The objective of this Accord is to further the
energy programs of the Parties by establishing
a framework for cooperation in the field of high
energy physics, including theoretical and ex-
perimental research, accelerator design and
construction techniques; and related technology
areas as may be mutually agreed.

Article 2

Cooperation under this Accord may include
the following forms:

1. Exchange and provision of information on
scientific and technical developments, ac-
tivities, and practices;

2. Research and development activities in
the form of experiments, tests, and other tech-
nical collaborative activities;

3. Exchange of scientists, engineers, and
other specialists; including visits by specialist
teams or individuals to the facilities of the
other Party, and exchange of personnel for
training purposes;

4. Exchange and provision of samples, ma-
terials, instruments, and components for testing
and evaluation;

5. Such other forms of cooperation as are
mutually agreed.

Article 3

Specific undertakings, obligations and condi-
tions with respect to the conduct of each activity
under Article 2 including responsibility for pay-
ment of costs shall be agreed by authorized en-
tities on a case-by-case basis.

Article 4

1 For the purpose of coordinating activities
pursuant to this Accord, a Committee on High

Department of State Bulletin:

ing of representatives of the Parties and such
other persons from each Party's national re-
search community as it may designate. Each
Party shall designate one person to act as its
co-chairperson on the Committee.

2. The Committee will encourage contacts
between scientists, universities, and labora-
tories of the two nations.

3. The Committee each year shall develop
and maintain a listing of joint activities to be
carried out, and, as requested by the par-
ticipating institutions and scientists, shall assist
with arrangements for the listed activities.
Items may be listed by consensus at meetings
of Commitee, or, between meetings, by agree-
ment of the co-chairpersons.

4. Each Party shall designate its members of
the Committee within two months of the effec-
tive date of this Accord. The first meeting of
the Committee should be held, if possible,
within three months thereafter at an agreed site.
Subsequently, the Committee shall meet in the
United States and the People's Republic of
China alternately at intervals of about 12
months or as agreed by the co-chairpersons.

5. The Committee shall be subject to the di-
rection of the US-PRC Joint Commission on
Scientific and Technological Cooperation es-
tablished under the aforesaid Agreement of
January 31, 1979. and shall periodically report
the Status of its program to that Commission.

6. The Committee may assume other duties
as mutually agreed by the Parties.

Article 5

The application or use of any information
exchanged or transferred between the Parties
under this Accord shall be the responsibility of
the Party receiving it. and the transmitting
Party does not warrant the suitability of such
information for any particular use or applica-
tion.

Article 6

The Parties recognize the need to agree upon I
provisions concerning protection of copyrights I
and treatment of inventions or discoveries made <
or conceived in the course of or under this Ac- 1
cord in order to facilitate specific activities!
hereunder. Accordingly, the Parties shall ap- 1
point experts in these two fields who shall |
separately recommend to the Parties detailed I
provisions which, if the Parties agree, shall be |
made an Annex to this Accord.

Article 7

Both Parties agree that in the event equip- I
ment is to be exchanged, or supplied by one
Party to the other for use in cooperative ac-
tivities, they shall enter into specific under-
standings on a case-by-case basis.

Article 8

I. Whenever an attachment of staff is con-i
templated under this Accord each Party shall

Energy Physics is hereby established, consist- ensure that staff with necessary skills and com-

March 1979

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petence are selected for attachment to the other
Party.

2. Each attachment of staff shall be the sub-
ject of an exchange of letters between the par-
ticipating institutions, covering funding and
other matters of interest not otherwise specified
in this Accord.

3. Each Party shall provide all necessary as-
sistance to the attached staff (and their
families) of the other Party as regards adminis-
trative formalities, travel arrangements and ac-
commodations.

4. The staff of each Party shall conform to
the general rules of work and safety regulations
in force at the host establishment, or as agreed
in separate attachment of staff agreements.

Article 9
1. All questions related to this Accord or ac-

tivities carried out hereunder shall be settled by
mutual agreement of the Parties.

2. Each Party will accept liability to the ex-
tent authorized by its national laws for damages
arising from cooperative activities under this
Accord.

Article 10

1. This Accord shall enter into force upon
signature, and. unless terminated earlier in ac-
cordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, shall
remain in force for a five-year period. It may
be amended or extended by mutual agreement
of the Parties.

2. This Accord may be terminated at any
time at the discretion of either Party, upon 6
months advance notification in writing by the
Party seeking to terminate the Accord.

3. The termination of this Accord shall not

affect the validity or duration of specific ac-
tivities being undertaken hereunder.

Done at Washington this 31st day of January
1979, in duplicate in the English and Chinese
languages, both equally authentic.

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

James R. Schlesinger

FOR THE STATE SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNOLOGICAL COMMISSION OF THE
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

Fang Yi

10

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Vance and Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua signing consular agreement.

Cultural Agreement

CULTURAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the People's
Republic of China,

Noting with satisfaction that better under-
standing between peoples of both countries has
been brought about through contacts and ex-
changes in culture, arts, humanities, jour-
nalism, sports, and other fields;

For the purpose of promoting wider contacts
between the two peoples in the interest of con-
solidating and developing friendly relations
between the two countries, and enhancing
mutual understanding through encouraging and
promoting cultural exchanges between the two
countries in the spirit of the Joint Communique
on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
between the United States of America and the
People's Republic of China, and on the basis of
the principles of equality, reciprocity and
mutual benefit;

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The two governments will encourage a
deeper knowledge of their respective histories,
cultures, literatures, arts, languages, sports and
other areas including attention to general
knowledge in addition to more specialized

study. Through cooperative programs as well
as exchanges, the two governments will pro-
mote and assist their respective efforts to this
end.

Article II

The two governments will encourage and
facilitate further development of contacts and
exchanges between the peoples of the two
countries, including but not limited to inter-
changes between representatives of profes-
sional groups, cultural organizations, news and
public information organizations, radio and
television organizations and academic institu-
tions and persons on the basis of shared inter-
ests.

Article III

The two governments will encourage,
through mutually agreed programs and ex-
changes, enhanced understanding between the
two peoples. Programs and activities to further
this objective may include, but would not be
limited to, the publication and distribution of
books, magazines, and other printed materials;
production and dissemination of films, re-
cordings, and other audio-visual materials; as
well as exhibitions relating to history, culture,
arts and contemporary life; presentations of
musical, dramatic and dance performances; and
sports. In order to make such presentations and
materials more readily understood in the other
country, each government will encourage the
development of activities such as translation
programs.

Article IV

The two governments will encourage the
broadest participation and support by non-
government as well as governmental institu-
tions for programs and activities covered by
this Agreement.

Article V

On behalf of the Government of the United
States of America, the Executive Agency for
this Agreement shall be the International
Communication Agency; on behalf of the Gov-
ernment of the People's Republic of China, the
Executive Agency for this Agreement shall be
the Ministry of Culture of the People's Repub-
lic of China.

The two Executive Agencies shall communi-
cate with one another to review and assist in
the implementation of this Agreement and may
meet periodically as they may agree. They may
reach understandings with one another regard-
ing specific programs for agreed periods of
time, which will guide the implementation of
this Agreement.

The two Executive Agencies will encourage
and facilitate, as appropriate, the development
of contacts and cooperation between govern-
ment agencies, institutions of higher learning,
research institutes and other entities of the two
countries and the conclusion of agreements
between such bodies for mutually beneficial
activities.

Article VI

This Agreement shall come into force on the
date of signature for a period of five years. It
shall be automatically renewed for another five
years unless one of the Governments gives
written notice of termination to the other at
least six months prior to the expiration of the
period, and shall be renewable accordingly
thereafter.

Done at Washington this 31st day of
January. 1979. in duplicate in the English and
Chinese languages, both equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Jimmy Carter

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

Deng Xiaoping

Consular Agreement

AGREEMENT BETWEEN

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

ON THE MUTUAL ESTABLISHMENT

OF CONSULAR RELATIONS

AND THE OPENING
OF CONSULATES GENERAL

The Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the People's

March 1979

II

Republic of China agree to establish consular
relations, open consular offices by each side in
the other's territory, promote the well-being of
each side's citizens in the other's territory, and
foster family reunion, tourism, commercial,
scientific-technological, cultural and other rela-
tions between the peoples of the United States
and China. The Government of the United States
of America agrees to the opening of Consulates
General by the Government of the People's Re-
public of China in San Francisco and Houston.
The Government of the People's Republic of
China agrees to the opening of Consulates Gen-
eral by the Government of the United States of
America in Guangzhou and Shanghai. For prac-
tical arrangements, see Annex. These Consulates
General will be opened at mutually agreed times
in the future.

Done at Washington this 31st day of January,
1979, in duplicate in the English and Chinese
languages, both equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Cyrus R. Vance

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

Huang Hua

Annex on Practical Arrangements

The Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the People's
Republic of China agree that consular relations
will be conducted on a basis of reciprocity and
mutual benefit and in accordance with the gen-

. eral principles and practice of international law.
In the event of disagreements, both governments
undertake to resolve them through consultations
in a spirit of mutual understanding and coopera-

' tion, drawing on the principles of customary in-
ternational law embodied in the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations of 1963.

Pending entry into force of a Consular Agree-
ment to be negotiated, the two sides agree to the
following interim practical arrangements:

1. The two governments agree to facilitate the
reunion of families and will process all applica-
tions as quickly as possible under mutually
agreed arrangements and in accordance with
each side's laws and regulations.

2. The two governments agree to facilitate
travel between their respective countries of per-
sons who may claim simultaneously the nation-
ality of the United States of America and the na-

, tionality of the People's Republic of China. Exit
formalities and documentation shall be dealt
with in accordance with the laws of the country
in which the person concerned resides. Entry
formalities and documentation shall be dealt
with in accordance with the laws of the country
to which the person concerned wishes to travel.

3. United States citizens entering the People's
Republic of China on the basis of United States
travel documents containing Chinese entry visas

will, during the period for which their status has
been accorded, and in accordance with the visa's
validity, be considered United States nationals
by the appropriate Chinese authorities for the
purpose of ensuring consular access and protec-
tion. Such persons shall have the right of depar-
ture from the People's Republic of China with-
out further documentation, regardless of whether
they may also be regarded as citizens of the
People's Republic of China, nor shall they lose
the right of consular protection or the right of
departure without further documentation if the
period of validity for which the status has been
accorded has expired during the course of judi-
cial or administrative proceedings which prevent
their earlier departure.

4. Citizens of the People's Republic of China
entering the United States using travel docu-
ments of the People's Republic of China con-
taining United States entry visas will, during the
period for which their status has been accorded,
and in accordance with the visa's validity, be
considered nationals of the People's Republic of
China by the appropriate United States au-
thorities for the purpose of ensuring consular ac-
cess and protection. Such persons shall have the
right of departure from the United States without
further documentation, regardless of whether
they may also be regarded as citizens of the
United States, nor shall they lose the right of
consular protection or the right of departure
without further documentation if the period of
validity for which the status has been accorded
has expired during the course of judicial or ad-
ministrative proceedings which prevent their
earlier departure.

5. If a citizen of the sending country is ar-
rested or detained in any manner, the authorities
of the receiving country shall, without delay,
notify the consular post or embassy accordingly
of the arrest or detention of the person and per-
mit access by a consular officer of the sending
state to the citizen who is under arrest or de-
tained in custody.

6. Persons residing in the People's Republic
of China who are entitled to receive financial
benefits from the Government of the United
States of America shall receive their benefits

SELECTED DOCUMENTS

The full texts of selected material con-
cerning U.S. policy on China are printed
in the Department of State's Selected
Documents No. 9 entitled "U.S. Policy
Toward China July 15, 1971-January 15.
1979" (stock no. 044-000-01721-1).
Copies of this 64-page publication may
be obtained for $2.20 each from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington,
DC. 20402. (Orders of 100 or more
copies of the same publication mailed to
the same address are sold at a 25% dis-
count.) Remittances in the form of a
check or money order payable to the
Superintendent of Documents must ac-
company orders.

under mutually agreed arrangements and in ac-
cordance with each side's laws and regulations.

7. Persons residing in the United States of
America who are entitled to receive financial
benefits from the Government of the People's
Republic of China shall receive their benefits
under mutually agreed arrangements and in ac-
cordance with each side's laws and regulations.

8. In addition to consular offices whose
opening has already been agreed upon, the two
sides agree to discuss the opening of consular
offices in other cities as the need arises.

JOINT PRESS COMMUNIQUE,
FEB. 1

At the invitation of the President ot the
United States of America and Mrs. Carter,
the Vice-Premier of the State Council of the
People's Republic of China Deng Xiaoping
and Madame Zhuo Lin are on an official
visit to the United States which lasts from
January 29 to February 4, 1979. Vice-
Premier Deng and President Carter held
talks on questions of mutual interest in
Washington. Accompanying Vice-Premier
Deng in the talks were Vice-Premier Fang
Yi, Foreign Minister Huang Hua and others.
Accompanying President Carter in the talks
were Vice President Mondale, Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance, Assistant to the Presi-
dent for National Security Affairs Zbigniew
Brzezinski and others.

The talks were cordial, constructive and
fruitful. The two sides reviewed the inter-
national situation and agreed that in many
areas they have common interests and share
similar points of view. They also discussed
those areas in which they have differing
perspectives. They reaffirm that they are
opposed to efforts by any country or group
of countries to establish hegemony or domi-
nation over others, and that they are deter-
mined to make a contribution to the mainte-
nance of international peace, security and
national independence. The two sides con-
sider that the difference in their social sys-
tems should not constitute an obstacle to
their strengthening friendly relations and
cooperation. They are resolved to work to-
ward this end, and they firmly believe that
such cooperation is in the interest of their
two peoples and also that of peace and sta-
bility in the world and the Asia-Pacific re-
gion in particular.

Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping on behalf of
the Government of the People's Republic of
China and President Carter on behalf of the
United States Government signed an
Agreement on Cooperation in Science and
Technology and a Cultural Agreement.
Vice-Premier Fang Yi and the President's
Science Adviser Frank Press signed and ex-
changed letters of understanding on cooper-
ation between the two countries in educa-
tion, agriculture and space. Vice-Premier
Fang Yi and Secretary of Energy James
Schlesinger signed an Accord between the

12

Department of State Bulletin

two countries on Cooperation in the Field ot
High Energy Physics. Foreign Minister
Huang Hua and Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance signed an Agreement on the Mutual
Establishment of Consular Relations and the
Opening of Consulates General in each
other's country.

Each side agreed to facilitate the ac-
creditation of resident journalists by the
other side.

The two sides agreed to conclude trade,
aviation, and shipping agreements. These
will be discussed during the visits to the
People's Republic of China by Secretary of
the Treasury Michael Blumenthal and Sec-
retary of Commerce Juanita Kreps.

On behalf of the Chinese Government and
Premier Hua Guofeng, Vice-Premier Deng
Xiaoping extended an invitation to Presi-
dent Carter to visit China at a time conve-
nient to him. President Carter accepted this
invitation. President Carter extended an in-
vitation to Premier Hua Guofeng to visit the
United States. Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping
accepted this invitation on behalf of Premier
Hua Guofeng. The specific time for these
visits by the top leaders of the two countries
will be discussed and decided upon at a later
time.

INTERVIEW WITH
PRESIDENT CARTER, JAN. 25

Following is the President's
question-and-answer session with Zhao
Zhongxiang of Central TV, People's
Republic oj China.6

Q. First of all, we would like to
express our appreciation for giving
us this opportunity to have this
interview.

A. It's a great honor and privilege
for me to have a chance to talk to the
millions of Chinese people who are
once again our very important, very
close friends.

Q. You have made positive contri-
butions to the normalization of rela-
tions between China and the United
States. The Chinese people are most
happy about the establishment of
diplomatic relations between our two
countries. What do you think is the
significance of normalization of
Sino-U.S. relations? How would you
assess the outlook for our relation-
ship after the normalization?

A. The normalization of relations
between China and the United States is
a development of great historical im-
portance. After long years of estrange-
ment between our people, we now have
a new and exciting, very happy oppor-
tunity to strengthen the ties of

COMMERCE HANDBOOK

The Department of Commerce released
in February 1979 a new handbook Doing
Business With China. It contains infor-
mation on market research, foreign trade
corporations, contract negotiations, ship
ping and insurance, P.R.C. tariffs, a sec-
tion on travel in China, and other topics
of interest to Americans who want to do
business with China. The publication may
be purchased for $1.80 from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington,
D.C. 20402. Remittances in the form of a
check or money order payable to the
Superintendent of Documents must ac-
company orders.

friendship which our people have
longed for.

This also opens up opportunities for
political discussions between our lead-
ers for improved cultural exchange,
better trade relationships and also, of
course, scientific opportunities where
both our nations would have great
mutual benefit. This original opening
of relations will also permit future
growth in all these aspects of a better
quality of life for our people and will
lay a foundation for the enhancement
of peace in the entire Asian region and,
indeed, throughout the entire world. It
will let our people cooperate with one
another on goals of mutual interest to
the people of China and the people of
the United States of America.

Q. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping is
coming to the United States soon for
a friendly, official visit at your invi-
tation. This is going to be the first
visit by a Chinese state leader in this
country. What do you expect from
this visit?

A. The most important element of
his visit, from my perspective, is the
extensive and private conversations
between Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping
and myself. We will have a broad
agenda of issues to be discussed of
great mutual interest to our people.

We will have an opportunity to
show, through the welcome extended to
Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, his wife,
and his entire party of leaders of China,
the friendship of the American people
for the people of China.

The Vice Premier will have an op-
portunity, as well, to discuss issues
with the Members of the Congress of
the United States, and will have a
chance to visit some of our very fine
cities — Atlanta, Houston, Seattle. This

is an important element of the Chinese
ability to understand the peace-loving
nature of Americans and the common
purposes that we obviously share.

I believe that this visit will be excit-
ing, enjoyable, and a wonderful op-
portunity to show the entire world that
the new friendship that exists between
our countries and our people is impor-
tant to us and will be of increasing im-
portance in the future.

Q. What is your assessment of the
outlook for the world situation in the
new year?

A. Obviously, there are some very
disturbing trouble spots around the
world where people are not at peace.
And we obviously have a need to ex-
tend the beneficial effect of the desire
for peace that exists among our people
to those troubled areas.

We have great need for an improved
quality of life for those who are hun-
gry, who don't have adequate shelter or
health care, who are struggling for
more freedom, and who desire to ex-
pand their range of knowledge of the
entire world and, therefore, their bene-
ficial effect.

We have, I think, a good opportu-
nity, however, with the new relations
between China and our own country to
influence those troubled areas toward a
more peaceful existence, to prevent the
spread of violence to adjacent areas,
and to let people live in harmony, one
with another.

March 1979

13

PINYIN— THE NEW CHINESE SYSTEM OF ROMANIZATION

As of January 1. 1979, the State Council
of China has decided that the Chinese
phonetic alphabet, Pinyin, will be used ex-
clusively in China to standardize the
romanization of Chinese names and places.
Pinyin replaces the Wade-Giles system
(named for two 19th century linguists). The
U.S. Government also adopted Pinyin on
January 1 and former spellings now appear
in parentheses for the convenience of read-
ers during a transitional period.

The new system means that the Roman
alphabet will be used to spell out Chinese
characters according to standard Chinese

pronunciation — for example, Peking be-
comes Beijing. In romanizing names of
Chinese persons, the surname (always
placed before the given name) is separated
from the given name, and no hyphen is used
in polysyllabic names. For example, the
name of China's Premier (Hua Kuo-feng) is
now spelled as Hua Guofeng and the Vice
Premier (Teng Hsiao-ping) as Deng Xiaop-
ing.

The State Council maintains that the tra-
ditional spelling of certain historical places
and persons need not be changed, but if
possible the new spelling should be used

and the former spelling given in pa-
rentheses. The name of China, however,
will not be changed to the Pinyin
version — Zhongguo. The Council states that
Pinyin is suited to all languages using the
Roman alphabet, including English. French.
German. Spanish, and Esperanto.

In August 1978 the U.N. conference on
the standardization of geographical names
adopted the Chinese delegation's proposal
to use Pinyin as the standard international
system for romanizing the spelling of
Chinese geographical names.

PROVINCE-LEVEL NAMES AFFECTED BY PINYIN

Conventional

Characters

Pinyin

Pronunciation

Conventional

Kweichow

Characters

Km

Pinyin

Guizhou

Pronunciation

Anhwei

£ft

Anhui

ahn - way

g way - joe

Chekiang

ma.

Zhejiang

)uh - jee_ong

Liaomng

it?

Liaomng

lee ow - ning

Fukien

m»

Fujian

foo - jeeen

Ningsia

T*

Ningxia

ning - she_ah

Heilungkiang

SSSil

Heilongjiang

hay - loong - jee_ong

Peking

Jfcsc

Bei|ing

bay - jing

Honan

MM

Henan

huh - non

Shanghai

hm

Shanghai

shong - hi

Hopeh

nz

Hebei

huh - bay

Shansi

ill Pi

Shanxi

shahn - she

Hunan

mm

Hunan

hoo - nan

Shantung

lit*

Shandong

shahn - doong

Hupeh

M

Hubei

hoo - bay

Shensi

Rft

Shaanxi

shun - she

Inner Mongolia

rt*S

Nei Monggol

nay - mung - goo

Sinkiang

#i*

Xinjiang

shin - jeeong

Kansu

tr*

Gansu

gahn - soo

Szechwan

QUI

Sichuan

ssu - ch_wan

Kiangsi

am

Jiangxi

jeeong - she

Tibet

ft*

Xizang

she - dzong

Kiangsu

as

Jiangsu

jee_ong - su

Tientsin

*i*

Tianjin

te_en - jin

Kirin

n W

Jilin

jee - lynn

Tsinghai

**>

Qinghai

ching - hi

Kwangsi

re

Guangxi

gwong - she

Yunnan

c*

Yunnan

yu oon - nan

Kwangtung

r*

Guangdong

gwong - doong

I think, in general, the world is in a
peaceful state. The trouble spots can be
brought to peace with our combined
efforts. And we'll be working with
China and other nations to let this in-
fluence be as great as possible for
peace.

Q. This is the first opportunity for
the Central TV of the People's Re-
public of China to have an interview
with a U.S. President. We would like
to express once again our apprecia-
tion. Do you have any message to
, convey to the Chinese TV audience?

A. Yes. This is my opportunity to
speak to the largest audience I've ever
had. And I'm very delighted, on behalf
of the 220 million people in our nation,
ito extend my personal thanks for the
inew, friendly relations between our
people.

I might point out that this opportu-

nity has not just resulted from the last
few weeks of negotiation between my-
self, as President of our country, and
Premier Hua and Vice Premier Deng
Xiaoping in China. It's a culmination
of years of negotiation between Chair-
man Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai of
China, and my predecessors. Presidents
Nixon and Ford, in this country. And
this represents a broad degree of sup-
port from many great leaders and also
the people ourselves.

I know there's a great feeling of
gratitude in China and the United
States for this new, wonderful relation-
ship. And that gratitude is expressed
not only from our own people, but
from the nations around the world who
see our new friendship as a basis for
increased friendship, harmony, and
peace throughout the world.

So, best wishes to all the people of
China, and we are very grateful for this
new opportunity for increasing

friendship and peace in the years
ahead. □

'Vice Premier Deng's remarks were made in
Chinese and translated by an interpreter. Text of
President Carter's interview with China's Cen-
tral TV from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of Jan. 29, 1979; all other texts
from Weekly Compilation of Feb. 5.

2Made at the welcoming ceremony on the
South Lawn of the White House and broadcast
live on radio and television.

3Made at the state dinner at the White House.

4For text of joint communique and related
material, see Bulletin of Jan. 1978, p. 25.

5Made following a performance on American
arts at the Kennedy Center.

6Made on the South Grounds of the White
House.

'Made following the document-signing cere-
mony in the East Room at the White House.

"The interview took place in the Cabinet
Room at the White House and was taped for later
broadcast in the People's Republic of China. Mr.
Zhao spoke in Chinese, and his remarks were
translated by an interpreter.

14

Department of State Bulletin

CHINA

O

Major industrial areas

Oil basins

Oilfields

Major coal deposits

Major iron ore deposits

International boundaries
Major rail lines
The "Great Wall"

Primary Agricultural Areas:

30% or more of the land surface
under cultivation

10% 29% of the land surface
under cultivation

327B 3-79 STATE(RGE)

March 1979

15

China— A Profile

People

Population: Estimates range from 900
million to over 1 billion.

Annual Growth Rate: 1-2% (est.).

Ethnic Groups: 947c Han Chinese;
others include Zhuang, Uygur, Hui,
Yi, Tibetan, Miao, Manchu, Mon-
gol, Buyyi, Korean.

Religions: Officially atheist; declining
numbers of Buddhists, Muslims,
Christians, and adherents to Chinese
folk religions (varying amalgams of
Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism,
and ancestor worship).

Languages: Standard Chinese (based on
the Beijing dialect); major dialects
include Cantonese, Fukienese, Shan-
ghai, Hakka.

Education: Minimum — 5 yrs.; 1968
goal is 8 yrs. in rural areas and 10
yrs. in cities. Literacy — over 50%
(est.).

Life Expectancy: 61 yrs. (est.).

Work Force (560 million):
Agriculture — 85%. Industry and
Service — 15%.

Geography

Area: 9,600,000 sq. km. (3,706,000
sq. mi; U.S.— 3,615,122 sq. mi.)

Capital: Beijing (Peking) (pop. 8.5
million).

Cities: Shanghai — 12 million, Tianjin
(Tienstin) — 7.2 mil., Gaungzhou
(Canton)— 5.2 mil., Shenyang — 4.8
mil., Wuhan — 4.4 mil.

Terrain: Varied.

Climate: Varied continental.

Government

Official Name: People's Republic of
China.

*m

Type: Communist State.

Constitution: 1978 (earlier versions —

1954, 1975).
Party Congresses: 1956 (8th), 1971

(9th), 1973 (10th), 1977 (11th).
National People's Congresses: 1954

(1st), 1958 (2d), 1964 (3d), 1975

(4th), 1978 (5th).

Political Parties: Chinese Communist
Party — about 35 million members; 8
minor parties.

Suffrage: Universal over 18.

Administrative Subdivisions: 21 Prov-
inces, 5 Autonomous Regions, 3
special municipalities.

Defense: 10% of GNP (1977 est.).

Economy

GNP: $373 billion (1977 est.).

Annual Growth Rate: (1957-77):
5.57%.

Per Capita Income: $379.

Natural Resources: Coal, iron, petro-
leum, mercury, tin, tungsten, anti-
mony, manganese, molybdenum,
magnetite, aluminum, lead, zinc,
uranium, hydroelectric potential.

Agriculture: Products — rice, wheat,
other grains, cotton.

Industry: Types — iron and steel, coal,
machinery, light industrial, arma-
ment.

Trade (1977 est.): Exports— $7 .9 bil-
lion: agricultural goods, textiles,
light industrial products, nonferrous
metals, petroleum, iron and steel.
Imports — $6.9 billion: grain, chemi-
cal fertilizer, industrial raw mate-
rials, machinery and equipment.
Partners — Japan, Hong Kong,
F.R.G., Romania, France, Singa-
pore, Malaysia, U.S., Canada, Aus-
tralia, U.K.

Official Exchange Rate: 1.7
yuan=U.S.$1.00.

Economic Aid Sent (1956-77): $4.3
billion.

Membership in
International Organizations

UN, FAO, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, IDA,
IFL, IHO, IMCO, ITU, Red Cross,
UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO, and
others.

U.S.-P.R.C. Relations

Following the establishment of the
People's Republic of China in October

1949, American diplomats remained in
China to see what the new govern-
ment's attitude would be toward the
United States. The new regime demon-
strated no interest in an official Ameri-
can presence, and all U.S. Government
representation was withdrawn in early

1950. Any lingering hope of improving
relations was ended by the Korean
conflict.

Partly because of the Korean conflict
and the mutual antagonism it produced,
there was little opportunity throughout
the 1950's to improve relations, al-
though some efforts were made. In
1954 bilateral contacts were instituted,
first between consular officials at
Geneva and then in 1955 at the ambas-
sadorial level — again at Geneva and
later at Warsaw, Poland. On September
10, 1955, the P.R.C. and the United
States issued an announcement, agreed
to jointly, concerning the repatriation
of nationals.

This was the only concrete arrange-
ment reached by the two sides in the
talks. But while these talks failed to
produce important changes in the rela-
tions of the two nations, they at least

served to give both governments a
clearer understanding of each other's
views on questions of mutual interest,
such as reducing the hazard of war by
miscalculation. The last session of the
talks was held in February 1970.

In the late 1960's the U.S. Govern-
ment began taking steps designed to
relax tension between the two coun-
tries. These steps ultimately included
the elimination of restrictions on the
use of U.S. passports for travel to the
P.R.C. and removal of the 20-year em-
bargo on trade by permitting imports
from the P.R.C. and authorizing ex-
ports on the same basis as to most other
Communist countries.

On July 15, 1971, President Richard
M. Nixon announced that he had sent
his Assistant for National Security Af-
fairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger, to Beijing
for meetings with Premier Zhou Enlai
(Chou En-lai) July 9-11. Dr. Kissinger
returned to the United States with an
invitation from the Premier for Presi-
dent Nixon to visit the P.R.C.

Shanghai Communique. Another
trip to Beijing in October 1971 by Dr.
Kissinger paved the way for President
Nixon's historic visit to the P.R.C. in
February 1972. A joint communique

16

Department of State Bulletin

PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT
AND PARTY OFFICIALS

Politburo

Standing Committee Members

Hua Guofeng (Hua Kuo-feng) — Chairman
of the Chinese Communis! Party Central
Committee (CCP-CCI, Premier of the
State Council

Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) — Vice
Chairman of the CCP-CC. Chairman of
the National People's Congress (NPC)
Standing Committee

Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping) — Vice
Chairman of the CCP-CC, Vice Premier
of the State Council

Li Xiannian (Li Hsien-nien) — Vice Chair-
man of the CCP-CCC. Vice Premier of
the State Council

Wang Dongxing (Wang Tung-hsing) — Vice
Chairman of the CCP-CC

Chen Yun (Chen Yun) — Vice Chairman of
the NPC Standing Committee, Vice
Chairman of the CCP-CC

Other Full Politburo Members

Chen Xilian (Chen Hsi-lien) — Vice Premier
of the State Council. Commander of the
Beijing (Peking) Military Region

Chen Yonggui (Chen Yung-kuei) — Vice
Premier of the State Council

Deng Yingchao (Teng Ying-chao) — Vice
Chairman of the NPC Standing Commit-
tee

Fang Yi (Fang I) — Vice Premier of the State
Council, Minister in Charge of the State
Scientific and Technological Commis-
sion

Geng Biao (Keng Piao) — Vice Premier of
the State Council

Hu Yaobang (Hu Yao-pang) — Secretary
General of the CCP

Ji Dengkui (Chi Teng-kuei) — Vice Premier
of the State Council

Li Desheng (Li Te-sheng) — Commander of
the Shenyang Military Region

Liu Bocheng (Liu Po-cheng) — Vice Chair-
man of the NPC Standing Committee

Ni Zhifu (Ni Chih-fu) — Second Secretary,
Peking Municipal CCP Committee and
Shanghai Municipal CCP Committee

Nie Rongzhen (Nieh Jung-chen) — Vice
Chairman of the NPC Standing Commit-
tee

Peng Chong (Peng Chung) — Third Secre-
tary, Shanghai Municipal CCP Commit-
tee

Su Zhenhua (Su Chen-hua) — First Secre-
tary. Shanghai Municipal CCP Commit-
tee, First Political Commissar of the
Navy

Wang Zhen (Wang Chen) — Vice Premier of
the State Council

Wei Guoqing (Wei Kuo-ching) — Vice
Chairman of the NPC Standing Commit-
tee, First Secretary, Guangdong
(Kwangtung) Provincial CCP Committee

Xu Shiyou (Hsu Shih-yu) — Commander of
the Guangzhou (Canton) Military Region

Xu Xiangqian (Hsu Hsiang-chien) — Vice
Premier of the State Council Minister of
National Defense

Yu Qiuli (Yu Chiu-Ii) — Vice Premier of the
State Council. Minister in Charge of the
State Planning Commission

Zhang Tingfa (Chang Ting-fa) —
Commander of the Air Force

Alternate Politburo Members

Chen Muha (Chen Mu-hua) — Vice Premier
of the State Council. Minister of Eco-
nomic Relations with Foreign Countries

Seypidin (Saifudin) — Vice Chairman of the
NPC Standing Committee

Zhao Ziyang (Chao Tzu-yang) — First Sec-
retary, Sichuan (Szechwan) Provincial
CCP Committee

Ministers

Huang Hua (Huang Hua) — Foreign Affairs

Xu Xiangqian (Hsu Hsiang-chien) —
National Defense

Yu Qiuli (Yu Chiu-li)— State Planning
Commission

Kang Shien (Kang Shih-en) — State Eco-
nomic Commission

Gu Mu (Ku Mu) — State Capital Construc-
tion Commission

Fang Yi (Fang I) — State Scientific and

Technological Commission
Yang Jingren (Yang Ching-jen) —

Nationalities Affairs Commission
Zhao Cangbi (Chao Tsang-pi) — Public Se-
curity
Cheng Zihua (Cheng Tzu-hua)— Civil Af-
fairs
Li Qiang (Li Chiang) — Foreign Trade
Chen Muhua (Chen Mu-hua) — Economic

Relations with Foreign Countries
Yang Ligong (Yang Li-kung) — Agriculture

and Forestry
Tang Ke (Tang Ko) — Metallurgical Industry
Zhou Zijian (Chou Tze-chien) — First

Ministry of Machine Building
Liu Wei (Liu Wei) — Second Ministry of

Machine Building
Lu Dong (Lu Tung) — Third Ministry of

Machine Building
Qian Min (Chien Min) — Fourth Ministry of

Machine Building
Zhang Zhen (Chang Chen) — Fifth Ministry

of Machine Building
Chai Shufan (Chai Shu-fan) — Sixth Minis-
try of Machine Building
Song Renqiong (Sung Jen-chiung) —

Seventh Ministry of Machine Building
Xiao Han (Hsiao Han) — Coal Industry
Song Zhenming (Sung Chen-ming) —

Petroleum Industry
Sun Jingwen (Sun Ching-wen) — Chemical

Industry
Qian Zhengying (Chien Cheng-ying) —

Water Conservancy and Power
Qian Zhiguang (Chien Chih-kuang) —

Textile Industry
Liang Lingguang (Liang Ling-kuang) —

Light Industry
Guo Weicheng (Kuo Wei-cheng) — Railways
Ye Fei (Yeh Fei) — Communications
Wang Zigang (Wang Tzu-kang) — Posts and

Telecommunications
Zhang Jingfu (Chang Ching-fu) — Finance
Yao Yilin (Yao I-lin) — Commerce
Huang Zhen (Huang Chen) — Culture
Liu Xiyao (Liu Hsi-yao) — Education
Jiang Yizhen (Chiang I-chen) — Public

Health
Wang Meng (Wang Meng) — Physical Cul-
ture and Sports Commission

was issued in Shanghai at the end of
the President's visit (and is popularly
known by the name of that city).' It
noted that:

There are essential differences between [the
P.R.C.] and the United States in their social
systems and foreign policies. However, the two
sides agreed that countries, regardless of their
social systems, should conduct their relations
on the principles of respect for the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of all states, non-
aggression against other states, non-
interference in the internal affairs of other
states, equality and mutual benefit, and peace-
ful coexistence.

The communique outlined a number
of other agreed principles, which
President Nixon described as a
framework for our relations and a
yardstick by which to measure each
other's performance. The principles
show U.S.-P.R.C. agreement that:

• International disputes should be
settled without the threat or use of
force.

• Progress toward the normalization
of relations between China and the
United States is in the interest of all
countries.

• Both wish to reduce the danger of
international military conflict.

• Neither should seek hegemony in
the Asia-Pacific region and that each is
opposed to any efforts to establish such
hegemony.

• Neither is prepared to negotiate on
behalf of any third party nor to enter
into agreements with the other directed
at other states.

Both sides further agreed to:

• Expand exchanges in such fields as
science, technology, culture, sports,
and journalism;

March 1979

17

• Facilitate the development of
bilateral trade; and

• Stay in contact through various
official channels.

The two sides also reviewed the
longstanding serious disputes between
them. The P.R.C. stated that Taiwan is
a province of China, that the liberation
of Taiwan is China's internal affair,
and that all U.S. forces and military in-
stallations must be withdrawn from the
island.

The United States acknowledged that
all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan
Strait maintain there is but one China
of which Taiwan is a part, declared that
it does not challenge that position, and
reaffirmed its interest in a peaceful set-
tlement of the Taiwan question by the
Chinese themselves. With the prospect
of such a settlement in mind, the
United States affirmed the ultimate
objective of the withdrawal of all U.S.
forces and military installations from
Taiwan, pledging in the meantime to
reduce progressively our military pres-
ence in Taiwan as tension in the area
diminishes.

After President Nixon's visit, both
sides pursued the normalization of their
relations in accordance with the Shang-
hai communique:

• Many thousands of U.S. citizens
visited the P.R.C.

• Increasing numbers of U.S. busi-
nessmen visited the semiannual
Guangzhou (Canton) trade fair.

• U.S. trade with the P.R.C. rose
from $95 million in 1972 to $754 mil-
lion in 1972 and reached a level of
$934 million the following year. Due
to reduced Chinese grain purchases
from the United States, trade declined
rapidly to $336 million in 1976, before
moving back up to $375 million in
1977.

Trade in 1978 is expected to hit a
new peak of over $1 billion largely due
to the resumption of U.S. grain ex-
ports. Further increases in trade are ex-
pected in 1979. Chinese contracts for
U.S. plants and equipment will main-
tain the upward momentum of trade.
Contracts signed in 1978 with the
United States totaled more than $2 bil-
lion and many other negotiations are
underway.

• More than 105 exchanges were
facilitated between the two govern-
ments, including the 1978 China pe-
troleum delegation hosted by the De-
partment of Energy and the 1975
exhibition in the United States of the

Archeological Finds of the P.R.C.
These exchanges have covered a broad
range of cultural, scientific, and edu-
cational concerns. Other exchanges
have been arranged directly between
the Chinese and private American indi-
viduals and groups.

• Liaison Offices were established at
Beijing (Peking) and Washington,
D.C.. in May 1973.

Continuing Discussions. Secretary
Kissinger visited Beijing for talks with
Chinese leaders on June 1, 1972, Feb-
ruary 1973, November 1973,
November 1974, and October 1975.
President Ford visited Beijing in De-
cember 1975.

Soon after entering office in January
1977, President Carter endorsed the
Shanghai communique and reiterated
the U.S. commitment to the goal of
normalizing relations with the People's
Republic of China. Secretary of State
Vance made the first visit by a high
official of the Carter Administration in
August 1977, immediately after the
ljth Chinese Communist Party Con-
gress. President Carter's Assistant for
National Security Affairs, Dr. Zbig-
niew Brzezinski, visited Beijing in
May 1978.

Ambassador Leonard Woodcock,
Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office at
Beijing, held discussions with Chinese
leaders on normalization of relations
beginning in the summer of 1978.
These discussions culminated in
agreement, immediately after which,
on December 15, 1978, the United
States and the People's Republic of
China issued a joint communique an-
nouncing the establishment of diplo-
matic relations as of January 1, 1979. 2

The communique reaffirmed the
principles of the Shanghai communique
and stated that the United States
". . . acknowledges the Chinese posi-
tion that there is but one China and
Taiwan is part of China." The com-
munique further stated that ". . .the
people of the United States will main-
tain cultural, commercial, and other
unofficial relations with the people on
Taiwan." Under the terms of the com-
munique, the United States and the
P.R.C. exchanged Ambassadors and
established Embassies on March 1,
1979. □

CHINA: COMMODITY

COMPOSITION OF TRADE

1977

Million

"c Of

U.S. $

Total

EXPORTS (f.o.b.)

7,955

100

Agricultural

2,840

36

Animals, meal, and fish

650

8

Grain

455

6

Fruits and vegetables

490

6

Oilseeds

90

1

Textile fibers

290

4

Crude animal materials

330

4

Other

535

7

Extractive

1,000

13

Crude minerals and metals

120

2

Crude oil

785

10

Coal

95

1

Manufacturing

4,115

51

Petroleum products

230

3

Chemicals

380

5

Metals and metal products

355

4

Machinery and equipment

270

3

Textile yarn and fabric

1.300

16

Clothing and footwear

625

8

Other light manufactures

955

12

IMPORTS (c.i.f.)

7,100

100

Foodstuffs

1.230

17

Grain

745

10

Sugar

320

5

Other

165

2

Industrial supplies

4,545

65

Rubber

225

3

Textile fibers

500

7

Chemicals

885

12

Iron and steel

1,570

22

Nonferrous metals

265

4

Metal products

55

1

Other

1,045

15

Capital goods

1,290

18

Nonelectric machinery

455

6

Electric machinery

105

1

Transport equipment

640

9

Other

90

1

Consumer goods

35

Negl

SOURCE: "China: International Trade

1977-78," CIA. Dec. 197$

.

Taken from the Department of State's January
1979 edition of the Background Notes on
China. Copies of the complete Note may be
purchased for 70( from the Superintendent of

Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office.
Washington. DC. 20402 (a 25% discount is al-
lowed when ordering 100 or more Notes mailed
to the same address).

'For text of the Shanghai communique, see
Bulletin of Mar. 20, 1972, p. 435.

2For text of the joint communique and other
related material, see Bulletin of Jan. 1979,
p. 25.

Department of State Bulletin

CHINA: TRADE BY AREA AND SELECTED COUNTRIES1

(million

U.S. $)

1976

1977

Total

Exports

Imports

Balance

Total

Exports

Imports

Balance

TOTAL (ALL COUNTRIES)

13,275

7,265

6,010

1,255

15,055

7,955

7,100

855

Non-Communist Countries

10,930

6,025

4,905

1,120

12,530

6,580

5,950

630

Developed Countries

6.805

2,695

4,110

-1,415

7,450

2,925

4,525

1,600

East Asia and Pacific

3,470

1,420

2,050

-630

4.205

1,620

2,585

-965

Australia

380

102

278

-176

631

124

507

-383

Japan

3,052

1,306

1,746

-440

3,509

1.473

2.036

-562

Western Europe2

2,675

985

1,690

-705

2,395

1,025

1,370

-345

France

571

169

402

-233

278

169

110

59

Italy

278

135

143

-8

240

140

100

-40

United Kingdom

277

136

141

-5

284

159

125

34

West Germany

952

236

716

-480

826

250

576

-325

North America

660

290

370

-80

850

280

570

-290

United States

351

202

149

53

391

203

188

14

Canada

309

90

219

-129

459

77

381

-304

Less Developed Countries

2,465

1,700

765

935

3.250

1.865

1.385

480

Southeast Asia

860

660

200

460

1,135

720

415

305

Malaysia

147

97

50

47

260

134

126

8

Singapore

295

254

41

213

324

262

62

200

South Asia

280

180

100

80

325

210

115

95

Iran

95

89

6

83

95

75

20

55

Pakistan

79

61

18

43

88

70

18

52

Middle East

440

285

155

130

520

375

145

230

Iraq

101

51

50

1

65

45

20

25

Kuwait

82

72

10

62

100

75

25

50

North Africa

175

110

65

45

225

130

90

40

Egypt

98

39

59

-20

90

45

45

0

Morocco

21

18

3

15

42

23

19

4

Sub-Saharan Africa

515

415

100

315

555

385

170

215

Nigeria

129

128

1

127

135

130

5

125

Sudan

53

26

27

-1

89

27

62

-35

Latin America

200

60

140

-80

495

45

450

-410

Argentina

3

Negl

3

-3

117

1

117

-116

Brazil

10

Negl

10

-10

179

Negl

179

-179

Hong Kong and Macao3

1,660

1,630

30

1,600

1.840

1,795

45

1,750

Communist Countries

2,345

1,240

1,105

135

2,520

1,370

1.150

225

USSR

417

179

238

-59

338

177

161

16

Eastern Europe

985

435

550

-115

1,220

600

625

-25

Czechoslovakia

126

56

70

-14

138

66

72

-6

East Germany

200

96

104

-8

225

110

115

-5

Romania

451

202

249

-47

600

300

300

0

Far East4

620

460

160

300

630

420

210

210

Other5

320

165

155

10

330

175

155

25

'Data for individual countries are rounded to nearest $1 million. All other data are

rounded to the nearest $5

million. Because of rounding.

components may not add to the totals

shown.

2 Including Spain, Portuga

, Greece

and Malta

''Including entrepot trade

with third

countries;

Hong Kor

g reexports

to third countries of $493

million in 1976 and $534

million in

1977;

reexports to China of $25 m

llion in 1976 and $38 million

in 1977.

4 Including North Korea, Mongolia,

Vietnam,

Cambodia

and Laos.

5 Including Yugoslavia, Cuba, and Albania.

SOURCE: Based on "China

International Trade

1977-78.

- CIA, Dec

1978.

March 1979

19

1/.S.-P.RX. Economic Relations

Foreign Relations Outline1

During the Korean War, commercial
relations between the United States and
the People's Republic of China
(P.R.C.) were severed. The U.S. Gov-
ernment froze P.R.C. assets in the
United States and prohibited trade and
U.S. dollar transactions with China. At
the same time Beijing (Peking)
nationalized U.S. assets in China.
Following President Nixon's visit to
China in February 1972, direct trade
relations were restored. The Shanghai
communique pledged both nations to

work toward increasing trade, and U.S.
Government restrictions on trade, ship-
ping, and financial transactions with
China were lifted.

Trade Flows

Trade soared as China turned to the
United States in 1973-74 for agricul-
tural imports. Delivery of U.S. grain,
cotton, and soybeans was the major
factor in boosting U.S. exports to
China to $807 million in 1974. Other
major U.S. exports have included 10
Boeing 707 aircraft, 8 ammonia plants.

and sizable amounts of oil-drilling and
exploration equipment. The People's
Republic of China, enjoying improved
harvests and facing balance-of-
payments problems, phased out imports
of U.S. agricultural products in 1975.
U.S. exports to China fell to $135 mil-
lion in 1976 and recovered slightly to
$172 million in 1977, when cotton de-
liveries resumed.

U.S. imports from China have grown
at a steady but more moderate pace,
rising to $203 million in 1977. These
imports have consisted largely of tex-
tiles, bristles and feathers, fireworks,
antiques and handicrafts, and nonfer-
rous metals. With the resumption of
U.S. grain sales, two-way trade in
1978 jumped to an estimated $1.4 bil-
lion. U.S. exports will total about $950
million, of which over $600 million
will be agricultural products.

Highlights of U.S.-China Trade1

Million U.S. $
4nn

_,./-, Cotton and Grain Shipments Peak /

300 / \ /

„„ l\ Wheat Deliveries End /

/ 1 A

?nn I \ / 1

Exports/

/ * 1 Fertilizer Plant Deliveries

isn / I

Cotton Shipments Begin / I Cotton

x/ I

mn / 1

Deliveries End /
„ China Buys Aluminum S

Grain Shipments Begin / Boeing Aircraft 1

\ / Deliveries 1 ^^

1 N[ Agricultural
\ / \ Exports Resume

/

# •
# •
/ •

•

^ Export Controls Lifted j.^^/ | /

^* -••- \ -• \**«i

/ 1 •* ***V* " 1/
Import / / .••**•••..•• ** \ /^n/

••*

Imports

i I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 II III IV 1 II III IV 1 II III IV 1 II III IV 1 II III IV 1 II III IV 1 II III IV 1 II III IV

1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

1 . Data is from U.S. Department of Commerce and shows both exports and imports on an fob. basis.

Source: "China: International Trade 1977-78." Central Intelligence Agency, Dec. 1978 (chart updated with data for 1978 quarters III and IV)

20

CHINA: TOP 10 TRADING

PARTNERS

Tola

1 Trade

(Million US St

1976

1977

Japan 3,052

3.509

Hong Kong 1,620

1,799

West Germany 952

826

Australia 380

631

Romania 451

600

Canada 309

459

United States 351

391

U.S.S.R. 417

338

Singapore 295

324

United Kingdom 277

284

SOURCE: "China: International

Trade,

1977-78," CIA, Dec. 1978.

Postnormalization Prospects
for U.S.-China Trade

The current Chinese leadership is
committed to economic modernization
and has set up an ambitious 10-year
plan (1975-85) to pursue this goal.
Major targets include constructing 120
industrial projects and producing 400
million tons of grain and 60 million
tons of steel by 1985. Foreign trade,
particularly acquisition of foreign tech-
nology, has high priority. Contracts for
Western plants and equipment worth
more than $8 billion have been signed;
further negotiations could push the
total to $40-50 billion in the next few
years. China's foreign trade, estimated
at $20 billion in 1978, is expected to
increase 10% to 20% per year.

Normalization of relations will im-
prove the existing good prospects for
U.S.-China trade. Two-way trade is
expected to reach $1.6 billion in 1979.
Continued large sales of agricultural
products will push U.S. exports to over
$1.2 billion. U.S. firms have already
begun to benefit from Beijing's wide-
ranging search for advanced technol-
ogy. Major agreements signed thus far
include:

• Iron ore mines and processing
facilities from U.S. Steel — $1 billion,
Bethlehem Steel — more than $100 mil-
lion, and Kaiser Engineers — $5 mil-
lion;

• Fifteen 1 ,000-room hotels from
Intercontinental Hotels and Hyatt worth
over $1 billion;

• Copper mine development by
Fluor worth $800 million; and

• Three Boeing 747 aircraft worth
$150 million.

Immediate Benefits

The most immediate benefit from
normalization will be the change in the
P.R.C.'s policy of treating the United
States as a residual supplier —
purchasing U.S. goods only when
comparable products were not available
from suppliers in countries with which
Beijing had established relations. Nor-
malization should pave the way for
settlement of the claims/assets prob-
lem, which would open up direct
banking and shipping relations. Nor-
malization also provides an opportunity
to address other trade and credit issues
that have hindered our economic re-
lationship, such as Export-Import Bank

CHINA

: BALANCE OF

TRADE

(Billion U.S

5)

Exports

Imports

Balance

1970

2.1

2.2

-0.2

1971

2.5

2.3

0.2

1972

3.2

2.8

0.3

1973

5.1

5.2

-0.2

1974

6.7

7.4

-0.8

1975

7.2

7.4

-0.2

1976

7.3

6.0

1.3

1977

8.0

7.1

0.9

1978*

10.2

10.6

-0.4

*Prelimi

nary

SOURCE: '

China:

nternational

Trade , ' '

CIA,

Dec. 1978 (1978

update

providec

by Dept. of State).

Department of State Bulletin

credits and most-favored-nation status
for P.R.C. exports. In addition, regular
government-level contacts will help in
other areas of trade facilitation and
promotion.

U.S. trade with China should post
substantial gains over the next several
years. A wide range of projects are
under discussion with U.S. firms, in-
cluding offshore oil development,
mining projects, a steel plant, hy-
droelectric facilities, agricultural pro-
grams, and transport and communica-
tions equipment.

Trade Problems

Trade growth will be a function of
China's ability to finance and absorb
large amounts of foreign technology.
China has an excellent credit rating and
is capable of handling a larger debt
burden. On the export side, China is
seeking to improve the quantity and
quality of its export goods to improve
demand in developed country markets.
Some Chinese exports, such as textiles,
have caused market disruption in the
United States. Direct links with Beijing
will permit negotiation of these prob-
lems. For example, talks are scheduled
with the Chinese to discuss orderly de-
velopment in textile exports. □

'Taken from a Department of State publica-
tion in the Gist series, released in Jan. 1979.
This outline is designed to be a quick reference
aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended
as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy state-
ment.

Letter
of Credence

On March 1, 1979, President Carter
accepted the credentials of Chai Zemin
of the People's Republic of China as
the newly appointed Ambassador to the
United States. □

March 1979

21

THE PRESIDENT: America's Role
in a Turbulent World

Address upon receiving an Honorary
Doctor of Engineering degree from the
Georgia Institute of Technology in At-
lanta on February 20. '

I remember when I first came to
Tech, the entire world was at war. Our
nation was under attack on two fronts
and was desperately gearing up for a
total war effort that we had not known
since we fought each other in the
1860's.

In 1 942-43 , it was not yet a time for
victories for the United States nor for
our allies, and many people feared that
western democracies might be over-
whelmed. We now face a very different
world from the world in which I came
of age. The old empires are gone, and
the maps are covered with new and de-
veloping nations with names that we
had then never heard.

But one thing has not changed as
much as I had hoped. It is still a world
of danger, a world in which democracy
and freedom are still challenged, a
world in which peace must be rewon
day by day.

Too many people still lack the
simplest necessities of life, and too
many are deprived of the most basic
human rights. As the events of recent
days have shown, peace remains a
fragile thing, vulnerable to assaults
from all sides.

Disturbances in Iran, the western In-
dian Ocean, and in Southeast Asia are a
challenge to our determination and our
leadership. They underscore the im-
portance of strength in our national
defenses, wisdom in our diplomacy,
and steadfastness in the pursuit of arms
control and peace.

I want to speak to you today about
America's purpose in this world of
change and turbulence.

Ever since the end of the Second
World War, the United States has been
the leader in moving our world closer
to a stable peace and genuine security.
We have the world's strongest econ-
omy; we have the world's strongest
military forces; and we share burdens
of mutual defense with friends abroad
whose security and prosperity are as
vital to us as to themselves.

With our strong allies, we have suc-
ceeded in preventing a global war for
more than one-third of a century — the
longest period of general peace in
modern times. And as President of the
United States, I am determined to keep
our nation at peace.

We help to sustain a world trading
and monetary system that has brought
greater prosperity to more of the
world's people than ever before in his-
tory.

We are working to resolve conflicts
among other nations so that each can
develop its own future in independence
and peace. And we have helped to
maintain the conditions in which more
than 100 new nations have come into
being and in which human hope — and
its fulfillment — has taken a revolu-
tionary leap forward.

In short, we in the United States
provide the bedrock of global security
and economic advance in a world of
unprecedented change and conflict. In
such a world America has four funda-
mental security responsibilities:

• To provide for our own nation's
strength and safety;

• To stand by our allies and our
friends;

• To support national independence
and integrity of other nations; and

• To work diligently for peace.

We do not oppose change. Many of
the political currents sweeping the
world express a desire that we
share — the desire for a world in which
the legitimate aspirations of nations
and individuals have a greater chance
for fulfillment.

The United States cannot control
events within other nations. A few
years ago, we tried this and we failed.

by the outsiders who seek not to ad-
vance human aims but rather to extend
their own power and their own position
at the expense of others.

Iran

As I speak to you today, the country
of Iran — with which we have had close
relations for the last 30 years — is in
revolution. It has been our hope that
Iran could modernize without deep
internal conflicts, and we sought to en-
courage that effort by supporting its
government, by urging internal change
toward progress and democracy, and by
helping to provide a background of re-
gional stability.

The revolution in Iran is a product of
deep social, political, religious, and
economic factors growing out of the
history of Iran itself. Those who argue
that the United States should or could
intervene directly to thwart these
events are wrong about the realities of
Iran. So, too, are those who spout
propaganda that protecting our own
citizens is tantamount to direct inter-
vention.

We have not and we will not inter-
vene in Iran, yet the future of Iran con-
tinues to be of deep concern to us and
to our friends and allies. It is an im-
portant nation in a critical part of the
world; an immediate neighbor of the
Soviet Union; a major oil producer that
also sits beside the principal artery for

If others interfere [in Iran], directly or indirectly, they are on notice
that this will. . . affect our broader relationships with them.

But we recognized as inevitable that
the uncertainty and the turmoil that
come with change can have its darker
side as well. We saw this in a senseless
act of violence last week in Afghanis-
tan, when a brave and good man —
Ambassador Adolph Dubs — gave his
life in the performance of his duty as a
representative of the United States. As
we meet here today at Georgia Tech —
enjoying the blessings of freedom and
peace — we must remember that we are
indebted for those blessings to the sac-
rifice of men and women like Spike
Dubs.

We also see the darker side of
change when countries in turbulence
provide opportunities for exploitation

most of the world's trade in oil. And it
is still a significant potential force for
stability and progress in the region.

Iran is a proud nation with a long
history — more than 2,000 years — of
struggle to establish and to guarantee
its own freedom. The independence of
Iran is also in our own vital interest and
in the interest of our closest allies, and
we will support the independence of
Iran.

Out of today's turmoil, it is our hope
that these troubled people will create a
stable government which can meet the
needs of the Iranian people and which
can enable that great nation not only to
remain independent but to regain its
internal strength and balance.

22

We are prepared to support that ef-
fort as appropriate and to work with the
Iranian Government and the people as a
nation, which shares common interests
and common aspirations with us.

But just as we respect Iran's inde-
pendence and integrity, other nations
must do so as well. If others interfere,
directly or indirectly, they are on
notice that this will have serious con-
sequences and will affect our broader
relationships with them.

Middle East

At the same time, we are intensify-
ing our efforts to promote stability
throughout the Middle East so that the
security and the independence of the
nations of that part of the world will be
maintained.

At my direction, the Secretary of
Defense recently carried out com-
prehensive consultations in Israel,
Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia concern-
ing the security of that region. We are
determined to work with these nations
and with others to put the peaceful de-
velopment of the region on a sound and
a lasting foundation.

Recent disturbances in the region
have underlined the need to work even
more urgently toward peace between
Israel and its Arab neighbors. To this
end, Israeli and Egyptian negoti-
ators— the Foreign Ministers of both
countries — will return to Camp David
tonight at the invitation of the United
States.

They will be meeting with Secretary
of State Cyrus Vance. And I myself
will do whatever I can to promote the
success of the Camp David negotia-
tions. And if it should be necessary,
and the parties show adequate flexibil-
ity, I will call another summit confer-
ence to work for peace. I urge all lead-
ers throughout the Middle East to
recognize the vital importance for their
region for these talks to succeed.

Southeast Asia

For us in the United States, any
crisis in the Middle East has the most
immediate and serious consequences.
But we are also deeply concerned by
what is happening now in Southeast
Asia. The same principles of American
policy apply: We support the independ-
ence and integrity of the regional na-
tions; we will stand by our friends; and
we will continue as a nation to work for
peace.

Just in the last few weeks we have
seen a Vietnamese invasion of Cam-
bodia and, as a result, a Chinese fron-
tier penetration into Vietnam. Both ac-
tions threaten the stability of one of the

world's most important and promising
regions — Southeast Asia.

We have opposed both military ac-
tions. Let me outline very briefly the
principles that govern our conduct.

First, we will not get involved in
conflict between Asian Communist na-
tions. Our national interests are not
directly threatened, although we are
concerned, of course, at the wider im-
plications of what might happen in the
future and what has been happening in
the past.

We have been using whatever dip-
lomatic and political means are avail-
able to encourage restraint on all par-
ties and to seek to prevent a wider war.
While our influence is limited because
our involvement is limited, we remain
the one great power in all the world
which can have direct and frank discus-
sions with all the parties concerned.
For this reason, we have a useful and
important role to play in the restoration
of stability. We will continue our ef-
forts, both directly with the countries
involved and through the United Na-
tions, to secure an end to the fighting
in the region, to bring about a with-
drawal of Vietnam forces from Cam-
bodia and of Chinese forces from Viet-
nam, and to gain the restoration of the
independence and integrity of all na-
tions involved.

At the same time, we are continuing
to express our deep concern that this
conflict may widen still further — with

. . . we will not get involved in
conflict between Asian Communist
notions.

unforeseen and grave consequences for
nations in the region and also beyond.

In any event, the United States is
fully prepared to protect the vital inter-
ests of our people wherever they may
be challenged. We are in close consul-
tation with our friends and allies in the
region, especially the members of the
Association of South East Asian
Nations — the ASEAN nations. Their
continued stability and prosperity are
of great importance to us.

The normalization of relations be-
tween the United States and the
People's Republic of China is already
an accomplished fact and will not be
reversed. This was the simple, long
overdue recognition of the reality of
the government in Peking.

In the last few days, we have con-
sulted directly with leaders around the

Department of State Bulletin

world — and with our own congres-
sional leaders as well — about events
both in the Middle East and Southeast
Asia. The responsibilities that we face
are serious, and they are shared by the
Administration and the Congress, by
our nation and our allies — and our
common understanding and our adher-
ence to a common cause are vital.

All of us know that the internal af-
fairs of Iran or combat even among
Communist nations are of concern to
us. Many nations are troubled — even
threatened — by the turmoil in Southeast
Asia and in the Middle East. To stand
by our friends and to help meet their
security needs in these difficult times, I
will consult with the Congress to de-
termine what additional military assist-
ance will be required. This added
measure of support is crucial for sta-
bility throughout the Indian Ocean
area. And let me repeat, in the Middle
East, in Southeast Asia, and elsewhere
in the world, we will stand by our
friends, we will honor our commit-
ments, and we will protect the vital
interests of the United States, and you
can depend on it.

U.S. Security and SALT

As we face this immediate series of
crises, we also look constantly to the
broader needs of security. If we are to
meet our responsibilities, we must
continue to maintain the military forces
we need for our defense and to contrib-
ute to the defense of our allies. This
year, I have proposed a substantial real
increase in the defense budget. The
events of recent weeks underscore the
responsibility of the Congress to ap-
propriate these funds in full.

There must be no doubt that the
people of the United States are fully
prepared to meet our commitments and
to back up those commitments with
military strength.

Turmoil and crisis also underscore
the vital needs to work wherever possi-
ble, to stabilize and to reduce competi-
tion in strategic nuclear weapons.

This effort has the same ultimate
goals as does our strong defense: the
goals of security, stability, and peace.
In pursuit of these goals, our nation
faces no more important task this year
than the successful conclusion of a
strategic arms limitation agreement.

Just as we work to support national
independence and to aid our friends
and allies in times of trial, we must
work to regulate nuclear arms capable
of threatening life throughout this
planet. For a SALT agreement is a fun-
damental element of strategic and
political stability in a turbulent
world — stability which can provide the

March 1979

23

necessary political basis for us to con-
tain the kinds of crises that we face
today and to prevent their growing into
a terrible nuclear confrontation.

After more than 6 years of negotia-
tions, conducted by three different
Presidents, agreement has now been
reached on most of the major compo-
nents of a sound and verifiable SALT II
treaty .

The emerging agreement will estab-
lish for the first time equal numbers of
strategic arms for both sides. It will
thus reverse the Soviet's numerical ad-
vantage which was temporarily estab-
lished in the SALT I treaty of 1972,
when they had about a 40% built-in
negotiated advantage.

To reach these new levels, the
Soviets will be required to reduce their
overall number of strategic arms. Over
250 Soviet missiles or bombers — about
10% of their strategic forces — will
have to be destroyed or dismantled. At
the same time, because we are now
well below the agreed ceiling, we
could substantially increase our own
operational strategic forces.

The SALT II agreement will also
provide negotiated limits on building
new types of weapons and limits on the
improvement of existing ones — the
so-called qualitative arms race can be
controlled.

SALT II will limit the size of land-
based missiles and the number of
warheads that can be placed on them.
Without these limits, the Soviets could
vastly increase the number of warheads
on their large land-based missiles, with
grave implications to the strategic
balance.

SALT II will, therefore, contribute
to our ability to deal with the growing
vulnerability of our land-based mis-
siles. Without it, the Soviet Union
could continue to increase the number
of their warheads, tending to nullify
our effort to protect our missiles.

The agreement will also permit us
and our allies to pursue all the defense
programs that we believe might even-
tually be needed — the M-X missile;
the Trident submarine and its missiles;
air, ground, and sea-launched cruise
missiles; cruise missile carrier aircraft;
and a new penetrating bomber. These
would be permitted.

Thus SALT II would allow our own
prudent programs to move ahead and

also will place important limits on what
the Soviets might otherwise do. And
this SALT II agreement will be a basis
for further negotiations for additional
substantial cuts in the level of nuclear
armaments.

Without the SALT II agreement, the
Soviet Union could have nearly one-
third more strategic forces by 1985

cure, it is in our national interest to
pursue it, even as we continue compe-
tition with the Soviet Union elsewhere
in the world. Therefore, I will seek
both to conclude this new SALT
agreement and to respond to any Soviet
behavior which adversely affects our
interests.

To reject SALT II would mean that

The emerging [SALT II] agreement will establish for the first time
equal numbers of strategic arms for both sides. . . . The agreement
will also permit us and our allies to pursue all the defense programs
that we believe might eventually be needed. . .

than with SALT II. We would, of
necessity, as a nation, match such a
buildup. The costs would be enor-
mous, the risks self-evident. And both
nations would wind up less secure.

The stakes in SALT are too high to
rely on trust. Any SALT II treaty that I
sign will be adequately verifiable,
using our own independent means of
guaranteeing Soviet compliance with
terms of the agreement.

SALT II will specifically forbid any
interference that would impede our
ability to verify compliance with the
treaty. Any effort on the part of the
Soviet Union to interfere with our ver-
ification activities would be a detecta-
ble violation of the agreement itself
and an early signal of any possible
cheating.

Finally, let me put this agreement in
the context of our overall relations with
the Soviet Union, and the turbulence
that exists in many parts of the world.
The question is not when SALT can be
divorced from this complicated con-
text. It cannot. As I have often said,
our relationship with the Soviet Union
is a mixture of cooperation and compe-
tition. And as President of the United
States, I have no more difficult and del-
icate task than to balance these two. I
cannot and I will not let the pressures
of inevitable competition overwhelm
possibilities for cooperation any more
than I will let cooperation blind us to
the realities of competition, which we
are fully prepared to meet.

Because this carefully negotiated and
responsible arms control agreement
will make the world safer and more se-

the inevitable competition in strategic
nuclear arms would grow even more
dangerous. Each crisis, each confron-
tation, each point of friction — as seri-
ous as it may be in its own right —
would take on an added measure of
significance and an added dimension of
danger for it would occur in an atmos-
phere of unbridled strategic competi-
tion and deteriorating strategic stabil-
ity. It is precisely because we have
fundamental differences with the
Soviet Union that we are determined to
bring this dangerous dimension of our
military competition under control.

In today's world, it is vital to match
the pursuit of ideals with the responsi-
ble use of force and of power. The
United States is a source of both —
ideals and power. Our ideals have in-
spired the world for more than two
centuries; and for three generations,
since World War II, our power has
helped other nations to realize their
own ideals.

The determination and strength of
purpose of the American people are
crucial for stability in a turbulent
world. If we stand together in main-
taining a steady course, America can
protect its principles and interest and
also be a force for peace. Americans
have always accepted the challenge of
leadership, and I am confident that we
will do so now. □

1 Text from White House press release of Feb.
20. 1979 (opening paragraphs omitted).

24

Department of State Bulletin

State of the Union Message
to the Congress (Excerpts)

The following excerpts are from a
message to the Congress dated January
25, 1979. This message elaborates on
the topics covered by the President in
his address before a joint session of the
Congress 2 days earlier. '

My State of the Union Address was
devoted to what I believe are the high-
est priorities facing our Nation in 1979
as we seek to build a new foundation at
home and abroad.2

However, my Administration's time
and effort this year will also be focused
on a significant number of other im-
portant initiatives and goals. I am
sending this State of the Union Mes-
sage so that the Members of the 96th
Congress are presented with a full pic-
ture of my basic legislative program in
domestic and foreign affairs for the
year.

DOMESTIC POLICY PRIORITIES

Multilateral Trade Negotiations

(MTN)

I have already notified the Congress
that we expect to sign and submit for
Congressional approval a set of trade
agreements which we will reach in the
Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations. With these agree-
ments, we expect to achieve major re-
ductions in tariff and nontariff barriers
to international trade. These agree-
ments will:

• Lead to increased opportunities for
U.S. exports;

• Ensure that import competition is
fair; and

• Result in lower prices, increased
competition, and greater prosperity for
the American people.

Passage of the MTN will be one of
my highest legislative priorities this
year. It is critical to the health of our
domestic and of the world economy.

Countervailing Duties

I have recently sent to the Congress a
message urging prompt passage of
legislation permitting the waiver of the
imposition of countervailing duties on
certain imported products. Passage is

essential to the successful completion
of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
and, therefore, should be one of Con-
gress' highest priorities at the begin-
ning of this session.

Exports

The United States has entered a
period where export growth is essential
to improve our balance of payments,
strengthen the dollar, and thereby help
reduce inflationary pressures. To do
this, both the private sector and the
Federal government must place a
higher priority on exports.

With the National Export Policy I
announced last year, we are moving to
meet this need. First, we are working
to reduce domestic barriers to exports
so that exporters are not stifled by ex-
cessive governmental regulation. Sec-

Passage of the MTN . . . is
critical to the health of our
domestic and of the world econ-
omy.

ond, we are providing further incen-
tives in the form of better export
financing and better government export
development programs. Third, we are
working with our trading partners in
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations to
reduce foreign barriers to our exports
and to secure a fairer international
trading system for all exporters.

These actions should expand our ex-
ports in 1979 and help us move toward
a reduced trade deficit, although they
will not cure our serious balance of
trade difficulties overnight. They are
the first steps in an essential, long-term
effort to strengthen the U.S. position in
world trade, while reaffirming the Na-
tion's Commitment to maintain an open
world trading system and to resist pro-
tectionism.

CIVIL LIBERTIES

Export Administration/Anti-Foreign
Boycott

My Administration will work with

the Congress to reauthorize the Export
Administration Act, which plays a vital
role in ensuring that American trade
serves our national interest. We will
make particular efforts to reauthorize
that part of the Act which prohibits
American compliance with the foreign
economic boycott of Israel. The anti-
boycott amendments passed by the
Congress were fair and equitable and
must continue to be strenuously en-
forced.

Hunger

We share a growing concern with
other Nations and their people over the
serious problem of world hunger.
While our government and the govern-
ments of other Nations and interna-
tional organizations are working to
assure the basic right to food, the prob-
lems of hunger and malnutrition are a
daily fact of life for millions of people
throughout the world. In order to make
our own programs more effective and
to examine additional efforts that might
be undertaken, I have established the
Presidential Commission on World
Hunger, under the leadership of Am-
bassador Sol Linowitz, to recommend
realistic solutions which we and other
Nations might undertake in a prompt
and efficient manner. The Commission
will report to me this year and will then
be involved in the implementation of
its recommendations. The Administra-
tion will be working closely with Con-
gress on the Commission's recommen-
dation.

PRESERVING AND DEVELOPING
NATURAL RESOURCES

The State of Food and Agriculture

World food security has been sub-
stantially improved in 1978. For the
third consecutive year, good-to-record
crops were harvested in most parts of
the world, pushing supplies to record
quantities and creating the opportunity
for people all over the world to im-
prove their diets.

For the United States, 1978 was also
a year of records. Large food and rec-

March 1979

ord feed grain crops were harvested by
U.S. producers, re-emphasizing the
U.S. farm sector's capability to lead
the world in productivity. But despite
the record crops which placed down-
ward pressure on prices here and
abroad, our farm economy became
stronger in 1978 and our agricultural
trade reached record levels.

The value of U.S. agricultural ex-
ports reached $27.3 billion in fiscal
1978 — 14 percent above 1 977 's record.
The volume of our farm exports was a
record 125 million metric tons — up 18
percent from 1977. Agricultural trade
made another record contribution to our
balance of payments — $13.4 billion in
fiscal 1978. Exports also accounted for
one out of every four dollars the U.S.
fanner earned.

Net farm income, which was $20.6
billion in 1977, is estimated at over
$28 billion for 1978— second highest
on record. In constant dollars, this was
the best year since 1975. This was
achieved while we met our domestic
needs, fulfilled our commitments to our
overseas customers, and built reserves
for future stability protection. This re-
covery in agriculture has been shared
by crop and livestock producers alike.
Indeed, American livestock producers
can now look forward to several years
of good returns to help them recover
from the last four years which were
marked by poor prices and forced liq-
uidation of herds.

Part of the recovery in the farm sec-
tor can be attributed to the programs
and policies adopted by my Adminis-
tration and the Congress — which farm-
ers have used to improve their incomes
and stabilize prices.

I am personally proud of the recov-
ery our farmers have made.

International Agricultural Trade

Over the past 2 years, this Adminis-
tration has worked to reduce barriers to
international trade and to develop new
markets and encourage increased ex-
ports of agricultural products. The Ag-
ricultural Trade Act of 1978, for exam-
ple, provides important new authorities
for intermediate credit and the estab-
lishment of trade offices in major mar-
kets. We have moved to establish new
and stronger trade ties with several na-
tions, including Japan and the People's
Republic of China. Partly as a result of
these efforts, exports of U.S. farm pro-
duced goods are expected to reach a
record $29 billion in fiscal 1979—21
percent higher than 2 years ago — and
contribute $15 billion to our balance of
payments.

Unlike previous Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, in the current MTN we

have placed heavy emphasis on the
lessening of restrictions on trade in ag-
ricultural products. Our efforts here
should have a major impact on U.S.
agriculture in the future, by broadening
our access to important existing and
new international markets.

International Emergency
Wheat Reserve

The cornerstone of our domestic
food and agricultural policy is the
farmer-owned grain reserve. In little
more than a year, we have built this
into a 1.3 billion bushel grain
reserve — the equivalent of more than a
third of our carry-over stocks from the
past year. These stocks remain under
the ownership of those farmers who
produced them rather than in the hands
of government or international grain
traders. This reserve provides a critical
cushion against shocks in the market
caused by production shortfalls either
here or abroad.

We now need to establish the same
sort of protection for our international
food aid progams. Accordingly, the
Administration will reintroduce legis-
lation to authorize the establishment
and management of an international
emergency wheat reserve. This reserve
will provide developing countries as-
surance that we will be able to fulfill
our food aid commitments. At the same
time, it will protect the domestic econ-
omy from further inflationary pressures
during periods of grain shortages.

25

mation that provides for a new, more
flexible system of sugar import fees
protecting a domestic raw sugar price
of 15 cents per pound.

To help stabilize world sugar prices,
to satisfy our international commit-
ments, and to protect our domestic
sugar producers, my Administration is
committed to working with the Con-
gress to develop an effective, non-
inflationary domestic sugar program
early in this session, and to achieve
ratification of the International Sugar
Agreement.

FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES

The Continuing Challenges
of Change

When I took office two years ago
this month, I was convinced that
America had to pursue a changed
course in a world which was itself un-
dergoing vast change.

In the midst of this accelerating
change, America's choice lies between
facing chaos or building with others a
new foundation for a true world com-
munity. Our foreign policy accepts the
latter responsibility both because of our
basic belief, and because of America's
critical role in the world.

To this end, we must have
four broad objectives:

• To buttress American power on
which global security and stability de-
pend;

Throughout 1978, the North Atlantic Alliance and the growing
partnership which links us with both Western Europe and Japan re-
mained at the heart of our foreign policy.

Sugar

In the absence of Congressional pas-
sage of a domestic sugar program in the
last session, the Administration has
taken several further steps to assure
domestic producers of a fair return and
consumers an assured supply at stable
prices. To underscore Administration
commitment to achieving ratification of
the International Sugar Agreement, I
directed that sugar imports from coun-
tries not party to the agreement be
strictly limited to the levels permitted
under the agreement for 1979. We have
also asked for and received an exten-
sion of the deadline for ratifying the
ISA to June 30, 1979. In addition, at
the end of last year, I issued a procla-

• To strengthen our relations with
other nations throughout the world in
order to widen the spirit of interna-
tional cooperation;

• To deal constructively with pres-
sing world problems which otherwise
will disrupt and even destroy the world
commmunity we seek;

• To assert our traditional commit-
ment to human rights, rejoining a rising
tide of belief in the dignity of the indi-
vidual.

Progress towards these goals de-
pends first on our ability as a Nation to
work together in the common interest.
During the coming year, the Congress,
the Executive, and the public will be
addressing an unusually wide range of

26

international issues. The action taken
will have an impact on our Nation's
position in the world for many years to
come — in establishing a secure nuclear
balance; in developing closer relations
with the world's most populous Nation;
in achieving an historic step towards
peace in the Middle East; or in setting
the pattern of trade relations during the
next decade and beyond.

This report elaborates on my address
to the Congress and, in particular, con-
centrates on the issues in which the role
of the Congress will be most important
to building a new foundation for peace.
In each case, the challenge is clear; to
exercise strong American leadership
with others to shape change rather than
permit change to shape us.

. . . the need to curb the strategic
arms race has never been more
urgent.

America's Military Strength

Elsewhere in this report I have de-
scribed the domestic programs and
policies required for a just, united, and
productive America. The maintenance
of American military strength is an es-
sential foundation for a successful
foreign policy that safeguards our free-
dom, our accomplishments, and our
friendships. In a world of accelerating
change, fraught with potential danger
and uncertainty, and marked by a con-
tinuing Soviet military buildup, we
must have, together with our allies, un-
surpassed military capability to deter
attack or attempts at political coercion.
Moreover, we must have the military
force to mount an effective defense at
any level of hostilities where our vital
interests are jeopardized.

The defense budget which I have
presented to the Congress funds a pro-
gram of prudent investments that will
ensure the effectiveness of our strategic
and conventional military posture. It
will:

• Begin full-scale development of a
new, more survivable ballistic missile
system to enhance the ICBM [inter-
continental ballistic missile] component
of our strategic triad;

• Maintain the Trident submarine
and missile programs, increasing the
security, striking power, and the range
of our submarine force;

• Extend the effectiveness of our
bomber force with the addition of air-
launched cruise missiles;

• Pursue a vigorous program of re-

search and development in cruise mis-
siles, aircraft, and other systems to en-
sure the continued technological
superiority of America's nuclear de-
terrent.

In addition, the defense budget I
have submitted this week will
strengthen our conventional capabilities
to fulfill our commitments to our major
allies and friends and retain a credible
military presence in both the Atlantic
and the Pacific. We will continue to
add armor and firepower to our infantry
and build a more modern, smaller air-
craft carrier which, together with more
frigates and destroyers, will improve
the effectiveness and flexibility of our
surface fleet.

In NATO, we have already achieved
important progress toward making the
Alliance more effective in the changing
security environment.

• We helped launch the Alliance's
Long-Term Defense Program to offset
growing Soviet modernization of its
deployment in Europe. The LTDP will
increase NATO military capabilities
through better coordination of defense
efforts, increased investment, and more
modern equipment.

• We removed, with the support of
Congress, a serious obstacle to
strengthening Turkey's defensive
capabilities and made further progress
toward the reintegration of Greek
armed forces into NATO's military
structure; both these efforts helped re-
pair a serious deficiency on NATO's
southern flank.

• We neared final agreement with
the Portuguese on the renewal of our
base rights in the Azores.

The provision of adequate military
as well as economic assistance to Tur-
key, Portugal, and other allies and
friends in need will be a matter of high
priority during the coming year.

NATO's strength is growing. In
1979, we can further that encouraging
process by standardizing more of the
Alliance's equipment and improving
Allied readiness. The proposal I will
soon put before the 96th Congress calls
for the authorization of inter-
governmental agreements to simplify
logistical problems both in peacetime
and during any period of hostilities.
Such agreements will permit the U.S.
to reinforce NATO more rapidly and
provide more effective defense at lower
cost.

We also intend to maintain a vigor-
ous American military presence in the
Pacific. Successful completion of a re-
vised military base agreement in the
Philippines, following ten years of
negotiations, provides an essential un-

Department of State Bulletin

derpinning for our military capability
in Asia.

Congressional authorization for the
transfer of military equipment to the
Republic of Korea was another contri-
bution to assuring the security of Korea
and Japan. Both actions unmistakably
signal not only our desire to promote
East Asian stability but our intention to
remain a concerned, involved, and re-
sponsible power in the Pacific.

The essential task of improving our
military posture must also be accom-
panied by increased efficiency. I take
this opportunity to thank the Congress
for its support last year of our actions
to reduce waste and needless duplica-
tion in our defense budget. Vigorous
cost-saving efforts will continue this
year in order to assure that the United
States will possess strong military
forces at the lowest possible cost.

BUILDING THE COMMUNITY
OF NATIONS

Military strength is essential to peace
but cannot alone guarantee it. The sys-
tem of cooperation we have with the
rest of the world is part of the founda-
tion for our own security. Our best
hope for a safer America and a peaceful
world resides in the building of closer
ties with as many nations as possible.

The Major Allies

Throughout 1978, the North Atlantic
Alliance and the growing partnership
which links us with both Western
Europe and Japan remained at the heart
of our foreign policy. The cooperation
we share with those whose purposes
and traditions are closest to our own is
strong and growing stronger.

Through our summit meetings, and
through an unprecedented pattern of
consultations at other levels of our
governments, we are working together
on virtually all of today's most critical
issues:

• Together we are seeking to reduce
the risk of nuclear confrontation;

• We are working on ways to
strengthen the common defense;

• We are attempting to promote a
peaceful transition in southern Africa;

• We are striving to resolve conflicts
in the Eastern Mediterranean to support
a just and lasting peace in the Middle
East and to maintain stability in the
Persian Gulf;

• We are contributing to a sounder
international economy;

• We are consulting on the issues
that confront all our societies: the
problems of youth and age, family and

March 1979

27

community, growth, and conserva-
tion— in short, advancing our demo-
cratic ideals at home in a time of
change in each of our countries.

America's role as host for the NATO
summit meeting in Washington last
spring, and our attendance at the
seven-nation economic summit in Bonn
last summer, symbolized American
commitment to the strength of relations
with Europe and Japan. I look forward
to meeting these and other allied lead-
ers at the Tokyo Summit next June,
where we will continue the essential
effort to deepen further the cooperation
between us.

A Wider Community

The changing realities of political
and economic interdependence require
that we strengthen our ties throughout
the developing world and seek to im-
prove relations with Communist na-
tions as well.

My trips to Nigeria, India, Saudi
Arabia, Iran, Brazil, and Venezuela
underlined American sympathy and
support for the international roles these
countries are playing in the process of
world change. Strengthened consulta-
tions with the ASEAN [Association of
South East Asian Nations] nations
serve the same end.

My trip to Mexico early next month
will be a part of this process; Mexico is
important to us not only because it is a
neighbor but also because it is one of
the most vigorous democracies in this
Hemisphere and a leader in the de-
veloping world. As neighbors, we
share an agenda of common con-
cerns— trade, migration, economic
growth, and social development — that
provides an opportunity to establish a
uniquely productive, cooperative re-
lationship.

My trip to Poland and the visits of
Secretary Vance and Secretary Blu-
menthal to Hungary and Romania un-
derscore the importance we attach to
better relations with the nations of
Eastern Europe. The support of the
Congress for our policy toward Eastern
Europe has provided a strong founda-
tion for building a stronger economic,
cultural, and political relationship — a
process that will continue to go forward
in the coming year.

China

The arrival next week of the first
leader of the People's Republic of
China to officially visit Washington
will give us an early and welcome op-
portunity in the new year not only to
cement the ties of friendship and hos-

pitality between us but to emphasize
our expectation that our relationship
with China will be a constructive one.
It will contribute to diversity in the
world and to peace and stability in
Asia. It is not directed against the
interests of any other country.

To fulfill the promise of this new era
in Sino-American relations, we will re-
quire legislation and support from the
Congress. Such legislation is particu-
larly important to facilitate continued
trade and other relations with the
people of Taiwan through non-
governmental instrumentalities and to
assure continued peace and prosperity
there. This has very high priority in our
legislative program for 1979.

USSR

We seek better relations with both
the Soviet Union and the People's Re-
public of China. Doing so is pro-
foundly in the interests of our Nation
and of global security.

I therefore would like also to wel-
come President Brezhnev to our coun-
try in the near future. At that time we
would hope to conclude an agreement
curbing the strategic arms race. There
are other areas where our two nations

as much of mankind remains im-
poverished and without hope.

As I emphasized in my State of the
Union address, the need to curb the
strategic arms race has never been
more urgent. It increases the risk of
nuclear war. It is a needless competi-
tion that draws away scarce resources
we need to invest in other areas of our
Nation's strength. It undermines
Americas 's security.

The conclusion and ratification of a
satisfactory SALT II Treaty with the
Soviet Union is therefore among our
top priorities. It will make a major
contribution to enhancing our long-
term security, while keeping open our
options to carry out needed moderniza-
tion of our strategic forces and preserve
our deterrence.

We will take whatever time is neces-
sary to negotiate a sound, verifiable
agreement. I am convinced that once
the American people and Congress
have had a chance to examine the terms
and benefits of this Treaty — and con-
sider the shape of our future without
it — they will conclude it serves our
vital security interests.

We will continue to consult the Con-
gress as we proceed this year with
other important arms control negotia-

Israeli and Egyptian commitment to peace will provide an indispensa-
ble step toward peace between Israel and all its neighbors and foster
the stability and orderly change we favor. . . .

can work constructively together.
These include a comprehensive nuclear
test ban treaty; limits on Indian Ocean
deployments, and on the transfer of
conventional arms; and restraint in
areas of turbulence and tension. Such
cooperative effort would do much to
make the world a safer place for all.

We will never ignore Soviet actions
which challenge our interests. We both
have a responsibility to our peoples and
the world to maintain a pattern of de-
tente which is genuinely reciprocal and
broadly defined.

DEALING WITH WORLD
PROBLEMS

A true world community cannot be
fashioned or endure so long as the
weapons of war multiply and spread, so
long as ancient disputes fester and the
demands for justice are unmet, so long

tions: on a comprehensive nuclear test
ban; the prevention of anti-satellite
warfare; mutual and balanced force re-
ductions in Europe; and limits on the
rising tide of conventional arms trans-
fers.

The risks inherent in the prolifera-
tion of nuclear technology figure
prominently among the dangers to the
world community. Although we and
the rest of the world still have far to go
in dealing responsibly with such risks,
the United States took an important
step last March with the adoption of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. For the
first time in our history we established
comprehensive legislation covering in-
ternational cooperation in the nuclear
field and the export of nuclear-related
materials. To build on that promising
beginning throughout 1979, we need
progress in the following areas, both
nuclear and nonnuclear:

• The International Nuclear Fuel

28

Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), a 53-nation
effort, can help us develop a new inter-
national nuclear fuel consensus that will
adequately balance energy needs with
non-proliferation concerns. We con-
tinue to believe that better alternatives
exist to the commercialization of
dangerous breeder reactors and we will
cooperate as fully as possible with
other countries in exploring those
alternatives.

• We will seek more substantial
progress in the problem of managing
nuclear waste and in attracting greater
international support for the acceptance
of nuclear safeguards. I ask the Senate
to ratify the treaty on the IAEA [Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency] Vol-
untary Safeguards Offer which will
provide concrete proof of our belief
that international safeguards do not
interfere with the successful develop-
ment and operation of commercial nu-
clear power.

• I will call for early Senate ratifi-
cation of Protocol I of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco, which will contribute to the
lessening of nuclear dangers for our
Latin American neighbors; the U.S.
and Cuba are now the only countries in
our Hemisphere which have not yet
ratified that Treaty.

Regional Conflict and Tension

Curbing the means of war cannot in
itself remove the threat of war. For
that, we must seek to resolve conflicts,
ease tension, and build trust. The
urgency of this task and its importance
to the United States and the world is
nowhere more clear than in the Middle
East. Though there has been great
progress, the goal of a just and lasting
settlement in that troubled part of the
world still eludes us. No one who has
looked at Middle East history can har-
bor any illusion about the difficulties
ahead. Yet we have made great strides
toward a final peace agreement be-
tween the two principal adversaries in
the Middle East. The differences which
they have overcome far outweigh the
issues which still divide them. Israeli
and Egyptian commitment to peace will
provide an indispensable step toward
peace between Israel and all its
neighbors and foster the stability and
orderly change we favor for the entire
Middle East region. Peace will permit
us to strengthen our ties with the Arab
states in the region and enhance our
relationship with Israel, a relationship
which will always be special to us.

In 1979 I will count on the continued
collaboration of the 96th Congress on
behalf of our efforts to gain and main-
tain peace throughout the region. The
support of the Congress and the Ameri-

can people for a purposeful role in that
region is particularly important in light
of the tumultuous events taking place
in Iran. Since the end of the Second
World War, the United States has
maintained a close relationship with
Iran and it has a vital interest in Iran's
independence and integrity. The people
of Iran should shape their own future
without foreign interference. That is
the policy of the government of the
United States and we expect it to be the
policy of all of Iran's neighbors.

Africa

Congressional support for peace,
stability, and orderly change are essen-
tial in other tense regions, as well.

In Southern Africa we are trying to
help bring about a peaceful transfor-
mation to majority rule which will
avoid growing bloodshed between
white and black and deeper interven-
tion by the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Together with our European allies,
Canada, and African states directly
concerned, we are making progress to-
ward the independence and majority
rule of Namibia — a step that would
have a positive impact on the evolution
of events in Rhodesia and elsewhere in
Southern Africa. We are heartened by
the support of the African leaders who
have worked with us in efforts to re-
solve the Namibian and Rhodesian
issues.

Congressional repeal of the Byrd
Amendment was essential in enhancing
our credibility in the effort to avoid a
gathering war and further Soviet and
Cuban gains in Southern Africa. We
will consult closely with the Congress
during the coming months, as we seek
the most constructive role we can play.
It will be increasingly important to
maintain our position of impartiality
among the parties so we can help them
resolve their differences should they
choose the path of peace.

Latin America

In our own Hemisphere, we can
point with pride to the cooperative
spirit which enabled us to change, in
mutually beneficial ways, the basis of
our relations with Panama. Senate ap-
proval of the two Panama Canal
treaties last year has improved the
quality of our historic relationship not
only with Panama itself but with our
friends in every part of Latin America.
By that act, our country helped demon-
strate its ability both to protect major
security interests and to deal with
smaller nations with dignity and mutual
respect. Congressional action to pass
the necessary implementing legislation

Department of State Bulletin

for these treaties before the October 1
deadline will ensure that the Canal is
efficiently operated during the transi-
tion to a new partnership with Panama.
The treaties and implementing
legislation, like our efforts to help the
people of Nicaragua find an enduring
democratic solution to the current crisis
there, are important to the future sta-
bility of Central America as a whole
and the strengthening of our new and
mature relationship with the nations of
all Latin America.

The International Economy

In our daily lives, we are constantly
reminded of the importance of a
healthy world economy to the strength
of our own. We see this in the wages of
our workers who produce goods for ex-
port, in the choice of goods for our
consumers, in the price of energy.

We must work closely with other
countries to ensure that the world
economy can steadily develop through
non-inflationary growth, while together
we manage the use of its resources and
protect our environment.

The focus for much of this effort
during the past year was the Bonn Eco-
nomic Summit. We worked out a
strategy of cooperation with our
partners to improve the world eco-
nomic situation: within the framework
of those Summit decisions. West Ger-
many and Japan have taken measures to
stimulate their economies while we are
giving top priority to fighting inflation.
Our actions, along with those taken by
other Summit participants, are leading
to a convergence of economic policies
that will strengthen the global econ-
omy.

We have strengthened the dollar by
working out arrangements with other
countries to counter speculative disor-
der in currency markets. Since I an-
nounced my dollar stabilization meas-
ures last November, we stopped the
dollar's decline in value against other
currencies and have actually increased
the dollar's value by around 10 percent
against several major currencies.
Moreover, we have announced a
multi-faceted program to increase U.S.
exports, which will benefit American
farmers and workers, while further
strengthening the position of the dollar.

We are now close to new agreements
with our trading partners to establish a
fairer, better operating, and more open
framework for world trade.

The American people have a vital
stake in Congressional approval of
these agreements. Ten million Ameri-
can jobs depend on our exports. Every
third acre of our farmland produces for
sales abroad. Two-thirds of our imports

March 1979

29

are essential raw materials or goods we
cannot readily produce.

At a time of difficult strains in our
own economy, there is always an im-
pulse to abandon our commitment to an
open world trading system. But the
costs of such a course to the American
people would be enormous. Each
American family would pay more for
what it buys and would have less
choice in the goods available. Inflation
would be fueled. Jobs would be jeopar-
dized, for protectionism against our
trading partners breeds protectionism
by them against us.

I am convinced that our economy
can adapt to changing patterns of world
trade in ways that protect the future of
our workers. We can compete effec-
tively in the world economy. The new
trade agreements give us the opportu-
nity to do so.

Our programs of economic develop-
ment assistance abroad are also an in-
vestment in our own future as well as
the future of other nations. Our most
rapidly growing markets lie in the de-
veloping world. By helping the people
of these countries, we not only help
extend their opportunities for a better
life, we help ourselves. By demon-
strating to their governments that we
are concerned for the well-being of
their people, we encourage their in-
creasing cooperation with the West on
a broad range of issues.

I therefore urge Congressional ap-
proval of the funding we propose for
our bilateral assistance programs and
our participation in the work of the
multilateral development banks and UN
agencies.

My proposal to establish a Founda-
tion of International Technological
Cooperation reflects our recognition
that scientists in many developing na-
tions are ready to work in collaboration
with our technological institutions to
solve the great problems of health, nu-
trition, productivity, and other aspects
of economic development.

Key commodity agreements can also
help us deal with the legitimate needs
and interests of the developing coun-
tries. Senate ratification of the Interna-
tional Sugar Agreement, which we
signed last year, along with price sup-
port legislation will stabilize prices for
that important commodity. We have
pledged a contribution to the Interna-
tional Tin Agreement, and we will
conduct negotiations on a rubber
accord.

Efforts to build a stronger interna-
tional economy are directed not simply
at managing economic relationships
among nations, but at improving the
lives of individual people around the
world. For it is the lives of individuals

which define the success or failure of
our foreign policies.

Reasserting America's Values

America's future is best secured in a
world founded on decency, justice, and
compassion.

The effort to make human rights a
central component of our foreign policy
comes from our deepest sense of our-
selves as a humane and freedom-loving
people. We do not make our standards
the precondition for every relationship
we have with other countries; yet
human rights can never be far from the
focus of our thinking or we violate our
own best values.

In the year just passed, some have
quarrelled with the timing or the tactics
of our emphasis on human rights
abroad. Others have pointed to our own
imperfect record on human rights at
home. Yet few can dispute an impor-
tant fact of this experience: our concern
for human rights has met with great re-
sonance in the world at large. The very
term has entered the language and be-
come imbued with an everyday famil-
iarity that was simply unknown little
more than two years ago.

advancing this process. I now ask the
Congress to take action in 1979 which
will further strengthen our human
rights record. I have signed four im-
portant human rights treaties, including
the Convention on Racial Discrimina-
tion, the International UN Covenants
on Economic and Social Rights, and on
Political and Civil Rights, and the
Inter-American Convention on Human
Rights. Senate ratification of these
treaties will firmly align our Nation
with the growing forces for rule of law
and human dignity in this world.
Similarly, I call upon the Senate finally
to ratify the Genocide Convention. The
United States is one of the very few
countries which have not yet ratified
this convention; this anomaly should be
corrected at the earliest possible mo-
ment in this Congress.

I am also proud of the efforts we
have undertaken this past year to al-
leviate the plight of refugees from the
far corners of the world, particularly
those fleeing the troubled Indochinese
peninsula. We have done a great deal
to reduce suffering among these des-
perate people and to provide many of
them with a possibility of a new home
and a new start.

We will continue to do our part and

Ten million American jobs depend on our exports .... Two-thirds of
our imports are essential raw materials or goods we cannot readily
produce.

We believe our efforts have contrib-
uted to a global awakening:

• Thousands of political prisoners
have been freed;

• In several countries, torture of
prisoners has been significantly re-
duced or eliminated and trials are more
often open to the public;

• Open advocacy of human rights
has occurred in nations where the con-
cept was heretofore forbidden;

• International organizations such as
the UN and the OAS now have vigor-
ous human rights commissions for the
investigation and airing of human
rights violations and the Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe
has helped to make human rights an in-
stitutionalized part of the international
agenda on both sides of the Atlantic;

• In a number of key nations around
the world, democratic institutions are
being strengthened as democratic val-
ues are reasserted.

Americans can be proud of the lead-
ing role their government has played in

to encourage others to increase their fi-
nancial assistance and opportunities for
resettlement. I hope to cooperate
closely with this Congress in the pas-
sage of new legislation which will
allow us to focus U.S. assistance more
efficiently in working toward the solu-
tion of this global, human problem.

Our challenges reflect a single fact:
the pressure of accelerating change in
our century. We need not fear this
phenomenon; indeed, we should wel-
come it. Change has not been merely a
challenge in American history; to a
very real degree, it has been our Na-
tion's charter. We have not prospered
and grown for more than two hundred
years by worshipping the status quo. In
building our Nation and confronting the
many tasks which history has assigned
us, we have found change to be our
natural element.

We should approach the task of
building a new Foundation for a world
of change with the confidence of a Na-
tion whose strengths are unmatched.
Our military forces are strong and

30

News Conferences of January 26
and February 12 (Excerpts)

JAN. 26'

Q. The United States has acknowl-
edged that there is one China, and
Taiwan is a part of it. And, remem-
bering the Gulf of Tonkin resolution
as an underpinning of the Vietnam
war, my question is, are you con-
cerned that the congressional resolu-
tions regarding Taiwan's security
may infringe on China's sovereignty
and, two, may involve us at some
future point in Asia again?

A. No, I'm not concerned about
that. I could not approve any legisla-
tion presented to me by Congress that
would be contradictory or that which
would violate the agreements that we
have concluded with the Republic of
China — the People's Republic of
China. I, myself, am committed to a
strong and a prosperous and a free
people on Taiwan. We intend to carry
on our diplomatic relations with the
People's Republic of China as the Gov-
ernment of China, but we'll have trade
relationships, cultural relationships
with the people on Taiwan. And I be-
lieve that the legislation that has now
been presented to the Congress is a
good foundation for this.

But I don't see this as an opening for
bloodshed or war. I think the state-
ments made by the Chinese leaders

since the announcement of intentions to
establish diplomatic relations have
been very constructive and have indi-
cated a peaceful intent.

Q. Are you speaking also of the
Kennedy resolution, which will be
introduced on Monday, or only your
own resolution?

A. I haven't read the so-called Ken-
nedy resolution. I really don't believe
that any resolution is needed. I think
our legislative proposal and the an-
nouncement made about normalization,
the combination of those two is
adequate.

Q. On Tuesday you said that we
would have a SALT agreement if the
Soviet Union continued to negotiate
in good faith.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have any slight doubt in
your mind on that score?

A. No. I've been in office now 2
years, and we've been negotiating with
the Soviets almost full time on a SALT
agreement. Prior to that time, 4 addi-
tional years of negotiations were con-
ducted with the Soviet Union. My un-
derstanding is that prior to the time I
came into office, and since I've been in
office, they have negotiated in good
faith.

State of the Union (Cont'd)

growing stronger. Our technological
and industrial capacities are unsurpas-
sed. Our allies are strong and reliable.
Our way of life, and what we stand for
as a nation, continue to have magnetic
international appeal.

I do not pretend that change comes
without cost. I do not pretend that it
comes without pain. Neither the vi-
sionary men of the 18th Century who
founded our Republic, nor the citizens
of conscience who opposed slavery in
the 19th, nor the men and women of
the 20th who led us successfully
through two world wars looked upon
change as easy. They did, however,
look upon it as inevitable.

So it was in the beginning of our
country, so it has been through all the
stages of our history. The future has
always brought Americans to a higher
level of national achievement as long
as we were willing to invest the time

and the energy and the imagination to-
ward shaping that future ourselves.

As we begin a new year, I repledge
my Administration to time, energy, and
imagination essential to build a new
Foundation for a world of peace, pros-
perity, and human justice. Together,
American's Congress, its people, and
its President cannot only master the
many challenges of change, but make
them a part of our Nation's purpose in
the world. In so doing, we can bring
America closer to that "more perfect
union" of Jefferson's dream in a wider
and more secure global community
congenial to our values, interests and
ideals.

Jimmy Carter □

1 For full text, see Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Jan. 29. 1979. p.
121.

2 For excerpts relating to foreign policy, see
Bulletin of Feb. 1979, p. 1.

Department of State Bulletin

They are tough bargainers; we are,
too. We have tried to evolve an agree-
ment with the Soviet Union which
would, first of all, be verifiable, which
would preserve the security of our na-
tion and even enhance it, which would
control nuclear weapons, and which
would lay a basis for increased
friendship between us and the Soviet
Union and let us control or reduce the
threat of the proliferation of nuclear
explosives to other nations throughout
the world. I think that we and the
Soviets have those goals in mind. And
I hope and expect that our progress will
continue.

Now we're negotiating every day at
Geneva and supplementing that negoti-
ation through diplomatic channels,
both here and in the Soviet Union.

Q. Could you say whether they
have hardened their position in the
last month or two?

A. No, they have not hardened their
position in the last month or two. I
think their positions, along with ours,
have been adequately hard. We have
negotiated very firmly, and there has
been a steady progress. There has
never been one time since I've been in
office when we've had a recess in the
efforts, nor a retrogressive action when
we were discouraged. We've been
making steady progress, and we still
are.

Q. The shipment of 200,000 bar-
rels of gasoline and diesel fuel to
Iran — doesn't that really amount to
the interference in Iran's internal
affairs that you have said the United
States will not now be part of? And
would you stand for a similar such
action from any other nation?

A. I don't see the shipment of fuel
supplies to Iran in any way as an in-
terference in the internal affairs of Iran.
These shipments of energy supplies
and, I'm sure, food and other goods to
let the people of Iran have a better life,
I think, are very good and constructive
and proper. We do not have any inten-
tion of interfering in the affairs of
Iran — the internal affairs of their
government — and we don't want any
other country to do it either.

Q. To what extent do you accept a
congressional investigating commit-
tee's finding that you and your top
foreign policy advisers must share
responsibility with the CIA for the
downfall of the Shah?

A. The situation in Iran now, politi-
cally speaking, is very sensitive, and I
can't think of anything I could say
about it that would contribute to the
hopes that we have that Iran would set-

March 1979

tie their problems peacefully, that
bloodshed would be prevented, and
that any political change in their gov-
ernment would be conducted in an or-
derly fashion in accordance with the
Iranian Constitution. So, I don't intend
to make any statements about the im-
pact of what we have done or will do
on Iran.

As I said earlier, we do not interfere
in the internal affairs of Iran. We do
not want any other government to do it
either.

Q. Have U.S. -Soviet relations been
impaired in any way by the Deng
[Chinese Vice Premier Deng
Xiaoping] visit? Any unhappiness
being expressed by the Soviets over
the visit?

A. No, I don't believe so. My
own belief is that the Deng visit and
the normalization of relations between
ourselves and China will not only help
the people of our two countries but will
provide for stability and peace in the
Western Pacific or the Asian region
and, also, the entire world. And my
hope and expectation is that the Soviets
will agree that that assessment is ac-
curate, that this will not be a destab-
lizing factor in the future, but a
stabilizing factor, and that world peace
will be enhanced.

We will be cautious in not trying to
have an unbalanced relationship be-
tween China and the Soviet Union.
And if there has been some concern
expressed by some sources — and I'm
not familiar with them — I don't think
they are well advised.

Q. Vice Premier Deng arrives in
this country on Sunday. And, of
course, his major purpose is to get to
know this country a little bit better
and so that you can have more of an
opportunity to discuss a variety of is-
sues. But I wonder if you're shooting
for a conclusion of any diplomatic
agreements or trade agreements with
him, as well as the other things that
I've mentioned?

A. There are some outstanding an-
cient claims filed on the part of China
against our country and vice versa. We
hope to lay the groundwork for the res-
; olution of that difference. We would
j like to prepare for the future visits to
China of some of our key Cabinet offi-
cers concerning trade and commerce.
Secretary [of the Treasury W. Michael]
■ Blumenthal, Secretary [of Commerce
: Juanita] Kreps will be going there
within the next few weeks. We hope to
conclude an aviation agreement with

them to provide better transportation to
and from our countries. We hope to
conclude, in addition, agreements that
would encompass technology, scien-
tific exchanges. These are the kinds of
bilateral agreements that we will
explore.

Perhaps some of them can be re-
solved while Vice Premier Deng is
here. Most of them, I think, would be
concluded later on with more detailed
technical discussions when an actual
legal document can be drafted for sig-
nature. But we'll have a very broad
agenda of items to be discussed with
China. Those are some illustrative
examples of the kind of bilateral
agreements that will be discussed.

Q. There is a report that the Rus-
sians have agreed to allow the United
States to put seismic listeningposts
inside Russia to make sure that they
are not testing nuclear weapons. Is
that report accurate, and if so, does
that mean we're very close to a nu-
clear test ban agreement?

A. I think it's inappropriate for me
to discuss specific items on which we
are negotiating with the Soviet Union
now. They agreed not to discuss them
publicly. We agreed to do the same.
But, obviously, that's one of the items
that we are negotiating with them.

As I said about the SALT agreement,
I'm not going to sign a SALT agree-
ment unless it's verifiable. And I am
not going to sign a comprehensive test
ban agreement unless it's verifiable.
Since tests of nuclear explosives can be
at a very low level and sometimes
perhaps concealed if they are in a very
deep depth within the Earth, listening
devices, either around the periphery of
the Soviet Union or within the Soviet
Union, are, obviously, advantageous.

The placement of listening devices
within the continental boundaries of
our country and the Soviet Union and
Great Britain — Great Britain is a part-
ner with us — is one of those items that
are being discussed. No final agree-
ment has yet been reached.

Q. Defense Secretary Brown told
the Congress yesterday that the U.S.
arsenal is far and away superior to
that of the Soviet Union. My question
is if that is the case, and realizing, of
course, that you're obviously trying
to sell the SALT treaty, why did you
not see fit to keep your campaign
promise to reduce the defense budget
instead of raising it at the expense of
social programs, which you said you
would never do?

A. I think we have kept the cam-

31

paign promise. We, obviously, can't
freeze the defense budget at a given
figure, but we've had savings that are
substantially in excess of the $5 billion
that I promised during the campaign.

I have no apology to make for a
strong, adequate defense, nor for the
allocation of funds necessary to insure
a strong and adequate defense. I think
we are able at this point to match any
military capability that the Soviets
have. I think we are much stronger
economically and politically than the
Soviet Union is. But in the last 10, 15
years, the Soviets every year have had
above and beyond inflationary costs a
4% or 5% increase in allocation of
funds for defense purposes. In most of
those years, we've been decreasing,
actually, in the amount of funds allo-
cated for defense.

I have not robbed the poor or the de-
prived or the social programs in order
to provide for defense. The percentage
of our budget that goes for defense has
been steadily reduced for a number of
years.

And it's absolutely imperative that
our country always have the ability to
defend itself. It's imperative for our
people to know that we are safe. It's
imperative for our allies to know that
we stand with them with an adequate
defense. It's imperative that the Soviet
Union know that we are capable of de-
fending ourselves. It's a major contri-
bution to peace. I have no apology to
make for it at all.

FEB. 12 2

First of all, I'd like to say a few
words about Iran.

Over the past several months, we
have observed closely the events un-
folding there. Our objective has been
and is a stable and independent Iran
which maintains good relations with
the United States of America. Our
policy has been not to interfere in the
internal affairs of Iran and to express
our firm expectation that other nations
would not do so either.

We hope that the differences that
have divided the people of Iran for so
many months can now be ended. As
has been the case throughout this
period, we have been in touch with
those in control of the Government of
Iran, and we stand ready to work with
them. Our goals are now, as they have
been for the past few months, to insure
the safety of Americans in Iran, to
minimize bloodshed and violence, to
insure that Iran is militarily capable of
protecting its independence and its ter-

32

ritorial integrity, to prevent interfer-
ence or intervention in the internal af-
fairs of Iran by any outside power, and
to honor the will of the Iranian people.

These have been our hopes and our
goals, and our involvement there has
been, as you know, minimal during the
last few months.

The curtailment of Iran's energy
supplies is of special interest to the
people of our country and to the world.
This underscores the vulnerability
about which I spoke when I presented
our proposal for a comprehensive
energy plan to the Congress in April of
1977. The net shortfall from the cur-
tailment of Iran's energy production is,
on a worldwide basis, about 2 million
barrels per day and for the United
States a curtailment of about one-half
million barrels per day.

To put this in perspective, it com-
prises about 2'/2% of the current
American consumption.

Most petroleum stocks were fairly
high at the beginning of this winter
season, and while we are, therefore, in
no immediate danger, the stocks here
and throughout the world continue to
be drawn down.

The last comment I have is about my
Mexico state visit. Two years ago,
President Jose Lopez Portillo of
Mexico became the first head of state
to visit me at the White House. This
was no accident but a carefully consid-
ered judgment because I wanted to
demonstrate the importance which I
have placed from the very beginning on
our relationships with our
neighbor — Mexico — the neighbor
which shares the North American Con-
tinent with ourselves and with Canada.

About 40 hours from now, I will de-
part for Mexico City to return President
Lopez Portillo 's visit and to renew our
own personal dialogue as part of the
consultations and negotiations which
have continued, since his visit, among
our ministers and top government offi-
cials.

We will be discussing some very
important and very difficult problems,
including trade, energy, and border is-
sues. I'm looking forward to extensive
discussions of global and regional
problems, as well. As you know,
Mexico plays a vital role in the entire
world, on a number of crucial issues,
such as economic development, arms
restraint, and nonproliferation. These
issues are very important, both to
President Lopez Portillo and to me.

Inevitably, there are differences in
outlook between two such diverse and
important neighbors, as Mexico and the
United States. But these differences are

dwarfed by our common concerns, our
common values, and our areas of coop-
eration.

I view this trip above all as an op-
portunity to listen and to learn. I want
to hear President Lopez Portillo's
views, and I want to relay my own
views to him. We will be working to-
gether toward an even better future re-
lationship between our two countries.

Q. Do you see much realistic hope
of entering into a mutually produc-
tive relationship with the new Gov-
ernment of Iran?

A. Yes, I see continued hope for
very productive and peaceful coopera-
tion with the Government of Iran. This
has been our posture in the past, and it
will continue to be our posture in the
future .

In the last few hours, our Embassy
has reported that the followers of des-
ignated Prime Minister [Medhi] Bazar-
gan have been very helpful in insuring
the safety of Americans, and we've
been consulting with them very
closely. So I believe that the people of
Iran and their government will continue
to be our friends and that the relation-
ship will be helpful to us.

Q. You said in an interview over
the weekend that a future President
has the option of going to war and
protecting Taiwan. Senator Jackson
says you should be more restrained.
My question is, would you go to war
to protect Taiwan?

A. I have no intention of going to
war. The relationship that we have with
Taiwan is one based on mutual interest,
and I wanted to point out that no future
decision by myself or my successor is
prevented. But our country is one that
believes in peace, and I have no antici-
pation that there will be any require-
ment for war in the western Pacific.

Q. On the same subject of Taiwan,
two related questions. You had ear-
lier said that no resolution by Con-
gress was necessary and suggested
that almost any resolution that might
come out of Congress which would
give any kind of reassurance to
Taiwan might not meet with your
approval. I wanted to ask you, in the
first place, whether you've changed
your mind in any way about that,
whether there is any kind of resolu-
tion from Congress which might be
accepted by you? I have in mind
particularly the approach of Sena-
tors Kennedy and Cranston.

And secondly, there remains con-
fusion resulting from your January
17 statement that you had pursued
the goal of getting from the Chinese

Department of State Bulletin

Government a commitment for
peaceful solution of the problem of
Taiwan. And, as you know, that re-
sulted in some misunderstanding
which you might like to clarify.

A. To repeat what I said in the last
press conference, I think we pursued
the goal of getting a maximum com-
mitment possible from China about the
peaceful resolution of their differences
with Taiwan successfully. We did get
the maximum, in my opinion, that was
possible.

I have never said that I would not
accept any resolution from the Con-
gress. I have said that I don't think a
resolution is necessary, because the
legislation we proposed to the Con-
gress, in my opinion, is adequate.

I could not accept any resolution or
amendment to the legislation that
would contradict the commitments that
we have made to the Government of
China on which is predicated our new
normal relationships. And I think that
any resolution or amendment that
would go as far or further with the de-
fense commitments to Taiwan would be
unacceptable.

Q. Do you think that this govern-
ment should have been better pre-
pared for the takeover by the Kho-
meini forces in Iran? And, also, in
retrospect, do you think it was a
mistake for you to embrace the
Bakhtiar government as you did?

A. Obviously, had we had an exact
prediction of what was going to
happen — it's not the policy of our gov-
ernment to go into the internal af-
fairs of another people or country and
try to determine who should be their
leaders. This is contrary to the philos-
ophy of our people. I think we've tried
it once in the past in Vietnam and
failed abominably. I think no one in
this country of any responsibility wants
to do that to a country, including Iran.

We have worked with the existing
government. We worked closely with
the Shah when he was in his office. We
have worked with Bakhtiar, who was
chosen, as you know, by the Iranian
Parliament in accordance with con-
stitutional provisions. Now Mr.
Bakhtiar has resigned and Mr. Bazar-
gan is their Prime Minister, and the
Majlis — the Parliament — has also re-
signed. We will attempt to work
closely with the existing government.
But we have never tried to decide or to
determine for the Iranian people or any
other people on Earth who their leaders
ought to be or what form of govern-
ment they should have since I've been
in office.

March 1979

Q. But why did we have to make
any statements of support for the
Bakhtiar government? Why couldn't
we just say nothing?

A. We have statements of support
and recognition for 150 nations on
Earth. When we establish relationships
with a government or a people, this is
part of the diplomatic process. And
when the governments change, quite
often without delay — sometimes with a
few days delay until the situation is
clarified — we very quickly establish
relations with the new government. But
this is something that's historically
been the case, and it's what we have
pursued in Iran and what we will pur-
sue in the future.

Q. When Vice Premier Deng of
China was in the United States, he
made a number of anti-Soviet state-
ments. In particular, on several oc-
casions he said that the Soviets are
seeking world domination. I wonder
if you agree with that statement, and
if you don't, I wonder what is your
view of the Soviets global intentions?

A. I have never tried to exercise cen-
sorship on a head state or major official
who came to our country. I didn't try to
tell Mr. Deng what to say when he had
press conferences. 1 didn't try to tell
him what to say when he was meeting
with the Members of Congress. I did
not try to write his banquet toasts for
him. And I think it's accurate to say
that Mr. Deng's statements in our
country are certainly more noteworthy
than the statements that he's made
within his own country and that he's
made in other nations.

The position and attitude of the
Chinese toward the Soviet Union have
been very apparent to all of us for
many years.

We have some areas where we dis-
agree with the assessment of the Soviet
Union as expressed by Mr. Deng. Our
purpose, our goal, I would say perhaps
the most important responsibility I
have on my shoulders, as President, is
to preserve peace in the world, and
especially to have good, sound re-
lationships with the Soviet Union based
on a common desire for peace, which I
am sure they share. We are working
now everyday to try to hammer out a
SALT agreement with the Soviet
Union. They have negotiated in good
faith. So have we. This does not mean,
however, that there are not areas of
contention and areas where we have
peaceful competition with the Soviet
Union. This is expectable, and I think
it will continue for many years in the
future.

I don't have any inclination to con-
demn the Soviets as a people or even as

a government. We'll explore in every
way we can a way to carry out the pur-
poses and honor the principles of our
own nation, to compete with the Soviet
Union's people and government leaders
peaceably when necessary but to seek
with them as much friendship, cooper-
ation, trade as possible under those cir-
cumstances.

Q. In that you're going to Mexico,
I'd like to ask a question on that
subject. Given their new-found oil
reserves and given the fact that you
want to discuss such things as illegal
aliens and trade, don't they have you
pretty much over a barrel — pardon
the bad pun — on the matter of illegal
aliens, which they don't consider il-
legal, and on their protective trade
rules, if we want any of their energy?

A. That's one of the reasons for
going to Mexico, is to explore the pos-
sibilities for resolving these acknowl-
edged differences of opinion between
our people and theirs. My goal will be
to protect the interests of my nation and
the people whom I represent and at the
same time, obviously, to deal with the
Mexicans openly and fairly and to un-
derstand and to honor the sensitivities
that exist within that great country.

I'm sworn by oath to enforce the
laws of our nation, including immigra-
tion laws, to stop smuggling at the bor-
der, and in many areas those goals are
compatible with the desires of the
Mexican people and the Mexican Gov-
ernment. They've cooperated with us
superbly, for instance, in stopping the
illicit traffic in heroin. And I believe
that this is one indication of how we
can cooperate.

We are very proud of the recent dis-
coveries of oil and natural gas in
Mexico. Obviously, a burgeoning, im-
proving economic situation in Mexico
will provide hundreds of thousands of
new jobs that will lessen the pressure
on some of them to seek employment
in our country. And I want to make
sure that we minimize any illegalities
relating to the border, and I want to
make sure that when people are in our
country, whether they are here as citi-
zens or not, that we protect their basic
human rights.

Another question about energy that
you asked — a decision on how much to
explore, produce, and sell oil and nat-
ural gas — is a decision to be made ex-
clusively by the Mexican people. We
are interested in purchasing now and
perhaps in the future even more oil and
natural gas from Mexico. We'll
negotiate with them in good faith.
We'll pay them a fair price.

We'd like to have those policies be
predictable on delivery dates and also

33

on price schedules. And we'll try to be
a good customer. But we have no incli-
nation to force them to give us a spe-
cial privilege nor to do anything that
would be damaging to the well-being of
the Mexican people.

I don't see that these statements that
I've made are incompatible with going
to Mexico to meet with Lopez Portillo,
to talk to his Congress, to talk to his
people. I think the best way to resolve
differences which do exist is in a
framework as I have just described to
you.

Q. You campaigned on a platform
of sunshine in government, and in
the last few weeks you've been telling
your advisers not to reveal what goes
on in the decisionmaking process,
some of the confusion and some of
the disagreement.

A. I've never told them that.

Q. Can you enlighten us as to what
you have told them? Are the reports
in the paper wrong about you telling
them to sort of cool it on that?

A. As has always been the case with
Presidents, and I guess other executive
leaders, I have to have two basic re-
lationships with my advisers and my
subordinates that sometimes are in-
compatible. One is, I have to have the
widest possible range of advice and
counsel, tough debate, sometimes even
open criticism as I evolve in my own
mind a basic decision to be made on an
important subject for the well-being of
the people of this country. Then once I
make that decision — and most of the
controversial decisions are very dif-
ficult ones — once I make a decision, I
expect my policy to be carried out with
loyalty and with enthusiasm.

When I make a policy decision that
might be contrary to the advice re-
ceived by some subordinate, if that
particular subordinate cannot carry out
my policy then the only option for them
is to resign. There have been very few
instances where I have permitted a de-
viation from that policy. I have never
told my people who work under me in
the State Department, NSC [National
Security Council], Defense, Treasury,
Housing, or anything else not to have
contact with the press.

I do, however, have to insist upon a
degree of teamwork once a decision is
made that relates to a sensitive issue,
like the Middle East or like SALT
negotiations or like the relationships
with Iran in recent months. That's what
I have admonished them to do; to have
a free expression of opinion and to let
me have their individual opinions up
until the time I make a decision; once I
make a decision, to comply with it.

34

Department of State Bulletin

THE SECRETARY: Foreign Assistance

and 1/.S. Policy

Statement before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on February 5,
1979. '

During the 25 months that I have
been Secretary of State, I have reg-
ularly appeared before this committee
to discuss a wide variety of issues of
great importance to our foreign policy.
I do so again today as I present the
Administration's proposed foreign as-
sistance program for fiscal year 1980,
for there is a fundamental relationship
between our foreign assistance pro-
grams and America's foreign policy.

President Carter is asking Congress
to approve an authorization of $8.9
billion for the seven components of our
foreign assistance efforts:2 $1.8 billion

for bilateral economic assistance;
nearly $2 billion for security support-
ing assistance; $656.3 million to fi-
nance a total foreign military sales
financing program of $2. 1 billion; $1 10
million for grant military assistance;
$33 million for grant military education
and training; $3.6 billion for assistance
through the multilateral development
banks; and $277 million for our volun-
tary contributions to international or-
ganizations.

In this testimony, I will concentrate
on the relationship between these pro-
grams and our foreign policy goals. Let
me emphasize that, in doing so, I do
not suggest that our development ob-
jectives need or should be controlled by

international political considerations.
The fact is that well-conceived and
well-executed foreign assistance pro-
grams that serve development also sub-
stantially benefit our foreign policy by
improving our relations with individual
developing nations.

Let me begin with a brief examina-
tion of one of the most important trends
of a new era: the growing economic
and political stakes for our country in
the developing world.

U.S. Stakes

in the Developing World

First, there is the strong link between
a sound American economy and con-

News Conferences (Cont'd)

Q. So you do not object if mem-
bers of your Administration talk to
reporters and tell them about the
differences within the Administration
on a policy as it is moving up toward
a final decision?

A. I don't think that's always appro-
priate. I wouldn't want to stand here
and tell you that everybody that works
in the government is free to go and ex-
press their own personal opinions
through the press as a policy is being
evolved. Some of these decisions are
based on highly secret information,
either the attitudes of a foreign leader
which cannot be revealed without em-
barrassment or based on security mat-
ters which, if revealed, might work
contrary to the best interests of our
country. So I'm not going to issue a
blanket permission for anybody in gov-
ernment to have a free access and to
express their own views to the press.

1 think that the policy that I have laid
out is well understood by my people
who work with me, before and during
and after a decision is made, and I
think that I've described it about as
thoroughly as I can this morning.

Q. Do you anticipate that at some
point in time you're going to have to
call a three-way meeting among
yourself, President Sadat, and Prime
Minister Begin to get this Middle
East peace process locked up and
that that might be a natural outcome

of the Foreign Ministers' meeting
that's coming up?

A. I would say that the reality of
having a Mideast peace settlement is
one of my fondest hopes and dreams
and my greatest commitment. I have
probably spent more of my personal
time on trying to have peace in the
Middle East than any other single
issue.

We made tremendous strides forward
at Camp David, as you know, and we
expected at that time to rapidly con-
clude the remaining 5% of the issues
that had not then been resolved. That
has not proven to be as easy as we
thought. I think an inevitable next step
is to have the Foreign Ministers of Is-
rael and Egypt come here to meet with
Secretary Vance — I might visit with
them briefly — in an attitude of mutual
commitment and flexibility and in a
maximum state of isolation from public
statements or commitments which quite
often form a very serious obstacle to
progress.

If that hope is realized, there would
be no need for any further summit
conference, but I would guess that in
this case that Mr. Khalil and Dayan
would go back to Egypt and to Israel to
report progress and to seek confirma-
tion of their negotiated positions from
their own government leaders, includ-
ing President Sadat and Prime Minister
Begin.

If that effort is not completely suc-
cessful and the final peace treaty terms
are not concluded, then if there's
adequate evidence of flexibility and de-
sire on the part of President Sadat and

Prime Minister Begin, then I would
certainly consider favorably having
them here for a summit meeting.

But our hope is that the Foreign
Ministers can be successful, provided
they take advantage of our recommen-
dation and routinely go back to Israel
and to Egypt to seek further guidance
during the negotiations themselves.

Q. Remembering the revelations
that followed the 1973 oil crisis about
how the major oil companies ganged
up on the American people to reap
huge profits, I'd like to know what
assurances can you give us, in light
of what's happening with the cut-off
of oil from Iran and the recent an-
nouncements of curtailed deliveries
by domestic companies, that such is
not being practiced on the American
people again?

A. As you know, we have very strict
laws concerning the pricing and deliv-
ery of oil, both that's imported and that
that's produced and sold within our
own country. The laws will change the
circumstance in May, and the control
of oil prices will be terminated, I think,
in September of 1981. What will hap-
pen then, I don't know, but I don't
have any evidence now that there is a
violation of either the law or pro-
prieties in the pricing or distribution of
energy products. □

' For full text, see Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Jan. 29, 1979,
p. 170.

2 For full text, see Weekly Compilation of

Feb. 19, p. 255.

March 1979

tinued economic vitality in developing
nations.

• In 1977 developing countries
bought $42 billion worth of U.S.
merchandise — more than a third of all
our exports. In the agricultural sector,
these countries buy about half of all our
wheat exports, 60% of our cotton ex-
ports, and 70% of our rice exports.

• During the 1970's, sales of U.S.
goods to developing countries grew by
22% per year compared to 15% for
sales to industrialized nations.

• Over the past 5 years, developing
countries have provided more than 25%
of the raw materials we use.

These statistics demonstrate a very
basic fact of economic life in the late
1970's and beyond: We can enhance
our own well-being by encouraging and
assisting rapid and equitable growth in
the developing world.

It is clear that our policies toward the
developing world affect individual
lives at home as well as abroad.

• The price of food in the neighbor-
hood supermarket will be affected by
food production progress in the de-
veloping world.

• Jobs in our factories will depend
on growing export markets and on
critical raw materials imported from
Third World nations.

• The incomes of many of our farm-
ers will depend on poor countries
earning sufficient income to expand
food imports.

Economic growth in the Third
World, particularly in the more ad-
vanced developing nations, will clearly
have an increasingly important and
positive impact on growth rates in the
industrialized world. Third World de-
velopment will directly affect both how
we live our lives and the kind of world
in which our children will live.

While the economic importance of
developing nations grows steadily, so
does their political role. They now
have a major impact on key regional
and global issues of concern to the
United States.

The most important of these is the
search for peace in troubled areas of
the world. Conflicts in the developing
world pose a danger to world peace,
because they can escalate into great
power confrontations. Developing na-
tions play important roles in helping
resolve conflicts in their regions in two
ways. First are the crucial diplomatic
efforts of the nations most immediately
affected by disputes near their borders.
The central contributions of the so-
called front-line states to the peace
process in Namibia is a case in point.
Second, as in the United Nations and

other multilateral organizations, such
as the Organization of American States
and the Organization of African Unity,
enhance their peacekeeping roles, de-
veloping nations become all the more
important.

In a number of other significant
areas, our political relations with the
developing world affect our ability to
attain goals of critical importance to
the American people.

• We will make little progress in
halting nuclear proliferation unless we
can convince those developing nations
which might otherwise acquire danger-
ous nuclear technology that they can
meet their energy and security needs
without it.

• Establishing a greater respect for
human rights — both political and
economic — depends largely on a
growing recognition among developing
nations that healthy societies must de-
fend and nurture the dignity of the in-
dividual.

• We cannot restrain the dangerous
growth of conventional arms unless de-
veloping nations become convinced
that this type of arms control enhances
their security.

• The battle against pollution of our
oceans and our atmosphere cannot be
won unless we enlist the developing
nations in this struggle.

Progress toward each of these goals
depends on the practical decisions of

35

variety of settings where industrialized
and developing nations meet to share
ideas, exchange views, and negotiate.
We have often spoken of the need for
this dialogue to be a positive one which
would avoid the rhetoric of confronta-
tion. But our position in the many
North-South negotiations, which will
take place in 1979 and 1980, can only
be sustained if we are willing to bear
our fair share of the financial burdens
and work with others in addressing
global economic problems in a positive
fashion.

At a more direct level, our aid is one
of the strongest and most tangible links
between the United States and the na-
tions of the developing world. Trade
and investment have a central and sig-
nificant impact on developing country
economies. Our economic aid is also of
particular importance through its direct
impact on the lives of the poor. And it
is the most visible expression of our
interest in the economic well-being of
developing nations.

It is not our policy to let short-term
political considerations govern our de-
cisions about development assistance.
But our development policy and our
diplomacy in general must be carefully
integrated, in part because the govern-
ments of nations receiving our aid often
interpret this as either a signal of de-
teriorating interest in them or a sign of
American weakness and withdrawal.

Our aid also helps buttress the strong

. . . well-conceived and well-executed foreign assistance programs that
seme development also substantially benefit our foreign policy by im-
proving our relations with individual developing nations.

many different governments. Our abil-
ity to influence those decisions requires
more than exhortation and imaginative
diplomacy. When we ask a poorer na-
tion to work with us for peace or to
forgo sensitive nuclear technology or to
build a society that is more equitable,
our influence will depend in part on our
ability to offer tangible support for its
security or energy development or eco-
nomic growth.

We will be more effective in asking
developing nations to share our goals
for a better and safer world if we are
willing to help them achieve their goals
of better and safer lives for their own
people. This basic reciprocity lies at
the heart of the relations with the Third
World.

In a broad context, the levels of our
foreign assistance are judged as a sig-
nal of our seriousness in the so-called
North-South dialogue.

This dialogue is conducted in a wide

sense of national independence and
identity among the developing nations
which is the surest barrier to domina-
tion by outside powers.

This point is important in both
long-term and short-term contexts.

In the long run, we can be confident
that the relationship between the West
and developing nations will remain
positive. These relations are based
solidly on our mutually beneficial eco-
nomic ties, on Western acceptance of
political diversity and support for
human freedom, and on the cultural
affinities which have enriched all our
peoples.

We cannot, however, disregard the
shorter term and rely only on our
long-term advantages to deal with
Soviet activities in the Third World.

Some have argued that we should
seek to force Soviet restraint by aban-
doning efforts to achieve agreements
that are deeply in our national security

36

interests — for example, a sound SALT
agreement. We believe that such an ap-
proach is likely to be ineffective and
damaging to our interests.

A better response is to continue to
take an affirmative approach of active
engagement in the Third World itself,
to concentrate on our ties with de-
veloping nations because of their in-
herent importance. Such an approach
requires our seeing Third World prob-
lems in their own terms rather than
primarily through an East-West prism.
And it must be backed up by sufficient
resources to address seriously the eco-
nomic as well as security concerns of
developing countries.

This strategy of affirmative involve-
ment and support for the independence
and diversity of developing nations
serves us well. It capitalizes on the
West's inherent strengths. It improves
our ties to developing countries in a
context which does not force them to
make an explicit choice between East
and West. It reduces the wider dangers
of conflict in the Third World. And the
fact is that it is working. Our ties to the
members of the Association of South
East Asian Nations and in the Asian sub-
continent, in Africa, and within the
Western Hemisphere are strong and
sound. This is reflected not only in the
atmosphere of our relations but in our
ability to work more easily together at
the United Nations and on regional
issues.

Let me cite an article I recently read
in Nigeria's Daily Times, entitled
"The Soviet Dilemma in Africa." Its
author states that:

First the Russians move into some African
nation, usually at a time when the nation's very
survival is threatened. For awhile there is a
halcyon period of fraternal collaboration usu-
ally cemented by massive infusions of military
aid. The nation feels a little more secure and
begins to worry about such mundane things as
food and hospitals and roads. It turns to the
Russians, hoping they will give economic aid
as readily as they gave military aid. The Rus-
sians say that they don't have the money. The
nation turns to the West which is waiting in the
wings. A quarrel ensues and the Russians are
asked to leave ....

The author goes on to conclude:

This situation in Africa at the present time is
such that the Soviet Union is losing out to the
Americans, not so much because African
countries detest socialism as because the Soviet
Union is unwilling to, or incapable of, provid-
ing more economic than military aid.

I believe we have every reason to be
confident about the future of our rela-
tions with the developing world as long
as we continue to support their eco-
nomic development and assist them

with the means to provide for their
self-defense.

U.S. Objectives

Our foreign assistance programs
have six important objectives which
guide us in designing specific programs
to help meet the unique needs of each
recipient nation.

First, we work to overcome the
worst aspects of poverty and help na-
tions achieve self-sustaining, equitable
growth primarily through a strategy of
meeting basic human needs. We play a
major role in the worldwide war on
hunger and malnutrition both through
our PL-480 food assistance programs
and through the strong emphasis in our
bilateral development assistance on
efforts to increase food production,
improve nutrition, enhance health care

It is not our policy to let
short-term political considerations
govern our decisions about de-
velopment assistance.

and education, control population
growth, and foster rural development.

• In Peru's extremely poor central
region, there are tragically high infant
and maternal mortality rates. We plan
to allocate $7.5 million in FY 1980 to
increase the access of 2 million rural
people to improved curative and pre-
ventive health care services.

• In Indonesia we will provide fur-
ther financing for a river basin de-
velopment project. An estimated
230,000 lowland farmers and laborers
will directly benefit from increased
crop production and income from irri-
gation while drainage will improve
sanitation and health.

• In Africa's Sahel we have been a
partner with the World Health Organi-
zation and more than a dozen other
countries and international institutions
in an effort to help control river blind-
ness in the Volta River Basin. This
dreaded disease has long prevented the
full economic development of some
700,000 kilometers of fertile land in
seven very poor West African nations.

Our second objective is to help de-
veloping nations strengthen their self-
reliance by supporting light industry,
technological progress, and improve-
ment of basic infrastructure. In each
case, our object is to promote human
welfare.

• President Carter has proposed the
creation of a new U.S. institute for in-

Department of State Bulletin

ternational technological cooperation.
The instititute would mobilize more
effectively the scientific and techno-
logical capacity of our country to work
with developing nations in creating and
adapting technology to solve their criti-
cal development problems and in
building their scientific and technolog-
ical capabilities. In its work with the
industrializing middle tier nations
which no longer receive concessional
aid, the institute would operate on a
cost-sharing basis.

• In Bangladesh we will finance a
$12 million rural roads program using
labor intensive methods to increase
local agricultural production and mar-
keting of agricultural commodities.

• In the English-speaking Carib-
bean, the small and geographic disper-
sion of the islands limits the market for
products grown by small farmers. We
plan to work with the Caribbean De-
velopment Bank to construct a farm
supply and marketing center, a cold
storage facility, and improved inter-
island transportation designed to in-
crease the production and income of
small farmers in the Eastern Caribbean.

Our third objective is to promote the
peaceful resolution of disputes by pro-
viding economic aid to nations in re-
gions beset by serious conflict.

• Our security supporting assistance
programs in both Egypt and Israel are
vital to the peace process because they
support the economic stability of both
nations.

Nearly half of Egypt's people live in
overcrowded cities. The government
cannot provide them with the neces-
sities of life without assistance from
the United States and other nations. We
will provide Egypt with $750 million in
FY 1980 to import the industrial raw
materials, spare parts, and other goods
needed to maintain essential services
and to support projects vital to Egypt's
longer term development. This is im-
portant to the political stability which
is critical to President Sadat's ability to
lead Egypt toward peace.

As with Egypt, Israel's ability to
provide for the security and well-being
of its people is a key factor in its deci-
sions toward peace. Our aid has helped
Israel to take the austere measures of
devaluation and import reduction
needed for efforts to increase its de-
fense capability following the 1973
war. Although Israel's economy is now
doing much better, its prospects for
steady growth and stability depend
strongly on help from the United
States. Our security supporting assist-
ance to Israel — $785 million in FY
1980 — will provide funds to keep es-
sential imports flowing. We are also

March 1979

37

providing Israel with $1 billion in
needed foreign military sales financing.

• Our assistance in southern Africa
is crucial to our diplomatic efforts for
peace in Namibia and Rhodesia. The
security supporting assistance we pro-
vide the nations of the area helps them
to deal with the severe economic dislo-
cations caused by years of conflict. By
promoting economic stability in the re-
gion, our assistance not only lessens
human suffering but also encourages
these nations to continue their efforts to
resolve conflicts peacefully.

A fourth objective of our assistance
programs is to help friendly nations
maintain adequate military establish-
ments to strengthen their self-defense.
Foreign military sales (FMS) financ-
ing, grant military assistance programs
(MAP), and international military edu-
cation and training (IMET) programs,
together with FMS cash sales, are the
means by which we accomplish this
objective.

In accordance with longstanding ex-
ecutive branch policy and congression-
al directives, we are continuing the shift
from grant MAP to FMS financing. We
are requesting grant program funds for
only four countries in FY 1980 — Jor-
dan, Portugal, Philippines, and Spain.

The FMS financing program is a less
costly means than MAP for assisting
other countries in financing their de-
fense programs. Except for a proposed
direct loan of $500 million for Israel on
which repayment would be forgiven,
FMS loans are eventually repaid and
require the appropriation of only $1.00
to guarantee each $10.00 in loans made
by the Federal Financing Bank [De-
partment of the Treasury].

The IMET program continues to
provide a significant return on a modest
investment. It not only develops the
technical and managerial competence
of foreign personnel to use effectively
U.S. -supplied equipment but also en-
ables officers who have or are likely to
attain positions of leadership in their
countries to learn more about the
United States and establish friendships
here. We believe that dollar-for-dollar,
this is one of our most important pro-
grams.

A few examples of proposed security
assistance programs in FY 1980 dem-
onstrate their importance.

• We are now engaged in an effort to
rebuild our important relationship with
Turkey. The $200 million FMS credit
and $2 million in IMET we wish to
provide are designed to assist Turkey in
its efforts to maintain a modern armed
force capable of performing its NATO
role. The $98 million in security sup-
porting assistance is crucial to Turkey's
efforts to stabilize its very difficult

economic situation; this is important
both to Turkey's contribution to the
mutual security of the West and also to
its capacity as a democratic govern-
ment to deal with the problems of de-
velopment.

• We are asking Congress to ap-
prove for Greece a $158 million pro-
gram of FMS credits and $1.8 million
in military training. This assistance
will promote the reintegration of Greek
forces into the NATO integrated mili-
tary structure, enable those forces to
meet their NATO responsibilities, and
help to insure that the present balance
of military strength among the coun-
tries of the region is preserved.

• One of our most important security
programs is for Korea. Peace and sta-
bility in Northeast Asia in general and
on the Korean Peninsula in particular
are of continuing vital importance to
our country. This year we are request-
ing $225 million in FMS financing for
support of Korea's 5-year force im-
provement plan, and this will be
supplemented by cash sales. We are
also requesting authority to provide
$1.8 million in grant military training
which will focus on training in the use
of newly acquired equipment.

A fifth objective is to help to pro-
mote respect for individual human
rights and to assist refugees.

• Recipient governments are aware
that human rights considerations influ-
ence the degree of our responsiveness
in terms of both levels and types of as-
sistance we extend. President Carter
reaffirmed last December that: "In
distributing the scarce resources of our
foreign assistance programs, we will
demonstrate that our deepest affinities

interagency committee on human rights
before it was submitted to the President
for final approval.

• Our refugee effort is a key element
of our assistance program, helping vic-
tims of war, civil strife, and human
rights violations to find new homes and
begin new lives. Given the increasingly
critical plight of refugees worldwide,
we intend to strengthen our efforts
through new legislation and more ef-
fective management of programs in all
agencies of government.

Our sixth objective is to strengthen
international responsibility and the
sharing of financial burdens for global
development by contributing our fair
share to multilateral assistance pro-
grams.

Multilateral aid is a particularly ef-
fective mechanism because of its lever-
age in generating contributions by
other donors and its mobilization of
private capital. The principal reason for
this is the use of callable capital which
provides financial backing for the
banks enabling them to raise the bulk
of their funding in the private capital
markets.

The advantages of burden-sharing
and leverage are most pronounced in
the World Bank where on a cumulative
basis each dollar we spend has resulted
in approximately $50 of lending. In the
recent replenishment negotiations for
the Inter-American Development Bank,
we obtained both increased reliance on
callable capital — which, though appro-
priated, does not give rise to budgetary
expenditures.

We have been successful in contain-
ing and in some cases reducing admin-
istrative expenses of the multilateral

Recipient governments are aware that human rights considerations
influence the degree of our responsiveness in terms of both levels and
types of assistance we extend.

are with nations which commit them-
selves to a democratic path to de-
velopment."3

• The content of our economic as-
sistance programs has been designed to
encourage more equitable patterns of
development and increased participa-
tion by poorer people in the develop-
ment process. This latter goal is en-
hanced by programs such as Title II
under PL^t80, which benefit the poor
through self-help as well as relief pro-
grams carried out by private voluntary
organizations.

• The budget we are presenting
today was carefully reviewed by our

banks and continue to make substantial
progress in increasing the involvement
of these institutions in activities that
alleviate extreme poverty.

The contributions of U.N. programs
to development also serve to meet hu-
man needs.

• In the Sudan, the U.N. Develop-
ment Program is equipping training
centers to teach practical skills to over
60,000 undereducated and under-
employed people.

• In the Philippines, UNICEF sup-
ports a unique televised nutritional
training program that reaches 15 mil-
lion students every school day.

38

Let me note here a matter of special
concern. Last year the Congress placed
in the State Department's FY 1979 ap-
propriation bill a prohibition against
the use of U.S. assessed contributions
for technical assistance by the United
Nations agencies. This prohibition pre-
cludes any payment by the United
States of its U.N. assessments, since
the U.N. agencies cannot accept as-
sessed contributions with conditions
attached. It places the United States in
violation of its legally binding financial
obligations to the U.N. agencies. In
turn. U.S. influence in the U.N. agen-
cies is weakened, just at a tirne when
this country has begun to reassert its
traditional leadership role and when the
United Nations is engaged in a number
of matters of critical importance for the
United States. We urge that this pro-
hibitory language be removed
promptly.

These are the purposes of our aid.
They are purposes in our national inter-
est. And they reflect the concern and
strength of the American people.

Management and Effectiveness
of Aid Programs

Yet the worth of our goals is an in-
sufficient measure of the worth of our
programs. We must address two further
questions. First, are our aid programs
increasingly well managed and the
funds effectively and efficiently used?
And second, even if they are effective
and efficient, can our programs make a
difference to Third World nations, or
do conditions there prevent progress?

With regard to the management and
effectiveness of our development ef-
forts. Governor Gilligan [John J. Gilli-
gan, Administrator of the Agency for
International Development (AID)] will
be prepared to discuss with you in
greater detail:

• Actions that have been taken by
the executive branch through the De-
velopment Coordination Committee to
link more effectively U.S. bilateral
programs with our efforts in the mul-
tilateral development institutions;

• What AID is doing to tighten con-
trols over its operating expense budget
and to decentralize decisionmaking
overseas;

• What new areas of cooperation
have been established between the
Peace Corps and AID to formulate
complementary and mutually suppor-
tive activities in specific countries;

• How AID has embarked on de-
veloping long-term strategies on a
country-by-country , region-by-region
basis; and

• How it is enhancing and

strengthening the system by which it
evaluates its programs.

As you know, the President is now
reviewing alternative means of fulfil-
ling the mandate that you gave him last
year to reorganize, consolidate, and
upgrade development assistance. We
have consulted your chairman and
others concerning these options and
will soon be making specific proposals.

With regard to whether our programs
can make a difference, the answer is a
clear "yes."

It is admittedly difficult to demon-
strate the exact degree to which strong
and effective aid programs contribute
to the growth of developing nations.
Obviously, they do so in a number of
ways. They help poor people become
more productive members of their
societies through programs that im-
prove their health and education, pro-
vide jobs for their hands and minds, or
supply fertilizer for their fields. And
they help national development also
through balance-of-payments support
and infrastructural development.

But many other important factors are
also at work in development — such as
the degree of local effort, the natural
resources of the nation concerned, or
even the weather. Thus, we and other
aid donors neither can nor should claim
some specific degree of credit for the
progress that has been.

What we can say is that progress is
taking place.

• Over the past 25 years, per capita
income in the developing countries
grew on the average of 3% each year.
This is about 50% better than the his-
torical growth rates in the developed
countries during their period of indus-
trialization.

• The quality of life for many mil-
lions has been improved by this
growth. These improvements are re-
flected in significant increases in life
expectancy, adult literacy, eradication
of smallpox, and burgeoning school
enrollment in the developing world.

• The developing countries weath-
ered the shocks of oil price increase,
crop failures, and recession better than
anticipated.

We can also say that our aid must
and will continue to be focused
primarily on those nations which share
our goal of equitable growth. While
much has been accomplished, much
more remains to be done.

Poverty afflicts hundreds of millions
while the economies of many nations in
Africa, the Asian subcontinent, and the
Caribbean are stagnating. Population
growth continues to outpace food pro-
duction in many nations. In the time it

Department of State Bulletin

has taken me to share these thoughts
with you this afternoon, world popula-
tion has increased by about 4,000 —
three every second.

These problems are compounded by
massive rural and urban unemployment
and a significant number of regional
conflicts which too often cripple eco-
nomic progress.

The unfinished business of develop-
ment presents a tragic picture of wasted
potential and widespread human suf-
fering. It represents a serious challenge
to the economic and political stability
which we and other nations require if
growth and prosperity are to be sus-
tained. And it is a moral challenge we
cannot evade.

The funds we have budgeted have
been carefully scrutinized. The same
strict criteria which the Administration
has applied to other Federal spending
have been applied to the foreign assist-
ance budget.

We had planned to increase foreign
assistance levels in the area of bilateral
economic aid more rapidly than we do
in this budget. The pressing need for
budgetary restraint caused us to slow
the expansion of these programs. Sub-
stantial cuts were made by the execu-
tive branch. Indeed, it is important to
note that our foreign assistance re-
quests for 1980 will result in only $160
million in outlays above the 1979 ap-
propriated level — a really negligible
impact on the total Federal budget.
Nonetheless, we believe that we must
make very modest progress toward a
goal of substantially increased aid in
the coming years.

For let me emphasize again that we
are speaking not only of the compelling
plight of human beings in desperate
need. We have a compelling national
interest in their progress. The United
States cannot have a strong foreign
policy of active engagement in the
world's affairs if we are unwilling to
put our resources behind our words. □

■The complete transcript of the hearings will
be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments. U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington. D.C. 20402; (press release 32).

2 This figure also includes funds for the food
aid program, refugee assistance, and other
foreign economic and financial assistance.

'Made at the ceremony on Dec. 6. 1978,
commemorating the 30th anniversary of the
adoption of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; for full text, see Bulletin of
Jan. 1979, p. 1.

March 1979

39

Overview of Major
Foreign Policy Issues

Statement before the Subcommittee
on State, Justice, Commerce, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the
Senate Appropriations Committee on
February 8, J 979. '

I am pleased to be here today as you
begin consideration of the FY 1980
budget request for the State Depart-
ment.

Chairman [Ernest F.] Hollings re-
quested that I review with you some of
the major foreign policy issues now on
our agenda. I understand well the need
for such an overview. The Depart-
ment's budget must be viewed within a
foreign policy context. The funds we
request are directly related to the ob-
jectives we pursue.

After 25 months in office, we have
not altered the two fundamental
priorities which we established early in
the Administration and which continue
to guide our foreign policy.

First, the search for peace remains
our foremost objective. It takes many
forms .

• We seek to mediate serious dis-
putes and conflicts between nations
which can erupt into wider regional or
global war.

• We seek to foster better relations
with the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China.

• We seek to make progress on a
substantial arms control agenda which
can enhance our security.

• We seek to encourage nations to
forgo the acquisition of technology
which can enable them to build nuclear
weapons.

• And we seek to restrain both arms
suppliers and recipients in the very
substantial trade in conventional
weapons.

Our second objective is sustaining
and enhancing the prosperity of the
American people through our partici-
pation in a vital international economic
system.

The pursuit of this objective involves
many factors:

• Maintaining a more open and
equitable international trading system;

• Developing Third World
economies, for growth among the de-
veloping nations enhances our own
economic well-being; and

• Providing encouragement and help
to our business community so that it

may take advantage of the many op-
portunities to expand its exports and
compete with others for foreign mar-
kets.

Achieving these objectives is not
possible without maintaining and en-
hancing our own military and economic
strength. These goals require as well
strong and enduring relations with our
allies built upon trust, friendship, and
wide-ranging cooperation. A strong
defense and sound relations with allies
are the foundation on which our foreign
policy is built. And we have managed
to develop a foreign policy which is
firmly rooted in the values of the
American people. This is essential if
we are to receive the public support on
which our policies ultimately depend.

Let me begin my overview of a
number of key issues on our foreign
policy agenda with a status report of
where we stand in our negotiations for
a just and lasting peace in the Middle
East.

Middle East

In the Middle East our strategic and
economic interests are vitally engaged.
The pursuit of Middle East peace ini-
tiatives remains among the very most
important of our policy goals.

Since Camp David, Egyptian-Israeli
negotiations on a draft peace treaty
have resolved all but a handful of the
issues between the two parties. The is-
sues that remain, however, involve
matters of fundamental importance to
both Egypt and Israel. We have invited
Foreign Minister Dayan and Prime
Minister Khalil to meet with me at
Camp David later this month to con-
tinue negotiations on the treaty. We
hope to hear from Egypt and Israel re-
garding this proposal within the next
several days.2

Throughout 1978 we have been
deeply involved in developing policies
to deal with the new situation in
Southwest Asia created by the Afghan
revolution, the upheaval in Iran, events
in the Yemens and the Horn of Africa,
and the security concerns these events
have generated among our friends in
the area.

In Iran our policy throughout the
current crisis has been based on the fact
that only Iranians can resolve the fun-
damental political issues which they
now confront. We have urged each

party to solve these problems within
the framework of the Iranian Constitu-
tion and institutions. In our view it is
imperative that an orderly political
process be restored and the economy
revived. We will continue to encourage
contact among the parties and to urge
reconciliation and moderation on all of
them.

The situation in Iran results primar-
ily from causes within Iran, but the in-
stability has an impact on all of the key
countries in the area. During the year
ahead, we will continue our efforts to
help resolve conflicts, to assist our
friends and be alert to threats to their
security from forces outside the area,
to promote stability in the entire Mid-
dle East and Southwest Asian region.
In this regard we will:

• Persist in our mediation role be-
tween Egypt and Israel and in launch-
ing the negotiations on the West Bank
and Gaza;

• Develop ways of helping the
people of this area build better lives on
the foundation of peace;

• Maintain our close dialogue with
Saudi Arabia on the Middle East peace
process, oil production and pricing,
and the security of the strategic Persian
Gulf area;

• Continue to support strongly a
peaceful resolution to the political tur-
moil and crisis in Iran;

• Work with all the parties in the
effort to strengthen the authority of
the government in Lebanon;

• Try to respond to Pakistan's con-
cerns for its economic well-being and
security; and

• Seek to strengthen our relations
with India in recognition of our inter-
ests in that country and the role it can
play in contributing to regional stabil-
ity.

SALT II

The United States and the Soviet
Union have resolved all but a few is-
sues in the SALT II negotiations. But
first I would like to step back from the
details of the negotiations to look in
broader terms at what we are trying to
accomplish.

We have pursued three fundamental
objectives in the SALT talks.

First, any agreement must, above
all, preserve and strengthen the secu-
rity of the United States and its allies.
The treaty that is now emerging does
so.

• The treaty sets equal limits on the
number of delivery vehicles for both
sides at 2,250. This will require the
Soviets to dismantle over 250 systems
while allowing us to increase slightly

40

Department of State Bulletin

our overall numbers of strategic deliv-
ery vehicles.

• It will allow all planned improve-
ments in our strategic forces to pro-
ceed.

• It will permit us to continue our
military cooperation with our allies.

Second, a SALT agreement should
maintain or enhance the stability of the
strategic balance, thereby reducing the
possibility of nuclear war and enhanc-
ing our security.

• SALT will reduce uncertainties
about future force levels of each side,
thus helping prevent a dangerous arms
race.

• It will put us in a better position to
deal with threats posed by MIRV'ed
ICBM's [intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles which are multiple independ-
ently-targetable reentry vehicles].

Third, a SALT treaty must be
adequately verifiable.

• The treaty contains explicit pro-
hibitions against impeding verification.

• The treaty's precise language will
help minimize ambiguity and the pos-
siblity for misunderstandings on com-
pliance.

• We have the capacity to determine
for ourselves whether the Soviets are
living up to their obligations under the
treaty.

At the Geneva session with
[Soviet] Foreign Minister Gromyko,
we reached essential agreement on
most of the remaining major issues. A
few matters remain unresolved. We are
continuing to work toward their res-
olution in Geneva and between our
capitals. These efforts will, we hope,
soon lead to final agreement. We can
then set a date for a summit and sub-
mission of the treaty for ratification.

People's Republic of China

Let me turn now to the historic step
that the United States and the People's
Republic of China have taken in estab-
lishing full diplomatic relations, and
what it means for the future.

Full and normal relations will allow
us to work more effectively toward a
stable system of independent nations in
Asia. It will permit us to encourage an
outward-looking China to play a con-
structive role in the world generally.
And it will enable American business
to deal on an equal footing with other
suppliers as China moves toward mod-
ernization.

From the beginning of this process of
normalization, the future well-being of
the people on Taiwan has been one of
our key concerns. From our standpoint,
the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan

question by the Chinese themselves is
critical. It is clear from actions and
statements by the People's Republic
over the past several weeks that nor-
malization has increased the pos-
sibilities that the resolution of the issue
will be pursued peacefully. After the
termination of the Mutual Defense
Treaty on December 31, 1979, we will
continue our previous policy of selling
carefully selected defensive weapons to
Taiwan. While the P.R.C. said they
disapproved of this, they nevertheless
moved forward with normalization with
full knowledge of our intentions.

In building our new relationship with
the people on Taiwan, we are taking
practical steps to insure continuity in
our trade and cultural relations. We
have submitted legislation to the Con-
gress to enable a nongovernmental
instrumentality — the American Insti-
tute in Taiwan — to carry on these
longstanding relationships. Under this
proposed legislation, we are certain
that Taiwan will continue to prosper
and that our relations with its people
will continue to flourish.

We are requesting authorization from
Congress to reprogram some of our FY
1979 resources to fund the activities of
the American Institute in Taiwan. The
exact amount needed for this purpose is
unknown at this time, but it would
come from the $2 million originally
budgeted for Department of State ac-
tivities in Taiwan during this fiscal
year. In addition, other Federal agen-
cies with activities in Taiwan will be
required to reprogram their funds in
order to channel them to the American
Institute in Taiwan to enable it to carry
out its responsibilities on their behalf.
Some of these other agencies are the
International Communication Agency,
Defense, and Commerce.

The Department plans to submit to
Congress a budget amendment to its
FY 1980 budget to provide funding for
the institute's operations in FY 1980.

Southern Africa

We are continuing our efforts to as-
sist in the difficult transition to major-
ity rule in both Namibia and Rhodesia.

Talks between U.N. representatives
and the South African Government
made progress and could lead in the
near future to the introduction of the
U.N. Transition Assistance Group
(UNTAG) into Namibia, thus begin-
ning the process of Namibia's peaceful
transition to independence.

A peaceful settlement in Namibia
would have great significance.

• It would demonstrate the viability
of a policy which seeks peaceful solu-

tions to the burning problems of south-
ern Africa.

• It could create more favorable
conditions for a solution to the
Rhodesia problem.

• It would resolve a longstanding
conflict which would have presented
increasing opportunity for outside in-
volvement in Namibia.

• And it could produce a more
favorable climate for South Africa's
cooperation on other issues.

In line with the policy followed by
recent Administrations, we intend to
offer to provide the initial airlift serv-
ices for UNTAG's deployment to
Namibia on a nonreimbursable basis.
The Office of Management and Budget
is now examining, on a priority basis,
the question of how the cost, which we
estimate at up to $25 million, of this
airlift should be handled.

The United Nations estimates that
the total cost of the UNTAG operation
would be approximately $300 million,
of which the U.S. contribution would be
approximately $75 million. This is
25% of the total, our customary share.
A supplemental budget request cover-
ing the U.S. share will be submitted
shortly, when we are sure that UNTAG
will proceed.

When viewed against the alternative
of mounting conflict in Namibia, and
the probability of increasing outside
involvement, we believe that this in-
vestment in a peaceful solution to the
problem of Namibian independence is
fully justified. The willingness of all
governments in southern Africa, in-
cluding the Government of South Af-
rica, to cooperate with the United Na-
tions in this venture supports the judg-
ment that this solution is in the interest
of all those who value peace and sta-
bility in southern Africa.

Over this past weekend I met with
British Foreign Secretary David Owen
for an extensive review of the current
situation in Rhodesia as well as
Namibia.

Our shared assessment is that the
Rhodesian situation is deteriorating
seriously and rapidly. The war is in-
creasing in both scope and intensity; an
estimated 1 ,000 persons are dying
monthly; and increasing numbers of
whites are leaving the country.

There is little prospect that the proc-
ess initiated under the Salisbury
agreement can reverse this trend.

In this circumstance, we and the
British are resolved to continue our
efforts to hold open the possibility of a
negotiated settlement that can end the
conflict.

The parties remain far apart. Neither
side has shown a willingness to com-

March 1979

promise substantially. Yet a negotiated
settlement remains in the interest of
both sides and of the people as a
whole.

We believe that taking sides in this
dispute would be a mistake. We do not
support trie demands of either side for
predominance during the period of
transition to independence. We stand
by proposals for an important transition
process and free elections that will let
the people peacefully decide who their
future leaders will be.

Helms Amendment

There is a matter of special concern
adversely affecting U.S. participation in
the U.N. system which I would like to
discuss. Last year the Congress re-
duced the appropriation requested for
our assessed contributions to the or-
ganizations of the U.N. system. But
more importantly, in the same action
Congress enacted a prohibition against
the use of any U.S. assessed contribu-
tions to U.N. agencies for technical
assistance.

Upon signing the FY 1979 Depart-
ment of State appropriation bill. Presi-
dent Carter indicated his strong oppo-
sition to this action. He also indicated
his intention promptly to seek remedial
legislation "... so this Government
can meet its clear obligations under the
United Nations Charter and related
treaties." The President's FY 1980
budget includes a request for the re-
quired corrective legislation. I hope
this committee will help us attain
prompt enactment of that legislation.

The U.N. agencies are unable to ac-
cept assessed contributions with condi-
tions attached. As long as the prohibi-
tion against the use of U.S. assessed
contributions remains in effect, the
United States will be unable to meet its
legally binding financial obligations to
the U.N. agencies.

Allowing this situation to continue
will:

• Cast doubt on the commitment of
the United States to the United Nations
and to multilateral diplomacy in
general;

• Weaken U.S. influence in the
United Nations, just when the United
States has begun to reassert its tradi-
tional leadership role and when the
United Nations is engaged in matters of
critical importance for us;

• Damage the U.S. posture in the
eyes of our allies, who look to us for
leadership, and of the developing
countries, who place substantial re-
liance on the United Nations;

• Seriously impair an important proc-
ess for developing greater international

cooperation in which the United States
has played a major role over the past
three decades; and

• Confront the U.N. agencies with a
significant shortage of funds which
would require cutbacks possibly af-
fecting such vital programs as the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency's
development of nuclear safeguards, the
World Health Organization's (WHO)
efforts to control and eradicate con-
tagious diseases, the International Civil
Aviation Organization promotion of air
navigation safety, and the Food and
Agriculture Organization's early
warning system on impending crop and
food shortages.

We know that some Members of
Congress believe that the technical as-
sistance work of the U.N. system
should be funded entirely through vol-
untary, rather than assessed, contribu-
tions. In fact, less than 19% of U.N.
system technical assistance is funded
by assessed contributions. Placed in
larger perspective, assessed contribu-
tions for technical assistance amount to
only about 5% of the total funds avail-
able within the U.N. system, and little
more than 1% excluding the assessed
WHO program.

It is longstanding U.S. policy to seek
to strengthen the voluntarily funded
U.N. Development Program (UNDP)
as the primary source of funding and
coordination for technical assistance
activities conducted by the relevant
U.N. agencies. In support of our major
emphasis on the central role of the
UNDP, the United States will continue
to:

• Press in each U.N. agency to keep
existing assessed funded technical as-
sistance to a minimum consistent with
overall U.S. policy objectives;

• Seek to avoid the introduction of
new programs unless the need is ex-
traordinarily and can be fully justified;
and

• Transfer wherever appropriate
funding and policy responsibility for
such programs to other agencies —
especially the UNDP — using voluntary
contributions.

At the same time, U.S. policy must
take into account the fact that some
U.N. agency statutes authorize the fur-
nishing of technical assistance out of
assessed budgets. We believe that uni-
versal funding and burden-sharing for
U.N. system technical assistance are
appropriate where benefits serve a
common interest, as in the case of
WHO's disease control programs. And
we support assessed funding of techni-
cal assistance when important goals are
better served this way than through the

41

UNDP; for example, in meeting
short-term emergency needs which
cannot be accommodated on a timely
basis within UNDP procedures.

As we pursue this policy, every ef-
fort will be made to insure that the
U.N. agencies and other governments
clearly understand that the longstand-
ing U.S. support for these organiza-
tions could be seriously impaired if the
repeated expressions of concern by
us — the major U.N. contributor — are
ignored.

Refugees

Finally, I would like to touch on a
matter of growing importance to our
foreign policy and directly related to
our future budgetary needs.

The United States has long distin-
guished itself by its active concern for
refugees. We have helped to ease their
personal tragedies by providing mate-
rial assistance abroad. We have wel-
comed them to live among us. We have
helped them to become productive
members of our society by teaching
them a new language, training them to
acquire new skills, and easing their
settlement into new homes.

Our response to continuing human
tragedy in Asia, the Soviet Union, Af-
rica, and elsewhere is a measure of our
deep concern for individual liberty and
demonstrates our interest in a more
humanitarian international system.

• Our programs relieve strains on
friendly governments in Southeast Asia
caused by the presence of so many ref-
ugees in their territories. Since August
1977 our government has authorized
the admission of 73,000 of the more
than 262,000 refugees in the camps in
this region.

• We are contributing to the care and
resettlement in Africa of more than 2
million refugees.

• And it is important to note that we
continue to welcome victims of perse-
cution, such as Cuban political prison-
ers.

As you can see, the present
worldwide conditions for refugees are
dramatic and pressing. We have al-
ready acted to urge other governments
to do more, to speed up our own pro-
cedures, and to lay the basis for
adequate management of an expanded
program.

It is clear that we need support
from the Congress and the public to
make our program fully effective. In
the first instance this means increased
funding. But we also need changes in
our legislation to consolidate our
domestic programs, to relieve pressure
on the Attorney General to use his

42

American Foreign Policy in a
Changing World

Reworks on January 25, 1979, be-
fore a conference of 100 national black
leaders from across the country.1

Our world is undergoing rapid
change. That change affects every
aspect of America's international
relations.

• We have seen the emergence of
dozens of new nations, each with a
distinctive identity and each working to
fullfill its nation's aspirations.

• We have seen the economic well-
being of Americans drawn more closely
to the economic well-being of
others — in the rest of the industrial
world and in the developing world.

• We have seen technology develop
at an unprecedented pace, presenting
both opportunities to better our lives
and dangers if it is not controlled.

• And we have seen a growing tide
in the assertion of people around the

Overview (Cont'd)

parole power by creating a new legis-
lative basis for admission of refugees,
and to update the law and ease planning
for the future.

Conclusion

As a result of the constructive re-
lationship which exists between this
subcommittee and the Department, we
have been provided the human and
material resources to meet the chal-
lenges of a demanding and complex
foreign policy agenda. And I must add
that I believe that the men and women
who serve in the Department of State
perform at a level of excellence and
professionalism which is equal to the
importance of the Department's re-
sponsibilities.

We are grateful for the cooperation
we have received from the subcommit-
tee and the positive way it approaches
the many budget issues before it. □

'The complete transcript of the hearings will
be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402; (press release 33).

2 Egypt and Israel accepted the invitation to
meet with Secretary Vance at Camp David on
Feb. 21, 1979.

world that their basic human rights be
protected and fulfilled.

These changes should be a source
not of fear but of confidence in
America's future. Many of these
changes arise from the same forces
which gave birth to this nation. And
our belief in positive change, our ac-
ceptance of diversity, and our extraor-
dinary strength as a nation give us a
capacity for leadership in the world
which is unsurpassed.

Let me speak briefly about how we
are dealing with change in several as-
pects of our foreign policy.

Our relationship with the Soviet
Union has, over the past two decades,
become a far more complex one. It in-
cludes elements both of competition
and of cooperation. We hope that the
cooperative strands can be
strengthened. It is extremely important,
as our relations continue to evolve, that
we avoid excessive swings in our pub-
lic mood — from unquestioning op-
timism to unwarranted pessimism.

Our security, and that of our friends
and allies, continues to depend on
maintaining a stable military balance.
The cost of doing so will remain high.
Neither we nor the Soviets should en-
tertain the notion that military supre-
macy can be attained. But we must and
will maintain a strong defense that
serves as a credible deterrent to any
potential adversary. These strong de-
fenses are also important to the sense
of confidence which allows us and our
allies to welcome and help shape global
change.

The power we share with the Soviets
for mutual annihilation carries with it
another imperative: to seek, through
responsible arms control agreements,
to lessen the dangers and costs of un-
relenting arms competition. We are
now engaged in a broad range of im-
portant arms control negotiations with
the Soviets. The most critical of these
in the coming weeks is SALT. We an-
ticipate that we will be able to com-
plete these negotiations successfully in
the near future, although we will con-
tinue to negotiate for as long as it takes
to reach an agreement that is acceptable
to us.

A SALT agreement will enhance our
long-term security and contribute to a
safer world. Its rejection would be ex-
tremely costly to our taxpayers, in-
crease tensions with the Soviets,
deeply trouble our allies, and deal a

Department of State Bulletin

profound blow to future arms control
possibilities.

Another aspect of dealing with
change is our ability to recognize new
political realities. By establishing dip-
lomatic relations with the People's Re-
public of China, we are recognizing
the simple reality that we must be able
to deal fully and effectively with a
government that represents 25% of the
world's people.

Let me emphasize that from the be-
ginning of the negotiations with the
Chinese, the future well-being of the
people on Taiwan has been one of our
essential concerns. The importance of
this to us is fully reflected in the ar-
rangements that we have been, and will
be, establishing.

Change can often be difficult, and
sometimes turbulent, as it has been in
Iran. The changes we are seeing there
result not from external forces but from
internal pressures — social and eco-
nomic forces that affect political in-
stitutions. The problems are funda-
mentally Iranian problems which the
Iranian people must resolve. Our role
will be to encourage restoration of calm
and a functioning economy to achieve,
through understanding among the prin-
cipal elements of the society, a stable
and independent Iran.

While our ability to affect the inter-
nal situation in Iran has necessarily
been limited, the international dimen-
sion of the Arab-Israeli conflict has
required a very active role for the
United States in trying to bring peace-
ful change to the region. The progress
Egypt and Israel have made, and the
major issues they have resolved, must
not be lost over the few remaining is-
sues that stand in the way of a peace
treaty.

A treaty between Israel and Egypt
would be a major step toward a just and
lasting peace in the region. To fail now
to seize this opportunity for peace is to
risk slipping back into the unrelenting
hostility that has produced war,
hardship, and the danger of wider
conflict.

Change is coming in southern Africa
as well. In no area is it more important.
We are seeking to assist this process.
In Namibia and Rhodesia, we are
working to bring change through
peaceful agreements rather than pro-
tracted and tragic conflicts. We have
urged the South African Government
now to begin the process of peaceful
change that is in the interests of all
South African citizens. From the be-
ginning of this Administration, we
have been working with African gov-
ernments to further human rights, ra-
cial equality, and majority rule in
southern Africa.

March 1979

43

On Namibia, the proposals of the
Western five members of the Security
Council have been approved by the
United Nations; and the Secretary Gen-
eral has presented plans for their im-
plementation. Real progress has been
made in recent consultations between
South African officials and U.N. spe-
cial representative Ahtisaari [Marti
Ahtisaari of Finland]. If, as a result of
these consultations, the mechanics of
U.N. involvement in Namibia can be
worked out, U.N. personnel could
begin arriving in the territory in late
February. After years of South African
domination and imposition of apartheid
policies, after a long and growing
military conflict, and after months of
difficult negotiations, Namibia may
soon be on the road to early independ-
ence and majority rule.

The Rhodesian situation, however,
continues to deteriorate. The parties
remain far apart. The bloodshed is
growing.

The British and we have reluctantly
concluded that a meeting among all the
parties at this time could not succeed.
But we remain committed to doing
what we can to promote a negotiated
settlement in Rhodesia, and we stand
by our proposals for such a settlement.
Similar to the plan for Namibia, they
call for fair elections with U.N. obser-
vers and a cease-fire to be maintained
by a U.N. force, with an impartial
transition government.

Given the difficulty of negotiations
and the tragedy of the mounting con-
flict, we have been under some pres-
sure to choose sides in Rhodesia. Some
public and congressional representa-
tives argue that if we would only sup-
port the Salisbury agreements and lift
sanctions, the "internal settlement"
could succeed. Some of the patriotic
front's supporters argue we should

Letters
of Credence

On Janaury 11, 1979, Nicolas
Mondjo of the Congo and Jose-Joseph
Amiar of Gabon presented their cre-
dentials to President Carter as their
countries' newly appointed Ambas-
sadors to the United States. □

support the view of the patriotic front
that it should have a predominant posi-
tion in any interim government.

We continue to believe that it would
be a terrible mistake for the United
States to choose sides with regard to
who should lead an independent Zim-
babwe. We would lose our ability to
mediate among the parties and close
the door to a negotiated settlement. For
this reason, and because it would be in
violation of our international treaty ob-
ligations to the United Nations, we
have opposed lifting of sanctions
against Rhodesia. However, last year's
Case-Javits amendment requires that
sanctions be lifted if the Salisbury par-
ties have agreed to negotiate in good
faith and free elections are held. We
will continue to evaluate the situation
to determine whether these conditions
are, in fact, met.

Let me summarize the essential ele-
ments of our policy toward South Af-
rica and apartheid.

• There is an urgent need for signifi-
cant progress toward full political par-
ticipation by all the people of South
Africa and toward an end to racial dis-
crimination.

• The United States would support
meaningful progress, acknowledging
that change in South Africa will be
a long and difficult process.

• We have put forward neither a
blueprint nor a timetable for change.
That is for all the people of South Af-
rica to decide together.

• Without such progress, our rela-
tions will deteriorate.

In retrospect, the most important in-
gredient in what we hope will be a suc-
cess in Namibia was the persistence of
our representatives, most particularly
Andy Young [U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N.] and Don McHenry [U.S. Dep-
uty Representative to the U.N. Security
Council]. The problems in Rhodesia
and South Africa are still more com-
plex and difficult. We will persist there
as well.

Let me say a final word about
change. It affects not only how we
conduct our foreign policy but the way
we use the talents of all Americans in
our work here and abroad. The diver-
sity of our society is one of its greatest
strengths. That diversity must be
reflected — to a greater degree than in
the past — at all levels of the Depart-
ment of State.

I am deeply committed to a serious
antidiscrimination and affirmative ac-
tion program for the Department of
State. I have accepted the report of an
executive level task force I appointed
at the outset of the Administration, and
we are carrying out its recommenda-
tions. They cover the full span of per-
sonnel activities and decisions affecting
minorities and women: recruitment,
hiring, training, assignments, counsel-
ing, promotions, and career develop-
ment. We have committed resources
and people to making equal employ-
ment opportunity a reality for the De-
partment.

We have made progress. But we
have a long way to go. I consider these
objectives to be central to what I hope
to accomplish as Secretary of State. □

' Press release 22.

AFRICA: Namibia

and Southern

Rhodesia

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
FEB. 31

Dr. Owen [David Owen, British
Foreign Secretary] and Secretary
Vance discussed over the past 2 days
many world problems of common
interest between the two countries, in-
cluding the problems of southern
Africa — particularly Rhodesia and
Namibia. They are concerned that the
situation in Rhodesia is deteriorating
seriously and that there is no solution
or end to the war in sight. U.N.-
supervised elections following a
cease-fire and a neutral transitional
administration, as provided for in the
Anglo-American proposals, remain es-
sential to a viable settlement. The U.S.
and British Governments remain fully
committed to continue their efforts to
bring about a peaceful transition to in-
dependence and majority rule through
U.N. -supervised elections in Namibia
and Rhodesia. □

1 Made available to the press by the Depart-
ment's associate spokesman Kenneth Brown.

44

Department of State Bulletin

EAST ASIA: Relations With the
People on Taiwan

Following is a statement by Deputy
Secretary of State Warren Christopher
before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations on February 5,
1979, President Carter's message to
Congress transmitting proposed legis-
lation concerning Taiwan on January
26, and texts of the legislation and
section-by-section analysis.

DEPUTY SECRETARY
CHRISTOPHER'S STATEMENT '

I am pleased to appear before this
committee today to speak for the Ad-
ministration, in support of S. 245,
which provides the framework for
maintaining commercial, cultural, and
other relations with the people of
Taiwan on an unofficial basis.

Normalization of relations with the
People's Republic of China is ob-
viously a matter of great importance to
the United States. In taking that step,
we have followed the example of all of
our NATO allies and more than 100
other countries which had previously
recognized the People's Republic of
China. As last week's visit by Vice
Premier Deng Xiaoping vividly demon-
strated [see p. 1], the normalization
and improvement of relations between
our two countries holds great potential
for the long-term benefit of the United
States and China, and the peoples of
the world.

Full and normal relations will allow
us to work more effectively toward a
stable system of independent nations in
Asia. It will permit us to encourage an
outward-looking China to play a con-
structive role in the world generally.
And it will enable American business
to deal on an equal footing with other
suppliers as China moves toward
modernization.

This Administration has consistently
maintained that normalization must be
carried out in ways which do not
jeopardize the well-being of the people
on Taiwan. Toward that end, the Presi-
dent has repeatedly affirmed our com-
mitment to maintain commercial, cul-
tural, and other relations with the
people on Taiwan on an unofficial
basis. To implement that commitment,
we have taken the following steps:

First, we have moved to assure that
with the exception of the Mutual De-
fense Treaty and related agreements,
our many treaties and other agreements

with Taiwan — more than 55 in all —
will remain in force. When I went to
Taiwan in December, I was instructed
to seek confirmation from the Taiwan
authorities that they too would regard
all existing agreements as continuing in
force after January 1, 1979. The
Taiwan authorities did provide such
confirmation.

Second, The President issued a
memorandum on December 30 direct-
ing all departments and agencies to
continue their current programs and
other relations with Taiwan on an un-
official basis.2 The purpose of the
memorandum was to insure that our
relations with the people on Taiwan
will continue pending the enactment of
legislation.

Third, on January 16 the American
Institute in Taiwan was incorporated as
a nonprofit District of Columbia cor-
poration. The institute, which is gov-
erned by three trustees appointed by the
Secretary of State, is the unofficial
body through which we will conduct
relations with the people on Taiwan.
As set forth in its articles of incorpora-
tion, the basic purpose of the institute
is to enable the American people and
the people on Taiwan to maintain
commercial, cultural, or other relations
without official government represen-
tation or diplomatic relations.

Fourth, the President has transmit-
ted to the Congress the bill now before
you. This bill has three fundamental
purposes:

• It will confirm the continued eligi-
bility of the people of Taiwan for par-
ticipation in programs and activities
that, under U.S. law, are to be carried
out with foreign governments.

• It will provide for the carrying out
of such programs and activities on an
unofficial basis through the American
Institute in Taiwan and the corre-
sponding instrumentality to be estab-
lished by the people on Taiwan.

• It will establish funding, staffing,
and administrative relationships of the
institute.

Future Security of Taiwan

Before getting into the details of the
bill, I want to comment on the future
security of Taiwan and its 17 million
people. I know how important this

issue is to the members of this com-
mittee. It is equally important to us.

In normalizing relations with the
People's Republic of China, we have
not by any means abandoned our role
as a Pacific power, or our interest in
the peace and security of Taiwan. In-
deed, a peaceful resolution of the
Taiwan issue is a fundamental part of
the structure of normalization.

During the negotiations that pre-
ceded President Carter's December 15
announcement, we impressed upon the
People's Republic of China our interest
in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan
issue and our expectation that this issue
will be settled peacefully by the
Chinese themselves. It is significant
that as part of normalization, the
People's Republic of China agreed not
to contradict our position on this cen-
tral point.

In addition. Vice Premier Deng has
made a number of statements since
normalization, including statements
made to members of this committee,
which clearly indicate a desire by the
People's Republic of China to settle the
Taiwan issue peacefully. As he put it to
Senator Glenn in Peking: "You can say
that the social system on Taiwan will
be decided by the people of Taiwan.
Changes might take a hundred years or
a thousand years, by which I mean a
long time. We will not change the soci-
ety by forceful means. "

In addition, any effort by the
People's Republic of China to resolve
the Taiwan issue by other than peaceful
means would be inconsistent with its
evident desire to have better relations
with the United States and our allies
and friends. China has established an
ambitious program of industrial moder-
nization and economic growth. The
success of this program depends on
good relations with the United States
and other industrialized nations that
both recognize the People's Republic
of China and maintain commercial re-
lations with the people on Taiwan. A
decision by China to use force against
Taiwan would, in effect, be a decision
to renounce good relations with these
nations and hence to abandon the pro-
gram of modernization and growth.
Such a sharp reversal of policy would
appear to be highly unlikely.

Finally, the fact is that Taiwan is
strong militarily, and we will continue
to sell Taiwan selected, defensive
weapons, as we have done in the past.
By contrast, the People's Republic of
China does not have the military capa-
bility to invade Taiwan and has not
attempted to acquire that capability.
The Secretary of Defense will testify
before this committee about the secu-
rity of Taiwan from a military

March 1979

45

standpoint. I shall, therefore, only note
the improbability of an attack across
100 miles of water against strong
forces and well-prepared defensive po-
sitions, as well as the military prob-
lems that China faces from other quar-
ters.

The Proposed Legislation

Let me now comment on the bill in
greater detail. The bill has three titles.
Title I, in its first three sections, pro-
vides that our laws and regulations will
continue to apply to the people on
Taiwan as they have in the past. Thus,
section 101 preserves Taiwan's eligi-
bility to participate in any U.S. pro-
gram for which recognition or diplo-
matic relations is otherwise required.
Section 102 provides that such terms as
"foreign country,'" "nation,''
"state," as used in U.S. legislation,
will include the people on Taiwan. And
section 103 authorizes the executive
branch to carry out with respect to the
people on Taiwan programs and other
relations which are authorized or re-
quired under U.S. law to be carried out
with respect to foreign countries.

Thus, taken together, sections 101,
102, and 103 provide for continuation
of our programs with the people on
Taiwan under U.S. law, notwithstand-
ing the normalization of relations with
the People's Republic of China.

Section 104 provides for our use of
the American Institute in Taiwan to
conduct relations with the people on
Taiwan. Section 105 provides that
whenever the U.S. Government is au-
thorized or required to enter into an
agreement relative to the people on
Taiwan, the agreement may be entered
into by the institute. Similarly, section
106 provides that actions by an instru-
mentality established by the people on
Taiwan will satisfy U.S. legal require-
ments for actions by a foreign country.

Practical Aspects

These sections permit important re-
lationships to continue on an unofficial
basis. Let me take a moment to de-
scribe what this will mean in practice.
Basically, the American Institute in
Taiwan will carry out the functions in
the commercial, cultural, and other
areas previously performed by our Em-
bassy in Taipei. For example, as the
Embassy has done, the American In-
stitute in Taiwan will perform the nor-
mal range of services for American
businessmen in Taiwan, such as pro-
viding data and responding to inquiries
concerning economic conditions and
investment opportunities.

In addition, the institute will process

applications for visas and passports,
just as the Embassy has done. (The
actual issuance of visas will, of course,
have to be done by consular officers,
probably in posts near Taiwan, such as
our Consulate General in Hong Kong.
We are still working out the
technicalities of this matter.)

As for trade, to the extent that trade
agreements, such as orderly marketing
arrangements, are deemed desirable,
they would be entered into between the
American Institute in Taiwan and its
Taiwan counterpart. Taiwan will con-
tinue to enjoy most-favored-nation
treatment and there is every reason to
believe that trade between the United
States and Taiwan will continue to
flourish.

As another example, I would note
that the Arms Export Control Act au-
thorizes the President to sell arms to
foreign countries and requires certain
undertakings from the purchasing gov-
ernment, such as a promise to provide
funds for timely payment of contrac-
tors. The American Institute in Taiwan
will make sales under the Arms Export
Control Act to its counterpart instru-
mentality created by the people on
Taiwan and will accept undertakings
from that instrumentality which will
satisfy the statute.

In sum, the picture I want to give
you is one of relations continuing with-
out interruption but on an unofficial
basis through nongovernmental means.
It must be said, of course, that it takes
two parties to conduct a relationship. It
will not be possible for us to maintain
relations unless Taiwan agrees to es-
tablish an unofficial instrumentality
with which the American Institute in
Taiwan may deal. Should Taiwan
choose not to create such an instru-
mentality, then the picture I have
painted becomes very unclear indeed,
and the prospect of a hiatus in our
relations as of March 1 becomes real.

Turning back to title I of the legisla-
tion, I would note that under section
107, when U.S. law requires that
foreign law be considered, the law
applied by the people on Taiwan will
be considered foreign law. This clarifi-
cation will be important, for example,
in determining the validity of marriages
and divorces, the distribution of dece-
dents' estates, and similar matters. It is
also important for public law purposes
such as the application of trade laws.

Title II of the bill permits govern-
ment agencies to provide support for
the institute. It thus enables the insti-
tute to make maximum use of existing
U.S. Government resources rather than
establish costly and duplicative inde-
pendent capabilities.

Title II also provides equitable

treatment for those who interrupt their
government careers to accept tempor-
ary employment with the institute. It
permits Federal employees who leave
government service for employment at
the institute to continue to participate
in Federal employee benefit programs
and to return to Federal service at a
later date without damage to their
careers.

Finally, title II provides that the in-
stitute will be tax exempt and that the
salaries and allowances paid to em-
ployees of the institute will be taxed in
the same way as comparable payments
the government makes to its own
employees.

Title III of the bill authorizes the
appropriation of funds for the institute.
This will permit the consolidation of
the institute's costs into a single budget
account, which will facilitate executive
branch and congressional oversight.
For the current fiscal year, we intend to
finance a contract with the institute by
reprogramming funds appropriated to
the Department of State and other
agencies.

On behalf of the Administration, I
commend this legislation to you and
urge its prompt enactment. The Con-
gress will thereby insure that the sub-
stance of our many important relations
with the people on Taiwan will be pre-
served and that these relations will
prosper.

PRESIDENT CARTER'S
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS3

The United Stales of America has recognized
the Government of the People's Republic of
China as the sole legal government of China and is
establishing diplomatic relations with that gov-
ernment. The Joint Communique issued by the
United States and the People's Republic of
China was the culmination of a long process
begun by President Nixon and continued by
President Ford and me.

I have also announced that, in the future, the
American people will maintain commercial,
cultural, and other relations with the people on
Taiwan without official government representa-
tion and without diplomatic relations. In fur-
therance of that policy, and pending enactment
of legislation on the subject, I have directed all
departments and agencies to continue unoffi-
cially to conduct programs, transactions and
other relations with Taiwan.

To authorize legally the permanent im-
plementation of that policy, I am today trans-
mitting to the Congress a bill "To promote the
foreign policy of the United States through the
maintenance of commercial, cultural and other
relations with the people on Taiwan on an unof-
ficial basis, and for other purposes."

This bill will confirm the continued eligibility
of the people on Taiwan for participation in

46

programs and activities that under United States
law are to be carried out with foreign govern-
ments; provide for the carrying out of such pro-
grams and activities on an unofficial basis
through the American Institute in Taiwan, a
non-profit corporation, and the corresponding
instrumentality being established by the people
on Taiwan; and establish funding, staffing and
administrative relationships of the Institute. It
also contains other authorizations and provisions
relating to the foregoing matters.

I am confident the Congress shares my view
that it is in the national interest that these unoffi-
cial relations between the American people and
the people on Taiwan be maintained. It is highly
desirable that this legislation be enacted as
promptly as possible. I look forward to working
with the Congress on this important project.

Jimmy Carter

TEXT OF PROPOSED
LEGISLATION4

A BILL, To promote the foreign policy of the
United States through the maintenance of
commercial, cultural and other relations with
the people on Taiwan on an unofficial basis,
and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of

Representatives of the United States of America

in Congress assembled.

TITLE I

Section 101. No requirement for maintenance
of diplomatic relations with the United States, or
for recognition of a government by the United
States, as a condition of eligibility for participa-
tion in programs, transactions or other relations
authorized by or pursuant to United States law
shall apply with respect to the people on Taiwan.

Sec. 102. Whenever any law, regulation or
order of the United States refers or relates to a
foreign country, nation, state, government or
similar entity, such terms shall include, and such
law, regulation or order shall apply with respect
to, the people on Taiwan.

Sec. 103. Whenever authorized or required by
or pursuant to United States law to conduct or
carry out programs, transactions or other rela-
tions with respect to a foreign country, nation,
state, government or similar entity, the President
or any department or agency of the United States
Government is authorized to conduct and carry
out such programs, transactions and other rela-
tions with respect to the people on Taiwan, in
accordance with applicable laws of the United
States.

Sec. 104. Programs, transactions and other
relations conducted or carried out by the Presi-
dent or any department or agency of the United
States Government with respect to the people on
Taiwan shall, as the President may direct, be
conducted and carried out by or through the
American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit cor-
poration incorporated under the laws of the Dis-
trict of Columbia (hereinafter "the Institute").

Sec. 105. Whenever the President or any de-

partment or agency of the United States Gov-
ernment is authorized or required by or pursuant
to United States law to enter into, perform,
enforce, or have in force an agreement or ar-
rangement relative to the people on Taiwan,
such agreement or arrangement shall be entered
into, or performed and enforced, as the President
may direct, by or through the Institute.

Sec. 106. Whenever the President or any de-
partment or agency of the United States Gov-
ernment is authorized or required by or pursuant
to United States law to render or provide to, or
to receive or accept from, the people on Taiwan
any performance, communication, assurance,
undertaking or other action, such action shall, as
the President may direct, be rendered or pro-
vided to, or received or accepted from, an in-
strumentality established by the people on
Taiwan.

Sec. 107. Whenever the application of a rule
of law of the United States depends upon foreign
law, or compliance with foreign law, the law
applied by the people on Taiwan shall be consid-
ered foreign law for that purpose.

TITLE II

Sec. 201. Any department or agency of the
United States Government is authorized to sell,
loan or lease property, including interests
therein, to, and to perform administrative and
technical support functions and services for the
operations of, the Institute upon such terms and
conditions as the President may direct. Reim-
bursements to departments and agencies under
this section shall be credited to the current appli-
cable appropriation of the department or agency
concerned.

Sec. 202. Any department or agency of the
United States Government is authorized to ac-
quire and accept services from the Institute upon
such terms and conditions as the President may
direct, without regard to the laws and regulations
normally applicable to the acquisition of services
by such department or agency.

Sec. 203. Any department or agency of the
United States Government employing alien per-
sonnel in Taiwan is authorized to transfer such
personnel, with accrued allowances, benefits and
rights, to the Institute without a break in service
for purposes of retirement and other benefits,
including continued participation in any system
established by law or regulation for the retire-
ment of employees, under which such personnel
were covered prior to the transfer to the Insti-
tute: Provided, That employee deductions and
employer contributions, as required, in payment
for such participation for the period of employ-
ment with the Institute, are currently deposited
in the system's fund or depository.

Sec. 204. (a) Under such terms and conditions
as the President may direct, any department or
agency of the United States Government is au-
thorized to separate from Government service
for a specified period any officer or employee of
that department or agency who accepts employ-
ment with the Institute.

(b) An officer or employee separated under
subsection (a) of this section shall be entitled

Department of State Bulletin

upon termination of such employment with the
Institute to reemployment or reinstatement with
that department or agency or a successor agency
in an appropriate position with attendant rights,
privileges and benefits which the officer or em-
ployee would have had or acquired had he or she
not been so separated, subject to such time
period and other conditions as the President may
prescribe.

(c) An officer or employee entitled to
reemployment or reinstatement rights under sub-
section (b) of this section shall, while continu-
ously employed by the Institute with no break in
continuity of service, continue to participate in
any benefit program in which such officer or
employee was covered prior to employment by
the Institute, including programs for compensa-
tion for job-related death, injury or illness; for
health and life insurance; for annual, sick and
other statutory leave; and for retirement under
any system established by law or regulation;
Provided, That employee deductions and
employer contributions, as required, in payment
for such participation for the period of employ-
ment with the Institute, must be currently de-
posited in the program's or system's fund or
depository. Death or retirement of any such offi-
cer or employee during approved service with
the Institute and prior to reemployment or
reinstatement shall be considered a death in
service or retirement from the service for the
purposes of any employee or survivor benefits
acquired by reason of service with a department
or agency of the United States Government.

(d) Any employee of the department or agency
of the United States Government who entered
into service with the Institute on approved leave
of absence without pay prior to the enactment of
this Act shall receive the benefits of this title for
the period of such service.

Sec. 205. The Institute shall be treated as a
tax exempt organization described in section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
and shall not be an agency or instrumentality of
the United States. Employees of the Institute
shall not be employees of the United States and.
in representing the Institute, shall be exempt
from section 207 of title 18, United States Code.
The salaries and allowances paid to employees
of the Institute shall be treated in the same way
for tax purposes, under sections 911, 912 and
913 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
salaries and equivalent allowances paid by de-
partments and agencies of the United States
Government.

TITLE III

Sec. 301. In addition to funds otherwise
available for the purposes of this Act, there are
authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of
State from time to time such funds as may be
necessary to carry out such purposes. Such funds
are authorized to remain available until
expended.

Sec. 302. The Secretary of State is authorized
to use funds made available to carry out this Act
to further the maintenance of commercial, cul-
tural and other relations with the people on

March 1979

47

Taiwan on an unofficial basis. The Secretary
may provide such funds to the Institute for ex-
penses directly related to the purposes of this
Act. including —

(1) Payment of salaries and benefits to Insti-
tute employees;

(2) Acquisition and maintenance of buildings
and facilities necessary to the conduct of Insti
tute business;

(3) Maintenance of adequate security for In-
stitute employees and facilities; and

(4) Such other expenses as may be necessary
for the effective functioning of the Institute.

Sec. 303. Any department or agency of the
United States Government making funds avail-
able to the Institute in accordance with this Act
shall make arrangements with the Institute for
the Comptroller General of the United States to
have access to the books and records of the
Institute and the opportunity to audit the opera-
tions of the Institute.

Sec. 304. The programs, transactions and
other relations carried out by the President or
any department or agency of the United States
Government with respect to the people on
Taiwan since January 1, 1979. are approved and
confirmed.

Sec. 305. The President is authorized to pre-
scribe such rules and regulations as he may deem
appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act.

ANALYSIS4

SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE
PROPOSED ACT TO PROMOTE THE
FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED
STATES THROUGH THE MAINTENANCE
OF COMMERCIAL. CULTURAL AND
OTHER RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE
ON TAIWAN ON AN UNOFFICIAL BASIS,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

I. INTRODUCTION

The legislation (hereinafter "the Bill") is
being proposed as the result of the recognition
by the United States of the People's Republic
of China as the sole legal government of China
and the establishment of diplomatic relations
between the United States and the People's
Republic of China. Its purpose is to facilitate
continuation of commercial, cultural and other
relations between the American people and the
people on Taiwan on an unofficial basis.

The Bill clarifies the application of laws of
the United States to the people on Taiwan in
light of the changed diplomatic situation, and
provides for the continued conduct of programs
and transactions with the people on Taiwan. It
also contains a number of provisions on ad-
ministrative, financial and related subjects
which will facilitate this new non-governmental
relationship with the people on Taiwan.

The term "people on Taiwan," as used in
the Bill, reflects the non-existence of a gov-
ernment to government relationship, and en-
compasses both the authorities and the inhabit-

ants on the islands of Taiwan and the Pesca-
dores.

II. PROVISIONS OF THE BILL

Section 101

This section provides that legal requirements
tor the maintenance of diplomatic relations
with the United States or recognition of a
foreign government by the United States will
not be a bar to eligibility of the people on
Taiwan for participation in programs, transac-
tions or other relations under U.S. law. This
will avoid questions under provisions of law
such as section 620(t) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370(0), which refers
explicitly to severance of diplomatic relations.
It is also intended to satisfy requirements for
diplomatic relations with or recognition by the
United States which might be implied by terms
such as "friendly country" contained in vari-
ous statutes.

Section 102

This section specifies that laws, regulations
and orders which refer or relate to "foreign
countries," or use similar terms, shall continue
to include and apply to the people on Taiwan.
The President has directed the heads of all
departments and agencies to construe such laws
as continuing to apply to the people on Taiwan.
This directive has facilitated maintenance of
unofficial relations pending action by the Con-
gress. This section is intended to confirm con-
tinued eligibility of the people of Taiwan under
such important legislation as the Arms Export
Control Act. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the
Export-Import Bank Act, the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961, the Mutual Educational and
Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 and the Trade
Act of 1974.

Section 103

This section expressly confirms the authority
of the President and departments and agencies
to carry out programs, transactions and other
relations with the people on Taiwan under laws
which provide for such programs, transactions
and relations with respect to foreign countries.

Section 104

This section provides that programs, trans-
actions and relations with respect to the people
on Taiwan will be conducted by or through the
American Institute in Taiwan, in the manner
and to the extent directed by the President. This
provision implements the President's statement
of December 15, 1978 that the American
people and the people on Taiwan "will main-
tain commercial, cultural, and other relations
without official government representation
. . ." The American Institute in Taiwan is a
nonprofit corporation organized under the laws
of the District of Columbia, which has been
established for this purpose.

Section 105

This section provides for the performance
and enforcement of existing agreements, and
the making of new agreements, with the people
on Taiwan by or through the Institute, to satisfy

authorizations or requirements for agreements
or arrangements with the people on Taiwan. If,
for example, an agreement with a "foreign
country" is a condition of eligibility for par-
ticipation in a program, with respect to the
people on Taiwan such a condition will be
satisfied by an agreement entered into or per-
formed through the Institute. This section
applies not only to new agreements, but also to
previous agreements, which remain in force
unless terminated.

Section 106

This section provides for dealing with the
people on Taiwan through an instrumentality
acting on their behalf. It makes clear that pro-
visions for dealing with a "foreign govern-
ment" will be satisfied with respect to the
people on Taiwan by dealing with that instru-
mentality. Section 104 and 105 and this section
provide for the conduct of nongovernmental
relations through the Institute and the coun-
terpart instrumentality of the people on Tai-
wan.

Section 107

This section provides that when the applica-
tion of United States law depends upon foreign
law, the law applied by the people on Taiwan
shall be looked to for that purpose.

Section 201

This section authorizes departments and
agencies to provide support for the Institute's
internal operations through transfers of prop-
erty and the performance of functions and
services. This will provide access by the Insti-
tute to existing federal resources in order to
reduce costs and increase the efficiency of op-
erations. It is expected that such support usu-
ally will be provided on a reimbursable basis.

Section 202

This section authorizes departments and
agencies to acquire and accept services from
the Institute. Although the initial arrangements
with the Institute are on a conventional con-
tractual basis, this section authorizes the Presi-
dent to disregard normally applicable laws and
regulations, such as limitations in procurement
regulations, in order to permit the development
of appropriate arrangements in these unique
circumstances.

Section 203

This section authorizes the transfer to the
Institute of alien employees of the U.S. Gov-
ernment and preserves their benefits under the
local compensation plan applicable in Taiwan
under section 444 of the Foreign Service Act of
1946, as amended (22 U.S.C. 889). It is ex-
pected that the Institute will adopt this plan for
its alien employees. This section also au-
thorizes the continued participation in U.S.
Government retirement systems by those
transferred alien employees who have hereto-
fore been covered by such systems, subject to
continued payment of contributions and deduc-
tions to the appropriate fund.

Section 204

This section, consisting of five subsections,

48

Department of State Bulletin

provides authority for the separation of federal
employees for employment with the Institute,
preservation of their federal benefits, and
reemployment rights in the federal service. It is
contemplated that such separated federal per-
sonnel will make up the staff of the Institute.

Subsection (a) provides that a federal officer
or employee who accepts employment with the
Institute may be separated from his or her
agency.

Subsection (b) provides that any officer or
employee so separated is entitled, upon termi-
nation of employment with the Institute, to be
reemployed or reinstated in the federal service.
Normally, reemployment for an employee in
the classified service will be to the position
from which the employee was separated. How-
ever, the President is authorized to determine
the appropriateness of the position for
reemployment. It is anticipated that, especially
in personnel systems based on the rank in per-
son concept, reemployment could be in a
higher class.

Subsection (c) provides for continuity of fed-
eral benefits during service with the Institute,
including compensation for job related death,
illness or injury; health and life insurance.
leave, and retirement. Contributions, where re-
quired, must be paid in order to preserve these
benefits. This section also provides that death
or retirement by a federal employee separated
under subsection (al while employed by the
Institute shall be considered a death in or re-
tirement from the federal service for purposes
of benefit entitlement.

Subsection (d) authorizes the extension of
the benefits of Title II of the Bill to federal
employees serving with the Institute on leave
without pay prior to the Bill's enactment.

Section 205

This section addresses several questions re-
lating to the status of the Institute and its
employees. It specifies that the Institute shall
be exempt from federal taxation and shall not
be an agency or instrumentality of the United
States. With respect to the Institute's employ-
ees, this section provides that they shall not be
employees of the United States, and that they
shall be exempt from the statutory prohibition
against dealing with their former agencies in
representing the Institute. It also provides that
the salaries and allowances of Institute employ-
ees shall be taxable in the same way as salaries
and allowances of federal employees.

Section 301

This section authorizes appropriations to the
Secretary of State of funds necessary to carry
out the Bill. It is contemplated that the funds
necessary for the operation and support of the
Institute on behalf of all departments and agen-
cies will be consolidated into a single account.
However, this section preserves the continued
ability of departments and agencies to utilize
the Institute for the performance of functions
involving the use of funds appropriated to the
department or agency concerned. Funds appro-
priated under this section could be made avail-
able until expended.

MIDDLE EAST: Challenges

and Opportunities for Peace

in the Middle East

by Harold H. Saunders

Address before a conference spon-
sored by the Department of State, the
World Affairs Council of Boston, and
the Ford- Hal I Forum in Boston on
January 29, 1979.

There are few areas in the world
today where so many different and im-
portant American interests come to-
gether as is the case in the Middle East.
This is an area where fundamental
changes are taking place at a dramatic
rate. It embraces some of the most
resource-rich and rapidly modernizing
nations of the world as well as some of
the poorest and most traditional. We
must expect instability. At the same
time we must recognize that the
changes we are witnessing across this
strategic area contain not only the
causes of instability and crisis but also
the seeds of progress.

Because of the importance of all our
interests, the only sensible American
policy toward this area is one which
permits us to pursue all of those inter-
ests at the same time in conditions of
orderly change. Only when we are ac-
tively engaged in the search for peace
can we pursue the full range of our
interests with all the principal nations
of the Middle East.

In this session, I want to concentrate
on the process of achieving an Arab-
Israeli peace and on how this relates to
our broader strategy toward the region.
For three decades the Middle East has
been subjected to the tragic course of
conflict, tension, stalemate, terror, and
renewed conflict. This recurrent cycle
affecting both Israelis and Arabs has
contributed to instability in the
region — and has impaired the hopes for
peace and prosperity for the world at
large.

Over the past year we have witnes-
sed dramatic advances, building on the
historic visit of President Sadat to
Jerusalem and on significant decisions
by Prime Minister Begin. The
framework for peace produced at Camp
David by President Sadat, Prime
Minister Begin, and President Carter,1
and now the treaty package almost
completed in the hard but rewarding
negotiations which began in Washing-
ton October 12. [1978] provide an un-
precedented opportunity for the people
of the Middle East to turn away from
the long cycle of violence and move
toward the new challenges of peace.

My purpose here is to assure to the
extent possible that this opportunity —
and what is at stake should it be
lost — is fully understood. The
framework for peace agreed at Camp

Section 302

This section authorizes the Secretary of State
to use the funds made available under the Bill
to further the maintenance of commercial, cul-
tural and other relations with the people on
Taiwan on an unofficial basis. In particular, it
authorizes the Secretary to provide these funds
to the Institute for this purpose. The use of
appropriated funds by the Institute will be gov-
erned by an appropriate contractual arrange-
ment with the Secretary of State, which will
contain limitations on expenses, such as lim-
itations on the compensation of Institute em-
ployees. The Institute will be required under
this arrangement to adhere generally to the
limitations applicable to federal employees.

Section 303

This section requires that departments and
agencies assure access by the Comptroller Gen-
eral to the Institute's books and records, and
that they provide the Comptroller General the
opportunity to audit the Institute's operations.

Section 304

This section approves and confirms the U.S.
Government actions taken since January 1,
1979. and prior to the Bill's enactment with
respect to the people on Taiwan.

Section 305

This section authorizes the President to pre-
scribe appropriate rules and regulations to carry
out the Bill's purposes. □

'The complete transcript of the hearings will
be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments. U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.

2For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 1979, p. 24.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Jan. 29. 1979.

4Text from White House press release of Jan.
26. 1979; also printed as House Doc. No.
96-45 of Jan. 29, 1979.

March 1979

David will be fulfilled in one important
part by the signing of the Egyptian-
Israeli treaty, but that agreement com-
mits us all to much more. At those
historic meetings, the Governments of
Egypt and Israel both committed them-
selves to principles and procedures for
a series of negotiations leading to a
peace between Israel and each of its
Arab neighbors. The achievement of
that peace depends on success in each
negotiation, and each new negotiation
builds on what has occurred before.
Let's look in detail at what was
achieved at Camp David and what lies
beyond.

Background of Camp David

Before I discuss the important ele-
ments of the Camp David accords, I
want to make a few broader points.

First, the United States was pursu-
ing its own interests at Camp David as
well as the interests of our Middle
Eastern friends. More than ever before,
Americans have come to recognize the
profound degree to which America's
own interests are tied to peace in the
region. Those interests include:

• Our historic and moral commit-
ment to the security of Israel;

• The important and mutually bene-
ficial economic and other relationships
between the United States and Arab
nations of the Middle East, including
access to oil at reasonable prices and
cooperation in maintaining order in the
global economy;

• Our humanitarian commitment to
the people of the region who do not
now look forward to fully productive
lives; and

• Concern for the dangers which
persisting crisis in this region poses for
global stability, prosperity, and free-
dom.

It is with these American interests in
mind, and with a deep humanitarian
sense of responsibility to all the people
of the Middle East, that we undertook
the negotiations at Camp David.

Second, the agreements reached at
Camp David are not peace treaties or
final settlements. As agreed by the
Governments of Egypt, Israel, and the
United States, they are, as their titles
state, frameworks for further negotia-
tions. They are foundations upon which
the structures of peace can be built.

It is important to understand the ap-
proach which underlies the agreements
reached at Camp David. This approach
recognizes that it is not possible to
solve all of the complicated problems
in the Arab-Israeli conflict at one
time — that the objective conditions of

the conflict require us to sort out those
issues and to deal with them sequen-
tially. Solving some basic issues today
makes it possible to solve other issues
tomorrow which simply cannot be
solved today.

Third, the agreements reached at
Camp David provide an unprecedented
opportunity for each party to achieve
some of their most vital objectives.

In those negotiations we were con-
stantly mindful that, for an interna-
tional agreement to achieve its purpose
and endure, each party must be able to
perceive that its interests are addressed
seriously and that there are reciprocal
advantages to be derived. The Camp
David agreements do address interests
on both sides and do offer just such re-
ciprocal advantages.

I shall discuss these in more detail
shortly. For the moment, let me simply
say that what is now required is that all
of the parties to the Arab-Israeli con-
flict understand that their most
sought-after objectives can be achieved
and — even more importantly — that the
opportunity now offered is unprec-
edented and must be seized if we are
not once again to face the prospect of
further tragedy in the Middle East.

Fourth, it is essential to understand
that the Camp David agreements are
deeply rooted in the only basis for
negotiation that has been agreed upon
by all parties to the conflict —

Middle East
Peace Talks

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
FEB. 12'

At President Carter's invitation.
President Sadat and Prime Minister
Begin have agreed that negotiations
between Egypt and Israel should be re-
sumed at the ministerial level. Delega-
tions headed by Prime Minister Khalil,
Foreign Minister Dayan, and Secretary
Vance will participate in these talks,
which will begin at Camp David on
February 21 .

In agreeing to these talks, all sides
have affirmed their commitment to the
Camp David accords and their determi-
nation that these negotiations be com-
pleted as quickly as possible. □

'Read to news correspondents by Department
spokesman Hodding Carter III.

49

Resolution 242, adopted unanimously
by the U.N. Security Council in
November 1967.

While there have been differences in
interpretation of this resolution, at its
heart Resolution 242 contains a very
simple formula: In return for Israel's
withdrawal from territories occupied in
the 1967 conflict, the Arab states will
recognize Israel within a framework of
true peace and security agreed by all.
Resolution 242 calls for a just and
lasting peace based upon the right of
every state in the area to live in peace
within secure and recognized bound-
aries and upon Israeli withdrawal from
territories occupied in 1967. Resolution
242 was clearly intended as a package.
The parts are linked together to make a
balanced whole, to be carried out to-
gether.

That being said, let me note what
Resolution 242 does not do.

• It does not define secure and rec-
ognized boundaries. It does not require
Israel to give up every inch of occupied
territory. Neither does it preclude Is-
raeli withdrawal to the lines of 1967.

• Resolution 242 does not deal fully
with the important Palestinian issue.
No solution can be complete that does
not recognize the aspirations of the
Palestinian people for an identity of
their own. President Carter recognized
this in the early days of his Adminis-
tration when he spoke of the need for a
homeland for Palestinians.

Against this background, it should
be understood that the Camp David
framework does not supersede Resolu-
tion 242 but is firmly based upon it and
serves to make more explicit some
principles left by 242 to the negotiating
process. In addition, it supplements
Resolution 242 in spelling out the
political dimensions of a settlement of
the Palestinian issue.

Reciprocal Advantages

Let me turn now to the advantages
which both sides find in the Camp
David accords. As I do, let me stress
we are not talking about advantages of
one side over the other. These are "re-
ciprocal advantages" and not points to
be totaled in debit and credit columns.
Not everything that any of the parties
might want is achieved at a single
stroke by these agreements. The unpre-
cedented achievement of Camp David
is that a political process has been set
in motion, a beginning has been made,
and to each side real advantages will
accrue.

Let me now outline just how the
Camp David frameworks and the treaty
package now being negotiated between

50

Egypt and Israel work to the advantage
of all sides concerned — Israel, Egypt,
the other Arab states, Palestinians, the
American people, and, indeed, the
wider world community.

For Israel. Let me deal first with
Israel. At Camp David the United
States started and ended with our un-
swerving commitment to a secure, free,
and democratic Israel. This commit-
ment is a permanent feature of Ameri-
can foreign policy both as a moral
commitment and as a strategic concern.
Israel as a sovereign state within the
family of nations has the right to rec-
ognition and acceptance by its
neighbors. Beyond this the people of
Israel, like people everywhere, have a
deep-felt longing and an inherent right
to live in peace and security — a secu-
rity which derives not only from our
commitment and Israel's own strength
and fortitude but from a peace based
upon the growing cooperation and
goodwill of its neighbors and from firm
and lasting security agreements mutu-
ally arrived at and observed. The Camp
David agreements go further toward
meeting all of these fundamental con-
cerns of Israel than any international
action since the founding of the modern
State of Israel.

For Israel, therefore, these agree-
ments speak to the centuries-old aspi-
ration of the Jewish people to live in
peace in a state of their own in the land
of their forefathers, within secure and
recognized borders, and to take their
rightful place in the international com-
munity of nations. As President Carter
said, "'. . . this great aspiration of Is-
rael has been certified without con-
straint with the greatest degree of en-
thusiasm by President Sadat, the leader
of one of the greatest nations on
earth."

In practical terms, Israel now can
look to a future of full peace with
Egypt while it carries through the res-
olution of problems that will lead to
peace with all of its neighbors. The
agreement with Egypt provides for
diplomatic relations, an end to
boycotts, the right to free passage
through international waterways, and
other ties characteristic of normal
peaceful relations between sovereign
states.

The framework agreements also
contain another indispensable
element — arrangements to guarantee
the security of the parties.

In the Sinai, there would be:

• A wide demilitarized zone;

• A limited armament zone east of
the Suez Canal;

• U.N. forces in a zone along the
Egyptian-Israeli border and the Gulf of
Aqaba;

• U.N. forces to assure freedom of
passage through the Tiran Strait and as
a buffer between Sinai and Gaza;

• Relocation of Israeli airfields from
Sinai to the Negev; and

• A small limited armament zone
on the Israeli side of the border.

In the West Bank and Gaza:

• Israeli security forces will remain
in specified security locations at least
through a 5-year transitional period to
provide for Israel's security;

• There will be arrangements for as-
suring internal security;

• There will be a 5-year transitional
period before the final status of the
area is decided; and

• Israel has a voice, together with
Egypt, Palestinians, and Jordan, should
it wish, in the determination of the
final status of the area.

In recent weeks voices in Israel have
expressed the fear that implementation
of the Camp David framework for the
West Bank and Gaza may eventually
lead to a situation endangering Israel's
security. Let me say. as President Car-
ter has stressed, that in our policy to-
ward the Middle East, the security of
Israel is of major importance.

In our view, security is best achieved
first by assuring Israel's strength and
then by building cooperative relations
of trust between Israelis and Arabs. If
that is not achieved, the situation will
not remain static; from the point of
view of Israel's security it cannot but
deteriorate. The surest guarantee of
true peace and durable security for Is-
rael lies in negotiated outcome of
mutual benefit to the legitimate con-
cerns of both sides. The Camp David
agreements provide the avenue to that
objective.

For the Arabs. Let me now turn to
those advantages offered not only to
Egypt but to all of the Arab states.
President Sadat can take pride in the
extent to which the Camp David
agreements speak to the concerns of the
Arab world at large. Through its con-
tribution to the document entitled "A
Framework for Peace in the Middle
East Agreed at Camp David" Egypt
has laid a foundation which can be used
by all Israel's neighbors which are pre-
pared to negotiate for peace and secu-
rity on the basis of all the principles
and provisions of the U.N. Security
Council Resolution 242. The result can
be the overall peace which we all seek.

If this opportunity is seized, the re-
sults can well shape the future of the
entire region for decades to come. It
can mean a Middle East that can live in
dignity, with expanding prosperity, and
freed from the shadow of outside pres-
sure or threat. It offers an avenue for

Department of State Bulletin

the Arabs to work together, not in the
negative way of marshaling their ener-
gies against a common adversary but
toward the attainment of the highest
human goals.

At the heart of Arab concerns, of
course, are the West Bank and Gaza is-
sues and the Palestinian problem. The
framework for peace in the Middle East
offers the Arabs a fair and honorable
way to begin resolving these problems.
While not achieving everything the
Arab people want in one step, it sets in
motion a political process which will
significantly advance legitimate Arab
objectives while assuring Israel's secu-
rity and its right to live in peace with
its neighbors.

To anyone who has worked on these
problems it is evident that the issues
involved in the West Bank and Gaza
and in the Palestinian question are far
too complex to be resolved all at once.
Because of this, we have long felt that
the only realistic approach to their so-
lution would be to establish a 5-year
transitional period for the West Bank
and Gaza in which the decisions that
needed to be made could be dealt with
in a logical sequence.

That approach has been agreed to by
Egypt and Israel, and they have invited
other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict
to support it. Let me briefly outline
what the Camp David framework
means for the achievement of their
interests.

For the first time in history a
Palestinian self-governing authority
would be established — something that
has never before existed.

• In the West Bank and Gaza,
Palestinian authority would be estab-
lished during the transitional period
pending negotiations of the final status
and boundaries of these areas.

Corrections

November 1978 issue:

Page I, col. 1, third para., second
sentence should read: "Because of ram-
pant population growth, and poverty due
in part to that growth, the hungry one-
fifth of mankind is no better off today
than it was in 1974."

Page 1. col. 2, 11th line should read:
"Nearly I billion people in the develop-
ing countries. ..."

February 1979 issue:

Page 34, col. 2, first full para, should
read:

"• An agreement on customs valuation
will encourage more uniform methods of
appraising imports for the purpose of ap-
plying import duties."

March 1979

51

• The Israeli military government
and its civilian administration would be
withdrawn and replaced by the self-
government authority freely elected by
the inhabitants of these areas. A major
initial withdrawal of Israeli military
forces would take place, and those
remaining would be redeployed to
specified locations. A strong local
Palestinian police force under
Palestinian authority would come into
being.

• The Palestinians, along with
Egypt. Israel, and possibly Jordan,
would participate in negotiations based
on all the provisions and principles of
Security Council Resolution 242; they
thereby would have a clear voice in
determining their own future. They
would participate in setting up their
self-governing authority, in the negoti-
ations to determine the final status of
the West Bank and Gaza, and in the
negotiations for an Israel-Jordan peace
treaty.

Their agreement on the final status
of the West Bank and Gaza would be
submitted to a vote by the elected rep-
resentatives of the West Bank and Gaza
to ratify or reject. Their elected repre-
sentatives would by themselves decide
how they shall govern themselves after
the 5-year transitional period, consist-
ent with the terms of their agreement
on the final status of the area.

• There are also provisions for
Palestinians not now in the West Bank
and Gaza. Representatives from among
these Palestinians as mutually agreed
may join the negotiations on establish-
ing the elected self-governing authority
in the West Bank and Gaza. Through-
out the transitional period in all the
negotiations responsible Palestinians in
this area and outside almost certainly
will reflect each other's views and con-
cerns.

• Finally. Israel has agreed that the
solution from negotiations must recog-
nize the legitimate rights of the Pales-
tinian people and their just require-
ments.

Many of our friends in the Arab
world have expressed concerns about
specific issues not covered or not fully
covered by the Camp David
framework, or they have asked us to
guarantee certain solutions. As I have
already indicated, we see these negoti-
ations as a beginning, a setting in mo-
tion of a process. Beyond this, how-
ever, is a conviction that, with each
problem resolved, it becomes all the
more possible to resolve the next and
more thorny problems — with each act
of trust the next act requiring even
greater trust becomes more possible.
This is not a platitude — it is simply a
practical reality basic to any negotiat-

ing process whether between individu-
als, corporations, or nations.

The Prospects at Present

On the basis of the Camp David ac-
cords, it is now possible in the near
future to achieve a treaty of peace be-
tween Egypt and Israel which provides
for full peace, normalization of rela-
tions, and the security arrangements I
Rave already described.

While Egypt and Israel have suc-
cessfully negotiated most of the provi-
sions of the treaty, neither has yet
agreed to every element of the pack-
age, which consists not only of the
treaty text but also three annexes and
interpretive notes and letters.

We are now actively engaged in
helping the parties to achieve a resolu-
tion of the three remaining issues:

• How to provide for a later review
of the Sinai security arrangements
which would be agreed upon in the
treaty;

• How to clarify the relationship of
the treaty to other existing international
obligations; and

• How to express the fact that while
the Egypt-Israel treaty is not legally
linked to the framework dealing with
the West Bank-Gaza-Palestinian issues,
the parties are committed to proceed
with both as steps toward an overall
peace.

Much progress has been made in
these negotiations and. with these few
exceptions, agreement has been
reached on the text of the treaty and its
annexes. We hope that the remaining
issues can be resolved and the treaty
package signed before much more time
has passed, although we acknowledge
that the remaining issues are difficult.

On concluding this treaty, both sides
will acknowledge the importance of
beginning to move promptly toward a
solution of the challenging problems of
the West Bank and Gaza. The Egypt-
Israel treaty is the essential first step
toward a comprehensive peace, but by
agreement between Egypt and Israel
the negotiations must continue. Peace
between them will be reinforced by
peace between Israel and its other
neighbors.

Resolution of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict can also in a broader context con-
tribute to stability in the greater Middle
Eastern region. Again, the process is
mutually reinforcing: Without an
Arab-Israeli settlement, stability in the
Middle East will be difficult to achieve
and until there is stability in the region
at large, the concerns of both Arabs
and Israelis for their security cannot be
completely allayed.

With this broader perspective, I want

to say something about the current in-
stability in Iran, which is so much a
part of our daily news. It is fair to ask
in the context of this conference
whether there is any common theme
which runs through our concern about
events in Iran and our pursuit of an
Arab-Israeli peace.

The answer lies in our interest in or-
derly change and in the resolution of
conflict through peaceful means. The
United States does not have an interest
in prescribing specific solutions for the
problems of these countries. The
United States does have an interest that
the causes of instability be dealt with in
such ways as to produce new stability.
We do not oppose change; our purpose
is to help channel it into constructive
paths.

With those interests in mind, we will
continue to work for the conclusion of
an Egyptian-Israeli treaty and will then
turn, with the agreement of Egypt and
Israel, to the negotiations on the West
Bank and Gaza as agreed by both par-
ties at Camp David. The continued pur-
suit of peace offers the best hope for
removing a major cause of instability in
this part of the Middle East and en-
abling the United States to pursue all of
its interests there.

A framework for peace was estab-
lished at Camp David and an Egypt-
Israel treaty — the first vital step on the
road to a just and lasting peace — is
well along. The challenges ahead are
formidable but for the first time a real
opportunity exists for peace in this
troubled region. The message from
Washington today is an urgent request
to all who are interested in peace in the
Middle East to seize this opportunity. □

'For texts of the agreements and related ma-
terial, see Bulletin of Oct. 1978, p. 1.

52

Department of State Bulletin

WESTERN HEMISPHERE:

President Carter9s Visit to Mexico

President Carter visited Mexico February 14-16, 1979. Following are re-
marks made by President Carter and President Jose Lopez Portillo on various
occasions during the trip, the joint communique, and President Carter' s inter-
view by Channel 13, Government of Mexico Television.*

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS,
WELCOMING CEREMONY,
FEB. 142

President Lopez Portillo

Mr. Carter, upon your arrival to
Mexico in the name of the people of
Mexico, in the name of the country, in
the name of the government, in the
name of my family, I cordially wel-
come you.

Two years ago it was my pleasure to
be the first foreign head of state to visit
your country during your Administra-
tion. Now you are reciprocating this
visit. Thus we continue with the possi-
bility of the dialogue that was started at
that time.

At that time we said, and we say so
once again now, that it is good for
neighbors to be friends. It is my con-
viction that from our personal contact,
a good friendship was started. This
friendship is now being renewed.

Very objectively, few countries in

Mexican greeting President Carter

the world have so much to talk about,
so many matters as we do.

In Mexico you will find that there is
enormous interest in this visit and re-
sults that it will bring with it. For us,
among all of our relations with the rest
of the nations of the world, the ones
that have more importance are those
that we have with the United States.
Expectation you will find in accordance
with our pluralism and our freedom.
You will find this expectation in all
mass communication media — press,
radio, television — in the streets and
also on signs on the walls.

As regards all the subjects that we
are going to deal with, I believe that
we have already set up the system for
such dealings with the system that we
set up during my visit to Washington.

This system was established on the
principles that are common to us both,
and on mechanisms that we agreed to
set up. However, I am completely cer-
tain that the most important thing of all
is good will and a good disposition in

order to take care of our problems; a
will to agree, a will for peace, a will to
establish our decisions on the mandates
of the law; and perhaps the most im-
portant will of all — the will to be
friends, which means reciprocal respect
and dignity in our dealings.

We receive you within the
framework of this spirit. We hope that
in our future, and for us, very impor-
tant talks, it is this spirit that will pre-
vail.

This is what our people expect from
us in fulfilling our responsibility. We
welcome you, and we hope your
sojourn in Mexico will be a happy one.

President Carter

And now I would like to say in my
own language for the benefit of the
people of my country, that we are very
delighted and honored to come again to
the great country of Mexico, to in-
crease my own understanding of the
Mexican people, and to enjoy an official
visit with my friend. President Lopez
Portillo.

My wife Rosalynn and I have come
to Mexico many times — first when I
was a young naval officer, and later on
a 3-week visit, when we traveled
through this great country trying to
make ourselves understood in Spanish
and to learn more about the impressive
culture and history of Mexico.

Also, 1 came here to visit for a pro-
motion of trade when I was Governor
of Georgia. But I've never had a wel-
come like this. I come here now to re-
unite with my friend President Lopez
Portillo to discuss very important is-
sues between Mexico and the United
States. It's very important to strengthen
the fundamental relationships between
our two countries.

The basis for our discussions, of
course, is a sincere recognition of some
very important problems that require
solutions, and also an appreciation of
the common objectives and purposes
and the great opportunities that we
have between our two countries, in a
spirit of peace, friendship, and mutual
respect.

We live in a time of great change,
dramatic and emotional change, in
Mexico, in the United States, and in
the problems and opportunities we face
together. We have a great deal to ac-
complish.

My wife and I, the entire party from
the United States, come here very

March 1979

pleased at a new opportunity to turn to
your beautiful country to reinspire our-
selves, to strengthen even further the
friendship that binds us together with
you, your wonderful family, and the
people of this great country.

I cannot imagine a more appropriate
day for our own reunion and to express
the feelings that the people of my
country have toward yours.

Happy St. Valentine's Day! Long
live Mexico!

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS,
LUNCHEON HONORING
PRESIDENT CARTER, FEB. 143

President Lopez Portillo

It has been 2 years now since we met
for the first time. Since then, a great
deal of water has flowed under the
bridges of the Rio Grande. A great deal
has also happened within our countries
and between our countries, as it has in
the world and to the world.

United by geography and the borders
that scar it, and immersed in the con-
flicts of a sometimes bitter and invari-
ably complex history, we have set out
to order our conduct as neighbors ac-
cording to the precepts of law, and,
even more important, on the favorable
basis of mutual friendship. This im-
plies good will, expressed in terms of
respectful, fair, and worthy treatment.

Today, 2 years later, it is only fitting
that we evaluate our objectives and
face the facts that confront us. We
know better now what each expects of
the other, but I believe we also know
that we have not yet put our friendship
to the test, since we have not yet de-
cided what we are willing to make of
our relationship. We can view it as a
problem, or we can think of it as a
conflict . In the first case, there are so-
lutions, which would be welcomed by
our friends; in the second, confronta-
tion, which would give joy to our
enemies.

We know that in a world charac-
terized by extraordinary and difficult
changes and by the readjustment of
forces, interests, resources, and posi-
tions, your great country is still in the
process of redefining its policies and
that this makes your decisions all the
more difficult.

Nevertheless, we see in you a leader
who has sought to revive the moral
foundations of the political institutions
of the United States. With great per-
sonal integrity, you have sought to re-
place provisional arrangements with
lasting agreements.

That is what we are hoping for. That
is what we are determined to do. Our
peoples want definitive agreements,

53

not circumstantial concessions.

Among permanent, not casual,
neighbors, surprise moves and sudden
deceit or abuse are poisonous fruits that
sooner or later have a reverse effect.
Consequently, we must take a long-
range view of ourselves. No injustice
can prevail without affronting decency
and dignity.

It is difficult, particularly among
neighbors, to maintain cordial and
mutually advantageous relations in an
atmosphere of mistrust or open hostil-
ity.

We do not wish to view our history
as one that uselessly anchors us, like so
many pillars of salt, to a burden of re-
sentment, just as we would not like you
to contemplate your future in terms of
the risks of silent migration. Neither an-
chors nor silence must impede our
dealings with one another.

A good-neighbor policy presupposes
a general climate of opinion in which
respect prevails over prejudice and in-
telligence over sectarianism.

Over our 3,000 kilometers of com-
mon border, we are the most represen-
tative example of North-South
relations — the confluence of two ex-
panding civilizations, formerly sepa-
rated by the desert but now closely
linked by a complex series of conurba-
tions and exchanges.

But no matter how greatly our rela-
tions may have been intensified, they
are neither exclusive nor excluding. As
a world power, the United States is in-
creasing its presence and its commit-
ments on all continents. Mexico, as an
independent country, recognizes no
limitations on the diversification of its
exchanges, other than its principles and
its development requirements.

It is in that light that we must view
the complex phenomenon of our inter-
relationship, which should never be
confused with dependence, integration,
or the blurring of borders. The two
countries complement and need each
other, but neither would want to de-
pend on the other to the point of nul-
lifying its own sovereign will, reducing
the scope of its international activities,
or losing its self-respect.

All this requires thoroughgoing anal-
ysis; we must not sacrifice what is im-
portant for the sake of what is urgent
nor neglect international and continu-
ing needs in favor of local and transit-
ory interests. Thus, we must keep a
firm grasp on matters of basic impor-
tance in devising solutions to our im-
mediate problems.

Today, the United States is re-
adjusting its power and influence in an
irrational world that refuses to take
rights and obligations into account in
its purusal of its interests and outbreaks
of violence, a world in which Man-

PRESIDENTIAL VISITS

To Mexico

William H. Tat!
October 16. 1909

Franklin D. Roosevelt
April 20. 1943

Harry S. Truman
March 3-6. 1947

Dwight D. Eisenhower
October 19. 1953
February 19-20, 1959
October 24. I960

John F. Kennedy

June 29-July 1. 1962

Lyndon B. Johnson
April 14-15. 1966
December 4. 1966
October 28. 1967

Richard M. Nixon
September 8. 1969
August 20-21. 1970

Gerald R. Ford
October 21. 1974

Jimmy Carter

February 14-16, 1979

To United States

Porfirio Diaz
October 16. 1909

Manuel Avila Camacho

April 21. 1943

Miguel Aleman Valdes
April 29-May 7, 1947

Adolfo Ruiz Cortines

October 19. 1953
March 26-28. 1956

Adolfo Lopez Mateos

October 9-12. 1959
September 25, 1964

Gustavo Diaz Ordaz
October 26-28, 1967
December 13. 1968

Luis Echeverria Alvarez
June 15-17. 1972
October 24. 1974

Jose Lopez Portillo y Paeheco
February 13-17, 1977

SOURCE: -'Lists of Visits of Presidents
of the United States to Foreign Countries
1789-1976" and "Lists of Visits of
Foreign Chiefs of State and Heads of
Government to the United States 1789-
1976." Office of the Historian, Dept. of
State. January 1977

ichaean political structures impede de-
velopment and make underdevelopment
even more distressing. Meanwhile,

54

supranational economic hegemonies —
devoid of any sense of social responsi-
bility and recognizing no country as
their own — are dividing up the world
among themselves and winning out
over sovereign nations.

And today, in this same world and
for the first time in its history, Mexico,
because of a nonrenewable resource
and the financial self-determination it
provides, has been given the opportu-
nity of becoming the free, secure, and
just nation envisaged by its great lead-
ers of the past, a nation ruled by the
principles of a revolution that has
evolved into a government and deter-
mined to live in peace nurtured by re-
spect for the rights of others — a simple
maxim, perhaps, but a valid one.

Mexico has thus suddenly found it-
self the center of American
attention — attention that is a surprising
mixture of interest, disdain, and fear,
much like the recurring vague fears you
yourselves inspire in certain areas of
our national subconscious.

You and I have the task of dealing
with the problem, of rationalizing
realities and prejudices, and fulfilling
our responsibility to our nations by
keeping insensitivity, ambition, fear,
or self-seeking manipulation of illu-
sions from casting a shadow on a re-
lationship founded on friendship or
eliminating any possibility of under-
standing.

Let us seek only lasting solutions —
good faith and fair play — nothing that
would make us lose the respect of our
children.

Multilateral relations, economic
order, trade and prices, demography,
finance, currency, drugs, energy
sources — land, sea, air, or gas —
migratory labor, or human rights and
all their associated questions constitute
agendas that call for varying degrees of
attention. What must not vary are the
principles on which our relations are
based, and the most fundamental of
these is treating others as we ourselves
would like to be treated. That is a
canon that holds true for both men and
nations, the test of our good will and
the measure of our deeds.

It is with such good will that, within
the context of that relationship, I want
to assume my temporary responsibility
for the permanent destiny of my
people, which, like you, I have sworn
to serve and have no right to endanger.
I am certain that you feel the same
way, and in token of this, let us join in
a toast as we hope to join our wills.

President Carter

President Lopez Portillo and I have,
in the short time together on this visit,
found that we have many things in

common. We both represent great na-
tions; we both have found an interest in
archeology; we both must deal with
difficult questions like energy and the
control of inflation. We both look
across the flowing waters of the Rio
Grande with interest, expressions of
friendship, concern, sometimes a lack
of understanding, but a determination
to make the future brighter.

We both have beautiful and in-
teresting wives, and we both run sev-
eral kilometers every day. [Laughter]
As a matter of fact, I told President
Lopez Portillo that I first acquired my
habit of running here in Mexico City.
My first running course was from the
Palace of Fine Arts to the Majestic
Hotel, where my family and 1 were
staying. In the midst of the Folklorico
performance, I discovered that I was
afflicted with Montezuma's revenge.
[Laughter]

We have also noticed some remarka-
ble changes at that time. My wife and I
and my three sons stayed at the Majes-
tic Hotel on the Zocalo for about a
week, and we paid each day $5.50.
The view, itself, was worth that price.

At the end of my visit, I will have
the honor of speaking to the Congress
of Mexico. In your address to the U.S.
Congress 2 years ago, Mr. President,
you said, and I quote: "Mexico has
never been, nor is it now, the leader of
any continent or group of countries." I
respect this modest view of your na-
tion's role. Yet our world is changing
very rapidly. It is no longer divided
into monolithic ideological nor military
blocs. The southern tier of our planet,
the so-called developing world, is as-
serting its rights and the respon-
sibilities that go with those rights. And
no one can deny that Mexico's new
strength, Mexico's new confidence,
and Mexico's new importance in the
world economy are casting your coun-
try in a new world role.

We seek to appreciate the individu-
ality of each independent nation and to
guide our own policies accordingly.
My Administration and the people of
our country recognize the uniqueness
of Mexico. By your own choice, as you
have said, Mexico is not the leader of
any bloc, but on many global issues the
independent voice of Mexico is heard
with increasing strength and persua-
siveness.

Mexico's voice is heard, for exam-
ple, on the crucial issue of the world's
economic system — to make it more
just, more equitable, and how to in-
crease the participation of the people of
the developing world. Because of the
different levels of development —
economically speaking — of our two
countries, our respective visions of the
pace and the kind of change are some-

Department of State Bulletin

what different. But our dialogue is a
creative one, beneficial to all countries
of the world, regardless of the degree
of their industrialization.

Mexico's voice is heard as an advo-
cate of a truly international approach to
human rights. The Mexican people
have a history of long and successful
struggle, not only for national inde-
pendence but for social justice and the
dignity of the individual.

Mexico has used its influence on be-
half of internationally recognized
standards of human rights, both politi-
cal and economic. This has been one of
my own most deeply felt concerns.

Our policies, both foreign and
domestic, must reflect our values as a
people. Those of us who are national
leaders have a responsibility to speak
out when human rights are violated
abroad, and we also have a responsi-
bility to protect human rights at home.
That extends to the basic human rights
of all those who, for whatever reason,
are within the borders of our countries.

The struggle for human rights is not
a static thing. It offers new challenges
to every generation. During the 1960's
in the United States, we enacted new
laws to protect the civil and voting
rights of all citizens regardless of lan-
guage, race, or color. Here in Mexico,
you've initiated an important political
reform and an amnesty law, evidence
of your belief in open debate and in the
accommodation of opposing views.

Finally, and most important, the
voice of Mexico is heard in the service
of world peace. Your government has
worked long and hard to control
weapons and armaments, both nuclear
and conventional, both in this hemi-
sphere and throughout the world. It
would not be going too far to say that
of all the major countries on Earth,
there is none more dedicated to arms
control and more opposed to militarism
than Mexico.

The leaders of this great country
have taken an extremely important ini-
tiative in the treaty of Tlatelolco, a
treaty that was signed here at this
place. This effort to make this region
of the entire world into a nuclear
weapons-free zone is one of the most
creative steps that any country has
taken since the invention of these terri-
ble weapons of nuclear destruction.

Your approach is both visionary and
practical, a difficult combination to
achieve. I hope and I trust that it will
serve as a model for other regions on
Earth. And in the United Nations and
elsewhere, you have been similarly
creative in trying to staunch the spread
of conventional arms.

We welcome Mexico's advocacy of
these issues. Though our two countries
may not agree with each other in every

March 1979

55

particular, there is a sense of shared
concern and shared values which
underline our relationships.

In the spirit of mutual respect and
mutual regard and with great admira-
tion, I look forward to continuing to
work with you toward a world commu-
nity of justice, diversity, and peace.

And now, I would like to propose a
toast: first, to the health of the Presi-
dent of Mexico and to Mrs. Lopez Por-
tillo, to the continuing friendship and
cooperation of the peoples of Mexico
and the peoples of the United States of

America, and to what we most desire,
peace throughout the world.

PRESIDENT CARTER'S
REMARKS, U.S. EMBASSY,
FEB. 14

You and I are indeed fortunate to be
partners in the service of a great na-
tion, with the task of improving re-
lationships among people who are
bound together by intense and ancient
ties of friendship, kinship, mutual

problems, mutual opportunities, and a
greater future.

It's no accident that this Embassy
here in the capital of Mexico is the
largest U.S. Embassy on Earth. This is
because the relationships between the
United States of America and the re-
public of Mexico are so important to
Americans, important not just to our
own two countries and our two peoples
but important indeed throughout this
entire hemisphere.

You have a special challenge here.
There are 20 million Americans who

MEXICO— A PROFILE

People

Population: 66.9 million (1978 est )

Annual Growth Rate: 2.99c (Dec. 1978 est.).

Ethnic Groups: Indian-Spanish (mestizo)
609c, American Indian 30%, Caucasian
9%. other 1 9c

Religion: Nominally Roman Catholic 97%.

Language: Spanish.

Education: Years compulsory — 9. Percent-
age attendance — 65%. Literacy — 75%.

Health: Infant mortality rate — 73 per 1.000
(U.S. = 17/1, 000). Life expectancy— 62
yrs.

Geography

Area: 1.978.750 sq. km. (764.000 sq. mi.).

Cities: Capital — Mexico City (Mexico,
DF — pop. 8.6 million. 1978 est.),
Guadalajara (1.9 million), Monterey (1.7
million). Puebla (500.000). Ciudad Juarez
(500,000).

Terrain: Varied — coastal lowlands to high
mountains.

Climate: Varied — tropical to desert

Government

Official Name: The United Mexican Slates.

Type: Federal Republic.

Independence: First proclaimed Sept. 16.

1810; republic established 1822. Date of

Constitution: Feb. 5. 1917.

Branches: Executive — President (Chief of
State and Head of Government).
Legislative — bicameral Congress (64-
member Senate; 300-member Chamber of
Deputies). Judicial — Supreme Court, local
and federal systems.

Political Parties: Institutional Revolutionary
Party (PR1), National Action Party (PAN),
Popular Socialist Party (PPS), Authentic
Party of the Revolution (PARM); three
other parties — the Socialist Workers Party
(PST), the Mexican Democratic Party
(PDM), and the Mexican Communist Party
(CPM), and four political associations
conditionally registered.

Suffrage: Universal over age 18.

Administrative Subdivisions: 31 States and

the Federal District.

Economy

GDP: $74.3 billion (1977).

Per Capita GDP: $1,149 (1977).

Annual Growth Rale: 6% ( 1978 est.).

Inflation: 15-20% (1978).

Natural Resources: Petroleum, silver, cop-
per, gold. lead, zinc, natural gas. timber.

Agriculture: Products — corn, cotton, coffee,
sugarcane, vegetables. Percentage of
GDP— 12%.

Industry: Types — food processing, chemical,
basic metal and metal products, petroleum.
Percentage of GDP— 379c.

Trade (1977); Exports— $4.6 billion (f.o.b.l:
coffee, cotton, fruits and vegetables, pe-
troleum, sulfur. Partners — U.S. 58%, EC.
Japan. Imports — $5.5 billion (c.i.f.):
machinery, equipment, industrial vehicles,
intermediate goods. Partners — U.S. 63%,
EC. Japan.

Average Exchange Rate: 22.5 pesos = U.S.
$1.00 (1978).

Economic Aid Received: Total (FY 1946-
76)— $3.7 billion. U.S. aid (FY 1946-
76) — $300 million; no direct bilateral eco-
nomic aid program.

Membership in
International Organizations

U.N., International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization (ICAO). Seabeds Committee,
Inter-American Defense Board (IADB).
Organization of American States (OAS),
Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA). INTELSAT, and several others.

Principal Government Officials

Mexico: President — Jose Lopez Portillo >
Pacheco; Minister of Foreign Relations —
Santiago Roel Garcia; Ambassador to the
U.S. — Hugo B. Margain

United States: Ambassador to Mexico —
Patrick J. Lucey.

Taken from the Department of State's Feb-
ruary 1979 edition of the Background
Notes on Mexico. Copies of the complete
Note may he purchased for 70<t from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office. Washington, DC.
20402 (a 259c discount is allowed when or-
dering 100 or more Notes mailed to the same
address).

56

lxtlilco el Grande

speak Spanish, most of them having
come from Mexico or having their par-
ents or ancestors having come from this
great land. Your responsibility is to tie
our two countries together econom-
ically, politically, and in matters of
mutual interest and mutual security.
But because of the unique relationship,
because we share so much, your offi-
cial duties, as I've just outlined so
briefly, have important human con-
cerns. Yours is not a sterile responsi-
bility, and it's almost impossible in an
embassy in this country, representing
the United States, to separate matters
of foreign policy from matters of
domestic policy.

You, perhaps more than any other
embassy representatives of our coun-
try, must be both diplomats and
politicians — politicians in the finest
sense of the word: understanding
human needs, understanding the diver-
sity that exists within this country and
within our own nation, understanding
differences, and, more importantly,
understanding similarities.

This special requirement for you is
the reason that I was personally in-
terested in asking my friend, former
Governor Patrick Lucey, to take on this
important responsibility, because I
knew that he and his wife, Jean, were
fully capable of combining the finest in
diplomacy with the finest in politics in
human terms. I'm indeed proud of
Ambassador Pat Lucey, and I'm indeed
proud of every one of you.

I know that the visit of a President
burdens you with greatly expanded
duties, assignments, and respon-
sibilities. It's a challenge when there
are so many highly publicized issues
which need to be resolved for you to

make adequate preparations or a visit
so important as this one.

I thank you for it, and I would also
like to thank the members of the
families of those who work here, be-
cause I know that you've been deprived
of your wives or husbands, your fathers
or your mothers, in preparing for my
visit. And I'm sure that after I leave,
having made my welcoming address at
the airport and planning to address the
Mexican Congress in Spanish, it'll take
you 2 or 3 weeks to repair the damage
that 1 will have done. [Laughter]

I would like to express special
thanks to the employees here who are
Mexican citizens. You understand
much better than could a citizen of the
United States the special needs and
interests of the people of Mexico. Your
closeness here within the Embassy
helps to insure the closeness of the 220
million people who live in our country
and the many millions of people who
live here. In microcosm, you represent
in the finest way the interrelationship
between our two countries.

I want to say a word, too, to the
young Americans who attend school
here, and I'll combine them with all
Americans who work here. I hope that
you will take every possible advantage
of this rare opportunity to learn what
you can about an exciting, interesting,
intriguing country and people. The
culture, the history, the language, if
learned about by you, will be an added
value for the rest of your lives.

I hope that whenever your own
duties permit, or consonant with your
duties, that you will travel throughout
this land, study its history, learn its
people and places, and absorb the con-
sciousness of the people who live in
Mexico.

Yours is most important work, and
I'm very grateful that our country has
dedicated people like you, competent
and professional, to represent our great
nation in this great nation.

PRESIDENT CARTER'S
REMARKS, IXTLILCO
EL GRANDE, FEB, 154

Rosalynn and I are very happy to be
here with all of you today. You have
been so kind and warm and considerate
that we do not feel like strangers at all,
but as if we were at home in our own
village.

I know that during the past week it
has been difficult for you to prepare for
our visit. You have welcomed the
people from my staff who came here to
work with you in making preparations.
I thank you.

Department of State Bulletin

I have had a busy and interesting
visit here today. You showed me some
of the finest tomatoes and onions and
corn and cantaloupes and watermelons
and rice that I have ever seen. And you
showed me your peanuts. As you
know, I have been a peanut farmer for
much longer than I have been a
President — and the peanuts of lxtlilco
el Grande look just as good as the ones
on my own farm.

Cuco Sanchez and his family demon-
strated the irrigation pump and ex-
plained to us how it benefits everyone
in the village. At the school, we met
Professor Sanchez and Maestra Ver-
gara and some of the boys and girls
who are so important to the future of
lxtlilco el Grande and to Mexico.

And what a delicious meal. We love
the cooks. Rosalynn and I are very
fond of Mexican food. At the White
House, in Washington, we have a
Mexican meal every week, but the
dishes you have served us today are the
best I have ever had. I hope you will
give Rosalynn the recipes.

Everything I have seen here has im-
pressed me very deeply. Through the
program for integrated rural economic
development, you are building a better
life for yourselves and your children.

I know how much progress like this
can mean. Rosalynn and I come from
the small farming community of Plains,
in the State of Georgia, which is not
even half as big as lxtlilco el Grande.
When I was a boy our village had no
electricity and no irrigation, and our
facilities for education and health care
and for marketing our crops were very
poor. It made a great difference in our
lives when we began to have these
things, and I can see that it has also
made a great difference here in lxtlilco
el Grande. Your government has
helped, but it is really the great efforts
of the people of lxtlilco el Grande that
have made this program a success.

What you are doing here meets basic
human needs, and my country admires
that achievement.

Again, I want to thank you — our new
friends — for your hospitality and your
kindness and your consideration. I will
never forget this day. iViva Mexico!
iViva lxtlilco el Grande.'

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS,
DINNER HONORING
PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO,
FEB. 165

President Carter

We are very delighted to have you
here with us as our guest tonight.
You have been blessed this evening

March 1979

57

with two beautiful concerts, the one
that just concluded, and the remarkable
performance by Leonard Bernstein and
the beautiful musicians from Mexico
City.

We have been blessed by three con-
certs, those two, plus the 2-hour con-
test between Bernstein and Lopez Por-
tillo [laughter] as to who could
remember — and I don't know a differ-
ent word for "sing" — the songs from
Latin America in Spanish. [Laughter]

I would like to say just a very few
words, because Leonard Bernstein has
asked me to keep my toasts brief.
[Laughter]

The relationship between our two
countries is one of the most complex
and one of the most intimate in all the
world.

The border between our two coun-
tries is 2,000 miles long— 3,000
kilometers — one of the longest unde-
fended borders on Earth.

I'm committed to working with you
to create a framework of a relationship
between our two peoples that's based
on the principles of understanding, bal-
ance, and mutual cooperation.

We have much work to do in resol-
ving specific interrelationships between
our countries. But perhaps the greatest
challenge that we face is to adopt at-
titudes toward each other that are based
not on the past, but on the realities of
the present and the needs of the future.

I've thought carefully about your
remarks yesterday, and I would like to
respond with the same degree of frank-
ness and of friendship.

The people of the United States are
fair and decent people in their relation-
ships with each other and in dealing
with people of other nations. We al-
ways try to negotiate with others in a
spirit of candor and friendship.

We always believe it's best to recog-
nize honest differences, to assess
problems realistically and without fear
or suspicion, and to work in harmony
with our friends to solve those prob-
lems and to take advantage of common
opportunities.

Each of us, as leaders, has a primary
responsibility to represent the interests
of our own people. Naturally, this
leads to differences in perspective and
differences of opinion as we do discuss
complicated issues. Our discussions on
this visit have been very productive.
And we now have an even better pros-
pect of resolving those inevitable dif-
ferences which have sometimes been
obstacles to further progress for many
generations. We know that questions
involving energy, trade, immigration,
transportation, and fisheries are not
easy to answer. But we are determined,
working together, to succeed.

In your memorable speech to the
Congress of the United States 2 years
ago, you said something that bears re-
peating tonight. You said, and I would
like to read your words:

It is difficult to be the neighbor of a nation as
powerful as yours. We run two grave risks: arro-
gance, which is easy but sterile, and submission,
which is easy but abject.

We have chosen instead the difficult path of
dignity, based on the liberty we want to maintain
and the responsibility which we wish to assume.

That was a perceptive statement.
And I would say in reply that it is
sometimes difficult to be the neighbor
of a nation such as yours [laughter] — a
nation of rapid change and develop-
ment, a nation whose new economic
power obliges its leaders to make dif-
ficult choices and to accept greatly ex-
panded responsibilities.

To conclude, let me say that I agree
that we must not go down the path of
arrogance or the path of submission.
Instead, I'm confident that we will
walk with you on the path of dignity,
toward a future of independence,
sovereignty, cooperation, mutual re-
spect, and peace.

And now I would like to propose a
toast: first, to the health of President
Lopez Portillo and Mrs. Lopez Portillo;
second, to the friendship of two great
nations, the republic of Mexico and the
United States of America; and to a
better life for all people, in our two
nations, and throughout the world.
Salud.

President Lopez Portillo

Similarly to what was done by Mr.
Carter, I wish to begin to speak by
paying homage to genius. I wish to say
that many, many years ago, I was pres-
ent at the first performance when the
musical selection "Salon Mexico," by
Copland, was played many years ago.
Since then, I have heard it many times.
But I want to say that it was tonight
that I really discovered this piece. It
was due to the genius of this man
[Leonard Bernstein], who made me
discover the message that has been sent
to us by the author, all the tenderness,
all the violence, all the strength, all the
graciousness, and all the intent of what
used to happen in the Salon Mexico,
the Salon Mexico to which I went
sometimes as a youth. [Laughter]

All of this was what I discovered this
evening in this extraordinary interpre-
tation. I am not speaking about the
other musical selections because — and
what I'm going to say now will only be
understood by the people that are sit-
ting around this table — I do not want to
extend a [inaudible]. [Laughter]

For us, your visit has been extremely
important. You and your associates
have been very friendly and very pa-
tient. Our friendship has made it possi-
ble for us to be frank. And it is a
beautiful thing when human beings can
communicate among themselves with
frankness and openly, even if they have
differences as the differences that exist
between our two peoples.

You are very right; it is difficult for
us to live next to the most powerful
country in the world. It must be very
difficult for you also to live next to a
poor country and a developing one.

Things happen, and at times such as
this one, it would be well to remember
what was said by the classics in order
to make an effort to bring harmony to
the world in accordance with the prin-
ciples that they advocated. Aristotle
said that after the ideal state of Plato,
very objectively and very realistically,
he conceived of a society in which
there would be no men that would be
rich enough to buy other men and men
so poor that they would have to sell
themselves.

This, I believe, is the most serious
matter of our times — the fact that there
are men that can buy men and that
there are men that have to sell them-
selves. And this is what happens very
frequently with our poor people that go
to the United States.

I confess that I am deeply moved,
and I shall try to be more stable.

But I must reflect upon the fact that
we are living in a world of
inequalities — that almost all political
systems have been capable of de-
nouncing these evils, but we have not
had the capability of taking to practice
the solutions that we have proposed.

And I wish to bring up a matter
which I confess concerns me deeply.
What is happening to the free world?
Where has freedom led us? And this is
a matter that I wish to bring up and to
state as one of the most serious ques-
tions that can be asked of the Mexican
revolution. We belong to the world of
free democracies. It is a political sys-
tem that would want to bring together
liberty and justice. But many times
when we wished to uphold freedom,
we had to sacrifice justice. And we
must ask ourselves: "What have we
done with our freedom?" Other coun-
tries, in order to obtain justice, in turn
sacrificed freedom. No doubt they will
have to ask themselves: "What have
we done with justice?"

We would want to believe that there
would be some kind of an order that
could be established in the world in
which it would be possible to have both
values. And that is why we want to
state this, for me, very serious ques-

58

tion: Is it possible for the human being
to be free and at the same time to be
just? Is it possible to conceive of an
international order that can avoid the
state of affairs in which a man would
sell himself and another one would buy
another human being? When the ques-
tion is asked by a theoretician, it is a
good statement. But when it is asked
by a statesman that has specific func-
tions to perform, it becomes a tre-
mendous responsibility.

I feel this responsibility. Convinced
as I am of the great values of Western
culture, certain as I am that it is impos-
sible to live without freedom, there is
no other alternative left but to make an
effort to find the roads that will lead to
justice. And this can only be found if
we conceive of life among nations as a
series of rights and duties, to find the
people responsible without pointing a
finger of guilt.

And I believe that during the talks
that we had yesterday and today, I be-
lieve that we have made statements and
posed questions in such a manner as to
feel satisfied. We have simply pro-
posed those matters. We have simply
brought them up. We have not opened
up the road to their solution. But this
does point a finger in the right direc-
tion.

From you and your associates, we
have received great understanding as
regards what troubles us. We have
agreed that human rights are of funda-
mental importance. And we have ex-
pressed our will to decide all the mat-
ters that were included in our very
broad agenda. And I believe that a very
good way to begin is to express our
will to do so, to commit our intelli-
gence and our good faith. And I believe

that this is what we have been able to
do during our meetings, commit our
intelligence and our good faith.

This is what I have understood this
fruitful dialogue to mean, a dialogue
which we have agreed to continue
within a very short time.

Until that time comes, until our as-
sociates are able to clear the way, let us
keep alive our willingness to live in
freedom and, without losing this free-
dom, resolve the very serious problems
of international coexistence.

There is no other way but to respect
values. For that great purpose, for the
effort that you are making in your
willingness to have human rights pre-
vail in the world, for your expressed
will to decide problems which are so
difficult between two countries such as
ours, for the merit it means to be fair
when you are strong, I wish to raise my
glass and offer a toast to your health, to
the health of your wife, and to the great
people of the United States.

PRESIDENT CARTER'S
REMARKS, MEXICAN
CONGRESS, FEB. 166

As President of the fourth largest
Spanish-speaking nation, I speak to
you — as best I can — in the language of
Mexico, the largest Spanish-speaking
nation on Earth.

Nearly a decade ago, the great Mexi-
can poet Octavio Paz wrote these words
about the United States, and I quote:

For more than a century that country has ap-
peared to our eyes as a gigantic but scarcely
human reality. Smiling or angry, its hand
clenched or open, the United States neither sees

Mexico's Trade'

(Billion U.S $)

1 [Total Exports yA2a Total Imports

1 I Exports to U S II Imports trom US

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975

1 Central Inteligence Agency data

2 Data not available tor 1978 exports to tfnports Irom U S

1976 1977 1978 (est)'

Department of State Bulletin

nor hears us, but keeps striding on, and as it
does so, enters our land and crushes us. It is im-
possible to hold back a giant. It is possible,
though far from easy, to make him listen to
others. If he listens, this opens the possibility of
coexistence.

My friends, I have come to Mexico
to listen.

This is a time to appreciate the
mutual benefits of our historical
friendship as neighbors. But it is also a
time of exciting changes within our two
countries and in our relationship with
each other. I have come here better to
comprehend these changes and to gain
a greater understanding of your views.

In the last 3 days, I have spent many
hours with your President, Jose Lopez
Portillo. Together, we are working to
shape a lasting relationship that is
based on balance and equality, based
on mutual respect for sovereignty and
independence, and a mutual recogni-
tion of our shared destinies.

The relations between our two coun-
tries are extremely complex. To quote
Octavio Paz once more: "What sepa-
rates us is the very thing that unites us.
We are two distinct versions of West-
ern civilization."

Yet it is undeniable that our cultures
and our civilizations are more and more
related. After all, I am speaking to you
in the language not only of Mexico but
of 20 million of my fellow citizens in
the United States of America.

This mutual interest we feel in our
respective music, art, drama, and
sports, and in the looks and sounds of
our own landscape and our cities as
well.

But it goes deeper than that. If the
cultural reality of the present is a prod-
uct of the past, it is also a map of the
future. And on that map, the paths to
progress for both our peoples increas-
ingly converge. I strongly believe that
the intermingling of our two cultures
should be welcomed, for it will be a
source of strength and vitality for both
peoples.

For all the cherished differences
between the customs and histories of
our two countries, we are alike in
another very important way: We are
both pluralistic societies.

Mexico is the product of many cul-
tural influences — influences which
have shaped a distinctive whole soci-
ety, while retaining, at the same time,
much of its original character. The
same can be said of the United States.
It is natural for us to learn and adopt
from one another ideas.

From our perspective, the 2,000-year
history of Mexican civilization is im-
pressive, even awesome. When the
first English settlers came to the United

March 1979

59

States, the University of Mexico and
Spanish settlements near my present
home State were already 100 years old.

Mexico has produced a great and
unique culture — one that today finds
beautiful expression in art, literature,
music, dance, and in architecture of
extraordinary vitality.

We respect your culture, which en-
riches our own. But we also respect
Mexico as a great and growing modern
nation in constant growth.

President Lopez Portillo has adopted
many important steps to strengthen
political participation, and he has set
forth goals of wider economic partici-
pation and social justice as well. We
admire and applaud these actions.

I have tried to develop a better ap-
proach to Latin America and the Carib-
bean also — one that emphasizes the
uniqueness of each country. The
United States views Latin American
countries not just as regional actors but
as important leaders in a wider system
of global cooperation. This commit-
ment is more than just words.

During my first year in office, the
United States signed a new treaty with
Panama on the Panama Canal, which
recognizes the national pride and
legitimate rights between people of
Panama, and at the same time, it is
consistent with the ideals and best
interests of the people of the United
States.

We particularly value the role that
Mexico plays in international affairs in
a world that is more and more varied
and less and less dominated by super
powers or by ideological blocs.

The influence and leadership of
Mexico have been increased. You are a
recognized force for international eco-
nomic justice, for the principle of na-
tional sovereignty and nonintervention,
for arms control and peace.

It has been said that war is too im-
portant to be left to the generals. It is
equally true that peace is too important
to be left solely to the superpowers.
Mexico's policy affirms that every
country has a stake in control of nu-
clear arms. Through the treaty of
Tlatelolco, you have taken a unique
and important initiative in inspiring
Latin America to be permanently free
of nuclear weapons.

In a world that can be traversed in an
hour by satellite, and in an instant by
radio, every country is, in a certain
sense, the neighbor of every other
country. Yet the closeness of Mexico
and the United States is no abstraction.
We share an open border more than
3,000 kilometers long. We are
neighbors in every sense of the
word — and, as President Lopez Portillo
said in his speech to our Congress 2

years ago, ". . .we shall go on being
neighbors as long as the Earth circles
the Sun."

Our friendship has at times been
marred by mistakes, and even by
abuses of power. Our perceptions of
each other have sometimes been dis-
torted. But we have made progress, and
I believe that in the coming years, we
will make greater progress toward
fuller cooperation, understanding, and
mutual respect.

This will be so if the relations be-
tween us are the product of an honest
dialogue such as President Lopez Por-
tillo and I have had during the last few
days.

In the 2 years since President Lopez
Portillo became the first head of state
to visit me at the White House, we
have recorded many accomplishments
together. We have signed a civil avia-
tion agreement that will bring the
largest expansion of air service be-
tween two countries in a full genera-
tion. We have signed and ratified
treaties on prisoner exchange, on
maritime boundaries, and on fisheries,
and on extradition.

We have worked together effectively
to combat the heroin trade — and we
know that the task is far from com-
plete. We have cooperated and sought
each other's counsel on international
issues. We have strengthened the con-
tinuing consultative links between our
two governments.

Yesterday we signed agreements to
expand scientific cooperation in the
areas of housing and in arid crop de-
velopment. These accomplishments are
important, not only for themselves but
because they demonstrate our willing-
ness and our ability to work together.

Difficult problems remain —
especially in the areas of trade, energy,
and migration. Each of these issues
defies easy solution. Now and for years
to come, each will require our best ef-
forts to narrow our differences and find
common ground.

As a result of the productive consul-
tations of this visit, working groups
will continue to study the problem. But
they will make frequent reports to
President Lopez Portillo and to me. We
have agreed to meet soon, preferably
this summer, to assess progress and to
resolve remaining problems.

This is important, and I want to re-
peat it in my language: [In English]
Because of the great progress that has
been made in this visit, we have as-
signed to working groups matters of
negotiation and consultation. These
groups will make frequent reports to
President Lopez Portillo and to me, and
your President and I have agreed to
meet very early again to assess the

progress that has been made, and to
add our personal influence in resolving
remaining problems. Our hope and our
expectation is that President Lopez
Portillo and I will meet again as early
as this summer.

[In Spanish] Trade between our two
countries, which already reaches an
annual level of about $10 billion, is
certain to grow even more rapidly in
the future. We must work together as
neighbors and as associates within the
system of international trade in order to
reduce the barriers to trade between our
countries and to manage presently our
commercial relations effectively.

For many reasons — some of them
historical — the issue of energy has
aroused strong emotion. You are justi-
fiably proud of the great natural re-
sources of Mexico. That is why I want
to repeat today what I have emphasized
in talking to the people of my own
country: We understand clearly that the
Mexican oil resources are the national
patrimony of the Mexican people, to be
developed and used and sold as Mexico
sees fit.

We respect the decision that Mexico
will produce at a rate suited to its de-
velopment objectives. As a good cus-
tomer, we are prepared to pay a fair
and just price for the gas and oil that
you may wish to sell.

Mexico's rapidly growing economic
strength will help to provide many
thousands of new jobs, a long-term an-
swer to the difficult problem of un-
lawful migration.

As President, I am responsible for
upholding the laws of my country, in-
cluding its immigration laws. I will
meet that responsibility as fairly and as
humanely as I can. My consultations
held here will help me to make the
right decisions. I am deeply and per-
sonally determined to protect the basic
human rights of all people within the
borders of my country whether or not
they are citizens of the United States.

You can be sure that I will meet that
commitment. My country welcomes the
growing strength of its great southern
neighbor. We will not always agree,
just as we do not always agree with
other close friends and allies. But we
are convinced that our own strength is
enhanced by having strong and inde-
pendent friends.

Our common problems will not be
resolved without patient work over
many years. But in our conversations,
President Lopez Portillo and I have
begun to define a common vision of a
better future.

It will be a future in which more
trade flows freely between our coun-
tries, greater legal migration in both
directions, greater cooperation between

60

Department of State Bulletin

our economists, planners, and scien-
tists, and a future in which we shall
preserve and enrich the cultures of both
our countries as our peoples become
increasingly bilingual.

Let us set the basis for our relations
upon the words of one of the greatest
figures in the history of human liberty.
Benito Juarez. These words are
emblazoned above, on the walls of this
chamber: "Among its individuals, as
among its nations, the respect of the
rights of others is peace."

These words are so important that I
wish to repeat them in my own lan-
guage: [In English] "Between indi-
viduals, as between nations, respect for
the rights of others is peace."

JOINT COMMUNIQUE,
FEB. 167

At the invitation of the President of the United
Mexican States, Licenciado Jose Lopez Portillo,
the President of the United States of America.
Jimmy Carter, made a visit to Mexico from the
fourteenth to the sixteenth of February. 1979.

Both Presidents held extensive discussions in
an atmosphere of sincerity, friendship and
mutual understanding. They reviewed interna-
tional issues, hemispheric problems and bilateral
matters, from the time when President Lopez
Portillo made a State visit to Washington,
DC. — the first visit by a foreign Head of State
to the United States after the inauguration of
President Carter.

Both Presidents reviewed the operation of the
U.S. -Mexican Consultative Mechanism, which
was established during that visit to examine is-
sues facing the two countries within the context
of an overall bilateral relationship. They decided
to strengthen the mechanism and provide it with
more dynamism, cohesion and flexibility for its
more effective operation. To this end, they
agreed that, in the light of the guidelines spelled
out in this Joint Communique, concrete recom-
mendations would be made within a period of
four months on ways the mechanism can more
effectively solve problems, taking into consid-
eration the close relationship among these prob-
lems.

Upon reviewing the international scene and
the grave problems that affect world peace, both
Presidents reiterated their confidence in the
United Nations, convinced that this institution is
the best alternative to achieve a peaceful world
with equity and justice. They also agreed that all
possible efforts should be made so that the
United Nations can achieve new dynamism.
They expressed their willingness to cooperate to
this end within the Special Committee on the
Charter of the United Nations and on the
Strengthening of the Role of the Organization.
They also expressed support for the important
work of the Organization of American States and
the need to strengthen and modernize this re-
gional organization.

They emphasized that a new international

system should be guided by accepted principles
of international conduct, particularly the fol-
lowing: non-intervention of the internal affairs
of other States, the prohibition of the use of
threat or force, respect for the self-determination
of peoples, the peaceful solution of conflicts,
and the sovereign right of each nation to take
full advantage of its natural resources for the
economic and social development of its people.

Both Presidents expressed their agreement that
peace is more than just the absence of hostilities;
peace also includes the elimination of hunger,
disease, illiteracy, poverty, ignorance and
injustice — tasks in which all countries of the in-
ternational community share responsibility.

The Presidents examined the development of
their economies within a global context. They
agreed that major efforts should be made to ad-
just and improve the international economic
system to take into account the interests and
concerns of developing countries. They ex-
pressed their concern over the world-wide prob-
lems of inflation, unemployment, protectionism
and monetary and financial difficulties. They
recognized that it is important to assure the
adequate transfer of real resources to developing
countries and to promote stable economic and
social development throughout the world.

The Heads of State committed themselves to
use their best efforts toward the execution of the
goals set by the Tenth U.N. Special Session on
Disarmament, and within this context, they also
recognized the importance of the Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco). President
Lopez Portillo expressed his appreciation to
President Carter for having signed Protocol I of
the Treaty of Tlatelolco. and he also expressed
his firm hopes that it will be ratified soon. Presi-
dent Lopez Portillo recognized the importance of
reaching an agreement on strategic arms lim-
itations as a solid base for further agreements in
this field.

The Presidents exchanged opinions on the
possible measures to limit the transfer of con-
ventional weapons, both at a worldwide and re-
gional level, and. in this context. President
Carter reiterated the support of his Administra-
tion for self-restraint in the transfer of conven-
tional weapons — efforts initiated by the nations
of Latin America and the Caribbean during a
meeting held in Mexico, in August of 1978. He
also reiterated his Administration's policy to re-
spect the decisions undertaken by the countries
interested in this matter. The Presidents also
recognized the importance of the U.N. Confer-
ence on Conventional Weapons to be held later
this year.

The Presidents expressed their particular
interest in strengthening international organiza-
tions engaged in the protection of guarantees of
individual rights. They especially commended
the work of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights and urged other nations in the
hemisphere to give it their full support.

Both leaders expressed their deep concern
over the crisis that continues to affect the people
of Nicaragua, violating their most fundamental
human rights, reaffirming their decision to con-

tinue working through the United Nations and
the Organization of American States, in the
search for a democratic and fair solution to the
conflict.

Upon reviewing trade relations between their
countries, both Presidents expressed their satis-
faction with the continuous growth of this ex-
change. President Lopez Portillo noted the his-
toric trade deficit of Mexico with the United
States, particularly if recent sales of Mexican oil
are excluded, making known the convenience of
taking all methods necessary to reduce it, per-
mitting an increase in the export of Mexican
merchandise, particularly those of higher value-
added which would benefit both countries.
President Carter emphasized the need to reduce
trade barriers on a broad basis. In this connec-
tion, he called attention to the trade concessions
offered by the United States which would be of
significant benefit to Mexico.

President Lopez Portillo noted that the even-
tual membership of Mexico to GATT [General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] would depend,
as it was stated in September. 1973, in Tokyo,
on the consideration of special treatment to de-
veloping countries which should be measured in
terms of equal treatment for equal countries and
unequal treatment for unequal countries; on the
final results of the multilateral trade negotia-
tions; and on the terms of its negotiation on
adherence to GATT, which it initiated on
January 16 of this year. Mexico will make a de-
cision which will depend on the compatibility of
the liberalization of trade and with the stage and
condition of Mexico's economic development.

President Carter expressed his strong support
for expanded world trade and reducing trade
barriers, and expressed his hope that Mexico
would play a greater role in the shaping and the
management of an improved world trading sys-
tem.

The two Presidents agreed that the rapid and
satisfactory conclusion of the Multilateral Trade
Negotiations will represent an important step
toward the improvement of the world's econ-
omy. They felt, however, that these negotiations
could only end successfully if developing coun-
tries, such as Mexico, have an equitable partici-
pation in its results. In order to achieve this, it is
necessary to fully implement the Tokyo Decla-
ration, particularly with regard to differential
treatment for developing countries.

They also agreed to try to conclude success-
fully and within the shortest period of time, their
bilateral trade negotiations with the framework
of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The
Presidents reaffirmed the Tokyo Declaration to
the effect that Mexico would make a contribu-
tion to the Multilateral Trade Negotiations only
to the extent of its trade, finance and develop-
ment possibilities. President Carter favorably
recognized Mexico's effort in gradually
eliminating non-tariff barriers and considered
this effort as a potential contribution to the goals
of the aforementioned negotiation.

The Presidents also agreed that the future ex-
pansion of trade between the two countries will
require a continuous liberalization of both coun-
tries' trade policies, in accordance with the

March 1979

61

trade, financial and development needs of each
nation. They also committed themselves to
renew their efforts to this end and to carry out
close consultations on trade and financial mat-
ters. President Lopez Portillo reasserted the
Mexican Government's decision to continue the
process of gradually eliminating non-tariff bar-
riers, and to do so with prudence, caution and
according to international economic conditions.
President Carter noted that his Administration
had given special attention to Mexico's export
needs in the implementation of U.S. trade laws
and committed himself to continue to oppose
protectionism and to resist attempts to reduce the
security of access to U.S. markets for Mexican
products.

Both Presidents recognized the mutual bene-
fits deriving from the U.S. Generalized System
of Preferences. However, President Lopez Por-
tillo pointed out that the system contains serious
limitations for its full utilization and that meas-
ures should be taken to improve the system, par-
ticularly, with regard to the liberalization of the
application of the so-called "competitive need
clause."

President Carter noted that Mexico's exports
that entered under GSP have doubled in the last
two years and that Mexico is the leading benefi-
ciary of trade preferences in Latin America.

President Lopez Portillo expressed hope that
the new rules of international trade would give
due consideration to the interests of developing
countries, and would not institutionalize the in-
creasing protectionist actions by developed na-
tions. President Carter pointed out that protec-
tionism was a contagious condition which
threatened all countries. He pointed out his own
record of opposition to protectionism which
should be resisted in all countries.

The Presidents emphasized the importance of
cooperation in the field of science and technol-
ogy as a means for dealing with many economic
and social problems. They also agree on the
mutual advantages of intensifying this coopera-
tion.

The Presidents expressed their satisfaction
with regard to plans to reinforce the present
mechanisms for scientific and technological
cooperation between both nations, and asked the
authorities in these fields of their respective na-
tions to expedite the execution of these plans,
within the framework of the mixed Scientific and
Technological Cooperation Commission and the
Consultative Mechanism.

To signal their commitment, the two Presi-
dents took note of the two agreements signed
during the visit, on Arid Lands Management and
Urban Planning and a Memorandum of Under-
standing on Scientific and Technological Coop-
eration also signed during the visit. They also
discussed plans for the Institute for Technolog-
ical Cooperation, which they agreed would
facilitate cooperative research and development
between the two countries.

Both Presidents exchanged views on fishery
matters because they considered this a priority
interest for both nations, and agreed to carry on
discussions in this important field.

The leaders had a wide-ranging discussion on

Mexico: Composition of Trade1

(1977)

Exports

Imports

Other 3%

Industrial
Goods

Metals and
Minerals

Agricultural
Goods

Intermediate
Goods

Petroleum

Capital
Goods

Consumer
Goods

1 Central Intelligence Agency data

energy, which included both its bilateral and
global aspects. They agreed that it is not possi-
ble to separate energy resources from economic
development, not only for countries who have
them, but for countries that do not have them,
and because of this, an economic order should
be sensitive to the necessity to provide for the
needs of the poor, and investment should be di-
rected so as to encourage their industrialization.

Taking into consideration Mexico's potential
as an energy producing country. President Lopez
Portillo reiterated that energy resources must be
considered as the patrimony of mankind so that
the production, distribution and consumption of
these resources be made in an orderly and ra-
tional fashion, and so that all alternative sources
of energy be developed including the financing
and transfer of technologies that are accessible
to all developing countries. President Carter ex-
pressed interest in this idea and willingness to
explore these subjects further.

The two Presidents decided to start im-
mediately the design of plans to collaborate in
the field of energy, with a strict observance of
their respective national policies, and to initiate
or expand, whatever might be the case, trade in
hydrocarbon products, electricity and other
energy resources.

Both Presidents agreed to plan a joint
Mexican-U.S. study on the possibilities of ex-
change of electric energy on a rational basis
along with [sic] common border.

With regard to nuclear energy. President Car-
ter noted the need to speed up the export of en-
riched uranium to Mexico to put in operation the
electricity-generating plants that the Mexican
Government is planning.

Both Presidents also agreed to support and
promote scientific and technological cooperation
in the field of energy, including solar and geother-
mal energy. President Carter said that his gov-
ernment would be helpful in cooperating to en-
hance the technological capabilities in Mexico.

The results of these agreements, studies and
talks would be included in the report of the Con-
sultative Mechanism.

With regard to the eventual sale of surpluses
of Mexican natural gas to the United States, the
Presidents discussed the future possibility of
such transactions.

On the part of the United States. President
Carter pledged to develop means for expediting
sales by Petroleos Mexicanos to purchasing
companies.

On the part of Mexico, the government will
re-evaluate the amount of the possible surpluses,
taking into consideration the needs to be gener-
ated with the establishment of the National Gas
Pipeline Network.

On this basis the two Presidents agreed to
have their governmental representatives meet as
soon as possible and begin discussing the best
means to facilitate decisions on these matters.

The two Presidents agreed to examine jointly
the prospects of future sales of crude oil and pe-
troleum products from Mexico to the United
States.

The phenomenon of the Mexican migrant
workers was discussed with the overall context
of social and economic relations between both
countries. The two Presidents committed them-
selves to carry out a close bilateral cooperation
in order to find an integral, realistic and long-
term solution which would respect the dignity
and the human rights of these workers, and
which would also respect the many social, eco-
nomic and development problems that are in-
volved in this matter.

In this context, they agreed that their govern-
ments would continue to consult closely on all
aspects of the migration question, including its
economic and social implications in both coun-
tries, and agreed that the Joint Consultative
Mechanism should meet promptly to share fully
and jointly the results of their respective re-
search and studies on this issue.

President Lopez Portillo reiterated that

62

Department of State Bulletin

Mexico: Petroleum Production'

(1,000 Barrels per day)

1,325

1,200

-

1,000

800

-

600

486

400

1,085

895

806

653

515 525

1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78est.

1 Includes crude, condensate, liquids; Central Intelligence Agency data

Mexico does not wish to export workers but
goods, and also noted that the phenomenon of
migrant workers is part of the employment
problem. whose solution is a priority concern of
the Mexican State in a constitutional category
and which is looked upon in Mexico's develop-
ment programs. He added, however, that it is
necessary to take into consideration that this is a
matter of bilateral nature, of long history, that it
is stimulated by a real demand, and that, in any
event, it deserves respect with regard to its
human aspect and requires a clear and objective
analysis, taking into consideration that restric-
tive measures in other areas slow down the solu-
tion that both countries wish for this problem.

President Carter expressed concern about the
problem of unlawful immigration into the United
States and its impact on the United States. He
took note of the responsibility of the United
States Government to enforce the laws respect-
ing immigration, and the need to bring to justice
those who traffic in undocumented migrants.

The Presidents discussed the status of border
relations, reaffirming their goals to promote an
adequate flow of goods and people, to fight all
kinds of contraband which adversely affect the
economies of both countries, and to strengthen
cooperation between the authorities of both
countries.

They noted with satisfaction the success of
current programs in sharply reducing the traffic
in dangerous drugs and pledged to continue to
strengthen and expand their efforts to suppress
the production and trafficking of illicit narcotics.
President Carter took special note of the effec-
tive record of Mexican authorities in suppressing
the traffic in narcotics. The two Presidents
agreed to explore with neighboring countries the
possibility of multilateral programs assisting
them in strengthening narcotics control arrange-
ments.

Both leaders reaffirmed the importance of

having good quality and abundant water for the
health and well-being of citizens on both sides of
the border. They instructed the International
Boundaries and Waters Commission in the con-
text of the existing agreements to make im-
mediate recommendations for further progress
toward a permanent solution to the sanitation of
waters along the border.

The Presidents agreed to continue their con-
sultations over a wide range of international
political and economic matters, and reaffirmed
their intention to maintain close contact and to
give their personal and continuous attention to
the reinforcement and broadening of the numer-
ous areas of cooperation existing between their
nations.

President Carter suggested that both Presi-
dents meet again in the summer to examine the
report of the Consultative Mechanism and to as-
sess progress on the issues discussed in Mexico
City. President Lopez Portillo gladly accepted
this suggestion.

INTERVIEW WITH
PRESIDENT CARTER,
FEB. 88

Following is the President's
question-and-answer session with Joa-
quin Lopez-Doriga of Channel 13,
Government of Mexico Television.

Q. In a few days you will be visit-
ing Mexico. In view of developments
in Mexico's oil production and the
problem of illegal workers, how do
you see relations between the two
countries?

A. 1 think in the last 2 years, since
I've been in office and since President
Lopez Portillo has been President, the

relations have improved considerably.
For a number of decades, there have
been strains between Mexico and the
United States and a lack of adequate
consultation and the sharing of mutual
problems. I think President Lopez Por-
tillo and I have both recognized that
problem when we became Presidents,
and we've made great strides to relieve
those challenges.

In the field of trade, border prob-
lems, agriculture, fisheries, maritime
problems, exchange of prisoners, the
control of narcotics, the enforcement of
customs laws, the holding down of
smuggling, and in many other hemis-
pheric problems, the control of arms,
the enhancement of peace, the control
of nuclear weapons, we have seen the
admirable leadership of President
Lopez Portillo in working with us to
reach agreement on how we can ap-
proach these problems as partners.

So, I think the situation is improving
rapidly, and I will learn a great deal
and my country will benefit very much
from my coming visit with your people
and your President.

Q. President Lopez Portillo has
said that Mexican oil production is
adjusted to the needs of Mexico. Do
you expect an increase of oil and gas
production to meet the needs of the
United States, or some kind of
agreement on this issue?

A. I expect the rate of exploration
and production of oil and gas in
Mexico to be decided by the Mexican
people only. This is not something that
we should try to influence. This should
be done with very careful attention to
what's best for the Mexican people.

We have been very pleased to see the
prospect of new prosperity and new
growth in job opportunities and a better
quality of life for the people of Mexico
because of the new discoveries of this
valuable energy source. And we want
to be a good customer for the portion of
oil and gas that Mexico decides to sell
to us as a neighbor. But the price must
be fair and the control of production
and distribution must be kept in the
hands of the Mexican people.

So, we want to be good customers
and we feel that your people and the
people of my country will benefit from
these new energy discoveries.

Q. Turning to the problem of il-
legal immigration, what do you see
as a solution to this problem which
our two countries share?

A. First of all, I will have to enforce
the laws of my country. And I've been
very deeply impressed on my visits to
Mexico with the desire of Mexican

March 1979

63

people to live in accordance with the
law.

In some ways, the immigration laws
that we now have in effect have not
been workable, and I have submitted to
the last Congress proposals for change
in those immigration laws. The Con-
gress did not act on my proposals. Be-
fore I decide whether or not to submit
new laws to Congress or what form
they should take, I want to consult very
closely with President Lopez Portillo
and other interested Mexican officials
so that when we do change our law, it
will be one that will be fair and work-
able and will protect the interests and
the basic human rights of even those
who have come to our country in the
past in violation of our immigration
laws.

We want to be fair to all those
who've come here, whether they origi-
nally came within the bounds of the
law or otherwise, and to make sure we
have a law that's simple and workable
and suitable both to the Mexican
people and to the people of my coun-
try.

Q. Every U.S. President since
Franklin Roosevelt, I think, has met
with his Mexican President and
hailed the visit as a breakthrough for
both countries. But after the
speeches are over, very little really
happens. I don't know if you agree
with this. Is your visit merely cere-
monial, or can you promise followup
actions?

A. There will be followup actions.
When President Lopez Portillo was in-
augurated, even before I was President,
my wife went to the ceremonies. When
I was inaugurated. Mrs. Lopez Portillo
came here to be an honored guest.
When I decided who would be my first
foreign visitor after I became Presi-
dent, my choice was President Lopez
Portillo.

And our Vice President has been to
Mexico, and we've had constant con-
sultations at the Cabinet level of our
top ministers. And, as I mentioned
earlier in the interview, we've already
concluded agreements relating to irri-
gation, agriculture, customs, the con-
trol of narcotics, fisheries, maritime
law. We've worked out a treaty on ex-
change of prisoners, and we've laid a
good basis for further achievements
both on my upcoming visit and also for
the future.

The consultations have been very
productive so far. I think they'll be
much more productive in the future.

One of the things that we see is a
rapid improvement in the job opportu-
nities and quality of life of the people

of Mexico and my country because of
increased trade. Mexico is our most
important trade partner in this hemi-
sphere, in Latin America. And our
trade level now is about $10 billion a
year. We export about the same amount
that we import from Mexico. It's an
even and mutual benefit.

These are the kind of things that we
see as great opportunities in the future,
even for more rapid progress. We're
very excited about this.

Q. Would you tell us, please,
which is the main purpose of your
visit to Mexico — oil, gas, illegals, or
all together?

A. All of our relationships with
Mexico are very complex and compli-
cated. There will be an agenda for
which I'm preparing that consists of
literally dozens of different subjects,
and I think they are very closely inter-
related. You can't isolate just one sub-
ject and say this is the most important
thing.

We are very grateful for the
friendship that exists between Mexico
and the United States. I'm also very
grateful and have admiration for your
leaders and your people because
Mexico has in recent years become one
of the most influential countries of the
whole world in stabilizing affairs in
this hemisphere, in providing a com-
mitment that never changes for the
protection of human rights, in promot-
ing democratic principles in all the
governments of the Western Hemi-
sphere, in trying to hold down the
spread of weapons and war, in trying to
prevent nuclear explosives from
spreading throughout the Southern
Hemisphere.

We are very interested also in seeing
the benefits that come to us and the en-
tire world for Mexico's leadership
among the nations that are rapidly de-
veloping, and as a regional leader,
Mexico's good relationships with us
are very valuable to the United States.
And I think in a system of mutual re-
spect and equality, partnership,
friendship, we benefit greatly, as do
the people of your country.

I might add that we now have 20
million American citizens of Mexican
ancestry who live among us. And we
derive great strength from this sharing
of a common background. Our nation
is one of immigrants. And almost
everyone who lives in our country,
with very few exceptions, immigrated
to our nation. We value this strength
and this natural tie of kinship and
friendship very much.

Q. [In Spanish] Thank you, Mr.
President. How is your Spanish?

A. [In Spanish] There is not much
opportunity to practice here in Wash-
ington. It will be a great pleasure for
me to be in Mexico and a great oppor-
tunity to consult with your President. □

"President Lopez Portillo spoke in Spanish,
and his remarks were translated by an interpre-
ter; texts from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of Feb. 19, 1979.

2 Made at the Licenciado Benito Juarez Inter-
national Airport; President Carter delivered his
remarks first in Spanish and then in English.

'Held in the Banquet Room of the Foreign
Ministry Building.

4 President Carter spoke in Spanish, and the
translation of his remarks as prepared for deliv-
ery is printed here.

■ Held at the U.S. Ambassador's residence.

6 President Carter spoke in Spanish, except
where noted, and the translation follows the
White House press release of Feb. 15.

7 President Carter and President Lopez Por-
tillo signed the joint communique during depar-
ture ceremonies at the Benito Juarez Interna-
tional Airport.

* Held in the Map Room at the White House
and taped for later broadcast in Mexico.

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64

Department of State Bulletin

Weir Patterns in
filler- liiierieciii Cooperation

by Viron P. Vaky

Address before the Pan American
Society of the United States in New
York on December 14, 1978. Ambas-
sador Vaky is Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs.

It is customary these days to observe
that the world has changed dramatically
since the end of World War II. But if
trite, that observation is also pro-
foundly true. Explosive advances in
science and technology and profound
changes in international economic be-
havior and political relationships have
all left a world transformed, different
in basic conditions and structures than
those which existed a bare 10 years
ago. It is no exaggeration to say that a
new international era is being born in
front of our eyes. Interactions among
nations are considerably more fluid and
varied than ever before, problems are
considerably more complex and di-
verse, and at the same time the oppor-
tunities facing mankind are consid-
erably greater and more challenging.

Against that setting, what I would
like to do today is to discuss briefly
some of the problems and opportunities
that abound in inter- American affairs.
In particular, I would like to suggest
that relations have changed in ways
that call for new kinds of leadership
and cooperation.

The Conflictive Relationship

The United States is by far the most
powerful and richest single nation in
the hemisphere. This fundamental fact
inevitably conditions and shapes
inter-American relations. And it has
given rise to two consistent strategies
in Latin America's approach to us
throughout modern history:

• To constrain what they see as our
interventionist tendencies; and, at the
same time

• To harness our power in behalf of
their own development.

Given the disparities in leverage,
Latin Americans have consistently used
international fora and juridical obliga-
tions to secure constraints and com-
mitments.

In the early part of this century.
Latin American fears centered on direct
U.S. military intervention. And their
strategy resulted in the de jure accept-
ance by the United States in the 1930's

and the 1940's of the legal principle of
nonintervention.

Today the use of U.S. military
power to intervene in the internal af-
fairs of another American republic is
unthinkable, and Latin American con-
cerns focus primarily on the uses of our
economic power.

This concern parallels and reflects
longstanding differences in concepts of
sovereignty. To caricaturize somewhat:
In the Latin view, actions by a state,
for example, to control business within
its borders or to define its maritime
limits are acts of sovereignty. Con-
versely, trade and aid benefits are in-
ternational obligations. The U.S. view
is almost the reverse: The rights of a
state to control business enterprises
within its borders or to define its sea-
ward limits are contingent upon inter-
national obligations; trade and aid
benefits are acts of sovereignty.

In the face of Latin American insist-
ence on the uncontingent nature of
sovereignty on such questions as
foreign investment, the United States
has resorted in the past to denial of as-
sistance or other economic benefits as a
means of obtaining a hearing for U.S.
rights. The Hickenlooper and Gonzalez
amendments, and more recently some
Trade Act provisions, are in this tradi-
tion.

In Latin America, such actions are
viewed as a form of coercion or inter-
vention. Resorting to their strategy of
attempting to constrain our power
juridically, they have sought to codify
relations to limit the use of economic
power to achieve political or economic
ends. And so we have had Latin
American-sponsored moves, for exam-
ple, to amend the Rio Treaty to include
articles on collective economic secu-
rity, i.e., legally binding agreements
proscribing acts of economic coercion.

Latin Americans also feel vulnerable
to the uncertainties of U.S. aid and
trade policies. Congressional appro-
priations go up and down, new trade
barriers are adopted, or economic pol-
icy decisions appear to be taken with-
out regard to their impact on Latin
America.

Again the Latin American response
has had a strong juridical component:
To seek to make cooperation on eco-
nomic matters legally obligatory rather
than discretionary. This was the thrust
of the consensus of Vina del Mar and
then of the Mexican-sponsored Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties. Today,
it is at the heart of the North-South de-

bate and the push for a new interna-
tional economic order.

Differences in power, of course,
exist in perceptions as well as in fact.
This psychological or perceptual di-
mension often passes unnoticed. Being
human, we are egocentric, and it is
very easy for us to believe that the facts
and circumstances we must take into
account in Washington or New York
constitute the "universe" within which
all actors must act and the objective re-
ality which, surely, everyone else must
see and understand as we do.

The truth, of course, is much differ-
ent. Something marginally important to
Washington may also be — and often
is — crucial to a given Latin American
country. Moreover, what seems mutu-
ally advantageous from Washington's
perspective may seem exploitative
when considered from a Latin Ameri-
can perspective. What seems to the rich
consumer nation, for example, a
"fair" price for a particular resource
may seem genuinely paltry to a country
with few other resources.

Differences in power, the history of
previous bargaining, the lingering fear
that onerous terms may be imposed,
and the perception of continuing power
disparities can even hinder efforts to
obtain an "objectively" fair result
through bargaining. Sometimes the op-
posite of what we intend happens: In-
stead of a sense of consultation and the
building of a common structure, we
convey the appearance of a large power
imposing its will and telling others
what to do.

Misunderstandings of this kind are
particularly likely when U.S. Govern-
ment decisions which importantly af-
fect Latin America are not taken as
Latin American policy decisions.
Examples are plentiful: the 1971 import
surcharge; the Trade Act of 1974; and
more recently policies regarding sugar,
tin, and other commodities. Some of
these are domestic policy decisions,
taken with little reference to their in-
ternational effects. Others are recog-
nized as foreign policy decisions but
are made independently of Latin
American policy. In such instances, the
ramifications for Latin America are
either not perceived or are considered
less important than a particular domes-
tic aim, or the desire for consistent
global policies.

There is another psychological
thread in all this that is worth noting,
and that is what Abe Lowenthal has
called the "hegemonic presumption,"
i.e., the assumption by all sides that
the United States has a special respon-
sibility for what happens in Latin
America and even a capacity to affect
or resolve things which are not ascribed
to us with regard to other areas. This

March 1979

"presumption of hegemony" exists not
only in Latin America but in the United
States where the reflex is still to blame
the Department of State for what does
or doesn't happen.

Thus, while no one advocates pater-
nalism anymore, the presumption of
U.S. hegemony lives on in Latin
American sensitivity to U.S. "inter-
vention," in the acceptance in some
circles of United States "guilt" for
Latin American conditions, and in the
assumption that only the United States
ultimately has the power to control
events.

What this all adds up to is that
hemispheric affairs are conditioned by
fundamental differences in perceptions
of reality, in notions of what is just or
proper, and in the conceptions of our
relationships — differences that at their
core reflect the persisting asymmetry of
power that has historically charac-
terized relations in this hemisphere.

New Complexities

The tensions I have just described
are not the full story. Differences in
power and perspective compete with
equally fundamental Latin American
desires to harmonize their growth with
our power, and both strands are held
together by the affinities born of a long
historic interaction that has created its
own ties of influence and custom.

Thus our relations are conflictive but
also civilized. Differences, once under-
stood, can be accommodated. Indeed,
now that Latin America's growth and
changes in U.S. values make the pre-
sumption of U.S. domination less cred-
ible than in the past, the nature of our
policy problems is somewhat easier.
Instead of asking ourselves to resolve
all problems throughout the hemi-
sphere, our dilemmas center funda-
mentally on how to handle a series of
intimate and often conflictive relation-
ships in ways that can accommodate
divergent interests.

The dilemmas, however, are still
acute. The new problems we face re-
quire new kinds of leadership. And de-
spite the many changes that have taken
place, our relative power and wealth
still impose major obligations on the
United States.

Economic development has become
a paramount national objective
throughout Latin America. Despite
major differences among and even
within countries, the drive toward
modernity has achieved extraordinary
success. Brazil now exports Volkswag-
ens to Germany and Mercedes buses
and trucks to the United States. Mexi-
can border industries assemble ad-
vanced "state-of-the-art" electronics
competitive with those produced any-
where in the world. More traditional

sectors have also expanded —
Venezuela remains a strong and steady
energy supplier; Brazil is now the sec-
ond agricultural exporter in the world.

This increasing integration of Latin
America into the world market has
brought many advantages to us as well.
For example, we sell as much machin-
ery, consumer goods, and chemicals to
Latin America as to the entire Euro-
pean Economic Community and more
than to Japan.

The drive for development, however,
has brought problems as well as op-
portunities. The region's capacity to
grow, to transform itself, and to man-
age the transition into industrialization
means that most of Latin America is
pulling out of the underdevelopment
we typically associate with the Third
World. As a result, Latin America is
becoming increasingly relevant, not
merely to the search for a general
global order but to our domestic lives
as well.

Industrialization is a key sign of
progress, but Latin America's growing
capacity to export manufactures some-
times competes directly with U.S. pro-
ducers. Increased communications and
technological capacity project the re-
gion's countries into the core problems
of the modern world — from nuclear
energy to environmental protection —
and also facilitate the emigration of
those who do not share in the benefits
of growth. This migration already
profoundly affects many U.S. com-
munities and shows few signs of abat-
ing.

Policymaking in this environment
calls for more than the arts of tradi-
tional diplomacy. In ever increasing
ways, the experience of the past decade
calls for the integration of domestic as
well as foreign policy considerations in
decisionmaking.

The increasing number of points at
which a growing Latin America comes
into contact with our economy have
made economic relations the predomi-
nant issue in the hemisphere. Trade,
capital flows, transfer of technology,
employment, migration — these are the
new agenda items we must face. And
the basic need — a dramatic mutual re-
duction of tariff and nontariff barriers
to trade that would maximize compara-
tive advantage and produce large ab-
solute gains for all countries — can be
met only through decisions tradi-
tionally viewed in primarily domestic
terms.

The substance of inter-American re-
lations thus now involves a multiplicity
of nongovernmental entities and proc-
esses as well as government decisions
or actions. As Abe Lowenthal has
pointed out, it is, in a sense, easier to
manage U.S. relations with China or

65

Russia than with Chile or Peru. Rela-
tions with our neighbors involve a
much greater variety of interests and
forces; many Americans, from busi-
nessmen to Congressmen to academics,
still believe the United States has the
leverage to bring about desired results
without significant compromises.

The Example of Mexico

Nowhere is the need to think through
the range of competing interests greater
than in the case of Mexico. Indeed,
relations with Mexico epitomize the in-
creasing complexity of inter-American
affairs — and the growing stakes we
have in our neighbors' development.

The United States and Mexico have a
common and permeable 2,000-mile
border that inevitably makes us inter-
dependent whether we like it or not.
Federal, State, and local agencies in
both countries deal with each other on
a daily basis to grapple with this
growing interrelationship.

Mexico's expanding population is
already larger than that of any of our
European allies. But despite truly im-
pressive achievements — Mexico is our
fifth largest trading partner — Mexico's
development remains uneven, and mil-
lions of Mexican citizens have sought
work in the United States.

Recent oil and gas discoveries mean
that by the mid- 1 980 's Mexico will be
able to export important quantities of
oil to the United States and to the
world. Perhaps more importantly, the
revenues so earned from its own re-
sources and work will, in the words of
President Lopez Portillo, enable
Mexico to "escape the vicious circle of
underdevelopment. . . and enter the
next century as a full employment soci-
ety."

U.S. exporters will obviously benefit
enormously from the expansion of
Mexico's internal market. Just as ob-
viously, Mexico's growing agricultural
and industrial capacity will lead to in-
creased exports to the United States.
The nature of the benefits, however,
will depend significantly on trade
policies on both sides. It will be dif-
ficult to convince Mexico to liberalize
its import regime if we continue to re-
strict products of major interest to
Mexico — labor-intensive agricultural
products and medium technology man-
ufactures. Yet trade liberalization in
these particular areas is also the most
likely to arouse protectionist sentiment
in this country.

Just as it is in the hemisphere gener-
ally, the extent and modalities by
which each country would be willing to
commit itself to trade liberalization is
thus a key issue in U.S. -Mexican rela-
tions.

66

The Administration has been exam-
ining the many competing interests that
make up the totality of our relations with
Mexico. An interagency process has
led to a number of recommendations on
how to approach the growing interde-
pendence of the two societies. Presi-
dent Carter will discuss many of them
with President Lopez Portillo when he
visits Mexico in February.

Even if the two Governments reach
agreement on a basic framework, how-
ever, the management of conflictive
interests — perhaps more often within
each country than between them — will
continue to test our wisdom and our
capacities for years to come.

Emerging Patterns

Our vital relations with Mexico are
but one part of the changing hemi-
spheric scene.

Senate consent to the Panama Canal
treaties last spring was a truly historic
step. Representatives of both countries
are now hard at work arranging a
smooth transition. Our immediate task
is to insure that implementing legisla-
tion is available well before the treaties
enter into effect next October.

The treaties are good for busi-
nessmen and shippers of all
nationalities who wish to see their
goods and vessels move safely and ef-
ficiently through this key waterway.
They are also an all-too-rare example
of shared leadership between two very
different countries for the common
good.

Another novel form of cooperation
began this fall when we joined with the
Dominican Republic and Guatemala to
offer a multilateral mediating effort to
help Nicaraguans peacefully reach a
national consensus on their own future.
In the past, similar situations invited
unilateral impositions or intervention.

An enduring and democratic solution
in Nicaragua is vital to the entire hemi-
sphere. President Somoza and his
largely business and democratic op-
position have both made concessions.
Although all details and arrangements
remain to be worked out, both have
conditionally accepted a plebiscite to
determine Nicaragua's political future.
Assuring an open and fair choice will
require responsible leadership in
Nicaragua and the full commitment of
all its friends.

The Caribbean is also a priority
area — one some are beginning to call
our "third border" because the number
of interests and their complexity re-
semble in microcosm those we have
with Mexico and Canada.

The Caribbean's problems under-
score the continuing precariousness of
development even in so called middle

income countries and raise troubling
questions about the increasing difficul-
ties we have in helping to meet the
sometimes critical short-range eco-
nomic problems of countries whose
cooperation we need to advance a wide
range of U.S. interests.

Because coffee, cocoa, and sugar
prices were then also moving to record
highs, the dire predictions of the con-
sequences of the sharp petroleum price
increases of 1973 and 1974 were pre-
mature for most Caribbean countries.
Today these favorable conditions are
coming to an end. Sugar prices re-
turned to low, historic levels well over
a year ago. Coffee and cocoa prices are
also dropping.

The resulting balance-of-payments
constraints have sharply curtailed
growth and are contributing to political
unrest and emigration. Jamaica and the
Dominican Republic confront aspects
of this new situation now. The coffee-
dependent countries of Central America
may be next in line.

We are supporting wide-ranging pro-
grams of integration and cooperation
through the World Bank and other in-
ternational financial institutions. But
our resources are limited. A great deal
will depend on what our neighbors will
be able to achieve without massive ex-
ternal assistance.

Turning to South America, its nations
are major actors on many of the global
aims of the Carter Administration — the
promotion of human rights and arms
restraint and the development of a
stronger world trading system.

Because political freedom is inhib-
ited by socioeconomic inequities and
requires strong political institutions and
values, it is sometimes argued that au-
thoritarian rule is inevitable in Latin
America.

I would counter that the many recent
elections and other decisions to support
an evolution toward more open
societies are proof that such pessimism
is unwarranted. Throughout the region,
national choices and priorities are in-
creasingly being debated openly and
brought into the political process. Nor
should we forget that some Latin
American countries are among the
world's foremost democracies. How
many countries can boast, like Ven-
ezuela, of three successive elections,
each of which returned power to the
opposition?

Progress is also being made on basic
human rights. In some countries,
political prisoners have been released.
Others have lifted states of siege and
censorship or restored due process.

We know that torture continues in
some countries, that political prisoners
are still sometimes held without
charges, and that others disappear in

Department of State Bulletin

the night. We know that virtually every
right consecrated by the American
Convention on Human Rights is vio-
lated in one nation or another, includ-
ing our own.

But we also know our position is
clear: We are determined to work for
an end to violations. The American
people expect no less. And we believe
our efforts are welcomed by the
peoples of the hemisphere as a form of
leadership in harmony with our com-
mon aspirations as nations that have
long been at the frontiers of Western
civilization.

Finally, Latin America's peaceful
traditions and leadership have contrib-
uted to Mexico's now well-advanced
initiative to create the world's first nu-
clear weapon free zone in the treaty of
Tlatelolco. At the U.N. Special Session
on Disarmament last June, Latin
American countries successfully
worked to include in its Program of
Action a call for regional consultations
on conventional arms control. In Au-
gust, 20 Latin American countries met
in Mexico City to consider steps to
limit arms purchases.

The United States strongly supports
these Latin American initiatives. Presi-
dent Carter signed Protocol I of the
treaty of Tlatelolco last year, and we
hope for favorable Senate action early
in 1979. We are engaged in talks with
other conventional arms suppliers on
ways to work with recipients to reduce
the global arms trade.

But we are also keenly aware that the
ultimate responsibility for controlling
the disputes which feed arms purchases
rests with the countries directly in-
volved. It would be a tragedy, for
example, if Argentina and Chile were
to allow differences over the Beagle
Channel to overwhelm their deeper
common interests.

The Future

In sum, Latin American and Carib-
bean growth, shifts in U.S. national
objectives, and changing political and
economic conditions are transforming
inter-American affairs and making
them more relevant to our domestic
lives. The nations of the region are in-
creasingly modern, asssertive, and
different one from another. Some are
becoming "middle powers," exercis-
ing major influence on Law of the Sea,
uses of nuclear energy, and prospects
for arms restraint.

What lies ahead? As I see it our first
priority must be to focus creatively on
trade and the other problems of eco-
nomic growth. To face this fundamen-
tal agenda, I would suggest we need:

• Jointly to find ways to keep mar-

March 1979

67

kets open and expanding so as to
promote trade, steady growth, and eco-
nomic and technological moderniza-
tion;

• To develop an ability to use lim-
ited, but important, amounts of bilat-
eral aid to help overcome balance-of-
payments problems and facilitate
moves toward democracy;

• To work out, in cooperation with
the international financial institutions,
strategies for access of the smaller and
the middle income Latin American na-
tions to needed capital; and

• To find additional ways to com-
municate with Latin American leaders
and peoples in ways that will demon-
strate concretely our interest in their
priorities and concerns in this increas-
ingly interknit world.

This will be no easy task. The
asymmetry of power and differences of
perception will be with us for a long
time. Scars of the past remain but our
practical problems give us common
ground. I am convinced that the future
can hold bright prospects for inter-
American relations but that this will
depend on our accepting the common-
ality of our problems if not always our
interests — and on how we act to meet
them together. □

TREATIES:

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

International plant protection convention. Done
at Rome Dec. 6. 1951. Entered into force
Apr. 3, 1952; for U.S. Aug. 18, 1972. TIAS
7465.

Adherence deposited: Solomon Islands, Oct.
18. 1978.

Antarctica

The Antarctic treaty. Signed at Washington
Dec. I, 1959. Entered into force June 23,
1961. TIAS 4780.
Accession deposited: Federal Republic of

Germany, Feb. 5, 1979. '
Recommendations relating to furtherance of the
principles and objectives of the Antarctic
treaty. Adopted at Oslo June 20, 1975, at the
eighth consultative meeting.
Entered into force: Recommendations VIII

6-8 and 10-14, Dec. 16, 1978. 2
Notification of approval: Japan, Dec. 16.

1978. for all recommendations except

VIII-1, 2, 5. and 9.'

Aviation

International air services transit agreement.
Signed at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into
force Feb. 8. 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.
Acceptance deposited: Bangladesh, Feb. 9,
1979.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful sei-

zure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 16.
1970. Entered into force Oct' 14, 1971.
TIAS 7192.
Accession deposited: Sudan, Jan. 18, 1979.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at
Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force
Jan 26. 1973. TIAS 7570.
Accession deposited: Sudan, Jan. 18, 1979.

Montreal protocol no. 4 to amend the conven-
tion for the unification of certain rules relat-
ing to international carriage by air signed at
Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929. (49 Stat. 3000) as
amended by the protocol done at The Hague
on Sept. 28, 1955. Done at Montreal Sept.
25, 1975.4
Signatures: Finland, May 2, 1978; Italy,

May 15. 1978.
Ratification deposited: Egypt, Nov. 17, 1978.

Additional protocol no. 3 to amend the con-
vention for the unification of certain rules
relating to international carriage by air
signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12. 1929". (49 Stat.
3000) as amended by the protocols done at
The Hague on Sept. 28. 1955. and at
Guatemala City on Mar. 8, 1971. Done at
Montreal Sept. 25. 1975. 4
Signatures: Finland, May 2, 1978; Italy,
May 15, 1978.

Containers

International convention for safe containers
(CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva Dec.
2, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1977; for
the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037
Ratification deposited: Republic of Korea.
Dec. 18, 1978.

Environmental Modification

Convention on the prohibition of military or
any other hostile use of environmental mod-
ification techniques, with annex. Done at
Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force
Oct. 5, 1978. 5
Ratification deposited: India, Dec. 15, 1978.

Finance

Agreement establishing the International Fund
for Agricultural Development. Done at Rome
June 13, 1976. Entered into force Nov. 30,
1977. TIAS 8765.

Accessions deposited: Central African Em-
pire. Dec. 11, 1978; Mauritius. Jan. 29.
1979; Yemen Arab Republic, Feb. 6.
1979.
Ratification deposited: Syria. Nov. 29.
1978.

Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment
of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris Dec.
9. 1948. Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951. 5
Accession deposited: Gambia, Dec. 29,

1978.
Ratification deposited: New Zealand, Dec.
28, 1978.

Human Rights

International covenant on civil and political
rights. Done at New York Dec. 16. 1966.
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. 5
Accession deposited: Trinidad and Tobago,

Dec. 21, 1978.
Ratification deposited: New Zealand. Dec.
28, 1978.
International covenant on economic, social,
and cultural rights. Done at New York Dec.
16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. 5
Accession deposited: Gambia. Dec. 29,
1978.

Ratification deposited: New Zealand. Dec.
28. 1978.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the service abroad of judicial
and extra judicial documents in civil or
commercial matters. Done at The Hague
Nov. 15. 1965. Entered into force Feb 10.
1969. TIAS 6638.
Signature: Italy. Jan. 25. 1979.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva
Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force Mar. 17.
1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptances deposited: Gambia. Jan. 11,
1979; Mozambique, Jan. 17, 1979; Nepal.
Jan. 31, 1979.

Inter-American convention on facilitation of
international waterborne transportation, with
annex. Signed at Mar del Plata June 7,
I963.4
Ratification deposited: Peru. Jan. 15. 1979. 6

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6.
1948. as amended, on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044. 6285, 6490). Done at London Nov.
14. 1975.'

Acceptances deposited: Ethiopia, Feb. 2,
1979; Gambia, Jan. 11, 1979; Kuwait,
Dec. 28, 1978; Nepal. Jan. 31, 1979.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948. as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285. 6490.
8606), on the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization. Adopted at Lon-
don Nov. 17, 1977. 4

Acceptances deposited: Denmark. Jan. 2,
1979; Gambia. Jan. 11, 1979; India. Jan.
22, 1979; Nepal, Jan. 31. 1979; Sweden.
Jan. 5. 1979.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done
at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force
Aug. 16, 1976. 5

Ratifications deposited: Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic, Nov. 20, 1978;7
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.
Dec. 15. 1978. 7

Oil Pollution

International convention relating to interven-
tion on the high seas in cases of oil pollution
casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels
Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6,
1975. TIAS 8068.

Accession deposited: German Democratic
Republic. Dec. 21. 1978. 8

International convention on civil liability for
oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels Nov.
29. 1969. Entered into force June 19. 1975. 5
Accession deposited: Republic of Korea,
Dec. 18, 1978.

Patents

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations.
Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered
into force Jan. 24, 1978. except for chapter
II. Chapter II entered into force Mar. 29,
1978. 5 TIAS 8733.

Ratification deposited: Austria, Jan. 23.
1979.

Pollution

Convention on the prevention of marine pollu-
tion by dumping of wastes and other matter,
with annexes Done at London, Mexico City,
Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29, 1972.
Entered into force Aug. 30, 1975. TIAS
8165.
Accession deposited: Poland, Jan. 23, 1979.

68

Properly, Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual
Property Organization. Done at Stockholm
July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26,
1970; lor the U.S. Aug. 25. 1970. TIAS
69.12

Accession deposited: Yemen Arab Republic.
Dec. 29. 1978.

Publications, Registration

Statutes of the international center for the reg-
istration ol serial publications. Done at Paris
Nov. 14. 1974. and amended Oct. 1 1 and 12.
1976. Entered into force Jan. 21. 1976; for
the U.S. Mar. 31. 1978."
Accessions deposited: Switzerland, Aug. 15.
1978; Norway. Nov. 29, 1978.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of
all forms of racial discrimination. Done at
New York Dec. 21. 1965. Entered into force
Jan 4. 1969. 5

Accession deposited: Gambia. Feb. 29. 1978.
Ratifications deposited: Israel, Jan. 3. 1979;
Korea, Dec. 5. 1978.

Safety at Sea

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international
convention for the safety of life at sea. 1974
Done at London Feb. 17. 1978. *
Signature: Liberia. Oct. 24. 1978."'

Sugar

International sugar agreement. 1977. with an-
nexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7. 1977. Entered
into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978.
Accession deposited: Iraq. Dec. 31, 1978.
Ratifications deposited: Egypt, Jan. 25,

1979; Finland, Dec. 29. 1979; Guatemala.

Dec. 30. 1978; Haiti. Dec. 11. 1978;

Mexico. Jan. 11. 1979; Norway. Dec. 28,

1978.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention
with annexes and protocol. Done at
Malaga-Torremolinos Oct. 25, 1973. Entered
into force Jan. 1 . 1975; for the U.S. Apr. 7.
1976. TIAS 8572.

Ratification deposited: Zambia, Nov. 17,
1978.

Tin

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes.
Done at Geneva June 21. 1975. Entered into
force provisionally July I. 1976. definitively
June 14. 1977. TIAS 8607.
Approval deposited: European Economic

Community. Dec. 22. 1978,
Accessions deposited: Norway, Dec. 28,
1978; Turkey. Dec. 29. 1978.

War

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions
of Aug. 12, 1949. and relating to the protec-
tion ot victims of international armed con-
flicts (protocol I), with annexes. Done at
Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force
Dec. 7. 1978. 5

Signatures: Australia, Dec. 7, 1978;* Bul-
garia, Dec. 11. 1978; Czechoslovakia.
Dec. 6, 1978; Korea, Dec. 7, 1978; New
Zealand, Nov. 27, 1978; Spain. Nov. 7,
1978;8 Togo, Dec. 12, 1977.
Ratification deposited: El Salvador. Nov.
23. 1978.
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions
of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the protec-
tion of victims of noninternational armed
conflicts (protocol II). Done at Geneva June
8. 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978. 5

Signatures: Australia. Dec. 7. 1978;" Bul-
garia. Dec. II. 1978; Czechoslovakia.
Dec. 6, 1978; Korea. Dec. 7, 1978; New
Zealand. Nov. 27, 1978; Spain. Nov. 7,
1978;" Togo. Dec. 12. 1977.

Ratification deposited: El Salvador, Nov.
23. 1978.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the
wheat trade convention (part of the interna-
tional wheat agreement). 1971 (TIAS 7144).
Done at Washington Apr. 26. 1978. Entered
into force June 24, 1978, with respect to
certain provisions. July 1, 1978. with respect
to other provisions.

Ratifications deposited: Austria. Jan. 29.
1979: Switzerland. Feb. 6. 1979.

Protocol modifying and further extending the
food aid convention (part of the international
wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done
at Washington Apr. 26. 1978. Entered into
force June 24. 1978. with respect to certain
provisions. July 1. 1978. with respect to
other provisions.

Ratification deposited: Switzerland, Feb. 6,
1979.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Memorandum of understanding regarding cer-
tain maritime matters. Signed at Buenos
Aires Mar. 31. 1978.
Entered into force: Jan. 30. 1979.

Belgium

Agreement amending the agreement of Apr. 5.
1946. as amended"(T!AS 1515, 8923). relat-
ing to air transport services. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Brussels Dec. 12 and 14,
1978. Entered into force Dec. 14. 1978.

Brazil

Agreement concerning atmospheric research
sounding rockets and balloon cooperation.
Effected by exchange of notes at Brasilia
Nov. 14, 1978, andean. 24. 1979. Entered
into force Jan. 24. 1979.

Canada

U.S. -Canada Haines-Fairbanks pipeline agree-
ment, as amended (TIAS 2875. 4631. 5039).
Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa June
30. 1953. Entered into force June 30. 1953.
Notification of termination: Canada. Jan. 12,
1979; effective Jan. 12. 1980.

Agreement concerning the establishment,
maintenance, and operation of four OMEGA
navigation system monitoring stations in
Canada. Effected by exchange of notes at
Ottawa July 26 and Dec. 20. 1978. Entered
into force Dec. 20, 1978.

Agreement amending the agreement of Feb. 26,
1973, (TIAS 7837) for promotion of safety
on the Great Lakes by means of radio. 1973.
Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa
Dec. 29, 1978. Entered into force Dec. 29.
1978; effective Feb. 1. 1979.

China (People's Republic of)

Implementing accord on cooperation in the
field of high energy physics. Signed at
Washington Jan. 31, 1979. Entered into
force Jan. 31, 1979.

Agreement on the mutual establishment of con-
sular relations and the opening of consulates
general, with annex. Signed at Washington
Jan. 31, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 31,
1979.

Department of State Bulletin

Cultural agreement. Signed at Washington Jan.
31. 1979. Entered into force Jan. 31, 1979.

Agreement on cooperation in science and tech-
nology, with exchange of letters. Signed at
Washington Jan. 31. 1979. Entered into
force Jan. 31. 1979.

China (Taiwan)

International express mail agreement, with de-
tailed regulations. Signed at Taipei and
Washington Sept. 11 and Nov. 10. 1978.
Entered into force Dec. 30. 1978.
Agreement amending the agreement of June 8,
1978, as amended, relating to trade in cot-
ton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and
textile products. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington Dec. 28. 1978. Entered
into force Dec. 28, 1978.
Agreement on trade matters, with annexes.
Effected by exchange of letters at Washing-
ton Dec. 29, 1978. Entered into force Dec.
29. 1978.

Colombia

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 3.
1978. relating to trade in cotton, wool, and
manmade fiber textiles and textile products.
Effected by exchange of notes at Bogota
Nov. 29 and Dec. 21. 1978. Entered into
force Dec. 21, 1978.

Egypt

Agreement concerning the exhibition in the
United States of "Africa in Antiquity: The
Art of Ancient Nubia and the Sudan." Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Cairo Aug. 26
and 31 and Dec. 19. 1978. Entered into force
Dec. 19. 1978; effective Aug. 31, 1978.

Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement extending the agreement of Sept.
24, 1976. (TIAS 8373) concerning mutual
assistance in the administration of justice in
connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
matter to include the McDonnell Douglas
Corp. and its subsidiaries and affiliates. Ef-
fected by exchange of letters at Bonn and
Washington Jan. 10 and Feb. 1. 1979. En-
tered into force Feb. 1. 1979.

Haiti

Agreement amending and extending the agree-
ment of Mar. 22 and 23, 1976. as amended
(TIAS 8268, 8395. 8643, 9084). relating to
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber
textiles and textile products. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Port-au-Prince Dec. 28
and 29. 1978. Entered into force Dec. 29.
1978.

Hungary

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on income, with exchange of
notes. Signed at Washington Feb. 12, 1979.
Enters into force as soon as the parties have
notified one another that their respective
constitutional requirements have been met.

Iran

Agreement extending the agreement of Oct. 6,
1947. as amended and extended (TIAS
1666), relating to a military mission. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Tehran Sept.
10. 1978, and Jan. 3. 1979. Entered into
force Jan. 3, 1979; effective Mar. 21. 1979.

Israel

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of Dec.
16, 1974 (TIAS 7978). Signed at Washington

March 1979

69

Jan. 16. 1979. Entered into force Jan. 16,
1979.

Japan

Agreement extending the agreement of Mar.
23, 1976. (T1AS 8233) on procedures for
mutual assistance in the administration of
justice in connection with the Lockheed Air-
craft Corp. matter to the McDonnell Douglas
Corp. and Grumman Corp. and their sub-
sidiaries and affiliates. Effected by exchange
of letters at Tokyo and Washington Jan. 20
and 22, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 22,
1979.

Jordan

Grant agreement for budgetary assistance.
Signed at Amman Dec. 10, 1978. Entered
into force Dec. 10, 1978.

Agreement amending the nonscheduled air
service agreement of Sept. 21, 1974, as
amended (TIAS 7954, 8553). and amending
and extending the exchange of notes of Mar.
14 and 16. 1977. establishing scheduled air
services (TIAS 8553). Effected by exchange
of notes at Washington Jan 10, 1979. En-
tered into force Jan. 10. 1979.

Korea

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec.
23, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9039), relating
to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber
textiles and textile products. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Washington Dec. 28,
1978. Entered into force Dec. 28, 1978.

Kuwait

Agreement on procedures for mutual assistance
in connection with matters relating to the
Boeing Co. Signed at Washington Oct. 6,
1978. Entered into force Oct. 6, 1978.

Agreement extending the agreement of Oct. 6.
1978, on procedures for mutual assistance in
connection with matters relating to the Boe-
ing Co. to the McDonnell Douglas Corp.
Effected by exchange of letters at Washing-
ton Dec. 21 . 1978. and Jan. 2. 1979. Entered
into force Jan. 15. 1979.

Macao

Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 3.
1975, as amended and extended (TIAS 8027,
8672). relating to trade in cotton, wool, and
manmade fiber textiles and textile products,
with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes
at Hong Kong and Macao Aug. 10 and Oct.
26, 1978. Entered into force Oct. 26, 1978;
effective Jan. 1. 1978.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of May 15,
1978, relating to additional cooperative ar-
rangements to curb the illegal production and
traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of
letters at Mexico Jan. 5. 1979. Entered into
force Jan. 5. 1979.

Agreement amending the agreement of May 16.
1978. relating to additional cooperative ar-
rangements to curb the illegal traffic in nar-
cotics. Effected by exchange of letters at
Mexico Jan. 8, 1979. Entered into force Jan.

8, 1979.

Agreement amending the agreement of May 24,
1978, relating to additional cooperative ar-
rangements to curb the illegal traffic in nar-
cotics. Effected by exchange of letters at
Mexico Jan. 9, 1979. Entered into force Jan.

9. 1979.

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug.
25, 1978, relating to computerization of in-
formation in support of programs against il-

legal narcotics production and traffic. Ef-
fected by exchange of letters at Mexico Jan.
10. 1979. Entered into force Jan. 10. 1979.

Agreement amending the agreement of May 23,
1978, as amended, relating to additional co-
operative arrangements to curb the illegal
traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of
letters at Mexico Jan. 11, 1979. Entered into
force Jan. 11, 1979.

Agreement amending the agreement of May 22,
1978, as amended, relating to additional co-
operative arrangements to curb the illegal
traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of
letters at Mexico Jan. 1 1 . 1979. Entered into
force Jan. II. 1979.

Agreement amending the agreement of May 22,

1978. as amended, concerning the illicit crop
detection system to be used in curbing the
illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by an
exchange of letters at Mexico Jan. 12, 1979.
Entered into force Jan. 12, 1979.

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat
imports from Mexico during calendar year

1979. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Jan. 11 and 15. 1979. Entered
into force Jan. 15. 1979.

Nepal

Agreement on procedures for mutual assistance
in connection with matters relating to the
Boeing Co. Signed at Washington Jan. 5.
1979. Entered into force Jan. 5. 1979.

Pakistan

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of Nov.
23, 1974. (TIAS 7971) with minutes. Signed
at Islamabad Jan. 24. 1979. Entered into
force Jan. 24, 1979.

Panama

Agreement concerning air traffic control and
related services, with annexes. Signed at
Panama Jan. 8. 1979. Enters into force on
the same date that the Panama Canal Treaty
of 1977 and the Treaty Concerning the Per-
manent Neutrality and Operation of the
Panama Canal enter into force, or on the date
on which Panama notifies the United States
that its constitutional processes have been
fulfilled, whichever is later.

Treaty on the execution of penal sentences.
Signed at Panama Jan. 11. 1979. Enters into
force on the date of exchange of instruments
of ratification.

Agreement relative to the use of plots of land
located in the Republic of Panama for main-
taining a permanent cemetery, with annexes.
Signed at Panama Jan. 11, 1979. Enters into
force on the same date that the Panama Canal
Treaty of 1977 and the Treaty Concerning the
Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the
Panama Canal enter into force, or on the date
on which Panama notifies the United States
that its constitutional requirements have been
fulfilled, whichever is later.

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat
imports from Panama during calendar year
1979. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Jan. 11 and 17, 1979. Entered
into force Jan. 17. 1979.

Philippines

Agreement amending the agreement of Mar.
14. 1947, as amended (TIAS 1775), con-
cerning military bases, with implementing
arrangements, exchanges of notes, and re-
lated letters. Effected by exchange of notes
at Manila Jan. 7, 1979. Entered into force
Jan. 7, 1979.

Saudi Arabia

Agreement extending the agreement of May 24
and June 5, 1965, as extended (TIAS 5830,
7687), relating to the construction of certain
military facilities in Saudi Arabia. Effected
by exchange of notes at Jidda Apr. 30. July
3. and Aug. 7. 1978. Entered into force Aug.
7. 1978; effective May 24, 1978.

Singapore

International express mail agreement, with de-
tailed regulations. Signed at Singapore and
Washington Jan. 5 and 10, 1979. Entered
into force Feb. 9. 1979; effective Jan. 1.
1979.

Somalia

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of Mar. 20, 1978.
Effected by exchange of letters at Mogadis-
cio July 18 and Aug. 10. 1978. Entered into
force Aug. 10. 1978.

Spain

Procedural annex XI on petroleum products
pipeline to agreement of Sept. 25. 1970. in
implementation of agreement of Aug. 6.
1970. Signed at Madrid Dec. 18, 1970. En-
tered into force Dec. 18, 1970, effective
Sept. 26. 1970. TIAS 6977.
Terminated: Dec. 19, 1978.

Procedural annex XII utilization of petroleum
products and facilities to the agreement of
Sept. 25, 1970, in implementation of the
agreement of Aug. 6. 1970. Signed at Ma-
drid Dec. 18. 1970. Entered into force Dec.
18. 1970, operative Sept. 26. 1970. TIAS
6977.
Terminated: Dec. 19. 1978.

Syria

Agreement amending the air transport agree-
ment of Apr. 28. 1947. as amended (TIAS
3285. 3818. 8552). Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington Jan. 10, 1979. Entered
into force Jan. 10, 1979.

Togo

Agreement on procedures for mutual assistance
in connection with matters relating to the
Gulfstream American Corp., formerly known
as Grumman American Aviation Corp.
Signed at Washington Jan. 30, 1979. Entered
into force Jan. 30. 1979.

Turkey

Agreement regarding the consolidation and re-
scheduling of certain debts owed to, guaran-
teed, or insured by the U.S. Government and
its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Wash-
ington Sept. 21. 1978. Entered into force
Dec. 7, 1978.

Agreement regarding the consolidation and re-
scheduling of payments due under P.L. 480
Title I agricultural commodity agreements,
with annexes. Signed at Ankara Dec. 5,
1978. Entered into force Dec. 5, 1978.

United Kingdom

Agreement for the exchange of international
express mail, with detailed regulations.
Signed at Washington and London Apr. 6
and June 29. 1976. Entered into force July 1.
1976. TIAS 8797.
Terminated: Jan. 1. 1979.

Agreement amending and supplementing the
agreement of Mar. 27. 1941 , as amended (55
Stat. 1560; TIAS 1592; TIAS 2105), regard-
ing leased naval and air bases, with appen-
dices. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Dec. 5 and 6. 1978. Entered into
force Dec. 6, 1978.

70

Department of State Bulletin

International express mail agreement with de-
tailed regulations. Signed at London and
Washington Nov. 6 and Dec. 14, 1978. En-
tered into force Feb. 12, 1979; effective Jan.
I, 1979. D

' Applicable to Land Berlin.

Recommendations VIII 1-5 and 9 are not in
force .

'Approval of VIII-12 accompanied by
statement.

4 Not in force.

'Not in force for the U.S.

6 With reservation.

'With reservation and declaration.

8 With declaration.

'Accession provisional, contingent upon
legislative action.

'"Subject to ratification.

CHRONOLOGY:

January 1979

Jan. 1 U.S. normalizes relations with the
People's Republic of China; diplo-
matic and other official relations
between the U.S. and Taiwan
cease.
France assumes presidency of the
European Economic Community

Jan. 4 President Carter, French President
Giscard d'Estaing. West German
Chancellor Schmidt, and U.K.
Prime Minister Callaghan arrive in
Guadeloupe for an informal meeting
Jan. 5-6.
Shah of Iran signs royal decree ap-
pointing Shapour Bakhtiar as Prime
Minister.

Jan. 6 New civilian government established
in Iran under Prime Minister
Bakhtiar.

Jan. 7 Vietnam-backed insurgents in Cam-
bodia claim the capture of Phnom
Penh and the collapse of Prime
Minister Pol Pot's government.
U.S., Philippines sign treaty agree-
ments to assure U.S. use of air and
naval installations in the Philippines
until 1983.

Jan. 8 Insurgents in Cambodia announce
formation of a new government.

Jan. 11 Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cam-
bodia addresses U.N. Security
Council to appeal against Viet-
namese interference in Cambodia.
U.S., Panama sign agreements on
prisoner transfer and on the Corozal
Cemetery in the present Canal
Zone.

Jan. 13 Regency Council formed in Iran.

Jan. 15 U.N. Security Council meets to con-
sider Vietnamese interference in
Cambodia.

Jan. 16 Shah of Iran arrives in Egypt.

Amb. Atherton and Legal Adviser
Hansell arrive in Israel for discus-
sions on continuing Middle East
peace negotiations. They then visit
Cairo Jan. 24-27, return to Israel
Jan. 27-28, and return to Wash-
ington Jan. 28.

Jan. 17 President Carter endorses the new
civilian government in Iran (news
conference).

Jan. 19 U.N. Security Council approves a
5-month extension for the U.N.
Interim Force in Lebanon.

Jan. 22 Shah of Iran arrives in Morocco.

President of Iran's Regency Council,
Sayed Jalaleddin Tehrani, resigns.

Jan. 23 President Carter calls for "building
the foundation for truly global
cooperation" (State of the Union
address). On Jan. 25 the President
submits a more detailed message to
Congress.
U.N. Committee on Disarmament
opens in Geneva. France,
U.S.S.R.. U.K., U.S.. and 35 other
nations attend (China sends unoffi-
cial observers).

Jan. 25 Pope John Paul II arrives in the
Dominican Republic. He then visits
Mexico (Jan. 26-31) and opens the
3d Latin American bishop's confer-
ence Jan. 27. He visits the Bahamas
(Jan. 31 -Feb. 1) and returns to
Rome Feb. 1 .

Jan. 28 Chinese Vice Premiers Deng Xiaoping
and Fang Yi arrive in Washington,
D.C., for an official visit. After
trips to several U.S. cities, they de-
part Feb. 5.

Jan. 30 White Southern Rhodesians vote ap-
proval of a constitutional plan as
part of the so-called internal settle-
ment providing for a government
led by blacks with extensive
safeguards for whites.

Jan. 31 U.S., Chinese government officials
sign agreements providing a
framework for cooperation in vari-
ous fields and establishing consular
relations. Italian Prime Minister
Andreotti submits the resignation of
his Christian-Democratic govern-
ment.
Ayatollah Khomeini arrives in
Iran. □

PRESS RELEASES:

Department of State

January 18-February 14

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of Press Relations. Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

*19 1/18 Ambassador Paul C. Warnke,

special consultant to the
Secretary for SALT, to ad-
dress conference on U.S.
security and the Soviet
challenge, Nashville, Feb.
1.

*20 1/23 New England Middle East

Conference, Boston, Jan.
25.

*21 1/23 Advisory committee on the

Law of the Sea. partially
closed meeting. Mar. 9.

22 1/25 Vance: remarks before the

black leaders conference.

*23 1/30 U.S.. Colombia amend tex-

tile agreement. Nov. 29
and Dec. 24.

*24 2/1 Foreign policy conference for

editors and broadcasters,
Feb. 21-22.

*25 1/25 Annual review meeting of the

U.S. -France cooperative
science program. Jan. 23.

*26 2/2 Shipping Coordinating Com-

mittee (SCO, Subcom-
mittee on Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS), working
group on subdivision and
stability, panel on bulk
cargoes, Feb. 22.
Program for the official visit
to the U.S. of Thai Prime
Minister Kriangsak, Feb.
4-16.
International Telegraph and
Telephone Consultative
Committee (CCITT), study
group 1 , Mar. 1 .
Patricia M. Derian sworn in
as Assistant Secretary for
Human Rights and Hu-
manitarian Affairs.
Hodding Carter III sworn in
as Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs and
Spokesman of the Depart-
ment.
Department of State pub-
lishes history of women
employees.
Vance: statement before the
House International Rela-
tions Committee on foreign
assistance.
Vance: statement before the
Subcommittee on State.
Justice, Commerce, the
Judiciary, and Related
Agencies of the Senate
Appropriations Committee
on major foreign policy is-
sues. Feb. 8.

*34 2/9 Vice President Mondale to

address conference on U.S.
security and the Soviet
challenge, Minneapolis,
Feb. 22.

*35 2/13 Advisory Committee on Pri-

vate International Law, ad
hoc study group on the
second inter- American
specialized conference on
private international law.
Mar. 2.

*36 2/13 Secretary Vance presents

Distinguished Honor
Award to Ambassador
Marshall Green.

t37 2/14 Joint U.S. -Canadian state-
ment on the Atlantic coast
fisheries and boundary
agreements.

*38 2/14 Ambassador Paul C. Warnke

to address conference on
U.S. security and the
Soviet challenge, In-
dianapolis. Feb. 27. □

* Not printed in the Bulletin.
t Held for a later issue.

*27

*28

'29

"30

*31

32

33

2/2

2/5

2/5
(rev.)

2/6
(rev.)

2/7

2/5

2/9

INDEX

MARCH 1979
VOL. 79, NO. 2024

Africa

ij American Foreign Policy in a Changing World

(Vance) 42

Chronology: January 1979 70

I Overview of Major Foreign Policy Issues

(Vance) 39

Slate ot the Union Message to the Congress

(excerpts) 24

Arms Control
i American Foreign Policy in a Changing World

(Vance) 42

I America's Role in a Turbulent World

(Carter) 21

I New Patterns in Inter-American Cooperation

(Vaky) 64

Overview of Major Foreign Policy Issues

(Vance) 39

j President Carter's News Conferences of

January 26 and February 12 (excerpts). . . 30

State of the Union Message to the Congress

(excerpts) 24

Asia
I America's Role in a Turbulent World

(Carter) 21

: Chronology: January 1979 70

China

American Foreign Policy in a Changing World

(Vance) 42

I Chiefs of Liaison Offices in the U.S. and

P.R.C 4

China— A Profile 15

Chinese Vice Premiers Deng Xiaoping and
Fang Yi Visit the United States (Carter.

Deng, texts of documents) 1

Highlights of Itinerary of Vice Premiers Deng

Xiaoping and Fang Yi 2

: Letter of Credence (Chai) 20

| Overview of Major Foreign Policy Issues

(Vance) 39

Pinyin — The New Chinese System of Romani-

zation 13

i President Carter's News Conferences of
January 26 and February 12 (excerpts) ... 30
I Principal P.R.C. Government and Party Offi-
cials 16

I Relations With the People on Taiwan (Carter.
Christopher, texts of proposed legislation

and analysis) 44

State of the Union Message to the Congress

(excerpts) 24

IU.S. Ambassador to the P.R.C. Leonard

Woodcock (biographic data) 3

I U.S. -P.R.C. Economic Relations (foreign re-
lations outline) 19

Commodities. State of the Union Message to

the Congress (excerpts) 24

Congo. Letter of Credence (Mondjo) 43

i Congress

i Foreign Assistance and U.S. Policy ( Vance) 34

J Overview of Major Foreign Policy Issues

l Vance) 39

Relations With the People on Taiwan (Carter,
Christopher, texts of proposed legislation

and analysis) 44

I State ot the Union Message to the Congress

i (excerpts) 24

r Consular Affairs

' Chinese Vice Premiers Deng Xiaoping and
Fang Yi Visit the United States (Carter,
Deng, texts of documents) 1

Relations With the People on Taiwan (Carter,
Christopher, texts of proposed legislation
and analysis) 44

Developing Countries. Foreign Assistance and
U.S. Policy (Vance) 34

Economics

New Patterns in Inter-American Cooperation
(Vaky) 64

U.S. -P.R.C. Economic Relations (foreign re-
lations outline) 19

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Chinese
Vice Premiers Deng Xiaoping and Fang Yi
Visit the United States (Carter, Deng, texts
of documents) 1

Egypt

Challenges and Opportunities for Peace in the
Middle East (Saunders) 48

Middle East Peace Talks (Department state-
ment) 49

President Carter's News Conferences of
January 26 and February 12 (excerpts) ... 30

Energy. President Carter's News Conferences
of January 26 and February 12 (excerpts) 30

Europe. Chronology. January 1979 70

Food. State of the Union Message to the Con-
gress (excerpts) 24

Foreign Aid. Foreign Assistance and U.S.
Policy (Vance) 34

Gabon. Letter of Credence (Amiar) 43

Human Rights

Foreign Assistance and U.S. Policy (Vance) 34

New Patterns in Inter-American Cooperation
(Vaky) 64

President Carter's Visit to Mexico (Carter,
Lopez Portillo, joint communique) 52

State of the Union Message to the Congress
(excerpts) 24

Immigration. President Carter's Visit to
Mexico (Carter. Lopez Portillo. joint com-
munique) 52

Iran

America's Role in a Turbulent World
(Carter) 21

President Carter's News Conferences of
January 26 and February 12 (excerpts) ... 30

Israel

Challenges and Opportunities for Peace in the
Middle East (Saunders) 48

Middle East Peace Talks (Department state-
ment) 49

President Carter's News Conferences of
January 26 and February 12 (excerpts). . . 30

Latin America and the Carihbean

Chronology: January 1979 70

New Patterns in Inter-American Cooperation
(Vaky) 64

State of the Union Message to the Congress
(excerpts) 24

Mexico

Mexico — A Profile 55

New Patterns in Inter-American Cooperation
(Vaky) 64

President Carter's News Conferences of
January 26 and February 12 (excerpts). . . 30

President Carter's Visit to Mexico (Carter.
Lopez Portillo, joint communique) 52

Presidential Visits to Mexico and the United
States 53

Middle East

American Foreign Policy in a Changing World
(Vance) 42

America's Role in a Turbulent World
(Carter) 21

Challenges and Opportunities for Peace in the
Middle East (Saunders) 48

Chronology: January 1979 70

Overview of Major Foreign Policy Issues
(Vance) 39

State of the Union Message to the Congress
(excerpts) 24

Military Affairs. State of the Union Message
to the Congress (excerpts) 24

Monetary Affairs. State of the Union Message
to the Congress (excerpts) 24

Namibia. Namibia and Southern Rhodesia
(Department statement) 43

Nicaragua. New Patterns in Inter-American
Cooperation ( Vaky) 64

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. State of
the Union Message to the Congress (ex-
cerpts) 24

Panama. New Patterns in Inter-American
Cooperation ( Vaky) 64

Petroleum. President Carter's Visit to Mexico
(Carter, Lopez Portillo. joint com-
munique) 52

Presidential Documents

America's Role in a Turbulent World 21

Chinese Vice Premiers Deng Xiaoping and
Fang Yi Visit the United States I

President Carter's News Conferences of
January 26 and February 12 (excerpts) ... 30

President Carter's Visit to Mexico 52

Relations With the People on Taiwan 44

State of the Union Message to the Congress
(excerpts) 24

Publications. GPO Sales 63

Refugees. Overview of Major Foreign Policy
Issues ( Vance) 39

Science and Technology. Chinese Vice Pre-
miers Deng Xiaoping and Fang Yi Visit the
United States (Carter, Deng, texts of docu-
ments) 1

Security Assistance. Foreign Assistance and
U.S. Policy (Vance) 34

South Asia. Overview of Major Foreign Policy
Issues ( Vance) 39

Southern Rhodesia. Namibia and Southern
Rhodesia (Department statement) 43

Trade

President Carter's Visit to Mexico (Carter.
Lopez Portillo, joint communique) 52

State of the Union Message to the Congress
(excerpts) 24

U.S. -P.R.C. Economic Relations (foreign re-
lations outline) 19

Treaties

Chinese Vice Premiers Deng Xiaoping and
Fang Yi Visit the United States (Carter,
Deng, texts of documents) 1

Current Actions 67

U.S.S.R.

American Foreign Policy in a Changing World
(Vance) 42

America's Role in a Turbulent World
(Carter) 21

President Carter's News Conferences of
January 26 and February 12 (excerpts) ... 30

State of the Union Message to the Congress
(excerpts) 24

United Nations

Chronology: January 1979 70

Foreign Assistance and U.S. Policy (Vance) 34

Overview of Major Foreign Policy Issues
(Vance) 39

Name Index

Amiar, Jose-Joseph 43

Carter, President 1 , 21 , 24, 30, 44, 52

Chai Zemin 20

Christopher, Warren 44

Deng Xiaoping 1

Lopez Portillo, Jose 52

Mondjo, Nicolas 43

Saunders. Harold H 48

Vaky. Viron P 64

Vance, Secretary 34. 39, 42

Superintendent of Documents
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