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bulletin 

Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volunne  80  /  Nunnber  2034 


January  1980 


UNITED  STATES    = 


Departint*nt  of  State 

bulletin 


Volume  80  /  Number  2034  /  January  1980 


Cover  Photo: 

U.S.  Ambasnador  to  the 
United  Nations  Donald 
F.  McHenry  in  the 
Security  Council  just 
before  he  addressed  the 
Council  on  December  1, 
1979.  Seated  behind  him, 
from  left  to  right  first 
row,  are  Senator  Frank 
Church  and 

Congressman  Clement  J. 
Zablocki;  in  the  second 
row  are  Congressman 
WilUaro  S.  Broomfield 
and  Ambassador 
William  vanden  Heuvel, 
Deputy  U.S. 
Representative  to  the 
United  Nations. 

(United  Nations  photo 
by  M.  Grant) 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and 
government  agencies  with  information 
on  developments  in  U.S.  foreign 
relations  and  the  work  of  the 
Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials; 
special  features  and  articles  on 
international  affairs;  selected  press 
releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission 
to  the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
other  agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party. 


CYRUS  R.  VANCE 

Secretary  of  State 

HOODING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA  ADAMS 

Assistant  Editor 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that 
the  publication  of  this  periodical  is 
necessary  in  the  transaction  of  the  public 
business  required  by  law  of  this 
Department.  Use  of  funds  for  printing  this 
periodical  has  been  approved  by  the 
Director  of  the  Office  of  Management  and 
Budget  through  January  31,  1981. 


NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 
copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein 
may  be  reprinted.  Citation  of  the 
Department  of  State  Bulletin  as  the 
source  will  be  appreciated.  The  Bulletin  is 
indexed  in  the  Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical 
Literature. 


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Price: 

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CONTENTS 


ECIAL  (See  Center  Section) 

;HANISTAN:  Pivsidi-nt  Carter's  Address  to  the  Nation,  January  4,  1980 

Ambassador  McHenry's  Statement  in  the  U.N.  Security  Council,  .January  6,  1980 
Text  of  the  Di'aft  Security  Council  Resolution  S/13729  of  January  7,  1980 

,X:  World  Opinion  on  the  Holding  of  U.S.  Hostages  in  Iran 


Kj  President 

News  Conference  of  Novembei- 
28 


iada 

Rejwrt  on  the  Transport  of  Air 
Pollutants 


i;t  Asia 

Mrs.  Carter  Visits  Thailand 

(Presidevi  Carter.  Mm. 

Carter,  Rererand  Theodore 

He.vhiirgli ) 
Pacific  Basin  (Da rid  D. 

NewsoDi) 
World  Efforts  to  Aid  Kampu- 

cheans 
U.S. -China  Trade  Agreement 

(Warren  Chrintophe)') 
Agreements  With  Taiwan 

(Warren  Clirltitoplier) 
Accounting  for  MIAs  (Richard 

C.  Holbrooke) 


)nomics 

Flexible  Exchangee  Rates  After  6 
Years'  Experience  (Richard 

N.  Cooper) 


ope 

Identifying  U.S.  Security  Inter- 
ests in  U.S. -Soviet  Rela- 
tions (Marshall  D.  Slnil- 
inan) 

Continuity  and  Commitment 
(Matthew  Nimetz) 

CSCE  Semiannual  Report  and 
1980  Madrid  Meeting  (De- 
partment Statement) 

Helsinki  Agreement  on  Human 
Rights  (Pre.'iident  Carter) 

Visit  of  Irish  Prime  Minister 
Lynch  (White  House  State- 
ment) 


l-luman  Rights 

26        Four  Treaties  Pertaining  to 
Human  Rights  (Warren 
Chri.'^topher.  Patricia  M. 
Derian.  Robert.^  B.  Owen) 

32  President  Carter  Receives 
Human  Rights  Award 
(President  Carter) 

32        Implementing  the  Human 
Rights  Policy  (Warre}/ 
Christopher) 


International  Law 


35 


Political  Asylum  I  Warren 
Cliristopher) 


Middle  East 

37        U.S.  Takes  Case  Against  Iran  to 
the  International  Court  of 
Justice  (Department  Ayi- 
noiincement,  Secretary's 
Letter.  Application  to  the 
Court,  Request  for  interim 
Measures  of  Protection, 
Response  From  IC.J) 

42        U.S.  Embassy  Marine  Security 
Guards 

42        International  Court  of  Justice 

42        Situation  In  Iran  (Message  to 
the  Congress,  White  House 
Announcement,  State- 
ments) 

44        Chronology  of  Events  In  Iran, 
November  1979 

46        The  Challenge  of  Peacemaking 
(Harold  H.  Saunders) 


V>os^ 


T'^- 


fpO 


svtoR^ 


United  Nations 

49  Security  Council  Meets  on  Ira- 
nian Situation  (Donald  F. 
McHenry,  Te.vt  of  Resolu- 
tion) 

52  Agenda  of  Global  Economic  Is- 
sues (Howard  T.  Rosen) 

54  Arms  Control  (George  M.  Seig- 
nious  ID 

56  International  Year  of  the  Child 
(.Jean  Young) 


Western  Hemisphere 

58        Central  Amei'ica  at  the  Cross- 
roads (Viron  P.  Vaky) 

65        Inter-American  Institute  for 

Cooperation  on  Agriculture 

(Message  to  the  Seriate) 
65        Chile  (Department  Statement) 


Treaties 

66        Current  Actions 

Chronology 

68  November  1979 

Press  Releases 

69  Department  of  State 

69  U.S. U.N. 

Publications 

70  GPO  Sales 

Index 


Ambassador  McHenry  confers  with  Ambassador  Kaiser  of  Bangladesh  before  the  U.N.  Security  Council  meeting  on  Novembei 


111 


Department  of  State  Bu 


r?ie  President 


»ws  Conference  of  November  28 


For  the  last  24  days,  our  nation's 
■ern  has  been  focused  on  our  fellow 
?ricans  being  held  hostage  in  Iran, 
have  welcomed  some  of  them  home 
fieir  families  and  their  friends.  But 
mU  not  rest  nor  deviate  from  our 
rts  until  all  have  been  freed  from 
r  imprisonment  and  their  abuse.  We 
the  Government  of  Iran  fully  re- 
isible  for  the  well-being  and  the 
return  of  every  single  person. 
I  want  the  American  people  to  un- 
;tand  the  situation  as  much  as  pos- 
but  there  may  be  some  questions 
ght  which  I  cannot  answer  fully  be- 
;e  of  my  concern  for  the  well-being 
le  hostages. 

First  of  all,  I  would  like  to  say  that 
1  proud  of  this  great  nation,  and  I 
t  to  thank  all  Americans  for  their 
/ers,  their  courage,  their  persist- 
,  their  strong  support  and  pa- 
ce. During  these  past  days,  our 
onal  will,  our  courage,  and  our 
uj'ity  have  all  been  severely  tested 
history  will  show  that  the  peoi^le  of 
United  States  have  met  every  test. 
In  the  days  to  come  our  determina- 
may  be  even  more  sorely  tried,  but 
yill  continue  to  defend  the  security, 
honor,  and  the  freedom  of  Ameri- 
everywhere.  This  nation  will  never 
i  to  blackmail. 

For  all  Americans  our  constant 
■ern  is  the  well-being  and  the  safety 
jr  fellow  citizens  who  are  being  held 
;ally  and  irresponsibly  hostage  in 
1.  The  actions  of  Iran  have  shocked 
civilized  world. 

For  a  government  to  applaud  mob 
ence  and  terrorism,  for  a  govern- 
it  actually  to  support  and,  in  effect, 
:icipate  in  the  taking  and  the  hold- 
of  hostages  is  unprecedented  in 
lan  history.  This  violates  not  only 
most  fundamental  precepts  of  in- 
lational  law  but  the  common  ethical 
religious  heritage  of  humanity, 
■re  is  no  recognized  religious  faith  on 
th  which  condones  kidnapping, 
■re  is  no  recognized  religious  faith  on 
•th  which  condones  blackmail.  There 
ertainly  no  religious  faith  on  Earth 
ch  condones  the  sustained  abuse  of 
jcent  people. 

We  are  deeply  concerned  about  the 
aman  and  degrading  conditions  im- 
ed  on  the  hostages.  From  every 
ner  of  the  world,  nations  and  people 
e  voiced  their  strong  revulsion  and 
demnation  of  Iran  and  have  joined 
n  calling  for  the  release  of  the  hos- 


Last  night  a  statement  of  support 
was  released  and  was  issued  by  the 
President  of  the  U.N.  General  Assem- 
bly, the  Security  Council,  on  behalf  of 
all  of  its  members.  We  expect  a  further 
Security  Council  meeting  on  Saturday 
night,  at  which  more  firm  and  official 
action  may  be  taken  to  help  in  obtaining 
the  release  of  the  American  hostages. 

Any  claims  raised  by  government 
officials  of  Iran  will  ring  hollow  while 
they  keep  innocent  people  bound  and 
abused  and  threatened.  We  hope  that 
this  e.xercise  of  diplomacy  and  interna- 
tional law  will  bring  a  peaceful  solution, 
because  a  peaceful  solution  is  prefera- 
ble to  the  other  remedies  available  to 
the  United  States. 

At  the  same  time,  we  pursue  such  a 
solution  with  gi-im  determination.  The 
Government  of  Iran  must  recognize  the 
gravity  of  the  situation  which  it  has  it- 
self created  and  the  grave  consequences 
which  will  result  if  harm  comes  to  any 
of  the  hostages. 

I  want  the  American  people  to 
know,  and  I  want  the  world  to  know, 
that  we  will  persist  in  our  efforts, 
through  every  means  available,  until 
every  single  American  has  been  freed. 
We  must  also  recognize  now,  as  we 
never  have  before,  that  it  is  our  entire 
nation  which  is  vulnerable  because  of 
our  overwhelming  and  excessive  de- 
pendence on  oil  from  foreign  countries. 
We  have  got  to  accept  the  fact  that  this 
dependence  is  a  direct,  physical  threat 
to  our  national  security.  And  we  must 
join  together  to  fight  for  our  nation's 
energy  freedom. 

We  know  the  ways  to  win  this  war: 
more  American  energy  and  the  more 
efficient  use  of  what  we  have.  The  U.S. 
Congress  is  now  struggling  with  this 
extremely  important  decision.  The  way 
to  victory  is  long  and  difficult,  but  we 
have  the  will  and  we  have  the  human 
and  the  natural  resources  of  our  great 
nation.  However  hard  it  might  be  to  see 
into  the  future,  one  thing  tonight  is 
clear:  We  stand  together. 

We  stand  as  a  nation  unified,  a 
people  determined  to  protect  the  life 
and  the  honor  of  every  American.  And 
we  are  determined  to  make  America  an 
energy  secure  nation  once  again.  It  is 
unthinkable  that  we  will  allow  our- 
selves to  be  dominated  by  any  form  of 
overdependence  at  home  or  any  brand 


of  terrorism  abroad.  We  are  deter- 
mined that  the  freest  nation  on  Earth 
shall  protect  and  enhance  its  freedom. 

Q.  The  Ayatollah  Khomeini  said 
the  other  day — and  I'm  using  his 
words — he  doesn't  believe  you  have 
the  guts  to  use  military  force.  He  puts 
no  credibility  in  our  military  deter- 
rent. I'm  wondering  how  do  we  get 
out  of  this  mess  in  Iran  and  still  re- 
tain credibility  with  our  allies  and 
with  our  adversaries  overseas? 

A.  We  have  the  full  support  of  our 
allies,  and  in  this  particular  instance  we 
have  no  adversaries  overseas.  There  is 
no  civilized  country  on  Earth  which  has 
not  condemned  the  seizure  and  the 
holding  of  the  hostages  by  Iran.  It 
would  not  be  advisable  for  me  to 
explore  publicly  all  of  the  options  ojjen 
to  our  country.  As  I  said  earlier,  I'm 
determined  to  do  the  best  I  can  through 
diplomatic  means  and  through  peaceful 
means  to  insure  the  safety  of  our  hos- 
tages and  their  release.  Other  actions 
which  I  might  decide  to  take  would 
come  in  the  future  after  those  peaceful 
means  have  been  exhausted. 

But  I  believe  that  the  growing  con- 
demnation of  the  world  community  on 
Iran  will  have  a  beneficial  effect. 

Q.  Why  did  you  reverse  your  pol- 
icy and  permit  the  Shah  to  come  into 
this  country  when,  one,  medical 
treatment  was  available  elsewhere; 
two,  you  had  been  warned  by  our 
Charge  that  the  Americans  might  be 
endangered  in  Tehran;  and  three,  the 
Bazargan  government  was  so  shaky 
that  it  was  questionable  whether  he 
could  deliver  on  the  promise  to  pro- 
tect our  Embassy;  and  last  of  all,  in 
view  of  the  consequences  do  you  re- 
gret the  decision? 

A.  No,  the  decision  that  I  made 
personally  and  without  pressure  from 
anyone  to  carry  out  the  principles  of 
our  country,  to  provide  for  the  means  of 
giving  the  Shah  necessary  medical  as- 
sistance to  save  his  life,  was  proper.  At 
the  same  time  we  notified  the  Govern- 
ment of  Iran.  We  were  assured  by  the 
Prime  Minister  and  the  Foreign  Minis- 
ter that  our  Embassy  would  be  pro- 
tected, and  it  was  protected  for  several 
days,  in  spite  of  threats  from  outside. 

Then  peremptorily,  after  Khomeini 
made  an  aggravating  speech  to  the 
crowds  in  the  street  and  withdrew  pro- 
tection from  the  Embassy,  it  was  at- 
tacked successfully.  The  Embassy  was 


The  President 


jjrotected  by  our  people  for  the  length 
of  time  possible  without  help  from  the 
host  government.  No  embassy  on  Earth 
is  a  fortress  that  can  withstand  con- 
stant attacks  by  a  mob  unless  a  host 
government  comes  to  the  rescue  of  the 
people  within  the  embassy. 

But  I  took  the  right  decision.  I 
have  no  regrets  about  it  nor  apologies 
to  make  because  it  did  help  to  save  a 
man's  life,  and  it  was  compatible  with 
the  principles  of  our  country. 

Q.  We  appear  to  be  in  a  rather 
dangerous  period  of  international 
tension  and  volatility,  especially  in 
the  Islamic  world,  and  it  comes  at  a 
time  when  we're  about  to  embark  on 
our  quadrennial  election  campaign, 
with  all  that  that  will  bring.  Have  you 
given  any  thought  to  whether,  fol- 
lowing examples  of  other  national 
emergencies,  it  may  be  wise  to  try  to 
mute  the  political  fallout  of  this  by 
trying  to  bring  opponents  in  and  out- 
side of  your  party  into  some  kind  of 
emergency  coalition  for  this  purpose? 

A.  We  have  attempted  to  keep  the 
I)olitical  leaders  in  our  nation  informed, 
both  publicly  and  through  other  chan- 
nels. We  have  given  frequent  briefings, 
for  instance,  on  the  Hill,  both  to  the 
Members  of  the  Senate  and  to  the 
House.  We  have  encouraged  all  of  those 
who  have  become  announced  candidates 
for  president  to  restrain  their  com- 
ments which  might  be  misconstrued 
overseas  and  to  have  a  maximum  de- 
gree of  harmony  among  those  who 
might  be  spokesmen  for  our  country.  I, 
myself,  in  order  to  stay  close  to  the 
scene  here  where  constantly  changing 
events  could  be  handled  by  me  as 
President,  have  eliminated  the  major 
portion  of  political  oriented  activities. 

I  don't  think  the  identity  of  the  Is- 
lamic world  is  a  factor.  We  have  the 
deepest  respect  and  reverence  for 
Islam  and  for  all  those  who  share  the 
Moslem  faith.  I  might  say  that  so  far  as 
I  know,  all  the  Islamic  nations  have 
joined  us  in  condemning  the  activities 
and  the  actions  of  the  Government  of 
Iran.  So  I  don't  think  religious  divisions 
are  a  factor  here  at  all. 

But  I  will  have  to  continue  to  re- 
strict my  own  political  activities  and 
call  on  those  who  might  be  opposing  me 
in  the  future  for  president  to  support 
my  position  as  President  and  to  provide 
unity  for  our  country  and  for  our  nation 
in  the  eyes  of  those  who  might  be  look- 
ing for  some  sign  of  weakness  or  divi- 
sion in  order  to  perpetuate  their  abuse 
of  our  hostages. 

Q.  What  can  the  United  States  do 
now;  what  can  it  do  to  prevent  future 


incidents  of  the  nature  of  Iran?  How 
can  you  satisfy  the  public  demand  to 
end  such  embarrassment? 

A.  This  is  an  unprecedented  and 
unique  occurrence.  Down  through  his- 
tory, we  have  had  times  when  some  of 
our  people  were  captured  by  terrorists 
or  who  were  abused,  and  they  have  ob- 
viously been  instances  of  international 
kidnapping  which  occurred  for  the  dis- 
comforture  of  a  people  or  a  govern- 
ment. So  far  as  I  know,  this  is  the  first 
time  that  such  an  activity  has  been  en- 
couraged by  and  supported  by  the  gov- 
ernment itself.  And,  I  don't  anticipate 
this  kind  of  thing  recurring. 

We  have  taken  steps  already,  in 
view  of  the  disturbances  in  the  Middle 
East  and  the  Persian  Gulf  region,  to 
guard  our  people  more  closely,  to  pro- 
vide them  with  a  higher  degree  of  secu- 
rity, and  to  make  arrangements  with 
the  host  government  to  provide  assist- 
ance if  it's  needed  in  the  fastest  possi- 
ble way. 

Many  other  nations  have  reduced 
severely  the  number  of  persons  over- 
seas. I  think  one  of  the  points  that 
should  be  made  is  that  a  year  ago,  we 
had  70,000  Americans  in  Iran— 70,000. 
There  were  literally  thousands  of 
people  who  were  killed  in  the  Iranian 
revolution,  from  all  nations. 

We  were  able  to  e.xtract  Americans 
from  Iran  safely.  It  was  a  superb  dem- 
onstration of  cooperation  and  good  con- 
duct on  the  part  of  the  State  Depart- 
ment and  other  American  officials. 
There  will  be  disturbances  in  the  fu- 
ture, but  I  think  we  are  well  protected 
as  we  possibly  can  be  without  with- 
drawing into  a  shell  from  protecting 
American  interests  in  nations  overseas. 

My  own  experience,  so  far,  has 
been  that  the  leaders  of  nations  have 
recommitted  themselves  to  provide  se- 
curity for  embassies  of  all  countries.  I 
think  we've  learned  a  lesson  from  this 
instance.  But,  because  it  is  so  unique, 
in  the  high  degree  of  irresponsibility  of 
the  Iranian  Government  leaders,  I  don't 
believe  that  we'll  see  another  reoccur- 
rence of  it  any  time  soon. 

Q.  Former  Secretary  of  State  Kis- 
singer has  criticized  your  Administra- 
tion's handling  of  the  situation  in 
Iran.  He  has  suggested  that  it  came 
about  because,  partly  because  of  the 
procedure — a  weakness  in  .American 
foreign  policy  and  that  it  has  further 
damaged  America's  image  as  a  result. 
How  do  you  respond? 

A.  I  would  rather  not  respond. 
There's  no  reason  for  me  to  get  into  a 


^ 


public  debate  at  this  time  with  formi 
Secretary  Kissinger  about  who  is  or 
who  is  not  responsible  for  the  event; 
that  took  place  in  Iran.  Obviously,  vv 
has  occurred  could  not  have  been  pr( 
dieted.  And  for  30  years,  our  countr 
has  had  a  relationship  with  a  fairly  s 
ble  government  there.  The  changes 
took  place  very  rapidly.  So  far  as  I 
know,  no  one  on  Earth  predicted  tht 
And,  I  think  it's  not  becoming  at  thi 
moment,  and  not  conducive  to  bettei 
American  understanding,  to  get  in- 
volved in  answering  allegations  that 
or  someone  else  may  have  been  culpr 
and  may  have  caused  a  further  aggi- 
vation  of  a  very  difficult  situation 

Q.  What  role  did  the  former  Si 
retary  play  in  your  decision  to  pen 
the  Shah  into  the  country? 

A.  None.  I  did  not  hear  at  all  fr 
the  Secretary — former  Secretary  Ki 
singer  nor  did  he  contact  Secretary  | 
Vance  at  any  time  during  the  days 
when  we  were  deciding  that  the  Sha  |i 
should  come  into  the  United  States 
medical  care  to  save  his  life.  In  pre- 
vious weeks  and  months,  since  the  S 
was  deposed.  Secretary  Kissinger  a 
many  others  let  it  be  known  that  th' 
thought  that  we  should  provide  a  ha- 
for  the  Shah.  But  Secretary  Kissing 
played  no  role  in  my  decision  to  per 
the  Shah  to  come  in  for  medical  tre; 
ment. 

Q.  Speaking  of  the  Shah,  if  he 
well  enough  to  travel,  would  you  I 
him  to  leave  the  country? 

A.  That's  a  decision  to  be  made 
the  Shah  and  by  his  medical  adviser 
When  he  decided  to  come  to  our  cou 
try,  with  my  permission,  I  was  in- 
formed then,  and  I  have  been  inforr 
since,  that  as  soon  as  his  medical 
treatment  was  successfully  complett 
that  his  intention  was  to  leave.  And 
have  not  encouraged  him  to  leave;  h 
was  free  to  come  here  for  medical 
treatment,  and  he  will  leave  on  his  < 
volition. 

Q.  The  consequences  of  the  cr 
in  Iran  is  drifting  the  United  State> 
to  almost  a  cold  war  with  the  Islam 
countries.  Watching  TV  news  for  1 
days,  Americans  soon  will  believe 
whole  Moslem  world  is  hating  ther 
Moreover,  they  are  not  told  that  ti 
Shiites  are  a  very  minor  minority 
among  the  population  of  the  Islam 
world,  because  the  most  majority  i 
Sunni.  Don't  you  think  you  get  an 
help  from  any  Islamic  country, 
what  will  your  policy  be  toward  th 
Islamic  countries  under  these  circi 
stances? 


Department  of  State  Bui!' 


The  President 


A.  The  premise  of  your  question  is 
pletely  wrong.  We  are  not  ap- 
iching  any  sort  of  cold  war  with  the 
mic  countries.  So  far  as  I  know, 
•y  Islamic  country  has  condemned 
for  its  capture  of  our  hostages  and 
been  vei'y  supportive. 
This  includes  Moslem  nations 
h,  in  the  past,  have  not  been  close 
ids  of  ours — Iraq,  Libya,  and 
rs.  So  I  don't  see  this  as  a  confron- 
in  at  all  between  our  nation  and  the 
Tiic  world.  It's  certainly  not  part  of 
Islamic  faith  to  condone,  as  I  said 
er,  blackmail  or  the  persecution  or 
1  of  innocent  people  or  kidnapping 
'rrorism. 

So  I  think  that  we  have  a  very  good 
ionship  with  the  people  and  the 
■rnments  of  the  Islamic  world,  and 
I't  think  it's  deteriorated  in  this  in- 
ce.  In  some  ways  we've  been  drawn 
■r  to  these  people,  because  they  see 
:  has  occuri-ed  in  Iran  as  something 
disgrace  for  their  own  religious 
,  and  they  don't  see  this  as  typical 
hat  Moslems  believe. 
I  might  add  also  that  this  is  not 
■al  of  the  Shiite  faith  either.  It's  the 
uided  actions  of  a  few  people  in 
who  are  burning  with  hatred  and  a 
•e  for  revenge,  completely  contrary 
e  teachings  of  the  Moslem  faith. 

Q.  There's  a  feeling  of  hostility 
lughout  the  country  toward  Iran 
use  of  the  hostages.  Senator 
r  said  that  the  taking  of  our  Em- 
y  in  Iran,  in  his  words,  is  an  act 
ar.  There  are  rumors,  since  de- 
,  that  our  Navy  has  been  called  up 
ervice.  I  ask  you,  as  our  Com- 
der  in  Chief,  is  war  possible?  Is 
thinkable? 

A.  It  would  be  a  mistake  for  the 
le  of  oui-  country  to  have  aroused 
in  them  hatred  toward  anyone:  not 
1st  the  people  of  Iran  and  certainly 
igainst  Iranians  who  may  be  in  our 
try  as  our  guests.  We  certainly  do 
vant  to  be  guilty  of  the  same  viola- 
of  human  decency  and  basic  human 
nples  that  have  proven  so  embar- 
ng  to  many  of  the  Iranian  citizens 
iselves. 

We  obviously  prefer  to  see  our  hos- 
s  protected  and  released  com- 
'ly  through  peaceful  means.  And 
s  my  deepest  commitment,  and 
will  be  my  goal.  The  United  States 
)ther  options  available  to  it  which 
be  considered,  depending  upon  the 
imstances.  But  I  think  it  would  not 
ell-advised  for  me  to  speak  of  those 
ifically  tonight. 


Q.  We  have  had  55.000  Iranian 
students  in  this  country.  We've  been 
very  good  to  them,  very  hospitable. 
Even  the  new  Finance  Minister  of 
Saudi  -Arabia  was  a  student  who  once 
demonstrated  in  Washington  against 
law  and  order.  Shouldn't  we  be  very 
careful  in  letting  any  of  these  stu- 
dents come  in  here?  Shouldn't  we 
screen  them  in  the  future  and  make 
them  agree  that  they  will  not  demon- 
strate? 

A.  It's  very  difficult  for  an  Iranian 
citizen  or  a  student  to  get  a  visa  at  the 
American  Embassy  in  Iran  at  this  time. 
[Laughter]  And  I  think  the  influ.x  of 
Iranians  to  our  country  now  would  be 
minimal. 

I'm  determined  to  enforce  the  law 
about  Iranian  students.  Some  of  them 
have  violated  the  law;  they  are  now 
being  screened,  they  are  being  assessed 
in  their  commitment  and  the  legality  of 
their  presence  here.  We  have  already 
finished  this  procedure  with  more  than 
22,000.  About  17,000  have  proven  to  be 
here  completely  legally  and  are,  indeed, 
full-time  students.  Among  the  other 
5,000,  about  several  hundred  have  al- 
ready departed.  Others  are  now  having 
to  prove  that,  contrary  to  the  earliest 
evidence,  they  do,  indeed,  have  a  right 
to  be  in  our  country.  If  they  are  here 
illegally,  they  will  be  expelled. 

There  is  one  exception  to  that  rule. 
If  a  citizen  of  Iran  can  prove  that  if  he 
or  she  returned  to  Iran  that  they  would 
be  executed  or  abused  because  of  their 
political  beliefs,  they  can  seek  asylum 
here.  And  if  that  asylum,  in  our  judg- 
ment, is  justified,  we  will  provide  it  for 
them.  But  this  procedure  is  going  for- 
ward in  accordance  with  American  law, 
in  accordance  with  American  fairness, 
in  accordance  with  the  full  principles  of 
the  U.S.  Constitution. 

Q.  Can  this  crisis  go  on  indefi- 
nitely or  ought  the  Ayatollah  Kho- 
meini understand  that  at  some  point 
the  American  people  may  demand  and 
other  nations  may  expect  that  you 
move  forward  to  resolve  it  by  what- 
ever means  you  find  necessary? 

A.  It  would  not  be  possible  or  even 
advisable  for  me  to  set  a  deadline  about 
when  or  if  I  would  take  certain  action  in 
the  future.  This  is  an  ever-present  con- 
sideration on  my  mind.  I'm  carrying  out 
all  of  the  duties  that  normally  fall  on  a 
President's  shoulders,  which  are 
adequate,  but  I  never  forget  one  mo- 
ment that  I'm  awake  about  the  hostages 
whose  lives  and  whose  safety  depend  on 
me,  and  I  am  pursuing  every  possible 
avenue  to  have  the  hostages  released. 


Any  excessive  threats  or  any  ex- 
cessive belief  among  the  Iranians  that 
they  will  be  severely  damaged  by  mili- 
tary action  as  long  as  these  negotiations 
are  proceeding  and  as  long  as  legalities 
can  be  followed  might  cause  the  death 
of  the  hostages,  which  we  are  com- 
mitted to  avoid.  So  that's  one  of  the 
questions  that  I  cannot  answer,  to  set 
down  a  certain  deadline  beyond  which 
we  would  take  extra  action  that  might 
result  in  the  harm  or  the  death  of  the 
hostages. 

We  are  proceeding,  I  guarantee 
you,  in  every  possible  way,  every  pos- 
sible moment,  to  get  the  hostages  freed 
and  at  the  same  time  protect  the  honor 
and  the  integrity  and  the  basic  princi- 
ples of  our  country.  That's  all  I  can  do. 
But  I'm  doing  it  to  the  best  of  my  abil- 
ity, and  I  believe  we  will  be  successful. 

Q.  Many  Americans  view  the  Ira- 
nian situation  as  one  in  a  succession 
of  events  that  proves  that  this  coun- 
try's power  is  declining.  How  can  you 
assure  Americans  tonight  that  our 
power  is  not  declining  abroad,  and 
how  are  you  reassessing  priorities  for 
the  1980s  in  terms  of  foreign  policy? 

A.  The  United  States  has  neither 
the  ability  nor  the  will  to  dominate  the 
world,  to  interfere  in  the  internal  af- 
fairs of  other  nations,  to  impose  our  will 
on  other  people  whom  we  desire  to  be 
free,  to  make  their  own  decisions.  This 
is  not  part  of  the  commitment  of  the 
United  States. 

Our  country  is  the  strongest  on 
Earth.  We're  the  strongest  militarily, 
politically,  economically,  and  I  think 
we're  the  strongest  moi'ally  and  ethi- 
cally. Our  country  has  made  great 
strides  even  since  I've  been  in  office. 
I've  tried  to  correct  some  of  the  defects 
that  did  exist.  We  have  strengthened 
the  military  alliances  of  our  country,  for 
instance.  NATO  now  has  a  new  spirit,  a 
new  confidence,  a  new  cohesion,  im- 
proving its  military  capabilities,  much 
more  able  to  withstand  any  threat  from 
the  East — from  the  Soviet  Union  or  the 
Warsaw  Pact — than  it  was  before. 

We've  espoused  again  the  princi- 
ples that  unite  Americans  and  make  us 
admired  throughout  the  world,  raising 
the  banner  of  human  rights.  We're 
going  to  keep  it  high.  We  have  opened 
up  avenues  of  communication,  under- 
standing, trade  with  people  that  for- 
merly were  our  enemies  or  excluded 
us — several  nations  in  Africa,  the  vast 
people  and  the  vast  country  of  the 
People's  Republic  of  China. 


CANADA 


In  doing  so  we've  not  alienated  any 
of  our  previous  friends.  I  think  our 
country  is  strong  within  itself.  There  is 
not  an  embarrassment  now  about  our 
government  which  did  e.xist  in  a  few  in- 
stances in  years  gone  by.  So  I  don't  see 
at  all  that  our  country  has  become 
weak.  We  are  strong  and  we  are  get- 
ting stronger,  not  weaker. 

But  if  anybody  thinks  that  we  can 
dominate  other  people  with  our 
strength — military  or  political  strength 
or  economic  strength — they  are  wrong. 
That's  not  the  purpose  of  our  country. 

Our  inner  strength,  our  confidence 
in  ourselves,  I  think,  is  completely 
adequate.  And  I  believe  the  unity  that 
the  American  people  have  shown  in  this 
instance,  their  patience,  is  not  at  all  a 
sign  of  weakness.  It  is  a  sign  of  sure 
strength. 

Q.  Serious  charges  have  been 
placed  against  the  Shah  concerning 
the  repression  of  his  own  people  and 
the  misappropriation  of  his  nation's 
funds.  Is  there  an  appropriate  vehicle 
to  investigate  those  charges,  and  do 
you  foresee  a  time  when  you  would 
direct  your  Administration  to  assist 
in  that  investigation? 

A.  I  don't  know  of  any  international 
forum  within  which  charges  have  ever 
been  brought  against  a  deposed  leader 
who  has  left  his  country.  'There  have 
been  instances  of  changing  govern- 
ments down  through  the  centuries  in 
history,  and  I  don't  know  of  any  in- 
stance where  such  a  leader  who  left  his 
country  after  his  government  fell  has 
been  tried  in  an  international  court  or 
in  an  international  forum.  This  is  a  mat- 
ter that  can  be  pursued.  It  should  be 
pursued  under  international  law,  and  if 
there  is  a  claim  against  the  Shah's  fi- 
nancial holdings,  there  is  nothing  to 
prevent  other  parties  from  going  into 
the  courts  in  accordance  with  the  law  of 
a  nation  or  internationally  and  seeking  a 
redress  of  grievances  which  they  claim. 

But  as  I  said  earlier,  I  don't  think 
there's  any  forum  that  will  listen  to  the 
Iranians  make  any  sort  of  claim,  jus- 
tified or  not,  as  long  as  they  hold 
against  their  will  and  abuse  the  hos- 
tages in  complete  contravention  to 
every  international  law  and  every  pre- 
cept or  every  commitment  or  principle 
of  humankind.  ■ 

Te.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  Dec.  3,  1979. 

For  other  documentation  pertaining 
to  the  situation  in  Iran,  see  p.  37.  For 
Ambassador  McHenry's  statements 
and  the  text  of  the  Security  Council 
resolution,  see  p.  49. 


Report  on  the  Transport  of  Air  Pollutanti 


The  Department  of  State  on  Oc- 
tober 15,  1979,  announced  the  release  of 
the  first  annual  report  of  the  U.S.- 
Canada Research  Consultation  Group 
on  the  long-range  transport  of  air  pol- 
lutants.' The  release  was  simultane- 
ously announced  in  Ottawa  by  the 
Canadian  Department  of  E.xternal 
Affairs. 

In  recognition  of  its  increasing  sig- 
nificance, the  two  governments  re- 
quested the  group  to  provide  them  with 
a  clear  and  concise  statement  of  the  na- 
ture of  the  pollutants  problem,  as  well 
as  of  its  impact  on  the  environment  of 
eastern  North  America.  Such  a  report 
was  to  provide  a  synthesis  of  existing 
scientific  information  which  would 
make  it  accessible  and  understandable 
to  the  nonspecialist  community  of  in- 
terested persons.  It  was  also  recog- 
nized that  such  a  report  would  be  of  as- 
sistance in  the  ongoing  discussions  on 
transboundary  air  quality. 

Research  programs  in  both  coun- 
tries are  at  an  early  stage  and  have 
benefitted  from  the  coordinating  efforts 
of  the  group.  The  data  in  the  report  and 
the  conclusions  which  it  advances  are  of 
a  preliminary  nature.  The  governments 
are  providing  this  information  to  the 
public  to  encourage  discussion  of  this 
important  bilateral  environmental 
issue.  Further  reports  from  the  Re- 
search Consultation  Group  are  expected 
in  the  future. 

The  bilateral  Research  Consulta- 
tion Group  was  formed  in  October  1978 
through  an  exchange  of  letters  between 
the  Embassy  of  Canada  and  the  U.S. 
Department  of  State.  The  group  is  to 
consult  on  ongoing  research  efforts  in 
Canada  and  the  United  States  and  to 
facilitate  a  full  exchange  of  technical 
information  on  the  long-range  transport 
of  air  pollutants.  Among  the  respon- 
sibilities of  the  group  are: 

1.  Analysis  of  currently  instituted 
programs  and  those  under  development 
to  determine  where  gaps  may  exist  in 
the  information  base  relating  to  the  oc- 
currence and  effects  of  long-range 
transport  of  air  pollutants; 

2.  Promotion  of  measures  neces- 
sary to  insure  the  intercomparability  of 
data  generated  by  programs  in  both 
countries; 

3.  Promotion  of  the  dissemination 
of  appropriate  data  and  research  infor- 
mation; 

4.  Tendering  advice  and  recom- 
mendations to  the  appropriate  agencies 
in  the  two  governments  with  respect  to 


modification  of  existing  research  pro 
grams  and/or  development  of  new  n- 
search  programs;  and 

5.  Preparation  of  a  yearly  status 
report  to  both  governments  and  otht 
reports  as  deemed  necessai'y. 

The  group  is  cochaired  by  a  repi 
sentative  of  Environment  Canada  an 
of  the  U.S.  Environmental  Protectio^j 
Agency  and  is  comprised  of  represen  f 
tives  of  a  number  of  Canadian  and  U 
agencies  with  research  interests  rela 
to  pollutants.  The  group  has  had  tw( 
plenary  meetings  since  its  formation.  L 
well  as  frequent  contact  between  re- ; 
searchers  in  particular  specialties.  ■!' 


Press  release  264. 

'  Copies  of  the  report  may  be  obtaine 
from  Mr.  Conrad  Kleveno.  Environmen 
Protection  Agency,  Washington,  D.C. 
20460. 


Department  of  State  Bull 


^ST  ASIA 

Irs.  Carter  Visits  Thailand 


At  the  request  of  the  President, 
.  Ro^alynn  Carter  visited  Thailand 
riiihrr  7-10,  1979,  to  observe  first 
r/  ///(  iilii/ht  of  refugees  there,  par- 
■liirl II  the  eiDiditions  of  Kampuchean 
,(/((N.  FuUoiving  are  remarks  made 
he  President,  Reverend  Theodore 
'Irsliiirgh,  Chairman  of  the  Select 
iimlssion  on  Immigration  and  Ref- 
'  Policy,  and  Mrs.  Carter  at  a 
te  House  meeting  on  relief  efforts 
Mrs.  Carter's  trip. ' 


CSIDENT  CARTER 

I'm  very  grateful  that  all  of  you 
'  come  to  the  White  House  to  talk 
it  one  of  the  most  important  issues 

faces  humanity  and  will  face  it  in 
lifetime.  It's  a  rare  occasion  in 
an  memory  when  there  has  been  a 
ibility  of  holocaust,  threatening  to 
roy  an  entire  race  of  people.  It 
)ened,  perhaps,  in  the  time  of  the 
enians,  earlier  in  this  century,  and 
•,  of  course,  among  Jews  and  others 
e  time  of  Hitler,  and  now  among 
jeople  of  Cambodia,  or  Kampuchea, 
's  presently  known. 
There  also  is  a  rare  occasion  when 
e  life  of  a  great  nation,  its  govern- 
t  and  its  people  can  react  in  an  un- 
ih,  dynamic,  and  effective  way  to 
iate  extraordinary  human  suffer- 
such  as  the  case,  again,  with  the 
^ees  and  the  starving  people  of  the 
bodian  region. 

I  was  very  pleased  that  the  three 
itors,  then  my  wife  and  Dr. 
mond  [Julius  B.  Richmond,  Assist- 
5ecretary  for  Health  and  Surgeon 
;ral.  Public  Health  Service],  Mrs. 
ng  [Jean  Young,  Chairperson,  U.S. 
mission  on  the  International  Year 
le  Child]  and  her  group,  and  now  a 
p  of  Congresswomen  and  others 

been  to  that  region  to  dramatize 
-leed  for  action,  and  also  to  bring 
:  tangible  recommendations  on  how 
suffering  might  be  alleviated  more 
•tively. 

It's  a  difficult  issue  to  resolve, 
'e  are  major  obstacles  to  overcome: 
acles  of  war,  over  which  we  have  no 
rol  in  that  long-troubled  part  of  the 
id;  the  issue  of  diplomatic  bridges 
are  very  hard  to  cross;  and  also,  of 
se,  the  very  serious  problems  in 
inistration,  in  dealing  with  the 
'aucratic  needs,  to  derive  help  from 
e  eager  to  give  and  actually  to  de- 
*  it  effectively  to  those  who  are 
t  in  need. 


Rosalynn  and  Senators  Danforth, 
Baucus,  and  Sasser,  Dr.  Richmond,  and 
others  have  brought  back  very  specific 
recommendations  on  what  might  be 
done.^  I'm  not  going  to  try  to  preempt 
their  reports  to  you.  They  can  make 
their  reports  much  better  than  can  I. 
I'm  one  of  those  who  is  listening,  and, 
like  you,  I  am  eager  to  act  in  accord- 
ance with  the  best  interests  of  those 
who  are  crying  out  for  assistance. 

There  are  three  basic  areas  of  re- 
sponse: One  is  the  U.S.  Government 
itself — and  the  Congress  has  reacted 
very  well  in  approving  almost  $70  mil- 
lion worth  of  aid.  And  I  will  go  to  the 
Congress  for  additional  aid  if  it's  neces- 
sary. 

Second  is  an  appeal  to  private  or- 
ganizations, volunteer  organizations  of 
all  kinds,  repi'esented  by  many  of  you 
here.  That's  a  resource  of  assistance 
which  is  eager  to  be  tapped  and  which 
has  already  done  yeoman's  work,  even 
before  governmental  help  could  be 
effective. 

And  the  third  recommendation  is 
concerning  international  relationships. 
And  I  would  like  to  caution  you  about 
that:  This  is  a  judgment  and  a  decision 
that  we  can't  make  in  this  room. 

One  of  the  vivid  reports  that 
Rosalynn  brought  back  to  me  was  that 
quite  often  a  U.S.  initiative  is  counter- 
productive in  the  eventual  carrying  out 
of  a  recommendation.  If  the  initiative 
comes  from  one  of  the  less  developed 
nations  of  the  world  or  comes  directly 
from  the  United  Nations  or,  perhaps, 
comes  from  other  countries  than  we, 
it's  much  more  effective. 

So,  I  would  like  to  urge  you  to  re- 
strain your  own  inclinations  to  give 
public  condemnation  or  public  advice  on 
what  the  Vietnamese  ought  to  do,  what 
the  warring  parties  in  Kampuchea 
ought  to  do,  what  the  United  Nations 
ought  to  do.  Let  that  be  handled 
through  diplomatic  channels.  I  can  as- 
sure you  that  I  will  not  permit  these 
efforts  to  be  abandoned  or  ignored.  But 
I  think  that  the  public  calling  for  action 
might  be  the  very  thing  that  would 
prevent  that  action  being  carried  out. 
That's  my  only  caution  to  you. 

I  have  a  second  one — I  forgot.  I 
think  the  more  all  of  us  forgo  credit  for 
action  to  be  taken,  the  more  effective 
the  effort  will  be.  There  is  a  great 
yearning.  I  know,  within  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment, within  the  Red  Cross,  within 
UNICEF,  within  Catholic  Charities, 
within  the  Protestant  churches,  within 
benevolent  groups,  to  want  to  give  aid 
and  then  have  that  assistance  be  pub- 


licly acknowledged  and  recognized. 
That  is  a  human  trait,  but  the  more  we 
can  subjugate  those  natural,  human  de- 
sires for  quiet  giving  and  close  coopera- 
tion with  others,  with  a  minimum  of 
jealousy  and  a  minimum  of  grasping  for 
recognition,  the  more  effective  we'll  all 
be. 

I'm  sure  that's  a  cautionary  word 
that  you  don't  need,  because  there's  an 
overwhelming  unselfishness  and  be- 
nevolent attitude  among  this  group. 
And  you've  taken  the  initiative,  and 
there's  been  no  evidence  of  a  grasping 
for  recognition.  But  in  the  future,  this 
is  going  to  be  a  long,  slow,  tedious 
process,  and  that  needs  to  be  recog- 
nized and  avoided. 

The  last  point  I'd  like  to  make  is 
this:  The  Thai  people  and  the  Thai  Gov- 
ernment both  deserve  every  possible 
recognition,  expression  of  gratitude, 
and  thanks.  They  are  a  poor  country. 
Many  of  the  Thai  people  suffer  terribly 
from  poverty,  disease,  and  hunger.  It's 
not  a  popular  political  thing  to  bring  in 
enormous  numbers  of  refugees  from  an 
alien  and  antagonistic  country,  who's 
been  historical  enemies  on  occasion, 
and  still  not  arouse  the  condemnation  of 
the  Thais,  who  themselves  suffer. 

This  has  been  a  very  great  demon- 
stration of  both  kindness  and  also  cour- 
age, political  courage.  I  know  that  this 
is  something  that  you'll  want  to  help 
with.  The  Thais  are  not  able  to  accept 
literally  hundreds  of  thousands  of  refu- 
gees into  their  country  and  feed  those 
refugees  on  their  own.  We've  got  to  be 
especially  generous  to  the  Thais  in  our 
thanks  and  in  our  direct  help  and  the 
recognition  of  what  they  are  contribut- 
ing. 

I  look  forward  with  great  eager- 
ness to  the  summary  of  your  recom- 
mendations. I  will  be  getting  it  through 
the  National  Security  Council,  and 
through  my  wife,  who  always  has  easy 
access  to  me.  And  I  think  that  her  in- 
volvement is  one  that  can  be  of  help  to 
you  as  well.  She'll  be  working  with  the 
wives  of  Senators  and  other  Members 
of  Congress,  and  female  Members  of 
Congress.  She  will  also  be  working  with 
any  of  you  who  want  her  to  help,  in 
providing  an  avenue  to  the  public  and 
also  an  avenue  directly  to  me. 

But  I'm  very  grateful  to  all  of  you 
for  being  willing  to  come.  I  think  this 
will  be  one  of  the  most  important 
meetings  ever  taking  place  in  the  White 
House.  And  I'm  grateful  that  I  am 
President  of  people  like  you. 


jary  1980 


East  Asia 


REVEREND  HESBURGH 

Just  short  of  3  weeks  ago,  on  Oc- 
tober 24,  this  same  group  of  leaders 
from  our  various  religious  faiths  and 
from  the  various  private  voluntary  or- 
ganizations met  in  Washington  to  dis- 
cuss what  we  might  do  togethei'  and  in 
concert  to  meet  the  tragedy  in  Cam- 
bodia. The  purpose  was  to  consult  how 
the  American  people,  how  the  Ameri- 
can Government,  and  how  the  United 
Nations  might  best  respond  to  avoid 
what  appeared  to  be  a  gi-owing 
holocaust,  already  half  accomplished,  if 
you  will. 

We  called  on  the  voluntary  agen- 
cies, first  of  all,  to  increase  their  efforts 
and  to  work  together  to  help  the  Cam- 
bodians. We  urged  Americans  to  pro- 
vide them  all  with  financial  support, 
and  in  a  special  letter  to  the  President 
we  urged  greater  U.S.  Government  ef- 
forts in  order  to  assist,  as  quickly  and 
as  effectively  as  possible,  this  people  in 
great  need. 

We  met  that  same  day  at  the  White 
House  with  the  President,  and  never 
was  a  letter  answered  moi'e  quickly.^ 
Hardly  before  the  letter  was  in  his 
hands,  he  granted  us  all  of  the  various 
requests  we  had  for  increased  aid  and 
said  he  was  willing  to  do  whatever  else 
might  be  necessary  to  do  to  avert  this 
holocaust. 

I  think  today,  in  the  '.ight  of  the 
appeal  made  by  United  Nations  Chil- 
dren's Fund— "UNICEF  — the  Interna- 
tional Committee  of  the  Red  Cross,  the 
appeals  by  all  of  our  various  voluntary 
agencies  for  more  than  $300  million  for 
Cambodian  relief,  and  aftei'  the  gener- 
ous and  immediate  response  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States  voiced 
by  our  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Vance, 
at  the  pledging  conference  of  the 
United  States  on  Monday,  November  5, 
when  many  of  you  were  present,  and  I 
too,  it  seemed  to  us  that  the  time  was 
now  appropriate  to  U]Hlate  our  October 
24  meeting  in  an  effort  to  relieve  the 
growing  misery  of  the  Cambodians. 

It  was  again  against  this  same 
background  as  our  last  meeting  that  I, 
as  chairman  of  the  Overseas  Develop- 
ment Council,  and  cochaired  by  the 
Reverend  Paul  McLeary,  who  is  chair- 
man of  the  American  Council  on  Volun- 
tary Agencies,  that  we  invited  this 
group  again,  on  very  short  notice,  to 
this  second  consultation  to  e.xchange 
information  on  the  situation  in  Thailand 
and  Cambodia  after  other  relief  is  tak- 
ing place  there. 

In  this  second  consultation  we  have 
four  things  we  would  like  to  do:  first,  to 
find  out  what  the  various  agencies  are 
now  doing;  second,  what  they  are  plan- 


ning to  do  for  the  near  term  future; 
third,  what  fundraising  effoi'ts  have 
been  undertaken  to  date;  and  fourth, 
what  are  the  various  bottlenecks  and 
needs  that  we  have  to  move  forward 
quickly  and  efficiently.  There  is.  of 
course,  a  fifth  topic  which  I'm  sure  will 
emerge  from  our  discussion  with  Mrs. 
Carter,  and  that  is  how  can  we  improve 
and  institutionalize  exchange  of  infor- 
mation among  ourselves  and  coordina- 
tion of  the  various  activities  — 
governmental  and  nongovernmental 
and  intergovernmental  —  here  and 
overseas. 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  vigor  of  the 
pluralistic  American  response  to  this 
Cambodian  tragedy  is  most  welcome, 
but  it  does  raise  for  all  of  us  a  great 
challenge  to  work  together  and,  as  the 
President  just  said,  to  work  together 
without  seeking  praise  in  so  doing. 

I  would  like  to  say  that  the  visit  to 
Cambodia  and  Thailand  in  October  by 
Senators  Danforth,  Sasser,  and  Baucus, 
who  are  here  with  us  this  morning,  on 
my  left,  your  right,  and  also  the  various 
Governors  and  the  Congresswomen 
and,  most  particularly,  of  our  First 
Lady,  Mrs.  Carter — all  of  this  has 
heightened  and  increased  the  con- 
sciousness of  Americans  for  the  need  of 
all  of  the  generous  action  we  might  put 
forward  to  alleviate  this  growing 
tragedy. 

May  I  say,  Mrs.  Carter,  in  intro- 
ducing you.  that  we  are  looking  forward 
to  hearing  the  report  from  you  and  your 
colleagues  on  the  situation  with  respect 
to  Cambodian  refugees  in  Thailand,  and 
any  other  recommendations  or  ques- 
tions you  may  have  of  this  group,  which 
represents,  I  think,  the  cream  of  the 
private  voluntary  effort.  After  your 
comments  we  will  be  hearing  from  all  of 
these  various  agencies  active  in  Cam- 
bodia on  the  questions  posed  earlier, 
and  we  are  looking  forward  later  in  the 
day  to  discussing  our  conclusions  fur- 
ther with  you. 

Mrs.  Carter,  it's  with  real  pride 
and  great  satisfaction  that  I'd  like  to 
present  you. 


MRS.  CARTER 

Thank  you  very  much.  I'm  very 
pleased  to  have  you  all  here  today.  I 
welcome  you. 

I  did  go  to  Cambodia,  and  I'm  very 
happy  to  have  this  opportunity  to  re- 
port to  you  about  my  trip,  and  also  to 
thank  you  for  what  you  have  done  al- 
ready and  for  what  you  continue  to  do, 


and  to  work  with  you  on  ways  that  v 
can  better  help  those  who  are  sufferiu 
in  this  area  of  the  world.  It, 

As  the  President  has  said,  I  werJJ, 
to  Thailand  on  his  behalf  to  express  t 
profound  concern  of  the  people  of  ou 
country  for  the  tragedy  that  is  unfnl( 
ing  in  Indochina.  My  visit  was  very 
brief,  but  I  think  I  can  say  positively . 
that  it  was  one  of  of  the  most  significirt 
events  of  my  life.  I  came  away  filled  |i 
with  admiration  for  the  representative 
of  your  organizations  who  are  there  || 
struggling  with  this  massive  problem  !l 
relief  for  thousands  and  thousands  ol 
human  beings  who  are  starving  and    , 
homeless  and  ill  and  bereaved.  And 
came  away  also,  as  Jimmy  said,  fille«| 
with  gratitude  for  the  efforts  of  the 
people  of  Thailand  and  for  the  Gove: 
ment  of  Thailand. 

And  I'm  sure  that  every  person 
this  room  knows  what  faces  us  in  th< 
coming  weeks.  The  problem  is  one  tl 
is  not  going  away  any  time  soon.  Wi 
will  be  faced  with  it  for  a  long  time. 
While  our  international  efforts  have 
brought  vast  improvements — and  I  i- 
in  the  refugee  camp  at  Sakeo  some  1 
ginnings  of  hope  for  those  few  who  h; 
been  brought  back  from  the  very  ed 
of  death.  The  camp,  since  the  time  t 
the  Senators  were  there,  has  really 
made  progress;  in  fact,  some  people 
told  us  that  a  miracle  had  happened 
the  last  few  weeks.  The  camp  is  onl,\ 
about  3  weeks  old,  but  people  are  bei 
fed  and  are  being  taken  care  of  in  tli 
camp  now.  You  will  have  a  further  i 
port  on  that  from  some  of  those  whd 
went  with  me. 

But  the  picture  in  the  near  futm 
looks  very  bleak,  because  a  wave  ol 
new  refugees  is  expected  to  come 
across  the  border  into  Thailand  fron 
Kampuchea — a  number  estimated  ;ui 
where  from  100.000  to  250,000,  may  1m 
300,000— that  are  now  right  at  the  li 
der,  that  are  expected  to  come  now  tl 
the  dry  season  is  here  and  the  fight ii 
has  begun  again.  They  will  be  pushr 
over  into  Thailand. 

And  for  those  of  us  who  have  s.' 
with  our  own  eyes  the  dimension  of 
problem  and  the  terrible  suffering  :ii 
starvation,  the  thought  of  so  many 
more  people  in  the  same  situation  wl 
will  be  coming  into  Thailand  is  almos 
more  than  you  can  bear,  when  you  ai 
there  and  look  at  it. 

I'd  like  to  tell  you  briefly  about  i 
trip.  I  was  accompanied  by  some  of 
those  here  that  are  here  at  that  head 
table,  who  will  be  reporting  to  you  ali 
Some  of  us  worked  together;  some  of 
dispersed  so  that  we  could  gather  mc 
information,  because  we  were  only 
there  for  a  few  hours,  a  day,  2  days. 

Department  of  State  Bull; 


East  Asia 


We  went  to  the  refugee  camps  in 
[land,  Kampuchea,  that  I  have  al- 
ly talked  about,  Sakeo.  We  wit- 
.ed  the  disease,  the  dislocation  of 
ons,  suffering,  starvation.  We  saw 
y,  young  and  old.  We  saw  children 
rated  from  their  parents,  afflicted 
malaria  and  malnutrition. 
In  the  camp  at  Ubon,  for  refugees 
Laos,  conditions  were  substan- 
y  better.  There  are  appro.ximately 
00  persons  there.  That  camp  is  4  or 
ars  old.  They  eat  well,  but  they 
t  go  out  of  the  camp.  They  have 
there,  some  for  3  or  4  years, 
ing  to  resettle  abroad.  And  al- 
gh  the  living  conditions  are  so 

better  than  Sakeo,  they  are  still 
mything  that  you  would  call  good. 
It  is  sad  to  see  them  with  no  pur- 
.  They  at  first  thought  they  might 
ick  into  Laos.  Now  they  know  they 
t,  or  don't  want  to.  And  they're 
ing  to  be  resettled,  some  of  them 
ng  that  they've  been  forgotten  by 
vorld,  because  the  focus  has  been 
le  Kampucheans,  the  focus  has 
on  the  boat  jjeoijle.  And  these 
e  really  feel  forgotten.  I  was 
led  by  them.  And  one  of  the  girls 
worked  with  me  said  that  one  of 
nain  problems  they  have  with  these 
le  is  mental  depression,  just 
ing  day  to  day  for  4  or  5  years, 
ng  to  see  what  happens  to  them. 
At  the  transit  center,  the  refugee 
it  center  in  Bangkok,  we  saw 
crowded  and  humiliating  conditions 
h  refugees  awaiting  final  process- 
or immigration  must  endure.  These 
things  that  I  don't  think  I'll  ever 
t.  These  were  people  who  have  al- 
y  been  chosen  to  go  to  other  coun- 
and  have  to  wait  in  an  unbelieva- 
ilace,  some  for  a  month  and  a  half 
months.  We  try  to  process  ours, 
mes  that  are  coming  to  the  United 
s,  much  earlier,  but  still  the  condi- 
are  unbearable. 

While  we  were  there  in  Bangkok, 
ad  candid  discussions  with  repre- 
atives  of  the  international  volun- 
organizations  to  discuss  their 
;,  their  frustrations,  and  the  need 
etter  coordination.  We  did  have  a 
good  meeting,  and  everybody,  I 
<.  vented  their  frustrations,  and 
ybody  decided  that  there  was  a 
t  need  for  coordination. 
We  met  with  the  King  and  Queen  of 
land  to  discuss  the  whole  spectrum 
e  refugee  problem  and  the  need  for 
ler  sites,  because  we  must  have 
ler  sites  for  this  200,000-300,000 
are  expected  to  come  into  Thailand 


from  Cambodia — and  they're  expected 
to  come  in  in  the  next  3  or  4  weeks.  The 
situation  is  urgent. 

We  had  a  long  discussion  with 
Prime  Minister  Kriangsak,  a  fruitful 
discussion,  about  the  political  and 
foreign  policy  risks  that  are  facing  the 
Thai  Government  because  of  their 
policies.  It  is  important  that  the  inter- 
national community  provide  visible  and 
demonstrable  jjolitical,  economic,  and 
security  support  to  the  Thais. 

As  we  flew  back  to  Washington,  we 
got  together  on  the  airplane  and 
worked  on  our  report  for  the  President, 
which  stresses  the  urgency  of  the  situa- 
tion, and  we  did  lay  out  some  specific 
recommendations.  We  will  give  you 
that  report  this  morning.  In  fact,  you 
have  in  your  brochure  a  folder  with  our 
recommendations  in  it. 

We  need  your  careful  consideration 
of  our  recommendations.  We  need  your 
creative  ideas  for  how  to  implement 
them,  your  support,  and  your  consen- 
sus. I  do  not  know  when  I  have  ever 
felt  a  sense  of  urgency  more  about  cut- 
ting redtape  and  unblocking  logjams 
and  moving  ahead. 

I  think  I  can  say  with  some  assur- 
ance that  the  American  people  are 
ready  to  help.  They  are  already 
mobilizing  help  as  you  here  indicate, 
and  as  I  have  seen  and  heard  through 
my  mail  and  telephone  calls  and  with 
people  in  the  whole  country  concerned 
about  this  problem.  But  they  need  to 
know  how  to  help,  and  they  need  to 
know  now.  They  need  to  know  where  to 
turn;  they  need  to  know  that  now.  They 
need  to  know  what  is  needed,  and  it's 
our  responsibility  to  give  the  people  of 
our  country  specific  information  about 
ways  they  can  reach  out  to  their  fellow 
man.  We  cannot  lose  time.  Time  is — the 
situation  is  urgent. 

I  understand  that  most  of  you  who 
are  here  have  prepared  briefing  papers 
about  your  programs  and  your  prob- 
lems. I  know  that  you  will  be  address- 
ing yourselves  to  this  issue  throughout 
the  day,  and  I  look  forward  to  being 
with  you  again  at  the  end  of  the  after- 
noon so  that  I  can  have  a  report  for  the 
things  that  you  talk  about  during  the 
day. 

But  now  I  want  to  call  on  the  mem- 
bers of  my  traveling  party,  who've 
brought  back  new  information  which 
might  be  helpful  to  you.  Then  I  would 
like  to  share — after  we  get  through 
with  the  reports  we  will  look  at  the  rec- 


ommendations, and  I  can  tell  you  then 
some  of  the  steps  that  we  are  already 
taking  to  implement  some  of  these  rec- 
ommendations. H 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Nov.  19,  1979. 

^For  text  of  the  Senators'  report,  see 
Bulletin  of  Dec.  1979,  p.  4. 

'  For  text  of  the  President's  an- 
nouncement on  Oct.  24,  see  BULLETIN  of 
Dec.  1979,  p.  7. 


Pacific  Basin 


by  David  D.  Newsom 

E.n'erpt^:  from  an  address  before 
the  Pacific  Basin  Economic  Council  in 
Los  Angeles  on  May  15,  1979.  Atnhas- 
sador  Newsom  is  Under  Secretary  for 
Political  Affairs.  The  full  text  of  this 
address  may  be  obtained  from  the  Pub- 
lic Information  Service,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State, 
Washington.  D.C.  20520.^ 

"...  the  Pacific  Basin  [is]  a  part  of 
the  world  where,  for  the  United  States, 
at  least,  the  positive  elements  out- 
number the  negative.  In  this  area,  an- 
cient protagonists  appear  prepared  to 
talk  to  each  other — with  mediators. 
Clearly,  regional  cooperation  is  more 
than  a  slogan.  The  problem  in  many 
countries  of  the  region  is  not  how  to 
stimulate  growth  but  how  to  control  it 
and  direct  it. 

"[Normalization  of  relations  with 
the  People's  Republic  of  China]  is  of 
major  significance  not  only  for  our  two 
countries  but  for  the  longer  term  peace 
and  stability  of  Asia.  Already  we  are 
well  into  a  large  agenda  of  trade,  legal, 
and  cultural  discussions  with  the 
Chinese.  Of  equal  importance,  we  are 
moving  into  a  better  understanding  of 
others'  points  of  view  on  global  issues. 

"In  the  satisfaction  of  our  renewed 
communication  with  China,  we  should 
not  forget  that  we  continue  to  be  two 
nations  quite  different  in  character  and 
with  often  different  perceptions  of 
events  in  Asia  and  around  the  world. 
We  should  not  be  surprised  if  occasional 
problems  and  disappointments  arise. 

"We  have  rough  spots  in  our  rela- 
tions with  Japan  but  almost  exclusively 
in  the  economic  field.  .  .  .  We  are  both 
mindful  that  the  United  States  and 
Japan  are  now  the  world's  two  largest 
non-Communist  economies.  .  .  .  Con- 
sidering the  breadth  of  economic  con- 
tacts and  some  basic  differences  in  the 
way  the  two  economies  work,  it  is  not 


East  Asia 


unnatural  that  we  should  have  prob- 
lems." 

"The  Soviet  Union,  after  the  col- 
lapse of  its  major  effort  in  Indonesia  in 
the  1960s,  had  relatively  little  impact 
on  Southeast  Asia.  The  active  Soviet 
support  for  the  Vietnamese  invasion  of 
Kampuchea  threatens  to  change  that. 
Soviet  naval  vessels  have  called  at 
Vietnamese  ports.  A  Soviet  airlift  has 
brought  extensive  supplies  to  Vietnam. 
The  possibility  of  greater  use  by  Soviet 
air  and  naval  forces  of  facilities  in  Viet- 
nam would  be  disturbing,  not  only  to  us 
but  to  the  Japanese  and  other  nations  in 
the  area  concerned  both  about  the  .secu- 
rity of  sealanes  and  about  preventing 
major  power  confrontation  in  Asia."H 

'  Press  release  132. 


World  Efforts  To  Aid  Kampucheans 

International  Appeal — launched  Nov.  .5,  1979,  at  U.N.  pledging  conference 
International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross  (ICRC)-UNICEF 

Relief  for  2.5  million  Khmer  in  Kampuchea  for  1  year 
U.N.  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  (UNHCR) 

Relief  for  Khmer  fleeing  to  Thailand  for  8  months 

Estimated  Pledges 


$2.51,000,0  ; 

$60,000,(i'> 
$311, 000, f 
$210, 000, ( 


ICRC-UNICEF 

From  mid-October  to  November  22,  ICRC-UNICEF  operated  a  daily  airlift  from 
Bangkok  to  Phnom  Penh  and  received  additional  flights  which  brought  in  886  metric  t( 
(MT)  of  relief  supplies.  By  November  18,  ICRC-UNICEF,  working  through  the  Work 
Food  Program  (WFP),  landed  food  supplies  at  Kompong  Som  port,  which,  combined  w 
Oxfam  shipments,  totaled  10,030  MT.  Phnom  Penh  authorities  agreed  November  4  to  op 
the  Mekong  River  to  relief  supplies.  An  Oxfam  barge  and  a  French  barge,  lie  de  Liim 
)iere.  were  able  to  land  2,510  MT  at  Phnom  Penh  via  the  Mekong  route.  ICRC-UNICI 
projects  it  will  reach  a  monthly  goal  of  34,500  MT  of  food  supplies  during  January  198( 
Relief  efforts  are  particularly  impeded  by  political  restrictions  on  the  radius  of  distrib 
tion  and  quantity  of  relief  agency  personnel.  Further,  ICRC-UNICEF  advises  that  d( 
spite  pledges  made  at  the  U.N.  conference,  a  critical  need  for  cash  funding  for  the  rel  I 
effort  now  exists. 


U.N.  Response 

Currently  estimated  U.S.  contribution 

$        925,000 

25,000,000 

5,000,000 

15,000,000 

30,000,000 

30.000.000 

Total 


(FY  1979  funds) 

(PL  480  food  commodities) 

(ca.sh  grant  to  ICRC-UNICEF) 

(UNHCR  for  Khmer  in  Thailand) 

(new  funds)' 

(reprograming  authority) 


$105,925,000 

As  of  late  November,  the  U.S.  Government  had  expended  $20,257,830  and  had  either 
shipped  or  is  in  the  process  of  preparing  $25,000,000  worth  of  PL  480  commodities  in 
response  to  WFP  requests.  Detailed  breakdown  follows; 


Amount     To/For 
Kampuchea        $5,000,000      ICRC-UNICEF  for  start-up  costs 
2.000.000      UNICEF  for  rice  purchases 
25.000,000      WFP  request  for  PL  480  commodities.  Ac- 
tivity to  date: 

Kampuchea — U.S.  Department  of  Ag- 
riculture purchases  10,000  MT  rice;  2,500  MT 
en  route,  remainder  arrives  late  December; 
3,781  MT  nonfat  dry  milk  (NFDM)  to  arrive 
December;  1,000  MT  vegetable  oil  to  arrive 
December. 
Thailand— 45  MT  instant  corn-soya-milk  (ICSM) 
arrived  Bangkok  11/12;  2,000  MT  corn-.soya- 
milk  to  arrive  December;  1,000  MT  vegetable 
oil;  1,000  MT  NFDM-2  shipments  arriving 
November/December. 
Thailand  $  300. 000*      ICRC  grant  for  border  feeding 

625,000»      Catholic  Relief  Services,  border  feeding 
9.000,000      UNHCR  for  care  and  maintenance  of  Khmer 
100.000      Thai  Red  Cross,  donation  by  Mrs.  Carter 
450,000      UNHCR  for  800  tents 
290.000      WFP  grant  for  leasing  trucks 

2,500      WFP  grant  to  pay  for  engineer 
500,000      Catholic  Relief  Services,  border  feeding 
407,830'      Special  airlift  medical/relief  supplies  per  Presi- 
dent's 11/13  decision;  arrived  Bangkok  11/20 
168.000      Air  transport  cost  for  11/12  airlift  of  ICSM  to 

Bangkok 
27.000      ICRC  for  two  field  labs 
250.000      U.S.  Embassy  Bangkok  for  emergency 
funds  for  Khmer  relief 
95,000      UNHCR  for  communications  equipment 
512,500      WFP  for  food  processing 

20.000      Medical  survey  team  for  Khmer  camps  in  Thailand 
600,000''      Airlift  cost  for  cranes  — UNICEF 
Total  $45,347,830 


E. 

11' 


iii 


Press  release  312,  Nov.  30,  1979.  '  Not  yet  appropriated.  =  FY  1979  funds.  =  Estimate 
cost. 

Department  of  State  BulftiB: 


East  Asia 


US.-China  Trade 
Igreement 

•ytyarren  Christopher 

Stiitement  before  the  Subcommittee 
'  "t'  ruafional  Trade  of  the  Senate 
'•':■'!■  Committee  on  November  15. 
•    Mr.  Christopher  is  Deputy  Sec- 
.  Ill  ,if  Stated 

I  am  pleased  to  have  this  opportu- 
to  testify  on  behalf  of  the  Agree- 
it  on  Trade  Relations  that  we  signed 
1  the  People's  Republic  of  China 
/  7  and  which  the  President  trans- 
ted  to  the  Congress  for  approval  Ge- 
ar 23.2 

The  establishment  of  diplomatic 
itions  January  1  opened  a  new  era 
U.S. -China  relations,  based  on 
ality,  mutual  interest,  and  respect, 
lomatic  recognition  alone,  however, 
s  not  automatically  insure  the  de- 
|)pment  of  a  normal  and  mutually 
leficial  relationship.  Thus  our  task  is 
I  r:  to  build  a  new  i-elationship  in 
kible  and  practical  ways. 
I  Barriers  to  trade  pose  one  hin- 
jnce  to  a  fruitful  relationship  with 
I  P.R.C.  The  trade  agreement  you 
|e  before  you,  by  reducing  these  bar- 
Is  and  creating  incentives  to  trade, 
go  a  long  way  toward  cementing 
bonds  between  China  and  the 
ted  States.  Nondiscriminatory 
itment,  credits,  insurance,  a  favora- 
investment  climate,  and  business 
litation  are  the  lifeblood  of  trade, 
hout  them,  trade  with  China  would 
ler.  With  them,  we  can  forge  the 
)le  and  constructive  ties  with  China 
L  we  seek  and  that  will  guide  us  into 
1980's  and  beyond. 
Our  new  ties  with  China  are  of  fun- 
lental  importance  to  the  United 
tes  and  to  the  prospects  for  a 
ceful  and  prosperous  world.  We 
it  to  encourage  China  to  play  a  con- 
ictive  and  stabilizing  role  in  Asia, 
want  to  see  a  prosperous  China,  a 
na  that  can  feed  and  fuel  itself. 
Every  long-term  global  problem— 
lomic  development,  population, 
1,  natural  resources,  or  the  envi- 
nent,  to  cite  just  a  few  examples — 
benefit  from  positive  contributions 
n  both  China  and  the  United  States, 
trade  agreement  not  only  sym- 
zes  our  mutuality  of  interest  in  pro- 
ing  closer  ties  but  also  our  support 
a  modern  China,  secure  and  out- 
dlooking,  which  will  be  part  of  the 
tion  to  such  problems. 


Failure  to  approve  this  agreement 
would,  unfortunately,  be  viewed  as  a 
sign  that  the  United  States  is  not  in- 
terested in  moving  toward  such  a  con- 
structive, mutually  beneficial  relation- 
ship with  the  Chinese.  It  is  in  our 
interest  for  China's  ne.xt  generation  of 
leaders  to  look  back  in  1990  upon  the 
relationship  we  are  now  building  with  a 
sense  of  satisfaction  and  to  view  the 
United  States  as  a  reliable  partner  in 
development. 

The  First  Year 

Beginning  with  the  January  visit 
here  by  Vice  Premier  Deng  Xiaoping, 
we  began  building  the  framework  of  our 
new  relationship.  We  signed  agree- 
ments in  science  and  technology,  cul- 
tural, and  consular  affairs. 

In  March  former  [Treasury]  Sec- 
retary Blumenthal  initialed  a  claims- 
assets  agreement  which  removed  a  sig- 
nificant obstacle  to  the  development  of 
economic  and  commercial  relations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  China.  We 
also  established  a  joint  economic  com- 
mittee with  China  to  help  coordinate 
the  development  of  our  economic  ac- 
tivities. This  committee  will  hold  its 
first  meeting  early  next  year  under 
Ti-easury  Secretary  G.  William  Miller. 

In  May  Secretary  [of  Commerce 
Juanita]  Kreps  signed  the  claims-assets 
agreement  and  initialed  the  trade 
agreement.  During  this  same  period, 
high-ranking  Chinese  officials  visited 
this  country  at  the  invitations  of  the 
Departments  of  Energy  and  Commerce 
in  cooperation  with  private  industry. 
And  a  number  of  U.S.  oil  companies 
signed  contracts  to  assist  China's 
offshore  oil  development. 

In  August  Vice  President  Mondale 
capped  this  extraordinary  period  by 
signing  a  hydropower  and  water  con- 
servation agreement,  by  opening  the 
first  U.S.  Consulate  General  on  the 
Chinese  mainland  in  30  years,  and  by 
stating  our  readiness  to  extend  Exim- 
bank  credits  and  Overseas  Private  In- 
vestment Corporation  guarantees  to 
China,  as  well  as  giving  a  boost  to 
bilateral  civil  aviation  and  maritime 
discussions. 

Clearly,  we  have  come  far  in  the 
past  year  in  developing  our  ties  with 
China.  Until  this  agreement  is  ap- 
proved, however,  we  will  remain  the 
only  major  trading  partner  that  does 
not  have  some  form  of  trade  agreement 
with  China  and  that  suffers  from  the 
competitive  disadvantage  that  lack  of 
nondiscriminatory  treatment  of  com- 
merce entails. 


Benefits  of  Trade 

Although  small  in  world  terms,  our 
trade  with  China  is  expanding  rapidly 
again  this  year  after  more  than  tripling 
in  1978  to  $1.1  billion.  Our  trade  bal- 
ance with  China  continues  to  weigh 
heavily  in  our  favor. 

Trade  with  the  West  is  critical  to 
China's  modernization.  Its  imports  of 
capital  equipment  and  industrial  mate- 
rials are  expected  to  continue  increas- 
ing faster  than  its  export  earnings.  For 
China  the  trade  equation  is  simple:  It 
must  sell  more  in  order  to  buy  more. 
Extending  most-favored-nation  (MFN) 
trading  status  to  China  is  fundemental 
to  this  equation. 

Of  course,  this  agreement  will 
benefit  the  United  States  as  well  as 
China.  The  foreign  exchange  that  China 
earns  from  sales  to  the  United  States 
will  allow  it  to  purchase  more  goods 
from  us,  thereby  benefiting  U.S. 
exporters,  helping  our  balance  of  pay- 
ments, and  reducing,  through  competi- 
tion, inflationary  pressures.  Without 
this  agreement,  the  United  States 
penalizes  its  exporters,  who  will  have 
to  face  their  European  and  Japanese 
competitors  supported  by  governments 
that  have  already  extended  lines  of 
credit  and  MFN  to  China.  In  a  market 
with  limited  foreign  exchange,  this  rep- 
resents an  appreciable  advantage  for 
our  competition  and  a  disadvantage  to 
us. 

I  would  now  like  to  focus  the  re- 
mainder of  my  remarks  on  the  political 
perspective  with  which  this  agreement 
should  be  viewed. 

Political  Perspectives 

I  know  that  questions  have  been 
raised  about  the  implications  that  sub- 
mission of  this  agreement  may  have  for 
our  policy  toward  the  Soviet  Union.  I 
want  to  be  clear  on  this  matter.  We 
want  to  improve  economic  relations 
with  both  countries.  But  we  do  not  feel 
that  we  should  make  every  move  with 
one  country  dependent  on  making  the 
same  move  at  precisely  the  same  time 
with  the  other.  Such  a  rigid  policy 
would  fail  to  recognize  relevant  differ- 
ences in  the  factual  situation  with  re- 
spect to  the  two  nations  as  well  as  rel- 
evant matters  of  timing. 

We  signed  a  trade  agreement  with 
the  Soviet  Union  in  1972.  We  have  not 
yet  submitted  it  to  Congress.  When  we 
do — which  I  hope  will  be  soon — it  will 
be  because  it  is  warranted  by  the  fac- 
tual situation,  because  it  is  consistent 
with  our  policy  toward  the  Soviet 
Union,  and  because  the  timing  is 


Jary  1980 


East  Asia 


fight — and  not  because  of  our  policy 
toward  China  or  some  other  third  coun- 
try. 

In  the  last  3  years  China's  eco- 
nomic, political,  and  cultui-al  policies 
have  undergone  substantial  change. 
There  is  greater  diversity  in  almost  all 
aspects  of  Chinese  life.  Economic  de- 
centralization, interaction  with  the 
West,  and  e.\perimentation  with  new 
ideas  and  concepts  have  been  matched 
by  an  increased  openness  and  a  willing- 
ness to  admit  problems.  The  Chinese 
leadership  publicly  has  committed  itself 
to  raising  the  living  standards  of  the 
people. 

The.se  new  developments  should  be 
kept  in  perspective.  We  cannot  ignore 
China's  long  authoritarian  tradition, 
but  neither  should  we  turn  our  back  on 
what  is  beginning  to  happen.  It  should 
be  a  source  of  satisfaction  to  us  that  the 
Chinese  Government  is  determined  to 
develop  a  legal  system  that  would  pi-e- 
vent  the  unchecked  exercise  of  official 
authority. 

China's  emigration  policies,  which 
have  undergone  substantial  change  in 
the  last  3  years,  are  of  particular  im- 
portance to  this  subcommittee.  Under 
the  provisions  of  the  Jackson- Vanik 
amendment,  MFN  treatment  of  Com- 
munist nations  that  restrict  emigration 
is  prohibited.  That  prohibition,  how- 
ever, may  be  waived  if  the  President 
concludes  and  reports  to  Congress  that 
the  amendment's  requirements  per- 
taining to  a  country's  emigration  prac- 
tices have  been  satisfied.  The  Trade 
Act  vests  in  the  President  the  respon- 
sibility to  determine  whether  these  re- 
quirements have  been  met.  In  his  re- 
port to  the  Congress  the  President  set 
forth  his  conclusion  that  in  the  case  of 
the  P.R.C.,  these  requirements  have, 
indeed,  been  met. 

The  President's  conclusion  was 
based  upon  an  analysis  and  weighing  of 
three  factors.  These  include  China's 
current  emigration  performance,  public 
statements  by  Chinese  officials,  and  our 
confidential  diplomatic  discussions  with 
Chinese  officials. 

On  the  first  element,  emigration 
from  China  has  increased  dramatically 
over  the  past  2  years.  In  1978,  71,000 
persons  emigrated  from  Hong  Kong, 
the  major  exit  point  from  the  P.R.C. 
This  figure  is  three  times  the  number 
who  emigrated  in  1977.  This  trend  con- 
tinued in  1979  with  28,000  emigrants 
entering  Hong  Kong  in  the  first  3 
months  alone.  The  number  has  slowed 
somewhat  since  April  due  primarily  to 
prote.sts  by  the  Hong  Kong  Govern- 
ment. Nevertheless,  4,000-5,000  emig- 
rants continue  to  enter  Hong  Kong  each 
month. 


10 


The  U.S.  Consulate  General  in 
Hong  Kong  received  over  10,000  appli- 
cations from  P.R.C.  emigrants  between 
November  1978  and  April  1979.  Chinese 
emigrants  and  visa  applicants  now  far 
exceed  the  available  immigrant  visa 
numbers  chargeable  to  China.  There- 
fore, several  thousand  have  been  ob- 
liged to  wait  in  China  and  in  Hong  Kong 
until  visa  numbers  become  available. 

That  the  P.R.C.  has  liberalized  its 
emigration  policy  is  confirmed  by  public 
statements  of  Chinese  officials.  Mi'. 
Liao,  the  Director  of  the  Office  of  Over- 
seas Chinese  Affairs,  stated  on  January 
4,  1978:  "We  should  provide  .  .  .  for 
foreign  nationals  of  Chinese  descent  to 
visit  their  relatives  in  China  or  make  a 
tour  of  the  country  as  well  as  for 
Chinese  citizens  to  go  abroad  for  re- 
union with  their  kinfolk  of  foreign  na- 
tionality, simplify  the  procedure  for 
getting  permission  to  enter  or  leave 
China,  give  warm  reception  to  those 
entei'ing  China,  and  improve  our  serv- 
ice." China  has  followed  this  theme 
consistently  since  this  instruction  was 
issued. 

Mr.  Liao  elaborated  on  this  policy 
in  Decembei'  1978  when  he  stated  that 
Chinese  who  had  received  visas  from 
other  countries  should  be  granted  exit 
permits  "immediately."  During  his  visit 
to  the  United  States  in  January  1979, 
Vice  Premier  Deng  Xiaoping  reiterated 
this  policy  publicly  before  the  U.S.- 
China People's  Friendship  Association. 
Adding  weight  to  the  Vice  Premier's 
remarks,  the  consular  agreement  con- 
cluded during  his  visit  contains  a  com- 
mitment by  China  ".  .  .  to  facilitate  the 
reunion  of  families  and  [to]  process  all 
applications  as  quickly  as  possi- 
ble ..  .  ." 

On  the  final  element,  U.S.  and 
Chinese  officials  conducted  confidential 
conversations  in  which  the  Trade  Act's 
emigration  requirements  and  Chinese 
emigration  policy  came  to  be  mutually 
understood.  The  conversations  indicate 
that  the  P.R.C.  is  liberalizing  its  emi- 
gration rules  and  intends  to  continue 
this  policy. 

We  have  examined  China's  emigra- 
tion record,  we  have  studied  the  public 
statements  made  by  their  officials,  and 
we  have  had  discussions  with  the 
Chinese  on  their  emigration  policy. 
Based  upon  all  of  these  factors,  we  are 
confident,  as  the  President  has  re- 
ported, that  the  requirements  of  Sec- 
tion 402  of  the  Trade  Act  have  been 
satisfied. 


In  closing,  I  seek  your  support  ^U 
urge  that  you  give  this  agreement 
speedy  approval.  We  are  now  buildir 
the  structure  of  our  relationship  witl 
China  for  the  1980's.  This  relationsh^ 
is  and  will  continue  to  be  very  impon 
tant  to  us.  Your  approval  of  this  trad 
agreement  is  a  critical  step  in  the  pr 
ess.  I  am  confident  of  your  support. II 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hea 
ings  will  be  published  bv  the  committee 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendei 
of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printii 
Office,  Wa.shington,  D.C.  20402. 

^For  texts  of  the  agreement  and  th. 
President's  message  to  the  Congress,  se^ 
Bulletin  of  Dec.  1979,  p.  33. 


Agreements  With 
Taiwan 

by  Warren  Christopher 

Statement  before  the  Snbcounni 
for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  i 
the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Coinn, 
tee  on  November  16,  1979.  Mr.  Chri 
pher  is  Deputy  Secretary  of  State.  ^ 

I  am  pleased  to  appear  today  bef 
the  committee  to  review  our  experie 
with  the  unofficial  arrangements  th; 
we  have  established  with  Taiwan. 

For  years  the  United  States,  al 
among  the  major  nations  of  the  wori 
refused  to  accord  recognition  to  the  i' 
People's  Republic  of  China  (P.R.C 
This  anomaly  hindered  our  diplomac; 
Asia  and  thwarted  the  development 
economic  relations  with  a  country  th 
is  the  home  of  one-fourth  of  the  wor 
population. 

Following  6  months  of  intense  d 
cussions  both  here  and  in  Beijing, 
President  Carter  announced  almost 
year  ago  that  the  United  States  wot 
henceforth  recognize  the  P.R.C.  as  i 
sole  legitimate  Government  of  Chins 
At  the  same  time  the  President  an- 
nounced our  intention  to  sever  offici 
relations  with  Taiwan. 

The  development  of  our  relation 
with  the  P.R.C.  over  the  i)ast  year 
stands  as  testimony  to  the  wisdom  o 
the  President's  decision.  As  this  con 
mittee  is  aware,  the  Administration 
recently  submitted  to  the  Congress 
Agreement  on  Trade  Relations  that 
would  extend  most-favored-nation  n 
discriminatory  trade  status  to  the 
P.R.C. 2 

While  our  improved  relations  w: 
China  have  been  gratifying,  I  am 


mI 


Department  of  State  BullMyj 


East  Asia 


l\y  pleased  by  the  fact  that  the 
ring  of  our  diplomatic  relations 
Taiwan  has  not  adversely  affected 
ivelfare  of  the  people  nor  has  it 
jched  the  practical  ties  that  exist 
teen  Taiwan  and  the  United  States. 
Taiwan's  economy  today  is  even 
5>  \  iuorous  than  it  was  before  we 
iialized  relations  with  the  P.R.C. 
;  an's  GNP  is  growing  robustly,  and 
St  rial  production  is  increasing  at 
uT  \ear.  Projected  U.S. -Taiwan 
,•  Ini-  1979  is  $10  billion  compared 
$7..",  billion  in  1978.  This  repre- 
s  an  increase  of  33%.  U.S.  private 
stment  in  Taiwan,  a  very  good  indi- 
r  of  confidence  in  the  island's  fu- 
,  was  $68.7  million  in  the  first  half 
is  year  compared  with  $27.1  million 
ng  the  same  period  in  1978 — a 
:ing  increase. 

and  CCNAA 

I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  the 
isition  from  official  to  unofficial  re- 
ns  has  been  problem  free.  But  the 
'an  Relations  Act,  the  basis  for  our 
relations,  has  afforded  us  the 
bility  to  deal  with  problems  co- 
atively  and  imaginatively.  In  par- 
I  ar,  the  unofficial  instrumentalities 
I  ir  new  relationship — the  American 
litute  in  Taiwan  (AIT)  and  the 
t  -dination  Council  for  North  Ameri- 
Affairs  (CCNAA)— have  proved 
j "  effectiveness  during  the  transi- 

In  accordance  with  the  Taiwan 
itions  Act,  the  President  issued  an 
cutive  order  that,  among  other 
gs,  delegates  to  the  Secretary  of 
e  the  authority  to  extend  functional 
ileges  and  immunities  on  a  recip- 
1  basis  to  the  CCNAA. 
AIT  provided  CCNAA  a  copy  of  a 
t  agreement  on  privileges  and  im- 
Lities  on  September  20,  1979,  to 
::h  CCNAA  has  responded.  Differ- 
I'S  are  minimal,  and  agreement  be- 
en the  parties  should  soon  result.  In 
meantime,  the  two  sides  have  ex- 
led  functional  privileges  to  allow  for 
ctive  operations  of  the  two  organi- 
3ns.  To  conduct  its  affairs,  the 
^AA  has  opened  nine  offices  in  our 
itry — a  number  that  is  appropriate 
our  new  relationship  with  Taiwan. 
Although  our  unofficial  relations 
1  Taiwan  are  coordinated  through 
AIT,  we  have  recognized  that  is- 
s  could  arise  which  are  beyond  the 
mieal  competence  of  the  AIT.  We 
e  made  it  clear  that,  to  the  extent 
essary  and  appropriate,  we  would 
mge  for  technical  contacts  with 


U.S.  Government  employees  through 
AIT.  Such  instances  have,  in  fact, 
arisen,  and  the  appropriate  contacts 
have  been  arranged. 

I  would  now  like  to  address  for  the 
record  some  of  the  issues  regarding 
agreements  in  an  attempt  to  clarify  the 
Administration's  intentions  and,  I  hope, 
to  dispel  any  misunderstandings. 

Existing  Agreements 

When  we  normalized  our  relations 
with  the  P.R.C,  we  made  crystal  clear 
our  intention  to  maintain,  on  an  unoffi- 
cial basis,  trade,  cultural,  and  other 
relations  with  Taiwan.  We  believed  it 
essential  that  our  existing  agreements 
with  Taiwan  would  continue  to  have 
legal  validity,  despite  the  withdrawal  of 
recognition.  The  President,  therefore, 
issued  a  presidential  memorandum  on 
December  30,  1978,  which  stated  that: 
"Existing  international  agreements  and 
arrangements  in  force  between  the 
United  States  and  Taiwan  shall  con- 
tinue in  force  .  .  .  ."^  The  Administra- 
tion welcomed  the  addition  of  Section 
4(c)  of  the  Taiwan  Relations  Act,  which 
approved  the  continuation  in  force  of 
such  agreements  "...  unless  and  until 
terminated  in  accordance  with 
law  .  .  .,"  because  that  provision  fur- 
ther removed  any  doubt  about  their 
continuing  validity.  This  treatment  of 
existing  agreements  by  the  Administra- 
tion and  Congress  stands  in  contrast  to 
that  of  most  other  nations  which  abro- 
gated their  agreements  with  Taiwan 
upon  recognizing  the  P.R.C. 

Our  relationship  with  Taiwan  is  not 
static.  It  has  not  been  frozen  in  the 
status  quo  that  existed  at  the  moment 
we  recognized  the  P.R.C.  Some  of  our 
agreements  with  Taiwan  will  expire, 
perhaps  calling  for  replacement  with 
new  agreements:  some  will  require 
changes  or  updating:  and  others,  having 
completed  their  purposes,  will  become 
obsolete.  However,  I  want  to  em- 
phasize that  we  do  not  have  a  policy  to 
convert  or  terminate  all  of  the  treaties 
and  agreements  we  maintain  with 
Taiwan.  Each  agreement,  as  the  cir- 
cumstances require,  will  be  considered 
on  its  own  merits,  on  a  case-by-case 
basis. 

In  that  context,  we  have 
undertaken  a  review  of  these  agree- 
ments with  Taiwan  and  I  will  share 
with  you  our  preliminary  views  on 
them.  There  are  five  agreements  that 
require  current  attention. 

Scientific  Cooperation.  First,  our 
agreement  on  t  4entific  coopei'ation, 
which  both  sides  have  found  beneficial, 
expires  in  January  1980.  Negotiations 
for  a  new  agreement  will  soon  begin  be- 


tween the  AIT  and  CCNAA.  Under  the 
Taiwan  Relations  Act,  agreements  con- 
cluded by  these  unofficial  instrumen- 
talities have  full  force  and  effect  under 
U.S.  law. 

Air  Transport.  Second,  the  air 
transport  agreement,  concluded  in 
Nanjing  [Nanking]  in  1946,  has  become 
a  hindrance  to  development  of  aviation 
relations  with  the  P.R.C.  It  was  only 
after  Vice  President  Mondale,  during 
his  trip  to  China  in  August,  informed 
Beijing  that  we  planned  to  replace  the 
Nanjing  agreement  with  a  new  agree- 
ment between  the  AIT  and  the  CCNAA 
that  the  Chinese  Govei'nment  agreed  to 
begin  negotiations  for  a  U.S. -P.R.C. 
civil  aviation  agreement.  In  any  event, 
a  new  basis  for  air  links  with  Taiwan 
would  be  useful  in  improving  U.S.- 
Taiwan air  services.  Negotiations  cur- 
rently are  underway  between  AIT  and 
CCNAA  on  a  civil  air  agreement.  Good 
progress  is  being  made  in  the  talks  and 
we  would  hope  to  have  a  new  agree- 
ment soon. 

Textiles.  Third,  our  textile  agree- 
ment with  Taiwan  requires  some  im- 
plementing modification.  These  are 
being  handled  by  AIT-CCNAA  letters 
of  understanding. 

Nuclear  Cooperation.  Fourth, 
pursuant  to  the  Nuclear  Nonprolifera- 
tion  Act  of  1978,  we  are  reviewing  the 
nuclear  cooperation  agreement. 

Trade.  Fifth,  on  October  24, 
CCNAA  and  AIT  exchanged  letters 
implementing  multilateral  trade 
negotiations-related  reductions  in  tariff 
and  nontariff  barriers. 

Having  mentioned  these  five 
categories  that  require  action,  no  other 
agreements  appear  to  require  current 
attention. 

Active  Programs 

A  second  group  of  29  agreements 
concerns  active  programs  or  contains 
provisions  of  continuing  relevance.  For 
example,  this  group  contains  agree- 
ments on  active  programs  in  the  fields 
of  education,  fisheries,  investment, 
postal  affairs,  and  the  Treaty  of 
Friendship,  Commerce,  and  Naviga- 
tion. 

Two  agricultural  sales  agreements, 
on  the  other  hand,  contain  provisions  of 
continuing  relevance.  They  relate  to 
commodities  which  have  previously 
been  furnished  but  for  wliich  payment 
is  still  being  received  by  the  United 
States.  We  see  no  reason  at  this  time  to 
take  any  action  with  respect  to  these 
agreements. 

A  third  category  includes  the 
mutual  defense  treaty  and  six  agree- 
ments in  the  military  field.  The  Presi- 


luary  1980 


11 


East  Asia 


dent  has  given  notice  that  the  mutual 
defense  treaty  will  terminate  on 
January  1,  1980,  and  we  are  committed 
to  taking  the  steps  necessary  so  that 
the  termination  will  occur  as  scheduled. 
Accordingly,  all  related  military 
agreements  will  also  terminate  with 
the  mutual  defense  treaty  at  the  end  of 
the  year. 

In  addition,  two  nonmilitary 
agreements  have  been  rendered  moot 
by  normalization.  One  agreement  calls 
for  entry-free  privileges  for  consular 
officers,  and  the  other  concerns  the 
status  of  the  American  Embassy  lan- 
guage school.  We  no  longer  have  con- 
sular officers  on  Taiwan  and  the  Ameri- 
can Embassy  school  in  Taiwan  ceased  to 
function  on  February  28.  We  plan  to 
delete  these  agreements  from  the 
January  1980  Treaties  /w  Force. 

It  is  appropriate  here  to  dispel  a 
notion  that  arises  from  time  to  time. 
There  is  no  substance  to  the  rumor  that 
we  are  planning  an  additional  1-year 
moratorium  on  new  arms  sales  to 
Taiwan.  When  the  mutual  defense 
treaty  terminates  at  the  end  of  this 
year,  we  shall  continue  to  provide 
Taiwan  access  to  selected  defensive 
weapons. 

The  final  group  concerns  14  agree- 
ments that  appear  to  be  either  fully 
executed  or  inactive.  These  include  five 
agricultural  commodities  agreements,  a 
fully  executed  agreement  for  provision 
of  nuclear  research  and  training  equip- 
ment, and  two  agreements  relating  to 
our  economic  aid  program  to  Taiwan. 
We  wish  to  take  more  time  to  review 
these  agreements.  AIT  will  discuss 
them  with  CCNAA  to  assure  that  they 
contain  no  active  provisions  before  de- 
ciding on  their  disposition. 

After  further  review  and  as 
changing  circumstances  warrant,  we 
may  want  to  take  further  action  with 
respect  to  certain  of  our  agreements.  I 
want  to  assure  you  that  we  intend  to 
maintain  close  contact  with  Congress  on 
this  subject.  We  will,  of  course,  notify 
Congress  of  any  agreements  concluded 
between  the  AIT  and  CCNAA  as  pro- 
vided in  the  Taiwan  Relations  Act. 

Although  our  new  relationship  with 
Taiwan  has  required  creativity  and 
flexibility  on  the  part  of  officials  on 
both  sides,  the  experience  of  the  past 
year  has  demonstrated  the  viability  of 
that  new  relationship.  Recognition  of 
the  P.R.C.  has  not  resulted,  as  some 
feared,  in  the  interruption  of  our  rela- 
tions with  Taiwan.  Avoiding  a  dogmatic 
approach,  we  have  sought  to  promote 
those  ties  with  Taiwan  that  are  consist- 
ent with  diplomatic  relations  with  the 
P.R.C. 


12 


I  believe  that  the  evidence 
demonstrates  the  success  of  the  transi- 
tion. At  the  same  time  that  U.S.  trade 
and  investment  in  Taiwan  have  in- 
creased dramatically,  we  have  suc- 
cessfully preserved  the  terms  upon 
which  we  normalized  relations  with  the 
F.R.C.B 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
wnl  be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

*For  text  of  agreement,  see  Bulletin 
of  Dec.  1979,  p.  33. 

^For  full  te.\t,  see  Bulletin  of  Feb. 
1979,  p.  24. 


Accounting  for  MIAs 


by  Richard  Holbrooke 

Excerpts  from  a  statement  before 
the  Subcommittee  on  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs  of  the  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee  on  October  17,  1979. 
Mr.  Holbrooke  is  Assistant  Secretary 
for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs.' 

I'm  pleased  to  have  this  opportu- 
nity to  appear  before  the  subcommittee 
today  to  discuss  with  you  the  efforts 
this  Administration  has  made  through 
the  Department  of  State  to  obtain  an 
accounting  of  Americans  lost  in  South- 
east Asia.  You  will  recall  Deputy  As- 
sistant Secretary  [for  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs  Robert  B.]  Oakley's  ap- 
pearance before  your  subcommittee  this 
past  May,  in  which  he  reviewed  the  re- 
sults of  our  efforts  up  to  that  time.^  I 
would  like  to  .  .  .  bring  you  up  to  date 
on  developments  since  then, 

Vietnam's  attitude  toward  the 
question  of  an  aid  commitment  and  to- 
ward normalization  with  the  United 
States  evolved  over  the  summer  of  1978 
and  officials  of  the  Socialist  Republic  of 
Vietnam  (S.R.V.)  hinted  broadly  to 
other  governments  that  they  were  on 
the  verge  of  dropping  the  precondition. 
We  met  with  the  Vietnamese  in  New 
York  for  direct  discussions  on  issues  of 
mutual  concern  during  the  fall  of  1978. 
The  Vietnamese  indicated  officially  and 
clearly  they  were  no  longer  demanding 
U.S.  aid  as  a  quid  pro  quo  for  normali- 
zation. Discussion  on  missing-in-action 


(MIAs)  was  also  positive,  and  we  ex 
pected  an  agreement  on  normalizati(|j 
might  emerge  before  the  end  of  the  jj, 
year.  However,  progress  was  halted)! 
due  to  the  emergence  in  October  ancjf 
November  of  new  Vietnamese  polici  Hi 
toward  the  region,  especially  on  refi| 
gees  and  Kampuchea.  j|: 

Although  progress  toward  norniB, 
zation  has  been  suspended,  we  have  ij 
continued  our  efforts  to  obtain  a  full  [j- 
accounting. 

In  February  Secretary  Vance  si 
a  personal  message  stressing  our  co 
tinuing  strong  interest  in  obtaining  ],i 
Vietnamese  cooperation  on  the  POV  III 
MIA  issue. 

During  May  our  Embassy  in  Pa 
reiterated  to  the  Vietnamese  Emba 
there  our  government's  continuing  d 
concern  over  the  fate  of  those  still 
missing  in  action.  The  Vietnamese  I 
bassy  said  that  Hanoi  was  aware  of 
humanitarian  need  to  make  every  ef  ., 
in  this  regard.  ;! 

During  the  refugee  meeting  in  i 
donesia.  Deputy  Assistant  Secretar  k 
Oakley  made  the  same  point  in  stro  t 
terms  directly  to  Vu  Hoang,  the  S.F  III.- 
official  with  responsibility  for  POW  i 
MIA  matters.  ti 

In  response  to  a  suggestion  by  ;  I 
our  Embas.sy  in  Moscow  approached  ir 
Soviet  Government  in  May  to  reque  l; 
that  it  impress  upon  the  Vietnames  j 
the  importance  the  United  States  a  ll,. 
taches  to  the  MIA  issue  and  urge  tl 
to  provide  us  the  fullest  possible  ac  t 
counting  of  our  missing  men.  Our  E  ij 
bassy  noted  that  we  had  contacted    i: 
Vietnamese  directly  on  this  matter 
numerous  occasions  and  that  our  ap 
proach  to  the  Soviets  reflected  our 
sire  to  explore  every  possible  avenu 
resolve  the  MIA  issue.  A  Departmt 
of  State  officer  also  made  a  similar 
proach  to  a  Soviet  Embassy  officer  1 
in  Washington.  The  Soviet  Ministrj 
Foreign  Affairs,  Southeast  Asia  de- 
partment chief,  agreed  to  pass  on  o 
request  to  his  superiors  but  indicat 
the  "surer"  route  remained  direct  c 
tact  with  the  Vietnamese. 

In  June  our  Joint  Casualty  Res 
tion  Center  (JCRC)  liaison  officer  i: 
Bangkok  again  met  with  his  counte 
part  in  the  Vietnamese  Embassy  to 
provide  further  specific  informatior 
which  we  believed  might  assist  the 
Vietnamese  in  resolving  certain  ind 
vidual  cases.  In  addition,  he  drew  i 
tention  to  the  continuing,  strong 
American  public  interest  in  arrivinj 
an  MIA  accounting  and  in  this  conn 
tion  cited  the  National  League  of 
Families  of  American  Prisoners  of  ' 
and  Missing  in  Southeast  Asia. 


Department  of  State  Bui 


East  Asia 


Mr.  Oakley  reiterated  in  his  meet- 
'  with  the  Vietnamese  in  New  York 
line  and  July  the  intense  interest 
•li  till'  Administration,  the  Con- 
s.  and  the  American  people  retain 
If  MIA  issue  and  in  obtaining  the 
I'st  piissible  accounting  of  our  miss- 
tnieii.  He  noted  that  the  cooperation 
■•h  thi'  Vietnamese  had  provided 
lei-  in  helping  to  provide  such  an  ac- 
ntinu  had  had  a  direct  bearing  on 
levolution  of  our  relationship  and 
:  it  was  extremely  important  for 
.  nam  to  make  good  on  its  promise  to 
inue  to  provide  information  on 
is.  He  also  urged  that  your  con- 
sional  delegation  be  given  the  fuU- 
jossible  cooperation  on  this  matter 
n  it  visited  Hanoi. 
The  major  recent  event  on  the 
V-MIA  issue  was  the  visit  of  your 
ressional  delegation  to  Hanoi  Au- 
10-12.  As  you  know,  Mr.  Vu 
ng.  Chief  of  Consular  Affairs  of  the 
V.  Foreign  Ministry,  reviewed  the 
<.  of  his  committee  but  stated  that 
nam  had  reduced  manpower,  funds, 
material  devoted  to  recovering 
.  remains.  He  indicated  that 
iodic"  visits  by  JCRC  representa- 
Lt.  Col.  Paul  Mather  might  be  pos- 
'  and  also  agreed  to  discuss  with 
ngn  Minister  Thach  possible  ways 
)proaching  the  Lao  People's  Demo- 
ic  Republic  to  arrange  talks  on 
.s. 

We  followed  up  Vu  Hoang's  indica- 
to  you  of  flexibility  on  visits  by  Lt. 
Mather  by  sending  a  message  in 
August  via  the  S.R.V.  liaison  offi- 
n  Bangkok  asking  for  Vietnamese 
's  on  the  timing  and  scope  of  such 
s  and  expressing  the  U.S.  desire  to 
n  them  as  rapidly  as  possible.  Re- 
ing  no  reply  to  this  message,  Em- 
y  Bangkok  raised  the  issue  again 
eptember  5,  and  we  sent  a  followup 
sage  September  10  reiterating  our 
re  to  begin  such  visits  at  an  early 
and  stressing  the  interest  and  im- 
ance  that  the  Administration,  the 
gress,  and  the  American  people 
e  on  making  demonstrable  progress 
^counting  for  missing  Americans. 
On  October  3,  an  officer  of  the 
,V.  Embassy  in  Bangkok  delivered 
ral  response  to  our  earlier  mes- 
s  on  the  proposed  visit  by  JCRC 
onnel.  He  stated  that  a  visit  by  Lt. 
Mather  had  initially  been  discussed 
ng  the  August  visit  of  the  U.S. 
sessional  delegation.  Although 
nam  was  under  conditions  of  war 
threat  of  invasion,  he  said,  Hanoi 
maintained  the  MIA  office  and  con- 


tinued to  devote  scarce  resources  to  re- 
solve MIA  cases.  Hanoi,  he  claimed, 
had  always  shown  goodwill  in  this  mat- 
ter and  has  thus  far  returned  the  re- 
mains of  more  than  70  MIAs.  With  re- 
gard to  the  visit  of  Lt.  Col.  Mather,  he 
stated  that  Hanoi  will  inform  the 
United  States  later  when  the  time  is 
convenient. 

During  the  discussion  which  fol- 
lowed, the  S.R.V.  officer  assured  us 
that  such  visits  could  take  place  but  at 
some  unspecified  future  date.  He  made 
no  attempt  to  back  away  from  the 
agreement  in  principle  for  such  visits. 

In  response,  the  U.S.  Embassy  of- 
ficer stressed: 

•  The  importance  of  the  MIA  issue 
to  the  United  States  and  to  our  bilat- 
eral contacts; 

•  The  disappointment  that  the 
Congress,  particularly  the  members  of 
your  delegation,  would  feel  over  the 
delay; 

•  Our  interest  in  keeping  the  MIA 
issue  separated  from  other  issues  on 
which  progress  is  currently  not  possi- 
ble; 

•  Our  appreciation  of  Hanoi's  past 
cooperation,  and  our  desire  to  acceler- 
ate these  efforts;  and 

•  Our  belief  that  resolution  of  the 
MIA  issue  is  in  the  interest  of  the 
S.R.V.  as  well  as  the  United  States. 

The  conditions  of  war  and  threat  of 
invasion  that  Hanoi  cited  are  real,  but 
they  are  conditions  that  the  S.R.V.  has 
brought  upon  itself  by  its  invasion  of 
Kampuchea.  And  this  should  not  be 
used  as  an  excuse  to  stall  on  exchanging 
information  on  MIAs.  We  hope  that 
progress  can  resume  shortly;  we  note 
that  the  Vietnamese  position  does  not 
rule  this  out. 

We  raised  the  subject  of  Lt.  Col. 
Mather's  visit  also  at  the  United  Na- 
tions with  the  Vietnamese  mission 
there,  stressing  the  importance  of  the 
issue  and  our  hope  for  a  resumption  of 
progress. 

Also  at  the  United  Nations,  as  re- 
quested by  this  committee,  we  formally 
transmitted  the  text  of  House  Concur- 
rent Resolution  10  and  Senate  Concur- 
rent Re.solution  17  to  Secretary  General 
Waldheim.  We  are  consulting  with 
other  delegations  there  to  see  if  there  is 
any  sentiment  for  general  action.  We 
have  contacted  the  International  Com- 
mittee of  the  Red  Cross  (ICRC)  in  New 
York,  and  they  have  agreed  to  consult 
with  their  headquarters  in  Geneva  to 
determine  how  they  can  support  this 
resolution.  We  will  also  continue  to 
work  with  the  U.N.  High  Commis- 
sioner for  Refugees  (UNHCR)  and  with 
the  ICRC  and  other  governments  which 


have  representatives  in  Vietnam  in 
support  of  our  efforts  to  gain  an 
accounting. 

Since  your  previous  hearings  on 
this  subject,  we  have  also  again  ex- 
pressed directly  to  the  Lao 
Government — via  a  letter  to  the  em- 
bassy here  and  approaches  by  our  em- 
bassy in  Vientiane — the  continued 
interest  of  the  U.S.  Government  in 
MIA  matters  and  the  importance  of 
making  progress  on  accounting  for 
MIAs.  We  noted  our  approaches  to  the 
S.R.V.  in  this  regard,  recounted  Viet- 
namese statements  of  willingness  to  be 
forthcoming,  and  asked  if  Laos  could 
also  actively  do  more  to  I'esolve  this 
issue.  We  repeated  the  standing  invita- 
tion for  a  Lao  delegation  to  visit  the 
JCRC  in  Hawaii  and  requested  that 
they  consider  a  visit  to  Laos  by  Lt.  Col. 
Paul  Mather,  or  any  other  group  which 
would  be  mutually  satisfactory,  in 
order  to  advance  the  accounting  process 
and  increase  the  exchange  of  informa- 
tion. Subsequently,  as  you  know,  the 
Lao  charge  met  informally  September 
26  with  a  small  group  of  congressmen, 
including  many  of  you,  and  passed  in- 
formation related  to  the  four  sets  of 
remains  the  Lao  provided  last  year, 
giving  crash  site,  approximate  date, 
and  plane  type  associated  with  each  set. 

On  October  4,  I  met  with  the  acting 
Lao  Foreign  Minister  Khamphai 
Boupha  in  New  York.  I  expressed  our 
appreciation  for  the  information  that 
the  charge  had  provided  Congress  and 
our  hope  that  this  would  be  the  first  in 
a  series  of  such  actions  by  the  Lao  Gov- 
ernment. I  emphasized  the  importance 
of  this  issue  to  the  American  people, 
the  Congress,  and  the  Administration. 
Our  new  charge  in  Laos,  Leo  J.  Moser, 
is  talking  with  Lao  officials  about  this 
matter  during  his  initial  calls  in  Vien- 
tiane and  will  continue  to  do  so 
throughout  his  assignment  there. 

As  you  can  see  from  my  remarks, 
we  have  consistently  addressed  the 
MIA  accounting  issue  in  our  contacts 
with  the  Vietnamese  and  Lao  au- 
thorities. There  is  no  doubt  that  they 
understand  its  importance  to  us.  We 
will  continue  to  work  toward  eliciting 
from  the  Vietnamese  and  Lao  forth- 
coming and  satisfactory  cooperation  in 
accounting  for  our  missing  personnel.  ■ 

'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

^For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  1979, 
p.  39. 


13 


ECONOMICS 


Flexible  Exchange  Rates  After  6  Years'  Experience 


by  Richard  N.  Cooper 

Address  before  the  World  Affairs 
Council  of  Philadelphia  and  the  Uni- 
versity of  Pennsylvatiia  on  October  31, 
1979.  Mr.  Cooper  is  the  Under  Secre- 
tary for  Economic  Affair.'!. 

The  title  of  this  conference, 
"Achieving  Stability  in  the  Interna- 
tional Monetary  System,"  suggests  that 
our  hosts  may  feel  that  the  present  in- 
ternational monetary  system,  with 
flexible  exchange  rates  at  its  center,  is 
not  stable.  There  are  also  those  who 
feel  that  the  flexible  exchange  rate  sys- 
tem has  caused  a  mai'ked  deterioration 
in  the  overall  performance  of  the  world 
economy,  that  exchange  rate  move- 
ments have  been  excessive,  and  that 
flexible  rates  have  not  made  a  major 
contribution  to  the  external  adjustment 
process. 

In  contrast  to  this  widely  held 
view,  I  want  to  take  this  opportunity 
today  to  indicate  my  judgment  that  the 
system  of  flexible  exchange  rates  works 
reasonably  well,  that  is  to  say,  it  has 
made  a  significant  contribution  to  the 
external  adjustment  process  and,  in- 
deed, that  it  has  worked  just  about  as 
one  would  expect,  given  the  disturb- 
ances the  world  economy  has  endured 
the  past  3  years. 

Macroeconomic  Performance — 
1973-79 

In  making  this  judgement,  I  have 
tried  to  abstract  from  the  week-to-week 
exchange  market  turbulences  which  we 
have  seen  at  times  during  the  past  6 
years.  Let  us  adopt  the  perspective  of 
looking  back  on  this  period  from,  say, 
1982.  Equally  important,  I  have  tried  to 
avoid  confusing  the  effects  of  flexible 
rates  themselves  with  our  overall  eco- 
nomic performance  during  the  period  of 
flexible  rates.  By  almost  any  compara- 
tive measure,  our  macroeconomic  per- 
formance during  the  period  1973-1979 
was  worse  than  our  performance  during 
the  last  several  years  of  the  adjustable 
peg  system.  For  example,  if  we  com- 
pare some  of  the  most  important  meas- 
ures of  economic  performance  of  the 
major  industrial  countries  during 
1973-79  to  the  previous  period,  we  see 
a  significant  difference:  Real  economic 
growth  was  only  60'%  as  fast;  unem- 
ployment rates  were  50%  higher;  and 
inflation  rates  were  more  than  double. 

These  developments,  however, 
cannot  be  attributed  to  the  flexible  rate 


system.  Post  hoc  does  not  imply  propter 
hoc.  To  appreciate  this,  we  only  need  to 
remind  ourselves  of  two  other  factors 
which  affected  economic  performance 
during  the  period  of  flexible  rates:  the 
quadrupling  of  world  oil  prices  in 
1973-74  and  the  further  doubling  of 
those  prices  since  then,  and  the  tre- 
mendous expansion  of  international  li- 
quidity in  1970-73  associated  with  the 
breakdown  of  the  fixed  exchange  rate 
system.  These  factors  have  forced  us  to 
deal  simultaneously  with  high  unem- 
ployment and  high  inflation,  a  task  to 
which  our  tools  of  economic  manage- 
ment are  not  well  suited. 

Movements  in  Exchange  Rates 

When  we  look  at  the  entire  6  years 
of  flexible  exchange  rates,  we  find  that 
the  broad  movement  of  exchange  rates 
has  not  been  surprising;  nor  has  it  been 
as  great  as  the  newspapers  have  led  us 
to  believe.  From  the  viewpoint  of 
balance-of-payments  adjustment,  what 
is  important  is  the  movement  of  each 
country's  currency  against  some  aver- 
age of  the  currencies  of  its  trading 
partners,  not  its  movement  against 
another  single  currency.  When  the  cur- 
rencies of  all  industrial  countries  are 
weighted  by  their  importance  in  U.S. 
trade  (which  implies,  for  example,  that 
the  Canadian  dollar  is  given  a  weight  of 
about  one-fifth),  the  U.S.  dollar  is  vir- 
tually unchanged  today  from  March 
1973,  when  major  currencies  were  al- 
lowed to  float  against  one  another. 

Moreover,  the  year-to-year  move- 
ments during  those  GVi  years  have  been 
relatively  modest  and  have  followed  a 
pattern  which  textbook  theory  would 
lead  us  to  expect:  The  dollar  ap- 
preciated when  U.S.  economic  activity 
increased  less  rapidly  than  elsewhere 
(or  declined),  and  the  dollar  depreciated 
when  U.S.  economic  activity  was  more 
vigorous  than  that  elsewhere.  The  ac- 
tual percentage  changes  in  the  U.S.- 
trade  weighted  value  of  the  dollar  rela- 
tive to  other  OECD  [Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Develop- 
ment] currencies  were  as  follows: 

March  20,  1973  to  Dec.  31,  1973, 
-1-1.5  percent;  1974,  -1.4  percent; 
1975,  -H4.9;  1976,  +0.7;  1977,  -3.5; 
1978,  -5.4;  1979  through  Oct.  26, 
-1-3.1;  or,  for  the  total  period  March 
1973  to  October  1979,  -1-0.4). 

Neither  have  the  movements  in  ex- 
change rates  been  surprising  if  we 
adopt  a  perspective  across  countries.  If 
we  had  forecast  accurately  in  December 


1976,  for  example,  the  current  accouii 
imbalances  which  in  fact  emerged,  we.- 
would  also  have  forecast  quite  accu-    L 
rately  the  changes  in  exchange  rates  L 
which  have  taken  place.  At  least  we   u 
would  have  forecast  accurately  the  rain, 
ordering  of  exchange  rate  changes;  w 
might  have  been  off  on  the  exact  mat 
nitude,  which  is  a  more  complicated    „ 
question.  L 

The  Swiss  franc  is  at  one  extrem  j|. 
It  appreciated  34%  against  the  U.S.   L 
dollar  between  December  1976  and  D  " 
cember  1978.  But  we  must  also  obser 
that  by  mid-1978  Switzerland  had  a 
current  account  surplus  equal  to  6'^f 
its  GNP.  By  any  standard,  this  is  an 
enormous  surplus,  and  it  is  not  at  all 
surprising  under  a  system  of  flexible 
exchange  rates  that  the  Swiss  franc  a  ,, 
predated  sharply  relative  to  other  ci 
rencies. 

Japan's  surplus  in  1978  was  muo 
larger  in  absolute  terms,  but  was 
smaller  relative  to  its  economy.  As  v. 
the  Swiss  franc,  it  is  not  surprising  t 
the  yen  increased  in  value  during  th 
period.  The  yen  is  followed  by  the  G 
man  mark  and  the  other  European  c 
rencies  that  are  linked  to  it.  Again, 
there  is  a  clear  relationship  betweei 
the  value  of  the  mark  and  Germany' 
current  account  surplus. 

Even  the  appreciation  of  the 
British  pound  can  be  readily  explair 
in  these  terms.  Recall  that  in  1976  t 
pound  was  under  severe  external  pi 
sure,  and  Britain  ran  a  large  curren 
deficit.  By  1978  Britain's  financial  s 
ation  and  the  current  account  had  b  .. 
improved  substantially  and  the  pouiX 
appreciated.  Comparable  developm»i 
took  place  in  Italy. 

In  contrast,  the  United  States 
moved  from  current  account  surplus 
1976  to  a  very  large  deficit  in  1978,  ; 
Canada  also  showed  a  deterioration  , 
Under  these  circumstances,  is  it  sui 
prising  that  the  U.S.  dollar  depreci;. 
relative  to  European  currencies  and  » 
yen  and  that  the  Canadian  dollar  dej 
elated  relative  to  the  U.S.  dollar?  T 
rank  order  of  movement  in  exchang- 
rates  relative  to  movements  in  curr 
account  positions  is  almost  perfect. 
France  is  an  exception.  The  French 
franc  was  especially  depressed  in  lai 
1976  by  the  prospect  of  a  Socialist- 
Communist  victory  in  the  French  el 
tions  of  March  1977.  The  election  n 
suits  differed  from  those  expected, 
the  French  franc  recovered  accord- 
ingly. 


14 


Department  of  State  BuHl 


Economics 


This  pattern  of  observations  is 
itly  what  we  would  expect  of  ex- 
ige  rates  if  they  are  to  function  as  a 
[element  in  the  external  adjustment 
ess.  Deficits  lead  to  depreciation 
surpluses  lead  to  appreciation.  I 
Id  also  note,  however,  that  it  is  not 
actual  current  account  balances 
h  cause  changes  in  exchange  rates, 
n  a  country's  economic  policies  are 
ed  to  be  inadequate  to  correct  ex- 
ad  current  account  imbalances,  an 
ctation  about  future  exchange 
^  is  created.  As  often  happens  in 
financial  market,  these  expecta- 
;  about  future  prices  have  an  effect 
resent  prices  as  well.  Long-term 
,al  flows  must  also  be  entered  into 
•alculation. 

If  my  judgment  that  the  pattern  of 
ange  rate  changes  is  what  we 
d  expect  if  they  are  to  function  as  a 
i?lement  in  the  adjustment  process 
I  IS  at  variance  with  the  popular  im- 
l?ion  of  an  unstable  exchange  rate 
hm,  the  difference  is  due  to  the  fact 
the  financial  press  exaggerates  the 
omic  importance  of  changes  in  ex- 
ge  rates  by  typically  reporting  the 
st  movements  in  bilateral  rates, 
t  is  relevant  from  the  point  of  view 
'  e  adjustment  process  is  a  trade- 
!  hted  average  movement  in  ex- 
i  ge  rates  for  each  country's  cur- 

iy- 

As  I  noted  above,  these  movements 
I  been  very  much  less  than  press 
rts  would  lead  us  to  believe.  For 
iple,  Germany  is  Switzerland's 
'st  trading  partner,  so  movements 
e  Swiss  franc-U.S.  dollar  rate 
tly  exaggerate  the  effective  move- 
t  of  the  Swiss  franc.  Similarly, 
ida  is  the  largest  trading  partner  of 
United  States,  so  movements  be- 
n  the  dollar  and  the  German  mark 
ot  capture  adequately  the  effective 
ement  of  the  U.S.  dollar. 


ie  and  Service  Flows 

Of  course,  if  movements  in  ex- 
ige  rates  are  to  be  a  key  element  in 
adjustment  process,  trade  and 
ice  flows  must  respond  to  these 
ements  in  exchange  rates.  I  have 
led  that  exchange  rates  moved  in 
onse  to  imbalances  in  goods  and 
ices.  But  will  trade  and  service 
s  in  turn  respond  to  movements  in 
lange  rates?  I  think  the  answer  is 
■mative,  provided  it  is  clear  that  we 
talking  about  real,  rather  than 
inal,  exchange  rates  changes  and 
we  are  talking  about  the  long-run 
ct  rather  than  the  short-run  effect. 


Those  who  take  the  view  that  flexible 
exchange  rates  do  not  work  have  mis- 
takenly focused  on  nominal  exchange 
rate  changes  or  have,  against  all  evi- 
dence, expected  a  quick  response  in 
current  account  positions. 

The  changes  in  exchange  rates  that 
we  have  observed  between  major  cur- 
rencies have  been  influenced  by  differ- 
ential rates  of  inflation  between  coun- 
tries. A  country's  competitive  price 
position  is,  of  course,  not  affected  to 
the  extent  that  movements  in  nominal 
exchange  rates  only  compensate  for 
differential  movements  in  price  levels. 
The  movements  in  exchange  rates  we 
have  seen  in  the  last  6  years  can  be  only 
partially  explained  by  differential  rates 
of  inflation  among  the  industrial  coun- 
tries. They  are,  therefore,  largely 
"real"  and  may  be  presumed  to  account 
for  some  part  of  the  shifts  in  current 
accounts  we  are  now  seeing. 

Long-Run  vs.  Short-Run  Effects 

In  judging  the  efficacy  of  the  flexi- 
ble exchange  rate  .'System,  it  is  also  im- 
portant that  we  look  at  the  long-run 
effect  rather  than  the  short-run  effect. 
Formal  studies  generally  show  that 
price  elasticities  of  demand  in  virtually 
all  industrial  countries  are  statistically 
significant  and  reasonably  large  over 
the  long  run,  defined  as  2  years  or 
more,  but  are  much  smaller  in  the  short 
run.  If  one  looks  only  at  the  short-run 
effects  of  exchange  rate  changes,  it 
would  be  possible  to  conclude  that  the 
adjustment  process  does  not  work.  In 
the  short  run,  import  prices  (in  domes- 
tic currency)  increase  more  rapidly 
than  import  volume  decreases,  result- 
ing in  a  worsening  of  a  country's  trade 
balance.  In  the  long  run,  however,  this 
trend  is  reversed,  producing  the  J- 
curve  effect,  and  the  trade  balance  im- 
proves. Changes  in  real  income  also 
have  an  important  impact,  and  mac- 
roeconomic  policy  must  be  used  to 
reinforce  changes  in  exchange  rates. 

When  we  adopt  a  long-run  perspec- 
tive, we  find  that  trade  flows  seem  to 
be  responding  to  the  changes  in  real  ex- 
change rates  which  have  taken  place. 
The  Japanese  and  German  surpluses 
are  declining  and  the  American  deficit 
is  also  declining.  We  now  expect  that 
the  U.S.  current  account  deficit  in  1979 
will  be  under  $4  billion,  compared  with 
about  $14  billion  in  both  1977  and  1978. 
Furthermore,  we  expect  a  surplus  next 
year  of  over  $5  billion.  This  is  strong,  if 
still  incomplete,  evidence  that  flexible 
exchange  rates  have  worked  well.  But 
we  need  patience  for  the  relevant  fac- 
tors to  work  themselves  out.  If  we  are 
not  patient,  we  may  well  find  that  we 


cannot  function  with  a  system  of  flexi- 
ble exchange  rates,  not  because  it  does 
not  work  in  economic  terms,  but  be- 
cause in  a  world  of  instant  gratification, 
we  find  the  delays  psychologically 
intolerable. 


Effects  of  Domestic  Economic 
Policies 

A  complete  analysis  of  the  flexible 
exchange  rate  system  must  also  ask 
how  the  large  current  account  imbal- 
ances arose  in  the  first  place.  An  analy- 
sis of  domestic  economic  policies  may 
seem  inappropriate  for  a  conference  fo- 
cused on  the  international  monetary 
system,  but  it  is  an  essential  part  of  the 
picture.  What  we  find  is  that  current 
account  imbalances  were  closely  related 
to  domestic  economic  policies.  Again, 
take  the  case  of  Switzerland. 

Switzerland  adopted  a  medium-run 
policy,  historically  the  only  case  of 
which  I  am  aware,  of  negative  growth. 
From  1974  to  1977,  Switzerland's  labor 
force  fell  by  about  9%,  through  the  re- 
duction of  foreign  workers  by  25%. 
Since  industrial  capacity  did  not  shrink 
con-espondingly,  but  domestic  demand 
fell,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  export 
surplus  grew  to  enormous  (relative) 
proportions. 

In  the  United  States,  we  had  ex- 
perienced a  long  recession  which  put 
great  strain  on  the  world  economy  and 
on  the  international  financial  system, 
especially  in  terms  of  its  effects  on  de- 
veloping countries.  By  late  1976,  the 
world  economy  was  in  a  very  precarious 
situation.  Unemployment  was  high  in 
the  United  States;  it  was  high  and  ris- 
ing in  Europe.  Many  countries,  includ- 
ing some  of  the  large  industrialized 
countries  as  well  as  many  developing 
countries,  found  themselves  with  a  very 
large  burden  of  external  indebtedness. 
Those  countries  had  to  engage  in  eco- 
nomic and  financial  retrenchment.  Yet 
that  alone  would  have  aggravated  and 
prolonged  the  world  recession,  making 
corrective  actions  in  all  countries  more 
difficult.  Under  these  circumstances, 
for  both  domestic  and  foreign  policy 
reasons,  the  United  States  undertook  a 
program  of  economic  expansion  to  end 
the  recession. 

Balanced  Expansion 

It  would  have  been  desirable  for 
the  world  economic  recovery  to  have 
been  led  by  a  balanced  expansion  in  the 
leading  industrial  economies  and  most 
notably  in  the  United  States,  Japan, 
and  Germany.  These  countries  all  had 


15 


Economics 


excess  capacity  and  relatively  strong 
external  positions.  The  London  eco- 
nomic summit  in  May  1977  represented 
an  effort  to  achieve  such  a  coordinated 
expansion  by  the  leading  countries,  but 
it  failed  in  that  respect.  The  United 
States  went  ahead  anyway. 

Largely  as  a  consequence,  the  U.S. 
payments  position  deteriorated  relative 
to  that  of  other  major  countries.  It  was 
recognized  at  the  time  that  vigorous 
economic  expansion  in  the  United 
States  without  concomitant  expansion 
in  other  countries  would  worsen  the 
U.S.  trade  position,  and  it  could  have 
been  expected  that  the  emerging  im- 
balance in  turn  would  lead  to  the  depre- 
ciation of  the  dollar  relative  to  some 
other  currencies.  A  balanced  expansion 
among  the  leading  countries  would  have 
avoided  this. 

Balanced  expansion  would  certainly 
have  been  preferable  to  the  actual  de- 
velopment, but  it  was  apparently  unat- 
tainable at  the  time.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances, I  believe  it  was  desirable 
for  the  United  States  to  go  ahead  alone, 
even  though  that  would  predictably 
lead  to  some  depreciation  of  the  dollar. 
Not  to  have  done  so,  in  my  judgment, 
would  have  courted  far  graver  dangers 
for  the  world  economy — extreme  finan- 
cial difficulties  for  a  number  of  coun- 
tries and  increasing  protectionist 
actions  in  most  of  the  industrialized 
countries.  Indeed,  the  highly  successful 
international  economic  system  which 
was  so  painstakingly  established  in  the 
preceding  25  years  was  in  jeopardy. 
The  U.S.  external  deficit  relieved  the 
financial  pressures  on  many  countries, 
and  it  also  reduced  protectionist  pres- 
sures abroad.  Still,  it  would  have  been 
preferable  to  have  had  in  1977  the  kind 
of  concerted  action  and  coordinated  ex- 
pansion which  was  finally  achieved  in 
1978.  Through  it,  we  could  have 
avoided  the  emergence  of  such  great 
imbalances  in  payments  and  at  least 
some  of  the  consequent  turbulence  in 
foreign  exchange  markets. 

Expected  Account  Imbalances 

I  mentioned  earlier  that  changes  in 
exchange  rates  are  caused  not  only  by 
emerging  current  account  imbalances 
but  also  by  expected  imbalances.  I  want 
to  return  briefly  to  the  role  of  expecta- 
tions before  concluding  this  discussion 
of  our  experience  with  flexible  ex- 
change rates,  because  the  fragility  of 
exchange  rate  expectations  is  one  of  the 
most  disturbing  features  of  our  experi- 
ence during  the  last  6  years.  As  I  have 
indicated,  the  broad  direction  and  mag- 
nitude of  exchange  rate  changes  are 
fully  explicable  by  underlying  move- 


16 


ments  of  payments  positions.  Yet  there 
were  clearly  several  occasions — briefly 
in  the  fall  of  1977  and  more  notably  in 
October  1978 — when  exchange  rates 
moved  too  far,  too  rapidly.  It  is  difficult 
to  explain  the  developments  in  October 
1978  in  terms  of  the  underlying  eco- 
nomic developments  I  have  been  em- 
phasizing. Contrary  to  what  was  as- 
serted at  the  time  differential  inflation 
rates — actual  or  reasonably 
expected — can  only  go  a  small  distance 
toward  explaining  the  exchange  rate 
movements  during  this  period.  I  think, 
therefore,  that  we  have  a  problem  with 
highly  fragile,  easily  moved  expecta- 
tions in  exchange  markets.  As  a  result, 
governments  must  be  prepared  to 
intervene  heavily  as  stabilizing 
speculators  even  in  a  system  of  floating 
exchange  rates. 

Ten  years  ago.  Federal  Reserve 
Governor  Henry  Wallich  divided 
mankind — or  at  least  international  fi- 
nancial specialists — into  four 
categories:  those  who  advocate  fixed 
exchange  rates;  those  who  advocate 
freely  floating  exchange  rates;  those 
who  prefer  fixed  rates  but  are  nervous 
about  it;  and  those  who  prefer  floating 
rates  but  ai'e  nervous  about  it.  I  am  a 
nervous  floater.  We  have  a  floating — or 
flexible — exchange  rate  system  which 
works  reasonably  well.  The  experience 
of  the  last  6  years  indicates  that  ex- 
change rates  will  change  in  response  to 
external  imbalances,  that  changes  in 
relative  prices  caused  by  changes  in 
real  exchange  rates  have  a  strong  influ- 
ence on  the  volume  of  both  exports  and 
imports,  and  that,  therefore,  flexible 
exchange  rates  can  make  a  significant 
contribution  to  the  external  adjustment 
process.  We  must  remember,  however, 
in  judging  the  flexible  exchange  rate 
system  that  the  short-run  impact  is  not 
the  same  as  the  long-run  impact,  that 
exchange  rates  are  not  the  only  deter- 
minant of  a  country's  external  balance, 
and  that  exchange  rate  changes  them- 
selves can  be  caused  by  expectations  as 
well  as  by  actual  economic 
developments. 

For  these  reasons,  we  have  to  be 
patient  for  the  equilibrating  results  of 
exchange  rate  changes.  From  time  to 
time,  monetary  authorities  will  have  to 
intervene  heavily  in  exchange  markets 
in  order  to  break  bandwagon  move- 
ments which  develop  because  of  the 
fragility  of  expectations  and  the  ease 
with  which  they  are  moved  around. 


The  U.S.  Dollar 

Now  let  me  turn  from  the  recent 
past  to  the  more  distant  future.  I  be 
lieve  that  the  U.S.  dollar  will  be  the 
world's  leading  currency  for  a  long  tii 
to  come.  Very  likely,  the  Japanese  V' 
and  German  mark,  and  perhaps  othe 
currencies,  will  grow  in  relative  impc 
tance;  and  diversification  out  of  the 
dollar  into  other  currencies  by  both 
private  and  official  holders  will  take 
place.  Moreover,  the  diversification  \ 
probably  not  take  place  smoothly  but 
fits  and  starts  that  create  periodic  ti 
bulence  in  exchange  markets.  Despit 
these  developments,  the  U.S.  dollar 
will  remain  the  most  important  cur- 
rency used  internationally. 

I  can  imagine,  however,  that  by 
first  or  second  decade  of  the  next  ct- 
tury,  the  international  role  now  play 
by  the  dollar  could  be  assumed  to  a 
great  extent  by  a  different  asset. 
Gradually  over  the  next  30  years;  th 
economic  dominance  of  the  United 
States  will  continue  to  decline,  as  it  1 
done  during  the  past  30  years.  The  L 
share  both  of  world  production  and  i 
world  trade  have  fallen,  (e.g.,  from 
169c  of  world  exports  in  1960  to  10 9i 
1978),  and  they  will  continue  to  fall- 
not  because  the  United  States  is  doi 
badly,  but  because  other  countries  c 
the  world  are  doing  well. 

Incomes  in  many  other  countrie 
will  rise  relative  to  incomes  in  the 
United  States.  Over  time,  this  will  i 
duce  the  relative  attractiveness  of  t 
dollar  as  an  international  currency, 
other  national  currency  will  offer  a 
clearly  preferable  substitute.  We 
should,  therefore,  begin  to  explore  I 
possibility  of  developing  an  effectivt 
alternative. 

Feasible  Alternatives 

These  discussions  are  presently 
centered  on  the  creation  of  a  substit 
tion  account,  whereby  dollars  and  ot 
official  reserves  would  be  deposited 
new  account  managed  by  the  Intern 
tional  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  in  ex- 
change for  assets  denominated  by  sj 
cial  drawing  rights.  The  substitutioi 
account  has  two  basic  purposes.  Thf 
first  is  to  inhibit  exchange  market  d 
orders  which  can  be  associated  with 
periodic  switches  in  assets  from  one 
currency  to  another,  especially  dive 
sification  from  dollars  to  other  majo 
currencies,  and  to  channel  this  divei 
sification  outside  of  exchange  marke 
The  second  purpose  is  to  enhance  th 
role  of  the  special  drawing  rights  an( 
provide  an  alternative  international 
naneial  vehicle  to  those  denominate! 
national  currencies. 

Department  of  State  Bu'l' 


EUROPE 


elusion 

Let  me  close  by  making  four  obser- 
ins  about  the  substitution  account 
|;he  longer  run  evolution  of  the  in- 
itional  monetary  system. 
Pirst,  it  is  not  a  short-run  dollar 
|ort  operation.  That  point  can 
lips  be  most  effectively  emphasized 
imsidering  a  realistic  timeframe  for 
lubstitution  account  to  emerge. 
le  must  first  be  an  extended  period 
licussion — several  differing  concep- 
!  of  substitution  accounts  must  be 
I — followed  by  a  period  of  negotia- 
I  followed  by  a  period  for  ratifica- 
I  An  optimistic  scenario  would  not 
I  a  substitution  account  in  place 
e  1982. 

|>econd,  consideration  of  the  sub- 
i  ion  account  in  the  near  future  will 
i'late  further  official  discussion  of 
I  reader  aims  and  character  of  the 
hational  monetary  system,  some- 
j  which  has  not  taken  place  for- 
I  since  1974.  This  will  be  a  useful 
ibution  even  if  the  substitution  ae- 
j  itself  fails  to  materialize, 
'hird,  success  in  making  the  spe- 
rawing  rights  an  international 
Jtary  medium  would  enable  the 
i  d  States  and  other  reserve  cur- 
(  countries  to  divorce,  or  at  least 
ily  attenuate,  the  responsibility  of 
rging  reserve  currencies  from  the 
(nsibilities  of  sensible  national  eco- 
f  policy, 
ourth,  to  accomplish  this  ambi- 
result  would  require,  in  my 
lent,  that  special  drawing  rights- 
ninated  assets  be  traded  exten- 
in  private  markets.  And  this  in 
urely  has  implications  for  how  a 
itution  account  aimed  at  this  ulti- 
result  must  be  set  up. 
n  the  long  meantime,  between 
ind  a  reformed  monetary  system, 
Ust  live  with  what  we  have;  which 
uggested  earlier  is  not  that  bad 
ired  with  the  feasible  alterna- 
But  living  with  the  present  sys- 
oes  require  looking  beyond  to- 
headlines  and  next  week's  money 
y  figures.  ■ 


Identifying  U.S.  Security  Interests  in 
U.S.-Soviet  Relations 


by  Marshall  D.  Shulman 

Address  before  the  International 
Studies  Association  at  the  University 
of  Pittsburgh  on  October  i,  1979.  Am- 
bassador Shulman  is  Special  Adviser 
to  the  Secretary  on  Soviet  Affairs. 

Those  of  you  who  work  in  the  field 
of  U.S.-Soviet  relations  know  that  in 
describing  the  interrelationship  of  these 
two  countries,  one  needs  to  deal  not 
only  with  their  foreign  policies  and  the 
domestic  determinants  of  foreign  policy 
but  with  a  third  element  that  some- 
times is  of  paramount  importance.  That 
third  element  in  the  relationship  is  the 
terrain  of  international  politics  on 
which  the  countries  meet  and  to  which 
each  of  them  is  reacting.  There  are 
many  aspects  of  the  international  politi- 
cal scene  that  are  relevant,  but  I  would 
like  to  speak  of  two  in  particular  that 
seem  to  me  to  put  the  stamp  on  this 
period  and  to  have  a  determining  influ- 
ence on  the  character  of  U.S.-Soviet 
relations. 

The  first  and  obvious  one  is  the 
revolutionary  development  of  military 
technology  in  our  times,  which  has  ob- 
viously changed  the  relationship  be- 
tween war  and  politics  and  has  also 
created  the  major  imperative  in  foreign 
policy  of  trying  to  work  our  way 
through  the  minefield  of  problems  and 
conflicts  with  which  we  are  confronted, 
without  its  leading  to  a  general  nuclear 
war. 

The  second  aspect  of  the  current 
international  political  scene  is  the  ex- 
traordinary turbulence  and  upheaval 
that  characterize  every  part  of  the 
world.  We  have  come  in  only  two  gen- 
erations from  the  prolonged  stability  of 
international  politics  that  characterized 
the  scene  at  the  opening  of  World  War 
I.  We  have  seen  the  rapid  collapse  of 
political  institutions,  the  weakening  of 
the  European  states  that  had  driven 
and  dominated  international  polities, 
and  the  emergence  on  the  international 
scene  of  the  United  States  as  a  major 
world  actor  together  with  the  Soviet 
Union  and  China.  Also  in  the  recent 
past  we  have  seen  the  consequences  of 
some  three  decades  of  rapid,  chaotic, 
turbulent  decolonization  and  the  trans- 
forming effect  this  has  had  and  is  hav- 
ing on  international  politics.  We  have 
also  witnessed  the  effect  of  upheavals 
within  industrial  societies,  including 
our  own,  which  have  resulted  in 
weakening  the  fabric  of  these  societies, 


,l,ary1980 


weakening  the  traditional  sources  of 
authority  of  the  state,  the  family,  and 
the  church — or  perhaps  I  will  have  to 
amend  that  as  a  result  of  the  visit  of  the 
Pope. 

But  nevertheless,  it  has  clearly 
created  a  time  of  disorientation  within 
societies.  An  age  of  irascibility  tends  to 
influence  the  domestic  climate  for 
foreign  policy.  In  the  developing  world, 
you  see  the  desperate  effort  of  new  na- 
tions to  create  necessities  for  the 
people  and  to  face  the  manifold  sources 
of  conflict  arising  out  of  tribal,  reli- 
gious, and  ethnic  border  disputes.  And 
most  recently  you  have  seen  the  added 
spurt  that  has  been  given  to  this  tur- 
bulence in  Africa  as  a  result  of  the  pre- 
cipitous collapse  of  the  Portuguese 
position. 

As  these  elements  enter  on  the 
scene  and  these  various  sources  of  con- 
flict throw  up  perturbations  to  which 
the  United  States  and  Soviet  Union, 
among  other  nations,  find  themselves 
responding — ofttimes  without  any 
planning  or  anticipation — these  become 
perturbations  in  the  Soviet-American 
relationship.  Since  we  must  expect  this 
will  continue  for  a  long  time,  it  is  quite 
likely,  in  my  judgment,  that  we  shall 
not,  in  the  foreseeable  future,  see  any 
substantial  easing  of  the  Soviet- 
American  relationship.  We  shall  not  see 
recreated,  I  think,  in  the  near  term 
what  was  by  many  people  called  de- 
tente as  it  was  thought  to  exist  in  1972. 

Against  this  background,  I  turn 
now  more  directly  to  the  topic  of  iden- 
tifying U.S.  security  interest  in  U.S.- 
Soviet relations.  First  of  all,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  what  we  are  talking  about  is 
predominantly  a  competitive  relation- 
ship between  the  two  countries  that 
emerged  on  the  scene  to  a  leading  posi- 
tion among  nations  by  reason  of  their 
resources  and  by  virtue  of  the  fact  that 
they  are  each  embarked  upon  a  period 
in  which  they  have  had  a  surge  of  na- 
tional development. 

A  Competitive  Relationship 

In  seeking  to  respond  to  this  situa- 
tion, we  need  to  ask  ourselves  not 
whether  to  respond  but  how  to  respond 
effectively.  The  first  element  here  is  to 
face  the  fact  that  a  military  equilibrium 
is  a  prerequisite  in  the  relationship. 
There  can  be  no  serious  questioning  of 
this  necessity,  but  there  is  a  question 
about  what  kind  of  military  equilib- 
rium, and  I  will  return  to  that  point  in  a 
moment. 


17 


Europe 


The  second  primary  necessity  is  to 
deal  effectively  with  the  kinds  of  issues 
I  have  mentioned  as  thrown  up  by  in- 
ternational political  developments.  We 
need  to  respond  to  them  in  their  local 
terms,  i.e.,  with  an  awareness  of  their 
local  significance,  local  politics,  local 
cultures,  and  not  purely  in  the  game 
theory  projection  of  the  East-West 
encounter. 

One  of  the  vulnerabilities  we  have, 
I  think,  in  our  recent  e.xperience  is  that 
we  have  not  done  so  in  these  terms.  We 
have  been  inclined  to  see  these  manifold 
problems  primarily  in  their  East- West 
conte.xt  without  a  sufficient  apprecia- 
tion of  the  local  factors.  Partly  I  think 
this  is  the  result  of  our  own  insularity 
or  lack  of  knowledge,  lack  of  sensitivity 
and  familiarity  with  the  cultures,  the 
languages,  and  histories  of  the  peoples 
who  have  been  only  names  in  an  atlas 
one  day  and  then  front-page  preoccupa- 
tions the  ne.xt  day. 

In  putting  those  two  elements  to- 
gether, it  seems  to  me  they  point  to  our 
interest  in  finding  ways  of  regulating 
the  competitive  aspects  of  this  relation- 
ship and  of  conducting  it  effectively. 
The  United  States  has  an  interest  in 
regulating  the  competition  and  mod- 
erating it  so  that  it  does  not  operate  at 
the  higher  end  of  the  tension  scale.  It 
seems  evident  to  me — and  I  should 
think  it  is  beyond  dispute — that  every 
problem  in  which  we  are  concerned 
would  be  more  difficult  and  more 
dangerous  if  the  United  States  and  the 
U.S.S.R.  were  locked  into  a  high  con- 
frontation relationship  instead  of  one  of 
moderated  tension. 

I  would  add  another  general  point 
and  that  is  the  necessity  of  recognizing 
that  though  this  is — and  we  should  not 
disguise  the  fact — primarily  a  competi- 
tive relationship,  it  is  not  without  sig- 
nificant elements  of  overlapping  inter- 
est between  the  two  countries.  Such  an 
interest  exists,  especially  in  regard  to 
the  effort  to  pass  through  this  period  of 
international  politics  without  having  it 
lead  to  a  general  nuclear  war  which 
clearly  neither  the  Soviet  Union  nor  the 
United  States  can  rationally  desire. 

Finally,  a  fourth  general  point — it 
is  necessary  not  only  to  conduct  this 
relationship  with  an  eye  toward  the 
crisis  of  the  month,  the  day-to-day 
problems,  but  also  with  some  sense  of 
where  we  would  like  to  see  it  go  over  5 
years  or  10  years,  within  our  capacity 
to  influence  this.  What  are  our  inter- 
ests in  the  longer  term  relationship 
with  the  Soviets?  How  would  we  like  to 
see  the  Soviet  Union  evolve,  to  the  ex- 
tent that  we  can  exercise  some  influ- 


18 


ence  over  the  process  of  evolution,  both 
in  its  domestic  characteristics  and  in  its 
role  in  the  world? 

This  question  ought  not  to  be  lost 
sight  of  at  a  time  when  the  Soviet 
Union  clearly  is  on  the  threshold  of  a 
wholesale  generational  turnover  of  its 
entire  upper  structure  of  leadership. 
This  may  bring  the  Soviet  Union  into  a 
period  of  grave  uncertainties — a  period 
that  is  very  difficult  for  us  to  extrapo- 
late from  the  past,  a  period  when  ele- 
ments among  the  secondary  and  ter- 
tiary levels  of  leadership  may  become 
ascendant. 

There  are  many  questions  that  we 
cannot  answer  about  that  process.  We 
do  know  something  about  the  ascendant 
generation.  We  know  that,  by  and 
large,  it  is  better  educated  than  the 
present  leadership.  We  know  that  it  is 
more  familiar  with  the  outside  world, 
but  beyond  that  it  is  clearly  not 
homogeneous  in  its  view  of  the  world. 
We  are  not  in  a  position  to  influence 
choices  that  will  be  made,  but  we  are,  I 
think,  in  a  position  to  influence  the  way 
in  which  the  successor  leadership  views 
us,  whether  there  is  a  series  of  transi- 
tions or  something  more  incisive.  We 
can  affect  the  way  in  which  that  lead- 
ership e.xamines  its  options  and  makes 
its  determinations  as  to  how  it  sees 
Soviet  self-interest  in  the  world.  We 
have  to  conduct  ourselves  now  in  such  a 
way  that  if  there  should  be,  among  the 
successor  leadership,  some  behind-the- 
scene  appreciation  for  the  Soviet  self- 
interest  in  responsibility  and  restraint 
in  the  world,  they  will  not  feel  that  op- 
tion is  closed  to  them  by  the  actions  we 
are  taking. 

It  is  necessary  for  us,  I  think,  to 
hold  out  what  might  be  called  a  twin  op- 
tion policy  to  them  at  all  times — that  is 
to  say,  a  policy  which  at  the  same  time 
makes  it  clear  to  them  what  our  re- 
sponse would  be  if  they  conduct  them- 
selves with  restraint  and  responsibility 
and  also  makes  them  aware  of  the 
measures  that  we  would  feel  it  neces- 
sary to  take  if  they  do  not,  or  if  actions 
on  their  part  have  the  effect  of  exacer- 
bating the  many  sources  of  conflict. 
This  is  related,  I  think,  to  a  problem 
that  should  be  dear  to  your  hearts — 
that  of  our  own  self-interest  in  this 
strengthening  of  the  international 
system. 

Therefore,  one  of  our  objectives 
has  to  be  to  try  to  do  what  we  can  to 
bring  the  Soviet  Union  to  the  point 
where  it  sees  self-interest  in  a  coopera- 
tive and  constructive  role  in  dealing 


with  local  issues  that  confront  us  all  ar 
in  participating  in  the  international  sy 
tem  in  a  way  it  does  not  at  the  pre,ser 
time.  To  some  extent  the  cooperative 
programs  that  we  have  developed — tl, 
dozen  or  so  bilateral  areas  of  coopera- 
tion in  agriculture,  transportation, 
space,  health,  in  the  problems  of  indu 
trial  societies,  etc. — are  tokens  of  tha 
future  intent.  They  do  not  go  to  the 
centrality  of  our  relationship  now.  Thi 
are  not  likely  to  influence  the  conduct 
of  the  Soviet  Union  in  present  prob- 
lems, but  they  are  there  as  a  signal  o 
our  intent  over  the  long  term. 

And  now  what  follows  from  this? 
any  effort  to  move  in  this  dii'ection, 
there  are  clearly  impediments  on  bot 
sides  to  working  toward  some  sensih 
regulated  relationship  against  the 
background  of  a  frank  recognition  of 
our  differences. 


In  the  Soviet,  view  there  is  m  „ 
inconsistency  between  suppo " 
for  what  the  Soviet  Union  ca 
"national  liberation  move- 
ments" and  "peaceful  coexis 
ence,"  or  detente. 


Impediments  on  the  Soviet  Side 

On  the  Soviet  side,  it  is  evident 
that  a  major  impediment  in  moving 
this  direction  is  the  Soviet  view  of  w 
coexistence  means,  what  it  includes, 
the  Soviet  view  there  is  no  inconsist 
ency  between  support  for  what  the    , 
Soviet  Union  calls  "national  liberatii 
movements"  and  "peaceful  coexist- 
ence." or  detente.  There  is  no  incons 
ency,  in  their  view,  in  the  exploitati  j 
of  local  conflict  situations  in  order  t 
advance  Soviet  interests  and  the  de- 
velopment of  better  relations  with  t 
United  States.  There  is  no  inconsist 
ency,  in  their  view,  between  their 
arming  and  transporting  of  Cuban  s 
diers  to  participate  in  combat  in  Afri 
conflicts  and  their  relations  with  us 

But  to  us  there  is  an  inconsisteni 
and  we  have  not  yet  reached  the  po 
where  we  are  able  to  work  out  with  ■ 
Soviet  Union  anything  like  a  Marqui 
Queensbury  understanding  about  th 
terms  within  which  we  will  conduct  i 
competition — what  the  limits  will  bi 
on  the  flow  of  weapons  into  trouble( 
areas  or  on  the  exacerbation  of  loca 
conflict. 


Department  of  State  Bull; 


Europe 


To  some  extent  there  have  been 
;  understandings  that  have  de- 
ped.  There  were  such  understand- 
,  for  example,  at  the  time  when  the 
den  conflict  was  at  its  height.  There 

communications  between  the  two 
?rnments  in  which  our  respective 
■erns  were  expressed,  and  there 
e  responses  that  were  helj^ful  in  in- 
ng  against  the  widening  of  that 
lict.  The  question  is  whether  we 
carry  that  a  step  further — whether 
possible  to  have  a  clearer  under- 
ding  between  us  on  the  boundaries 
lin  which  we  will  act  in  the  prosecu- 
of  our  i-espective  interests  in  these 
lict  situations. 

A  second  obvious  impediment  to 
improvement  of  relations  in  the  way 
ggested  has  been  the  Soviet  mili- 
builduj)  in  the  recent  period,  both 
le  development  of  strategic 
pons  systems  and  in  the  develop- 
t  of  its  military  capabilities  that 
•  on  the  European  theater.  In  both 
■ects  these  have  been  of  concern  to 
nd  to  our  allies.  They  seem  to  us  to 
>  gone  beyond  a  reasonable,  pru- 

concern  with  legitimate  Soviet 
nse  requirements. 
From  the  Soviet  perspective,  no 
ot,  they  may  see  themselves  as  still 
:ing  to  catch  up  with  the  United 
es,  to  come  out  from  under  the 
len  of  the  strategic  inferiority 
?r  which  they  labored  for  so  many 
•s.  And  it  may  be  that  one  of  the 
ilems  here  is  that  they  and  we  as- 
differently  the  different  attributes 
le  central  strategic  balance  and  are 
ned  to  give  different  weight  to 
■e  fields  in  which  the  other  side  has 
dvantage.  There  may  be,  therefore, 
t  a  reporter  recently  called  the 
ouKin  effect  of  the  difference  in  our 
lective  perspectives  on  what  the  ac- 
state  of  the  central  strategic  bal- 
'  may  be.  Nevertheless,  this  ques- 
of  the  strategic  balance  has  been  a 
■ce  of  particular  sensitivity  to  us  as 
suit  of  the  .sequelae  to  our  experi- 
?  in  the  Vietnam  war  and  the  ap- 
lensions  that,  as  a  result  of  that  ex- 
ence,  we  may  have  become  or  may 
lerceived  as  becoming  weaker  or 
resolute. 

Finally,  among  the  impediments  on 
Soviet  side  there  is  the  Soviet  sys- 
itself  and  the  repressive  aspects  of 
t  system  which  are  repugnant  to 
5e  of  us  who  cherish  the  values  of 
vidual  freedom  and  dignity.  This 
been,  of  course,  an  abrasive  factor 
he  recent  past  as  a  result  of  the 
»rgence  of  the  human  rights  issue  as 
gnificant  element  in  U.S.  foreign 
ey,  and  it  is  quite  likely  that  it  will 


continue  to  be  an  element  of  disruption 
in  the  relationship. 

The  issue  here,  I  think,  is  not 
whether  we  should  seek  to  express  in 
our  foreign  policy  the  basic  values  of 
our  own  society:  the  issue  rather  is  to 
learn  how  to  do  that  in  a  way  that  can 
have  productive  results.  This,  I  think, 
we  have  been  learning  to  do,  somewhat 
imperfectly,  as  a  result  of  our  recent 
experience.  But  we  have  to  recognize 
that  there  are  limits  of  feasibility 
within  which  we  can  expect  to  see  sig- 
nificant change  in  the  Soviet  Union  and 
in  the  Soviet  system.  These  limits  arise 
from  the  enormous  strength  of  the 
political  police  bureaucracy  and  the 
party  bureaucracy.  The  party  is  deter- 
mined not  to  let  power  slip  from  its 
hands,  which  might  be  the  consequence 
of  a  further  diffusion  of  political  power 
within  the  society. 

Impediments  on  the  U.S.  Side 

From  the  U.S.  side  there  are  also 
impediments  to  the  development  of 
what  one  might  call  a  sensibly  regu- 
lated relationship.  First  of  all,  there 
has  been  a  lack  of  clarity  in  perceiving 
our  own  interests  in  this  relationship 
and  of  even  describing  to  ourselves 
where  we  want  to  go  with  it,  what  we 
would  like  it  to  be.  This  is  perhaps  in 
part  a  result  of  our  own  recent  political 
experience — the  result  of  changes  in 
our  society  which  have  widely  sepa- 
rated the  experience  of  one  generation 
from  the  next.  These  changes  have  oc- 
cured  at  a  very  rapid  rate  and  have  in- 
volved us  in  traumatic  experiences  in 
the  world,  the  consequence  of  which 
has  been  to  heighten  the  disorientation 
and  anxieties  which  characterize  this 
period. 

Some  of  these  anxieties,  whether 
appropriately  or  not,  have  clearly  fo- 
cused upon  the  Soviet  Union  as  the 
symbol  of  our  hostilities  and  made  it 
more  difficult  to  follow  a  measured 
course  in  this  relationship.  Sometimes 
in  reading  the  papers  one  has  the  im- 
pression that  the  determination  of  our 
policy  toward  the  Soviet  Union  is  like 
ordering  an  egg  at  breakfast.  It  should 
be  either  hard  or  soft.  But  in  truth 
neither  hard  nor  soft  is  really  very  good 
advice  for  us  in  this  relationship. 
Neither  extreme  is  very  sensible  or  is 
truly  in  our  interest.  Either  appease- 
ment on  one  side  or  bellicosity  on  the 
other  quite  evidently  would  be  likely  to 
encourage  a  more  militant  policy  on  the 
part  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

What  makes  better  sense,  although 
it  makes  less  convenient  headlines,  is  a 
policy  of  firmness,  clarity,  and  civility 
in  the  relationship.  We  would  seek  in 


pursuing  such  a  policy  to  conduct  the 
relationship  in  a  way  that  protects  and 
advances  our  interests  but  strives  at 
the  same  time  to  moderate  the  level  of 
tension  and  pays  due  attention  to  those 
areas  in  which  there  is  an  overlapping 
of  interest  between  the  two  countries. 
Civility,  I  stress,  and  perhaps  I  sur- 
prised you  with  the  word  because  there 
is  in  our  society  an  evident  difference  of 
judgment  about  how  to  encourage  the 
Soviet  Union  to  move  in  the  directions 
we  would  like  to  see  it  move.  There  are 
some  who  feel  that  the  only  language 
the  Soviet  Union  understands  is  that  of 
a  two-by-four  across  the  forehead.  It  is 
quite  evident  from  our  recent  experi- 
ence that  the  net  effect  of  an  appi'oach 
to  the  Soviet  Union  in  these  terms  is 
about  the  same  as  a  similar  approach 
would  be  to  us — causing  us  to  stiffen  in 
our  determination  to  resist  movements 
toward  their  position. 

Rather  it  seems  to  me  that  the 
model  to  be  followed  is  that  which  was 
followed  by  President  Kennedy  in  the 
Cuban  missile  crisis,  i.e.,  while  paying 
attention  to  the  elements  of  power  re- 
quired in  the  situation,  nevertheless  to 
leave  a  way  open  for  the  Soviet  Union 
to  move  without  a  sense  of  humiliation. 
The  ultimate  folly  in  the  conduct  of  this 
relationship  would  be  to  take  on  the 
Soviet  style  in  determining  our  re- 
sponse to  the  Soviet  Union,  instead  of 
speaking  in  terms  that  truly  reflect  our 
own  values,  our  own  civility  in  our  soci- 
ety. 

Secondly,  the  issue  has  come  to  the 
fore  in  recent  days,  as  Dean  Funari 
said,  about  linkage  of  SALT  to  other 
issues — in  this  case  to  the  issue  of  the 
Soviet  brigade  in  Cuba.  It  seems  to  me 
that  those  who  would  make  the  ratifica- 
tion of  SALT  dependent  on  the  Soviet 
brigade  in  Cuba,  or  any  other  actions  of 
the  Soviet  Union  in  the  world  rather 
than  on  the  security  of  the  United 
States,  suffer  from  a  terminal  case  of 
myopia.  It  would  not  advance  our 
interests  to  do  so'  it  would  have  the  ef- 
fect of  weakening  U.S.  security;  and  we 
would  lose  an  opportunity  to  operate  in 
an  international  environment  in  which 
it  was  possible  to  regulate  the  strategic 
military  confrontation.  Instead,  we 
would  face  the  unknown  of  an  unregu- 
lated strategic  military  confrontation. 
We  would,  in  effect,  be  making  a  choice 
about  which  way  lies  U.S.  security — 
whether  our  security  is  best  advanced 
through  the  effort  to  stabilize  strategic 
military  competition  or  whether  it  is 
better  advanced  by  the  effort  to  attain 
a  superiority  which,  in  fact,  it  is  not 
possible  to  attain  and  which  can  only 


luary  1980 


19 


Europe 


have  the  effect  of  plunging  the  world 
into  development  of  more  weapons, 
more  widely  dispersed,  more  complex, 
more  difficult  to  regulate,  and  all  the 
uncertainty  that  goes  with  that. 

This  is  not  in  any  way  to  diminish 
the  importance  of  those  measures  which 
have  been  proposed  for  strengthening 
the  U.S.  defense  program  where  it  is 
now  not  adequate,  but  it  is  important  to 
bear  in  mind  that  the  measures  re- 
quired to  deal  with  those  deficiencies 
would  have  to  be  substantially  larger  in 
the  event  there  were  no  effective  SALT 
agreement.  In  this  connection  I  think  it 
is  important  to  say  that  the  effect  of 
postponing  SALT — and  we  should  not 
deceive  ourselves  on  this — would  be  to 
kill  the  treaty;  if  we  were  to  seek,  1 
year  from  now,  2  years,  3  years  from 
now  to  pick  up  the  pieces  and  try  to 
bring  the  treaty  to  realization  at  that 
time,  we  would  not  be  able  to  start 
where  we  left  off.  The  military  envi- 
ronment will  not  stand  still;  we  and  the 
Soviet  Union  will  be  moving  into  sys- 
tems that  will  be  more  difficult  of  reg- 
ulation, and  we  shall  have  to  begin 
again.  No  one  can  foresee  the  terms 
that  such  an  effort  at  regulation  might 
require  under  those  circumstances. 

The  effect  of  postponement  or  of 
nonratification  would  be  more  im- 
mediately felt,  I  think,  on  Soviet  pro- 
grams than  on  our  own,  because  most  of 
the  programs  now  being  proposed  and 
discussed  for  rectifying  our  strategic 
posture  are  not  prohibited  to  us  under 
the  treaty,  whereas  many  of  the  meas- 
ures before  the  Soviet  Union  would  be. 
The  Soviet  Union's  practice  in  recent 
months  of  taking  out  of  circulation 
submarines  to  offset  newer  systems  as 
they  come  into  service  would  no  longer 
be  required  if  the  Interim  Agreement 
were  not  regarded  as  being  in  force. 
Without  the  SALT  II  Treaty,  there 
would  be  no  limits  on  the  number  of 
warheads  on  strategic  missiles,  which  is 
a  matter  of  great  concern  to  us.  The 
ban  on  interfering  with  national  techni- 
cal means  of  verification  would  also  not 
be  in  force.  Encryption  of  Soviet  telem- 
etry would  then  not  be  barred,  in  the 
absence  of  a  treaty.  Moreover,  I  think 
it  is  important  that  we  not  lose  sight  of 
concerns  our  allies  have  unanimously 
expressed  about  the  situation  in  which 
they  would  find  themselves  should  the 
treaty  fall. 

Behind  many  of  these  concerns  is 
the  need  for  greater  rationality  in  our 
defense  policy.  It  is  evident  to  all  of  us 
that  there  is  a  certain  accidental  quality 
in  the  determination  of  our  defense 
capabilities.  It  is  a  resultant  of  the 
interplay  of  pressures  and  interests 
having  to  do  with  particular  systems, 


20 


rather  than  the  result  of  an  overarching 
plan  which  takes  account  of  our  needs 
and  at  the  same  time  integrates  into 
our  defense  planning  the  undoubted  se- 
curity interest  we  have  in  trying  to 
stabilize  the  military  competition 
wherever  we  can.  And  it  must  be,  I 
think,  an  objective  for  those  of  us  who 
work  in  this  field  to  try  to  move  toward 
that  greater  rationality. 

In  conclusion,  we  have  to  bear  in 
mind  that  the  Soviet  Union  is  obviously 
not  our  only  ])roblem,  and  except  for 
this  one  aspect — the  danger  of  nuclear 
war — it  is  not  the  main  problem  in  our 
foreign  policy.  In  many  of  the  problems 
we  deal  with,  the  Soviet  Union  is  a 
complicating  factor  rather  than  a  prime 
cause  of  our  troubles.  It  is  essential  for 
the  effectiveness  of  our  response  to  the 
competitive  aspects  that  we  should  ad- 
dress the  real  needs  of  the  Third 
World  —  the  nations  of  Africa  and  Asia 
and  elsewhere — so  that  we  are  seen  as 
having  interests  that  are  not  in  conflict 
with  theirs  and  that  we  help  to  bring 
them  too  into  the  framework  of  the  in- 
ternational system  which  is  important 
to  us. 

It  is  clear  that  if  we  are  not  suc- 
cessful in  doing  this,  the  situation  may 
roll  on  in  its  own  unguided  way  toward 
a  disintegrative  development  of  the  in- 
ternational system,  leading  to  anarchy 
and  chaos  in  which  the  values  to  which 
our  own  society  is  dedicated  shall  not 
flourish  and  may  not  survive.  ■ 


Continuity  and 
Commitment 


by  Matthew  Nimetz 

Address  before  the  leadership  con- 
ference of  the  National  Interreliqions 
Task  Force  on  Soviet  Jewry  in  New 
York  City  on  October  30,  1979.  Mr. 
Nimetz  is  Counselor  for  the  Depart- 
ment of  State. 

My  purpose  today  is  to  speak  to 
you  about  one  of  the  most  important 
ways  in  which  we  are  trying  to  improve 
the  situation  for  human  rights  in  the 
East- West  context.  I  speak  of  the  Hel- 
sinki process,  the  dialogue  which  was 
formalized  in  1975  by  the  leaders  of  the 
35  nations  who  signed  the  Helsinki 
Final  Act.  I  would  like  particularly  to 
address  my  remarks  to  the  thinking  of 
the  U.S.  Government  about  where  we 
are  and  where  we  ought  to  go  with  re- 


spect to  this  process  and  also  to  give 
you  the  flavor  of  our  thoughts  on  how 
to  improve  the  dialogue  in  the  future,  i 

This  audience  certainly  under-  l 
stands  the  fundamental  difference  be-i 
tween  the  Westei'n  system  of 
democratic  society  and  the  comijetinj: 
Soviet  .system.  The  Helsinki  process  |j 
seeks  to  address  our  basic  foreign  pol« 
icy  dilemma:  How  can  these  two  com-[ 
peting  and  largely  antagonistic  systeni: 
coexist  in  a  manner  that  protects  our  j) 
security  and  at  the  same  time  create  i 
opportunities  to  increase  areas  of  [ 
cooperation? 

The  Final  Act  goes  beyond  dealii 
with  interests  of  diplomats  for  it  also 
seeks  to  address  the  universal  desire 
all  peoples  for  basic  human  rights  am 
freedoms.  For  this  reason,  we  do  not 
conceive  of  the  Helsinki  process  as  a 
bloc-to-bloc  confrontation,  although  v 
have  no  illusions  that  the  problem  of 
the  East  is  at  present  our  central  coi 
sideration.  By  taking  account  of  the 
various  wishes  and  hopes  of  the  sign: 
tory  nations,  the  Helsinki  process  he!  ., 
to  keep  open  channels  of  communicati  g 
on  many  sensitive  issues  in  a  way  whi  \( 
shows  great  promise  for  the  improve  u 
ments  we  seek.  This  process,  howevi  q 
can  only  be  kept  alive  through  our      ^ 
commitment  to  make  it  work  and  to  u  g 
its  potential  continuously  to  attain  oi  is 
objectives. 

Background  of  the  Final  .Act  -" 

W 
Before  I  continue  with  my  main   « 

theme,  let  me  briefly  review  the 

genesis  of  the  Final  Act  in  order  to 

place  in  perspective  my  later  remark 

about  the  continuity  of  its  applicatioi 

We  are  all  familiar  with  the  post 
war  situation  as  it  developed  in  Eun 
following  the  victory  of  the  allies  ovt 
Nazi  Germany.  The  nature  of  the  |hi 
war  division  of  territory,  people,  am 
value  systems  is  still  more  than  a  ge 
eration  later,  at  the  heart  of  the  cur-  i-i 
rent  political  strains  in  Europe. 

In  the  period  after  the  Soviet 
Union  consolidated  its  control  over 
Eastern  Europe,  Moscow  devoted  itt|( 
efforts  to  legitimize  its  postwar  sphe 
of  domination.  To  achieve  this  end,  a 
to  exclude  the  United  States  from 
Europe,  the  U.S.S.R.  sought  a  confe 
ence  solely  of  European  states  to 
finalize  the  frontier  arrangements 
which  had  existed  de  facto  since  the 
end  of  World  War  II.  The  West  stooo  , 
firm  against  these  Soviet  desires  sim 
we  had  no  interest  in  unilaterally 
granting  legal  recognition  to  the 
U.S.S.R.'s  territorial  gains.  The 
United  States  and  our  allies,  in  addi- 
tion, saw  that  such  a  Soviet-sponsort 

Department  of  State  Bulle 


la 


Europe 


ipc.in  conference  would  be  used  by 
1 1  111  weaken  the  relationship  among 
,    iiitiHl  States,  Canada,  and  West- 
iKuropean  nations,  as  in- 
lionalized  in  the  NATO  alliance. 
In  the  late  1960s,  as  a  part  of  the 
iral  relaxation  of  tensions,  a  Euro- 
::  1.1  inference  became  of  greater 
est  tliroughout  the  West.  The 
-"(»  alliance  expressed  cautious 

iv-^i  m  such  a  conference,  provided 
c/nited  States  and  Canada  took 
1.  Simultaneously  during  this 
ixi,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
)y  inti-oduced  its  Ostpolltik  in  part 
iit'liiirate  various  intra-German 
( leiiis,  and  the  United  States  was 
)dng  directly  with  the  Soviet  Union 
number  of  specific  questions  such 
iprovements  in  the  Berlin  situa- 
I   S.\LT  I,  nonproliferation,  and 
>us  other  issues. 

The  policy  of  Western  nations  in 
early  1970s  was  to  work  toward  a 
I  cation  of  political  tension  and  a  re- 
lion  of  the  all  too  real  risks  of  nu- 
•  war.  This  effort,  of  course,  is  now 
vn  by  the  short-hand  term  — 
nte.  Someone  has  said  that  there 
;  be  something  wrong  with  a  con- 
that  cannot  be  described  in  Eng- 
Nevertheless,  one  of  the  concrete 
I  continuing  results  of  detente  was 
I  Conference  on  Security  and  Coop- 
iion  in  Europe,  which  we  commonly 
I-  to  as  CSCE.  Preparatory  talks 
hed  in  Helsinki  in  late  1972,  and 
htiations  continued  there  and  in 
I3va  to  work  out  the  outlines  of  the 
1  Act. 

Since  security  concerns  such  as 
.T,  the  mutual  and  balanced  force 
ction  negotiations,  and  other  such 
ific  topics  were  being  handled 
rately  in  their  own  restricted 
ms,  the  concept  of  security  which 
Final  Act  of  Helsinki  embodied  was 
irstood  to  be  a  much  broader  one. 
Helsinki  negotiators  sought  to  en- 
re  the  sense  of  security  among  all 
participating  nations  by  expanding 
leration  among  them,  especially  be- 
5n  Eastern  and  Western  nations,  in 
de  range  of  areas  including  eco- 
ic,  humanitarian,  educational,  and 
aral. 

The  practical  expression  of  this  or- 
zational  concept  resulted  in  the  di- 
)n  of  the  Final  Act  into  three  basic 
IS  which  have  commonly  been  called 
tets.  Basket  1  contained  a  declara- 
of  principles  of  interstate  behavior, 
1  as  sovereign  equality  and  restraint 
n  the  use  of  force,  principles  which 
e  consistent  with  the  U.N.  Charter 
other  declarations  of  international 


Basket  1  also  contained  a  very  im- 
portant affirmation  of  human  rights  and 
fundamental  freedoms,  including  reli- 
gious practice,  as  one  of  the  10  princi- 
ples governing  the  relations  among  the 
participating  states.  The  inclusion  of 
this  principle  was  a  difficult  achieve- 
ment and  was  accomplished  by  careful 
drafting  which  produced  wording  simi- 
lar to,  and  consistent  with,  earlier 
statements  in  such  documents  as  the 
U.N.  Charter,  the  Universal  Declara- 
tion of  Human  Rights,  and  the  U.N. 
convenants  on  human  rights.  In  re- 
stating this  principle,  the  Helsinki  sig- 
natories not  only  affirmed  their  com- 
mitment to  such  freedoms,  they  also 
specifically  reaffirmed  the  earlier  and 
more  basic  documents.  More  impor- 
tantly, perhaps,  the  signatories  im- 
plicitly affirmed  the  principle  that  true 
detente — and  true  security — rested  in 
the  final  analysis  upon  respect  for 
human  rights. 

Also  included  in  basket  1  is  an  in- 
novative and  important  security  com- 
ponent, called  confidence-building 
measures. 

Realizing  that  the  building  of  trust 
is  an  important  component  of  security, 
the  Final  Act  provides  for  the  prior 
notification  of  certain  troop  maneuvers 
and  movements  and  the  exchange  of  ob- 
servers among  the  signatories  at  mili- 
tary maneuvers. 

Baskets  2  and  3,  you  will  recall, 
deal  with  economics,  science,  and  tech- 
nology, and  with  cooperation  in  cul- 
tural, humanitarian,  and  other  fields. 
In  these  baskets,  specific  areas  of  coop- 
eration were  outlined  which  nations 
could  pursue  to  strengthen  interchange 
and  provide  for  the  betterment  of  the 
conditions  of  life  in  specific  ways  for 
their  populations. 

A  great  deal  more  could  be  said 
about  the  elements  included  in  the 
Final  Act,  but  I  suspect  you  are  all 
quite  familiar  with  them.  Among  the 
many  who  talk  readily  about  the  Final 
Act,  few  have  actually  read  it  and,  I 
further  suspect,  a  significant  proportion 
of  that  exclusive  group  is  present  in 
this  room.  For  that  reason,  you  are  all 
aware  that  the  Helsinki  act  is  not  ac- 
tually a  treaty.  It  is  instead  a  solemn 
agreement  among  the  signatories  to 
seek  the  political  objectives  outlined  in 
the  act.  Inherent  in  the  Final  Act's 
provisions  was  the  desire  to  reduce  the 
level  of  confrontation  between  East  and 
West  and  to  contribute  to  the  spirit  of 
detente.  Also  implicit  in  the  provisions 
was  a  commitment  to  increase  the 
dialogue  among  the  parties,  especially 
between  Eastern  and  Western  nations. 


The  negotiators  created  a  deli- 
cately balanced  document;  it  contained 
items  of  importance  to  each  participant. 
All  of  the  participants  were,  quite  ob- 
viously, interested  in  a  strengthened 
sense  of  security  in  Europe.  For  the 
Soviet  Union,  CSCE  implied  a  certain 
degree  of  acceptance  of  the  post- World 
War  II  territorial  frontiers  in  Europe, 
since  the  signatories  agreed  to  seek  no 
change  in  frontiers  except  by  peaceful 
means.  For  many  of  the  East  European 
states,  it  established  a  framework  that 
permitted  greater  interaction  with 
Western  countries  than  was  ])reviously 
possible. 

For  the  neutral  and  nonaligned 
states,  CSCE  provided  a  forum  in 
which  to  pursue  European-wide  inter- 
ests. Thus  Switzerland,  which  is  not  a 
member  of  the  United  Nations,  plays  a 
creative  political  role  in  Europe:  the 
Vatican  pursues  its  important  moral 
and  institutional  goals:  while  Malta  ex- 
presses its  interests  in  Mediterranean 
issues. 

For  the  West,  the  Final  Act  gave 
us  a  means  to  promote  the  exchange  of 
people  and  ideas  and  to  seek  peaceful 
evolution  in  the  systems  that  govei'n 
the  populations  of  the  U.S.S.R.  and  the 
countries  of  Eastern  Europe  and  pro- 
vided as  well  a  concrete  affirmation  of 
the  right  of  states  to  raise  humanitarian 
concerns  in  a  diplomatic  context.  In  our 
view,  the  Final  Act  achieved  an  enor- 
mous success  of  making  quite  explicit 
the  notion  that  improved  human  rights 
would  be  a  permanent  factor  in  the  de- 
tente equation.  This  may  have  been  an 
unexpected  turn  of  events  for  the 
Soviet  Union,  but  it  quickly  became 
plain  that  the  inclusion  of  the  human 
rights  concept  was  to  be  essential  to  the 
CSCE  process. 

Perhaps  the  most  important  aspect 
of  Helsinki  is  that  it  is  more  than  a 
document:  it  is  a  document  that  was 
converted  into  a  vital  process.  It 
created  a  process  for  continuous 
dialogue  between  the  East  and  West,  a 
platform  from  which  the  signatory  na- 
tions legitimately  could  talk  about  sen- 
sitive concerns  with  their  neighbors, 
concerns  that  previously  were  difficult 
to  voice  in  a  diplomatic  context.  This 
was  accomplished  through  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  unique  system  of  follow-on 
meetings  which  allows — or  more  accu- 
rately, requires — the  signatory  nations 
to  review  with  each  other  on  a  con- 
tinuing basis  the  progress  being  made 
toward  the  implementation  of  the  Final 
Act's  provisions.  By  placing  in  the  text 
of  the  act  itself  the  requirement  to  re- 
view the  implementation  of  the  political 
objectives  to  which  they  had  agreed, 
the  Helsinki  signatories  initiated  a 


uary  1980 


21 


Europe 


i 


process  that  is  as  important  as  the  text 
of  the  Final  Act  itself. 


U.S.  Policy  Toward  the  CSCE 

At  this  point  let  me  try  to  give  you 
an  idea  of  how  the  U.S.  Government 
views  the  current  status  of  the  Helsinki 
CSCE  process. 

First  of  all,  we  think  the  process  is 
reasonably  healthy  given  the  nature  of 
the  Soviet  system  and  the  state  of 
East-West  relations  today.  The  Bel- 
grade meeting  of  1977  showed  our  seri- 
ous commitment  to  implementation  and 
to  the  process  itself.  Under  the  distin- 
guished leadership  of  Ambassador  Ar- 
thur Goldberg,  the  U.S.  delegation 
made  a  strong  effort  to  enhance  im- 
plementation of  the  Final  Act  by  all 
signatories.  Although  some  may  have 
preferred  a  more  anodyne  approach  to 
the  meeting,  we  believed  that  it  was 
important,  at  the  first  Helsinki  fol- 
lowup  meeting,  to  articulate  our  deter- 
mination that  the  commitments  made  at 
Helsinki  be  taken  seriously.  Our  de- 
termination has  not  diminished. 

Since  the  Belgrade  meeting,  there 
have  been  numerous  bilateral  and  mul- 
tilateral talks  among  the  signatories  as 
called  for  in  the  Final  Act.  In  1978  and 
1979,  our  government  held  CSCE  con- 
sultations with  nearly  all  the  members 
of  the  Warsaw  Pact,  with  all  of  our 
NATO  allies,  and  with  most  of  the  neu- 
tral or  nonaligned  signatories  such  as 
Austria,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  and 
Yugoslavia.  We  have  also  met  on  sev- 
eral occasions  with  the  Spanish,  given 
their  important  role  as  hosts  for  the 
ne.xt  review  conference  in  Madrid.  Our 
experience  in  the  bilateral  discussions 
with  Eastern  countries  has  been  mod- 
erately encouraging.  Like  all  diplomatic 
interchange,  they  were  confidential, 
but  I  can  assure  you  they  were  frank, 
extensive,  and  specific. 

We  intend  to  continue  the  process 
in  the  next  12  months  with  the  hope 
that  progress  can  be  made  in  the  period 
before  the  Madrid  meeting.  These  reg- 
ular and  extensive  bilateral  meetings 
are  an  important  development  since 
Belgrade,  and  the  existence  of  these  in- 
tensive talks  has  caused  the  Helsinki 
process  to  take  on  greater  vitality. 

Another  productive  Helsinki  activ- 
ity was  the  work  of  the  expert  groups 
established  by  the  Belgrade  meeting  to 
discuss  concrete  ways  to  enhance  spe- 
cific CSCE  implementation.  A  scientific 
forum  under  CSCE  auspices  will  take 
place  in  Hamburg  in  February,  with 
Dr.  Philip  Handler,  President  of  the 
National  Academy  of  Sciences,  as  head 
of  the  U.S.  delegation. 


22 


Moreover,  the  Helsinki  Final  Act 
has  permeated  the  day-to-day  inter- 
change between  nations  and  within 
states  as  well.  We  find,  for  example, 
that  CSCE  topics  now  tend  to  become 
key  agenda  items  during  state  visits, 
and  we  note  increasing  references  in 
speeches  by  the  leaders  of  the  signatory 
nations  to  the  value  of  the  CSCE  proc- 
ess and  to  the  need  to  make  a  deeper 
commitment  to  it,  and  even  an  effect  on 
domestic  legislation  such  as  that  in- 
volving our  visa  laws. 

As  a  result  of  all  this  activity,  ef- 
forts by  the  signatory  nations  to  create 
the  necessary  atmosphere  for  improved 
compliance  with  the  Final  Act's  provi- 
sions have  been  enhanced.  I  would  not 
tell  you  that  all  is  well,  however.  The 
harsh  sentences  recently  imposed  on 
Charter  '77  members'  by  Czechoslovak 
authorities  shocked  the  world  and  made 
a  mockery  of  that  country's  commit- 
ments to  its  obligations  under  the  Final 
Act,  not  to  mention  its  obligation  to 
fundamental  concepts  of  human  rights. 

American  policy  toward  CSCE  re- 
mains unchanged.  We  are  committed  to 
the  continuity  of  the  Helsinki  process 
and  we  seek  to  deepen  the  commitment 
of  others  to  this  process  as  well.  We  are 
committed  to  fulfill  our  obligations 
under  the  Final  Act,  and  in  this  regard, 
we  have  been  seeking  to  improve  our 
domestic  implementation  of  the  Final 
Act's  provisions.  I  might  mention  at 
this  point  that  the  CSCE  Commission, 
under  the  able  and  effective  leadership 
of  Representative  Dante  Fascell,  is  in 
the  process  of  finalizing  a  report  on  this 
subject  which  will  be  released  shortly 
to  the  public. 

Naturally  we  also  continue  to  re- 
view and  seek  improved  implementa- 
tion of  the  Final  Act's  provisions  by  all 
parties  since  it  is  indisputable  that  the 
Helsinki  process  can  be  viable  only 
when  all  signatories  honor  their  com- 
mitments. As  an  adjunct  to  this  desire, 
the  United  States  continues  to  search 
for  new  ways  to  build  cooperation 
within  the  CSCE  context  and  will  be 
working  with  other  governments  on 
ways  to  enhance  implementation 
through  specific  proposals  for  the  1980 
CSCE  review  conference  in  Madrid, 
some  of  which  I  will  talk  about  shortly. 
Lastly,  the  United  States  continues 
to  maintain  its  unflagging  interest  in 
the  human  rights  provisions  of  the 
F^inal  Act.  It  is  here  most  of  all  that  we 
seek  the  evolutionary  change  in  the 
East  which  will  result  in  a  true  reduc- 
tion in  the  political  tensions  dividing  us 
and  which  will,  in  the  long  run,  allow 
our  relations  with  the  East  to  take  on  a 
more  normal  character  and  contribute 
to  the  betterment  of  life  not  only  in 
those  countries  but  throughout  the 
CSCE  area. 


Current  Status  of  Implementation 

Now  let  me  address  our  view  of  th 
current  status  of  implementation.  I 
mentioned  earlier  that  the  Heksinki 
process  was  causing  the  signatory 
nations  to  make  efforts  to  enhance 
implementation  of  the  Final  Act's  pro 
visions.  Although  this  has,  indeed, 
happened,  and  although  the  Helsinki 
process  may  to  some  extent  be  respor 
sible  for  this  happening,  it  is  obvious 
that  not  all  aspects  of  the  Final  Act  ar 
being  implemented  satisfactorily. 

In  this  regard,  the  United  States 
remains  quite  unsatisfied  with  the  levi 
of  CSCE  implementation  by  the  East 
the  human  rights  area.  The  Final  Act 
has  provided  a  yardstick  to  measure  tl 
implementation  of  human  rights  in  th 
East  and,  by  all  measures,  implement 
tion  is  insufficient  to  meet  the  stand- 
ards expected  when  the  Final  Act  wa 
signed.  We  are  continuing  by  all  feas 
ble  means,  and  especially  in  the  bilat 
eral  and  multilateral  talks  which  I  me 
tioned  earlier,  to  make  our  views 
known  on  human  rights  implementati 
and  the  ways  we  think  it  can  imjirovf 

The  U.S.  Government  has  been  i 
the  forefront  of  this  effort  on  human 
rights:  yet  at  the  same  time,  we  reco 
nize  there  are  limitations  to  what  we 
can  accomplish.  Being  a  government 
engaged  in  an  intense  security  compe 
tion  with  the  Soviet  Union,  we  will  a 
ways  be  open  to  the  charge  that  our 
human  rights  concerns  are  politically 
and  ideologically  motivated.  For  this 
reason,  the  U.S.  Government  continu 
to  believe  that  private  citizens  and 
their  organizations  in  all  CSCE  coun 
tries  necessarily  play  a  very  importa 
role  to  encourage  CSCE  implementati 
The  very  nature  of  private  groups,  sii 
as  those  you  represent,  puts  beyond 
dispute  the  humanitarian  concerns  to 
which  they — and  you — are  devoted. 
You  are  not  required  to  balance  com- 
peting interests  as  governments  mus 
do.  Your  concerns  are  direct  and  spe 
cifically  focused.  You  have  an  enornm 
advantage  in  many  respects  in  bringi 
to  public  attention,  in  a  believable  ar 
effective  way,  the  areas  in  which 
human  rights  implementation  can  am 
must  be  improved. 

For  this  reason,  the  U.S.  Goveri 
ment,  from  President  Carter  on  dowi 
is  very  pleased  with  the  interest  andl 
involvement  in  the  Helsinki  process 
which  private  citizens  and  their  orga( 
zations  have  shown.  We  feel,  fur- 
thermore, that  your  efforts  very  use 
fully  complement  the  government's  ai 
that  the  overall  result  has  been  to 
deepen  this  nation's  commitment  to  t 
continuity  of  the  Helsinki  process 

Department  of  State  Built 


Europe 


The  Final  Act,  we  believe,  specif- 
ly  encourages  relevant  private  ac- 
I'by  providing  that  individuals  shall 
)W,"and  have  a  right  to  act  upon, 
ir  rights  and  duties.  For  this  reason, 

establishment  of  CSCE  monitoring 
lups  in  Eastern  countries  was  a  wel- 
ne  sign,  and  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 

United  States  will  be  able  to  speak 
litively  about  the  Eastern  perform- 
■e  so  long  as  CSCE  monitors  con- 
je  to  languish  in  detention  and  are 
erwise  harassed. 

Iture  Directions 

Let  me  turn  to  another  aspect  of 
Helsinki  process  and  inform  you 
iUt  our  government's  current  thinking 
ithe  future  directions  it  believes  the 
lee.ss  should  take.  First  of  all,  as  I 
!'e  already  said,  the  United  States  is 
nmitted  to  deepening  the  involve- 
int  of  all  Helsinki  signatories  in  the 
Ice  process. 

I    It  is  quite  clear  to  us  that  a  bal- 
I  ed  implementation  of  all  aspects  and 
I  visions  of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  is  a 
I  cial  factor  in  the  deepening  commit- 

Int  to  the  CSCE  process.  We  know 
5  is  so  because  various  signatories 
m  have  specific  interests  in  different 
as  of  the  Final  Act.  I  mentioned  be- 
?  that  the  genius  of  the  Final  Act 
(5  that  it  contained  something  of  im- 
i  tance  for  each  participant. 

In  the  implementation  process,  we 
list  apply  this  genius  practically  by 

1'  imoting  implementation  across  a 
lad  spectrum.  Some  nations,  such  as 
•s,  tend  to  place  priority  on  the  hu- 
nitarian  provisions  as  we  seek  bai- 
led progress  in  all  CSCE  areas, 
ners,  while  interested  in  these  con- 
ns, give  greater  prioi-ity  to  security 
i  economic  aspects  of  the  Final  Act 
geographic,  historical,  or  other  rea- 
ls. A  successful  process,  and  a  suc- 
^sful  meeting  at  Madrid,  will  see 
egress  in  a  broad  range  of  areas,  in 
ieh  the  humanitarian  and  the  secu- 
y  fields  must  be  included. 
We  have  also  come  to  understand 
t  an  uneven  manner  of  implementa- 
n  can  damage  the  entire  Helsinki 
)cess.  Nations  whose  interests  are 
fleeted  or  whose  values  are  given 
3rt  shrift  will  lose  interest  in  the 
)eess.  There  are  already  Americans 
.0  have  suggested  that  we  abandon 
iCE  because  progress  has  been  slow 
humanitarian  fields.  There  have  been 
Tie  Europeans  who  have  shown  irri- 
;ion  over  the  failure  of  rapid  progress 
other  fields — for  example,  the  exten- 
in  of  more  advantageous  trading 
ms,  increased  attention  to  security 
iasures,  or  extensive  Mediterranean 
icussions. 

inuary  1980 


Based  on  our  experience  to  date, 
we  must  recognize  that  balanced  im- 
plementation of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act 
has  not  been  achieved.  The  United 
States  and  its  friends  among  the  Hel- 
sinki signatories  have  been  emphasizing 
implementation  of  the  humanitarian 
provisions  of  the  Final  Act.  Given  the 
nature  of  the  Eastern  response  so  far, 
we  have  been,  at  best,  exploring  the 
fringes  of  the  Eastern  nations  recep- 
tivity to  progress  in  these  areas.  We 
know,  however,  that  the  East  is  not 
monolithic  and  that  their  internal  re- 
gimes and  societies  differ.  Their  rela- 
tions among  themselves  and  with  us  are 
distinct,  and  their  record  of  implemen- 
tation in  the  human  rights  area  reflects 
these  differences. 

In  our  discussions,  we  have 
achieved  some  progress  in  connection 
with  family  reunification,  a  major 
priority  for  us.  In  several  countries  re- 
ligious" freedom  and  intellectual  diver- 
sity are  somewhat  greater  now  than 
before.  Advances  have  been  made  in 
greater  cultural  interchange  with  a  few 
countries.  But  the  free  flow  of  people 
and  ideas— which  CSCE  envisions— is 
certainly  far  off. 

The  economic  provisions  of  the 
Final  Act  have  not  been  pursued  as 
vigorously  as  they  might  have — 
although  it  should  be  noted  that  other 
forums  exist  for  this  purpose.  U.S. 
legislation  links  the  trade  status  of  the 
Soviet  Union  and  most  nonmarket 
countries  to  the  emigration  question, 
and  this  has  placed  limits  on  economic 
relations  with  several  of  them.  Fulfill- 
ment by  many  Communist  countries  of 
Helsinki  commitments  to  provide  busi- 
ness information  and  adequate  working 
conditions  for  our  businessmen  has  not 
been  satisfactory.  Because  the  com- 
merce of  Communist  countries  is  con- 
ducted by  the  state,  political  consid- 
erations often  affect  economic  activity. 
Despite  these  difficulties,  however, 
trade  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  East- 
ern Europe  has  grown  over  the  last  few 
years  and  has  produced  a  large  and 
rising  trade  surplus. 

At  present,  many  of  the  Helsinki 
signatories  look  to  the  security  provi- 
sions of  the  Final  Act  as  an  area  that  is 
ripe  for  improved  effort  at  implementa- 
tion. 

The  confidence-building  measures 
presently  in  the  Final  Act  have  worked 
rather  well  and  thus  have  proved  to  be 
worthy  precedents  for  possible  further 
expansion.  There  have  been  several 
proposals  for  security  enhancement, 
and  the  U.S.  Government  has  been 


closely  examining  them.  Among  the 
most  important  and  creative  of  these 
proposals  was  forwarded  by  the  French 
a  year  or  so  ago  for  a  conference  on  dis- 
armament in  Europe.  The  proposal  was 
intended  to  widen  the  area  for  conven- 
tional arms  control  by  establishing  a 
conference,  the  first  stage  of  which 
would  develop  confidence-building 
measures  to  enhance  the  sense  of  secu- 
rity among  nations. 

Another  proposal  was  put  forth  by 
the  Warsaw  Pact  states.  In  their 
Budapest  proposal  made  earlier  this 
year,  they  called  for  a  European  con- 
ference on  military  detente  which 
would  discuss  confidence-building 
measures  as  well  as  other  Eastern 
ideas. 

These  initiatives  are  currently 
under  active  consideration  and  discus- 
sion. The  United  States  and  its  allies 
have  a  deep  interest  in  enhanced  secu- 
rity for  all  states  in  Europe,  and  there 
are  aspects  of  these  and  similar  propos- 
als that  may  be  of  interest  to  us.  But 
three  things  should  be  clear. 

First,  neither  we  nor  our  allies  will 
have  any  interest  in  arms  control  exer- 
cises that  are  motivated  by  a  desire  to 
achieve  propaganda  victories  and  one- 
sided advantages  or  to  delay  our  NATO 
modernization  programs  without  prop- 
erly addressing  the  underlying 
realities. 

Second,  we  do  not  want  to  estab- 
lish new  forums  or  procedures  that 
might  interfere  with  or  endanger  the 
goals  we  seek  through  currently  estab- 
lished channels  of  arms  control  negotia- 
tions. 

Third,  we  will  not  permit  the 
CSCE  process  to  become  distorted  and 
its  balance  lost  through  excessive 
weighting  in  one  area  at  the  expense  of 
others. 

Thus,  we  return  to  our  theme  of 
balance  since  this  notion  seems  to  us  to 
provide  the  best  chance  of  making 
long-term  progress  in  basic  areas.  We 
will  not  lessen  our  emphasis  on  human- 
itarian concerns,  and  we  expect  that 
other  Western  nations  will  stand  firmly 
beside  us  in  demanding  better  im- 
plementation. And,  at  the  same  time, 
we  should  find  a  way  to  deal  in  a  posi- 
tive fashion  with  the  desire  of  Euro- 
pean states  for  enhanced  security 
within  the  CSCE  context.  Therefore, 
we  are  rededicating  ourselves  to  the 
pursuit  of  a  positive,  as  opposed  to  a 
negative,  balance  in  CSCE— that  is,  a 
balance  based  on  greater  movement 
toward  implementation  in  all  CSCE 
areas. 

There  are  several  ways  in  which  we 
can  enhance  balance  in  the  implementa- 
tion process.  First,  perhaps,  we  should 

23 


Europe 


explore  more  systematically  the  rela- 
tions between  trade  and  economy  and 
security  and  human  rights  so  that  we 
can  see  the  interdependent  factors  in 
each  of  these  areas.  Second,  when  we 
consult  bilaterally  and  multilaterally 
with  the  Helsinki  signatories,  we  can 
widen  the  scope  and  expertise  available 
on  all  areas  of  the  Final  Act.  Third,  we 
can  suggest  that,  in  the  interim  be- 
tween i-egular  CSCE  review  confer- 
ences, there  could  be  more  experts  or 
high-level  meetings  on  specific  and  con- 
crete CSCE  subjects,  such  as  we  have 
seen  in  a  limited  way  after  the  Belgrade 
meeting.  There  would  be  fruitful  areas 
for  intensive  work  in  the  coming  years, 
for  example  in  the  areas  of  security, 
family  reunification,  freer  travel,  and 
emigration. 

All  of  these  suggestions  offer  ways 
to  implement  the  Final  Act  in  an 
evenhanded  manner  and  to  give  us  the 
tools  we  need  to  seek  greater  commit- 
ment to  the  implementation  of  those 
concerns  in  which  we  have  a  specific 
interest. 

Preparations  for  the 
Review  Conference 

Now  that  I  have  given  you  an  idea 
of  our  current  thinking  about  the  CSCE 
process,  I  would  like  to  say  a  few  words 
about  our  preparations  for  the  followup 
review  conference  in  Madrid  and  the 
period  beyond. 

Our  policy  is  to  have  the  Madrid 
meeting  be  a  constructive  one  which 
will  review  compliance,  seek  to  enhance 
implementation  in  the  future,  and 
explore  concrete  ideas  for  improving 
cooperation.  In  the  area  of  human 
rights,  there  is  absolutely  no  doubt  that 
we  will  continue  vigorously  to  seek  full 
implementation,  particulary  of  princi- 
ples seven  and  basket  3.  I  have  men- 
tioned earlier  the  high  level  of  interest 
in  this  area,  and  given  your  own  con- 
tinuous involvement  in  these  concerns, 
I  am  sure  our  commitment  to  effective 
human  rights  implementations  will 
deepen. 

In  this  regard,  among  the  many 
areas  which  we  will  be  examining  at 
Madrid,  we  will  do  our  utmost  to  en- 
courage Eastern  countries  to  accord  re- 
spectful and  humane  treatment  to  the 
courageous  individuals  who  have  estab- 
lished citizens'  committees  to  monitor 
and  stimulate  compliance  with  the  Hel- 
sinki Final  Act.  Related  to  this  will  be 
efforts  to  alleviate  the  suffering  and  ob- 
tain freedom  for  those  who  have  been 
imprisoned  because  of  their  political 
and  religious  beliefs  and  for  espousing 
compliance  with  the  Final  Act. 


Of  specific  concern  to  this  lead- 
ership conference  will  be  our  continuing 
interest  in  a  more  humane  approach  to 
emigration  and  improved  emigration 
procedures,  with  special  emphasis  on 
and  continuing  sympathy  for  the  plight 
of  Soviet  Jews  and  other  religious  ad- 
herents who  wish  to  emigrate,  as  well 
as  for  the  elimination  of  harassment  of 
those  who  have  been  refused  exit  visas. 
We  remain  concerned  about  implemen- 
tation of  the  provisions  involving  the 
freedom  of  journalists  to  pursue  their 
work  without  interference. 

We  see  no  reason  why  there  could 
not  be  substantial  progress  in  these 
areas  in  the  period  before  Madrid;  posi- 
tive developments  here  would  be  a 
powerful  stimulus  to  making  the  Ma- 
drid meeting  the  type  of  success  we  all 
wish  it  to  be. 

For  the  sake  of  balance,  and  to  en- 
hance our  ability  to  obtain  compliance 
with  all  aspects  of  the  Final  Act,  we 
will  be  working  with  other  signatories 
to  improve  implementation  of  the  secu- 
rity provisions  of  the  Helsinki  agree- 
ment by  looking  at  ways  to  heighten  the 
effect  of  the  confidence-building  meas- 
ures written  into  the  Final  Act.  Since 
the  Final  Act  also  encourages  the  par- 
ties to  make  further  efforts  which  could 
lead  to  developing  and  enlarging  meas- 
ures aimed  at  strengthening  confi- 
dence, we  will  be  willing  to  explore 
ways  to  implement  these  provisions  in  a 
manner  that  accommodates  some  as- 
pects of  the  French  proposal  and  War- 
saw Pact  proposal  within  the  CSCE 
context  in  the  period  after  the  Madrid 
meeting. 

In  the  economic  fields,  we  will  also 
look  for  ways  to  facilitate  trade  and 
other  forms  of  economic  cooperation. 

The  scientific  forum,  which  will  be 
held  in  Hamburg  this  coming  winter, 
will  allow  distinguished  private  scien- 
tific figures,  as  well  as  the  CSCE  sig- 
natories, to  see  where  further  efforts 
can  be  made  in  this  important  field.  In 
Geneva  in  November  w'e  will  sign  the 
Convention  of  Transboundary  Air  Pol- 
lution worked  out  in  the  CSCE  context 
under  the  auspices  of  the  U.N.  Eco- 
nomic Commission  for  Europe.  We  will 
also  try  to  see  where  other  environ- 
mental problems  of  common  interest 
can  be  cooperatively  examined.  We  in- 
tend to  further  cooperation  and  ex- 
changes in  the  fields  of  science  and  cul- 
ture as  well.  These  questions  will  be 
taken  up  bilaterally  and  multilaterally 
as  we  prepare  for  the  Madrid  review 
conference. 


What  I  have  attempted  to  do  in 
these  remarks  is  to  describe  for  you  th. 
U.S.  Government's  continuing  interest 
in  the  well-being  of  the  Helsinki  jjroc- 
ess  and  our  deepening  commitment  to 
the  implementation  of  all  Final  Act 
provisions  agreed  to  by  the  signatories 
Of  all  the  methods  we  have  for  dealiiiL 
with  the  East,  of  all  the  concrete  meai; 
established  to  work  out  the  parametei 
of  detente,  and  of  all  the  forums  that 
have  been  constructed  to  improve  wha 
is,  at  best,  a  tense  relationship  with  a 
strong  and  determined  adversary,  the 
Helsinki  process  is  by  far  the  broadest 
and  most  politically  workable. 

For  the  long-term,  however,  the 
Helsinki  process  can  lead  us  beyond  thi 
bloc-to-bloc  relationship  and  dissemi-     , 
nate  understanding  for  the  concepts  of «: 
openness,  pluralism,  and  humanity  in  ^. 
the  world.  For  this  reason,  the  United  jj> 
States  remains  deeply  committed  to  thi  j- 
Helsinki  process  and  to  the  effort  beinj 
made  by  all  35  signatories  to  improvin 
their  relationships  by  means  of  this 
unique  diplomatic  and  public  process.  I 


'A  private  group  in  Czechoslovakia  e 
tablished  to  monitor  compliance  with  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act. 


CSCE  Semiannual 
Report  and  1 980 
Madrid  iVIeeting        |eJ 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT. 
DEC.  5.  1979' 


On  behalf  of  President  Carter,  Sec 
retary  Vance  on  December  4,  1979, 
transmitted  the  seventh  semiannual  ri 
port  on  implementation  of  the  Helsink 
Final  Act  to  Chairman  Dante  Fascell 
the  Commission  on  Security  and  Coop 
eration  in  Europe.  These  reports  are 
submitted  to  assist  the  commission  in 
its  function  of  monitoring  implementa 
tion  of  the  Helsinki  accords.  The  pres 
ent  report  covers  the  period  June  1- 
November  30,  1979.^ 

The  next  followup  meeting  of  the 
Conference  on  Security  and  Coopera- 
tion in  Europe  (CSCE)  will  start  in  Mi 
drid  on  November  11,  1980.  A  major 
feature  of  that  meeting  will  be  a  reviei 
by  the  signatories  of  implementation  ( 
the  Final  Act.  The  United  States  in- 
tends to  speak  frankly  and  honestly 
about  successes  and  failures  in  im- 


24 


Department  of  State  Bulle' 


Europe 


[U'litation.  Our  comments  will  re- 
V  the  record  of  progress  at  that 

Thus  far,  the  record  has  been  un- 
1.  Advances  in  some  areas  have 
1  coupled  with  serious  failures  with 
ect  to  other  aspects  of  the  Final 
For  example,  during  the  period 
red  by  the  report,  there  have  been 
)Uraging  developments  in  the 
ification  of  divided  families  and  the 
ral  area  of  human  contacts  but  con- 
ed repression  of  individuals  seeking 
"iercise  rights  which  their  govern- 
its  have  pledged  to  respect. 
i.The  Final  Act  recognizes  respect 
human  rights  as  an  integral  ])art  of 
(basis  for  the  development  of  secu- 
I  and  cooperation  among  the  35  par- 
lating  states.  It  is  in  the  area  of 
J  an  rights  that  certain  states  have 
)  the  most  difficulty  in  meeting  the 
mitments  which  they  voluntarily 
:e  at  Helsinki.  The  United  States, 
lit;  the  coming  yeai'  and  at  the  Ma- 
:  meeting,  intends  to  continue  to  en- 
lage  all  signatories  to  implement 
I  Final  Act  in  its  entirety.  ■ 


I  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  De- 
Inent  spokesman  Hodding  Carter  III. 

'Copies  of  the  report  may  be  obtained 
I  the  Public  Information  Service, 

au  of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of 

;,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


Jsinki  Agreement 
Human  Rights 


j:SIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 

/.  30.  1979  > 

My  Administration  is  deeply  com- 
ed  to  the  cause  of  human  rights 

here  and  abroad.  As  a  means  to 
lote  respect  for  fundamental  free- 

and  the  development  of  a  more 
eful,  stable  world,  the  United 
es  attaches  great  significance  to  the 

Act  of  the  Conference  on  Security 
Cooperation  in  Europe  (CSCE). 
document,  signed  in  1975  at  Hel- 
i  by  the  leaders  of  33  European  na- 
5,  Canada,  and  the  United  States, 
ges  its  signers  to  work  toward  low- 
5  barriers  and  improving  coopei'a- 
between  East  and  West.  Each  na- 
made  solemn  promises  to  take 
s  to  improve  the  lives  of  its  citi- 
.  These  obligations  required  some 
stments  in  the  foreign  and  domestic 
ies  of  all  35  nations. 


I  am  extremely  pleased  that  the 
U.S.  Commission  on  Security  and 
Cooperation  in  Europe  has  taken  the 
lead  in  assessing  U.S.  implementation 
and  identifying  areas  where  American 
performance  can  be  improved.  The 
commission's  report,  "Fulfilling  Our 
Promises:  The  United  States  and  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act" — released  on 
November  8 — is  the  first  comprehen- 
sive review  by  any  CSCE  signatory 
which  takes  into  account  criticism  from 
other  Helsinki  states  as  well  as  domes- 
tic observers. 

CSCE  signatory  states  which  sup- 
press human  rights  cannot,  in  good  con- 
science, justify  their  record  of  com- 
pliance. But  I  believe  our  record  of  im- 
plementation has  been  second  to  none, 
even  among  the  other  democracies 
among  the  35  participating  states. 
American  political  history  is  testimony 
to  the  firm  foundation  of  civil  liberties 
enshrined  in  our  own  Constitution  with 
its  Bill  of  Rights,  long  before  Helsinki. 

As  this  report  points  out,  our  work 
is  never  complete.  Our  own  traditions, 
reinforced  by  the  Helsinki  Final  Act, 
pledge  us  to  strive  constantly  for  im- 
provement in  both  domestic,  civil,  and 
economic  rights  and  in  the  expanded 
cooperation  with  other  participating 
states.  This  report  should  go  far  to  per- 
suade other  CSCE  governments  that 
the  United  States  is  serious  about  its 
obligations  under  the  Helsinki  accords. 

I  also  hope  that  it  will  stimulate 
other  Helsinki  countries  to  undertake 
similar  public  assessments  of  their 
performance.  Implementation  of  the 
Final  Act  is  critical  to  peace  and  secu- 
rity in  Europe  and  for  our  own  nation. 
We  cannot  permit  the  Helsinki  agree- 
ment to  become  meaningless  words  on 
parchment.  We  must  bring  it  to  life, 
and  I  believe  the  CSCE  Commission 
has  made  a  major  contribution  to  that 
end.  ■ 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Dec.  3,  1979. 


Visit  of  Irish  Prime 
Minister  Lynch 


Prime  Minister  Jack  Lynch  of 
Ireland  made  an  official  visit  to  the 
United  States  November  7-15,  1979. 
While  in  Washington  (November  8-10), 
he  met  with  President  Carter  and  other 
government  officials.  Following  is  the 
press  statement  issued  at  the  conclu- 


sion of  hi.s  ))ieetl»g  ivith  the  P)'esident 
on  November  <s'.' 

The  President  met  today  with 
Prime  Minister  Jack  Lynch  of  Ireland. 
Prime  Minister  Lynch,  in  addition  to 
being  the  Head  of  Government  of  Ire- 
land, is  for  the  last  half  of  1979  also  the 
President  of  the  European  Council  of 
Heads  of  State  or  of  Government  of  the 
nine  countries  of  the  European  Com- 
munity. 

The  President  and  the  Prime 
Minister  reviewed  the  close  relations 
between  their  two  countries  and  dis- 
cussed a  number  of  key  world  issues 
which  are  of  particular  concern  to  the 
European  Community,  with  which  the 
United  States  enjoys  close  cooperation, 
based  on  common  interests  and  values. 

The  President  and  the  Prime 
Minister  also  discussed  at  length  the 
tragic  communal  problems  in  Northern 
Ii-eland.  They  condemned  support  for 
organizations  engaged  directly  or  indi- 
rectly in  campaigns  of  violence  which 
only  delays  the  day  when  peace  and 
reconciliation  can  come  to  Northern 
Ireland.  They  noted  with  interest  the 
projjosal  of  the  British  Government  to 
convene  a  conference  of  the  principal 
political  parties  in  Northern  Ireland 
and  shared  the  hope  that  progress  could 
be  made  toward  a  form  of  administra- 
tion acceptable  to  both  parts  of  the 
community  there.  The  President  reaf- 
firmed his  statement  of  August  1977 
looking  to  support  for  American  in- 
vestment in  Northern  Ireland  when  the 
violence  is  ended. 

The  official  visit  of  Prime  Minister 
and  Mrs.  Lynch  to  Washington  and  to 
several  other  American  cities  demon- 
strates the  great  friendship  between 
the  two  nations  and  also  the  great  re- 
spect of  the  American  Government  and 
people  for  a  country  which  in  recent 
years  has  enjoyed  rapid  economic 
growth  and  taken  its  place  among  the 
industrialized  nations  of  the  world.  The 
Prime  Minister  spoke  of  the  contribu- 
tion of  American  investment  to  this 
growth  and  reiterated  his  government's 
continuing  support  for  such  investment. 

The  Prime  Minister  invited  the 
President  to  visit  Ireland  at  a  mutually 
agreeable  date  and  the  President  ac- 
cepted the  invitation  with  pleasure.  ■ 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Nov.  12,  1979, 
which  also  carries  the  texts  of  President 
Carter's  and  Prime  Minister  Lynch's  re- 
marks made  at  the  welcoming  ceremony  on 
Nov.  8,  their  remarks  to  reporters  follow- 
ing a  meeting  on  Nov.  8,  and  their  dinner 
toasts  that  evening. 


jary  1980 


25 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


Four  Treaties  Pertaining  to  Human  Rights 


Following  are  statcnwnfs  befuiT  tin 
Senate  Foreign  Relatione  Committee 
on  November  Hi,  1979,  by  Deputy  Sec- 
retary of  State  Warren  Christopher. 
Legal  Adriser  of  the  Department  of 
State  Robert.s  B.  Owen,  and  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Human  Rights  and 
Humanitarian  Affairs  Patricia  M. 
Derian  .^ 


DEPUTY  SECRETARY 
CHRISTOPHER 

I  am  grateful  for  this  opportunity 
to  appear  before  the  committee  in  sup- 
port of  the  four  multilateral  treaties  on 
human  rights  transmitted  to  the  Senate 
by  President  Carter  in  1978:  the  Inter- 
national Convention  on  the  Elimination 
of  All  Forms  of  Racial  Discrimination; 
the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and 
Political  Rights;  the  International  Cov- 
enant on  Economic,  Social  and  Cul- 
tural Rights;  and  the  American  Con- 
vention on  Human  Rights.^ 

A  fifth  human  rights  treaty,  the 
genocide  convention,  has  already 
undergone  extensive  hearings  before 
this  committee  and  is,  therefore,  not 
before  you  today.  I  want  to  emphasize, 
however,  that  ratification  of  that  con- 
vention remains  one  of  the  most  impor- 
tant goals  of  this  Administration's 
human  rights  policy.  As  President  Car- 
ter said  in  a  message  to  the  Senate 
[May  23,  1977],  the  genocide  convention 
".  .  .  protects  the  most  fundamental  of 
all  human  rights — the  right  to  live.  .  .  ." 
And  as  this  committee  well  knows,  its 
ratification  is  very  long  overdue. 

In  addressing  the  United  Nations 
about  the  treaties  [March  17,  1977]  be- 
fore you  today.  President  Carter  noted 
that;  "The  basic  thrust  of  human  affairs 
points  toward  a  more  universal  demand 
for  fundamental  human  rights."  The 
treaties — all  of  which  have  been  signed 
by  large  numbers  of  countries  and  have 
already  entered  into  force — are  a  re- 
flection of  that  "basic  thrust."  Our  his- 
tory, and  our  vital  national  interests, 
require  that  we  be  a  full  and  active  part 
of  it. 

In  my  remarks  this  morning,  I  will 
concentrate  on  the  compelling  interests 
— both  foreign  and  domestic — that  call 
for  U.S.  adherence  to  the  treaties. 
Later  today  Bob  Owen,  the  Legal  Ad- 
viser of  the  Department  of  State,  and 
our  colleagues  from  the  Department  of 
Justice  will  discuss  in  detail  the  legal 
dimensions  of  the  treaties,  as  well  as 
the  reservations  to  them  that  we  rec- 


ommend. Patt  Derian.  the  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Human  Rights  and  Hu- 
manitarian Affairs,  will  address  the 
relationship  between  the  treaties  and 
other  aspects  of  our  human  rights  pol- 
icy. 

At  the  outset,  however,  I  would 
like  to  describe  very  briefly  the  con- 
tents of  the  four  treaties. 

Contents  of  the  Treaties 

The  racial  discrimination  conven- 
tion was  signed  by  the  United  States  in 
1966.  Its  purpose  is  to  define  racial  dis- 
crimination, to  condemn  and  prohibit 
the  practice  of  racial  discrimination  by 
governments,  and  to  encourage  the  re- 
moval of  institutional  obstacles  to  the 
ending  of  racial  discrimination. 

The  International  Covenant  on 
Civil  and  Political  Rights,  signed  by  the 
United  States  in  1977,  is  a  more  com- 
prehensive document.  It  commits  par- 
ticipating states  to  respect  many  of  the 
rights  enshrined  in  our  own  Constitu- 
tion; freedom  of  speech,  religion,  as- 
sociation, and  movement;  the  right  to 
vote  in  secret  elections;  the  right  to 
stand  equal  before  the  law;  the  right  to 
self-determination  and  to  nondiscrimi- 
nation; the  presumption  of  innocence 
for  those  accused  of  a  crime;  the  right 
against  self-incrimination;  and  the  pro- 
tections of  due  process  of  law. 

Unlike  the  other  U.N.  treaties,  the 
International  Covenant  on  Economic, 
Social  and  Cultural  Rights,  which  was 
signed  by  the  United  States  in  1977, 
looks  to  the  future.  It  commits  states  to 
take  steps  toward  the  future  realization 
of  certain  economic,  social,  and  cultural 
goals  for  the  individual.  These  goals  are 
ones  to  which  the  United  States  has 
long  been  committed,  including  the 
right  to  work,  to  social  security,  to 
physical  and  mental  health,  to  educa- 
tion, and  to  freedom  from  hunger. 

The  one  non-U. N.  treaty  being 
considered  here — the  American  Con- 
vention on  Human  Rights — was 
adopted  by  the  Organization  of  Ameri- 
can States  in  1969  and  signed  by  the 
United  States  in  1977.  It  seeks  to 
guarantee  for  the  peoples  of  this  hemi- 
sphere rights  similar  to  those  guaran- 
teed by  the  civil  and  political  covenant. 

All  four  of  the  ti'eaties  before  you 
today  also  contain  reporting  procedures 
and  provide  for  review  by  independent 
e.xperts  of  progress  in  achieving  the 
treaties'  goals. 


Domestic  Interests 

As  I  suggested  earlier,  the  Ad- 
ministration urges  Senate  approval  of 
these  treaties  because  adherence  to 
them  is  so  clearly  in  our  national  inter!' 
est.  Concern  for  human  rights  is  one  o 
the  foundations  of  our  greatness  as  a 
nation.  Our  observance  of  human  right 
contributes  pi'ofoundly  to  our  lead- 
ership in  the  international  community 
But  to  preserve  and  enhance  that  lead  j 
ership  role,  we  must  demonstrate  our  j 
willingness  to  make  human  rights  a     '' 
matter  of  international  commitment  ai 
policy  and  not  solely  a  matter  of  dome 
tic  law. 

As  President  Carter  noted  in  his 
letter  to  the  Senate  transmitting  the 
treaties  [February  23,  1978],  the 
United  States  is  one  of  the  few  impoi 
tant  nations  in  the  world  that  has  nut 
yet  become  a  party  to  the  U.N. 


Unless  the  United  States  is  a 
pcoiy  to  the  fotir  human 
rights  treaties  ive  ivill  be  iiti- 
able  to  contribute  full  1/  to  tin 
evolving  internatiottal  laiv  o/ 
human  rights. 


treaties.  In  the  eyes  of  the  world,  oi 
failure  to  do  so  reflects  adversely  u)! 
our  own  impressive  accomplishment; 
the  human  rights  field.  Even  more  ii  . 
portantly,  our  nonadherence  to  the     i^ 
treaties  prejudices  U.S.  participatioi  u 
the  development  of  the  international  i> 
law  of  human  rights.  Ij 

This  is  not  only  unfortunate,  it  i 
also  unnecessary.  In  essence,  the 
treaties  create  an  international  com- 
mitment to  the  same  basic  human  rig^ 
that  are  already  guaranteed  to  citize*  iii( 
of  the  LTnited  States  by  our  own  law 
and  Constitution.  U.S.  ratification 
would  not  endanger  any  rights  that 
currently  enjoy.  On  the  contrary, 
ratification  would  encourage  the  ext 
sion  of  rights  already  enjoyed  by  ou 
citizens  to  the  citizens  of  other  natic 
and  it  would  allow  the  United  State 
participate  in  this  process. 

The  fundamental  rights  enjoyed 
this  country  are  a  product  not  only 
our  Founding  Fathers'  drafting  but  : 
of  two  centuries  of  practice  and  in- 
terpretation. Similarly,  the  rights 
enunciated  in  these  treaties  will  be 
molded  by  the  actions  of  the  states 
party  to  them  in  future  years.  Unle 
the  United  States  is  a  party  to  the 
treaties,  we  will  be  unable  to  contrilij^ 
fully  to  this  evolving  international  1 
of  human  rights. 


26 


Department  of  State  Bui 


Human  Rights 


jrnational  Interests 

Moreover,  ratification  of  the 
ties  will  remove  a  troubling  compli- 
m  from  our  diplomacy.  Govern- 
ts  with  which  we  raise  human 
ts  concerns  will  no  longer  be  able  to 
it  the  force  of  our  approaches  or 
tion  the  seriousness  of  our  com- 
nent  by  pointing  to  our  failure  to 
•y.  I  have  personally  observed  that 
t  person-to-person  diplomacy  pro- 
s  the  primary  and,  in  many  in- 
ces,  the  best  means  to  obtain  im- 
ements  in  human  rights.  But  I 

also  observed  personally  that  our 
tiveness  can  be  compromised  by 
own  failure  to  ratify  these  treaties. 
Ratification  also  gives  the  United 
es  an  additional  international  forum 
hich  to  pursue  the  advancement  of 
an  rights  and  to  challenge  other 
es  to  meet  the  high  standards  set 
his  nation.  We  should  not  deny  our- 
es  this  opportunity  to  help  shape 
developing  international  standards 
luman  rights  and  to  encourage  the 
nsion  to  others  of  the  rights  we 

long  enjoyed. 

While  the  treaties  are  not  subject 
fgally  binding  sanctions,  they  do  in- 
se  the  political  costs  attached  to 
itions  of  human  rights.  The  commit- 

established  to  review  compliance 

the  treaties  provide  a  mechanism 
ugh  which  human  rights  practices 
ughout  the  world  can  be  evaluated, 
pared,  and  publicized.  These  com- 
ees  will  develop  a  sort  of  human 
ts  caselaw — a  body  of  precedent 

can  give  shape  and  substance  to 
basic  standards  enunciated  in  the 
ties. 
It  is  toward  this  goal — the  opera- 

of  the  rule  of  law  in  the  interna- 
al  human  rights  field  —  that  we 
lid  strive.  Ratification  of  these  four 
ties  would  be  an  important  step  to 

end. 

U.S.  adherence  to  these  treaties 
Id  unquestionably  promote  the  in- 
Lational  recognition  of  fundamental 
lan  rights.  But  it  would  also  un- 
5tionably  advance  the  national 
rests  of  the  United  States.  As 
sident  Carter  suggested  on  the  30th 
iversity  of  the  Universal  Declara- 

of  Human  Rights,  the  two  are  ine.x- 
ably  linked.  As  he  said  on  that  occa- 

human  right.';  are  not  peripheral  to  the 

ign  policy  of  the  United  States  .... 

pur.'iuit  of  human  rights  is  part  of  a 
'  id  effort  to  use  our  great  power  and  our 
-fiendous  influence  in  the  service  of 

ting  a  better  world  —  a  world  in  which 
J  lan  beings  can  live  in  peace,  in  freedom, 

with  their  basic  needs  adequately  met. 


For  these  reasons,  I  respectfully 
urge  that  advice  and  consent  be  given 
to  the  ratification  of  these  human  rights 
treaties. 


MR.  OWEN 

I  feel  pleased  and  privileged  to  ap- 
pear before  this  distinguished  commit- 
tee in  order  to  testify  in  support  of  the 
four  treaties  on  human  rights  now 
before  you.  Deputy  Secretary  Christo- 
pher has  already  presented  the  compel- 
ling case,  in  terms  of  U.S.  foreign 
policy  and  our  domestic  system  of  val- 
ues, for  ratification  of  these  treaties.  I 
shall  only  reiterate  that  considerations 
of  the  effectiveness  of  our  moral  and 
economic  leadership  in  the  world  com- 
munity today,  and  a  deep  commitment 
to  the  just  treatment  of  men  and 
women  everywhere,  underlie  this  Ad- 
ministration's vigorous  espousal  of 
ratification. 

Everyone  here  today  agrees  that 
every  person  should  have  the  benefit  of 
freedom  from  arbitrary  and  inhumane 
treatment  at  the  hands  of  his  or  her 
government.  Such  freedom  takes  the 
form  of  legal  rights  within  the  constitu- 
tional system  of  the  United  States.  We 
cherish  these  rights  and  have  made 
great  progress  in  promoting  their  ad- 
vancement. 

I  am  here  today  to  support  ratifica- 
tion of  these  treaties  as  a  means  for  the 
United  States  to  participate  in  the  fur- 
therance of  similar  rights  in  the  inter- 
national sphere.  They  were  drafted 
under  the  close  scrutiny  of  representa- 
tives of  our  government  at  the  United 
Nations  and  the  Organization  of  Ameri- 
can States.  We  have  had  them  under 
careful  review  for  a  good  many  years 
and  are  satisfied  that  any  problems 
they  still  present  can  be  satisfactorily 
resolved  through  a  reasonable  number 
of  reservations,  understandings,  and 
declarations.  I  wish  to  assure  this 
committee  that  these  treaties  will  in- 
sure a  more  widely  accepted  legal 
framework  in  which  the  United  States 
can  pursue  internationally  the  values  of 
human  freedom  and  justice  under  law 
that  we  all  share. 

Since  these  treaties  are  extensive, 
I  propose  to  review  their  provisions 
only  briefly  and  then  to  discuss  at  some 
length  certain  aspects  of  the  treaties 
and  of  this  Administration's  approach 
to  them  that  some  perceive  as  obstacles 
to  ratification. 


Provisions  of  the  Treaties 

The  racial  discrimination  conven- 
tion defines  "racial  discrimination"  to 
include  distinctions  and  preferences 
based  not  only  on  race,  but  also  on  "col- 
our, descent,  or  national  or  ethnic  ori- 
gin" whose  purpose  or  effect  is  to  im- 
pair the  enjoyment  of  human  rights  on 
an  equal  footing.  The  substantive  pro- 
visions of  the  convention  require  states 
parties  to  undertake  to  pursue  a  policy 
of  eliminating  such  discrimination  by 
refraining  from  discriminatory  prac- 
tices, by  guaranteeing  equality  before 
the  law  with  respect  to  a  variety  of 
substantive  rights,  and  by  providing  for 
remedies  against  discriminatory  treat- 
ment. These  undertakings  are  in  keep- 
ing with  the  legislative  and  judicial 
strides  taken  in  this  country  in  the  last 
100  years  through  the  adoption  of  the 
14th  amendment  and  the  Civil  Rights 
Acts  of  the  1960s. 

The  other  three  treaties  under  con- 
sideration today  range  far  more  widely 
over  the  spectrum  of  rights  which  an 
individual  may  enjoy. 

Under  the  International  Covenant 
on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  and  the 
American  Convention  on  Human 
Rights,  states  parties  undertake  to  re- 
spect and  insure  a  series  of  rights  of  in- 
dividuals that  largely  coincide  with 
fundamental  rights  built  into  our  demo- 
cratic tradition  and  guaranteed  by  our 
Bill  of  Rights.  These  treaty  rights  in- 
clude the  right  to  vote,  to  free  expres- 
sion, to  freedom  of  religion,  to  freedom 
of  association  and  assembly;  rights  of 
the  family  and  of  children  and  a  right  to 
nationality:  rights  to  freedom  of  move- 
ment and  of  residence:  and  a  whole 
series  of  procedural  rights  of  the  ac- 
cused to  a  fair  trial,  to  representation  by 
counsel,  and  other  procedural  rights. 
Each  treaty  requires  that  the  states 
parties  respect  the  enumerated  rights 
without  discrimination  as  to  race,  sex, 
national  origin,  or  other  status. 

Special  importance  attaches  to  ar- 
ticle 4  of  the  covenant  which  addresses 
the  need  to  distinguish,  in  accord- 
ance with  internationally  agreed  stand- 
ards, between  emergencies  that  war- 
rant reasonable  derogations  from  the 
covenant's  requirements  and  unwar- 
ranted claims  of  emergency,  and  be- 
tween those  rights  from  which  reason- 
able derogation  is  permissible  and  those 
from  which  no  derogation  is  allowed.  In 
the  latter  category  are  such  fundamen- 
tal rights  as  freedom  from  torture,  from 
slavery,  and  from  retroactive  applica- 
tion of  statutes  defining  criminal  of- 
fenses. 


tuary  1980 


27 


Human  Rights 


Unlike  its  partner  covenant,  the 
International  Covenant  on  Economic, 
Social  and  Cultural  Rights  looks  not  to 
the  recognition  of  present  rights  but  to 
the  future.  It  commits  states  to  take 
steps  toward  the  future  realization  of 
certain  economic,  social,  and  cultural 
goals  for  the  individual,  much  as  many 
of  our  domestic  enactments  and  policy 
statements  look  toward  aspirational 
goals  of  full  employment,  universal 
health  care,  and  the  like.  Article  2  re- 
quires that  ratifying  states  undertake 
"to  take  steps  .  .  .  with  a  view  to 
achieving  progressively  the  full  realiza- 
tion of  the  rights  recognized  in  the 
present  Covenant  .  .  .  ." 

These  rights  include  the  right  to 
work  and  to  enjoy  just  and  fair  condi- 
tions of  work:  the  right  to  social  secu- 
rity, to  the  enjoyment  of  a  high  stand- 
ard of  health,  and  to  an  adequate 
standard  of  living;  the  right  to  the  pro- 
tection of  the  family  and  of  children; 
and  the  right  to  primary  education. 

The  desirability  of  realizing  these 
rights  is  clear  and  in  keeping  with 
policies  fostered  in  the  United  States 
for  some  50  years  at  least.  It  is  worth 
reiterating  that  no  i-atifying  party 
thereby  commits  itself  to  the  present 
implementation  of  these  rights.  Nor 
does  any  party  commit  itself  to  distrib- 
ute the  benefits  foreseen  by  the  cove- 
nant to  individuals  directly.  Rather,  the 
covenant  obliges  governments  to  work 
toward  the  eventual  achievement  of  the 
minimum  standards  it  sets  out.  To  em- 
phasize that  this  constitutes  an  obliga- 
tion to  promote  rather  than  an  im- 
mediate legal  commitment  to  perform, 
the  Administration  has  suggested  aj)- 
pending  a  declaration  to  this  effect. 

Implementation  Procedures 

All  four  of  these  treaties  contain 
provisions  for  their  enforcement.  There 
are  four  essential  ways  by  which  im- 
plementation of  these  treaty  rights  may 
be  overseen. 

First,  common  to  the  racial  dis- 
crimination convention,  the  economic 
and  social  rights  covenant,  and  the  civil 
and  political  rights  covenant  is  a  re- 
porting procedure  requiring  states  par- 
ties to  submit  reports  on  the  measures 
they  have  adopted  to  give  effect  to  the 
rights  recognized  in  the  ti'eaties.  These 
three  treaties  call  for  such  reports 
within  1  year  of  their  entries  into  force 
and  periodically  thereafter. 

The  reports  required  by  the  eco- 
nomic and  social  rights  covenant  are  to 
be  submitted  to  the  Economic  and  So- 
cial Council  of  the  United  Nations 
through  the  Secretary  General;  those 
required  by  the  racial  discrimination 


28 


convention  and  the  civil  and  political 
rights  covenant  are  to  be  submitted, 
again  through  the  Secretary  General,  to 
independent  committees  established  by 
the  treaties.  The  Committee  on  the 
Elimination  of  Racial  Discrimination 
and  the  Human  Rights  Committee  each 
contain  18  members  who  are  persons  of 
"high  moral  standing"  and  "character" 
and  competence,  elected  by  secret  bal- 
lot from  nominees  by  states  parties  and 
who  act  in  an  individual  capacity. 

The  American  convention  reconsti- 
tutes a  similarly  independent  seven- 
member  commission  called  the  Inter- 
American  Commission  on  Human 
Rights.  The  respective  bodies  review- 
ing the  reports  are  authorized  by  the 
treaties  to  make  general  comments 
based  upon  examinations  of  the  reports. 

The  second  route  of  implementa- 
tion consists  of  an  interstate  complaint 
and  conciliation  procedure. 

Under  the  racial  discrimination 
convention  each  state  party  subjects  it- 
self to  the  interstate  procedure,  but 
under  the  civil  and  political  rights  cov- 
enant and  the  American  convention,  a 
state  party  does  not  so  subject  itself 
unless  it  makes  a  declaration  to  that 
effect.  Such  a  declaration  would  state 
that  the  state  party  recognizes  the 
competence  of  the  appropriate  inde- 
pendent committee  to  receive  and 
examine  allegations  from  other  states 
parties  that  it  is  not  fulfilling  its  obliga- 
tions under  the  treaty.  The  appropriate 
committee  or  commission  is  authorized 
to  examine  the  complaint  and  to  issue 
reports  with  nonbinding  recommenda- 
tions. 


The  rationale  behind  the  reser- 
vations is  .  .  .  that  ive  take  oio' 
international  U'gal  obligations 
seriously  and  .  .  .  cotnniit 
ourselves  to  do  by  treaty  only 
that  which  is  constitutionally 
and  legally  permissible  within 
our  domestic  law. 


The  economic  and  social  rights  cov- 
enant has  no  comparable  provision  for 
interstate  complaints  and  conciliation 
procedures. 

The  third  type  of  implementation 
procedure  allows  individuals  and 
groups  to  lodge  complaints  with  the  ap- 
propriate commission  or  committee 
against  states  parties  to  the  treaties. 


Under  the  racial  discrimination 
convention,  a  state  party  subjects  itsc 
to  such  complaints  only  if  it  makes  a 
declaration  to  that  effect;  under  the 
civil  and  political  rights  covenant,  a 
state  would  be  so  subject  only  if  it 
ratifies  an  optional  protocol. 

The  American  convention  provide  li 
that  any  individual,  group,  or  organiziff 
tion  may  lodge  complaints  of  violation 
by  states  parties;  submission  to  this 
procedure  is  not  optional  for  a  ratifyin 
state. 

The  economic  and  social  rights 
covenant  contains  no  comparable  prov  j., 
sion.  I 

The  fourth  and  last  means  of  im-  im- 
plementation is  set  forth  only  in  the 
American  convention;  that  is,  judicial 
proceedings  before  the  Inter-Americ: 
Court  of  Human  Rights.  This  court, 
composed  of  seven  judges  elected  in  i 
individual  capacity,  has  jurisdiction  t 
hear  cases  submitted  by  states  i)artii 
and  the  commission  only  if  the  in- 
terstate complaint  procedures 
described  above  have  already  been 
completed  and  only  if  the  states  part 
involved  have  declared  themselves 
subject  to  the  court's  jurisdiction.  Tl 
court  provides  the  only  enforcement 
mechanism  that  would  produce  deci- 
sions legally  binding  the  states  partii 
concerned. 

As  is  evident  from  a  summary  oi 
the  substantive  provisions  of  these  fd 
treaties,  they  do  not  concern  them- 
selves solely  with  the  behavior  of  on 
state  toward  another.  One  of  their  pr 
cipal  objects  and  purposes  is  to  sul)j( 
the  behavior  of  a  government  towan 
its  people  to  international  legal 
scrutiny,  not  generally,  but  only  wht 
that  behavior  does  not  meet  certain 
minimum  standards  of  justice  and  hu 
manity  as  reflected  in  the  treaties. 

As  Deputy  Secretary  Christopht 
has  pointed  out,  the  United  States  h 
always  striven  to  conform  its  treatmf  ' 
of  those  under  its  jurisdiction  to  our 
constitutional  standards  and  the  proi 
esses  of  law;  on  the  whole,  we  do  for 
our  own  citizens  what  the  drafters  o 
these  treaties  contemplated  as  neces 
sary  for  the  citizens  of  all  countries 

Criticisms  of  Opponents 

But  because  these  treaties  do  co 
cern  themselves  with  the  relations  b 
tween  governments  and  individuals 
rather  than  solely  with  those  betwee 
states,  objections  have  been  raised  tJ 
them.  It  is  feared  by  some  that  thes- 
treaties  could  be  used  to  distort  the 
constitutional  legislative  standards  tl 
shape  our  Federal  and  our  State  go\ 
ernments'  treatment  of  individuals 


Department  of  State  Bulk 


^-jman  Rights 


iin  tlie  United  States.  These  criti- 
is  ili'serve  response. 

Siuh  objections  tend  to  fall  into 
■r  .iitegories. 

1  I'-t,  it  is  said  that  the  human 
'  caties  could  serve  to  change 
>  as  they  are,  allowing  individu- 
III  ./iiurts  of  law  to  invoke  the  treaty 
n>  w  here  inconsistent  with  domestic 
f  or  e\'en  with  the  Constitution. 
The  second  type  of  objection  is  that 
treaties  could  be  used  to  alter  the 
sdictional  balance  between  our  Fed- 

and  State  institutions.  Since  these 
t  two  objections  will  be  addressed 
ng  these  hearings  by  the  Depart- 
it  of  Justice,  I  will  go  into  them  only 

fly- 

The  third  type  of  objection  is  that 
relationship  between  a  government 

its  citizens  is  not  a  proper  subject 
the  treatymaking  powers  at  all  but 
ht  to  be  left  entirely  to  domestic 
slative  processes.  This  last  point  I 
1  address  in  somewhat  more  detail. 

Inconsistencies  With  Domestic 

,'s.  As  others  have  noted,  the 
ties  do  diverge  from  our  domestic 
in  a  I'elatively  few  instances.  Crit- 
'ear  that  this  divergence  will  cause 
iges  in  that  domestic  law  outside 
normal  legislative  process,  or  at 
t  will  subject  the  relations  between 
government  and  the  individual  to 
licting  legal  standards. 
This  fear  is  not  well  founded,  in  our 
^ment,  for  two  reasons.  First,  the 
5ident  has  recommended  that  to 
1  of  the  four  treaties  there  be  ap- 
led  a  declaration  that  the  treaties' 
tantive  provisions  are  not  self- 
uting.  A  treaty  is  self-e.xecuting, 
thus  automatically  the  law  of  the 
upon  entry  into  force,  or  non-self- 
:uting,  requiring  implementing 
slation  before  it  becomes  a  rule  for 
courts,  depending  upon  its  terms 
the  intention  of  the  parties  adher- 
to  it. 

It  is  the  Administration's  view  that 
treaties  are,  on  their  face  and  ac- 
ling  t(i  their  terms,  not  self- 
?uting  and,  thus,  are  not  enforce- 
'  directly  by  the  courts.  A  Senate 
laration  would  simply  clarify  the  in- 
;ion  of  the  United  States  in  this  re- 
i.  This  does  not  mean  that  vast  new 
lementing  legislation  is  required,  as 
great  majority  of  the  treaty  provi- 
is  are  already  implemented  in  our 
lestic  law.  It  does  mean  that  further 
nges  in  our  laws  will  be  brought 
ut  only  through  the  normal  legisla- 
'  process.  This  understanding  as  to 
non-self-e.xecuting  nature  of  the 
stantive  provisions  of  the  treaties 
lid  not  derogate  from  or  diminish  in 


any  way  our  international  obligations 
under  the  treaties;  it  touches  only  upon 
the  role  the  treaty  provisions  will  play 
in  our  domestic  law. 

A  second  reason  why  we  need  not 
fear  a  confusion  of  standai'ds  due  to 
possible  conflicts  between  the  treaty 
provisions  and  domestic  law  rests  in 
this  Administration's  recommended 
reservations  and  understandings.  In 
the  few  instances  where  it  was  felt  that 
a  provision  of  the  treaties  could  rea- 
sonably be  interpreted  to  diverge  from 
the  requirements  of  our  Constitution  or 
from  Federal  or  State  law  presently  in 
force,  the  Administration  has 
suggested  that  a  reservation  or  under- 
standing be  made  to  that  provision. 

In  our  view,  these  reservations  do 
not  detract  from  the  object  and  the 
purpose  of  the  treaties — that  is,  to  see 
to  it  that  minimum  standards  of  human 
rights  are  observed  throughout  the 
world — and  they  permit  us  to  accept 
the  treaties  in  a  form  consonant  with 
our  domestic  legal  requirements. 

Jurisdictional  Balance  Between 
Federal  and  State  Institutions.  As  I 

have  previously  noted,  a  second  objec- 
tion raised  by  critics  to  the  ratification 
of  these  human  rights  treaties  is  that 
they  might  upset  the  existing  allocation 
of  jurisdiction  between  our  Federal  and 
State  institutions.  Some  of  these  critics 
feel  that  certain  matters  addressed  in 
the  treaties  lie  exclusively  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  several  States  within 
our  Federal  system  and  that  subjecting 
these  matters  to  regulation  by  treaty  or 
by  congressional  legislation  will  in- 
fringe upon  that  State  jurisdiction. 

Although  most  of  the  matters  dealt 
with  in  the  treaties  are  governed  by 
Federal  law  at  this  juncture  in  our  his- 
tory, the  Administration  is  sensitive  to 
this  concern.  We  have,  therefore,  rec- 
ommended a  reservation  to  the  racial 
discrimination  convention  and  the  two 
covenants,  stating  that  the  United 
States  shall  implement  the  treaty  pro- 
visions over  whose  subject  matter  the 
Federal  Government  exercises  jurisdic- 
tion and  shall  encourage  State  au- 
thorities to  take  appropriate  measures 
with  regard  to  the  provisions  over 
whose  subject  matter  the  States  exer- 
cise jurisdiction. 

The  content  of  this  reservation  is 
already  built  into  article  28  of  the 
American  convention.  There  need  be  no 
apprehension  that  the  ratification  of  the 
human  rights  treaties  will  invade  the 
field  of  those  matters  which  are  prop- 
erly left  to  states  jurisdiction. 


Relationship  Between  Govern- 
ment and  Its  Citizens.  The  third  objec- 
tion that  has  been  raised  is  that  the 
subject  mattei-  of  these  treaties  lies  be- 
yond the  scope  of  the  treatymaking 
power.  The  text  of  the  Constitution,  of 
course,  gives  no  guidance  as  to  what 
may  or  may  not  be  the  subject  of  a 
treaty.  The  Supreme  Court  has  said  a 
number  of  times  that  "[t]he  treaty- 
making  ])ower  of  the  United  States  is 
not  limited  by  any  express  provision  of 
the  Constitution,  and,  though  it  does 
not  extend  'so  far  as  to  authorize  what 
the  Constitution  forbids,'  it  does  extend 
to  all  proper  subjects  of  negotiation  be- 
tween our  government  and  other  na- 
tions." (Asakura  v.  Seattle,  265  U.S. 
341  (1923);  Geofroy  v.  Riggt;,  133  U.S. 
258,  266  (1899);  Ware  v.  Hylton.  3  Dall. 
199  (1796))  Although  the  Court  has  not 
elaborated  upon  what  a  "proper  subject 
of  negotiation"  might  or  might  not  be, 
it  has  come  to  be  commonly  accepted 
that  the  treaty  power  extends  to  any 
"matter  of  international  concern."  (See 
ResfateiHent  of  Foreign  Relations  Laiv. 
(§40,  comment  b  at  117  (1965)) 

Although  there  have  in  the  past 
been  differences  of  opinion  as  to  what  is 
and  is  not  a  matter  of  "international 
concern,"  it  seems  clear  today  that  no 
matter  how  widely  or  narrowly  the 
boundaries  of  "international  concern" 
be  drawn,  a  treaty  concerning  human 
rights  falls  squarely  within  them. 
States  have  entered  into  such  treaties 
since  the  17th  century. 

For  example,  in  1648  the  treaty  of 
Westphalia  established  the  principle  of 
equality  of  rights  for  those  of  the 
Catholic  and  Protestant  religions.  The 
Congress  of  Vienna  in  1815  and  the 
Congress  of  Berlin  in  1878  both  pro- 
vided for  the  free  exercise  of  religion 
by  individuals.  Numerous  treaties  in 
the  19th  century  had  as  their  goal  the 
suppression  of  the  slave  trade;  the 
United  States  became  party  to  one  of 
them  in  1862.  The  peace  treaties  in  cen- 
tral Europe  following  the  First  and 
Second  World  Wars  assured  protection 
of  life  and  liberty  to  all  inhabitants 
without  regard  to  birth,  nationality, 
language,  race,  or  religion  and  included 
provisions  for  the  protection  of 
minorities. 

In  the  20th  century,  the  United 
States  has  become  party  to  a  number  of 
treaties  that  address  the  rights  of  the 
individual  as  against  his  government, 
including  international  labor  conven- 
tions, the  constitution  of  the  Interna- 
tional Labor  Organization,  the  1926 
slavery  convention,  the  1945  peace 
treaties,  the  U.N.  Charter,  and,  more 
recently,  the  Supplementary  Conven- 
tion on  Slavery  in  1967  and  the  Conven- 


^uary  1980 


29 


Human  Rights 


tion  on  the  Political  Rights  of  Women  in 
1976. 

The  United  States  is  party  to  the 
Charter  of  the  Organization  of  Ameri- 
can States,  which  addresses  the  eco- 
nomic and  social  rights  of  the  indi- 
vidual, and  we  are.  of  course,  party  to 
the  U.N.  Charter,  under  which  mem- 
bers are  pledged  to  take  action  to 
promote  "...  universal  respect  for.  and 
observance  of,  human  rights  and  fun- 
damental freedoms  for  all  without  dis- 
tinction as  to  race,  sex,  language,  or 
religion."  The  growth  of  the  U.N.  sys- 
tem of  reporting,  review,  and 
treatymaking  arising  from  this 
provision — touching  on  matters  from 
terrorism  to  the  status  of  refugees — 
reflects  a  universal  judgment  that 
human  rights  are  properly  a  matter  of 
international  concern  and  foreign  policy 
interest. 

A  reporter's  note  to  the  Second 
Restatement  of  Foreign  Relations  Law 
states  in  part  as  follows. 

Proposed  treaties  dealing  with  human  rights 
have  raised  questions  in  the  U.S.  and,  in- 
deed, in  other  countries  as  to  whether  or  not 
they  deal  with  matters  that  are  appropriate 
for  settlement  by  agreement  between  na- 
tions .  .  .  Although  such  conventions  gener- 
ally specify  standards  already  observed  in 
the  U.S.,  it  has  an  interest  in  seeing  that 
they  are  observed  by  as  many  states  as  pos- 
sible, not  m.erely  to  protect  its  own  stand- 
ards, but  to  promote  conditions  abroad  that 
will  foster  economic  development  and  demo- 
cratic institutions  that  are  conducive  to 
prosperity  in  the  U.S.  and  achievement  of 
its  foreign  policy  objectives.  It  cannot  effec- 
tively urge  other  states  to  adhere  to  such 
conventions  without  doing  so  itself.  (Re- 
statement (Second)  of  Foreign  Relations 
Law,  §118,  Reporter's  note  at  375). 

In  sum,  it  seems  now  beyond  dis- 
pute that  human  rights  are  properly  a 
matter  of  international  concern. 

Criticisms  of  Supporters 

Thus  far  I  have  discussed  criticisms 
heard  from  opponents  of  ratification  of 
these  treaties  on  human  rights.  Let  me 
turn  now  to  criticisms  heard  from  sup- 
porters of  ratification.  Some  of  these 
supporters — including  some  of  the 
treaties'  most  distinguished 
proponents — are  critical  of  what  they 
perceive  as  the  Administration's  efforts 
to  insulate  our  own  domestic  system 
from  the  impact  of  the  human  rights 
treaties'  terms  by  means  of  reserva- 
tions. 

It  is  asserted  that  the  essential 
object  or  purpose  of  these  human  rights 
treaties  is  to  change  the  domestic  law  of 
the  ratifying  states  in  order  to  conform 


30 


with  the  precise  dictates  of  the  treaties' 
terms.  That  being  the  case,  it  is  said, 
the  Administration's  recommended  res- 
ervations violate  the  purposes  of  the 
treaties,  because  the  reservations  are 
designed  to  harmonize  the  treaties'  re- 
quirements with  our  e.xisting  domestic 
law. 

We  think  it  appropriate  to  suggest, 
however,  that  these  critics  have  not 
fully  appreciated  the  purpose  of  these 
human  rights  treaties.  The  primary 
objective  is  the  fostering  of  interna- 
tional commitments  to  erect  and  ob- 
serve a  minimum  standard  of  rights  for 
the  individual  as  set  forth  by  the 
treaties.  This  standard  is  met  by  our 
domestic  system  in  practice,  although 
not  always  in  precisely  the  same  way 
that  the  treaties  envision.  By  ratifica- 
tion, we  would  commit  ourselves  to 
maintain  the  level  of  respect  we  already 
pay  to  the  human  rights  of  our  people; 
we  would  commit  ourselves  not  to 
backslide;  and  we  would  be  subjecting 
this  commitment  and  our  human  rights 
performance  as  a  whole  to  international 
scrutiny. 

Our  main  goal  in  suggesting  the 
reservations  that  I  have  described  is, 
thus,  not  to  evade  the  minimum  stand- 
ards imposed  by  the  treaties  whenever 
they  touch  our  system.  The  rationale 
behind  the  reservations  is,  rather,  that 
we  take  our  international  legal  obliga- 
tions seriously  and,  therefore,  will 
commit  ourselves  to  do  by  treaty  only 
that  which  is  constitutionally  and  le- 
gally permissible  within  our  domestic 
law. 

In  this  respect,  it  should  be  noted, 
we  are  in  good  company.  This  has  been 
the  approach  taken  by  other  countries 
which  share  with  us  the  democratic 
traditions  from  which  these  treaties  de- 
rive their  content.  Specifically,  a 
number  of  Western  European  countries 
have  appended  extensive  substantive 
reservations  to  these  treaties.  I  might 
add  that  the  European  Convention  for 
the  Protection  of  Human  Rights,  which 
is  similar  to  the  civil  and  political  cove- 
nant in  content,  explicitly  provides  for 
the  making  of  reservations  to  allow  par- 
ticipating countries  to  make  their  in- 
ternational commitments  by  treaty  con- 
sistent with  their  domestic  legal  sys- 
tems. At  least  five  nations  have  availed 
themselves  of  this  opportunity. 

Another  reason  why  the  Adminis- 
tration has  proposed  a  number  of  res- 
ervations, understandings,  and  declara- 
tions is  pragmatic.  We  believe  these 
treaties  to  be  important  and  necessary, 
and  we  are  anxious  to  secure  the  advice 
and  consent  of  the  Senate  to  their 
ratification.  It  is  our  judgment  that  the 
prospects  for  securing  that  ratification 


would  be  significantly,  and  perhaps  de 
cisively,  advanced  if  it  were  to  be  clea' 
that,  by  adopting  these  treaties,  the  jl 
United  States  would  not  automatically  |l 
be  bringing  about  changes  in  its  inter- 
nal law  without  the  legislative  concur- 
rence of  the  Federal  or  State  govern- 
ments. 

How  Enforcement  Has  Proceeded      il 

Let  me  turn  to  a  brief  examinatio  ii 
of  how  enforcement  of  the  treaties  har 
proceeded  in  practice  up  to  this  time, 
for  that  will  give  some  indication  as  tc 
whether  ratification  would  unduly  ex- 
pose the  United  States  to  unwarrante- 
or  unfair  attack  pursuant  to  the 
treaties. 

The  reporting  procedures  for  the 
racial  discrimination  convention  and  ti 
civil  and  political  rights  covenant  hav 
thus  far,  been  the  principal  enforce- 
ment mechanisms.  The  Committee  on 
the  Elimination  of  Racial  Discrimina- 
tion has  been  meeting  to  consider  re- 
ports submitted  by  states  parties  siin 
1970;  the  Committee  on  Human  Righi 
since  1977.  Each  has  begun  to  build  i' 
own  set  of  practices  and  procedures  i 
that  time. 

The  Racial  Discrimination  Comni 
tee  requires  the  states  parties  to  sub 
mit  an  itemized  account  of  the  "legisl 
five,  judicial,  administrative  or  othei 
measures"  adopted  with  regard  to  ea 
of  the  substantive  obligations  of  the 
convention.  The  committee  has  no  in 
dependent  factfinding  authority,  but 
practice  committee  members  have  ah 
gathered  outside  information  in  their 
capacity  as  "experts."  The  utilization 
such  additional  information  has  giver 
the  committee  the  opportunity  to  rai 
meaningful  questions  as  to  a  state's 
claims  of  compliance. 

The  Racial  Discrimination  Comni 
tee  has  never  issued  a  formal  determ 
nation  of  noncompliance  with  the  con 
vention  in  response  to  a  state's  repoi 
On  the  other  hand,  it  has  invited  eac 
state  party  to  send  a  representative 
reply  to  questions  of  the  committee  i 
it  considers  the  state's  report,  and  tl 
practice  has  given  the  committee  the 
opportunity  to  convey  to  that  state  il 
opinion  that  compliance  with  the  con 
vention's  obligations  is  unsatisfactory 
albeit  without  issuing  a  formal  ruling 
that  effect. 

The  attendance  of  a  state  repress 
tative  affords  the  state  a  forum  in 
which  its  practices  in  the  area  of  dis- 
crimination can  be  directly  defended 
against  deserved  or  undeserved  atta 


:■) 


a 


« 


•n 


Department  of  State  Bullc 


Human  Rights 


lui  <■  is  no  provision  for  cross- 
amination  of  the  answers  to  commit- 
'  i|Ufstions  given  by  these  represen- 

ll\rs.) 

The  system  I  have  just  described 
's  Licnerally  worked  fairly  toward 
iiisf  whose  compliance  has  been  ques- 
:iiie(l.  On  a  few  occasions,  however, 
.i-tkuhu-  states  have  attempted  to  use 
;,'  committee  to  further  other  political 
jiis.  For  example,  in  two  cases  a  re- 
rtiiig  state  has  used  its  report  on  its 
n  compliance  with  the  convention  as 
vay  of  charging  another  country,  not 
rty  to  the  convention,  with  human 
hts  violations;  in  one  of  those  cases 
2  United  States  was  the  wrongly 
arged  party.  Not  being  a  party  to  the 
nvention,  however,  the  United  States 
d  no  opportunity  to  refute  the 
arges  befoi'e  the  committee  through  a 
ite  representative  of  its  own  choosing 
to  question  the  competence  of  the 
Timittee  to  address  what  was  in  sub- 
mce  an  interstate  complaint  through 
;  reporting  procedure. 

The  Committee  on  Human  Rights, 
irged  with  implementing  the  civil 
i  political  rights  convenant,  also 
oids  formal  rulings  against  states  and 
ikes  use  of  state  representatives'  ap- 
arances,  just  as  does  the  Racial  Dis- 
mination  Committee.  In  its  shorter 
;tory  the  Human  Rights  Committee 
s  managed  to  steer  clear  of  political 
ifrontation,  and  the  questioning  of  all 
ite  representatives — whether  from 
i  develo])ing  world.  Eastern  Europe, 
Western  Europe — has  been  uni- 
■mly  tough  and  searching.  British 
■atment  of  prisoners  in  Northern 
'land  has  come  in  for  severe  criticism 
have  Soviet  restrictions  on  freedom 
movement. 

The  committee  members  are  taking 
riously  their  position  as  impartial,  in- 
pendent  jurists.  Although  its  record 
still  quite  brief,  the  committee  ap- 
ars  to  have  great  potential  for  shap- 
l  attitudes  toward,  and  the  language 
human  rights  standards  as  they  de- 
lop  over  time;  participating  coun- 
es,  through  their  reports,  their  re- 
onses  to  questioning,  and  through  the 
iividuals  they  nominate  to  serve  as 
;mbers  will  have  the  opportunity  to 
ve  a  hand  in  such  future  develop- 
jnts. 

The  conclusions  we  draw  from  the 
rly  practice  of  the  implementing 
tnmittees  are  twofold. 

First,  to  the  extent  that  they  re- 
lin  impartial  mechanisms  for  the 
jnitoring  of  states'  compliance  with 
e  human  rights  treaties,  as  they 
'gely  have  been  so  far,  the  United 
ates  would  do  well  to  participate  and, 


thus,  have  a  role  in  the  development  of 
an  international  jurisprudence  of 
human  rights. 

Second,  to  the  rare  extent  that  the 
committees  do  lapse  into  political  con- 
frontation, the  United  States  cannot 
afford  not  to  be  represented  so  as  accu- 
rately to  set  forth  its  human  rights  rec- 
ord. 

The  United  States  has  historically 
maintained  a  strong  tradition  of  com- 
mitment to  the  cause  of  the  rights  of 
the  individual  at  home  and  abroad.  The 
I'atification  of  these  four  treaties  before 
this  committee  today  would  provide  a 
mechanism  for  upholding  this  fine  tra- 
dition internationally.  President  Carter 
has  described  these  treaties  as  a 
beacon — a  guide  to  a  future  of  personal 
security,  political  freedom,  and  social 
justice.  In  order  to  enhance  our  contri- 
bution to  the  achievement  of  such  a  fu- 
ture, I  urge  this  committee  to  report 
favorably  on  these  treaties. 

ASSISTANT  SECRETARY  DERIAN 

I  want  to  thank  the  committee  for 
this  opportunity  to  speak  about  the  four 
human  rights  treaties:  the  International 
Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights; 
the  International  Covenant  on  Eco- 
nomic, Social  and  Cultural  Rights;  the 
International  Convention  on  the  Elimi- 
nation of  All  Forms  of  Racial  Discrimi- 
nation; and  the  American  Convention 
on  Human  Rights. 

My  message  today  is  very  simple. 
It  concerns  the  connection  between 
these  treaties  and  the  human  rights 
policy  of  the  United  States.  Our  failure 
so  far  to  ratify  them  has  had  a  signifi- 
cant negative  impact  on  the  conduct  of 
that  policy.  Ratifying  them  in  the  near 
future  will  substantially  improve  our 
ability  to  pursue  human  rights  objec- 
tives in  foreign  affairs. 

By  adhering  to  these  treaties,  we 
strengthen  the  international  legal  basis 
for  the  protection  of  basic  human 
rights;  we  can  participate  fully  in  the 
machinery  established  by  the  treaties 
for  their  implementation;  and  we  in- 
crease the  credibility  and  effectiveness 
of  our  own  human  rights  efforts. 

Strengthening  International  Law 
on  Human  Rights 

These  treaties  embody  the  funda- 
mental tenet  that  international  law 
creates  obligations  which  all  govern- 
ments owe  to  their  citizens.  Together 
with  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights,  they  create  an  interna- 
tional legal  structure  for  the  protection 
of  human  rights.  They  set  standards  for 
the  world  community  which  reflect  the 


same  vision  that  inspired  our  own  Bill 
of  Rights. 

Ratification  by  the  United  States 
will  significantly  enhance  the  legitimacy 
and  acceptance  of  these  standards.  It 
will  encourage  other  countries  to  join 
those  which  have  already  accepted  the 
treaties.  And  in  countries  where  human 
rights  are  generally  not  respected,  it 
will  aid  citizens  to  raise  human  rights 
issues. 


Our  failure  to  ratify  so  far 
has  become  confusing  to  our 
friends  and  may  be  exploited 
by  our  adversaries. 


I  would  like  to  elaborate  for  a  mo- 
ment on  this  last  point.  In  countries 
where  citizens  have  few  domestic  rem- 
edies for  human  rights  abuses,  they  can 
point  to  these  international  standards. 
Today,  dissidents  throughout  the  world 
are  monitoring  their  own  governments' 
compliance  with  this  body  of  interna- 
tional law  for  the  protection  of  human 
rights.  It  is  cited  by  wall  posters  in 
China,  on  manifestos  of  Soviet  dissi- 
dents, and  by  families  of  the  disap- 
peared in  Latin  America.  Ratification 
of  the  treaties  will  support  their  ef- 
forts. 

Participation  in  Implementation 

The  four  treaties  establish  interna- 
tional machinery  for  monitoring  their 
implementation.  The  United  States  has 
taken  a  strong  position  in  favor  of  such 
machinery.  This  is  because,  over  the 
long  run,  greater  respect  for  human 
rights  depends  on  the  creation  of  inter- 
national institutions.  Yet  because  it  has 
not  ratified  these  treaties,  the  United 
States  cannot  participate  in  the  work  of 
these  implementing  bodies.  The  United 
States  does  not  review  the  reports 
submitted  by  states  parties  on  their 
compliance  with  the  treaties,  and  it 
does  not  have  a  voice  in  their 
interpretation — interpretations  which 
may  affect  the  course  of  the  law  of 
human  rights  for  decades  to  come. 

I  would  like  to  describe  some  of  the 
activities  of  the  monitoring  bodies  for 
you.  Ratification  will  enable  us  to  par- 
ticipate in  them. 

•  A  U.N.  committee  on  compliance 
with  the  covenant  on  civil  and  political 
rights  is  reviewing  reports  on  Czecho- 
slovakia, the  U.S.S.R.,  Chile,  and 
Uruguay.  By  ratifying  the  covenant, 
we  can  participate  in  this  review  proc- 
ess. 


inuary  1980 


31 


Human  Rights 


•  In  the  Western  Hemisphere,  an 
Inter-American  Human  Rights  Court 
has  been  established  to  hear  disputes, 
and  an  Inter-American  Human  Rights 
Commission  has  been  established  to 
conduct  investigations  of  abuses.  By 
ratifying  the  American  Human  Rights 
Convention,  we  will  be  eligible  to  nomi- 
nate and  vote  for  their  members. 

•  The  racial  discrimination  conven- 
tion applies  not  only  to  discrimination 
on  account  of  race  but  also  on  account  of 
ethnic  origin.  Ratification  would  enable 
us  to  participate  in  the  implementation 
committee's  monitoring  of  such  dis- 
crimination around  the  world. 

Credibility  and  Effectiveness 
of  the  U.S.  Human  Rights  Policy 

Our  human  rights  policy  has  raised 
significantly  the  priority  of  human 
rights  in  U.S.  foreign  policy.  It  has 
contributed  to  an  increasing  level  of  in- 
ternational consciousness  about  human 
rights  and  to  a  climate  in  which  im- 
provements have  taken  place  in  a 
number  of  countries.  We  can  be  proud 
of  these  achievements.  But  it  is  also 
essential  for  our  nation  to  ratify  the 
instruments  establishing  the  interna- 
tional legal  framework  for  their  observ- 
ance. Ratification  will  enhance  our 
ability  to  remain  in  the  forefront  of 
those  who  are  struggling  for  the  full 
enjoyment  of  human  rights. 

Our  failure  to  ratify  so  far  has  be- 
come confusing  to  our  friends  and  may 
be  exploited  by  our  adversaries.  In  his 
latest  report  to  the  Congress  on  the 
Helsinki  accords,  President  Carter 
noted  the  criticism  directed  against  this 
country  for  not  yet  ratifying  the  inter- 
national human  rights  agreements. 

Ratification  of  the  human  rights 
treaties  is  also  important  for  U.S.  par- 
ticipation in  the  reviewing  process 
under  the  Helsinki  Final  Act.  The  Hel- 
sinki accords,  themselves,  call  on  par- 
ticipating states  to  fulfill  their  obliga- 
tions under  international  human  rights 
declarations  and  agreements,  including 
the  international  covenants. 

The  United  Nations  last  summer 
established  a  working  group  to  examine 
the  "circumstances"  preventing  gov- 
ernments from  ratifying  the  treaties.  In 
my  own  work,  I  am  asked  constantly  by 
representatives  of  foreign  governments 
why  the  United  States  has  failed  to 
ratify  these  agreements,  given  our  fine 
human  rights  record,  our  human  rights 
policy,  and  our  previously  active  role  in 
drafting  these  agreements.  I  have  not 
yet  found  an  acceptable  response. 

The  United  States  has  a  long  tradi- 
tion of  seeking  to  fully  implement  the 
human  rights  enshrined  in  our  Con- 


32 


stitution  and  Bill  of  Rights.  Our  history 
has  been  one  of  struggle  for  universal 
suffrage,  for  the  abolition  of  slavery, 
for  women's  rights,  for  racial  equality, 
for  trade  union  rights.  That  struggle 
continues.  To  date,  the  United  States 
has  ratified  international  human  rights 
treaties  on  slavery,  women's  rights, 
and  refugees.  Ratification  of  these  ad- 
ditional human  rights  agreements 
would  emphasize  our  determination  to 
work  for  a  world  in  which  the  rights 
enjoyed  by  our  own  citizens  are  univer- 
sally respected. 

The  treaties  befoi'e  the  Senate  ex- 
press values  in  which  the  people  of  the 
United  States  have  believed  for  a  long 
time.  They  give  expression  to  human 
rights  that  coincide  with  our  own  laws 
and  practices. 

I  join  the  Deputy  Secretary  and 
other  witnesses  in  urging  that  the  ad- 
vice and  consent  of  the  Senate  be  given 
to  the  four  human  rights  treaties.  ■ 

'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  tne  Superintendent 
of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

*For  texts  of  the  two  international 
covenants,  see  Bulletin  of  Jan.  16,  1967, 
pp.  107  and  111;  for  text  of  the  American 
convention,  see  BULLETIN  of  July  4,  1977, 
p.  28:  the  convention  on  racial  discrimina- 
tion was  not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


President  Carter 
Receives  Human 
Rights  Award 


Following  are  excerpts  from  re- 
marks President  Carter  made  on  Oc- 
tober 2Jf,  1979,  upon  accepting  an  in- 
ternational human  rights  award  from 
the  Synagogue  Council  of  America.^ 


Human  rights  takes  on  a  broad 
range  of  meanings.  And  we've  had  some 
notable  successes  in  the  last  2%  to  3 
years:  Prison  doors  have  opened  to  re- 
lease literally  tens  of  thousands  of  those 
who've  been  incarcerated  for  years, 
even  decades.  We've  seen  a  massive 
shift  in  countries  around  the  world  and 
particularly,  I  think,  in  this  hemisphere 
toward  giving  people  the  basic  human 
right  of  shaping  their  own  future,  of 
choosing  their  own  leaders,  of  modify- 
ing and  establishing  the  policies  of  their 
own  government. 


It  has  not  always  been  easy,  even 
in  this  country,  to  maintain  a  strong 
commitment  to  human  rights.  As  Patt 
Derian  [Assistant  Secretary  for  Human  l 
Rights  and  Humanitarian  Affairs],  sit- 
ting in  the  front  row,  responsible  for 
this  position  in  the  State  Department, 
so  well  knows,  there  are  always  delega- 
tions who  come  to  me  or  to  her  or  to 
Secretary  Vance  and  say:  "This  par- 
ticular dictator  has  been  a  valuable  ally 
of  ours,  and  when  the  United  States 
makes  a  critical  remark  about  political 
prisoners  who  are  being  restrained  or 
in  jail  or  punished  or  executed,  it  tend- 
to  shake  our  relationship  with  that 
country."  We've  had  to  withstand  those 
kinds  of  pressures,  and  I  believe  that  in  III' 
many  instances  we've  been  successful  ii  H' 
that  effort.  ■ 


'  For  full  text,  see  Weekly  Compilatioi 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  29,  1979, 
p.  2009. 

Implementing  the    > 
Human  Rights  I 

Policy 

by  Warren  Christopher 

Statement  before  the  Subcommitt( 
OH  International  Organizations  of  the  ., 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on    ^. 
May  2,  1979.  Mr.  Christopher  is  Dep- 
uty Secretary  of  State.' 


May  I  begin  by  congratulating  yoi  ^. 
(tn  your  new  position  as  head  of  the 
House  Subcommittee  on  International 
Organizations  [Don  Bonker  of  Washing 
ton].  I  hope  and  expect  that  we  will 
continue  the  close  and  productive 
working  relationship  that  has  existed 
between  the  subcommittee  and  this 
Administration. 

As  you  know,  this  Administration 
has  placed  renewed  emphasis  on  huma 
rights  objectives  in  the  conduct  of  our 
foreign  affairs.  In  this  endeavor,  we 
have  had  the  benefit  of  this  subcommit 
tee's  extensive  interest  and  involve- 
ment in  human  rights  issues.  It  has 
played  a  vital  role,  particularly  throug 
building  a  solid  legislative  foundation 
for  the  pursuit  of  human  rights  objec- 
tives in  foreign  affairs.  Perhaps  most 
significant  was  a  1976  amendment  to 
the  Foreign  Assistance  Act — an 
amendment  that  orignated  in  this  sub 
committee.  It  states:  "A  principal  goai  j." 
of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  United 
States  shall  be  to  promote  the  observ 
ance  of  internationally  recognized 
human  rights." 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


itii| 


Human  Rights 


Today  I  would  like  to  describe  the 
)s  that  have  been  taken  in  the  past  2 
rs  and  4  months  to  implement  that 
ctive.  In  particular,  I  would  like  to 
uss  three  areas  in  which  human 
ts  considerations  have  become  an 
gral,  everyday  part  of  the  foreign 
ey  process:  first,  reporting  and 
uating  information  on  human  rights 
litions:  second,  incorporating 
lan  rights  into  our  diplomacy,  both 
teral  and  multilateral;  and  third, 
ging  human  rights  considerations  to 
on  our  foreign  assistance  pro- 
ns. 

orting  and  Evaluating 
irmation 

A  necessary  first  step  in  imple- 
ting  an  effective  human  rights  pol- 
s  the  systematic  collection  and 
uation  of  basic  data  on  human 
ts  conditions  throughout  the  world, 
lout  balanced,  objective,  and  de- 
id  assessments  of  the  human  rights 
ition  in  a  country,  we  cannot  hope 
nve  productive  discussions  with 
country  about  possible  improve- 
rs in  the  situation. 
In  order  to  develop  such  assess- 
's,  we  have  sought  information 
)  many  sources.  Of  course,  a  pri- 
1/  source  of  information  is  our  em- 
ies  abroad.  All  U.S.  Ambassadors 
been  asked  to  report  on  human 
8  conditions  in  their  host  countries 
regular  and  detailed  basis. 
We  also  rely  on  the  published  re- 

of  nongovernmental  human  rights 
nizations,  on  reports  of  intei-na- 
11  organizations,  on  findings  of  con- 
sional  committees,  on  discussions 
private  U.S.  citizens,  and  on  other 
mation  in  the  public  domain. 
Some  of  this  information  is  inevi- 

controversial.  Reports  of  serious 
in  rights  abuses  often  elicit  official 
lis.  Official  claims  of  significant 
ress  may  be  challenged  by  private 
in  rights  groups.  We  are  careful  to 
k  and  recheck  the  accuracy  of  criti- 
iformation  and  the  reliability  of  its 
:e. 

The  information  we  collect  is  used 
for  internal  decisionmaking  and 
rej^aring  the  annual  reports  re- 
'd  by  the  Congress  on  human 
s  practices  in  countries  receiving 
development  or  security  assist- 
.  I  believe  that  if  you  compare  the 
rts  submitted  for  the  3  years  Con- 
)  has  required  them,  you  will  see  a 
stent  improvement  in  their  cover- 
ind  quality.  This  year's  reports 
r  over  650  pages  and  115  countries, 
include  for  the  first  time  an  over- 
isessment  of  the  human  rights  situ- 


ation worldwide.  Also  included  is  an 
appendix  reporting  on  the  compliance 
by  East  European  countries  with  the 
human  rights  provisions  of  the  Helsinki 
Final  Act. 

We  I'ecognize,  of  course,  that  the 
assessment  of  human  rights  conditions 
is  not  an  e.xact  science.  There  are  inevi- 
tably some  questions  of  judgment  on 
which  reasonable  people  will  differ. 
There  are  inevitably  some  elements  of 
subjectivity  which  the  most  conscien- 
tious jjrocess  of  reporting  and  evalua- 
tion cannot  eliminate.  And  there  are  in- 
evitably differences  in  the  quantity  and 
quality  of  data  available  on  human 
rights  practices  ai'ound  the  world,  de- 
pending for  example,  on  the  degree  of 
contact  of  a  particular  country  with  the 
United  States  and  other  Western  coun- 
tries or  on  the  extent  of  foreign  press 
coverage. 

Nevertheless,  I  believe  we  can 
have  confidence  in  our  overall  apprais- 
als and  in  our  identification  of  trends. 
And  that  is  an  essential  predicate  for  an 
effective  human  rights  policy. 

Diplomacy 

Let  me  tui'n  to  the  di])lomacy  of 
human  rights.  The  jjrimary  ingredient 
in  this  human  rights  diplomacy  has  a 
seeming  simplicity:  We  frankly  discuss 
human  rights  in  our  consultations  with 
foreign  diplomats  and  leaders.  This  may 
seem  an  obvious  technique.  But  it  is  a 
dramatic  change  from  past  diplomatic 
practice. 

In  the  past,  our  dijjlomats  tended 
to  shy  away  from  high-level  dialogue  on 
sensitive  human  rights  issues,  such  as 
the  fate  of  political  prisoners.  Now 
those  issues  are  raised  in  face-to-face 
conversation.  They  are  brought  to  the 
center  of  the  diplomatic  interchange, 
where  they  must  be  addressed  rather 
than  being  conveniently  ignored. 

In  the  case  of  governments  which 
seriously  restrict  the  rights  of  their 
citizens,  we  have  expressed  concern 
over  specific  abuses.  Where  countries 
have  good  records,  we  have  encouraged 
such  practices  and  invited  support  for 
our  efforts.  In  all  cases,  we  discuss  the 
international  legal  foundation  for  rec- 
ognizing basic  obligations  owed  by  all 
governments  to  their  citizens.  We  em- 
phasize, in  addition,  the  high  priority 
which  the  Congress  and  the  American 
people  attach  to  human  rights  concerns. 

We  underline  these  discussions 
with  actions,  such  as  meeting  with  op- 
])osition  political  figures  or  with  exiled 
victims  of  human  rights  abuses.  For 


example,  when  President  Carter  visited 
Brazil  last  year,  he  met  with  a  Brazilian 
human  rights  leader,  as  well  as  with  of- 
ficials of  the  military  government. 

In  some  circumstances,  a  public 
statement  of  concern  or  praise  may  be 
appropriate.  We  generally  do  not  prefer 
to  use  public  criticism,  but  we  will  not 
shrink  from  it  where  it  can  be  effective. 

This  bilateral  diplomacy  has  been 
complemented  by  our  multilateral  ef- 
forts. We  are  participating  actively  in 
the  consultations  and  conferences  in 
which  the  35  nations  which  signed  the 
Helsinki  F'inal  Act  are  reviewing  what 
has  been  done — and  what  has  not  been 
done.  It  is  clear  that  the  Soviet  Union 
and  the  East  European  countries,  in 
varying  degrees,  have  not  lived  up  to 
their  human  rights  commitments.  We 
have  not  hesitated  to  say  so  publicly. 
And  we  are  persisting  in  our  efforts  to 
seek  fuller  compliance.  The  role  of  the 
congressional  Commission  on  Security 
and  Cooperation  in  Europe,  under  the 
wise  and  able  leadership  of  Con- 
gressmen Dante  Fascell,  has  been  in- 
dispensable in  this  work. 

At  the  United  Nations,  we  have 
pressed  for  more  even-handed  treat- 
ment of  human  rights  issues.  We  re- 
main deeply  disturbed  by  the  unfair 
politicization  of  these  issues  in  that 
body.  But  we  believe  that  progress  is 
being  made  toward  establishing  fair 
procedures  that  can  lead  to  broader  and 
more  objective  consideration  of  human 
rights  issues  by  the  United  Nations. 

In  the  Western  Hemisphere,  we 
are  working  to  strengthen  the  inter- 
governmental machinery  for  protecting 
human  rights.  The  authority  and  staff 
of  the  Inter-American  Human  Rights 
Commission  have  been  increased.  Last 
year  the  Commission  reported  on  viola- 
tions in  Chile,  Nicaragua,  Paraguay, 
and  Uruguay;  and  the  Commission  has 
accepted  an  invitation  to  visit  Argen- 
tina this  year. 

Foreign  Assistance  Programs 

These  and  other  efforts  at  quiet 
diplomacy  are  in  many  ways  our  most 
effective  tools  in  promoting  human 
rights.  But  we  are  also  prepared  to 
support  our  words  with  actions — to 
take  tangible  steps  to  recognize  good 
human  rights  performance  or  to  man- 
ifest our  concern  over  human  rights 
violations.  I  would  like  to  discuss  one 
such  area  —  namely,  the  way  we  are 
bringing  human  rights  considerations  to 
bear  on  oui-  foreign  assistance  pro- 
grams. 

Our  foreign  assistance  programs 
are  an  essential  tool  in  promoting  a 
broad  category  of  internationally  rec- 


33 


Human  Rights 


ognized  human  rights — rights  to  ful- 
fillment of  such  vital  needs  as  food, 
shelter,  health  care,  and  education.  In 
the  face  of  severe  budget  pressures,  the 
President  proposed  significant  in- 
creases in  development  assistance  for 
1979  and  1980.  At  the  same  time,  we 
are  attempting  to  channel  a  growing 
share  of  our  economic  aid  to  countries 
that  respect  the  human  rights  of  their 
people.  The  President  reaffirmed  this 
policy  a  few  months  ago  when  he  said: 

In  distributing  the  scarce  resources  of 
our  foreign  assistance  programs,  we  will 
demonstrate  that  our  deepest  affinities  are 
with  nations  which  commit  themselves  to  a 
democratic  path  to  development. 

Congress  has  played  an  active  role 
in  this  area  by  mandating  that  human 
rights  considerations  be  taken  into  ac- 
count in  decisions  to  provide  aid  to 
some  countries  and  deny  it  to  others.  It 
has  enacted  a  broad  range  of  statutes 
which  restrict  the  flow  of  economic  and 
military  assistance  to  countries  with 
serious  human  rights  problems.  Re- 
strictions of  varying  kinds  apply,  for 
example,  to  our  economic  assistance, 
our  military  assistance  and  sales,  our 
PL-480  food  aid,  and  our  votes  on  loans 
in  the  World  Bank  and  other  interna- 
tional development  banks. 

Congress  passed  many  of  these 
|)rovisions  before  the  Carter  Adminis- 
tration came  into  office  and  others  more 
recently.  For  e.xample,  in  the  last  ses- 
sion of  Congress,  new  legislation  was 
passed  requiring  the  Overseas  Private 
Investment  Corporation  to  take  into  ac- 
count human  rights  considerations  in 
the  conduct  of  its  programs  abroad.  In 
that  same  session,  Congress  also 
strengthened  the  restriction  on  pro- 
viding security  assistance  to  serious 
human  rights  violators. 

We  are  commited  to  carrying  out 
the  letter  and  the  spirit  of  these  laws. 
To  assist  in  these  efforts,  the  Inter- 
agency Group  on  Human  Rights  and 
Foreign  Assistance  was  established  in 
the  early  months  of  the  Administration 
to  provide  a  broad  and  open  forum  for 
discussion  within  the  executive  branch 
of  human  rights  issues  relating  to 
foreign  assistance  programs.  The  mem- 
bership includes  representatives  from 
the  Departments  of  State,  Defense, 
Labor,  Treasury,  Commerce,  and  Ag- 
riculture, from  the  National  Security 
Council  and  the  Agency  for  Interna- 
tional Development,  and  from  other 
agencies  that  have  a  potential  interest 
in  the  deliberations  of  the  group. 

In  applying  the  relevant  statute  to 
a  particular  loan,  grant,  or  program, 
this  interagency  group  generally  con- 


siders a  wide  range  of  factors,  including 
the  following: 

•  The  present  human  rights  situa- 
tion in  the  recipient  country  and  any 
positive  or  negative  trend; 

•  The  political,  economic,  and  cul- 
tural background  of  the  country  and  the 
level  of  human  rights  performance  that 
can  reasonably  be  expected  of  the  coun- 
try in  light  of  that  background; 

•  The  other  fundamental  U.S. 
interests  with  respect  to  that  country: 

•  The  extent  to  which  a  loan  will 
directly  benefit  the  needy:  and 

•  The  effectiveness  of  a  decision  to 
defer  or  oppose  a  loan  in  comparison  or 
in  combination  with  any  of  the  available 
diplomatic  tools  for  indicating  our  con- 
cern about  human  rights  violations. 

The  interagency  group  is  by  no 
means  the  only  forum  in  which  issues 
relating  to  human  rights  and  foreign  as- 
sistance are  discussed.  For  example, 
human  rights  aspects  of  arms  transfers 
are  generally  considered  by  the  Arms 
Export  Control  Board,  which  is  respon- 
sible for  formulating  our  security  as- 
sistance programs. 

Over  the  past  2  years,  the  agencies 
participating  in  these  and  other  groups 
have  gained  valuable  experience  in 
carrying  out  the  new  function  of  sys- 
tematically bringing  human  rights  con- 
siderations to  bear  on  foreign 
assistance  decisions.  Working  groups 
have  been  established  which,  in  an  in- 
creasing number  of  cases,  are  able  to 
develop  consensus  recommendations 
that  eliminate  the  need  for  higher  level 
review. 

Perhaps  most  useful  in  promoting 
the  smooth  functioning  of  this  inter- 
agency process  has  been  the  emergence 
of  a  number  of  general  principles  which 
have  come  to  guide  our  decisionmaking. 
We  have  not  tried  to  formalize  these 
principles  because  we  wished  to  pro- 
ceed cautiously  and  deliberately  in  im- 
plementing a  new  and  controversial 
policy  and  because  we  wished  to  re- 
spond flexibly  to  the  widely  varying 
circumstances  presented  by  particular 
countries  and  particular  programs. 

U.S.  Guidelines 

However,  I  think  it  is  now  appro- 
priate to  mention  a  few  of  these 
guidelines  that  have  developed  over  the 
more  than  2  years  that  we  have  been 
addressing  these  problems. 

•  We  attach  fundamental  impor- 
tance to  all  three  basic  categories  of  in- 
ternationally recognized  human 
rights — that  is,  personal,  economic. 


and  political  rights.  We  are  prepared  to 
react  to  flagrant  denials  of  any  of  these 
rights,  but  we  have  found  in  practice 
that  we  are  most  often  called  to  re- 
spond to  flagrant  violations  of  personal 
rights  such  as  widespread  systematic 
torture  or  arbitrary  executions. 

•  The  most  effective  strategy  for 
obtaining  human  rights  improvements 
is  one  that  combines  the  full  range  of 
diplomatic  approaches  with  a  willing- 
ness to  adjust  our  foreign  assistance 
programs  as  required.  No  element  in 
the  overall  strategy  can  be  as  effective 
alone  as  in  combination  with  others.  Ir 
addition,  the  use  of  these  various  ele- 
ments must  be  calibrated  and  sequen- 
tial, conveying  our  concerns  in  a 
steady,  even  way  while  avoiding  sud- 
den escalations. 

•  Bilateral  or  multilateral  economi 
assistance  that  directly  benefits  the 
needy  is  rarely  disapproved,  even  to 
governments  with  poor  human  rights 
records.  Disapproval  could  penalize  th 
poor  because  of  their  government's 
misdeeds. 

•  Only  compelling  considerations! 
national  security  can  justify  providing 
security  assistance  to  countries  with 
very  serious  human  rights  problems. 
Even  where  these  considerations  re- 
quire us  to  go  forward  with  military 
sales  to  such  a  country,  we  still  restrii 
sales  to  the  police  or  others  involved 
human  rights  abuses.  And  we  take  pj 
ticular  care  to  convey  our  human  righ 
concerns  through  other  diplomatic  in- 
struments. 

•  Decisions  to  extend  or  withhok 
assistance  are  often  taken  on  the  basi 
of  trends  in  human  rights  conditions, , 
well  as  the  overall  level  of  performam 

It  should  be  apparent  from  these 
five  principles  that  we  do  not  rigidly 
adopt  the  same  approach  to  foreign  a 
sistance  decisions  just  because  two 
countries  have  a  similar  human  right 
situation.  Our  decisions  are  influence 
by  other  factors — factors  such  as  the|! 
presence  of  other  important  U.S.  intli 
ests,  conditions,  and  traditions  uniqu|i 
to  a  particular  foreign  country  and  c(  i 
siderations  of  effectiveness  and  tactiiji 
What  does  remain  constant  in  our  apj 
proach  to  human  rights  problems 
around  the  world  is  our  determinatio 
to  bring  these  concerns  to  bear  on 
foreign  assistance  programs  in  a  con- 
scientious process  that  fully  reflects  t 
will  of  Congress. 

I  have  discussed  the  implementa 
tion  of  the  human  rights  policy  in  thi 
areas — reporting,  diplomacy,  and 
foreign  assistance.  Let  me  turn  now 
address  briefly  what  I  believe  we  ha> 
accomplished  with  this  policy. 


34 


Department  of  State  Bull 


FECIAL 

oviet  Invasion  of  Afghanistan 


FoUoiruni  arc  PrcHidci/t  Carte)''s  address  fa  flic  )iatioii  on 
JaHiiary  A,  1980,  U.S.  Anibas.mdor  to  the  U^N.  Donald  F. 
McHoiri/'s  sfafewent  in  the  Security  Cmmcil  ou  January  6, 
a)id  the  tcvf  of  the  draft  Securiti/  Council  resolution  cospon- 
sured  by  Bangladesh,  .Jamaica,  Niger,  the  Phil)ppi)ies,  and 
Zambia.  When  the  Council  voted  on  the  draft  resolution  on 
January  7.  it  was  vetoed  by  the  Soviet  Union  ajid  not  adopted  (a 
veto  by  a  permanoit  member  of  the  Council  prevents  adoption 
of  a  resolution).  Members  of  the  Coujicil  which  voted  in  favor  of 
the  draft  resolution  n-ere  Ba)iglad(  sh,  China,  Fratice,  Jamaica, 
Mexico,  Niger,  Norway,  Philippines,  Portugal,  Tunisia,  the 
United  Kingdom,  the  United  States,  and  Zambia.  The  Soviet 
Union  and  the  German  Democratic  Republic  voted  against  the 
resolution. 


ESIDENT'S  ADDRESS, 

N.  4,  1980' 


me  to  you  this  evening  to  discuss  the 
emely  important  and  rapidly  chang- 
ciri-umstanees  in  Southwest  Asia. 
I  continue  to  share  with  you  the 
se  of  outrage  and  impatience  because 
he  kidnapping  of  innocent  American 
tages  and  the  holding  of  them  by 
tant  terrorists  with  the  support  and 
roval  of  Iranian  officials. 
Our  purposes  continue  to  be  the  pro- 
ion  of  the  long-range  interests  of  our 
ion  and  the  safety  of  the  American 
tages. 

We  are  attempting  to  secure  the  re- 
e  of  the  Americans  through  the  In- 
lational  Court  of  Justice,  through  the 
ted  Nations,  and  through  public  and 
ate  diplomatic  efforts.  We  are  deter- 
ed  to  achieve  this  goal.  We  hope  to  do 
vithout  bloodshed  and  without  further 
ger  to  the  lives  of  our  50  fellow  Anier- 
s.  In  these  efforts  we  continue  to 
e  the  strong  support  of  the  world 
imunity.  The  unity  and  the  common 
se  of  the  American  people  under  such 
ng  circumstances  are  essential  to  the 
cess  of  our  efforts. 

Recently  there  has  been  another 
y  serious  development  which 
atens  the  maintenance  of  the  peace  in 
ithwest  Asia.  Massive  Soviet  militaiy 
es  have  invaded  the  small  non-aligned 
ereign  nation  of  Afghanistan,  which 
hitherto  not  been  an  occupied  satel- 
of  the  Soviet  Union. 
Fifty  thousand  heavily  armed  Soviet 
jps  have  crossed  the  border,  and  are 
iT  dispersed  throughout  Afghanistan, 
jmpting  to  conquer  the  fiercely  inde- 
dent  Muslim  people  of  that  country. 
The  Soviets  claim  falsely  that  they 
■e  invited  into  Afghanistan  to  help 


protect  that  country  from  some  unnamed 
outside  threat.  But  the  President,  who 
had  been  the  leader  of  Afghanistan  before 
the  Soviet  invasion,  was  assassinated — 
along  with  several  members  of  his 
family — after  the  Soviets  gained  control 
of  the  capital  city  of  Kabul. 

Only  several  days  later  was  the  new 
puppet  leader  even  brought  into  Af- 
ghanistan by  the  Soviets. 

This  invasion  is  an  extremely  serious 
threat  to  peace — because  of  the  threat  of 
further  Soviet  expansion  into  neighbor- 
ing countries  in  Southwest  Asia,  and  also 
because  such  an  aggressive  mihtai-y  pol- 
icy is  unsettling  to  other  peoples, 
throughout  the  world. 

This  is  a  callous  violation  of  interna- 
tional law  and  the  United  Nations  Char- 
ter. 

It  is  a  deliberate  effort  of  a  powerful 
atheistic  government  to  subjugate  an 
independent  Islamic  people. 

We  must  recognize  the  strategic  im- 
portance of  Afghanistan  to  stability  and 
peace. 

A  Soviet-occupied  Afghanistan 
threatens  both  Iran  and  Pakistan  and  is  a 
stepping  stone  to  possible  control  over 
much  of  the  world's  oil  supplies. 

The  United  States  wants  all  nations 
in  the  region  to  be  free  and  to  be  inde- 
pendent. If  the  Soviets  are  encouraged  in 
this  invasion  by  eventual  success,  and  if 
they  maintain  their  dominance  over  Af- 
ghanistan and  then  extend  their  control 
to  adjacent  countries — the  stable,  stra- 
tegic and  peaceful  balance  of  the  entire 
world  will  be  changed.  This  would 
threaten  the  security  of  all  nations  includ- 
ing, of  course,  the  United  States,  our  al- 
lies and  our  friends. 

Therefore,  the  world  simply  cannot 
stand  by  and  permit  the  Soviet  Union  to 
commit  this  act  with  impunity. 


Fifty  nations  have  petitioned  the 
United  Nations  Security  Council  to  con- 
demn the  Soviet  Union  and  to  demand 
the  immediate  withdrawal  of  all  Soviet 
troops  from  Afghanistan. 

We  realize  that  under  the  United  Na- 
tions Charter  the  Soviet  Union  and  other 
permanent  members  may  veto  action  of 
the  Security  Council. 

If  the  will  of  the  Security  Council 
should  be  thwarted  in  this  manner,  then 
immediate  action  would  be  appropriate  in 
the  General  Assembly  of  the  United  Na- 
tions where  no  Soviet  veto  exists. 

In  the  meantime,  neither  the  United 
States  nor  any  other  nation  which  is 
committed  to  world  peace  and  stability 
can  continue  to  do  business  as  usual  with 
the  Soviet  Union. 

I  have  already  recalled  the  United 
States  Ambassador  from  Moscow  to 
Washington.  He  is  working  with  me  and 
my  other  senior  advisors  in  an  immediate 
and  comprehensive  evaluation  of  the 
whole  range  of  our  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Union. 

The  successful  negotiation  of  the 
SALT  II  Ti-eaty  has  been  a  major  goal 
and  a  major  achievement  of  this  Adminis- 
tration— and  we  Americans,  the  people  of 
the  Soviet  Union,  and  indeed  the  entire 
world  will  benefit  from  the  successful 
control  of  strategic  nuclear  weapons 
through  the  implementation  of  this  care- 
fully negotiated  Ti'eaty. 

However,  because  of  the  Soviet  ag- 
gression, I  have  asked  the  United  States 
Senate  to  defer  further  consideration  of 
the  SALT  II  Treaty  so  that  the  Congress 
and  I  can  assess  Soviet  actions  and  inten- 
tions and  devote  our  primary  attention  to 
the  legislative  and  other  measures  re- 
quired to  respond  to  this  crisis. 

As  circumstances  change  in  the  fu- 
ture we  will,  of  course,  keep  the  ratifica- 
tion of  SALT  II  under  active  review  in 


luary  1980 


Special 


consultation  with  the  leadei-s  of  the  Sen- 
ate. 

The  Soviets  must  understand  our 
deep  concern. 

We  will  delay  opening  of  any  new 
American  or  Soviet  Consular  facilities, 
and  most  of  the  cultural  and  economic  ex- 
changes currently  under  consideration 
will  be  deferred.  Ti'ade  with  the  Soviet 
Union  will  be  severely  restricted. 

I  have  decided  to  halt  or  reduce  e.\- 
ports  to  the  Soviet  Union  in  three  areas 
that  are  particularly  important  to  them. 
These  new  policies  are  being  and  will  be 
coordinated  with  those  of  our  allies. 

I  have  directed  that  no  sales  of  high 
technology  or  other  strategic  items  will 
be  licensed  for  sale  to  the  Soviet  Union 
until  further  notice,  while  we  revise  our 
licensing  policy. 

P^ishing  privileges  for  the  Soviet 
Union  in  United  States  waters  will  be  se- 
verely curtailed. 

The  17  million  tons  of  grain  or<:lered 
by  the  Soviet  I'nion  in  e.xcess  of  tViat 
amount  which  we  are  committed  to  sell 
w  ill  not  be  delivered.  This  grain  was  not 
intended  for  human  consumption  but  was 
to  be  used  for  building  up  Soviet  live- 
stock herds. 

I  am  determined  to  minimize  any  ad- 
verse impact  on  the  American  farmer 
from  this  action.  The  undelivered  gi'ain 
will  be  removed  from  the  market  through 
storage  and  price  support  programs  and 
through  purchases  at  market  prices.  We 
will  also  increase  amounts  of  grain  de- 
voted to  the  alleviation  of  hunger  in  poor 
countries  and  we  will  have  a  massive  in- 
crease of  the  use  of  grain  for  gasohol 
production  here  at  home. 

After  consultation  with  other  princi- 
pal grain  exporting  nations,  I  am  confi- 
dent that  they  will  not  replace  these 
quantities  of  grain  by  additional  ship- 
ments on  their  part  to  the  Soviet  Union. 

These  actions  will  require  some  sac- 
rifice on  the  part  of  all  Americans,  but 
there  is  absolutely  no  doubt  that  these 
actions  are  in  the  interest  of  world  peace 
and  in  the  interest  of  the  security  of  our 
own  nation  and  they  are  also  compatible 
with  actions  being  taken  by  our  own 
major  trading  partners  and  others  w  ho 
share  our  deep  concern  about  this  new- 
Soviet  threat  to  world  stability. 

Although  the  United  States  would 
[irefer  not  to  withdraw  from  the  (_)lympic 
games  scheduled  in  Moscow  this  summer, 
the  Soviet  I'nion  must  realize  that  its 
continued  aggressive  actions  will 
endanger  both  the  participation  of  ath- 
letes and  the  travel  to  Moscow  by  spec- 
tators who  would  normally  wish  to  attend 
the  Olympic  games. 


Along  with  other  countries  we  will 
provide  militaiy  equipment,  food,  and 
other  assi.stance  to  help  Pakistan  defend 
its  independence  and  its  national  security 
against  the  seriously  increased  threat  it 
now  faces  from  the  North.  The  United 
States  also  stands  ready  to  help  other  na- 
tions in  the  region  in  similar  ways. 

Neither  our  allies  nor  our  potential 
adversaries  should  have  the  slightest 
doubt  about  our  willingness,  our  deter- 
mination, and  our  capacity  to  take  the 
measures  I  have  outlined  tonight. 

I  have  consulted  with  leaders  of  the 
Congress  and  I  am  confident  they  will 
support  legislation  that  may  be  required 
to  cari->'  out  these  measures. 

History'  teaches  perhaps  veiy  few- 
clear  lessons.  But  surely  one  such  lesson 
learned  by  the  world  at  great  cost  is  that 
aggression  unopposed  becomes  a  con- 
tagious disease. 

The  response  of  the  international 
community  to  the  Soviet  attempt  to  crush 
Afghanistan  must  match  the  gravity  of 
the  Soviet  action. 

With  the  support  of  the  American 
people  and  working  with  other  nations, 
we  will  deter  aggression,  we  will  protect 
our  nation's  security,  and  we  will  pre- 
serve the  peace. 

The  United  States  will  meet  its  re- 
sponsibilities. 


AMBASSADOR  McHENRY, 

JAN.  6,  19802 


The  Security  Council  meets  today,  at  the 
request  of  more  than  50  members  of  the 
United  Nations  from  all  parts  of  the 
world  and  of  all  political  persuasions.  We 
meet  to  consider  a  matter  of  fundamental 
importance  to  world  peace  and  to  the 
principles  on  which  the  .United  Nations 
was  founded. 

A  member  state  of  this  world  organi- 
zation has  been  invaded  by  massive  con- 
tingents of  troops  from  another  state.  Its 
government  has  been  overthrown.  Its 
leaders  have  been  killed.  Its  people  have 
been  silenced.  Its  territory  has  been  oc- 
cupied. 

The  United  States  has  joined  in  the 
call  for  an  urgent  meeting  of  the  Security 
Council  to  consider  the  Soviet  Union's 
blatant  act  of  aggression  against  the  ter- 
ritory and  people  of  Afghanistan.  We 
have  done  so  because  the  action  of  the 
Soviet  Union  not  only  breaches  the  peace 
and  violates  international  law-,  but  also 


threatens  the  viability  of  the  fundamental 
principles  that  underlie  the  U.N.  Charter. 

Sequence  of  Events 

The  representative  of  the  Soviet  Union 
has  offered  us  a  wide  and  confusing  range 
of  rationales  for  the  so-called  "limited"      i 
but  surely  deadly  assistance  foisted  on 
the  people  of  Afghanistan.  Let  us  look  at  ' 
the  chilling  sequence  of  events  connected 
with  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan.  ! 

•  During  the  first  weeks  of  Decem-  j 
ber,  the  Soviet  Union  secured  Bagram 
airfield,  north  of  the  Afghan  capital  of      . 
Kabul,  by  sending  the  equivalent  of  an 
airborne  regiment  there.  It  also  landed 
troops  and  equipment  at  the  Kabul  air- 
port and,  at  the  same  time,  mobilized 
enormous  forces  in  areas  bordering  Af- 
ghanistan. 

•  On  December  25  and  26,  a  massivi 
Soviet  airlift  into  Kabul  took  place.  In 
over  200  flights,  roughly  10,000  Soviet 
troops  were  transported  into  Afghanis- 
tan. 

•  On  the  evening  of  December  27,  a  ' 
special  Soviet  assault  unit  surrounded  th  n 
presidential  palace  in  Kabul.  Afghan  sol-  j 
diers  defending  the  palace  were  attackec  . 
and  overcome,  and  President  Amin  was 
summarily  executed.  Simultaneously,  ' 
Soviet  troops  attacked  Afghan  forces  i 
guarding  radio  Afghanistan  and  other  kf  n 
government  installations  and  took  them  g 

under  control. 

n 

•  The  first  announcement  of  the 
Soviet-engineered  coup  d'etat,  and  the 
replacement  of  President  Amin  by  Bab- 
rak  Karmal,  who  had  been  in  exile  in 
Eastern  Europe,  was  made  using  fre-      g 
quencies  purporting  to  be  Radio  Kabul,  jj 
In  fact,  the  transmitters  from  which        g 
these  announcements  were  made  were  I  li 
cated  in  the  Soviet  Union.  We  know  this 
because  the  real  Radio  Kabul  continued  | 
normal  transmissions  for  at  least  V/z        | 
hours  after  these  announcements  were    i 
first  heard.  Nothing  in  these  broadcasts  |i 
from  Kabul  confirmed  the  content  of  th(  'j 
Soviet  broadcast  disseminated  in  Af-       \i 
ghanistan's  name.  ||i 

•  Subsequently,  Soviet  troops  cap-  i| 
tured  all  key  civilian  and  militar\-  instal-  ii 
lations  in  the  Kabul  area  and  establishec  ^t 
a  defense  perimeter  around  Kabul.  Af-  iii, 
ghan  militarj'  forces  have  been  disarme(  i| 

•  Immediately  after  the  coup,  two  ll 
Soviet  motorized  rifle  divisions  entered  iji 
Afghanistan  by  land,  one  at  Kushka  and  ■ 
the  other  at  Termez.  Elements  of  the 
western  division  arrived  at  Herat,  whei 
fighting  between  Soviet  and  Afghan 
forces  was  reported.  Much  of  the  Terme 
division  proceeded  to  the  Kabul  area. 


Department  of  State  Bullel 


Special 


I  •  The  Soviet  Union  now  has  up  to 
poo  troops  in  Afghanistan.  There  are 
iications  that  other  Soviet  divisions  are 
(ving  into  the  Soviet-Afghan  border 
j-iet  forces  have  moved  out  to  secure 
ler  key  towns. 

The  Soviet  Union  has  claimed  that 
leadership  of  Afghanistan  requested 
'iet  military  assistance.  Which  leader- 
)?  It  is  beyond  doubt  that  President 
in  was  still  in  office  when  the  Soviet 
)ps  attacked  the  presidential  palace 

when  he  was  executed.  Are  we  to  be- 
e  that  President  Amin  invited  Soviet 
)ps  to  come  into  Afghanistan  in  order 
■versee  his  own  downfall  and  his  own 
cution?  Or  was  it  the  leadership  of 
urak  Karmal,  President  Amin's 
I  iet-appointed  successor,  a  man  who 
|i  not  even  in  Afghanistan  at  the  time 
the  Soviet  intervention  but  was, 
her,  in  the  Soviet  Union? 


U.N.  Principles 

The  armed  intervention  of  the  Soviet 
Union  in  Afghanistan  and  the  presence  of 
an  uninvited  occupation  force  in  that 
counti-y  is  a  gross  and  blatant  violation  of 
the  most  important  principles  of  interna- 
tional law  and  of  the  U.N.  Charter  What 
are  those  principles? 

•  That  one  state  must  not  use  force 
against  the  territorial  integrity  and  polit- 
ical independence  of  another  state; 

•  That  a  state  must  not  intervene  by 
force  in  the  internal  affairs  of  another 
state; 

•  That  all  states  must  respect  the 
principle  of  equal  rights  and  self- 
determination  of  peoples; 

•  That  fundamental  principles  of 
human  rights  must  be  respected  by  all 
governments;  and 


I  icle  51  of  U.N.  Charter 

Vhing  in  the  present  Charier  shall  impair  the  inherent  right  of  individual 
{'oUective  self-defeyise  if  an  armed  attack  occurs  against  a  Member  of  the 
I  ited  Natio7is,  until  the  Security  Council  has  taken  the  measures  necessary 
\naintain  international  peace  and  security.  Measures  taken  by  Members  in 
\  exercise  of  this  right  of  self-defense  shall  be  immediately  reported  to  the 
I  urity  Council  and  shall  not  in  any  way  affect  the  authority  and 
i  oonsibility  of  the  Security  Council  under  the  present  Charter  to  take  at 

I  time  such  action  as  it  deems  necessary  in  order  to  maintain  or  restore 

imational  peace  and  security. 


The  Afghan  people  and  Afghan  army 
-S  have  resisted  this  Soviet  aggres- 
1,  despite  the  overwhelming  military 
eriority  of  the  invader  Fighting  con- 
ies in  .several  areas  of  the  country. 

The  facts  of  the  situation  are  clear 
!r  a  period  of  months,  the  Soviet 
on  carefully  planned  and  prepared  to 
ide  Afghanistan,  because  it  was  dis- 
sfied  with  the  degree  of  subservience 
he  Amin  government  and  undoubtedly 
ti  its  performance  against  Moslem  in- 
dents in  Afghanistan  who  long  have 
n  struggling  for  their  rights.  The 
let  Union  then  carried  out  its  military 
ration — quickly  and  brutally.  They  of- 
!d  no  recourse  whatsoever  to  the  au- 
rities  then  in  power  in  Afghanistan. 

Soviet  Union  overthrew  the  Amin 
ernment,  which  it  had  previously 
ported,  and  replaced  it  with  a  puppet 
ime. 


•  That  states  must  settle  interna- 
tional disputes  by  peaceful  means. 

The  Soviet  claim  that  it  was  acting  in 
furtherance  of  collective  self-defense 
under  Article  51  of  the  Charter  is  a  per- 
version of  the  Charter — an  insult  to  the 
intelligence  of  the  members  of  this  Coun- 
cil. Article  51  can  be  invoked  only  "if  an 
armed  attack  occurs  against  a  Member  of 
the  United  Nations."  From  whence  came 
the  armed  attack  on  Afghanistan?  The 
only  armed  attack  on  Afghanistan  was 
the  one  launched  by  the  Soviet  Union.  No 
one  can  believe  the  claim  that  the  Soviet 
Union  was  requested  by  the  Afghan  Gov- 
ernment to  intervene  in  Afghanistan  in 
the  fashion  in  which  it  did,  unless  one  also 
believes  that  President  Amin  invited  the 
Soviet  Union  in  to  overthrow  him.  Arti- 
cle 51  of  the  Charter  requires  that  meas- 
ures taken  by  members  in  e.xercise  of 
their  right  of  self-defense  "shall  be  imme- 
diately reported  to  the  Security  Council 


and  shall  not  in  any  way  affect  the  au- 
thority and  responsibility  of  the  Security 
Council  under  the  .  .  .  Charter  to  take  at 
any  time  such  action  as  it  deems  neces- 
sary in  order  to  maintain  or  restore  in- 
ternational peace  and  security."  That 
neither  the  Soviet  Union,  nor  the  puppet 
regime  it  has  installed  in  power  in  Kabul, 
has  given  the  required  notice  to  the  Secu- 
rity Council  under  article  51  is  itself  evi- 
dence of  the  hoUowness  of  the  Soviet 
Union's  refuge  behind  the  Charter 

Nor  can  one  believe  that  the  Soviet 
Union  was  requested  by  the  Afghan  Gov- 
ernment to  intervene  in  Afghanistan  pur- 
suant to  the  terms  of  the  so-called  Treaty 
of  Friendship  and  Cooperation  it  entered 
into  with  that  country  in  1978.  For  the 
Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan  violates 
the  Soviet  Union's  obligation,  under  the 
terms  of  the  treaty,  to  respect  Afghanis- 
tan's national  sovereignty  and  to  refrain 
from  interfering  in  its  internal  affairs. 

The  U.N.  Charter  does  not  give  the 
Soviet  Union  or  any  nation,  the  right  to 
take  military  action  in  another  country  or 
to  replace  its  government  because  it  dis- 
agrees with  the  policies  or  performance  of 
the  existing  government.  The  fact  is  that 
the  Soviet  Union  has  flouted  interna- 
tional law  and  has  violated  regional  and 
international  peace  and  stability.  That  the 
Soviet  Union  has  done  so  with  cold  calcu- 
lation and  advance  planning,  in  an  area  of 
the  world  which  is  now  experiencing  par- 
ticular instability  and  tension,  makes  its 
act  even  more  egregious  and  irresponsi- 
ble. That  the  Soviet  Union  is  taking  mili- 
tary action  against  a  deeply  religious  and 
fiercely  independent  people,  who  are 
struggling  for  human  and  religious  rights, 
underscores  the  brutality  and  illegality  of 
its  action. 

The  Need  for  U.N.  Action 

Accordingly,  it  remains  for  this  Council  to 
take  action  under  the  Charter  to  restore 
international  peace  and  security. 

A  terrible  miscalculation  has  been 
made  by  Soviet  authorities.  The  ramifica- 
tions of  the  Soviet  intervention  in  Af- 
ghanistan are  enormous.  For  no  state  will 
be  safe  against  a  larger  and  more  power- 
ful neighbor  if  the  international  commu- 
nity appears  to  condone  the  Soviet  Union's 
armed  intervention.  This  must  be  of 
particular  concern  to  states  whose  ter- 
ritories lie  near  the  Soviet  borders. 

It  is,  therefore,  incumbent  upon  this 
Council  and  upon  every  nation  that  be- 
lieves in  the  rule  of  law  and  opposes  the 
use  of  force  in  international  affairs  to  de- 
nounce this  dangerous  breach  of  peace 
and  security.  It  is  incumbent  upon  this 


luary  1980 


Special 


Council  to  make  the  weight  of  world  opin- 
ion felt. 

We  note  that  the  Soviet  Union  has 
stated  that  it  intends  to  withdraw  its 
troops  from  Afghanistan  at  some  point. 
We  urge  the  Soviet  Union  to  do  so  imme- 
diately and  to  allow  the  people  of  Af- 
ghanistan to  conduct  their  own  affairs,  to 
choose  their  own  system  of  government, 
to  choose  their  own  national  leaders 
without  outside  pressure  and  interfer- 
ence. Only  in  this  way  can  the  grave 
threat  to  international  peace  and  security 
created  by  the  Soviet  Union  be  di- 
minished and  this  most  .serious  challenge 
to  the  basic  principles  of  the  United  Na- 
tions be  removed. 

No  state,  not  even  a  great  power,  can 
be  allowed  to  ignore  w-ith  impunity  the 
responsibilities,  obligations,  and  com- 
mitments it  assumed  when  it  became  a 
member  of  the  United  Nations.  The 
United  States  therefore  calls  on  all  mem- 
bers of  the  Council  to  act  vigorously  in 
discharge  of  their  Charter  obligations. 


DRAFT  RESOLUTION, 
.JAN.  7,  1980 

The  Security  Council, 

Having  considered  the  letter  dated  3  Jan- 
uarj'  1980  addressed  to  the  President  of  the 
Security  Council  (S/13724  and  Add.l  and  2), 

Gravely  concerned  over  recent  develop- 
ments in  Afghanistan  and  their  implications  for 
international  peace  and  security. 

Reaffirming  the  right  of  all  peoples  to  de- 
termine their  own  future  free  from  outside  in- 
terference, including  their  right  to  choose  their 
own  form  of  government, 

Mindful  of  the  obligations  of  Member 
States  to  refrain  in  their  international  relations 
from  the  threat  or  use  of  force  against  the  ter- 
ritorial integrity  or  political  independence  of 
any  State,  or  in  any  other  manner  inconsistent 
with  the  purposes  of  the  United  Nations, 

1.  Reaffirms  aneu'  its  conviction  that  the 
preservation  of  sovereignty,  territorial  integ- 
rity and  political  independence  of  every  State 
is  a  fundamental  principle  of  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations,  any  violation  of  which  on  any 
pretext  whatsoever  is  contrary  to  its  aims  and 
purposes; 

2.  Deeply  deplores  the  recent  armed 
intervention  in  Afghanistan,  which  is  incon- 
sistent with  that  principle; 

3.  Affirms  that  the  sovereignty,  territorial 
integrity,  political  independence  and  non- 
aligned  status  of  Afghanistan  must  be  fully  re- 
spected; 

4.  Calls  for  the  immediate  and  uncondi- 
tional withdrawal  of  all  foreign  troops  from 
Afghanistan  in  order  to  enable  its  people  to  de- 
termine their  own  form  of  government  and 
choose  their  economic,  political  and  social  sys- 
tems free  from  outside  intervention,  coercion 
or  constraint  of  any  kind  whatsoever; 

5.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to 
submit  a  report  on  progress  towards  the  im- 
plementation of  this  resolution  within  two 
weeks; 

6.  Decides  to  remain  seized  of  this  ques- 
tion. 


{Documentation  concerning  tak- 
ing the  Question  oftfie  Soviet  invasion 
of  Afgltanistan  to  the  (General  Assem- 
hly  will  he  published  in  the  February 
1980  Bulletin.]  m 


'  Broadcast  live  on  television  and  radio 
from  the  Oval  Office  (text  from  White 
House  press  release). 

^USUN  press  release  1. 


Department  of  State  Bulle', 


Norld  Opinion  on  the  Holding 
)f  U.S.  Hostages  in  Iran 


FoUoirhig  is  a  partial  list  < if  public  actions  taken  by  gov- 
eni»n')ifs,  iiitcniational  organizations  (both  governmental  and 
nongovernynental),  and  promine)it  persons  supporting  efforts  to 
assure  the  safrtg  and  release  of  the  U.S.  hostages  in  Iran. 


Special 


ovember  4 

West  European  Embassies  (Nov. 
5)  inform  U.S.  of  developments  in 
ehran  and  offer  to  assist  in  efforts  for 
elease  of  hostages 

ovember  6 

U.N.  Security  Council.  Issues 
atement  on  behalf  of  Secretary  Gen- 
ral  Waldheim  expressing  e.xtreme  con- 
em  about  the  situation  in  Iran  and  of- 
ring  his  assistance. 

Canada.  House  of  Commons  ap- 
roves  resolution  to  protest  to  the  Ira- 
ian  Government  against  an  "act  of 
iminal  aggression." 

I'ovember  7 

Turkish  Ambassador  attempts  to 
islt  hostages. 

t'ovember  8 

Liberia.  President  Tolbert  appeals 
the  Ayatollah  Khomeini  for  release  of 
ostages  on  humanitarian  grounds. 

Canadians  visit  Charge  d'Affaires 
,.  Bruce  Laingen,  the  senior  U.S.  dip- 
)matic  official  held  hostage  in  Tehran. 

U.K.  Prime  Minister  Thatcher  an- 
ounces  that  the  United  Kingdom  will 
ontinue  to  do  everything  possible  to 
ssist  the  United  States. 

lovember  9 

U.N.  General  Assembly.  President 
•alim  Ahmed  Salim  issues  a  statement 
xpressing  his  concern  for  the  safety 
nd  security  of  hostages  and  announces 
e  is  sending  a  personal  message  to 
Khomeini  appealing  for  their  release. 

U.N.  Security  Council.  President 
'alacios  de  Vizzio  reads  a  statement 
xpressing  the  Council's  profound  con- 
em  over  prolonged  detention  of  hos- 
ages  and  states  that  the  taking  of  hos- 
ages  is  in  violation  of  internationally 
ccepted  norms. 


European  Community  Ambas- 
sadors join  in  demarche  to  Iran's 
Foreign  Ministry,  urging  access  to  the 
U.S.  Charge  and  hostages. 

November  10 

Cape  Verde.  Voz  de  Povo,  a  Cape 
Verde  newspaper  which  speaks  for  the 
government  party,  comments  that  "in- 
vasion of  the  American  Embassy  in 
Tehran  runs  counter  to  all  the  princi- 
ples (if  conduct  (if  relations  and  coexist- 
ence among  nations." 

Algerian,  French,  Swedish,  and 
Syrian  Ambassadors  visit  hostages. 

EC-9  Ambassadors  call  at  the  Ira- 
nian Foreign  Ministry  to  express  their 
governments'  concern  over  violations  of 
diplomatic  immunity. 

Swiss  Ambassador  appeals  to  Ira- 
nian Foreign  Ministry  to  release  women 
hostages  as  a  humanitarian  gesture. 

November  11-12 

Pakistan.  In  response  to  Secretary 
General  Waldheim's  request,  major 
newspapers  report  that  President  Zia 
Ul-Haq  sent  a  special  message  to  Kho- 
meini appealing  for  release  of  hostages. 

November  12 

EC-9  Ambassadors  again  visit  the 
Iranian  Foreign  Ministry. 

November  13 

Prince  Sihanouk,  in  a  message  to 
Khomeini,  asks  that  he  grant  mercy  to 
the  hostages  "who  are  in  no  way  re- 
sponsible for  the  actions  of  their  gov- 
ernment." 

Norway.  Undersecretary  Hoist 
states  that  the  Norweigen  Government 
views  the  use  of  hostages  as  an  intoler- 
able mechanism  and  points  out  that  it  is 
equally  intolerable  that  Iranian  au- 
thorities condone  the  violation  of  dip- 
lomatic immunity. 


November  14 

Brazil.  In  columns  and  editorials, 
newspapers  criticize  Khomeini  govern- 
ment, and  several  applaude  U.S.  re- 
straint. 

Netherlands.  Foreign  Minister  van 
der  Klaauw  expresses  deep  concern  and 
states  that  the  principle  of  inviolability 
of  diplomatic  missions  and  personnel 
must  be  upheld. 

In  Paris,  the  International 
Human  Rights  Federation,  which  de- 
nounced the  Shah's  rule  some  time  ago, 
states  that  Iran's  demand  to  return  a 
"sick  man"  is  unjustified  and  urges  un- 
conditional release  of  hostages. 

November  15 

West  Germany.  Economic  Minister 
Lambsdorff  states  that  the  F.R.G.  will 
take  no  action  to  undermine  the  U.S.  oil 
embargo. 

Kenya.  A  statement  by  President 
Moi,  broadcast  on  the  "Voice  of 
Kenya,"  states  in  part  that  "whatever 
crimes  might  have  been  committed  by 
the  Shah  during  his  reign,"  the  taking 
of  hostages  to  coerce  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment to  return  him  for  trial  "consti- 
tutes a  serious  breach  of  diplomatic  in- 
tercourse and  must  be  viewed  with  dis- 
approval by  the  entire  international 
community." 

India.  The  Times  carries  a  letter 
by  a  prominent  Indian  Moslem,  Bad- 
ruddin  Tyabji,  expressing  his  hope  that 
Khomeini  will  remind  the  students  of  the 
distinguished  Islamic  traditions  of 
chivalry,  hospitality,  and  generosity. 

Paraguay.  Senate,  in  a  unanimous 
vote,  issues  a  strong  statement  re- 
nouncing the  action  of  Iranian  au- 
thorities. 

New  Zealand.  Government  expres- 
ses its  profound  concern  about  the  Ira- 
nian situation  and  associates  itself  with 
the  statement  made  by  Security  Coun- 
cil President  Palacios  on  November  9 
urging  immediate  release  of  hostages. 

Malaysia.  Press  refers  to  U.S.  ac- 
tion as  "commendably  restrained"  and 


Special 


most  state  that  the  United  States  can- 
not be  expected  to  bow  to  pressure  by 
meeting  the  Iranian  Government's  de- 
mands. 

London  Times  states  that  if  the 
United  States  were  to  yield  to  Iranian 
Government  pressure,  such  action 
would  invite  lawless  governments  or 
unscrupulous  armed  groups  worldwide 
to  seize  U.S.  diplomats  as  hostages  and 
hold  them  for  ransom. 

Resolution  is  adopted  by  the  Euro- 
pean Parliament  condemning  deten- 
tion of  U.S.  diplomatic  personnel  in 
Tehran  and  e.xpressing  solidarity  with 
all  those  who  oppose  the  seizure  of  hos- 
tages. 

Bangladesh.  Daily  newspaper,  If- 
tefuq,  calls  the  Iranian  occupation  of  the 
U.S.  Embassy  and  the  taking  of  hos- 
tages a  disgrace  for  the  entire  nation. 
In  the  Sajigbad,  often  anti-U.S.,  a  col- 
umnist says  that  action  by  Iranian  stu- 
dents violates  all  practiced  diplomatic 
norms  and  cannot  be  supported. 

November  17 

Paraguay.  Press  editorial  expres- 
ses outrage  at  Iranian  action. 

Norway.  Press  is  uniformly  sup- 
portive of  President  Carter  and 
strongly  condemns  Iranian  authorities 
for  their  breaches  of  diplomatic  immu- 
nity. 

West  Germany.  Chancellor 
Schmidt  announces  West  Germany's 
"full  solidarity  with  the  American  na- 
tion and  the  American  leadership"  in 
the  Iranian  crisis. 

November  18 

Swiss  Ambassador  in  Tehran  as- 
sists in  coordinating  evacuation  of  hos- 
tages scheduled  for  release. 

November  19 

Papua  New  Guinea.  Government 
states  that  it  regards  the  seizure  of 
hostages  under  any  pretext  as  indefen- 
sible, and  the  taking  of  diplomatic  per- 
sonnel as  hostages,  in  violation  of  in- 
ternational law  and  the  canons  of 
civilized  behavior,  as  especially  rep- 
rehensible. 

Cyprus.  Union  of  Members  of  the 
Foreign  Service  delivers  a  message  to 
the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Nicosia,  express- 
ing to  the  families  of  the  hostages  their 
sympathy  and  their  support. 

Liberia.  President  Tolbert  again 
writes  Khomeini  appealing  for  release  of 
hostages  on  religious,  moral,  human- 
itarian, and  international  legal  grounds. 


Dominican  Republic.  Both  houses 
of  Parliament  pass  resolutions  de- 
nouncing the  taking  of  hostages  and  the 
invasion  of  the  Embassy. 

Turkish  Ambassador  visits 
Laingen. 

November  20 

Swedish  Ambassador  visits 
Laingen. 

Finland.  Foreign  Minister  Vayry- 
nen  says  Finland  considers  the  Vienna 
convention  on  diplomatic  relations  a 
central  part  of  international  law,  and  it 
should  be  respected  by  every  govern- 
ment. 

Netherlands.  Parliament  passes  a 
resolution  condemning  the  hostage 
taking  and  expressing  support  for  Sec- 
retary General  Waldheim's  efforts  to 
reach  a  peaceful  solution. 

Portugal.  Government  issues  a 
statement  calling  the  Embassy 
takeover  a  "grave  act  which  collides 
frontally  with  the  basic  norms  of  inter- 
national law  and  coexistence." 

EC-9  Foreign  Ministers  Council 
condemns  "any  attempt  to  exert  pres- 
sure on  governments  by  the  taking  of 
hostages." 

Guyana.  Foreign  Ministry  con- 
demns the  holding  of  U.S.  hostages. 

Australia.  Foreign  Minister 
Peacock  declares  that  the  holding  of 
hostages  conflicts  with  Iran's  obliga- 
tions under  international  law  and  can- 
not be  justified  in  any  circumstances. 
He  adds  he  would  "strongly  deplore" 
any  so-called  trial  of  hostages. 

Venezuela.  Pi'esident  of  the 
Chambei-  of  Deputies,  Carlos  Canache 
Mata.  writes  that  Khomeini  is  a 
"medieval  fanatic"  who  has  "edited  God 
out  of  the  Koran." 

Togo.  President  Eyadema  calls  for 
release  of  hostages. 

EC-9  Foreign  Minister's  Council 
issues  a  statement  denouncing  the 
holding  of  hostages  and  the  threat  to 
put  them  on  trial  as  a  breach  of  interna- 
tional law,  concluding  that  the  Iranian 
Government  failed  to  fulfill  its  obliga- 
tions under  international  law  to  protect 
diplomats  and  embassy  premises. 

West  Germany.  Chancellor 
Schmidt  informs  President  Carter  of 
West  Germany's  wholehearted  support 
in  the  U.S. -Iranian  crisis  and  pledges 
to  assist  in  securing  release  of  hos- 
tages. 

Secretary  General  Waldheim, 
through  the  U.N.  press  spokesman,  ex- 
presses deep  concern  over  the  con- 
tinued detention  of  hostages.  He 


stresses  that  the  hostage-taking  con- 
travenes diplomatic  conventions  and  a 
U.N.  resolution  to  which  Iran  was  a 
party. 

U.N.  General  Assembly.  President 
Salim  Ahmed  Salim  issues  a  statement 
expressing  his  personal  gratification 
and  appreciation  at  the  release  of  13 
hostages  and  recalls  the  appeal  he  ad- 
dressed to  Khomeini  on  November  9. 

November  21  I 

Australia.  Foreign  Minister 
Peacock  states  he  deplores  the  taking  of 
hostages.  | 

Honduras.  General  Paz  sends  a  I 
message  to  Khomeini  appealing  for  re-  1 
lease  of  hostages.  s 

Sweden.  Foreign  Minister  states     ; 
that  the  takeover  of  the  Embassy  is  of 
the  utmost  gravity  because  a  govern- 
ment is  behind  the  violation  of  interna- 
tional law. 

Jamaica.  Government  issues  an 
appeal  to  Iranian  authorities  to  insure 
the  release  of  hostages  and  cessation  of 
the  occupation  of  the  Embassy. 

Mexico.  Government  expresses 
sympathy  with  the  United  States  and  a 
desire  to  be  helpful.  It  publicly  declares 
that  the  Shah  is  welcome  to  return  to 
Mexico. 

Tanzania.  President  Nyerere 
sends  a  strong  personal  message  to 
Khomeini  urging  the  prompt  release  of 
hostages. 

Zambia.  President  Kaunda  writes 
Khomeini  as  a  fellow  revolutionary. 

Zaire.  President  Mobutu  and 
Foreign  Minister  Nguza  send  messages 
to  Khomeini  and  acting  Foreign  Minis- 
ter Bani-Sadr,  respectively. 

Senegal.  On  orders  from  President 
Senghor,  the  Prime  Minister  makes  an 
official  protest  against  the  taking  of 
hostages  to  the  Iranian  Charge. 

Cameroon.  President  Ahidjo 
promises  a  government  communique  on 
the  situation  and  views  that  as  the  only 
effective  avenue  available  to  Cameroon. 

Botswana.  In  Parliament,  Foreign 
Minister  Mogwe  makes  what  the  local 
I'adio  terms  "a  strong  statement"  on  the 
Iranian  situation. 

Sierra  Leone.  Government  issues  a 
statement  which  is  carried  on  the  local 
media  and  sent  to  Iran. 

Mauritius.  Minister  of  External 
Affairs  sends  a  message  to  Tehran 
urging  release  of  hostages. 

Mozambique.  Permanent  Repre- 
sentative to  U.N.  informs  the  Iranian 
Charge  that  Iran's  action  is  unaccept- 
able and  is  criticized  by  almost  all  gov- 
ernments. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Special 


Rwanda.  Government  sends  U.S. 
Embassy  a  diplomatic  note  expressing 
support. 

Mauritania.  Prime  Minister  de- 
•lines  public  support  for  U.S.  efforts  or 
.0  intervene  with  Iranian  authorities. 
The  government  also  turns  down  an 
Iranian  request  for  support. 

Tanzania.  Student  organization  of 
he  political  party  at  Dar  es  Salaam 
University  passes  a  resolution  and  is- 
sues a  statement  calling  the  holding  of 
nostages  inhumane  and  indefensible  and 
appeals  for  their  unconditional  and  im- 
mediate release. 

Guyana.  Foreign  Minister  tells  the 
jress  he  is  especially  disturbed  over 
:he  events  in  Iran.  The  Foreign  Minis- 
:er  announces  that  he  has  written  to 
"uban  Premier  Castro  proposing  that 
he  nonaligned  movement  help  resolve 
;he  conflict. 

Panama.  Permanent  Mission  to 
LI.N.  expresses  dismay  and  concern 
;hat  a  large  number  of  Embassy  per- 
sonnel are  still  held  captive  and  remain 
1  prey  to  terror  and  uncertainty.  Under 
:he  Vienna  convention,  they  call  for 
•elease  of  hostages. 

France.  Government  says  all  must 
)bey  rules  that  govern  diplomatic  im- 
munity and  which  conform  with  univer- 
sal law. 

Canada.  Former  Prime  Minister 
Trudeau,  in  Parliament,  calls  for 
Janada  to  do  all  possible  to  support  the 
Jnited  States  in  its  present  situation 
md  to  take  the  lead  in  mobilizing  inter- 
lational  support. 

Greece.  Government,  through  its 
'barge  d'Affaires  in  Tehran,  partici- 
)atcs  in  a  joint  action  by  ambassadors 
requesting  I'elease  of  hostages. 

November  22 

Committee  of  Ministers  of  the 
Council  of  Europe  notes  that  Iranian 
action  "constitutes  a  flagrant  violation 
of  the  most  elementary  rules  of  interna- 
tional law  .  .  .  [and]  appeals  to  the  Ira- 
nian authorities  to  see  that  the  hos- 
tages are  released  immediately." 

Austria.  Foreign  Minister  Wil- 
libald  Pahr  calls  the  taking  of  hostages 
an  outrageous  violation  of  international 
law  and  the  Vienna  convention. 

Nepal.  Student  association  issues 
a  statement  praising  Iranian  students 
for  their  role  in  bringing  down  the 
Shah,  but  calls  their  conditions  for  re- 
lease of  hostages  "fanatic"  and 
"bizarre." 

Mauritius.  National  Moslem  Coun- 
cil sends  a  message  to  Khomeini  uring 


release  of  hostages  to  mark  the  occas- 
sion  of  Muharram. 

South  Africa.  Moslem  Judicial 
Council  of  Cape  Province  cables  Kho- 
meini seeking  release  of  hostages  and 
stating  that  holding  them  for  the  crime 
of  another  is  not  in  accordance  with  Is- 
lamic teachings.  The  Cape  Times  car- 
ries the  cable  as  well. 

Singapore.  Government  appeals  to 
the  Iranian  Government  to  release  hos- 
tages, stating  that  diplomatic  immunity 
has  been  the  cardinal  principle  of  inter- 
national relations,  and  any  breach 
would  render  it  impossible  for  peaceful 
exchanges  and  contacts  between  na- 
tions. 

Libya.  Radio  reports  that  Libya 
does  not  support  any  action  against 
diplomatic  missions  and  their  staff 
members,  and  in  principle,  it  is  against 
any  action  directed  against  missions 
and  the  holding  of  staff  members  as 
hostages. 

November  23 

Turkey.  Prime  Minister  Demirel 
states  that  his  government  disapproves 
of  events  occurring  in  Iran. 

Poland.  Primate  Stefan  Wyszinski 
appeals  publicly  to  Iran  to  release  hos- 
tages. 

Spain.  Council  of  Ministers  urges 
release  of  hostages  and  stresses  accept- 
ance of  international  relations. 

Spain.  Leading  weekly,  Camhio 
IG.  carries  an  editorial  by  publisher 
.Juan  Tomas  de  Salas,  who  calls  Iranian 
actions  "a  current  of  irrationalism — 
which  threatens  to  lead  humanity  into 
new  and  frightening  holocaust." 

Italy.  President  Pertini  urges 
Khomeini  to  release  hostages;  Liberal 
Party  condemns  holding  hostages;  and 
the  foreign  affairs  spokesman  of  the 
Italian  Communist  Party,  Gian  Carlo 
Jajetta,  states  that  Iranian  actions 
"completely  violate  international  law," 
put  Iran  in  "a  difficult  position  before 
every  other  country  and  international 
organization,  and  certainly  do  not  help 
the  government  of  Tehran  in  this  dif- 
ficult moment." 

East  Germany.  Publishes  a  call  for 
the  release  of  hostages. 

Swiss  Ambassador  visits  Laingen. 

EC-9  Ambassadors  visit  the  Ira- 
nian Foreign  Minister  and  stress  their 
anxiety  about  hostages'  well-being. 

U.S.S.R.  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko  advocates  fulfillment  of  inter- 
national convention  of  respect  for  dip- 
lomatic immunity. 


Niger.  President  Kountche  sends 
message  to  Khomeini. 

Twelfth  World  Congress  of  the  In- 
ternational Confederation  of  Free 
Trade  Unions  (ICFTU)  is  shocked  that 
Iran  blatantly  disregards  principle  of 
inviolability  of  embassies  in  that  it  con- 
dones holding  hostages  as  a  means  of 
attaining  objectives. 

Colombia.  National  Confederation 
of  Liberal  Youth,  National  Federation 
of  Liberal  Youth,  and  Social  Action 
Brigades  of  the  Conservative  Party 
urge  Iranian  students  to  i-espect  the 
hostages'  lives  and  to  release  them  to 
show  that  the  Islamic  republic  respects 
human  rights. 

Zaire.  In  a  message  to  Khomeini, 
President  Mobutu  publicly  appeals  for 
release  of  hostages. 

November  24 

Suriname.  Prime  Minister  calls  for 
release  of  hostages  and  condemns  Iran's 
violations  of  international  law. 

Nicaragua.  Junta  members, 
Ortega  and  Bobelo,  strongly  condemn 
holding  of  hostages  as  an  act  of  ter- 
rorism. Nicaraguan  delegation  to  the 
Organization  of  American  States  will 
support  OAS  consensus  resolution  on 
hostages. 

Colombia.  Youth  groups  deliver 
telephone  message  to  Iranian  students 
asking  "respect  for  the  lives  and  per- 
sonal integrity"  of  hostages  and  for 
their  liberation. 

Tunisia.  Tunis  press  reports  that 
the  government  expresses  disappoint- 
ment over  the  hostage  situation  to  a 
delegation  from  the  Iranian  Revolu- 
tionary Council.  Iran  is  asked  to  con- 
sider the  consequence  of  escalation  and 
to  conform  to  the  rules  of  international 
law. 

Senegal.  Government  issues  com- 
munique on  November  22  meeting  be- 
tween Prime  Minister  Abdou  Diouf  and 
the  Iranian  Charge  in  which  the  former 
"vigorously  requested  the  prompt  lib- 
eration of  the  hostages"  and  expressed 
his  government's  "ardent  wish  to  see 
the  tension  created  by  the  occupation" 
of  the  Embassy  "dissipate  rapidly." 

Mauritius.  Prime  Minister  Ram- 
goolam  appeals  to  "the  head  of  the 
Revolutionary  Council  of  Iran"  for  re- 
lease of  hostages. 

Canada.  Ivan  Head,  an  interna- 
tional lawyer  who  is  now  President  of 
Canada's  International  Development 
Center,  states  that  the  hostage  actions 


January  1980 


Special 


by  Iranians  violate  the  law  of  treaties 
and  the  law  of  diplomatic  immunity. 

November  25 

Guinea.  President  Sekou  Toure 
strongly  condemns  the  taking  of  hos- 
tages and  refers  to  international  law, 
the  Koran,  and  the  Bible. 

November  26 

Italy.  President  Pertini  outlines 
his  previous  record  of  support  for 
human  rights  and  urges  Khomeini  to 
free  hostages. 

Turkey.  Prime  Minister  Demirel 
expresses  disapproval  of  the  taking  of 
hostages. 

Bolivia.  Foreign  Minister  Julio 
Garret  instructs  U.N.  Security  Council 
President  Palacios  to  do  everything 
possible  to  help  secui'e  release  of  hos- 
tages. 

Brazil.  Foreign  Minister  Guerreiro 
is  cited  in  the  press  as  defending  the 
concept  of  immunity  for  diplomats  and 
the  inviolability  of  diplomatic  property. 

China.  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs 
issues  a  statement  saying  "principles 
guiding  international  relations  and  ac- 
cepted diplomatic  immunities  should  be 
universally  respected." 

Ghana.  Government  issues  a 
statement  calling  for  the  release  of  hos- 
tages. 

Burundi.  Issues  of  the 
government-controlled  newspaper  con- 
demns the  taking  of  hostages  and  cites 
President  Bagaza  as  stating  Burundi's 
committment  to  international  conven- 
tions on  diplomatic  immunity. 

Canada.  Roman  Catholic  Arch- 
bishop of  Plourde  of  Ottawa  and  Dr.  W. 
Gunther  Plaut,  President  of  Canadian 
Jewish  Congress,  respond  to  U.S.  Am- 
bassador Ender's  telegram  com- 
municating President  Carter's  state- 
ment asking  for  special  prayers  for  hos- 
tages. 

Swedish  branch  of  Amnesty  Inter- 
national calls  for  release  of  hostages. 

Morocco.  Maroc  Sair  calls  hostage 
situation  a  "condemnable  act." 

Guinea.  President  Toure  condemns 
the  hostage  situation  as  "absolutely 
contrary"  to  international  law,  as  well 
as  to  the  Koran. 

Canada.  Ma.xwell  Cohen,  former 
Law  Dean  at  McGill  University  and 
former  Canadian  Chairman  of  the  In- 
ternational Joint  Commission,  calls  for 
respect  for  the  principle  of  protection  of 
diplomats. 


OAS.  Approves  resolution  in  spe- 
cial session  which  condems  holding  of 
hostages  in  Tehran. 

November  27 

Cameroon.  Government-owned 
Tribune  carries  te.xt  of  a  message  from 
President  Ahidjo  to  Khomeini. 

Austria.  Foreign  Minister  Pahr 
states  that  hostage-taking  is  "an  out- 
rageous violation  of  international  law 
and  the  Vienna  diplomatic  convention." 

Chile.  Human  rights  exponent, 
Raul  Cardinal  Silva,  Archbishop  of  San- 
tiago, says  in  reference  to  the  Iranian 
situation  that  "men  who  say  they  love 
God  seemingly  do  not  want  to  respect 
their  brothers;  to  respect  the  innocent 

"Suriname  unconditionally  con- 
demns the  seizure"  and  supports  "in- 
ternational action  to  undo  the  occupa- 
tion of  the  Embassy." 

Iceland.  Prime  Minister  and 
Foreign  Minister  announce  they  have 
protested  to  the  Iranian  Government's 
takeover  of  the  U.S.  Embassy. 

A  statement  is  issued  by  the  Com- 
monwealth High  Commissioners  ap- 
pealing to  the  Iranian  Government  to 
procure  the  release  of  all  hostages  and 
expressing  the  hope  that  the  parties 
will  resolve  their  differences  by  peace- 
ful means. 

Uruguay.  Dr.  Edwardo  Jimenez  de 
Arechaga,  former  judge  and  President 
of  the  International  Court  of  Justice 
1970-79,  states:  "The  conduct  of  Ira- 
nian authorities  .  .  .  constitutes  the 
most  flagrant  violation  of  the  norms  of 
international  law  ....  Diplomatic  and 
juridical  annals  will  register  the  actions 
of  those  authorities  or  the  most  com- 
plete list  of  infractions  against  univer- 
sally recognized  norms  of  international 
law  in  matters  relating  to  diplomatic 
immunity  and  privileges  .  .  .  ." 

Senegal.  President  Senghor  de- 
nounces taking  of  hostages,  burning  of 
buildings,  and  murders  as  means  for 
the  solution  of  conflicts  ".  .  .  beyond  in- 
ternational law." 

Commonwealth  Secretary  Gen- 
eral Ramphal  says  holding  diplomatic 
personnel  hostage  violates  international 
law  and  jeopardizes  fabric  of  interna- 
tional relations. 

November  28 

Tehran-based  Embassies  of  Fin- 
land, other  Nordic  countries,  Austra- 
lia, Austria,  Canada,  Greece,  New 


Zealand,  Spain,  Portugal,  and  Swit- 
zerland submit  appeal  to  Iranian 
Foreign  Minister  Bani-Sadr  for  release 
of  Embassy  personnel. 

France.  President  Valery  Giscard 
d'Estaing  calls  the  taking  of  hostages 
"totalfy  unacceptable." 

Non-EC-9  Western  Ambassadors 
meet  with  Iranian  Foreign  Minister; 
EC-9  Ambassadors  hold  similar  meet- 
ing with  Foreign  Minister. 

Canada.  A  unanimous  resolution 
adopted  by  the  House  of  Commons  "un- 
equivocally condemns  the  Government 
of  Iran"  for  breaching  the  rule  of  inter- 
national law  "by  allowing  and  en- 
couraging the  taking  of  American  dip- 
lomatic staff  as  hostages  within  that 
country." 

No  Date 

Malaysia.  Tunku  Abdul  Rahman, 
the  father  of  Malaysian  independence, 
strongly  denounces  the  holding  of  dip- 
lomatic hostages  and  calls  for  their  re- 
lease. 

Amnesty  International  issues  twt 
statements  calling  for  release  of  hos- 
tages. 

Belize.  Premier  Price  appeals  on 
grounds  of  international  law  and  hu- 
manity for  release  of  hostages. 

The  Dalai  Lama  appeals  to  Kho- 
meini to  protect  hostages. 

Hungary.  Television  states  that 
the  taking  of  diplomats  as  hostages 
should  not  be  condoned. 

South  Korea.  Supports  the  United 
States  in  its  public  positions. 

German  Democratic  Republic. 
Calls  for  adherence  to  and  respect  for 
principle  of  protection  of  diplomatic 
missions  extended  under  international 
law  and  in  accordance  with  the  Vienna 
convention,  as  essential  part  of  the 
function  of  normal  government-to- 
government  relations.  ■ 


* 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


I'.omplishments 

( iiie  uf  the  major  aehievement.s  is 
-Iramatic  increase  in  world  aware- 

■  ■>(  human  rights  issues.  To  quote 

ill'  1978  annual  report  of  a  leading 
,•  human  rights  organization,  the 
r  riiational  League  for  Human 

:hts. 

Within  the  past  year,  human  rights 
;  ini-  the  first  time  become  a  subject 
tmtional  policy  debate  in  many  coun- 
-    Human  rights  concerns  have  been 
In,  us  of  greater  discussion  in  inter- 
iiniial  organizations  and  of  greater 
it'iition  in  world  media.  A  most  sig- 
lieant  factor  in  this  has  been  Presi- 
1(1  (."ai-ter  and  the  U.S.  human  rights 
u  cy. 

This  new  consciousness  helps  to 

ill  existing  abuses  and  to  deter  new 

alums.  Moreover,  there  are  many 

■  iii|)les  of  tangible  human  rights 
Lji'fss.  We  do  not  claim  credit  for 
tiiiilar  improvements.  But  we  be- 
r  iliat  we  have  contributed  to  an 
lo-phere  that  makes  progress  more 
■ly  t(i  occur. 

In  the  past  year,  significant  steps 
aril  the  transfer  of  power  from  the 
It  ny  to  civilian  democratic  institu- 
I     were  taken  in  the  Dominican  Yle- 
'lii  ,  (Ihana,  Nigeria,  Peru,  Brazil, 
Thailand.  In  Bangladesh,  Sudan, 
niiesia,  Nepal,  and  Paraguay,  sub- 
ntial  numbers  of  political  prisoners 
e  released,  and  other  prisoner  re- 
ncurred  in  Cuba.  Guinea,  and 
Kepublic  of  Korea.  In  Bangladesh, 
ill,  and  Thailand  more  freedom  was 
eiiiled  to  the  press,  to  labor  organi- 
;  lens,  and  to  political  parties.  Just  a 
<    I  lays  ago,  successful  elections  were 
:i  (i  m  Ecuador  which  help  pave  the 
wy  for  civilian  rule. 

In  Elastern  Europe  and  the  Soviet 
luiman  rights  conditions  remain 
e  of  serious  concern.  But  even 
L..ie.  we  have  seen  some  positive 
ns:  prisoner  releases  in  Poland  and 
goslavia;  greater  tolerance  for  dis- 
it  in  Hungary  and  Poland;  and  sig- 
icant  increases  in  emigration  from 
i  Soviet  Union.  We  are  particularly 
atified  that  Aleksandr  Ginzburg  and 
ir  fellow  dissidents  have  been  re- 
ised  from  prison  and  are  now  in  the 
lited  States. 

In  my  view,  then,  our  policy  clearly 
s  been  effective  in  improving  human 
hts  around  the  world.  Moreover,  I 
lieve  our  policy  is  also  making  an  im- 
rtant  contribution  to  our  security  in  a 
anging  and  often  turbulent  world.  In 
is  regard,  our  idealism  and  self- 
merest  coincide. 


Our  human  rights  policy  responds 
to  the  aspirations  of  more  and  more 
people  in  the  Third  World  for  a  fuller 
participation  in  their  government  and 
economy.  As  Secretary  Vance  said  last 
night  in  Chicago,  these  growing  de- 
mands for  fulfillment  of  fundamental 
rights  are  generally  in  our  national 
interest,  because  they  are  producing 
new  or  strengthened  democratic  in- 
stitutions in  many  countries  around  the 
world.  By  helping  Third  World  nations 
meet  popular  aspirations  in  an  orderly 
and  peaceful  way,  we  can  improve  our 
relations  and  strengthen  our  own  secu- 
rity, not  on  a  temporary  basis  of  ac- 
commodation to  a  repressive  regime 
but  on  an  enduring  basis  of  a  shared 
commitment  to  democratic  values. 

As  I  have  said,  I  believe  our  efforts 
in  implementing  the  human  rights  pol- 
icy have  been  effective.  But  the  dis- 
tance covered  is  dwarfed  by  the  dis- 
tance that  still  must  be  traveled.  Let 
me  say  a  few  concluding  words  about 
this  task  that  remains. 

Despite  the  many  improvements  I 
have  mentioned  and  others  like  them, 
egregious  violations  of  human  rights 
persist  around  the  globe.  Through  our 
words  and  our  actions,  we  will  perse- 
vere in  our  efforts  to  improve  these 
situations.  As  progress  is  achieved,  we 
will  set  new  goals  for  further  attain- 
ment. 

In  these  efforts,  we  seek  your  sup- 
port to  carry  out  the  common  objective 
of  Congress  and  the  President  to  rekin- 
dle the  beacon  of  human  rights  in 
American  foreign  policy.  ■ 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


Political  Asylum 


by  Warren  Christopher 

Addfeaa  before  the  Los  Angeles 
Co/oity  Bar  Association  on  November 
6.  1979.  Mr.  Christopher  is  Deputy 
Secretary  of  State. 

Late  last  summer,  I  found  myself 
confronted  with  one  drama  of  political 
asylum.  As  you  will  recall,  the  Soviet 
Dancer  Alexandr  Godunov  had  left  the 
Bolshoi  Ballet  while  on  tour  here  and 
was  granted  asylum.  The  circumstances 
led  the  State  Department  to  request  an 
interview  with  his  wife,  the  Bolshoi 
ballerina  Lyudmila  Vlasova,  so  that  we 
could  ascertain  her  wishes.  Despite 
Soviet  assurances  to  Department  offi- 
cials that  such  an  interview  would  be 
arranged,  Ms.  Vlasova  suddenly  ap- 
peared at  Kennedy  Airport  in  New 
York,  accompanied  by  a  group  of  husky 
Soviet  escorts  who  rushed  her  aboard 
an  Aeroflot  flight  for  Moscow. 

This  issue  reached  my  desk  on  a 
Friday  afternoon  at  about  the  same  time 
Ms.  Vlasova  arrived  at  the  airport.  Our 
laws  authorize  the  Immigration  and 
Naturalization  Service  (INS)  to  prevent 
an  alien's  departure  from  the  LInited 
States  when  such  a  departure  would  be 
contrary  to  the  national  interest.  Act- 
ing under  that  statute,  I  asked  the 
Department  of  Justice  to  delay  Ms. 
Vlasova's  departure  so  that  we  could 
determine  whether  her  leaving  was 
truly  voluntary. 

Ms.  Vlasova  had  been  taken  aboard 
the  aircraft  before  this  order  could  be 
carried  out — and  thus  ensued  a  3-day 
standoff  at  the  airport.  The  "prevention 
of  departure"  order  issued  by  INS  kept 
the  plane  on  the  ground,  while  we  dis- 
cussed with  the  Soviets  our  insistence 
that  Ms.  Vlasova  be  interviewed  in  a 
noncoercive  atmosphere.  As  the 
weekend  wore  on,  it  became  clear  that 
the  issue  was  being  considered  at  the 
highest  levels  of  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment. 

On  day  three  of  this  incident,  the 
Soviets  finally  acquiesced  to  a  sugges- 
tion we  had  made  on  day  one,  and  the 
interview  was  conducted  in  a  mobile 
lounge  at  the  airport.  Our  team  of  ex- 
perts on  the  scene  was  led  by  Ambas- 
sador Don  McHenry  [then  U.S.  Deputy 
Representative  to  the  U.N.  Security 
Council  and  now  U.S.  Ambassador  to 
the  United  Nations]  and  included  both  a 
doctor  and  Mr.  Godunov's  attorney. 
They  were  convinced  that  Ms.  Vla- 
sova's expressed  desire  to  leave  was,  in 
fact,  voluntary,  and  she  was,  therefore, 


inuary  1980 


35 


International  Law 


permitted  to  depart  without  further 
delay. 

While  we  were  able,  in  this  case,  to 
uphold  the  principle  of  no  forced  repa- 
triation, the  procedures  employed  were 
not  ideal.  As  I  shall  discuss  a  little 
later,  we  are  now  working  with  the  Jus- 
tice Department  to  improve  them. 

Since  then,  a  number  of  spectacular 
defections  and  asylum  cases  has  been  in 
the  news.  In  September  two  more  Bol- 
shoi  dancers  sought  and  received 
asylum  here  in  Los  Angeles.  A  pair  of 
Soviet  Olympic  skating  champions 
sought  asylum  in  Switzerland.  A  Soviet 
journalist  appeared  at  our  Embassy  in 
Tokyo  to  ask  for  asylum,  and  he,  too,  is 
now  in  the  United  States.  An  East 
German  family  fled  to  West  Germany  in 
a  homemade  hot-air  balloon.  And  re- 
cently, reports  appeared  in  the  press 
suggesting  that  a  champion  Soviet 
canoeist,  who  had  received  asylum  in 
West  Germany,  has  disappeared  under 
mysterious  circumstances,  perhaps  in  a 
case  of  forced  repatriation. 

Such  dramatic  cases  are,  in  many 
ways,  a  tribute  to  the  West  and  its  free 
institutions.  Certainly  we  in  the  United 
States  can  take  pride  in  the  fact  that 
citizens  from  other  countries  are  willing 
to  risk  their  lives  in  order  to  breathe 
the  free  political  and  cultural  air  of 
America. 

But  we  should  not  let  pride  blind  us 
to  the  complexities  that  surround  the 
subject  of  asylum.  While  asylum  is  an 
essentially  humanitarian  issue,  it  can 
have  far-reaching  international  ramifi- 
cations. In  controversial  cases,  when 
charges  and  countercharges  ai'e  traded 
back  and  forth — involving  undiplomatic 
words  like  "persecution,"  "kidnapping," 
and  "espionage" — tensions  inevitably 
increase,  and  the  whole  range  of 
relations  between  countries  can  be 
affected. 

For  a  nation  like  ours,  the  decision 
to  grant  or  deny  asylum  in  a  particular 
case  cannot  turn  on  a  cool  calculation  of 
the  international  pros  and  cons.  Be- 
cause of  our  historical  role  as  a  country 
of  refuge  for  the  oppressed,  because  of 
our  firm  national  commitment  to  human 
rights,  we  must  insure  that  our  actions 
in  such  cases  comport  not  only  with  the 
law  but  also  with  the  dictates  of  con- 
science. 

So  let  us  explore  the  theory  and 
practice  of  asylum — in  the  belief  that 
the  United  States  can  handle  these  sen- 
sitive matters  with  intelligence  and 
compassion  and  with  more  efficiency  as 
well. 


36 


Theory  of  Asylum 

The  concept  of  asylum  appears  to 
be  almost  as  ancient  as  the  idea  of 
human  mercy.  And  the  law  of  asylum, 
like  so  much  of  our  law,  has  its  roots  in 
primitive  magic  and  taboo:  Ancient 
tribes  and  societies  had  their  sacred 
places — temples  or  the  houses  of 
chiefs — where  bloodshed  and  revenge 
were  prohibited.  The  Incas  had  for- 
tified places  to  which  women  and  chil- 
dren repaired  for  safety  in  time  of  hos- 
tilities. Some  of  the  Greek  city-states 
even  sought  to  formalize  a  basic  law  of 
asylum. 

In  modern  times — to  leapfrog  over 
a  great  stretch  of  history — the  right  of 
asylum  is  enshrined  in  both  national 
and  international  law. 


Asylum,  is  granted  to  persons 
who  are  already  in  the  United 
States  and  want  to  stay.  Refu- 
gee status  is  granted  to  those 
who  are  somewhere  else,  but 
who  want  to  come  to  the  United 
States. 


Before  discussing  the  legal  princi- 
ples, I  should  note  that  when  I  speak  of 
asylum,  I  am  actually  referring  to  what 
is  properly  called  territorial  asylum, 
which  involves  refuge  sought  by  foreign 
persons  within  U.S.  territory.  The  re- 
lated concept  of  diplomatic  asylum,  in- 
volving refuge  in  diplomatic  missions 
abroad,  is  widely  recognized  in  some 
parts  of  the  world.  But  it  is  strictly 
limited  by  U.S.  law.  It  is  longstanding 
U.S.  policy  to  grant  temporary  refuge 
in  our  diplomatic  posts  abroad  only  to 
persons  in  immediate  physical  danger. 
Of  course,  Cardinal  Mindszenty's  1.5- 
year  stay  in  our  Embassy  in  Budapest 
demonstrates  that  the  rule  is  not  totally 
inflexible,  but  that  example  also  dem- 
onstrates the  kind  of  practical  problems 
that  can  arise  when  diplomatic  missions 
become  places  of  refuge. 

We  should  also  differentiate  be- 
tween asylum  and  the  related  issue  of 
refugees.  While  the  legal  distinction  is 
not  clear  cut,  it  is  useful  to  think  of  the 
difference  this  way:  Asylum  is  granted 
to  persons  who  are  already  in  the 
United  States  and  want  to  stay.  Refu- 
gee status  is  granted  to  those  who  are 
somewhere  else,  but  who  want  to  come 
to  the  United  States. 


Legal  Principles 

The  starting  point  in  discussing  the 
law  of  a.sylum  is  the  U.N.  Universal 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  which 
declares  that:  "Everyone  has  the  right  t^ 
seek  and  to  enjoy  in  other  countries 
asylum  from  persecution."  Similarly, 
the  Declaration  on  Territorial  Asylum, 
passed  by  the  U.N.  General  Assembly 
in  1967,  provides  that  no  person  seek- 
ing territorial  asylum  ".  .  .  shall  be 
subjected  to  measures  such  as  rejection 
at  the  frontier  ...  or  compulsory  re- 
turn to  any  state  where  he  may  be 
subjected  to  jjerseeution." 

While  these  declarations  are  aspi- 
rational  in  nature,  the  U.N.  Protocol 
Relating  to  the  Status  of  Refugees  has 
the  force  of  a  treaty  and,  therefore,  the 
force  of  law.  This  protocol  provides  tha 
no  signing  state  shall  return  a  seeker  ol 
asylum  who  would  face  a  threat  to  his 
life  or  freedom  ".  .  .  on  account  of  his 
race,  religion,  nationality,  membership 
in  a  particular  social  group  or  political 
opinion." 

Our  own  domestic  legislation 
adopts  a  similar  standard.  Under  the 
Immigration  and  Nationality  Act,  the 
Attorney  General  is  authorized  to 
"withhold  deportation"  of  an  alien 
seeking  asylum  who  would  be  subject  t 
persecution  on  account  of  race,  reliumi 
or  political  opinion. 

This  statutory  standard  so/nnh 
fairly  straightforward,  but  there  are 
some  significant  ambiguities.  For 
example,  what  constitutes  "persecu 
tion"  under  the  act?  Is  "persecution" 
necessarily  political  in  nature — or  is  th 
concept  of  "persecution  on  account  ol' 
.  .  .  political  opinion"  broad  enough  tn 
encompass  restrictions  on  the  ability  u 
a  painter  or  sculptor  to  express  hersel 
fully?  Or  on  a  dancer's  right  to  the  full 
est  artistic  expression?  Or  the  highest 
pay?  Can  extreme  economic  deprivatim 
amount  to  "persecution"?  Hundreds  of 
would-be  immigrants  from  Haiti  claim 
that  it  does  and  are  currently  pressing 
their  claims  in  a  U.S.  District  Court  ir 
P^lorida. 

Many  asylum  cases  involve  no  com 
plications  and  are  handled  each  year  b 
our  immigration  authorities  without 
fanfare  and  with  only  routine  advice 
from  the  State  Department.  But  in 
politically  sensitive  cases — where  the 
safety  of  the  seeker  of  asylum  may  be  i 
doubt,  where  there  is  the  danger  of  for 
cible  repatriation,  or  where  sensitive 
relations  between  nations  could  be 
affected — the  State  Department  may 
be  involved  from  the  outset. 


Department  of  State  Bulletit  i 


MIDDLE  EAST 


It  is  in  such  cases,  involving  not 
\  hiuh  diplomatic  stakes  but  the 
Mi'ins  of  coordination  among  various 
rniment  agencies,  that  the  dangers 
liicatest  that  missteps  and  mis- 
i>  w  ill  occur.  Our  laws  and  I'egula- 
<is  edverning  the  granting  of  asylum 
.  m  my  judgment,  generally  fair  and 
qiiate.  It  is  in  trying  to  execute 
hm  with  compassion  and  dispatch  that 
ublems  may  arise.  And  it  is  here  that 
'•  are  working  to  improve  our  per- 
niance. 

^■ential  Problems 

<  )ne  problem  arises  from  the  fact 
i  a  request  for  asylum  may  occur 
ii^t  anywhere,  at  any  time.  A  re- 
-I  may  be  encountered,  in  spite  of 
lest  efforts,  by  people  who  simply 
i(  lot  know  what  to  do. 

In  1970,  for  example,  a  Lithuanian 
eman  leapt  from  his  Soviet  ship  onto 
'Icck  of  the  U.S.  Coast  Guard  cutter 
///.  A  sad  scenario  was  played  out 
n.hich  the  jjroper  authorities  were 
IK  notified:  the  standard  procedures 
'n  handling  asylum  requests  were  not 

iin:  and  judgments  were  made  on 
-  -I lilt  to  return  the  seaman  to  his 
^l"!,  where  he  was  beaten  unconscious. 

The  story  of  the  seaman,  Simas 
<  lirka,  has  a  happy  ending.  As  it 
u  led  out,  he  was  an  American  citizen 
1  lii'th  and  was  later  granted  entry  to 
I  iiited  States.  But  the  incident  on 
ril  the  Vigilant  should  have  been 
lidled  very  differently. 

Another  potential  problem  we  are 
il  ly  to  encounter  in  the  future,  as  we 
'  witli  Ms.  Vlasova,  concerns  the 
<tiiin  of  whether  a  foreign  citizen  is 
i«  arting  the  United  States  voluntarily 
)tmder  duress. 

More  specifically,  when  are  we  jus- 
i  'd  in  delaying  someone's  departure 
'■n  the  United  States,  in  the  face  of 
I'li'son's  express  desire  to  leave,  in 
I'v  to  determine  whether  he  or  she  is 
Aiv:  under  duress?  As  I  suggested 
:lier,  there  was  a  reasonable  basis  for 
M  concern  about  the  circumstances 
iiiiinding  Ms.  Vlasova's  hasty  depar- 
'.  <  tiir  request  for  an  interview  in  a 
i  iciiercive  environment  was  amply 
itified  by  both  U.S.  and  international 
;  .  1  am  convinced,  however,  that  we 
need  to  strengthen  our  regulations 
'  ins  point  and  to  clarify  the  proce- 
1  es  til  be  followed  when  such  inci- 
I  Its  occur. 

I  proving  Procedures 

To  deal  with  all  these  and  with 
it-r  problems,  we  are  taking  several 


steps,  in  cooperation  with  the  Justice 
Department. 

First,  we  are  updating  and 
clarifying  the  State  Department's  offi- 
cial guidelines  for  dealing  with  a.sylum 
cases.  These  guidelines  will  be  issued  to 
other  government  agencies,  to  local  of- 
ficials, and  to  police  agencies  across  the 
nation  so  that  those  who  may  become 
involved  in  asylum  cases  will  be  aware 
of  the  specific  steps  to  be  taken. 

Second,  we  are  amending  the  reg- 
ulations governing  the  departure  of 
aliens  from  the  United  States  to  deal 
more  explicitly  with  the  problem  of 
possible  involuntary  departui-e.  This 
involves  two  steps.  We  will  make  clear 
in  the  proposed  new  regulation  that 
where  doubt  exists  whether  an  alien  is 
departing  voluntarily,  such  departure 
would  be  prejudicial  to  the  interest  of 
the  United  States  and  may,  therefore, 
be  temporarily  delayed  while  an  inquiry 
is  conducted.  And  we  will  propose  that 
immigration  officers  be  granted  the 
power  to  subpoena  persons  who  in  our 
judgment  should  be  interviewed.  This 
will  make  clear  their  authority  to  con- 
duct an  investigation  into  the  question 
of  whether  an  impending  departure  is 
voluntary  or  forced. 

Third,  we  are  studying  how  best  to 
handle  the  problem  of  protecting  a  per- 
son who  may  be  in  danger  of  forced  re- 
patriation. As  lawyers,  you  will  readily 
understand  the  complexity  of  affording 
such  protection  without  violating  the 
constitutional  rights  of  the  person  in- 
volved. 

In  a  very  real  and  often  dramatic 
way,  the  issue  of  political  asylum  is  a 
barometer  of  humanity's  yearning  for 
freedom.  Asylum  was  traditionally 
granted  to  political  figures  who  needed 
protection  from  their  own  governments 
in  the  wake  of  wars  or  revolutions. 
Today,  increasingly,  we  see  not  only 
political  figures  but  writers,  dancers, 
musicians,  and  others  seeking  asylum 
as  a  means  of  free  expression — artistic 
or  even  athletic  expression.  And  we  see 
ordinary  people  seeking  asylum  for  rea- 
sons of  religion  or  personal  belief. 

For  us  in  the  United  States,  these 
requests  for  refuge  may  create  tempor- 
ary abrasions  and  difficulties.  But  they 
are  a  tribute  to  our  way  of  life — and  to 
the  values  we  represent  in  the  world. 
They  are  also  a  recurring  challenge  to 
our  support  for  human  rights. 

The  steps  I  have  outlined  today 
represent  our  continuing  effort  to  do 
not  only  what  the  law  requires  but  what 
conscience  compels,  so  that  in  the  fu- 
ture we  can  respond  to  that  challenge 
with  imagination,  skill,  and  the 
generosity  that  are  the  hallmarks  of  our 
people.  ■ 


U.S.  Takes  Case 
Against  Iran  to  the 
International 
Court  of  Justice 


DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT, 
NOV.  29,  1979' 

The  United  States  on  November 
29,  1979,  took  its  case  against  Iran  to 
the  International  Court  of  Justice.  In 
an  action  filed  with  the  Court  in  The 
Hague,  the  United  States  charges  that 
the  Government  of  Iran  has  violated 
fundamental  principles  of  international 
law  in  not  protecting  the  U.S.  Embassy 
in  Tehran,  in  supporting  the  actions  of 
those  holding  the  American  hostages, 
and  in  threatening  to  subject  the  hos- 
tages to  trial. 

In  particular,  the  United  States 
charges  Iran  has  violated  the  1961 
Vienna  Convention  on  Diplomatic  Rela- 
tions, the  1963  Vienna  Convention  on 
Consular  Relations,  the  1973  Conven- 
tion on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment 
of  Crimes  Against  Internationally  Pro- 
tected Persons,  including  Diplomatic 
Agents,  the  1955  U.S. -Iran  Treaty  of 
Amity,  and  the  Charter  of  the  United 
Nations. 

The  United  States  will  seek  an  ur- 
gent hearing  before  the  Court  and  has 
requested  the  Court  to  issue  forthwith 
a  preliminary  order  directing  Iran  to 
secure  the  release  of  the  hostages  and 
to  insure  their  safety. 

Following  are  the  texts  of  the  U.S. 
A])plication  to  the  Court,  its  Request 
for  Interim  Measures  of  Protection,  and 
a  letter  from  Secretary  of  State  Vance 
to  the  President  of  the  Court.  The  pa- 
pers were  filed  by  the  Legal  Adviser  of 
the  Department  of  State,  Mr.  Roberts 
B.  Owen,  who  will  represent  the  United 
States  in  the  action. 


LETTER  TO  ICJ 

Dear  Sir  Humphrey: 

The  Government  of  the  United  States 
is  today  filing  with  the  Court  an  Applica- 
tion and  a  Request  for  Interim  Measures  of 
Protection  in  a  case  against  the  Govern- 
ment of  Iran  for  the  seizure,  and  holding  as 
hostages,  of  members  of  the  United  States 
Embassy  in  Tehran.  As  you  are  aware,  at 
least  fifty  United  States  nationals  are 
being  subjected  to  prolonged  and  inhumane 
detention.  They  have  already  been  held 


luary  1980 


37 


Middle  East 


hostage  fur  more  than  three  weeks,  and 
threats  have  been  made  that  they  may  be 
placed  on  trial. 

In  view  of  the  extraordinary  urgency 
of  this  case,  which  is  unlike  any  before 
submitted  to  the  Court.  I  respectfully 
suggest  that  you,  as  President  of  the 
Court,  urge  the  Government  of  Iran  to  act 
immediately  to  appoint  its  Agent  in  the 
case.  I  further  urge  that  the  Court  in  any 
event  hold  any  hearing  on  the  request  for 
Interim  Measures  as  soon  as  it  has  a 
quorum.  My  Government  earnestly  hopes 
that  the  Court  will  issue  an  Order  indicat- 
ing appropriate  interim  measures  within 
days.  As  the  Secretary-General  of  the 
United  Nations  has  informed  the  Security 
Council,  the  present  crisis  constitutes  a 
serious  threat  to  international  peace  and 
security. 

May  I  further  respectfully  suggest  that 
you,  as  President  of  the  Court,  im- 
mediately request  the  Government  of  Iran 
to  ensure  that  no  steps  are  taken  to  inflame 
opinion  against  the  hostages,  to  heighten 
the  danger  to  which  they  are  exposed,  or  to 
place  them  on  trial. 

I  have  designated  the  Legal  Adviser  of 
the  United  States  Department  of  State,  the 
Honorable  Roberts  B.  Owen,  as  Agent  of 
the  United  States  in  this  case. 

Sincerely 

Cyrus  Vance 

Sir  Humphrey  Waldock, 
President, 

International  Court  of  Justice, 
The  Hague. 


APPLICATION  TO  THE  COURT 


Sir, 

I  have  the  honor  to  refer  to  the  follow- 
ing; 

(1)  the  Vienna  Convention  on  Diploma- 
tic Relations  of  1961,  and  Article  I  of  the 
Optional  Protocol  Concerning  the  Compul- 
sory Settlement  of  Disputes  of  that  Conven- 
tion; 

(2)  the  Vienna  Convention  on  Consular 
Relations  of  1963,  and  Article  I  of  the  Op- 
tional Protocol  Concerning  the  Compulsory 
Settlement  of  Disputes  of  that  Convention; 

(3)  Article  XXI{2)  of  the  Treaty  of 
Amity,  Economic  Relations,  and  Consular 
Rights  between  the  United  States  of 
America  and  Iran  of  1955,  and 

(4)  Article  13(1)  of  the  Convention  on 
the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  Crimes 
Against  Internationally  Protected  Persons, 
including  Diplomatic  Agents,  of  1973. 

Under  the  jurisdiction  thereby  conferred 
upon  the  Court,  I  hereby  submit,  in  accord- 
ance with  Article  40(1)  of  the  Statute  and 
Article  38  of  the  Rules  of  Court,  this  appli- 
cation instituting  proceedings  in  the  name  of 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  against  the  Government  of  Iran  in 
the  following  case; 


38 


I.  Statement  of  Facts 

At  about  10:30  a.m.,  Tehran  time,  on 
November  4,  1979,  during  the  course  of  a 
demonstration  of  approximately  3,000  per- 
sons, the  United  States  Embassy  compound 
in  Tehran  was  overrun  by  several  hundred 
of  the  demonstrators.  The  Iranian  Govern- 
ment's security  personnel  on  duty  at  the 
Embassy  compound  apparently  made  no  ef- 
fort to  deter  or  discourage  the  dem- 
onstrators from  the  takeover.  Access  to 
the  compound  and  Chancery  building  was 
gained  by  cutting  chains  and  removing  bars 
from  a  Chancery  basement  window,  and  con- 
trol of  the  first  floor  of  the  Chancery  was 
rapidly  seized.  In  the  process  the  invaders 
took  hostage  the  Embassy  security  officer, 
who  had  come  out  of  the  Chancery  to 
negotiate  with  them,  and  four  of  the  Em- 
bassy's Marine  guards.  A  large  group  of 
Embassy  personnel,  including  consular  and 
non-American  staff  and  visitors,  took  refuge 
on  an  upper  floor  of  the  Chancery. 

About  two  hours  after  the  beginning  of 
the  attack,  and  after  the  invaders  had  at- 
tempted to  set  fire  to  the  Chancery  building 
and  to  cut  through  the  upstairs  steel  doors 
with  a  torch,  the  demonstrators  gained 
entry  to  the  upper  floor  and  seized  the  re- 
maining personnel. 

During  the  two  hours  of  attack  on  the 
Embassy,  no  Iranian  security  forces  were 
sent  to  relieve  the  situation,  despite  re- 
peated calls  for  help  from  the  Embassy  to 
the  Iranian  Foreign  Ministry,  and  despite 
the  efforts  of  the  United  States  Charge 
d' Affaires,  who  made  contact  with  the  Prime 
Minister's  office  and  Foreign  Ministry  offi- 
cials at  the  time  the  attack  occurred.  No  at- 
tempt was  made  by  the  Government  of  Iran 
to  clear  the  Embassy  premises,  to  rescue 
the  personnel  held  hostage,  or  to  persuade 
the  invaders  and  demonstrators  to  termi- 
nate their  action.  Nor  did  the  Government  of 
Iran  take  any  action  when,  shortly  after  the 
Embassy  seizure,  the  U.S.  consulates  in 
Tabriz  and  Shiraz  were  also  seized. 

Since  the  time  of  the  takeover,  the  Em- 
bassy personnel  have  been  held  hostage  in 
the  compound  under  threatening  and  in- 
humane conditions.  Some  hostages  have 
been  paraded  in  sight  of  the  crowd  outside, 
blindfolded  and  hands  bound,  in  full  hearing 
of  menacing,  chanting'crowds.  Inside  the 
buildings  the  hostages  have  been  kept 
bound,  often  by  hand  and  foot,  forced  to  re- 
main silent,  subjected  to  other  forms  of 
coercion,  and  denied  communication  with 
their  families  and  U.S.  officials.  Embassy 
records  have  been  ransacked. 

During  the  entire  time  and  with  the 
support  and  assistance  of  the  Iranian  au- 
thorities, demonstrations  have  been  occur- 
ring outside  the  compound,  often  quite  vo- 
ciferous. A  crowd  of  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  demonstrators  converged  on  the  Em- 
bassy on  November  22. 

Those  holding  the  hostages  have  refused 
to  release  them  and  have  conditioned  their 
release  on  various  unacceptable  demands. 
They  have  threatened  on  several  occasions 
that,  in  certain  circumstances,  the  hostages 
would  be  put  to  death.  While  13  hostages 
were  released  on  November  18  and  20,  at 


least  50  Americans  remain  in  captivity,  vi^ 
tually  all  of  whom  are  diplomatic  agents  of 
the  United  States  or  members  of  the  ad- 
ministrative and  technical  staff  of  the  Em- 
bassy. The  group  holding  the  Embassy  has 
asserted  that  the  remaining  hostages  are 
guilty  of  espionage  and  will  be  tried  for  theii 
"crimes"  if  their  demands  are  not  met. 
Non- Iranian  outside  observers  have  been 
permitted  only  limited  access  to  the  hos- 
tages. It  is  not  certain  that  all  persons  held 
have  been  seen,  and  the  conditions  during 
these  few  visits  did  not  permit  free  com- 
munication with  the  hostages. 

During  this  continuing  ordeal,  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Iran  is  failing  and  refusing  to 
make  any  effort  to  secure  the  release  of  thi 
hostages  and  the  return  of  the  Embassy  am 
consular  premises  to  the  United  States'  con 
trol.  The  Government  has  refused  any  direc 
substantive  contact  with  United  States  Gov 
ernment  officials  in  Tehran  or  at  the  Unite 
Nations.  It  refused  to  admit  the  special 
emissaries  sent  to  Iran  by  the  Government 
of  the  United  States.  The  United  States 
Charge  d'Affaires,  who  was  at  the  Foreign 
Ministry  at  the  time  the  attack  began,  has 
been  confined  to  the  Foreign  Ministry  and 
denied  free  access  both  to  his  diplomatic 
colleagues  from  other  Embassies  and  to 
senior  Iranian  officials. 

Moreover,  the  Government  of  Iran, 
from  an  early  stage  of  the  crisis,  has  givei 
direct  support  and  encouragement  to  the 
group  holding  the  Embassy.  Members  of 
that  group  have  been  permitted  to  come  ar 
go  freely  from  the  compound.  The  Govern 
ment  of  Iran  has  refused  or  ignored  the  re 
peated  requests  of  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  to  free  the  hostages  and  tor 
store  the  Embassy  compound  to  the  posses- 
sion of  the  United  States.  The  Governmer 
of  Iran  has  supported  the  demands  of  thoi 
holding  the  hostages,  has  endorsed  the 
charges  of  espionage  leveled  against  Em- 
bassy personnel,  and  has  threatened  to  pla 
the  personnel  on  trial  for  espionage. 

II.  The  Jurisdiction  of  the  Court 

Under  Paragraph  1  of  Article  36  ot  tl 
Statute  of  the  Court,  the  jurisdiction  of  tl 
Court  encompasses  "all  matters  specially 
provided  for  .  .  .  in  treaties  and  conventioi 
in  force."  The  United  States  and  Iran  are, 
members  of  the  United  Nations,  parties  t 
the  Statute,  and  are  also  parties  to  three  i 
ternational  conventions,  each  of  which  ind 
pendently  establishes  the  Court's  jurisdic 
tion  over  the  present  dispute. 

First,  the  United  States  and  Iran  are 
parties  to  the  Vienna  Convention  on  Dipli 
matic  Relations  (done  at  Vienna,  April  18 
1961)  and  to  its  Optional  Protocol  Conceri 
ing  the  Compulsory  Settlement  of  Disputi 
As  set  forth  separately  in  this  application 
the  actions  of  Iran  bearing  on  this  dispute 
constitute  multiple  and  profound  violatior 
of  that  Convention.  Article  I  of  the  ProtO! 
provides; 

"Disputes  arising  out  of  the  interpret 
tion  or  application  of  the  Convention  shall 
within  the  compulsory  jurisdiction  of  the  1 
ternational  Court  of  Justice  and  may  ac- 
cordingly be  brought  before  the  Court  by 

Department  of  State  Bullc 


Middle  East 


i.  :iti(in  made  by  any  party  to  the  dispute 
L'  ;i  I'arty  to  the  present  Protocol." 

nd,  the  United  States  and  Iran  are 
(I  the  Vienna  Convention  on  Con- 
'  lations  (done  at  Vienna,  April  24, 
1 1  to  its  Optional  Protocol  Concern- 
I  ompulsory  Settlement  of  Disputes. 
:  il,    1  of  that  Protocol  is  identical  in  its 
ll^  Id  Article  I  of  the  Protocol  to  the 
cveiition  on  Diplomatic  Relations, 
•n.*  The  present  dispute  involves 
erous  violations  of  the  Consular  Con- 
ion. 

Finally,  the  United  States  and  Iran  are 
ies  to  the  Treaty  of  Amity,  Economic 
itions,  and  Consular  Rights  between  the 
;ed  States  and  Iran,  signed  in  Tehran  on 
ust  15,  1955  (284  U.N.T.S.  93).  As  set 
1  below,  numerous  and  serious  violations 
is  treaty  are  also  involved  in  the  pres- 
lispute.  Article  XXI,  Paragraph  2  of  the 
ty  provides: 

"Any  dispute  between  the  High  Con- 
.ing  Parties  as  to  the  interpretation  or 
cation  of  the  present  Treaty,  not  satis- 
jrily  adjusted  by  diplomacy,  shall  be 
nitted  to  the  International  Court  of  Jus- 
unless  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
16  to  settlement  by  some  other  pacific 
ns." 

;  a  dispute  exists  between  the  United 
es  and  Iran  is  clear.  The  present  dispute 
not  been  satisfactorily  adjusted  by  dip- 
icy,  Iran  is  continuing  in  its  violations, 
Iran  has  refused  to  discuss  pacific 
lament  of  the  dispute. 
In  addition  to  the  foregoing,  the  United 
es  and  Iran  are  parties  to  the  Conven- 
on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of 
les  Against  Internationally  Protected 
ons,  Including  Diplomatic  Agents  (done 
ew  York,  December  14,  1973).  Serious 
itions  of  this  Convention  are  also  in- 
ed  in  the  present  dispute.  Article  13, 
.graph  1  of  the  Convention  provides: 

"Any  dispute  between  two  or  more 
es  Parties  concerning  the  interpretation 
jplication  of  this  Convention  which  is 
settled  by  negotiations  shall,  at  the  re- 
t  of  one  of  them,  be  submitted  to  arbi- 
on.  If  within  six  months  from  the  date  of 
•equest  for  arbitration  the  parties  are 
le  to  agree  on  the  organization  of  the 
tration,  any  one  of  them  may  refer  the 
ute  to  the  International  Court  of  Justice 
quest  in  conformity  with  the  Statute  of 
Court." 

ght  of  the  urgency  of  rectifying  the 
lent  violations  of  the  Convention  and 

s  refusal  to  meet  with  United  States 
isaries  on  the  subject,  which  renders 
■acticable  and  infeasible  any  prior  resort 
•bitration,  it  is  submitted  that  the  Court 
impetent  to  hear  the  United  States' 
ns  under  this  Convention  in  connection 

its  other  claims. 

The  Claims  of  the  United  States 

The  Government  of  the  United  States, 
ibmitting  the  dispute  to  the  Court, 
ns  as  follows: 


(a)  Pursuant  to  Article  29  of  the  Vienna 
Convention  on  Diplomatic  Relations,  the 
Government  of  Iran  is  under  an  interna- 
tional legal  obligation  to  the  United  States 
to  ensure  that  the  persons  of  United  States 
diplomatic  agents  be  kept  inviolate  from 
"any  form  of  arrest  or  detention"  and  that 
every  such  diplomatic  agent  shall  be  treated 
"with  due  respect"  and  protected  from  "any 
attack  on  his  person,  freedom,  or  dignity." 
The  Government  of  Iran  has  violated  and  is 
currently  violating  the  foregoing  obliga- 
tions. 

(b)  Pursuant  to  Article  37  of  the  same 
Convention,  the  Government  of  Iran  is 
under  an  international  legal  obligation  to  the 
United  States  to  ensure  that  members  of  the 
administrative  and  technical  staff  of  the 
United  States  Embassy  in  Tehran,  and 
members  of  the  families  of  United  States 
diplomatic  agents  and  of  administrative  and 
technical  staff,  enjoy  the  relevant  privileges 
and  immunities  specified  in  Article  29  of  the 
Convention.  The  Government  of  Iran  has 
violated  and  is  currently  violating  the 
foregoing  obligations. 

(c)  Pursuant  to  Article  31  of  the  same 
Convention,  the  Government  of  Iran  is 
under  an  international  legal  obligation  to 
the  United  States  to  ensure  that  its  diplo- 
matic agents  shall  be  absolutely  immune 
"from  the  criminal  jurisdiction"  of  Iran  and 
that,  under  Articles  31  and  37  of  the  Con- 
vention, such  immunity  is  accorded  to 
members  of  the  administrative  and  techni- 
cal staff  of  the  United  States  Embassy  as 
well  as  to  the  families  of  diplomatic  agents 
and  of  administrative  and  technical  staff. 
By  its  threats  of  prosecution,  the  Govern- 
ment of  Iran  has  violated  and  is  currently 
violating  the  foregoing  obligations. 

(d)  Pursuant  to  Article  22  of  the  same 
Convention,  the  Government  of  Iran  is 
under  an  international  legal  obligation  to 
the  United  States  to  ensure  that  United 
States  diplomatic  premises  in  Iran  "shall  be 
inviolable."  The  Government  of  Iran  has 
violated  and  is  currently  violating  this  ob- 
ligation. 

(e)  Pursuant  to  Articles  24,  25,  27,  and 
47  of  the  same  Convention,  the  Govern- 
ment of  Iran  is  under  an  international  legal 
obligation  to  the  United  States  to  ensure 
the  inviolability  of  the  archives  and  docu- 
ments of  the  United  States  Embassy  in 
Tehran,  to  accord  full  facilities  for  the 
performance  of  the  functions  of  the  Em- 
bassy, to  permit  and  assist  Embassy  per- 
sonnel to  depart  from  Iran,  and  to  pre- 
clude discrimination  between  States  in  the 
application  of  the  Convention.  The  Gov- 
ernment of  Iran  has  violated  and  is  cur- 
rently violating  the  foregoing  obligations. 

(f)  Pursuant  to  Articles  28,  31,  33,  34, 
36,  and  40  of  the  Vienna  Convention  on 
Consular  Relations,  the  Government  of 
Iran  is  under  an  international  legal  obliga- 
tion to  the  United  States  to  ensure  that  the 
United  States  enjoys  full  facilities  for  the 
performance  of  consular  functions;  that 
United  States  consular  premises,  docu- 
ments, and  archives  are  kept  inviolate;  that 
the  consular  personnel  of  the  United  States 
shall  enjoy  freedom  of  movement  and 
travel  in  Iran;  that  such  personnel  shall 


enjoy  the  right  to  communicate  and  contact 
other  United  States  nationals;  that  the  con- 
sular personnel  of  the  United  States  be 
treated  with  respect  and  protected  from  at- 
tack on  their  persons,  freedom,  and  dig- 
nity; and  that  United  States  consular  offi- 
cers be  free  from  arrest  or  detention.  The 
Government  of  Iran  has  violated  and  is  cur- 
rently violating  the  foregoing  obligations. 

(g)  Pursuant  to  Article  4  of  the  Con- 
vention on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment 
of  Crimes  Against  Internationally  pro- 
tected Persons,  Including  Diplomatic 
Agents,  the  Government  of  Iran  is  under 
an  international  legal  obligation  to  the 
United  States  to  cooperate  in  the  preven- 
tion of  crimes  against  the  official  premises 
and  the  staff  of  the  United  States  Embassy 
in  Tehran,  including  an  obligation  to  take 
all  practicable  measures  to  prevent  prep- 
arations in  its  territory  for  the  commission 
of  such  crimes.  The  Government  of  Iran  has 
violated  and  is  currently  violating  the 
foregoing  obligations. 

(h)  Pursuant  to  Article  7  of  the  Con- 
vention on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment 
of  Crimes  Against  Internationally  Pro- 
tected Persons,  Including  Diplomatic 
Agents,  the  Government  of  Iran  is  under 
an  international  legal  obligation  to  the 
United  States  to  submit  to  competent  Ira- 
nian authorities  for  the  purpose  of  prosecu- 
tion all  those  persons  who,  since  November 
4,  1979,  have  been  engaged  in  committing 
crimes  against  the  official  premises  and  the 
staff  of  the  United  States  Embassy  in 
Tehran.  The  Government  of  Iran  has  vio- 
lated and  is  currently  violating  the  forego- 
ing obligation. 

(i)  Pursuant  to  Articles  11(4)  and  XIX 
of  the  Treaty  of  Amity,  Economic  Rela- 
tions, and  Consular  Rights  between  the 
United  States  and  Iran,  the  Government  of 
Iran  is  under  international  legal  obligation 
to  the  United  States  to  ensure  that  nation- 
als of  the  United  States  shall  receive  "the 
most  constant  protection  and  security" 
within  the  territory  of  Iran;  that  such  na- 
tionals shall,  if  placed  in  custody,  receive 
reasonable  and  humane  treatment;  that  the 
United  States  shall  have  the  full  opportu- 
nity to  safeguard  the  interests  of  such  de- 
tained nationals;  and  that  such  nationals 
shall,  while  in  custody,  have  full  access  to 
United  States  consular  officials  and  serv- 
ices. The  Government  of  Iran  has  violated 
and  is  currently  violating  the  foregoing  ob- 
ligations. 

(j)  Pursuant  to  Articles  XIII  and 
XVIII  of  the  foregoing  Treaty  of  Amity, 
Economic  Relations,  and  Consular  Rights, 
the  Government  of  Iran  is  under  an  inter- 
national legal  obligation  to  the  United 
States  to  accord  to  United  States  consular 
officers  and  employees  the  privileges  and 
immunities  accorded  to  officers  and  em- 
ployees of  their  rank  and  status  by  general 
international  usage  and,  in  particular,  im- 
munity from  local  jurisdiction  for  acts  done 
in  their  official  capacities  and  within  the 
scope  of  their  authority;  to  accord  to  such 
consular  officers  and  employees  the  oppor- 
tunity to  exercise  all  functions  which  are  in 
accordance  with  general  international 


39 


Middle  East 


usage;  and  to  ensure  that  consular  offices 
are  not  entered  by  the  police  or  other  local 
authorities  except  in  case  of  fire  or  other 
disaster.  The  Government  of  Iran  has  vio- 
lated and  is  currently  violating  the  forego- 
ing obligations. 

(k)  The  Government  of  Iran,  or  persons 
acting  with  its  support  and  approval,  are 
holding  United  States  citizens  as  hostages 
and  are  threatening  the  lives  of  these  hos- 
tages in  order  to  coerce  the  United  States 
into  taking  actions  which  the  United  States 
has  no  international  legal  obligation  to 
take.  This  exercise  of  coercion  is  in  viola- 
tion of  Iran's  obligations  under  the  Charter 
of  the  United  Nations,  particularly  Article 
2,  paragraphs  3  and  4,  and  Article  33. 

(1)  The  Government  of  Iran  is  under  an 
international  legal  obligation  to  the  United 
States  to  respect  and  observe,  and  ensure 
respect  for  and  observance  of,  the  obliga- 
tions of  Iran  under  customary  international 
law  to  ensure  the  immunities  of  the  diplo- 
mats and  staff  of  the  United  States  Em- 
bassy in  Tehran,  the  inviolability  of  its 
Embassy,  and  the  protection  of  its  nation- 
als. The  Government  of  Iran  has  violated 
and  is  currently  violating  the  foregoing  ob- 
ligations. 

IV.  Judgment  Requested 

Accordingly,  the  United  States  re- 
quests the  Court  to  adjudge  and  declare  as 
follows: 

(a)  That  the  Government  of  Iran,  in 
tolerating,  encouraging,  and  failing  to  pre- 
vent and  punish  the  conduct  described  in 
the  preceding  Statement  of  Facts,  violated 
its  international  legal  obligations  to  the 
United  States  as  provided  by 

•  Articles  22,  24,  25,  27,  29,  31,  37  and 
47  of  the  Vienna  Convention  on  Diplomatic 
Relations, 

•  Articles  28,  31,  33,  34,  36,  and  40  of 
the  Vienna  Convention  on  Consular  Rela- 
tions, 

•  Articles  4  and  7  of  the  Convention  on 
the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  Crimes 
Against  Internationally  Protected  Persons, 
Including  Diplomatic  Agents,  and 

•  Articles  11(4),  XIII,  XVIII,  and  XIX 
of  the  Treaty  of  Amity,  Economic  Relations 
and  Consular  Rights  Between  the  United 
States  and  Iran,  and 

•  Articles  2(3),  2(4),  and  33  of  the 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations; 

(b)  That  pursuant  to  the  foregoing  in- 
ternational legal  obligations,  the  Govern- 
ment of  Iran  is  under  a  particular  obliga- 
tion immediately  to  secure  the  release  of  all 
United  States  nationals  currently  being  de- 
tained within  the  premises  of  the  United 
States  Embassy  in  Tehran  and  to  assure 
that  all  such  persons  and  all  other  United 
States  nationals  in  Tehran  are  allowed  to 
leave  Iran  safely; 

(c)  That  the  Government  of  Iran  shall 
pay  to  the  United  States,  in  its  own  right 
and  in  the  exercise  of  its  right  of  diplomatic 
protection  of  its  nationals,  reparation  for 
the  foregoing  violations  of  Iran's  interna- 
tional legal  obligations  to  the  United 


40 


States,  in  a  sum  to  be  determined  by  the 
Court;  and 

(d)  That  the  Government  of  Iran  sub- 
mit to  its  competent  authorities  for  the 
purpose  of  prosecution  those  persons  re- 
sponsible for  the  crimes  committed  against 
the  premises  and  staff  of  the  United  States 
Embassy  and  against  the  premises  of  its 
Consulates. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States 
further  requests  the  Court  to  indicate 
interim  measures  of  protection  as  set  forth 
in  a  separate  request  filed  concurrently 
with  this  Application. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States 
has  designated  the  undersigned  as  its 
Agent  for  the  purposes  of  these  proceed- 
ings. All  communications  relating  to  this 
case  should  be  sent  to  the  Embassy  of  the 
United  States,  The  Hague.  Lange  Voor- 
hout  102. 

Respectfully  submitted, 

Roberts  B.  Owen 
The  Legal  Adviser 

The  Registrar, 

International  Court  of  Justice, 
The  Hague. 

APPENDED  STATEMENT 

I,  David  D.  Newsom,  certify  and  de- 
clare the  following: 

1.  I  am  Under  Secretary  for  Political 
Affairs  of  the  United  States  Department  of 
State.  I  have  been  vested  by  the  Secretary 
of  State  with  overall  responsibility  within 
the  Department  for  matters  relating  to  the 
crisis  in  Iran. 

2.  In  this  capacity,  I  have  closely  moni- 
tored events  since  the  attack  on  the  United 
States  Embassy  in  Tehran  began.  The  facts 
stated  in  the  Application  of  the  United 
States  to  the  Court  are,  to  the  best  of  my 
knowledge,  true. 

David  N.  Newsom 


REQUEST  FOR  INTERIM 
MEASURES  OF  PROTECTION 

The  Registrar 

International  Court  of  Justice 

Sir, 

1.  I  have  the  honor  to  refer  to  the  Ap- 
plication submitted  to  the  Court  this  day 
instituting  proceedings  in  the  name  of  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  against  the  Government  of  Iran 
and  to  submit,  in  accordance  with  Article 
41  of  the  Statute  of  the  Court  and  Articles 
73,  74  and  75  of  the  Rules  of  Court,  an  ur- 
gent request  that  the  Court  indicate  provi- 
sional measures  which  ought  to  be  taken 
promptly  to  preserve  the  rights  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States. 


2.  The  compelling  reasons  for  tjiis  re- 
quest are  set  out  in  the  Statement  of  Facts 
of  the  Application  of  the  United  States  to 
the  Court.  The  facts  set  forth  therein  have 
been  verified  in  the  appended  statement  of 
David  D.  Newsom,  Under  Secretary  for 
Political  Affairs  of  the  United  States  D.- 
partment  of  State.  The  premises  of  the 
Embassy  and  Consulate  of  the  United 
States  in  Tehran  have  been  invaded  by 
large  numbers  of  persons  acting  with  the 
support  and  under  the  apparent  authority 
of  the  Government  of  Iran,  and  remain  oc- 
cupied without  the  authorization  of  the 
United  States.  At  least  fifty  United  States  Ij 
citizens,  virtually  all  of  whom  are  diploma-  j 
tic  agents  or  administrative  and  technical    | 
staff  of  the  Embassy,  are  being  held  hos- 
tage. The  conditions  of  their  detention  are 
harsh,  demeaning,  dangerous  and  in  fla-      L 
grant  violation  of  international  law.  The      j 
Iranian  authorities  have  stated  that  the       |< 
hostages  will  be  kept  until  the  United  j^ 
States  complies  with  various  demands.  The  i 
Government  of  Iran  has  also  threatened  to  u 
submit  the  hostages  to  criminal  trial  and     [, 
punishment,  despite  their  entitlement  to     jr 
diplomatic  and  other  immunities.  The          E 
Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations    i 
has  convoked  the  United  Nations  Security  (j 
Council  because  of  this  "grave  situation",    jj 
In  exercise  of  his  exceptional  powers  undei  ■ 
Article  99  of  the  United  Nations  Charter, 
he  has  informed  the  Security  Council  that 
"the  present  crisis  poses  a  serious  thre;ii 
international  peace  and  security". 

3.  The  Government  of  the  United 
States  submits  that  the  interim  measuii- 
of  protection  requested  are  urgently 
needed  to  preserve  the  rights  of  the  Unib 
States.  The  United  States  in  its  Applirii 
tion  primarily  requests  the  Court  to  ad 
judge  and  declare  that  Iran  shall  relea>. 
immediately  and  permit  to  depart  from 
Iran  immediately  all  hostages  and  other 
members  of  the  Embassy  of  the  United 
States  who  are  not  of  Iranian  nationality, 
shall  restore  to  the  United  States  its  em- 
bassy premises,  shall  be  held  in  violation  ( 
multiple  international  legal  obligations,  ar 
shall  pay  to  the  United  States  reparation! 
for  numerous  grave  violations  of  the  Intel 
national  legal  rights  of  the  United  States. 
Interim  measures  of  protection  are  re- 
quired to  preserve  the  following  rights  of 
the  United  States:  the  rights  of  its  nation  |  ^ 
als  to  life,  liberty,  protection  and  securitj 
the  rights  of  inviolability,  immunity  and 
protection  for  its  diplomatic  and  consular 
officials;  and  the  rights  of  inviolability  an 
protection  for  its  diplomatic  and  consul:ir 
premises.  The  Court  can  grant  and  Iran  ci  i 
execute  a  decision  providing  effective  anclf 
meaningful  redress  only  if  the  lives  and 
physical  and  emotional  well-being  of  the 
hostages  are  preserved.  In  the  volatih'  ri 
cumstances  existing  in  Tehran,  the  ho^ 
tages  are,  to  an  anguishing  degree,  in  coi 
tinuing  jeopardy;  their  situation  could 
sharply  deteriorate  at  any  moment.  In  th 
absence  of  effective  measures  of  protec 
tion,  a  tragedy  of  an  irreparable  kind  cmi 
result.  It  is  these  possible  consequence.';  « 
the  Court's  not  indicating  provisional 
measures  that  so  urgently  impel  the  Ifnit 
States  to  request  them. 

Department  of  State  Bulle 


Middle  East 


;    Moreover,  the  Government  of  the 
i.il  States  submits  that  the  urgent  need 
III  I  iim  measures  of  protection  is  rein- 
.  .!  iiy  the  dangers  to  the  fabric  of  dip- 
ii  I.   relations  and  international  law 
!  li  ;iie  posed  by  the  continued  detention 
m!|im1  States  diplomatic  personnel. 
i  i\'  that  this  condition  continues 
ri-eparable  damage  to  principles  of 
ticinal  law  and  the  fundamentals  of 
.jiiiiiatic  relations.  Indeed,  recent  events 
itli.-r  countries  demonstrate  that  eon- 
jation  of  this  situation  in  Tehran  pre- 
,s  a  clear  and  present  danger  to  the 
ty  of  the  diplomatic  community  at 
e.  Moreover,  should  the  Government  of 
1  proceed  to  implement  a  possible 
•se  of  action  which  it  has  threatened, 
ely,  to  place  diplomats  on  trial  for  al- 
:d  criminal  acts  of  espionage,  the  prin- 
BS  of  international  law  and  the  funda- 
tals  of  diplomatic  relations  will  have 
1  irreparably  damaged.  No  judgment  of 
Court  will  be  able  to  undo  the  taking  of 
awless  and  e.xtraordinary  a  step. 

5.  In  view  of  the  considerations  re- 
ed to  in  the  foregoing  paragraphs  and 
le  Application  of  the  United  States,  I 
lectfully  request,  on  behalf  of  the  Gov- 
nent  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
;,  pending  final  judgment  in  this  suit. 
Court  indicate  forthwith  the  following; 

(a)  That  the  Government  of  Iran  im- 
liately  release  all  hostages  of  United 
;es  nationality  and  facilitate  the  prompt 
safe  departure  from  Iran  of  these  per- 
and  all  other  United  States  officials  in 
ified  and  humane  circumstances. 
^  (b)  That  the  Government  of  Iran  im- 
nrtliately  clear  the  premises  of  the  United 
Sites  Embassy,  Chancery  and  Consulate 
)i  11  persons  whose  presence  is  not  au- 
tl  rized  by  the  United  States  Charge 
d  ffaires  in  Iran,  and  restore  the  premises 
U  'nited  States  control. 

(c)  That  the  Government  of  Iran  ensure 
t  t  all  persons  attached  to  the  United 

:  tes  Embassy  and  Consulate  should  be 

a  5rded,  and  protected  in,  full  freedom 

V  bin  the  Embassy  and  Chancery  prem- 

i  ;,  and  the  freedom  of  movement  within 

I  n  necessary  to  carry  out  their  diplomatic 

a  consular  functions. 

(d)  That  the  Government  of  Iran  not 
(  :e  on  trial  any  person  attached  to  the 
1  bassy  and  Consulate  of  the  United 

:   tes  and  refrain  from  any  action  to  im- 
I  ment  any  such  trial. 

(e)  That  the  Government  of  Iran  en- 
s  e  that  no  action  is  taken  which  might 

fjudice  the  rights  of  the  United  States  in 
pect  of  the  carrying  out  of  any  decision 
ich  the  Court  may  render  on  the  merits, 
|l  in  particular  neither  take  nor  permit 
(ion  that  would  threaten  the  lives, 
ety,  or  well-being  of  the  hostages. 

6.  In  view  of  the  gravity  of  the  current 

riation  caused  by  the  actions  taken  and 
eatened  by  the  Government  of  Iran  and 
persons  acting  under  its  authority  or 
;h  its  support,  the  Government  of  the 
ited  States  urges  that  this  request  be 
Jated  as  a  matter  of  e.xtreme  urgency.  In 
t^s  connection,  the  attention  of  the  Court 


is  invited  to  the  letter  from  the  Secretary 
of  State  of  the  United  States  to  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Court,  a  copy  of  which  is  at- 
tached, which  is  submitted  in  conformity 
with  Article  74,  paragraph  4,  of  the  rules  of 
the  Court.  In  view  of  the  e.xtreme  urgency 
of  the  case,  the  United  States  further  re- 
spectfully requests  that  the  Court  set  a 
hearing  on  this  request  at  the  earliest  pos- 
sible date. 

7.  The  undersigned  is  authorized  by 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  to  appear  before  the  Court  in  any 
proceedings  or  hearings  relating  to  this  re- 
quest which  the  Court  may  convene  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  terms  of  Article  74, 
paragraph  3  of  the  Rules  of  the  Court. 

Roberts  B.  Owen 

Agent  for  the  Government  of  the 

United  States  of  America 


RESPONSE  FROM  THE  ICJ, 
NOV.  30,  19792 

The  Registrar  of  the  International 
Court  of  Justice  has  sent  on  November 
30,  1979,  the  following  communication 
to  Roberts  B.  Owen,  the  Legal  Adviser 
of  the  State  Department,  who  is  repre- 
senting the  United  States  in  the  case 
the  United  States  has  brought  against 
Iran  before  the  Court: 

I  have  the  honor  to  refer  to  the  Appli- 
cation of  the  United  States  of  America,  in- 
stituting proceedings  against  Iran  on  29 
November  and  to  simultaneous  request 
filed  by  the  United  States  for  indication  of 
provisional  measures.  The  President  di- 
rects me  to  express  his  hope  that  the  two 
governments  concerned  will  take  into  ac- 
count the  fact  that  the  matter  is  now  siih 
jiidice  before  the  International  Court.  This 
being  so  the  President,  in  conformity  with 
Article  74,  paragraph  4,  of  the  Rules  of 
Court,  draws  the  attention  of  both  parties 
to  the  need  to  act  in  such  a  way  as  will  en- 
able any  order  the  Court  may  make  on  the 
request  for  provisional  measures  to  have 
its  appropriate  effects.  A  similar  communi- 
cation addressed  today  to  Government  of 
Iran.  Court  will  hold  public  hearings  at  an 
early  date  to  afford  parties  the  opportunity 
of  presenting  their  observations  on  request 
for  interim  measures.  Projected  date  and 
time  for  such  hearings  is  Monday,  10  De- 
cember, at  3  p.m. 

The  provisional  measures  which 
the  United  States  has  requested  and  to 
which  the  Registrar  referred  were  as 
follows: 


(a)  That  the  Government  of  Iran  im- 
mediately release  all  hostages  of  United 
States  nationality  and  facilitate  the  prompt 
and  safe  departure  from  Iran  of  these  per- 
sons and  all  other  United  States  officials  in 
dignified  and  humane  circumstances. 

(b)  That  the  Government  of  Iran  im- 
mediately clear  the  premises  of  the  United 
States  Embassy,  Chancery  and  Consulate 
of  all  persons  whose  presence  is  not  au- 
thorized by  the  United  States  Charge 
d'Affaires  in  Iran,  and  restore  the  premises 
to  United  States  control. 

(c)  That  the  Government  of  Iran  ensure 
that  all  persons  attached  to  the  United 
States  Embassy  and  Consulate  should  be 
accorded,  and  protected  in,  full  freedom 
within  the  Embassy  and  Chancery  prem- 
ises, and  the  freedom  of  movement  within 
Iran  necessary  to  carry  out  their  diplomatic 
and  consular  functions. 

(d)  That  the  Government  of  Iran  not 
place  on  trial  any  person  attached  to  the 
Embassy  and  Consulate  of  the  United 
States  and  refrain  from  any  action  to  im- 
plement any  such  trial. 

(e)  That  the  Government  of  Iran  en- 
sure that  no  action  is  taken  which  might 
prejudice  the  rights  of  the  United  States  in 
respect  of  the  carrying  out  of  any  decision 
which  the  Court  may  render  on  the  merits, 
and  in  particular  neither  take  nor  permit 
action  that  would  threaten  the  lives, 
safety,  or  well-being  of  the  hostages. 

The  United  States  welcomes  the 
action  of  the  President  of  the  Interna- 
tional Court  of  Justice  and  urges  that 
the  hearing  take  place  at  the  earliest 
feasible  time.  ■ 


'  Press  release  311. 

*Articles  II  and  III  of  the  Protocols  to 
the  Vienna  Conventions  on  Diplomatic  and 
Consular  Relations  both  provide  that  the 
parties  may  agree  on  alternate 
procedures — arbitration  or  conciliation — in 
lieu  of  proceeding  directly  to  this  Court. 
No  such  agreements  have  been  made.  In- 
deed, the  Iranian  authorities  have  refused 
to  discuss  the  dispute — still  less  modes  of 
settlement  of  it— with  United  States  emis- 
saries. The  terms  of  the  preambles  to  both 
Protocols  demonstrate  the  intent  of  the 
protocols  to  make  recourse  to  the  Court 
unconditional  and  not  dependent  upon  joint 
pursuit  by  the  parties  of  the  options  of  ar- 
bitration or  conciliation.  They  provide  that; 
"expressing  their  ivisli  to  resort  in  nil 
matters  concerning  them  in  respect  of  any 
dispute  arising  out  of  the  interpretation  or 
application  of  the  Convention  to  the  com- 
pulsory jurisdiction  of  the  International 
Court  of  Justice,  unless  some  other  form  of 
settlement  has  been  agreed  upon  by  the 
parties  ivithin  a  reasonable  period  .  .  .  ." 
(Emphasis  supplied.)  [Text  in  Original.] 

*Press  release  313. 


inuary  1980 


41 


Middle  East 


U.S.  Embassy 
Marine  Security 
Guards 


Marine  security  guards  have  a  long 
and  proud  tradition  of  providing  secu- 
rity guard  coverage  at  U.S.  Embassies 
and  Consulates  abroad. 

Shortly  after  World  War  II,  the 
Department  of  State  recognized  a  need 
for  a  guard  force  of  young,  alert,  well- 
trained,  and  highly  disciplined  Ameri- 
can military  personnel  to  man  its  Em- 
bassies and  Consulates.  The  evolution 
of  the  present-day  Marine  Security 
Guard  Battalion,  based  at  Quantico, 
Va.,  began  in  1947.  In  that  year,  a  pro- 
posal was  made  that  the  Dej^artment  of 
War  furnish  Marine  Corps  personnel 
for  Foreign  Service  guard  duty  under 
the  provisions  of  the  Foreign  Service 
Act  of  1946.  Two  years  later,  on  Jan. 
28,  1949,  the  first  Marines  departed 
Washington,  D.C.,  for  their  assign- 
ments. 

A  normal  tour  for  Marine  security 
guards  is  30  months,  broken  into  two 
15-month  tours  at  different  posts.  Usu- 
ally, a  new  Marine  security  guard  will 
be  assigned  to  a  hardship  post  where 
there  are  restricted  recreation  and  so- 
cial activities.  Examples  are  Moscow 
and  Brazzaville  (Congo),  which  are 
12-month  tours.  Tour  length  in  Iran  has 
been  6  months. 

The  largest  detachment  is  in  Paris, 
with  35  Marines.  Other  large  posts  are 
London  (19)  and  Tokyo  (20).  The  small- 
est posts  have  six  Marines,  such  as  the 
one  at  Bridgetown,  Barbados. 

While  on  post.  Marine  security 
guards  are  under  direct  operational 
control  of  the  Chief  of  Diplomatic  Mis- 
sion. The  primary  mission  of  Marine  se- 
curity guards  is  to  provide  protection  of 
classified  and  administratively  con- 
trolled material  and  other  assigned 
U.S.  Government  property  and  person- 
nel. 

In  the  event  of  large-scale  riots  and 
demonstrations  directed  against  U.S. 
diplomatic  installations,  the  role  of  the 
Marine  security  guards  is  twofold:  (1) 
to  delay  entry  of  a  hostile  group  into 
the  installation  long  enough  to  allow  for 
the  destruction  of  classified  material 
and  (2)  to  aid  in  safeguarding  the  lives 
of  American  and  locally  hired  person- 
nel. 

Their  duties,  therefoi'e,  are  defen- 
sive in  nature,  entailing  both  the  pro- 
tection of  classified  information  and  the 
provision  of  an  "in-house"  deterrent  to 
counter  small-scale  acts  of  violence  di- 


I'ected  against  U.S.  personnel  and 
facilities. 

Overall  protection  of  U.S.  Embas- 
sies and  assigned  personnel  is  the  re- 
sponsibility of  the  host  governments. 
This  is  generally  provided  by  national 
police  or  other  paramilitary  organiza- 
tions. The  host  government  is  bound  by 
the  "Vienna  convention"  to  protect  the 
lives  and  property  of  assigned  diplo- 
mats. Contingency  plans  concerning  use 
of  Marine  security  guards  in  a  "delay- 
ing action"  presuppose  that  the  host 
government  will  honor  its  obligations. 
Marine  security  guards  are  not  in- 
tended to  be  a  fighting  force  ready  and 
able  to  engage  a  hostile  population  in 
pitched  battle. 

There  are  presently  about  1,100 
Marine  security  guards  on  duty.  They 
man  118  posts  in  105  countries  around 
the  world.  There  are  15  women  serving 
with  the  Marine  security  guards,  who 
are  part  of  a  pilot  program.  No  more 
women  will  be  admitted  to  the  program 
until  it  has  been  evaluated.  They  are 
serving  at  Kingston,  Jamaica;  Seoul, 
Korea;  Belgrade,  Yugoslavia;  Amman, 
Jordan:  Quito,  Ecuador;  and  Karachi, 
Pakistan.  ■ 


International  Court 
of  Justice 

The  International  Court  of  Justice 
(ICJ)  is  the  principal  judicial  organ  of 
the  United  Nations.  It  was  created  by 
the  U.N.  Charter  in  1945  as  the  succes- 
sor to  the  Permanent  Court  of  Interna- 
tional Justice.  The  Statute  of  the  ICJ 
forms  an  integral  part  of  the  U.N. 
Charter.  The  Court's  principal  func- 
tions are  to  decide  such  cases  as  are 
submitted  to  it  by  states  and  to  give 
advisory  opinions  on  legal  questions  at 
the  request  of  intergovernmental 
bodies  authorized  pursuant  to  the  Stat- 
ute of  the  Court  and  the  U.N.  Charter. 

The  Court  is  composed  of  15 
judges,  no  two  of  whom  may  be  nation- 
als of  the  same  state,  elected  by  the 
U.N.  General  Assembly  and  the  Secu- 
rity Council,  voting  independently.  The 
electors  are  mandated  to  bear  in  mind 
the  qualifications  of  the  individual  can- 
didates and  the  need  for  the  Court  as  a 
whole  to  represent  the  main  forms  of 
civilization  and  the  principal  legal  sys- 
tems of  the  world.  Members  of  the 
Court  are  elected  for  9  years,  one  third 
of  the  total  number  of  judges  being 
elected  every  3  years. 


The  membership  of  the  Interna- 
tional Court  of  Justice  at  the  present 
time  is  as  follows:  President,  Sir  Hum- 
phrey Waldock  (United  Kingdom); 
Vice  President,  Taslim  Olawale  Elias 
(Nigeria);  and  Judges  Manfred  Lachs 
(Poland),  Isaac  Forster  (Senegal), 
Andre  Gros  (France),  Richard  R.  Bax- 
ter (United  States  of  America),  P.  D. 
Morozov  (Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Re- 
publics), Jose  Sette  Camara  (Brazil), 
Jose  Maria  Ruda  (Argentina), 
Nagendra  Singh  (India),  Abdullah  .\l\ 
El-Erian  (Egypt),  Hermann  Mosler 
(Federal  Republic  of  Germany),  Shig- 
eru  Oda  (Japan),  Salah  El  Dine  Tarazi 
(Syrian  Arab  Republic),  and  Robert 
Ago  (Italy).  ■ 


Situation  in  Iran 


WHITE  HOUSE  ANNOUNCEMENT, 
NOV.  14,  1979 » 

The  President  has  today  acted  to 
block  all  official  Iranian  assets  in  the 
United  States,  including  deposits  in 
U.S.  banks  and  their  foreign  brancht-.- 
and  subsidiaries.  This  order  is  in  re- 
sponse to  reports  that  the  Government 
of  Iran  is  about  to  withdraw  its  funds. 
The  purpose  of  this  order  is  to  insure 
that  claims  on  Iran  by  the  United 
States  and  its  citizens  are  provided  for 
in  an  orderly  manner. 

The  order  does  not  affect  accounts 
of  persons  other  than  the  Government 
of  Iran,  the  Central  Bank  of  Iran,  and 
other  controlled  entities.  The  precise 
amounts  involved  cannot  be  ascertainec 
at  this  time,  but  there  is  no  reason  for 
disturbance  in  the  foreign  exchange  nv 
other  markets. 

The  President  is  taking  this  action 
pursuant  to  the  International  Emer- 
gency Economic  Powers  Act,  which 
grants  the  President  authoi-ity  "to  dea 
with  any  unusual  and  extraordinary 
threat  to  the  national  seeui-ity,  foreign 
policy,  or  economy  of  the  United 
States." 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS. 
NOV.  14,  1979' 

Pursuant  to  Section  204(b)  of  the  In 
ternational  Emergency  Economic  Poweis 
Act,  50  U.S.C.A.  S  1703,  I  hereby  report  t 
the  Congress  that  I  have  today  exercised 
the  authority  granted  by  this  Act  to  block 
certain  property  or  interests  in  property  n 
the  Government  of  Iran,  its  instrumen 


42 


Department  of  State  BuNei 


Middle  East 


;.  -  and  coiitriilled  entities  and  the  Cen- 
K.iiik  of  Iran. 

1     The  circumstances  necessitating  the 
:>  I-,,  (if  this  authority  are  the  recent 
Ml    111  Iran  and  the  recent  actions  of  the 
,  ii  iiment  of  Iran. 
l!    These  events  and  actions  put  at 
'  isk  the  personal  safety  of  United 
itizens  and  the  lawful  claims  of 
:  .States  citizens  and  entities  against 
1  i-i\  I'rnment  of  Iran  and  constitute  an 
ani  ilinary  threat  to  the  national  secu- 
iiiil  foreign  policy  of  the  United 

'    I  iinsequently,  I  have  ordered 
K.mI  all  property  and  interests  in  prop- 
i!  the  Government  of  Iran,  its  in- 

iitalities  and  controlled  entities  and 

1  .  ntral  Bank  of  Iran  which  are  or  be- 
I     iiliject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
till  States  or  which  are  or  come  within 
h  possession  of  persons  subject  to  the 
usiliction  of  the  United  States.  I  have 
a  loi-ized  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to 
nli)y  all  powers  granted  to  me  by  the  In- 
eiational  Emergency  Economic  Powers 
V   til  carry  out  the  blocking. 

4.  Blocking  property  and  property 
.1  rests  of  the  Government  of  Iran,  its  in- 
I  mentalities  and  controlled  entities  and 
I  .  ntral  Bank  of  Iran  will  enable  the 
ii  n  States  to  assure  that  these  re- 
.  i>  will  be  available  to  satisfy  lawful 
111  -  iif  citizens  and  entities  of  the  United 
iti'>  against  the  Government  of  Iran. 

fi.  This  action  is  taken  with  respect  to 
I  I  for  the  reasons  described  in  this  re- 
ii, 

Jimmy  Carter 


WIITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
N  V.  17,  1979^ 

We  welcome  this  announcement 
t    ome  of  the  Americans  held  in  the 
iliiissy  of  Tehran  will  be  released. 

'  aic  thankful  the  ordeal  may  be  over 
tlii'm  and  that  they  may  be  soon  re- 

1  tt'd  with  their  families. 

We  strongly  urge  that  the  au- 

arities  in  Iran  now  move  to  secure 
■  -ale  release  of  all  those  still  being 
'I.  Their  ordeal  is  not  over.  The  U.S. 
■eiriment  will  continue  to  work  in 
•1  \  channel  open  to  it  to  achieve  that 

.'1.' 


RESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
")\  .  17,  1979^ 

As  we  approach  our  traditional  day 
n.itional  Thanksgiving,  the  hearts  of 
Americans  are  heavy  with  concern 
1  lie  safety  of  those  held  ho.stage  in 
;  m. 

We  join  with  people  of  all  faiths 
troughout  the  world  who  adhere  to 
Ijidamental  principles  of  human  rights 
;ld  international  law.  We  are  united 


with  them  in  seeking  an  end  to  acts  of 
terrorism  against  innocent  people. 

On  Thanksgiving  Day  and  during 
the  holiday  weekend,  I  ask  all  Ameri- 
cans to  make  a  special  prayer  at 
chui'ches  and  synagogues  and  places  of 
public  meeting. 

Let  us  seek  God's  guidance  in  our 
search  for  peace  and  human  brother- 
hood and  pray  for  the  safe  return  of 
those  whose  lives  are  threatened.  May 
we  come  with  gratitude  for  our  abun- 
dant blessings  and  humility  before  the 
heavy  burden  of  world  responsibility 
that  our  blessings  and  power  have 
brought. 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
NOV.  19,  19792 

Three  of  our  hostages  in  Tehran 
have  been  I'eleased  and  have  left  Iran. 
After  a  brief  period  of  rest  and  care, 
they  will  be  reunited  with  their  families 
here  in  the  United  States. 

The  remaining  hostages  must  also 
be  released.  Their  detention  is  without 
justification.  The  Government  of  Iran  is 
i-esponsible  for  achieving  their  im- 
mediate and  safe  release,  and  the 
United  States  has  the  right  to  expect 
that  Iran  will  do  so. 

The  specter  has  been  raised  of 
other  American  diplomatic  hostages 
being  placed  on  trial.  Such  a  step  would 
be  a  further  flagrant  violation  of 
elementary  human  rights,  religious 
precepts,  and  international  law  and 
practice.  Worldwide  outrage  at  the  de- 
tention of  the  hostages  would  be 
greatly  heightened  by  any  attempt  to 
put  these  diplomatic  personnel  on  trial. 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
NOV.  20,  19792 

There  are  reports  that  the  Ameri- 
can citizens  being  illegally  held  as  hos- 
tages in  Tehran  with  the  support  of  the 
Iranian  Government  might  soon  be  put 
through  some  sort  of  "trial."  This  would 
be  a  flagrant  violation  of  intei'national 
law  and  basic  religious  principles,  and 
the  Government  of  Iran  would  bear  full 
responsibility  for  any  ensuing  conse- 
quences. The  United  States  is  seeking  a 
peaceful  solution  to  this  problem 
through  the  United  Nations  and  every 
other  available  channel.  This  is  far 
preferable  to  the  other  remedies  avail- 
able to  the  United  States.  Such  rem- 
edies are  explicitly  recognized  in  the 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations.  The 
Government  of  Iran  must  recognize  the 
gravity  of  the  situation  it  has  created. 


PRESIDENT'S  REMARKS, 
NOV.  28,  19793 

This  morning  I  have  received  the 
credentials  of  the  Ambassadors  of  sev- 
eral nations.  This  is  a  very  important 
and  a  very  solemn  occasion  for  me 
whenever  I  have  this  opportunity. 
There  is  a  vivid  reminder  in  this  cere- 
mony of  the  importance  of  diplomatic 
relationships.  In  looking  down  this  row 
of  representatives,  who  are  quite  dis- 
tinguished in  their  own  right,  the  dif- 
ferences among  us  are  apparent.  We 
represent  countries  with  different 
backgrounds,  different  political  sys- 
tems, different  customs,  heritage, 
commitments,  goals,  opportunities, 
different  levels  of  income,  different  al- 
liances with  widely  varying  countries. 

The  only  way  to  bridge  the  inher- 
ent gaps  between  countries  and  to 
maintain  peace  and  proper  relationships 
is  through  the  honoring  of  the  integrity 
of  diplomatic  immunity.  It's  extremely 
important  that  mob  violence  be  con- 
trolled and  that  international  teiTorism 
not  be  permitted  to  reign.  All  countries 
are  afflicted  at  times  with  mob  violence 
and  terrorism. 

The  tragedy  of  the  occurrences  in 
Iran  is  that  in  a  departure  from  ac- 
cepted custom  and  tradition  down 
through  the  centuries,  in  this  instance, 
the  Government  itself  has  both  con- 
doned and  encouraged  the  seizure  of  an 
American  Embassy  and  our  personnel 
through  mob  violence  and  through 
terrorism. 

The  inviolability  of  embassies  is 
absolutely  indispensable  in  easing  ten- 
sions and  resolving  problems  that  exist 
among  nations  and  in  searching  for  a 
common  ground  of  peace  and  communi- 
cation among  people.  This  is  vital  to 
every  country.  It's  particularly  vital  to 
those  countries  which  are  small  and 
which  are  weak  and  which  do  not  have 
military  power  or  economic  power  to 
exert  in  defending  one's  own  institu- 
tions and  one's  own  rights. 

In  this  principle,  the  attitude  of  our 
own  country,  our  efforts  to  have  our 
hostages  released  and  to  restore  the  in- 
tegrity of  our  diplomatic  institutions,  is 
an  effort  not  only  for  the  rights  and 
benefits  of  the  United  States  but  for 
the  rights  and  benefits  of  all  nations. 
Some  of  the  countries  represented 
here,  almost  all  of  them,  have  strongly 
supported  the  condemnation  of  the  Ira- 
nian Government's  actions  in  seizing 
our  Embassy  and  holding  our  hostages 
captive.  We  need  the  help  of  all  coun- 
tries. The  rule  of  law  is  only  as  strong 
as  the  efforts  of  those  who  are  com- 
mitted to  defend  it.  We  are  very 
grateful  for  the  help  of  those  nations 


jnuary  1980 


43 


Middle  East 


which  have  joined  us  in  this  effort. 

The  harming  of  innocent  people  is 
condemned  by  every  law  of  mankind 
and  by  every  law  of  God,  no  matter 
what  religious  principles  or  economic  or 
political  principles  prevail  in  a  country. 
We  are  determined  to  work  as  peace- 
fully as  possible  to  achieve  the  release 
of  our  hostages  as  early  as  we  possibly 
can  and,  of  course,  commensurate  with 
that,  to  defend  and  to  protect  the  un- 
changing principles  on  which  our  nation 
and  other  nations  are  founded. 

My  hope  is  that  all  countries  repre- 
sented here  and  those  others  who  have 
representatives  in  our  Capital  City  will 
join  with  us  in  bringing  a  quick  and 
peaceful  resolution  to  the  problem 
which  afflicts  not  only  the  United  States 
but  all  countries.  ■ 

'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Nov.  19,  1979. 

^Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Nov.  26,  1979. 

^Made  in  the  Oval  Office  when  he  re- 
ceived diplomatic  credentials  from  the 
newly  appointed  Ambassadors  from 
Nicaragua.  Algeria,  Australia,  Honduras. 
Yugoslavia,  and  West  Germany  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Dec.  3.  1979). 


Chronology  of 
Events  in  Iran, 
November  1979 


Iranian  students  seize  U.S. 
Embassy  in  Iran  and  hold 
100  hostages  (6b'~'(  Ameri- 
can) protesting  that  the  de- 
posed Shah  of  Iran,  Moham- 
med Reza  Pahlavi,  be  re- 
turned to  Iran  to  stand  trial. 
Promised  host  government 
help  never  arrives. 

Iran  announces  cancellation  of 
20-year-old  defense  agree- 
ment with  U.S.  and  scraps 
portions  of  a  1921  treaty 
with  Russia. 

U.S.  rejects  students'  de- 
mands to  return  the  Shah  to 
Iran  and  expects  Prime 
Minister  Mehdi  Bazargan's 
government  to  live  up  to  its 
assurances  for  protection  of 
American  diplomatic  staff 
and  premises. 

Prime  Minister  Bazargan's 
provisional  revolutionary 
government  dissolves, 
yielding  power  to  the  Islamic 
authority  of  Ayatollah 
Ruhollah  Khomeini  and  his 
secret  Revolutionary  Coun- 
cil. 


Nov.  6 


Iranian  students  publicly 
threaten  to  kill  American 
hostages  if  U.S.  attempts 
rescue. 

PLO  announces  that  it  is 
sending  representatives  to 
Iran  to  seek  release  of  hos- 
tages. 

At  President  Carter's  request, 
former  Attorney  General 
Ramsey  Clark  and  Mr.  Wil- 
liam Miller,  U.S.  Senate 
committee  senior  staff  offi- 
cial, leave  Washington  for 
Tehran  carrying  a  message 
from  the  President  to  Ira- 
nian authorities  seeking  the 
release  of  American  hostages 
and  to  discuss  U.S.  relations 
with  Iran. 

Iranian  authorities  agree  to 
receive  emissaries. 
Nov.  7  Khomeini  rejects  talks  with 

President  Carter's  special 
envoys  Clark  and  Miller 
stating  that  if  the  U.S.  gives 
up  the  Shah  and  stops  es- 
pionage, negotiations  may  be 
possible. 

PLO  officials  announce  that  a 
two-member  delegation, 
headed  by  a  leader  of  Al 
Fatah  (the  main  guerrilla 
group),  arrives  in  Tehran  in 
efforts  to  protect  the  lives  of 
the  hostages. 

Deposed  Shah  offers  to  leave 
U.S  but  is  dissuaded  by  doc- 
tors. 
Nov.  8  Secretary  Vance  declares  that 

the  U.S.  holds  Iranian  au- 
thorities responsible  for 
safety  of  hostages. 

Iranian  students  reject  negoti- 
ations with  PLO. 

Iranian  students  protest  in 
Washington,  and  American 
students  stage  counter- 
demonstration. 

President  Carter  announces 
postponement  of  Canada 
visit  until  1980. 

Iran  cuts  supplies  to  some  oil 
concerns  by  101  for  rest  of 
1979. 
Nov.  9  U.N.  Security  Council  Presi- 

dent urges  Iran  to  free  hos- 
tages. 

U.S.  announces  suspension  of 
deliveries  of  about  $30  mil- 
lion in  military  equipment 
and  spare  parts  to  Iran. 

Egyptian  President  Sadat  in- 
vites Shah  to  Egypt  for  fur- 
ther medical  treatment  and 
political  asylum  and  attacks 
Khomeini  as  a  "lunatic  who 
misrepresents  Islam." 

Pope  John  Paul  II  sends  a 
message  to  Khomeini  asking 
him  to  insure  the  safety  of 
the  hostages. 


Nov.  10         President  Carter  directs 

Attorney  General  Civilettitc 
deport  any  Iranian  student  ' 
who  is  in  the  U.S.  illegally. 

Officials  of  the  PLO  fail  in 
their  efforts  to  free  hos- 
tages. 

Abolhassan  Bani-Sadr  becomes 
Iran's  acting  Foreign  Minis- 
ter and  reaffirms  demands 
that  the  U.S.  return  the 
Shah. 

Khomeini  receives  Papal  Nun- 
cio but  rejects  Pope's  appeal. 
Nov.  12         President  Carter  orders  sus-    [ 
pension  of  purchases  of  Ira-  f 
nian  oil  to  U.S.  Shortly         I 
after,  Iran  announces  that  it 
is  cutting  petroleum  shi|)- 
ments  to  the  U.S. 

Bani-Sadr  asks  the  Security 
Council  to  hear  charges 
against  the  U.S.,  accusing 
America  of  being  a  "threat  t 
peace." 

Mexico  announces  it  is  closinp 
its  embassy  in  Iran. 
Nov.  13         American  and  British  naval 
vessels  start  maneuvers  in 
the  Arabian  Sea.  Iran, 
charging  the  U.S.  with  war 
threats,  calls  for  a  meeting 
of  the  Security  Council. 
Nov.  14  Iran's  Foreign  Minister  an- 

nounces that  Iran  will  with 
draw  its  funds  from  Ameri- 
can banks. 

President  Carter  acts  to  blocl 
all  official  Iranian  assets  in 
the  U.S.  including  deposits 
in  U.S.  banks,  their  foreisr 
branches,  and  subsidiaries. 

With  Secretary  of  State 
Vance's  support,  the  Secu- 
rity Council  declines  to  de- 
bate Iran's  charges  against 
the  U.S.  until  hostages  are 
freed. 
Nov.  15         Iranian  officials  hint  that 

women  and  blacks  among  th 
hostages  are  to  be  freed. 
Students  holding  them 
strongly  reject  the  possibil 
ity. 

Iran  announces  it  will  no 
longer  sell  oil  to  American 
companies. 

Defense  Department  disclose; 
that  it  may  end  training  in 
the  U.S.  for  Iranian  militar 
men. 

Khomeini  cancels  all  appoint- 
ments until  Dec.  5  because  i 
fatigue  and  illness. 

President  Carter  accuses  Ira- 
nian Government  of  en- 
couraging embassy  takeove 
and  warns  Tehran  that  I.S 
"will  not  yield  to  interna- 
tional terrorism  or 
blackmail." 
Nov.  16         Iranian  students  warn  that 
hostages  will  pay  if  Shah  i.s 
allowed  to  go  anywhere  but 
to  Iran. 


44 


Department  of  State  Bullfeii 


I 


Middle  East 


150  Iranians  are  ordered  by 
U.S.  Government  to  leave 
U.S.  voluntarily  in  30  days 
or  face  deportation. 

President  Carter  discourages 
public  recriminations  against 
all  Iranians  living  in  U.S. 

Federal  Judge  orders  Presi- 
dent Carter  to  lift  ban  on 
demonstrations  by  Iranians 
and  Americans  on  Federal 
property  calling  the  ban  "a 
substantial  infringement  on 
their  First  Amendment 
rights." 

Khomeini  orders  students  to 
release  all  women  and  blacks 
among  hostages. 

Khomeini  declares  U.S.  hos- 
tages face  being  tried  as 
spies. 

Iranian  students  announce  that 
three  hostages  will  be 
released  —  a  woman  and  two 
black  men. 

19  U.S.  demands  all  remaining 
hostages  in  American  Em- 
bassy in  Tehran  be  released 
and  says  that  if  any  are  tried 
on  espionage  charges,  it 
would  be  "a  further  flagrant 
violation"  of  "human  rights, 
religious  precepts,  and  in- 
ternational law." 

Iranian  officials  announce  they 
will  stop  using  dollars  to  pay 
for  imports  and  asks  OPEC 
not  to  accept  dollars  for  their 
oil  exports. 

20  A  second  group  of  10  hostages 
are  released  and  arrive  at  a 
U.S.  air  base  near 
Frankfort,  West  Germany. 

U.S.  suggests  to  Iran  that  it 
might  resort  to  military 
force  if  the  remaining  49  hos- 
tages are  not  freed. 

Khomeini  repeats  threat  to  try 
the  49  remaining  hostages. 

President  Carter  orders  a  sec- 
ond naval  task  force,  in- 
cluding the  aircraft  carrier 
Kitty  Hawk,  into  the  Indian 
Ocean  to  join  the  carrier 
Midway  and  four  other  ships 
in  the  Arabian  Sea. 

21  Students  warn  that  all  hos- 
tages will  die  if  U.S.  attacks 
and  the  embassy  will  be 
blown  up. 

Security  Council  offers  Iran 
two  forums  in  which  to  state 
its  case  in  return  for  the  re- 
lease of  hostages. 

First  stage  of  the  deposed 
Shah's  medical  treatment 
ends. 

22  Thirteen  hostages  freed  from 
U.S.  Embassy  in  Tehran  ar- 
rive in  Washington;  they  are 
met  by  Secretary  Vance  and 
other  senior  State  Depart- 
ment officials. 

Khomeini  urges  all  Moslems  to 
rise  up  against  the  West  to 
fight  "blasphemy." 


U.S.  pledges  to  maintain  pres-        Nov.  27 
ence  in  Islamic  world. 

President  Carter  instructs 
U.S.  Embassies  around  the 
world  to  undertake  greater 
security  precautions  and  for 
host  governments  to  do  all 
they  can  to  protect  embas- 
sies. 

U.S.  again  warns  Iran  that  it 
will  be  held  "strictly  ac- 
countable" for  the  safety  of 
the  hostages. 
Nov.  23         Bani-Sadr  declares  that  all 

Iranian  foreign  debts  are  re- 
pudiated. 

PLO  officials  say  Yasir  Arafat 
never  tried  to  mediate  the 
release  of  hostages  because 
"we  are  allies  of  the  Iranian 
revolution." 

Israel  announces  in  a  broad- 
cast that  it  has  a  plan  for 
rescuing  hostages. 
Nov.  24         Khomeini  accuses  U.S.  and  Is- 
rael of  attempting  to  seize 
two  of  the  most  sacred  Mos- 
lem mosques  in  the  holy 
cities  of  Mecca  and  Medina. 
Nov.  25         A  U.N.  Security  Council  session 
is  called  by  Secretary  Gen- 
eral Waldheim  because  Iran 
fails  to  respond  to  an  appeal 
to  release  U.S.  hostages.  It        Nov.  28 
is  only  the  second  time  in  19 
years  that  a  Secretary  Gen- 
eral has  requested  such  a 
meeting. 

U.S.  Congressman  George 
Hansen  (Idaho),  on  a  self- 
appointed  peace  mission  to 
Tehran,  visits  some  of  the 
U.S.  hostages. 
Nov.  26         State  Department  orders  em- 
bassies in  11  Moslem  coun- 
tries to  evacuate  "voluntar- 
ily" dependents,  nonessen- 
tial diplomats,  and  private 
businessmen  to  minimize 
risks  in  the  aftermath  of 
events  in  Iran,  Pakistan, 
Saudi  Arabia,  and  other 
countries. 

The  U.N.,  in  a  new  appeal  for 
immediate  release  of  hos- 
tages, moves  to  bring  U.S. 
diplomats  together  with  a  Nov, 29 

responsible  figure  in  the 
Iranian  regime.  Foreign 
Minister  Bani-Sadr,  who  had 
planned  to  fly  to  the  U.N. 
headquarters  in  New  York, 
is  overruled  by  Iran's  ruling       Nov.  30 
Revolutionary  Council  which 
decides  that  no  leader  can 
leave  Iran  until  Ashura,  the 
holiest  period  of  the  Shiite 
Moslem  calender,  ends. 
Bani-Sadr  plans  to  come  to 
the  U.N.  on  Dec.  1  when 
talks  could  begin. 

Italian  President  Pertini  urges 
Khomeini  to  free  the  hos- 
tages on  humanitarian 
grounds. 


State  Department  recommends 
that  only  essential  travel  by 
U.S.  citizens  be  undertaken 
to  United  Arab  Emirates, 
Iraq,  Lebanon,  Syria,  Qatar, 
Kuwait,  Oman,  Libya,  Bah- 
rain, the  Yemen  Arab  Re- 
public, and  Bangladesh. 

Officials  at  New  York 
Hospital-Cornell  Medical 
Center  announce  that  the 
deposed  Shah  of  Iran  is  able 
to  leave  the  hospital  and  re- 
turn to  Me.xico  within  a 
week. 

Khomeini  attacks  plans  for  a 
session  of  the  Security 
Council  claiming  the  outcome 
had  been  dictated  by  the 
U.S. 

Security  Council  receives  writ- 
ten promise  that  Iran's  act- 
ing Foreign  Minister  will  ar- 
rive for  the  Dec.  1  session. 

A  statement  issued  by  the 
Commonwealth  High  Com- 
missioners appeals  to  the 
Iranian  Government  to  pro- 
cure the  release  of  all  hos- 
tages and  expresses  the  hope 
that  the  parties  will  resolve 
their  differences  by  peaceful 
means. 

Bani-Sadr  is  dismissed  as 
Iran's  acting  Foreign  Minis- 
ter. Sadegh  Ghotbzadeh,  Di- 
rector of  Iranian  television, 
is  named  to  the  post. 

Deposed  Shah's  health  is  im- 
proved and  a  plane  is  re- 
ported standing  by  at  Ken- 
nedy International  Airport 
to  return  him  to  exile  in 
Mexico. 

President  Carter  denounces 
the  "inhuman  and  degrading 
conditions"  imposed  upon 
the  hostages  and  again 
warns  Iran  that  it  would 
suffer  "grave  consequences" 
if  hostages  are  harmed. 

Iranian  Government  files  suit 
in  New  York  against  the  de- 
posed Shah  and  his  wife 
asking  $56.5  billion  in  dam- 
ages. 

U.S.  initiates  actions  against 
Iran  in  the  International 
Court  of  Justice. 

Mexico  announces  it  will  not 
renew  visa  for  deposed 
Shah. 

U.S.  expects  Shah  to  leave 
country  despite  Mexico's 
refusal  to  renew  his  visa. 
The  Shah  announces  he  in- 
tends to  leave  U.S.  in  hopes 
that  his  departure  would 
"end  the  tragic  situation  in 
Iran." 

President  Carter  cancels  six- 
state  political  tour  because 
of  Iranian  crisis. 

Foreign  Minister  Ghotbzadeh 
announces  Iran  will  not  at- 


45 


Middle  East 


tend  the  meeting  of  the  Se- 
curity Council  stating  that 
"there  is  no  basis  for  negoti- 
ations over  the  hostages  ex- 
cept the  return  of  the  de- 
posed Shah  for  trial  in  this 
country."  He  also  announces 
that  Laingen  and  two  other 
embassy  officials  are  not 
hostages  and  "are  free  to 
leave  at  any  time"  although 
he  could  not  guarantee  their 
safety  to  the  airport. 
Registrar  of  the  ICJ  issues  call 
to  parties  of  hostage  case 
stating  that  the  "Court  will 
hold  public  hearings  at  an 
early  date  to  afford  parties 
the  opportunity  of  present- 
ing their  observations  on 
request  for  interim  meas- 
ures. Projected  date  and 
time  for  such  hearings  is 
Monday,  10  December,  at  3 
p.m."B 


The  Challenge  of 
Peacemaking 

by  Harold  H.  Saunders 

Address  before  the  Conference  on 
U.S.  Vital  Interests  in  the  Middle  East 
in  St.  Louis  on  November  6,  1979.  Mr. 
Saunders  is  Assista7it  Secretary  for 
Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs. 

I  am  delighted  to  be  here  in  St. 
Loui.s  to  speak  about  the  challenge  of 
war  and  peace  in  the  Middle  East,  and 
we  appreciate  the  interest  all  of  you 
have  shown  in  coming  to  share  this  day 
with  us.  Conferences  such  as  these  give 
us  in  your  Department  of  State  a  valu- 
able opportunity  to  e.xchange  percep- 
tions with  informed  and  interested  citi- 
zens about  what  is  at  stake  for  all  of  us 
in  this  key  area  of  the  world — an  area 
which  Americans  in  many  walks  of  life 
increasingly  recognize  can  affect  their 
lives  and  interests. 

At  the  root  of  our  exchange  of 
views  are  some  basic  questions. 

•  Why  is  the  United  States  so  deeply 
involved  in  the  search  for  peace  in  the 
Middle  East? 

•  Does  that  involvement  serve  our 
national  interests  or  threaten  them? 

•  What  are  those  national  interests, 
and  just  how  should  we  pursue  them  in 
this  unstable  region  where  change  is 
taking  place  with  unprecedented  rapid- 
ity? 


The  answers  to  these  questions 
begin  to  define  the  elements  of  a  truly 
national  policy  toward  this  troubled  re- 
gion. For  years,  Middle  East  policy  was 
the  preserve  of  a  few  specialists.  Today 
it  is  the  concern  of  all  Americans. 

The  purpose  of  this  conference  has 
been  to  stimulate  thought  and  to  con- 
tribute to  a  greater  understanding  of 
the  ingredients  of  our  policy.  For, 
without  a  national  consensus  about 
what  the  United  States  is  trying  to  do 
in  such  a  critical  area  and  why,  no 
policy — no  matter  how  designed  and 
executed  from  Washington — can 
succeed. 

At  the  outset  let  me  make  three 
central  points  about  the  Middle  East, 
and  then  develop  them  in  relation  to  the 
peacemaking  process. 

•  More  important  and  yet  different 
American  interests  converge  in  the 
Middle  East  today  than  in  any  other 
area  of  the  developing  world.  The 
United  States  no  longer  has  the  choice 
of  distancing  itself  from  what  happens 
there. 

•  Fundamental  changes  are  taking 
place  in  the  Middle  East  at  breathtak- 
ing speed.  Some  of  the  richest  and  fast- 
est modernizing  nations  in  the  world 
live  side-by-side  with  some  of  the 
poorest  and  most  traditional  nations, 
and  all  are  co|)ing  with  the  impact  of 
rapid  change.  Instability  of  some  kind 
is  inevitable.  The  issue  is  not  whether 
we  can  avoid  instability  but  how  we 
deal  with  it. 

•  Within  this  environment  of  high 
stakes  and  diverse  interests,  the  only 
sensible  policy  for  us  is  one  which  per- 
mits us  to  pursue  all  of  our  interests  at 
the  same  time  in  conditions  of  orderly 
change.  We  must  avoid  being  forced  to 
make  choices  among  our  various  inter- 
ests because  none  is  so  unimportant 
that  it  can  be  sacrificed.  This  is  in  our 
interest.  It  is  in  the  interest  of  our 
friends  in  the  Middle  East. 

Important  U.S.  Interest.s 

Any  discussion  of  American  inter- 
ests in  the  Middle  East  today  must 
begin  with  some  thought  about  how 
American  perceptions  of  the  Middle 
East  and  our  interests  there  have 
changed  in  recent  years.  Only  after 
such  reflection  do  we  see  what  is  at 
stake. 

For  years,  the  Middle  East  was 
thought  of  mainly  in  schoolbook  geog- 
raphy terms  as  a  "strategic  cross- 
roads," as  a  "land  bridge"  joining  Asia, 
Africa,  and  Europe  and  forming  the 
"life  line"  of  the  British  Empire.  In  the 
1950s  and  1960s,  the  area  took  on  new 
geopolitical  importance  because  of  the 


oil  it  provided  to  our  NATO  allies  and  j 
Japan  and  because  of  the  importance  of  ' 
Turkey  and  Iran  in  containing  Soviet    '^ 
expansion  to  the  south  toward  that  oil.  ' 
Even  during  those  years,  however,  the 
Middle  East  still  did  not  seem  to  have 
direct  overriding  importance  to  the 
United  States  itself.  We  could  still        ' 
make  the  choice  of  standing  a  step  back  ,;, 
from  direct  involvement  in  its  problem  ' 

That  situation  has  changed  mark-  / 
edly  in  the  1970s.  If  we  can  just  look    , ; 
for  a  moment  at  the  five  areas  of  pri-    ,' 
mary  interest  which  the  United  States 
has  today  in  the  Middle  East  we  will 
see  the  extent  of  the  change. 

The  first  relates  to  the  Soviet 
Union.  While  we  have  long  recognized  ',. 
the  importance  of  denying  to  the  Soviet  i 
Union  a  predominant  influence  in  the 
Middle  East,  we  have  also  learned  in    n 
the  heat  of  two  crises  that  we  have  a 
particular  concern  to  avoid  confronta- 
tion with  the  Soviets  there  in  this  nu-  i^ 
clear  age.  The  Soviet  Union,  for  rea-    ^ 
sons  of  power,  oil,  geographic  prox-     [ij 
imity,  and  ethnic  and  cultural  ties  be-  ' 
tween  elements  of  its  population  and 
peoples  of  the  Middle  East  also  consid  \,, 
ers  that  it  has  interests  in  the  area.      ": 

Our  interest  is  to  help  the  nations  ■ 
of  the  area  preserve  their  independenc  i 
against  any  foreign  domination.  But  ir 
unlike  Europe,  where  the  lines  betwee  .; 
the  Soviets  and  us  are  drawn  both  gei  ^.^ 
graphically  and  by  precedent,  the  line 
are  not  clearly  drawn  in  the  Middle  I, 
East.  Either  by  accident  or  by  escala-  jj^ 
tion,  the  two  superpowers  could  end  i  ., 
in  confrontation.  Messages  exchanged  j: 
between  Moscow^  and  Washington  in  tl  |^ 
heat  of  crisis  in  both  the  1967  and  the  ,., 
1973  wars  made  that  specter  all  too  , 
clear. 

So  today  we  are  more  acutely 
aware  than  ever  before  of  the  challeng  ^, 
of  avoiding  confrontation,  while  makin  || 
certain  that  nations  of  the  area  pre- 
serve their  independence. 

Our  second  major  interest  is  the 
security  and  well-being  of  Israel.  Evei  ,j 
American  President  since  the  estab-    .,, 
lishment  of  Israel  in  1948  has  declarec^.], 
the  unwavering  American  commitmeiiij. 
to  that  end.  Our  two  peoples  have  de(  j, 
cultural  and  emotional  ties  which  mali|I, 
relations  between  our  two  countries    || 
both  unique  and  indestructible.  We      ' 
have  stood  by  Israel  through  its  war.- 
and  given  generously  to  its  develop- 
ment and  defense.  As  President  Carti^, 
has  put  it;  "F^or  30  years  we  have  stoi|  j 
at  the  side  of  the  proud  and  independ  , 
ent  nation  of  Israel.  I  can  say  without, » 
reservation,  as  President  of  the  Unitfji, 
States  of  America,  that  we  will  con- 
tinue to  do  so  not  just  for  another  30 


46 


Department  of  State  Built; 


Middle  East 


■>.  l)Ut  forever.  The  United  States 
in'\er  support  any  agreement  or 
;ntii)n  that  places  Israel's  security 
•opardy. 

Today  this  traditional  interest  in 
•ael  has  new  dimensions. 
During  the  early  days  of  the  1973 

Israeli  reverses  shook  Israel's 
1  III  its  military  prowess  and  led  to  a 
hiT  military  buildup.  But  those  re- 
fs  also  raised  questions  about 
thcr,  over  time,  Israel  could  de- 
I  Milely  on  its  military  strength  to 
1  i\f. 

Now  the  peace  treaty  with  Egypt 
iged  last  March  finally  provides  a 
rtical  complement.  'Today,  for  the 
r  time,  Israel  has  a  realistic  hope  of 
5!  ring  its  future  not  just  by  arms 
(■  -though  these  will  always  be 
>>ary — but  by  developing  peaceful 
•:tiiinships  with  its  neighbors  as  an 
et  pted  member  of  the  Middle  East 
wmunity  of  nations.  In  helping  Israel 
I   this  dream  of  peace  with  its 
-I  neighbor.  President  Carter  has 
'  II  a  new  dimension  to  our  commit- 
t  t(i  Israel.  We  now  have  the  his- 
■  challenge  and  opportunity  to  help 
inline  what  is  necessary  to  provide 
ifl  with  security  in  peace  as  well  as 
1  ar. 

Our  third  interest  is  in  the  supply 
f  liddle  Eastern  oil.  We  have  long 
le  that  this  oil  must  be  available  "at 
■e  onable  prices"  to  our  allies  who 
fi'  so  dependent  on  it.  In  this  decade 
(-ec  that  oil  in  a  different  light.  That 
evidence  has  hit  closer  to  home.  We 
le  1  only  remember  the  impact  of  the 
il'mbargo  of  1973-74,  or  again  more 
ntly  the  gas  lines  of  early  summer, 
nti'  that  the  United  States  itself 
I-  deeply  affected  by  imported  oil, 
!i  nf  it  from  the  Middle  East.  Be- 
I-  the  greatest  reserves  are  there, 
'■  nations  also  have  the  capacity  to 
i-t  [irice  as  well  as  supply. 
The  fourth  American  interest, 
Uely  tied  to  the  third,  is  maintenance 
flose  and  friendly  ties  with  key  mod- 
1-  Arab  nations.  The  reasons  are 
I  imlitical  and  economic.  Politically, 
niiiderate  leaders  of  the  Middle 
I  w  ill  set  the  character  of  that  area 
till-  remainder  of  the  century.  They 
I  I'll  the  forces  which  will  be  the  first 
lit'  defense  against  any  foreign 
uiiation.  Economically,  the  Middle 
t  is  among  the  fastest  growing  mar- 
-  Ill  the  world.  We  have  an  obvious 
ii  st  in  developing  trade  which  will 
'  ntt'set  the  cost  of  oil.  We  also  have 
I'gtT  foreign  policy  interest  in  the 
wing  network  of  relationships  that 
tlic  people  of  this  area  to  the  people 
lif  I'nited  States  in  common  pur- 


Furthermore,  the  oil-producing  na- 
tions of  the  Middle  East,  with  their 
large  supplies  of  capital,  also  have  the 
capacity  to  influence  world  economic 
stability  and  to  provide  help  to  the  de- 
veloping nations  with  everything  from 
expensive  development  projects  to  aid 
in  meeting  high  energy  costs. 

Our  fifth  and  no  means  last  inter- 
est in  the  Middle  East  is  a  humanitarian 
one.  We  remain  a  nation  concerned 
about  the  people  of  the  area.  For  years 
we  have  provided  assistance  to  refu- 
gees, whether  from  the  Holocaust  in 
Europe  or  from  Arab  villages  in  Pales- 
tine. We  are  now  trying  to  help  end  the 
cycle  of  violence  in  southern  Lebanon 
which  has  caused  so  much  suffering  to 
innocent  civilians  and  caused  200,000 
refugees  to  flee  north  from  their  homes. 
We  have  contributed  to  economic  de- 
velopment of  the  poorer  nations  and 
have  provided  necessary  technology  to 
those  nations  which  have  oil  money. 


Until  the  Palestinian  refugees 
can  find  dignity  and  hope  in  a 
future  .  .  .  there  can  be  no 
final  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 


Today  e.xciting  new  opportunities 
exist.  With  the  conclusion  of  the 
Egyptian-Israeli  Peace  Treaty  as  the 
first  step  toward  a  comprehensive 
peace  settlement,  we  have  realistic 
hope  of  progress  in  resolving  the  Pales- 
tinian problem  in  all  its  aspects.  We  can 
look  to  the  day  when  the  refugees  will 
no  longer  define  their  future  in  the 
hopelessness  of  the  camps.  This  is  a 
complex  problem  but  also  a  vital  human 
one.  Until  the  Palestinian  refugees  can 
find  dignity  and  hope  in  a  future — until 
they  can  have  a  voice  in  the  determina- 
tion of  that  future  and  feel  that  peace  in 
the  Middle  East  has  something  in  it  for 
them — there  can  be  no  final  peace  in  the 
Middle  East.  In  facing  this  tragic 
human  problem,  we  are  deeply  con- 
scious that,  as  President  Carter  has 
said,  it  sometimes  takes  more  courage 
to  wage  peace  than  to  wage  war. 

Forces  of  Change 

In  considering  these  diverse  and 
important  interests — and  our  sharp- 
ened national  perception  of  them — we 
must  consider  the  forces  of  change 
which  define  the  environment  in  which 
those  interests  are  pursued. 


With  rapid  change  comes  instabil- 
ity. In  the  past  year,  we  have  wit- 
nessed a  revolution  in  Iran,  a  coup 
d'etat  in  Afghanistan  and  spreading  in- 
surrection there,  continued  internal 
strife  in  Lebanon,  and  the  escalating 
dispute  over  the  western  Sahara  in 
North  Africa.  All  reflect  unending  tur- 
moil which  outsiders  are  powerless  to 
control.  The  issue  for  the  United 
States,  therefore,  is  not  whether 
change  will  occur  but  how  we  deal  with 
it. 

Our  tendency  too  often  has  been  to 
consider  change  as  threatening.  That 
need  not  be  so.  After  all,  our  country 
has  been  and  remains  one  of  the  fastest 
changing  in  the  world.  Our  heritage  is 
revolutionary.  Our  society  has  thrived 
on  change.  The  spirit  of  innovation  has 
produced  human  and  technological 
achievements  which  cause  other  de- 
veloping societies  to  look  to  us  for  lead- 
ership. These  achievements  are  the 
hallmarks  of  our  capacity  to  advance 
the  human  condition  through  harness- 
ing change. 

Dangers  do  exist  in  the  Middle 
East.  We  cannot  ignore  them.  At  the 
same  time,  I  propose  that  we  look  at 
the  changes  occurring  there  as  an  op- 
portunity to  build,  not  solely  as  a 
danger  to  destroy.  As  Secretary  Vance 
said  in  Chicago  last  May,  the  United 
States  must  be  seen  as  a  power  that 
uses  its  tremendous  resources — 
diplomatic,  military,  economic — to 
promote  healthy  change  and  not  as  the 
power  employing  its  military  might  to 
repress  change. 

Our  task  is  to  work  with  the  mod- 
erate governments  of  the  area,  to  try  to 
help  them  direct  change  into  construc- 
tive channels.  It  is  they  who  have  to 
cope  with  the  consequences  of  an  eco- 
nomic revolution,  where  in  some,  fast 
increases  in  oil  revenues  have  produced 
new  power  of  global  dimensions  at  a 
time  that  their  societies  are  experienc- 
ing the  painful  stresses  and  strains  of 
rapid  modernization.  Nor  are  any  gov- 
ernments there  immune  from  the  pres- 
sures of  new-found  nationalism,  of  the 
Islamic  revival,  of  the  traditional  rival- 
ries within  the  region,  which,  together 
with  the  economic  revolution,  feed 
change  and  instability. 

For  our  part,  we  have  great  assets 
in  helping  these  nations  meet  the  chal- 
lenge. While  some  are  just  beginning  to 
enjoy  the  independence  and  power 
which  their  resources  provide  them, 
they  are  also  finding  that  interdepend- 
ence is  equally  a  force  in  the  modern 
world.  Whether  it  be  in  food  production 
and  imports,  acquiring  industrial  and 
consumer  goods,  importing  skilled  and 
unskilled  labor,  no  nation — no  matter 


luary  1980 


47 


Middle  East 


how  rich — can  prosper  on  its  own. 

With  few  exceptions,  the  peoples  of 
North  Africa,  the  Middle  East,  and 
Southwestern  Asia  want  a  good  work- 
ing relationship  with  us.  They  value  our 
know-how,  our  practicality  and  inven- 
tiveness, our  technology,  our  educa- 
tional system,  and  share  many  of  our 
values.  They  know  we  respect  their 
right  to  solve  their  own  problems  and 
to  preserve  their  own  freedom.  They 
know  that  we  do  not  ask  them  to  be  like 
us  but  only  to  work  with  us  in  a  shared 
desire  for  an  orderly  and  peaceful 
world.  Our  acceptance  of  a  pluralistic 
world  enables  us  to  contribute  rather 
than  to  dominate.  While  they  recognize 
we  have  our  own  interests  in  the  area, 
they  also  recognize  that  we  will  pursue 
them  with  respect  for  their  integrity. 

Strategy  for  Peace 

This  brings  me  to  the  third  point  I 
mentioned  in  opening — that  the  only 
sensible  policy  for  us  in  the  Middle  East 
is  one  designed  overall  to  permit  us  to 
pursue  all  our  interests  simultaneously 
in  conditions  of  orderly  change. 

Our  problem  is  that  interests  as  di- 
verse as  ours  sometimes  come  into  con- 
flict with  one  another.  The  most  ob- 
vious e.xample  is  the  difficulty  over  the 
years  of  pursuing  steadfast  support  for 
Israel  while  preserving  and  developing 
the  relationships  we  need  in  the  Arab 
world;  nor  can  we  totally  thwart  Soviet 
designs  on  the  region  or  pursue  hu- 
manitarian aspirations  to  end  the  plight 
of  refugees  and  release  valuable  re- 
sources for  economic  development  so 
long  as  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  is  al- 
lowed to  fester  and  periodically 
explode. 

We  have  discovered  over  the  past  6 
years  that  a  strategy  centered  on  find- 
ing an  Arab-Israeli  peace  best  meets 
our  interests.  It  allows  us  to  work 
closely  with  all  of  the  key  nations  in  the 
Middle  East  in  pursuing  a  common,  if 
difficult,  objective.  We  have  been 
helped  by  the  common  perception  in  the 
area  that  we  are  the  one  outside  nation 
able  to  help  obtain  settlement  by  dip- 
lomatic means  rather  than  the  military 
means  which  have  proved  so  fruitless. 

We  do  not  delude  ourselves  that 
this  is  an  easy  task.  It  is  extremely  dif- 
ficult. Nevertheless,  this  active  search 
for  peace  not  only  enables  us  to  pursue 
the  full  range  of  our  national  interests 
in  the  Middle  East,  it  also  can  claim  full 
support  of  the  American  people,  har- 
monizing as  it  does  the  strategic,  eco- 
nomic, political,  moral,  and  humane 
interests  of  this  nation.  In  the  Middle 
East  we  need  not  be  torn  between  cur- 
rent perceptions  of  strategic  interests 

48 


and  our  humane  and  moral  interests  as 
we  were  during  the  decade  of  Vietnam. 

Egyptian-Israeli  Peace 

The  progress  of  the  past  year  in 
moving  toward  an  Arab-Israeli  peace 
has  been  historic.  Today  after  three 
decades  of  recurrent  war  without  hope, 
the  prospect  for  peace  in  the  Middle 
East  is  real.  For  the  first  time  negotia- 
tions are  directed  toward  lasting 
peace — not  just  temporary  armistice. 
They  are  built  on  real  achievement  by 
brave  and  dedicated  leaders  who  have 
had  the  courage  to  put  aside  fatalistic 
assumptions  about  the  insolubility  of 
the  conflict  between  them — President 
Sadat,  Prime  Minister  Begin,  and 
President  Carter.  The  Treaty  of  Peace 
between  Egypt  and  Israel  signed  on  the 
White  House  lawn  last  March  26  opened 
the  door  to  negotiated  peace  between 
Israel  and  all  its  neighbors. 

The  first  gigantic  step  came  in  Sep- 
tember of  last  year,  when  the  leaders  of 
Egypt  and  Israel  agreed  at  Camp  David 
on  two  "framework"  documents  for 
peace  in  the  Middle  East.  The  first  set 
forth  the  principles  for  a  comprehensive 
peace  and  established  the  basis  for  pro- 
ceeding with  negotiations  on  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza,  where  Palestinians 
would  participate  in  determining  their 
own  future.  The  second  document  es- 
tablished the  basic  terms  governing  an 
Egyptian-Israeli  peace  treaty.  When 
those  terms  were  actually  translated 
into  a  contractual  peace  agreement  last 
March  26,  President  Sadat  and  Prime 
Minister  Begin  signed  a  joint  letter  ad- 
dressed to  President  Carter  setting 
foi-th  a  time  frame  for  the  West  Bank- 
Gaza  negotiations. 

Americans  can  take  pride  in  the 
role  their  country  ])layed  in  this  historic 
event.  Both  leaders  have  paid  tribute  to 
the  key  role  of  President  Carter.  I  can 
say  as  a  professional  that  without  the 
courage,  vision,  and  persistence  of  our 
President,  this  first  practical  step  in  30 
years  toward  peace  in  the  Middle  East 
would  not  have  been  taken. 

The  Egyptian-Israeli  treaty  is  now 
being  scrupulously  implemented.  It  was 
reached  through  mutual  concessions — 
Egypt,  by  breaking  the  pattern  of  con- 
frontation and  giving  full  recognition  to 
Israel;  Israel  by  agreeing  to  withdraw 
completely  from  the  Sinai.  The  treaty 
opens  new  avenues  for  trade  and  com- 
munications; for  economic,  scientific, 
and  social  betterment;  and  for  the  en- 
hancement of  learning  and  cultural  ex- 
change. Its  achievement  against  heavy 
odds  is  a  demonstration  of  men  and 


women  everywhere  that  human  reasoi 
common  sense,  goodwill,  hard  work, 
and  faith  can  prevail.  Its  careful  im- 
plementation is  demonsti'ating  that 
even  those  who  have  been  adversaries  j 
for  generations  can  overcome  enmity  j 
and  make  peace. 

Status  of  the  Peace  Process 

As  important  as  the  Egypt-Israe! 
Peace  Treaty  is,  it  is  not  an  end  in  it- 
self. It  is  still  only  the  first  step  on  tl 
long  and  difficult  road  to  a  comprehei  i 
sive  peace.  Peace  has  come  to  Egypt  [ 
and  Israel;  it  has  not  come  to  the  oth 
peoples  involved.  Until  it  does,  the 
peoples  of  Egypt  and  Israel  cannot 
realize  fully  the  benefits  of  their  peai 
and  there  can  be  no  end  to  the  tensic 
and  hostility  which  have  plagued  the  5 
Middle  East.  All  the  governments  at 
Camp  David  have  committed  them 
selves  to  a  comprehensive  peace.  Tli 
process  outlined  in  September  197^. 
President  Sadat,  Prime  Minister  P.iij 
and  President  Carter  at  Camp  Da\  i( 
continues. 

The  principal  unfinished  item  or 
the  Middle  East  agenda  is  the  relati  ,,, 
ship  between  Israel  and  its  other 
neighbors,  particularly  between  ]>r: 
and  the  Palestinian  Arab  people.  U 
we  seek,  as  full  partner  in  continiiin 
negotiations,  is  a  permanent  basis  l( 
assuring  the  full  security  of  Israel  :i 
at  the  same  time,  satisfaction  of  th. 
legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinians 

To  that  end,  Egypt,  Israel,  and 
United  States  have  entered  the  nex 
phase  of  negotiations  set  out  in  the 
Camp  David  framework.  For  the  fir 
time  in  30  years,  we  have  begun  a 
negotiation  which  concentrates  on  is 
sues  of  concern  to  the  Palestinians  ; 
well  as  protection  of  Israel's  securit 
We  have  embarked  on  negotiating  t 
series  of  practical  steps  laid  out  at 
Camp  David  by  which  more  than  1  ) 
lion  Palestinians  living  on  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza — and  eventually  the 
displaced  by  war  now  living 
elsewhere — can  participate  in  deter 
mining  their  future. 

These  negotiations  have  been 
underway  since  late  May  with  Amb 
sador  Robert  Strauss  heading  the 
American  negotiating  team.  It  is  im 
tant  to  understand  their  objective. 
They  are  a  first  stage  in  dealing  wi 
the  issues  of  the  West  Bank  and  Ga 
What  we  are  attempting  to  do  is  bui 
political  structui'e — a  self-governinj 
authority — on  the  West  Bank  and  C 
that  takes  into  account  the  legitima 
interests  of  both  Israelis  and  Palesi 
ians.  This  step  is  designed  to  pave 
way,  over  a  succeeding  5-year  tran 


Department  of  State  Bul- 


bs 


ItSiil 


UNITED  NATIONS 


1 1  period,  for  working  out  the  final 
i>  iif  these  territories.  This  first 
ltd  give  them  full  autonomy  to 
ihi'ir  lives  through  their  own  self- 
nff  body  and  to  participate  in 
t  ions  on  the  final  status  of  these 

.    I'les. 

This  is  complicated.  No  one  before 
;lft'ined  "full  autonomy"  in  such  cir- 
i-taiiees.  The  three  parties  to  the 
(flit  talks  are  developing  a  transi- 
,  il  iirrangement,  not  deciding  the 
V  status  of  the  territories.  Yet  that 
k'Aerning  authority  must  be 
iinuful  and  credible  so  that  Pales- 
!i-  will  be  willing  to  vote  and  par- 
■  ate  in  picking  leaders  who  will  rep- 
ent them  in  the  next  round  of 
■jitiations  during  the  5-year  transi- 
)il  period.  Obviously,  many  deep 
f  reiices  exist  at  this  early  stage. 
the  past  5  months,  the  negotiating 
>  and  their  two  working  groups 
.  '  I II 'en  laying  the  technical  basis  for 
■■  ling  just  what  will  be  the  content  of 
.  iioiiiy. 
1 'regress  has  been  slow,  painstak- 
aiiil  not  highly  visible.  But  it  is 
1-  111  the  steady  achievements  of  the 
nIiil:  groups.  The  achievements, 
'  Lih  modest,  ai'e  building  blocks  for 
iiil:  autonomy  into  a  reality.  As  you 
'. .  we  have  a  May  1980  target  date 
I  iiiiipleting  these  first  negotiations. 
i'>sential  to  insure  that  genuine,  if 
.  progress  is  being  made,  that  sub- 
:;  tial  progress  is  there  by  next  year, 
1   we  are  on  the  way  to  resolving  the 
billing  difficult  issues  in  order  to 
ic  the  credibility  of  the  peace 

This  credibility  is  essential  if  we 
itij  encourage  Palestinians  and  other 
,il)  nations  and  leaders  to  join  in  the 
e  itiations.  They  must  see  that  these 
utiations  are  a  genuine  beginning.  It 
0  secret  that  a  sizable  body  of  opin- 
in  the  Arab  world  remains  uncon- 
■ed  that  our  course  is  the  right  one. 
her  than  a  step  toward  a  com- 
iiensive  peace,  they  see  the  Egypt- 
lel  treaty  as  a  separate  peace  de- 
ictive  of  Ai-ab  unity.  We  hope  that 
tudes  will  become  more  positive  as 
world  sees  that  these  negotiations 
produce  concrete  results. 
One  of  the  positive  elements  in  the 
sent  situation  is  that  parties  on  all 
;s  are  taking  a  fresh  look  at  their 
rests  in  the  present  fluid  situation, 
ns  exist  that  the  Palestinians  and 
er  Arabs  are  watching  the  negotia- 
is  closely,  that  they  are  carefully 
sidering  their  next  steps,  and  that  a 
tain  sense  of  realism  is  emerging  in 
ts  of  their  relationship. 


luary  1980 


In  Israel,  too,  awareness  is  grow- 
ing of  the  need  for  creativity  and 
imagination  in  dealing  with  the  Pales- 
tinian problem.  As  for  the  United 
States,  we  see  evidence  all  around  us 
that  more  and  more  Americans  under- 
stand the  need  to  resolve  the  Palestin- 
ian dimension  of  the  Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 

Success  will  not  come  overnight. 
Violence  continues  to  poison  the  envi- 
ronment. Years  of  hatred  and  suspicion 
are  not  easily  overcome.  At  Camp 
David  we  all  recognized  this  truth. 
Since  the  gap  between  Israeli  and  Pal- 
estinian and  other  Arab  perceptions  of 
each  other's  motives  cannot  be  bridged 
in  one  stroke,  the  Camp  David 
framework  sets  up  a  process  for  evolv- 
ing a  negotiated  solution  over  time. 
Each  success  and  the  trust  which  comes 
with  genuine  accommodation  form  the 
basis  for  tackling  still  harder  issues  in 
later  stages  and  a  context  for  testing 
the  results  of  negotiations.  What  re- 
mains for  us  all  is  to  persevere  in  the 
course  we  have  set.  This  we  intend  to 
do — for  our  own  interests  in  the  Middle 
East,  as  well  as  for  those  of  the  peoples 
living  there.  ■ 


Security  Council 

Meets 

on  Iranian  Situation 


Following  are  statements  made  by 
U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  United  Na- 
tions Donald  F.  McHenry  to  the  press 
foUoirini/  a  Security  Council  meeting 
on  Noreuiber  27,  1979,  in  Security 
Conncil  sessions  on  December  1  and  J,, 
and  the  resolution  unanimously 
adopted  by  the  Conncil  on  December  i. 

AMBASSADOR  McHENRY, 
NOV.  27,  1979' 

I  can  say  on  a  preliminary  basis 
that  what  you  have  seen  the  Council  do 
this  afternoon  has  been  to  respond  to 
the  call  of  the  Secretary  General  for  an 
immediate  meeting  and  to  reject  the 
idea  that  a  situation  can  be  so  urgent  as 
to  require  action  under  article  99  and 
then  wait  until  one  party  finds  it  conven- 
ient to  appear. 

What  we  sought  to  do  was  to,  in  a 
sense,  bend  over  backward  to  insure 
that  there  was  no  excuse  for  the  con- 
sideration of  the  Council  on  the  issue 
before  it,  and  that  issue,  stripped  of  all 


of  the  rhetoric  which  may  be  present,  is 
the  question  of  the  illegal  detention  of 
the  American  diplomatic  personnel  and 
the  occupation  of  the  American  diplo- 
matic premises  in  Iran  in  violation  of 
every  principle  of  international  law. 

There  has  been  a  great  deal  of  dis- 
cussion within  the  Council  in  the  con- 
sultations over  the  last  several  days 
with  regard  to  the  procedure  which  was 
to  be  followed.  And  some  of  the  discus- 
sions went  on  at  interminable  length. 

Basically  what  the  Council  has 
done  has  been  to  publicly  and  formally 
not  only  restate  the  important  ])rinciple 
involved  here,  which  is  the  inviolability 
of  diplomatic  personnel,  but  to  both  re- 
state and  reiterate  that  principle  and 
the  call  for  release  despite  the  excuses 
which  have  been  offered  for  the  action 
which  has  been  taken.  Our  effort  here 
was  to  insure  that  that  was  done  even 
while  trying  to  accommodate  and  to  in- 
sure that  there  was  no  excuse,  no  im- 
pediment to  the  work  of  the  Council. 

I  think  it  is  clear  from  the  reitera- 
tion of  the  statement  by  the  President 
of  the  Council,  on  the  behalf  of  all  of  its 
members,  that  the  position  of  the 
Council  with  regard  to  the  holding  of 
hostages  is  one  which  is  unanimously 
held.  In  my  own  experience  here  in  the 
last  3  weeks  since  this  unbelievable 
event  occurred,  I  have  not  come  upon 
any  single  delegate,  whether  they  are 
in  agreement  with  the  United  States  on 
other  issues  or  in  disagreement  with 
the  United  States  on  other  issues,  I 
have  yet  to  find  one  delegate  who  has 
defended  the  action  which  has  been 
taken  by  the  authorities  in  Iran. 

I  think  that  one  thing  is  clear,  one 
additional  thing  is  clear,  and  it  is  that 
the  unanimity  which  is  present  in  the 
Security  Council  and  in  the  General  As- 
sembly as  a  whole  is  one  which  is  also 
present  with  regard  to  the  American 
public.  Despite  efforts  to  try  and  take 
advantage  of  differences  which  may 
exist  within  our  own  society,  Ameri- 
cans are  at  one,  whether  they  are 
women  or  men,  white  or  black;  they  are 
at  one  in  the  insistence  that  American 
diplomatic  personnel  held  in  Iran  be 
released  and  be  released  safely  and 
promptly.  I  think  in  view  of  the  gravity 
of  the  situation,  the  restraint  which  has 
been  shown  by  the  American  public  is  a 
restraint  which  is  both  admirable,  and  I 
would  suggest  to  you  one  which  must 
not  be  misunderstood.  It  would  be  a 
mistake  to  interpret  the  restraint  which 
exists  as  one  which  in  any  way  ac- 
quiesces with  the  action  which  has  been 
taken  in  Iran. 


49 


United  Nations 


General  view  of  the  Security  Council  on  December  4,  1979,  when  the  15  members 
(U.S.,  Norway,  Portugal,  U.K.,  Gabon,  France,  Bolivia,  Bangladesh,  U.S.S.R.,  Zam- 
bia, Nigeria.  Czechoslovakia.  China,  Jamaica,  and  Kuwait)  unanimously  adopted  a 
resolution  calling  on  Iran  to  immediately  release  the  U.S.  personnel  being  held  in 
Tehran. 


Our  e.xpectation  is  that  the  Council 
will  meet  on  Saturday.  We  specifically 
insisted  that  it  not  only  have  a  day 
given  but  that  the  Council  would  have 
to  set  a  time,  and  we  insisted  that  the 
Iranians  had  to  submit  a  letter  to  the 
President  of  the  Security  Council  this 
morning,  prior  to  any  agreement  on 
this  afternoon's  activities,  indicating 
that  they  would  be  present  and  indi- 
cating the  individual  who  would  be 
present. 

Our  hope  is  that  the  efforts  of  the 
Secretary  General  over  the  last  3  weeks 
will  be  facilitated  by  the  jjrocess  which 
has  been  set  in  train. 

There  is  one  final  point  which  I 
wish  to  make.  I  have  read  some  of  your 
statements  in  terms  of  dissension 
within  the  Council  and  I  think  that  in 
some  instances  individuals,  members  of 
the  Council,  are  done  a  disservice  by 
the  interpretations,  snippets  here  and 
there,  because  I  think  as  was  indicated 
by  the  unanimous  statement  which  the 
President  read,  the  Council  is  at  one  on 
the  question  of  the  release  of  the  hos- 
tages and  maintains  that  position  de- 
spite the  effort  to  put  this  in  a  broader 
context. 


AMBASSADOR  McHENRY, 
DEC.  1,  1979^ 

Twenty-seven  days  ago,  63  Ameri- 
cans, as  well  as  personnel  of  other 
nationalities,  were  seized  when  an 
armed,  disciplined  group  of  dem- 
onstrators invaded  the  U.S.  Embassy 
in  Tehran.  Eighteen  of  those  cajHured 
have  been  released.  At  least  50  Ameri- 
cans remain  captive. 


As  with  diplomats  everywhere,  the 
individuals  who  were  taken  hostage  are 
entitled  to  the  protection  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Iran  by  the  most  solemn 
commitment  nations  can  give  —  the 
sovereign  pledge  of  governments  by 
treaty  and  international  obligation. 

Governments  retain  the  right  to 
require  that  foreign  diplomatic  person- 
nel leave  their  soil.  But  every  standard 
of  international  behavior,  whether  es- 
tablished by  practice,  by  ethics,  by 
treaty,  or  by  common  humanity,  sup- 
ports the  principle  that  the  personnel  of 
a  diplomatic  mission  and  diiilomatic 
property  are  inviolate.  Even  in  the 
darkest  moments  of  relationships  be- 
tween countries,  the  security  and 
well-being  of  diplomatic  personnel  have 
been  respected. 

Iran  asks  that  its  grievances  be 
heard  and  acted  upon.  Yet  Iran,  and 
the  authorities  who  speak  for  it,  are 
violating  the  most  basic  obligation  of 
nations.  They  hold  hostage  the  very 
people  who  facilitate  those  communica- 
tions that  can  resolve  differences  and 
lead  to  understanding  and  agreement 
among  nations. 

None  of  us,  whatever  our  differ- 
ences on  other  issues,  can  ignore  the 
implications  for  all  of  us  of  this  event. 
Nor  can  the  world  ignore  that  these 
diplomatic  representatives  are  being 
held  under  degrading  conditions.  They 
are  threatened,  kept  bound,  isolated, 
not  allowed  to  speak,  denied  mail.  Even 
their  whereabouts  are  uncertain.  All  of 
us  at  this  table  are  also  diplomatic  rep- 
resentatives of  our  countries,  charged 
with  the  same  duties  and  protected  by 
the  same  laws  and  rules  of  conduct  as 
those  now  held  captive  in  Tehran.  It  is 
for  all  of  us  to  speak  up  to  demand  their 


release  and  to  insist  upon  basic  condi-    f' 
tions  of  humanity  for  their  care  pendinc ' 
that  release,  including  daily  visitation 
by  impartial  observers. 

Many  members  of  the  United  Na-   u, 
.tions,  including  some  members  of  this  n. 
Council,  have  had  ambassadors  mur-     || 
dered,  diplomatic  personnel  injured,     J 
,  embassy  facilities  destroyed.  On  each    J 
occasion  the  delicate  framework  of  our 
international  community  has  been 
.  harmed,  but  efforts  were  made  to  n- 
pair  the  wounds.  The  situation  in 
Tehran  has  a  feature  unlike  other  as- 
saults on  the  diplomatic  ties  that  bind  {u 
our  world.  In  Iran,  the  government  it-  I 
self  defends  the  violence  which  hold?     ■" 
diplomats  hostage.  Such  a  position  is 
intolerable. 

The  United  States  insists  that  its  j 
diplomatic  personnel  be  released  and  its  n 
diplomatic  premises  restored.  These  jg 
ai'e  not  negotiable  matters.  The  Unitec  ^ 
States  will  hold  the  authorities  in  Iran  ;' 
fully  responsible  for  the  safety  of  the  f| 
Americans  held  captive.  \j 

I  speak  today  for  hostages  who  an 
endangered  by  the  frenzy  and  uncer-    _ 
tainty  of  events,  by  the  inhumane  con- 
ditions under  which  they  are  held,  and 
by  the  threat  of  the  authorities  in  Iran  ^^ 
to  compound  unjust  acts  through  trials  * 

Around  the  world,  nations  of  East  " 
and  West,  North  and  South,  in  indi-  '* 
vidual  and  collective  statements,  have  '• 
expressed  their  opposition  to  this  viola-  * 
tion  of  international  law  and  called  for  * 
the  immediate  release  of  the  hostages,  "t 
We  express  our  appreciation  for  this  jj 
overwhelming  expression  of  interna-  ff 
tional  concern  and  support  in  behalf  of 
principles  that  lie  at  the  heart  of 
civilized  international  behavior. 

In  this  spirit,  the  President  of  the  " 
Security  Council,  speaking  for  the  1 
members  of  this  body,  has  twice  ur-  J 
gently  appealed  for  the  release  of  the  f 
hostages.  The  President  of  the  General  \ 
Assembly  has  twice  spoken  eloquently  •! 
in  support  of  this  plea.  The  Secretary  f 
General  of  the  United  Nations  has 
worked  unceasingly  to  resolve  this 
crisis. 

There  has  not  been  a  satisfactory  j 
response,  and  the  hostages  are  still  nol  1 
free.  We  gather  here  to  determine  wha  |' 
more  can  be  done.  : 

None  of  us  is  deaf  to  the  passionate  ^ 
voices  that  speak  of  injustice,  that  C17  * 
out  against  past  wrongs,  and  that  ask  J 
for  understanding.  There  is  not  a  single (| 
grievance  alleged  or  spoken  in  this  '' 
situation  that  could  not  be  heard  in  an  '* 
appropriate  forum. 

In  addition,  as  we  have  said  from 
the  beginning,  the  United  States  if 
mains  ready,  upon  the  release  of  thi 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulle;; 


United  Nations 


luvs,  to  discuss  with  the  Iranian 
iiities  the  differences  which  exist 
icii  us  and  to  seek  their  resolution. 
lint  no  country  can  call  for  justice 
•  at  the  same  time  denying  it  to  the 
I  iscless.  No  country  can  breach  the 
r.  fundamental  rules  of  the  commu- 
'(il  nations  and  at  the  same  time  ex- 
cthat  community  to  be  helpful  in  the 
oiems  which  it  perceives  for  itself. 
In  the  simplest  terms,  no  country 
.nireak  and  ignore  the  law  while 
•eing  its  benefits. 
What  is  it  that  the  world  can  agree 
I   if  not  the  protection  and  respect 

lose  whom  we  appoint  to  represent 
1  (i\ereignty  and  resolve  our  differ- 


The  United  States  insists 
its  diplomatic  personnel 
(■leased  and  its  diplomatic 
nises  restored.  These  are 
Negotiable  matters. 


How  tragic  for  Iran,  how  tragic  for 
•evorld  that  threats  to  peace  are 
i;  (li-iven  to  a  new  crescendo.  The 
I   powerful  voices  in  Iran  are  en- 
t  iging  violence  in  neighboring 
ii  tries  and  condoning  bloodshed 
it:^r  than  condemning  it.  In  addition, 
)t  ly  unfounded  charges  which  can 
n]  inflame  the  situation  are  being 
,ae  against  the  United  States  with 
^sect  to  the  current  crisis. 
The  United  States,  in  all  the  years 
<  history,  has  had  as  a  fundamental 
iL'iple  the  freedom  of  all  people  to 
Qihip  as  they  choose.  Out  of  this  his- 
a  and  long  association,  we  honor  and 
■sect  the  leaders  and  the  nations  of 
hi. 

The  principle  of  noninterference  in 
(internal  affairs  of  other  nations  is 
i    a  tenet  of  the  United  Nations  and 
ic  foreign  policy  of  the  United 
(s.  and  that  includes,  of  course,  re- 
t  for  the  territorial  integrity, 
i.ical  independence,  and  sovereignty 
an.  We  respect  the  right  of  the 
lie  of  Iran  to  determine  their  own 
rr  through  institutions  of  their  own 
1  i.siiig.  All  of  us  must  accept  their 
€'sions. 
The  President  of  the  United 
ts,  speaking  for  a  unified  and  de- 
iiincd  nation,  has  made  it  clear  that 
;irf  seeking  a  peaceful  resolution  to 
coiiOict  so  that  the  wounds  of  the 
t  lan  be  healed.  In  this  spirit,  the 
ti'd  States  has  turned  to  the  Secu- 
Council  and  the  Secretary  General 


in  the  search  for  a  peaceful  solution.  In 
this  spirit,  the  United  States  has  begun 
proceedings  in  the  International  Court 
of  Justice. 

There  is  in  the  United  States  a 
unity  of  purpose,  a  disciplined  sensitiv- 
ity to  the  needs  of  peace,  a  determina- 
tion to  search  out  all  peaceful  means  to 
bring  this  dispute  to  a  just  conclusion, 
and  also  a  determination  to  do  what 
must  be  done  to  protect  our  fellow  citi- 
zens and  the  rule  of  law.  That  unity  of 
purpose  is  shared  by  all  Americans.  But 
make  no  mistake.  Beneath  that  disci- 
pline is  a  seething  anger  which  Ameri- 
cans properly  feel  as  they  witness  on 
daily  television  new  threats  and  out- 
rages against  their  fellow  citizens.  The 
hostages  must  be  freed. 


AMBASSADOR  McHENRY, 
DEC.  4,  19793 

The  15  members  of  the  Security 
Council  in  their  action  today  have  given 
unanimous  expression  once  more  to 
their  urgent  call  on  the  Government  of 
Iran  for  the  immediate  and  uncondi- 
tional release  of  the  hostages  of  our 
Embassy  being  held  in  Tehran.  They 
have  called  on  the  Government  of  Iran 
to  provide  the  hostages  protection  and 
to  allow  them  to  leave  the  country. 

It  is  clear  from  this  vote  and  from 
the  debate  of  the  last  4  days,  in  which 
representatives  from  all  parts  of  the 
world  have  participated,  that  the  family 
of  nations  speaks  with  one  voice  in 
calling  for  the  immediate  release  of  the 
hostages.  We  are  deeply  appreciative. 

We  hope  that  this  call  of  the  Secu- 
rity Council  will  be  heeded  and  carried 
out  by  the  Government  of  Iran  in  a 
matter  of  hours.  Whatever  the  time  re- 
quired, we  urge  the  Secretary  General, 
in  the  exercise  of  his  good  offices,  to 
provide  all  humanitarian  support  possi- 
ble to  those  being  detained  against 
their  will.  We  remain  deeply  concerned 
for  their  safety,  their  well-being,  and 
their  health  on  this,  their  30th  day  of 
suffering  and  isolation. 

The  United  States  wishes  to  place 
on  the  record  that  the  adoption  of  this 
resolution  by  the  Security  Council 
clearly  is  not  intended  to  displace 
peaceful  efforts  in  other  organs  of  the 
United  Nations.  Neither  the  United 
States  nor  any  other  member  intends 
that  the  adoption  of  this  resolution 
should  have  any  prejudicial  impact 
whatever  on  the  request  of  the  United 
States  for  the  indication  of  provisional 
measures  of  protection  by  the  Interna- 
tional Court  of  Justice. 


With  the  hostages  released,  the 
resolution  calls  on  the  Governments  of 
Iran  and  the  United  States  to  take  ur- 
gent steps  to  resolve  peacefully  the  re- 
maining issues  between  them  in  accord- 
ance with  the  purposes  and  principles  of 
the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations.  The 
United  States  is  fully  prepared  to  coop- 
erate with  this  call. 

Many  speakers  in  this  debate  have 
also  referred  to  the  grievances  of  the 
people  of  Iran.  I  myself  did  so  when  I 
remarked  that:  "None  of  us  is  deaf  to 
the  passionate  voices  that  speak  of  in- 
justice, that  cry  out  against  past 
wrongs,  and  that  ask  for  understanding. 
There  is  not  a  single  grievance  alleged 
or  spoken  in  this  situation  that  could 
not  be  heard  in  an  appropriate  forum." 
The  Security  Council  has  now  also 
noted  those  grievances  in  its  acknowl- 
edgment of  the  Iranian  letter  of 
November  13.  1979. 

Neither  the  United  States  nor  the 
other  members  of  the  community  of  na- 
tions has  a  desire  to  isolate  Iran.  We 
are  all  members  of  the  United  Nations. 
Let  us  then,  all  of  us,  be  true  to  the 
purposes  and  principles  of  the  charter 
which  we  have  pledged  ourselves  to 
honor. 

SECURITY  COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION  457^ 

The  Security  Council. 

Having  considered  the  letter  dated  25 
November  1979  from  the  Secretary- 
General  (S/13646), 

Deeply  concerned  at  the  dangerous 
level  of  tension  between  Iran  and  the 
United  States  of  America,  which  could 
have  grave  consequences  for  international 
peace  and  security, 

Recalling  the  appeal  made  by  the 
President  of  the  Security  Council  on  9 
November  1979  (S/13616),  which  was  reit- 
erated on  27  November  1979  (S/13652), 

Taking  note  of  the  letter  dated  13 
November  1979  from  the  Foreign  Minister 
of  Iran  {S/13626)  relative  to  the  grievances 
of  Iran, 

Mindful  of  the  obligation  of  States  to 
settle  their  international  disputes  by 
peaceful  means  in  such  a  manner  that  in- 
ternational peace  and  security,  and  justice, 
are  not  endangered. 

Conscious  of  the  responsibility  of 
States  to  refrain  in  their  international  rela- 
tions from  the  threat  or  use  of  force  against 
the  territorial  integrity  or  political  inde- 
pendence of  any  State,  or  in  any  other 
manner  inconsistent  with  the  purposes  of 
the  United  Nations, 

Reaffirming  the  solemn  obligation  of 
all  States  Parties  to  both  the  Vienna  Con- 
vention on  Diplomatic  Relations  of  1961  and 
the  Vienna  Convention  on  Consular  Rela- 
tions of  1962  to  respect  the  inviolability  of 
diplomatic  personnel  and  the  premises  of 
their  missions, 


J  luary  1980 


51 


United  Nations 


1.  Urgently  calls  on  the  Government  of 
Iran  to  release  immediately  the  personnel 
of  the  Embassy  of  the  United  States  of 
America  being  held  in  Teheran,  to  provide 
them  protection  and  allow  them  to  leave 
the  country; 

2.  Further  calla  on  the  Governments  of 
Iran  and  of  the  United  States  to  take  steps 
to  resolve  peacefully  the  remaining  issues 
between  them  to  their  mutual  satisfaction 
in  accordance  with  the  purposes  and  princi- 
ples of  the  United  Nations; 

3.  Urges  the  Governments  of  Iran  and 
of  the  United  States  to  exercise  the  utmost 
restraint  in  the  prevailing  situation; 

4.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to 
lend  his  good  offices  for  the  immediate  im- 
plementation of  this  resolution  and  to  take 
all  appropriate  measures  to  this  end; 

5.  Decides  that  the  Council  will  remain 
actively  seized  of  the  matter  and  requests 
the  Secretary-General  to  report  urgently  to 
it  on  developments  regarding  his  efforts.  ■ 


'USUN  pressrelease  129. 
'USUN  press  release  134. 
'USUN  pressrelease  138. 
'Adopted  unanimously  on  Dec.  4,  1979. 


Agenda  of  Global 
Economic  issues 


by  Howard  T.  Rosen 

Statement  in  Committee  II  (Eco- 
nomic and  Financial)  of  the  U.N. 
General  Assembly  on  October  12,  1979. 
Mr.  Rosen  is  a  U.S.  delegate  to  the 
U.N.  General  Assembly.^ 

We  meet  in  the  34th  General  As- 
sembly of  the  United  Nations  at  a  criti- 
cal time  in  international  economic  rela- 
tions. The  global  economy  faces  serious 
challenges: 

•  The  traditional  fuel  supply  of  our 
planet  is  shrinking  while  its  population 
is  burgeoning. 

•  Economic  growth  is  slowing 
while  the  aspirations  of  the  world's  citi- 
zens are  soaring. 

•  The  shocks  of  high  oil  prices  are 
undermining  economic  stability. 

•  Joblessness  is  increasing  and  in- 
flation eroding  the  real  value  of  income. 

•  Exchange  markets  are  moving 
erratically  and  gold  prices  are  rising  ir- 
rationally. 

•  Protectionist  pressures  are 
mounting  even  as  international  trade  is 
becoming  increasingly  important  to  the 
health  and  prosperity  of  all  nations  and 
their  people. 


•  The  interdependence  of  our  des- 
tinies is  becoming  clearer,  yet  the  call 
for  protectionism  is  growing  louder. 

These  challenges  must  be  met  and 
they  must  be  met  urgently.  All  of  our 
futures,  and  those  of  our  children,  will 
depend  on  the  outcome  of  our  en- 
deavors. We  will  succeed  in  restoring 
balance  to  the  world  economy  and  pro- 
moting national  and  international 
growth  and  prosperity  if  we  demon- 
strate the  will  to  take  strong  actions 
domestically  and  globally.  We  will  fail  if 
we  procrastinate  or  seek  to  avoid  hard 
decisions  by  casting  all  the  blame  for 
the  current  malaise  elsewhere.  New 
initiatives  will  be  required,  but  older 
programs  and  institutions,  whose  effec- 
tiveness has  been  tested,  must  continue 
to  be  utilized  and  strengthened. 

A  cooperative  international  ap- 
proach is  imperative  for  the  orderly  and 
mutually  beneficial  management  of  the 
world  economy.  Such  an  approach  re- 
quires that  all  nations  set  their  domes- 
tic houses  in  order  as  well  as  seek  in- 
ternational solutions  to  issues  of  global 
significance. 

On  the  national  level  the  indus- 
trialized countries  must  curb  inflation 
while  maintaining  employment,  stimu- 
late growth,  seek  to  insure  that  their 
economic  actions  do  not  adversely  af- 
fect others,  and  undertake  effective 
measures  to  produce  more  energy  and 
moderate  their  consumption. 

The  developing  countries  must  in- 
crease domestic  savings  and  invest- 
ment, utilize  scarce  economic  resources 
more  effectively,  and  make  difficult 
trade-offs  between  growth  rates  and 
indebtedness. 

The  oil-exporting  nations  must  ac- 
cept, in  their  pricing  and  production 
policies,  the  responsibilities  for  global 
economic  health  and  stability  thrust  on 
them  by  their  position  as  suppliers  of 
the  world's  chief  source  of  energy. 

And  the  countries  with  centrally 
planned  economies  must  follow  internal 
programs  and  policies  which  both  re- 
flect the  reality  of  their  increasing  par- 
ticipation in  the  global  economic  system 
and  enable  them  to  assume  their  re- 
sponsibilities vis-a-vis  the  developing 
countries. 

U.S.  Domestic  Actions 

Let  me  briefly  note  several  recent 
actions  taken  by  President  Carter  to 
strengthen  the  U.S.  economy  and  con- 
tribute to  international  economic  pros- 
perity and  stability. 

Determined  to  maintain  a  reason- 
able balance  in  our  external  accounts 
and  to  insure  that  the  dollar  is  sound 


and  stable,  my  government  has  im- 
plemented policies  to  strengthen  un- 
derlying economic  conditions  and  to 
counter  market  disruptions  with  force- 
ful exchange  market  operations.  In 
1980  we  expect  a  strong  current  ac- 
count surplus.  We  are  confident  that 
budgetary  stringency  measures  and 
policies  announced  last  week  to  raise 
interest  rates,  slow  monetary  growth, 
and  increase  reserve  requirements  will 
moderate  significantly  our  inflation 
rate,  sharply  reduce  inflationary  expec- 
tations, and  strengthen  the  dollar. 
These  efforts  will  be  reinforced  by  the 
new  national  accord  with  labor  that 
provides,  among  other  things,  for  an 
effective  voluntary  program  of  wage 
and  price  restraints.  We  will  overcome 
our  energy  difficulties;  the  President!! 
committed  to  hold  down  oil  imports,  to 
raise  domestic  oil  prices  to  market 
levels,  and  to  assist  the  development  o 
domestic  alternate  energy  supplies,  in- 
cluding new  and  renewable  sources  of 
energy. 

These  unilateral  actions  by  the 
United  States,  and  equally  appropriatf 
ones  by  other  nations — developed  and 
developing,  producer  and  consumer — 
are  necessary  for  internal  and  global 
prosperity.  But  by  themselves  they  ar 
not  sufficient.  We  face  many  common 
problems  —  global  probl ems  —  where 
complementary  national  actions  are  es 
sential,  or  we  all  suffer.  And  most  of 
these  problems  cannot  accurately  be 
characterized  as  North-South  issues 
that  demand  action  by  one  group  of 
countries  for  the  primary  benefit  of 
another.  Instead  they  are  global  con- 
cerns that  require  action  by  all  and  en 
tail  gains  to  all. 

Energy 

The  subject  of  energy  is  the  most 
obvious.  The  farmer  buying  diesel  fuel 
in  Iowa  and  the  farmer  buying  kerosen 
near  Khartoum  must  both  cope  with 
rising  world  petroleum  prices.  Govern 
ments  in  the  richest  countries  and  thos 
in  the  poorest  must  deal  with  the  im- 
pact of  higher  energy  costs  and  rising 
energy  demand  on  their  national 
economies. 

Those  who  suffer  most  as  we  ente 
the  era  of  energy  scarcity  are  to  be 
found  in  the  countries  emerging  from 
centuries  of  deprivation.  In  the  de- 
veloping nations,  3  billion  people  need 
energy  at  prices  they  can  afford  if  the; 
are  to  rise  from  lives  of  bai'e  subsis- 
tence. The  oil-importing  developing 
countries  will  face  an  oil  bill  in  1979  of 
more  than  $35  billion,  an  increase  of  $1 
billion  over  only  a  year  earlier. 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulled 


United  Nations 


The  distinguished  Minister  of  Ex- 
- 1  Affairs  of  India  spoke  last  week 
'  special  problem  that  energy 
to  many  developing  economies: 
arc  marked  by  limited  substitution 
hilities  for  priority  uses  such  as 
I  port ,  by  the  high  capital  intensity 
it'tnative  energy  sources,  and  by 
ifficulty  of  reducing  further  a  level 
eisumption  already  at  bare  and  es- 
ral  minimums. 
■]\en  the  oil-exporting  countries 
selves  cannot  regard  the  effects  of 
lice  and  supply  policies  on  the 
I  economy  with  complacency,  for 
iTects  adversely  impact  on  them. 
H'  are  poor  countries,  despite  their 
I'oduction.  All  have  ambitious  de- 
l(iment  plans  that  can  be  under- 
n:l  by  global  inflation  and  recession, 
111  are  related  in  part  to  rising  oil 

(S. 

luch  needs  to  be  done.  Secretary 
.re  indicated  in  the  General  Assem- 
•  key  question  today  is  whether  the 
(  porting  nations  are  pi-epared  to 
i/.e  i)riees  and,  to  the  extent  it  is 
11  control,  to  insure  adequate 
y.  All  nations  must  use  energy 
.  elTiciently.  They  must  also  inten- 
fforts  to  develop  their  domestic 
cs  of  energy.  National  and  inter- 
,:ial  efforts  should  aim  at  the  re- 
al h,  exploration,  and  development 
ptroleum  and  its  alternatives  as 
rif  an  overall  strategy  for  increas- 
;  orld  supply. 
so  single  subject  is  in  such  need  of 
\  agreement,  and  action  by  this 
I-  energy.  Yet  in  an  interdepend- 
i  urlcl,  there  are  other  vital  issues 
lii  must  be  addressed  if  we  are  to 
V  a  healthy  world  economy. 


bod  and  nutrition  are  also  eco- 
problems  of  global  dimensions. 
ite  the  "green  revolution"  and 
r  food  production  worldwide,  de- 
I  generated  by  burgeoning  popula- 
and  improved  eating  habits  is 
lly  outdistancing  supply.  There 
larming  predictions  of  widespread 
e  in  several  parts  of  the  world  in 
980's.  The  situation  is  much  more 
al  than  most  believe.  As  with 
;y,  a  major  international  effort  is 
red. 

)ur  world  cannot  tolerate  that  one 
ery  five  of  its  citizens  is  sick  or 
:  or  hungry  because  he  or  she  does 
ave  enough  to  eat.  We  must  act 
;her  to  increase  food  production, 
ove  its  distribution,  and  promote 
ir  nutrition,  particularly  with  re- 
to  the  world's  poorest. 


The  United  States  is  contributing 
in  a  major  way  to  dealing  effectively 
with  the  international  problem.  Our 
bilateral  assistance  alone  in  the  agricul- 
tural area,  including  concessionary  food 
assistance,  will  surpass  $2  billion  this 
year.  In  various  international  foi'a,  we 
are  pressing  for  progress  on  world  food 
security,  including  rapid  completion  of 
a  new  food  aid  convention  and  for  in- 
creased international  funding  for  ag- 
ricultural research.  We  are  also 
stressing  the  importance  of  adoption  by 
governments  of  food  sector  strategies 
which  can  help  increase  domestic  food 
production  and  improved  nutritional 
levels. 

Trade 

The  experiences  of  the  past  30 
years  have  demonstrated  the  value  to 
all  nations  of  an  increasingly  open  in- 
ternational trading  system.  The  re- 
cently concluded  trade  negotiations  — 
the  most  recent  of  several  major 
liberalizations  since  World  War  II  — 
resulted  in  major  tariff  cuts,  significant 
reductions  in  nontariff  barriers,  and  an 
intensified  framework  agreement  that 
permits  special  and  differentiated 
treatment  for  developing  countries. 
Though  less  than  many  of  us  would 
have  desired,  the  multilateral  trade 
negotiations  did  produce  benefits  for 
all.  It  is  in  the  interests  of  developing 
counti'ies  to  sign  the  various  codes  at  an 
early  date  and  participate  actively  in 
their  implementation  to  insure  that 
their  respective  interests  are  advanced. 

Other  Issues 

Other  global  issues  require  con- 
tinuing attention  by  the  international 
community — managing  the  growing 
deficits  of  a  number  of  countries;  pro- 
viding better  health  care  worldwide: 
spreading  the  benefits  of  science  and 
technology  around  the  world;  increas- 
ing employment  opportunities  and  im- 
proving living  conditions  of  the  poor  in 
whichever  country  they  are  found;  and 
protecting  the  political,  economic,  and 
social  rights  of  all  human  beings. 

Most  economic  questions  of  major 
consequence  to  the  world  economy  are 
under  discussion  in  international  fora. 
The  exception  is  energy.  This  General 
Assembly  could  make  a  significant  con- 
tribution to  global  economic  health  and 
stability  by  agreeing  to  a  program  for 
getting  discussion  of  the  world  energy 
situation  underway. 

We  have  an  extremely  full  interna- 
tional calendar  before  us,  in  Committee 
II  and  elsewhere.  In  addition  to  our 
own  work,  the  negotiations  on  the 


ary  1980 


common  fund  and  commodities  under 
the  U.N.  Conference  on  Trade  and  De- 
velopment are  in  progress;  in  Belgrade 
the  Development  Committee  recently 
agreed  to  recommend  that  the  World 
Bank  and  the  International  Monetary 
Fund  study  several  important  financial 
issues:  and  the  implementation  of  new 
codes  negotiated  in  the  multilateral 
trade  negotiations  will  soon  begin  in  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade.  In  addition,  if  approved  by  the 
General  Assembly,  the  Committee  of 
the  Whole  will  begin  consultations  in 
January  on  the  most  effective  way  of 
conducting  a  new  round  of  global 
negotiations.  The  special  session  next 
year  will  consider  the  international  de- 
velopment strategy  and  decide  on  the 
new  round  of  global  negotiations.  In 
1981,  the  United  Nations  will  hold  the 
important  Conference  on  New  and  Re- 
newable Energy. 

Our  full  calendar  is  a  positive  sign 
that  the  international  community  rec- 
ognizes the  urgency  of  dealing  with  the 
global  issues. 

The  following  story,  told  to  me  by  a 
South  American  diplomat,  makes  a 
point  we  should  ponder  in  our  work.  He 
said  a  college  professor  established  a 
model  farm  in  a  remote  rural  area  of  his 
country.  The  local  farmers  were  as- 
tounded by  the  excellent  crops  that  re- 
sulted from  his  new,  innovative  agricul- 
tural methods.  One  day  the  professor 
announced  that  he  was  going  to  train 
his  horse,  a  fine  stallion,  to  survive 
without  food  or  water.  Even  though 
they  were  astounded  by  the  plan,  in 
view  of  his  previous  record,  the  farmers 
thought  it  might  be  possible  for  the 
professor  to  succeed.  After  a  week  had 
passed,  one  of  the  farmers  asked  the 
professor  about  the  progress  of  his 
stallion.  He  replied  that  the  stallion  had 
been  learning  very  rapidly  and  was  on 
the  verge  of  a  breakthrough  until  —  for 
no  apparent  reason — it  had  unexpect- 
edly expired. 

Clearly,  if  we  do  not  act  vigorously 
and  with  urgency,  the  international 
community  may  fail  in  meeting  the 
challenges  of  the  global  economic  is- 
sues, to  the  detriment  of  all  nations. 

With  the  conclusion  of  our  general 
debate,  let  us  then  turn  to  our  work 
with  a  spirit  of  dedication  and  a  deter- 
mination to  make  our  session  produc- 
tive and  meaningful.  Let  us  approach 
our  task  in  a  manner  that  will  insure 
that  our  efforts  here  contribute  to  con- 
crete progress  in  dealing  with  the  eco- 
nomic issues  of  concern  to  all  nations. 
Unfortunately,  we  have  little  time  to 
accomplish  all  that  is  before  us.  For 
that  reason,  I  will  not  deal  specifically 


53 


United  Nations 


in  these  remarks  with  all  of  the  key 
items  on  our  agenda;  I  will  put  forward 
the  U.S.  positions  as  we  come  to  the  in- 
dividual subjects.  My  delegation  will 
contribute  constructively  to  our  com- 
mon Herculean  task  of  completing  our 
work  in  this  committee.  ■ 

■USUN  press  release  89. 


Arms  Control 


by  George  M.  Seignious  II 

Statement  in  Committee  I  (Politi- 
cal and  Security)  of  the  U.N.  General 
Assembly  on  October  18,  1979.  Mr. 
Seignious  is  Director  of  the  U.S.  Arms 
Control  and  Disarmament  Agency. '^ 

I  am  pleased  to  have  this  opportu- 
nity to  address  the  First  Committee  of 
the  United  Nations  General  Assembly. 
This  is  my  first  visit  to  the  United  Na- 
tions as  Director  of  the  United  States 
Arms  Control  and  Disarmament 
Agency.  I  am  honored  to  be  here. 

The  fact  that  some  $450  billion  is 
spent  the  world  over  every  year  for 
arms,  the  fact  that  1,000  missile 
warheads  could  kill  more  than  100  mil- 
lion people,  the  fact  that  conflict  any- 
where could  result  in  destruction 
everywhere — these  facts  make  the 
pursuit  of  peace  a  necessity  for  all 
humanity. 

The  fact  that  this  committee  now 
deals  only  with  disarmament  and  secu- 
rity, the  fact  that  more  nations  than 
ever  before  are  actively  participating  in 
the  consideration  of  disarmament  is- 
sues, the  fact  that  there  are  some  nine 
international  arms  control  conventions 
in  effect  which  have  been  adhered  to  by 
most  of  the  nations  of  the  world  —  these 
facts  testify  to  a  simple  conclusion: 
arms  control  and  disarmament  are  the 
province  of  all  nations. 

We  have  an  immense  task  ahead  of 
us.  It  is  difficult  enough  psychologically 
for  any  nation  or  people  to  share  re- 
sponsibility for  their  security  with 
other  nations.  How  much  more  of  a 
revolution  in  thinking  is  required  for 
nations  to  see  security  as  a  function  of 
reducing  the  very  arms  that  often  have 
been  the  only  means  that  they  have  had 
to  insure  their  security.  Arms  control, 
in  short,  does  not  come  naturally,  and 


any  progress — although  it  may  fall 
short  of  our  hopes — should  be  wel- 
comed as  a  step  toward  security 
through  restraint  of  arms  and  as  a  step 
away  from  the  tradition  of  security  only 
through  arms. 

Because  so  many  challenges  re- 
main, progress  should  not  mean  com- 
placency. We  cannot  be  satisfied  with 
the  security  of  the  world  as  it  is.  The 
weapons  we  have  within  our  collective 
hands  are  too  numerous  and  too  awe- 
some to  entrust  our  common  destiny  to 
good  fortune  and  chance.  We  must  ac- 
tively seek  a  safer  world  and  never  fal- 
ter in  that  search. 

My  government  has  negotiated  and 
supported  two  SALT  treaties,  because 
we  believe  that  strategic  arms  lim- 
itations that  are  equitable  can  enhance 
the  security  of  all  nations.  No  agree- 
ment constructed  on  unilateral  gain  or 
fiat  can  long  endure,  even  if  it  were 
possible  to  achieve  in  the  first  place. 
Consensus  on  SALT  between  two  na- 
tions, or  on  any  other  arms  control  is- 
sues among  many  nations,  is  a  difficult 
but  unyielding  prerequisite  for  success, 
for  we  are  dealing  with  fundamental  is- 
sues of  security  and  survival. 

The  process  of  SALT  confirms  that 
serious  negotiations,  seriously  con- 
ducted, can  move  forward  provided 
they  do  not  bear  impossible  burdens. 
No  arms  control  talks  will  succeed  if 
they  must  right  every  age-old  wrong. 
And  no  arms  control  talks  can  make 
progress  if  political  advantage,  rather 
than  the  enhancement  of  mutual  secu- 
rity, is  the  principal  purpose.  My  gov- 
ernment is  firmly  committed  to  arms 
control  agreements  based  on  principles 
of  equity  and  improved  security  —  for 
all. 

Today,  I  want  to  discuss  five  arms 
control  subjects  that  I  know  are  of 
interest  to  this  committee.  All  of  them 
demonstrate  that  our  task  ahead  is  not 
without  challenge  as  it  is  also  not  with- 
out hope. 

SALT  II  Treaty 

I  want  to  begin  with  the  new 
agreement — SALT  II  —  to  limit 
strategic  offensive  nuclear  arms.  I  have 
said  over  and  over  to  my  fellow  citizens 
that  SALT  II  is  not  the  millenium,  nor 
will  it  stop  competition,  nor  will  it 
guarantee  permanent  stability.  But  it  is 
still  a  remarkable  accomplishment. 

•  The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  have  established,  for  the  first 
time,  equal  ceilings  on  strategic  nuclear 
forces. 

•  We  have  negotiated  equal  sub- 
ceilings  on  strategic  systems  carrying 


multiple  independently  targetable 
warheads. 

•  We  have  begun  the  much-desiit 
process  of  reductions. 

•  We  have  taken  major  steps  tn 
control  the  technological  arms  race, 
such  as  limiting  the  numbers  of 
warheads  allowed  on  each  missile.       R; 

•  We  have  broken  new  ground  in  ,. 
verification  procedures. 

•  We  have  renewed  our  commit- 
ment to  the  long-term  process  of 
strategic  arms  limitation.  In  crafting j  tl* 
framework  of  equality  between  two     | 
different  strategic  forces,  SALT  II  is  j 
an  essential  bridge  to  deeper  reduetioi  <j 
and  further  qualitative  restraints  in 
SALT  III. 

I  want  to  reaffirm  before  you  the  '' 
commitment  of  the  United  States  and  ■'■ 
President  Carter — as  expressed  in  th  ' 
SALT  II  agreement  itself — to  begin 
negotiations  to  achieve  further  lim- 
itations and  deeper  reductions  in  nu-  ^s 
clear  arms  promptly  upon  entry  into    li 
force  of  SALT  II.  We  take  this  obliga  » 
tion  with  the  utmost  seriousness.  It  ii 
an  obligation  between  two  nations,  ar  , 
it  is  an  obligation  of  two  nations  to  al 
nations. 

In  this  regard,  let  me  state  in  tiii 
forum  what  President  Carter  makes    L 
clear  every  day  in  Washington.  The 
Administration  is  making  strenuous 
efforts  to  insui-e  early  ratification  am 
entry  into  force  of  SALT  II. 


Comprehensive  Test  Ban 

I  would  like  to  turn  now  to  the 
subject  of  the  comprehensive  nuclear 
test  ban,  for  no  arms  control  measure 
has  been  consistently  assigned  a  highi 
priority  in  this  chamber  over  many 
years.  Indeed,  the  very  fact  that 
negotiations  are  underway  on  such  a 
treaty  can  be  attributed  in  part  to  th( 
dedicated  efforts  by  many  nations  anc 
individuals  to  build  strong  internation 
support  for  such  a  ban. 

That  support  is  well  founded.  A 
comprehensive  test  ban  will  place  an 
important  qualitative  constraint  on  th 
nuclear  arms  competition,  and  it  willb 
an  important  contribution  to  the  inter 
national  community's  efforts  to  prevei 
the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons. 

The  trilateral  negotiations  are  pri 
ceeding  actively  in  Geneva.  Agreemei 
has  already  been  reached  on  many  of 
the  features  of  the  treaty,  including 
some  issues  that  just  a  few  years  ago 
seemed  insurmountable  obstacles.  Vei 
ification  of  a  comprehensive  test  ban  i 
e.xtremely  important.  Innovative  co- 
operative measures  will  be 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulle, 


United  Nations 


11  red — as  both  sides  have  recog- 
cl    Work  is  now  continuing  on  these 
other  aspects.  A  number  of  these 
'leins  have  been  less  susceptible  to 
npt  solutions  than  we  had  hoped. 

1  my  government  continues  to  place 

ut  importance  on  the  conclusion  of 
.'  negotiations.  Success  will  require 
1  work.  But  success,  I  believe, 

old  he  a  statement  of  hope  no  nation 

lid  ignore. 

kmical  Weapons 

As  with  the  negotiations  for  a  com- 
Mtiisive  test  ban,  progress  in  the 
1-;  between  the  United  States  and 
iSii\  iet  Union  on  chemical  weapons 
I  not  been  rapid,  but  it  has  been  sub- 
;tial.  Two-and-a-half  months  ago, 
I  two  nations  provided  a  detailed  re- 
1  iin  these  negotiations  to  the  Com- 

ee  (in  Disarmament. 

A  treaty  providing  for  the  elimina- 
i:  of  chemical  weapons  would  be  a 
n  ue  and  far-reaching  accomplish- 
.(t. 

•  For  the  first  time,  an  entire  class 
eapons  that  has  been  used  in  a 

;  ir  conflict  would  be  banned  and 
I inated. 

•  The  international  community 

( id  he  establishing,  and  participating 
i/ooperative  measures  of  verification 
f  feat  breadth  and  complexity. 

•  A  technology  capable  of  inflicting 
vi?spread  and  horrible  destruction  of 
Uian  life  would  be  safeguarded  for 
le-eful  uses. 

These  are  some  of  the  reasons  why 
unvernment  attaches  high  impor- 
'■  to  the  chemical  weapons  negotia- 
~,  We  fully  recognize  that  many 
■I-  cduntries  have  a  direct  interest  in 
lineal  weapons  prohibition.  Many 
aons  could  produce  them  on  short 
cce.  And  all  nations  that  adhere 
■jM  be  affected  by  the  verification 
ir?edures  that  are  a  necessity  if  such 
agreement  is  to  promote  stability 
111  confidence.  In  this  connection,  I 
•riM  like  to  note  that  my  government 
fateful  for  the  important  work  on 
it'iiation  which  is  being  pursued  by  a 
ihef  of  countries. 
Tile  Committee  on  Disarmament 
a  \  ital  role  to  play  in  the  process  of 
iieving  a  chemical  weapons  conven- 
1.  The  United  States  fully  ap- 
ijciates  the  importance  of  that  com- 
mtee's  role,  and  we  are  giving  serious 
lught  to  how  we  can  contribute  to 
king  the  committee's  work  in  this 
a  nidst  effective  in  advancing  the 
'lective  we  all  seek. 

The  complete  prohibition  and 
^nination  of  chemical  weapons  has 


been  an  important  goal  of  the  interna- 
tional community  for  many  decades, 
ever  since,  in  the  first  great  world  war 
of  this  century,  these  weapons  were 
used  on  a  massive  scale.  Even  though 
that  war  is  receding  in  time,  I  can  still 
remember,  as  a  boy,  the  vision  of  men 
returned  home,  but  gasping  for  breath 
forever.  That  is  a  vision  we  should 
eradicate  entirely  from  the  memory  of 
man. 

Radiological  Weapons 

We  could  be  haunted  by  another 
class  of  weapons  never  used  but  with  a 
similarly  dreadful  potential  — 
radiological  weapons.  The  number  of 
facilities  producing  radioactive  by- 
products has  multiplied  manyfold  in  re- 
cent years  and  the  accumulation  of  ma- 
terials is  accelerating. 

I  am  pleased  to  note  that  signifi- 
cant progress  was  achieved  this  year  to 
deal  with  such  weapons.  My  nation  and 
the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics 
have  presented  a  joint  initiati'^'e  to  the 
Committee  on  Disarmament  to  ban  all 
radiological  weapons.  The  United 
States  hopes  that  the  General  Assem- 
bly will  encourage  the  Committee  on 
Disarmament  to  build  on  this  achieve- 
ment and  to  elaborate  an  international 
convention. 

Nonproliferation  Treaty 

August  1980  will  mark  the  date  of 
the  second  review  conference  of  the 
Nonproliferation  Treaty.  The  SALT  II 
agreement,  with  its  commitment  to 
continuing  the  process  in  SALT  III, 
reflects  the  determination  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  to  fulfill 
their  obligation  under  Article  VI  of  the 
Nonproliferation  Treaty.  My  govern- 
ment is  deeply  conscious  of  its  obliga- 
tions to  the  nations  party  to  this  treaty 
which  have  forsworn  nuclear  weapons. 
Their  continued  restraint,  and  that  of 
other  non-nuclear-weapons  states,  is 
essential  to  preventing  a  dangerous 
multiplication  of  the  risk  that  conflict  or 
miscalculation  could  lead  to  nuclear 
war. 

In  this  regard,  the  United  States 
welcomes  the  recent  adherence  of  the 
nations  of  Sri  Lanka,  Indonesia,  and 
Bangladesh. 

We  can  further  buttress  nonprolif- 
eration and  nuclear  stability  by  the  es- 
tablishment of  nuclear-weapon-free 
zones.  The  full  realization  of  a 
nuclear-weapon-free  zone  in  Latin 
America  is  drawing  closer.  We  continue 
to  hope  that  the  necessary  steps  to 
bring  the  treaty  of  Tlatelolco  into  force 


for  all  concerned  states  within  the  re- 
gion will  be  taken  in  the  near  future. 

Additionally,  the  United  States 
strongly  supports  efforts  to  establish 
nuclear-weapon-free  zones  in  other  re- 
gions of  the  world  —  in  accordance  with 
the  criteria  which  we  believe  can  per- 
mit the  successful  establishment  of 
zones  that  promote  the  security  of  the 
participants. 

The  development  of  effective  inter- 
national arrangements  for  assuring  that 
nations  that  forswear  nuclear  weapons 
will  not  be  threatened  by  nuclear  attack 
is  an  effort  which  deserves  our  serious 
consideration.  Such  arrangements 
would  help  create  a  climate  of  confi- 
dence and  would  reduce  incentives  for 
additional  countries  to  develop  nuclear 
weapons.  The  United  States  would  like 
to  reiterate  its  proposal  made  last  July 
in  the  Committee  on  Disarmament  that 
there  be  a  General  Assembly  resolution 
setting  forth  the  various  undertakings 
made  by  the  five  nuclear  powers  to  give 
assurance  to  non-nuclear-weapon  states 
against  the  use  of  nuclear  weapons. 

In  concluding  this  brief  review  of 
the  important  questions  with  which  this 
committee  is  concerned,  I  am  also 
happy  to  refer  to  the  progress  which 
has  been  made  on  a  number  of  signifi- 
cant and  potentially  useful  studies  cur- 
rently underway,  such  as  the  pilot  test 
of  a  standard  format  for  reporting  mili- 
tary budgets,  the  study  on  the  relation- 
ship between  disarmament  and  de- 
velopment, and  the  study  of  regional 
arms  control.  The  United  States,  for  its 
part,  will  continue  to  give  these  studies 
wholehearted  support.  They  are  in- 
vestments in  the  future. 

My  life  has  been  dedicated  to  the 
security  of  the  United  States.  Yet,  I 
see  no  greater  security  for  my  nation 
than  peace  among  all  nations.  We  share 
a  common  goal — peace  with  security. 
For  we  share,  in  this  nuclear  age,  a 
common  bond  for  survival  and  a  com- 
mon search  for  the  ability  of  us  all  to 
live  in  a  secure  world. 

We  are  all  involved  in  an  under- 
taking to  shape  our  destiny.  As  Presi- 
dent Carter  said  in  Vienna:  "If  we  can- 
not control  the  power  to  destroy,  we 
can  neither  guide  our  own  fate  nor  pre- 
serve our  own  future. "■ 


'USUN  press  release  95. 


luary  1980 


55 


United  Nations 


International  Year 
of  the  Child 

by  Jean  Young 

Statement  to  the  U.N.  General 
Assembly  on  October  17,  1979.  Mrs. 
Young  is  Chairperson  of  the  U.S.  Na- 
tional Commission  on  the  Interna- 
tional Year  of  the  Child.  ^ 

The  International  Year  of  the  Child 
(lYC)  has  been  a  celebration  of  the  in- 
estimable value  of  the  child  in  all  the 
countries  of  the  world.  Activities  as- 
sociated with  the  lYC  have  done  much 
to  concentrate  the  attention  of  the 
world's  people  not  only  on  the  impor- 
tance of  children  but  also  on  the  inter- 
national obligation  to  meet  perhaps  the 
most  pressing  and  heart-rending  need 
of  the  day — to  improve  the  lot  of  suf- 
fering children  in  so  many  paints  of  the 
world  and  most  especially  in  the  de- 
veloping world.  It  is  thus  fully  appro- 
priate that  this  meeting  focus  on  the 
follow-up  to  the  International  Year  of 
the  Child  and  that  the  follow-up  concen- 
trate on  methods  to  improve  the  situa- 
tion of  children  of  the  world,  especially 
in  developing  countries. 

In  his  report  on  the  work  of  the  or- 
ganization, the  Secretary  General 
states:  "In  the  International  Year  of 
the  Child  we  have  been  reminded  very 
forcefully  of  the  stark  deprivations 
suffered  by  children  in  many  parts  of 
the  world  and  we  have  seen  that  all  too 
often  children  are  also  victims  of  viola- 
tions of  human  rights.  It  is  absolutely 
intolerable  that  children  should  be 
made  to  suffer  in  this  manner  in  our  day 
and  age." 

It  is  absolutely  intolerable  that 
children  should  suffer  so  in  our  day  and 
age.  But  they  are  suffering  in  varying 
degrees  in  all  parts  of  the  world. 

We  in  the  United  States  have 
prided  ourselves  in  caring  not  only 
adequately  but  very  well  for  our  chil- 
dren. We  provide  free  education.  We 
have  good  child  labor  laws.  We  have  e.x- 
tensive  safety  regulations  to  protect 
them.  Good  hospitals  and  clinics  e.xist  in 
all  our  States.  Food  is  plentiful,  and  we 
have  a  high  standard  of  living  as  com- 
pared with  the  rest  of  the  world. 

Yet,  even  as  a  nation  of  such  im- 
mense resources,  we  recognize  that 
there  are,  indeed,  children  suffering. 
There  ai-e  children  in  the  mountains  of 
Appalachia,  in  rural  areas,  in  the  urban 
ghettos,  on  Indian  reservations,  in  His- 
panic barrios,  and  in  migrant  camps 
who  lack  the  basic  necessities  of  life. 
There  are  other  children  who  do  not  re- 
ceive an  equal  opportunity  in  this  great 


56 


nation  because  of  language,  race,  eco- 
nomic status,  or  mental  or  physical 
handicaps.  There  are  still  other  chil- 
dren who  suffer  neglect,  abuse,  or 
indifference. 

Nevertheless,  we  recognize  that  in 
comparison  with  the  world  statistical 
averages  that  our  children  fare  very 
well.  But  we  recognize  also  that  if  a 
single  child  suffers  anywhere  in  the 
world,  we  must  be  concerned.  This  is 
why,  in  addition  to  appealing  to  Ameri- 
cans to  understand  and  resolve  the 
problems  of  their  own  children,  we 
have  also  committed  ourselves  to 
reaching  out  to  hel])  the  most  desperate 
of  the  world's  children.  The  National 
Commission  initiated  this  goal  with  the 
theme:  "The  World's  Children — A  Joy 
to  Share,  A  Responsibility  to  Care." 

Through  more  than  3.50  non- 
governmental organizations  and  52 
States  and  territories,  the  commission 
shared  information  on  the  status  of  ref- 
ugee children,  abandoned  children,  and 
children  in  need  in  developing  nations. 
This  effort  has  been  followed  uj)  with 
fund-raising  plans  to  culminate  at 
Thanksgiving.  We  will  give  thanks  by 
giving  to  children  without.  In  addition 
to  giving  funds,  we  are  urging  Ameri- 
cans to  give  programmatic  and  legisla- 
tive support  to  meeting  the  needs  of  the 
world's  children. 

Plight  of  Children 

It  has  been  estimated  that  55  million 
children  in  the  world  under  the  age  of 
15  must  work.  Millions  of  children  in 
our  world  know  virtually  no  childhood 
at  all.  They  must  take  on  the  role  of 
adults  in  many  cases  even  before  they 
ai'e  old  enough  to  begin  school.  Poverty 
is  the  reason  for  much  of  this  but  so 
also  is  greed,  and  it  is  a  problem  of  the 
developed  countries  as  well  as  the  de- 
veloping. Children  are  employed  in 
hazardous  .jobs,  at  hard  labor.  Many 
must  beg,  and  many  barely  into  pu- 
berty are  forced  to  become  prostitutes. 
In  some  places,  because  child  labor  is 
cheap,  children  work  at  adult  jobs  while 
adults  are  unemployed. 

In  recent  history  there  have  been 
particularly  distressing  conditions  that 
have  highlighted  i-ather  dramatically 
the  deprivation  of  children.  We  wit- 
nessed the  tragedy  of  children  in  south- 
ern Africa.  We  saw  the  heart-rending 
plight  of  "boat  people"  children.  We 
have  seen  the  9-  and  10-year-old  chil- 
dren of  Northern  Ireland  and  the  Mid- 
dle East  brandishing  weapons. 

Millions  of  children  in  our  world 
suffer  from  malnutrition  which  hampers 
their  physical  and  mental  development. 
Many  receive  little  or  no  education. 


Many  are  homeless  and  many  are  with 
out  parents. 

In  some  areas  where  the  plight  of 
children  is  so  appallingly  bad  at  the 
best  of  times,  it  has  become  immeasur 
ably  worse  as  children  become  the  innc 
cent  victims  of  warfare.  The  world 
community  for  years  has  tried  to  cope 
with  the  suffering  of  refugee  children. 
Especially  in  Africa  and  Asia,  e.xtensiv 
efforts  have  been  taken  to  alleviate  th 
suffering  of  refugee  children,  as  well 
as,  of  course,  that  of  adults.  Our  own 
government,  as  well  as  the  interna- 
tional community,  has  responded  mas- 
sively to  this  need  and  much  has  been 
done,  although  so  much  more  remains 
to  be  done.  This  problem  will  be  befor 
us  for  the  foreseeable  future  and  de- 
mands our  continuous  attention. 

Children  of  Kampuchea 

Even  sadder  than  the  tragic  pligh 
of  refugee  children — though  a  greater 
sadness  than  that  seems  inconceivable 
— is  that  of  the  child  victims  of  war  wh 
have  yet  to  be  reached  by  the  relief  e 
forts  of  the  international  community. 
The  most  recent  case  involves  the  chil 
dren  of  Kampuchea,  who  represent  45' 
of  that  country's  population. 

Professional  relief  experts  have  r 
ported  that  in  that  unhappy  land,  ver 
few  children  under  the  age  of  5  have 
survived  the  famine  and  associated  di; 
eases  that  have  resulted  from  pro- 
longed warfare;  the  validity  of  these 
observations  is  supported  by  the  vii-tu 
absence  of  young  children  among 
Khmer  refugees.  The  few  who  do  sur- 
vive the  famine  and  fighting  in  Kam- 
puchea will  undoubtedly  bear  perma- 
nent mental  and  physical  scars  as  a 
result  of  severe  malnutrition. 

Scientific  research  has  proven  cdi: 
clusively  that  malnutrition  in  early 
childhood  is  closely  related  to  later  dr 
velopmental  disabilities.  One  recent 
survey  of  a  Khmer  refugee  group  alon 
the  Thai-Khmer  border  indicated  that 
969f^  of  the  surviving  children  in  that 
group  were  suffering  from  malnutri- 
tion. A  generation  of  Khmer  may  al- 
ready have  been  lost,  and  thousands  0 
older  children  are  likely  to  perish  un- 
less urgent  actions  are  undertaken  by 
the  international  community. 

An  international  effort  to  provide 
relief  to  Kampuchean  civilians  is 
underway.  UNICEF  has  been  desig- 
nated by  the  Secretary  General  as  the 
lead  agency  for  the  U.N.  system  in  thi; 
effort.  Together  with  the  Internationa 
Committee  of  the  Red  Cross,  UNICEl 
deserves  our  particular  appreciation  fo' 
its  initiative  and  perseverance  in  at-  ] 
tempting,  under  the  most  difficult  coni 

Department  of  State  Bulle*'' 


United  Nations 


(Ills,  to  alleviate  the  suffering  of 
iipuchean  children  and  mothers  as 
I  as  others  in  need. 
It  is  the  fervent  hope  of  my  gov- 
nitiit  that  as  a  fitting  contribution  to 
>  liitfrnational  Year  of  the  Child,  all 
!  iibor  nations  will  join  in  support  of 
i  effort  to  save  the  children  of  Kam- 
.hea  and  also  join  in  urging  all  in- 
c.ed  parties,  particularly  the  parties 
ahe  area,  to  support  and  cooperate  in 
■eef  efforts.  We  trust  that  this  session 
if  he  General  Assembly  will  receive  a 
oiprehensive  report  on  the  status  of 
hdren  in  Kampuchea  and  on  the  prog- 
■e-  of  efforts  to  assist  them. 

Confronted  with  the  appalling  situ- 
t  11  of  so  many  of  the  children  of  the 
,rld,  we  must  reject  despair  and  at- 
ac  the  problems  with  resolution.  Gov- 
•rments  must  do  more  for  the  welfare 

|ii-iitection  of  the  children  in  their 
.  xliction  and  to  the  extent  that  they 
al>le  to  help  other  governments 
•  with  their  problems.  UNICEF  and 
')■  agencies  of  the  U.N.  system  must 
inue  and  expand  the  work  they 
!■  l)een  doing.  My  government 
!tes,  for  instance,  that  the  Interna- 
ii  al  Labor  Organization  will  continue 
otudy  to  seek  ways  to  resolve  the 

0  plex  problem  of  child  labor  and  that 
ti'r  U.N.  agencies  and  governments 
v:  cooperate  in  this  vital  effort. 

The  International  Year  of  the  Child 

IS  done  great  service  in  increasing  our 

,  I'cness  of  the  problems  of  children, 

1  there  have  been  many  small  suc- 
e^es  in  meeting  those  needs.  All  those 
iSiciated  with  its  conception  and  im- 
jlnentation  deserve  our  gratitude. 

Tl  t  this  increased  awareness  also  has 
irught  increased  determination  to 
id  with  the  demands  of  the  situation 
8  emonstrated  by  the  Secretary  Gen- 
'I's  commendable  compilation  of  spe- 

messages  on  the  lYC  by  heads  of 
\  A-  or  government.  It  is  well  to  re- 
nnber  in  the  face  of  intolerable 
r^edy  that  improvement  is  possible 
.«■  that  the  determination  to  improve 
s  reat. 

Special  credit  to  the  success  of  the 
n:  must  go  to  UNICEF  and  the  lYC 
S<retariat  for  their  excellent  work  in 
Holving  all  the  countries  of  the  world 
nhe  year.  My  special  admiration  goes 
'3r.  Estefania  Aldaba-Lim,  the  Sec- 
•  ii-y  General's  special  representative 
the  lYC,  for  her  skill  in  stirring  the 
rigination  and  participation  of  so 
Tny  countries. 

The  Government  and  the  people  of 
I  nited  States  were  among  those 
ii  responded  enthusiastically  to  these 
)fts.  In  his  message  to  the  Secretary 
leral,  President  Carter  said: 
orking  through  UNICEF  and  other 


United  Nations  agencies  and  through 
the  leaders  of  other  nations,  I  think  we 
can  enhance  the  opportunity  for  better 
clothing,  housing,  food,  medical  care, 
education  and  the  protection  against 
suffering  on  the  part  of  children  of  all 
nations.  So  I  am  very  eager  to  be  a  part 
of  it.  It  is  a  sobering  prospect  to  know 
that  perhaps  once  in  a  lifetime  we  have 
an  opportunity  to  focus  attention  on 
such  a  neglected  group  in  the  world's 
population." 

U.S.  National  Commission 
Activities 

The  President  appointed  a  National 
Commission  for  the  International  Year 
of  the  Child  and  did  me  the  honor  of 
asking  me  to  be  its  Chairperson. 
Throughout  this  year,  the  commission 
has  initiated  and  conducted  a  dialogue 
for  the  purpose  of  increasing  public 
awareness  of  the  special  needs  of  chil- 
dren in  such  areas  as  health,  nutrition, 
education,  justice,  recreation,  and  the 
arts.  In  addition,  we  dealt  with  equal 
opportunity,  the  impact  of  media  on 
children,  and  the  needs  of  children 
around  the  world. 

Because  of  this  effort  many  people 
learned  for  the  first  time  that  many 
among  the  one-third  of  our  population 
who  are  children  are  inadequately  pro- 
vided for  in  these  areas.  Many  were 
shocked  to  learn  that  17  million  children 
in  the  United  States  do  not  have  an 
adequate  standard  of  living.  Many  of 
them  receive  inadequate  nutrition, 
medical  care,  and  educational  opportu- 
nity. Many,  and  not  necessarily  the 
poor,  are  denied  the  warmth  and  secu- 
rity of  a  loving  home.  In  some  of  our 
large  cities,  juvenile  crime  and  juvenile 
exploitation  are  serious  problems. 

The  response  to  the  commission's 
activities  from  the  public,  from  gov- 
ernments at  the  municipal  and  State 
levels,  from  the  interagency  committee 
at  the  Federal  level,  and  from  non- 
government organizations  of  many 
kinds  was  enthusiastic.  Activities  were 
far  too  numerous  to  list  in  this  speech, 
let  alone  describe.  However,  a  detailed 
description  is  contained  in  the  commis- 
sion's report  to  the  General  Assembly. 
I  will  say  just  a  few  words  about  how 
the  National  Commission  approached 
its  work. 

The  commission  set  itself  the  fol- 
lowing goals: 

•  To  stimulate  a  national  dialogue 
on  issues  facing  children,  both  at  home 
and  abroad  and  thus  create  a  broad- 
based  support  group  concerned  and 
knowledgeable  about  children  and  their 
problems; 


•  To  form  lasting  coalitions  of  con- 
cerned citizens  at  the  local.  State,  and 
national  levels  to  serve  as  continuing 
advocates  for  children's  needs,  both  at 
home  and  abroad  long  after  1979; 

•  To  motivate  people  from  all  walks 
of  life — private  as  well  as  public  organi- 
zations, parents  as  well  as  children,  in- 
dividuals as  well  as  groups,  government 
agencies  as  well  as  charitable  institu- 
tions, organized  labor  as  well  as 
corporations — and  at  all  levels  fi'om  the 
local  to  the  national  to  evaluate  the 
needs  of  children  in  their  communities 
and  take  concrete  steps  toward  meeting 
these  needs; 

•  To  provide  a  celebratory  oppor- 
tunity for  children,  families,  and  com- 
munities to  come  together  in  a  joyful 
event; 

•  To  persuade  legislative  bodies  to 
take  legislative  actions  and  governmen- 
tal agencies  to  review  and  refine  regu- 
lations and  policies  that  affect  the 
well-being  of  children  and  their 
families; 

•  To  discover  the  concerns,  feel- 
ings, and  aspirations  for  children  from 
all  across  our  country,  including  those 
of  children  themselves;  and 

•  To  reach  out  beyond  our  own 
country  for  information  exchange  and 
cooperation  in  confronting  common 
problems. 

In  each  of  these  goals  we  have  re- 
ceived a  very  positive  response  from 
the  American  people.  We  have  begun  to 
see  progress  in  all  areas.  We  look  for 
this  momentum  to  be  sustained  through 
existing  organizations  and  governmen- 
tal channels.  In  light  of  this  we  are  pre- 
senting to  our  President  not  a  final 
report  but  a  "challenge  report" — a 
challenge  to  our  country  to  continue  the 
work  begun  on  behalf  of  children  here 
and  around  the  world. 

The  International  Year  of  the  Child 
will  soon  be  behind  us  and  the  matter  at 
hand  is  the  follow-up  to  the  year.  The 
U.S.  Government  supports  a  vigorous 
follow-up  to  the  accomplishments  of 
this  year.  We  hope  that  the  General 
Assembly  will  make  a  strong  statement 
on  the  continuing  need  to  focus  on  chil- 
dren's welfare  as  a  major  element  of 
government  policies  in  all  countries. 
We  believe  the  lYC  has  demonstrated 
that  its  focus  on  children  can  serve  as 
an  organizing  principle  to  mobilize  gov- 
ernment actions  as  well  as  community 
support  and  participation  for  develop- 
ment activities  benefiting  the  country 
as  a  whole.  We  hope  that  UNICEF  at 
its  next  executive  board  session  will 
recommend  steps  to  be  taken  to  con- 
tinue the  momentum  that  has  been 
created.  We  agree  with  the  recommen- 


luary  1980 


57 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


dation  of  UNICEF  that  we  should  con- 
tinue to  place  emphasis  on  providing 
basic  services  to  the  poorest  children  in 
the  low  income  countries. 

UNICEF  has  performed  admirably 
as  the  lead  agency  for  the  International 
Year  of  the  Child.  My  government 
looks  forward  to  continued  cooperation 
with  UNICEF  in  the  lead  agency  role 
as  we  move  into  the  follow-up  phase.  At 
the  same  time,  we  urge  other  U.N. 
agencies  to  maintain  an  awareness  of 
the  needs  of  children  in  all  of  their 
programing. 

Let  me  reiterate  our  concern  about 
the  intolerable  situation  for  many  of  the 
children  of  the  world  and  particularly 
about  the  desperate  need  to  save  the 
children  of  Kampuchea.  The  govern- 
ments of  the  world,  together  with  in- 
ternational organizations,  have  the 
ability  to  vastly  improve  this  situation. 
My  government  has  supported  and  will 
support  efforts  toward  this  end.  We 
urge  other  governments  to  continue  to 
support  and  cooperate  with  these  ef- 
forts so  that  children  everywhere  can 
have  the  love  and  care  that  they  need 
and  which  the  world  requires  to  ad- 
vance the  common  humanity  of  us  all.  ■ 

»USUN  press  release  93. 


Central  America  at  the  Crossroads 


by  Viron  P.  Vaky 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Inter-American  Affairs  of  the  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on  Sep- 
tember 11,  1979.  Mr.  Vaky  is  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Inter-American  Affairs.^ 

I  welcome  the  opportunity  to  meet 
with  you  today  to  discuss  the  situation 
in  Central  America.  I  would  like  to  con- 
sider first  the  overall  Central  American 
scene,  then  the  various  national  con- 
texts and  regional  aspects,  and  con- 
clude by  reviewing  our  policy  response. 

OVERVIEW 

Much  of  Central  America — 
particularly  the  northei'n  tier — is 
gripped  by  a  polarizing  dynamic  of 
pressure  for  change,  terrorism,  and  po- 
tential radicalization.  These  wrenching 
instabilities  are  rooted  in  basic  under- 
lying structural  problems  and  vul- 
nerabilities. The  impact  of  recent 
events  in  Nicaragua  is  assuredly  a  fac- 
tor in  the  internal  politics  of  all  coun- 
tries in  Central  America.  But  even 
without  Nicaragua  the  situation  would 
be  volatile. 

The  nations  of  the  region  face  a 
number  of  common,  interrelated  social 
and  economic  problems,  most  of  which 
produce  direct  pressures  for  political 
and  systemic  change. 

•  With  the  e.xception  of  Costa  Rica, 
and  to  some  extent  Panama,  societies  in 
the  region  are  characterized  by  deep 
class  and,  in  some  cases,  ethnic  divi- 
sions, endemic  violence,  political  atomi- 
zation,  and  distrust.  Inequalities  of  op- 
portunity mark  the  social,  political,  and 
class  structures  in  varying  degrees. 
The  demands  of  new  middle  class 
entrepreneurs  and  professionals — an 
educated,  informed,  articulate,  and 
generally  ambitious  group — for  a 
greater  national  role  and  share  of 
political  power  have  frequently  not 
been  accommodated.  The  minimal  needs 
of  workers  and  peasants,  whose  ranks 
have  been  swollen  by  the  population 
explosion,  have  also  remained  unmet  in 
varying  degree.  Growing  social  ten- 
sions and  defeated  aspirations  have, 
therefore,  become  natural  breeding 
grounds  for  alienation,  opposition,  and 
violence. 

•  With  the  possible  exception  of 
Costa  Rica  and  Panama,  virtually  all  of 
these  countries  are  characterized  by 
unequal  and  inequitable  economic 
growth,  national  poverty,  and  maldis- 


tribution of  income.  While  statistically 
many  of  these  nations  show  respectable 
growth,  the  benefits  of  progress  have, 
in  most  cases,  accrued  to  traditional 
elites;  the  masses  of  the  people  find 
their  situation  little  changed.  Malnutri- 
tion and  illiteracy  rates  remain  high 
among  the  poor  majority.  Unemploy- 
ment and  underemployment  are  high 
and  growing. 

•  Again  with  the  exception  of 
Costa  Rica,  and  to  some  degree 
Panama — although  the  system  there  is 
not  yet  fully  open — political  institutions 
have,  in  the  past,  tended  to  be  au- 
thoritarian and  resistant  to  change.  As 
pressures  build  up,  governments  have 
tended  to  rely  on  repression  of  dissent 
Movements  expressing  pressures  for 
modernization  or  more  basic  demands 
for  equity  have  too  often  been  frus- 
ti'ated  by  electoral  manipulation  and 
violence,  censorship  of  the  media,  out- 
lawing of  political  parties,  and  suspen 
sion  of  constitutional  guarantees. 
Where  legitimate  channels  of  redress 
are  choked  off,  the  political  situation 
tends  to  polarize  to  the  extremes  and 
the  likelihood  of  peaceful  evolution  an; 
change  is  reduced. 


Politicaa  Parties  am 
Groups  in  Central 
America 

EL  SALVADOR 

Political  Parties  and  Groups 

•  National  Conciliation  Party  (Partido^ 
de  ConciUacion  Nacional — PCN).  The  offi 
cial  party;  backs  progovernment  candidate , 
but  has  few  other  functions.  , 

•  Nationalist  Democratic  Organization  , 
(ORDEN).  A  rural,  military-sanctioned  i 
civilian  force  with  an  estimated  strength  o  |, 
about  30,000.  It  is  ostensibly  dedicated  to  | 
civic  education  and  law  enforcement  but  ie . 
occasionally  used  in  political  activity.  Owil  i 
to  its  record  of  alleged  human  rights  viola- jj 
tions,  ORDEN  has  become  a  major  targett , 
the  government's  critics  at  home  and 
abroad. 

•  United  National  Opposition  (Unioh 
Nacional  Opositora — UNO).  Now  shaky  "l 
position  coalition  which  includes: 

Christian  Democratic  Party  (Partii 
Democrata  Cristiano—PDC).  Th( - 
largest  opposition  party;  left-of-    " 
center. 

National  Revolutionary  Movement 
(Movimiento  Nacional 


58 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


Western  Hemisphere 


Institutions  of  all  kinds — from 

Older  and  social  services  to  press 
(ilitical  parties — are  being  under- 
I  li\  socioeconomic  strains,  human 

\  idlations,  and  terrorism.  These 
■lu  >  in  turn  produce  obsession 

iir\  ival  and  a  temptation  to  blame 
n;il  causes  for  the  region's  difficul- 

i-:c(inomic  stress  in  the  form  of 
■   inflation,  fluctuating  commodity 
■. ,  ;ind  recession  have  decreased 
1  ifomes  and  lessened  the  ability  of 
nincnts  to  meet  popular  needs. 
ni  costs  have  quadrupled,  with 
uly  severe  cumulative  effects. 
New  political  lines  and  new  eco- 
1  rliallenges  have  been  drawn  in 
I' 1 1  111.  Sandinista  Nicaragua, 
I  Kica,  and  Panama  will  not  com- 
.11  !■  easily  with  the  passionately 
[list  governments  of  the  northern 
it  if  communication  is  imperfect, 
111  tensions  will  grow,  and  the 
Miiiin  necessary  to  sustain  a 
■  rceional  economy  and  Central 
1 .111  common  market  will  be  im- 
-  I'lirtunately,  indications  are 
II  M'  potential  costs  are  recog- 
iinil  tentative  but  significant  ef- 
it  "hridge-building"  are  in  train 
d  national  actors. 


In  sum,  deep  grievances;  legitimate 
needs  for  reform,  growth,  and  moderni- 
zation; and  basic  demands  for  equity 
are  all  coursing  through  the  region. 
These  give  rise  to  equally  deep  pres- 
sures for  political  and  systemic  change. 
As  in  other  pai'ts  of  the  world,  those 
aspirations  and  demands  are  so  funda- 
mental that  change  cannot  be  avoided. 
Defense  of  the  status  quo  cannot  pre- 
vent it  or  cap  instability  for  long;  it  can 
only  radicalize  the  dynamics  at  work. 

A  com])lieating  factor  is  that 
Castroist/Marxist  and  extreme  insur- 
gent groups  have  seized  upon  these 
legitimate  aspirations  and  unstable 
situations  to  advance  their  own  objec- 
tives. Thereby,  they  may  exacerbate  the 
tensions  and  the  violence,  but  they  do 
not  cause  them.  The  upsurge  of  ter- 
rorism and  subversion  unfortunately 
often  confuses  perception  of  the 
realities  and  strengthens  tendencies  by 
those  benefiting  from  the  status  quo  to 
misidentify  the  issues  and  focus  on  in- 
surgency rather  than  on  the  underlying 
core  problems. 

If  there  is  any  one  central  motif 
that  characterizes  Central  America 
today,  it  is  this  intense — and  essentially 
inevitable — pressure  for  change  which 
has  swept  into  the  region.  The  central 


issue,  in  turn,  is  not  whether  change  is 
to  occur  but  whether  that  change  is  to 
be  violent  and  radical — or  peaceful  and 
evolutionary  and  preserving  individual 
rights  and  democratic  values. 


THE  NATIONAL  CONTEXTS 

The  trends,  problems,  and  vul- 
nerabilities described  above  come  to- 
gether in  different,  even  idiosyncratic, 
ways  in  individual  countries. 

Let  me  first  deal  with  Nicaragua, 
whose  revolution  cannot  help  but  affect 
its  neighbors'  political  future.  Then  the 
"south" — Panama  and  Costa  Rica,  each 
different  but  representing  progressive 
and  moderate  forces  for  change  in  Cen- 
tral America.  Finally,  the  "northern 
tier" — Honduras,  El  Salvador,  and 
Guatemala,  now  led  by  conservative  es- 
tablishments where  the  winds  of  change 
are  blowing  the  hardest. 

Impact  of  Nicaragua 

For  both  Latin  America  and  the 
United  States,  Nicaragua  now  presents 
a  critical  challenge  and  a  major  oppor- 
tunity. The  course  of  events  will  influ- 
ence prospects  for  democracy  else- 


Rfvolucionario — MNR).  Small. 

left-of-center  party  associated  with 

Social  Democratic  circles. 
National  Democratic  Union  {Union 

Deniocratd  Nacional — UDN). 

<'ommunist  influenced  party  often 

considered  a  legal  front, 
•^alxadoran  Popular  Party  iPiirtido 

—  Iradoreno—PPS).  Small,  right- 


gl  (iroups 

•  'I'luilar  Revolutionary  Bloc  (Bloqiie 

iii'i-oliicionayio — BPR).  A  coalition 
11.  1  ,  student,  and  peasant  groups 

riL'  a  membership  of  60,000-80.000. 

2\  directed  or  controlled  by  the  FPL 
■low  I;  beneficiary  of  the  political 

•  all. in. 

"rile  United  Popular  Action  Front 

.  '/.  Acciott  Popular  Unido—FAPV). 

:  I  mass  front  group  controlled  by 
,  . -timated  8,000-15,000  members. 

I'arahundo  Marti  Popular  Liberation 
l-'iirrzan  Po/iiihires  de 
." — FPL).  The  strongest  guerrilla 
I'lnfessing  a  revolutionary  Mar.xist 
[>i  nhably  numbers  about  800. 

Armed  Forces  of  National  Resistance 

'I,   Armadax  de  Resistencia 

"'  -FARN).  Second  most  important 

i-t  tiroup;  about  600  strong. 

Popular  Revolutionary  Army  (Ejer- 
rnl iirionario  del  Pueblo — ERP). 
'  'St  terrorist  group. 


GUATEMALA 

Political  Parties  and  Groups 

•  National  Liberation  Movement 
(Movimiento  de  Liberacion  Nacioiinl — 
MLN).  Ultraconservative,  linked  to  rightest 
terrorist  groups;  now  in  opposition,  controls 
more  congressional  seats  than  any  other 
party. 

•  National  Action  and  Reconstruction 
Party  (Parlido  de  Accion  if  Reconstrucion 
Nacional — PARN).  Small,  conservative 
party  of  former  Chief  of  State  Peralta  Azur- 
dia. 

•  Institutional  Democratic  Party  {Par- 
tido  Institacional  Democratico — PID). 
Small,  conservative  party. 

•  Revolutionary  Party  {Partido 
Revolncionario — PR).  The  most  powerful 
party  in  the  government.  Originally  em- 
bracing all  elements  of  the  left,  it  is  now 
centrist,  liberal,  and  mildly  nationalistic. 

•  United  Revolutionary  Front  (Frente 
Unido  de  lu  Revoluccwn — FUR).  Leftwing. 
Founded  by  Vice  President  Villagran 
Kramer.  Formerly  led  by  Manuel  Colom  Ar- 
gueta. 

•  Christian  Democratic  Party  (Partido 
Democrata  Cristiano — PDC).  Liberal,  re- 
formist. 


Illegal  Groups 

•  Guatemalan  Labor  Party  (Partido 
Guatemalteco  de  los  Trabajadores — PGT). 
Communist-led,  small;  has  engaged  in  some 
guerrilla  actions. 

•  Rebel  Armed  Forces  (Fuerzas  Ar- 
madas Rebeldes — FAR).  Left  terrorist 
group. 

•  Guerrilla  Army  of  the  Poor  (Ejercito 
Gnerillero  de  los  Pobres—EGP).  Most  po- 
tent insurgent  force,  formed  in  1974;  about 
;300  members. 

•  Guatemalan  Workers  Militia  {Milicias 
Obreras  Guatemaltecan — MOG).  Rightwing 
counterterrorist  group. 

•  Secret  Anti-Communist  Army  (Ejer- 
cito Secreto  Ant icomnnista— EST).  Right- 
wing  counterterrorist  group. 

HONDURAS 

•  Nationalist  Party  (Partido 
Nacionalista  de  Honduras — PNH).  Tradi- 
tional, conservative  party:  founded  in  1911 
but  with  roots  in  the  old  liberal-conservative 
division  that  characterized  Central  Ameri- 
can political  life  in  the  last  century. 

•  Liberal  Party  (Partido  Liberal  de 
Honduras — PLH).  Traditional  liberal  party, 
founded  in  1870;  now  moderately  reformist. 

•  Innovation  and  Unity  Party  (Partido 
de  Inovacion  y  Unidad — PINU).  Small,  cen- 
trist; lacks  historical  base  of  two  major  par- 
ties. 


iry  1980 


59 


Western  Hemipshere 


where  and  have  an  important  impact  on 
U.S. -Latin  American  relations. 

The  new  Government  of  National 
Reconstruction  (GNR)  took  office  July 
20  in  a  country  left  without  functioning- 
political,  economic,  or  security  institu- 
tions. Almost  half  of  Nicaragua's  popu- 
lation was  displaced,  and  the  country  is 
now  struggling  with  massive  problems 
of  hunger  and  unemployment.  The  loss 
of  life  and  physical  destruction  were 
staggering.  The  United  Nations  has  re- 
ported that  45,000  persons  were  killed, 
160,000  wounded,  and  40,000  orphaned, 
while  Agency  for  International  De- 
velopment (AID)  figures  indicate  some 
1  million  in  need  of  food  and  250,000  in 
need  of  shelter.  Economic  losses  ap- 
proach $2  billion.  The  Nicaraguan  econ- 
omy is  completely  disrupted. 

Initially  formed  in  exile,  the  new 
Nicaraguan  Government  is  a  coalition 
comprised  of  former  guerrilla  and  civic 
leaders.  It  consists  of  a  five-member 
junta  as  the  executive  authority,  a  19- 
member  Cabinet,  and  a  33-member  Na- 
tional Council  still  in  the  process  of 
formation.  The  Sandinista  National  Di- 
rectorate, made  up  of  guerrilla  leaders, 
some  with  close  ties  to  Cuba,  wields 
major  influence. 

Since  the  GNR  formally  took  office 
July  20,  the  following  have  become 
clear. 


•  Nicaragua's  humanitarian  and  re- 
construction needs  are  immediate  and 
too  great  to  he  met  by  Nicaraguans 
alone. 

•  Administrative  confusion  and  im- 
provisation remain  widespread,  but  the 
change  of  government  is  popularly  ac- 
cepted, and  there  is  definite  movement 
toward  restoration  of  public  order. 

•  The  GNR  has  shown  generally 
moderate,  pluralistic  tendencies  in  its 
initial  policies.  It  is  not  distinguishably 
Marxist  or  Cuban  in  orientation,  al- 
though Marxist  figures  are  present  in 
key  positions.  It  has  restrained  repris- 
als, promulgated  a  decree  guaranteeing 
individual  rights,  and  permitted  an  in- 
dependent press  and  radio.  It  has 
promised  free  elections.  In  foreign  af- 
fairs the  GNR  has  indicated  a  desire  for 
friendly  relations  with  all  countries  in- 
cluding their  northern  neighbors. 
Nicaraguan  leaders  have  denied  any  in- 
tention of  "exporting  revolution." 

•  Nevertheless,  the  political  situa- 
tion remains  very  fluid,  with  hetero- 
geneity, confusion,  and  flux  in  the  power 
dynamics.  The  country's  political  and 
economic  future  thus  remain  unclear, 
and  many  outcomes  or  scenarios  are 
still  possible  within  the  framework  of 
the  Sandinista  revolution. 


•  Christian  Democrat  Party  {Partido 
Cristiano  Democralico — PCD).  Organized  in 
1962  but  not  yet  accorded  legal  recognition 
by  the  government.  Associated  with  a 
Christian  Democratic  trade  union  confedera- 
tion (COT)  and  a  Christian  Democratic  peas- 
ant association  (UNO. 

•  Communist  Party  of  Honduras  (Par- 
tido Communista  de  Honduras — PCH). 
Soft-line  Communist  Party;  outlawed  since 
1963.  Funded  largely  by  the  Soviets.  Neg- 
ligible electoral  strength;  has  pro-Soviet  and 
pro-Chinese  factions. 

COSTA  RICA 

•  Unity  Party  (Partido  Unidad—PN). 
Government  coalition;  constituent  groups 
are: 

Democratic  Renovation  Party  (Par- 
tido de  Renovacion  Democratica). 
President  Carazo's  party. 

Calderonista  Republican  Party 
(Partido  Repi(hlicann  Cal- 
deronista). Traditional  conserva- 
tive party  originally  founded  by 
Ramon  Calderon;  now  led  by 
Foreign  Minister. 

Christian  Democratic  Party  (Partido 
Democratica  Cristiano). 

Popular  Union  (Union  Popular). 
Small,  rightwing  group. 

•  National  Liberation  Party  (Partido  de 
Liberacion  Nacional — PLN).  Founded  by 


60 


Jose  Figueres.  Reformist,  non-Marxist. 

•  United  People  (Pueblo  Unido).  Coali- 
tion of  leftwing  groups.  Components  are: 

Popular  Vanguard  Party.  Orthodox 
Communist. 

Partido  de  Accion  Socialista.  Com- 
munist splinter  group. 

Partido  Obrero.  Small  radical  group 
linked  to  Sandinista  movement. 

Frente  Popular.  Small,  leftist  group. 

PANAMA 

Parties  are  officially  suspended.  The 
suspension  was  relaxed  prior  to  the  1978 
elections,  but  no  candidates  were  permitted 
to  run  on  party  tickets.  Main  parties  are: 

•  Partido  Panamenista.  One  of  two 
major  pre-1969  parties  (the  other  being  the 
PLN).  Led  by  the  charismatic  former  Presi- 
dent Arnulfo  Arias. 

•  Partido  Liberal  Nacional.  Stems 
from  the  Colombian  Liberal  Party.  Led  by 
David  Samudio. 

•  Partido  Revolucionario  Democratica. 
Left-of-center  Torrijista  party.  Organized  in 
1978. 

Other  opposition  parties  are: 

•  Partido  Democrata  Cristiano 

•  Mooimiento  Independiente  Demo- 
cratica 

•  Partido  del  Pueblo  de  Panama.  The 
Communist  Party.  ■ 


The  central  issue  in  the  Nicaragua 
situation,  therefore — whether  in  term;|. 
of  its  internal  system,  its  relation.s  tn 
Cuba,  its  attitude  toward  its 
neighbors — is  the  extent  to  which  a     r. 
moderate,  pluralistic,  and  equitable     |j 
democratic  order  can  emerge  in  a  courjt 
try  with  few  democratic  traditions  am  It 
whose  new  and  inexperienced  leaders  |l 
could  resort  to  authoritarianism  to  cop  In 
with  the  enormous  tasks  facing  them.  j|' 

The  course  of  the  Nicaraguan  rev  h- 
olution  will  thus  depend  in  part  on  how  Ij: 
the  United  States  perceived  it  and  re-  a 
lates  to  it.  Indeed,  Nicaragua's  future  \t 
internal  policies  and  relationships  will ' ' 
the  outside  world  will,  in  fact,  be  de-  " 
termined  by  those  Nicaraguans  who 
best  define  and  meet  the  country's 
needs  during  the  reconstruction  perioc  i( 
The  individual  leaders  who  do  so  will  ► 
necessarily  have  outside  contacts.  Bui  nt 
who  they  will  be  and  the  terms  on  i- 
which  they  relate  to  each  other  and  tc  li: 
outsiders  will  not  be  predetermined  by  a 
the  past  guerrilla  war  against  Somoza  \i 
It  will  depend  on  the  reconstruction  n 
Nicaragua  from  that  war. 

The  "South" 

Costa  Rica  has  long  had  an  excel-  u 
lent  functioning  democracy,  and  j^: 

Panama  has  been  moving  toward  a  It: 
more  open  political  system.  Economic  li 
and  social  problems  exist  but  the  pro(  it 
ess  of  change  and  accommodation  funi  ij: 
tions  sufficiently  well  to  keep  the  intei  «; 
nal  situation  fairly  stable. 

Both  countries  have  established 
close  and  cooperative  relationships  hi 
the  Nicaraguan  Government.  Having  ,. 
supported  the  Sandinista  cause,  they  ■' 
are  not  disposed  to  see  the  Nicaragua  J" 
revolution  turn  out  "radical."  The  lea  ' 
ers  of  these  countries  will  continue  to  ' 
use  their  influence  to  urge  moderatioi  f 
Both  countries  have,  relative  to  their  T 
resources  and  capacities,  extended  sitT 
nificant  amounts  of  technical  and  mat  f;^ 
rial  assistance  to  Nicaragua.  ' 

Panama.  U.S.  interests  in  jkr 

Panama,  though  more  extensive  than  * 
the  presence  of  the  Panama  Canal,  re  4' 
volve  primarily  around  the  canal.  Theijr 
Panama  Canal  treaties  of  1977  enter  i), 
into  force  on  October  1.  With  that  dal  j  i 
approaching  very  fast,  we  are  trying  •' 
insure  the  continued  smooth  and  oi- 
derly  functioning  of  the  canal  under  tl 
new  treaty  relationships  with  Panami 
For  this  reason,  I  hope  that  the  Sena  . 
and  the  House  will  proceed  promptly' 
enact  the  implementing  legislation 
necessary  to  exercise  our  respon- 
sibilities under  the  treaty. 


Department  of  State  Bull 


_^ 


Western  Hemisphere 


'anama  has  been  relatively  stable 
t  the  1968  coup  that  deposed  Presi- 
Aiinilfo  Arias.  We  have  expressed 
■111  about  human  rights  conditions 
::■  past.  Constitutional  reforms  and 
!<■  measures  taken  since  1977  have 
'  (\i'<]  for  movement  toward  a  more 
;mil  democratic  political  system 
m  more  engagement  of  the  people 
niiii  measures  and  in  developmen- 
iiji^ots.  Although  opposition  par- 
-  It'  ])ushing  for  more  and  faster 
ical  I'eforms,  we  do  not  see  at  this 
lui  real  threat  to  the  civilian  gov- 
fiit  of  President  Royo. 
'anama's  current  economic  situa- 
>  difficult.  Problems  stem  largely 
till'  same  factors  that  are  affecting 
nited  States — inflation  and  energy 
prts.  Economic  pressures  and  issues 
v  caused  disaffection  with  the  gov- 
.  eiit  and  will  continue  to  do  so  until 
Illation  eases  through  new  in- 
u-nt,  improved  official  economic 
1  trement,  and  a  possible  increase  in 
1  Knee  when  the  treaties  enter  into 
(. 

iome  10  opposition  parties  have 
1  Hi  a  National  Opposition  Front  for 
e  urpose  of  seeking  prompt  reforms, 
rjularly  the  holding  of  early  elec- 
■  fill-  a  new  government.  The  two 

■  participants  in  the  front — the 
I  manistas,  headed  by  Arnulfo 
i;,  and  the  Liberals — have  no 
en  links  and  are  themselves  often 
lis  iiver  tactics.  The  smaller  Chris- 
1  X'inocratic  Party  is  linked  to  the 
mtian  Democratic  movement  in 
,»ti  America  and  Western  Europe. 

i^osta  Rica.  Costa  Rica  continues 
<joy  a  stable  democratic  political 
■:  m.  Strong  democratic  traditions 

M  rved  to  give  the  country  an  out- 
.  linu  human  rights  record.  Freedom 
[rticipate  in  the  political  process  is 
Oided  for  in  the  constitution  and  re- 
e  ed  in  practice.  Elections  are  free, 
e,  and  highly  competitive. 
Mdrmally  one  of  the  best  managed 
iniies  in  the  region,  Costa  Rica  is 
;  ricncing  internal  stresses  stimu- 
'   liy  oil  price  increases,  internal 
■  ilifficulties,  and  the  spillover  of 
nil  from  neighboring  Nicaragua. 
Security  situation  is  stable. 
•ur  bilateral  relations  with  Costa 
arc  close  and  cordial.  Problems  are 
with  in  a  friendly,  straight- 
-aid,  and  pragmatic  manner. 

^''Northern  Tier" 

The  Governments  of  El  Salvador, 
'  eniala,  and  Honduras  tend  to  see 
Aiiiki  through  a  different  lens  than 
uscfl  in  the  "south."  They  are  ap- 


prehensive over  the  Nicaraguan  revolu- 
tion and  what  its  impact  will  be.  An.x- 
iety  over  their  future  pervades  these 
governments,  which  expect  to  have  to 
contend  with  a  new  rash  of  insurgency. 

Although  circumstances  vary 
among  them,  all  three  societies  are  rel- 
atively closed.  Political  systems  and 
processes  are  relatively  restricted. 
Economic  development  is  at  varying 
levels,  but  a  small  elite  is  the  main 
beneficiary  in  each  country,  and  oppor- 
tunities for  upward  mobility  remain 
limited.  The  incidents  of  violence,  re- 
pression, and  human  rights  violations 
are  high  in  Guatemala  and  El  Salvador. 

With  limited  channels  of  redress  or 
free  political  flow,  dissent  tends  to  back 
up  into  pressure  and  instability.  Politi- 
cal and  social  tensions,  instabilities,  and 
polarization  are  considerably  higher 
here  than  in  the  rest  of  the  region,  al- 
though domestic  circumstances  vary.  El 
Salvador  is  the  most  volatile,  given 
conflict  between  activated  and 
polarized  political  and  social  groups, 
while  Honduras  is  the  most  tranquil 
with  optimistic  prospects  for  social  and 
political  modernization. 

El  Salvador.  El  Salvador— the 
smallest  and  most  densely  populated 
country  in  Central  America — presents 
a  classic  setting  for  social  and  political 
unrest.  Its  population  density — at  565 
persons  per  square  mile — is  the  high- 
est of  any  country  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  Population  growth  of 
3.2 '/f  and  agricultural  land  pressures 
have  pushed  the  unemployment- 
underemployment  rate  above  30 '7r. 
New  jobs  in  industry  absorb  less  than 
one-sixth  of  labor  force  entrants,  and 
agriculture  provides  jobs  for  only  one- 
half  of  new  job  seekers.  Many  Salva- 
dorans,  faced  with  poverty  and  lack  of 
opportunity,  have  chosen  to  emigrate. 

The  export-oriented  economy  is 
characterized  by  a  highly  skewed  dis- 
tribution of  income,  wealth,  and  land. 
In  agriculture,  for  example,  2%  of  the 
population  owns  almost  60%  of  the 
land.  A  small  oligarchy  controls  much  of 
industry  and  agriculture  and  has  great 
influence  on  the  quasimilitary  goveim- 
ment.  The  class  structure  is  one  of  the 
most  rigid  in  Latin  America.  Human 
rights  violations  have  been  serious,  as 
noted  in  the  Department's  report  on  the 
human  rights  situation  submitted  to  the 
Congress  last  January. 

Under  a  constitutional  system  in 
place  since  1962,  military  candidates 
have  been  regularly  elected  to  the 
presidency  under  the  banner  of  the  offi- 
cial Paiiido  de  Conciliacion  Nacio7ial. 


The  political  system  has  not  accommo- 
dated dissent  and  demands  for  change 
well. 

Political,  economic,  and  social 
rigidities  under  successive  regimes 
have  not  allowed  a  sufficient  outlet  for 
rising  frustration  and  dissatisfaction. 
This  atmosphere  has  spawned  a 
dramatic  increase  in  leftist  terrorism, 
and  terrorist  movements  have 
flourished,  their  actions  accelerating  a 
drift  toward  revolutionary  violence. 

The  country  has  thus  been  caught 
in  a  chronic  national  crisis;  antigovern- 
ment  activity  is  rampant,  often  beget- 
ting violence,  and  trust  is  lacking  on  all 
sides.  In  these  circumstances  polariza- 
tion is  far  advanced,  and  the  prospects 
for  avoiding  insurrectional  violence  are 
rapidly  dimming. 

Fortunately,  however,  there  are 
signs  that  President  Romero,  the  mod- 
erate opposition,  and  the  private  sector 
are  crucially  aware  of  this  spiraling 
polarization  and  some  evidence  of  a  de- 
sire to  find  some  reconciliation.  In 
mid-August  President  Romero  an- 
nounced a  series  of  significant  electoral 
measures,  which  if  they  can  be  effec- 
tively implemented,  hopefully  would  go 
far  to  end  the  spiraling  violence,  frus- 
tration, and  polarization.  Halting 
human  rights  abuses  against  the  integ- 
rity of  the  person  will  also  be  crucial  to 
allowing  an  atmosphere  to  develop 
which  will  permit  these  reforms  a 
realistic  chance  of  success. 

President  Romero's  commitment  to 
free  municipal  and  legislative  elections 
in  March  1980  and  to  measures  to  re- 
form and  open  up  the  electoral  system 
is  particularly  encouraging.  He  also  in- 
vited all  political  exiles  to  return,  has 
asked  the  Organization  of  American 
States  (OAS)  for  observers  and  ad- 
visors to  assist  in  electoral  reform,  and 
has  invited  the  International  Red  Cross 
to  visit  the  prisons  to  judge  conditions 
there. 

Guatemala.  Guatemala  is  the  most 
populous  and  the  most  economically 
significant  country  in  Central  America. 
The  nation's  population  is  divided  into 
two  distinct  ethnic  groups,  each  with 
its  own  languages  and  culture.  The  In- 
dians, embracing  20  distinct  indigenous 
tongues,  make  up  40%  of  the  total 
population  and  remain  both  physically 
and  culturally  separate  from  the  larger 
Spanish-speaking  group.  The  urban 
population  growth  rate  of  4.4%  is 
among  the  region's  fastest.  Even  so, 
rural  areas  still  account  for  over  60%  of 
the  population. 

The  economy  is  largely  agrarian, 
with  agriculture  employing  55  ^  of  the 
labor  force  and  contributing  a  little 


jarv  1980 


61 


Western  Hemisphere 


I 

jbapr 


more  than  one-fourth  of  GDP.  Along- 
side the  agricultural  base  is  a  developed 
manufacturing  sector — the  largest  in 
the  region.  Although  manufactured  ex- 
ports account  for  less  than  one-third  of 
foreign  sales,  it  is  the  most  dynamic 
sector  in  terms  of  employment  and 
growth. 

Benefits  of  Guatemala's  generally 
solid  economic  performance  have  been 
unevenly  distributed.  For  three-fourths 
of  the  population,  annual  per  capita  in- 
come is  still  less  than  one-half  of  the  na- 
tional average.  Neither  the  rural  poor 
nor  labor  have  proportionately  bene- 
fitted from  growth  in  the  agricultural 
and  manufacturing  sectors.  Widespread 
poverty  and  a  major  need  for  land  re- 
form are  probably  among  the  major  fac- 
tors contributing  to  instability  and 
political  violence. 

Politically.  Guatemalan  society  is 
polarized  and  has  been  for  many  years. 
Violence  is  widespread  and  virtually  in- 
stitutionalized. Subversive  groups  of 
the  extreme  left  are  capable  of  terrorist 
operations;  the  extreme  right  is  simi- 
larly organized  with  their  own  terrorist 
organizations.  Recipi'ocal  acts  of  ter- 
rorism have  cycled  through  Guatemalan 
society  for  many  years.  The  list  of  as- 
sassinated political  reformists  is  long, 
as  is  the  list  of  government  officials 
who  have  been  assassinated  by  leftwing 
terrorists. 

While  presidential  succession  takes 
place  with  regularity  every  4  years,  the 
political  process  is  relatively  closed. 
The  political  opposition  is  divided.  New 
parties  of  the  right  and  center  left  have 
been  intimidated  by  the  assassination  of 
their  most  prominent  leaders.  The  labor 
movement  is  i-elatively  weak.  Human 
rights  violations  have  been  described  in 
the  Department's  report  to  the 
Congress. 

While  enjoying  something  of  a  re- 
surgence since  being  decimated  in  the 
early  1970's,  leftist  guerrilla  groups  are 
relatively  weak.  They  are  isolated  from 
the  large  but  unassimilated  Indian 
population  in  rural  areas  and  out- 
gunned in  the  cities.  Moreover,  they 
lack  broad-based  front  groups  like  El 
Salvador's  Popular  Revolutionary  Bloc 
to  organize  and  direct  popular  dissent. 

Guatemala  thus  suffers  similar 
socioeconomic  imbalances  and  political 
polarization  as  its  neighbors,  but  the 
conflicts  have  not  yet  reached  the  same 
degree  of  intensity  as  in  El  Salvador. 

Honduras.  Honduras  is  the  poorest 
of  the  Central  American  countries,  but 
at  the  same  time  it  suffers  from  far  less 
internal  polarization  and  enjoys  greater 
domestic  calm  than  other  countries  in 
the  region.  Class  differences  are  far 


less  marked  and  rigid,  and  wealth  is 
considerably  more  evenly  distributed 
than  in  its  northern  tier  neighbors.  Al- 
though Honduras  has  a  high  population 
growth,  it  remains  comparatively  un- 
derpopulated with  fewer  people  and 
five  times  the  land  area  of  neighboring 
El  Salvador.  Land  is  relatively  abun- 
dant and  fairly  evenly  distributed. 

The  current  military  government 
has  experienced  a  general  continuity 
since  December  1972  when  a  Superior 
Defense  Council  took  power  from  the 
elected  Nationalist  Party  president. 
Admittedly  de  facto,  the  government  is 
committed  to  a  return  to  constitutional 
rule  beginning  with  elections  for  a  con- 
stituent assembly  in  April  1980. 

The  government,  while  ruling  as  a 
de  facto  regime,  is  generally  not  re- 
pressive. Human  rights  performance 
and  civil  liberties  are  reasonably  good. 
The  government,  and  the  military  in- 
stitutions are  much  moi'e  sensitive  to 
popular  aspirations  and  pressures  than 
in  the  other  countries,  and  the  govern- 
ment is  committed  to  development  pro- 
grams aimed  at  bettering  the  lot  of  the 
ordinary  citizen,  especially  in  the  rural 
areas. 

Honduras  has  no  current  guerrilla 
problem,  and  it  faces  the  least  serious 
threat  to  stability  from  internally  gen- 
erated insurgent  action,  at  least  in  the 
short  term.  Several  factors  have  helped 
insulate  Honduras  from  an  insurgent 
threat — relatively  benign  military  rule, 
a  favorable  land-labor  ratio,  and  an 
economic  distribution  pattern  that  has 
avoided  the  sharp  economic  polarization 
and  deep  gaps  between  rich  and  poor 
that  exist,  for  example,  in  El  Salvador. 


EXTERNAL  FACTORS 

Cuba 

The  most  important  single  factor 
governing  possible  Cuban  involvement 
in  subversive  activities  in  the  northern 
tier  will  be  its  perception  of  opportuni- 
ties. 

Profiting  from  its  experience  in  the 
1960's,  Cuba  has  generally  followed  a 
policy  of  cultivating  and  maintaining 
contact  with  leftist  rebel  movements;  in 
some  cases  providing  subsistence-level 
support,  safehaven  as  needed,  and 
various  types  of  training;  urging 
disjjarate  opposition  forces  to  unite; 
counseling  recipients  of  their  aid  to  ex- 
pand grassroots  support;  and  waiting 
for  the  development  of  objective  condi- 
tions propitious  for  additional  support. 


Given  events  in  Nicaragua,  CubaWI- 
certain  to  increase  its  attention  to  Cen  j. 
tral  America.  Cuba,  however,  may  now  !' 
seek  a  period  of  assessment  and  diges- 
tion  of  the  results  of  Nicaragua.  Thus,  'i? 
we  should  not  be  surprised  if  the  Casta  f 
regime  carefully  weighs  pros  and  cons 
of  each  situation  as  it  arises  and,  rathei 
than  trying  to  force  events  to  happen, 
should  decide  to  react  to  events  as  they 
occur.  In  assessing  opportunities  Cas-  i 
tro  is  very  likely  to  consider  such  fac- 
tors as  the  internal  dynamism  in  each 
country,  the  U.S.  reaction,  the  impact 
on  members  of  the  nonaligned  move- 
ment, the  degree  of  support  or  toler-    [ 
ance  from  other  Latin  American  coun- 
tries, the  complexities  of  logistical 
problems,  the  extent  of  Cuban  influeno 
with  the  insurgent  groups,  and,  ulti- 
mately, the  chances  of  success. 

The  major  question  in  the  minds  o 
interested  neighbors  is  what  kind  nf 
timate  relationship  with  Cuba  Nic- 
aragua will  develop.  While  Havana  ct-i  |i 
tainly  has  the  gratitude  of  the  San-      n 
dinista  leadership  for  the  assistance  it  it 
provided,  and  considerable  ties  with     »; 
key  figures  in  the  revolution,  it  is  not  4 
automatic  that — whatever  Havana's 
intentions — the  intei'ests  of  the  San- 
dinistas as  the  Government  of 
Nicaragua  will  become  indentical  with  '•* 
those  of  Cuba.  There  is,  indeed,  every  j* 
reason  to  suppose  that  Nicaraguans      j* 
would  prefer  independent  development  t^- 

Certainly  there  are  significant 
forces  at  work  to  produce  something 
better  than  a  worst-case  model  in         *( 
Nicaragua.  Practical  considerations      i., 
may  work  to  constrain  radical  impulses  " 
within  the  Sandinista  movement:  a        |||| 
period  of  relative  calm  needed  to  re- 
habilitate the  country;  the  diplomatic 
shelter  that  a  broad-based  policy  af- 
fords in  contrast  to  a  provocatively 
Communist  tilt;  the  potential  for  , 

growing  power  and  authority  of  moder  .^ 
ate  elements  in  the  government  and  tht  u- 
society;  and  the  support  and  coopera- 
tion of  non-Communist  countries  and 
international  financial  institutions  in 
and  outside  of  Latin  America. 


Other  Latin  American  Countries 

Moderate  governments  of  Latin         1 
America,  especially  the  Andean  group,  '| 
have  shown  a  keen  interest  in  Central  l^ 
America.  Venezuela,  particularly,  has   j, 
chosen  to  play  an  active  role  of  assist-  ,; 
ance  and  contact  with  these  govern- 
ments, and  an  official  Venezuelan  nn- 
sion  recently  visited  the  northern  tier 
countries.  Mexico,  too,  has  a  majoi' 
interest  in  developments  in  this  geo- 
graphically close  region. 


62 


Department  of  State  Bullet' 


M^ 


Western  Hemisphere 


licse  jrovei'nments  have  indicated 

u^ial  of  fostering-  ])eaceful  change 

t    uicin  generally  and  supporting 

iM!i  in  Nicaraguan  domestic  and 

II   Kilicies.  It  can  be  expected  that 

-  iLitKins  will  play  an  increasingly 

)ic:mt  and  constructive  role. 


POLICY  RESPONSES 

iiitral  America's  geographic 
nii\  creates  special  U.S.  interests 
iiral  American  peace,  prosperity, 
loprration.  enhanced  by  the  sym- 

-1  I  rum  deep  past  involvement. 

•  itci'ests  embrace: 

The  existence  of  reasonably  sta- 
;  il  iViendly  governments  free  from 
I  atiiin  by  outside  powers: 

Security  against  use  of  the  region 
I  ci's  hostile  to  us; 

Human  rights,  including  the  de- 

iitiit  of  viable  democratic  institu- 

aiid 

Kcduomic  and  social  development 

I  :b  domestic  reform  and  increased 

II  a!  cooperation  and  integration. 

iven  the  volatile  circumstances 
;   ilnerabilities  described,  the  in- 
uility  of  change,  and  the  dangers 
Kirization  and  radicalization,  we 
il  hope  to  see  those  vulnerabilities 


reduced  by  peaceful  change  consistent 
with  individual  liberties  and  democratic 
values  and  more  open,  pluralistic,  and 
equitable  societies. 

To  help  assure  peaceful  and 
evolutionary  change,  we  want  to  work 
with  the  nations  of  Central  America 
and  with  other  hemisphere  countries  to 
achieve: 

•  An  evolution  toward  more  open, 
pluralistic  political  systems,  maintain- 
ing contact  with  all  elements  in  Central 
America,  including  labor  and  youth  or- 
ganizations, the  media,  private  sector 
groups,  and  public  officials: 

•  Social  and  economic  development 
through  bilateral  and  multilateral  as- 
sistance programs: 

•  Positive  relationships  with  the 
region's  governments  on  a  basis  of 
nonintervention,  equality,  and  respect 
for  human  rights;  and 

•  Regional  cooperation  in  dealing 
with  common  economic  problems. 

Let  me  now  summarize  our  major 
policy  lines  toward  Nicaragua  and  the 
countries  of  the  northern  tier. 


Nicaragua 

We  seek  to  develop  positive  re- 
lationships with  the  Government  of  Na- 
tional Reconstruction  on  the  basis  of 
nonintervention,  equality,  and  mutual 
respect.  I  am  confident  that  our  new 
relationships  will  reflect  efforts  to  fos- 
ter respect  for  human  rights  and 
democracy. 

We  support  a  humane  and  pluralis- 
tic evolution,  based  on  Nicaragua's  own 
needs,  without  outside  intervention 
from  anyone.  We  plan  to  maintain  con- 
tact with  all  elements  in  Nicaragua,  in- 
cluding the  church,  the  media,  and  the 
private  sector,  as  well  as  public  offi- 
cials. 

We  will  encourage  Nicaragua  and 
its  neighbors  to  build  bridges,  to 
dampen  tensions,  to  remove  the  possi- 
bility of  involvement  in  each  other's 
domestic  political  affairs,  and  to  pro- 
mote regional  cooperation  and  security. 

We  are  already  helping  alleviate 
human  suffering  and  hope  to  assist  con- 
cretely in  the  massive  reconstruction 
task  facing  that  nation,  thus  insuring 
the  best  possible  climate  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  normal  democratic  order 
with  respect  for  human  rights. 

We  plan  to  cooperate  with  other 
nations  and  public  and  private  institu- 
tions in  assisting  Nicaragua's  economic 
recovery  and  progress. 


c^nomic 

C9peration, 

regration 

I  spite  very  real  progress  in  the  early 
-the  integration  movement  is  in  con- 
■'li-  disarray.  Currently  new  large- 

'|"'i'ti'nities  for  import  substitution 
I  iI'mI.  Political  problems  abound,  Op- 
'I-  future  progress  for  economic  in- 
-  rare.  The  obstacles  to  major 
-  include: 

•lif  current  situation  in  Nicaragua 
'  major  political  and  economic  impact, 
t  angles  from  interrupted  transporta- 
itwi'en  Costa  Rica  and  the  rest  of 

1  America  to  problems  due  to  insta- 

nd  border  closings; 
"'he  deteriorating  security  situation  in 

adni-  and  Guatemala; 
'  "111-  longstanding  dispute  between  El 

il'  and  Honduras  that  has  yet  to  be 

d; 
•die  failure  to  obtain  any  agreement  to 
restructuring  a  substitute  for  the 

ill  .Market  treaty  which  expires  in 

n.l 
« "he  Honduras  position  that  it  has  not 
1  d  e.|uivalent  benefits  from  the  Com- 

irkel  and  the  unwillingness  to  date  of 

t-r  countries  to  agree  to  structural 


changes  to  insure  that  Central  America's 
only  less  developed  country  receives  rela- 
tively favorable  treatment. 

Nevertheless  there  is  still  enough  inter- 
est in  the  Common  Market  either  because  of 
its  perceived  benefits  or  because  of  belief  in 
a  regional  commitment  to  keep  its  institu- 
tions and  arrangements  functioning  even 
when  ad  hoc  arrangements  are  required. 

The  strength  of  the  historical,  social, 
and  psychological  basis  for  continued  re- 
gional cooperation  in  the  area  does  not  rest 
solely  on  the  progress  of  economic  integra- 
tion. The  realization  that  Central  America 
was  one  country  before  1823;  similar  legal 
codes;  similar  climate;  production  of  coffee, 
sugar,  and  cotton;  good  transportation  and 
communications;  intermarriage  among 
families;  easy  movement  of  people  within 
the  region;  similar  cultures;  same  language; 
and  country  sizes  (small)  all  lead  to  a  sense 
of  community  within  the  region  which  per- 
mitted the  Central  American  Common  Mar- 
ket e.xperiment  and  holds  together  a  cooper- 
ative structure  today. 

After  over  a  decade  of  relatively  rapid 
economic  growth,  per  capita  incomes  for  the 
countries  of  the  region  have  risen  substan- 
tially. There  is  a  considerable  variance  in 
per  capita  incomes,  however,  ranging  from 
the  low  in  Honduras  of  $400  to  the  middle 
income  levels  of  $1,100+  in  Panama  and 
Costa  Rica. 


While  still  agriculturally  based,  the 
economies  of  the  Central  American  coun- 
tries have  become  more  diversified  and  a  re- 
cent study  by  the  Regional  Office  for  Cen- 
tral America  and  Panama  and  the  Sec- 
retariat for  Central  American  Integration 
attributes  the  creation  of  over  150,000  jobs 
in  the  modern  sector  to  the  effects  of  the 
economic  integration  movement.  Even  in  the 
face  of  great  difficulty,  intraregional  trade 
has  grown  to  about  $1  billion  annually. 

Nontraditional  exports  are  increasing 
due  at  least  in  part  to  the  period  of  protec- 
tion provided  under  the  Common  Market  ar- 
rangements. Whether  the  Common  Market 
can  be  rejuvenated  depends  largely  on 
whether  it  can  become  a  means  for  coopera- 
tion in  producing  exports  from  the  Common 
Market  to  other  parts  of  the  world,  particu- 
larly Europe  and  Japan  in  addition  to  the 
United  States.  Since  the  easy  opportunities 
for  import  substitution  have  been  seized, 
growth  within  the  market  is  expected  to  be 
only  that  induced  by  the  growth  of  the  con- 
stituent countries.  Reform  of  industrializa- 
tion and  export  incentives  in  the  region  may 
be  easier  to  bring  about  on  a  group  basis 
than  by  the  individual  countries  acting 
alone. 

Regional  Institutions 

Some  regional  institutions  are  techni- 
cally strong  although  financial  support  from 
the  countries  in  the  area  is  often  disap- 


iry  1980 


63 


Western  Hemisphere 


El  Salvador 

We  are  encouraging  the  govern- 
ment and  other  democratic  elements  in 
the  very  deUcate  political  transition 
process  now  underway  in  El  Salvador. 
This  is  of  critical  importance  to  the  fu- 
ture of  El  Salvador.  Putting  an  end  to 
human  rights  violations  of  the  integrity 
of  the  person  is  crucial  to  the  overall 
atmosphere  in  the  country. 

We  believe  the  establishment  of  a 
real  and  credible  electoral  process, 
leading  to  free  municipal/legislative 
elections  in  March  1980,  is  crucial  to  El 
Salvador's  peaceful  evolution  and  to  ar- 
resting the  critical  polarization  and 
frustration  that  can  lead  almost  cer- 
tainly to  violent  confrontation  between 
right  and  left. 

President  Romero's  August  1979 
proposals  offer  a  constructive  and 
hopeful  beginning.  They  represent  sig- 
nificant promises  that  now  must  be 
given  life  by  both  government  and  op- 
position in  restoring  trust  and  agreeing 
to  program  specifics.  The  concrete 
steps  already  taken  are  encouraging, 
but  the  overall  assessment  of  the  situa- 
tion is  uncertain. 

We  will  support  real  and  serious 
reform  with  appropriate  cooperation 
and  assistance. 


Honduras 

We  have  been  impressed  by  the 
Honduran  Government's  demonstration 
of  social  awareness  and  its  commitment 
to  return  that  counti-y  to  constitutional 
rule  ne.xt  year. 

It  is  also  clear  that  geography 
gives  Honduras  a  central  role  in  the 
prevention  of  regional  conflict,  incur- 
sions, and  potential  infiltrations  both 
ways  between  revolutionary  Nicaragua 
and  its  conservative  northern 
neighbors. 

Honduras  is  thus  central  to  the 
"bridge-building"  process  we  hope  will 
emerge  in  Central  America.  We  will  en- 
courage Honduras  to  play  such  a  role 
and  will  encourage  both  El  Salvador 
and  Honduras  to  reach  an  early  settle- 
ment on  their  border  dispute. 

We  will  provide  cooperation  and 
assistance  to  the  government  to  help  it 
achieve  its  goals. 

Guatemala 

We  see  no  crisis  in  the  months  im- 
mediately ahead,  but  we  recognize  the 
country  faces  severe  and  fundamental 
longer  term  socioeconomic  and  political 
questions. 

We  would  encourage  the  Govern- 
ment of  Guatemala  to  work  toward  a 


more  open  electoral  process,  to  take 
effective  action  to  halt  spiraling  politi- 
cal violence,  and  to  play  a  constructive 
role  in  regional  cooperation. 

Conclusion 

This  brings  me  full  circle  to  my 
opening  comments.  Central  America  is 
a  region  in  which  deep  demands  for 
change  exist,  in  which  serious  in- 
equities and  structural  problems  create 
political  pressures,  in  which  legitimate 
grievances  result  in  basic  demands  for 
equity  and  redress.  In  the  northern  tier 
these  instabilities  have  run  up  against 
relatively  closed  or  rigid  processes  thai 
permit  their  accommodation  or  venting 
with  great  difficulty.  The  consequent 
tensions  result  in  polarization  that  un- 
less relieved  will  invite  radicalization 
and  the  capture  and  perversion  of 
legitimate  causes  by  extreme  elements. 

There  is  in  all  this  a  difficult  and 
agonizing  dilemma — the  legitimacy  of 
grievances  and  inequities  and  the  in- 
evitability and  drive  for  systemic 
change  and  reform,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  effort  by  Castroist/Marxist 
elements,  on  the  other,  to  exploit  these 
currents  for  their  own  use  in  order  to 
disguise  and  legitimize  their  ulterior 
objectives.  Clearly,  helping  resolve  the 


pointing.  The  Common  Market  Secretariat 
(SIECA)  has  suffered  from  insufficient 
backing  for  its  proposals  by  the  Ministers  of 
Economy.  The  impact  of  the  new  Secretary 
General  remains  to  be  seen.  The  Central 
American  Bank  for  Economic  Integration 
(CABEI)  is  now  an  established  lending  in- 
stitution which  has  had  real  success  in 
financing  regional  infrastructure  projects, 
particularly  highways  and  telecommunica- 
tions. 

There  are  several  institutions,  such  as 
the  Center  for  Tropical  Agricultural  Re- 
search (CATIE),  the  Nutrition  Institute  for 
Central  America  and  Panama  (INCAP),  and 
the  Central  America  Institute  of  Research 
and  Industrial  Technology  (ICAITI),  which 
have  substantial  technical  staffs  which  can 
address  common  development  problems  in 
the  area,  such  as  agricultural  research,  nu- 
trition, energy,  technology,  and  the 
environment. 


International  Inputs 

The  World  Bank,  the  Inter-American 
Development  Bank,  the  Agency  for  Interna- 
tional Development  (AID),  and  other  inter- 
national and  bilateral  assistance  programs 
are  active  in  Central  America.  There  is  a 
clear  willingness  on  the  part  of  the  World 
Bank  to  finance  additional  bilateral  projects 
as  they  materialize.  This  is  demonstrated  by 
its  current  plan  to  establish,  along  with  the 


U.N.  Development  Program,  a  project  de- 
sign team  in  Central  America.  The  Inter- 
American  Development  Bank  is  currently 
lending  even  larger  amounts  than  the  World 
Bank.  AID  programs  are  relatively  much 
smaller  but  still  have  a  major  impact  as 
trailblazers. 

All  three  institutions  have  provided 
substantial  support  to  projects  designed  to 
have  a  direct  impact  on  the  rural  poor,  al- 
though the  banks  continue  to  finance  major 
infrastructure  projects  as  well. 

Commerce  and  Trade 

Well  over  half  of  current  exports  from 
Central  America  are  to  the  United  States 
(excluding  trade  with  other  countries  in  the 
region).  However,  the  Central  American 
countries  have  not  taken  maximum  advan- 
tage of  general  system  of  preferences  (GSP) 
under  current  U.S.  legislation.  Commercial 
opportunities  have  not,  therefore,  been 
exploited  to  the  extent  they  can  be. 

Realistically,  however,  any  major  in- 
crease in  exports  to  the  U.S.  in  such  areas 
as  textiles  or  shoes  or  even  fruits  and  vege- 
tables, can  run  into  major  political  opposi- 
tion in  the  United  States.  As  a  result  there 
are  very  real  limitations  on  export  expan- 
sion to  the  United  States  in  any  area  where 
these  exports  are  in  direct  competition  with 
U.S.  products. 


Similarly,  the  European  Common  Mar- 
ket presents  limited  opportunities  in  many 
products,  with  the  additional  problem  that 
many  primary  products  benefit  from  prefer 
ence  arrangements  with  former  colonies  in 
Africa  and  the  Caribbean.  Nevertheless, 
possibilities  for  major  export  expansion  do 
exist  in  many  areas  and  products,  especiall; 
nontraditional  exports  and  processed  ag- 
ricultural products.  Beef  and  beef  products 
are  examples.  Japan  could  become  a  major 
market  as  it  already  is  for  cotton.  Assembly 
operations  in  fields  such  as  electronics  for 
reexport  offer  other  possibilities. 

An  important  conclusion  about  the  Cen 
tral  American  countries  is  that  given  the 
relative  importance  of  the  external  sector  ir 
the.se  economies  and  their  relative  openness 
U.S.  trade  policy  may  be  an  important  ele- 
ment in  determining  the  parameters  of  fur- 
ther growth  in  the  region.  ■ 


64 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Western  Hemisphere 


former  in  a  peaceful,  democratic,  mod- 
erate way  is  the  best  defense  against 
the  latter.  Communism's  greatest  ally 
is  a  rigid,  indiscriminate  defense  of  the 
status  quo  and  intolerance  of  change 
and  dissent.  As  I  noted,  defense  of  the 
status  quo  will  not  avoid  change;  it  will 
only  radicalize  it.  Instability  cannot  be 
capped,  nor  repression  maintained,  in- 
definitely without  sowing  the  seeds  of  a 
violent  and  radical  denouement.  Failure 
on  our  part  to  identify  with  the  legiti- 
mate aspirations  of  the  people  in  these 
countries — and  with  those  democratic 
elements  who  seek  peaceful  construc- 
tive change — respect  for  human  rights, 
and  basic  equity  will  put  us  on  the 
wrong  side  of  history. 

Our  task,  therefore,  is  how  to  work 
with  our  friends  to  guide  and  influence 
change,  how  to  use  our  influence  to 
promote  justice,  freedom,  and  equity  to 
mutual  benefit — and  thereby  avoid  in- 
surgency and  communism.  Nowhere 
will  this  task  be  more  crucial  than  in 
Nicaragua.  As  Dr.  Hans  Morgenthau 
once  wrote:  "The  real  issue  facing 
American  foreign  policy  ...  is  not  how 
to  preserve  stability  in  the  face  of  rev- 
olution, but  how  to  create  stability  out 
of  revolution."  ■ 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


Inter- American 

Institute 

for  Cooperation  on 

Agriculture 

MESSAGE  TO  THE  SENATE, 
NOV.  14,  1979' 

I  transmit  herewith,  for  Senate  advice 
and  consent  to  ratification,  the  Convention 
on  the  Inter-American  Institute  for  Cooper- 
ation on  Agriculture  (the  Convention)  which 
was  signed  at  Washington  on  March  6,  1979. 
For  the  information  of  the  Senate,  I  also 
transmit  the  report  of  the  Department  of 
State  with  respect  to  the  Convention. 

The  Convention  is  a  revision  of  the  1944 
Convention  on  the  Inter-American  Institute 
of  Agricultural  Sciences.  It  clarifies  the  1944 
Convention  and  strengthens  and  broadens 
the  mandate  of  the  Inter-American  Institute 
of  Agricultural  Sciences  (the  Institute). 

Membership  in  the  Institute  under  the 
Convention  is  open  to  states  which  are 
members  of  the  OAS  [Organization  of 
American  States]  and  the  existing  Institute, 
or  other  American  states  whose  admission  is 
accepted  by  the  Inter-American  Board  of 
Agriculture. 

Under  the  Convention,  the  Institute 
will  consist  of  three  principal  organs — the 
Inter-American  Board  of  Agriculture,  the 
Executive  Committee,  and  the  General  Di- 
rectorate. The  Inter-American  Board  of  Ag- 
riculture will  be  the  highest  organ  of  the  In- 
stitute and  will  consist  of  one  representative 
from  each  Member  State.  The  new  Conven- 
tion stipulates  that  such  representatives 
should  preferably  be  persons  connected  with 
agriculture  or  rural  development.  This 
Board  will  be  responsible  for  setting  policy 
and  budgetary  priorities  of  the  Institute. 

To  reflect  the  changed  responsibilities 
of  the  Institute,  its  name  has  been  changed 
to  the  Inter- American  Institute  for  Cooper- 
ation on  Agriculture. 

The  Convention  will  enter  into  force 
when  two-thirds  of  the  states  parties  to  the 
1944  Convention  have  deposited  instruments 
of  ratification.  Correspondingly,  the  1944 
Convention  will  cease  to  be  in  force  for  those 
states  for  which  the  new  Convention  is  in 
force. 

I  recommend  that  the  Senate  give  early 
and  favorable  consideration  to  the  Conven- 
tion and  advice  and  consent  to  ratification. 
Jimmy  Carter  ■ 

'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Nov.  19,  1979. 


Chile 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 

NOV.  .30,  1979' 

The  Government  of  the  United 
States  has  been  reviewing  our  relations 
with  the  Government  of  Chile,  in  light 
of  Chile's  actions  with  respect  to  the 
assassination  of  Orlando  Letelier,  a 
former  Ambassador  of  Chile  to  the 
United  States,  and  Ronni  Moffitt. 

Mr.  Letelier  and  Mrs.  Moffitt  were 
killed  in  Washington  in  September  1976 
by  a  bomb  attached  to  their  car.  On 
August  1,  1978,  a  Federal  grand  jury 
handed  down  a  number  of  indictments 
in  the  case.  Three  officers  of  the  Chil- 
ean intelligence  service  (Messrs.  Con- 
treras,  Espinoza,  and  Fernandez)  were 
indicted  for  having  planned  and  di- 
rected the  killings.  Michael  Townley,  a 
member  of  the  Chilean  intelligence 
service,  pleaded  guilty  and  was  sen- 
tenced for  his  role  in  the  crime,  and  two 
of  his  Cuban  accomplices  were  sub- 
sequently tried  and  convicted  in  the 
U.S.  District  Court  in  Washington.  The 
United  States  sought  the  extradition 
from  Chile  of  the  three  Chilean  offi- 
cials, but  on  October  1  that  request  was 
denied  by  the  Chilean  Supreme  Court. 
The  court  also  chose  not  to  call  for  a 
Chilean  investigation  of  the  murder 
charges. 

The  Government  of  Chile  bears  a 
twofold  responsibility  in  this  matter. 
First,  the  three  men  indicted  for  having 
planned  and  directed  the  killings  were 
officials  of  that  government  and  in- 
cluded the  former  head  of  Chile's  intel- 
ligence service.  The  overwhelming 
body  of  evidence  amassed  by  the  De- 
partment of  Justice  makes  it  likely  that 
the  charges  against  these  officials 
would  be  upheld  if  a  fair  trial  could  be 
held.  Second,  for  over  20  months  the 
Government  of  Chile  has  made  no  seri- 
ous effort  to  investigate  or  prosecute 
these  crimes  on  its  own. 

The  Government  of  Chile  has  thus, 
in  effect,  condoned  this  act  of  interna- 
tional terrorism.  It  now  seems  likely 
that  the  men  who  planned  and  directed 
this  crime,  committed  on  the  streets  of 
our  nation's  capital,  will  go  unpunished. 
We  believe  it  is  essential  that  we  make 
clear,  both  to  the  Government  of  Chile 
and  to  others  throughout  the  world, 
that  such  acts  of  terrorism  cannot  be 
tolerated. 

Accordingly,  the  President  has 
concluded  that  the  following  measures 
should  be  taken. 

•  We  shall  reduce  the  size  of  our 
mission  in  Chile. 


January  1980 


65 


•  By  January  1,  1980,  we  will  ter- 
minate the  foreign  military  sales  (FMS) 
"pipeline"  to  Chile  and  will  thereby 
terminate  all  deliveries  of  military 
equipment  to  the  Government  of  Chile 
by  the  U.S.  Government. 

•  The  military  group  now  stationed 
in  our  Embassy  in  Santiago  will  be 
phased  down  as  the  FMS  pipeline  is  re- 
duced: at  the  end  of  this  year,  we  will 
assess  whether  the  military  group 
should  be  completely  eliminated. 

•  Pursuant  to  the  Export-Import 
Bank  Act  and  to  authority  delegated  by 
the  President,  Secretary  Vance  has  de- 
termined that  suspension  of  E.xim 
financing  in  Chile  would  "clearly  and 
impoi'tantly  advance  U.S.  policy"  in 
combating  international  terrorism. 
E.xim  is,  therefore,  immediately  sus- 
pending all  such  financing. 

•  The  Overseas  Private  Invest- 
ment Corp.  will  not  approve  any  fur- 
ther guaranties  or  undertake  any  new 
activities  in  Chile. 

Chile's  deplorable  conduct  in  this 
affair,  and  in  particular  its  refusal  to 
conduct  a  full  and  fair  investigation  of 
this  crime,  demand  the  actions  we  are 
taking  today,  which  constitute  a  strong 
reaffirmation  of  our  determination  to 
resist  international  terrorism.  ■ 

•  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  De- 
partment spokesman  Hodding  Carter  III. 


TREATIES 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

Convention  on  the  Inler-Amei'ican  Institute 
for  Cooperation  on  Agricultui-e.  Done  at 
Washington  Mar.  6,  1979.' 
Ratifications  deposited:  Barbados,  Oct.  24. 
1979;  Canada,  July  11,  1979. 

Arbitration 

Convention  on  the  recognition  and  enforce- 
ment of  foreign  arbitral  awards.  Done  at 
New  York  June  10,  19.58.  Entered  into  force 
June  7,  1959:  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  29,  1970. 
Ratification  deposited:  Jordan,  Nov.  15, 
1979. 

Aviation 

Convention  for  the  unification  of  certain 

rules  relating  to  international  transportation 

by  air  and  additional  protocol.  Concluded  at 

Warsaw  Oct.  12,  1929.  Entered  into  force 

Feb.  13,  1933;  for  the  U.S.  Oct.  29,  1934.  49 

Stat.  3000. 

Accessions  deposited:  Chile,  Mar.  2,  1979:^ 

Uruguay,  July  4,  1979. 

Notification  of  succession:  Bangladesh,  Feb. 

13,  1979. 

Additional  protocol  No.  3  to  amend  the  con- 
vention for  the  unification  of  certain  rules 
relating  to  international  carriage  by  air 
signed  at  Warsaw  on  Oct.  12,  1929  (49  Stat. 
3000)  as  amended  by  the  protocols  done  at 
The  Hague  on  Sept.  28,  1955  and  at 
Guatemala  City  on  Mar.  8,  1971.  Done  at 
Montreal  Sept.  25,  1975.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Brazil.  Aug.  16, 
1979.2 

Montreal  protocol  No.  4  to  amend  the  con- 
vention for  the  unification  of  certain  rules 
relating  to  international  carriage  by  air 
signed  at  Warsaw  on  Oct.  12,  1929  (49  Stat. 
3000)  as  amended  by  the  protocol  done  at 
The  Hague  on  Sept.  28,  1955.  Done  at 
Montreal  Sept.  25,  1975.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Brazil,  Aug.  16, 
1979.2 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
acts  against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation. 
Done  at  Montreal  Sept.  23,  1971.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  26,  1973.  TIAS  7570. 
Accession  deposited:  Kuwait,  Nov.  27,  1979. 

Biological  Weapons 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  the  de- 
velopment, production  and  stockpiling  of 
bacteriological  (biological)  and  toxin 
weapons  and  on  their  destruction.  Done  at 
Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  Apr.  10, 
1972.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  26,  1975. 
TIAS  8062. 

Ratification  deposited;  Argentina,  Nov.  27, 
1979. 


Customs 

Convention  establishing  a  Customs  Cooper- 
ation Council,  with  annex.  Done  at  Brussels 
Dec.  15,  1950.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  4, 
1952;  for  the  U.S.  Nov.  5,  1970.  TIAS  7063. 
Accession  deposited:  Mauritania,  Oct.  2, 
1979. 

Environmental  Modification 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  military  or 
any  other  hostile  use  of  environmental  mod- 
ification techniques,  with  annex.  Done  at 
Geneva  May  18,  1977.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  5,  1978.3 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
Nov.  28,  1979. 

Finance 

Articles  of  agreement  of  the  International 
Monetary  Fund  formulated  at  Bretton 
Woods  Conference  July  1-22,  1944.  Opened 
for  signature  at  Washington  Dec.  27,  1945. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  27,  1945.  TIAS 
1501. 

Signature  and  acceptance:  St.  Lucia,  Nov. 
15,  1979. 

Human  Rights 

American  convention  on  human  rights. 
Done  at  San  Jose  Nov.  22,  1969.  Entered 
into  force  July  18.  1978. ^ 
Ratification  deposited:  Nicaragua,  Sept. 
25,  1979. 

Judicial  Procedure 

Convention  abolishing  the  requirement  of 
legalization  for  foreign  public  documents 
with  annex.  Done  at  The  Hague  Oct.  5, 
1961.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  24,  1965. ^ 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  accession: 
Nov.  28,  1979. 

Maritime  Matters 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948,  as  amended  (TIAS  4044,  6285,  6490), 
on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Consul- 
tative Organization.  Adopted  at  London 
Oct.  17,  1974.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  1, 
1978.  TIAS  8606. 

Accejitance  deposited:  Argentina,  Oct.  8, 
"1979: 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948,  as  amended  (TIAS  4044,  6285,  6490, 
8606),  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization.  Adopted  at  Lon- 
don Nov.  14,  1975.' 

Acceptance  deposited:  Liberia,  Nov.  19, 
1979. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948,  as  amended  (TIAS  4044,  6285,  6490, 
8606),  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization.  Adopted  at  Lon- 
don Nov.  17,  1977.' 

Acceptances  deposited:  Canada,  Finland, 
Nov.  19,  1979. 

Red  Cross 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conven- 
tions of  12  August  1949,  and  relating  to  the 


66 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Treaties 


protection  of  victims  of  international  armed 
Iconflicts  (Protocol  I),  with  annexes. 
Adopted  at  Geneva  Jvme  8,  1977.  Entered 
into  force  Dec.  7,  1978.^ 
Ratifications  deposited:  Sweden.  Aug.  31, 
1979;-'  Tunisia.  Aug.  9,  1979. 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conven- 
tions of  12  August  1949,  and  relating  to  the 
protection  of  victims  of  noninternational 
armed  conflicts  (Protocol  II).  Adopted  at 
eneva  June  8,  1977.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  7.  1978.3 

Ratification  deposited:  Sweden,  Aug.  31, 
1979:  Tunisia.  Aug.  9,  1979. 


sugar 

nternational  sugar  agreement,  1977,  with 
nnexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  7,  1977.  En- 
ered  into  force  provisionally  Jan.  1,  1978. 
enate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 


«Iov.  30,  1979. 

Trade 

'rotocol  extending  the  arrangement  re- 
tarding international  trade  in  textiles  of 
9ec.  20.  1973  (TIAS  7840).  Done  at  Geneva 
Dec.  14,  1977.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1, 
978.  TIAS  8939. 
tatification  deposited:  Guatemala,  Oct.  29, 


979. 


IVhaling 

•Imendments  to  the  .schedule  to  the  interna- 
ional  convention  for  the  regulation  of 
vhaling,  1946  (TIAS  1849).  Adopted  at  the 

1st  meeting  of  the  International  Whaling 
Commission,  London  July  9-13,  1979. 

ntered  into  force:  Oct.  24,  1979  except  for 


he  provision  concerning  the  catch  limit  of 
143  fin  whales  for  the  Spain-Portugal- 
iritish  Isles  stock  of  the  North  Atlantic, 
^hich  shall  enter  into  force  Jan.  22,  1980. 

iVheat 

'rotocol  modifying  and  further  extending 
he  wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the  in- 
ernational  wheat  agreement),  1971  (TIAS 
144).  Done  at  Washington  Apr.  25,  1979. 
entered  into  force  June  23,  1979,  with  re- 
pect  to  certain  provisions,  July  1,  1979, 
vith  respect  to  other  provisions. 
Accessions  deposited:  Belgium,  Nov.  29, 


979;  Ireland,  Dec.  3,  1979. 

tatification  deposited:  Cuba,  Dec.  3,  1979. 

'rotocol  modifying  and  further  extending 
he  food  aid  convention  (part  of  the  interna- 
ional  wheat  agreement),  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
)one  at  Washington  Apr.  25,  1979.  Entered 
nto  force  June  23,  1979,  with  respect  to  cer- 
ain  provisions,  July  1,  1979,  with  respect  to 
ither  provisions. 
Accessions  deposited:  Belgium,  Nov.  29, 


979;  Ireland,  Dec.  3,  1979. 


Jilateral 


Argentina 

Agreement  concerning  hide  exports  and 
ither  trade  matters.  Signed  at  Washington 
Aug.  10,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  19, 
979. 


lanuary  1980 


Colombia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Aug. 
3,  1978.  as  amended  (TIAS  9515),  relating  to 
trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  man-made  fiber 
textiles  and  textile  products.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  letters  at  Bogota  Aug.  30  and 
Sept.  7,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  7, 
1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Aug. 
3,  1978,  as  amended  (TIAS  9515),  relating  to 
trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  man-made  fiber 
textiles  and  textile  products.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  letters  at  Bogota  Sept.  6  and  7, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  7,  1979. 

Egypt 

Agreement  concerning  U.S.  Government 
and  other  claims,  with  exchange  of  notes. 
Signed  at  Cairo  May  19,  1979. 
Entered  into  force:  Nov.  5,  1979. 

Finland 

Extradition  treaty.  Signed  at  Helsinki  June 
11,  1976.' 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
Nov.  29,  1979. 

France 

Arrangement  for  the  exchange  of  technical 
information  and  cooperation  in  the  regula- 
tion of  nuclear  safety.  Signed  at  Paris  Oct. 
25,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  25,  1979. 

Germany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Treaty  concerning  extradition,  with  pro- 
tocol. Signed  at  Bonn  June  20,  1978.' 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
Nov.  29.  1979. 

Greece 

Agreement  concerning  the  grant  of  defense 
articles  and  services  under  the  military  as- 
sistance program.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Athens  Aug.  30,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  30,  1979. 

Hungary 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  income,  with  exchange  of 
notes.  Signed  at  Washington  Feb.  12,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Sept.  18,  1979. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  Nov.  28,  1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  July 
7,  1972,  as  amended  and  extended  (TIAS 
8640),  on  scientific  cooperation.  Signed  at 
Washington  and  Budapest  Oct.  24,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Oct.  24,  1979. 

Program  of  cooperation  and  exchanges  in 
culture,  education,  science  and  technology 
for  1980  and  1981,  with  annex.  Signed  at 
Washington  Oct.  25,  1979.  Enters  into  force 
Jan.  1,  1980. 

India 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Dec. 
30,  1977,  as  amended  (TIAS  9036,  9232), 
relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  man- 
made  fiber  textiles  and  textile  products. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washing- 
ton Nov.  6,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  6, 
1979. 


Israel 

Memorandum  of  understanding  for  technical 
cooperation  in  mineral  technology.  Signed  at 
Washington  and  Jerusalem  Aug.  14  and 
Sept.  19,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  19, 
1979. 

Agreement  relating  to  cash  assistance  to  Is- 
rael during  fi.scal  year  1980  to  support  the 
economic  and  political  stability  of  Israel. 
Signed  at  Washington  Nov.  15,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Nov.  15,  1979. 

Japan 

Treaty  on  extradition,  with  exchange  of 
notes."  Signed  at  Tokyo  Mar.  3,  1978.' 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
Nov.  30,  1979. 

Kiribati 

Treaty  of  friendship,  with  agreed  minute. 
Signed  at  Tarawa  Sept.  20,  1979.  Enters 
into  force  on  the  date  of  the  exchange  of  in- 
struments of  ratification. 

Malaysia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  May 
17  and  June  8,  1978,  as  amended  (TIAS 
9180),  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool  and 
man-made  fiber  textiles  and  textile  prod- 
ucts. Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Washington  and  New  York  Oct.  4  and  12, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  12,  1979. 

Mexico 

Treaty  on  extradition,  with  appendix. 
Signed  at  Mexico  City  May  4,  1978.' 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
Nov.  30,  1979. 


Morocco 

Agreement  regarding  interpretation  of  Arti- 
cles 21(2)  and  25(1)  of  the  convention  of  Aug. 
1,  1977  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation 
and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  re- 
spect to  taxes  on  income.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  letters  at  Washington  and  Rabat 
Oct.  25,  1979.  Enters  into  force  upon  entry 
into  force  of  the  convention  of  Aug.  1,  1977. 

Norway 

Extradition  treaty.  Signed  at  Oslo  June  9, 

1977.' 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

Nov.  30,  1979. 

Panama 

Treaty  on  the  execution  of  penal  sentences. 
Signed  at  Panama  Jan.  11,  1979.' 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
Nov.  30,  1979. 

Agreement  relating  to  the  library  and 
museum  in  the  Civil  Affairs  Building.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Panama  Sept. 
24,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  24,  1979. 
Interim  agreement  relating  to  continued  use 
of  lands  and  installations  for  purposes  of  air 
traffic  control  and  related  services,  with  re- 
lated note.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Panama  Oct.  1,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  1,  1979. 


67 


CHRONOLOGY 


Agreement  relating  to  the  Port 
Meteorological  Office.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Panama  Oct.  1.  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Oct.  1.  1979. 

Agreement  relating  to  Article  II  of  the 
agreement  in  implementation  of  Article  III 
of  the  Panama  Canal  Treaty  concerning  e.<- 
tablishment  of  a  Coordinating  Committee. 
Effected  by  e.xchange  of  notes  at  Panama 
Oct.  1,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  1,  1979. 

Agreement  relating  to  Article  III  of  the 
Panama  Canal  Treaty  concerning  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  Consultative  Committee.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Panama  Oct. 
1.  1979.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  1,  1979. 

Agreement  relating  to  Article  III  of  the 
agreement  in  implementation  of  Article  IV 
of  the  Panama  Canal  Treaty  concerning  es- 
tablishment of  a  Joint  Committee.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Panama  Oct.  1, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  1,  1979. 

Agreement  relating  to  the  agreements  in 
implementation  of  Articles  III  and  IV  of  the 
Panama  Canal  Treaty  with  respect  to  tax  on 
movable  property.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Panama  Oct.  1,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Oct.  1,  1979. 

Agreement  relating  to  Article  IV  of  the 
Panama  Canal  Treaty  concerning  establish- 
ment of  a  Combined  Board.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Panama  Oct.  1,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Oct.  1,  1979. 

Agreement  relating  to  Article  VI  of  the 
Panama  Canal  Treaty  concerning  establish- 
ment of  a  Joint  Commission  on  the  Envi- 
ronment. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Panama  Oct.  1.  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  1,  1979. 

Agreement  relating  to  electric  power.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Panama  Oct. 
1,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  1,  1979. 

Agreement  relating  to  tropic  testing  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  provisions  of  the  agree- 
ment on  certain  activities  of  the  U.S.  in 
Panama.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Panama  Oct.  1,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  1,  1979. 

Sweden 

Arrangement  for  the  exchange  of  technical 
information  and  cooperation  in  nuclear 
safety  matters,  with  patent  addendum. 
Signed  at  Washington  Oct.  30,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Oct.  30,  1979. 

Tunisia 

Agreement  concerning  cultural  cooperation. 
Signed  at  Tunis  Sept.  28,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Sept.  28,  1979. 

Turkey 

Treaty  on  extradition  and  mutual  assistance 
in  criminal  matters.  Signed  at  Ankara  June 
7,  1979.1 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
Nov.  28,  1979. 


68 


Treaty  on  the  enforcement  of  penal  judg- 
ments. Signed  at  Ankara  June  7,  1979.* 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
Nov.  30,  1979.  ■ 


'  Not  in  force. 

''With  reservation. 

^Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

■•With  declaration  and  reservation. 


November  1979 


Events  pertaining  to  Iran  can  be  found  on 
page.  44. 

Nov.  1  Secretary  Vance  departs  for  Seoul 

to  attend  President  Park  Chung 
Hee's  funeral. 
U.S.  announces  normalization  of 
diplomatic  relations  with 
Equatorial  Guinea. 

Nov.  2  A  military  junta  headed  by  Boliv- 

ian Col.  Alberto  Natusch 
Busch  overthrows  the  govern- 
ment of  Pre.sident  Walter 
Guevara  Ai-ze. 
U.S.  suspends  assistance  to 
Bolivia  in  reaction  to  military 
takeover. 

Nov.  4  Bolivia's  new  military  government 

declares  martial  law. 

Nov.  5  U.N.  General  Assembly  holds 

Pledging  Conference  for  Emer- 
gency Humanitarian  Relief  to 
the  people  of  Kampuchea;  $210 
million  in  aid  is  pledged  by  rep- 
resentatives of  51  nations. 

Nov.  6  U.S.  pledges  $69  million  to  help 

check  starvation  among  Kam- 
pucheans. 
UNESCO  meeting  on  Communi- 
cation Development  Activities 
held  Nov.  6-9  at  State  Depart- 
ment. 
UNHCR  sends  $60  million  to  aid 
Kampuchean  refugees  in  Thai- 
land. 

Nov.  7  Mrs.  Carter  leaves  on  fact-fmding 

tour  of  Kampuchean  refugee 
camps  in  Thailand  to  focus  in- 
ternational attention  on  the 
problem,  Nov.  7-10. 
Irish  Prime  Minister  Jack  Lynch 

visits  U.S.,  Nov.  7-15. 
Col.  Natusch  of  Bolivia  suspends 
martial  law  and  press 
censorship,  but  remains  silent  on 
military-civilian  junta. 

Nov.  8  Shelling  incident  occurs  during 

Mrs.  Carter's  vi.sit  to  the 
Thai-Kampuchean  border  re- 
sulting in  significant  number  of 
deaths  and  injuries  to  innocent 
civilians. 


Kenya's  parliamentary  elections 
are  held  with  both  President 
Moi  and  Vice  President  Kabiki 
returned  to  office.  As  in  pre- 
vious elections,  a  lai'ge  number 
of  Cabinet  Ministers  and  over 
half  the  Parliament  were  de- 
feated in  their  bids  for  reelec- 
tion. 

Nov.  12  Turkish  Prime  Minister  Demirel 

announces  formation  of  a  gov- 
ernment consisting  of  28  Minis- 
ters in  the  new  Cabinet. 
U.S.  and  Chinese  officials  hold 
fu-st  round  of  talks  in  Beijing 
aimed  at  conclusion  of  a  bilat- 
eral consulai'  convention.  The 
talks  provide  an  opportunity  foi 
a  general  review  of  the  posi- 
tions of  the  tw'o  parties. 

Nov.  13  Israeli  Ambassador  to  Portugal  i: 

wounded  and  his  bodyguard 
killed  in  an  attack  on  the  Isra. 
Embassy  in  Lisbon. 

Nov.  14  Palestinian  mayors  in  Israeli- 

occupied  ten-itoi-y  resign  in  pro 
test  against  the  imprisonment 
and  threatened  deportation  of 
Nablus  Mayor  Bossam  al- 
Shakuaa.  U.N.  Security  Counc 
issues  unanimous  statement  ex 
pressing  its  concern. 

Nov.  16  Bolivian  Congress,  for  the  first 

time,  selects  a  woman,  Lydia 
Gueiler,  as  interim  President. 
People's  National  Party  of  Ghai 
wins  8  of  10  parliamentary  seal 
contested  in  last  round  of 
byelections. 

Nov.  18  Thailand  opens  its  borders  to 

560,000  Kampucheans  camped 
along  its  frontier. 

Nov.  19  Soviet  Foreign  Minister  Gromyk 

anives  in  Spain  for  a  3-day  offi 
cial  visit.  While  there,  he  ex- 
presses Soviet  opposition  to 
Spain's  joining  NATO. 
Semiannual  U.S. -Economic  Com- 
munity high-level  consultations 
held  Nov.  19-20  at  State  De- 
partment. 

Nov.  20  Armed  fundamentalist  Moslems, 

believed  to  be  from  Iran,  seize 
Grand  Mosque  in  Mecca. 

Nov.  21  U.S.  Embassy  in  Pakistan  is 

stormed  and  partially  burned. 
A  U.S.  Marine  guai-d  is  killed 
and  100  persons  are  trapped  fo 
5  houi-s  in  the  security  vault 
before  l)eing  led  to  safety  by 
Pakistiini  Armed  Forces. 
Former  Canadian  Prime  Ministei 
Trudeau  resigns  as  leader  of  th 
Liberal  Party. 

Nov.  25  Minority  government  of  Turkish 

Prime  Minister  Demirel  wins  i 
vote  of  confidence  in  Parliamer 
with  the  support  of  the  Fun- 
damentalist Nationalist  Salva- 
tion Party,  the  National  Move- 
ment Party,  and  several  Inde- 
pendents. The  vote  in  the  450 
seat  assembly  was  229  to  208, 
with  13  members  abstaining. 
Israel  gives  up  Alma  oilfields  in 
the  Gulf  of  Suez  to  Egypt. 

Department  of  State  Bulleti 


PRESS  RELEASES 


Jov.  26  Newly  appointed  ambassadors  to 

the  U.S.  presented  their  cre- 
dentials to  President  Carter — 
Rafael  Soils  Cerda  (Nicaragua), 
Redha  Malek  (Algeria), 
Nicholas  F.  Pai-kinson  (Austra- 
lia), Ricardo  Midence  Soto 
(Hondui'as),  Budimir  Loncar 
(Yugoslavia),  and  Dr.  Peter 
Hermes  (Federal  Republic  of 
Germany). 

27  Soviet  leadership  promotes 
Nicolai  A.  Tikhonov  to  fuU 
membership  in  the  Communist 
Party  ruling  Politburo. 

28  South  Africa's  Ambassador  to  El 
Salvador  Archibald  G.  Dunn,  is 
kidnapped  by  a  gi-oup  calling  it- 
self the  Populai-  Liberation 
Force. 

30  State  Department  announces 

sanctions  against  Chile  affecting 
diplomatic,  military,  and  finan- 
cial relations  in  response  to 
Chilean  failure  to  carry  out  a 
diligent  and  prompt  investiga- 
tion of  murder  charges  against 
three  former  secret  police  offi- 
cers accused  of  the  assassination 
of  Orlando  Letelier,  a  Chilean 
exile,  and  Ronnie  Moffitt,  an 
American  citizen,  in  Washing- 
ton 1976 

Several  thousand  people  demon- 
strate neai-  the  U.S.  Emba.ssy 
in  Kuwait.  Kuwaiti  security 
personnel,  using  tear  gas,  dis- 
perse crowd. 

Several  e.xplosive  devices  go  off 
simultaneously  on  the  grounds 
of  the  U.S.  Embassy  in 
Bangkok.  ■ 


Department  of  State 


November  19-30 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from 
the  Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department 
of  State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


No 


*301 
*302 


11/19 


11/19 
11/19 


*303      11/20 


*304       11/21 


*305 

11/21 

*306 

11/23 

*307 

11/27 

*308 

11/27 

*309 

11/28 

*310 

11/28 

311 

11/29 

312 

11/30 

313 

11/30 

Subject 

Harry  Roberts  Malone 
sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Rwanda  (biographic 
data). 

U.S.,  Malaysia  amend  tex- 
tile agreement,  Oct.  4  and 
12. 

U.S.  Organization  for  the 
International  Radio  Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCIR),  study  group  1, 
Dec.  13. 

Robert  B.  Oakley  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  the 
Republic  of  Zaire  (bio- 
graphic data). 

U.S.  Organization  for  the 
International  Telegraph 
and  Telephone  Consulta- 
tive Committee  (CCITT), 
study  group  A,  Dec.  19. 

Asian-American  Foreign 
Policy  Conference,  Dec. 
1. 

Joint  statement  following 
U.S. -Andean  Pact  meet- 
ing. 

Anne  Forrester  Holloway 
sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  the  Republic  of  Mali 
(biographic  data). 

U.S.,  Pakistan  amend  tex- 
tile agreement,  Nov.  13 
and  16. 

U.S.,  India  amend  textile 
agreement,  Oct.  26  and 
Nov.  6. 

U.S.,  Singapore  amend  tex- 
tile agreement  Sept.  12 
and  Oct.  16. 

U.S.  initiates  action  against 
Iran  in  International 
Court. of  Justice. 

International  and  U.S.  ef- 
forts to  aid  Kampuchean 
famine. 

President  of  ICJ  issues  call 
to  parties  in  hostage 
case.  ■ 


'Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


U.S.U.N. 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from 
the  Public  Affairs  Office,  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations,  799  United  Nations 
Plaza,  New  York,  N.Y.  10017. 

No.  Date  Subject 

*71        8/24    Young:  Palestinian  ques- 
tion, Security  Council. 
72        8/29    Young:  Lebanon,  Security 
Council. 


January  1980 


*73        8/31     Announcement  of  U.S.  con- 
tribution of  $102.9  million 
as  1979  partial  payment 
toward  the  U.N.  regular 
assessed  budget. 

*74         9/4     Cardwell:  apartheid  and 
women,  preparatory 
committee  for  the  World 
Conference  of  the  Decade 
for  Women. 

*75         9/4     Ambassador  to  lead  trade 
mission  to  Africa. 

*76        9/11    McHenry:  death  of  Angolan 
President  Neto. 
77        9/12     Hormats:  world  economy. 
Committee  of  the  Whole, 
Sept.  12. 

*78        9/12    Petree:  admission  of  Saint 
Lucia,  Security  Council. 

*79        9/18    McHenry:  admission  of 

Saint  Lucia,  General  As- 
sembly. 

80  9/18    U.S.  representatives  and 

alternate  representatives 
to  the  34th  U.N.  Gen- 
eral Assembly  (bio- 
graphic data). 

81  9/21    Petree:  Kampuchean  cre- 

dentials. General  Assem- 
bly. 

82  9/21    Reis:  Venda,  Security 

Council. 

83  9/24    Vance:  opening  session  of 

the  General  Assembly. 

*84        9/27    Busnell:  Nicaraguan  relief 
and  reconstruction  as- 
sistance, ECLA  Commit- 
tee of  the  Whole. 

*85        10/1    Saddler:  financial  reports 
and  accounts,  Commit- 
tee V. 

*86         10/8    Graham:  foreign  economic 
interests.  Committee  IV. 

*87       10/11   Graham:  foreign  economic 
interests.  Committee  IV. 

*88       10/11   Dunfey:  foreign  economic 

interests.  Committee  IV. 
89       10/12   Rosen:  energy.  Committee 
II. 

*90       10/16  Rosenthal:  atomic  radia- 
tion, Special  Political 
Committee. 

*91        10/16   Brecher:  assistance  to 

Nicaragua,  Committee  II. 

*92        10/16   Saddler:    program   budget. 
Committee  V. 
93        10/17   Young:  lYC,  General  Assem- 
bly. 

*94        10/18   Coopersmith;  racial  discrimi- 
nation. Committee  III. 
95        10/18    Seignious:  arms  control. 
Committee  I. 

*96       10/18  Jill  Schuker  named  Coun- 
selor for  Public  Affairs 
(biographic  data). 

*97       10/19  Rosenthal:  UNRWA,  Spe- 
cial Political  Committee. 

*98       10/19  McHenry:  Special  Commit- 
tee Against  Apartheid's 
Day  of  Solidarity  With 
South  African  Political 
Prisoners. 

99       10/22  McHenry:  economic 

dialogue.  General  Assem- 
bly. 

69 


PUBLICATIONS 


100        10/24 


*101 

10/24 

*102 

10/25 

*103 

10/26 

*104 

10/31 

*105 

10/31 

*106 

11/1 

*107 

11/1 

*108 

11/2 

*109 

11/5 

*110 

11/2 

*111 

11/5 

112 

11/5 

*113 

11/6 

*114 

11/6 

115 

11/8 

*116 

11/9 

*117 

U/12 

*118 

11/13 

*119 

11/13 

McHenry;  address  before 
the  Appeal  of  Conscience 
Foundation  awards  din- 
ner, New  York,  Oct.  23. 

Vanden  Heuvel:  human 
rights,  Committee  III. 

Morgenthau:  food,  Commit- 
tee II. 

Vanden  Heuvel:  Czecho- 
slovak dissidents.  Com- 
mittee III. 

Dunfey:  TTPI,  Committee 
IV. 

Coopersmith:  torture. 
Committee  III. 

Dunfey:  U.S.  Virgin  Is- 
lands and  American 
Samoa,  Committee  IV. 

Petree:  outer  space.  Special 
Political  Committee. 

Rosen:  environment.  Com- 
mittee II. 

Dunfey:  U.N.  visiting  mis- 
sion to  Guam,  Committee 
of  24. 

Petree:  Angolan  complaint. 
Security  Council. 

Winn:  IAEA  report.  Gen- 
eral Assembly,  Nov.  2. 

Vance:  pledging  conference 
for  Kampuchean  refu- 
gees. General  Assembly. 

Coopersmith:  religious  in- 
tolerance. Committee  III. 

Fisher:  arms  control,  Com- 
mittee I. 

Dunfey:  apartheid,  General 
Assembly. 

Rosen:  operational  ac- 
tivities for  development. 
Committee  II. 

Rosen:  U.N.-OAU  coopera- 
tion, plenary,  Nov.  9. 

Vanden  Heuvel:  situation  in 
Kampuchea,  plenary. 

Rosenthal:  information. 
Special  Political  Commit- 
tee. ■ 


GPO  Sales 


*Not  printed  in  the  BULLETIN. 


PitblicatUms  may  be  ordered  by  eutaliniiic 
or  stock  number  from  the  Superititeiidiiil 
of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20^02..  A  25% 
discount  is  made  on  orders  for  100  or  wore 
copies  of  any  one  pnblication  mailed  to  the 
.snnic  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  tlie 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  must  ac- 
conipany  orders.  Prices  shown  below, 
irhicli  include  domestic  postage,  are  subject 
to  chiiHc/e. 

Primary  School  Reconstruction.  Agree- 
ment with  Guatemala.  TIAS  9015.  42  pp. 
$1.60.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9015.) 
Whaling — International  Observer 
Scheme.  Agreement  with  Australia.  TIAS 
9034.  8pp.  80e.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9034.) 
Assistance  to  Small  Farmers.  Agreement 
with  Bolivia.  TIAS  9043.  35  pp.  $1.50. 
(Cat.  No.  89.10:9043.) 
Crop  Protection.  Agreement  with  the 
Philippines.  TIAS  9060.  31  pp.  $1.40.  (Cat. 
No.  89.10:9060.) 

Great  Lakes  Load  Lines.  Memorandum  of 
understanding  with  Canada.  TIAS  9088.  3 
pp.  70(Z.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9088.) 
Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement 
with  Syria.  TIAS  9096.  15pp.  $1.10.  (Cat. 
No.  89.10:9096.) 

Economic  Assistance — Program  Assist- 
ance Grant.  Agreement  with  Israel.  TIAS 
9098.  14  pp.  90e.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9098.) 
Agricultural  Commodities  —  Transfer 
Under  Title  II.  Agreement  with  Rwanda. 
TIAS  9102.  2  pp.  60«.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9102.) 

Agricultural  Commodities — Transfer 
Under  Title  II.  Agreement  with  Tanzania. 
TIAS  9104.  3  pp.  70^.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9104.) 

Agricultural  Commodities — Transfer 
Under  Title  IL  Agreement  with  Uppei' 
Volta.  TIAS  9105.  7  pp.  SOf.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9105.) 

Agricultural  Commodities — Transfer 
Under  Title  II.  Agreement  with  Togo. 
TIAS  9106.  3  pp.  70^.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9106.) 

Agricultural  Commodities — Transfer 
Under  Title  II.  Agreement  with  Guinea- 
Bissau.  TIAS  9107.  5  pp.  70e.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9107.) 

Agricultural  Commodities  —  Transfer 
Under  Title  II.  Agreement  with  Mozam- 
bique. TIAS  9108.  3  pp.  lOi.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9108.) 

Agricultural  Commodities — Transfer 
Under  Title  II.  Agreement  with  Somalia. 
TIAS  9109.  3  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9109.) 

Technical  Assistance  to  Develop  Civil 
Aviation  Infrastructure.  Memorandum  of 
agreement  with  Venezuela.  TIAS  9110.  19 
pp.  $1.10  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9110.) 
Aviation — Technical  Assistance.  Memo- 
randum of  agreement  with  Iran.  TIAS 
9111.  10  pp.  80«.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9111.) 


70 


Narcotic  Drugs — Additional  Cooperative 
.■\rrangements  to  Curb  Illegal  Productior 
and  Traffic.  .Agreement  with  Mexico. 
TIAS  9113.  13  pp.  90e.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9113.) 

Narcotic  Drugs — Additional  Cooperative 
Arrangements  to  Curb  Illegal  Productior 
and  Traffic.  Agreement  with  Me.xico,  ex- 
tending the  agreement  of  February  16, 
1977,  as  amended.  TIAS  9114.  5  pp.  70?. 
(Cat.  No.  89.10:9114.) 
Narcotic  Drugs — Additional  Cooperative 
Arrangements  to  Curb  Illegal  Productior 
and  Traffic.  Agreement  with  Mexico, 
amending  the  agreement  of  February  16, 
1977,  as  amended  and  extended.  TIAS 
9115.  6  pp.  70(Z.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9115.) 
Peace  Corps.  Agreement  with  Oman, 
amending  the  agreement  of  November  15 
and  28,  1972.  TIAS  9116.  5  pp.  700.  (Cat. 
No.  89.10:9116.) 

Integrated  Rural  Development.  Agree- 
ment with  Upper  Volta.  TIAS  9117.  13  pp. 
900.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9117.) 
Cereals  Production.  Agreement  with 
Niger,  TIAS  9118.  51  pp.  $1.80.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9118.) 

Peace  Corps.  Agreement  with  Tuvalu. 
TIAS  9119.  3  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9119.) 

Technical  Cooperation  in  Earth  Sciences 
Memorandum  of  understanding  with 
Morocco.  TIAS  9121.  5  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9121.) 

Population  Planning.  Agreement  with 
Thailand.  TIAS  9123.  14  pp.  900.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9123.) 

Population  Planning.  Agreement  with  tht 
Philippines.  TIAS  9124.  57  pp.  $1.90.  (Cat 
No.  89.10:9124.) 

Population  Planning.  Agreement  with  the 
Philippines,  amending  the  agreement  of 
August  31,  1977.  TIAS  9125.  7  pp.  800. 
(Cat.  No.  89.10:9125.) 
Meteorological  Cooperation.  Agreement 
with  Iran.  T1A8  9127.  9  pp.  800.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9127.) 

Defense — Evaluation  of  Sonar  System  of 
High  Speed  Surface  Vessel.  Agreement 
with  Canada.  TIAS  9129.  18  pp.  $1.00. 
(Cat.  No.  89.10:9129.) 
Establishment  of  .Agricultural  Research 
and  Development  Fund.  Agreement  with 
Israel.  TIAS  9131.  7  pp.  800  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9131.) 

Agricultural  Research.  Agreement  with 
Tanzania.  TIAS  9132.  10  pp.  800.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9132.) 

Educational  Programs.  Agreement  with 
Panama,  amending  the  agreement  of 
November  19,  1975.  T1A8  9133.  22  pp. 
$1.10  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9133.) 
Rural  Health  Services.  Agreement  with 
Egypt,  amending  the  agreement  of  Sep- 
tember 30.  1976.  TIAS  9134.  3  pp.  70#. 
(Cat.  No.  89.10:9134.) 
Water  Use  and  Management  Project. 
Agreement  with  Egypt,  amending  the 
agreement  of  June  30,  1976.  TIAS  9135.  4 
pp.  700  (Cat.  No.  89. 10:9135. )■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Jt 


IDEX 


kNUARY  1980 
>L.  80,  NO.  2034 

ghanistan.    Soviet    Invasion   of    Af- 
ghanistan (Carter,   McHenry,   draft 

-esolution)   A 

riculture.  Inter-American  Institute  for 
cooperation  on  Agriculture  (message  to 

he  Senate) 65 

Stns  Control.  Arms  Control  (Seignious)  54 
Inada.  Report  on  the  Transport  of  Air 

'dllutants 4 

iU'.  Chile  (Department  statement)  . .  .65 
ina.  Agreements  With  Taiwan  (Christo- 

.ih,.i)   10 

ific  Basin  (Newsom) 7 

!. -China  Trade  Agreement  (Christo- 

her)   9 

ngress 

ounting  for  MIAs  (Holbrooke) 12 

reements  With  Taiwan  (Christopher)  .10 
ntral   America   at   the   Crossroads 

Vaky) 58 

CE  Semiannual  Report  and  1980  Madrid 

leeting  (Department  statement)  24 

ir  Treaties  Pertaining  to  Human  Rights 

Christopher,  Derian,  Owen)   26 

plementing  the  Human  Rights  Policy 

Christopher)  32 

er-American  Institute  for  Cooperation 
n  Agriculture  (message  to  the  Senate) 65 
nation  in  Iran  (Carter,  message  to  the 
ongress.  White  House  announcement, 

tatements) 42 

3. -China  Trade  Agreement  (Christo- 

her)   9 

^'loartment  and  Foreign  Service 

sident  Carter's  News  Conference  of 

lovember  28 1 

urity  Council  Meets  on  Iranian  Situa- 

,on  (McHenry,  text  of  resolution) 49 

aation  in  Iran  (Carter,  message  to  the 
longress.  White  House  announcement, 

tatements) 42 

5.  Embassy  Marine  Security  Guards.  .42 

onomics 

enda  of  Global   Economic  Issues  (Ro- 

en) 52 

ntral   America   at   the   Crossroads 

Vaky) 58 

ronology  of  Events  in  Iran,   November 

979 44 

ypt.  The  Challenge  of  Peacemaking 

Saunders) 46 

ergy 

enda  of  Global   Economic  Issues  (Ro- 

en) 52 

esident  Carter's  News  Conference  of 

'lovember  28 1 

vironment.  Report  on  the  Transport  of 

Vir  Pollutants 4 

rope 

CE  Semiannual  Report  and  1980  Madrid 

vleetiTig  (Department  statement)  24 

Intinuity  and  Commitment  (Nimetz) . .  .20 
I'lsinki  Agreement  on   Human  Rights 

Carter) 25 

od.  Agenda  of  Global  Economic  Issues 

Rosen) 52 

ireign  Aid.  World  Efforts  To  Aid  Kam- 

DUcheans 8 

iman  Rights 

CE  Semiannual  Report  and  1980  Madrid 

Meeting  (Department  statement)  24 

ntinuity  and  Commitment  (Nimetz) . .  .20 
ur  Treaties  Pertaining  to  Human  Rights 

I  Christopher,  Derian,  Owen)  26 
ilsinki  Agreement  on  Human  Rights 
Carter) 25 


Implementing  the  Human  Rights  Policy 
(Christopher)  32 

International  Year  of  the  Child  (Young)  .56 

Political  Asylum  (Christopher) 35 

President  Carter  Receives  Human  Rights 
Award  (Carter)  32 

International  Law 

Chronology  of  Events  in  Iran,  November 
1979 44 

International  Court  of  Justice  42 

Political  Asylum  (Christopher) 35 

U.S.  Takes  Case  Against  Iran  to  the  Inter- 
national Court  of  Justice  (Department 
announcement,  Secretary's  letter,  appli- 
cation to  the  Court,  request  for  interim 
measures  of  protection,  response  from 
ICJ)  37 

Iran 

Chronology  of  Events  in  Iran,  November 
1979 44 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of 
November  28 1 

Security  Council  Meets  on  Iranian  Situa- 
tion (McHenry,  text  of  resolution) 49 

Situation  in  Iran  (Carter,  message  to  the 
Congress,  White  House  announcement, 
statements) 42 

Soviet  Invasion  of  Afghanistan  (Carter, 
McHenry,  draft  resolution) A 

U.S.  Embassy  Marine  Security  Guards.. 42 

U.S.  Takes  Case  Against  Iran  to  the  Inter- 
national Court  of  Justice  (Department 
announcement.  Secretary's  letter,  appli- 
cation to  the  Court,  request  for  interim 
measures  of  protection,  response  from 
ICJ)  37 

World  Opinion  on  the  Holding  of  U.S.  Hos- 
tages in  Iran   E 

Ireland.  Visit  of  Irish  Prime  Minister 
Lynch  (press  statement) 25 

Israel.  The  Challenge  of  Peacemaking 
(Saunders) 46 

Japan.  Pacific  Basin  (Newsom) 7 

Latin  America   and   the   Caribbean. 

Central  America  at  the  Crossroads 
(Vaky) 58 

Inter-American  Institute  for  Cooperation 
on  Agriculture  (message  to  the  Senate) 65 

Laos.  Accounting  for  MIAs  (Holbrooke)  12 

Middle  East 

The  Challenge  of  Peacemaking  (Saun- 
ders)   46 

Chronology  of  Events  in  Iran,  November 
1979 44 

Monetary  Affairs 

Flexible  Exchange  Rates  After  6  Years' 
Experience   14 

Situation  in  Iran  (Carter,  message  to  the 
Congress,  White  House  announcement, 
statements) 42 

Presidental  Documents 

Helsinki  Agreement  on  Human  Rights 
(Carter) 25 

Inter-American  Institute  for  Cooperation 
on  Agriculture  (message  to  the  Senate)65 

Mrs.  Carter  Visits  Thailand  (Carter,  Car- 
ter, Hesburgh) 5 

President  Carter  Receives  Human  Rights 
Award  (Carter)  32 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of 
November  28 1 

Situation  in  Iran  (Carter,  message  to  the 
Congress,  White  House  announcement, 
statements) 42 

Soviet  Invasion  of  Afghanistan  (Carter, 
McHenry,  draft  resolution   A 

Publications.  GPO  sales  70 

Refugees 

International  Year  of  the  Child  (Young)  .56 

Mrs.  Carter  Visits  Thailand  (Carter,  Car- 
ter, Hesburgh) 5 

World  Efforts  To  Aid  Kampucheans 8 


Security  Assistance.  Chile  (Department 

statement) 65 

Terrorism 

Chile  (Department  statement) 65 

Chronology  of  Events  in  Iran,  November 
1979  44 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of 
November  28 1 

Security  Council  Meets  on  Iranian  Situa- 
tion (McHenry,  text  of  resolution) 49 

Situation  in  Iran  (Carter,  message  to  the 
Congress,  White  House  announcement, 
statements) 42 

U.S.  Takes  Case  Against  Iran  to  the  Inter- 
national Court  of  Justice  (Department 
announcement.  Secretary's  letter,  appli- 
cation to  the  C^ourt,  request  for  interim 
measures  of  protection,  response  from 
ICJ)  37 

Thailand.  Mrs.  Carter  Visits  Thailand 
(Carter,  Carter,  Hesburgh) 5 

Trade 

Agenda  of  Global  Economic  Issues  (Ro- 
sen)   52 

U.S. -China  Trade  Agreement  (Christo- 
pher)    9 

Treaties 

Current  Actions 66 

Four  Treaties  Pertaining  to  Human  Rights 
(Christopher,  Derian,  Owen)   26 

U.S. -China  Trade  Agreement  (Christo- 
pher)    9 

U.S.S.R. 

Identifying  U.S.  Security  Interests  in 
U.S. -Soviet  Relations  (Shulman) 17 

Soviet  Invasion  of  Afghanistan  (Carter, 
McHenry,  draft  resolution) A 

United  Nations 

Agenda  of  Global  Economic  Issues  (Ro- 
sen)  52 

Arms  Control  (Seignious) 54 

Chronology  of  Events  in  Iran,  November 
1979 44 

International  Court  of  Justice   42 

International  Year  of  the  Child  (Young). 56 

Security  Council  Meets  on  Iranian  Situa- 
tion (McHenry,  text  of  resolution)  ...  .49 

Soviet  Invasion  of  Afghanistan  (Carter, 
McHenry,  draft  resolution) A 

U.S.  Takes  Case  Against  Iran  to  the  Inter- 
national Court  of  Justice  (Department 
announcement.  Secretary's  letter,  appli- 
cation to  the  Court,  request  for  interim 
measures  of  protection,  response  from 
ICJ)  37 

World  Efforts  To  Aid  Kampucheans 8 

Vietnam 

Accounting  for  MIAs  (Holbrooke) 12 

Pacific  Basin  (Newsom) 7 


Name  Index 

Carter,  President 1,  5,  25,  32,  42,  65 

Carter,  Rosalynn 5 

Christopher,  Warren 9,  10,  26,  32,  35,  37 

Cooper,  Richard  N 14 

Derian,  Patricia  M  26 

Hesburgh,  Theodore  M 5 

Holbrooke,  Richard  12 

McHenry,  Donald  F 49 

Newsom,  David  D 7 

Nimetz,  Matthew   20 

Owen,  Roberts  B 26 

Rosen,  Howard  T  52 

Saunders,  Harold  H 46 

Seignious,  George  M  II 54 

Shulman,  Marshall  D 17 

Vaky,  Viron  P   58 

Vance,  Secretary 37 

Young,  Jean  56 


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V    of  state  ^-m  J    ^ 

bulletin 


he  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  80  /  Number  2035 


February  1980 


Cover: 

Great  Seal  of  the  United  States. 


Dppartmpnt  of  Statp 

bulletin 


Volume  80  /  Number  2035  /  February  1980 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin  , 
published  by  the  Office  of  PubUc 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and 
government  agencies  with  information 
on  developments  in  U.S.  foreign 
relations  and  the  work  of  the 
Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials; 
special  features  and  articles  on 
international  affairs;  selected  press 
releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission 
to  the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
other  agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party. 


CYRUS  R.  VANCE 

Secretary  of  State 

HOODING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA  ADAMS 

Assistant  Editor 


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Budget  through  January  31,  1981. 


NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 
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Literature. 


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CONTENTS 


SPECIAL  (See  Center  Section) 

President  Carters  State  of  the  Union  Address 

President  Carter's  State  of  the  Union  Message  to  the  Congress 


rhe  Secretary 

Security  of  the  Western  Alliance 
'  Interview  on  the  "Today"  Show 


nterview 

Deputy  Secretary  Christopher 
Interviewed  on  "Face  the  Na- 
tion" 


\frica 

Negotiations  on  Southern 

Rhodesia  {Richard  M.  Moose) 

0  Sanctions  Against  Southern 

Rhodesia  (Memorandum  for 
the  Secretari/  of  State) 

1  Southern  Rhodesia  Settlement 

(Department  and  White  House 
Stateme)its) 

2  Group  Formed  for  Development 

Vrms  Control 

2        Delay  Requested  for  SALT  II 
Treaty  i^Whife  House  State- 
]  ment.  Letter  to  Senator  Bijrd) 


•nvlronment 

3        Wildlife  Protection  and  the 

Habitat  (William  A.  Hayne) 


lurope 


15 


NATO  Ministers  Meet  in  Brus- 
sels (Secretaries  Brown  and 
Vance,  Communique) 

Visit  of  British  Prime  Minister 
Thatcher  (White  House  State- 
ment) 

U.S. -U.K.  Atomic  Energy 
Agreement  (Message  to  the 
Congress,  Memorandums  for 
the  Secretaries  of  Defense  and 
Energy) 

16th  Report  on  Cyprus  (Message 
to  the  Congress) 

National  Security  and  U.S.- 
Soviet Relations  (Matthew 
Nimetz) 

Publications 


Foreign  Aid 

29  Approaching  Common  Issues 
With  Developing  Countries 
(Thomas  Ehrlich) 


General 

32  Perspective  on  the  Nonaligned 
Movement  After  the  Havana 
Conference  (Charles  William 
Mai/nes) 

Human  Rights 

37        Missing  and  Disappeared  Per- 
sons (Patricia  M.  Derian) 


Military  Affairs 


58 


Middle  East 


40 


53 


54 


54 


54 


54 
55 


56 


World  Court  Rules  on  American 
Hostages  in  Iran  (Benjamin 
R.  Civiletti,  Roberts  B.  Owen, 
Sir  Humphrey  Waldock,  Text 
of  Court  Order) 

U.S.  Seeks  Sanctions  Against 
Iran  (President  Carter) 

NATO  Issues  Declaration  on 
Iran 

Iranian  Diplomatic  Personnel  in 
U.S.  (Department  Statements) 

FMS  Credits  for  Israel  (White 
House  Statement) 

Publications 

American  Hostages  in  Iran 
(President  Carter,  Vice  Presi- 
dent M  on  dale.  White  House 
and  Department  Statements) 

Iran  Chronology,  December  1979 


U.S.  Defense  Policy  (President 
Carter) 


South  Asia 

61         Review  of  U.S.  Policy  in  the 
1980s  (Howard  B.  Schaffer) 

65        Soviet  Invasion  of  Afghanistan 
(Department  Statement) 

65        Background  on  Afghanistan 

United  Nations 

67        U.S.  Asks  Security  Council  to 

Impose  Sanctions  Against  Iran 
(Secretary  Vance,  DoJiald  F. 
McHenry,  Texts  of  Resolu- 
tions, Voting  Records) 

72        General  Assembly  Acts  on 

Soviet  Invasion  of  Afghanistan 
(Donald  F.  McHenry,  Texts  of 
Resolutions,  Voting  Records) 

Treaties 

74        Current  Actions 


Chronology 


77 


December  1979 


Press  Releases 

77  Department  of  State 

Publications 

78  GPO  Sales 

index 


Profile 

People 

Population:  15.5  million  (1979  est.). 
Density:  50  per  sq.  mi. 
Religion:  Sunni  Moslem. 
Literacy:  10%. 
Life  Expectancy:  40  years. 

Geography 

Area:  260,000  sq.  mi.  (673,397  sq.  km.), 

compares  with  the  size  of  Texas. 
Capital:  Kabul  (pop.  603,969). 

Economy 

Agriculture:  Products — wheat,  cotton,  fruit 
and  nuts,  karakul  pelts,  wool,  mutton. 

Industry:  Pn>ductK — textiles,  soap,  furni- 
ture, shoes,  carpets,  fertilizer,  cement. 

Natural  Resources:  Natural  gas,  oil,  coal, 
copper,  talc,  barites,  sulphur,  lead, 
zinc,  iron,  salt,  precious  and  semipre- 
cious stones. 


Trade:  S.rpocf.s— $340  million  (1978):  natural 
gas,  fruit  and  nuts,  karakul  pelts,  raw 
cotton,  carpets,  wool.  Partners — 
U.S.S.R.  (4.5%),  U.S.,  U.K.,  India, 
Pakistan,  Iran.  Imports — $450  million 
(1978):  capital  goods,  petroleum  prod- 
ucts, textiles,  foodstuffs.  Partyiers — 
U.S.S.R.  (45%),  U.S.,  Japan,  India, 
U.K.,  F.R,G. 

Economic  Aid  Received:  Foreign  aid  was  in 
the  range  of  $200  million  per  year  just 
before  the  April  1978  coup.  This  was 
two  to  three  times  the  level  of  earlier  in 
the  decade.  The  leading  donor  has  been 
the  Soviet  Union.  Substantial  aid  has 
also  been  received  traditionally  from 
the  U.S.,  the  F.R.G.,  and  multilateral 
agencies.  During  the  Daoud  period, 
large  commitments  were  also  received 
from  Middle  East  oil  states  and  China. 
More  recently,  much  of  the  foreign  aid 
has  been  suspended  except  for  that  re- 
ceived from  the  U.S.S.R. 

(For  more  details  on  Afghanistan's  ge- 
ography, people,  history,  government,  and 
economy,  see  p.  65.) 


THE  SECRETARY 


Security  of  the  Western  Alliance 


Address  hrjoir  tin  Fx'rHii  Pirss 
Assiiciafioii  ill  Hi'vliii  (III  Deceiiihvv  10, 
1979  (delivered  hi/  Geonje  S.  Vest, 
Assintaiif  Secretari/  for  European 

Aftiiirs).' 

I  want  tu  begin  by  expressing  Secre- 
tary Vance's  keen  regret  that  the  pres- 
sure of  events  makes  it  impossible  for 
him  to  be  here  tonight.  The  continuing 
situation  in  Iran  has  required  that  he 
make  some  urgent  changes  in  his  travel 
l)laiis — a  fact  which  he  regrets  and 
which  he  and  I  hope  you  will  under- 
stand. He  has  asked,  therefore,  that  I 
convey  to  you  his  greetings  and  that  I 
stress  to  you  this  point:  that  every 
word  I  speak  tonight  should  be  ac- 
cepted as  his — and  attributed  to  him. 

An  invitation  to  address  the  Berlin 
Pi'ess  Association  is  itself  an  honor. 
S(ime  lines  of  Goethe  go  this  way:  "He 
only  earns  his  freedom  and  existence 
who  daily  conquers  them  anew." 

Each  day,  the  press  corps  of  this 
city  expresses  anew  the  truth  of  those 
lines — by  upholding  the  principles  of  a 
free  and  open  press.  You  help  us  under- 
stand the  profound  changes  taking 
place  about  us,  and  you  help  defend  the 
i-ight  of  citizens  to  participate  in  deci- 
sions which  affect  their  lives  and  well- 
being. 

This  gathering  affords  an  opportu- 
nity also  to  express,  once  again,  the 
admiration  that  millions  of  Americans 
feel  for  Berlin  and  its  people — and  the 
abiding  commitment  of  our  nation  to 
this  city.  President  Carter,  who  re- 
members with  great  warmth  his  visit  to 
Bei'lin  last  year,  has  asked  that  his  per- 
sonal greetings  be  conveyed  to  you, 
along  with  his  assurance  that  the 
United  States  is  steadfast  in  this 
commitment. 

For  35  years,  Berlin  has  been  a 
symbol  for  free  people  everywhere.  In 
the  postwar  period  of  tension  and  con- 
frontation, Berlin  became  a  stirring 
example  of  human  determination  to  be 
free — to  live  under  democratic  institu- 
tions. It  is  this  unyielding  determina- 
tiiin  which  helped  create  the  balance 
ui.)()n  which  Berlin's  current  stability  is 
based.  The  clear  demonstration  that 
Berlin  would  not  yield,  that  Berliners 
wished  to  remain  part  of  the  Western 
world,  made  possible  the  Quadripartite 
Agreement. 

And  in  the  years  since  the  Quad- 
ripartite Agreement,  Berlin  has  been 
an  impressive  symbol  of  the  tangible 
fruits  detente  can  yield. 


For  the  United  States,  the  freedom 
of  Berlin — and  protection  of  the  bene- 
fits made  possible  by  the  Quadripartite 
Agreement — are  central  foreign  policy 
objectives.  We  will  use  every  means  at 
our  disposal  to  guarantee  the  safety  and 
the  fi'eedom  of  this  city. 

Moreover,  we  are  committed  to 
fui-ther  easing  tensions  in  Berlin 
through  the  opportunities  provided  by 
the  Quadripartite  Agreement.  Full 
realization  of  these  opportunities  will 
benefit  both  East  and  West.  Strict  ob- 
servance and  full  implementation  of  all 
aspects  of  the  Quadripartite  Agreement 
will  make  such  progress  possible. 

It  is  essential  to  maintain  the  deli- 
cate balance  of  interests  which  has  de- 
veloped in  and  around  the  city.  There 
should  be  no  temptation  to  use  Berlin 
as  a  point  of  pressure  in  reaction  to  de- 
velopments in  other  areas  of  East- West 
I'elations. 

There  should  be  no  questioning  the 
important  ties  between  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  and  the  Western 
sectors  of  Berlin,  to  which  the  United 
States  attaches  particular  importance. 
Perhaps  most  importantly,  there 
should  be  no  questioning  of  Four  Power 
rights  and  responsibilities  for  Berlin  as 
a  whole.  These  remain  the  basis  for  the 
stable  situation  which  has  developed  in 
this  city.  The  United  States  is  deter- 
mined to  maintain  Four  Power  rights 
and  responsibilities  for  Berlin  as  a 
whole.  We  expect  the  agreement,  and 
the  practices  and  procedures  which 
have  arisen  from  it,  to  be  strictly 
honored. 

There  is  yet  another  reason  to  wel- 
come this  forum,  for  it  affords  us  the 
opportunity  to  discuss  an  issue  of  vital 
concern  to  the  people  of  Berlin  and  to 
us  all — the  security  of  our  Western 
alliance. 

Berliners  know,  better  than  most, 
that  true  security— what  John  F.  Ken- 
nedy called  "the  survival  and  success  of 
liberty"— cannot  be  bought  with  arms 
alone.  The  security  of  the  West  de- 
pends ultimately  upon  the  vitality  and 
the  appeal  of  free  political  systems, 
upon  the  health  of  our  economies,  upon 
the  ability  of  the  Western  democracies 
to  cooperate  with  one  another.  Our  goal 
is  not  only  to  defend  ourselves,  it  is  to 
build  and  maintain  a  way  of  life  worth 
defending. 


Nonetheless — as  Berliners  also 
know — it  would  be  folly  to  neglect  the 
military  aspects  of  security.  Indeed, 
one  of  the  stern  lessons  of  the  past 
three  decades  is  that  we  make  detente 
possible  through  strength,  not  weak- 
ness. In  a  perfect  world  this  would  not 
be  true;  in  the  real  world  it  is  inescapa- 
ble. 

So  let  us  focus  tonight  on  the  issue 
of  military  security — in  both  its  defense 
and  arms  control  aspects'. 

The  subject  is  especially  timely 
now,  for  the  NATO  allies  are  reaching, 
at  this  moment,  a  number  of 
decisions — decisions  which  will  shape 
the  secui-ity  of  Europe  in  the  1980s  and 
deeply  influence  relations  between  East 
and  West.  Such  decisions,  as  you  know, 
will  be  the  chief  concern  of  the  NATO 
ministers  when  they  meet  in  Brussels 
later  this  week. 

One  of  these  decisions  involves  a 
fundamental  question  which  confronts 
NATO  members  and,  indeed,  all  of  the 
West.  How  should  the  alliance  respond 
to  the  Soviet  Union's  unprecedented 
buildup  of  long-range  theater  nuclear 
forces  targeted  against  Western 
Europe? 

Deterrence  and  Arms  Control 

We  will  be  answering  that  question  in 
Brussels  this  week  in  a  way  w-hich  em- 
phasizes two  essential  points. 

•  First,  we  stand  ready  to  adjust 
force  levels  through  concrete  arms  con- 
trol negotiations.  Our  hope  is  that  such 
negotiations  will  limit  force  levels  on 
both  sides.  The  Soviet  Union  and  the 
Warsaw  Pact  nations  should  under- 
stand that  we  have  a  genuine  commit- 
ment to  seek  mutual  arms  limitations  in 
strategic,  theater  nuclear,  and  conven- 
tional arms. 

•  NATO  is  determined, 
however — and  this  is  the  second  essen- 
tial point — to  maintain  secure  deter- 
rent forces  across  the  entire  nuclear 
and  conventional  spectrum.  This  the 
Soviets  must  also  understand. 

This  dual  policy — a  policy  of  main- 
taining deterrence  and  of  pursuing 
arms  control — will  be  at  the  heart  of 
NATO's  strategy  in  the  1980s,  for  it  is 
self-evident  to  us  that  adequate  de- 
fenses and  arms  control  must  go 
hand-in-hand.  Arms  control  agreements 
hold  out  the  hope  of  affording  greater 
security  than  arms  competition  with  its 
high  costs  and  built-in  dangers.  But 


The  Secretary 


only  a  strong  defense,  including  pru- 
dent measures  to  modernize  our  forces, 
can  remove  any  doubts  about  our 
resolve— doubts  which  themselves 
would  make  genuine  arms  limitations 
less  likely. 

Let  me  explain  how  this  dual  policy 
will  manifest  itself  in  our  decisions  in 
the  coming  decade— decisions  concern- 
ing strategic,  theater  nuclear,  and  con- 
ventional forces. 

The  Balance  of  Strategic  Forces 

Strategic  nuclear  parity  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  is, 
and  will  remain,  a  central  fact  of  inter- 
national security.  Efforts  by  either  side 
to  resist  this  central  fact,  or  to  evade  it, 
will  inevitably  threaten  the  world's  sta- 
bility and  security— for  neither  side 
will  allow  the  other  to  attain  superior- 
ity. 

Over  the  past  decade,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  steadily  increased  its 
strategic  capabilities.  Without  new  in- 
vestments on  our  part  in  our  strategic 
forces,  this  Soviet  momentum  could 
jeopardize  a  stable  balance  at  the 
strategic  level.  So  we  are  making  those 
investments  in  each  leg  of  our  strategic 
triad. 

•  We  are  developing  advanced 
cruise  missiles  for  our  B-52  bombers. 

•  We  are  now  deploying  the  new- 
Trident  I  missile  in  some  existing  sub- 
marines, and  by  1981  we  will  be  de- 
ploying the  new  Trident  submarine. 

•  And  we  are  moving  forward  with 
the  MX  missile  program  to  assure  the 
survivability  of  our  land-based  strategic 
missiles. 

These  improvements  represent  the 
most  vigorous  American  strategic 
weapons  program  in  more  than  a 
decade. 

Our  purpose  in  these  efforts  is  not 
only  to  maintain  essential  equivalence 
in  strategic  forces,  it  is  also  to  maintain 
flexibility  in  our  strategic  nuclear  op- 
tions. For,  while  we  accept  the  idea 
that  mutual  vulnerability  is  a  deterrent 
to  war,  we  do  not  accept  the  notion  that 
our  options  should  be  limited  to  mutual 
assured  destruction.  We  must  have  in 
our  strategic  quiver  more  than  the 
single  arrow  of  Armageddon. 

It  is  both  our  policy  and  our  prac- 
tice, therefore,  to  maintain  a  variety  of 
strategic  forces,  capable  of  absorbing 
the  heaviest  blows  possible  and  still  re- 
taining the  power  to  retaliate  against 
the  entire  spectrum  of  military  and 
economic  targets.  We  refuse  to  lock 
ourselves  into  either  of  two  doctrines: 


the  doctrine  of  reliance  on  massive  re- 
taliation alone  or  a  doctrine  which  em- 
phasizes so-called  limited  nuclear  ex- 
changes directed  by  each  side  against 
the  other's  strategic  forces. 

There  must  be  a  deliberate  uncer- 
tainty about  precisely  what  our  re- 
sponse to  attack  might  be— for  that 
very  uncertainty  strengthens  deter- 
rence. Our  doctrine  of  flexible  re- 
sponse, and  our  wide  range  of  strategic 
forces,  preserve  that  uncertainty. 

We  will  maintain  a  secure  strategic 
balance  and  a  credible  deterrent,  at 
whatever  level  of  effort  is  required. 
But  we  know  that  there  can  be  no  ulti- 
mate security  in  relentless  escalations 
of  strategic  power.  Both  we  and  the 
Soviet  Union  have  a  compelling  national 
interest  in  stabilizing  the  strategic 
competition  and  achieving  balanced  re- 
ductions through  negotiation. 

The  SALT  process  demonstrably 
serves  these  ends.  And  SALT  provides 
a  striking  illustration  of  the  dual  ap- 
proach I  have  described — the  mutual 
reinforcement  of  arms  control  and  force 
modernization.  For  it  is  clear  that  au- 
thentic arms  control  progress  would  not 
be  possible  without  our  determination 
to  maintain  the  balance  in  any 
environment — whether  with  arms  con- 
trol or  without  it.  But  it  is  clear,  as 
well,  that  in  a  nuclear  age,  true  secu- 
rity will  elude  us  unless  we  are  equally 
determined  in  our  diplomacy— in  the 
search  for  dependable  and  balanced 
controls  on  nuclear  arms. 

The  SALT  II  Treaty  is  now  before 
the  U.S.  Senate.  It  is  my  hope  and  be- 
lief that  it  will  be  ratified  in  the  near 
future.  Once  that  step  is  taken,  the 
agreed  goal  of  SALT  III  will  be  to 
achieve  substantial  reductions  in  nu- 
clear arsenals. 

Throughout  this  process  we  have 
benefited  from  consultations  with  our 
European  allies.  We  have  worked  to  as- 
sure that  European  security  interests 
and  options  are  fully  protected.  In  the 
next  phase,  SALT  III,  those  consulta- 
tions will  be  even  more  intense;  the  role 
of  the  allies  in  shaping  our  approach 
will  be  even  more  direct,  as  the  talks 
take  up  issues  of  long-range  theater,  as 
well  as  strategic,  forces. 

But  the  same  central  principles  will 
guide  us:  a  commitment  to  have  what- 
ever arms  we  need  to  maintain  the  bal- 
ance while  we  press  for  progressively 
more  stringent  mutual  limits  through 
negotiations. 


Theater  Nuclear  Forces 

Maintaining  stability  and  deterrence  is 
important  not  only  in  the  field  of  inter- 
continental strategic  weapons  but  at 
the  theater  nuclear  level  as  well. 

Indeed,  the  emergence  of  parity  in 
these  strategic  systems  focuses  atten- 
tion on  NATO's  long-range  theater  nu- 
clear forces  as  a  stone  in  the  arch  of 
deterrence. 

For  many  years,  NATO's  Europear 
allies  have  had  the  assurance  that  the 
threat  posed  to  Western  Europe  by 
Soviet  and  Warsaw  Pact  forces  is  ulti- 
mately deterred  by  the  intercontinental 
nuclear  striking  power  of  the  United 
States. 

That  assurance  is  undiminished. 
Our  strategic  nuclear  forces  would  be 
used  if  necessary  for  Europe's  defense. 
The  vital  interests  of  the  United  Statei 
are  so  engaged  in  Europe,  our  commit- 
ments so  deep,  and  our  ties  so  strong 
that  it  could  not  be  otherwise. 

But  NATO's  chief  aim  is  to  prevent 
aggression.  We  must,  therefore,  be 
sure  that  no  problem  arises  with  regarc 
to  Soviet  perceptions,  for  it  is  on  those 
perceptions  that  deterrence  rests. 

It  is  crucial  that  the  Soviets  not  b( 
tempted  to  believe — however 
wrongly— that  strategic  parity  betweei 
the  superpowers  means  that  Europe's 
defense  could  be  separated  from  that  ol 
the  United  States  or  that  the  Soviet 
Union  itself  could  remain  immune  fron 
a  military  conflict  in  Europe.  Thus  de- 
terrencerequires  that  NATO  have  a 
full  range  of  capabilities  to  respond  to 
any  level  of  military  challenge.  It  re- 
quires that  there  be  no  gap  in  this  con- 
tinuum of  forces;  that  every  stone  in 
the  arch  of  deterrence  be  sound. 

Such  a  gap  could  emerge  if  we 
should  fail  to  modernize  NATO's  long- 
range  theater  nuclear  forces.  For  the 
Soviet  Union,  having  achieved  strategi 
parity,  appears  now  to  be  driving  to- 
ward nuclear  preponderance  in  the 
European  theater. 

We  can  see  the  evidence  in  the 
Soviet  Union's  vigorous  program  to 
modernize  and  expand  its  long-range 
theater  nuclear  forces. 

The  most  dramatic  development  in 
this  regard— and  the  matter  of  greates 
concern  to  us— is  the  rapid,  ongoing 
Soviet  deployment  of  the  SS-20  mobile 
missile. 

Let  us  make  no  mistake:  The  SS-2( 
is  not  an  upgrading  of  an  old  system.  It 
is  an  entirely  new  system — the  first 
mobile,  land-based,  long-range  missile 
system  in  the  European  theater.  Each 
SS-20  launcher  can  reload  and  refire. 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


'» 


The  Secretary 


ach  missile  can  deliver  not  one  but 
hree  nuclear  warheads.  The  SS-20  can 
each  everywhere  in  Europe  from  bases 
eep  within  Soviet  territory. 

Add  to  the  SS-20  system  the 
rowing  numbers  of  Backfire  bombers 
eployed  in  the  European  theater  and 
le  conclusion  is  inescapable:  This 
oviet  buildup  goes  beyond  what  is 
ecessary  to  upgrade  their  armaments 
r  to  meet  developments  in  NATO's 
)rces. 

Yet  Soviet  spokesmen  tell  us  that 
ly  moves  by  NATO  to  redress  this 
tuation  could  undermine  detente  and 
unch  a  new  period  of  East-West  ten- 
ons in  Europe.  They  have  insisted 
lat  we  accept,  in  the  name  of  detente, 
trend  toward  manifest  inequality. 

The  West  cannot  be  passive  in  this 
tuation.  From  a  political  standpoint, 
do  so  would  constitute  a  curious  ap- 
•oach  to  detente.  It  would  say  to  the 
orld  that  Western  security  decisions 
e  the  business  of  both  East  and  West 
It  that  those  of  the  East  are  for  Mos- 
w  to  make  alone.  For  the  West  to  ac- 
liesce  in  such  a  notion  could  tempt 
oscow  to  risk  other  kinds  of  pressure 
other  issues.  I  need  not  remind  this 
dience  how  gravely  this  would 
idermine  the  only  sensible  basis  for 
operation  between  East  and  West — 
•e  principle  of  mutual  security. 

So  it  is  essential  for  the  United 
ates  and  the  NATO  allies  to  maintain 
terrence  across  the  whole  military 
ectrum. 

This  week  in  Brussels,  therefore, 
e  NATO  Defense  and  Foreign  Minis- 
fs  will  decide  upon  a  set  of  proposals 
oviding  for  theater  nuclear  moderni- 
tion  and  arms  control. 
In  this  connection,  let  me  say  that 
staunchness  of  the  German  Gov- 
nment  and  Chancellor  Schmidt  and 
?  resolution  passed  here  in  Berlin  last 
ek  by  the  Social  Democratic  Party 
ngress  are  far-sighted  contributions 
lich  will  add  to  the  unity  and  deter- 
nation  of  the  alliance  as  we  meet  in 
ussels. 
The  pending  modernization  propos- 
call  for  deployment  by  NATO  in 
jstern  Europe  of  long-range  theater 
clear  weapons — a  mi.x  of  land-based 
iise  and  ballistic  missiles. 
:l|    By  replacing  aging  long-range 

ater  nuclear  systems  with  highly 
J  rvivable  and  more  capable  systems, 
deployments  will  reduce  the  chance 
it  the  Soviet  Union  might  perceive, 
wever  incorrectly,  a  gap  in  NATO's 
3ctrum  of  deterrence.  And  by  im- 
jving  NATO's  deterrent  posture, 
'y  will  raise  the  most  significant 
"eshold — that  between  peace  and 


Ibruary  1980 


This  deployment  will  permit  NATO 
to  reduce  its  overall  nuclear  stockpile  in 
Europe  as  part  of  the  rationalization  of 
its  theater  nuclear  forces.  And  it  will 
signal  to  the  Soviet  Union  that  its 
buildup  promises  no  real  military  or 
political  advantages — because  NATO 
will  respond  to  the  challenge. 

At  the  same  time,  we  firmly  be- 
lieve that  our  security  can  be  enhanced 
through  genuine  arms  control;  through 
concrete  agreements  to  regulate  force 
levels.  Such  agreements  hold  the 
promise  of  preventing  unrestrained 
competition  and  providing  greater  sta- 
bility in  the  theater  nuclear  field. 

But  arms  limitation  cannot  be  uni- 
lateral; it  must  be  achieved  through  a 
process  that  is  truly  mutual. 

Because  we  are  committed  to 
seeking  genuine  arms  control,  our  mod- 
ernization decisions  will  be  coupled 
with  an  important  arms  limitation 
offer — an  offer  aimed  at  limiting  long- 
range  theater  nuclear  forces  on  both 
sides.  NATO's  proposal  will  call  for 
verifiable  limits  that  are  significant  and 
based  upon  the  principle  of  equality. 

This  arms  control  initiative  will 
test  the  sincerity  of  the  Soviets  on  lim- 
iting these  systems.  Since  the  first 
NATO  systems  will  not  be  fielded  until 
1983,  there  will  be  ample  time  to  pur- 
sue serious  arms  control  negotiations. 

There  are  those,  I  know,  who 
argue  that  NATO  should  delay  its  de- 
ployment decision  until  such  talks  can 
be  held.  We  must  not  delay,  for  two 
important  reasons. 

First,  we  cannot  know  in  advance 
that  such  talks  will  succeed.  It  would 
make  little  sense  for  the  allies  to  fall 
farther  and  farther  behind  in  the  mere 
hope  that  the  talks  might  succeed.  And 
given  the  present  momentum  of  Soviet 
efforts,  any  delay  in  NATO  moderniza- 
tion increases  an  already  troubling 
disparity. 

Second,  the  West  must  demon- 
strate its  seriousness  about  moderniza- 
tion or  the  Soviets  will  have  no  visible 
incentive  to  negotiate  reductions  in 
forces. 

So  our  position  is  clear:  The  United 
States  and  the  NATO  allies  will  strive 
to  reduce  forces  through  negotiations. 
But  we  will  do  all  that  is  necessary  to 
maintain  a  credible  deterrent  across  the 
entire  spectrum  of  nuclear  and  conven- 
tional forces. 

We  cannot,  however,  accept  unilat- 
eral restraint  by  NATO  as  a  prereq- 
uisite to  negotiations,  and  we  will  not. 
The  restraint  must  come  from  both 
sides. 


The  Balance  of  Conventional  Forces 

The  policy  I  have  described — a  policy  of 
maintaining  deterrence  by  force  im- 
provements where  necessary  and  by 
arms  control  where  possible — is  also 
our  strategy  in  the  field  of  conventional 
forces. 

Because  improvements  in  Soviet 
conventional  forces  continue  and  be- 
cause conventional  forces  are  central  to 
the  alliance's  deterrent,  it  is  essential 
that  the  allies  hold  to  their  comprehen- 
sive modernization  program.  NATO's 
Long-Term  Defense  Program  will  as- 
sure us  a  modern,  better  integrated, 
and  more  effective  conventional  force 
for  the  1980s.  The  NATO  goal  of  3% 
real  annual  increases  in  member  de- 
fense spending  will  provide  the  re- 
sources essential  to  finance  these  im- 
provements in  conventional  forces, 
which  consume  the  largest  share  of  de- 
fense budgets. 

But  here  again,  we  are  determined 
both  to  maintain  deterrence  and  to  ne- 
glect no  opportunity  for  progress  in 
arms  limitation. 

One  significant  opportunity  for 
progress  lies  in  the  mutual  and  bal- 
anced force  reduction  (MBFR)  talks  in 
Vienna.  Here  our  hope  is  to  give  practi- 
cal meaning  to  the  concept  of  balance  in 
the  conventional  field — just  as  the 
SALT  process  has  sought  to  do  in  the 
strategic  field. 

The  goal  of  the  MBFR  talks— a 
goal  now  accepted  by  both  sides — is  to 
negotiate  common  collective  ceilings  at 
lower  levels  for  NATO  and  Warsaw 
Pact  forces  in  central  Europe.  But 
progress  toward  that  goal  has  been 
hobbled  by  Eastern  unwillingness  to 
resolve  the  data  issue.  There  is  still  a 
very  large  discrepancy  between  the 
figures  provided  by  East  and  West  re- 
garding the  level  of  Eastern  forces  in 
the  area. 

Let  me  reaffirm  today  that  the 
Western  side  is  eager  to  make  progress 
toward  agreement — progress  which  can 
come  only  if  such  basic  issues  as  the 
data  problem  and  verification  methods 
can  be  resolved. 

The  announcement  by  Chairman 
Brezhnev  of  a  Soviet  withdrawal  of  up 
to  20,000  troops,  1,000  tanks,  and  some 
other  equipment  is  a  positive  step. 
However,  the  basic  issues  of  the  MBFR 
negotiations  must  still  be  resolved. 

Progress  toward  greater  stability 
and  mutual  confidence  in  Europe  can 
also  come  through  the  effort  to  imple- 
ment the  Final  Act  of  the  Conference 
on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe 
(CSCE),  signed  in  1975  by  35  nations  at 
Helsinki. 


The  Secretary 


The  Final  Act  is  an  historic  docu- 
ment, for  it  transcends  normal  state- 
to-state  relations  to  deal  with  concrete 
problems  that  have  divided  East  and 
West.  Compliance  with  its  obligations 
would  enrich  the  lives  of  people  and 
ease  the  tensions  between  East  and 
West. 

The  Final  Act  offers  a  potential 
framework  for  reducing  military  ten- 
sions in  Europe  and  building  greater 
confidence  with  respect  to  military 
activities. 

There  have  been  a  number  of 
suggestions  that  this  objective  could  be 
advanced  through  a  meeting  of  the 
CSCE  states  to  deal  with  security  is- 
sues. The  Government  of  France  has 
put  forward  a  useful  proposal  in  this 
regard. 

Clearly  such  a  meeting  would  only 
make  sense,  however,  as  part  of  a  bal- 
anced and  healthy  CSCE  process.  Thus 
it  is  important,  fii'st,  to  conclude  suc- 
cessfully the  review  in  Madrid.  As  we 
approach  that  meeting,  the  United 
States  will  keep  in  mind,  above  all,  the 
importance  of  implementing  all  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Final  Act,  not  just  the  se- 
curity provisions.  We  are  particularly 
concerned  about  the  provisions  dealing 
with  humanitarian  issues  that  directly 
affect  the  daily  lives  of  our  citizens  and 
those  elsewhei'e  in  Europe. 

We  will  work  to  insui-e  that  the  dis- 
cussions in  Madrid  take  place  in  a  con- 
structive atmosphere,  free  of  polemics. 
But  we  will  not  avoid  providing  an  hon- 
est assessment  of  problems  simply  to 
project  a  positive  image. 

Conclusion 

The  realities  of  military  security  I  have 
discussed,  and  the  opportunities  for 
progress  in  arms  limitation,  argue  for  a 
special  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  allies 
as  we  face  the  1980s— an  attitude  I 
would  describe  as  sober  optimism. 

We  must  be  sobered  by  the  pros- 
pect that  deep  and  fundamental  differ- 
ences will  persist  between  East  and 
West — differences  rooted  in  geog- 
raphy, in  history,  and  in  the  assump- 
tions underlying  our  political  systems. 
Neither  our  differences  nor  our 
weapons  systems  will  be  dismantled 
overnight.  So  we  would  do  well  to  keep 
ourselves  free  of  illusions  based  solely 
on  hope. 

But  we  should  never  abandon  hope. 
For  in  spite  of  our  historic  differences, 
East  and  West  have  come  a  long  way  in 
their  relations.  The  range  of  contacts 
among  the  countries  of  Eastern  and 
Western  Eurojje  has  broadened;  their 


relations  have  taken  on  an  increasing 
air  of  normality. 

Clearly,  the  future  of  East-We.st 
relations  will  be  marked  by  deep  differ- 
ences. But  we  should  at  the  same  time 
seek  to  broaden  the  areas  of  coopera- 
tion between  us. 

Neither  prospect  should  unsettle  us 
in  the  West,  for  we  bring  to  the  future 
an  impressive  I'ecord  of  achievements 
and  an  etjually  impi'essive  array  of 
sti'engths. 

•  For  31  years,  the  deterrent 
shield  of  the  NATO  alliance  has  worked 
successfully. 

•  The  economies  of  the  Western  al- 
liance are  more  than  three  times  as 
productive  as  those  of  the  Warsaw 
Pact. 

•  Our  societies  are  free  and  open, 
hospitable  to  innovation  and  creativity, 
unafraid  of  change. 

•  Though  we  cannot  dominate 
events  in  our  world,  our  power  is  im- 
mense to  influence  those  events  and  to 
shape  them  in  ways  that  impi'ove  the 
prospects  for  humanity. 

If  we  preserve  these  strengths  and 
build  upon  them,  if  in  the  future  we  find 
within  ourselves  the  same  qualities  of 
statesmanship  we  have  always  found, 
we  need  not  fear  the  1980s  or  the  dec- 
ades beyond.  We  will  be  strong — 
strong  enough  to  protect  ourselves  and 
strong  enough,  if  our  adversaries  are 
also  willing,  to  cooperate  in  pursuit  of 
peace. 

Indeed,  just  as  we  will  do  whatever 
necessary  to  maintain  stability  and  de- 
terrence in  Europe,  so  are  we  deeply 
committed  to  a  rela.xation  of  tensions 
between  East  and  West.  We  stand 
ready  to  propose  and  consider  new 
ideas,  to  follow  unconventional  paths, 
to  respond  to  every  sign  of  good  faith 
fr(]m  the  other  side,  for  we  want  to 
build  a  future  in  which  the  peace  of 
Europe — East  and  West — is  never 
again  disturbed.  ■ 

'  Press  release  321. 


Interview  on  the 
"Today"  Show 


Sccif/tdi'ii  Vdiiee  /('!■( ,s  iiiterricii'i'd 
in  WanlihnitoH,  D.C..  <))i  tlie  "Todai/" 
Slioir  on  Jaiiuanj  11,  1980.  by  Richard 
Valeriani,  NBC  Neics  diplomatic  cor- 
respondent and  Tom  Brokaic.  host  of 
fhe-'Todai/"  Show.'' 


Q.  What  other  measures  is  the  Admin 
istration  planning  to  take  in  reaction  to 
the  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan? 

A.  We  are  not  planning,  at  this 
point,  to  take  any  other  measures.  The 
invasion  of  Afghanistan  by  the  Soviet 
Union  crossed  a  new  threshold  and  it  re- 
quired a  veiy  strong  and  a  vei^y  resolute 
response.  That  response  was  given  by 
President  Carter  in  the  speech  which  he 
made. 

We  have  two  purposes  in  the  actions 
which  we  have  taken.  First,  to  make  it 
veiy  clear  to  the  Soviet  Union  that  they 
will  continue  to  pay  a  heavy  price  as  long 
as  their  troops  remain  in  Afghanistan. 
And  secondly,  to  make  sure  that  they 
understand  that  aggression  will  be  faced 
up  to  whenever  it  occurs.  It's  too  early  tc 
say  at  this  point  what  the  long-range  ef- 
fect is  going  to  be  on  the  U.S. -Soviet  re- 
lationship. That  depends  upon  Moscow 
and  actions  which  will  be  taken  in 
Moscow. 

I  do  want  to  make  a  point,  which  I 
think  is  a  veiy  important  point  to  make. 
And  that  is  that  the  invasion  of  Afghanis- 
tan underscores  the  importance  of  pursu- 
ing the  policies  which  we  have  been  em- 
barked upon.  What  are  those  policies? 
Let  me  outline  them  for  you  veiy  briefly. 

•  Continuing  to  strengthen  America 
— we  have  been  in  the  process  of  doing 
that  during  the  past  3  years  through  a 
wide  variety  of  steps  in  the  strategic 
fields  and  the  field  of  theater  nuclear 
weapons  and  in  the  field  of  conventional 
weapons  as  well.  That  will  continue. 

•  Secondly,  we  will  continue  to  play 
an  active  diplomatic  role  thi-oughout  the 
world,  taking  the  kind  of  actions  such  as 
we  have  taken  in  the  past  to  help  pre- 
serve the  peace  in  the  Middle  East  and  in 
southern  Africa. 

•  We  will  also  continue  to  play  an  ac- 
tive role  in  the  Third  World,  dealing  with 
Third  World  problems  on  Third  World 
basis,  and  not  trying  to  impose  solutions 
from  the  outside,  from  e.xternal  forces. 

•  In  addition  to  that,  we  will  con- 
tinue to  pursue  an  active  policy  in  terms 
of  democratization  and  the  support  and 


in 


The  Secretary 


tection  of  human  rights  throughout 
world,  and  will  continue  to  pursue  our 
icy  of  seeking  mutual  and  balanced 
ns  control  progress  wherever  neces- 

Q.  Getting  back  to  Afghanistan, 
uld  the  United  States  consider  help- 
the  Afghan  insurgents? 

A.  The  question  of  what  happens  in- 
nally  is  a  question  I'd  prefer  not  to  get 

Q.  As  you  know,  the  Administra- 
n  has  drawn  considerable  criticism 
ir  some  of  the  measures  it's  taken: 
withholding  of  the  sale  of  grain  and 
anced  technology  to  the  Soviet  Un- 
.  And  the  question  is.  why  should 
M  American  farmer,  why  should  the 
Uerican  businessman  pay  the  price 
lit  you're  talking  about? 

A.   I  think  it's  very  important,  as  I 
Heated  earlier,  that  we  take  firm,  clear, 
r  )vs(ilute  action.  And  this  required 
:  IS  iici'oss  the  board.  We  took  not  only 
I  in  in  the  field  of  cutting  back  on  the 
7  n  shipments  in  a  very  substantial  way 
I  alsii  steps  in  denying  to  the  Soviet 

III  high  technology.  And  another 
1  II'  area  was  cutting  back  on  the  fish 
I  -ations  so  that  it  would  be  no  longer 
r  fish  allocations  to  the  Soviet  Union  in 
1  future. 

These  kinds  of  strong  steps  were 
e  ssai-y.  And  all  of  us  are  going  to  have 
}  lare  in  the  sacrifices  that  are  neces- 
a  to  make  this  demonstrated  stand  to 
3  et  the  view  which  we  hold  about  the 
r  irtaiice  of  the  principles  which  are 
r  Ivfd  here. 

Q.   How  long  will  these  measures 
Biain  in  effect?  And  I  ask  that  in  light 
f  hat  happened  with  the  Soviet  inva- 
I  of  Hungary  in  19.56,  Czechoslo- 
1)  a  in  1968.  Six  months,  a  year 
itr,  we  were  back  doing  business  as 

il. 

A.  They  will  remain  in  effect  as  long 
necessary.  And  I  believe  it  will  be  a 
raeted  period.  That  may  not  be  the 

That  would  be  fortunate  if  that 
'  the  case.  But  I  do  not  believe  that  is 
ase.  We  must  assume  it  will  be  for  a 
raeted  period. 

You're  absolutely  right.  When  you 
back  at  what  took  place  at  the  time 
e  Hungarian  invasion,  that  was 

forgotten  in  a  period  of  weeks, 
same  thing  was  true  in  the  case  of 
■hoslovakia.  The  Soviets  must  un- 
tand  that  this  will  not  be  a  passing 

,  that  aggression  will  not  be  re- 
Bed. 


ruary  1980 


Q.  What  about  the  economic  re- 
prisals that  we've  taken  thus  far? 
Aren't  they  largely  symbolic?  There's  a 
wide  body  of  opinion  that  they  really 
will  have  no  eflfect  on  the  Russian  qual- 
ity of  life  or  certainly  on  the  presence 
of  Soviet  troops  in  Afghanistan,  that 
they  were  done  primarily  to  make  us 
feel  better  and  to  send  up  some  kind  of 
a  signal;  but  it's  really  no  more  than  a 
signal. 

A.  No,  I  would  respectfully  disagree 
very  strongly  with  you.  The  steps  taken 
insofar  as  gi'ain  are  concerned  are  going 
to  have,  in  our  judgment,  a  major  impact 
on  the  livestock  program  in  the  Soviet 
Union.  The  denial  of  grain  to  them  is 
going  to  require  a  sharp  cutback  in  live- 
stock production.  This  is  a  very  impor- 
tant program  to  the  Soviets,  and  it's  had 
the  strong  backing  of  Mr.  Brezhnev.  The 
denial  of  high  technology  is  something 
which  is  also  of  great  importance  and  has 
been  for  many  years.  Therefore,  I  think 
that  that  will  have  a  substantial  impact. 
The  cutting  back  in  the  fish  allocations  is 
of  lesser  importance  but,  again,  an  im- 
portant step. 

Q.  What  about  the  Olympic 
games?  Vice  President  Mondale  is  now 
suggesting  that  they  be  moved  to 
Canada.  Is  that  the  official  Administra- 
tion policy? 

A.  The  official  policy  was  stated  by 
the  President  at  the  time  that  he  made 
his  speech.  At  that  time  he  said  that  we 
prefer  the  games  would  go  forward,  but 
that  we  would  have  to  watch  and  see 
what  happens,  and  he  would  make  his  de- 
cision in  the  future,  after  seeing  how  the 
situation  develops  in  terms  of  what  the 
Soviets  would  now  do. 

Q.  — take  the  Olympic  Games  out 
of  Moscow  is  something  that  would 
probably  really  hurt  the  Russians.  Is 
there  much  sympathy  for  that  among 
our  allies,  other  Western  countries, 
Third  World  countries? 

A.  It's  mixed. 

Q.  Is  that  something  you're  going 
to  push? 

A.  We  are  going  to  watch  and  see 
what  happens.  It  remains  a  possibility 
which  may  be  exercised. 

Q.  Let  me  ask  you  about  Iran  now. 
Do  you  expect  the  Soviet  Union  to  veto 
the  Security  Council  resolution  against 
sanctions? 

A.  I  don't  know.  It  remains  a  real 
possibility.  As  you  know,  we'll  probably 
vote  on  the  sanctions  issue  either  tonight 


at  the  United  Nations  or  tomorrow  morn- 
ing. I  believe  that  the  vote  will  be  a  posi- 
tive vote,  but  the  Soviet  Union  may  veto. 

Q.  What  will  you  do  if  there's  a 
veto? 

A.  We  will  go  ahead  and  take  action 
as  if  the  sanctions  had  indeed  been  put 
into  effect. 

Q.  Would  you  consider  a  naval 
blockade  to  back  it  up? 

A.  I  do  not  rule  it  out. 

Q.  What  if  the  Soviets  begin  to 
move  out  of  Afghanistan  and  toward 
the  warm-water  ports  of  the  Persian 
Gulf,  as  a  lot  of  people  are  speculating 
that  they  may.  Does  that  mean  that  we 
have  to  begin  to  move  troops  to  that 
area? 

A.  I  do  not  want  to  speculate  on 
events  which  are  not  facing  us  at  this 
time.  We'll  deal  with  them  when  we  have 
to  cross  that  bridge.  ■ 

'Press  release  10  of  Jan.  15,  1980. 


INTERVIEW 


Deputy  Secretary  Christopher 
Interviewed  on  "Face  the  Nation" 


Deputy  Secrefuri/  of  State  Warre)i 
CIn-istopher  was  interviewed  on  CBS's 
"Face  the  Natiov"  on  January  6,  1980, 
by  George  Herman,  CBS  News  (mod- 
erator); Marvin  Kalh.  CBS  Neu's;  ai/d 
Henry  Trewhitt,  Baltimore  Sun. 

Q.  I  think  the  question  that  almost 
every  American  is  asking  himself  or 
herself  today,  reading  the  headlines 
about  Soviet  denunciations  of  President 
Carter  and  American  sanctions,  if  you 
like,  against  the  Soviet  Union,  is  are  we 
now  embarking  on  a  second  cold  war? 

A.   I  don't  think  it  is  very  helpful  to 
use  terms  like  that.  We  are  in  a  period  of 
making  a  strong  response  to  what  we  re- 
gard as  an  extraordinary  event.  You  have 
to  consider  the  degree  of  the  aggression 
of  the  Soviet  Union  into  Afghanistan. 
They  go  in  with  50,000  troops,  they  are 
involved  in  wiping  out  the  head  of  the 
country,  they  install  a  puppet  regime, 
they  are  bearing  down  on  the  Moslem 
minority.  This  is  the  kind  of  an  event  that 
calls  for  the  strong  response  that  Presi- 
dent Carter  has  made. 

We  will  have  to  see  in  the  future  how 
U.S. -Soviet  relations  work  out.  I  don't 
think  it  is  time  to  pronounce  the  death  of 
detente,  but  I  think  we  need  to  deal  with 
an  important  and  serious  reality  for 
America. 

Q.  In  your  first  answer,  you  said 
we  will  have  to  wait  and  see  in  the  fu- 
ture what  our  relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union  are  going  to  be.  That  sort  of 
brings  to  mind  the  idea  that  you  feel  it 
is  a  temporary  situation — this  crisis 
over  Afghanistan.  If  we  have  this  em- 
bargo on  grain  and  all  these  other 
things  afoot,  what  will  it  take  on  the 
Soviet  Union's  part  to  end  it?  What  is 
the  minimum  Soviet  action  which  will 
stop  this  threat  of  a  second  cold  war? 

A.  Let  me  respond  to  that  by  telling 
you  what  our  goals  are.  We  are  deter- 
mined to  show  the  Soviet  Union  that 
their  aggression  into  Afghanistan  is  not 
without  considerable  cost  to  them.  We  are 
also  determined  to  make  it  clear  to  them 
that  any  subsequent  event  of  the  same 
kind  will  be  subject  to  very  severe  penal- 
ties. 

Now,  if  we  can  make  those  points, 
then  the  Soviet  response  will,  I  think,  de- 
termine what  our  relationship  will  be 
with  them  in  the  future. 

Q.   Isn't  there  some  danger,  how- 
ever, that  if  you  simply  withdraw  these 


sanctions  after  the  Soviet  Union  has 
consolidated  its  position  in  Afghanis- 
tan, that  you  will  be  seen  in  something 
of  the  ambivalent  position  you  have  in 
the  past  as  with  the  combat  brigade  in 
Cuba,  that  sort  of  thing? 

A.  We  don't  intend  to  set  any  time 
for  withdrawing  the  sanctions.  I  think 
one  of  the  lessons  coming  out  of  the 
Czechoslovakia  crisis  is  that  the  response 
needs  to  be  determined  and  of  consider- 
able duration.  When  I  was  in  Europe  last 
week,  I  was  struck  by  the  number  of  offi- 
cials there  who  had  gone  through  the 
Czech  crisis  and  who  regretted  the  fact 
that  their  response  was  of  such  short  du- 
ration. I  think  we  need  to  be  determined 
and  persistent  here. 

Q.  Could  you — pointing  out  this 
West  European  possible  allied  response 
— could  you  point  out  for  us  what  you 
expect,  what  you  have  worked  out  with 
the  European  allies? 

A.  We  are  in  the  early  stages  of  that. 
But  there  are  a  number  of  things  we  do 
expect.  First,  we  e.xpect  our  allies  will 
not  move  in  to  supply  the  grain  that  we 
are  denying  to  the  Soviet  Union. 

Q.  That  is  Canada,  Australia, 
Argentina. 

A.  That  is  Canada,  Australia,  and 
any  of  the  other  European  countries 
which  may  have  some  grain  stocks  which 
could  be  substituted  for  ours. 

Second,  I  think  we  expect  them  to 
terminate  their  aid  programs  for  Af- 
ghanistan. It  is  one  thing  to  aid  a 
nonaligned  country;  it  is  quite  another 
thing  to  aid  a  puppet  regime  of  the  Soviet 
Union. 

We  expect  them  to  take  some  action 
with  respect  to  their  diplomatic  repre- 
sentation. We  also  expect  them  to  take 
actions  which  are  somewhat  parallel  to 
ours  in  the  economic  field.  Every  country 
will  have  to  do  what  it  can  do  best.  For 
example,  I  would  expect  some  of  the 
countries  there  to  deny  export  credits 
that  they  have  been  giving  in  the  past. 

Now  we  are  in  the  early  stages  of 
working  through  this  kind  of  a  response. 
The  United  States  took  a  long  step  when 
President  Carter  announced  his  program 
on  last  Friday;  the  NATO  group  will  be 
meeting  this  week  to  consider  what  ac- 
tions they  will  take  in  response.  In  my 
meetings  with  our  NATO  allies,  I  am  sure 
that  they  are  as  concerned  about  this  ac- 
tion of  the  Soviet  Union  as  we  are,  and  I 


expect  their  response  to  be  determined 
and  firm. 

Q.  What  about  the  French?  Ther( 
have  been  reports  that  the  French 
really  don't  see  it  quite  the  same  way 
that  the  United  States  does. 

A.  I  will  have  to  see  it  as  that  deve 
ops.  In  the  comparable  situation  in  Iran 
France  has  been  very  supportive  of  the 
United  States,  and  I  didn't  see  any  dif- 
ference in  talking  with  my  French  col- 
league as  to  his  analysis  of  the  gravity  c 
the  Soviet  step.  Everyone  recognizes 
that  it  is  a  new  departure  in  Soviet  poli( 

Q.  The  American  position  regard 
ing  the  Olympic  games  is  unclear  to 
me.  Now  I  see  the  Saudis  have  with- 
drawn from  the  games  next  summer. 
What  is  the  United  States  really  rec- 
ommending in  that  regard?  Are  you 
considering  withdrawing  support  of  tl 
games,  recommending  voluntary  non- 
participation  by  Americans?  What  is 
the  American  position? 

A.   First  let  me  comment  on  the 
Saudi  reaction  which  I  think  is  very  in- 
teresting here.  We  have  a  leading  Mosk 
country  feeling  so  strongly  about  the 
Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan  that  the; 
are  pulling  out  of  the  Olympic  games. 

Our  position  is  the  one  stated  by 
President  Carter  on  Friday  night.  We 
would  much  prefer  to  be  able  to  go  to  tl- 
Olympic  games,  but  the  aggressive  be- 
havior of  the  Soviet  Union  puts  at  somt 
risk  both  the  athletes  and  the  fact  that 
individuals  will  be  going  to  the  Soviet 
Union.  So  we  have  not  reached  a  decisii 
on  that  subject.  It  is  under  review  and 
will  continue  to  be. 

Q.  On  the  question  of  SALT,  whii 
is  of  interest  to  a  lot  of  people,  the  Ad 
ministration  tried  so  hard  to  complet* 
the  process  of  negotiating  SALT.  You 
went  to  the  Congress,  held  up  in  the 
Senate  Afghanistan,  and  suddenly  yoi 
are  pulling  back  and  shelving  it  for  th 
time  being.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  ma 
very  clear  that  we  are  going  to  abide  I 
the  terms  of  the  treaty  as  it  was  nego 
ated  and  it  seems  why  the  ratificatior 
process,  in  a  sense?  But  why  stick  wil 
the  terms? 

A.  Under  international  law,  a  cour 
try  is  obligated  to  stick  to  the  terms  of 
treaty  that  has  been  negotiated  and 
which  is  in  the  process  of  ratification.  V 
intend  to  do  that  for  our  part.  But  we 
also  intend  to  keep  our  eye  on  the  Sovi( 
Union,  and  if  we  find  some  deviation 
from  the  terms  of  SALT  II  on  their  par 
then,  of  course,  we  will  be  in  quite  a  dii 
ferent  position  ourselves. 


Department  of  State  Bull 


Interview 


(J.  Listening  to  your  answers  ear- 
lior  to  what  our  intentions  were  on  this 
■Soviet-Afghanistan  incursion  or  inva- 
sion, you  said  we  wanted  to  show  that 
such  an  action  was  not  without  cost  to 
hem,  that  it  would  incur  very  severe 
jenalties. 

It  sounds — now  correct  me  if  I  am 
lot  getting  the  diplomatic  language 
xactly  right — it  sounds  as  though  what 
his  means  is  you  do  not  expect  our  ac- 
ions  to  roll  back  the  Soviet  action,  you 
ust  are  trying  to  say  that  any  future 
ictions  of  this  kind  will  be  expensive. 

A.  No.  We  hope  both. 

Q.  Realistically? 

A.  We  hope  both.  We  hope  that  they 
rill  roll  back  their  actions  in  Afghanistan, 
nd  we  hope  to  make  the  point  that  any 
onsequent  actions  of  that  same  kind  will 
icur  vei-y  heavy  penalties. 

Q.  You  also  said — I  just  am  trying 
D  clear  up  a  few  loose  ends  on  this  very 
ipening  point,  I  asked  about  the  cold 
van  You  said  it  is  too  early  to  call  it 
■hat,  yet  you  quoted  various  diplomats 
ho  regretted  our  response  to  the 
toviet  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia  was 
10  brief,  and  it  sounds  to  me  a  little  bit 
IS  though  you  are  hinting  that  our 
eaction  at  this  time,  or  displeasure, 
hould  be  longer. 

A.  I  would  not  think  our  reaction 
ill  be  a  brief  one  this  time.  I  don't  ex- 
ect  to  go  back  to  business  as  usual  with 
18  Soviet  Union  for  some  time  to  come, 
•/e  have  taken  severe  actions  in  this 
)untry.  It  will  result  in  a  loss  to  the 
loviet  Union  of  17  million  tons  of  grain 

fis  year,  360,000  tons  offish,  a  good  deal 
high  technology.  Those  are  strong  ae- 
ons. We  intend  to  carry  them  out  for 
ng  enough  so  that  the  Soviet  Union  in- 
irs  some  cost  for  this  really  quite  un- 
"ecedented  action  that  they  have  taken 
moving  into  Afghanistan. 

Q.  I  wonder  if  I  could  get  into  this 
rea.  Did  you  have  intelligence  before 
le  Russians  moved  in  that  they  would 
a  such  a  thing? 

A.  We  knew  that  there  was  a  buildup 
;ross  the  border  of  Soviet  troops.  And 
e  have  been  warning,  backgrounding, 
dking  about  this  prospect  for  some  time, 
ut  until  they  flew  in  the  250  planes  in  a 
]-hour  period,  of  course,  we  didn't  know 
lat  they  were  going  to  do  that.  Indeed, 
lere  had  been  some  signs  that  they  were 
oing  to  shore  up  the  Amin  regime,  but 
hen  they  flew  in  the  250  planes,  when 
ley  went  across  the  border  with  two 
ivisions,  then,  of  course,  we  had  an  en- 
rely  new  situation  on  our  hands. 


Q.  What  I  am  trying  to  get  at 
really — that  suggests  surprise  by  the 
dimension  of  the  Soviet  action,  the 
boldness  of  it.  What  about  our  intelli- 
gence? There  has  been  a  problem  with 
that  in  the  past,  expressed  by  the  Presi- 
dent him.self  concerning  Iran,  and  I  am 
wondering  if  the  same  problem  is  not 
manifest  here.  In  talking  to  your  col- 
leagues, I  find  that  they  were  taken 
quite  by  surprise  by  the  boldness  of  this 
Soviet  action.  Isn't  that  in  itself  worse? 

A.  I  think  we  ought  to  recognize 
that  this  is  the  first  time  since  World  War 
II  that  the  Soviet  Union  has  used  its 
troops  outside  the  Warsaw  bloc.  Now  the 
vei-y  audacity  of  that  move  is  one  that 
caused  us  to  be  taken  aback.  We  didn't 
think  the  Soviet  Union  would  take  such  a 
great  risk,  and,  having  taken  it,  I  think 
we  are  determined  to  respond  in  a  way 
that  is  commensurate  with  the  risk. 

Q.  That  leads  directly  to  the  ques- 
tion of  why  they  were  willing  to  take 
that  risk.  Do  you  think  they  felt  that 
the  United  States  had  become,  in  order 
to  borrow  a  phrase  from  the  past,  "a 
pitiful,  helpless  giant"  and  simply 
would  not  react  in  a  substantive  way? 

A.  It  is  veiy  hard  to  speculate  about 
Soviet  intentions.  I  do  not  think  we  are  a 
weak  or  pitiful  giant  in  any  respect.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  I  think  our  country's  mili- 
taiy  posture  is  a  good  deal  stronger  than 
it  was  when  we  came  into  office  3  years 
ago  with  the  strengthening  of  NATO, 
with  the  cruise  missile,  and  the  other  de- 
fense steps  that  we  have  taken. 

There  are  a  number  of  reasons  why 
the  Soviet  Union  might  have  done  what 
they  did.  They  might  be  in  Afghanistan 
for  a  specific  reason,  or  there  might  be 
reasons  that  extend  beyond. 

Q.  Which  is  it? 

A.  I  don't  think  anybody  knows  at 
the  present  time,  but  I  think  the  United 
States  has  to  be  ready  for  either  one  of 
the  altei'natives. 

Q.  — put  it  the  other  day  in  terms 
of  the  steppingstone.  He  said  the  Af- 
ghan action  was  a  steppingstone  toward 
some  broader  strategic  aim. 

A.  I  think  we  believe  it  could  be  a 
steppingstone  to  some  broader  aim,  per- 
haps to  their  historic  interest  in  a  warm 
water  port,  perhaps  to  their  interest  in 
oil. 

Q.  Do  you  see  this  as  an  effort  by 
perhaps  a  new  group  within  the  Krem- 
lin, a  new  hard  faction?  There  are  some 
of  your  intelligence  people  who  talk 


about  the  rise  once  again  of  .Mikhail 
Suslov  to  greater  prominence  in  the 
Politburo.  Is  this  possible  to  explain 
what  the  Russians  have  done? 

A.  I  wouldn't  want  to  get  into  fac- 
tions. This  was  an  action  taken  by  the 
Soviet  Government.  They  have  the  re- 
sponsibility for  it.  I  wouldn't  want  to  get 
into  a  good-guys,  bad-guys  situation 
within  the  Soviet  Government.  They  are 
responsible  as  a  government. 

Q.  That  leads  in  turn  again  to  the 
question  about  their  objectives  in 
Pakistan,  which  is  a  neighbor  that 
clearly  feels  threatened.  How  far  is  the 
United  States  prepared  to  go  in  setting 
aside  its  concern  over  the  development 
of  nuclear  weapons  in  Pakistan  in 
order  to  help  the  Pakistanis  rearm? 

A.  We  retain  our  concern  over  the 
development  of  nuclear  weapons  there. 
Our  nuclear  nonproliferation  policy  is  one 
of  our  important  policies.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  only  one  of  the  tenets  of  our 
foreign  policy.  This  is  an  exceptional  situ- 
ation and  we  will  be  prepared  to  help  the 
[Paki.stanisl  in  this  exceptional  situation  if 
they  do  desire. 

Q.  Do  they  so  desire?  Are  you  in 
communication  with  them  on  this? 

A.  We  are  in  communication  with 
them  and  I  think  the  next  week  or  two 
will  give  us  an  opportunity  to  indicate 
how  we  and  to  what  extent  we  will  be 
helpful  to  the  [Pakistanis]. 

Q.  Would  you  have  to  balance  aid 
to  Pakistan  with  some  kind  of  aid  to 
India,  or  some  help,  something  to  keep 
from  tilting  as  the  previous  Administra- 
tion once  said? 

A.  We  are  determined  to  maintain 
relations  with  India,  but  India  ought  to 
see  the  action  of  the  Soviet  Union  as  a 
threat  to  India  as  well  as  the  other  coun- 
tries in  the  region.  After  all,  India — 

Q.  Do  you  see  signs  that  they  do? 

A.  I  see  signs  that  some  elements  of 
the  government  do.  They  are  in  the  pro- 
cess of  an  election  campaign.  I  think  we 
will  have  a  fuller  response  for  them  after 
the  campaign. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  ask  you  about 
China  and  Defense  Secretary  Brown's 
visit  there.  There  has  been  speculation 
that  the  United  States,  while  not  in  any 
sense  choosing  at  this  point  to  establish 
a  military  relationship  with  the 
People's  Republic  of  China,  is  not  be- 
yond considering  with  Peking  the  pos- 
sibility of  stationing  radar  facilities  in 


Interview 


China  to  replace,  for  example,  some  of 
those  lost  in  Iran.  Is  there  that  kind  of 
halfway-house  military  relationship 
possible  with  the  Chinese? 

A.  Let  me  say  in  general  terms  that 
we  don't  intend  to  let  the  misconduct  of 
the  Soviet  Union  keep  us  from  developing 
a  normal  relationship  with  the  People's 
Republic  of  China. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  have  said,  and 
we  continue  to  maintain,  that  we  do  not 
intend  to  furnish  arms  or  weapons  to  the 
People's  Republic  of  China.  Now  Secre- 
tary Brown  is  there.  He  will  be  having 
conversations  with  respect  to  many  sub- 
jects, including  the  new  Afghan  invasion 
by  the  Soviet  Union,  and  I  thini<  that  out 
of  that  will  come  an  important  indication 
to  us  as  to  how  we  can  cooperate  in  that 
area.  But  as  I  say,  we  will  not  be  in  a 
military  relationship  of  supplying  arms  or 
weapons  to  the  People's  Republic. 

Q.  But  short  of  the  supply  of 
American  weapons  to  China,  will  the 
United  States  try  to  explore  with  the 
Chinese  the  possibility  of  using  Chinese 
territory  for  the  basing  of  radar-type 
facilities? 

A.  On  that  subject  I  really  wouldn't 
have  any  comment  e.xcept  to  say  that  we 
will  be  discussing  with  them,  for  exam- 
ple, their  possible  aid  to  other  countries 
in  the  region  which  might  be  threatened 
by  the  Soviet  behavior. 

Q.  In  Pakistan,  for  example? 

A.   If  Pakistan  desired,  we  would  be 
talking  to  a  number  of  countries  around 
the  world  about  aiding  Pakistan.  So  I 
would  put  Pakistan  in  that  gi-oup. 

Q.   Let  me  direct  your  attention  to 
Afghanistan's  other  boundary.  The  im- 
pact of  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanis- 
tan has  been  sort  of  peculiar  in  Iran. 
On  the  one  hand  you  have  the  Moslems 
from  Afghanistan  invading  the  Soviet 
Embassy  in  Tehran;  on  the  other  hand 
you  have  the  militants  who  hold  the  50 
Americans  demanding  three  more 
Americans.  Do  you  have  any  kind  of 
evaluation  as  to  what  the  adventure  in 
Afghanistan  is  going  to  do  to  the  hold- 
ing of  American  hostages  in  Tfehran? 

A.  If  the  people  in  Iran  are  thinking 
clearly  about  the  matter,  I  would  think 
that  it  would  cause  them  to  want  to  end 
their  controversy  with  the  United  States 
and  the  obscene  holding  of  our  hostages 
and  direct  their  attention  to  the  greater 
threat  which  comes  from  Soviet  domina- 
tion of  Afghanistan. 

Q.  But  what  have  you  seen  or 
sensed? 


A.   I  have  some  reason  to  think  that 
a  number  of  the  leaders  of  that  country 
sense  the  importance  of  ending  the  prob- 
lem with  the  United  States.  How  high 
that  goes  in  that  government  is,  of 
course,  a  puzzle. 

Q.  But  there  is  no  guarantee  at  all 
that  reasonable  thought  has  dominated 
the  people  who  hold  the  hostages  in  the 
Embassy.  Do  you  see  any  evidence 
whatever  that  the  transition  in  the  gov- 
ernment, if  that  is  what  is  happening, 
appreciation  of  strategic  reality  or 
whatever,  is  having  an  influence  on  the 
willingness  of  the  people  who  are  in 
that  Embassy  to  release  the  hostages? 

A.  We  haven't  seen  it  yet  but  I  have 
to  believe  that  the  people  of  that  country 
are  concerned  about  their  own  welfare, 
concerned  about  their  own  future,  and 
that  the  combination  of  actions  that  the 
United  States  is  taking — the  seeking  of 
sanctions,  the  condemnation  of  the  world 
community,  and  now  the  threat  from 
Afghanistan — that  combination  of  events 
may  bring  the  people  of  Iran,  including 
the  terrorists  who  hold  our  hostages, 
bring  them  to  their  senses. 

Q.   Is  it  your  sense  that  if  the 
Ayatollah  Khomeini  should  give  a  di- 
rect order  through  whatever  gradual 
process  for  the  people  in  the  Embassy 
to  release  those  hostages,  that  they 
would  do  it? 

A.   It  is  my  judgment  that  the 
Ayatollah  could  give  such  an  order  and 
have  it  carried  out. 

Q.  You  seemed  to  be  suggesting  a 
moment  ago  when  you  said  there  might 
be  some  members  of  the  government 
who  would  like  to  end  all  of  this  and 
get  on  with  better  relationships  with 
the  United  States,  that  these  were 
lower  ranking  members.  What  about 
Khomeini  who  seems  to  have  the 
power?  Is  there  anything  from  all  of 
your  diplomatic  activities  and  ventures 
over  the  last  9  or  10  weeks  to  suggest 
that  he  has  changed  his  basic  approach 
to  this  crisis? 

A.  No,  I  don't  have  any  indication  of 
a  change  in  his  mind.  I  hope  one  will  be 
forthcoming. 

Q.  What  help,  what  support  can 
the  American  people  realistically  hope 
for  from  the  United  Nations  in  bringing 
pressure  to  bear  on  the  Soviet  Union 
over  Afghanistan? 

A.  Well  1  think  the  fact  that  50  coun- 
tries have  gone  to  the  United  Nations 
from  all  over  the  world  seeking  a  resolu- 
tion in  the  Security  Council  of  condemna- 
tion against  the  Soviet  Union  is  an  impor- 


tant fact  in  itself.  This  is  outci^ying  of  in- 
ternational opinion  against  this  invasion 
that  has  its  own  importance.  Beyond 
that,  I  think  you  can  look  forward  per- 
haps to  a  debate  in  other  organs  of  the 
United  Nations  which  once  again  could 
focus  world  opinion,  add  to  the  costs  that 
the  Soviet  Union  is  paying  for  their  ac- 
tions. 

Q.   During  this  and  other  Adminis- 
trations, I  think  specifically  of  some 
of  the  statements  by  Ambassador 
Moynihan  as  he  was  then,  there  was  a 
strong  feeling  in  this  country  that  the 
independent  nations,  the  Third  World, 
tended  more  to  support  the  Soviet 
Union  than  the  United  States.  Does  this 
sudden  end  of,  at  least  temporary  end, 
of  detente  begin  to  push  the  balance  in 
the  United  Nations  a  little  more  in  our 
favor? 

A.  Well  there  have  been  a  number  of 
interesting  indications  along  those  lines. 
You  know  it  is  important  to  remember 
that  on  Iran,  the  vote  in  the  Security 
Council  was  15  to  nothing.  The  vote  at 
the  International  Court  of  Justice  in 
favor  of  the  United  States  was  15  to  noth 
ing.  The  Third  Woi'ld  countries  on  these 
two  issue.s — both  Iran  and  Afghanistan 
— are  lining  up  behind  the  United  States 
policy,  and  I  think  that  is  a  very  impor- 
tant change. 

Q.  What  about  the  question  of 
America  being  able  to  use  not  bases  bu 
military  facilities  in  the  Persian  Gulf 
region?  We  have  read  stories  about  the 
possibility  of  Oman  providing  facilities 
Kenya,  Somalia.  Could  you  tell  us 
something  about  that? 

A.   Let  me  back  up  just  a  minute  on 
that  and  say  President  Carter's  speech  o 
Friday  night  was  primarily  directed  to 
bilateral  steps  that  might  be  taken  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union.  Now  in  addition  to  that,  the 
United  States  is  in  the  process  of  impor- 
tant steps  to  improve  its  military  posture 
in  the  Middle  East.  A  carrier  task  force, 
to  be  operating  in  the  Indian  Ocean, 
building  up  our  facilities  at  Diego  Garcia 
and  in  that  connection  we  will  be  seeking 
additional  facilities  in  those  three  coun- 
tries to  service  the  fleet  and  to  give  us  a 
greater  capacity,  additional  facilities,  bot 
ports  and  airfields, 

Q.  Could  I  pursue  that,  because 
perhaps  even  more  sensitive  than  the 
three  countries  Mr.  Kalb  mentioned 
would  be  the  possibilities  of  facilities  ii 
Egypt  and  Israel,  both  of  which  would 
be  receptive  to  that  kind  of  arrang- 
ment.  What  is  the  U.S.  attitude  on 
that? 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


AFRICA 


A.  They  are  under  consideration  as 
well,  along  with  the  others. 

Q.  There  is  a  movement  in  this 
country  now  to  end  that  old  traditional 
thing — bipartisan  foreign  policy.  Will 
the  beginning  of  Republican  and  other 
Democratic  attacks  on  this  Administra- 
tion have  any  impact  on  our  ability  to 
conduct  our  foreign  policy  and  to  make 
it  stick? 

A.   I  think  the  people  of  the  United 
States  are  unified.  Some  of  the  politicians 
may  not  be  at  the  moment.  I  thought  it 
was  rather  strange  and  ironic  last  night 
that  those  who  call  out  most  loudly  for  a 
stronger  U.S.  position  against  the  Soviet 
Union  were  criticizing  the  single 
strongest  step  we  took — the  grain  em- 
Dargo. 

I  might  say  in  this  connection  that 
,he  Administration  will  be  announcing 
.omorrow  a  major  new  gasohol  program, 
me  that  will  use  the  equivalent  of  5  mil- 
ion  tons  of  corn  during  the  ne.xt  year. 
This  will  lead,  during  1980,  to  the  produc- 
ioti  of  over  500  million  gallons  of  gasohol. 
iid.'ed,  by  the  end  of  1980  over  10%  of  a 
)ai-ticular  kind  of  gasoline  will  have  al- 
ohol  added  to  it. 

[Later  in  the  week,  the  Administra- 
ion  announced  a  gasohol  program  which 
vill  seek  to  create,  during  1981,  the  ca- 
)acity  to  use  5  million  tons  of  biomass 
products,  most  of  which  will  be  corn,  in 
he  production  of  more  than  500  million 
^allons  of  ethanol.  This  would  replace 
ibout  10%  of  the  anticipated  U.S.  demand 
or  unleaded  gasoline.] 

This  is  the  kind  of  thing  that  we  can 
lo  to  compensate  for  the  gi'ain  and  corn 
hat  is  not  being  sold  to  the  Soviet  Union, 
think  it  is  an  important  development.  I 
hink  our  farmers  would  rather  be  gi'ow- 
ng  grain  to  solve  our  energy  problems 
han  they  would  for  the  Soviet  Union's 
lerds. 

Q.  So  you  don't  think  that  the  end 
of  bipartisanship  hurts  your  ability  to 
conduct  foreign  policy? 

A.   I  don't  think  there  is  an  end  to 
bipartisanship  among  the  people.  There 
may  be  among  some  of  the  political  lead- 
ers.  ■ 


Negotiations  on  Southern  Rhodesia 


hfi  Richard  M.  Moose 

Stdfciiieiifs  before  the  Senate 
Fdi-eifpi  Reldtidi/s  Comriiittec  ())i 
Niireiiil)('r  ,':.  1>):<).  ttml  Ihr  Snhnnii- 
iiiittfcs  ,,)/  Afncd  mill  IntirHdfKDial 
Off/diiizdtidii  Affaii-n  of  tile  House 
Foreif/ii  Affdii-s  Committee  ov 
Decern lu')'  5. ' 


NOV.  27.  1979 

I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  meet 
with  you  today.  I  want  to  discuss  the 
President's  determination  on  sanctions 
and  the  relationship  of  that  decision  to 
the  negotiations  on  Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 
now  underway  at  Lancaster  House  in 
London. 

As  you  are  aware,  the  President 
informed  the  Congi'ess  on  November  14 
of  his  determination  that  it  is  in  the  na- 
tional interest  to  continue  sanctions 
against  Zimbabwe-Rhodesia  at  this 
time.  In  the  justification  which  accom- 
panied his  determination,  he  noted  that 
the  negotiations  presently  being  con- 
ducted by  the  United  Kingdom  have  not 
yet  concluded. 

If  the  United  States  lifts  sanctions 
now,  it  could  jeopardize  the  chance  for 
a  successful  conclusion  to  those  negotia- 
tions. A  termination  of  sanctions  at  this 
stage  could  lead  all  the  parties  to 
harden  their  positions  on  the  remaining 
issues. 

The  President  made  it  clear  that 
we  are  prepared  to  lift  sanctions  when  a 
British  Governor  assumes  authority  in 
Salisbury  and  a  process  leading  to  im- 
partial elections  has  begun.  With  this 
objective  in  mind,  he  instructed  the 
Secretary  of  State  to  report  to  him  im- 
mediately upon  the  conclusion  of  the 
conference  and  to  recommend  action  by 
the  United  States  with  respect  to  the 
termination  of  sanctions. 

The  London  conference  started 
with  a  sober  appreciation  that  this 
could  be  the  last  chance  to  achieve  a 
peaceful  settlement  for  Rhodesia.  Im- 
portant obstacles  subsequently  have 
been  overcome.  It  is  remarkable  that  so 
much  has  been  accomplished  in  bridging 
the  differences  between  the  parties  to 
the  conflict. 

Agreement  has  been  reached  on 
two  of  the  fundamental  goals  we  have 
pursued  for  so  long — a  democratic  con- 


stitution providing  for  majority  rule 
and  protection  of  minority  rights  and  an 
impartial  transition  government  which 
would  manage  elections  open  to  all 
parties. 

The  constitution  to  which  the  par- 
ties have  now  agreed  corrects  the  in- 
adequacies of  the  previous  constitution. 
While  the  white  minority  will  not  be 
able  to  exert  disproportionate  influ- 
ence, the  rights  of  every  individual — 
white  as  well  as  black — would  be  pro- 
tected. This  would  include  property 
rights.  And  the  minority  would  be 
guaranteed  a  special  20%  representa- 
tion in  Parliament  for  the  first  7  years 
of  independence. 

The  parties  have  also  agreed  to 
transition  arrangements.  They  provide 
for  a  British  Governor  who  will  assume 
all  legislative  and  executive  authority 
and  manage  the  election.  The  Governor 
would  be  assisted  by  senior  British  civil 
servants  and  police,  who  would  thor- 
oughly supervise  the  day-to-day  opera- 
tions of  government,  the  elections 
process,  and  the  maintenance  of  law 
and  order  by  the  existing  civil  police. 
Commonwealth  observers  would  be  in- 
vited to  observe  every  aspect  of  the 
elections.  All  parties  would  be  repre- 
sented on  an  Election  Council,  which 
would  be  concerned  with  the  fair  con- 
duct of  elections.  Political  prisoners 
would  be  released,  bans  against  politi- 
cal parties  lifted,  and  all  parties  allowed 
to  campaign  freely. 

These  are  enormous  achievements. 
It  has  been  possible  because  of  the 
statesmanship  shown  by  the  parties  and 
the  skill  with  which  [British  Foreign 
Secretary]  Lord  Carrington  has  con- 
ducted the  negotiations.  And  it  has 
been  possible,  as  well,  because  we — the 
United  States  as  well  as  the  United 
Kingdom — did  not  choose  sides  in  a 
tragic  conflict.  By  maintaining  our  own 
impartiality  among  the  parties,  we  have 
been  able  effectively  to  assist  Britain  in 
pressing  for  agreement  to  arrange- 
ments which  are  both  workable  and 
fair. 

The  conference  is  now  addressing 
the  cease-fire  issues,  which  form  the 
third  and  last  phase  of  the  negotiations. 
The  British  tabled  their  elaborated 
cease-fire  proposals  on  November  22. 
We  believe  the  prospects  are  good  that 
the  British  will  be  able  to  obtain 
agreement  on  a  cease-fire  very  soon. 
For  us  to  change  our  policy  at  this  deli- 
cate moment  would  be  unnecessary  and 
unwise. 


Africa 


The  British  should  have  a  chance  to 
resolve  the  Zimbabvve-Rhodesian 
problem.  It  is  not  in  our  national  inter- 
est to  move  before  they  do.  Our  most 
effective  role  is  to  reinforce  the  British 
effort  to  bring  the  talks  to  a  successful 
conclusion.  We  have  been  doing  pre- 
cisely that,  and  we  shall  continue  to  do 
so. 

While  the  negotiations  continue, 
the  British  are  maintaining  most  of 
their  sanctions.  They  have  stated  these 
sanctions  will  remain  in  force  until  the 
British  Governor  airives  in  Salisbui-y. 
No  other  country  has  terminated  sanc- 
tions against  Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. 
Under  these  circumstances,  there  is  no 
reason  why  the  United  States  should 
stand  alone  in  the  international  commu- 
nity. 

As  we  look  to  the  future,  we  should 
bear  in  mind  that  a  peaceful  settlement 
will  benefit  not  only  the  people  of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia  but  neighboring 
countries  as  well.  Because  of  the  hos- 
tilities, Zambia  and  Mozambique  have 
suffered,  and  important  lines  of  trans- 
portation and  communication  have  been 
disrupted.  The  surrounding  countries 
have  also  had  to  cope  with  a  steady  in- 
flu.x  of  refugees  which  has  strained 
their  economies  and  their  societies.  The 
process  leading  to  an  independent  and 
internationally  recognized  government 
in  Zimbabwe  will  allow  the  recovery 
pi'ocess  to  begin  throughout  the  region. 

The  Lancaster  House  conference  is 
in  its  concluding  moments.  The  goal  we 
share  is  within  sight.  We  urge  the  Con- 
gress not  to  take  precipitous  action  by 
lifting  sanctions  now. 


DEC.  5,  1979 


Since  the  announcement  of  the  Presi- 
dent's determination,  there  have  been 
important  developments  at  the  Lancas- 
ter House  conference.  On  November 
15,  the  Patriotic  Front  delegation 
agreed  to  the  transition  arrangements, 
which  were  the  focus  of  the  second 
stage  of  the  conference.  These  ar- 
rangements provide  for  a  British  Gov- 
ernor who  will  assume  all  legislative 
and  e.xecutive  authority  and  manage 
the  elections.  In  the  same  sense  that 
the  earlier  agreement  on  constitutional 
proposals  provided  for  majority  rule, 
the  transition  proposals  provide  an  im- 
partial framework  for  the  holding  of 
elections.  These  are  extremely  impor- 
tant and  significant  accomplishments. 
They  are  entirely  consistent  with  our 
previous  objectives  when  we  sought  to 
obtain  a  negotiated  settlement  to  the 
Rhodesian  problem. 


10 


Subsequently  and  during  the  past 
2'/2  weeks,  the  conference  has  ad- 
dressed the  cease-fire  issues.  This  con- 
stitutes the  last  phase  of  the  negotia- 
tions. The  Salisbury  delegation  has 
agreed  to  the  cease-fire  proposals 
which  were  tabled  by  the  British  on 
November  16  and  were  amplified  on 
November  22.  Lord  Carrington  pro- 
vided a  more  detailed  description  of 
these  proposals  to  the  Patriotic  Front 
on  November  28  and  asked  for  a  posi- 
tive response  to  them  so  that  technical 
discussions  could  be  conducted  to  work 
out  the  final  details  for  the  implementa- 
tion of  a  cease-fire. 

As  of  the  time  of  the  preparation  of 
this  statement,  the  Patriotic  Front  has 
not  replied  favorably  to  Lord  Car- 
rington's  request.  The  Patriotic  Front 
has  advanced  counterproposals  on 
cease-fire  arrangements,  and  discus- 
sions are  continuing. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the 
Administration  continues  to  believe 
that  this  is  not  the  moment  to  lift  sanc- 
tions. The  negotiations  have  not  been 
concluded;  the  British  are  retaining 
most  of  their  sanctions  at  this  point; 
and  the  British  Governor  has  not  ar- 
rived in  Salisbury  and  assumed  author- 
ity. No  other  country  has  ended  sanc- 
tions against  Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  If 
we  were  to  lift  sanctions  now,  we  would 
stand  alone  and  isolated  in  the  interna- 
tional community. 

On  December  3,  the  Secretary  of 
State  informed  the  Senate  Foreign  Re- 
lations Committee  that  when  the 
British  Governor  arrives  in  Salisbury  to 
implement  an  agi'eed  Lancaster  House 
settlement  and  the  electoral  process 
begins,  the  President  will  take  prompt 
action  to  lift  sanctions.  The  Secretary 
said  that  this  will  be  done  no  later  than 
1  month  after  the  Governor's  arrival. 

The  Secretary  also  took  the  posi- 
tion that  if  an  agreed  settlement  is  not 
reached  at  the  conference,  we  will  con- 
sult with  the  respective  committees  of 
the  Senate  and  the  House  regarding  the 
course  of  action  which  best  serves  the 
national  interest. 

I  would  emphasize,  however,  that 
in  view  of  the  agreements  which  have 
been  reached  at  Lancaster  House,  the 
prospects  for  a  successful  conclusion  to 
the  negotiations  remain  very  good.  We 
believe  that  the  talks  can  be  concluded 
quickly  and  the  terms  of  the  agree- 
ments can  soon  thereafter  be  im- 
plemented. If  this  is  achieved,  the  Ad- 
ministrati(jn  will  move  to  terminate 
sanctions  for  there  would  be  no  reason 
to  maintain  sanctions  under  these 
conditions. 


Our  principal  objective  in  the  im- 
mediate days  ahead  should  be  to  lend 
full  support  to  the  British  effort  to 
bi'ing  the  conference  to  a  successful 
conclusion  promptly.  This  has  been  our 
overriding  purpose  evei'  since  the  con- 
ference began,  and  I  believe  that  we 
have  been  helpful  to  the  negotiating 
process.  We  must  never  lose  sight  that 
the  United  Kingdom  has  primary  re- 
sponsibility for  Rhodesia  and  that  they 
should  have  the  opportunity  to  resolve 
this  problem.  After  15  years  of  failed 
negotiations,  I  do  not  believe  this  is  tO' 
much  to  ask. 

The  parties  ai'e  now  close  to  an 
agreement.  When  the  record  of  the  la; 
3  months  is  reviewed,  it  is  remarkablt 
that  so  much  has  been  accomplished. 
We  must  give  great  credit  for  this  re- 
sult to  the  skill  that  Prime  Minister 
Thatcher  and  Foreign  Secretary  Car- 
rington have  shown  during  the  negoti 
tions.  Until  we  know  the  final  outcom 
at  Lancaster  House,  however,  we 
should  not  risk  jeopardizing  that  proc 
ess  by  lifting  sanctions  now.  ■ 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear 
ings  will  be  published  by  the  committees 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superinten 
ent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402 


Sanctions  Against 
Southern  Rhodesi 


MEMORANDUM  FOR  THE 
SECRETARY  OF  ST.ATE, 
NOV.  14,  1979' 

Si<hicct:  Maintenance  of  Sanctions  Agai 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia  Under  Section  408( 
of  the  Department  of  State  Authorizati 
Act.  Fiscal  Years  1980  and  1981. 

Pursuant  to  Section  408(b)  of  the  D 
partment  of  State  Authorization  Act,  F 
cal  Years  1980  and  1981  (93  Stat.  405), 
hereby  determine  that  it  is  in  the  natio 
interest  of  the  United  States  to  contint 
sanctions  against  Zimbabwe-Rhodesia  < 
this  time. 

You  are  requested,  on  my  behalf,  t 
report  this  determination  promptly  to 
Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representativ 
and  the  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  Senate. 

You  are  further  requested  to  repo 
me  immediately  upon  the  conclusion  of 
present  Constitutional  Conference  on 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia  being  held  in  Lon 
describing  the  conclusions  of  that  conf 


h. 


Department  of  State  Bilfafyi 


Africa 


nee  and  your  recommendations  for  action 
ly  the  United  States  with  respect  to  the 
ermination  of  sanctions. 

This  determination  shall  be  published 
1  the  Federal  Register. 

Jimmy  Carter 

ustification  for  Presidential  Determina- 
ion  lender  Section  408(b)  of  the  Depart- 
lent  of  State  Authorization  Act,  Fiscal 
ears  1980  and  1981  Concerning  Sanc- 
ons  Against  Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 

roblem 

Section  408(b)  of  the  Department  of 
tate  Authorization  Act,  Fiscal  Years  1980 
id  1981,  requires  that  sanctions  against 
imbabwe-Rhodesia  be  terminated  by 
ovember  15.  1979,  unless  the  President 
>termines  that  it  would  not  be  in  the  na- 
onal  interest  of  the  United  States  and  so 
■ports  to  the  Congress. 

jstification 

Encouraging  progress  has  been  made 
recent  months  toward  a  peaceful  resolu- 
m  of  the  conflict  in  Zimbabwe-Rhodesia; 
)wever,  the  negotiations  presently  being 
nducted  by  the  United  Kingdom  with  the 
'.rties  have  not  yet  been  concluded,  and 
fferences  still  remain.  A  termination  of 
nctions  at  this  stage  could  lead  all  the 
rties  to  harden  their  positions  and  would 
3pardize  the  chances  for  a  successful  set- 
■ment  for  Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. 

The  British  Government  has  not  yet 
ncluded  negotiations  that  would  end  the 
bellion  in  Rhodesia.  They  have  stated 
at  this  will  occur  when  the  British  Gov- 
nor  arrives  in  Salisbury  and  assumes  au- 
ority.  At  the  present  time,  the  great  bulk 
British  sanctions  remain  in  force  and 
ne  of  our  major  allies  has  taken  action  to 
'•minate  sanctions. 

The  negotiations  are  now  at  a  critical 
ige.  We  hope  they  will  be  rapidly  and 
ecessfully  concluded.  While  the  talks 
ntinue,  it  would  be  premature  for  the 
lited  States  to  alter  its  position  on  sanc- 
■ns.  We  would,  however,  be  prepared  to 
:  sanctions  when  a  British  Governor  as- 
mes  authority  in  Salisbury  and  a  process 
iding  to  impartial  elections  has  begun, 
r  policy  will  continue  to  be  that  no  party 
iuld  have  a  veto  over  fair  settlement 
jposals. 

This  issue  will  be  kept  under  eontinu- 
<  review  and  the  President  will  promptly 
tify  the  Congress  when  conditions  war- 
it  the  lifting  of  sanctions.  ■ 


Southern  Rhodesia  Settlement 


Te.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
esidential  Documents  of  Nov.  19,  1979. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
DEC.  6,  1979' 

Th^e  U.S.  Government  welcomes  the 
news  of  an  agreement  on  cease-fire  ar- 
rangements for  Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. 
The  historic  accomplishments  of  the 
Lancaster  House  negotiations  reflect 
great  credit  on  all  of  the  participants 
who  have  displayed  a  seriousness  of 
purpose  and  a  willingness  to  com- 
promise in  the  interest  of  ending  the 
bloodshed. 

Although  a  few  issues  remain  to  be 
dealt  with  in  detail,  the  United  States 
is  confident  that  a  settlement  is  near 
and  urges  all  the  parties  to  conclude  the 
historic  task  in  which  they  are  engaged. 
In  doing  so,  the  British  Government 
and  the  parties  have  the  full  support  of 
the  American  Government. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
DEC.  12.  19792 

The  United  States  welcomes  and  urges 
pi'ompt  acceptance  of  the  now  complete 
Bi'itish  proposals  for  a  settlement  in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  Those  parts  of  the 
proposals  already  agreed  to  by  the  par- 
ties provide  for  a  democratic  constitu- 
tion with  protection  of  individual  rights 
and  elections  for  an  independent  gov- 
ernment in  which  all  parties  can  par- 
ticipate freely. 

The  final  proposals  for  implementa- 
tion of  the  cease-fire  certainly  would 
appear  to  assure  that  voters  could 
choose  their  government  in  peace,  free 
from  intimidation  by  any  faction. 

We  strongly  urge  the  Patriotic 
Front  to  accept  the  cease-fire  im- 
plementation proposals  and  join  in  the 
settlement.  It  would  be  tragic  if  this 
remarkable  chance  for  peace  were  lost 
in  last-minute  efforts  to  gain  military 
advantage. 

As  the  President  has  said,  our  pol- 
icy will  continue  to  be  that  no  party 
should  have  a  veto  over  fair  settlement 
proposals. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
DEC.  15,  19793 

With  the  arrival  of  the  British  Gover- 
nor in  Salisbury  on  December  12,  the 
United  Kingdom  has  assumed  legal  and 
constitutional  authority  in  Rhodesia, 
and  a  process  leading  to  impartial  elec- 
tions and  independence  has  begun.  The 


British  Government  has  taken  this  ac- 
tion on  the  basis  of  proposals  developed 
by  the  pai'ties  at  the  Lancaster  House 
conference. 

On  the  Govei'nor's  arrival,  ordi- 
nances have  come  into  effect  which 
establish  the  powers  of  the  Election 
Commissioner  and  make  provision  for 
the  Election  Council.  All  parties  which 
agree  to  campaign  peacefully  will  be 
able  to  do  so  freely.  All  parties  which 
wish  to  participate  in  the  elections  have 
been  invited  to  register.  The  British 
Government  is  taking  the  legislative  ac- 
tion necessary  to  bring  into  force  those 
parts  of  the  independence  constitution 
required  for  elections  to  be  held. 

It  has  been  heartening  that  the  two 
delegations  led  by  Bishop  Muzorewa 
and  Messrs.  Nkomo  and  Mugabe  have 
accepted  the  basic  principles  of  all  the 
proposals  elaborated  by  the  British 
delegation  in  the  Lancaster  House 
negotiations.  The  remaining  issues  re- 
late to  some  aspects  of  the  implementa- 
tion of  the  cease-fire.  On  December  11, 
British  Foreign  Secretary  Lord  Car- 
rington  presented  detailed  cease-fire 
proposals  which  we  believe  provide  the 
assurances  necessary  for  the  Patriotic 
Front  to  have  confidence  in  the  condi- 
tions under  which  the  elections  will 
take  place. 

Having  studied  all  the  British  pi'o- 
posals  jiresented  at  Lancaster  House 
for  the  constitution,  the  transitional  ar- 
rangements, and  the  cease-fire,  it  is  our 
judgment  that  they  are  fair  and  make 
possible  an  impartial  election  leading  to 
a  just  settlement  of  the  Rhodesian 
conflict. 

In  these  circumstances,  it  seems 
clear  that  the  aims  and  objectives  of  the 
U.N.  sanctions  as  set  forth  in  the  rel- 
evant resolutions  of  the  Security  Coun- 
cil, have,  in  fact,  been  achieved. 

President  Carter,  in  e.xplaining  his 
November  14  decision  to  maintain  sanc- 
tions against  Rhodesia,  stated  that  he 
would  be  prepared  to  lift  sanctions 
when  a  British  Governor  assumes  au- 
thority in  Salisbury  and  a  process 
leading  to  impartial  elections  has 
begun.  These  conditions  have  now  been 
met,  and  the  President  has  ordered, 
effective  midnight  the  16th  of  De- 
cember, that  U.S.  sanctions  against 
Rhodesia  be  lifted. 


bruary  1980 


11 


ARMS  CONTROL 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
DEC.  17,  1979^ 

Today,  final  agreement  was  i-eached  at 
Lancaster  House  on  a  Rhodesian  set- 
tlement. The  world  can  celebrate  a 
triumph  of  reason  and  an  extraordinary 
diplomatic  success.  A  long,  destructive, 
and  tragic  conflict  is  ending. 

This  settlement  is  a  tribute  to  the 
parties  concerned,  who  rose  above  bit- 
terness and  suspicion  to  agree  upon  a 
formula  for  peace.  It  is  a  tribute  to  the 
United  Kingdom,  whose  leaders  took 
the  issue  directly  in  hand  and  applied  a 
remarkable  combination  of  wisdom, 
courage,  persistence,  and  skill.  The 
concerned  African  states  plaved  a  vital 
role. 

Active  American  involvement  in 
the  search  for  a  Rhodesian  settlement 
began  in  the  last  Administration.  In 
coopei'ation  with  the  British  we  inten- 
sified that  effort  and,  since  last  sum- 
mer, have  given  our  full  support  to  the 
British  negotiations. 

The  settlement  which  has  been  at- 
tained can  lead  to  an  enduring  peace  in 
Zimbabwe  and  promote  tranquillity  in 
the  region.  It  is  founded  upon  majority 
rule  with  protection  of  minority  rights 
and  reflects  the  interest  of  all  of  the 
parties. 

As  the  pr<)cess  leading  to  an  inde- 
pendent Zimbabwe  unfolds,  it  will  be 
incumbent  upon  the  international  com- 
munity, and  especially  the  surrounding 
states,  to  support  and  respect  the  elec- 
toral process  and  its  outcome. 

For  its  part,  the  United  States 
looks  forward  to  the  day  when  an  inde- 
pendent Zimbabwe  can  be  welcomed  to 
the  family  of  nations.  ■ 


'  Read  to  new.s  correspondents  by  De- 
partment spokesman  Hodding  Carter  III. 

'^  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  act- 
iiij;  Department  spoke.sman  Tom  Reston. 

^  Made  available  to  news  corre- 
spondents by  acting  Department  spokesman 
Tom  Reston. 

•*  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Dec.  24,  1979. 


Group  Formed 
for  Development 


For  the  purpose  of  strengthening  their 
economic  assistance  effort  in  sub- 
Saharan  Africa,  representatives  of  Bel- 
gium, Canada,  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  France,  the  United  King- 
dom, and  the  United  States  have  met  in 
Pai'is,  on  the  French  Government's  ini- 


12 


tiative,  in  order  to  work  toward  coordi- 
nation of  resources  for  joint  projects 
within  the  framework  of  a  concerted  ac- 
tion for  development  in  Africa.  They 
are  prepai'ed  to  consider  widening  the 
circle  of  donor  countries  to  other  mem- 
bers of  the  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development. 

The  si.x  countries,  aware  of  the  fact 
that  Africa  has  a  great  need  for  sub- 
stantial assistance  from  the  interna- 
tional community,  are  resolved  to  take 
this  necessity  into  account.  They  have 
more  particularly  in  mind  projects  of  a 
I'egional  character  related,  for  example, 
to  the  opening-up  of  land-locked  re- 
gions, the  development  of  agricultural 
resources,  or  the  effects  of  problems 
such  as  drought  or  tropical  diseases, 
since  these  action  areas  require  efforts 
which  ai'e  still  only  partially  covered  by 
the  national  or  international  programs. 

They  deem  it  indispensable  that 
this  new  action  should  be  elaborated  in 
close  collaboration  with  the  Africans 
concerned  on  the  continental,  regional, 
or  national  levels  in  such  a  way  that 
projects  which  are  selected  for  joint  ac- 
tion conform  to  priorities  set  by  the  Af- 
ricans themselves.  This  means  that  the 
concerted  action  should  harmonize  with 
the  existing  international  and  national 
programs. 

The  projects  shall  be  identified  and 
carried  out  according  to  appropriate 
procedui'es  which  will  be  worked  out 
during  periodic  meetings  of  representa- 
tives of  donor  countries.  A  permanent 
liaison  will  be  insured  by  means  of  a 
grcjup  of  officials  in  Paris  beginning 
.January  1,  1980.  ■ 

Unnumbered  press  release  of  Dec.  28,  1979. 


Delay  Requested 
for  SALT  II  Treaty 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JAN.  3.  1980' 

After  consultation  with  the  Senate 
leadership,  the  President  has  asked 
Senate  Majority  Leader  Robert  Byrd  to 
delay  consideration  of  the  SALT  11 
Treaty  on  the  Senate  floor. 

While  the  President  continues  to 
believe  that  ratification  of  SALT  II  is 
in  the  national  security  intei-est  of  the 
United  States,  he  has  concluded  that 
the  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan,  in 
defiance  of  the  U.N.  Charter,  has  made 
consideration  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty 
inappropriate  at  this  time. 


The  President  has  asked  that  the 
delay  continue  while  he  and  the  Con- 
gress assess  Soviet  actions  and  inten- 
tions and  devote  their  attention  to 
legislative  and  other  mea.sures  requii'ed 
to  respond  to  the  crisis  created  by  the 
Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan. 


LETTER  TO  SENATOR  BYRD. 
JAN.  3.  19802 

In  light  (if  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghani 
Stan,  I  request  that  you  delay  consideration 
of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  on  the  Senate  floor 

The  purpose  of  this  request  is  not  to 
withdraw  the  Treaty  from  consideration, 
but  to  defer  the  debate  so  that  the  Congress 
and  I  as  President  can  assess  Soviet  action: 
and  intentions,  and  devote  our  primary  at- 
tention to  the  legislative  and  other  measure 
required  to  respond  to  this  crisis. 

As  you  know,  I  continue  to  share  your 
view  that  the  SALT  II  Treaty  is  in  the  na- 
tional security  interest  of  the  United  State 
and  the  entire  world,  and  that  it  should  be 
taken  up  by  the  Senate  as  soon  as  these 
more  urgent  issues  have  been  addressed 

Sincerely, 


Jimmy  Carter 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
White  House  press  secretary  Jodv  Powell 
(te.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Preside 
tial  Documents  of  Jan.  7,  1980). 

^Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Jan.  7. 


?iiitio 
cek' 

slates 
let  ioi 


Department  of  State  Bl  jary 


Ifdfor, 
orldjji 

ikitatit 


jfildlife 
irotection 

William  A.  Hayne 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
Remurce  Protection  of  the  Senate 
nmittee  on  Environment  and  Public 
•ks  on  November  7,  1979.  Mr. 
/ne  ('.s  Deputy  As.sistant  Secretary 
Oceans  and  International  En- 
mmental  and  Scientific  Affairs.^ 

se  hearings  are  timely.  They  co- 
de with  an  upsurge  of  activities 
)lving  international  conservation  is- 
5  and  efforts  by  the  Department  of 
,e  to  increase  international  wildlife 
ection,  drawing  on  the  considerable 
jrtise  of  U.S.  Government  agencies, 
■cially  the  Department  of  Interior, 
are  also  helped  by  other  Federal 
icies  such  as  the  Council  on  En- 
nmental  Quality  and  the  Smithso- 
,  the  private  sector,  and  interna- 
il  organizations  to  define  specific 
Is  and  develop  domestic  and  inter- 
)nal  activities  to  implement  them. 
Department  of  State  is  firmly 
•nitted  to  development  of  environ- 
tally  sound  strategies  and  pro- 
is. 

Until  recently  many  nations,  par- 
arly  the  less  developed  ones,  re- 
ed environmental  protection  as  a 
ry  of  the  rich.  Now  we  see  growing 
jnition  that  unless  the  natural  re- 
:e  base  is  protected,  future  eco- 
c  development  is  impossible.  This 
dates  into  increased  willingness  to 
ict  soil  resources  and  tropical 
ts.  While  there  is  yet  in  our  view 

•  distance  to  go  in  recognizing  the 
;  of  wildlife — apart  from  the  ob- 

i  tourist  attractions — the  forests  at 
help  preserve  needed  habitat.  But 
le  whole,  increasing  populations 
ge  in  a  never-ending  quest  for 
land,  and  raw  materials.  These 
iures  on  the  Earth's  grasslands, 
IS,  forests,  and  croplands  are  un- 
ting. 

The  only  visible  means  of  support 
lese  new  millions  are  the  Earth's 
ands  and  a  more  intensive  use  of 

•  areas  already  dominated  by  man's 
ities.  Unknown  numbers  of  species 
lated  for  extinction  unless  coun- 
working  together  can  devise  new 
egies  for  protecting  wildlife  and 

habitat  until  population  growth 
8  contained.  Wildlife  is  our  canary 
3  coal  mine.  Its  decline  signals  our 


jjjljary  1980 


Framework  for  Protection 

Today's  hearings  focus  on  channels 
available  to  the  United  States  for  the 
protection  of  international  wildlife.  The 
most  important  is  the  Convention  on 
International  Trade  in  Endangered 
Species  of  Wild  Fauna  and  Flora, 
negotiated  in  1973  and  ratified  by  the 
U.S.  Senate  in  1975.  The  convention  es- 
tablished an  international  system  for 
controlling  trade  in  endangered  and 
threatened  species  and  created  a  co- 
operative network  of  scientific  and 
management  authorities  in  signatory 
countries  to  administer  the  trade  con- 
trols and  advise  the  54  member  gov- 
ernments on  the  status  of  species  cov- 
ered by  the  convention. 

Other  international  conventions 
and  agreements  collectively  provide  an 
institutional  and  programmatic 
framework  within  which  nations  are 
now  making  significant  progress  toward 
improved  protection  of  wildlife  species. 

Before  I  move  on  to  habitat  degra- 
dation, the  most  important  factor  in 
wildlife  decline  internationally,  I  would 
like  to  note  a  couple  difficult  issues  that 
reoccur  in  wildlife  protection  negotia- 
tions. Your  committee  may  wish  to  re- 
view these  issues  and  consider  legis- 
lating clearer  guidelines.  At  any  rate, 
airing  them  as  problems  will  serve 
notice  that  we  don't  like  the  situation 
any  better  than  do  some  of  our  con- 
stituent groups. 

One  of  the  first  difficult  issues  is 
that  of  Federal-State  relationships. 
During  the  negotiation  of  a  Convention 
on  the  Conservation  of  Migratory 
Species  of  Wild  Animals  in  Bonn,  and 
again  recently  in  our  preparations  for 
negotiating  with  the  Canadians  a  treaty 
on  migratory  caribou,  the  concern  of 
State  groups  that  the  Federal  govern- 
ment would  use  international  agree- 
ments to  encroach  upon  traditional 
State  rights  to  manage  wildlife  has 
caused  confusion.  Lack  of  a  clear  un- 
derstanding of  the  State  and  Federal 
roles  brought  widespread  opposition 
from  State  fish  and  wildlife  groups  to 
the  migratory  species  convention;  it 
may  happen  as  well  to  the  caribou 
treaty.  This  ambiguity  should  be 
resolved. 

Another  issue  is  that  of  habitat 
protection  in  international  agreements. 
We,  as  well  as  most  other  nations,  re- 
sist any  outside  suggestions — especially 
those  of  a  compulsory  nature — affecting 
the  use  to  which  we  will  put  our  land. 
We  are  not  always  certain  what  eco- 
nomic activities  are  compatible  with 
maintaining  wildlife  populations.  Fur- 
thermore, we  and  other  nations  are 
faced  with  possible  difficult  choices. 


To  illustrate  this  problem,  I  invite 
the  committee's  attention  to  the  pro- 
posed treaty  with  Canada  on  migratory 
caribou.  Complete  habitat  protection  is 
in  possible  conflict  with  petroleum 
exploration.  Access  highways  on  both 
sides  of  the  border  expose  herds  to 
sports  hunters.  What  is  the  relative 
importance  of  these  uses  to  the  tradi- 
tional needs  of  local  people  who  use 
caribou  for  essential  food  needs? 

Other  issues  that  arose  in  connec- 
tion with  the  negotiation  in  Bonn  of  a 
treaty  to  protect  migratory  species  in- 
volved possible  conflicts  with  U.S.  Law 
of  the  Sea  positions.  We  were  also 
restricted  by  possible  overlapping  jur- 
isdictions with  existing  treaties  ap- 
plicable to  marine  mammals  and  par- 
ticularly by  possible  application  to  all 
marine  species,  including  commercial 
fish  species. 

As  the  commitee  may  be  aware,  the 
United  States  and  a  number  of  other 
major  countries  were  unable  to  sign 
this  convention  at  Bonn. 

Habitat  Degradation 

There  is  growing  recognition  that 
the  major  issue  is  the  loss  of  critical 
habitat  in  many  regions.  Accordingly, 
our  wildlife  conservation  efforts  now 
center  on  the  advancement  of  habitat 
protection  strategies.  This  is  most  dif- 
ficult to  do  effectively;  the  United 
States  has  supported  and  assisted  a 
number  of  recent  international  efforts 
that  support  this  goal  including  the 
world  conservation  strategy  (in  prep- 
aration by  the  International  Union  for 
Conservation  of  Nature  and  National 
Resources),  UNESCO's  Man  and  the 
Biosphere  Program,  and  the  Global 
Plan  of  Action  to  Combat  Desertifica- 
tion. 

Chief  among  our  efforts,  however, 
has  been  development  of  a  series  of 
recommendations  for  the  President  on 
U.S.  goals,  strategies,  and  programs  to 
help  protect  and  conserve  world 
forests. 

Forests.  One  of  our  highest 
priorities  is  tropical  deforestation. 
Forest  cover  in  most  of  the  world's 
tropical  countries  is  disappearing  at  an 
accelerating  rate  to  meet  an  increasing 
demand  for  cropland,  rangeland, 
firewood,  and  commercial  wood  and 
wood  products.  One  of  the  most  alarm- 
ing aspects  is  that  mankind  stands  to 
lose  critical  habitat  for  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  plants  and  animal  species. 
This  committee  has  heard  from  other 
witnesses  about  the  importance  of 
maintaining  genetic  diversity  and  about 
the  potential  benefits  of  many  indi- 

13 


Environment 


vidual  tropical  species  threatened  with 
extinction  which  have,  to  date,  never 
even  been  examined  for  their  social  and 
economic  values. 

In  June  1978,  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Agency  for  International 
Development  (AID)  cosponsored  a 
"U.S.  Strategy  Conference  on  Tropical 
Deforestation"  to  obtain  a  better  as- 
sessment of  the  nature  of  the  problem, 
to  clarify  U.S.  interests  in  addressing 
it,  and  to  obtain  views  on  an  appropri- 
ate U.S.  response.  One  result  was  the 
establishment  by  the  State  Department 
of  an  interagency  task  force  on  tropical 
forests  to  provide  a  government-wide 
focal  point  for  policy  and  program  plan- 
ning and  coordination.  The  conference 
also  recommended  that  a  comprehen- 
sive "U.S.  policy  strategy  and  pro- 
gram" on  tropical  forests  be  developed 
to  shape  and  guide  future  U.S.  efforts 
in  this  area;  we  anticipate  transmitting 
recommendations  on  this  to  the  Presi- 
dent next  month. 

I  believe  that  we  must  mobilize  an 
expanded  U.S.  effort  on  tropical  forest 
management  which  will  catalyze  and 
support  a  much  larger  effort  by  the  in- 
ternational community  as  a  whole.  In 
pursuit  of  this,  the  United  States  raised 
the  deforestation  issue  at  the  U.N. 
General  Assembly  earlier  this  week  and 
over  the  past  year  in  other  major  U.N. 
forums.  Last  May,  the  Governing 
Council  of  the  U.N.  Environment  Pro- 
gram overwhelmingly  approved  a 
U.S. -sponsored  resolution  calling  for 
an  international  meeting  of  experts  to 
develop  proposals  for  a  coordinated  ac- 
tion program,  and  a  division  of  labor,  to 
insure  better  management  of  tropical 
forests.  That  meeting  is  now  scheduled 
for  February  1980  in  Gabon. 

Given  the  fact  that  the  U.S.  pos- 
sesses less  than  1%  of  the  world's  tropi- 
cal forests,  it  is  clear  that  international 
cooperation  is  the  key  to  any  success 
we  wish  to  achieve  in  this  area. 

Acid  Rain.  Moving  closer  to 
habitat  in  our  own  forests  and  lakes,  we 
see  a  problem,  particularly  in  the 
Northeast,  of  acid  rain.  This  is  a  widely 
recognized  problem  as  was  illustrated 
earlier  this  month  when  800  people 
gathered  in  Toronto  for  a  "action  semi- 
nar on  acid  precipitation"  under  the 
sponsorship  of  the  National  Clean  Air 
Coalition  and  a  number  of  environmen- 
tal groups.  We  anticiapte  that  Presi- 
dent Carter  and  Canadian  Prime  Minis- 
ter Clark  will  discuss  this  topic  when 
they  next  meet.  Next  week  Douglas  M. 
Costle,  Administrator  of  the  Environ- 
mental Protection  Agency,  will  sign  for 
the  United  States,  in  Geneva,  a  Con- 
vention on  Long-Range  Transboundary 
Air  Pollution. 


14 


Acid  rain  has  been  linked  to  sharp 
declines  in  the  number  of  fish  in  many 
lakes  and  streams.  Some  freshwater 
lakes  in  Canada,  the  United  States,  and 
Scandanavia  are  totally  unable  to  sup- 
port fish  life.  We  are  less  certain  of  our 
facts  with  respect  to  the  effect  on  vege- 
tation, but  there  is  evidence  to  show 
that  tree  growth  is  slowed  and  agricul- 
tural crops  are  affected  adversely. 

Negotiations  have  been  begun  with 
Canada  with  a  view  to  conclude  a  treaty 
concerning  the  transboundary  acid  rain 
problem. 

Meanwhile,  we  and  the  Canadians 
are  engaged  in  a  number  of  joint  pro- 
grams to  attack  this  problem  pending 
the  negotiation  of  a  treaty.  By  their 
signature  to  the  Economic  Commission 
for  Europe  treaty  in  Geneva,  both 
Canada  and  the  United  States  will  ac- 
cept the  broad  and  rather  general  obli- 
gations specified  in  that  convention 
concerning  transboundary  air  pollu- 
tions. Efforts  are  now  underway  to  im- 
plement the  extensive  programs  to 
combat  acid  rain  set  out  in  President 
Carter's  environmental  message  of  Au- 
gust 2.  These  measures  have  a  direct 
bearing  on  our  transboundary  acid  rain 
problem  and  on  wildlife  habitat  in  the 
United  States  and  Canada. 

Tropical  deforestation  and  acid  rain 
are  two  very  different  types  of  habitat 
disruption  for  the  many  species  of 
wildlife  that  call  the  forests,  both  tropi- 
cal and  temperate,  home.  On  both 
fronts  the  Department  of  State  is  look- 
ing for  solutions  before  the  situation 
deteriorates  further. 

Trade  in  Elephant  Products 

Earlier  in  the  year  Chairman  John 
Murphy  of  the  House  Merchant  Marine 
and  Fisheries  Committee  introduced 
H.R.  4685,  a  bill  to  provide  for  the  con- 
trol of  the  importing  into,  and  the  ex- 
porting from,  the  United  States  of 
elephants  and  elephant  products.  The 
bill  authorizes  the  Secretary  of  the 
Interior  to  permit  importation  of 
elephant  products  only  from  nations  ac- 
tively managing  and  conserving 
elephant  populations. 

The  Administration,  while  in  sym- 
pathy with  the  intent  of  the  bill,  op- 
posed H.R.  4685,  largely  because  it  was 
not  certain  that  an  elephant  product 
import  ban  would  actually  help  save 
elephants. 

In  response  to  Chairman  Murphy's 
request  that  the  State  Department 
canvas  its  sources  for  African  elephant 
range  state  views  on  the  legislation  and 
on  the  elephant  conservation  situation 
in  general,  we  found  division  among 
countries  on  the  question  of  whether 


H.R.  4685  would  help  conserve  African 
elephants. 

We  found  consensus  on  a  couple 
other  points.  First,  while  range  states 
appreciate  our  good  intentions  in  seek- 
ing ways  to  assist  them  in  controlling 
illegal  trade  in  elephant  products  and 
generally  regard  the  convention  on 
ti'ade  in  endangered  species  as  useful, 
they  do  not  have  the  financial  where- 
withal to  build  the  wildlife  management 
infrastructure  sufficient  to  bring  them 
into  compliance  with  either  the  conven- 
tion or  what  H.R.  4685  would  do  if 
enacted. 

Secondly,  approximately  two- 
thirds  of  responding  states  were  in- 
terested in  various  types  of  technical 
assistance,  ranging  from  wildlife  train- 
ing programs  and  equipment  supply  to 
help  with  creating  and  managing  na- 
tional parks  and  wildlife  reserves.  One 
range  state  spokesman  commented  that 
developed  countries  do  not  seem  to  un- 
derstand fully  the  expensive  demands 
on  developing  countries'  limited  re- 
sources entailed  by  compliance  with  the 
convention.  He  urged  priority  attention 
by  developed  countries  to  increasing 
funds  available  to  elephant  range  states 
for  enforcement  of  their  conservation 
and  antipoaching  laws  and  for  training 
of  the  necessary  wardens  and  other 
staff. 

We  cannot  set  standards  for  is- 
suance of  permits  to  countries  if  there 
is  no  visible  means  to  achieve  those 
standards.  If  we  are  going  to  continue 
to  press  poor  countries  to  join  the  con- 
vention on  trade  in  endangered  species, 
we  must  find  a  way  to  marshal  existing 
monies  and  personnel  into  projects  tha 
offer  multiple  benefits.  A  pooling  of 
agency  resources  through  an  inter- 
agency coordinating  mechanism  might 
aid  the  Department  of  State  and  other 
Federal  agencies  in  this  difficult  task. 

Many  of  the  African  elephant  rang( 
states  are  AID  or  Peace  Corps  coun- 
tries. AID  is  developing  a  number  of 
natural  resource  protection  projects 
which  will  also  aid  the  elephant  and 
provide  environmental  training  for  host 
country  personnel.  The  Peace  Corps 
has  environmental  projects  in  over  30 
countries.  Approximately  200  volun- 
teers are  involved  in  forestry,  soil  con 
servation,  and  watershed  protection. 
Approximately  20  Peace  Corps  volun- 
teers are  involved  in  wildlife 
management  and  another  200  in 
fisheries  management.  Perhaps  200 
more  are  involved  in  various  water 
supply  and  agricultural  projects  which 
are  beneficial  to  wildlife  habitat. 

The  African  elephant  is  not  the 
only  African  species  threatened  with 
extinction.  As  populations  grow  and 

Department  of  State  Bulleti 


it 


EUROPE 


development  increases,  many  more  will 
disappear.  The  most  feasible  course 
would  seem  for  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment, conservationists,  and  the  Con- 
gress to  turn  away  from  single  species 
approaches  and  work  toward  training 
wildlife  and  natural  resource  managers 
in  regional  centers  such  as  the  College 
of  African  Wildlife  Management  in 
Mweka,  Tanzania,  and  the  Wildlife 
School  at  Garoua,  Cameroon.  We  must 
redouble  efforts  within  the  interna- 
tional organizations  such  as  the  U.N. 
Food  and  Agriculture  Organization,  the 
U.N.  Development  Program,  the  U.N. 
Environment  Program,  and  the  U.N. 
Educational,  Scientific  and  Cultural 
Organization  which  are  engaged  in 
wildlife  management  and  ecosystem 
protection  efforts. 

Future  Needs 

As  mentioned  above,  the  greatest 
1  present  need  is  the  protection  of 
wildlife  habitat.  As  this  frequently  puts 
wildlife  needs  in  competition  with 
people  for  agricultural  land  or  resource 
development,  solutions  are  not  easy. 

Depending  upon  the  priority  we  in 
the  United  States  are  prepared  to  give 
to  the  protection  of  international 
wildlife,  we  should  be  able  to  extend 
i  additional  help.  It  might  be  possible  to 
coordinate  better  international  ac- 
tivities of  U.S.  Government  agencies 
with  a  view  to  protecting  wildlife. 
Greater  use  might  possibly  be 
made  of  Federal  personnel  assigned  to 
temporary  duty  in  countries  which  re- 
quest training  assistance.  Sometimes 
agencies  can  spare  someone  for  a  1  or  2 
month  assignment,  when  an  entire  year 
wouldn't  be  possible.  Short  training 
courses  would  double  or  triple  the 
wildlife  management  expertise  in  many 
countries  and  help  countries  achieve 
the  standards  we  might  wish  for  them, 
in  the  process  saving  their  resident 
wildlife  from  extirpation. 

The  Department  of  State  does  not 
have  suggestions  at  this  time  for 
statutory  changes  that  might  facilitate 
our  work.  If  we  develop  any  sugges- 
tions, we  will  be  glad  to  submit  them 
for  the  record.  ■ 


NATO  Ministers  iVieet 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
wUl  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


Scrrefati/  VcDire  depaiied  Wash- 
iiigfoii,  D.C.  December  9,  1979,  to  meet 
ii'ith  officials  in  London  (December  10). 
Paris  (December  10-11),  Rome  (De- 
cember 11),  and  Bonn  (December 
11-lJ).  He  then  headed  the  U.S.  dele- 
gation at  a  special  meeting  of  Foreign 
and  Defense  Ministers  of  NATO  mem- 
bers (December  11-12)  and  at  the  reg- 
ular semiannual  session  of  the  North 
Atlantic  Council  (December  IS-U)  in 
Brussels  before  returning  tn  Washing- 
ton on  December  14. 

Following  are  the  Seo'etari/'s 
statement  in  the  special  meeting,  the 
communique,  a  statement  issued  In/ 
Secretary  Vance,  and  the  te.rt  of  a  joint 
news  coyiference  by  Secretary  Vance 
and  Scci-etai-y  of  Defense  Harold  Broirn 
iin  December  12  and  Secretary  Vance's 
statement  in  the  North  Atlantic  Coun- 
cil on  December  IS  and  the  com- 
munique and  Secretary  Vance's  news 
conference  of  December  lit. 


SECRETARY  VANCE, 
SPECIAL  MEETING, 
DEC.  12,  1979 

The  Foreign  and  Defense  Ministers  of 
NATO  have  just  concluded  a  successful 
meeting  of  extraordinaj-y  importance.  We 
have  decided  to  proceed  with  a  plan  to 
deploy  108  Pershing  II  ballistic  missiles 
and  464  gi'ound-launched  cruise  missiles 
in  Europe.  At  the  same  time,  we  have 
decided  to  pursue  vigorously  with  the 
Soviets  a  meaningful  and  equitable  arms 
control  agreement  on  long-range  theater 
nuclear  forces. 

The  far-reaching  decisions  we  have 
made  here  attest  to  the  determination 
and  common  purpose  of  NATO's  member 
states.  The  2  years  of  intensive  consulta- 
tions which  led  up  to  these  decisions  give 
evidence  of  the  mutual  trust  that  prevails 
in  the  alliance. 

Before  Secretary  Brown  discusses 
the  details  of  the  steps  taken  here  to 
strengthen  NATO's  defense  posture,  I 
would  like  to  sketch  for  you  the  political 
context  of  these  decisions. 

The  Atlantic  alliance  is  committed  to 
a  reduction  of  tensions  between  East  and 
West.  But  our  pursuit  of  detente,  includ- 
ing balanced  arms  control  agreements, 
must  rest  on  a  firm  foundation  of  military 
security.  Relaxation  of  tensions  is  possi- 
ble only  when  each  side  has  confidence  in 
its  own  strength.  Serious  negotiations 


can  only  proceed  when  neither  side 
doubts  the  will  and  capacities  of  the 
other.  Steps  to  consolidate  and 
strengthen  NATO's  collective  defense 
thus  are  central  not  only  to  a  secure  de- 
terrence of  military  threats;  they  also 
provide  a  basis  for  broader  efforts  to  find 
a  relaxation  of  tensions. 

In  a  political  as  well  as  military 
sense,  defense  modernization  and  the 
pursuit  of  detente  are  twin  paths  along 
the  road  of  security.  In  recent  years,  the 
Soviet  Union  has  improved  significantly 
its  nuclear  forces  in  Europe.  The  Soviet 
deployment  of  modern  MIRVed  SS-20s, 
and  the  Backfire  bomber,  threatens  to 
provide  the  Soviets  with  nuclear  prepon- 
derance in  the  European  theater.  In  re- 
sponse, the  alliance  has  developed  paral- 
lel programs  of  modernization  and  arms 
control. 

In  deciding  to  deploy  new  long-range 
nuclear  forces  in  Europe  and  to  support 
the  United  States  in  its  pursuit  of  a  seri- 
ous arms  control  agi'eement  involving 
theater  nuclear  forces,  the  aUiance  is  giv- 
ing new  meaning  and  force  to  its  policy  of 
deterrence,  defense,  and  detente.  Our 
deployment  decision  gives  evidence  of  the 
continued  vitality  and  cohesiveness  of  the 
alhance.  This  decision  has  strengthened 
our  spirit  as  well  as  our  forces,  and  it  has 
conveyed  the  clear  message  that  we  de- 
fine detente  as  a  search  for  mutual  and 
balanced,  rather  than  unilateral,  advan- 
tage. 

In  this  context,  we  are  prepared  to 
enter  into  serious  negotiations  on  long- 
range  theater  nuclear  forces,  within  the 
framework  of  SALT  III.  Any  agreement 
reached  must — like  SALT  II — be  bal- 
anced and  adequately  verifiable.  We  will 
not  entertain  any  notion  of  a  freeze  which 
would  confinn  a  Soviet  preponderance  in 
long-range  nuclear  forces  in  this  theater. 
But  we  are  prepared  to  negotiate  an  equi- 
table agreement  on  U.S.  and  Soviet  de- 
ployments of  these  systems  at  reduced 
levels.  This  would  mean  a  reduction  of 
the  Soviet  threat  and  a  reduction  in 
NATO's  deployment  program. 

The  modernization  decision  that  we 
have  made  here  also  makes  it  possible  for 
us  to  withdraw  1,000  nuclear  warheads 
from  Europe.  In  addition  to  this  reduc- 
tion, for  each  of  these  weapons  we  deploy, 
we  will  withdraw  one  existing  weapon 
from  Europe.  Thus,  far  from  increasing 
NATO's  reliance  on  nuclear  weapons,  our 


February  1980 


15 


Europe 


decisions  will  result  in  a  significant  i-educ- 
tion  in  the  size  of  NATO's  overall  nuclear 
stockpile  in  Europe. 

Our  willingness  to  enter  into  negoti- 
ations on  theater  nuclear  forces  in  the 
SALT  framework  is  but  one  of  a  com- 
prehensive set  of  arms  control  initiatives 
which  the  alliance  is  now  developing. 
Mutual  and  balanced  force  reductions  and 
the  Conference  on  Security  and  Coopera- 
tion in  Europe  are  other  negotiations 
which  the  alliance  members  are  pursuing 
with  equal  vigor 

The  political  effects  of  the  decisions 
taken  here  today  are  considerable.  Faced 
with  a  I'eal  challenge  to  the  security  of 
Western  Europe,  the  alliance  has  reacted 
decisively,  prudently,  and  in  a  way  that 
invites  the  pursuit  of  arms  conti'ol  initia- 
tives. I  believe  that  our  govei'nments  can 
be  proud  of  this  memorable  achievement, 
and  that  the  free  peoples  of  the  alliance 
will  show  overwhelming  support  for  the 
decisions  made  here  today. 


COMMUNIQUE, 
SPECIAL  MEETING, 
DEC.  12.  19791 

1.  At  a  Special  Meeting  of  Foreign  and 
Defense  Ministers  in  Brussels  on  12  December 
1979: 

2.  Ministers  recalled  the  May  1978  Sum- 
mit where  governments  expressed  the  political 
resolve  to  meet  the  challenges  to  their  security 
posed  by  the  continuing  momentum  of  the 
Warsaw  Pact  militai-y  build-up. 

.3.  The  Warsaw  Pact  has  over  the  years 
developed  a  large  and  growing  capability  in 
nuclear  systems  that  directly  threaten  Western 
Europe  and  have  a  strategic  significance  for 
the  Alliance  in  Europe.  This  situation  has  been 
especially  aggi'avated  over  the  last  few  years 
by  Soviet  decisions  to  implement  progi'ams 
modernizing  and  expanding  their  long-range 
nuclear  capability  substantially.  In  particular, 
they  have  deployed  the  SS-20  missile,  which 
offers  significant  improvements  over  previous 
systems  in  providing  greater  accuracy,  more 
mobility,  and  greater  range,  as  well  as  having 
multiple  warheads,  and  the  Backfire  bomber, 
which  has  a  much  better  performance  than 
other  Soviet  aircraft  deployed  hitherto  in  a 
theater  role.  During  this  period,  while  the 
Soviet  Union  has  been  reinforcing  its  superior- 
ity in  LRTNF  llong-range  theater  nuclear  for- 
ces] both  quantitatively  and  qualitatively, 
Western  capabilities  have  remained  static.  In- 
deed these  forces  are  increasing  in  age  and 
vulnerability  and  do  not  include  land-based, 
long-range  theater  nuclear  missile  systems. 

4.  At  the  same  time,  the  Soviets  have 
also  undertaken  a  modernization  and  expan- 
sion of  their  shorter-range  TNF  Itheater  nu- 
clear forcesl  and  greatly  improved  the  overall 
quality  of  their  conventional  forces.  These  de- 
velopments took  place  against  the  background 


16 


of  increasing  Soviet  inter-continental  capabili- 
ties and  achievement  of  parity  in  inter- 
continental capability  with  the  United  States. 

5.  These  trends  have  prompted  serious 
concern  within  the  Alhance,  because,  if  they 
were  to  continue,  Soviet  superiority  in  theater 
nuclear  systems  could  undermine  the  stability 
achieved  in  inter-continental  systems  and  cast 
doubt  on  the  credibility  of  the  Alliance's  deter- 
rent strategy  by  highUghting  the  gap  in  the 
spectrum  of  NATO's  available  nuclear  response 
to  aggression. 

6.  Ministers  noted  that  these  recent  de- 
velopments require  concrete  actions  on  the 
part  of  the  Alliance  if  NATO's  strategy  of  flex- 
ible response  is  to  remain  credible.  After  in- 
tensive considerations,  including  the  merits  of 
alternative  approaches,  and  after  taking  note 
of  the  positions  of  certain  members.  Ministers 
concluded  that  the  overall  interest  of  the  Al- 
liance would  best  be  served  by  pursuing  two 
parallel  and  complementary  approaches  of 
TNF  modernization  and  arms  control. 

7.  Accordingly  Ministers  have  decided  to 
modernize  NATO's  LRTNF  by  the  deployment 
in  Europe  of  US  ground-launched  systems 
comprising  108  Pershing  11  launchers,  which 
would  replace  existing  US  Pershing  I-A,  and 
464  GLCM  Iground-launched  cruise  missiles], 
all  with  single  warheads.  All  the  nations  cur- 
rently participating  in  the  integrated  defense 
structure  will  participate  in  the  program:  the 
missiles  will  be  stationed  in  selected  countries. 
and  certain  support  costs  will  be  met  through 
NATO's  existing  common  funding  ar- 
rangements. The  program  will  not  increase 
NATO's  reliance  upon  nuclear  weapons.  In  this 
connection.  Ministers  agreed  that  as  an  inte- 
gi-al  part  of  TNF  modernization,  1,000  US  nu- 
clear warheads  will  be  withdrawn  from  Europe 
as  soon  as  feasible.  Further,  Ministers  decided 
that  the  572  LRTNF  warheads  should  be  ac- 
commodated within  that  reduced  level,  which 
necessarily  implies  a  numerical  shift  of  empha- 
sis away  from  warheads  for  delivery  systems 
of  other  types  and  shorter  ranges.  In  addition 
they  noted  with  satisfaction  that  the  Nuclear 
Planning  Group  [NPG]  is  undertaking  an  ex- 
amination of  the  precise  nature,  scope,  and 
basis  of  the  adjustments  resulting  from  the 
LRTNF  deployment  and  their  possible  impli- 
cations for  the  balance  of  roles  and  systems  in 
NATO's  nuclear  armor  as  a  whole.  This  exami- 
nation will  form  the  basis  of  a  substantive  re- 
port to  NPG  Ministers  in  the  Autumn  of  1980. 

8.  Ministers  attach  great  importance  to 
the  role  of  arms  control  in  contributing  to  a 
more  stable  military  relationship  between  East 
and  West  and  in  advancing  the  process  of  de- 
tente. This  is  reflected  in  a  broad  set  of  initia- 
tives being  examined  within  the  Alliance  to 
further  the  course  of  arms  control  and  detente 
in  the  1980's.  They  regard  arms  control  as  an 
integral  part  of  the  Alliance's  efforts  to  assure 
the  undiminished  security  of  its  member 
states  and  to  make  the  strategic  situation  be- 
tween East  and  West  more  stable,  more  pre- 
dictable, and  more  manageable  at  lower  levels 
of  armaments  on  both  sides.  In  this  regard 
they  welcome  the  contribution  which  the 
SALT  II  treaty  makes  towards  achieving  these 
objectives. 


9.  Ministers  consider  that,  building  on 
this  accomplishment  and  taking  account  of  the 
expansion  of  Soviet  LRTNF  capabilities  of 
concern  to  NATO,  arms  control  efforts  to 
achieve  a  more  stable  overall  nuclear  balance 
at  lower  levels  of  nuclear  weapons  on  both 
sides  should  therefore  now  include  certain  US 
and  Soviet  long-range  theater  nuclear  sys- 
tems. This  would  reflect  previous  Western 
suggestions  to  include  such  Soviet  and  US  sys- 
tems in  arms  control  negotiations  and  more  re- 
cent expressions  by  Soviet  President  Brezhnev 
of  willingness  to  do  so.  Ministers  fully  support 
the  decision  taken  by  the  United  States  follow- 
ing consultations  within  the  Alhance  to  negoti- 
ate arms  limitations  on  LRTNF  and  to  propose 
to  the  USSR  to  begin  negotiations  as  soon  as 
possible  along  the  following  Unes  which  have 
been  elaborated  in  intensive  consultations 
within  the  Alliance: 

A.  Any  future  limitations  on  US  sys- 
tems principally  designed  for  theater  missions 
should  be  accompanied  by  appropriate  limita- 
tions on  Soviet  theater  systems. 

B.  Limitations  on  US  and  Soviet  long- 
range  theater  nuclear  systems  should  be  nego- 
tiated bilaterally  in  the  SALT  III  framework 
in  a  step-by-step  approach. 

C.  The  immediate  objective  of  these 
negotiations  should  be  the  establishment  of 
agi-eed  limitations  on  US  and  Soviet  land- 
based  long-range  theater  nuclear  missile 
systems. 

D.  Any  agreed  limitations  on  these  sys- 
tems must  be  consistent  with  the  principle  of 
equality  between  the  sides.  Therefore,  the  lim- 
itations should  take  the  form  of  dejure  equal- 
ity both  in  ceilings  and  in  rights. 

E.  Any  agreed  Hmitations  must  be 
adequately  verifiable. 

10.  Given  the  special  importance  of  these 
negotiations  for  the  overall  security  of  the  Al- 
liance, a  special  consultative  body  at  a  high 
level  will  be  constituted  within  the  Alhance  to 
support  the  US  negotiating  effort.  This  body 
will  follow  the  negotiations  on  a  continuous 
basis  and  report  to  the  Foreign  and  Defense 
Ministers  who  will  examine  developments 

in  these  negotiations  at  their  semi-annual 
meetings. 

11.  The  Ministers  have  decided  to  pursue 
these  two  parallel  and  complementary  ap- 
proaches in  order  to  avert  an  arms  race  in 
Europe  caused  by  the  Soviet  TNF  build-up, 
yet  preserve  the  viability  of  NATO's  strategv' 
of  deterrence  and  defense  and  thus  maintain 
the  security  of  its  member  states.  A  moderni- 
zation decision,  including  a  commitment  to  de- 
ployments, is  necessary  to  meet  NATO's  de- 
terrence and  defense  needs,  to  provide  a  cred- 
ible response  to  unilateral  Soviet  TNF  de- 
ployments, and  to  provide  the  foundation  for 
the  pursuit  of  serious  negotiations  on  TNF. 
Success  of  arms  control  in  constraining  the 
Soviet  build-up  can  enhance  Alliance  security, 
modify  the  scale  of  NATO's  TNF  moderniza- 
tion requirements,  and  promote  stability  and 
detente  in  Europe  in  consonance  with  NATO's 
basic  policy  of  deterrence,  defense  and  detente 
as  enunciated  in  the  Harmel  Report.  NATO's 
TNF  requirements  will  be  examined  in  the 
light  of  concrete  results  reached  through 
negotiations. 


Europe 


ECKETARYS  STATEMENT, 

EC.  12.  19792 

ie  P'oreign  and  Defense  Ministers  of 
ATO  have  just  concluded  a  successful 
eeting  of  extraordinary  impoitance. 

We  have  decided  to  proceed  with  a 
an  to  deploy  108  Pershing  II  ballistic 
ssili's  and  464  ground-launched  cruise 
ssik'S  in  Europe.  At  the  same  time, 
e  have  decided  to  pursue  vigorously 
ith  the  Soviets  a  meaningful  and 
[uitable  arms  control  agreement  on 
ng-range  theater  nuclear  forces. 

The  far-reaching  decisions  we  have 
ade  here  attest  to  the  determination 
d  common  purpose  of  NATO's 
jmber  states.  The  2  years  of  intensive 
nsultations  which  led  up  to  these  de- 
mons give  evidence  of  the  mutual 
jst  that  prevails  in  the  alliance. 

Before  Secretary  Brown  discusses 
e  details  of  the  steps  taken  here  to 
•engthen  NATO's  defense  posture,  I 
)uld  like  to  sketch  for  you  the  political 
iitext  of  these  decisions. 

The  Atlantic  alliance  is  committed 
a  reduction  of  tensions  between  East 
d  West.  But  our  pursuit  of  detente, 
■hiding  balanced  arms  control  agree- 
■nts,  must  rest  on  a  firm  foundation 
military  security. 

Relaxation  of  tensions  is  possible 
ly  when  each  side  has  confidence  in 
own  strength.  Serious  negotiations 
1  only  proceed  when  neither  side 
jbts  the  will  and  capacities  of  the 
ler.  Steps  to  consolidate  and 
■engthen  NATO's  collective  defense 
IS  are  central  not  only  to  a  secure  de- 
•rence  of  military  threats;  they  also 
)vide  a  basis  for  broader  efforts  to 
d  a  relaxation  of  tensions.  In  a  politi- 
as  well  as  military  sense,  defense 
'dernization  and  the  pursuit  of  de- 
ite  are  twin  paths  along  the  road  of 
■urity. 

In  recent  years,  the  Soviet  Union 
?  improved  significantly  its  nuclear 
•ces  in  Europe.  The  Soviet  deploy- 
nt  of  modern  MIRVed  SS-20s,  and 
'  Backfire  bomber,  threatens  to  pro- 
le the  Soviets  with  nuclear  prepon- 
rance  in  the  European  theater.  In  re- 
)nse,  the  alliance  has  developed 
Uel  programs  of  modernization  and 
^  control. 

In  deciding  to  deploy  new  long- 
:ge  nuclear  forces  in  Europe  and  to 
jp'ort  the  United  States  in  its  pursuit 
a  serious  arms  control  agreement  in- 
ving  theater  nuclear  forces,  the  al- 
ace  is  giving  new  meaning  and  force 
*  its  policy  of  deterrence,  defense,  and 
;ente.  Our  deployment  decision  gives 
dence  of  the  continued  vitality  and 
lesiveness  of  the  alliance. 


etifl  bruary  1980 


This  decision  has  strengthened  our 
spirit  as  well  as  our  forces,  and  it  has 
conveyed  the  clear  message  that  we 
define  detente  as  a  search  for  mutual 
and  balanced,  rather  than  unilateral, 
advantage. 

In  this  context,  we  are  pi-epared  to 
enter  into  serious  negotiations  on  long- 
range  theater  nuclear  forces,  within  the 
framework  of  SALT  III.  Any  agree- 
ment i-eached  must — like  SALT  II — be 
balanced  and  adequately  verifiable. 

We  will  not  entertain  any  notion  of 
a  freeze  which  would  confirm  a  Soviet 
preponderance  in  long-range  nuclear 
forces  in  this  theater.  But  we  are  pre- 
pared to  negotiate  an  equitable  agree- 
ment on  U.S.  and  Soviet  deployments 
of  these  systems  at  reduced  levels.  This 
would  mean  a  reduction  of  the  Soviet 
threat  and  a  reduction  in  NATO's  de- 
ployment program. 

The  modernization  decision  that  we 
have  made  here  also  makes  it  possible 
foi-  us  to  withdraw  1,000  nuclear 
warheads  from  Europe.  In  addition  to 
this  reduction,  for  each  of  these 
weapons  we  deploy,  we  will  withdraw 
one  existing  weapon  from  Europe. 
Thus,  far  from  increasing  NATO's  re- 
liance on  nuclear  weapons,  our  deci- 
sions will  result  in  a  significant  reduc- 
tion in  the  size  of  NATO's  overall 
nuclear  stockpile  in  Europe. 

Our  willingness  to  enter  into 
negotiations  on  theater  nuclear  forces 
in  the  SALT  framework  is  but  one  of  a 
comprehensive  set  of  arms  control  ini- 
tiatives which  the  alliance  is  now  de- 
veloping. Mutual  and  balanced  force  re- 
ductions (MBFR)  in  Europe  and  the 
Conference  on  Security  and  Coopera- 
tion in  Europe  (CSCE)  are  other 
negotiations  which  the  alliance  mem- 
bers are  pursuing  with  equal  vigor. 

The  political  effects  of  the  decisions 
taken  here  today  are  considerable. 
Faced  with  a  real  challenge  to  the  secu- 
rity of  Western  Europe,  the  alliance 
has  reacted  decisively,  prudently,  and 
in  a  way  that  invites  the  pursuit  of 
arms  control  initiatives.  I  believe  that 
our  governments  can  be  proud  of  this 
memorable  achievement  and  that  the 
free  peoples  of  the  alliance  will  show 
overwhelming  support  for  the  decisions 
made  here  today. 


SECRETARIES  VANCE  AND 
BROWN,  NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
DEC.  12,  1979 

Secretary  Vance:  I  think  you've  all  got 
a  copy — and  if  you  haven't  got  it,  you'll 
get  it  shortly — of  a  short  press  state- 
ment which  I  have  issued.  I'd  like  to 


say  a  few  words  of  introduction  and 
then  Harold  and  I  would  be  glad  to  an- 
swer any  of  youi-  questions. 

As  you  know  from  your  meeting 
with  the  Secretary  General,  the 
Foreign  and  Defense  Ministers  have 
just  concluded  a  successful  meeting  of 
extraordinary  importance.  We  decided 
at  that  meeting  that  we  would  go  for- 
ward with  the  program  to  modernize 
our  long-range  nuclear  theater  forces. 
And  at  the  same  time  we  decided  to 
pursue  vigorously  oui-  program  for 
arms  control  agreement  in  the  long- 
range  nuclear  theater  forces  area  with 
the  Soviet  Union.  As  you  know,  the 
subject  has  been  under  study  for  ap- 
proximately 2  years  now,  and  the  rec- 
ommendations of  the  two  study  groups 
made  their  presentations  to  the  group 
today  and  the  final  decision  was  taken. 
The  decision,  I  think  it  is  important  to 
note,  was  a  unanimous  decision  on  the 
part  of  the  alliance  to  go  forward  with 
the  program. 

Q.  Did  you  bring  up  the  subject  of 
the  Iran  crisis  at  any  point  in  the  pro- 
ceedings? What  did  you  ask  of  the  al- 
liance and  what  response  did  you  get? 

Secretary  Brown:  It  didn't  come 
up  today  in  the  joint  meeting  between 
Defense  and  Foreign  Ministers.  I  did 
raise  it  this  morning  with  the  Defense 
Ministers,  and  it  was  along  the  same 
line  that  Secretary  Vance  has  been 
speaking  to,  and  I'll  let  him  answer  it. 

Secretary  Vance:  It  will  be  coming 
up  again  tomorrow  morning  in  the 
meeting  which  we  are  going  to  be  hav- 
ing, and  I  will  be  reporting  to  the 
Council  on  the  situation  in  Iran.  It  will 
be  taken  up  in  restricted  session,  and 
we  will  have  a  discussion  of  the  Iran 
issue,  and  in  my  judgment  we  will 
probably  issue  a  statement  of  the  15  na- 
tions, as  15  nations — not  as  NATO  but 
as  15  nations. 

Q.  Could  you  comment  on  the  re- 
strictions made  by  the  Dutch  and  the 
Belgian  Governments  on  the  installa- 
tion and  the  difficulties  for  the  deci- 
sion to  go  on  with  the  production  of 
the  new  arms? 

Secretary  Brown:  First,  I  would 
say  that  the  decision  was  a  very  suc- 
cessful one  in  deciding  to  respond  to 
Soviet  modernization  and  increased  de- 
ployments of  its  theater  nuclear  forces; 
that  the  agreement  provides  a  solid 
basis  for  the  United  States  to  proceed 
with  production  of  the  missiles.  The 
agreement  did  call  for  that,  and  you  will 
recall  that  President  Carter  has  in- 
sisted that  if  the  United  States  is  to 


17 


Europe 


produce  the  missiles,  there  must  be  a 
previous  decision  on  the  part  of  NATO 
to  deploy  them.  The  Belgian  Govern- 
ment, along  with  the  United  Kingdom, 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  and 
Italy,  has  decided  to  deploy  the  mis- 
siles. It  has  also  decided  that  it  will 
e.xamine  the  question  of  implementing 
that  decision  in  about  6  months  on  the 
basis,  among  other  things,  of  the  suc- 
cess reached  during  that  time  in  ai'ms 
control  of  theater  nuclear  forces. 

The  Dutch  position  is  that  they  will 
make  a  decision  on  whether  to  accept 
deployments  within  2  years.  But  it 
should  be  noted  that  of  the  total 
number  being  contemplated  for  de- 
ployment, only  about  15%  or  20%  are  to 
be  deployed  in  those  two  countries. 

Q.  We  have  three  countries  that 
have  agreed  to  station  these  systems. 
The  Germans  have  said  that  they  will 
not  be  the  only  country  that  would 
take  them  on  the  continent.  If  Italy 
were,  during  the  next  2  years,  to  de- 
cide for  one  reason  or  another  to  pull 
out,  couldn't  this  decision  quickly 
unravel? 

Secretary  Brown:  The  Germans 
consider  their  conditions  to  have  been 
met.  As  I  noted,  Belgium,  as  well  as 
Italy,  has  made  a  decision  to  deploy. 

Q.  Are  you  optimistic  over  a  posi- 
tive response  by  Russia  on  the  offer  of 
negotiating  on  the  long-range  theater 
nuclear  weapons?  And  can  you  figure 
out  how  long  it  will  take  to  start 
off — months  or  years? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  am  optimistic 
that  negotiations  will  get  underway  be- 
tween ourselves  and  the  Soviet  Union 
on  the  question  of  arms  control,  in  the 
field  of  long-range  nuclear  theater 
forces.  As  to  when  the  discussions  can 
get  underway,  I  am  merely  speculating. 

Let  me  say  that  the  first  step  will 
be  to  assemble  the  consultative  group 
which  is  to  be  established  pursuant  to 
the  plan  which  has  been  developed. 
That  is  a  consultative  group  including 
ourselves  and  our  allies.  We  will  be 
working  to  put  together  the  final 
touches  on  what  we  will  be  sending 
forward  to  the  Soviet  Union,  and  fol- 
lowing that  there  will  be  discussions 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  I  do  not  rule  out 
some  preliminary  discussions,  but  they 
would  be  only  of  a  preliminary  nature 
sometime  in  the  ne.xt  month  or  two.  At 
what  pace  those  negotiations  will  pro- 
ceed is  a  different  question,  because  it 
is  the  decision  that  these  negotiations 
can  best  be  carried  out  in  SALT  III. 
And  we,  therefore,  have  the  factor  of 


18 


when  we  can  get  to  SALT  III  in  order 
to  get  the  starting  date  for  actual 
negotiations. 

Q.  Given  the  Belgian  and  Dutch 
reservations,  are  you  confident  that 
Congress  will  provide  them  $5  billion 
to  finance  this  program,  and 
moreover,  what  kind  of  signal  of  this 
lack  of  unity  within  the  alliance  do 
you  think  NATO  is  sending  the  Soviet 
Union? 

Secretary  Vance:  Let  me  say  first 
that  I  think  that  it  is  wrong  to  charac- 
terize this  as  a  lack  of  unity.  The  deci- 
sion taken  across  the  board  was  that 
the  program  was  accepted  and  that  we 
would  go  forward  with  the  program. 

Secretary  Brown:  Indeed,  this  was 
a  unanimous  decision  to  proceed  with 
the  program,  and  these  countries  will 
all  participate  in  the  infrastructure 
funding,  which  is  a  part  of  the  opera- 
tions funding  of  these  systems.  The 
Congress,  as  you  know,  has  been  very 
interested  and  very  concerned  about 
the  imbalance  of  theater  nuclear  forces 
between  the  Warsaw  Pact  and  NATO, 
and  as  a  consequence  of  this  decision,  I 
would  expect  that  Congress  will,  in- 
deed, support  the  program.  They  have 
been  supporting  the  research  and  de- 
velopment; they  have  been  saying,  tell 
us  when  you  have  a  place  to  put  most  of 
these,  and  we  now  have  that. 

Secretary  Vance:  Let  me  just  add 
from  somebody  who  sees  it  from  a 
slightly  different  perspective,  because  I 
deal  with  different  committees  than 
Harold  does  in  the  Congress.  I  find  the 
same  interest  and  importance  attached 
to  the  modernization  of  our  theater  nu- 
clear forces,  and  I  would  expect  that  we 
would  find  support  in  the  Congress. 

Q.  What  was  your  reaction  to  the 
Danish  proposal? 

Secretary  Vance:  Insofar  as  the 
Danish  proposal  was  concerned — which 
called  for  a  deferral  for  6  months  or  a 
postponement  of  making  any 
decision — I  have  felt  all  along  that  we 
could  not  and  should  not  postpone  this 
decision.  The  time  had  come,  after  2 
years  of  study,  when  all  the  work  was 
done;  we've  got  to  get  on  with  the  proc- 
ess of  modernizing  our  forces.  We've 
also  got  to  get  on  with  the  companion 
program  of  discussions  in  the  arms  con- 
trol area  so  that  the  sooner  the  better, 
and.  therefore.  I  was  against  any 
postponement. 


Secretary  Brown:  Moreover,  tha 
proposal  found  no  support  from  any 
other  country,  partly  because  I  think 
was  realized  that  during  that  6  months 
the  Soviet  deployment  of  SS-20s, 
which  continues  at  the  same  or  perha] 
even  an  accelerated  rate  as  part  of  th 
theater  nuclear  force  increase  and  mo( 
ernization,  would  have  deployed  abou 
200  additional  nuclear  warheads  again 
the  countries  of  Western  Europe. 

Q.  [Inaudible]  by  the  Defense 
Minister  includes  a  specific  referen 
of  assumption  that  SALT  II  will  ha 
been  ratified  by  the  end  of  this  2-ye 
period.  Before  this  meeting,  there  h 
been,  over  some  period,  indications 
that  the  ratification  of  SALT  would 
have  an  important  influence  on  Eur 
pean  positions.  Do  you  feel  that  if 
SALT  had  been  ratified  by  now,  all 
the  alliance  members  would  have 
been  able  to  stay  on  the  same  line? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  don't  know  t 
answer  to  that.  But  let  me  say — 
because  I  don't  know  enough  about  t 
internal  politics  of  a  number  of  the 
various  countries — that  I  think  all  of 
you  are  familiar  with  the  reasons  tha 
the  hearings  on  SALT  have  fallen  be 
hind  schedule  in  the  Congress.  It  no' 
only  came  about  as  a  result  of  the  ne 
to  get  through  vital  energy  legislatic 
that  is  before  the  Congress  right  no\ 
but  of  course,  we  have  been  seized  w 
the  Iranian  crisis  which  has  not  only 
taken  most  of  the  waking  hours  of  th( 
of  us  in  the  executive  branch  but  als 
has  consumed  a  great  amount  of  the 
tention  and  time  of  the  congressiona 
leadership  and  the  Members  of  the 
Congress.  As  a  result  of  these  factoi 
Senator  Byrd  decided  that  he  would 
delay,  until  about  the  fourth  week  ir 
January,  the  bringing  forward  of  tht 
SALT  debate  to  the  floor.  I  believe  t 
it  will  come  forward  at  that  time,  ant 
is  still  my  strong  belief  that  we  will, 
those  hearings,  come  out  with  a 
successful  conclusion. 

Q.  Don't  you  have  any  fears  th 
the  Soviet  Union  might  consider  tl 
restrictions  which  have  been  put  f( 
ward  by  Belgium,  the  Netherlands 
and  Denmark  as  a  sign  of  weaknes 
as  a  breach  in  NATO  solidarity  ant 
that  they  will  seek  political  profit  j 
from  it? 

Secretary  Vance:  No.  I  don't  th 
so.  I  think  that  there  are  obviously 
very  difficult  problems,  political  pro 
lems.  in  various  countries.  However 
the  decision  was  taken  in  Belgium,  ; 
Harold  Brown  has  previously  indicaiJ 


Department  of  State  BulU 


Europe 


you,  to  make  a  positive  decision  with 
spect  to  the  problem  and  to  the  issue 
deployment  with  the  caveat  that  they 
inted  to  take  a  look  at  the  situation  in 
nonths  to  see  whether  there  had  been 
ough  progress  in  the  arms  control 
Id  to  change  their  mind.  Otherwise, 
e  decision  is  made:  they  are  going 
rward. 

Q.  Could  you  just  tell  us  whether 
e  United  States  is  going  to  ask  any 
her  country,  besides  the  five,  on  de- 
oying  the  missiles  in  the  coming  2 
ars? 

Secretary  Brown:  The  program 
is  made  up  by  a  military-civilian 
oup,  a  so-called  high-level  group,  and 
'se  were  the  candidate  countries.  I 
n't  rule  out  further  studies,  but  the 
Dgram  we  are  proceeding  with  is  the 
3gram  that  the  high-level  group  came 
with. 

Secretary  Vance:  Let  me  add  one 

ng  to  that.  We  decided  how  many 
litional  warheads  were  required  in 
modernization  program.  Having 
de  that  determination,  the  next  step 
s  to  determine  how  it  might  be  best 
allocate  the  deployment,  and  the 
st  sensible  course  of  action  de- 
oped  by  the  group  which  was  study- 
it  was  the  five  countries  which  we 
/e  referred  to.  And,  that's  how  we 
■ived  at  the  group  that  is  included 
N  as  the  deployment  sites  for  the 
V  missiles. 

Q.  If  I  understood  well,  it  will 
;e  at  least  2  or  3  years  before  these 
dern  weapons  are  going  to  be  lu- 
lled here.  What  about  if  the  Soviet 
ion,  in  the  meantime,  produces  or 
ates  a  more  modern  weapon?  What 
1  happen? 

Secretary  Vance:  This  is  the  very 
iblem  that  Harold  was  talking  about 
■ause  as  the  months  go  by,  more  and 
re  weapons  are  being  deployed,  and 
s  is  obviously  a  matter  of  great  con- 
n  to  us.  This  is  the  reason  that  we 
'e  both  the  modernization  program 
i  the  arms  control  program.  So  that 
!fljs  necessary  not  only  that  we  take  the 
ps  to  move  forward  to  produce  and 
)loy  these  new  weapons  but  also  to 
ceed  vigorously  with  the  arms  con- 
I  aspect  of  this  bilateral  program. 

Q.  Given  your  answer  on  possible 
ling  of  any  negotiations,  what  do 
i  think  the  Belgians  will  have  in  6 
nths  time  to  change  their  minds? 


Secretary  Vance:  Quite  honestly,  I 
would  say  that  there  probably  will  be 
not  a  great  deal.  I  think  negotiations 
will  have  been  started  by  that  time,  but 
as  anybody  knows  who  has  been  in- 
volved in  negotiations  in  the  strategic 
nuclear  field,  these  are  very  compli- 
cated matters.  They  pi'oceed  e.xtremely 
slowly.  We  also  took  6V2  years  to 
negotiate  the  SALT  II  agreement,  and 
I  would  expect  that  this  is  going  to  be 
even  a  more  complex  negotiation  than 
the  ones  which  we've  had  so  far  in 
SALT  II. 

Secretary  Brown:  Again,  I'm  not 
sure  that  we've  gotten  across  to  the 
public  the  very  substantial  existing  im- 
balance in  theater  forces.  The  Soviets 
have  far  more  warheads,  far  more  mis- 
siles, of  intermediate  range  than  the 
NATO  alliance,  and  they  are  adding 
SS-20  warheads  at  the  rate  of  about 
one  a  day. 

Q.  To  what  extent  does  the  Dutch 
and  Belgian  decision  represent  a  mes- 
sage that  they  are  sending  to  the 
American  Congress  on  SALT?  To 
what  extent  did  you  find  the  agree- 
ment that  you  reached  here  in  effect 
depends  upon  ratification  of  the 
SALT  Treaty? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  think  that  as  I 
said  earlier,  they  continue  to  attach 
great  importance  to  ratification  of 
SALT.  But,  at  the  same  time,  they  at- 
tach great  importance  to  dealing  with 
the  theater  nuclear  problem.  So,  I  think 
that  it  sends  forward  two  messages  to 
the  Congress:  number  one,  they  stand 
just  as  strongly  as  they  did  before  in 
urging  and  hoping  that  we  can  get  on  to 
ratification  of  SALT,  and  at  the  same 
time  they  want  to  get  us  moving  in  the 
theater  nuclear  field  not  only  on  the  de- 
velopment, production,  and  deployment 
side  but  also  on  the  arms  control  side. 

Q.  Secretary  General  Luns  said 
that  the  infrastructure  financing 
would  be  done  by  NATO  as  a  whole, 
which  would  seem  to  imply  that  all 
the  systems  are  single  systems  and 
that  the  level  of  financing  is  rather 
lower  than  what  Secretary  Brown 
mentioned  in  The  Hague  what  the 
United  States  might  hope  for.  Or  are 
you  satisfied  with  what — 

Secretary  Brown:  The  United 
States  is  going  to  pay  for  the  develop- 
ment and  production  of  the  missiles. 
That  is  likely  to  run  into  several  billions 
of  dollars.  The  operation  and  mainte- 
nance costs  including  the  guard  force, 
security  force,  etc.,  construction  of 
some  base  equipment,  will  be  arranged 


thrciugh  infrastructure  and  that  cost 
will  be  shared.  The  United  States  un- 
(lUestionably  will  carry  the  great  bulk 
of  the  cost. 

Q.  Can  you  move  ahead  with 
negotiations  on  theater  nuclear 
weapons  if  vou  don't  get  a  ratification 
of  SALT  II? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  think  the  an- 
swer is  yes  we  can.  But  it  will  be  much 
more  difficult  to  do.  Therefore,  I  think 
it's  incumbent  on  us  to  get  SALT  II 
ratified  and  get  moving  on  both  aspects 
of  the  problem,  negotiating  SALT  III 
insofar  as  central  systems  are  con- 
cerned and  also  insofar  as  theater  sys- 
tems are  concerned. 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT. 
NORTH  ATLANTIC  COUNCIL, 
DEC.  13.  1979 

Before  leaving  Washington  for  this  ses- 
sion of  the  North  Atlantic  Council,  I 
reviewed  our  forthcoming  meeting  with 
President  Carter.  He  has  a  deep  inter- 
est in  our  work  here  this  week  and 
asked  me  to  extend  to  all  of  you  his 
greetings.  I  would  also  like  to  extend  a 
special  welcome  to  the  Ministers  joining 
the  Council  for  the  first  time. 

In  the  history  of  the  alliance,  this 
meeting  will  be  remembered  as  a  mo- 
ment of  special  significance.  Issues  cen- 
tral to  NATO  are  always  important. 
But  on  this  occasion,  the  issues  before 
us  are  so  important.  Our  decisions  are 
of  such  deep  meaning  for  the  continued 
security  of  the  alliance  and  for  the 
strengthening  of  peace  in  Europe  that 
our  deliberations  merit  well  the  word 
"historic." 

We  meet  at  the  opening  of  a  new 
decade.  None  of  us  believes  that  the 
times  ahead  will  be  easy.  But  turbulent 
times  can  call  forth  the  best  that  is  in 
us.  Such  challenges  can  rally  our 
societies  to  greater  achievements.  Our 
peoples  have  shown  such  strength 
throughout  the  history  of  our  alliance. 
They  will  do  so  again. 

We  of  this  alliance,  which  has  been 
so  successful  in  the  past,  should  look 
with  confidence  to  the  future.  Our  sys- 
tems are  strong  and  flexible.  Our 
economies  are  resilient  and  innovative. 
Our  peoples  are  steadfast.  With  con- 
tinuing hard  work  and  cooperation,  we 
will  maintain  the  healthy  and  strong 
societies  on  which  our  security  ulti- 
mately depends. 

It  was  the  quest  for  security  that 
brought  us  together  in  this  alliance. 
Today,  no  less  than  30  years  ago,  we 


19 


Europe 


have  the  strength  and  the  will  to  be 
able  to  dei-ide  fcir  (lurselves.  through 
Sdber  assessment,  the  I'equirements  (if 
our  defense.  This  uni(|ue  group  of  free 
nations,  valuing  our  sovereign  inde- 
pendence and  collective  values,  will 
never  permit  others  to  dictate  the 
terms  of  our  security. 

With  the  understanding  and 
support  of  our  peoples,  we  are  now 
taking  action  to  preserve  the  peace.  We 
are  acting  to  strengthen  our  strategic 
forces  in  the  United  States — to  mod- 
ernize our  theater  nuclear  forces  in 
Europe  and  to  improve  our  conven- 
tional posture. 

I  am  convinced  that  the  alliance  is 
on  the  right  track.  Our  Long-Term 
Defense  Program,  our  commitment  to 
39^  real  increases  in  annual  defense 
spending,  and  our  decisions  to  modern- 
ize theater  nuclear  foi'ces  promise  to 
take  us  into  the  1980s  with  a  sense  of 
real  security.  It  has  been  clear  to  all 
that  we  will  maintain  the  fortitude  and 
determination  necessary  to  carry  these 
decisions  forward. 

The  strength  of  our  alliance  re- 
mains the  essential  underpinning  of  our 
efforts  to  strengthen  the  framework  for 
more  productive  relations  with  the 
East.  It  is  clear  to  all  that  we  will  pur- 
sue security  for  Europe  through 
negotiations  as  well  as  through  military 
preparedness.  Here  also  we  need  to 
move  forward  on  a  broad  front. 

•  In  SALT  and  theater  nuclear 
force  negotiations,  we  look  forward  to  a 
more  intensive  alliance  consultative 
mechanism.  We  must  insure  that  the 
promise  this  mechanism  holds  for  closer 
coordination  within  the  alliance  is 
matched  by  our  determination  to  make 
progress  in  the  negotiations 
themselves. 

•  In  MBFR,  our  persistent  and  pa- 
tient negotiations  will  continue  to 
e.xplore  vigorously  all  promising  av- 
enues for  achievement  of  an  agreement. 

•  In  CSCE,  we  will  couple  creative 
new  proposals  for  building  military 
confidence  with  a  determination  to  pre- 
serve the  integrity  of  the  Final  Act;  to 
maintain  progress  across  the  board  on 
CSCE  issues,  including  those  that  most 
directly  affect  people's  lives. 

•  In  East-West  relations,  we  un- 
derstand that  security  in  the  broadest 
sense  is  not  achieved  by  weapons  alone. 
The  members  of  the  alliance  will  con- 
tinue to  show  willingness  to  increase 
official,  individual,  and  commercial  ex- 
changes. These  exchanges  can  grow  as 
a  mutual  commitment  to  better  rela- 


20 


tions  between  East  and  West  grows.  As 
better  understanding  between  East 
and  West  is  pursued,  all  our  people 
benefit  from  the  lessening  of  tensions. 

This  alliance  draws  strength  from 
our  determination  to  achieve  both 
mutual  security  and  a  lessening  of  ten- 
sions. This  very  important  meeting 
provides  an  opportunity  to  match  the 
challenges  that  we  face  with  the  deci- 
sions of  wisdom — decisions  that  will 
reinforce  our  preparedness,  strengthen 
the  confidence  of  our  peoples  in  our 
readiness,  and  enhance  the  prospects 
for  greater  security  through  the  agreed 
control  of  arms. 

Whenever  we  assemble,  and  espe- 
cially at  such  moments  of  great  decision 
as  today,  I  believe  that  each  of  us  is 
touched  by  the  past,  by  recollections  of 
the  wisdom  of  the  founders  of  this  al- 
liance. They  knew  that  people  who  live 
in  freedom  are  people  at  their 
strongest.  They  knew  that  collective 
decisions,  made  in  freedom,  are  the 
strongest  decisions.  And  they  knew 
that  free  nations,  acting  together,  draw 
strength  from  each  other  as  they  work 
for  peace. 


COMMUNIQUE, 

NORTH  ATLANTIC  COUNCIL, 

DEC.  14,  1979 

1.  The  North  Atlantic  Council  met  in 
Ministerial  session  in  Brussels  on  13th  and 
14th  December  1979. 

Ministers  accepted  with  pleasure  the 
invitation  of  the  Turkish  Government  to 
hold  the  next  Ministerial  session  of  the 
North  Atlantic  Council  in  Ankara  in  the 
spring  of  1980. 

2.  Ministers  renewed  their  faith  in  the 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  which  guarantees  the 
freedom,  security  and  well-being  of  their 
peoples  and  the  preservation  of  peace  and 
international  stability.  Because  their  gov- 
ernments are  based  on  the  consent  of  their 
peoples,  on  democratic  institutions  and  on 
the  principle  of  equality  and  the  rule  of  law, 
the  members  of  the  Alliance  have  the 
strength,  enhanced  by  the  will  to  assist  each 
other,  to  face  the  challenges  which  lie  ahead. 
Looking  forward  to  the  1980's,  Ministers 
expressed  their  confidence  that,  by  main- 
taining the  strength  and  cohesion  of  their 
Alliance  and  pursuing  the  complementary 
goals  of  arms  control,  disarmament  and  the 
improvement  of  relations  between  East  and 
West  in  general,  their  governments  would 
continue  to  make  a  major  contribution  to 
peace  and  stability  in  Europe  and  the  world. 

3.  Reviewing  developments  in  East- 
West  relations  since  they  last  met.  Ministers 
noted  that  the  conclusions  of  the  study  un- 
dertaken in  1978  remain  valid.  They  recalled 
their  commitment  to  detente  and  stressed 


the  defensive  nature  of  the  Alliance.  Evt-nt 
since  their  previous  meeting  showed  the 
continuing  influence  of  forces  not  eonduciv 
to  the  consolidation  of  international  stabilii 
and  security.  They  expressed  concern  o\r 
the  direct  or  indirect  actions  of  the  Soviet 
Union  and  some  of  its  Allies  in  a  number  t 
troubled  areas  concurrently  with  a  very  co 
siderable  build-up,  both  qualitative  and 
quantitative,  in  Warsaw  Pact  military 
strength,  and  particularly  with  growing 
Soviet  theatre  nuclear  and  conventional 
capabilities.  Ministers  noted  that  these  de 
velopments  were  a  cause  for  legitimate  di: 
quiet  and  were  not  compatible  either  with 
assurances  by  the  Warsaw  Pact  countries 
that  they  do  not  seek  military  superiority  i 
with  their  publicly-declared  intention  to 
promote  detente,  particularly  in  the  milita 
sphere.  Ministers  reiterated  their  view  th 
detente  must  be  worldwide  and  indivisible 
character. 

4.  Ministers  confirmed  that  their  gov 
ernments  were  resolved  to  take  steps  to  r 
duce  the  growing  imbalance  of  forces  by 
proving  their  military  capabilities  and  thu 
maintain  an  adequate  level  of  deterrence 
and  defence  across  the  full  spectrum.  The 
recalled  the  determination  of  their  goverr 
ments  to  achieve,  as  a  key  element  in  con 
ventional  force  modernization,  more  effec 
tive  use  of  available  resources  through 
co-operative  equipment  programmes  and 
increased  standardization  and  interopera- 
bility of  weapons  systems.  They  noted  wi 
satisfaction  the  initial  progress  that  has 
been  achieved  in  these  respects,  they  re- 
peated that  through  the  transatlantic 
dialogue  they  would  continue  to  work  to- 
wards more  balanced  relations  among  the 
European  and  North  American  members 
the  Alliance  in  the  field  of  armaments  de- 
velopment and  production  in  order  to  en- 
hance the  availability  and  quality  of  new 
defence  equipment.  They  noted  the  contr 
bution  which  is  being  made  by  the  Confer 
ence  of  National  Armaments  Directors  in 
this  respect,  and  the  need  to  bear  in  mine 
the  interests  of  the  less  industrialized  me 
bers  of  the  Alliance. 

5.  Ministers  believed  that  efforts  to 
achieve  agreement  in  fields  of  arms  contr 
disarmament  and  confidence  building  shoi 
go  hand  in  hand  with  defence  efforts  of  tl 
Allies.  They  noted  that  recent  proposals  p 
forward  by  the  Eastern  countries  echoed 
part  the  Western  proposals  and  they  saw 
them  a  hopeful  indication  of  the  evolution 
these  countries  towards  a  more  positive  a 
titude  in  the  search  for  common  ground. 
Ministers  considered  ways  of  advancing  a 
propriate  discussions  and  negotiations 

6.  Ministers  recalled  that  the  Strateg 
Arms  Limitation  Treaty  (SALT  II)  signe( 
by  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Unio 
on  18th  June  reflected  their  desire  for 
genuine  arms  control  measures  which  shoi 
contribute  to  the  stability  of  East- West  r 
lations.  Ministers  observed  that  the  Trea 
makes  it  possible  to  maintain  a  strong  US 
strategic  nuclear  deterrent,  which  remair 
vital  to  the  defence  of  the  Alliance.  Thus 
this  Treaty,  which  will  have  the  effect  of 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


Europe 


ciii-l)ing  the  build-up  of  strategic  nuclear 
\M':i|i(ins  in  the  world,  improves  the  pros- 
prits  for  detente  without  jeopardizing  the 
-I nirity  interests  of  the  members  of  the  Al- 
lien, r.  Ministers  expressed  the  hope  that 
ihr  Freaty  would  soon  come  into  force.  They 
1( Hiked  forward  to  the  early  continuation  of 
the  SALT  process,  on  the  basis  of  further 
close  consultations  within  the  Alliance, 
leading  to  additional  United  States  and 
Soviet  reductions  and  qualitative  limitations 
in  the  nuclear  field.  They  also  expressed  the 
belief  that  ratification  of  the  Treaty  would 
contribute  to  other  possibilities  of  progress 
in  the  field  of  arms  control. 

7.  Ministers  believed  that  the  process 
initiated  by  the  Conference  on  Security  and 
Co-operation  in  Europe  made  a  most  valu- 
able contribution  to  the  strengthening  of  de- 
tente, and  offered  further  opportunities  to 
develop  existing  and  new  areas  of  dialogue 
in  the  search  for  agreement.  They  expressed 
the  hope  that  the  CSCE  follow-up  meeting 
to  be  held  at  Madrid  in  1980  will  be  a  major 
step  forward  in  that  process.  Tangible  prog- 
ress in  the  meantime  in  implementing  the 
orinciples  and  provisions  of  the  Final  Act 
ind  adequate  preparation  are  of  great  im- 
)ertance  for  the  success  of  the  Madrid 
iieeting  and  could  provide  a  basis  for  par- 
icipation  at  the  political  level.  Although 
here  have  been  certain  welcome  measures 
if  relief,  in  particular  the  granting  of  am- 
lesty,  and  some  improvement  in  other 
"ields.  Ministers  noted  with  concern  that  in 

ertain  countries  the  situation  remained 
msatisfactory  or  had  even  deteriorated  as 
egards  respect  for  human  rights  and  fun- 
lamental  freedoms,  including  cases  where 
itizens  continue  to  be  subject  to  harassment 
md  imprisonment  for  no  reason  other  than 
heir  efforts  to  bring  about  the  full  im- 
ilementation  of  the  Final  Act.  Ministers  also 
loted  that  process  in  the  field  of  human  con- 
acts  was  uneven  and  expressed  their  con- 
•ern  that  the  level  of  implementation  of  the 
)rovisions  dealing  with  a  freer  flow  of  in- 
ormation  and  working  conditions  for  jour- 
lalists  had  remained  low  and,  in  some  cases, 
lad  deteriorated.  They  noted  with  satisfac- 
ion,  however,  that  the  Final  Act  increas- 
ngly  has  become  the  standard  by  which  the 
.ctions  of  signatory  states  are  judged. 

8.  Ministers  expressed  their  intention  to 
(evote  increasing  efforts  to  preparations  for 
Ihe  Madrid  meeting  during  the  period 
Ihead,  emphasizing  the  importance  of  con- 
ultations  among  Allies  as  well  as  with  the 
'ther  participating  states  and  of  maintaining 
lalance  among  all  sections  of  the  Final  Act. 
''hey  confirmed  that  they  intended  to  ap- 
proach and  conduct  the  Madrid  meeting  in  a 
onstructive  frame  of  mind  and  in  a  manner 
ihich  would  permit  a  thorough,  frank  and 
neasured  review  of  the  implementation  of 

11  provisions  of  the  Final  Act.  In  this  spirit, 
hey  will  be  ready  to  put  forward  new  pro- 
posals and  to  discuss  proposals  from  other 
'articipants  calculated  to  bring  concrete  and 
lalanced  progress  in  all  fields  covered  by 
'■  he  Final  Act  and  thereby  contribute  to  the 
itality  of  the  CSCE  process.  Ministers  rec- 


■ebruary  1980 


ognized  the  importance  for  the  Alliance  of 
developing  the  confidence  building  measures 
and  the  other  provisions  of  the  Final  Act 
relating  to  certain  aspects  of  security  and 
disarmament,  and  hoped  for  concrete  results 
in  this  regard  at  the  Madrid  meeting. 

They  reviewed  with  interest  the  pro- 
posals made  in  these  fields  by  different 
CSCE  participants,  whether  Western,  neu- 
tral and  non-aligned  or  Warsaw  Pact  coun- 
tries, including  those  made  by  the  latter  in 
May  and  December  1979.  They  considered 
that  the  proposal  for  a  Conference  on  Dis- 
armament in  Europe  put  forward  by  France 
is  a  useful  concept  providing  a  basis  upon 
which  to  continue  developing  their  approach 
in  this  field  to  bring  about  such  a  confer- 
ence. 

They  agreed  to  work  towards  the  adop- 
tion during  the  Madrid  meeting,  as  part  of  a 
balanced  outcome,  of  a  mandate  for  further 
negotiations  under  the  aegis  of  the  CSCE  on 
military  significant  and  verifiable  confidence 
building  measures,  applicable  to  the  entire 
continent  of  Europe.  These,  if  agreed,  would 
help  create  conditions  conducive  to  limita- 
tion and  reduction  of  arms  in  the  same  geo- 
graphical area.  This  process  should  take  ac- 
count of  both  the  varied  aspects  of  the 
existing  security  situation  and  of  the  current 
negotiations  on  other  aspects  of  arms  control 
and  disarmament  concerning  the  European 
continent. 

9.  The  Ministers  of  countries  par- 
ticipating in  the  negotiations  on  Mutual  and 
Balanced  Force  Reductions  reemphasized 
their  determination  to  work  for  a  successful 
outcome  which  would  enhance  stability, 
peace  and  security  in  Europe.  They  noted, 
however,  their  concern  that  despite  repre- 
sentations made  at  the  highest  level  by 
Western  leaders  to  the  Eastern  partici- 
pants, the  East  has  made  no  effort  to  re- 
solve the  data  question.  These  Ministers 
noted  that  agreement  on  the  starting  size  of 
forces  to  be  reduced  is  not  only  an  essential 
prerequisite  to  any  reductions,  but  can  also 
serve  to  build  confidence  that  a  reduction 
agreement  is  being  observed  and  that 
mutual  security  is  being  enhanced. 

In  order  to  advance  the  negotiations 
toward  an  early  result,  these  Ministers  ap- 
proved a  proposal  for  an  interim  Phase  I 
agreement  consistent  with  the  objectives  of 
their  governments  in  the  negotiations,  in 
particular  the  establishment  of  parity  in  the 
form  of  a  common  collective  ceiling  on 
ground  force  manpower  and  agreement  on  a 
combined  common  collective  ceiling  on  air 
and  ground  force  manpower  of  each  side  in 
the  area  of  reductions.  Their  new  initiative 
aims  at  simplifying  existing  proposals  for  a 
Phase  I  agreement  by  focussing  on  US  and 
Soviet  manpower  withdrawals  and  lim- 
itations, based  on  agreed  US-Soviet  data, 
and  on  associated  measures  applied  on  a 
multilateral  basis.  This  interim  Phase  I 
agreement  would  open  the  way  for  a 
subsequent  Phase  II  agreement,  based  on 
agreed  overall  data,  providing  for  a  common 
collective  ceiling  on  ground  force  manpower 


for  each  side  at  approximately  700,000  and 
for  agreement  on  a  combined  common  collec- 
tive ceiling  on  air  and  ground  force  man- 
power for  each  side  at  approximately 
900,000. 

These  Ministers  called  attention  to  the 
package  of  associated  measures  which  forms 
an  integral  part  of  their  proposal  for  an 
interim  Phase  I  agreement.  This  package  of 
measures  is  designed  to  promote  military 
stability  and  confidence,  to  ensure  adequate 
verification  of  an  MBFR  agreement  and  to 
help  safeguard  undiminished  security  for 
flank  countries. 

These  Ministers  urged  Eastern  partici- 
pants to  give  prompt  and  serious  considera- 
tion to  their  initiative,  which  takes  account 
of  negotiating  proposals  of  both  sides  and 
which  is  in  accordance  with  the  agreed  aim 
of  the  negotiations  to  contribute  to  the  crea- 
tion of  a  more  stable  relationship  and  to  the 
strengthening  of  peace  and  security  in 
Europe.  They  view  this  new  Western  initia- 
tive as  an  integral  part  of  the  arms  control 
initiatives  agreed  upon  during  this  Ministe- 
rial meeting. 

10.  Turning  to  the  question  of  negotia- 
tions on  disarmament  and  arms  limitation  in 
other  fora.  Ministers  reaffirmed  the  impor- 
tance which  they  attached  to  the  adoption  of 
effective,  balanced  and  verifiable  measures. 
They  welcomed  as  positive  elements  the  dis- 
cussions during  the  first  session  of  the 
Committee  on  Disarmament  in  Geneva  and 
the  deliberations  of  the  Disarmament  Com- 
mission in  New  York.  They  attached  impor- 
tance to  the  frequent  and  active  consultative 
on  these  questions  within  the  permanent 
machinery  of  the  Alliance. 

11.  Ministers  discussed  developments 
with  regard  to  Berlin  and  Germany  as  a 
whole.  They  noted  that  since  their  last 
meeting  the  climate  in  and  around  Berlin 
had  continued  to  remain  relatively  calm. 
Ministers  reaffirmed  their  conviction  that  an 
undisturbed  situation  in  Berlin  and  on  the 
access  routes  is  an  essential  element  of  de- 
tente, security  and  cooperation  in  Europe, 
and  noted  the  continuing  relevance  of  the 
London  declaration  of  9  May  1977  and  the 
Tokyo  declaration  of  29  June  1979.  Ministers 
noted  with  satisfaction  the  improved  climate 
in  the  relations  between  the  two  German 
states  after  a  period  of  reserve  and  wel- 
comed the  conclusion  of  new  agreements  and 
the  continuation  of  negotiations.  Ministers 
consider  this  as  a  positive  element  in  the 
process  of  detente  in  Europe,  having  at  the 
same  time  beneficial  effects  for  Berlin. 

12.  Ministers  noted  the  report  on  the 
situation  in  the  Mediterranean  prepared  on 
their  instructions  and  underlined  again  the 
necessity  of  maintaining  the  balance  of 
forces  in  the  whole  area.  They  requested  the 
Council  in  permanent  session  to  continue  to 
consult  on  the  question  and  submit  a  further 
report  at  their  next  meeting. 

13.  Ministers  welcomed  the  continuation 
of  the  dialogue  between  Greece  and  Turkey 
in  search  of  a  peaceful  solution  to  the  differ- 
ences between  the  two  countries  and  they 
expressed  the  hope  that  in  this  manner  posi- 
tive results  could  be  attained  in  the  near 
future. 


21 


Europe 


14.  Ministers  considered  a  report  by  the 
Secretary  General  on  the  particular  prob- 
lems faced  by  economically  less  advanced 
member  countries  which  constitutes  a  sound 
basis  for  action.  While  noting  with  satisfac- 
tion the  special  efforts  that  had  been  made 
over  recent  months,  they  stressed  the  need 
to  give  further  momentum  to  the  efforts  to 
provide,  in  the  spirit  of  Article  2  of  the 
North  Atlantic  Treaty,  assistance  to  those 
countries,  so  as  to  reach  concrete  and  timely 
results.  They  reaffirmed  their  continuing 
political  support  for  this  process  which  w-ill, 
indeed,  constitute  an  essential  element  for 
the  fulfillment  of  the  contributions  by  those 
countries  to  collective  defence. 

15.  With  respect  to  the  Middle  East,  the 
Ministers  affirmed  the  importance  of 
elaborating  and  implementing  a  just,  lasting 
and  comprehensive  settlement  of  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict  on  the  basis  of  Resolutions 
242  and  338  and  with  the  participation  of  all 
the  parties  concerned,  including  representa- 
tives of  the  Palestinian  people.  Ministers 
noted  with  satisfaction  the  progress 
achieved  by  Egypt  and  Israel  in  the  im- 
plementation of  Resolution  242  insofar  as 
their  mutual  relations  are  concerned.  They 
reaffirmed  that  a  lasting  peace  requires  the 
solution  of  the  Palestinian  problem  in  all  its 
aspects  and  the  achievement  of  the  legiti- 
mate rights  of  the  Palestinian  people  in  the 
context  of  a  negotiated  settlement  that  en- 
sures the  security  of  all  states  in  the  region 
including  Israel. 

16.  Ministers  warmly  welcomed  the 
agreement  reached  in  the  constitutional 
conference  on  Rhodesia.  They  expressed  the 
hope  that  the  cease-fire  proposals  agreed  at 
that  conference  would  quickly  become  fully 
effective,  and  that  peace  would  return  to 
Rhodesia  and  the  neighboring  countries. 
Ministers  looked  forward  to  the  day  when 
the  independent  Republic  of  Zimbabwe 
would  take  its  place  as  a  full  member  of  the 
international  community. 

17.  Ministers,  recalling  that  the  Com- 
mittee on  the  Challenges  of  Modern  Society 
(CCMS)  had  been  set  up  in  1969,  took  note 
of  the  Committee's  achievements  during  its 
first  ten  years.  They  commended  its  innova- 
tive and  flexible  approach  to  many  problems 
of  the  human  environment  in  fields  such  as 
energy  conservation,  alternative  energy 
sources  and  pollution.  Ministers  noted  the 
studies  launched  in  1979,  including  those  of 
the  restoration  and  conservation  of  monu- 
ments, and  on  man's  impact  on  the  strato- 
sphere, as  well  as  projected  studies  on  the 
management  of  technology. 

18.  The  Ministers  who  participated  in 
the  special  meeting  of  Foreign  and  Defence 
Ministers  on  12th  December,  1979  noted 
with  satisfaction  that  the  decisions  taken 
today  by  the  North  Atlantic  Council  in  their 
opinion  complemented  those  adopted  at  that 
meeting.  Taken  together,  along  with  con- 
tinuing activities  flowing  from  decisions 
reached  at  the  London  and  Washington 
meetings,  they  constitute  a  comprehensive 
programme  of  action.  This  programme  com- 
prises measures  to  reduce  the  military  im- 
balance through  concrete  improvement  and 
modernization  of  long-range  theatre  nuclear 
and  conventional  forces,  and  the  following 


22 


w'ide  range  of  initiatives  particularly  in  the 
fields  of  confidence  building  and  arms  con- 
trol designed  to  improve  mutual  security 
and  co-operation  in  Europe: 

•  An  offer  to  negotiate  for  substantial 
reductions  in  the  level  of  long-range  theatre 
nuclear  forces  as  well  as  intercontinental 
strategic  forces  within  the  framework  of 
SALT  III; 

•  Unilateral  withdrawal  of  one  thousand 
US  nuclear  warheads  from  Europe  as  part  of 
the  12th  December  decision; 

•  A  proposal  for  an  interim  Phase  I 
agreement  for  mutual  and  balanced  force  re- 
ductions, designed  to  give  fresh  impetus  to 
the  MBFR  negotiations; 

•  A  proposal  for  a  package  of  associated 
measures  in  MBFR  designed  to  ensure  com- 
pliance with  the  agreement  and  to  make 
military  activities  more  transparent, 
thereby  improving  mutual  confidence; 

•  In  furtherance  of  the  CSCE  process, 
readiness  to  examine  proposals  concerning 
confidence  building  measures  and  a  confer- 
ence on  disarmament  in  Europe. 

These  Ministers  are  determined  that  the 
1980's  should  see  a  fundamental  change  for 
the  better  in  the  situation  between  East  and 
West  and  will  make  every  effort  to  bring 
this  about.  The  programme  of  action  which 
they  envisage  offers  the  best  opportunity  for 
creating  more  constructive  relations  be- 
tween East  and  West  for  which  their  citi- 
zens have  hoped  for  so  long. 

These  Ministers  considered  that  this 
programme  represents  a  major  new  oppor- 
tunity for  the  countries  of  the  Warsaw  Pact 
to  translate  into  action  the  interest  they 
have  signalled  in  improving  the  situation  in 
Europe.  They  call  on  the  Warsaw  Pact  Gov- 
ernments to  respond  to  this  offer  by  making 
a  determined  effort,  in  all  available 
negotiating  fora,  to  achieve  substantial  re- 
sults which  will  enhance  security  and  mutual 
trust. 


SECRETARY'S  NEWS 
CONFERENCE, 
DEC.  14,  1979 

Let  me  say  at  the  outset  that  I  believe 
that  this  has  been  one  of  the  most  pro- 
ductive ministerial  meetings  of  NATO 
in  many  years.  The  achievements  were 
solid,  and  a  sense  of  common  purpose 
was  impressively  high.  After  this 
meeting  and  the  NATO  summit  meet- 
ings in  1977  and  in  1978,  I  think  we  can 
say  that  we  have  set  the  alliance  on  a 
sound  course  for  the  next  decade. 

Let  me  review  for  you  briefly,  be- 
fore we  get  into  the  questions,  what  has 
taken  place. 

On  Wednesday  [December  12],  as 
you  all  know,  the  Ministers  reached 
agreement  on  an  important  program  to 
modernize  the  theater  nuclear  forces 
and  to  start  negotiations  on  limiting 


theater  nuclear  forces  in  the  SALT  III 
framework.  Yesterday,  the  alliance  is- 
sued a  declaration  on  the  situation  in 
Iran,  and  we  had  a  very  useful  discus- 
sion of  this  subject,  and  I  was  heart- 
ened by  the  support  shown  us  by  all  of 
those  around  the  table. 

Today  the  alliance  has  issued  a 
communique  which  I  think  you  have 
probably  now  seen  which  presents,  in 
my  judgment,  a  challenge  to  the  War- 
saw Pact  to  translate  into  action  the 
interest  that  they  have  signaled  in  im- 
prciving  the  situation  in  Europe. 

The  Ministers  have  agreed  on  a 
comprehensive  program  of  action  in  the 
field  of  arms  control  which  is  designed 
to  improve  security  and  cooperation  in 
Europe,  and  I'll  sketch  very  briefly  for 
you  the  principal  items  of  this  com- 
prehensive program. 

The  first  is  an  offer  for  substantial 
reductions  in  the  level  of  long-range 
theater  nuclear  forces  as  well  as  inter- 
continental strategic  forces  to  be  dis- 
cussed within  the  framework  of  SALT 
III. 

Next,  a  withdrawal  of  1,000  U.S. 
nuclear  warheads  from  Europe  as  part 
of  the  theater  nuclear  decisions  which 
were  taken  on  Wednesday. 

Third,  a  proposal  for  an  interim 
phase-one  agreement  for  mutual  and 
balanced  force  reductions  designed  to 
give  fresh  impetus  to  the  MBFR 
negotiations. 

Next,  a  proposal  for  a  package  of 
associated  measures  in  MBFR  designed 
to  insure  compliance  with  the  agree- 
ment and  to  make  military  activities 
more  transparent  and,  as  a  result,  pro- 
ducing and  improving  mutual  confi- 
dence. 

And  finally,  in  furtherance  of  the 
CSCE  process,  readiness  to  examine 
proposals  concerning  confidence  meas- 
ures and  a  conference  on  disarmament 
in  Europe. 

The  United  States  will  be  shortly 
transmitting  to  the  Soviet  Union  the 
communique  of  the  December  12  meet- 
ing which  contains  the  decision  taken 
by  the  United  States  following  consul- 
tations within  the  alliance  to  negotiate 
arms  limitations  on  long-range  theater 
nuclear  forces,  and  to  propose  to  the 
Soviet  Union  to  begin  negotiations  as 
soon  as  possible  along  the  lines  con- 
tained in  the  December  12  communiciue 

We  also  promptly  moved  within  the 
alliance  to  implement  the  December  12 
decision  by  constituting  a  special 
high-level  consultative  body  to  support 
the  U.S.  negotiating  effort  on  theater 
nuclear  weapons  in  SALT  III.  I  think  it 
is  a  comprehensive  and  a  very  impor- 


Department  of  State  Bulleti: 


Europe 


tant  program  which  was  unanimously 
supported  today. 

Q.  The  American  proposal  for  de- 
ploying missiles  in  Western  Europe 
was  put  forward  on  the  theory  that  it 
would  stimulate  arms  negotiations 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  And  yet  the 
reaction  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  their 
allies  has  been  a  negative  one.  Do  you 
take  that  reaction  as  being  just  an  in- 
stant reaction,  or  does  it  suggest 
something  about  their  unwillingness 
to  see  the  proposal  the  way  you  do 
and  to  negotiate? 

A.  I  take  it  as  an  initial  reaction.  It 
is  my  judgment  that  when  they  see  and 
study  the  proposal  that  has  been  put 
forward  that  they  will  treat  it  as  a  seri- 
ous proposal,  and  I  believe  that  it  does 
form  the  basis  for  negotiations  between 
the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States 
acting  in  consultation  with  its  allies. 

Q.  What  effect  do  you  think 
events  in  Iran  will  have  on  the  au- 
tonomy negotiations  for  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza,  because  the  U.S. 
chief  negotiator  is  a  pessimist  re- 
garding the  May  25  target  date? 

A.  I  do  not  think  that  the  situation 
in  Iran  will  affect  the  negotiations  on 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  As  to  whether 
or  not  the  May  target  date  can  be  met, 
I  think  it's  too  early  yet  to  see.  We've 
always  said  that  that  was  going  to  be  a 
v'ei-y  difficult  set  of  negotiations.  There 
are  very  tough  issues  to  be  resolved  in 
those  negotiations.  Some  progress  has 
oeen  made.  There's  a  long  way  to  go  on 
:hat  road.  People  are  going  to  do  their 
Dest  to  meet  that  target  date.  I  can't 
say  for  sure  whether  it  can  be  met  or 
not. 

Q.  Did  you  say  that  the  negotia- 
tions about  the  reduction  of  the 
long-range  theater  nuclear  forces  will 
take  place  in  the  framework  of  SALT 
III?  Does  that  mean  that  nothing  can 
be  started  until  SALT  II  is  ratified  by 
the  U.S.  Senate? 

A.  What  it  means  is  that  we  will 
;tart  consultations  with  our  allies  in 
January  in  the  consultative  group  which 
referred  to  earlier,  and  there  will  be 
onstant  consultations  with  them  on  a 
-egular  and  periodic  basis.  I  would  say 
;hat  they  would  occur  at  least  at  a 
quarterly  basis  and  my  guess  is  more 
requently. 

In  addition  to  that,  I  intend  to 
•ommunicate  to  the  Soviet  Union  in  a 
"ew  days — probably  next  Monday — the 
proposal  which  resulted  from  our  delib- 
rations  here.  I  think  it  is  possible  to 
lave  preliminary  discussions,  but  in- 


sofar as  actual  negotiations  are  con- 
cerned they  would  await  the  start  of 
the  SALT  III  negotiations. 

Q.  Does  the  United  States  now 
contemplate,  either  in  SALT  or  in 
these  theater  nuclear  force  negotia- 
tions, adding  our  forward  base  sys- 
tems to  the  mix  in  exchange  perhaps 
for  the  Backfire? 

A.  Insofar  as  the  Backfire  is  con- 
cerned, as  I  indicated  yesterday. 
Backfire  is  one  of  the  issues  which  must 
be  taken  care  of  in  the  SALT  III 
negotiations,  and  it  is  a  key  and  impor- 
tant issue.  On  the  question  of  forward 
base  systems,  they  were  e.xcluded  from 
the  prior  negotiations.  We  will  have  to 
wait  and  see  what  the  Soviet  position  is 
in  the  SALT  III  negotiations. 

Q.  Some  U.S.  officials  in  recent 
weeks  have  characterized  the  NATO 
arms  control  package  as  the  most 
comprehensive  arms  control  proposal 
ever  made  concerning  Europe.  Would 
you  agree  with  that  characterization? 

A.  That  what  we  arrived  at  today 
is  the  most  comprehensive?  Yes,  I 
think  it  is  because  it's  a  comprehensive 
proposal  that  cuts  across  the  entire 
spectrum.  And  when  you  see  that,  also 
coupled  with  the  fact  that  insofar  as 
central  systems  are  concerned — we  will 
be  discussing  central  systems  as 
well — it  is  indeed  the  most  comprehen- 
sive that's  ever  been  put  forward. 

Q.  Could  you  repeat  the  concrete 
proposals  you  are  going  with  to  Mos- 
cow which  were  very  vague  in  the 
communique?  Could  you  be  more  con- 
crete on  that? 

A.  I  think  it's  quite  concrete.  I've 
just  been  through  an  outline;  what  all 
they  covered  just  a  moment  ago. 

Q.  If  we  now  add  yet  another 
echelon  in  the  disarmament  field  of  a 
conference — the  35  nation 
conference — how  are  you  going  to 
keep  the  kind  of  lines  of  what  each  is 
doing  clear?  What's  the  point  of  add- 
ing yet  another  conference  to  this 
process? 

A.  The  negotiations  with  respect  to 
theater  nuclear  forces  do  add  a  com- 
plexity to  the  discussions  in  SALT  III. 
There's  no  question  about  that.  And  it 
will  be  a  much  more  complex  set  of 
negotiations  than  were  the  negotiations 
in  SALT  II,  because  they  include  not 
only  central  systems  but  theater  sys- 
tems as  well.  Insofar  as  the  question  of 
a  conference  on  disarmament  is  con- 
cerned, that  I  think  is  a  constructive 


idea  which  has  been  put  forward  by 
France,  and  it's  a  useful  concept  which 
may  provide  a  basis  for  putting 
forward — on  which  to  continue  de- 
veloping their  approach  in  this  field  to 
bring  about  a  conference  where  one 
could  discuss  confidence-building 
measures. 

Q.  Would  you  please  outline  for 
us  what  you  think  the  accom- 
plishments have  been  this  week  in 
terms  of  your  efforts  to  get  the  hos- 
tages in  Iran  free  and  what  future 
steps  are  contemplated? 

A.  I  have  had  a  series  of  very  use- 
ful meetings  with  a  number  of  the  heads 
of  government  of  several  of  the  Euro- 
pean nations.  In  this  I  have  been  able 
to  explore  with  them  the  current  state 
of  the  discussions  and  activities  which 
are  going  on  in  the  diplomatic  field  and 
various  actions  which  are  underway  and 
various  actions  which  are  contem- 
plated. This  has  been  very  useful  to  us 
in  helping  to  chart  our  own  course  of 
action,  and  I  have  been  very  pleased  by 
the  solidarity  that  I  have  found  in  the 
discussions  with  the  various  heads  of 
government. 

In  addition  to  that  I  haVe  had  a 
chance  here  to  meet  with  the  Foreign 
Ministers  of  the  14  nations  and  to  dis- 
cuss with  them  also,  in  a  very  full  but 
less  detailed  sense,  the  same  matters 
which  I  discussed  with  the  heads  of 
state.  I  think  I  have  outlined  to  them 
not  only  what  the  situation  is  but  what 
the  immediate  prospects  are  for  the 
days  immediately  ahead  of  us,  and, 
again,  I  feel  encouraged  by  the  very 
obvious  and  clear  solidarity  that  was 
shown  by  all  of  our  allies. 

Q.  You  are  speaking  of  solidarity. 
What  I  want  to  know  is  really 
whether  you  have  asked,  and  whether 
you  got  some  support  by  the  Euro- 
pean governments,  in  joining  the 
United  States  of  America,  if  eventu- 
ally you  will  decide  to  apply  sanctions 
against  Iran. 

A.  I  have  discussed  with  our  col- 
leagues the  possibility  of  having  to  go 
to  the  Security  Council  for  chapter  7 
sanctions  if  action  is  not  forthcoming  in 
the  release  of  the  hostages.  And  I  have 
discussed  that  at  quite  some  length 
with  not  only  the  Foreign  Ministers  but 
with  the  heads  of  government,  and  I 
have  been  much  encouraged  by  the  re- 
sponse I've  gotten.  ■ 


'  Press  release  326  of  Dec.  19,  1979. 

^  Issued  at  the  conclusion  of  the  joint 
meeting  of  NATO  Foreign  and  Defense 
Ministers. 


-ebruary  1980 


23 


Europe 


Visit  of  British 
Prime  IMinister 
Thatcher 


Prime  Minister  Margaret  Thatcher 
of  the  United  Kingdom  made  an  official 
visit  to  the  United  States  December 
16-18.  1979.  While  in  Washington. 
D.C.  (Dec.  16-17),  she  met  with  Presi- 
dent Carter  and  other  government  offi- 
cials. Following  is  the  te.vt  of  the  White 
House  statement  issued  on  December 
18.' 

The  President  met  December  17  with 
Prime  Minister  Margaret  Thatcher  of 
the  United  Kingdom.  Prime  Minister 
Thatcher  is  making  an  official  visit  to 
the  United  States,  her  first  to  this 
country  as  Prime  Minister. 

The  President  and  the  Prime 
Minister  reviewed  the  exceptionally 
close  relations  between  their  two  coun- 
tries and  discussed  a  number  of  key 
world  issues  which  are  of  particular 
concern  to  both.  These  included  the 
Iran  crisis,  the  Rhodesia  settlement. 
Middle  East,  Northern  Ireland,  theater 
nuclear  force  modernization  and  arms 
control,  strategic  cooperation,  SALT, 
the  comprehensive  test  ban  talks,  in- 
ternational economic  issues  and  energy, 
common  approaches  to  the  Caribbean 
and  aid  to  developing  countries,  trans- 
Atlantic  defense  trade,  and  bilateral 
economic  and  commercial  issues. 

The  President  e.xpressed  his  ap- 
preciation and  that  of  the  entire  Ameri- 
can people  for  the  United  Kingdom's 
assistance  and  support  in  connection 
with  the  international  effort  to  secure 
release  of  American  hostages  held  by 
Iran  in  defiance  of  universally  accepted 
standards  of  decency  and  law.  The 
President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
agreed  that  the  principle  of  civilized 
behavior  and  the  rule  of  law,  vital  to 
the  whole  world  community,  is  at  stake 
in  the  present  crisis.  The  Prime  Minis- 
ter made  it  clear  that  Britain  shared 
the  anguish  of  America  and  would  do  its 
utmost  to  convince  the  Iranian  au- 
thorities to  release  all  the  hostages 
unharmed. 

The  President  congratulated  the 
Prime  Minister  on  her  government's 
vigorous  role  in  the  Lancaster  House 
negotiations  and  the  potential  these 
have  for  contributing  to  peace  and  sta- 
bility in  southern  Africa.  The  Prime 
Minister  e.xpressed  warm  appreciation 
for  the  full  support  of  the  United  States 
for  an  all-party  solution  to  outstanding 


24 


issues  and  its  readiness  to  promote  fur- 
ther progress  in  Rhodesia  toward  a 
fully  democratic,  independent  state, 
within  the  framework  of  the  arrange- 
ments agreed  upon  by  the  parties  di- 
rectly concerned. 

The  Prime  Minister  explained  the 
British  Government's  recent  political 
initiative  in  proposing  a  conference  of 
the  principal  political  parties  in  North- 
ern Ireland  with  the  aim  of  finding  an 
acceptable  way  of  giving  the  people  of 
Northern  Ireland  more  responsibility 
for  their  own  affairs.  Both  leaders  con- 
demned support  for  organizations  and 
individuals  engaged  directly  or  indi- 
rectly in  campaigns  of  violence  and 
agi'eed  that  such  campaigns  only  delay 
the  day  when  peace  and  reconciliation 
can  come  to  Northern  Ireland.  The 
President  reaffirmed  U.S.  policy  con- 
cerning the  tragic  problem  of  Northern 
Ireland  as  set  forth  in  this  statement  of 
August  1977. 

In  security  matters  directly  af- 
fecting their  two  countries,  the  Presi- 
dent and  the  Prime  Minister:  (1) 
applauded  the  decision  taken  last  week 
by  NATO  governments  to  proceed  with 
effective  modernization  and  deployment 
of  theater  nuclear  forces  and  with  arms 
control  proposals  designed  to  reduce, 
on  a  basis  of  equality,  nuclear  weapons 
of  both  NATO  and  the  Warsaw  Pact;  (2) 
agreed  that  the  earliest  possible  ratifi- 
cation of  the  SALT  II  treaty  would  sig- 
nificantly contribute  to  a  safer  and 
more  stable  international  security 
environment. 

The  President  and  Prime  Minister 
agreed  on  the  importance  of  maintain- 
ing a  credible  British  strategic  deter- 
rent force  and  U.S. -U.K.  strategic 
cooperation.  The  leaders  agreed  that 


Prime  Minister  Thatcher  and 
President  Carter. 


their  governments  should  continue 
their  discussions  of  the  most  appropri- 
ate means  of  achieving  these  objectives 
for  the  future.  In  this  connection  the 
President  and  Prime  Minister  discussed 
the  importance  of  increased  efforts  to 
strengthen  NATO's  defenses,  both  nu- 
clear and  conventional.  The  President 
reviewed  the  new  U.S.  5-year  defense 
plan,  noting  that  in  order  to  carry  out 
that  plan  the  United  States  will  be  in- 
creasing defense  spending,  in  real 
terms,  steadily  over  the  next  5  years. 

The  President  and  Prime  Minister 
reaffirmed  their  strong  support  for  the 
NATO  Long-Term  Defense  Program 
and  for  the  NATO  aim  of  3%  real 
growth  in  annual  defense  spending.  The 
Prime  Minister  noted  plans  for  further 
significant  increases  in  the  U.K.  de- 
fense budget  to  improve  the  effective- 
ness of  United  Kingdom  conventional 
forces,  including  provision  of  modern- 
ized e(|uipment  and  reserves.  The 
Prime  Minister  agreed  that  it  was  es- 
sential for  America's  European  allies  to 
share  ecjuitably  in  any  collective  de- 
fense buildup  to  meet  the  needs  of  the 
common  defense. 

During  her  visit  to  the  United 
States,  the  Prime  Minister  is  also 
meeting  with  Secretary  of  Defense 
Brown,  Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff,  General  Jones,  and  other  senior 
defense  officials;  Members  of  Congress; 
Chairman  Volcker  of  the  Federal  Re- 
serve Board;  U.N.  Secretary  General 
Waldheim,  and  the  President  of  the 
U.N.  General  Assembly. 

Prime  Minister  Thatcher  invited 
the  President  to  visit  the  United  King- 
dom at  a  mutually  agreeable  date,  and 
the  President  accepted  the  invitation 
with  pleasure.  ■ 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Dec.  24,  1979, 
which  also  contains  President  Carter's  and 
Prime  Minister  Thatcher's  exchange  of  re- 
marks at  the  arrival  ceremony  and  following 
a  meeting  on  Dec.  17  and  their  toasts  at  the 
state  dinner  that  evening. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Europe 


U.S.-U.K.  Atomic 
Energy  Agreement 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
NOV.  28.  1979' 

I  am  pleased  to  transmit  to  the  Congress, 
pursuant  to  Section  123d  of  the  Atomic 
Energy  Act  of  1954.  as  amended  (42  U.S.C. 
2153).  the  text  of  an  amendment  to  the 
Agreement  Between  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Brit- 
ain and  Northern  Ireland  for  Cooperation  on 
the  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy  for  Mutual  De- 
fense Purposes  of  July  3.  1958.  as  amended, 
and  my  written  approval,  authorization  and 
determination  concerning  the  agreement. 
The  joint  classified  and  unclassified 
memoranda  submitted  to  me  by  the  Sec- 
retaries of  Energy  and  Defense  which  pro- 
vide a  summary  analysis  of  the  amendment 
are  also  enclosed. 

The  amendment  extends  for  five  years 
until  December  31.  1984)  those  provisions 
.vhich  permit  the  transfer  of  nonnuclear 
jarts,  source,  by-product  special  nuclear 
Tiaterial  and  other  material  for  nuclear 
weapons  and  special  nuclear  material  for 
'ueling  military  propulsion  reactors. 

In  my  judgement,  the  proposed  amend- 
nent  meets  all  statutory  requirements.  The 
Jnited  Kingdom  intends  to  continue  to 
naintain  viable  nuclear  forces.  In  light  of 
lur  previous  close  cooperation  and  the  fact 
hat  the  United  Kingdom  has  committed  its 
luclear  forces  to  NATO,  I  have  concluded 
hat  it  is  in  our  security  interest  to  continue 
0  assist  them  in  maintaining  a  credible  nu- 
lear  force. 

I  have  approved  the  amendment  and  au- 
horized  its  execution  and  urge  the  Congress 
:ive  it  favorable  consideration. 

Jimmy  Carter 


MEMORANDUMS  FOR  THE 
5ECRETARIES  OF  DEFENSE 
VND  ENERGY,  NOV.  28.  1979' 

lubject:  Proposed  Amendment  to  the 
JS-UK  Agreement  for  Cooperation  on  the 
Jses  of  Atomic  Energy  for  Mutual  Defense 
'urposes 

I  have  reviewed  your  joint  letter  to  me 
'f  November  2,  1979,  recommending  ap- 
■roval  of  a  proposed  Amendment  to  the 
Agreement  Between  the  Government  of  the 
Jnited  States  of  America  and  the  Govern- 
lent  of  the  United  Kingdom  for  Coopera- 
ion  on  the  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy  for 
Mutual  Defense  Purposes.  I  note  from  your 
oint  recommendation  that  the  United  King- 
om  is  participating  with  the  United  States 


pursuant  to  an  international  agreement  by 
substantial  and  material  contributions  to  the 
mutual  defense  and  security.  The  proposed 
Amendment  will  permit  cooperation  which 
will  fui-ther  improve  our  mutual  defense 
posture  and  be  in  support  of  NATO. 
I  hereby: 

•  Approve  the  program  outlined  in  the 
proposed  Amendment  to  the  1958  Agree- 
ment; 

•  Determine  that  cooperation  under  the 
proposed  Amendment  will  promote  and  will 
not  constitute  an  unreasonable  risk  to  the 
common  defense  and  security;  and 

•  Authorize  the  execution  of  the  pro- 
posed Amendment  for  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  in  a  manner  specified  by 
the  Secretary  of  State. 

Jimmy  Carter  ■ 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Dec.  3,  1979. 


16th  Report 
on  Cyprus 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
NOV.  28,  1979' 

In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Public 
Law  95-384,  I  am  submitting  the  following 
report  on  progress  made  during  the  past  60 
days  towards  the  conclusion  of  a  negotiated 
solution  of  the  Cyprus  problem. 

In  my  last  Cyprus  report  to  the  Con- 
gress, dated  September  25,  I  noted  that  the 
rece.ss  in  the  intercommunal  talks  continues 
despite  persistent  and  intensive  efforts  by 
UN  Secretary  General  Waldheim  and  his 
staff  to  bring  the  two  parties  back  to  the 
conference  table.  I  regret  to  report  that  in 
the  intervening  60  days  these  efforts  have 
still  not  borne  fruit. 

The  United  States  shares  the  view  that 
only  sustained  intercommunal  talks  can  lead 
to  a  just  and  lasting  settlement  of  the  Cy- 
prus problem.  We  believe  that  the  continu- 
ing good-offices  efforts  of  the  Secretary 
General  are  the  most  promising  way  to 
achieve  a  serious  negotiation.  I  am  pleased 
that  our  November  1978  proposals  provided 
impetus  for  the  current  UN  initiative.  We 
have  strongly  supported  that  initiative  since 
it  began,  and  we  shall  continue  to  do  so.  In 
part  due  to  our  support,  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral and  his  staff  are  making  progress  to- 
ward finding  a  formula  on  the  basis  of  which 
the  talks  might  resume. 

The  current  session  of  the  UN  General 
Assembly  is  creating  opportunities  to 
explore  avenues  of  progress  on  the  Cyprus 
question.  Secretary  Vance  had  meetings 
with  President  Kyprianou  in  New  York  on 
September  26  and  October  4.  Other  U.S.  of- 
ficials are  in  contact  with  principals  in  the 
Cyprus  dispute,  and  with  interested  third 
parties,  to  prepare  for  the  General  Assem- 
bly debate  on  Cyprus.  We  hope  that  after 


the  General  Assembly  completes  its  discus- 
sion of  Cyprus,  both  sides  will  find  it  possi- 
ble to  resume  the  intercommunal  negotia- 
tions. It  is  essential  that  they  not  allow  the 
quest  for  short-term  advantage  to  erode 
their  mutual  objective  of  finding  a  settle- 
ment which  meets  the  basic  needs  of  all 
people  on  the  island. 

The  long  and  tortuous  history  of  the 
Cyprus  problem  demonstrates  that  peaceful 
progress  has  never  been  easy.  The  obsta- 
cles, while  formidable,  are  not  insurmount- 
able. We  continue  to  believe  that  progress  is 
achievable,  and  we  are  vigorously  seeking 
it.  Toward  that  end,  we  remain  in  close 
touch  with  all  parties  to  the  Cyprus  dispute, 
the  United  Nations,  our  European  allies, 
and  other  states  which  have  a  legitimate 
role  to  playand  which  desire  to  contribute 
to  the  achievement  of  our  common  goal. 

Sincerely. 

Jimmy  Carter  ■ 


'  Identical  letters  addressed  to  Thomas 
P.  O'Neill.  Jr..  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  and  Frank  Church. 
Chairman  of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  Dec.  3,  1979). 


CORRECTION 

In  the  November  1979  issue  of 
the  Bulletin,  page  35,  the  Secre- 
tary's statement  on  "U.S.  Commit- 
ment to  Western  Europe,"  in  the 
first  paragraph,  the  last  sentence 
should  read:  "The  substantial  forces 
we  have  deployed  to  Europe  are  one 
concrete  evidence  of  that  commit- 
ment." Through  a  typographical 
error,  the  word  "one"  was  printed  as 
"not." 


■ebruary  1980 


25 


Europe 


National  Security 

and  U.S.-Soviet  Relations 


by  Matthew  Nimetz 

Address  af  Duke  University  in 
Durham.  North  Carolina,  on 
November  19.  1979.  Mr.  Nimetz  is 
Counselor  for  the  Department  of  State. 

Forty  years  ago,  Winston  Churchill — in 
a  now  famous  piece  of  rhetoric — 
described  the  Soviet  Union  as  "a  riddle 
wrapped  in  a  mystery  inside  an 
enigma."  He  spoke,  of  course,  before 
the  creation  of  a  wartime  alliance  be- 
tween the  Soviet  Union  and  Great  Brit- 
ain and  the  United  States,  before  the 
detonation  of  the  first  nuclear  device, 
before  the  onset  of  the  cold  war  and  the 
division  of  much  of  the  world  between 
East  and  West,  before  the  Cuban  mis- 
sile crisis,  before  the  era  of  detente, 
and  before  the  SALT  process. 

Our  relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union  have  undergone  much  change  in 
the  intervening  years,  punctuated  with 
major  developments  and  occasional 
crises,  but  the  aura  of  mystery  and  un- 
predictability still  remains.  Both  sides 
have  yet  to  arrive  at  a  common  under- 
standing of  each  other,  much  less  a 
common  approach  to  participating  in 
the  wider  international  environment. 

That  this  should  be  so  is  not  a  re- 
flection upon  the  wisdom  or  skills  of  the 
officials  who  have  managed  our  bilat- 
eral relations  in  the  past  decades. 
There  has  been  no  lack  of  desire  to 
carve  out  a  peaceful  and  productive  re- 
lationship with  the  Soviet  Union,  but 
we  remain,  however,  two  nations  with 
fundamentally  different  points  of  view. 
Our  moral  values,  social  beliefs,  and 
economic  systems  are  very  different. 
Our  approach  to  international  problem 
areas  is  often  widely  divergent.  Our 
perceptions  of  the  strategic  military 
balance  are  probably  quite  dissimilar. 
Our  approach  to  the  Third  World,  to 
development  issues,  to  the  creation  of  a 
harmonious  approach  to  North-South 
questions  is  not  the  same  and  often  in- 
tensely competitive.  Our  methods  of 
formulating  foreign  policy — including 
the  assimilation  of  domestic 
viewpoints — are  notably  different.  And 
our  relationship  often  is  influenced  by 
developments  in  the  international  envi- 
ronment which  neither  country  can 
control. 

In  large  part  the  differences  be- 
tween our  two  countries  are  inescapa- 
ble, and  we  must  recognize  that  our 


26 


bilateral  relationship  must  reflect  the 
fact  that  we  are  dealing  with  a  nation 
and  a  set  of  leaders  whose  background 
and  principles  and  sense  of  national 
interests  are  very  different  from  our 
own.  The  frustration  and  disappoint- 
ment that  sometimes  accompany  the 
periodic  setbacks  in  our  dealings  with 
the  Soviet  Union  are  understandable; 
but  we  should  not  despair  that  overall 
progress  cannot  be  made.  We  should 
continue  to  seek  out  those  areas  of  ac- 
commodation that  are  possible  while 
accepting  the  fact  that  the  Soviet  lead- 
ership will  measure  progress  in  our  re- 
lations by  a  yardstick  of  their  own 
construction. 

It  has  historically  been  true  that 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
have  had  only  very  few  areas  of  con- 
tact. Our  genesis  as  a  nation  was 
primarily  in  Western  Europe,  and  our 
ties  to  that  continent  have  traditionally 
been  close  and  fruitful.  Russia,  on  the 
other  hand,  on  the  periphery  of 
Europe,  retained  a  powerful  tie  to  na- 
tive Slavic  and  Central  Asian  traditions 
and  culture  that  were  untouched  by  the 
Renaissance  and  only  superficially  af- 
fected by  17th  and  18th  century 
humanism.  The  physical  breadth  and 
wealth  of  our  two  nations  insured  a  de- 
gree of  insularity  to  our  two  societies. 
We  are  both  continental  nations;  the 
United  States  being  surrounded  by  two 
oceans,  and  Russia  being  separated 
from  major  Western  European  centers 
by  vast  distances  with  uncertain 
communication. 

Consequently,  trade  between  our 
two  countries  has  historically  been  very 
slight.  Prior  to  1917,  our  interests  in 
terms  of  global  developments  centered 
on  different  portions  of  the  world.  Cul- 
tural developments  and  industrializa- 
tion took  place  in  each  country  largely 
independent  of  developments  in  the 
other.  Perhaps  most  importantly,  we 
developed  a  system  of  government  that 
drew  upon  principles  of  individual  lib- 
erty, representative  government,  and 
the  subservience  of  the  state  to  its 
citizens — all  markedly  different  from 
the  historical  and  cultural  determinants 
that  shaped  the  character  of  czarist  rule 
and  the  Government  of  the  Soviet 
Union. 


National  Security 

Thus,  the  historical  background  alone 
should  caution  us  against  being  too  san- 
guine about  the  degree  to  which  the 
interests  and  attitudes  of  our  two  na- 
tions can  be  closely  reconciled.  We  shall 
continue  to  remain  fundamentally  op- 
posed on  a  variety  of  important  issues. 
What  has  changed  in  the  last  four  dec- 
ades is  not  the  degree  to  which  the 
world  views  of  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  have  converged  but 
the  number  of  areas  in  which  our  direct 
interests  have  intersected  and  occa- 
sionally clashed. 

Nowhere  is  this  more  apparent 
than  in  the  field  of  national  security. 
We  have  entered  a  world  since  1945  in 
which  the  growing  arsenals  of  both 
countries  and  the  revolutionary  change 
brought  about  by  the  development  of 
nuclear  weapons  has  made  it  impossible 
for  us  to  ignore  the  potential  challenges 
of  Soviet  military  power.  Dealing  with 
this  new  factor  in  the  U.S.-Soviet  equa- 
tion is  perhaps  the  central  foreign  pol- 
icy problem  we  face  today.  How  we  re- 
spond to  the  fact  that  the  Soviet  Union 
has  at  last  emerged  as  a  global  military 
force,  with  all  the  political  and  diplo- 
matic consequences  that  stem  from  that 
development,  will  influence  the  course 
of  our  international  policies  for  some 
time  to  come  and  profoundly  affect  the 
character,  the  stability,  and  even  the 
continuation  of  the  entire  international 
order. 

Until  recently,  the  military  forces 
of  the  Soviet  Union  were  largely 
oriented  toward  territorial  defense  and 
control  of  the  Eastern  European  mem- 
bers of  the  Warsaw  Pact.  The  U.S.S.R. 
has  always  maintained  a  large  standing 
army,  but  these  combat  forces  were 
trained  and  ecjuipped  primarily  to  fight 
in  defense  of  the  homeland  or  on  the 
periphery  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Simi- 
larly, until  the  present  decade,  the 
Soviet  Navy  lacked  a  significant 
ocean-going  capability,  concentrating 
instead  upon  the  deployment  of  smaller 
craft  designed  for  coastal  purposes.  Tht 
Soviet  Air  Force,  although  impressive 
in  many  areas,  was  largely  made  up  of 
tactical  interceptors,  and  the  U.S.S.R. 
has  never  emphasized  the  development 
of  a  significant  intercontinental  bombei 
force. 

Beginning  in  the  1960s,  the  lead- 
ership of  the  Soviet  Union  began  a 
major,  sustained  campaign  to  improve 
Soviet  military  capabilities  across  the 
board.  Real  increases  were  made  in  th( 
Soviet  defense  budget  on  the  order  of 
3%  every  year.  Significant  resources 


Department  ot  State  Bulletir 


Europe 


were  funneled  into  an  extensive  pro- 
gram of  military  research  and  develop- 
ment. New  weapons  were  acquired  and 
eventually  assigned  to  combat  units. 

As  a  result,  major  changes  have 
taken  place  in  the  power  and  sophistica- 
tion of  the  Soviet  military  establish- 
ment. New  generations  of  ICBMs  [in- 
tei'continental  ballistic  missiles], 
equipped  with  multiple  warheads,  have 
gradually  been  introduced  into  the 
Soviet  rocket  forces.  The  Soviet  Air 
Force  has  greatly  e.xpanded  its  ability 
to  strike  deep  within  an  adversary's 
territory  and  carry  out  naval  strike  and 
interdiction  roles.  The  Soviet  Navy  has 
now  become  a  truly  "blue  water"  force, 
capable  of  operating  in  all  oceans  of  the 
planet  and  confronting  us  for  the  first 
time  with  a  significant  danger  of  inter- 
ference with  vital  western  sea  lines  of 
communication. 

Why  the  Soviet  leadership  has  cho- 
sen to  emphasize  military  strength  at  a 
time  when  the  Soviet  economy  is  having 
great  difficulty  in  meeting  even  the 
most  basic  domestic  needs  is  unknown 
to  us.  Given  the  bitter  differences  in 
views  among  Marxist  states  and 
parties — among  the  Soviet  bloc,  China. 
Yugoslavia,  Albania,  and  the  Euro- 
Communists — it  is  hard  to  believe  that 
the  leaders  of  the  Kremlin  still  pursue 
the  dream  of  Lenin  and  Trotsky  to 
subjugate  the  world  under  the  unified 
rule  (if  a  Russian-based  Communist  dic- 
tate n-ship.  To  rational  men  those  goals 
must  long  have  perished  as  the 
ideological  appeal  of  the  Soviet  Union 
las  steadily  diminished  throughout  the 
A'orld.  Whatever  the  motive,  it  seems 
obvious  to  us  that  the  extent  and  de- 
cree of  this  Soviet  military  buildup  is 
ar  in  excess  of  what  is  reasonably  re- 
quired to  protect  the  basic  security 
nterests  of  the  Soviet  people. 

We  should  bear  in  mind  that  our 
iefinition  of  national  security  is  not 
lecessarily  shared  by  Soviet  defense 
planners.  The  Soviets  obviously  are 
•oncerned  not  only  about  the  United 
States  and  our  allies  but  about  an  un- 
riendly  China  on  their  border.  Recent 
listory  plays  a  major  role  as  well.  Our 
ountry  has  not,  after  all,  been 
ubjected  to  an  actual  military  invasion 
n  this  century.  The  U.S.S.R."  has— 
wice — and  with  devastating  results, 
"he  national  calamity  of  World  War  II, 
v'ith  some  20  million  casualties  in  the 
Soviet  Union,  is  an  experience  that  is 
eeply  etched  in  the  minds  and  psyches 
f  every  member  of  the  Soviet  Polit- 
uro.  It  has  been  pointed  out  that  such 


a  trauma  contributes  to  a  policy  that 
errs  generously  on  the  side  of 
overpreparedness. 

But  we,  as  careful  trustees  of  our 
nation's  destiny,  must  base  our  plan- 
ning on  what  we  see  and  assume  that 
current  Soviet  military  planning 
springs  from  pragmatic  and  calculated 
geopolitical  considerations.  As  dedi- 
cated as  our  nation  may  be  to  the 
peaceful  resolution  of  international  dis- 
putes, it  is  an  indisputable  fact  that 
military  power  counts  in  the  modern 
world.  It  counts  not  only  in  the  direct 
application  of  force  to  the  settlement  of 
conflicts,  or  in  the  threat  of  its  use,  but 
also  in  the  effects  that  the  knowledge  of 
superiority  of  military  power  inevitably 
has  upon  the  actions  that  nations  may 
choose  to  take  or  to  forego  when  faced 
with  a  stronger  and  better  armed  ad- 
versary. There  is  no  doubt  that  military 
sti-ength  is  a  powerful  aspect  of  diplo- 
matic relations,  even  if  it  is  never  ac- 
tually used  and  never  actually 
threatened. 

U.S.  Policy 

Our  policy  in  the  United  States  has 
been  to  meet  the  challenge  of  the  Soviet 
military  buildup  in  two  ways. 

First,  we  are  determined  that  our 
overall  military  capabilities  remain  es- 
sentially equivalent  to  those  of  the 
Soviet  Union  and  that  they  are  suffic- 
ient to  deter  any  aggression  against  the 
United  States,  our  allies,  or  our  mili- 
tary forces  overseas. 

Second,  when  we  can  reach  agree- 
ment with  the  U.S.S.R.  on  the  basis  of 
enlightened  self-interest,  we  are  com- 
mitted to  pursuing  those  arms  control 
initiatives  which  will  reduce  the  likeli- 
hood of  armed  conflict,  enhance  our 
own  national  security,  and  contribute  to 
international  stability. 

These  twin  goals  are  interrelated 
and  mutually  reinforcing.  Together, 
they  will  help  us  in  managing  the 
U.S. -Soviet  military  balance  in  the 
years  to  come. 

To  insure  parity  between  the  de- 
fense forces  of  the  two  sides  is  not  to 
insist  upon  a  strict  numerical  equilib- 
rium based  upon  the  accountant's 
ledger  or  the  unyielding  comparison  of 
any  given  set  of  static  indicators.  Sim- 
ply counting  up  the  number  of  tanks, 
ships,  and  other  weapons  deployed  on 
each  side  would  reveal  a  military  bal- 
ance that  is  inherently  misleading  in 
terms  of  what  it  indicates  about  the  rel- 
ative effectiveness  of  the  two  military 
forces.  We  do  not  need  a  defense  struc- 


ture that  is  a  mirror  image  of  the  Soviet 
Union's.  Perfect  symmetry  will  not  in 
itself  guarantee  the  fulfillment  of  our 
true  defense  needs.  Our  geography  is 
different;  our  relations  with  our 
neighbors  are  different;  our  economies 
are  different;  and  our  allies  are  differ- 
ent. 

What  we  do  need  is  a  defense  effort 
that  is  adequate  to  guarantee  our  na- 
tional security,  the  security  of  our  al- 
lies, and  our  worldwide  interests.  We 
are  spending  enough  now  to  meet  that 
goal,  but  the  trends  in  Soviet  military 
expenditures  mean  that  we  shall  have 
to  do  more  in  the  years  to  come.  The 
Soviet  military  is  currently  outspending 
us,  although  it  is  worth  remembering 
that  the  U.S.S.R.  defense  effort  must 
draw  upon  a  civilian  economy  that  is 
much  less  efficient  than  our  own.  They 
also  began  their  current  buildup  from  a 
position  of  clear  inferiority,  so  that  we 
have  had  a  marginal  advantage  for 
mqny  years  that  has  made  it  relatively 
less  important  that  our  defense  ex- 
penditures match  those  of  the  Soviets. 

Indeed,  for  most  of  the  years  in  the 
past  decade,  our  own  military  spending 
has  actually  declined  when  measured  in 
constant  dollars  or  as  a  percejntage  of 
gross  national  product.  In  1960,  for 
example,  national  defense  expenditures 
amounted  to  $115  billion  (in  1978  dol- 
lars) and  constituted  slightly  more  than 
9%  of  our  gross  national  product.  Those 
figures  rose  during  the  latter  half  of  the 
decade  due  to  our  involvement  in 
Southeast  Asia,  but  they  then  began  to 
decline.  By  1977,  we  were  actually 
spending  $12  billion  less  on  defense  in 
real  terms  than  we  were  in  1960,  and 
the  percentage  of  our  GNP  allotted  to 
the  military  had  fallen  to  5.S9i. 

Meanwhile,  the  Soviet  military 
buildup  continued  unabated.  (You 
should  know  that  the  Soviets  devote 
about  13%  of  their  GNP  to  defense.)  As 
Secretary  of  Defense  Harold  Brown  has 
noted,  the  U.S.S.R.'s  commitment  to 
rising  defense  budgets  has  been  unaf- 
fected by  the  decisions  we  have  made 
with  regard  to  defense  spending:  "As 
our  defense  budgets  have  risen,  the 
Soviets  have  increased  their  defense 
budget.  As  our  defense  budgets  have 
gone  down,  their  defense  budgets  have 
increased  again." 

Given  these  facts,  we  have  ar- 
rested the  downward  spiral  in  U.S. 
military  spending.  Last  year,  the  Ad- 
ministration was  successful  in  obtaining 
a  real  increase  in  the  defense  budget  of 
3%,  and  the  President  has  made  clear 
his  commitment  to  an  increase  in  the 
next  budget  of  at  least  3%.  We  have 


"ebruary  1980 


27 


Europe 


certainly  not  been  standing  still  during 
the  past  10  years,  but  it  is  equally  clear 
that  further  efforts  are  required  if  we 
are  to  be  successful  in  maintaining  the 
military  balance  for  the  future. 

We  have,  as  I  say,  made  some  im- 
pressive strides  in  modernizing  and  ex- 
panding our  capacity  to  respond  to  mili- 
tary conflicts  throughout  the  world.  In 
the  field  of  strategic  nuclear  weapons, 
the  President  has  decided  to  improve 
the  survivability  of  our  land-based  in- 
tercontinental ballistic  missile  (ICBM) 
force  through  the  development  and  de- 
ployment of  the  new,  mobile  MX  missile 
system.  We  have  just  put  the  first  of 
the  new  Trident  submarines  to  sea,  and 
we  are  currently  in  the  process  of  de- 
ploying the  improved  Trident  I 
submarine-launched  ballistic  missile.  In 
1981,  we  shall  begin  fitting  many  of  our 
B-.52  strategic  bombers  with  long- 
range,  air-launched  cruise  missiles  that 
will  serve  to  extend  the  useful  life  of 
the  B-52  force  well  into  the  1980s. 

We  have  also  sought  to  upgrade 
our  capabilities  in  the  field  of  conven- 
tional weapons.  Together  with  our 
NATO  allies,  we  have  agreed  upon  a 
long-term  defense  program  for  Western 
Europe  that  will  vastly  improve  the  al- 
liance's ability  to  respond  to  any  mili- 
tary threat  or  incursion  from  the  War- 
saw Pact.  We  have  accelerated  our 
programs  for  the  acquisition  of  sophis- 
ticated antitank  weapons  and  other 
precision-guided  munitions.  We  have 
generally  upgraded  the  overall  effec- 
tiveness of  our  conventional  forces,  and 
we  are  exploring  new  ways  of  organiz- 
ing military  units — such  as  the  pro- 
posed rapid  deployment  force — that  will 
enable  us  to  meet  military  situations  in 
a  flexible  and  effective  manner.  A 
major  watershed  in  the  deployment  of 
theater  nuclear  weapons  will  occur  next 
month  when  the  NATO  governments 
meet  to  decide  upon  the  emplacement  of 
a  new  generation  of  medium-range  nu- 
clear weapons  in  Western  Europe. 

SALT 

Military  competition  can  be  managed, 
however,  in  ways  other  than  mutual 
buildup  of  forces.  For  this  reason  we 
pursue  arms  control  initiatives,  perhaps 
the  most  important  of  which  is  SALT. 
SALT — the  Strategic  Arms  Limitation 
Talks — is  certainly  not  a  panacea  that 
will  solve  all  our  problems,  and  it  is  also 
not  a  substitute  for  the  increased  effort 
we  are  making  in  terms  of  defense  out- 
lays. For  one  thing,  SALT  deals  only 
with  a  limited  categoi-y  of  weapons — 
those  that  are  nuclear  capable  and  that 
are  deliverable  from  the  territory  of  the 


28 


United  States  to  the  Soviet  Union,  or 
vice  versa.  The  talks  have  not  dealt 
with  conventional  weapons  or  with 
shorter  range,  theater  nuclear  devices. 
These  systems  continue  to  be  uncon- 
strained by  the  arms  control  process. 

Secondly,  the  SALT  II  agreement 
that  is  currently  before  the  Senate  of 
the  United  States  does  not  go  as  far  as 
we  would  like  in  limiting  and  restrain- 
ing the  strategic  nuclear  delivery  ve- 
hicles that  are  included  in  the  agree- 
ment. Both  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  will  be  able  to  modernize 
their  strategic  arsenals  to  some  degree 
even  with  the  SALT  II  agreement  in 
force.  We  do  plan,  however,  to  make 
further  progress  in  obtaining  greater 
controls  on  strategic  weapons  in  the 
context  of  the  SALT  III  negotiations. 

SALT  II  is  an  important  step  for 
the  United  States,  however,  because 
we  will  slow  the  momentum  of  Soviet 
strategic  deployments  in  several  crucial 
areas.  The  agreement  will  last  until 
1985,  and  we  could  well  be  facing  a 
more  dangerous  strategic  environment 
in  that  year  without  the  controls  that 
SALT  II  will  provide. 

•  We  know,  for  example,  that  the 
Soviet  Union  currently  has  four  and 
possibly  five  new  types  of  ICBMs 
either  on  the  drawing  boards  or  in  the 
early  stages  of  development.  Without 
SALT  II,  the  U.S.S.R.  could  deploy  all 
five  news  types.  With  SALT  II,  they 
will  be  limited  to  one  totally  new  mis- 
sile system. 

•  Without  SALT  II,  the  Soviet 
Union  could  deploy  as  many  as  3,000 
strategic  missile  launchers  and  heavy 
bombers  by  1985.  With  SALT  II,  they 
will  be  limited  to  no  more  than  2,250. 

•  Without  SALT  II,  the  Soviet 
Union  could  have  in  place  by  1985  as 
many  as  1,200  ICBMs  equipped  with 
multiple  warheads.  With  SALT  II,  they 
will  be  limited  to  a  maximum  of  820. 

•  Without  SALT  II,  the  Soviet 
Union  could  deploy  30  or  35  individual 
warheads  on  each  of  their  largest  land- 
based  missiles.  With  SALT  II,  they  will 
be  limited  to  no  more  than  10. 

•  Without  SALT  II,  it  is  question- 
able whether  the  Soviet  Union  would 
choose  voluntarily  to  make  real  reduc- 
tions in  its  nuclear  arsenal.  With  SALT 
II,  the  U.S.S.R.  will  be  forced  to  dis- 
mantle some  250  strategic  nuclear  de- 
livery vehicles  that  are  now  targeted  on 
the  United  States. 

The  SALT  II  agreement,  there- 
fore, will  enhance  our  ability  to  meet 
the  challenge  of  rising  Soviet  defense 
expenditures.  It  will  do  so  without  con- 
straining any  significant  military  pro- 


grams that  we  plan  to  inaugurate  dur- 
ing the  term  of  the  agreement.  It  will 
be  a  useful  complement  to  our  regular 
defense  programs,  and  it  will  aid  us  in 
predicting  the  future  course  of  Soviet 
defense  decisionmaking. 

Other  U.S.  Strengths 

We  should  also  remember  that  national 
security  is  made  up  of  a  number  of  im- 
portant factors,  of  which  military 
strength  is  only  one.  By  most  other  in- 
dicators, the  United  States  is  clearly 
the  most  powerful  nation  in  the  world. 
In  terms  of  our  economic  strength,  the 
vitality  of  our  basic  science  and  tech- 
nology, the  appeal  of  our  democratic 
lifestyle  to  other  nations,  and  the  politi- 
cal and  social  vitality  of  our  society,  the 
Soviet  Union  does  not  rank  as  even  a 
distant  second.  Our  allies  and 
friends — Canada,  Western  Europe, 
Japan,  Australia,  and  New  Zealand — 
add  overwhelmingly  to  Western  influ- 
ence and  strength,  particularly  when 
compared  to  the  demoralized  and  often 
reluctant  supporters  of  the  Soviet 
LInion. 

Let  me  mention  the  sphere  of 
ideas — the  competition  for  the  minds  of 
people — as  another  arena  of  competi- 
tion where  I  believe  we  have  a  decisive 
advantage,  albeit  one  we  have  not  used 
as  adeptly  as  we  might.  The  Soviets, 
trained  in  the  Marxist-Leninist  tradi- 
tion, place  heavy  emphasis  on  prop- 
aganda and  on  ideology,  while  we  tend 
to  feel  less  comfortable  with  heavy- 
handed  verbal  posturing. 

But  we  should  make  no  mistake 
about  the  importance  of  articulating  our 
values  strongly,  continuously,  and  per- 
suasively. Western  ideals  of  indi- 
vidualism, personal  dignity,  and  repre- 
sentative government  strike  responsive 
cords  everywhere.  The  results  can 
clearly  be  seen  in  the  movement  of 
people.  The  Soviet  Union  and  other 
Marxist  states  expend  great  effort,  in- 
cluding the  crude  use  of  walls  and 
barbed  wire,  to  keep  their  people  from 
leaving.  Our  problem,  as  we  review  our 
immigration  and  refugee  policy,  is  to 
decide  how  many  of  the  millions  who 
want  to  participate  in  our  society  we 
can  reasonably  accept. 

It  is  only  in  the  area  of  military 
strength  that  the  U.S.S.R.  has  ap- 
proached equivalence  with  us.  We 
should  not  undervalue  the  enormous 
potential  and  capacity  of  the  United 
States  in  nondefense  matters.  But  we 
must  also  be  realistic  about  preserving 
our  ability  to  defend  our  interests, 
should  that  become  necessary.  For  this 
reason,  we  see  a  new  realism  pervading 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


FOREIGN  AID 


the  American  polity — a  realism  about 
the  world  that  is  neither  defeatist  nor 
cocky.  The  next  decade  will  require 
strengthened  defense  programs,  tough 
negotiations,  and  a  firmness  and  con- 
stancy of  principle.  I  have  no  doubt  that 
we  will  meet  that  challenge.  I  have  no 
doubt  that  the  fundamental  advantages, 
now  and  for  the  future,  lie  with  the 
West,  not  the  East.  ■ 


Publications 


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Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office.  Washington,  D.C.  20102.  A  25% 
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copies  of  ant/  one  puhlicatioti  mailed  to  the 
same  address.  Remittances,  pai/able  to  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  must  ac- 
company orders.  Prices  shown  below, 
which  include  domestic  postage,  are  subject 
to  change. 

Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  with 

the  Polish  People's  Republic,  amending  the 

agreement  of  July  19,  1972,  as  amended 

and  extended.  TIAS  9192.  8  pp.  $1.00.  (Cat. 

No.  89.10:9192.) 

Aviation — Flight  Inspection  Services. 

Memorandum  of  agreement  with  the 

Netherlands.  TIAS  9199.  5  pp.  750.  (Cat. 

No.  89.10:9199.) 

defense — Production  of  AIM-9L 

sidewinder  Missile  System.  Memorandum 

if  understanding  with  the  Federal  Republic 

.f  Cermany.  TIAS  9202.  21  pp.  $1.25.  (Cat. 

<(..  89.10:9202.) 

•ostal  Union  of  the  Americas  and  Spain. 

riAS  9206.  280  pp.  $5.00.  (Cat.  No. 

^9. 10:9206.) 

Vir  Transport  Services.  Agreement  with 

Belgium,  amending  the  agreement  of  April 

,  1946,  as  amended.  TIAS  9207,  23  pp. 

1..50.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9207.) 

lasic  Sanitation.  Agreement  with  Por- 

ugal.  TIAS  9209.  25  pp.  $1.50.  (Cat.  No. 

"9.10:9209.) 

'rade  in  Textiles.  Agreement  with  the 

ocialist  Republic  of  Romania,  amending 

he  agreements  of  June  17,  1977,  as 

mended,  and  January  6  and  25,  1978. 

'IAS  9211.  3  pp.  75(Z.  (Cat.  No. 

9.10:9211.) 

'rade  in  Textiles.  Agreement  with  the 

ocialist  Republic  of  Romania,  amending 

le  agreement  of  January  6  and  25,  1978,  as 

mended.  TIAS  9212.  3  pp.  75?.  (Cat.  No. 

9.10:9212.)  ■ 


Approaching  Common  Issues 
With  Developing  Countries 


by  Thomas  Ehrlich 

Address  before  the  Council  of 
Presidents  of  the  National  Association 
of  State  Universities  and  Land-Grant 
Colleges  in  Washington,  D.C,  on 
November  27,  1970.  Mr.  Ehrlich  is  Di- 
rector of  the  International  Devehipvient 
Cooperation  Agency. 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  be  here  today.  I  am 
honored  to  speak  before  the  represen- 
tatives of  institutions  that  have  played 
a  vital  role  in  the  development  of  this 
country  and  many  other  nations  as  well. 
My  hope  today  is  to  underscore  my 
commitment  to  a  partnership  in  inter- 
national ec(jnomic  development  be- 
tween the  Federal  Government  and 
State  universities  and  land-grant  col- 
leges and  to  suggest  some  of  the  ways 
in  which  that  partnership  can  be 
strengthened,  using  the  energy  field  as 
an  e.xample. 

Your  institutions  have  been  a 
major  force  in  increasing  American  and 
global  agricultural  production  since  the 
last  part  of  the  I9th  century.  They  de- 
serve much  of  the  credit  for  our  coun- 
try's ability  not  only  to  feed  its  own 
citizens  but  also  to  serve  as  the  granary 
of  the  world.  Your  universities  have 
made  powerful  contributions,  not  only 
in  educating  students  but  also  in  spon- 
soring innovative  research  and, 
through  unique  extension  services,  in 
applying  its  benefits  to  communities 
throughout  the  world. 

Our  system  of  State  universities 
and  land-grant  colleges  is  a  particularly 
important  asset  to  the  developing  na- 
tions of  the  world,  where  more  than 
15%  of  the  world's  people — over  3  bil- 
lion human  beings — live.  Far  too  many 
people  in  these  countries  exist  in  condi- 
tions of  abject  poverty — more  than  1 
billion  are  continually  hungry  and  mal- 
nourished, more  than  700  million  per- 
sons in  developing  countries  are  illiter- 
ate, and  2%  billion  do  not  have 
adei|Uate  health  care. 

We  should  all  be  proud  of  the  30- 
year  history  of  cooperation  between 
your  universities  and  the  Agency  for 
International  Development  (AID)  and 
its  predecessors.  Research,  extension 
services,  and  training  facilities  planned 
and  implemented  by  your  universities — 
in  collaboration  with  your  colleagues 
abroad — have  helped  develop  vital 
technology  and  services  for  poor 
families  in  the  Third  World.  Many  of 


ebruary  1980 


the  leaders  in  every  walk  of  life  in  the 
Third  World  were  educated  in  univer- 
sities represented  here  today.  The  U.S. 
Government  relies  heavily  on  you  for 
the  expertise  and  training  to  manage 
many  of  our  assistance  efforts. 

In  1975  Congress  reaffirmed  the 
vital  role  of  U.S.  universities  in  al- 
leviating world  hunger  by  passing  title 
XII  of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act.  The 
title  mandates  AID  to  utilize  the  skills 
and  experience  of  American  univer- 
sities. It  goes  on  to  provide  means  for 
strengthening  the  capacities  of  agricul- 
tural universities  to  assist  developing 
countries  in  increasing  their  food 
production. 

As  a  former  university  dean,  I  un- 
derstand the  importance  of  government 
support  in  planning,  building,  and 
maintaining  specialized  capabilities. 
Concerns  are  increasingly  expressed  in 
some  quarters,  however,  that  foreign 
aid  funds  may  merely  subsidize  Ameri- 
can universities  and  not  go  significantly 
to  meet  the  pressing  development 
needs  of  poor  countries.  These  concerns 
arise  when  there  is  a  perception  that 
development  assistance  funds  are  not 
being  used  directly  to  address  the  basic 
human  needs  of  people  in  developing 
countries. 

Our  efforts  should  be  and  will  be 
carefully  scrutinized,  especially  in 
times  of  fiscal  restraint.  The  ultimate 
success  of  those  efforts  rests  on  our 
ability  to  deal  with  the  challenges  rep- 
resented in  these  questions.  Your  uni- 
versities, the  U.S.  Government,  the 
American  people,  and,  especially,  poor 
people  throughout  the  world  have  an 
enormous  stake  in  insuring  that  our  co- 
operative arrangements  are  im- 
plemented in  the  most  effective  manner 
possible  and  that  they  are  carefully  and 
fully  explained  to  the  American  people 
and  their  representatives  in  Congress. 

Purposes  of  Foreign  Aid 

U.S.  interests  are  at  stake  in  a  wide 
range  of  problems  that  foreign  eco- 
nomic assistance  addresses.  Our  own 
prosperity  and  security,  to  a  large  ex- 
tent, will  depend  on  how  effectively  we 
assist  developing  countries  in  advanc- 
ing their  economic  growth  and  meeting 
the  basic  needs  of  their  citizens. 

Our  foreign  aid  serves  both  the  de- 
velopment aspirations  of  the  Third 
World  and  U.S.  interests  in  three  fun- 
damental ways. 


29 


Foreign  Aid 


First,  our  historical  values  and  be- 
liefs provide  a  humanitarian  basis  for 
our  efforts  to  help  alleviate  world  pov- 
erty. As  a  free  people  with  one  of  the 
highest  standards  of  living  in  the  world, 
we  must  respond  to  the  staggering  pic- 
ture of  world  hunger,  poverty,  illiter- 
acy, unemployment,  and  disease  and 
the  misery  that  these  words  represent 
in  human  terms. 

Second,  we  have  vital  global  inter- 
ests that  require  collaboration  with  de- 
veloping countries.  These  include  the 
need  to  control  world  population 
growth  and  the  need  to  manage  better 
the  world's  deteriorating  natural  re- 
source base.  The  promotion  of  interna- 
tional human  rights  and  democratic 
values  vitally  depends  on  our  coopera- 
tion with  Third  World  countries.  De- 
veloping countries  cannot  adequately 
respond  to  these  challenges  without  our 
assistance. 

Third,  foreign  aid  sei'ves  our  eco- 
nomic and  political  interests.  Third 
World  development  means  more  trade 
and  moi'e  jobs  for  Americans. 

•  The  developing  countries  are  a 
major — and  the  fastest  growing — 
market  for  U.S.  goods.  They  already 
buy  over  one-third  of  our  exports — the 
same  share  as  for  Europe  and  the 
Communist  countries  combined.  One 
out  of  every  three  acres  of  American 
farmland  produces  food  for  export, 
much  of  it  to  the  Third  World,  and  1.2 
million  American  manufacturing  jobs 
now  depend  on  exports  to  the  develop- 
ing countries. 

•  The  United  States  is  increasingly 
dependent  on  Third  World  countries  for 
essential  raw  materials  vital  to  our 
economy  and  security.  We  import  from 
developing  nations  SS'X  of  the  bauxite 
required  for  aluminum  products.  We 
obtain  93%  of  our  tin  from  developing 
countries.  The  importance  of  oil  im- 
ports from  the  Third  World  has  been 
repeatedly,  almost  bitterly,  brought 
home  to  us.  I  will  focus  on  energy  a  bit 
later  in  my  remarks. 

•  Our  country  earned  more  than 
$16  billion  from  our  direct  investments 
in  the  developing  world  in  1978.  Last 
year  U.S.  firms  invested  nearly  $6  bil- 
lion in  the  developing  world. 

•  Our  economy  also  benefits 
substantially  from  aid  dollars  spent 
here  to  buy  commodities  and  services. 
For  every  dollar  we  have  paid  into  the 
multilateral  development  banks,  U.S. 
GNP  increased  roughly  $3  as  a  direct 
result  of  bank  lending  activities. 

A  developing  country's  commit- 
ment to  its  equitable  growth  is  the  most 


30 


impoi'tant  factor  in  determining  its  own 
economic  development.  Basic  policies 
concerning  trade,  investment,  com- 
modities, and  technology  transfer  have 
an  enormous  impact  on  the  develop- 
ment process.  But  external  aid  also 
plays  a  vital  role,  and  this  will  continue 
for  the  foreseeable  future. 

Earlier  this  month  I  visited 
Bangladesh,  Thailand,  and  Indonesia 
and  saw  how  important  the  programs  of 
AID,  the  multilateral  banks,  and  the  in- 
ternational organizations  are  to  the  de- 
velopment goals  of  these  countries.  The 
problems  are  enormous.  I  found  the 
pressures  of  overpopulation  in  Dacca 
frightening,  for  example.  Every  aid 
program,  of  course,  can  be 
strengthened.  But  they  are  making  a 
major  contribution. 

World  peace  and  security  interests 
are  served  by  foreign  aid  because  de- 
veloping countries  are  key  participants 
in  the  quest  for  peaceful  resolution  of 
disputes,  regional  stability,  arms  re- 
straint, nonproliferation,  and  other 
basic  foreign  policy  objectives.  Good 
relations  with  developing  nations  are 
essential  in  a  wide  range  of  areas  that 
affect  our  security. 

Human  economic  and  social  prog- 
ress, promoted  by  effective  develop- 
ment, mitigates  against  conflict  result- 
ing from  poverty,  inequitable  distribu- 
tion of  resources,  and  denigration  of 
basic  human  rights.  The  words  of  Pope 
-John  XXIII  come  to  mind:  "In  a  world 
of  constant  want  there  is  no 
peace.  .  .  ." 

The  United  States  has  committed 
substantial  amounts  of  foreign  aid  over 
the  past  years — acting  bilaterally  and 
through  multilateral  development 
banks  and  international  institutions. 
But  since  1975,  our  contributions  to  de- 
velopment assistance  as  a  share  of  U.S. 
gross  national  product  have  been  only 
about  Vi  of  1%.  This  year  the  figure  is 
less  than  that — .22%,  which  ranks  the 
United  States  13th  out  of  17  major 
donor  countries.  All  foreign  economic 
aid  amounts  to  only  about  1%  of  our  na- 
tional budget:  $7.3  billion  for  FY  1979. 
Given  the  importance  of  U.S.  interests 
at  stake,  a  major  priority  of  all  our  ef- 
forts must  be  to  seek  support  through- 
out this  country  for  stronger  develop- 
ment assistance  efforts  in  the  future. 


Role  of  IDCA 

An  important  step  in  that  direction 
came  earlier  this  fall  when  the  new  In- 
ternational Development  Cooperation 
Agency  (IDCA)  was  established.  The 
IDCA,  which  came  into  being  on  Oc- 


tober 1,  1979,  plays  the  central  role  in 
U.S.  development  assistance  efforts.  It 
is  primarily  responsible  for  formulating 
U.S.  international  development  policies 
for  the  President  and  for  serving  as  his 
principal  spokesman  on  those  matters. 

As  the  principal  adviser  to  the 
President  on  international  develop- 
ment, IDCA  must  insure  that  our  var- 
ied bilateral  and  multilateral  develop- 
ment efforts  are  coordinated,  efficient, 
and  effective.  The  agency  just  prepared 
the  first  comprehensive  foreign  assist- 
ance budget  and  will  present  it  next 
year  to  the  Congress  and  the  American 
people. 

The  component  parts  of  IDCA  in- 
clude AID,  the  Overseas  Private  In- 
vestment Corporation,  and — if  ap- 
proved by  Congress — a  new  Institute 
for  Scientific  and  Technological  Coop- 
eration. IDCA's  concern  and  responsi- 
bility is  economic  development,  and 
from  this  perspective  it  shares  with  the 
State  Department  responsibility  for 
U.S.  involvement  in  the  U.N.  system; 
with  the  Treasury  Department,  respon- 
sibility for  U.S.  participation  in  the 
multilateral  development  banks:  and 
with  the  Department  of  Agriculture, 
the  direction  of  the  U.S.  Food  for  Peace 
Program. 

Finally,  the  new  agency  has  been 
mandated  by  the  Pi-esident  and  Con- 
gress to  insure  that  our  economic  rela- 
tions with  developing  nations  are  taken 
into  account  in  the  full  range  of  U.S.  in- 
ternational policies,  including  trade, 
commodity  arrangements,  and  financial 
matters. 

In  short,  IDCA  has  a  broad  range 
of  responsibilities  that  extend  beyond 
U.S.  bilateral  assistance.  The  agency 
should  lead  the  way  in  analyzing  and 
understanding  the  full  complexity  of 
U.S.  economic  relations  with  develop- 
ing nations  and  provide  advice  on  the 
development  aspects  of  these  relation- 
ships. In  that  role,  we  need  your 
help — we  need  the  partnership  of  your 
institutions  in  many  areas,  just  as  it 
exists  in  agriculture.  Let  me  use 
energy  as  an  example. 

Ciiallenge  of  Energy  Development 

Among  development  problems,  none  is 
more  challenging  than  energy.  Many 
universities — and  many  of  you,  their 
leaders — have  already  become  involvec 
in  the  complex  issues  that  the  dynamics 
of  energy  have  thrust  on  us.  Energy 
concerns  are  plainly  global.  Domestic 
solutions  alone  cannot  adequately  deal 
with  our  own  energy  problems.  'The 
enormity  of  the  task  of  the  transition  to 
a  postpetroleum  era  requires  our  best 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


Foreign  Aid 


minds  and  efforts  in  cooperation  with 
their  counterparts  in  the  Third  World. 
As  events  of  the  past  weeks  have 
made  increasingly  clear,  the  totality  of 
our  relations  with  the  developing  coun- 
tries is  interwoven  with  energy 
economics. 

•  More  than  one  half  of  world  oil 
production  is  in  developing  countries. 

•  Nine  out  of  every  10  barrels  en- 
tering the  international  market  come 
from  developing  countries. 

•  Developing  countries  currently 
use  about  one-sixth  of  the  world's  oil,  a 
figure  likely  to  approach  one-fourth 
within  a  decade. 

The  oil-importing  developing  coun- 
tries have  been  hit  vei'y  hard  by  petro- 
leum price  rises.  Expensive  imported 
fuel  is  exacerbating  balance-of-trade 
problems.  Many  countries  are  post- 
poning needed  investment  projects, 
holding  down  the  growth  of  essential 
social  services,  and  going  more  heavily 
into  debt.  Stagflation  and  the  dangers 
of  protectionism  in  industrialized  coun- 
tries, as  well  as  the  overall  slower 
growth  in  the  countries  belonging  to 
the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooper- 
ation and  Development,  have  seriously 
affected  most  developing  countries. 

Developing  countries'  demand  for 
commercial  energy  is  likely  to  double 
by  1990.  Many  of  these  economies  are 
entering  energy-intensive  phases  of 
growth,  much  as  we  did  during  the  last 
century. 

What  is  too  often  not  understood, 
or  overlooked,  is  that  most  of  the 
people  in  developing  countries  rely  on 
so-called  traditional  fuels  for  their  di- 
rect energy  needs.  In  the  rural  areas  of 
the  Third  World,  between  80%  and  90% 
of  nonanimate  energy  is  provided  by 
wood,  charcoal,  and  crop  and  animal 
wastes,  as  well  as  simple  forms  of  solar, 
water,  and  wind  energy.  Growing 
populations  are  straining  these 
supplies.  Firewood  shortages  are  espe- 
cially serious.  The  ever-demanding 
search  for  firewood  diverts  villagers 
from  agricultural  tasks  and  denudes  the 
landscape  causing  widespread  soil  ero- 
sion. The  shortages  of  wood  leaves 
people  without  fuel  to  cook  and  boil 
water  for  health  needs.  Here  are  a  few 
examples  of  how  serious  is  the  firewood 
crisis. 

•  At  current  rates  of  depletion,  the 
world's  tropical  forests,  which  are 
mostly  in  developing  countries,  will 
disappear  in  only  60  years. 

•  At  least  12  countries,  with  a 
combined  population  of  about  150  mil- 
ion  people,  are  currently  using  fuel- 
wood  in  excess  of  sustainable  yields. 

February  1980 


•  The  pace  at  which  the  firewood 
crisis  is  expanding,  and  the  economic 
and  environmental  damage  it  portends, 
present  a  clear  and  present  danger  to 
future  generations  throughout  the 
planet. 

Policymakers  and  planners  in  the 
Third  World  are  now  paying  much  more 
attention  to  energy  problems  than  in 
the  past,  just  as  we  are.  Virtually  all 
developing  countries  have  begun  to 
take  concrete  steps  to  manage  their 
energy  sectors  more  efficiently.  These 
steps  include  more  rational  energy 
prices,  expanding  investment  in  domes- 
tic energy  resources,  organizing  energy 
ministries,  and  funding  research  on  lo- 
cally suitable  energy  techniques. 

It  is  also  becoming  increasingly 
clear,  however,  that  foreign  assistance 
is  needed  to  expedite  this  process. 
Rapid  development  of  their  energy  sec- 
tors is  limited  by  lack  of: 

•  Basic  knowledge  of  their  own 
resources; 

•  Appropriate  technology; 

•  Financial  resources;  and 

•  Adequately  trained  personnel. 

Moreover,  most  developing  coun- 
tries are  just  beginning  systematic 
energy  planning.  Much  of  what  must  be 
done  will  be  new,  experimental,  and  in- 
novative. As  a  new  and  growing  area  of 
major  concern,  IDCA  is  making  energy 
a  priority  area  of  focus.  Today,  I  want 
to  share  with  you  some  of  the  actions 
that  are  underway. 

Energy  Assistance  Programs 

At  both  the  Bonn  and  Tokyo  summits, 
the  United  States  and  other  Western 
countries  agreed  to  increase  aid  for 
energy  conservation  and  supply.  Presi- 
dent Carter  has  emphasized  the  U.S. 
commitment  to  increased  energy  assist- 
ance. 1  reiterate  that  pledge  to  you. 
The  United  States  will  continue  to 
support  vigorously  bilateral  and  mul- 
tilateral programs  for  balanced  energy 
development. 

•  With  strong  U.S.  backing,  the 
World  Bank  recently  approved  a  major 
new  lending  program  for  petroleum, 
natural  gas,  and  coal  projects.  We  an- 
ticipate that  lending  will  rise  to  an  an- 
nual level  of  $1.5  billion  by  1983. 

•  We  are  further  urging  the  World 
Bank  to  take  a  more  active  role  in  coor- 
dinating the  energy  assistance  pro- 
grams of  bilateral  and  multilateral 
agencies,  especially  in  the  areas  of  re- 
newable energy. 

•  We  will  continue  to  encourage  all 
multilateral  development  banks  to  con- 


sider expanding  their  energy  programs. 
This  process  has  begun  at  the  Asian  and 
Inter-American  Development  Banks, 
and  we  are  encouraged  that  the  World 
Bank  is  now  preparing  a  policy  state- 
ment on  renewable  energy. 

•  The  U.S.  strongly  supports  the 
planned  1981  U.N.  Conference  on  New 
and  Renewable  Energy.  Preparations 
are  underway  for  active  U.S.  participa- 
tion at  all  levels,  including  helping  less 
developed  countries  with  their  own 
conference  preparations. 

•  The  United  States  is  currently 
funding,  on  a  bilatei'al  basis,  a 
substantial  range  of  assistance  projects 
in  the  energy  field. 

•  The  Department  of  Energy  and 
AID  have  undertaken  energy  sector  as- 
sessments in  Egypt,  Peru,  Indonesia, 
Portugal,  and  Argentina.  These  efforts 
undertaken  in  collaboration  with  those 
governments,  establish  an  essential 
data  base  for  planning. 

•  A  Peace  Corps  energy  program 
has  been  established  to  strengthen 
energy-related  volunteer  training, 
identify  rural  energy  needs,  and  de- 
velop village-level  energy  projects.  I 
anticipate  that  such  volunteer  efforts 
will  become  an  increasingly  important 
part  of  our  energy  assistance. 

•  aid's  funding  for  pilot  energy 
projects  in  rural  areas  has  more  than 
doubled  in  the  past  2  years. 

•  We  are  taking  steps  to  insure 
that  energy  concerns  and  needs  are  in- 
tegrated as  a  matter  of  standard  proce- 
dure into  all  rural  development  assist- 
ance projects  that  the  United  States 
supports. 

The  lack  of  properly  trained  techni- 
cal manpower  is  a  serious  constraint  to 
accelerated  and  diversified  energy  pro- 
duction in  the  Third  World.  AID  is  al- 
ready funding  several  training  pro- 
grams related  to  energy.  Two  are  at 
your  member  institutions — a  course  in 
energy  sector  management  at  the 
Stoneybrook  Campus  of  the  State  Uni- 
versity of  New  York  and  a  course  on  al- 
ternate energy  technology  at  the  Uni- 
versity of  Florida.  I  am  convinced  that 
much  more  can.  and  should  be,  done. 

Recognizing  that  the  U.S.  higher 
education  system  is  the  most  significant 
asset  we  have  for  transferring  technical 
skills,  I  am  pleased  to  announce  to  you 
that  we  are  preparing  a  new  program  to 
provide  support  for  long-term  training 
in  science  and  engineering  fields  related 
to  energy.  The  program  will  offer  fel- 
lowships for  training  ranging  from  in- 
ternships to  doctoral-level  studies,  with 
heavy  emphasis  on  existing  master's 
degree  programs.  I  hope  that  by  Sep- 
tember 1981,  the  first  students  will 


31 


GENERAL 


have  enrolled,  many  of  them  at  your  in- 
stitutions. This  could  eventually  be- 
come one  of  the  largest  single  economic 
development  training  programs  ever 
undertaken  by  the  U.S.  Government 
for  people  from  developing  nations. 

Against  this  background.  I  under- 
score the  important  role  that  you  and 
your  institutions  can  play  in  the  energy 
area  and  in  other  development  sectors 
as  well.  Training  programs  relevant  to 
the  Third  World  need  to  be  expanded. 
There  will  be  a  need  to  absorb  more 
students.  There  is  a  need  for  new  cur- 
ricula, especially  in  emerging  fields 
such  as  energy  sector  management  and 
renewable  energy  technologies.  Simi- 
larly research  on  new  energy  technol- 
ogies will  have  to  take  into  account  de- 
veloping country  circumstances. 

A  strong  partnership  between  de- 
velopment agencies  and  universities  is 
essential  given  the  task  before  us.  De- 
velopment is  a  taxing  and  often  dis- 
couraging process.  It  will  be  even  more 
difficult  in  the  future.  Our  commitment 
to  Thii'd  World  development  will  re- 
quire even  more  sacrifice  and  dedica- 
tion. But  no  effort  is  more  worthwhile 
in  terms  of  the  world's  future  and  the 
future  well-being  of  our  children. 

Just  2  years  ago,  Senator  Hubert 
Humphrey,  who  first  proposed  the  In- 
ternational Development  Cooperation 
Agency,  spoke  at  the  Famine  Preven- 
tion Symposium.  It  was  his  final  public 
speech.  His  words  apply  today  as  they 
did  2  years  ago. 

So,  as  I  said,  it  is  appropriate  for  these 
institutions  which  are  in  title  XII — that 
have  such  a  responsibility — begin  to  play  a 
vital  and  integral  role  in  the  agricultural  de- 
velopment of  countries  around  this  planet. 
But,  may  I  say  to  my  friends  of  the  diplo- 
matic corps  that  are  here  today,  it  won't 
work  if  we  just  have  to  come  knocking  at 
your  door.  We  have  to  join  hands.  You  may 
have  to  knock  at  our  door  or  we  at  yours, 
but  more  importantly  we  have  to  understand 
we  can  help  each  other.  .  .  .  ■ 


The  Nonaligned  Movement 
After  the  Havana  Conference 


bii  Charles  William  Maynes 

Keifnote  address  before  the  Na- 
fidnal  Conferevce  on  the  Third  World 
at  the  Uinversitij  of  Nebraska  in 
Omaha  on  Oetober  25,  1979.  Mr. 
Maijves  is  Assistant  Secretari/  fur  In- 
ternational Organization  Affairs. 

Once  in  a  while  an  act  can  symbolize  an 
age:  This  summer  Garry  Davis  asked  to 
come  home. 

Who  is  Garry  Davis?  A  highly  pa- 
triotic bombardier  in  World  War  II, 
Davis  renounced  the  United  States  for 
a  citizenship  of  the  world  to  dramatize 
his  view  that  nationhood  was  incom- 
patible with  peace.  Over  the  years  he 
drew  tens  of  thousands  of  Europeans  to 
world  government  rallies  and  upset 
immigration  officials  by  appearing  at 
their  borders  with  a  42-page  "World 
Citizens  Passport."  Now  he  wants  to 
come  home. 

But  Garry  Davis'  return  poses  a 
problem  for  those  of  us  interested  in 
American  foreign  policy,  particularly 
those  of  us  interested  in  U.S.  policy 
toward  the  Third  World.  Many  of  us 
undoubtedly  thought  Garry  Davis' 
quest  for  world  government  foolish. 
Yet  in  an  extreme  way,  he  represented 
an  underlying  and  coherent  current  in 
the  postwar  American  approach  to  the 
world.  In  the  wake  of  the  devastation  of 
World  War  II — with  the  evidence  of 
the  monumental  inhumanity  which  the 
traditional  game  of  international  poli- 
tics can  bring — we  thought  we  knew 
what  we  wanted.  We  also  thought  we 
knew  what  the  rest  of  the  world 
wanted.  Even  if  few  believed  in  world 
government,  many  believed  we  were  in 
the  process  of  creating  a  tightening  web 
of  international  institutions  and  laws 
which  would  make  the  world  a  better 
place  to  live.  The  process  of  change  in 
the  Third  World  seemed  almost  reas- 
suring. With  these  new  nations,  the 
world  could  begin  afresh. 

At  first  things  seemed  to  work  out. 
Self-determination,  a  word  American 
Presidents  minted  for  international 
coinage,  swept  the  world.  New  states 
took  their  place  on  the  international 
stage,  most  verbally  supporting  our 
values,  most  visibly  copying  our  in- 
stitutions. They  joined  the  United  Na- 


tions. They  asked  for  our  help.  We 
seemed  to  have  new  friends  and  new 
interests. 

Then  it  seemed  to  go  sour.  In  coun- 
try after  country,  democratic  struc- 
tures crumbled  under  military  or  mob 
assault.  Or  the  very  men  and  women 
who  controlled  the  new  democratic  in- 
stitutions appeared  intent  on  subvert- 
ing them.  When  even  India,  dear  to 
American  internationalists,  temporarily 
moved  out  of  the  democratic  camp,  the 
whole  postwar  vision  of  the  way  the 
world  would  develop  seemed  bankrupt, 
and  many  wanted  to  withdraw  from  the 
area  of  the  world  we  never  understood 
very  well  in  the  first  place — the  de- 
veloping world,  the  Third  World,  the 
nonaligned  world. 

So  many  Americans  in  recent  years 
came  home  like  Garry  Davis.  Yet  once 
home,  they  soon  faced  a  paradox.  They 
no  sooner  retired  from  the  developing 
world — declared  it  was  outside  the 
"core  of  U.S.  interests" — than 
everyone  began  hinting  it  was  impor- 
tant after  all.  Angola,  Ethiopia, 
Rh(]desia,  and  Namibia  suggested  that 
not  only  [former  U.S.  Ambassador  to 
the  U.N.]  Andy  Young  considered  Af- 
rica important.  Many  had  downgraded 
the  importance  of  Indochina  until  the 
Vietnamese  occupied  Cambodia  and 
threatened  Thailand.  Commentators 
considered  the  Caribbean  of  secondary 
importance  until  revolutions  began  to 
sweep  the  area.  South  Asia  was  not 
even  on  the  back  pages  until  the  coup  in 
Afghanistan,  the  revolution  in  Iran, 
and  the  nuclear  moves  in  Pakistan. 
Suddenly  and  surprisingly,  everyone 
agreed  the  Third  World  was  important 

Suddenly  everyone  agreed  we  cam* 
home  too  soon.  So  I  would  like  to  spend! 
the  rest  of  my  time  discussing  the  fol- 
lowing ((uestions.  Who  is  in  the  Third 
World?  Why  do  we  have  trouble  talking 
to  them?  What  should  our  policy  be? 

Organization  of  the  Nonaligned 
Movement 

Let's  begin  with  the  so-called 
nonaligned  movement.  What  does  it 
represent?  What  are  its  priorities? 
The  current  membership  is  95. 
Burma  having  just  detached  itself  in 
protest  to  Cuban  intimidation  tactics  ii 
Havana,  the  nonaligned  movement  nov 
consists  of  91  nations  and  four  libera- 
tion movements,  nearly  two-thirds  of 


32 


Department  of  State  Bulletr 


,.  I 


General 


the  U.N.  membership.  The  nonaligiied 
movement  has  iki  charter,  no  executive, 
no  secretariat.  It  is  usually  the  host 
country  for  each  summit  meeting  which 
assumes  the  presidency  for  periods  of  3 
years. 

The  summit  remains  the  authorita- 
tive organ.  It  reviews  events  since  the 
previous  summit,  debates  and  takes  po- 
sitions on  the  issues,  and  then  adopts 
action  programs  for  a  3-year  period. 
Each  summit  initiates  a  new  3-year 
cycle  of  nonaligned  movement  meet- 
ings. In  the  first  year,  there  is  a  meet- 
ing of  the  36  Non-Aligned  Coordinating 
Bureau  at  the  Foreign  Minister  level 
and  there  is  a  plenary  meeting  of 
Foreign  Ministers.  In  the  final  year,  a 
new  round  of  plenary  meetings  of 
Foreign  Ministers  is  followed  im- 
mediately by  the  summit  of  heads  of 
state  and  government. 

Membership  criteria  in  the  non- 
:ned  movement  are  vague,  largely 
determined  by  members'  attitudes  to- 
ward a  particular  applicant.  So,  one  has 
major  actors  of  international  politics  in 
the  group  such  as  India  or  Nigeria,  im- 
portant ones  such  as  Yugoslavia  or 
Cuba,  harried  ones  such  as  Kampuchea, 
and  insigificant  ones  such  as  some  of 
the  smaller  island  states.  It  has  Com- 
munist members  such  as  North  Korea, 
anti-Communists  such  as  Argentina  and 
Indonesia,  Communists  who  fight  each 
other  such  as  Vietnam  and  Cambodia, 
rich  ones  such  as  OPEC  [Organization 
of  Petroleum  E.xporting  Countries],  and 
poor  ones  who  are  most  of  the  rest. 

How  could,  one  might  ask,  such  a 
group  hold  together?  Their  cohesive- 
ness  is  e.xplained  perhaps  best  by  not 
what  they  are  but  what  they  are  not. 
They  are  not  white,  though  Yugoslavia 
was  a  founding  member:  they  are  not 
rich,  though  that  has  changed  as  far  as 
:he  OPEC  countries  are  concerned; 
they  are  not  members  of  the  big  power 
olocs,  though  that  must  be  taken  with  a 
^rain  of  salt  when  one  thinks  of  North 
Korea,  Cuba,  and  Vietnam;  they  are 
lot  countries  with  democratic  govern- 
■nents,  though  its  largest  members  such 
as  India  and  Nigeria  are,  and  the  trend 
s  somewhat  more  promising  than  a  few 
/ears  ago. 

Evolution  of  Causes 

The  nonaligned  movement  was  founded 
jy  Tito,  Nehru,  Sukarno,  and  Nasser, 
3Ut  its  genealogy  includes  the  Bandung 
•onference;  Zhou  Enlai;  and  an  assort- 
Tient  of  attempts  to  seek  third  roads, 
hird  camps,  and  third  worlds.  While 
>ach  of  its  founders  had  a  pet  big  power 


to  be  wary  of,  this  movement,  as  most 
movements  do.  emerged  as  a  reaction 
to,  rather  than  as  an  initiative  for. 
Something. 

Thus,  the  nonaligned  were  coun- 
tries situated  in  what  used  to  be  called 
"grey  areas"  of  conflict  in  the  cold  war, 
from  which  they  wanted  to  stay  out. 
Trying  to  avoid  overdependence  on  the 
superpowers  and  trying  to  enhance 
their  own  influence  internationally 
through  e.xpressions  of  solidarity  on 
major  issues,  the  nonaligned  movement 
began,  with  its  first  summit  in  Belgrade 
in  1961,  as  a  concerted  effort  to  mediate 
in  the  cold  war.  But  it  quickly  emerged 
that  this  common  denominator  did  not 
provide  a  sufficient  impulse  to  unity. 
Over  the  next  few  years,  therefore, 
nonaligned  emphasis  shifted  to  a  cam- 
paign to  speed  up  the  decolonization 
process.  This  was  the  overriding 
nonaligned  issue  at  the  Carlo  summit  in 
1964. 

The  economic  issues — always  a 
concern — gained  nonaligned  attention 
on  par  with  the  cold  war  and  decoloni- 
zation only  at  the  Lusaka  summit  in 
1970.  At  Lusaka,  a  separate  summit 
declaration  on  economic  issues — the 
first  such — emphasized  self-reliance, 
mutual  assistance,  and  cooperation. 
This  thrust  achieved  new  momentum  at 
the  Algiers  summit  in  1973  with  the 
adoption  of  a  comprehensive  nonaligned 
economic  program  calling  for  funda- 
mental revision  of  the  world  economic 
order,  the  forerunner  of  the  controver- 
sial new  international  economic  order. 
Nearly  one-half  of  the  recent  Havana 
summit's  final  declaration  is  devoted  to 
aspects  of  these  same  economic  issues, 
as  was  a  major  portion  of  the  October 
12  U.N.  General  Assembly  speech  of 
Fidel  Castro,  the  current  chairman  of 
the  nonaligned  movement. 

Is  the  evolution  of  causes  of  the 
nonaligned  movement  a  theater  in 
search  of  a  play?  The  nonaligned 
movement,  as  most  movements,  does 
not  define  itself  by  strict  rules  of 
adherence  to  a  core  ideology.  Nor  is  it 
an  alliance  based  on  contract  with  fine 
print.  Faithfulness  to  the  original  spirit 
that  spawned  the  movement  is  its  best 
characteristic,  and  this  is  where  the 
sharpest  battles  are  fought — not  unlike 
most  denominational  movements.  The 
integrity  of  original  principles  is  where 
Tito  put  most  of  his  efforts  at  the  re- 
cent Havana  summit.  It  is  to  his  credit 
that  the  section  on  principles  and  on 
philosophy  of  the  movement  in  the  final 
declaration  was  largely  satisfactory  to 
those  members  w'ho  attach  special  im- 
portance to  the  independence  of  the 


movement.  The  Yugoslavs  and  others 
succeeded  at  Havana  in  rebuffing  the 
Cuban  drive  toward  a  nonaligned 
movement-Soviet  "natural  alliance"  and 
in  gaining  confirmation  of  the  move- 
ment's traditional  posture  as  an  inde- 
pendent nonbloc  force. 

Yet  this  should  not  be  viewed  as  a 
defeat  of  the  Soviets,  much  less  a  vic- 
tory for  the  West,  nor  should  it  be  dis- 
missed as  an  inconsequential  victory  of 
principles  over  expediency.  It  was  a 
battle  fought  for  reasons  hardly  flat- 
tering to  any  major  military  power. 

The  raisan  d'cfre  of  the  nonaligned 
movement,  at  least  in  the  minds  of  its 
founders,  was  to  raise  as  high  as  possi- 
ble the  psychological  barriers  to  the  use 
of  force  in  international  relations  since 
Third  World  countries  were  the  most 
probable  victims  of  the  use  of  force. 
The  reason  the  Yugoslavs  and  others 
resisted  the  Cuban  drive  to  support 
Vietnam  in  its  campaign  to  occupy 
Cambodia  is  precisely  because  they  fear 
Vietnam's  success  will  lower  the  bar- 
riers for  many  even  more  powerful 
countries  to  intervene  in  Third  World 
affairs. 

Anticolonialism 

One  will  notice  I  referred  to  interven- 
tion in  Third  World  affairs.  Nonaligned 
movement  members  have  concentrated 
their  criticism  and  joint  opposition  to 
the  historic  ability  of  the  colonial  coun- 
tries to  intervene  in  Third  World  inter- 
nal affairs.  They  have  denounced  the 
least  threatening  action  of  former  colo- 
nial countries  in  their  region  while  re- 
maining silent  on  more  threatening  de- 
velopments in  other  parts  of  the 
world — for  example,  Soviet  actions  in 
Eastern  Europe.  The  global  reach  of 
the  Soviet  Union,  using  Cuban  and 
Vietnamese  proxies,  has  increasingly 
called  into  question  this  double  stand- 
ard which  has  understandably  troubled 
us. 

The  nonaligned  movement  concen- 
tration on  principles  does  not  obviate 
the  continuing  search  of  the  movement 
for  animating  causes.  The  movement's 
earlier  emphasis  on  anticolonialism  and 
traditional  stand  against  the  cold  war 
no  longer  serve  effectively  to  insure 
solidarity  of  the  nonaligned  countries. 
There  are  reasons  for  this. 

•  The  decolonization  process  is 
nearly  concluded;  indeed,  we  are 
working  with  our  allies  and  with  the 
front-line  African  states  to  bring  about 
internationally  acceptable  solutions  in 


33 


General 


southern  Africa,  the  final  bastion  of 
colonialism. 

•  We  have  tried  where  we  could  to 
lower  the  level  of  East-West  confronta- 
tion, but  we  have  been  prepared  to  re- 
spond vigorously  to  protect  our  inter- 
ests. 

While  neither  colonialism  nor  the 
cold  war  provides  a  single  unifying 
raisiDi  d'etre,  nonaligned  movement 
members  now  discuss  nearly  every  im- 
portant international  issue.  At  the  re- 
cent Havana  summit,  for  example,  the 
nonaligned  movement: 

•  Strongly  supported  liberation 
groups  in  Rhodesia  and  Namibia  while 
pointing  to  the  importance  of  efforts 
toward  negotiated  settlements; 

•  Was  on  record  in  favor  of  a  politi- 
cal settlement  of  the  Kampuchea  prob- 
lem, consistent  with  the  principles  of 
noninterference  and  withdrawal  of 
foreign  forces  and  also  came  down  for 
humanitarian  efforts  to  deal  with  the 
refugee  and  famine  issues  in  Indochina; 

•  Was  critical  of  U.S.  policy  in 
Latin  America  while  rebuffing  Castro's 
efforts  to  condemn  the  Rio  pact  and  the 
Inter-American  system; 

•  Condemned  the  Camp  David 
agreements,  thanks  largely  to  Cuban 
intimidation  and  manipulation  tactics  at 
the  summit.  I  might  add  that  this  deci- 
sion was  not  sustained  in  a  meeting  of 
nonaligned  Foreign  Ministers  a  couple 
of  weeks  later  in  New  York. 

But  while  the  nonaligned  move- 
ment at  Havana  considered  a  broad 
range  of  international  political  ques- 
tions, summit  discussions  of  them  have 
demonstrated  a  significant  lack  of  con- 
sensus. In  the  post-Havana  period,  this 
lack  of  consensus  has  been  even  more 
notable;  for  example,  the  Havana  decla- 
ration's position  on  the  representation 
of  Kampuchea  was  promptly  revised  by 
the  U.N.  General  Assembly. 

The  key  point  I  am  trying  to  make 
is  that  none  of  these  many  issues  has 
provided  the  movement  with  an  effec- 
tive replacement  for  colonialism  or  for 
the  cold  war  as  unifying  themes. 

The  New  International 
pjconomic  Order 

That  leaves  the  movement  with  the  eco- 
nomic issues — the  new  international 
economic  order — as  the  cause  which  can 
again  bring  unity  and  results.  But  there 
are  differences  between  decolonization 
and  development  as  issues  for  con- 
fronting the  industrialized  world. 


Anticolonialism  invr)lved  a  clearly 
identifiable  opponent  who  accepted  part 
of  the  nonaligned  criti(iue.  The  same  is 
not  true  with  respect  to  the  new  inter- 
national economic  order.  Admittedly,  it 
can  be  said — and  it  is  being  said — that 
so-called  neocolonialism  is  the  main 
evil.  After  all,  the  former  colonialists 
who  once  controlled  foreign  territory 
continue  to  control  much  of  the  capital, 
resources,  technology,  and  information 
which  flow  in  international  channels. 
The  difficulties  reside  in  the  differ- 
ences. In  the  case  of  colonialism.  West- 
ern nations  admitted  to  behavior  in 
conflict  with  Western  values.  This  ethi- 
cal disjuncture  engendered  a  feeling  of 
guilt;  and  in  fact.  Western  nations  could 
neither  legitimize  nor  hold  on  to  their 
colonial  empire — which  in  time,  and  in 
any  event,  they  considered  a  burden, 
not  an  asset. 

Over  the  issues  where  the  battle  is 
now  joined,  however,  most  in  the  West 
do  not  see  any  fundamental  conflict  be- 
tween Western  behavior  and  Western 
value  systems.  They,  therefore,  feel  no 
sense  of  guilt.  Moreover,  unlike  the 
case  with  colonialism,  they  believe  that 
this  time  around  the  West  is  being 
asked  to  shed  policies  bringing  it  not 
weakness  but  ultimately  strength.  Con- 
sequently, while  the  West  does  not 
seek  victory  in  the  battle,  it  does  not 
want  to  come  out  a  loser.  It,  therefore, 
offers  formulas  for  compromise  and 
stresses  mutual  advantages.  In  this  re- 
spect, although  some  portions  of  Fidel 
Castro's  speech  did  stress  mutual  advan- 
tage, his  recent  U.N.  call  on  the  North 
to  aid  the  South  as  an  act  of  retribution 
for  past  sins  represents  for  the  North- 
South  dialogue  a  dead  end  and  a  dis- 
service. The  call  cannot  be  received  be- 
cause the  language  is  not  understood. 
Castro  is  trying  to  apply  a  strategy 
which  brilliantly  succeeded  on  one 
issue — colonialism — but  which  will  in- 
evitably fail  on  another — North-South 
relations. 

Cumulative  Impact  of  LDCs 
on  Western  Countries 

Yet  if  all  this  is  true,  it  is  also  incon- 
testable that  the  Third  World  is  much 
more  important  to  U.S.  security  and 
welfare  than  it  has  ever  been.  In  the 
past,  less  developed  countries  (LDCs) 
commanded  superpower  attention  be- 
cause they  were  weak  and  breeding 
grounds  for  East-West  conflict.  That 
concern  remains  and  in  some  regions  of 
the  world  even  grows.  But  in  addition, 
they  now  command  attention  because, 
collectively,  they  have  on  some  issues 


more  strength  than  before  and  are 
raising  f|uestions  relevant  to  the  West's 
own  future  economic  welfare.  Thus, 
many  LDCs  have  acquired  the  capacity 
to  affect  international  events  in  signifi- 
cant ways.  Some  of  them,  like  Brazil, 
India,  and  Nigeria,  have  potentially 
preponderant  regional  influence  be- 
cause of  location,  population,  and  mili- 
tary power.  Others,  such  as  Saudi 
Arabia  and  Venezuela,  have  substantial 
oil  power.  Particularly,  the  countries  in 
East  Asia  play  major  roles  in  interna- 
tional trade.  There  are,  in  short,  new 
loci  of  political  and  military  power  in 
the  Third  World,  and  the  cumulative 
impact  of  unified  action  in  many  areas 
is,  at  least  on  paper,  considerable. 

Yet,  like  us,  the  members  of  the 
nonaligned  movement  confront  many 
contradictions  in  the  foreign  policy 
goals  they  pursue.  Together  with  the 
need  for  unity,  they  share  the  impor- 
tance of  maintaining  direct  and  respon- 
sive relationships  with  industrialized 
states  for  reasons  that  are  economic, 
military,  and  political  or  a  combination; 
of  all  these.  For  example,  some  oil 
states  have  an  indisputable  ability  to 
shake  the  foundations  of  the  interna- 
tional financial  system  and  wield  con- 
siderable political  influence  in  the 
Mideast  and  Persian  Gulf  regions.  Yet 
they  remain  vulnerable  to  military  at- 
tack from  their  neighbors,  and  their 
wealth  depends  on  Western  stability. 
They  cannot  act  alone.  For  them,  as  for 
us,  close  bilateral  and  multilateral  re- 
lationships are  crucial  to  their  securitj 
and  economic  viability. 

These  considerations  underscore 
the  compelling  argument  for  some  sort 
of  world  order  vision  which  can  replaci 
the  one  we  have  lost.  If  neither  the  tra- 
ditional powers  nor  the  newly  emerginj 
centers  of  influence  can  impose  their 
will  on  the  others,  nor  survive  without 
each  other,  then  we  need  to  strive  for 
some  common  framework,  some  neutra 
understanding. 

Yet  it  is  not  enough  to  underscore 
the  mutuality  of  interests  between  the 
developing  countries  and  the  indus- 
trialized world.  Nor  is  it  enough  to  ap- 
peal to  fear,  since  apocalyptic  warn- 
ings, unless  real  and  immediate,  remai) 
unconvincing.  Rather  we  must  pa- 
tiently strive  for  common  ground. 

"Moderation" — Key  Objective  to 
World  Order  Politics 

The  objective  of  world  order  politics,  t( 
use  Stanley  Hoffman's  phrase,  must  be 
"moderation  plus" — neither  Utopia  nor 
resignation.  Notwithstanding  the  disci 


34 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


General 


pline  it  reciuires.  we  must  begin  with 
moderation.  Rhetorical  fulminations 
against  the  Third  World  are  no  more 
effective  with  them  than  their  rhetori- 
cal excesses  are  with  us.  This  is  not  to 
say  that  we  should  not  expose  rhetori- 
cal posturing  when  it  takes  place  and 
adjust  our  bilateral  relationship  ac- 
cordingly. Nor  does  it  mean  that  the 
United  States  should  not  respond  vig- 
orously to  countries  that  unfairly  abuse 
or  challenge  our  legitimate  intei'ests.  If 
for  no  other  reason  than  self-respect, 
that  will  be  necessary.  But  we  should 
not  expect  more  from  confrontation 
than  it  can  yield.  Even  when  we  are 
forced  to  act  vigorously,  we  should 
make  clear  that  the  U.S.  bias  is  to  re- 
turn to  moderation  and  dialogue. 

If  we  can  maintain  moderation  and 
provided  that  others  maintain  it  too, 
then  the  "plus"  we  need  can  be  intro- 
duced into  the  new  global  politics.  That 
"plus"  re(|uires  that  we  go  beyond 
thinking  of  the  current  dilemma  as  an 
essentially  North-South  dichotomy  or 
as  a  question  of  economics. 

In  a  way,  we  have  to  go  back  to  the 
drawing  board  and  negotiate  not  about 
ivho  gets  what  and  who  yields  what  but 
A'hether  the  rules  which  all  in  the  end 
•an  accept  can  be  applied  more  equita- 
bly to  all  the  players. 

Several  examples  come  to  mind 
vhich  suggest  that,  in  fact,  we  are  — 
vith  the  Third  World  —  haltingly  doing 
)recisely  that  already.  In  recent 
nonths  and  even  days,  the  United 
states  has  joined,  and  is  participating 
n,  international  conferences  and 
ieg(jtiations  which  specifically  deal 
iith  the  equitable  application  of  the 
ules  of  access  to  global  wealth,  re- 
ources,  and  power. 

The  Law  of  the  Sea  negotiations, 
he  Vienna  Conference  on  Science  and 
'echnology  for  Development  convened 
•y  the  United  Nations,  and  the  World 
i^dministrative  Radio  Conference,  now 
n  process  in  Geneva,  each  deal  with 
his  issue.  In  each  of  these  fora,  delega- 
ions  and  negotiating  teams  are  con- 
ronting  extremely  difficult  challenges 
n  devising  international  regimes  which 
egulate  access  and  utilization  of  global 
esources. 

In  all  of  the  debates  on  equity  of 
ccess  and  utilization  of  the  global 
ommons,  sides  have  been  drawn  along 
luralistic  lines.  Across  the  board,  the 
roblem  has  been  whittled  down  to  one 
asic  point — after  the  consensus  is 
eached  on  objectives,  are  the  rules  of 
he  game  being  fairly  applied? 


System  of  Rules 

This  has  been  in  almost  every  instance 
the  crux  of  the  negotiating  process.  In 
every  case,  we  have  supported  a  strict 
policy  of  rule-adherence,  where  they  al- 
ready existed,  and  rulemaking,  when 
they  did  not,  as  the  basis  for  negotia- 
tion. We  have  defended  or  sought  fair 
and  impartial  rules. 

In  all  these  questions  of  equitable 
access  and  sharing,  we,  for  our  part, 
have  maintained  that  it  is  inherently 
unfair  for  the  developing  countries  to 
share  in  the  proceeds  without  sharing 
in  the  effort  according  to  their  abilities. 
The  developing  countries  in  turn  have 
maintained  that  they  cannot  accept  a 


system  under  which  they  may  share  in 
the  benefits  but  do  not  share  in  the  op- 
eration and  management. 

So  for  all  practical  purposes, 
"charity"  is  out,  but  common  interest  is 
in,  as  it  should  be  where  one  is 
negotiating  over  "rules"  which  must 
rest  on  common  interest  and  not  "re- 
lief which  must  develop  from  shared 
compassion. 

In  the  Law  of  the  Sea  negotiations, 
we  see  the  operative  example  of  how^ 
this  new  system  of  rules  may  work, 
where  developed  and  developing  na- 
tions have  exhausted  debate  and  have 
gotten  down  to  compromise.  The  prod- 
uct is  a  relatively  strong  model  of  co- 


95  MEMBERS  OF  THE  NONALIGNED  MOVEMENT 


Sao  Tome  and  Principe 

Saudi  Arabia 

Senegal 

Seychelles 

Sierra  Leone 

Singapore 

Somalia 

Sri  Lanka 

Sudan 

Suriname 

Swaziland 

Syria 

Tanzania 

Togo 

Trinidad  and  Tobago 

Tunisia 

Uganda 

United  Arab  Emirates 

Upper  Volta 

Vietnam 

Yemen  (Aden) 

Yemen  (Sana) 

Yugoslavia 

Zaire 

Zambia 

African  National  Congress 

Palestine  Liberation  Or- 
ganization 

Patriotic  Front  of  Zim- 
babwe 

South  West  Africa  People's 
Organization 


Afghanistan 

Iraq 

Algeria 

Ivory  Coast 

Angola 

Jamaica 

Argentina 

Jordan 

Bahrain 

Kampuchea 

Bangladesh 

Kenya 

Benin 

Korea  (North) 

Bhutan 

Kuwait 

Bolivia 

Laos 

Botswana 

Lebanon 

Burundi 

Lesotho 

Cameroon 

Liberia 

Cape  Verde 

Libya 

Central  African  Republic 

Madagascar 

Chad 

Malawi 

Comoros 

Malaysia 

Congo 

Maldives 

Cuba 

Mali 

Cyprus 

Malta 

Djibouti 

Mauritania 

Egypt 

Mauritius 

Equatorial  Guinea 

Morocco 

Ethiopia 

Mozambique 

Gabon 

Nepal 

Gambia 

Nicaragua 

Ghana 

Niger 

Grenada 

Nigeria 

Guinea 

Oman 

Guinea-Bissau 

Pakistan 

Guyana 

Panama 

India 

Peru 

Indonesia 

Qatar 

Iran 

Rwanda 

ebruary  1980 


35 


General 


operative,  joint  venture  —  of  fairness,  if 
you  will. 

The  basis  of  this  treaty  dealing 
with  the  mining  of  seabeds  calls  for  the 
creation  of  parallel  regimes.  A  private 
firm  winning  a  concession  must  help  the 
international  community  mine  a  parallel 
track. 

I  was  particularly  intrigued  by  the 
analysis  of  one  of  the  major  architects 
of  this  tentative  agreement — Ambas- 
sador M.C'.W.  Pinton  from  Sri  Lanka. 
In  describing  the  rationale  for  this  in- 
ternational regime,  he  stated:  ".  .  .  the 
"common  heritage'  of  these  resources  is 
not  'res  nulius'  to  be  had  for  the  taking: 
is  not  'res  communis'  simply  for  en- 
joyment or  use  in  common;  it  is  more 
akin  to  property  held  in  trust — held  in 
trust  for  'mankind  as  a  whole,'  for  the 
public.  It  is,  therefore,  closest  to  'res 
publicae,'  the  property  of  the  people  to 
be  administered  by  the  people  and  for 
the  people." 

His  prescription  is  a  rejection  of 
social  Darwinism  in  global  politics  yet 
does  not  make  the  opposing  error  of 
Utopian  regimes.  In  an  age  of  di- 
minishing resources,  growing  scarcities 
but  also  growing  threats.  I  am  re- 
minded of  Jefferson's  words  that  such 
'res  publicae'  is  the  only  form  of  gov- 
ernment which  is  not  eternally  at  open 
or  secret  war  with  the  rights  of  man- 
kind." 

In  the  continuing  dialogue  on  the 
rules  for  a  new  international  order,  as 
in  a  republic,  even  the  rules  must  be 
debated  according  to  the  rules.  Neither 
the  demands  of  the  Third  World  nor  our 
interests  can  be  satisfied  in  conditions  of 
global  anarchy. 

But  within  the  rules  we  have  inter- 
ests to  protect  and  principles  to  uphold. 
We  cannot  agree  to  rules  that  unfairly 
tax  our  interests  just  as  we  cannot  ex- 
pect the  developing  world  to  abide  by 
rules  which  unfairly  violate  theirs. 

We  are  conscious  of  the  unfair 
treatment  history  has  given  some  coun- 
tries or  groups  within  countries,  in- 
cluding our  own.  But  both  at  home  and 
abroad  the  sins  of  the  past  cannot  be 
the  foundation  of  the  future.  We  must 
lay  aside  charges  of  guilt  and  focus  on 
the  duty  of  common  obligations. 

There  is  no  other  way  to  forge  the 
global  coalition  necessary  for  achieving 
the  reforms  we  need  to  make  the  world 
safer  and  more  prosperous.  As  Fidel 
Castro,  speaking  as  the  chairman  of  the 
nonaligned,  acknowledged  in  his  report 
to  the  General  Assembly  on  the  Havana 
conference,  worldwide  economic  crisis 
will  harm  everyone — from  Socialist 
state  to  capitalist  investor. 


36 


Consequently,  everyone  according 
to  his  abilities  must  participate  in  the 
solution.  In  today's  integi'ated  world 
economy,  we  can  no  longer  allow  the 
choice  of  opting  out  of  one's  respon- 
sibilities. 

Common  obligations  in  a  new  world 
order  imply  a  division  of  labor  but  not  a 
division  of  the  world  into  competing 
blocs  plus  one  more  bloc  to  remain  on 
the  sidelines.  If  the  Third  World  has 
obligations  and  interests,  if  the  West 
has  obligations  and  interests,  so  do  the 
Soviets  and  their  allies.  If  they  are  af- 
fected by  the  cycles  of  economic  reces- 
sion, so  must  they  share  in  offering 
concrete  remedies  to  avoid  them. 

This  is  not  to  say  that  we  will  al- 
ways be  able  to  communicate  with  the 
nonaligned  as  a  movement.  Just  as 
NATO  members  speak  with  one  voice 
multilaterally  yet  often  differ  bilater- 
ally, so  do  the  nonaligned.  Precisely  for 
this  reason,  the  Administration  has  not 
sought  relations  with  the  nonaligned  as 
a  movement  but  with  countries  in  the 
movement  which  have  power  to  influ- 
ence problems  we  believe  must  be  re- 
solved. 

We  have,  therefore,  established 
close  relations  with  some  members  of 
the  nonaligned  and  maintain  strained 
relations  with  others.  We  will  continue 
to  act  accordingly.  We  will  judge  the 
nonaligned  movement  as  a  movement. 
We  regard  the  movement's  record  as 
very  mixed,  with  commendable  balance 
displayed  on  some  issues  and  high  ir- 
responsibility in  evidence  on  others. 
Nevertheless,  we  will  judge  its  mem- 
bers as  individual  countries  and  will 
find  we  can  w^ork  with  some  and  must 
resist  others.  To  do  otherwise — either 
to  reject  the  nonaligned  countries  in 
their  entirety  or  to  embrace  them  in 
their  collectivity — would  only  damage 
U.S.  interests. 

Conclusion 

Where  then  does  this  leave  us  in 
terms  of  U.S.  policy  toward  the  Third 
World?  I  would  like  to  suggest  a  policy 
based  on  three  components:  responsi- 
bility, resources,  and  realism. 

Responsibility  in  the  sense  that 
the  Third  World  must  show  it  as  well  as 
expect  it.  Colonialism  was  a  historic 
mistake  which  had  to  be  eradicated.  So 
long  as  it  existed,  the  primary  respon- 
sibility was  on  the  shoulders  of  the 
powers  which  were  called  on  to  decol- 
onialize.  But  we  are  approaching  the 
end  of  that  era. 


With  the  new  issues  there  are  — 
there  must  be — reciprocal  obligations 
for  all  parties.  These  obligations  may 
take  into  account  different  circum- 
stances, but  reciprocity  is  critical  to 
final  agreement. 

Resources  in  the  sense  that  the 
Third  World  needs  help  and  we  must 
play  a  larger  role  in  providing  that 
help.  The  way  that  we  have  allowed  our 
aid  program  to  deteriorate  is  a  national 
disgrace.  It  is  time  we  stated  the  issue 
starkly.  There  is  no  way  that  the 
United  States  can  compete  for  influence 
in  the  world,  as  the  critics  of  the  Ad- 
ministration are  urging,  without  the  re 
source  commitment  which  those  same 
critics  are  denying. 

Realism  in  the  sense  that  we  look 
at  the  Third  World  as  it  really  is — as  an 
area  in  flux,  of  concern,  and  with  im- 
portance. In  flux,  because  the  popular 
stereotypes  of  a  region  headed  for  au- 
thoritarian darkness  are  wrong.  Some 
of  the  most  heartening  developments  of 
the  Third  World  have  been  the 
liberalizing  trends  in  the  powerhouses 
of  the  Third  World  —  in  India,  in 
Nigeria,  in  Brazil,  and  even  in  China. 
Indeed,  were  it  not  for  the  tragedy  in 
Kampuchea,  the  past  year  would  be 
seen  as  a  banner  year  for  human  rights 
in  the  Third  World  as  four  of  the  most 
vicious  tyrants  since  Hitler  and  Stalin 
have  been  overthrown  —  Idi  Amin,  Pol 
Pot,  Bokassa,  and  Macias. 

Of  concern  because  the  thesis  that 
American  security  need  only  be  con- 
cerned with  the  industrial  heartlands  ol 
Western  Europe  and  Japan  was  wrong 
when  it  was  formulated  and  clearly  is 
wrong  today. 

With  importance  because  issues 
such  as  oil,  nonprolife ration,  strategic 
location,  and  trade  document  the  vital 
nature  of  the  Third  World  to  our  secu- 
rity and  well-beiog. 

A  policy  built  on  responsibility,  re 
sources,  and  realism  can  succeed.  It      | 
will  not  give  us  the  world  government 
Garry  Davis  sought,  but  it  can  make 
the  world  safer  and  the  United  States 
more  secure.  And  that,  in  the  end,  is 
what  a  sound  foreign  policy  is  all 
about.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


Missing  and  Disappeared  Persons 


by  Patricia  M.  Dcrian 

Sfatciiu'Hf  before  the  Subcommittee 
ill!  International  Organizations  oftlie 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
October  IS.  1979.  Ms.  Dcrian  is  Assist- 
ant Sccretarij  for  Hu})ian  Rights  and 
HnnuDiifarian  Affairs. ' 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  appear 
before  you  and  your  colleagues  and 
commend  the  committee  for  its  initia- 
tive in  conducting  these  hearings  on 
missing  or  disappeared  persons.  We 
consider  this  problem  to  be  one  of  the 
most  serious  human  rights  issues  con- 
fronting the  world  today,  necessitating 
attention  and  action  not  only  by  the 
United  States  but  by  all  members  of  the 
international  community.  This  was  the 
view  expressed  by  the  U.S.  Represen- 
tative to  the  Human  Rights  Commis- 
sion to  Committee  III  of  the  United 
Nations  last  December  and  reiterated 
by  him  at  the  U.N.  Human  Rights 
Commission  earlier  this  year.  It  re- 
mains our  view  today. 

In  your  previous  hearings,  distin- 
guished witnesses  from  a  variety  of 
nongovernmental  human  rights  organi- 
zations have  provided  considerable  de- 
tail on  the  disappearance  phenomenon. 
We  believe  their  accounts  were  care- 
fully researched  and  accurate.  I  do  not 
intend  t(j  rehearse  those  details  at  any 
great  length.  Previous  testimony  has 
made  them  painfully  familiar  to  all  of 

What  I  should  like  to  do  today,  in 
■accordance  with  your  letter  to  Secre- 
tary Vance  requesting  my  appearance, 

is  to: 

•  Provide  you  the  Administration's 
views  and  response  to  this  relatively 
new  violation  of  human  I'ights; 

•  Discuss  some  of  the  remedies 
being  proposed  both  on  the  bilateral 
and  multilateral  levels;  and 

•  Examine  the  role  of  our  embas- 
sies and  human  rights  officers  in  those 
countries  where  disappearances  are  re- 
iably  reported. 

Finally,  I  shall  give  you  a  status 
:"eport  on  our  efforts  to  give  effect  to 
[J.N.  Resolution  33/173  on  disappeared 
persons  adopted  by  the  General  As- 
sembly on  December  20,  1978. 


Views  on  and  Response  to 
Disappearances 

As  I  stated  at  the  outset,  the 
United  States  views  the  use  of  officially 
sanctioned  political  kidnappings  as  one 
of  the  most  serious  problems  confront- 
ing the  international  community.  Dis- 
appearances have  become  one  of  the 
more  tragic  and  insidious  instances  of 
human  rights  abuse  occurring  in  today's 
world.  Coupled  with  the  failure  of  gov- 
ernments to  account  for  those  missing, 
this  disturbing  development  has  been 
causing  intense  anguish  and  suffering 
for  countless  individuals  and  families  in 
many  parts  of  the  world.  As  you  know, 
the  word  "disappeared"  itself  has  be- 
come a  euphemism  for  what  often  ap- 
pears to  or  does  amount  to  political 
murder,  preceded  by  intensive  interro- 
gation and  torture  of  those  not  charged 
with  any  crime. 

Forms  of  Disappearances 

I  would  like  to  review  very  briefly  the 
forms  that  disappearances  take.  In  one, 
governmental  policy  directs  the  secu- 
rity forces,  military,  and/or  police  to 
round  up  all  persons  suspected  of 
subversion  to  get  them  out  of  circula- 
tion, to  obtain  information,  to  halt  spe- 
cific acts,  and  to  demoralize  the  "op- 
position." There  are  no  constraints  of 
any  kind  placed  on  those  charged  with 
the  roundup. 

In  another,  security  or  police 
forces  operate  "unofficially,"  generally 
in  civilian  clothes,  with  the  tacit  ap- 
proval or  acc|uiescence  and  under  the 
umbrella  of  protection  from  the  state. 

In  a  third,  groups  of  "civilians," 
often  with  official  urging  or  approval, 
operate  their  own  terrorist  forces. 
(When  "unauthorized"  groups  bring  too 
much  embarrassment  to  the  govern- 
ment or  when  the  government  wishes 
to  end  their  actions,  it  often  finds  that 
is  has  set  in  motion  a  force  which  eludes 
its  control.  They  are  then  faced  with 
the  problem  of  trying  to  contain  a  group 
«hich  is  nominally  its  own.) 

In  all  forms,  people  are  abducted 
from  their  homes,  offices,  or  while 
moving  about  in  public.  Sometimes  op- 
erations are  strictly  clandestine — no 
one  sees  the  pickup,  no  phone  calls  or 
messages  are  delivered;  people  simply 
vanish.  On  other  occasions,  a  street  or 
an  area  is  blocked  off  by  unmarked 
cars,  a  force  of  armed  men — nearly  al- 


-ebruary  1980 


ways  in  civilian  clothes — storms  a 
building  or  house  and  emerges  with  the 
person  or  persons  who  are  taken  away. 
Or  a  group  of  armed  men  stops  their  car 
in  traffic,  leaps  onto  the  street  with 
drawn  guns,  and  wrestles  the  victim 
into  a  car  and  speeds  away. 

The  victims  are  taken  to  secret 
places  of  detention,  often  military  in- 
stallations, and  tortured  for  periods 
ranging  from  hours  to  months.  Some- 
times they  die  as  a  consecjuence  of  tor- 
ture, sometimes  they  are  killed  in  de- 
tention, and  sometimes  they  are  set  up 
for  death  in  a  flamboyant  and  public 
way.  They  may  be  loaded  into  a  car  or 
van,  told  to  drive  away  after  being 
given  arms  without  ammunition,  fol- 
lowed, and  killed  in  a  "shootout."  A  few 
endure  and  eventually  find  themselves 
in  a  regular  place  of  detention.  These 
people  may  be  held  indefinitely  without 
trial  or  charges  or  they  may  be 
charged,  tried,  and  sentenced  to  official 
Jail  terms  by  military  or  civilian  courts. 
A  miniscule  number  are  released  at 
some  stage  of  the  process. 

At  no  point  do  any  parts  of  the  sys- 
tem of  justice  or  the  rule  of  law  or  due 
process  operate  on  behalf  of  the  disap- 
peared. They  disappear  not  only  liter- 
ally but  also  as  legal  entities. 

They  do  not  disappear  from  the 
thoughts  of  their  families,  however. 
And  what  becomes  of  them?  Sometimes 
they  are  too  frightened  to  take  any  ac- 
tion or  tell  anyone  what  has  happened; 
this  is  often  the  case  in  the  first  period 
of  disappearances. 

Sooner  or  later,  though,  an  inquiry 
is  made  to  some  official  unit.  They  are 
told  that  there  is  no  record  of  an  arrest; 
there  is  no  information.  Occasionally, 
the  family  will  receive  an  anonymous 
phone  call  which  might  say  that  the  dis- 
appeared person  will  be  released  soon, 
is  all  right,  or  if  an  infant  or  child  has 
been  taken,  might  request  some  item  for 
the  child  or  tell  where  the  child  can  be 
picked  up  if  the  child  is  not  to  be  held. 
But  the  search  is  fruitless  unless  a  body 
is  found  or  the  person  finally  surfaces  in 
prison.  Otherwise,  the  family  members 
wait  in  tense  anguish  for  months  or 
years.  For  some  there  will  probably 
never  be  an  answer. 

Responsibility  for  remedying  the 
tragic  phenomenon  of  disappearances 
rests  with  the  government  which  shuts 
its  eyes  to  or  colludes  in  or  engineers 
disappearances.  Whether  these  disap- 
pearances are  the  result  of  authorized 
actions,  unauthorized  excesses  by  law 
enforcement  and  security  agencies, 


37 


Human  Rights 


paramilitary  or  private  groups,  gov- 
ernments are  responsible  for  bringing 
them  under  control,  even  in  times  of 
emergency.  In  confronting  domestic 
violence  or  terrorism,  there  is  no  jus- 
tification under  domestic  or  interna- 
tional law  for  such  violations. 

Governments  furthermore  cannot 
argue  that  they  do  not  know.  Govern- 
ments are  custodians  of  the  law.  When 
they  engage  in  their  own  campaign  of 
terror,  they  jeopardize  the  rule  of  law 
and  their  right  to  govern.  They  are  no 
different  at  those  times  than  the  worst 
of  their  opponents. 

International  law,  as  set  forth  in 
the  Intel-national  Covenant  on  Civil  and 
Political  Rights  (article  4),  the  Euro- 
pean Convention  for  the  Protection  of 
Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Free- 
doms (article  15),  and  the  American 
Convention  on  Human  Rights  (article 
27)  prohibits  states,  even  in  times  of 
public  emergency,  from  abandoning 
certain  fundamental  guarantees  af- 
forded the  individual. 

Under  no  circumstances  can  a  state 
arbitrarily  deprive  its  citizens  of  their 
lives  or  subject  them  to  torture  or 
cruel,  inhuman,  or  degrading  punish- 
ment. Death  sentences  can  be  imposed 
only  in  accordance  with  due  process  of 
law.  Governments  are  responsible  for 
the  safety  and  protection  of  those  de- 
tained. They  are  also  responsible  for 
rendering  an  accounting  of  the  where- 
abouts and  fate  of  those  apprehended. 

There  is  now  available  a  well- 
developed  body  of  human  rights  stand- 
ards and  precedents.  It  is  up  to  indi- 
vidual countries  to  realize  them.  The 
United  States  tries  to  influence  other 
nations  to  live  up  to  common  interna- 
tional obligations.  In  the  final  analysis, 
the  decision  to  comply  with  international 
law — and  to  do  what  is  right — rests 
with  the  individual  country.  While  our 
ability  to  influence  other  nations' 
human  rights  performance  varies  from 
country  to  country,  I  can  assure  you  we 
are  assiduous  in  our  efforts  to  persuade 
governments  to  halt  disappearances 
and  accompanying  excesses  and  to  in- 
sure that  those  guilty  of  such  practices 
must  be  punished  in  accordance  with 
law. 

We  urge  all  governments  in  whose 
countries  there  are  disappeared  per- 
sons to  release  prisoners  arbitrarily  de- 
tained, to  provide  the  guarantee  of  fair 
trial,  to  publish  lists  of  those  missing, 
and  to  provide  death  certificates  for 
those  known  to  be  killed.  We  also  urge 
that  thev  return  remains  to  relatives 


38 


and  establish  governmental 
mechanisms,  together  with  the  courts, 
to  trace  missing  people  and  clarify  their 
status  for  their  relatives. 

In  my  discussions  with  the  families 
of  the  disappeared — both  here  in 
Washington  and  abroad  —  they  em- 
phasize that  it  would  be  easier  for  them 
to  suffer  the  knowledge  of  the  death  of 
their  relatives  than  to  suffer  continuous 
uncertainty  about  their  fates.  In  most 
countries,  this  would  represent  an  act 
of  strength  and  courage  on  the  part  of 
the  government  and  indicate  a  desire 
for  national  reconciliation,  peace,  and 
return  to  the  rule  of  law. 

In  our  discussions  with  a  variety  of 
governments,  we  have  pointed  out  that 
ample  precedents  exist  in  international 
law  for  dealing  with  the  problem  of  ac- 
counting for  those  taken  prisoner  as  a 
result  of  domestic  and  international 
conflicts.  During  periods  of  armed  con- 
flict and  occupation,  the  1949  Geneva 
Convention  Relative  to  the  Treatment 
of  Prisoners  of  War  and  the  1949 
Geneva  Convention  Relative  to  the 
Protection  of  Civilian  Persons  in  Time 
of  War  require  parties  to  implement  a 
variety  of  reporting  and  other 
mechanisms  to  account  for  prisoners  of 
war  and  "protected  persons." 

More  recently  in  July  1977,  addi- 
tional protocols  to  the  Geneva  conven- 
tions set  forth,  in  the  context  of  armed 
conflict,  even  more  detailed  provisions 
for  tracing  the  missing  and  the  dead 
and  for  protecting  the  human  rights  of 
those  held  in  captivity. 

Protocol  I  asserts  "the  right  of 
families  to  know  the  fate  of  their  rela- 
tives." requires  governments  to  gather 
and  transmit  all  relevant  information 
concerning  persons  reported  missing  by 
an  adverse  party,  and  imposes  several 
obligations  concerning  the  remains  of 
all  persons  who  have  died  for  reasons 
related  to  hostilities.  These  legal  re- 
quirements make  available  to  countries 
standards  and  procedures  for  dealing 
with  prisoners  of  war  and  other  de- 
tained or  interned  persons  and  for  hand- 
ling the  problem  of  missing  persons  in 
a  humane  manner. 

Let  me  digress  for  a  moment  and 
explain  a  dilemma  with  which  we  are 
sometimes  faced.  In  certain  countries 
there  have  been  efforts  by  some  au- 
thorities to  eliminate  the  disappearance 
phenomenon.  The  numbers  of  disap- 
peared may  decline  dramatically.  The 
question  then  arises  of  how  the  United 
States  should  respond.  Quite  clearly, 
even  one  person  disappearing  is  one  too 
many.  But  if  we  elect  not  to  recognize 
this  "progress,"  we  may  perhaps  run 
the  risk  of  strengthening  the  hands  of 
individuals  in  or  outside  a  repressive 


government  who  may  argue  that  the 
U.S.  human  rights  appetite  is  insati- 
able. If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  choose 
to  recognize  the  "progress"  that  has 
been  made,  certain  governments  may 
incorrectly  conclude  that  we  are  recon- 
ciled to  some  irreducible  minimum  of 
disappearances  or  other  human  rights 
violations.  These  are  not  easy  questions 
to  resolve.  Difficult  judgments  and 
hard  choices  are  required.  We  confront 
such  problems  every  day,  and  in  almost 
every  case  there  are  honest  differences 
of  opinion  on  how  we  can  best  resolve 
them. 

It  is  also  appropriate  to  note  here 
that  this,  like  other  forms  of  official 
human  rights  violations,  is  not  endemic 
to  any  country  and  is  not  an  inevitable 
concomitant  of  political  unrest  or  insta- 
bility. Some  of  today's  worst  offenders 
have  long  previous  histories  of  high  re- 
spect for  individual  rights,  even  in 
times  of  crisis,  which  gives  us  hope  that 
they  can  return  to  their  best  traditions. 
And  in  recent  times,  some  whose  prac- 
tices have  been  most  deplored  have,  in- 
deed, done  so  and  thereby  not  only  re- 
gained the  respect  of  the  world  commu- 
nity but  also  set  an  example  for  others. 

Role  of  Embassies  and 
Human  Rights  Officers 

Permit  me  now  to  speak  about  the 
role  of  our  embassies  and  the  human 
rights  officers  in  embassies  in  countries 
where  disappearances  take  place. 

Each  embassy  has  a  human  rights 
officer  usually  in  the  Political  Section 
whose  responsibility  is  to  report  on 
human  rights  conditions  and  to  present 
the  U.S.  Government's  views  to  the 
host  government.  Our  Ambassadors  are 
charged  with  human  rights  respon- 
sibilities as  personal  representatives  of 
the  President.  They  are  deeply  con- 
scious of  the  priority  he  has  assigned  to 
human  rights  in  our  foreign  policy.  As 
the  President  noted  in  his  remarks  to 
the  Hispanic  Caucus  on  September 
13th:  "From  the  day  that  I  took  office,  1 
have  sought  to  place  at  the  top  of  my 
agenda  and  to  awaken  the  conscience  of 
the  world  and  to  bring  that  conscience 
about  human  rights  to  bear  on  the 
world's  leaders." 

An  important  part  of  a  human 
rights  officer's  responsibilities  is  to 
maintain  contact  with  individuals  and 
groups  most  aware  of  human  rights  con- 
ditions in  the  country  in  which  he/she 
works.  He  or  she  must  be  active  and 
energetic  in  seeking  out  these  contacts 
These  include  private  human  rights 
groups;  representatives  of  the  religiou; 
community,  the  legal  profession,  politi 
cal  opposition,  and  dissident  groups; 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


(t 


SPECIAL 


State  of  the  Union  Address 


Following  is  the  text  of  President 
Carter's  address  before  a  joint  session 
of  the  Congress  on  January  23 ,  1980.  ' 

These  last  few  months  have  not  been  an 
easy  time  for  any  of  us.  As  we  meet  to- 
night, it  has  never  been  more  clear  that 
the  state  of  our  union  depends  on  the 
state  of  the  world.  And  tonight,  as 
throughout  our  own  generation,  freedom 
and  peace  in  the  world  depend  on  the 
state  of  our  union. 

The  1980s  have  been  born  in  turmoil, 
strife,  and  change.  This  is  a  time  of  chal- 
lenge to  our  interests  and  our  values,  and 
it's  a  time  that  tests  our  wisdom  and  our 
skills.  At  this  time  in  Iran  50  Americans 
are  still  held  captive,  innocent  victims  of 
terrorism  and  anarchy.  Also  at  this  mo- 
ment, massive  Soviet  troops  are  attempt- 
ing to  subjugate  the  fiercely  independent 
ind  deeply  religious  people  of  Afghanis- 
tan. These  two  acts — one  of  international 
;errorism  and  one  of  military  aggression 
—present  a  serious  challenge  to  the 
Jnited  States  of  America  and  indeed  to 
ill  the  nations  of  the  world.  Together,  we 
vill  meet  these  threats  to  peace. 

I  am  determined  that  the  United 
states  will  remain  the  strongest  of  all  na- 
ions,  but  our  power  will  never  be  used  to 
nitiate  a  threat  to  the  security  of  any  na- 
ion  or  to  the  rights  of  any  human  being. 
Ve  seek  to  be  and  to  remain  secure — a 
lation  at  peace  in  a  stable  world.  But  to 
le  secure  we  must  face  the  world  as  it  is. 
"■hree  basic  developments  have  helped  to 
hape  our  challenges: 

•  The  steady  growth  and  increased 
projection  of  Soviet  military  power  be- 
ond  its  own  borders; 

•  The  overwhelming  dependence  of 
he  Western  democracies  on  oil  supplies 
rom  the  Middle  East;  and 

•  The  press  of  social  and  religious 
,nd  economic  and  political  change  in  the 
nany  nations  of  the  developing  world — 
xemplified  by  the  revolution  in  Iran. 

Each  of  these  factors  is  important  in 
:s  own  right.  Each  interacts  with  the 
thers.  All  must  be  faced  together — 
quarely  and  courageously. 

We  will  face  these  challenges.  And 
tre  will  meet  them  with  the  best  that  is  in 
s.  And  we  will  not  fail. 

In  response  to  the  abhorrent  act  in 
ran,  our  nation  has  never  been  aroused 
•nd  unified  so  greatly  in  peacetime.  Our 
losition  is  clear.  The  United  States  will 


not  yield  to  blackmail.  We  continue  to 
pursue  these  specific  goals: 

•  First,  to  protect  the  present  and 
long-range  interests  of  the  United  States; 

•  Secondly,  to  preserve  the  lives  of 
the  American  hostages  and  to  secure  as 
quickly  as  possible  their  safe  release; 

•  If  possible,  to  avoid  bloodshed 
which  might  further  endanger  the  lives  of 
our  fellow  citizens; 

•  To  enlist  the  help  of  other  nations 
in  condemning  this  act  of  violence  which 
is  shocking  and  violates  the  moral  and  the 
legal  standards  of  a  civilized  world; 

•  To  convince  and  to  persuade  the 
Iranian  leaders  that  the  real  danger  to 
their  nation  lies  in  the  north  in  the  Soviet 
Union  and  from  the  Soviet  troops  now  in 
Afghanistan  and  that  the  unwarranted 
Iranian  quarrel  with  the  United  States 
hampers  their  response  to  this  far  greater 
danger  to  them. 

If  the  American  hostages  are 
harmed,  a  severe  price  will  be  paid.  We 
will  never  rest  until  every  one  of  the 
American  hostages  is  released.  But  now 
we  face  a  broader  and  more  fundamental 
challenge  in  this  region  because  of  the  re- 
cent military  action  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
Now,  as  during  the  last  three  and  one- 
half  decades,  the  relationship  between 
our  country — the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica— and  the  Soviet  Union  is  the  most 
critical  factor  in  determining  whether  the 
world  will  live  in  peace  or  be  engulfed  in 
global  conflict. 

Since  the  end  of  the  Second  World 
War,  America  has  led  other  nations  in 
meeting  the  challenge  of  mounting  Soviet 
power  This  has  not  been  a  simple  or  a 
static  relationship.  Between  us  there  has 
been  cooperation,  there  has  been  compe- 
tition, and  at  times  there  has  been  con- 
frontation. 

•  In  the  1940s,  we  took  the  lead  in 
creating  the  Atlantic  alliance  in  response 
to  the  Soviet  Union's  suppression  and 
then  consolidation  of  its  East  European 
empire  and  the  resulting  threat  of  the 
Warsaw  Pact  to  Western  Europe. 

•  In  the  1950s,  we  helped  to  contain 
further  Soviet  challenges  in  Korea  and  in 
the  Middle  East,  and  we  re-armed,  to  as- 
sure the  continuation  of  that  contain- 
ment. 

•  In  the  1960s,  we  met  the  Soviet 
challenges  in  Berlin  and  we  faced  the 
Cuban  missile  crises,  and  we  sought  to 


engage  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  important 
task  of  moving  beyond  the  cold  war  and 
away  from  confrontation. 

•  And  in  the  1970s,  three  American 
Presidents  negotiated  with  the  Soviet 
leaders  in  attempts  to  halt  this  growth  of 
the  nuclear  arms  race.  We  sought  to  es- 
tablish rules  of  behavior  that  would  re- 
duce the  risks  of  conflict,  and  we 
searched  for  areas  of  cooperation  that 
could  make  our  relations  reciprocal  and 
productive — not  only  for  the  sake  of  our 
two  nations,  but  for  the  security  and 
peace  of  the  entire  world. 

In  all  these  actions,  we  have  main- 
tained two  commitments:  to  be  ready  to 
meet  any  challenge  by  Soviet  military 
power  and  to  develop  ways  to  resolve 
disputes  and  to  keep  the  peace. 

Preventing  nuclear  war  is  the  fore- 
most responsibility  of  the  two  superpow- 
ers. That  is  why  we've  negotiated  the 
strategic  arms  limitation  talks — treaties 
SAUr  I  and  SALT  II.  Especially  now  in  a 
time  of  great  tension,  observing  the 
mutual  constraints  imposed  by  the  terms 
of  these  treaties  will  be  in  the  best  inter- 
est of  both  countries  and  will  help  to  pre- 
serve world  peace.  I  will  consult  very 
closely  with  the  Congress  on  this  matter 
as  we  strive  to  control  nuclear  weapons. 
That  effort — to  control  nuclear  weapons 
— will  not  be  abandoned. 


The  1980s  have  been  born  in  turmoil 
and  change.  This  is  a  time  of 
challenge  to  ofur  interests  and  our 
values,  a  time  that  tests  our  wisdom, 
and  our  urill. 


We  superpowers  will  also  have  the 
responsibility  to  exercise  restraint  in  the 
use  of  our  great  military  force.  The  integ- 
rity and  the  independence  of  weaker  na- 
tions must  not  be  threatened.  They  must 
know  that  in  our  presence  they  are  se- 
cure. But  now  the  Soviet  Union  has  taken 
a  radical  and  an  aggressive  new  step.  It's 
using  its  great  military  power  against  a 
relatively  defenseless  nation.  The  impli- 
cations of  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Af- 
ghanistan could  pose  the  most  serious 
threat  to  the  peace  since  the  Second 
World  War 

The  vast  majority  of  nations  on 
Earth  have  condemned  this  latest  Soviet 


ebruary  1980 


Special 


attempt  to  extend  its  colonial  domination 
of  others  and  have  demanded  the  im- 
mediate withdrawal  of  Soviet  troops.  The 
Moslem  world  is  especially  and  justifiably 
outraged  by  this  aggression  against  an  Is- 
lamic people.  No  action  of  a  world  power 
has  ever  been  so  quickly  and  so  over- 
whelmingly condemned. 

But  verbal  condemnation  is  not 
enough.  The  Soviet  Union  must  pay  a 
concrete  price  for  their  aggression.  While 
this  invasion  continues,  we  and  the  other 
nations  of  the  world  cannot  conduct  busi- 
ness as  usual  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

That's  why  the  United  States  has 
imposed  stiff  economic  sanctions  on  the 
Soviet  Union. 

I  will  not  issue  any  permits  for 
Soviet  ships  to  fish  in  the  coastal  waters 
of  the  United  States. 

I've  cut  Soviet  access  to  high- 
technology  equipment  and  to  agricultural 
products. 

I've  limited  other  commerce  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  I've  asked  our  allies 
and  friends  to  join  with  us  in  restraining 
their  own  trade  with  the  Soviets  and  not 
to  replace  our  own  embargoed  items. 

And  I  have  notified  the  Olympic 
Committee  that  with  Soviet  invading 
forces  in  Afghanistan,  neither  the  Ameri- 
can people  nor  I  will  support  sending  an 
Olympic  team  to  Moscow. 

The  Soviet  Union  is  going  to  have  to 
answer  some  basic  questions:  Will  it  help 
promote  a  more  stable  international  envi- 
ronment in  which  its  own  legitimate, 
peaceful  concerns  can  be  pursued?  Or  will 
it  continue  to  expand  its  military  power 
far  beyond  its  genuine  security  needs, 
and  use  that  power  for  colonial  conquest? 

The  Soviet  Union  must  realize  that 
its  decision  to  use  military  force  in  Af- 
ghanistan will  be  costly  to  every  political 
and  economic  relationship  it  values. 

The  region  which  is  now  threatened 
by  Soviet  troops  in  Afghanistan  is  of 
great  strategic  importance.  It  contains 
more  than  two-thirds  of  the  world's  ex- 
portable oil.  The  Soviet  effort  to  domi- 
nate Afghanistan  has  brought  Soviet  mili- 
tary forces  to  within  300  miles  of  the  In- 
dian Ocean  and  close  to  the  Straits  of 
Hormuz — a  waterway  through  which 
most  of  the  world's  oil  must  flow.  The 
Soviet  Union  is  now  attempting  to  con- 
solidate a  strategic  position,  therefore, 
that  poses  a  grave  threat  to  the  free 
movement  of  Middle  East  oil. 

This  situation  demands  careful 
thought,  steady  nerves,  and  resolute  ac- 
tion, not  only  for  this  year  but  for  many 
years  to  come.  It  demands  collective  ef- 
forts to  meet  this  new  threat  to  security 
in  the  Persian  Gulf  and  in  southwest 
Asia.  It  demands  the  participation  of  all 


those  who  rely  on  oil  from  the  Middle 
East  and  who  are  concerned  with  global 
peace  and  stabiUty.  And  it  demands  con- 
sultation and  close  cooperation  with  coun- 
tries in  the  area  which  might  be 
threatened. 

Meeting  this  challenge  will  take  na- 
tional will,  diplomatic  and  political  wis- 
dom, economic  sacrifice,  and,  of  course, 
mihtary  capability.  We  must  call  on  the 
best  that  is  in  us  to  preserve  the  security 
of  this  crucial  region. 

Let  our  position  be  absolutely  clear: 
An  attempt  by  any  outside  force  to  gain 
control  of  the  Persian  Gulf  region  will  be 
regarded  as  an  assault  on  the  vital  inter- 
ests of  the  United  States  of  America,  and 
such  an  assault  will  be  repelled  by  any 
means  necessary,  including  military  force. 

During  the  past  3  years  you  have 
joined  with  me  to  improve  our  own  secu- 
rity and  the  prospects  for  peace,  not  only 
in  the  vital  oil  producing  area  of  the  Per- 
sian Gulf  region  but  around  the  world. 

•  We've  increased  annually  our  real 
commitment  for  defense,  and  we  will  sus- 
tain this  increase  of  effort  throughout  the 
5-year  defense  program.  It's  imperative 
that  the  Congress  approve  this  strong  de- 
fense budget  for  1981  encompassing  a  5% 


.  .  .  /  have  notified  the  Olympic 
Committee  that  with  Soviet  invading 
forces  in  Afghanistan,  neither  the 
American  people  nor  I  mil  support 
sending  an  Olympic  team  to  Moscow. 


real  growth  in  authorizations  without  any 
reduction. 

•  We  are  also  improving  our  capabil- 
ity to  deploy  U.S.  military  forces  rapidly 
to  distant  areas. 

•  We  have  helped  to  strengthen 
NATO  and  our  other  alliances.  And  re- 
cently we  and  other  NATO  members 
have  decided  to  develop  and  to  deploy 
modernized  intermediate-range  nuclear 
forces  to  meet  an  unwarranted  and  in- 
creased threat  from  the  nuclear  weapons 
of  the  Soviet  Union. 

•  We  are  working  with  our  allies  to 
prevent  conflict  in  the  Middle  East.  The 
Peace  Treaty  between  Egypt  and  Israel 
is  a  notable  achievement  which  repre- 
sents a  strategic  asset  for  America  and 
which  also  enhances  prospects  for  re- 
gional and  world  peace.  We  are  now  en- 
gaged in  further  negotiations  to  provide 
full  autonomy  for  the  people  of  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza,  to  resolve  the  Palestinian 
issue  in  all  its  aspects,  and  to  preserve 
the  peace  and  security  of  Israel.  Let  no 


one  doubt  our  commitment  to  the  secu- 
rity of  Israel.  In  a  few  days  we  will  ob- 
serve an  historic  event  when  Israel 
makes  another  major  withdrawal  from 
the  Sinai  and  when  ambassadors  will  be 
exchanged  between  Israel  and  Egypt. 

•  We've  also  expanded  our  own 
sphere  of  friendship.  Our  deep  commit- 
ment to  human  rights  and  to  meeting 
human  needs  has  improved  our  relation- 
ship with  much  of  the  Third  World.  Our 
decision  to  normalize  relations  with  the 
People's  Republic  of  China  will  help  to 
preserve  peace  and  stability  in  Asia  and 
in  the  western  Pacific. 

•  We've  increased  and  strengthened 
our  naval  presence  in  the  Indian  Ocean, 
and  we  are  now  making  arrangements  for 
key  naval  and  air  facilities  to  be  used  by 
our  forces  in  the  region  of  northeast  Af- 
rica and  the  Persian  Gulf. 

•  We've  reconfirmed  our  1959 
agreement  to  help  Pakistan  preserve  its 
independence  and  its  integrity.  The 
United  States  will  take  action — 
consistent  with  our  own  laws — to  assist 
Pakistan  in  resisting  any  outside  aggres- 
sion. And  I'm  asking  the  Congress  specif- 
ically to  reaffirm  this  agreement.  I'm  also 
working,  along  with  the  leaders  of  other 
nations,  to  provide  additional  military 
and  economic  aid  for  Pakistan.  That  re- 
quest will  come  to  you  in  just  a  few  days. 

•  In  the  weeks  ahead,  we  will  fur- 
ther strengthen  political  and  military  ties 
with  other  nations  in  the  region. 

•  We  believe  that  there  are  no  ir- 
reconcilable differences  between  us  and 
any  Islamic  nation.  We  respect  the  faith 
of  Islam,  and  we  are  ready  to  cooperate 
with  all  Moslem  countries. 

•  Finally,  we  are  prepared  to  work 
with  other  countries  in  the  region  to 
share  a  cooperative  security  framework 
that  respects  differing  values  and  politica 
beliefs,  yet  which  enhances  the  independ- 
ence, security,  and  prosperity  of  all. 

All  these  efforts  combined  emphasize 
our  dedication  to  defend  and  preserve  the 
vital  interests  of  the  region  and  of  the  na- 
tion, which  we  represent,  and  those  of 
our  allies  in  Europe  and  the  Pacific  and 
also  in  the  parts  of  the  world  which  have 
such  great  strategic  importance  to  us, 
stretching  especially  through  the  Middle 
East  and  southwest  Asia.  With  your 
help,  I  will  pursue  these  efforts  with 
vigor  and  with  determination.  You  and  I 
will  act  as  necessary  to  protect  and  to 
preserve  our  nation's  security. 

The  men  and  women  of  America's 
Armed  Forces  are  on  duty  tonight  in 
many  parts  of  the  world.  I'm  proud  of  the 
job  they're  doing,  and  I  know  you  share 
that  pride.  I  beUeve  that  our  volunteer 


Department  of  State  Bullet;; 


Special 


forces  are  adequate  for  current  defense 
needs.  And  I  hope  that  it  will  not  become 
necessar>'  to  impose  the  draft.  However, 
we  must  be  prepared  for  that  possibility. 
For  this  reason,  I  have  determined  that 
the  selective  service  system  must  now  be 
revitalized.  I  will  send  legislation  and 
budget  proposals  to  the  Congress  next 
month  so  that  we  can  begin  registration 
and  then  meet  future  mobilization  needs 
rapidly  if  they  arise. 

We  also  need  clear  and  quick  passage 
of  a  new  charter  to  define  the  legal  au- 
thority and  accountability  of  our  intelli- 
gence agencies.  We  will  guarantee  that 
abuses  do  not  recur,  but  we  must  tighten 
our  controls  on  sensitive  intelligence  in- 
formation. And  we  need  to  remove  un- 
warranted restraints  on  America's  ability 
to  collect  intelligence. 

The  decade  ahead  will  be  a  time  of 
rapid  change,  as  nations  everywhere  seek 
to  deal  with  new  problems  and  age-old 
tensions.  But  America  need  have  no 
fear — we  can  thrive  in  a  world  of  change 
if  we  remain  true  to  our  values  and  ac- 
■jvely  engage  in  promoting  world  peace. 

We  will  continue  to  work  as  we  have 
'or  peace  in  the  Middle  East  and  southern 
\frica.  We  will  continue  to  build  our  ties 
vith  developing  nations,  respecting  and 
lelping  to  strengthen  their  national  inde- 
lendence,  wliich  they  have  struggled  so 
ard  to  achieve.  And  we  will  continue  to 
upport  the  growth  of  democracy  and  the 
rotection  of  human  rights. 

In  repressive  regimes,  popular  frus- 
rations  often  have  no  outlet  except 
trough  violence.  But  when  peoples  and 
leir  governments  can  approach  their 
■roblems  together — through  open,  demo- 
rat  ic  methods — the  basis  for  stability 
nd  peace  is  far  more  solid  and  far  more 
nduring.  That  is  why  our  support  for 
uman  rights  in  other  countries  is  in  our 
wn  national  interest  as  well  as  part  of 
ur  own  national  character. 

Peace — a  peace  that  preserves 
reedom — remains  America's  first  goal, 
n  the  coming  years  as  a  mighty  nation, 
/e  will  continue  to  pursue  peace.  But  to 
e  strong  abroad  we  must  be  strong  at 
ome.  And  in  order  to  be  strong,  we 
lust  continue  to  face  up  to  the  difficult 
isues  that  confront  us  as  a  nation  today. 

The  crises  in  Iran  and  Afghanistan 
ave  dramatized  a  very  important  lesson: 
>ur  excessive  dependence  on  foreign  oil 
i  a  clear  and  present  danger  to  our  na- 
ion's  security.  The  need  has  never  been 
lore  urgent.  At  long  last,  we  must  have 
clear,  comprehensive  energy  policy  for 
le  United  States. 

As  you  well  know,  I  have  been  work- 
!g  with  the  Congress  in  a  concentrated 
nd  persistent  way  over  the  past  3  years 
)  meet  this  need.  We  have  made  prog- 


ress together.  But  Congress  must  act 
promptly  now  to  complete  final  action  on 
this  vital  energy  legislation.  Our  nation 
will  then  have  a  major  conservation  ef- 
fort, important  initiatives  to  develop 
solar  power,  realistic  pricing  based  on  the 
true  value  of  oil,  strong  incentives  for  the 
production  of  coal  and  other  fossil  fuels  in 
the  United  States,  and  our  nation's  most 
massive  peacetime  investment  in  the  de- 
velopment of  synthetic  fuels. 

The  American  people  are  making 
progress  in  energy  conservation.  Last 
year  we  reduced  overall  petroleum  con- 
sumption by  S%  and  gasoline  consump- 
tion by  5%  below  what  it  was  the  year 
before. 

Now  we  must  do  more.  After  consul- 
tation with  the  governors,  we  will  set 


Second,  as  we  continue  to  work  with 
business  to  hold  down  prices,  we  will 
build  also  on  the  historic  national  accord 
with  organized  labor  to  restrain  pay  in- 
creases in  a  fair  fight  against  inflation. 

Third,  we  will  continue  our  success- 
ful efforts  to  cut  paperwork  and  to  dis- 
mantle unnecessary  government  regula- 
tion. 

Fourth,  we  will  continue  our  prog- 
ress in  providing  jobs  for  America,  con- 
centrating on  a  major  new  program  to 
provide  training  and  work  for  our  young 
people,  especially  minority  youth.  It  has 
been  said  that  "a  mind  is  a  terrible  thing 
to  waste."  We  will  give  our  young  people 
new  hope  for  jobs  and  a  better  life  in  the 
1980s. 

And  fifth,  we  must  use  the  decade  of 


The  Soviet  Union  is  going  to  have  to  answer  same  basic  questions:  Will  it 
help  promote  a  more  stable  international  environment  in  which  its  own 
legitimate,  peaceful  concerns  can  be  pursued?  Or  will  it  continue  to  expand 
its  military  power  far  beyond  its  genuine  security  needs,  and  use  that  power 
for  colonial  conquest? 


gasoline  conservation  goals  for  each  of 
the  50  States,  and  I  will  make  them  man- 
datory if  these  goals  are  not  met.  I've  es- 
tablished an  import  ceiling  for  1980  of  8.2 
million  barrels  a  day — well  below  the 
level  of  foreign  oil  purchases  in  1977.  I 
expect  our  imports  to  be  much  lower  than 
this,  but  the  ceiling  will  be  enforced  by  an 
oil  import  fee  if  necessary.  I'm  prepared 
to  lower  our  imports  still  further  if  the 
other  oil  consuming  countries  will  join  us 
in  a  fair  and  mutual  reduction.  If  we  have 
a  serious  shortage,  I  will  not  hesitate  to 
impose  mandatory  gasoline  rationing  im- 
mediately. 

The  single  biggest  factor  in  the  infla- 
tion rate  last  year — the  increase  in  the  in- 
flation rate  last  year — was  from  one 
cause:  the  skyrocketing  prices  of  OPEC 
oil.  We  must  take  whatever  actions  are 
necessary  to  reduce  our  dependence  on 
foreign  oil  and  at  the  same  time,  to  re- 
duce inflation. 

As  individuals  and  as  families,  few  of 
us  can  produce  energy  by  ourselves.  But 
all  of  us  can  conserve  energy — every  one 
of  us,  every  day  of  our  lives.  Tonight  I 
call  on  you — in  fact  all  the  people  of 
America — to  help  our  nation.  Conserve 
energy.  Eliminate  waste.  Make  1980  in- 
deed a  year  of  energy  conservation. 

Of  course,  we  must  take  other  ac- 
tions to  strengthen  our  nation's  economy. 

First,  we  will  continue  to  reduce  the 
deficit  and  then  to  balance  the  federal 
budget. 


the  1980s  to  attack  the  basic  structural 
weaknesses  and  problems  in  our  economy, 
through  measures  to  increase  productiv- 
ity, savings,  and  investment. 

With  these  energy  and  economic 
policies,  we  will  make  America  even 
stronger  at  home  in  this  decade — just  as 
our  foreign  and  defense  policies  will  make 
us  stronger  and  safer  throughout  the 
world. 

We  will  never  abandon  our  struggle 
for  a  just  and  a  decent  society  here  at 
home.  That's  the  heart  of  America,  and 
it's  the  source  of  our  ability  to  inspire 
other  people  to  defend  their  own  rights 
abroad.  Our  material  resources,  great  as 
they  are,  are  limited.  Our  problems  are 
too  complex  for  simple  slogans  or  for 
quick  solutions.  We  cannot  solve  them 
without  effort  and  sacrifice.  Walter 
Lippmann  once  reminded  us: 

You  took  the  good  things  for  granted. 
Now  you  must  earn  them  again.  For  every 
right  that  you  cherish,  you  have  a  duty  which 
you  must  fulfill.  For  every  good  which  you 
wish  to  preserve,  you  will  have  to  sacrifice 
your  comfort  and  your  ease.  There  is  nothing 
for  nothing  any  longer " 

Our  challenges  are  formidable.  But 

there's  a  new  spirit  of  unity  and  resolve 
in  our  country.  We  move  into  the  1980s 
with  confidence  and  hope  and  a  bright 
vision  of  the  America  we  want: 

•  An  America  strong  and  free; 

•  An  America  at  peace; 


■ebruary  1980 


Special 


•  An  America  with  equal  rights  for 
all  citizens  and  for  women  guaranteed  in 
the  United  States  Constitution; 

•  An  America  with  jobs  and  good 
health  and  good  education  for  every  citi- 
zen; 

•  An  America  with  a  clean  and 
bountiful  life  in  our  cities  and  on  our 
farms; 

•  An  America  that  helps  to  feed  the 
world; 

•  An  America  secure  in  filling  its 
own  energy  needs; 

•  An  America  of  justice,  tolerance, 
and  compassion. 

For  this  vision  to  come  true,  we 
must  sacrifice,  but  this  national  commit- 
ment will  be  an  exciting  enterprise  that 
will  unify  our  people.  Together  as  one 
people  let  us  work  to  build  our  strength 
at  home.  And  together  as  one  indivisible 
union,  let  us  seek  peace  and  security 
throughout  the  world.  Together  let  us 
make  of  this  time  of  challenge  and  dangei 
a  decade  of  national  resolve  and  of  brave 
achievement.     ■ 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Jan.  28,  1980. 


State  of  the  Union  Message 


Following  are  excerpts  relating  to 
foreign  policy  from  President  Carter's 
message  to  the  Congress  of  Januarij  ^1 . 
1980.  1 

My  State  of  the  Union  Address  will  be 
devoted  to  a  discussion  of  the  most  im- 
portant challenges  facing  our  country  as 
we  enter  the  1980s. 

Over  the  coming  year,  those  chal- 
lenges will  receive  my  highest  priority 
and  greatest  efforts.  Howevei'.  there  will 
also  be  many  other  significant  areas 
v\hich  will  receive  my  personal  commit- 
ment, as  well  as  that  of  my  Administra- 
tion, during  the  2nd  Session  of  the  96th 
Congi'ess. 

It  is  important  that  Congress,  along 
with  the  public,  be  aware  of  these  other 
vital  areas  of  concern  as  they  listen  to  my 
State  of  the  Union  Address.  In  that  way, 
the  conte.xt  of  the  Address,  and  my  Ad- 
ministration's full  message  for  1980,  can 
best  be  understood. 

For  that  reason,  I  am  sending  this 
State  of  the  Union  Message  to  the  Con- 
gress today,  several  days  before  my 
State  of  the  Union  Address. 


RECORD  OF  PROGRESS 

When  I  took  office  in  1977,  our  Nation 
faced  a  number  of  serious  domestic  and 
international  problems; 


•  no  national  energy  policy  e.\isted, 
and  our  dependence  on  foreign  oil  was 
rapidly  increasing; 


•  our  defense  posture  was  declining 
as  a  result  of  a  continuously  shrinking 
defense  budget; 

•  the  strength  of  the  NATO  Alliance 
was  at  a  post- World  War  II  low; 

•  tensions  between  Israel  and  Egypt 
threatened  another  Middle  East  war;  and 

•  America's  resolve  to  oppose  inter- 
national aggression  and  human  rights 
violations  was  under  serious  question. 

Over  the  past  36  months,  clear  prog- 
ress has  been  made  in  solving  the  chal- 
lenges we  found  in  Januai-y  of  1977; 


•  the  decline  in  defense  spending  has 
been  reversed;  defense  spending  has  in- 
creased at  a  real  rate  of  over  3%  in  1979, 
and  I  am  proposing  a  real  increase  in  the 
defense  spending  level  of  more  than  20% 
over  the  next  5  years; 

•  the  NATO  Alliance  has  been  re- 
vitalized and  strengthened  through 
substantially  increased  resources,  new 
deterrent  weapons,  and  improved  coordi- 
nation; increased  emphasis  has  also  been 
given  to  conventional  force  capabilities  to 
meet  crises  in  other  areas  of  the  world; 

•  Egypt  and  Israel  have  ended  more 
than  30  years  of  war  through  a  Peace 
Treaty  that  also  established  a  framework 
for  comprehensive  peace  in  the  Middle 
East; 

•  the  commitment  of  our  Nation  to 
pursue  human  rights  throughout  the 
world,  in  nations  which  are  friendly  and 
thcise  which  are  not,  has  been  made  cleai 
to  all; 

•  our  resolve  to  oppose  aggression, 
such  as  the  illegal  invasion  of  the  Soviet 
Union  into  Afghanistan,  has  been 
supported  by  tough  actions. 


LEGISLATIVE  PRIORITIES 

In  the  coming  legislative  session,  the  lasi 
in  this  Presidential  term,  I  am  deeply 
ciimmitted  to  finishing  the  agenda  that  -I 
have  placed  before  the  Congress.  That 
agenda  has  been  comprehensive  and  de- 
manding, but  it  has  also  been  absolutely 
essential  for  our  Nation's  well-being. 

I  do  not  plan  to  add  significantly  to 
the  agenda  this  year.  Because  of  the  im- 
portance of  enacting  the  proposals  al- 
ready before  the  Congi-ess,  and  the  rela- 
tively short  Congressional  session  facing 
us.  I  will  be  limiting  my  major  neir  pro- 
posals to  a  critical  few: 


•  Initiatives  implementing  my  re- 
sponse to  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanis 
tan. 

I  am  convinced  that  these  new  initia- 
tives, along  with  the  major  proposals  I 
previously  made  to  the  Congress,  can  be 
enacted  this  year,  if  we  have  a  dedicated 
all-out  effort  on  the  part  of  the  Adminis- 
tration and  the  Congress.  I  pledge  such 
an  effort  on  my  part,  and  that  of  my  Ad 
ministration. 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


Special 


As  in  the  previous  three  years.  I  will 
be  working  with  you  toward  the  basic- 
goals  of: 


•  Building  America's  military 
strength: 

•  Working  to  resolve  international 
disputes  through  peaceful  means: 

•  Striving  to  resolve  pressing  inter- 
national economic  problems; 

•  Continuing  to  support  the  building 
of  democratic  institutions  and  protecting 
human  rights;  and 

•  Preventing  the  spread  and  further 
development  of  nuclear  weapons. 

My  highest  legislative  priorities  in 
each  of  these  areas  this  year  will  be: 


Building  America's  Military  Strength 

•  Defense  Department  Authoriza- 
tions and  Appropriations  —  I  will  be 
proposing  a  defense  budget  containing  a 
3.3 '/f  real  growth  in  outlays.  It  is  essen- 
tial that  the  Congress  support  an  increase 
of  that  amount  if  we  are  to  strengthen 
our  defense  capabilities. 

Working  to  Resolve  International  Dis- 
putes 

•  Refugee  Legislation  and 
Funding — This  legislation  is  necessary 
to  improve  our  refugee  program  and  to 
provide  needed  domestic  assistance  to 
refugees.  Prompt  House  action  would  as- 
sure that  we  have  a  sound  framev\ork 
within  which  to  accommodate  the  in- 
creasing flow  of  refugees. 


Striving  to  Resolve  International  Eco- 
nomic Problems 

•  Bilateral  and  Multilateral  Foreign 
Assistance — I  will  be  proposing  foreign 
assistance  legislation  which  provides  the 
authority  needed  to  carry  forward  a  co- 
operative relationship  v\ith  a  large 
number  of  developing  nations.  Prompt 
Congressional  action  is  essential. 

•  China  Trade  Agreement  —  I  will 
be  seeking  early  approval  by  the  Con- 
gress of  the  Trade  Agreement  reached 
vvith  China;  the  Agreement  represents  a 
major  step  forward  in  the  process  toward 
improved  economic  relations  with  China. 

Continuing  to  Support  the  Building  of 
Oemocratic  Institutions  and  Protecting 
Human  Rights 

•  Special  International  Security 
hssistance  for  Pakistan  —  I  am  sending 


February  1980 


to  Congress  a  military  and  economic  as- 
sistance program  to  enable  Pakistan  to 
strengthen  its  defenses.  Prompt  enact- 
ment will  be  one  of  my  highest  legislative 
priorities. 

•  H)inian  Rights  C(rnventi<)ns — I 
will  continue  to  press  the  Senate  to 
ratify  five  key  human  rights  treaties — 
the  American  Convention  on  Human 
Rights,  the  Convention  on  Racial  Dis- 
crimination, the  UN  Covenants  on  Civil 
and  Political  Rights,  and  on  Economic 
and  Social  and  Cultural  Rights,  and  the 
Genocide  Convention. 


Preventing  the  Spread  and  Further 
Development  of  Nuclear  Weapons 

•  SALT  II— I  firmly  believe  that 
SALT  II  is  in  our  Nation's  security 
interest  and  that  it  will  add  signifi- 
cantly to  the  control  of  nuclear 
weapons.  But  because  of  the  Soviet  in- 
vasion of  Afghanistan,  I  do  not  believe 
it  is  advisable  to  have  the  Senate  con- 
sider the  Treaty  now. 


I.  ENSURING  ECONOMIC 
STRENGTH 


Trade 

This  past  year  was  one  of  unmatched 
and  historic  achievement  for  a  vital 
component  of  the  U.S.  economy — 
exports  and  trade.  In  1979,  nearly  3 
million  jobs  in  our  manufacturing  indus- 
tries, or  one  out  of  every  seven  jobs  in 
manufacturing,  depended  upon  our  e.\- 
port  performance  in  overseas  markets. 
Our  exports  were  a  key  contributor  to 
the  growth  of  the  U.S.  economy  in 
1979. 

Exports  of  agricultural  and  indus- 
trial goods  grew  by  an  unparalleled  $35 
billion,  reaching  a  level  of  .$180  billion. 
This  represented  an  increase  of  25'% 
over  exports  in  1978.  This  record  in- 
crease in  exports,  coupled  with  a  slower 
rate  of  growth  of  imports,  resulted  in 
substantial  improvements  of  $5  billion 
in  our  balance  of  trade.  Furthermore,  a 
rapid  growth  of  service  exports  in  1979 
led  to  a  $13  billion  improvement  in  the 
current  account,  bringing  that  account 
from  a  deficit  in  1978  to  near  balance  in 
1979. 

I  expect  that  in  1980  our  exports 
will  continue  to  strengthen  and  that,  if 
we  can  continue  to  further  conserve  and 
limit  imports  of  oil,  we  will  further  im- 


prove our  trade  balance  position  and 
that  of  the  dollar.  The  future  for 
American  exports  is  bright,  and  will 
remain  so,  despite  the  necessity  of 
suspending  certain  exports  to  the 
Soviet  Union. 

This  Administration  has  accom- 
plished several  goals  in  the  last  year  in 
assuring  that  there  will  continue  to  be 
greater  exports  and,  therefore,  job 
possibilities  for  U.S.  workers  and 
farmers. 

To  improve  the  condition  of  access 
of  U.S.  exports  to  foreign  markets,  I 
signed  into  force  in  July  of  last  year  a 
new  frade  act  which  reflected  two  years 
of  hard  bargaining  in  the  recently  con- 
cluded round  of  multilateral  trade 
negotiations.  These  negotiations,  which 
included  all  major  developed  and  lesser 
developed  countries,  resulted  in 
agreements  to  strengthen  the  rules  of 
conduct  of  international  trade  and  open 
new  markets  to  U.S.  exports.  These 
negotiations  were  of  historic  impor- 
tance in  their  scope  and  accomplish- 
ment, and  their  success  is  attributable 
to  close  cooperation  that  existed  during 
and  after  the  negotiations  between  the 
Congress,  the  private  sector  and  the 
Administration. 

Our  negotiating  success  now  chal- 
lenges us  to  take  advantage  of  the  op- 
portunity for  improving  further  our  ex- 


.  .  .  I  am  proposing  a  real  increase 
i}i  the  defense  spending  level  of 
more  than  20%  over  the  next  5 
gears. 


port  performance.  To  meet  this  chal- 
lenge, I  proposed  in  1979  a  major  reor- 
ganization of  the  government's  trade 
policy  and  export  promotion  activities. 
That  reorganization  will  strengthen 
government  coordination  in  the  trade 
field  and  provide  an  improved  basis  for 
protecting  American  interest  in  the  re- 
cently negotiated  trade  agreements.  I 
put  this  reorganization  into  effect,  with 
Congressional  approval,  earlier  this 
month.  With  the  changes  initiated  in 
my  trade  reorganization,  we  will  ensure 
that  trade  between  the  United  States 
and  its  trading  partners  will  be  con- 
ducted fairly  and  openly. 

Consistent  with  my  decisions  on 
suspending  certain  types  of  trade  with 
the  Soviet  Union,  my  Administration 
will  be  seeking  this  year  to  find  addi- 
tional ways  to  foster  U.S.  export  ex- 


Special 


pansion.  We  are  studying  the  possibil- 
ity of  further  agreements  on  expanded 
trade  with  both  traditional  and  newer 
trade  partners,  including  China.  I  look 
forward  to  working  with  the  Congress 
on  ways  we  can  continue  to  improve  our 
trading  position  which,  in  turn,  will 
help  maintain  a  prosperous  American 
economy. 


II    CREATING  ENERGY  SECURITY 

Since  I  took  office,  my  highest 
legislative  priorities  have  involved  the 
development  of  our  Nation's  first  com- 
prehensive energy  policy.  The  struggle 
to  achieve  that  policy  has  been  difficult 
for  all  of  us,  but  the  accomplishments  of 
the  past  three  years  leave  no  doubt  that 
our  country  is  finally  serious  about  the 
problems  caused  by  our  overdepen- 
dence  on  foreign  oil.  The  accom- 
plishments can  be  lost,  however,  and 
the  progress  stopped,  if  we  fail  to  move 
forward  even  further  this  year.  There 
is  no  single  panacea  that  will  solve  our 
energy  crisis.  We  must  rely  on  and  en- 
courage multiple  forms  of  production — 
coal,  crude  oil,  natural  gas,  solar,  nu- 
clear, synthetics— and  conservation. 

It  is  therefore  essential  that  Con- 
gress enact  the  major  energy  bills  I 
proposed  last  year;  and  their  enactment 
will  be  my  most  immediate  and  highest 
legislative  priority  this  year. 


Ill    ENHANCING  BASIC  HUMAN 
AND  SOCIAL  NEEDS 


Refugees 

In  1979  my  Administration  made  sig- 
nificant progress  in  resolving  a  number 
of  problems  arising  from  the  increase  in 
refugees.  Last  March,  I  proposed  com- 
prehensive refugee  legislation,  and  I 
regard  its  passage  as  a  high  priority 
this  year.  The  legislation— which  is  the 
first  comprehensive  reform  of  our  refu- 
gee immigration  and  domestic  reset- 
tlement policies  in  twenty-eight 
years — will  bring  common  sense  and 
cohesion  to  an  unnecessarily  frag- 
mented approach  to  international  and 
domestic  refugee  needs.  Under  vigor- 
ous new  leadership,  the  Office  of  the 
U.S.  Coordinator  for  Refugee  Affairs, 
which  I  created  last  year,  will  aggres- 
sively address  the  needs  of  refugees  at 
home  and  abroad.  We  will  also  encour- 
age greater  cooperation  with  the  pri- 


vate sector  and  other  actions  to  ensure 
successful  refugee  resettlement. 


VI  PROTECTING  AND 
DEVELOPING  OUR  NATURAL 
RESOURCES 


AGRICULTURE 
Agricultural  Progress 

While  much  work  remains  to  bedone. 
America's  agriculture  is  by  far  the  best 
in  the  world.  Efforts  made  by  my  Ad- 
ministration, in  cooperation  with  Con- 
gress, to  secure  economic  stability  for 
the  farmer,  have  produced  results. 

In  1979,  we  experienced  another 
record  year  for  farm  production.  Net 
farm  income  jumped  to  $32  billion  in 
1979,  a  $4  billion  increase  over  1978. 
Agricultural  exports  also  reached  new 
highs,  rising  18%  in  1979  to  $32  billion. 
Despite  the  suspension  of  exports  to 
the  Soviet  Union,  we  can  expect  a  con- 
tinued healthy  export  picture  for  our 
Nation's  farmers. 

Last  year  the  Secretary  of  Agricul- 
ture travelled  around  the  country  and 
conducted  an  extraordinarily  detailed 
and  creative  dialogue  with  the  Nation's 
farmers.  He  obtained  invaluable 
suggestions  on  economic  and  social  is- 
sues concerning  farm  life;  as  we  pre- 
pare our  farm  program  for  this  year  and 
beyond,  the  advice  of  our  Nation's 
farmers  will  clearly  be  reflected  in  the 
policies  we  develop  with  the  Congress. 

Soviet  Grain  Suspension 

In  response  to  the  Soviet  armed  inva- 
sion of  Afghanistan  on  Christmas  Eve, 
I  took  several  actions  to  demonstrate 
our  Nation's  resolve  to  resist  such  hos- 
tile acts  of  aggression  against  a 
sovereign,  independent  nation.  One  of 
the  most  important  of  these  actions  was 
the  suspension  of  grain  sales  to  the 
Soviet  Union  beyond  the  8  million  tons 
provided  under  our  1975  grains  agree- 
ment. The  Soviet  Union  had  intended  to 
purchase  an  estimated  25  million  tons  of 
U.S.  wheat  and  feed  grains.  Thus,  the 
suspension  of  sales  above  the  8  million 
ton  agreement  level  is  expected  to  re- 
sult in  the  freeing  of  about  17  million 
tons. 

My  decision  to  suspend  these  sales 
was  a  difficult  one.  but  a  necessary  one. 
We  could  not  continue  to  do  business  as 
usual  with  the  Soviet  Union  while  it  is 
invading  an  independent,  sovereign  na- 
tion in  an  area  of  the  world  of  strategic 


importance  to  the  United  States.  I  am 
fully  committed  to  a  policy  of  promotiiiii 
international  trade,  and  particularly  tin 
expanded  export  of  U.S.  agricultural 
products.  I  am  proud  of  my  Administra- 
tion's record  in  this  regard.  Because  of 
the  aggressive  efforts  of  American 
farmers  and  businessmen,  working  in 
cooperation  with  Federal  representa- 
tives, and  the  provision  of  new  au- 
thorities by  Congress,  we  have  set  new 
trade  export  records  in  each  of  the  past 
3  years.  Even  with  the  Soviet  suspen- 
sion, we  intend  to  set  still  another  rec- 
ord in  the  coming  year.  In  making  my 
decisions  on  the  suspension,  I  believed 
it  would  be  unfair  to  ask  the  American 
farmer  to  bear  a  greater  share  of  the 
burden  and  sacrifice  than  their  fellow 
Americans  were  asked  to  bear.  Farm- 
ers should  not  be  penalized  simply  be- 
cause they  are  part  of  an  agricultural 
machine  that  is  of  growing  strategic 
importance  in  the  world. 

To  protect  American  farmers  from 
the  price  depressing  effects  of  the  grain 
suspension.  I  directed  the  Secretary  of 
Agriculture  to  take  several  actions: 

•  The  Commodity  Credit  Corpora- 
tion will  assume  the  contractual  obliga- 
tions for  grain  previously  committed  for 
shipment  to  the  Soviet  Union. 

•  The  Department  of  Agriculture, 
acting  through  the  Commodity  Credit 
Corporation,  will  purchase  wheat  con- 
tracted for  export  to  the  Soviet  Union 
for  the  purpose  of  forming  an  emer- 
gency international  wheat  reserve.  In 
this  connection.  I  will  propose  legisla- 
tion authorizing  release  of  this  wheat 
for  international  aid  purposes. 

•  To  encourage  farmers  to  place 
additional  grain  in  the  farmer-held 
grain  reserve,  the  Secretary  of  Agricul- 
ture has  made  several  modifications  in 
that  important  program. 

•  The  Commodity  Credit  Corpora- 
tion will  purchase  corn  at  the  local  level 
to  alleviate  the  congestion  within  the 
transportation  system  caused  by  the 
refusal  of  the  International  Long- 
shoremen's Association  to  load  grain  up 
to  the  8  million  metric  ton  level. 

In  combination,  these  actions  are 
expected  to  isolate  from  the  market  an 
amount  of  grain  equivalent  to  that  not 
shipped  to  the  Soviet  Union,  thereby 
avoiding  a  decline  in  grain  prices.  I  am 
pleased  to  report  that  these  actions 
are  having  the  desired  results  and  that 
American  farmers  are  being  protected 
from  the  effects  of  the  suspension. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Special 


If  further  aftions  are  necessary  to 
insure  that  American  agriculture  does 
not  bear  a  disproportionately  large 
share  of  the  burden  associated  with  this 
action,  I  will  not  hesitate  to  take  them. 


International  Emergency  Wheat 
Reserve 

The  Congress  has  not  yet  acted  on  the 
proposal  I  made  in  the  last  Session  to 
create  an  International  Emergency 
Wheat  Reserve.  This  reserve  of  up  to  4 
million  tons  of  wheat  would  be  used  to 
assure  recipient  nations  that  we  will 
meet  our  international  food  aid  com- 
mitments. The  suspension  of  further 
grain  sales  to  the  Soviet  Union  pro- 
vides an  appropriate  opportunity  to 
provide  this  authority,  and  thereby 
establish  guidelines  for  the  release  of 
wheat  now  being  acquired  by  the  Com- 
modity Credit  Corporation. 

FOREIGN  POLICY 

From  the  time  I  assumed  office  three 
years  ago  this  month,  I  have  stressed 
the  need  for  this  country  to  assert  a 
leading  role  in  a  world  undergoing  the 
most  extensive  and  intensive  change  in 
human  history. 

My  policies  have  been  directed  in 
particular  at  three  areas  of  change: 

•  the  steady  growth  and  increased 
projection  abroad  of  Soviet  military 
power — power  that  has  grown  faster 
than  our  own  over  the  past  two 
decades. 

•  the  overwhelming  dependence  of 
'Western  nations,  which  now  increas- 
ingly includes  the  United  States,  on 
vital  oil  supplies  from  the  Middle  East. 

•  the  pressures  of  change  in  many 
nations  of  the  developing  world,  in- 
•luding  the  year  old  revolution  in  Iran 
iiiil  uncertainty  about  the  future  in 

pmany  other  countries. 

As  a  result  of  those  fundamental 
facts,  we  face  some  of  the  most  serious 
challenges  in  the  history  of  this  Nation. 
The  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan  is  a 
hreat  to  global  peace,  to  East- West 
"elations,  and  to  regional  stability  and 
;o  the  flow  of  oil.  As  the  unprecedented 
ind  overwhelming  vote  in  the  General 
\ssembly  demonstrated,  countries 
icross  the  world — and  particularly  the 
ion-aligned — regard  the  Soviet  inva- 
;ion  as  a  threat  to  their  independence 
md  security.  Turmoil  within  the  region 
idjacent  to  the  Persian  Gulf  poses  risks 
or  the  security  and  prosperity  of  every 
Vestern  nation  and  thus  for  the  entire 
global  economy.  The  continuing  holding 
if  American  hostages  in  Iran  is  both  an 

■ebruary  1980 


affront  to  civilized  people  everywhere, 
and  a  serious  impediment  to  meeting 
the  self-evident  threat  to  widely-shared 
common  interests — including  those  of 
Iran. 

But  as  we  focus  our  most  urgent 
efforts  on  pressing  problems,  we  will 
continue  to  pursue  the  benefits  that 
only  change  can  bring.  For  it  always 
has  been  the  essence  of  America  that 
we  want  to  move  on — we  understand 
that  prosperity,  progress  and  most  of 
all  peace  cannot  be  had  by  standing 


We  face  a  broad  range  of  threats 
and  opportunities.  We  have  and  should 
continue  to  pursue  a  broad  range  of 
defense,  diplomatic  and  economic 
capabilities  and  objectives. 

I  see  five  basic  goals  for  America  in 
the  world  over  the  1980s: 

•  First,  we  will  continue,  as  we 
have  over  the  past  three  years,  to  build 
America's  military  strength  and  that  of 
our  allies  and  friends.  Neither  the 
Soviet  Union  nor  any  other  nation  will 


Exports  of  agricultural  and  industrial  goods  grew  by  an  unparallMled  $35 
billion,  reaching  a  level  of  $180  billion.  This  represented  an  increase  of 
25%  over  exports  in  1978. 


still.  A  world  of  nations  striving  to  pre- 
serve their  independence,  and  of  peoples 
aspiring  for  economic  development  and 
political  freedom,  is  not  a  world  hostile 
to  the  ideals  and  interests  of  the  United 
States.  We  face  powerful  adversaries, 
but  we  have  strong  friends  and  depend- 
able allies.  We  have  common  interests 
with  the  vast  majority  of  the  world's 
nations  and  peoples. 

There  have  been  encouraging  de- 
velopments in  recent  years,  as  w'ell  as 
matters  requiring  continued  vigilance 
and  concern: 

•  Our  alliances  with  the  world's 
most  advanced  and  democratic  states 
from  Western  Europe  through  Japan 
are  stronger  than  ever. 

•  We  have  helped  to  bring  about  a 
dramatic  improvement  in  relations  be- 
tween Egypt  and  Israel  and  an  historic 
step  towards  a  comprehensive  Arab- 
Israeli  settlement. 

•  Our  relations  with  China  are 
growing  closer,  providing  a  major  new 
dimension  in  our  policy  in  Asia  and  the 
world. 

•  And  across  southern  Africa  from 
Rhodesia  to  Namibia  we  are  helping 
with  the  peaceful  transition  to  majority 
rule  in  a  conte.xt  of  respect  for  minority 
as  well  as  majority  rights. 

The  central  challenge  for  us  today 
is  to  our  steadfastness  of  purpose.  We 
are  no  longer  tempted  by  isolationism. 
But  we  must  also  learn  to  deal  effec- 
tively with  the  concentration  of  the 
world — the  need  to  cooperate  with  po- 
tential adversaries  without  euphoria, 
without  undermining  our  determination 
to  compete  with  such  adversaries  and  if 
necessary  confront  the  threats  they 
may  pose  to  our  security. 


have  reason  to  question  our  will  to 
sustain  the  strongest  and  most  flexible 
defense  forces. 

•  Second,  we  will  pursue  an  active 
diplomacy  in  the  world,  working — 
together  with  our  friends  and  allies — to 
resolve  disputes  through  peaceful 
means  and  to  make  any  aggressor  pay  a 
heavy  price. 

•  Third,  we  will  strive  to  resolve 
pressing  international  economic 
problems — particularly  energy  and 
inflation — and  continue  to  pursue  our 
still  larger  objective  of  global  economic 
growth  through  expanded  trade  and 
development  assistance. 

•  Fourth,  we  will  continue  vigor- 
ously to  support  the  process  of  building 
democratic  institutions  and  improving 
human  rights  protection  around  the 
world.  We  are  deeply  convinced  that 
the  future  lies  not  with  dictatorship  but 
democracy. 

•  Fifth,  we  remain  deeply  com- 
mitted to  the  process  of  mutual  and 
verifiable  arms  control,  particularly  to 
the  effort  to  prevent  the  spread  and 
further  development  of  nuclear 
weapons.  Our  decision  to  defer,  but  not 
abandon  our  efforts  to  secure  ratifica- 
tion of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  reflects  our 
firm  conviction  that  the  United  States 
has  a  profound  national  security  inter- 
est in  the  constraints  on  Soviet  nuclear 
forces  which  only  that  treaty  can  pro- 
vide. 

Continuing  close  cooperation  be- 
tween the  Congress  and  the  Executive 
Branch  will  be  required  to  achieve  these 
goals.  My  most  immediate  legislative 
priorities  include: 


Special 


(1)  Defense  Department  Authoriza- 
tion and  Appropriation  Bills 

(2)  Special  International  Security 
Assistance,  for  Pakistan  and  other 
countries 

(3)  Bilateral  and  Multilateral 
Foreign  Assistance  Bills,  including 
Central  America  supplemental 

(4)  The  China  Trade  Agreement 

(5)  Intelligence  Charters 

(6)  Refugee  Legislation  and  Fund- 
ing 

(7)  Human  Rights  Conventions 

(8)  And,  when  appopriate,  the 
SALT  II  Treaty. 

One  very  immediate  and  pressing 
objective  that  is  uppermost  on  our 
minds  and  those  of  the  American  people 
is  the  release  of  our  hostages  in  Iran. 

We  have  no  basic  quarrel  with  the 
nation,  the  revolution  or  the  people  of 
Iran.  The  threat  to  them  comes  not 
from  American  policy  but  from  Soviet 
actions  in  the  region.  We  are  prepared 
to  work  with  the  government  of  Iran  to 
develop  a  new  and  mutually  beneficial 
relationship. 


in  which  democracy  and  freedom  are 
still  challenged,  a  world  in  which  peace 
must  be  re-won  every  day." 

We  must  have  both  the  military 
power  and  the  political  will  to  deter  our 
adversaries  and  to  support  our  friends 
and  allies. 

We  must  pay  whatever  price  is  re- 
quired to  remain  the  strongest  nation 
in  the  world.  That  price  has  increased 
as  the  military  power  of  our  major  ad- 
versary has  grown  and  its  readiness  to 
use  that  power  been  made  all  too  evi- 
dent in  Afghanistan. 


The  U.S.-Soviet  Relationship 

We  are  demonstrating  to  the  Soviet 
Union  across  a  broad  front  that  it  will 
pay  a  heavy  price  for  its  aggression  in 
terms  of  our  relationship.  Throughout 
the  last  decades  U.S.-Soviet  relations 
have  been  a  mixture  of  cooperation  and 
competition.  The  Soviet  attack  on  Af- 
ghanistan and  the  ruthless  extermina- 
tion of  its  government  have  highlighted 
in  the  starkest  terms  the  darker  side  of 


As  the  unprecedented  and  overwhelming  vote  in  the  General  Assembly 
demonstrated,  countries  across  the  world — a7id  partictdarly  the 
uon-aligned — regard  the  Soviet  invasion  as  a  threat  to  their  independence 
a)id  secin-ifj). 


But  that  will  not  be  possible  so  long 
as  Iran  continues  to  hold  Americans 
hostage,  in  defiance  of  the  world  com- 
munity and  civilized  behavior.  They 
must  be  released  unharmed.  We  have 
thus  far  pursued  a  measured  program 
of  peaceful  diplomatic  and  economic 
steps  in  an  attempt  to  resolve  this  issue 
without  resorting  to  other  remedies 
available  to  us  under  international  law. 
This  reflects  the  deep  respect  of  our 
Nation  for  the  rule  of  law  and  for  the 
safety  of  our  people  being  held,  and  our 
belief  that  a  great  power  bears  a  re- 
sponsibility to  use  its  strength  in  a 
measured  and  judicious  manner.  But 
our  patience  is  not  unlimited  and  our 
concern  for  the  well-being  of  our  fellow 
citizens  grows  each  day. 


ENHANCING  NATIONAL 
SECURITY— AMERICAN  MILI- 
TARY STRENGTH 

The  maintenance  of  national  security  is 
my  first  concern,  as  it  has  been  for 
every  President  before  me. 

As  I  stated  (me  year  ago  in  Atlanta: 
"This  is  still  a  world  of  danger,  a  world 


H 


their  policies — going  well  beyond  com- 
petition and  the  legitimate  pursuit  of 
national  interest,  and  violating  all 
norms  of  international  law  and  practice. 

This  attempt  to  subjugate  an  inde- 
pendent, non-aligned  Islamic  people  is  a 
callous  violation  of  international  law 
and  the  United  Nations  Charter,  two 
fundamentals  of  international  order. 
Hence,  it  is  also  a  dangerous  threat  to 
world  peace.  For  the  first  time  since 
World  War  II,  the  Soviets  have  sent 
combat  forces  into  an  area  that  was  not 
previously  under  their  control,  into  a 
non-aligned  and  sovereign  state. 

On  January  4  I  therefore  an- 
nounced a  number  of  measures,  includ- 
ing the  reduction  of  grain  sales  and  the 
curtailment  of  trade  and  technology 
transfer,  designed  to  demonstrate  our 
firm  opposition  to  Soviet  actions  in  Af- 
ghanistan and  to  underscore  our  belief 
that  in  the  face  of  this  blatent  trans- 
gression of  international  law,  it  was 
impossible  to  conduct  business  as  usual. 
I  have  also  been  in  consultation  with 
our  allies  and  with  countries  in  the  re- 
gion regarding  additional  multilateral 


measures  that  might  be  taken  to  regis- 
ter our  disapproval  and  bolster  security 
in  Southwest  Asia.  I  have  been  heart- 
ened by  the  support  expressed  for  our 
position,  and  by  the  fact  that  such 
support  has  been  tangible,  as  well  as 
moral. 

The  destruction  of  the  independ- 
ence of  Afghanistan  government  and 
the  occupation  by  the  Soviet  Union  has 
altered  the  strategic  situation  in  that 
part  of  the  world  in  a  very  ominous 
fashion.  It  has  brought  the  Soviet 
Union  within  striking  distance  of  the 
Indian  Ocean  and  even  the  Persian 
Gulf. 

It  has  eliminated  a  buffer  between 
the  Soviet  Union  and  Pakistan  and  pre- 
sented a  new  threat  to  Iran.  These  two 
countries  are  now  far  more  vulnerable 
to  Soviet  political  intimidation.  If  that 
intimidation  were  to  prove  effective, 
the  Soviet  Union  might  well  control  an 
area  of  vital  strategic  and  economic 
significance  to  the  survival  of  Western 
Europe,  the  Far  East,  and  ultimately 
the  United  States. 

It  is  clear  that  the  entire 
subcontinent  of  Asia  and  specifically 
Pakistan  is  threatened.  Therefore,  I  am 
asking  Congress,  as  the  first  order  of 
business,  to  pass  an  economic  and  mili- 
tary aid  package  designed  to  assist 
Pakistan  defend  itself. 

Defense  Budget 

For  many  years  the  Soviets  have 
steadily  increased  their  real  defense 
spending,  expanded  their  strategic 
forces,  strengthened  their  forces  in 
Europe  and  Asia,  and  enhanced  their 
capability  for  projecting  military  force 
around  the  world  directly  or  through 
the  use  of  proxies.  Afghanistan 
dramatizes  the  vastly  increased  mili- 
tary power  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  Soviet  Union  has  built  a  war 
machine  far  beyond  any  reasonable  re- 
quirements for  their  own  defense  and 
security.  In  contrast,  our  own  defense 
spending  declined  in  real  terms  every 
year  from  1968  through  1976. 

We  have  reversed  this  decline  in 
our  own  effort.  Every  year  since  1976 
there  has  been  a  real  increase  in  our 
defense  spending — and  our  lead  has  en- 
couraged increases  by  our  allies.  With 
the  support  of  the  Congress,  we  must 
and  will  make  an  even  greater  effort  in 
the  years  ahead. 

The  Fiscal  Year  1981  budget  would 
increase  funding  authority  for  defense 
to  more  than  $158  billion,  a  real  growth 
of  more  than  .5%  over  my  request  for 
Fiscal  Year  1980.  Therefore,  requested 
outlays  for  defense  during  Fiscal  Year 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Special 


1981  will  grciw  by  more  than  oQ  in  real 
terms  over  the  preceding  yeai-. 

The  trends  we  mean  to  correct 
cannot  be  remedied  overnight;  we  must 
be  willing  to  see  this  program  through. 
To  ensure  that  we  do  so  I  am  setting  a 
growth  rate  for  defense  that  we  can 
sustain  over  the  long  haul. 

The  defense  program  I  have  pro- 
posed for  the  next  five  years  will  re- 
i|uire  some  sacrifice — but  sacrifice  we 
can  well  afford. 

The  defense  program  emphasizes 
four  areas: 

(a)  It  ensures  that  our  strategic  nu- 
clear forces  will  be  etjuivalent  to  those 
of  the  Soviet  Union  and  that  deterrence 
against  nuclear  war  will  be  maintained; 

(b)  It  upgrades  our  forces  so  that 
the  military  balance  between  NATO 
and  the  Warsaw  Pact  will  continue  to 
deter  the  outbreak  of  war — conven- 
tional or  nuclear — in  Europe; 

(c)  It  provides  us  the  ability  to 
come  quickly  to  the  aid  of  friends  and 
allies  around  the  globe; 

(d)  And  it  ensures  that  our  Navy 
will  continue  to  be  the  most  powerful 
on  the  seas. 

Strategic  Forces 

We  are  strengthening  each  of  the  three 
legs  of  our  strategic  forces.  The  cruise 
missile  production  which  will  begin 
next  year  will  modernize  our  strategic 
air  deterrent.  B-52  capabilities  will  also 
be  improved.  These  steps  will  maintain 
and  enhance  the  B-52  fleet  by  improv- 
ing its  ability  to  deliver  weapons 
against  increasingly  heavily  defended 
targets. 

We  are  also  modernizing  our 
strategic  submarine  missile  force.  The 
first  new  Trident  submarine  has  al- 
ready been  launched  and  will  begin  sea 
trials  this  year.  The  second  Trident  will 
be  launched  in  the  spring  of  1980.  The 
first  of  our  new  Trident  missiles,  with.a 
range  of  more  than  4.000  miles,  have 
already  begun  operational  patrols  in 
Poseidon  submarines. 

The  new  MX  missile  will  enhance 
the  survivability  of  our  land-based  in- 
tercontinental ballistic  missile  force. 
That  is  why  I  decided  last  spring  to 
produce  this  missile  and  selected  the 
basing  mode  best  suited  to  enhance  its 
capability.  Further  the  MX  will 
strengthen  our  capability  to  attack  a 
wide  variety  of  Soviet  targets. 

Our  new  systems  will  enable  U.S. 
strategic  forces  to  maintain  equivalence 
in  the  face  of  the  mounting  Soviet  chal- 
lenge. We  would  however  need  an  even 
greater  investment  in  strategic  systems 


■ebruary  1980 


to  meet  the  likely  Soviet  buildup  with- 
out SALT. 

Forces  for  NATO 

We  are  greatly  accelerating  our  ability 
to  reinforce  Western  Europe  with 
massive  ground  and  air  forces  in  a 
crisis.  We  are  undertaking  a  major 
modernization  program  for  the  Army's 
weapons  and  equipment,  adding  armor, 
firepower,  and  tactical  mobility. 

We  are  prepositioning  more  heavy 
e(|uipment  in  Europe  to  help  us  cope 
with  attacks  with  little  warning,  and 
greatly  strengthening  our  airlift  and 
sealift  capabilities. 

We  are  also  improving  our  tactical 
air  forces — buying  about  1700  new 
fighter  and  attack  aircraft  over  the 
next  five  years — and  increasing  the 
number  of  Air  Force  fighter  wings  by 
over  10%. 

We  are  accelerating  the  rate  at 
which  we  can  move  combat  aircraft  to 
Europe  to  cope  with  any  surprise  at- 
tack, and  adding  to  the  number  of  shel- 
ters at  European  airbases  to  prevent 
our  aircraft  from  being  destroyed  on 
the  ground. 

Rapid  Deployment  Forces 

We  are  systematically  enhancing  our 
ability  to  respond  rapidly  to  non-NATO 
contingencies  wherever  required  by  our 
commitments  or  when  our  vital  inter- 
ests are  threatened. 

The  rapid  deployment  forces  we 
are  assembling  will  be  extraordinarily 
flexible:  They  could  range  in  size  from  a 
few  ships  or  air  scjuadrons  to  forma- 
tions as  large  as  100,000  men,  together 
with  their  support.  Our  forces  will  be 
prepared  for  rapid  deployment  to  any 
region  of  strategic  significance. 

Among  the  specific  initiatives  we 
are  taking  to  help  us  respond  to  crises 
outside  of  Europe  are: 

•  the  development  and  production 
of  a  new  fleet  of  large  cargo  aircraft 
with  intercontinental  range; 

•  the  design  and  procurement  of  a 
force  of  Maritime  Prepositioning  Ships 
that  will  carry  heavy  equipment  and 
supplies  for  three  Marine  Corps 
brigades. 

In  addition,  responding  to  the 
Soviet  military  presence  in  Cuba  and 
the  proxy  role  of  Cuba  on  behalf  of  the 
USSR,  we  have  taken  or  are  taking  the 
following  actions  in  support  of  the  rapid 
deployment  force: 

(1)  We  are  substantially  increasing 
our  ability  to  monitor  Cuban  and 
Soviet/Cuban  activities; 


(2)  We  have  established  a  Carib- 
bean Joint  Task  Force  Headquarters 
which  improves  our  ability  to  respond 
to  events  in  the  region; 

(3)  We  are  increasing  regional  mili- 
tary exercises;  and, 

(4)  We  are  intensifying  assistance 
to  countries  in  the  region  that  are 
threatened  by  Soviet  or  Cuban 
intervention. 

Naval  Forces 

Seapower  is  indispensable  to  our  global 
position — in  peace  and  also  in  war.  Our 
shipbuilding  program  will  sustain  a 
550-ship  Navy  in  the  1990s  and  we  will 
continue  to  build  the  most  capable  ships 
afloat. 

The  program  I  have  proposed  will 
assure  the  ability  of  our  Navy  to  oper- 
ate in  high  threat  areas,  to  maintain 
control  of  the  seas  and  protect  vital 
lines  of  communication — both  military 
and  economic — and  to  provide  the 
strong  maritime  component  of  our  rapid 
deployment  forces.  This  is  essential  for 
operations  in  remote  areas  of  the  world, 
where  we  cannot  predict  far  in  advance 
the  precise  location  of  trouble,  or  pre- 
position equipment  on  land. 

Military  Personnel 

No  matter  how  capable  or  advanced  our 
weapons  systems,  our  military  security 
depends  on  the  abilities,  the  training 
and  the  dedication  of  the  people  who 
serve  in  our  armed  forces.  I  am  deter- 
mined to  recruit  and  to  retain  under 
any  foreseeable  circumstances  an  ample 
level  of  such  skilled  and  experienced 
military  personnel. 

We  have  enhanced  our  readiness 
and  combat  endurance  by  improving  the 
Reserve  Components.  All  reservists 
are  assigned  to  units  structured  to 
complement  and  provide  needed  depth 
to  our  active  forces.  Some  reserve  per- 
sonnel have  also  now  been  equipped 
with  new  equipment. 

Mobilization  Planning 

I  have  also  launched  a  major  effort  to 
establish  a  coherent  and  practical  basis 
for  all  government  mobilization  plan- 
ning. Begun  last  May,  this  is  the  first 
such  effort  conducted  at  Presidential 
level  since  World  War  II.  It  involves 
virtually  every  Federal  agency,  with 
the  aim  of  improved  efficiency  and 
readiness. 


Special 


Our  Intelligence  Posture 

Our  national  interests  are  critically  de- 
pendent on  a  strong  and  effective  intel- 
ligence capability.  We  will  not 
shortchange  the  intelligence 
capabilities  needed  to  assure  our  na- 
tional security.  Maintenance  of  and  con- 
tinued improvements  in  our  multi- 
faceted  intelligence  effort  are  essential 
if  we  are  to  cope  successfully  with  the 
turbulence  and  uncertainties  of  today's 
world. 

The  intelligence  budget  I  have 
submitted  to  the  Congress  responds  to 
our  needs  in  a  responsible  way,  pro- 
viding for  significant  growth  over  the 
Fiscal  Year  1980  budget.  This  growth 
will  enable  us  to  develop  new  technical 
means  of  intelligence  collection  while 
also  assuring  that  the  more  traditional 
methods  of  intelligence  work  are  also 
given  proper  stress.  We  must  continue 
to  integrate  both  modes  of  collection  in 
our  analyses. 

It  is  imperative  that  we  now  move 
forward  promptly  within  the  context  of 
effective  Congressional  oversight  to 
provide  America's  intelligence  commu- 
nity with  Charters  which  can  permit  it 
to  operate  more  effectively  and  within  a 
national  concern  codified  by  law. 


REGIONAL  POLICIES 

Every  President  for  over  three  decades 
has  recognized  that  America's  interests 
are  global  and  that  we  must  pursue  a 
global  foreign  policy. 

Two  world  wars  have  made  clear 
our  stake  in  Western  Europe  and  the 
North  Atlantic  area.  We  are  also  inex- 
tricably linked  with  the  Far  East — 
politically,  economically,  and  militarily. 
In  both  of  these,  the  United  States  has 
a  permament  presence  and  security 
commitments  which  would  be  automati- 
cally triggered.  We  have  become  in- 
creasingly conscious  of  our  growing 
interests  in  a  third  area— the  Middle 
East  and  the  Persian  Gulf  area. 

We  have  vital  stakes  in  other  major 
regions  of  the  world  as  well.  We  have 
long  recognized  that  in  an  era  of  inter- 
dependence, our  own  security  and 
prosperity  depend  upon  a  larger  com- 
mon effort  with  friends  and  allies 
throughout  the  world. 


The  Atlantic  Alliance 

At  the  outset  of  this  Administration  I 
emphasized  the  primacy  of  our  Atlantic 
relationship  in  this  country's  national 
security  agenda.  We  have  made  impor- 


tant progress  toward  making  the  Atlan- 
tic Alliance  still  more  effective  in  a 
changing  security  environment. 

We  are  meeting  the  Soviet  chal- 
lenge in  a  number  of  important  ways: 

First,  there  is  a  recognition  among 
our  allies  that  mutual  security  is  a  re- 
sponsibility to  be  shared  by  all.  We  are 
each  committed  to  increase  national 
defense  expenditures  by  3%  per  year. 
There  remains  much  work  to  be  done  in 
strengthening  NATO's  conventional 
defense;  the  work  proceeding  under  the 
Alliance's  Long  Term  Defense  Program 
will  help  achieve  this  objective. 

Last  month,  we  and  our  NATO  al- 
lies took  an  historic  step  in  Alliance  se- 
curity policies  with  the  decision  to  im- 
prove substantially  our  theater  nuclear 
capabilities.  The  theater  nuclear  force 
modernization  (TNF)  program,  which 
includes  the  deployment  of  improved 
Pershing  ballistic  missiles  and  of 
ground-launched  cruise  missiles  in 
Europe,  received  the  unanimous 
support  of  our  allies.  The  accelerated 
deployment  of  Soviet  SS-20  MIRVed 
missiles  made  this  modernization  step 
essential.  TNF  deployments  will  give 
the  Alliance  an  important  retaliatory 
option  that  will  make  clear  to  the 
Soviets  that  they  cannot  wage  a  nuclear 
war  in  Europe  and  expect  that  Soviet 
territory  will  remain  unscathed. 

While  we  move  forward  with  our 
necessary  defense  efforts  in  Europe,  we 
are  also  proceeding  with  our  efforts  to 
improve  European  security  through 
arms  control. 

As  an  integral  part  of  the  NATO 
TNF  decisions,  the  Alliance  has  made  it 
clear  that  it  is  prepared  to  negotiate 
limitations  on  long-range  theater  nu- 
clear missiles. 

On  our  part,  our  TNF  moderniza- 
tion efforts  will  make  possible  a 
streamlining  of  our  nuclear  weapons 
stockpile  in  Europe,  allowing  us  to 
withdraw  1,000  nuclear  warheads  over 
the  next  year. 

In  the  Mutual  and  Balanced  Force 
Reduction  talks,  we  and  our  allies  have 
recently  put  forward  new  proposals 
that  are  designed  to  simplify  the 
negotiations  and  improve  the  prospect 
for  early  progress  in  limiting  conven- 
tional military  forces  in  Europe. 

In  a  very  real  sense  the  accom- 
plishments of  the  past  year  answered  a 
critical  question  concerning  NATO's  fu- 
ture: can  the  Western  Alliance,  which 
has  provided  the  foundation  for  one  of 
the  longest  periods  of  peace  and  pros- 
perity that  Europe  has  ever  enjoyed, 
still  summon  the  essential  cohesion, 
relevance,  and  resolve  to  deal  with  fun- 


damental security  issues  likely  to  affect 
its  member  nations  well  into  the  next 
century?  NATO's  consensus  in  favor  of 
modernizing  and  negotiating  about  its 
nuclear  arsenal  while  continuing  to  im- 
prove conventional  forces,  dramatized 
Allied  capacity  to  respond  effectively  to 
both  the  military  and  political  threats 
posed  by  the  Soviet  Union. 

Relations  with  our  allies  and 
friends  in  Europe  are  taking  on  ever 
broader  dimensions.  Our  security 
agenda  remains  central;  we  are  ad- 
dressing new  concerns  as  well. 

I  met  with  an  unprecedented 
number  of  European  statesmen  in 
Washington  during  the  year  just  past, 
including  the  leaders  of  Great  Britain, 
West  Germany,  Austria,  Norway,  Fin- 
land, the  Netherlands,  Ireland, 
Sweden,  and  the  European  Community; 
in  all  of  these  meetings  a  common 
theme  was  the  changing  realities  of 
political  and  economic  interdependence 
and,  as  we  enter  a  new  decade,  the 
need  to  promote  more  equitable  condi- 
tions of  peaceful  growth  and  stability 
throughout  the  world. 

This  approach  has  achieved  tangi- 
ble form  in  a  number  of  ways.  For 
example,  every  West  European  gov- 
ernment supports  us  as  we  have  con- 
tinued by  every  peaceful  means  to  seek 
the  release  of  American  hostages  held 
in  Tehran  in  defiance  of  universal 
standards  of  international  law  and  de- 
cency. We  are  consulting  and  coop- 
erating closely  in  our  responses  to  the 
Soviet  Union's  invasion  and  occupation 
of  Afghanistan. 

In  the  NATO  area  itself,  we  moved 
together  vigorously  to  meet  the  serious 
economic  problems  faced  by  Turkey  and 
thereby  strengthen  a  vital  part  of 
NATO's  southern  flank  and  we  have 
signed  a  new  base  agreement  with  Tur- 
key. This  action,  though  indispensible 
in  its  own  right,  also  supported  our  con- 
tinuing efforts  to  promote  a  solution  to 
the  Cyprus  problem  and  to  bring  about 
the  reintegration  of  Greece  within  the 
military  framework  of  the  Atlantic  Al- 
liance, objectives  which  retain  high 
priority  this  year. 

Asia 

The  United  States  is  a  Pacific  nation,  as 
much  as  it  is  an  Atlantic  nation.  Our 
interests  in  Asia  are  as  important  to  us 
as  our  interests  in  Europe.  Our  trade 
with  Asia  is  even  greater  than  our 
trade  with  Europe.  We  have  pursued 
and  maintained  these  interests  on  the 
basis  of  a  stable  balance  of  power  in  the 
region.  Our  partnership  and  alliance 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Special 


with  Japan  is  central  to  our  Asian  pol- 
icy. We  are  strengthening  our  new  re- 
lationship with  China.  We  have  e.x- 
panded  our  ties  with  the  Association  of 
South  East  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN) 
and  its  member  governments. 

My  trip  to  the  Far  East  helped 
forge  closer  working  relationships  with 
Japan  and  Korea. 

Asian  Security 

The  balance  of  power  is  fundamental  to 
Asian  security.  We  have  maintained 
that  balance  through  a  strong  United 
States  military  posture  in  the  region,  as 
well  as  close  ties  with  our  allies,  Japan, 
Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Korea. 
Over  the  past  year  I  have  worked  to 
stabilize  the  United  States  military 
presence  in  Asia  by  concluding  an 
amended  base  agreement  with  the 
Philippines  that  will  last  until  1991.  We 
have  fostered  the  closest  degree  of  se- 
curity cooperation  with  Japan  in  the 
history  of  our  two  nations — exemplified 
by  joint  planning  for  the  defense  of 
Japan,  increased  Japanese  contribu- 
tions to  United  States  base  costs  in 
Japan,  and  large-scale  Japanese  pur- 
chases of  United  States  defense  equip- 
ment. After  examining  in  detail  new  in- 
telligence estimates  of  North  Korean 
military  strength,  I  decided  to  maintain 
our  troop  strength  in  the  Republic  of 
Korea  at  its  present  level  until  at  least 
1981.  The  reaffirmation  of  our  commit- 
ment tn  Korean  security  has  been  of 
great  importance  to  the  Koreans  as 
they  make  necessary  political  adjust- 
ments in  the  wake  of  President  Park's 
assassination. 

Response  by  nations  in  East  Asia 
jto  the  Soviet  aggression  in  Afghanistan 
has  been  gratifying.  Australia  in  par- 
ticular deserves  recognition  for  the 
forthright  stand  it  has  taken.  Japan  and 
the  ASEAN  nations  have  also  been 
strongly  supportive. 

China 

Over  the  last  year  we  have  expanded 
our  new  relationship  with  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  to  ensure  that  where 
jur  interests  coincide,  our  separate  ac- 
tions will  be  mutually  reinforcing.  To 
this  end  we  have  enhanced  our  consul- 
tative relationship.  We  have  also 
sought  to  develop  an  enduring  institu- 
tional framework  in  the  economic,  cul- 
tural, scientific,  and  trade  areas. 

This  process  has  been  facilitated  by 
the  successful  visits  of  Vice  Premier 
Deng  to  the  United  States  and  Vice 
'resident  Mondale  to  China;  through 
;he  signing  of  over  15  commercial,  sci- 


entific, and  cultural  agreements; 
through  numerous  Cabinet-level  visits; 
and  through  a  significant  expansion  of 
trade  and  the  flow  of  people  between 
our  two  countries. 

During  Secretary  of  Defense 
Brown's  recent  trip  to  the  People's  Re- 
public of  China,  wide-ranging  talks 
were  held  on  global  and  regional  issues, 
arms  control,  technology  transfer,  and 
ways  to  sustain  bilateral  contacts.  Al- 
though we  may  differ  with  the  Chinese 
on  some  issues,  our  views  coincide  on 
many  important  issues,  particularly 
with  respect  to  the  implications  for  the 
region  of  the  Soviet  invasion  of 
Afghanistan. 

In  1980  I  look  forward  to  passage 
by  Congress  early  in  the  year  of  the 
China  Trade  Agreement  and  of  authori- 
zation of  OPIC  operations  in  China;  we 
plan  to  conclude  civil  aviation, 
maritime,  and  textile  agreements;  and 
continue  to  expand  our  commercial,  cul- 
tural, and  scientific  relations,  particu- 
larly, through  ExImBank  credits  to  the 
People's  Republic  of  China. 

Southeast  Asia 

The  countries  comprising  ASEAN  are 
central  to  United  States  interests  in 
Southeast  Asia. 

Throughout  the  past  year,  our  rela- 
tions with  ASEAN  have  continued  to 
expand  as  our  consultative  arrange- 
ments were  strengthened. 


We  arc  dcinoiisf rating  to  the  Soviet 
U)iio)i  across  a  broad  front  that  it 
will  pay  a  heavy  price  for  its 
aggression  i)i  terms  of  our 
relationship. 


The  stability  and  prosperity  of 
Southeast  Asia  have  been  severely 
challenged  by  Soviet-supported  Viet- 
namese aggression  in  Cambodia.  Dur- 
ing this  year  we  will  continue  to  en- 
courage a  political  settlement  in  Cam- 
bodia which  will  permit  that  nation  to 
be  governed  by  leaders  of  its  own 
choice.  We  have  taken  all  prudent  steps 
possible  to  deter  Vietnamese  attacks  on 
Thai  territory  by  increasing  our 
support  to  the  Thais,  and  by  direct 
warnings  to  Vietnam  and  the  U.S.S.R. 
The  other  members  of  ASEAN  have 
stood  firmly  behind  Thailand,  and  this 
in  great  measure  has  helped  to  contain 
the  conflict.  We  have  been  gratified  by 
Thailand's  courageous  and  humane  ac- 
ceptance of  the  Cambodian  refugees. 


Middle  East— Persian  Gulf- 
South  Asia 

Events  in  Iran  and  Afghanistan  have 
dramatized  for  us  the  critical  impor- 
tance for  American  security  and  pros- 
perity of  the  area  running  from  the 
Middle  East  through  the  Persian  Gulf 
to  South  Asia.  This  region  provides 
two-thirds  of  the  world's  oil  exports, 
supplying  most  of  the  energy  needs  of 
our  allies  in  Europe  and  Japan.  It  has 
been  a  scene  of  almost  constant  conflict 
between  nations,  and  of  serious  internal 
instability  within  many  countries.  And 
now  one  of  its  nations  has  been  invaded 
by  the  Soviet  Union. 

We  are  dealing  with  these  multiple 
challenges  in  a  number  of  ways. 

Middle  East.  First,  it  has  been  a  key 
goal  of  my  Administration  since  1977  to 
promote  an  enduring  resolution  of  the 
Arab-Israeli  conflict — which  is  so  es- 
sential to  bringing  stability  and  peace 
to  the  entire  region.  Following  the 
Camp  David  Summit  of  August  1978,  in 
March  1979,  I  helped  bring  about  the 
signing  of  a  peace  treaty  between 
Egypt  and  Israel — the  first  time  in  30 
years  of  Middle  East  conflict  that  peace 
had  shined  with  such  a  bright  and 
promising  flame.  At  the  historic  signing 
ceremony  at  the  White  House,  Prime 
Minister  Begin  and  President  Sadat  re- 
peated their  Camp  David  pledge  to 
work  for  full  autonomy  for  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza. 

Since  then  Egypt  and  Israel  have 
been  working  to  complete  this  part  of 
the  Camp  David  framework  and  to  pro- 
vide an  opportunity  for  the  Palestinian 
people  to  participate  in  determining 
their  future.  I  strongly  support  these 
efforts,  and  have  pledged  that  we  will 
be  a  full  partner  in  the  autonomy 
negotiations.  We  will  continue  to  work 
vigorously  for  a  comprehensive  peace  in 
the  Middle  East,  building  on  the  un- 
precedented achievements  at  Camp 
David. 

At  the  same  time,  I  have  reinforced 
America's  commitment  to  Israel's  secu- 
rity, and  to  the  right  of  all  nations  in 
the  area  to  live  at  peace  with  their 
neighbors,  within  secure  and  recog- 
nized frontiers. 

Persian  Gulf.  In  recent  years  as  our 
own  fuel  imports  have  soared,  the  Per- 
sian Gulf  has  become  vital  to  the 
United  States  as  it  has  been  to  many  of 
our  friends  and  allies.  Over  the  longer 
term,  the  world's  dependence  on  Per- 
sian Gulf  oil  is  likely  to  increase.  The 
denial  of  these  oil  supplies — to  us  or  to 
others — would  threaten  our  security 


-ebruary  1980 


Special 


and  pro'-oke  an  economic  crisis  greater 
than  that  of  the  Great  Depression  50 
years  ago,  with  a  fundamental  change 
in  the  way  we  live. 

Twin  threats  to  the  flow  of  oil — 
from  regional  instability  and  now  po- 
tentially from  the  Soviet  Union — 
require  that  we  firmly  defend  our  vital 
interests  when  threatened. 

In  the  past  year,  we  have  begun  to 
increase  our  capacity  to  project  military 
power  into  the  Persian  Gulf  region,  and 
are  engaged  in  e.xplorations  of  in- 
creased use  of  military  facilities  in  the 
area.  We  have  increased  our  naval 
presence  in  the  Indian  Ocean.  We  have 
been  working  with  countries  in  the  re- 
gion on  shared  security  concerns.  Our 
rapid  deployment  forces,  as  described 
earlier,  could  be  used  in  support  of 
friendly  governments  in  the  Gulf  and 
Southwest  Asian  region,  as  well  as  in 
other  areas. 

South  Asia.  The  overwhelming  chal- 
lenge in  this  region  will  be  dealing  with 
the  new  situation  posed  by  Soviet  ag- 
gression in  Afghanistan.  We  must  help 
the  regional  states  develop  a  capability 
to  withstand  Soviet  pressures  in  a 
strengthened  framework  for  coopera- 
tion in  the  region.  We  want  to  cooper- 
ate with  all  the  states  of  the  region  in 
this  regard — with  India  and  Pakistan, 
with  Sri  Lanka,  Bangladesh  and  Nepal. 

In  this  new  situation,  we  are  pro- 
posing to  the  Congress  a  military  and 
economic  assistance  program  to  enable 
Pakistan  to  buttress  its  defenses.  This 
is  a  matter  of  the  most  urgent  concern, 
and  I  strongly  urge  the  earliest  possible 
approval  by  the  House  and  Senate.  We 
are  also  working  closely  with  other 
friends  of  Pakistan  to  increase  the  re- 
sources available  for  Pakistan's  de- 
velopment and  security. 

We  are  also  pursuing  the  possibil- 
ity of  gaining  access  to  military 
facilities  in  the  region  in  time  of  trou- 
ble. We  are  prepared  to  work  closely 
with  our  friends  in  the  region,  on  a  co- 
operative basis,  to  do  whatever  is  re- 
quired to  ensure  that  aggressors  would 
bear  heavy  costs  so  that  further  ag- 
gression is  deterred. 

A  high  priority  for  us  in  the  region 
is  to  manage  our  nuclear  concerns  with 
India  and  Pakistan  in  ways  that  are 
compatible  with  our  global  and  regional 
priorities.  The  changed  security  situa- 
tion in  South  Asia  arising  from  the 
Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan  calls  for 
legislative  action  to  allow  renewed  as- 
sistance to  Pakistan.  But  this  in  no  way 
diminishes  our  commitment  to  work  to 
prevent  nuclear  weapons  proliferation, 
in  Pakistan  or  elsewhere. 


Steady  growth  of  our  economic  as- 
sistance is  also  essential  if  the  countries 
of  South  Asia  are  to  achieve  growth  and 
true  stability. 

Africa 

A  peaceful  transition  to  majority  rule  in 
Southern  Africa  continues  to  be  a  major 
goal  of  the  United  States.  We  gave  our 
fullest  support  to  the  successful  British 
drive  to  reach  an  agreement  among  all 
parties  in  Rhodesia.  The  process  of  im- 
plementation will  not  be  easy,  but  the 
path  is  now  open  to  a  peaceful  outcome. 
With  our  European  allies,  Canada  and 
the  African  states  directly  concerned 
we  also  are  making  progress  toward  in- 
dependence and  majority  rule  for 
Namibia.  The  momentum  resulting 
from  successful  resolution  of  the 
Rhodesian  conflict  should  aid  in  these 
initiatives. 

Congressional  support  for  the 
Executive  Branch  decision  to  maintain 
sanctions  on  Rhodesia  until  the  parties 
reached  agreement  on  a  ceasefire  and 
an  impartial  elections  process  had 
begun  was  instrumental  in  creating  the 
conditions  necessary  for  agreement. 
Now  that  the  United  States,  European 
trading  partners  and  the  surrounding 
African  states  have  lifted  sanctions,  the 
process  of  economic  reconstruction  in 
Rhodesia — soon  to  be  Zimbabwe — can 
begin. 

With  the  creation  of  an  independ- 
ent Zimbabwe  after  many  years  of 
fighting,  we  will  be  prepared  to  cooper- 
ate in  a  coherent  multi-donor  develop- 
ment plan  for  the  poor  nations  in  the 
Southern  Africa  region. 

Our  active  support  for  self- 
determination  and  racial  equality  in 
Southern  Africa  has  enabled  the  United 
States  to  develop  a  continuing  and  ef- 
fective dialogue  with  governments 
throughout  the  continent.  As  Africa 
grows  more  important  to  us  for  eco- 
nomic, political  and  strategic  reasons, 
we  will  be  strengthening  our  ties  of 
mutual  interest  with  Africans.  We  will 
continue  to  participate  in  their  first 
priority — economic  development — and 
to  help  Africans  resolve  their  political 
problems  and  maintain  stability  in  their 
continent. 

Whether  in  the  Horn  or  in  other 
areas  of  the  continent,  we  will  also  pro- 
vide to  friendly  nations  security  assist- 
ance when  needed  for  defense  of  their 
borders. 

North  Africa 

In  1979  the  United  States  moved  to 
help  a  long-standing  friend  by 


strengthening  our  arms  supply  re- 
lationship with  Morocco.  In  assisting 
Morocco  to  deal  with  attacks  inside  its 
internationally  recognized  frontiers,  we 
seek  conditions  of  greater  security  and 
confidence  in  which  a  political  settle- 
ment of  the  Western  Sahara  conflict  can 
be  effectively  pursued.  Though  not  it- 
self a  mediator,  the  United  States  in 
the  months  ahead  will  encourage  the 
countries  in  the  area  to  resolve  their 
differences  peacefully  in  order  that  the 
vast  economic  potential  of  North  Africa 
can  be  exploited  for  the  well-being  of 
the  people  living  there. 

Latin  America 

Since  my  inauguration,  I  have  worked 
hard  to  forge  a  new,  collaborative  re- 
lationship with  the  nations  of  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean — one  rest- 
ing on  a  firm  commitment  to  human 
rights,  democratization,  economic  de- 
velopment and  non-intervention.  The 
events  of  1979 — even  the  turbulence  in 
Central  America  and  the  Caribbean — 
presented  us  with  opportunities  to 
move  toward  these  goals. 

There  was  encouraging  progress  in 
the  area  of  human  rights  and  democ- 
ratization in  the  Western  Hemisphere 
this  past  year.  The  inauguration  of  a 
new  democracy  in  Ecuador,  and  the 
strong  effort  by  the  Andean  countries 
to  preserve  democracy  in  Bolivia  were 
positive  steps. 

During  1979,  I  met  with  the  Presi- 
dent of  Mexico  twice  to  discuss  the  op- 
portunities and  difficult  issues  before 
our  two  countries.  We  have  taken 
worthwhile  steps,  including  an  agree- 
ment on  natural  gas  and  on  trade. 

On  October  1,  Vice  President  Mon- 
dale  and  many  leaders  from  Latin 
America  traveled  to  Panama  to  cele- 
brate the  coming  into  force  of  the 
Panama  Canal  Treaties.  The  transition 
to  a  new  relationship  and  a  new  sti'uc- 
ture  to  manage  the  Canal  was  smooth 
and  effective  because  of  the  contribu- 
tions and  the  mutual  respect  between 
Panamanians  and  Americans. 

The  Vice  President  also  traveled  to 
Brazil  and  Venezuela.  The  Secretary  of 
State  met  with  leaders  in  Quito  at  the 
inauguration  of  the  new  democratic 
President  of  Ecuador  and  in  La  Paz  at 
the  OAS  General  Assembly.  These 
meetings  have  helped  us  to  develop  fur- 
ther the  close  consultative  ties  which 
are  so  important  to  a  free  and  balanced 
community  of  nations  in  the  hemi- 
sphere. 

Also,  in  1979,  the  United  States 
moved  to  a  much  closer  economic  and 


Department  of  State  Bulletirl 


Special 


political  relationship  with  the  increas- 
ingly significant  Andean  Pact  countries. 
A  memorandum  of  understanding  on 
economic  relations  was  signed  in 
Washington  in  November. 

Central  America  and  the  Carib- 
bean region  are  undergoing  a  period  of 
rapid  social  and  political  change.  There 
is  a  threat  that  intervention  by  Cuba 
may  thwart  the  desire  of  the  people  of 
the  region  for  progress  within  a  demo- 
cratic framework  and  we  have  been 
working  closely  with  the  governments 
in  the  region  to  try  to  aid  in  the  de- 
velopmental process  of  the  region  and 
are  prepared  to  assist  those  threatened 
by  outside  intervention. 

The  Caribbean  Group,  which  is 
coordinated  by  the  World  Bank  and 
which  we  helped  establish,  has  now  be- 
come an  important  factor  for  develop- 
ment in  the  region,  adding  $260  million 
in  concessionary  resources  to  the  re- 
gion. We  have  increased  our  aid  to  the 
Caribbean,  reprogrammed  loans,  and 
are  seeking  prompt  Congi'es.sional  ac- 
tion on  a  supplemental  of  $80  million  for 
Nicuaragua  and  Central  America. 

My  Science  Advisor,  Dr.  Frank 
Press,  led  a  large  delegation  of  scien- 
tists and  educators  to  Barbados,  Peru, 
Venezuela  and  Brazil  to  forge  new  and 
fruitful  ties  between  our  countries 
in  important  areas  of  science  and 
technology. 

THE  INTERNATIONAL  ECONOMY 

A  growing  defense  effort  and  a  vigor- 
ous foreign  policy  rest  upon  a  strong 
economy  here  in  the  United  States. 
And  the  strength  of  our  own  economy 
depends  upon  our  ability  to  lead 
and  compete  in  the  international 
marketplace. 

Energy 

An  essential  lesson  to  be  drawn  from 
Iran  is  that  there  are  compelling 
foreign  policy  as  well  as  domestic  eco- 
nomic reasons  for  lessening  our  de- 
pendence on  foreign  oil. 

In  response  to  a  series  of  United 
States  proposals,  the  industrial  coun- 
tries adopted  in  1979  a  cooperative 
s'nergy  strategy  for  the  1980s.  Its  main 
lements  are  collective  restraint  on  oil 
mports;  intensified  efforts  to  conserve 
)il  and  boost  production  of  conventional 
substitutes  for  oil;  and  collaborative 
esearch,  development  and  commer- 
nalization  of  new  fuel  technologies. 

At  the  Tokyo  Economic  Summit  in 
lune,  the  heads  of  government  of  the. 
even  major  industrial  democracies 
igreed  that  they  must  take  responsi- 


l-ebruary  1980 


bility  foi-  cui'bing  oil  demand.  By  the 
end  of  the  year,  20  industrialized  na- 
tions, members  of  the  International 
Energy  Associati(m,  had  agreed  not 
only  to  enforce  ecjuitably  allocated 
ceilings  on  their  oil  imports,  but  to 
create  a  system  for  quickly  adjusting 
the  ceilings  to  changes  in  world  oil 
supply.  Completi(m  of  the  detailed 
agreements  to  execute  the  global  oil 
demand-allocation  process  is  at  the 
head  of  the  international  energy  agenda 
for  1980. 

At  the  1980  Economic  Summit  in 
Venice,  I  intend  to  propose  further 
joint  action  to  smooth  the  transition 
from  oil  to  more  abundant  fuels  and  to 
slow  the  growth  in  oil  prices. 

In  support  of  the  international  oil 
strategy,  the  Administration  and  the 
United  States  coal  industry  are 
launching  joint  marketing  efforts  to 


provement.  Of  course  the  outcome  de- 
pends in  part  also  upon  responsible 
pricing  behavior  by  OPEC  and  other  oil 
l)roducers. 

We  support  the  efforts  under  way 
to  strengthen  the  international  mone- 
tary system.  I  urge  the  Congress  to 
enact  promptly  legislation  permitting 
the  United  States  to  increase  its  quota 
in  the  International  Monetary  Fund 
(IMF)  as  part  of  the  general  e.xpansion 
of  Fund  resources.  We  welcome  the 
measures  being  taken  by  the  IMF  to 
improve  its  ability  to  promote  sound 
economic  and  exchange  rate  policies 
in  all  member  countries.  We  also  wel- 
come the  study  of  the  possible  estab- 
lishment of  a  "substitution  account"  to 
strengthen  the  international  monetary 
system  by  promoting  the  role  of  the 
Special  Drawing  Right  as  the  principal 
reserve  asset  in  the  system. 


We  have  long  recognized  thai  i)i  an  era  of  interdependence,  our  own 
security  and  prosperity  depend  upon  a  larger  common  effort  ivith  friends 
and  allies  throughout  the  world. 


make  this  country  a  major  exporter  of 
steam  coal.  With  assurance  of  reliable 
United  States  coal  supply  at  competi- 
tive prices,  many  of  the  electric  power 
plants  to  be  built  in  the  1980s  and  1990s 
can  be  coal-fired  rather  than  oil- 
burning.  Coal  exports  will  help  us  pay 
for  our  declining  but  costly  oil  imports. 

A  new  source  of  natural  gas  supply 
for  the  United  States — Mexico — was 
(jpened  through  the  conclusion  of 
government-to-government  negotia- 
tions. Through  close  cooperation  with 
our  northern  neighbor,  Canada,  the 
Administration  cleared  the  way  for  ex- 
panding the  flow  of  Canadian  natural 
gas  to  the  United  States  and  for  private 
development  of  the  Alaskan  gas 
pipeline  across  Canada  to  the  lower  48 
states. 

We  continue  to  believe  that  nuclear 
power  will  play  an  essential  role  in 
meeting  the  energy  needs  of  many  na- 
tions, but  with  effective  safeguards 
against  the  proliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons. 

International  Monetary  Policy 

We  are  moving  forcefully  to  establish 
the  fundamental  economic  conditions 
for  a  strong  dollar.  In  1979  the  balance 
of  payments  was  in  approximate  bal- 
ance for  the  first  time  in  three  years, 
despite  substantially  higher  oil  import 
costs.  Our  anti-inflationary  economic 
policies  and  strong  energy  program 
should  provide  a  basis  for  further  im- 


Trade 

Under  the  direction  of  my  Special 
Trade  Representative,  we  brought  to  a 
successful  conclusion  the  multilateral 
trade  negotiations,  the  most  ambitious 
set  of  negotiations  to  reduce  barriers  to 
international  trade  in  a  decade.  The  re- 
sulting "MTN"  agreements,  covering  a 
broad  spectrum  of  trade  issues,  were 
concluded  and  ratified  bv  overwhelming 
majorities  of  the  Unitecf  States  Con- 
gress. These  binding  commitments, 
signed  by  all  the  major  trading  nations, 
provide  the  framework  for  a  new  era  in 
international  trading  relations  with 
them  and  with  the  developing  nations. 
This  makes  clear  my  resolve  and  that  of 
the  American  people  to  resist  the  dan- 
gers of  protectionism. 

The  reorganization  of  the  Federal 
government  trade  agencies  which  I  di- 
rected will  assure  more  effective  and 
prompt  governmental  action  to  exploit 
the  export  opportunities  afforded  by 
the  MTN.  The  plan,  approved  by  Con- 
gress this  fall,  establishes  a  strong,  au- 
thoritative voice  in  the  Executive  Of- 
fice of  the  President  to  provide  coher- 
ence and  leadership  to  United  States 
trade  policy,  negotiations,  and  the  im- 
plementation of  the  MTN  trade  codes. 
The  reorganization  establishes  the  Of- 
fice of  the  U.S.  Trade  Representative 
and  strengthens  the  Commerce  De- 
partment. 


Special 


Sugar 

In  1979,  Congress  ratified  the  Interna- 
tional Sugar  Agreement,  thus  fulfilling 
a  major  commitment  of  this  Adminis- 
tration. The  agreement  is  an  important 
element  in  our  international  commodity 
policy  with  far-reaching  implications  for 
our  relations  with  developing  countries, 
particularly  sugar  producers  in  Latin 
America.  This  agreement  and  other 
measures  my  Administration  has  taken 
already  have  helped  to  stabilize  sugar 
prices  and  bring  high  domestic  prices 
into  line  with  those  prevailing  in  the 
world  marketplace.  Producers  and  con- 
sumers alike  will  benefit  from  a  more 
stable  market  for  this  essential  com- 
modity. We  need  prompt  enactment  of 
implementing  legislation  for  this 
agreement. 

Tin 

At  year's  end.  Congress  approved 
stockpile  disposal  legislation  which  will 
permit  the  General  Services  Adminis- 
tration to  sell  30,000  metric  tons  of  tin 
from  our  strategic  stockpile  and  con- 
tribute up  to  5,000  metric  tons  to  the 
International  Tin  Organization's  (ITO) 
buffer  stock.  This  fulfills  a  United 
States  pledge  made  during  the  Confer- 
ence on  International  Economic  Coop- 
eration and  represents  a  major  step 
forward  in  our  relations  with  producing 
countries  in  the  developing  world.  We 
will  consult  with  other  members  of  the 
ITO  to  ensure  that  our  tin  disposals  do 
not  disrupt  markets  and  take  into  ac- 
count the  needs  of  both  producers  and 
consumers. 

Common  Fund 

The  United  States  joined  members  of 
the  United  Nations  Conference  on 
Trade  and  Development,  both  de- 
veloped and  developing  nations,  in 
negotiating  an  agreement  on  the 
framework  of  a  Common  Fund  to  help 
international  commodity  agreements 
stabilize  the  prices  of  raw  materials. 
Negotiations  are  now  underway  on  the 
final  articles  of  agreement  of  the  Fund. 
The  United  States  also  participated 
in  successful  negotiations  of  an  interna- 
tional rubber  agreement. 

Economic  Cooperation  With 
Developing  Nations 

Our  relations  with  the  developing  na- 
tions are  of  central  importance  to  the 
United  States.  The  fabric  of  our  rela- 
tions with  these  countries  has  both 
political  and  economic  dimensions,  as 
we  witnessed  in  recent  weeks  when  na- 


N 


tions  of  the  Third  World  took  the  lead 
in  condemning  the  Soviet  invasion  of 
Afghanistan.  Our  ability  to  work  to- 
gether with  developing  nations  toward 
goals  we  have  in  common — their  politi- 
cal independence,  the  resolution  of  re- 
gional tensions,  and  our  growing  ties  of 
trade  for  example — require  us  to  main- 
tain the  policy  of  active  engagement 
with  the  developing  world  that  we  have 
pursued  over  the  past  three  years. 

The  foreign  assistance  legislation 
which  I  will  be  submitting  to  you  for 
FY  81  provides  the  authority  and  the 
funds  to  carry  on  a  cooperative  re- 
lationship with  a  large  number  of  de- 
veloping nations.  Prompt  Congressional 
action  on  this  legislation  is  essential  in 
order  to  meet  our  treaty  and  base 
rights  agreements,  continue  our  peace 
efforts  in  the  Middle  East,  provide  eco- 
nomic and  development  support  to 
countries  in  need,  promote  progress  on 
North-South  issues,  protect  Western 
interests,  and  counter  Soviet  influence. 

We  will  also  be  asking  Congress  to 
enable  us  to  honor  our  international 
agreements  for  multilateral  assistance 
by  authorizing  and  appropriating  funds 
for  the  International  Financial  Institu- 
tions. 

Finally,  the  Administration  and  the 
Congress  agreed  in  1979  on  fundamen- 
tal changes  in  the  way  the  United 
States  government  is  organized  to  con- 
duct economic  and  technical  relations 
v\ith  the  developing  nations.  I  sub- 
mitted and  the  Congress  approved  a 
plan  to  consolidate  in  a  small  policy- 
eoordmation  body,  the  International 
Development  Cooperation  Agency 
(IDC A),  responsibility  for  direct 
United  States  development  assistance, 
for  guidance  to  United  States  represen- 
tatives in  multilateral  development 
agencies,  and  for  presenting  our  long- 
term  development  interests  in  Federal 
government  policy  bodies  dealing  with 
trade  and  other  economic  relations  with 
developing  nations.  I  also  submitted, 
and  the  House  approved  in  the  1979 
session  of  Congress,  a  plan  to  establish 
the  Institute  for  Scientific  and  Techno- 
logical Cooperation  (ISTC),  a  con- 
stituent element  of  the  IDCA  group  of 
agencies.  Once  approved,  the  ISTC  will 
carry  out  research  as  well  as  support 
research  by  foreign  scientists  on  tech- 
nological means  of  reducing  poverty  in 
developing  nations. 

Food — The  War  on  Hunger 

One  of  the  main  economic  problems 
facing  developing  countries  is  lagging 
food  production.  We  must  help  these 
countries  meet  this  problem — not  only 
so  that  their  peoples  will  be  free  from 


the  threat  of  continuing  hunger,  but 
also  so  that  their  societies  will  be 
strong  enough  to  resist  external  pres- 
sure. I  have  directed  that  United 
States  bilateral  and  multilateral  aid  be 
geared  increasingly  to  this  goal,  as  rec- 
ommended by  our  Hunger  Commission, 
chaired  by  Sol  Linowitz;  we  are  urging 
other  donor  countries  to  join  in  more 
effective  efforts  to  this  end. 

Good  progress  has  been  made  since 
the  Tokyo  Economic  Summit  called  for 
increased  effort  on  this  front.  The 
World  Bank  is  giving  this  problem  top 
priority,  as  are  some  other  donor  coun- 
tries. The  resources  of  the  consultative 
Group  on  International  Agricultural 
Research  will  be  doubled  over  a  five- 
year  period.  The  work  of  our  own  Insti- 
tute of  Scientific  and  Technological 
Cooperation  will  further  strengthen  the 
search  for  relevant  new  agricultural 
technologies. 

The  goal  of  freeing  the  world  from 
hunger  by  the  year  2000  should  com- 
mand the  full  support  of  all  countries. 

THE  HUMAN  DIMENSION  OF 
FOREIGN  POLICY 

Human  Rights 

The  ultimate  aim  of  our  foreign  policy 
must  be  to  preserve  freedom  for  our- 
selves and  to  expand  freedom  for  others. 
This  is  a  matter  both  of  national  princi- 
ple and  of  national  interest.  For  we  be- 
lieve that  free  and  open  societies  are 
not  only  better  able  to  meet  the  rising 
expectations  of  their  people;  they  are 
also  better  able  to  accommodate  often 
conflicting  internal  pressures  before 
popular  frustrations  explode  in  violent 
and  radical  directions. 

We  do  not  seek  to  impose  our  sys- 
tem or  institutions  on  others.  Rather, 
we  seek  to  support,  in  practical  and 
concrete  ways,  the  efforts  of  other  na- 
tions to  build  their  own  institutions  in 
ways  that  will  meet  the  irrepressible 
human  drive  for  freedom  and  justice. 

Human  rights  policy  commands  the 
strong  support  of  our  citizens,  and  of 
the  Congress.  The  world  climate 
increasingly  favors  human  rights 
progress. 

Despite  new  turbulence  and  con- 
flict, the  past  year  featured  some  en- 
couraging positive  developments.  We 
cannot  and  should  not  claim  credit  for 
them.  But  it  is  clear  that  we  are  part  of 
a  growing  movement.  During  1979,  we 
saw : 

•  The  further  strengthening  of 
democratic  practices  in  Spain  and  Por- 
tugal, with  free  elections  in  both  coun- 
tries; 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Special 


•  The  disappearance  of  several  of 
the  world's  most  repressive  regimes; 

•  The  freeing  of  political  prisoners 
in  Asia,  Africa,  and  Latin  America; 

•  A  return  to  democratic  rule  in 
several  Latin  American  countries  and 
widespread  progress  in  reducing  human 
rights  violations  in  the  region; 

•  The  growing  strength  of  interna- 
tional human  rights  institutions.  The 
Inter-American  Court  of  Human  Rights 
held  its  first  meeting.  Preparations 
began  for  another  conference  to  review- 
compliance  with  the  Helsinki  accords, 
to  be  held  in  Madrid  this  November. 
The  OAU  took  long  strides  toward 
establishing  a  human  rights  commission 
for  Africa.  UN  bodies  became  increas- 
ingly active  in  their  human  rights 
efforts. 

The  United  States  is  still  not  a 
party  to  the  key  human  rights  treaties 
that  establish  world  standards  and  im- 
plementing machinery.  In  early  1978,  I 
sent  for  Senate  approval  four  such 
treaties,  the  American  Convention  on 
Human  Rights,  the  Convention  on  Ra- 
cial Discrimination,  and  the  UN  Cov- 
enants on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  and 
on  Economic  and  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights.  Hearings  were  held  in  1979.  No 
single  action  by  this  country  would  do 
more  to  advance  the  cause  of  human 
rights  than  Senate  approval  of  these  in- 
struments and  a  fifth  human  rights 
treaty  sent  to  Congress  previously,  the 
Genocide  Convention.  I  urge  the  ear- 
liest possible  Senate  action. 


(Humanitarian  Aid 

The  mass  exodus  of  refugees  from 
Vietnam  reached  a  crescendo  in 
summer  1979  with  over  65,000  people  a 
month  fleeing  repression  and  economic 
privation.  Most  fled  by  boat,  and  many 
vvere  lost  at  sea.  In  July,  at  a  special 
UN  meeting  on  refugees.  Vice  Presi- 
dent Mondale  presented  a  major  United 
States  program  to  rescue  and  help 
support  and  resettle  the  new  refugee 
jopulation.  I  doubled  to  14,000  a  month 
;he  number  of  Indochinese  refugees  the 
United  States,  in  accord  with  our  finest 
.raditions.  would  absorb  over  the  year 
(head. 

The  Vietnamese  invasion  of  Kam- 
puchea in  late  1978  gravely  jeopardized 
),he  supply  of  food  for  the  already  deci- 
nated  and  brutalized  Khmer  people.  In 
Dctober,  I  announced  that  the  United 
states  would  pay  one-third  of  the  costs 
)f  the  international  relief  program 
nounted  jointly  by  UNICEF  and  the 
nternational  Committee  of  the  Red 


Cross.  Leaders  of  thirty-five  church 
and  voluntary  agencies,  with  White 
House  encouragement,  are  engaged  in 
their  own  large  fund-raising  program 
for  refugees. 

In  early  November,  Mrs.  Carter 
vi.sited  refugees  on  the  Thai-Cambodian 
border  and  reported  back  to  me,  the 
United  States  voluntary  agencies,  and 
the  American  people.  In  response,  our 
efforts  to  avert  a  mass  famine  were 
accelerated. 

The  obstacles  remain  daunting — 
continued  warfare  and  aggression  by 
Vietnam,  non-distribution  by  the 
Phnom  Penh  authorities  of  much  of  the 
UNICEF-ICRC  aid,  movement  of  up  to 
900,000  hungry  Khmer  to  and  across 
the  Thai  border  where  they  can  be  fed 
and  helped. 

But  Americans  will  continue  their 
efforts  both  public  and  private  to  avert 
the  famine  that  looms.  New  help  for  our 
efforts  will  come  from  the  National 
Committee  formed  in  early  1980  by 
leading  citizens  to  help  in  mobilizing 
and  supporting  the  sustained  effort  es- 
sential to  achieve  this  humanitarian 
goal. 


THE  CONTROL  OF  NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS 

Together  with  our  friends  and  allies,  we 
are  striving  to  build  a  world  in  which 
peoples  with  diverse  interests  can  live 
freely  and  prosper.  But  all  that  human- 
kind has  achieved  to  date,  all  that  we 
are  seeking  to  accomplish,  and  human 
existence  itself  can  be  undone  in  an 
instant — in  the  catastrophe  of  a  nuclear 
war. 

Thus  one  of  the  central  objectives 
of  my  Administration  has  been  to  con- 
trol the  proliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons  to  those  nations  which  do  not 
have  them,  and  their  further  develop- 
ment by  the  existing  nuclear  powers — 
notably  the  Soviet  Union  and  the 
United  States. 

Non-Proliferation 

I  entered  office  committed  to  assert 
American  leadership  in  stemming  the 
proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons — 
which  could  create  fundamental  new  in- 
stabilities in  critical  regions  of  the 
world,  and  threaten  the  security  of  the 


An  essential  lesson  to  be  drawn  from  Iran  is  that  there  are  compelling 
foreign  policy  as  well  as  domestic  economic  reasons  for  lessening  our 
dependence  on  foreign  oil. 


As  the  year  began,  we  are  also  con- 
sidering new  means  of  helping,  through 
our  contribution  to  the  UN  High  Com- 
missioner for  Refugees  and  in  other 
ways,  the  mounting  Afghan  refugee 
population  in  Pakistan  and  other  des- 
perate refugee  situations  such  as 
Somalia. 

It  cannot  be  ignored  that  the  de- 
structive and  aggressive  policies  of  the 
Soviet  Union  have  added  immeasurably 
to  the  suffering  in  these  three  tragic 
situations. 

I  have  asked  the  heads  of  the  ap- 
propriate departments  of  the  Executive 
Branch  to  play  an  active  role  in  the 
Select  Commission  on  Immigration  and 
Refugee  Policy  to  formulate  a  new  ap- 
proach to  deal  with  sensitivity  with  the 
difficult  subject  of  people  arriving  on 
our  shores  from  Latin  America. 

My  meeting  with  Pope  John  Paul  II 
during  his  historic  and  unprecedented 
visit  to  the  United  States  helped  raise 
the  world's  consciousness  in  connection 
with  pressing  problems  of  famine, 
homelessness,  and  human  rights.  Our 
talks  spurred  positive  action  in  many  of 
these  areas,  notably  Indochina,  and  set 
the  stage  for  further  action  in  1980. 


United  States.  This  should  not  and  can- 
not be  done  unilaterally.  The  coopera- 
tion of  other  suppliers  of  nuclear  tech- 
nology and  materials  is  needed.  This 
issue  must  not  become  a  North-South 
confrontation. 

We  have  been  proceeding  on  a 
number  of  fronts: 

•  We  have  been  seeking  to  encour- 
age nations  to  accede  to  the  Non- 
Proliferation  Treaty,  or  to  accept  full- 
scope  international  safeguards.  The 
Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Act  calls  for 
such  safeguards  in  connection  with 
United  States  nuclear  exports. 

•  The  International  Nuclear  Fuel 
Cycle  Evaluation  (INFCE)  has  demon- 
strated that  suppliers  and  recipients 
can  work  together.  Its  results  will  be 
published  in  a  month.  While  differences 
remain,  it  will  provide  a  broader  inter- 
national basis  for  national  decisions 
which  must  balance  energy  needs  with 
non-proliferation  concerns. 

•  Finally,  we  are  working  to  en- 
courage regional  cooperation  and  re- 
straint. Protocol  I  of  the  Treaty  of 
Tlatelolco  which  will  contribute  to  the 
lessening  of  nuclear  dangers  for  our 


■ebruary  1980 


Special 


Latin  American  neighbors  has  not  yet 
been  ratified  by  the  United  States 
Senate. 

Working  together  with  Congress.  I 
remain  committed  to  vigorous  pursuit 
(tf  our  non-proliferation  objectives. 

Limitations  on  Strategic  Arms 

The  most  prominent  of  our  nuclear 
arms  control  efforts  is,  of  course, 
SALT  IL 

The  signing  of  the  Treaty  brought 
to  an  end  painstaking  negotiations  car- 
ried out  under  three  administrations  of 
both  parties. 

•  SALT  II  is  in  our  mutual  inter- 
est; it  is  neither  an  American  favor  to 
the  Soviet  Union  nor  a  Soviet  favor  to 
the  United  States. 

•  Ratification  of  the  SALT  II 
Treaty  \v(juld  represent  a  major  step 
forward  in  restraining  the  continued 
growth  of  Soviet  strategic  forces. 

Because  SALT  II  reduces 
superpower  competition  in  its  most 
dangerous  manifestation,  this  Treaty  is 
the  single  most  important  bilateral  ac- 
cord of  the  decade: 

•  SALT  II  will  permit  us  better  to 
maintain  strategic  equivalence  in  nu- 


clear weapons  and  devote  our  defense 
increases  more  heavily  to  our  highest 
priority  needs  for  conventional  force 
improvements; 

•  Without  it,  the  Soviets  can  add 
more  power  to  their  forces  and  better 
conceal  from  us  what  they  are  doing; 

•  Without  SALT  II,  and  the  begin- 
ning of  SALT  III,  deeper  cuts  would 
take  many  more  years  to  achieve; 

•  Without  SALT  II,  our  efforts  to 
control  the  proliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons  will  be  more  difficult. 

I  believe  that  the  Senate  will  ratify 
SALT  II  because  the  Treaty  is,  in  its 
simplest  terms,  in  the  interest  of  our 
Nation's  security. 

But  I  do  not  believe  it  advisable  at 
this  time  to  bring  up  the  Treaty  for 
consideration  on  the  Senate  floor.  The 
Congress  and  the  E.xecutive  Branch 
must  first  deal  with  the  pressing  mat- 
ters arising  from  the  Soviet  invasion  of 
Afghanistan. 


CONCLUSION 

As  we  enter  the  decade  of  the  1980s,  we 
face  challenges  both  at  home  and 
abroad  which  will  test  our  qualities  as  a 


people — our  toughness  and  willingness 
to  sacrifice  for  larger  goals,  our  courage 
and  our  vision. 

For  this  Nation  to  remain  secure, 
for  this  country  to  prosper,  we  must 
rise  above  narrow  interests.  The  dan- 
gers of  disunity  are  self-evident  in  a 
world  of  major  power  confrontation. 
The  rewards  of  a  new  national  consen- 
sus and  sense  of  purpose  are  eciually 
clear. 

We  have  new  support  in  the  world 
for  our  purposes  of  national  independ- 
ence and  individual  human  dignity.  We 
have  a  new  will  at  home  to  do  what  is 
rec|uired  to  keep  us  the  strongest  na- 
tion on  earth. 

We  must  move  together  into  this 
decade  with  the  strength  which  comes 
from  realization  of  the  dangers  before 
us  and  from  the  confidence  that  to- 
gether we  can  overcome  them. 

.Jimmy  Carter  ■ 


'Te.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Jan.  28,  1980. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Human  Rights 


and  the  families  and  friends  of  victims 
of  human  rights  abuses  including  the 
disappeared.  Often  as  important,  but 
sometimes  more  difficult  to  manage, 
are  contacts  with  government  agencies 
responsible  for  the  judicial  system,  the 
management  of  detention  centers,  and 
the  general  administration  of  justice. 

In  countries  where  disappearances 
have  been  commonplace,  we  have  regis- 
tered our  disapproval  of  this  phenome- 
non in  the  strongest  possible  terms, 
emphasizing  as  well  the  damage  it  does 
to  our  bilateral  relationship  and  the 
negative  effects  it  may  have  on  all  as- 
pects of  our  relationship  including  the 
assistance  we  provide. 

We  talk  on  two  levels;  one  on  the 
principles  concerned  the  problem  itself, 
clearly  and  specifically,  and  we  make 
formal  and  informal  representations 
about  the  disappeared  on  our  own  ini- 
tiative and  at  the  behest  of  the  families 
and  friends  of  the  disappeared.  Mem- 
bers of  the  Congress,  private  citizens, 
and  human  rights  organizations.  We 
present  representation  lists  containing 
the  names  of  the  disappeared. 

The  sad  reality  is  that  even  when  a 
■  repressive  government  reaches  a  stage 
I  of  willingness  to  look  for  certain  of  the 
I  disappeared,  or  when  an  individual  offi- 
I  cial  is  disposed  to  be  helpful  in  such  a 
I  search,  it  is  often  unable  to  determine 
I  the  whereabouts  of  an  individual  v\  ho 
i  may  have  been  picked  up  by  security 
agencies  operating  without  the  knov\l- 
edge  of  other  agencies  or  operatives 
acting  independently  without  the 
knowledge  of  their  superiors. 

In  some  instances,  during  the  early 
stages,  our  representations  are  dispar- 
aged. We  are  told  that  the  disappear- 
ances, while  unfortunate,  ai'e  the  una- 
voidable byproduct  of  the  "wai-"  against 
subversion  or  terrorism.  We  are  asked 
why  we  are  interested  at  all  since  the 
disappeared  are  not  U.S.  citizens  but 
terrorists  and  criminals.  It  is  suggested 
to  us.  and  not  obliquely,  that  we  have 
no  business  meddling  in  another  na- 
tion's internal  affairs.  As  we  enter  the 
third  year  of  this  policy,  however, 
these  efforts  to  escape  discussion  of  the 
issue  have  by  and  large  been  aban- 
doned. 

Needless  to  say,  we  reject 
categorically  such  self-serving  and  fun- 
idamentally  erroneous  distortions  of  the 
linternational  human  I'ights  obligations 
of  all  countries.  We  are  prepared  to 
demonstrate,  and  indeed  have  demon- 
strated, our  concern  on  this  issue  in  a 
tangible  way  using  the  variety  of 


foreign  policy  instruments  provided  by 
law  and  policy  to  the  conduct  of  our 
foreign  affairs. 

U.S.  Support  for  U.N. 
Resolution  .33/17.3 

There  is  much  the  United  States  can 
and  does  do  bilaterally  in  our  efforts  to 
attenuate  and  eventually  eliminate  this 
problem.  Our  efforts  are  enhanced 
when  other  states  join  in  our  represen- 
tations and  express  concerns  similar  to 
our  own. 

At  times  world  public  opinion  may 
seem  ephemeral,  but  no  country — no 
matter  how  unenlightened  or  repres- 
sive its  regime — enjoys  being  the 
target  of  international  scorn  and  ob- 
loquy. In  nations  where  disappearances 
occur,  we  have  joined  with  like-minded 
friends  and  allies  to  urge  an  end  to  this 
dreadful  human  rights  violation.  We 
work  closely  with  other  free  nations  to 
foster  our  international  human  rights 
objectives.  There  still  is  no  more  ap- 
propriate forum  for  such  cooperation 
than  the  United  Nations. 

On  December  20,  1978,  the  U.N. 
General  Assembly  adopted  Resolution 
33/173.  on  disappeared  persons.  Its 
genesis  can  be  found  in  a  growing 
awareness  that  in  various  parts  of  the 
world,  enforced  or  involuntary  disap- 
pearances of  persons,  as  a  result  of  ex- 
cesses by  law  enforcement  or  security 
authorities,  unhappily  had  become  a 
common  phencjmenon.  The  resolution 
called  upon  governments  to  search  for 
missing  persons,  hold  law  enforcement 
and  security  authorities  fully  accounta- 
ble for  disappearances,  and  to  cooper- 
ate with  other  governments  in  locating 
or  accounting  for  persons  who  disap- 
pear. The  resolution  also  requested  the 
U.N.  Human  Rights  Commission  to 
consider  the  ([uestion  of  the  disap- 
peared. It  ui'ged  the  U.N.  Secretary 
General  to  use  his  good  offices  in  disap- 
pearance cases  and  to  draw  the  con- 
cerns expressed  in  the  resolution  to  the 
attention  of  governments  with  a  view 
toward  disinterested  humanitarian  ac- 
tion. 

The  United  States  strongly 
supported  this  resolution,  and  is  work- 
ing to  insure  that  it  is  implemented  in 
the  spirit  which  animated  its  adoption. 
In  late  August  of  1979  in  Geneva,  the 
Subcommission  on  the  Prevention  of 
Discrimination  and  Protection  of 
Minorities  discussed  the  human  rights 
of  detained  persons  with  special  em- 
phasis on  the  disappeared.  The  outcome 
of  this  discussion  was  a  resolution 
adopted  by  the  subcommission  on  Sep- 
tember 5. 


The  subcommission  considers  that 
the  resolution  in  question  places  not 
merely  a  legal  but  also  a  moral  obliga- 
tion, based  on  the  principles  of  elemen- 
tary humanity  which  inspire  the  inter- 
national community  on  all  those  par- 
ticipating in  U.N.  activities.  Nations 
are  asked  to  take  account  at  every  ap- 
propriate opportunity  of  disappear- 
ances brought  to  their  knowledge  and 
to  combine  their  efforts  to  try  to  locate 
the  missing  and  dissappeared  persons. 

The  subcommission  also  proposes 
for  Human  Rights  Commission  approval 
the  creation  of  a  group  of  experts  who 
would  be  given  all  the  information 
available  for  locating  disappeared  and 
missing  persons  in  various  regions  of 
the  world  and  who  would  make  neces- 
sary contacts  with  government  and 
families  concerned. 

The  subcommission  also  transmit- 
ted to  the  U.N.  Secretary  General  sev- 
eral lists  of  missing  persons  with  a  view 
toward  his  exercising  the  good  offices 
role  urged  in  the  General  Assembly 
resolution  of  last  December. 

Finally,  the  subcommission 
suggests  that  if  the  disappearance 
phenomenon  continues,  its  extreme 
gravity  would  justify  some  form  of 
emergency  remedy  based  on  the  notion 
(jf  habeas  cDrpus  designed  to  induce 
governments  to  search  for  the  disap- 
peared. 

What  is  striking  about  the 
subccimmission's  actions  is  that  we  are 
witnessing  the  beginning  of  the  forging 
of  machinery  and  procedures  within  the 
U.N.  system  to  handle  the  disappear- 
ance phenomenon.  The  U.N.  Human 
Rights  Commission  will  consider  the 
subcommission's  recommendations  at 
its  meeting  in  Geneva  in  early  1980.  I 
promise  you  the  United  States  will  do 
all  it  can  to  insure  constructive  action 
on  the  subcommission's  proposals. 

Let  me  conclude  by  reiterating  my 
appreciation  for  the  opportunity  to  ap- 
pear before  your  committee,  my  admi- 
ration for  the  tremendous  international 
public  service  this  forum  provides,  and 
my  assurances  that  this  Administration 
remains  totally  committed  to  finding 
ways  to  mitigate  and  eliminate  the  e- 
gregious  violation  of  human  rights  that 
"disappearances"  represent.    ■ 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  bv  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  tne  Superintendent 
of  Documents.  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office.  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


-ebruary  1980 


39 


MIDDLE  EAST 


World  Court  Rules  on  American  Hostages 


Following  are  introductory  remarks  by 
the  President  of  the  Inter-national  Coiirt 
of  Justice,  Sir  Humphrey  Waldock.  and 
the  oral  argument  to  the  Court  by  the 
United  States,  on  December  10,  1979,  and 
the  order  of  interim  measures  of  protec- 
tion issued  by  the  Court  on  December  15, 
1979,  in  the  case  United  States  Diplo- 
matic and  Consular  Staff  in  Tehran. 

The  oral  argument  ivas  presented  to 
the  Court  at  The  Hague  by  U.S.  Attorney 
General  Benjamin  R.  Civiletti  and  the 
Legal  Adviser  of  the  Department  of  State, 
Roberts  B.  Owen.  The  U.S.  Government 
was  represented  by  Roberts  B.  Owen,  as 
Agent;  Benjamin  R.  Civiletti  and 
Stephen  M.  Schwebel,  Deputy  Legal  Ad- 
viser of  the  State  Department,  as  Coun- 
sel; and  David  H.  Small,  Assistant  Legal 
Adviser  for  Near  Eastern  and  South 
Asian  Affairs  of  the  State  Department, 
as  Adviser.  Mr.  Civiletti  was  assisted  by 
Jack  Goldklang,  Attorney- Adviser,  Office 
of  the  Legal  Couyisel  of  the  Justice  De- 
partment, and  by  Robert  Smith,  Special 
Assistant  to  the  Attorney  General. 

Texts  (if  the  U.S.  application  tn  ihv 
Court  instituting  proceedings  against 
Iran,  its  rviiuist  for  interim  mcasuns 
iif  priitvvtion .  (1)1(1  a  U  ttcr  from  Sccrc- 
tartj  of  State  Vance  to  the  President  of 
the  Court  were  printed  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  Bulletin  of  January  1980, 
p.  .i7. 

PRESIDENT  WALDOCK 

The  Court  meets  to  consider  the  request 
for  the  indication  of  provisional  measures, 
under  Aiticle  41  of  the  Statute  of  the 
Court,  and  Articles  73  and  74  of  the 
Rules  of  Court,  made  by  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  of  America,  in  the 
case  concerning  United  States  Diplo- 
matic and  Consular  Staff  in  Tehran 
brought  by  the  United  States  of  America 
against  Iran. 

The  case  was  brought  before  the 
Court  by  an  application  filed  in  the  Regis- 
try of  the  Court  on  29  November  1979.  In 
that  application  the  U.S.  Government 
claims  to  found  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Court  on  the  Vienna  Convention  on  Dip- 
lomatic Relations  of  1961  and  Article  I  of 
the  Optional  Protocol  thereto  concerning 
the  compulsory  settlement  of  disputes; 
the  Vienna  Convention  on  Consular  Rela- 
tions of  196.3  and  Article  I  of  the  Optional 
Protocol  thereto  concerning  the  compul- 
sory settlement  of  disputes;  Article  XXI, 
paragraph  2,  of  a  Treaty  of  Amity,  Eco- 


40 


nomic  Relations,  and  Consular  Rights  of 
1955  between  the  United  States  of 
America  and  Iran;  and  Article  13,  para- 
gi'aph  1,  of  the  Convention  of  1973  on  the 
Prevention  and  Punishment  of  Crimes 
against  Internationally  Protected  Per- 
sons, Including  Diplomatic  Agents. 

The  United  States  then  alleges  a 
sequence  of  events  beginning  on  4 
November  1979  in  and  around  the  U.S. 
Embassy  in  Tehran,  involving  invasion  of 
the  Embassy  premises  and  the  seizure 
and  detention  of  U.S.  diplomatic  and  con- 
sular staff.  On  the  basis  of  these  allega- 
tions, it  formulates  a  number  of  legal 
claims  and  asks  the  Court  to  adjudge  and 
declare  that  the  Government  of  Iran,  in 
tolerating,  encouraging,  and  failing  to 
prevent  and  punish  the  conduct  described 
in  the  application,  violated  its  interna- 
tional legal  obligations  to  the  United 
States  under  the  provisions  of  a  number 
of  international  treaties  and  conventions; 
that  the  Government  of  Iran  is  under  a 
particular  obhgation  immediately  to 
secure  the  release  of  all  U.S.  nationals 
currently  being  detained  and  to  assure 
that  they  are  allowed  to  leave  Iran  safely; 
that  the  Government  of  Iran  should  pay 
reparation  for  the  alleged  violations  of 
Iran's  international  legal  obligations;  and 
that  the  Government  of  Iran  should  sub- 
mit to  its  competent  authorities  for  the 
purpose  of  prosecution  the  persons  re- 
sponsible for  the  crimes  committed 
against  the  premises  and  staff  of  the  U.S. 
Embassy  and  Consulates. 

On  29  November  1979,  the  day  on 
which  the  application  itself  was  filed,  the 
United  States  of  America  submitted  the 
present  request  for  the  indication  of  pro- 
visional measures.  I  now  ask  the  Regis- 
trar to  read  from  that  request  the  state- 
ment of  the  measures  which  the  United 
States  asks  the  Court  to  indicate. 

THE  REGISTRAR 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  requests  that  pending  final 
judgment  in  this  suit  the  Court  indicate 
forthwith  the  following: 

(i)  that  the  Government  of  Iran  immedi- 
ately release  all  hostages  of  United  States  na- 
tionality and  facilitate  the  prompt  and  safe  de- 
parture from  Iran  of  these  persons  and  all 
other  United  States  officials  in  dignified  and 
humane  circumstances; 

(ii)  that  the  Government  of  Iran  immedi- 
ately clear  the  premises  of  the  United  States 
Embassy,  Chancery  and  Consulate  of  all  per- 
sons whose  presence  is  not  authorized  by  the 


United  States  Charge  d' Affaires  in  Iran,  and 
restore  the  premises  to  United  States  control; 

(iii)  that  the  Government  of  Iran  ensure 
that  all  persons  attached  to  the  United  States 
Embassy  and  Consulate  should  be  accorded, 
and  protected  in,  full  freedom  within  the  Em- 
bassy and  Chancery  premises,  and  the  free- 
dom of  movement  within  Iran  necessary  to 
carry  out  their  diplomatic  and  consular 
functions; 

(iv)  that  the  Government  of  Iran  not  place 
on  trial  any  person  attached  to  the  Embassy 
and  Consulate  of  the  United  States  and  refrain 
from  any  action  to  implement  any  such  trial; 

(v)  that  the  Government  of  Iran  ensure 
that  no  action  is  taken  which  might  prejudice 
the  rights  of  the  United  States  in  respect  of 
the  carrying  out  of  any  decision  which  the 
Court  may  render  on  the  merits,  and  in  par- 
ticular neither  take  nor  permit  action  that 
would  threaten  the  lives,  safety,  or  well-being 
of  the  hostages. 


PRESIDENT  WALDOCK 

The  Government  of  Iran  has  not  ap- 
pointed an  Agent.  On  the  other  hand,  by 
a  letter  telegraphed  to  the  President  and 
received  in  the  Registry  in  the  late  eve- 
ning of  yesterday,  9  December  1979,  the 
Government  of  Iran  has  informed  the 
Court  of  its  view  that  on  various  grounds 
the  Court  cannot  and  should  not  take 
cognizance  of  the  case  submitted  to  it  by 
the  U.S.  Government,  or  indicate  the 
provisional  measures  formulated  in  the 
Request.  A  copy  of  that  letter  was  com- 
municated immediately  to  the  Agent  of 
the  United  States  of  America.  I  shall 
therefore  ask  the  Registrar  now  to  read 
the  text  of  that  letter. 


THE  REGISTRAR 

[ Translat  ion  fro m  French  ] 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  receipt  of 
the  telegrams  concerning  the  meeting  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  on  10  December 
1979,  at  the  request  of  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  and  to  submit  to 
you  below  the  position  of  the  Government  of 
the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  in  this  respect. 

1.  First  of  all,  the  Government  of  the  Is- 
lamic Republic  of  Iran  wishes  to  express  its 
respect  for  the  International  Court  of  Justice, 
and  for  its  distinguished  members,  for  what 
they  have  achieved  in  the  quest  for  just  and 
equitable  solutions  to  legal  conflicts  between 
States.  However,  the  Government  of  the  Is- 
lamic Republic  of  Iran  considers  that  the  Court 
cannot  and  should  not  take  cognizance  of  the 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Middle  East 


case  which  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  of  America  has  submitted  to  it,  and  in 
a  most  significant  fashion,  a  case  confined  to 
what  is  called  the  question  of  the  "hostages  of 
the  American  Embassy  in  Tehran". 

2.  For  this  question  only  represents  a 
marginal  and  secondary  aspect  of  an  overall 
problem,  one  such  that  it  cannot  be  studied 
separately,  and  which  involves,  inter  alia, 
more  than  25  years  of  continual  interference 
by  the  United  States  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
Iran,  the  shameless  exploitation  of  our  coun- 
try, and  numerous  crimes  perpetrated  against 
the  Iranian  people,  contrary  to  and  in  conflict 
with  all  international  and  humanitarian  norms. 

3.  The  problem  involved  in  the  conflict  be- 
tween Iran  and  the  United  States  is  thus  not 
one  of  the  interpretation  and  the  application  of 
the  treaties  upon  which  the  American  Applica- 
tion is  based,  but  results  from  an  overall  situa- 
tion containing  much  more  fundamental  and 
more  comple.x  elements.  Consequently,  the 
Court  cannot  examine  the  American 
Application  divorced  from  its  proper  context, 
namely  the  whole  political  dossier  of  the  rela- 
tions between  Iran  and  the  United  States  over 
the  last  25  years.  This  dossier  includes,  inter 
alia ,  all  the  crimes  perpetrated  in  Iran  by  the 
American  Government,  in  particular  the  coup 
d'etat  of  1953  stirred  up  and  carried  out  by  the 
CIA,  the  overthrow  of  the  lawful  national  gov- 
ernment of  Dr.  Mossadegh,  the  restoration  of 
the  Shah  and  of  his  regime  which  was  under 
the  control  of  American  interests,  and  all  the 
social,  economic,  cultural,  and  political  conse- 
quences of  the  direct  interventions  in  our 
internal  affairs,  as  well  as  grave,  flagrant  and 
continuous  violations  of  all  international 
norms,  committed  by  the  United  States  in 
Iran. 

4.  With  regard  to  the  request  for  provi- 
sional measures,  as  formulated  by  the  United 
States,  it  in  fact  implies  that  the  Court  should 
have  passed  judgment  on  the  actual  substance 
of  the  case  submitted  to  it,  which  the  Court 
cannot  do  without  breach  of  the  norms  govern- 
ing its  jurisdiction.  Furthermore,  since  pro- 
visional measures  are  by  definition  intended  to 
protect  the  interests  of  the  parties,  they  can- 
not be  unilateral,  as  they  are  in  the  request 
submitted  by  the  American  Government. 

In  conclusion,  the  Government  of  the 
Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  respectfully  draws  the 
attention  of  the  Court  to  the  deep-rootedness 
and  the  essential  character  of  the  Islamic  revo- 
lution of  Iran,  a  revolution  of  a  whole  op- 
pressed nation  against  its  oppressors  and  their 
masters;  any  examination  of  the  numerous  re- 
percussions thereof  is  essentially  and  directly  a 
matter  within  the  national  sovereignty  of  Iran. 

I  have  the  honour,  etc. 

Tehran,  9  December  1979 


MR.  OWEN 

I  have  the  honor  to  appear  before  the 
Court  today  as  Agent  of  the  United 
States  of  America  in  support  of  the  re- 
quest of  the  United  States  for  provisional 
measures  of  pi-otection  against  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Iran.  Mr.  President,  in  view 
of  the  extraordinary  nature  of  the  matter 
which  is  to  be  argued  before  the  Court 
this  afternoon,  the  President  of  the 
United  States  has  requested  the  Attor- 
ney Genei-al  of  the  United  States  to  ap- 
pear before  the  Court  as  Counsel  in 
support  of  our  request  for  provisional 
measures.  With  the  Court's  permission, 
therefore,  I  would  like  at  this  time  to  in- 
troduce to  the  Court  the  Attorney  Gen- 
ei-al,  Mr.  Benajmin  R.  Civiletti,  who  will 
commence  the  presentation  on  behalf  of 
the  United  States. 


MR.  CIVILETTI 

I  appear  today  as  Attorney  General  of 
the  United  States  and  advocate  in  sup- 
port of  its  request  for  provisional  meas- 
ures of  protection  from  illegal  acts  of  the 
Government  of  Iran.  I  feel  privileged  to 
appear  on  behalf  of  my  government.  I 
should  also  say  that  the  United  States  is 
grateful  to  the  Court  for  providing  a 
hearing  at  this  time. 

If  I  may  be  permitted  a  personal  in- 
troduction. I  have  spent  my  working  life 
as  a  trial  lawyer  in  the  United  States.  I 
have  been  an  advocate  both  for  the  gov- 
ernment and  for  those  who  oppose  the 
government,  in  both  civil  and  criminal 
suits.  Anyone  who  has  been  a  trial  advo- 
cate in  any  country  would  approach  this 
Court  with  respect  and  awe.  In  a  real 
sense  this  Court  represents  the  highest 
legal  aspiration  of  civilized  man. 

Yet  I  find  myself  addressing  this 
Court  with  awe  but  with  restrained  an- 
ger. More  than  50  of  my  countrymen  are 
held  prisoners,  in  peril  of  their  lives  and 
suffering  even  as  I  speak.  This  im- 
prisonment and  this  suffering  are  illegal 
and  inhuman.  It  takes  no  advocate  to 
bring  this  cause  to  you.  The  facts  are 
known  worldwide,  and  every  citizen  of 
the  world — trained  in  the  law  or  not — 
knows  the  conduct  to  be  criminal. 

I  come  to  this  Court,  my  government 
comes  to  this  Court,  not  so  that  yet  an- 
other body  will  reiterate  the  fact  that 
what  we  are  witnessing  in  Iran  is  il- 
legal. The  United  States  comes  here  so 
that  this  tribunal  may  demonstrate  that 
international  law  may  not  be  tossed 
aside,  that  the  international  fabric  of 
civility  may  not  be  rent  with  impunity. 

My  government  asks  this  Court  to 
take  the  most  vigorous  and  most  speedy 


action  it  can  not  to  settle  a  minor  bound- 
ary dispute  with  regard  to  a  small  bound- 
ary, not  to  give  to  one  national  treasury 
from  another,  but  to  save  lives  and  set 
human  beings  free.  This  is  what  people 
everywhere — not  just  monarchs  and  pres- 
idents, not  just  lawyers  and  jurists — 
expect  of  what  a  judge  in  my  nation 
called  the  "omnipresence"  that  we  know 
to  be  the  law. 

If  I  come  to  you  with  anger,  I  also 
come  to  you  with  urgency.  We  who  speak 
the  sober  language  of  jurisprudence  say 
the  United  States  is  seeking  the  "in- 
dication of  provisional  measures."  What 
we  are  asking  this  Court  for  is  the  quick- 
est possible  action  to  end  a  barbaric  cap- 
tivity and  to  save  human  lives. 

For  the  first  time  in  modei-n  diplo- 
matic history,  a  state  has  not  only  ac- 
quiesced in,  but  participated  in  and  is 
seeking  political  advantage  from  the  il- 
legal seizure  and  imprisonment  of  the  dip- 
lomatic personnel  of  another  state.  It 
even  threatens  to  put  these  diplomatic 
personnel  on  trial.  If  our  international  in- 
stitutions, including  this  Court,  should 
even  appear  to  condone  or  tolerate  the 
flagrant  violations  of  customary  interna- 
tional law,  state  practice,  and  explicit 
treaty  commitments  that  are  involved 
here,  the  result  will  be  a  serious  blow  not 
only  to  the  safety  of  the  American  diplo- 
matic persons  now  in  captivity  in  Tehran, 
but  to  the  rule  of  law  within  the  interna- 
tional community. 

To  allow  the  illegal  detention  and 
trial  of  U.S.  diplomatic  personnel  and 
other  citizens  to  go  forward  during  the 
pendency  of  this  case  would  be  to  encour- 
age other  governments  and  individuals  to 
believe  that  they  may,  with  impunity, 
seize  any  Embassy  and  any  diplomatic 
agent,  or  indeed  any  other  hostage,  any- 
where in  the  world.  Such  conduct  cannot 
be  tolerated;  every  civilized  government 
recognizes  that.  We  therefore  submit  that 
this  Court  has  a  clear  obligation  to  take 
every  action  to  bring  this  conduct  to  an 
immediate  end. 

We  shall  this  afternoon  discuss  the 
simple,  clear  issues  presented  in  the  fol- 
lowing order.  I  shall  review  the  applicable 
basic  principles  of  international  law  which 
bind  both  Iran  and  the  United  States,  not 
only  under  customary  international  law 
but  also  under  four  treaties  to  which  both 
states  are  parties.  These  treaties  are  di- 
rectly in  point.  Mr.  Owen  will  then  briefly 
summarize  the  facts  to  demonstrate  to 
the  Court  that  the  Government  of  Iran 
has  committed,  is  committing — and  is 
proposing  to  commit — clear,  flagrant  vio- 
lations of  these  principles  of  international 
law. 


February  1980 


41 


Middle  East 


We  will  next  demonstrate  that  the 
Court  has  jurisdiction  over  this  dispute 
and  the  authority  to  indicate  the  pro- 
visional measures  requested  by  the 
United  States.  Finally,  we  shall  explain 
why,  on  the  basis  of  article  41  of  the 
Court's  Statute,  an  indication  of  interim 
measures  is  urgently  needed  and  amply 
justified. 

The  international  legal  standards 
here  are  of  ancient  origin.  They  have 
evolved  over  centuries  of  state  practice, 
and  in  recent  years  have  been  codified  in 
a  series  of  international  agreements.  It  is 
on  four  of  those  agreements  that  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  relies 
here. 

Vienna  Convention  on 
Diplomatic  Relations 

Since  the  subject  of  this  proceeding  is 
focused  largely  on  the  status  and  im- 
munities of  diplomatic  agents,  I  shall 
refer  at  the  outset  to  the  1961  Vienna 
Convention  on  Diplomatic  Relations.  The 
purpose  of  that  convention,  to  which  both 
the  United  States  and  Iran  are  parties, 
was  to  codify  a  fundamental,  firmly  es- 
tablished rule  of  international  law — that 
the  immunity  and  inviolability  of  Embas- 
sies and  diplomats  must  be  absolutely  re- 
spected and  that  in  no  circumstances  may 
a  state  engage  in  the  type  of  conduct  that 
is  involved  here  in  this  matter  before  this 
Court. 

The  first  relevant  provision  of  the 
Vienna  Convention  on  Diplomatic  Rela- 
tions is  article  22,  relating  to  the  physical 
premises  of  an  Embassy  or  mission.  The 
words  of  article  22  are  clear: 

"1.  The  premises  of  the  mission  shall  be 
inviolable.  The  agents  of  the  receiving  State 
may  not  enter  them,  except  with  the  consent 
of  the  head  of  the  mission. 

2.  The  receiving  State  is  under  a  special 
duty  to  take  all  appropriate  steps  to  protect 
the  premises  of  the  mission  against  any  intru- 
sion or  damage  and  to  prevent  any  disturbance 
of  the  peace  of  the  mission  or  impairment  of  its 
dignity. 

3.  The  premises  of  the  mission,  their  fur- 
nishings and  other  property  thereon  and  the 
means  of  transport  of  the  mission  shall  be  im- 
mune from  search,  requisition,  attachment  or 
execution." 

As  to  the  personnel  of  such  a  diplo- 
matic mission,  article  29  of  the  conven- 
tion goes  on  to  provide  that  every  diplo- 
matic agent  "shall  be  inviolable"  and  that 
he  shall  be  free  from  "any  form  of  arrest 
and  detention."  The  language  is  unqual- 
ified: It  prohibits  any  form  of  arrest  or 
detention,  regardless  of  any  grievance 
which  the  host  state  may  suppose  that  it 
has  against  a  particular  diplomat.  There 


is  a  remedy  available  against  a  diplomat 
who  a  state  believes  has  engaged  in  im- 
proper conduct — to  require  him  to  leave 
the  country.  But  the  Vienna  convention 
excludes  any  form  of  physical  arrest  or 
detention  for  the  purpose  of  prosecution 
or  for  any  other  reason. 

The  convention  reemphasizes  the 
principle  of  diplomatic  inviolability  in 
several  different  ways.  Article  29  re- 
quires the  receiving  state  to  prevent  any 
attack  upon  the  person,  freedom,  or 
dignity  of  a  diplomatic  agent.  Article  31 
requires  that  each  such  agent  enjoy  un- 
qualified "immunity  from  the  criminal 
jurisdiction  of  the  receiving  State."  There 
is  no  exception;  no  matter  what  the 
cause,  the  receiving  state  is  precluded 
from  allowing  the  criminal  prosecution  of 
a  diplomatic  agent.  In  the  last  few  days, 
as  we  will  explain  later  in  our  argument, 
this  absolute  immunity  from  criminal 
prosecution  has  taken  on  an  overwhelm- 
ing importance. 

Article  37  of  the  convention  extends 
the  same  absolute  inviolability  and  abso- 
lute immunity  from  assault  and  from 
criminal  trial  to  the  administrative  and 
technical  staff  of  an  Embassy.  All  but  two 
of  the  more  than  50  Americans  currently 
being  held  hostage  in  Tehran  are  either 
diplomatic  agents  or  Embassy  adminis- 
trative and  technical  staff,  some  of  whom 
also  perform  consular  functions. 

Other  immunities  and  privileges  per- 
tinent to  this  case  are  found  in  Articles 
24,  25,  26,  27,  44,  45,  and  47  of  the  Vi- 
enna Convention  on  Diplomatic  Relations. 
Among  these  are  the  inviolability  of  the 
archives  and  documents  of  the  mission, 
the  right  of  diplomatic  agents  and  staff  to 
communicate  freely  for  official  purposes, 
and  the  right  to  depart  from  the  receiv- 
ing state  at  any  time  they  wish. 

Over  the  hundreds  of  years  that 
these  principles  have  been  recognized 
and  honored  throughout  the  international 
community,  there  have  been  occasions 
when  a  particular  state  has  felt  dissatis- 
fied or  aggrieved  by  the  conduct  of  a  dip- 
lomatic agent  of  another  state  or  his  gov- 
ernment; and  Iran  is  claiming  some  such 
grievances  now.  For  hundreds  of  years, 
however,  states  have  uniformly  recog- 
nized that  the  only  lawful  course  open  to 
them  is  to  declare  the  diplomatic  agent 
persona  yion  grata.  When  a  state  declares 
a  diplomatic  agent  persona  non  grata,  his 
government  must  withdraw  him  or  suffer 
the  eventual  termination  of  his  diplomatic 
status. 

These  uniformly  recognized  princi- 
ples have  been  codified  in  article  9  of  the 
Vienna  convention.  Under  that  treaty,  a 
receiving  state  can  in  effect  expel  an  ob- 
jectionable diplomat — but  under  no  cir- 
cumstances may  a  state  imprison  an 
emissary  or  put  him  on  trial.  In  diplo- 


matic history  and  practice  there  is  no 
precedent  or  justification  for  the  seizure 
of  a  diplomat,  let  alone  an  entire  diplo- 
matic mission.  There  is  also  no  precedent 
or  justification  of  the  imprisonment  and 
trial  of  such  persons  in  an  attempt  to 
coerce  capitulation  to  certain  demands.  It 
is  difficult  to  think  of  a  more  obvious, 
more  flagrant  violation  of  international 
law. 

Vienna  Convention  on 
Consular  Relations 

Both  Iran  and  the  United  States  are  also 
parties  to  the  second  international  con- 
vention on  which  the  United  States  relies 
in  this  proceeding — the  1963  Vienna  Con- 
vention on  Consular  Relations.  This  con- 
vention reflects  many  of  the  same  princi- 
ples I  have  just  described.  Under  the 
consular  convention  every  state  party,  in- 
cluding Iran,  has  an  international  legal 
obligation  to  protect  the  consular  facili- 
ties and  members  of  the  consular  posts  of 
every  other  state  party. 

Of  course,  when  personnel  of  a  dip- 
lomatic mission  are  providing  consular 
services,  they  are  entitled  to  the  full  pro- 
tection afforded  by  the  Vienna  Conven- 
tion on  Diplomatic  Relations.  The  Con- 
vention on  Consular  relations  also 
requires  the  receiving  state  to  permit 
another  state  party's  consular  officers  to 
communicate  with  and  have  access  to 
their  nationals.  This  right  is  manifestly 
violated  when  the  consular  officers  are 
themselves  held  incommunicado  by  force. 

New  York  Convention 

Apart  from  these  two  Vienna  Con- 
ventions, the  United  States  and  Iran  also 
are  parties  to  the  New  York  Convention 
on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of 
Crimes  Against  Internationally  Protected 
Persons,  Including  Diplomatic  Agents. 
One  of  the  essential  premises  of  the  New 
York  convention  is  stated  in  its  preamble. 
It  is  that  crimes  against  such  internation- 
ally protected  persons,  including  diplo- 
matic agents,  are  "a  serious  threat  to  the 
maintenance  of  normal  international  rela- 
tions" and  "a  matter  of  grave  concern  to 
the  international  community." 

The  convention  defines  a  number  of 
types  of  conduct  as  constituting  crimes 
within  its  scope.  Under  article  2  it  is  a 
criminal  act  to  participate  as  an  accom- 
plice in  an  attack  on  the  person  or  liberty 
of  an  internationally  protected  person  or 
in  a  violent  attack  on  official  premises. 
Under  article  4  of  the  convention,  every 
state  party,  including  Iran,  is  required  to 
prevent  such  crimes.  Under  article  7, 
every  state  party  must  take  steps  to  see 
that  those  responsible  for  such  crimes  are 
prosecuted.  The  Government  of  Iran  has 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Middle  East 


violated  evei-y  one  of  these  provisions  in 
the  plainest  way. 

All  three  of  the  treaties  I  have  dis- 
cussed were  drafted  by  the  U.N.  Inter- 
national Law  Commission.  They  were 
adopted  by  conferences  of  plenipoten- 
tiaries or  by  the  U.N.  General  Assembly 
— and  thus  by  the  vast  majority  of  the 
states  of  the  world.  They  have  been  so 
widely  ratified  as  to  demonstrate  that 
they  reflect  universally  recognized  rules 
of  international  law. 


Bilateral  TVeaty  of  Amity 

Finally,  the  United  States  relies  in  this 
case  upon  a  bilateral  treaty — the  1955 
Treaty  of  Amity,  Economic  Relations, 
and  Consular  Rights  between  the  United 
States  and  Iran.  This  treaty  is  in  a  sense 
even  broader  than  the  three  multilateral 
conventions  to  which  I  have  previously 
referred.  Under  article  II,  paragraph  4, 
of  the  treaty  of  amity,  each  party  has  a 
legal  obligation  to  insure  that  within  its 
territory  the  nationals  of  the  other  party 
shall  receive  "the  most  constant  protec- 
tion and  security." 

In  addition,  article  II  provides  that, 
if  any  U.S.  national  is  in  custody  in  Iran, 
Iran  must  in  every  respect  accord  him 
"reasonable  and  humane  treatment." 
Under  articles  II  and  XIX  any  such  na- 
tional is  entitled  to  communicate  with  his 
own  government  and  avail  himself  of  the 
services  of  his  consular  officials.  Article 
XIII  requires  that  the  consular  officers 
and  employees  themselves  be  accorded 
the  privileges  and  immunities  accorded 
by  general  international  usage  and  that 
they  be  treated  in  a  fashion  no  less  favor- 
able than  similar  officer  and  employees  of 
any  third  country. 

That  completes  my  brief  summary 
of  the  principles  of  international  law  that 
underlie  the  application  of  the  United 
States.  I  could  go  on  to  discuss  the  pro- 
visions of  Article  2,  Paragraphs  3  and  4, 
of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations, 
under  which  Iran  and  all  other  U.N. 
members  are  obligated  to  settle  their  dis- 
putes by  peaceful  means  and  to  refrain  in 
their  international  relations  from  the 
threat  or  use  of  force.  But  the  United 
States  believes  that  the  three  multilateral 
conventions  and  the  1955  bilateral  treaty 
provide  as  clear  a  legal  predicate  as  can 
be  rationally  required  for  its  request  for 
an  indication  of  provisional  measures. 

MR.  OWEN 


The  Attorney  General  has  summarized 
the  treaty  provisions  which  form  the  legal 
predicate  for  the  United  States'  pending 


request  for  an  indication  of  provisional 
measures — and  I  would  like  to  open  my 
portion  of  the  argument  by  making  one 
brief  comment  about  those  treaty  pro- 
visions. 

In  my  judgment,  the  most  striking 
feature  of  the  legal  principles  involved  in 
this  case  is  their  clarity  and  simplicity. 
All  of  the  substantive  principles  involved 
are  well  known  and  familiar,  and  they  are 
clear  and  unambiguous.  This  is  not  a  case 
involving  complicated  legal  considerations 
or  difficult  questions  of  interpretation; 
the  only  question  here  is  one  of  the  appli- 
cation of  the  four  treaties — and  I  suggest 
that  the  application  of  the  treaties  will 
become  very  clear  indeed  from  a  brief  re- 
view of  the  facts — to  which  I  now  turn. 

Like  the  legal  principles  involved, 
the  facts  are  simple — and  tragically  so.  I 
submit  that  a  mere  recitation  of  the 
events  will  demonstrate  beyond  any 
doubt  whatever  that  the  Government  of 
Iran  is  today  engaged,  on  a  continuing 
basis,  in  gross  and  obvious  violations  of 
the  international  legal  obligations  which 
it  owes  to  the  United  States  and  to  the 
international  community  at  large. 

The  immediate  factual  story  began 
on  November  4  of  this  year.  On  that  day, 
in  the  course  of  a  demonstration  of  sev- 
eral thousand  people  immediately  outside 
the  U.S.  Embassy  compound  in  Tehran, 
several  hundred  demonstrators  broke 
away  and  commenced  a  physical  assault 
on  the  Embassy.  I  will  not  burden  you 
with  the  details  of  the  2-hour  attack  on 
the  Embassy  or  the  manner  in  which  the 
attackers  physically  cut  their  way  into 
the  Embassy.  But  I  should  emphasize 
that  throughout  the  attack,  U.S.  officials 
were  in  contact  with  the  office  of  the 
Prime  Minister  of  Iran  and  the  Iranian 
Foreign  Ministry — vigorously  calling  for 
security  assistance — and  yet  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Iran  made  absolutely  no  effort 
to  prevent  the  seizure  of  the  Embassy 
and  its  personnel. 

Indeed,  in  the  days  and  weeks  that 
have  followed  the  initial  attack  and  the 
seizure  of  more  than  50  American  hos- 
tages, the  chief  of  the  Iranian  Govern- 
ment and  the  members  of  his  council  have 
repeatedly  praised  and  approved  the  con- 
duct of  the  captors.  Instead  of  honoring 
its  legal  obhgations  and  seeking  to  pre- 
vent or  remedy  the  violations  of  the 
rights  of  the  United  States,  the  Govern- 
ment of  Iran  has  actually  ratified  those 
violations  and  made  them  its  own. 

Since  this  last  point  is  important  in 
fixing  the  responsibility  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  Iran,  let  me  pause  to  emphasize 
that  government's  complicity  in  the  con- 
duct involved.  In  response  to  a  question 
from  the  President  of  the  Court,  we  have 
submitted  to  the  Court  a  collection  of 
pubhc  statements  made  by  Iranian  offi- 


February  1980 


cials  in  the  last  few  weeks,  and  I  would 
like  to  refer  to  two  or  three  of  those 
statements.  On  November  4,  the  very 
day  of  the  Embassy  seizure  by  the  so- 
called  Iranian  students,  the  Ayatollah 
Khomeini,  then  the  de  facto  Chief  of 
State,  approved  the  students'  action,  and 
the  next  day,  Novem'oer  5,  a  number  of 
Iranian  officials  did  exactly  the  same. 

On  that  day,  November  5,  the 
Ayatollah  Khomeini  publicly  refused  to 
call  upon  the  students  to  withdraw;  the 
commander  of  the  Revolutionary  Guard 
congratulated  the  students  and  pledged 
the  Guard's  full  support  for  the  action; 
the  public  prosecutor  and  the  judiciary 
announced  their  support;  and  then  the 
Foreign  Minister  of  Iran  declared:  "The 
action  of  the  students  enjoys  the  en- 
dorsement and  support  of  the  Govern- 
ment." On  November  18  the  Ayatollah 
Khomeini  declared  "what  our  nation  has 
done  is  to  arrest  a  bunch  of  spies,  who, 
according  to  the  norms,  should  be  inves- 
tigated, tried,  and  treated  in  accordance 
with  our  own  laws."  He  made  clear  at  the 
same  time  that  the  hostages  would  be  re- 
leased only  if  the  United  States  first  met 
certain  specified  demands  of  the  Iranian 
Government. 

I  ask  the  Court  to  bear  in'  mind  that 
these  statements  emanated  from  a  gov- 
ernment which  is  under  a  solemn  and 
continuing  legal  duty  to  provide  the  most 
constant  protection  and  security  to  U.S. 
personnel.  Indeed,  as  documented  in  the 
materials  we  have  submitted  to  the 
Court,  two  senior  members  of  the  Iranian 
Government  have  publicly  acknowledged 
this  legal  duty,  while  at  the  same  time 
approving  its  violation. 

Continuing  the  story  of  the  hostages, 
the  fact  is  that  since  the  time  of  their  cap- 
ture they  have  been  subjected  to  a  har- 
rowing ordeal.  Bound  hand  and  foot  and 
frequently  blindfolded,  they  have  been 
subjected  to  severe  discomfort,  complete 
isolation  and  threats,  including  repeated 
threats  both  by  their  captors  and  by  the 
Iranian  Government  to  the  effect  that,  in 
certain  cirumstances,  they,  the  hostages, 
would  be  put  on  trial  and  even  put  to 
death.  They  have  been  paraded  blindfolded 
before  hostile  crowds,  denied  mail  and 
visitors,  and  essentially  held  incom- 
municado. Some  time  ago,  it  is  true,  5 
non- American  captives  and  13  American 
hostages  were  released,  but  more  than  50 
U.S.  citizens  continue  to  be  held  in  these 
inhumane  and  dangerous  circumstances. 
Moreover,  recent  reports  suggest  that 
some  of  the  hostages  may  have  been 
transferred  from  the  Embassy  compound 
to  other  places  of  confinement.  We  have 
no  way  of  knowing  the  details  of  the  con- 
ditions of  their  confinement  or  their 
treatment  at  any  such  new  locations. 


43 


Middle  East 


When  these  facts  are  held  up  against 
the  standards  of  international  law  to 
which  the  Attorney  General  earlier  re- 
ferred, including  the  principles  that  every 
diplomatic  agent  must  be  kept  inviolate 
from  any  form  of  arrest  or  detention  and 
from  any  attack  upon  his  person,  free- 
dom, or  dignity,  I  suggest  that  it  is  not 
really  possible  to  imagine  any  clearer  vio- 
lations of  the  four  applicable  treaties  than 
the  violations  presented  in  this  case.  On 
this  score,  I  might  also  add,  there  is  true 
unanimity  among  international  legal 
scholars.  Since  early  November  there  has 
been  an  outpouring  of  pronouncements 
from  leading  international  legal  scholars 
throughout  the  world,  and  all  have  unan- 
imously condemned  the  Iranian  treat- 
ment of  the  American  nationals  in 
Tehran. 

In  addition,  the  same  view  has  re- 
ceived the  public  support  of  numerous 
well-known  organizations  of  jurists,  in- 
cluding various  societies  of  international 
law,  the  International  Law  Association, 
and  the  International  Commission  of 
Jurists.  Without  exception,  the  scholars 
and  leai'ned  societies  have  condemned  the 
Iranian  hostage-taking  as  the  purest  kind 
of  violation  of  international  law.  To  cite 
just  a  single  example,  the  retired  Presi- 
dent of  this  Court  stated  in  a  recent 
interview  as  follows: 

...  the  conduct  of  the  Iranian  authorities 
in  this  matter  constitutes  the  most  flagrant 
violation  of  the  norms  of  international  law  hon- 
oring the  privileges  and  immunity  of  diplo- 
matic missions  and  their  officials. 

He  went  on  to  say  that  history  will  record 
Iran's  actions  as  "the  most  complete  hst 
of  infractions"  against  these  universally 
recognized  norms  of  international  law. 

I  know  of  no  dissent.  Moreover,  we 
are  not  speaking  in  the  past  tense.  The 
violations  are  going  forward  and  continu- 
ing as  I  stand  here  this  afternoon.  With 
each  passing  day — indeed  with  each  pass- 
ing hour— the  rights  of  the  United  States 
and  the  rights  of  its  citizens  in  Tehran  are 
being  assaulted  in  a  manner  which  is  to- 
tally inconsistent  with  the  rule  of  law. 
That  ongoing  and  continuing  violation  of 
plainly  established  rights  is  the  essence  of 
the  problem  before  the  Court  this  after- 
noon. 


Jurisdiction  of  the  Court 

Having  reviewed  the  substantive  ele- 
ments, legal  and  factual,  of  the  dispute 
with  Iran  which  the  United  States  has 
brought  before  this  Court,  I  would  like 
now  to  turn  to  the  question  of  the  Court's 
jurisdiction  over  the  dispute.  As  I  under- 
stand the  teachings  of  the  prior  decisions 
of  the  Court  with  respect  to  the  indica- 
tion of  provisional  measures,  it  is  not 


necessary  for  a  state  requesting  such 
measures  to  establish  conclusively  that 
the  Court  has  jurisdiction.  The  urgency 
of  the  situations  which  call  for  provisional 
measures  is  such  that  an  effort  to  reach 
final  and  conclusive  determinations  with 
respect  to  jurisdiction  could  well  defeat 
the  purpose  of  Article  41  of  the  Court's 
statute.  For  these  reasons,  as  I  under- 
stand it,  the  Court  follows  the  principle 
that  if  the  Party  requesting  interim  pro- 
tective measures  makes  a  prima  facie 
showing  that  the  Court  has  jurisdiction 
over  the  dispute,  that  showing  provides  a 
sufficient  jurisdictional  predicate  for  the 
Court  to  act  affirmatively  on  the  request. 

In  this  case,  I  respectfully  submit, 
the  United  States  can  make  more  than  a 
prima  facie  showing.  Indeed,  I  think  I 
can  demonstrate  that  the  Court  has 
jurisdiction  over  the  present  dispute  be- 
yond any  doubt  at  all. 

In  this  connection  let  me  refer  to  the 
jurisdictional  provisions  of  the  Optional 
Protocol  to  the  Vienna  Convention  on 
Diplomatic  Relations.  Article  I  of  the 
Protocol  provides  unequivocally: 

Disputes  arising  out  of  the  interpretation 
or  application  of  the  Convention  shall  lie  within 
the  compulsory  jurisdiction  of  the  Interna- 
tional Court  of  Justice  and  may  accordingly  be 
brought  before  the  Court  by  an  application 
made  by  any  party  to  the  dispute  being  a 
Party  to  the  present  Protocol. 

Needless  to  say,  the  United  States  is  a 
party  to  a  dispute  with  Iran.  It  has  re- 
peatedly called  upon  the  Government  of 
Iran  to  release  the  hostages  pursuant  to 
its  international  legal  obligations,  and 
Iran  has  repeatedly  refused.  Since  both 
states  are  parties  to  the  protocol,  and 
since  one  of  them  (the  United  States)  has 
presented  an  application  to  the  Court,  ar- 
ticle I  confers  mandatory  jurisdiction 
upon  the  Court. 

It  is  true  that  articles  II  and  III  of 
the  protocol  go  on  to  provide  that  the 
parties  to  the  dispute  may  agree  on  other 
methods  of  setthng  the  dispute,  namely 
by  arbitration  or  concihation.  That  is  to 
say,  the  compulsory  jurisdiction  of  this 
Court  under  article  I  is  unqualified,  but 
under  articles  II  and  III  the  parties  may 
mutually  agree  on  arbitration  or  concilia- 
tion instead.  I  want  to  emphasize,  how- 
ever, that  the  settlement  procedures  con- 
templated by  articles  II  and  III  are 
purely  optional.  In  the  English  version  of 
the  protocol  this  is  indicated  not  only  by 
the  permissive  word  "may"  as  it  appears 
in  articles  II  and  III,  but  also  by  the 
preamble  to  the  protocol,  which  indicates 
exphcitly  the  intention  that  the  Court 
shall  have  jurisdiction  "unless"  arbitra- 
tion or  conciliation  have  been  agreed 
upon  by  the  parties.  Moreover,  I  am  in- 


formed that  the  same  conclusion  flows 
from  the  equally  authoritative  texts  of 
the  protocol  in  French,  Spanish,  Russian, 
and  Chinese. 

And,  finally,  the  same  conclusion — 
the  conclusion  that  the  Court  has  juris- 
diction if  no  such  optional  agreement  on 
arbitration  or  concihation  has  been 
reached — is  confirmed  by  two  articles  by 
well-known  scholars,  both  of  which  ap- 
pear in  a  volume  whose  Enghsh  title  is  A 
Collection  of  Studies  on  International 
Laiv,  In  Honor  of  Paul  Guggenheim, 
pubhshed  in  1968.  May  I  refer  the  Court 
respectfully  to  pages  634  and  695  of  that 
volume,  at  which  Herbert  Briggs  and 
Paul  Ruegger  emphasize  that  under 
treaty  provisions  of  this  kind  the  Court's 
jurisdiction  is  obligatory  where  the  par- 
ties have  not  in  fact  resorted  to  other 
means  of  settlement. 

The  Court  will  not  be  surprised  to 
hear  from  me  that  no  agreement  on  other 
means  of  settlement  has  been  reached  in 
this  case.  In  response  to  questions  pro- 
pounded by  the  President,  the  U.S. 
Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Political 
Affairs,  Mr.  Newsom,  has  provided  the 
Court  with  a  factual  account  of  the  efforts 
made  by  the  United  States  to  open  nego- 
tiations with  the  Iranian  authorities,  and 
the  total  rejection  of  all  such  overtures  by 
the  Government  of  Iran.  Specifically,  in 
early  November,  after  the  seizure  of  the 
hostages,  when  the  U.S.  Government 
dispatched  a  distinguished  emissary,  a 
former  U.S.  Attorney  General  [Ramsey 
Clark],  to  visit  Iran  to  discuss  the 
hostage-taking  with  the  Government  of 
Iran,  that  government  refused  even  to  let 
him  enter  the  country.  He  stayed  in 
Istanbul  for  several  days  attempting  as- 
siduously to  open  discussions,  but  even- 
tually he  returned  home  without  having 
been  able  to  meet  any  representative  of 
the  Government  of  Iran. 

Moreover,  as  Mr  Newsom  has 
stated,  subsequent  efforts  by  the  United 
States  to  negotiate  have  been  equally  un- 
successful. In  fact,  every  one  of  the 
United  States'  repeated  efforts  to  open 
direct  communications  between  the  two 
parties  has  been  rebuffed  by  Iran  which, 
incidentally,  has  even  refused  to  attend 
the  relevant  meetings  of  the  U.N.  Secu- 
rity Council.  Under  such  circumstances 
the  United  States  respectfully  submits 
that,  even  if  articles  II  and  III  of  the  pro- 
tocol required  a  prior  attempt  to  arbi- 
trate or  conciliate  as  a  condition  on  this 
Court's  jurisdiction — and  we  do  not  be- 
lieve that  they  do — that  requirement 
would  have  been  obviated  by  this  Iranian 
conduct.  I  should  add  that  exactly  the 
same  is  true  with  respect  to  the  Vienna      I 
Convention  on  Consular  Relations  whose  ! 
jurisdictional  provisions  are  identical  to 


44 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Middle  East 


those  of  the  Vienna  Convention  on  Dip- 
lomatic Relations. 

Turning  to  the  elements  of  the  dis- 
pute which  arise  under  the  Ti-eaty  of 
Amity,  Economic  Relations,  and  Consular 
Rights  between  the  United  States  of 
America  and  Iran,  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Court  is  again,  I  submit,  ci-ystal  clear. 
Article  XXI,  paragi-aph  2,  of  the  treaty 
provides  in  its  entirety  as  follows,  and  I 
quote: 

Any  dispute  between  the  High  Contract- 
ing Parties  as  to  the  interpretation  or  applica- 
tion of  the  present  Treaty,  not  satisfactorily 
adjusted  by  diplomacy,  shall  be  submitted  to 
the  International  Court  of  Justice,  unless  the 
High  Contracting  Parties  agree  to  settlement 
by  some  other  pacific  means. 

Again,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  re- 
peated efforts  of  the  United  States  to 
deal  with  the  dispute  by  diplomacy  have 
been  consistently  rebuffed  by  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Iran,  it  seems  indisputable 
that  under  the  treaty  of  amity,  this  case  is 
properly  before  this  Court. 

A  final  jurisdictional  issue  arises 
under  the  Convention  on  the  Prevention 
and  Punishment  of  Crimes  against  Inter- 
nationally Protected  Persons,  Including 
Diplomatic  Agents.  With  respect  to  that 
convention,  the  jurisdictional  showing 
that  we  can  make  is  admittedly  less  com- 
pelling than  the  showing  we  have  made 
with  respect  to  the  other  three  treaties. 
In  contrast  with  the  Vienna  Conventions 
on  Diplomatic  and  on  Consular  Relations, 
article  13  of  the  convention  on  interna- 
tionally protected  persons  might  be  read 
as  i-equiring  a  6-months'  effort  by  the 
parties  to  arbitrate  the  dispute  as  a  pre- 
requisite to  the  Court's  jurisdiction. 

It  is  the  position  of  my  government, 
however,  that  where,  as  in  this  case,  one 
of  the  parties  has  closed  down  the  Em- 
bassy of  the  other  and  has  flatly  refused 
even  to  open  communications,  either 
through  the  other's  special  emissary  or  in 
any  other  fashion,  the  arbitration  re- 
quirement is  rendered  inoperable.  It  is 
our  position,  therefore,  that  we  have 
made  out  a  prima  facie  showing  of  juris- 
diction, even  under  the  internationally 
protected  persons  convention.  Moreover, 
even  if  no  such  showing  had  been  made, 
all  of  the  major  claims  presented  in  the 
Apphcation  of  the  United  States  are  sol- 
idly based,  I  submit,  upon  the  other  three 
treaties — as  to  which,  in  our  view,  the 
Court's  jurisdiction  appears  not  merely 
prima  facie,  but  beyond  dispute. 

At  this  point,  in  response  to  a  ques- 
tion raised  by  the  President  of  the  Court, 
I  should  make  one  final  comment  on  the 
Court's  jurisdiction.  As  the  Court  is 
aware,  the  Security  Council  of  the  United 
Nations  has  addressed  the  present  dis- 


February  1980 


pute,  and  in  Resolution  No.  457,  adopted 
6  days  ago,  the  Council  called  upon  the 
Government  of  Iran  to  bring  about  the 
immediate  release  of  the  hostages.  In 
such  circumstances  it  might  conceivably 
be  suggested  that  this  Court  should  not 
exercise  jurisdiction  over  the  same  dis- 
pute. 

I  respectfully  submit  that  any  such 
suggestion  would  be  untenable.  It  is,  of 
course,  an  impressive  fact  that  the  15 
countries  represented  in  the  Security 
Council — 15  countries  of  very  diverse 
views  and  philosophies — have  voted 
unanimously,  15  to  nothing,  in  favor  of  the 
resolution  to  which  I  have  i-eferred.  The 
fact  remains,  however,  that  the  Security 
Council  is  a  pohtical  organ  which  has  re- 
sponsibility for  seeking  solutions  to  inter- 
national problems  through  political 
means.  By  contrast,  this  Court  is  a  judi- 
cial body  with  the  responsibihty  to  em- 
ploy judicial  methods  in  order  to  resolve 
those  problems  which  he  within  its  juris- 
diction. There  is  absolutely  nothing  in  the 
U.N.  Charter  or  in  this  Court's  Statute 
to  suggest  that  action  by  the  Security 
Council  excludes  action  by  the  Court, 
even  if  the  two  actions  might  in  some  re- 
spects be  parallel. 

By  contrast,  Article  12  of  the  U.N. 
Charter  provides  that,  while  the  Security 
Council  is  exercising  its  functions  respect- 
ing a  dispute,  the  General  Assembly  shall 
not  make  any  recommendation  on  that 
dispute;  but  the  charter  places  no  corre- 
sponding restriction  on  the  Court.  As 
Rosenne  has  observed  at  page  87  of  his 
treatise,  The  Law  and  Practice  of  the  In- 
ternational Court  of  Justice,  the  fact  that 
one  of  the  political  organs  of  the  United 
Nations  is  deahng  with  a  particular  dis- 
pute does  not  mihtate  against  the  Court's 
taking  action  on  those  aspects  of  the  same 
dispute  which  fall  within  its  jurisdiction. 

To  sum  up  on  this  point,  the  United 
States  has  brought  to  the  Court  a  dispute 
which  plainly  falls  within  the  Court's 
compulsoi-y  jurisdiction,  and  I  respect- 
fully submit  that,  if  we  can  satisfy  the 
Court  that  an  indication  of  provisional 
measures  is  justified  and  needed  in  a 
manner  consistent  with  Article  41  of  the 
Court's  Statute,  the  Court  will  have  a 
duty  to  indicate  such  measures,  quite 
without  regard  to  any  parallel  action 
which  may  have  been  taken  by  the  Secu- 
rity Council  of  the  United  Nations.  As  to 
whether  the  actions  of  the  Security 
Council  affect  the  need  for  provisional 
measures,  I  will  have  more  to  say  a  httle 
later  in  my  argument,  but  first  I  would 
hke  to  explain  the  specific  reasons  which 
underhe  our  request  for  such  an  indica- 
tion of  such  measures. 


Nature  of  Interim  Measures 

On  this  subject  I  start  from  the  premise 
that  an  essential  purpose  of  such  pro- 
visional measures  is  to  preserve  the 
rights  of  the  parties  pending  the  final  de- 
cision of  the  Court.  Putting  the  matter  in 
other  terms,  it  is  famihar  jui'isprudence 
that  the  Court  may  look  to  see  whether 
any  injury  which  may  be  done  to  one 
party  or  the  other  during  the  pendency  of 
the  case  will  be,  on  the  one  hand,  an  in- 
jury which  can  be  remedied  through  the 
Court's  final  decision  or,  on  the  other 
hand,  whether  during  the  pendency  of 
the  case  one  party  will  be  subject  to  an 
injury  which  is  actually  irreparable. 

An  injury  of  the  former  kind  may  or 
may  not  justify  an  indication  of  pro- 
visional measures,  but  where  an  irrepar- 
able injury  threatens  or  is  actually  being 
inflicted  during  the  pendency  of  the  case, 
there  is  clear  justification — and  indeed  an 
urgent  need — for  interim  protective 
measures.  As  the  Court  observed  in  the 
Fisheries  Jurisdiction  cases,  the  Nuclear 
Test  cases,  and  the  Aegean  Sea  cases.  Ar- 
ticle 41  of  the  Court's  Statute,  and  I 
quote,  "presupposes  that  irreparable 
prejudice  should  not  be  caused  to  rights 
which  are  the  subject  of  dispute  in  judi- 
cial proceedings". 

Applying  this  standard  of  irreparable 
injury  to  the  present  case,  I  submit  that 
the  United  States  is  clearly  entitled  to 
interim  measures  of  protection.  The  sim- 
ple fact  is  that  the  United  States'  rights 
of  the  highest  dignity  and  importance  are 
being  currently  and  irreparably  violated 
by  the  Government  of  Iran.  Specifically, 
the  international  agreements  upon  which 
we  base  our  claim  have  conferred  upon 
the  United  States  the  right  to  maintain  a 
working  and  effective  embassy  in  Tehran, 
the  right  to  have  its  diplomatic  and  con- 
sular personnel  protected  in  their  lives 
and  persons  from  every  form  of  interfer- 
ence and  abuse,  and  the  right  to  have  its 
nationals  protected  and  secure. 

As  I  indicated  earlier,  with  each 
passing  hour  those  rights  are  being  de- 
stroyed, and  the  injury,  once  incurred,  is 
plainly  and  completely  irreparable.  The 
trauma  of  being  held  hostage  day  after 
day  in  conditions  of  danger  cannot  be 
erased;  the  weeks  of  interruption  of  dip- 
lomatic functions  cannot  be  repaired.  If 
the  hostages  are  physically  harmed,  this 
Court's  decision  on  the  merits  cannot 
possibly  heal  them.  Given  the  nature  of 
the  rights  involved,  an  ultimate  award  of 
monetary  damages  simply  could  not  make 
good  the  injuries  currently  being  sus- 
tained as  this  case  awaits  the  Court's 
judgment. 


45 


Middle  East 


That  being  so,  I  would  direct  the 
Court's  attention  to  an  early  and  similar 
case  decided  by  the  Permanent  Court  of 
International  Justice.  In  that  case,  enti- 
tled The  Case  Concerning  the  Denuncia- 
tion of  the  Treaty  of  November  2, 1865, 
Between  China  and  Belgium,  interim 
measures  were  requested  in  order  to  pro- 
vide for  the  protection  and  security  of  na- 
tionals and  property,  the  performance  of 
consular  functions  and  freedom  from 
arrest  and  criminal  penalties  except  in 
accordance  with  law.  In  indicating  the 
requested  protective  measures,  the  Pres- 
ident of  the  Court  emphasized  that  the 
injury  expected  to  occur  during  the  pen- 
dency of  the  case  "could  not  be  made 
good  by  the  payment  of  an  indemnity  or 
by  compensation  or  restitution  in  some 
other  material  form."  In  that  case,  given 
the  threat  of  irreparable  injury,  interim 
measures  were  indicated,  and  we  seek 
the  same  reUef  here. 

Moreover,  I  should  emphasize  that 
the  threat  of  future  irreparable  injury  is 
growing.  The  situation  in  Tehran  is  vol- 
atile in  the  extreme,  and  the  danger  for 
the  hostages  can  sharply  increase  at  any 
moment.  The  current  chief  of  the  Iranian 
state  himself  has  spoken  of  the  possible 
destruction  of  the  hostages — the  ultimate 
in  irreparable  injury.  In  this  connection  it 
should  be  recalled  that  in  recent  months 
over  600  Iranian  nationals  have  actually 
been  executed  after  peremptory  trials  by 
revolutionary  councils.  The  defendants  in 
those  trials  were  denied  the  right  to 
counsel,  the  right  to  present  defensive 
evidence,  the  right  to  appeal — indeed, 
the  right  to  any  legal  process  at  all — and 
the  penalty  was  death. 

Against  that  background,  the  often 
repeated  threats  to  put  the  American 
hostages  on  trial  for  alleged  crimes 
creates  an  ominous  and  an  unacceptable 
threat  not  only  for  the  hostages  and  for 
the  United  States  but  for  the  entire  in- 
ternational community.  In  the  words  of 
the  Secretary  General  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, "The  present  crisis  poses  a  serious 
threat  to  international  peace  and  secu- 
rity," a  threat  which  may  well  be  al- 
leviated if  this  Court  promptly  indicates 
the  interim  measures  requested  by  the 
United  States. 

I  would  like  now  to  turn  to  an  alter- 
native standard  under  which  the  United 
States  in  our  submission  is  now  entitled 
to  the  requested  relief.  As  the  Court  is 
aware,  in  many  legal  systems  it  is  recog- 
nized that  interim  rehef  of  the  kind  re- 
quested here  is  appropriate  in  order  to 
preserve  the  status  quo  pendente  lite — 
and  it  is  the  position  of  the  United  States 
that  this  principle  also  cries  out  for  im- 
mediate judicial  action  in  this  case. 


On  this  point,  however,  I  do  not  wish 
to  be  misunderstood.  Obviously  I  am  not 
asking  the  Court  to  maintain  the  status 
quo  as  created  by  the  Government  of  Iran 
over  the  past  days  and  weeks.  Obviously 
the  status  quo  which  we  seek  to  preserve 
— or,  more  correctly,  to  which  we  seek  to 
return — is  the  status  quo  ante,  the  situa- 
tion immediately  prior  to  the  Iranian  sei- 
zure of  the  Embassy  and  the  hostages. 

There  is,  I  submit,  clear  authority 
for  such  relief,  as  noted  in  Dumbauld's 
treatise.  Interim  Measures  in  Interna- 
tional Controversies.  Referring  to  the 
general  principle  of  enforcing  or  sanction- 
ing the  status  quo  through  indications  of 
interim  measures — and  citing  cases  and 
authorities — Judge  Dumbauld  states  as 
follows  (and  I  quote  from  page  187  of  his 
treatise): 

It  should  be  noted  that  the  status  quo  thus 
sanctioned  is  not  that  at  the  time  of  the  judg- 
ment, or  at  the  date  suit  is  brought,  but  the 
last  uncontested  status  prior  to  the  con- 
troversy. 

The  controversy  which  we  have  brought 
before  the  Court  arose  with  the  seizure  of 
the  Embassy  and  the  hostages  in  Tehran 
on  November  4,  1979,  and  I  submit  that 
the  situation  cries  out  for  interim  meas- 
ures calling  upon  Iran  to  release  the  hos- 
tages and  the  Embassy  and  thus  return 
to  the  status  quo  as  of  November  3,  1979. 

In  order  to  test  the  validity  of  this 
conclusion,  I  should  hke  to  pose  for  the 
Court  a  simple  hypothetical  case.  Let  us 
assume  that  on  November  4,  1979,  in- 
stead of  allowing  the  Embassy  and  the 
hostages  to  be  seized,  the  Revolutionary 
Council  of  Iran  had  announced  that,  un- 
less certain  demands  were  met  by  the 
United  States  by — let  us  say — December 
10,  1979,  the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Tehran 
would  then  be  attacked  and  its  personnel 
taken  hostage. 

If  in  that  situation  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  had  brought  its  case 
to  this  Court  and  requested  an  indication 
of  provisional  measures  calUng  upon  Iran 
to  desist  from  its  threat,  I  suggest  that 
the  Court  would  have  acted  affirmatively 
on  that  request.  In  that  situation,  I  sub- 
mit, the  Court  would  have  called  upon 
Iran  to  leave  the  American  diplomatic 
staff  in  Tehran  free  and  inviolable  and 
immune  from  prosecution — and  I  want  to 
emphasize  that  that,  in  essence,  is 
exactly  the  basic  provisional  measure  we 
are  requesting  from  the  Court  now. 

In  other  words,  we  would  have  been 
entitled,  in  our  view,  to  such  a  provisional 
measure  if  Iran  had  not  yet  violated  its 
international  legal  obligations  to  the 
United  States,  and,  in  our  view,  that 


necessarily  means  that  we  are  entitled  to 
the  same  protective  measures  now— now 
that  Iran  has  actually  embarked  upon  a 
profound  and  continuing  violation  of  our 
rights.  To  hold  otherwise  at  this  time — to 
withhold  such  protective  measures — 
would  be  to  allow  Iran  to  benefit  from  ac- 
tually using  force  instead  of  merely 
threatening  to  do  so. 

For  the  foregoing  reasons,  we  be- 
lieve that  we  are  clearly  entitled,  as  a 
matter  of  law  and  logic,  to  the  protective 
measures  which  we  are  seeking,  and  we 
submit  that  humanitarian  considerations 
require  no  less. 

Possible  Obstacles  to  the  U.S.  Request 

At  this  point  I  would  like  to  turn  to  the 
question  of  whether  there  are  any  possi- 
ble legal  obstacles  to  our  request.  We 
have  considered  that  question  with  care, 
and  we,  at  least,  have  concluded  that 
there  are  none. 

On  this  subject  I  would  refer  at  the 
outset  to  the  telegraphic  message  which 
has  just  been  received  by  the  Court  from 
the  Government  of  Iran  and  reference  to 
which  was  made  by  the  President  at  the 
opening  of  the  hearing.  Since  that  mes- 
sage constitutes  Iran's  only  response  to 
the  United  States'  request  for  provisional 
measures,  I  should  like  to  reply  thereto 
on  behalf  of  my  government. 

I  think  it  is  significant  that  the  open- 
ing paragraph  of  the  Iranian  statement 
expresses  great  respect  for  this  Court 
and  its  achievements  in  resolving  legal 
conflicts  between  states.  It  is  our  hope 
and  expectation  that  this  respect  will  lead 
the  Government  of  Iran  to  honor  in  full 
whatever  action  the  Court  may  take  in 
response  to  the  pending  U.S.  request. 

The  main  theme  of  the  telegraphic 
statement  of  the  Government  of  Iran  is 
that  the  question  of  the  American  hos- 
tages in  Tehran  is  only  one  of  several 
problems  or  disputes  that  now  exist  as 
between  the  two  governments.  It  is  al- 
leged in  general  terms  that  in  various 
ways  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  has  behaved  improperly  toward 
Iran  in  past  years  and  that  in  this  larger 
context  the  problem  of  the  American  hos- 
tages in  Tehran  is  only  a  marginal  and 
secondary  problem. 

There  are,  I  suggest,  two  short  an- 
swers to  this  proposition.  First  of  all, 
Iran's  view  of  its  treatment  of  the  Ameri- 
can hostages  as  a  secondary  problem  is 
not  shared  by  the  Secretary  General  of 
the  United  Nations  or  the  Security  Coun- 
cil of  the  United  Nations.  They  have 
unanimously  characterized  the  hostages' 
captivity  as  a  major  threat  to  interna- 
tional peace.  Secondly,  to  the  extent  that 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Middle  East 


there  are  other  disputes  between  Iran 
and  the  United  States,  Iran  has  made  ab- 
solutely no  effort  to  bring  any  such  mat- 
ters before  the  Court.  The  fact  is  that  the 
only  dispute  which  has  been  brought  be- 
fore the  Court  is  the  dispute  relating  to 
the  taking  of  the  American  hostages, 
and,  we  submit,  with  the  greatest  re- 
spect, that  that  is  the  only  dispute  with 
which  the  Court  can  now  deal.  The  Gov- 
ernment of  Iran  asserts  that  the  Court 
should  not  take  cognizance  of  the  dispute 
relating  to  the  hostages,  but  for  the  rea- 
sons I  have  previously  indicated,  that  is 
simply  incorrect  as  a  matter  of  law.  The 
hostage  question  clearly  lies  within  the 
Court's  jurisdiction  and,  we  submit,  is 
properly  presented  for  your  decision  now. 

Paragraph  4  of  Iran's  statement  of 
yesterday  goes  on  to  suggest — albeit 
somewhat  indirectly — that  the  United 
States  is  now  improperly  seeking  part  or 
all  of  the  relief  which  it  seeks  on  the 
merits.  In  fact,  if  the  Court  compares  our 
request  for  interim  measures  with  the 
form  of  judgment  that  we  are  seeking,  it 
will  find  that  the  two  pleadings  request 
different  forms  of  rehef — except  in  one 
respect.  The  only  respect  in  which  our 
request  and  our  application  overlap  is 
that  both  pleadings  ask  in  effect  for  an 
order  calling  for  the  immediate  release  of 
the  hostages  and  their  safe  departure 
from  Iran. 

I  submit,  however,  that  this  con- 
vergence of  the  two  requests  results 
merely  from  an  excess  of  caution  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States.  Frankly,  we 
are  hopeful  that  this  Court  will  indicate 
measures  calling  for  immediate  release  of 
the  hostages  and  that  Iran,  consistent 
with  its  asserted  respect  for  this  Court, 
will  comply  long  before  it  becomes  neces- 
sary for  the  Court  to  write  its  final  judg- 
ment. It  is  our  hope  and  expectation, 
therefore,  that  the  request  for  a  judg- 
ment requiring  release  of  the  hostages 
will  have  become  moot  long  before  the 
Court  acts  on  our  application  for  such  a 
judgment. 

In  a  very  real  sense,  therefore,  our 
request  for  release  of  the  hostages,  being 
one  of  the  very  greatest  urgency,  should 
have  appeared  only  in  our  pending  re- 
quest for  an  indication  of  provisional 
measures — and  should  not  have  been  in- 
cluded in  our  application  for  judgment. 
Nevertheless,  not  wishing  to  presume  as 
to  how  the  Court  will  rule  as  a  result  of 
today's  hearing,  we  took  the  conservative 
course  of  including  a  similar  request  in 
our  apphcation.  I  earnestly  submit,  how- 
ever, that  such  conservatism  on  our  part 
does  not  in  any  way  militate  against  our 
request  for  an  indication  of  interim  meas- 
ures; the  need  for  such  relief  is  urgent  in 
the  extreme. 


February  1980 


This  brings  me  to  the  final  point 
made  in  yesterday's  statement  by  the 
Government  of  Iran.  It  is  there  sug- 
gested that  if  provisional  measures  are 
indicated  by  the  Court,  they  cannot 
properly  be  made  unilateral — the  implica- 
tion being  that  the  Court  could  not 
properly  call  for  the  release  of  the  hos- 
tages by  Iran  without  calling  for  some 
equivalent  action  by  the  United  States. 

That  suggestion  is  simply,  I  submit, 
incorrect.  Article  41  of  the  Court's  Stat- 
ute authorizes  the  Court,  where  circum- 
stances so  require,  to  indicate  "any  pro- 
visional measures  which  ought  to  be 
taken  to  preserve  the  respective  rights  of 
either  party"  I  submit  that  clearly  con- 
templates that  where  one  of  two  parties 
is  unilaterally  causing  irreparable  injury 
to  the  other,  a  unilateral  provisional 
measure  is  entirely  appropriate.  As  I 
shall  indicate  in  a  moment,  the  United 
States  would  have  no  objection  if  the 
Court  were  to  include,  in  an  indication  of 
provisional  measures,  the  conventional 
provisions  calling  upon  both  parties  to 
avoid  aggi-avation  of  the  dispute  and  pre- 
serve their  rights — but  we  nevertheless 
assert  an  urgent  need  for  unilateral  ac- 
tion by  Iran  to  release  the  hostages. 

Having  provided  that  response  to  the 
recent  statement  of  the  Government  of 
Iran,  I  should  now  like  to  return  to  the 
question  of  whether  there  are  any  legal 
obstacles  which  might  militate  against 
our  pending  request.  In  this  respect  we 
have  considered  with  care  the  possibility 
that  the  Coui't's  1976  decision  in  the  Ae- 
gean Sea  Continental  Shelf  case  might  be 
viewed  as  contrary  authority  against  our 
request,  having  in  mind  the  recent  action 
of  the  U.N.  Security  Council.  I  respect- 
fully submit,  however,  that  the  facts  and 
law  of  the  Aegean  Sea  case  are  so  distin- 
guishable that,  far  from  militating  against 
an  indication  of  provisional  measures  in 
this  case,  they  actually  support  the  pres- 
ent position  of  the  United  States. 

In  the  Aegean  Sea  dispute  between 
Greece  and  Turkey,  both  parties  partici- 
pated in  the  Security  Council  debates  on 
the  dispute.  Both  parties  agreed  in  the 
Security  Council  that  a  solution  to  the 
dispute  could  be  achieved  only  through 
direct  negotiations  between  the  parties. 
After  the  Council  called  upon  both  par- 
ties to  negotiate,  both  parties  expressly 
agreed  that  they  would  do  so.  Moreover, 
in  the  Aegean  Sea  case  the  question 
whether  violations  of  international  law 
were  occurring  was  open  to  legal  ques- 
tion, and  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court 
was  also  in  doubt. 

In  that  situation,  when  Greece  re- 
quested that  this  Court  indicate  pro- 


visional measures  calling  upon  Turkey  to 
refrain  from  certain  exploratory  activities 
on  the  disputed  Continental  Shelf,  the 
Court  assumed  that  both  states  would 
honor  their  undertakings  to  negotiate  and 
that  aggravation  of  the  dispute  would 
thereby  be  avoided.  Most  importantly, 
the  Court  was  not  persuaded  that  the  ac- 
tivities of  which  Greece  complained  were 
actually  threatening  irreparable  injury. 
For  those  reasons,  as  we  read  that  case, 
the  Court  concluded  that  an  indication  of 
provisional  measures  was  unnecessary. 

The  contrast  with  the  present  case,  I 
submit,  is  very  clear  indeed.  In  the  pres- 
ent case  the  Court  plainly  has  jurisdic- 
tion; the  authorities  of  Iran  have  refused 
to  send  a  representative  to  take  part  in 
the  proceedings  of  the  Security  Council; 
they  have  rejected  the  Council's  resolu- 
tion as  "an  American  plot";  they  have  re- 
fused to  communicate  with  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment in  any  way  at  all;  their  violations 
of  international  law  are  clear;  by 
threatening  trials,  they  are  continuing  to 
aggravate  the  dispute;  and  truly  irrepar- 
able injury  is  proceeding  day  by  day.  In 
the  present  case  the  need  for  protective 
measures,  I  submit,  could  not  be  more 
imperative. 

If  there  were  any  doubt  about  the 
distinctions  between  the  Aegean  Sea  case 
and  the  present  one,  I  think  it  is  laid  to 
rest  by  the  terms  of  the  resolution  of  the 
Security  Council  in  this  case  and  the  de- 
bate which  attended  its  adoption.  Resolu- 
tion 457,  to  which  the  President  of  the 
Court  has  earlier  referred,  in  its  first 
operative  paragraph,  "Urgently  calls  on 
the  Government  of  Iran  to  release  imme- 
diately the  personnel  of  the  Embassy  of 
the  United  States  of  America  being  held 
in  Tehran,  to  provide  them  protection  and 
to  allow  them  to  leave  the  country."  The 
second  operative  paragraph  "Further 
calls  on  the  Governments  of  Iran  and  of 
the  United  States  of  America  to  take 
steps  to  resolve  peacefully  the  remaining 
issues  between  them  to  their  mutual 
satisfaction  in  accordance  with  the  pur- 
poses and  principles  of  the  United  Na- 
tions." That  is  to  say,  the  resolution  calls 
upon  the  parties  to  take  steps  directed 
not  to  the  release  of  these  hostages,  but 
to  "the  remaining  issues"  between  the 
two  states.  Those  remaining  issues,  how- 
ever, are  not  before  this  Court,  and  the 
Court  can  take  no  responsibility  for  them. 
Under  its  Statute  the  Court's  ftinction  "is 
to  decide  in  accordance  with  international 
law  such  disputes  as  are  submitted  to 
it  .  .  ."  and  that  is  a  judicial  function 
which  has  not  been,  and,  of  course,  could 
not  be,  undertaken  by  the  Security 
Council. 


47 


Middle  East 


In  short,  there  is  a  clear  division  of 
responsibilities  here  and  that  division  was 
clearly  recognized  during  the  proceedings 
in  the  Security  Council.  At  that  time 
U.S.  Ambassador  [to  the  United  Nations] 
Donald  McHenry  stated  as  follows: 

The  United  States  wishes  to  place  on  the 
record  that  the  adoption  of  this  resolution  by 
the  Security  Council  clearly  is  not  intended  to 
displace  peaceful  efforts  in  other  organs  of  the 
United  Nations.  Neither  the  United  States  nor 
any  other  member  intends  that  the  adoption  of 
this  resolution  should  have  any  prejudicial  im- 
pact whatever  on  the  request  of  the  United 
States  for  the  indication  of  provisional  meas- 
ures of  protection  by  the  International  Court 
of  Justice. 

Before  making  that  statement  Ambas- 
sador McHenry  and  his  colleagues  in- 
formed Council  members  that  the  United 
States  would  speak  in  this  vein  during 
the  debates  about  this  pending  case  be- 
fore the  Court,  and  all  of  the  members  so 
consulted  were  in  agreement  with  the 
statement.  Moreover,  after  the  statement 
was  made,  no  member  of  the  Council  dis- 
agi'eed  with  the  stated  intention  to  the  ef- 
fect that  the  Council's  action  should  not 
impede  the  United  States'  pending  re- 
quest before  this  Court.  Thus  all  15  mem- 
bers of  the  Security  Council  evidently 
agree  that  the  Court  is  free  to  act  affirm- 
atively on  the  pending  request  of  the 
United  States  if  it  is  inclined  to  do  so. 

Requested  Measures 

Let  me  conclude  my  argument  in  favor  of 
interim  protective  measures  by  reciting 
e.xactly  what  measures  are  being  re- 
quested. The  Government  of  the  United 
States  respectfully  requests  that  the 
Court,  pending  final  judgment  in  this 
case,  indicate  forthwith  the  following: 

First,  that  the  Government  of  Iran  im- 
mediately release  all  hostages  of  U.S.  na- 
tionality and  facihtate  the  prompt  and 
safe  departure  from  Iran  of  these  persons 
and  all  other  U.S.  officials  in  dignified 
and  humane  circumstances. 

Second,  that  the  Government  of  Iran 
immediately  clear  the  premises  of  the 
U.S.  Embassy,  Chancery,  and  Consulate 
in  Tehran  of  all  persons  whose  presence  is 
not  authorized  by  the  U.S.  Government 
and  restore  the  premises  to  U.S.  control. 

Third,  that  the  Government  of  Iran  in- 
sure that  all  persons  attached  to  the  U.S. 
Embassy  and  Consulate  should  be  ac- 
corded, and  protected  in,  full  freedom  of 
movement  necessary  to  carry  out  their 
diplomatic  and  consular  functions.  That  is 
to  say,  to  the  extent  that  the  United 
States  should  choose,  and  Iran  should 


48 


agj-ee,  to  the  continued  presence  of  U.S. 
diplomatic  personnel  in  Tehran,  they 
must  be  permitted  to  cany  out  their 
functions  in  accordance  with  their  privi- 
leges and  immunities. 

Fourth,  that  the  Government  of  Iran  not 
place  on  trial  any  person  attached  to  the 
Embassy  and  Consulate  of  the  United 
States — and  refrain  from  any  action  to 
implement  any  such  trial. 

Now,  in  connection  with  this  fourth 
request,  I  should  hke  to  draw  the  Court's 
attention  to  recent  reports  that  Iran  may 
intend  to  continue  the  captivity  of  these 
hostages  so  that  they  may  appear  before 
some  sort  of  international  commission. 
Whatever  the  purpose  of  the  continued 
detention,  of  course,  it  I'emains  totally 
unlawful.  Accordingly,  in  light  of  these 
recent  reports,  with  the  Court's  permis- 
sion, the  United  States  wishes  now  to 
amend  its  fourth  request  for  interim 
measures  to  add:  that  the  Government  of 
Iran  must  not  detain  or  permit  the  deten- 
tion of  these  persons  in  connection  with 
any  proceedings,  whether  of  an  "interna- 
tional commission"  or  otherwise,  and  that 
they  not  be  forced  to  participate  in  any 
such  proceeding. 

Finally,  the  fifth  request  of  the  United 
States  is  that  the  Government  of  Iran  in- 
sure that  no  action  is  taken  which  might 
prejudice  the  rights  of  the  United  States 
in  respect  of  the  carrying  out  of  any  deci- 
sion which  the  Court  may  render  on  the 
merits,  and  in  particular  neither  take, 
nor  permit,  action  that  would  threaten 
the  lives,  safety,  or  well-being  of  the 
hostages. 

This  recitation  of  the  provisional 
measures  requested  by  the  United  States 
makes  clear,  we  believe,  that  we  are  seek- 
ing an  indication  which  is  relatively  spe- 
cific as  to  the  measures  to  be  taken.  We 
recognize  that  in  some  cases  it  may  be 
appropriate  simply  to  indicate,  in  general 
terms,  that  each  party  should  take  no  ac- 
tion to  aggravate  the  dispute  or  prejudice 
the  rights  of  the  other  party  in  respect  of 
the  carrying  out  of  the  Court's  decision 
on  the  merits.  As  I  indicated  earlier,  the 
United  States  has  no  objection  to  the  in- 
clusion of  such  general  provisions,  sub- 
ject, of  course,  to  the  usual  specification 
that  such  measures  will  apply  on  the 
basis  of  reciprocal  observance.  I  earnestly 
submit,  however,  that,  in  the  circum- 
stances of  this  particular  case,  any  pro- 
visional measures  indicated  by  the  Court 
should  be  specific  as  to  the  release  of  the 
hostages,  the  clearing  of  the  Embassy, 
and  the  inadmissibility  of  putting  the  hos- 
tages on  trial,  or  bringing  them  before 
any  international  commission.  Every  ef- 
fort should  be  made  to  insure  that  the 
Court's  message  will  be  clearly  under- 


stood in  Iran,  thus  maximising  the  chance 
that  it  will  be  effective. 

There  is  ample  precedent,  I  submit, 
for  the  specificity  of  our  request.  In  the 
Anglo-Irmnan  Oil  Co.  case,  the  Court,  in 
indicating  provisional  measures,  included 
not  only  the  usual  language  about  avoid- 
ing prejudice  to  the  rights  of  the  parties 
and  aggi-avation  of  the  dispute;  it  also  in- 
cluded particularized  measures  as  to  the 
method  by  which  the  Anglo-Iranian  Oil 
Company  should  be  managed  during  the 
pendency  of  the  litigation.  Similarly,  as 
another  example,  in  the  Fisheries  Juris- 
diction case,  the  Court  indicated  very 
specific  provisional  measures  as  to  the  en- 
forcement of  fisheries  regulations  and 
even  permissible  annual  catches  offish.  I 
respectfully  submit  that,  if  such  specific 
measures  were  appropriate  in  the  context 
of  these  commercial  cases,  they  are  the 
more  appropriate  in  a  case  which  involves 
the  lives  and  hberties  of  some  50  human 
beings  and  in  which,  because  of  diver- 
gences in  culture  and  language,  misun- 
derstandings as  to  meaning  may  arise  un- 
less any  provisional  measures  indicated 
by  the  Court  are  as  specific  and  hence  as 
clear  as  possible.  The  specific  measures 
indicated  in  the  case  between  Belgium 
and  China  which  I  have  earlier  discussed 
are  illustrative  of  what  is  required;  the 
measures  there  indicated  are  not  unlike 
those  sought  here. 

Conclusion 

In  concluding  my  argument  this  after- 
noon, I  would  respectfully — most 
respectfully — urge  that  the  Court  rule  on 
the  request  of  the  United  States  with  the 
maximum  possible  expedition.  We  have 
taken  the  liberty  of  reviewing  the  timing 
of  the  Court's  actions  on  requests  for 
provisional  measures  in  years  past,  and 
we  have  found  that  in  one  case,  the  Court 
indicated  provisional  measures  13  days 
after  the  request  was  filed;  in  another 
case  the  Court  ruled  on  the  request  in  9 
days;  and  in  a  third  case,  the  Court  acted 
in  only  6  days.  Today  is  the  11th  day  sine 
the  pending  U.S.  request  was  filed,  and 
we  recognize,  of  course,  that  the  Court 
will  need  some  amount  of  additional  time 
to  deUberate  and  to  act. 

Nevertheless,  we  respectfully  re- 
quest that  the  Court  act  with  the  maxi- 
mum possible  speed — because  we  are 
dealing  here,  again,  not  with  commercial 
interests,  but  with  the  lives  and  liberties 
of  persons  who  have  now  been  under 
close  confinement  and  imminent  peril  for 
more  than  5  weeks.  The  danger  for  thest 
50  or  more  Uves  increases  as  each  day 
goes  by.  It  is  critically  important  to  my 
government  to  achieve  the  immediate  re 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


Middle  East 


lease  of  these  individuals,  and  I  suggest 
that  it  is  no  less  important  to  the  world 
community  and  to  the  rule  of  law. 

Mr.  President,  distinguished  and 
learned  Members  of  the  Court,  we  be- 
lieve that  this  case  presents  the  Court 
with  the  most  dramatic  opportunity  it  has 
ever  had  to  affirm  the  rule  of  law  among 
nations  and  thus  to  fulfill  the  world  com- 
munity's expectation  that  the  Court  will 
act  vigorously  in  the  interests  of  interna- 
tional law  and  international  peace.  The 
current  situation  in  Tehran  demands  an 
immediate,  forceful,  and  explicit  declara- 
tion by  the  Court,  calling  upon  Iran  to 
conform  to  the  basic  rules  of  international 
intercourse  and  human  rights.  Only  in 
that  manner,  I  respectfully  suggest,  can 
the  Court  discharge  its  high  responsibili- 
ties under  the  Charter  of  the  United 
Nations. 

On  behalf  of  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  I  respectfully 
request  that  the  Court  indicate  pro- 
visional measures  calling  upon  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Iran  to  bring  about  the  im- 
mediate release  of  the  U.S.  nationals  now- 
held  captive  in  Iran  and  the  transfer  of 
control  of  the  American  Embassy  in 
Tehran  to  the  Government  of  the  United 
States. 


TEXT  OF  COURT  ORDER 

International  Court  of  Justice 

Year  1979 
15  December  1979 

Case  Concerning  United  States 

Diplomatic  and  Consular 

Staff  in  Tehran 

(United  States  of  America  v.  Iran) 

Request  for  the  Indication  of 

Provisional  Measures 

order 

Present:  President  Sir  Humphrey  Waldock; 
Vice-President  Elias;  Judges 
Forster,  Gros,  Lachs,  Morozov, 
Nagendra  Singh,  Ruda,  Mosler, 
Tarazi,  Oda,  Ago,  El-Erian, 
Sette-Camara,  Baxter;  Registrar 
Aquarone. 

The  International  Court  of  Justice, 

Composed  as  above. 

After  deliberation, 

Having  regard  to  Articles  41  and  48  of  the 
Statute  of  the  Court, 

Having  regard  to  Articles  73  and  74  of  the 
Rules  of  Court, 

Having  regard  to  the  Application  by  the 
United  States  of  America  filed  in  the  Registry 
3f  the  Court  on  29  November  1979,  instituting 
proceedings  against  the  Islamic  Republic  of 
Iran  in  respect  of  a  dispute  concerning  the 
ituation  in  the  United  States  Embassy  in 
Tehran  and  the  seizure  and  holding  as  hostages 
jf  members  of  the  United  States  diplomatic 
md  consular  staff  in  Iran; 


Makes  the  following  Order: 

1.  Whereas  in  the  above-mentioned  Applica- 
tion the  United  States  Government  invokes 
jurisdictional  provisions  in  certain  treaties  as 
bases  for  the  Court's  jurisdiction  in  the  pres- 
ent case;  whereas  it  further  recounts  a  se- 
quence of  events,  beginning  on  4  November 
1979  in  and  around  the  United  States  Embassy 
in  Tehran  and  involving  the  invasion  of  the 
Embassy  premises,  the  seizure  of  United 
States  diplomatic  and  consular  staff  and  their 
continued  detention;  and  whereas,  on  the  basis 
of  the  facts  there  alleged,  it  requests  the  Court 
to  adjudge  and  declare: 

"(a)  That  the  Government  of  Iran,  in  tol- 
erating, encouraging,  and  failing  to  prevent 
and  punish  the  conduct  described  in  the  pre- 
ceding Statement  of  Facts  [in  the  Application], 
violated  its  international  legal  obligations  to 
the  United  States  as  provided  by 

•  Articles  22,  24,  25,  27,  29,  31,  37  and 
47  of  the  Vienna  Convention  on  Diplomatic  Re- 
lations, 

•  Articles  28,  31,  33,  34,  36  and  40  of 
the  Vienna  Convention  on  Consular  Relations, 

•  Articles  4  and  7  of  the  Convention  on 
the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  Crimes 
against  Internationally  Protected  Persons,  in- 
cluding Diplomatic  Agents,  and 

•  Articles  11(4),  XIII,  XVIII  and  XIX 
of  the  Treaty  of  Amity,  Economic  Relations, 
and  Consular  Rights  between  the  United 
States  and  Iran,  and 

•  Articles  2(3),  2(4)  and  33  of  the  Char- 
ter of  the  United  Nations; 

(b)  That  pursuant  to  the  foregoing  inter- 
national legal  obligations,  the  Government  of 
Iran  is  under  a  particular  obligation  immedi- 
ately to  secure  the  release  of  all  United  States 
nationals  currently  being  detained  within  the 
premises  of  the  United  States  Embassy  in 
Tehran  and  to  assure  that  all  such  persons  and 
all  other  United  States  nationals  in  Tehran  are 
allowed  to  leave  Iran  safely; 

(c)  That  the  Government  of  Iran  shall  pay 
to  the  United  States,  in  its  own  right  and  in 
the  exercise  of  its  right  of  diplomatic  protec- 
tion of  its  nationals,  reparation  for  the  forego- 
ing violations  of  Iran's  international  legal  obli- 
gations to  the  United  States,  in  a  sum  to  be 
determined  by  the  Court;  and 

(d)  That  the  Government  of  Iran  submit 
to  its  competent  authorities  for  the  purpose  of 
prosecution  those  persons  responsible  for  the 
crimes  committed  against  the  premises  and 
staff  of  the  United  States  Embassy  and 
against  the  premises  of  its  Consulates"; 

2.  Having  regard  to  the  request  dated  29 
November  1979  and  filed  in  the  Registry  the 
same  day,  whereby  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  relying  on  Article 
41  of  the  Statute  and  Articles  73,  74  and  75  of 
the  Rules  of  Court,  asks  the  Court  urgently  to 
indicate,  pending  the  final  decision  in  the  case 
brought  before  it  by  the  above-mentioned  Ap- 
plication of  the  same  date,  the  following  pro- 
visional measures: 

"(a)  That  the  Government  of  Iran  imme- 
diately release  all  hostages  of  United  States 
nationality  and  facilitate  the  prompt  and  safe 


*  February  1980 


departure  from  Iran  of  these  persons  and  all 
other  United  States  officials  in  dignified  and 
humane  circumstances. 

(b)  That  the  Government  of  Iran  immedi- 
ately clear  the  premises  of  the  United  States 
Embassy,  Chancery  and  Consulate  of  all  per- 
sons whose  presence  is  not  authorized  by  the 
United  States  Charge  d'Affaires  in  Iran,  and 
restore  the  premises  to  United  States  control. 

(c)  That  the  Government  of  Iran  ensure 
that  all  persons  attached  to  the  United  States 
Embassy  and  Consulate  should  be  accorded, 
and  protected  in,  full  freedom  within  the  Em- 
bassy and  Chancery  premises,  and  the  freedom 
of  movement  within  Iran  necessary  to  carry 
out  their  diplomatic  and  consular  functions. 

(d)  That  the  Government  of  Iran  not  place 
on  trial  any  person  attached  to  the  Embassy 
and  Consulate  of  the  United  States  and  refrain 
from  any  action  to  implement  any  such  trial. 

(e)  That  the  Government  of  Iran  ensure 
that  no  action  is  taken  which  might  prejudice 
the  rights  of  the  United  States  in  respect  of 
the  carrying  out  of  any  decision  which  the 
Court  may  render  on  the  merits,  and  in  par- 
ticular neither  take  nor  permit  action  that 
would  threaten  the  Uves,  safety,  or  well-being 
of  the  hostages"; 

3.  Whereas,  on  the  day  on  which  the  Appli- 
cation and  request  for  indication  of  provisional 
measures  were  received  in  the  Registry,  the 
Government  of  Iran  was  notified  by  telegram 
of  the  fihng  of  the  Application  and  request, 
and  of  the  particular  measures  requested,  and 
copies  of  both  documents  were  transmitted  by 
express  airmail  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs of  Iran; 

4.  Whereas,  pursuant  to  Article  40,  para- 
graph 3,  of  the  Statute  and  Article  42  of  the 
Rules  of  Court,  copies  of  the  Application  were 
transmitted  to  Members  of  the  United  Nations 
and  to  other  States  entitled  to  appear  before 
the  Court; 

5.  Whereas  on  6  December  1979  the  Regis- 
trar addressed  the  notification  provided  for  in 
Article  63  of  the  Statute  of  the  Court  to  the 
States,  other  than  the  parties  to  the  case, 
which  were  listed  in  the  relevant  documents  of 
the  United  Nations  Secretariat  as  parties  to 
the  following  conventions,  invoked  in  the  Ap- 
plication: 

(i)  the  Vienna  Convention  on  Diplomatic 
Relations  of  1961,  and  the  accompanying  Op- 
tional Protocol  Concerning  the  Compulsory 
Settlement  of  Disputes; 

(ii)  the  Vienna  Convention  on  Consular 
Relations  of  1963,  and  the  accompanying  Op- 
tional Protocol  Concerning  the  Compulsory 
Settlement  of  Disputes; 

(iii)  the  Convention  on  the  Prevention  and 
Punishment  of  Crimes  against  Internationally 
Protected  Persons,  including  Diplomatic 
Agents,  of  1973; 

6.  Whereas  on  30  November  1979,  pending 
the  meeting  of  the  Court,  the  President,  in 
exercise  of  the  power  conferred  on  him  by  Ar- 
ticle 74,  paragraph  4,  of  the  Rules  of  Court, 
addressed  a  telegram  to  each  of  the  two  gov- 
ernments concerned  calling  attention  to  the 
fact  that  the  matter  was  now  sub  judice  before 
the  Court  and  to  the  need  to  act  in  such  a  way 
as  would  enable  any  Order  the  Court  might 
make  in  the  present  proceedings  to  have  its 


49 


Middle  East 


appropriate  effects;  and  whereas  by  those 
telegrams  the  two  governments  were,  in  addi- 
tion, informed  that  the  Court  would  hold  pub- 
lic hearings  at  an  early  date  at  which  they 
might  present  their  observations  on  the  re- 
quest for  provisional  measures,  and  that  the 
projected  date  for  such  hearings  was  10  De- 
cember 1979,  this  date  being  later  confirmed 
by  further  telegrams  of  3  December  1979; 

7.  Whereas,  in  preparation  for  the  hearings, 
the  President  put  certain  preliminary  ques- 
tions to  the  Agent  of  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment by  a  telegram  of  4  December  1979,  a 
copy  of  which  was  communicated  on  the  same 
date  to  the  Government  of  Iran;  whereas,  in 
response  to  those  questions  the  United  States 
Agent  on  7  December  1979  submitted  to  the 
Court  a  declaration  by  Mr  David  D.  Newsom, 
Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Political  Affairs, 
together  with  certain  documents  appended 
thereto;  and  whereas  copies  of  that  letter  and 
the  declaration  and  documents  accompanying 
it  were  immediately  transmitted  to  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Iran; 

8.  Whereas  on  9  December  1979  a  letter, 
dated  the  same  day  and  transmitted  by  tele- 
gram, was  received  from  the  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs  of  Iran,  which  reads  as  follows: 
[Tyaiislation  from  French  ] 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  receipt 
of  the  telegrams  concerning  the  meeting  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  on  10  December 
1979,  at  the  request  of  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  and  to  submit  to 
you  below  the  position  of  the  Government  of 
the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  in  this  respect. 

1.  First  of  all,  the  Government  of  the  Is- 
lamic Republic  of  Iran  wishes  to  express  its  re- 
spect for  the  International  Court  of  Justice, 
and  for  its  distinguished  members,  for  what 
they  have  achieved  in  the  quest  for  just  and 
equitable  solutions  to  legal  conflicts  between 
States.  However,  the  Government  of  the  Is- 
lamic Republic  of  Iran  considers  that  the 
Court  cannot  and  should  not  take  cognizance  of 
the  case  which  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  of  America  has  submitted  to  it,  and  in  a 
most  significant  fashion,  a  ease  confined  to 
what  is  called  the  question  of  the  "hostages  of 
the  American  Embassy  in  Tehran". 

2.  For  this  question  only  represents  a 
marginal  and  secondary  aspect  of  an  overall 
problem,  one  such  that  it  cannot  be  studied 
separately,  and  which  involves,  inter  alia, 
more  than  25  years  of  continual  interference  by 
the  United  States  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
Iran,  the  shameless  exploitation  of  our  coun- 
try, and  numerous  crimes  perpetrated  against 
the  Iranian  people,  contrary  to  and  in  conflict 
with  all  international  and  humanitarian  norms. 

3.  The  problem  involved  in  the  conflict 
between  Iran  and  the  United  States  is  thus  not 
one  of  the  interpretation  and  the  application  of 
the  treaties  upon  which  the  American  Applica- 
tion is  based,  but  results  from  an  overall  situa- 
tion containing  much  more  fundamental  and 
more  complex  elements.  Consequently,  the 
Court  cannot  examine  the  American  Applica- 
tion divorced  from  its  proper  context,  namely 
the  whole  political  dossier  of  the  relations  be- 
tween Iran  and  the  United  States  over  the  last 
25  years.  This  dossier  includes,  inter  alia,  all 
the  crimes  perpetrated  in  Iran  by  the  Ameri- 


50 


can  Government,  in  particular  the  coup  d'etat 
of  1953  stirred  up  and  carried  out  by  the  CIA, 
the  overthrow  of  the  lawful  national  govern- 
ment of  Dr  Mossadegh,  the  restoration  of  the 
Shah  and  of  his  regime  which  was  under  the 
control  of  American  interests,  and  all  the  so- 
cial, economic,  cultural,  and  poHtical  conse- 
quences of  the  direct  interventions  in  our 
internal  affairs,  as  well  as  grave,  flagrant  and 
continuous  violations  of  all  international 
norms,  committed  by  the  United  States  in 
Iran. 

4.  With  regard  to  the  request  for  pro- 
visional measures,  as  formulated  by  the 
United  States,  it  in  fact  impHes  that  the  Court 
should  have  passed  judgment  on  the  actual 
substance  of  the  case  submitted  to  it,  which 
the  Court  cannot  do  without  breach  of  the 
norms  governing  its  jurisdiction.  Fur- 
thermore, since  provisional  measures  are  by 
definition  intended  to  protect  the  interests  of 
the  parties,  they  cannot  be  unilateral,  as  they 
are  in  the  request  submitted  by  the  American 
Government. 

In  conclusion,  the  Government  of  the  Is- 
lamic Republic  of  Iran  respectfully  draws  the 
attention  of  the  Court  to  the  deep-rootedness 
and  the  essential  character  of  the  Islamic  revo- 
lution of  Iran,  a  revolution  of  a  whole  op- 
pressed nation  against  its  oppressors  and  their 
masters;  any  examination  of  the  numerous  re- 
percussions thereof  is  a  matter  essentially  and 
directly  within  the  national  sovereignty  of 
Iran. 

9.  Whereas  both  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the  Government 
of  Iran  have  been  afforded  an  opportunity  of 
presenting  their  observations  on  the  request 
for  the  indication  of  provisional  measures; 

10.  Whereas  at  the  public  hearing  held  on  10 
December  1979  there  were  present  in  Court 
the  Agent,  counsel  and  adviser  of  the  United 
States  of  America; 

11.  Having  heard  the  oral  observations  on 
the  request  for  provisional  measures  on  behalf 
of  the  United  States  of  America  presented  by 
the  Honorable  Roberts  B.  Owen,  Agent,  and 
the  Honorable  Benjamin  R.  Civiletti, 
Attorney-General  of  the  United  States,  as 
counsel,  and  taking  note  of  the  repHes  given  on 
behalf  of  that  Government  to  further  questions 
put  at  the  conclusion  of  the  hearing  by  the 
President  of  the  Court  and  by  two  Members  of 
the  Court; 

12.  Having  taken  note  that  the  final  sub- 
missions of  the  United  States  of  America  filed 
in  the  Registry  on  12  December  1979,  follow- 
ing the  hearing  of  10  December  1979,  were  to 
the  effect  that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  requests  that  the  Court,  pending  final 
judgment  in  this  case,  indicate  forthwith  the 
following  measures: 

"First,  that  the  Government  of  Iran  im- 
mediately release  all  hostages  of  United  States 
nationality  and  facihtate  the  prompt  and  safe 
departure  from  Iran  of  these  persons  and  all 
other  United  States  officials  in  dignified  and 
humane  circumstances. 

Second,  that  the  Government  of  Iran  im- 
mediately clear  the  premises  of  the  United 
States  Embassy,  Chancery  and  Consulate  in 
Tehran  of  all  persons  whose  presence  is  not  au- 
thorized by  the  United  States  Charge  d'Af- 


faires  in  Iran,  and  restore  the  premises  to 
United  States  control. 

Third,  that  the  Government  of  Iran  en- 
sure that,  to  the  extent  that  the  United  States 
should  choose,  and  Iran  should  agree,  to  the 
continued  presence  of  United  States  diplomatic 
and  consular  personnel  in  Iran,  all  persons  at- 
tached to  the  United  States  Embassy  and 
Consulates  should  be  accorded,  and  protected 
in,  full  freedom  of  movement,  as  well  as  the 
privileges  and  immunities  to  which  they  are 
entitled,  necessary  to  carry  out  their  diplo- 
matic and  consular  functions. 

Fourth,  that  the  Government  of  Iran  not 
place  on  trial  any  person  attached  to  the  Em- 
bassy and  Consulates  of  the  United  States  and 
refrain  from  any  action  to  implement  any  such 
trial;  and  that  the  Government  of  Iran  not  de- 
tain or  permit  the  detention  of  any  such  person 
in  connection  with  any  proceedings,  whether  of 
an  'international  commission'  or  otherwise,  and 
that  any  such  person  not  be  required  to  partic- 
ipate in  any  such  proceeding. 

Fifth,  that  the  Government  of  Iran  ensure 
that  no  action  is  taken  which  might  prejudice 
the  rights  of  the  United  States  in  respect  of 
carrying  out  of  any  decision  which  the  Court 
may  render  on  the  merits,  and,  in  particular, 
neither  take,  nor  permit,  action  that  would 
threaten  the  lives,  safety,  or  well-being  of  the 
hostages"; 

13.  Noting  that  the  Government  of  Iran  was 
not  represented  at  the  hearing;  and  whereas 
the  non-appearance  of  one  of  the  States  con- 
cerned cannot  by  itself  constitute  an  obstacle 
to  the  indication  of  provisional  measures; 

14.  Whereas  the  treaty  provisions  on  which, 
in  its  Application  and  oral  observations,  the 
United  States  Government  claims  to  found  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Court  to  entertain  the  pres- 
ent case  are  the  following: 

(i)  the  Vienna  Convention  on  Diplomatic 
Relations  of  1961,  and  Article  1  of  its  accom- 
panying Optional  Protocol  concerning  the 
Compulsory  Settlement  of  Disputes; 

(ii)  the  Vienna  Convention  on  Consular 
Relations  of  1963,  and  Article  1  of  its  accom- 
panying Optional  Protocol  concerning  the 
Compulsory  Settlement  of  Disputes; 

(iii)  Article  XXI,  paragraph  2,  of  the 
Treaty  of  Amity,  Economic  Relations,  and 
Consular  Rights  of  19.55  betw^een  the  United 
States  of  America  and  Iran;  and 

(iv)  Article  13,  paragraph  1,  of  the  Con- 
vention of  1973  on  the  Prevention  and  Punish- 
ment of  Crimes  against  Internationally  Pro- 
tected Persons,  including  Diplomatic  Agents; 

15.  Whereas  on  the  request  for  provisional 
measures  in  the  present  case  the  Court  ought 
to  indicate  such  measures  only  if  the  provisions 
invoked  by  the  Applicant  appear,  prima  facie, 
to  afford  a  basis  on  which  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Court  might  be  founded; 

16.  Whereas,  so  far  as  concerns  the  rights 
claimed  by  the  United  States  of  America  with 
regard  to  the  personnel  and  premises  of  its 
Embassy  and  Consulates  in  Iran,  Article  I  of 
each  of  the  two  Protocols  which  accompany  the 
Vienna  Conventions  of  1961  and  1963  on,  re- 
spectively. Diplomatic  and  Consular  Relations 
provides  expressly  that: 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Middle  East 


"Disputes  arising  out  of  the  interpretation 
or  application  of  the  Convention  shall  lie  within 
the  compulsorj'  jurisdiction  of  the  Interna- 
tional Court  of  Justice  and  may  accordingly  be 
brought  before  the  Court  by  an  application 
made  by  any  party  to  the  dispute  being  a 
Party  to  the  present  Protocol"; 
whereas  the  United  Nations  publication  Mul- 
tilateral Treaties  in  respect  of  which  the 
Secretary-General  Performs  Depositary  Func- 
tions lists  both  Iran  and  the  United  States  as 
parties  to  each  of  the  two  Conventions,  as  also 
to  each  of  their  Protocols  concerning  the  com- 
pulsory settlement  of  disputes,  and  in  all  cases 
without  any  reservation  to  the  instrument  in 
question; 

17.  Whereas,  while  it  is  true  that  Articles  II 
and  III  of  the  above-mentioned  Protocols  pro- 
vide for  the  possibility  for  the  parties  to  agree, 
under  certain  conditions,  to  resort  not  to  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  but  to  an  arbi- 
tral tribunal  or  to  a  conciliation  procedure,  no 
such  agreement  was  reached  by  the  parties; 
and  whereas  the  terms  of  Article  I  of  the  Op- 
tional Protocols  provide  in  the  clearest  manner 
for  the  compulsory  jurisdiction  of  the  Interna- 
tional Court  of  Justice  in  respect  of  any  dis- 
pute  arising  out  of  the  interpretation  or  appli- 
cation of  the  above-mentioned  Vienna  Con- 
ventions; 

18.  Whereas,  accordingly,  it  is  manifest  from 
the  information  before  the  Court  and  from  the 
terms  of  Article  I  of  each  of  the  two  Protocols 
that  the  provisions  of  these  Articles  furnish  a 
basis  on  which  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court 
might  be  founded  with  regard  to  the  claims  of 
the  United  States  under  the  Vienna  Con- 
ventions of  1961  and  1963; 

19.  Whereas,  so  far  as  concerns  the  rights 
claimed  by  the  United  States  with  regard  to 
two  of  its  nationals  who,  according  to  the  dec- 
laration by  Mr.  David  D.  Newsom  referred  to 
in  paragraph  7  above,  are  not  personnel  either 
of  its  diplomatic  or  of  its  consular  mission,  it 
appears  from  the  statements  of  the  United 
States  Government  that  these  two  private  in- 
dividuals were  seized  and  are  detained  as  hos- 
tages within  the  premises  of  the  United  States 
Embassy  or  Consulate  in  Tehran;  whereas  it 
follows  that  the  seizure  and  detention  of  these 
individuals  also  fall  within  the  scope  of  the  ap- 
plicable provisions  of  the  Vienna  Conventions 
of  1961  and  1963  relating  to  the  inviolability  of 
the  premises  of  Embassies  and  Consulates; 
whereas,  furthermore,  the  seizure  and  deten- 
tion of  these  individuals  in  the  circumstances 
alleged  by  the  United  States  clearly  fall  also 
within  the  scope  of  the  provisions  of  Article  5 
of  the  Vienna  Convention  of  1963  e.\pressly 
providing  that  consular  functions  include  the 
functions  of  protecting,  assisting  and  safe- 
iguarding  the  interests  of  nationals;  and 
whereas  the  purpose  of  these  functions  is  pre- 
cisely to  enable  the  sending  State,  through  its 
consulates,  to  ensure  that  its  nationals  are  ac- 
corded the  treatment  due  to  them  under  the 
general  rules  of  international  law  as  aliens 
within  the  territory  of  the  foreign  State; 

20.  Whereas,  accordingly,  it  is  likewise  man- 
ifest that  Article  I  of  the  Protocols  concerning 
the  compulsory  settlement  of  disputes  which 
accompany  the  Vienna  Conventions  of  1961  and 
1963  furnishes  a  basis  on  which  the  jurisdiction 


February  1980 


of  the  Court  might  be  founded  with  regard  to 
the  claims  of  the  United  States  in  respect  of 
the  two  private  individuals  in  question; 

21.  Whereas,  therefore,  the  Court  does  not 
find  it  necessary  for  present  purposes  to  enter 
into  the  question  whether  a  basis  for  the  exer- 
cise of  its  powers  under  Article  41  of  the  Stat- 
ute might  also  be  found  under  Article  XXI, 
paragraph  2,  of  the  Treaty  of  Amity,  Economic 
Relations,  and  Consular  Rights  of  1955,  and 
Article  13,  paragraph  1,  of  the  Convention  on 
the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  Crimes 
against  Internationally  Protected  Persons,  in- 
cluding Diplomatic  Agents,  of  1973. 

22.  Whereas,  on  the  other  hand,  in  the 
above-mentioned  letter  of  9  December  1979  the 
Government  of  Iran  maintains  that  the  Court 
cannot  and  should  not  take  cognizance  of  the 
present  case,  for  the  reason  that  the  question 
of  the  hostages  forms  only  "a  marginal  and 
secondary  aspect  of  an  overall  problem"  involv- 
ing the  activities  of  the  United  States  in  Iran 
over  a  period  of  more  than  25  years;  and 
whereas  it  further  maintains  that  any  exami- 
nation of  the  numerous  repercussions  of  the  Is- 
lamic revolution  of  Iran  is  essentially  and  di- 
rectly a  matter  within  the  national  sovereignty 
of  Iran; 

23.  Whereas,  however  important,  and  how- 
ever connected  with  the  present  case,  the  in- 
iquities attributed  to  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment by  the  Government  of  Iran  in  that 
letter  may  appear  to  be  to  the  latter  Govern- 
ment, the  seizure  of  the  United  States  Em- 
bassy and  Consulates  and  the  detention  of  in- 
ternationally protected  persons  as  hostages 
cannot,  in  the  view  of  the  Court,  be  regarded 
as  something  "secondary"  or  "marginal",  hav- 
ing regard  to  the  importance  of  the  legal  prin- 
ciples involved;  whereas  the  Court  notes  in 
this  regard  that  the  Secretary-General  of  the 
United  Nations  has  indeed  referred  to  these 
occurrences  as  "a  grave  situation"  posing  "a 
serious  threat  to  international  peace  and  secu- 
rity" and  that  the  Security  Council  in  resolu- 
tion 457  (1979)  expressed  itself  as  deeply 
concerned  at  the  dangerous  level  of  tension 
between  the  two  States,  which  could  have 
grave  consequences  for  international  peace  and 
security; 

24.  Whereas,  moreover,  if  the  Iranian  Gov- 
ernment considers  the  alleged  activities  of  the 
United  States  in  Iran  legally  to  have  a  close 
connection  with  the  subject-matter  of  the 
United  States  Application,  it  remains  open  to 
that  Government  under  the  Court's  Statute 
and  Rules  to  present  its  own  arguments  to  the 
Court  regarding  those  activities  either  by  way 
of  defence  in  a  Counter-Memorial  or  by  way  of 
a  counter-claim  filed  under  Article  80  of  the 
Rules  of  Court;  whereas,  therefore,  by  not  ap- 
pearing in  the  present  proceedings,  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Iran,  by  its  own  choice,  deprives 
itself  of  the  opportunity  of  developing  its  own 
arguments  before  the  Court  and  of  itself  fding 
a  request  for  the  indication  of  provisional 
measures;  and  whereas  no  provision  of  the 
Statute  or  Rules  contemplates  that  the  Court 
should  decline  to  take  cognizance  of  one  aspect 
of  a  dispute  merely  because  that  dispute  has 
other  aspects,  however  important; 

25.  Whereas  it  is  no  doubt  true  that  the  Is- 
lamic revolution  of  Iran  is  a  matter  "essentially 
and  directly  within  the  national  sovereignty  of 
Iran";  whereas  however  a  dispute  which  con- 


cerns diplomatic  and  consular  premises  and  the 
detention  of  internationally  protected  persons, 
and  involves  the  interpretation  or  application 
of  multilateral  conventions  codifying  the  inter- 
national law  governing  diplomatic  and  consular 
relations,  is  one  which  by  its  very  nature  falls 
within  international  jurisdiction; 

26.  Whereas  accordingly  the  two  consid- 
erations advanced  by  the  Government  of  Iran 
in  its  letter  of  9  December  1979  cannot,  in  the 
view  of  the  Court,  be  accepted  as  constituting 
any  obstacle  to  the  Court's  taking  cognizance 
of  the  case  brought  before  it  by  the  United 
States  Application  of  29  November  1979. 

27.  Whereas  in  that  same  letter  of  9  De- 
cember 1979  the  Government  of  Iran  also  puts 
forward  two  considerations  on  the  basis  of 
which  it  contends  that  the  Court  ought  not,  in 
any  event,  to  accede  to  the  United  States  re- 
quest for  provisional  measures  in  the  present 
case; 

28.  Whereas,  in  the  first  place,  it  maintains 
that  the  request  for  provisional  measures,  as 
formulated  by  the  United  States,  "in  fact  im- 
pHes  that  the  Court  should  have  passed  judg- 
ment on  the  actual  substance  of  the  case  sub- 
mitted to  it";  whereas  it  is  true  that  in  the 
Factory  at  Chorzow  case  the  Permanent  Court 
of  International  Justice  declined  to  indicate 
interim  measures  of  protection  on  the  ground 
that  the  request  in  that  case  was  "designed  to 
obtain  an  interim  judgment  in  favour  of  a  part 
of  the  claim"  {Order  of  21  November  1927, 
P.C.I. J..  Series  A,  No.  12,  at  p.  10);:whereas, 
however,  the  circumstances  of  that  case  were 
entirely  different  from  those  of  the  present 
one,  and  the  request  there  sought  to  obtain 
from  the  Court  a  final  judgment  on  part  of  a 
claim  for  a  sum  of  money;  whereas,  moreover, 
a  request  for  provisional  measures  must  by  its 
very  nature  relate  to  the  substance  of  the  case 
since,  as  Article  41  expressly  states,  their  ob- 
ject is  to  preserve  the  respective  rights  of 
either  party;  and  whereas  in  the  present  case 
the  purpose  of  the  United  States  request  ap- 
pears to  be  not  to  obtain  a  judginent,  interim 
or  final,  on  the  merits  of  its  claims  but  to  pre- 
serve the  substance  of  the  rights  which  it 
claims  pendente  lite; 

29.  Whereas,  in  the  second  place,  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Iran  takes  the  position  that  "since 
provisional  measures  are  by  definition  in- 
tended to  protect  the  interests  of  the  parties 
they  cannot  be  unilateral";  whereas,  however, 
the' hypothesis  on  which  this  proposition  is 
based  does  not  accord  with  the  terms  of  Arti- 
cle 41  of  the  Statute  which  refer  explicitly  to 
"any  provisional  measures  which  ought  to  be 
taken  to  preserve  the  respective  rights  of 
either  party";  whereas  the  whole  concept  of  an 
indication  of  provisional  measures,  as  Article 
73  of  the  Rules  recognizes,  imphes  a  request 
from  one  of  the  parties  for  measures  to  pre- 
serve its  own  rights  against  action  by  the 
other  party  calculated  to  prejudice  those 
rights  pendente  lite;  whereas  it  follows  that  a 
request  for  provisional  measures  is  by  its  na- 
ture unilateral;  and  whereas  the  Government 
of  Iran  has  not  appeared  before  the  Court  in 
order  to  request  the  indication  of  provisional 
measures;  whereas,  however,  the  Court,  as  it 
has  recognized  in  Article  75  of  its  Rules,  must 
at  all  times  be  alert  to  protect  the  rights  of 


51 


Middle  East 


both  the  parties  in  proceedings  before  it  and, 
in  indicating  provisional  measures,  has  not  in- 
frequently done  so  with  reference  to  both  the 
parties;  and  whereas  this  does  not,  and  cannot, 
mean  that  the  Court  is  precluded  from  enter- 
taining a  request  from  a  party  merely  by  rea- 
son of  the  fact  that  measures  which  it  requests 
are  unilateral; 

.30.  Whereas,  accordingly,  neither  of  the 
considerations  put  foi-ward  in  the  Iranian  Gov- 
ernment's letter  of  9  December  1979  can  be  re- 
garded as  constituting  grounds  which  should 
lead  the  Court  to  decline  to  entertain  the 
United  States  request  in  the  present  case; 

31.  Whereas  it  follows  that  the  Court  has 
not  found  in  the  Iranian  Government's  letter  of 
9  December  1979  legal  grounds  which  should 
lead  it  to  conclude  that  it  ought  not  to  enter- 
tain the  United  States  request; 

32.  Whereas  the  Court  will  accordingly  now 
proceed  to  examine  the  request  of  the  United 
States  Government  for  the  indication  of  pro- 
visional measures  in  the  present  case; 

33.  Whereas  by  the  terms  of  Article  41  of 
the  Statute  the  Court  may  indicate  such  meas- 
ures only  when  it  considers  that  circumstances 
so  require  in  order  to  preserve  the  rights  of 
either  party; 

34.  Whereas  the  circumstances  alleged  by 
the  United  States  Government  which,  in  the 
submission  of  that  Government,  require  the 
indication  of  provisional  measures  in  the  pres- 
ent case  may  be  summarized  as  follow^s; 


(i)  On  4  November  1979,  in  the  course  of  a 
demonstration  outside  the  United  States  Em- 
bassy compound  in  Tehran,  demonstrators  at- 
tacked the  Embassy  premises;  no  Iranian  se- 
curity forces  intervened  or  were  sent  to  relieve 
the  situation,  despite  repeated  calls  for  help 
from  the  Embassy  to  the  Iranian  authorities. 
Ultimately  the  whole  of  the  Embassy  premises 
was  invaded.  The  Embassy  personnel,  includ- 
ing consular  and  non-American  staff,  and  vis- 
itors who  were  present  in  the  Embassy  at  the 
time  were  seized.  Shortly  afterwards,  accord- 
ing to  the  Unites  States  Government,  its  con- 
sulates in  Tabriz  and  Shiraz,  which  had  been 
attacked  earlier  in  1979,  were  also  seized, 
without  any  action  being  taken  to  prevent  it; 
(ii)  Since  that  time,  the  premises  of  the 
United  States  Embassy  in  Tehran,  and  of  the 
consulates  in  Tabriz  and  Shiraz,  have  remained 
in  the  hands  of  the  persons  who  seized  them. 
These  persons  have  ransacked  the  archives 
and  documents  both  of  the  diplomatic  mission 
and  of  its  consular  section.  The  Embassy  per- 
sonnel and  other  persons  seized  at  the  time  of 
the  attack  have  been  held  hostage  with  the  ex- 
ception of  13  persons  released  on  18  and  20 
November  1979.  Those  holding  the  hostages 
have  refused  to  release  them,  save  on  condi- 
tion of  the  fulfilment  by  the  United  States  of 
various  demands  regarded  by  it  as  unaccepta- 
ble. The  hostages  are  stated  to  have  frequently 
been  bound,  blindfolded,  and  subjected  to  se- 
vere discomfort,  complete  isolation  and  threats 
that  they  would  be  put  on  trial  or  even  put  to 
death.  The  United  States  Government  affirms 
that  it  has  reason  to  believe  that  some  of  them 
may  have  been  transferred  to  other  places  of 
confinement; 

(iii)  The  Government  of  the  United  States 
considers  that  not  merely  has  the  Iranian  Gov- 


ernment failed  to  prevent  the  events  described 
above  but  also  that  there  is  clear  evidence  of 
its  complicity  in,  and  approval  of,  those  events; 
(iv)  The  persons  held  hostage  in  the  prem- 
ises of  the  United  States  Embassy  in  Tehran 
include,  according  to  the  information  furnished 
to  the  Court  by  the  Agent  of  the  United 
States,  at  least  28  persons  having  the  status, 
duly  recognized  by  the  Government  of  Iran,  of 
"member  of  the  diplomatic  staff"  within  the 
meaning  of  the  Vienna  Convention  on  Diplo- 
matic Relations  of  1961;  at  least  20  persons 
having  the  status,  similarly  recognized,  of 
"members  of  the  administrative  and  technical 
staff"  within  the  meaning  of  that  Convention; 
and  two  other  persons  of  United  States  na- 
tionality not  possessing  either  diplomatic  or 
consular  status.  Of  the  persons  with  the  status 
of  member  of  the  diplomatic  staff,  four  are 
members  of  the  Consular  Section  of  the  Em- 
bassy; ,    , ,  u 

(v)  In  addition  to  the  persons  held  hos- 
tage in  the  premises  of  the  Tehran  Embassy, 
the  United  States  Charge  d'Affaires  in  Iran 
and  two  other  United  States  diplomatic  agents 
are  detained  in  the  premises  of  the  Iranian 
Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs,  in  circumstances 
which  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
has  not  been  able  to  make  entirely  clear,  but 
which  apparently  involve  restriction  of  their 
freedom  of  movement,  and  a  threat  to  their  in- 
violability as  diplomats; 

35.  Whereas  on  the  basis  of  the  above  cir- 
cumstances alleged  by  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment it  claims  in  the  Application  that  the 
Government  of  Iran  has  violated  and  is  violat- 
ing a  number  of  the  legal  obligations  imposed 
upon  it  by  the  Vienna  Convention  on  Diplo- 
matic Relations  of  1961,  the  Vienna  Convention 
on  Consular  Relations  of  1963,  the  Treaty  of 
Amity  Economic  Relations,  and  Consular 
Rights  between  Iran  and  the  United  States  of 
1955,  the  Convention  on  the  Prevention  and 
Punishment  of  Crimes  against  Internationally 
Protected  Persons,  including  Diplomatic 
Agents,  of  1973,  the  Charter  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, and  customary  international  law; 

36.'  Whereas  the  power  of  the  court  to  indi- 
cate provisional  measures  under  Article  41  of 
the  Statute  of  the  Court  has  as  its  object  to 
preserve  the  respective  rights  of  the  parties 
pending  the  decision  of  the  Court,  and  presup- 
poses that  irreparable  prejudice  should  not  be 
caused  to  rights  which  are  the  subject  of  dis- 
pute in  judicial  proceedings; 

.37.  Whereas  the  rights  which  the  United 
States  of  America  submits  as  entitled  to  pro- 
tection by  the  indication  of  provisional  meas- 
ures were  specified  in  the  request  of  29 
November  1979  as: 


"the  rights  of  its  nationals  to  life,  liberty, 
protection  and  security;  the  rights  of  inviolabil- 
ity, immunity  and  protection  for  its  diplomatic 
and  consular  officials;  and  the  rights  of  inviola- 
bility and  protection  for  its  diplomatic  and  con- 
sular premises"; 
and  at  the  hearing  of  10  December  1979  as: 

"the  right  [of  the  United  States]  to  main- 
tain a  working  and  effective  embassy  in 
Tehran,  the  right  to  have  its  diplomatic  and 
consular  personnel  protected  in  their  lives  and 
persons  from  every  form  of  interference  and 


abuse,  and  the  right  to  have  its  nationals  pro- 
tected and  secure"; 

and  whereas  the  measures  requested  by  the 
United  States  for  the  protection  of  these  rights 
are  as  set  out  in  paragraphs  2  and  12  above; 

38.  Whereas  there  is  no  more  fundamental 
prerequisite  for  the  conduct  of  relations  be- 
tween States  than  the  inviolability  of  diplo- 
matic envoys  and  embassies,  so  that  through- 
out history  nations  of  all  creeds  and  cultures 
have  observed  reciprocal  obligations  for  that 
purpose;  and  whereas  the  obligations  thus  as- 
sumed notably  those  for  assuring  the  personal 
safety  of  diplomats  and  their  freedom  from 
prosecution,  are  essential,  unqualified,  and  in- 
herent in  their  representative  character  and 
their  diplomatic  function; 

39.  Whereas  the  institution  of  diplomacy, 
with  its  concomitant  privileges  and  im- 
munities, has  withstood  the  test  of  centuries 
and  proved  to  be  an  instrument  essential  for 
effective  co-operation  in  the  international 
community  and  for  enabling  States,  irrespec- 
tive of  their  differing  constitutional  and  social      ] 
systems,  to  achieve  mutual  understanding  and 
to  resolve  their  differences  by  peaceful  means; 
40.  Whereas  the  unimpeded  conduct  of  con- 
sular relations,  which  have  also  been  estab- 
lished  between  peoples  since  ancient  times,  is 
no  less  important  in  the  context  of  present-day 
international  law,  in  promoting  the  develop- 
ment of  friendly  relations  among  nations,  and 
ensuring  protection  and  assistance  for  aliens 
resident  in  the  territories  of  other  States;  and 
whereas  therefore  the  privileges  and  im- 
munities of  consular  officers  and  consular  em- 
ployees, and  the  inviolability  of  consular  prem- 
ises and  archives,  are  similarly  principles 
deep-rooted  in  international  law; 

41.  Whereas,  while  no  State  is  under  any 
obligation  to  maintain  diplomatic  or  consular 
relations  with  another,  yet  it  cannot  fail  to  rec- 
ognize the  imperative  obligations  inherent 
therein,  now  codified  in  the  Vienna  Con- 
ventions of  1961  and  1963,  to  which  both  Iran 
and  the  United  States  are  parties; 

42.  Whereas  continuance  of  the  situation  the 
subject  of  the  present  request  exposes  the 
human  beings  concerned  to  privation,  hard- 
ship, anguish  and  even  danger  to  hfe  and 
health  and  thus  to  a  serious  possibiUty  of  ir- 
reparable harm; 

43.  Wliereas  in  connection  with  the  present 
request  the  Court  cannot  fail  to  take  note  of 
the  provisions  of  the  Convention  on  the  Pre- 
vention and  Punishment  of  Crimes  against  In- 
ternationally Protected  Persons,  including  Dip- 
lomatic Agents,  of  1973,  to  which  both  Iran 
and  the  United  States  are  parties; 

44.  Whereas  in  the  light  of  the  several  con- 
siderations set  out  above,  the  Court  finds  that 
the  circumstances  require  it  to  indicate  pro- 
visional measures,  as  provided  by  Article  41  of 
the  Statute  of  the  Court,  in  order  to  preserve 
the  rights  claimed; 

45.  Whereas  the  decision  given  in  the  pres- 
ent proceedings  in  no  way  prejudges  the  ques- 
tion of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  to  deal 
with  the  merits  of  the  case  or  any  questions 
relating  to  the  merits  themselves,  and  leaves 
unaffected  the  right  of  the  Government  of  Irar 
to  submit  arguments  against  such  jurisdiction 
or  in  respect  of  such  merits; 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


Middle  East 


46.  Whereas  the  Court  will  therefore  now 
proceed  to  indicate  the  measures  which  it  con- 
siders are  required  in  the  present  case; 

47.  Accordingly, 

The  Court, 
unanimously, 

1.  Indicates,  pending  its  final  decision  in  the 
proceedings  instituted  on  29  November  1979 
by  the  United  States  of  America  against  the 
Islamic  Republic  of  Iran,  the  following  pro- 
visional measures: 

A.  (i)  The  Government  of  the  Islamic  Re- 
public of  Iran  should  immediately  ensure  that 
the  premises  of  the  United  States  Embassy, 
Chancery  and  Consulates  be  restored  to  the 
possession  of  the  United  States  authorities 
under  their  exclusive  control,  and  should  en- 
sure their  inviolability  and  effective  protection 
as  provided  for  by  the  treaties  in  force  be- 
tween the  two  States,  and  by  general  interna- 
tional law; 

(ii)  The  Government  of  the  Islamic  Repub- 
lic of  Iran  should  ensure  the  immediate  re- 
lease, without  any  exception,  of  all  persons  of 
United  States  nationality  who  are  or  have 
been  held  in  the  Embassy  of  the  United  States 
of  America  or  in  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs in  Tehran,  or  have  been  held  as  hostages 
elsewhere,  and  afford  full  protection  to  all  such 
persons,  in  accordance  with  the  treaties  in 
force  between  the  two  States,  and  with  gen- 
eral international  law; 

(iii)  The  Government  of  the  Islamic  Re- 
public of  Iran  should,  as  from  that  moment, 
afford  to  all  the  diplomatic  and  consular  per- 
sonnel of  the  United  States  the  full  protection, 
orivileges  and  immunities  to  which  they  are 
?ntitled  under  the  treaties  in  force  between 
.he  two  States,  and  under  general  interna- 
-ional  law,  including  immunity  from  any  form 
)f  criminal  jurisdiction  and  freedom  and  facili- 
ies  to  leave  the  territory  of  Iran; 

B.  The  Government  of  the  United  States 
if  America  and  the  Government  of  the  Islamic 
lepublic  of  Iran  should  not  take  any  action 
ind  should  ensure  that  no  action  is  taken 
vhich  may  aggravate  the  tension  between  the 
wo  countries  or  render  the  existing  dispute 
nore  difficult  of  solution; 

Decides  that,  until  the  Court  delivers  its 
inal  judgment  in  the  present  case,  it  will  keep 
he  matters  covered  by  this  Order  continu- 
usly  under  review. 

Done  in  EngHsh  and  in  French,  the  Enghsh 
ext  being  authoritative,  at  the  Peace  Palace, 
'he  Hague,  this  fifteenth  day  of  December, 
ne  thousand  nine  hundred  and  seventy-nine, 
1  four  copies,  of  which  one  will  be  placed  in 
he  archives  at  the  Court,  and  the  others 
-ansmitted  respectively  to  the  Government  of 
ie  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran,  to  the  Govern- 
lent  of  the  United  States  of  America,  and  to 
le  Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations 
i)r.  transmission  to  the  Security  Council. 

(Signed)  Humphrey  Waldock 
President 

(Signed)  S.  Aquarone, 
Registrar  ■ 


■ebruary  1980 


U.S.  Seeks  Sanctions  Against  Iran 


PRESIDENT  CARTER. 
DEC.  21.  1979> 

Fi'din  the  first  clay  the  American  Em- 
bassy was  invaded  and  our  diplomatic 
staff  was  seized  as  hostages  by  Iran,  we 
have  pursued  every  legal  channel  avail- 
able to  us  to  secure  their  safe  and 
prompt  release.  On  at  least  four  sepa- 
rate occasions  the  world  community, 
through  the  U.N.  Security  Council  and 
through  the  International  Court  of  Jus- 
tice, has  expressed  itself  clearly  and 
firmly  in  calling  upon  the  Iranian  Gov- 
ernment to  release  the  American 
hostages. 

Yet  Iran  today  still  stands  in  ar- 
rogant defiance  of  the  world  commu- 
nity. It  has  shown  contempt  not  only 
for  international  law  but  for  the  entire 
international  structure  for  securing  the 
peaceful  resolution  of  differences 
among  nations. 

In  an  irresponsible  attempt  at 
blackmail,  to  which  the  United  States 
will  never  yield,  kidnappers  and  ter- 
rorists, supported  by  Iranian  officials, 
continue  to  hold  our  people  under  in- 
humane conditions.  With  each  day  that 
passes,  our  concern  grows  for  the 
health  and  for  the  well-being  of  the  hos- 
tages. We  have  made  clear  from  the 
very  beginning  that  the  United  States 
prefers  a  peaceful  solution,  in  prefer- 
ence to  the  other  remedies  which  are 
available  to  us  under  international  law. 
For  a  peaceful  resolutitin  to  be 
achieved,  it  is  now  clear  that  concrete 
action  must  be  taken  by  the  interna- 
tional community. 

Accordingly,  I  have  decided  to  ask 
for  an  early  meeting  of  the  U.N.  Secu- 
rity Council  to  impose  international 
economic  sanctions  upon  Iran,  under 
title  VII  of  the  U.N.  Charter.  The  Gov- 
ernment of  Iran  must  realize  that  it 
cannot  flaunt  with  impunity  the  ex- 
pressed will  and  law  of  the  world  com- 
munity. The  Security  Council  must  act 
to  enforce  its  demand  that  Iran  release 
the  hostages.  The  world  community 
must  support  the  legal  machinery  it  has 
established  so  that  the  United  Nations 
and  the  International  Court  of  Justice 
will  continue  to  be  relevant  in  settling 
serious  disputes  which  threaten  peace 
among  nations. 

I  can  think  of  no  more  clear  and 
compelling  challenge  to  the  interna- 
tional community  than  the  one  we  face 
today.  The  lives  of  over  50  innocent 


people  are  at  stake;  the  foundation  of 
civilized  diplomacy  is  at  stake;  the  in- 
tegrity of  international  law  is  at  stake; 
the  credibility  of  the  United  Nations  is 
at  stake.  And  at  stake,  ultimately,  is 
the  maintenance  of  peace  in  the  region. 
As  we  call  on  the  Security  Council  to 
act.  on  behalf  of  international  law  and 
on  behalf  of  peace,  we  again  call  on  the 
Government  of  Iran  to  end  this  crisis  by 
releasing  the  hostages  without  delay. 

And  now,  because  our  holy  days 
approach — a  time  to  think  of  peace — I 
would  like  to  add  a  few  special  words 
for  the  American  people,  indeed  the 
people  of  good  will  in  all  countries,  in- 
cluding Iran,  who  share  concern  for  50 
innocent  human  beings  who  hope, 
themselves,  for  peace  and  for  the  salva- 
tion of  their  lives. 

Henry  Longfellow  wrote  a 
Christmas  carol  in  a  time  of  crisis,  the 
War  Between  the  States,  in  1864.  Two 
verses  of  that  carol  particularly  express 
my  thoughts  and  prayers  and,  I'm  sure, 
those  of  our  nation  in  this  time  of  chal- 
lenge and  of  concern  and  of  crisis.  And 
I  would  like  to  quote  from  that  poem: 

And  in  despair  I  bowed  my  head. 
'There  is  no  peace  on  earth,'  I  said. 
'For  hate  is  strong  and  mocks  the  song 
Of  peace  on  earth,  good  will  to  men.' 
Then  pealed  the  bells,  more  loud  and 

deep, 
'God  is  not  dead,  nor  does  He  sleep. 
The  wrong  shall  fail,  the  right  prevail. 
With  peace  on  earth,  good  will  to 

men.'  ■ 


'  Made  to  reporters  assembled  in  the 
White  House  Briefing  Room  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Docu- 
ments of  Dec.  24,  1979). 


NATO  Issues 
Declaration  on  Iran 


Declaration  on  Iran  Issued  by  Ministers  and 
Other  Representatives  Attending  the 
NATO,  Brussels,  December  14,  1979: 

The  Foreign  Ministers  and  representa- 
tives of  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark, 
France,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
Greece,  Iceland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands,  Norway.  Portugal.  Turkey, 
the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States 
of  America,  meeting  in  Brussels  on  13th  De- 
cember 1979,  reviewed  the  grave  situation 
created  by  the  occupation  of  the  Embassy  of 
the  United  States  of  America  in  Tehran  and 


53 


Middle  East 


the  holding  of  members  of  its  staff  as  hos- 
tages in  flagrant  violation  of  international 
law  and  human  rights. 

They  reaffirmed  that  their  countries 
fully  respect  the  independence  of  other 
states  and  recognise  the  right  of  all  peoples 
to  chart  their  own  political,  economic  and 
social  course.  They  have  no  desire  to  inter- 
vene in  Iran's  internal  affairs. 

They  emphasised  that  any  taking  of  hos- 
tages, for  any  motive  whatsoever,  is  totally 
unacceptable  and  must  be  firmly  opposed  by 
the  international  community  as  a  whole. 

The  Governments  of  the  above- 
mentioned  countries  urgently  call  upon  the 
Iranian  authorities  immediately  to  release 
unharmed  all  the  United  States  Embassy 
staff  members  in  Tehran  and  to  allow  them 
to  return  to  their  country.  ■ 


Iranian  Diplomatic 
Personnel  in  U.S. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
DEC.  12,  1979' 

The  Department  of  State  has  informed 
the  Charge  of  the  Iranian  Embassy  that 
the  staffing  level  of  the  Embassy  should 
be  reduced  to  15  persons.  The  Charge 
was  also  informed  that  the  Iranian  Con- 
sulates General  in  New  York,  San 
Francisco,  Chicago,  and  Houston  are 
expected  to  reduce  their  personnel  to 
five  at  each  post. 

These  steps  have  been  taken  in 
view  of  the  continued  illegal  detention 
of  American  personnel  and  holding  of 
the  American  Embassy  compound  in 
Tehran,  as  well  as  U.S.  Government 
property  in  Tabriz  and  Shiraz. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
DEC.  29,  19792 

I  want  to  clarify  the  situation  with  re- 
spect to  the  staffs  of  the  Iranian  Em- 
bassy and  four  Consulates. 

On  December  12,  the  Iranians  were 
asked  to  reduce  their  staff  with  diplo- 
matic status  to  35  and  to  give  us  a  list 
of  those  remaining  within  5  days.  Our 
list  on  December  12  showed  a  total  of 
218  individuals  in  that  category  at  those 
Iranian  posts.  We  noted  at  the  time 
that  we  believed  our  list  might  not  be 
up-to-date  as  the  Iranian  Embassy  had 
not  been  reporting  regularly  on  the  de- 
parture of  its  personnel. 

We  have  since  learned  that  of  the 
total  of  218.  152  have  been  removed 
from  the  rolls  of  the  Iranian  Embassy 
and  Consulates.  Many  of  these  were  old 


54 


regime  personnel  who  have  either  de- 
parted or  been  given  permission  to  re- 
main. That  leaves  a  total  of  66  persons 
to  be  accounted  for. 

Thirty-five  of  those  persons  are 
eligible  to  remain  in  the  United  States 
under  the  maximum  levels  we 
established  on  December  12.  The  Ira- 
nian Embassy  is  revising  the  list  of 
those  eligible  to  remain  that  they  origi- 
nally provided  us,  and  we  expect  that 
list  Monday.  The  remaining  31  persons 
of  the  66,  plus  an  additional  17  military 
officers  (who  have  been  reported  to  us 
by  the  Department  of  Defense  as  liaison 
personnel),  are  ret|uired  to  depart  or 
regularize  their  status  with  Immigra- 
tion and  Naturalization  Service  (INS). 
The  Iranian  Embassy  has  been  directed 
that  these  persons  not  immediately  de- 
parting should  be  in  touch  with  INS  at 
once. 

INS  is  getting  in  touch  directly 
with  each  Iranian  removed  from  the 
list — the  1.52  persons  associated  with 
the  previous  regime  who  were  removed 
from  the  Embassy  rolls  plus  the  31 
terminated  diplomatic  personnel  and 
the  17  terminated  military  personnel. 
These  persons  will  be  instructed  to 
make  arrangements  for  their  departure 
or  to  regularize  their  status  in  the 
United  States. 

We  have  requested  INS  to  provide 
continuing  reports  on  the  status  on  Ira- 
nian Embassy  and  Consulate  employees 
including  departure  information.  ■ 


'  Made  available  to  news  corre- 
spondents by  acting  Department  spokesman 
Tom  Reston. 

^  Made  available  to  news  corre- 
spondents by  Department  spokesman  Hod- 
ding  Carter  III. 


FMS  Credits 
for  Israel 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
DEC.  31,  1979' 

The  President  met  with  Israeli  Minister 
of  Defense  Ezer  Weizman  on  December 
28,  1979.  Subsequently,  the  President 
has  decided  to  request  the  Congress  to 
increase  by  .$200  million  the  foreign 
military  sales  (FMS)  credits  previously 
authorized  for  Israel  in  the  special 
legislation  in  support  of  the  peace 
treaty. 

The  decision  was  based  on  consid- 
eration of  such  factors  as  inflation  and 


Israel's  balance-of-payments  deficit  and 
takes  into  account  the  fact  that  the  Is- 
raeli Government  has  instituted  since 
November  extremely  tough  austerity 
measures  designed  to  overcome  these 
economic  problems. 

The  decision,  taken  at  a  time  when 
the  President  is  determined  to  hold 
down  Federal  expenditures,  reflects 
our  sympathy  and  concern  for  Israel's 
security  and  well-being. 

Presently,  U.S.  FMS  credits  for 
Israel  total  $2.2  billion,  in  addition  to  a 
grant  of  $800  million,  to  be  disbursed 
over  a  period  of  approximately  3 
years.  ■ 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Dec.  31.  1979. 


Publications 


Piihlicafiotis  iiiaij  he  ordered  by  catalog  or 
stock  UN  tuber  from  the  Siijieri  ntoident  of 
Docuntents.  U.S.  Govern  mini  I'nnling 
Office,  Washington.  D.C    JninJ.  A  .'5% 
discount  is  tnade  on  orders  for  100  or  more 
copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to  the 
same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  must  ac- 
company orders.  Prices  shown  below, 
which  include  domestic  postage,  are  subject 
to  change. 


Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement 
with  Egypt.  TIAS  92.30.  13  pp.  $1.  (Cat. 
No.  89.10:9230.) 

Exhibition  of  Art  Treasures.  Agreement 
with  Egypt,  modifying  the  agreement  of  Oc- 
tober 28,  1975.  TIAS  9236.  4  pp.  75(2.  (Cat. 
No.  89.10:9236.) 

Economic  Cooperation.  Agreed  minutes 
with  Iran.  TIAS  9238.  27  pp.  $1.50.  (Cat. 
No.  89.10:9238.) 

Technical  Cooperation  in  Audit 
Administration  and  Training.  Agreement 
with  Saudi  Arabia.  TIAS  9246.  10  pp.  $1. 
(Cat.  No.  89.10:9246.) 
Pedagologique  Nationale  d'Education 
Technique.  Agreement  with  Lebanon.  TIA; 
9280.  9  pp.  $1.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9280.) 
Technical  Cooperation  in  Supply  Man- 
agement Development.  Agreement  with 
Saudi  Arabia.  TIAS  9281.  10  pp.  $1.  (Cat. 
No.  89.10:9281.) 

Collecting  and  Conser>'ing  Water  Supplie 
from  Surface  Runoff.  Agreement  with  the  ( 
United  Arab  Emirates,  amending  and  ex- 
tending the  agreement  of  July  10,  1976. 
TIAS  9288.  9  pp.  $1.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9288. 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


Middle  East 


American  Hostages 
in  Iran 


VICE  PRESIDENT  MONDALE. 
DEC.  5,  1979' 

Over  the  past  several  weeks,  we  have 
been  hearing  a  drumfire  of  propaganda 
out  of  Tehran,  some  of  it  from  people 
calling  themselves  students,  some  of  it 
from  the  government-controlled  radio 
and  television  in  Iran,  and  some  of  it 
from  various  officials  or  people  in  au- 
thority. The  message  is  very  clear.  It 
says  over  and  over  that  the  world  and 
the  American  people  should  ignore  the 
hostages,  forget  about  the  innocent 
people  bound  hand  and  foot,  overlook 
the  continued  outrage  to  law  and  stand- 
ards of  human  behavior.  We  are  told  to 
forget  all  that  and  focus  on  the  hatred 
of  one  man.  We  are  not  going  to  forget, 
and  the  American  people  are  not  going 
to  get  their  priorities  confused. 

How  are  our  hostages  being 
treated?  The  facts  are  there  for  all  to 
see,  and  the  simple  fact  is  that  50  hu- 
man beings  are  being  held  under  inhu- 
man conditions,  contrary  to  all  civilized 
standards,  in  order  to  prove  a  political 
point.  They  are  not  permitted  regular 
v'isit(]rs.  They  are  isolated  and  not  al- 
owed  to  speak,  except  to  their  captors. 
As  far  as  we  know,  the  hostages  have 
Tot  been  allowed  to  receive  mail  or 
■nessages.  There  has  never  been  a  sys- 
;ematic  accounting  of  the  numbers  and 
welfare  of  the  hostages. 

The  so-called  students  have  not 
3ermitted  any  outside  observers  even 
0  see  these  people  for  10  days.  They 
ire  refusing  to  let  international  organi- 
5ati(]ns,  such  as  the  Red  Cross,  into  the 
compound.  They  refuse  visits  by  reli- 
gious (jrganizations.  They  refuse  repre- 
entatives  of  neutral  states.  Even  pris- 
iners  of  war  are  guaranteed  certain 
standards  of  human  treatment.  But 
hese  standards  are  being  dragged  in 
,he  dirt  every  day  by  a  group  of  kid- 
lapers,  with  the  acquiescence  of  the 
i;overnment. 

We  are  hearing  daily  propaganda 
ibout  the  alleged  crimes  of  our  people 
n  Tehran,  most  of  whom  volunteered  to 
erve  their  country  at  a  difficult  and 
langerous  time.  We  are  not  and  will  not 
■espond  to  that  propaganda. 

I  would  note  that  one  of  those 
)eing  held  as  a  so-called  spy  in  Tehran 
s,  in  fact,  a  private  American  citizen 
vho  simply  happened  to  be  visiting  the 
mbassy  on  business  at  the  time  of  the 
ittack  on  November  4.  It  was  many 


■ebruary  1980 


days  before  we  even  learned,  indi- 
rectly, that  he  was  being  held.  That 
man.  like  the  rest,  has  now  been  held 
for  31  days — tied  up,  denied  contact 
with  his  family,  denied  e.xercise,  denied 
access  even  to  the  comfort  of  religion. 

We  hear  a  great  deal  about  the 
crimes  of  the  Shah,  but  that  is  not  the 
issue.  The  issue  which  disturbs  the 
American  people  is  that  50  of  our  fellow 
citizens  are  being  abused,  in  violation  of 
international  law.  These  are  our 
brothers  and  sisters. 

Yesterday,  the  U.N.  Security 
Council  passed  a  resolution  which 
called — as  the  first  most  important 
priority,  as  it  should — for  the  release  of 
the  American  hostages.  That  is  the 
issue.  It  is  the  only  issue,  and  we  are 
not  going  to  forget  they  must  be  set 
free. 


PRESIDENT  CARTER, 
DEC.  7,  19792 

[Inaudible]  in  the  last  30  days  has  been 
not  only  the  support  and  understanding 
and  patience  of  the  American  people 
and  the  strength  of  the  hostages' 
families,  but  alst)  the  superb  work  of 
the  State  Department  and  all  of  you, 
who  I  know  have  put  in  many  e.xtra 
hours,  prayers,  and  extra  commitments 
to  help  protect  the  lives  and  the  safety 
of  our  hostages. 

The  most  important  single  message 
that  I  can  give  to  you  is  this:  As  far  as  I 
am  concerned,  as  far  as  the  State  De- 
partment is  concerned,  as  far  as  our  na- 
tion is  concerned,  there  is  one  issue  and 
that  is  the  early  and  the  safe  release  of 
the  American  hostages  from  their  cap- 
tors in  Tehran.  And  it's  important  for 
us  to  realize  that  from  the  very  first 
hour  of  the  captivity  of  our  hostages  by 
a  mob — who  is  indistinguishable  from 
the  government  itself — that  has  been 
our  purpose.  And  we  have  tried  to  re- 
strain every  other  nation  and  the 
United  Nations  and  the  people  in  our 
own  country  from  confusing  the  issues. 

At  this  time,  I  am  not  interested  in 
trying  to  resolve  whether  or  not  the 
Shah  was  a  good  or  bad  leader  or  the 
history  of — [applause] — or  the  history 
of  Iran.  I'm  not  trying  to  interfere  in 
the  Government  of  Iran  or  the  inclina- 
tion of  the  people  there,  and  we  do  not 
want  to  confuse  the  issue  by  injecting 
these  extraneous  questions  or  debates 
into  the  present  situation.  When  that 
does  happen,  in  my  opinion,  it  delays 
the  day  when  we  will  see  the  American 
hostages  come  home. 


I  am  not  going  to  take  any  military 
action  that  would  cause  bloodshed  or 
arouse  the  unstable  captors  of  our  hos- 
tages to  attack  them  or  to  punish  them. 
We're  going  to  be  very  moderate,  very 
cautious,  guided  and  supported  and  ad- 
vised by  Secretary  Vance,  Our  purpose 
is  to  get  the  hostages  home  and  get 
them  safe.  That's  my  total  commitment, 
and  I  know  you  join  with  me  as  full 
partners  in  this  effort. 

Just  one  other  comment.  I'm  not 
trying  to  be  presumptuous  in  speaking 
for  them,  but  there's  no  doubt  in  my 
mind  that  evei-y  hostage  and  every  per- 
son who  loves  th(]se  hcjstages.  not  just 
the  families,  but  220  million  American 
people,  thank  you — working  with  Sec- 
retary Vance  and  all  those  in  this 
Department — for  the  superb  work  that 
you  have  done  in  insuring,  so  far,  the 
safety  in  which  I  am  confident  and 
which  I  pray  every  moment  of  my  life 
will  be  successful  in  getting  our  hos- 
tages home  where  they  belong. 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
DEC.  13,  1979^ 

We  have  read  reports  from  Iran  today 
that  international  observers  will  be  al- 
lowed to  see  our  people  who  are  being 
held  hostage. 

I  want  to  emphasize  that  for  any 
such  visit  to  the  hostages  to  accomplish 
a  humanitarian  objective  and  to  be  re- 
sponsive to  international  opinion  and  to 
acceptable  standards  of  behavior,  it  is 
important  that  those  who  see  the  hos- 
tages be  allowed  to  see  all  of  them,  to 
talk  with  them,  and  to  report  to  the 
families  of  the  hostages  and  to  the 
world  on  the  condition  of  each  hostage. 
Any  observers  allowed  on  the  Embassy 
compound  should  be  (|ualified.  interna- 
tionally recognized,  impartial,  neutral 
observers  and  should  include  a  qualified 
medical  doctor.  Visits  by  these  observ- 
ers should  occur  regularly  and  fre- 
quently until  the  hostages  are  released. 
If  this  occurs,  we  would  consider  it  a 
step  forward. 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
DEC.  18.  1979^ 

There  continue  to  be  confusing  and 
sometimes  conflicting  reports  that 
American  citizens  being  illegally  held  as 
hostages  might  be  placed  before  some 
type  of  public  trial  or  tribunal.  As  we 
made  clear  on  November  20,  such  an 
action  would  be  a  further  provocation  to 
the  United  States  and  to  the  world 


55 


Middle  East 


community.  The  gravity  of  the  situation 
created  by  the  illegal  and  irresponsible 
holding  of  the  hostages  would  be  com- 
pounded by  any  such  public  exploitation 
of  American  citizens.  The  authorities  in 
Iran  would  bear  full  responsibility  for 
any  ensuing  consequences. 

As  also  stated  on  November  20.  the 
United  States  is  seeking  a  peaceful  so- 
lution through  every  available  channel. 
This  is  far  preferable  to  the  other  rem- 
edies available  to  the  United  States. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
DEC.  25.  19795 

The  State  Department  believes  there 
are  50  U.S.  hostages  being  held  in  the 
American  Embassy  in  Tehran.  We 
have,  on  previous  occasions,  requested 
a  list  from  the  Iranian  authorities  of  all 
the  persons  being  held  in  the  Embassy. 
We  have  not  yet  received  such  a  list. 
This  discrepancy  illustrates  the  impor- 
tance of  our  getting  such  a  list  and  re- 
ceiving confirmation  from  the  Iranian 
authorities  that  all  the  hostages  are 
safe.  We  are  continuing  to  seek  such  a 
list  from  the  Iranian  authorities 
through  the  channels  available  to  us. 


PRESIDENT  CARTER, 
DEC.  28,  1979« 

Secretary  of  State  Vance  will  proceed 
to  the  United  Nations  tomorrow  to 
press  the  world's  case  against  Iran,  in 
order  to  obtain  the  speediest  possible 
release  of  American  hostages,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  demands  which  have 
already  been  made  earlier  by  the  U.N. 
Security  Council  and  the  International 
Court  of  Justice. 

The  United  States  reserves  the 
right  to  protect  our  citizens  and  our 
vital  interests  in  whatever  way  we  con- 
sider appropriate  in  keeping  with  prin- 
ciples of  international  law  and  the 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations.  But  our 
clear  preference  is  now,  and  has  been 
from  the  beginning  of  this  crisis,  for  a 
quick  and  a  peaceful  solution  of  this 
problem  through  concerted  interna- 
tional action. 

We  must  never  lose  sight  of  our 
basic  goals  in  this  crisis — the  safety  of 
our  fellow  citizens  and  the  protection  of 
the  long-term  interests  of  the  United 
States.  A  thoughtful  and  determined 
policy,  which  makes  clear  that  Iran  will 
continue  to  pay  an  increasingly  higher 
price  for  the  illegal  detention  of  our 
people,  is  the  best  policy  to  achieve 
those  goals,  and  it  is  the  policy  that  I 
will  continue  to  pursue. 


56 


Another  serious  development, 
which  has  caused  increased  concern 
about  peace  and  stability  in  the  same 
region  of  the  world,  is  the  recent  Soviet 
military  intervention  in  Afghanistan, 
which  has  now  resulted  in  the  over- 
throw of  the  established  government 
and  the  execution  of  the  President  of 
that  country.  Such  gross  interference  in 
the  internal  affairs  of  Afghanistan  is  in 
blatant  violation  of  accepted  interna- 
tional rules  of  behavior. 

This  is  the  third  occasion  since 
World  War  II  that  the  Soviet  Union  has 
moved  militarily  to  assert  control  over 
one  of  its  neighbors,  and  this  is  the  first 
such  venture  into  a  Moslem  country  by 
the  Soviet  Union  since  the  Soviet  occu- 
pation of  Iranian  Azerbaijan  in  the 
1940s. 

The  Soviet  action  is  a  major  matter 
of  concern  to  the  entire  international 
community.  Soviet  efforts  to  justify 
this  action  on  the  basis  of  the  U.N. 
Charter  are  a  perversion  of  the  United 
Nations  that  should  be  rejected  im- 
mediately by  all  its  members. 

I  have  discussed  this  serious  mat- 
ter personally  today  with  several  other 
heads  of  government,  all  of  whom  agree 
that  the  Soviet  action  is  a  grave  threat 
to  peace.  I  will  be  sending  the  Deputy 
Secretary  of  State  [Warren  Christo- 
pher] to  Europe  this  weekend  to  meet 
with  representatives  of  several  other 
nations  to  discuss  how  the  world  com- 
munity might  respond  to  this  unwar- 
ranted Soviet  behavior.  Soviet  military 
action  beyond  its  own  borders  gives 
rise  to  the  most  fundamental  questions 
pertaining  to  international  stability, 
and  such  close  and  extensive  consulta- 
tion between  ourselves  and  with  our  al- 
lies are  urgently  needed. 

Q.  Do  we  have  the  votes  in  the 
U.N.  Security  Council,  and  do  we 
have  the  Russians'  promise  they  won't 
veto  our  resolution? 

A.  I  expect  we  will  see  adequate 
support  in  the  U.N.  Security  Council 
for  our  position. 

Q.  Have  you  gotten  in  touch  with 
Brezhnev? 

A.  I  have  sent  him  a  message.  ■ 


'  Remarks  made  to  reporters  assembled 
in  the  White  House  Briefing  Room  (te.\t 
from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Dec.  10,  1979). 

^  Remarks  made  to  State  Department 
employees  in  the  lobby  at  the  State  Depart- 
ment (text  from  Weekly  Ciimpilation  of  Dec. 
10).  Prior  to  the  remarks,  the  President  and 
Secretary  Vance  met  with  the  families  of  the 
hostages. 


^  Made  by  White  House  press  secretary 
Jody  Powell  ("text  from  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Dec.  17). 

■*  Made  by  White  House  press  secretary 
Jody  Powell  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Dec.  24). 

^  Made  available  to  news  corre- 
spondents by  Department  spokesman  Hod- 
ding  Carter  III  in  reply  to  questions  about 
the  discrepancy  between  the  numbers  of 
hostages  believed  to  be  in  the  Embassy  in 
Tehran  and  the  number  of  hostages  reported 
to  have  been  seen  by  visiting  American 
clergymen. 

•*  Remarks  made  to  reporters  in  the 
White  House  Briefing  Room  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Docu- 
ments of  Dec.  31). 


Iran  Chronology, 
December  1979 


December  1 

Iranian  students  announce  they  have 
identified  CIA  agents  among  the  hostages. 

December  2 

President  Carter  gives  deposed  Shah 
temporary  sanctuary  at  Lackland  Air  Force 
Base  hospital  in  San  Antonio,  Texas. 

Egypt  renews  asylum  offer  for  deposed 
Shah. 

December  3 

United  States  reports  no  success  in 
finding  a  permanent  haven  abroad  for  de- 
posed Shah. 

U.N.  Security  Council  drafts  third  ap- 
peal to  Iran  to  release  hostages. 

December  4 

Security  Council  unanimously  adopts 
resolution  "urgently"  demanding  the  im- 
mediate release  of  hostages. 

In  an  investigation  of  the  deposed 
Shah's  finances,  Iranian  officials  allegedly 
uncover  $1  billion  in  identifiable  funds  mis- 
appropriated by  the  Shah. 

Foreign  Minister  Ghotbzadeh  says  hos- 
tages will  be  tried  as  spies  and  judged  by 
the  students  holding  them  captive. 

December  5 

Deposed  Shah  rules  out  Egypt,  Panama, 
South  Africa,  and  the  Bahamas  as  possible 
places  of  refuge. 

December  8 

Nephew  of  deposed  Shah  is  slain  in 
Paris. 

December  9 

Foreign  Minister  Ghotbzadeh  announces 
that  Iran  intends  to  proceed  with  an  investi- 
gation into  alleged  U.S.  wrongdoings  in  Ira- 
nian affairs. 

Ghotbzadeh  assures  Secretary  General 
Waldheim  of  hostages'  safety  and  states  that 
they  can  be  visited  by  a  neutral  observer. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Middle  East 


Soviet  Union  warns  United  States  that 
any  military  action  in  Iran  could  have  "grave 
consequences." 

December  10 

In  The  Hague,  Attorney  General 
Civiletti  appeals  to  the  International  Court 
of  Justice  to  take  "the  quickest  possible  ac- 
tion" to  insure  release  of  hostages. 

Carter  Administration  charges  Japan 
with  undercutting  U.S.  efforts  to  use  eco- 
nomic pressure  against  Iran. 

December  11 

A  Federal  district  judge  rules  the  order 
issued  by  Attorney  General  Civiletti  on 
November  13  unconstitutional. 

In  a  private  session,  the  International 
Court  of  Justice  begins  consideration  of  U.S. 
suit  against  Iran. 

December  12 

United  States  orders  expulsion  of  Ira- 
nian diplomats  in  retaliation  for  continued 
detention  of  hostages. 

Carter  Administration  asks  appeals 
court  to  allow  continued  deportation  of  Ira- 
nian students,  arguing  that  the  program  was 
a  key  foreign  policy  measure  in  efforts  to  se- 
cure release  of  hostages. 

December  13 

Khomeini  approves  Foreign  Minister 
Ghotbzadeh's  plan  for  an  "international  in- 
vestigative team"  to  look  into  "aggressor 
policies"  of  the  United  States  in  Iran.  He 
also  approves  Ghotbzadeh's  suggestion  that 
an  international  team  visit  the  hostages. 

New  Iranian  delegate  to  the  United  Na- 
tions, Mansour  Farhang,  is  scheduled  to  ar- 
rive in  New  York. 

Central  Bank  in  Iran  accuses  the  Shah 
and  his  associates  of  forging  documents,  di- 
verting nationalized  land  into  private  hold- 
ings, and  illegally  taking  over  a  company  as 
part  of  a  plot  to  embezzle  hundreds  of  mil- 
lions of  dollars. 

United  States  welcomes  Iran's  decision 
to  allow  outside  observers  to  check  on  condi- 
tion of  hostages. 

Three  hostages  are  permitted  to  make 
telephone  calls  to  their  families. 

Central  Bank  in  Iran  estimates  that 
Iran's  economy  shrunk  by  12'^  in  1979. 

Foreign  Ministers  and  other  represen- 
tatives attending  the  NATO  ministerial 
meeting  in  Brussels  issue  a  declaration  con- 
demning the  holding  of  U.S.  hostages  in 
Tehran.  They  reaffirm  that  while  they  have 
no  desire  to  intervene  in  Iran's  internal  af- 
fairs and  ".  .  .fully  respect  the  independence 
of  other  states,  recognizing  the  right  of  all 
peoples  to  chart  their  own  political,  eco- 
nomic, and  social  course,  any  taking  of  hos- 
tages, for  any  motive  whatsoever,  is  totally 
unacceptable  and  must  be  firmly  opposed  by 
the  international  community  as  a  whole." 
They  urgently  call  upon  Iranian  authorities 
to  release  unharmed  all  hostages  and  allow 
them  to  return  to  their  country. 

December  15 

International  Court  of  Justice  orders 
Iran  to  immediately  release  all  hostages  and 


February  1980 


tells  Iran  to  return  the  Embassy  in  Tehran 
and  consulates  in  Tabriz  and  Shiraz  to  U.S. 
control. 

Deposed  Shah  leaves  United  States  for 
residence  in  Panama. 

After  learning  of  the  Shah's  departure 
for  Panama.  Iranian  militants  holding  the 
U.S.  Embassy  announce  that  trial  for  the  50 
hostages  would  "definitely  begin." 

Foreign  Minister  Ghotbzadeh  says  that 
hostages  will  be  visited  by  delegation  of 
Christian  clergy  before  Christmas  to  see 
that  "none  have  been  harmed."  He  also 
states,  while  appearing  on  ABC -TV's  "Is- 
sues and  Answers"  that  "no  trial  will  go  on." 

December  16 

In  a  proclamation,  President  Carter 
designates  December  18  as  National  Unity 
Day  and,  to  demonstrate  support  for  the 
hostages,  calls  upon  all  citizens  and  organi- 
zations to  observe  that  day  by  prominently 
displaying  the  American  flag. 

December  17 

Khomeini  says  that  the  militants  oc- 
cupying the  U.S.  Embassy  are  expressing 
the  people's  will  and  not  setting  a  separate 
foreign  policy. 

December  18 

Carter  Administration  reports  it  is  seri- 
ously considering  "nonviolent"  military  ac- 
tion if  hostages  are  put  on  trial. 

December  19 

United  States  agrees  to  a  request  by 
Secretary  General  Waldheim  to  delay  moves 
to  seek  economic  sanctions  against  Iran. 

December  21 

President  Carter  decides  to  ask  Secu- 
rity Council  to  impose  economic  sanctions 
against  Iran. 

Khomeini  orders  arrangements  be  made 
for  clergymen  to  visit  U.S.  Embassy  in 
Tehran  to  hold  Christmas  services  for 
hostages. 

December  22 

United  States  warns  Soviet  Union  that 
any  attempt  by  Soviets  to  block  the  Security 
Council  from  imposing  economic  sanctions 
against  Iran  would  be  regarded  as  un- 
friendly action. 

Iran  ignores  Carter  Administration  call 
for  economic  sanctions  by  United  Nations. 
Iranian  Economic  Minister,  Bani-Sadr, 
states  they  were  already  prepared  for  such 
action  and  have  taken  precautionary 
measures. 

December  23 

Secretary  Vance  revokes  passport  of 
former  CIA  employee,  Philip  Agee,  who 
proposed  resolving  the  Iranian  situation  by 
exchanging  CIA  files  on  Iran  for  release  of 
hostages. 

December  24 

Three  American  clergymen  hold 
Christmas  services  in  U.S.  Embassy  com- 
pound for  hostages. 


Soviet  Government  indicates  disap- 
proval of  U.S.  efforts  to  have  Security 
Council  impose  economic  sanctions  against 
Iran. 

United  States  announces  its  intent  to 
seek  wide-ranging  rather  than  limited  sanc- 
tions against  Iran. 

Japan  rebuffs  a  plea  by  Iranian  ambas- 
sador to  remain  neutral  in  international  ef- 
fort to  obtain  release  of  hostages. 

December  25 

Four  clergymen  meet  43  hostages  in 
Iran  creating  a  discrepancy  in  the  total 
number  of  hostages  held. 

Soviet  Union  rebuffs  appeal  by  Ambas- 
sador Thomas  J.  Watson,  Jr.,  that  it  prom- 
ise not  to  veto  a  move  for  Security  Council 
sanctions  against  Iran. 

U.S.  Congressman  George  Hansen  em- 
barks on  a  second  trip  to  Iran. 

December  26 

United  States  asks  Iran  for  explanation 
on  the  discrepancy  in  the  number  of  hos- 
tages being  held. 

December  27 

Federal  appeals  court  rules  that  the 
Carter  Administration  had  the  right  to  con- 
duct special  immigration  checks  of  Iranian 
.students  in  the  United  States  and  to  begin 
deportation  proceedings  against  any  who 
were  here  illegally  or  who  did  not  report  to 
officials  as  ordered. 

Three  clergymen  return  from  visit  with 
hostages. 

Foreign  Minister  Ghotbzadeh  abandons 
attempts  to  find  a  way  out  of  the  impasse 
over  the  hostages  through  an  international 
tribune  and  calls  for  their  trial  on  charges  of 
spying. 

December  29 

Secretary  Vance  visits  the  United  Na- 
tions to  press  world's  case  against  Iran  in 
order  to  obtain  release  of  hostages  in  ac- 
cordance with  demands  already  made  by  the 
Security  Council  and  the  Internationa] 
Court  of  Justice. 

December  31 

Secretary  General  Waldheim  leaves  for 
Iran  in  an  effort  to  negotiate  the  release  of 
hostages. 

Security  Council  votes  11  to  0  to  give 
Iran  one  week  to  release  hostages.  ■ 


57 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


U.S.  Defense  Policy 


by  President  Carter 

Remarks  to  members  of  the  Busi- 
ness Council  in  the  East  Room  of  the 
White  House  on  December  12,  1979.' 

It's  indeed  a  pleasure  for  me  to  be  with 
you  again.  This  afternoon  I  would  like 
to  make  a  very  important  statement  to 
you,  following  which  the  Chairman  and 
I  will  walk  down  the  hall,  and  I'd  like  to 
greet  each  one  of  you  individually,  as 
has  been  my  custom  in  the  past  when 
we've  been  together.  And  then  we'll 
have  a  chance  for  a  few  questions  that 
you  might  want  to  put  to  me  concerning 
energy  or  inflation  or  legislation  before 
the  Congress  or  Iran  or  other  matters 
of  interest  to  you. 

But  my  first  concern,  and  the  first 
concern  of  every  President  who  has 
ever  lived  in  this  house,  is  and  must  be 
the  security  of  our  nation.  This  security 
rests  on  many  kinds  of  strength — on 
arms  and  also  on  arms  control,  on  mili- 
tary power  and  on  economic  vitality  and 
the  quality  of  life  of  our  own  people,  on 
modern  weapons,  and  also  on  reliable 
energy  supplies.  The  well-being  of  our 
friends  and  our  allies  is  also  of  great 
importance  to  us.  Our  security  is  tied  to 
human  rights  and  to  social  justice  which 
prevails  among  the  people  who  live  on 
Earth  and  to  the  institutions  of  interna- 
tional force  and  peace  and  order,  which 
we  ourselves  have  helped  to  build. 

We  all  hope  and  work  and  pray  that 
we  will  see  a  world  in  which  the 
weapons  of  war  are  no  longer  neces- 
sary, but  now  we  must  deal  with  the 
hard  facts,  with  the  world  as  it  is.  In 
the  dangerous  and  uncertain  world  of 
today,  the  keystone  of  our  national  se- 
curity is  still  military  strength — 
strength  that  is  clearly  recognized  by 
Americans,  by  our  allies,  and  by  any 
potential  adversary. 

Twice  in  this  century,  each  time  in 
the  aftermath  of  a  global  war,  we  were 
tempted  in  this  country  by  isolationism. 
The  first  time,  we  succumbed  to  that 
temptation,  withdrawing  from  our 
global  responsibilities,  and  you  know 
what  the  result  was.  A  generation  later 
the  world  was  again  engulfed  by  war. 
But  after  the  Second  World  War,  we 


built  a  national  consensus,  based  on  our 
own  moral  and  political  values,  around 
the  concept  of  an  active  role  for 
America  in  preserving  peace  and  secu- 
rity for  ourselves  and  for  others. 

Despite  all  the  changes  that  have 
swept  across  this  world  in  the  last  30 
years,  that  basic  consensus  has  en- 
dured. We've  learned  the  mistake  of 
military  intervention  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  another  country  when  our 
own  American  security  was  not  directly 
involved.  But  we  must  understand  that 
not  every  instance  of  the  firm  applica- 
tion of  the  power  of  the  United  States 
is  a  potential  Vietnam.  The  consensus 
for  national  strength  and  international 
involvement,  already  shaken  and 
threatened,  survived  that  divisive  and 
tragic  war. 

Recent  events  in  Iran  have  been  a 
vivid  reminder  of  the  need  for  a  strong 
and  united  America,  a  nation  which  is 
supported  by  its  allies  and  which  need 
not  bluff  or  posture  in  the  quiet  e.xer- 
cise  of  our  strength  and  in  our  con- 
tinued commitment  to  international  law 
and  the  preservation  of  peace.  Today, 
regardless  of  other  disagreements 
among  ourselves,  we  are  united  in  the 
belief  that  we  must  have  a  strong  de- 
fense and  that  military  weakness  would 
inevitably  make  war  more  likely. 

So,  the  issue  we  face  is  not  whether 
we  should  be  strong;  the  issue  is  how 
we  will  be  strong.  What  will  be  our  de- 
fense responsibilities  for  the  1980s  and 
beyond?  What  challenges  must  we  con- 
front in  meeting  those  responsibilities? 
What  defense  programs  do  we  need, 
and  how  much  will  be  spent  to  meet 
them?  How  can  we  correlate  most 
successfully  our  military  readiness  and 
our  arms  control  efforts?  To  begin  with, 
our  defense  program  must  be  tailored 
to  match  our  responsibilities. 

European  and  Pacific  Alliances 

In  Europe  our  military  forces  have  pro- 
vided the  foundation  for  one  of  the 
longest  periods  of  peace  and  prosperity 
that  continent  has  ever  enjoyed.  Our 
strength,  both  conventional  and  nu- 
clear, helps  to  maintain  peace  while  our 
allies  work  together  and  build  together 
through  the  European  Community  and 


also  nurture  their  historical  ties  to  the 
countries  of  Eastern  Europe.  Our 
mutual  commitments  within  the  Atlan- 
tic alliance  are  vital  to  us  all,  and  those 
commitments  are  permanent  and 
unshakable. 

American  military  strength  pro- 
vides the  framework  within  which  our 
mature  friendships  with  Japan,  Korea. 
Australia,  New  Zealand,  the  Philip- 
pines, and  Thailand  all  contribute  to 
stability  in  the  Pacific  basin  and 
throughout  the  world. 

The  prospects  for  peace  in  the  Mid- 
dle East  have  been  enhanced  by  a 
strong  America  and  by  confidence  in  us 
among  our  friends  in  Egypt  and  in  Is- 
rael. We  are  determined  to  continue  the 
progress  which  has  been  made  in  the 
Middle  East. 

We  must  and  we  will  continue  to 
meet  these  and  our  other  respon- 
sibilities. But  there  are  reasons  for  con- 
cern about  our  ability  to  sustain  our 
beneficial  and  our  peaceful  influence 
throughout  the  world — real  reasons  for 
concern. 

Defense  Spending 

For  nearly  20  years  now,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  been  increasing  its  real  de- 
fense spending  by  3%  or  49c  each  year, 
3%  or  4%  compounded  annually.  In  con- 
trast, our  own  defense  spending  has  de- 
clined in  real  terms  every  year  from 
1968  through  1976.  This  is  creating  a 
real  challenge  to  American  leadership 
and  to  our  influence  in  the  world. 

We  will  almost  certainly  face  other 
challenges,  less  direct,  though  no  less 
serious.  The  1980s  are  very  likely  to 
bring  continued  turbulence  and  up- 
heaval, as  we've  e.xperienced  in  the 
1970s.  Problems  of  energy  price  and 
energy  supply  will  continue  to  strain 
the  economy  of  the  developed  world  and 
will  put  even  more  severe  pressures  on 
the  developing  nations.  Political  insta- 
bility, which  is  already  serious  enough, 
may  even  intensify  as  the  newer  na- 
tions struggle  to  cope  with  these  prob- 
lems, which  are  serious  enough  for  us. 

As  in  the  past,  when  the  winds  of 
change  threaten  to  arouse  storms  of 
conflict,  we  must  be  prepared  to  join 
our  friends  and  our  allies  in  resisting 
threats  to  stability  and  to  peace. 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Military  Affairs 


The  steady  buildup  by  the  Soviets 
and  their  growing  inclination  to  rely  on 
military  power  to  exploit  turbulent 
situations  call  for  calm,  deliberate,  and 
sustained  American  response. 

Through  the  mid-1970s,  the  United 
States  relied  on  the  defense  strategy 
and  also  on  force  structures  devised 
during  the  early  1960s,  a  time  when  we 
enjoyed  strategic  nuclear  superiority 
and  a  tactical  nuclear  monopoly,  when 
Soviet  seapower  was  limited  and  the 
Soviet  military  presence  outside  East- 
ern Europe  almost  nonexistent.  All  that 
had  changed  by  the  time  I  took  office  as 
President. 

Beginning  in  1976  and  continuing  in 
my  own  Administration,  we've  set  out 
to  counterbalance  the  growth  in  Soviet 
military  power  by  launching  new  efforts 
that  draw  on  our  own  considerable 
strengths.  During  each  of  the  last  4 
years,  there  has  been  a  moderate  in- 
crease in  real  defense  spending.  In 
Europe  we've  taken  steps,  as  you 
know,  to  reverse  a  decade  of  relative 
decline  in  the  military  strength  of  the 
Atlantic  alliance. 

When  I  first  began  to  meet  with 
Atlantic  alliance  leaders  almost  3  years 
ago,  I  found  them  very  troubled  by  the 
state  of  our  military  strength  in  the 
Atlantic  alliance.  I  promised  to  raise 
our  own  level  of  defense  spending,  in 
real  terms,  by  some  3%  per  year,  and 
our  NATO  allies  responded  by  making 
the  same  pledge.  With  American  lead- 
ership, NATO  also  took  the  crucial  step 
of  adopting  a  bold.  Long-Term  Defense 
Program,  which  will  extend  over  15 
years.  That  program  is  helping  us  to  in- 
crease our  capacity  to  deter  or  to  defeat 
any  surprise  attack  that  may  be 
launched  against  our  European  allies 
and,  therefore,  against  ourselves. 

Theater  Nuclear  Forces 

We  are  also  taking  steps  to  redress  the 
balance  in  other  theater  nuclear  forces. 
This  action,  as  you  know,  we've  been 
pursuing  in  the  last  few  days. 

In  the  early  1960s,  the  United 
States  removed  its  medium-range  mis- 
siles from  Europe.  We  could  do  this 
then  because  there  was  overwhelming 
U.S.  strategic  superiority.  But  the 
Soviet  Union  did  not  show  similar  re- 
straint. The  accelerating  development 


of  their  relatively  long-range,  mobile, 
multiwarhead  SS-20  missile  is  a  major 
escalation  in  theater  nuclear  arma- 
ments. With  the  advent  of  rough 
strategic  parity,  this  new  missile 
creates  a  potentially  dangerous  weak- 
ness in  NATO's  ability  to  deter  aggres- 
sion. In  the  SALT  II  negotiations,  we 
carefully  protected  our  freedom  to  cor- 
rect this  weakness. 

Just  a  few  hours  ago,  I  was  in- 
formed that  the  NATO  alliance  re- 
solved to  strengthen  its  theater  nuclear 
weapons  to  offset  actual  Soviet  deploy- 
ments. The  agreement  reached  this  af- 
ternoon in  Europe  was  a  unanimous 
agreement  very  encouraging  to  all  of 
us.  Now,  on  the  basis  of  strength,  we 
can  negotiate  with  the  Warsaw  Pact  to 
reduce  nuclear  weapons  and  also  to  re- 
duce, we  hope,  conventional  weapons 
throughout  the  European  theater. 

Strategic  Forces 

In  the  area  of  intercontinental  or 
strategic  forces,  we  also  face  adverse 
trends  that  must  be  corrected.  Im- 
proved Soviet  air  defenses  now 
threaten  to  make  our  strategic  bombers 
vulnerable.  The  cruise  missile  will  be 
our  solution  to  that  problem.  Produc- 
tion of  the  first  generation  of  air- 
launched  cruise  missiles  will  begin  next 
year. 

In  addition,  our  land-based  Min- 
uteman  intercontinental  ballistic  mis- 
siles (ICBM)  are  becoming  increasingly 
vulnerable  because  of  the  improved  ac- 
curacy of  the  Soviet  Union's  mul- 
tiwarhead missiles.  That's  why  we  de- 
cided last  spring  to  produce  the  MX 
missile.  The  relatively  small  number  of 
MX  missiles  to  be  deployed  will  have 
mobility  and  a  large  number  of  shelters 
and  will  be  far  less  vulnerable  than  our 
present  fixed-shelter  Minutemen. 

Further,  in  response  to  any  first 
strike  against  us,  the  MX  will  have  the 
capability  to  attack  a  wide  variety  of 
Soviet  military  targets.  The  MX  mis- 
sile, deployed  as  I've  just  described, 
will  not  undermine  stability,  but  it  will 
deter  attack  and  encourage  negotia- 
tions on  further  nuclear  arms  limits.  In 
addition,  by  increasing  the  difficulty  of 
any  contemplated  Soviet  strike,  it  will 
contribute  to  the  survivability  of  our 
own  strategic  bombers  and  submarines. 
Even  with  SALT  II,  America  needs  the 
MX  to  maintain  the  strategic  nuclear 
balance. 


We  are  also  modernizing  our 
strategic  submarine  force.  The  first 
new  Trident  submarine  has  already 
been  launched,  and  the  first  of  our  new- 
Trident  missiles,  with  a  range  of  more 
than  4,000  miles,  have  already  been  put 
to  sea. 

Thus,  each  leg  of  our  strategic 
triad  is  being  modernized — cruise  mis- 
siles for  our  bombers,  the  MX  for  our 
intercontinental  missiles,  and  Trident 
for  our  undersea  deterrent.  Nor  will  we 
neglect  our  conventional  forces,  though 
here  we  must  rely  heavily  on  the 
parallel  efforts  of  our  allies,  in  Asia  as 
w  ell  as  in  Europe.  They  must  bear  their 
proportional  share  of  the  increased 
costs  of  a  common  defense. 

Conventional  Forces 

I'm  determined  to  keep  our  naval  forces 
more  powerful  than  those  of  any  other 
nation  on  Earth.  Our  shipbuilding  pro- 
gram will  sustain  a  550-ship  Navy  in 
the  1990s. and  we  will  continue  to  build 
the  most  capable  ships  afloat.  Seapower 
is  indispensable  to  our  global  strategy, 
in  peace  and  also  in  war. 

And  finally,  we  are  moving  rapidly 
to  counterbalance  the  growing  ability  of 
the  Soviet  Union,  dii-ectly  or  through 
surrogates,  to  use  its  military  power  in 
Third  World  regions,  and  we  must  be 
prepared  to  deal  with  hostile  actions 
against  our  own  citizens  or  our  vital 
interests  from  others  as  well.  For  this 
purpose,  we  need  not  only  stronger 
forces  but  better  means  for  rapid  de- 
ployment of  the  forces  that  we  already 
have. 

Our  1981  defense  budget  and  our 
5-year  defense  program  will  meet  this 
need  in  two  different  ways.  The  first 
will  be  a  new  fleet  of  maritime  preposi 
tioning  ships  that  will  carry  the  heavy 
equipment  and  the  supplies  for  three 
Marine  brigades  that  can  be  stationed 
in  forward  areas  where  U.S.  forces  may 
be  needed.  With  their  supplies  already 
near  the  scene  of  action,  the  troops 
themselves  can  then  be  moved  in  by  air 
very  rapidly.  The  second  innovation 
will  be  a  new  fleet  of  large  cargo  air- 
craft to  carry  Army  tanks  and  other 
equipment  over  intercontinental  dis- 
tances. Having  rapid  deployment  forces 
does  not  necessarily  mean  that  we  will 
use  them.  We  intend  for  their  existence 
to  deter  the  very  developments  that 
would  otherwise  invoke  their  use. 

We  must  always  remember  that  no 
matter  how  capable  or  advanced  our 
weapons  systems,  our  militai\y  security 


February  1980 


59 


Military  Affairs 


depends  on  the  abilities,  the  training, 
and  the  dedication  of  the  people  who 
serve  in  our  Armed  Forces.  I'm  deter- 
mined to  recruit  and  to  retain,  under 
any  foreseeable  circumstances,  an 
ample  level  of  such  skilled  and  experi- 
enced military  personnel. 

To  sum  up,  the  United  States  is 
taking  strong  action:  first,  to  improve 
all  aspects  of  our  strategic  forces,  thus 
assuring  our  deterrent  to  nuclear  war; 
second,  to  upgrade  our  forces  in  NATO 
and  in  the  Pacific,  as  part  of  a  common 
effort  with  our  allies;  third,  to  modern- 
ize our  naval  forces  and  keep  them  the 
best  in  the  world:  fourth,  to  strengthen 
our  rapid  deployment  capabilities  to 
meet  our  responsibilities  outside 
NATO;  and  fifth,  to  maintain  an  effec- 
tive force  of  highly  trained  military 
personnel. 

Defense  Budget 

We  must  sustain  these  commitments  in 
order  to  maintain  peace  and  security  in 
the  1980s.  To  insure  that  we  press  for- 
ward vigorously,  I  will  submit  for  fiscal 
year  1981  a  budget  to  increase  funding 
authority  for  defense  to  moi-e  than  $157 
billion,  a  real  growth  of  more  than  5% 
over  my  request  for  fiscal  year  1980. 
Just  as  in  1979  and  in  1980,  requested 
outlays  for  defense  during  fiscal  year 
1981  will  grow  by  more  than  3%  in  real 
terms,  over  the  preceding  year.  We  will 
sustain  this  effort. 

My  .5-year  defense  program  pro- 
vides a  real  funding  increase  that  will 
average  more  than  4V2%  each  year.  I  in- 
tend to  carry  out  this  program.  With 
careful  and  efficient  management,  we 
should  be  able  to  do  so  within  the 
budget  increases  I  propose.  If  inflation 
increases  or  exceeds  the  projected 
rates  that  we  now  expect,  I  intend  to 
adjust  the  defense  budget  as  needed, 
just  as  has  been  done  in  1980  fiscal 
year. 

Much  of  this  program  which  I've 
outlined  to  you  will  take  5  years  or 
more  to  reach  fruitiim.  The  imbalances 
it  will  correct  have  been  caused  by 
more  than  a  decade  of  disparity.  This 
cannot  be  remedied  overnight,  so  we 
must  be  willing  to  see  this  program 
through.  To  insure  that  we  do  so,  I'm 
setting  a  growth  rate  for  defense  that 
will  be  tolerable  for  our  country  over 
the  long  haul. 


The  most  wasteful  and  self- 
defeating  thing  that  we  could  dcj  would 
be  to  start  this  necessary  program, 
then  alter  it  or  cut  it  back  after  a  year 
or  two  when  such  an  action  might  be- 
come politically  attractive.  The  defense 
program  that  I'm  proposing  for  the 
next  5  years  will  require  some 
sacrifice — but  sacrifice  that  we  can  well 
afford.  It  will  not  increase  at  all  the 
percentage  of  our  gross  national  prod- 
uct devoted  to  defense,  which  will  re- 
main steady  at  almost  exactly  5%  per 
year. 

We  must  have  a  long-range,  bal- 
anced approach  to  the  allocation  of 
Federal  expenditures.  We  will  continue 
to  meet  such  crucial  needs,  of  course,  as 
jobs  and  housing  and  education  and 
health,  but  we  must  realize  that  a  pre- 
requisite to  the  enjoyment  of  such 
progress  is  to  assure  peace  for  our  na- 
tion. So  in  asking  congressional  support 
for  our  defense  efforts,  I'm  asking  for 
consistent  support,  steadfast 
support— not  just  for  1980  or  1981  but 
until  these  commitments  have  been 
fulfilled. 

Sustained  American  strength  is  the 
only  possible  basis  for  the  wider,  truly 
reciprocal  detente  which  we  seek  with 
the  Soviet  Union.  Only  through 
strength  can  we  create  global  political 
conditions  hospitable  to  worldwide  eco- 
nomic and  political  progress  and  to  con- 
trolling both  conventional  and  nuclear 
weapons. 

SALT 

As  the  strongest,  most  advanced  coun- 
try on  Earth,  we  have  a  special  obliga- 
tion to  seek  security  through  arms  con- 
trol as  well  as  through  military  power. 
So,  I  welcome  the  debate  by  the  Senate 
in  its  consideration  of  the  SALT  II 
Treaty.  It  will  enable  us  to  build  a 
clearer  understanding  that  these  efforts 
in  both  arms  control  and  in  defense  are 
vital  to  our  security  and  they  are  mutu- 
ally compatible,  one  with  another. 

There  are  several  reasons  why 
SALT  II  will  strengthen  the  military 
aspect  of  our  national  security. 

First,  we  can  better  maintain 
strategic  equivalence  in  nuclear 
weapons  with  SALT  II.  Without  it,  the 
Soviet  Union  can  add  more  to  the 
power  of  their  own  forces,  widen  any 
advantage  that  they  may  achieve  in  the 
early  1980s,  and  conceal  from  us  what 
they  are  doing.  For  us,  maintaining 
parity  with  these  uncontrollable  Soviet 
activities  would  add  to  our  costs  in 
time,  money,  and  also  uncertainty 
about  our  own  safety. 


Second,  we  can  better  maintain  the 
combat  efficiency  and  readiness  of  our 
non-nuclear  forces  with  SALT  II  than 
we  can  without  it.  Whatever  the  level  of 
the  defense  budget,  more  of  it  will  have 
to  go  into  strategic  weapons,  atomic 
weapons,  if  SALT  II  is  not  ratified. 

Third,  we  can  better  strengthen 
the  unity,  resolve,  and  capability  of  the 
NATO  alliance  with  SALT  II  than  we 
can  without  it.  That's  why  the  heads  of 
other  NATO  countries  have  urged 
strongly  its  ratification. 

Fourth,  we  can  better  continue  the 
SALT  process,  which  has  now  been 
going  on  for  more  than  30  years — the 
process  of  negotiating  further  reduc- 
tions in  the  world's  nuclear  arsenals, 
with  SALT  II  than  without  it.  Without 
SALT  II  and  all  its  limits,  its  rules,  and 
definitions  in  place,  any  agreement  in 
SALT  III  would,  at  the  very  best,  take 
many  more  years  to  achieve. 

And  finally,  we  can  better  control 
the  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons 
among  currently  non-nuclear  nations 
with  SALT  II  than  without  it.  This 
could  be  one  of  the  most  important  fac- 
tors involved  in  our  pending  decision  on 
the  SALT  Treaty. 

All  of  these  issues  are  extremely 
important  and  they  are  intimately  in- 
terrelated. A  strong  defense  is  a  matter 
of  simple  common  sense;  so  is  SALT  II. 

I  will  do  my  utmost  as  President  to 
keep  America  strong  and  to  keep  our 
nation  secure,  but  this  cannot  be  done 
without  sustained  effort  and  without 
some  sacrifice,  which  our  nation  can 
certainly  afford. 

The  best  investment  in  defense  is 
in  weapons  that  will  never  have  to  be 
used  and  in  soldiers  who  will  never 
have  to  die.  But  the  peace  we  enjoy  is 
the  fruit  of  our  strength  and  our  will  to 
use  this  strength  if  we  need  to.  As  a 
great  nation  devoted  to  peace,  we  must 
and  we  will  continue  to  build  that 
American  strength.  ■ 


'  Te.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Dec.  17,  1979. 


60 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  I 


SOUTH  ASIA 


Review  of  U.S.  Policy  in  the  1 980s 


by  Howard  B.  Schaffer 

Address  before  the  Foreign  Policy 
Conference  for  Asian-Americans  at 
Hunter  College  in  New  York  City  on 
December  1.  1979.  Mr.  Schaffer  is 
Country  Director  for  India.  Nepal,  and 
Sri  Lanka  Affairs  in  the  Bureau  of 
Near  Eastern  and  South  Asia)i  Affairs. 

During  its  now  203-year  history,  the 
United  States  has  had  a  relationship 
with  the  countries  of  South  Asia  that 
differs  in  many  ways  from  our  involve- 
ment with  the  rest  of  Asia.  China  clip- 
pers and  Yankee  traders  did  not  plough 
the  waters  of  the  Indian  Ocean  as  they 
did  those  of  the  Pacific.  We  never  in- 
volved ourselves  directly  in  the  political 
affairs  of  South  Asia — there  was  no 
"Open  Door"  policy,  no  forced  opening 
to  the  west,  no  colonial  relationships. 
We  fought  no  wars  in  the  region.  Until 
recently,  South  Asia  was  not  a  source 
of  immigrant  skills  for  our  own  eco- 
nomic development.  Even  our  mis- 
sionaries did  not  find  South  Asia  as 
fruitful  a  ground  as  other  regions. 

Of  course,  we  all  remember  that 
he  beginning  of  our  own  history  goes 
Jack  to  South  Asia — Columbus  was 
ooking  for  a  new  route  to  India  and 
bund  a  new  world  instead.  But  the 
;ubcontinent  was  exactly  half  a  world 
iway  from  us.  Throughout  most  of  our 
listory.  this  region  of  the  world  was 
lominated  by  one  colonial  power, 
hereby  closing  off  the  possibility  for 
he  development  of  closer  ties  between 
he  United  States  and  the  nations  of 
5outh  Asia. 

It  was  not  until  1947  and  the  dawn 
f  independence  in  South  Asia  that  the 
Jnited  States  began  to  search  for  its 
ole  in  the  region,  to  seek  to  define  a 
elationship  where  none  really  had 
xisted  before. 

But  in  the  postwar  world,  America 
I'as  a  very  different  kind  of  country 
I'ith  global  responsibilities.  The  way 
\'e  looked  at  South  Asia  reflected  in 
nany  ways  the  way  we  looked  at  the 
.orld  as  a  whole.  And  just  as  our  per- 
eption  of  the  world  has  changed  during 
he  past  three  decades,  so  has  the  na- 
ui'e  of  our  relationship  with  the  coun- 
ries  of  South  Asia. 

In  the  1950s  we  tended  to  look  at 
he  nations  of  the  region,  as  we  did 
ountries  elsewhere,  through  the  prism 
f  the  cold  war,  looking  at  any  gain  for 
ur  adversaries  as  a  loss  for  us 


ebruary  1980 


In  the  1960s  our  emphasis  was  on 
economic  development.  We  were  de- 
termined to  do  everything  we  could  to 
promote  the  human  development  of  the 
region  and  to  enable  it  to  serve  as  an 
alternative  to  the  developmental  mod- 
els offered  by  the  Communist  world. 

In  the  1970s  a  number  of  develop- 
ments in  the  region  caused  us  to  reas- 
sess our  interests  there.  Many  of  our 
critics  borrowed  a  phrase  coined  by  one 
of  our  former  American  ambassadors  to 
India  and  said  that  we  were  pursuing  a 
policy  of  benign  neglect.  I  do  not  be- 
lieve this  is  true.  But  nevertheless,  in 
the  wake  of  Vietnam  and  our  own  re- 
examination of  American  interests  and 
involvement  around  the  world,  it  was 
inevitable  that  we  should  ask  ourselves 
what  kind  of  a  relationship  we  should 
have  with  the  nations  of  the 
subcontinent. 

Principles  of  U.S.  Policy 

Today,  as  we  face  the  beginning  of  the 
decade  of  the  1980s,  I  think  we  have  a 
clear  idea  of  what  our  policy  should  be. 
I  would  like  to  review  with  you  some  of 
the  major  principles  that  will  govern 
our  policy  toward  South  Asia  during 
the  coming  decade. 

•  The  United  States  seeks  eciually 
good  relations  with  all  the  nations  of 
South  Asia.  We  recognize  as  a  fact  of 
life  that  no  matter  what  measuring 
stick  one  uses — GNP,  population,  mili- 
tary strength,  political  and  economic 
influence — India  is  the  most  important 
power  in  the  region.  But  our  desire  to 
pursue  equally  good  relations  with  all  of 
the  countries  in  the  region  means  that 
there  will  be  no  "tilt"  in  U.S.  policy  to- 
ward any  country. 

•  We  respect  the  nonalignment  of 
the  South  Asian  nations  and  expect 
others  to  do  the  same.  Today,  for  the 
first  time,  all  of  the  nations  of  the  area 
are  members  of  the  nonaligned  move- 
ment. Nonalignment  in  the  true  sense 
of  the  word  is  acceptable  to  us.  We 
want  to  see  a  South  Asia  that  is  free  of 
great  power  involvement  and  competi- 
tion, a  South  Asia  that  is  able  to  work 
out  its  own  problems  without  fear  of 
external  manipulation  or  exploitation. 
For  our  part,  we  do  not  wish  to  domi- 
nate the  region  or  any  part  of  it,  and  we 
do  not  wish  to  see  an  external  power 
play  such  a  role.  In  this  connection,  we 
cannot  help  but  look  with  great  concern 


at  the  increased  Soviet  role  in  Af- 
ghanistan and  the  specter  of  external 
involvement  in  the  region  that  this 
portends. 

•  We  want  to  see  a  South  Asia  that 
continues  along  the  path  of  economic 
development,  that  increasingly  meets 
its  own  food  needs,  that  betters  the 
conditions  for  human  development,  and 
that  seeks  to  alleviate  chronic  unem- 
ployment and  underemployment. 

•  We  want  to  see  South  Asian  na- 
tions develop  strong  internal  institu- 
tions, where  the  strength  of  the  gov- 
ernments derive  from  the  consent  of 
the  governed,  and  where  the  relation- 
ships between  the  governments  and  the 
people  lead  to  internal  stability  and  not 
instability. 

•  We  want  to  see  a  South  Asia 
where  the  nations  of  the  region  con- 
tinue to  improve  their  relations  with 
each  other,  where  they  begin  to  look  to 
the  future  and  not  to  the  past,  and 
where  they  seek  areas  of  cooperation 
based  on  their  common  heritage  and 
interests. 

•  We  want  to  see  a  South  Asia  that 
remains  free  of  the  peril  of  nuclear  pro- 
liferation, not  only  because  of  our  gen- 
eral desire  for  a  halt  to  the  spread  of 
nuclear  weapons  but  for  the  very  real 
and  specific  dangers  this  would  present 
to  the  stability  and  security  of  the 
region. 

In  pursuing  these  goals,  we  will 
help  where  we  can,  bearing  in  mind  the 
wishes  of  the  people  of  the  region.  But 
we  must  recognize  that  in  the  final 
analysis,  it  is  the  people  of  the  region 
themselves — and  especially  their 
governments — who  bear  the  responsi- 
bility for  creating  in  reality  what  the 
people  of  South  Asia  have  sought  for 
generations — a  just  society,  free  from 
want  and  free  from  fear. 

With  this  outline  of  our  policy 
interests  in  South  Asia  as  a  backdrop,  I 
would  now  like  to  describe  a  number  of 
developments  in  the  individual  coun- 
tries of  the  region,  and  relate  them  to 
those  overall  policy  interests. 

India 

I  believe  we  can  take  some  satisfaction 
with  the  present  state  of  affairs  in 
South  Asia,  with  the  exception  of  the 
tragic  situation  in  Afghanistan.  Rela- 
tions among  most  of  the  countries  of  the 


61 


South  Asia 


region  have  rarely  been  better.  Indian 
policy  has  been  key  to  this,  and  any  de- 
scription of  South  Asia  must  start  with 
its  largest  member — India. 

In  the  last  years  of  Mrs.  Gandhi's 
government,  relations  were  restored 
between  India  and  Pakistan  and  Am- 
bassadors were  again  exchanged  be- 
tween India  and  China.  Mrs.  Gandhi 
made  additional  efforts  to  improve  rela- 
tions with  India's  smaller  neighbors. 
Following  up  this  welcome  progress, 
the  Janata  government,  which  took  of- 
fice in  1977,  made  the  good-neighbor 
policy  a  cornerstone  of  its  foreign  pol- 
icy. Further  improvements  were  made 
in  Indo-Pakistan  relations,  and  Indian 
and  Pakistani  leaders  have  met  with 
each  other  on  a  number  of  occasions. 
This  is  not  to  say,  however,  that  deep- 
seated  suspicions  do  not  remain.  A  re- 
lationship born  in  the  turmoil  of  India's 
partition — and  one  which  has  led  to 
three  armed  conflicts — cannot  be 
changed  overnight.  But  progress  has 
been  made,  and  we  sincerely  hope  that 
further  progress  will  come. 

Similarly,  India  has  improved  its 
relations  with  Nepal  and  Bangladesh.  It 
agreed  to  Nepalese  requests  for  sepa- 
rate trade  and  transit  agreements. 
India  also  agreed  to  a  short-term  divi- 
sion of  Ganges  Rivers  waters  with 
Bangladesh.  India's  actions  created  a 
greater  sense  of  confidence  on  the  part 
of  its  neighbors,  who  are  often  uneasy 
about  the  over-awing  strength  and  size 
of  the  giant  across  the  border. 

Aside  from  being  well-received  by 
the  smaller  South  Asian  countries,  In- 
dia's good-neighbor  policy  has  been 
good  politics  in  India  itself.  This  would 
seem  to  augur  well  for  a  continuation  of 
the  policy  by  any  government  which 
takes  office  in  New  Delhi  after  the 
January  election.  We  would  certainly 
hope  so  and  will  be  doing  what  we  can 
from  the  sidelines  to  cheer  on  the  cause 
of  stable  and  friendly  relations. 

Afghanistan 

There  is,  of  course,  one  major  e.xception 
to  the  general  improvement  of  relations 
among  the  states  of  South  Asia.  This  is 
the  uneasy  relationship  between  Paki- 
stan and  the  Democratic  Republic  of 
Afghanistan.  The  situation  in  Afghani- 
stan is  a  profoundly  troubling  one  for  the 
United  States.  I  would  like  to  review  it 
for  you. 


Afghanistan  is  today  the  scene  of 
continuing  human  suffering  and  what 
amounts  to  civil  war.  In  April  1978  the 
People's  Democratic  Party  came  to 
power  in  Kabul  in  a  violent  coup.  Since 
then  the  prospects  for  reform  under  the 
new  government  have  been  over- 
shadowed by  internal  strife.  The  gov- 
ernment is  confronted  by  continuing 
rebel  operations  and  occasional  troop 
mutinies.  Nonetheless,  the  new  Presi- 
dent, HafizuUah  Amin,  continues  to 
demonstrate  that  he  retains  the  loyalty 
of  key  military  units  and  that  he  is  de- 
termined to  employ  these  well-armed 
forces  to  defend  his  regime. 

There  are  in  Afghanistan  large 
numbers  of  Soviet  military  personnel, 
primarily  engaged  in  technical  and  ad- 
visory roles  with  the  Afghan  Armed 
Forces.  They  appear  to  be  taking  an  in- 
creased role  in  military  decisions  and 
operations.  The  prospect  is  for  a  pro- 
longed period  of  continued  fighting. 

Important  U.S.  interests  are  af- 
fected by  developments  in  Afghanistan. 
Our  effort  to  encourage  peace  and  sta- 
bility in  the  region  is  clearly  made  more 
difficult  by  Afghanistan's  internal  un- 
rest and  the  exodus  of  refugees  from 
Afghanistan.  These  already  number 
over  300,000,  most  of  whom  have  fled  to 
Pakistan.  The  reorientation  in  Af- 
ghanistan's foreign  policy  away  from  its 
traditional  genuine  nonalignment  to  an 
approach  virtually  indistinguishable 
from  that  of  Cuba  or  the  Soviet  Union 
is  one  we  regret. 

Our  interest  in  the  welfare  and 
economic  development  of  the  people  of 
Afghanistan — one  of  the  world's 
poorest  nations — has  been  amply  dem- 
onstrated by  the  fact  that  we  have  pro- 
vided over  $.5  billion  of  assistance  in 
the  past  30  years.  In  the  present  situa- 
tion, economic  development  has  largely 
come  to  a  standstill,  and  our  own  aid 
program  is  being  phased  out  in  accord- 
ance with  legislative  requirements. 

We  are  especially  disturbed  by  the 
growing  involvement  of  the  Soviet 
Union  in  Afghan  affairs.  Afghanistan 
and  the  Soviet  Union,  as  neighbors, 
have  always  had  close  relations.  Never 
before  in  recent  times,  however,  have 
the  Soviet  military — and,  apparently, 
the  political — roles  been  as  extensive. 
Direct  interference  in  Afghanistan  by 
any  country,  including  the  Soviet 
Union,  would  threaten  the  integrity  of 
that  nation  and  peace  in  the  area  and 
would  be  a  matter  of  deep  concern  to 
the  United  States.  We  have  repeatedly 


impressed  on  the  Soviet  Government 
the  dangers  of  more  direct  involvement 
in  the  fighting  in  Afghanistan.  We  are 
continuing  to  monitor  developments 
closely. 

For  its  part,  the  U.S.  Government 
seeks  no  special  position  in  Afghanis- 
tan. We  look  for  a  relationship  based  on 
mutual  respect  and  shared  interests  in 
regional  stability,  the  independence  and 
territorial  integrity  of  all  states  in  the 
area,  and  nonintervention.  These  are 
goals  which  I  have  already  spelled  out 
as  among  the  guiding  principles  of  our 
policy  throughout  South  Asia.  We  have 
important  differences  with  the  Afghan 
Government,  including  our  deep  con- 
cern about  the  human  rights  situation 
in  Afghanistan.  Security  concerns  and 
the  decline  in  our  programs  have  re- 
C|Uired  us  to  reduce  our  Embassy  staff 
in  Kabul  and  to  withdraw  dependents  of 
U.S.  Government  personnel.  Never- 
theless, we  have  continued  to  express 
to  the  Government  of  Afghanistan  our 
desire  for  normal  and  friendly  relations. 
We  consider  that  the  initiative  for  such 
relations  lies  with  them. 

Pakistan 

Pakistan's  understandable  uneasiness 
about  developments  in  Afghanistan  is 
heightened  by  its  internal  difficulties. 
The  country  continues  under  martial 
law,  imposed  in  July  1977.  Elections 
that  were  promised  for  November  of 
this  year  were  indefinitely  postponed, 
and  martial  law  has  been  indefinitely 
extended.  We  regret  this  decision  and 
continue  to  hope  that  Pakistan  will  re- 
form to  elected  civilian  government  as 
soon  as  possible. 

Pakistan's  political  problems  are 
heightened  by  its  economic  difficulties 
Years  of  heavy  budget  deficits,  mount 
ing  imports  and  inadequate  exports 
have  brought  Pakistan  to  the  brink  of 
crisis  in  its  external  finances.  More- 
over, to  feed  itself,  Pakistan  will 
require  a  sustained  and  substantial  in- 
crease in  agricultural  productivity.  To 
turn  this  situation  around  will  require 
difficult  economic  policy  decisions. 

The  United  States  traditionally  ha 
had  a  close  relationship  with  Pakistan 
Pakistan  was  a  member  of  both 
South-East  Asia  Treaty  Organization 
(SEATO)  and  the  Central  Treaty  Or- 
ganization (CENTO).  Our  two  countrit 
continue  to  be  linked  together  by  a  19." 
agreement  which  pledges  the  two  sidt 
to  consult  in  accordance  with  const itu 
tional  processes  in  the  event  of  aggre. 
sion  from  Communist  powers.  Althciug 
SEATO  and  CENTO  no  longer  exist 


62 


Department  of  State  Bullet] 


South  Asia 


and  Pakistan  has  joined  the  nonaligned 
movement,  we  continue  to  value  oui- 
ties  with  this  country  and  remain 
pledged  to  support  Pakistan's  inde- 
pendence and  territorial  integrity. 
Pakistan's  security  is  an  important  con- 
cern for  us. 

Our  ability  to  provide  Pakistan 
with  the  support  we  would  wish  to  give 
it  has  been  restricted  by  Pakistan's  nu- 
clear activities.  Our  legislation  man- 
dates a  cutoff  of  most  development  and 
military  assistance  to  countries  which 
import  certain  sensitive  nuclear  equip- 
ment material  and  technology,  includ- 
ing equipment  used  for  uranium  en- 
richment. The  fact  that  Pakistan  has 
been  developing  a  uranium  enrichment 
program  which  is  inconsistent  with  its 
power  generation  or  research  needs  has 
caused  us  deep  concern.  We  have  cut 
off  further  economic  development  as- 
sistance, valued  at  about  $40  million 
annually,  as  well  as  terminated  our 
modest  military  training  program.  This 
action,  as  I  have  said,  was  required 
under  U.S.  law. 

We  have  expressed  our  concern  to 
the  Pakistanis  about  their  nuclear  ac- 
tivities and  have  urged  them  not  to 
move  forward  to  develop  a  nuclear  e.\- 
olosives  capability.  We  believe  that  the 
levelopment  of  such  a  capability  could 
aggravate  rather  than  relieve  their  se- 
;'urity  concerns  and  could  be  a  major 
ource  of  instability  in  the  South  Asian 
egion. 

As  you  all  know,  our  Embassy  in 
slamabad  was  overrun  by  a  mob  and 
iestroyed  by  fire  10  days  ago.  Four 
nembers  of  our  staff  died  tragically  in 
hat  fire — two  American  servicemen 
ind  two  Pakistani  employees.  There 
ire  legitimate  questions  about  the  time 
t  took  for  the  Pakistanis  to  clear  the 
ompound.  The  Pakistani  Government 
las  established  a  commission  of  inquiry 
0  look  into  this.  But  in  contrast  to  the 
ranian  regime,  the  Government  of 
'akistan  acknowledged  its  responsibil- 
ty  for  the  protection  of  our  diplomatic 
nission.  President  Zia  has  expressed 
lis  regret  to  us  about  the  incident  and 
as  offered  to  rebuild  our  chancery  in 
slamabad. 

lelations  With  India 

)ifferences  over  nuclear  issues  have 
Iso  influenced  U.S.  relations  with 
ndia,  whose  1974  nuclear  explosion 
as  a  key  element  in  generating  re- 
ewed  concern  in  this  country  and 
Isewhere  about  the  danger  of  the 
pread  of  nuclear  technology  which 


'ebruary  1! 


could  be  used  for  military  purposes. 
U.S.  concern  about  nuclear  prolifera- 
tion eventually  resulted  in  the  Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation  Act  of  1978. 

This  act  has  had  an  important 
bearing  on  our  relations  with  India.  It 
provides  that  after  March  1980,  nuclear 
supplies  may  not  be  exported  by  the 
United  States  to  any  country  which  has 
not  accepted  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  safeguards  over  all  its 
peaceful  nuclear  facilities.  India  has 
refused  to  accept  such  safeguards. 

The  provisions  of  the  act  affect  the 
continued  supply  of  enriched  uranium 
fuel  to  the  twin  reactors  at  Tarapur, 
north  of  Bombay.  These  reactors, 
which  supply  some  15%  of  the  power 
requirement  of  western  India,  were 
built  in  the  1960s  with  American  eco- 
nomic assistance.  A  bilateral  agreement 
calls  for  U.S.  supply  of  enriched 
uranium  for  the  lifetime  of  the  reactors. 
India,  in  exchange,  is  obligated  to  pur- 
chase all  Tarapur  fuel  from  the  United 
States  and  to  accept  certain  safeguards 
and  other  controls  over  the  fuel  and  the 
waste  material  produced  from  it. 

This  knotty  problem  has  received 
considerable  attention  in  India.  It  has 
at  times  tended  to  obscure  the  fact  that 
relations  between  the  United  States 
and  India  are  otherwise  good  and  prob- 
ably better  than  they  have  been  since 
the  early  1960s. 

The  improvement  in  our  relations 
with  India  dates  back  to  the  last  years 
of  Mrs.  Gandhi's  government.  You  will 
recall  that  a  few  years  before  that,  in 
1971,  our  relations  had  sunk  to  a  low 
with  the  famous,  so-called  American  tilt 
toward  Pakistan  in  the  Bangladesh  war 
and  the  dispatch  of  the  aircraft  carrier 
Eutvypriac  to  the  Indian  Ocean.  By  the 
mid-1970s,  both  governments  had  come 
to  recognize  that  a  more  mature  re- 
lationship was  called  for.  The  Desai 
government  moved  further  in  this  di- 
rection. It  made  "genuine  nonalign- 
ment"  a  watchword.  While  it  main- 
tained good  relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  it  also  sought  better  ties  with 
the  United  States. 

The  United  States  and  India  often 
stress  our  shared  commitment  to 
human  rights  and  the  democratic  proc- 
ess. But  our  relationship  with  India 
goes  far  beyond  the  realm  of  political 
philosophy.  Perhaps  nothing  better 
symbolizes  the  diversity  of  ties  be- 
tween the  two  countries  and  the  con- 
crete ways  in  which  that  cooperation  is 
manifested  than  the  Indo-U.S.  Joint 
Commission  and  the  work  carried  <m 


through  its  four  subcommission.s — eco- 
nomics and  commerce,  agriculture,  sci- 
ence and  technology,  and  education  and 
culture. 

We  hope  that  through  the  work  of 
these  commissions,  through  our  ex- 
panding trade  (now  approaching  $2  bil- 
lion annually),  through  the  establish- 
ment of  a  modest  economic  assistance 
program,  through  exchanges  of  scholars 
and  students,  and,  perhaps  most  impor- 
tant, by  a  willingness  on  the  part  of  the 
two  countries  to  engage  as  equals  in  a 
wide  range  of  candid  consultations  on 
bilateral  and  multilateral  issues,  the 
ups  and  downs  which  have  so  fre- 
((uently  characterized  Indo-U.S.  rela- 
tions in  the  past  will  be  avoided.  We 
recognize  that  we  have  much  in  com- 
mon. We  also  recognize  that  there  are 
issues  where  we  disagree.  Our  aim  has 
been  to  expand  the  former  and  to  iso- 
late and  discuss  the  latter.  We  think  we 
have  made  considerable  progress. 

We  hope  that  this  will  continue. 
India  now  faces  general  elections, 
scheduled  for  January,  taking  place  in 
an  established  institutional  framework. 
We  are  confident  that  whatever  gov- 
ernment comes  to  power,  our  good  rela- 
tions with  India  will  continue.  We  can 
also  hope,  as  I  have  said  earlier,  that 
India  will  continue  to  strengthen  and 
improve  relations  with  its  neighbors.  In 
the  final  analysis,  it  is  this  aspect  of  In- 
dian foreign  relations  that  may  be  the 
most  important  from  our  own  point  of 
view. 

Let  me  turn  now  to  four  smaller 
countries  of  the  area. 

Sri  Lanka 

Sri  Lanka  (or  as  it  was  formerly  known, 
Ceylon),  like  most  of  the  countries  of 
South  Asia,  has  faced  two  major  prob- 
lems since  it  won  independence  in  1948: 
the  creation  of  an  economy  sufficient  to 
I'aise  the  standards  of  living  and  meet 
the  aspirations  of  its  people  and  the 
nurturing  of  a  sense  of  nationality  and 
unity  among  peoples  of  diverse  ethnic, 
religious,  and  linguistic  communities. 
Sri  Lanka  has  tried  to  meet  these  chal- 
lenges within  a  democratic  system  and 
remains  one  of  the  few  functioning  mul- 
tiparty democracies  in  the  Third  World. 

Since  the  government  headed  by 
J.R.  Jayewardene  came  to  office  in  the 
last  national  elections  in  mid-1977,  Sri 
Lanka  has  dramatically  changed  its 
former  economic  policies.  While  not 
abandoning  the  general  Socialist  orien- 
tation that  has  characterized  Sri  Lanka 


63 


South  Asia 


for  decades,  the  government  has  en- 
coui-aged  the  domestic  private  sector, 
welcomed  foreign  investment,  and  ac- 
celerated a  major  economic  develop- 
ment program  designed  to  bring  irriga- 
tion to  hundreds  of  thousands  of  pres- 
ently unproductive  acres.  Sri  Lanka  has 
been  very  successful  in  enlisting  foreign 
support  for  this  development  effort,  in- 
cluding the  United  States,  and  the  re- 
sponse of  the  economy  to  the  new  eco- 
nomic policies  has  been  impressive. 
From  a  GNP  growth  of  under  3%  for 
most  of  the  1970s,  Sri  Lanka  achieved  a 
real  gTov\th  rate  of  over  8%  in  1978. 
Despite  this  economic  success, 
there  remain  unresolved  tensions  be- 
tween the  majority  ethnic  group,  the 
Sinhalese  who  are  Buddhist,  and  the 
minority  Tamils  who  are  Hindu  and 
Christian.  Underlying  the  tension  is  a 
small  group  of  Tamil  terrorists  bent  on 
achieving  a  separate  nation  for  Tamils 
through  violence.  While  Sri  Lanka  has 
a  population  of  only  15  million,  the 
course  of  events  over  the  next  few 
years  may  have  a  significance  beyond 
the  shores  of  the  island  nation.  What  is 
at  stake  is  whether  a  nation  can  main- 
tain its  commitment  to  democracy  and 
human  rights  and  meet  the  economic 
expectations  of  its  people,  while  at  the 
same  time  resolving  the  competing  and 
conflicting  claims  of  its  majority  and 
minority  peoples.  While  the  problems 
are  centuries  old,  Sri  Lanka's  traditions 
and  the  moderation  and  accommodating 
spirit  of  its  government  augur  well  for 
the  future. 

Bangladesh 

Bangladesh,  in  the  eastern  part  of  the 
region,  is  one  of  the  world's  most  im- 
poverished and  overpopulated  coun- 
tries. Following  its  creation, 
Bangladesh  faced  a  number  of  major 
economic,  political,  and  administrative 
problems.  In  recent  years  there  has 
been  a  modest  but  broad-based  im- 
provement in  the  quality  of  public  ad- 
ministration, the  economy,  and  public 
order.  Ziaur  Rahman,  who  took  power 
in  1975,  was  elected  president  in  June 
1978.  This  February  parliament  elec- 
tions gave  his  Bangladesh  Nationalist 
Party  a  majority. 

During  the  past  year,  there  has 
been  continued  progress  in  fulfilling 
commitments  to  restore  political  free- 
dom and  to  promote  economic  develop- 
ment. The  number  of  political  prisoners 
has  been  further  reduced.  The  Feb- 
ruary 1979  parliamentary  election  was  a 
step  forward  in  Bangladesh's  political 


64 


evolution.  Martial  law  was  withdrawn, 
restrictions  on  press  freedom  were  re- 
laxed, and  some  long-banned  newspa- 
pers resumed  publication.  On  Wed- 
nesday of  this  week,  Ziaur  completed 
the  dismantlement  of  the  emergency/ 
martial  law  regime  which  had  been  in 
place  nearly  4  years,  ending  the  state  of 
emergency  and  announcing  the  release 
of  730  political  prisoners.  Ziaur's  ac- 
tions are  worthy  of  commendation. 

Bangladesh  states  that  its  foreign 
policy  is  one  of  "friendship  toward  all" 
and  genuine  nonalignment.  Relations 
with  the  United  States  are  excellent 
and  probably  as  good  as  they  have  ever 
been  since  that  nation's  birth.  Our 
interests  in  Bangladesh  reflect  our  de- 
sire for  stability  and  a  humanitarian 
interest  in  improving  the  lot  of 
Bangladesh's  desperately  poor  major- 
ity. We  welcome  Bangladesh's  position 
as  a  moderate  in  multilateral  forums 
such  as  the  United  Nations  and  the 
nonaligned  movement. 

Nepal 

The  Himalayan  Kingdom  of  Nepal  is 
also  being  buffeted  by  the  winds  of 
change.  Disturbances  which  broke  out 
this  spring  led  the  King  tfi  call  for  a  ref- 
erendum to  determine  whether  the 
country  should  continue  with  and 
slightly  modify  its  present  system  of  no 
political  parties  and  indirectly  chosen 
representatives — or  whether  it  should 
move  to  a  multiparty  system.  The 
King's  decision  was  widely  hailed  in 
Nepal  and  abroad  as  a  bold  and  imagi- 
native step  which  paves  the  way  to 
genuine  popular  participation  in  a  con- 
tinuing monarchical  system.  It  has  been 
followed  by  a  burst  of  political  activity, 
facilitated  by  lifting  of  restrictions  on 
politicians  and  the  press.  The  referen- 
dum is  expected  to  be  held  in  the 
spring. 

Nepal's  primary  relations  are  with 
its  two  giant  neighbors — India  and 
China.  Our  relations  with  it  are  good. 
We  are  grateful  for  Nepal's  consistently 
moderate  stance  on  international  politi- 
cal and  economic  issues  in  the 
nonaligned  movement,  the  United  Na- 
tions, and  other  international  forums. 

Our  humanitarian  interest  in  Nepal 
as  one  of  the  poorest  of  the  world's 
countries  has  prompted  a  substantial 
American  economic  assistance  program 
there.  This  has  contributed  to  the 
strength  of  our  bilateral  relationship. 


Maldives 

I  would  like  to  mention  one  other  coun- 
try with  which  until  recently  we  had 
very  little  contact — the  Republic  of 
Maldives.  Maldives  is  a  new  country — it 
gained  its  independence  only  in  1965 — 
and  it  is  comprised  of  nearly  2,000  is- 
lands stretching  over  600  miles  through 
the  Indian  Ocean.  During  the  last  2 
years  we  have  sought  to  develop  and 
strengthen  our  ties  with  this  nation. 
Like  the  rest  of  the  South  Asian 
nations,  Maldives  is  nonaligned.  Its 
first  national  priority  is  economic  de- 
velopment. To  date,  we  have  not  been 
able  to  provide  any  direct  economic  as- 
sistance, but  international  developmen 
institutions  to  which  we  are  a  con- 
tributor, such  as  the  U.N.  Develop- 
ment Program,  the  Asian  Developmen' 
Bank,  and  the  World  Bank,  are  in- 
volved in  promoting  human  develop- 
ment in  this  fascinating  country.  We 
value  our  relationship  with  Maldives 
and  hope  we  will  be  able  to  develop  it 
further  in  the  years  ahead. 

Conclusion 

In  much  of  this  talk  I  have  spoken  of 
South  Asia  as  if  it  were  a  discrete  par 
of  the  world,  somehow  isolated  from 
events  to  its  east  and  west,  and  pro- 
tected by  the  Himalayas  in  the  north 
and  the  Indian  Ocean  to  the  south.  Of 
course  it  is  not.  The  links  between 
South  Asia  and  other  areas  of  the 
greater  region  of  which  it  is  a  part  ar 
important  and  becoming  ever  stronge 
You  will  recall  that  very  early  in 
my  remarks,  I  said  that  the  way  the 
United  States  historically  has  looked 
South  Asia  reflects  in  many  ways  the 
way  we  have  looked  at  the  world  as  a 
whole.  As  a  global  power,  with  global 
responsibilities,  we  cannot  make  Sout 
Asia  policy  in  a  vacuum.  We  cannot  de 
with  all  developments  there  as  if  thej 
were  somehow  isolated  from  events 
elsewhere.  Furthermore,  because  of 
the  growing  links  between  the  South 
Asian  nations  and  the  countries  to  the 
east  and  west,  the  countries  of  the 
subcontinent  themselves  recognize  th 
their  security  and  well-being  increas- 
ingly are  affected  by  events  occurrin: 
outside  their  own  region.  And  we  als 
seek  to  make  them  aware  that  many 
their  actions  carry  great  implications 
for  our  global  interests  and,  indeed,  f 
the  world  as  a  whole.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bullei 


South  Asia 


Soviet  Invasion 
of  Afghanistan 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT. 
DEC.  26.  1979' 

On  December  25-26  there  was  a  large- 
scale  Soviet  airlift  into  Kabul  Interna- 
tional Airport,  perhaps  involving  over 
150  flights.  The  aircraft  include  both 
arge  transports  (AN -22s)  and  smaller 
ransports  (AN -12s).  Several  hundred 
soviet  troops  have  been  seen  at  the 
<abul  airport  and  various  kinds  of  field 
■quipment  have  been  flown  in.  I  cannot 
;ive  you  an  estimate  of  numbers. 

The  Soviet  military  buildup  north 
if  the  Afghan  border  is  continuing,  and 
ve  now  have  indications  that  there  are 
he  ecjuivalent  of  five  divisions  in  Soviet 
reas  adjacent  to  Afghanistan.  It  ap- 
pears that  the  Soviets  are  crossing  a 
ew  threshold  in  their  military  deploy- 
lents  into  Afghanistan.  We  believe 
hat  members  of  the  international 
omnninity  should  condemn  such  bla- 
ant  military  interference  into  the 
iternal  affairs  of  an  independent 
I  jvereign  state.  We  are  making  our 
lews  known  directly  to  the  Soviets.  ■ 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  De- 
artment  spokesman  Hodding  Carter  III. 


Background  on 
Afghanistan 


eography 

fghanistan  is  a  landlocked  counti'y 
hose  strategic  location  has  had  a 
ajiir  influence  on  its  history.  It  bor- 
rs  on  the  U.S.S.R.,  Iran,  Pakistan, 
id  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 

From  southwest  to  northeast  the 
untry  is  divided  by  the  towering — up 
25,000  feet  (7,620  m.)  above  sea  level 
Hindu  Kush  and  Pamir  mountain 
nges.  Mountains  and  arid  desert 
untry  are  interspersed  by  small  val- 
ys  made  fertile  by  irrigation  from 
ow-fed  mountain  streams. 

Afghanistan's  climate  is  typical  of 
e  higher  regions  of  central  Asia — cold 
the  winter  and  hot  and  dry  in  the 
mmer.  Another  characteristic  of  the 
imate  is  the  range  of  temperature 
ange  within  short  periods,  from  sea- 
n  to  season,  and  from  place  to  place, 
ir  example,  in  summer  at  Kabul 


i|e3bruary  1980 


(6,000  ft.:  1,829  m.),  the  temperature 
may  be  60°F  (16°C)  at  sunrise  and  by 
noon  reach  100°F  (38°C).  Kabul's  mean 
temperature  in  January  is  32°F  (0°C). 
In  the  plains  of  Jalalabad  (1,800  ft.;  549 
m.),  summer  temperatures  can  reach 
115°F  (46T). 

Precipitation  is  scanty — rarely  ex- 
ceeding 15  inches  (38  cm.)  annually, 
most  of  which  occurs  from  October  to 
April. 

People 

Afghanistan's  ethnically  and  linguisti- 
cally mixed  population  reflects  its  loca- 
tion astride  trade  and  invasion  routes 
that  lead  from  central  Asia  into  the 
Middle  p]ast  and  the  Indian 
subcontinent.  Pushtun  (Pathan),  Tajik, 
Uzbek,  Turkoman,  and  Hazara  groups 
constitute  the  bulk  of  the  Afghan 
population,  with  small  groups  of  other 
peoples  represented.  The  dominant 
ethnic  group — the  Pushtun — comprises 
about  half  of  the  total  population.  Af- 
ghan Persian  (Dari)  and  Pushtu  are  the 
principal  languages  spoken,  although 
Turki  is  also  used  in  the  north. 

The  principal  cities  of  Afghanistan 
are  the  capital,  Kabul,  in  the  east;  Kan- 
dahar, southwest  of  Kabul;  Herat,  near 
the  Iranian  border  in  the  northwest; 
and  Mazar-e-Sharif,  near  the  Soviet 
border  in  the  north.  Other  cities  with 
industrial  bases  are  growing. 

Afghanistan  is  a  Moslem  country, 
which  is  now  governed  by  a  Marxist  re- 
gime. Religion  has  traditionally  per- 
vaded all  aspects  of  life,  and  it  is  now  a 
prime  factor  underlying  the  coun- 
trywide revolt  against  the  government, 
which  is  perceived  as  Communist  and 
atheist.  Except  for  a  rather  small  urban 
population  in  the  principal  cities,  people 
are  divided  into  clan  and  tribal  groups 
and  follow  centuries-old  customs  and 
religious  practices  in  the  conduct  of 
their  affairs. 

History 

Afghanistan,  often  called  the  cross- 
roads of  central  Asia,  has  had  a  turbu- 
lent history  and  has  suffered  many  in- 
vasions. In  328  B.C.,  Alexander  the 
Great  entered  present-day  Afghanistan 
and,  after  crossing  the  Helmand  River 
and  the  Hindu  Kush,  captui-ed  ancient 
Bactria  (present-day  Balkh).  His  rule 
was  followed  by  domination  by  Scyt- 
hians, White  Huns,  and  Turks.  In  652 
A.D.,  Afghanistan  fell  to  conquering 
Arabs,  who  brought  with  them  a  new 
religion,  Islam. 


Arab  rule  gave  way  to  Persian 
rule,  which  continued  until  998,  when 
Mahmud  of  Ghazni  (of  Turkish  extrac- 
tion) assumed  control.  Mahmud 
established  Ghazni  as  a  great  capital 
and  cultural  center,  from  which  he  re- 
peatedly invaded  India  to  spread  the 
Moslem  faith.  Mahmud's  dynasty  was 
short-lived,  however,  and  Afghanistan 
was  ruled  by  various  princes  until  the 
invasion  of  Ghengis  Kahn  in  the  early 
13th  century,  which  resulted  in  the  de- 
struction of  Herat,  Ghazni,  and  Balkh. 

Late  in  the  14th  century,  Afghanis- 
tan was  again  devastated — this  time  by 
the  invasion  of  Tamerlane,  who  made  it 
pai-t  of  his  huge  Asian  empire.  In  the 
early  16th  century,  Afghanistan  came 
under  the  rule  of  Babar,  who  founded 
the  Moghul  dynasty  in  India  and  who  is 
buried  at  Kabul,  his  favorite  city. 

Afghanistan  was  founded  as  an  in- 
dependent kingdom  by  Ahmad  Shah 
Durrani  in  1747.  Ahmad  Shah  consoli- 
dated various  chieftainships,  petty 
principalities,  and  provinces  into  one 
country.  From  then  until  1973,  when 
the  monarchy  was  overthrown  and  a 
republic  was  established,  the  monarchs 
were  members  of  the  Durrani  tribe,  al- 
though after  1818  they  were  members 
of  a  different  clan. 

European  Influence.  During  the 
19th  century,  as  British  power  in  India 
expanded  and  Russia  moved  into  cen- 
tral Asia  in  its  push  to  the  east,  the  his- 
tory of  Afghanistan  was  significantly 
influenced  for  the  first  time  by  Euro- 
pean countries.  British  efforts  to  secure 
a  stronger  position  in  order  to  counter 
Russian  influence  in  Persia  (Iran)  and 
central  Asia  led  to  the  first  Anglo- 
Afghan  war,  from  1838  to  1842. 

British  anxiety  over  Russian  ad- 
vances in  central  Asia  and  Afghan 
dealings  with  Russia  led  to  the  second 
Anglo- Afghan  war  (1878-80),  which 
brought  the  Amir  Abdur  Rahman  to  the 
throne.  This  ruler  agreed  to  British 
control  of  Afghan  foreign  affairs. 

World  War  I.  During  World  War  I, 
Afghanistan  remained  neutral  despite 
German  intrigue  to  have  the  Afghans 
foment  trouble  along  the  borders  of 
India.  Meanwhile,  nationalism  was  de- 
veloping in  the  area.  Amanullah,  who 
succeeded  to  the  throne  in  1919  follow- 
ing the  assassination  of  his  father, 
sought  to  terminate  British  control  of 
Afghanistan's  foreign  affairs.  This  re- 
sulted in  the  third  Anglo- Afghan  war, 
which  lasted  only  a  few  months.  Some 
initial  Afghan  successes  persuaded  the 


65 


South  Asia 


war-weary  British  to  give  Afghanistan 
the  freedom  to  conduct  its  external  af- 
fairs. This  event,  celebrated  on  May  27, 
is  considered  to  be  its  independence 
day,  even  though  Afghanistan  was 
never  actually  colonized  by  the  British. 

Reform  and  Reaction.  After  the 
third  Anglo- Afghan  war,  King 
Amanullah  set  about  making  changes  in 
his  country.  Moving  from  its  traditional 
isolation,  Afghanistan  entered  into 
diplomatic  relations  with  the  principal 
nations  of  the  world.  In  1927  the  King 
made  an  e.xtensive  tour  of  Europe,  an 
experience  which  fired  him  with  a  de- 
sire to  modernize  Afghanistan.  His 
modernization  efforts,  which  included 
abolishing  the  traditional  Mcjslem  veil 
for  women,  alienated  many  tribal  and 
religious  leaders.  This  development, 
together  with  the  depletion  of  the  na- 
tional treasury  and  the  deterioration  of 
his  army,  made  him  easy  prey  for 
Bacha-i-Saqao,  a  brigand  who  captured 
Kabul  and  declared  himself  King  early 
in  1929.  Nadir  Khan  defeated  Bacha-i- 
Saqao  on  October  10,  1929,  with 
Pushtun  tribal  support  and  was  de- 
clared King,  returning  the  ci-own  to  the 
Durrani  tribe. 

His  son,  Mohammad  Zahir  Shah, 
succeeded  to  the  throne  on  November 
8,  1933,  after  the  assassination  of  Nadir 
Shah  by  a  fanatical  follower  of  the  pre- 
vious dynasty.  Nadir  Shah's  brothers 
were  Prime  Ministers  through  1952, 
and  Zahir  Shah's  cousins,  Sardar 
Mohammad  Daoud  and  Sardar  Moham- 
mad Naim,  were  Prime  Minister  and 
Deputy  Prime  Minister/Foreign  Minis- 
ter from  19.53  until  March  1963. 

With  the  1964  Constitution  as  the 
vehicle,  Zahir  introduced  a  program  of 
social  and  political  reforms  under  a 
more  liberal  parliamentary  rule.  In 
practice,  the  so-called  experiment  in 
democracy  produced  few  lasting  re- 
forms, and  frequent  executive- 
legislative  deadlocks  delayed  or  blocked 
vital  legislation.  Under  this  more  re- 
laxed rule,  which  allowed  political  ex- 
pression but  which  did  not  provide  for  a 
legalized  political  party  system,  the 
country's  moderate  reformers  were  in- 
creasingly overshadowed  by  extremists 
of  both  the  left  and  right.  A  2-year 
drought  in  1971-72  worsened  economic 
conditions.  Amid  charges  of  corruption 
and  malfeasance,  the  monarchy  was 
removed  from  power  by  a  virtually 
bloodless  military  coup  d'etat,  led  by 
former  Prime  Minister  Mohammad 
Daoud,  on.Iulv  17,  1973.  The  1964  Con- 


stitution was  abrogated,  and  Afghani- 
stan was  declared  a  republic  with 
Daoud  as  its  first  President  and  Prime 
Minister. 

Recent  Events.  Five  years  after 
coming  to  power.  President  Daoud  was, 
in  turn,  overthrown  by  a  Marxist  coup 
in  April  1978.  Daoud  and  many  mem- 
bers of  his  family  were  killed  at  this 
time.  The  coup  was  carried  out  by  the 
leadership  of  the  People's  Democratic 
Party  of  Afghanistan,  a  coalition  of  the 
Marxist  Khakj  and  Parcham  parties.  It 
succeeded  because  of  previous  effective 
recruitment  of  a  large  number  of  young 
military  officers. 

Opposition  to  the  Marxist  govern- 
ment developed  almost  immediately 
and  subsequently  grew  into  a  coun- 


•^U.  S.  S.  R. 

r^/ 

■^     .-../' 

C^     CHINA 

\ 

IRAN 

AfmANISTAN  /* 

vWlSTAN 

^          INDIA 

A  radian  Sea 

A    / 

trywide  insurgency.  Differences  be- 
tween the  leaders  also  surfaced  very 
early  and  resulted  in  the  exile  of  the 
Parcham  group  and  numerous  purges 
and  impi-isonments.  Approximately  1% 
years  after  coming  to  power,  the  in- 
party  factionalism  erupted  in  a  show- 
down between  the  two  top  leaders — 
Mohammad  Taraki  and  Hafizullah 
Amin — resulting  in  the  death  of  Taraki 
and  the  assumption  of  power  by  Amin 
in  September  1979.  Three  months  later, 
Amin  was  overthrown  in  a  bloody  coup 
engineered  by  the  Soviets  and  was  re- 
placed by  Abarak  Karmal,  leader  of  the 
Parcham  group  which  had  been  exiled 
in  the  summer  of  1978. 

After  the  April  1978  coup  had 
bi-ought  a  Marxist  government  to 
power  in  Afghanistan,  the  Soviets 
moved  (juickly  to  take  advantage  of  the 
new  situation  and  to  consolidate  their 
ties  with  the  Taraki  government.  In 
December  1978,  they  signed  a  new 
Treaty  of  Friendship  and  Cooperation 


with  Afghanistan.  Soviet  military  as- 
sistance to  Afghanistan  grew  signifi- 
cantly and,  as  the  insurgency  against 
the  government  developed,  Soviet  mill 
tary  equipment  and  advisers  became 
critical  to  the  survival  of  the  regime. 
Beginning  in  the  spring  of  1979,  Sovie 
military  involvement  in  Afghanistan 
began  to  escalate  dramatically  until  it 
culminated  in  December  1979  with  the 
current  Soviet  invasion  which  installec 
the  new  government. 

Government 

Since  April  1978  Afghanistan  has  beer 
ruled  by  a  Marxist  regime.  The  gov- 
ernment calls  itself  a  republic.  The 
highest  body  is  the  Revolutionary 
Council  headed  by  a  President.  There 
a  Council  of  Ministers  headed  by  a 
Prime  Minister.  Basic  power  is  vested 
in  the  Politburo  of  the  ruling  party,  th 
People's  Democratic  Party  of  Afghani 
Stan  headed  by  a  Secretary  General. 
The  new  leader,  Babrak  Karmal,  hold: 
all  three  leadership  positions — 
President,  Prime  Minister,  and  Secre 
tary  General  of  the  party — as  did  his 
predecessor,  Hafizullah  Amin. 

Economy 

The  turmoil  which  has  engulfed  Af- 
ghanistan during  the  past  year  owing 
an  insurgency,  which  escalated  stead 
throughout  the  year  until  it  had  spre 
thr(]Ugh(JUt  the  entire  country,  has  t( 
tally  disrupted  the  basic  economic  sy 
tem.  Therefore,  it  is  impossible  to  pr 
vide  any  reliable  current  economic 
statistics.  The  last  statistics  availabh 
are  for  1978  when  the  gross  national 
product  was  in  the  range  of  $3-4  billii 
and  the  per  capita  income  was  about 
$250.  ■ 


66 


Department  of  State  Bulk 


JNITED  NATIONS 


J.S.  Asks  Security  Council 

ro  Impose  Sanctions  Against  Iran 


ECRETARY  VANCE. 
(EC.  29.  1979> 

/e  meet  tonight  at  a  moment  when  the 
rinciples  upon  which  this  great  inter- 
ational  body  rests  are  being  sharply 
^lallenged  in  Iran. 

More  than  8  weeks  have  passed 
nee  our  Embassy  was  seized  and  our 
ople  and  those  from  other  nations 
ere  taken  hostage  in  Tehran.  On  three 
parate  occasions,  this  Council  has 
lanimously  expressed  the  will  of  the 
ternational  community  that  the  hos- 
ges  be  released  immediately. 

From  the  outset,  the  Secretary 
neral.  with  the  full  cooperation  of  the 
nited  States,  has  labored  unceasingly 
r  a  peaceful  solution.  The  President  of 
e  General  Assembly  has  twice  urged 
an  to  release  the  hostages.  The  In- 
rnational  Court  of  Justice  has  spoken, 
'arly  and  unanimously.  Governments 
d  world  leaders,  of  varying  political 
d  religious  faiths,  have  appealed  for 
e  release  of  our  people.  And  the  U.S. 
ivernment  has.  with  determination, 
rsistence,  and  patience,  pursued 
ery  peaceful  channel  available  to  us. 

The  response  of  those  who  per- 
tuate  this  crisis — the  terrorists  who 
ve  invaded  our  Embassy  and  the 
vernment  of  Iran  which  supports 
'm — has  been  defiance  and  contempt, 
ey  have  placed  themselves  beyond 
'  world's  law  and  beyond  the  moral 
peratives  that  are  common  to  the 
rld's  cultures  and  religions. 

At  the  heart  of  this  matter  are  50 
n  and  women — still  captive,  still 
lated,  still  subjected  to  the  most  se- 
■e  strains.  The  World  Court,  in  its 
mimous  decision,  expressed  concern 
it  continuation  of  these  conditions  of 
jrisonment  "...  exposes  the  human 
ngs  concerned  to  privation, 
dship,  anguish  and  even  danger  to 
and  health  and  thus  to  a  serious 
;sibility  of  irreparable  harm.  .  .  ." 
lims  that  the  hostages  are  well  ring 
low.  for  the  international  community 
;  been  denied  either  consistent  or 
nprehensive  access  to  them. 

But  let  us  be  clear:  It  is  not  only  50 
lerican  men  and  women  who  are  held 
tage  in  Iran,  it  is  the  international 
imunity. 


gijllf 


This  is  far  more  than  a  conflict  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Iran.  Iran 
has  placed  itself  in  conflict  with  the 
structure  of  law  and  with  the  machin- 
ery of  peace  all  of  us  have  painstakingly 
built. 

The  time  has  come  for  the  world 
community  to  act,  firmly  and  collec- 
tively, to  uphold  international  law  and 
preserve  international  peace.  We  must 
give  practical  meaning  to  the  principles 
and  pui-poses  of  our  charter. 

As  long  as  Iran  remains  indifferent 
to  the  voices  of  reason  and  mercy  that 
have  been  raised  from  eveiy  corner  of 
the  world,  as  long  as  it  refuses  to  rec- 
ognize the  common  rules  of  interna- 
tional behavior,  it  must  accept  the  con- 
sequences of  its  deliberate  actions. 
On  November  25  the  Secretary 
General,  acting  under  article  99  of  the 
charter,  took  the  extraordinary  step  of 
requesting  an  urgent  meeting  of  the 
Council  to  deal  with  this  crisis,  stating 
that  "the  present  crisis  poses  a  serious 
threat  to  international  peace  and  secu- 
rity." The  Council's  resolution  of  De- 
cember 4.  adopted  unanimously,  ex- 
pressed the  Council's  deep  concern  at 
the  dangerous  level  of  tension  and 
spoke  of  possible  grave  consequences 
for  international  peace  and  security. 

These  statements,  along  with  the 
many  statements  of  concern  by  member 
states,  make  clear  the  judgment  of  the 
international  community  that  Iran's  act 
of  taking  and  holding  hostages  repre- 
sents a  violation  of  the  law  of  nations 
and  threatens  international  peace  and 
security.  If  Iran  continues  to  hold  the 
hostages,  after  the  Council  and  the 
world  community  have  unanimously 
called  for  their  release,  action  against 
Iran  under  chapter  VII  of  the  charter  is 
not  only  justified  but  required  to  pro- 
mote a  peaceful  solution  to  this  crisis. 
It  is,  therefore,  incumbent  upon  all 
of  us  as  members  of  this  Council  to  take 
the  steps  necessary  to  insure  that  the 
Council's  earlier  unanimous  decision  is 
implemented.  My  government,  there- 
fore, seeks  a  resolution  which  would 
condemn  Iran's  failure  to  comply  with 
earlier  actions  of  the  Security  Council 
and  of  the  International  Court  calling 
for  the  immediate  release  of  all  the  hos- 
tages. The  resolution  would  further 


Kuary  1980 


provide  for  two  additional  steps:  first, 
request  the  Secretary  General  to  inten- 
sify his  good  offices'  efforts,  noting  his 
readiness  to  go  personally  to  Tehran 
and  to  report  back  to  the  Council  by  a 
specified  date;  second,  decide  that,  if 
the  hostages  have  not  been  released 
when  the  Council  meets  again  at  the 
early  specified  date,  the  Council  will  at 
that  time  adopt  specific  sanctions  under 
article  41  of  the  charter. 

We  believe  that  the  continued  sol- 
idarity of  the  international  community 
will  serve  to  demonstrate  that  an  early 
resolution  of  the  problem  is  to  the 
benefit  of  all,  including  the  people  and 
leaders  of  Iran.  The  prolongation  of  this 
crisis  is  in  no  one's  interest. 

We  are  not  unmindful  of  the  griev- 
ances of  the  Iranian  people.  We  respect 
Iran's  sovereignty  and  independence 
and  the  right  of  the  Iranian  people  to 
decide  their  own  form  of  government. 
As  we  have  repeatedly  emphasized, 
once  the  hostages  are  released  un- 
harmed, we  are  prepared,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  U.N.  Charter,  to  seek  a 
resolution  of  the  issues  between  us. 
With  the  hostages'  release,  the  way  will 
be  clear  for  Iran  to  present  its  griev- 
ances in  any  appropriate  forum. 

The  United  States,  however,  can- 
not respond  to  claims  of  injustice  while 
our  citizens  are  held  in  unjust  captivity, 
in  violation  of  the  resolutions  and  or- 
ders of  the  world's  primary  peacekeep- 
ing institutions.  As  a  great  American 
President,  Abraham  Lincoln — a  man  of 
deep  compassion  and  understanding — 
once  declared:  "There  is  no  grievance 
that  is  a  fit  object  of  redress  by  mob 
law." 

Our  patience  and  forbearance 
have  been  severely  tested  in  these  past 
weeks.  They  are  not  unlimited.  We 
have  made  clear  from  the  beginning 
that  we  prefer  a  peaceful  solution  to  the 
other  remedies  that  are  available  to  us 
under  international  law.  It  is  in  the 
interest  of  such  a  peaceful  solution  that 
today  we  call  upon  this  body  to  act. 

Let  us  act  now  to  preserve  the  web 
of  mutual  obligation  which  binds  us  to- 
gether and  shields  us  from  chaos  and 
from  disorder.  For  there  can  be  no  eva- 
sion of  this  central  point:  If  the  interna- 
tional community  fails  to  act  when  its 
law  is  flouted  and  its  authority  defied, 
we  not  only  diminish  the  possibility  for 
peace  in  this  crisis,  we  belittle  this  in- 
stitution of  peace,  itself. 

Effective  action  by  the  Security 
Council  can  breathe  new  life  into  the 
provisions  of  the  charter  and  the  deci- 


67 


United  Nations 


sions  iif  this  Council.  It  can  remind  all 
(if  us.  now  and  in  the  future,  of  our  sol- 
emn obligation  to  heed  the  judgments 
of  this  body  and  to  preserve  its  central 
place  in  the  maintenance  of  interna- 
tional peace  and  security. 

Let  us  move  together,  in  a  manner 
that  is  clear  and  convincing,  to  demon- 
strate that  the  rule  of  law  has  meaning 
and  that  our  machinery  of  peace  has 
practical  relevance.  Let  us  protect,  as 
we  must,  the  basic  process  that  permits 
nations  to  maintain  civilized  relations 
with  one  another. 

Through  the  decision  we  urge  on 
this  Council,  we  together  can  hasten 
the  day  when  this  ordeal  is  resolved. 
And  through  our  demonstrated  com- 
mitment to  the  purposes  of  our  charter, 
we  will  strengthen  both  the  principles 
and  the  institutions  that  serve  world 
peace  and  protect  us  all. 


SECURITY  COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION  461, 
DEC.  31,  1979 

The  Securitfi  Cmoicil. 

Recalling  its  Resolution  4.57  (1979)  of  4 
December  1979, 

Recalling  also  the  appeal  made  by  the 
President  of  the  Security  Council  on  9 
November  1979  (S/13616),  which  was  reit- 
erated on  27  November  1979  (S/13652), 

Gravely  concerned  over  the  increasing 
tension  between  the  Lslamic  Republic  of 
Iran  and  the  United  States  of  America 
caused  by  the  seizure  and  prolonged  deten- 
tion of  persons  of  United  States  nationality 
who  are  being  held  as  hostages  in  Iran  in 
violation  of  international  law,  and  which 
could  have  grave  consequences  for  interna- 
tional peace  and  security. 

Taking  note  of  the  letters  from  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Islamic 
Republic  of  Iran  dated  13  November  1979 
(S/13626)  and  1  December  1979  (S/13671) 
relating  to  the  grievances  and  statements 
of  his  Government  on  the  situation, 

Recalling  also  the  letter  dated  25 
November  1979  from  the  Secretary- 
General  (S/13646)  stating  that,  in  his  opin- 
ion, the  present  crisis  between  the  Islamic 
Republic  of  Iran  and  the  United  States  of 
America  poses  a  serious  threat  to  interna- 
tional peace  and  security. 

Taking  into  account  the  order  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  of  15  De- 
cember 1979  calling  on  the  Government  of 
the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  to  ensure  the 
immediate  release,  without  any  exception, 
of  all  persons  of  United  States  nationality, 
who  are  being  held  as  hostages  in  Iran 
(S/13697)  and  also  calling  on  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  of  America  and 


the  Government  of  the  Islamic  Republic  of 
Iran  to  ensure  that  no  action  is  taken  by 
them  which  will  aggravate  the  tension  be- 
tween the  two  countries. 

Further  taking  into  account  the  report 
of  the  Secretary-General  of  22  December 
1979  on  developments  of  the  situation 
(S/13704), 

Mindful  of  the  obligation  of  States  to 
settle  their  international  disputes  by 
peaceful  means  in  such  a  manner  that  in- 
ternational peace  and  security,  and  justice, 
are  not  endangered. 

Conscious  of  the  responsibility  of 
States  to  refrain  in  their  international  rela- 
tions from  the  threat  or  use  of  force  against 
the  territorial  integrity  or  political  inde- 
pendence of  any  State,  or  in  any  other 
manner  inconsistent  with  the  purposes  of 
the  United  Nations. 

1.  Reaffirms  its  Resolution  457  (1979) 
in  all  its  aspects; 

2.  Deplores  the  continued  detention  of 
the  hostages  contrary  to  Security  Council 
Resolution  457  (1979)  and  the  order  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  of  15  De- 
cember 1979  (S/13697); 

3.  Urgently  calls,  once  again,  on  the 
Government  of  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran 
to  release  immediately  all  persons  of 
United  States  nationality  being  held  as 
hostages  in  Iran,  to  provide  them  protec- 
tion and  to  allow  them  to  leave  the  country; 

4.  Reiterates  its  request  to  the 
Secretary-General  to  lend  his  good  offices 
and  to  intensify  his  efforts  with  a  view  to 
assisting  the  Council  to  achieve  the  objec- 
tives called  for  in  this  resolution,  and  in 
this  conne.xion  takes  note  of  his  readiness 
to  go  personally  to  Iran; 

5.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to 
report  to  the  Council  on  his  good  offices 
efforts  before  the  Council  meets  again; 

6.  Decides  to  meet  on  7  January  1980 
in  order  to  review  the  situation  and  in  the 
event  of  non-compliance  with  this  Resolu- 
tion, to  adopt  effective  measures  under  Ar- 
ticles 39  and  41  of  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations. 


VOTE  ON  RESOLUTION  461. 
DEC.  31,  1979 

For  (11) 

Bolivia,  China,  France.  Gabon,  Jamaica, 
Nigeria,  Norway,  Portugal,  U.K.,  U.S., 
Zambia. 

Abstain  (4) 

Bangladesh,  Czechoslovakia,  Kuwait, 

U.S.S.R. 


AMBASSADOR  McHENRY, 
JAN.  13,  19802 

For  the  third  time  in  the  last  6  weeks, 
this  Council  meets  to  consider  a 
dangerous  violation  of  the  principle  of 
diplomatic  inviolability — one  that,  in 
the  words  of  the  Secretary  General, 
poses  a  serious  threat  to  international 
peace  and  security. 

After  70  days,  the  50  personnel  at 
the  American  Embassy,  who  were 
taken  hostage  by  a  lawless  mob  in 
Tehran,  are  still  prisoners.  We  have  ye 
to  have  a  statement  of  opposition  to 
their  imprisonment  from  the  Iranian 
authorities. 

Those  few  outsiders  who  have  see 
the  hostages  briefly,  during  carefully 
orchestrated  visits,  report  that  the  hos 
tages  are  isolated,  psychologically 
abused,  and  afforded  an  inadequate 
diet,  despite  assurances  to  the  con- 
trary. Some  have  suffered  the  humilia 
tion  of  forced  participation  in  prop- 
aganda broadcasts.  Neutral  observers 
are  not  permitted  to  visit  them  reg- 
ularly to  assess  their  condition  or  to 
minister  to  their  needs.  Even  the  Sec 
retary  General  of  the  United  Nations, 
the  emissary  of  the  world  community, 
was  barred  from  seeing  the  hostages. 

The  past  2  months  have  been 
marked  by  repeated  calls  for  the  re- 
lease of  the  hostages  from  nearly  eve 
member  of  the  international  commu- 
nity. The  Secretary  General  and  man. 
members  of  this  Organization  have  de 
voted  tireless  efforts  to  promote  a 
peaceful  resolution  of  the  present  cris 
The  broad  international  support  we 
have  received  in  our  efforts  to  secure 
the  release  of  the  hostages  has  given 
encouragement  to  the  American  peop 
in  this  difficult  and  trying  period.  On 
their  behalf,  I  thank  all  who  have 
w  orked  so  hard. 

It  might  be  useful  to  recall  the 
measured  steps  which  have  brought  i 
to  the  current  situation. 

On  two  separate  occasions  durinj. 
November,  the  President  of  the  Secu 
rity  Council,  expressing  the  will  of  th 
members  of  the  Council,  appealed  to 
Iran  to  release  the  hostages.  But  the 
hostages  were  not  freed. 

On  December  4  of  last  year,  this 
Council,  by  unanimous  vote,  urgently 
called  on  the  Government  of  Iran  to 
release  immediately  the  personnel  of 
the  American  Embassy  who  were  beii 


«i 


68 


Department  of  State  Bull 


United  Nations 


held  in  Tehran,  to  provide  them  with 
protection,  and  to  allow  them  to  leave 
Iran.  Still  the  hostages  were  not  freed. 
On  December  15,  the  International 
Court  of  Ju.-^tice  gave  the  authority  of 
the  world's  highest  tribunal  on  interna- 
tional legal  matters  to  the  position  set 
forth  in  the  Council's  resoluticm.  The 
Court  noted  that  ".  .  .  there  is  no  more 
fundamental  prerequisite  for  the  con- 
duct of  relations  between  States  than 
the  inviolability  of  diplomatic  envoys 
and  embassies.  ..."  The  Court  ordered 
the  Government  of  Iran  to  release  the 
hostages  immediately  and  to  restore 
possession  of  the  U.S.  Embassy  in 
Tehran  to  American  authorities.  Still 
the  hostages  were  not  freed. 

On  December  31,  this  Council, 
without  dissent,  adopted  resolution 
461.  in  which  it  deplored  the  continued 
detention  of  the  hostages  as  contrary  to 
the  order  of  the  International  Court 
and  its  own  prior  resolution  and  ur- 
gently called  once  again  on  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Iran  to  release  immediately 
all  U.S.  nationals  being  held  as  hos- 
tages. In  that  resolution,  the  Council 
decided  that  it  would  adopt  effective 
measures  under  Articles  39  and  41  of 
:he  U.N.  Charter  in  the  event  that  Iran 
lid  not  comply  with  its  mandate.  And 
^till  the  hostages  have  not  been  freed. 
Five  times  the  world  community, 
icting  through  the  duly  constituted  or- 
gans of  the  United  Nations,  has  pleaded 
■vith  the  Government  and  people  of  Iran 
0  conform  to  the  precepts  of  interna- 
ional  law  and  release  the  hostages, 
■^ive  times  our  collective  plea  has  fallen 
in  deaf  ears. 

The  International  Court  and  the 
ourt  of  world  opinion  have  demanded 
hat  Iran  release  the  hostages  in  ac- 
ordance  with  both  the  accepted  norms 
if  international  behavior  and  its  treaty 
ibligations.  Yet  Iran  continues  to  im- 
irison  diplomatic  personnel  as  part  of  a 
ampaign  of  terrorism  and  political 
ilackmail  by  elements  in  Iran  who  have 
ig|he  support  of  Iranian  authorities. 

Resolution  461  is  a  decision  of  the 
lecurity  Council  adopted  under  chapter 
''11  of  the  charter.  The  operative  lan- 
uage  of  that  resolution,  including  the 
Council's  decision  to  adopt  effective 
aeasures  under  articles  39  and  41  of 
he  charter  in  the  event  of  non- 
ompliance  with  the  resolution,  con- 
inues  in  full  force.  Under  article  25  and 
ii  rticle  2,  paragraph  2.  of  the  charter, 
11  members  of  the  United  Nations  are 
bliged  to  accept  that  decision  and  to 
arry  out  its  mandate. 


jebruary  1980 


Clearly  Iran  has  not  complied  with 
the  resolution  and  freed  the  hostages. 
The  time  has,  therefore,  come  for  the 
Security  Council  to  adopt  the  effective 
measures  against  Iran  under  Articles 
39  and  41  of  the  U.N.  Charter  that  are 
required  by  paragraph  7  of  resolution 
461. 

The  members  of  the  Council  have 
before  them  the  measures  that  my  gov- 
ernment proposes.  Admittedly,  they 
should  not  be  taken  lightly.  But  after  2 
months  of  re.straint  by  the  American 
people  and  the  world  community,  dur- 
ing which  we  have  explored  every  pos- 
sible avenue  for  a  solution,  we  have 
failed  to  secure  the  release  of  the  hos- 
tages and  to  restore  the  rule  of  interna- 
tional law. 

Our  deliberations  this  weekend 
exemplify  the  patience  and  good  faith 
with  which  we  have  sought  to  resolve 
this  crisis.  The  Council  was  originally 
scheduled  to  vote  on  these  measures 
last  Friday,  January  11.  In  the  hours 
before  the  meeting,  various  suggestions 
and  reports  from  voices  purporting  to 
speak  for  Iran  led  some  to  believe  prog- 
ress toward  release  of  the  hostages  was 
possible.  They  believed  further  clarifi- 
cation of  Iran's  position  was  necessary 
before  proceeding  to  vote  on  sanctions. 

Reluctantly  the  United  States 
agreed  to  delay  the  vote — not  because 
we  saw  any  evidence  of  movement  to- 
ward a  solution  but  because  we  were, 
and  are,  prepared  to  explore  every 
proposal  that  holds  any  realistic  pros- 
pect of  securing  the  release  of  the  hos- 
tages. The  Secretary  General  then  sent 
an  urgent  message  to  Tehran,  seeking 


Article  39  of 
the  U.N.  Charter 

The  Security  Council  shall  determine  the 
existence  of  any  threat  to  the  peace,  breach 
of  the  peace,  or  act  of  aggression  and  shall 
make  recommendations,  or  decide  what 
measures  shall  be  taken  in  accordance  with 
Articles  41  and  42,  to  maintain  or  restore 
international  peace  and  security. 

.Article  41  of 
the  U.N.  Charter 

The  Security  Council  may  decide  what 
measures  not  involving  the  use  of  armed 
force  are  to  be  employed  to  give  effect  to 
its  decisions,  and  it  may  call  upon  the 
Members  of  the  United  Nations  to  apply 
such  measures.  These  may  include  com- 
plete or  partial  interruption  of  economic 
relations  and  of  rail,  sea,  air,  postal,  tele- 
graphic, radio,  and  other  means  of  com- 
munication, and  the  severance  of  diploma- 
tic relations. 


clarification  of  the  unwritten  proposal 
which  some  thought  they  had  heard 
Friday  afternoon. 

Last  night  the  Secretary  General 
received  a  letter,  but  the  letter  did  not 
respond  to  the  Secretary  General's 
message.  The  letter  does  not  mention 
the  existence  of  the  hostages  or  ac- 
knowledge the  world's  concern  and  re- 
sponsibility for  them.  Even  the  most 
dexterous  among  us  have  had  difficulty 
finding  a  clue  in  the  letter  that  could 
encourage  responsible  governments  to 
delay  the  vote  on  sanctions  any  longer. 

The  most  that  can  be  said  for  the 
letter  is  that,  for  the  first  time  since 
last  November,  when  Mr.  Bani-Sadr 
resigned  as  Foreign  Minister,  Iran  has 
sent  a  written  message  to  the  United 
Nations.  Even  so,  Iran  has  now 
explicitly  refused  to  abide  by  any  pro- 
nouncements from  the  United  Nations 
with  which  it  does  not  agree — includ- 
ing, obviously,  the  demand  for  the  im- 
mediate release  of  the  hostages  con- 
tained in  resolution  461. 

We  delayed  Friday's  vote  in  order 
to  explore  any  possible  hope  repre- 
sented by  Friday's  suggestions  and  by 
this  letter.  To  have  gone  ahead  without 
doing  so  would  have  been  irresponsible. 
But  our  efforts  at  clarification  have 
come  to  a  frustrating  end.  It  would  be 
even  more  irresponsible  for  us  to  delay 
any  longer  in  discharging  our  obliga- 
tions under  Resolution  461  and  the 
charter.  Clearly  the  time  to  take  effec- 
tive measures  has  come. 

When  Secretary  of  State  Vance  ad- 
dressed this  Council  on  December  29, 
he  said  that:  "As  long  as  Iran  remains 
indifferent  to  the  voices  of  reason  and 
mercy  that  have  been  raised  from  every 
corner  of  the  world,  as  long  as  it  re- 
fuses to  recognize  the  common  rules  of 
international  behavior,  it  must  accept 
the  consequences  of  its  deliberate  ac- 
tions." The  sanctions  we  propose  will 
serve  to  demonstrate  that  Iran's  con- 
tinued defiance  of  international  law  will 
result  in  its  increased  isolation  from  the 
world  community. 

While  the  proposed  sanctions  con- 
stitute a  meaningful  and  significant  ex- 
pression of  the  world's  condemnation, 
they  are  yet  a  temperate  response  to 
Iranian  intemperance.  To  adopt  meas- 
ures less  stringent  than  those  proposed 
in  the  resolution  before  the  Council 
would  be  tantamount  to  adopting  no 
measures  at  all.  And  to  adopt  no  meas- 
ures at  all  would  both  violate  the  bind- 
ing mandate  of  paragraph  6  of  resolu- 
tion 461  and  constitute  an  abdication  of 
our  obligation  to  search  for  peaceful 


69 


United  Nations 


resolutions  to  international  disputes 
and  uphold  the  fundamental  principles 
of  international  law. 

Some  have  urged  that  we  not  pur- 
sue sanctions  because  they  may  not  re- 
sult in  the  immediate  release  of  the  h(js- 
tages,  and  may  even  harden  Iranian  in- 
transigence. 

We  hope  that  sanctions  will 
strengthen  the  voices  of  those  in  Iran 
who  argue  that  the  holding  of  diploma- 
tic hostages  is  wrong  and  will  result  in 
Iran's  increased  isolation  from  the  in- 
ternational community. 

Failure  to  impose  sanctions  will 
confirm  the  belief  of  those  in  Iran  who 
feel  that  they  can  act  with  impunity. 
The  effect  of  our  failure  will,  thus,  be 
measured  in  a  lessening  of  this  Coun- 
cil's ability  to  deal  effectively  with  in- 
ternational crises. 

Others  have  urged  that  the  Council 
set  aside  the  question  of  sanctions  in 
order  to  focus  the  world's  attention  on 
Soviet  aggression  in  Afghanistan. 

But  Soviet  aggression  in  Afghanis- 
tan does  not  reduce  our  concern  over 
the  situation  in  Iran.  On  the  contrary, 
it  should  heighten  Iran's  concern  for  its 
future  as  an  independent  nation.  It 
should  bring  Iranians  to  a  realization 
that  they  must  rebuild  their  country 
quickly  and  prepare  to  defend  their 
borders.  It  should  make  Iran  aware  of 
the  danger  posed  by  its  isolation  from 
the  rest  of  the  world  community. 

Once  sanctions  have  been  imposed, 
the  key  to  ending  this  crisis  and  re- 
storing its  status  as  a  fully  participating 
member  of  the  international  community 
will  lie  with  Iran.  It  has  only  to  free  the 
hostages  and  provide  them  with  safe 
conduct  until  they  can  leave  for  home, 
and  the  sanctions  will  automatically  e.x- 
pire.  Iran  can  even  avoid  imposition  of 
the  sanctions  altogether  by  releasing 
the  hostages  before  the  members  of  the 
United  Nations  complete  the  process  of 
taking  the  necessary  steps  under  their 
constitutions  and  laws  to  implement 
sanctions.  Nothing  will  prejudice  Iran's 
right  to  seek  redress  of  its  grievances, 
whether  against  the  United  States  or 
its  former  rulers,  in  an  appropriate  in- 
ternational forum. 

I  remind  the  Council  that  this  is 
not  a  bilateral  (|uarrel  but  a  confronta- 
tion between  Iran  and  the  entire  inter- 
national community.  The  continued  via- 
bility of  cherished  and  heretofore  uni- 
versally observed  principles  of  interna- 
tional law  is  at  stake.  As  the  distin- 
guished delegate  from  Nigeria,  who 
served  so  ably  on  this  Council  during 
prior  debates,  said  last  month,  diploma- 
tic immunities  and  inviolability  are  so 


70 


much  a  part  of  international  law  and 
custom  that  all  nations  that  rely  on 
and  respect  law  have  an  obligation  to 
defend  them. 

The  members  of  this  Council  must 
now  do  what  we  can  do,  in  the  words  of 
Secretary  Vance,  "...  demonstrate 
that  the  rule  of  law  has  meaning  and 
that  our  machinery  of  peace  has  practi- 
cal relevance." 

We  must  do  what  we  can  under  the 
charter  to  defuse  this  most  serious 
threat  to  peace  and  world  order.  That  is 
the  object  and  purpose  of  the  collective 
security  system.  We  must  show  Iran 
that  the  world  is  determined  to  see  the 
hostages  freed. 


DRAFT  RESOLUTION. 

JAN.  13.  1980 

The  Security  Cou>icil. 

Recalling  its  Resolutions  457  (1979)  of 
4  December  1979,  and  461  (1979)  of  31  De- 
cember 1979. 

Recalling  alsa  the  appeal  made  by  the 
President  of  the  Security  Council  on  9 
November  1979  (S/13616)  which  was  reiter- 
ated on  27  November  1979  (8/136.52), 

Having  taken  note  of  the  letters  dated 
13  November  1979  and  1  December  1979 
concerning  the  grievances  and  views  of 
Iran  (S/13626  and  S/13671,  respectively). 

Having  taken  into  account  the  order  of 
the  International  Court  of  Justice  of  15  De- 
cember 1979  calling  on  the  Government  of 
the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  to  ensure  the 
immediate  release,  without  any  exception, 
of  all  persons  of  United  States  nationality, 
who  are  being  held  as  hostages  in  Iran 
(S/13697)  and  also  calling  on  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  of  America  and 
the  Government  of  the  Islamic  Republic  of 
Iran  to  ensure  that  no  action  is  taken  by 
them  which  will  aggravate  the  tension  be- 
tween the  two  countries. 

Further  recalling  the  letter  dated  25 
November  1979  from  the  Secretary- 
General  (S/13646)  stating  that,  in  his  opin- 
ion, the  present  crisis  between  the  Islamic 
Republic  of  Iran  and  the  United  States  of 
America  poses  a  serious  threat  to  interna- 
tional peace  and  security. 

Bearing  in  mind  that  adoption  by  the 
General  Assembly  by  consensus  on  17  De- 
cember 1979  of  a  convention  against  the 
taking  of  hostages. 

Mindful  of  the  obligation  of  States  to 
settle  their  international  disputes  by 
peaceful  means  in  such  a  manner  that  in- 
ternational peace  and  security,  and  justice, 
are  not  endangered  and,  to  that  end,  to  re- 
spect the  decision  of  the  Security  Council, 

Conscious  of  the  responsibility  of 
States  to  refrain  in  their  international  rela- 
tions from  the  threat  of  use  offeree  against 


the  territorial  integrity  or  political  inde- 
pendence of  any  State,  or  in  any  other 
manner  inconsistent  with  the  purposes  of 
the  United  Nations, 

Affirming  that  the  safe  release  and  de 
parture  from  Iran  of  all  those  being  held 
hostage  is  an  essential  first  step  in  resolv- 
ing peacefully  the  issues  between  Iran  anc 
the  United  States  and  the  other  States 
Members  of  the  international  community, 

Reiterating  that  once  the  hostages 
have  been  safely  released,  the  Governmen 
of  Iran  and  the  United  States  of  America 
should  take  steps  to  resolve  peacefully  the 
remaining  issues  between  them  to  their 
mutual  satisfaction  in  accordance  with  the 
purposes  and  principles  of  the  United 
Nations, 

Further  taking  into  account  the  repor 
of  the  Secretary-General  of  6  January  198( 
(S/13730)  made  pursuant  to  Resolutions 
457  (1979)  of  4  December  1979  and  461 
(1979)  of  31  December  1979, 

Bearing  in  mind  that  the  continued  de 
tention  of  the  hostages  constitutes  a  con- 
tinuing threat  to  international  peace  and 
security. 

Acting  in  accordance  with  Articles  39- 
and  41  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, 

1.  Urgently  calls,  once  again,  on  the 
Government  of  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Ira 
to  release  immediately  all  persons  of 
United  States  nationality  being  held  as 
hostages  in  Iran,  to  provide  them  protec- 
tion and  to  allow  them  to  leave  the  countr 

2.  Decides  that,  until  such  time  as  th 
hostages  are  released  and  have  safely  de- 
parted from  Iran,  all  States  Members  of 
the  United  Nations: 

(a)  Shall  prevent  the  sale  or  supply,  I 
their  nationals  or  from  their  territories, 
whether  or  not  originating  in  their  ter- 
ritories, to  or  destined  for  Iranian  gov- 
ernmental entities  in  Iran  or  any  other  per- 
son or  body  in  Iran,  or  to  or  destined  for 
any  other  person  or  body  for  the  purpose 
of  any  enterprise  carried  on  in  Iran,  of  a' 
items,  commodities,  or  products,  except 
food,  medicine,  and  supplies  intended 
strictly  for  medical  purposes; 

(b)  Shall  prevent  the  shipment  by  V( 
sel,  aircraft,  railway,  or  other  land  tran^ 
port  of  their  registration  or  owned  by  or 
under  charter  to  their  nationals,  or  the  c; 
riage  whether  or  not  in  bond  by  land  tran 
port  facilities  across  their  territories  of  a  [ 
of  the  items,  commodities,  and  products 
covered  by  subparagraph  (a)  which  are 
consigned  to  or  destined  for  Iranian  gov- 
ernmental entities  or  any  person  or  body 
Iran,  or  to  any  enterprise  carried  on  in 
Iran; 

(c)  Shall  not  make  available  to  the  I 
nian  authorities  or  to  any  person  in  Iran 
to  any  enterprise  controlled  by  any  Iran 
governmental  entity  any  new  credits  or  T 


Department  of  State  Bulle  l. 


United  Nations 


h.aiis;  shall  not,  with  respect  to  such  per- 
sons iir  enterprises,  make  available  any 
new  deposit  facilities  or  allow  substantial 
increases  in  existing  non-dollar  deposits  or 
alldw  more  favourable  terms  of  payment 
,  than  customarily  used  in  international 
(  commercial  transactions;  and  shall  act  in  a 
\i  businesslike  manner  in  exercising  any 
rights  when  payments  due  on  existing 
credits  or  loans  are  not  made  on  time  and 
shall  require  any  persons  or  entities  within 
thi'ir  jurisidction  to  do  likewise; 

(d)  Shall  prevent  the  shipment  from 
their  territories  on  vessels  or  aircraft  reg- 
istered in  Iran  of  products  and  commodities 
covered  by  subparagraph  (a)  above; 

(e)  Shall  reduce  to  a  minimum  the  per- 
sonnel of  Iranian  diplomatic  missions 
accredited  to  them; 

(0  Shall  prevent  their  nationals,  or 
firms  located  in  their  territories,  from  en- 
gaging in  new  service  contracts  in  support 
of  industrial  projects  in  Iran,  other  than 
those  concerned  with  medical  care; 

(g)  Shall  prevent  their  nationals  or  any 
person  or  body  in  their  territories  from  en- 
gaging in  any  activity  which  evades  or  has 
;he  purpose  of  evading  any  of  the  decisions 
^et  out  in  this  resolution; 

3.  Decides  that  all  States  Members  of 
;he  United  Nations  shall  give  effect  forth- 
A'ith  to  the  decisions  set  out  in  operative 
jaragraph  2  of  this  resolution  not- 
withstanding any  contract  entered  into  or 
icence  granted  before  the  date  of  this  res- 
ilution; 

4.  Calls  upon  all  States  Members  of  the 
Jnited  Nations  to  carry  out  these  decisions 
if  the  Security  Council  in  accordance  with 
Article  25  of  the  Charter; 

5.  Urges,  having  regard  to  the  princi- 
iles  stated  in  Article  2  of  the  Charter. 
itates  not  members  of  the  United  Nations 
0  act  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
he  present  resolution; 

6.  Calls  upon  all  other  United  Nations 
'odies  and  the  Specialized  Agencies  of  the 
Jnited  Nations  and  their  Members  to  con- 
orm  their  relations  with  Iran  to  the  terms 
f  this  resolution; 

7.  Calls  upon  all  States  Members  of  the 
Inited  Nations,  and  in  particular  those 
;ith  primary  responsibility  under  the 
'barter  for  the  maintenance  of  interna- 
ional  peace  and  security,  to  assist  effec- 
ively  in  the  implementation  of  the  meas- 
res  called  for  by  the  present  resolution; 

8.  Calls  upon  all  States  Members  of  the 
Inited  Nations  or  of  the  Specialized  Agen- 
ies  to  report  to  the  Secretary-General  by 

February  1980  on  measures  taken  to  im- 
lement  the  present  resolution; 

9.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to 
eport  to  the  Council  on  the  progress  of  the 
nplementation  of  the  present  resolution. 
ie  first  report  to  be  submitted  not  later 
lan  1  March  1980. 


VOTE  ON  DRAFT  RESOLUTION. 
JAN.  13.  1980 

For  (10) 

France.  Jamaica.  Niger.  Norway.  Philip- 
pines, Portugal,  Tunisia.  U.K..  U.S..  Zam- 
bia. 

Against  (2) 

German  Democratic  Republic.  U.S.S.R. 

Abstain  (2) 
Bangladesh,  Mexico. 

Not  Participating  (1) 

China. 


AMBASSADOR  McHENRY, 
JAN.  13,  1980S 

The  Security  Council  has  now  com- 
pleted its  effort  to  discharge  the  legally 
binding  obligation  imposed  on  it  by  the 
passage  of  resolution  461/79  and  to 
adopt  effective  measures  against  Iran 
under  Articles  39  and  41  of  the  U.N. 
Charter.  It  has  been  prevented  from 
doing  so  by  the  negative  vote  of  the 
Soviet  Union.  Written  by  Lewis  Carroll 
as  pages  out  of  Alice  in  Wonderland, 
the  light  becomes  darkness.  The  victim 
becomes  the  criminal.  Commitment  to 
international  law  becomes  a  defense  of 
anarchy.  How  extraordinary  to  hear 
from  a  nation  that  has  just  sent  its  ar- 
mies and  gauleiters  into  Afghanistan  to 
describe  our  efforts  to  seek  the  freedom 
of  50  of  our  citizens  held  hostage  by 
armed  terrorists  as  interference  in  "the 
internal  affairs"  of  Iran. 

The  Soviet  vote  is  a  cynical  and  ir- 
responsible exercise  of  its  veto  power. 
The  motive  behind  it  is  transparent. 
The  Soviets  hope  that,  by  blocking  sanc- 
tions, they  can  divert  attention  from 
their  subjugation  of  Afghanistan  and 
curry  favor  with  the  Government  and 
people  of  Iran,  who  are  among  those 
most  directly  affected  by  the  Afghan 
invasion. 

But  the  Soviets  hope  in  vain.  The 
nations  of  the  world,  viewing  this  veto 
in  tandem  with  the  Soviet  invasion  of 
Afghanistan,  cannot  fail  to  note  that 
Soviet  tributes  to  the  primacy  of  inter- 
national law  are  purely  rhetorical  and 
that  Soviet  policy  only  conforms  to  in- 
ternational norms  on  a  selective  and 
self-serving  basis. 

And  in  Iran,  even  though  chaos 
seems  to  reign,  it  should  be  apparent 
that  the  Soviet  veto  is  an  act  of  political 
expediency  designed  to  buy  Iranian 
silence  on  Afghanistan  and  Soviet  ad- 
vantage in  the  region. 


By  resolution  461,  the  Council 
undertook  a  binding  obligation  to  adopt 
effective  measures  under  article  25  of 
the  charter;  all  member  states  are  ob- 
liged to  respect  the  provisions  of  res- 
olution 461.  A  Soviet  veto  now  at- 
tempts to  block  the  membership  from 
fulfilling  that  obligation. 

The  (|Uestion  then  arises:  what  a 
member,  bound  by  resolution  461.  and 
acting  in  good  faith,  pursuant  to  its  ob- 
ligations under  article  2,  paragraph  2  of 
the  charter,  should  do  to  implement  it. 

Most  obviously,  Iran  remains 
bound  immediately  to  release  the  hos- 
tages pursuant  to  resolution  461.  But 
in  addition  to  that  paramount  obliga- 
tion, the  membership  of  the  United  Na- 
tions at  large  remains  obliged  to  review 
the  situation  and  the  event  of  Iran's 
noncompliance  with  it — an  event  which 
has  come  to  pass — to  take  effective 
measures  consistent  with  the  charter  to 
carry  out  that  resolution. 

My  government  has  already  insti- 
tuted measures  designed  to  exert  eco- 
nomic pressure  on  Iran,  as  envisaged  in 
the  vetoed  resolution.  These  measures 
will  be  applied  firmly  and  vigorously 
until  the  hostages  have  been  released. 
We  urge  all  other  members  of  the 
United  Nations  to  join  with  us  in  the 
application  of  meaningful  measures 
against  the  continued  holding  of  the 
hostages  in  defiance  of  international 
law.  Only  thus  will  we  demonstrate  to 
Iran  that  their  lawless  actions  are 
viewed  with  disfavor  by  all  nations.  The 
United  States  will,  of  course,  welcome 
and  cooperate  with  the  continued  good 
offices  of  the  Secretary  General  and  all 
members  of  the  world  community  in 
seeking  a  solution  to  the  present  crisis. 
We  sincerely  hope  that,  despite  the 
Soviet  veto,  our  efforts  will  lead  to  the 
return  of  the  hostages  and  the  return  to 
the  rule  of  law  in  international  affairs.  ■ 


'  USUN  press  release  155. 
^  USUN  press  release  6. 
^  USUN  press  release  7. 


71 


United  Nations 


General  Assembly  Acts  on 
Soviet  Invasion  of  Afghanistan 


FiiUdiriug  arc  tc.i-ts  of  Security 
Cdiiiicil  RcsolKtioii  Jt62  adopted  by 
co)i.sc)isiis  oil  .Jaiiuarii  9,  1980.  U.S. 
Aiiiba.ssador  to  the  United  Nafioiifi 
Donald  F.  McHcurij's  slatciueiit  in  the 
General  A.'f.seinbly  on  Jatiiiari/  12.  and 
the  General  Asscinbh/  rcftolution 
adopted  .Jaiiiiani  H. 

SECURITY  COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION  462, 
JAN.  9.  1980 

The  Security  Council. 

Having  considered  the  item  on  the 
agenda  of  its  2185th  meeting,  as  contained 
in  documents  S/ Agenda  2185, 

Taking  into  account  that  the  lack  of 
unanimity  of  its  Permanent  Members  at  the 
2190th  meeting  of  the  Security  Council  has 
prevented  it  from  exercising  its  primary 
responsibility  for  the  maintenance  of  inter- 
national peace  and  security. 

Decides  to  call  an  emergency  Special 
Session  of  the  General  Assembly  to  exam- 
ine the  question  contained  in  Document 
S/Agenda/2185. 


AMBASSADOR  McHENRY, 

JAN.  12.  1980' 

This  emergency  session  marks  only  the 
sixth  time  that  the  General  Assembly 
has  been  specifically  convoked  under 
the  "uniting  for  peace"  procedure  to 
discharge  the  peacekeeping  functions  of 
the  United  Nations  when  the  Security 
Council  was  prevented  from  doing  so. 
On  each  of  those  occasions,  the  precari- 
I  ais  peace  guarded  by  this  Organization 
was  undermined  by  a  crisis  that  chal- 
lenged principles  underlying  the  U.N. 
Charter.  The  infreciuency  with  which 
the  Security  Council  has  used  this  ex- 
traordinai-y  procedure  attests  to  the 
world's  collective  judgment  that  it  be 
invoked  sparingly  and  only  in  grave  cir- 
cumstances. 

Today  we  are  faced  with  a  chal- 
lenge to  the  principles  of  the  charter  as 
grave  as  any  that  necessitated  our 
meeting  during  previous  crises.  We 
need  no  long  oration,  no  extensive  re- 
marks to  remind  us  why  we  are 
gathered  here. 

Afghanistan,  a  member  of  the 
United  Nations,  has  been  invaded  by 
the  Soviet  Union,  another  member.  It 
was  invaded  in  violation  of  the  Soviet 
Union's  obligation  not  to  use  force 


72 


against  the  territorial  integrity  and 
political  independence  of  another 
state  —  an  obligation  imposed  on  the 
Soviets  by  both  the  U.N.  Charter  and  a 
bilateral  treaty  between  the  Soviet 
Union  and  Afghanistan. 

Afghanistan,  a  nonaligned 
sovereign  state,  has  been  occupied  by 
Soviet  troops  in  violation  of  the  inter- 
national legal  principle  that  no  state 
may  intervene  by  force  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  another.  Afghanistan  has  had 
its  government  toppled  and  replaced  by 
a  regime  chosen  by  the  Soviet  Union,  in 
violation  of  every  nation's  right  to 
self-determination  by  its  people. 

When  I  addressed  the  Security 
Council  during  its  debate  on  this  mat- 
ter, I  chronicled  the  brutal  series  of 
events  in  Afghanistan.  Every  member 
here  knows  how  the  Soviet  Union  air- 
lifted tens  of  thousands  of  troops  into 
the  territory  of  its  neighbor  and  took 
over  the  Afghan  capital  of  Kabul. 
Every  member  know's  that  after  Soviet 
troops  surrounded  the  presidential 
palace  in  Kabul,  the  President  of  Af- 
ghanistan was  summarily  executed,  and 
a  puppet  leader  from  abroad  was  in- 
stalled in  his  place.  Every  member 
knows  that  the  Soviet  Union  then 
undertook  widespread  military  opera- 
tions to  subjugate  Afghanistan  and  its 
people.  Every  member  of  the  United 
Nations  also  knows  that  the  invasion  of 
Afghanistan  poses  a  serious  threat  to 
other  countries,  both  in  southwest 
Asia,  where  the  current  level  of  tension 
and  instability  is  already  high,  but  also 
elsewhere  in  the  world.  It  poses  a  par- 
ticular danger  to  Afghanistan's 
neighbors. 

The  Soviet  Union  and  its  allies,  in- 
cluding the  Foreign  Minister  repre- 
senting the  Soviet-installed  regime  now 
in  power  in  Kabul,  have  asserted,  both 
here  and  in  the  Security  Council,  that 
the  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan  was 
prompted  by  armed  intervention  into 
that  country  by  other  foreign  pow- 
ers—  including,  as  they  tell  it,  the 
United  States.  They  have  asserted  that 
all  the  woi-ld  is  well  aware  that  Af- 
ghanistan has  been  the  target  of  so- 
called  imperialist  aggression  aimed  at 
overthrowing  the  "popular  democratic 
regime"  that  governs  there. 


But  all  the  woi'ld  knows  no  such 
thing.  These  allegations  are  an  obvious 
attempt  to  divert  attention  from  the 
central  issues.  The  Soviet  allegations 
are  nothing  more  than  a  transgressor's 
attempt  to  mask  its  misdeeds.  No  one 
can  or  should  believe  them. 

We  are  particularly  insulted  by  the 
transparent  falsity  of  the  Soviet  claim 
that  its  troops  entered  Afghanistan  at 
the  repeated  invitation  of  its  "popular 
democratic  regime."  As  so  many  of  my 
fellow  delegates  have  pointed  out  dur- 
ing this  debate,  no  reasonable  man 
could  possibly  believe  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  President  Amin  issued  such  a 
deadly  invitation.  Amin's  Soviet- 
appointed  successor  was  not  even  in  of- 
fice at  the  time  Soviet  troops  first  en- 
tered Afghanistan. 

The  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  the 
Soviet  Union  invaded  Afghanistan  to 
c|uell  determined  opposition  by  the  Af- 
ghan people  to  their  own  government. 
The  Soviet  Union  replaced  one  leader  ii 
Afghanistan  with  another  to  its  own 
liking.  It  is  sheer  hypocrisy  for  the 
Soviets  to  claim  that  their  presence  wa 
necessary  to  prevent  the  overthrow  of; 
"popular  democratic  regime"  by  so- 
called  imperialist  forces. 

Neither  the  U.N.  Charter  nor  any 
bilateral  treaty  affords  the  Soviet 
Union,  or  any  country,  the  right  to  tak 
military  action  in  another  country  be- 
cause it  disagrees  with  the  policies  or 
performance  of  the  existing  govern- 
ment. The  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghani- 
stan flouts  international  law,  breaches 
world  peace,  and  threatens  regional  an 
global  security.  ' 

The  universal  outcry  against  the 
subjugation  of  a  nonaligned  state  by  i 
great  power  neighbor  proves  that  the  I 
world  will  not  condone  military  inter- 
vention without  legal  or  moral  justific 
tion  by  one  state  into  another.  The 
strong  responses  to  this  act  of  aggres 
sion  by  many  countries,  including  my 
own,  demonstrate  to  the  Soviet  Unioi 
that  it  cannot  ignore  international  lav 
without  suffering  serious  consequence 
The  United  States  and  other  nations 
are  considering  other  unilateral  and 
multilateral  measures  to  further 
demonstrate  to  the  Soviet  Union  of 
the  magnitude  of  its  error,  including 
withdrawal  from  cultural  exchanges, 
trade  missions,  and  even  the  1980 
Summer  Olympic  Games. 

But  unilateral  action  on  the  part 
individual  states  is  most  effective  wh 
it  is  taken  in  concert  with  collective  : 
tion  that  expresses  the  will  of  the  woi 
community. 


Department  of  State  BuikHjjr 


United  Nations 


Tlu'  Sec'Ui-ity  Council  considered 
le  threat  to  the  peace  raised  by  the 
uestion  of  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Af- 
hanistan  at  length.  The  vast  majority 
fits  members  voted  to  call  for  the 
ithdi-awal  of  the  invasion  force  in  Af- 
haiiistan.  But  the  Soviet  Union  vetoed 
le  resolution  and  stymied  the  Coun- 
I's  attempt  to  discharge  its 

icekeeping  function  under  the 
larter. 

Therefore,  the  nations  of  the  \\(irld 
W'v  turned  to  the  General  Assembly  to 
nounce  this  dangerous  breach  of  the 
ace  and  security. 

It  is  imperative  that  we.  the 
ember  states  of  the  United  Nations. 
;press  in  clear  and  forceful  terms  that 
e  w  ill  never  condone  lawless  interfer- 
e  with  the  right  of  a  sovereign 
pic  and  the  lawless  invasion  of  its 
rritory. 

It  is  imperative  that  we  demand 
e  w  ithdrawal  of  Soviet  forces  from 
'ghanistan.  so  that  the  people  of  that 
untry  can  be  free  to  set  their  own 
ui-se  in  the  world  and  to  choose  their 
n  leaders. 

It  is  imperative  that  we  demon- 
•ate  we  cannot  be  duped  into  ignoring 
r  responsibility  to  defend  the  princi- 
'S  of  the  charter  by  tortured  explana- 
ns  that  insult  our  intelligence. 

And.  above  all.  it  is  imperative  that 
•  view  this  incident  for  what  it  really 
The  Soviet  Union  insists  that  this 
nei'al  Assembly  debate  has  been 
mijited  by  American  and  Chinese 
ttifogging;  that  it  is  being  used  as  an 
L'Use  to  renew  the  cold  war;  and  that 
nunciation  of  its  invasion  by  the 
■mbers  of  the  General  Assembly  will 
il  lount  to  an  abandonment  of  the  prin- 
les  of  nonalignment  embraced  by 
ny  nations  represented  here. 

But  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Af- 
anistan  is  no  cold  v\'ar  squabble.  It  is 
act  that  the  rest  of  the  world  cannot 
ord  to  ignore.  It  demonstrates  that 
'  Soviet  Union  has  no  real  commit- 
nt  to  the  principles  of  territorial  in- 
;rity.  to  self-determination,  to 
lalignment.  when  those  principles 
iflict  with  its  perception  of  its 
e  rests. 

For  this  body  to  remain  silent  in 
'  face  of  open  aggression  would  be  for 
'  members  of  the  United  Nations  to 
idone  a  violation  of  the  only  princi- 
■s  that  small  nations  can  invoke  to 
itect  themselves  from  self-aggran- 
ement  by  larger  and  more  powerful 
tes.  It  is  not  the  United  States 
ose  freedom  is  most  threatened  by 


ilebruary  1980 


Soviet  indiffei'ence  to  the  charter;  the 
small  and  nonaligned  countries,  like 
Afghanistan,  are  most  imperiled. 

So  we  cannot  remain  mute.  We 
must  speak  out.  We  must  stand  united 
in  support  of  the  principles  of  freedom, 
in  support  of  independence,  and  in 
support  of  the  principles  of  self- 
determination. 


GENERAL  ASSEMBLY 
RESOLUTION  A/RES/ES-6/2, 
.JAN.  14.  1980 

The  General  Assembly, 

Taking  note  of  Security  Council  Resolu- 
tion 462  (1980)  of  9  January  1980.  calling  for 
an  emergency  Special  Session  of  the  General 
Assembly  to  e.xamine  the  question  contained 
in  document  S/Agenda/2185. 

Gravely  cancenicd  at  the  recent  de- 
velopments in  Afghanistan  and  their  impli- 
cations for  international  peace  and  security. 

Rcaffiniiiiiy  the  inalienable  right  of  all 
peoples  to  determine  their  own  future  and  to 
choose  their  own  form  of  government  free 
from  outside  interference. 

Mindful  of  the  obligations  of  all  States 
to  refrain  in  their  international  relations 
from  the  threat  or  use  of  force  against  the 
sovereignty,  territorial  integrity  and  politi- 
cal independence  of  any  State,  or  in  any 
other  manner  inconsistent  with  the  purposes 
and  principles  of  the  Charter  of  the  United 
Nations, 

Recognizing  the  urgent  need  for  im- 
mediate termination  of  foreign  armed  inter- 
vention in  Afghanistan  so  as  to  enable  its 
people  to  determine  their  own  destiny  with- 
out outside  interference  or  coercion. 

Noting  with  profound  concern  the  large 
outflow  of  refugees  from  Afghanistan. 

Reralliiig  its  resolutions  on  the 
strengthening  of  international  security,  on 
the  inadmissibility  of  intervention  in  the 
domestic  affairs  of  States  and  the  protection 
of  their  independence  and  sovereignty  and 
on  the  principles  of  international  law  con- 
cerning friendly  relations  and  co-operation 
among  States  in  accordance  with  the  Char- 
ter of  the  United  Nations, 

Expressing  its  deep  concern  at  the 
dangerous  escalation  of  tension,  intensifica- 
tion of  rivalry  and  increased  recourse  to 
military  intervention  and  interference  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  States,  which  are  detri- 
mental to  the  interests  of  all  nations,  par- 
ticularly the  non-aligned  countries, 

Mindful  of  the  purposes  and  principles 
of  the  Charter  and  of  the  responsibility  of 
the  General  Assembly  under  the  relevant 
provisions  of  the  Charter  and  of  Assembly 
Resolution  377A(V)  of  3  November  1950, 

1.  Reaffirms  that  respect  for  the 
sovereignty,  territorial  integrity  and  politi- 
cal independence  of  every  State  is  a  funda- 
mental principle  of  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations,  any  violation  of  which  on 
any  pretext  whatsoever  is  contrary  to  its 
aims  and  purposes; 


2.  Strongly  deplores  the  recent  armed 
intervention  in  Afghanistan,  which  is  incon- 
sistent with  that  principle; 

3.  Appeals  to  all  States  to  respect  the 
sovereignty,  territorial  integrity,  political 
independence  and  non-aligned  character  of 
Arghanistan  and  to  refrain  from  any  inter- 
ference in  the  internal  affairs  of  that  coun- 
try; 

4.  Calls  for  the  immediate,  uncondi- 
tional and  total  withdrawal  of  the  foreign 
troops  from  Afghanistan  in  order  to  enable 
its  people  to  determine  their  own  form  of 
government  and  choose  their  economic, 
political  and  social  systems  free  from  outside 
intervention,  subversion  or  coercion  or  con- 
straint of  any  kind  whatsoever; 

.5.  Urges  all  Parties  concerned  to  assist 
in  bringing  about,  speedily  and  in  accord- 
ance with  the  purposes  and  principles  of  the 
Charter,  conditions  necessary  for  the  volun- 
tary return  of  the  Afghan  refugees  to  their 
homes; 

6.  Appeals  to  all  States  and  national  and 
international  organizations  to  extend  hu- 
manitarian relief  assistance  with  a  view  to 
alleviating  the  hardship  of  the  Afghan  refu- 
gees in  coordination  with  the  United  Na- 
tions High  Commissioner  for  Refugees; 

7.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to 
keep  Member  States  and  the  Security  Coun- 
cil promptly  and  concurrently  informed  on 
the  progress  towards  the  implementation  of 
the  present  resolution; 

8.  Calls  upon  the  Security  Council  to 
consider  ways  and  means  which  could  assist 
in  the  implementation  of  this  resolution. 


VOTE  ON  RESOLUTION, 
JAN.  14.  1980 

Of  the  152  members  of  the  United  Nations, 
140  participated  in  the  special  session  vote 
on  General  Assembly  Resolution  A/RES/ 
ES-6/2  on  January  14  as  follows: 

For  (104) 

Albania.  Argentina.  Australia,  Austria, 
Bahamas,  Bahrain,  Bangladesh,  Barbados, 
Belgium,  Bolivia,  Botswana,  Brazil.  Burma. 
Cameroon.  Canada.  Chile.  China.  Colombia, 
Costa  Rica.  Denmark.  Djibouti.  Dominican 
Republic,  Ecuador,  Egypt,  El  Salvador, 
Fiji,  France,  Gabon,  Gambia,  Federal  Re- 
public of  Germany,  Ghana,  Greece. 
Guatemala.  Guyana.  Haiti,  Honduras,  Ice- 
land. Indonesia.  Iran.  Iraq.  Ireland,  Israel, 
Italy,  Ivory  Coast,  Jamaica.  Japan,  Jordan, 
Kampuchea,  Kenya,  Kuwait,  Lebanon, 
Lesotho.  Liberia.  Lu.xembourg.  Malawi. 
Malaysia,  Maldives,  Malta,  Mauritania, 
Mauritius,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Nepal, 
Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Niger.  Nigeria, 
Norway,  Oman,  Pakistan,  Panama,  Papua 
New  Guinea,  Paraguay,  Peru,  Philippines, 
Portugal,  Qatar,  Rwanda,  Saint  Lucia, 
Samoa,  Saudi  Arabia,  Senegal,  Sierra 
Leone,  Singapore,  Somalia,  Spain,  Sri 


73 


TREATIES 


Lanka.  Suriname,  Swaziland,  Sweden,  Tan- 
zania, Thailand,  Togo,  Trinidad  and  Tobago, 
Tunisia,  Turkey,  United  Arab  Emirates, 
United  Kingdom.  United  States,  Upper 
Volta,  Uruguay.  Venezuela,  Yugoslavia, 
and  Zaire. 

Against  (18) 

Afghanistan,  Angola,  Bulgaria,  Byelorus- 
sian S.S.R..  Cuba,  Czechoslovakia, 
Ethiopia,  German  Democratic  Republic, 
Grenada,  Hungary,  Laos.  Mongolia. 
Mozambiiiue.  Poland,  Ukrainian  S.S.R., 
U.S.S.R.,  Vietnam,  and  Yemen  (Aden). 

Abstain  (18) 

Algeria.  Benin.  Burundi.  Congo.  Cyprus. 
Equatorial  Guinea.  Finland.  Guinea. 
Guinea-Bissau.  India.  Madagascar.  Mali, 
Nicaragua.  Sao  Tome  and  Principe,  Syria. 
Uganda.  Yemen  (Sana),  and  Zambia. 

Absent  (12) 

Bhutan.  Cape  Verde.  Central  African  Re- 
public. Chad.  Comoros.  Dominica.  Libya. 
Romania.  Seychelles.  Solomon  Islands. 
South  Africa,  and  Sudan.  ■ 

^USUN  press  release  5. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Atomic  Energy 

Agreement  for  the  transfer  of  enriched 
uranium  for  a  research  reactor  in  In- 
donesia, with  anne.x  and  exchange  of  notes. 
Signed  at  New  Delhi  Dec.  7,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Dec.  7.  1979. 
Signatures:  Indonesia,  IAEA,  and  U.S.. 
Dec.  7.  1979. 

Aviation 

Convention  on  international  civil  aviation. 
Dene  at  Chicago  Dee.  7.  1944.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  4.  1947.  TIAS  1591. 
Adherence  deposited:  St.  Lucia.  Nov.  20. 
1979^ 

Biological  Weapons 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  the  de- 
velopment, production,  and  stockpiling  of 
bacteriological  (biological)  and  toxin 
weapons  and  on  their  destruction.  Done  at 
Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  Apr.  10, 
1972.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  26.  1975. 
TIAS  8062. 

Accession  deposited:  Sao  Timie  and  Prin- 
cipe, Aug.  24.  1979. 

Conservation 

Convention  on  international  trade  in  en- 
dangered species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora, 
with  appendices.  Done  at  Washington  Mar. 
3,  1973.  Entered  into  force  July  1.  1975. 
TIAS  8249. 


Ratifications  deposited:  Italy,  Oct.  2, 
1979;'  Guatemala.  Nov.  7.  1979;  Tanzania. 
Nov.  29.  1979. 

Accession  deposited:  Liechtenstein.  Nov. 
30.  1979. 

Copyright 

Universal  copyright  convention,  as  re- 
vised, with  two  protocols  annexed  thereto. 
Done  at  Paris  July  24.  1971.  Entered  into 
force  July  10,  1974.  TIAS  7868. 
Ratification  deposited:  Italy.  Oct.  25.  1979. ^ 

Cotton 

Articles  of  agreement  of  International  Cot- 
ton Institute.  Done  at  Washington  Jan.  17. 
1966.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  23,  1966. 
TIAS  5964. 

Notification  of  withdrawal  deposited:  Iran. 
Nov.  23.  1979;  effective  Dec.  31.  1979. 

Cultural  Property 

Convention  on  the  means  of  prohibiting  and 
preventing  the  illicit  import,  export,  and 
transfer  of  ownership  of  cultural  property. 
Adopted  at  Paris  Nov.  14.  1970.  at  the  16th 
session  of  the  UNESCO  General  Confer- 
ence. Entered  into  force  Apr.  24.  1972. ^ 
Ratification  deposited:  Cyprus.  Oct.  19, 
1979. 

Environmental  Modification 

Convention  on  the  prohibiti(m  of  military  or 
any  other  hostile  use  of  environmental 
modification  techniques,  with  annex.  Done 
at  Geneva  May  18.  1977.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  5.  1978.3 

Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the 
President:  Dec.  13.  1979. 

Fisheries 

Conventifjn  on  future  multilateral  coopera- 
tion in  the  northwest  Atlantic  fisheries. 
Done  at  Ottawa  Oct.  24.  1978.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  1,  1979.^ 

Ratification  deposited:  Portugal,  May  25, 
1979, 

Human  Rights 

International  covenant  on  civil  and  political 
rights.  Done  at  New  York  Dec.  16.  1966. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  23.  1976. ^ 
Ratification  deposited:  El  Salvador.  Nov. 
30,  1979. 

International  covenant  on  economic,  social, 

and  cultural  rights.  Done  at  New  York 

Dec.  16.  1966.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  3. 

1976.3 

Ratification  deposited:  El  Salvador.  Nov. 

30,  1979. 

Judicial  Procedure 

Convention  abolishing  the  requirement  of 
legalisation  for  foreign  public  documents, 
with  annex.  Done  at  The  Hague  Oct.  5. 
1961.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  24,  1965.3 
Instrument  of  accession  signed  by  the 
President:  Dec.  27.  1979. 


Maritime  Matters 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948.  as  amended,  on  the  Intergovernmei 
tal  Maritime  Consultative  Organization 
(TIAS  4044.  6285.  6490.  8606).  Adopted  a 
London  Nov.  14.  1975." 
Acceptance  deposited:  United  Kingdom, 
Dec.  5.  1979. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948.  as  amended,  on  the  Intergovernmei 
tal  Maritime  Consultative  Organization 
(TIAS  4044.  6285.  6490.  8606).  Adopted  a 
London  Nov.  17,  1977." 
Acceptances  deposited:  Kuwait,  Nov.  27, 
1979;  United  Kingdom.  Dec.  5.  1979. 

International  convention  on  standards  of 
training,  certification,  and  watchkeeping 
for  seafarers.  1978.  Done  at  London  July  ' 
1978.  Enters  into  force  12  months  after  th 
date  on  which  not  less  than  25  states,  the 
combined  merchant  fleets  of  which  consti 
tute  not  less  than  oO'J  of  the  gross  tonnag 
of  the  world's  merchant  shipping  of  ships 
100  gross  register  tons  or  more,  have 
either  signed  it  without  reservation  as  to 
ratification,  acceptance,  or  approval  or  d 
posited  the  requisite  instruments. 
Signatures:  Belgium.  Dec.  7.  1978;= 
Chma.  June  13.  1979;"'  Denmark.  June  4. 
1979;  '-^  Federal  Republic  of  Germany. 
Mar.  26.  1979;  Liberia,  Mar.  21.  1979;=  P 
land.  Dec.  1.  1978;=  U.K..  Dec.  1,  1978;= 
U.S..  Jan.  25.  1979;=  U.S.S.R.,  Oct.  9, 
1979;  Yugoslavia,  Mar,  23.  1979.= 

International  convention  on  maritime 
search  and  rescue,  1979,  with  annex.  Do 
at  Hamburg  Apr.  27.  1979.  Enters  into 
force  12  months  after  the  date  on  which 
states  have  either  signed  without  reserv 
tion  as  to  ratification,  acceptance,  or  ap- 
proval or  deposited  the  requisite  instru- 
ments. 

Signatures:  Federal  Republic  of  German 
U.S.."*  Nov.  6.  1979;  Switzerland.  Nov.  : 
1979.'' 

Nuclear  Test  Ban 

Treaty  banning  nuclear  weapon  tests  in  t 
atmosphere,  in  outer  space,  and  under 
water.  Done  at  Moscow  Aug.  5,  1963.  Ei 
tered  into  force  Oct.  10.  1963.  TIAS  543: 
Accession  deposited:  Cape  Verde.  Oct.  2 
1979^ 

Nuclear  Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty  on  the  ncm-proliferation  (jf  nude: 
weapons.  Done  at  Washington.  London, 
and  Moscow  July  1.  1968.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  5.  1970.  TIAS  6839. 
Accession  deposited:  Cape  Verde.  Oct.  2 
1979. 

Patents — Microorganisms 

Budapest  treaty  on  the  international  rec 

ognition  of  the  deposit  of  microorganism 

for  the  purposes  of  patent  procedure,  wi 

regulations.  Done  at  Budapest  Apr.  28. 

1977." 

Ratification  deposited:  U.S..  Sept.  24. 

1979. 


74 


Department  of  State  Bulk 


Treaties 


atents — Plant  Varieties 

riternational  convention  for  the  protection 
f  new  varieties  of  plants  of  Dec.  2,  1961. 
s  revised.  Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  23,  1978. ■> 
ignatures:  Canada.  Oct.  31.  1979:  Ireland, 
ept.  27.  1979;  Japan.  Oct.  17.  1979; 
[exico.  New  Zealand,  July  25.  1979;  Swe- 
en,  Dec.  6.  1978. 

ostal 

onstitution  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union. 

■ith  Final  Protocol.  Done  at  Vienna.  July 

D,  1964.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1.  1966. 

IAS  5881. 

atification  deposited:  Lebanon.  Oct.  5, 

^79. 

dditional  protocol  to  the  Constitution  of 
le  Universal  Postal  Union  with  Final  Pro- 
col  signed  at  Vienna  July  10.  1964.  Done 
Tokyo  Nov.  14,  1969.  Entered  into  force 
ily  1,  1971,  except  for  Article  V  of  the 
dditional  Protocol  which  entered  into 
rce  Jan.  1.  1971.  TIAS  71.50. 
atification  deposited:  Lebanon.  Oct.  5, 
"79^ 

?cession  deposited:  Albania,  Sept.  28. 
79. 

cond  additional  protocol  to  the  constitu- 
in  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union  of  July 
,  1964,  general  regulations  with  final 
otocol  and  annex,  and  the  universal 
stal  convention  with  final  protocol  and 
tailed  regulations.  Done  at  Lausanne 
ly  5.  1974.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1. 
76.  TIAS  8231. 

tifications  deposited:  Colombia,  July  26, 
79;  Lebanon.  Oct.  5.  1979;  San  Marino, 
t.  26,  1979. 
cession  deposited:  Albania,  Sept.  28. 


f9. 

ney  orders  and  postal  travelers'  checks 
-eement,  with  detailed  regulations.  Done 
Lausanne  July  5.  1974.  Entered  into 
ce  Jan.  1.  1976.  TIAS  8232. 
tifications  deposited:  Colombia.  July  26, 


'9;  Lebanon,  Oct.  5,  1979;  San  Marino, 
;.  26,  1979. 

cial  Discrimination 

ernational  convention  on  the  elimination 
dl  forms  of  racial  discrimination.  Done 
New  York.  Dec.  21.  1965.  Entered  into 
ce  Jan.  4.  1969. ^ 
ession  deposited:  El  Salvador.  Nov.  30. 


ellite  Communications  System 

rating  agreement  on  the  international 
ritime  satellite  organization  (INMAR- 
D.  with  annex.  Done  at  London  Sept.  3, 
6.  Entered  into  force  July  16,  1979. 
nature:  Argentina,  Oct.  2,  1979. 


ivention  on  the  international  maritime 
Uite  organization  (INMARSAT),  with 

ex.  Done  at  London  Sept.  3,  1976.  En- 
d  into  force  July  16.  1979. 

natures:  Algeria,'  July  15,  1979;  China,' 


tugal,'  July  13,  1979. 

ifications  deposited:  Belgium.  July  14, 

9;  Brazil,  Italy,"*  July  10,  1979;  Finland, 


)ruary  1980 


Julv  12,  1979;  Greece,  July  13,  1979;  Po- 
land, July  3.  1979. 
Accession  deposited:  Argentina,  Oct.  2. 

wiw. —      

Seabed  Disarmament 

Treaty  on  the  prohibition  of  the  emplace- 
ment of  nuclear  weapons  and  other 
weapons  of  mass  destruction  on  the  seabed 
and  the  ocean  floor  and  in  the  subsoil 
thereof.  Done  at  Washington,  London,  and 
Moscow  Feb.  11,  1971.  Entered  into  force 
May  18,  1972,  TIAS  7337. 
Accessions  deposited:  Cape  Verde.  Oct.  24, 
1979;  Sao  Tome  and  Principe,  Aug.  24, 
1979. 

Space 

Convention  on  international  liability  for 
damage  caused  by  space  objects.  Done  at 
Washington.  London,  and  Moscow  Mar.  29. 
1972.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  1,  1972;  for 
the  U.S.,  Oct.  9,  1973.  TIAS  7762. 
Accession  deposited:  Liechtenstein,  Dec. 
26.  1979. 

Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement.  1977,  with 
annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  7,  1977,  En- 
tered into  force  provisionally  Jan.  1,  1978. 
Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the 
President:  Dec.  13.  1979. 
Ratification  deposited:  U.S.,  Jan.  2,  1980. 

Telecommunications 

International  telecommunication  conven- 
tion with  annexes  and  protocol.  Done  at 
Malaga-Torremolinos  Oct.  25,  1973.  En- 
tered into  force  Jan.  1,  1975;  for  the  U.S., 
Apr.  7.  1976.  TIAS  8572. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Costa  Rica.  Sept. 
10,  1979;  Ivory  Coast,  People's  Democrac- 
tic  Republic  of  Yemen,  Sept.  25,  1979. 

Final  Acts  of  the  World  Administrative 
Radio  Conference  for  the  planning  of  the 
broadcasting-satellite  service  in  frequency 
bands  11.7-12.2  GHz  (in  regions  2  and  3) 
and  11.7-12.5  GHz  (in  region  1),  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  Geneva  Feb.  13,  1977.  En- 
tered into  force  Jan.  1,  1979.' 
Approval  deposited:  Argentina,  Oct.  1. 

\m. — 

Partial  revision  of  the  radio  regulations 
(Geneva.  1959).  as  revised,  relating  to  the 
aeronautical  mobile  (R)  service,  with  an- 
nexes and  final  protocol.  Done  at  Geneva 
Mar.  5,  1978.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  1. 
1979,  except  for  the  frequency  allotment 
plan  for  the  aeronautical  mobile  (R)  service 
which  shall  come  into  force  on  Feb.  1, 
1983.' 

Approval  deposited:  U.S.S.R..  Sept.  24, 
WIW. 

Terrorism 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punish- 
ment of  crimes  against  internationally  pro- 
tected persons,  including  diplomatic 


agents.  Done  at  New  York  Dec.  14,  1973. 

Entered  into  force  Feb.  20,  1977.  TIAS 

8532. 

Accession  deposited:  Barbados,  Oct.  26, 

1975: 

International  convention  against  the  taking 
of  hostages.  Adopted  by  the  LI.N.  General 
Assembly  Dec.  19,  1979.  Enters  into  force 
on  the  30th  day  following  the  date  of  de- 
posit of  the  22d  instrument  of  ratification 
or  accession. 

Trade 

Fourth  certification  of  changes  to  schedules 
to  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade.  Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  20,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Apr.  20,  1979. 

Protocol  of  provisional  application  of  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade. 
Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  30,  1947.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  1.  1948.  TIAS  1700. 
De  facto  application:  St.  Vincent  and  the 
Grenadines.  Oct.  27.  1979. 

Whaling 

Protocol  to  the  international  convention  for 
the  regulation  of  whaling  (TIAS  1849). 
Done  at  Washington  Nov.  19.  1956.  En- 
tered into  force  May  4,  1959.  TIAS  4228. 
Adherence  deposited:  Peru,  Dec.  28.  1979. 

BILATERAL 

Association  of  South-East  Asian  Nations 

Agreement  concerning  cooperation  in  eco- 
nomic development,  education,  culture,  and 
narcotics.  Signed  at  Denpasar  and  Kuala 
Lumpur  July  2  and  Oct.  24,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Oct.  24,  1979. 

Commission  of  the  Cartagena  Agreement 
(Andean  Group) 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  science 
and  technology  cooperation.  Signed  at 
Washington  Nov.  21,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Nov.  21,  1979. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
trade,  financing,  science  and  technology, 
development  of  industry,  agriculture,  and 
infrastructure.  Signed  at  Washington  Nov. 
21,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  21.  1979. 

Cuba 

Agreement  extending  the  provisional  ap- 
plication of  the  maritime  boundary  agree- 
ment of  Dec.  16,  1977.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Washington  Dec.  27  and 
28.  1979.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  28,  1979. 

Finland 

Extradition  treaty.  Signed  at  Helsinki  June 
U,  1976." 

Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the 
President:  Dec.  13,  1979. 


75 


France 

Protocol  relating  to  the  isotopic  enrichment 
of  uranium  by  chemical  exchange.  Signed 
at  Washington  Sept.  4.  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Oct.  31,  1979. 

Federal  Republic  of  Germany 

Treaty  concerning  extradition,  with  pro- 
tocol.'Signed  at  Bonn  June  20,  1978." 
Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the 
President:  Dec.  20,  1979. 

Guyana 

General  agreement  for  economic,  technical, 
and  related  assistance.  Signed  at 
Georgetown  Nov.  8,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Nov,  8,  1979. 

India 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  30,  1977,  as  amended  (TIAS  9036, 
9578),  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  prod- 
ucts. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Oct.  26  and  Nov.  6.  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Nov.  6,  1979. 

Indonesia 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  the  mul- 
tilateral trade  negotiations.  Signed  at 
Jakarta  Nov.  29,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Nov.  29,  1979. 

Italy 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
energy  cooperation,  with  annexes.  Signed 
at  Rome  Oct.  17,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  17,  1979. 

Japan 

Treaty  on  extradition,  with  exchange  of 
notes.  Signed  at  Tokyo  Mar.  3,  1978.'' 
Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the 
President:  Dec.  13,  1979. 

Macao 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Mar.  3,  1975,  as  amended  and  extended 
(TIAS  8027,  9472),  relating  to  trade  in  cot- 
ton, wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and 
textile  products.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
letters  at  Washington  Oct.  17,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Oct.  17,  1979. 

Mexico 

Treaty  on  extradition,  with  appendix. 
Signed  at  Mexico  City  May  4,  1978." 
Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the 
President:  Dec.  13,  1979. 


Nigeria 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Apr.  20,  1976  (TIAS  8243),  concerning  pro- 
cedures for  mutual  assistance  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  justice  in  connection  with 
the  Lockheed  Aircraft  Corporation  to  the 
International  Telephone  and  Telegraph 
Corporation  and  its  subsidiaries  and  af- 
filiates. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Mar.  8  and  26,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Mar.  26,  1979. 

Norway 

Extradition  treaty.  Signed  at  Oslo  June  9, 

1977." 

Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the 

President:  Dec.  13,  1979. 

Pakistan 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Jan.  4  and  9,  1978,  as  amended  (TIAS  9050, 
9551),  relating  to  trade  in  cotton  textiles. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at  Wash- 
ington Nov.  13  and  16,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Nov.  16,  1979. 

Panama 

Treaty  on  the  execution  of  penal  sentences. 
Signed  at  Panama  Jan.  11,  1979." 
Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the 
President:  Dec.  17,  1979. 

Saudi  Arabia 

Project  agreement  for  technical  coopera- 
tion in  educational  programs  for  meteorol- 
ogy' hydrology,  arid  land  studies,  and  en- 
vironmental protection,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Riyadh  Nov.  25,  1979.  Enters 
into  force  after  deposit  by  the  Government 
of  Saudi  Arabia  of  the  sum  described  in  ar- 
ticle IX. 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the 
technical  cooperation  agreement  of  Feb. 
13,  1975.  Signed  at  Riyadh  Nov.  25,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Nov.  25,  1979. 

Singapore 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Sept.  21  and  22,  1978,  as  amended  (TIAS 
9214),  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  prod- 
ucts. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Sept.  12  and  Oct.  16,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Oct.  16,  1979. 

Spain 

Agreement  regarding  claims  arising  from 
CRISEX.  Signed  at  Madrid  Nov.  13,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Nov.  13.  1979. 

Switzerland 

Agreement  on  research  participation  and 
technical  exchange  in  the  U.S.  heavy  sec- 
tion steel  technology  program  and  the 
Swiss  research  program  in  fracture 
mechanics,  with  appendices.  Signed  at 
Washington  and  Wurenlingen  June  15  and 
July  9,  1979.  Entered  into  force  July  9, 
1979. 


76 


Agreement  on  research  participation  and 
technical  exchange  in  the  U.S.  loss  of  flu 
test  program  and  the  Swiss  emergency  co 
cooling  systems-reflood  program,  with  af 
pendices.  Signed  at  Washington  and 
Wurenlingen  June  15  and  July  9,  1979,  E 
tered  into  force  July  9,  1979. 

Thailand 

Agreement  relating  to  air  transport  serv 
ices,  and  annex.  Signed  at  Bangkok  Feb: 
26,  1947.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  26,  194 
TIAS  1607. 
Terminated:  Dec.  7,  1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  air  transport 
agreement  of  Feb.  26,  1947  (TIAS  1607). 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Bangko 
Mar.  3,  1970.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  3, 
1970.  TIAS  6837. 
Terminated:  Dec.  7,  1979. 

Air  transport  agreement,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Bangkok  Dec.  7,  1979.  Enterec 
into  force  Dec.  7,  1979. 

Turkey 

Treaty  on  extradition  and  mutual  assist- 
ance in  criminal  matters.  Signed  at  Anka 
June  7,  1979." 

Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the 
President:  Dec.  13,  1979. 

Treaty  on  the  enforcement  of  penal  judg 
ments.  Signed  at  Ankara  June  7,  1979." 
Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the 
President:  Dec.  13,  1979. 

Agreement  concerning  the  grant  of  defei 
articles  and  services  under  the  military 
sistance  program.  Effected  by  exchange 
notes  at  Ankara  Aug.  15  and  31,  1979.  I 
tered  into  force  Aug.  31,  1979. 

Agreement  relating  to  a  loan  and  grant 
support  and  promote  the  financial  stabi 
and  economic  recovery  of  Turkey.  Signi 
at  Ankara  Nov.  1,  1979.  Entered  into  fi 
Nov.  1,  1979. 

United  Kingdom 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double 
taxation  and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  ev 
sion  with  respect  to  taxes  on  estates  of 
ceased  persons  and  on  gifts.  Signed  at 
London  Oct.  19,  1978,  Entered  into  for. 
Nov.  11,  1979.  j 

Proclaimed  by  the  President:  Dec.  6.  lil 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  | 
July  3,  1958,  as  amended  (TIAS  4078,  4: 
6659,  6861.  8014),  for  cooperation  on  th 
uses  of  atomic  energy  for  mutual  defen 
purposes.  Signed  at  Washington  Dec.  f 
1979.  Enters  into  force  on  the  date  on 
which  each  government  shall  have  rece 
from  the  other  government  written  not 
cation  that  it  has  complied  with  all  sta 
tory  and  constitutional  requirements  fi 
entry  into  force. 

Agreement  concerning  the  turnover  of 
airfield  at  Grand  Turk  Auxiliary  Air  B 
to  the  Government  of  the  Turks  and  C 
Islands  and  its  use  by  the  U.S.  Goveri 
ment.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  a 


Department  of  State  Bu 


PRESS  RELEASES 


Washington  Dec.  12,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Dec.  12,  1979. 

Agreement  concerning  United  States  de- 
fense areas  in  the  Turks  and  Caicos  Is- 
lands, with  annex,  memorandum  of  un- 
derstanding and  aide  memoire.  Signed  at 
Washington  Dec.  12,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Dec.  12,  1979;  effective  Jan.  1,  1979. 

Yugoslavia 

Agreement  on  the  establishment  of  a  U.S. 
information  center  in  Titograd  in  accord- 
ance w  ith  the  terms  of  the  memorandum  of 
understanding  of  June  14,  1961.  Signed  at 
Belgrade  June  2.5,  1979.  Enters  into  force 
upon  its  acceptance  by  authorized  parties 
of  both  countries  in  accordance  with  their 
national  laws. 

Taiwan 

Mutual  defense  treaty.  Signed  at  Washing- 
ton Dec.  2,  19.54,  Entered  into  force  Mar.  3, 
1955,  TIAS  3178. 
Terminated:  Jan.  1,  1980.  ■ 


'  With  reservation. 
^With  a  statement. 
^Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 
"Not  in  force. 

''Subject  to  ratification,  approval,  ac- 
ceptance. 

*  Subject  to  ratification. 
'Not  subject  to  ratification. 
'With  declaration. 


December  1979 


Events  pertaining  to  Iran  can  be  found 
on  page  56. 

December  2 

American  Embassy  in  Tripoli,  Libya,  is 
ittacked  by  demonstrators. 

In  Portugal's  parliamentary  election, 
;he  Democratic  Alliance  wins  128  seats  in 
he  250  seat  Parliament,  Francisco  Sa  Car- 
leiro  is  named  Prime  Minister. 

December  4 

Secretary  Vance  transmits  the  seventh 
semiannual  report  on  implementation  of 
Helsinki  Final  Act  covering  the  period  June 
1  through  November  30,  1979,  to  Con- 
gressman Dante  Faseell,  Chairman  of  the 
ZIommission  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in 
3urope. 

December  5 

United  States  temporarily  suspends 
normal  operations  of  Tripoli  Embassy. 

December  6 

Ambassador  Sol  Linowitz  departs  on 
lis  first  official  visit  to  Egypt  and  Israel, 
is  the  President's  special  representative, 
0  review  work  of  the  negotiations  to  date, 
December  6-13. 


December  7 

U.N.  Cuban  mission  is  bombed. 

December  8 

Britain  appoints  Lord  Soames  as 
British  Governor  to  Rhodesia. 

December  9 

Secretary  Vance  departs  for  Europe 
for  meeting  with  the  NATO  Council  and 
leaders  of  U.S.  major  allies,  December 
9-14. 

December  10 

Shin  Hyon  Hwack  is  named  Prime 
Minister  of  South  Korea. 

December  11 

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia  Parliament  re- 
nounces rebellion  against  Britain  clearing 
the  way  for  the  British  to  resume  control. 
The  territory  resumes  use  of  its  colonial 
name.  Southern  Rhodesia. 

In  a  vote  of  82  to  62,  Irish  Parliament 
elects  Charles  Haughey  as  new  Prime 
Minister  of  Ireland. 

Special  meeting  of  NATO  Foreign  and 
Defense  Ministers  is  held  in  Brussels,  Dec. 
11-12. 

December  12 

Rhodesia  returns  to  legality  under 
British  Crown.  British  economic  sanctions 
are  lifted. 

December  13 

Semiannual  ministerial  session  of  the 
North  Atlantic  is  held  in  Brussels,  Dec. 
13-14. 

December  15 

Britain  declares  formal  end  to 
Rhodesia  conference  without  cease-fire 
agreement. 

December  16 

British  Prime  Minister  Thatcher  ar- 
rives in  the  U.S.  for  official  visit  December 
16-18. 

December  17 

Leaders  of  Patriotic  Front  guerrilla  al- 
liance, Joshua  Nkomo  and  Robert  Mugabe, 
agree  to  a  British  cease-fire  plan  aimed  at 
ending  the  7-year  Rhodesian  civil  war. 

December  21 

Parties  to  the  7-year  Rhodesian  civil 
war,  Robert  Mugabe,  Joshua  Nkomo,  and 
Bishop  Abel  T.  Muzorewa.  sign  Lancaster 
House  agreement. 

U.N.  Security  Council  votes  to  lift  13- 
year  economic  embargo  against  Rhodesia. 

Choi  Kyu  Hah  takes  office  as  South 
Korea's  fourth  President. 

December  22 

Prime  Minister  Pol  Pot,  leader  of  the 
Cambodian  forces,  is  replaced  by  Khieu 
Samphan.  Pot  is  Secretary  General  of  the 
Communist  Party  and  Commander  in  Chief 
of  Democratic  Kampuchean  Armed  Forces. 


December  24-25 

Over  150  flights,  part  of  a  large-scale 
Soviet  airlift,  land  at  Kabul  Airport  in  Af- 
ghanistan. 

December  26 

United  States  announces  reductions  in 
Embassy  staff  and  other  official  missions  in 
El  Salvador  because  of  concern  for  the 
safety  and  welfare  of  U.S.  Government 
employees  and  their  dependents. 

December  27 

Afghan  President  Hafizullah  Amin  is 
ousted  from  power  and  killed,  along  with 
members  of  his  family,  in  a  coup  supported 
by  Soviet  troops.  He  is  replaced  by  Babrak 
Karmal,  a  former  Deputy  Prime  Minister 
who  had  been  living  in  exile  in  Eastern 
Europe. 

Maria  de  Lourdes  Pintasilgo,  Por- 
tugal's first  female  Prime  Minister,  re- 
signs. 

December  29 

Gabon  President  Bongo  is  re-elected  to 
a  second  7-year  term. 

December  31 

Togo  President  Eyadema  is  re-elected 
to  a  new  7-vear  term.  ■ 


Department  of  State 


November  30-December  2S 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from 
the  Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department 
of  State,  Washington,  D,C,  20520, 


No. 


[)ate 


Subject 


t314       12/3 


"ebruary  1980 


Habib:  address  at  the 
Miami  Conference  on 
the  Caribbean,  Nov.  28. 

*315       11/30        Richard  Cavins  Matheron 
sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Swaziland  (bio- 
graphic data). 

*316       12/3  Advisory  Committee  on 

International  Invest- 
ment, Technology,  and 
Development,  Jan.  4. 

*317       12/5  Victor  H.  Palmieri  ap- 

pointed U.S.  Coor- 
dinator for  Refugee 
Affairs  (biographic 
data). 

*318       12/4  Conference  on  U.S. 

foreign  policy  in  Africa, 
Detroit,  Dec.  13. 

*319       12/7  Fine  Arts  Committee 

meeting,  Jan,  18, 

'320       12/7  Oceans  and  International 

Environmental  and  Sci- 
entific Affairs  Advisory 
Committee,  Jan.  8. 


77 


PUBLICATIONS 


321       12/10 


*322       12/12 


*323       12/12 


326  12/19 

*327  12/19 

*328  12/19 

*329  12/20 

*330  12/26 

*331  12/21 

*332  12/28 


Vance:  address  at  the 
Berlin  Press  Associa- 
tion (delivered  by  As- 
sistant Secretary 
George  Vest). 

Gerald  B.  Helman  sworn 
in  as  Ambassador  to  the 
U.S.  Mission  to  the 
European  Office  of  the 
U.N.  (biographic  data). 

Itinerary  of  British  Prime 
Minister  Thatcher's 
visit  to  the  U.S.  Dec. 
16-18. 

International  and  U.S. 
efforts  to  aid  Kampu- 
chean  famine. 

U.S.  Organization  for  the 
International  Radio 
Consultative  Committee 
(CCIR),  study  group  1, 
Jan.  10. 

Communique  of  Special 
Meeting  of  NATO 
Foreign  and  Defense 
Ministers.  Dec.  12. 

CCIR  study  group  2,  Jan. 
23. 

CCIR  study  group  4,  Jan. 
16. 

Nancy  Rawls  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  the 
Ivory  Coast  (biographic 
data). 

Oceans  and  International 
Environmental  and  Sci- 
entific Affairs  Advisory 
Committee. 

Vance:  statement  on  the 
release  of  Peace  Corps 
Volunteer  Deborah 
Laff. 

Secretary's  Advisory 
Committee  on  Private 
International  Law, 
study  group  on  Interna- 
tional Child  Abduction, 
Jan.  19. 

U.S.  Organization  for  the 
International  Telegraph 
and  Telephone  Consul- 
tative Committee 
(CCITT),  study  group 
A,  Jan.  23  and  24. ■ 


tHeld  for  a  later  issue. 

*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


GPO  Sales 

Piibluiifioiif.  may  be  ordered  by  catalogue 
or  Htock  II i( tuber  from  the  Superintendent 
of  Docintients,  Lf.S.  Gore rnment  Printing 
Office.  Washington.  DC.  20J,02.  A  2.5% 
discount  is  made  on  orders  for  100  or  more 
copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to  the 
same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  must  ac- 
company orders.  Prices  shonm  beloic. 
which  include  domestic  postage,  are  subject 
to  change. 

Population  Planning.  Agreement  with 
Thailand.  TIAS  9122.  9  pp.  80^.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9122.) 

Helwan-Talka  Gas  Turbine  Project. 
Agreement  with  Egypt,  amending  the 
agreement  of  July  31,  1976.  TIAS  9136.  3 
pp.  70«.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9136.) 
Agricultural  Commodities — Transfer 
Under  Title  II.  Agreement  with  Niger. 
TIAS  9143.  5  pp.  70(?.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9143.) 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement 
with  Guyana.  TIAS  9145.  16  pp.  $1.10  (Cat. 
No.  89.10:9145.) 

Agricultural  Commodities — Transfer 
Under  Title  II.  Agreement  with  Chad. 
TIAS  9146.  5  pp.  70«.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9146.) 

Agricultural  Commodities — Transfer 
Under  Title  II.  Agreement  with  Mali.  TIAS 
9147.  7  pp.  sot.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9147.) 
Agricultural  Commodities — Transfer 
Under  Title  II.  Agreement  with  The  Gam- 
bia. TIAS  9148.  3  pp.  70c.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9148.) 

Agricultural  Commodities — Transfer 
Under  Title  II.  Agreement  with  Guinea. 
TIAS  9149.  8  pp.  80c.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9149.) 

Agricultural  Commodities^— Transfer 
Under  Title  II.  Agreement  with  Djibouti. 
TIAS  9150.  4  pp.  70C.  (Cat.  No. 
89,10:9150.) 

Agricultural  Commodities — Transfer 
Under  Title  II.  Agreement  with  Guinea- 
Bissau.  TIAS  9151.  4  pp.  70c.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9151.) 

Agricultural  Commodities — Transfer 
Under  Title  II.  Agreement  with  The  Gam- 
bia. TIAS  9152.  3  pp.  70c.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9152.) 

Agricultural  Commodities — Transfer 
Under  Title  II.  Agreement  with 
Mauritania.  TIAS  9153.  6  pp.  70C.  (Cat. 
No.  89.10:9153.) 

Integrated  Rural  Development.  Agreement 
with  Panama.  TIAS  9154.  79  pp.  $2.10.  (Cat. 
No.  89.10:9154.) 

Environmental  Cooperation.  Agreement 
with  Iran.  TIAS  9155.  7  pp.  80c.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9155.) 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement 
with  Morocco.  TIAS  9156.  6  pp.  70c.  (Cat. 
No.  89.10:9156.) 


Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement 
with  Sudan.  TIAS  9157.  20  pp.  $1.10.  (Cat. 
No.  89.10:9157.) 

Aviation — Provision  of  Services.  Agree- 
ments with  Cape  Verde,  amending  and  ex- 
tending the  memorandum  of  agreement  of 
October  13  and  November  19,  1976.  TIAS 
9158.  4  pp.  70c.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9158.) 
Development  of  Korea  Standards  Re- 
search Institute.  Agreement  with  the  Re- 
public of  Korea,  extending  the  memoran- 
dum of  understanding  of  December  19,  1975 
and  January  15,  1976.  TIAS  9161.  9  pp. 
80c.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9161.) 
Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement 
with  Morocco.  TIAS  9162.  6  pp.  70C.  (Cat. 
No.  89.10:9162.) 

Trade — Meat  Imports.  Agreement  with 
Canada.  TIAS  9163.  3  pp.  70c.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9163.) 

Weather  Stations.  Agreement  with 
Mexico,  extending  the  agreement  of  July 
31,  1970,  as  amended  and  extended.  TIAS 
9164.  5  pp.  70c.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9164.) 
Aviation — Jet  Fuel  Prices.  Memorandum 
of  agreement  with  Colombia.  TIAS  9165. 
pp.  80c.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9165.) 
Trade — Meat  Imports.  Agreement  with 
other  Governments.  TIAS  9168.  58  pp. 
$2.50.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9168.) 
Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreements 
with  Indonesia,  amending  the  agreement  < 
May  17,  1977,  as  amended,  and  exchange  < 
letters  of  December  16,  1977.  TIAS  9169. 
19  pp.  $1.10  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9169.) 
Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement 
with  Tanzania.  TIAS  9170.  4  pp.  70C.  (Ca 
No.  89.10:9170.) 

Trade  in  Textiles.  Agreement  with 
Mexico,  amending  the  agreement  of  May 
12,  1975,  as  amended.  TIAS  9171.  6  pp. 
70C.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9171.) 
Trade  in  Textiles.  Agreement  with  the 
Philippines,  amending  the  agreement  of 
October  15,  1975,  as  amended  and  ex- 
tended. TIAS  9172.  3  pp.  70C.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9172.) 

Trade — Non-Rubber  Footwear.  Agree- 
ment with  the  Republic  of  Korea,  amendi 
the  agreement  of  June  21,  1977.  TIAS  91' 
7  pp.  80C.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9173.) 
Trade  in  Man-Made  Fiber  Textiles. 
Agreement  with  Brazil,  amending  the 
agreement  of  April  22,  1976.  TIAS  9174. 
pp.  75C.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9174.) 
Trade  in  Cotton  Textiles.  Agreement  wi 
Brazil,  amending  the  agreement  of  April 
22,  1976.  TIAS  9175.  5  pp.  75C.  (Cat.  N( 
89.10:9175.) 

Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  wit 
Syria,  amending  the  agreement  of  April 
1947,  as  amended.  TIAS  9176.  6  pp.  75C 
(Cat.  No.  89.10:9176.) 
Consular  Relations.  Agreements  with  il 
People's  Republic  of  China.  TIAS  9177 
pp.  $1.00.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9177.)  i 

Cultural  Relations.  Agreement  with  th 
People's  Republic  of  China.  TIAS  9178.   | 
pp.  $1.00.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9178.) 
Cooperation  in  Science  and  TechnolojJ 
Agreement  with  the  People's  Republic  '■■i-^'' 
China.  TIAS  9179.  29  pp.  $1.50.  (Cat.  t 
89.10:9179.)  ■ 


78 


Department  of  State  Bull 


hJDEX 


EBRUARY  1980 
OL.  80,  NO.  2035 


ghanistan 

ickK'i'ound  on  Afghanistan 65 

?putv  Secretary  Christopher  Interviewed 

jn  "Face  the  Nation" 6 

neral  Assembly  Acts  on  Soviet  Invasion 
of  Afghanistan'  (McHenry,  texts  of  res- 
olutions, voting  record) 72 

■view  of  U.S.  Policy  Toward  South  Asia 

in  the  1980s  (Schaffer) 61 

cretarv    Vance    Interviewed    on    the 

Today"  Show 4 

viet   Invasion  of  Afghanistan  (Depart- 

Tient  statement)    65 

ate  of  the  Union  Address  (Carter) A 

riea 

ironology:  December  1979  77 

oup  Formed  for  Development  12 

maligned  Movement  After  the  Havana 

Ilonference  (Maynes) 32 

ite  of  the  Union  Message  (Carter)  . . .  .D 
ms  Control 

■lay  Requested  for  SALT  II  Treaty 
White  House  statement,  letter  to  Sena- 

or  Byrd)  12 

putv  Secretary  Christopher  Interviewed 

m  ""Face  the  Nation" 6 

tional  Security  and  U.S. -Soviet  Rela- 

ions  (Nimetz) 26 

iTO  Ministers  Meet  in  Brussels  (Brown, 

.'ance,  communiques)   15 

?uritv  of  the  Western  Alliance  (Vance)  1 
ite  of  the  Union  Message  (Carter)   . . .  .D 

3.  Defense  Policy  (Carter)  58 

la 

ronoloey:  December  1979  77 

ite  of  trie  Union  Message  (Carter)  . . .  .D 
ngladesh.  Review  of  U.S.  Policy  To- 
ward South  Asia  in  the  1980s  (S'chaf- 

er) 61 

ina.    Deputy   Secretary   Christopher 

nterviewed  on  "Face  the  Nation"  6 

ngress 

lay   Requested   for   SALT   II   Treaty 

White  House  statement,  letter  to  Sena- 

or  Byrd)  12 

5sing  and   Disappeared  Persons  (De- 

ian) 37 

gotiations     on     Southern     Rhodesia 

Moose) 9 

h  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the 

Congress) 25 

:te  of  the  Union  Address  (Carter) A 

ite  of  the  Union  Message  (Carter)  . . .  .D 
S.-U.K.  Atomic  Energy  Agreement 
message  to  the  Congress,  memoranda 
or   the    Secretaries    of   Defense    and 

Energy) 25 

Idlife    Protection    and    the    Habitat 

Hayne) 13 

nsular  .Affairs.  Iranian  Diplomatic  Per- 
onnel    in    U.S.    (Department    state- 

nents) 54 

prus.  16th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message 

0  the  Congress)  25 

partment  and  Foreign  Service.  Ameri- 
an  Hostages  in  Iran  (Carter,  Mondale, 
Vhite  House  and   Department  state- 

lents) 55 

veloping  Countries 

proaching  Common  Issues  With  De- 
eloping  Countries  (Ehrlich) 29 

naligned   Movement  After  the  Havana 

'onference  (Maynes) 32 

onomics 

n  Chronology,  December  1979 56 

ite  of  the  Union  Message  (Carter)  . . .  .D 
3.  Asks  Security  Council  To  Impose 
sanctions  Against  Iran  (McHenry, 
^ance,  texts  of  resolutions,  voting  rec- 
rd) 67 


Energy 

State  of  the  Union  Address  (Carter) A 

State  of  the  Union  Message  (Carter)   D 

Environment.  Wildlife  Protection  and  the 

Habitat  (Hayne) 13 

Europe 

Chronology:  December  1979  77 

Security  of  the  Western  Alliance  (Vance)  1 

State  of  the  Union  Address  (Carter) A 

State  of  the  Union  Message  (Carter)   . . .  .D 

U.S.  Defense  Policy  (Carter)  58 

Foreign  Aid.  Approaching  Common  Issues 
With  Developing  Countries  (Ehrlich).  .29 
Human  Rights 
Missing  and   Disappeared   Persons  (De- 

rian) 37 

State  of  the  Union  Message  (Carter)   . . .  .D 
India.  Review  of  U.S.  Policy  Toward  South 

Asia  in  the  1980s  (Schaffer) 61 

International  Law 

Iran  Chronology,  December  1979 56 

World  Court  Rules  on  American  Hostages 
in  Iran  (Civiletti,  Owen,  Waldock,  text  of 

Court  order)  40 

Iran 

American  Hostages  in  Iran  (Carter,  Mon- 
dale,   White    House    and    Department 

statements) 55 

Deputy  Secretary  Christopher  Interviewed 

on  "Face  the  Nation" 6 

Iran  Chronology,  December  1979  56 

Iranian  Diplomatic  Personnel  in  U.S.  (De- 
partment statements)   54 

NATO  Issues  Declaration  on  Iran 54 

NATO  Ministers  Meet  in  Brussels  (Brown, 

Vance,  communiques)   15 

State  of  the  Union  Address  (Carter) A 

U.S.  Asks  Security  Council  To  Impose 
Sanctions  Against  Iran  (McHenry, 
Vance,  texts  of  resolutions,  voting  rec- 
ord)  67 

U.S.  Seeks  Sanctions  Against  Iran  (Car- 
ter)   53 

World  Court  Rules  on  American  Hostages 
in  Iran  (Civiletti,  Owen,  Waldock,  text  of 

Court  order)  40 

IsraeL   FMS  Credits  for  Israel  (White 

House  statement)  54 

Latin  .America  and  the  Caribbean 

Chronology:  December  1979  77 

Nonaligned   Movement  After  the  Havana 

Conference  (Maynes) 32 

State  of  the  Union  Message  (Carter)   D 

Maldives.   Review  of  U.S.  Policy  Toward 
South  Asia  in  the  1980s  (Schaffer)  ...  .61 
Middle  East 

Chronology:  December  1979 77 

State  of  tne  Union  Address  (Carter) A 

State  of  the  Union  Message  (Carter)   D 

Military  Affairs.   U.S.   Defense  Policy 

(Carter) 58 

Nepal.   Review  of  U.S.   Policy  Toward 
South  Asia  in  the  1980s  (Schaffer)  ...  .61 
NATO 

NATO  Issues  Declaration  on  Iran 54 

NATO  Ministers  Meet  in  Brussels  (Brown, 

Vance,  communiques)  15 

Pakistan 

Deputy  Secretary  Christopher  Interviewed 

on  "Face  the  Nation" 6 

Review  of  U.S.  Policy  Toward  South  Asia 

in  the  1980s  (Schaffer) 61 

Presidential  Documents 
American  Hostages  in  Iran  (Carter,  Mon- 
dale,   White    House   and    Department 

statements) 55 

Delay  Requested  for  SALT  II  Treaty 
(White  House  statement,  letter  to  Sena- 
tor Byrd)  12 

Sanctions  Against  Southern  Rhodesia 
(memorandum    for    the    Secretary    of 

State) 10 

16th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the 

Congress) 25 

State  of  the  Union  Address  (Carter) A 


State  of  the  Union  Message  (Carter)   . . .  .D 

U.S.  Defense  Policy  (Carter)  58 

U.S.  Seeks  Sanctions  Against  Iran  (Car- 
ter)   53 

U.S. -U.K.  Atomic  Energy  Agreement 
(message  to  the  Congress,  memoranda 
for  the  Secretaries  of  Defense  and 
Energy) 25 

Publications   29,  54,  78 

Security  Assistance.  FMS  Credits  for  Is- 
rael (White  House  statement) 54 

Southern  Rhodesia 

Negotiations  on  Southern  Rhodesia 
(Moose) 9 

Sanctions  Against  Southern  Rhodesia 
(memorandum  for  the  Secretary  of 
State) ;..10 

Southern  Rhodesia  Settlement  (Depart- 
ment, White  House  statements)   11 

Sri  Lanka.  Review  of  U.S.  Policy  Toward 
South  Asia  in  the  1980s  (Schaffer)  ...  .61 

Terrorism 

American  Hostages  in  Iran  (Carter,  Mon- 
dale, White  House  and  Department 
statements) 55 

Iran  Chronology,  December  1979 56 

Missing  and  Disappeared  Persons  (De- 
rian) 37 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 74 

U.S.S.R. 

Deputy  Secretary  Christopher  Interviewed 
on  "Face  the  fJation" 6 

General  Assembly  Acts  on  Soviet  Invasion 
of  Afghanistan  (McHenry,  texts  of  res- 
olutions, voting  record) 72 

National  Security  and  U.S. -Soviet  Rela- 
tions (Nimetz) 26 

NATO  Ministers  Meet  in  Brussels  (Brown, 
Vance,  communiques)  15 

Secretary  Vance  Interviewed  on  the 
"Today"  Show 4 

Security  of  the  Western  Alliance  (Vance)  1 

Soviet  Invasion  of  Afghanistan  (Depart- 
ment statement)   65 

State  of  the  Union  Address  (Carter) A 

United  Kingdom 

U.S. -U.K.  Atomic  Energy  Agreement 
(message  to  the  Congress,  memoranda 
for  the  Secretaries  of  Defense  and 
Energy) 25 

Visit  of  British  Prime  Minister  Thatcher 
(White  House  statement) 24 

United  Nations 

General  Assembly  Acts  on  Soviet  Invasion 
of  Afghanistan  (McHenry,  texts  of  res- 
olutions, voting  record) 72 

Iran  Chronology,  December  1979 56 

U.S.  Asks  Security  Council  To  Impose 
Sanctions  Against  Iran  (McHenry, 
Vance,  texts  of  resolutions,  voting  rec- 
ord)  67 

U.S.  Seeks  Sanctions  Against  Iran  (Car- 
ter)   53 


Name  Index 

Brown,  Harold 15 

Carter,  President 10,  12,  25,  53,  58 

Christopher,  Warren  6 

Civiletti,  Benjamin  R 40 

Derian,  Patricia  M  37 

Ehrlich,  Thomas  29 

Hayne,  William  A 13 

Maynes,  Charles  William 32 

McHenry,  Donald  F   67,  72 

Mondale,  Vice  President 55 

Moose,  Richard  M 9 

Nimetz,  Matthew   26 

Owen,  Roberts  B 40 

Schaffer,  Howard  B 61 

Vance,  Secretary 1,  4,  15,  67 

Waldock,  Sir  Humphrey 40 


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bulletin 

^e  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  80  /  Number  2036 


March  1980 


Cover  Photo: 

Mangbetu  woman,  Zaire 
(  Museum  of  African  Art, 
Eliot  Elisofon  Archives ) 


Department  of  State 

bulletin 


Volume  80  /  Number  2036  /  March  1980 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin  , 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and 
government  agencies  with  information 
on  developments  in  U.S.  foreign 
relations  and  the  work  of  the 
Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials; 
special  features  and  articles  on 
international  affairs;  selected  press 
releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission 
to  the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
other  agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  ptirty. 


CYRUS  R.  VANCE 

Secretary  of  State 

HOODING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA  ADAMS 

Assistant  Editor 


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source  will  be  appreciated.  The  Bulletin  is 
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t. 


CONTENTS 

FEATURE 

1        Sub-Saharan  Africa  and  the  United  States — Part  1 


he  President 

"Meet  the  Press"  Interview 
Interview  for  NBC  News 
Hostages  in  Iran,  Invasion  of 
Afghanistan 

"lie  Secretary 

;         Meeting  the  Challenge  in  South- 
west Asia 
;         "New  York  Times"  Interview 
'         FY  1981  Foreign  Assistance 
Programs 

last  Asia 

'  Poison  Gas  Use  in  Indochina 
5  (Evelyn  Colbert) 

I  U.S. -China  Discuss  Sale  of  Mili- 
I  tary  Technology  (Defense  De- 

ll partment  Statement) 

l;onomics 

'         Suspension  of  Agricultural  Ex- 
ports to  the  U.S.S.R.  (Cooper, 

„  Memorandums  for  the  Sec- 

retaries of  Commerce  and  Ag- 
riculture, Letter  to  Speaker 
O'Neill  and  Senate  President 
Mondale) 
Customs  Valuation  Agreement 
(Letter  to  House  Speaker 
O'Neill  and  Semite  President 
Mondale) 
Allies  Support  U.S.  Embargo 
(Department  Statement) 


Foreign  Aid 

53        FY  1981  Development  Assist- 
ance Programs  (Thomas 
Ehrlich) 

Human  Rights 

59        Nobel  Laureate  Sakharov  Exiled 
(White  House  Statement) 

59  Human  Rights  Reports 

Middle  East 

60  Soviets  Veto  Sanctions  Against 

Iran  (White  House  Statement) 

60  U.S.  Files  Brief  With  ICJ  in 

Iran  Hostage  Case 

61  Iran  Chronology,  January  1980 


Nuclear  Policy 


62 


IAEA  Conference  Held  in  India 
(Gerard  C.  Smith) 


Security  Assistance 

63  Munitions  Sales  to  Saudi  Arabia 

(Lucy  Wilson  Benson) 

64  Export  of  Fighter  Aircraft  (De- 

partment  Statemeyit) 


South  Asia 

65        Security  Relations  With  Paki- 
stan (Warreti  Christopher, 
Joint  Statement) 


Western  Hemisphere 

66        Assistance  to  the  Caribbean, 

Central  America  (Christopher, 
Message  to  the  Congress) 


Treaties 

70        Current  Actions 

Chronology 

72  January  1980 

Press  Releases 

73  Department  of  State 

Publications 

74  GPO  Sales 

Index 


Ijrope 


U.S.  Favors  Transfer  of  Summer 

Olympics  (Secretary  Vance) 
Summer  Olympics  in  Moscow 

(President  Carter,  Warren 

Christopher) 
Technology  Transfers  to  the 

U.S.S.R.  (Memorandums  for 

the  Secretaries  of  Commerce, 

State,  and  Defense) 
Hermitage  Exhibit  Canceled 

( Department  Statement) 


BcwtOB  Public  Library 
Superint«nd»nt  of  Document3 

APR  -  p  1P80 


DEPOSITORY 


SPECIAL  (See  Center  Section) 

President  Carter's  address  before  the  American  Legion  Convention,  February  19, 

1980 
President  Carter's  News  Conference,  February  13,  1980 


FEATURE 


Sub-Saharan  Africa 


U.    S.    S.    R. 


North 

Atlantic 

Ocean 


South 

Atlantic 

Ocean 


500  1000  h 


Indian 
Ocean 


3«61   2  80STATE(RGEI 


Information  in  this  article  is  intended  to  provide  f)ackground  for  study  and 
discussion;  it  is  not  designed  to  he  read  as  a  formal  statement  of  I'.S.  policy, 
except  where  the  material  is  specifically  described  as  such.  The  article  sum- 
marizes currently  available  information  and  raises  relevant  yuestions  (some  of 
which  admittedly  may  be  unanswerable)  as  an  aid  to  public  discussion  of  im- 
portant issues  in  U.S.  foreign  policy.  All  material  in  this  article  is  in  the  public 
domain  except  where  copyright  is  indicated. 


{ub-Saharan  Africa  and  the 
Inited  States — Part  1 


Feature 


Once  called  the  "dark  Continent," 
Africa,  in  recent  years,  has  become  a 
vital  part  of  this  natio7t's  foreign  pol- 
icy. The  following  discussion  paper, 
compiled  by  former  Ambassador  G. 
Edwa^-d  Clark,  deals  with  the  sub- 
Saharan  natio}is  and  their  relations 
with  the  United  States. 

The  paper  is  presented  as  a  two- 
part  series  with  Part  1  focusing  on 
geography,  history,  the  people  and  their 
culture,  and  economic  and  political 
conditions.  Part  2,  to  be  published  in 
the  April  Bulletin,  will  examine  the 
role  the  United  States  has  played  in 
postcolonial  African  development. 

INTRODUCTION 

Sub-Saharan  Africa  is  not  only  the  di- 
rect ancestral  home  of  millions  of 
Americans  but,  according  to  some  an- 
thropologists, perhaps  the  cradle  of 
mankind  —  the  birthplace  of  Homo  sa- 
piens. Long  enshrouded  in  primeval 
mist,  it  has  revealed  its  grandeur  and 
its  myriad  cultures  slowly  to  the  rest  of 
the  world.  Ancient  Egypt  and  Car- 
thage, followed  later  by  Islamic  trad- 
ers, missionaries,  and  European  colo- 
nial powers,  ultimately  sensed,  discov- 
ered, and  began  to  exploit  the  latent 
potential  of  the  continent's  human  and 
natural  resources. 

Only  within  the  past  three  decades, 
however,  has  the  majority  of  Africa  re- 
sumed independence  through  the  crea- 
tion of  nation-states  and  undertaken 
significant  roles  in  the  community  of 
nations.  Now  African  states  are  in 
themselves,  singly  and  as  a  bloc,  pow- 
ers to  be  reckoned  with.  It  behooves 
Americans  to  know  this  continent — its 
potential,  its  strength,  its  problems— 
because  the  future  of  the  United  States 
is  inextricably  linked  to  the  destiny  of 
Africa. 

Sub-Saharan  Africa  is  indeed  a 
majestic  mosaic,  stretching  from  the 


>ve:  Tyi  Wara  (antelope)  headress,  Mali 

o  by  John  Klekas) 


Although  the  broad  generic  term  "Af- 
rica" is  frequently  used  throughout  this 
publication  and  some  data  pertain  to 
the  entire  continent,  attention  actually 
is  focused  on  sub-Saharan  Africa  and 
the  off-shore  island  states,  which  in  fact 
contain  the  majority  of  countries  and 
most  of  the  continent's  population. 
Within  the  Department  of  State,  re- 
sponsibility for  the  conduct  of  relations 
with  this  area  is  delegated  to  the 
Bureau  of  African  Affairs.  The  De- 
partment of  State  conducts  relations 
with  North  Africa  through  its  Bureau 
of  Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian 
Affairs. 


sands  of  the  Sahara  to  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope,  lifting  from  rain  forests  of  the 
Congo  to  the  snows  of  Mt.  Kilimanjaro. 
It  is  a  melange  of  some  1,000  ethnic 
groups,  hundreds  of  religious  sects,  and 
47  separate  countries,  45  of  which  are 
fully  independent.  Africa  is  an  ever- 
emerging  drama  of  changing  leaders, 
changing  names,  and  changing  al- 
liances. But  it  is  far  more.  For  the 
United  States  it  represents: 

•  Individual  and  collective  political 
power; 

•  A  source  of  essential  natural  re- 
sources; 

•  An  area  involving  important 
human  rights  concerns; 

•  A  potential  site  for  great  power 
confrontation; 

•  Significant  strategic  locations; 
and 

•  Ever-present  hunger  for  human- 
itarian and  developmental  assistance. 

For  those  who  already  know,  un- 
derstand, and  admire  Africa  and  its 
people,  this  document  is  designed  to 
provide  some  updating  of  information, 
views,  and  data.  For  those  who  are  not 
familiar  with  the  continent,  it  is  in- 
tended to  serve  as  a  basis  for  under- 
standing the  significance  and  impor- 
tance of  our  relations  with  this  vital  re- 
gion of  the  world. 


Feature 


GEOGRAPHY 

The  continent  of  Africa  covers 
11,635,000  square  miles — nearly  one- 
fifth  of  the  world's  total  land 
surface — an  area  which  could  contain 
all  of  the  United  States,  Western 
Europe,  and  India.  It  is  the  second 
largest  landmass  in  the  world.  Some  of 
its  countries,  such  as  Sudan,  Zaire,  and 
Mali,  approach  one-third  the  size  of  the 
continental  United  States.  The  African 
Continent  stretches  5,000  miles  ft-om 
north  to  south  and  4,600  miles  from 
east  to  west.  Its  18,900-mile  coastline 
looks  out  upon  the  Atlantic  and  Indian 
Oceans,  the  Mediterranean  and  Red 
Seas.  Of  this  vast  continent,  the  region 
known  as  sub-Saharan  Africa,  of 
course,  does  not  touch  the  Mediterra- 
nean and  contains  2,322,625  fewer 
square  miles  than  the  rest  of  the  conti- 
nental landmass.  Despite  close  ties  be- 
tween countries  of  north  Africa  and 
those  of  the  Near  East,  there  are  some 
historic,  economic,  and  cultural  reasons 
to  consider  the  continent  more  than  a 
geographical  entity. 

In  addition  to  the  continent  itself,  a 
number  of  islands  are  also  included 
under  the  rubric  "Africa."  With  the  ex- 
ception of  the  Canary  Islands  and  Re- 
union, all  others  are  identified  with 
sub-Saharan  Africa.  These  include 
Madagascar,  Cape  Verde,  Comoros, 
Seychelles,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Sao 
Tome  and  Principe,  and  Mauritius.  The 
islands  of  Zanzibar  and  Pemba  are  now 
part  of  the  United  Republic  of 
Tanzania. 


Topography 

Approximately  four-fifths  of  the  Afri- 
can Continent  lie  in  the  tropical 
latitudes.  Its  vast  surface  consists  of  a 
series  of  level  or  slightly  undulating 
plateaus  which  fall  away  from  a  central 
area  of  high,  cliff-like  formations  to 
low-lying  coastal  zones  which  average 
only  20  miles  in  width.  The  plateaus  are 
1,000  feet  or  higher,  rising  to  2,000  or 
3,000  feet  in  southern  and  eastern  Af- 
rica and  to  5,000  feet  in  some  areas. 
Massive  geologic  changes  in  the 
plateaus  have  prockiced  corrugations 
which  are  among  the  most  conspicuous 
features  of  the  African  landscape:  the 
Great  Rift  Valley  of  east  Africa,  one  of 
the  deepest  fractures  in  the  Earth's 
crust;  Mt.  Kilimanjaro,  19,565  feet  and 
Ml.  Kenya  17,058  feet  above  sea  level 


in  east  Africa;  and  the  volcanic  peak  of 
Mt.  Cameroon  in  west  Africa,  13,353 
feet  above  sea  level.  These  changes  also 
jjroduced  Lake  Chad  in  central  Africa; 
the  lakes  of  East  Africa,  including  Af- 
rica's largest.  Lake  Victoria;  and  the 
continent's  four  major  rivers:  the  Nile 
(4,000  miles  long),  the  Zaire  (3,000),  the 
Niger  (2,600),  and  the  Zambezi  (1,650). 
These  rivers  are,  for  the  most  part, 
broad  and  sluggish  and  have  occasional 
rough  cataracts  and  spectacular  falls, 
such  as  Victoria. 

In  addition  to  its  peaks  and  moun- 
tain ranges — the  Atlas  Mountains  of 
the  northwest,  the  highland  belt  of 
Ethiopia  and  eastern  Africa,  and  the 
Drakensberg  of  South  Africa  —  the  con- 
tinent contains  the  Sahara  and  Kalahari 
deserts,  regions  of  heavy  rainfall  and 
lush  forest  vegetation,  and,  between 
desert  and  rain  forest,  grasslands 
(known  as  savannas),  and  savanna 
woodlands.  Desert  makes  up  nearly 
one-half  of  Africa's  total  area,  while 
40 '7f  contains  the  partly  forested 
grasslands  and  10'7f  dense  forests  and 
thickets. 

Climate 

Since  it  lies  astride  the  Equator,  most 
of  Africa  has  either  a  tropical  or  sub- 
tropical climate.  Temperate  climates 
are  found,  however,  in  the  north  close 
to  the  Mediterranean,  along  the  south- 
ern and  southwestern  areas  of  the  Cape 
of  Good  Hope,  and  on  the  higher  parts  of 
the  inland  plateaus.  Air  temperatures 
vary  from  hot  in  most  parts  of  the  con- 
tinent to  cold  in  the  deserts  (at  night), 
on  the  plateaus,  and  in  the  mountains, 
where  some  peaks  are  permanently 
snowcapped. 

Africa  is  divided  into  distinct 
climatic  belts,  allowing  for  the  excep- 
tions already  noted.  In  one  belt,  which 
is  bounded  by  the  5°  line  on  each  side  of 
the  Equator,  there  is  a  year-long  hot 
and  rainy  climate,  with  some  areas  re- 
ceiving as  much  as  100  inches  of  rain 
annually.  From  5°  to  15°  on  each  side  of 
the  Equator  the  climate  is  warm,  with 
heavy  rainfall  during  the  season  when 
the  sun  is  high.  Deserts  prevail  in  areas 
15°  to  30°  from  the  Equator,  areas 
where  temperatures  vary  from  very  hot 
to  very  cold.  Accumulated  rainfall  in 
these  areas  is  less  than  10  inches  annu- 


African  Highlights 

Total  area:  11.635,000  square  miles  (of 
which  sub-Saharan  Africa  is 
9,312,375  square  miles) 

Valleys:  Great  Rift  Valley  of  East  Africa- 
one  of  the  deepest  fractures  in  the 
Earth's  crust 

Mountains:  tVIt  Kilimaniaro,  19,565  feet. 
and  Mt  Kenya,  17,058  feet,  above 
sea  level 

Lakes:  Lake  Victoria — Africa's  largest 
lake  with  26,828  square  miles  (com- 
pare with  Lake  Superior,  North 
Americas  largest  lake,  31,700  square 
miles) 

Rivers:  the  Nile  (4,000  miles  long),  Zaire 
(3,000  miles),  Niger  (2,600  miles), 
and  Zambezi  (1,650  miles) 

Deserts:  the  Sahara  and  Kalahari — all 
deserts  comprise  about  50%  of  the 
continent's  total  area 

Partly  forested  grasslands:  40%  of 
Africa  s  total  area 

Dense  forests  and  thickets:  10%  of  total 
area 

Climate:  mainly  tropical  or  subtropical 

Population:  estimated  at  more  than  400 
million 

Population  growth  rate:  2  9% 

Independence:  since  1945,  45  nations 
gained  independence 


ally,  and  sometimes  no  measurable 
rainfall  occurs  for  years.  More  than  c 
from  the  Equator  there  are  mild,  rail 
winters  and  warm,  dry  summers. 

Africa's  varied  climate  has  not  on 
affected  vegetation,  river  conditions, 
and  the  incidence  of  disease,  it  has  als( 
helped  determine  patterns  of  settle- 
ment. Africans  gravitated  toward  fer 
tile  lands,  water,  and  areas  suitable  1 
grazing.  Europeans,  when  they  ar- 
rived, tended  to  settle  near  the  coast 
on  the  cool  eastern  and  southern 
plateaus  and  the  temperate  regions  o 
northern  and  southern  Africa.  Moder 
cities,  having  mostly  evolved  out  of 
bastions  of  colonial  administration  an 
trade,  dot  the  landscape  of  the 
continent. 


Department  of  State  Bullc 


Feature 


[ISTORY 

redence  to  the  theory  of  man's  African 
•igiii  has  been  jjrovided  by  the  re- 
arch  and  diggings  of  renowned  an- 
ropologists  in  eastern,  southern,  and 
estern  Africa.  Remains  of  a  forerun- 
r  of  modern  man  —  Australopithe- 

•and  other  creatures  with 
minoid  characteristics,  such  as  Homo 
ectus  and  Homo  habilis,  have  been 
learthed  in  various  parts  of  the  conti- 
nt.  Some  are  thought  to  be  over  'IVz 
illion  years  old. 

Further  evidence  of  the  evolution 
primitive  people  throughout  the 
ileolithic  (unpolished  Stone  Age — 1 
illion-16,000  years  B.C.)  has  been 
scovered,  including  remains  of  Nean- 
rthal  man  dating  back  to  around 
,000  B.C.  Traces  of  his  continued  de- 
lopment  down  through  the  Meso- 
hic,  Neolithic  (polished  Stone 
!;e).  Bronze,  and  Iron  Ages  have  been 
jnd  in  several  regions  of  Africa. 

Some  scholars  believe  that  primi- 
e  African  people  expanded  to 
ighboring  continents  midway  through 
3  Paleothithic  Age.  Meanwhile,  in  Af- 
a  they  were  dividing  into  three  main 
:es — Negroid,  Bushmanoid,  and 
gmoid.  Near  the  end  of  the 
leolithic  period  Caucasoid  people 
)m  the  Mediterranean  region  moved 
0  northeast  Africa.  Somewhat  later, 
ifth  racial  group,  the  Mongoloid, 
iched  the  coast  and  islands  of  east 
rica. 

Of  the  indigenous  Africans,  the 
groid  became  dominant,  learning 
st  to  hunt  and  forage,  later  to  domes- 
ate  animals,  and  finally  to  develop 
ricultural  communities.  In  a  mil- 
lium  before  and  a  millenium  after 
irist,  descendants  (known  by  linguis- 
classification  as  Niger-Congo  or 
gritic)  e.xpanded  to  control  much  of 
i  southern  half  of  Africa.  A  major 
bgroup,  speaking  the  Bantu  Ian- 
age,  spearheaded  migration  to  the 
3t  and  south,  overrunning  and  nearly 
minating  the  Pygmoid  and  Bush- 
moid  peoples  in  the  process. 

Meanwhile,  additional  Caucasoid 
Dups,  during  several  centuries  B.C. 
d  A.D.,  were  moving  into  north  and 
rtheast  Africa,  in  some  instances  re- 
icing  earlier  Caucasoids  or  in  other 
ses  pushing  back  Niger-Congo 


3629  2-80  STATE(RGE 


(Nigritic)  groups.  During  the  7th  to 
10th  centuries.  Bedouins  spread  Islamic 
influence  across  north  Africa,  while 
from  the  10th  to  the  18th  centui'y  other 
Moslems  continued  to  settle  in  east  Af- 
rica from  the  Horn  southward  to  Zim- 
babwe. 

As  groups  spread  and  then  consoli- 
dated, sophisticated  societies  de- 
veloped. Artifacts,  dating  to  the  10th 
century,  attest  to  the  organization 
of  their  civilizations.  Starting  with 
Kush  (Ethiopian  plateau — 1st  to  3rd 
centuries),  "Sudanic"  kingdoms  de- 
veloped for  over  1,000  years — ancient 
Ghana,  Kamen,  Mali,  Songhai,  the 
Hausa  states.  The  kingdoms  of  the 
Congo — Kongo,  Lunda,  and 


Society,  1980. 


Penetration  of  Islam 


"mm     Moslems  predon 

1        i     Moslems  form  s 
minority 


linate 
gnificaii 


3629  2-80  ST ATE(RGE) 


Feature 


Dogon  cliff  dwellings  (Museum  o!  Alncan  An,  Eliot  Elisolon  Archives) 


Bushong — somewhat  similar  in  gov- 
ernment and  organization  to  the 
"Sudanic"  states,  appear  to  have  been 
founded  in  the  14th  century.  The  city- 
states  of  the  Guinea  Coast  —  Ife,  Benin, 
Yoruba  —  date  at  least  to  the  15th  cen- 
tury. These  states  were  highly  or- 
ganized and  engaged  in  long-distance 
trade  in  salt,  gold,  cattle,  horses,  and 
ivory. 

Early  in  the  15th  century  Por- 
tuguese navigators  undertook  voyages 
of  exploration  that  initiated  a  gradual 
buildup  of  African  trade  relations  with 
Europe  and  the  Americas,  leading 
eventually  to  Christian  missionary  con- 
tact with  Africa.  During  the  16th  and 
17th  centuries  the  Dutch,  British, 
French,  Spanish,  and  Arabs  increased 
their  trade  with  Africa.  Slaves  became 
an  important  commodity,  although  this 
trade  had  existed  for  centuries  before 
with  various  Arab  countries.  No  reli- 
able figures  exist  as  to  the  extent  of  the 
slave  trade,  but  estimates  range  from 
10  to  30  million  people  sold  into  slavery. 
At  that  time,  a  fringe  of  trading  posts 
and  maritime  stations  was  established 
on  the  Atlantic  and  Indian  Ocean 
coasts,  but  the  interior  of  the  continent 
remained  unknown  to  most  non- 
Africans. 


Colonial  Period 

The  18th  and  early  19th  centuries  saw 
extensive  European  exploration,  reli- 
gious proselytizing,  and  ultimate  co- 
lonialization  of  much  of  Africa.  Mis- 
sionaries, traders,  and  adventurers 
penetrated  into  the  heart  of  the  conti- 
nent. These  were  the  years  of  Mungo 
Park,  Savorgnan  de  Brazza,  Rene 
Caille,  H.M.  Stanley,  Sir  Richard  Bur- 
ton, and  David  Livingstone.  They  were 
followed  later,  especially  after  1880,  by 
government  officials  extending  inland 
their  colonial  domains. 

Once  the  main  dimensions  of  Af- 
rica's inner  geography  and  resources 
were  revealed,  a  scramble  for  colonial 
territory  took  place.  Although  until 
1879  only  a  small  pan  of  the  African 
Continent  was  under  foreign  rule,  by 
1900  all  but  two  of  the  present  47  coun- 
tries (45  independent  states)  of  sub- 
Saharan  Africa  were  subject  to  Euro- 
pean control.  These  exceptions  were 
Liberia,  settled  by  freed  American 
slaves  in  the  1820s,  and  the  ancient 
Empire  of  Ethiopia.  The  remainder  of 
Africa  had  been  claimed  and  placed 
under  one  form  of  control  or  another  by 
France,  Great  Britain,  Portugal,  Bel- 
gium, Spain,  Germany,  and  Italy.  For 
the  next  half-century,  Europeans  them- 


selves settled  in  various  areas  of  the 
continent,  traded,  extracted  minerals, 
and  established  governments  reflectin, 
the  different  policies  and  institutions  ( 
the  colonial  metropoles. 

Independence 

Many  factors  heljjed  to  create  a  climat 
in  which  most  of  the  European-ruled 
colonies  in  Africa  eventually  became 
independent:  the  growth  of  African 
nationalist  movements;  the  participa- 
tion of  Africans  in  World  Wars  I  and  II 
the  Atlantic  Charter  of  1941  proclaim- 
ing the  right  of  all  peoples  to  choose  th 
form  of  government  under  which  they 
would  live;  and  changing  interests  anc 
ideas  in  Europe  regarding  the  efficacy 
of  empire,  including  its  economic 
im])lications. 

With  the  exception  of  South  Africi 
which  had  become  an  independent  uni( 
with  flominion  status  within  the  Britis 
Commonwealth  in  1910,  and  the  Sudan 
(separated  from  Egypt  in  1956),  the 
wave  of  actual  independence  did  not 
begin  until  1957.  Led  by  Nkrumah  of 
the  Gold  Coast,  Kenyatta  of  Kenya,  am 
Sekou  Toure  of  Guinea,  a  host  of  sub- 
Saharan  countries  in  rapid  succession 
broke  ties  with  their  colonial  rulers. 
Thus,  since  1957,  41  nations  have  joint 
the  four  already  independent  (Ethiopi. 
Liberia,  Sudan,  South  Africa)  with  tw 
more  (Zimbabwe  and  Namibia)  poised 
on  the  threshold  of  independence. 

Africa's  political  evolution  during 
the  past  two  decades  has  been  tumulti 
ous,  with  nearly  two-thirds  of  the  coui 
tries  undergoing  nonconstitutional 
changes  in  leadership  and  forms  of  gov 
ernment.  Dozens  of  coups  have  topple 
not  only  early  leaders  and  rulers  but 
sometimes  series  of  their  successors. 

While  more  than  half  of  the  nation 
have  come  under  the  control  of  militar 
leaders  or  committees,  some — Nigeria, 
Upper  Volta,  and  Ghana — have  now 
completed  the  cycle  and  returned  to 
civilian-constitutional  rule.  Some  lead- 
ers who  assumed  dictatorial  powers 
—  Idi  Amin  of  Uganda,  Bokassa  of  ihe 
Central  African  Empire,  and  Macias  ii 
Equatorial  Guinea — have  been  ousted 


Department  of  State  Bulle* 


Feature 


yr  more  moderate  forces.  Despite 
slitical  trauma  in  many  areas,  there 
ive  been  islands  of  relative  tranquility 
ith  stable  leadership  elsewhere  on  the 
)ntinent — Tanzania  (Nyerere),  Zam- 
ia  (Kaunda),  The  Gambia  (Jawara), 
otswana  (Seretse  Khama),  Ivory 
oast  (Houphouet-Boigny),  Senegal 
lenghor),  and  Kenya,  where  Moi  suc- 
eded  Kenyatta  in  an  orderly  constitu- 
onal  process. 

Secession  attempts  have 
reatened  national  entities.  Eritrea 
s  been  trying  to  break  free  from 
:hiopia  since  shortly  after  formal  ab- 
rption  into  Ethiopia  in  1962.  Katanga 
ow  Shaba)  tried  unsuccessfully  to 
cede  from  /laire  (then  the  Democratic 
epublic  of  the  Congo)  in  1960  and 
afara  from  Nigeria  in  1967. 

Not  only  have  there  been  internal 
sturbances  in  many  African  countries 
t  disputes  and  sometimes  open  war- 
re  have  broken  out  between  states. 
)r  example,  Somalia  and  Ethiopia 
ve  been  fighting  intermittently  over 
ssession  of  the  Ogaden  region  for 
ars.  Shabans,  operating  out  of  An- 
la,  have  made  incursions  into  Zaire  in 
th  1977  and  1978.  Until  recently, 
auritania  first  sided  with,  but  then 
posed,  Morocco  in  its  dispute  with 
e  Polisario  over  the  fate  of  the  West- 
!n  Sahara  (former  Spanish  Sahara), 
nad  asserts  that  Libya  has  anne.xed  a 
■  rtion  of  its  northern  territory. 

.African  nations,  acting  through  the 
■gaiiization  of  African  Unity  (OAU) 
(I  \  arious  ad  hoc  groups,  have 
(leavored  to  mediate  some  of  these 
ernational  disputes.  While  they  have 
(I  moderate  success  in  a  few  in- 
dices, the  continental  unity  advo- 
tfil  by  Nkrumah  of  Ghana  in  the 
n-.African  movement  of  the  early  in- 
pendence  years  has  failed  to  provide 
e  degree  of  cohesion  envisioned  by 
any  Africans. 

Another  source  of  turmoil  is  found 
the  "wars  of  liberation"  being  waged 
southern  Africa.  Although  in  various 
ages  of  resolution  or  escalation,  they 
imarily  involve  the  future  of  Zim- 
ibwe,  Namibia,  and  ultimately  South 
frica. 


AFRICA 
Former  Colonial  Status 

Political  Affiliation  -  1952 

United  Kingdom  I  |   |  |  Spain 

France  □□  Italy 

Portugal  |  |   |  |  '"^f^S\ 

3633  2-eO  STATE(RGE 


larch  1980 


Feature 


PEOPLE 


3642  2-80  STATE  (RGEI 


Children  in  Sudan  (aid  photo  by  Kay  Chemush) 


The  population  of  Africa  is  presently 
estimated  at  more  than  400  million  pe 
sons,  with  85'7(  living  in  sub-Saharan 
Africa.  However,  because  of  the  vast- 
ness  of  the  continent,  density  is  less 
than  half  that  of  the  United  States, 
running  at  about  30  persons  per  squa: 
mile.  This  figure  is  steadily  increasinj 
nonetheless,  with  an  estimated  annua 
increase  of  2.9*7^.  Should  current  tren( 
continue,  the  continent's  population 
might  conceivably  reach  as  high  as  80 
million  by  the  year  2000,  a  subject  of 
growing  concern  to  the  governments 
some  of  the  highly  populated  countrig 

People  are  dispersed  unevenly 
throughout  the  continent.  Vast 
stretches  of  deserts  and  mountains  an 
virtually  uninhabited.  As  indicated  e£i 
Her,  good  climate,  fertile  land,  navigs 
ble  rivers,  safe  ports,  and  historical 
demographic  movements  have  createi* 
several  areas  with  population  density 
running  as  high  as  500  persons  per 
square  mile.  South  of  the  Sahara,  the 
most  populated  areas  are: 

•  The  lands  bordering  the  Gulf  o 
Guinea  in  west  Africa,  particularly 
Nigeria  and  the  southern  parts  of 
Ghana,  Benin,  and  Togo: 

•  The  Nile  Valley  in  northern 
Sudan; 

•  The  east  Africa  highlands,  par- 
ticularly the  plateaus  of  Ethiopia  and 
eastern  Zaire.  Rwanda,  Burundi,  am 
Tanzania:  and 

•  The  eastern  and  southern  coast 
and  interior  High  Veld  of  South  Afris 

Ninety  percent  of  the  African 
people  have  dwelt  for  decades  as  sma 
groups  in  rural  areas  but  many  have 
been  moving  in  recent  years  to  urban 
centers.  Increased  employment  oppoi 
tunities,  drought  in  some  regions,  an^ 
the  universal  lure  of  the  "big  city"  ar 
creating  burgeoning  metropolises  whi 
begin  to  rank  with  some  of  the  world 
largest  and  busiest.  Among  those  wit 
more  than  a  million  inhabitants  are: 
Kinshasa  (Zaire),  Lagos  and  Ibadan 
(Nigeria),  Johannesburg  and  Cape 
Town  (South  Africa),  Abidjan  (Ivory 
Coast),  Addis  Ababa  (Ethiopia),  and 
Accra  (Ghana). 


Department  of  State  Bulle. 


Feature 


African  Language  Groups 


leans  and  batiks 

pchives) 


Art,  Eliot  Elisofon 


Tremendous  diversity  exists  among 
le  people  of  sub-Saharan  Africa.  This 
iversity  stems  from  a  variety  of 
auses — the  infusion  of  elements  from 
utside  the  African  Continent,  the 
lelding  of  a  portion  of  these  people 
nth  original  African  stock,  migration 
3  new  areas  in  search  of  better  liveli- 
ood,  rivalries  which  produced  factions 
nd  subdivisions,  tendencies  to  or- 
anize  into  small,  close-knit  groups  for 
rotection  and  mutual  support.  This 
rocess,  which  has  continued  for  many 
nillenia,  has  produced  more  than  800 
thnic  divisions. 

Scholars  have  attempted  to  clas.sify 
he  people  of  Africa  in  a  variety  of 
vays.  Anthropologists  identify  by  ra- 
ial  strain.  Some  scholars  use  linguistic 
■ategories,  and  others  work  with  list- 
ngs  of  ethnic  or  "tribal"  groups.  From 
lames  alone,  it  is  often  difficult  to  de- 
ermine  the  interrelationship  among 
•ace,  language,  and  group  or  tribe, 
rherefore,  in  the  outline  of  African  his- 
:ory,  references  were  made  to  the  five 
anthropological  strains  of  the  continent. 
A  section  follows  on  linguistic  classifi- 
jation,  which  endeavors  to  link  origin 
with  major  linguistic  groups.  Finally,  a 
third  section  carries  the  progression  on 
to  more  familiar  ethnic,  enthnolinguis- 
tic,  or  tribal  names. 


AFROASIATIC 

A. 

Semitic 

B. 

Berber 

C. 

Cushitic 

D. 

Ctiad 

E. 

Ancent  Egyptian 

(Co 

Ptic) 

SUDANIC 

F. 

Cfiari  •  Nile 

t.  central  cnari  - 

Nile 

2.  Eastern  Ctiari  ■ 

Nil 

a.  Nilotic 

b.  Nubian  and 

oth 

er 

Ctiari  .  Nile 

Ian 

ua9e 

G 

Central  Saharan 

H 

Maban 

NIGER  -  CONGO  AND  KORDOFANIAN 

L.  Atlantic 

r^.  Mandingo 

N.    Voltaic 

O.  Kwa 

P.  Lio 

Q.  Adamawa  and  Eastern  Niger  -  Congo 

R.  Benue  -  Niger  (including  Bantu) 

S.  Kordofanian 


The  approximate  distribution  of  the  main  native  language  groups  of  Africa  is  shown  on  the  map.    Although  the 
number  of  different  languages  is  very  high  (perhaps  more  than  800).  all  native  languages  derive  from  four  basic 
stocks.    These  stocks  are  represented  by  the  shaded  and  unshaded  portions  of  the  map.    Key  letters  indicate 
divisions  of  the  main  stocks  and  are  placed  in  localities  where  interrelated  languages  are  spoken.    European  and 
European  colonial  languages,  which  often  serve  as  a  common  language  between  language  groups,  are  not  includei 
in  this  presentation.    The  dotted  tine  at  E  shows  the  area  where  Ancient  Egyptian  was  spoken,  but  the  present 
language  is  Arabic,    certain  other  distributions,  too  minute  to  be  shown  on  the  map,  include  complex  vari- 
ations in  the  Sudanic  languages;  pockets  of  Fulani  in  the  Atlantic  subgroup  of  Niger  -  Congo  (L)  found  as  far 
east  as  l_ake  Chad;  and  Bantu  (R)  encroachments  on  the  territory  of  the  Click  .  speakers. 


©  Macmillan  Educational 
3643  2-80  STATE(RGE) 


con 


on,  1974 


Languages 

The  complexity  of  African  society  is 
graphically  demonstrated  by  the 
number  of  languages  found  on  the  con- 
tinent. Of  more  than  1,000  languages 
and  dialects,  fewer  than  10  are  spoken 
by  over  a  million  persons.  Most  are 
used  by  groups  numbering  less  than 
100,000  people. 

Of  the  numerous  linguistic  au- 
thorities, the  classifications  of  Prof. 


Joseph  Greenberg  represent  something 
of  a  contemporary  consensus.  His  list- 
ing of  categories  and  a  map  showing  the 
general  geographic  location  of  groups  is 
reproduced  here.  In  the  brief  textual 
amplification  which  follows,  references 
are  also  made  to  alternate  names  used 
by  another  eminent  scholar.  Prof. 
George  Murdock. 

The  largest  language  family  is  the 
Niger-Congo  and  Kordofian  (Nigritic- 


March  1980 


Feature 


Ethnolinguistic  Groups 

Groups  selected  show  diversity,  not  relative  importance 


/         Berber  «%, .   '  I  | 

NOar-"    '^  *(wff.      „  ,  i(«i'"'^„i  Cftamfta    d-^-'""''  Tsj^     Qj/la     ^.:, 

Maka      fjgf"        A,5o„e^°;''™''Pfte,„°s.iiA         Soma/i/ 
.     RinO«  «»Ao.j     tuo    ,<^        Li'" 

Bakomo   4  <^  ^'kuyu  Me'» 
r      *'•''  ■^^Kamba 

/Cuba         ,   ^a'^ff  Wachaaga 

,_^  mgogo  > 

f^--    Wahehe  % 

,,    Ovimbunou 

\        Ovambo 

\  ^  Batst 

Bushmen 


3634  2-80  STATE  ( 


Murdock)  of  which  the  Bantu  sublan- 
guage group  is  the  most  important. 
Members  of  this  family,  of  course,  are 
descendants  of  the  earliest  people  who 
remained  on  the  continent  and  who  oc- 
cupy much  of  sub-Saharan  Africa.  The 
Afroasiatic  (Hamitic-Murdock)  includ- 
ing Semitic-,  Berber-,  and  Cushitic- 
speaking  people,  stem  from  the  early 
Caucasoids  and  are  found  primarily  in 
north  and  northeast  Africa.  The 
Sudanic  can  be  found  in  a  region 
stretching  along  the  lower  Nile  and 
westward  through  the  area  known  as 
the  Sahel. 

One  of  the  smallest,  but  purest 
strains  involve  the  Click  (Khoisan- 
Murdock)  family,  known  as  such  by  the 
characteristic  clicking  sound  made  by 
its  speakers.  Bushmen  and  Hottentots 
of  southwestern  Africa  belong  to  this 
family.  There  are  some  languages,  such 
as  Swahili  and  Hausa,  which  act  as  lin- 
guae franca  e  between  widely  divergent 
groups,  especially  in  regard  to  trade.  In 
addition  to  indigenous  languages,  Eng- 
lish, French,  Portuguese,  and  Arabic 


are  used  widely  throughout  Africa  for 
official  and  commercial  puri)oses. 

Ethnolinguistic  (Iroups 

Finally  the  diversity  of  ethnic  group- 
ings, which  reflect  original  racial 
strains  and  bear  names  sometimes,  but 
by  no  means  always,  similar  to  the  lan- 
guages they  speak,  is  illustrated  on  the 
ethnolinguistic  map.  This  includes  a 
portion  of  the  names  of  well-known 
ethnic-linguistic  or  tribal  groups.  Their 
inclusion  does  not  necessarily  reflect 
their  relative  importance,  nor  is  their 
location  on  the  map,  along  with  relation 
to  national  borders,  politically  defini- 
tive. 

Scattered  throughout  the  continent 
are  approximately  5  million  people  of 
predominantly  European  descent,  more 
than  half  of  whom  are  concentrated  in 
southern  Africa.  There  are  also  nearly  1 
million  Asians  and  a  sprinkling  of  other 
races  on  the  continent. 


Religion 

Religion  plays  a  significant  role  in  the 
life  of  most  Africans.  There  are  as 
many  variations  of  indigenous  religiou; 
practice  as  there  are  languages  and 
ethnic  groups.  However,  for  the 
majority  of  beliefs  which  have  de- 
veloped within  Africa's  own  culture, 
there  are  two  or  three  common  de- 
nominators. One  involves  faith  in  a  Su 
preme  Being  who  created  all  things, 
who  gave  the  world  its  order  and  in- 
fu,sed  it  with  ongoing  energy.  Another 
is  the  conviction  that  the  universe  is  a 
unity  of  being,  without  separation  of 
physical  and  spiritual  elements. 

African  religious  beliefs  also  at- 
tribute conscious  life  to  nature  and  nat 
ural  objects,  one  of  the  reasons  that  th 
term  "animi.st"  (a  Latin  derivative)  ha 
been  commonly  used  as  a  generic  tern 
to  cover  many  traditional  religions.  In 
fact  it  inadequately  describes  the  rang' 
and  depth  of  the  religious  faith  which 
chai-acterizes  sub-Saharan  Africa.  The 
7th  century  sweep  of  Islam  did  con- 
vert to  the  Moslem  faith  many  sub- 
Saharan  Africans  living  in  and  some- 
times below  the  Sahel  and  in  certain 
regions  of  east  Africa.  Christian  mis- 
sionaries also  brought  their  denomina- 
tional doctrines  to  sub-Saharan  Africa 

Culture 

The  cultural  richness  of  Africa  is  man 
ifested  in  four  major  forms:  art,  musi( 
dance,  and  literature.  All  interpret  in 
unique  ways  the  traditional  African 
values — religious  beliefs;  veneration  of 
the  deceased;  respect  for  nature;  and 
the  importance  of  childbearing,  the 
family,  the  community,  and  its  leader: 
The  arts  e.xpress  reverence  for  the 
past,  and  when  used  during  the  rites  ( 
passage— i.e.,  puberty,  marriage, 
death — teach  social  roles  and  respon- 
sibilities, as  well  as  aiding  in  the  as- 
similation of  traditional  beliefs. 

Thanks  to  energetic  art  coUectorf 
from  early  colonial  e.xplorers  to  mode) 
curators  and  tourists,  sculpture  has  b 
come  best  known  outside  the  continen 
as  examples  of  traditional  cultural  ex- 
pression. Most  of  those  recently  ac- 
quired are  in  wood,  but  museums  do 
hold  fascinating  collections  of  terra 
cotta  Nok  statues  from  the  2d  and  3d 
centuries  B.C.,  as  well  as  Benin  and  It 
bronzes  several  thousand  years  old. 
Other  forms  of  traditional  art  include 
rock  paintings,  decorative  metalwork. 
basketry,  and  jewelry. 


Department  ol  State  Bullei 


lise 


us 
C 


Feature 


Traditional  dances  reveal  much  of 
African  lore  and  legend,  philosophy,  and 
)elief.  They  may  celebrate  glories  and 
riumphs  of  the  past,  mark  contemjio- 
ary  events  and  rites  of  passage,  oi- 
nake  supplication  for  a  good  harvest  or 
he  security  of  the  community.  Folk 
lances  vary  markedly  throughout  the 
:ontinent,  from  those  of  the  Zulu  war- 
iors  to  the  Dogon  masked  societies. 
However,  most  involve  group,  rather 
ban  individual,  effort  with  participants 
nassed  in  circles  or  lines. 

Drums  are  most  often  identified 
vith  African  music.  However,  Africans 
'or  thousands  of  years  have  played 
vinfl,  string,  as  well  as  other  percus- 
;ion  instruments,  obtaining  subtle  and 
■omple.x  e.\pressions  from  relatively 
iimple  devices.  While  much  of  the 
nusic  has  served  as  accompaniment  for 
lancing,  soloists  and  ensembles  per- 
orm  for  many  other  occasions.  The 
■hythmic  patterns  of  African  music  are 
•eflected  outside  the  continent,  notably 
n  American  jazz. 

Until  the  18th  century,  most  Afri- 
■an  literature  was  in  the  oral  tradition, 
)eing  handed  on  from  generation  to 
!:eneration  by  word  of  mouth.  E.xperts 
'stimate  that  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  one 
■an  find  over  250,000  myths,  legends, 
md  folk  tales.  Written  literature  ap- 
)eared  first  in  areas  which  reflect 
\rabic  influence,  Hausa  in  west  Africa 
md  Swahili  in  the  ea.st.  In  the  past  80 
■eai-s  published  works  have  burgeoned, 
ncluding  such  landmarks  as  Leopold 
-ienghor's  "Negritude"  poetry,  H.I.E. 
Dhlonio's  Vallei/  of  the  TIiokscuiiI  Hills. 

hinua  Achebe's  Things  Fall  A/xni. 
md  Thomas  Mofolo's  Chakn. 


AFRK'A.N  GROUPS 


In  the  tribes  of  ti'aditional  Africa  every 
person — man  or  woman — had  a  role  as- 
signed to  him  by  the  society.  He 
learned  the  ways  of  the  society  and  the 
tasks  expected  of  him.  If  the  particular 
tribe  had  a  relatively  complex  struc- 
ture, he  might  belong  to  groups  other 
than  family  groups  within  the  society, 
such  as  age-sets,  military  wings,  secret 
societies,  artisans'  guilds,  etc.  But  he 
would  be  assigned  to  these  groups  just 
as  surely  as  he  would  be  a  member  of  a 
given  family.  Almost  no  choice  would 
be  open  to  him.  He  could  never  openly 
organize  to  change  the  society  because 
the  justification  of  all  authority  was 
based  on  doing  things  the  way  they  had 
always  been  done.  This  does  not  mean 
there  was  no  change,  but  change  was 
not  planned.  It  came  about  because  of 
natural  disaster  or  invasion.  Men  did 
not  organize  in  groups  to  bring  about 
change.  Rather  the  groups  that  existed 
were  there  to  perform  certain  tradi- 
tional functions  in  ritualistic  ways. 

As  tribesmen  migrated  to  the 
urban  centers  under  the  colonial  re- 
gime, they  often  moved  away  from  the 
direct  control  of  their  traditional 
rulers — because  the  distance  was 
great,  because  sometimes  the  European 
administration  encouraged  this,  and  be- 
cause they  found  new  rewards  and  new 
values  in  the  new  urban  ways.  In  gen- 
eral, this  decline  in  allegiance  to  the 
traditional  rulers  was  regarded  by  the 
African  urban  migrant  as  a  liberation 
from  the  restrictions  that  had  been  im- 
posed upon  him  by  ancient  custom. 

This  change  in  attitude,  however, 
had  important  consequences  for  him. 
The  tribal  structure  had  offered  him 
two  kinds  of  security:  social  and 
psychological.  In  the  tribe  he  was  al- 
ways assured  of  enough  to  eat,  insofar 
as  the  whole  tribe  had  enough  to  eat. 


He  had  assured  work.  When  he  grew 
old,  the  tribe  would  provide  for  him. 
This  was  his  social  security.  Fur- 
thermore, he  learned  a  single  set  of 
rules  of  behavior.  He  knew  what  was 
expected  of  him  and  what  he  could  ex- 
pect of  others.  He  knew  that  when  he 
was  married  or  his  children  were  born 
or  a  member  of  his  family  died,  the 
tribe  would  participate  in  an  appropri- 
ate ceremony  to  mark  the  occasion. 
This  was  his  psychological  security. 

In  the  towns  he  tended  to  lose  this 
kind  of  security.  Often  far  from  home, 
sometimes  separated  from  his  im- 
mediate family,  he  could  not  count  on 
always  having  food  or  employment.  In 
moments  of  crisis  or  ceremony — death, 
birth,  marriage,  coming-of-age — he 
might  have  neither  money  nor  compan- 
ions with  which  to  mark  the  occasion. 
Furthermore,  the  ways  of  the  city  were 
bewildering.  He  was  not  sure  what  was 
expected  of  him  or  what  he  might  rea- 
sonably ask  others  to  do.  He  was  torn 
between  traditional  ways  and  some  of 
the  new  ideas  he  learned  in  the  city.  He 
looked  around  for  ways  and  means  to 
replace  the  sense  of  social  and 
psychological  security  he  had  lost  by 
leaving  his  rural,  tribal  area.  To  the  ex- 
tent that  the  government  could  not 
provide  this  security,  because  of  lack  of 
money  or  personnel  or  popular  accept- 
ance, the  migrant  to  the  towns  began  to 
create  new  groups,  voluntary  associa- 
tions, which  might  help  to  meet  these 
needs.  The  very  idea  of  a  voluntary  as- 
sociation was  a  new  one,  for  it  implied 
that  individuals  would  group  together 
in  their  own  interests  for  limited  pur- 
poses to  change  the  social  situation  in 
some  way.  The.se  were  more  the  in- 
struments of  change  than  the  instru- 
ments of  tradition. 


Text  from  Colliers  Encyclopedia,  Vol. 
I,  1974,  p.  22  (''  Maemillan  Educational 
Corporation,  1974). 


March  1980 


Feature 


POLITICAL  PROCESSES 

Political  institutions  and  processes  vary 
greatly  in  sub-Saharan  Africa.  There 
are  highly  centralized  forms  of  govern- 
ments, constitutional  monarchies,  mili- 
tary oligarchies  and  autocracies,  as  well 
as  i^arliamentary  systems.  The  latter,  in 
tui-ii,  include  numerous  variations — 
presidential  and  collective  e.xecutives, 
unicameral  and  bicameral  houses,  fully 
elected  and  partly  appointed  legisla- 
tures. Universal  suffrage  is  found  in 
most  countries,  although  in  some  of 
southern  Africa  voting  rights  are  ra- 
cially restricted. 

Some  of  these  differences  are  due 
in  part  to  the  administrative  and  politi- 
cal institutions  imposed  upon  the  Afri- 
cans during  the  European  colonial 
period.  The  various  forms  of  govern- 
ment also  reflect  different  historical 
and  social  backgrounds.  Ethiopia's 
former  constitutional  monarchy,  for 
example,  was  deeply  rooted  in  the 
country's  centuries-old  royal  history. 
Nigeria's  newly  inaugurated  American- 
style  federalism  on  the  other  hand,  rep- 
resents an  attempt  to  maintain  unity  in 
one  of  Africa's  largest  states  by  ac- 
commodating the  social,  cultural,  and 
historical  differences  which  exist  among 


the  country's  several  ethnic  groups. 

Africa's  Niger-Congo  (Nigritic) 
groupings  are  characterized  by  strongly 
developed  traditional  structures,  which 
in  some  cases  cut  across  political 
boundaries  superimposed  on  areas  by 
colonial  powers  with  little  or  no  regard 
for  linguistic  or  cultural  distribution. 
Despite  the  impact  of  modernization  in 
urban  areas,  traditional  loyalties  re- 
main strong  and,  therefore,  the  de- 
velopment of  national  consciousness  in 
Africa  is  an  exceptionally  complicated 
task. 

Most  independent  African  nations 
have  endeavored  in  a  variety  of  ways 
and  with  varying  degrees  of  success  to 
make  government  both  effective  and 
I'esponsive  to  the  will  of  the  people,  to 
provide  some  means  for  citizen  partici- 
pation in  government,  and  to  establish 
country-wide  arenas  in  which  poten- 
tially divisive  forces — such  as  ethnic 
and  regional  interests — can  contest 
peacefully. 

Supplementing  and  at  times  super- 
seding the  role  of  government  institu- 
tions in  working  toward  these  goals  in 
many  African  countries  is  a  ruling 
political  party.  Usually  the  outgrowth 
of  the  country's  earlier  nationalist 
movement,  these  parties  have  con- 
tinued after  independence  their  efforts 
to  achieve  national  mobilization  and  the 
resolution  of  differences  within  the 


"Despite  the  impact  of  modernization  in  urban 
areas,  traditional  loyalties  remain  strong.  .  .  ." 

Left:  Africa  Hall  in  Addis  Ababa,  Ethiopia, 

meetingplace  of  the  Organization  of  African 

Unity  and  UN,  Economic  Commission  for 

Africa 

Above:  Mushenge  village  chief,  Zaire  (Museum 

African  Art,  Eliot  Elisofon  Archives) 


populace.  Consequently,  much  of  the 
political  activity  which  normally  occur 
within  government  institutions  in  mos 
Western  nations  occurs  "outside  the 
government"  —  within  the  ruling  part; 
— in  many  African  countries.  Thus 
political  confrontation,  bargaining,  and 
decisionmaking  frequently  take  place 
more  often  within  the  party  organiza- 
tion than  within  the  formal  structure  ' 
government. 

Although  many  of  these  political 
parties  before  independence  could  boa: 
unified  bodies  of  support,  they  now  e> 
perience  pressures  toward  fragmenta- 
tion. Ojjposition  has  frequently  been 
based  on  ethnic-linguistic  and  regional 
rather  than  national  loyalties.  Thi 
strains  national  political  unity,  leading 
in  some  cases  to  the  breakaway  move 
ments  or  strong  centralized  govern- 
ments cited  earlier.  The  postindepen- 
(lence  era  has  also  seen  the  rise  of  nev 
competing  factions  based  on  age,  eco- 
nomic, and  other  interests. 

It  is  probable  that  the  African 
states  will  continue  to  experience 
change  in  government  form  and  proce 
as  they  experiment  in  an  effort  to  find 
the  best  political  mechanism  for  their 
particular  needs. 


ati{ 
slrii 


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Ni 
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(it) 
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Kit 


10 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


Feature 


CONOMIC  ISSUES 

harp  contrasts  are  found  in  the 
^onomies  of  the  45  independent,  and  2 
early  independent,  countries  of  sub- 
aharan  Africa.  Some,  like  Gabon, 
uinea,  Liberia,  Mauritania,  Nigeria, 
aire,  Zambia,  and  South  Africa  have 
rge  reserves  of  minerals.  Today,  from 
s  known  reserves,  Africa  produces 
':>'7r  of  the  world's  diamonds,  ST7(  of  its 
)balt,  65'7r  of  its  gold,  549,  of  its 
ironie,  and  a  steadily  increasing  pro- 
Drtion  of  its  petroleum.  A  few,  like 
'ory  Coast  and  Kenya,  have  success- 
illy  developed  agricultural  exports.  On 
le  other  hand,  others,  such  as  Chad, 
ali,  and  Upper  Volta  in  the  Sahel,  are 
)ubly  disadvantaged  by  poor  re- 
lurces  and  landlocked  locations  which 
■eate  high  transport  costs.  These  con- 
asting  circumstances  are  further  ac- 
■ntuated  by  varied  colonial  and  cul- 
iral  heritages  and  postcolonial 
lilosophies  of  economic  development. 

Generally  speaking,  however,  most 
Africa  suffers  from  poverty  and  ex- 
eme  underdevelopment.  The  conti- 
mt,  in  fact,  contains  two-thirds  of  the 
orld's  least  economically  developed 
lUntries.  Economic  growth  rates  of 
"i  and  other  indicators  are  discourag- 
g,  portending  further  economic  and 
iman  crises,  as  well  as  possible  result- 
it  political  unrest. 

The  major  sectors  of  concern  af- 
cting  African  development  involve 
p-iculture,  transport,  health,  desert- 
ication  and  deforestation,  energy,  in- 
jstrial  employment,  trade,  education, 
nd  population  growth. 

griculture 

gricultural  prospects  are  discourag- 
ig.  Per  capita  food  production  is  now 
sclining  by  IA'7(  annually,  compared 
ith  Asia's  3.4%  increase  each  year.  A 
eficit  of  23  million  tons  of  food  grains 
1  Africa  is  forecast  by  1990  unless  pro- 
uction  can  be  significantly  increased, 
his  deficit  would  be  14  times  greater 
lan  1975  shortages.  Average  daily  per 
apita  nutritional  intake  for  Africa  is 
,950  calories  and  55  protein  grams,  the 
)west  in  the  developing  world  and  de- 
lining.  Wholly  inadequate  transporta- 
ion  systems  prevent  agricultural  and 


Limping  water  in  Malawi  (usica  photo  by  Richard 

tunders) 


11 


Feature 


Agriculture 


3630  2-80  ST  A 


social  services  from  reaching  isolated 
rural  people  and  prevent  food  from 
reaching  markets  and  food  deficit 
areas.  There  is  a  lack  of  research  and 
extension  services.  Inadequate  atten- 
tion is  focused  on  the  role  of  women, 
who  are  the  main  agricultural  workers, 
both  in  production  and  marketing.  Poor 
rainfall  and  soil  conditions  e.xist  in 
many  parts  of  the  continent.  Inappro- 
priate domestic  policies  in  many  coun- 
tries hold  down  the  price  of  agricultural 
goods  in  order  to  provide,  in  effect, 
subsidies  to  the  politically  more  impor- 
tant urban  populations.  There  are  other 
factors  including  lack  of  farmer  credit 
and  lack  of  adequate  fertilizer. 

Desertification  and 
Deforestration 

Fifty-two  percent  of  Africa's  land  is 
desert  or  is  threatened  by  desertifica- 
tion. This  compares  with  4'7f  in  Asia  and 


1'7(  in  Latin  America.  In  part  this  re- 
sults from  climatic  changes  and  other 
natural  phenonema,  such  as  in  the 
Sahel  and  sections  of  Ethiopia  and 
Kenya.  However,  part  of  the  tragedy  is 
manmade.  Since  the  beginning  of  this 
century  100  million  hectares  have  been 
taken  out  of  forests  and  put  to  other 
uses.  When  many  tree's  are  stripped 
off  the  land  .so  quickly,  it  leads  to 
lower  water  tables,  erosion,  and  floods. 
Wood  becomes  more  scarce,  thus 
firewood  becomes  difficult  to  obtain,  a 
hardship  for  rural  people  who  depend 
on  it  as  their  main  source  of  local 
energy. 

Energy 

Despite  oil  production  in  some  parts  of 
Africa,  many  developing  countries  suf- 
fer from  energy  shortages.  They  are 
squeezed  between  increasing  require- 
ments and  skyrocketing  energy  prices. 
Increased  petroleum  costs  have  sharply 
raised  the  price  of  fertilizer  which  is 
vital  to  African  rural  economy.  They 
have  also  slowed  African  industrializa- 
tion, made  it  expensive  to  pump  water, 


and  costly  to  transport  goods  to  mar- 
kets. Hydroelectric  dams,  such  as  the 
Volta,  Inga,  and  Aswan  dams,  have 
helped  somewhat  but  so  far  cannot 
meet  the  demands,  in  part  because 
power  lines  are  not  available  or  pract 
cal. 

Trade 

In  addition  to  the  export  of  minerals, 
Africans  rely  on  the  sale  of  primary 
natural  products  (agricultural,  timbei 
etc.)  for  their  national  incomes.  Be- 
cause many  depend  on  a  single  expor 
product,  they  are  vulnerable  to  work 
price  fluctuations  cited  earlier.  CuiTen 
increases  in  oil  prices,  of  course, 
greatly  benefit  Nigeria,  Angola,  Zair 
and  Gabon  at  the  moment,  and  poten 
tially  Congo  and  Madagascar  in  the 
future. 

With  certain  exceptions,  African 
nations  trade  relatively  little  with  ea 
other.  In  fact,  the  African  infrastruc 
ture  of  transportation  and  communic; 
tions,  inherited  from  colonial  days, 
links  capitals  more  directly  to  Weste 
Europe  than  to  one  another,  thus  lirr 
iting  commercial  cooperation  among  j 
rican  states.  The  low  volume  of  inter 
African  trade  also  results  from  the  f; 
that  African  nations  export  a  relativi 
limited  range  of  products,  many  of 
which  are  mutually  competitive.  A  f( 
promising  I'egional  projects  now  cut 
across  former  colonial  borders  and  ai 
designed  to  reduce  dependence  on  co 
sumer  goods  and  manufactured  prod- 
ucts imported  from  outside  the  regio 

Employment 

Important  to  some  African  countries 
with  large  populations  is  the  effort  ti 
increase  employment  in  industry. 
Labor  intensive  industries  are  critic; 
because  African  exports  depend  verj 
heavily  at  the  present  time  on  com- 
modities. Mineral  extraction,  proces; 
ing,  and  exportation  provide  many 
jobs  and  are  a  major  source  of  reven 
for  a  number  of  countries.  Unfortu- 
nately, fluctuations  in  world  mineral 
prices  often  benefit  the  rich  (gold  frc 
South  Africa)  and  sometimes  hurt  th 
poor,  for  example,  when  Zambia  and 
Zaire  suffered  a  few  years  ago  from 
temporary  decline  in  copper  prices. 


12 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


Hydro-electric  Resources 


alth 

alth  is  a  serious  problem.  Although 
rica's  primary  need  in  this  field  is 
?ventive  medicine,  many  of  the  medi- 

facilities  provided  during  the  colo- 
,1  period  —  hospitals  and  urban 
pensaries — were  designed  for  cura- 
e  purposes.  Africa,  nevertheless,  has 
ig  been  an  important  center  for  the 
idy  of  tropical  medicine,  including 
rasitic  diseases.  The  great  epidemics 
lich  once  took  such  a  toll  of  African 

are  being  controlled  and  in  some 
ses  eliminated. 

Much,  however,  needs  to  be  done, 
fe  expectancy  averages  43  years, 
mpared  with  53  years  in  the  entire 


developing  world  and  71  years  in  the 
United  States.  Infant  and  child  mortal- 
ity remains  particularly  high.  The  ratio 
of  medical  personnel  to  population  in 
Africa  is  very  low;  water  supply  and 
sanitation  facilities  remain  widely  in- 
adequate. 

Education 

Africa  is  also  wrestling  with  monumen- 
tal problems  in  education.  Illiteracy  is 
estimated  at  an  average  80 '7f  across  the 
continent.  Costs  are  staggering — some 
countries  devote  more  than  one-third  of 
their  budgets  to  education  in  an  effort 
to  increase  instruction  at  all  levels  and 
to  meet  increases  in  population.  There  is 
also  the  desire  to  modify  the  European 
educational  models  inherited  from  the 
colonial  period  by  adding  courses  which 
reflect  African  traditions,  culture,  and 
history. 


Feature 


Most  countries  are  endeavoring  to 
expand  their  vocational  and  technical 
schools.  They  are  also  attempting  to 
provide  better  teacher  training 
facilities  to  staff  secondary  schools 
which  still  often  depend  on  non-African 
teachers.  In  these  efforts,  they  face  a 
dilemma — knowing  that  better  edu- 
cated citizens  will  facihtate  nation- 
building  but  at  the  same  time  finding 
that  national  economies  are  often  un- 
able to  fully  absorb  secondary  school 
and  college  graduates. 

African  universities  and  secondary 
schools  have  their  share  of  student  un- 
rest. Part  of  the  unrest  is  directed  to- 
ward student  grievances,  such  as 
housing  and  student  desire  for  more 
participation  in  school  administration 
and  choice  of  curriculum.  Another  part 
reflects  grievances  concerned  with  na- 
tional, political,  and  economic  prob- 
lems. 

Population  Growth 

Population  and  urbanization  growth 
rates  are  the  highest  in  the  world — 
2.9%  and  ll'7f  respectively. 
Furthermore,  growth  rates  appear  to  be 
accelerating.  Efforts  to  control  popula- 
tion increases,  which  impact  adversely 
on  already  poor  societies,  are  inhibited 
by  religious  resistance  and  traditional 
African  belief  in  the  importance  of  the 
large  extended  family. 

Development 

In  attempting  to  arrest  its  economic  de- 
cline and  counter  such  adverse  indi- 
cators as  stagnant  food  production, 
growing  populations,  and  declining  per 
capita  income,  Africa  must  have  foreign 
assistance.  Even  in  countries  such  as 
Nigeria,  which  has  benefited  from 
higher  oil  prices  and  large  oil  exports, 
there  are  extensive  pockets  of  poverty. 
Many  developed  countries  have  re- 
sponded through  both  bilateral  and 
multilateral  programs  to  African  needs, 
although  seldom  at  levels  which  satisfy 
the  impoverished  or  produce  dramatic 
improvements  in  national  economies. 

While  total  official  development  as- 
sistance to  sub-Saharan  Africa  has  in- 
creased modestly  each  year,  in  effect 
the  amounts  have  barely  kept  even  with 
inflation,  particularly  in  some  countries 


13 


Feature 


with  extremely  high  rates.  Currently 
i'Z'^'r  of  aid  is  provided  bilaterally,  '■W'-r 
multilaterally,  and  14'r  from  the  Or- 
ganization of  Petroleum  Exporting 
Countries  (OPEC)— where  statistics 
combine  bilateral  and  multilateral  aid. 
It  should  also  be  recognized  that  large 
bilateral  donors,  such  as  France,  the 
United  States,  and  West  Germany,  are 
also  major  contributors  to  international 
development  organizations. 

International  donors  have  endeav- 
ored to  focus  their  assistance  on  the 
major  problem  areas  cited  earlier.  The 
World  Bank,  the  United  States,  and 
other  developed  countries  have  concen- 
trated on  the  improvement  of  rural  ag- 
riculture extension  services,  building 
road  networks,  increasing  fertilizer 
production,  and  adapting  modern  tech- 
nology to  Africa's  needs.  The  World 
Health  Organization  (WHO)  is  coor- 
dinating numerous  medical  and  health 
projects,  including  major  immunization 
programs  in  which  the  United  States 
takes  a  leading  role.  A  plan  is  being  de- 
veloped for  a  U.N.  Decade  on  Drinking 
Water  and  Sanitation  plus  Transport 
and  Communications.  Many  countries, 
with  the  United  States  as  a  leader, 
have  mounted  Sahelian  recovery  and 
i-elief  pi'ograms,  with  the  aggregate 
total  approximately  $1  billion  per  year. 
A  U.N.  Desertification  Conference  was 
held  in  Nairobi  in  1977  as  an  initial  step 
in  organizing  efforts  to  deal  with  the 
long-range  problems  of  arid  land. 
Periodic  follow-up  meetings  have  been 
held  subsequently. 

In  regard  to  Africa's  energy  needs, 
the  heads  of  major  industrialized  coun- 
tries at  the  1978  Bonn  economic  summit 
agreed  to  intensify  efforts  to  deal  with 
energy  problems  in  the  developing 
world  by  devoting  more  bilateral  aid  to 
them  and  encouraging  the  World  Bank, 
which  already  does  much  in  this  area, 
to  provide  still  more  to  ameliorate 
shortages  in  the  developing  world. 
Since  employment  in  industry  depends 
on  highly  volatile  commodity  prices, 
major  consumers  and  producers  have 
negotiated  three  important  interna- 
tional commodity  agreements  involv- 
ing cocoa,  coffee,  and  sugar. 

Despite  the  foregoing  efforts,  in- 
ternational organizations  and  donor 
countries  must  concentrate  even  more 
effort  on  helping  Africans  deal  with  the 
two  factors  which  most  seriously  im- 


Minerals 


3631   2-80  STATE  IRG 


Africa 

Other 

Africa 

Other 

145 

155 

390 

990 

41 

47 

28 

18 

Sub-Saharan  Africa:  Selected  Development  Indicators  (median  values) 


Income  per  person,  1976  (SU.S) 
Share  of  agriculture  in  GDP,  1976  (%) 
Share  of  population  in  urban  areas, 

1975  (%) 
Share  of  manufactures  in  exports, 

1975  (%) 
Life  expectancy  at  birth,  1975 
Total  fertility  rate,  1975 
Percentage  of  primary  school-age 

children  attending  school,  1975 
Adult  literacy  rate.  1974 


Low  Income  Middle  Income 

Developing  Countries       Developing  Countries 


SOURCE;  World  Bank— Development  Indicators,  World  Bank  Development  Report,  1978 


5 

14 

5 

24 

41 

45 

44 

61 

6.3 

6.2 

6.5 

5.8 

53 

51 

79 

103 

23 

22 

15 

72 

14 


Total  Official  Development  Assistance  to  Sub-Saharan  Africa' 

(Commifments  in  S  millions) 


Feature 


DONOR  GROUPS 


1978 
Estimate 


TOTAL 

BILATERAL  (FREE  WORLD  AND  COMMUNIST) 

MULTILATERAL 

European  Communities  (EDF)^ 
International  Organizations 

BILATERAL  AND  MULTILATERAL^ 

United  States^ 

AID 

PL  480 

Peace  Corps 

Exim  Bank  (nonadditive) 

Other  Free  World 
Europe  (17  countries) 

France 

United  Kingdom 
West  Germany 
Other  (12  countries) 
European  Communities 

Non-Europe 

Canada 

OH  Producers  (9  OPEC  countries) 

Irtternational  Organizations 

International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development 

(loans) 
International  Development  Association  (loans) 
International  Financial  Corporation  (loans) 
U.N,  programs  (grants)* 
African  Development  Bank 

Communist  (8  donors) 

USSR. 
Ctiina 
East  Europe 


4,612      100%     4,585      100%     5,054      100%     6,275       100%     6,695      100% 
2,529         55         3,731         60         2,575         51  3,277         52         3,485         52 


1,179 

25 

1,383 

30 

1,656 

33 

1,998 

32 

2,260 

34 

305 

7 

176 

4 

515 

10 

772 

12 

850 

13 

874 

19 

1.207 

26 

1,141 

23 

1.226 

20 

1,4103 

21 

904 

20 

471 

10 

823 

16 

I.OOOest  16 

950 

14 

270 

6 

294 

6 

353' 

7 

371 

6 

470 

7 

131 

3 

160 

4 

203<^ 

4 

219 

4 

330 

5 

117 

3 

108 

2 

117' 

2 

124 

2 

119=1 

2 

22 

neg. 

26 

neg. 

336 

1 

28 

neg. 

21 

neg. 

(84) 

(2) 

(125) 

(121) 

(98)<^ 

(2) 

(49) 

(-) 

(-) 

(-) 

4.008 

87 

4,058 

89 

4,572 

90 

5,785 

92 

6,105 

91 

2,027 

44 

2,188 

48 

2,413 

48 

3,157 

50 

3,320 

50 

562 

12 

715' 

16 

617 

12 

597 

10 

620 

9 

170 

4 

198 

4 

233 

5 

154 

2 

155 

2 

344 

7 

393 

9 

313 

6 

398 

6 

415 

6 

646 

14 

706 

15 

735 

15 

1.236 

20 

1.280 

20 

305 

7 

176 

4 

515 

10 

772 

12 

850 

13 

1,107 

24 

663 

15 

1,018 

20 

1,402 

22 

1,375 

20 

203 

4 

192 

4 

195 

4 

402 

6 

425 

6 

904 

20 

471 

11 

823 

16 

1.000 

16 

950 

14 

874 

19 

1,207 

26 

1,141 

22 

1,226 

20 

1,410 

21 

394 

9 

594 

13 

494 

10 

505 

8 

5843 

9 

364 

8 

373 

8 

419 

9 

373 

6 

4293 

6 

3 

neg. 

2 

neg. 

27 

1 

26 

neg. 

323 

neg. 

73 

1 

83 

2 

70 

1 

88 

2 

1933 

3 

40 

1 

155 

3 

131 

1 

234 

4 

172 

3 

334 

7 

233 

5 

129 

3 

119 

2 

120 

2 

17 

neg. 

73 

2 

26 

1 

21 

neg. 

— 

— 

237 

5 

150 

3 

57 

1 

10 

neg 

— 

— 

80 

2 

10 

neg 

46 

1 

88 

2 

— 

— 

'Official  development  assistance  is  defined  as  gross  commitments  of 
grants  and  concessional  loans  for  development  purposes  and 
excludes  ottier  official  flows  consisting  mainly  of  export  credits. 
Exceptions  made  in  ttiis  table  are  ttie  inclusion  of  nonconcessional 
loans  from  tfie  International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and 
Development  (IBRD).  International  Financial  Corporation  (IFC).  and 
Afncan  Development  Bank  (ADB)  An  unknovi^n  portion  of  USSR, 
and  Eastern  European  aid  to  Africa  is  also  nonconcessional 

Table  comprises  all  independent  sub-Saharan  African  countnes 
including  former  and  current  recipients  of  assistance  from  the  Agency 
for  International  Development  (AID) 

Data  are  by  calendar  year  Exceptions  are  IBRD,  International 
Development  Association,  IFC,  and  ADB  loans  and  US.  assistance 
which  are  by  U.S.  fiscal  year  for  the  reason  explained  under 
footnote  5. 

^European  Communities  assistance  consists  of  the  European 
Development  Fund  (EDF)  grants  and  soft  loans  and  part  of  the 
Communities  budget  (food  aid,  emergency  relief,  and  some  technical 
assistance),  both  of  which  are  financed  by  the  nine  members 
(Belgium.  Denmark.  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  France.  Italy. 
Ireland.  Luxembourg.  Netherlands,  and  the  United  Kingdom). 

3Actual  figure. 

"Of  which  bilateral  assistance  amounted  to  $443  million  in  1974  and 
$438  million  in  1975  Only  combined  data  available  for  1976.  Oil 


producers  of  the  Organization  of  Petroleum  Exporting  Countnes 
(OPEC)  comprise  Algeha,  Iran,  Iraq.  Libya.  Kuwait.  Nigeria,  Qatar. 
Saudi  Arabia,  and  United  Arab  Emirates.  Ivlultilateral  organizations  are 
Arab  Fund  for  Economic  and  Social  Development.  Special  Arab  Fund 
of  Afhca,  Technical  Assistance  Fund  for  Afnca.  and  Arab  Bank  for 
Economic  Development  in  Afnca 

^Although  calendar-year  data  are  reported  and  used  by  the  donor 
community,  US,  fiscal-year  data  are  used  here  for  assistance  from 
international  organizations  and  from  the  United  Slates  to  avoid 
confusion  regarding  the  figures  prepared  for  congressional 
committees  which  are  provided  on  a  fiscal-year  basis.  They  are 
published  for  the  Congress  in  AIDs  US  Overseas  Loans  and  Grants 
and  Assistance  from  International  Organizations. 

^15  months,  i.e.,  FY  1976  plus  transitional  quarter 

'Recent  changes  in  donor  aid  levels  partly  reflect  fluctuations  in 
exchange  rates. 

*U.N.  data  are  not  available  on  a  commitments  or  expenditures  basis. 
Nor  are  they  comparable  since  definitions  change  frequently.  (For 
explanation  see  notes  in  U.S.  Overseas  Loans  and  Grants  and 
Assistance  from  International  Organizations.)  Data  for  the  U.N. 
specialized  agencies  have  not  been  available  since  FY  1969. 

SOURCE;  Agency  for  International  Development,  revised  1978 


i/larch  1980 


15 


Feature 


nATCRN'P^  0^^'~h:Q 


Public  health  instructor,  Sudan  (aid  photo  by  Kay 

Chernushl 


pede  African  development — a  lack  of 
infi'astructure  and  a  shortage  of  skilled 
and  semiskilled  workers. 

It  should  not  be  inferred  that  all 
African  developing  countries  are  de- 
pendent on  foreign  aid  in  all,  or  even 
selected,  areas  of  their  economies. 
Some  have  been  particularly  successful 
in  certain  sectors  (Guinea  in  bauxite 
export  and  Nigeria  in  petroleum  pro- 
duction). Others,  which  initially  de- 
voted large  portions  of  their  resources 
to  increasing  manufacturing  (Kenya  and 
Ivory  Coast)  are  now  able  to  devote 
greater  support  again  to  agricultural 
production.  As  indicated  earlier,  many 
countries  are  investing  heavily  in  edu- 
cation and  the  training  of  Africans  to 
replace  the  exjjensive,  imported  Euro- 
pean manpower  which  still  provides 
technicians  anfl  management  for  some 
sectors  of  African  business  and 
government. 


.MILTILATERAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 


Inited  Nations 


Sub-Saharan  African  nations,  individu- 
ally and  collectively,  play  important 
roles  in  the  international  and  regional 
organizations  of  which  they  are  mem- 
bers. They  regai-d  the  United  Nations 
as  a  major  forum  for  asserting  their 
views  and  as  a  convenient  arena  for  ad- 
vancing foreign  policy  objectives.  Each 
country,  large  or  small,  has  one  vote  in 
the  General  Assembly  and  all  45  inde- 
pendent sub-Saharan  states  are  U.N, 
members.  Therefore,  they  have  neai-ly 
one-third  of  the  Assembly's  152  votes, 
and  their  often  coordinated  position  on 
many  issues  is  significant  and  often 
crucial.  The  African  members  have 
been  particularly  concerned  about  is- 
sues involving  colonial  powers,  subju- 
gated peoples,  and  human  rights  issues. 
They  have  been  ])rime  movers  in  Gen- 
eral Assembly  and  Security  Council 
re,solutions  dealing  with  southern  Afri- 
can problems.  They  have  been,  how- 
ever, more  reluctant  to  take  controver- 
sial positions  involving  other  inde].)end- 
ent  black  regimes. 

Just  as  African  nations  particiijate 
actively  in  the  United  Nations,  af- 
filiated organizations  and  other  interna- 
tional bodies  have  been  deeply  involved 
in  the  development  of  Africa.  Among 
these  are  the  U,N.  Conference  on 
Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD); 
the  International  Bank  for  Reconsti-uc- 
tion  and  Development  (IBRD),  its  In- 
ternational Development  Association 
(IDA),  and  its  International  F'inance 
Corporation  (lEC);  the  International 
Monetary  P\ind  (IMF);'the  U.N.'s 
World  Health  Organization  (WHO),  the 
International  Labor  Organization 
(ILO),  the  Children's  Fund  (UNICEP^), 
Food  and  Agriculture  Organization 
(FAO),  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees 
(UNHCR),  and  the  Educational,  Scien- 
tific and  Cultui'al  Organization 
(UNESCO).  Many  of  these  bodies  par- 
ticipate in  the  U.N.  Development  Pro- 
gram (UNDP),  which  has  given  or  plans 
to  give  $789,175,(J0(_),  or  one-fourth  of  its 
world  total  of  allotments  (approxi- 
mately $3.5  billion),  to  sub-Saharan  Af- 
rica in  the  i)eriod  1977-81. 


Economic  Commission  for  .Africa 

The  Economic  Commission  for  Africa 
(ECA)  is  a  U.N.  regional  body  in  which 
all  independent  .African  states,  exce])t 


t« 


lodi 


South  Africa,  are  represented.  It  was 
e.stablished  in  1958  for  the  promotion 
and  planning  of  African  economic  and 
social  development  through  cooperativi 
and  regional  jiction.  The  ECA  carries 
on  extensive  research  and  has  acted  as 
a  catalyst  in  the  creation  of  the  Africa 
Development  Institute  and  the  Africap|iiali 
Development  Bank.  It  maintains  and 
endeavors  to  strengthen  economic  ties 
with  other  countries  of  the  world.  The 
heaflquarters  of  the  ECA's  Secretariat 
is  located  at  Addis  Ababa,  Ethiopia. 

Organization  of  .African  Unity 

The  Organization  of  Afi'ican  Unity 
(OAII)  is  the  most  prestigious  and  en 
compassing  organization  on  the  Africa. 
Continent.  Founded  in  May  1963,  it  in- 
cludes all  indepenflent  African  states 
except  the  white-ruled  Republic  of 
South  Africa.  Headquartered  in  Addis 
Ababa,  it  has  both  political  and  eco- 
nomic responsibilities.  With  no  coerciv 
powers  over  its  members,  OAU  resoh 
tions  are  advisory  rather  than  binding; 
although  individual  OAU  states  typi- 
cally have  been  extremely  reluctant  ti 
depart  from  OAU  positions  adopted  b 
resolution.  A  primary  OAU  function  i 
to  obtain  an  Afi'ican  consensus  on  que; 
tions  of  interest  at  the  United  Nation 
where  the  OAU  maintains  a  permanei 
office. 

The  preamble  of  the  OAU  Charte 
reaffirms  the  principles  of  the  United 
Nations  and  its  Universal  Declaration 
of  Human  Rights.  It  also  pledges  to 
support  the  legitimate  aspirations  of 
the  African  peoples  and  to  foster  Afri 
can  political  and  economic  fievelopmen 
The  signatories  agree  to  coordinate  an 
harmonize  their  general  policies  in 
order  to  promote  African  progress  an' 
unity,  to  defend  sovereignty  and  ter- 
ritorial integrity,  to  eradicate  co- 
lonialism from  Africa,  and  to  promote 
international  cooperation.  Signatories 
adhere  to  the  principle  of  noninterfer- 
ence in  one  another's  affairs,  the 
peaceful  settlement  of  disputes,  the 
condemnation  of  political  assassinatiot 
or  subversive  activity  against 
neighboring  states,  the  liberation  of 
remaining  dependent  areas,  and  the 
nonalignment  of  national  blocs. 

The  work  of  the  OAU  is  carried  o 
through  four  "principal  institutions"— 
the  Assembly  of  Heads  of  State  and 
Government:  the  Council  of  (Foreign) 


Hi 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


Feature 


Ministers;  the  General  Secretariat;  and 
the  Commission  of  Mediation,  Concilia- 
tion, and  Arbitration.  A  number  of  spe- 
cialized and  ad  hoc  commissions  deal 
with  a  wide  variety  of  activities  of 
common  interest  and  attemj.it  to  instill  a 
spirit  of  cooperation  among  member 
states. 

Annual  t)Al'  "summits"  endeavor 
to  deal  with  current  crises,  often  in- 
volving African  interstate  relations. 
Debates  are  sometimes  acrimonious  and 
avoid  facing  up  to  the  tough  issues  and 
differences  which  divide  nations.  The 
OAU,  however,  over  the  years  has  en- 
deavored to  assist  in  such  issues  as  the 
early  mercenary  problems  in  Zaire,  the 
Riafran  rebellion,  disputes  between 
Ethiopia  and  Somalia,  the  transition  to 
indejiendence  in  Angola,  the  status  of 
the  Western  Sahara,  liberation  issues 
of  southern  Africa,  and,  I'ecently, 
human  rights  in  other  areas  of  Africa. 

African  Development  Hank 

The  i)urpose  of  the  African  Develop- 
ment Bank,  which  was  established  in 
1964  and  now  has  a  membership  of  48 
iiiilependent  African  nations  (including 
those  of  North  Africa),  is  to  contribute 
to  the  economic  and  social  development 
of  its  members,  both  individually  and 
collectively.  The  Bank  finances  invest- 
ment projects  and  development  pro- 
grams, placing  special  emphasis  on  mul- 
tinational projects.  The  Bank  has  an  au- 
thorized capitalization  of  $1  billion,  of 
which  appro.ximately  359^  has  now  been 
deposited  by  subscribers.  It  is  expected 
that  the  United  States  and  others  will 
soon  become  members,  helping  to  in- 
crease the  Bank's  capital  to  $6.3  billion 
by  1984.  The  United  States  will  be  the 
largest  single  donor,  with  17''^  of 
nonregional  members'  capital 
contributions. 

Lome  Con\ention 

The  Lome  Convention,  establishing 
overall  cooperation  between  the  Euro- 
pean Economic  Community  (EEC)  and 
the  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific 
(ACP)  group,  was  signed  in  Lome, 
Togo,  in  February  1975.  The  Lome  II 
Convention,  signed  in  November  1979, 
succeeds  it.  The  new  5-year  accord  pro- 
vides ACP  counti-ies  with  trade  prefer- 
ences, economic  assistance,  and  indus- 
trial cooperation.  In  addition,  the  Lome 
Convention  has  financed  efforts  to 
maintain  stable  e.xport  earnings  for  cer- 
tain commodities  of  less  developed 


March  1980 


counti'ies  in  an  e.xperimental  attemjit 
known  as  the  STABEX  program. 

\C\'  (Jroup 

The  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific 
(ACP)  group  was  originally  con- 
vened to  negotiate  the  Lome  Conven- 
tion with  the  EEC.  Founded  as  a  per- 
manent group  in  July  1975,  the  ACP 
group  enfleavors  to  insure  that  the 
ACP/EEC  Convention  is  properly  im- 
plemented. It  also  tries  to  develop 
closer  trade,  economic,  and  cultural 
relations  among  the  ACP  states  and  to 
promote  effective  I'egional  and  interre- 
gional cooperation  between  its  mem- 
bers. ACP  headquarters  is  in  Brussels. 

Economic  Community  of 
West  .African  States 

The  Economic  Community  of  West  Af- 
rican States  (ECOWAS)  has  16  mem- 
bei's,  including  nearly  all  the  Fran- 
cophone, Anglophone,  and  Lusophone 
countries  of  the  West  African  region 
reaching  from  Maui-itania  to  Nigeria. 
Its  objective  is  to  create  a  common 
market  in  which  internal  trade  barriers 
will  be  eliminated.  The  community  also 
promotes  free  movement  of  people, 
services  and  capital,  harmonization  of 
agricultural  policies,  joint  development 
of  economic  and  industrial  policies,  and 
elimination  of  disparities  in  levels  of 
development.  Community  headquarters 
is  in  Lagos,  Nigeria. 

Inter-.\frican  Coffee  Organization 

The  Inter-African  Coffee  Organization 
(lACO),  which  has  15  members,  was 
formed  in  1960.  Its  objective  is  to  adopt 
and  adhere  to  a  united  policy  on  the 
mai-keting  of  coffee.  The  organization 
facilitates  conti-acts  among  member 
countries,  international  organizations, 
and  coffee  buyers.  Its  headquarters  is 
at  Abidjan,  Ivory  Coast. 

West  .\frican  Kice  Development 
.Association 

The  West  African  Rice  Development 
Association  (WARDA)  has  14  members. 
Its  purpose  is  to  work  cooperatively  in 
the  I'esearch,  growing,  and  marketing 
of  rice.  It  lobbies  for  increased  quotas 
on  the  world  market.  WARDA's  head- 
quarters is  in  Monrovia,  Liberia. 

Table  on  Multilateral  Organiza- 
tions can  he  found  on  page  28. 


Basic  Data 

on  Sub-Saharan 

Africa 


Data  presented  in  the  following  tables 
have  been  assembled  by  the  Bureau  of 
African  Affairs,  Department  of  State,  to 
illustrate  the  diversity  and  comple.xity  of 
sub-Saharan  Africa.  Profiles  include 
selected  information  on  the  governments, 
l)eo])le,  geography,  and  economy  of  47 
political  entities  south  of  the  Sahara.  Not 
listed  are  the  countries  of  North  Africa, 
which  do  not  come  under  the  purview  of 
the  African  Bureau.  Data  vary  in  accu- 
racy and  recency,  depending  on  method  of 
collection,  as  well  as  economic  and  politi- 
cal considerations.  Culled  from  a  variety 
of  sources,  the  data  should  not  be  re- 
garded as  definitive  or  finite  and  should 
not  be  used  for  accurate  countiy  compari- 
sons. They  are  intended  to  provide  a  few 
basic  facts  for  each  country  and  an  order 
of  magnitude  by  which  to  gauge  demo- 
graphic changes  and  economic  devel- 
opment. 


17 


SUB-SAHARAN  AFRICA' 

1 

COUNTRY 

LAND 

PEOPLE 

Familiar  Name 

Official  Name 

lEartier  Namei ' 

CapiUl 

Total 

Sq.  Mi. 

%in 
Agricul- 
ture 

Population 

Culture 

Education 

Labor  Force 

Total 
(mil) 

Growth 
Rate 

{%) 

Den- 
sity 
per 
Sq.  Mi. 

Life 

Expect 

ancy 

(yrs.) 

Ethnic 
Groups  (%) 

Religion 

Language 

Liter- 
acy 

(%) 

Primary 
Students 

(%of 

age 

group^) 

%in 
Agr. 

%in 
Industry^ 
Service, 
&Coni. 
merce 

INI 

Angola 

Peoples'  Republic 
of  Angola 

{Angola) 

Luanda 

481,351 

22 

6.35 

2.0 

17 

38 

Ovimbundu38.0 
Kimbundu   23.0 
Bakongo       13.0 

animist        84.0 
Catholic      12.0 

Portu- 
guese 
Local 

20 

79.0 

75.0 

Ind.      li 
Serv.    11 

I.J3 

Benin 

The  People's 
Republic  of 
Benin 

iDuhomey) 

Porto  Novo 

43,483 

18 

3.4 

2.8 

78 

40 

Pons 
Adjas 
Baribas 
Yoruba 

animist        65.0 
Christian     15.0 
Moslem        13.0 

French 
Local 

20 

43.0 

60.0 

Ind. 
Serv.  & 
Com.  3 

.H 

Botswana 

Republic  of 
Botswana 
(Bechuanulanil) 

Gaborone 

220,000 

5 

.72 

3.0 

3 

55 

Batswana  and 

others       99,0 
White             1  0 

animist        85.0 
Christian      15.0 

English 
Setswana 

30 

na'' 

75.0 

2  3 

Burundi 

Republic  of 
Burundi 

Bujumbura 

10,747 

na 

3.9 

2.2 

362 

41 

Hutu            85.0 
Tutsi             14.0 
TWa                1.0 

Christian     60.0 
animist 

Moslem 

Kirundi 
French 

10 

23.0 

92.0 

Ind 

,iO 

Cameroon 

United  Republic 
of  Cameroon 

(French  and  British 
Cameroonx} 

Yaounde 

183,568 

35 

8.16 

2.0 

42 

41 

200  Groups 

Moslem 

Christian 

animist 

English 
French 
Local 

65 

1110 

80.0 

Ind        ! 

m 

Cape  Verde 

Republic  of 

Cape  Verde 
(Cape  Verde  Islands! 

Praia 

1,557 

na 

.33 

2.8 

211 

50 

Creole          71.0 
African         28.0 
European        1.0 

Catholic      65.0 
animist        35.0 

Portu- 
guese 
Crioulo 

26 

na 

na 

na 

,0] 

Central  African 
Republic 

Central  African 

Republic 
1  Central  African 

Empire;  Vhangi- 

Shari) 

Bangui 

247,000 

10 

2.2 

2.3 

7 

41 

Baya- 

Mandjia 
Banda 
MBaka 

Protestant    40.0 
Catholic      28.0 
animist        24.0 
Moslem         8.0 

French 
Sangho 

18 

79.0 

87.0 

na 

.)! 

Chad 

Republic  of  Chad 

N'Djamena 

496,000 

50 

4.2 

2.1 

8 

39 

Sudanic 
Nilotic 
Arabic 
Saharan 

Moslem 
Christian 
animist 

French 
Chadian 
Arabic 

7 

37.0 

90.0 

Ind 

.» 

Comoros 

Comoros  Federal 

Islamic  Republic 
(Comoro  Islands) 

Moroni 

863 

na 

.37 

3.7 

117 

49 

Antalote 
Cafre 
Makao 
Other 

Shirazi- 

Moslem  86.0 
Catholic      14.0 

Shaafi- 
Islam 

Malagasy 
French 

15 

50.0 

87.0 

Govt. 

,0i 

.1* 

Congo 

People's  Republic 

of  the  Congo 
(French  Congo) 

Brazzaville 

132,000 

1 

1.78 

2.4 

9 

44 

Bakongo 
Bateke 
M'Bochi 
Sangha 

animist        48.0 
Christian     47.0 
Moslem         5.0 

French 
Lingala 
Kikongo 

90 

90.0 

70.0 

na 

Djibouti 

The  Republic 
of  Djibouti 

f  French  Territory 
ofAfars 
and  Issas) 

Djibouti 

9,000 

na 

.25 

na 

27 

na 

Somalis 
(Issas) 
Afars 

Moslem 

French 
Somali 
Afar 
Arabic 

10 

na 

na 

na 

See  footnotes  at  end  of  table. 

18                                                                                                                                                                 Department  of  State  Bulletin 

ECONOMY 

GOVERNMENT 

COUNTRY* 

IVade 

U.S. 

.r,.^s  [ 

•omestic  Product 

Distr 

button  of  GDP 

Imports 

Exports 

Econ. 

Chief 

Assist- 

Date 

ofSUIe 

Growth 

Per 

% 

% 

% 

From 

To 

ance 

Inde- 

and/or 

nnual 

Rale 

Capita 

From 

From 

From 

ToUl 

U.S. 

ToUl 

U.S. 

Leading 

FY  1979 

pen- 

Head 

(bil.l 

(%l 

($IIS) 

Agr. 

Ind. 

Serv. 

($  mil) 

(Smil) 

($mil) 

($  mil) 

Exports 

($mil) 

Type 

dence 

of  Govt. 

1  83 

6.5 

492 

29 

27 

44 

541 

na 

672 

na 

Oil 

Coftee 
Diamonds 
Iron 

1.1 

People's 
Republic 

11/11/75 

Pres— Jose  E. 
Dos  Santos 

Angola 

.54 

3.0 

170 

39 

20 

41 

226 

13 

144 

na 

Palm  Products 

Cotton 

Peanuts 

1.0 

Military 
(Revolu- 
tionary 
Republic) 

8/1/60 

Pres— Col. 
M.  Kerekou 

Benin 

.23 

35.0 

480 

na 

na 

na 

207 

na 

170 

na 

Diamonds 
Copper 
Nickel 
Beef 

16.0 

Republic 

Pari. 

Dem. 

9/30/66 

Pres— Sir  S. 
Khama 

Botswana 

.50 

2.7 

128 

64 

15 

21 

61.40 

na 

97.50 

na 

Coffee 
Tea 

2.0 

Republic 

7/1/62 

Pres— Col. 
J.  B.  Bagaza 

Burundi 

2.60 

14.20 

328 

33 

20 

47 

608 

48 

530 

14 

Cocoa 
Coffee 
Timber 
Aluminum 

10.6 

indepen- 
dent 
Republic 

1/1/60 

Pres— A. 
Ahidjo 

Cameroon 

.07 

0 

179 

na 

na 

na 

32.3 

1.8 

na 

na 

Fish 

Bananas 

Salt 

5,7 

Republic 

7/5/75 

Pres— A. 
Pereira 

Cape  Verdt 

.39 

4.0 

177 

37 

23 

40 

78.8 

na 

80.10 

na 

Diamonds 
Cotton 
Timber 
Coffee 

0.2 

Republic 

8/13/60 

Pres— 
David  Dacko 

Central  African 
Republic 

.29 

2.0 

120 

52 

14 

34 

126 

3 

98 

0 

Cotton 
Livestock 

7,0 

National 
Union 
Transi- 
tional 
Govt. 

8/11/60 

Pres— 

Oueddei 

Goukouni 

Chad 

.05 

1.0 

153 

na 

na 

na 

13 

na 

9 

1.35 

Perfume 
Oils 

Copra 

0 

Republic 

7/6/75 

Pres — Ahmed 
Abdallah 

Comoros 

.89 

2.6 

500 

15  0 

43 

42.0 

238.9 

na 

235.4 

na 

Wood 
Sugar 
Tobacco 

0.9 

People's 
Republic 

8/15/60 

Pres— D. 

Sassou- 

Nguesso 

Congo 

.06 

na 

360 

na 

na 

na 

74 

na 

na 

20 

Hides 
Cattle 
Coffee 

1.4 

Republic 

6/27/77 

Pres- H.G. 
Aptidon 

Djibouti 

March  1980 


19 


COUNTRY 

LAND 

PEOPLE                                                                1 

Familiar  Name 

Official  Name 
i  Earlier  Nimiet' 

Capital 

Total 
Sq.  Mi. 

%in 
Agricul- 
ture 

Population 

Culture 

Education 

Labor  Force       1 

Total 

(mil) 

Growth 
Rale 

Den- 
sity 
per 
Sq.  Mi. 

Life 
Expect- 
ancy 

(yrs.) 

Ethnic 
Groups  (%) 

Religion 

(%) 

Language 

Liter- 
acy 

(%) 

Primary 
Students 

(%of 

age 

group-*) 

%in 
Agr. 

%in 
Industry, 
Service, 
&  Com- 
merce 

r 
■III 

Equatorial  Guinea 

Republic  of 

Equatorial  Guinea 
lEquiiforiul  Guineii 

und  Spanish 

Guinea) 

Vlalabo 

10,820 

85-90 

31 

1.7 

29 

na 

Fang            75.0 

Benges 

Combes 

Other            25.0 

Catholic      60.0 

Protestant 

animist 

Spanish 

20 

na 

95.0 

Ind       .2 

Ethiopia 

Ethiopia 

(Empire  of  Ethiopia) 

Addis 
Ababa 

455,000 

53 

30.0 

2.5 

62 

38 

Amhara        25.0 
Galla            40.0 
Tigre             12.0 
Other           23.0 

Ethiopian 

Orthodox 

Christian  40.0 
Moslem      45.0 
animist        15.0 

Amharic 
Tigrinya 
Gallinya 
Arabic 

7 

23.0 

86.0 

Ind       IC 

Gabon 

Gabonese  Republic 
1  Gabon) 

Libreville 

102,317 

1 
Forest- 

75 

.58 

1.7 

5.4 

na 

Fang 
Eshira 
Bapounou 
Bateke 

Christian     46.0 

Moslem 

animist 

French 

20.0 

na 

70.0 

Ind.     3(1 

1 

Gambia  (The) 

Republic  of 

the  Gambia 
(Gambia) 

Banjul 

4,003 

55 

.56 

2.08 

139 

na 

Mandingo    40.0 
Fula               13.0 
Wolof           12.0 
Other           35.0 

Moslem      85.0 

animist 

Christian 

English 

Mandinka 

Wolof 

10.0 

na 

85.0 

na 

Ghana 

Republic  of  Ghana 
(Gold  Coast) 

Accra 

92,100 

70 

10.6 

3.2 

115 

48 

Akan 
Ewe 
Ga 

animist        45.0 
Christian     43.0 
Moslem       12.0 

English 
Akan, 
Ewe,  Ga 

30.0 

60.0 

60.0 

Ind       II 

Guinea 

People's  Revolu- 
tionary Republic 
of  Guinea 

(French  Guinea) 

Conakry 

246,048 

na 

4.5 

2.5 

18 

41 

Foulah 

Malinke 

Soussous 

Moslem      75.0 
animist        24.0 
Christian        1.0 

French 
Local 

10.0 

17.0 

84.0 

Ind& 
Com 

Guinea-Bissau 

Republic  of 

Guinea-Bissau 
(Portuguese  Guinea) 

Bissau 

14,000 

na 

.92 

3.0 

65 

35 

Balanta 

Fulani 

Manjaca 

animist 
Moslem 
Christian 

Portu- 
guese 
Crioulo 

12.0 

na 

90.0 

5.' 

Ivory  Coast 

Republic  of 

The  Ivory  Coast 
(Ivory  Coast) 

Abidjan 

124,500 

na 

7.3 

4,2 

58 

44 

60  Groups 

animist        63.0 
Moslem      25.0 
Christian     12.0 

French 
Local 

20.0 

62.0 

75.0 

25.1 

Kenya 

Republic  of  Kenya 
(Kenya) 

Nairobi 

224,900 

10- 
15.0 

15.8 

4.0 

70 

53 

Kikuyu        20.0 
Luo              14.0 
Luhya           14.0 
Other            52.0 

animist        38.0 
Protestant    37.0 
Catholic      22.0 
Moslem        3.0 

English 
Swahili 
Local 

25.0 

109.0 

21.0 

Ind   23.1 

Lesotho 

Kingdom  of  Lesotho 
(Basutoland) 

Maseru 

11,716 

na 

1.2 

2.1 

102 

46 

Sotho            85.0 
Nguni            14.0 
White             1.0 

Christian     70.0 
animist        30.0 

English 
Sesotho 
Xhosa 
Zulu 

59.0 

65.0 

90.0 

Ind     2.1 
Serv   2.1 
Govt  4.1 

Liberia 

Republic  of  Liberia 
(Liberia) 

Monrovia 

43,000 

na 

1.73 

3.3 

40 

46 

American 
Descendents 

20  Niger- 
Congo 
Groups 

Tribal          75.0 
Moslem       15.0 
Christian     10.0 

English, 
LocaJ 

24.0 

400 

76.0 

9.1 

20 

Department  ot  State  Bulleti.; 

ICl) 

ECONOMY 

GOVERNMENT 

COUNTRY' 

s  Domestic  Product 

Distribution  of  GDP 

IVade 

U.S. 

Econ. 

Assist- 
ance 
FY  1979 

(Smil) 

T>pe 

Date 
Inde- 
pen- 
dence 

Chief 
of  State 
and/or 
Head 
of  Govt. 

Imports 

Exports 

ud 

1.) 

Growth 
Rate 

Per 
Capita 

($IIS» 

% 
From 

Agr. 

% 
From 
Ind. 

% 
From 
Serv. 

Total 

($  mil) 

From 
U.S. 
($  mil) 

Total 
($mil) 

To 
U.S. 
($  mil) 

Leading 
Exports 

.20 

240 

na 

na 

na 

20 

na 

2.2 

na 

Cocoa 
Coffee 
Wood 
Bananas 

0 

Republic 

10/12/68 

Pres— Lt.  Col. 
Obiang 

Nguema 
Mbazogo 

Equatorial 
Guinea 

4.0 

103 

50.0 

15 

35.0 

520 

27 

306 

95 

Coffee 
Pulses 
Hides 
Meat 

9.0 

Provi- 
sional 

Military 

Since 

Ancient 

Times 

Chief  of 
State — 
Mengistu 
Haile- 
Mariam 

Ethiopia 

10.0 

4,012 

na 

na 

na 

800 

25.9 

1,449 

187 

Petroleum 
Wood 

Manganese 
Uranium 

0 

Republic 

8/17/60 

Pres— El  Hadj 
Omar  Bongo 

Gabon 

4.5 

280 

na 

na 

na 

84.2 

1.44 

42 

.8 

Peanuts 
Palm 
Fish 
Hides 

4.9 

Republic 

2/18/65 

Pres — Sir 
A.  D.  Jawara 

Gambia 

■5 

2.9 

380 

49.0 

25 

26.0 

842 

134 

804 

153 

Cocoa 

Minerals 

Wood 

22.3 

Republic 

3/6/57 

Pres— Hilla 
Limann 

Ghana 

) 

3.0 

140 

43.0 

33 

24 

206 

na 

272 

na 

Bauxite 
Alumina 
Fruit 
Coffee 

8.5 

Republic 

10/2/58 

Pres— Sekou 
Toure 

Guinea 

) 

na 

120 

na 

na 

na 

35 

na 

12 

0 

Peanuts 
Palm  Products 
Fish 

2.3 

Republic 

9/24/73 

Pres — Luis 
Cabral 

Guinea-Bissau 

9.10 

821 

25.0 

20.0 

55.0 

1,300 

97 

1,600 

171 

Coffee 
Cocoa 

0 

Republic 

8/7/60 

Pres-F 

Houphouet- 

Boigny 

Ivory  Coast 

5 

5.7 

337 

30.0 

23.0 

47.0 

1,800 

na 

1,100 

na 

Coffee 
Tea 
Meal 
Cement 

28.0 

Republic 

12/12/63 

Pres— D.  T 
arap  Moi 

Kenya 

4 

4.0 

120 

38.0 

8.0 

54.0 

206 

na 

16.80 

na 

Wool 
Mohair 
Cattle 
Diamonds 

12.2 

Constitu- 
tional 
Monarchy 

10/4/66 

King— 
Moshoeshoe  II 
PM— Dr.  L. 
Jonathan 

Lesotho 

2 

4.0 

450 

29.0 

37.0 

34.0 

463.5 

na 

447.4 

na 

[ron 

Rubber 
Timber 
Diamonds 

9.8 

Republic 

1847 

Pres— W.  R. 
Tolbert,  Jr. 

Liberia 

21 


I 

COUNTRY 

LAND       1 

PEOPLE 

L 

Familiar  Name 

Official  Name 
(Earlier  Namei^ 

Capitiil 

Total 
Sq.  Mi. 

%in 
Agricul- 
ture 

Population 

Culture                                   1 

Education 

Labor  Force| 

Total 
(mil) 

Growth 
Rate 

(%) 

Den- 
sity 
per 
Sq.  Mi. 

Life 
Expect- 
ancy 

(yrs.l 

Ethnic 
Groups  (%) 

Religion 

(%) 

Liter- 
acy 
Language     {%) 

Primary 

Students 

(%of 

age 

group') 

%in 
Agr. 

%ii   »» 
Indus   '' 
Servi< 
&Co   0i 

men  III 

Madagascar 

Democratic  Republic 

of  Madagascar 
(Malagasy  Republic) 

Antana- 
narivo 

228,000 

na 

9.1 

2.6 

37 

44 

18  Malagasy 

Groups 
Comoran 
French 
Orientals 

Christian 
animist 

Malagasy 
French 

40.0 

80.0 

90.0 

Ind       " 

Malawi 

Republic  of  Malawi 
(Nyasaland 
Protectorate) 

Lilongwe 

45.747 

30.0 

5.9 

2.9 

129 

42 

Chewas 
Njanja 
Lomwe 
Yao 

Traditional 

Christian 

Moslem 

Chichewa 
English 

25.0 

61.0 

90.0 

Ind   1  * 

Mali 

Republic  of  Mali 
(French  Soudan) 

Bamako 

464.873 

na 

6.5 

2.7 

5.1 

38 

Mande         50.0 
Peul              17.0 
Voltaic          12.0 
Other           21.0 

Moslem     90.0 
Traditional   9.0 
Christian      1.0 

French 
Bambara 

5.0 

15.0 

80.0 

Ind  « 
S  .vl 

Mauritania 

Islamic  Republic 
of  Mauritania 
(Mauritania) 

Nouakchott 

419,229 

na 

1.42 

2.1 

3 

39 

Arab-Berber  33.0 
Arab- Berber 

Negroid   33.0 
Negroid        33.0 

Moslem 

Hasanya- 
Arabic 
French 
Toucouleur 

12.0 

16.0 

88.0 

na       " 

Mauritius 

Mauritius 

Port  Louis 

720 

60.0 

.9 

1.3 

1.238 

66 

Indo- 

Mauritian  67.0 

Creoles         28.0 

Sino- 

Mauritian   3.0 

Franco- 
Mauritian    2.0 

Hindu 
Moslem 
Catholic 
Protestant 

English 
French 
Creole 
Hindi 

61.{ 

na 

28.9 

;;li 

Mozambique 

People's  Republic 
of  Mozambique 
(Mozambique) 

Maputo 

303.769 

30.0 

9.6- 
10.4 

2.2 

29 

44 

Makua 
Tsonga 
Other  Bantu 
Europeans 

animist      65.0 
Christian  22.0 
Moslem     U.O 
Other        20.0 

Portu- 
guese, 
Local 
English 

20.0 

52.0 

80.0 

Ind 

Namibia 

(South  West  Africa 
—former  name) 

Windhoek 

318,261 

30.0 

.92 

4.1 

2.9 

na 

Africans       88.0 
Mixed- 
European  12.0 

Christian  50  0 
animist 

Afrikaans 
English 
German 
Local 

Wh* 
80.0 
NWh 

28.0 

60.0 

Ind 

Niger 

Republic  of  Niger 

(Niger) 

Niamey 

490,000 

na 

5-6 

2.8 

8.1 

39 

Hausa          50.0 
Djerma         23.0 
Fulani            15.0 
Taureg           12.0 

Moslem 
animist 
Christian 

French 
Hausa 
Djerma 

6.0 

17.0 

90.0 

na 

Nigeria 

Federal  Republic 

of  Nigeria 
(Nigeria) 

Lagos 

357,000 

40.0 

79.8 

2.5 

224 

41 

Hausa- 

Fulani 
Ibo 
Yoruba 

Moslem     47.0 
Christian   34.0 
animist       19.0 

English 
Hausa 
Ibo 
Yoruba 

25.( 

49.0 

75.0 

Rwanda 

Republic  of  Rwanda 

Kigali 

10,169 

39.0 

4.2 

2.17 

400 

44 

Hutu             89.0 
Tbtsi              100 
Twa                 10 

animist 
Christian 

Most'  .n 

French 
Kinyar- 
Wanda 

25.( 

37.0 

95.0 

Ind 

*Wh=white;  N'Wh  =  nonwhite 

22 

Department  of . 

5iate  Bullet.i 

ECONOMY 

GOVERNMENT 

COUNTRY' 

TVade 

U.S. 

OSS  Domestic  Product 

Distribution  of  GDP 

Imports 

Exports 

Econ. 

Chief 

Assist- 

Date 

of  Slate 

Growth 

Per 

% 

% 

% 

From 

To 

ance 

Inde- 

and/or 

nual 

Rate 

CapiU 

From 

From 

From 

Total 

U.S. 

Total 

U.S. 

Leading 

FY  1979 

pen- 

Head 

bil.) 

(%) 

($IIS) 

Agr. 

Ind. 

Serv. 

1$  mil) 

($  mil) 

($mil) 

($mil) 

Exports 

(Smil) 

Type 

dence 

of  Govt. 

74 

1.0 

208 

29.0 

20.0 

51.0 

282 

6 

278 

59 

Coffee 
Cloves 
Vanilla 

2.1 

Republic 

6/29/60 

Pres— Cdr.  D. 

Ratsiraka 

Madgascar 

08 

6.4 

183 

45.0 

22.0 

33.0 

344.3 

4.3 

183 

10.7 

Tobacco 
Tea 

Ground  Nuts 
Sugar 

3,5 

Republic 

7/6/64 

Pres— Dr.  H. 
K.  Banda 

Malawi 

94 

5.0 

140 

38.0 

17.0 

45.0 

211 

3.5 

84 

na 

Meat 
Cotton 
Fish 
Peanuts 

17,4 

Republic 

9/22/60 

Pres— B.  Gen. 
M.  Traore 

Mali 

52 

-.60 

376 

35.0 

37.0 

28,0 

283 

na 

161 

na 

Iron 

Gypsum 

Fish 

7,1 

Military 
Republic 

11/28/60 

Pres.— 
U.  Col. 
Ould 
Haidala 

Mauritania 

45 

10.0 

680 

na 

na 

na 

306 

15.40 

310 

15.60 

Sugar 

Tea 

Tobacco 

3,3 

Parl.Dem. 
Under 
Const. 
Monarch 

3/12/68 

Chief  of 

State — 
Queen 
Elizabeth 

PM— SirS. 
Ramgoolam 

Mauritius 

.6 

0.0 

170 

45.0 

15 

40.0 

635 

20 

150 

39 

Cashew 
Cotton 
Veg.  Oil 
Tea 

13,7 

People's 
Republic 

6/25/75 

Pres— S.  M 
Machel 

Mozambique 

.2- 

0.0 

Wh* 

na 

na 

265 

10 

530 

5 

Copper 

0 

Interna- 

Pending 

South  Africa- 

Namibia 

.4 

6.800 
NWh 
816 

Uranium 

Diamonds 

Cattle 

tional 
Territory 

Illegal 
Administrator 

Ml 

8,0 

142 

47.0 

24 

29.0 

317.9 

na 

307.7 

na 

Uranium 
Livestock 
Cowpeas 

9.6 

Republic 

8/3/60 

Pres- Col. 

Seyni 

Kountche 

Niger 

2.7 

2.9 

522.6 

23.0 

50 

27.0 

12,452 

985 

10,347 

3,981 

Petroleum 
Cocoa 
Tin 
Coal 

0 

Federal 
Repub- 
lic 

10/1/60 

Pres— 
Alhaji  Shehu 
Shagari 

Nigeria 

62 

5-6.0 

106 

52.0 

22 

26.0 

105.4 

na 

106 

na 

Coffee 
Cassiterite 
Tea 
Pyrethrum 

0 

Republic 

7/1/62 

Pres— Maj. 
Gen.  J.  Hab- 
yarimana 

Rwanda 

Vh=^  white;  NWh=  nonwhite 


Vlarch  1980 


23 


COUNTRY 

LAND 

PEOPLE                                                         1 

Familiar  Name 

Official  Name 
(Earlier  Name}' 

Capiul 

Total 
Sq.  Mi. 

%  in 
Agricul- 
ture 

•Population             J 

Culture 

Education 

Labor  Fore  1 

Total 
(mili 

Growth 
Rale 

1%) 

Den- 
sity 
per 
Sq.  Mi. 

Life 

Expect' 

ancy 

(yrs.) 

Ethnic 
Groups  (%! 

Religion 

Language 

Liter 
acy 

Primary 

Students 

(%of 

age 

groups ) 

%in 
Agr. 

Indu   ^ 
Sen 

&C    ^ 

mei    jDj 

Sao  Tonie  and 
Principe 

Democratic  Republic 
of  Sao  Tome 
and  Principe 

>ao  Tome 

372 

na 

.08 

2.0 

215 

na 

vlixed- 
Portuguese- 
African 

African 

Christian     80.0 
Other           20.0 

Portu- 
guese 

5- 
10.0 

na 

62.0 

Ind      ,B 
Othei 

Senegal 

Republic  of  Senegal 
t  Senegal) 

Dakar 

76.000 

na 

5.38 

2.6 

71 

44 

Wolof           36.0 
Fulani            17.5 
Sere               16.5 
Other           30.0 

Moslem       75.0 
Christian       5.0 
animist        20.0 

French 
Wolof 
Pulaar 
Local 

5-10 

53 

70 

Ind      iJ) 
Gov 
Se 

Seychelles 

Republic  of 
Seychelles 
(Seychelles  Colony) 

Victoria 

171 

na 

.06 

2.6 

360 

60 

Seychellois 
Creole 

Catholic      91 .0 
Other            9.0 

English 
French 

60 

na 

17 

Ind       B 

Sierra  Leone 

Republic  of 

Sierra  Leone 
(Sierra  Leone) 

•reetown 

27,925 

30 

3.22 

2.4 

115 

44 

Temne 
Mende 

animist        70.0 
Moslem      25.0 
Christian       5.0 

English 
Krio 

10 

35 

75 

Ind       ii 
Ind       1! 

Somalia 

Somali  Democratic 

Republic 
(British  Somaliland 

and  Italian 

Somalia ) 

klogadishu 

246,155 

13 

3.2 

2.3 

13 

41 

Somali         98.8 

Arab 

Asian              1.2 

Moslem      99.0 

Somali 
Arabic 
English 
Italian 

20 

58 

60 

South  Africa 

Republic  of 
South  Africa 

(Union  of 
South  Africa) 

Pretoria 

472,359 

na 

27.39 

2.5 

53 

61 

African        69.0 
White           20.0 
Colored        10.7 
Asian              .03 

Traditional 
Christian 

English 
Afrikaans 
Zulu 
Xhosa 

Wh* 
100 
NWh 

35 

89 

31 

n    H 

Sudan 

Democratic  Republic 

of  the  Sudan 

(Anglo-Egyptian 

Sudan) 

Chartoum 

967,500 

20 

16.8 

2.5 

17 

50 

Arab- 
African 

Nilotic- 
African 

Moslem       70.0 
Indigenous 

beliefs     25.0 
Christian       5.0 

Arabic 
English 
Local 

28 

33 

86 

Ind        I 

Swaziland 

Kingdom  of 

Swaziland 

(SwarMand) 

vibabane 

6,704 

8 

.49 

3.0 

74 

43 

Swazi 

Zulu 

White             3.0 

Christian 
animist 

English 
SiSwati 
Zulu 

36 

na 

85 

Ind 

Tanzania 

United  Republic 
of  Tanzania 

(Tanganyika  and 
Zanzibar) 

DarEs 
Salaam 

365,608 

na 

17.4 

2.7 

48 

45 

Over  130 
Groups 

Christian     35.0 
Moslem       35.0 
animist        30.0 

Swahili 
English 

63 

57 

90 

Ind 
Com 

*Wh=  white;  NWh=  ni 

inwhile 

24 


Department  of  State  Bulletui 


ECONOMY 

GOVERNMENT 

COUNTRY' 

iross  Domestic  Product 

Distribution  of  GDP 

IVade 

U.S. 
Econ. 
Assist- 
ance 
FY  1979 
($mil) 

Type 

Date 
Inde- 
pen- 
dence 

Chief 
of  State 
and/or 
Head 
of  Govt. 

Imports 

Exports 

knnual 
$bil.) 

Growth 
Rate 

{%) 

Per 
Capita 

% 
From 
Agr. 

% 
From 
Ind. 

% 
From 
Serv. 

Tbtal 
($iiiii) 

From 

U.S. 
($mil) 

Ibtal 
(Smil) 

lb 

U.S. 
($mil) 

Leading 
Exports 

.019 

160 

na 

na 

na 

6.9 

na 

6.5 

na 

Cocoa 
Copra 
Palm 

0.1 

Republic 

7/12/75 

Pres— M. 
Pinto  Da 
Costa 

Sao  Tbme  and 
Principe 

1.80 

2.30 

333 

28 

24 

48 

713 

na 

426 

na 

Peanuts 

Phosphate 

Fish 

18.1 

Republic 

4/4/60 

Pres— L.  S. 
Senghor 

Senegal 

.63 

6.5 

1.146 

na 

na 

na 

53 

na 

13 

na 

Copra 
Cinnamon 

0.5 

Republic 

6/29/76 

Pres— F  R. 
Rene 

Seychelles 

.55 

2.40 

176 

32 

23 

45 

173 

na 

151.10 

60.40 

Minerals 
Agricultural 

5.9 

Republic 

4/27/61 

Pres— 

S.  P  Stevens 

Sierra  Leone 

.22 

na 

70 

31 

8 

61 

175 

na 

55 

na 

Livestock 

Fruit 

Hides 

26.2 

Indepen- 
dent 
Republic 

7/1/60 

Pres — M.  Gen 
Si  ad  Barre 

Somalia 

45.71 

14.3 

9,136** 
3,836 
2.857 
2,056 

9 

23 

68 

9,279 

1.079 

8.549 

2.259 

Gold 

Ore 

Uranium 

Diamonds 

Wool 

Sugar 

0 

Republic 

5/31/10 

Pres— M. 

Viljoen 
PM— PW. 

Botha 

South  Africa 

7.5 

3.0 

386 

41 

16 

43 

1.075 

100 

525 

22 

Cotton 
Gum  Arabic 
Peanuts 

42.8 

Republic 

1/1/56 

Pres— 
Gen.  G.  M. 

Numayri 

Sudan 

.22 

9.80 

440 

na 

na 

na 

151 

na 

152 

na 

Sugar 
Wood 
Iron 
Asbestos 

6.2 

Monarchy 

9/6/68 

King— 

Sobhuza  II 
PM— M.  Gen 

Dlamini 

Swaziland 

3 

5.90 

180 

45 

16 

39 

784 

na 

574 

na 

Coffee 
Cotton 
Sisal 
Spices 

22.9 

Republic 

Tan       1961 
Zan      1963 
Union  1964 

Pres— J. 
Nyerere 

Tanzania 

*9,136  (White),  3,836  (Asian).  2,857  (Colored),  2,056  (African) 


March  i; 


25 


COUNTRY 


LAND 


PEOPLE 


Familiar  Name 

OfHcial  Name 
(Earlier  Sainei' 


Capital 


Total 
Sq.  Mi. 


Population 


ToUl 
(mil) 


Growth 
Rate 

(%l 


Den- 
sity 
per 
Sq.  Mi. 


Life 
Expect 

ancy 

(yrs.» 


Ethnic 
Groups  {%) 


Religion 

(%• 


Language 


Liter- 
acy 


Primary 
Students 

(%or 

age 
group-*) 


%in 
Industr 
Servia   * 
&Coni   ": 


Togo 

Republic  of  Togo 
I  French  TogoUind) 


21,853 


40 


Ewe 
Mina 
Kabye 


animist  60.0 
Christian  20.0 
Moslem       20.0 


French 

Local 


Uganda 

Republic  of  Uganda 
I  Uganda  I 


Kampala 


Bantu 
Nilotic 
Sudanic 


Christian  50.0 
Moslem  10.0 
animist        40.0 


English 
Swahili 
Luganda 


Upper  Volta 

Republic  of 

Upper  Volta 
(Upper  Volta i 


Ouaga- 
dougou 


Voltaic 
Mande 
Fulani 


animisl 
Moslem 
Christian 


French 
Local 


Zaire 

Republic  of  Zaire 
(Belgian  Congo) 


Bantu 
80  other 
groups 


Christian     50.0 
Syncretic 
sects        50.0 


French 
Lingala 
Other 


Zambia 

Republic  of  Zambia 
{Northern  Rhodesia) 
(Federation  of 

Rhodesia  and 

Nvasaland) 


290,724 


Bantu 
groups 


ammist 
Christian 


English 
70  local 


Zimbabwe 

(Zimbabwe  Rhodesia) 
(Southern  Rhodesia) 


Salisbury 


African 
White 


96.0 
3.0 


Syncretic  52.0  English 
Christian  24. Ol  Shona 
animist        24. 0|    Ndebele 


Wh 
100 
NWh 
30 


•Wh=  while;  NWh=  nonwhite 

'Statistics  are  drawn  from  the  latest,  most  reliable  data  available  from  a  variety  of  sources,  particularly 
Department  of  State  B<((<:xn<H«</.V(;/('.v  which  are  periodically  updated.  Therefore,  except  where  indicated,  no 
specific  year  can  be  designated  for  each  category  of  statistics.  Furthermore ,  current  figures  do  nol  exist  in  many 
cases  and  some  data  are  based  on  U.S.  Government  estimates. 

-The  earlier  name  listing  is  Included  to  identify  for  readers  unfamiliar  with  Africa  earlier  names  by  which 
some  of  the  countries  have  been  known.  In  some  cases  these  names  date  to  pre-independence  and  in  other 
instances  relate  to  previous  post-independence  regimes.  No  political  significance  should  be  attached  to 


pts 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulleti( 


ECONOMY 


GOVERNMENT 


COUNTRY' 


ross  Domestic  Product 


inual 
bil.l 


Growth 
Rale 


Per 
Capita 

($IIS) 


CNstribulion  of  GDP 


From 

Agr. 


From 
Ind. 


From 

Serv. 


Imports 


Total 
«$  mil) 


From 

U.S. 
(Smil) 


Exports 


ToUl 
($  mil) 


U.S. 
($mih 


Leading 
Exports 


U.S. 

Econ. 

Assist- 
ance 
FY  1979 

($  mil) 


T>pe 


Date 
Inde- 


Chief 
of  State 
and/or 
Head 
of  Govt. 


Phosphates 

Cocoa 

Coffee 


Repubhc 


Pres — Gen. 
G   Eyadema 


Togo 


Coffee 
Tea 

Cotton 
Copper 


Republic 


Pres— G. 
Binaisa 


Uganda 


Livestock 
Peanuts 
Shea  Butter 
Cotton 


Republic 


Pres— A.  S. 
Lamizana 


Upper 
Volta 


114 
+  Can- 
ada 


197.7 
+  Can 


Copper 
Cobalt 
Diamonds 
Coffee 


Republic, 
with  strong 
pres. 
authority 


Pres — Lt.  Gen 
Mobutu 
Sese  Seko 


Copper 
Cobalt 

Emeralds 
Zinc 


Republic 


Pres— Dr  K 
Kaunda 


Wh* 
8,800 
NWh 
816 


Tobacco 
Chrome 
Textiles 
Grain 


Future 
under 
negotia- 
tion 


Pending 


Wh  =  white;  NWh  =  nonwhite 

ections,  which  are  based  largely  on  historical  perceptions. 

'The  resulting  percentages,  or  "Gross  Primary  Enrollment  Ratio,",  for  countries  with  universal  primary 

acation  may  exceed  100%  since  some  pupils  may  be  above  or  below  the  accepted  primary  school  age — 6  lo 

years. 

na=nol  available 

The  Bureau  of  African  Affairs  has  a  peripheral  interest  in  ihe  following  geographical  entities:  Western 
hara.  British  Indian  Ocean  Territory. 


March  1980 


27 


Feature 


Selected  African  Multilateral  Organizations 


No.  of 
African  Countries' 


Economic  Communities  and  Other 
Multisectoral  Organizations 

African.  Caribbean  and  Pacific  Group  (AGP) 
(Lome  Convention  between  EC 
and  AGP) 

Central  African  Customs  and  Economic 
Union  (UDEAG) 

Council  of  the  Entente  States 

Customs  Union  Between  Swaziland.  Bots- 
wana. Lesotfio  and  Soutfi  Afnca 

Economic  Community  of  West  Afncan 
States  (ECOWAS) 

Great  Lakes  States  Economic  Community 
(GEPGL) 

Lake  Ctiad  Basin  Commission  (CBLT) 

Organization  for  tfie  Development 
of  tfie  Senegal  River  (OMVS) 

Organization  of  African  Unity  (OAU) 


River  Niger  Commission  (CFN) 
United  Nations  Economic  Commission 

for  Afnca  (UNECA) 
West  African  Economic  Community  (CEAO) 


Specific  Purpose  Organizations 

Afncan  Civil  Aviation  Commission  (AFCAC) 

Cocoa  Producers  Alliance 

Desert  Locust  Control  Organization  for 

East  Afnca  (DLCOEA) 
Inter-Afncan  Coffee  Organization  (lACO) 
Organization  of  Petroleum  Exporting 

Countries  (OPEC) 
Permanent  Inter-State  Committee  on  Drought 

Control  in  the  Sahel  (CILSS) 

West  African  Rice  Development  Association 
(WARDA) 

Banking,  Finance 

Afncan  Development  Bank  (ADB) 
Arab  Bank  for  Economic  Development 

in  Afnca  (ABEDA) 
Bank  of  Central  African  States  (BEAC) 
West  African  IVlonetary  Union  (Ut^/IOA) 

West  African  Development  Bank  (BOAD) 

Education  and  Research 

African  Training  and  Research  Center 
in  Administration  and  Development 
(GAFRAD) 
Association  of  African  Universities  (AAU) 
Pan-Afncan  Institute  for  Development  (PAID) 
Organization  of  Coordination  and  Cooperation 
for  the  Fight  Against  the  Major  Endemic 
Diseases— West  Afnca  (OCCGE) 


Headquarters 


Brussels.  Belgium 


4 
5 

Bangui,  GAR 
Abidjan.  Ivory  Coast 

4 

None 

16 

Lagos.  Nigena 

4 

Rotates 

4 

N'Djamena,  Chad 

3 

All  independent 

Afncan  states 

except  South 

Africa 

9 

Dakar.  Senegal 
Addis  Ababa.  Ethiopia 

Niamey.  Niger 

All 

7 

Addis  Ababa.  Ethiopia 
Ouagadougou.  Upper 
Volta 

33 

7 

Dakar.  Senegal 
Lagos.  Nigeria 

7 

Addis  Ababa.  Ethiopia 

15 

Not  designated 

4 

Vienna.  Austria 

8 

Ouagadougou,  Upper 
Volta 

14 

IVIonrovia.  Libena 

Abidjan,  Ivory  Coast 

Khartoum.  Sudan 
Yaounde.  Cameroon 
No  permanent  head- 
quarters 
Lome.  Togo 


Tangier,  t^orocco 
Accra.  Ghana 
Geneva.  Switzerland 


Bobo-Dioulasso.  Upper 
Volta 


'  Numbers  are  not  always  limited  to  sub-Saharan  countries,  for  example.  AGP  and  OPEC  include 
North  African  and  other  countries 


('i;/)(('.s-  of  I  he  coihijU'Ic  discKKsion  paper, 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  and  the  United  States 
//(((//  ftc  purchased  fi)r  $J. 50  from  the 
Si(perinteiide)it  of  DocHiiieiitu,  U.S.  Gor- 
enniieiit  Pri)/tiii(/  Office,  Was<h}>njto>t , 
!).(\  J<)J,0.i  (a  ^rtl,  dincoiiiit  is  aUoiced 
ii-lirii  urderiiifi  100  or  more  discHssioii  po- 
llers mailed  to  the  same  address). 


28 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  lljii 


THE  PRESIDENT 


'^Meet  the  Press"  Interview 


Prei<i(iviit  Carter  ivax  i iitcrricired 
,11  XBC's  "Meet  flic  Prc.s.s-"  on  Jdiiiinri/ 
'(I.  19S0,  1)1/  Darid  Broiler.  The  Wash- 
ngton  Post;  Curl  T.  Rowan,  Chicago 
-^uii-Times:  ami  Jiiili/  Woodruff  ami 
■^ill  Moiiroi'  ,-/  .V/?r'.\V(rx.> 

Q.  Assuming  the  Soviets  do  not  pull 
ut  of  Afghanistan  any  time  soon,  do 
ou  favor  the  United  States  participat- 
ng  in  the  Moscow  Olympics?  And  if 
lo),  what  are  the  alternatives? 

A.  No.  Neither  I  nor  the  American 
leople  would  support  the  sending  of  an 
vmerican  team  to  Moscow  with  Soviet 
ivasion  troops  in  Afghanistan.  I've  sent 

message  today  to  the  U.S.  Olympic 
"ommittee  spelling  out  my  own  position, 
hat  unless  the  Soviets  withdraw  their 
roops  within  a  month  from  Afghanistan 
hat  the  Olympic  games  be  moved  from 
•loscuw  to  an  alternate  site,  or  multiple 
ites  <ii'  postponed  oi'  cancelled.  If  the 
loviets  do  not  withdraw  their  troops  im- 
nediately  from  Afghanistan  within  a 
nonth,  I  would  not  support  the  sending 
if  an  American  team  to  the  Olympics. 

It's  veiy  important  for  the  world  to 
ealize  how  serious  a  threat  the  Soviets' 
nvasion  of  Afghanistan  is.  I  do  not  want 
0  inject  pt)litics  into  the  Olympics,  and  I 
vould  personally  favor  the  establishment 
fa  permanent  Olympic  site  for  both  the 
ummer  and  the  winter  games.  In  my 
•pinion,  the  most  appropriate  permanent 
;ite  for  the  summer  games  would  be 
Greece.  This  will  be  my  own  position,  and 

have  asked  the  U.S.  Olympic  Commit- 
ee  to  take  this  position  to  the  Interna- 
ional  Olympic  Committee,  and  I  would 
lope  that  as  many  nations  as  possible 
Aould  support  this  basic  position.  One 
lundred  and  four  nations  voted  against 
he  Soviet  invasion  and  called  for  their 
mmediate  withdrawal  from  Afghanistan 
n  the  United  Nations,  and  I  would  hope 
is  many  of  those  as  possible  would  su]v 
port  the  position  I've  just  outlined  to  you. 

Q.  If  a  substantial  number  of  na- 
tions does  not  support  the  I'.S.  posi- 
tion, would  not  that  just  put  the  I'nited 
States  in  an  isolated  position,  without 
doing  much  damage  to  the  Soviet 
Union? 

A.  Regardless  of  what  other  nations 
might  do,  I  would  not  favor  the  sending 
of  an  American  Olympic  team  to  Moscow- 
while  the  Soviet  invasion  troops  are  in 
Afghanistan. 

March  1980 


Q.  Vou  spoke  earlier  of  a  serious 
threat  to  peace.  Just  how  serious  is  this 
situation?  Are  we  potentially  on  the 
verge  of  conflict  with  the  Soviet  Union? 

A.  As  I  said  earlier,  this  in  my  opin- 
ion is  the  most  serious  threat  to  world 
peace  since  the  Second  World  War  It's  an 
unprecedented  act  on  the  part  of  the 
Soviet  Union.  It's  the  first  time  they 
have  attacked,  themselves,  a  nation  that 
was  not  already  under  their  domination, 
that  is,  a  part  of  the  Warsaw  Pact  neigh- 
borhood. They  have  used  surrogate 
forces,  the  Cubans,  to  participate  in  other 
countries,  like  Angola  or  Ethiopia. 

This  is  a  threat  to  a  vital  area  of  the 
world.  It's  a  threat  to  an  area  of  the 
world  where  the  interests  of  our  country 
and  those  interests  of  our  allies  are 
deeply  embedded.  More  than  two-thirds 
of  the  total  e.xjwrtable  oil  that  supplies 
the  rest  of  the  world  comes  from  the  Per- 
sian Gulf  region  in  southwest  Asia. 

My  own  assessment  is  that  there 
have  been  times  in  the  years  gone  by  that 
we  have  had  intense  competition  with  the 
.Soviet  Union  and  also  an  effort  for  ac- 
commo<lation  with  the  Soviet  Union,  for 
consulting  with  them  and  working  with 
them  toward  peace.  This  is  an  action  ini- 
tiated by  the  Soviets,  and  I  am  still  com- 
mitted to  peace,  but  peace  through 
strength  and  through  letting  the  Soviets 
know  in  a  clear  and  certain  way,  by  action 
of  our  own  country  and  other  nations, 
that  they  cannot  invade  an  innocent  coun- 
try with  impunity:  they  must  suffer  the 
consequences. 

Q.  In  that  connection,  your  critics 
say  that  the  Soviets  are  moving  because 
they've  seen  weakness  on  your  part. 
They  don't  believe  you  or  the  American 
people  will  fight.  If  they  move  into 
Pakistan  or  into  Iran,  will  you  use 
military  force? 

A.  We've  not  been  weak.  We've  been 
firm  and  resolved  and  consistent  and 
clear  in  our  policy  since  I've  been  in  the 
White  House.  We've  had  a  steady  in- 
crease in  our  commitment  to  the  strength 
of  our  national  defense,  as  measui-ed  by 
budget  levels  and  also  measured  by  the 
tone  and  actions  that  I  have  taken  and 
the  Congress  has  taken.  We've  strength- 


ened (lur  alliances  with  NATO,  both  in 
the  buildup  of  fighting  capability  and  also 
lately  in  the  theater  nuclear  force  re- 
sponse to  the  Soviet  threat  with  atomic 
weapons. 

We've  also  let  it  be  clear  that  we 
favor  the  resolution  of  intense  differences 
that  have  destabilized  the  Middle  East 
and  the  Persian  Gulf  region.  The  most 
notable  advance  has  been  the  peace 
treaty  signed  between  Israel  and  Egypt 
and  we  have  reconfirmed  oui-  commit- 
ment to  Pakistan  of  1959.  We  are  commit- 
ted to  consult  with  Pakistan  and  to  take 
whatever  action  is  necessaiy,  under  the 
constitutional  guidelines  that  I  have  to 
follow  as  President  of  our  country,  to  pro- 
tect the  security  of  Pakistan,  involving 
militan-  force  if  necessary. 

In  addition  to  that,  we're  increasing 
and  will  maintain  an  increased  level  of 
naval  forces  in  the  northern  Indian  Ocean 
and  the  Persian  Gulf  region  and  we  are 
now  e.xploring  with  some  intensity  the 
establishment  of  facilities  for  the  servic- 
ing of  our  air  and  naval  forces  in  the 
northern  Indian  Ocean,  Persian  Gulf  re- 
gion. These  actions  have  been  initiated 
ever  since  I've  been  in  office.  They  are 
consistent  and  clear  and  we  are  concen- 
trating on  them  now  with  an  increased 
level  of  commitment  because  of  the 
Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan. 

Q.  The  timing  of  this  appearance 
the  day  before  the  Iowa  caucuses  sug- 
gests a  political  motive.  Why  did  you 
accept  this  appearance  when  you  have 
refused  to  appear  anyplace  where  your 
challengers  could  confront  you  di- 
rectly? 

A.  In  a  time  of  crisis  for  our  country 
I  believe  it's  veiT  important  for  the  Pres- 
ident not  to  assume  in  a  public  way  the 
role  of  a  partisan  campaigner  in  a  political 
contest.  Our  country  is  in  a  state  of  crisis, 
and  this  has  been  a  consistent  policy  that 
I  have  maintained  since  the  Iranians  cap- 
tured and  held  hostage  Americans  in 
Tehran.  I  do  not  consider  this  to  be  a 
campaign  foium,  "Meet  the  Press,"  and 
I'm  not  here  as  a  partisan  candidate. 

As  you  well  know,  we  have  been 
presenting  my  views  very  clearly  to  the 
American  jjoople  in  multi|>le  ways,  my 
own  appearances  before  the  press,  my 
briefing  of  gr-oups  in  the  White  House, 
the  sending  of  surrogates  for  me  to  Iowa. 


29 


The  President 


I  think  my  positions  and  the  actions  that 
I've  taken  have  been  veiy  clear,  and  my 
a|)pearance  on  this  show  is  an  opportu- 
nity to  give  you,  for  instance,  a  chance  to 
ask  me  questions  about  issues  that  are 
important  to  the  American  peoj^le. 

Q.  A  colleague  of  mine  printed  this 
question  .3  weeks  ajio,  at  the  time  that 
you  cancelled  out  of  the  Iowa  debate, 
as  an  example  of  what  you  might  have 
been  asked,  and  Fd  like  to  ask  it. 

A.   P^ine. 

Q.  With  ail  due  respect,  we  still 
have  .».S'^f  unemployment.  Inflation  has 
risen  from  4.<S'y  to  V/t.  We  still  don't 
have  a  viable  energy  policy.  Russian 
troops  are  in  Cuba  and  Afghanistan. 
The  dollar  is  falling,  (iold  is  rising.  And 
the  hostages,  after  78  days,  are  still  in 
Tthran.  Just  what  have  you  done,  sir,  to 
deserve  renomination? 

A.   Well,  since  I've  lieen  in  the  White 
House,  I've  done  everything  possible  to 
strengthen  our  own  nation,  not  only 
militarily  but  economically  and  politically, 
and  I  think  morally  and  ethically  as  well. 
We  have  strengthened  our  alliances  with 
our  allies,  which  has  been  pointed  out  al- 
I'eady  on  this  program.  We  have  dealt  not 
only  with  peace  for  our  countiy  but  peace 
for  others,  working  with  the  British  and 
Rhodesia,  working  with  the  Egyptians 
and  Israelis  in  the  Middle  East. 

We've  tried  to  e.xpand  American 
friendships  among  other  nations  on 
Earth,  notably  being  successful  in  retain- 
ing our  friendship  with  the  people  of 
Taiwan,  opening  up  a  new  and  friendly 
relationship  with  the  recognizition 
I  sic  I  of  a  fourth  of  the  world's  total 
population  in  China.  We've  had,  I 
think,  a  great  improvement  in  our  own 
nation's  relationships  with  countries  as 
expressed  by  recent  U.N.  votes. 

Domestically,  I've  dealt  with  the  na- 
tion's crises  and  problems  as  best  I  could, 
working  with  a  Congress  that  sometimes 
acts  too  slowly.  Since  the  first  day  I've 
been  in  office,  we've  been  addressing  the 
most  serious  threat  to  our  nation  domes- 
tically and  that  is  inflation,  tied  very 
closely  with  energy. 

Energy  is  the  single  most  important 
I'actor  in  the  increase  in  the  inflation  rate 
since  I've  been  in  office.  Just  in  the  last 
12  months  OPEC  [Organization  of  Petro- 
leum Exporting  Counti'iesl  has  increased 
energy  prices  by  H0^/< .  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  all  the  increase,  for  practical  pur- 
poses, of  the  inflation  rate  since  I've  been 
in  off'ice  has  been  directly  attributable  to 
increase  in  OPEC  oil  prices. 


30 


When  I  was  elected  the  prime  threat 
til  our  countiy  was  extremely  high  unem- 
|}ioyment.  We've  added  a  net  increase  of  9 
million  jobs,  and  we've  cut  the  unem- 
ployment rate  down  by  2.59^.  This  has 
been  a  veiy  good  move  toward  the 
strengthening  of  our  nation's  economy. 
We've  cut  down  our  balance  of  trade  defi- 
cit. We  have  seen  a  veiy  clear  increase  in 
net  income  for  Americans  above  inflation, 
above  taxes  paid  of  about  TV^Vr .  Coi'po- 
rate  profits  have  gone  up  about  50'7r.  And 
I  think  our  nation  is  much  more  unified 
and  I  believe  in  addition  to  that,  there's  a 
greater  respect  for  the  integrity  and  the 
truthfulness  of  the  government  of  our 
country.  So  we've  made  some  progress. 

I  might  say  that  I  don't  claim  to 
know  all  the  answers.  They  are  not  easy 
(juestions  to  address.  They  are  not  easy 
problems  to  solve.  But  our  countiy  is 
united.  We  are  struggling  with  these  veiy 
difficult  and  complicated  questions.  And  I 
think  that  they  need  to  be  pursued  fur- 
ther, hopefullv  in  a  second  term  for  mv- 
self. 

Q.  You  said  in  an  inter\iew  re- 
cently that  the  invasion  of  Afghanistan 
had  changed  your  opinions  of  the  Rus- 
sians more  drastically  than  anything 
else  since  you  had  been  in  office.  Why 
did  it  take  almost  .'5  years  for  you  to 
discover  the  true  intentions  of  the 
Soviet  leadership? 

A.  I've  never  doubted  the  long- 
range  policy  or  the  long-range  ambitions 
of  the  Soviet  Union.  The  fact  that  we 
have  consistently  strengthened  our  own 
nation's  defense  after  15  years  of  a  de- 
crease in  commitment  to  our  nation's  de- 
fense vis-a-vis  the  Soviets  is  one  indica- 
tion of  that.  All  of  the  actions  that  I  de- 
scribed earlier,  the  strengthening  of 
NATO,  the  movement  into  the  northern 
Indian  Ocean,  the  search  for  peace  in  the 
Mideast,  and  so  forth  were  directly  be- 
cause of  the  ultimate  threat  by  the  Soviet 
Union  to  world  peace. 

But  it  is  obvious  that  the  Soviets'  ac- 
tual invasion  of  a  previously  nonaligned 
country,  an  independent,  freedom-loving 
countiy,  a  deeply  religious  country  with 
their  own  massive  troops  is  a  radical  de- 
jiarture  from  the  policy  or  actions  that 
the  Soviets  have  pursued  since  the  Sec- 
ond World  War.  It  is  a  direct  threat  be- 
cause Afghanistan,  formerly  a  buffer 
state  between  the  Soviet  Union  and  Iran 
and  the  world's  oil  supplies  and  the 
Hormuz  Straits  and  the  Persian  Gulf,  has 
now  become  kind  of  an  arrow  aiming  at 
those  crucial  strategic  regions  of  the 
world.  So  this  is  a  major  departure  by  the 


Soviet  Union  from  their  previous  actions 
Their  long-range  policies  have  been  well 
understood  by  me  then  and  still  are. 

Q.  And  yet  your  Administration 
didn't  take  any  steps  to  offset  the  huge 
increases  in  the  number  of  Cuban 
troops  in  .\frica  in  recent  years.  Soviet 
combat  troops  are  still  in  Cuba  today, 
despite  your  statement  last  fall  that 
their  presence  was  not  acceptable.  In 
light  of  this  failure  to  counter  Soviet 
aggression  earlier,  do  you  accept  any 
responsibility  at  all  for  the  Soviet  cal- 
culation that  they  could  move  into  .Af- 
ghanistan with  impunity? 

A.  The  Soviets  have  seriously  mis- 
judged our  own  nation's  strength  and  re- 
solve and  unity  and  determination  and 
the  condemnation  that  has  accrued  to 
them  by  the  world  community  because  o 
their  invasion  of  Afghanistan.  As  you 
know,  Cuban  troops  went  into  Angola 
long  before  I  became  President,  and  the 
Soviet  brigade,  about  2,00(1  to  2, .500 
troops,  has  been  in  Cuba  since  the  early 
19(50s.  There  has  obviously  been  a  buildu 
in  the  Soviet  adventurism  in  the  horn  of 
Africa,  in  Ethiopia.  These  moves  were  o 
great  concern  to  us. 

But  the  point  that  I  would  like  to 
make  clear  is  that  we  have  always  had  a 
very  complicated  relationship  with  the 
Soviet  Union  based  on  cooperation  whei 
we  could  together  move  toward  a  peace- 
ful resolution  of  the  world's  problems  lik 
the  negotiation  of  the  SALT  Treaty  and 
competition  with  the  Soviet  Union  wher 
our  interests  were  at  cross  purposes  in 
any  region  of  the  world.  I  think  our 
strength  has  been  clearly  demonstrated 
The  resolve  of  our  nation  has  been  clear 
demonstrated.  The  support  of  our  allies 
has  been  clearly  demonstrated,  and,  in- 
deed, the  support  of  the  world  in  the 
condemnation  of  the  Soviets'  recent  inv; 
sion  has  also  been  clearly  demonstrated. 

Times  change  and  circumstances 
change.  Our  countiy  has  been  one  that 
does  commit  itself  to  the  preservation  ot 
peace,  but  peace  through  strength,  not 
weakness.  That  has  been  our  policy.  Tha' 
will  still  be  our  policy. 


n 


Q.  Is  there  any  specific  new  hope 
for  ending  the  hostage  crisis  with  Iran 

A.   I  can't  )jredict  the  early  end  of 
that  situation.  The  concern  that  I  feel 
about  the  hostages  today  is  just  as  great 
as  it  was  a  month  ago  or  2  months  ago. 
Our  policy  on  the  Iranian  capturing  of  oi 
hostages  has  been  clear  and  consistent. 
It's  an  abhorrent  violation  of  every  mora 
and  ethical  standard  and  international 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


The  President 


aw.  It's  a  criminal  act.  a  group  of  ter- 
•orists,  kidnappei's  .seizing  innocent  vic- 
ims  and  holding  them  for  attempted 
)lackmail  in  an  unprecedented  way,  .'^u))- 
)orted  and  encouraged  by  gcjvernment 
jfficials  themselves. 

Oui'  response  has  been  clear,  to  ])ro- 
ect,  first  of  all,  the  short  term  and  long- 
•ange  interests  of  our  countiy;  secondly, 

0  protect  the  safety  and  the  lives  of  the 
lostages  themselves;  third,  to  pursue 
>very  possible  avenue  of  the  early  and 
;afe  release  of  our  hostages;  fourth,  to 
ivoid  bloodshed  if  possible  because  I  have 
elt  from  the  veiy  beginning  that  the  ini- 
iation  of  a  militai-y  action  or  the  causing 
)f  bloodshed  would  undoubtedly  result  in 
he  death  of  the  hostages;  and  fifth,  and 
jerhaps  most  difficult  of  all,  is  to  arouse 
md  to  sustain  the  strong  support  by  the 
.•ast  majority  of  nations  on  Earth  for  our 
position  as  an  aggrieved  nation  and  the 
•ondemnation  of  the  world  for  Iran  for 
his  direct  violation  of  international  law. 
:t's  an  abhorrent  act. 

I  don't  know  when  the  hostages  will 
oe  released,  but  we  will  maintain  our  in- 
ense  interests  in  it.  We  will  maintain  our 
commitment  to  every  possible  avenue  to 
.■arry  out  the  policies  I've  just  described 
:o  you,  and  we  will  maintain  as  best  we 
."an  the  full  support  of  the  rest  of  the 
Aorld  and  that  concerted  pressure  from 
Tiany  sources,  including  the  recent  sanc- 
;ions  that  we  have  initiated  against  Iran, 

1  believe  and  I  hope  and  I  pray  will  result 
n  the  safe  release  of  our  hostages.  I  can't 
predict  e.xactly  when. 

Q.  How  do  you  answer  criticism 
that  your  Administration  bungled  the 
admission  of  the  Shah  to  this  country 
chiefly  by  not  providing  guaranteed 
protection  to  the  American  Embassy  in 
Iran  after  .American  diplomats  had 
warned  that  there  might  be  this  kind  of 
trouble,  and  there  had  been,  in  fact,  a 
seizure  of  the  Embassy  a  few  months 
previously? 

A.  I  don't  have  any  apology  at  all  for 
letting  the  Shah  come  here  as  an  e.\- 
tremely  sick  i)erson — 

Q.  What  about  protection  of  the 
Embassy? 

A.  — for  treatment.  The  Embassy 
had  been  attacked  in  the  past.  Embassies 
around  the  world  are  often  subjected  to 
attacks.  In  every  instance  the  Iranian  of- 
ficials had  joined  with  our  own  people  to 
protect  the  Embassy  of  the  United 
States.  Following  the  seizure  of  the  Em- 
bassv  earlier  in  the  year  we  had  carried 


March  1980 


out  a  substantial  jjrogram  for  the 
strengthening  of  the  Embassy's  defenses. 

After  the  Shah  came  here  to  the 
United  States  for  treatment  and  we 
notified  the  Iranian  officials  of  that  fact, 
we  were  again  assured  by  the  Iranian 
Prime  Minister  and  the  Iranian  Foreign 
Minister  that  the  Embas.sy  would  be  pro- 
tected. It  was,  indeed,  protected  for 
about  10  days,  following  which  the  Ayatol- 
lah  Khomeini  made  a  veiy  aggressive  and 
abusive  speech  and  when  it  was  attacked 
by  militant  terrorists,  the  Iranians,  the 
Iranian  Government,  withdrew  their  pvo- 
tection  for  the  Embassy. 

It  was  an  unpredictable  kind  of 
thing.  This  has  never  been  done,  so  far  as 
I  know,  in  modern  history,  to  have  a  gov- 
ernment support  a  terrorist  act  of  this 
kind,  the  kidnapping  of  hostages  and  the 
holding  of  them  for  attempted  blackmail. 
But  there  was  no  stone  unturned  in  our 
attempt  to  maintain  relations  with  Iran, 
which  is  in  our  interest,  and  at  the  same 
time  to  protect  our  people. 

Q.  Some  of  our  allies  are  now  say- 
ing that  Iran  already  is  in  chaos  and 
that  if  the  United  States  puts  the  eco- 
nomic screws  on,  that  country  could 
fall  apart  and  make  it  easy  for  the 
Soviet  Union  to  pick  up  the  pieces.  Are 
you  listening  to  this  or  are  you  still 
going  to  put  the  screws  on  Iran? 

A.  That's  been  a  constant  concern  of 
mine.  What  we  want  is  a  unified  Iran,  not 
fragmented.  We  want  a  stable  and  inde- 
pendent Iran,  and  we  want  a  secure  Iran. 
But  we  cannot  accept  the  abhorrent  act, 
supported  by  the  Iranian  officials,  of  the 
terrorists  holding  Americans  hostage.  We 
have  decided  to  take  action  against  Iran, 
with  the  presence  of  our  naval  forces,  to 
prevent  injury  to  our  hostages;  and  sec- 
ondly, to  impose,  with  an  increasing  de- 
gree of  severity,  sanctions  against  Iran 
that  would  encourage  them  to  release  the 
hostages. 

Thei'e  has  been  obviously  a  new  ele- 
ment introduced  into  the  Iranian  hostage 
crisis  in  recent  weeks  with  the  Soviet  in- 
vasion of  Afghanistan.  My  belief  is  that 
many  of  the  responsible  officials  in  Iran 
now  see  that  this  major  threat  to  Iran's 
security,  and  the  peace  of  Iran,  is  becom- 
ing paramount,  and  that  there  will  be  an 
additional  efi'ort  on  their  part  to  secure 
the  release  of  the  hostages  and  remove 
the  isolation  of  Iran  from  the  rest  of  the 
civilized  world. 

But  I  think  our  actions  have  been 
well  considered.  We  have  taken  every 
element  of  caution  about  the  possibility 
which  you  describe.  And  in  my  judgment. 


the  l)est  thing  for  Iran  to  do  now  is  to 
I'elease  the  hostages,  to  seek  redress  of 
their  alleged  grievances  in  the  interna- 
tional fora  and  the  courts  of  the  individ- 
ual nations,  and  to  begin  to  strengthen 
themselves  against  the  possible  thi'eat  by 
the  Soviets  now  addressed  toward  them 
in  Afghanistan. 

(i-   In  view  of  what  you  just  said, 
are  you  prepared  to  accept  a  delay  or 
postponement  of  the  imposition  of  the 
economic  sanctions  against  Iran? 

A.  No.  Those  sanctions  will  be  jnir- 
sued  by  ourselves,  unilaterally,  and  joined 
in  by  as  many  of  our  allies  as  will  agree. 
We  have  had  very  acceptable  support  by 
our  allies  in  this  imposition  of  sanctions 
against  Iran,  and  we've  had  over-whelm- 
ing suppoi-t  in  the  International  Court  of 
Justice  and  in  the  I'nited  Nations  fi'om 
many  nations  who've  observed  this  situa- 
tion. So  I  will  not  ])ost])one  the  imposition 
of  sanctions. 

Q.  In  1976  you  castigated  the  Re- 
publicans for  what  you  described  as  a 
"misery  index"  of  some  VVr .  That  mis- 
ery index  is  now  up  to  ItKv.  What  do 
you  think  about  it  now? 

A.   Obviously,  when  a  nation  is  in  a 
state  of  crisis — a  deep  obsession  and  con- 
cern with  the  holding  of  innocent  Ameri- 
cans and  an  acknowledged  threat  to 
world  peace  by  a  Soviet  invasion  of  Af- 
ghanistan; with  high  inflation  brought 
about  by,  in  my  opinion,  unwarranted  in- 
creases in  the  price  of  oil — this  preys  on 
the  minds  of  Americans.  We  are  taking 
action,  as  I've  described,  on  this  program 
and  previously  to  alleviate  these  con- 
cerns, and  I  believe  that  the  unity  of 
America  has  been  paramount.  I  believe 
the  future  will  hold  a  better  prospect  for 
the  alleviation  of  those  tensions.  ■ 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Jan.  28,  1980. 


31 


The  President 


Interview  for 
NBC  News 


FolloH'itKf  /N  (III  iiiterr'u'W  f'rcsi- 
ileiit  Cniierhchl  m  the  Oral  Office  with 
John  Chinicfllor  of  XHC  News  on 
Jiniiiii i-jl  7.  lilSii,  jioiiioiix  of  which 
irci'c  hroiiilnist  iliirnii/  the  wcek.^ 

H.  I  was  wondeririK  about  aid — 
military  aid — t(t  Pakistan. 

A.  Yes.  This  is  a  commitment  that 
I  am  ready  to  make.  We  have  already 
assured  Pi'esident  Zia,  who's  the  leadei' 
of  Pakistan,  directly  with  a  telephone 
communication  fi'om  me  the  day — very 
shortly  after  the  invasion,  and  since 
then  through  emissaries,  that  we're 
willing  to  join  other  nations  in  giving 
necessai'y  protection  to  Pakistan  and 
meet  their  legitimate  defensive  military 
needs.  This  is  not  a  threat  to  India,  an 
adjacent  country,  but  it's  an  ability  for 
Pakistan  to  repel  invasion  if  it  should 
occur  and  paiticularly  to  let  Pakistan 
be  known  as  a  strong  nation  able  to  i)ro- 
tect  itself,  so  that  a  possible  invasion 
will  be  i)revented. 

Q.  Have  there  been  any  specific 
communications  within  the  last  48 
hours  on  this  between  yourself  and 
General  Zia  or  the  two  governments 
involved".' 

A.  Through  diplomatic  emissaries, 
yes;  not  directly  between  me  and  Zia. 

Q.  .Are  you  able  to  expand  on 
that,  about  the  amount  of  aid  or  how 
it  would  be  delivered  or  what  it  would 
be.' 

X.  No.  There  ai'e  three  factors  that 
have  to  be  considered.  One  is  the  de- 
gree to  which  other  nations  will  join  in 
with  us  in  ])roviding  economic  and  mili- 
tary aid;  secondly,  the  amount  of  aid 
anfl  the  specific  form  of  it  that  the  Paki- 
stanis would  like  to  have;  and  thirdly, 
of  course.  Pll  have  to  go  to  the  Con- 
gress to  get  authorization  to  provide 
the  American  jiortion  of  the  aid  that's 
decided  to  be  given  to  Pakistan. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  what  other 
countries  might  also  be  supplying  aid 
to  Pakistan"? 

.A.  I  think  it  would  be  better  to  let 
them  speak  for  themselves. 

Q.  Would  they  be  Western,  indus- 
trialized countries".' 

A.  Yes,  mostly,  and  also  some  of 


32 


the  Mideast  countries  pei-ha])s,  which 
have  the  wealth  and  the  ability  to  help 
t(i  finance  pail  of  the  aid. 

Q.  So  you're  really  putting  to- 
gether a  package  of  aid  for  Pakistan. 

A.  Yes.  Some  peoi)le  call  it  a  con- 
sortium. I  don't  want  to  pi-edict  at  this 
point  what  other  nations  might  do,  be- 
cause the  evolution  of  this  so-callerl 
consortium  is  still  in  the  embryonic 
stage,  but  we  want  to  accommodate 
Pakistan's  neefls.  And  obviously,  with 
our  complete  absence,  some  of  the  re- 
gional countries  are  obviously  consult- 
ing with  one  another  and  will  help 
themselves  individual))-. 

Q.  Somalia,  Oman,  and  Kenya 
have  offered  us  the  use  of  naval  and 
air  facilities.  Will  the  I'nited  States 
accept  any  of  those  offers'.' 

A.  Yes,  we're  considei'ing  the  use 
of  some  of  those  facilities.  We  don't 
have  any  definite  agreement  yet,  but 
that's  the  kind  of  thing  that  I  think  is 
important  to  our  Nation  to  prepare  for 
the  long-range  meeting  of  any  threat  to 
the  peace  in  the  Mideast-Persian  Gulf- 
northern  Indian  Ocean  area. 

Q.  .\s  a  journalist  it  sometimes 
seems  to  me  as  though  the  Soviet 
Union,  which  will  become  a  net  im- 
porter of  petroleum  durins  the  ]9S()s, 
is  really  going  for  the  Persian  (Julf. 
They're  trying  to  control  that  part  of 
the  world.  Is  that  your  view'.' 

A.  I  think  that's  one  of  the  factors 
that  we  believe  is  e.xtant.  No  one  can 
know  what  the  Soviets'  plans  might  be, 
but  I  think  we've  got  to  be  prepared  for 
that  eventuality,  and  the  best  way  to 
prejjare  for  it  is  to  prevelit  its  occur- 
rence. The  arousing  of  world  opinion  to 
recognize  the  threat  that  the  Soviets 
project  to  that  area  of  the  world  is  an 
important  first  step,  particularly  the 
marshaling  of  common  condemnation  of 
the  Soviets  for  what  they've  already 
flone.  The  strengthening  of  countries  in 
the  area  that  might  be  threatened,  so 
that  they  can  repel  any  potential  inva- 
sion, is  another  very  important  ele- 
ment. And  I  think  the  third  thing  is  to 
make  sure  that  our  own  country 
realizes  that  we've  got  a  long-range 
commitment  to  be  made  and  that  the 
responsibility  and  the  sacrifice  eco- 
nomically to  prepare  for  it  must  be 
shared  by  all  of  us. 

One  of  the  important  elements  in- 
volved in  the  question  you  asked  is  the 
Soviets'  need  to  produce  more  of  their 
oil  anfl  gas.  High  technology  is  an  ele- 
ment of  that.  And  the  punitive  aspects 


of  a  partial  trade  embargo  against  the 
Soviet  Union  for  those  very  valuable 
items  is  a  cautionary  message  to  the 
Soviet  Union  that  I  think  they  are  per- 
fectly able  to  read  and  must  read. 

Q.  Could  I  ask  you  about  Iran, 
and  where  we  stand  now  in  terms  of 
the  hostages'.' 

A.  We've  always  had  a  few  basic 
principles  to  guide  me  since  I've  been 
involvefl  in  meeting  this  absolutely  il- 
legal and  abhorrent  act.  One  is  to  pro- 
tect the  long-range  interests  of  our 
country;  secondly,  to  protect  the  lives 
and  the  well-being  of  the  hostages; 
third,  to  seek  their  release;  fourth,  to 
avoid  bloodshed  if  possible,  but  still  to 
protect  our  interests  if  necessary;  and 
lastly,  to  make  sure  that  a  strong 
majority  of  the  nations  of  the  world  un- 
derstand that  Iran  is  a  criminal  actor  in 
this  process  and  that  we  are  the  ag- 
grieved party,  and  to  kee])  world  suj)- 
])ort  for  our  ])osition. 

We've  had  four  votes  in  the  U.N. 
Security  Council.  We've  not  had  a 
negative  vote  yet;  we've  only  had  four 
abstentions.  When  we  took  our  case  to 
the  International  Court  of  Justice,  the 
vote  was  15  to  nothing  in  favor  of  our 
position. 

And  I  think  that  Iran  must 
realize — there  are  some  responsible 
l)eoi)le  in  Iran — and  the  world  must 
realize  that  Iran  is  at  this  moment  in- 
volved in  a  criminal  act,  a  terrorist  act. 
.And  it's  not  a  mattei'  of  negotiating  on  s 
diplomatic  basis  between  two  nations. 
This  is  a  matter  of  condemning  Iran  foi' 
international  terrorism  and  for  kidnap- 
ing. And  I  think  those  purposes  that 
I've  described  are  and  will  be  our  basic 
principles  until  those  hostages  are 
home  safe. 

Q.  If  some  .Americans  are  put  on 
trial  in  "show  trials,"  what  would 
your  reaction  be  to  that'/ 

A.  I  would  rather  not  give  specif- 
ics, but  we  are  prepared  to  take  action 
that  would  be  quite  serious  in  its  con:;e- 
quences  for  Iran. 

Q.  .And  I  can't  draw  any  further 
details  on  that  out  of  you  today".' 

.A.  .\o,  1  don't  think  it  would  be 
good  to  go  into  fletails.  ■ 


r 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presirleiitial  Document.s  of  Jan.  14,  1980. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


The  President 


Hostages  in  Iran, 
Invasion  of  Afghanistan 


Fnllo, 

■iiHI  tirr 

IT  mark 

s-  h,/  fh 

■'r,si,lci,f 

IIKUh     lit 

II  Wliit 

Hi, IIS 

untnn,  f, 

)■  Me  III  III 

rs  „fC 

1,1 1/ res 

Unniiini  ,s 

,  UlSll.  1 

r(iiiiL;lit  I'd  like  to  take  a  few  minutes 
II  rxplain  to  you  two  basic  and  serious 
iiiililems  that  we've  now  been  address- 
iiu — one  of  them  since  the  4th  of 
\'ii\  ember,  the  other  one,  just  Christ- 
iKi>  P>\'e. 

n  lostanes  in  Iran 

don't  recall  in  histoi'v  a  time,  at  least 
n  modern  histoi'.v,  when  our  nation  was 
it  peace  that  it  was  so  deeply  con- 
•erned  as  it  has  been  the  last  2  months 
nnce  American  hostages  were  kidnaj)- 
k\  in  our  own  Embassy  in  Tehran  on 
^lovember  4.  I  need  not  go  into  the  de- 
ails  on  that  incident,  because  you're 
horoughly  familiar  with  them.  But  I 
\-\\\  outline  very  quickly  the  basic  prin- 
'iples  that  have  guided  me  the  last  2 
iionths,  and  then  at  the  end  of  my  brief 
'omments,  I'll  be  glad  to  have  questions 
'I'om  any  of  you. 

This  has  not  been  a  good  2  months. 
It's  been  a  time  of  strain  and  trial.  It's 
Deen  a  time  of  intimate  negotiations 
v\-ith  many  foreign  leaders,  trying  to  ac- 
om))lish  the  basic  goals  that  we  have 
:'olIowed  since  the  beginning  of  this 
onfrontation  with  the  terrorists  or 
:idnai:)ers  in  Tehran. 

Our  first  commitment  has  been  to 
protect  the  interests  of  our  Nation,  the 
long-run,  long-range  interests;  sec- 
ondly, to  do  what  we  can  to  insui-e  the 
lives  and  the  safety  of  the  American 
hostages  —  our  50  fellow  countrymen: 
third,  to  secure  through  diplomatic 
means,  using  every  possible  channel, 
their  release  —  unharmed,  if  God  be 
willing:  fourth,  to  avoid  bloodshed, 
which  would  very  likely  lead  to  the 
death  of  our  hostages:  and  fifth  and 
most  difficult,  to  maintain  support  for 
the  American  position  by  the  vast 
majority  of  nations  on  Earth. 

This  has  not  been  an  easy  last  task, 
because  historically  in  the  United  Na- 
tions and  other  international  fora,  our 
country  has  not  been  a  favorite,  be- 
cause we  are  powerful  and  a  super- 
power and  because  there  is  a  jealousy 
and  animosity  at  times  and  distrust 
toward  us. 


We've  now  had  four  votes  in  the 
Security  Council,  as  you  know.  We've 
not  yet  experienced  a  negative  vote.  On 
the  last  vote  to  set  a  deadline  foi'  the 
imposition  of  sanctions  and  to  call  foi- 
the  Secretary  General's  trip  to  Iran, 
there  were  foui'  abstentions  —  the 
Soviet  Union  and  their  puppet,  Czecho- 
slovakia, and  two  small  Moslem  na- 
tions, Bangladesh  and  Kuwait.  The 
other  11  nations  voted  to  send  the  Sec- 
retary General  to  Iran  for  a  last  effort 
to  negotiate  the  release  of  the  hostages, 
at  the  end  of  which  time  the  Security 
Council  would  come  back  and  take  ac- 
tion on  jiossible  economic  sanctions. 

In  the  International  Court  of  Jus- 
tice, the  vote  was  15  to  0 — a  unanimous 
vote. 

So  fai'  then,  we  have  accomplished 
all  the  goals  that  we  set  for  ourselves 
excejjt  the  release  of  the  hostages,  and 
we  ai'e  still  e.xploring  every  possible 
avenue  for  that  I'elease. 

The  most  difficult  part  of  the  Ira- 
nian que.stion  is  that  there's  no  gov- 
ernment entity  with  whom  we  can 
communicate  or  negotiate  or  registei'  a 
com|.)laint  or  a  request.  When  the  Sec- 
retary General  went  over  to  Iran,  he 
came  back  and  I'eported  the  same  thing 
that  we  had  already  known,  and  that  is 
that  the  most  powerful  single  political 
entity  in  Iran  consists  of  the  inter- 
national terrorists  or  the  kidnapers  who 
are  holding  our  hostages.  Whenever 
there  has  been  a  showdown  concerning 
the  hostages  between  Khomeini  or  the 
Revolutionary  Council  vei'sus  the  ter- 
rorists, the  terrorists  have  always  pre- 
\'ailed. 

We  don't  know  what  will  happen  in 
the  future,  but  I  think  you  possibly  rec- 
ognize that  this  small  group  of 
people — who  may  originally  have  com- 
prised some  students,  but  who  ai'e  not 
students  and  should  not  be  referred  to 
as  students — have  achieved,  with  the 
holding  of  American  hostages,  a  great 
and  significant  political  influence  in 
Ii-an.  They  don't  necessarily  have  as 
one  of  their  prime  interests  the  integ- 
i-ity  of  Iran  as  a  nation  or  the  well-being 
of  the  Iranian  people  or  even  the  secu- 
rity of  the  country  within  which  they 
live.  And  so  there  is  no  legitimate 
political  bargaining  leverage  that  can 
be  e.xerted  on  them,  and  there  is  no  en- 
tity there  with  whom  one  can  negotiate. 


They  know  that  the  consequences 
to  Iran  will  be  quite  severe  if  our  hos- 
tages are  injured  or  killed,  and  I  think 
only  the  ])resence  of  a  very  strong  mili- 
tary force  in  the  Arabian  Sea  has  deter- 
red them  so  far  from  taking  action  that 
woukl  have  been  even  more  abhoi'rent 
to  the  rest  of  the  world.  That  problem 
persists.  It's  an  ever-present  considera- 
tion of  mine  and  yours.  And  I'm  deter- 
mined that  this  country  will  not  forget 
for  a  moment  those  hostages.  And  the 
last  hostage  there  is  just  as  im)3ortant 
to  me  as  the  first  one. 

Our  country  is  remarkably  unified. 
I've  had  strong  support,  which  I  deeply 
appreciate,  and  the  Amei'ican  people 
have  been  surprisingly  patient,  which, 
as  you  know,  is  not  a  characteristic  of 
Americans.  But  I  think  most  people 
who've  studied  the  situation,  who've 
looked  at  the  map,  who've  seen  where 
the  Embassy  is  located  within  Tehran, 
can  see  that  a  strike  force  or  a  military 
action  that  might  be  oriented  toward 
the  release  of  the  hostages  would  al- 
most certainly  end  in  failure  and  almost 
certainly  end  in  the  death  of  the  hos- 
tages. 

They  are  being  held  in  small 
gi'ou])s — two  or  perhaps  three  in  a 
group — with  heavily  armed  militants 
constantly  guarding  them  and  the  hos- 
tages constantly  being  tied,  with  their 
hands  bounrl  at  all  times. 

We'll  continue  to  pei'sist.  Oui'  next 
step  will  be  in  the  United  Nations  to 
have  sanctions  imposed  against  Iran.  I 
cannot  predict  to  you  that  the  imposi- 
tion of  those  sanctions  —  if  we  get  the 
nine  requisite  votes — will  cause  an 
early  release  of  the  hostages.  We  pray 
that  something  will  happen  and  that 
eventually  Iran  will  recognize  that  the 
threat  to  them  is  not  from  the  United 
States  but  even  more  vividly  from  the 
So^•iet  Union,  which  has,  on  Chi'istmas 
Eve,  invaded  Afghanistan. 

Invasion  of  Afghanistan 

In  my  own  opinion,  shared  by  many  of 
the  world's  leaders  with  whom  I  have 
discussed  this  matter,  the  Soviet  inva- 
sion of  Afghanistan  is  the  gi'eatest 
threat  to  peace  since  the  Second  World 
War.  It's  a  sharp  escalation  in  the  ag- 
gressive history  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

Obviously,  we  all  were  shocked  and 
deplored  publicly  and  officially  the 
Soviet  action  in  Hungary  and  then 
later,  in  1968,  in  Czechoslovakia.  Those 
were  two  countries  which,  since  the 
Second  World  War,  were  basically  sub- 
servient to  the  Soviet  Union;  thev  were 


March  1980 


33 


The  President 


not  independent  nations  in  control  of 
their  own  affairs.  Thei-e  was  an  iijiris- 
ing,  as  you  know,  and  the  Soviets  bru- 
tally stamped  the  uprising  out  within 
those  two  countries. 

This,  however,  was  a  sovereign  na- 
tion, a  nonaligned  nation,  a  deejily  reli- 
gious nation,  and  the  Soviets  invaded  it 
brutally. 

We  were  informed,  other  leaders 
throughout  the  world  were  informed, 
by  Soviet  Ambassadors  and  direct  mes- 
sages from  Moscow,  that  the  Soviets 
went  into  the  nation  to  protect  it  from 
some  third  force  that  might  be 
threatening  Afghanistan.  When  ques- 
tioned about  where  was  the  third 
threatening  force  from,  the  Soviets 
have  never  been  able  to  give  a  reason- 
able answer.  They  claim  that  they  were 
in\ited  in  by  the  government  to  protect 
Afghanistan.  As  you  know,  the  leader 
of  Afghanistan,  President  Aniin,  who 
was  supposed  to  have  invited  them  in, 
was  immediately  assassinated  as  soon 
as  the  Soviets  obtained  control  over 
Kabul,  the  capital  city,  and  several  of 
the  members  of  the  President's  family 
were  also  killed. 

We  are  the  other  superpower  on 
Earth,  and  it  became  my  responsibility, 
I'epresenting  our  great  nation,  to  take 
action  that  would  prevent  the  Soviets 
from  this  invasion  with  impiuiity.  The 
Soviets  had  to  suffei'  the  consequences. 
In  my  judgment  our  ovii  Nation's  secu- 
I'ity  was  directly  threatened.  There  is 
no  doubt  that  the  Soviets'  move  into 
Afghanistan,  if  done  without  adverse 
consequences,  would  have  resulted  in 
the  temptation  to  move  again  and  again 
until  they  reached  warm  water  ports  or 
until  they  acquired  control  over  a  major 
portion  of  the  world's  oil  supplies. 

I  talked  to  the  President  of  Paki- 
stan immediately  after  this  Afghanistan 
invasion  and  also  talked  to  many  other 
of  the  world's  leaders  and  .sent  them  di- 
rect messages.  The  action  that  we  could 
take  was  confined  to  three  opportuni- 
ties. One  is  to  take  military  action, 
which  I  did  not  consider  appropi'iate. 
Our  country  has  no  desire,  nor  could  we 
have  effectively  implemented  military 
action,  to  drive  the  Soviet  forces  from 
Afghanistan — which  left  tne  with  two 
other  options,  which  I  chose  to  e.xer- 
cise.  One  is  political  action,  and  the 
other  one  is  economic  action. 

Politically,  we  joined  with  50  othei- 
nations  to  take  to  the  Security  Council 
two  propositions:  one,  to  condemn  the 
Soviet  Union  for  the  invasion  and, 
therefore,  the  threat  to  world  peace; 


34 


and  secondly,  to  call  upon  the  Soviets  to 
withdraw  their  troops.  The  vote  was 
east  after  the  debates  were  concluded. 
The  only  nations  voting  against  these 
two  propositions  wei'e  East 
Germany  —  again,  a  Soviet  puppet 
nation  —  and  the  Soviets  themselves. 
The  |)ermanent  members,  as  you  know, 
have  a  veto  right.  And  now  a  move  is 
undei'way,  wdiich  I  think  will  be 
i-ealized,  to  take  this  case  to  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  for  further  condemnation 
of  the  Soviet  Union. 

It's  difficult  to  understand  why  the 
Soviets  took  this  action.  I  think  they 
probably  underestimated  the  advei'se 
reaction  from  around  the  world.  I've 
talked  to  many  other  leaders,  our  allies 
and  those  representing  nations  that 
might  be  further  threatened,  and  they 
all  believe  that  we  took  the  right  ac- 
tion. It  was  not  done  for  political  rea- 
sons; it  was  not  done  to  implement 
some  foreign  policy.  It  was  done  in  the 
interest  of  our  national  security. 

We  did  take  economic  action,  which 
I  think  was  properly  balanced.  It  was 
carefully  considered.  We  will  try  to  im- 
pose this  action  on  the  Soviet  Union  in 
a  way  that  will  have  a  minimal  adverse 
effect  on  our  own  country,  where  the 
sacrifices  will  be  shared  as  equitably  as 
you  and  I  together  can  possibly  devise 
and  at  the  same  time  let  the  Soviets 
realize  the  consequences  of  their  inva- 
sion. 

We  will  not  permit  the  Soviets  to 
fish  in  American  waters  within  200 
miles  of  our  land  area.  They  have  a 
very  large  fishing  fleet,  involving  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  of  tons  of  fish  har- 
vested. They  will  not  have  those  j.ier- 
mits  I'enewed. 

We  will  not  send  high  technology 
equipment  to  the  Soviet  Union  or  any 
equipment  that  might  have  a  security 
benefit  to  the  Soviet  Union.  This  will 
include  drilling  equipment,  for  instance, 
used  for  the  exploration  and  production 
of  oil  and  natural  gas. 

We  will  restrict  severely  normal 
commerce  with  the  Soviet  Union,  which 
is  highly  advantageous  to  them.  And  of 
course,  I  have  interrupted  the  delivery 
of  grain,  which  the  Soviets  had  or- 
dered, above  and  beyond  the  8  million 
tons  which  our  Nation  is  bound  by  a 
5-year  agreement  to  have  delivered  to 
the  Soviet  Union. 

We  have  taken  .steps  to  make  sure 
that  the  farmers  are  protected  from  the 
adverse  consequences  of  this  interrup- 
tion of  grain  shipments  to  a  maximum 
degree  possible.  It  will  be  a  costly  prop- 
osition. I  understood  this  when  I  took 


the  action.  And  my  estimate  is,  based 
on  a  fairly  thorough  but  somewhat 
rapid  analysis,  that  this  year  the  extra 
cost  to  purchase  this  grain  and  to  ; 

change  the  price  levels  of  corn  and 
wheat  and  to  pay  the  extra  storage 
charges  will  amount  to  about  $2  billion. 
That's  in  fiscal  year  1980.  In  fiscal  year 
1981  there  will  be  an  additional  cost  of 
about  $800  million. 

It  may  be  that  as  the  season  pro- 
gresses and  we  have  more  experience  in 
substituting  for  the  Soviet  Union  as  the 
purchaser  of  this  grain,  that  there  will 
be  an  additional  $200-300  million  spent 
in  1980.  If  this  should  take  place,  then 
that  would  reduce  by  the  same  amount, 
roughly,  expenditures  in  1981  fiscal 
year.  So,  the  total  cost  will  be  in  the 
neighborhood  of  $2.8  billion.  This  cost 
will  not  fall  on  the  farmers  except  to 
the  extent  that  they  are  taxpa.vers  like 
every  other  Amei'ican.  This  will  be 
shared  by  all  those  in  this  country  who 
pay  taxes  to  the  Federal  Government. 

This  grain  will  not  be  permitted  to 
go  back  on  the  market  in  such  a  way  as 
to  depress  agricultural  prices.  And  in  a 
few  minutes  I'll  let  one  of  the  represen- 
tatives here  of  the  Agriculture  De- 
partment, Jim  Williams,  outline  to  you 
the  details.  And  I  have  a  sheet  pre- 
pared, for  handing  out  to  all  of  you — 
the  exact  loan  prices  for  wheat  and  corn 
and  the  other  jirices  for  the  redemption 
of  corn  and  wheat  from  storage. 

The  last  point  I  want  to  make  is 
this:  It's  very  important  that  we  under- 
stand that  our  allies  are  w-orking  very 
closely  with  us.  I  talked  to  several  of 
them  before  we  took  this  action.  All  of 
them  agreed  that  it  should  be  taken. 
We've  got  the  maximum  practical  as- 
surance from  them  that  they  will  not 
substitute  their  sale  of  goods,  including 
grain,  for  our  own.  There  are  three 
major  nations  that  ordinarily  have 
grain  to  export  —  Argentina,  Canada, 
and  Australia.  Argentina  does  not  have 
adequate  grain  to  make  any  significant 
difference. 

I  talked  to  President  Giscard  d'Es- 
taing  today,  who  represents  West 
Eiu'ope.  They  do  have  substantial 
quantities  of  grain  ordinarily  on  hand, 
I)articularly  barley.  They  will  not  sub- 
stitute their  grain  for  ours  that's  being 
withheld  from  the  Soviet  Union. 

We  anticipate  that  this  withholding 
of  grain  to  the  Soviet  Union  will  not 
force  them  to  withdraw  their  troops 
from  Afghanistan.  We  understood  this 
from  the  beginning.  We  don't  think  that 
economic  pressure  or  even  condemna- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


ion  by  the  United  Nations  of  the 
Miviet  Union  will  cause  them  to  with- 
h-;i\v  their  troops.  But  we  hope  that  we 
lave  laid  down  a  marker  and  let  them 
;n(iw  that  they  will  indeed  suffer,  now 
mil  in  the  future,  from  this  unwar- 
aiited  invasion  of  a  formerly  iiidejiend- 
'iit,  nonaligned  country. 

1  need  the  support  of  the  American 
leople.  I  believe  that  it's  a  matter  of 
latriotism,  and  I  believe  that  it's  a 
natter  of  protecting  our  nation's  secu- 
•it.\-.  I  anticipate  that  we'll  get  good  re- 
-])Oiise  from  the  Congress  in  the  mini- 
iia]  legislation  that  might  be  requii-ed 
(I  carry  out  these  programs.  Almost  all 
if  it  can  be  done  by  administrative  ac- 
loii  under  the  rights  given  by  the  Con- 
:iess,  through  legislation,  to  the  Secre- 
ar\  of  Agriculture  and  to  me. 

There  are  just  a  couple  of  other 
hiiigs  that  perhaps  should  be  men- 
iuned,  but  I  think  I'll  wait  on  them  till 
I  little  later. 

We  want  to  pursue  a  long-range 
iiialysis  and  a  schedule  of  actions  to 
^trt'Hgthen  American  interests  and 
)re>ence  and  influence  in  this  troubled 
Ilea  of  the  world,  in  southwest  Asia. 
'I'oii  know  about  some  of  the.se  from 
news  reports  that  have  already  been  is- 
sued. 

.And  we  will  take  action,  with  the 
L'diigress'  help,  to  strengthen  Pakistan. 
Our  desire  is  to  do  this  through  a  con- 
sortium of  nations;  that's  also  the  desire 
of  Pakistan.  I  talked  since  lunch  with 
I  President  Zia  of  that  country.  Pve 
talked  to  him  before  about  this  matter. 

And  other  nations  in  the  region 
which  might  be  threatened  by  the 
Soviets,  fi'om  Afghanistan,  will  also 
know  that  we  and  many  other  nations 
on  Earth  are  committed  to  their 
adequate  defense  capability,  so  that  the 
Soviets  will  be  discouraged  from  fur- 
ther expansionism  in  the  area. 

Because  of  the  Iranian  question, 
we  have  greatly  built  up  our  naval 
forces  in  the  northern  China  Sea  or  in 
the  Arabian  Sea.  Those  will  be  main- 
tained at  a  higher  level  than  they  have 
been  in  the  past.  And  as  you  know, 
there  has  been  a  marshaling  of 
worldwide  public  opinion,  not  only  in 
the  condemnation  of  the  Iranian  ter- 
rorists who  hold  our  hostages  but  also 
against  the  Soviet  Union  for  their  un- 
precedented invasion  of  Afghanistan  in 
this  recent  few  weeks.  ■ 


'Opening  and  closing  paragraphs  omit- 
ted; te.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Jan.  14,  1980. 


Meeting  the  Challenge  in 
Southwest  Asia 


SfateiHciit  hcfdir  the  Sciiafe  Ap- 
inrijiriofioiix  Cminii ittce  on  Ffl))-iiani  1 , 

We  meet  at  a  time  when  new  challenges 
abroad  underscore  the  importance  of 
active  American  leadership  in  the 
world — a  leadership  based  both  on 
strength  and  on  diplomatic  skill.  For 
these  are  times  which  test  both  our 
wisdom  and  our  will. 

Our  requirements  are  underscored 
by  the  particular  challenges  we  face  in 
the  southwest  Asia  and  Persian  Gulf 
region,  where  Iranian  militants  hold 
American  diplomats  prisoner — and 
where  Soviet  troops  seek  to  suppress 
the  peo])le  of  a  sovereign  nation. 

Let  me  begin  my  testimony  by 
taking  a  few  moments  to  describe  the 
elements  of  our  strategy  in  this  trou- 
bled area.  Obviously,  one  region  does 
not  flefine  oui-  total  agenda.  It  does, 
however,  provide  a  compelling  demon- 
stration of  the  imposing  diplomatic 
tasks  that  lie  ahead. 

Resisting  Soviet  .Aggression 

In  its  invasion  of  Afghanistan,  the 
Soviet  Union,  foi-  the  first  time  since 
World  War  II,  has  used  its  own  armed 
forces  beyond  the  Warsaw  Pact  s])here 
to  impose  its  authoi-ity  directly  over  a 
Third  World  country.  The  Soviets'  pre- 
cise motives  in  attacking  Afghanistan 
may  remain  unclear.  But  there  is  no 
lack  of  clarity  about  the  fact  of  theii' 
aggression. 

The  Soviet  action  requires  an 
American  response  that  is  firm,  sus- 
tained, and  effective.  Our  object  is  to 
impose  a  cost  on  Soviet  actions  in  Af- 
ghanistan and,  more  broadly,  to  make  it 
clear  that  such  aggression  anywhere 
will  encounter  firm  I'esistance.  We  seek 
also  to  strengthen  our  position  in  the 
region  in  ways  that  protect  our  inter- 
ests, reassure  our  friends,  and  recog- 
nize local  realities. 

The  President  acted  promptly  after 
the  invasion  to  limit  the  transfer  of  high 
technology,  grain  sales,  and  other 
commercial  contracts;  to  restrict  Soviet 
access  to  our  fisheries;  and  to  suspend 
various  U.S. -Soviet  exchanges.  It  is 
also  our  firm  view  that  we  should  not 


make  the  same  mistake  that  we  made  in 
1936,  when  we  participated  in  an  Olym- 
pics which  wei'e  used  to  glorify  a  host 
whose  policies  were  threatening  the 
peace. 

We  are  working  with  our  allies,  and 
with  other  nations,  as  they  develop 
their  own  measures  in  opposition  to  ag- 
gression. 

The  Soviet  Union  stands  con- 
demned by  the  entire  world  community. 
The  U.N.  General  Assembly  vote  of 
condemnation,  104  nations  to  18,  was  a 
telling  rebuke  to  the  Soviet  Union  and 
especially  to  their  notion,  pressed  last 
summer  in  Havana,  that  developing 
countries  and  the  Soviet  Union  have  a 
"natural  alliance." 

The  President  is  also  taking  action 
to  deter  further  aggression  in  the  area. 
We  have  assured  Pakistan  of  our  sup- 
port. And  the  Soviet  Union  is  on  notice 
that  any  attempt  to  control  the  vital 
Persian  Gulf  region  will  be  repelled  by 
any  means  necessary,  including  mili- 
tary force. 

To  strengthen  our  ability  to  re- 
spond swiftly  and  effectively  to  military 
needs  in  the  region  should  they  arise, 
we  have  increased  our  force  presence  in 
the  Indian  Ocean.  We  have  held  posi- 
tive initial  discussions  with  a  number  of 
nations  in  the  area  concerning  U.S.  ac- 
cess to  air  and  port  facilities.  And  we 
are  accelerating  our  plans  for  the  rapid 
deployment  force.  These  steps  to  en- 
hance the  mobility  of  our  military 
forces  are  an  essential  part  of  the  over- 
all defense  modernization  program  in 
which  we  ai'e  engaged. 

Strengthening  Regional  Security 

Enhancing  the  security  of  that  region 
must  also  be  a  cooperative  undertaking. 
As  the  President  said  in  the  State  of 
the  Union:  "...  we  are  prepared  to 
work  with  other  countries  in  the  region 
to  share  a  cooperative  security 
framework  that  respects  differing  val- 
ues and  political  beliefs,  yet  which  en- 
hances the  independence,  security,  and 
prosperity  of  all." 

This  effort  to  build  a  moi-e  secure 
community  of  independent  nations  in 
the  region  will  require  a  sustained, 
long-term  commitment.  Let  me  briefly 


March  1980 


35 


The  Secretary 


discuss  five  critical  elements  of  this  ef- 
fort. 

First,  we  are  working  to  im])i'ove 
local  capabilities  for  self-defense  and 
enhance  the  political  and  economic  sta- 
bility of  the  area. 

This  objective  is  advanced  through 
our  economic  and  security  assistance 
program,  including  those  in  Israel  and 
Egypt.  And  to  address  the  immediate 
danger  to  Pakistan,  we  will  be  re- 
questing an  exception  to  e.xisting  legis- 
lative restrictions  so  that  we  can  join 
with  others  in  responding  swiftly  to 
Pakistan's  security  needs.  This  does  not 
signal  a  lessening  of  oui-  commitment  to 
nonproliferation,  and  we  have  so  indi- 
cated to  the  Pakistanis.  It  does  signal 
our  determination  to  help  a  country 
that  faces  the  threat  of  Soviet  combat 
forces  and  combat  operations  on  its 
border. 

Second,  the  goal  of  regional  secu- 
rity will  be  served  if  local  disputes  can 
be  resolved.  Resolution  of  such  dis- 
|)Utes  can  strengthen  the  security  of  the 
states  in  the  region,  bring  a  greater 
measure  of  stability  to  the  area,  and 
lessen  the  chances  for  conflict  which  the 
Soviets  could  exploit. 

Recent  events  have  uiidei'lined  our 
interest  and  that  of  all  parties  in  the 
region  in  an  Arab-Israeli  peace.  It  is  in 
Israel's  and  Egypt's  strategic  interest, 
as  well  as  in  ours,  to  carry  forward  the 
Camp  David  accords.  A  secure  peace 
between  Israel  and  its  neighbors  would 
enhance  the  security  of  Israel  and  jier- 
mit  the  Arab  states  to  concentrate 
more  fully  on  domestic  needs  and  the 
Soviet  threat. 

For  similar  reasons,  we  must  be 
diligent  in  our  support  for  effoils  to  re- 
solve the  differences  between  India  and 
Pakistan  and  to  avoid  a  nuclear  rivalry 
on  the  subcontinent.  We  ai-e  also  en- 
couraging cooperation  among  the  na- 
tions of  the  Persian  Gulf  and  Arabian 
Peninsula. 

In  a  highly  significant  show  of 
cohesion  this  week,  the  Foreign  Minis- 
ters of  35  Islamic  countries  united  in  a 
forceful  denunciation  of  the  Soviet  ag- 
gression against  Afghanistan  and  called 
for  the  use  of  "all  possible  means"  to 
bring  about  a  withdrawal. 

Third,  it  is  important  that  we  seek 
improved  relations  with  nations 
throughout  the  area,  wherever  there  is 
a  basis  of  shared  interests. 

As  we  seek  to  help  Pakistan  meet 
its  legitimate  defense  requirements,  we 
retain  a  strong  intei'est  in  cooperation 


36 


with  India.  Clark  Clifford's  [President 
Carter's  personal  emissary  to  India! 
mission  is  a  measure  of  the  high  pi-ioi'- 
it.\-  we  attach  to  U.S. -Indian  relations. 

With  respect  to  Iran,  as  the  Presi- 
dent said:  "We  cannot  and  will  not  relax 
our  concern  for  the  hostages."  To  do  so 
would  be  to  fail  our  responsibilities  to 
fellow  citizens  and  to  countenance  a 
flagrant  disregard  for  international  law 
and  for  elemental  standards  of  decency. 
Therefore,  this  matter  will  remain  up- 
permost in  our  relations  with  Iran  and 
at  the  top  of  our  foreign  policy  agenda. 
We  will  pursue  every  channel  to 
achieve  the  safe  return  of  our  people. 

But  the  Soviet  action  should  give 
Iran  added  reason  to  be  responsive.  As 
the  .Soviet  threat  has  increased,  the 
leaders  of  Iran  have  added  reason  to 
bring  about  the  prompt  and  uncondi- 
tional release  of  the  hostages,  as  man- 
dated by  both  the  Intei'national  Court 
of  Justice  and  the  U.N.  General  As- 
sembly. 

P'ourth,  we  are  coordinating  our 
effoi'ts  with  others  outside  the  I'egion 
who  share  our  interests  there. 

We  have  already  made  clear  that 
our  assistance  to  Pakistan  will  be  an  in- 
tegral part  of  a  broad  international  ef- 
fort. We  have  been  engaged  in  active 
consultations  with  our  European  allies, 
Japan,  Australia,  Saudi  Arabia,  and 
others  to  this  end.  The  Soviet  invasion 
of  Afghanistan  presents  a  threat  not 
f)nly  to  American  interests  in  the  I'e- 
gion:  it  is  a  threat  to  the  interests  of 
oui-  allies  as  well.  We  are  asking  our  al- 
lies not  that  they  support  an  American 
response;  we  are  asking  that  they  fol- 
low our  lead  in  a  coordinated  response 
to  serve  our  common  interests. 

Fifth,  we  need  to  demonsti-ate 
American  and  Western  understanding 
of  Islam.  Our  difference  with  Iran,  for 
example,  is  in  no  sense  a  confrontation 
with  the  Islamic  faith  or  Islamic  tradi- 
tions. On  the  other  hand,  the  Soviet  in- 
vasion of  Afghanistan  represents  an  at- 
tem])t  to  crush  an  Islamic  resistance 
and  to  impose  external  rule  over  all  of 
an  Islamic  nation. 

We  must  pursue  such  policies  on  a 
sustained  basis.  They  will  require  not 
only  our  strength  and  our  resources  but 
also  diplomatic  skill.  And,  to  a  consid- 
erable degree,  their  impact  will  depend 
upon  our  actions  in  other  areas  as  well. 

It  is  all  the  more  critical  now  that 
we  reduce  our  reliance  on  foreign  oil. 
The  strength  of  our  international  posi- 
tion is  grounded  in  the  strength  of  our 


economy  and  thus  upon  our  ability  to 
construct  a  secure  energy  future.  We 
must  invest  our  efforts  here  with  still 
greater  urgency — to  substitute,  our  own 
conservation  for  a  greater  share  of  im- 
ported oil  and  to  build  a  greater  capac- 
ity to  fulfill  our  own  enei-gy  needs. 

And  we  must  persist  in  foreign 
policy  directions  that  have  been  charted 
and  which  remain  fundamentally  sound. 
As  we  build  our  strength  to  meet  the 
challenges  of  the  times,  we  must  not 
lose  sight  of  the  strengths  we  gain 
through  steadiness  in  our  diplomacy. 

The  Soviet  assault  against  Af- 
ghanistan requires  the  new  steps  we 
are  taking  in  our  foreign  policies.  Our 
relations  with  the  Soviet  Union  must 
convey  the  clear  message  that  the  re- 
sponse to  aggression  will  be  firm  and 
sustained.  For  our  hopes  for  better  re- 
lations  and  for  peace  will  depend  on  the 
choices  they  make  in  coming  years. 

But  let  us  also  be  clear  that  the 
longer  tei'm  goals  we  are  pursuing  are 
essential  if  we  are  to  continue  building 
America's  military,  economic,  arid 
political  strength  in  the  coming  decade. 

•  We  will  continue  to  build 
America's  military  strength  and  to 
strengthen  our  alliances.  The 
reinstatement  of  registration  for  the 
draft  will  further  demonsti'ate  oui-  re- 
solve. 

•  We  will  continue,  out  of  hai'd- 
headed  self-interest,  to  support  effec- 
tive, verifiable  limits  on  the  accumula- 
tion and  spread  of  nuclear  weajions. 
The  SALT  II  Treaty  remains  strongly 
in  our  security  interest.  Without  it,  by 
1985  the  Soviets  could  have  several 
thousand  more  warheads  and  sevei'al 
hundred  more  systems  to  deliver  them 
than  is  possible  under  the  treaty.  With- 
out it,  our  ability  to  observe  Soviet 
strategic  forces — and  thus  evaluate 
Soviet  capabilities — would  be  impaired. 
Oui'  predictions  of  future  Soviet 
strategic  forces  will  be  less  certain  and 
thus  our  defense  planning  more  dif- 
ficult. And  the  opportunity  for  further 
limits  in  the  future  will  be  clouded.  For 
these  reasons,  we  remain  committed  to 
ratification  of  the  treaty. 

•  We  will  continue  the  process  of 
normalization  of  relations  with  China. 

•  We  will  continue  to  jnirsue  an  ac- 
tive diplomacy,  as  in  the  Middle  East 
and  southern  Africa,  to  seek  peaceful 
solutions  to  regional  dis])utes.  A  just 
peace  is  always  its  own  justification. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


SPECIAL 


National  Security  Goals 


by  President  Carter 

Excerpts  from  an  address  before 
the  annual  convention  of  the  American 
Legion  in  Washington,  D.C.,  on  Feb- 
ruary 19,  1980.'- 


We  remain  the  world's  most  powerful 
force,  and  the  American  people  and  the 
Congi'ess  are  now  united  with  me  in  keep- 
ing the  United  States  second  to  none  in 
military  strength.  I  have  to  tell  you  that 
this  ilegree  of  common  commitment  has 
not  always  existed.  During  the  last  12 
vears,  for  instance,  the  Congress  has  cut 
the  Presidents'  defense  budget  by  more 
than  $50  billion — an  average  reduction 
;  below  what  the  Presidents  have  proposed 
)f  more  than  $4  billion  per  yean 

Recently  this  pattern  has  changed. 
Hid  we  now  have  obvious  and  growing 
;u|)p<irt  throughout  this  country  for  a 
;tiiing  national  defense.  This  new  unity 
md  this  new  determination  must  be  sus- 
ained;  not  just  for  a  few  months,  but  so 
ong  as  the  serious  challenges  confront 
hf  United  States  of  America,  we  must 
K'  united  and  determined  to  have  a 
itmng  country.  I'm  ver>'  thankful  that 
iKist  Americans  agree  with  you  and  me 
hat  in  order  to  insure  an  America  at 
jeace,  we  must  and  we  will  have  that 
;tr()ng  America. 

■Promoting  Peace 

A'c  are  determined  also  to  see  the 
)lessings  of  peace  shared  with  other 
)ei)ple  around  the  world.  At  Camp  David 
md  during  my  personal  mission  to  the 
Vliileast,  we  promoted  peace  between 
"]gyi)t  and  Israel.  In  just  a  few  days,  a 
nilestone  will  be  passed  in  history  when 
full  diplomatic  recognition  is  consum- 
mated with  the  e.xchange  of  Ambassadors 
Detween  those  two  countries  that  have 
Deen  at  war  four  times  in  the  last  30 
years.  Now  work  must  continue  toward 
:hat  comprehensive  peace  that  is  so  vital 
:o  the  security  of  the  United  States  and 
to  stability  in  the  Middle  East. 

After  4  years  of  negotiation  also,  we 
:oncluded  the  historic  Panama  Canal 
treaties,  which  will  protect  American 
interests,  which  will  stabilize  a  poten- 
tially volatile  situation,  which  will  assure 
continued  responsible  operation  of  the 
canal,  which  will  enable  us  to  protect  the 
canal — now  and  in  the  far  distant  future, 
during  the  2Ist  century — and  strengthen 


Vlarch  1980 


our  influence  in  a  strategic  area  of  the 
world  and  of  this  hemisphere. 

We  have  also  negotiated  a  sound 
strategic  arms  limitation  treaty,  SALT  II, 
which  has  great  advantages  for  our  coun- 
try. It  will  enhance  world  stability  and 
peace. 

SALT  II  will  continue  the  pnxress  of 
arms  control  which  was  beg^n  by  Presi- 
dent Eisenhower  and  which  has  been  con- 
tinued by  every  President  since  his  time. 
It  will  help  to  prevent  the  proliferation  of 
nuclear  weapons  among  the  other  nations 
on  Earth.  It  will  force  substantial  reduc- 
tion in  the  present  numbers  of  Soviet 
missile  launchers  and  provides  no  similar 
requirement  that  missile  launchers  of  the 
United  States  be  reduced.  It  will  enhance 
the  ability  that  we  have  to  monitor  the 
Soviet  nuclear  forces.  It  will  prevent  an 
expensive  and  a  dangerous  nuclear  arms 
race,  an  arms  race  that  would  be  coun- 
terproductive both  for  ourselves  and  for 
the  Soviet  Union,  and  would  require 
funding,  very  high  levels  of  funding 
which  are  needed  to  improve  the  Ameri- 
can conventional  forces. 

SALT  II  is  not  a  panacea.  It  is  a 
supplement  and  not  a  substitute  for  a 
strong  defense.  SALT  II  is  not  based  on 
trust.  It  can  be  verified  by  our  own  na- 
tional technical  means.  I  will  consult  very 
closely  with  the  Congress  when  the  time 
comes  again  to  move  toward  ratification 
of  the  treaty. 

During  these  past  3  years  we've 
joined  with  our  Atlantic  allies  to 
strengthen  NATO,  both  its  spirit  and  also 
its  military  capability.  There's  a  new 
sense  of  cooperation  and  resolve  and  a 
greater  confidence  that  we  together  can 
deter  aggression. 

Another  successful  foreign  policy  ini- 
tiative has  great  strategic  significance. 
We  have  normalized  relations  with  China 
while  retaining  our  trade  and  friendship 
with  the  people  of  Taiwan.  We  now  have 
a  great  opportunity  to  expand  this  new 
relationship  to  bring  mutual  advantages 
to  both  countries  and  to  improve  the 
prospects  for  a  stable  and  a  peacefiil 
Asia.  This  is  the  first  time  I  recall  in  his- 
tory when  our  nation  has  been  friends 
with  both  Japan  and  China  at  the  same 
time. 

And,  as  you  well  know,  our  nation's 
commitment  to  democracy,  to  human 
rights,  to  self-determination,  and  to  eco- 
nomic stability  and  development  has 
greatly  improved  our  relations  with  the 
countries  of  the  Third  World. 


New  Challenges 

These  achievements  have  all  been  gratify- 
ing to  you  and  to  me,  yet  today  we  face 
new  and  serious  challenges.  At  this  very 
moment,  53  Americans  are  being  held 
hostage  in  Iran.  The  long  and  continuous 
efforts  to  insure  the  safe  release  of  our 
people  have  now  reached  a  particularly 
sensitive  and  intense  stage.  My  task  is  to 
protect  the  interests  and  the  principles  of 
our  nation  while  we  negotiate  for  the  re- 
lease of  the  Americans  who  are  being 
held  as  innocent  prisoners. 

1  deeply  appreciate  the  firmness,  pa- 
tience, the  unity,  and  the  will  shown  by 
almost  all  Americans  during  these  days  of 
crisis.  1  cannot  and  I  will  not  rest  until 
every  single  American  is  home,  safe,  and 
free. 

Also  at  this  very  moment,  some 
100,000  Soviet  troops,  heavily  armed, 
seek  to  subjugate  a  proud  and  a  once 
independent  nation,  a  nation  that  pre- 
sented no  challenge  to  Soviet  security 
and  wanted  only  to  retain  their  freedom. 
This  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan  poses 
a  threat  to  the  independence  of  countries 
throughout  southwest  Asia  and  to  the 
economic  lifeblowl  of  many  nations,  oil.  It 
has  altered  the  careful  balance  of  forces  in 
a  vital  and  a  volatile  area  of  the  world. 

That's  why  I  did  not  hesitate  to  an- 
swer Soviet  aggression  with  strong  eco- 
nomic sanctions,  including  restrictions  on 
grain  shipments  and  sales  of  high 
technology  to  the  Soviet  Union.  That's 
why  we  joinetl  with  more  than  100  other 
nations  in  the  United  Nations  to  condemn 
this  aggression  and  to  demand  with- 
drawal of  the  Soviet  invasion  forces  from 
Afghanistan.  And  that  is  why  1  have 
given  notice  that  the  United  States  will 
not  attend  the  Moscow  Olympics,  unless 
the  Soviet  invasion  forces  are  withdrawn 
from  Afghanistan  before  February  20. 
That  deadline  is  tomorrow,  and  it  will  not 
be  changed. 

And  finally,  1  have  served  notice  in 
my  State  of  the  Union  address,  and  I 
would  like  to  quote  the  words:  "An  at- 
tempt by  any  outside  force  to  gain  control 
of  the  Persian  Gulf  region  will  be  re- 
gardetl  as  an  assault  on  the  vital  interests 
of  the  United  States  of  America,  and 
such  an  assault  will  be  repelled  by  any 
means  necessary,  including  military 
force." 

And  as  I  also  stated  clearly  to  the 
Congress:  While  protecting  the  constitu- 
tional rights  of  Americans  and  avoiding 
the  abuses  of  the  past,  we  must  remove 
all  impediments  to  an  effective  intelli- 
gence capability  for  our  nation. 

At  this  time,  I  am  strengthening  our 
own  military  presence  in  the  Persian  Gulf 
region,  and  we  are  encouraging  other  na- 


Special 


tiuns  to  form  a  cooperative  security 
framework,  which  can  enhance  their 
independence  and  help  to  preserve  re- 
gional peace. 

To  underscore  our  resolve  and  our 
readiness,  I've  stepped  up  our  overall  de- 
fense effort  and  proposed  registration  for 
draft-age  Americans.  I  have  made  it  clear 
that  there  is  no  need  at  this  time  to  reim- 
pose  the  draft,  but  registration  is  a  nec- 
essary' precaution  which  will  e.xpedite 
mobilization  if  it  should  be  required  in  the 
future. 

It  is  important  that  everyone  under- 
stands that  evei7  action  that  I  have 
taken  is  peaceful  and  is  designed  to  pre- 
serve peace.  Because  we  seek  peace,  we 
have  pursued  and  will  pursue  ever>'  op- 
portunity to  ease  tensions.  Because  we 
seek  peace,  we  have  been  cautious  and 
restrained.  Because  we  seek  peace,  we 
must  leave  no  room  for  doubt  among  our 
allies  and  no  room  for  miscalculation 
among  our  potential  adversaries. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  Soviet  leaders 
did  miscalculate  in  Afghanistan.  They 
underestimated  the  courage  and  the 
tenacity  of  freedom  fighters  in  that  coun- 
try, and  they  did  not  anticipate  the 
worlfl's  quick  and  forceful  response  to 
their  aggi'ession.  They  are  now  paying  a 
high  price  in  the  number  of  casualties  in 
Afghanistan,  in  our  own  actions,  in  the 
actions  of  our  allies,  and  in  the  condemna- 
tion of  virtually  the  entire  Muslim  and 
Third  World  community  in  the  United 
Nations  and  in  the  individual  and  collec- 
tive statements  and  actions. 

There  is  no  way  for  you  or  me  to 
know  the  future  plans  of  the  Soviet  lead- 
ers. We  cannot  be  certain  if  or  when  they 
will  withdraw  their  forces,  if  they  seek 
colonial  domination  only  in  Afghanistan 
or  if  they  seek  other  conquests  as  well. 
No  President  of  the  United  States  can  af- 
ford to  gamble  our  peace  and  security 
upon  wishful  thinking  about  the  present 
or  the  future  intentions  of  the  Soviet 
Union.  But  we  do  know  that  our  inten- 
tions mu.'^t  be  ci7Stal  clear  We  will  stand 
firm  against  aggression,  and  we  will  not 
accept  business  as  usual  with  the  Soviet 
Union  while  the  invasion  continues. 

Our  firmness  is  not  a  prelude  to 
combat  nor  is  it  a  return  to  the  cold  war 
It  is  simply  prudence — to  reduce  the 
chances  for  a  misjudgment  that  could  be 
fatal  to  peace.  It's  a  reaffirmation  of  a 
longstanding  commitment  and  a  sustained 
response  to  a  strategic  challenge. 

Our  measured  reaction  to  this  ag- 
gression, fortunately,  comes  at  a  time 
when  our  military  strength  is  unequaled 


and  gi'owing,  in  keejiing  with  the  com- 
mitment that  I  made  to  you  in  1976. 
A  dangerous  decline  in  defense 
spending  has  been  reversed.  From  19IW 
to  1976,  real  defense  outlays — that  is, 
constant  dollars  spent — declined  every 
year  In  constant  dollars,  defense  spend- 
ing dropped  by  one-third  in  those  8  years 
before  I  became  President.  President 
Ford  began  to  reverse  this  pattern,  but 
only  since  1977  have  outlays  for  defense 
been  increased  every  year.  Our  5-year  de- 
fense program  through  198.5  will  continue 
this  trend. 

I  would  like  to  reemphasize  that  from 
the  very  start,  my  Administration,  in 
cooperation  with  the  Congress,  has  been 
engaged  in  a  substantial  and  carefully 
planned  strengthening  of  our  military' 
forces.  In  December  of  last  year — well 
before  the  Soviet  invasion — the  Secretary 
of  Defense  presented  to  the  Congress  the 
broad  outlines  of  my  plans  for  defense 
spending  not  only  in  1981  but  for  the  ne.xt 
.5  years.  And  last  month  I  submitted  offi- 
cially the  strong  budget  proposal  itself. 
The  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan 
has  made  everyone  more  aware  of  the 
importance  of  a  strong  defense  capability. 
But  since  the  process  of  strengthening 
our  militaiy  forces  has  been  unden\ay  for 
several  years,  the  recent  developments  in 
southwest  Asia  do  not  now  require  any 
major  redesign  of  next  year's  defense 
budget.  Of  course  we  will  continue  to  re- 
view our  requirements  and  make  any 
necessao'  adjustments  to  meet  changing 
circumstances. 

I  consider  the  increase  in  the  defense 
budget  for  fiscal  year  1981  to  be  necessar>' 
to  assure  our  national  security.  It's  a  care- 
fully measured  amount,  and  it  in  no  way 
signals  a  new  or  transient  "boom"  in  de- 
fense spending.  It  is  estimated  quite  ac- 
curately that  the  Soviet  Union  spends 
VSVi  of  their  gi-oss  national  income  or 
gross  national  product  on  defense.  The 
percentage  of  our  own  gross  national 
product  represented  by  defense  expendi- 
tures for  1981  is  about  o^r .  And  that  share 
will  hardly  vaiy  at  all  if  the  present  j^ro- 
jections  of  our  defense  expenditures  are 
carried  out  in  1982,  1983,  1984,  and 
198o— about  .5'7f  of  our  GNR  The  impact 
of  the  additional  expenditure  on  the  infla- 
tion rate  will  be  negligible. 

These  expenditures  for  defense  are 
clearly  within  the  cai^ability  of  our  Amer- 
ican economy.  And  moreover,  we  are 
spending  our  money  well. 

•  We  are  strengthening  our  strategic 
"triad"  that  deters  the  Soviet  nuclear 
threat. 


•  I  accelerated  development  of 
cruise  missiles,  which  begin  production 
this  year  Because  of  their  small  size  and 
the  large  numbers,  cruise  missiles  will  be 
far  more  effective  than  the  B-1  bomber 
for  jienetrating  Soviet  air  defenses  now 
or  those  they  can  |)roject  in  the  future. 

•  We  have  initiated  a  new  MX  mis- 
sile system  and  finally  resolved  schedule 
and  contract  problems  that  had  stalled 
the  Trident  submarine  progi'am  for  so 
long.  The  first  Ti'ident  was  launched  last 
year,  and  six  more  are  under  construc- 
tion. 

Because  we  have  emphasized  a 
stronger  NATO,  which  had  languished,  as 
you  know,  during  the  Vietnam  war,  we 
now  have  commitments  from  our  NATO 
partners  for  an  annual  S'/r  real  growth  in 
their  own  defense  budgets.  We  have 
begun  joint  developments  of  new 
weapons,  we  have  enhanced  our  ability 
for  a  rapid  deployment  of  ground  and  air 
forces  in  Europe  in  a  crisis,  and  have 
spurred  modernization  of  NATO  theater 
nuclear  weapons  to  meet  a  threatening 
buildup  of  formidable  Soviet  nuclear 
missiles  in  that  region  of  the  world. 

Our  NATO  allies  keep  about  3  million 
troops  on  active  duty.  Added  to  our  2  mil- 
lion, we  can  and  we  will  maintain  a  pow- 
erful and  effective  force  for  the  defense  of 
Western  Europe.  You  can  depend  on  that 
because  it  is  vital  to  our  own  nation's  de- 
fense. 

I  have  also  emphasized  since  1  have 
been  in  office  the  general  modernizing  of 
the  conventional  forces  of  our  countr>',  to 
respond  to  militate  threats  not  only  in 
P^urope  but  in  other  vital  areas  of  the 
world. 

•  We  are  re-equipping  our  ground 
forces.  We  have  already  expanded  the 
number  of  tanks  and  infanti->'  battalions. 
We  are  modernizing  our  Navy  with  an 
additional  aircraft  carrier,  new  guided- 
missile  ships.  Harpoon  cruise  missiles, 
and  new  and  more  modern  and  effective 
attack  submarines.  We  have  now  under- 
way the  first  full-scale  modernization  of 
tactical  air  forces  since  the  19(i()s. 

•  We  are  capable  today  of  respond- 
ing to  a  threat  of  peace — to  a  threat  to 
peace  in  almost  any  part  of  the  world. 
Our  naval  task  force  now  in  the  Persian 
Gulf  region  testifies  to  our  mobility  and 
our  strength,  and  we  are  building  a  rapid 
de|)loyment  force  which  can  carry 
stronger  defense  forces — much  stronger 
defense  forces — to  any  vital  area. 

•  To  achieve  that  goal,  we  have  al- 
ready begun  development  of  a  new  fleet 
of  large  transport  planes  and  a  force  of 
maritime  prepositioning  ships  with 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Special 


lenough  suijplies  and  heavy  e(|uipnit'iit  f(ir 
three  Marine  brigades. 

The  sum  of  all  these  defense  efforts 
is  a  flear  message:  We  have  not  abdicated 
— and  we  will  not  abdicate — the  respon- 
sibility of  the  United  States  to  help  main- 
tain a  peaceful  world. 

Commitment  to  Peace 

Our  commitment  to  world  peace  is 
twofold;  We  and  our  allies  must  be  able  to 
meet  any  militaiT  challenge,  and  we  must 
be  strong  and  |)rincipled  as  we  .seek  to  re- 
solve disputes  and  to  reduce  tensions. 
Preventing  nuclear  war  is  a  preeminent 
task,  to  re])eat  what  I  said  earliei".  That  is 
why  the  last  three  U.S.  Presidents  have 
negotiated  the  strategic  arms  limitation 
treaties — and  I  will  not  abandon  this  ef- 
fort to  control  nuclear  weapons.  In  fact, 
the  immediate  crisis  undei'scoi'es  the  im- 
portance of  mutual  constraints  on  nuclear 
weapons.  Because  it  serves  our  security 
intei-ests,  I  remain  committed  to  the 
ratification  of  the  SALT  II  Treaty 

Last  month  I  said  in  my  State  of  the 
I'nion  address  that  we  must  face  the 
world  as  it  is.  We  must  be  honest  with 
oui'selves,  and  we  must  be  honest  with 
others.  That  is  why  3  years  ago  I  deter- 
mined to  reverse  the  declining  effective- 
ness of  our  military  forces.  And  that  is 
why  I  have  worked  so  hard  to  fight  infla- 
tion as  we  develop  a  national  energy  i)ol- 
icy.  We  are  dangerously  dependent  on  im- 
ported oil,  and  there  is  no  cheap  way  (JUt. 

Let  me  quote  from  the  American 
Legion's  own  energy  p(jlicy  statement: 
"Our  national  security,  as  well  as  our  eco- 
nomic security,  cannot  e.xist  without 
energy  independence.  .  .  ."' 

I  thank  you  again  for  your  hai'd  work 
and  your  effective  efforts  to  face  facts 
and  to  help  build  a  secure  future  for  our 
country.  We  cannot  spend  or  regulate  our 
way  out  of  eveiy  national  problem.  Nor 
can  we  abolish  inflation  by  decree.  That  is 
the  truth.  Above  all,  whether  it  is  regis- 
tration of  young  people,  increased  mili- 
taiy  strength  for  ourselves  and  our  allies, 
or  increased  energy  conservation  and 
production,  we  cannot  have  peace  and  se- 
curity without  a  willingness  to  sacrifice. 
That  is  the  most  important  truth  of  all. 

With  your  help  and  with  the  support 
of  the  American  people,  I  propose  to 
cari-y  on  the  struggle  for  a  strong  nation, 
for  a  just  society,  and  for  a  peaceful 
world. 


'Text  from  White  House  press  release 
of  Feb.  19,  1980. 


President  Carter's 
News  Conference, 
February  13 
(Excerpts) 


Since  the  day  our  Embassy  was  seized 
in  Tehran,  we  have  had  two  goals:  one, 
the  safety  and  release  of  the  Americans 
being  held  hostage,  and  the  other  is  the 
protection  of  our  national  interest  in 
this  critical  area  of  the  world.  Since 
that  first  day,  we  have  pursued  every 
possibility  to  achieve  these  goals.  No 
stone  has  been  left  unturned  in  the 
search  for  a  solution. 

Over  the  past  several  weeks,  our 
efforts  and  our  activities  have  become 
particularly  delicate  and  intense.  Re- 
cently there  have  been  some  positive 
signs,  although  experience  has  taught 
us  to  guard  against  excessive  optimism. 

Since  mid-November,  we  and  the 
Iranian  officials  have  been  discussing 
with  Secretary  General  Waldheim  of 
the  United  Nations  his  proposal  to  send 
a  commission  of  inquiry  to  Tehran.  We 
would  support  steps  by  the  United  Na- 
tions that  would  lead  to  the  release  of 
the  hostages  if  the  steps  are  consistent 
with  our  goals  and  our  essential  inter- 
national principles.  An  appropriate 
commission  with  a  carefully  defined 
purpose  would  be  a  step  toward  resolu- 
tion of  this  crisis. 

I  know  that  you  and  the  American 
people  will  understand  that  I  cannot 
afford  at  this  delicate  time  to  discuss  or 
to  comment  further  upon  any  specific 
efforts  that  may  be  underway  or  any 
proposals  that  may  be  useful  in  ending 
this  crisis. 

Q.  Do  you  think  it  was  proper  for 
the  United  States  to  restore  the  Shah 
to  the  throne  in  1953  against  the  pop- 
ular will  within  Iran? 

A.  That's  ancient  history,  and  I 
don't  think  it's  appropriate  or  helpful 
for  me  to  go  into  the  propriety  of  some- 
thing that  happened  30  years  ago. 

Q.  If  the  crisis  in  Afghanistan  is 
real  and  as  serious  as  you  have  said  it 
is — if  it  is,  does  the  United  States 
have  the  military  capacity  to  cope 
with  it,  short  of  using  a  nuclear 
weapon? 

A.  The  crisis  is  a  great  one,  pre- 
cipitated by  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Af- 
ghanistan, for  several  reasons.  First  of 
all,  this  is  a  crucial  area  of  the 
world — to  us,  to  our  allies,  and  to  other 
nations.  Two-thirds  of  all  the  oil  ex- 


ported in  the  entire  world  come  from 
the  Persian  Gulf  region.  Secondly,  it's  a 
highly  volatile,  rapidly  changing,  un- 
stable part  of  the  world.  Third,  the 
Soviets  have  been  indulging  in  a  steady 
military  buildup  over  a  number  of 
years,  which  has  caused  us  concern  and 
to  which  we  have  reacted  since  I've 
been  in  this  office.  Fourth,  the 
Soviets — a  major  departure  from  any- 
thing they've  done  since  the  Second 
World  War — have  now  exhibited  a 
willingness  to  use  their  military  forces 
beyond  their  own  borders,  in  a  massive 
invasion  of  Afghanistan. 

The  reaction  that  I  have  taken  to 
these  steps  are  appropriate  and,  I  be- 
lieve and  hope,  adequate.  We  must 
convince  the  Soviet  Union,  through 
peaceful  means,  peaceful  means,  that 
they  cannot  invade  an  innocent  country 
with  impunity,  and  they  must  suffer  the 
consequences  of  their  action. 

Everything  we've  done  has  been  to 
contribute  to  stability,  moderation, 
consistency,  persistence,  and  peace. 
We  have  taken  actions  on  our  own,  and 
we  have  asked  our  allies  and  others  to 
join  in  with  us  in  the  condemnation  of 
the  Soviet  Union  and  the  demand  that 
the  Soviets  withdraw  from  Afghanistan 
and  to  convince  them  that  any  further 
adventurism  on  their  part  would  cause 
grave  consequences  to  the  Soviet 
Union. 

In  my  judgment  our  forces  are 
adequate.  We  cannot  afford  to  let  the 
Soviets  choose  either  the  terrain  or  the 
tactics  to  be  used  by  any  other 
country — a  nation  that  might  be  in- 
vaded, their  neighbors,  our  allies,  or 
ourselves — if  they  should  persist  in 
their  aggressive  action.  Those  judg- 
ments would  have  to  be  made  at  the 
time.  But  I  believe  they're  adequate. 

Q.  In  Afghanistan  again,  what 
kind  of  regime  would  be  acceptable  to 
you"/  The  Russians  have  said  that  if 
they  withdraw,  they  would  leave — I 
think  have  left  the  indication  that 
they  would  leave  a  puppet  regime. 
Would  you  insist  on  a  neutralist  re- 
gime, or  what  ideas  have  you  on  it? 

A.  What  we  would  like  to  have, 
first  of  all,  is  a  Soviet  withdrawal  and  a 
commitment,  that  might  be  verified  and 
carried  out,  that  the  Soviets  would  not 
invade  another  country  or  use  their 
military  forces  beyond  their  borders 
again  to  destabilize  the  peace.  We 
would  like  to  have  a  neutral  country.  If 
there  had  to  be  a  transition  phase  dur- 
ing which  a  neutral  and  responsible 
government  might  be  established  ac- 


March  1980 


Special 


ceptable  to  the  Afghanistan  people, 
then  perhaps  some  peacekeeping  force 
espoused  by  the  United  Nations,  maybe 
comprised  of  Muslim  military  troops  or 
otherwise,  could  be  used  during  that 
transition  phase. 

But  the  prime  consideration  that  I 
have  is  to  make  sure  that  the  Soviets 
know  that  their  invasion  is  not  accept- 
able, to  marshal  as  much  support  from 
other  nations  of  the  world  as  possible, 
and  to  prevent  any  further  threat  to  the 
peace  and  the  cause  of  war.  I  think 
through  strength  we  can  maintain 
peace.  But  we've  got  to  be  resolute, 
we've  got  to  be  consistent,  and  our  ac- 
tions have  got  to  be  in  a  tone  of  long- 
range,  predictable  action  clearly  under- 
stood by  the  Soviet  Union. 

Q.  You  call  for  an  increase  of 
about  5%  in  military  defense  spend- 
ing. Some  Members  of  Congress  have 
suggested  that  that  might  be  too 
small,  given  the  invasion  of  Afghan- 
istan by  the  Soviet  Union.  Would  you 
support  a  plan  by  Congress  to  go  as 
far  as  doubling  the  current  5%  in- 
crease in  military  spending? 

A.  Ever  since  the  first  year  I've 
been  President,  we've  had  a  substantial 
and  steady  increase  in  spending  for  de- 
fense, because  I  recognized  that  we  had 
some  defects  in  our  defense  capability 
when  I  became  President.  I  might  add, 
in  complete  accuracy,  that  President 
Ford  had  initiated  this  buildup  shortly 
before  he  went  out  of  office.  It's  one 
I've  continued. 

In  my  opinion,  the  military  budget 
that  we  have  presented  to  the  Congress 
in  recent  weeks  is  the  appropriate  level 
of  e.xpenditures.  It's  very  carefully 
matched  to  how  rapidly  we  can  pur- 
chase and  develop  weapons  and  accu- 
rately matched  to  the  ultimate  goals  of 
deployment  of  our  troops,  the  mobility 
of  our  troops,  and  the  interrelationship 
with  our  allies. 

I'm  not  saying  that  there  would  be 
no  fine  tuning  or  some  modification  to 
the  budget  that  wouldn't  be  acceptable 
to  me,  but  I  would  resist  very  strongly 
any  effort — as  has  been  proposed  just 
recently — to  cut  the  defense  budget 
below  what  I  proposed. 

Q.  You  have  said  that  the  Soviets 
have  to  be  made  to  pay  a  price  for  in- 
vading Afghanistan,  and  your  counsel 
has  said  that  our  boycott  of  the 
Olympics  is  not  intended  to  be  puni- 
tive. How  do  you  explain  the  seeming 
difference  between  these  two  posi- 
tions'/ 


A.  We  have  no  desire  to  use  the 
Olympics  to  punish,  except  the  Soviets 
attach  a  major  degree  of  importance  to 
the  holding  of  the  Olympics  in  the 
Soviet  Union.  In  their  own  propaganda 
material,  they  claim  that  the  willing- 
ness of  the  International  Olympic 
Committee  to  let  the  games  be  held  in 
Moscow  is  an  endorsement  of  the 
foreign  policy  and  the  peace-loving  na- 
ture of  the  Soviet  Union. 

To  me  it's  unconscionable  for  any 
nation  to  send  athletes  to  the  capital  of 
a  nation  under  the  aegis  of  the  Olym- 
pics when  that  nation — that  host 
nation — is  actively  involved  in  the  in- 
vasion of  and  the  subjugation  of  inno- 
cent people.  And  so,  for  that  reason,  I 
don't  believe  that  we  are  at  all  obli- 
gated to  send  our  athletes  to  Moscow. 

And  I  would  like  to  repeat,  if  the 
Soviet  Union  does  not  withdraw  its 
troops  from  Afghanistan  by  the  20th  of 
this  month,  then  neither  I  nor  the 
American  people  nor  the  Congress  will 
support  the  sending  of  an  Olympic  team 
to  Moscow  this  summer. 


Q.  If  the  Soviets,  by  any  chance, 
should  remove  their  troops  from  Af- 
ghanistan between  February  20  and 
May  24,  when  the  Olympic  commit- 
tees have  to  give  their  decisions,  is 
there  any  possibility  you  might 
change  your  mind  and  then  support 
sending  the  American  team  to  Mos- 
cow? 


A.  I  don't  see  any  possibility  of 


that. 


Q.  As  you  know,  the  French  have 
not  agreed  to  go  to  a  foreign  ministers 
conference  in  Rome  later  this  month. 
The  West  Germans  have  not  agreed  to 
the  Olympic  boycott,  and  there's  been 
some  dissatisfaction.  I  understand, 
with  your  Administration's  reaction 
to  the  Japane-se.  Have  you  been  en- 
tirely satisfied  with  the  Japanese,  the 
French,  and  the  West  German  reac- 
tions to  your  call  for  punishment  and 
sanctions  against  the  Soviet  Union? 

A.  In  general,  I  have  been  well 
pleased,  yes.  There's  a  remarkable  de- 
gree of  unanimity  among  all  our  major 
allies  about  the  seriousness  of  the 
Soviet  threat  into  Afghanistan  and  the 
actions  that  must  be  taken  to  counter 
that  threat  and  prevent  further  aggres- 
sion by  the  Soviet  Union. 

There  are  nuances  of  difference. 


The  countries  are  different;  they  have 
different  perspectives;  they  have  dif- 
ferent forms  of  government.  Some  are 
coalition  governments  where  the  prime 
minister  has  a  different  party  repre- 
sented in  his  foreign  ministry  and  so 
forth.  We  do  have  times  when  we  get 
aggravated  and  displeased,  for  in- 
stance, with  the  French.  There  are 
times  when  the  French  get  aggravated 
and  displeased  by  us. 

The  recent  disagreement  on 
exactly  the  time  and  the  composition 
and  the  secrecy  to  be  maintained  by  the 
foreign  ministers  meeting  was  unfortu- 
nate. My  understanding  of  it  was  de- 
rived from  a  telephone  conversation 
with  [West  German]  Chancellor 
Schmidt  after  he  met  several  days  with 
[French]  President  Giscard  d'Estaing. 
My  understanding  was  that  the  date 
and  the  place  had  been  arranged  by 
them  and  that  I  was  conforming  to  their 
request.  That  was  not  the  same  under- 
standing that  the  French  had.  We  did 
not  communicate  adequately.  But  that's 
just  a  minor  difference  compared  to  the 
major  agreements  on  which  we  base 
present  and  future  policy  among  us 
allies. 

Q.  You  once  said  that  you  weren't 
sure  whether  American  troops  should 
ever  be  used  to  defend  Yugoslavia. 
Marshal  Tito  is  sick.  In  light  of  Af- 
ghanistan, do  you  still  feel  that  way? 

A.  We  have  had  close  discussions 
with  the  Yugoslavian  leaders,  including 
Marshal  Tito  when  he  was  here  not  too 
long  ago.  The  overall  message  that  they 
give  to  us,  which  I  accept  as  accurate, 
is  that  Yugoslavia  is  a  strong,  fiercely 
independent,  courageous,  well- 
equipped  nation  that  can  defend  itself. 
If  we  are  called  upon  to  give  any  kind  of 
aid  to  the  Yugoslavian  people  in  the  fu- 
ture, we  would  seriously  consider  it  and 
do  what,  in  our  opinion,  would  be  best 
for  them  and  for  us. 

I've  had  frequent  conversations  re- 
cently with  other  major  European  lead- 
ers about  the  need  to  strengthen  our 
ties  with  Yugoslavia  and  to  protect 
them  as  a  nonaligned  country,  without 
being  dominated  or  threatened  suc- 
cessfully by  the  Soviet  Union.  We'll 
take  whatever  action  is  necessary  to 
carry  out  those  goals,  but  commensu- 
rate with  actual  need  and  commensu- 
rate with  specific  requests  from  Yugo- 
slavia itself.  ■ 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Feb.  18,  1980. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


The  Secretary 


I'liit  now  these  efforts  h;n'e  an  e\eii 
uicater  worth. 

•  We  will  maintain  a  policy  of  posi- 
ii\i'  enga.uenient  with  the  rleveloping 
udi-lil.  to  assist  their  development  and 
liflp  them  defend  their  independence. 
I'lii.--  is  deeply  in  our  interest  as  well  as 

IIUMI-S. 

•  And  we  will  continue  to  press  the 
|irncess  of  democratization  and  human 
iii^lits.  For  as  Presiflent  Carter  noted 
111  Ins  State  of  the  Union  address: 

111  reiiressive  regimes,  popular  frusti'a- 
tions  often  have  no  outlet  except  through 
violence.  But  when  peoples  and  their  gov- 
ernments can  approach  their  problems 
together — through  open,  democratic 
methods — the  basis  for  stability  and  peace 
is  far  more  solid  and  enduring.  That  is  why 
our  support  for  human  rights  in  other  coun- 
tries is  in  our  own  national  interest  as  well 
as  part  of  our  own  national  character. 

Supporting  the  Foreign  Service 

Against  this  policy  background,  let  me 
comment  briefly  on  the  safety  and 
well-being  of  the  people  on  whom  we 
dejiend  to  conduct  the  foreign  affairs  of 
this  Nation. 

Since  the  days  of  Benjamin 
Franklin  and  the  Committee  of  Cori'e- 
spontlence,  our  diplomats  have  risked 
their  lives  in  the  service  of  our  country. 
At  no  time  since  World  War  II  has  such 
;ei'vice  been  more  dangei'ous  and  dif- 
ficult than  at  present.  Recent  events 
have  illustrated  the  jioint  all  too 
cleai'ly.  Foreign  Service  has  often  be- 
come hazardous,  frontline  duty  as  evi- 
denced by  actions  against  our  peojde  in 
Tehran,  Islamabad,  Kabul,  Triijoli, 
Managua,  and  San  Salvador. 

At  many  other  posts,  persons 
se)-ving  abroad  have  to  work  and  live 
under  conditions  of  physical  danger  and 
stress.  More  and  moi'e  employees  en- 
dure long  periods  of  separation  from 
their  families  because  of  deteriorating 
conditions  of  overseas  service  an<l, 
more  recently,  because  of  widespread 
evacuations  of  their  dependents. 

Despite  these  most  trying  circum- 
stances the  Foreign  Service  has  per- 
formed with  singular  dedication  and 
high  competence. 

During  times  such  as  these,  the 
members  of  the  Foreign  Service  de- 
serve the  best  conditions  of  service  and 
support  we  can  reasonably  provide.  To 
this  end,  the  budget  submissions  befoi'e 
you  have  been  formulated,  and  certain 


I'evisions  may  be  needed,  to  provide 
enhanced  supjiort  for  oui-  jieople  in  sev- 
eral respects. 

•  Our  foreign  buildings  operations, 
which  have  always  had  the  strong 
backing  of  this  committee  and  the  Con- 
gress, have  been  modified  to  ]:)rovide 
greatei-  emjihasis  than  before  on  better 
staff  housing  and  safei'  working  sjjace  in 
dangerous,  disagreeable,  and  high-cost 
locations. 

•  Our  FY  1981  request  presently 
contains  $25  million  for  jiost  security 
against  potential  terrorist  attacks  and 
better  safeguards  against  fire.  In  light 
of  the  increased  danger  of  hostile  mob 
actions,  we  are  seeking  authorization  to 
submit  in  the  near  futui-e  an  FY  1980 
sup])lemental  request  designerl  to  ])i-o- 
vide  better  jirotection  in  such  cii'cum- 
stances. 

•  The  Administration  will  soon 
reach  a  final  decision  on  a  new  single 
Foreign  Sei-vice  pay  plan.  The  Admin- 
isti'ation  will  then  be  requesting  adiii- 
tional  FY  1981  sums,  as  covered  in  the 
allowances  for  contingencies  section  of 
the  Federal  budget,  to  provide  Foreign 
Sei-\ice  employees  pay  comparable  to 
their  Civil  Service  counterparts.  This 
was  recommended  by  a  congressionally 
mandated  expert  pay  study  completed 
last  June  and  is  required  by  the  Pay 
Comparability  Act  of  1971.' 

•  Our  evacuation  costs  i-eached  a 
record  high  last  yeai'  and  may  do  so 
again  this  year.  Thus  there  is  an  un- 
avoidable deficit  in  the  FY  1979  emergen- 
cies account,  along  with  an  anticipated 
shortfall  this  year,  for  which  we  are 
seeking  sujjplemental  funds. 

•  For  the  worst  hardship  posts  we 
are  also  including  funds  in  our  FY  1981 
request  to  permit  annual  rest  and  re- 
cuperation trips  to  the  United  States 
for  the  first  time,  as  authorized  by 
Congress. 

•  We  are  requesting  funds  and  po- 
sitions in  the  FY  1981  submission  to 
strengthen  our  basic  reporting  and 
analytical  capabilities  at  key  posts  and 
related  critical  hard-language  training 
skills. 

•  And  finally,  we  are  seeking  final 
congressional  support  this  year  for  a 
new  Foreign  Service  Act  to  replace  the 
present  obsolete  1946  charter.  The  au- 
thorizing committees  are  now  marking 
up  the  bill.  This  measure  will  provide  a 
modern,  simplified,  and  suppoi'tive  |.iei'- 
sonnel  structure.  The  luidei'standing 


and  subsequent  support  of  the  Appro- 
priations Committee  will  be  essential. 

In  concluding,  let  me  emphasize 
one  point:  If  we  are  to  meet  the  re- 
quirements of  leadership  in  a  troubled 
world,  we  have  to  back  our  policies 
with  our  resources. 

That  basic  truth  is  widely  recog- 
nized in  connection  with  our  defenses. 
We  must  be  prepared  to  invest  consid- 
erably greater  sums  in  the  years  ahead. 

The  same  rule  applies  in  connection 
with  our  foreign  economic  and  military 
assistance.  Minimal  commitments  will 
not  ovei'come  massive  requirements. 

The  rule  holds  just  as  firmly  when 
it  comes  to  supporting  the  people  we 
depend  upon  to  design  and  conduct  the 
foreign  jjolicy  of  the  United  States. 

I  am  confident  that  they  will  con- 
tinue to  justify  your  backing  and  sup- 
jiort in  the  critical  times  ahead.  ■ 


'Press  release  30  of  Feb.  4,  1980.  The 
complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be 
published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


"New  York  Times" 
Interview 


Follou'iiKj  arc  e.i-cer/tts  fruiii  Sec- 
)'eta)i/  Vance's  iiitei'riew  with  Bei'intrd 
Gwertziiiaii  on  Jcnniari/  15,  19S0,  inid 
piihlislied  ill  The  New  York  Times  on 
Jiniiinnj  Hi, 

Q.  About  a  year  ago,  you  were  saying 
that  if  we  got  a  strategic  arms  agree- 
ment, this  might  lead  to  better  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union,  and  I  won- 
dered if  you  might  reflect  on  what  went 
wrong. 

A.  I  had  hoped  that  if  we  were  able 
to  get  SAUT  II  negotiated  and  signed  and 
ratified  that  this  would  provide  a  basis 
for  a  more  stable  relationship,  without 
the  peaks  and  valleys  that  we  have  expe- 
rienced in  the  more  than  3  years  we  have 
been  here. 

However,  the  situation  which  we 
have  just  seen  take  place  in  Afghanistan 
has  obviously  had  a  veiy  major  negative 
impact  on  our  relations.  The  Soviet  Union 
clearly  crossed  a  threshold  in  its  action. 


March  1980 


37 


The  Secretary 


(J.  What  prompted  the  Soviet  ac- 
tion? 

A.  There  are  all  kinds  of  theories. 
They  run  from  the  Soviets'  attempting  U) 
place  themselves  in  a  position  where  they 
can  exert  inci'easing  influence  in  Central 
and  South  Asia — where  they  are  closer  to 
the  Indian  Ocean  and  could  have  as  a 
long-range  objective  pushing  through  to 
the  Indian  Ocean — to  the  thesis  that  they 
found  the  situation  deteriorating  in  Af- 
ghanistan and  they  decided  to  move  in,  to 
a  concern  about  what  an  independent  and 
nationalistic  Afghanistan  with  a  strong 
I'eligious  base  would  mean  for  the 
Moslems  in  the  Soviet  Union. 

Hut  I  don't  think  it  does  any  good  to 
tiy,  at  this  p(]int.  to  psychoanalyze  which 
of  these  was  the  reason — or  what  combi- 
nation of  them.  The  jjlain  fact  is  that  the 
Soviet  Union  committed  aggression  in  a 
naked  way  by  moving  their  forces  in  vast 
numbers  into  a  neighboring  countiy:  in 
short,  it  invaded  that  country.  The  conse- 
quence of  that  is  that  there  must  be  a 
sharp  and  firm  response. 

The  .'-liiNiets  must  recognize  that  the>' 
arc  going  to  have  to  pay  a  cost  as  long  as 
their  troops  stay  in  Afghanistan.  In  addi- 
tion, they  are  going  to  have  to  realize 
that  this  kind  of  action  is  going  to  be  met 
by  a  firm  and  jn'otracted  response  so  that 
such  adventures  will  not  hajijien  in  the 
future. 

(J.  Do  you  think  the  United  States 
contributed  to  the  Soviet  action  by  not 
being  decisive  enough  in  its  own  signals 
to  .Moscow'/ 

A.  The  United  States  has  e.xpresseil 
its  convictions  on  important  issues  to  the 
Soviet  Union  in  strong  terms  and  I  don't 
buy  the  proposition  that  the  Soviet  Union 
didn't  understand  our  views  on  key  is- 
sui's.  I  think  they  took  a  conscious,  calcu- 
lated decision  in  invading  Afghanistan, 
and  they  are  going  to  have  to  pa\'  the 
pi-irc  fo|-  it. 

(i.  Do  vou  feel  personally  misled  by 
the  Russians'.' 

A.  No.  1  have  always  believed  that 
there  are  both  competitive  and  coinple- 
nientaiy  interests  involved  in  our  rela- 
tionship. I  have  felt  that  even  though 
there  were  competitive  aspects  in  the  re- 
lationship, we  should  try  to  see  whether 
we  could  find  a  convergence  of  interests 
in  areas  .such  as  arms  control,  which 
hojiefully  could  lead  to  an  easing  of  ten- 
sions. 


()bvi(nisly,  the  action  which  was 
taken  in  Afghanistan  by  them  has  dealt  a 
Itlow  to  our  bilateral  relations.  That  is  too 
bad,  but  we  live  in  the  real  world,  and  we 
have  to  respond  to  it  in  a  clear  and  firm 
way,  and  we  have  done  so. 

().  Can  you  discuss  the  speech  or 
doctrine  that  the  President  is  preparing 
to  deal  with  the  situation? 

A.  In  light  of  what  happened  in  Af- 
ghanistan, We  are  reviewing  the  situati(in 
and  considei'ation  is  being  given  to  a 
sjieech  which  would  state  our  foreign  pol- 
icy in  broad  terms  and  also  specifically,  as 
it  I'elates  to  southwest  Asia.  'We  are  con- 
sidering the  possibility  of  a  statement  on 
luiilding  a  strengthened  framework  for 
regional  cooi)eration  in  the  area. 

(J.  Would  this  be  similar  to  the 
Kisenhower  doctrine,  which  offered 
.\merican  protection  for  countries  in 
the  .Middle  East  threatened  by  com- 
munism? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  comment  on  spe- 
cifics which  may  develop  from  the  current 
i-eview,  but  there  ai'e  certain  elements  in 
our  strategy  that  are  already  obvious. 


The  Soviet,^  in/<st  recognize  thai  thei/ 
(ire  going  to  have  to  pay  a  coi^t  as 
long  as  their  troops  stay  in  Afghan- 
istan. 


There  is  the  fact  of  the  increased 
jn-esence  of  American  forces  in  the  Indian 
Ocean  area.  There  is  the  fact  that  we 
have  always  stated  that  we  would  in- 
crease assistance  to  nations  which  are 
threatened.  And  there  is  the  fact  that  we 
will  press  in  negotiations  for  regional 
peace,  such  as  the  Arab-Israeli  negotia- 
tions. These  are  some  of  the  points  that 
are  involved  in  considering  the  frame- 
work for  regional  cooperation. 

(J.  .\n  .American  team  recently 
went  to  Kenya,  Somalia,  and  Oman  to 
discuss  further  use  of  military  facilities 
there.  What  has  been  the  reaction  from 
those  countries? 

\.  Reactions  arising  from  our  pre- 
liminary  discussions  have  been  positive. 
By  the  way,  we  are  not  talking  of  huge 
U.S.  ba.ses  but  the  use  of  facilities  that 
e.xist  in  vai'ious  countries  which  would  be 
available  to  the  United  States  in  connec- 
tion v\ith  the  increased  presence  which 
the  United  States  has  there  and  would  in- 
tend to  keep  there  for  the  foreseeable  fu- 
ture. 


Q.  Like  more  port  calls  and 
logistics? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  Rather  than  stationing  combat 
troops? 

A.  \'es. 

(J.  .\s  someone  who  has  been 
interested  in  sports  your  whole  life,  do 
you  have  any  personal  feelings  about 
.American  participation  in  the  .Moscow- 
summer  Olympics? 

A.  Yes.  I  look  back  to  the  19:](i 
games,  when  I  was  in  college,  and  I  think 
in  hindsight  that  it  was  a  mistake  for  us 
to  attend  the  1936  Olympics.  Obviously, 
that  affects  my  thinking  about  the 
curivnt  situation. 

Q.  In  other  words,  you  oppose 
.American  participation  if  the  current 
situation  prevails  in  .Afghanistan? 

A.  That  is  my  view. 

Q.  .At  w  hat  point  do  you  have  to 
make  a  decision?  Obviously,  you  can't 
wait  until  .July  IS. 

A.  It  would  have  to  be  made  in  the 
fairly  neai-  future. 

Q.  Hy  the  end  of  this  month? 

A.  1  would  say  by  mid-Februaiy. 

(J.  Can  the  government  compel 
.Americans  not  to  take  part? 

A.  If  the  government  e.xpressed  its 
views,  I  believe  that  our  citizens  would 
follow  that  view. 

Q.  Does  the  President  feel  the 
same  way  as  you  do  on  the  Olympics? 

.A.  .My  guess  is  he  does. 

(J.  The  other  day,  Mr.  Brezhnev 
again  said  that  the  Soviet  troops  would 
he  withdrawn  after  their  mission  was 
completed.  Do  you  think  they  will? 

A.  If  they  did,  that  would  be  a  good 
thing.  I  don't  believe  that  is  going  to 
ha|)i)en  in  the  near  future,  but  I  would 
like  to  be  jn'oven  wrong. 

(J.  Vou  don't  think  the  United 
States  has  overreacted  in  its  actions 
and  rhetoric? 

A.  No,  I  don't. 

(J.  Is  there  any  disagreement 
within  the  .Administration  on  what  to 
do? 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


The  Secretary 


I        A.  There  is  no  (lisaj;reemein. 

Q.  On  tho  question  of  further  arms 
Lontroi  talks,  there  has  been  some 
ronfusion.  What  are  your  instructions? 

A.  Our  policy,  insofar  as  arms  control 
ssui's  are  concerned,  is  that  we  should 
(iiitinue  to  pursue  those  under  discussion 
,\ith  one  or  two  exceptions.  This  is 
ii'cause  the  jjursuit  of  these  negotiations 
s  in  (lur  national  interest  and,  indeed, 
u'comes  even  more  important  at  a  time 
if  hiuh  tension  or  crisis  than  in  moi'e 
iiinnal  times.  It  is  in  the  interest  of  the 
1  'iiitt'd  States  and  of  regional  stability 
iiid  |ieace  as  well. 

So  we  will  be  pui'suiiig  vai'ious  arms 
•iiiurol  initiatives  which  are  going 
niwai'd.  One  exception  is  that  of  the 
iidian  Ocean,  where  the  action  in 
M'uhanistan  cut  the  legs  from  under  the 
iasi>  for  such  negotiations.  In  other  areas 
,ik-h  as  nonproliferation  of  nucleai' 
Acapons,  our  objectives  remain  the  same, 
md  we  .should  also  continue  to  pursue 
iniits  on  conventional  arms  transfers 
\ith  the  understanding  that  when  our 
Viriuls  are  placed  in  jeopardy  by  actions 
tv  ihi'eats  that  are  directed  against  them. 
\v  u  ill  help  them  and  jirovifle  them  with 
iiilitary  assistance.  We  will  continue  to 
)ursue  that  policy. 

Q.  On  Iran,  how  frustrating  has  it 
ibeen  for  you  as  a  negotiator'.' 

A.  It  is  a  veiT  frustrating  problem 
because  there  is  no  interlocutor  with 
whom  one  can  talk  who  has  the  authority 
to  pursue  a  discussion. 

For  example,  you  begin  to  talk  to 
somebody.  It  appears  that  maybe  some 
progress  is  being  made.  Then  the  inter- 
locutor is  removed  from  the  scene,  and 
somebody  else  is  put  in  his  place.  We  may 
begin  to  make  progress  again  in  the  dis- 
cussions. Then  either  that  intei'locutor  is 
removed  fi'om  the  scene  or  he  is  over- 
ruled, so  that  there  is  no  one  that  you  can 
really  talk  to  and  have  any  confidence 
that  something  is  going  to  come  out  of  the 
discussion. 

Obviously,  this  is  a  teri-ibly  frustrat- 
ing experience,  especially  when  the 
safety  of  .^O  Americans  is  involved,  and 
concern  about  their  well-being  is  some- 
thing that  one  carries  every  hour  of  the 
day  and  night. 

I  often  wake  up  at  night  and  wondei' 
if  there  is  some  avenue  we  are  not  pursu- 
ing that  we  ought  to  be  pursuing.  I  get 
up  and  tiy  to  think  out  the  issues,  think  a 
new  suggestion  through.  This  is  someting 
that  all  of  us  do  because  this  is  uppermost 
in  our  minds. 

Q.  How  many  secret  channels  have 
you  tried? 


A.   Lefs  say  more  than  10. 

(J.  Were  there  some  secret  trips 
you  took? 

A.  Yes.  Early  in  the  crisis,  when  we 
were  first  involved  in  negotiations  in  the 
hope  that  we  could  find  a  rapid  solution 
for  the  problem,  I  made  three  secret  trij^s 
to  New  York.  We  thought  they  held  some 
promise  and  that  is  why  they  were  han- 
dled in  such  a  sensitive  way.  It  was  being 
handled  through  the  United  Nations. 

Q.   Is  that  when  the  package  pro- 
posal first  surfaced — the  idea  of,  in  re- 
turn for  freeing  the  hostages,  the  Ira- 
nians could  have  their  grievances  aired 
at  the  I'nited  Nations? 

A.  Yes. 

(J.  What  will  happen  next?  .\re  we 
in  for  a  protracted  siege? 

A.   I  can't  say  that  I  see  at  this  jjoint 
any  encouraging  prospect  foi-  a  quick  so- 
lution. I  wish  I  could  say  othenvise.  But  I 
would  be  misleading  you  if  I  indicatefl 
that  I  did  see  a  (|uick  solution. 

Q.  Is  the  United  States  pushing  it- 
self as  a  result  of  .\fghanistan  into  a  re- 
lationship with  t'hina  that  might  hold 
risks  for  the  future? 

.\.    I  think  that  the  Chinese  will  fol- 
low what  they  believe  to  be  the  correct 
coui'se  of  action  from  their  standpoint.  We 
will  follow  what  we  believe  to  be  correct. 
There  may  be  a  degree  of  parallelism  on 
steps  that  should  be  taken  in  connection 
with  Afghanistan.  But  that  does  not 
mean  that  there  is  any  military  alliance  oi- 
such  relationship  between  the  United 
States  and  China. 

Q.  Might  not  the  Chinese  draw  the 
impression  we  would  support  them  in 
another  war  on  Vietnam  or  somewhere 
else? 

A.  There  is  certainly  no  basis  for 
that.  They  are  going  to  follow  what  they 
believe  to  be  in  their  national  interests. 
We  will  do  the  same.  There  will  be  differ- 
ences of  views,  as  in  the  Security  Council 
the  other  night  when  they  did  not  partic- 
ipate in  the  sanctions  vote  against  Iran. 

Q.  How  important  is  a  solution  of 
the  Palestinian  issue  to  the  kind  of  re- 
gional cooperation  you  have  talked 
about? 

A.  It  is  clear  that  the  solution  of  the 
Arab-Israeli  dispute  is  a  key  issue  that  is 
necessary  for  the  achievement  of  peace 


and  stability  in  the  region.  Therefore,  one 
of  the  most  important  matters  that  we 
and  others  have  to  devote  our  attention 
to  is  an  effort  to  ti7  and  bring  about  a 
satisfactoiT  resolution  of  the  Palestinian 
problem.  We  must  continue  to  ])ursue  the 
autonomy  talks  and  try  to  make  progress 
in  them  by  the  target  date,  which  the 
parties  set  for  themselves,  at  the  end  of 
May 

Q.  Summing  up,  do  you  think 
we're  in  another  cold  war? 

A.  Obviously,  the  bilateral  relation- 
ship has  received  a  severe  blow  as  a  re- 
sult of  what  happened  in  Afghanistan, 
but  I  think  it  is  too  early  at  this  point  to 
say  what  the  long-range  outcome  is  going 
to  be. 

This  will  depend  upon  the  actions 
which  Moscow  now  takes  and  what  their 
actions  will  be  in  respect  to  the  with- 
drawal of  forces  from  Afghanistan. 
Therefore,  it  is  premature  to  predict  the 
long-term  future. 

What  is  not  premature  is  to  make 
sure  that  the  steps  that  we  take  and  that 
others  take  are  clear  and  firm  and  strong 
so  that  the  Soviets  understand  clearly  the 
action  which  they  took  is  going  to  require 
them  to  pay  a  continuing  price  as  long  as 
their  troops  remain  in  Afghanistan  and 
that  aggression  will  be  resisted. 

Q.  Are  you  still  planning  to  leave 
office  at  the  end  of  this  term? 

A.  I  haven't  changed  my  mind.   ■ 


March  1980 


39 


The  Secretary 


FY  1 981  Foreign  Assistance  Programs 


Sfnfeii/ei/t  before  the  Honse 
Foreign  Affairs  Corrniiitfee  on  Feh- 
riiari/  5,  19S0J 

When  I  appeared  before  you  a  year  ago 
on  behalf  of  our  foreign  assistance  pro- 
grams, I  said  that  the  United  States 
cannot  have  a  foreign  policy  of  active 
leadership  in  the  world  if  we  are  un- 
willing to  put  out  resources  behind  our 
words.  Today,  in  the  face  of  new  chal- 
lenges in  southwest  Asia  and  other  re- 
gions of  the  world,  that  fact  is  all  the 
more  evident. 

The  President,  with  the  clear  sujj- 
])ort  of  the  Congress  and  the  American 
people,  has  responded  firmly  and 
thoughtfully  to  the  challenges  posed  by 
terrorism  in  Iran  and  aggression 
against  Afghanistan.  In  both  cases,  we 
are  showing  that  acts  which  violate  in- 
ternational law,  threaten  our  interests, 
or  abuse  our  citizens  will  meet  a  deter- 
mined response  from  a  strong  and  uni- 
fied America. 

Afghanistan  and  Iran  are  im- 
mediate challenges  which  require  im- 
mediate responses.  But  they  also  are 
manifestations  of  more  jjrofound  and 
sustained  challenges  which  we  must 
meet  through  sustained  and  determined 
policies  of  our  own.  And  buttressing 
those  policies  must  be  strong  foreign 
assistance  programs  of  the  kind  we  ai'e 
proposing. 

Diplomacy  and  ForeiKti  Aid 

111  Third  World  countries  throughout 
Latin  Amei'ica,  Africa,  and  Asia,  more 
and  moi'e  ])eople  are  insisting  not  only 
that  their  nations  preserve  their  inde- 
pendence from  foreign  domination  but 
also  that  they  themselves  have  a 
greater  say  in  the  economic  and  politi- 
cal decisions  of  their  governments. 
When  these  demands  are  long  denied, 
popular  frustrations  can  e.xplode  in 
violent  and  radical  directions.  By  help- 
ing poorer  nations  and  people  in  need  to 
build  a  better  future,  we  are  both 
strengthening  the  world  economy  and 
enhancing  the  jwlitical  stability  which 
comes  with  economic,  social,  and  politi- 
cal justice. 

Beyond  the  challenge  of  construc- 
tively addressing  change  within  de- 
veloping nations,  we  must  respond  as 
well  to  threats  they  may  face  from  be- 


40 


yond  their  bordei's.  A  policy  which 
failed  to  provide  for  the  legitimate  se- 
curity needs  of  our  friends  would  be 
more  than  short-sighted.  It  would  be 
dangerous.  For  it  would  increase  the 
danger  of  conflicts — and  international 
confrontations — that  can  be  avoided  if 
local  security  balances  are  preserved. 

We  can  expect  that  the  Soviet 
Union  will  continue  to  take  advantage 
of  conflict  —  both  within  developing  na- 
tions and  between  them.  As  we  pursue 
policies  that  helj)  developing  nations 
preserve  their  independence  and  meet 
the  real  needs  of  their  people,  we  ai'e 
addressing  today  the  conditions  of  pov- 
erty and  tension  that  will  produce,  if 
left  unattended,  the  crises  of  tomorrow. 

In  short,  a  policy  which  addresses 
in  their  own  terms  the  genuine  needs 
and  priorities  of  Third  World  nations  is 
a  policy  which  also  has  the  effect  of 
hel])ing  us  comj^ete  effectively  with  the 
Soviets  in  the  Third  World.  Through 
sustained  support  for  economic  and  in- 
stitutional development  in  the  Third 
World,  we  also  strengthen  the  global 
basis  for  resistance  to  outside  domina- 
tion. 

In  an  immediate  context,  we  are 
also  well  served  by  the  vivid  contrast 
between  our  approach  to  the  developing 
world  and  that  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

•  We  are  seeking  to  address  human 
needs. 

•  We  are  prepai'ed  to  work  within  a 
world  of  diversity,  with  nations  of 
varying  economic  and  political  systems, 
as  long  as  they  are  prepared  to  work 
with  us  toward  goals  we  share. 

•  Our  efforts  are  structured  to 
support  the  independence  and  self- 
sufficiency  of  developing  nations. 

The  Afghanistan  invasion  is  a  vivid 
demonstration  for  all  the  world  to  see 
that  the  Soviet  Union  disregards  such 
principles  and  practices.  This  fact — and 
this  contrast  —  has  not  been  lost  on  the 
nations  of  the  world. 

I  began  my  testimony  with  this 
brief  discussion  of  the  importance  of 
our  foreign  assistance  to  our  diplomacy, 
since  together  we  must  make  cei'tain 
that  our  diplomacy  is  strong  and  equal 
to  the  challenges  of  our  times.  And 
again,  I  emphasize  that  we  cannot  lead 
in  the  world  without  adequate  re- 
sources. 


We  all  must  also  recognize  the  full 
range  of  compelling  reasons  for  effec- 
tive foreign  assistance  programs. 

The  human  dimension  of  the  issue 
is  clear.  We  cannot  I'est  well  when  we 
know  that  hunger  is  the  bitter  com- 
panion of  hundreds  of  millions  of  human 
beings;  when  we  know  that  many  mil- 
lions more  lack  such  essentials  as  shel- 
ter, health,  and  training.  The  continua- 
tion of  that  suffering  is  an  affront  to  the 
conscience  of  men  and  women 
everywhere. 

And  our  humanitarian  commitment 
is  reinforced  by  the  recognition  of  other 
ways  in  which  our  aid  serves  our  inter- 
ests as  well  as  the  interests  of  de- 
veloping nations. 

The  countries  of  the  Third  World 
are  increasingly  involved  in  our  daily 
lives.  They  supply  the  major  proportion 
of  such  critical  raw  materials  as  rubber, 
manganese,  and  tin.  And  they  are  the 
fastest  gi'owing  markets  for  oui'  ex- 
ports. 

The  cooperation  of  developing 
countries  is  also  essential  to  the  solu- 
tion of  global  problems  that  affect  us 
all.  No  nation,  acting  alone,  can  halt  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons  or  cure  the 
lioUution  of  air  and  water  or  overcome 
the  tension  between  spiraling  global 
population  growth  and  finite  resources. 
There  can  only  be  international 
answers  —  oi'  there  will  be  no  real 
answer — to  these  and  other  pressing 
global  challenges. 

For  these  reasons,  the  proposition 
is  inescapable  that  peace  and  prosperity 
for  ourselves,  now  and  for  the  future, 
are  directly  related  to  the  strength  of 
our  relations  with  the  developing  na- 
tions and  the  political  and  economic 
paths  they  choose  to  pursue.  That  is  not 
to  say  that  our  interests  and  those  of 
developing  nations  inevitably  are  the 
same.  They  often  are  not.  But  we  can 
negotiate  most  effectively  and  con- 
structively on  specific  and  practical  is- 
sues between  us  in  an  atmosphere  of 
mutual  respect  and  shared  concerns. 

I  believe  we  have  demonstrated 
over  the  past  several  years  that  our 
clear  commitment  to  work  toward  jus- 
tice and  economic  pi'ogress  abi-oad  does 
sti-engthen  our  ties  in  the  developing 
world.  Despite  setbacks  and  heightened 
causes  of  tension  in  some  areas,  our 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


If 


The  Secretary 


'elatiiiiishi|is  with  the  nations  of  Africa, 
Latin  Aniei'ica,  ami  Asia  are,  in  gen- 
ei'al,  better  today  than  they  have  been 
in  some  time.  And  the  practical  results 
have  served  our  interests. 

•  We  have  made  concrete  progi'ess 
with  developing  nations  on  inter- 
national economic  issues — on  the  com- 
mon fund,  on  trade  and  investment  re- 
ations,  and  on  strengthening  inter- 
national economic  institutions  such  as 
the  World  Bank  and  the  International 
Monetary  P'und. 

•  Pi'ogress  towai'd  peace,  justice, 
uid  independence  in  Rhodesia  has  been 

due  not  only  to  the  skill  of  British  di- 
plomacy and  the  wisdom  of  the  parties  to 
the  conflict:  it  would  not  have  beesi  pos- 
ible  without  the  constructive  role 
played  by  the  African  governments  in 
the  region  and  our  ability  to  woi'k  with 
them. 

•  Resolving  our  dispute  with 
Panama  on  the  future  of  the  canal  has 
sti'engthened  the  security  of  the  canal 
and  strengthened  the  basis  for  con- 
strictive relations  throughout  the 
hemisphere. 

•  And,  with  regard  to  the  situa- 
tions in  Ii-an  and  Afghanistan,  our  abil- 
ity to  pursue  our  diplomatic  goals  at  the 
United  Nations  and  elsewhere  has  been 
enhancefl  by  our  imi)i'oved  relations 
with  the  nations  of  the  Third  World. 

The  foreign  assistance  legislation 
before  you  is,  quite  simply,  a  request 
for  the  resources  and  the  fle.xibility 
necessary  to  sustain  this  active  and 
pi-actical  approach  to  the  developing 
world. 

The  re()uests  before  you  are  aus- 
tere in  view  of  the  challenges  with 
which  we  must  deal.  They  have  been 
prei)ared  with  careful  regard  for  their 
budgetary  impact.  As  is  always  the 
case,  we  will  keeji  these  levels  and  their 
allocation  under  continuing  review  to 
assure  that  the  resources  we  are  re- 
questing are  adequate  to  the  task.  For 
we  cannot  serve  our  nation's  interests 
without  the  resources  necessary  for 
sustained  and  effective  American  lead- 
ershi))  in  the  woiid. 

Major  Programs 

Before  tui'ning  to  some  of  our  spe- 
cific [irograms,  let  me  address  some  of 
the  broader  asjiects  of  oui'  fiscal  year 
19S1  request. 

The  first  point  is  the  imjjortance  of 
the  overall  levels  we  are  proposing. 

For  FY  1981,  we  are  requesting 


.$2.9(i  billion  in  budgetary  authority  to 
f'lUid  security  assistance  programs  to- 
taling $4.9  billion,  including  both  mili- 
tary assistance  and  economic  support 
funds.  When  the  Soviets  ai-e  e-Xjianding 
their  ca])al)ility  to  intervene  militarily 
around  the  world,  it  is  clear  that  we 
cannot  reduce  our  own  determination  to 
helj)  others  defenrl  themselves  and 
strengthen  their  economies. 

We  ha\e  proposed  a  modest  in- 
crease from  .$1.7  billion  to  almost  $2 
billion  in  bilateral  develoi)ment  assist- 
ance. There  is  ample  programmatic  jus- 
tification for  this  increase. 

We  are  also  proposing  $1.9  billion 
for  the  international  financial  institu- 
tions and  such  U.N.  bodies  as  UNICEF 
and  the  U.N.  Development  Program. 
These  multilateral  efforts  increasingly 
reflect  priorities  similar  to  ours.  In 
many  cases,  they  also  complement  our 
bilateral  assistance  efforts  by  suppoi-t- 
ing  large-scale  infrastructure  projects, 
such  as  iri-igation  and  transportation 
and  other  sectors  where  U.S.  bilateral 
assistance  is  limited.  The  size  and  mul- 
tinational character  of  these  organiza- 
tions enables  them  to  take  the  lead  in 
cooi'dinating  donor  activity  and  in  en- 
couraging recipient  governments  to  im- 
jjlement  policy  measures  needed  to  fos- 
ter equitable  economic  development.  It 
should  be  noted  that  this  year  we  have 
reduced  the  size  of  our  request  by  not 
seeking  budget  authority  for  callable 
cajjital  subscriptions  to  the  multilateral 
development  banks.  None  of  these 
fluids  have  ever  been  spent.  We  do  not 
believe  it  necessary  or  desirable  to  seek 
appropriations  of  funds  for  this  pur- 
]J0se . 

In  connection  with  the  FY  1981  re- 
quests I  have  just  mentioned,  although 
it  is  not  within  the  direct  purview  of 
this  committee,  let  me  note  that  the  FY 
1980  foreign  assistance  appropriations 
bill  has  yet  to  be  reported  out  of  the 
Senate-House  conference  committee.  In 
the  meantime,  we  are  operating  under  a 
continuing  resolution  which  provides 
for  drastically  reduced  spending  levels 
for  several  im])ortant  programs.  This 
situation,  if  it  continues,  will  severely 
impair  the  effectiveness  of  our  assist- 
ance efforts,  both  economic  and  mili- 
tary, bilateral  and  multilateral.  It  is 
urgent  that  a  FY  1980  appropriations 
bill  be  agreed  u])on  by  the  conference 
committee  and  speedily  enacted  by  the 
Congress. 

Our  proposed  PL  480  Food  for 
Peace  program  for  FY  1981  will  hel].! 


meet  critical  food  needs  in  over  60 
countries.  For  FY  1981  we  are  re- 
(luesting  a  $1.6  billion  Food  for  Peace 
program.  These  funds  will  pi-ovide  an 
estimated  6  million  metric  tons  of  ag- 
ricultural commodities.  In  addition,  we 
will  request  through  a  budget  amend- 
ment an  addition  of  $100  million  to 
make  use  of  some  of  the  grain  which 
would  have  been  available  to  the  Soviet 
Union.  In  the  distribution  of  our  Food 
for  Peace,  priority  is  directed  to  feed- 
ing hungi-y  people,  particularly  I'efu- 
gees  in  Kam|Hichea,  southern  Africa, 
and  Somalia,  and  to  helping  reduce 
balance-of-payments  problems  in 
Egypt,  Bangladesh,  Pakistan, 
Nicaragua,  the  Sudan,  and  other  coun- 
tries e.xperiencing  economic  difficulties. 

Let  me  einphasize  that  the  sum  of 
the  parts  of  these  economic  assistance 
programs  has  an  independent  worth  of 
its  own.  It  conveys  the  vital  message 
that  w-hile  our  emphasis  on  security 
measures  is  necessarily  gi-owing,  our 
commitment  to  help  meet  economic  and 
human  needs  remains  just  as  strong. 

Second,  let  me  emphasize  that  the 
Soviet  action  in  Afghanistan  warrants 
particular  attention  to  our  programs  for 
the  Middle  East  and  southwest  Asian 
region.  We  must  demonstrate  to  those 
who  rely  upon  us — and  to  the  Soviets 
as  well — that  oui-  commitment  to  the 
economic  progress  and  military  security 
of  the  states  in  the  region  is  strong  and 
deiiendable. 

We  have  agreed  to  continue  our 
discussion  with  Pakistani  officials  about 
Pakistan's  military  and  economic  re- 
quirements. We  have  made  it  cleai-  that 
we  do  not  intend  to  go  beyond  the  level 
of  assistance  we  have  alreadv  discussed 
for  FY  1980  and  FY  1981.  We  will  also 
continue  our  consultations  with  other 
governments  on  their  plans  for  assist- 
ance to  Pakistan.  Pending  these  further 
discussions,  we  will  defer  our  request 
to  the  Congress  for  assistance  to  Paki- 
stan at  this  time. 

Third,  the  President  is  requesting 
a  sum  of  $50  million  in  unprogramed 
economic  su|)port  funds.  This  proposal 
will  help  us  to  meet  emergency  situa- 
tions where  relatively  small  amounts  of 
aid,  readily  available,  can  promote  im- 
mediate and  pi'essing  foreign  policy 
interests. 

The  requirement  for  a  fund  of  this 
nature  has  been  clear  for  some  time.  In 
the  past  year  we  have  had  to  come  to 
the  Congress  with  a  number  of  requests 
for  supplementals  or  budget  amend- 
ments to  deal  with  urgent  and  un- 


March  1980 


41 


The  Secretary 


I'lireseeable  aid  requirements  ranging 
fVdin  Southeast  Asia  to  Central 
America.  Obviously  I  cannot  promise 
that  this  amount  of  unprogramerl 
finids  will  eliminate  the  need  for  future 
supplementals.  Kut  it  can  gi\'e  us  a 
greater  degree  of  flexibility  and  can 
liel|j  us  to  respond  promptly  where 
ci'isis  conditions  thi'eaten  our  intei'ests. 
It  will  be  used  only  after  providing 
Congress  written  notification  of  oui'  in- 
tended use  of  the  fund,  in  accordance 
with  standard  reprogi'aming  proce- 
dures. 

Fourth,  our  national  interest  in  the 
iiitei'iiational  system,  including  the 
United  Nations  and  the  affiliated  in- 
stitutions, has  become  ever  more  clear 
in  the  recent  past.  In  tui'n,  oui'  own 
sup|)ort  for  these  agencies  is  especially 
important  now. 

The  United  Nations  has  been  an 
im|iortant  forum  for  the  pursuit  of  our 
goals  in  both  the  Iran  and  Afghanistan 
crises.  The  I'ecent  votes  in  the  Security 
Council  and  the  Genei'al  Assembly  at- 
test to  the  widespread  support  for  our 
objectives  on  these  two  issues.  Beyond 
that,  the  U.N.  Development  Program 
and  other  technical  assistance  agencies, 
together  with  the  international  financial 
institutions,  sei've  most  of  the  same 
long-term  goals  as  our  own  bilateral  aid 
]3rograms — the  goals  of  sustained 
human  progress  and  a  stable  world 
order.  And  the  multilateral  develoji- 
ment  banks  are  a  particulai'ly  effective 
and  efficient  way  of  achieving  these 
aims:  The  combined  effect  of  contribu- 
tions from  other  donors  and  the  use  of 
callable  capital  to  sujjport  borrowing  in 
jjrivate  mai'kets  mean  that  U.S.  e.x- 
penditures  on  the  World  Bank,  for 
example,  are  multiplied  many  times 
o\er  in  actual  Bank  lending. 

For  these  reasons  I  hope  the  Con- 
gress will  resist  any  effort  to  treat  our 
contributions  to  these  agencies  as  ve- 
hicles foi'  jninishing  or  i-ewarding  re- 
cipient countries. 

I  have  emphasized  that  our  eco- 
nomic assistance  programs  have  jjoliti- 
cal,  as  well  as  economic  and  human- 
itarian, im])ortance.  In  times  of  chal- 
lenge to  our  intei-ests,  our  incentive  to 
sup])ort  global  development  is  redou- 
liled.  But  we  should  never  forget  that 
economic  develojiment  is  not  an 
abstraction;  it  is  a  process  through 
which  many  millions  of  human  beings 
find  first  the  hojje  and  then  the  reality 
of  adequate  food,  decent  health  care, 
and  the  new  opportunities  whicii  educa- 


42 


tion  and  training  can  bring.  Economic 
de\'el()i)ment  is  one  of  the  great  moral 
challenges  of  our  times. 


Security  Assistance 

Let  me  add  a  few  words  about  our  secu- 
rity assistance  programs. 

These  programs  are  essential  in- 
struments for  promoting  both  our  own 
security  and  that  of  our  friends  and  al- 
lies. In  addition  they  are  a  vital  part  of 
our  policies  toward  the  Third  World.  In 
recent  years  they  have  proved  their 
worth  in  many  ways. 

They  have  strengthened  our  rela- 
tions with  Israel  and  Egypt,  and 
strengthened  those  nations,  as  they 
have  negotiated  toward  peace.  They 
have  afforded  material  support  to 
friendly  nations  in  Southeast  Asia 
whose  security  has  been  threatened  by 
Vietnamese  actions.  They  have  hel|.)ed 
us  strengthen  NATO's  southern  flank, 
maintain  peace  and  stability  in  Koi'ea, 
and  assist  Latin  American  and  African 
nations  as  they  meet  their  security 
needs. 

As  in  the  jiast,  our  FY  19.S1  secu- 
rity assistance  request  includes  five 
programs. 

•  Recent  e\'ents  have  cleai'ly  dem- 
onstrated the  importance  of  our  foreign 
military  sales  (FMS)  financing  pro- 
gram. FMS  provides  credits  and  loan 
guarantees  which  assist  foreign  gov- 
ernments in  purchasing  needed  defense 
articles,  services,  and  training.  This 
approach  has  made  possible  our  gi-adual 
transition  away  from  grant  military  aid. 
For  FY  1981  we  are  requesting  a  total 
I)rogram  of  $2.6  billion,  requiring 
budget  authority  of  only  $714  million. 
.Some  59^'(  is  allocated  for  Isi'ael  and 
EgyjJt  and  will  make  a  critical  contribu- 
tion to  our  effoi't  to  achieve  a  com- 
])rehensive  Middle  East  peace. 

•  Under  the  military  assistance 
program  (MAP),  we  are  requesting 
funding  for  only  Portugal,  Spain,  and 
the  Philippines.  In  each  of  those  coun- 
tries we  have  imjjortant  military  bases 
serving  mutual  security  interests.  The 
$105  million  requested'for  FY  1981  will 
fund  those  three  programs,  manage- 
ment ex]ienses,  and  delivei'y  of  pre- 
viously funded  MAP  material. 

•  The  economic  support  fund,  foi' 
which  we  are  requesting  $2.1  billion, 
provides  needed  economic  aid  to  coun- 
tries of  particular  jjolitical  and  security 
interest  to  the  Lhiited  States.  Again, 


Israel  and  Egypt  are  the  primary  re- 
cipients. In  addition,  the  economic  sup^ 
port  fund  will  be  used  to  help  improve 
the  prospects  for  reconstruction  and 
l)eaceful  growth  in  Central  America, 
southern  Africa,  and  other  troubled 
areas.  Let  me  stress  in  this  context  the 
great  urgency  we  attach  to  the  pending 
FY  1980  supplemental  request  for 
Nicaragua,  in  addition  to  the  proposed 
$25  million  in  economic  support  funds 
for  1981. 

•  The  peacekeej^ing  operations 
progi'am  provides  funds  for  the  Sinai 
F'ield  Support  Mission,  as  well  as  for 
U.S.  contributions  to  multilateral 
lieacekeejjing  effoi'ts  in  Cyprus.  This 
])rogram  for  1981  will  cost  $25  million 
and  will  help  reduce  the  risk  of  war  in 
these  troubled  parts  of  the  world. 

•  F'iiially,  the  international  mili- 
tary education  and  training  program 
(IMET)  is  a  cost-effective  element  of 
our  secui-ity  assistance.  For  FY  1981 
we  are  proposing  IMET  jjrograms  of 
$32.5  million  to  train  personnel  from  61 
countries.  We  consider  this  program  of 
major  importance,  despite  the  rela- 
tively small  sums  involved.  In  addition 
to  strengthening  local  defense 
capabilities,  IMET  improves  the  basis 
for  U.S.  security  cooperation  with  de- 
veloping countrries,  particularly  in  the 
ca.se  of  small  nations  where  we  have  no 
other  military  ties.  In  the  process, 
IMET  directly  supi)orts  our  efforts  to 
advance  the  cause  of  human  rights,  as  it 
exposes  military  officers  in  other  coun- 
tries to  the  role  of  our  own  arnierl 
forces  in  a  democi'atic  nation.  I  believe 
it  has  been  a  factor  in  the  heartening 
moves  toward  democracy  of  a  number 
of  Latin  American  nations  in  recent 
years.  I  hope  IMET  will  have  youi'  spe- 
cial attention. 

In  conclusion  let  me  emphasize  a 
central  point.  Far  from  suggesting  a 
change  in  direction,  events  in  Iran  and 
Afghanistan  have  underscored  the  ab- 
solute necessity  of  a  sustained  Ameri- 
can commitment  in  the  developing 
world.  In  both  cases,  important  chal- 
lenges are  being  answered  with  re- 
solve. I  believe  the  American  people 
are  united  in  this  i-esolve. 

This  unity  and  this  resolve  must 
not  be  applied  only  to  our  immediate 
I'esponse  to  the.se  particular  challenges. 
We  are  also  dealing  with  long-term. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EAST  ASIA 


broader  issues  which  require  our  hold- 
ing to  long-term  strategies — in  both 
defense  and  development  —  that  are 
fundamentally  sound. 

To  build  and  protect  the  kind  of 
woi'ld  in  which  tVeedom  is  nui'tured,  our 
persistence  o\er  time  —  measure<l 
largely  by  the  resources  we  ai)ply  —  will 
be  decri^ive. 

That  is  why  I  believe  that  the  FY 
1981  foreign  assistance  legislation  be- 
fore you  is  of  particular  importance  to 
our  nation.  ■ 


•Press  release  32.  The  complete  tran- 
script of  the  hearings  will  be  published  by 
the  committee  and  will  be  avaihible  from 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office.  Washington. 
D.C.  20402. 


Poison  Gas  Use  in  Indochina 


hy  Kiel  If  n  (  Olhirt 

Stat,  III,  , it  li,f,,ir  thr  Siihniiiiiiiitt,',^ 
nil  AKiiiii  mill  Fncific  Affairn  (if  tin 
Hulls,  Full  ii/ii  Af'fairx  Cininiiitt,  I  mi 
D,,'i  iiih,  r  I  J.  hit:).  Ms.  (\illi,rt  Is  D,p- 
iitfl  Assistiiiit  Si  i-ntiiri/  I'm-  Fast  Asian 
mill  Pilrlfir  Affairs.  ' 

Many  members  of  the  Hmong  (Meo) 
hilltribes  minority  arriving  in  Thailand 
as  refugees  from  Laos  have  reported 
chemical  attacks  by  Lao- Vietnamese 
forces  in  Laos.  In  some  cases,  they 
have  stated  that  they  were  the  actual 
victims  of  such  attacks.  The.se  attacks, 
directed  against  both  civilian  and  mili- 
tary targets,  are  reported  to  have  oc- 
curred from  1974  to  as  recently  as  May 
1979.  As  we  have  already  heard,  we  do 
not  have  absolute  proof  of  these 
charges;  however,  the  result  of  U.S. 
Government  investigations  support  the 
conclusion  that  some  chemical  agent  or 
agents  were  being  used  in  Laos  during 
the  period  in  question,  as  part  of  the 
Lao  Government's  effort  to  bring  the 
Hmong  under  its  control. 

HmonK  Resistance 

The  years  of  enmity  between  the 
Hmong  and  the  lowland  Lao  and  Viet- 
namese have  left  bitterness  on  both 
sides.  During  the  Indochina  wars,  one 
faction  of  the  Hmong  worked  with  the 
Lao  and  Vietnamese  Communists. 
However,  the  majority  of  the  Hmong 
supported  French  and  later  American 
efforts  to  forestall  a  Vietnamese  Com- 
munist victory  in  Laos.  With  their  un- 
matched skills  as  guerrilla  fighters,  the 
Hmong  played  an  important  military 
role  for  both  the  United  States  and 
France. 

When  the  Communists  came  to 
power  in  Vientiane  in  1975,  a  few 
Hmong  settled  under  Lao- Vietnamese 
control  semivoluntarily.  However, 
many  of  the  Hmong  who  had  been  allied 
with  the  French  and  the  United  States 
continued  their  guerrilla  resistance  in 
remote  upland  areas,  threatening  land 
communications  and  attacking  isolated 
Lao  and  Vietnamese  units.  Other 
Hmong  retreated  deeper  into  the  moun- 
tains of  northern  Laos  or  fled  to  Thai- 
land. 

Those  who  continued  their  resis- 
tance did  so  without  any  U.S.  assist- 
ance, then  or  now,  drawing  instead 


lai'gely  upon  cached  weapons  and  am- 
munition and  inspired  by  their  peren- 
nial fears  of  control  by  the  dominant 
hjwland  Lao  and  the  Vietnamese.  Most 
Hmong  have  seen  their  actions  as  de- 
fensive and  that  of  the  Vietnamese  and 
Lao  Government  forces  as  an  attempt 
to  eradicate  Hmong  tribes,  at  least 
th(ise  wh(]  are  former  followers  of  Gen- 
eral Vang  Pao  and  their  families  in  Phu 
Bia  and  Phu  Ma  Thao. 

Lao- Vietnamese  Resettlement 
Campaign 

The  Lao  Government,  with  strong 
Vietnamese  assistance,  is  waging  a 
military  campaign  against  the  300,000 
Hmong.  This  campaign  is  aimed  ulti- 
mately at  resettling  them,  primarily  in 
the  lowlands  and  plains  where  they  can 
be  more  easily  controlled.  The  govern- 
ment contends  that  such  resettlement  is 
essential  to  its  security.  It  fears  foreign 
support  of  the  Hmong  insurgency  if  the 
Hmong  are  left  in  I'emote  areas.  It  is 
also  the  Lao  Government's  policy  to  put 
an  end  to  the  Hmong  traditional  prac- 
tice of  slash  and  burn  agriculture  which 
results  each  year  in  the  destruction  of 
valuable  timber — one  of  Laos'  few  nat- 
ural resources. 

The  practical  effect  of  this  cam- 
paign has  been  to  create  great  hardship 
for  many  Hmong,  resulting  in  the  flight 
to  Thailand  of  appro.ximately  one-fifth 
of  the  Laos  Hmong  population. 
Beginning  in  1974,  and  gradually  in- 
creasing in  frequency  in  1976  and  1977, 
there  were  reports  of  use  of  poison  gas 
by  Lao  and  Vietnamese  troops  against 
insurgent  Hmong  tribes.  All  of  the  re- 
ports on  this  subject  referred  to  air  de- 
livery of  a  chemical  agent — or 
agents — causing  illness  or  death.  De- 
scriptions given  by  refugees  of  color 
and  other  characteristics  of  the  agents 
and  the  symptoms  of  the  illnesses 
caused  vary  widely.  Several  reports 
told  of  repeated  chemical  attacks  on 
Hmong  villages  under  control  of  the 
Lao  Government. 

I  should  emphasize  that  as  we  have 
heard,  it  has  been  very  difficult  to  ob- 
tain physical  evidence  of  poison  gas. 
Some  of  the  symptoms  described  could 
possibly  re.sult  from  materials  other 
than  lethal  poison  gas,  e.g.,  defoliants, 
riot  control  agents,  phosphorous  shells, 
etc.  The  physical  evidence  of  most  toxic 
agents  normally  dissipates  very 


43 


East  Asia 


rapidly.  In  addition,  persons  severely 
affected  by  toxic  agents  would  be  un- 
able to  survive  the  long  Journey  to  Thai 
refugee  camps  and  this,  in  effect,  has 
ruled  out  the  possibility  of  physical 
examination. 

Nevertheless,  as  we  can  see  in  the 
materials  released  today,  we  believe 
that  the  reports  are  numerous  enough 
to  warrant  our  attention  and  concern. 
In  1977  we  had  begun  a  dialogue  with 
U.S.  agencies  and  other  governments 
as  well  as  with  Lao  officials  in  which  we 
sought  to  focus  concern  on  the  welfare 
of  Hmong  caught  up  in  Lao- Vietnamese 
resettlement  schemes.  The  chairman 
has  already  mentioned  our  diplomatic 
efforts  in  this  regard.  In  early  October 
1978,  we  specifically  raised  our  concern 
about  the  reports  of  gas  use  in  Laos 
with  the  Lao  charge  d'affaires  in 
Washington.  Later  in  October  Assist- 
ant Secretary  [for  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs]  Richard  Holbrooke,  in 
Vientiane,  reiterated  to  the  Lao  leaders 
our  concern  over  Hmong  human  rights 
and  other  issues  relating  to  them. 

Still  later  in  1978,  the  State  De- 
partment directed  U.S.  diplomatic  mis- 
sions in  the  area  to  seek  further  infor- 
mation on  the  possible  use  of  poison  gas 
against  the  Hmong. 

In  .January  1979,  the  Department 
again  informed  the  Lao  Embassy  of  its 
concern  about  reports  of  poison  gas  use 
in  Laos,  coupling  this  with  a  similar 
demarche  in  Vientiane.  The  Lao  denied 
the  reports.  At  the  same  time  we  also 
notified  the  International  Committee  of 
the  Red  Cross  (ICRC)  of  our  concern. 

In  March  the  U.S.  Representative 
to  the  3.5th  session  of  the  U.N.  Human 
Rights  Commission  [Jerome  J.  Shes- 
tack]  expressed  U.S.  concern  about  the 
plight  of  the  Hmong,  specifically  raising 
the  issue  of  reported  use  of  poison  gas 
in  Laos  against  this  tribal  minority. 

In  May  a  State  Department  repre- 
sentative went  to  refugee  camps  in 
Thailand  to  interview  Hmong  claiming 
to  be  eyewitnesses  and/or  victims  of 
poison  gas  attacks  in  Laos.  The  State 
Department  representative  also  visited 
Vientiane  where  he  discussed  the 
problem  with  various  diplomatic  mis- 
sions and  the  senior  U.N.  representa- 
tive in  Laos.  He  raised  the  problem  di- 
rectly with  the  Lao  Foreign  Ministry, 
noting  that  he  had  been  assigned  tn 
seek  evidence  of  gas  use  from  among 
Hmong  refugees  in  Thailand.  Working 
with  another  officer  from  the  American 
Consulate  in  Udorn,  Thailand,  he  com- 
pleted a  report  in  June  based  on  over  20 
interviews  with  Hmong  who  claimed  to 


be  eyewitnesses  and/or  victims.  The 
report  concluded  that  based  on  these 
interviews,  there  was  reason  to  believe 
that  some  chemical  agent  was  being 
employed  in  Laos. 

Also,  during  this  mission,  the  two 
State  Department  representatives  re- 
ceived from  Hmong  refugees  two  sam- 
ples of  material  that  the  Hmmig 
claimed  to  be  poison  gas  residue  col- 
lected at  the  sites  of  two  attacks  in 
Laos.  We  have  already  heard  from  the 
medical  i)eople  about  the  difficulties 
here. 

We  have  provided  these  reports 
and  our  conclusions  from  these  investi- 
gations to  the  Lao  Government  tn  sub- 
stantiate and  underscore  our  cimcern. 
We  have  also  made  demarches  to  the 
Vietname.se  and  the  Soviets  and  pro- 
vided them  with  these  June  interview 
reports,  urging  that  the  Soviets  use 
their  influence  with  both  Hanoi  and 
Vientiane  to  raise  the  matter  with  their 
allies.  The  Vietnamese  and  the  Lao 
have  categorically  rejected  reports  of 
the  use  of  such  gas.  The  Soviets  have 
stdiid  behind  these  assertions.  We  have 
also  provided  information  developed  in 
these  reports  to  other  governments, 
asking  each  to  share  with  us  any  avail- 
able information  they  may  have.  Thus 
fai-,  none  have  come  for-ward  with  addi- 
tional evidence. 

In  late  September  of  this  year,  an 
Army  medical  team  was  dispatched  to 
Thailand  to  interview  Hmong  who 
claimed  to  have  knowledge  of  gas  at- 
tacks in  Laos.  The  team  interviewed 
over  40  eyewitnesses  and  ]iroduced  a 
report  which  reinforced  the  findings  of 
the  June  investigation  and  elaborated 
in  greater  detail  the  symptomology  of 
the  alleged  victims.  Dr.  [Charles  W.| 
Lewis  has  discussed  his  findings  in  de- 
tail. I  can  assure  you  that  v\e  will  very 
strongly  raise  Dr.  Lewis'  findings  with 
various  governments  in  a  manner  simi- 
lar til  our  demarches  based  on  thi'  .lune 
reiJort. 

As  recently  as  October  4,  Assistant 
Secretary  Holbrooke  met  with  Lao 
Acting  Foreign  Minister  Khamphay 
Boupha  in  New  York  and  expressed 
deep  U.S.  concern  about  reports  that 
poison  gas  was  being  used  in  Laos.  The 
Lao,  as  in  the  past,  rejected  the  allega- 
tions. 

As  Chairman  [Lester]  Wolff  has 
noted,  we  have  received  no  reports  of 
the  use  of  poison  gas  in  Laos  later  than 
May  1979,  providing  some  hope  that 
whatever  may  have  been  taking  place 
before  that  time  has  since  cea.'^ed. 
However,  there  have  been  a  few  re- 


ports recently  from  Khmer  refugees 
and  from  Khmer  resistance  groups  that 
Vietnamese  forces  seeking  to  consoli- 
date control  in  Kampuchea  are  using 
lethal  chemical  agents. 

In  late  1978,  we  had  noted  isolated 
allegations  by  the  Pol  Pot  government, 
at  that  time  still  in  control  of  the  coun- 
try, that  Vietnamese  troops  were  using 
poison  gas  delivered  by  artillery  fire  in 
eastern  Kampuchea.  Following  the 
Vietnamese  invasion  and  occupation  of 
Kampuchea,  these  allegations  began  to 
multiply  as  did  refugee  reports  of  ap- 
parent gas  attacks  that  were  in  some 
instances  lethal.  While  we  obviously 
cannot  accept  Pol  Pot  allegations  at 
face  value,  we  are  concerned  by  and  in- 
vestigating refugee  reports. 

We  do  not  have  the  volume  of  re- 
porting from  Kampuchea  at  this  time 
that  we  have  seen  from  Laos.  We  are, 
however,  monitoring  developments  re- 
lated to  reports  of  gas  use  in  Kam- 
puchea very  closely.  We  note  that  in 
Kampuchea,  Vietnamese  forces  and 
their  allies  face  a  guerrilla  resistance, 
often  based  in  rugged  and  relatively  in- 
accessible terrain,  much  as  they  do  in 
Laos.  In  our  demarches  to  the  Viet- 
namese and  Soviets,  we  made  it  clear 
that  our  concern  about  these  reports 
related  to  all  of  Indochina. 

In  sum,  on  the  basis  of  very 
sketchy  reports  of  gas  use  in  Laos,  over 
a  year  ago,  we  acted  to  expand  our 
knowledge  on  the  ((Uestion.  Operating 
on  the  basis  that  the  mounting  numbers 
of  reports  give  them  collective  weight, 
and  on  our  conviction  that  given  their 
subject  matter  warranted  our  deep  con- 
cern, we  have  also,  for  over  a  year, 
used  diplomatic  channels  to  draw  them 
to  the  attention  of  those  with  influence 
in  Hanoi  and  Vientiane.  In  the  case  of 
Laos,  we  expressed  our  concern  well  in 
advance  of  the  availability  of  significant 
evidence.  We  note  the  absence  of  any 
gas  reports  by  refugees  from  Laos  in 
over  6  months.  We  will,  of  course,  con- 
tinue to  monitor  the  situation  very 
closely. 

In  Kampuchea,  while  we  do  not 
have  the  weight  of  refugee  testimony 
that  we  have  had  in  the  case  of  Laos, 
the  similarity  of  the  terrain  and  the  na- 
ture of  the  fighting  suggests  that  Viet- 
namese might  possibly  choose  to  rely  on 
lethal  chemical  agents,  if  they  have  not 
already  begun  to  do  so,  as  some  reports 
indicate. 

We  will  continue  to  scrutinize 
develoimients  in  Kampuchea  and  are 
prepared  to  use  diplomatic  and  inihlic 
[pressure  on  the  Vietnamese  should  we 


iCotii 

l,S 
lal 


ijor 


44 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ECONOMICS 


veld))  additiiinal  iiifni'iiiatidn  |KiiiUinii' 
possibli'  sas  usr  in  Kampiichca.  ■ 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
gs  will  be  puDlished  by  the  committee  and 
ill  be  available  from  tne  Superintendent 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
ffice.  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


J.S.-China  Discuss 
•ale  of  Military 
'echnology 


KKENSE  DEI'ARTMENT 
IJIVTEAIENT.  J.W.  21.  19S() 

?chiioloi;y  tran.>^i'ef  wa.'i  one  of  the 
ajoi'  toi)ics  of  iliscus.^ion  liui'lnij  Secre- 
ry  I  of  Defen.'^e  Harold  |  Brown's  re- 
■nt  vi.sit  to  the  People's  Republic  of 
hina  (P.R.C.).  During  his  discussion 
lere,  he  indicated  that  the  United 
;ates  is  prepared  to  sell  to  the  Chinese 
vilian  technology  which  we  would  not 
pprove  for  sale  to  the  Soviet  Union. 
his  position  grew  out  of  the  visit  of 
ice  President  Mondale  to  China  last 
ugust.  While  the  discussions  with  the 
.R.C.  during  Secretary  Brown's  visit 
icused  primarily  on  the  sale  of  civilian 
'chnology  designed  to  assist  China  in 
s  industi'ial  and  economic  mo<lerniza- 
on,  it  was  recognized  that  some  of  the 
chnology  could  also  be  used  for  mili- 
iry  purjioses. 

During  his  visit,  Secretai'y  Brown 
so  indicated  that  the  United  States 
as  |)repared  to  consider,  on  a  case- 
,'-case  basis,  the  sale  of  certain  care- 
dly  selected  items  of  sujjpoi't  equip- 
lent  also  suitable  for  military  use, 
.g.,  trucks,  communications  gear,  cer- 
ain  types  of  early-warning  radar.  At 
he  same  time,  he  made  clear  that  the 
Jnited  States  has  not  changed  its  posi- 
ion  that  it  has  no  plans  to  sell  arms  or 
.'eapons  systems  to  China. 

No  decision  has  been  made  as  to 
v'hat  specific  equipment  might  be  sold 
0  China,  nor  have  the  Chinese  made 
pecific  requests.  We  are  studying  this 
ssue  carefully  now,  have  informed 
jongress  of  our  intent,  and  have  held 
jreliminary  meetings  with  the  Chinese 
luring  Secretary  Brown's  visit.  ■ 


Suspension  of  Agricultural 
Exports  to  the  U.S.S.R. 


Folliiinii;/  arc  the  lefts  ol  I'lrsi- 
(leiit  Carter's  iHciiKinnul inns  for  the 
Secretaries  of  Coiuiiierce  and  Agricul- 
ture of  Jainiari/  7,  1980;  tiie  President's 
tetter  to  Speaker  oftlie  House  of  Reii- 
rcseiitatives  Thoii/as  P.  0'\'eill.  Jr.. 
and  President  of  the  Senate  Walter  F. 
Mondale  anil  liis  report  on  resfrietions 
on  ai/ncnltii rat  coin iniid it i/  e.fjiorts  to 
the  i'.S.S.R.  pursuant  to  the  Export 
Administration  Act  of  1979  ofjamiarij 
Jl ;  a  nil  a  statement  bi/  Under  Secretari/ 
for  Economic  Affairs  Richard  X . 
Cooper  before  the  Siibcom miftee  on  In- 
ternational Finance  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Banking.  Housing,  and 
I'rban  Affairs  on  Janiiari/  -','. 


.ME.AIOK.WDUM  FOK  THE 
SECKET.\RV  OF  CO.M.MERCE, 
.l.\N.  7,  19S()' 

1  hei'eby  direct  that  you,  in  consultation 
with  the  Secretary  of  Agriculture  and  other 
appropriate  officials,  take  immediate  action 
under  the  E.x|)ort  Administration  Act  to 
terminate  shipments  of  agricultural  com- 
modities and  products,  including  w'heat  and 
corn,  to  the  Soviet  Union.  Export  licenses 
should  be  granted,  however,  to  the  extent 
necessary  to  permit  shipments  to  continue 
up  to  the  8,000,000  metric  tons  of  wheat 
and  corn  per  year  covered  by  Article  1  of 
the  1975  Agreement  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  on  the  Supply 
of  Grain.  I  am  taking  this  action  in  the  na- 
tional security  and  foreign  policy  interests 
of  the  United  States.  I  have  determined  in 
accordance  with  the  Export  Administration 
Act  that  the  absence  of  controls  would  be 
detrimental  to  those  interests  and  that  al- 
ternative courses  of  action  would  not  com- 
jiai'ably  advance  them. 

Jimmy  Carter 


MEMORANDU.M  FOR  THE 
SECRETARY  OF  AGRICULTURE, 
JAN.  7.  19S()' 

I  have  today  directed  the  Secretary  of 
Commerce,  in  consultation  with  you  and 
other  appropriate  officials,  to  take  im- 
mediate action  under  the  Export  Adminis- 
tration Act  to  terminate  shipments  of  ag- 
ricultural commodities  and  products, 
including  wheat  and  corn,  to  the  Soviet 
Union.  The  Secretary  of  Commerce  shall, 
however,  grant  export  licenses  to  the  ex- 
tent necessary  to  permit  shipments  to  con- 


tinue up  to  the  8,000,000  metric  tons  of 
wheat  and  corn  per  year  covered  by  Article 
I  of  the  1975  Agreement  between  the 
llnited  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  on  the 
Supply  of  Grain.  I  am  taking  this  action  in 
the  national  security  and  foreign  policy 
interests  of  the  United  States. 

I  hereby  direct  that  you  take  the 
necessary  actions,  through  commodity  pur- 
chases, and  through  the  price  support  and 
grain  reserve  programs,  to  protect 
America's  farmers  from  the  impact  of  this 
unanticipated  action.  These  steps  are  de- 
signed to  remove  supplies  from  the  market 
in  order  to  assure  that  price  levels  will  not 
be  unduly  affected. 

Jimmy  Carter 


PRESn)ENTS  LETTER. 
JAN.  21,  19S02 

The  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan  and  the 
installation  of  a  puppet  government  is  an 
extremely  serious  threat  to  peace.  It 
threatens  vital  U.S.  security  and  foreign 
policy  interests: 

•  It  places  the  Soviets  within  aircraft 
striking  range  of  the  vital  oil  resources  of 
the  Persian  Gulf; 

•  It  threatens  a  strategically  located 
country,  Pakistan; 

•  It  poses  the  prospect  of  increased 
Soviet  pressure  on  Iran  and  on  other  na- 
tions in  the  Middle  East; 

•  Above  all,  it  shows  that  the  Soviets 
will  use  force  to  take  over  a  neighboring 
country. 

The  Soviet  invasion  requires  a  firm  and 
vigorous  response  by  the  United  States. 
We  must  make  clear  to  the  Soviet  Union 
that  it  cannot  trample  on  the  independence 
of  other  states  and  at  the  same  time  carry 
on  business  as  usual  with  the  rest  of  the 
world. 

I  have  therefore  taken  several  meas- 
ures. I  have  directed  the  Secretary  of 
Commerce  to  restrict  exports  and  re- 
exports of  identified  agricultural  com- 
modities from  the  United  States  to  the 
U.S.S.R.,  except  for  exports  of  wheat  and 
corn  authorized  under  Article  I  of  the 
Agreement  on  the  Supply  of  Grain  of  Oc- 
tober 20,  1975.  These  restrictions  became 
effective  January  7,  1980  under  regulations 
issued  by  the  Department  of  Commerce. 
The  restrictions  were  initially  made  appli- 
cable to  a  broadly  described  group  of  ag- 
ricultural commodities  and  products  as  a 
means  of  quickly  achieving  the  objective  of 
stopping  exports  of  any  items  which  are 
significant  in  terms  of  the  grounds  on  which 
I  acted.  The  Department  of  Commerce  is 


March  1980 


45 


Economics 


revising  the  list  to  eliminate  items  for 
which  controls  are  not  warranted. 

I  have  acted  in  the  national  security 
and  foreign  policy  interests  of  the  United 
States  under  the  authority  of  the  Export 
Administration  Act  of  1979.  I  transmit 
herewith  my  report  pursuant  to  Sections 
(i(e)  and  7(g)(3)  of  the  Act. 

I  have  recognized  that  othei'  countries 
are  major  e.xporters  of  agi'icultural  com- 
modities. At  my  direction.  United  States 
officials  promptly  began  consultations  with 
other  major  agricultural  exporters  to  seek 
their  cooperation  in  restricting  exports  in 
harmony  with  our  actions.  These  consulta- 
tions and  negotiations  have  been  fruitful 
and  will  continue.  We  have  also  consulted 
with  U.S.  farm  organizations  and  trading 
companies,  and  these  consultations  have 
contributed  valuable  information  concern- 
ing the  domestic  impact  of  these  export  re- 
strictions, their  adverse  impact  on  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  the  availability  of  iden- 
tified items  from  foreign  sources.  I  have 
considered  the  possibility  that  some  of  the 
agricultural  coinmodities  involved  might  be 
obtained  by  the  Soviet  Union  from  other 
countries.  1  have  also  assessed  the  threat 
to  our  national  security  and  foreign  policN' 
posed  by  the  Soviet  aggression  and  the 
consequences  of  a  failure  to  take  prompt 
and  decisive  action.  I  have  determined  pur- 
suant to  Section  4(c)  of  the  Act  that  the  ab- 
sence of  such  controls  would  prove  detri- 
mental to  the  foreign  policy  and  national 
security  interests  of  the  United  States. 

Pursuant  to  Section  6(d)  of  the  Act,  I 
have  determined  that  although  reasonable 
efforts  have  been  made  to  achieve  the  pur- 
poses of  these  controls  through  alternative 
means,  available  alternatives  would  not 
comparably  advance  the  foreign  policy  and 
national  security  interests  of  the  United 
States. 

I  have  also  directed  that  the  Secretary 
of  Commerce,  in  consultation  with  the  Sec- 
retary of  Defense  and  other  appropriate 
officials,  review  and  revise  our  policy  with 
respect  to  the  export  of  high  technology 
and  other  strategic  items  to  the  Soviet 
Union.  This  review  is  to  proceed  with  the 
utmost  urgency.  Effective  January  11,  1980 
the  Department  of  Commerce  suspended  all 
outstanding  licenses  and  authorizations  for 
exports  to  the  Soviet  Union  and  announced 
that  it  has  suspended  the  issuance  of  new 
licenses  and  authorizations.  The  review  I 
have  directed  will  also  consider  what  our 
policy  should  be  on  future  applications  for 
licenses,  whether  existing  special  licenses 
should  be  amended  or  revoked,  and 
whether  validated  licenses  should  be  re- 
quired foi-  any  other  exports  currently 
permitted  to  the  Soviet  Union  under  gen- 
eral license.  The  Secretary  of  Commerce 
announced  on  January  11,  1980  his  denial 
on  national  security  grounds  of  eight 
license  applications  for  export  of  high  tech- 
nology ite?iis  to  the  Soviet  Union. 


When  the  review  and  revision  of  our 
policy  on  high  technology  and  other 
strategic  items  is  completed,  I  wdll  submit 
a  further  report  to  the  Congress  concerning 
any  additional  controls  that  may  be  im- 
posed. 

Sincerely, 

Jimmy  Carter 

Restrictions  on  .Agricultural  Commodity 
Exports  to  the  USSR:  Report  to  the  Con- 
gress Pursuant  to  the  Export  .\dministra- 
tion  Act  of  1979 

Acting  pursuant  to  a  Presidential  directive 
issued  on  January  7,  1980  under  the  au- 
thority of  the  Export  Administration  .Act  of 
1979,  the  Department  of  Commerce  has  is- 
sued rules  effective  p.m.  January  7,  1980, 
restricting  the  export  of  identified  agricul- 
tural commodities  and  products  to  the 
Soviet  Union.  (45  Fed.  Reg.  1883,  Jan.  9, 
1980).  This  is  the  Report  required  by  Sec- 
tions 6(e)  and  7(g)  (3)  of  the  Act  with  re- 
spect to  the  imposition  of  these  export  con- 
trols. 

77/c,s-c  RrstnchiDis  Furl  her  Sii/h  itiritutl  ,i 
r..S\  Xatiuiial  Srnii'ili/  ,ii,,l  Fiirciiiii  Polirii 
liilcn'^ls 

The  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan  and  the 
installation  of  a  puppet  government  is  an 
extraordinary  and  grave  act  of  aggression 
which  threatens  vital  U.S.  security  and 
foreign  policy  interests.  This  invasion  is  an 
extremely  serious  threat  to  peace. 

•  It  places  the  Soviets  within  aircraft 
striking  range  of  the  vital  oil  resources  of 
the  Persian  Gulf; 

•  It  threatens  a  strategically  located 
country,  Pakistan; 

•  It  poses  the  prospect  of  inci'eased 
Soviet  pressure  on  Iran  and  on  other  na- 
tions of  the  Middle  East; 

•  Above  all,  it  is  the  first  Soviet  inva- 
sion of  a  previously  independent  and  unoc- 
cupied nation  since  World  Wai-  11. 

These  extraordinary  circumstances 
demand  prompt  and  forceful  response  by 
the  United  States.  We  must  show  the 
Soviet  Union  that  it  cannot  expect  to  con- 
tinue to  do  business  as  usual  with  the 
United  States  while  it  is  invading  and 
occupying  an  independent  nation.  Accord- 
ingly restrictions  have  been  placed  on  ag- 
ricultural exports  to  the  USSR.  These  ex- 
ports make  a  substantial  contribution  to 
Soviet  strength.  U.S.  security  interests 
are  affected  when  that  strength  is  devoted 
to  the  military  invasion  of  previously  inde- 
pendent nations.  Curtailment  of  these  ex- 
ports is  a  critical  element  in  our  efforts  to 
demonstrate  to  the  USSR  in  tangible  ways 
that  it  cannot  engage  in  armed  aggression 
with  impunity  and  without  cost  to  itself. 

As  President  and  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  Armed  Forces  of  the  United  States, 
I  find  that  the  exports  being  curtailed  by 


this  action  make  a  significant  contribution 
to  the  military  potential  of  the  Soviet 
Union  that  is  detrimental  to  the  national 
security  of  the  United  States. 


nil- 
jiiiill 


pell 


Itrsi 


jort 


Probablliiy  of  Siiccchk.  The  restric 
tions  can  reasonably  be  expected  to  bring;  ^\ 
home  to  the  Soviet  leaders  that  they  canno  jjeji 
act  as  they  have  in  Afghanistan  without 
paying  a  significant  price.  The  controls  ar  j 
expected  to  have  a  significant  impact  on  th  k 
Soviet  economy.  They  will  impress  upon 
the  Soviet  people  the  consequences  of  thei) 
government's  actions.  Absent  substitutes 
from  other  soui-ces,  the  restrictions  will 
mean  the  loss  of  up  to  half  of  projected 
grain  imports  for  FY  1980.  Combined  witll  j, 
the  48  million  ton  short-fall  from  planned 
1979  production,  the  effect  will  be  a  majoi 
reduction  in  the  availability  of  livestock 
feed,  the  slaughter  of  livestock  that  canno 
be  fed,  and  in  due  course  a  significant  re- 
duction in  USSR  meat  production  below 
planned  levels.  Moreover,  contacts  with 
the  governments  of  other  major  grain 
supplier  countries  indicate  that  there  w-ill '  ^^ 
be  substantial  cooperation  in  limiting  the 
Soviet  Union's  ability  to  replace  the  cur- 
tailed U.S.  shipments  with  imports  from 
other  sources. 


Com iMtibilHii  ivifli  Foreign  Polici/. 
The  controls  are  essential  to  achieve  U.S. 
national  security  and  foreign  policy  objec- 
tives and  are  compatible  with  overall  U.S| 
policy  toward  the  USSR,  for  the  reasons  ' 
given  above. 


Wi 
itat 


Foreign  Reiictioii.  Many  countries 
have  expressed  support  for  these  action 
by  the  United  States,  and  United  States 
officials  are  urgently  consulting  with  othe<  p, 
suppliers  to  seek  complementary  action 


Economic  Impact  of  Control  a.  The 
most  significant  effect  of  the  control  on 
U.S.  exports  relates  to  the  17  million  tons 
of  grain  previously  authorized  for  the 
Soviet  Union,  valued  at  about  $2.3  billion. 
In  FY  1978  U.S.  exports  of  all  agricultural 
commodities  to  the  USSR  v.  ere  $1.9  billion: 
and  in  FY  1979  $2.2  billion.  These  exports 
constituted  6.S9r  of  total  U.S.  agricultural^ 
exports  in  FY  1978  and  6.9'^^  in  FY  1979 
Grain  exports  accounted  for  about  80'?  of 
the  value  of  U.S.  agricultural  exports  to 
the  USSR  in  FY  1979.  Soybeans  accounted 
for  another  159f .  The  U.S.  provided  65.1% 
of  Soviet  grain  imports  in  FY  1978  and 
77. 8 ^f  in  FY  1979. 

Total  Soviet  grain  utilization  is  esti- 
mated at  231  million  metric  tons  from  July 
1978  to  June,  1979,  and  —  before  imposition   u, 
of  these  restrictions  —  was  projected  to  be 
228  million  tons  for  July,  1979  to  June, 
1980.  U.S.  grain  exports  (11.1  million  tons) 
accounted  for  4.8'^;of  the  1978/1979  Soviet 
use.  Before  these  restrictions,  U.S.  ex- 
ports w-ere  projected  to  provide  11. 2*? 
(25.5  million  tons)  of  the  Soviets'  projected 
1979/1980  utilization  (228  million  tons). 


m 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Economics 


The  United  States  is  the  worhl's 
i-gest  exporter  of  wheat  and  corn  and  will 
main  so  even  after  the  suspension  of  most 
;ricultiiral  commodity  exports  to  the 
iviet  Union.  The  United  States  has  been 
idertaking  consultations  with  other  gov- 
nnients  to  reduce  the  possibility  that 
her  suppliers  would  take  advantage  of 
S.  action  to  build  up  their  own  competi- 
t-e  position  at  U.S.  expense.  Because  the 
;port  restriction  has  been  imposed  on  ag- 
:ultural  commodities  destined  to  the 
SSR  in  response  to  a  Soviet  act  of  ag- 
ression and  on  the  basis  of  fundamental 
.S.  national  security  and  foreign  policy 
terests,  it  is  unlikely  that  such  action  will 
minish  the  overall  reputation  of  the 
ited  States  as  a  reliable  supplier. 

With  respect  to  foreign  availability  of 
heat  and  corn,  the  United  States  is  the 
ajor  supidier  of  these  commodities  in 

■Id  ti-ade.  At  this  time,  it  appears  that 
Iditional  supplies  available  in  the  world 
arket  are  limited.  With  respect  to  soy- 
■ans  and  soybean  products,  there  is  sub- 
antially  greater  foreign  availability.  The 
ailability  of  these  commodities  to  the 
)viet  Union  will  depend  therefore,  in 
irt.  upon  the  cooperation  of  foreign 
ippliers. 

In  the  absence  of  offsetting  domestic 
)licies  the  restriction  on  agricultural  ex- 
.)rts  to  the  USSR  would  have  an  economic 
ipact  primarily  on  grain  farmers,  on  firms 
id  employees  in  the  grain  sector,  on  cer- 
.in  rail  and  barge  lines,  and  on  coni- 
unities  in  grain  producing  areas. 

Absent  offsetting  action,  it  is  esti- 
ated  that  the  restrictions  on  the  export  of 
i;ricultural  commodities  to  the  Soviet 
nion  would  reduce  1980  farm  income  by 
^proximately  $3.0  billion. 

The  Secretary  of  Agriculture  has  been 
irected  to  take  a  number  of  actions,  using 
-ithorities  already  available  under  current 
-W,  to  ensure  that  the  suspension  of  ex- 
orts  to  the  USSR  will  not  fall  unfairly  on 
rmers  and  on  grain  marketing  systems. 
0  assure  that  it  does  not,  he  has  taken  the 
allowing  actions: 

0  pri'ceiit  niiiiH'didfe  market  coiige.'<tioii 

'he  Department  of  Agriculture: 

•  has  requested  that  future  trading  in 
.'heat  and  corn  be  suspended  for  the  mar- 
et  days,  January  7  and  January  8; 

•  has  announced  that  it  will  purchase 

p  to  4  million  tons  (150  million  bushels)  of 
/heat,  including  the  assumption  of  the  con- 
ractual  obligations  on  up  to  3.7  million 

IS  (135  million  bushels)  that  will  not  be 
hipped  to  the  Soviet  Union; 

•  is  preparing  to  assume  the  contrac- 
ual  obligation  on  up  to  10.0  million  tons 
395  million  bushels)  of  corn. 

None  of  these  grain  purchases  will  be 
•esold  on  the  domestic  market  until  it  can 
le  done  without  adversely  affecting  market 
irices.  All  contractual  assumptions  will  be 
nade  at  prices  that  will  protect  against 
osses,  but  will  not  guarantee  profits. 


To  fiillii  iiffsct  tlic  iiitrniicdiiilr  Icnii  iiii- 
pacts  ollhr  .sv(.s7.c//.s/o»  ofsairs  l„  I  he 

rssR 

The  Department  of  .-Xgriculture  has  taken 
action  to: 

•  increase  the  wheat  loan  i)rice  to  $2.50 
a  bushel; 

•  increase  the  corn  loan  price  to  $2. 10  a 
bushel,  with  comparable  increases  in  loan 
prices  for  the  other  feed  grains; 

•  increase  the  reserve  release  price  to 
$3.75  a  bushel  for  wheat  —  representing  150 
percent  of  the  new  loan  price; 

•  increase  the  reserve  call  price  to 
$4.63  a  bushel  for  wheat  —  representing  185 
percent  of  the  new  loan  price; 

•  increase  the  reserve  release  price  to 
$2.63  a  bushel  for  corn  —  representing  125 
percent  of  the  new  loan  price; 

•  increase  the  reserve  call  price  to 
$3.05  a  bushel  for  corn  —  representing  145 
percent  of  the  new  loan; 

•  make  comparable  increases  in  reserve 
release  and  call  prices  for  the  other  feed 
grains; 

•  waive  first-year  interest  costs  for  the 
next  13  million  tons  of  corn  (corn  only)  en- 
tering the  reserve; 

•  increase  reserve  storage  payments 
from  25  to  26V2  cents  a  bushel  for  all  re- 
serve commodities  except  oats,  which  is  in- 
creased from  19  to  20  cents  a  bushel. 

To  facilildte  loii(/-ten)i  fiiipplii  and  (leiiiiiinl 
odjiistiiieiits 

The  Department  of  Agriculture  is  not 
evaluating: 

•  increased  commercial  grain  exports, 
and  increased  food  donations  under  P.L. 
480  where  appropriate; 

•  increased  jiroduction  of  fuel  alcohols 
from  grain  and  other  agricultural  com- 
modities; 

•  acreage  diversion  programs. 
These  steps  are  intended  to  offset  the 

reduction  in  farm  income  and,  assuming  a 
suspension  through  1980,  will  limit  the  re- 
duction in  value  of  agricultural  exports  to 
approximately  $2.0  to  $2.25  billion  (instead 
of  $3  billion).  It  is  anticipated  that  these 
actions  will  result  in  increased  budgetary 
costs  of  $2.5  to  $3.0  billion  during  FY  1980 
and  1981.  Most  of  the  increase  in  budget 
outlays  will  be  associated  with  removal  of 
wheat  and  corn  from  the  market  and, 
therefore,  the  budget  impact  will  be  less- 
ened when  these  commodities  move  back 
into  the  market  and  loans  are  repaid  or 
sales  proceeds  are  obtained. 

Enforcement 

No  unusual  problem  is  anticipated  in  en- 
forcing the  control  on  United  States  direct 
sales  of  agricultural  products.  With  respect 
to  reexports  from  third  countries  to  the 
USSR,  the  fungible  nature  of  the  com- 


modities makes  it  somewhat  difticult  to  con- 
trol their  ultimate  destination.  The  De- 
partment of  Commerce  and  other  agencies 
will  watch  this  situation  closely  and  will 
take  enforcement  action  in  case  of  viola- 
tions. 

ForeiKn  Policy  Consequences  of  Not 
Imposing  Controls 

If  this  and  other  measures  which  have  im- 
mediate and  practical  effect  had  not  been 
imposed.  United  States  reactions  to  Soviet 
aggression  would  have  been  limited  largely 
to  woi-ds.  Vigorous  and  far-reaching  action 
was  required  to  confirm  to  the  Soviets  that 
they  cannot  with  impunity  engage  in  acts  of 
aggression  that  threaten  the  foreign  policy 
and  national  security  interests  of  the 
United  States. 


UNDER  SECRKTARY  COOPER, 
JAN.  22,  19S0  ' 

I  am  jjleased  to  have  this  opportunity  to 
testify  befoi-e  your  committee  at  over- 
sight hearings  on  the  President's  sus- 
pension of  shipments  of  agricultural 
products  and  high  technology  items  to 
the  Soviet  Union.  I  would  like  to  start 
with  a  brief  description  of  the  events  in 
Afghanistan  which  led  us  to  take  these 
economic  measures.  I  will  comment  on 
their  role  in  U.S.  relations  with  the 
U.S.S.R.,  our  allies,  and  other  coun- 
tries, and,  in  that  conte.xt,  respond  to 
the  questions  in  your  letter  of  invita- 
tion. 

Events  in  .Afghanistan 

Massive  Soviet  military  forces  have  in- 
vaded the  small,  nonaligned,  sovereign 
nation  of  Afghani-stan.  Fifty  thousand 
heavily  armed  Soviet  troops  oi'iginally 
crossed  the  bordei'  and  are  now  dis- 
persed throughout  Afghanistan.  More 
Soviet  troops  are  arriving  in  Afghani- 
stan daily,  with  some  80,000  there  now. 
They,  and  the  Afghan  troops  under 
their  control,  ai'e  attacking  Afghan 
tribesmen. 

This  invasion  violates  the  rules  of 
international  conduct  and  jeopardizes 
peace  beyond  the  borders  of  Afghani- 
stan. It  heightens  the  threat  of  further 
Soviet  e.xpansion  into  neighboring 
countries  in  southwest  Asia.  A  Soviet- 
occupied  Afghanistan  threatens  both 
Iran  and  Pakistan.  Such  an  aggressive 
militai-y  policy,  if  it  goes  unanswered, 
threatens  othei'  countries  on  the 
periphery  of  the  Soviet  Union,  includ- 
ing Europe  and  the  Persian  Gulf.  It  en- 


47 


Economics 


dangers  the  security  of  all  nations,  in- 
cluding, of  course,  the  United  States 
and  our  allies  anfl  friends. 

There  has  been  overwhelming  op- 
position in  the  United  Nations  to  the 
Soviet  invasion.  Our  allies  and  most  of 
the  Third  World  have  called  for  Soviet 
withdrawal,  in  the  Security  Council  and 
General  Assembly.  But  expressions  of 
concern,  even  vast  U.N.  General  As- 
sembly majorities,  would  not  alone  con- 
vey to  the  Soviets  our  resolve  to  resi-st 
their  aggression,  especially  if  we 
treated  our  economic  relations  with  the 
U.S.S.R.  as  untouchable.  Unambiguous 
action  by  the  United  States  was  neces- 
sary. 

I'.S.  Response 

On  January  4th,  the  President  an- 
nounced a  series  of  measures  in  re- 
sponse to  the  Soviet  invasion.  We  have 
asked  the  Senate  to  defer  consideration 
of  SALT  II.  We  have  sharply  curtailed 
U.S.  grain  exports  and  Soviet  fishing 
privileges.  We  will  delay  new  consular 
facilities  and  defer  most  cultural  and 
scientific  exchanges.  Since  the  Presi- 
dent's speech,  we  have  reduced  Aero- 
flot  landings  in  the  United  States.  We 
have  suspended  shipments  of  goods 
under  validated  export  licenses  and  all 
new  licensing  pending  a  review  of  our 
policy.  Other  major  aspects  of  our 
bilateral  relationship  with  the  Soviet 
Union  are  also  under  intensive  review, 
and  additional  measures  may  be  an- 
nounced. 

We  plan  to  increase  direct  and  indi- 
rect support  for  threatened  countries  in 
southwest  Asia.  We  have  announced 
that  we  will  maintain  an  inci-eased  level 
of  forces  in  the  Indian  Ocean.  We  are 
taking  other  steps  to  permit  us  to  pro- 
ject military  power  more  effectively  in 
the  region. 

All  of  the.se  actions  are  designed  to 
demonstrate  to  the  U.S.S.R.  in  a  tan- 
gible way  that  it  cannot  engage  in  ag- 
gression with  impunity.  The  restric- 
tions on  grain  exports — oui'  lai'gest 
commodity  exi)orts  to  the  Soviet 
Union  —  most  clearly  illustrate  oui-  re- 
solve to  the  Soviets  and  to  other  coun- 
tries. 

The  costs  to  the  Soviet  Union  will 
be  heavy.  The  U.S.S.R.  is  dependent 
upon  gi-ain  imports  for  growth  in  its 
standard  of  living.  After  an  initial  re- 
duction in  livestock  herds,  an  embargo 
will  mean  reduced  per  capita  meat  con- 


sumption in  a  country  that  normally 
does  not  jirovide  adequate  supplies.  If 
we  and  other  countries  fiiul  it  necessary 
to  continue  to  i-esti-ict  Soviet  agricul- 
tural imports,  the  U.S.S.R.  will  have  to 
revise  its  hopes  for  improving  basic 
living  standards.  We  will  pay  a  price 
oui-selves  for  imijosing  these  resti'ic- 
tions. 

Foreign  trade  is  always  mutually 
beneficial,  and  we  cannot  penalize  the 
Soviet  Union  in  this  area  without  to 
some  extent  hurting  ourselves.  But  we 
have  the  mechanisms  in  place  to  insure 
that  the  price  is  kept  to  a  minimum  and 
is  borne  equitably. 

.Multilateral  Support 

The  grain  export  controls  have  received 
multilateral  support.  On  January  12,  we 
convened  a  meeting  of  representatives 
of  the  major  gi-ain  ex].)orting  countries, 
including  Argentina,  Australia, 
Canada,  and  the  European  Community 
(EC).  This  group  generally  agreed  that 
its  governments  would  not  replace  di- 
rectly or  indirectly  the  grains  denied  by 
U.S.  measures. 

Those  countries  with  destination 
controls  will  impose  them.  Canada  will 
refrain  from  grain  sales  in  excess  of 
normal  traditional  levels.  Australia  will 
not  replace  wheat  taken  off  the  market 
by  U.S.  action.  The  EC  has  taken  a<l- 
ministrative  measures  to  reduce 
sharply  grain  and  poultry  exports  to 
the  U.S.S.R.  Argentina  will  not  use 
government  measures  to  take  commei'- 
cial  advantage  of  U.S.  action  but  has 
indicated  it  will  not  seek  to  altei'  natu- 
ral market  demand.  All,  including 
Ai'gentina,  agreed  to  set  up  a  gi'oup  to 
monitor  grain  flows  on  a. continuing 
basis  to  achieve  "our  common  pur- 
poses." We  are  following  up  with  the 
Argentine  Government  to  increase 
theii'  cooperation. 

We  are  also  seeking  parallel  and 
supportive  action  for  our  other  meas- 
ures. A  few  days  ago  Deputy  Secretary 
Christopher  anfl  I  returned  from  inten- 
sive exploratory  consultations  with  our 
Eurojjean  allies — including  discussion 
in  NATO;  with  the  membei-  countries  of 
the  European  Economic  Community; 
and  additional  talks  in  Bonn,  London, 
Rome,  and  Pans.  Philip  Habib  [Special 
Adviser  to  the  Secretary  of  State]  has 
just  concluded  similar  consultations  in 
Tokvo. 


Our  allies  shai-e  our  view  that  the 
Soviet  inva.sion  is  a  sharp  and 
threatening  deviation  from  Soviet  pol- 
icy in  i-ecent  years.  They  agree  that  we 
must  demonstrate  to  the  Soviets  that 
their  conduct  will  involve  heavy  costs 
for  the  U.S.S.R.  Their  capabilities  for 
resjjonding  to  the  Soviet  threat  differ, 
but  I  am  encouraged  by  their  desire  to 
maintain  a  .strong,  united  front  under 
the  current  circumstances. 

Controls  on 
Agricultural  Exports 


0 
ilicy. 


ffii 


m 

oviei 

L 


olicii 


48 


We  are  particularly  mindful  of  the 
provisions  of  the  new  Export  Adminis 
tration  Act  of  1979  and  of  this  subcom 
mittee's  major  contribution  to  that 
legislation  over  the  past  year.  You  have'  '||* 
or  will  soon  have  before  you  the  Presi- 
dent's report  of  his  decision  to  imjjose 
controls  on  agricultural  exports  to  the    : 
Soviet  Union.  I  woukl  simply  like  to 
mention  some  of  the  major  themes  of 
the  1979  act  which  are  reflected  in  two 
of  the  questions  in  your  invitation  and 
in  the  President's  actions. 

•  A  wide  range  of  political  and  eco- 
nomic measures  has  been  under  consid- 
eration from  the  beginning  of  the  Af- 
ghan crisis,  not  just  export  controls. 

•  We  raised  the  issue  of  Soviet  in- 
tervention in  Afghanistan  with  in- 
creasing urgency  as  the  Soviet  military 
buildup  proceeded,  culminating  with  a 
Presidential  me.s.sage  to  President 
Brezhnev.  No  satisfactory  rejily  was 
I'eceived. 

•  The  Administi'ation  consulted 
congi-essional  leatlers  pi'omptly,  as  soon 
as  it  became  clear  that  controls  on  grain 
exports  and  other  actions  would  he 
necessary. 

•  We  have  given,  and  continue  to 
give,  high  priority  to  obtaining  the 
cooperation  of  othei-  governments  and 
to  limiting  the  availability  of  substi- 
tutes from  foreign  soui-ces. 

•  The  grain  controls  have  been — 
and  any  new  controls  we  may  need  to 
add  for  technology  exports  will  be — 
measured  again.st  the  specific  criteria 
contained  in  the  1979  act. 

Except  for  agricultural  proflucts. 
we  have  not  added  new  controls  oi-  in- 
creased the  number  of  expoi-t  items  for 
which  validated  licenses  are  required. 
The  susi)ension  of  shijjments  of  licensed 
goods  is  a  temporary  measure,  ex- 
pected to  last  4-6  weeks,  while  we  re- 
view our  licensing  jiolicy  and  adoi)t  any 
changes  that  seem  apjn'opriate  under 
the  new  circumstances.  We  look  foi'- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Economics 


,-ard  to  receiving'  your  views  and  the 
iews  of  your  committee  concerning 
ppropriate  I'evisions  in  oui-  licensing 
olicy. 

In  conducting  our  review  in  tlie 
■gilt  ot'tlie  Soviet  invasion,  we  must 
ear  in  mind  that  the  concepts  of 
oreign  |)olicy  and  national  security  —  a 
entral  objective  of  our  foreign 
olicy  —  are  inextricably  intertwined. 
Ve  must  reevaluate  which  ex])orts  ac- 
ually  make  a  significant  contribution  to 
;oviet  military  potential  which  would 
e  detrimental  to  our  security.  We  will 
Iso  consider  othei'  items  which  should 
e  conti'olled  in  order  to  help  deter 
lOviet  aggi'ession. 

Let  me  conclude  by  affirming  that 
/e  continue  to  hope  that  the  Soviets 
,'ill  see  the  need  for  resti-aint  in  their 
olicies.  We  have  called  for  them  to 
.-ithdraw  their  troops  from  Afghani- 
tan  in  accordance  with  the  U.N.  resolu- 
ions.  We  must  detei'  them  from  further 
hreats  to  Pakistan,  Iran,  the  Persian 
iulf,  and  elsewhere.  Neither  we  nor 
he  rest  of  the  world  can  tolerate  a  jiol- 
y  of  Soviet  expansionism.  The  more 
juickly  we  can  bring  this  message  to 
he  attention  of  the  Kremlin  through 
irm  measures,  the  better  our  chances 
hat  it  will  be  heeded  before  greater 
amage  is  done. 

The  1980s  have  begun  with  little 
sptimism  for  U.S. -Soviet  relations, 
'et  only  rarely  in  the  past  25  years 
ave  we  seen  such  worldwide  condeiu- 
ation  of  Soviet  aggression  as  we  now 
ee.  Only  rarely  have  we  seen  NATO  as 
eady  as  it  now  is  to  strengthen  its  de- 
?nses  and  to  act  in  concert.  If  we  had 
ot  taken  strong  actions,  if  we  had 
laintained  a  posture  of  business-as- 
sual  beyond  our  diplomatic  protests,  I 
ave  little  doubt  that  the  condemnation 
y  othei'  countries  and  their  willingness 
0  work  together  to  deter  aggression 
Isewhere  would  dissipate  in  a  cloud  of 
ncertainty  sui'i'ounding  U.S.  lead- 
rship  and  U.S.  determination  to  I'esist 
lOviet  aggression.  ■ 


'Te.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
'residential  Documents  of  Jan.  14,  1980. 

^Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
an.  28. 

^The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ngs  will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
vill  he  available  from  the  Superintendent 
if  Documents,  U.S.  Govei'nment  Printing 
)ffice,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


Customs  Valuation  Agreement 


LETTER  TO  HOUSE 
SPEAKER  O'NEILL  AND 
SENATE  PRESIDENT  .MONDALE, 
JAN.  Iti,  198(1' 

During  1979  we  achieved  a  remarkable 
series  of  impi'ovenients  in  the  international 
rules  for  the  conduct  of  trade,  domestic 
legislation  governing  trade  policy,  and  the 
organization  of  the  Executive  branch  ti'ade 
policy  agencies.  These  successes  were  the 
result  of  a  cooperative  effort  between  the 
Congress  and  the  Executive  which  must  be 
continued  if  we  are  going  to  conduct  suc- 
cessfully our  international  economic  policy. 

At  the  end  of  the  Tokyo  Round  of  the 
Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations  last  year, 
we  had  not  yet  completed  negotiations  with 
a  significant  number  of  developing  coun- 
tries on  the  Customs  Valuation  Agreement. 
Despite  this  fact,  we  decided  to  submit  the 
Customs  Valuation  Agreement  to  the  Con- 
gress together  with  the  other  nontariff 
barrier  codes  for  approval.  Negotiations 
with  developing  countries  have  continued, 
however,  and  have  reached  a  point  such 
that  I  can  now  notify  the  Congress  of  my 
intention  to  enter  into  a  supplementary 
agreement  on  customs  valuation. 

The  new  agreement  would  make  a 
minor  amendment  to  the  Customs  Valua- 
tion Agreement  already  approved  by  the 
Congress.  This  amendment  would  eliminate 
one  of  the  four  tests  under  the  Agreement 
by  which  related  parties  can  establish  a 
transaction  value  for  customs  purposes, 
i.e.,  the  use  of  the  transaction  value  from 
unrelated  parties'  sales  of  identical  goods 
from  third  countries  (Article  1.2(b)(iv)). 
This  amendment  wdll  have  little  impact  on 
the  Customs  Valuation  Agreement  but  will 
greatly  facilitate  acceptance  of  that 
Agreement  by  a  significant  number  of  de- 
veloping countries.  All  the  developed  coun- 
try signatories  to  the  Agreement  support 
the  amendment. 

In  accordance  with  the  Trade  Act  of 
1974  procedures  for  approval  and  im- 
plementation of  trade  agreements,  the 
United  States  Trade  Representative  and 
other  appropriate  agencies  will  consult 
with  Congressional  committees  about  the 
agreement  for  the  next  90  calendar  days. 
After  the  agreement  has  been  signed  it  will 
be  submitted  for  Congressional  approval 
together  wdth  proposed  implementing 
legislation  and  a  statement  of  administra- 
tive action  necessary  or  appropriate  to  im- 
plement the  agreement  in  the  United 
States.  The  agreement  will  not  take  effect 
with  respect  to  the  United  States,  and  will 
not  have  domestic  legal  force,  unless  the 
Congress  approves  it  and  enacts  the  appro- 
priate implementing  legislation. 

Congressional  approval  of  the  amend- 
ment to  the  Customs  Valuation  Agreement 
will  help  us  obtain  broader  support  for  the 
Tokyo  Round  agreements  by  developing 
countries.  This  result  will  advance  our  na- 
tional interest  and  enhance  the  prosperity 


of  oui'  people.  I  look  forward  to  working 
together  in  this  continuing  effort. 
Sincerely. 

Jimmy  Carter 


'Text  of  identical  letters  addressed  to 
Thomas  P.  O'Neill,  Jr.,  Speaker  of  the 
House  of  Repi-esentatives,  and  Walter  F. 
Mondale,  President  of  the  Senate  (text 
from  Weeklv  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  J;ni.  21,  1980). 


Allies  Support 
U.S.  Embargo 


DEPARTMENT  STATE.VIENT. 
,JAN.  10,  198(1' 

The  United  States  is  pleased  by  the 
positive  reaction  on  the  part  of  oui' 
European  allies  to  the  President's  deci- 
sion cancelling  the  sale  of  17  million 
metric  tons  of  grain  to  the  Soviet  LInion 
in  the  wake  of  their  invasion  of  Af- 
ghanistan. The  President  has  received 
assurances  from  the  leaders  of  major 
West  European  nations  that  their  gov- 
ernments sup])ort  this  important  meas- 
ure. They  will  take  approjiriate  steps  to 
assure  that  the  Soviet  shortfalls  re- 
sulting from  the  cancellation  of  U.S. 
sales  will  not  be  made  up  through  ex- 
ports of  their  own  grain  supplies. 

At  the  same  time,  we  are  in  urgent 
consultation  with  the  other  major  grain 
exporting  nations.  Both  Australia  and 
Canada  have  already  confirmed  that 
they,  too,  will  support  the  U.S.  action 
and  not  make  up  the  Soviet  grain  defi- 
cit. As  a  result  of  these  consultations, 
which  are  continuing,  the  Soviet  Union 
will  be  unable  to  purchase  sufficient 
grain  from  other  countries  to  meet  the 
major  shortfall  caused  by  the  Presi- 
dent's decision. 

The  United  States  feels  that  the 
strong  allied  backing  in  this  area  dem- 
onstrates Western  solidarity  in  the  face 
of  a  direct  Soviet  threat  to  international 
security  and  will  make  clear  to  the 
Soviets  that  they  cannot  undertake  ag- 
gression with  ini])unity.  The  President 
believes  that  we  have  laid  down  a 
marker  and  let  the  Soviet  Union  know 
that  they  will,  indeed,  suffer  now  and  in 
the  future  from  their  unwarranted  in- 
vasion of  a  formerly  independent 
nonaligned  country.  ■ 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  De- 
partment spokesman  Hodding  Carter  III. 


49 


EUROPE 

U.S.  Favors  Transfer 
of  Summer  Olympics 


/)//  Sicretarii  \  aiice 

R('iiiiirl:s  hrtiiir  the  s;<l  scssim,  of 
the  niK'i/iiKi  III  thr  liiU-niiiliointI  Oli/iii- 
inr  Ciiiininttcr  (IOC)  m  L'ikc  I'IiickI, 
Xrir  York,  nn  Fvhnu,  r,i  9 .  IUSI).' 

Oil  behalf  of  [^resident  Carter,  and  as^ 
an  honorary  Vice  President  of  the  U.S. 
Olympic  Committee,  it  is  an  honor  to 
welcome  this  distin.nui.shed  committee 
to  the  United  States  and  to  Lake  Placid 
and  to  welcome  athletes  from  around 
the  world  to  the  1980  Winter  Olympics. 
As  we  meet  hei-e  tonight,  the  world 
faces  a  serious  threat  to  peace  which 
raises  an  issue  of  fundamental  impor- 
tance to  the  Olympic  movement. 

From  their  beginnings  in  ancient 
Greece,  the  Olympics  have  symbolized 
.some  of  humanity's  noblest  principles. 
Foremost  among  the.se  i.s  peace.  The 
modern  games  reflect  this  principle  in 
the  opening  ceremonies,  when  doves 
are  released  to  symbolize  peace. 

The  ancient  games  were  held  in  the 
city-state  of  Elis.  They  marked  a  "truce 
of  the  gods."  During  this  truce,  open 
warfare  against  or  by  the  host  city- 
state  was  forbidden. 

In  the  view  of  my  government,  it 
would  be  a  violation  of  this  fundamental 
Olymjiic  principle  to  conduct  oi'  attend 
Olympic  Games  in  a  nation  which  is  cur- 
rently engaging  in  an  aggressive  war 
and  has  refused  to  comply  with  the 
world  community's  demand  to  halt  its 
aggression  and  withdraw  its  forces. 

Let  us  be  clear  about  the  funda- 
mental issue  we  face.  This  is  not  a 
([uestion  of  whether  a  national  team 
should  be  barred  from  competing  on 
political  grounds.  We  welcome  every 
team  this  committee  has  invited  to 
these  winter  games. 

The  question  we  now  confront  is 
entirely  different.  It  is  whether  the 
games  should  be  held  in  a  country 
which  is  itself  committing  a  serious 
breach  of  international  peace.  It  is  our 
conviction  that  to  do  so  would  be  wholly 
inconsistent  with  the  meaning  of  the 
Olympics. 

It  is  impossible  to  sepai'ate  this  de- 
cision from  its  political  consequences. 
To  hold  the  Olymjiics  in  any  nation  that 


is  warring  on  anothei'  is  to  lend  the 
Olympic  mantle  to  that  nation's  actions. 
We  already  see  the  nation  selected 
as  host  of  the  summer  games  describing 
its  selection  as  recognition  of  "the  cor- 
rectness of  I  it  si  foreign  political  course" 
and  its  "enormous  services  ...  in  the 
struggle  for  peace." 

The  inescapable  fact  is  that  the 
struggles  of  nations  and  peoples  to  pre- 
serve their  independence — to  preserve 
peace  now  and  for  the  future — will  be 
contradicted  and  diminished  if  the 
Olympics  are  held  in  a  nation  whose 
continuing  aggression  has  been  con- 
demned by  an  overwhelming  majority 
of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly. 

Re.sponsibility  for  this  matter 
should  not  be  shifted  to  the  athletes. 
That  would  only  force  them  to  carry  a 
burden  which  properly  belongs  to  the 
leaders  of  the  Olympic  movement.  None 
of  us  wants  our  athletes  to  suffer.  But 
neither  should  we  let  them  be 
exploited. 

Beyond  the  effects  of  this  decision 
on  efforts  for  international  peace,  we 
should  be  concerned  about  its  conse- 
quences for  the  Olympic  movement. 

The  United  States  deeply  values 
the  Olympic  Games  and  the  pi-incijiles 
on  which  the\'  rest.  We  are  immensely 
proud  of  our  own  athletes  and  those  of 
other  nations  who  have  trained  long 
and  hard.  We  do  not  want  to  see  the 
Olympic  movement  damaged. 

But  if  the  basic  principles  of  the 
Olymjiics  are  ignoi'ed,  the  future  of  the 
games  themselves  will  be  placed  in 
jeopardy. 

Throughout  the  world,  there  is 
bi-oad  and  growing  opposition,  among 
governments  and  people,  to  going  for- 
ward with  the  games  as  planned,  as  if 
nothing  has  happened.  To  do  so  would 
imperil  the  broad  popular  interest  and 
support  upon  which  this  and  future 
Olympics  depend. 

The  preferable  course  would  be  to 
transfer  the  games  from  Moscow  to 
another  site  or  multiple  sites  this  sum- 
mer. Clearly  there  are  practical  dif- 
ficulties, but  they  could  be  overcome. 
There  is  also  precedent  for  cancelling 


the  games.  Or  it  would  be  possible, 
with  a  simple  change  of  rules,  to  post 
pone  the  games  for  a  year  or  more.  -^ 

Let  me  make  my  government's  po-i  t^ 
sition  clear:  We  will  oppose  the  partici-J| 
pation  of  an  American  team  in  any 
Olympic  Games  in  the  capital  of  an  in- 
vading nation.  This  position  is  fii-m.  It 
reflects  the  dee])  convictions  of  the 
U.S.  Congi-ess  and  the  American 
people. 

To  avoid  such  iiroblems  in  the  fu- 
ture, we  support  the  establishment  of 
jiermanent  homes  for  the  Summer  and 
Winter  Olympics. 

I  know  that  this  distinguished  bodyf 
will  carefully  weigh  the  issues  now  be- 
fore you.  By  upholding  the  principles  of 
the  Olympics  when  they  are  under 
challenge,  we  will  i)reserve  the  mean- 
ing of  the  Olympics  for  years  to 
come.  ■ 


cfi 


•Press  release  3(5. 


us, 


50 


Summer  Olympics 
in  Moscow 

Fiilldiriii;/  arc  I'lr^idfiit  Carfcf'tf 
Irttcr  iif  Jdiiiiiinj  ,'l),  19St),  to  Robert 
Kaiiv.  Prfsidciii  of  the  U.S.  Oh/nipic 
Ciiiiniiiftee.  (uid  Depiiti/  Secretary  i 

Wiirreii  Chrixtoplier's  .'<tatet)ieiit  before 
till   Sriiiitc  Cdiiiniittre  on  Forcifiii  Re- 
lations OH  .Jniiiiiirii  -'A'. 

PRKSIDENTS  LKTTER 

.l.\N.  20.  1980' 

As  President  of  this  nation  and  as  Honor- 
ary President  of  the  United  States  Olympic 
Committee  (USOC),  I  write  to  advise  you 
of  my  views  concerning  the  Games  of  the 
XXII  Olympiad  scheduled  to  be  held  in 
Moscow  this  Summer. 

I  regard  the  Soviet  invasion  and  the  at 
tempted  suppre.ssion  of  Afghanistan  as  a 
serious  violation  of  international  law  and  ai 
e.xtremely  serious  threat  to  world  peace. 
This  invasion  also  endangers  neighboring 
independent  countries  and  access  to  a 
major  part  of  the  world's  oil  supplies.  It 
thorefore  threatens  our  own  national  secu- 
rity, as  well  as  the  security  of  the  region 
and  the  entire  world. 

We  must  make  cdear  to  the  Soviet 
Union  that  it  cannot  trample  upon  an  inde 
pendent  nation  and  at  the  same  time  do 
business  as  usual  with  the  rest  of  the 
world.  We  must  make  clear  that  it  will  pay 
a  heavy  economic  and  political  cost  for  such 
aggressions.  That  is  why  I  have  taken  the 
severe  economic  measures  announced  on 
January  4,  and  why  other  free  nations  are 
supporting  these  measures.  That  is  why 
the  United  Nations  General  A.ssembly,  by 
an  overwhelming  vote  of  104  to  18,  con- 
Department  of  State  Bulletir 


Europe 


emncti  the  invasimi  and  urged  the  |)riim|)t 
,ithdra\val  of  Soviet  troops. 

I  want  to  reaffirm  my  own  personal 
ommitment  to  the  principles  and  purposes 
f  the  Olympic  movement.  I  believe  in  the 
esirability  of  keeping  Government  policy 
ut  of  the  Olympics,  but  deeper  issues  are 
take. 

In  the  Soviet  Union  international 
ports  competition  is  itself  an  aspect  of 
ioviet  government  policy,  as  is  the  decision 
o  invade  Afghanistan.  The  head  of  the 
loscow  Olympic  Organizing  Committee  is 
high  Soviet  Government  official. 

The  Soviet  Government  attaches 
normous  political  importance  to  the  hold- 
ng  of  the  1980  Olympic  Games  in  Moscow, 
nd  if  the  Olympics  are  not  held  in  Moscow 
ecause  of  Soviet  military  aggression  in 
Afghanistan,  this  powerful  signal  of  world 
utrage  cannot  be  hidden  from  the  Soviet 
eople,  and  will  reverberate  around  the 
obe.  Perhaps  it  will  deter  future  aggres- 
ion. 

I  therefore  urge  the  USOC,  in  coopera- 
ion  with  other  National  Olympic  Commit- 
ees,  to  advise  the  International  Olympic 
'ommittee  (IOC)  that  if  Soviet  troops  do 
lot  fully  withdraw  from  Afghanistan  within 
he  next  month,  Moscow  will  become  an  un- 
uitable  site  for  a  festival  meant  to  cele- 
irate  peace  and  good  will.  Should  the 
ioviet  Union  fail  to  withdraw  its  troops 
vithin  the  time  prescribed  above,  I  urge 
he  USOC  to  propose  that  the  Games  either 
)e  transferred  to  another  site  such  as 
"VIontreal  or  to  multiple  sites,  or  be  can- 
■elled  for  this  year.  If  the  International 
llympic  Committee  rejects  such  a  USOC 
iroposal,  I  urge  the  USOC  and  the  Olympic 
'ommittees  of  other  like-minded  nations 
lot  to  participate  in  the  Moscow  Games.  In 
his  event,  if  suitable  arrangements  can  be 
nade,  I  urge  that  such  nations  conduct  al- 
rnative  games  of  their  own  this  summer 
it  some  other  appropriate  site  or  sites.  The 
Jnited  States  Government  is  prepared  to 
end  its  full  support  to  any  and  all  such 
fforts. 

I  know  from  your  letter  to  me  and  your 
neeting  with  Secretary  Vance  and  Lloyd 
'utier  of  your  deep  concern  for  the  men 
ind  women  throughout  the  world  who  have 
rained  tirelessly  in  the  hopes  of  par- 
icipating  in  the  1980  Olympic  Games.  I 
^hare  your  concern.  I  would  support  the 
jarticipation  of  athletes  from  the  entire 
>V(irkl  at  Summer  Olympic  Games  or  other 
panics  this  summer  outside  the  Soviet 
Union,  just  as  I  welcome  athletes  from  the 
entire  world  to  Lake  Placid,  for  the  Winter 
Olympic  Games. 

I  have  the  deepest  admiration  and  re- 
spect for  Olympic  athletes  and  their  pursuit 
of  excellence.  No  one  understands  better 
than  they  the  meaning  of  sacrifice  to 
achieve  worthy  goals.  There  is  no  goal  of 
greater  importance  than  the  goal  at  stake 
here — the  security  of  our  nation  and  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

I  also  urge  that  the  IOC  take  a  further 
step  to  eliminate  future  political  competi- 
tion among  nations  to  serve  as  hosts  for  the 


Olympic  Games.  I  call  upon  all  nations  to 
join  in  supporting  a  permanent  site  for  the 
Summer  Olympics  in  Greece,  and  to  seek  an 
appropriate  permanent  site  for  the  Winter 
Olympics. 

The  course  I  am  urging  is  necessary  to 
help  secure  the  peace  of  the  world  at  this 
critical  time.  The  most  important  task  of 
world  leaders,  public  and  private,  is  to 
deter  aggression  and  prevent  war.  Aggres- 
sion destroys  the  international  amity  and 
goodwill  that  the  Olympic  movement  at- 
tempts to  foster.  If  our  response  to  aggres- 
sion is  to  continue  with  international  sports 
as  usual  in  the  capital  of  the  aggressor,  our 
other  steps  to  deter  aggression  are  under- 
mined. 

The  spirit  and  the  very  future  of  the 
Games  depend  upon  courageous  and  reso- 
lute action  at  this  time.  I  call  for  your  sup- 
port and  your  help  in  rallying  the  support 
of  the  other  Olympic  Committees  through- 
out the  world. 

Sincerely, 

.Jimmy  Carter 


DEPUTY  SECRETARY 
CHRISTOPHER 
.JAN.  28.  19802 

I  appreciate  this  opportunity  to  meet 
with  you  to  discuss  the  Administra- 
tion's views  on  U.S.  participation  in  the 
Summer  Olympic  Games  in  Moscow. 

In  his  State  of  the  Union  address, 
President  Carter  emphasized  that  "... 
with  Soviet  invading  forces  in  Af- 
ghanistan, neither  the  American  people 
nor  I  will  support  sending  an  Olympic 
team  to  Moscow." 

This  weekend  in  Colorado  the  U.S. 
Olympic  Committee  agreed  to  ask  the 
International  Olympic  Committee, 
when  it  meets  in  Lake  Placid  in  early 
February,  to  transfer,  postpone,  or 
cancel  the  Summer  Games.  We  are  en- 
couraged by  this  decision  and  by  the 
support  and  understanding  shown  by 
the  U.S.  C)lympic  Committee. 

We  have  carefully  examined  the 
two  resolutions  introduced  on  .January 
22  by  Senators  Muskie  and  Pry  or  (S.R. 
333  and  334)  and  are  in  general  agree- 
ment with  them.  Our  preference  at  this 
time,  however,  would  be  Senate  adop- 
tion of  a  third  resolution — the  one 
passed  overwhelmingly  by  the  House 
last  week  (H.  Con.  Re's.  249). 

This  morning  I  would  like  to  review 
with  you,  briefly,  some  of  the  factors 
which  led  the  Administration  to  take 
such  a  strong  stand  on  the  Olympics  and 
the  reasons  we  would  welcome  the 
committee's  early  passage  of  a  concur- 
rent I'esolution. 


In  late  December  the  Soviets 
launched  a  massive  invasion  of  Af- 
ghanistan. They  played  an  instrumental 
I'ole  in  the  e.xecution  of  that  country's 
head  of  state.  More  than  80,000  Soviet 
troops  are  now  occupying  Afghanistan, 
seeking  to  crush  the  resistance  offered 
by  Afghan  nationalists  fighting  for  their 
freedom. 

In  our  considered  judgment,  this 
invasion  presents  a  serious  thi-eat  to 
world  peace  and,  in  particular,  to  the 
security  of  the  nations  in  the  region 
surrounding  Afghanistan. 

In  his  State  of  the  Union  address, 
the  President  outlined  a  full  range  of 
responses  to  this  threat.  I  would  like  to 
confine  myself  chiefly  to  the  (juestion  of 
the  Olympics. 

The  essence  of  the  President's  de- 
cision is  clear  and  simple:  Unless  all 
Soviet  troops  are  withdrawn  from  Af- 
ghanistan within  the  next  month,  the 
U.S.  Government  will  not  support  \rdr- 
ticipation  by  U.S.  athletes  in  the  Sum- 
mer Olympics  in  Moscow. 

Our  consultations  with  other  gov- 
ernments prove  that  many  strongly 
share  our  concerns.  We  are  much  en- 
couraged by  the  decision  this  weekend 
of  the  West  German  Olympic  Commit- 
tee to  support  transfer,  postponement, 
or  cancellation  of  the  Summer  Games. 
Other  governments  around  the  world 
have  also  adopted  a  position  paralleling 
that  of  President  Carter,  and  we  expect 
many  more  governments  to  join  in  this 
effort  in  the  days  ahead. 

We  are  still  exploring  a  number  of 
alternative  ways  of  dealing  with  the 
games:  transferring  them  to  another 
site — or  sites — or  cancelling  them 
entirely — as  was  done  in  1916,  1940, 
and  1944.  In  this  latter  case,  the  inter- 
national community  could  decide  to  hold 
some  other  form  of  international  com- 
petition, this  year  or  next. 

The  President  has  also  suggested 
that,  in  the  future,  a  permanent  home 
for  the  Summer  Olympics  might  be  es- 
tablished in  Greece.  A  suitable  site  for 
the  Winter  Games  could  be  sought  as 
well. 

We  expect  that  the  U.S.  Olympic 
Committee  will  discuss  all  these  pos- 
sibilities with  the  International  Olympic 
Committee  at  their  February  9  meet- 
ing. A  firm  and  united  expression  from 
the  U.S.  Congress  before  that  meeting 
would  help  to  convey  the  strength  and 
depth  of  U.S.  sentiment  on  this  crucial 
question. 

I  would  like  to  stress  that  we  are 
deeply  conscious  of  the  long,  hard,  even 
painful  years  of  practice  our  athletes 


March  1980 


51 


Europe 


have  undergone  to  prepare  for  the 
Summer  Olympics.  That  is  why  we  are 
actively  exploring  with  other  govei-n- 
ments  possible  alternatives  to  holding 
the  games  in  Mosccnv. 

But,  at  the  same  time,  we  cannot 
forget  that  more  profound  issues  are  at 
stake  here.  We  must  convince  the 
Soviets  that  we  are  willing  and  able  to 
respond  to  their  aggression,  whether  in 
Afghanistan  oi-  elsewhere.  If  we  permit 
sports  to  go  forward  as  usual,  after  we 
have  said  there  will  be  no  business  as 
usual,  we  will  be  sending  out  a  con- 
tradictory signal,  and  one  which  could 
call  into  question  the  firmness  (if  oui- 
resolve. 

The  Soviets  clearly  attach  tre- 
mendous political  importance  to  the 
games.  Their  propaganda,  the  way  in 
which  they  have  gone  about  Olympic 
preparations,  their  transparent  hope  of 
using  the  games  as  a  shcnvcase  of  the 
alleged  successes  of  a  totalitarian  sys- 
tem, leave  no  doubt  that  they  see  in 
these  Olympics  a  political  device.  We 
cannot  give  our  support  or  blessing  to  a 
cynical  effort  by  the  U.S.S.R.  to  mas- 
querade as  a  peaceloving  country  while 
at  the  same  time  Soviet  troops  are  oc- 
cupying and  oppressing  Afghanistan. 

Our  view  of  this  matter  is  rein- 
forced by  the  recent  arrest  and  exile  of 
Andrei  Sakharov,  world  famous  physi- 
cist, human  rights  advocate,  and  Nobel 
laureate.  Who,  in  the  face  of  this  out- 
rageous act,  can  believe  the  Soviets  in- 
tend to  host  the  Olympics  as  a  celebra- 
tion of  the  human  spirit? 

Facing  such  bleak  realities,  we 
cannot  afford  to  remain  passive.  Our 
stand  on  the  Olympic  Games  is  one  step 
which  may  help  convince  Moscow  that  it 
cannot  invade  its  neighbors  and  cjppress 
its  own  citizens  with  impunity. 

We  look  forward  to  working  closely 
with  the  committee  to  develop  policies 
which  will  uphold  our  own  principles 
and  will  deter  the  Soviets  from  aggres- 
sive, repressive  actions  in  the  future.  ■ 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Jan.  28,  1980. 

2  The  complete  tran.script  of  the  hear- 
ing.s  will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office.  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


Technology  Transfers  to 
the  U.S.S.R. 


5REI 


1V 


ME.\l()KAM)r\I  FOR  THE 
SECRETARY  OF  CO.MMERCE, 
JAN.  S.  19S0' 

Suhjcrt:  Policy  on  Technology  Transfers  to 
the' USSR 

I  direct  that  you,  in  consultation  with 
the  Secretary  of  Defense  and  other  appro- 
jiriate  officials,  review  and  revise  our  pol- 
icy with  respect  to  the  export  of  high  tech- 
nology and  other  strategic  items  to  the 
Soviet  Union.  Pending  review,  no  validated 
export  licenses  for  shipment  of  goods  or 
technical  data  to  the  Soviet  Union  are  to  be 
approved.  This  review  is  to  reassess  what 
ex|)orts  will  make  a  significant  contriliut  ion 
to  the  military  potential  of  the  Soviet 
Union  and  therefore  prove  detrimental  to 
the  security  of  the  United  States  in  light  of 
the  Soviet  intervention  in  Afghanistan. 

In  addition,  I  direct  that  you  im- 
mediately review  those  transactions  for 
which  validated  licenses  have  already  been 
issued  but  export  has  not  occurred  to  de- 
termine whether  any  such  licenses  should 
be  suspended  or  revoked  in  light  of  the 
changed  national  security  circumstances. 

Finally,  I  direct  that  you,  in  consulta- 
tion with  the  Secretary  of  State  and  other 
ajjpropriate  officials,  determine  whether 
certain  transactions  now  under  general 
license  requirements  should  be  subject  to 
validated  license  requirements. 

Jimmy  Carter 


.MEMORANDUM  FOR  THE 
SECRETARIES  OF  ST.ATE 

AND  DEFENSE,  JAN.  S.  19S0' 

Siihjcrl:  Policy  on  Technology  Transfers  to 
the  USSR 

I  have  directed  the  Secretary  of  Com- 
merce to  i-eview  and  revise  our  policy  with 
i-espect  to  the  export  of  high  technology 
and  other  strategic  items  to  the  Soviet 
Union.  This  review  is  to  reassess  what  ex- 
ports will  make  a  significant  contribution  to 
the  military  potential  of  the  Soviet  Union 
and  therefore  prove  detrimental  to  the  se- 
curity of  the  United  States  in  light  of  the 
Soviet  intervention  in  Afghanistan. 

Our  COCOM  ICoordinating  Committee 
for  East-West  Trade  Policyl  partners 
should  be  consulted'  on  this  review,  which 
will  reexamine  precedents  established  in 
the  past  for  COCOM  exceptions,  in  order  to 
secure  their  cooperation.  These  consulta- 


tions should  make  clear  that  the  basis  for 
review  and  revision  is  the  Soviet  interven- 
tion in  Afghanistan  which  has  changed  the 
nature  of  the  potential  danger  to  our  com- 
mon military  security. 

Jimmy  Carter  ■ 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Jan.  14,  1980. 


Hermitage  Exhibit 
Canceled 


DEPARTMENT  ST.VTEMENT, 
JAN.  22,  19S()' 

The  U.S.  Government  has  decided  that 
in  the  wake  of  the  Soviet  invasion  of 
Afghanistan,  it  cannot  recommend  that 
an  exhibition  in  this  country  of  art  ob- 
jects from  the  Hermitage  Museum,  in 
Leningrad,  would  be  in  our  national 
interest.  This  decision  has  been  con- 
veyed to  the  .spon.sors  of  the  exhibition. 

What  this  means  is  that  the  gov- 
ernment will  not  gi-ant  the  objects  im- 
munity fi'om  judicial  seizure  under 
Public  Law  89-259.  This  law  provides 
that  objects  imported  for  temporary 
cultural  display  cannot  be  seized  as  part 
of  a  legal  proceeding,  that  is,  the 
waiver  would.  Without  a  finding  that 
exhibition  is  in  the  national  interest, 
this  immunity  cannot  be  granted. 

In  the  past,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
chosen  not  to  permit  objects  into  the 
United  States  for  cultural  purposes 
without  the  granting  of  this  immunity. 
The  exhibition  was  originally  .scheduled 
foi'  Washington,  Minneajjolis,  San 
Francisco,  and  Detroit,  sponsored  by 
Control  Data  Corporation.  I  would  note 
that  a  lot  of  countries  do  .send  exhibits 
here  without  a  waiver.  ■ 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  De- 
)ja]-tnient  spokesman  Hodding  Carter  111. 


1!»«. 


Itpi 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


>REIGN  AID 


FY  1981  Development 
issistance  Programs 


Thomas  Ehrlivh 


Stiitciiiciif  hrftiir  the  Hi. 
ForcKjii  Affi. 


Coin- 
fti'i   nil-  ForvKjii  Aft'iiirs  OH  Fchnun-i/ 
19'Sit.  Mr.  Elirln-h  IS  Dnrclnr  i,f  the 
S.  IiifcriKitioiKil  Dcrclojiiiiciit 
Ojicnilioii  Ajiciicn. ' 

m  pleased  to  present  the  first  tes- 
loiiy  of  the  International  Develop- 
nt  Cooperation  Agency  (IDCA)  be- 
e  this  committee.  IDCA  owes  much 
the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Commit- 

for  its  existence.  My  objective 
lay  is  to  ]:)i'esent  an  overview  of  all 

(lexelopment  assistance  programs 
jposed  by  the  President  foi'  the 
ning  year.  To  evaluate  the  individual 
Dgrams,  they  should  be  viewed  in  the 
itext  of  our  entire  development  as- 
tance  effort. 

The  testimony  is  in  two  parts.  The 
st  describes  our  overall  development 
distance  plans,  indicates  the  range  of 
r  development  assistance  goals,  and 
scribes  activities  in  some  of  the 
iority  areas  within  that  range.  The 
:ond  briefly  explains  the  budget  re- 
est  for  each  of  the  separate  programs 
d  indicates  how  they  relate  to  one 
other. 

Many  now  recognize  the  impor- 
ice  of  developing  countries  to  the 
lited  States  and  that  assisting  de- 
lopment  is  in  the  U.S.  intei'est  for 
manitarian,  economic,  political,  and 
■ategic  reasons.  But  it  is  also  essen- 
1  to  step  back  and  to  see  these  objec- 
es  as  part  of  a  coherent  effort  to 
hieve  an  overi'iding  goal — a  world  at 
ace  in  which  we  can  overcome  pov- 

ty. 

Pi-esident  Carter,  in  his  State  of 
e  Union  address,  stated  that: 
'eace — a  peace  that  preserves 
edoni — remains  America's  fii'st 
al."  A  world  at  peace  in  which  na- 
)ns  respect  each  other's  national  in- 
peiidence,  in  which  each  nation  ex- 
nds  the  partici])ation  of  its  people  in 
■  political  process,  in  which  each  na- 
)n  respects  the  human  rights  of  its 
;izens,  in  which  each  nation  strives  to 
eet  the  economic  aspirations  of  its 
oiile  equitably — that  is  a  world  in 
hicli  oui-  own  people  and  institutions 
n  flourish. 


We  have  learned  that  dictatorships 
which  consistently  fail  to  meet  the  eco- 
nomic and  political  aspii-ations  of  their 
peo|:ile  raise  the  risk  of  internal  strife. 
Frustrated  and  enraged  people,  mired 
in  poverty  and  oppressed  by  a  few, 
breed  terror,  i-evolution,  and  chaos. 
They  do  not  jiroduce  nations  that  can 
resist  subversion.  Nor  can  such  nations 
strengthen  their  national  independence. 
They  are  prey  to  destabilizing  influ- 
ences from  within  and  without.  They 
raise  the  temptations  of  intervention 
for  their  neighbors  and  more  distant 
majoi'  ])owei's.  Often  those  temptations 
threaten  the  peace  we  seek. 

A  world  of  nations  striving  to  meet 
the  aspirations  of  their  people  through 
the  use  of  representative  institutions 
and  caring  about  the  human  rights  of 
their  citizens  does  not  guarantee  peace 
and  freedom  but  certainly  is  a  neces- 
sary pi'econdition. 

Those  who  fight  for  peace  are  also 
ret|uired  to  struggle  against  poverty. 

American  interests  in  Africa,  Asia, 
and  Latin  America — dramatized  by  the 
threat  to  our  security  that  currently 
confronts  us — are  diverse  and  signifi- 
cant. How  we  resolve  the  many  chal- 
lenges brought  to  us  by  the  develojiing 
world  in  the  1980s  will  have  a  tremen- 
dous impact  on  the  course  of  our  owni  na- 
tion's develoi>ment  during  the  rest  of 
this  century. 

The  central  feature  of  the  de- 
veloping world  is  cliange — social,  eco- 
nomic, and  political  change  that  results 
from  an  up-swelling  of  nationalistic  or 
religious  feeling,  from  a  desire  to  bring 
theii-  nations  to  parity  with  developed 
countries,  or  fi-om  the  economic  injus- 
tice that  is  far  too  pervasive  within  the 
developing  world. 

In  the  midst  of  an  interdependent 
world  economy  marked  by  much  pros- 
perity, hundreds  of  millions  of  people 
remain  witJiout  adequate  food,  shelter, 
and  health  care.  We  must  forge  an 
American  response  to  the  twin  prob- 
lems of  growing  interdejiendence  and 
world  poverty.  If  America  meets  this 
challenge,  oui-  own  economy  and  society 
will  be  strengthened  by  the  growth  and 
adaptation  that  our  response  will  re- 
quire. 


Eacli  of  the  facets  of  our  interrle- 
jjendent  relationship  with  the  Thirrl 
World  involves  imjjortant  domestic 
interests.  There  are  those  in  this  and 
other  industrial  countries  who  would 
take  a  protective  stance  in  reaction  to 
the  growth  in  economic  contacts  be- 
tween the  develoj^ed  and  developing 
worlds.  But  our  country  can  profit  and 
grow  as  a  result  of,  not  in  spite  of,  the 
jrolitical  and  economic  development  of 
the  Third  World.  We  need  the  courage 
and  sense  of  purpose  to  do  so. 

In  that  context,  I  emphasize  that 
our  FY  1981  development  assistance 
budget  is  an  important  statement  in 
relation  to  the  current  world  turmoil. 
At  a  time  when  the  world  is  watching 
all  our  actions,  and  reactions,  the 
President's  request  says  that  the 
United  States  seeks  to  strengthen  our 
relations  with  the  nations  of  the  Third 
World.  Those  relations  will  be 
strengthened  in  other  ways  as  well:  in 
international  organizations,  the  United 
Nations,  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT),  the  World 
Bank,  and  the  International  Monetary 
Fund  (IMF).  The  United  States  will  ' 
continue  to  cooperate  and  negotiate  on 
issues  of  significance  to  both  developed 
and  developing  nations.  As  IDCA  re- 
sponds to  its  mandate  in  the  field  of  de- 
velopment assistance,  it  will  also  play 
its  part  with  other  agencies  in  setting 
policies  toward  the  overall  U.S.  rela- 
tions with  the  developing  nations  and 
toward  international  negotiations  with 
them. 

I  have  just  returned  from  a  2-week 
visit  to  Africa.  Throughout  that  trip  I 
heard  time  after  time — directly  and 
indirectly — two  quite  different  con- 
cerns that  have  arisen  in  the  wake  of 
the  recent  events  in  Iran  and  Afghani- 
stan. 

On  the  one  hand,  some  Africans 
suggested  the  United  States  might 
simply  turn  inward  and  minimize  its 
relations  with  developing  countries. 
Those  who  expressed  this  fear  were 
concerned  that  isolation  from  the  Third 
World  might  be  the  apparent  lesson  of 
Iran  to  the  United  States — we  could 
expect  only  grief,  not  gratitude,  from 
our  efforts  to  help  the  nations  of  the 
Third  World,  and  we  would  be  best  off 


53 


Foreign  Aid 


to  minimize  our  contacts  in  the  hope  of 
minimizing  our  losses.  This  possibility 
is  of  real  concern  to  many  in  Moslem  as 
well  as  non-Moslem  nations. 

The  second  jjossible  shift  in  U.S. 
attitudes,  equally  feared  by  those  in 
Africa  with  whom  I  spoke,  would  be  in 
reaction  to  events  in  Afghanistan  and 
our  subsequent  efforts  to  help  Paki- 
stan. Unless  the  Russians  are  coming, 
it  is  said  by  some,  the  United  States 
will  not  provide  significant  hel])  to  de- 
veloping nations. 

It  would  be  a  grave  error  for  the 
United  States  to  follow  either  of  these 
courses,  or  even  to  leave  uncorrected  a 
suspicion  of  our  adherence  to  them.  Our 
long-term  political  and  economic  well- 
being  is  far  too  enmeshed  with  the  de- 
veloping world  to  allow  cynicism  of  that 
nature  to  be  seen  as  the  basis  of  our 
relations  with  them.  On  the  contrai'y. 
Iran  and  Afghanistan  present  a  prime 
opportunity  to  affirm  U.S.  support  for 
developing  countries.  Failui-e  to  meet 
the  challenge,  however,  would  be  moi'e 
than  just  an  opportunity  missed;  it 
could  lead  to  serious  trouble  over  time 
by  creating  unnecessary  tension  in  our 
relations  with  the  Third  World. 

President  Carter  uiiflerscored  the 
significance  of  this  ojiportunity  in  his 
State  of  the  Union  address  2  weeks  ago. 
He  declared  that: 

We  will  continue  to  build  our  lies  with  de- 
veloping nations,  respecting  and  helping  to 
strengthen  their  national  independence, 
which  they  have  struggled  so  hard  to 
achieve.  And  we  will  continue  to  support 
the  growth  of  democracy  and  the  protection 
of  human  rights. 

He  continued  by  pointing  out  that:       ' 

In  repressive  regimes,  popular  frustrations 
often  have  no  outlet  except  through  vio- 
lence. But  when  peoples  and  their  govern- 
ments can  approach  their  problems 
together — through  open,  democratic 
methods — the  basis  for  stability  and  peace 
is  far  more  solid  and  far  more  enduring. 

Our  development  assistance  plans  con- 
stitute a  national  statement  that  we 
want  to  work  as  partners  with  de- 
veloping nations  throughout  the  world. 
The  ci'eation  of  IDCA — and  the  cohe- 
sion it  will  provide  to  the  presentation 
of  oui'  development  assistance 
programs — could  not  have  come  at  a 
more  important  time.  This  year  the 
Administration  has  prepared  a  de- 
velopment assistance  budget  that 
makes  cleai-  we  will  not  abandon  those 
who  look  to  the  United  States  to  help 
them  bring  an  end  to  starvation  and 


54 


who  seek  to  meet  the  basic  human 
needs  of  their  peojjle. 

During  our  preparation  of  the  FY 
1981  budget,  we  paid  particular  atten- 
tion to  the  relative  advantages  of  dif- 
ferent instruments  for  achieving  differ- 
ent development  goals.  We  compared 
the  advantages  of  various  bilateral  jji'o- 
grams  and  e.xamined  closely  the  ways  in 
which  U.S.  bilateral  aid  can  comple- 
ment the  activities  of  the  multilatei'al 
jirograms  to  which  we  contribute. 

This  budget  focuses  on  the 
priorities  that  Congress  and  the  Presi- 
flent  have  stressed  as  most  important. 
In  the  bilateral  requests,  we  are  em- 
phasizing several  key  sectors  of  de- 
velopment. These  include  agriculture, 
energy,  health,  and  population.  Our 
bilateral  requests  also  give  emphasis  to 
countries  that  have  demonstrated 
strong  support  for  human  rights  and 
equitable  economic  flevelojiment.  Fur- 
thermore, we  have  strengthened  our 
sujiport  for  jirivate  voluntary  organiza- 
tions. 


DEVELOPMENT  THEMES 

In  shaping  our  dexelopment  assistance 
pi'ogram,  we  must  be  realistic  in  our 
e.xpectations  of  what  can  be  achieved. 

We  cannot  expect  foreign  assist- 
ance to  instantly  louy  us  friendship 
among  the  developing  nations. 

Similarly,  we  cannot  expect  im- 
mediate, dramatic  change.  We  alone 
cannot  wipe  out  poverty  or  hunger.  Yet 
change  is  occurring  and  will  continue. 
The  economic,  political,  and  social 
brces  that  set  development  in  motion 
are  vast.  Our  task  is  to  demonstrate  a 
willingness  to  be  involved,  to  help 
channel  and  accelerate  the  change  to 
make  it  as  productive  and  equitable  as 
possible. 

We  must  continue  to  aid  the  na- 
tions of  the  developing  world.  Unless 
we  are  willing  to  do  so,  and  at  the  same 
time  demonstrate  sensitivity  toward 
their  national  and  cultural  aspirations, 
we  cannot  expect  them  to  respect  our 
system  and  our  values.  The  concrete 
accomplishments  at  each  increment  of 
our  effort  may  seem  small,  but  the  re- 
sults are  cumulative  and  lasting. 

In  order  to  make  sure  our  de- 
velojimental  goals  are  cast  within  a 
realistic  framework  and  to  be  certain 
that  our  limited  development  resoui'ces 
are  being  used  most  efficiently,  IDCA 
defined  a  set  of  prioi'ities  for  our  de- 


fiCt. 

irit; 


(« 


Ipiii 


m 


velopment  activities  in  the  immedia' 
future.  The  i-ange  of  these  priorities'' 
shows  that  assistance  is  only  one  of  tl 
activities  that  affect  developmental 
concerns.  Just  as  important  to  de- 
velopment are  our  policies  in  areas  sui 
as  trade,  raw  materials,  and  inter- 
national finance,  which  do  much  to 
shape  the  nature  of  growth  and  de- 
velojjment  in  the  Third  Workl. 

In  defining  the  full  range  of  poli(A(t 
areas  for  our  attention,  we  examined'  it 
both  intensity  of  need  and  IDCA's  ab  iijn 
ity  to  make  a  constructive  contributic 
to  U.S.  policy.  The  result  was  an 
agenda  for  U.S.  development  efforts 
that  is  realistic  in  scope  and  that  ad-  j^. 
rlresses  immediate,  pressing  problemj  *' 

In  brief,  this  development  policy 
agenda  deals  with  particular  areas 
within  five  broad  categories  of  concei 
where  we  will  be  directing  our  atten- 
tion. 

•  We  will  be  guiding  an  accelerat 
attack  on  global  poverty — addressin 
the  needs  for  food  security,  populati^ 
control,  and  health  and  emphasizing 
programs  that  recognize  the  role  of 
women  in  development. 

•  We  will  stress  areas  in  which  t 
United  States  and  developing  nationH 
have  the  greatest  mutual  economic 
interests — particularly  energy  de- 
velopment, debt  management,  trade,,   "' 
I'aw  materials,  and  investment.  ■"" 

•  We  will  focus  on  regions  and 
counti'ies  of  particular  importance — 
especially  the  Caribbean  basin,  sub- 
Saharan  Africa,  and  countries  demon 
strating  strong  concern  for  human 
i-ights  and  equitable  development. 

•  We  will  be  involved  with  desigi: 
ing  a  development  .strategy'  for  the  coir  * 
ing  decade  through  participation  in  the 
U.N.  Third  Development  Decade  and 
through  the  negotiations  at  the  globai 
level  in  the  United  Nations  and  in  oth' 
international  agencies.  We  will  also  b 
addressing  the  needs  of  the  future  by 
fostering  scientific  research  and  de- 
velopment applicable  to  development 
needs  and  by  adjusting  the  allocation 
U.S.  development  resources  as  needs' 
change. 

•  We  will  manage  increased  bilat 
eral  assistance  with  reduced  staff  size 
by  use  of  the  most  effective  technique 
of  assistance  at  different  stages  of  de 
velopment.  We  will  also  increase  oui 
development  impact  by  improving 
coorflination  among  bilateral  and  mul- 


Department  of  State  Bullej 


ilti 


rdf 


Ik 


Kle 


Foreign  Aid 


1  programs  and  coordination 
wiiassistance  programs. 

Within  this  range  of  policy  themes, 
have  begun  to  give  particular  atten- 
n  to  several  of  the  most  pressing  sec- 
•s  in  which  we  can  also  make  the  most 
pact.  Three  of  these  sectors  are  food 
■urity  and  agriculture,  energy  de- 
lopment,  and  population  and  health, 
cause  of  their  importance,  and  be- 
jse  they  provide  sound  e.xamples  of 
lat  the  different  bilateral  and  mul- 
iteral  programs  can  achieve,  it  may 
helpful  to  describe  briefly  some  of 
?  activities  in  those  sectors. 

lod  Security  and  Agriculture 

■Iping  to  meet  the  crisis  of  world 
nger  is  the  President's  most  impor- 
it  develoimient  priority.  Kampuchea 
s  made  human  starvation  a  current 
•al  point  of  the  public  attention.  But 
mpuchea  represents  only  the  most 
;ible  example  of  the  horror  that  hun- 
?ds  of  millions  of  people  around  the 
■rid  face  every  day. 

Chronic  starvation  is  rampant  and 
Dwing.  As  stressed  by  the  President's 
■mmission  on  World  Hunger,  there  is 
more  important  way  for  us  to  dem- 
strate  concern  for  the  needs  of  people 
the  Thii-d  World  than  to  work  towaixl 
?  eradication  of  hunger.  And  there 

no  clearer  areas  than  food  and  ag- 
mlture  in  which  development  must 
cur  if  we  are  to  be  able  to  work 
•aceably  and  productively  with  the 
veloping  nations. 

Obviously  the  United  States  cannot 
pect  to  feed  the  world.  Instead,  we 
11  have  to  marshall  our  efforts  on 
ree  levels. 

•  Food  production  must  be  ex- 
nded  in  developing  countries. 

•  The  earnings  of  poor  people  must 
increased  so  they  can  buy  the  food 

ey  need. 

•  The  United  States  must  continue 
transfer  food  to  areas  where  it  is 

•eded. 

We  are  pursuing  these  goals 
rough  both  bilateral  and  multilateral 
stitutions.  The  bilateral  Agency  for 
iternational  Development  (AID)  pro- 
•am  for  agriculture,  nutrition,  and 
u'al  development  has  increased  in  em- 
lasis  considei'ably  in  I'ecent  years, 
he  level  of  funding  has  grown  from 
174  million  in  1977  to  $729  million  re- 
iested  in  FY  1981,  over  half  AID's 


functional  account  budget.  AID  funds 
will  continue  to  concentrate  on 
institution-building;  on  the  introduction 
of  high-yielding  and  innovative  technol- 
ogies; and  on  services,  commodities, 
and  generally  smaller  scale  infrastruc- 
ture aimed  specifically  at  the  needs  of 
small  farmers  and  the  rural  poor. 

A  second  major  bilateral  tool  in  this 
effort  is  the  PL  480  Food  for  Peace 
program,  which  provides  both  food  for 
needy  jteople  and  generates  resources 
to  sujiport  development  activities. 

From  1977  to  1979  the  World  Bank 
grou])  devoted  more  than  $8  billion  to 
projects  in  agriculture  and  rural  de- 
velopment. About  one-third  of  the 
Bank's  concessional  resources  were 
used  for  these  purposes  in  FY  1979. 
Within  the  sector,  there  has  also  been  a 
greater  em])hasis  by  all  the  multilatei'al 
development  banks  on  lending  that  as- 
sists small  farmers,  as  distinct  from 
larger  infrastructure  projects. 

We  are  encouraging  those  banks 
and  the  relevant  U.N.  agencies — the 
Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  (the 
U.N.'s  leading  organization  in  this  sec- 
tor), the  World  Food  Program,  and  the 
International  Fund  for  Agriculture  De- 
velopment (IFAD) — to  expand  even 
further  their  agricultural  development 
programs.  IFAD  is  unique  in  that  it  is 
charged  with  the  task  of  dealing  spe- 
cifically with  the  problems  of  the  rural 
poor  and  also  because  a  major  share  of 
its  funds  come  from  members  of  the 
Organization  of  Petroleum  Exporting 
Countries  (OPEC).  We  are  monitoring 
IFAD's  ))erformance  carefully  with 
other  members  of  that  institution. 

Energy 

Energy  is  a  sector  in  which  our  inter- 
ests and  those  of  developing  countries 
are  obviously  linked.  While  we  are 
struggling  with  the  energy  crisis,  they 
are  facing  huge  energy  problems  of 
their  own,  ranging  from  depletion  of 
firewood  and  other  traditional  fuels  to 
staggering — and  growing — debt  bur- 
dens brought  about  by  their  oil  imports. 

Clearly,  we  help  ourselves  by 
helping  them  develop  energy  resources 
of  their  own.  Not  only  are  we  not  com- 
peting for  the  same  energy  supplies, 
but  their  growing  financial  burdens  are 
straining  the  international  financial 
system. 

In  developing  the  FY  1981  budget, 
IDCA  has  placed  high  priority  on 


energy.  The  budget  addresses  the  most 
])i-essing  energy  needs  of  the  develop- 
ing countries:  assessments  of  energy 
requirements  and  |)otential  enei'gy 
sources  in  particulai'  countries,  full  de- 
velopment of  conventional  energy 
supplies,  development  and  implementa- 
tion of  new  and  renewable  energy 
sources,  and  expansion  of  traditional 
fuel  supplies  to  reverse  or  contain  wor- 
sening environmental  degradation. 

As  in  agriculture,  a  description  of 
the  various  donor  programs  for  energy 
shows  the  relative  advantages  of  the 
different  institutions.  IDCA  is  woi-king 
to  insure  that  these  energy  assistance 
programs  complement  one  another. 

The  multilateral  development 
banks  have  the  compai-ative  advantage 
of  being  able  to  provide  substantial 
amounts  of  capital  for  large  projects. 
With  strong  U.S.  support,  the  World 
Bank  has  now  taken  the  lead  in  assist- 
ing developing  countries  to  develop 
their  own  fossil  fuel  resources.  The 
United  States  has  also  encouraged  the 
development  banks  to  become  more  in- 
volved in  forestry  and  renewable 
energy.  The  World  Bank  is  now  begin- 
ning to  include  fuelwood  as  an  integral 
part  of  rural  development. 

In  our  bilateral  program,  AID  will 
undertake  a  wide  range  of  energy  proj- 
ects in  FY  1981,  with  particular  focus 
on  i-enewable  energy  and  on  institu- 
tion-building for  improved  management 
of  all  energy  resources.  The  emphasis 
in  our  bilateral  program  on  renewable 
energy  reflects  a  concern  for  the  needs 
of  the  poor  who  inci-easingly  will  be  un- 
able to  meet  the  rising  cost  of  conven- 
tional fuels.  In  this  regard,  AID  is 
working  at  the  frontiers  of  the  use  of 
alternative  technologies  to  provide 
energy  from  indigenous  resources.  The 
Peace  Corps  has  been  active  in  helping 
to  carry  out  these  efforts.  In  a  joint 
project  with  AID,  the  Peace  Corps  has 
begun  to  survey  rural  energy  use  in 
more  than  30  countries  and  has  helped 
disseminate  basic  energy  information  at 
the  village  level. 

Current  bilateral  activities  also  in- 
clude an  Overseas  Private  Investment 
Corporation  (OPIC)  program  to  en- 
courage and  assist  private  U.S.  energy 
companies  to  explore  and  produce  pe- 
troleum, natural  gas,  and  other  energy 
resources  in  energy-deficient  develop- 
ing countries.  This  began  as  a  special 
program  in  1977  and  has  increased  in 
activity  since  then.  In  a  major  achieve- 
ment this  past  year,  one  of  the  first 


/larch  1980 


55 


Foreign  Aid 


OPIC-sponsored  petroleum  projects 
reached  commercial  production  in 
Ghana. 

In  addition,  the  Institute  for  Scien- 
tific and  Technological  Cooperation 
(ISTC)  will  play  a  major  part  in  our 
bilateral  energy  program.  It  will  have 
principal  re.sponsibility  for  long-term 
research  and  development,  for 
evaluating  the  applicability  to  develop- 
ing countries  of  different  energy  tech- 
nologies, and  for  fostering  the  ability  of 
the  developing  countries  to  do  research 
and  development  in  energy-related 
areas. 

Population  and  Health 

Pi-ogress  in  all  major  fields — agricul- 
ture, energy,  industry,  and  health  —  is 
threatened  by  rapid  population  growth. 
If  present  trends  continue,  the  world's 
population  would  only  stabilize  in 
2090 — at  10  billion  compared  with  to- 
day's 4.3  billion.  The  implications  not 
only  for  development  but  also  for  peace 
and  security  throughout  the  world  are 
obvious. 

Moreover,  high  fertility  strains  the 
health  of  both  mothers  and  children, 
through  the  effects  of  close  birth- 
spacing  and  through  septic  abortion, 
particularly  in  countries  lacking  family 
planning  services. 

The  United  States  can  and  should 
do  more  to  encourage  family  planning. 
The  proposed  FY  1981  budget  reflects 
this  need,  particularly  through  in- 
creased support  for  private  voluntary 
organizations  working  in  the  field.  As 
emphasized  at  the  U.N.  World  Popula- 
tion Conference  and  the  U.N.  Inter- 
national Women's  Year  Conference,  all 
couples  .should  have  not  only  the  right 
to  plan  their  families  but  also  the  safe, 
effective,  and  affordable  means  to  do 
so,  as  couples  in  developed  countries 
have  had  for  years.  Family  planning  as- 
sistance is  being  requested  by  the  gov- 
ernments of  most  people  in  the  Third 
World,  from  countries  of  many  faiths 
and  cultures.  IDCA  is,  therefore,  di- 
recting a  study  of  assistance  needs  in 
this  area  and  of  the  strengths  of  other 
donors,  notably  the  World  Bank  and  the 
United  Nations,  as  well  as  the  opportu- 
nities for  increased  U.S.  efforts. 

Equally  important,  we  will  develop 
policies  and  programs  that  help  make 
small  families  a  more  attractive  option, 
particularly  by  improving  opportunities 
for  women  so  that  they  are  less  de- 
pendent socially  and  economically  on 
large  families. 


56 


Poor  health  also  hampers  develop- 
ment, particularly  through  its  effects 
on  productivity  and  on  learning  ability. 
The  princi])al  thi'eats  to  health  in  the 
Third  World  are  malnutrition,  common 
infections,  and,  of  course,  high  birth 
rates.  IDCA  is  working  to  improve 
health  by  supporting  primary  care, 
safer  water  and  better  sanitation,  dis- 
ease control  (especially  for  malaria), 
and  health  planning.  In  conjunction 
with  the  U.N.  system  and  the  World 
Bank,  we  are  expanding  through 
AID— and,  through  ISTC,  will  be  ex- 
panding even  further — recent  efforts  to 
bring  U.S.  scientific  skill  to  bear  on 
health  problems  of  the  Third  World, 
focusing  particularly  on  primary  care. 


COMPREHENSIVE 
DEVELOPMENT  BUDGET 

The  most  important  initial  task  of 
IDCA  has  been  to  work  with  the  Presi- 
dent in  establishing  a  coordinated, 
comprehensive  budget  for  the  total 
U.S.  development  assistance  effort. 

The  President's  budget  request  for 
the  full  range  of  development  assist- 
ance and  development-related  pro- 
grams in  FY  1981  is  $8.3  billion.  This 
includes  $6.4  billion  for  bilateral  pro- 
grams, $1.7  billion  for  multilateral  de- 
velopment banks,  and  $244  million  for 
contributions  to  the  United  Nations  and 
the  Organization  of  American  States 
(OAS). 

I  am  convinced  that  this  com- 
prehensive budget  is  well  balanced  and 
makes  maximum  use  of  the  unique  ad- 
vantages of  the  various  donor 
mechanisms.  IDCA  conducted  an  in- 
tense review  of  the  program  budgets  as 
they  were  developed  to  assure  consis- 
tency and  to  assure  appropriate  em- 
phasis. 

The  budget  reflects  the  priorities  I 
have  already  mentioned.  It  also  pro- 
vides positive  incentives  for  countries 
with  good  records  in  human  rights  and 
equitable  economic  growth  and  seeks 
greater  use  of  private  voluntary  or- 
ganizations. 

Two  other  features  of  the  FY  1981 
budget  are  worthy  of  note. 

First,  we  are  proposing  a  change  in 
the  budgetary  treatment  of  callable 
cajiital  subscriptions  to  the  multilateral 
development  banks.  Although  these 
banks  are  not  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
this  committee,  the  callable  capital 
point  is  important  in  terms  of  the  full 
impact  of  the  development  assistance 


litki 


!kei 


budget.  This  year  we  are  not  seeking, 
budget  authority  for  this  type  of  capi^i  *"' 
tal.  As  a  result  there  is  a  substantial 
lowering  in  the  amount  of  our  request. 
Callable  capital  accounts  for  about  90_9l»?™ 
of  our  total  subscriptions  to  bank  capi-i 
tal.  It  is  not  paid  in  to  the  banks;  it 
serves  only  as  a  guarantee  for  bank 
borrowings  from  private  capital  mark 
ets  and  could  only  be  called  to  meet  ob( 
ligations  on  those  borrowings.  It  is 
highly  unlikely  that  it  will  ever  be 
called.  More  than  $11  billion  is  alreadjljgf 
available  in  ca.se  of  a  call,  $5.7  billion  ir 
appropriated  funds  and  another  $5.7 
billion  through  authority  for  public  deb 
transactions. 

None  of  these  funds  has  ever  been  ,„,; 
spent,  and  we  do  not  think  it  is  neces- 
sary or  desirable  to  seek  further  appro* 
priations  of  funds  for  this  particular 
purpose.  In  recognition  of  these  fac- 
tors, the  Administration  proposes 
enactment  of  program  limitations, 
rather  than  budget  authority,  for  con- 
trol of  callable  capital.  For  i981,  the 
budget  authority  for  the  multilateral 
flevelopment  banks  is,  therefore,  $1.1 
billion  less  than  the  previous  system 
would  have  shown. 

Second,  the  Administration  is  re- 
questing a  separate  $50  million  emer- 
gency special  requirement  fund  for  th( 
economic  support  fund.  This  will  allow' 
ra]:)id  and  flexible  responses  to  chang 
ing  international  situations  without  din  jj- 
rupting  planned  programs  elsewhere 
and  without  relying  on  supplemental 
requests.  Allocations  from  the  emer- 
gency fund  would  be  done  with  con- 
gressional consultation. 

At  this  point,  let  me  summarize  th< 
major  program  accounts. 


Bilateral  Prosrams 

AID — Development  Assistance.  The 

AID  development  assistance  request  O' 
$1,882  billion  will  allow  AID  to  provide 
substantial  increases  for  a  number  of 
countries  that  have  performed  well  in 
human  rights  and  economic  develop- 
ment and  also  to  undertake  almost  $80 
million  in  energy  programs  (compared 
with  about  $30  million  in  FY  1980). 

The  emphasis  in  AID  development 
assistance  programs  is  on  meeting  basii 
human  needs  in  poor  countries.  In  car- 
rying out  this  emphasis,  AID  spe- 
cializes in  areas  where  U.S.  experience 
technology,  and  carefully  programed 
resources  can  multiply  the  effectivenes 
of  others  and  make  use  of  our  comparai 
five  advantages.  It  has  a  strong  tradi- 


Department  of  State  Bulletir  brd 


Sti[ 


Jfei 


irli( 


Foreign  Aid 


Ml  of  leadership  in  innovative  aj)- 
Hiclies  to  development,  many  of 
I.  h  are  now  sujjported  by  larji'e  in- 
-^  iii'nts  from  tlie  banks.  Country 
",  I  ams  ai'e  at  the  heart  of  AID's 
—  ])rograms  that  emphasize  not 
\  I  D's  prog'rammatic  strengths  but 
-li  ics|jon(l  to  this  nation's  concern  for 
-p|Mii't  of  institutions  that  encourage 
||iuhii-  i)artici])ation  and  equitable  de- 
1  liipinent. 

I'Ood  for  Peace.  The  request  for 
'  .  ISO  ijrogram  levels  totals  slightly 
iM-  SI. 6  billion;  in  addition  a  budget 
lendment  will  be  submitted  shortly  to 
?rease  this  amount  by  .$100  million  to 
ike  use  of  some  of  the  gi-ain  diverted 
)m  sales  to  the  Soviet  Union.  Ba.sed 
December  estimates  of  1981  seasonal 
■erage  prices,  this  should  allow  foi'  a 
ogram  of  about  6.4  million  tons. 

Food  aid  is  provided  primarily  for 
inanitarian  and  development  jnir- 
ses  to  poor  countries.  Concessional 
les  under  titles  I  and  III,  which  are 
sically  resource  transfei'  mechanisms, 
are  some  of  the  attributes  of  both  the 
-iltilateral  aid  and  the  AID  programs 
encouraging  sound  economic  jrolicies. 
)r  e.xample,  whei'e  appropriate,  title  I 
ograms  are  used  in  support  of 
anges  recommended  by  the  IMF  and 
e  multilateral  development  banks, 
tie  III  multilateral  year  programs  re- 
ire  developing  countries  to  undertake 
ditional  development  efforts,  par- 
■ularly  in  the  field  of  agriculture  and 
ral  development.  Food  donated  undei' 
le  II  is  used  by  U.S.  voluntary  agen- 
>s  and  the  multilateral  World  Food 
•ogram  in  various  ways  to  benefit  the 
edy,  including  increasingly  large 
Tounts  for  refugee  feeding. 

The  food  program  has  become  more 
■velopment-oriented  in  recent  years 
ider  both  congressional  and  adminis- 
ative  direction.  IDCA  is  working  to 
rther  that  trend  and  to  insure  that  it 
mplements  our  other  developmental 
forts. 

We  urge  speedy  enactment  of  the 
od  security  reserve  legislation  now 
nding  before  the  Congress.  It  pro- 
des  for  a  reserve  of  up  to  4  million 
ns  of  wheat,  a  large  part  of  which 
ould  consist  of  wheat  that  had  been 
stined  for  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
heat  reserve  would  be  used  in  times  of 
arcity  to  provide  for  emergency  food 
!eds  in  developing  countries  even 
hen  our  food  production  is  relatively 
w,  and  without  disrupting  the  U.S. 
arket. 


Overseas  Private  Investment  Cor- 
poration. No  budget  authority  is 
requested  for  OPIC  because,  as  a  self- 
sustaining  U.S.  Government  corpora- 
tion, it  does  not  require  annual  appro- 
priations to  fund  its  programs. 

OPIC  offers  political  risk  insurance 
for  private  U.S.  investments  in  de- 
veloping countries,  guarantees  loans  by 
U.S.  business  in  these  countries,  and, 
in  some  cases,  invests  its  own  funds. 
OPIC  has  carried  out  its  mandate  well. 
OPIC's  basic  authorities  e.xpire  in  FY 
1982.  As  we  approach  the  time  for 
reauthorization,  IDCA  and  OPIC  will 
need  to  consiiier  whether  OPIC's  pro- 
grams can  be  made  more  effective  in 
achieving  U.S.  develo]>ment  and  e.xjiort 
objectives. 

Economic  Support  P^ind.  For  FY 
1981,  the  President  is  requesting  .$2.1 
billion  for  the  economic  support  fund, 
including  peackeeping  operations.  This 
also  includes  the  proposed  $50  million 
emei'gency  special  requirement  fund. 
Such  a  fund  is  important  for  avoiding 
disruptive  emergency  reprograming 
at  times  when  changing  situations  re- 
quire unanticipated  use  of  economic 
support  funds. 

The  economic  support  fund  pro- 
vides economic  assistance  to  countries 
where  U.S.  foreign  policy  interests  can 
be  served  by  bolstering  economies  that 
have  been  affected  by  ])olitical  or  eco- 
nomic crises.  It  can  finance  balance-of- 
payment  assistance  through  cash 
transfers  or  commodity  import  pro- 
grams and  large  infrastructure  proj- 
ects, as  well  as  programs  of  more  im- 
mediate benefit  to  the  poor. 

The  Secretary  of  State  allocates 
economic  suppoi't  funds  among  coun- 
tries based  on  foreign  policy  consid- 
erations. AID  manages  the  economic 
support  fund  projects,  taking  into  ac- 
count economic  development  criteria. 

Institute  for  Scientific  and  Tech- 
nological Cooperation.  The  President 
is  requesting  budget  authority  of  $95 
million  foi'  the  proposed  ISTC  in  FY 
1981.  Of  this  amount,  $57  million  is  for 
the  continuation  of  projects  to  be 
transferred  from  AID. 

ISTC  was  authorized  by  Congress 
as  a  component  of  IDCA  in  the  Interna- 
tional Development  Cooperation  Act  of 
1979.  Since  funds  for  ISTC  have  not  yet 
been  appi'opriated,  ISTC  has  not  begun 
operations. 

Currently,  a  very  small  fraction  of 
the  world's  research  anrl  development 


is  focused  on  the  problems  of  the  poor 
countries.  Through  ISTC,  we  will  be 
able  to  channel  much  more  research 
effort  into  the  same  areas  upon  which 
we  are  placing  priority  emphasis 
throughout  our  developmental  efforts. 
Furthermore,  the  program  will  be 
structured  to  emphasize  research  in  the 
developing  countries  themselves,  thus 
fostering  their  self-help  capabilities. 

To  help  in  the  fight  against  hunger, 
ISTC  will  lead  a  sustained  research  ef- 
fort in  the  developing  countries  on  the 
crops,  the  soils,  the  actual  farming  con- 
ditions of  poor  farmers  who  do  not  have 
access  to  irrigation  or  the  money  to  buy 
commercial  fertilizers  used  in  the 
high-yielding  I'ice  and  wheat  varieties. 

In  the  energy  sector,  ISTC  will 
support  centers  in  selected  developing 
countries  which  improve  and  adapt 
technologies  that  are  not  yet  ready  for 
practice,  doing  the  work  under  actual 
conditions.  These  centers  will  serve  as 
central  points  of  information,  problem- 
solving,  and  training. 

Health  is  a  third  area  in  which 
ISTC  will  play  a  leading  role.  A  tiny 
percentage  of  the  world's  health  re- 
search effort  is  spent  on  diseases  that 
ravage  the  poor  of  the  world.  As  a  re- 
sult, we  labor  in  our  assistance  efforts 
with  inadequate  vaccines,  health 
equipment  unsuited  for  the  conditions 
of  developing  countries,  and,  most  of 
all,  lack  of  knowledge  on  the  causes 
(and  thereby  on  potential  low-cost  pre- 
vention) of  these  diseases.  ISTC  will 
manage  a  program  that  links  U.S. 
health  science  to  training  and  ex- 
perimentation by  researchers  in  their 
own  countries  to  help  address  these 
problems. 

Other  donor  nations  have  recog- 
nized the  importance  of  this  type  of 
help  and  have  restructured  their 
foreign  assistance  programs  to  give 
special  focus  to  science  and  technology. 
Canada's  International  Development 
Research  Centre,  separately  organized 
from  the  Canadian  bilateral  program, 
has  been  exceptionally  successful  in 
strengthening  the  local  problem-solving 
capability  of  Third  World  scientists  and 
practitioners.  Sweden,  West  Germany, 
the  Netherlands,  Australia,  and  Aus- 
tria have  all  set  up  similar  institutions. 
ISTC  will  be  able  to  work  closely  with 
these  organizations,  as  well  as  with  the 
new  U.N.  Fund  for  Science  and  Tech- 
nology for  Development. 

The  principal  things  that  distin- 
guish the  ISTC  from  any  other  ac- 
tivities supported  by  the  United  States 


larch  1980 


57 


Foreign  Aid 


in  the  development  field  (including  the 
U.N.  fund,  which  is  described 
elsewhere  in  my  statement)  are: 

•  Its  prnii'ram  will  be  built  around 
key  subject  areas  in  which  scientific 
and  technological  investigation  can  pro- 
duce results  that  are  broadly  applicable 
throughout  the  developing  world; 

•  It  will  work  e.xtensively  with  the 
scientific  and  technological  institutions 
and  skilled  individuals  in  developing 
countries,  linked  along  lines  of  common 
interests  with  counterparts  in  the 
United  States,  to  enhance  capability 
within  the  selected  key  areas;  and 

•  It  will  monitor  the  results  of  sci- 
entific and  technical  research  in  the 
United  States  for  new  applications  to 
the  jiroblems  of  developing  countries. 

Peace  Corps.  For  FY  1981,  $118.8 
million  is  requested  for  the  Peace 
Coi'ps.  This  unique  organization  con- 
tinues to  be  e.xtremely  successful.  By 
working  directly  at  the  village  level, 
the  Peace  Corps  volunteers  often  en- 
hance the  development  prospects  of  the 
countries  whei'e  they  serve.  The  Peace 
Corps  also  provides  support  to  the 
domestic  development  service  pro- 
grams of  Third  World  nations  and  to 
multilateral  volunteer  programs. 

Inter-American  Foundation.  In 

FY  1981,  the  Administration  is  re- 
questing $17  million.  The  foundation  is 
an  indepenflent  government  corporation 
that  has  focused  on  small-scale  de- 
velo|)ment  in  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean.  It  has  successfully  worked 
with  local  |)rivate  organizations  that 
normally  would  not  have  direct  access 
to  U.S.  development  assistance  pro- 
grams. 

.Multilateral  Development  Banks 

The  President  is  requesting  a  total  of 
$1.7  billion  for  the  World  Bank  group 
and  the  regional  development  banks. 
As  discussed  previously,  this  incorpo- 
rates a  projiosed  change  in  the  budg- 
etary treatment  of  callable  capital  sub- 
scriptions. 

The  lai'gest  recjuest  is  for  budget 
authority  of  $1.1  billion  for  the  first  of 
three  installments  for  our  share  in  the 
sixth  replenishment  for  the  Inter- 
national Development  Association 
(IDA).  IDA  is  the  "soft  loan  window"  of 
the  Woi'ld  Bank,  making  only  conces- 
sional loans  and  only  to  the  poorest 
countries.  It  is  the  major  source  of  this 


type  of  assistance.  The  Administration 
thus  places  a  very  high  priority  on  pro- 
viding our  full  share  of  resources  for 
the  replenishment  of  IDA. 

I  also  want  to  highlight  the  request 
for  $18  million  for  the  first  portion  of 
our  subscription  to  the  capital  of  Afri- 
can Development  Bank  (ADB).  This 
will  be  the  first  U.S.  subscription  to  the 
.ADB.  It  constitutes  an  important  sign 
of  our  commitment  to  growth  and  de- 
velojjment  in  the  African  continent. 

The  multilateral  development 
l)anks  are  the  largest  source  of  financial 
development  assistance.  They  receive 
subscriptions  and  conti'ibutions  from 
many  donor  countries  in  addition  to  the 
United  States,  and  they  mobilize  sub- 
stantial amounts  of  private  capital  in 
markets  throughout  the  world.  As  a  re- 
sult, they  can  sujjport  large-scale  infra- 
structure projects  in  critical  sectors, 
and  they  can  help  in  instances  where 
U.S.  bilateral  assistance  is  small  or  en- 
tirely absent.  They  also  provide  assist- 
ance to  middle  income  countries  with 
whom  the  United  States  does  not  have 
a  bilateral  assistance  i)rogi-am. 

These  countries  continue  to  need 
substantial  amounts  of  e.xternal  financ- 
ing for  development  purposes  and  many 
of  them  are  important  to  the  United 
States  for  foreign  policy  and  national 
security  reasons.  The  banks,  as  a  con- 
sequence of  their  size  and  multilateral 
character,  are  also  an  impoi'tant  force 
in  coordinating  donor  activity  and  in 
encouraging  recipient  governments  to 
implement  appropriate  policy  measures 
for  fostering  equitable  growth. 

In  recent  years  the  banks  have 
moved  increasingly  toward  our  policies 
of  supporting  development  in  rural 
areas  in  poor  countries.  IDCA  is  ac- 
tively working  on  furthering  those 
policies  within  the  banks  and  on  estab- 
lishing specific  mechanisms  to  assure 
that  banks'  projects  and  U.S.  bilateral 
projects  are  coordinated  for  maximum 
effectiveness. 

International  Organizations 
and  Programs 

The  President  is  requesting  $244  mil- 
lion for  U.S.  voluntaiT  contributions  to 
U.N.  programs  and  to  the  OAS.  The 
largest  of  the.se  requests  is  for  $140 
million  for  the  U.N.  Development  Pro- 
gram (UNDP),  which  plays  a  key  role 
in  coordinating  multilateral  and  bilat- 
eral assistance  at  the  country  level. 
Also  included  are  requests  for  $40  mil- 


~  it 

I 


lion  for  UNICEF,  $17.5  million  for 
technical  cooperation  programs  of  the 
OAS,  and  $15  million  for  the  new  U 
Interim  Fund  for  Science  and  TechnoI( 
ogy  foi'  Development. 

The  new  science  and  technology 
fund,  which  will  be  managed  by  the 
UNDP,  is  an  initiative  growing  out  of 
the  U.N.  Conference  on  Science  and 
Technology  for  Development  which 
took  place  last  summer  in  Vienna.  The 
fund's  multilateral  character  will  permit 
it  to  take  an  active  role  in  areas  where^ 
bilateral  efforts  are  necessarily  limited.. 

In  contrast  to  the  problem-oriented 
api>roach  of  the  ISTC,  the  fund,  as  a 
U.N.  program,  will  devote  the  major 
jiai-t  of  its  resources  to  meeting  the 
sjjecific  requests  from  member  coun- 
tries and  regional  groups.  The  fund  wlU 
primarily  undertake  institution- 
building  activities  which  would  com- 
plement the  basic  needs  focus  of  AID 
and  the  problem-oriented  research  ap- 
in-oach  of  ISTC.  The  fund  will,  for 
example,  help  developing  countries 
through  technical  assistance,  training, 
and  policy  advice  to  build  up  basic  sci- 
entific competence.  Increased  scientific! 
ca])abilities  will  in  turn  enable  these 
countries  to  participate  in  and  benefit 
from  the  |)rograms  of  ISTC  and  other 
agencies. 

The  fund  is  planneil  to  be  in  exist- 
ence for  a  2-year  period,  with  a  target 
for  total  resources  of  $250  million.  \ 
second  U.S.  contribution  in  FY  1982 
will  be  considered  as  the  program  be- 
comes more  detailed  and  the  intentions 
of  other  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Develojiment  (OECD) 
and  OPIC  donors  become  clearer. 


CONCI.rSION 

The  President's  reorganization  of  the 
foi'eign  assistance  programs  will  assure 
a  well-coordinated,  government-wide 
approach  to  U.S.  development  assist- 
ance goals.  Three  bilateral  assistance 
organizations  — AID,  OPIC,  and  the 
proposed  ISTC  —  are  components  of 
IDCA.  U.S.  participation  in  the  de- 
velopmentally  oriented  U.N.  voliaitary 
programs  falls  under  the  new  agency's 
direction,  and  responsibilit\'  for  U.S. 
jjarticipation  in  the  multilateral  de- 
velopment banks  is  shared  by  the  IDCA 
and  the  Department  of  Treasury.  Thus, 
IDCA  is  in  a  unique  overview  position 
to  both  observe  and  influence  overall 
U.S.  jirograms. 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulletii' 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


The  comprehensive  foreign  assist- 
iT  prograin  I  have  outlined  is,  I  be- 
\r,  well-reasoned  and  well-balanced. 
1  rik'cts  our  nation's  compassion  for 
U'  millions  of  our  fellow  human  beings 
\i(i  face  staggering  bui'dens  in  sim|)ly 
(taming  the  most  basic  of  human 
I  imIs.  It  also  reflects  the  need  to  make 
{V  most  efficient  use  of  our  develop- 
I  Mit  assistance  dollars. 

.More  than  ever,  it  is  essential  that 
' '  efficiently  marshall  our  foreign  as- 

laiice  .so  that  we  are  identified  in  the 
iifiiiational  community  with  a  strong 
immitment  to  economic  progress  and 
liinan  decencv.  The  Administration's 
)  (igram  for  FY  1981  meets  that  objec- 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ts will  be  published  by  the  Committee 
(1  will  be  available  frorri  the  Superintend- 
t  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
inting  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


Nobel  Laureate 
Sakharov  Exiled 

WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JAN.  2:5,  19S(M 

The  decision  by  Soviet  authorities  to 
deprive  Nobel  laureate  Andrei 
Sakharov  of  his  honors  and  to  send  him 
into  exile  arouses  worldwide  indigna- 
tion. This  denial  of  basic  freedoms  is  a 
direct  violation  of  the  Helsinki  accords 
and  a  blow  to  the  aspirations  of  all 
mankind  to  establish  respect  for  human 
rights.  The  American  people  join  with 
free  men  and  women  everywhei'e  in 
condemning  this  act. 

We  must,  at  the  same  time,  ask 
why  the  Soviet  Union  has  chosen  this 
moment  to  persecute  this  great  man. 
What  has  he  done  in  the  past  few 
months  that  is  in  any  way  different 
from  what  he  was  doing  for  the  past  20 
years?  Why  the  need  to  silence  him 
now?  Is  it  because  of  the  invasion  and 
occupation  of  Afghanistan? 

Just  as  we  have  welcomed  Sol- 
zhenitsyn,  Brodsky,  Rostropovich,  and 
thousands  of  others  who  have  fled 
Soviet  oppression,  so  we  would  wel- 
come Dr.  Sakharov.  It  is  part  of  our 
proud  and  sacred  heritage. 

The  arrest  of  Dr.  Sakharov  is  a 
scar  on  their  system  that  the  Soviet 
leaders  cannot  erase  by  hurling  abuse 
at  him  and  seeking  to  mask  the  truth. 
His  voice  may  be  silenced  in  e.xile,  but 
the  truths  he  has  spoken  serve  as  a 
monument  to  his  courage  and  an  inspi- 
ration to  man's  enduring  quest  for  dig- 
nity and  freedom.  ■ 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Jan.  28,  1980. 


Human  Rights 
Reports 


On  February  4,  1980,  the  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  Committee  and  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  re- 
leased Country  Reports  on  Human 
Rights  Practices  for  1979.  This  report 
on  human  rights  conditions  in  1,954 
countries  was  submitted  to  the  Con- 
gress by  the  Department  of  State  in 
compliance  with  Sections  116(d)(1)  and 


502B(b)  of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act 
of  1961,  as  amended. 

The  1979  report  includes  39  coun- 
tries that  were  not  covered  in  previous 
reports.  The  expanded  coverage  is  the 
result  of  a  1979  amendment  to  the 
Foreign  Assistance  Act  which  directs 
that  the  reports  include,  in  addition  to 
recipients  of  U.S.  economic  or  security 
assistance,  all  foreign  countries  which 
are  U.N.  members.  In  addition  to  those 
countries  which  fall  into  the  statutory 
categories,  three  additional  countries, 
which  may  be  of  interest  to  Members  of 
the  Congress,  are  included  (North 
Korea,  Southern  Rhodesia,  and 
Taiwan). 

The  report  draws  on  information 
furnished  by  U.S.  missions  abroad, 
congressional  studies,  nongovernmental 
organizations,  and  human  rights  bodies 
of  international  organizations.  For  most 
countries  reported  on,  conditions  are 
described  up  to  the  end  of  1979.  In  the 
case  of  a  few  countries,  significant  de- 
velopments occurring  during  the  first 
month  of  1980  are  also  included. 

The  organization  of  this  report  fol- 
lows three  basic  categories.  After  an 
introduction,  the  description  of  condi- 
tions in  each  country  is  divided  into 
three  sections  which  correspond  to 
three  categories  of  human  rights.  A 
fourth  section  describes  the  govern- 
ment's attitude  toward  outside  investi- 
gations of  internal  human  rights  condi- 
tions. In  addition,  statistical  tables  are 
provided,  where  relevant,  listing  the 
amounts  of  U.S.  bilateral  assistance 
and  multilateral  development  assist- 
ance for  fiscal  years  1977,  1978,  and 
1979. 

Copies  of  this  854-page  report  may 
be  purchased  from  the  Superintendent 
of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C. 
20402,  for  $8.00  each.  Remittance,  pay- 
able to  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, must  accompany  order.  ■ 


Vlarch  1980 


59 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Soviets  Veto  Sanctions  Against  Iran 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT. 
JAN.  14,  1980' 

Like  the  presence  of  Soviet  tanks  in  the 
streets  of  Kabul,  the  Soviet  veto  of  the 
U.N.  Security  Council  resolution  on 
Iran  exposes,  for  all  the  people  of  the 
world  to  see,  the  Soviet  Union's  disre- 
gard for  international  law  and  the 
world's  machinery  of  peace. 

Their  veto  is  an  act  of  political 
cynicism.  It  offends  the  conscience  of 
all  who  honor  freedom  and  who  seek  to 
strengthen  the  grip  of  law  over  law- 
lessness, of  peace  over  strife  —  in  this 
crisis  and  for  the  future. 

The  facts  are  clear.  On  December 
31,  the  Security  Council  adopted  a 
binding  resolution  on  Iran.^  That  res- 
olution, as  had  a  prior  resolution  which 
the  Soviet  Union  approved,  called  on 
Iran  to  release  the  hostages.  It  re- 
quested that  Secretary  General  Wald- 
heim  continue  to  use  his  good  offices  to 
secure  their  release.  It  committed  the 
Security  Council  to  review  the  situation 
again  on  January  7  and,  if  the  Iranians 
had  not  yet  complied,  to  adopt  effective 
measures  under  Articles  39  and  41  of 
the  U.N.  Charter.  These  are  the  arti- 
cles of  the  U.N.  Charter  that  provide 
for  mandatory  sanctions. 

The  Secretary  General  then  went 
to  Tehran.  He  reported  to  the  Council 
on  January  7  that  the  progress  he 
sought  had  not  been  made;  that  the 
Iranians  refused  to  release  the  hos- 
tages. It,  therefore,  became  incumbent 
on  the  Security  Council  to  act. 

Twice  the  United  States,  despite 
extreme  skepticism,  agreed  to  a  delay 
of  this  action  so  that  any  indication  of  a 
good-faith  effort  to  resolve  this  crisis 
could  be  explored.  As  has  so  often  been 
the  case  in  the  past,  those  explorations 
proved  fruitless. 

The  necessary  majority  of  the 
members  of  the  U.N.  Security  Council 
voted  to  impose  specific  sanctions  on 
Iran  in  accordance  with  the  provisions 
of  the  charter  and  the  previous  decision 
of  the  Council.  The  Soviet  Union  has 
thwarted  that  effort  with  their  veto. 

Let  us  be  clear  about  what  the 
Soviet  Union  is  saying  to  the  world  by 
its  two  vetoes  in  the  past  week  and  by 
its  other  actions:  The  Soviet  Union  has 
opposed  this  effort  of  the  international 
community,  including  the  United 
States,  to  resolve  the  crisis  in  Iran 
through  peaceful  means.  Meanwhile,  it 


is  seeking  to  crush  the  independence  of 
Afghanistan  through  military  force. 

The  Soviet  Union  can  veto  the  Se- 
curity Couincil's  resolution  on 
Afghanistan  —  but  they  cannot  veto  the 
imprint  their  aggression  has  left  on 
world  opinion. 

The  Soviet  Union  can  keep  the  Se- 
curity Council  from  acting  now  on 
Iran — but  they  cannot  block  the  de- 
termination of  members  of  the  inter- 
national community  that  terrorism  and 
lawlessness  must  be  dealt  with  firmly. 

Over  the  next  several  days,  we  will 
be  working  with  other  nations  which 
uphold  the  principles  of  the  United  Na- 
tions and  which  seek  a  peaceful  end  to 
the  crisis  in  Iran,  to  carry  out  our  obli- 
gations under  the  Security  Council  res- 
olution of  December  31  and  to  imple- 
ment the  sanctions.  At  the  President's 
direction.  Deputy  Secretary  of  State 
Warren  Christopher  is  now  in  Europe 
to  discuss  our  actions  with  our  Euro- 
pean allies.  We  will  also  be  in  im- 
mediate contact  with  other  nations. 

The  terrorists  holding  the  Ameri- 
can hostages  cannot  take  comfort  from 
this  veto,  because  in  reality  it  is  aimed 
at  advancing  Soviet  designs  in  Iran. 
The  veto  does  nothing  to  lessen  the 
world  community's  condemnation  of 
their  acts,  nor  does  it  lessen  Iran's  iso- 
lation from  the  world.  In  spite  of  the 
veto,  we  are  confident  that  nations  will 
act  to  maintain  the  rule  of  law.  ■ 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Jan.  21,  1980. 

'For  text  of  Resolution  461,  see  Bul- 
letin of  Feb.  1980,  p.  68. 


U.S.  Files  Brief  WitI 
ICJ  in  Iran 
Hostage  Case 


On  January  15,  1980,  the  United  States 
filed  its  Memorial  on  the  merits  with 
the  International  Court  of  Justice  (ICJ) 
in  the  Case  Concerning  the  United 
States  DipUmiatic  and  Consular  Staff 
in  Tehran.  The  Memorial  was  filed  in 
accordance  with  the  Court's  order  of 
December  24,  1979,  which  gives  Iran 
until  February  18,  1980,  to  file  its 
Counter-Memorial. 

In  the  Memorial,  the  United  States^ 
requests  the  Court  to  declare  that  Irani 
has  violated  its  international  obliga- 
tions to  the  United  States  and  to  orden 
Iran  to  conform  to  its  legal  obligations. 
The  United  States  also  requests  the 
Court  to  hold  that  the  United  States  isi 
entitled  to  reparations  for  Iran's  viola- 
tions of  international  law,  in  a  sum  to 
be  determined  after  the  full  extent  of 
injury  suffered  by  the  United  States 
and  its  nationals  is  known. 

In  particular,  the  United  States 
alleges  that  Iran  has  violated: 

•  Articles  22,  24,  25,  26,  27,  29,  31 
37,  44,  and  47  of  the  Vienna  Conventioi  i| 
on  Diplomatic  Relations; 

•  Articles  5,  27,  28,  31,  33,  34,  35, 
36,  40,  and  72  of  the  Vienna  Conventior 
on  Consular  Relations; 

•  Article  11(4),  XIII,  XVIII,  and 
XIX  of  the  Treaty  of  Amity,  Economic 
Relations,  and  Consular  Rights  be- 
tween the  United  States  of  America 
and  Iran;  and 

•  Articles  2,  4,  and  7  of  the  Con- 
vention on  the  Prevention  and  Punish- 
ment of  Crimes  against  Internationally 
Protected  Persons,  Including  Diplo- 
matic Agents. 

The  specific  measures  the  Court  is 
asked  to  order  are: 

•  That  Iran  immediately  restore 
the  U.S.  Embassy,  Chancery,  and  Con- 
sulates to  the  exclusive  control  of  the 
United  States  and  insure  protection  and 
inviolability  of  those  properties  ac- 
cording to  treaties  between  the  United 
States  and  Iran  and  general  inter- 
national law; 

•  That  Iran  immediately  release  all 
U.S.  hostages  and  grant  them  full  pro- 
tection, privileges,  and  immunities  to 
which  they  are  entitled  under  treaties 
in  force  and  general  international  law, 


60 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Middle  East 


eluding  immunity  from  criminal  juris- 
ctiiin  and  freedom  and  facilities  to 
ave  Iran; 

•  That  none  of  the  hostages  be 
rifd  to  appear  at  any  "trial,"  "grand 
ry."  or  "international  commission;" 

•  That  those  responsible  for  crimes 
::ainst  the  personnel  and  premises  of 
It'  United  States  be  prosecuted  or  ex- 
adited  to  the  United  States;  and 

•  That  the  United  States  is  entitled 
1  reparation  in  its  own  right  and  in  the 
<frcise  of  its  right  of  diplomatic  pro- 
■ction  of  its  nationals  held  hostage. 

Many  of  these  measures  were  al- 
>ady  specified  by  the  Court  in  its 
-der  of  December  15,  1979,  directing 
■an  to  release  the  hostages.  The  De- 
'mber  15  order  was  an  interim  order 
itered  to  preserve  the  rights  of  the 
nited  States  while  the  case  is  pend- 
ig.  In  the  Memorial  filed  January  15, 
le  United  States  recjuests  that  a  final 
idgment  be  entered  in  favor  of  the 
'nitfd  States  on  all  issues  in  the 


Pres.<;  release  11  of  Jan.  15,  1980. 


ran  Chronology, 
anuary  1980 


inuary  1 

U.N.  Secretary  General  Kurt  Wald- 
■im  arrives  in  Tehran  to  seek  negotiations 
r  release  of  the  hostages. 

inuary  2 

A  spokesman  for  the  Iranian  militants 
3serts  that  Secretary  General  Waldheim 
ould  not  be  allowed  access  to  the  hos- 
dges. 

anuary  3 

Secretary  General  Waldheim  meets 
ith  Iran's  policymaking  Revolutionary 
Council  but  fails  to  meet  with  Khomeini. 

U.S.  begins  search  for  9.000  Iranian 
tudents  who  failed  to  report  to  the  Immi- 
ration  and  Naturalization  Service. 

anuary  4 

Militants  order  Iranian  Foreign  Minis- 
ry  to  hand  over  U.S.  Charge  L.  Bruce 
-aingen,  to  be  interrogated  about  docu- 
nents  that  were  found  in  the  Embassy 
iles. 


sanctions  against  Iran  and  plans  to  include 
the  measure  in  a  forthcoming  U.N.  resolu- 
tion. 

January  11 

U.S.  submits  draft  resolution  calling 
for  economic  sanctions  against  Iran  to  the 
U.N.  Security  Council. 

January  12 

Security  Council  delays  debate  on  U.S. 
bid  for  sanctions  against  Iran  because  of  a 
last  minute  message  from  Iranian  au- 
thorities to  Secretary  General  Waldheim 
proposing  to  release  the  hostages  in  return 
for  the  formation  of  an  international 
tribunal  that  would  hear  Iran's  grievances. 

Iran  formally  asks  Panama  to  arrest 
the  deposed  Shah  for  extradition  to  Iran. 

January  1.3 

Security  Council  votes  13  to  2  (Soviet 
Union  and  East  Germany)  on  a  draft  res- 
olution calling  for  economic  sanctions 
against  Iran. 

January  14 

Iran's  ruling  Revolutionary  Council 
announces  that  all  journalists  working  for 
U.S.  news  organizations  would  be  expelled 
from  Iran. 

Iranian  Government  warns  U.N.  mem- 
bers that  the  economic  boycott  envisioned 
by  the  U.S.  would  jeopardize  their  rela- 
tions with  Iran.  The  Iranian  Foreign  Minis- 
try also  informs  U.N.  authorities  that  any 
Security  Council  decision  that  was  contrary 
to  Iran's  interests  would  be  considered 
invalid. 

January  1.5 

Abolhassan  Bani-Sadr,  Iran's  Eco- 
nomic and  Finance  Minister,  leads  in  the 
Iranian  Presidential  campaign. 

U.S.  files  its  Memorial  with  the  World 
Court  on  the  merits  of  the  U.S. -Iran  hostage 
case.  The  Memorial  was  filed  in  accordance 
with  the  Court's  order  of  December  24, 

1979,  which  gives  Iran  until  February  18, 

1980,  to  file  its  Counter-Memorial. 

January  19 

Alleged  plotters  of  a  coup  against 
Iran's  Revolutionary  Government  are  ar- 
rested in  Tabriz. 

January  22 

Because  of  the  Afghanistan  crisis,  the 
Carter  Administration  makes  a  policy  deci- 
sion to  offer  future  economic  and  military 
cooperation  to  Iran  if  the  hostages  are  re- 
leased unharmed. 

January  23 

Khomeini  is  hospitalized  in  Tehran  for 
treatment  of  a  heart  ailment. 


he  receives  75.7%.  However,  the  Revolu- 
tionary Council  remains  supreme  until 
Bani-Sadr's  government  can  be  approved 
by  a  General  Assembly  to  be  elected  about 
the  end  of  February. 

January  27 

Bani-Sadr  states  that  the  major  re- 
sponsibility for  ending  the  crisis  over  the 
hostages  lays  with  the  U.S.  He  states  that 
"when  America  decides  to  put  aside  its 
policy  of  expansionism  and  violating  the 
sovereignty  of  other  countries,  then  it  will 
be  adopting  correct  policies  for  the  solution 
of  the  crisis." 

January  28 

Canada  announces  it  is  temporarily 
closing  its  Embassy  in  Iran. 

A  Federal  judge  orders  the  Carter 
Administration  to  return  the  passport  of 
Philip  Agee.  the  former  CIA  official  who, 
in  December,  proposed  resolving  the  Ira- 
nian situation  by  exchanging  CIA  files  on 
Iran  for  release  of  the  hostages. 

Secretary  General  Waldheim  plans  a 
series  of  new  moves  aimed  at  speeding  the 
release  of  hostages  among  which  includes  a 
tentatively  selected  five-member  commis- 
sion to  inquire  into  Iran's  grievances 
against  the  U.S.  and  the  deposed  Shah. 

January  29 

With  the  help  of  the  CIA  and  the 
Canadian  Embassy,  six  U.S.  Embassy  em- 
ployees, who  had  been  secretly  hiding  in 
the  Canadian  Embassy  in  Tehran,  escape 
from  Iran  posing  as  Canadian  diplomats 
and  carrying  Canadian  passports  with 
forged  Iranian  visas. 

January  30 

Foreign  Minister  Ghotbzadeh  states 
that  the  escape  of  the  Americans  aided  by 
the  Canadians  could  worsen  conditions  for 
the  50  hostages.  He  also  condemns  the  act 
as  a  violation  of  "international  law." 

January  31 

Iranian  militants  announce  that  they 
would  refuse  to  obey  any  order  by 
President-elect  Bani-Sadr  to  hand  over 
their  hostages  to  a  third  party. ■ 


anuary  8 

U.S.  wins  approval  from  other  major 
ndustrial  countries  on  new  financial 


January  25 

Bani-Sadr  wins  in  Iran's  first  Presiden- 
tial election.  Of  the  4  million  votes  counted. 


Vlarch  1980 


61 


NUCLEAR  POLICY 


IAEA  Conference  Held  in  India 


hy  Gerard  C.  Smith 

Statement  at  the  23d  general  con- 
ference of  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  (IAEA)  in  Neii'  Delhi 
on  December  Jf .  1979.  Ambassador 
Smith  is  Special  Representative  of  the 
President  for  Nonproliferation  Mat- 
ters. 

It  is  indeed  an  honor  to  appear  here 
today.  I  would  first  like  to  congratulate 
you,  Dr.  Sethna  [Homi  N.  Sethna, 
Chairman  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Com- 
mission of  India],  on  your  election  as 
President.  You  have  long  been  one  of 
the  most  admired  and  respected  indi- 
viduals associated  with  the  work  of  the 
agency.  Your  election  augurs  well  for 
the  success  of  this  conference. 

I  would  also  like  to  express  our 
gratitude  to  the  Government  of  India 
for  all  its  efforts  in  hosting  this  confer- 
ence. 

The  President  of  the  United  States 
has  asked  me  to  convey  the  following 
message: 

On  behalf  of  the  American  people,  I 
would  like  to  send  my  best  wishes  to  the 
participants  in  the  IAEA's  23d  general 
conference. 

Nuclear  power  can  be  critical  in  the 
urgent  efforts  we  must  make  —  individually 
and  jointly  —  to  reduce  our  dependence  on 
dwindling  and  sometimes  insecure  fossil 
fuel  supplies.  Our  extensive  cooperative 
and  supply  relationships  with  other  coun- 
tries are  major  elements  in  expanding  the 
utilization  of  nuclear  power. 

Our  ability  to  derive  its  full  benefits 
will  depend  upon  greater  public  confidence 
that  this  important  energy  source  is  being 
developed  and  managed  in  a  safe  and  effec- 
tive manner.  Misuse  of  the  technology  will 
gravely  affect  the  security  of  all  nations, 
and  it  is  vital  that  we  intensify  our  joint 
efforts  to  halt  the  spread  of  nuclear  explo- 
sives. 

Difficult  challenges  often  provide  great 
opportunities.  By  working  together  I  be- 
lieve we  can  fulfill  the  promise  of  the  atom 
for  a  better  and  more  peaceful  world. 

The  United  States  recognizes  the  cen- 
tral role  that  the  IAEA  is  playing  in  these 
endeavors.  We  intend  to  continue  providing 
strong  support  for  the  programs  of  the 
agency. 

It  is  my  hope  and  the  hope  of  the 
American  people  that  as  we  enter  the  1980s 
we  can  renew  our  efforts  to  pursue  nuclear 
development  in  a  harmonious  and  reward- 
ing fashion. 

Nuclear  power  is  needed  by  many 
countries,  including  my  own.  The 


United  States  recognizes  this  need;  we 
will  meet  our  commitment  to  peaceful 
nuclear  cooperation.  At  the  same  time, 
we  must  do  a  far  better  job  in  meeting 
the  challenges  facing  the  nuclear  power 
industry,  including  public  concern 
about  safety,  waste  disposal,  prolifera- 
tion, and  supply  assurance. 

Challenges  Facing 
the  Nuclear  Industry 

We  are  committed  to  improving  reactor 
safety.  Reactor  operators  must  be  more 
highly  trained;  regulatory  agencies, 
properly  organized;  we  need  more  ef- 
fective and  timely  response  capabilities 
in  emergencies.  Three-Mile  Island 
demonstrated  shortcomings;  it  did  not 
negate  nuclear  energy  as  a  safe,  reli- 
able, and  economic  source  of  energy.  It 
should  make  us  better  able  to  assure 
the  safe  operation  of  nuclear  facilities. 
The  United  States  will  continue  to 
share  with  the  IAEA  and  its  member 
states  the  results  of  its  investigation  of 
Three-Mile  Island. 

Radioactive  waste  disposal  is  as 
much  a  social  and  institutional  question 
as  a  technological  one.  We  should  inten- 
sify our  joint  efforts  to  demonstrate 
and  convince  our  citizens  of  the  feasi- 
bility of  waste  disposal  in  different 
geologic  media. 

We  need  to  deal  more  effectively 
with  the  disposition  of  spent  fuel. 
INFCE  and  other  examinations  should 
give  us  greater  confidence  in  this  re- 
spect. There  is  more  than  one  option 
from  which  to  choose.  Protracted  re- 
trievable storage  of  spent  fuel  produced 
by  most  current  type  reactors  is  safe 
and  economically  competitive  with  re- 
processing. There  is  growing  agree- 
ment that  reprocessing  is  not  essential 
for  waste  management. 

There  is  growing  apprehension  that 
additional  nations  may  acquire  nuclear 
explosives.  We  must  insure  that  this 
does  not  occur,  since  it  could  have  a 
seriously  prejudicial  impact  on  inter- 
national nuclear  commerce,  as  well  as 
on  international  security  and  stability. 

The  United  States  recognizes  the 
urgent  need  to  maintain  confidence  in 
nuclear  supply  arrangements  with  na- 
tions meeting  nonproliferation  condi- 
tions. We  realize  that  there  should  be 
greater  certainty  in  the  issuing  of  ex- 
port licenses  and  predictability  in  the 


exercise  of  national  controls.  To  thesi 
ends  we  are  prepared  to  work  closely 
with  others  and  intend  to  implement 
our  law  in  ways  that  provide  for  such 
certainty.  Consumer  states  also  bear 
responsibility;  their  use  or  misuse  of 
technology  can  have  an  important  effe 
on  the  actions  of  suppliers. 

There  is  need  for  adequate  uraniu 
mining,  production,  and  enrichment  t 
sustain  reactor  needs.  The  United 
States  is  prepared  to  help  others  to 
identify  and  develop  their  natural 
uranium  resources.  With  necessary 
exploration  and  investment,  we  belie' 
that  the  uranium  industry  should  not 
experience  excessive  difficulty  in 
meeting  needs  at  least  until  the  end  of 
the  century.  It  appears  that  one  conclt 
sion  of  the  International  Nuclear  Fue 
Cycle  Evaluation  (INFCE)  is  that  the 
will  be  sufficient  enrichment  capacity 
meet  probable  demands,  at  least 
through  the  1990s.  This  is  encouragin 

The  long-term  growth  of  nuclear 
power  will  also  eventually  require  moi 
advanced  reactor  systems.  Since  fuel 
utilization  improvements  can  be 
achieved  in  thermal  reactors,  nuclear 
power  could  proceed  in  a  once-throug 
mode  for  a  con.siderable  time.  Pluto- 
nium recycle  appears  to  us  as  un- 
necessary, marginally  economic  at  be^ 
and  imprudent  at  this  time  from  a  noi 
proliferation  standpoint. 

Although  some  nations  are  pro- 
ceeding with  breeder  research  and  de 
velopment  (which  requires  reprocess- 
ing), we  believe  there  are  compelling 
economic  and  nonproliferation  reasons 
for  limiting  the  number  of  reprocessir 
plants  to  a  few  large-scale  facilities  ar 
gearing  reprocessing  capacity  to  near 
term  plutonium  demand  for  research 
and  development  on  advanced  reactor 

As  such  reprocessing  takes  place, 
will  become  highly  important  to  assur 
that  the  resultant  plutonium  is  subjec 
to  rigorous  international  controls. 

If  the  breeder  proves  to  be  eco- 
nomic as  it  is  developed  and  demon- 
strated, it  is  likely  to  be  so  only  in 
those  countries  having  advanced  infra- 
structures and  suitable  grid  sizes.  Thi; 
does  not  mean  that  breeders  should  bt 
limited  to  some  countries  and  denied  t 
others.  And,  there  will  be  time  before 
selecting  a  particular  advanced  techno! 
ogy  to  look  at  various  options  and  to 
modernize  international  nonprolifera- 
tion arrangements. 


62 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


5.  Support  for  IAEA 

e  IAEA  has  long  served  as  a  focal 
nt  for  nuclear  cooperation.  We  be- 
/e  it  will  prove  important  in  meeting 

challenges  I  have  described. 

We  strongly  support  the  Director 
neral's  proposal  to  intensify  the 
EA's  efforts  on  nuclear  safety. 

We  will  continue  to  support  the 
EA's  vital  safeguards  program  which 
io  critical  to  nonproliferation  efforts, 
is  year  the  United  States  has  con- 
Duted  $5.1  million  to  this  program; 

call  upon  others  to  augment  their 
)port  for  it.  We  believe  that  nations 
)uld  also  design  nuclear  facilities  for 
3Ctive  application  of  safeguards. 

Additional  nations  are  adhering  to 

■  Nonproliferation  Treaty  (NPT),  and 
hope  that  full-scope  safeguards  will 

■ome  a  norm  for  international  nuclear 
de. 

We  congratulate  the  IAEA  for  its 
e  in  the  conclusion  of  the  Convention 
Physical  Protection.  The  convention 
Duld  help  discourage  diversion  by 
Torists  or  other  subnational  groups. 

The  agency's  technical  assistance 
jvities  help  developing  nations  to 
;e  advantage  of  the  peaceful  uses  of 
)mic  energy.  Subject  to  appropria- 
ns  by  Congress,  we  will  increase  our 
iuntary  1980  contributi(jn  over  the 
79  level.  We  also  plan  to  implement 
r  special  program  of  technical  assist- 
ce  outlined  at  the  recent  U.N.  ses- 
n  on  disarmament.  We  believe  our 
■ord  of  cooperation  in  accordance 
th  Article  IV  of  the  NPT  has  been 
isistently  good.  We  continue  to  look 

■  new  ways  to  be  even  more  respon- 
e  to  the  needs  of  the  developing 
antries.  We  endorse  the  agency's 
idy  on  spent  fuel  and  are  actively 
ning  in  its  examination  of  whether  an 
ernational  plutonium  regime  can 
nforce  existing  nonproliferation 
■asures. 

We  appreciate  the  Secretariat's 
atribution  to  insure  the  usefulness  of 
iFCE.  We  expect  the  IAEA  to  have 

important  role  in  INFCE  follow-on. 
nee  INFCE  apparently  will  not 
•eshadow  major  technical  fixes,  we 
ould  press  for  institutional  measures 
provide  both  greater  supply  and 
nproliferation  assurance.  Indeed  such 

evolution  is  contemplated  by  U.S. 
Af  and  policy. 

To  sum  up,  the  United  States 
■pes  to  preserve  and  increase  the  es- 
ntial  role  of  nuclear  power,  but  this 


arch  1980 


will  require  greater  public,  governmen- 
tal, and  commercial  confidence,  as  well 
as  international  cooperation. 

With  INFCE's  conclusion,  we  need 
to  resolve  remaining  differences  and, 
building  on  past  achievements,  move 
toward  a  more  assured  nonproliferation 
framework. 

Misuse  of  technology  and  equip- 
ment could  severely  damage  prospects 
for  nuclear  power.  This  would  be 
tragic,  especially  given  the  need  of 
many  countries  to  draw  on  this  great 
source  of  power  to  enhance  their 
energy  security. 

I  began  by  underscoring  our  de- 
pendence on  the  development  of  nuclear 
energy.  I  would  end  on  a  note  of 
optimism — that  by  dint  of  cooperation 
and  discipline  this  great  source  of 
energy  can  be  ours.  ■ 


Munitions  Sales 
to  Saudi  Arabia 


by  Lucff  yVilson  licnson 

Sfatiiini/t  Ixfnn   tbr 
Si(hc(iiiniiitt(('s  1,11  Eampv  and  flu- 
Micldli'  East  and  Intel-national  Sccu- 
ritfi  and  Scientific  Affairs  of  the  House 
Forcicjn  Affairs  Committee  on  De- 
ccnil)er  IJ.  1979.  Mrs.  Benson  is  Under 
Seereta rif  for  Seen riti/  Assi.sta )ice. 
Science,  and  TiclinohH/i/.' 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  be  here  today  to  meet 
with  the  members  of  the  subcommittees 
of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Commit- 
tee. I  have  a  brief  statement  to  make 
concerning  the  proposed  sale  of  $120 
million  of  F-5  munitions  to  Saudi 
Ai'abia. 

In  brief,  this  proposed  sale  includes 
Sidewinder  missiles,  Maverick  missiles, 
laser  guided  bombs,  and  cluster  bomb 
units.  All  of  these  munitions  are  al- 
ready in  the  Saudi  inventory.  The  pro- 
posed sale  would,  thus,  complement  an 
earlier  sale  made  pursuant  to  congres- 
sional notification. 

The  Saudi  F-5  fleet  is  an  integral 
part  of  Saudi  Arabia's  overall  defense 
posture,  a  posture  designed  to  provide 
defensive  coverage  of  a  very  large, 
resource-rich  land  area  with  limited 
manpower.  The  F-5  version  we  have 
supplied  to  Saudi  Arabia  is  a  workhorse 
aircraft  which  must  fulfill  a  variety  of 
defensive  missions.  Its  major  weapons 


systems  ai'e  the  Sidewinder,  Maverick, 
laser-guided  bombs,  and  cluster  bomb 
units.  Obviously  the  usefulness  of  these 
systems,  and  thus  of  a  significant  por- 
tion of  the  Saudi  Air  Force,  is  tied  to 
the  availability  of  munitions  such  as 
those  proposed  in  the  sale  we  are  dis- 
cussing today. 

Saudi  Arabia  initially  requested 
these  munitions  in  1976,  to  phase  with 
deliveries  of  the  aircraft  and  the  as- 
sociated ti'aining  programs.  After  dis- 
cussions with  the  Congress  at  that 
time,  the  United  States  agreed  to  pro- 
vide some,  though  not  all,  of  the  (|uan- 
tities  requested.  We  also  told  the 
Saudis  then  that  we  would  undei'take  to 
supply  additional  munitions  at  a  later 
date.  When  we  gave  that  assurance,  we 
clearly  conveyed  to  the  Saudis  that  any 
further  sales  would  also  be  subject  to 
our  congressional  notification  proce- 
dures. Nonetheless  the  assurance  was 
given,  both  because  we  felt  that  addi- 
tional quantities  would  be  justified  and 
because  the  original  sale  of  the  weapons 
system  themselves  only  made  sense  if  it 
included — as  it  did — a  corresponding 
willingness  to  supply  the  necessary 
munitions. 

The  Saudis  have  expres.sed  to  us  on 
numerous  occasions  over  the  past  3 
years  their  concern  that  we  follow- 
through  on  this  earlier  commitment  and 
provide  ade(|Uate  numbers  of  those  mu- 
nitions for  both  reserve  stocks  and  for 
training  purposes.  Their  growing  con- 
cern must,  I  think,  be  viewed  in  light  of 
the  major  importance  to  U.S.  national 
interests  of  the  ([uality  of  our  overall 
relations  with  Saudi  Arabia. 

I  know  that  members  of  the  com- 
mittee are  aware  of  Saudi  Arabia's  key 
role  in  both  regional  and  world  affairs 
and  of  the  importance  of  the  U.S. -Saudi 
bilateral  relationship. 

Saudi  Arabia  remains  the  world's 
largest  exporter  of  crude  oil.  It  cur- 
rently provides  21%  of  American  oil 
imports.  Saudi  decisions  on  oil  produc- 
tion and  price  have  enormous  impact  on 
the  world  economy,  and  our  own.  For 
example,  the  Saudi  decision  last  June  to 
increase  daily  production  temporarily 
from  8.5  to  9.5  million  barrels  greatly 
eased  pressures  of  supply  and  price. 
Saudi  Arabia  agreed  to  continue  this 
higher  level  of  production  through  the 
final  quarter  of  this  year  in  response  to 
continued  supply  and  price  pressure. 

Saudi  Arabia  has  become  an  impor- 
tant factor  in  international  finance,  in 
support  for  the  U.S.  dollar,  and  in 
world  development  lending. 


63 


Security  Assistance 


Saudi  Arabia  has  been  and  con- 
tinues to  be  a  key  working  pai-tner  in 
our  efforts  to  resolve  a  number  of  con- 
flicts in  the  Middle  East  and  Africa  and 
has  become  a  major  contributor  to  the 
quest  for  stability  in  the  region.  As  we 
proceed  with  our  efforts  to  i-each  a 
comprehensive  peace  in  the  Middle 
East,  we  will  need  to  broaden  the  base 
of  Arab  support  for  the  negotiating 
process,  and  Saudi  cooperation  in  this 
endeavor  will  be  of  significant  impor- 
tance. 

For  its  part  Saudi  Arabia  places 
great  reliance  on  its  security  relation- 
ship with  the  United  States.  In  a  gen- 
eral sense  it  recognizes  the  inherent 
vulnerability  of  a  large  territorial  area 
with  a  relatively  sparse  population. 
Add  to  that  combination  natural  re- 
sources worth  over  $5  trillion  at  today's 
prices  and  you  have  what  the  Saudis 
recognize  as  a  tempting  target.  The 
Saudis  also  recognize  that  there  is  little 
in  history  to  suggest  that  resources 
such  as  theirs  will  go  both  unprotected 
and  unmole.sted  for  very  long. 

In  specific  terms  the  Saudis  view 
with  great  concern  events  in  neighbor- 
ing countries  which  symbolize  to  them, 
to  a  greater  or  lesser  degree,  an  ag- 
gressive Soviet  policy  whose  objective 
is  expansion  of  Soviet  influence  over 
the  long  term.  In  recent  years  they 
have  seen  manifestations  of  this  policy 
in  South  Yemen  and  Ethiopia  to  the 
south,  in  Irac|  to  the  ninth,  and  in  Af- 
ghanistan in  the  not  too  distant  north- 
east. In  Saudi  defense  planning,  Ira(| 
and  South  Yemen  have  been  seen  as  the 
most  direct  threats.  They  each  hnvv 
sufficient  resources  available  in  either 
military  hardware  terms  or  in  the 
capacity  to  organize  subvei'sion  to  jus- 
tify Saudi  concerns. 

To  counter  these  perceived  threats. 
Saudi  Arabia  embarked  some  years  ago 
on  a  phased,  and  we  think  coherent, 
program  to  e.xpand  its  armed  foi'ces  and 
to  modernize  its  military  equipment. 
This  program  takes  full  account  of  the 
country's  size  and  of  its  inherent  man- 
power limitations.  It  involves  neither 
projection  forces  nor  the  capability  for 
large-scale,  modern  offensive  opera- 
tions, nor  in  most  cases  the  most  ad- 
vanced weaponry,  "Defensive"  is  occa- 
sionally used  as  a  term  of  art;  in  this 
case  it  is  a  precise  description  of  the 
force  structure  and  armament  on  which 
Saudi  military  expenditure  is  based. 
The  large  proportion  of  Saudi  military 


expenditure  devoted  to  construction  of 
cantonments,  ports,  roads,  and  other 
facilities  is  consistent  with  the  defen- 
sive missi(m  of  Saudi  forces.  The  rela- 
tively heavy  investment  in  air  defense 
and  the  associated  cummand  and  con- 
trol systems  is  eijUally  consistent  with 
that  mission,  as  are  the  limited  armcjred 
forces,  the  coastal  Navy,  and  the  up- 
grading of  the  National  Guard.  And  the 
F-.")  program  itself  is  also  primarily 
defensive;  its  primary  roles  are  to 
counter  armored  (jr  mechanized  attack, 
suppress  relatively  unsophisticated  air 
cover  for  such  operations,  antl  attack 
support  and  staging  areas. 

Much  of  the  requisite  new  eijuip- 
ment  for  the  Saudi  modernization  ]jro- 
gram  has  been  purchased  from  the 
United  States,  and  Saudi  Arabia  sees 
American  willingness  to  provide 
support,  spare  parts,  and  munitions  as 
an  integral  element  of  oui-  concern  for 
their  security  needs. 

It  is  worth  noting  that  each  of 
these  factors  bearing  (m  our  relation- 
ship w  ith  Saudi  Arabia  has  evfjlved 
since  we  sold  the  initial  (|uantity  of  F-o 
munitions  more  than  3  years  ago.  Saudi 
policy  with  respect  to  oil  production 
and  pricing,  investments,  and  support 
of  the  dollar  is.  if  anything,  muve  im- 
poi'tant  today. 

In  the  meantime,  too,  the  situation 
in  the  Middle  East  has  stabilized  in  one 
sense  as  a  result  of  the  Camp  David  ac- 
coi'ds,  focusing  even  more  attention  on 
next  steps  in  the  peace  process.  At  the 
same  time,  the  situatir)n  in  the  gulf  has 
become  increasingly  unstable,  and  the 
Saudis  perceive  a  more  immediate 
threat  from  Soviet-insjjired  and  as- 
sisted regimes  in  the  general  ai-ea. 
Thus  events  in  the  period  since  we  fii-st 
assured  the  Saudis  that  we  wnulil  |)r(i- 
vide  additional  (|Uantities  of  F-o  muni- 
tions argue  in  favor  (jf  this  sale. 

The  F-5  munitions  proposal  should 
he  .seen  in  this  context.  The  Saudis  be- 
lieve that  these  munitions  ai-e  needed  if 
they  are  to  adequately  maintain  the 
defense  capabilities  of  the  F-5  aircraft 
they  have  ac(|uired  from  the  United 
States.  The  Depai'tment  of  Defense  has 
carefully  examined  this  munitions  sale 
and  has  concluded  that  the  (|Uantities 
we  are  proposing  to  sell  Saudi  Arabia 
are  militarily  justified  and  w  ill  be  an 
important  contribution  to  Saudi 
Arabia's  defensive  needs.  The  I)ei)art- 
ment  of  State  concurs  in  that  view. 


More  important,  we  believe  there 
are  urgent  and  overriding  policy  rea'f' 
sons  for  approving  the  sale.  The  threi 
is  real,  and  the  munitions  to  be  supplie 
would  not  have  a  significant  impact  ot 
the  balance  of  forces  in  the  region. 
Saudi  Arabia's  past  and  potential  con- 
tributions to  our  purposes  in  the  Middl 
East  and  to  our  major  national  interest 
in  the  energy,  financial,  and  security 
fields  support  our  view  that  the  sale 
sh((uld  be  made.  ■ 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  publi.shed  by  the  ciimmittee  ai 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  0: 
fice,  Washington.  D.C.  20402. 


Export  of 
Fighter  Aircraft 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
,)AN,  4,  1980' 

The  Pre.sident  has  decided  that  in  cer  I 
tain  cases  the  sale  to  foi-eign  countrie 
of  intermediate  fighter  aircraft  de-       I 
veloped  or  modified  for  export  (FX) 
w(juld  be  in  the  national  interest  and 
wduld  be  consistent  with  the  objectiv 
of  the  U.S.  arms  tran.sfer  policy.  An  ii 
tei-mediate  fightei'  is  defined  as  one 
whose  cost  and  performance  charac- 
teristics would  generally  lie  between 
our  current  export  fighter,  the  F-.'jE 
and  fighter  aircraft  now  in  productior 
for  U.S.  forces,  such  as  the  F-lfi. 

The  availability  of  FX  aircraft  wi 
contribute  to  our  national  security  ob 
jectives  by  permitting  the  United 
States  to  respond  positively  to  the  se 
curity  needs  of  our  friends  and  allies 
when  the  F-.5E  is  inade(|uate,  and  it 
w  ill  contribute  to  arms  transfer  re- 
sti-aint  objectives  by  discouraging  pui 
chases  of  more  sophisticated  first-line 
ail-craft  from  the  United  States  and 
other  suppliers.  An  interagency  stud.\ 
of  the  FX  concept  found  that,  without 
an  intermediate  alternative,  an  in- 
creasing number  of  countries  may  tur 
to  fii-st-line  aircraft  to  fill  their  fighte 
needs.  The  FX,  w  ith  its  capabilities 
tailored  largely  toward  a  defensive 
I'ole,  is  thus  consistent  with  the  over- 
riding ai-ms  control  jiurpose  of  the 
President's  arms  transfer  policy — to 


64 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


OUTH  ASIA 


o\  \i\c  countries  with  the  weapons 
St  suited  t(i  their  legitimate  self- 
■liMsc  piu'iJiises. 

The  U.S.  Gdveriiment  will  not  pro- 
;lr  timdiiiu  for  development  of  the  air- 
laft.  and  aii'eraft  companies  will  as- 
■iiii   all  financial  and  market  risks. 
Iti'itsted  companies  can  proceed, 
I  \M  \cr,  with  the  assurance  that  the 
I  S.  (liivei'nment  will  not  disapprove 
ir  >ale  of  an  intermediate  fighter  on 
It   u rounds  that  it  was  developed  or 
!  Hlit'ifd  Solely  for  export.  We  will  con- 
iiiii  .  iif  course,  to  apply  all  other  arms 
iii-fcr  ])olicy  criteria  to  any  proposed 
K  ,~  nil  a  case-by-case  basis  to  insure 
(iisistency  with  our  foreign  policy,  na- 
linal  security,  and  arms  control  inter- 
its.  In  additi<in,  any  FX  sales  to  coun- 
1  es  covered  by  the  President's  arms 
1  msfer  ceiling  w  ill  be  accommodated 
'thin  the  annual  ceiling.  ■ 


'  Made  available  to  news  corre- 
iiuli'iits  bv  Department  spokesman  Hud- 
i,u  Carter'lII. 


'iecurity 
llelations  With 
l^akistan 


Fnllniriiif,  (ire  tin  jiiit/t  U.S.- 
I  kisiiiii  stiitcii/ciit  issued  (III  Fehmafji 

.  I  USD,  lit  III,    ri,llch(Slllll  of  the  i'isif  to 

I  aiiiobail  III/  Zbifpiivir  Bvzczhiski, 
csidi'itt  Carter'n  National  Security 
'viscr,  and  Warren  Chri.itopher, 
jputy  Secretary  of  State,  and  a 
Itement  by  Mr.  Christopher  before  tin 
note  Foreign  Relations  Coiinnittee 
February  7. 


)INT  STATKMENT, 

EB.  3,  1980 

•esident  Zia-ul-Haq,  Foreign  Affairs 
iviser  Agha  Shahi,  and  other  Paki- 
an  Government  officials  held  talks 
ith  Dr.  Brzezinski,  Assistant  to  the 
■esident  for  National  Security  Affairs, 
id  Mr.  Warren  Christopher,  Deputy 
?cretary,  and  their  advisers  on  Feb- 
lary  2  and  3. 

There  was  a  full  exchange  of  views 
1  global  and  strategic  matters,  on  the 
tuation  in  the  region,  and  on  the 


broad  range  of  issues  in  the  bilateral 
relations  between  the  two  nations. 

The  two  nations  agreed  that  the 
Soviet  armed  intervention  in  Afghani- 
stan and  the  aggression  against  the  Mos- 
lem people  of  that  country  is  a  flagrant 
violation  of  international  covenants  and 
norms  and  a  serious  threat  to  the  peace 
and  security  of  Pakistan,  the  region, 
and  the  world. 

The  United  States  reiterated  that 
its  commitment  to  Pakistan's  independ- 
ence and  security  pursuant  to  the  1959 
agreement  is  firm  and  enduring.  The 
Government  of  Pakistan  reiterated  its 
resolve,  as  stated  in  the  1959  agree- 
ment, that  it  is  determined  to  resist  ag- 
gression. 

President  Zia-ul-Hac|  expressed 
appreciation  for  the  visit  of  Dr. 
Brzezinski  and  Mr.  Christopher.  The 
American  side  expressed  warm  ap- 
preciation for  the  generous  hospitality 
extended  to  it  by  the  Government  of 
Pakistan. 

Appropriate  consultations  between 
the  two  governments  will  continue. 


DEPUTY  SKCRKTARY 
CHRISTOPHKR,  FEB.  7,  1980> 

In  the  period  since  the  Soviet  invasion 
of  Afghanistan,  we  have  had  the  strong 
support  of  the  Pakistan  Government  in 
shaping  an  effective  political  response 
both  internationally  and  regionally. 
Much  of  what  has  been  done  in  the 
United  Nations  and  the  Islamic  confer- 
ence to  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  the 
Soviet  Union  has  depended  heavily  on 
Pakistani  leadership  along  with  our 
strong  support.  Quite  clearly  we  share 
with  Pakistan  a  common  assessment  of 
the  Soviet  threat  both  globally  and  in 
the  region  and  are  united  in  our  deter- 
mination to  meet  the  Soviet  challenge. 

The  2  days  of  intensive  discussions 
in  Islamabad  over  last  weekend  built  on 
our  earlier  talks  with  Pakistani  Foreign 
Affairs  Adviser  Agha  Shahi  in  Wash- 
ington. They  produced  a  large  measure 
of  agreement  of  the  nature  of  the  secu- 
rity relationship  we  seek  to  build  be- 
tween our  two  nations.  The  personal 
participation  of  President  Zia  through- 
out these  discussions  indicates,  in  our 
view,  the  importance  which  he  attaches 
to  the  regional  threat  and  to  U.S.- 
Pakistani cooperation  in  meeting  that 
threat. 

Much  of  the  discussion  in  Is- 
lamabad focused  on  the  U.S.  commit- 
ment to  the  security  and  territorial  in- 


tegrity of  Pakistan  as  embodied  in  the 
1959  agreement  of  cooperation.  We 
again  strongly  reaffirmed  our  commit- 
ment to  the  1959  agreement  with  Paki- 
stan. The  President's  forthright  state- 
ment of  vital  U.S.  interests  in  the  re- 
gion in  his  State  of  the  Union  address 
seemed  to  have  had  a  salutary  effect  in 
helping  to  remove  doubts  about  the 
strength  and  durability  of  this  commit- 
ment. We  stated  our  willingness  to  ask 
the  Congress  to  affirm  this  commitment 
explicitly  when  we  seek  legislation  to 
permit  resumption  of  assistance.  The 
Pakistanis  expressed  satisfaction  with 
this  outcome. 

We  described  our  intention  to  pro- 
pose to  the  Congress  a  legislative  pack- 
age which  would  affirm  the  1959 
agreement  and  authorize  economic  as- 
sistance and  military  credits  not- 
withstanding other  legislative  provi- 
sions such  as  the  Symington  and  Glenn 
amendments.  We  described  our  efforts 
to  encourage  other  traditional  donors  to 
increase  their  levels  of  assistance  sub- 
stantially and  indicated  that  we  viewed 
our  contribution  to  be  part  of  a  broad 
multilateral  effort. 

The  Pakistanis  asked  that  we  defer 
presenting  any  legislation  which  would 
specify  amounts  of  aid  until  we  had  a 
better  assessment  of  Pakistan's  overall 
economic  and  military  needs  and  until 
we  had  a  fuller  appreciation  of  the 
global  totals  of  increased  assistance 
which  might  be  forthcoming  to  meet 
these  needs.  We  agreed  to  this  request, 
while  making  clear  that  our  offer  of  as- 
sistance continued  to  stand. 

In  the  immediate  period  ahead, 
both  we  and  the  Pakistanis  intend  to 
continue  discussions  with  those  gov- 
ernments to  which  we  are  looking  to 
provide  additional  assistance.  Our  dis- 
cussions in  Riyadh  with  Saudi  officials 
were  a  very  important  first  step  in  this 
regard,  and  we  received  assurances  of 
strong,  continued  Saudi  support.  We 
will  stay  in  close  touch  with  the  Paki- 
stan Government  as  the  multilateral 
consultations  proceed.  We  have 
stressed  to  them  the  importance  of  not 
losing  momentum  and  moving  forward 
with  our  own  projected  assistance  as 
soon  as  possible. 

In  the  meantime,  our  military  team 
has  continued  detailed  discussions  in 
Pakistan  in  an  effort  to  determine  the 
scope  of  Pakistan's  existing  military 
deficiencies  and  to  identify  specific 
types  of  equipment  which  the  United 


larch  1980 


65 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


States  might  provide  to  strengthen 
Paltistan's  defensive  capabilities  along 
its  border  with  Afghanistan.  Following 
an  assessment  of  these  talks,  we  intend 
to  have  further  detailed  discussions 
with  other  potential  equipment 
suppliers  and  sources  of  financing  in  an 
effort  to  coordinate  an  overall  effective 
response. 

During  the  Islamabad  discussions, 
we  reiterated  our  deep  concerns  about 
Pakistan's  nuclear  activities.  We  have 
made  clear  to  the  Pakistanis  our  view 
that  a  nuclear  explosion  in  the  present 
unsettled  international  environment  in 
South  Asia  would  be  especially  danger- 
ous and  even  more  unwise  than  before. 
We  have  stated  what  we  consider  to  be 
a  fact — that  a  Pakistani  nuclear  test 
would  drastically  alter  our  relationship 
and  put  at  serious  risk  our  further 
cooperation. 

Throughout  the.se  discussions  we 
stressed  our  view  that  the  Soviet  occu- 
pation of  Afghanistan  posed  a  challenge 
to  the  entire  region  and  that  we  hoped 
an  appnjpriate  regional  response  would 
be  forthcoming.  Since  the  visit  of  the 
President's  special  emissary  Clark 
Clifford  to  New  Delhi  nearly  coincided 
with  our  own,  we  were  able  to  under- 
line in  both  capitals  our  support  for 
continued  good  relations  between  India 
and  Pakistan.  ■ 


Assistance  to  the  Caribbean, 
Central  America 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


FtiUtiiv'nig  arc  Pr)><idi')it  Catier'n 
nu'ssagi'  to  the  Congresti  of  Navonber  9. 
1979,  and  a  statement  by  Deputy  Sec- 
retary of  State  Warren  Chrifitopher  tic- 
fore  the  Senate  Foreign  Rclationf< 
Committee  on  December  7 . 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
NOV.  9,  1979' 

Many  of  our  neighbors  in  Central  America 
and  the  Caribbean  are  in  crisis — crisis 
marked  by  economic  problems,  terrorism, 
and  popular  frustration.  The  resolution  of 
these  problems  in  ways  that  will  preserve 
the  independence  and  security  of  these 
countries,  while  expanding  democracy  and 
supporting  human  rights,  is  very  much  in 
the  national  interest  of  the  United  States. 

Prompt  and  effective  U.S.  assistance  is 
vital. 

•  Nicaragua's  economy  has  been 
crushed  by  bitter  and  prolonged  strife.  We 
have  been  asked  to  help,  and  we  are  doing 
so.  But  more  is  needed  to  restore  public 
confidence,  private  initiatives,  and  popular 
well-being. 

•  The  Governments  in  El  Salvador  and 
Honduras  have  pledged  democracy  and 
moderation.  These  and  other  Central 
American  countries  are  embarked  on  accel- 
erated development  efforts  of  direct  benefit 
to  the  poor.  Assistance  in  these  efforts  is  es- 
sential in  creating  the  conditions  under 
which  democratic  institutions  can  grow  and 
thrive. 

•  The  countries  of  the  Kastern  Carib- 
bean are  young  and  struggling  democracies. 
They  need  help  now  for  nation-building  and 
for  economic  development. 

I  am  therefore  today  proposing  action  to 
expand  our  support  for  development  and  se- 
curity in  Central  America  and  the  Carib- 
bean. This  will  augment  our  existing  de- 
velopment and  security  assistance  programs 
in  these  regions,  which  in  turn  complement 
the  contributions  of  several  other  govern- 
ments and  international  agencies. 

I  have  directed  that,  subject  to  normal 
congressional  notification  procedures,  funds 
be  reprogrammed  for  use  in  Central 
America  and  the  Caribbean.  These  include: 

•  $.5  million  from  the  fiscal  year  1980 
Economic  Support  Funds  for  development 
projects  in  Central  American  countries 
other  than  Nicaragua. 

•  $10  million  from  fiscal  year  1979  and 
fiscal  year  1980  development  assistance 
funds  for  public  works  and  high  employment 
impact  projects  in  the  Caribbean.  These 
projects  are  an  important  part  of  our  fi.scal 
year  1979-80  contributions  of  $66.9  million 


budgeted  for  the  Caribbean  Development 
Group,  chaired  by  the  World  Bank. 

We  are  also  reprogramming  Food  for  [ 
Peace  funds  to  increase  food  assistanic  in  [ 
the  area,  especially  in  Nicaragua.  Wo  will  I 
also  likely  be  reprogramming  $5  to  $10  mill 
lion  in  Foreign  Military  Sales  credits  and  Ii! 
ternational  Military  Education  and  Trainir 
funds  for  the  Caribbean,  and  similar 
amounts  for  such  programs  in  Central 
America.  We  are  still  working  out  the  fina 
details  of  these  proposed  reprogrammings 
and  will  fully  inform  the  appropriate  con- 
gressional committees  of  our  proposed  ac- 
tions. 

Reprogramming,  however,  is  not 
enough.  The  enclosed  bill  would  provide  $1 
million  in  flexible  Economic  Support  fund- 
ing, $7.5  million  to  assist  in  the  reconstruc 
tion  of  the  Nicaraguan  economy  and  $.5  mi 
lion  for  early-impact  development  projects 
in  other  Central  American  countries. 

I  strongly  urge  rapid  congressional  ac 
tion  on  this  bill. 

Such  action  will  demonstrate  that  the 
United  States  can  be  relied  upon  to  suppo 
democratic  aspirations,  the  rebuilding  of 
broken  economies,  and  the  security  of  our 
friends  in  this  nearby  region.  Our  additioi 
funds  for  Central  American  development 
should  substantially  augment  existing  pro 
grams.  Furthermore,  we  hope  that  other  n 
tions  and  international  institutions  will  in- 
crease their  efforts  to  accelerate  the  sociati 
and  economic  development  of  Central 
America. 

With  your  help  we  can  make  clear 
where  we  stand. 

-IiMMY  Carter 


DEPUTY  SECRETARY 
CHRISTOPHER.  DEC.  7,  1979^ 

The  President's  proposals  to  help 
strengthen  democracy  and  support  de 
velopment  in  Central  America  and  thf 
Caribbean  will  address  growing  prob 
lems  in  a  part  of  the  world  that  is  of 
major  importance  to  the  United  State' 
We  believe  these  programs  are  essen 
tial  to  an  effective  and  credible  U.S.  n 
sponse  to  changes  in  the  region. 

Most  of  the  new  appropriations  w^ 
have  proposed  would  assist  Nicaragua 
reconstruction.  But  these  constitute 
only  part  of  a  major  effort  in  the  regio: 
I  would,  therefore,  like  to  begin  by  coi 
sidering  the  broader  issues  and  their 
implications  for  our  national  interests 


66 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


Western  Hemisphere 


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67 


Western  Hemisphere 


Interests,  Polity,  and  Challenges 

With  few  exceptions,  our  neighbors  in 
Central  America  and  the  Caribbean 
face  grave  endemic  problems  that  are 
aggravated  by  adverse  international 
economic  conditions.  In  recent  months 
there  have  been  violence  and  coups  in 
both  Central  America  and  in  the 
English-speaking  Caribbean.  Unem- 
ployment, poverty,  and  population 
growth  are  placing  severe  strains  on 
local  institutions.  The  global  energy 
crisis  and  worldwide  inflation  com- 
pound the  difficulty  of  planning  and 
financing  long-range  development  ef- 
forts. 

As  President  Carter  said  in  trans- 
mitting this  supplemental  request, 
helping  our  neighbors  deal  with  these 
severe  problems  in  ways  that  will  pre- 
serve their  independence  and  security 
is  very  much  in  the  national  interest  of 
the  United  States. 

We  desire  for  our  neighbors  in 
Central  America  and  the  Caribbean 
what  we  desire  for  our  own  people: 
strong,  independent  democracies  that 
respect  human  rights;  equitable  eco- 
nomic development;  and  security 
against  hostile  outside  forces. 

To  promote  these  goals,  we  have 
supported  the  gradual  development  of 
open,  pluralistic  political  systems  that 
respect  human  rights.  Our  motives  re- 
flect practical  as  well  as  idealistic  con- 
siderations, for  the  flexibility,  respon- 
siveness, and  resilience  of  democracy 
are  the  surest  guarantees  against 
radicalism  and  disruption. 

We  have  promoted  regional  coop- 
eration to  deal  with  common  economic 
problems.  In  the  Caribbean  we  have 
supported  a  successful  multilateral  ef- 
fort under  the  World  Bank  to  increase 
both  the  effectiveness  and  the  level  of 
foreign  assistance.  In  Central  America, 
we  are  examining  ways  to  revivify  the 
Common  Market  and  its  institutions. 

In  light,  however,  of  the  traumatic 
events  of  the  past  year,  we  must  do 
more  to  support  moderate  solutions  to 
the  region's  pressing  needs. 

After  a  bitter,  prolonged,  and  de- 
structive struggle,  the  people  of 
Nicaragua  today  face  a  massive  re- 
building on  a  scale  that  is  unpre- 
cedented in  this  hemisphere.  Because 
the  ultimate  character  of  Nicaragua's 
new  government  will  heavily  influence 
prospects  in  other  nations  of  the  region, 
we  must,  for  our  own  sake,  participate 
in  Nicaragua's  reconstruction. 

Honduras  is  in  the  midst  of  a 
promising  development  process  that  in- 
cludes elections.  But  its  strategic  loca- 


tion and  poverty  make  it  vulnerable  to 
radical  influence. 

El  Salvador  has  a  new  government 
pledged  to  open  the  political  system,  to 
pursue  urgently  needed  economic  re- 
forms, and  to  respect  human  rights. 
But  it  faces  bitter  opposition  from  both 
the  radical  left  and  the  reactionary 
right. 

While  Guatemala  is  stronger,  par- 
ticularly economically,  it  too  has  de- 
velopment problems,  as  well  as  human 
rights  problems. 

Recent  events  have  underscored 
the  fragility  of  the  newly  independent 
democracies  of  the  tiny  eastern  Carib- 
bean island  states.  Their  leadei-s,  many 
of  a  younger  generation  educated  in  the 
United  States,  the  United  Kingdom, 
and  Canada  are  impatient  to  build 
societies  responsive  to  the  needs  of 
their  peoples.  But  some  of  them  appear 
to  be  willing  to  discard  the  regional 
heritage  of  parliamentary  democracy. 
The  coup  d'etat  in  Grenada  last  March 
exemplifies  this  disturbing  trend. 

Finally,  Cuba  stands  ready  to 
exploit  regional  tensions,  straining  still 
further  the  often  fragile  political  bal- 
ance that  exists  in  its  smaller  neighbors 
in  both  the  Caribbean  and  Central 
America. 

These  conditions  are  accelerating 
change  in  the  region  and  provoking 
widespread  instability  and  uncertainty. 
The  fundamental  problem  we  share 
with  our  neighbors  is  not  that  of  de- 
fending stability  in  the  face  of  revolu- 
tion; it  is  to  build  a  more  stable,  equita- 
ble, and  pluralistic  order.  That  is  the 
challenge  of  Nicaragua,  and  it  is  the 
challenge  throughout  the  region. 

Our  Overall  Response 

The  challenges  facing  the  countries  of 
Central  America  and  the  Caribbean  are 
too  complex  and  deep-rooted  to  be  re- 
solved quickly,  even  with  large-scale 
outside  assistance. 

By  supporting  the  reconstruction  of 
Nicaragua,  however,  we  can  demon- 
strate our  genuine  concern  for  the  fu- 
ture of  that  country,  and  we  can  help  to 
revitalize  the  country's  private  sector, 
whose  contributions  are  so  important 
both  to  development  and  to  democracy. 
By  increasing  our  support  for  sound 
development  throughout  Central 
America  and  the  Caribbean,  we  can 
help  provide  hope  and  direction  even  in 
the  face  of  turmoil.  And  by  responding 


to  legitimate  security  concerns,  we  ci 
help  free  attention  and  resources  to 
deal  with  economic  development  in  ai 
atmosphere  of  peace.  The  President's 
proposals  will  enable  us  to  do  this  by 
increasing  direct  U.S.  assistance. 

In  Central  America,  our  develop- 
ment assistance  and  PL  480  food  aid  t 
tals  have  averaged  $80-90  million  oven 
the  past  several  years,  providing  a 
stimulus  to  regional  integration  as  w( 
as  an  important  contribution  to  ind 
vidual  countries. 

In  the  Caribbean,  development  a 
sistance  and  PL  480  programs  have 
nearly  doubled  since  FY  1976,  to  ove 
$130  million  in  FY  1979.  This  increa 
will  have  a  growing  impact  in  cominj; 
months  as  actual  disbursements  begi: 
to  catch  up  with  obligations.  It  has  a 
ready  contributed  to  the  regional  im- 
petus of  the  World  Bank-led  Caribbe 
Group  for  Cooperation  in  Economic  I 
velopment,  which  includes  30  recipiei 
and  donors,  including  Venezuela, 
Brazil,  and  .Japan,  as  well  as  Europe: 
countries. 

The  serious  situation  now  facing 
Central  America  and  the  Caribbean  h 
led  us  to  consider  additional  resource 
through  reprograming  of  funds  in  th( 
proposed  FY  1980  budget.  These  re- 
programings  would  include: 

•  $5  million  in  economic  support : 
El  Salvador.  These  funds  would  be  us 
for  high-impact  programs  to  improve 
the  barrios  surrounding  San  Salvadoi 
and  five  other  major  cities  and  to  pr( 
vide  jobs  for  the  people  who  live  thei 
We  are  also  considering  the  possibilit 
of  diverting  funds  for  similar  projects 
Guatemala  if  conditions  there  improv 
soon; 

•  $10  million  in  development  as- 
sistance for  the  eastern  Caribbean;  $7 
million  of  this  already  has  been  repro 
gramed  from  FY  1979  funds.  These 
funds  are  to  finance  labor-intensive 
construction  and  repair  of  schools, 
roads,  water  and  sanitation  systems, 
and  markets; 

•  Substantially  increased  develoj 
ment  assistance  funds  for  Honduras  a 
El  Salvador; 

•  $1.5-20  million  in  PL  480  for  F" 
1980— $10  million  in  title  I  and  $4-5 
million  in  title  II — to  meet  essential 
needs  for  Nicaragua;  and 

•  $10-20  million  in  foreign  milita, 
sales  (FMS)  funds  and  international 
military  education  and  training  (IME' 
for  the  Caribbean  and  Central  Americ 
The  funds  will  be  used  for  a  number  ( 
purposes  including  the  replacement  b 
the  Dominican  Republic  of  equipment 


68 


Department  of  State  Bulici 


Western  Hemisphere 


St  (luring  the  1979  hurricanes;  train- 
U  in  Panama  and  the  United  States; 
Ic  (if  basic  equipment  and  Coast 
Hard  training  to  eastern  Caribbean 
(til (lis;  and,  in  Central  America — 
ipciially  in  Honduras  and  Kl 
itlvador — transportation,  communica- 
)n.  medical,  and  other  equipment, 
us  training  for  professional  develop- 
ent. 

iipplemental  Request 

Ithough  these  reprogramings  will 
Idress  many  urgent  needs,  some  of 
le  most  pressing  requirements  can  be 
et  only  through  economic  support 
inding.  However,  as  you  know,  sub- 
lantial  reprograming  of  economic 
jpport  funds  is  not  possible.  We  are, 
erefore,  seeking  new  authorizations 
italing  $80  million;  $75  million  in  eco- 
omic  support  funding  will  be  used  to 
sist  in  the  reconstruction  of  the 
icaraguan  economy,  especially  its  pri- 
,te  sector. 

Our  supplemental  request  for 
dcaragua  includes: 

•  A  $70  million  loan  to  provide 
•reign  exchange  resources  that 

Bicaragua  needs  to  maintain  supplies  of 
itical  imports — 60'7r  of  these  imports 
lould  go  to  the  private  sector — which 
in  include  agricultural,  industrial, 
jedical,  and  transportation  items  that 

Re  U.S.  has  traditionally  sold 
icaragua,  thus  helping  to  reconfirm 
ur  historically  close  trading  ties;  and 

•  $5  million  in  grants  for  technical 
isistance  to  help  support  agricultural 
stitutions,  expand  activities  by  pri- 
dte  and  voluntary  organizations,  and 
rengthen  educational  exchange  pro- 
rams. 

These  activities  are  carefully  de- 
gned  to  provide  direct  support  for  the 
rivate  sector,  through  credit  for  small- 
nd  medium-size  businessmen  and 
irmers  and  home  repair  and  recon- 
, ruction.  All  together,  we  estimate 
lat  these  funds  will  generate  the 
quivalent  of  more  than  30,000  year- 
3und  jobs. 

Nicaragua's  economy  has  been 
rushed  by  the  long  and  destructive 
ivil  war  that  finally  ended  in  July.  The 
peed  and  nature  of  its  recovery  will  be 
key  factor  in  determining  Nicaragua's 
ature. 

There  has  been  a  substantial  global 
esponse  to  Nicaragua's  needs.  Roughly 
270  million  in  bilateral  credits  and 
rants  have  been  pledged  by  other 
ountries  to  aid  in  reconstruction. 


International  financial  institutions  have 
made  extraordinary  efforts.  The 
Inter-American  Development  Bank,  for 
example,  has  moved  rapidly  to  provide 
$95.5  million  in  recovery  assistance  and 
to  reformulate  another  $86  million  of  its 
existing  portfolio. 

The  new  government  has  effi- 
ciently used  the  resources  that  have 
been  provided.  Even  so,  critical  needs 
remain.  They  include  restoring  private 
sector  productive  capacity  in  both  ag- 
riculture and  industry;  reconstructing 
public  transportation,  housing,  schools, 
health  facilities,  and  infrastructure;  and 
providing  employment  opportunities. 

In  the  absence  of  U.S.  assistance, 
our  mission  in  Nicaragua  has  projected 
that  the  unfinanced  balance-of- 
payments  deficit  over  the  2-year  re- 
habilitation period  would  be  $400  mil- 
lion. Approximately  $100  million  may 
be  covered  by  new  projects  under  con- 
sideration by  other  donors,  leaving  an 
unfinanced  gap  of  $300  million. 

The  political  situation  remains  in 
flux.  The  Nicaraguan  Government 
today  operates  collegially  and  prag- 
matically. Many  views  are  represented. 
Some  of  the  Sandinista  leadership 
wants  to  lead  Nicaragua  toward  a  Marx- 
ist model.  Others  want  to  restructure 
their  country  in  an  independent, 
pluralist  fashion.  The  Catholic  Church, 
private  entrepreneurs,  and  other  key 
groups  in  Nicaragua  are  all  actively 
participating  in  reconstruction. 

We  are  pleased  by  the  reestablish- 
ment  of  an  open  press  and  the  respect 
being  shown  for  legal  processes  in  gen- 
eral. We  are  concerned,  however,  by 
the  large  numbers  of  former  National 
Guard  members  still  held  prisoner  and 
by  the  delays  in  bringing  them  to  trial. 
We  hope  the  Nicaraguan  Government's 
invitation  to  the  Inter-American 
Human  Rights  Commission  is  an  indica- 
tion that  this  situation  will  soon  be  re- 
solved. 

Our  own  policy  is  to  support  the 
development  of  an  independent  and 
pluralist  Nicaragua  working  with  its 
neighbors  in  a  framework  of  regional 
cooperation.  We  understand  and  sup- 
port what  has  emerged  as  the  driving 
consensus  among  Nicaraguans 
today — to  build  a  new  Nicaragua  that, 
through  popular  participation,  is  capa- 
ble of  meeting  basic  human  needs. 

Through  mutual  cooperation, 
mutual  respect,  and  nonintervention, 
we  are  strengthening  our  contacts  with 
the  government  and  with  the  many 
groups  on  which  a  healthy  pluralist  so- 
ciety depends — the  church,  labor,  the 


media,  and  the  private  sector.  We  are 
encouraging  Nicaragua  and  its 
neighbors  to  ease  the  tensions  that 
have  existed  and  to  promote  a  new  era 
of  regional  cooperation  and  economic 
integration. 

The  United  States  has  helped 
Nicaragua  generously  with  emergency 
relief.  These  new  programs  would  en- 
able us  to  continue  to  play  a  role  in 
meeting  the  far  greater  challenge  of 
Nicaragua's  reconstruction. 

Nicaragua's  relations  with  other 
nations  will  be  shaped  by  the  respon- 
siveness of  those  nations  to  Nicaragua's 
immediate  problems.  Cuba  has  pro- 
vided teachers,  doctors,  technicians, 
and  military  advisers.  Other 
countries — Mexico,  Germany,  the  An- 
dean Pact,  Spain — have  contributed 
people  and  money.  We  can  do  no  less. 

In  addition  to  the  $75  million  in 
supplemental  funds  for  Nicaragua,  we 
are  seeking  $5  million  in  economic  sup- 
port funding  for  high  impact  urban  and 
rural  development  projects  in  Honduras 
and  possibly  Guatemala. 

Honduras  has  made  an  impressive 
commitment  to  social  development  and 
democracy.  Its  common  frontier  with 
Nicaragua  and  a  longstanding  boundary 
dispute  with  El  Salvador  make  it  cen- 
tral to  the  peace  of  the  region. 

The  additional  funds  requested  for 
this  strategically  located  country  would 
be  used  to  support  high-impact  de- 
velopment projects  in  small  towns  and 
rural  areas,  including  roads,  water  and 
sanitation  systems,  and  local  slaughter 
houses.  This  assistance  will  demon- 
strate our  willingness  to  support  a  Cen- 
tral American  government  with  a  good 
human  rights  record  and  a  proven 
commitment  to  equitable  development. 

In  closing,  I  want  to  reiterate  our 
judgment  that  these  requests  are  vital 
to  U.S.  interests  in  Central  America 
and  the  Caribbean.  By  helping  to  meet 
new,  urgent  requirements,  we  will 
make  our  presence  felt  on  the  side  of 
both  development  and  democracy.  ■ 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Nov.  12,  1979. 

^The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


69 


TREATIES 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

The  Antarctic  Treaty.  Signed  at  Washing- 
ton Dec.  1,  1959.  Entered  into  force  June 
23,  1961.  TIAS  4780.  Accession  deposited: 
Uruguay,  Jan.  11,  1980.' 


Atomic  Energy 

Fourth  supply  agreement  for  the  transfer 
of  enriched  uranium  for  a  research  reactor 
in  Yugoslavia,  with  annex  and  exchange  of 
notes.  Signed  at  Vienna  Jan.  16,  1980.  En- 
ters into  force  on  the  date  upon  which  the 
amendment  to  the  project  agreement  of 
Oct.  4,  1961  between  the  International 
Atomic  Energy  Agency  and  Yugoslavia  en- 
ters into  force. 

Aviation 

Convention  on  international  civil  aviation. 
Done  at  Chicago  Dec.  7,  1944.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  4,  1947.  TIAS  1591. 
Adherence  deposited:  Monaco,  Jan.  4,  1980. 

Containers 

International  convention  for  safe  contain- 
ers (CSC),  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva 
Dec.  2,  1972.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  6, 
1977;  for  the  U.S.  Jan.  3,  1979.  TIAS  9037. 
Accession  deposited:  Argentina,  Sept.  11, 
1979. 

Cultural  Relations 

Protocol  revising  the  convention  of  Nov. 
22,  1928  (TIAS  6548)  relating  to  interna- 
tional expositions,  with  appendix  and 
annex.  Done  at  Paris,  Nov.  30,  1972.  * 
Ratification  deposited:  Italy,  Nov.  20, 
1979. 

Customs 

Customs  convention  on  the  international 
transport  of  goods  under  cover  of  TIR  car- 
nets,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Nov. 
14,  1975.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  20, 
1978.3 

Accession  deposited:  Norway,  Jan.  11, 
1980. 

Education 

Convention  on  the  recognition  of  studies, 
diplomas,  and  degrees  concerning  higher 
education  in  the  states  belonging  to  the 
Europe  region.  Done  at  Paris  Dec.  21, 
1979.  Enters  into  force  1  month  after  the 
fifth  instrument  of  ratification  has  been  de- 
posited. 
Signature:  U.S.  Dec.  21,  1979. 

Finance 

Agreement  establishing  the  International 
Fund  for  Agricultural  Development.  Done 
at  Rome  June  13,  1976.  Entered  into  force 


Nov.  30,  1977.  TIAS  8765. 

Accessions  deposited:  China,  Maldives,  Jan. 

15,  1980. 

Genocide 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punish- 
ment of  the  crime  of  genocide.  Adopted  at 
Paris  Dec.  9,  1948.  Entered  into  force  Jan. 
12,  1951.3 

Accession  deposited:  Barbados,  Jan.  14, 
1980. 

Maritime  Matters 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 

1948,  as  amended  (TIAS  4044,  6285,  6490, 

8606),  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 

Consultative  Organization.  Done  at  London 

Nov.  14,  1975.2 

Acceptances  deposited:  Argentina,  Dec.  31, 

1979; 

Cuba,  Dec.  27,  1979;  Dominica,  Dec.  18, 

1979;  Israel,  Dec.  31,  1979;  Peru,  Jan.  21, 

1980. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948,  as  amended  (TIAS  4044,  6285,  6490, 
8606),  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization.  Done  at  London 
Nov.  17,  1977.2 

Acceptances  deposited:  Dominica,  Dec.  18, 
1979;  Israel,  Dec.  31,  1979;  Peru,  Jan.  21, 
1980;  Poland,  Jan.  2,  1980;  Sri  Lanka,  Jan. 

16,  1980. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948,  as  amended  (TIAS  4044,  6285,  6490, 
8606),  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization.  Adopted  at 
London  Nov.  15,  1979.  Enters  into  force  12 
months  after  acceptance  by  two-thirds  of 
the  members  of  the  Organization,  other 
than  associate  members,  except  for  those 
which,  before  the  amendments  come  into 
force,  make  a  declaration  that  they  do  not 
accept  them. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Finland,  Jan.  14, 
1980. 

Patents 

Patent  cooperation  treaty,  with  regula- 
tions. Done  at  Washington  June  19,  1970. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  24,  1978;  except  for 
chapter  II.  Chapter  II  entered  into  force 
Mar.  29,  1978. ■•  TIAS  8733. 
Accession  deposited:  Australia,  Dec.  31, 
1979. 

Telecommunications 

International  telecommunication  conven- 
tion, with  annexes  and  protocols.  Done  at 
Malaga-Torremolinos  Oct.  25,  1973.  En- 
tered into  force  Jan.  1,  1975;  for  the  U.S. 
Apr.  7,  1976.  TIAS  8572. 
Accession  deposited:  Honduras,  Oct.  11, 
1979. 

Trade 

Agreement  on  technical  barriers  to  trade. 
Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  1,  1980. 


if 


Acceptances  deposited:  Chile, ^  Oct.  25, 
1979;  Argentina,"  Austria,®  Belgium,* 
Canada,  European  E;conomic  Community 
Finland,"  France,  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,'  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,'  Luxeiii 
bourg,  Netherlands, "■"'  New  Zealand, 
Switzerland,  U.K.,  »■"  U.S.,  Dec.  17,  197 
Sweden,  Dec.  20,  1979;  Denmark,  Dec.  2 
1979;'2  Brazil,  Norway,  Dec.  28,  1979. 

International  dairy  arrangement.  Done  at 
Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  1,  1980. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Argentina,"  Aus- 
tria," European  Economic  Community,' 
Finland,"  Hungary,  Japan,  New  Zealand 
Switzerland,  U.S.,  Dec.  17,  1979;  South 
Africa,  Dec.  18,  1979;  Sweden,  Dec.  20, 
1979;  Bulgaria.  Dec.  26,  1979;  Norway, 
Dec.  28,  1979. 

Arrangement  regarding  bovine  meat.  Do 
at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  1,  1980. 

Acceptances  deposited:  Argentina,"  Aus- 
tria," Canada,  European  Economic  Com- 
munity, Finland,"  Hungary,  Japan,  New- 
Zealand,  Switzerland,  U.K.,'"  U.S.,  Dec 
17,  1979;  South  Africa,  Dec.  18,  1979;  Sw 
den,  Dec.  20,  1979;  Bulgaria,  Dec.  26,  197 
Brazil,  Norway,  Dec.  28,  1979. 

Agreement  on  trade  in  civil  aircraft.  Dor 
at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  1,  1980. 

Acceptances  deposited:  Belgium,"  Euro- 
pean  Economic  Community,  France,  Fed 
eral  Republic  of  Germany,'  Ireland,  Ital. 
Japan,*  Luxembourg,  Netherlands,''" 
Switzerland,"  U.K.,""  Dec.  17,  1979; 
Canada,"*  Sweden,  U.S.,  Dec.  20,  1979; 
Denmark, '2  Dec.  21,  1979;  Norway,  Dec. 
28,  1979. 

Agreement  on  implementation  of  article 
VII  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade  (TIAS  1700).  (Customs  valua- 
tion) Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Ente 
into  force  Jan.  1,  1981,  for  the  governmer 
which  have  accepted  or  acceded  to  it  by 
that  date. 

Agreement  on  government  procurement. 
Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Enters  in 
force  Jan.  1,  1981  for  those  governments 
which  have  accepted  or  acceded  to  it  by 
that  date. 

Agreement  on  import  licensing  procedure 
Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered  intt 
force  Jan.  1,  1980  for  the  governments 
which  have  accepted  or  acceded  to  it  by 
that  date. 

Agreement  on  implementation  of  article  \ 
of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade  (antidumping  code).  Done  at  Genev; 
Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1, 
1980,  for  those  governments  which  have 
accepted  or  acceded  to  it  by  that  date. 

Agreement  on  interpretation  and  applica- 
tion of  articles  VI,  XVI,  and  XXIII  of  th« 


70 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


Treaties 


uial  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
bsulii'S  and  countervailing  duties).  Done 
uiirva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered  into  force 

I  I,  1980  for  those  governments  which 

r  .iiiepted  or  acceded  to  it  by  that  date. 

h  \a  (1979)  protocol  to  the  General 
iciriient  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at 
I.  \  a  .lune  30,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
1,   1,  1980. 

I  M.  Industrial  Development 
(ifanization 

Castitution  of  the  U.N.  Industrial  De- 
vopment  Organization,  with  annexes. 
;»(ipted  at  Vienna  Apr.  8,  1979.  Enters 
nil  force  when  at  least  80  states  that  have 
diosited  instruments  of  ratification,  ac- 
itance,  or  approval  notify  the  depositary 
t  t  lny  have  agreed,  after  consultation 
liiii;  themselves,  that  the  constitution 

II  iiiter  into  force. 

-  natures;  Algeria,  Argentina,  Brazil, 
'/\\v.  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Egypt,  El  Sal- 
vi(ir,  Ghana,  Lebanon,  Libya,  Nigeria, 
F^u,  Romania,  Senegal,  Thailand, 
Inisia,  Turkey,  Uganda,  Yemen  (Aden), 
Igoslavia,  Apr.  8,  1979;  Austria,  Oct.  3, 
r9;  Bangladesh,  Jan.  2,  1980;  Belgium, 
(  nmark,  France,  Federal  Republic  of 
(  rmany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxem- 
t  irg,  Netherlands,  U.K.,  Venezuela, 
imbia.  Oct.  5,  1979;  Benin,  Dec.  4,  1979; 
I  ina,  Sept.  6,  1979;  Congo,  Dee.  18,  1979; 
(  ba,  Oct.  2,  1979;  Finland,  Sept.  28,  1979; 
(b(in,  .Jan.  8,  1980;  Guinea,  Nov.  29,  1979; 
Ilia,  Nov.  16,  1979;  Indonesia,  Sept.  28, 
K9;  .lapan,  Jan.  18,  1980;  Madagascar, 
Ic.  13,  1979;  Mexico,  Nov.  12,  1979; 
I 'aragua,  Jan.  16,  1980;  Niger,  Apr.  9, 
ir9;  Norway,  Sept.  28,  1979;  Pakistan, 
(t.  22,  1979;  Panama,  Aug.  17,  1979; 
ilippines,  Oct.  12,  1979;  Portugal,  Sept. 
.  1979;  Rwanda,  Aug.  28,  1979;  Sierra 
one,  Aug.  29,  1979;  Spain,  Jan.  21,  1980; 
i  Lanka,  Oct.  31,  1979;  Sudan,  June  27, 
79;  Swaziland,  Jan.  14,  1980;  Sweden, 
pt.  28,  1979;  Switzerland,  Sept.  19,  1979; 
S.,  Jan.  17,  1980;  Upper  Volta,  Nov.  16, 
79;  Yemen  (Sana),  July  19,  1979;  Zaire, 
n.  21,  1980. 

itifications  deposited:  India,  Mexico,  Jan. 
,  1980;  Madagascar,  Jan.  18,  1980;  Paki- 
in,  Oct.  29,  1979. 

heat 

otocol  modifying  and  further  extending 
e  food  aid  convention  (part  of  the  inter- 
tional  wheat  agreement)  1971  (TIAS 
44).  Done  at  Washington  Apr.  25,  1979. 
itered  into  force  June  23,  1979.  with  re- 
ect  to  certain  provisions,  July  1,  1979, 
th  respect  to  other  provisions. 
atification  deposited:  Norway,  Jan.  28, 
'80. 

•otocol  modifying  and  further  extending 
e  wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the  in- 
rnational  wheat  agreement)  1971  (TIAS 
44).  Done  at  Washington  Apr.  25,  1979. 


Entered  into  force  June  23,  1979,  with  re- 
spect to  certain  provisions,  July  1,  1979, 
with  respect  to  other  provisions. 
Ratification  deposited:  Spain,  Jan.  9,  1980. 

BILATKRAL 

Bolivia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for 
sales  of  agricultural  commodities  of  May 
31,  1978  (TIAS  9581).  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  La  Paz  Dec.  6,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Dec.  6,  1979. 

Bulgaria 

Joint  statement  on  the  development  of 
cooperation  in  agriculture,  with  annex. 
Signed  at  Washington  Nov.  26,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Nov.  26,  1979. 

Canada 

Agreement  for  a  cooperative  vessel  traffic 
management  system  for  the  Juan  de  Fuca 
region,  with  annex.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Ottawa  Dec.  19,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Dec.  19,  1979. 

Denmark  and  the  Faroe  Islands 

Agreement  concerning  fisheries  off  the 
coasts  of  the  U.S.,  with  annexes  and 
agreed  minute.  Signed  at  Washington  Sept. 
5,  1979. 
Entered  into  force:  Jan.  18,  1980. 

Egypt 

Project  grant  agreement  relating  to  techni- 
cal assistance  for  the  improvement  of  the 
Egyptian  telecommunications  system,  with 
annex.  Signed  at  Cairo  Dec.  30,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Dec.  30,  1979. 

European  Atomic  Energy  Community 
(EUR ATOM) 

Arrangement  in  the  field  of  nuclear  safety 
research,  with  addenda.  Signed  at  Wash- 
ington Mar.  19,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.  19,  1979. 

Hungary 

Agreement  on  tariff  matters,  with  annexes 
and  exchange  of  letters.  Signed  at 
Budapest  Nov.  18,  1978. 
Entered  into  force:  Jan.  1,  1980. 

Indonesia 

Agreement  for  cooperation  in  scientific  re- 
search and  technological  development,  with 
exchange  of  letters.  Signed  at  Washington 
Dec.  11,  1978. 
Entered  into  force:  Oct.  5,  1979. 

International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
(IAEA) 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
May  11,  1959,  as  amended  and  extended 
(TIAS  4291,  7852),  for  cooperation  in  the 


civil  uses  of  atomic  energy,  with  annex. 
Signed  at  Vienna  Jan.  14,  1980.  Enters  into 
force  on  the  date  on  which  the  Agency  re- 
ceives from  the  U.S.  written  notification 
that  it  has  complied  with  all  requirements 
for  such  entry  into  force. 

Israel 

First  amendment  to  the  agreement  of  Nov. 
15,  1979  relating  to  cash  assistance  to  Is- 
rael during  FY  1980  to  support  the  eco- 
nomic and  political  stability  of  Israel. 
Signed  Dec.  12,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  12,  1979. 

Agreement  for  cooperation  in  the  field  of 
health.  Signed  at  Washington  Jan.  29, 
1980.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  29,  1980. 

Japan 

Agreement  on  educational  exchange  pro- 
grams. Signed  at  Tokyo  Feb.  15,  1979. 
Entered  into  force:  Dec.  24,  1979. 

Agreement  for  financing  an  educational  ex- 
change program,  with  memorandum.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Tokyo  Jan. 
11,  1958,  as  amended  Dec.  2,  1960,  and 
Aug.  23,  1963.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  11, 
1958.  (TIAS  3982,  4635,  5422) 
Terminated:  Dec.  24,  1979. 

Republic  of  Korea 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Seoul  and 
Washington  Dec.  27,  1979,  and  Jan.  14, 
1980.  Enters  into  force  on  the  date  mutu- 
ally agreed  upon  by  the  Administrations. 

Macao 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton, 
wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  tex- 
tile products,  with  annexes.  Klffected  by 
exchange  of  letters  at  Hong  Kong  and 
Macao  Nov.  29  and  Dec.  18,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Dec.  18,  1979;  effective  Jan.  1, 
1980. 

Mexico 

Treaty  on  extradition,  with  appendix. 
Signed  at  Mexico  City  May  4,  1978. 
Instruments  of  ratification  exchanged:  Jan. 
25,  1980. 
Entered  into  force:  Jan.  25,  1980. 

Agreement  relating  to  salary  supplements 
to  personnel  dedicated  to  opium  poppy 
eradication  and  narcotics  interdiction.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  letters  at  Mexico 
Dee.  3,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  3, 
1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
June  2,  1977,  as  amended  (TIAS  8952, 
9251),  relating  to  additional  cooperative  ar- 
rangements to  curb  the  illegal  traffic  in 
narcotics.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters 
at  Mexico  Dec.  5,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  5,  1979. 


larch  1980 


71 


Treaties 


CHRONOLOGi 


Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
May  22,  1978,  (TIAS  9248)  concerning  an 
illicit  crop  detection  system  to  be  used  in 
curbing  the  illegal  traffic  in  narcotics.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  letters  at  Mexico 
Dec.  6,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  6, 
1979. 

Poland 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Nov.  8,  1976,  (TIAS  8407)  relating  to  the 
acceptance  of  airworthiness  certifications. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washing- 
ton Jan.  28,  1980.  Entered  into  force  Jan. 
28,  1980. 

Saudi  Arabia 

Project  agreement  for  technical  coopera- 
tion in  educational  programs  for  meteorol- 
ogy, hydrology,  arid  land  studies,  and  en- 
vironmental protection,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Riyadh  Nov.  25,  1979. 
Entered  into  force:  Jan.  23,  1980. 

Spain 

Arrangement  for  the  exchange  of  technical 
information  and  cooperation  in  nuclear 
safety  matters,  with  patent  addendum. 
Signed  at  Madrid  Nov.  5,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Nov.  5,  1979. 

Agreement  relating  to  the  reciprocal 
granting  of  authorizations  to  permit 
licensed  amateur  radio  operators  of  either 
country  to  operate  their  stations  in  the 
other  country.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Madrid  Dec.  11  and  20,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Dec.  20,  1979. 

Sudan 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, with  annexes  and  agreed  min- 
utes. Signed  at  Khartoum  Dec.  22,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  22,  1979. 

Grant  agreement  for  commodity  imports. 
Signed  at  Khartoum  Dec.  31,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Dec.  31,  1979. 

Switzerland 

Administrative  agreement  for  the  im- 
plementation of  the  agreement  on  social  se- 
curity of  July  18,  1979.  Signed  at  Bern  Dec. 
20,  1979.  Enters  into  force  on  the  date  of 
entry  into  force  of  the  July  18,  1979  agree- 
ment. 

Turkey 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to, 
guaranteed,  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment and  its  agencies,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Ankara  Dec.  11,  1979.  Enters 
into  force  upon  receipt  by  Turkey  of  writ- 
ten notice  that  domestic  U.S.  laws  and 
regulations  covering  debt  rescheduling 
concerning  this  agreement  have  been  com- 
plied with. 


United  Kingdom 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  coopera- 
tion in  earth  sciences  and  environmental 
studies.  Signed  at  Reston  and  London 
Sept.  21  and  26,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  26,  1979. 

Venezuela 

Agreement  for  scientific  and  technological 
cooperation.  Signed  at  Caracas  Jan.  11, 
1980.  Enters  into  force  on  the  date  on 
which  the  parties  notify  each  other  that 
they  have  complied  with  the  constitutional 
and  statutory  requirements  necessary  for 
its  entry  into  force. 

Yugoslavia 

Agreement  on  the  establishment  of  a  U.S. 
information  center  in  Titograd  in  accord- 
ance with  the  terms  of  the  memorandum  of 
understanding  of  June  14,  1961.  Signed  at 
Belgrade  June  25,  1979. 
Entered  into  force:  Dec.  6,  1979. 

Zambia 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of  Aug. 
4,  1978,  with  minutes  of  negotiation. 
Signed  at  Lusaka  Dec.  21,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Dec.  21,  1979.  ■ 


'  With  declaration. 

'^  Not  in  force. 

^  Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

•*  Chapter  II  not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

^  Ad  referendum. 

^  Subject  to  ratification. 

'  Applicable  to  Berlin  (West). 

*  Subject  to  completion  of  constitu- 
tional procedures. 

'  Subject  to  approval. 

'"  Provisionally  applicable  to  the  King- 
dom in  Europe. 

"  In  respect  of  its  metropolitan  terri- 
tory and  the  territories  for  which  it  has  in- 
ternational responsibility  except  for  Anti- 
gua, Bermuda,  Brunei,  Cayman  Islands, 
Montserrat,  St.  Kitts-Nevis,  Sovereign 
Base  Areas  (Cyprus),  Virgin  Islands. 

'*  Not  applicable  to  the  Faroe  Islands. 

'^  In  respect  of  Belize. 

■''  In  respect  of  its  metropolitan  terri- 
tory and  the  territories  for  which  it  has  in- 
ternational responsibility  except  for  Anti- 
gua, Belize,  Bermuda,  Brunei,  Cayman  Is- 
lands, Hong  Kong,  Montserrat,  St.  Kitts- 
Nevis,  Sovereign  Base  Areas  (Cyprus), 
Virgin  Islands. 

'^  With  reservation. 


January  1980 


Events  pertaining  to  Iran  can  be  foui 
on  page  61. 

January  2 

U.S.  Coordinator  for  Refugee  Affairs 
Ambassador  Victor  Palmieri,  leaves  on  a 
2-week  trip  to  Southeast  Asia  for  a  first- 
hand look  at  Kampuchean  relief  efforts  ar 
refugee  assistance  programs  throughout 
the  region.  He  will  visit  Hong  Kong,  Thai 
land,  Malaysia,  Singapore,  Indonesia,  the 
Philippines,  and  Japan. 

January  3 

India's  seventh  national  parliamentar 
elections  are  held. 

Fifty-two  nations  call  for  an  urgent 
meeting  of  the  Security  Council  "to  con- 
sider the  situation  in  Afghanistan  and  its 
implications  for  international  peace  and  s 
curity." 

January  4 

President  Carter  cuts  off  sale  of  high 
technology  equipment  and  grain  and  limit 
fishing  privileges  in  U.S.  waters  to  the 
Soviet  Union  in  response  to  its  aggressioi 
in  Afghanistan. 

U.N.  Security  Council  meets  to  con- 
sider the  Soviet  military  intervention  in 
Afghanistan. 

January  5 

Mauritanian  President  Mohammed 
Mahmoud  Ould  Louly  is  dismissed  by  the 
ruling  military  committee.  Prime  Ministe 
Mohammed  Khouna  Ould  Haidalla  takes 
over  his  post  and  will  also  serve  as  head  ( 
the  ruling  military  committee. 

Secretary  of  Defense  Brown  arrives  i 
Beijing  for  an  8-day  visit,  the  first  to  Chin 
by  a  senior  Pentagon  official  since  the 
Communists  came  to  power  in  1949. 

January  7 

U.N.  Security  Council  votes  on  a  dral 
resolution  calling  for  the  "immediate  and 
unconditional  withdrawal  of  all  foreign 
troops  from  Afghanistan." 

January  9 

Security  Council  adopts  Resolution  46: 
by  consensus  to  call  an  emergency  Special 
Session  of  the  General  Assembly  to  deal 
with  the  Afghanistan  situation.  The  vote 
was  12  to  2  (U.S.S.R.  and  East  Germany) 
with  one  abstention  (Zambia). 


72 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


PRESS  RELEASES 


mary  10 
'.S. -Turkey  announce  successfully 
■  Iciiil  negotiations  on  an  agreement  for 
ration  on  defense  and  economy  and 
supplementary  agreements  detailing 
i  rai  ion  in  the  areas  of  defense  support, 
.,-M-  industry,  and  installations. 

ary  1.3 

l.S.  offers  Pakistan  a  tentative  2-year 

mic  and  military  aid  package  worth 

,  $400  million  to  help  meet  the  threat 

I  by  Soviet  military  intervention  in 

inistan. 

oviet  Union  Aeroflot  office  in  New 

is  bombed. 

iry  14 

l.N.  General  Assembly  adopts  resolu- 
ondemning  "armed  intervention"  in 
inistan  and  calling  for  the  "im- 
ite,  unconditional,  and  total  with- 
il  of  the  foreign  troops  from  Afghani- 
The  vote  was  104  to  18,  with  18  ab- 
ijns  and  12  absentees. 
panish  Prime  Minister  Adolfo  Suarez 

?<5  with  President  Carter. 
>eputy  Secretary  Christopher  visits 

e  ?rn  Europe  Jan.  14-16. 

nry  15 

Egyptian  Vice  President  Hosni 
^  rak  visits  U.S.  Jan.  15-19. 

r  ary  17 

J.S.  journalists,  accused  of  biased  re- 
1  ng  and  interfering  in  Afghanistan's 
ti  nal  affairs,  are  ordered  out  of  the 
u  ry. 

I  ary  19 

Afghanistan  Government  expels  jour- 
1  s  with  U.S.  passports  after  having 
[  them  under  house  arrest  for  2  days. 

I  ary  21 
Vest  German  Foreign  Minister 
-Dietrich  Genscher  visits  the  U.S. 
21-22. 

lary  22 

Roy  Jenkins,  President  of  the  Euro- 
Commission,  arrives  in  Washington 
3-day  visit  Jan.  22-24. 
J.S.  decides  that  in  the  wake  of  Soviet 
don  of  Afghanistan,  the  exhibition  of 
bjects  from  the  Hermitage  Museum  in 
ngrad  would  not  be  in  U.S.  national 
•ests. 

Dr.  Andrei  D.  Sakharov,  Soviet  dissi- 
leader  and  Nobel  Peace  Prize 
;ate,  is  arrested  by  the  Soviet  Gov- 
lent  and  exiled  to  the  city  of  Gorky, 
■niles  east  of  Moscow. 

lary  23 

President  Carter  delivers  his  "State  of 
Union"  address. 

Prime  Minister  Cossiga  of  Italy  arrives 
e  U.S.  on  an  official  visit  Jan.  23-26. 


January  24 

House  votes  386  to  12  to  support 
President  Carter's  request  that  the  U.S. 
press  for  the  transfer,  cancellation,  or 
boycott  of  the  Moscow  Summer  Olympic 
Games. 

In  a  House  vote  of  294  to  88  and  a  Sen- 
ate vote  of  74  to  8,  China  is  approved 
most-favored-nation  trade  status. 

U.S.  announces  it  is  willing  to  sell  mili- 
tary equipment  to  China,  excluding 
weapons. 

Ambassador  Linowitz,  U.S.  special 
envoy  to  the  Middle  East,  visits  Europe 
and  the  Middle  East  Jan.  24-Feb.  4.  He 
meets  in  London  with  King  Hussein  of  Jor- 
dan and  British  officials  Jan.  25-26. 

January  26 

Under  Secretary  for  Political  Affairs 
Newsom  visits  Romania  Jan.  26-28. 

January  28 

Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
unanimously  approves  a  resolution  calling 
for  the  relocation,  postponement,  or  can- 
cellation of  the  1980  Moscow  Summer 
Olympic  Games. 

European  Parliament  President 
Simone  Veil  visits  the  U.S.  Jan.  28-31. 

January  29 

At  a  conference  in  Pakistan,  Islamic 
Foreign  Ministers  from  35  Moslem  coun- 
tries adopt  a  resolution  condemning  the 
Soviet  military  intervention  in  Afghanistan 
as  a  "flagrant  violation"  of  international 
law. 

Senate  adopts  a  resolution  88  to  4  call- 
ing for  the  U.S.  to  boycott  the  Moscow 
Summer  Olympics  unless  the  games  are 
postponed,  canceled,  or  moved,  regardless 
of  whether  Soviet  troops  withdraw  from 
Afghanistan. 

January  30 

Australian  Prime  Minister  Malcolm 
Fraser  visits  the  U.S.  Jan.  30-Feb.  1. 

January  31 

Newly  appointed  Ambassadors  to  the 
U.S.  Simon  Sabimbona  (Burundi)  and  Her- 
bert Richard  Wright  Brewer  (Liberia) 
present  their  credentials  to  President  Car- 
ter. 


Department  of  State 


January  1-29 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from 
the  Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department 
of  State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

No.  Date  Subject 

*1  1/4        Status  of  U.S.  contribution 

to  international  efforts  for 
Khmer  relief. 

*2  1/9       William  G.  Bowdler  sworn 

in  as  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Inter-American  Af- 
fairs (biographic  data). 

*3  1/9       Shipping  Coordinating 

Committee  (SCO,  Sub- 
committee on  Safety  of 
Life  at  Sea  (SOLAS), 
working  group  on  radio 
communications,  Jan.  17. 

*4  1/9       U.S.  Organization  for  the 

International  Telegraph 
and  Telephone  Consulta- 
tive Committee  (CCITT), 
study  group  D,  Jan.  31. 

*5  1/9       Secretary  of  State's  Advi- 

sory Committee  on  Pri- 
vate International  Law, 
bankruptcy  study  group, 
Feb.  1. 

*6  1/9       sec,  SOLAS,  working 

group  on  standards  of 
training  and  watchkeep- 
ing,  Jan.  23. 

*7  1/9       sec,  SOLAS,  working 

group  on  safety  of  fishing 
vessels,  Jan.  23. 

*8  1/9       sec,  SOLAS,  working 

group  on  subdivision  and 
stability,  Jan.  23. 

t9         1/15       U.S.  Secretariat  for  the 
World  Conference  of  the 
U.N.  Decade  for  Women, 
1980. 

10  1/15       Vance:  interview  on 

"Today"  show.  New  York, 
Jan.  11. 

11  1/15       U.S.  files  brief  with  World 

Court  in  Tehran  hostage 

case. 
*12         1/16       U.S.,  Indonesia  establish 

textile  visa  system,  Oct.  1 

and  15,  1979. 
*13         1/16       U.S..  Macau  sign  textile 

agreement,  Nov.  29  and 

Dec.  18. 
*14         1/17       sec,  SOLAS,  working 

group  on  safety  of  naviga- 
tion, Feb.  20. 
*15         1/17       Advisory  Committee  on  the 

Law  of  the  Sea,  Feb.  7 

(closed),  Feb.  8  (open  and 

closed). 
*16         1/22        Lyie  Franklin  Lane  sworn 


Ch  1980 


73 


PUBLICATIONS 


in  as  Ambassador  to 
Uruguay  (biographic 
data). 

*17         1/23        Itinerary  of  Italian  Prime 
Minister  Cossiga's  visit  to 
the  U.S.,  Jan.  23-26. 

tl8         1/23        U.S.  aid  to  refugees  in 
Somalia. 

*19         1/24       Advisory  Committee  on  In- 
ternational Investment, 
Technology,  and  De- 
velopment, Feb.  22. 

*20  1/25  U.S.,  Netherlands  Antilles 
sign  air  transport  agree- 
ment, Jan.  22. 

*21         1/25       Vance:  statement  before 
the  New  York  State  Bar 
Association,  New  York. 

*22  1/28  Status  of  U.S.  contribution 
to  international  efforts  for 
Khmer  relief. 

*23         1/29       Advisory  Committee  on  In- 
ternational Investment, 
Technology,  and  De- 
velopment, Feb.  26. 

*24         1/29       sec,  SOLAS  working 

group  on  the  handling  of 
dangerous  goods  in  ports, 
Mar.  4. 

*25         1/29       William  G.  Bowdler  sworn 
in  as  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Inter-American  Af- 
fairs (revised  biographic 
data).  ■ 


*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 
tTo  be  printed  in  a  later  issue. 


GPO  Sales 


Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or 
stock  number  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20i02.  A  25% 
discount  is  made  on  orders  for  100  or  more 
copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to  the 
same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  must  ac- 
company orders.  Prices  shown  below, 
which  include  domestic  postage,  are  subject 
to  change. 

Small  Farmer  Technologies.  Agreement 
with  Honduras.  TIAS  9181.  26  pp.  $1.50. 
(Cat.  No.  89.10:9181.) 
Reimbursement  of  Income  Taxes.  Agree- 
ment with  the  United  Nations.  TIAS  9183. 
5  pp.  75(Z.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:9183.) 
Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement 
with  the  Republic  of  Korea,  amending  the 
agreement  of  July  21,  1977.  TIAS  9186.  5 
pp.  750.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:9186.) 
Agricultural  Commodities,  agreement 
with  the  Philippines.  TIAS  9187.  15  pp. 
$1.25.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:9187.) 
Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement 
with  Jamaica.  TIAS  9188.  10  pp.  $1.00 
(Cat.  No.  S9.10:9188.) 
Aviation — Provision  of  Parts  and  Serv- 
ices. Memorandum  of  agreement  with  Tius- 
tralia.  TIAS  9189.  7  pp.  $1.00.  (Cat.  No. 
S9.10:9189.) 

Aviation — Flight  Inspection  Services. 
Memorandum  of  agreement  with  Singa- 
pore. TIAS  9195.  5  pp.  75«.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9195.) 

Aviation — Flight  Inspection  Services. 
Memorandum  of  agreement  with  Panama. 
TIAS  9196.  5  pp.  75(Z.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9196.) 

Aviation — Flight  Inspection  Services. 
Memorandum  of  agreement  with  Canada. 
TIAS  9198.  5  pp.  750.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9198.) 

Trade  in  Textiles  and  Textile  Products. 
Agreement  with  Malaysia.  TIAS  9180.  26 
pp.  $1.50  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9180.) 
Aviation — Flight  Inspection  Services. 
Memorandum  of  agreement  with  the  Re- 
public of  China.  TIAS  9197.  5  pp.  75?. 
(Cat.  No.  89.10:9197.) 
Whaling — International  Observer 
Scheme.  Agreement  with  Australia.  TIAS 
9203.  8  pp.  $1.00.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9203.) 
Whaling — International  Observer 
Scheme.  Agreement  with  Japan,  e.xtending 
the  agreement  of  May  2,  1975,  as  extended. 
TIAS  9204.  4  pp.  75«J.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9204.) 


Mutual  Defense  Assistance — Cash  Co 
tribution  by  Japan.  Agreement  with 
Japan,  relating  to  the  agreement  of  Ma 
8,  1954.  TIAS  9208.  6  pp.  75«f.  (Cat.  N(  ' 
89.10:9208.)  j 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreemen 
with  Sierra  Leone.  TIAS  9210.  13  pp. 
$1.00.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9210.) 
Trade  in  Textiles  and  Textile  Produci 
Agreement  with  Singapore.  TIAS  9214 
pp.  $1.25.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9214.) 
Trade  in  Textiles  and  Textile  Produci 
Agreement  with  Thailand.  TIAS  9215. 
pp.  $1.50  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9215.) 
Prisoner  Transfer.  Treaty  with  Bolivi; 
TIAS  9219.  18  pp.  $1.25.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:9219.) 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreemen 
with  Somalia.  TIAS  9222.  17  pp.  $1.25. 
(Cat.  No.  89.10:9222.) 
Research  Cooperation  in  Transportati 
Memorandum  of  understanding  with  Me: 
TIAS  9221.  4  pp.  750  (Cat.  No.  S9.10;9i 
Trade  in  Textiles  and  Textile  Product^ 
Agreement  with  the  Philippines.  TIAS  9 
19  pp.  $1.25.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9223.) 
Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  wit 
the  Polish  People's  Republic,  amending 
agreement  of  July  19,  1972,  as  amended 
extended.  TIAS  9225.  15  pp.  $1.25.  (Cai 
No.  89.10:9225.) 

Trade  in  Textiles.  Agreement  with  Jap 
modifying  and  extending  the  arrangeme 
September  27,  1974,  as  modified.  TIAS 

9226.  10  pp.  $1.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9226.) 
Trade  in  Textiles.  Agreement  with  Jap 
modifying  the  arrangement  of  Septemb< 
27,  1974,  as  modified  and  extended.  TI^ 

9227.  2  pp.  750.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9227.) 
Trade — Non-Rubber  Footwear.  Agreer 
with  Hong  Kong.  TIAS  9228.  25  pp.  $1. 
(Cat.  No.  89.10:9228.) 

Trade  in  Textiles  and  Textile  Products 

Agreement  with  Macao,  amending  the 

agreement  of  March  3,  1975,  as  amended 

extended.  TIAS  9229.  12  pp.  $1.  (Cat.  f 

89.10:9229.) 

Air  Transport  Services — North  Atlanti 

Fares.  Agreement  with  the  United  King 

of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland,  ■ 

tending  and  modifying  the  agreement  of 

March  17,  1978.  TIAS  9231.  4  pp.  750.  ( 

No.  89.10:9231.) 

Deep  Sea  Drilling  Project.  Memorandui 

understanding  with  the  Federal  Republi 

Germany.  TIAS  9233.  13  pp.  $1.  (Cat.  N 

89.10:9233.) 

Cooperation  in  Narcotics  Field.  Memo) 

dum  of  understanding  with  Venezuela.  T 

9235.  9  pp.  $1.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9235.) 

Criminal  Investigations.  Agreement  wi 

Chile.  TIAS  9237.  2  pp.  750.  (Cat.  No. 

89.10:9237.) 


74 


Department  of  State  Bull. 


ilEX 


ffCH  1980 

\  80,  NO.  2036 

sit  >  in  Iran,  Invasion  of  Afghanistan 

•l.rl 33 

I  111'  Press"  Interview  (Carter) ...  .29 
lie  the  Challenge  in  Southwest  Asia 

u<  ) 35 

al  Security  Goals  (Carter) A 

^  (Ilk  Times"  Interview  (Vance)   ..37 
1.  nt  Charter's  News  Conference,  Feb- 

■>   K-I  (excerpts)   C 

.ir  Olympics  in  Moscow  (Carter, 
iM.ipher  statement) 50 

M.lotjy,  January  1980 72 

^  iirk  Times"  Interview  (Vance)   .  .37 
l:>aharan   Africa   and   the   United 

.Ues— Part  1 1 

r  ulture.   FY   1981  Development  As- 

aiu  f  Programs  (Ehrlich)  53 

^  Control 

,i:l;  the  Challenge  in  Southwest  Asia 

\ncf) 35 

t  nai  Security  Goals  (Carter) A 

,    Yiirk  Times"  Interview  (Vance)   ..37 

.  inlngy,  January  1980 72 

t  iial  Security  Goals  (Carter) A 

i  :i  (las  Use  in  Indochina  (Colbert)  .  .43 
)  I 

■    Y(irk  Times"  Interview  (Vance)   ..37 

China  Discuss  Sale  of  Military  Tech- 

oLTN    (Defense   Department  state- 

itV 45 

I  nodities 

.;    Support  U.S.  Embargo  (Department 

!i  .ement) 49 

e  'nsion  of  Agricultural  Exports  to  the 
[;5.S.R.  (Cooper,  memorandums  for  the 
3retaries  of  Commerce  and  Agricul- 
;ie,  letter  to  Speaker  O'Neill  and  Sen- 

t  President  Mondale) 45 

i)  ress 

i  stance  to  the   Caribbean,   Central 

herica  (Christopher,  message  to  the 

£  ngress) 66 

« jms  Valuation  Agreement  (letter  to 
(use  Speaker  O'Neill  and  Senate  Presi- 

Jit  Mondale) 49 

(1981   Development  Assistance  Pro- 

ims  (Ehrlich) 53 

an  Rights  Reports 59 

tions  Sales  to  Saudi  Arabia  (Benson)63 
in  Gas  Use  in  Indochina  (Colbert)  .  .43 
rity  Relations  With  Pakistan  (Christo- 

sr,  joint  statement) 65 

mer  Olympics  in  Moscow  (Carter, 

ristopher  statement) 50 

ension  of  Agricultural  Exports  to  the 
S.S.R.  (Cooper,  memorandums  for  the 
cretaries  of  Commerce  and  Agricul- 
'e,  letter  to  Speaker  O'Neill  and  Sen- 

i  President  Mondale) 45 

ural  Affairs.  Hermitage  Exhibit  Can- 
ed (Department  statement)  52 

irtment  and  Foreign  Service 

ages  in  Iran,  Invasion  of  Afghanistan 

arter) 33 

rview  for  NBC  News 32 

et  the  Press"  Interview  (Carter) . . .  .29 
ting  the  Challenge  in  Southwest  Asia 

ance) 35 

eloping  Countries 

1981  Development  Assistance  Pro- 
ams  (Ehrlich) 53 

1981   Foreign  Assistance  Programs 

ance) 40 

nomics 

I  Chronology,  January  1980 61 

i-Saharan  Africa  and  the  United 
ates — Part  1 1 


Energy 

FY  1981  Development  Assistance  Pro- 
grams (Ehrlich)  53 

"Meet  the  Press"  Interview  (Carter) . . .  .29 

Meeting  the  Challenge  in  Southwest  Asia 
(Vance) 35 

Europe 

Allies  Support  U.S.  Embargo  (Department 
statement) 49 

Chronology,  January  1980 72 

National  Security  Goals  (Carter) A 

President  Carter's  News  Conference,  Feb- 
ruary 13  (excerpts)   C 

Foreign  Aid 

Assistance  to  the  Caribbean,  Central 
America  (Christopher,  message  to  the 
Congress) 66 

FY  1981  Development  Assistance  Pro- 
grams (Ehrlich)  53 

FY  1981  Foreign  Assistance  Programs 
(Vance) 40 

Sub-Saharan  Africa  and  the  United 
States— Part  1  1 

Human  Rights 

Human  Rights  Reports 59 

Nobel  Laureate  Sakharov  Exiled  (White 
House  statement)  59 

Poison  Gas  Use  in  Indochina  (Colbert)  .  .43 

International  Law.  U.S.  Files  Brief  With 
ICJ  in  Iran  Hostage  Case 60 

International  Organizations.  Chronology, 
January  1980 72 

Iran 

Chronology,  January  1980 61 

Hostages  in  Iran,  Invasion  of  Afghanistan 
(Carter) 33 

Interview  for  NBC  News 32 

Iran  Chronology,  January  1980  61 

"Meet  the  Press"  Interview  (Carter)  . .  .  .29 

Meeting  the  Challenge  in  Southwest  Asia 
(Vance) 35 

"New  York  Times"  Interview  (Vance)   .  .37 

President  Carter's  News  Conference,  Feb- 
ruary 13  (excerpts)   C 

Soviets  Veto  Sanctions  Against  Iran 
(White  House  Statement) 60 

U.S.  Files  Brief  With  ICJ  in  Iran  Hostage 
Case 60 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean.  Assist- 
ance to  the  Caribbean,  Central  America 
(Christopher,  message  to  the  Con- 
gress)   66 

Middle  East 

Chronology,  January  1980 72 

"New  York  Times"  Interview  (Vance)   .  .37 

Military  Affairs 

National  Security  Goals  (Carter)  A 

President  Carter's  News  Conference,  Feb- 
ruary 13  (excerpts)   C 

Nuclear  Policy.  IAEA  Conference  Held  in 
India  (Smith) 62 

Pakistan 

Interview  for  NBC  News 32 

Meeting  the  Challenge  in  Southwest  Asia 
(Vance) 35 

Security  Relations  with  Pakistan  (Christo- 
pher, joint  statement) 65 

Population.  FY  1981  Development  Assist- 
ance Programs  (Ehrlich) 53 

Presidential  Documents 

Assistance  to  the  Caribbean,  Central 
America  (Christopher,  message  to  the 
Congress) 66 

Customs  Valuation  Agreement  (letter  to 
House  Speaker  O'Neill  and  Senate  Presi- 
dent Mondale) 49 

Hostages  in  Iran,  Invasion  of  Afghanistan 
(Carter) 33 

Interview  for  NBC  News 32 

"Meet  the  Press"  Interview  (Carter) ...  .29 

National  Security  Goals  (Carter)  A 

President  Carter's  News  Conference,  Feb- 
ruary 13  (excerpts)   C 

Suspension  of  Agricultural  Exports  to  the 
U. S.S.R.  (Cooper,  memorandums  for  the 


Secretaries  of  Commerce  and  Agricul- 
ture, letter  to  Speaker  O'Neill  and  Sen- 
ate President  Mondale) 45 

Technology  Transfers  to  the  U. S.S.R. 
(Memorandums  for  the  Secretaries  of 
Commerce,  State,  and  Defense) 52 

Publications 74 

Saudi  Arabia.  Munitions  Sales  to  Saudi 
Arabia  (Benson)  . . . . ; 63 

Science  and  Technology 

Technology  Transfers  to  the  U. S.S.R. 
(memorandums  for  the  Secretaries  of 
Commerce,  State,  and  Defense) 52 

U.S. -China  Discuss  Sale  of  Military  Tech- 
nology (Defense  Department  state- 
ment)   45 

Security  Assistance 

Export  of  Fighter  Aircraft  (Department 
statement) 64 

FY  1981  Foreign  Assistance  Programs 
(Vance) 40 

Munitions  Sales  to  Saudi  Arabia  (Ben- 
son)    63 

Security  Relations  With  Pakistan  (Christo- 
pher, joint  statement) 65 

Terrorism 

Hostages  in  Iran,  Invasion  of  Afghanistan 
(Carter) 33 

Interview  for  NBC  News 32 

Iran  Chronology,  January  1980 61 

Trade 

Customs  Valuation  Agreement  (letter  to 
House  Speaker  O'Neill  and  Senate  Presi- 
dent Mondale) 49 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 70 

U.S.S.R. 

Allies  Support  U.S.  Embargo  (Department 
statement) 49 

Hermitage  Exhibit  Canceled  (Department 
statement) 52 

Hostages  in  Iran,  Invasion  of  Afghanistan 
(Carter) 33 

"Meet  the  Press"  Interview  (Carter) 29 

Meeting  the  Challenge  in  Southwest  Asia 
(Vance) 35 

National  Security  Goals  (Carter)  A 

"New  York  Times"  Interview  (Vance)   .  .37 

Nobel  Laureate  Sakharov  Exiled  (White 
House  statement)  59 

President  Carter's  News  Conference,  Feb- 
ruary 13  (excerpts)   C 

Soviet  Veto  Sanctions  Against  Iran  (White 
House  statement)  60 

Summer  Olympics  in  Moscow  (Carter, 
Christopher  statement) 50 

Suspension  of  Agricultural  Exports  to  the 
U.S.S.R.  (Cooper,  memorandums  for  the 
Secretaries  of  Commerce  and  Agricul- 
ture, letter  to  Speaker  O'Neill  and  Sen- 
ate President  Mondale) 45 

Technology  Transfers  to  the  U.S.S.R 
(memorandums  for  the  Secretaries  of 
Commerce,  State,  and  Defense) 52 

U.S.  Favors  Transfer  of  Summer  Olympics 
(Vance) 50 

United  Nations 

Iran  Chronology,  January  1980 61 

Soviets  Veto  Sanctions  Against  Iran 
(White  House  statement) 60 

Yugoslavia.  President  Carter's  News 
Conference,  February  13  (excerpts)  ...C 

Name  Index 

Benson,  Lucy  Wilson 63 

Carter,  President  29,  32,  33, 

45,  51,  52,  66 

Christopher,  Warren 49,  65,  66 

Colbert,  Evelyn 43 

Cooper,  Richard  N 45 

Ehrlich,  Thomas  53 

Smith,  Gerard  C  62 

Vance,  Secretary 35,  37,  40,  49 


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